The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1971 [1st ed.] 9783030561819, 9783030561826

Citation preview

The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1971 Brandon Friedman

The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1971

Brandon Friedman

The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1971

Brandon Friedman The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies (MDC) Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv, Israel

ISBN 978-3-030-56181-9    ISBN 978-3-030-56182-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56182-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Christine Osborne Pictures / Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

This book would not have been possible without the guidance and support of my doctoral supervisors, Professor David Menashri and Professor Uzi Rabi. I owe a debt of immense gratitude to them for everything they have done for me. I would also like to pay tribute to Professor Joseph Kostiner (of blessed memory), whose influence on my work is like a finger-­ sketch in the dust: its faint outline is not always visible, but it is always there. I am also deeply indebted to my teachers, who generously shared their knowledge and scholarship with me over the years: Professor Meir Litvak, Professor Eyal Zisser, Dr. Paul Rivlin, Professor Bruce Maddy-­ Weitzman, Professor Ofra Bengio, and Professor David Yeroushalmi. I would also like to thank former directors of the Moshe Dayan Center (MDC)—Professor Asher Susser, Professor Itamar Rabinovich, and Professor Shimon Shamir—for their scholarly example, support, and encouragement. Tel Aviv University provided me with the enormous privilege and opportunity to pursue a doctorate and later to become a member of the faculty. This would not have happened without the institutional support of the Moshe Dayan Center (MDC) for Middle Eastern and African Studies, the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies, the Department of Middle Eastern and African History, and the Zvi Yavetz Graduate School of Historical Studies. Collectively, these institutions have provided me with a home for the past fifteen years. I am grateful for the generosity, warmth, guidance, and assistance of a special group of accomplished scholars and

v

vi 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

administrators. I would like to particularly thank the MDC’s Efrat Shulman-Arad for her professionalism and support in recent years. I was fortunate to begin my graduate studies when the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies was being established by Professor David Menashri. I am grateful to the Alliance Center’s principal donors—Lord David Alliance, and David and Laura Merage—whose generosity made my doctorate possible. I would also like to acknowledge the Mieczyslaw Wejc Memorial Doctoral Fellowship, which provided a substantial portion of the annual funding that allowed me to complete my graduate studies. My thanks to the editorial team at Palgrave Macmillan. Molly Beck commissioned this work, and Sam Stocker has been a patient and responsive editorial guide. I am particularly grateful to Ms. Beck for efficiently shepherding the manuscript through the review process during the uncertainty of the coronavirus outbreak. My thanks as well to the anonymous reviewer for the constructive criticism and feedback, which I believe has improved the final manuscript. Of course, all shortcomings and errors are entirely my own. I would also like to thank Taylor & Francis and the Editors of Middle Eastern Studies, Saul Kelly and Helen Kedourie. This book is derived, in part, from an article, “From union (ʾittihad) to united (muttahida): the United Arab Emirates, a success born of failure,” published in a special issue of Middle Eastern Studies, “From Aden to Abu Dhabi—Britain and State Formation in Arabia, 1962–1971: A Retrospective,” in November 2016, and edited by the late Sylvia Kedourie. I would like to warmly thank Professor Clive Jones of Durham University’s School of Government and International Affairs for inviting me to participate in the workshop “Aden and South Arabia: A Retrospective Study in the Failure of State Creation” at Durham University in January 2015, which led to the publication of the abovementioned article in a special edition of Middle Eastern Studies. Elizabeth Michael, my “Oma,” and my late grandmother, Josephine Friedman, encouraged and supported my decision to leave a secure career and go to graduate school. I must especially remember my Oma, a survivor if there ever was one. She taught me a great many things about life, including the meaning of my Jewish identity, the value of education, and the necessity of persistence, perseverance, and sacrifice. She passed away as I was in the final stages of preparing this manuscript, and I deeply regret that I will not be able to share this book with her.

 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

vii

My wife, Magnenia Kabada, has brought immeasurable joy into my life since we met. Our boys, Yoav and Rem, have endured my absentminded preoccupation with this book with indefatigable indifference. My love for them is boundless. Finally, this book is dedicated to my parents, David and Shlomit Friedman, for their unconditional love and support. I am eternally grateful.

A Note on Transliteration

The U.S.  Library of Congress table of Romanization was used to transliterate Arabic words into English throughout this monograph. For names of people, I also used the Library of Congress Romanization table; however, I did not include diacritical marks for long vowels or velarized consonants. For commonly used names and places I relied on the wordlist provided by the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES). So rather than Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāsir, I used IJMES’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, rather than using King Faisal, as recommended by IJMES, I elected to use King Faysal. For the names of places, I relied on IJMES or the most common English language usage. So, for example, rather than (al-­Kuwayt), I used Kuwait.

ix

Contents

1 Introduction  1 2 The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf 19 3 One Step Forward, One Step Back 51 4 Iran: The British Successor in the Gulf? 83 5 Nixon, the Shah, and King Faysal113 6 Iran Shifting Gears139 7 From Crisis to Clarity163 8 A Sea Change in the Middle East and the Gulf195 9 Grandeur and Independence223

xi

xii 

CONTENTS

10 Conclusion255 Bibliography263 Index275

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This book is organized around one simple question: how did the rulers (hukām, singular: hakı̄m) along the Persian Gulf1 littoral respond to the British decision to withdraw their military from the region in 1968? The British ended 150 years of military supremacy in the Gulf between 1968 and 1971;2 this is a history of the rulers’ competition for power and prestige during those four years. More specifically, this book argues against the claim that “Pax Britannica gave way to Pax Iranica” in the Gulf.3 This work challenges the argument that the post-British vacuum was filled by Iranian primacy. There was no legitimate successor to the British in Gulf and its withdrawal led to an increasingly destabilizing rivalry between Iran and Iraq. While the Nixon Doctrine supported Iranian primacy as a proxy for U.S. power in the Gulf, Iran’s pretension of filling the vacuum and 1  The name of the Gulf is a politically contested term, which has been the subject of dispute between Persians and Arabs of the region. This monograph will use “Persian Gulf,” the most common usage in English. In some instances, the term “Gulf” will be used for the sake of brevity and without political intent. See Lawrence G. Potter, ed., The Persian Gulf in History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 15–16. 2  Uzi Rabi, “British Possessions in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Arabia,” in Zach Levey and Elie Podeh (eds.), Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner (Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2008), pp. 264–280. 3  Faisal bin Salman al-Saud, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Power Politics in Transition 1968–1971 (London, I.B. Tauris, 2003), p. 129.

© The Author(s) 2020 B. Friedman, The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1971, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56182-6_1

1

2 

B. FRIEDMAN

replacing the British at the end of 1971 was not accepted by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, or the Arab rulers of the lower Gulf emirates. The U.S., during the last year of Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration, adopted a British-inspired policy that became popularly known as a “twin pillars” policy in the region, which meant leaning on a condominium of Iranian and Saudi power to safeguard U.S. interests in the Gulf.4 During the first two years of the Nixon administration, this policy remained in place. In practice, the U.S. under President Richard Nixon viewed Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi as a “safe bet,” and Saudi Arabia as a “long-term liability,”5 when it came to protecting U.S. interests in the Gulf. However, it was not until November 7, 1970, that official U.S. policy began to tilt towards promoting Iranian primacy in the Gulf.6 Nevertheless, just because “the United States embraced Iran as the paramount power in the Gulf after the British completed their withdrawal in 1971,”7 it did not mean that the rulers in the Gulf viewed it as a legitimate arrangement. The British system was accepted for more than a century in the Gulf not merely because the British were the dominant military power in the region. The balance of power mattered, but so did the framework within which the British exercised their power. The British were viewed as legitimate arbiters of regional security because, on the whole, they avoided interfering in how the rulers exercised their local authority. The search for a new framework for regional politics was not simply a matter of which ruler would amass enough military power to fill the void left by the British, it was also a matter of the rulers coming to a shared understanding of when and how the exercise of power would be viewed as legitimate. This book is the story of how and what shaped the rulers’ ideas and actions about what constituted the legitimate exercise of power in the absence of a British system that separated the Iranian and Arab sides of the Gulf from 4  Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 29–37. “Twin pillars” was not a term that was used by U.S. or British officials during this period. It became popularized later and widely accepted in U.S. policy circles following Richard Haas’ 1981 article: Richard Haas, “Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Twin Pillars in Revolutionary Times,” in The Security of the Persian Gulf (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), Hossein Amirsadeghi, ed., pp. 151–169. 5  Roham Alvandi, “Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf,” Diplomatic History 36:2 (2012), 357. 6  Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 54–55. 7  Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 5.

1 INTRODUCTION 

3

one another. Some might argue that little happened between 1968 and 1971. However, an overemphasis on events runs the risk of overlooking crucial changes in beliefs, ideas, and interactions between the primary actors in history and how those beliefs in turn shaped the system in which they acted. In the aftermath of the Baʿth revolution in Iraq in July 1968, the decade-long regional rivalry between Iran and Iraq rapidly escalated. This rivalry pitted Imperial Iranian nationalism against Iraq’s revolutionary Arab nationalism, creating a cycle of mutually reinforcing hostility. The narrative presented here shows how Saudi Arabia and the ruling shaykhs of the lower Gulf attempted to navigate the intensifying rivalry between Iranian nationalism and revolutionary Arab nationalism, particularly after the death of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970. In a narrow sense, then, this monograph focuses on how the rulers viewed and pursued their respective interests—security, power, wealth, honor, and prestige—in order to preserve and protect their dynastic regimes. Yet, the core argument in this book is that political relationships between the rulers in the Gulf, on both sides, Arab and Iranian, were tightly interconnected.8 The book will describe these interconnections and explain the effects of British withdrawal on them.

Shaykhly Authority During most of the nineteenth century and more than half of the twentieth century, Great Britain was the “arbiter and guardian of the Gulf.”9 From the perspectives of the ruling Arab shaykhs, by accepting this “culturally sanctioned” role as arbiter and protector, the British Resident was the Gulf’s paramount ruler in the shaykhly system of authority and known as Chief of the Gulf (raʾis al-khalij).10 The British referred to this arrangement as the “Trucial system,” in reference to the series of treaty arrangements that Great Britain entered into with the various ruling shaykhs in the Gulf between 1835 and 1916. 8  For a theoretical explanation of the concept of interconnections in a system, see: Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 6. 9  James Onley, “The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the Nineteenth Century,” New Arabian Studies, Vol. 6 (2004), 30–92, here 75. 10  James Onley, ‘The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the Nineteenth Century’, New Arabian Studies, Vol. 6 (2004), 30–92, here 32.

4 

B. FRIEDMAN

In the nineteenth century, the British transformed the Gulf into a “British lake” by entering into a series of treaties with the ruling shaykhs of the Arab littoral that were meant to pacify Gulf waters for the safe passage of British merchant vessels. The British intended to end the tribal warfare and sea-raiding that had erupted in Gulf waters and threatened the security of British trade in the early nineteenth century. In 1820, the ruling shaykhs of the Omani coast (what is the present-day United Arab Emirates) signed a peace agreement with the British. Bahrain asked to be admitted to the treaty in order to avoid paying maritime tolls.11 At that time the British considered Qatar to be a Bahraini dependency and Kuwait under Ottoman suzerainty and so they were not included in the treaty. In 1835 the ruling shaykhs of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, and the Qasimi Empire12 and the British upgraded the 1820 treaty to a “Maritime Truce,” made perpetual in 1853 (Bahrain joined in 1861), which outlawed warfare at sea in the Gulf and made Great Britain the ultimate arbiter of disputes in the Gulf. The British began to refer to these shaykhdoms as the “Trucial States” and to the Omani coast as the “Trucial Coast.” In 1892, the ruling shaykhs entered into a new agreement with the British government which constituted the basis for Britain’s special relationship with the Arab rulers in the Gulf until 1971.13 The shaykhs, in exchange for protection from external threats, agreed not to have relations with, or cede territory to, any outside power other than Great Britain. The British interpreted these agreements as mandates

11  Except where otherwise noted with a separate footnote, this account of the British treaties in the Gulf is based on James Onley, “The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the Nineteenth Century,” New Arabian Studies, Vol. 6, pp. 30–92. 12  The Qasimi Empire included territory on both sides of the Gulf waters: Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah, Rams, Dibba, Khor Fakkan, Fujairah, Kalba, Mughu, Lingah, and Qeshm Island. 13  The nature of this relationship was unique in the British Empire. Its scope, meaning, and impact have been debated in the historical literature on the British Empire, and are best summarized in Onley, “The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the Nineteenth Century,” and Glen Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire in the Middle East (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 98–105. For an alternative view, see: Abdel Razzaq Takriti, Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans, and Empires in Oman, 1965–1976 (Oxford University Press, 2015); and, Abdel Razzaq Takriti, “Colonial Coups and the Wars on Popular Sovereignty,” American Historical Review 124:3 (June 2019), 878–909.

1 INTRODUCTION 

5

for control over the shaykhdoms’ external affairs.14 Bahrain signed such an agreement in 1880, and the Shaykh of Kuwait signed a similar agreement in 1899 (which was terminated in 1961 with Kuwaiti independence). In 1916, Qatar’s independence from Bahrain was acknowledged by the British and the Shaykh of Qatar entered into an exclusive agreement with Britain. While these treaties provided Britain exclusivity and safety in the Gulf, they also guaranteed the shaykhs an important source of their authority and legitimacy, providing them with a perpetual means to fulfill two of their principal obligations to their peoples—maintaining order and providing protection from external threats. And what is important for the purposes of this study is that British protection made the shaykhs’ authority much less frail than in the past. The ruling shaykhs used British protection as an extension of their own power. During the nineteenth century, the shaykhs and their families transformed themselves into the established vehicle through which the British protection from external threats was implemented. In most cases this relationship with the British enhanced the status of the ruling families and as a result they became less vulnerable to internal threats with the exception of intrafamilial challenges.15 Therefore, by virtue of the British treaties, Al Nahyan of the Al Bu Falah clan cemented the supremacy established by Zayid bin Khalifah (1855–1909) in Abu Dhabi, while their cousins and bitter rivals, the Al Maktum of the Al Bu Falasah used British protection to establish a lucrative transit trade in Dubai which traversed the Gulf and Indian Ocean. Shaykh Mubarak Al Sabah of Kuwait used the treaty with the British to outmaneuver an Ottoman bid for control of Kuwait’s strategic port, as well as to cement Al Sabah ascendancy over the other prominent merchant families of Kuwait. The Al Thani of Qatar, caught between the Al Khalifah of Bahrain and Ottoman suzerainty at the beginning of the twentieth century, was able to parlay British recognition into independent power.16 14  Peter Lienhardt, Sheikhdoms of Eastern Arabia (London: Palgrave, 2001), edited by Ahmad Al-Shahi, p. 3. 15  James Onley, “The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the Nineteenth Century,” New Arabian Studies, Vol. 6, p. 66. 16  J.E. Peterson, “Historical Pattern of Gulf Security,” in Security in the Persian Gulf (New York: Palgrave, 2002), edited by Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, pp. 7–31; Jill Crystal, Oil and politics in the Gulf: Rulers and merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge University Press, 1990).

6 

B. FRIEDMAN

The treaties ironically also protected the rapidly deteriorating fortunes of the Al Qawasim in Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. After all, it was the Al Qawasim sea-raids (gharat) of merchant ships in the Gulf that prompted the British to put an end to what they deemed piracy (qarsana).17 In 1819–1820 the British launched a full-scale naval expedition from Bombay that wiped out hundreds of Qasimi vessels along 322 kilometers (200 miles) of the littoral, which the British had named the “Pirate Coast.” While the British gunboats and subsequent treaties ended a profitable maritime raiding enterprise for the Qasimi shaykhs of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, leading to their decline, the British guarantee of protection also prevented the Qasimi rulers from being absorbed by larger, more powerful neighbors in Abu Dhabi, Muscat, and Oman. The British relationship with the ruling shaykhs, until the announcement of withdrawal, eliminated threats to British maritime interests in the Gulf; provided a form of protection and power to the existing ruling shaykhs; and limited the expansion of both Iran into the Gulf waters and the Al Saʿud conquests from the Arabian interior to the Gulf coast. As James Onley outlined, the British were socialized to function as the paramount shaykh in a shaykhly system,18 and, in 1968, it was not clear how the system of shaykhly sovereignty would survive without the British.

Historiography and Sources The long British presence in the Gulf and its decision to withdraw from the region have been the focus of a considerable amount of research. In addition to the well-developed historiography on British role in the Gulf, scholars have focused their research on one of four main areas: First, Cold War diplomatic histories that attempt to explain the relations between the great powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union—and the Gulf’s leading actors; second, case studies of the foreign policy of one of the Gulf states covering several decades; third, the history of state-formation in the Gulf, primarily related to the formation of the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar in 1971; and, fourth, the history of territorial claims in the Gulf, usually with the aim of building a historical or legal case for one side or the other in the dispute.  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 36. 18  James Onley, “The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the Nineteenth Century,” New Arabian Studies, Vol. 6, pp. 30–92. 17

1 INTRODUCTION 

7

So why yet another study on British withdrawal? This history, presented in a chronological framework, makes the regional politics the object of analysis. In so doing, it bridges the gap between the Cold War or End of Empire histories focused on great power dynamics and the more narrowly focused state formation and foreign policy literature that view these issues through the prism of one specific actor.19 Several scholars have examined the impact of British withdrawal from the perspective of British imperial politics and policy but these studies have minimized the regional issues related to Gulf politics, focusing instead on the British Empire.20 British imperial history has re-emerged in recent years in a variety of forms, including subaltern and postcolonial scholarship.21 This literature informed this work with respect to the British influence on the social and political processes in the region, but it does not address the changes in the regional political interactions that took place between the rulers in the Gulf following the British announcement in 1968. Abdel Razzaq Takriti’s recent revisionist scholarship is an important exception; nevertheless, Takriti focuses on re-characterizing the nature of the 19  Two relatively new works edited by Lawrence G. Potter address the Gulf as a regional unit, but these books are generally focused on sub-state groups, networks, and localities as the objects of analysis. See: Lawrence G. Potter, ed., The Persian Gulf in History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); and, Lawrence G. Potter, ed., The Persian Gulf in Modern Times (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 20  For example, see: Glen Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain’s Relinquishment of Power in Her Last Three Dependencies (Cambridge, 1991); Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2002); William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization: Collected Essays (London, New  York: I.B.Tauris, 2006); Miriam Joyce, Ruling Shaikhs and Her Majesty’s Government, and Kuwait, 1960–1969: An AngloAmerican Perspective (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Simon Smith, Britain’s Revival and Fall in the Gulf (London and New  York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); Shohei Sato, “Britain’s Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf, 1964–68: A Pattern and a Puzzle,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 37:1 (2009), 99–117; Simon S.  Smith, Ending Empire in the Middle East: Britain, the United States and Post-war Decolonization, 1945–73 (London: Routledge, 2012); Helene von Bismarck, British Policy in the Persian Gulf, 1961–1968: Conceptions of Informal Empire (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Simon C. Smith, Britain’s Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf: A Pattern Not a Puzzle,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 44: 2 (2016), 328–351; Shohei Sato, Britain and the formation of the Gulf States: Embers of Empire (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2016). 21  Yoav Alon, “The Historiography of Empire, The Literature on Britain in Middle East” in Zach Levey and Elie Podeh (eds.), Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner (Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2008), pp. 23–47.

8 

B. FRIEDMAN

relationship between imperial actors and local rulers, rather than on the dynamics between the rulers themselves.22 Other scholars have examined American relations with the Gulf States during this period, but these studies focused on American security and alliance considerations with a particular emphasis on the Cold War.23 Tore Petersen’s The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East, 1961–1969 and W. Taylor Fain’s American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region provide detailed diplomatic histories of the Anglo-American role in Gulf events during this period. Fain analyzes U.S. and British policies and relations during the period leading up to and following the British withdrawal. Fain’s study is based on a careful reading of the British and American national archives, but his focus is on American-British relations.24 His work sheds light on British-American policy discussions and is less concerned with the unfolding regional events reported in the diplomatic cables from the British and American officials based in the embassies and consulates in the Gulf. Petersen’s The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East, 1961–1969, which was published two years before Fain’s book, is a continuation of an earlier work focusing on the 1950s.25 In The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East, Petersen covers the 1960s and he takes up the Nixon years in still another volume.26 Both Peterson and 22  Abdel Razzaq Takriti, Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans, and Empires in Oman, 1965–1976 (Oxford University Press, 2015); Abdel Razzaq Takriti, “Colonial Coups and the Wars on Popular Sovereignty,” American Historical Review 124:3 (June 2019), 878–909. Takriti’s work should be seen as advancing themes first outlined in Khaldoun Hasan Al-Naqeeb, Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula, translated by L.M.  Kenny (London: Routledge, 1990). 23  For example, see: James Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Rachel Bronson, Thicker Than Oil : America’s uneasy partnership with Saudi Arabia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), and Richard Cottam, Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988); Tore Petersen, The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East, 1961–1969: A Willing Retreat (Eastbourne:  Sussex Academic Press, 2006); W. Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Jeffrey R. Macris, The Politics and Security of the Gulf (New York: Routledge, 2009). 24  See Fain, pp. 175–180. 25  Tore Petersen, The Middle East Between the Great Powers: Anglo-American Conflict and Cooperation, 1952–1957 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000). 26  Tore Petersen, Richard Nixon, Great Britain and the Anglo-American Alignment in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula: Making Allies out of Clients (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2009).

1 INTRODUCTION 

9

Fain were focused on the Anglo-American story in the Gulf, unlike this monograph, which makes the regional actors, rather than the great powers, the objects of analysis. The scholarship that has related to regional actors in the Gulf during this period has focused on either the security of one particular state in the region, or, in some cases, bilateral relations between two states of the region rather than the effect of regional interaction. These studies generally cover several decades and therefore devote scant attention to the political changes that take place during the four years of British withdrawal, between 1968 and 1971. There are several empirically rich and informative studies of post–World War II Iranian foreign policy that have analyzed the impact of the British withdrawal from the Gulf.27 Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih’s The Foreign Relations of Iran and R.K. Ramazani’s Iran’s Foreign Policy, 1941–1973 and The Persian Gulf, Iran’s Role provide three important contributions to the literature on Iranian foreign policy for the period under discussion in this study. Yet these works focus on analyzing the change in Iran’s foreign policy over broad periods of time. As a result, only fleeting attention is devoted to the important changes that affected Iran and its Gulf neighbors between 1968 and 1971 following the British announcement. Further, since these studies were written in the 1970s, they do not include documents from the British and American national archives, which are only released after 30 and 25 years, respectively. There are also several important works on Saudi security and foreign policy, which similarly focus on the evolution of Saudi policies over broad periods of time rather than explaining changes over time during the narrow period of British withdrawal from the Gulf.28 Laurie Mylroie’s ­unpublished doctoral thesis is an important exception, but, in contrast to 27  Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran: A developing state in a zone of great-power conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Ruhoullah Karegar Ramazani, The Persian Gulf: Iran’s Role (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972); R.K. Ramazani, Iran’s Foreign Policy, 1941–1973 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975). 28  For example, see: Nizar Obaid Madani, The Islamic content of the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia. King Faisal’s call for Islamic solidarity, 1965–1975, (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, The American University, Washington, D.C., 1977); Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985); Ghassan Salamé, al-Siyasa al-Kharijiya al-Saʿudiya mundu 1945 [Saudi foreign policy since 1945](Beirut: Ma’had al’Inma al-‘Arabi, 1980).

10 

B. FRIEDMAN

this study, the period 1968–1971 constitutes only one chapter in her broader monograph.29 Perhaps the work that comes closest to placing the analytic focus exclusively on the intra-Gulf political dynamics was J.B. Kelly’s Arabia, the Gulf, and the West, which was published in 1980.30 Kelly and Mylroie’s works, given when they were written and published, do not include important declassified documents from the British and American national archives. Two important studies of bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran touch on many of the issues in this monograph, but have ignored important events of the period that were peripheral to this bilateral relationship.31 Saeed Badeeb’s work covers Saudi-Iranian relations across a broad period of time (1932–1982) and glosses over the important changes that took place during the period of British withdrawal. On the other hand, Faisal bin Salman al-Saud’s book, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf, is an important contribution because it is one of the few existing studies that provides a historical narrative of the period of British withdrawal from a regional perspective. Yet despite the book’s title, its analytic focus is narrow: it describes Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the international powers, and there is no attempt to explain the nature of regional interactions in the Gulf beyond the Iranian-Saudi framework. Al-Saud’s book is based on documents from the British, American, and Saudi archives. It is the only existing English-language scholarly work addressing this period that makes use of documents from the Royal Saudi Archive, and, as such, is an invaluable resource. On the other hand, al-Saud’s use of the British and American documents often appears limited to cabinet-level documents at the expense of documents generated by officials serving in the regional embassies and consulates in the Gulf. There is a rich and detailed literature on the history and politics of specific territorial and border disputes in the Gulf during this period. Many of these books and articles are intended to make a historical or legal case for one side or another’s claim in a long-standing territorial dispute, and often fail to explain how these issues were affected by the broader political 29  Laurie Mylroie, Regional Security After Empire: Saudi Arabia and the Gulf (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 1985) 30  J.B. Kelly, Arabia the Gulf and the West (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1980). 31  Saeed M. Badeeb, Saudi-Iranian Relations, 1932–1982 (London: Centre for Arab and Iranian Studies, 1993); Faisal bin Salman al-Saud, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Power Politics in Transition 1968–1971 (London, I.B. Tauris, 2003).

1 INTRODUCTION 

11

context during this specific time period.32 Important exceptions, however, to this general appraisal of the literature on the boundary disputes includes the work of British scholar Richard Schofield, as well as several others.33 There are also several important works that address state formation in the Gulf. These works, however, have limited their discussions to how state formation was affected by regional interactions in the Gulf during this period. The regional dynamics are not fully developed.34

32  For example, see: Hooshang Amirahmadi, ed., Small Islands, Big Politics: The Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Gulf (London: Macmillan, 1996); Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf, A Maritime Political Geography (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999). The title of Thomas Mattair’s The Three Occupied UAE Islands (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2005) also reflects this phenomenon. See, also: Koroush Ahmadi, Islands and International Politics in the Persian Gulf (Routledge, 2008). 33  See, for example: Richard Schofield, “Borders and Territoriality in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula during the Twentieth Century,” in Richard Schofield (ed.), Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States (London: UCL Press 1994/Routledge, 2016), pp.  1–77; Farhad Cyrus Sharifi-Yazdi, Arab-Iranian Rivalry in the Persian Gulf: Territorial Disputes and the Balance of Power in the Middle East (London: I.B.  Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2015) Richard Schofield, “Anything but Black and White: A Commentary on the Lower Gulf Islands Dispute,” in Security in the Persian Gulf (New York: Palgrave, 2002), edited by Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, pp. 171–187; or, Richard Schofield, “The crystallisation of a complex territorial dispute: Britain and the Saudi-Abu Dhabi borderland, 1966–1971,” Journal of Arabian Studies 1:1 (2011), pp. 27–51. See, also: John C. Wilkinson, Arabia’s Frontiers: The Story of Britain’s Boundary Drawing in the Desert (London: I.B.  Tauris, 1991); Gwenn Okruhlik and Paul Conge, “The Politics of Border Disputes: On the Arabian Peninsula,” International Journal 54/2 (1999), pp. 230–48; John Peterson, “Sovereignty and Boundaries in the Gulf States,” in Mehran Kamrava (ed.), International Politics in the Persian Gulf (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2011), pp. 21–49. 34  For example, see: John Duke Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics and Petroleum (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1975); Frauke Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition (London: Longman, 1982); Ali Mohammed Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation (Boulder and London: Westview Press and Croom Helm Ltd, 1979); Abdullah Omran Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, 1950–85 (London: Croom Helm, 1987); and, Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: A Political and Social History of the Trucial States (London: Macmillan Press, 1978); Rosemary Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

12 

B. FRIEDMAN

This book rests on a close reading of thousands of pages of declassified and unpublished records from the British35 and American36 national archives in combination with a selection of Persian- and Arabic-language media sources, and memoirs, addressing how the rulers in the Gulf reacted to the British announcement and responded to the consequences of the British decision between 1968 and 1971. The analysis in this monograph relies heavily on records generated by U.S. and British officials based in the Gulf. This research is supplemented with a selection of Persian and Arabic language media sources, and several Arabic books by journalists who covered the events during this period. There are three methodological challenges embedded in this approach. First, many of the descriptions of the words of the Gulf rulers were drawn from reports written by British and American diplomats, or Arab and Persian journalists. As a result, in some cases the words and observations of the rulers are sometimes presented through the prism of distinctly British and American voices and observations. And while this is often the best available information for a given event or meeting, the reader should be aware of this potential distortion or shortcoming from the outset. Nevertheless, after examining thousands of pages of these records and comparing them with the accounts written by Arabs and Persians from the Gulf, I believe these records are often unfairly discounted. The task of the historian is to examine the best evidence of a ruler’s words and actions and arrive at an interpretation. All sources have flaws, and it is the job of the historian to examine a large enough corpus of sources to develop a reliable filter with which to examine and, wherever possible, corroborate the material in the documents. Memoirs, as well as Arabic- and Persian-language news reports, also possess flaws, and in many instances the memoirists and the reporters were much further removed from the rulers than the British and American diplomats. Second, I did not conduct research in the Iranian, Saudi, or Emirati national archives, therefore I did not have access to documents that may shed important light on the events described and explained in this book. I hope that some future scholar of the Gulf, with access to these archives, will supplement and or adjust the record accordingly. It is worth bearing 35  The National Archives of the United Kingdom were formerly known as the Public Record Office (P.R.O.), and are located in Kew on the outskirts of London. 36  The National Archives of the United States are located in College Park, Maryland, just outside of Washington, D.C.

1 INTRODUCTION 

13

in mind that Faisal bin Salman al-Saud’s book, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf, which covered the period under discussion here, was based, in part, on material in the Royal Saudi archive. Third, my emphasis on the perceptions of the Gulf rulers, and the regional dimension of politics between 1968 and 1971, means that my story intentionally minimizes the interests and constraints of the international actors or great powers, which have been treated at length elsewhere. In contrast, this work identifies important political changes during this period from the regional perspective and highlights the importance of the historical relationships between the local polities in the Gulf.

Analytical Themes and Organization of the Book The rulers’ assumptions were a key element of this history. In many cases, these assumptions were rooted in the historical experience inherited by the dynastic families of each of the rulers. These inherited histories shaped the worldviews of the rulers and influenced their behavior and decisions. The history, as related in this monograph, consists, in large part, in tracing the influence of these assumptions on the rulers’ actions (or inaction) during the four-year period of British withdrawal from the Gulf. These assumptions form the four basic analytical themes in this book. First and most important, personal honor and status were at the heart of political survival in the region.37 This manifested itself most explicitly in the regional competition to dominate and be “first among equals.” Social organization along the western coast of the Gulf was rooted in tribal kinship, and everyone was perceived as equal. Authority and power were products of dominating equals or kin who were organized into social solidarities (khānāt), usually family-based associations, for protection.38 The weaker rulers in the Gulf, who were not in a position to compete for dominance, attempted to resist hegemony (domination) and preserve autonomy (independence of action). This socio-political mode of behavior has also been characterized within the framework of the Arabian custom of 37  James Onley and Suleyman Khalaf, “Shaikhly Authority in the Pre-oil Gulf: An Historical–Anthropological Study,” History & Anthropology, Vol. 17, No. 3 (September 2006), 201. 38  Fuad I. Khuri, Tents and Pyramids: Games and Ideology in Arab culture from Backgammon to Autocratic Rule (London: Saqi Books, 1990), p. 14; and, Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 41.

14 

B. FRIEDMAN

“protection seeking” as part of a protector-protégé relationship.39 Protection seeking and competing to be “first among equals,” based on tribal and historical rivalries, was an important dimension of the four-year negotiation process that resulted in the formation of the independent states of Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates at the end of 1971.40 Protection-seeking and competing to be “first among equals” was also an important part of the territorial conflicts that were revived during this four-year period. These conflicts included Iran’s claim to sovereignty over Bahrain; the Iran-Iraq confrontation over the border on the Shatt al-Arab waterway; Iran’s dispute with Sharjah over ownership of the island of Abu Musa and with Ras al-Khaimah over the two Tunb islands; and, Saudi Arabia’s dispute with Abu Dhabi and the British over the Buraimi Oasis. These territorial disputes have often been described in material terms that emphasize access to potential hydrocarbon resources or in historical/ legal terms outlining complex competing historical claims based on nationalist interpretations of history. Yet the material and historical/legal explanations do not adequately account for how and why these disputes re-emerged as sources of conflict when they did. Instead of a material or historical/legal approach, this study will reevaluate the territorial conflicts during this period using a contextual approach that focuses on the regional maneuvering for political dominance that emerged during the process of British military withdrawal. In the period under discussion in this monograph, 1968 through 1971, there was an important change in the regional power structure due to the British plan to withdraw their military from the region. This monograph argues that the territorial conflicts described in each chapter were a symptom of a new competition to derive power from the domination of equals and become “the first,” in the impending absence of the British.41 Second, historical mistrust and mutual suspicion between the Arab rulers of the Gulf littoral and the Shah of Iran was a major stumbling obstacle toward cooperation and coordination despite converging areas of mutual political and strategic interest between them. A Lebanese journalist who reported on the Gulf during this period noted that “the common ground  Onley & Khalaf, p. 201.  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), pp. 38–42. 41  Khuri, p. 85. 39 40

1 INTRODUCTION 

15

between all Arabs of the day—shaykhs and non-shaykh alike—was the fear of Iranian ambitions and its threat to the Arab identity of the Gulf.”42 Likewise, R.K. Ramazani, a scholar of modern Iran, noted that “divergent national-cultural ethos” and “cultural particularisms of these two ancient peoples” were part of “an Irano-Arab power conflict that dated back to the fourth century.”43 Nevertheless, this theme was not monolithic. This monograph identifies the particular circumstances in which historical Arab-Iranian mistrust appeared, and explains when and how it played a greater or lesser role in the political developments of this period. A third theme of this work is that a ruler’s personal status was also an important domestic consideration in terms of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. Mohammad Reza Shah of Iran, King Faysal of Saudi Arabia, and the ruling shaykhs on the Gulf coast all viewed the strength of their domestic authority as directly linked to their personal prestige. As a result, all of the rulers were sensitive and attentive to the impact of regional events on their personal prestige, even if the sources or formulas for legitimacy and prestige were different from ruler to ruler. For example, King Faysal, as well as other important members of the Al Saʿud, viewed the dispute with Abu Dhabi and the British over the Buraimi Oasis as having a direct impact on the prestige of the ruling family, where prestige was viewed as power based on reputation. Mohammad Reza Shah, for his part, viewed his dispute with the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah over Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands as being a question of prestige, despite persistently framing the issue strategically, in terms of securing the Strait of Hormuz. However, the Shah’s understanding of how his people viewed his prestige was in terms of reputation based on power (power taken as synonymous with military force), rather than power based on reputation.44 This work’s fourth analytic prism focuses on the legacy of the British withdrawal from the Aden Protectorate in South Arabia in 1967 on the rulers in the Gulf. The impact of the British withdrawal from Aden on the perceptions of the Gulf rulers is not sufficiently accounted for in the existing 42  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p.  57; see also, Wm. Roger Louis, “The British Withdrawal from the Gulf, 1967–1971,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2003), p. 95. 43  R.K. Ramazani, The Persian Gulf: Iran’s Role (Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1972), p. 34. 44  Harold Nicolson, The Meaning of Prestige (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937).

16 

B. FRIEDMAN

scholarly literature on the British withdrawal from the Gulf. The British made the announcement of withdrawal from the Gulf in January 1968, less than two full months after the British withdrawal from Aden was completed at the end of November 1967. From 1968 to 1971 the rulers in the Gulf were afraid that British withdrawal from the Gulf would mimic Aden and create a “power vacuum”45 that would invite violent revolutionary subversion of traditional dynastic political authority in the Gulf. Following Egypt’s defeat in the Six-Day War in June 1967, the Gulf rulers viewed Abdel Nasser’s Egypt as a diminishing revolutionary threat to the Gulf. However, they still considered Soviet support for Iraq, Syria, and South Arabia as dangerous subversive threats to the Gulf regimes after 1967. Coup d’états by military officers overthrew monarchical regimes in Sudan in May 1969, and then Libya in September 1969, and re-affirmed the Gulf rulers’ belief that they were not just tilting at windmills: the revolutionary officers in Sudan and Libya shared the same Nasserist revolutionary vision of Arab unity that the rulers in the Gulf viewed as a challenge to their position and power. In short, these four themes—the rulers maneuvering for hegemony or autonomy, Arab-Iranian mistrust, the preservation of a ruler’s prestige, and the impact of South Arabia’s revolutionary turn—were closely interconnected, suffusing the politics of this period with the qualities of a system, meaning a change or perception of change in one area impacted the outcomes in other areas. In order to demonstrate these effects, this book is organized chronologically. Following this introductory chapter, there are eight chapters. As well as a final, concluding chapter, with each of the eight narrative chapters representing six months of each year, from 1968 to 1971. The chronological organization demonstrates not only the interconnectedness of the interactions among the rulers in the Gulf, but also the effects of international and regional developments on the rulers’ perceptions and behavior. For example, the chronological approach allows us to 45  This term became part of the common parlance among diplomats and politicians in Great Britain and abroad in the 1960s, as part of the British debates on their imperial commitments East of Suez. Sir William Luce, the former Governor of Aden (1956–1960), published an article in 1967 discussing the potential for a “power vacuum” in the Gulf. See: William Luce, “Britain in the Persian Gulf,” The Round Table, Vol. 57 No. 227 (1967), p.  280. See, also: Helene von Bismarck, British Policy in the Persian Gulf, 1961–1968: Conceptions of Informal Empire (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp.  186–215; Simon Smith, “Britain’s Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf: A Pattern Not a Puzzle,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 44:2 (2016), 328–351.

1 INTRODUCTION 

17

see how the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the 1969 coup d’états in Libya and Sudan influenced attitudes and actions in the Gulf during this period. Nevertheless, this book’s primary focus is the regional politics in the Gulf, rather than international politics, which has been typically expressed in terms of the Cold War or the End of [the British] Empire interests. In short, this is a history of how the rulers in the Gulf managed their political affairs during the period of British withdrawal.

CHAPTER 2

The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf

On 8 January 1968, Shaykh ʿIsa bin Salman Al Khalifah, the ruler of Bahrain, listened to British Minister of State Goronwy Roberts tell him that the British would be withdrawing their military forces from the Gulf by 1971. According to British officials, Shaykh ʿIsa observed in response that the “Gulf was in a terrible situation and its stability was shaky.” He agreed with the British representative that now was the time for the Gulf rulers to come together, but said there were internal disputes that had proved too difficult to settle. Shaykh ʿIsa proceeded to list pre-existing regional disputes: Iraq’s claim to Kuwaiti territory, the Saudi claim on Abu Dhabi and Omani territory [including, but not limited to, the Buraimi Oasis], Iran’s claim on Bahrain, as well as disputes between Bahrain and Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and Dubai and Sharjah. He said the Gulf rulers were no-nearer to cooperation now. He said that rather than cooperate, he expected his fellow ruling shaykhs to attempt to make alliances with larger powers. Once Britain left there would be no stability he emphasized, and again expressed his deep regret regarding the British decision.1 The future political status of the shaykhdoms raised fundamental questions regarding how Gulf rulers viewed the future of Gulf politics. Iran saw Abdel Nasser’s defeat in the June 1967 Six-Day War and the British decision to withdraw in January 1968 as an opportunity to assert Iran’s longstanding ambition to be the dominant power in the Gulf, without  British National Archives (BNA): “Note of a Meeting Held at Rifa’a Palace,” Bahrain, on Monday, 8 January, 1968, FO 1016/753. 1

© The Author(s) 2020 B. Friedman, The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1971, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56182-6_2

19

20 

B. FRIEDMAN

Egypt’s interference or external mediation from the superpowers. Iran’s posturing during this period of withdrawal was that of a regional power, and it sought such recognition from its neighbors in exchange for recognition of their political sovereignty. This point suggests that as important as bilateral diplomatic cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran was to U.S. and Britain, it was only one piece of the political puzzle in the Gulf during this period. Bahrain primarily looked to Saudi Arabia for support vis-a-vis Iran’s historical claim, while Kuwait sought to play Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia off one another. Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi and Ahmad of Qatar were attempting to parlay their oil wealth into a leadership sphere in the lower Gulf, while the rulers of Dubai and the five smaller shaykhdoms were concerned with maintaining their political autonomy. Preserving independence and resisting domination, as well as historical territorial and tribal disputes, contributed to the shaykhs’ longstanding reluctance to cooperate and coordinate with one another in early 1968. These feelings of historical mistrust between neighbors fueled broader concerns that British military withdrawal would lead to a power vacuum in the region. The legacy of British withdrawal from Aden Protectorate in 1967 cast a long shadow over the statements and actions of Gulf rulers during this period.2 The Saudi fear, shared by the Shah and other rulers, was that a revolutionary takeover would be repeated in Oman,3 and from there spread to the other littoral shaykhdoms and perhaps even to Saudi Arabia itself. Both the Shah and King Faysal feared a scenario where Arab revolutionaries would control the Musandam Peninsula bordering the Gulf shipping lanes in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran and Saudi Arabia, whose economies were dependent on oil revenues, regarded the secure traffic of oil through the Strait of Hormuz as a vital element of regional and regime stability and security. This chapter demonstrates that regional concerns were deeply interconnected: they encompassed immediate material, 2  For background on the British withdrawal from Aden, see: Glen Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire in the Middle East (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 49–95; and, J.B. Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf, and the West (New York, Basic Books, 1980), pp. 1–46; Jonathan Walker, Aden Insurgency (Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount Limited, 2005); For background on the NLF’s rise to power, see: Joseph Kostiner, The Struggle for South Yemen (London: Croom & Helm, 1984); and, Robert Stookey, South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982). 3  For background on the rebellion in Dhofar, see: J.E. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies: The Sultanate’s Struggle for Supremacy (London: Saqi Books, 2007).

2  THE END OF PAX BRITANNICA IN THE PERSIAN GULF 

21

strategic, and territorial interests, as well as historical sources of contention rooted in identity and elements of personal rivalry and prestige.

The British Deliver the Message of Withdrawal Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi had been the first Gulf ruler to receive British Minister of State Goronwy Roberts following the 4 January decision to withdraw British military forces from the Gulf by 1971. Roberts had been dispatched by the British government on a tour through the Gulf to inform the rulers of the British decision. In a meeting with the Shah on 7 January, Roberts said that a public announcement of withdrawal was likely to be made in the British Parliament on 16 January. The Shah, presenting a calm and composed disposition to the British emissary, confidently stated that the decision came as no surprise to him, and that he long feared that Britain would be unable to maintain its worldwide commitments indefinitely. He then “wished Britain every success in surmounting her economic difficulties.” Unsolicited, the Shah then launched into his vision of future Gulf security arrangements. These comments would set the tone for the Shah’s positions on several important security issues for the following four years. He said that he hoped to interest the Kuwaitis and Saudis in joint “police-type” naval and air cooperation, followed by a full defense agreement with Iran at a later date. He said if the Kuwaitis wanted a guarantee of Iranian military assistance in the event of an attack he would be willing to provide it. He said that at first military cooperation would be a “one-­ way” street because the Saudis and the Kuwaitis did not yet have much to offer in the way of arms, but for the time being they could look upon Iranian ships and aircraft as their own. He said Iran had no wish to convert the Persian Gulf into mare nostrum (“our sea”), and while Iran would much rather work on a cooperative basis it was prepared to go at it alone, if necessary. The Shah also expressed the desire for broad economic cooperation in the region, and envisioned establishing a regional development bank in Iran that would be available to the riparian states. The Shah said he hoped that Iraq would be able to participate in these initiatives, but the prospects were dim at present. He said he was concerned about the direction in which Iraq was heading. The Shah then pointed out the Soviet threat to the Middle East, and referred to the Soviet-Iraqi oil agreement (24 December 1967) and the possibility that vast quantities of oil would be piped from Iraq through Syria undercutting

22 

B. FRIEDMAN

Western and Eastern European markets. He said the Soviets were equipping Iraq with modern weapons and that the Soviets were “establishing a firm grip on Iraq and Syria,” and soon a “Red Crescent” might emerge. The Shah then moved to the issue of Bahrain and the disputed ownership of the lower Gulf islands of Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb. The Shah said that while it would be “politically difficult to recognize Bahrein’s [sic] independence so soon…there was absolutely no question of Iran seeking to occupy Bahrein [sic] by force” following the British departure. “Thinking aloud,” he suggested that perhaps the British could hold a referendum on Bahrain’s independence that would make it possible for Iran to publicly recognize Bahrain’s independence. He also ruminated on the possibility of Iran taking over Britain’s defense facilities in Bahrain, but later changed his mind and included Bahrain in a prospective joint Iran-Arab regional defense agreement. Regarding the disputed islands, the Shah stated he was not prepared to lose any more territory, and if the Arabs did not like it they would just have to live with it. He underscored this remark by saying that while Iran wanted cooperation, it was strong enough to “go at it alone if need be.”4 The Shah was clearly suggesting that he envisioned Iran as replacing the British as the next dominant military power in the Gulf. The Shah’s thinking, as outlined to the British Minister of State, was articulated more explicitly in the Iranian press during the following week.5 The next day, January 8, the Emir of Kuwait Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah was “stunned” by Roberts’ message and asked, “What would become of the Gulf states?”6 He said that the Kuwait government needed time to study the situation and that he was not prepared to comment “off the cuff.” In a subsequent conversation with the British official, when asked if he was still afraid of Iraq, the Emir responded by saying, “not quite as much as in the past,” but he was a little afraid of pretty well everybody nowadays.7 Later the same day, January 8, Shaykh ʿIsa of Bahrain was shocked by Roberts’ message; he said it was the last thing he expected he [Roberts] 4  BNA: “Draft Record of Conversation between Minister of State, Foreign Office and H.I.M. the Shah at the Niavarand Palace,” 7 January 1968, FO 1016/754. 5  Ayandegan, 14 January 1968; Kayhan International, 9 & 11 January 1968. 6  BNA: “Summary Record of Conversation at 11:30am on 8 January 1968 between the Minister of State in the Foreign Office, Mr. Goronwy Roberts, M.P., and His Highness the Amir of Kuwait,” 8 January 1968, FO 1017/753. 7  BNA: Kuwait to Foreign Office, 20 January 1968, FO 1016/884.

2  THE END OF PAX BRITANNICA IN THE PERSIAN GULF 

23

would say following the British reassurances they would not be going anywhere in November 1967, following the British withdrawal from South Arabia. Shaykh ʿIsa expressed concern regarding the Iranian reaction to withdrawal, and asked “who was going to replace the British in the Gulf?”8 Shaykh Ahmad bin ʿAli Al Thani of Qatar and Shaykh Rashid bin Saʿid Al-Maktum of Dubai also met with Roberts on 8 January. Shaykh Ahmad’s response was “vehement.” He responded to Roberts’ message by asking Roberts what was the point of opining on a matter that had evidently already been decided. Shaykh Rashid declared that there would be trouble in the Gulf within three years. He said the trouble would come from the communists, Baʿthists, and Arab socialist revolutionaries, starting in Bahrain. He said the outcome in the Gulf would be the same as it had been when the British left the Aden Protectorate in South Arabia, which resulted in the Soviet-supported People’s Republic of Southern Yemen at the end of 1967. Shaykh Ahmad asked that the British postpone announcing a fixed date for withdrawal and postpone the public announcement to allow the rulers to collect themselves and present it properly. He warned Roberts that the announcement would invite trouble, particularly from the Syrians. Shaykh Ahmad emphasized that the announcement was a bad mistake and should have been tackled differently. Shaykh Rashid said that Gulf was not the same as it was when Britain had first arrived. It was rich with oil now and its wealth was coveted by others. He said the “Gulf states could not exist without protection.”9 The following day, 9 January 1968, Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi appeared to receive Roberts’ message with confidence and equanimity. He said that he had always appreciated that the British presence in the Gulf was temporary. It was not the fact that the British were leaving that was important, but the manner in which they left, he claimed. He said if the British simply left they would be criticized throughout the Gulf, but if instead they “constructed” a regional system that brought the Gulf rulers

8  BNA: “Note of a Meeting Held at Rifa’a Palace,” Bahrain, on Monday, 8 January, 1968, FO 1016/753. 9  BNA: “Record of a Conversation between Mr. Goronwy Roberts, M.P., Minister of State, Foreign Office, and T.H. the Rulers of Qatar and Dubai in Dubai on 8 January 1968,” FO 1016/754.

24 

B. FRIEDMAN

together in unity, then “friendship between the British and the Gulf would never die.”10 Shaykh Zayid added that he knew the people of the Trucial States, and he knew they wanted to come together for their own improvement, but the ruler of Dubai was standing in their way. Shaykh Zayid had heard this from a deputation of leading merchants from Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah which had encouraged him to use his oil wealth to begin building up an army to protect the Trucial States. The delegation urged Zayid to go to the Sultan of Oman and offer to pay the Sultan for recruits. Further, the delegation was concerned a Saudi office was opening in Dubai. The delegation interpreted this to mean that the future protection of the Gulf lay with the Saudis by land and the Iranians by sea. Zayid said he believed the office in Dubai was purely a cultural office. But at the same time he said he was friendly with the Sultan of Oman but not the Saudis, because “the Saudi nature was different than the Gulf nature.” Zayid said he feared “the Communists for obvious reasons, next the Saudis because they were expansionist, and thirdly the Iranians because there was no relationship and no place for them in the Gulf system.”11 At this point during the meeting, Shaykh Zayid surprised the British Minister of State by extending a proposition. He said that if Britain were withdrawing its forces from the Gulf for economic reasons, he was prepared to contribute towards British military expenditures in the Gulf “in the interest of stability and peaceful development of the whole area.” In 1968, Abu Dhabi would generate $153 million in oil revenues.12 Roberts responded to Zayid’s proposal by acknowledging its importance and promising to bring it to his government’s attention.13 Later the same day, 9 January, Roberts met with the rulers of the smaller shaykhdoms of Ajman, Fujairah, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, and Umm 10  BNA: “Record of Meeting Between Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi at the Ruler’s Palace in Abu Dhabi at 12:00pm on 9 January 1968,” FO 1016/754. 11  BNA: “Record of Meeting Between Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi at the Ruler’s Palace in Abu Dhabi at 12:00pm on 9 January 1968,” FO 1016/754. 12  Fred Halliday, Arabia without Sultans (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 419. 13  BNA: “Record of Meeting Between Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi at the Ruler’s Palace in Abu Dhabi at 12:00pm on 9 January 1968,” FO 1016/754.

2  THE END OF PAX BRITANNICA IN THE PERSIAN GULF 

25

al-Qaiwain. Shaykh Saqr bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi of Ras al-Khaimah spoke on behalf of the other rulers and began by asking why Roberts had not met with all the Trucial shaykhdoms’ rulers in council. He said the Gulf rulers were one family and that this group of northern Gulf rulers was too poor to arrange their affairs for themselves. In that vein, he made four additional points: First, that the rulers were going to meet on 13 January to carefully consider the announcement and its implications; second, the Gulf rulers would contact and consult the ruler of Bahrain directly; third, the rulers wanted to know if they would continue to receive technical and other aid from Britain; and, fourth, that the rulers would continue their relationship with Britain despite the change in its status.14 The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman’s treaty relationship with the British was different than that of the Gulf shaykhs. Sultan Saʿid bin Taymur al Bu Saʿid15 did not have a special protection treaty with the British; however, the Sultan’s armed forces had 30 seconded and 40 contract British officers in a corps of 100 total officers.16 The Sultan, who resided in Dhofar’s main town of Salalah rather than the capital Muscat, had been faced with a growing rebellion in Dhofar since the late 1950s and early 1960s. The rebellion gained momentum and support from the ascension of the National Liberation Front (“NLF”) to power in South Arabia following the British withdrawal from Aden. Nevertheless, the Sultan’s posture with the British consul general regarding the news of withdrawal was “sanguine” in meetings on 13 and 20 January 1968. The Sultan said that he had been handling Omani tribes and their leaders for thirty years. Apart from a few enemies, they would back him as long as his rule was characterized by strength and tempered with kindness. The essential thing, however, if one was to command loyalty in Oman, was the appearance of strength—not kindness. “And it would be a mistake to do anything which would strike the people as out of character, and leave them wondering if 14  BNA: “Record of a conversation between Goronwy Roberts, M.P., Minister of State, Foreign Office, and H.H. The Rulers of the Northern Trucial States in Dubai on 9 January 1968,” FO 1016/754. 15  See: Uzi Rabi, The Emergence of States in a Tribal Society: Oman under Saʿid bin Taymur, 1932–1970 (Brighton, England: Sussex Press, 2006). 16  The British relationship with the Al Bu Saʿid of Muscat and Oman dated back to 1798. The British were concerned primarily with keeping competing colonial powers out of the Gulf. Culturally, it is important to note that the tribesmen of Oman tend to be either of Yemeni origin (Hinawis) and Ibadhi Muslims, or of Nizari origin (Ghafiris) who tended to be adherents of Sunni Islam.

26 

B. FRIEDMAN

his motive had been fear.”17 The Sultan emphasized he would do nothing to seek the friendship of Saudi Arabia, which had been suggested by the British consul general. He said he would seek the friendship of Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi and think carefully about closer relations with Iran. However, he said that all rulers and governments derive strength from their armed forces.18 On 10 January, Roberts met with Saudi King Faysal in Riyadh; by that time Roberts’ message was in all likelihood well known to King Faysal. The King said British military withdrawal would leave a vacuum, and while King Faysal had no ambition to “swallow up the Gulf States,” he suspected Iran’s motives with regard to Bahrain and Kuwait and its ambition for Gulf hegemony. King Faysal said that while he was on good terms with Iran and there was cooperation, he did not agree with Iran’s claims on Arab lands. When King Faysal asked Roberts to tell him how the other Gulf rulers had reacted to Roberts’ news, Roberts explained that the Shah was eager to cooperate but saw problems in connection with the Tunb islands in the Gulf. Roberts noted that King Faysal did not appear to know where the Tunb islands were located. King Faysal replied to the Shah’s position by stating that these issues would be resolved through “international procedures,” perhaps suggesting some kind of U.N. role. King Faysal mentioned that he suspected Kuwaiti ambitions “to dominate” the shaykhdoms, and asked Roberts what Britain intended to do to prevent such designs. King Faysal said that Saudi Arabia welcomed cooperation with all her neighbors and particularly those southeast from Abu Dhabi to Muscat. He said he had told these rulers they could not survive alone, and he would be happy to see Britain arrange for a confederation that allowed each to retain their internal political autonomy. Saudi Arabia was prepared to help them in these arrangements. He added that no other neighbors should harbor “ambitions,” as Saudi Arabia certainly had none. He said that he told the shaykhdoms that he would not have them even if they wanted “to amalgamate” with Saudi Arabia. King Faysal noted that if there were problems between the rulers it was due to Shaykh Zayid (Abu Dhabi) and Sultan Saʿid (Oman). Faysal did not elaborate, but it was well

17  BNA: “Sultan’s reactions to Withdrawal of British Forces from Persian Gulf,” Muscat to Bahrain, 20 January 1968, FO 1016/754. 18  BNA: “Sultan’s reactions to Withdrawal of British Forces from Persian Gulf,” Muscat to Bahrain, 20 January 1968, FO 1016/754.

2  THE END OF PAX BRITANNICA IN THE PERSIAN GULF 

27

known to the British that King Faysal was in conflict with these two rulers over disputed national borders near the Buraimi Oasis.19 King Faysal emphasized that Britain must not allow subversive groups to emerge in the Gulf the way they had emerged in Aden prior to the British withdrawal there.20 King Faysal asked that Britain postpone announcing a specific date for withdrawal which he viewed would encourage revolutionary subversion. For example, he said, “many of the jobless terrorists had been sent out of Aden and were now in Dhofar (Oman).” A public announcement of withdrawal date would cause them to stir up trouble, in Faysal’s estimation. King Faysal concluded by emphasizing the danger of announcing a specific date for withdrawal.21

An Iranian-Saudi Rift Emerges The week before Roberts’ Gulf tour, the Pakistani ambassador to Iran, Tayyeb Hussein, gave an interview to Jahangir Behrouz, the editor of the Iranian daily newspaper Ayandegan. The Pakistani ambassador was reported as saying that “Pakistan considers Bahrain a part of Iran, the Gulf as the Persian Gulf, and would not recognize Bahrain as a separate entity.”22 This Ayandegan story caused a political maelstrom when it was picked up by the BBC Arabic Service on 6 January and broadcast to the neighboring Gulf shaykhdoms.23 The Pakistani Ambassador claims his comments were taken out of context and that he did not address the issue of Bahrain’s sovereignty. The Pakistani government disavowed the Ambassador’s reported comments. However, the damage was done: The Pakistani Ambassador’s comments publicly resurrected the contentious issue of Iran’s historic claim to Bahrain at just the time when the Gulf rulers were feeling vulnerable due to the British decision to withdraw from the region.

19  BNA: “Record of Meeting Between Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia at Riyadh Airport at 12:00PM on 10 January 1968,” FO 1016/754. 20  King Faysal had delivered a similar message to the British in London in May 1967, prior to the British withdrawal from Aden and South Arabia. See: J.B. Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf, and the West (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 31. 21  Ibid.; and, BNA: “Tour of Persian Gulf,” Cypher from Minister of State Roberts in Jedda to Foreign Office in London, FO 1016/753. 22  Ayandegan, 4 January 1968; BNA: FO 08/528. 23  BNA: FO 08/528.

28 

B. FRIEDMAN

Despite the Al Khalifah conquest of Bahrain in 1782–1783, Iran never recognized the Al Khalifah sovereignty. However, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Iran did not possess the naval power necessary to expel the Al Khalifah, and was preoccupied with the more serious Russian threat on its northern border. A British colonial official noted that between 1783 and 1812, Bahrain paid a small tribute to Persia on four occasions. However, these tributes may have been paid by the Al Khalifah as part of a protection seeking mode of shaykhly behavior that did not necessarily imply an acknowledgment of Iran’s sovereign authority. At various times during the nineteenth century the Al Khalifah also paid tribute to the Wahhabi rulers of Arabia, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, Egypt, and Ottoman officials, in addition to Iran.24 The Iranian claim to sovereignty over Bahrain rests largely on several diplomatic episodes that took place between Britain and Iran during the nineteenth century, which Iran has interpreted in support of its claim on Bahrain.25 The vagaries of Iranian dispute with Britain regarding its historical claim to sovereignty over Bahrain between 1798 and 1968 are complex and rest on controversial interpretations of detailed diplomatic correspondence between Britain and Iran. Whether the Iranian claim is more or less convincing than the British version is less important, for the purpose of regional politics, than the fact that both sides continued to maintain that their own view of the issue was the correct and unassailable version of history.26 As a result, Iran’s position in 1968 was self-endowed with historical and national legitimacy supported by its insistence on sovereignty over Bahrain.27 This claim continued despite the fact that the Al Khalifah ruled Bahrain from the time of their conquest in 1782–1783. The Iranian press’ reporting of the Pakistani Ambassador’s comments in early January 1968 was obviously lingering in the minds of the Gulf 24  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 88. 25  See: J.B. Kelly, “The Persian Claim to Bahrain,” International Affairs (Royal Institute for International Affairs), Vol. 33, No. 1 (Jan. 1957); and R.K. Ramazani, The Persian Gulf: Iran’s Role (Charlottesville, Virgina: University Press of Virginia, 1972). 26  Prior to 1968, Iran’s argument was outlined in diplomatic and legal terms by Dr. Fereydun Adamiyat, Bahrein Islands: A Legal and Diplomatic Study of the British-Iranian Controversy (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1955). 27  For a detailed analytical presentation of these issues, see: Farhad Cyrus Sharifi-Yazdi, Arab-Iranian Rivalry in the Persian Gulf: Territorial Disputes and the Balance of Power in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris Ltd., 2015), pp. 57–80.

2  THE END OF PAX BRITANNICA IN THE PERSIAN GULF 

29

rulers when Roberts appeared carrying a message that encouraged regional cooperation for the future security of the region. In fact, the Emir of Kuwait raised the issue of the Pakistani Ambassador’s statement when Roberts mentioned Iran and future regional security cooperation on 8 January. In response, Roberts attempted to minimize the Kuwaiti Emir’s concerns and emphasize the Shah’s flexibility on the issue.28 The week after Roberts’ Gulf visit, on 16 January 1968, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson appeared before the British Parliament to publicly announce the British intention to withdraw all of their forces from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971. At the time of the announcement, the Bahraini ruler, Shaykh ʿIsa, was in the middle of a three-day visit (which began on 15 January) to Saudi Arabia, where he had been received as a “head of state.” On 17 January, the day after the British announcement, a joint Saudi-Bahraini press release was issued regarding the nature of the Bahraini visit to Saudi Arabia. The announcement emphasized the historical bonds between the peoples of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, stressed Saudi Arabia’s “full support” for the government of Bahrain “in every field,” and announced that a causeway would be built linking Saudi Arabia to Bahrain.29 A few days later, on 21 January 1968, a British newspaper leaked a private conversation between the Shah and the ruler of Kuwait during which the Shah was said to have assured the Kuwaiti ruler that Iran had no intention of pursuing its claim on Bahrain.30 A previously unpublished confidential U.S. diplomatic cable, which confirms the British press report, states that the Shah told the U.S. Ambassador to Tehran, Armin Meyer, “that in the strictest confidence he had conveyed to the Kuwaiti Ruler that Iran has no interest in even one centimeter of Bahrain or other Arab territory.”31

28  BNA: “Summary Record of Conversation at 11:30am on 8 January 1968 between the Minister of State in the Foreign Office, Mr. Goronwy Roberts, M.P., and His Highness the Amir of Kuwait,” 8 January 1968, FO 1017/753. 29  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Ankara to Washington, 6 February 1968, Ankara 03652 061411Z, Record Group (RG) 59; Al Riyadh, 18 January 1968—BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), 19 January 1968. 30  Observer (U.K.), 22 January 1968. 31  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 30 January 1968, Tehran 03103 302241Z, RG 59.

30 

B. FRIEDMAN

The combination of Bahraini Shaykh ʿIsa’s reception in Saudi Arabia as a head of state,32 the Saudi-Bahraini press release, and the press leak regarding the Shah’s private assurances to the ruler of Kuwait resulted in the Shah getting “very worked up” at the end of January 1968.33 The Shah told the U.S. Ambassador to Tehran, Armin Meyer, that the leak of his private conversation with the Kuwaiti ruler to the Western press made him seem like a “traitor” to his own people.34 Further, the fact that the Shah had not “confided his Bahrein [sic] policy to his top advisers” humiliated him in front of his subordinates, which to the Shah was intolerable.35 Saudi officials learned from Iranian Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi that the Shah’s visit to Saudi Arabia scheduled for 3 February 1968 might be cancelled.36 The U.S. Ambassador to Iran, Armin Meyer, in a private conversation with the Shah, explained that it was his understanding that King Faysal had “watered-down” the language of the Saudi-Bahraini communiqué “to avoid irritating the Iranians.” Further, Meyer pointed out that this dispute may not have arisen at all if the Pakistani ambassador had not made a public statement endorsing Iran’s claim to Bahrain in early January. The Shah, in response to Meyer, asked “who gave Saudi Arabia mandate over Bahrain which permits issuance of such an ‘impertinent insult’.”37 The Shah claimed that visiting Saudi Arabia after such a press release would validate its content. The Shah said that the only way he could go through with the scheduled visit to Saudi Arabia was if some kind of “remedy” was found regarding the press release. In his report, the U.S. Ambassador opined that the remedy the Shah was seeking was “some sort of explanation from Feisal that press release does not impinge on 32   U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 30 January 1968, A-284, RG 59. 33  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 30 January 1968, Tehran 03103 302241Z, RG 59. 34  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 30 January 1968, Tehran 03103 302241Z, RG 59. 35   U.S.  Department of State Airgram, Tehran to Washington, 10 February 1968, A-417, RG 59. 36  Faisal bin Salman al-Saud, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Power Politics in Transition 1968–1971 (London, I.B. Tauris, 2003), p. 33; U.S. State Department Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 1 February 1968, Jidda 02641 000830Z, RG 59. 37  U.S.  State Department Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 30 January 1968, Tehran 03103 302241Z, RG 59.

2  THE END OF PAX BRITANNICA IN THE PERSIAN GULF 

31

Iran’s dignity.” The U.S. Ambassador privately reported that he doubted “whether Feisal would be prepared to do it.”38 Iran’s public tone toward its Arab neighbors became firmer at the end of January 1968. On 27 January, the Iranian daily Kayhan reported that sources in Iran have denied that Iran’s claim on Bahrain was dropped. And on 28 January 1968, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Iran’s Prime Minister, issued a strong statement expressing Iran’s differences with Saudi Arabia with respect to Bahrain and taking issue with Kuwait’s characterization of the Gulf as Arab.39 Tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia escalated on 1 February 1968, when an Iranian naval party seized an ARAMCO drilling rig and its crew that had been ordered to begin drilling in disputed Gulf waters by Saudi Oil Minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani.40 The ARAMCO personnel were released in short order and Iran allowed ARAMCO to tow the drilling rig away.41 Whether the Iranian naval action was the result of a political decision or rather an initiative of the local naval commander is not clear from the archival records or media reports; whatever the case may be, the timing of this incident could not have been worse, coming just a day before the Shah’s scheduled state visit to Saudi Arabia. On 1 February 1968, Iranian officials, privately citing the Saudi-Bahrain communiqué as the offending provocation, informed Saudi officials that the Shah’s scheduled visit (February 2–8) to Saudi Arabia would be postponed.42 King Faysal learned of the postponed Iranian visit and the ARAMCO rig incident within hours of each other. The Shah’s postponement was taken as insult by the Saudis, and a public rift emerged between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 38  U.S.  State Department Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 30 January 1968, Tehran 03103 302241Z, RG 59. 39  Kayhan International, 27, 28 January 1968. 40  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, 7 February 1968, A-80, RG 59; and, U.S. Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 31 January 1968, Dhahra 00529 061121Z, RG 59. 41  Al-Saud, p.  142, footnote 37; BNA: British Embassy Jedda to Foreign Office, 20 February 1968, FO 8/809; U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 2 February 1968, Jidda 02666 021020Z, RG 59. 42  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Brussels to Washington, 29 January 1968, Brusse 04340 291946Z, RG 59; U.S. Department of State Telegram, Washington to Tehran, Jidda, Dhahran, 30 January 1968, 107317 RG 59; U.S. Department of State Telegram, Washington to Tehran, Jidda, Dhahran, 30 January 1968, 106834, RG 59; U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 1 February 1968, Jidda 02655 011352Z, RG 59.

32 

B. FRIEDMAN

A Regional Security Pact for the Gulf As the rift between Iran and Saudi Arabia was unfolding in February 1968, the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Dubai, and Qatar were waiting to hear from the British regarding their offer to underwrite the cost of the British military presence in the Gulf. Before they received an official answer, British Defense Minister Dennis Healey appeared on the BBC television program “Panorama” where, in response to the offer from the Gulf rulers he said he did not like the idea of “being a sort of white slaver for Arab shaikhs…I think it would be a very great mistake if we allowed ourselves to become mercenaries for people who would like to have a few British troops around.”43 On 24 January, British diplomats in the Gulf delivered messages to the Gulf rulers expressing the Defense Minister’s regret regarding the phrasing he used and assuring them that the proposal would be given serious consideration.44 Shaykh Zayid, in a meeting with the British political agent, said that London’s careful consideration was more important than the apology and that he was not angry. Nevertheless, the political agent said the Shaykh did, in fact, appear angry.45 A week later, Shaykh Zayid and the rulers of Bahrain, Dubai, and Qatar received personal visits from British diplomats informing them that it would not be practical for Britain to maintain the logistical backing required for its troops in the Gulf, even with the proposed financial contribution (£25/$60.2 million annually) from the rulers.46 In effect, the British were rejecting the rulers’ offer to pay for the cost of British troops in the region. While the Gulf shaykhs were offering to underwrite British costs, Iran was already making discreet inquiries through diplomatic channels regarding the costs, size, and equipment of Britain’s military forces in the Gulf.47 These inquiries suggest that Iran continued to view itself as Britain’s natural successor as the dominant power in the Gulf,48 and may have been  BNA: Foreign Office to Bahrain, 23 January 1968, FO 248/1651.  BNA: Abu Dhabi to Bahrain, 24 January 1968, FO 248/1651. 45  BNA: Abu Dhabi to Bahrain, 24 January 1968, FO 248/1651. 46  BNA: Bahrain to Foreign Office, 1 February 1968, FO 248/1651. 47  See, for example: BNA: Telegram no. 168, Foreign Office to Tehran Embassy, 30 January 1968, FO 1016/754. 48  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Ankara to Washington, 14 March 1968, Ankara 04429 141650Z, RG 59. 43 44

2  THE END OF PAX BRITANNICA IN THE PERSIAN GULF 

33

trying to assess what might be needed to replace British forces with comparable military assets of its own. The U.S., which had privately expressed contempt and resentment upon being informed of British withdrawal from the Gulf,49 inadvertently raised tension in the region in late January when, during a press conference, Undersecretary of State Eugene V. Rostow said that Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, and in the long run Iraq, would take responsibility for regional security in the Gulf.50 Eugene Rostow’s ill-timed suggestion of creating a Western sponsored security pact in January 1968—consistent with NATO, SEATO, ANZUS, the Balkan Pact, and CENTO (formerly the Baghdad Pact) in other regions—alarmed the Arab rulers in the Gulf. They feared that it would awaken dormant ambitions to dominate the Gulf, which British power had largely deterred throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The British recognized the problem as early as 1965 and tried to “disabuse the Shah of the idea that, if and when we ever leave the Persian Gulf, Iran can take our place: given the Arab character of the southern shores of the Persian Gulf, and pretensions of Saudi Arabia and Iraq (to say nothing of the United Arab Republic) this hope is quite illusory.”51 Rostow’s remarks were not coordinated with the British, and he may have been trying to publicly “avoid any possible erroneous impression that the USG is planning to ‘replace’ [the] British in the Gulf….”52 Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were concerned that rumors of their participation in a Western-engineered alliance along the lines of the Baghdad Pact would trigger revolutionary subversion from Arab nationalist movements in the region and revolutionary propaganda from their state supporters, such as Abdel Nasser’s Egypt and Jadid’s Syria. Therefore, the Arab rulers

49  BNA: UK Mission New York to Foreign Office, 11 January 1968; FO 248/1658; See, also: W. Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); and, Simon S. Smith, Ending Empire in the Middle East: Britain, the United States and Post-war Decolonization, 1945–1973 (London: Routledge, 2012). 50  BNA: BBC World Monitoring Service—Voice of America, 19 January 1968, FO 1016/885. 51  Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 31. 52  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Washington to Dhahran, 16 February 1968, 116285, RG 59.

34 

B. FRIEDMAN

in the Gulf quickly denied any knowledge of such an arrangement and explicitly stated their objection to regional alliances.53 At this stage Bahrain was thinking of a future as an independent “mini-­ state” and full member of the U.N., with a Saudi defense guarantee. However, talks of a regional defense pact that included Iran made the Bahrainis fear that King Faysal’s commitment to them might weaken in light of Iran’s claim to Bahrain. Further, there was some concern that Bahrain’s Shiʿi community might oppose such an explicit alliance with Saudi Arabia. Along these lines, Shaykh ʿIsa believed that any security arrangement in the Gulf had to include Iraq, “to whom many of the Shiʿis look,” but he remained at a loss regarding how that could be done. Embracing a Western-engineered security agreement in the Gulf put Saudi Arabia and Arab shaykhs in the dangerous position of provoking both Iran and its Arab nationalist neighbors. Such an agreement would be viewed as directed against both Arab nationalist and Iranian nationalist ambitions in the Gulf. Mohammad Reza Shah’s interpretation of Iranian nationalism meant that Iran should be the dominant power, or hegemon, in the Gulf in the aftermath of British withdrawal. Adherents of Arab Nationalism, whether of the Nasserist or Baʿthist version, aspired to create a unified, sovereign state in the lands of all Arabic-speaking peoples, including the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf littoral. The supranational ideology of Arab nationalism “amounted to a direct challenge to the principle of raison d’etat upon which interstate relations” were conducted.54 And it was particularly threatening to the Arab shaykhs because their sovereignty had been principally guaranteed by the very British military power that was now to be withdrawn from the Gulf. In 1968, the shaykhdoms were not internationally recognized as sovereign states. The nineteenth- and twentieth-century treaty arrangements with the British had allowed the shaykhs to exercise internal sovereignty within their patrimonial territory, while ceding control over their external affairs to the British. The sovereignty of the shaykhs had been guaranteed by the British.55 Therefore, the ruling shaykhs were particularly vulnerable  BNA: BBC, January 1968; al-Hayat (Beirut), January 26, 1968, FO 1016/885.  Maridi Nahas, “State-Systems and Revolutionary Challenge: Nasser, Khomeini, and the Middle East,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Nov. 1985), pp.  507–527; and, F.  Gregory Gause III, “Systemic Approaches to Middle Eastern International Relations,” International Studies Review 1:1 (1999), 26–31. 55  For an alternative view on these issues, see: Abdel Razzaq Takriti, “Colonial Coups and the Wars on Popular Sovereignty,” American Historical Review 124:3 (June 2019), 878–909. 53 54

2  THE END OF PAX BRITANNICA IN THE PERSIAN GULF 

35

to what might succeed the British in the Gulf because they did not historically enjoy the basic legitimizing principle of international politics, state sovereignty.

Historical Competition and Conflict in the Gulf It was during the nineteenth century that the Gulf became a vital communications stop on the British Empire’s maritime trade routes to India. The British presence also influenced the patterns of rivalry and competition between the ruling families of the Arabian Peninsula that would impact the politics of the region in the twentieth century. Therefore, the nineteenth century antecedents became part of the inherited worldviews that shaped the actions and behavior of rulers along the Gulf during British withdrawal. Great Britain’s strategy to expand India’s frontiers in order to protect the British Empire’s lucrative India trade transformed the Gulf into a “British lake.”56 The British allowed the Qajar Shahs a free hand in ruling Iran’s interior, but along the southern Iranian coast a British political resident based in Bushire (1822–1946) was the decisive authority for matters relating to the Gulf. On the other side of the Gulf, along the Arab littoral, Britain gradually engineered formal protection treaties with the tribal chieftains who ruled the peoples of the Gulf coast.57 These treaties transformed the tribal shaykhdoms or chiefdoms (mashikhat)58 into territorial mini-states and guaranteed ascendancy for the families that entered into the protection treaties with the British.59 The legacy of Bahrain’s historical conflicts with Iran and Qatar in the nineteenth century played an important role in the events of 1968 through 1971. These conflicts have their roots in the Al Khalifah protector-protégé 56  J.E. Peterson, “Historical Pattern of Gulf Security,” in Security in the Persian Gulf (New York: Palgrave, 2002), edited by Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, pp. 7–31; Uzi Rabi, “Britain’s ‘Special Position’ in the Gulf: Its Origins, Dynamics and Legacy,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3 (May 2006), p. 354. 57  J.E. Peterson, “Historical Pattern of Gulf Security,” in Security in the Persian Gulf (New York: Palgrave, 2002), edited by Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, pp. 7–31. 58  These shaykhdoms came to be known as emirates between 1968 and 1971. The terms will be used interchangeably throughout this monograph. 59  Khaldoun Hasan al-Naqeeb, Society and State in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula (London: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1990), translated by L.M. Kenny and emended by Ibrahim Hayani, pp. 6–65.

36 

B. FRIEDMAN

dynamics that emerged during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The ruling Al Khalifah clan of Bahrain conquered Bahrain from its fortified coastal compound of Zubarah on the northwest coast of the Qatar peninsula in 1782–1783.60 Iran refused to accept the Al Khalifah conquest and sovereignty over Bahrain; yet during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Iran lacked the military capabilities to challenge British naval supremacy and forcefully assert its claim to sovereignty over Bahrain. Instead it confined its sovereign claims to diplomatic maneuvers. Following its conquest at the end of the eighteenth century, the Al Khalifah continued to rule Bahrain from Zubarah on the northwest Qatari coast and exacted tribute from the Al Thani shaykhs of the southeast Qatari town of Doha. More than a half century later, between 1861 and 1878, the Al Thani family of Qatar freed themselves from the Al Khalifah dominance and established their authority over the Qatari peninsula, when they maneuvered between British and Ottoman authorities to rid themselves of the tribute demanded from them by the Al Khalifah of Bahrain. The Al Thani shaykhs are descendants of the Bani Tamim tribe which emerged from Najd in the Al Saʿud–dominated Arabian interior. The Al Thani were encouraged by the paramount Al Saʿud in Najd to rise up against the Al Khalifah tribute. The Al Thani ancestral links to Najd and its relationship with Al Saʿud and Wahhabism are an important legacy of its nineteenth- and early twentieth-century ascent to power in Qatar. And the twentieth-century animus between Al Khalifah of Bahrain and Al Thani of Qatar was also rooted in their nineteenth-century conflicts over land, tribute, and dominance. This historical antagonism between Bahrain and Qatar was at the heart of the divisive political maneuverings for supremacy during the meetings between the ruling shaykhs to discuss a formula for political union between 1968 and 1971. Another major fault line among the shaykhdoms of eastern Arabia was the historical feud between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. This began as a family struggle within the Bani Yas tribal confederation. In the early nineteenth century, the Al Bu Falasah clan, a section of the Bani Yas, renounced its allegiance to the ruling Al Nahyan (or Al Bu Falah) clan of Abu Dhabi. In 1833 the Al Bu Falasah migrated to Dubai and the Al Maktum family 60  Farhad Cyrus Sharifi-Yazdi, Arab-Iranian Rivalry in the Persian Gulf: Territorial Disputes and the Balance of Power in the Middle East (London: I.B.  Tauris Ltd., 2015), pp.  1–80; Ahmad Mustafa Abu Hakima, History of Eastern Arabia, 1750–1800 (Beirut: Khayats, 1965), pp. 91–124.

2  THE END OF PAX BRITANNICA IN THE PERSIAN GULF 

37

established its independent rule there. Dubai became known as a refuge for disaffected or disposed tribal factions. Through the mid-twentieth century the Al Maktum of Dubai remained rivals and at times even enemies of the Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi, who did not forgive their cousins of their nineteenth-century betrayal. When the British announced withdrawal in 1968, relations between Abu Dhabi and Dubai were still mired in mutual suspicion of one another. Throughout the nineteenth century Abu Dhabi (allied with the Al Bu Saʿid sultans of Muscat and Oman) had also contested the Al Qawasim maritime empire for supremacy on the Omani coast. In 1799, the Al Qawasim had adopted the Wahhabi faith and sought protection from the Al Saʿud dynasty, based in the Najdi interior of the Arabian Peninsula.61 The Qasimi shaykhs of the Omani (and later Trucial) coast paid tribute to the first (1744–1818) and second (1821–1891) Saudi states during the nineteenth century. It was the Al Qawasim maritime raiding in the Gulf during the first two decades of the nineteenth century that ultimately prompted British naval intervention in the region. Later, it was the Bani Yas (led by Abu Dhabi) challenge to the Al Qawasim supremacy in the pearl fishing trade in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that caused tension between the two tribal confederations. This tension was heightened by the fact that the Qasimi maritime trade declined with the increasing commercial expansion of the British during this period, leaving the Al Qawasim more dependent on pearl fishing. Later, the decimation of the Gulf’s pearl fishing industry in the 1930s added another serious blow to the fortunes of the Al Qawasim shaykhs. When the issue of political union emerged following the British announcement in 1968, the poor Qasimi shaykhs of Sharjah and Ras al-­ Khaimah were forced to consider the notion of permanent political subordination to their oil-rich neighbor in Abu Dhabi,62 which  had been a Qasimi rival for more than one hundred years.

61  R.  Bayly Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century (London: Macmillan and Co.mpany, 1965), pp. 35–36. 62  Oil production began in Bahrain in 1934, in Saudi Arabia in 1939, in Kuwait 1946, in Qatar in 1949, in Abu Dhabi 1962–1963, in Dubai in 1969, and in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman the first oil exports were produced in August 1967.

38 

B. FRIEDMAN

A Union of Gulf Shaykhdoms The mode of politics between the ruling shaykhs focused on preserving political autonomy and resisting dominance. Nevertheless, they needed the goodwill of their larger neighbors, Iran and Saudi Arabia, in order to survive in a post-British system. The ruler of Sharjah, Shaykh Khalid bin Muhammad Al Qasimi, with his brother Shaykh ʿAbdulaziz bin Muhammad, met with a British military officer on 3 February and said they believed in the necessity of a federation of Gulf states. Shaykh Khalid said the federation should have an elected ruler to serve a term of office, and that there should be an al-majlis al-siaʾda al-wilayat al-khalij al-­ mutahida (“The Council of Senior Representatives of the Gulf States” or, literally, “The State Council of United Gulf States”). Shaykh Khalid and his brother insisted that the federation should include only seven states (Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah and Umm al-Qaiwain), rather than a broader union of nine which would include Bahrain and Qatar. In the same breath, they said that they foresaw being annexed by Saudi Arabia or Kuwait as a certainty without British protection. They also expressed bitter disgust with the republican (Arab nationalist) pretensions of their fellow Al Qawasim, Shaykh Saqr, the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah. They said he had become an object of ridicule even among his own people. They said that the locals on the whole were uneducated and ignorant and had no knowledge of republican rule and they simply endorsed the propaganda line.63 The issues raised by the ruler of Sharjah regarding a union of Gulf shaykhdoms would become important points of contention during the spring of 1968 and the remaining three and a half years of British withdrawal. What kind of union would emerge? Would it be a federation with a strong central governing authority? Or would it be a looser confederated union that allowed each ruler to maintain political autonomy? Would it consist of the seven Trucial shaykhdoms, or would it be a union of nine, including Qatar and Bahrain? Would Iran accept a union that included Bahrain? Should the union have an elected leader? Should authority rest with a single leader or a council? What would be the union’s relationship to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman? These questions were further complicated by personal differences, historical suspicions, and unequal 63  BNA: “Ruler of Sharjah’s Views on British Withdrawal,” 4 February 1968, FO 1016/885.

2  THE END OF PAX BRITANNICA IN THE PERSIAN GULF 

39

material resources among the shaykhs. Yet, in one form or another, these issues needed to be resolved by the ruling shaykhs if they were going to move toward unity before the British withdrawal in 1971. On 19 February 1968, the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai set aside years of intense rivalry and feuds, and announced a dual federation that was only later extended to include the five other shaykhdoms, Qatar, and Bahrain.64 Shaykh Rashid of Dubai felt that Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi was offering generous terms to settle an offshore border dispute that had been a source of ongoing friction between the two shaykhdoms. Rashid was also hoping a new ruler of Abu Dhabi was ready to restart relations with Dubai on better terms than his predecessor, Shaykh Shakhbut. Zayid for his part viewed Rashid as a “strong and nimble” ruler, who was well respected in the region, and whom Zayid would need on his side if he was going to play a leadership role in any future union.65 The Abu Dhabi-Dubai agreement infuriated Shaykh Ahmad of Qatar, who felt that he should have been consulted. Shaykh Ahmad believed that Qatar’s wealth and history gave it the right to play the dominant role among the smaller shaykhdoms, and resented the attempt by Shaykh Zayid to lead.66 Shaykh Ahmad was also concerned that Qatar’s strong alliance with Dubai would be weakened as a result of the new Abu Dhabi/ Dubai union.67 A week later, Shaykh Ahmad, with the help of his Egyptian adviser Hassan Kamal, initiated a three-day conference in Dubai which included all of the ruling shaykhs and resulted in the announcement of a union of nine Arab emirates (ittihad al-ʾimarat al-ʿarabiyya), including the seven Trucial shaykhdoms, Qatar, and Bahrain, which would take effect 30 March 1968.68 64  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 23; U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 20 February 1968, Jidda 02921 201031Z, RG 59. 65  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij Khalı̄j [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 23. 66  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, London to Washington, 27 February 1968, London 06762 2719 57Z, RG 59; U.S. Department of State Intelligence Note, Thomas L. Hughes to The Secretary of State, “Federation of Arab Amirates to be Born March 30,” 22 March 1968, RG 59. 67  BNA: “Persian Gulf: Discussion with U.S. Officials at the Foreign Office on Wednesday 27 March 1968,” FO 1016/754. 68  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, 4 March 1968, Dhahran A-89; U.S.  Department of State, Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, 6 May 1968, Dhahran A-119.

40 

B. FRIEDMAN

The public announcement of unity masked deep misgivings among the Gulf rulers regarding the nature and configuration of the union. Only King Faysal and the Saudis strongly preferred a union of nine. Faysal was hoping a strong political union would prevent Arab nationalist revolutionary subversion in the weaker Trucial shaykhdoms, limit Shaykh Zayid’s ambition and power, and protect Bahrain and the smaller shaykhs from Iran’s territorial claims.69 In order to avoid provoking Iran’s ire, Shaykh Ahmad of Qatar was viewed in Riyadh as more suitable than Shaykh ʿIsa of Bahrain to assume leadership of the nascent union.70 Shaykh Ahmad of Qatar’s announcement of union from Riyadh underscored the conceptual ambiguity regarding the structure of the new political entity. Ahmad referred to a “federation of a special type” where each “amirate would retain its own government.”71 Yet despite Qatar’s ambition to play a leading role in the future union of nine, it had also been quietly exploring avenues to independence.72 The Al Khalifah of Bahrain did not like that the union of nine was a Qatari initiative and preferred the idea of pursuing their independence as a “mini-state.” The Al Khalifah of Bahrain and the Al Thani of Qatar were historical rivals and had long-standing territorial disputes. The same problem had existed between Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi and Shaykh Rashid of Dubai. The Al Khalifah believed these obstacles were formidable and were reluctant to join a broad union.73 However, following Deputy Ruler Shaykh Khalifah bin Salman Al Khalifah’s visit to Riyadh, on 5 May, Bahrain, which was apparently influenced by Saudi opinion, decided that it would agree to support the union of nine despite its misgivings. Shaykh Ahmad of Qatar and Shaykh Rashid of Dubai were linked through bonds of marriage: Shaykh Ahmad had married one of Shaykh Rashid’s daughters. Therefore, Shaykh Rashid favored a union of nine led by Qatar rather than succumbing to his rival Shaykh Zayid’s dominance in

69  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), pp. 28, 59 & 61. 70  Shaykh Ahmad’s press conference from Riyadh, April 1968, see: U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 3 ‘April 1968, Jidda 03465 031206Z, RG59. 71  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 3 April 1968, Jidda 03465 031206Z, RG 59. 72  U.S.  Department of State Airgram, “Request for Support and Assistance from the Sheikh of Qatar,” Beirut to Washington, 14 February 1968, A-704, RG 59. 73  BNA: “Sheikh Hamad bin Isa’s visit to Jordan,” 26 March 1968, FCO 8/523.

2  THE END OF PAX BRITANNICA IN THE PERSIAN GULF 

41

a smaller grouping of seven lower Gulf shaykhdoms.74 Shaykh Rashid seemed to be exploring all possibilities during this period.75 He professed that he would not join any union that did not include Qatar, yet he accepted 10 kilometers of oil-rich sea bed abutting Dubai’s Fatah oil-field from Abu Dhabi’s Shaykh Zayid; a deal which was concluded on the same day as the 19 February announcement of an Abu Dhabi-Dubai union that was made without Qatar. Shaykh Rashid also actively courted Saudi Arabia’s support as another check on Shaykh Zayid’s ambition.76 Shaykh Zayid viewed Qatar as a rival for leadership of the union and beholden to Saudi influence, and was indifferent to a union of nine. He preferred a smaller union of the seven Trucial shaykhdoms  that would allow him to dominate. To that end he used his oil-wealth to purchase support for his initiatives from his poorer neighboring shaykhs in Ajman, Fujairah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Qaiwain.77 When Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-­ Khaimah opposed Shaykh Zayid’s overtures, Zayid reportedly donated funds and arms to the Shihuh, a rival tribal grouping that was not aligned with Shaykh Saqr in Ras al-Khaimah.78 And in spite of Shaykh Zayid’s generous territorial settlement with Dubai’s Shaykh Rashid, Rashid continued to side with Qatar in the tense negotiations regarding the nature of the proposed union. Thus, throughout 1968, Qatar, Dubai, and Ras al-­ Khaimah were consistently in opposition to Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, and the four smaller Trucial shaykhdoms in the meeting to establish a union of the Gulf shaykhdoms.79

74  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), pp. 18–28. 75  Ibid. 76  Ibid. 77  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 10 April 1968, Dhahra 00794 101214Z, RG 59. 78  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 16 May 1968, Dhahra 00890 160706Z, RG 59. 79  British National Archives: “Persian Gulf,” 27 March 1968, FO 1016/754; See, also: John Duke Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics and Petroleum (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 1975), pp.  109–112; A.O.  Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, 1950–1985 (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 110–111.

42 

B. FRIEDMAN

Between Iran and Saudi Arabia During King Faysal’s state visit to Kuwait from 8 to 11 April 1968, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia attempted to set aside their rivalry for influence on the Gulf littoral and announced their joint support for a union of shaykhdoms.80 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were concerned about manifestations of Iran’s aspiration to replace the British as the dominant power in the Gulf and the protector of the Arab shaykhdoms. For different reasons and in different ways, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia both viewed the Arab littoral as their natural sphere of diplomatic influence. The Kuwaitis took an active approach to regional diplomacy, while the Saudis preferred a more passive approach. In early April, Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs ʿUmar Saqqaf told the U.S. Ambassador that the Saudis are “determined to prevent NLF [National Liberation Front of South Yemen] subversion from reaching the lower Gulf States,” but the Saudis are “suffering from certain limitations in pursuing an active policy in the Gulf, including Faysal’s reluctance to delegate authority, shortage of qualified personnel and unprogressive image.” Indeed, the Saudis’ only real presence in the shaykhdoms was a cultural office of one mid-level diplomat and five clerks that was established in Dubai in March, and “officially” opened in May 1968.81 The Saudis had purchased their influence in Dubai with a £2/$5.6 million gift in 1965.82 In response, U.S.  Ambassador Eilts told Saqqaf that the U.S. Consul General in Dhahran had noted “considerable concern among lower Gulf rulers at what they consider to be either SAG [Saudi Government] inactivity or disinterest in lower Gulf area. In contrast, they pointed to Iranian activism in the area.”83 The Saudis explained that they could not be seen as being too active in the shaykhdoms, lest their smaller neighbors feel the Saudis were trying to dominate them.84 80  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Kuwait to Washington, 11 April 1968, Kuwait 00952 112023Z; U.S.  Department of State Airgram, Kuwait to Washington, 16 April 1968, A-189. 81  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, 19 June 1968, A-141, R 59. 82  BNA: “Persian Gulf: Discussion with U.S. Officials at the Foreign Office on Wednesday 27 March 1968,” FO 1016/754. 83  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 3 April 1968, Jidda 01120 031521Z, RG 59. 84  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 24 August 1968, Jidda 05169 250506Z, RG 59; See, also: Fuad I. Khuri, Tents and pyramids: games and ideology in Arab culture from backgammon to autocratic rule (London: Saqi Books, 1990).

2  THE END OF PAX BRITANNICA IN THE PERSIAN GULF 

43

In the weeks leading up to the late-May meeting to discuss the federation of emirates, there was a flurry of diplomatic activity in the Gulf. Shaykh Ahmad of Qatar arrived in Kuwait on 12 May for a four-day visit, and on 5 May King Faysal met with Deputy Ruler Shaykh Khalifah bin Salman Al Khalifah of Bahrain. King Faysal quietly urged Shaykh Khalifah to work toward a union of nine and suggested that it would be unwise for the rulers to meet in Bahrain and risk provoking the Shah’s anger. The Bahrainis were convinced the Saudis were pushing for the union of nine to control Abu Dhabi’s Zayid and limit his relations with either Iran or revolutionary Arab states.85 Perhaps for this reason Shaykh Rashid of Dubai was effusive regarding Saudi influence. Rashid contrasted his faith in the Saudis with the threat posed by Abu Dhabi as a result of Shaykh Zayid’s decision to allow Syrian, Iraqi, and Egyptian advisors and technicians into his territory. Shaykh Rashid viewed subversive Arabs and not Iran as the real danger to the Gulf rulers. In early May, Rashid told visiting American officials, “You Americans draw distinction between socialist and communist, to me they are all the same.” He added, “Zayid is as obsessed with Saudi Arabia as Bahrain is with Iran; this makes him blind to real danger.”86 Shaykh Rashid, whose shaykhdom served as an entrepôt for trade with Iran, downplayed Iran’s threat to the shaykhdoms. Yet in April and May Iran sent representatives to visit many of the Gulf shaykhs to convey the warning that “retaliatory action” could be expected if a political union that included Bahrain was formed.87 In fact, Iranian representatives were said to have alluded to a “pay-off” for Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah and other Trucial rulers if they opposed Bahrain’s inclusion into the federation.88 On 18 and 19 May, advisers to the Gulf shaykhs convened in Abu Dhabi to set the agenda for the rulers’ meeting on the federation. On 22 May 1968, King Faysal told the New York Times that “There need be no vacuum in that area when the British leave in 1971 as long as the federation receives the support of the U.S. and its neighbors. We certainly support it.”89 Two days later, on 24 May, meetings between the Gulf shaykhs 85  U.S. Department of State Outgoing Telegram, Washington to Dhahran, 14 May 1968, 1564037, RG 59. 86  U.S.  Department of State Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, 16 May 1968, 00890 160810Z, RG 59. 87  Ibid. 88  Ibid. 89  Drew Middleton, The New York Times, 23 May 1968.

44 

B. FRIEDMAN

in Abu Dhabi convened. This meeting had been moved from Bahrain to Abu Dhabi to avoid provoking Iran. The Shah, in an interview published by Ettelaʿat, expressed his doubts regarding the viability of a federation, and claimed that Iran opposed the federation on the grounds that it was an “imperialist” creation and a product of British “manipulation.”90 In an interview with the Guardian (Manchester), the Shah said that he believed federalism was incompatible with tribalism.91 The Shah also continued to insist that Iran would oppose a federation that included Bahrain. Therefore, it is not surprising that the only public announcement following the meetings held in Abu Dhabi, between 24 and 26 May, was that the shaykhs agreed to meet again at the beginning of July. The rivalry for leadership of the union between Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi and Shaykh Ahmad of Qatar continued during the Abu Dhabi meetings. There was some dispute regarding whether naming a chairman and capital or drafting a constitution should be the first order of business. Another contentious issue was whether decisions within the union should be made by a majority (as advocated by Zayid) or unanimously (as advocated by Ahmad).92 Yet, in the end, it was likely Iran’s resistance to Bahrain’s inclusion in the union that effectively prevented any positive signs of forward progress toward a union of nine Arab shaykhdoms. The meeting was viewed as a disappointment in the Arab media following the optimism of the late February announcements, and the expectations that a broad union would now emerge were low.93 In early June, the ruler of Qatar was hunting in the mountains of Iran and the ruler of Dubai was on holiday in Shiraz, while emissaries from the shaykhdoms shuttled between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to update King Faysal and Emir Sabah on the May meetings. In the meantime, Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi was exploring possibilities of a smaller union that excluded Bahrain and Qatar, in response to what he perceived to be the ruler of Qatar’s efforts to prevent Zayid from becoming the leader of the new federation. To that end Zayid paid a visit to Oman in early June to

 Ettelaʾat, 27 May 1968 in BNA: FO 248/1650.  Chubin and Zabih, p. 217. 92  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, London to Washington, 28 May 1968, London 09348 281058Z, RG 59. 93  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), pp. 27–29; Taryam, endnotes 23, 24, pp. 101/139. 90 91

2  THE END OF PAX BRITANNICA IN THE PERSIAN GULF 

45

discuss matters with the Sultan.94 On 23 June 1968, Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al-Sabah led a team on a diplomatic tour of the Gulf shaykhdoms. Dr. Wahid Raʾfat, an Egyptian jurist, and the Kuwaiti emir’s personal legal advisor, accompanied the foreign minister in order to provide the shaykhs with concrete suggestions to “rescue” the “foundering” union of nine. Raʾfat, referring to the union’s prospects, said to a U.S. official, “We are trying hard, but there is not much hope.”95

The Shah and King Faysal Reconcile Against the backdrop of the diplomatic rift between Saudi Arabia and Iran, on 7 May 1968, the editor of Kuwaiti newspaper al-Siyasa, Ahmad Jarallah, published an interview with King Faysal during which he stated that the Shah would be welcome to visit Saudi Arabia whenever he wished to visit. He also added, “Iran has interests in the Gulf, and we have interests. We should cooperate to safeguard our common interests. We do not allow ourselves as Arabs to stand against Iran’s interests....”96 On 9 May 1968, the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Ray al-ʿAam published an interview with the Shah in which he stated that he hoped to pay a visit to Saudi Arabia, “his neighbor and friend,” at the earliest available opportunity. The Shah further stated that the Persian Gulf powers were able to cooperate with one another in order to compensate for the effects of the British withdrawal, stating, “I think Kuwait, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have a major role in this respect.”97 On the evening of 11 May, Iranian Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi summoned the U.S.  Ambassador to tell him “in the strictest secrecy” that the Shah would be sending word to King Faysal that he is “looking forward” to re-scheduling his postponed visit. Zahedi said the decision was based on the “good effect” of Faysal’s comments in al-­ Siyasa and “by the good work of the Moroccans.” Zahedi said the Moroccan Foreign Minister Ahmed Laraki had a long discussion with the Shah that morning. Zahedi said he would be sending Iran’s Ambassador 94  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), pp. 27–29. 95  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Kuwait to Washington, 23 June 1968, Kuwait 01222 230735Z, RG 59. 96  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Kuwait to Washington, 9 May 1968, Kuwait 01041 091411Z, RG 59. 97  al-Ray al-ʿAam, 9 May 1968; U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 12 May 1968, Tehran 04788 121206Z, RG 59.

46 

B. FRIEDMAN

to Saudi Arabia to see King Faysal within two days to re-schedule the Shah’s visit.98 King Hassan II of Morocco may have played a critical role in bridging the differences between the two monarchs during his late April tour through the region.99 The Shah’s adviser Asadollah Alam indicated King Hassan’s mediation was an important factor in reconciling the two,100 while the historian Faisal Salman bin Al-Saud downplayed the Moroccan king’s role.101 The Moroccan Foreign Minister Laraki told the U.S. Ambassador in Rabat that “Efforts exerted by King Hasan to dissipate misunderstanding between Saudi Arabia and Iran have been conclusive.”102 The U.S. archival records, Alam’s memoirs, and Zahedi’s meeting with the U.S.  Ambassador seem to suggest the Moroccan role was important, if not decisive.103 The record is less conclusive regarding whether it was the Shah or King Faysal who took the first step toward reconciliation: The U.S. Ambassador in Tehran, Armin Meyer, noted that the Shah took “the first important step toward resumption of dialogue with Saudi Arabia which hopefully have [sic] an important impact on future of Persian Gulf.” The U.S. records indicate that the Moroccans’ messages from the Shah to the Saudis in late April may have contributed to King Faysal’s decision to make a friendly statement to Moroccan Radio, and then give an interview to al-Siyasa in early May.104 Indeed, in his al-Siyasa interview, King Faysal explicitly said that King Hassan confirmed that Iran still maintained its friendship for 98  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 11 May 1968, Tehran 04681 111646Z, RG 59. 99  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 17 April 1968, Tehran 04221 171817Z, RG 59. 100  Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran’s Royal Court, 1969–1977; introduced and edited by Alinaghi Alikhani; translated into English by Alinaghi Alikhani and Nicholas Vincent (London: I.B.Tauris, 1991). 101  Al-Saud, p. 41. 102  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Rabat to Washington, 14 May 1968, Rabat 04201 141609Z, RG 59. 103  David Holden maintains it was the Shah’s conciliatory note to King Faysal in May that initiated the reconciliation. See David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1981), p. 275. Faisal bin Salman al-Saud maintains it was King Faysal’s comments in al-Siyasa that initiated the reconciliation; See al-Saud, p. 41. 104  See, for example: U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 27 April 1968, 03779 271056Z, RG 59; U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 27 April 1968, 03786 280507Z, RG 59; and, U.S. Department of State Telegram, Rabat to Washington, 3 May 1968, Rabat 04064 031801Z, RG 59.

2  THE END OF PAX BRITANNICA IN THE PERSIAN GULF 

47

Saudi Arabia, and that the friendship was based on Islamic solidarity.105 The Lebanese media also praised Morocco’s role in the reconciliation. U.S. Ambassador Meyer mentioned that Iran’s Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi informed him that the Shah’s interview with al-Ray al-ʿAam was given before Iranian officials were aware of King Faysal’s remarks in al-­ Siyasa, which supports the notion that there was a third party working to reconcile the two monarchs.106 The historian Faisal bin Salman Al-Saud suggests the reconciliation was initiated by Faysal’s al-Siyasa interview and facilitated by the former Syrian prime minister Maʾruf al-Dawalibi. Al-Saud argues that al-Dawalibi, an advisor to King Faysal, was dispatched to Tehran on Saudi Arabia’s behalf to discreetly discuss the issue of Bahrain with the Shah. Al-Dawalibi was sent by King Faysal in early May 1968 to convey the seriousness of the Bahrain issue for the entire Arab world. According to Al-Saud, al-Dawalibi was warmly received by the Shah and was surprised when the Shah asked him to inform King Faysal that the Shah would not press the Bahrain claim.107 The British and American records, as well as the Iranian media, do not mention al-Dawalibi’s trip to Tehran or his meeting with the Shah in May; moreover, in late March, the U.S. Ambassadors in both Tehran and Jidda reported that King Faysal turned down a proposal for al-­ Dawalibi’s mission to Tehran.108 Whatever the exact nature of al-­Dawalibi’s role in brokering the reconciliation, the Shah adjusted his scheduled trip to East Africa in order to stop in Jidda and meet with King Faysal for a little more than an hour at the airport on 3 June 1968. Lebanese journalist Salim al-Lawzi characterized the brief June 1968 meeting between the Shah and King Faysal as analogous to the June 1967 Glassboro summit between U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin. In other words, rather than a discussion of the particulars, the two kings came to a basic understanding on the situation

105  BNA: “Interview with King Faysal of Saudi Arabia, Published in Al Siyasa on 7 May 1968,” FO 248/1652. 106  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 12 May 1968, Tehran 04788 121206Z, RG 59. 107  Al-Saud, pp. 41–42. 108  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 26 March 1968, Jidda 03369 261505Z, RG 59; U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 25 March 1968, Tehran 03904 251431Z, R 59; U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 23 March 1968, Jidda 03307 240435Z; RG 59.

48 

B. FRIEDMAN

between themselves. The Shah’s full state visit was later rescheduled for early November 1968.109 In addition to the uncertainty of whether it was the Shah or King Faysal who initiated the reconciliation in May 1968, the question of what prompted the monarchs to reconcile at this point in time also remains unclear according to the diplomatic records. However, just days before the May reconciliation between King Faysal and the Shah, the New York Times ran a feature story entitled “Soviet Entry Into Mideast’s Oil Affairs Has Some Pedestrian Trappings; Soviet Bid for Arab Oil Is Analyzed.”110 And two months before the May exchange, in early March 1968, a Soviet communiqué greatly upset the Shah by alluding to Iran and the Persian Gulf as within the sphere of Soviet influence.111 It was in early March that a Soviet naval fleet began patrolling the Indian Ocean. The Soviet warships paid a visit to the Pakistani port of Karachi, and on 11 May 1968, two Soviet warships visited the Iraqi port, Umm Qasr.112 While Soviet-­ Iranian relations were friendly in 1968—in fact, Soviet Premier Kosygin traveled to Iran for a state visit for the first time on 2 April 1968—the Shah did not want to see the British leave the Gulf only to be replaced by another imperial power. King Faysal had expressed the same sentiments regarding foreign powers in his 7 May al-Siyasa interview. Therefore, it may be fair to say that Soviet activity in the Gulf in the spring of 1968 increased the Shah and King Faysal’s concern regarding the Soviets’ evolving relations with Iraq and the prospects of permanent Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, and contributed to their mutual desire to reconcile with one another. Nevertheless, despite a rapprochement between King Faysal and the Shah, based, in part, on shared strategic perceptions and mutual personal respect, the historic obstacles to regional cooperation remained. Prestige and image were also important components of the Shah’s diplomacy regarding the issue of Bahrain in early 1968. The Shah’s private comments to the Kuwaiti ruler, which were repeated in the Shah’s private conversations with the U.S. Ambassador and British Minister of State in January 1968, suggest the Shah was never seriously intent on pursuing 109  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 83. 110  William D. Smith, The New York Times, 5 May 1968. 111  U.S.  Department of State Airgram, Tehran to Washington, 27 March 1968, Tehran A-503, RG 59. 112  The New York Times, 11 May 1968.

2  THE END OF PAX BRITANNICA IN THE PERSIAN GULF 

49

Iran’s claim to sovereignty over Bahrain following the British announcement.113 The Saudi historian, Faisal bin Salman Al-Saud has referred to an American document that “pinpoints” 9 February 1968 as the date the Shah began to convey his “explicit” lack of interest in the Iranian claim. In a meeting with U.S. national security advisor Walt Rostow, the Shah stated that “...he would not use force to gain Bahrain,” and that Bahrain’s pearl and oil industries were no longer a great prize. However, the Shah emphasized that Iran’s claim to Bahrain was more than 150 years old, and he could not afford to relinquish it without justification.114 Despite these forthright remarks by the Shah in February 1968, British archival records indicate that as early as his initial conversations with British officials on 7 January 1968 the Shah had privately expressed to British officials, and later in January to the Kuwaiti ruler and American officials, his reluctance to pursue the Bahrain claim. Why then did the Shah continue to publicly pursue Iran’s claim? The Shah wanted to (1) appease domestic hard-liners (Pan-Iranist Party) on the issue, while at the same time gaining domestic and regional prestige; (2) assert Iran’s stature as the new regional power; and (3) extract further territorial and strategic concessions during the process of British withdrawal by bartering with Iran’s claim on Bahrain.

Interconnections As the British prepared to leave the Gulf, the crux of the problem for the ruling shaykhs was how to preserve their sovereignty and freedom of action in the face of their larger neighbors’ bids to succeed the British as the dominant regional power. Accepting Iranian regional dominance would provoke attacks, through propaganda and subversion, from regional Arab nationalist movements. But if the Arab nationalist ambition of Arab political unity was realized, a single unified state would mean the shaykhs would lose their sovereignty, authority, and patrimony. At the same time, accepting Saudi dominance threatened the rulers’ independence and exposed the shaykhs to the same kind of subversion by Arab nationalists

113  State Department Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 30 January 1968, Tehran 03103 302241Z. 114  Al-Saud, pp. 39–40.

50 

B. FRIEDMAN

for aligning with the Western-backed Arab forces of “reaction.” The conundrum facing the ruling shaykhs highlights the interconnectedness, or systemic nature, of politics in the Gulf: The question of the future sovereignty of the shaykhs could not be separated from the broader issue of what kind of arrangement for maintaining political stability and security in the region would succeed the British-enforced system. The Kuwaiti Prime Minister (and Crown Prince) Jabir al-Ahmad al-­ Jabir Al Sabah told the British resident that the British should hand power over the shaykhs (excluding Kuwait, which had its independence recognized in 1961) to the Saudis, even over much bigger Bahrain. He said he had a great deal of sympathy for the Al Khalifah, but that it “was no good shutting one’s eyes to the fact that without British backing they simply could not last as rulers of Bahrain.” He said that “the Bahrainis, not the Iranians, would turn them out and then heaven knew what the Shiʿa would do. Better let the Saudis in first.” He also said Kuwait should pursue the “Egyptian solution” with Britain, meaning that the British should provide Kuwait with arms, training, and support during war, just like the Kuwaitis perceived the Soviets were doing for Egypt.115 It is interesting to note that Bahrain’s Director of Oil Affairs, Yusuf Shirawi, in a private conversation with a U.S. diplomatic officer, said that he was proposing to Shaykh ʿIsa that Bahrain should attach itself to Saudi Arabia, while maintaining its domestic political autonomy.116 The rift between Iran and Saudi Arabia in mid-January over the Saudi-­ Bahraini communiqué reflected Arab fears regarding historical and future Iranian ambitions in Gulf (ʾatmaʿ),117while the Shah’s comment regarding the communiqué’s “impertinent insult” suggests he was unhappy with how he believed his Arab neighbors perceived Iran’s stature and historical position in the region. In other words, the consequences of relations between Bahrain and Iran were not merely bilateral. They were systemic, influencing political relationships among all the rulers of the Gulf littoral.

115  BNA: G.G. Arthur, British Embassy Kuwait to Foreign Office, 28 January 1968, FO 1016/885. 116  U.S.  Department of State Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, 22 January 1968, A-75, RG 59. 117  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 28.

CHAPTER 3

One Step Forward, One Step Back

Ten years after Iraq’s 1958 revolution, Iraqi Baʿthists overthrew President ʿArif’s regime during coup d’états on 17 and 30 July 1968.1 Baʿthist ideology was an anathema to both King Faysal and the Shah. They viewed the Baʿthist aspiration for Arab political unity as a revolutionary challenge to the legitimacy of monarchical authority. While there were substantial political differences between Syrian and Iraqi Baʿthists,2 the Shah and King Faysal did not make these ideological distinctions. For the rulers in the Gulf, Syria was a Soviet-backed Arab state espousing a revolutionary Arab nationalist ideology and supporting subversive political groups operating in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf. Their fear, following the Baʿthist revolution in July 1968, was that Iraq would go the same way as Syria. The change of regime in Iraq did not have an immediate impact on the actions of the Gulf rulers. Instead, it reinforced their general threat perception with respect to revolutionary Arab Nationalism and regional 1  See, for example: Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba’thists, and Free Officers (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 1073–1110; Haim Shemesh, Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968–1988: In the Shadow of the Iraq-Iran Conflict (Lynne Rienner, 1992); Joseph Sassoon, “The East German Ministry for State Security and Iraq, 1968–1989,” Journal of Cold War Studies 16:1(Winter 2014), pp. 4–23. 2  Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), third edition; Eberhard Kienle, Baʿth vs. Baʿth: The Conflict Between Syria and Iraq, 1968–1989 (London: I.B.Tauris, Ltd., 1991).

© The Author(s) 2020 B. Friedman, The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1971, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56182-6_3

51

52 

B. FRIEDMAN

security, and underscored the notion that Iraq was politically unstable and unreliable and was now even more susceptible to Soviet aid and influence. The perceived Soviet-backed revolutionary threat emanating from South Arabia, and perhaps Iraq on the horizon, as well as pressure fostered by the 1971 deadline for British withdrawal, did, however, create a sense of urgency in the Gulf, during the latter half of 1968, for establishing a stable political structure for the shaykhdoms and resolving outstanding political disputes. In July 1968, Shaykh Khalifah of Qatar said the union would be able to fill the so-called vacuum after Britain’s withdrawal.3 During the second-half of 1968, there were three regional issues that dominated the rulers’ attention: First, moving forward with a union of nine emirates; second, resolving the issue of Iran’s claim on Bahrain; and, third, dealing with the questions of ownership and control of three islands in the lower gulf, greater and lesser Tunb and Abu Musa. While none of these issues were entirely resolved in 1968, there were real signs of diplomatic progress. In June 1968, forward momentum toward a union of nine shaykhdoms, which had been declared in February, was stalled as a result of latent animosity, suspicion, and mistrust among the shaykhs of Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Dubai, and Qatar. Kuwait, which was not viewed as a potential dominant regional power by the shaykhs, played an important role in brokering relations between various Gulf players throughout the second half of 1968. Despite Kuwait’s involvement, movement on the institutional and legal establishment of the union of shaykhdoms alternated between one step forward and one step back, often becoming bogged down in the shaykhs’ maneuvering for dominance within the new union.

Kuwaiti and Saudi Diplomacy in the Lower Gulf In June 1968, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia increased their diplomatic efforts to encourage the ruling shaykhs to make tangible progress toward a union between the seven Trucial shaykhdoms, Bahrain, and Qatar, following the deadlock during the meetings in Abu Dhabi in late May. The Kuwaiti foreign minister traveled to the shaykhdoms bringing concrete constitutional suggestions, while Saudi officials received the rulers’ emissaries but

3

 al-Hayat, 9 July 1968.

3  ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 

53

emphasized finding a broad consensus rather than focusing on the specific nature and scope of the union’s structure.4 The Kuwaiti press emphasized that the purpose of the Kuwaiti foreign minister’s trip to the lower Gulf was to encourage the shaykhdoms to use their forthcoming July meeting to begin setting up the institutions outlined by the rulers in late February that would lay the foundation for a federated union, such as a federal court, and an executive council for the Supreme Council of Rulers. The Kuwaiti delegation was also supporting choosing a temporary capital for the union and electing a president based on a system that would rotate the office among the rulers.5 Rashad Pharaon, adviser to King Faysal, claimed that the Saudis had stressed that the establishment of the union should be the urgent priority for the shaykhs. Pharaon said that the Saudis emphasized to the shaykhs that at this stage it was unnecessary to create a definitive constitution and roles for the union’s executive and institutions. The Saudis felt that a provisional constitution was a better idea, noting it could be finalized as the new entity emerges. The Saudis realized that outstanding disputes and territorial claims between the rulers would take time to resolve, and, therefore, should not obstruct the establishment of the union.6 In essence, the Saudis were trying to encourage the rulers to sidestep the divisive questions that might forestall bringing the union to fruition. The results of the 6 and 7 July 1968 rulers’ meeting in Abu Dhabi suggest that the shaykhs attempted to implement both the Saudi and Kuwaiti recommendations. Qatar and Dubai dropped their demand to name a president and capital of the union. The rulers adopted a resolution to engage the esteemed Egyptian legal expert, Dr. ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-­Sanhuri, to draft a general charter for the Federation of Arab Emirates.7 Al-Sanhuri authored Egypt’s civil law code of 1948, and played a role drafting the legal code in Libya and Kuwait, as well. Shaykh Zayid was named the interim chairman of the Supreme Council of Rulers. No decision was taken on a future capital. Qatar’s Deputy Ruler, Shaykh Khalifah bin

4  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), pp. 26–27. 5  Taryam, p. 101 (footnote 25, p. 139). 6  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 6 July 1968, Jidda 04634 060939Z, RG 59. 7  For more on al-Sanhuri, see: Guy Bechor, The Sanhuri Code, and the emergence of modern Arab civil law, (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007).

54 

B. FRIEDMAN

Hamad Al Thani, who was known as the “strongman” of Qatar,8 was named chairman of the Provisional Federal Council. The council’s decisions would be made with a two-thirds majority vote. Finally, a committee was appointed to examine the issues of a unified currency, a flag, a national anthem, an official federation emblem, and a federation newspaper.9 The institutional framework outlined on 6 and 7 July appears to follow the Kuwaiti recommendations, yet the provisional nature of the resolutions and the spirit of compromise seem very much in line with what the Saudis had urged. While Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi publicly thanked Kuwait for its assistance,10 it would seem the Saudis also played an important, if somewhat less visible, role. The Saudis were eager to see the union of shaykhdoms established, because once established, the Saudis, along with Iraq, Kuwait, and the union, could participate in negotiations with Iran on the full spectrum of “outstanding Gulf issues.” Rashad Pharaon claimed that it would be easier to induce the union to make “necessary island concessions” to Iran than it would be to induce the individual Trucial rulers.11 The Saudis seemed to believe that a collective Arab front would be a more effective way to negotiate with Iran on Gulf issues. This may have had as much to do with inter-­ Arab politics, and the need to present a unified Arab front in the Gulf in order to avoid giving the revolutionary Arab states (primarily, Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen) a card to play in their effort to undermine or subvert one of the weaker Gulf shaykhs, as it did with presenting the Iranians with a collective Arab position on territorial negotiations. For this reason, King Faysal decided to limit a visible Saudi presence in the shaykhdoms. Not only did the Saudis want to avoid giving their smaller neighboring rulers the impression they wanted to dominate them, but they wanted to avoid giving Iraq, Syria, or other revolutionaries the impression that they were out to dominate the lower Gulf littoral.12 In this fashion, the Saudis 8  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 23. 9  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, 17 July 1968, A-151, RG 59; Taryam, p. 102. 10  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Kuwait to Washington, 10 July 1968, Kuwait 01291 100915Z, RG 59. 11  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 6 July 1968, Jidda 04634 060939Z, RG 59. 12  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 15 October 1968, Dhahra 01199 151337Z, RG 59.

3  ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 

55

­ emonstrated an awareness of negative feedback and the systemic effect of d their actions: they exercised restraint in projecting influence into the lower Gulf, anticipating that attempting to dominate the shaykhs would provoke revolutionary Arab nationalist states to increase their aid to revolutionaries operating in the Gulf. Therefore, in the early summer of 1968, the Saudis seemed to tacitly encourage Kuwait’s active diplomatic role in brokering the union because it served their dual interests of seeing a broad union of nine come together as quickly as possible but without appearing to be a Saudi-driven initiative. The Kuwaitis did, in fact, play a meaningful diplomatic role during their late June trip to the shaykhdoms despite the impression among some rulers in the lower Gulf that the “arrogance of the Kuwaitis is universally resented.”13 This feeling may be traced back to the year before, 1967, when the Kuwaitis floated the poorly received idea of using the Kuwaiti dinar as a common Gulf currency for the shaykhdoms. Further, many of the ruling shaykhs in the lower Gulf viewed Kuwait’s educational and security institutions as being thoroughly compromised by Arabs sympathetic to revolutionary elements.14 Be that as it may, in mid-1968, Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi appeared to value Kuwait’s role in the formation of the union, particularly as a valuable counterweight to the Saudi influence with rivals in Qatar and Dubai.15 A sign of Zayid’s satisfaction with the Kuwaitis was the mid-July appointment of Kuwaiti Ashraf Luti, a former Secretary-General of OPEC, to reorganize Abu Dhabi’s Department of Oil Affairs.16 The rulers’ meeting on 6 and 7 July produced no momentous leap forward toward a union; however, it did create important and tangible first steps toward compromise among the shaykhs and gave them a basic provisional framework with which to move forward.17 In contrast to the 13  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 15 May 1968, Dhahra 00889 160829Z, RG 59. 14  Simon Smith, Britain’s Revival and Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States, 1950–71 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp.  85–88; John Chalcraft, “Migration and Popular Protest in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf in the 1950s and 1960s,” International Labor and Working-Class History 79 (Spring 2011), 28–47. 15  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Kuwait to Washington, 10 July 1968, Kuwait 01291 100915Z, R 59. 16  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Kuwait to Washington, 17 July 1968, A-269, R 59. 17  “Voice of the Coast” (Sawt as-Sahil) broadcasts from 6 and 7 July, 1968, as transcribed in U.S. Department of State Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, “Federation of Arab Amirates Meeting in Abu Dhabi July 6 and 7, 1968,” 17 July 1968, A-151, RG 59.

56 

B. FRIEDMAN

meetings at the end of May, there was a general sense of optimism following these meetings if not quite a real spirit of cooperation.

Iran and the Union of Shaykhdoms However, this optimism was tempered somewhat by the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s swift (8 July) and direct condemnation of the union, which included Bahrain.18 A week later, following his return from his home on the Caspian Sea, the Shah told American officials that he viewed the union as a British instrument with which to “return [to the Gulf] through the back door.” He also said that Iran’s interests can’t be “rudely ignored,” and if the Saudis recognized the union now, it would set back their [Iranian-Saudi] relations five months, alluding to the postponement of his February visit to Saudi Arabia. The Shah called the union a “slap in the face,” and that to undermine his prestige is to undermine his leadership in Iran and the very existence of the regime. The Shah stressed that he had no interest in invading Bahrain, because it was not worth it and it would harm Iran’s international relationships. But he also emphasized that “the vacuum in the Gulf” had to be filled by riparian states and Iran was an “unexcludable” participant.19 Amir Khosrow Afshar, a deputy foreign minister, explained Iran’s position more precisely: The problem was not Bahrain’s inclusion in the union, because Iran realized that a smaller union would be an easier target for subversion, but the “grave mistake,” according to Afshar, was the assumption that the union could make the Bahrain issue disappear. What Iran objected to was the formation of the union before the Bahrain issue was resolved.20 King Faysal attempted to reassure Iran through diplomatic back channels that Saudi Arabia had no plans to publicly recognize the formation of the union, and believed that any “meaningful” union was still “at least six months away.”21 However, it says much about the fragile relationship  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 9 July 1968, Tehran 05631 0915127, RG 59; Taryam, p. 103. 19  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 12 July 1968, Tehran 05667 121139Z, RG 59. 20  U.S.  Department of State, Tehran to Washington, 24 July 1968, Tehran 05811 241438Z. 21  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Washington to Tehran, 22 July 1968, 206537, RG 59; U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 21 July 1968, Jidda 04832 211514Z, RG 59. 18

3  ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 

57

between King Faysal and the Shah that these kinds of messages needed to be delivered through third-party diplomats rather than direct communication between the monarchs or their officials. Despite the reconciliation between King Faysal and the Shah, relations remained delicate, and the specter of the unresolved Bahrain issue continued to spoil more energetic cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which in turn caused the Gulf shaykhs to tiptoe around the issue of Bahrain in talks about the union. Bahrain’s Shaykh ʿIsa appeared to be growing increasingly disenchanted with the union in the period between May and October 1968.22 In particular, the Bahrainis repeatedly expressed frustration that the Saudis were not more assertive in brokering an agreement between the rulers for the union. Since February the Saudis had strongly encouraged Shaykh ʿIsa and Bahrain to join the union rather than pursue independence alone. Shaykh ʿIsa was convinced the Saudis primarily wanted Bahrain to participate in the union in order to circumscribe Shaykh Zayid and Abu Dhabi’s power. Yet the Saudis also discreetly suggested to Bahrain that it should not play a visible role in the union’s formation in order to avoid provoking Iran. This left Bahrain in the awkward position of being the most populous Gulf shaykhdom, but, due to the threat of Iran’s claim, having to take a subordinate role in the union’s leadership to either Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi or Shaykh Ahmad of Qatar. What made this even more difficult for Shaykh ʿIsa to swallow was that the Al Thani of Qatar were century-old rivals of Al Khalifah of Bahrain, and the Saudis were expecting Bahrain to limit Abu Dhabi and Shaykh Zayid’s power in the union, which would benefit Qatar’s bid for leadership. Therefore, in July 1968, Bahrain pursued a dual approach: Anxious not to further aggravate delicate Saudi-­ Iranian relations, they accommodated the Saudis, to an extent, and worked with the other Gulf shaykhs to advance the union of nine; but, at the same time, they quietly began to lay the internal groundwork for a path to independence.23 Shaykh ʿIsa was not the only Gulf ruler trying to maneuver independently outside of the new joint framework of the federated union, which had not addressed the federation’s mechanism for defense. Zayid of Abu 22  See, for example: BNA: Bahrain to Arabian Department – Foreign Office, J.H.G. Leahy to D.J. McCarthy, 19 July 1968, FO 1016/762; and, U.S. Department of State Telegram, Washington to Dhahran, 14 May 1968, 164037, RG 59. 23  See for example, U.S. Department of State Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, 31 July 1968, A-160, RG 59.

58 

B. FRIEDMAN

Dhabi, Deputy Ruler Shaykh Khalifah of Qatar, and Shaykh Rashid of Dubai began to consult with the British regarding developing independent military forces for their respective shaykhdoms. To that end, Shaykh Zayid used his oil wealth to double the pay of the Abu Dhabi Defense Forces and plan its expansion from 1400 to 4000 men by 1971, including naval and air defense branches. Zayid’s increased pay scale lured experienced manpower away from the British commanded Trucial Oman Scouts, which had been established in the 1950s, and was tasked with minimizing tribal warfare and patrolling the Trucial shaykhdoms’ borders with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Oman.24 Shaykh Khalifah of Qatar went to London in mid-July and consulted with British defense officials about the possibility of purchasing new light weapons and vehicles for its own armed force. Shaykh Rashid of Dubai was also reported to have gone to London with his British military adviser for the purpose of exploring the idea of establishing a 500-man Dubai defense force.25 This arms race, writ small, was an expression of the competition to establish political dominance within the union through military supremacy.26 So despite positive signs of progress toward a federation of nine shaykhdoms during the early July meetings in Abu Dhabi, serious questions remained about issues that could not be separated from the union’s future, and the Gulf shaykhs appeared to be taking their cues from the dynamics between King Faysal and the Shah.

Package Deals King Faysal and Mohammed Reza Shah confirmed their May 1968 reconciliation during the Shah’s brief stop-over in Riyadh to meet with King Faysal at the airport on 3 June 1968. This hour-and-a-half meeting allowed both monarchs to clear the air regarding the Shah’s postponed February 24  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, 7 August 1968, A-164, RG 59; U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 29 July 1968, Dhahra 01043 300505Z, R 59. For more on the Trucial Oman Scouts, see: Tancred Bradshaw, “The Hand of Glubb: The Origins of the Trucial Oman Scouts, 1948–1956,” Middle Eastern Studies 53:4 (2017), 656–672; Tom Walcot, “Trucial Oman Scouts: An Overview, 1955–1971,” Asian Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 17–30. 25   U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Washington CIRCULAR, 13 July 1968, 202001, RG 59. 26  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, London to Washington, 17 July 1968, London 10911 180116Z, RG59.

3  ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 

59

visit and to come to a broad understanding that the future stability of the Gulf could only be ensured through the cooperation of the riparian states.27 It also paved the way for renewed talks in July between the two sides to resolve the outstanding territorial questions related to ownership of the Gulf sea-bed and establishing a median line in Gulf waters. The issue of the median line was important because it represented a critical confidence building first step for both sides following the diplomatic crisis that erupted in February 1968 when the Shah postponed his visit over the Saudi-Bahrain mid-January communiqué. Before exploring the outcome of the 1968 median line negotiations, it makes sense to provide a brief overview of the dispute. In December 1965 King Faysal and the Shah signed a continental shelf agreement that was never ratified by the Iranian Majlis (parliament). The agreement was a product of 1964 negotiations over disputed offshore territory in the Gulf that the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) had opened to international bidding. The oil concession granted by NIOC to the Pan American Petroleum Corporation conflicted with a territorial concession the Saudis had already granted to ARAMCO. The December 1965 agreement set a median line between the territorial seas of the small Gulf islands of al-­ Arabiyah and al-Farisi and a median line was drawn between the two islands. According to the 1965 agreement, Iran would exercise sovereignty over al-Farisi Island and Saudi Arabia would exercise sovereignty over al-Arabiya Island. A few months after the December 1965 agreement had been signed, Iran discovered oil in the Fereydun field in the northern segment of disputed territory off of Kharg Island. Conservative projections estimated that the size of the discovery in the disputed area amounted to approximately 15 million barrels. The sheer volume of the new oil discovery, most of which lay on the Saudi side of the 1965 median line, ensured that the Iranian side would seek to renegotiate and revise the terms of the 1965 agreement, which is why the agreement was never ratified in the Iranian parliament.28 The dispute was renewed in late January 1968, when, just as the Shah was postponing his state visit to Saudi Arabia, Iran’s navy seized—and later released—a Saudi ARAMCO oil rig that was 27  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 4 June 1968, Jidda 04262 0416172, RG 59. 28  Faisal bin Salman al-Saud, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Power Politics in Transition 1968–1971 (London, I.B.  Tauris, 2003), pp.  35–38; Farhad Cyrus Sharifi-Yazdi, ArabIranian Rivalry in the Persian Gulf: Territorial Disputes and the Balance of Power in the Middle East (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, Ltd., 2015), pp. 175–221.

60 

B. FRIEDMAN

operating in the disputed territorial waters. Further negotiations in February 1968 went nowhere, primarily because of the strained relations between Faysal and Mohammad Reza, but also because Iran was proposing a joint venture in territory that the Saudis felt had already been agreed upon in December 1965. Between 29 July and 2 August 1968, Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Zaki Yamani elaborately hosted Iran’s Manuchehr Eqbal, the managing director of NIOC, in Taʾif, for renewed talks on a median line in the Gulf. The Saudis made a conscious effort to use this visit as an opportunity to demonstrate their desire for improved Saudi-Iranian relations. Dr. Eqbal was given special treatment, including comprehensive media coverage, an audience with King Faysal, and full dignitary treatment. Following his visit, Eqbal said he had been treated with “dignity, thoughtfulness, and flexibility,” and that King Faysal was “most gracious.” During these negotiations, the two parties reached a preliminary memorandum of understanding on the basis of an “equitable” division of “oil in place,” or estimated existing crude oil, in the oil-rich section of disputed area (specified in the 1965 agreement as “third section northernmost”). In meetings held in Taʾif from 30 August through September 11, the two parties formalized an amended agreement including coordinates for a median line, and an understanding that there would be a “fifty-fifty” distribution of oil in place in the disputed Fereydun/Marjan territory. The amended 1965 agreement did not change the fact that al-Farisi Island would be on the Iranian side of the median line and al-Arabiya Island on the Saudi side. The letters of understanding were finalized by Eqbal and Yamani on 24 October 1968, and the Iranian Majlis ratified the agreement on 10 November prior to the Shah’s re-scheduled visit to Saudi Arabia. King Faysal issued a Royal Decree ratifying the agreement on 13 November, during the Shah’s state visit.29 The Saudi historian Faisal bin Salman Al Saud suggests that it was the Shah who made concessions in the new median line deal, noting that the “Shah gave priority to long-term stability in Saudi-Iranian relations instead of immediate gains.”30 However, King Faysal appeared to be the more flexible party, and adjusted several times to Iranian demands during these

29   U.S.  Department of State Airgram, Jidda to Washington, 18 November 1968, A-613, RG 59. 30  Al-Saud, pp. 44–45.

3  ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 

61

negotiations, which, in effect, were a revision of a previous agreement for Iran’s material gain. The diplomatic records also suggest that King Faysal was hoping to parlay flexibility in the renewed July median line negotiations into an informal understanding with Iran on the disputed islands in the lower Gulf: Greater and Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa. King Faysal believed that if a new Median Line could be extended through the lower Gulf, then, similar to the division of al-Farisi and al-Arabiya, the islands on Iran’s side of the line—Sirri Island and the two Tunb islands—would fall under Iranian sovereignty, while Abu Musa, which would be on the Arab side of the new median line, would remain under Arab sovereignty.31 This was the “package deal” envisioned by the Saudis.32 However, in mid-1968, Iran had a very different conception of a “package deal.” The Shah believed if he was to relinquish Iran’s claim to Bahrain, then he would need all three of the disputed lower Gulf islands that Iran maintained legally and historically belonged under Iranian sovereignty. The Saudi flexibility in the 1968 median line negotiations over the disputed oil-rich Fereydun/Marjan offshore field was not, as King Faysal might have hoped, met with Iranian flexibility on an islands package. The median line negotiations in mid-1968 were both a success and failure. On the one hand they demonstrated that the Saudis and Iranians could work with one another on important issues of mutual material interest, and, if the monarchs were willing, to compromise. In this sense, the median line negotiations were a positive, confidence-building step between Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, on the other hand, the Saudi desire to use the median line talks as a springboard to come to a broader understanding with Iran on Bahrain and Iran’s other territorial claims in the Gulf came to nothing and left King Faysal feeling as if the Shah was “inflexible” and “unreasonable.” The Shah, for his part, believed the Gulf rulers were not sufficiently attentive to his prestige—which he equated with that of Iran and considered it an issue of both regime and regional security. These mutual perceptions of one another, in mid-1968, perpetuated a lingering sense of mistrust between the two rulers despite their shared interests and increased cooperation. 31  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 24 July 1968, 04868 241023Z, RG 59. 32  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 23 October 1968, Jidda 05718 241041Z, RG 59.

62 

B. FRIEDMAN

Iran to Replace the British? With Bahrain’s status still unresolved, the Shah attempted to balance his hostile public posture toward the union of nine with a more active diplomatic outreach to the lower Gulf rulers in the summer and fall of 1968.33 Shaykh Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qasimi, the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, was elaborately hosted in Iran during a ten-day visit from 15–25 August. As a sign of the length the Shah went to make a positive impression on his neighbor, Shaykh Saqr was met at the airport by Prime Minister Hoveyda, SAVAK Chief Nematollah Nassiri, State Police Chief Mohsen Mobasser, and Grandmaster of Ceremonies of the Imperial Court Hormuz Qarib. The Kuwaiti and Saudi Ambassadors were also present at Saqr’s arrival. On 17 August, the Shah treated Saqr to an exhibition of Iran’s modern military power during a tactical air show by the special airborne division of the Iranian Imperial Army and Air Force.34 Shaykh Saqr was also showered with gifts and given an audience with the Shah on 19 August. Saqr said that during meetings with Prime Minister Hoveyda and Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi, Iran’s claim to Bahrain was forcefully asserted, and Saqr was urged to oppose Bahrain’s inclusion in the union. When Saqr asked them whether Iran intended to take Bahrain by force, Zahedi answered that military occupation was far from their thoughts, though they had “other means,” which Saqr took to mean subversion.35 It also appears that Iran sounded out Saqr on the idea of purchasing Ras al-Khaimah’s claim to the two Tunb islands. Saqr is reported to have responded evasively by claiming that he believed the islands possessed unexplored oil and mineral wealth.36 On the day Saqr ended his visit to Iran, 25 August, the ruler of Fujairah, Shaykh Muhammad bin Hamad Al Sharqi, arrived for a ten-day visit. Iran’s foreign ministry official responsible for Persian Gulf affairs, Dr. Zandfard, described Shaykh Muhammad as intelligent, “shifty,” and “hard to pin down on anything, which is why he has been called the ‘wolf’ of the 33  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), pp. 49,67. 34   U.S.  Department of State Airgram, Tehran to Washington, 27 August 1968, A-786, RG 59. 35   British National Archives: Tehran to Foreign Office  – Eastern Department, M.C.S. Weston to A.J. Beamish, 29 August 1968, FO 248/1651. 36  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 29 August 1968, Tehran 06269 291730Z, RG 59.

3  ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 

63

Persian Gulf.”37 Despite the fact that Iran had no outstanding territorial disputes with Fujairah, Shaykh Muhammad was still accorded the same elaborate hospitality that Shaykh Saqr received, including similar gifts and reception by the same high-level officials, with one important exception:38 Shaykh Muhammad of Fujairah was not treated to a high-powered military air show during his visit, as Shaykh Saqr had been just days before. This suggests that while the Shah’s elaborate hospitality toward his Gulf neighbors was designed, in part, to convince them of his good intentions, his display of modern aerial military power was, perhaps, a not-so-subtle warning to Shaykh Saqr with whom he had an outstanding territorial dispute over the Tunb islands. Throughout August 1968 the Shah pursued a forward diplomatic policy in the Gulf which appeared designed to convince the ruling shaykhs that the future stability of the Gulf could be managed by riparian powers, without interference from outside the Gulf. For example, there was a report of an Iranian SAVAK official visiting Shaykh Zayid in Abu Dhabi in August to question him about the nature of the large influx of Egyptians into the shaykhdom. On 20 August, Shaykh Ali, the son of the ruler of Ajman, met with Iranian officials in Bandar Abbas, and, on 2 September, Shaykh Ahmad Jasim Amin, the uncle of the ruler of Qatar also visited Iran. On July 21, the son of Shaykh Ahmad of Qatar arrived in Iran for six months of “military training” to prepare him to assume the post of commander-­in-chief of Qatar’s expanding armed forces. It is notable that Shaykh Ahmad seemed to be courting Iran’s support as much as Iran was attempting to project its influence in the Gulf through Qatar. Shaykh Ahmad was cultivating trade and expanding ties with Iran as a means to balance its longstanding lineage and religious ties with Saudi Arabia, and to  avoid Saudi dominance. Ahmad may have also thought stronger ties with Iran would give it leverage in its maneuvering for leadership of the nascent union of shaykhdoms, particularly given the longstanding rivalry between Qatar and Bahrain. In essence, Qatar saw itself as cultivating what it perceived to be the leading regional military power, Iran, as a means to support its authority within the community of shaykhdoms—where Qatar faced resistance and competition from Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi and Shaykh ʿIsa of Bahrain— and to balance the strength of the Saudi influence on the littoral rulers. An  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Tehran to Washington, 31 August 1968, A-797.  Ibid.

37 38

64 

B. FRIEDMAN

oversimplification of Shaykh Ahmad’s maneuvering would be to say he was using Saudi support to limit Shaykh Zayid’s ambition in the union and Iranian support to constrain Bahrain’s Shaykh ʿIsa. Perhaps a better way to characterize this kind of diplomacy would be to say it was designed to protect and maximize Qatar’s independence of action and to create external legitimacy for its claim to authority within the union. Iran’s diplomatic charm offensive directed at the Gulf rulers in August 1968 was intended to blunt the sharp edge of its public rhetoric against the establishment of a union of shaykhdoms, and to convince its smaller neighbors that Iran could ensure the security of the Gulf, without the need for an external power. The Shah perceived (1) establishing a union of shaykhdoms, (2) resolving the claim on Bahrain, and (3) settling the question of sovereignty and control over Abu Musa and the Tunb islands as interconnected. And for the Shah, the price of a peaceful settlement to these issues was ensuring an end to the British-enforced Gulf system that had circumscribed Iran’s power. The Shah was adamant that Britain would not “return through the back door,” suggesting the British would use the union as a mechanism for institutionalizing its influence in the Gulf. In fact, in mid-August Britain’s Conservative Party chief, Edward Heath, delivered a speech in Australia suggesting when the Conservative party returned to power in Great Britain it would retain British forces in the Gulf. Heath’s statement triggered Sawt al-Arab (Voice of the Arabs) Radio of Cairo to renew its dormant propaganda campaign for Arab unity in the Persian Gulf.39 This renewal of Egyptian propaganda in the Gulf fueled the Shah’s perception that outside powers—particularly the Soviet Union, but also Britain and Egypt—had to be prevented from interfering in the Gulf.

 BNA: FO 1016/754.

39

3  ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 

65

Abu Musa and the Two Tunb Islands The strategic epicenter of the Gulf was the Strait of Hormuz. Abu Musa,40 Greater Tunb, and the Lesser Tunb41 are three small islands located close to the narrow mouth of the Persian Gulf, and very near to the Strait of Hormuz and the heart of the shipping lanes where oil tankers traffic into and out of the Gulf. For the Shah, Iran’s control over the disputed islands located near the strait was a security imperative imbued with what Iran perceived to be historical legitimacy. The British, as the dominant military power in the Gulf during the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, supported and enforced the Al Qawasim claim to ownership of these three islands. The Shaykh of Sharjah was considered the sovereign ruler of the island of Abu Musa, and the Shaykh of Ras al-Khaimah was considered the sovereign ruler of Greater and Lesser Tunb. Throughout the twentieth century, Iran challenged the British-backed Al Qawasim claim to sovereignty over the three islands and asserted its own claims to legitimate sovereignty over them. Iran viewed the British announcement of withdrawal in January 1968 as an opportunity to reestablish its rightful sovereign authority over the three Gulf islands. The quantity of scholarly analysis on this issue is voluminous,42 which attests to the longevity, complexity, and contentiousness of the dispute. However, the large majority of this scholarly work has focused on either 40  Abu Musa, located west of the Strait of Hormuz, and 45 miles from the coast of Sharjah, is a square-shaped island approximately 4.4 square miles by 4.4 square miles. Its total area is approximately 18.5 square miles. Its population in 1968 was approximately 700, and the island also had a school, a medical clinic, and a police post. There were radio links between the resident community and Sharjah. 41  Greater and Lesser Tunb, two islands, lie at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. Greater Tunb lies 16 miles from Iranian-owned Qeshm Island and is 7.5 miles long and 4.4 miles wide. Lesser Tunb is a triangular 1.3 miles long and 0.5 miles wide. It lies 8 miles west of Greater Tunb and is largely uninhabited. There were 200 subjects of Ras al-Khaimah living on Greater Tunb in 1968, including a governor (wali) appointed by Shaykh Saqr. It also had a lighthouse, a school, a police post, and a radio link with Ras al-Khaimah. 42  See, for example: Farhad Cyrus Sharifi-Yazdi, Arab-Iranian Rivalry in the Persian Gulf: Territorial Disputes and the Balance of Power in the Middle East (London and New  York: I.B. Tauris, Ltd., 2015). The most comprehensive work from the Arab perspective is Mattair; the most thorough study from the Iranian perspective in English are: Koroush Ahmadi, Islands and International Politics in the Persian Gulf (Routledge, 2008), and Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999).

66 

B. FRIEDMAN

the historical and/or legal legitimacy of each side’s claim. The relative legitimacy of either side’s claim is less important for the purpose of this narrative, which will, instead, focus on the contingent strategic and diplomatic elements of the dispute that were rooted in the period 1968 through 1971. The period of British withdrawal was a turning point in the history of this dispute because it afforded Iran the opportunity to reassess and attempt to revise the British-enforced status quo that had existed throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Early in 1968 Iran revived its claim to the three islands, which then became linked to Iran’s claim to Bahrain, and added another layer of complexity to finding a resolution to these issues. King Faysal and the Saudis understood that it would be politically challenging for the rulers of Ras al-Khaimah or Sharjah to strike a deal that would force them to cede territorial sovereignty of the islands to Iran, particularly if the ruling shaykhs believed the islands might possess rich mineral and/or offshore oil resources. Iran might be prepared to compensate the ruling shaykhs for the loss of material wealth the islands possessed; however, both the Saudis and the shaykhs knew that the current spirit of revolutionary Arab Nationalism sweeping the region would make the political cost of ceding “Arab” territory to Iran extremely high for an individual Arab ruler. Therefore, King Faysal was a forceful advocate of a union of nine shaykhdoms in 1968 because he believed it would provide a strong institutional framework through which the shaykhs could make a compromise with Iran and collectively withstand the consequences of revolutionary Arab nationalist subversion. Saudi Arabia was also pushing for a larger union, in part, to advance its own particular interests. King Faysal believed a union would be more accommodating than Shaykh Zayid in a future compromise on Saudi Arabia’s territorial claim to the Buraimi Oasis.43 With respect to Iran’s claim to the islands, in the spring of 1968 the Saudis took the liberty of advocating on behalf of the nascent union for some kind of “package deal,” where Iran renounced its claim to Bahrain, and the federation, as a “quid pro quo,” would then give Iran Greater and Lesser Tunb but retain Abu Musa. In fact, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Saudis explored this compromise solution with Iran during median line negotiations during the summer and fall of 1968 by offering to divide the islands by extending the median line into the lower gulf. 43  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), pp. 17–18.

3  ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 

67

However, instead of a median line package in which Iran would give up its claim to Abu Musa, the quid pro quo Iran was looking for was sovereign control over all three lower gulf islands and some kind of face-saving public referendum in Bahrain in exchange for renouncing its claim. The fundamental problem with these “packages” as one British official noted, was, that in the absence of an established union of shaykhdoms, a “quid” that went to Bahrain was exchanged for a “quo” taken from Ras al-Khaimah and/or Sharjah. The shaykhs were hardly a part of these package discussions that were largely held in private meetings between British, Saudi, and Iranian officials. In fact, early in 1968, during its exploratory discussions with the British, Iran realized it could use its willingness to renounce its claim to Bahrain as an instrument of leverage with which to strengthen its claim to the three lower gulf islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb. The Shah’s position was that he could not be seen as giving up Bahrain without receiving something meaningful in return. To do so would be a blow to his prestige, which the Shah strongly believed would weaken Iran’s domestic and regional security. Throughout the four-year period of British withdrawal, the Shah consistently justified his hardline demands on the issue of the lower Gulf islands by referring to his willingness to compromise on Bahrain.

Iran and Bahrain and Referendum Iranian officials, in contrast to public statements in 1968, privately articulated their belief that a strong union was important to secure the Gulf littoral from the threat of an Aden-style revolutionary subversion in the shaykhdoms. What remained unclear to the Gulf shaykhs was whether the Shah would countenance a union that included Bahrain. As noted earlier, Amir Khosrow Afshar had said that Iran did not oppose the union, but it could not be established before the Bahrain issue was resolved. In addition, behind closed doors the Shah and his top officials insisted that while they had no intention of invading or occupying Bahrain, Iran’s historical claim had to be respected. As a result, throughout the spring and summer of 1968 the Shah insisted that a plebiscite was the only “face-saving” mechanism that could induce him to publicly renounce his claim to Bahrain.

68 

B. FRIEDMAN

Shaykh ʿIsa and Saudi Arabia were both strongly opposed to a plebiscite to determine the question of Bahrain’s status. Bahrain’s population in 1968 was approximately 205,000 (182,000 according to a 1965 Census). The Iranian community in Bahrain was approximately 7000, the majority of whom were unskilled or transient laborers. Included among the 7000 were a number of Iranian small shopkeepers, tradesmen, and clerks, as well as a handful of prominent Iranian merchant families. The remaining non-­ Arab foreign communities were Indians (5000), Pakistanis (4000), and British (2000). There were a large number of Sunni and Ibhadi Arabs from Oman and other parts of the Arabian Peninsula, and the total number of non-Bahraini Arabs amounted to 18,000. Of the remaining Bahraini population, there were approximately 80,000 Sunnis, 80,000 Arab Shiʿa, and 200–300 Jews. The Sunni population included several thousand families known as the Huwala. The Huwala were Arabs who migrated from the Arabian Peninsula to the southern Persian coast in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when it was under Arab control, and then migrated from the Persian coast to Bahrain in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century. Many of Bahrain’s leading merchant families were Huwala, spoke Persian and Arabic, and proud of both their Persian culture and Sunni faith. In contrast to the Sunni Huwala, the majority of the Arab Shiʿa in Bahrain are known as the “Baharna.” They believe themselves to be the indigenous population of Bahrain, and resent the Sunni domination of the island-­ archipelago. Culturally, the Baharna were said to look to Iraq’s Shiʿa rather than Iran, but there was a tendency for them to marry brides from southern Iran because “the price is cheaper and the girls are prettier.”44 There was little question in 1968 that Bahrain’s population viewed itself culturally and politically as “Arab,” rather than Persian. Yet, Shaykh ʿIsa, and the ruling Al Khalifa, were still dead-against taking any kind of public vote on the question of Bahrain’s independence. There were three primary reasons. First, the ruler was against the idea of an electoral process in decision making, which by definition would undermine its shaykhly authority. Second, the idea of presenting their subjects with the option that Bahrain was something other than the Al Khalifah domain was virtually unthinkable for the more conservative elements of 44  BNA: Bahrain to Foreign Office, A.D. Parsons, 17 June 1968, FO 248/1652; Bahrain to Foreign Office, 4 August 1968, FO 248/1672; U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Department of State, Washington to Tehran, 9 August 1968, 218552, RG 59.

3  ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 

69

the family. And, third, they feared that the voting process itself would trigger a wave of revolutionary Arab nationalist demonstrations and public unrest that would threaten the regime’s grip on power. Public unrest may have been the most important element of Shaykh ʿIsa’s objection to the plebiscite; the specter of the Sunni-Shiʿi street clashes of the early 1950s was still fresh in the ruler’s mind.45 King Faysal of Saudi Arabia also objected to the idea of plebiscite to resolve the question of Bahrain’s status, for many of the same reasons that Shaykh ʿIsa outlined. Further, the Saudis were concerned that a plebiscite would set a dangerous precedent for the other Gulf shaykhdoms, and would become a tool Arab revolutionaries would use to subvert the rulers. In May 1968, the Shah was convinced that the only way to secure Bahrain from the threat of Soviet-backed Arab revolutionaries—part of what the Shah referred to as imperialism by proxy—was to hold a public referendum on Bahrain’s status, ensure that Iranians on Bahrain had equal rights, and create a multilateral defense agreement between Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia with joint-forces stationed at the current British military facilities in Bahrain.46 He claimed that a survey of public opinion among Bahrainis would permit him to withdraw Iran’s historical claim without losing prestige. The appearance of the settlement for the Shah was as important as the substance. By the end of July, perhaps in recognition of King Faysal’s resistance to the idea of a plebiscite, the Shah was privately considering alternatives. The Shah asked American officials to explore the possibility of registering a complaint against the British with the U.N. Security Council or obtaining an opinion from the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).47 In early August, the Kuwaiti foreign minister returned from a private meeting with the Shah in Tehran with a plan to broker secret talks between Bahrain and Iran. Bahraini Deputy Ruler Shaykh Khalifah was to meet 45  BNA: Bahrain to Foreign Office, A.D. Parsons, 17 June 1968, FO 248/1672; see, also: Rowena Abdul Razak “When Guns Are Not Enough: Britain’s Response to Nationalism in Bahrain, 1958–63,” Journal of Arabian Studies 7:1 (2017), 63–80; Sir Charles Belgrave, Personal Column (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1972). 46  U.S. Department of State of Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 21 May 1968, Tehran 04864 220830Z, RG 59. 47  U.S. Department of State Telegram (Secret EXDIS), Secretary of State to Tehran, 31 July 1968, 212152; U. S. Department of State Telegram, Washington to Tehran, 30 July 1968, 214602, R 59. This material provides the missing documentation alluded to in Al Saud, p. 146, footnote 130.

70 

B. FRIEDMAN

with Iranian Foreign Minister Zahedi in Geneva, Switzerland.48 During the first of these secret meetings held in Geneva in September 1968, there were three options discussed for resolving the Bahrain issue. These options were (1) a plebiscite, (2) U.N. mediation, or (3) arbitration at the ICJ at The Hague in the Netherlands.49 Iran expressed its preference for the plebiscite solution, but the Bahrainis remained staunchly opposed to this idea. The Bahrainis agreed to explore the merits of the other options. The two sides did not reach an agreement, but agreed to continue the bilateral talks later in the year. Throughout the summer of 1968, the Shah reached out to the Gulf shaykhs, attempting to demonstrate his good intentions and his desire to find an acceptable compromise to outstanding disputes. However, what was acceptable to Iran did not necessarily seem acceptable to the Gulf shaykhs. Bahrain’s Shaykh ʿIsa remained alarmed by his exposure to Iran’s claim, and felt squeezed between two unattractive options: Iran’s proposal for a plebiscite and Saudi Arabia’s desire to see Bahrain absorbed in a tight union of Gulf shaykhdoms. Shaykh ʿIsa strongly rejected a public referendum that might undermine the legitimacy of his authority, question the Arab character of the island, and trigger public unrest. And as for the union favored by the Saudis, Bahrain was cooperating, but Shaykh ʿIsa was far from resigned to the idea of ceding his political authority to a union that would be dominated by Qatar, Bahrain’s less-populated historical rival.

Jockeying for Dominance in the Union Despite tentative confidence building diplomacy between Iran and Saudi Arabia regarding a Gulf median line, and Iran’s attempt to reach out to the smaller Gulf shaykhdoms, there was a still little progress toward solidarity among the Gulf shaykhs: Shaykh ʿIsa was busy searching for a way to resolve Bahrain’s standoff with Iran; Shaykh Ahmad was using the larger regional players to legitimize Qatar’s bid to lead the federation; while Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi used the summer to strengthen his claim to authority and legitimacy in the lower Gulf.

 BNA: Kuwait to Foreign Office, G. G. Arthur, 13 August 1968, FO 248/1672.  Roham Alvandi, “Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question, 1968–1970,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2010, p. 167. 48 49

3  ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 

71

Shaykh Zayid was active during the summer of August 1968. In addition to using his oil-wealth to  earn the support of the rulers of Ajman, Fujairah, and Umm al-Qaiwain, British officials reported that Zayid regularly met with the desert tribal leaders in the interior of Oman who looked upon Shaykh Zayid favorably.50 Zayid also attempted to purchase influence with prominent merchant families in Dubai as a means to weaken Shaykh Rashid and build support in Dubai.51 Shaykh Zayid contributed large amounts of money to the Trucial Coast Development Fund ($3.5 million),52 which directly benefited the infrastructure development in the less prosperous Gulf shaykhdoms and was used to pay for the Trucial Oman Scouts military force.53 Zayid’s activities suggest that despite his public declarations in support for the union of nine, he was working to cultivate support primarily among the seven Trucial shaykhdoms. This was the suspicion of Zayid’s principal union rival, Shaykh Ahmad of Qatar. Shaykh Zayid’s focus on the lower seven shaykhdoms did not mean he opposed a union of nine; he may in fact have been fully committed to a grouping of nine in October 1968 and his actions in the lower gulf were merely a means to legitimate his own leadership claim by cementing a majority backing from among the rulers.54 Alternatively, he may have been hedging his bets in the event that a union of nine proved unworkable. In the meantime, Shaykh Ahmad of Qatar was trying to use Saudi Arabia’s dispute with Abu Dhabi over Buraimi as a means to weaken Shaykh Zayid’s claim to union leadership, and Iran’s dispute with Bahrain to neutralize Shaykh ʿIsa’s influence as the largest shaykhdom in the union. The jockeying for leadership of the union continued on 8 September 1968, during the first meeting of the Provisional Federal Council, which took place in Doha. The council was chaired by Qatar’s Deputy Ruler Shaykh Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani, and, consisted largely of the hereditary successors to each of the shaykhdoms. Crown Prince Shaykh Maktum bin Rashid Al Maktum of Dubai was appointed deputy chairman of the  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, 7 July 1969, A-105, RG 59.  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 29 July 1968, Dhahra 01043 300505Z, RG 59. 52  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, 16 October 1968, A-197, RG 59; U.S. Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 29 July 1968, Dhahra 01043 300505Z, RG59. 53   U.S.  Department of State Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, 21 August 1968, A-176, RG 59. 54  Indeed, Taryam makes this argument, see: p. 107. 50 51

72 

B. FRIEDMAN

council. The council’s biggest achievement was institutionalizing the differences between the rulers. At the council’s first meeting a heated dispute arose between Bahrain and Qatar regarding whether the council possessed the authority to discuss defense issues.55 Qatar, supported only by Ras al-­ Khaimah, believed the council was entitled to debate defense issues and to provide the Supreme Council with recommendations. Bahrain, supported by Abu Dhabi, Fujairah, and Umm al-Qaiwain, opposed the council’s attempt to discuss defense matters. The disharmony could be measured by the fact that Shaykh Zayid even objected to the Provisional Federal Council’s work being labeled as “resolutions.” In a mid-September letter to Shaykh Ahmad of Qatar, Zayid maintained that the “resolutions” should be considered “proposals” or “recommendations” since they still had to be ratified by the Supreme Council.56 The September meeting of the Provisional Federal Council resulted in little, apart from institutionally reinforcing the competition among the leaders to assert their authority over the union. The September meeting also stirred up rumors in the Arab media. Lebanon-based al-Hayat reported that the rulers, fearing Soviet influence in the Gulf, had implemented a “secret resolution” in Doha to appeal to the British to reverse their decision to withdraw.57 In fact, attempts at secret diplomacy during the summer of 1968 involved Kuwaiti attempts to induce Mohammad Reza Shah to reconcile with Egyptian President Abdel Nasser.58 However, the Shah had no intention of reconciling with Egypt. He still considered Egypt the principal instrument of potential Soviet subversion in the Gulf.59 The Shah closely monitored the flow of Egyptians into the shaykhdoms,60 and was concerned about rumors that Shaykh Zayid was considering opening a diplomatic office in Cairo.61 Shaykh Zayid, however, was talking with Cairo as means to maneuver against the  Taryam, pp. 105–106.  Taryam, p. 106. 57  Al-Hayat, 10 September 1968. 58  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Kuwait to Washington, 8 August 1968, Kuwait 01388 081107Z, R 59. 59  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 4 July 1968, Tehran 05581 041324Z; RG 59. 60  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 12 October 1968, Tehran 06907 120943Z, RG 59; U.S. Department of State Airgram; Jidda to Washington, 31 July 1968, A-161, RG 59; BNA: Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Bahrain, 25 October 1968, Telegram 1103, FCO 8/938. 61  Ibid. 55 56

3  ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 

73

Saudi influence among rival rulers in the union.62 Zayid believed his maneuvering would provide him with more autonomy and counter his union rivals’ reliance on the Saudis, yet his rivals (particularly Qatar) were seeking Saudi backing because they suspected Zayid was the chosen instrument of the British to lead the union.63 In early October, in the weeks leading up to the next meeting of the Supreme Council of the union, Shaykh Khalifah of Qatar was in Saudi Arabia meeting with King Faysal, while Shaykh Rashid of Dubai was in Iran. Rashid generally aligned with Qatar during the union meetings but seemed to be maneuvering between Qatar and Abu Dhabi, also attempting to leverage his relationships with the larger regional powers to maintain his political autonomy and avoid Shaykh Zayid’s dominance in the lower Gulf.64 The summer of vigorous diplomatic activity among the shaykhdoms themselves, and between the shaykhdoms and Iran and Saudi Arabia, did produce tangible reasons for optimism. In spite of positive progress toward the union during the rulers’ July meeting in Abu Dhabi, Iran had harshly condemned the union in the aftermath of the meeting. Yet, in contrast to Iran’s July statements, during Shaykh Rashid’s October visit to Iran, Iranian Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda publicly expressed Iran’s desire to coexist with all of the shaykhdoms in peace.65 Therefore, despite outstanding differences with Iran regarding Bahrain and the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs, there was reason to believe continued progress might be expected from the nine shaykhs during the 20–22 October meeting of the Supreme Council of Rulers. Shaykh Ahmad chaired the Supreme Council meeting in Doha at the end of October.66 The most important outcome of the meeting was a resolution for the establishment of armed forces for the federation, including army, navy, and air force branches. The federation forces were to have  Ibid.  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, 8 April 1968, A-109, RG 59; U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 7 April 1968, Dhahra 00784 071102Z, RG 59. 64  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 20. 65  Kayhan, 10 October 1968. 66  For the most detailed account of this meeting, see: A.O. Taryam, pp. 107–110. See also, U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 23 October 1968, Jidda 05716 231556Z, RG 59. 62 63

74 

B. FRIEDMAN

unified command and training. However, the resolution also protected the member shaykhdoms’ right to establish local armed forces, which allowed the council to sidestep an important point of contention but at the same time also created an ongoing source for competition within the union. The major source of conflict during the meetings was the issue that Shaykh Zayid wrote to Shaykh Ahmad about following the September Provisional Federal Council meeting: Did the Provisional Federal Council have the authority to make “resolutions,” or was it only allowed to present “recommendations” to the Supreme Council? This issue was important only because it openly revealed the animosity between Bahrain and Qatar, and the opposition between the Bahrain/Abu Dhabi axis (supported by Ajman, Fujairah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Qaiwain) and the Qatar/Dubai/ Ras al-Khaimah axis within the union. This division as well as the personal suspicions (al-washushāt al-­ shakhsiyya) between the rulers was fueled by the legacy of historical territorial disputes and rivalries, but also rooted in the contemporary competition for supremacy within the newly established union.67 Differences within the Supreme Council were adjudicated by a majority vote, so in the case of intractable disputes the Bahrain/Abu Dhabi axis held the majority. Prior to the October meeting, the ruler of Qatar suspected that Shaykh Zayid was maneuvering for a smaller union of the seven lower Gulf shaykhdoms that he would be able to dominate. Yet Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi held a double advantage within the union at this stage. Not only did his axis possess a numerical majority over his historical rivals Qatar and Dubai, but his ally, Shaykh ʿIsa of Bahrain, was not a serious rival for leadership of the union because all of the shaykhs understood that Iran would not tolerate a Bahrain-led federation. Further, at this stage, it was still not clear to the shaykhs whether Iran would even support a federation that included Bahrain.68 To a certain extent, the ruling shaykhs were waiting to see whether the Shah’s November visit to Saudi Arabia would produce an understanding that would minimize, or even eliminate, Iran’s territorial claims as an obstacle to establishing the union.

67  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 40. 68  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 40.

3  ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 

75

Toward Reconciliation? Mohammad Reza Shah arrived at Riyadh Airport in Saudi Arabia at 11:00am on 9 November, where he was greeted by King Faysal and the royal family.69 The Shah’s five-day visit was an important-step in the highly sensitive relationship between the two monarchs. The meetings between Mohammad Reza and Faysal would be their first face-to-face meeting since the January announcement of British withdrawal and would constitute an important test for whether there was common ground for future regional cooperation. In October, Iranian officials had informed the Saudis that the Shah planned on raising three specific issues with King Faysal during his visit: Bahrain, the disputed Abu Musa and Tunb islands, and the union of shaykhdoms.70 However, despite the importance of coming to an understanding on these particular issues, perhaps the most important outstanding question was whether Faysal and Mohammad Reza could develop a personal rapport and mutual goodwill, which would be a significant factor in determining whether it would be possible to smoothly resolve the more particular contentious issues. During their private talks, the two monarchs had a chance to speak frankly about Bahrain, which was the issue that caused the postponement of the Shah’s February visit. King Faysal told the Shah that Bahrain was an Arab state, despite what its ethnic composition may have been at an earlier period, and that the Shah should recognize Bahrain’s independence.71 He could no more accept an Iranian claim to Bahrain then he could an Iraqi or Kuwaiti claim.72 The Shah claimed that he could not renounce Iran’s claim because of domestic sentiment and preferred a plebiscite to determine Bahrain’s future status. The Shah explained that if he gave up Iran’s claim to Bahrain, a future successor might question his right to have done so.73 The Shah outlined the three possible paths for the Bahrain issue: continued hostility, referral to the U.N., or a plebiscite or any other public 69   U.S.  Department of State Airgram, Jidda to Washington, 21 November 1968, A-613, RG 59. 70  Al Saud, pp. 48–49. 71  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 16 November 1968, Jidda 05987 161326Z, RG 59. 72  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 21 November, Jidda 06043 210837Z, RG 59. 73  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 16 November 1968, Jidda 05987 161326Z, RG 59.

76 

B. FRIEDMAN

consultation compatible with U.N. procedures.74 King Faysal acknowledged the Shah’s domestic constraints, but said that a plebiscite was not feasible because the ruler of Bahrain could not be expected to call into question his right to rule. King Faysal then compared Iran’s claim on Bahrain to Saudi Arabia’s claim on Buraimi. He suggested that the Shah quietly shelve his claim to Bahrain, the way King Faysal had shelved his claim to Buraimi.75 The implication in King Faysal’s suggestion was that the issue could be revisited, or the claim revived, at some less contentious point in the future. King Faysal claimed that some public gesture was needed. The two monarchs did not reach an agreement on the issue, but the Shah agreed to further consider the matter in order to find a way out of the impasse. The Shah emphasized that he would  continue to oppose a union that included Bahrain for as long as Iran’s claim on Bahrain issue was not addressed. This last point may have been a source of misunderstanding between the Iranians and the Saudis. The archival records indicate that following the Shah’s visit the Saudis believed Iran would not accept a union that included Bahrain. However, what the Shah had said was that he would oppose a union as long as the Bahrain issue went unresolved. Foreign Minister Zahedi and his deputy, Amir Khosrow Afshar, also maintained that Iran would not oppose a union that included Bahrain after the Bahrain issue was resolved to Iran’s satisfaction.76 Apart from the issues of Bahrain and the union, King Faysal expressed his preference for security cooperation between all the riparian powers, including Iraq and Kuwait. The Shah supported Kuwait’s inclusion but expressed reservations regarding Iraq’s “willingness or ability” to cooperate, and noted that the political situation in Iraq was “completely unstable.” When the Shah stressed Iran’s “security interest” in the lower Gulf islands, King Faysal demurred that this was not Saudi territory to give away.77 The two monarchs agreed to cooperate to combat Soviet and communist influence in the Middle East, and to protect the Gulf shaykhdoms from subversive threats. The Shah was impressed with the depth of Faysal’s 74  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 24 November 1968, 07432 240850Z, RG 59. 75  U.S.  Department of State Intelligence Note, Director of Intelligence and Research, “Iran-Saudi Arabia-Kuwait,” 22 November 1968, RG 59. 76  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 22 November 1968, Tehran 07406 220952Z, RG 59. 77  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 14 November 1968, Jidda 05979 141537Z, RG 59.

3  ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 

77

animosity toward communism,78 while Saudi Minister of State Saqqaf expressed surprise and pleasure with what he viewed as the “depth” of Foreign Minister Zahedi’s feelings regarding the need for Israeli withdrawal from “occupied territory, including Jerusalem.” Saqqaf said that the Shah’s public statement calling for “the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territory” would help the Saudis with the other Arab states.79 The Shah’s visit may not have produced breakthroughs on any specific issue, but the Shah believed the trip was a success because it built mutual confidence, while King Faysal characterized it more mildly as “helpful.” King Faysal said that his decision to renegotiate and compromise on the 1965 median line agreement to Iran’s benefit was meant to demonstrate Saudi goodwill and its desire for cooperation with Iran.80 Iranian Foreign Minister Zahedi and his chief deputy Amir Khosrow Afshar were extremely positive about the meetings, saying they were excellent, and that they were highly impressed with King Faysal and his Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, ʿUmar Saqqaf. Saqqaf said the meeting was important because it increased the rapport and mutual understanding between Mohammad Reza and Faysal. The warm tone and language used in their exchange of messages following the visit was a strong indication this new respect for each other, according to Saqqaf.81 The success of the visit was an important step forward in the Saudi-Iranian relationship, and had important ramifications for the outstanding regional disputes. As Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi had explained to the Shah during his early November visit to Iran, the shaykhdoms had been marking time in order to take their lead from the Mohammad Reza-Faysal meetings.82 Progress in the Saudi-Iranian relationship can be attributed, in part, to a mutual fear that revolutionary subversive elements were feeling empowered by British withdrawal. In mid-November 1968, the Dhofar Liberation 78  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 24 November 1968, Tehran 07432 240850Z, RG 59. 79  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 16 November 1968, Jidda 05987 161326Z. 80  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 21 November 1968, Jidda 06043 210837Z, RG 59. 81  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 16 November 1968, Jidda 05987 161326Z, RG 59. 82  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 4 November 1968, Tehran 07170 041354Z.

78 

B. FRIEDMAN

Front (“DLF”), which was established in June 1965 and conducting a small-scale insurgency against the Sultan in the western most region of Muscat and Oman, near the border with South Yemen (The  People’s Republic of South Yemen), announced that it was going to change its name to the People’s Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (“PFLOAG”). The announcement was published in the revolutionary Arab nationalist publication October 14 in Aden, South Yemen. The announcement was a product of a September DLF conference that was held in the Hamrin valley, which, among other things, called for “organizing revolutionary violence as the only means to defeat imperialism, reaction, the bourgeoisie, and feudalism” in the “occupied” Arabian Gulf.83 In June, the group had publicly condemned the new union of shaykhdoms as a British imperial tool.

Iran and the Tunb Islands As summer turned into fall in 1968, the Shah publicly expressed opposition to a union of nine shaykhdoms that was conceived without consulting Iran on the matter of Bahrain’s inclusion. Later, during his private meetings with King Faysal in November, Iran attempted to make it clear that it would continue to oppose a union as long as the issue of Bahrain went unresolved. Iran attempted to make it clear to Saudi Arabia and the shaykhs that Bahrain’s status had to be addressed before Iran would cooperate with the union. For Iran, settling the outstanding questions Bahrain and the union of nine shaykhdoms was also explicitly linked to satisfying its claims to the three lower Gulf islands. In late October 1968, the Shah renewed his effort to convince Ras al-­ Khaimah to come to an agreement with Iran on the Tunb islands. The Shah had opened preliminary direct discussions on the issue with Shaykh Saqr during the ruler’s visit at the end of August, offering the ruler an unspecified sum of money for use of the islands. During the last week of October, Shaykh Saqr’s son, Shaykh Khalid, traveled to Tehran and met with Iran’s Deputy Prime Minister and head of the SAVAK, General Nematollah Nassiri, twice to discuss an Iranian-proposed agreement on 83  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Aden to Washington, 20 November 1968, A-172, RG 59; U.S.  Department of State Airgram, Aden to Washington, 27 November 1968, A-175, RG 59; Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 366–370.

3  ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 

79

the Tunb islands. According to Shaykh Khalid, the Iranians were “fanatical” about the islands.84 Nassiri took a heavy-handed approach to the ruler’s son. He said that the Tunbs had been taken from Iran by the British, who were now trying to give them to Ras al-Khaimah. He said this “was like borrowing a car and then giving it to someone else. It could not be allowed.” Shaykh Khalid told Nassiri that in return for an agreement on the islands, Ras al-Khaimah was asking Iran for (1) an arms package, (2) a loan, and (3) the construction of a 30 kilometer road from Ras al-Khaimah to the village of Sha’am.85 Nassiri complained that the cost of these three items was excessive. Nassiri explained to Khalid that a new median line agreement had been struck with Saudi Arabia and the Tunb islands were on the Iranian side of the line. In fact, this kind of median line extension into the lower Gulf had not been agreed upon between Saudi Arabia and Iran because Iran would not give up its claim to Abu Musa. Nassiri pressured Ras al-Khaimah to accept Iran’s proposal on the Tunb islands in the ten days left before the Shah’s state visit to Saudi Arabia in early November or risk losing Iran’s friendship and cooperation.86 Iran’s proposed agreement and statement, to be signed by the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, would have granted Iran de facto control of the islands for “defense purposes,” in exchange for unspecified “aid and assistance.” The brief statement made the arrangement sound like an open-ended lease which would give Iran clear control over the islands. Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah refused to be strong-armed into a premature agreement and did not respond within the time frame Nassiri was demanding. The negotiations between Shaykh Saqr’s representatives and General Nassiri continued into November and December in 1968, but ultimately produced no agreement because Iran refused to include in a written agreement any reference—implicit or explicit—that suggested Ras al-Khaimah owned the islands. The issue of sovereignty was the critical point for both sides. Iran was reluctant to commit any step that could be construed as prejudicing its historical claim to sovereignty, while Shaykh Saqr feared that if he was viewed as giving up ownership of the islands he would be attacked by revolutionary Arab nationalist groups.  BNA: Dubai to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 30 October 1968, FCO 8/960-1.  BNA: Dubai to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2 November 1968, FCO 8/960-1. 86  BNA: Dubai to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 30 October 1968 and 2 November 1968, FCO 8/960-1. 84 85

80 

B. FRIEDMAN

The negotiations broke down in late December when a British attorney, Richard Weston, who was engaged to represent Shaykh Saqr and Ras al-Khaimah, traveled to Iran to meet with General Nassiri. Weston’s attempts to negotiate modifications to the terms of the Iranian agreement were met with indignant refusal by General Nassiri. Nassiri’s aide, Ali Farazian, told Weston twice during his visit that Iran would simply take the islands by force when it suited them if Shaykh Saqr was not willing to sign the agreement.87 During median line negotiations with Iran between June and October, Saudi Arabia had unsuccessfully explored the idea of dividing the islands between Iran and the union based on the new median line extended into the lower Gulf. This proposal would have given Iran control over the two Tunb islands and left ownership of Abu Musa in control of the union. These discussions may have convinced Iran that Saudi Arabia would be able to live with Iranian control over the Tunb islands. Iran resisted taking this package deal and instead tried to make a separate deal with Ras al-­ Khaimah, in part, because the Shah was unwilling to give up Abu Musa. In contrast to Bahrain, which the Shah consistently denigrated privately as a political tinderbox without natural resources or wealth, he viewed Abu Musa as a strategic asset. He considered Abu Musa as a site for a future Iranian naval base, and he also believed there were valuable untapped offshore oil reserves in its territorial waters. The Shah’s approach to settling the disputes between Iran and the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah was inextricably linked to Bahrain and the establishment of a union of shaykhdoms and were not treated in isolation.

A Sense of Urgency The maneuvering for power within the union illustrates how the ruling shaykhs thought about Gulf politics in terms of a system and acted accordingly. And they were not passive objects of great power or regional power rivalry; they were independently acting in the system: the shaykhs sought to advance their separate interests by actively exploiting Saudi-Iranian mistrust; Bahrain’s vulnerability to Iran’s claim to sovereignty; Abu Dhabi’s territorial dispute with Saudi Arabia; and even the Saudi-Iranian fear of Arab nationalist subversion. So, for example, British withdrawal revived 87  BNA: Richard Weston, Esq. to Shaikh Saqr Bin Mohammad bin Selim Al Qasimi (copy), 20 December 1968, FCO 8/960-1.

3  ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 

81

Iran’s claim on Bahrain. Shaykh Ahmad perceived Bahrain’s vulnerability as Qatar’s opportunity to assert its leadership within the union. British withdrawal both constrained and created opportunities for those acting in the Gulf system. However, there was still little sense among the ruling shaykhs that their interests and security could best be advanced collectively, as the British advised, through mutual cooperation in achieving common objectives. Instead, preserving freedom of action and either asserting or resisting dominance were still the primary goals of most of the ruling shaykhs in 1968. Or as Bahraini Crown Prince Hamad bin ʿIsa Al Khalifa put it, “The old jealousies would not be forgotten even in the face of common dangers created by an early British withdrawal.”88 The Shah and King Faysal perceived regional coordination with some sense of urgency during the second half of 1968. King Faysal repeatedly conveyed this to the ruling shaykhs, prodding them to establish a strong union of nine emirates, while toward the end of 1968 Mohammad Reza Shah pursued his desire to resolve the Bahrain matter “quickly.” This urgency can be attributed, in part, to regional and international developments in 1968 that were perceived as immediate threats to regional stability and security: The July Baʿthist revolution in Iraq, the announcement of the establishment of PFLOAG in Oman, growing concern that the Soviets were aspiring to establish a naval presence in the Persian Gulf, continued Soviet arms supplies to republican forces in Yemen Arab Republic, and the Soviet takeover in Czechoslovakia were all viewed as ominous developments in the eyes of King Faysal and Mohammad Reza Shah,89 and gave impetus to their perception that regional disputes should be resolved as quickly as possible in order to ensure stability and reduce the risk of communist-­supported subversion.90

 BNA: British Embassy Amman to Bahrain, 26 March 1968, FCO 8/523.  U.S.  Department of State Outgoing Telegram, Washington to Tehran, 25 October 1968, 261947, RG 59; U.S. Department of State, Jidda to Washington, 11 February 1968, Jidda 00002 111342Z, RG 59; U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 20 May 1968, Jidda 04064 201343Z, RG 59. 90  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), pp. 27, 41, 67. 88 89

CHAPTER 4

Iran: The British Successor in the Gulf?

On 4 January 1969, during a press conference in New Delhi, India, Mohammad Reza Shah declared, “if the people of Bahrain do not want to join my country first of all, it is against our principle to use force in order to reattach this land to ours.” This declaration was made without any prior notice to the region, yet it provided the “public gesture” on Bahrain that King Faysal had asked for during the Shah’s state visit to Saudi Arabia in November 1968. In the same declaration the Shah also defended Iran’s historical claim, arguing that Bahrain was separated from Iran and could not be offered by the British “to other people at our expense…That is one principle that we cannot accept.” Following this pugnacious assertion, the Shah struck a more conciliatory note, stating that “a cardinal and fundamental policy of my country is that we are against the use of force for the acquisition of territory against the will of that people…it is not even intelligent to try to occupy a land against the will of its people.”1 He concluded by offering a solution: “…anything that will be the expression of the will of the people of Bahrain, we, you, the world will recognize as the will of the people of that island.” The Shah’s declaration that Iran would not use force to make good on its historical claim to Bahrain was unilateral. It was not prepared in consultation or discussed in coordination with any of the major Gulf actors. His 1  Tehran Journal, 6 January 1969 in BNA: Tehran to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 18, 6 January 1969, FCO 8/939.

© The Author(s) 2020 B. Friedman, The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1971, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56182-6_4

83

84 

B. FRIEDMAN

remarks in New Delhi surprised British officials in Tehran, who deemed it of “major importance.”2 The Iranian daily newspaper Kayhan, which often closely reflected the views of the Shah, argued that the Shah’s statement introduced “a far greater flexibility to a dispute which appeared headed to a deadlock,” because “…the Shah has left fairly open the manner in which the Bahraini view can be expressed.” It also added that “Iran has shown, by this [statement] that it is willing to be reasonable and that it wants the Bahrainis themselves to decide whether they wish to be part of Iran, or independent.” Lastly, the editorial concluded with a friendly ultimatum to Iran’s Gulf neighbors: “Those countries interested in the stability of the Persian Gulf would do well to bend their efforts now to make the ShahanShah’s proposal acceptable…”3 It is therefore, important to note that while the Shah’s statement was a major breakthrough for the region, Iran was also unilaterally setting the terms for the future of Bahrain without first consulting with Shaykh ʿIsa, the British, or the other Gulf rulers. In November 1968, the Shah and King Faysal had created an opening for positive cooperation in the Gulf as a result of their meetings during the Shah’s state visit to Saudi Arabia. These meetings created a significant change in the Iranian perception of the Saudis as a potential partner in the Gulf, particularly for Mohammad Reza Shah and his Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi. While King Faysal may have felt somewhat cooler toward the Iranians, the November meetings played a big part in moving the Shah toward his 4 January, New Delhi, statement in which he stated Iran would not use violence to pursue its claim on Bahrain. Yet, despite the breakthrough statement that was the “public gesture” King Faysal had been looking for, relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia did not exhibit any greater sense of cooperation or coordination during the first three months of 1969. As a result of the November 1968 meetings, ʿUmar Saqqaf and Ardeshir Zahedi, were supposed to begin meeting regularly to coordinate Gulf affairs. By early April 1969, there still had not been any meetings between the two ministerial counterparts. This strained Saudi-Iranian relations when a major crisis erupted between Iran and Iraq over the Shatt al-Arab at the end of March 1969. 2  BNA: Tehran to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 6 January 1969, Telegram No. 21, FCO 8/939. 3  Kayhan International, 6 January 1968; BNA: Tehran to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 6 January 1969, Telegram No. 21, FCO 8/939.

4  IRAN: THE BRITISH SUCCESSOR IN THE GULF? 

85

Kuwait’s Mediation: Iran and Bahrain Shaykh ʿIsa viewed the Shah’s January remarks in New Delhi as constructive but was still extremely apprehensive about a U.N. assessment of public opinion in Bahrain. Secret negotiations with Iran being conducted through the Kuwaitis were supposed to provide Shaykh ʿIsa with a greater comfort level regarding a U.N. brokered solution, but ʿIsa was still very much afraid that any visit to the islands by a U.N. representative would trigger internal unrest and result in Sunni-Shiʿi violence. He preferred sending Bahraini political representatives to the U.N. in New  York in order to avoid having them come to Bahrain and “stirring up trouble.”4 A U.N. option had gained some added traction during secret meetings between Iran and Bahrain in Geneva in September 1968. The Iranians had rejected the two Bahraini proposals: (1) that Iran recognize a union of emirates which included Bahrain or (2) Iran acquiesce to Bahrain’s admission to the U.N. as an independent “mini-state.” The Bahrainis had rejected the Iranian proposals of a plebiscite or arbitration in the U.N.’s International Court of Justice, but remained open to a third proposal which was some kind of U.N. mediation that had yet to be defined in detail.5 In December 1968, the British began to actively explore the details of a potential U.N. fact-finding mission to Bahrain. Several meetings between Abbas Massoudi, publisher of the influential Iranian newspaper Ettela’at and Vice President of Iran’s Senate, and the British Ambassador to Iran, Sir Denis Wright, on 7, 9, and 21 December, led to Wright meeting with Shah on 24 December, Christmas Eve, to discuss the possibility of pursuing a U.N.-administered fact-finding mission to Bahrain. What was essential, according to the Shah, was that the will of the Bahraini people be ascertained in an international and legally recognizable way. In mid-December, Lord Caradon, the British Representative to the U.N. in New  York, held at least two secret discussions with U.N. Undersecretary-General Ralph Bunche about the possibility of asking the Secretary-General’s office to conduct an inquiry into the will of the Bahraini people on the question of independence. The British were discreetly sounding out Bunche in order to find a solution that limited the 4  BNA: Bahrain to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 January, Telegram No. 8, FCO 8/939; Bahrain to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 6 January 1968, Telegram No. 6, FCO 8/939. 5  BNA: Bahrain to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 11 December 1968, FCO 8/938.

86 

B. FRIEDMAN

role of the U.N. to the Secretary-General’s office, without involving the U.N.  Security Council, the General Assembly, or the Committee of 24 (also known as the Special Committee on Decolonization, est. 1961). Iran recognized that a protracted public debate on the issue of Bahrain in any of the U.N.’s larger forums would stir up public “passions” and make the issue more difficult to resolve. Ralph Bunche told Lord Caradon that there was a precedent for such an inquiry, and referred to his own fact-­ finding mission to Yemen on behalf of the Secretary-General in 1963.6 In late December 1968, a second round of Kuwait-brokered secret meetings had taken place between Iran and Bahrain in Geneva, Switzerland. Shaykh Mohammad bin Mubarak and Shaykh Khalifah bin Salman of Bahrain arrived on 18 December for two days of preliminary meetings with Kuwait’s Ambassador to Iran, and two other Kuwaiti officials: Badr al-Khalid and Fuad Hamza. Bahrain’s approach to the meeting on the 20th was passive, it did not offer Iran any proposals, instead Mubarak and Khalifah were there to seek clarification from Iran on what was meant by a U.N.-administered solution.7 Iran’s representative in Geneva, Amir Khosrow Afshar, expressed Iran’s desire to resolve this issue quickly and in a way that generated “Arab goodwill.” Shaykh Mohammad bin Mubarak considered this as a “major change in heart,” and Kuwaiti representative Badr al-Khalid viewed the Iranian attitude at these meetings as a real “breakthrough.” Al-Khalid had been part of the first round of secret meetings in Geneva in September 1968, and had left those meetings feeling uncertain whether Iran really wanted a settlement.8 The central problem in January 1969 was how to formulate a U.N. solution that would convince Shaykh ʿIsa that applying the principle of self-­ determination, which is how the Iranians viewed a U.N. survey, would “not open a pandora’s box,” meaning domestic unrest and challenges to the legitimacy of the ruling family of Bahrain.9

6  BNA: UK Mission New  York to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 16 December 1968, Tel. No. 3313, FCO 8/939; Bunche was referring to United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), see, U Thant’s report to the U.N.  Security Council S/5298 of 29 April 1963, and http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/ unyombackgr.html 7  BNA: Bahrain to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 16 December 1968, FCO 8/939. 8  BNA: Kuwait to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 29 December 1968, FCO 8/939. 9  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 29 January 1969, Tehran 00363 291118Z, RG 59.

4  IRAN: THE BRITISH SUCCESSOR IN THE GULF? 

87

The Iranian plan was to approach the Secretary-General’s office through the U.N. Security Council where Iran would present its case. The British, on behalf of Bahrain, could then present a reply in the Security Council. Iran favored the Security Council approach rather than a direct appeal to the Secretary-General’s office because it would stimulate a Security Council debate that Iran felt was important for legitimizing its actions with its people.10 The Shah believed that his domestic audience would only support a decision to drop Iran’s claim to Bahrain if it was legitimated by an international legal process. In January and February, the Kuwaitis went back and forth between Iran and Bahrain attempting to find an appropriate mechanism for resolving the issue. The British were also closely involved in these discussions. Badr al-Khalid, one of the Kuwaiti diplomats brokering the secret negotiations between Iran and Bahrain, told British officials that if Iran was too aggressive on Bahrain, it risked an Arab backlash against the relatively large Iranian communities residing in the Gulf shaykhdoms, which, according to al-Khalid, meant that “life could be difficult” for them.11 On 10 February, in advance of the next secret meeting in Geneva between Bahraini and Iranian officials in early March, Bahrain decided that if Iran insisted on the Security Council approach then Bahrain would break off talks and apply for U.N. membership. Despite the Shah’s remarks to the U.S. Ambassador that Iran’s position was being kept “very elastic,”12 on 15 February, the Iranians informed the British that their decision on the Security Council approach was final.13 The Geneva meeting on 2 and 3 March between Iranian and Bahraini officials was tense. Iran insisted on the Security Council approach. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Amir Khosrow Afshar, explained that Bahrain could not be considered a party to the dispute because Bahrain was regarded as legally part of Iran. Iran wanted the Security Council to appoint a committee to study the issue and send a representative to the island to “ascertain” the “wishes of the Bahrainis.” Bahrain objected to 10  U.S. Department of State Memorandum, “Bahrain Negotiations,” William D. Brewer to Joseph Sisco, 10 March 1969, RG 59. 11  BNA: Kuwait to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 January 1969, Telegram No. 12, FCO 8/939, RG 59. 12  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 17 January 1969, Tehran 00222 171942Z, RG 59. 13  U.S. Department of State Memorandum, “Bahrain Negotiations,” William D. Brewer to Joseph Sisco, 10 March 1969, R 59.

88 

B. FRIEDMAN

this approach because it denied the existence of Bahrain as an independent entity, while Iran said the direct approach to the Secretary-General prejudged the Iranian claim. In what appeared to contradict the Shah’s 4 January statement in New Delhi, Iranian officials told the Bahrainis that if Bahrain applied for U.N. membership, Iran would take “physical action” to stop it. At the conclusion of the meetings in Geneva, Iran backed off its hardline approach and agreed to consider a joint Iranian-Bahraini14 inquiry to the Secretary-General’s office in order to determine what procedures the Secretary-General would recommend to assess public opinion in Bahrain.15 The four parties—Iran, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the U.K.—held ongoing consultations and negotiations on the specific U.N. mechanism for the following six months, between March and September 1969.16 Two issues reemerged in the interim that complicated the Bahrain picture and slowed the march toward a resolution: first, the question of Abu Musa and the Tunb islands and their connection to the Bahrain question and, second, a tour of the Gulf by British Conservative opposition leader Edward Heath, which left many of the rulers in the Gulf wondering if a change in political leadership in the U.K. would result in a reversal of Britain’s decision to withdraw from the region.

Iran’s Bid for the Gulf Islands In January 1969, Iran’s Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Amir Khosrow Afshar began quietly suggesting to British officials that Iran had been reviewing its historical-legal claim to Abu Musa and it looked very strong. He also said that Iran could not appear to be coming away empty handed in exchange for its concession on Bahrain.17 These two points captured Iran’s two-pronged approach to its territorial claims during the period of British withdrawal. Iran used its historical/legal case to legitimize its claim in the diplomatic sphere, but, in practice, it privately pressed its claim 14  Alvandi maintains this was exclusively an Iranian approach to the Secretary-General’s office; see: Alvandi, p. 170. 15  U.S. Department of State Memorandum, “Bahrain Negotiations,” William D. Brewer to Joseph Sisco, 10 March 1969, R 59. 16  BNA: Acland to Brighty, “Bilateral Talks with the United States Secretary State, The Gulf, Additional Note on Talking Points,” 22 May 1969, FCO 8/958. 17  BNA: Tehran to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Wiggin to Acland, 29 January 1969, FCO 8/960/1.

4  IRAN: THE BRITISH SUCCESSOR IN THE GULF? 

89

during negotiations not through legal or historical principle, but rather through implicit threats and the politics of power.18 In late December, Ali Farazian, an aide to Iran’s General Nassiri,19 visited Shaykh Saqr and conveyed the message that if Saqr did not accept Iran’s proposal for the two Tunbs, then Iran would simply take the islands. Saqr told Farazian that he was powerless to stop Iran from doing this, but the Shah should be reminded that if he did take the islands by force he would forfeit the friendship of not just the Gulf rulers, but the entire Arab world.20 Shaykh Saqr’s son, Khalid, traveled to Riyadh on 25 December and met with King Faysal. Faysal told Khalid that it “was very important to find a solution to this problem,” which was with “a friendly Muslim people on the other side of the Gulf.” Faysal told Khalid that Ras al-­ Khaimah must not “try to force anything down the Shah’s throat.” Faysal asked Khalid if it was possible to give Iran one of the Tunb islands and keep the other, which was not an attractive proposal for Saqr since the smaller Tunb island was uninhabited and virtually uninhabitable. Khalid also saw Saudi Prince Nawwaf in Riyadh who reiterated the consistent Saudi view that the Tunbs were part “of a complex of problems” which ought to be settled together and in agreement with the other emirates.21 It was clear that Saudi Arabia was trying to tell Ras al-Khaimah that it was unwilling to jeopardize its delicate relations with Iran by inserting itself into the dispute over the Tunb islands. In the meantime, Iran was beginning to lay the groundwork for a diplomatic stand on its claim to Abu Musa, which Britain recognized as belonging to the ruler of Sharjah. Shaykh Khalid of Sharjah (not to be confused with the aforementioned, Khalid of Ras al-Khaimah, Shaykh Saqr’s son) was suspicious of Iranian influence in the region. In the summer and fall of 1968, when the Shah had reached out to many of the neighboring shaykhs, contact between Iran and Sharjah was extremely limited. In the past, Shaykh Khalid, unlike his neighboring rulers, had rejected Iranian requests to open banks, hospitals, or schools or other civil institutional projects in his shaykhdom. In fact, according to one British official, “Shaykh Khalid is the only one of the 18  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 87. 19  Iran’s head of domestic security and intelligence service, SAVAK (Sazeman-e Ettela’at va Amniyat-e Keshvar, or “National Organization for Security and Intelligence”). 20  BNA: Dubai to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 7 January 1969, FCO 8/960/1. 21  BNA: Dubai to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 7 January 1969, FCO 8/960/1.

90 

B. FRIEDMAN

Trucial States rulers who could be called anti-Iranian.”22 In early 1969, Shaykh Khalid increased his economic security by signing two 40-year oil concession agreements with the Dutch company Shell on 12 January, which paid Shaykh Khalid a $1.85 million bonus for the concession, with further bonuses of $14.5 million to be paid when certain amounts of commercial oil were discovered and made available for export from 3675 square miles (5914 sq. km) of onshore and offshore exploration rights.23 Dutch Shell’s exploration rights did not include Abu Musa Island or its offshore waters, yet Iran’s ministry of foreign affairs still summoned the Dutch ambassador in Iran to register an oral protest.24 The negotiation for these concessions took place throughout 1968 and ultimately provided Shaykh Khalid with a new source of independent income. Therefore, it is not surprising Iran did not make the same type of material offer of “aid and assistance” to Shaykh Khalid for Abu Musa that it had proposed to Shaykh Saqr during the second-half of 1968 for control of the Tunb islands. In April, Ali Farazian, General Nassiri’s SAVAK envoy, delivered a message to Shaykh Khalid of Sharjah on behalf of the Iranian government. The following account is based on Shaykh Khalid’s description of this meeting:25 Farazian began by explaining that Shaykh Khalid and the Trucial shaykhdoms would face increasing danger from socialists, communists, and nationalists when the British forces withdrew. Shaykh Khalid asked if it was certain that British forces would withdraw, and alluded to Edward Heath’s statement that Britain might reverse its decision to withdraw. Farazian said the British were weak and asked rhetorically how many aircraft the British had based in Sharjah. He then said that ten aircraft were not enough to defend the shaykhdoms. Shaykh Khalid told Farazian that it was not British aircraft but British prestige (hayba) which protected the 22  British National Archives: Dubai to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 18 February 1969, FCO 9/960/1. 23  British National Archives: Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Tehran, Makinson to Wiggin, 14 February 1969, FO 248/1690; MEES, Vol. XII, No. 12, 17 January 1969. 24  British National Archives: Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Tehran, Wiggin to Acland, 30 January 1969, FO 248/1690; and, Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Tehran, Makinson to Wiggin, 14 February 1969, FO 248/1690. 25  It is important to point out that several accounts of this conversation from Iranian officials, including the head of SAVAK, exist in the British archives, but they are considerably less detailed and characterize the conversation in much more convivial terms. Given the fact that Shaykh Khalid’s account of these events is more consistent with how Farazian’s behavior was depicted in separate conversations with the shaykhs of Ras al-Khaimah, Shaykh Khalid of Sharjah’s account is given more evidentiary weight in this narrative.

4  IRAN: THE BRITISH SUCCESSOR IN THE GULF? 

91

Trucial shaykhdoms. Farazian said that Iran was going to be the strongest power in the region, and emphasized that the British would not be allowed to return through the window after leaving by the door.26 Farazian then moved the discussion to more specific issues, telling Shaykh Khalid that Iran wanted to put a military base on Abu Musa for the defense of the region, and that the median line through the lower gulf would detour at Abu Musa so that the island would be included on the Iranian side. He said that any oil and minerals would be the property of Sharjah. The ruler responded to Farazian by saying that Abu Musa was an “inseparable part of Sharjah territory” and had been for hundreds of years, and he could not enter into negotiations or discussions about it in the midst of efforts to arrive at a union between the shaykhdoms. He said if Iran needed a military base it could use Sirri Island. Farazian responded ambiguously saying, “Iran would not simply take the island by force, although India had taken Goa, and the Jews had taken Palestine nor would the Arabs get it back.” Shaykh Khalid told Farazian that his allusions to occupations by force were inconsistent with Iran’s proclamations of cooperation and neighborliness. Farazian asked if he could report back that “a personal understanding” had been reached between himself and the ruler. Khalid told him only to report that he had delivered his message.27 An important factor that appeared to have influenced Shaykh Khalid’s response to Iran’s message about Abu Musa was British opposition leader Edward Heath’s late March and early April tour through the Gulf. Heath had said that his party might be interested in concluding a defense treaty with the shaykhdoms that would include the continued presence of some level of British forces in the region after 1971.28 Sharjah was home to a British base housing 2700 military personnel, and Heath’s statement may have led Shaykh Khalid to believe this would limit Iranian aggression, particularly at the time of this early April discussion with Farazian.

26  British National Archives: Dubai to Bahrain, Bullard to Weir, 2 April 1969, FCO 8/960/1. 27  BNA: Dubai to Bahrain, 2 April 1969, Telegram No. 97, FCO 8/960/1; and, Dubai to Bahrain, Bullard to Weir, 2 April 1969, FCO 8/960/1. 28  BNA: “Minutes of a meeting with Mr. P.T. Hayman, Deputy Undersecretary of F.C.O.,” 25 May 1969, FCO 8/958.

92 

B. FRIEDMAN

A British Reversal? Britain’s Conservative Party leader, Edward Heath, embarked on a tour through the Gulf in the spring of 1969 to meet with the region’s rulers and to explain the Conservative Party’s policy toward them. In a written response to questions from a Bahraini journalist, Mahmud Mardi, Heath emphasized that his visit was not a campaign gimmick: “It is precisely because I take this matter so seriously that I have come to the Gulf as leader of the Conservative Party to discuss it with our friends.” He reiterated that “when we are returned to power we will abandon the present timetable of withdrawal, and if our friends in the area wish a British presence to remain, we will at that time discuss it with them how this can best be organized.”29 Heath met with the Shah in Iran on 6 April and came away very impressed after the two shared a long lunch. The Shah told Heath that once British forces were withdrawn they could not be returned. He also suggested that if certain forces were not withdrawn that maybe some kind of arrangement might be worked out. Heath said that the Shah would support the union of emirates once the Bahrain problem was settled. However, according to Heath, the Shah was “uncompromising” on Abu Musa and the Tunbs, even to the point where Heath noted that the Shah “got rather worked up over them.” Heath had expected his meeting with the Shah to be difficult, but he came away feeling very positive about the Shah.30 Heath met with Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi in Al Ayn on 4 April, where Heath asked the ruler what he thought about the possibility of maintaining British forces in the region after 1971. Zayid seemed to discourage Heath, saying, “You may find this difficult.” Zayid was probably alluding to the potential for revolutionary Arab backlash from Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and other groups had Britain decided to reverse its withdrawal. Zayid appeared to differentiate between a situation where the British forces withdrew from the region and then had to be invited back, which Zayid believed would present problems for the rulers, and a situation where the British forces present in the region were invited to extend their presence. When Heath asked what Zayid expected from the British after  BNA: Bahrain to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 12 April 1969, FO 1056/756.  BNA: Tehran to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Wright to Arthur, 9 April 1969, FO 1056/756. 29 30

4  IRAN: THE BRITISH SUCCESSOR IN THE GULF? 

93

1971, Zayid said that he would like Britain to make it clear to the new union of emirates that it “would always be able to count on the British in a time of need.” Heath then asked Zayid if this meant he would like some kind of defense treaty with Britain, and Zayid acknowledged that is what he meant.31 Shaykh Rashid of Dubai told Heath that even if the union of emirates was a success, it would still need the backing of “a large outside power.” He criticized Britain for intending to withdraw without providing any kind of defense pact for the union. Rashid also pointed out that it was a mistake to allow each shaykhdom to have its own army. He said the union should have one army with state police support. Without saying so explicitly, Rashid was trying to convey to Heath that Britain should not support Zayid’s development of the Abu Dhabi Defense Force. Rashid also told Heath that he expected that the union of emirates would have to allow Bahrain to withdraw because Iran was more likely to accept an independent Bahrain than Bahrain as part of a union of emirates. Shaykh Khalid of Sharjah expressed a deep suspicion of Iran’s regional ambition during his meeting with Heath. He said that Iran was claiming the islands for the moment but “had designs” on the whole Gulf, “eventually.” He also told Heath he wanted British troops to remain after 1971, or at least a British defense commitment. In response to concern that British troops would provoke a revolutionary Arab backlash, Khalid proposed sending a delegation to Cairo and Damascus and elsewhere to lay the groundwork.32 Heath had meetings and dinner with Shaykh ʿIsa in Bahrain on 5 April, during which ʿIsa expressed his opinion that a British military presence in the Gulf after 1971 was “the only real effective guarantee of stability in the Gulf.” However, Shaykh ʿIsa also informed Heath that the maintenance of British forces in the region might not be possible anymore because of the reactions from other Arab states and from his own people. Shaykh Khalifah bin Salman also referred to the folly of British military withdrawal, and, while in principle the Bahraini government “would be delighted” to see the withdrawal policy reversed, he did not think Bahrain could accept a policy reversal because it would arouse “dangerous hostility” from

31  BNA: Abu Dhabi to Bahrain, 5 April 1969, Telegram No. 127, FO 1056/756; and, Bahrain to Foreign Office, Crawford to McCarthy, 9 April 1969, FO 1056/756. 32  BNA: Dubai to Bahrain, “Mr Heath’s Visit,” 5 April 1969, FO 1056/756.

94 

B. FRIEDMAN

revolutionary Arab states and sections of the Bahraini population.33 It is unclear how convincing these Bahraini reservations were expressed, because Heath came away from Bahrain believing the Bahrainis entirely supported maintaining British troops in the Gulf after 1971. During King Faysal’s meeting with Heath on 6 April he told Heath that he did not oppose British withdrawal, but before they left they had to leave a workable and secure political system, otherwise “the story of Aden would be repeated again in the Gulf.” Faysal agreed with Heath that the union of emirates only needed one armed force, and, perhaps alluding to rumors that Arab revolutionaries from Oman were infiltrating the Abu Dhabi Defense Forces, said that Zayid should realize that the military force he was trying to build was a threat to his own position as ruler of Abu Dhabi.34 The fear of a revolutionary Arab nationalist backlash if Britain reversed its decision to withdraw was a major concern for the rulers. Throughout the period of Heath’s tour, the Iraqi newspapers attacked the British for reneging on their “promise” to withdraw from the Gulf. The Iraqi newspaper, and Baʿth party mouthpiece, al-Thawra, printed stories claiming that Britain intended to retain its forces on Masirah Island, off the coast of Oman, in order to “divide and exploit” the Gulf and protect its oil interests. The paper also claimed that the battle against imperialism was not just for Iraq and the Gulf states but for all the Arabs from the Atlantic to the Gulf.35 Shortly after Heath concluded his trip, he summarized his views in an editorial entitled “Back to the Gulf,” which was published in the London Sunday Times on 27 April. He said that “Arabs” had suggested to him that Britain provide a “defence commitment to the new union [of emirates].” He argued that such a commitment “would only be credible and act as a deterrent to troublemakers if Britain retained modest forces somewhere in the area.” Heath concluded by criticizing the current British government, maintaining that “The Labour Government abandoned its responsibilities,” and suggesting that Britain should reverse its decision: “The risks and opportunities in the Gulf are so great that neither this country nor that area can afford this. Britain must display its sense of purpose and regain its nerve.”36

33  BNA: Doha to Bahrain, 8 April 1969, FO 1056/756, and, Bahrain Political Agent (Stirling) to Bahrain Political Resident (Crawford), 13 April 1969, FO 1056/756. 34  BNA: Jedda to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 April 1969, Telegram No. 174, FO 1056/756; and, Jedda to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Morris to McCarthy, 9 April 1969, FO 1056/756. 35  al-Thawra, 16 and 18 April 1969. 36  The Times (London), 27 April 1969.

4  IRAN: THE BRITISH SUCCESSOR IN THE GULF? 

95

Heath’s visit appeared to plant a strong seed of doubt in the minds of the shaykhs about whether the British were indeed going to carry out their policy of military withdrawal. This doubt had an immediate impact on regional politics in the sense that it removed the strong sense of urgency that had existed in the region in the second half of 1968. King Faysal had worked hard to encourage this sense of urgency by quietly and continually pressing the shaykhs to form a union of nine. Mohammad Reza Shah had also contributed to a sense of urgency, particularly with respect to finding a solution to the Bahrain issue. Shaykh Jabir al-Ali Al Sabah, Kuwait’s Minister of Information, commenting on Heath’s visit, expressed his concern that there was not enough urgency on the part of the rulers of the shaykhdoms. He said that the shaykhs were “incapable of getting together and forming a nation without very strong pressure” from the British. He thought the British should tell the rulers what to do and accompany it with a carrot and stick with respect to British protection.37 He said that even if the rulers support a British reversal on withdrawal, it was important that the British not give the shaykhs any opportunity or excuse to reduce their efforts toward a union of emirates. Shaykh Jabir emphasized that while the union “was perhaps a poor thing,” the Kuwaiti government believed that it was “vital” that nothing should be done that would cause the rulers to “sit back and relax.”38

Faysal and Zayid King Faysal was not going to let the shaykhs relax, particularly Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi. Faysal appeared to be frustrated by Shaykh Zayid’s growing stature in the region and his increasingly independent behavior. In early 1969, Saudi Arabia reminded Shaykh Zayid that Saudi Arabia’s Buraimi claim was still outstanding and not forgotten. It also wanted to serve notice with the British as well, whom the Saudis saw as Shaykh Zayid’s enablers.39

37  BNA: Kuwait to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Falle to McCarthy, 15 April 1969; FO 1056/756. 38  BNA: Kuwait to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 April 1969, FO 1056/756. 39  BNA: “ Abu Dhabi-Qatar seabed boundary,” Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Jedda, 23 April 1969, Telegram No. 128, FCO 8/956.

96 

B. FRIEDMAN

The Al Thani of Qatar and the Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi had been rivals dating back to at least the eighteenth century.40 One of the principal bones of contention between the two ruling families was ownership over the inlet at the base of the eastern side of the Qatari Peninsula, known as Khor al-Udaid.41 The dispute between Qatar and Abu Dhabi over Khor al-­ Udaid was further complicated in 1935 when Saudi Arabia claimed to own it. The Saudis coveted the inlet and inland territory surrounding it because Saudi Arabia lacked its own outlet to the eastern Gulf.42 In December 1965, Shaykh Ahmad transferred the Qatar claim to the Khor al-Udaid to Saudi Arabia in exchange for frontier territory elsewhere and a defined border with Saudi Arabia. The British refused to recognize the validity of the agreement with respect to claims on territory the British recognized as belonging to Abu Dhabi,43 and Qatar never demarcated the specified border. On 20 March 1969, Abu Dhabi and Qatar signed an agreement to establish a maritime boundary between the two Gulf shaykhdoms for the sea-bed extending off the coast of the Khor al-Udaid inlet.44 Shaykh Zayid, similar to a border adjustment agreement he made with Shaykh Rashid in February 1969,45 was generous in his 20 March compromise with Qatar, which included the two shaykhdoms splitting revenues from the

40  Richard Schofield, “The Crystallisation of a Complex Territorial Dispute: Britain and the Saudi-Abu Dhabi Borderland, 1966–71,” Journal of Arabian Studies 1:1 (2011), 27–51; J.B. Kelly, Arabia the Gulf and the West (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1980), p. 56. 41  Richard Schofield, “The Crystallisation of a Complex Territorial Dispute: Britain and the Saudi-Abu Dhabi Borderland, 1966–71,” Journal of Arabian Studies 1:1 (2011), 27–51; Hussein M. Baharna, The Arabian Gulf States: Their legal and political status and their international problems (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 2nd edition, 1975) p. 224. 42  Richard Schofield, “The Crystallisation of a Complex Territorial Dispute: Britain and the Saudi-Abu Dhabi Borderland, 1966–71,” Journal of Arabian Studies 1:1 (2011), 27–51;Baharna, pp. 200–201. 43  Richard Schofield, “The Crystallisation of a Complex Territorial Dispute: Britain and the Saudi-Abu Dhabi Borderland, 1966–71,” Journal of Arabian Studies 1:1 (2011), 27–51; Baharna, p.  263; BNA: “The Frontiers between Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi,” Middle East Section—Research Department, 16 April 1969, FCO 8/956. 44  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, 2 April 1969, A-56, RG 59; and, MEES, Vol. XII, No. 21, 21 March 1969. 45  This agreement transferred the rights of an offshore oil field from Abu Dhabi to Dubai. See: U.S. Department of State Telegram, 20 April 1969, Dhahran to Washington, Dhahra 00340 200506Z.

4  IRAN: THE BRITISH SUCCESSOR IN THE GULF? 

97

al-­Bunduq oil field.46 Nevertheless, the agreement was finalized without consulting Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia believed its territorial rights to the area surrounding Khor al-Udaid entitled it to participate in the division of the inlet’s territorial waters.47 King Faysal was angered by the agreement between Qatar and Abu Dhabi, and registered a formal complaint with the British, in their role as protector of the Gulf shaykhdoms. The strenuous objection of Saudi Arabia to the agreement between Qatar and Abu Dhabi in March 1969, had more to do with the Saudi animosity toward Shaykh Zayid, and the historical dispute between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi over the Buraimi Oasis, than it did with the Saudis desire to protect any sovereign claim they may have had to the offshore territory divided between Qatar and Abu Dhabi. On the face of it, the Saudis should have been happy to see Qatar and Abu Dhabi set aside their historical rivalry and settle an unresolved and longstanding dispute. This agreement was a positive step toward future cooperation between two of the central rulers in the union of nine shaykhdoms, which Saudi Arabia had been quietly pushing for throughout 1969. King Faysal, who had urged the rulers to set aside their differences and bring the union of nine to fruition, should have been pleased by the Abu Dhabi-Qatari compromise. The Saudi reaction to the Abu Dhabi-Qatari agreement bordered on outrage, and suggests the Saudis viewed the union of shaykhdoms first and foremost as a vehicle to protect Saudi security interests.48 It also speaks volumes about the depth and seriousness of the Saudi dispute with Shaykh Zayid. In April 1967, shortly after Shaykh Zayid assumed leadership of Abu Dhabi he visited Riyadh, where King Faysal had presented him Saudi Arabia’s territorial claim which encompassed nearly three-quarters of the Abu Dhabi shaykhdom. Saudi Arabia’s claim was closely connected to two valuable oil fields which had been discovered in the southern Dhafrah, which was part of the disputed territory.49 Shaykh Zayid never replied to King Faysal’s 1967 claim, and it had remained outstanding ever since.

46  BNA: “The Frontiers between Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi,” Middle East Section—Research Department, 16 April 1969, FCO 8/956. 47  Richard Schofield, “The Crystallisation of a Complex Territorial Dispute: Britain and the Saudi-Abu Dhabi Borderland, 1966–71,” Journal of Arabian Studies 1:1 (2011), 27–51. 48  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), pp. 49–50. 49  Kelly, p. 74.

98 

B. FRIEDMAN

In January 1969, during the British Ambassador’s first meeting with King Faysal since November 1968, King Faysal took the British to task for allowing the issue of the Saudi/Abu Dhabi frontier to languish.50 It was the first time King Faysal had revived the issue since the British announcement of withdrawal in January 1968, and appeared at odds with his implicit policy of allowing the Saudi claim to remain “dormant” until the union of shaykhdoms could be properly established.51 Faysal was upset that the British were supporting Shaykh Zayid’s aggressive buildup of the Abu Dhabi Defense Forces. In early April, a short time after the announcement of the Abu Dhabi-­ Qatar seabed agreement, ʿUmar Saqqaf, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, delivered a message to the British Ambassador informing them that it was the British responsibility to make sure that Abu Dhabi does not interfere or intrude on Saudi Arabia’s territory or territorial waters. In what sounded like an ultimatum, Saqqaf told the Ambassador that if the British could not control Zayid, then the Saudis “would know how to settle matters directly with Abu Dhabi.”52 Shaykh Zayid adopted a more conciliatory posture toward Saudi Arabia and suggested he was ready to compromise. He asked American officials to convey this to Saudi Arabia, and emphasized that there was “no question” that the shaykhdoms needed Saudi support and understanding because as “desert Arabs” they shared a “common destiny” and “common enemies” (Baʿthists and communists).53 Saudi Arabia’s dispute with Shaykh Zayid was also affecting progress and politics in the union. Shaykh Zayid was perceived as intent on expanding the Abu Dhabi Defense Force primarily as a consequence of Saudi’s claim to large tracts of Abu Dhabi territory. Shaykh ʿIsa of Bahrain felt that if Saudi Arabia reduced its pressure on Shaykh Zayid it would make it easier for Abu Dhabi to cooperate with the union on defense matters.54 In 50  BNA: “Saudi Arabia and the Gulf,” Jedda to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Morris to McCarthy, 16 January 1969, FCO 8/956. 51  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 51. 52  BNA: “Qatar/Abu Dhabi boundary,” Jedda to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 11 April 1969, Telegram No. 177, FCO 8/956. 53  U.S. Department of State Telegram, 20 April 1969, Dhahran to Washington, Dhahra 00340 200506Z, RG 59. 54  U.S Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 28 February 1969, Dhahra 00190 01100 1Z, RG 59.

4  IRAN: THE BRITISH SUCCESSOR IN THE GULF? 

99

early February, British General, Sir John Willoughby, arrived in the Gulf as a military consultant to the shaykhs, for the purpose of touring the region and producing a report and recommendations on the future defense requirements for the federation.55 Many of the Gulf shaykhs were frustrated that the union was going to duplicate institutions by supporting a united military force, but at the same time permitting the individual shaykhdoms, like Abu Dhabi, to maintain separate military forces. This frustrated Shaykh Rashid, in particular, who not only felt threatened by Shaykh Zayid’s expanding military but saw that this process of duplicating military forces was compelling him to compete for military supremacy as a means to legitimize his political authority. Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah pointed out that in his view settling the problem between King Faysal and Shaykh Zayid was more important for the union’s future than Iran’s approval.56

Bahrain and the Union The union’s Supreme Council met in Doha from 10 to 14 May to discuss the “constitutional shape” of the federation. In April, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Bahrain, and Qatar consulted to decide on the principal issues on agenda, which included: selection of a president and prime minister, the location of a capital, and the structure and selection of the federation’s advisory assembly.57 However, when the May meeting opened, a heated argument ensued between Bahrain and Qatar over the nature of setting the agenda. The opening meeting went no further than reelecting Shaykh Ahmad of Qatar as the chairman of the Supreme Council and debating the method for establishing an agenda for the Supreme Council. The second meeting established a Council of Ministers to replace the Provisional Federal Council. There were also lengthy discussions on the formation and role of a representative assembly. The rulers agreed that members of the assembly should be appointed rather than popularly elected. Where the meeting broke down was on the issue of how the shaykhdoms should be 55  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 5 February 1969, Dhahra 00115 051136Z, RG 59. 56  U.S. Department of State Telegram, 20 April 1969, Dhahran to Washington, Dhahra 00340 200506Z, RG 59. 57  Taryam, p. 118; and, for a draft copy of the agenda items in English, see: U.S. Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 10 May 1969, Dhahra 00401 101110Z, RG 59.

100 

B. FRIEDMAN

represented in the assembly: either equally or proportionally, based on population size. Bahrain, as the most populous shaykhdom, insisted on proportional representation. Qatar feared that proportional representation would allow Bahrain to dominate the assembly because Bahrain’s population was equal to  the combined population of all the other shaykhdoms, which would entitle Bahrain to at least half the seats in the assembly. Abu Dhabi proposed a compromise that would grant Bahrain six members in the assembly versus four members for each of the other shaykhdoms. This compromise formula was rejected by all the shaykhdoms, except Bahrain and Abu Dhabi.58 Shaykh Zayid was unhappy with the recommendations from the British military consultant, General Willoughby. Willoughby recommended that the federation’s future military force consist of two battalions: The Trucial Oman Scouts as it was presently constituted and a second battalion of locally recruited soldiers. He recommended the force should be based in Sharjah, and he also suggested purchasing a squadron of fighter aircraft. Zayid wanted an entirely new military force that would be completely independent of the British-led Trucial Oman Scouts, and believed it should be raised entirely from local recruits.59 Zayid was investing heavily in his Abu Dhabi Defense Force, and envisioned it as the future core of the union’s military for two reasons. First, he was hoping military supremacy within the union would buttress his claim to authority in the union. And, second, he still feared Saudi Arabia’s hostility and outstanding claim to a large chunk of Abu Dhabi’s territory, and viewed a modern military capability to be the best deterrent against Saudi aggression. An important practical achievement of the meeting was the establishment of a committee of legal advisers to work out a draft provisional constitution. Each ruler, except Umm al-Qaiwain, appointed representatives to this committee. The committee would oversee the work that Dr. Sanhuri and his two aides had been chosen to begin in 1968, which was to investigate options for a “Permanent and Complete Charter” for the federation. It is interesting to note that the initial wording did not use the term “constitution.” Later, Dr. Sanhuri and his principal aide, Dr. Hassan al-Turabi from Sudan, were able to convince the rulers that they were 58  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 68; Taryam, pp. 120–121. 59  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 30 April 1969, Dhahra 00375 300 944Z, RG 59.

4  IRAN: THE BRITISH SUCCESSOR IN THE GULF? 

101

capable of preparing a draft constitution for the federation, based on their investigation into what the rulers wanted during 1968. The distinction between a charter and a constitution was important, because a constitution implied a tighter federated union as a result of a constitution’s legally binding centralization of authority. Therefore, when the shaykhs created this new constitutional committee in May,60 they were careful to stipulate that it was authorized to prepare a “draft provisional constitution,” [emphasis added] that precluded any binding legal commitment from the rulers.61 This one-word qualification embodied the shaykhs’ collective reluctance to make a full commitment to a centralized federation which might limit each of the rulers’ political autonomy and transfer power to a rival. Like previous meetings in 1968, the May 1969 Supreme Council meetings were dominated by the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Dubai, and Qatar. The difference during the May meetings was that Abu Dhabi seemed to be working more closely with Qatar and Dubai, leaving Bahrain feeling more isolated.62 This was a product of four related developments. First, Bahrain itself was uncompromising in its demands because it was not entirely convinced it really wanted to be a part of the union.63 This assessment diverges significantly from one of the dominant historical interpretations of Bahrain’s attitude towards the union in May 1969. Abdullah Taryam, in The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, 1950–1985, viewed Bahrain as strongly committed to leading the union. Taryam, who did not have access to British or American archival records, would also have been unaware of important developments in the ongoing dispute between Iran and Bahrain, in which the Shah remained unyielding in his opposition to Bahrain’s inclusion. Taryam assumed that the Shah’s public statement in New Delhi on 4 January 1969 that Iran would not use force against Bahrain meant that Iran tacitly accepted Bahrain’s inclusion in the union. Shaykh ʿIsa and his principal advisers appeared to prefer independence, but as a result of Saudi persuasion were continuing to participate in the union. Bahrain’s sensitivity was also, in part, due to what it felt was its 60  Dr. Wahid Raʾfat was appointed to lead the effort to draft the provisional constitution, replacing Dr. Sanhuri, who was in ill health and died shortly thereafter. 61  Taryam, pp. 122–123. 62  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 68. 63  See, Taryam, pp. 127–129.

102 

B. FRIEDMAN

marginalization by the other rulers as a result of Iran’s unresolved claim. In the words of Bahraini journalist Mahmud Mardi, the other ruling shaykhs considered Bahrain the “sick man” of the union and were reluctant to risk infection or bear the cost of medicine to treat the condition.64 Bahrain, for its part, was resisting what it viewed as the other rulers’ attempt to exploit Bahrain’s ongoing dispute with Iran. Third, during the first six months of 1969 there was a growing sense among the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Qatar that Iran would not support a union that included Bahrain, and, therefore, it was unrealistic to expect a union of nine to work.65 Fourth, there was genuine improvement in the coordination between Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Qatar as a result of Abu Dhabi’s new border agreements with Qatar and Dubai, and a mutual perception that Bahrain could be a financial and political liability to the new federation.66 Therefore, the Abu Dhabi/Bahrain versus Dubai/Qatar dynamic that emerged in 1968 appeared be changing in May 1969. The five smaller shaykhdoms—Ajman, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Qaiwain—were left to maneuver for their own gain by taking advantage of these internal dynamics between the four larger shaykhdoms or, alternatively, trying to manipulate the relations between the larger regional powers and the shaykhdoms. They were also poorer, in addition to being smaller in terms of territory and population. Therefore, they used the conflicts between the larger shaykhdoms to leverage their voting rights within the meetings into promises of financial or developmental assistance. Ajman, Fujairah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Qaiwain generally supported Shaykh Zayid and Abu Dhabi within union meetings, believing that Abu Dhabi’s immense oil wealth and a shared sense of Omani identity made Abu Dhabi the most reliable source of assistance for the long-term economic development of the smaller shaykhdoms. Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah was playing a more dangerous game for a ruler of a poor, small shaykhdom: he often took independent positions during the meetings and then tried to leverage his relations with Saudi Arabia as a means of creating pressure on Shaykh Zayid and obtaining concessions from various rulers.67 64   U.S.  Department of State Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, 26 March 1969, A-53, RG59. 65  Smith, pp.  92–93; Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 68. 66  Smith, pp. 93–94. 67  Taryam, p. 118.

4  IRAN: THE BRITISH SUCCESSOR IN THE GULF? 

103

On 19 May, following the meetings in Doha, frustrated Bahraini envoys Shaykh Khalifah bin Salman and Shaykh Mohammad bin Mubarak met with King Faysal in Saudi Arabia to seek support for Bahrain’s position within the federation, or for Bahraini independence if consensus within the federation was not possible.68 Kuwait’s daily newspaper al-Ray al-ʿAam reported a statement from Shaykh Khalifah that “Bahrain is keen that the two sisters, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, should know that its [Bahrain’s] stand continues to be that for the establishment of real union, even if it has to make concessions on many matters,” which suggests the Saudis may have provided additional encouragement to the Bahrainis, who were clearly fed-up with the union following the May 1969 meetings.69

The Shatt Al-Arab and War On 23 March 1969, a group of Iranian fishermen were arrested by Iraqi officials on the Shatt al-Arab (known in Iran as the Arvand Rud) waterway, which is formed where Tigris and Euphrates rivers meet. The Shatt al-Arab extends 80 kilometers (50 miles) into the Persian Gulf and serves as the border between Iran and Iraq. These arrests followed a similar 6 March incident during which an Iranian fisherman on the Shatt al-Arab had been fired on by Iraqi forces. Iran sent Iraq a note of protest, and Iraq rejected the Iranian note and reminded Iran that Iraq maintained that the whole Shatt al-Arab was under Iraqi sovereignty. The second Treaty of Erzurum in 1847, between the Ottoman and Persian Empires, had fixed the border between the two states at the low-­ water line of the eastern side of the Shatt al-Arab. This definition was reaffirmed by a 1937 treaty between Iraq and Iran, which, in effect, gave Iraq sovereign control of this international waterway. This treaty became a continual source of contention as a result of poor relations between Iran and Iraq during the 1960s. In early 1966, Iran declared the treaty void, but failed to act on the declaration as relations with Iraq improved during the course of the year. A joint committee was established to resolve the border issue. However, regime change in Iraq scuttled a prospective agreement arrived at in March 1967, when President ʿArif visited Iran. In early 68  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 20 May 1969, Jidda 01695 200936Z, RG 59. 69  al-Raʿy al-ʿAam, 19 May 1969; Taryam, p. 118 & 128; Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-lKhalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 40.

104 

B. FRIEDMAN

December 1968 Iraq’s Defense Minister, Hardan al-Tikriti, and Foreign Minister, ʿAbd al-Karim al-Shaykhli, led a state visit to Iran but negotiations ended in a deadlock. Iran had a hard time identifying where power rested in the new Baʿthist regime in Iraq, less than a year after the July 1968 Baʿthist coup d’état.70 Iraq’s neighbors perceived the Iraqi government as unstable, and that the ongoing purges and executions in Iraq were indications that factions were still fighting for control over key state institutions. One British official noted that there were two competing factions: the first consisted of “doctrinaire Ba’athists” led by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior General Saleh Mahdi ʿAmmash, and, the second, more “flexible” faction led by the other Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister General Hardan al-Tikriti.71 On 26 March 1969, Iraq delivered a letter to the Iranian ministry of foreign affairs informing Iran that all Iranian merchant ships traveling from the Gulf through the Shatt al-Arab would have to fly the Iraqi flag. An Iraqi official noted that it was standard practice for Iranian merchant vessels to fly the Iraqi flag alongside the Iranian flag upon entering the Shatt. He said Iranian warships had never been required to follow this practice.72 The 26 March note stated that Iranian ships that continued to travel on the Shatt with the Iranian flag would henceforth be stopped and searched by the Iraqi navy. Iraq appeared to be provoking Iran, but the more likely explanation is that it simply miscalculated how far it could assert itself at a delicate juncture in Iranian-Arab relations. Iran had just broken off diplomatic ties with Lebanon.73 Further, Iran had increased its oil exports through the Shatt al-Arab and was in the middle of delicate negotiations with the Iranian oil consortium. 70  BNA: Baghdad to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 9 April 1969, Telegram No. 350, FCO 17/879. 71  BNA: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hinchecliffe to Acland, 11 April 1969, FCO 17/879. 72  BNA: Baghdad to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 23 April 1969, Telegram No. 390, FCO 17/879. 73  On 1 April 1969, Iran severed diplomatic relations with Lebanon, because Lebanon had declined to extradite former Iranian SAVAK chief Teymour Bakhtiar to Iran. Bakhtiar had plotted to overthrow the Shah. Bakhtiar’s prison term for arms smuggling in Lebanon had expired in January 1969, and on 3 April 1969 he traveled from Beirut to Switzerland and received political asylum. Later in the year he arrived in Iraq, where he continued to plot against the Shah. For more details, see: Abbas Milani, The Shah (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

4  IRAN: THE BRITISH SUCCESSOR IN THE GULF? 

105

On 15 April the Iranian Ambassador to Iraq was summoned by the Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister and informed that: first, the Shatt al-Arab is “an integral part of Iraqi territory;” second, vessels flying the Iranian flag would have to lower the flag upon entering the Shatt; and, third, Iranian naval personnel should be removed from vessels traversing through the Shatt.74 According to Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Afshar, Iraq also said it would use force if these conditions were not met and Iranian vessels destined for Iranian ports would be denied access to the Shatt. This appears to have been the point during the crisis where Iran made a conscious decision to escalate the tension and flex its muscles. At the time the Shah was on a state visit to Tunisia with Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi, and it appears the Shatt issue was being handled from there. Asadollah Alam, Minister of Court, who was in Birjand, reports receiving an urgent phone from General Nassiri to return to Tehran, where Alam recorded in his diary that “Zahedi has made a complete cock-up and landed us on war-footing with Iraq.”75 Amir Khosrow Afshar told American officials that the Iraqis called the Iranian Ambassador to Baghdad on 17 April to acknowledge the “mistake” of their 15 April ultimatum. However, Afshar suggested that by then Iran had already made the decision to exploit the issue.76 It seems that the Shah and Zahedi planned to send Iranian vessels flying the Iranian flag through the Shatt al-Arab in defiance of Iraq’s demands. The Shah ordered the army to stand by on red alert and to intervene should Iraqi forces attempt to detain Iranian vessels.77 According to Alam, most of the Iranian government was unaware of these plans up to that point. On 17 April, Alam, who was “gravely concerned,” cabled the Shah to verify whether this was “really an appropriate moment to resort to force.” In addition to the military risk, there was a more practical issue that both Alam and British officials noted: Iran had no internationally 74  BNA: Tehran to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 20 April 1969, Telegram No. 341, FCO 17/879; and Echo of Iran, Vol. XVII, No. 4, 1969; See, also: Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1974), p. 185. 75  Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), edited and translated by Alinagh Alikhani and Nicholas Vincent, pp. 53. 76  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 20 April 1969, Tehran 01399 210138Z, RG 59. 77  Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), edited and translated by Alinagh Alikhani and Nicholas Vincent, pp. 53.

106 

B. FRIEDMAN

accredited sea pilots available and relied entirely on Iraqi pilots to guide Iranian merchant ships through the Shatt.78 The following day, 18 April, the Shah’s brief response to Alam read, “They [the Iraqis] were getting exceedingly arrogant; they needed putting in their place.”79 It appears that between 18 and 21 April, Iran sent 3000 troops into the region surrounding Abadan, stationed M-47 Tanks along the banks of the Shatt al-Arab, and began flying F-5 combat aircraft over the Shatt al-Arab. The Iraqis had about 1000 soldiers and one tank unit in the region, and approximately a dozen MIG-17/21 combat aircraft stationed at a base in Basra, but it was unclear if they were combat ready. Many of Iraq’s troops were in Syria or Jordan, or tied up fighting the Kurds in Iraq.80 During this period, Iran also repositioned all of its navy ships in the Gulf. In economic terms, Iran’s risk may have been limited. In 1966–1967, 16 percent of Iran’s oil production was exported from terminals in the Shatt al-Arab. Evidently, the Shah had elected to send a message to Iraq.

Iran Escalates The day after the Shah’s cable to Alam, on 19 April, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Afshar appeared before the Iranian parliament to announce that Iran’s 1937 treaty with Iraq was null and void, and that Iran recognized no other principle than the thalweg (mid-point) as the “dividing line” between Iran and Iraq. It is interesting to note that Afshar suggested the 1937 treaty was made at a time when Iran was dominated by British colonialism,81 which was also the period that Mohammad Reza Shah’s father, Reza Shah Pahlavi, reigned. Afshar told Sir Denis Wright, the British Ambassador to Iran, that while Iran wanted to maintain and expand friendly relations with Iraq, and negotiate a new treaty with it, the Iraqis were informed that “any violation of Iran rights of sovereignty in the Shatt al-Arab, or any attempts to prevent ships destined for Iranian ports from entering the waterway, any restrictions imposed on vessels carrying the 78  Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), edited and translated by Alinagh Alikhani and Nicholas Vincent, pp. 53; and, British National Archives: 79  Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), edited and translated by Alinagh Alikhani and Nicholas Vincent, pp. 53. 80  BNA: “Shatt al-Arab dispute between Iran and Iraq,” Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 24 April 1969, FCO 17/879. 81  U.S. Department of State Intelligence Note, “Iran-Iraq: Dispute over the Shatt al-Arab disturbs relations periodically,” Thomas L. Hughes, 22 April 1969, RG 59.

4  IRAN: THE BRITISH SUCCESSOR IN THE GULF? 

107

Iranian flag and any demonstration of force against the Imperial Armed Forces will be met with the strongest possible reaction.” Afshar told Wright explicitly that “their fire will be answered by fire by the Imperial Armed Forces and the responsibility for such a development, which would have very wide repercussions, would rest with the government of Iraq.”82 The following day, 20 April, the Iraqi newspaper al-Jumhurriyah noted that Iraqi public opinion was “in shock” over Afshar’s comment that the 1937 treaty was null and void, which the Iraqi government said it still considered valid and under which it reserved its right to safeguard its territory and preserve its sovereignty. The Iraqi government also said that Iran’s actions were unilateral and “inconsistent with the principles of international law and the respect for agreements and treaties,” while another article in al-Jumhurriyah threatened that the “law will not be Iraq’s last resort.”83 On 22 April in Beirut, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, General ʿAmmash, told the media that “Iran may want to continue its provocations and challenges, but we will not reciprocate, and we will not allow ourselves to be dragged into a battle with Iran.” He claimed Iran’s moves were a ploy to get Iraq to withdraw its troops from Syria and Jordan (there were approximately 15–20,000 Iraqi troops stationed there in the event of a confrontation with Israel), but these troops would not be withdrawn. Another Iraqi official, the head of political affairs at the ministry of foreign affairs, told the British that Iraq had been surprised at the recent turn of events, noting there were Iranian troops stationed along the entire length of the 1200 kilometer (746 mile) border with Iraq, because there was no new factor that warranted the new Iranian posture. He said Iraq was somewhat mystified by the severity of Iran’s reaction, and the official position of the Iraqi government, for want of another, was that Iran was trying to put pressure on Iraq to withdraw its forces from Jordan.84 According to British officials, Iran chose to escalate this issue with Iraq not because of Iraqi provocations on the Shatt or because Iraqi troops were stationed in Jordan, but rather as a result of Hardan al-Tikriti’s 9-day visit to Bahrain and the lower Gulf between 4 and 13 April,85 just prior to 82  BNA: Tehran to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 20 April 1969, Telegram No. 341, FCO 17/879. 83  BNA: Baghdad to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 21 April 1969, Telegram No. 378, FCO 17/879. 84  BNA: Baghdad to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 23 April 1969, Telegram No. 390, FCO 17/879. 85  al-Raʿy al-ʿAam, 7 and 8 April 1969.

108 

B. FRIEDMAN

Iraq’s 15 April ultimatum on the Shatt. According to the British, Iran wanted to “make it dramatically clear to [the] Iraqis what country among [the] Gulf riparians has real muscle and will have the biggest say in the future of [the] Gulf area.”86 The following day the Shah returned from Tunisia, and the day after, 22 April, the 1500-ton Iranian freighter Ibn Sina left from Khorramshahr and sailed down the Shatt under the Iranian flag and with an Iranian naval escort. Requests from Iraqi officials to stop, raise the Iraqi flag, and take on an Iraqi pilot were refused.87 On 25 April, the 12,000-ton Iranian vessel Arya Far sailed down the Shatt al-Arab from Khorramshahr with an Iranian naval pilot, a naval escort, and Iranian air cover, which included fighter jets and a helicopter. When the ship passed the Fao Peninsula, three Iraqi patrol boats signaled to it to stop, but the Iranian naval escort informed the Iraqi patrol boats that the ship was in Iranian territorial waters and therefore would not stop. The Iraqis did not attempt to detain the vessel, and American officials report that Iraq had informed Iran it would not challenge these vessels.88 Iraq, as Deputy Premier Ammash made clear, was not going to pick up the gauntlet that Iran had laid down. Instead, Iraq used the crisis to draw closer to the Soviet Bloc. On 30 April, Iraq became the first non-Communist state to extend full diplomatic recognition to East Germany.89 This followed East Germany’s public support for Iraq during the crisis. Indeed, Iraq’s Foreign Minister ʿAbd al-Karim Shaikhly had laid the ground work for Iraqi recognition during state visits to the Soviet Union and East Germany between 19–31 March. Following Iraq’s 30 April declaration, the rest of the revolutionary Arab states—Egypt, Sudan, Syria, and South Yemen—granted East Germany full diplomatic recognition. As Israeli historian Haim Shemesh has noted, “By extending recognition to East Germany, Iraq sought first and 86  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, London to Washington, 1 May 1969, London 03404 011819Z, RG 59. 87  BNA: Baghdad to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 29 April 1969, Telegram No. 410, FCO 17/879; and, U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 22 April 1969, Tehran 01444 221425Z, RG59. 88  BNA: Tehran to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 26 April 1969, Telegram No. 362, FCO 17/879; and U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 22 April 1969, Tehran 01444 221425Z, RG59; and, U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 21 April 1969, Tehran 01416 211301Z, RG 59. 89  Haim Shemesh, Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968–1988: In the Shadow of the Iraq-Iran Conflict (Boulder & Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), pp. 28–29.

4  IRAN: THE BRITISH SUCCESSOR IN THE GULF? 

109

foremost…to promote relations with the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc at large and gain their support vis-à-vis Iran.”90 Iraq realized that it was unprepared for a full-blown armed confrontation with Iran. On 29 April, ʿAdnan Raʿuf, the acting permanent representative of Iraq to the U.N., protested to the U.N.  Security Council that “the Iranian renunciation of the 1937 treaty was accompanied by massive disposition of troops, naval and air force units all along the Iraqi borders” and “this constitutes a serious threat to the security and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq.”91 Iran’s muscle-flexing during the Shatt crisis contributed to pushing Iraq’s Baʿthist regime into the arms of the Soviets.92 In late May 1969, Hardan al-Tikriti led a 14-member Iraqi military delegation to the U.S.S.R., securing a Soviet commitment to supply Iraq with arms, including fighter planes.93 And in late June/early July 1969, the first Soviet-Iraqi oil agreement was concluded and reported to be worth $72 million to the Soviet Union. Iraq paid for Soviet technology and technical expertise to develop the North Rumaila oil field in southern Iraq, near the Kuwaiti border. In addition, in May 1969, the Soviet Union renewed its cooperation with Iraq to develop nuclear energy.94 The Soviets indeed viewed Iraq as an instrument through which they could project their influence into the Gulf, but they were not ready to fully commit to Iraq so as to rupture its hard-earned ties with Iran. Moreover, in 1969, the Soviets were unhappy with Iraq’s internal policies; specifically, they wanted to see Iraq’s Communist Party included in the government, and they wanted Iraq to find a peaceful resolution to its Kurdish problem.95 Therefore, despite Iraq’s growing need for the Soviet Union’s military support, the Soviets were not yet ready to fully embrace the Baʿthist regime in Iraq. The crisis that emerged in April 1969 over the Shatt al-Arab was based on a historical and recurring source of contention between Iran and Iraq, which Iran intentionally chose to escalate, and which brought the two  Ibid., p. 29.  BNA: UK-Mission to New York to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 30 April 1969, Telegram No. 827, FCO 17/879; and, U.S. Department of State Telegram, US UN Mission New York to Washington, 30 April 1969, US US N 01268 302225Z, RG 59. 92  Shemesh, p. 35. 93  Shemesh, p. 31. 94  Shemesh, p. 45. 95  Ofra Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), p. 30. 90 91

110 

B. FRIEDMAN

states to the brink of armed conflict. It was the third time within a decade that the waterway had triggered tension between the two neighboring states. The 1969 confrontation was, according to Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, “the most important incident in Iran-Iraq relations in the period under consideration [1946–1974], for it symbolized a new and much wider rivalry between the two.”96 In an April meeting between the Shah and the Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs ʿUmar Saqqaf, the Shah was quite “tough” when Saqqaf raised the issue of finding a peaceful resolution to Iran’s dispute with Iraq over the Shatt al-Arab. According to Saqqaf, the Shah stated flatly that we would “exterminate” the Iraqis if they attempted to use force on Iranian vessels. The Shah added that the Iraqi regime was “useless and untrustworthy,” and he pointed out with “considerable anger” that Hardan al-Tikriti had “blatantly” chosen to visit Bahrain and lower Gulf immediately after the Shah’s public announcement that he would not use force on Bahrain.97 The Saudi Ambassador to the United Kingdom told a British Foreign Ministry official that Iran’s declaration that the 1937 treaty with Iraq was null and void was “an example of Iranian bullying.” He added it was a bad omen for the Gulf because Iran’s tactic seemed to be a unilateral assertion of its claims against the weaker Arabs. He said that there was nothing Iraq could do to prevent Iranian “encroachment” and that the same situation would one day apply to the Arab states in the Gulf. He was concerned that Iranian behavior was a pattern that would repeat itself in the near future.98

Between Arab and Iranian Nationalisms In May 1969, a Free Officers Movement in Sudan, which appeared to be inspired by Abdel Nasser in Egypt, overthrew the regime and claimed it would establish a socialist revolutionary state. The revolution in Sudan took place less than one year after the Baʿthist coup d’état in Iraq, and aggravated Saudi sensitivity to the spread of Arab nationalist revolution through the region. The march of Soviet-supported revolutionary Arab 96  Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1974), p. 185. 97  U.S. Department of State Telegram. Jidda to Washington, 3 April 1969, Jidda 01112 031138Z, RG 59. 98  BNA: Foreign and Commonwealth Department, Arthur to McCarthy, 23 April 1969, FCO 17/879.

4  IRAN: THE BRITISH SUCCESSOR IN THE GULF? 

111

nationalists, as the Saudis saw it, made King Faysal uncomfortable with the Shah’s heavy-handed approach to Arab states in the region. While Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs ʿUmar Saqqaf described Saudi Arabia’s policy in the Gulf as “conscious self-restraint,”99 signs of Saudi impatience could be seen in remarks made by Saqqaf to American officials in early April that there were several outstanding “problems” between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Shah’s tough posture toward “the Arabs,” made relations with Iran difficult for the Saudis. In particular, Saqqaf said that Iran’s territorial claims in northern Iraq and its strategic assistance to the Iraqi Kurds, as well as the Shah’s decision to sever diplomatic relations with Lebanon for not extraditing former SAVAK head Teymour Bakhtiar to Iran, were examples of Iran’s “open hostility” toward Arabs, and Iranian hostility toward Arabs “causes embarrassment” for Saudi Arabia.100 It is clear from the emphasis Saqqaf gave to inter-Arab affairs that King Faysal may have been worried that Iran’s confrontation with Arab states on several fronts would create dangerous backlash in the Saudi kingdom, with Arab nationalist revolutionaries and their patrons using Saudi Arabia’s cooperation with the Shah as a pretext to increase their attacks on Saudi Arabia. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s vision for securing the Gulf following the British withdrawal was outlined in the Iranian newspaper Ayandegan in June 1969: “What the ShahanShah proposes to the sheikhdoms should leave little doubt as to Iran’s intentions: Instead of the doubtful protection of an outside Power which has lost its will east of Suez [an allusion to Great Britain] and which is becoming more and more a purely European Power, they should rely on the collective arrangements with the interested powers of the region. Instead of turning the Persian Gulf into a place of rivalry for outside powers, it should be closed to all outside influence. Instead of giving away to self-seeking elements which are using ‘Arabism’ as a pretext, there should be fruitful coexistence among the peoples and governments of the region.” The article also added that Iran would like to see “the Persian Gulf closed to all outside influence, whether British, Soviet, American or Arab extremists. Far from inviting an outside power 99  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 3 April 1969, Jidda 01120 031521Z, RG 59. 100  U.S. Department of State Telegram. Jidda to Washington, 3 April 1969, Jidda 01112 031138Z, RG 59.

112 

B. FRIEDMAN

to establish a base in the Persian Gulf, Iran is making adequate arrangements to counter any outside effort to establish a base or influence in the region. As the ShahanShah has said, Iran has sufficient power to be equal to all the Arab countries put together.”101 However, as Winston Churchill III, the grandson of former British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill, noted in a column he wrote following a visit to Iran and a meeting with the Shah: “It cannot be doubted that this offer of protection springs from Iranian good will and, above all, from a common interest which Iran shares with all her neighbors—and indeed Britain—in the maintenance of peace and stability. Nevertheless, to the Arabs in the Gulf and, above all, to the Bahrainis it sounds more like a threat, particularly at a time when the Iranians are still pressing their claim to Bahrain.” Churchill also noted that Iran’s Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi had recently declared: “Our position is that Bahrain is a part of Iran.”102 Moreover, in a private discussion with U.S.  Secretary of State William Rogers on 1 April 1969, the Shah said that Iran had no intention of permitting the British “to hand over” Abu Musa and the two Tunbs “to the Arabs.”103 In the middle of 1969, despite the possibility of the British reversing its decision to withdraw, Iran was still publicly pressing its maximalist claims in the Gulf.

 Ayandegan, 14 June 1969—in Echo of Iran, Vol. XVII, No. 130.  Winston Churchill, The Times (London), 10 June 1969. 103  BNA: “The Shah’s Visit to the United States for Mr. Eisenhower’s Funeral,” British Embassy Washington D.C. to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 10 April 1969, FCO 8/955. 101 102

CHAPTER 5

Nixon, the Shah, and King Faysal

On 1 April 1969, Mohammad Reza Shah met privately with the new U.S.  President, Richard A.  Nixon, for 45  minutes. The Shah was the senior-most head of state who attended former U.S.  President Eisenhower’s funeral. The Shah later met separately with the U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew, Secretary of State William Rogers, and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. Theodore Eliot, the country director for Iran in the U.S. Department of State, said that the Shah “made an excellent impression on all the members of the U.S. administration that he met here.”1 Joseph Sisco, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia, said in June 1969 that the “US government does not have policy on the Persian Gulf because of a number of imponderables…the future of the Suez Canal will affect our decision [an allusion to the renewed War of Attrition between Egypt and Israel]…Further, we are not yet sure as to the Soviet role, or what the area countries are going to do, especially Iran.” He stressed that the U.S. had not yet adopted a firm policy, but is actively engaged in studying the options.2 In 1969, the Shah would have several opportunities to present his vision of Persian Gulf security to the  BNA: “The Shah’s Visit to the United States for Mr. Eisenhower’s Funeral,” British Embassy Washington D.C. to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 10 April 1969, FCO 8/955. 2  U.S.  Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, “Persian Gulf,” 4 June 1969, RG 59. 1

© The Author(s) 2020 B. Friedman, The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1971, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56182-6_5

113

114 

B. FRIEDMAN

new American administration because U.S. policy toward the Gulf was not seriously discussed or reviewed by Kissinger’s National Security Council between 12 July 1969 and 5 June 1970.3 The Shah’s perception of the future security of the Gulf during this period was influenced by events that unfolded during 1969. In particular, several challenges to King Faysal’s domestic authority reinforced the Shah’s impression that Saudi Arabia was not ready to assume responsibility for regional security. Iran, therefore, must be ready to independently safeguard the security for the entire Gulf region. He outlined these views in interviews published in the Washington Post and The Times in June 1969.4 These views found a ready audience in Washington D.C., as the new Nixon administration took office, an administration favorably inclined to see the Shah as a strategic Cold War ally. The Shah’s “lifelong relationship” with Richard Nixon began when Nixon visited Iran in 1953 as vice president. Throughout the 1950s Nixon exchanged gifts and notes of friendship with the Shah. The Shah also was said to have made significant private contributions to Nixon’s 1960 and 1968 presidential campaigns.5 Nixon had “an unusually long meeting” with the Shah in 1967 during a visit to Iran at the start of Nixon’s new presidential campaign. The Shah presented Nixon with his ideas on the future security of the region, arguing that future defense of the Persian Gulf should be left to Iran. Nixon and Kissinger’s strong personal relationship with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi led them to view him as an “unconditional ally.”6 On 25 July 1969, at the top of the Mar Hotel in Guam, Nixon made a series of impromptu remarks at a press briefing that were later formulated into the “Nixon Doctrine.” The three basic principles of this doctrine were: “(1) the U.S. will keep its treaty commitments; (2) The U.S. will continue to provide a shield if a nuclear power threatened an American ally or a state whose survival was deemed to be vital for US interests; (3) In the case of the other types of aggression, the US shall look to the state directly 3  See: W. Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 185–188, particularly footnotes 88–90. Nixon’s Gulf policy was ultimately set in National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 92 on November 7, 1970; see: Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger and the Shah, pp. 54–55. 4  Alfred Friendly, “Shah Arming Iran as Buffer Against Radical Arab States,” Washington Post, 7 June 1969; Winston Churchill, The Times (London), 10 June 1969. 5  Abbas Milani, The Shah (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 248. 6  Milani, p. 327.

5  NIXON, THE SHAH, AND KING FAYSAL 

115

threatened to assume the primary responsibility for its defense.”7 The doctrine was undoubtedly shaped by the U.S.’s experience in Vietnam, and was a formula intended to emphasize the U.S.  Cold War priorities, yet avoid direct military intervention in regional disputes. The U.S. foreign policy priorities when Nixon took office in 1969 were disengagement from Vietnam and détente with the Soviet Union.8 The Gulf was not high on the list of Cold War priorities during the early days of the Nixon administration. The Johnson administration, which had preceded Nixon, encouraged Iranian-Saudi security cooperation in the Gulf. In a conversation with the Iranian Ambassador to Washington in 1968, U.S. Under-Secretary of State Eugene V.  Rostow reminded the Iranian official that “the Shah and the King [Faysal] had many interests in common: peace and security in the Gulf; a political-settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute; the Yemen and South Arabia; the future orientation of Iraq; and the risk that Nasser might turn again to policies of stirring up political trouble or worse against Feisal and other moderates.”9 Rostow added, “It was of critical importance to the process of achieving peace and stability that the two men work together constructively.”10 The U.S. ambassadors to Saudi Arabia and Iran did not notice a great deal of policy change in the transition from the Johnson to the Nixon administration11 primarily because for the Nixon administration there was no Gulf policy during 1969 and most of 1970. In practice, the “Nixon Doctrine” in the Gulf evolved into a policy of subsidizing and arming Iran as a regional “gendarme” to function as the bulwark in the U.S. strategy of containing the Soviets. While Robert Litwak noted that “the evolving American relationship with Iran after 1969 was hailed by the [Nixon] administration as a paradigmatic application of the Nixon Doctrine,” W.  Taylor Fain observed that this was “a paradigmatic illustration of the Shah’s efforts to manipulate his

 Al Saud, p. 64.  Roham Alvandi, “Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 36, No. 2, April 2012, pp. 337–372. 9  U.S.  State Department Telegram, Brussels to Washington, 29 January 1968, Brusse 04340 291946Z. 10  U.S.  State Department Telegram, Brussels to Washington, 29 January 1968, Brusse 04340 291946Z. 11  Al Saud, p. 64. 7 8

116 

B. FRIEDMAN

superpower patron to support imperial Iranian foreign policy goals.”12 Saudi Arabia was unhappy with the contours of the new Nixon doctrine.13 King Faysal viewed Saudi Arabia as playing a leading role on the Arab side of the Gulf,14 but outside of the career diplomats in the U.S.  State Department, the senior Nixon foreign policy officials did not devote a great deal of time determining how to foster greater Saudi-Iranian security cooperation. In an interview Kissinger said, “I did not know how Saudi-­ Iranian relations worked, my priority was to get the Soviets out of the Middle East.”15 In a conversation with senior U.S. Secretary of State Rogers and other senior State Department officials in Washington on 22 October 1969, the Shah said that, ideally, security of the Persian Gulf would be provided by some kind of arrangement between Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, because “there were a number of uncertainties about Saudi Arabia’s future,” including the “question of King Faysal’s successor,” Iran could not “bank on this,” and must be prepared to “stand by itself if necessary.”16 The Shah also told the Secretary of State that he saw the Soviets gaining domination in the region through a pincer movement, with one hand starting in Egypt and extending through Yemen into the Arabian Peninsula, while the other arm swept down from Iraq toward Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, about which he was particularly concerned. The Shah added that the Soviets were providing Iraq with missile-launching naval vessels and pilot training. When Rogers told the Shah that it would be madness for Iraq to contemplate attacking Iran, the Shah responded, “those fellows in Iraq are mad.”17 The Shah may have been framing the security threats to the Persian Gulf in a manner designed to convince American officials to supply him with the advanced military technology and support he was 12  As quoted in W. Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.  191; See, also: Roham Alvandi, “Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 337–372. 13  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Washington to Jidda, 24 March 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. XXIV, No.139. 14  U.S.  Department of State Research Memorandum, “The Persian Gulf: Radical Arab Subversion and the Conservative Response,” 14 November 1968, RG 59. 15  Al Saud, p. 65. 16  U.S.  Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, 22 October 1969, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 30. 17  Ibid.

5  NIXON, THE SHAH, AND KING FAYSAL 

117

asking for, but it also reflected his most serious concerns about threats to the region, which included the stability of King Faysal’s regime in Saudi Arabia.

Plots Against King Faysal On the night between 30 and 31 May 1969 a group of PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) commandos dynamited a portion of the Saudi Trans-Arabian (Tapline) oil pipeline in the Golan Heights, which was controlled by Israel following the Six-Day War in June 1967. Tapline transported oil thousands of kilometers from Dhahran in Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean port of Sidon in Lebanon for shipment to the European market. The pipeline transited through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Israel, and Lebanon. The May 1969 attack resulted in tons of oil spilling into the Sea of Galilee and extensive damage and loss of revenues to ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia.18 Shortly after the Tapline sabotage, the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate initiated a series of arrests throughout the kingdom of several different civilians and military groups that the Saudi authorities believed were involved in subversive activity and plots against King Faysal’s regime. Arabic-language media reported a plot to overthrow King Faysal scheduled for 5 June 1969—the date that marked the start of the Six-Day War in June 1967—that was organized by junior Saudi military officers. According to media reports, the plot was inspired by Sudan’s 25 May 1969 coup d’état, and called for the Saudi officers to seize the cities of Mecca, Medina, Jidda, and Taʾif.19 In contrast to the Arabic-language media, the reports coming from Saudi officials suggest that a coup d’état was never attempted, and disloyal military officers were arrested before they could put any plans in motion. Saudi authorities arrested 150 to 300 people who were believed to be engaged in subversive activity. According to Saudi officials, these people belonged to one of five groups: a loosely organized anti-regime dissident group from the Hijaz, a spy network working for the People’s Democratic 18  Asher Kaufman, “Between Permeable and Sealed Borders: The Trans-Arabian Pipeline and the Arab Israeli Conflict,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 46 (2014), 95–116. 19  Daniel Dishon (ed.), The Middle East Record, Vol. IV-V, 1969–1970 (Jerusalem, Israel Universities Press, 1977), pp. 1029–1030.

118 

B. FRIEDMAN

Republic of Southern Yemen, a group of students believed to be affiliated with a Cairo-based network, a group of ARAMCO employees, and 60 to 70 military officers.20 Approximately 15 of the military officers were said to belong to an Egyptian-backed espionage network that was responsible for placing bombs in the Saudi Ministries of Interior and Defense in 1966 and 1967. These officers led Saudi authorities to caches of explosives in Riyadh, Jidda, and on the outskirts of Taʾif.21 The regime used the arrest of this group to crack down on other military officers believed to be harboring anti-regime sentiments. This included 31 air force officers, 14 army officers, 9 police officers, 1 navy officer, and 3 retired officers. The group that claimed responsibility for the 1966–1967 bombings was the “Union of the People of the Arabian Peninsula,” a student exile group led by a Cairo-­ based Ahmad Abdullah al-Fasi. Al-Fasi was believed to have worked with Egyptian intelligence to recruit Saudi students abroad to use as tools to distribute anti-Saudi propaganda. Twenty-five Saudi students who had recently returned from studying abroad were also arrested in the summer of 1969. Among the approximately thirteen ARAMCO employees arrested, nine were Shiʿa. It is unclear how serious or advanced any of these groups were in their plots against the regime. Rashard Pharaon, a close adviser to King Faysal, suggested that Saudi intelligence had received information that arms had recently been smuggled into the kingdom to some of these “cells,” which the regime had been monitoring for almost a year prior to the arrests.22 What is clear is that throughout June, July, and August 1969 Saudi authorities used the existence of the groups and advanced intelligence on their actions to conduct a highly visible and broad security sweep of anti-­ regime elements in the kingdom. The widespread arrests of high-ranking military officers damaged morale and may have temporarily affected the military’s operational capabilities, particularly in the air force.23 However, 20  U.S.  Department of State Research Memorandum, “Saudi Arabia: Arrests Reinforce Authoritarianism,” RNA-40, 21 August 1969, RG 59. 21  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 30 August 1969, Jidda 03001 301318Z, RG 59. 22  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 8 July 1969, Jidda 02307 081455Z, RG 59. 23  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 20 August 1969, Jidda 02883 2014459Z; RG 59, and, U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington 30 July 1969, Jidda 02587 301410Z, RG 59.

5  NIXON, THE SHAH, AND KING FAYSAL 

119

the Saudi National Guard was considered the stronger and more loyal branch of Saudi armed forces during this period. The Saudis seem to have been using these arrests as a form of deterrence. In the wake of the damaging PFLP sabotage of the Saudi-owned Trans-­ Arabian (Tapline) pipeline at the end of May,24 Prince Fahd25 told the American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia that there was no “plot” against King Faysal, rather the Saudis wanted to prevent any possibility that “George Habash’s group” [PFLP] may have been laying the groundwork for future sabotage or subversion.26 Yet the breadth and scale of the arrests during this three-month period also suggests that the Saudis were trying to send a powerful message to those states which may have been collaborating with subversives in the kingdom. The massive security crackdown across Saudi Arabia during the summer months of 1969 caused some tension among the ruling Al Saʿud princes. King Faysal apparently held Prince Fahd, who was the Interior Minister, accountable for not acting earlier against known revolutionary groups in the kingdom. Fahd, for his part, may have objected to the scope and intensity of the security crackdown ordered by King Faysal. In the midst of a subsequent round of arrests in October 1969, Prince Fahd left the kingdom on diplomatic missions and remained abroad in Europe until May 1970. There were reports that Fahd’s extended absence from the kingdom was an expression of his displeasure with King Faysal’s security tactics.27 In addition to carrying out a broad security crackdown, King Faysal responded to challenges to his authority by attempting to provide the region with a form of solidarity that could be conceived as an alternative to Arab Nationalism. King Faysal was also trying to re-frame the issue of collective support for the Palestinian resistance in a way that would neutralize it as a propaganda tool to be used by the revolutionary states to attack the Saudi monarchy. In 1969, King Faysal revived his call for

24  See Beirut-based Al Hurriya (a PFLP organ), which named operatives arrested during round-up in September 1969. 25  Minister of the Interior and Second Deputy Prime Minister (and future king) of Saudi Arabia. 26  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 24 June 1969, Jidda 02137 241335Z, RG 59. 27  See: Gary Samore, Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia, 1953–1982 (unpublished PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1984), pp. 263–270.

120 

B. FRIEDMAN

regional solidarity based on Islam rather than Arab Nationalism.28 Faysal’s call for Islamic solidarity, in contrast to Arab Nationalism, did not demand a transformation of the political culture in Saudi Arabia, and, more important, did not by definition pose a challenge to Al Saʿud’s monarchical rule.

Faysal’s Call for Islamic Solidarity In late February 1969, at an annual banquet in Mecca during the annual pilgrimage (haj), King Faysal delivered a speech in which he called the Muslim world to jihad to free Jerusalem, saying, “The Holy City of Jerusalem appeals to you to rescue it…until when do we have to wait now that our Holy Shrines are subjected to the worst insult and disdain. Are we afraid to die? Is there a better death than to sacrifice one’s life for the holy jihad in the way of Allah?” The political impetus for King Faysal’s call to jihad was also emphasized in this speech, when he said: “Dear Muslim brothers, we want it to be a pure Islamic uprising, free from nationalism, racialism, or partisan bias.”29 King Faysal’s call for Pan-Islamic solidarity was not new. It was a cornerstone of his foreign policy and worldview,30 which intensified when Israel captured Jerusalem during the Six-Day War in June 1967. Politically, it allowed King Faysal to offer an alternative model for regional leadership and solidarity to compete with Abdel Nasser’s Arab Nationalism. King Faysal had been promoting an Islamic summit since late-1965, when he called for pan-Islamic solidarity in Tehran during a state visit to Iran in early December 1965.31

28  The idea for an “Islamic Conference” had been most seriously promoted during King Faysal’s December 1965 state visit to Tehran. See: Jesse Ferris, Nasser’s Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline in Egyptian Power (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 254–257. 29  BNA: “King Faisal Renews Call for Holy Jihad to Liberate Sacred Shrines and Usurped Lands from Zionist Occupation,” FCO 8/1201. 30  See: David E. Long, “King Faisal’s World View” in King Faisal and the Modernisation of Saudi Arabia (London: Croom & Helm, 1980), edited by Willard A. Beling, pp. 173–183; Abdullah M. Sindi, “King Faisal and Pan-Islamism,” in King Faisal and the Modernisation of Saudi Arabia (London: Croom & Helm, 1980), edited by Willard A. Beling, pp. 184–199; and Ghazi A. AlGosaibi, “King Faisal’s world view,” Arabian Essays (London: Kegan Paul International, 1982), pp. 26–36. 31  See: Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), third edition, pp.  109–110; See: Jesse Ferris,

5  NIXON, THE SHAH, AND KING FAYSAL 

121

King Faysal’s vision was rolled into action following a 21 August 1969 fire which destroyed parts of the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. The fire prompted an emergency meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers, and resulted in the 26 August announcement of an Islamic summit “to discuss a joint plan aimed at returning all holy places occupied by the Israelis to Arab hands.”32 The ministers asked King Hassan of Morocco and King Faysal to convene a meeting of the leaders of 40 Muslim countries, and emphasized the necessity of providing “all possible material and military aid” to the Palestinian guerrilla organizations.33 Egyptian President Abdel Nasser’s endorsement of the Islamic nature of the summit may have represented a political victory for King Faysal, who contributed £50/$79.4 million of the £135/$215 million in annual subsidies to Egypt and Jordan following the Khartoum summit in the summer of 1967. Abdel Nasser concession to King Faysal was not just a symbolic political victory, it had a practical consequence, as well: It allowed King Faysal to limit the summit’s agenda to the problem of Al Aqsa Mosque and the status of Jerusalem, and therefore avoid the much thornier issue of the broader Arab-Israeli dispute. This would be necessary if the summit’s organizers hoped to secure the participation of all Muslim heads of state, many of whom might not be interested in inserting themselves into the Arab-Israeli conflict.34 A committee of representatives from seven states—Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Iran, Somalia, Malaysia, Niger, and Pakistan—met in Morocco between 9 and 11 September 1969 to set the agenda for the conference that would be held between 22 and 24 September in Rabat, Morocco. The Egyptian daily newspaper al-Ahram reported that President Abdel Nasser told King Hussein of Jordan that the conference and any resolutions it issued would be important. The paper also reported that Egypt would decide on the level of its representation at the conference based on preparations that establish clear positions of mutual interest.35 Ultimately, Egypt chose future president Anwar al-Sadat to lead its delegation to the Nasser’s Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline in Egyptian Power (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 254–257. 32  The Times (London), 27 August 1969. 33  The Times (London), 27 August 1969. 34  BNA: Jedda to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Islamic Summit,” 3 September 1969, FCO 8/1201. 35  BNA: Cairo to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 17 September 1969, Telegram No. 957, FCO 8/1201.

122 

B. FRIEDMAN

summit. However, it was clear that Abdel Nasser felt compelled to use the media to prevent the conference planners from adopting an agenda that would undercut and damage Egypt’s legitimacy as the champion of revolutionary Arab Nationalism. On 19 September, al-Ahram reported that “the decisive factor in the [Arab-Israeli] conflict is the strength of Arab Nationalism and what it can mobilize for the battle.”36 On 20 September al-Ahram noted that the Egyptian Foreign Ministry was contacting Arab states in advance of the summit to stress the necessity of studying the whole Palestinian problem and explaining it to Muslim countries.37 The Egyptian viewpoint going into the conference was summed up in an al-Akhbar editorial by Ihsan ʿAbd al-Quddus, who wrote, “There can be no doubt the encroachment on the Aqsa Mosque is an aggression on Muslims throughout the world. It is a challenge to all Islamic states and belittles their strength, existence, and prestige.” Al-Quddus then continued to explain how, in the Egyptian eyes, the mosque issue was a symptom of the problem: “The encroachment is a by-product of a state of affairs which induced and encouraged Israel’s aggression against a Muslim holy place…The subject is not one of encroachment on a wall of a holy mosque; it is connected with a state of affairs which enables Israel to perpetrate such an aggression.” Al-Quddus concluded by expressing the views of Egyptian leadership: “We support the convocation of the conference. We do not want the conference to end in mere talk while Muslim land is still occupied and while we are fighting.”38 Syria and Iraq safeguarded their revolutionary credentials by boycotting the Islamic summit in Rabat. Radio Baghdad issued a commentary on the summit in a broadcast on 23 September, which was extremely critical of Iran’s participation in the summit while failing to name it directly in its comments.39 Ultimately, 25 of approximately 35 Muslim states that were invited participated in the summit.40 Failure to properly lay the groundwork for the conference agenda in advance resulted in an open split during the 36  BNA: Cairo to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 19 September 1969, Telegram No. 972, FCO 8/1201. 37  BNA: Cairo to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 20 September 1969, Telegram No. 976, FCO 8/1201. 38  BBC Monitoring Service – SWB ME/3180/A/1, 16 September 1969. 39  BBC Monitoring Service – SWB, 23 September 1969. 40  For a complete list of participants, see: Daniel Dishon (ed.), The Middle East Record, Vol. IV–V, 1969–1970 (Jerusalem, Israel Universities Press, 1977), p. 580.

5  NIXON, THE SHAH, AND KING FAYSAL 

123

conference’s first closed session on 22 September and continued the following morning. Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Tunisia attempted to confine the agenda to a discussion of the status of Jerusalem and the status of the Islamic holy shrines. Egypt, backed by a majority of the Arab states, stated its position and pressed for a broader discussion of the question of Palestine.41 During one of the summit’s initial closed sessions on 23 September, Algeria’s President Boumedienne managed to convince the conference organizers to admit the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) representatives as observers. Algeria also argued that the conference should take up the entire Palestinian question rather than limit discussion to the future of the Muslim holy places. Delegates from the new, revolutionary regimes in Libya and Sudan, as well as North and South Yemen took provocative, immoderate positions on the issue. Turkey and Iran, who had relations with Israel, were not in favor of the Algerian proposition and were uncomfortable with its backing from the revolutionary delegates of Libya, Sudan, and the Yemens.42 At the conference’s conclusion, the participant states issued a joint declaration that adopted language considerably less confrontational than the Egyptian line, as a result of joint-support from Jordan, Turkey, and Iran, and to a lesser extent, Lebanon. The communiqué stated that the participants considered the Al Aqsa Mosque fire and declared that “the continued threat upon the sacred shrines of Islam in Jerusalem is the result of the occupation of this city by the Israeli forces…They therefore declare that their governments and peoples are firmly determined to reject any solution of the problem of Palestine which would deny Jerusalem the status it had before June 1967…They affirm their full support to the Palestinian people for the restitution of their rights which were usurped and in their struggle for national liberation…And adherence to the principle of peace, but peace with honor and justice.”43 The Voice of Asifa, the radio organ of Yasser Arafat’s Fatah party, commented on the Islamic summit, stating that “The masses throughout the Muslim world were expecting revolutionary declarations, but we know that many of those participating were

41  BNA: “The Islamic Summit,” Rabat to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 29 September 1969, FCO 8/1201. 42  The Times (London), 24 September 1969 43  British National Archives: Rabat to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 299, 26 September, 1969, FCO 8/1201.

124 

B. FRIEDMAN

not of us.”44 If this was the case, then King Faysal may have considered the Islamic Summit a political victory of sorts. If only for a short time, the conference allowed King Faysal to seize the initiative on the Palestinian issue, and shift the rhetoric away from revolutionary declarations by adopting a firm but more moderate and institutional tone. Despite the milder language of the conference’s declaration, the statement allowed King Faysal to take credit for demonstrating leadership on the question of Jerusalem and the Palestinians, which was an important boon to his domestic and regional prestige. The timing of this boost to King Faysal’s prestige was important. It came just a few short months after Abdel Nasser–style revolutions had toppled monarchies in Sudan (May) and Libya (September), and at a time when a new Israeli-­ Egyptian armed conflict (March 1969) that would evolve into the War of Attrition (harb al-iʾstinzaf )  was escalating. King Faysal was also able to demonstrate strong leadership immediately following a three-month period of domestic unrest that raised concerns about the stability of Faysal’s regime among Saudi Arabia’s regional and international allies.

Union in Disarray King Faysal had been the strongest proponent of a union of nine shaykhdoms following the British announcement of withdrawal in 1968. The Gulf shaykhs, despite being wary of Saudi domination, viewed King Faysal as an important counterweight to the Shah’s ambitions in the Persian Gulf. The fear that the revolutions sweeping through the Arab world had arrived at King Faysal’s doorstep presented a serious concern to the Gulf shaykhs. If Saudi Arabia tried to navigate the ground between the Iraq-­ Iran hostility, the shaykhs, for their parts, were maneuvering between their larger neighbors Iran and Saudi Arabia to maintain their freedom of action. But without a stable Saudi Arabia, they would be more vulnerable to the same revolutionary Arab Nationalist forces that were presenting a subversive challenge to King Faysal’s authority in 1969. Yet the shaykhs still preferred to speak to everyone but each other during the summer of 1969. Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi visited Great Britain in June and met Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart. Zayid also met with Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Goronwy Roberts. Shaykh Khalifah, the deputy ruler and “strongman” of  The Times (London), 27 September 1969

44

5  NIXON, THE SHAH, AND KING FAYSAL 

125

Qatar, and Shaykh Rashid of Dubai also made visits to Great Britain. Shaykh Ahmad of Qatar and Shaykh Rashid of Dubai followed their trips to Britain with visits to Iran.45 Bahrain’s Director of Foreign Affairs, Mohammad bin Mubarak, told American officials in advance of the late October Supreme Council meeting that “the important thing for Bahrain at this point was to give [an] unmistakable expression of support for the federation.” He said that Bahrain’s posture during the upcoming meeting would be one of compromise. It would accept the formula for representation in the Federal National Assembly that would be proposed during the upcoming Supreme Council meeting in Abu Dhabi despite Bahrain’s belief that this formula was not “equitable.” However, it was “not worth the fight” at this critical juncture, according to bin Mubarak. He said Bahrain would support the establishment of a provisional capital in Abu Dhabi, and would not object to building a new capital “anywhere they want in the desert,” despite Bahrain’s position that it would be costly and unwise. Bin Mubarak also said they would vote for the appointment of Shaykh Zayid as the first president of the federation. Bin Mubarak said he was interested in seeing Dubai’s reaction to Bahrain’s determination to cooperate because he was convinced Dubai did not want Bahrain in the union. When American officials pointed out that Shaykh Rashid had given a 13 October speech that was extremely supportive of the union of nine, Shaykh ʿIsa told the official not to forget that “Rashid is a fox.”46 Shaykh Rashid and Shaykh Ahmad of Qatar were said to have told the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister that they planned to make life so difficult for Bahrain during the meetings between 21 and 25 October that Bahrain would opt out of the union.47 However, it was reported that Bahrain took this behavior in stride and did not allow itself to be provoked. As a result, there was a good deal of administrative progress in the early stages of the conference: Shaykh Zayid was elected president, Shaykh Rashid 45  British National Archives: Kuwait to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 11 October 1969, FO 248/1652. 46  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 20 October 1969, Dhahra 00907 200834Z; RG 59; Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), pp. 68–73. 47  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 24 October 1969, Dhahra 00920 2406409Z, RG 59; and, U.S. Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 28 October 1969, Dhahra 00940 281255Z, RG 59; Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), pp. 68–73.

126 

B. FRIEDMAN

vice-president, and Shaykh Khalifah of Qatar was elected prime-minister. And while the deliberations for the position of vice-president were lengthy and involved, and several different shaykhs were nominated and declined, Shaykh Rashid ultimately accepted the nomination and was unanimously approved. Bahrain, as it said, cooperated with respect to a provisional capital in Abu Dhabi and also supported the initiative for a future capital to be built on the border between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah unsuccessfully advocated for the new capital to be located between Dubai and Sharjah. Bahrain also compromised on the issue of equal representation for the shaykhdoms in the Federal National Assembly which was a major change from its insistence on proportional representation in May. Toward the end of the meetings on 24 May, the discussion turned to distribution of the federation’s ministries. It was decided that Abu Dhabi would have the ministry of defense and Dubai the ministry of foreign affairs. Bahrain was offered the ministries of education and health. It was also agreed that each shaykhdom would provide Prime Minister Shaykh Khalifah with a list of three names for each ministry and he would make the final appointment. On 24 October, the meeting suddenly took an abrupt turn for the worse. The discussions resumed with further distribution of ministry responsibilities when Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah declared that unless he received the defense portfolio he would refuse to sign any agreement then or in the future. Shaykh Saqr’s demand created pandemonium in the meeting and jeopardized the progress that had been made the day before. Britain’s political resident in Abu Dhabi, who had been observing the meeting, chose to intervene with a statement that had been prepared in advance. The statement had been composed as a contingency when Britain had learned of Shaykh Rashid and Shaykh Ahmad’s plan to provoke Bahrain. The statement was read by the British official and expressed Britain’s hope that the rulers would press through difficulties and overcome any differences for the common good. The statement was met with silence by the shaykhs until the British official left the room. Shaykh Ahmad then declared the British statement a “flagrant interference” and that it amounted to telling the rulers what to do. He and Shaykh Saqr abruptly left the meeting, and Saqr told the press that the British were to blame for the meeting’s failure. According to American diplomatic records, Shaykh Ahmad boarded his yacht to return to Qatar, and had set sail when Shaykh Zayid, pursuing Ahmad’s yacht in an Abu Dhabi Defense Force patrol vessel, caught up

5  NIXON, THE SHAH, AND KING FAYSAL 

127

with Ahmad and persuaded him to return to the meeting. The meetings resumed, but any further discussion of ministries or their distribution among the shaykhs was postponed to a future meeting.48 Further, the rulers of Qatar, Dubai, and Ras al-Khaimah refused to sign a final document that would have put into force the various issues resolved earlier in the conference. On 25 October, the Iranian ministry of foreign affairs issued a statement in response to the Abu Dhabi conference. It claimed that despite making its position on the union of shaykhdoms known on several times in the recent past, “it has been deemed necessary to announce once more that, so long as the future of Bahrain has not been clarified on a legal basis in accordance with correct and prevalent international norms, such a federation will in no way be acceptable to Iran.” It also stated that several decisions made during the conference were “in contradiction to the sense of friendship and cooperation promoted and requested by the Imperial Government of Iran for providing the Persian Gulf region with stability, security, and welfare.”49 Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to Lebanon, Muhammad Mansur al-­ Rumaih, was dispatched to visit the Gulf rulers in early November to gauge the reactions of the rulers in the aftermath of the October meeting. He came back with the impression that the rulers should not meet again, even if that meant waiting several months, until the Bahrain issue was settled. He also cautioned that the issues should be agreed upon in advance of the next meeting. Qatar’s 31 October 1969 statement on the Abu Dhabi conference stated that Qatar “is of the opinion that pre-­consultations and contacts have become essential,”50 echoing the ideas expressed by the Saudi Ambassador. Rumaih also noted that his impression was that some of the rulers had been intimidated by Iran.51 In fact, prior to the October meetings, several of the shaykhs were reported to have shown King Faysal draft agreements that Iran had asked them to sign that were said to be

48  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 28 October 1969, Dhahra 00940 281255Z, RG 59. 49   U.S.  Department of State Airgram, Bonn to Washington, 7 November 1969, A-1121, RG 59. 50  Taryam, p. 137. 51  BNA: London to Bahrain, 17 November 1969, Telegram No. 578, FO 248/1652.

128 

B. FRIEDMAN

similar in wording to the protectorate treaties between Great Britain and the Trucial shaykhdoms.52 The five days of Supreme Council meetings began with real progress but collapsed into inconclusive failure. Shaykh Saqr and others blamed the British for the meeting’s implosion, but it would appear that it was a combination of elements that undermined success. Bahrain, changing its tack from the May 1969 Supreme Council meetings, was cooperative and accommodating. Perhaps due to strong encouragement from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, it had decided that it would make a committed effort to the union. However, Bahrain’s concessions accrued primarily to Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi, and this may have been too much for Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah who was reluctant to be part of a union dominated by Abu Dhabi. The British suspected that Shaykh Ahmad and Shaykh Rashid had entered the meeting with their “tactics fixed,” and when Bahrain did not give them their expected pretext, Shaykh Ahmad used Shaykh Saqr’s declaration for the defense ministry and the subsequent British intervention as an excuse to undercut the meetings. This view is supported by Lebanese journalist Salim al-Lawzi’s account.53 A.O. Taryam and Riyad Najib al-­ Rayyis have attributed the failure to historical animosities. Taryam astutely noted that “A constitution, government bodies, organizations and ministries will not bring about union if the leadership does not possess goodwill, complete conviction, enthusiasm and political will.”54 A week after the Supreme Council meeting, a British official observed that “there is widespread disillusionment amongst the Rulers about the Union’s prospects.” He identified three primary obstacles: first, objections to Bahrain’s inclusion; second, resentment of Shaykh Zayid by Shaykh Rashid of Dubai and Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah; and, third, “the basic inability to sink old attitudes in a new situation.”55 52  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 22 October 1969, Jidda 03573 221024Z, RG 59. 53  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), pp. 69–76; Simon Smith, Britain’s Revival and Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States, 1950–71 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 96–97. 54  A.O.  Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, 1950–1985 (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 136–137; See, also: Riyad Najib al-Rayyis, Siraʿ al-waḥat wa-alnifṭ, humum al-Khalij al-ʿArabi bayna 1968–1971 [The Struggle for Oil and Oasis: The Arabian Gulf, 1968–1971] (Beirut: Riad al-Rayyes Books, 2004, 3rd edition), p. 386. 55  BNA: “Visit of Mr. Elliot Richardson,” 5 November 1969, FCO 8/955.

5  NIXON, THE SHAH, AND KING FAYSAL 

129

An Unexpected Demonstration of Force At seven in the morning on 26 November 1969, a military force of 300 to 500 men from South Yemen crossed the undemarcated Saudi-South Yemeni border area in 80 vehicles and 15 armored personal carriers (APCs) and attacked and captured a Saudi frontier force of 26 men trained to prevent smuggling and direct caravan traffic at the Saudi outpost of Wadiʾa.56 The Saudis also had approximately 100 National Guard troops at Sharurah, a village approximately 60 kilometers north of Wadiʾa, who were not involved in the initial South Yemen cross-border attack on Wadiʾa, on the 26th. Wadiʾa, little more than a well on a caravan route through the Hadramawt quarter, was locally recognized as Saudi territory, and any confusion or confrontation over the border in that area historically came nearer to Al-Abr, which is 75 kilometers (47 miles) south of Wadiʾa, and not considered Saudi territory.57 Saudi Arabia had positioned forces at Wadiʾa following the destruction of a Saudi border marker at the nearby village of Sharurah in 1968, which was believed to have been carried out by forces from South Yemen. Between 29 November and 2 December 1969, the Saudi Royal Air Force initiated air attacks twice daily on South Yemen forces in the Wadiʾa region. The Saudis used 13 British-made Lightnings and 8 U.S. made F-86s for combat missions from Khamis Mushayt. The Saudi army’s M-41 tank units were made available, and American-made C-130 transport planes delivered approximately 800 additional Saudi troops to the region.58 On 30 November 1969, Saudi forces recaptured Wadiʾa and launched a counter-offensive. Skirmishes continued in the area for several days, and the decisive battle came when a well-armed Saudi ground force of 400, with Royal Saudi Air Force support, defeated a large South Yemen force at Umm Sumar on 3 December. Total Saudi losses during the fighting were estimated at 8 killed, 20 wounded, and 31 missing or captured (including 56  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 29 November 1969, 03907 300214Z, RG 59. 57  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 29 November 1969, Jidda 03906 291713Z. 58  U.S.  Department of State Airgram, Jidda to Washington, 8 December 1969, A-346; and, U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 3 December 1969, Jidda 03975 031444Z; and, U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 6 December 1969, Jidda 03986 061239Z.

130 

B. FRIEDMAN

the 25 of 26 of the initial Saudi frontier force at Wadiʾa). The Saudis reported capturing 24 South Yemeni soldiers and destroying approximately 75 South Yemeni vehicles. South Yemen also received MIG-17 air support during the fighting, and two Saudi helicopters were reportedly shot down, but there were no direct air engagements with the Saudi air force. The Saudi forces did not pursue the remnants of the South Yemeni forces, and stopped 15  kilometers (9  miles) south of Wadiʾa between Sharurah and Al Abr.59 Saudi officials reported that captured South Yemeni soldiers who were interrogated revealed that Soviet military advisers accompanied the South Yemeni forces on their attack on Wadiʾa. The Saudis also suspected that Soviet pilots, and perhaps Syrians, flew the MIG-17s that provided air cover for the South Yemeni forces. U.S. officials, however, remained skeptical about this claim in the absence of firm evidence. Abdel Nasser was not believed to have been involved or aware of the South Yemeni attack, and the muted response to the incident in the Egyptian press led some to believe that Abdel Nasser was afraid King Faysal would use the South Yemen attack as an excuse to skip the upcoming Arab Summit in Rabat, which Abdel Nasser was anxious to have Faysal attend.60 The reason for South Yemen’s unprovoked attack on Saudi Arabia was puzzling for Saudi officials. They suspected that the revolutionary regime in Aden was trying to demonstrate that the Saudi regime was weak and provide inspiration to spur groups in Saudi Arabia to rise up and challenge the Saudi regime. This Saudi perception directed King Faysal’s immediate and forceful military response and contributed to an uncharacteristically bold Saudi media propaganda against South Yemen. In some respect, the attack allowed Faysal to go on the offensive and state that it was South Yemen that was undermining Arab solidarity and obstructing a united effort on the Arab-Israel issue. Mohammad Reza Shah and King Hassan of Morocco were troubled by the South Yemeni attack. The Shah was “most fearful something was about to happen in Saudi Arabia,” and the South Yemen attack was the 59   U.S.  Department of State Airgram, Jidda to Washington, 8 December 1969, A-346, RG 59. 60  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Washington to Tehran, 22 December 1969, 211261, RG 59; and, U.S.  Department of State Intelligence Note, “Saudi Arabia-South Yemen: Conflict in the Sands,” 4 December 1969, RG 59.

5  NIXON, THE SHAH, AND KING FAYSAL 

131

first step in a Russian and Egyptian campaign to bring down Faysal’s regime.61 The Free Officers’ revolution in Sudan in May and a similar military revolution in Libya in September were fresh in the minds of the Shah and King Hassan, who were afraid for the stability of the Saudi regime. On 3 December 1969, following the decisive Saudi victory over the South Yemeni forces, King Faysal announced he would attend the Arab summit in Rabat.

Inter-Arab Politics The late November South Yemen attack on Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia’s forceful response, gave King Faysal more diplomatic leverage with which to deal with the inter-Arab pressure that had been building against Saudi Arabia during the second half of 1969 to support the call for an Arab summit to discuss the intensifying Egyptian-Israeli conflict. Egypt appeared to be losing its War of Attrition.62 Abdel Nasser, in his speech rejecting the 28 October Rogers Plan for peace delivered on 6 November, days before the opening of the Arab Joint Defense Council in Cairo on 8 November, appeared to address the Arab states in the Gulf when he said: “The new circumstances created by the inevitability of the battle require more guidance and closer participation…If the confrontation states [Egypt, Jordan, Syria] bear a special responsibility…the great Arab resources are the basic support for this front line. Without this…the frontline loses much of its effect…[just as] any fighting army without a support and supply base…The time has come for every part of the Arab nation to raise its hand and to count itself or be dropped. The time has come for the Arab nation …to arm itself with the strength of unity and the unity of strength…the requirements of confrontation make it necessary to call for an Arab summit conference.”63 The focus of the 11th Arab Joint Defense Council meetings in Cairo between 8 and 10 November was the need for an Arab summit. On 10 November, facing increasing isolation from the other members of the 61  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 18 December 1969, Tehran 05077 181521Z, RG 59. 62  Laura M. James, “Military/political means/ends: Egyptian decision making in the War of Attrition,” in The Cold War in the Middle East (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), Nigel Ashton (ed.), p. 99. 63  Daniel Dishon (ed.), The Middle East Record, Vol. IV–V, 1969–1970 (Jerusalem, Israel Universities Press, 1977), p. 534.

132 

B. FRIEDMAN

Council, the Saudis agreed to attend a summit, but only after a public declaration from the Council that all efforts to find a peaceful solution had failed. On 18 November, ʿUmar Saqqaf, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, gave a press conference in order to explain and defend Saudi Arabia’s position on the Arab summit in response to media pressure and speculation about whether it would participate. During the press conference Saqqaf explained that in the past Saudi Arabia had opposed a summit until all peaceful means to an Arab-Israeli settlement had failed. Now that the Arabs had admitted that the road to a peaceful settlement is blocked, Saudi Arabia was willing to support and attend the proposed Arab summit. Saqqaf also emphasized that Saudi Arabia opposed any Great Power peace settlement where Jerusalem is not the main article of the agreement, which appeared to be a subtle jab at the Rogers Plan. Saudi Arabia, Saqqaf also added, had never considered the annihilation of Israel, and would support the Palestinian guerrillas as much as possible without interfering in their affairs. Saqqaf’s key point was to emphasize that Saudi Arabia had contributed great financial support to the states involved in the Six-Day War and that Saudi troops in Jordan were not a symbolic force but “a large, well-equipped fighting force in the heart of the battle area.”64 In contrast to Saqqaf’s defensive tone during this mid-November press conference, Saudi Arabia’s inter-Arab position following the South Yemen-­ Wadiʾa episode in early December was much more secure and confident. Saudi Arabia could claim it had remained focused on the Arab-Israel issue, while the revolutionary Arab states were dividing the Arab camp and prevented unified Arab action by attacking Saudi Arabia. Yet in the weeks leading up to the Rabat summit, Morocco’s King Hassan shared the Shah’s concern that Saudi Arabia’s situation was “grave” and that Faysal’s regime was in “danger.” Moroccan diplomat, Mehdi Ben Abdeljalil, added that what was important was that “the Holy Places of Islam do not fall into the hands of Arab radical pro-communist hands, for if that happened over a million Muslim pilgrims who visit the Holy Places each year from all corners of the world would be exposed to radical Arab pro-communist indoctrination, and this would tear Islam apart and destroy its utility as a barrier to communist expansion.” Abdeljalil had been asked to coordinate an approach to King Faysal to convince him not to visit 64  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 19 November 1969, Jidda 03829 191430Z, RG 59.

5  NIXON, THE SHAH, AND KING FAYSAL 

133

Abdel Nasser in Cairo before attending the Arab Summit in Rabat in late December. King Hassan and the Shah were concerned that Faysal’s visit would create the impression that he was visiting out of weakness to pay homage to Abdel Nasser in an effort to arrange Arab affairs. Iran had tried to convince Faysal to visit Algeria to meet with Boumedienne instead of Abdel Nasser, because Boumedienne’s regime appeared “less disposed to external adventures” than its predecessor, and with Faysal’s encouragement, it might be inclined to distance itself from the region’s revolutionary regimes.65 In late November 1969, Prince Sultan the Saudi defense minister and acting interior minister (in Fahd’s absence) appealed to the American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia for strong support from the U.S. in the “critical days ahead.” Sultan said that Saudi Arabia felt increasingly threatened by “communist” pressure particularly from “radical Arab states.” He said, in reference to the summer’s security crackdown, that it had been unimaginable that nearly 70 Saudi military officers would be implicated in “communist activities.” Prince Sultan also outlined the Saudi position on the upcoming Arab summit in Rabat. He expected the summit to be difficult because “demands on Saudi Arabia for additional subsidy payments will be intense.” He said the Saudi position was that it was giving the maximum possible financial assistance it could and it would give no more. He said that if the Egypt and others wanted more money they should go to Libya, Kuwait, and Iraq. Sultan also attempted to mitigate the effect of any public Saudi statements at the summit by telling the American official that some of the comments King Faysal might make should be understood within the context of “fending off radical Arab pressures.”66 King Faysal did not heed Moroccan and Iranian entreaties not to visit Cairo before the Rabat summit. Faysal wanted no surprises in Rabat, and flew to Cairo to meet with Abdel Nasser between 18 and 20 December before traveling to Rabat. During his visit, King Faysal raised the issue of the Egyptian connection to the June 1969 plot against the Saudi monarchy. Faysal suggested that one of Abdel Nasser’s men, Sami Sharaf, was involved. Abdel Nasser admitted to working against Faysal prior to 1967, but claimed that he had explicit orders to desist such operations following 65  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 22 December 1969, Tehran 05104 221348Z, RG 59. 66  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 26 November 1969, Dhahran 01050 260834Z, RG 59.

134 

B. FRIEDMAN

the Khartoum Summit in August 1967. Faysal dropped the subject, and Abdel Nasser brought the discussion around to money.67 He suggested that Egypt would need a larger financial contribution from Saudi Arabia. Then Egypt’s foreign minister, Mahmoud Riad, presented Faysal with a report with the amount of revenue of each Arab country and its corresponding contribution to the frontline states. Riad pointed out that Saudi Arabia was contributing 12 percent of its national income, and proposed that all Arab oil-producing states increase their contributions by one or two percent.68 Faysal made no promises to Abdel Nasser; however, money remained the key issue for Abdel Nasser and the problem would not go away in Rabat simply because Faysal had met with Abdel Nasser in Cairo and politely deflected Abdel Nasser’s hints for a greater Saudi financial contribution.69 Fourteen Arab states, as well as the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) sent delegations to the Arab Summit which took place in Rabat between 21 and 24 December. The conference agenda, which was outlined at the Arab Joint Defense Council in early November, was: (1) mobilization of the maximum Arab resources—political, military, and economic—for the liberation of the land [of Israel], (2) support for the Palestinian resistance and the supply of all the arms and material resources necessary for its struggle against the enemy, and (3) strengthening the steadfastness of the Palestinian people in the occupied land.70 In practice the conference foundered on the question of money. On 23 December, Abdel Nasser told the summit that Egypt was overburdened. The Suez Canal’s closure and the loss of oil income from territory conquered by Israel in 1967 were taking its economic toll. Abdel Nasser said he needed £150 ($360) million to purchase arms. He needed £37.5 ($90) million immediately to pay as an advance on the weapons. Apparently Qaddafi agreed to give Abdel Nasser an additional £10 ($24) million, and then began his “emotional demands…toward Faisal…to raise his contribution.”71 Faysal responded by pointing out to Qaddafi that  Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (London: Collins, 1975), pp. 78–79.  Mahmoud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (London: Quartet Books, 1981), pp. 115–117; See, also: Abdel Magid Farid, Nasser: The Final Years (Reading, U.K: Ithaca Press, 1994), pp. 154–162. 69  Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (London: Collins, 1975), pp. 78–79. 70  Daniel Dishon (ed.), The Middle East Record, Vol. IV–V, 1969–1970 (Jerusalem, Israel Universities Press, 1977), p. 539. 71  Riad, p. 117. 67 68

5  NIXON, THE SHAH, AND KING FAYSAL 

135

Saudi Arabia was paying £50 ($120) million per year to the confrontation states while Libya was paying £30 ($71.7) million, while oil production in Libya was the same as oil production in Saudi Arabia.72 Faysal also pointed out that Saudi Arabia was contributing 12 percent of its national income while Libya was contributing just four percent.73 Apparently, it was during this exchange between Saudi Arabia and Libya that Abdel Nasser walked out of the session in anger.74 King Faysal’s refusal to give in to demands for a greater Saudi financial contribution frustrated Abdel Nasser who was reported to have said at the end of the conference, “I am a tired man, because I have the impression that I am a lonely man.”75 The summit had been convened because the Arab states had declared that peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli issue had failed. It was time to mobilize. Yet Abdel Nasser claimed he did not have the financial resources and the weapons to seriously contemplate another full-scale war. He was seeking additional financial support from the Gulf, but none was forthcoming. He may have been seeking an alternative to increasing Egyptian dependence on Soviet aid.76 Abdel Nasser also found himself isolated between the conservative Gulf oil producers—principally, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait—and the more radical revolutionary states: Algeria, Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen. That Abdel Nasser appeared to be out of step with the more radical states was not lost on King Faysal in Rabat. Without a united revolutionary front for action in the Arab-Israeli confrontation, Abdel Nasser’s means to undermine Saudi authority was greatly diminished. It appears that King Hassan and the Shah’s fears for the stability of King Faysal’s regime may have been misplaced or exaggerated; Faysal’s ability to navigate the domestic and inter-Arab challenges to his authority throughout 1969 strengthened his regime and his authority rather than weakening it.

72  Daniel Dishon (ed.), The Middle East Record, Vol. IV–V, 1969–1970 (Jerusalem, Israel Universities Press, 1977), p. 541. 73  Riad, p. 117. 74  The New York Times, 24 December 1969. 75  Daniel Dishon (ed.), The Middle East Record, Vol. IV–V, 1969–1970 (Jerusalem, Israel Universities Press, 1977), p. 544. 76  Dima Adamsky, “‘Zero-Hour for the Bears’: Inquiring into the Soviet Decision to Intervene in the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition, 1969–1970” Cold War History, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2006, pp. 113–136.

136 

B. FRIEDMAN

Iran Aims to Replace the British In 1969, the Shah’s vision of replacing the British as the dominant military power in the Gulf came into sharper focus. In his annual speech to a joint session of parliament in Iran on 6 October, the Shah emphasized that Iran will be making “enormous” military expenditures in order to assume its new responsibilities in the Gulf upon British departure in 1971.77 He told the U.S. Secretary of State that Iran needed an “over-kill capability” so that should anyone be tempted to attack Iran they would think twice or even three times.78 In order to execute this vision he presented his case to the new Nixon administration for supplying Iran with the most expensive and modern military technology to transform Iran into an unparalleled regional military power. In conversations with the U.S., the Shah framed his ambitions in terms of the Cold War struggle. During the Shah’s October 1969 meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Rogers, he outlined his defense needs, declaring his air force to be his first priority. When he asked for U.S. air force technicians to service the new F-4 fighter planes he was planning on purchasing, U.S. officials expressed some reluctance to have such a large number of U.S. advisers and technicians in Iran. The Shah responded by stating that the Soviets now had more than 1000 advisers in Egypt, so the U.S. should not feel inhibited about providing Iran with a considerably smaller number of advisers.79 In a conversation with British Secretary of State Michael Stewart, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Ardeshir Zahedi, expressed concern that the new revolutionary regime in Sudan would begin sending its military officers for training in the Soviet Union.80 Iran viewed the Soviet challenge to the Gulf as an indirect threat rather than a direct Soviet incursion into the Gulf. Iran feared Soviet military aid and personnel finding its way to anti-­ monarchical Arab revolutionaries in Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, and Oman.81 In light of reports that Soviet advisers had been fighting alongside South 77  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 9 October 1969, Tehran 04123 019327Z, RG 59. 78  U.S.  Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, 22 October 1969, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 33. 79  U.S.  Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, 22 October 1969 FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 34. 80  BNA: “The Secretary of State’s Call on the Iranian Foreign Minister,” 29 May 1969. 81  U.S.  Department of State Airgram, Tehran to Washington, “Future Security of the Persian Gulf – Indian Ocean Area,” 20 February 1969, A-066, RG 59.

5  NIXON, THE SHAH, AND KING FAYSAL 

137

Yemeni forces against the Saudis at Wadiʾa in late 1969, such concerns had the force of substance. Saudi Arabia also saw the main security threat to the region in terms of the Soviet-Arab nationalist connection, and while anxious to maintain positive relations with Iran, Faysal was, at the same time, also concerned about Iran’s regional ambitions. In November 1969, the Saudi Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shaykh Abdul Rahman al-Helaissi, told Foreign Office officials that the British should put its full weight behind a union of nine shaykhdoms and a quick and satisfactory resolution to the Bahrain issue as the best means to promoting Saudi-Iranian cooperation. He added that Iran’s influence in the shaykhdoms was strong, and if a union of nine failed to materialize, Iran’s influence in the shaykhdoms would grow stronger. The Saudi Ambassador then said that if there was a “radical revolution in Iran,” the growth of Iranian influence in the Gulf shaykhdoms would turn out to be a direct threat to Saudi Arabia, which would then be “hemmed in by revolutionaries on all sides.”82 Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi felt that the spread of “radical” revolutionary ideology posed a serious threat to the region and many of the Gulf rulers were not taking it seriously enough. He said he feared that the young people who were being lured away by the Soviets and radical Arab states for training in ideology and subversion would return to undermine the regimes in their homelands. He said the greatest threat came from Muscat and Oman, where the Sultan was “thoroughly hopeless.” Zayid said that the Dhofari rebels had serious grievances against the Sultan, but because they could not receive help from anywhere else, they have fallen under the influence of radical forces. Zayid emphasized that the situation in Oman was “very serious” and should be “subjected to intensive study” by those who fear the communist and radical threat to the region. He said that if the U.S. and U.K. are not “thoroughly aware of these dangers,” then “radical forces with full support, encouragement, and guidance from the Soviets will gradually but inevitably come to wield the greatest influence in the area by default.”83 The threat perceptions of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Abu Dhabi illustrate the political issue that dominated the Gulf in 1969: the threat of 82   BNA: “Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Gulf,” Arabian Department  – Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Jedda, 19 November 1969, FO 248/1652. 83  U.S. Department of State Telegram, London to Washington, 21 June 1969, London 04892 2114072.

138 

B. FRIEDMAN

Soviet-backed revolutionary subversion. The period of political transition in both the U.S. and the U.K. fed the perception that there was a power vacuum emerging in the region. Further, Iran’s public expressions of its plan to fill the perceived void only aggravated the situation because the Arab rulers in the Gulf recognized that Imperial Iranian domination in the Gulf was a provocation to the revolutionary Arab nationalist states. The perception in the Gulf that King Faysal’s regime was under severe destabilizing pressure from subversive forces during the latter half of 1969 had two consequences for political progress in the Gulf. First, Iran, concerned that King Faysal grip on power was eroding, was less aggressive regarding its public statements on its territorial claims to Bahrain and the three islands. Nevertheless, in part because Iran did not press its claims, there was also little tangible progress on resolving the outstanding conflicts that were crucial to any progress toward a union of shaykhdoms. Second, the perception that Saudi rule may be teetering on the brink of collapse may have caused certain shaykhs to upgrade or renew relations with either Iran or external powers like Great Britain or the U.S. as another source of political and security support. In the latter half of 1969 a “let’s wait and see” attitude prevailed in the Gulf, as local rulers watched to see how political developments would evolve in late 1969 and early 1970.

CHAPTER 6

Iran Shifting Gears

The U.S. Ambassador to Iran in 1970, Douglas MacArthur, Jr., noted that “with the prospect of vacuum developing after the British withdrawal, it [Iran] is now seeking to allay fears and suspicions of Arab Gulf States by treating their leaders with respect and extending assistance to Saudi Arabia so that some arrangement for cooperation between Iran and the moderate Gulf States can be developed.”1 Indeed, one of the chief differences between the first six months of 1969 and the first six months of 1970 was Iran’s more cautious and measured approach to the Arab Gulf rulers. In marked contrast to his conciliatory 4 January 1969 public announcement that Iran would not use force to assert Iran’s claim to Bahrain, the Shah seemed intent on presenting a tough and uncompromising posture and policy toward the Arab states in early 1969. Yet following the revolutions in Sudan (May) and Libya (September) in 1969, a much more visible Soviet presence in Egypt and Iraq, and the internal challenges to King Faysal’s regime, Iran’s approach became less aggressive as the ruling shaykhs in the region came under increasing pressure from revolutionary forces across the Middle East. In short, the more Iran felt that the Arab nationalist-Soviet revolutionary forces, as it perceived it, were threatening to make gains in the Gulf, the more flexible the Shah appeared in accommodating the ruling shaykhs.

 U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 2 February 1970, Tehran 00418 041629Z. 1

© The Author(s) 2020 B. Friedman, The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1971, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56182-6_6

139

140 

B. FRIEDMAN

This dynamic was popularly referred to throughout this period as regional fear of a “power vacuum” in the Gulf. More particularly, what Iran feared was Soviet-supported Arab nationalist revolutionaries attempting to subvert or overthrow the ruling shaykhs in the Gulf during the withdrawal of British military power. During the first half of 1970, Iran exhibited a more restrained approach toward its Arab Gulf neighbors. This can be attributed to the Shah’s increased confidence in Iran’s future standing in the Gulf, and the improved spirit of cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It can also be attributed to what the Shah seems to have perceived as the beginning of a more serious challenge to the Gulf from Soviet-backed forces in the region. As a consequence of growing ties between Iraq and the Soviet Bloc and the increased Soviet presence in Egypt, the Shah began to view the Soviet-backed revolutionary threat to the Gulf in a more serious light, and, as a result, adopted a less aggressive posture toward the moderate Gulf rulers. In March 1969 the fighting between Egypt and Israel in what became known as the War of Attrition began to escalate. In March, between 60 and 80 Soviet pilots and 4,000 Soviet missile crew members arrived in Egypt.2 In April and May 1970, it became public that the Soviets were positioning advanced surface-to-air missile batteries (SAM-3) as anti-­ aircraft defense barriers around Egyptian cities and strategic assets, and that Soviet pilots were flying Soviet-supplied fighter aircraft for the Egyptians.3 Yet the impression of one American official, “Never before had the Soviets put their forces in combat jeopardy for the sake of a non-­ communist government,” overlooked the deep Soviet involvement in Yemen.4 There had been reports of Soviet pilots flying combat missions in Yemen during the Saudi-South Yemen fighting in Wadiʾa in December 2  Laura M. James, “Military/political means/ends: Egyptian decision making in the War of Attrition,” in The Cold War in the Middle East (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), Nigel Ashton (ed.), p. 101. 3  Dima P.  Adamsky, “‘Zero-Hour for the Bears’: Inquiring into the Soviet Decision to Intervene in the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition, 1969–1970” Cold War History, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2006, pp. 113–136; and, Dima P. Adamsky, “How American and Israeli intelligence failed to estimate the Soviet intervention in the War of Attrition,” The Cold War in the Middle East (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), Nigel Ashton (ed.), pp. 113–136. 4  As quoted in Craig Daigle, The Limits of Détente, The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab Israeli Conflict, 1968–1973 (Unpublished PhD dissertation, George Washington University, 2008), p. 123.

6  IRAN SHIFTING GEARS 

141

1969, and of Soviet pilots flying civilian supply and military combat missions in the Yemen Arab Republic throughout the civil war (1962–1970).5 Direct Soviet military involvement on Abdel Nasser’s behalf in Egypt, combined with increasing Soviet military ties with Baʿthist Iraq and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, South Yemen), as well as the intensifying rebellion in Dhofar, which the Shah believed was backed by the Soviets, combined to moderate the Shah’s approach to Saudi Arabia and the shaykhdoms, and increase his sensitivity to Soviet actions in the region. On 1 June 1970, the Shah wanted to flash “a red light” to the Americans to alert them that the Soviets were making an effort to intimidate Iran. After years of silence about the existence of the treaty, high-level Soviet officials visiting Iran, in late April and again in late June 1970, made oblique references to Article 6 of the 1921 Soviet-Iran Treaty, which supposedly gave the Soviets the right to invade and occupy Iran if developments there threatened the Soviet Union. Iran had considered awarding contracts to American companies to exploit timber/forest resources in the Caspian Sea area on the border with the Soviet Union, and the Shah suspected the Soviet references to the treaty may have been a subtle warning to Iran to turn to the Soviets not the Americans in this geographic area of Iran. The Shah expressed his concern that “the Soviet activity in the Middle East was an extended hand with fingers probing the Mediterranean, Iraq, Gulf…Soviets have been advancing into the Middle East with success after success in much of the Arab world where they are considered not just supporters of Arabs against Israel but as an actual defender through SA-3 and Soviet air squadrons in Egypt.” The Shah told American officials that Soviet intimidation was a result of the “Soviet confidence that the U.S. is so committed elsewhere that the Soviets can start their move toward the Gulf with impunity, starting with increasingly dependent Iraq.”6 The Shah’s comments were meant, in part, to convince U.S. officials to push through the $800 million loan Iran was seeking from the U.S. to purchase American military arms and equipment. However, the timing of the Soviet 5  See: Jesse Ferris, Nasser’s Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013), pp.70–101, 142–173. 6  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Washington to London, 2 June 1970, State 084063, RG 59.

142 

B. FRIEDMAN

comments to Iran—coming during the Soviet military build-up in Egypt— rattled the Shah’s confidence in his ability to manipulate Iran’s relationship with the Soviet Union. The Shah’s  remarks to American officials reflected his heightened concern that Soviet-backed Iraq would challenge Iran’s Gulf policy.

Iran and Iraq: Shadow War? Tension between Iran and Iraq steadily increased throughout 1969 as a result of the confrontation in April/May over the Shatt al-Arab. Iraq had expelled thousands of Iranians from their homes in Iraq during the crisis, and a bitter propaganda war between the two states was conducted over radio waves. The hostility along the border increased even further at the start of 1970, after Iraq uncovered a secret Iranian-backed plot to overthrow the Baʿth regime, and the Iraqi government, with Soviet encouragement, came to an agreement with the Kurdish resistance in Iraq. This meant that a large number of Iraqi troops were available for re-deployment along the Shatt al-Arab, Iran-Iraq border. The Iraqi weekly Alif-Ba stated that the Iraqi government’s March Declaration (bayan adhar), which was supposed to solve the Kurdish problem peacefully, would allow Iraq “to play a national role…in confronting Iranian aspirations in the Arab Gulf.”7 The heightened tension between Iran and Iraq in early 1970 was a product of the growing military and economic ties between the Soviet Union and Iraq in 1969, as well as reports that Iraq was serving as a base for training, funding, and arming Arab revolutionaries who were working to overthrow the Arab rulers in the Gulf. A British official in Baghdad noted in December 1968 that Iraq, while harboring no territorial ambitions in the Gulf, will wish “to maintain, and to be seen maintaining, the Arabism of the Arab side of the Gulf.” He also observed that Iraq needs to “very badly come to terms with Iran,” and “will use whatever influence they have in the Gulf, and indeed in the Arab world generally, to convince the Iranians that, in spite of Iraq’s instability

7  Middle East News Agency, March 1970 as quoted in Ofra Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), p. 50.

6  IRAN SHIFTING GEARS 

143

it would be worth Iran’s while to do business with her even to the extent of withdrawing support from the Kurdish rebels.”8 While the threat of war over the Shatt al-Arab appeared slim in late 1969, there was still no resolution to the outstanding question of a border between the two states along the waterway. Tension along the Shatt al-­ Arab was further heightened in early 1970, when the Iraqi government came to an agreement with Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani, allowing Kurdish self-rule and some degree of autonomy.9 The agreement put an end to the six-year low-intensity civil war in Iraq and released between 20,000 and 30,000 Iraqi troops from engagement in the conflict with the Kurdish national movement. Iran was concerned these troops would be re-stationed on Iraq’s southern border with Iran.10 The loss of the “Kurdish card” was a serious blow to the Shah’s Iraq strategy. The Shah had been the Iraqi Kurds’ most generous patron since 1963, providing Barzani’s forces with arms and equipment, training, food, cash, and communications.11 Tension between Iran and Iraq also increased in late 1969, when the former head of Iran’s security services (SAVAK), Teymour Bakhtiar, established himself in Iraq. Bakhtiar had plotted to overthrow the Shah and was exiled from Iran in 1962. He was later arrested and imprisoned in Lebanon for smuggling arms in May 1968. In April 1969, following the expiration of his prison term, Lebanese authorities allowed Bakhtiar to travel from Beirut to Switzerland to receive political asylum after which he traveled to Iraq. After arriving in Iraq in late 1969, Bakhtiar continued his plots to overthrow the Shah. Bakhtiar was part of an ongoing shadow war between Iran and Iraq which intensified in the wake of the Shatt al-Arab crisis in the spring of 1969. The secret Iranian plot to overthrow the Baʿth regime  that Iraqi authorities discovered in January 1970 was one element of the war.  British National Archives: Baghdad to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 December 1968, FO 248/1652. 9  Asadollah Alam reports the deal in his diaries on 8 February 1970, yet it was not publicly announced until early March 1970; See, also: Ofra Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), pp. 47–63. 10  Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), edited and translated by Alinagh Alikhani and Nicholas Vincent, p. 129. 11  BNA: Research Memorandum: The Kurdish Problem in Iraq, 1963–1971, Departmental Series No. 17, 6 December 1971, FCO 51/358; See, also: Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 74–77. 8

144 

B. FRIEDMAN

Further, in 1969 Iran had been actively supporting Iraqi Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani’s war against the Baʿthist regime.12 And throughout 1969, Iran, via Radio Ahwaz in Khuzestan Province, and, Iraq, using Radio Baghdad, broadcasted vitriolic propaganda attacks back and forth across borders.13 The propaganda was meant to undercut each regime’s legitimacy. The Baʿth Party used Bakhtiar as another instrument with which to attack Iran. Bakhtiar was given a base of operations in Baghdad and an Iraqi diplomatic passport, which allowed him to coordinate his covert activities against the Shah. In September 1969, Bakhtiar gave an interview to the Lebanese weekly newspaper as-Sayyad and accused the Shah of provoking the confrontation with Iraq on the Shatt al-Arab to divert attention from the rising discontent with the Shah in Iran.14 Further, in 1969 there were reports of Iranian exiles training in Iraq for infiltration back into Iran in the area of Javanrud and Marivan, which were traditionally Kurdish areas of Iran.15 Bakhtiar’s presence and activities in Iraq were a provocation for Iran, but in January 1970, Iran was revealed to have been reciprocating Bakhtiar’s activity in kind. The Iraqi press published reports indicating the Iraqi military had stopped a sophisticated and serious attempt by two former Iraqi military officers to lead a coup d’état against the regime. The conspirators were said to have been funded and armed by Iranian agents in Iraq as payback for the 1969 Shatt al-Arab crisis. The leaders of the conspirators were retired Major-General ʿAbd al-Ghani al-Rawi and Colonel Salih Mahdi al-Samarraʾi. Al-Rawi had been a loyal officer to the ʿArif brothers during their regimes in the 1960s, while al- Samarraʾi had been a senior officer during the years of Iraqi monarchy. Al-Samarraʾi led a group of 50 armed men from the Rashid Camp on the outskirts of Baghdad to the Republican Palace on 20 January 1970. At the palace, military officers loyal to regime were waiting to arrest the conspirators. Within four days, the conspirators were tried and 44 were executed. General al-Rawi managed to escape to Iran.16 12  U.S.  Department of State Airgram, Beirut to Washington, 22 September 1969, A-386, RG 59. 13  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Tehran to Washington, 8 July 1969, A-322; and, U.S. Department of State Airgram, Tehran to Washington, 10 June 1969, A-281. 14  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Beirut to Washington, 22 September 1969, A-386. 15  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Tehran to Washington, 3 March 1970, A-090. 16  Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq, pp. 52–55.

6  IRAN SHIFTING GEARS 

145

The Iraqi media published photographs of letters between General al-­ Rawi and his Iranian backers that were exchanged through the Iranian embassy in Baghdad. The plot was initiated by Iran in April 1969 through an Iranian official working at the embassy in Baghdad. There was a September 1969 meeting in the Iranian embassy in Kuwait, and later Iran delivered approximately 3,000 weapons and thousands of rounds of ammunition to the Iraqis.17Within 48 hours of the uncovering of the plot, the Iranian ambassador and his staff were expelled from Iraq. Iranian diplomats working in consulates in Basra and Karbala were also forced to leave Iraq. Iran retaliated by ordering the Iraqi ambassador and military attaché in Tehran to leave. Similar to the spring of 1969, the tension caused by the rapid momentum of events resulted in escalation and heightened military readiness along the Iran-Iraq border. Asadollah Alam reports that on 22 January 1970, as Iraq executed the conspirators in the coup, Iranian General Djam sent a cable to the Shah recommending a preemptive strike against Iraqi air bases. The Shah told Alam to “ask him [General Djam] if he’s completely lost touch with reality? What makes him think the Iraqis plan an attack?” The Shah appeared sanguine in the face of the rapid escalation with Iraq, and calmly noted, “If their army has been told to stand-by, it’s either because they are responding to our own alert, or as a move against the coup.”18 Iraq was not as comfortable with the speed of developments, and on 2 February 1970, appealed to the U.N. to intervene to restrain Iran. Iran did not yet view the politically unstable Baʿth government as a direct military threat. However, the Shah was troubled by signs that the Soviet Union was expanding ties—primarily, economic and military—with Iraq in 1969. Further, the Shah was angered that the Baʿthist regime provided Bakhtiar with a base of operations to attack his regime. And he was no less concerned that Iraq was also providing Arab nationalist groups a base for conducting operations to destabilize and subvert the shaykhdoms along the Persian Gulf littoral. Iraq’s increasing activity as a spoiler in the Persian Gulf was yet another reason for the Shah to push for an urgent resolution to the region’s outstanding political issues prior to British military withdrawal.

 al-Jumhuriyyah, 22 January 1970.  Alam, p. 126.

17 18

146 

B. FRIEDMAN

Bahrain Diplomacy On 24 December 1969, Christmas Eve in Geneva, Switzerland, three Bahraini representatives met with Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi and Ralph Bunche, as well as Sir Geoffrey Arthur of the U.K.  Bunche, the Undersecretary-General for Special Political Affairs, flew to Geneva from New York in poor health and stayed in Geneva for less than twenty-four hours; his presence was meant to convey the seriousness and importance of the issue for the U.N.  Secretary-General. Winspeare Guicciardi was Italy’s former ambassador in Prague and Dublin, and, at the time, Director General of the United Nations Office for Europe in Geneva, Switzerland. He was subsequently appointed the Secretary-General’s Personal Representative on the question of Bahrain. As a result of the 1861 treaty relationship with the British, Bahrain considered itself an independent state in a special treaty relationship with Great Britain and not a British colony.19 Therefore, the question of Bahrain could not be considered as a direct dispute between Iran and the U.K., two member states of the U.N.  Rather, Bahrain was approaching the U.N.  Secretary-General’s Office through the U.K.  As part of the agreement established on 24 December 1969, both Great Britain (on behalf of Bahrain) and Iran agreed to accept the findings of the Secretary-General’s representative, which would be subject to endorsement by the U.N. Security Council. Iran was not party to these December 1969 negotiations between the U.N., the British, and the Bahrainis. On 2 September 1969, the Shah had informed the British that the Bahrainis and the British could select any procedure they preferred for U.N.  Secretary-General’s inquiry, but he explicitly requested that Iran was to be kept out of these discussions. It is important to note that the Shah’s message to the British that he would acquiesce on the issue of procedure came the day after King Idris was overthrown in a military-officers led revolution in Libya. It also came at a time when the Shah feared for the stability of King Faysal’s regime in the wake of reports of multiple coup d’état plots in Saudi Arabia. These events may have played an important role in convincing the Shah that urgent compromise was necessary on the Bahrain question. Further, the Shah did not want Iran to be a part of negotiations over the procedure for assessing public opinion in Bahrain because he was extremely sensitive to the notion 19  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 85.

6  IRAN SHIFTING GEARS 

147

of being exposed to claims that Iran colluded with the British to betray Iran and give away Bahrain.20 The Shah wanted to be able to plausibly deny to his own subjects that he prearranged the results of the U.N. Mission’s work. This issue, the question and degree of Iranian involvement in the prearrangements for the U.N. Mission to Bahrain, resulted in a good deal of diplomatic maneuvering between Iran, the British, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the U.N. in the period from September 1969 through March 1970.21 The UN Secretary-General, U Thant, was unwilling to go along with Iran’s desire to be excluded from discussions of the U.N.  Mission’s investigation. U Thant was afraid that if and when the U.N. found in favor of Bahraini independence, the Shah would turn around and reject the U.N.’s findings on the basis that Iran had not been consulted on the Mission’s investigation. U Thant asked for an informal request from both Britain and Iran which was to include a signed memorandum from both states agreeing to the U.N. Mission’s terms of reference and its methodology.22 Iran, however, was unwilling to be privy to any—informal or formal— communication that outlined the U.N.’s methodology prior to its investigation. On 28 December, Iran’s Ambassador to the U.N., Mehdi Vakil, met with U Thant to informally ask him to exercise the “good offices” of the Secretary-General to “ascertain the wishes of the Bahraini people.” He said that Iran would leave it to the Secretary-General to determine the mechanism for its investigation and emphasized that Iran did not want to receive any communication from the Secretary-General regarding this procedure. U Thant agreed to provide the “good offices” of the Secretary-­ General only if there was agreement between the parties (including Iran) on the terms of reference and methodology. He did not ask Iran to sign a memorandum, but he did insist that his office would send a summary of its plans to Iran. Iran reluctantly agreed to this arrangement, and, on 29 December 1969, the Secretary-General’s office delivered a memorandum to the Iranian Mission to the U.N. which contained a summary of the

20  Roham Alvandi, “Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question, 1968–1970,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2010), p. 172. 21  Salim al-Lawzi maintains that Saudi Arabia was also involved in the secret diplomatic negotiations, see: Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), pp. 77–88. 22  Roham Alvandi, “Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question, 1968–1970,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2010), p. 172.

148 

B. FRIEDMAN

U.N.’s proposed methodology for Bahrain. Iran did not respond to this document.23 The wording of the formal approach to the U.N. Secretary-General’s office was hashed out during negotiations between Iran and Great Britain during January and February 1970. The most important issue for Iran was avoiding any suggestion of collusion with the British. The final negotiations on the wording were made between Amir Khosrow Afshar and Sir Denis Wright on 5 February 1970 in St. Moritz, Switzerland, where the Shah was on a ski holiday. The formal letter was delivered by Mehdi Vakil to U Thant on 9 March 1970. The letter was held for much of February and early March so that Bahrain would have time to prepare itself for the UN mission’s visit.24

Preparing for a Settlement Laying the groundwork for the U.N. mission was critical for both Iran and Bahrain. The Iranian government distributed leaflets to the armed forces, government bureaucrats, and university students and lecturers in Iran outlining why Iran’s claim to Bahrain was unsustainable. On 8 February, the Shah and his close adviser, Asadollah Alam, exchanged private thoughts on Bahrain. The Shah asked Alam, “Between ourselves, do you suppose we are acting as traitors to our country by going ahead with this settlement over Bahrain? Or, as many voices from around the world keep telling me, are we actually on the brink of a major achievement, rescuing the region from futile confrontation and communism?” Alam replied, “Merely to demand the island as a legal right would get us nowhere. If we seized it by force it could only become a millstone around our necks, and a permanent provocation to the Arabs. What’s more, it would be immensely expensive, since Bahraini oil resources are gradually drying up…”25 The Shah’s Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi, who was already well known for his strong nationalist views on Gulf issues, was the only senior official who was known to openly express reservation about the decision on Bahrain. In a meeting on 14 January 1970, the Shah explained to Zahedi and other

 Alvandi, p. 173.  Alvandi, pp. 173–174. 25  Alam, p. 129. 23 24

6  IRAN SHIFTING GEARS 

149

senior ministry of foreign affairs officials that relinquishing Iran’s claim would pave the way for Iran to assume a leadership position in the Gulf. 26 On 15 March, two leading daily Iranian newspapers, Kayhan and Ayandegan, published articles about the Shah’s 4 January 1969 declaration in New Delhi that Iran would not use force to assert its claim on Bahrain. The following day, 16 March, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manuchechr Zelli, delivered a speech reminding the public of the Shah’s New Delhi declaration, and expressing Iran’s hope that the Bahrain question could be settled “on a legal basis” that would be “acceptable to the world,” and that Iran would do “its utmost to settle the problem peacefully and in the interests of regional stability.”27 For Bahrain, smoothly laying the groundwork for the U.N.  Mission meant making sure there would not be a firestorm of Arab nationalist propaganda from Egypt and other important members of the “progressive” or revolutionary camp. The week of 23 to 28 March, Bahrain sent Muhammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa to Baghdad and Cairo to brief the governments of Iraq and Egypt on the U.N. mission.28 Muhammad Bin Mubarak, who was known by Bahraini dissidents as the “Machiavelli of the Gulf,” told the Iraqis that Bahrain had managed to get Iran and Britain “to agree clearly and explicitly, and we are all cooperating now to ward off the colonial danger.”29 ʿAbdal Karim al-Shaykhli, Iraq’s foreign minister, responded that the ambitions of Iran in the Gulf are unknown and the British departure will open the door to Iran.“ Bin Mubarak responded by saying, “…the danger has already arrived from the British withdrawal…the problem now is Arab identity in Bahrain…We might disagree on the nature of regimes, but can you disagree on the Arab identity of Bahrain?” Iraqi Defense Minister Hardan al-Tikriti said, “Honestly, we do not believe in suspicious peaceful solutions.“ Bin Mubarak replied: “I am not talking about peaceful or military solutions.

 Alvandi, p. 174.  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 19 March 1970, Tehran 01030 191344Z, RG 59. 28  U.S. Department of State Telegram, “Iran’s Claim to Bahrain,” Washington to Dhahran, 5 March 1970. 29  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 81. 26 27

150 

B. FRIEDMAN

We have a solution with Iran to recognize the Arab identity of Bahrain, and this we call the “happy solution.”30 Bin Mubarak believed he had convinced the Iraqis that the agreement was fine as long as the Arab identity of Bahrain was internationally recognized. But bin Mubarak had barely left Baghdad, and the U.N. envoy arrived in Bahrain to begin his task, when Iraq publicly condemned the U.N. mission as the “great conspiracy,” and its national leadership issued a statement which echoed what Shaykhli had told bin Mubarak in Baghdad, that “the settlement between Iran and Bahrain was meant to extend the life of the British in the region.”31 The news regarding the U.N. mission to Bahrain did not come as a big surprise to Egypt when Muhammad bin Mubarak arrived in March 1970, because Kuwait, in its special role and broker between Iran and Bahrain, had also been relaying information about the various proposals to Cairo.32 Further, Kamal Adham, King Faysal’s brother-in-law, and a trusted adviser and envoy, had briefed Abdel Nasser on the Shah’s position on Bahrain in mid-1969. Adham told Abdel Nasser that the Shah was opposed to the Soviet presence in the Middle East and the creeping “leftist” Chinese involvement coming from South Yemen, and Iraq’s constant incitement against the Iranian regime. These issues made the Shah flexible on a solution to the Bahrain issue. Abdel Nasser told Adham in 1969 that he should safeguard Arabism, whether inside Bahrain or outside. He added, “You know our situation now. Egypt is not able to fight two battles at the same time: the battle with Israel and the battle with Iran. The strength I have to move in the Gulf is slow or almost non-existent. I can only hope you preserve the Arabism of the region.”33

30  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two 1971), p. 81. 31  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two 1971), p. 81. 32  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Tehran 051435Z, RG 59. 33  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two 1971), p. 84.

Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: to Washington, 5 January 1970, 02036 Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon:

6  IRAN SHIFTING GEARS 

151

The U.N. Solution On 28 March 1970, U Thant submitted a note to the U.N.  Security Council informing it that, after receiving formal letters from Iran and Great Britain, the Secretary-General had agreed to use his good offices to resolve outstanding differences on the matter of Bahrain. The task remained to inform the Iranian public and the Majlis that a U.N. mission would be visiting Bahrain and if the mission found that Bahrainis wanted independence then Iran would relinquish its claim to Bahrain. Reactions to the public announcements in Iran were carefully managed. The press, which for the most part, adhered closely to the government position, characterized the Shah’s decision as a victory for Iran over British imperialism. Iran’s Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi and Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda argued about which one of them would present the U.N. report on Bahrain to the Majlis, because neither of the two senior officials wanted the job.34 Ultimately, the Shah chose Zahedi to deliver the message to the Majlis on 29 March 1970. The only serious objections came from the relatively small Pan-Iranist party, whose leader, Mohsen Pezechgpour, denounced the Shah’s decision on the Majlis floor. Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda had held a meeting with the Pan-Iranist leadership at Pezechgpour’s home on 26 March, in advance of the Majlis announcement, in order to ask them for support on the Bahrain findings and to warn them of severe consequences of a public dissent. Following the Majlis announcement and Pezechgpour’s denunciation, the Pan-Iranist party’s offices were closed and the party newspaper shut down.35 Apart from the expected Pan-Iranist dissent, there was little visible public opposition to the Shah’s decision. The U.N. Secretary-General’s Personal Representative, Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, arrived on 30 March. His team consisted of five additional members: a Principal Secretary, a Political Officer, an Interpreter, an Administrative Assistant, and a Security Officer. The mission’s methodology had been agreed upon in advance, and Bahraini officials presented the mission with a list of Bahraini political clubs and the names of their representatives, with whom the mission would meet to determine the popular will of the Bahraini people.36 The mission, after consulting with  Alam, p. 136.  Alvandi, p. 175. 36  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), p. 78. 34 35

152 

B. FRIEDMAN

local officials in Bahrain, expanded the list to include municipal councils, and other civil society organizations. Ultimately, the mission surveyed approximately 106 organizations during its investigation.37 Despite the fact that the conduct of the U.N.’s investigation in Bahrain was carefully pre-negotiated and pre-arranged, the mission carried out its work seriously and conducted a number of unannounced visits to peripheral population centers to allow the mission to verify its preliminary findings with additional information. After three weeks of “intensive” meetings and consultations conducted “in private and in confidence” with a “wide variety of people,” the mission concluded that the Bahrainis “…were virtually unanimous in wanting a fully independent and sovereign state. The great majority added that this should be an Arab state.”38 On the afternoon of Monday, 11 May, the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to approve the findings of the Secretary-General’s “good offices” mission to Bahrain. Sixteen states were represented, and Iran and South Yemen were allowed to join the debate on the issue at their request, but were not allowed a vote. The Security Council stated that it “welcomes the conclusions and findings of the report, in particular that ‘the overwhelming majority of the people of Bahrain wish to gain recognition of their identity in a fully and independent sovereign State free to decide for itself its relations with other states.’“39 Mehdi Vakil, Iran’s representative to the U.N., was the first to speak after the unanimous vote, and said that the Security Council’s decision had removed a major obstacle from the path of fruitful cooperation in the Persian Gulf. He wished the people of Bahrain well, and said that Iran looked forward to future cooperation and intimate relations with other states in the region. He also noted that “Bahrain had been separated from Iran 150 years ago as a result of the colonialist policy of the British government in those days, whose aim was the establishment of military bases in the Persian Gulf area.”40 The successful and peaceful diplomatic resolution of the Bahrain question was an important step forward for Arab-Iranian relations in the Gulf, post-British withdrawal. The Shah quietly handled both the domestic politics from a small but vocal ultra-nationalist minority, and deftly 37  Erik Jensen, “The Secretary General’s Use of Good Offices and the Question of Bahrain,” Millenium—Journal of International Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1985, pp. 340–341. 38  Jensen, p. 342. 39  Jensen, p. 343. 40  Jensen, pp. 343–344.

6  IRAN SHIFTING GEARS 

153

maneuvered between the British and the U.N. to ensure events played out in a way that would add to the Shah’s international prestige. The Shah appeared willing to swap Iran’s historical claim for tacit acceptance— regionally and internationally—of Iran’s future role as the British successor in the Persian Gulf. The U.N. endorsement for Bahraini independence had an important consequence that has often gone overlooked in the historiography. In 1968, Bahrain’s first choice following the British declaration of withdrawal was to appeal to the U.N. for acceptance as an independent “mini-state.” Iran’s vigorous claim made this tactic unrealistic, so, with strong Saudi encouragement, Bahrain attempted to shield itself from Iranian irredentism in a union of shaykhdoms. However, the looming shadow of Iran’s claim prevented Bahrain from fully asserting itself within the union. Further, because of Iran’s claim and historic rivalries, the shaykhs of Dubai and Qatar viewed Bahrain’s participation in the union as a political liability rather than an asset, and therefore maneuvered to further limit Bahrain’s participation within the union. This dynamic created a great deal of ill will among Bahrain’s leaders who felt it was losing freedom of action, or political autonomy. Therefore, Bahrain pursued a dual track policy in 1968 and 1969: At the behest of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain participated in the political process of union between the shaykhdoms, but at the same time secretly pursued negotiations with Iran and quietly created the domestic institutions required for independent statehood. When the U.N. endorsed Bahraini independence, Bahraini leadership believed it had freedom of action to either fully press their claims in the union or go their own way toward independent statehood. This dynamic illustrates the systemic effect of regional politics in the Gulf. Until 11 May 1970, Bahrain’s political options were tightly constrained by the system. The U.N.  Mission, and Iran’s decision to relinquish its claim to Bahrain in service of its broader interests, freed Bahrain from these constraints and unintentionally made the task of creating a broad union of nine shaykhdoms more difficult.

Iranian-Saudi Pact? A solution to the Iranian claim on Bahrain paved the way to improved relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. A successful resolution to the Bahrain question was an important litmus test for the future potential of

154 

B. FRIEDMAN

cooperation between  King Faysal and the Shah. The relationship also appeared to improve in the latter half of 1969, partly as a result of the Shah’s fear for  King Faysal’s regime survival. Reports of internal challenges to the Al Saʿud throughout the spring and summer of 1969, in combination with revolutionary socialist regimes seizing power in Sudan (May) and Libya (September) appeared to temper the Shah’s aggressiveness in the Gulf lest he provoke revolutionary backlash in the region through his own aggressive Gulf policy. The Shah’s increasing confidence in Iran’s post-withdrawal position in the Gulf, in combination with his perception that King  Faysal was weak and vulnerable, created the right atmosphere for the Shah to demonstrate magnanimity in his dealings with Saudi Arabia in 1970. For his part, in addition to the Bahrain settlement, King Faysal felt reassured when Iran answered the Saudi call for military aid during the Wadiʾa combat that took place on the Saudi-South Yemen border in late November and early December 1969. In November 1969, the Shah agreed to loan the Saudis American-manufactured 40mm anti-aircraft weapons to protect the Jazan airfield during its fighting with South Yemen.41 In January 1970, Saudi Arabia began negotiations with Iran for a loan of 106mm anti-aircraft guns.42 As the U.N. mission to Bahrain was playing out in March and April 1970, Saudi Arabia and Iran began to take steps to more actively coordinate their Gulf policies with one another. On March 23 delegations from 22 Islamic countries arrived in Jidda for three days of meetings in what was called a Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers. Observers from Cameroon, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the Arab League were also invited to participate in the meetings. The “radical” revolutionary states of Syria, Iraq, and South Yemen were not invited, while Libya and Sudan did participate. King Faysal addressed the conference and called for practical action toward Islamic solidarity to rise to the challenge of Zionism and regain Islamic rights in Palestine. The meetings also provided a fertile opportunity for private discussions between Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Ardeshir Zahedi and ʿUmar Saqqaf, the Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.43 In mid-April (9–15), those discussions were continued in Iran, when ʿUmar Saqqaf, traveled to Tehran to meet with the Shah and Zahedi. Asadollah Alam told American officials that King Faysal and the Shah were  Alam, pp. 104 & 106.  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Jidda to Washington, 4 February 1970, A-38, RG 59. 43  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Jidda to Washington, 7 April 1970, A-76, RG 59. 41 42

6  IRAN SHIFTING GEARS 

155

convinced that Syria, Iraq, and Southern Yemen were “planning a major subversive action in the Gulf,” which was to take “some form of thinly disguised aggression.” Alam claimed that Faysal and Mohammad Reza shared the same perception of the “dangerous threat to the Gulf” presented by Syria and Iraq. Therefore, Alam argued, that the “moderate Gulf states” must be prepared when the British withdraw at the end of 1971. According to Alam, the “burden of providing a deterrent strength” would be Iran’s.44 The Shah instructed Alam to inform the U.S. Ambassador on the substance of Saqqaf’s visit.45 Alam’s remarks seem intended to tell the Americans what they wanted to hear, particularly because the Shah was eager to receive U.S. congressional approval for an $800 million loan to Iran for U.S. military technology and equipment. U.S. State Department officials had been asking both Faysal and Mohammad Reza to increase their regional coordination with one another. Nevertheless, Alam’s characterization of threats from Iraq, South Yemen, and Syria was consistent with the events Iran was seeing and experiencing in the region during this period. The Arabic-language media reported on Saqqaf’s visit to Tehran and speculated that Saudi Arabia and Iran were meeting to discuss a defense agreement or alliance for the Gulf.46 It is unlikely that any kind of formal defense pact was discussed. The Shah and King Faysal were both extremely attuned to how such an arrangement might provoke a serious barrage of Arab nationalist propaganda. However, what might have been discussed was an informal deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia regarding their respective interests with regard to the lower Gulf islands and Buraimi: Saudi Arabia would stay out of Iran’s dispute with Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah over Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands, and Iran would stay out of Saudi Arabia’s dispute with Abu Dhabi over Buraimi and the frontier. In fact, Shaykh ʿIsa told the British that he had heard from Kamal Adham that Saudi Arabia promised to “help Iran get the islands,” in exchange for Iran’s dropping its claim to Bahrain.47 Improved Saudi-Iranian coordination, discounting the undocumented notion of a secret Saudi-Iranian deal or quid pro quo in the Gulf, was still 44  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 11 April 1970, Tehran 01395 11815Z, RG 59. 45  Alam, p. 144. 46  al-Hayat, 15 April 1970. 47  BNA: “Record of Conversation with the Ruler of Bahrain at Rifa Palace on Thursday 27 August 1970,” Bahrain Residency, 1 September 1970, FO 1016/758.

156 

B. FRIEDMAN

a delicate matter. The importance of Saudi prestige to the future survival of Al Saʿud meant that King Faysal’s regime could not afford to appear as the junior (or weaker) partner in a Gulf security arrangement with Iran. Yet one American official referred to the relationship as the “imbalance between the two ends of the Gulf dumbbell.”48 Therefore, while relations with Iran had improved, Saudi Arabia was still exploring ways to rapidly enlarge its navy to compete with Iran’s ambition to dominate the Gulf. Further, and more important, were the Saudi sensitivities to how the Saudi ʿulamaʾ perceived Shiʿi Iran, and how the neighboring Arab states perceived Saudi Arabia’s standing on the Arab-­ Israeli question. Saudi officials were extremely sensitive about making sure the regime’s standing on the conflict was considered legitimate enough to withstand propaganda attacks from Iraq or Syria, or incitement to subversion from the PDRY (South Yemen). Saudi relations with Iran were viewed by these states as a betrayal of the Palestinians because Iran had de facto relations with Israel. Moreover, the Saudi standing on the Arab-Israeli question was also an important matter for domestic legitimacy and stability as well.49 The tension in the Saudi-Iranian strategic relationship worked two ways: Saudi’s second-class treatment of its Shiʿi minority in the Eastern Province was problematic for Iran’s Shiʿi ʿulamaʾ and had the potential to undermine the Shah’s domestic legitimacy as well. The Shah attended to his domestic prestige by projecting an image of uncompromising strength and military force in the Gulf. Yet in early 1970, the Saudis profited from the Shah’s fear that King Faysal’s regime would go the way of Libyan King Idris. The Shah’s concern may seem like an exaggeration, nevertheless it produced fewer Iranian public challenges or declarations directed at its Arab neighbors in the Gulf. Iran’s restraint, and concern for Faysal’s survival, did not prevent Iran from making plans to realize its post-British vision as the dominant power in the Gulf. On 13 May, Amir Taheri, a prominent Iranian journalist, published an article suggesting that Iran was exploring ways to declare the Persian Gulf an inland or “closed” sea, which had important consequences for international shipping through the Gulf.50 If the Gulf were declared an  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Jidda to Washington, 29 July 1970, A-178, R 59.  Muhammad Hassanein Heykal, “The Saudi Era,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1977, pp. 158–164. 50  Kayhan International, 13 May 1970. 48 49

6  IRAN SHIFTING GEARS 

157

inland sea, international law would grant the littoral states the right to control and search all vessels traveling through the Gulf. In order to declare the Gulf an inland sea, Iran would need an agreement with all the littoral states of the Gulf, including Iraq, which seemed highly unlikely at the time. Taheri’s article was not necessarily a scoop. The Shah had made a similar statement in a June 1969 interview with Winston Churchill. However, Taheri’s article itself is an important indication of the direction of Iranian ambitions in the Gulf. In 1970, Iran was the only Gulf state that possessed even modest naval strength. If the Gulf was declared an inland sea, the role of policing the sea would naturally fall to Iran following British withdrawal because it was the only state possessing sufficient naval capabilities to assume the responsibility. In reality, Taheri’s article was reiterating the message that Iran saw itself as the British successor in the Gulf and would not suffer future foreign penetration or control. The withdrawal of British power from the region meant that the principal constraint on Iranian behavior was going to be removed. In the meantime, the Saudis realized that until they could develop their own naval capabilities, they would have to accommodate Iranian dominance in Gulf waters as they had done with the British. This reality was demonstrated during the dispute over Abu Musa’s territorial waters that erupted in May 1970.

Sharjah’s Bid for Oil In early 1970, a six-party dispute over the territorial waters of the island of Abu Musa emerged between Ajman, Iran, Great Britain, Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain, and, tangentially, Ras al-Khaimah. Umm al-Qaiwain sold an oil concession for its territory to California-based Occidental Petroleum. Umm al-Qaiwain’s territorial waters consisted of a narrow wedge that abutted Sharjah’s waters. At the end of January 1970, Occidental also purchased oil exploration rights from Ajman, which owned a narrow strip of territorial waters that bordered Sharjah’s waters as well. Sharjah had sold its own oil exploration concession for its territorial waters to Buttes Oil & Gas Company (in partnership with Clayco Petroleum Corporation) in late December 1969, following a contentious and unsuccessful negotiation with Occidental. Buttes then turned around and tried to sell its Sharjah concession to Occidental for $2 million in early 1970. Occidental declined, believing that it had already purchased the more valuable concessions from Umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman. In early 1970, seismic work in

158 

B. FRIEDMAN

the area uncovered a potential offshore oil field that was located in what Occidental believed were Umm al-Qaiwain territorial waters approximately nine miles from the coast of Abu Musa Island. Occidental signed a $7 million contract with Umm al-Qaiwain to build a tower and drill an offshore well at the end of May 1970. In March 1970, Shaykh Khalid of Sharjah, whose claim to sovereignty over Abu Musa was supported by the British, informed the U.K. Foreign Office that in September 1969 he had declared that Abu Musa territorial waters extended in a 12-mile radius. This broad definition of Abu Musa’s territorial waters would deny Occidental access to the new oil site it had surveyed. Occidental claimed that Sharjah’s definition of Abu Musa’s territorial waters (a 12-mile radius) infringed on its concession. Shaykh Khalid’s September 1969 declaration of a 12-mile radius of territorial waters would become the center of contention in this issue. Occidental challenged the authenticity of the document and questioned why it had not been submitted to the British before March 1970. Further, the British Foreign Office maps used by the shaykhs to grant oil concessions show a 3-mile limit for Abu Musa’s territorial waters.51 Naturally, Ajman and Umm al-Qaiwain, relatively poor shaykhdoms seeking to profit from a potentially lucrative oil discovery, disputed that Abu Musa territorial waters extended in a 12-mile radius. Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah further muddied the waters by initiating an old territorial claim against Umm al-Qaiwain in an attempt to profit from a share of the new oil exploration. The U. K., bound by treaty as the foreign relations protector of each of the Trucial shaykhdoms, was caught in the middle. Moreover, while Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia recognized territorial waters up to 12 miles (19.3 kilometers) from their coasts, Great Britain had traditionally recognized territorial waters only up to 3 miles (4.8 kilometers) off the coast of sovereign territory.52 British officials pleaded with Sharjah to consider how its claims would affect relations with its neighboring shaykhs. In a letter to Shaykh Khalid, the British stated, “there is an agreed sea boundary of 1964 between Sharjah and Umm Al Qawain and where a concession agreement was concluded by the ruler of Umm Al Qawain and approved by Her Majesty’s Government on the basis of that sea boundary. It is not right to simply  Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), Vol. XIII, No. 32, 5 June 1970.   U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Washington to London, 21 April 1970, 05897, RG 59. 51 52

6  IRAN SHIFTING GEARS 

159

ignore the existence of the sea boundary and the concession area of Occidental and Umm Al Qawain.”53 However, the British, as protectors of both Umm al-Qaiwain and Sharjah were caught between the two shaykhdoms. The British also tried to encourage Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain, and Ajman to view the concession as a dispute between partners in the new union of shaykhdoms. In practice, however, the shaykhdoms had already entered into separate concession contracts with different companies as independent shaykhdoms, not through a federated union. The British were advising Sharjah to reconsider its position on the 12-mile claim, but they also appeared reluctant to push the issue on behalf of Umm al-­ Qaiwain because they realized there was an additional complication. Iran also claimed sovereign ownership to Abu Musa and claimed that no drilling could begin in the disputed Abu Musa area until Iran’s dispute with Sharjah over the island itself was resolved. In a 13 April interview in The Times of London, the Shah suggested Iran would take “unilateral steps” to prevent any drilling in the area.54 Senior Iranian officials also privately emphasized that Iran was prepared to take strong action against any activity. The issue was plagued by several additional layers of conflict. Shaykh Khalid of Sharjah felt that he had been insulted by Occidental Petroleum during his negotiations with it over Sharjah’s concession, which is why he ultimately elected to grant the concession to Buttes. Therefore, he was reluctant to explore any solution that involved joint exploration between Occidental and Buttes. Iran, to a certain degree, rendered the issue moot, because it was adamant that there would be no oil drilling until its claim to Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands was resolved. Occidental Petroleum had paid the rulers of Umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman large sums of money up front, and was incurring high daily expenses for platform and drilling rigs and shipping fees. Therefore, Occidental was aggressively maneuvering to begin drilling. Occidental began informing local officials it planned to begin operations on 1 June. In meetings between Occidental and Iranian officials on 28 May, Occidental offered to put any revenues from oil production in the area into a trust until the question of Abu Musa’s sovereignty was resolved. Iranian officials responded by telling Occidental that it had better cut its 53  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, London to Washington, 21 May 1970, London 04008 212039Z, RG 59. 54  The Times (London), 13 April 1970.

160 

B. FRIEDMAN

losses now and shut down operations while it could because its concession was not valid.55 Occidental believed that Shaykh Khalid of Sharjah had sent an envoy, an Iraqi Beirut-based oil consultant named Dhia Jaʾfar, to Iran in May to encourage Iran to take a hard line against Occidental’s plans to drill in the area.56 The British were very concerned about the possibility of Occidental initiating operations in the disputed offshore area on 1 June. They sent a message to the Americans asking them to dissuade Occidental from proceeding.57 The British did not want to give Iran an opportunity to conspicuously demonstrate its naval strength in the Gulf, and were afraid aggressive Iranian action would jeopardize improving relations between Iran and the shaykhs, as well as Saudi Arabia. The British and Iran were hinting they would be obliged to use force to maintain the status quo. What each side believed was the “status quo” remained a bit murky. Yet, what did seem clear was that there was potential for some kind of conflict, or show of force, between the British, acting on behalf of what it perceived to be the rights of the shaykhdoms, and Iran. The British, anxious to avoid a confrontation with Iran, told American officials that if Occidental did not voluntarily shut down its drilling operation at the site, the British would enforce a three-month suspension on Occidental operations in the area.58 The British sent four Royal Navy minesweepers into the area and Royal Air Force Hawker Siddeley fighter planes and helicopters flew overhead on 31 May in anticipation of Occidental activity the following day. At midnight on 31 May, the rulers of Umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman authorized Occidental to proceed with its plans to begin drilling. On 1 June 1970, Occidental moved a barge into the offshore area at which point a British warship, HMS Yarnton, forcibly stopped the barge and boarded the ship. On 1 June The Times of London reported that “the reassertion of the Iranian threat of force was a major political factor” in the British decision to stop Occidental’s operations.59 55  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Washington to Jidda/Tehran, 29 May 1970, 083205, RG 59. 56  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Washington to Jidda/Tehran, 18 June 1970, 095521, RG 59. 57  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 28 May 1970, Tehran 02305 281501Z, RG 59. 58  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, London to Washington, 28 May 1970, London 04180 281854Z, R59. 59  The Times (London), 1 June 1970.

6  IRAN SHIFTING GEARS 

161

Occidental reported that on the morning of 2 June the British established Trucial Oman Scouts surrounded the house of Shaykh Ahmad bin Rashid al-Muʿalla, the ruler of Umm al-Qaiwain, as two British Hawker Siddeley jets buzzed the home of the ruler and one helicopter flew directly overhead. The local British Political Agent, Julian Bullard, told Shaykh Ahmad that if he did not direct Occidental to withdraw its drilling hardware and to limit its operations then he would be deposed. After four hours of British pressure, Occidental was given the order to cease its activity in the disputed area. On 3 and 4 June, Occidental removed all of its equipment and personnel from the region.60 Occidental also filed separate lawsuits in Great Britain and the U.S. Federal Court in Los Angeles for damages. The British solution was to enforce a temporary three-month suspension of all drilling operations in the disputed area until the matter could be resolved by a “third-party” arbitrator. The rulers of Umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman presented a document at the Deputy Rulers Meeting of the Trucial States Council stating that they would not participate in any union or federation of shaykhdoms until their claim was resolved and drilling restarted.61 The issue, however, was more than simply a dispute between Sharjah, on one side, and Umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman on the other. There were two levels of dispute to this problem. Iran was making it clear that unless it received a satisfactory settlement to its dispute with Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah on Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands respectively, it would not permit drilling in the waters off of Abu Musa. At the time, Sharjah believed that Iran was demanding physical control of Abu Musa to use for military purposes in exchange for the oil and mineral rights belonging to the island. Therefore, if Sharjah wanted the oil rights to Abu Musa it would have to relinquish sovereign control over Abu Musa to Iran. Doing so, however, would put Shaykh Khalid at great risk of a violent backlash from revolutionary Arab nationalists, who would not tolerate an Arab shaykh ceding Arab territory to Iran. Therefore, British and Iranian assurances to Shaykh Khalid in June 1970 that the Iranians were willing to “fuzz” the issue of sovereignty over Abu Musa were not entirely

60   U.S.  Department of State Airgram, London to Washington, 25 June 1970, A-1046, RG 59. 61   U.S.  Department of State Airgram, London to Washington, 25 June 1970, A-1046, RG 59.

162 

B. FRIEDMAN

convincing.62 Moreover, Umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman were claiming that the territorial waters that Sharjah was using to bargain with the Iranians did not belong to Abu Musa/Sharjah in the first place. This multi-layered dispute had broad and important implications that went beyond the important question of who in fact owned the rights to exploit this potentially lucrative oil field. The dispute threatened the evolving union of shaykhdoms from two different directions: First, Iran would not recognize the union without satisfaction on Abu Musa and the two Tunbs. And, second, Umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman were threatening to pull out of the union of shaykhdoms without satisfaction on the issue of their offshore oil rights. In addition to the implications for a union of shaykhdoms, the dispute over the offshore concession was a powerful illustration of how preexisting boundary agreements in the Gulf were often subordinated to the vicissitudes of regional politics. Umm al-Qaiwain and Sharjah had a preexisting offshore sea boundary agreement that Sharjah’s September 1969 declaration ignored. Sharjah was attempting to revise the territorial boundaries and stake its claim to a potentially valuable oil discovery at the weaker Umm al-Qaiwain’s expense. Sharjah, however, was encumbered by the fact that Iran would not allow Sharjah’s oil grab unless its own claims to Abu Musa were satisfied. This was a case of a minor territorial dispute potentially snowballing into an armed conflict in the Persian Gulf. Yet the existence of a prior international territorial agreement—for example, the 1964 sea-boundary agreement between Umm al-Qaiwain and Sharjah—did not preclude Sharjah from attempting to revise it when the presence of a potentially lucrative oil field created an incentive to do so. International legal agreements or claims appeared to be only as strong as the states willing or able to enforce them. The regional political context trumped the legal claim in the case of Umm al-Qaiwain’s offshore territorial boundary. Nevertheless, the offshore boundary of Abu Musa was not the only minor territorial dispute in the region that threatened to turn violent during the first half of 1970. While trouble was brewing in the lower Gulf, relations between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi were deteriorating as well. 62  For documents describing the Shah’s willingness to obscure sovereignty on the islands in June 1970, see: U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 4 June 1970, Tehran 02382 041441Z, RG 59; and, U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 15 June 1970, Tehran 02546 151704Z, RG 59.

CHAPTER 7

From Crisis to Clarity

During the middle of 1970, the behavior of the rulers of Dubai, Qatar, and Bahrain suggested they lacked conviction and resolution with respect to a union of nine shaykhdoms. Bahrain, freed from the chains of an Iranian claim, was now free to demand influence in proportion to its size in a union of shaykhdoms. The prospect of Bahrain, which was much larger and more politically volatile than the other shaykhdoms, having a disproportionately large influence in a union presented a threat to the shaykhs of Qatar and Dubai. Mutual  suspicion between Bahrain on the one hand and Qatar and Dubai on the other made the idea of a union of nine seem increasingly improbable to insiders. What’s more, the dispute over Abu Musa’s territorial waters created a new problem between Sharjah and Ajman/Umm al- Qaiwain which also threatened to obstruct progress toward a smaller union of shaykhdoms. And while Iran’s threat to Bahrain had been set aside in the spring of 1970, Saudi Arabia’s claim to Buraimi emerged to challenge Shaykh Zayid who had been one of the principal forces for progress toward a union of shaykhdoms.

Faysal Confronts Zayid In June and July 1969, Saudi Arabia made several efforts to reach out to Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi. Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia had told British officials that they should encourage Shaykh Zayid to pay a visit to King Faysal to resolve outstanding issues. Fahd had assured the British that © The Author(s) 2020 B. Friedman, The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1971, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56182-6_7

163

164 

B. FRIEDMAN

Saudi Arabia’s only desire was to see the union of shaykhdoms succeed. In July 1969, when Fahd was encouraging Zayid to visit Saudi Arabia, the Saudis were in the middle of a widespread security crackdown on anti-­ regime revolutionaries; a Free Officers movement brought a revolutionary movement to power in Sudan and, most importantly, progress toward a union of shaykhdoms was stalled following a contentious May 1969 meeting in Doha. The failed Supreme Council meeting in May 1969 was  affected by British Conservative Party leader Edward Heath’s tour through the region in late March and April 1969. Heath may have given the ruling shaykhs reason to believe there may be a British policy reversal on withdrawal, and this possibility contributed to the shaykhs’ lack of cooperation in May. Yet, in spite of Heath’s visit, the Saudis continued to believe that a strong union of shaykhdoms was the best way to prevent revolutionary penetration into the Gulf littoral. Following the fall of  Libya’s King Idris in September 1969 and the South Yemen attack on Saudi forces in late November 1969, the Saudis were concerned that their kingdom could be encircled on the Arabian Peninsula if the Arab nationalist revolutionaries were successful in Oman or any of the shaykhdoms. Despite strong Saudi backing for a union of shaykhdoms, Shaykh Zayid continued to view King Faysal as a hostile rival who had plans to seize a large portion of Abu Dhabi territory extending from the Khor al-Udaid in the northeast to Shaykh Zayid’s home village of Al-ʿAyn and the Buraimi Oasis in the southwest. Further, Saudi Arabia felt it was dealing from a stronger position in early 1970 than it had been in mid-1969. In mid-1969, the Saudis felt embattled by internal antiregime challenges and confronted with a great deal of external pressure from the revolutionary Arab camp, particularly on the Arab-Israeli issue. However, following the Islamic summit in September 1969, the effective Saudi military counteroffensive against South Yemen in late November and early December 1969, and then the strong Saudi showing on the Arab-Israeli issue leading up to the Arab Summit in Rabat in December 1969, King Faysal appeared to believe Saudi Arabia was on firmer inter-Arab ground at the beginning of 1970 than it had been in 1969. The Saudis may have also concluded that with the settlement of Iran’s claim to Bahrain, Bahrain would opt for independence rather than membership in the union of shaykhdoms. If Bahrain chose independence rather than the union, it was likely Qatar would opt for independence, as well. Bahrain and Qatar’s absence from a prospective union would increase the

7  FROM CRISIS TO CLARITY 

165

probability that Shaykh Zayid would wield decisive power in any smaller union. The Saudis, who wanted to keep their territorial claims dormant until the British withdrew, had pushed for a larger union where Shaykh Zayid’s power would be circumscribed by his fellow shaykhs and the institutional structures of the union. King Faysal believed it would be easier to negotiate a favorable deal on disputed Saudi-Abu Dhabi territory with the institutional framework of a federation of nine shaykhdoms rather than with Shaykh Zayid directly. However, if Bahrain and Qatar were not going to be part of the union of shaykhdoms, then Saudi Arabia may have believed a Zayid-dominated union would strengthen rather than weaken Shaykh Zayid’s negotiating hand. In January 1970 the largely British-owned Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC) began drilling for oil in an area of western Abu Dhabi, near the Liwa Oasis, which had been part of the long-standing territorial dispute between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi.1 There were four oil drilling structures in an area that came to be known as “Zarrara.” It was clear that the Zarrara site would produce a great deal of oil. The drilling in early 1970 confirmed Zarrara’s oil-producing potential, and ensured that ADPC’s exploitation of this disputed territory land would revive the historical dispute between King Faysal and Shaykh Zayid.2 During the first week of May 1970 (2–6 May), as Prince Fahd had suggested in July 1969, Shaykh Zayid initiated a visit to Saudi Arabia. Shaykh Zayid’s aims for the visit were to first, seek an expression of Saudi Arabia’s backing for Bahrain’s inclusion in a union of nine shaykhdoms, which was being opposed by Dubai and Qatar;3 and second, to convey to King Faysal 1  For a thorough description of the historical background to the Saudi-Abu Dhabi territorial dispute, see: J.C.  Wilkinson, “The Oman Question: The Background to the Political Geography of South-East Arabia,” The Geographical Journal, Vol. 137, No. 3 (Sep., 1971), pp. 361–371. 2  J.B. Kelly, Arabia the Gulf and the West (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1980), pp. 74–78. Michael Quentin Morton’s historiography in Buraimi: The Struggle for Power, Influence and Oil in Arabia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013) is a useful resource. See, also: Richard Schofield (2011) The Crystallisation of a Complex Territorial Dispute: Britain and the Saudi-Abu Dhabi Borderland, 1966–71, Journal of Arabian Studies, 1:1 (2011), 27–51, particularly p. 46. 3  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 27 April 1970, Dhahra 00487 271139Z.  It is important to note Zayid’s decision to visit Saudi Arabia took the British by surprise; See: Richard Schofield, “The Crystallisation of a Complex Territorial Dispute: Britain and the Saudi-Abu Dhabi Borderland, 1966–71,” Journal of Arabian Studies 1:1 (2011), 27–51, here 42.

166 

B. FRIEDMAN

the collective concern of the shaykhs regarding the growing strength of the rebellion in Dhofar, Oman. For several months in late 1969 and early 1970, Shaykh Zayid had been continuously expressing his fear to British and American officials about the expanding rebellion directed against the Sultan in Salalah. Ahmad Khalifa Al-Suwaydi, Shaykh Zayid’s closest advisor, had said that events in Oman carried particular importance for Shaykh Zayid because Oman was part of the shaykhdoms.4 Al-Suwaydi also believed that Oman should eventually become part of any new union of shaykhdoms. Shaykh Zayid believed that tribes of Oman were friendlier with him than with “Sayyid Saʿid” as he referred to the Sultan of Oman and Muscat. Zayid even told American officials that he had a letter from Omani exiles, Sulayman and Tariq bin Himyar, claiming that the Iraqis had “laid down the law” to them to “get the revolution started against Sultan” or they would lose their offices in Syria, Iraq, and Kuwait.5 King Faysal, based on information received from the Kuwaitis,6 believed Zayid had come to Saudi Arabia ready to address the outstanding territorial disputes. The British had advised Shaykh Zayid not to discuss Buraimi during this visit but rather to focus on laying the groundwork for better relations between himself and Faysal, which he did.7 Yet on the final day of Zayid’s visit, King Faysal asked Zayid if he had anything to propose to him on the matter of the frontier dispute. When Zayid demurred and told Faysal he was not prepared to discuss such matters during this visit, Faysal, annoyed and frustrated that Zayid was not prepared to engage him on

4  For more on the historical and geographic contiguity between the Trucial or Omani shaykhdoms and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, see: J.C.  Wilkinson, “The Oman Question: The Background to the Political Geography of South-East Arabia,” The Geographical Journal, Vol. 137, No. 3 (Sep., 1971), pp. 361–371; See, also: Tore Tingvold Petersen, “Anglo-American Rivalry in the Middle East: The Struggle for the Buraimi Oasis,” 1952–1957;” The International History Review 14:1 (February 1992), 71–91; 5  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 13 February 1970, Dhahra 00176 141130Z, RG 59. 6  U.S.  Department of State Airgram, Jidda to Washington, 1 June 1970, A-120; and U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 19 May 1970, Jidda 01933 19336Z. 7   U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 7 May 1970, Jidda 01779071626Z, RG 59.

7  FROM CRISIS TO CLARITY 

167

their outstanding issues, took out maps and insisted on outlining a series of new Saudi proposals anyway.8

Armed Conflict Over Zarrara? King Faysal’s territorial claims were less sweeping than those made in 1949 and 1967, but the Saudis were still claiming the Sabkhat Matti district of northwest Abu Dhabi, the area dividing Abu Dhabi from Qatar, and the corridor leading to the Khor al-Udaid. In effect, the Saudi claim would mean that Saudi Arabia was carving itself a strip of territory between Qatar and Abu Dhabi during a period in which Shaykh Ahmad of Qatar and Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi were trying to find common ground toward a union of shaykhdoms. The Saudis wanted this territory, in part, because ARAMCO had emphasized the need for a land corridor to transit oil from the untapped and relatively isolated Shaybah oil field in the Rubʾ Al-Khali to the Gulf coast.9 But perhaps the more contentious parts of the Saudi territorial claims were areas already being exploited for oil, which were located in the Zarrara parallelogram of wells near the Liwa Oasis. Further southeast was the disputed Buraimi Oasis area, where Shaykh Zayid had been born and raised. King Faysal proposed conducting a plebiscite in Buraimi, similar to what had been carried out in Bahrain in April 1970, which was somewhat ironic given the Saudi opposition to a Bahrain plebiscite in 1968. However, Faysal insisted that all the tribesmen that had fled Buraimi for Saudi Arabia in 1955 be permitted to return and resettle there before the plebiscite. King Faysal also demanded that ADPC stop drilling at the Zarrara wells which he maintained were in Saudi territory. Zayid asked for time to consider Faysal’s latest proposal and frontier demarcation. Faysal said he would give Zayid two weeks to halt ADPC activity at Zarrara and two months to consider the Saudi border demarcation.10 The implication was that the Saudis would use force to stop work at Zarrara. When Zayid tried

8  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 1 May 1970, Jidda 01786 100939Z, RG 59. 9  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 19 May 1970, Jidda 01933 19336Z, RG 59;U.S. Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 5 May 1970, Dhahra 00539 061321Z, RG 59. 10  Kelly, pp.  74–78; U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 24 May 1970, Jidda 02018 241454Z, RG 59.

168 

B. FRIEDMAN

pointing out that the Sultan of Muscat and Oman should be consulted on any Buraimi proposal, Faysal dismissed the notion. At midnight on 18 May, the two-week period Faysal had given Zayid to stop work at Zarrara had expired. Zayid, who was visiting Iran at the end of the two weeks, informed Saudi Arabia that there was no work being done at Zarrara-1 structure but ADPC work continued at Zarrara-2. Zayid may not have been aware of all of the specific details of the oil operations at Zarrara, because the Zarrara-1 well had already stopped operating prior to Faysal’s ultimatum. At the end of the two-week period, ADPC work continued at Zarrara-2, but drilling had not yet begun.11 British and American officials were concerned the Saudis would see the ongoing work at Zarrara-2 as a defiant provocation and mobilize their military to stop work in the area. Not only would such a confrontation destroy any chance of future Saudi-Abu Dhabi political cooperation, but it would obligate the British, as protectors of Abu Dhabi through 1971, to respond. An ARAMCO officer believed there was a 50-50 chance the Saudis would take military action, but the U.S.  Ambassador to Saudi Arabia noted that the U.S.  Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia had not reported any mobilization of the Saudi Royal Army or Air Force. And if the Saudi National Guard was used, the British, with military advisors in Riyadh, would have advance notice.12 North American oil companies Mobil and Esso asked for American help to convince the British to pressure ADPC to discontinue all work in the Zarrara area. The oil companies feared a Saudi military operation and believed that the ADPC was too involved in a dispute that needed to be resolved at the government level.13 Following expressions of concern from Mobil representatives and British diplomats in Jidda, the Iraqi Petroleum Company, ADPC’s parent company, ordered operations temporarily shut down at Zarrara. In the meantime, there were no signs of Saudi military preparations, but the British Embassy in Jidda took the situation seriously enough that it began military contingency planning, which included alerting the

11  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, London to Washington, 22 May 1970, London 04041 221811Z, RG 59. 12  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 23 May 1970, Jidda 01991 231404Z, RG 59. 13  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, “SAG-Abu Dhabi Stalemate,” Washington to Jidda, 23 May 1970, 079529, RG 59.

7  FROM CRISIS TO CLARITY 

169

Trucial Oman Scouts.14 On the one hand, the British were reluctant to continue suspending the ADPC operations at Zarrara as a result of the Saudi threat of military action because they feared it would set a precedent for the future. On the other hand, the British wanted to find a plausible pretext for ADPC to temporarily discontinue the Zarrara work for the following eight weeks, which was the time allotted by Faysal for Zayid to consider the Saudi border proposal. They also wanted to postpone a potential confrontation until after the upcoming meeting of the union’s Supreme Council.15 American officials in Saudi Arabia believed that the Saudi Minister of Defense, Prince Sultan, was using the threat of military action as a bluff to get the oil companies to voluntarily back away from additional activity in the Zarrara zone.16 In early June 1970, Zayid and Faysal exchanged messages confirming Faysal’s demand that all drilling activity at Zarrara—not just the Zarrara-1— cease. King Faysal also told Zayid that he hoped Zayid would not put the interests of the ADPC ahead of Saudi-Abu Dhabi relations.17 Rashad Pharaon told American officials that on the question of Buraimi, King Faysal was acting on a strong consensus among the Royal Princes—Fahd, Abdullah, and Sultan.18 Further, the U.S.  Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Herman Eilts, noted that King Faysal could not and would not bring himself to view Shaykh Zayid, and any of the other Gulf shaykhs, as his equal. Eilts pointed out that Faysal’s perception was shaped by history. The ruling shaykhs’ families had been clients of the Al Saʿud, and, in Faysal’s view, would have continued to have been so had it not been for British interference.19 Therefore, there was both a historical-cultural, as well as material, component to the Saudi rigidity on its frontier dispute with Abu Dhabi. The Saudis may have also felt that they needed to assert their territorial claim before Shaykh Zayid’s intensive investment and buildup of his Abu 14  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 24 May 1970, Jidda 02022 241634Z, RG 59. 15  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Washington to Jidda, 26 May 1970, 080435, RG 59. 16  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 27 May 1970, Jidda 02068 271344Z, RG 59. 17  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Washington to Jidda, 8 June 1970, 088440, RG 59. 18  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Jidda to Washington, 8 June 1970, A-132, RG 59; and, U.S. Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 28 April 1970, Dhahra 00493 271853Z, RG 59. 19  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 19 May 1970, Jidda 01933 19336Z, RG 59.

170 

B. FRIEDMAN

Dhabi Defense Force became a real threat. The Saudis had expressed concern to the Kuwaitis about Zayid’s plan to acquire sophisticated British Lightning fighter aircraft, and that it was already unhappy with Zayid’s possession of British Hawker Hunter aircraft. Saudi diplomats couched their arguments in terms of “a fair settlement,” and continued to profess that its dispute with Abu Dhabi would not interfere with progress toward the union of shaykhdoms, yet in practice Saudi Arabia was only willing to compromise if Saudi prestige could be maintained. In the case of Buraimi, this seemed to require some form of acknowledgment of Saudi predominance in the disputed areas. In addition, King Faysal was extremely patient in waiting for favorable settlements that preserved and protected Saudi material and territorial interests. The Saudis, for example, believed it was “imperative” that while bilateral discussions continue neither Saudi Arabia nor Abu Dhabi should exploit oil resources in the contested areas.20 In late June, in advance of King Faysal’s two-month deadline to consider the Saudi proposal, Shaykh Zayid and the British composed a response that was intended to side-step the issue. Shaykh Zayid claimed that he was currently occupied with establishing the union of shaykhdoms and suggested that talks on a Saudi-Abu Dhabi border be postponed until September, and drilling in the Zarrara area would remain suspended.21 The letter expressed Zayid’s desire to come to a “package” agreement on all the outstanding issues. Further, oil company executives said that they thought Zayid could be persuaded into accepting the creation of a neutral zone in the territory where the Zarrara wells were located, and oil income would be split between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi.22 Shaykh Zayid, with British counseling, chose delay and conciliation rather than confrontation with the Saudis.

Tapline Goes Offline On 3 May 1970, a bulldozer that was part of a work crew that Syrian news sources reported was installing telephone lines near the village of ʾUthman in the Syrian province of Darʿa ruptured the Tapline oil pipeline spilling  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Jidda to Washington, 8 June 1970, A-132, RG 59.  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 22 June 1970, Jidda 02432 221413Z, RG 59. 22   U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, Dhahra 00726 290856Z, RG 59. 20 21

7  FROM CRISIS TO CLARITY 

171

approximately 20,000 barrels of oil into the Yarmouk river. Tapline transported oil thousands of kilometers from Dhahran in Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean Port of Sidon in Lebanon for shipment to the European market. Following the 3 May attack the government of Syria refused to allow Tapline to repair the damage.23 In 1969, sabotage of Tapline shut down the pipeline for 112 days, reducing the average throughput on the line from a capacity of 470,000 barrels per day (b/d) to 332,000 b/d. Of ARAMCO’s 160 million tons of oil production in 1969, 16.6 million were delivered through Tapline. At the time of the May 1970 damage, officials estimated that Saudi Arabia would lose $200,000 per day (p/d), ARAMCO $150,000 p/d, Tapline $50,000 p/d, and the governments of Syria and Jordan $10,000 per day, respectively.24 Saudi officials responded to the Syrian refusal to allow the pipeline to be repaired by prohibiting Syrian freight trucks from transiting through Saudi Arabia. On 11 May, Syria banned all Saudi transit traffic through Syria. Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs ʿUmar Saqqaf responded by framing the damage to Tapline in inter-Arab terms, arguing that the “planned sabotage” damaged not just the pipeline but also “Arab action against the enemy” [Israel], and suggested losses to Saudi Arabia will affect all Arabs in the “future battle for liberation.” On 19 May, Syria banned Saudi aircraft from flying through Syrian airspace, adding up to two hours to regular flights from Jidda to Beirut.25 Syria was attempting to use the damage to Tapline as a form of blackmail. On 7 June it allowed Saudi vehicles to travel through Syria but it doubled the transit fees. In late June and early July, the Beirut media reported that Syria was seeking compensation of between £1/$2.4 million and £8/$19 million for allowing repairs to pipeline. At the end of August, Tapline officials offered the Syrian government $5 million as a “settlement price” for repairing the pipeline, but Syrian officials rejected the proposal and countered with a demand for $20 million in annual transit fees from Tapline. Tapline officials claimed they did not possess the financial means to meet such a demand.26 Saudi Arabia argued that the economic damage to Tapline would mean that it would be unable to pay Egypt and Jordan  MEED, 15 May 1970.  MEED, 15 May 1970. 25  MEED, 22 and 29 May 1970. 26  MEED, 3 July 1970; Financial Times, 26 August 1970. 23 24

172 

B. FRIEDMAN

their regular installments of financial aid as outlined in the 1967 Khartoum Agreement. The Saudis were not entirely bluffing. Inflated defense spending and the unexpected damage to Tapline was taxing Saudi Arabia’s financial liquidity. In September 1970, Saudi Arabia’s ministry of finance announced the implementation of a one-year temporary income tax. It was the first time Saudi Arabia had ever introduced an income tax, which was referred to as a “jihad tax.”27 The income tax was quite low (between 1 and 5 percent; 10 percent for business profits over 50,000 Saudi Rials) but the symbolic impact of the measure was powerful. A U.S. government research report noted the “seriousness” of Saudi Arabia’s “present, and foreseeable, financial plight.” The report stressed that Saudi Arabia’s “1969/70 budget is in effect in deficit, particularly when subsidies to UAR [Egypt] and Jordan are considered as de facto part of the budget.”28 Saudi Arabia could not make up the financial losses from Tapline by exporting more oil from Ras Tanura in the Gulf because the higher shipping expenses from Ras Tanura to Europe (a 30-day transit around the Cape of Good Hope) offset any increased volume. Further, the damage to Tapline meant that all of Saudi Arabia’s economic risk was concentrated at Ras Tanura. In 1968, 28.5 million tons of oil transited to market through Tapline, while 88.5 million tons were loaded onto tankers at Ras Tanura. In 1970, the year the Tapline was offline for eight months due to damage, only 8.5 million tons of oil reached market through Tapline, and 130 million tons were loaded onto tankers at Ras Tanura.29 Any damage to that export facility could have crippled the Saudi economy during a period of tight liquidity. The Tapline pipeline remained closed for the remainder of 1970, and the eight-month-long episode fueled King Faysal’s perception that the government in Syria was “radical,” and posed a legitimate and serious security threat to the Saudi regime and the stability of the region. American officials appeared to share the Saudi perception that Arab nationalism remained a threat to Saudi Arabia, independent of Egypt’s Abdel Nasser. The U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia noted that “While Khartoum  MEED, 19 September 1970.  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 20 July 1970, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 SAUD. 29  Benjamin Shwadran, Middle East Oil: Issues and Problems (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing, Co., 1977), p. 41. 27 28

7  FROM CRISIS TO CLARITY 

173

payments, which at the moment faced a doubtful future, may keep UAR [Egypt] appeased, SAG [Saudi Arabia] has virtually no leverage on increasingly hostile Iraqi and Syrian regimes or on more radical Fedayeen [Palestinian guerrilla] groups, all of which [are] presently active on propaganda and subversive fronts in [an] effort to bring down Saudi regime.”30

Hedging Their Bets In early 1970, following two years of unproductive negotiations, the emergence of a union of nine shaykhdoms seemed remote. The rulers continued to pay lip-service to their commitment to a federation of nine, yet their behavior suggested otherwise. In the months following the contentious breakdown of the October 1969 Supreme Council meeting, each of the four larger shaykhdoms—Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Dubai, and Qatar— began creating separate state institutions that indicated they were preparing themselves for independent statehood. Saudi Arabia, which had been pushing for a union of nine during much of 1968 and the first half of 1969, was preoccupied with inter-Arab affairs and the regional revolutionary challenge for much of the second half of 1969. The shaykhs, for their part, saw the Saudi regime as embattled and Iran as on the ascent, particularly in light of the new U.S. administration’s tacit support for Iranian military dominance in the Gulf. Further, Iran’s inflexible position on Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb, and Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to involve itself in these disputes, contributed to skepticism regarding Saudi Arabia as a balance to Iran’s power. The Iran-Bahrain issue also influenced the direction of developments among the shaykhdoms. Without being fully aware of the secret negotiations for a settlement on Bahrain in late December 1969 and early 1970, Qatar and Dubai increasingly saw a union that included Bahrain encumbered and unworkable because of Iran’s emerging dominance.31 However, Qatar and Dubai viewed Bahrain as an unreliable future political partner for reasons related to, but also distinct from, Bahrain’s dispute with Iran. 30  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 20 July 1970, FRUS 1969– 1976, Vol. XXIV, No. 142. At the end of January 1971, Tapline resumed operations. A new government in Syria allowed the necessary repairs, but only after Saudi Arabia agreed to increase Syria’s annual transit fee from $4.5 million to $8 million, and paid Syria a settlement “bonus” of $9 million; see, Shwadran, p. 41. 31  Salim al-Lawzi, Rasasatan fi-l-Khalij [Two Bullets in the Gulf] (Beirut, Lebanon: 1971), pp. 77–88.

174 

B. FRIEDMAN

Bahrain’s large and diverse population, political culture, and its historical rivalry with Qatar were important components of inter-shaykhdom dynamics. Shaykh Ahmad of Qatar believed that Bahrain’s ruler Shaykh ʿIsa was a “weak man,” and his brother Shaykh Khalifah was a “a sick man” (he suffered from diabetes) who “will die soon.” He said Bahrain was divided between communities of Iranians, and a mixed bag of Arabs and Baharnas, and Bahraini students were “100 percent extremists.” Ahmad said that the Shah is “determined to protect the Gulf against extremism,” and the union must have the Shah’s good will. He added that the Shah would not hesitate to occupy Bahrain to keep the extremists from taking control. Indeed, Ahmad said, “he [the Shah] would not hesitate to occupy the entire Gulf if he felt it necessary to preserve stability for moderation.” Ahmad also felt that the union had no credible military capability against an outside aggressor. In this respect, he insisted, “Iran’s friendship is of singular importance.”32 Ahmad told Iranian officials that he and Rashid of Dubai opposed a union that included Bahrain. Ahmad added that Bahraini radical elements would “drag the shaykhs down the road to ruin.”33 Shaykh Rashid’s principal adviser, Mehdi Tajir, told American officials that a “federation was beyond the capabilities of the shaykhdoms at this point in history, and they should start with an economic union at this point, a “common market“ to start with. He added that a political federation would take “20 or 30 years.” Tajir claimed that the shaykhs “feared Bahrain” and said the shaykhdoms would get along much better in the future without Bahrain as a legal partner. He elaborated, saying that Bahrain could “dominate a federation,” and, while cooperation with Bahrain was desirable and possible, a union that included Bahrain would give Bahrain “advantages over the others.”34 In February 1970, Shaykh Ahmad of Qatar and Shaykh Rashid of Dubai had pressed Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi to form a federation of eight, excluding Bahrain, at the conclusion of Id al-ʿAdha holiday that

32  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, “The Persian Gulf- Abu Dhabi and Qatar Opinions,” 17 February 1970, A-18, RG 59. 33  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 4 April 1970, Tehran 01300 061500Z, RG 59. 34  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 3 April 1970, Dhahra 00363 030813Z, RG 59.

7  FROM CRISIS TO CLARITY 

175

followed the annual Muslim pilgrimage (haj) in late February 1970.35 The plans did not materialize, in all probability because they were discouraged by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.36 In the meantime, Bahraini leadership was secretly moving toward a resolution with Iran and, following the U.N. endorsement of the Bahraini people’s desire for independence in May, no longer viewed membership in the union of shaykhdoms as a security necessity. The U.N. mission’s findings emboldened Bahraini leadership in its demands for greater Bahraini power in any union. The Al Khalifah drew confidence in their demands from its ongoing efforts to establish independent state institutions. In mid-January 1970, Shaykh ʿIsa formed an executive “State Council” to begin creating institutional mechanisms to manage Bahraini policy on legislation, administration, finance, health and social welfare, and cultural affairs. The new State Council had twelve members, and the ruler’s brother, Shaykh Khalifah bin Salman Al Khalifah was named the chairman.37 Shaykh ʿIsa also named directors for several new government departments. Bahrain’s institutional activity did not go unnoticed in Qatar. On 2 April 1970, with no prior notice to its fellow shaykhs, Qatar declared a new constitution. The first article declared, somewhat paradoxically, that Qatar was a sovereign independent Arab state and a member of the Union of Arab Emirates. On 29 May a national cabinet of nine ministers was formed, and Shaykh Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani was named the Prime Minister. The cabinet did not name a minister of foreign affairs or defense, which was meant to signal that Qatar still intended to honor the February 1968 Dubai agreement, under which defense and foreign affairs were to be governed by the union. It is important to note that in early 1970 Bahrain also elected not to appoint ministers for defense or foreign affairs. Qatar signaled its independence by applying for membership in the Arab League, despite still being bound by its British protectorate treaty. Qatar appeared to be sending mixed messages. On the one hand it seemed to want to leave the door open to its full participation in a union, but on the other hand it was unilaterally declaring independent sovereignty, which appeared to be a maneuver meant to show its fellow shaykhs, and

35  U.S. Department of State Airgram, Dhahran to Washington, “The Persian Gulf- Abu Dhabi and Qatar Opinions,” 17 February 1970, A-18, RG 59. 36  MEED (Middle East Economic Digest), 13 and 20 March 1970. 37  Taryam, pp. 142–143.

176 

B. FRIEDMAN

particularly Bahrain, that it had political options and negotiating leverage as well. The Trucial shaykhdoms of the Omani coast were not idle either. In early 1970, the Trucial Council of Rulers held its 31st meeting in Dubai between 28 February and 4 March. During the council meeting Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi agreed to finance a budget for the seven lower Gulf shaykhdoms that would provide funds for technical education, health, agriculture, water facilities, roads, and immigration affairs.38 Funds were also allocated for the Trucial Oman Scouts. On 7 June 1970, King Faysal stopped in Dubai for two hours on his way to a state visit to Malaysia, and met with the rulers of six Trucial shaykhdoms (without Zayid of Abu Dhabi). King Faysal used this visit to explain Iranian-Saudi dynamics to the shaykhs. He told them that Iran genuinely wanted cooperation with the shaykhdoms but that it had “interests in the area that cannot be denied.” Faysal praised the Shah’s decision to drop its claim on Bahrain and criticized false reports of a secret Saudi-­ Iranian defense pact. He also said media reports about the sale of the islands to Iran were designed to divide the Arab rulers.39 Kuwait, which had played an important role in brokering the Iranian-Bahraini negotiations, also increased its efforts to bring the shaykhs together for a union of nine.40 On 18 June 1970 the British Conservative Party won the British general election, causing a great deal of excitement in the lower Gulf shaykhdoms that were eager for the new Conservative British government to postpone or cancel military withdrawal. Shaykh Muhammad bin Hamad al-Sharqi of Fujairah was pleased with the news. He believed that a reversal of British policy would allow the union of shaykhdoms to evolve more naturally under the “umbrella of British protection.” Shaykh Ahmad of Umm al-Qaiwain believed the British would cancel withdrawal.41 The British vacillation regarding withdrawal would provide the ruling shaykhs with yet another reason to resist progress toward a unified state in 1970.

 Taryam, p. 142.  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 8 June 1970, Tehran 02422 081440Z, RG 59, and U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 9 June 1970, Jidda 02238 091245Z, RG 59. 40  BNA: “Record of Conversation between the Parliamentary Undersecretary and the Kuwait Foreign Minister,” 26 April 1970, FO 1016/757. 41  BNA: “British Policy in the Gulf,” Dubai to Bahrain, 22 June 1970, FO 1016/757. 38 39

7  FROM CRISIS TO CLARITY 

177

The Shah’s Budget Crisis In September 1970, Mohammad Reza Shah was anxious. He sent his Minister of Court Asadollah Alam to inform the American Ambassador about Iran’s latest intelligence on the Soviet Union. The Soviets were endeavoring to expand their influence in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria in their efforts to “achieve a dominant position in the Middle East.” There were 12,000 Soviet “experts” in Egypt, according to the Shah. The Shah did not believe the Soviets were sincere about the new Rogers Plan and was doubtful any Arab-Israeli settlement would hold. More specifically, he claimed the Soviets had recently provided 300 furnished combat planes to Iraq, and newly trained Iraqi pilots were beginning to return to Iraq from their pilot’s courses in the Soviet Union. The Soviet success “penetrating the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt…substantially increases the threat to the Persian Gulf,” was Iran’s principal concern.42 The Iraqi government’s early March 1970 agreement to end Barzani’s Kurdish rebellion, made the Shah very uneasy. In March he described the agreement as a “very grave development,” not only because it freed approximately 20,000 Iraqi troops for redeployment on the Iranian border, but also because it meant Iraq could “increase its resources and capabilities for subversion against the small Gulf states.” The Shah also argued that the agreement prepared the ground for the Soviet plan to transform an autonomous Iraqi Kurdish province into a Kurdish state with a Soviet border, which would allow the Soviets to overcome the present Turkish-­ Iranian barrier to direct Soviet penetration in the Middle East. The Shah argued these developments “made it more important than ever” that Iran would have U.S. cooperation to equip and develop its military forces “so that necessary minimum deterrent strength could be developed” prior to British withdrawal at the end of 1971.43

42  On 23 July 1970 Abdel Nasser accepted a simplified version of the U.S. sponsored Rogers Plan (affirming U.N.  Resolution 242). See: Laura M.  James, “Military/political means/ends: Egyptian decision making in the War of Attrition,” in The Cold War in the Middle East (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), Nigel Ashton (ed.), p. 102. U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 9 September 1970; Tehran 03905 100607Z, R 59; and, U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 2 August 1970, Tehran 03312 020836Z, R 59. 43  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 12 March 1970, Tehran 0928 1335Z, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 53; See, also: Alvandi, pp. 74–77.

178 

B. FRIEDMAN

Mehdi Samii, the head of the Iranian Plan Organization, believed Iran military spending was “worrying.”44 Samii was concerned that defense spending was coming at the expense of a stable Iranian economy. And without financing, Iran would not be able to pay for the additional two squadrons of F-4 Phantom II fighter jets that were scheduled for delivery to Iran at the end of 1971.45 The Shah was convinced the latest U.S. military technology would guarantee Iran’s position as a regional power. The Shah’s ambitions and the changing regional environment contributed to his increasing anxiety over a serious budget crisis he faced in 1970, which was a result of a shortfall of oil revenues and Iran’s ambitious and rapid military spending.46 This budget crisis led the Shah to put enormous pressure on both the U.S. government and the oil producers47 to help raise the money to purchase the arms Iran had ordered from the U.S. to defend the Gulf. The link between the Shah’s determination to achieve military supremacy in the Gulf, his oil negotiations with Iran’s oil consortium, and the budget shortfall in 1970 have been overlooked in much of the existing literature on Iran’s foreign policy during this period. 48 In early 1970, the Iranian government did not have enough cash on hand to pay for the military equipment it had ordered from the U.S., and the terms of credit that were available through U.S. lenders were too expensive for Iran. Mehdi Samii, the managing director of Iran’s Plan Organization, explained that Iran had increased its defense spending by 25 percent for 1970. Half of Iran’s ordinary budget would go to defense spending. The

44  Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 19, 1970, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 80. 45  Ibid, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 19, 1970. 46  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 17 February 1970, Tehran 0602 1425Z, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 46. 47  The bulk of the oil produced from Iran was taken by a consortium made up of 40% British Petroleum, 14% English Shell, 7% each for Texaco, Standard of California, Standard of N.J., Mobil and Gulf, 5% a group of U.S. Independents, and 6% Compagnie française des pétroles (CFP). 48  For example, see: Mahmoud Meskoub, “Social Policy in Iran in the Twentieth Century,” Iranian Studies 39:2 (2006), 227–252, here 233; Hadi Salehi Esfahani and M.  Hashem Pesaran, “The Iranian Economy in the Twentieth Century: A Global Perspective,” Iranian Studies 42:2 (2009), 177–211, here 189. For an overview of Iran’s economic challenges during this brief period, see: Massoud Karshenas, Oil, State, and Industrialization in Iran (Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 207–230.

7  FROM CRISIS TO CLARITY 

179

debt-servicing (interest payments) on the military purchases were “worrying” to Samii. Iran currently had $155 million shortfall in its development budget for 1970, and Samii said it would have to come out of the development funds for agriculture and industry, but not the education budget. The Shah was anxious that the budget shortfall would pose an obstacle to purchasing the full range of military technology that he believed Iran needed to fulfill its role as protector of the Gulf.

The Shah Appeals to Nixon The Shah wrote at least three personal letters to U.S. President Nixon in the first six months of 1970 to explain his case. In response, high-ranking U.S. government officials made the Shah’s concerns a priority. Nixon’s National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, had U.S. officials consistently apply discreet pressure on the oil producers to attempt to accommodate the Shah in 1970 and sell more Iranian oil. The Shah believed Iran’s financial bind could be solved if the U.S. purchased more oil from Iran. The Shah argued the money would be recycled back to the U.S. through Iran’s arms purchases and it would help the U.S. balance of trade. However, the U.S. was reluctant to import more oil from Iran because oil imports were closely regulated, and it would also mean diverting business from ARAMCO, an American-owned company, to Iran’s oil consortium that was majority-controlled by British companies, which would create domestic political problems for the Nixon administration. The Shah was not only facing an immediate budget shortfall but also less friendly terms of credit from the U.S. The Shah told Nixon that “these worsening conditions” placed “an intolerable burden on the resources of a country irrevocably committed to rapid economic development and social progress while maintaining sufficient military forces for her own security.”49 The 1970 budget crisis was not just a short-term issue for Iran. Iran had $400 million in $100 million one-year “tranches” left under a five-­ year 1968 credit agreement with the U.S.; but the Shah also had plans to purchase $896 million of military equipment over the following five years. Mehdi Samii and U.S. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, Jr., tried to pare 49  Letter from Shah of Iran to Nixon, Tehran, 11 March 1970, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Iran, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 52.

180 

B. FRIEDMAN

down Iran’s military spending. Samii believed Iran could reduce the total by $136 million, but it would still have to find a way to budget for $760 million. This figure included: four additional squadrons of F-4 fighter planes for 1973 to 1976 at $345 million; C-130 transport aircraft at $215 million; the remaining balance on the third and fourth squadrons of F-4 fighters at $53.7 million; an air-defense network labeled “Peace Ruby,” for $17.7 million; and miscellaneous radar and ammunition, and spare parts. Samii and the U.S. Ambassador believed that Iran might be able to finance the equipment if they could stretch out the payments over eight years instead of the current five allotted under the 1968 agreement. However, that would require extending the 1968 agreement to 1976, which would require U.S. congressional approval. Despite the budget-squeeze, Samii was convinced that the Shah would not give up the fighter aircraft. He had to have them.50 In an internal discussion about Iran’s military needs, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle G. Wheeler questioned the Shah’s order for 36 additional C-130s. He said that the Shah claimed he needed these to move a battalion or two to threatened areas. General Wheeler said that without ever stating it explicitly, what the Shah really had in mind was the capability to go to Saudi Arabian defense should the need arise.51 In the Shah’s 15 June letter to President Nixon he urged the U.S. president “most emphatically to provide Iran with a sufficient oil importation quota which will enable us to purchase our requirements, or at least our defence equipment from the United States of America. Another alternative concerns the decision of Libya to decrease her daily production of oil by 800,000 barrels which amount could at least be taken off from Iran and the matter will thus be solved.”52 Libya had dramatically cut back its oil production in August 1970 in order to drive up the price of oil, and Iran was trying to convince the oil companies to purchase the shortfall from Iran.

50  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 1 April, 1970, Tehran 1247 1430Z, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 57; and, Kissinger to Nixon, 13 April 1970, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Iran, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 59. 51  U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, 14 April 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 60. 52  Letter from the Shah of Iran to President Nixon, Tehran, 15 June 1970, National Archives, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 73.

7  FROM CRISIS TO CLARITY 

181

This problem took shape as the new Nixon administration took office in the U.S. in 1969. The Shah believed this administration was predisposed to help Iran, because of the longstanding personal friendship between Nixon and the Shah. Yet in 1970, as the U.S. was in the process of reviewing its post-British Gulf policy, the U.S. defense establishment was questioning whether the Shah’s aggressive military spending was in his own best interest. Nixon wanted to help the Shah, despite the Pentagon’s misgivings. But Nixon would not be able to get congressional approval to divert business away from ARAMCO to import more Iranian oil. Therefore, Nixon’s options were limited.53 The Shah grew increasingly desperate in his direct appeals to Nixon. Yet Nixon’s hands were tied; in a personal letter from Nixon to the Shah on 30 July 1970, Nixon flatly turned down the Shah’s proposals for the U.S. to purchase more Iranian oil.54 The existing historiography does not fully acknowledge the seriousness of the economic challenge facing Iran from mid-1970 to early 1971. It appeared as if the Shah’s grand ambition of transforming Iran into a dominant military power was going to stall because of lack of available funds or financing.

The Libyan Solution The Shah found a way out of this bind by exploiting the 1970 oil crisis created by Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya. Qaddafi was a young radical Arab nationalist army colonel who seized power in a coup on 1 September 1969. Qaddafi’s new regime “stunned” U.S. oil companies by “demanding a radical escalation in the posted price of Libyan crude” oil.55 In other words, Qaddafi was seeking a greater share of the oil revenues for the state. A 12 May U.S. Central Intelligence Agency memorandum claimed that Egypt and Algeria had “independently advised Libya to squeeze all it can out of oil companies without actually nationalizing them because they recognize that Arab countries needed Western oil expertise.”56

53  Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 13, 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 59. 54  Letter from President Nixon to the Shah of Iran, Washington, July 30, 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 80. 55  Information Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of African Affairs, “Subject: Possible Libyan Oil Crisis,” May 13, 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. XXXVI, No. 45, pp. 107–108. 56  Information Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of African Affairs, footnote 2.

182 

B. FRIEDMAN

Libya’s oil industry had grown exponentially from its beginnings in 1961, and, by 1969, it was the largest Arab oil producer, its volume exceeding even that of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Demand for Libyan oil was strong because of its high quality and low transportation costs to nearby Western Europe. The Suez Canal was closed because of the June 1967 War, which further increased the market’s preference for Libyan oil. Persian Gulf producers had to ship oil from the Gulf to Europe around the southern coast of Africa  or send it through overland  pipelines to the Mediterranean, while Libyan oil simply had to cross the Mediterranean. By 1968–1969, Libya was supplying a quarter or more of Western Europe’s oil. In January 1970, Qaddafi told the oil companies that he wanted a higher posted price for Libyan oil. Qaddafi was willing to sacrifice current oil revenues to achieve his ends and was well positioned to do so. Libya’s oil revenues had increased so rapidly between 1961 and 1969 that it had more than enough cash to fund its short-term development needs for three years, given its small population.57 In 1970, Libya’s per capita income was twice as high as Saudi Arabia’s and four times as high as Iran’s. On the other hand, Western Europe’s rapidly expanding economy could not do without Libya’s oil. Qaddafi’s demand for a greater share of the oil profits was accompanied by fiery political rhetoric that was filled with references to “an Imperialist-Zionist plot to enslave Libya.” Qaddafi seemed to believe the U.S. oil companies should be made to pay the price for the U.S. government’s support for Israel.58 Libya’s hand was further strengthened in May 1970 when a Syrian bulldozer, working on a telephone line, cut the Trans-Arabian pipeline (Tapline), which delivered 500,000 barrels per day (b/d) of Saudi oil to the Mediterranean port of Sidon. Syria refused to allow the Saudis to repair the pipeline and restore the Mediterranean supply. These developments led to a rapid increase in the cost of shipping oil via tankers, which were in short supply, further strengthening the demand for Libya’s short-­ haul oil. Libya threatened to shut down and seize the assets of the largest independent U.S. oil company, Occidental. In May 1970, Occidental was ordered by the Libyan government to reduce its production from 800,000 to 680,000 barrels per day. 57  Telegram from the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State, Tripoli, September 23, 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. XXXVI, No. 55, pp. 127–128. 58  James Bamberg, British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950–1975: The Challenge of Nationalism (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 452.

7  FROM CRISIS TO CLARITY 

183

The crisis with Libya proved profitable to Iran. On September 9, the consortium agreed to Iran’s demand to raise production by 200,000 barrels per day (b/d) to fill some of the European demand that resulted from Libya’s 800,000 b/d cutback. The 2.9 percent increase in Iranian production was believed to provide Iran with $30 million in additional revenue.59 However, this was not enough to meet the Shah’s budget shortfall. In October 1970, after months of escalating confrontation and threats, Libya had succeeded in radically renegotiating the terms of its relationship with the Western oil companies. Posted prices were raised 30 cents a barrel (plus an additional 2 cents per barrel each year) and the income tax the companies paid on revenues was raised to 55 percent. James Bamberg, who wrote a definitive history of the British Petroleum Company, noted that this was a “decisive moment” in the relationship between the oil companies and the OPEC countries. The companies realized they would now face similar demands from the other producer countries, in what became known as being “whip-sawed” by the producing countries. Iran’s Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda had indeed warned Shell in October 1970 that if the companies increased the posted price and tax rate for Libya, they would have to do the same for Iran. The Shah was not to be outdone by Libya’s Qaddafi. National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) representatives met with consortium officials in London in October 1970. Prior to negotiations, the Shah delivered a speech to a joint session of the Iranian Majlis and Senate warning the oil companies that if they did not increase production they would face legal consequences, which was perhaps a veiled threat of some kind of nationalization.60 When the British Ambassador warned Iranian officials against breaking off talks with the oil companies, the Shah privately responded with a fit of indignant fury, “The British advise me…If they have the fucking audacity to advise me ever again, I shall fuck them so rigid that they’ll think twice about ever crossing my path in the future.”61 On November 2, in advance of the talks that were going to take place in Tehran later that week, the Shah made a public statement designed to apply pressure on the consortium. The Shah, using distinctly nationalistic tropes, declared: “It is our permanent policy to fight for the full rights of  Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 18 September 1970.  MEED, 9 October 1970. 61  Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), edited and translated by Alinagh Alikhani and Nicholas Vincent, p. 174. 59 60

184 

B. FRIEDMAN

Iran in the exploitation of her natural resources…next Saturday we shall hold firm talks of destiny; we shall once again be fighting for the legitimate rights of Iran which are recognized by international law and principles.”62 On November 16, the oil consortium accommodated the Shah and announced an agreement with Iran to increase the tax on their oil revenues from 50 to 55 percent, and to raise the price per barrel for Iranian heavy crude oil from $1.63 per barrel to $1.72 per barrel.63 In practical terms, the increase would mean that Iran would receive an estimated extra £50 ($120) million in oil revenue for 1970, which, when added to the U.S. military credits ($100 million) under the 1968 agreement, covered Iran’s 1970 budget shortfall. The U.S. president’s assistant for international economic affairs noted, “the Shah is apparently satisfied at the present time.”64 Indeed, thanks to Libya’s lead, the Shah had discovered the means with which he could fulfill his grand vision for Iran’s regional leadership. Despite the restoration of Iranian-Egyptian diplomatic relations, and Egypt’s turn inward following Abdel Nasser’s death in September 1970,65 the Shah still believed a primary Soviet objective was to become the dominant external influence in the Persian Gulf, by using the “radical Arab regimes to destroy moderate Arab states.” The Shah was concerned that the newly proposed Federal Arab Republic between Libya, Sudan, and Egypt, announced in early November 1970, 66 would become a reality, and then expand to include Syria and Iraq. He said if the republic was just the three African states it would not present a threat to the Gulf, but if it included Iraq and Syria it would be a “grave danger,” and not just to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the shaykhdoms, but also to Iran. The Shah was also troubled by Soviet military aid to South Yemen. He had intelligence that the Soviets were supplying equipment for six brigades, as well as landing craft. The Shah asked rhetorically, “Why has Southern Yemen any need for landing craft unless it has designs on Oman and the sheikhdoms?” He then said that if Southern Yemen succeeded in taking over one of the

 MEED, 13 November 1970.  MEED, 20 November 1970. 64   Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) to President Nixon, Washington, 1 December 1970, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 101. 65  Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (London: Collins, 1975), pp.105–113. 66  The New York Times, 9 November 1970. 62 63

7  FROM CRISIS TO CLARITY 

185

shaykhdoms, would the Soviets then provide landing craft to “infiltrate into Iran?”67 The gap between Iran’s strategic aims and its military capabilities weighed heavily on the Shah’s mind in 1970, and planted a seed of doubt about whether Iran would be able to turn his vision into a reality. At a ceremony on Army Day in Iran, on 12 December 1970, the Shah was dispirited by military drills he attended, remarking to Asadollah Alam, that “If only I knew they could fight well, I could have forgiven them their raggedy drill…What worries me is that they may neither know how to fight nor to march.”68

A New British Policy in the Gulf? The Conservative Party’s victory in the 18 June 1970 British general election triggered a great deal of speculation about whether the British would in fact withdraw their forces from the Gulf at the end of 1971. The speculation was fueled by Edward Heath’s visit to the region in 1969. A 6 July speech to the British Parliament by the new Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, suggested the new government would try to restore coherence to British foreign policy following the “precipitate” announcement of withdrawal. Following Douglas-Home’s meeting with the Shah in Brussels in July, he asked British officials in the Gulf to prepare the rulers for a visit and consultation with his new especially appointed envoy for Gulf affairs, Sir William Luce. Luce was appointed to his post on 27 July, and had served as the British Governor of Aden (1956–1960) and the British Political Resident for the Gulf (1961–1966) and was a well-­ respected figure in the Gulf. In late July, Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi explained some of the challenges that would be facing the new British representative. Zayid met with the British Deputy Political Resident in the Gulf, Michael Weir, on 30 July. He told Weir that he now had no hope for a federation of nine emirates. He said the Qataris were not serious about an effective federation. They had sent a secret envoy at the beginning of July to propose a new form of federation which called for a Federation Council to manage joint defense, foreign affairs, currency, and a development fund financed by the 67  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 10 December 1970, Tehran 05335 101427Z, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 106. 68  Alam, p. 179.

186 

B. FRIEDMAN

four large emirates. The development fund would assist the smaller shaykhdoms with schools, hospitals, roads, water, and electricity. This proposal was a looser form of confederation, which was conceived as an alternative to federation in order to avoid ceding power to a central government. Zayid explained that this proposal illustrated the pattern of behavior during the union negotiations: as soon as a basis for a federation had been agreed upon, someone—usually the Qataris—came along and tried to change everything. Shaykh Zayid also pointed out that there was a serious lack of confidence between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and without confidence there could be no federation. He said he did not see cooperation growing as the federation came into existence, and did not believe the forthcoming meetings between the deputy rulers would produce substantial results. Hinting at an internal power struggle in Qatar, he said that Qatar would not give Shaykh Khalifah enough authority to make the October deputy rulers’ meeting a success. He said that Abu Dhabi would continue its efforts toward a federation, but it was not optimistic. Weir asked Zayid if a federation would be possible if British made it clear that they wanted a federation to be the basis for a future security arrangement. Zayid doubted whether withdrawal could be used as a stick to force the emirates into a federation. He said that maybe in a few years “if the rulers were sufficiently frightened.” Zayid then added, “nine was dead, other numbers should be tried… the only way forward was for the British to invite the rulers to form a federation of whatever number they wished leaving it open to the other rulers to join if they wished.” He said there should not be separate treaties for the shaykhdoms that did not join the smaller federation. He concluded by emphatically stating that the current British protectorate treaties (dating back to the nineteenth and early twentieth century) should be terminated by the end of 1971. Shaykh Zayid, of course, preferred a smaller union under a new British protection treaty, because a smaller union which excluded Qatar and Bahrain would ensure his leadership and guarantee Abu Dhabi dominance among the lower Gulf shaykhs. Shaykh Zayid also urged the new British government to retain forces in the Gulf. He said many of the rulers were reluctant to publicly state this view because they knew Saudi Arabia and Iran opposed the British remaining, and if the British were to withdraw in any case, what was the point of antagonizing Iran and Saudi Arabia. When British officials reassured Zayid that the British were ready to give the opinions of the shaykhs the “fullest possible weight,” Zayid said that the British should remain until a

7  FROM CRISIS TO CLARITY 

187

federation was firmly established. He said it would be “utterly wrong” for the British to leave before making suitable arrangements for the future. He argued that the Gulf would become a battlefield for the Saudis, Iranians, and Iraqis. He said the shaykhdoms would have to look to somebody for defense and there was nobody. A Saudi-Iranian alliance would be strongly opposed by Iraq and the Arab world in general, but he was less concerned about the Arab world’s reaction to a new treaty with Britain. He said the shaykhdoms could convince Egypt and the rest of the Arab world to accept such an arrangement. These states preferred seeing a treaty with Britain to an increase in Saudi or Iranian regional influence— this was particularly true for Iraq, according to Zayid. Zayid reiterated that he was fully prepared to give public support for a defense treaty with Britain. Zayid further argued that the British presence in the Gulf would not require physical defense because just the British presence would preclude the use of force. He said the only enemies were “left wing subversives,” and they would be subversive anyway. British military installations would not be an additional provocation. Zayid then tried to draw an important distinction between the situation in the Gulf and the pre-withdrawal environment in Aden: He said that in the Gulf the people wanted the British to stay, while it was the regional powers who wanted the British to leave so they could expand their own influence in the region. In other words, Zayid was saying that the shaykhs feared future domination by the larger regional powers more than they feared any internal subversive backlash to the British staying. This was precisely the opposite view of King Faysal and Mohammad Reza Shah who believed revolutionary subversion supported by the Soviet-backed Arab nationalist states was the principal threat to the shaykhs. Shaykh Zayid, like nearly all of the shaykhs, believed he was capable of withstanding subversive challenges, and, consequently, was reluctant to surrender freedom of political action or authority and submit to either a rival shaykh’s dominance or to a neighboring regional power. He preferred the protection offered by British supremacy.

Luce’s Consultations On 22 August, Sir William Luce met with King Faysal to consult with him on the future British policy in the Gulf. King Faysal emphasized three key points in his brief meeting with Luce. The first point was that the British should not change the timing of its proposed withdrawal from the Gulf at

188 

B. FRIEDMAN

the end of 1971. He said the British should be firm with the emirates and to give them no reason to suppose a change in policy was possible. The British should strongly encourage them to move forward with forming their union. In summary, his point was “that it was essential to avoid a repetition of the Aden experience.” King Faysal’s second point was that whatever the future British policy was in the Gulf, nothing should be done that could be used as evidence to claim that the union of shaykhdoms was not fully independent of Britain. Third, King Faysal stressed that Saudi Arabia would not consider anything less than a union of nine shaykhdoms. He dismissed Luce’s claim that Bahraini public opinion appeared to be moving against a union. Faysal emphasized that “a union of nine is what is required” and he would not consider any other alternative. Luce asked Faysal about his position on the lower Gulf islands of Abu Musa and Two Tunbs. Faysal explained that “it was essential that Arab sovereignty over the islands was assured.” He said that he did not see why the Shah needed a garrison on the Tunb islands, since he had Qeshm Island, a large island, “on which he could station all the troops and guns he wanted.” Faysal argued that if the Shah garrisoned troops on an island that did not belong to him it would pave the way for other states such as Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to begin stationing troops in the Gulf. Faysal urged the British to continue their efforts to make the Shah see reason. He said the Shah was a “sensible man,” as he demonstrated during the Bahrain issue. On the question of Buraimi, King Faysal was more expansive than on the previous issues. He explained that Saudi Arabia needed the coastline of Sabkhat Matti because the coastline of Khor al-Udaid was not adequate for Saudi security needs. Regarding the Buraimi Oasis itself, Faysal appeared more conciliatory and even ready to compromise. He said the oasis was Saudi, but after the refugees who fled in 1955 were allowed to return, the people of Buraimi should be allowed to choose for themselves. He said if Shaykh Zayid wanted to give them money to affect their choice that was up to him. He said that this was his final offer, and he might be willing to make some slight variation to it, but if Zayid was not willing to accept it, then Saudi Arabia would revert back to its 1949 claim. Luce explained that he would like to see Shaykh Zayid to discuss this Saudi proposal before the scheduled Saudi-Abu Dhabi meeting in Dammam on 6 September. They agreed to postpone the meeting to the end of the

7  FROM CRISIS TO CLARITY 

189

month. Faysal concluded the session by mentioning that existing onshore or offshore concessions would not be affected by any territory that Abu Dhabi ceded to Saudi Arabia, suggesting that the underlying issue in the Buraimi dispute was not an attempt to seize Abu Dhabi’s oil near Zarrara in the Rubʾ al-Khali.69 Prior to his meeting with King Faysal, Sir William Luce had met with two of Faysal’s close advisors—Kamal Adham and Dr. Rashad Pharaon— on 20 August to review matters of mutual interest in the Gulf. The dispute between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia over the frontier was the focus of the discussion. Dr. Pharaon said it might be possible to bring the King around to a compromise. Adham thought a compromise could be proposed to King Faysal, if some face-saving formula could be found.70 Indeed, British ambassador Willie Morris had told Luce earlier in August 1970 that the Saudis “constantly emphasize to me the need for the Abu Dhabians to adopt a personal ‘Arab’ approach, which will flatter Feisal’s ego, and appeal to his generosity.” The Buraimi dispute appeared to be as much about personal prestige as it was a strategic interest for Faysal.71 Shaykh Muhammad bin Hamad al-Sharqi spoke to Luce in Dubai on 23 August and argued that the British should keep their forces in the region. He said when the current treaties expired the British should sign new “protection” (himaya) treaties with each of the independent emirates to protect them from external aggression or aggression from a neighboring shaykhdom. He said to the British official, “your protection is like a house. One cannot sleep without a house. We cannot sleep without your protection.” Shaykh Muhammad did not think a defense treaty through a union of shaykhdoms was sufficient. He said the union would change as its president changed, and a defense treaty with the union would not reassure the individual emirates. He also had no problem with making a public statement in support of a continued British military presence; the reactions from other Arab states were “neither here, nor there” for him because those states were only looking to take over the Trucial shaykhdoms  BNA: “Record of Meeting with King Feisel at Taif on 22 August 1970,” FCO 1016/758.  BNA: “Record of Conversation with Shaikh Kamal Adham and Dr. Rashard Pharaon on Thursday 20 August [1970],” FCO 1016/758. 71  BNA: Jedda to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 August 1970, 1016/758. 69 70

190 

B. FRIEDMAN

anyway. He was in favor of cooperation between the riparian powers in the Gulf, but not for the purpose of imposing their views on the smaller emirates.72 Shaykh ʿIsa of Bahrain told Luce that while in principle Bahraini membership in a strong union would be “to the best advantage” for both Bahrain and the union, Bahrain had lost patience with it because of the lack of progress. ʿIsa added that the Bahraini people were critical of how much time and effort had been wasted on it. Shaykh ʿIsa then said that “Bahrain should go for separate independence, particularly as there was no longer any danger from Iran.” Sir William told Shaykh ʿIsa that the British would like to make one final effort at a union of nine and that he hoped that Bahrain would take part in the effort, and, if in two or three months, it proved that such a union was unattainable there would probably be no other choice than for Bahrain to become independent separately. He added that he planned on becoming personally involved in “constitutional matters” of the union in order to establish some common ground between the “big four”—Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Dubai, and Qatar. Shaykh ʿIsa told Luce that Bahrain was prepared to cooperate fully with this effort, but remained skeptical because of Qatar’s attitude. Sir William Luce then explained that King Faysal had told him that the British should stick to the schedule of withdrawal, otherwise the rulers would suffer harsh criticism throughout the Arab world, and there would be an immediate increase in subversion and instability. King Faysal added that he would not oppose a short extension of British forces, if it would help protect and establish the Union of Emirates. Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad Al Sabah, the acting Emir of Kuwait, told Luce that the Kuwaiti government was opposed to the British troops extending their presence for “even one day.” Shaykh ʿIsa was disappointed that King Faysal and Shaykh Jabir al-­ Ahmad were opposed to British forces remaining in the Gulf, because the Bahrain government would like the British naval and air force forces—but not land forces—to continue to be based in the Gulf after 1971. Moreover, Shaykh ʿIsa said he would like those forces to remain based in Bahrain. Sir William then asked Shaykh ʿIsa what military threats required a continued military presence in the Gulf. Shaykh ʿIsa said that there was “no direct 72  BNA: “Consultations with the Ruler of Fujairah on the future of the Gulf,” 23 August 1970, FCO 1016/758.

7  FROM CRISIS TO CLARITY 

191

military threat,” but that the British forces would create “a sense of confidence and stability in the area.” Shaykh ʿIsa elaborated on this point, saying, “the Gulf was presently regarded as a British sphere of influence; a full British withdrawal would create the impression that there was a power vacuum in the Gulf, and states such as Egypt and Iraq would extend their influence to fill it.” He emphasized that a British military presence would prevent these states from trying to extend their influence. Luce pushed back on this point arguing that once the British treaties with the shaykhs expired, it would be difficult to prevent states like Egypt or Iraq from opening embassies and consulates in the Gulf. And if Bahrain joined the Arab League it would be almost impossible to refuse Arab states. There was no way of preventing them from extending their influence. Shaykh Khalifah bin Salman said there were ways to limit the influence of “radical Arab states,” and pointed out that Bahrain had refused to allow flights from United Arab Airlines (Egypt). Luce said that Bahrain did not need British forces in the Gulf to limit this kind of influence. Luce added that the major threat to the shaykhdoms was subversion, which could not be prevented by British forces. Shaykh ʿIsa and Shaykh Khalifah acknowledged that British forces could not prevent subversion, but maintained that a British military presence would be a stabilizing force for the region. Luce asked how other Arab states would react to an ongoing British military presence. Shaykh Khalifah said that if the Gulf shaykhs made their agreements with the British after they became independent, then other states would accept these agreements.73 During Sir William Luce’s consultations with the Gulf shaykhs in mid-1970, two new points emerged. First, Qabus’s ascent to the Sultanate of Oman complicated the already fractious issue of what form a union of shaykhdoms should take. It was clear that a strong current of “Omani” identity was shared among the Trucial shaykhs, and feelings of Omani solidarity had been awakened by the political developments in Oman. Second, for many of the Gulf rulers the prospect of even a token British military presence in the Gulf would have as much of a psychological effect on the stability of the Gulf as it would serve as an actual military deterrent. The shaykhs believed that British forces would not only deter direct military 73  British National Archives: “Record of Conversation with the Ruler of Bahrain at Rifa Palace on Thursday 27 August, 1970,” FO 1016/758.

192 

B. FRIEDMAN

aggression but would also deter prospective subversives from aggressive action against the shaykhs. Further, the rulers of the smaller shaykhdoms believed the British presence would discourage more powerful shaykhs from coercing the weaker shaykhs, and the same for the regional powers.

A Union of Nine: Not To Be The idea of a union of nine emirates decisively collapsed in October 1970. The deputy rulers of the emirates met in Abu Dhabi (24–27 October). Bahrain paid lip-service to its commitment to the union, but freed from the constraints of Iran’s claim, it fully pressed all of its claims. This proved to be the rock upon which the union foundered. The key point of contention was Bahrain’s demand for proportional representation in the Federal National Assembly based on population. Bahrain’s population far exceeded the population of the other emirates, and proportional representation would have created an institutional mechanism for Bahrain’s political domination of the union. In contrast, the previously agreed-upon article of the draft constitution had called for an assembly of 36 members, with seats to be distributed equally among the emirates of the union. When Bahrain’s proposal for proportional representation was put to a vote as an amendment to Article 69 of the draft constitution, only Sharjah voted for it. Abu Dhabi abstained, and the rest of the emirates rejected Bahrain’s proposal. Following this rejection, Bahrain abstained from the remainder of the meeting’s votes. Bahrain had also wanted to reevaluate the question of the federal capital. At previous meetings, the emirates had agreed to establish a temporary capital in Abu Dhabi, until a permanent one could be built in a “no-man’s land” between Dubai and Abu Dhabi. When this issue was voted upon, all the emirates endorsed the building of a new capital, except Bahrain, which abstained.74 Bahrain also abstained from voting on an annual federal budget that was to be financed by a 10 percent commitment of each emirate’s oil revenues. Bahrain also abstained from voting on the issue of voting procedure for the union’s Supreme Council. The issue was whether resolutions should be adopted based on a two-thirds vote or a unanimous vote. Eventually the eight emirates apart from Bahrain agreed that resolutions should be adopted only after a unanimous vote.

 Taryam, pp. 156–160.

74

7  FROM CRISIS TO CLARITY 

193

On the last day of the meeting, 26 October 1970, Shaykh Khalifah bin Salman Al Khalifa of Bahrain delivered a statement into the record that made it clear that Bahrain could not continue to take part in the affairs of the union until “the fundamental principle” of “representation in a reasonable manner in the federal assembly” was resolved.75 Shaykh Khalifah’s statement was an anticlimactic death knell for the union of nine shaykhdoms.

 Taryam, p. 159 (quoting from the minutes of the meeting).

75

CHAPTER 8

A Sea Change in the Middle East and the Gulf

Throughout the spring and summer of 1970, tension in the Gulf had grown as the Shah and King Faysal watched with growing trepidation the Soviet militarization of Egypt. The sea changes that followed in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria during the latter half of 1970 were being cautiously digested by the leaders in the Gulf in early 1971. Further, between December 1970 and May 1971, Pakistan descended into civil war and jeopardized the stability and viability of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). This accentuated the value of Iran and the Shah as a regional military ally to the U.S.1 In March 1971, the British Conservative Party, which had won the June 1970 election, confirmed that it would uphold the previous government’s policy to withdraw British military forces from the Gulf by the end of 1971. Yet, equally important were the broader regional developments in the Levant such as Egypt’s acceptance of the revised Rogers Plan (July 1970), Abdel Nasser’s sudden death (September 1970), the “Black September” civil war in Jordan and the subsequent Hussein-Arafat agreement in Cairo (September 1970), and Hafiz al-Asad’s bloodless coup d’état in Syria (November 1970). These events changed perceptions in the Gulf in early 1971.

1  Roham Alvandi, “Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 36, No. 2 (April 2012), pp. 366–369.

© The Author(s) 2020 B. Friedman, The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1971, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56182-6_8

195

196 

B. FRIEDMAN

At the end of May 1971, the Shah told Sir William Luce that “at the moment” the Middle East is “unusually conducive to stability.” He said that Saudi policy, while frequently obscure, was not subversive. He noted that Egypt’s attitude had changed and that they no longer wished to be involved in the Gulf. And “even the Russians did not seem to be trying to upset stability, although their position in Iraq would give them a powerful advantage if they wished to cause trouble in the future.” He also noted that despite an extremely large embassy in Kuwait, the Russians were relatively inactive. When they asked questions on Gulf affairs they were usually “ill-informed” and “random.”2 The Shah’s perception that the Soviet-­ sponsored threat to the Gulf was dormant buoyed his confidence.

Big Oil vs. OPEC Iran’s mid-November 1970 agreement with the Iranian oil consortium, which increased Iran’s share of tax revenue and increased the posted price of Iranian oil, rescued the Shah’s plan to become the Gulf’s next dominant military power. Without the cash infusion from the 1970 agreement, as well as generous loan support from the U.S., the Shah would have been hard-pressed to pay for the military hardware he had ordered from the U.S.  Yet, while the November 1970 deal solved Iran’s immediate cash crisis, it was only a temporary fix because the Shah’s military purchases were spread over several years. In December 1970 Libya demanded another price increase as well as the same 55 percent share of tax revenues that Iran’s oil consortium had agreed to with the Shah. The oil companies, who needed to find a way to stop the merry-go-round cycle of demands from the oil-producing states, demanded a five-year OPEC-wide agreement. The OPEC states insisted on a regional approach to negotiations, beginning with the Persian Gulf. Negotiations between the Gulf oil-producing states and the oil companies were supposed to resume in Tehran on 12 January 1971. Jamshid Amuzegar of Iran, Zaki Yamani of Saudi Arabia, and Saadun Hammadi of Iraq represented the six oil producers in the Gulf, which also included Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, and Qatar (Dubai also began producing oil in 1969). However, when the oil companies’ representatives arrived in Tehran in mid-January 1971, they were not authorized to negotiate terms and could 2  BNA: “Record of Conversation at Niavaran Palace, Tehran,” 23 May 1971, FO 1016/911.

8  A SEA CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF 

197

not provide a date when authorized negotiators would be available. The Shah was outraged at the “arrogance” of the oil companies. He told the U.S. ambassador that OPEC had scheduled a meeting in Tehran on 19 January, and if the oil companies did not send principals to Tehran to negotiate before then, OPEC “would take unilateral action, which included shutting down production.”3 As the oil crisis entered this second round, in late 1970 and early 1971, the structure of the crisis was not fully understood by U.S.  President Nixon’s national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. In a 11 January 1971 telephone conversation between Kissinger and Deputy Undersecretary of State John Irwin, Irwin tried to inform Kissinger that the situation was coming “to a very serious point.” Kissinger baldly admitted that “I’m frankly not on top of that.”4 The very serious point Irwin was alluding to had to do with the prospect of unified OPEC action. The crisis that had been initiated by Qaddafi was taken up by the ten OPEC oil-producing countries in December 1970. From December 9–12, OPEC met in Caracas, Venezuela, and agreed to collectively demand for a greater share in oil revenues. Negotiations were to begin in mid-January 1971 with the Persian Gulf producers, and in the event they were not successful by February 3 OPEC would enforce its demands through joint action of all members. Libya, however, pre-empted the Persian Gulf producers and demanded another increase to Libyan oil’s posted prices on January 2. In response, 24 oil companies sent a joint message to OPEC calling for a comprehensive negotiation between the oil companies and all OPEC members to find an accommodation on posted prices and tax rates that would last for five years.5 The oil companies believed that this demand for collective bargaining between the companies and all OPEC members had the full backing of the U.S. government. They were mistaken. While Kissinger was bringing himself up to speed on the issues between January 11 and January 15, the U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, at the request of U.S. oil companies, recommended that President Nixon send a personal envoy to meet with the Persian Gulf oil producers. Nixon 3  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 14 January 1971, Tehran 0218 1445Z, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 109. 4  Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Under Secretary of State (Irwin), Washington, January 11, 1971, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. XXXVI, No. 67, pp. 170–171. 5  Bamberg, p. 457.

198 

B. FRIEDMAN

appointed Deputy Undersecretary of State John Irwin as his envoy. Irwin’s mission to Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia has generated a great deal of controversy in the scholarly literature. The scholarship assumes that the U.S. government was fully supporting the oil companies’ demand to collectively negotiate with OPEC as a unit because the U.S. Department of Justice had waived anti-trust laws, which allowed the oil companies to negotiate with OPEC as a unit. Therefore, when Nixon’s envoy, Irwin, met with the Shah and agreed to the Shah’s recommendation that the oil companies would be better off negotiating separately with the moderate Persian Gulf producers first and only afterwards the Mediterranean producers (including Libya), it was viewed as an abrupt and inexplicable volte-face by the U.S. during the crisis.6 This historical controversy—why did the U.S. government choose not to support the Western oil companies’ effort to present a united front in the face of increasing, or “whipsawing,” OPEC demands?—provides a useful opportunity to illustrate how archival documents can shed light on historical issues.7 After all, what was the U.S. policy in the midst of this fast-moving crisis? Was the U.S. government backing the joint position of the oil companies? Did it renege on this position? If so, why? Historian John B. Kelly, who did not have access to the archival documents, blamed the reversal of U.S. policy on John Irwin, the U.S. president’s personal envoy to the Gulf, for succumbing to the influence of the U.S. Ambassador to Iran, Douglas MacArthur III, whom Kelly points out was described as being “more Persian than the Persians sometimes.”8 However, the archival record suggests a different story. It is important to mention here that the president’s national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, was a marginal figure during the crisis in 1971. He admits as much in his memoirs, and the archival records confirm it.  J.B. Kelly, Arabia the Gulf and the West (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1980), p. 348.  See: Joe Stork, Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1975), pp. 138–178; Steven A. Schneider, The Oil Price Revolution (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), pp. 155–156; Ian Skeet, Opec: Twenty-five years of prices and politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 65; Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), pp. 581–582; M.A. Adelman, The Genie out of the Bottle: World Oil since 1970 (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1995), pp.  76–82; Francesco Petrini, “Public Interest, Private Profits: Multinationals, Governments, and the Coming of the First Oil Crisis,” Business and Economic History 12 (2014), 1–18. 8  Kelly, p. 349. 6 7

8  A SEA CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF 

199

While the crisis reached its climax when Nixon had dispatched Irwin to meet with the Shah in Tehran on January 17 at the urging of the oil companies, Kissinger’s 18 January 1971 memo to the president revealed that all the activity of his (Kissinger’s) staff “is completely tactical and reactive” and he called for a “quick study of our basic objectives in the situation… ”.9 Basically, they were playing catch-up during a fast-moving crisis.

Nixon Sides with the Shah The explanation for the U.S. decision during the crisis is not to be found with Kissinger, but with Nixon. Nixon sent Irwin to Tehran with a personal letter dated 16 January 1971. Nixon’s letter stated, “Oil supply is vital to the free world…The consuming countries need a secure source of oil available on reasonable terms, and the producing countries have every right to expect a fair income from their most precious resource. The United States Government has taken such legal steps as it can to facilitate expeditious negotiations between the companies and oil producing countries.”10 Irwin conveyed the president’s letter11 and told the Shah that the president had sent an emissary not to discuss the details of the oil negotiation, but to stress Nixon’s interest in the vital part oil played in the free world security from both an economic and military strategic view, and to emphasize the U.S.’s concern that the oil negotiations would result in a stable system of oil supply and marketing that would be fair to the producing countries, the oil companies, and the consuming countries. Irwin also told the Shah that the U.S. had not participated in any oil negotiations previously and it was doing so now, to this very limited extent, because it thought these negotiations were critical to the future of the oil industry, arrangements in the Persian Gulf, and their effect on Europe, Japan, and the U.S. And because threats had issued from Libya that oil would be used as a political weapon against US policy in the Middle East. The critical line 9  Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Under Secretary of State (Irwin), Washington, January 18, 1971, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. XXXVI, No. 73, pp. 180–183. 10  Letter From President Nixon to Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, Washington, January 16, 1971, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. XXXVI, No. 72, pp. 179–180. 11  M.A. Adelman mistakenly claimed the letter was not delivered, see: M.A. Adelman, The Genie out of the Bottle: World Oil since 1970 (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 76–82.

200 

B. FRIEDMAN

that Irwin delivered to the Shah was that “the US was not taking the part per se of the oil companies but because of the greater interest, including that of Iran, we were asking HIM [the Shah] to use his great prestige and influence to seek an agreement which would result in stability.”12 These documents show that Irwin was articulating the president’s message to the Shah, which was an explicit statement that the U.S. government would not side with the oil companies in the upcoming negotiations.13 Unaware of Nixon’s letter, historians James Bamberg and John Barrett Kelly attributed the decision to support the Gulf oil producers at the expense of the oil companies to the personal judgment of the president’s envoy, John Irwin. Ian Skeet argues that Irwin had no precise instructions.14 Yet Irwin bore Nixon’s letter, which did contain guidance. It was Nixon who decided to defer to the Shah’s judgment and convey the message that the U.S. government was taking a “hands off” approach to the negotiation, as long as the supply of oil to the West remained secure.15 In response to the president’s message, the Shah told Irwin he was determined to make sure the oil companies did not employ any “dirty tricks” to increase their share of the profits at the expense of the oil consuming states.16 One of the major reasons for the repeated demands for price increases from the oil producing states was the sudden and rapid decline in purchasing power of the oil producing states’ oil revenues. Posted prices for oil had largely remained unchanged, while the U.S. dollar had declined in value and inflation was high in 1970. The Shah 12   Telegram From Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the Department of State, Washington, January 18, 1971, 1632Z, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. XXXVI, No. 74, pp. 184–188. 13  Most of the existing historiography did not have access to the U.S. archival records and relied on documents produced during the U.S. Congressional hearings in the 1970s following an investigation into the crisis. These documents do not fully explain why the U.S. did not back the multinational oil companies in 1971; only the documents released by the U.S. government during the last fifteen years clarify the issue. For the evidence used by most of the historiography on this issue, see: United States Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, Report on Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy, 93rd Congress, 2nd session (Washington, D.C., 1975). 14  Ian Skeet, Opec: Twenty-five years of prices and politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 65. 15  Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 858–866. 16  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 18 January 1971, Tehran 0277 1632Z, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 111.

8  A SEA CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF 

201

speculated that the increase they were seeking amounted to somewhere between 20–30  cents more per barrel.17 The Shah also told Irwin that King Faysal and the Emir of Kuwait had sent messages that they would “go along with whatever” the Shah agreed to.18 From 19 January through 12 February, negotiations between the Gulf OPEC states, led by Iran, and the oil companies, continued intermittently. The Shah gave a press conference on 24 January during which he warned the oil companies that they would bring on “a dangerous crisis” if they tried to “intimidate” OPEC. He also hinted at a “stoppage of oil” or “a much more terrible rebellion of the have-nots against the haves.”19 The Shah gave another combative public statement at OPEC meeting before a joint meeting of Iran’s parliament on 3 February. However, the Shah’s bombast was mostly theatrics. He had indicated to Irwin that he would not allow the oil supply to the West to be cut. On 12 February, George T.  Piercey, acting as the spokesman for the oil companies told the U.S.  Ambassador they had “collapsed” and met virtually every one of OPEC’s demands.20 The Shah’s successful manipulation of the negotiations was a turning point for the Shah and his future plans in the Gulf. The Shah’s oil revenues approximately doubled from $885 million in 1971 to $1.6 billion in 1972.21 The increased revenues afforded Iran the opportunity to stretch its budget to its limit. Ten days after the agreement, on 24 February, the Shah proposed a budget for the new fiscal year (21 March 1971 to 20 March 1972) that would consume all of the increased oil revenues, as well as demand “substantial deficit spending.” The proposed budget included a $1.3 billion deficit, to be covered by drawing on foreign loans of approximately $800 million and domestic borrowing of roughly $500 million. A report prepared by the U.S.’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), noted that both forms of borrowing would “exacerbate an already difficult financial situation.” By resorting to foreign loans, Iran was increasing its annual debt servicing commitments to almost $150 million, and, by borrowing  MEED, 29 January 1971.   Telegram From Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the Department of State, Washington, January 18, 1971, 1632Z, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. XXXVI, No. 72, pp. 184–188. 19  MEED, 29 January 1971. 20  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 12 February 1971, Tehran 722 1001Z, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 114. 21  Fain, p. 193. 17 18

202 

B. FRIEDMAN

heavily from the domestic market, the government was narrowing the credit available for private investment. The CIA noted that Iran would “continue to walk a narrow financial tight rope.”22 The settlement with the oil companies also had an important psychological impact on the Shah. On 16 February, Asadollah Alam, noted that the Shah was “euphoric.” On a flight from Iran to Switzerland, the Shah told Alam, “Look how things have sorted themselves out…Iran’s leadership of the Middle East acknowledged throughout the world.”23

Iran and the Islands The Shah’s confidence carried over to his approach in addressing the outstanding dispute with Ras al-Khaimah, over control and sovereignty of Greater and Lesser Tunb, and with Sharjah over Abu Musa Island. Shaykh Khalid of Sharjah was considered the more pliant of the two rulers, and the Shah rolled out the “red-carpet” treatment for him during a state visit to Iran from 17 to 22 January 1971. Shaykh Khalid was treated to a private audience with the Shah and a banquet meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs Ardeshir Zahedi. He was taken on tours through Isfahan and Shiraz, and his photo appeared on the front page of major Iranian newspapers. The media praised Shaykh Khalid for recognizing that the future security of the Gulf could only be maintained through cooperation between littoral states. The Shah outlined a settlement on Abu Musa by telling Shaykh Khalid that Iran was willing to forego all oil and mineral rights to Abu Musa and its offshore waters, and commit itself to improving the social welfare of the people of Sharjah. Shaykh Khalid asked for more time to consider the Shah’s proposals. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Ardeshir Zahedi reportedly took a heavier hand with Khalid and told him that Iran “must have that island before the end of 1971.”24 Iran’s position was clear: it was willing to compensate the rulers of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah and divide any revenues from the islands’ natural resources, but it would have the islands, by force if necessary, by the time the British withdrew. Iran’s official justification was that military control 22  Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Memorandum, March 1971, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 117. 23  Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), edited and translated by Alinagh Alikhani and Nicholas Vincent, p. 202. 24  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 26 January 1971, Tehran 00308 261514Z, RG 59.

8  A SEA CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF 

203

over islands was a strategic imperative for Iran’s national security. In practice, the issue was more complicated. The Shah’s prestige and sentiments of Iranian nationalism were closely bound into Iran’s belief that after compromising on Bahrain, it was entitled to take back the islands that it believed were misappropriated by force of British arms during the period of Pax Britannica in the Gulf. For the rulers of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah, defending their claim to sovereignty over the islands was viewed as a matter of political survival: If the rulers were viewed as voluntarily ceding Arab territory to Iran, regardless of the terms, it would undermine their legitimacy and invite a direct challenge to their authority. Further, the rulers were receiving little support from King Faysal. Faysal was unwilling to get directly involved in the dispute, and his position was that he would not object to any agreement the rulers made, but he did not wish to be consulted in advance. Privately he encouraged the rulers to accommodate the Shah in some fashion, but at the same time he urged them not to cede sovereignty over the islands to Iran. In the meantime, Baʿthist Iraq was using the pan-Arab media to provoke and transform the issue from a territorial dispute into a clash between Arab nationalism and Iranian nationalism. Kuwait’s position on the islands reflected both pressure from Iraq as well as the Al Sabah’s sensitivity to Arab nationalist groups within Kuwait’s borders. Kuwaiti officials and the media publicly argued the islands were Arab and could not simply be given away to Iran. Kuwait was careful to have its views on the public record early and often. It did not want Iraq to be able to claim that Kuwait had colluded to give away the islands to Iran. Kuwait told the British that it did not buy Iran’s argument regarding the strategic importance of the islands, and did not believe the Iranians were serious about their threats to seize the islands by force, claiming the Shah was “too wise” and “too statesmanlike” to throw away the goodwill of his Arab neighbors. Further, the Kuwaitis believed negotiations over the islands should wait until a union was formed because a union government would be better situated than the rulers to make a deal.25 Iran, however, saw this point precisely from the opposite perspective. It would not recognize any union until the dispute over the islands was resolved. Iranian officials knew it would be more difficult to come to terms with a newly created union government that had access to the U.N. than it would be with the two relatively powerless shaykhs.  BNA: “Record of Conversation in Kuwait,” 10 February 1971, FO 1016/906.

25

204 

B. FRIEDMAN

At the end of September 1970, Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ardeshir Zahedi, met with the new British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas Home. Zahedi told Douglas-Home that Iran had made its position clear to its Gulf neighbors, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia: It could not compromise on the issue of the three lower Gulf islands. If this policy damaged Iran’s relations with its neighbors, it was prepared to accept the consequences. Iran had “encouraged the Kuwaitis not to make an issue out of something which they might later regret.” Zahedi emphasized that Iran did not wish to embarrass the Gulf rulers, and they did not wish to publicize the issue as long as the Iranian forces could occupy the islands. He also said that whether or not there was oil around the islands, Iran was prepared to give the rulers “considerable help.” This would involve fairly large sums, but “the question of aid must not be linked to the Iranian occupation of the islands. It must be a separate file.” Zahedi said that if no satisfactory solution was found, Iran would take the islands by force by the time the British left. Iran had pointed out that this step would not improve bilateral relations, and that the future of the federation also depended on a resolution to the question of the islands. In response to a question from the British on his view about King Faysal’s position, Zahedi noted that it was “difficult to discuss this issue with King Faysal,” and “the Iranians did not want to get involved with Buraimi.” This unsolicited reference to Buraimi implies that there was some relationship between the islands and Buraimi for Iran and Saudi Arabia. Zahedi said that when he raised the issue of the islands with King Faysal, Faysal had said that the matter was not important for Saudi Arabia. Bahrain was what had been important for them. The Iranians had explained that the two issues were linked in their minds, but that they had not wanted to explicitly connect them during the Bahrain negotiations in order not to obstruct them. Zahedi stated that Bahrain was a difficult problem to solve, but it had been solved, and was not a problem now. Zahedi then reiterated Iran’s strategic argument regarding the islands. He said that 35 to 40 percent of the oil that passed through the Strait of Hormuz was Iranian, and, therefore, the security of the islands was a vital element of Iran’s security. He said Iran had reiterated to the shaykhs that there would be no problem regarding Iranian aid if they came to an agreement on the islands. Zahedi said that the Shaykh of Ras al-Khaimah had asked for a multimillion-dollar loan. Zahedi had told him first they must become friends, and if they were, there would be no problem. Iran wanted the shaykhs to remain and to rule stable governments. He hoped they

8  A SEA CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF 

205

would be capable of combating subversion. The Iranians would help with defense aid, technical aid, and construction. He said it was in Iranian interests to help the shaykhs otherwise these shaykhdoms might become a threat to Iran. Zahedi said he did not envision large defense installations on the islands, and believed the military component could be kept quiet. Zahedi said he was somewhat troubled by reports of Shaykh Saqr’s flirtation with the Iraqis. He said they had told Saqr not to threaten an Iraqi intervention. He added that if the Iraqis wanted to intervene let them attack directly. Zahedi said he had nothing but sympathy for the Iraqis who had such a rich country but were in such a poor political and economic state.26 When British officials met with Abdul Hussein Jamali in Iraq in September 1970, his statements seemed carefully scripted. Without naming Iran, Jamali said that “a certain country” was claiming the islands “to which it had no right.” Jamali then told the British that Iraq was against the British handing ownership of the islands to anyone else. He said they were Arab and the Arab world would not accept it if “they [the islands] were alienated in any way.” Jamali said that the Arab countries of the Gulf exported more oil through the Strait of Hormuz than Iran and “they would not accept that a non-Arab country should have a stranglehold on this vital waterway.” In what appeared to be a veiled threat, Jamali concluded by emphasizing that if British forces remained in the Gulf it would be “impossible” for Iraq to restrain extremists or even continue to follow its own moderate policy.27 The gap between Iran and Iraq on the issue of the islands was serious, because it was becoming clear that Iran was leaning toward making the issue a fait accompli. In February 1971, following the Saudi/Kuwait mission to the region, Sir William Luce met with the Shah to discuss the Shah’s settlement offer for the islands. It was more compensation than compromise. It came down to Iran giving the rulers a majority share of any oil or mineral revenues generated from the islands. The rulers would have to remove their police and local administration of the islands, and sovereignty would be Iran’s. The Shah was willing to leave the issue of sovereignty open, but only as a temporary compromise. It was a “momentary” thing, he said, 26  BNA: “Record of Conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Iranian Foreign Minister,” 25 September 1970, FO 1016/759. 27  BNA: “Record of Meeting with Abdul Hussein Jamali at the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Baghdad,” 16 September 1970, FO 1016/759.

206 

B. FRIEDMAN

and Iran would withhold any oil revenues until a final settlement was reached which included Iranian sovereignty. He said that any oil exploration on the islands or in their offshore waters would have to receive written Iranian permission. The Shah told Luce that he was pessimistic about the possibility of settling with the rulers and was inclined to make a public statement to the effect that Iran would seize the islands after British withdrawal. The Arabs believed that because he had conceded on Bahrain that he would also give in on the islands. He said the two cases were not the same. Bahrain with a population of 200,000, most of whom were Arabs, “could not have been successfully taken over by Iran.” The islands, on the other hand, were sparsely populated and could be easily occupied. Alluding to his negotiations with the Arab rulers, he said he would not participate “in an auction of Iranian territory.” Almost sanguine, he added that he was not concerned about an Arab reaction to an Iranian takeover because there was little the Arabs could do to materially damage Iranian interests. He said they would protest loudly for a couple of days, and nothing more. He added that it might be in Iran’s interests to take the islands before the end of 1971, but Iran did not want to embarrass the British. When Luce pointed out that the British still had a defense commitment to the rulers, the Shah smiled and told Luce that Britain “could be taken by surprise,” but then reaffirmed that Iran would not occupy the islands “while you are still there.”28 Thus it was clear that Iran’s posture on the islands was based on the calculus of military power. The Arab Gulf rulers, for their parts, viewed themselves as stuck between Arab nationalism and Iranian nationalism, and were hoping that the Shah “would see reason” and act as a “statesmen.” The Shah was willing to compensate the shaykhs of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah to maintain Arab goodwill, but he was unwilling to sacrifice what he believed was personal prestige or Iranian nationalism by securing anything less than full control and sovereignty over the islands. This message was conveyed clearly and directly to the British special envoy, Sir William Luce, nearly 10  months before the date of British military withdrawal.

 BNA: “Record of Conversation in Tehran,” 13 February 1971, FO 1016/906.

28

8  A SEA CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF 

207

British Confirm Withdrawal On 1 March 1971, British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home officially confirmed the message Sir William Luce had privately conveyed to the Gulf rulers at the beginning of February 1971: The British government would stay the course and execute withdrawal by the year’s end, 1971. Douglas-Home emphasized that the protectorate treaties established in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would expire at the end of 1971. The British intended to offer treaties of friendship in their place, and would continue to offer military support as well as limited numbers of troops for training and liaison. There were five components of the future British presence in the Gulf: (1) treaties of friendship; (2) a transfer of the British-officered Trucial Oman Scouts to constitute the nucleus of a federal army for a union of emirates; (3) stationing of limited number of British forces for training and liaison purposes; (4) regular joint training maneuvers in the region in which British army and air force would participate; and (5) regular visits to Gulf ports from British naval warships.29 Home pointed out that this redefined role for British forces had been accepted by all of the rulers, as well as by Saudi Arabia and Iran. On 2 March 1971, a spokesman for PFLOAG (Popular Front for the Liberation of Arabian Gulf) in Aden described the British announcement that it would withdraw from the Gulf as “fictitious” and “meaningless.” It added that the British decision allowed the British to retain military advisers and troops in the region, and made no mention of the British airfield on Masirah Island off the coast of Oman, and British owned Jufair naval base on Bahrain that was leased to the U.S. In the end, it claimed, this decision allowed the Conservative British government “to return to the Gulf through the window after leaving through the door.”30 Iraq’s response emphasized the Arab element of the Gulf. Its ministry of foreign affairs released a statement welcoming the British announcement, and added, “The Arabian Gulf and the Arab emirates are part of the Arab motherland, and the guarantee of Arab sovereignty in all Arab lands and waters, including the Arab islands in the region, is a purely Arab responsibility.”31 The Iraqi media was much more strident and critical of the British, with the editorials in the major Baghdad newspapers more  Taryam, p. 165; and BNA: FO 1016/906 and 1016/907.  BNA: Aden to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 93, 3 March 1971, FO 1016/906. 31  Taryam, p. 166. 29 30

208 

B. FRIEDMAN

closely resembling the sentiments expressed by the PFLOAG, rather than the Iraqi ministry of foreign affairs.32 Despite having advance notice of the announcement and giving their consent to it, reactions from the Gulf regimes were mixed. The Kuwaiti government and the Saudi regime expressed subdued satisfaction, although the Kuwaiti press attacked the British. Al-Siyasa claimed that the British did not make a sincere effort to ensure a union of emirates because it could have created one with no problems. It also said that the British plan to make periodic naval visits to the Gulf would lead to an upsurge of American and Soviet naval visits and would lead to “a power clash in the area.”33 Bahrain’s Shaykh ʿIsa was “saddened” and “resigned” to complete British military withdrawal. Shaykh Khalifah bin Salman, ʿIsa’s deputy, said that while the initial British decision had been unpleasant, its reversal at this stage “would have endangered Gulf stability.” Shaykh Khalifah also told British officials it would now begin preparing for separate independence “at once.” Mohammad bin Mubarak, who was ill, would be sent to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as soon as he recovered to “clear the lines.” Shaykh ʿIsa shook his head and said it “was sad that people like the Russians and Americans would be coming in.”34 Shaykh Rashid of Dubai, who had been staunchly opposed to British withdrawal from the very beginning, gave a very candid interview to The Times of London in which he again expressed his frustration that the British had simply come along and presented their decision to the rulers as a fait accompli, without any real meaningful exchange of views.35 The 1 March announcement from Sir Douglas-Home put to rest more than three years of British vacillation regarding its future policy in the Gulf. And while the various reactions to the decision reflected the different perceptions and interests of the various Gulf regimes, the decision did have a powerful impact on the rulers in the Gulf: it focused their attention on the future and generated a storm of diplomatic activity.

32  BNA: Baghdad to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 256, 4 March 1971, FO 1016/906. 33  BNA: “Telegram Guidance No. 53 from FM Douglas-Home to Certain Missions,” 8 March 1971, FO 1016/906. 34  BNA: Bahrain to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 5 March 1971, FO 1016/906. 35  BNA: Dubai to Bahrain, Telegram No. 52, 3 March 1971, FO 1016/906.

8  A SEA CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF 

209

The Wilting Union King Faysal met with Sir William Luce at the Royal Palace in Riyadh on 12 May 1971. Faysal was still concerned that a union had not yet been established, and argued that the “British could bring about a union if they really wanted.” Faysal also claimed that time was short and that stability in the Gulf depended on the existence of a union. Luce asked if all nine rulers genuinely possessed the will to unite. Faysal argued that the main obstacle to unification was Shaykh Zayid who refused to give up his separate Abu Dhabi Defense Force to the union. Faysal could not understand why Zayid refused to give up the force because no one was threatening Abu Dhabi. Luce told Faysal that Zayid felt this sovereignty was being threatened by Saudi Arabia. This was nonsense according to Faysal; Saudi Arabia could take over Abu Dhabi from within whenever it wanted, there was no need for a military attack and it was not Saudi policy to settle disputes by force. He argued that the British should use their influence to help settle the outstanding dispute regarding the union’s capital.36 The union of nine had been crumbling under the weight of the Bahrain-­ Qatar rivalry for a year, and the British wanted to help the rulers move forward with alternative groupings, but the shaykhs were reluctant to draw the ire of King Faysal. By early May 1971, Bahrain was ready to openly declare for separate independence, but King Faysal was unwilling to concede the union of nine was dead and asked the Bahrainis to wait 45 days. King Faysal was opposed to a union of seven, because it would be dominated by Abu Dhabi, which continued to  avoid  Faysal’s territorial demands. Faysal also opposed a Greater Oman grouping, which, in any case, was still an impractical option while young Sultan Qabus was still struggling to get his internal affairs in order.37 The British, frustrated by what they felt was King Faysal’s obstruction, wondered if King Faysal wanted British efforts to fail so that he would have someone to blame when chaos erupted in the shaykhdoms. And Shaykh ʿIsa, who for almost two years had been baffled by Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to assert itself in the affairs of the shaykhdoms, guessed that King Faysal, whose wisdom is “renowned through all Arabia,” knew that a union of nine was now beyond achievement, and was still insisting on a

 BNA: “Record of Meeting at the Royal Palace Riyadh,” 12 May 1971, FO 1016/906.  BNA: “Record of Conversation in Rifaa Palace, Bahrain,” 6 May 1971, FO 1016/910.

36 37

210 

B. FRIEDMAN

union of nine, “because he is determined that there should be no union at all.”38 Indeed, the British suspected that Saudi Arabia was preparing itself to oppose a smaller, Abu Dhabi-led, union of seven unless it received satisfaction from Shaykh Zayid on its territorial claims. As the clock wound down to British withdrawal in 1971, in addition to the challenge of overcoming the internecine competition between rival rulers, the shaykhs were also faced with the problem of creating a union while dealing with uncompromising territorial challenges from their larger regional “allies,” Iran and Saudi Arabia.39

The Islands Quandary Following the British confirmation of withdrawal, the next few months were devoted to intensive efforts to find a solution to the dispute between Iran and the shaykhs of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah over three islands. The period between end of April 1971 and the end of September 1971 has been overlooked in the existing secondary source literature dealing with this period and these issues in the Gulf.40 The Shah had made it clear he would oppose any kind of union of emirates until this problem was resolved, and so the British attempted to help the shaykhs find a compromise with Iran. At the end of January, Shaykh Khalid of Sharjah said that the message from Saudi Prince Nawwaf of Saudi/Kuwaiti mission was that the emirates should federate first and then deal with the islands problem. He added that “if progress was to be made soon it could only be made on the basis of Iranian acknowledgment of Sharjah’s sovereignty.” Sir William Luce pointed out that Iran “would not accept any of this.” Iran, for its part, was signaling its intentions loud and clear. On 16 February, the Shah told a reporter from the Associated Press that he “would not preside over an auction of my country,” and made public his plan that Iran would take the islands by force if no settlement was reached. This was despite the fact that the Shah had twice promised Sir William Luce (on 13 38  BNA: Geoffrey Arthur to Sir Douglas-Home, “God Save Me From My Friends,” 25 May 1971, FO 1016/906. 39  BNA: Geoffrey Arthur to Sir Douglas-Home, “God Save Me From My Friends,” 25 May 1971, FO 1016/906. 40  See, for example: Thomas Mattair, The Three Occupied UAE Islands (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2005), pp. 377–378.

8  A SEA CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF 

211

February) he would make no such public statement until settlement talks were exhausted.41 Nevertheless, Iran underscored the Shah’s point by sending a large naval vessel to Greater Tunb on three separate occasions in late February (24, 25, and 26 February). The effect was like a shark circling the waters, and on 12 February an Iranian naval vessel even landed a small group of unarmed emissaries to survey the village on the island.42 The Shah’s public statement and military maneuvers were meant to “spur the rulers to reach a settlement,” according to Amir Khosrow Afshar, Iran’s Ambassador to Great Britain; yet this was precisely the wrong tactic to take with the shaykhs if Iran was looking for a peaceful settlement. Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah noted that the Shah says he wants friendship, not trouble, but then talks of seizing the islands by force. The traditional mode of negotiating among the shaykhs was to seek face-saving accommodation through compromise; however, when directly pressured or challenged, they were more inclined to dig in their heels and refuse to make any concessions.43 In late March, Shaykh Khalid was under intense pressure from his family and leading citizens of Sharjah not to negotiate with the Iranians at all. Shaykh Khalid was hesitant and uncertain about what to do about Abu Musa, still shaken by the assassination attempt against him that was carried out at his palace earlier in the year. Because of the local pressure in Sharjah against negotiating with Iran, the British believed that Shaykh Khalid was tempted to let the Iranians seize the islands, which would allow Shaykh Khalid to blame the British for abandoning him and the Americans for siding with the Iranians. The British noted that in that case, “the only winners would be the Russians, who would cash in on Khalid’s martyrdom.”44 Shaykh Saqr was also taking stock of public opinion in Ras al-Khaimah, and in a consultation with British officials on 11 April stated that he believed the question about what to do about the Tunbs should be submitted to either the Supreme Council of the union (if it was formed) or the Trucial States Development Council. Shaykh Saqr said the other rulers

41  BNA: Tehran to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 103 &104, 19 February 1971, FO 1016/908. 42  BNA: Dubai to Bahrain, “The Tunbs,” 16 February & 2 March 1971, FO 1016/908. 43  Michael Hudson, Arab Politics (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 26. 44  BNA: Dubai to Bahrain, Telegram No. 102, 10 March 1971, FO 1016/909.

212 

B. FRIEDMAN

should share the responsibility.45 Shaykh Zayid, for his part, felt the issue was “too big” and “too important” to be handled by the Trucial shaykhdoms alone. He said Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt should be actively involved. He thought a compromise where two of three islands were declared Iranian and the third remained Arab seemed like a reasonable proposal. He said if the Tunbs were to be Iranian and Abu Musa remained under Arab sovereignty, he did not see Shaykh Khalid objecting to an Iranian garrison on the island.46 It is worth pointing out that Shaykh Zayid and Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah were historic rivals, and that Zayid’s compromise proposed giving away Shaykh Saqr’s territory. In mid-April 1971, the Shah outlined a proposal representing a temporary compromise on the issue of sovereignty. He proposed that Iranian forces occupy the islands jointly with the rulers’ forces. Two weeks later the new Union of Emirates could be announced, and it would be publicly supported by Iran provided there was no mention of the disputed islands in any official Union document or statement. A little while later the rulers’ police would be withdrawn from the islands, and the Shah would provide generous financial aid to the rulers. The issue of sovereignty would remain ambiguous for two or three years, and afterward Iran would quietly settle the issue of sovereignty directly with the rulers.47 On 8 May, Shaykh Khalid complained to Sir William Luce that this proposal “was not just.” When Luce explained that justice was “not the salient factor in this situation,” and pointed out that Iran would be the strongest power in the region after 1971, and unless a peaceful settlement was reached before then, Iran would seize the islands.48 On 20 May, Shaykh Khalid of Sharjah sent a message to the Shah through an American attorney, Northcutt Ely. He told the Shah that he wanted to cooperate, but he could not accept the current Iranian proposals and survive. He asked Ely to persuade the Shah that he was working against his own

45  BNA: Bahrain to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 225, 13 April 1971, 1016/909. 46  BNA: Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Bahrain, Telegram No. 264, 31 May 1971, 1016/910. 47  BNA: Tehran to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Gulf Islands and the UAE,” Telegram No. 261, 18 April 1971, FO 1016/909; “Record of Conversation at the Niavaran Palace,” 4 May 1971, FO 1016/910. 48  BNA: “Record of Conversation in Sharjah, Saturday 8 May, 1971,” 9 May 1971, FO 1016/910.

8  A SEA CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF 

213

interests, and those of the U.S. and U.K., by ensuring instability and an entrée of Iran’s enemies into the Gulf.49 On 23 May, Sir William Luce told the Shah that the rulers had met with their peoples and had acquiesced to the idea of Iranian garrisons on the islands. However they insisted on some vague agreement on sovereignty. They said they could not just totally cede the territory to Iran. The Shah insisted that the ambiguity on sovereign control over the islands had to be temporary and added that their police forces would have to be removed and their flags lowered from the islands at the time of Iranian military occupation and before the union was established. In an earlier conversation with Luce, the Shah had insisted that the six policemen on Greater Tunb and the police post on Abu Musa would have to be removed because they were a symbol of the rulers’ sovereignty.50 In exchange he was willing to pay the rulers £1.5/$3.6 million annually, and provide financial aid equivalent to 49 percent of any oil revenues produced from the islands’ resources. He was willing to put the agreement on financial terms in writing. The Shah’s attitude about this offer was take it or leave it, and pointed out that the rulers “would lose everything” if they did not take it.51 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had different approaches to the islands dispute in the spring of 1971. Kuwait was outspoken in its opposition to Iran seizing the islands by force, yet it also objected to any deal on the islands that did not include Arab sovereignty. It was in full agreement with Iran that the security of the Gulf should not be jeopardized by any hostile foreign power occupying the islands, but it believed the islands could be protected by Iranian forces while the shaykhs maintained sovereignty over the islands. For reasons of prestige this was unacceptable to the Shah, who was growing increasingly angry with Kuwait’s public statements in defense of Arab sovereignty over the islands. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia was quite clear that while it “must” continue to assert the islands were Arab, it would not object to any compromise made by the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-­ Khaimah. King Faysal had told the Shah that the islands were not a matter of personal prestige or security for him as they were for Iran. In fact, King Faysal made a concerted effort to avoid the topic. The Shah and King  BNA: Dubai to Tehran, Telegram No. 13, 20 May 1971, FO 1016/909.  BNA: “Record of Conversation at the Niavaran Palace,” 4 May 1971, FO 1016/910. 51  BNA: “Record of Conversation at the Niavaran Palace on 23 May, 1971,” 24 May 1971, FO 1016/911; Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Bahrain, Telegram No. 360, 24 May 1971, FO 1016/910. 49 50

214 

B. FRIEDMAN

Faysal met once in May and again in June, and on both occasions the two monarchs studiously avoided the topic of the islands. King Faysal’s adviser (and brother-in-law) Kamal Adham noted that King Faysal’s approach was that he would not raise the issue if the Shah did not raise it.52 As a result of Saudi Arabia’s indifference toward an islands settlement, Kuwait was beginning to feel increasingly isolated. Kuwait as one of Egypt’s major financial patrons, attempted to make the argument to both Iranian and British officials that Egypt’s reaction to any Iranian occupation of the islands would be harsh. Yet, in the wake of Abdel Nasser’s death, Egyptian statesmen attempted to remain aloof from this sensitive diplomatic minefield and focus on vital state interests rather than projecting regional influence. Egypt told Iranian officials the islands were a Gulf issue, and it would defer to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Egypt’s problem, however, was that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had different positions on the issue. The British explained to Egypt’s Foreign Minister Mahmud Riad that, on one hand, Iran was saying Egypt would not react strongly if Iran seized the islands, while Kuwait was saying the opposite.53 In early June, Mahmud Riad, trying to set the record straight with Iran, summoned the Iranian Ambassador to Egypt to emphasize to Iran that Egypt’s position was that “any outstanding differences over the future of the Gulf should be settled amicably.” Riad also pointed out that Egypt must pay attention to the fact that the British position was that the islands were Arab. He also reminded Iran’s ambassador that Kuwait’s Foreign Minister had several alternative solutions to securing the islands. Riad said that forcibly occupying the islands would set an “unfortunate precedent” in the Gulf as “Iraq had claims on Kuwait which it might be tempted to occupy forcibly in the event of any upset of the present stability elsewhere in the Gulf.” Riad also observed that Iran was going to have to coexist with the other states in the Gulf after withdrawal, and it was strongly in Iranian interests that Iranian relations with those states not start off on the wrong foot.54

52  BNA: Jedda to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 498, 28 June 1971, FO1016/911. 53  BNA: “Record of Meeting in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cairo on Friday 28 May, 1971,” 1 June 1971, FO 1016/911. 54  BNA: Cairo to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 681, 8 June 1971, FO 1016/911.

8  A SEA CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF 

215

War of Words Despite Egyptian entreaties for an amicable negotiation, in early June 1971, a war of words over the islands erupted into the public sphere. At a press conference following Kuwait’s weekly Cabinet meeting on 13 June, Abdul Aziz Hussein Said, Kuwait’s Minister of State, said that Kuwait’s position on the islands was clear: “The Islands were Arab and would remain so. Kuwait was not prepared to abandon her position and it was inconceivable she would do so.”55 Also on 13 June, Ayandegan, a major Iranian daily newspaper, published an editorial arguing that “The Arabs must make it clear whether they are our friends or enemies: It is intolerable that we should do so much for people who stab us in the back in the Persian Gulf.”56 The Shah’s public posture on the islands hardened in June 1971, in part, as a result of a Palestinian guerrilla attack on an Israeli tanker transporting Iranian crude oil from the Gulf to the Red Sea. The 11 June 1971 attack took place just north of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, approximately 50  kilometers (31  miles) from al-Barim Island off the coast of North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic). A group of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) guerrillas in a small boat fired nine rocket-­ propelled grenades (RPGs) at the Coral Sea, a tanker that was on its way to the Israeli port of Eilat after loading Iranian oil at Kharg Island in the Gulf. The tanker was hit by some of the missiles and its cargo ignited, but the ship did not explode and there were no serious injuries.57 The guerrillas safely made their escape following the attack. The Shah told British officials that a “hit and run attack” like that “must not be allowed to happen in the Persian Gulf.”58 During the last week in June the Shah began to suspect the British were encouraging negative media stories about Iran and the islands and therefore Iranian officials responded by directing their hostile statements against British “colonialism and imperialism.” While visiting, Bahrain Minister of Foreign Affairs Zahedi said that while “we shall do our utmost to solve 55  BNA: Kuwait to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 285, 14 June 1971, FO 1016/911. 56  BNA: Kuwait to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 413, 15 June 1971, FO 1016/911. 57  The New York Times, 14 & 15 June 1971. 58  BNA: Tehran to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 461, 30 June 1971, FO 1016/911.

216 

B. FRIEDMAN

this [the islands question] peacefully, but if we fail we shall take whatever action may be necessary to recover the islands…we shall never surrender Iranian territory.”59 This was followed by an Agence France-Presse (AFP) report from London on 24 June that stated the British government issued a “semi-official” communiqué in response to Zahedi that rejected Iran’s claims to sovereignty over the islands and emphasized that the islands belonged to Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. The Shah, who was said to have been irritated by the AFP report, gave an interview to the Indian publication, Blitz, a few days later and addressed the issue of the islands, saying, “But let there be no mistake about the fact that we intend to take back what is ours. I can’t sit here and witness the auction of my land to some ruler or the other. Eighty years of occupation does not give anybody the right to take over or dispose of our property.” The Shah also emphasized that the location of the islands “make them issues of tremendous military value,” and noted that South Yemen had recently issued a communiqué vowing to bring revolution to the entire Gulf.60 On 27 June, the Iranian media gave front page headlines to statements made by Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda in Bandar Abbas, which echoed the Shah’s comments in Blitz. Hoveyda denounced those who wanted to change the name of the Gulf (from “Persian” to “Arabian”), and joked that while in the past Britain and Portugal had been the main foreign imports into the Gulf, in the future Iran would be exporting Portugal (the Persian word for both the country and “oranges”) and British imperialism once and for all.61 All word play aside, the Shah was no longer sanguine or matter-of-fact when discussing the islands with the British. He was extremely frustrated with media reports coming from Kuwait, the shaykhs, and Britain emphasizing Arab sovereignty over the islands. On 29 June, the Shah told the new British Ambassador to Iran that they would have to decide whether they wanted Iran’s friendship or hostility when deciding her policy on the islands. He said he could not allow these islands to fall into the hands or come under the influence of a hostile power. He warned the British that a good deal would be at stake if the British chose to oppose Iran. He pointed out that it would be a long time before Britain and Europe would be able 59  BNA: Foreign and Commonwealth to Bahrain, Telegram No. Guidance 142, 25 June 1971, FO 1016/911. 60  BNA: Tehran to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, No. 443, 24 June 1971, FO 1016/911. 61  BNA: Tehran to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 455, 28 June, 1971, FO 1016/911.

8  A SEA CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF 

217

to find new sources of energy to compensate for their growing need of oil from Iran and the Middle East. He added that Britain’s interests and objectives should be the same as Iran’s, and he could not understand why the British were “intriguing against Iran.” The Shah was unhappy that the British were trying to involve the Egyptians in Gulf affairs against their wishes. The Shah believed he had earned the Egyptians’ support for his Gulf ambitions by supporting the Egyptian position vis-à-vis the Rogers Plan. The Shah had even written a personal letter to U.S. President Nixon on behalf of Egypt encouraging Nixon to put pressure on Israel to come to an agreement based on U.N.S.C.R. 242 and the Rogers Plan.62 Therefore, the Shah was frustrated by the British approach to the Egyptians on the islands. He wanted to know why the British had tried to persuade the Egyptians that if the issue of sovereignty over the islands was not peacefully settled in negotiations it would be taken to the U.N., with “dangerous consequences” because Britain would be forced to oppose Iran. The Shah, visibly angry by such a prospect, threatened that if “you oppose us in the United Nations…you will have to face the consequences in relations with my country.” He asked why the British were trying to involve the Egyptians; these matters, he insisted, should be left to the riparian states.63 The British tried pointing out that “a prolonged wrangle” in the U. N. might “poison relations” between Iran and the Arab States in the Gulf and enable hostile powers to intervene. The Shah responded, “I do not give a damn what the Arabs might do. They have never helped us and if they want our friendship they know how to set about it.” The Shah’s sharp warnings and rhetorical questions suggest he was both frustrated and confounded by the British resistance to Iranian policy regarding the islands.64 The Shah had hoped to carry out “quiet diplomacy” to find a remedy regarding the islands, but the statements in the Kuwaiti press and the British media reports led the Shah to suspect the British were orchestrating a concerted media campaign to undermine Iran’s efforts at quiet diplomacy. As a result, the Shah felt compelled to respond to these 62  U.S. Department of State, Letter from the Shah of Iran to President Nixon, Tehran, 11 April 1971; FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 124. 63  BNA: Tehran to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 461, 30 June 1971, FO1016/911. 64  BNA: Tehran to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 461, 30 June 1971, FO1016/911.

218 

B. FRIEDMAN

“offensive statements,” which led to rhetorical escalation and increased tension that eclipsed the dispute with the British. On 28 June, Sayyid Ali bin Ahmed al-Ansari, Qatar’s Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, had a one hour meeting with Iraqi President Hassan al-Bakr in Baghdad. The following day Ansari left for Beirut and Iraq’s Foreign Minister fired Iraq’s first public salvo in response to Iranian Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda’s 27 June statement that Iran would take the islands by force. Shaykhli called for “a united Arab challenge to Iran over the islands,” and said that expansionist designs on the Gulf islands were in conflict with the principles of the United Nations Charter. He also reiterated Iraqi President Bakr’s “absolute rejection” of any foreign (namely, Iranian) sovereignty and influence over part of the “Arab Gulf.”65 During an early July visit to Egypt, Iraq’s Foreign Minister attempted to enlist Egypt’s support for its position in the Gulf. The Egyptians told Iraqi officials that they were fully occupied with the Arab-Israeli dispute, but hoped for continued stability in the Gulf.66 Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for their parts, were consistently conveying the message that they would not interfere in the islands dispute, but preferred for it to be resolved amicably and without confrontation. On 5 July, the outgoing Saudi Ambassador to Kuwait gave an interview to the Kuwaiti daily newspaper al-Siyasa and said, “It is very possible to come to an understanding with the Iranian government over the problems of the area and also possible to reach positive results over its demands for the three Arab islands by quiet diplomacy without a heated conflict of views.” He also added that the way the issue had been publicly presented amounted to a “conspiracy to break the bonds of Arab-Iranian brotherhood.”67 On 9 July, the Shah, following extensive back-and-forth discussion with the British, recognized that the exchange of provocative public statements had been counterproductive and agreed to a moratorium on public statements on the question of the islands.68 The Arab and British media reports, and the Palestinian attack in the Bab al-Mandab Strait in June 1971, illustrated the Shah’s twofold interest  BNA: Baghdad to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2 July 1971, FO 1016/911.  BNA: Cairo to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 823, 9 July 1971, FO 1016/912. 67  BNA: Kuwait to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 325, 8 July 1971, FO 1016/912. 68  BNA: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. Guidance 152, 9 July 1971, FO 1016/912. 65 66

8  A SEA CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF 

219

in executing sovereignty and control over the islands. First, Iranian sovereignty over the islands would bring nationalist prestige to the Shah for rectifying what Iran believed was a historic/legal injustice when the British assigned ownership of the islands to the Al Qawasim tribe during a period of Iranian weakness in the nineteenth century. Second, the Shah wanted strategic control over the island to establish a military presence on Abu Musa and Greater Tunb in order to safeguard oil shipped through the Strait of Hormuz. The Shah was quite confident in Iran’s ability to manage any collective Arab response to Iran’s policy on the islands, but his calm began to fray around the edges when he suspected the British might have been coordinating a media campaign through the Kuwaiti media and the BBC to undermine his regional ambition. Finally toward the end of June and the beginning of July, statements from Saudi and British officials gave the Shah the reassurance and security he needed to avoid escalating the rhetoric and tension in the region. What remained to be seen, however, was how Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah, as well as the rest of the shaykhs, would react to Iran’s latest proposal.

An Interconnected Gulf The Bahrain-Qatar rivalry was proving to be the undoing of the union of nine shaykhdoms. Bahrain had eyed independent status as a U.N.protected mini-state since 1968; only Saudi insistence and the Iranian threat kept Bahrain fully committed to the union of nine negotiations in 1968 and 1969. Escaping the shadow of Iran’s territorial claim in May 1970 left Bahrain free to press for a dominant role in the union, to which it felt entitled based on its size. Qatar was not willing to take a backseat to Bahrain in a union. Qatar, which following the Abu Dhabi-Dubai agreement in February 1968, had been eager to avoid isolation, now appeared better prepared to pursue independence. The historical sources of rivalry between Al Khalifa of Bahrain and Al Thani of Qatar made accommodation or compromise an unlikely option. Qatar and Bahrain both preferred weak independence to a strong union in which they would not be the first among equals. Abu Dhabi had preferred a smaller union of seven, dating back to 1968, because a union that excluded Bahrain and Qatar would allow Shaykh Zayid to dominate. Shaykh Rashid of Dubai appeared to be the odd shaykh out in mid-1971. The British suspected Rashid might be unwilling to participate in a smaller union dominated by his traditional rival, Shaykh

220 

B. FRIEDMAN

Zayid of Abu Dhabi, despite the fact that it was the union between Dubai and Abu Dhabi in February 1968 that initiated the negotiations for a broader union in 1968. At the end of June 1971 things seemed just as uncertain as they had in February 1968, and the shaykhs had just six months left to create a new political framework before the British withdrew. They faced not just the challenge of rivalry, but also found themselves squeezed between Iran’s claim to sovereignty over the lower Gulf islands and Saudi Arabia’s claim to Abu Dhabi land stretching from Buraimi to Sabkhat Matti. Kuwait also found itself navigating between three larger states of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, and played a sophisticated game to preserve its regime’s survival and autonomy. It took special pains to stay on good terms with Iraq, which harbored irredentist ambitions that it had acted on as recently as in 1961. Who would Kuwait rely on if trouble with Iraq erupted and the British were no longer available in a pinch? Further, the growing ties between the Baʿthist government and the Soviet Union could only be mitigated, in Kuwait’s estimation, by Kuwaiti efforts to cultivate closer ties with Baʿthists to prevent a Communist takeover in Iraq. All of this meant that in 1971 Kuwait was forced to take a strong public stand against Iran’s attempt to seize the three islands in the lower Gulf. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait unsuccessfully collaborated on working for a strong union of nine during the first six months of 1971, but their policies diverged on the issue of Iran’s claim to the three islands. Unlike Kuwait, which felt it was obligated to support Iraq’s position on the islands in order to preserve its regime security, Saudi Arabia did not view the islands as an issue that directly involved Saudi domestic prestige or security. For reasons of domestic political legitimacy, Saudi officials paid lip service to the claim that the islands were “Arab,” but in practice it repeatedly expressed its willingness to quietly accommodate Iran. Saudi Arabia’s actions in the Gulf led some of the rulers to suspect King Faysal wanted a union to fail so that Saudi Arabia would be better situated to dominate the shaykhs. In practice, Saudi Arabia was an adamant supporter of a union. However, it preferred a larger union in which it could easily exert its influence through ties of patronage, kinship, and religion with the rulers of Bahrain, Dubai, and Qatar. In other words, a union of nine shaykhdoms afforded Saudi Arabia several instruments through which it could project influence on a union and pursue its own interests, which included satisfaction on its claims to Abu Dhabi territory. A smaller union of seven led by Shaykh Zayid would reduce opportunities for Saudi influence on the union, and make it more difficult for Saudi Arabia to

8  A SEA CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF 

221

resolve its territorial disputes with Abu Dhabi. Further, and perhaps more important, King Faysal firmly believed one large union of shaykhdoms would be better situated to resist subversion from Soviet-backed Iraq or South Yemen than would several smaller, more vulnerable, independent states that would not have the benefit of British military protection. While Kuwait was willing to accommodate or pay off South Yemen, Iraq, and the Soviet Union in order to defuse or forestall any subversive threat to its regime, King Faysal saw any Soviet advance in the region as a threat to the survival of the Al Saʿud monarchy. In early 1971, Saudi Arabia was involved in active low-intensity proxy conflicts with South Yemen and Iraq; therefore, the prospect of active military subversion and sabotage by Iraq or South Yemen through the Gulf shaykhdoms was still a serious and legitimate security threat from the Saudi perspective. This threat perception was shared by the Shah in Iran. Yet while Saudi Arabia viewed a strong union of nine shaykhdoms as the safest bet against subversion, the Shah’s view was rooted in his “positive nationalism” and Iranian military strength. The Shah believed that guaranteeing Iranian supremacy in the Gulf was the best means through which to preserve regional security and protect the shaykhdoms from subversion. To that end, reassured by the change in leadership in Egypt and his deft manipulation of the Western oil companies, the Shah’s posture throughout 1971 was aggressive and confident. The Shah’s first priority in a settlement on the three islands was based on generating prestige and legitimacy by projecting Iranian power, rather than arriving at a compromise that would satisfy Iran’s strategic concern regarding secure military control over the islands yet still preserve some form of face-saving sovereignty for the Arab shaykhs. For the Shah the islands were a symbol of the restoration of Iran’s nationalistic claim to supremacy in the Gulf, or, in other words, a matter of generating Iranian prestige defined as reputation based on power. Yet Iran’s ability to replace the British as guardians of the Gulf was not pre-ordained. Real doubts remained regarding Iran’s capabilities. In an April 1971 conversation between the U.S.  Ambassador to Iran and President Nixon, it was clear the U.S. defense establishment still had doubts about the Shah’s ability to fill the impending vacuum in the Gulf. Douglas MacArthur, Jr., the U.S. Ambassador to Iran, was trying to convince President Nixon to visit the Shah prior to the British withdrawal. He told Nixon, “That vacuum is going to be filled. Iran is going to have to play the major part in doing it.” Nixon asked, “Are they capable of it?” He added, “And as you know…I’m stronger than a horseradish for him [the

222 

B. FRIEDMAN

Shah]. But then I raised it with our staff here-Defense they sort of stare at it [unclear]—but they say, “Well the Shah just hasn’t got the stuff,” is that right, Al? Isn’t that what we find? They don’t think-they just don’t think he’s got the stroke to do it.”69 The Shah, for his part, remarked to his adviser, Asadollah Alam, in February that “I have learned by experience that a tragic end awaits anyone who dares cross swords with me: Nasser is no more, John and Robert Kennedy died at the hands of assassins, their brother Edward has been disgraced, Khrushchev was toppled, the list is endless.”70

69  U.S. Department of State, Conversation Among President Nixon, Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, and General Alexander Haig, Washington, April 8, 1971, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 123. 70  Alam, p. 202.

CHAPTER 9

Grandeur and Independence

In mid-1971, King Faysal and Mohammad Reza Shah felt buoyed by what they saw as the weakening Soviet position in the region. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reported that “in the past year the Soviets have, for the first time in more than a decade, been forced by events into a defensive covert action posture.” Anwar Sadat’s May 1971 dismissal of the pro-­ Moscow elite in Cairo led American intelligence officials to report that in general, “the political tide is running against the USSR in Egypt, Libya, and Sudan,” and they are running into “other problems” in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula.1 In the summer of 1971, King Faysal was directly invested in orchestrating a rapprochement between Egypt and the U.S., spending a full week visiting Anwar Sadat in Egypt at the end of June. King Faysal wrote U.S. President Nixon a personal letter dated 30 June, making an argument for the U.S. to support Sadat, whom King Faysal argued was ready to work toward a peaceful settlement with Israel.2 King Faysal also sent Prince Fahd, the second deputy prime minister and interior minister, to Washington to meet with Nixon and make this argument in person. 1  U.S.  Department of State, Memorandum from Richard Kennedy of National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, 28 August 1971, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. XXIV, No. 31. 2  The New  York Times, 27 June 1971; U.S.  Department of State, Memorandum from President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President, 17 August 1971, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. XXIV, No. 154.

© The Author(s) 2020 B. Friedman, The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1971, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56182-6_9

223

224 

B. FRIEDMAN

Fahd noted that communist forces in Sudan and Egypt had suffered setbacks in the summer, and reported that President Sadat was willing to reduce Egypt’s relationships with communist states.3 King Faysal believed it was up to the West to create the proper environment to allow Sadat to execute such a reduction. To that end, Fahd emphasized that (1) King Faysal “sees a very difficult time ahead in the Middle East if there is no solution to the Arab-Israeli problem this fall”; (2) Sadat was under great pressure and might be toppled if there was “no solution in the near future”; (3) Sadat was interested in an “interim settlement around the Suez Canal and King Faysal believed such a settlement would be in the interest of Israel, as would an overall peace settlement; and (4) Sadat was willing to reduce his relationship with the communists if there was a settlement, and he wanted “a stronger relationship with the United States.”4 King Faysal’s emphasis on these issues, perhaps even at the expense of Gulf affairs, accurately reflected his foreign policy priorities. He saw the Arab-Israeli conflict and the communist presence in the Middle East as the two primary security challenges to Saudi domestic stability. First, King Faysal believed that Soviet-backed Arab nationalist states were working to subvert his regime and overthrow the Saudi monarchy. Second, the Arab-­ Israeli conflict galvanized the Saudi population and destabilized the Kingdom—the June 1967 riots in the Eastern Province were still in the back of King Faysal’s mind. While King Faysal was focused on reconciling Egypt with the U.S. in order to marginalize the Soviets, the Shah’s regime was busy fighting attempts at subversion coming from Iraq in the months leading up to the Shah’s October 1971 2500-year anniversary of the Iranian monarchy in Persepolis, which was held to commemorate Cyrus the Great’s founding of the ancient Achaemenid Empire. In August 1971, Iranian security forces uncovered two separate groups that had received training and support in Iraq to destabilize the Shah’s regime, indicating the cycle of confrontation with Iraq had not been laid to rest. On 27 August a group of fourteen Iranian-born Baluchi émigrés to Iraq surrendered to Iranian security forces before executing any 3  Yevgeny Primakov, Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the Present (New York: Basic Books, 2009), translated by Paul Gould, pp. 130–138. 4  U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, 13 September 1971, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 144.

9  GRANDEUR AND INDEPENDENCE 

225

subversive operations, while four others were found in Iranian Baluchistan. In mid-August Iranian border guards identified a second group attempting to infiltrate into Iran from Iraq at Gomsar, near Ilam. In the clash that ensued, two of the infiltrators were killed and three others captured.5 The Shah told U.S.  Vice President Spiro Agnew, during the 25 October Centenary events in Shiraz, that Iran “must be military strong” and possess sufficient “deterrent strength to discourage any adventures by neighbors such as the radical Iraq regime.” He also claimed that he had informed the Soviet Union that “if any great power, and this means Russia, attacks Iran then the Iranian Army will fight to the end.” He added that in such a scenario the Iranian government would adhere to a scorched-earth policy so “that there will be nothing left for the invading Russians that is worth anything.”6 The extravagance of the Shah’s 2500-year pageant in Persepolis in October 1971 was a symbolic expression of the Shah’s nationalistic, and some might say grandiose, vision for the Iranian monarchy’s future.7 The celebration came six months after the British Conservative government announced its intention to uphold the previous Labour government’s decision to withdraw British military forces from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971. The British announcement ended three long years of debate and uncertainty in the Gulf, and forced the rulers of the nine gulf shaykhdoms to confront the consequences of a change many of them had sought to postpone or avoid. With less than a year to consummate the withdrawal, the British envoy, Sir William Luce, brought a sense of urgency to his task of trying to resolve the outstanding obstacles to a stable political order among the shaykhdoms. However, any such resolution had to go through Iran. And the British timetable may well have been a handicap in negotiating with the Shah over Abu Musa and the Tunb islands. The Shah felt he was dealing from a position of strength, and was willing to engage the British, who served as the interlocutors between Iran and shaykhs of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah, in a game of brinkmanship. In other words, the Shah was confident the British would be the first to blink, 5  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 30 August 1971, Tehran 04816 1000Z; RG 59. 6  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Shiraz to Washington, 15 October 1971, Shiraz 16 2010Z, FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, No. 144. 7   Robert Steele, “Pahlavi Iran on the Global Stage: The Shah’s 1971 Persepolis Celebrations,” in Roham Alvandi, ed., The Age of Aryamehr: Late Pahlavi Iran and its Global Entanglements (London: Gingko Library, 2018), pp. 116–152.

226 

B. FRIEDMAN

and the brinkmanship would provide Iran with a golden opportunity to assert itself as the natural successor to British dominance in the Gulf. And, in the waning days of British protection, the ruling shaykhs continued to pursue their individual stratagems for relative dominance and/or political autonomy by cautiously maneuvering between their large regional neighbors, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq.

Bahraini Independence Sir William Luce met with Shaykh Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani, the deputy ruler of Qatar on 30 July to emphasize to Khalifah that any new “Treaty of Friendship” between an independent Qatar and Great Britain would not include a British defense commitment. Khalifah said that he was not worried about external aggression. The only danger he foresaw was “internal subversion” and he saw that as being generated from Bahrain rather than from within Qatar itself.8 Like Bahrain, Khalifah said that Qatar would delay any official move toward independence if King Faysal wished them to do so. At the end of July, a two-man Bahraini delegation traveled to Saudi Arabia seeking approval for independence from King Faysal. King Faysal remained unmoved, and reminded the Bahrainis that Saudi policy had all along been a support for the nine-member union of shaykhdoms. When the Bahraini delegates attempted to point out that British withdrawal was imminent, King Faysal asked why Bahrain could not wait another three to four months. Bahraini officials pointed out that there was some concern that the U.N. would establish rules in the fall of 1971 barring membership for states with populations of less than one million. In private discussions with King Faysal’s adviser, Rashard Pharaon, the Bahrainis were sympathetically advised to put their arguments in a written memorandum for King Faysal’s further consideration.9 A week after Bahrain officially declared its independence on 14 August 1971 (formally consummated on 15 August), Prince Fahd, the increasingly influential Saudi interior minister and second deputy prime minister,

8  BNA: Luce to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Draft Treaty between HMG and Qatar,” 2 August 1971, FCO 1016/907. 9  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 29 July 1971, Jidda 02646 291142Z.

9  GRANDEUR AND INDEPENDENCE 

227

led a high-level Saudi delegation to Bahrain.10 At the close of the visit, Prince Fahd said that Saudi relations with Bahrain were “deeper, wider, and closer than narrow formalities.” He also stated that Saudi Arabia was seriously interested in constructing a land bridge connecting Saudi Arabia to Bahrain.11 On 21 September 1971, Bahrain was admitted as a member-­ state of the U.N.12

Zayid Could Not Wait The verbal pyrotechnics between Iran, Kuwait, and the British media over the islands throughout June 1971, led Shaykh Rashid of Dubai to stun Shaykh Zayid on 27 June, when he said he could not discuss a union of seven. Apparently, Shaykh Rashid feared Iran’s objections to a union of seven. Less than forty-eight hours later, the advisers and rulers from Dubai, Sharjah, and Ras al-Khaimah hastily traveled to Abu Dhabi to consult with Shaykh Zayid on 28 and 29 June. Shaykh Rashid seemed to have changed his mind in the interim, and the advisers focused their attention on the urgent need for a union. They discussed convening a meeting of the Supreme Council of Rulers, and transforming the existing Abu Dhabi Development Bureau into a federal government. The bureau had already initiated studies on the mechanisms for unifying domestic security, the defense forces, passports, and diplomatic representation. A rulers’ meeting was scheduled for 5 July 1971.13 However, Shaykh Zayid learned that certain shaykhs were still not ready to commit to a constitutional union. Therefore, Zayid raised the stakes and, on 1 July, announced that Abu Dhabi would establish its own political and administrative institutions. A Council of Ministers was announced, and Crown Prince Khalifah bin Zayid Al Nahyan was named its chair. Shaykh Zayid also declared the establishment of a National Consultative Assembly to secure the “participation of the people” in “running the affairs and policies of the land.”14

 The New York Times, 14 and 15 August, 1971.  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 23 August 1971, Jidda 02959 231059Z, RG 59. 12  U.S. Department of State Telegram, US UN mission to Washington, 12 October 1971, US UN 03088 030056Z, RG 59. 13  Taryam, p. 172. 14  Taryam, pp. 172–173. 10 11

228 

B. FRIEDMAN

Shaykh Zayid’s move had a two-fold impact: First, it put Abu Dhabi’s actions on par with Qatar and Bahrain, who were also creating their own independent state structures at this juncture. Second, and more important, it put the remaining shaykhs on notice that Zayid was not going to wait for their approval to secure Abu Dhabi’s future. Zayid possessed the material resources to move forward alone, if need be, while the other shaykhs did not. Zayid’s actions were an indirect ultimatum to his neighboring shaykhs to either get in line with his agenda or find themselves isolated and on their own. Shaykh Rashid of Dubai was particularly concerned despite his differences with Zayid. He dispatched his adviser, Mehdi al-Tajir, to Abu Dhabi where Tajir met with Zayid’s adviser Ahmad Al Suwaydi. Al Suwaydi had been named Zayid’s Minister of Cabinet Affairs for the new Council of Ministers. Tajir told Suwaydi that Dubai agreed to join Abu Dhabi in a union, but asked for time before moving forward. He asked if Abu Dhabi could at least wait until Qatar and Bahrain had declared their intentions regarding union or independence. Abu Dhabi’s response was that it could not wait. The deadline with the British was just six months away and economic conditions on the littoral were deteriorating as a result of the political instability, according to Suwaydi. What was more, the people were experiencing a psychological fatigue and lack of faith in the seriousness of the union because of all of the false fits and starts during the past three years. Following this message there were a series of meetings between officials from Dubai and Abu Dhabi, which led to a meeting of all seven of the Trucial shaykhs on 10 July 1971. This five-hour closed meeting was a complete failure. The issue of Iran’s claim to islands and the question of union were tabled. Instead the shaykhs were only interested in discussing the role of Abu Dhabi’s Development Bureau. The Trucial shaykhs were reluctant to surrender authority to a constitutional federal union. They preferred something akin to a confederation, where certain basic infrastructure and services would be provided by a central administration, like the Development Bureau, but all political authority would remain with the seven individual shaykhs. It is clear that throughout the week of discussions leading to the 10 July meeting, Dubai was attempting to find a formula that would limit Shaykh Rashid’s subordination to Shaykh Zayid without leaving Dubai isolated and on its own. First it wanted to increase the powers of the Abu Dhabi Development Bureau, which would circumscribe the federal powers of the union and limit Shaykh Zayid’s political authority over Dubai.

9  GRANDEUR AND INDEPENDENCE 

229

In a constitutional federal union of seven shaykhs, Zayid would have the ability to purchase the loyalty of a majority of dependent rulers in any Supreme Council vote. Therefore, Dubai also tried arguing that federal union was only between Dubai and Abu Dhabi, which would mean both rulers were on equal footing. In effect, Dubai was attempting to construct a confederation arrangement through the backdoor, and avoid a constitutional federation of seven. Rashid had used Qatar to propose a confederation for the union of nine in 1970. After the frustrating five-hour session on 10 July, Shaykh Zayid said the meeting lacked seriousness. After two more days of ineffective sessions, Shaykh Zayid convened a session on 13 July and directly asked all six rulers whether they wanted a union or not. The rulers unanimously supported a union. Abu Dhabi proposed using the draft constitution for the nine-member union that was approved in June 1970, with the appropriate modifications for a seven-­ member union, and with expanded powers for the representative National Federal Assembly. Shaykh Zayid’s constitutional proposal was accepted, and meetings among representatives of the shaykhs continued. A federal capital, voting procedure in the Supreme Council, and the proportion of income contributed by the oil-producing emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai were still important issues under discussion. Abu Dhabi insisted that voting in the Supreme Council should be governed by a five-member majority, which had to include both Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Ostensibly, Dubai and Abu Dhabi possessed a veto power over all Supreme Council resolutions. Further, national consultative council membership would consist of forty representatives: eight from Dubai and Abu Dhabi, respectively; six members from Sharjah and Ras al-­ Khaimah, respectively; and four members each from Ajman, Fujairah, and Umm al-Qaiwain. Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah opposed the Supreme Council voting procedure, the structure of representation in the national council, and the 5 percent contribution from oil revenues to the union budget. Nevertheless, the union was forged without Shaykh Saqr and Ras al-Khaimah, and, on 18 July 1971, the six remaining Trucial shaykhdoms officially declared its intention to establish the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It is important to note that the word used throughout the four-year discussion of the state was “union” (ʾittihad), but when the state moved to declare its independence the word was changed to “united” (muttahida). The wording suggests that the rulers had opted for a centrally controlled federated structure rather than a more autonomous, loosely binding confederated structure. Further, their practical steps forward

230 

B. FRIEDMAN

confirmed the moves toward a federated union. Ultimately, the six shaykhs signed a constitution, and planned to transform the 1700-member Trucial Oman Scouts, which was a British-trained and British-officered force, into the foundation of a federal army that would be expanded to 5000 men. Ten percent of annual oil income of 300,000,000 Rials would be dedicated for the annual UAE defense budget.15 On 21 July, Kamal Adham, King Faysal’s close adviser, pointed out to American officials that it would be difficult for the Saudis to send an endorsement of the union to Shaykh Zayid, the temporary president of the union. Adham emphasized that with the boundary dispute unsettled, and Zayid’s studied silence on the latest Saudi proposal, it was unlikely that public Saudi support would be forthcoming. Adham was also concerned a public endorsement of the union would anger Iran, and Saudi Arabia was eager to maintain cooperation with Iran in order to preserve stability in the Gulf. When the American officials tried to point out that it would help the union ward off subversive threats from Iraq if it were better supported by its larger neighbors, Adham explained that Saudi influence in the emirates “was stronger…than might be apparent.” He even claimed that the rulers of Ajman, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, and Umm al-Qaiwain had offered—in writing—to become part of Saudi Arabia. He did not mention when these offers had been made.16

Qatar Seeks Saudi Blessing Shaykh Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani of Qatar met with King Faysal on 25 August to seek Saudi Arabia’s blessing for Qatar’s separate independence. Khalifah said that he told Faysal that while efforts were underway to constitute a union of emirates, Bahrain had chosen independence, and now Qatar believed its best option was independence as well. Faysal told Khalifah that he had worked for unity and cooperation in the Gulf in the interest of security and stability. According to Khalifah, King Faysal said he had given Bahrain his approval for independence, and he would give his blessing to Qatar, as well.17 Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs  Rayyis, p. 194.  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 22 July 1971, Jidda 02576 230619Z, RG 59. 17  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 26 August 1971, Jidda 03002 261522Z, RG 59. 15 16

9  GRANDEUR AND INDEPENDENCE 

231

ʿUmar Saqqaf said that Faysal voiced his concern that the proliferation of multiple entities in the Gulf was bound to encourage and facilitate “dangerous activities” from “communists and radical elements.” Saqqaf added that Faysal “strongly advised” Khalifah against permitting the establishment of communist diplomatic missions in Qatar. Saqqaf said that King Faysal had not explicitly endorsed Qatari independence, “but allowed Khalifah to draw the obvious conclusions from his reference to foreign missions in Qatar.”18 This small episode revealed two important elements of relations between Saudi Arabia and the neighboring Arab rulers. First, it was clear that throughout the summer of 1971, Qatar and Bahrain would take no public step toward official independence without tacit Saudi permission. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Qatar and Bahrain was almost like the relationship between a father and his adult sons: The increasingly independent sons chafe at their self-imposed subordination to the father’s behavior, but ultimately respect his authority. Second, it confirmed that King Faysal’s primary interest in seeing a large union of nine emirates was his belief that a larger entity was the most effective mechanism for creating security and stability along the Gulf littoral. More specifically, in the eyes of King Faysal, a single political structure would afford “communist and radical elements” fewer targets on the Arabian Peninsula. Saqqaf, the Saudi minister of state, also mentioned that King Faysal’s position on the newly established United Arab Emirates was “known and clear.” There would be no Saudi recognition of the union until the Saudi boundary with Abu Dhabi was settled. Saqqaf said that union had not been directly informed of this, but Faysal had discussed this issue with the British who, Saqqaf believed, would pass along the information to the union. It is notable that King Faysal was unwilling to directly communicate with the new union, which was a sign that Saudi Arabia would do nothing that could be construed to be either implicit or explicit recognition of the new state.19 On 7 September the United Arab Emirates sent a delegation to Taʾif, Saudi Arabia, which was led by Abu Dhabi’s interior minister, Shaykh Mubarak bin Muhammad, and Mehdi al-Tajir, Shaykh Rashid’s chief 18  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 28 August 1971, Jidda 03029 281510Z, RG 59. 19  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 2 August 1971, Dhahran 00902 021304Z, RG 59.

232 

B. FRIEDMAN

adviser. The delegation was met by the Deputy Governor of Mecca, but none of the king’s ministers or representatives were on hand to welcome the delegation. It was a very brief visit. The group arrived late morning and by late afternoon it returned to Dubai. Despite a local radio report that the delegation would meet with King Faysal, there were no reports that such a meeting took place. This suggests that even if King Faysal discreetly met with the union’s representatives, he was continuing his policy of giving it no explicit or implicit recognition of any kind. Nevertheless, it was also important that King Faysal did not openly oppose the union. Saqqaf believed that the king still had hope for the future formation of the larger union of nine, despite Qatar and Bahrain’s request for Saudi support for independence. Shaykh Zayid, for his part, believed that the border problem with Saudi Arabia was not “acute.” His view was that it was a dispute with an Arab neighbor with whom Zayid desired the closest possible relations. Adnan Pachachi, Zayid’s Iraqi adviser on foreign affairs, said that Zayid understood that he would have to make a deal with King Faysal, and that he was ready to compromise “up to a point.”20

Negotiating the Islands In mid-September 1971, as the six emirates attempted to move forward with their plans for independence, the Shah took a much harder line with the emirates in order to pressure the rulers to resolve the islands dispute. Moreover, as opposed to its hostile public statements in June, Iran was directing his statements privately at the British rather than publicly at the Arab shaykhs. On 9 September, the British reported that the Shah privately threatened that unless the current Iranian proposal for the islands settlement was accepted he would “attack and destroy the union of Arab emirates.” According to the Shah, the British could have the Iranian carrot or the stick. The carrot was a set of economic trade inducements offered under the label of a “special relationship.” Such cooperation was to include political ties in the Gulf and Indian Ocean; additional military sales and training contracts with Iran (at the time Iran already had almost £200/$493  million worth of missile and tank orders with the British); 20  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 17 November 1971, Dhahran 01536 171316Z, RG 59.

9  GRANDEUR AND INDEPENDENCE 

233

increased public sector contracts, and an overall doubling of British manufacturing exports to Iran. The stick Iran would use against Britain included destroying the UAE; withdrawing from CENTO, including over-flight rights for the British Royal Air Force; an end to all military, trade, and investment deals; and moving the Iranian embassy from London to Coventry. Further it was clear that if Iran was forced to seize the islands without a settlement, it would place full blame on the British.21 On 12 September, the Iranian daily newspaper Kayhan, which was closely aligned with the government, published an editorial expressing satisfaction that the six shaykhdoms were planning on declaring independence at the end of the week because it would hasten the end of the “colonial era” in the Persian Gulf. However, it also stated that the fate of “the tiny island of Abu Musa is of key importance” to Iran. The article claimed that if the island was handed to one of the shaykhdoms it would be impossible for Iran to recognize the UAE. It warned that Britain would be mistaken to try to get itself off the hook by wasting time, and that attempts to “involve the shaikhs in a matter that has nothing to do with them” represents “the worst kind of Machiavellianism.”22 Asadollah Alam explained that Iran had “dampened down the Iranian press,” and the Shah had refrained from making public statements since the end of June. The Shah had avoided mentioning the islands during his 31 August address to the new session of the Iranian Majlis (parliament) despite having made a statement about the islands the year before. However, now he felt as if the British were building the UAE “by stealth,” and would suddenly declare it established “thereby pulling the carpet out from under the feet of the Iranians and leaving them in direct confrontation with the Arabs.”23 As the last six months of the British military presence in the Gulf wound down, the tension and urgency that accompanied the pressing need for a negotiated solution to the question of the three disputed islands was ratcheting up. The proposal that had been agreed upon between the British and Iran on 3 September 1971 in London consisted of the following core elements: (1) Saqr and Khalid would agree on a specific date for Iranian forces and 21  BNA: Tehran to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Britain, Iran, and “the Islands”: The Carrot and the Stick,” 28 September 1971, FO 1016/914; and, Tehran to FCO, 9 September 1971, FO 1016/913. 22  Kayhan International, 12 September 1971; BNA: Tehran to FCO, 13 September 1971, FO 1016/913. 23  BNA: Tehran to FCO, 11 September 1971, FO 1016/913.

234 

B. FRIEDMAN

officials to land on the three islands toward the end of 1971; (2) the rulers would provide written confirmation to Great Britain that after one year they would withdraw their administrations and remove their flags from the islands; (3) Iran and the two rulers would agree to say nothing about the sovereignty of the islands for a period of eighteen months after Iranian occupation; (4) Iran agrees to compensate any island resident who chooses to permanently leave the island after Iranian occupation; (5) all the rulers of the UAE would provide a written agreement that they would do nothing to alter the arrangements of this agreement in exchange for Iran’s positive support for the UAE; (6) all agreements would be handled through the U.K., and the only direct agreement between Iran and the two rulers would be the agreement for financial assistance and annual aid (£1.5/$3.6 million) for nine years, including a cash equivalent of up to 49 percent of any oil revenues generated from the islands.24 On 14 September, Sir William Luce returned to the Gulf to convince Saqr and Khalid to accept the proposed resolution that had been negotiated in London with Iran’s Ambassador Amir Khosrow Afshar.25 Shaykh Saqr told Luce that he had consulted with fifteen of his most prominent citizens twice to discuss the latest Iranian proposal. Their consensus was that the Iranian proposal was unacceptable because it left “virtually nothing” to Ras al-Khaimah. Saqr pointed out that the financial aid Iran was offering for the Tunbs was less that what the British were offering to Malta. He also said that there was no guarantee that Iran would continue the aid; they could simply cut it off at any time. Saqr said he was considering taking the issue to the Arab League; he believed that some of the Arab states that had good relations with Iran might be better suited to broker a more favorable agreement than Britain. Luce warned Saqr that the Shah would never tolerate the issue being taken up by the Arab League. He said that the current proposal was the only sure basis for a solution, and that it was a better deal than the one that had been offered three months earlier.26 24  BNA: “Summary Record of Conversation between Sir William Luce and Iranian Ambassador at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 3 September 1971,” FO 1016/914. 25  BNA: “Proposed Elements of a Settlement of the Islands Question Discussed Between H.E.  Mr. Afshar and Sir William Luce, for putting to the rulers concerned,” ND, FO 1016/914. 26  BNA: “Record of Meeting in Ras al-Khaimah on Tuesday 14 September, 1971,” 15 September 1971, FO 1016/914.

9  GRANDEUR AND INDEPENDENCE 

235

Nevertheless, Saqr argued, it was still not good enough. He said “it would be better if the Iranians simply took the islands” without giving him any aid. Luce said that if Saqr found it “absolutely impossible” to accept the current proposal he should think carefully about an alternative arrangement that would station Iranian troops on Greater Tunb based on a written agreement between Saqr and Iran, with nothing said about the administration or policing of the island. However, Luce warned Saqr that Iran would likely eject both the police and administration after one year. Luce cautioned that he was not sure the Shah would accept such an arrangement, but Saqr had to offer a counter-proposal to the Shah; simply saying the Shah’s offer was unacceptable was not a reply. Saqr told Luce that there was nothing in the Shah’s current proposal but financial aid, which he did not want. Of course he needed money, but he maintained it must be gotten “honorably.” Iran had no right to the islands, Saqr argued, “she was simply talking the language of power.”27 Luce urged Saqr to consider the interests of the broader area, and not simply Ras al-Khaimah’s interests. Saqr shot back that all the blame for handing the islands over to Iran would fall on Ras al-Khaimah alone. Luce argued that Saudi Arabia and Egypt wanted to see a solution to this problem and were unlikely to blame Saqr. Saqr said he could not agree to anything without King Faysal’s approval because he was the senior Arab ruler in the area. Saqr then expressed the desire to consult with other Arab governments about the Iranian proposals. Luce told him that consultation would end the negotiations with Iran, which were supposed to be confidential.28 Luce again tried to find a compromise by reminding Saqr that they could work toward an arrangement to waive the demand for a written statement from Saqr that he would withdraw his forces from the island. The Shah would simply eject Ras al-Khaimah’s administration and forces after a year, and Saqr would be free to express his protest and assert sovereignty (as long as he did not file a complaint in the Arab League), and the Shah would continue to pay the ruler financial aid. Saqr said that the Kuwaiti press would pillory him and say he sold the islands to Iran. Luce told him Kuwait made those public arguments because it was afraid of 27  BNA: “Record of Meeting in Ras al-Khaimah on Tuesday 14 September, 1971,” 15 September 1971, FO 1016/914. 28  BNA: “Record of Meeting in Ras al-Khaimah on Tuesday 14 September, 1971,” 15 September 1971, FO 1016/914.

236 

B. FRIEDMAN

Iraq, but, in any case, it was Saudi Arabia and Egypt whose opinions counted and they wanted a solution. Another British official argued that since Ras al-Khaimah’s administration would not be expelled for a year, it is unlikely the Kuwaiti press would criticize him now. Saqr complained that this was “all very difficult.” He then repeated his argument that it would be best if Iran simply seized the islands, he didn’t want Iran’s aid, and he would keep quiet. He would not protest.29 Luce argued that if there was no settlement it wouldn’t matter if Saqr remained silent because other Arab states would protest and trouble would begin anyway. Saqr reiterated that the Iranians were not being reasonable and were acting not “on right” but “on power.” Saqr asked about the inhabitants of the island, and Luce explained that the Shah had given assurances that the people who wanted to stay would be well looked after and those that elected to leave would be compensated. The Shah also agreed to look after the Arab school and the fishing rights of the islanders. Luce told Saqr that he would give him a few more days to consider the proposal. Saqr responded that he considered it “day and night, but the Iranians left him very little room for maneuver.”30

Abu Musa In the meantime, Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi was giving the British little room to maneuver as well. During the first week of October, in the midst of the struggle over the islands, the British attempted to convince Zayid to postpone establishing UAE’s independence until later in the year. Zayid demurred arguing two months was much too long to wait. He said “his people would lose their appetite if the food grew cold.” Luce warned Zayid not to issue a challenge to the Shah, and added that “cold food was better than poisoned food.” The British were so concerned that Zayid, acting prematurely, would provoke the Shah that they approached Shaykh Rashid of Dubai to discover if he shared Zayid’s views regarding the urgency of establishing the union, and to ask him if he could restrain Zayid.31

29  BNA: BNA: “Record of Meeting in Ras al-Khaimah on Tuesday 14 September, 1971,” 15 September 1971, FO 1016/914. 30  BNA: “Record of Meeting in Ras al-Khaimah on Tuesday 14 September, 1971,” 15 September 1971, FO 1016/914. 31  BNA: Dubai to FCO, 6 October 1971, FO 1016/914.

9  GRANDEUR AND INDEPENDENCE 

237

Shaykh Rashid told the British that he felt that the union could wait until the end of the year and even into the following year, but he said that he did not have the kind of influence with Zayid to be able to restrain him. Mehdi al-Tajir, Shaykh Rashid’s chief adviser, told the British that Egypt’s Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Riad, had encouraged them to make every effort to solve their problems with Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, he suggested that if they had not succeeded by the beginning of December, Egypt would support the proclamation of the UAE in spite of Iran. As a result of Tajir’s comment, and the fact that Ramadan fell in November in 1971, the British believed they could restrain Zayid from establishing the union until, at the very least, the end of November 1971.32 Some British officials felt Zayid was being pushed to declare the UAE in spite of Iran’s opposition by his Iraqi adviser on foreign affairs, Adnan Pachachi, whom the British suspected of harboring strong Arab nationalist views. The British believed that Shaykh Rashid of Dubai loathed Pachachi and would therefore drag his feet on the issue, in any case. Yet, Shaykh Zayid was not simply “under Pachachi’s Arab nationalist spell”; with Saudi Arabia’s claim to Abu Dhabi territory still unresolved, Zayid wanted to be sure the UAE did not miss its opportunity for UN membership in 1971.33 It was sometime after the late September meeting with Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah that Sir William Luce began exploring a counter-proposal to Iran that was somewhat similar to the Gulf median line compromise advocated by Saudi Arabia in November 1968.34 The Saudi compromise had Abu Musa remaining Arab while the Tunb islands, which were more distant from the Arab coastline and on the Iranian side of the median line, would be Iran’s. The British archival records on this issue are heavily redacted; however, a modified version of this idea appears to have been floated to Shaykh Khalid by Luce’s team following the unsuccessful efforts to elicit any sense of compromise from Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah. The idea would be that Iranian forces would be based on Abu Musa, with Sharjah permitted to retain certain governance privileges and trappings of sovereignty, while the two Tunb islands would devolve outright to Iranian sovereign control. During the month of October 1971, Luce returned to Tehran to inform the Shah that the early September Luce/Afshar proposal had not  BNA: Bahrain to FCO, 8 October, 1971, FO 1016/915.  BNA: Abu Dhabi to FCO, 7 October 1972, FO 1016/914. 34  Mattair, p. 393. 32 33

238 

B. FRIEDMAN

been accepted by the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. Luce met with the Shah twice for a total of five hours, and personally worked with him to reformulate “elements of settlement” that would be based on the median line in Gulf: In exchange for complete and sovereign control of the Tunb islands, the Shah was willing to make certain concessions to Sharjah on Abu Musa. It was the Shah’s final proposal.35 On 30 October, Shaykh Saqr gave Sir William Luce his final answer on a settlement for the Tunb islands. He said the Tunbs belonged to Ras al-­ Khaimah and he was not going to brand himself as the ruler who gave them away, even less as the ruler who took money for them. Saqr argued that placing the blame on the British would not help him, Iran should take the islands by force if it insisted on having them. He said that when it came to giving up Ras al-Khaimah territory he could only look at the issue from Ras al-Khaimah’s point of view. He said he would be attacked by other Arabs and would have behaved dishonorably toward his own people. His honor was all-important, he persisted.36 However, on the same day, Shaykh Khalid of Sharjah gave Sir William Luce indications that he might be amenable to the Shah’s latest proposal on Abu Musa. He asked for an opportunity for one last private consultation with approximately 50 of his leading citizens.37 The following day Luce returned, and Shaykh Khalid settled on a slightly modified counter-­ proposal that Luce would present to the Shah. The main points of the proposal were published on 1 November, in al-Khalij, a Sharjah-based newspaper printed in Kuwait, under several headlines, including one that read, “Sharjah Stands Up Alone to Pressure and Threats Amidst Total Arab Silence.” In contrast to Khalid’s private acquiescence to the latest Iranian proposal discussed with Luce, which included avoiding any reference to sovereignty, Khalid is quoted in the newspaper as saying that Sharjah does not have the power to resist Iranian occupation and that the island belongs not to Sharjah alone but to the whole Arab nation: “And I appeal to all Arab countries to move quickly and openly to coordinate their efforts and to take a unified Arab position on this vital question.”38 35  BNA: “Record of Conversation in the Ruler’s Palace, Sharjah on Wednesday 27 October, 1971,” 29 October, 1971, FO 1016/917. 36  BNA: “Record of Conversation in Ruler’s Palace, Ras al-Khaimah on Saturday 30 October, 1971,” 2 November 1971, FO 1016/917. 37  BNA: “Record of Conversation in Ruler’s Palace, Sharjah on Saturday 30 October, 1971,” 31 October 1971, FO 1016/917. 38  BNA: Bahrain to FCO, 3 November 1971, FO 1016/915.

9  GRANDEUR AND INDEPENDENCE 

239

The newspaper had also outlined the major points of the proposal that Shaykh Khalid told Luce he could accept: (1) Iran and Sharjah will divide the island in a manner that gives Iran strategic control of the island’s deep waters and allows Iran to establish a military base on the island; (2) Sharjah will have the right to choose the oil company to explore the offshore fields in Abu Musa waters, provided the company operates under Iranian law; (3) Sharjah and Iran will split any oil revenues, and the Shah pledges to spend his share of the revenues on the development of the emirates that have no oil resources; (4) Sharjah and Iran will recognize Abu Musa’s territorial waters up to 12  miles; (5) Iran will provide Sharjah with £1.5/$3.6 million in financial assistance for nine years, but this assistance will be cut if Sharjah’s oil revenues from the island exceed £1.5/$3.6 million; and (6) agreement to these proposals will be recorded in letters exchanged through the British. The published proposal reflected the British-Iranian negotiating effort to construct a deal that avoided addressing the issue of conflicting claims to sovereignty over the island. The British documents are heavily redacted, but a close reading of the hundreds of pages of files related to the islands suggests that the British tacitly accepted the notion that Iran would fulfill its claim to sovereignty over the islands at an appropriate time in the future, following British military withdrawal. Al-Khalij, lamenting the absence of significant Arab support for the rulers, noted, “The Arab League has remained silent…it is as though the islands were Honolulu and Jamaica and not Abu Musa and the Tunbs— Arab islands.” It also condemned the attitude on the international level, which it said was one of “conspiracy guided by the interest of states—a game for filling the vacuum.”39 The newspaper also published a statement from Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah saying that he had refused an Iranian offer of £1.6 million per year and 49 percent of oil revenues for the Tunb islands.40 The following day, 2 November, Shaykh Khalid told Luce he had never made those statements and that he had issued a formal denial through Reuters news service, which had picked up the story. Luce strongly recommended that Khalid also send a letter of regret and denial to the Shah,

 BNA: Bahrain to FCO, 3 November 1971, FO 1016/915.  BNA: al-Khalij, 1 November 1971, FO 1016/915.

39 40

240 

B. FRIEDMAN

which he did.41 The Shah sent a personal message in return accepting the “sincerity” of Khalid’s statements and expressing a desire for a successful conclusion to their negotiations.42 In addition, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Information confiscated and destroyed all issues of al-Khalij that were intended for distribution in Kuwait.43 Although there is no documentary evidence, it is possible and perhaps probable that Shaykh Khalid allowed and even encouraged the al-Khalij story in order to protect himself.44 The ruler of Sharjah feared that coming to an agreement with Iran on Abu Musa would cost him his life.45

Shaykh Saqr Is Out of Options In the meantime, Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah, looking for some kind of external support to use as leverage in negotiations, decided to send his son and chief adviser to the U.S. to make a case for U.S. support, directly and in person. On 8 November 1971, Shaykh Khalid bin Saqr and Tawfiq Abu Khader met with U.S.  Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco in Washington D.C. Shaykh Khalid explained that Ras al-Khaimah would not join the UAE because (1) only Dubai and Abu Dhabi, out of seven emirates, were granted absolute veto powers; (2) the original agreement provided for a rotation of the president of the union every two years, while the new amended constitution stipulates that the president will have a five-­ year term with the possibility of serving successive terms; (3) the amended constitution reduced the power of the Supreme Council of seven rulers by no longer granting it the authority to appoint the union’s minister or prime minister. Khalid said that for these reasons Ras al-Khaimah intends to declare its independence and full sovereignty on 1 January 1972 and would like to request U.S. recognition and full diplomatic relations. Khalid also requested the “good offices” of the U.S. in dealing with Iran 41  BNA: Bahrain to FCO, 3 November 1971, FO 1016/915; “Record of Conversation in the Ruler’s Palace, Sharjah on Tuesday 2 November, 1971,” 2 November 1971, FO 1016/916. 42  BNA: Tehran to FCO, 4 November 1971, FO 1016/916. 43  BNA: Kuwait to FCO, 3 November 1971, FO 1016/915. 44  The Chief Editor of al-Khalij at the time was A.O. Taryam. Shaykh Khalid described Taryam as a “nationalist” to Sir William Luce. Taryam later became the UAE’s first minister of justice. Curiously, there is no mention of this early November episode in Taryam’s book, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates 1950–1985. 45  BNA: FCO to Tehran, 25 October 1971, FO 1016/915.

9  GRANDEUR AND INDEPENDENCE 

241

regarding the two Tunb islands. He also pointed out that Ras al-Khaimah would welcome a U.S. military base anywhere within its sovereign territory. Khalid said that Ras al-Khaimah had “tried everything” to find a compromise on joining the union and had even asked for a letter from Abu Dhabi and Dubai that they would not use their veto. Ras al-Khaimah had supported a constitutional union of nine shaykhdoms, but the current amended constitution granted Abu Dhabi and Dubai “unacceptable power” over the decision-making within the federation. Abu Khader said that Ras al-Khaimah was still prepared to join a larger union of nine if and when that kind of structure “could come about.” Abu Khader emphasized that what the shaykhdom needed was U.S. support to replace the British treaty of protection. He noted that the oil company operating in Ras al-­ Khaimah was American, and that “time was running out for Ras al-­ Khaimah.” However, Abu Khader was under the impression Ras al-Khaimah had until the end of the year. In fact, the British were planning to terminate the protection treaty at the beginning of December. Abu Khader expressed frustration with British mediation in the islands dispute. He said the British were simply passing the Iranian proposals to Ras al-Khaimah. Abu Khader explained that Ras al-Khaimah had no problem with Iranian troops garrisoning the island, as long as Iran acknowledged Ras al-Khaimah’s sovereignty. Sovereignty was the key issue, and Shaykh Saqr would not make any agreement with Iran that “fuzzed” the issue of sovereignty. Sisco diplomatically side-stepped the issue while deferring to the British and expressing hope that a settlement in the interests of Ras al-Khaimah could be found. Abu Khader had described the British and union officials as applying “pressure tactics” on Ras al-Khaimah, and said that Shaykh Saqr would never “kneel to Abu Dhabi.” Finally, he confirmed that while King Faysal did not want to seem as if he was spoiling the union, he continued to favor a union of nine shaykhdoms and had provided Ras al-Khaimah written assurance that he would not leave Ras al-Khaimah “by itself.” It would be fair to say that while the Shaykh Khalid bin Saqr received assurance from the U.S. that it could continue to enjoy and rely on U.S. friendship, it received no satisfaction on its request for diplomatic recognition, use of U.S. “good offices” regarding the Tunb islands and Iran, or material aid or protection. In late November, Sisco had the U.S.  Consul General in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, Lee Dinsmore, personally deliver his letter to Shaykh Saqr

242 

B. FRIEDMAN

that explained that the U.S. was concerned for the security and welfare of Ras al-Khaimah, and hoped that the ruler would “reconsider the possibility of joining with other Gulf states in the coming months.” On 29 November, Saqr told Dinsmore he would not join the union on its present terms and that the conditions of the constitution “forced” Ras al-Khaimah to opt for independence. Dinsmore suggested that the best way to influence the direction of the union was to join it. He said Shaykh Saqr’s strong personality was bound to have a powerful affect. Saqr demurred, and said that recent events were indicative of how things in the union would be run. He noted that a few days earlier Shaykh Rashid and Shaykh Zayid had met with the British and drawn up a schedule of events leading up to the establishment of the union. He observed that “after they had made up their minds,” they appointed “an employee” to notify the four other shaykhs of their decision. “That is the way it was going to be,” Shaykh Saqr said. The implication of course, was that there was no consultation regarding decision-making in the union; in all walks of politics, being marginalized from decisions is frustrating, but in traditional patriarchal politics, while consultation among equals may sometimes be symbolic, it is almost always obligatory. Saqr was suggesting that the absence of consultation was a demeaning insult, and a sign that the union would be dominated by Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Shaykh Saqr was not “blind to reality,” as one American official claimed, yet, despite his best efforts to appeal to a foreign power and cling to King Faysal’s assurances, Shaykh Saqr, in his refusal to accept subordination, was moving toward dangerous isolation.

Tacit Agreement While Saqr was appealing to the Americans in early November, Sir William Luce continued to diligently apply himself to the shuttle diplomacy between the Shah and the shaykhs of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. During the Shah’s meeting with Luce on 11 November, he expressed concern about the East German War Minister’s visit to Iraq. He claimed there “was a report” that Iraq was planning to seize the islands (Tunbs and Abu Musa) preemptively with East German help. The Shah added, “they did not see how it could be possible…because if the British were prepared to defend the islands against Iran then this commitment would extend to

9  GRANDEUR AND INDEPENDENCE 

243

defending them also against seizure by Iraq.”46 Sir William Luce confirmed that Shaykh Khalid accepted “that neither side would surrender its claim to sovereignty [to Abu Musa] nor recognize the other claims.”47 Khalid’s decision, and the Shah’s agreement to leave the question of sovereignty unsettled, were significant concessions on the part of both rulers. Shaykh Khalid’s counter-proposal pertained chiefly to the geographical division of the island. The Shah said that Iran’s principal preoccupation was with control over the island’s high ground, as well as the ability to bring Iran’s naval warships to the island. The Shah was willing to concede to Shaykh Khalid’s territorial requests. Indeed, the Shah agreed to nearly every major counter-proposal that Luce brought from Khalid. There was a minor debate about the method for compensating Umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman over the Abu Musa oil concession dispute, but the Shah remained flexible. The only point that appeared to be a point of contention for the Shah was the mechanism for asserting Iranian control over the islands. Details of this discussion are heavily redacted in the British documents, but in one published section Luce states that there would be a serious “row” in the U.N. if Iran seized the islands without a settlement on the islands. The implication of this statement, which follows a redacted portion of the discussion, is important: The implicit logic of Luce’s comments suggest that if Iran seized the islands by force the consequence would be a U.N. “row” and not a British military defense of the islands. Luce then suggested that an Iranian seizure of the islands would generate an American condemnation. The Shah responded by saying he doubted whether America would “so easily forfeit friendship with Iran.” The Shah then took the brinkmanship to another level by saying that Iran would be forced to seek friends elsewhere, adding, “If Iran were pushed to become a communist country, which would be the worst possible outcome of the situation envisaged, this would be a pity.” The Shah continued by pointing out that the West sometimes “fails to realize when it is unwittingly crushing the patriotic self-expression of a country. The West must realize Iran’s period of weakness was over.”48 46  BNA: “Record of Conversation in Iran at Babolsar on Thursday 11 November, 1971,” 13 November 1971, FO 1016/916. 47  BNA: “Record of Conversation in Iran at Babolsar on Thursday 11 November, 1971,” 13 November 1971, FO 1016/916. 48  BNA: “Record of Conversation in Iran at Babolsar on Thursday 11 November, 1971,” 13 November 1971, FO 1016/916.

244 

B. FRIEDMAN

It seems that at the heart of the argument between Luce and the Shah was the fact that there was no compromise from Shaykh Saqr, and the Shah insisted on taking the Tunb islands by force. It was not just the Tunbs, but also Abu Musa; the Shah was intent on demonstrating a show of military force in the Gulf during the process of assuming control over the islands. Luce responded by telling the Shah he could not believe that Iran’s prestige depended on whether it seized the islands or not. The Shah replied that “Britain must not think that Iran was afraid of international pressure over the islands question. He added that he could not afford to diminish his prestige by sacrificing Iranian territory.”49 Luce also raised the issue of the timetable for the UAE’s formation. He made it clear that the UAE was expected to become formally established in the first few days of December in order to be considered for admission to the U.N. before the end of the year. Luce knew that the Shah intended to resolve the islands issue before the UAE came into existence. Luce acknowledged as much when he added that “time therefore is very short if the islands arrangements were to be put into effect before then.” In reply to a question from Luce, the Shah answered that military plans to occupy both Abu Musa and the Tunb islands “were prepared.”50 On 16 November, Luce finalized a deal in Iran that he could take back to Shaykh Khalid in Sharjah. The Shah had proved extremely flexible on accommodating Shaykh Khalid’s minor territorial adjustments to the geographical division of Abu Musa. A good portion of the November negotiating effort was devoted to settling the contractual and legal arrangements between the Iranian government and Buttes, the American company that had been granted the oil exploration concession for Abu Musa. Another outstanding issue was how Iran and Sharjah might adequately compensate Umm al-Qaiwain and Ajman for their claims to offshore oil rights in the twelve miles of offshore waters that Iran and Sharjah were unilaterally defining as belonging to Abu Musa.51 The Shah agreed to pay Umm al-­ Qaiwain £500,000 ($1.25 million) per year. If oil was discovered on Abu Musa, Iran would compensate Umm al-Qaiwain according to a ratio of approximately £3/$7.5 million for every £8/$20 million in income that 49  BNA: “Record of Conversation in Iran at Babolsar on Thursday 11 November, 1971,” 13 November 1971, FO 1016/916; Tehran to FCO, 13 November 1971, FO 1016/916. 50  BNA: “Record of Conversation in Iran at Babolsar on Thursday 11 November, 1971,” 13 November 1971, FO 1016/916; Tehran to FCO, 13 November 1971, FO 1016/916. 51  The shaykhdoms had submitted to a British enforced arbitration in 1970 which failed, in part, due to Iran’s outstanding claim to Abu Musa.

9  GRANDEUR AND INDEPENDENCE 

245

Iran received. The Shah also said he “would try to help Ajman” too, even though he believed Zayid should be doing more for it.52 However, the Shah insisted that Luce make it clear to Khalid that if any “Baathists, guerrillas, or any trouble-makers” arrived on the Sharjah portion of Abu Musa, Iran reserved the right to take whatever military action it deemed necessary to neutralize the threat to the island.53 Luce met with Khalid on 17 November and explained that the Shah had been willing to allow for the geographical adjustments Khalid had asked for. These included access to the ruler’s ancestral burial grounds, control over the islanders’ date groves, a clear approach to one of the island’s wells, and a deep water approach on the island’s eastern side. Khalid remained uncomfortable with the delineations along the southeastern corner of the island, but seemed willing to avoid making an issue of it. The next day, 18 November, Shaykh Khalid signed a memorandum of understanding, in front of senior members of his family, accepting the proposed arrangements between Iran and Sharjah for Abu Musa.54 The following day, 19 November, the British Foreign Office began circulating a detailed schedule of events for the last week of November regarding both the establishment of the UAE and the dispensation of the islands. These documents make it clear there was some degree of coordination between the British and Iran. Both British and Iranian officials had sent Shaykh Khalid and Shaykh Saqr advanced warning of the imminent Iranian occupation planned for 30 November, the day before the British were terminating the protection treaties with the Trucial rulers.55 The British also sent the American Department of State a detailed schedule of events that listed 30 November as the date “Iranian forces land on the islands.”56 29 November 1971 telegram from U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers to the American embassy in Bahrain refers to the planned Iranian occupation of the three islands on 30 November as “L

52  BNA: “Record of Conversation between Sir William Luce and H.I.M. the Shah of Iran at the Niavaran Palace, on 16 November, 1971” 18 November 1971, FO 1016/917. 53  BNA: “Record of Conversation between Sir William Luce and H.I.M. the Shah of Iran at the Niavaran Palace, on 16 November, 1971” 18 November 1971, FO 1016/917. 54  BNA: Dubai to FCO, Telegram No. 419, 19 November 1971, FC 1016/917. 55  BNA: Tehran to FCO, Telegram No. 1031, 1 December 1971, FO 1016/918. 56  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Secretary of State (Washington) to Tel Aviv and US UN New York, 15 November 1971, State 214109, RG 59.

246 

B. FRIEDMAN

Day.”57 Therefore, in contrast to former British diplomat Glen Balfour-­ Paul’s account in The End of Empire in the Middle East, which is also cited by Thomas Mattair in The Three Occupied UAE Islands, it is certain that the British knew of the date of Iran’s plans in advance. The Iranian operation to occupy the three islands was coordinated with the British in the weeks leading up to 30 November.58

Taking the Islands At seven in the evening on 29 November, Sawt as-Sahil (Voice of the Coast) radio, at the request of Shaykh Khalid of Sharjah, announced that Iran and Sharjah had reached an agreement to divide control over Abu Musa Island.59 The following morning, at 06:15, 30 November, five Iranian warships fired their guns in salute and a landing party was flown in on a helicopter to assume military control over Abu Musa Island. The Iranian forces were welcomed by Shaykh Saqr bin Mohammad, Shaykh Khalid’s brother. The atmosphere was friendly, and Saqr dined with the Iranian Admiral on the flagship Iranian naval vessel. The police commander from Sharjah and the new Iranian governor later walked the island together to clarify the division of territorial responsibility. Yet despite the convivial spirit of cooperation between officials from Iran and Sharjah on Abu Musa, both governments continued to maintain their claims to sovereignty over the island. Shaykh Khalid, the ruler of Sharjah, issued a statement announcing that Sharjah had come to an agreement with “the Iranian Empire” on the island of Abu Musa. He claimed that Sharjah and its people retained a “legal right” to a “dear portion” of “our good land.” He outlined the four main points of the deal: (1) the deal will not affect Sharjah’s view in respect 57  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Secretary of State (Washington) to Manama, 29 November 1971, State 215882, RG 59. 58  W.  Roger Louis, “British Withdrawal from the Gulf, 1967–1971,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2003), footnote 91, p. 107, is slightly vague on this issue. In contrast to Louis, Balfour-Paul (1991), and Mattair (2005), Simon Smith, in Britain’s Revival and Fall in the Gulf (2004), and Tore T. Petersen, in Richard Nixon, Great Britain and the Anglo-American Alignment in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula (2009), accurately reports of the British fore-knowledge of the Iranian occupation. See, Smith, p. 107 and Petersen, pp. 76–77. In fairness to Louis and Mattair, many of the relevant files had not yet been declassified at the time of their writing. For an extremely critical account of British behavior during this incident, see Taryam (1987), pp. 185–187. 59  BNA: Dubai to FCO, 29 November 1971, FO 1016/918.

9  GRANDEUR AND INDEPENDENCE 

247

of its sovereignty over Abu Musa Island…The Sharjah flag shall continue to be raised on the police headquarters…likewise the citizens of it shall continue to be under the authority and jurisdiction of the Sharjah government; (2) Buttes Oil & Gas Company will continue to drill for oil and explore natural resources on Abu Musa Island and in its territorial waters, which extend twelve nautical miles, and any income from natural resources will be split between Iran and Sharjah; (3) Iranian forces “shall reach an area” of the island agreed upon by both sides; (4) Iran will provide Sharjah £1.5/$3.6 million annually for nine years, or until Sharjah’s oil income from the island reach £3/$7.5 million annually. The same morning, Iran’s Prime Minister, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, delivered a speech before the Iranian Majlis (parliament), and said, “Thus, after nearly 80 years, during which colonialist policy has prevented Iran from the exercise of her sovereignty over these islands, despite Iran’s undoubted historical rights, as a result of the wise policy of him the ShahanShah and after extensive discussions with the British government, once again, the islands are under the rule of Iran.” He added later in his statement: “One essential point which we must take the opportunity to mention is that the Imperial Iranian government has in no way renounced its undoubted right to sovereignty over the whole island of Abu Musa.”60 British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, noted that “neither party is (in its own view) departing in any way from its position on the sovereignty of Abu Musa nor recognizing by any of the arrangements envisaged the other’s claim to sovereignty. Against this background the agreed practical arrangements over the island can be implemented without prejudice to the legal position of either party as regards sovereignty.”61 At the same time Iranian forces were being welcomed on Abu Musa, Iranian forces were preparing to seize the Tunb islands. At 05:30 helicopters dropped leaflets on Greater Tunb Island that warned the Arab residents of the island of the operation and told them that they should be proud to join the Iranian nation of 30  million people.62 Approximately forty-five minutes later warships had surrounded the island and helicopters deposited 30 Iranian soldiers on the island’s main beach. The landing forces removed the Ras al-Khaimah flag and surrounded the island’s police post. In the days leading up to the landing, Shaykh Saqr had received  BNA: Tehran to FCO, Telegram No. 1028, 30 November 1971, FO 1016/918.  BNA: FCO (Douglas-Home) to Kuwait, 29 November 1971, FO 1016/918. 62  BNA: Dubai to FCO, 5 December 1971, 1016/918. 60 61

248 

B. FRIEDMAN

warnings from Iran and the British to expect an Iranian landing on the Tunb islands, and it was strongly recommended to him that he advise his policemen on Greater Tunb not to resist Iranian forces. Nevertheless, on the morning of 30 November, Ras al-Khaimah policemen on Greater Tunb open fired on the Iranian landing force and killed three Iranian soldiers. One Ras al-Khaimah policeman was killed in the return fire and at least three others were wounded before they surrendered. Despite being informed by the Iranian forces that they were entitled to remain in their village, most of the frightened villagers on Greater Tunb immediately evacuated the island, pouring into three fishing dhows that carried them to mainland Ras al-Khaimah. Shaykh Saqr, after hearing news of the occupation, was reported to be “deeply shocked” and “subdued.” Nevertheless, British and American records indicate Shaykh Saqr was informed of the Iranian operation in advance. Further, these records suggest that Saqr was reluctant to provide any advance warning to the islands’ inhabitants of the impending landing for fear of appearing complicit in the Iranian operation. On 2 December Ras al-Khaimah sent a telegram to the Arab League denouncing Iran’s aggression as “rejecting all neighborly and religious relations,” and claiming that “it will lead to the greatest disturbance this area has seen for a long time.”63 The telegram also called on the Arab League to defend “Arab soil.” In a similar telegram to the U.N., Shaykh Saqr asked for “urgent action in the name of humanity” and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Iranian troops from “my territory.”64

The Backlash In the aftermath of the Iranian landing on the islands, there were popular demonstrations in Ras al-Khaimah, Dubai, and Sharjah. Demonstrators in Ras al-Khaimah attacked and set fire to the branch of the Iranian Bank Saderat in the old town, and also attacked Iranian-owned shops in the new part of town near the ruler’s residence. The Ras al-Khaimah police force attempted to manage the violence, but the Trucial Oman Scouts were also called in. In Dubai, Shaykh Rashid’s son Muhammad, managed to convince “some 600 school-children” demonstrating against Iranians in

 BNA: Cairo to FCO, 2 December 1971, FO 1016/918.  BNA: UKMISSION New York to FCO, 30 November, 1971, FO 1016/918.

63 64

9  GRANDEUR AND INDEPENDENCE 

249

Dubai to disperse.65 In Sharjah, approximately 200 rioting adults and schoolchildren headed toward the Iranian colony and the ruler’s palace. In a confrontation on the evening of 1 December, Shaykh Saqr bin Muhammad, the ruler’s brother, and the one who led the welcoming party for the Iranians on Abu Musa, was shot twice in the chest with a revolver, but survived his wounds.66 The Trucial Oman Scouts established road blocks with local police in Sharjah, Umm al-Qaiwain, and Ajman to prevent the riots from spreading. On 2 December in Kuwait, 2000 demonstrators gathered outside the ruler’s palace demanding weapons with which to expel the Iranians from Kuwait. The riot police were called in and they dispersed the crowd and made four arrests. A small fire was started outside the Bank of Iran, and 30 students from Sharjah protested outside the Kuwait Assembly building.67 There were demonstrations in Abu Dhabi town that turned violent when demonstrators attacked the Iranian bank and school and looted Iranian owned shops. The rioters were quickly dispersed by local police. On 4 December, there were reports of attacks on Iranian hospitals in Dubai and Fujairah. In Ajman, there were reports of clashes between a group of 30 Iranians who had arrived from Dubai by bus and the local population, but these were soon brought under control by local authorities. These riots and localized demonstrations were tolerated by the rulers who understood that they were a relatively mild and limited means to defuse local anger and frustration regarding the unsatisfying islands settlement. Iraq and Saudi Arabia represented the opposite poles of the spectrum regarding reaction in the Arab world to the Iranian occupation of the Tunbs and Abu Musa. At one extreme were the revolutionary Arab nationalist regimes of the region. On 30 November, the Iraqi Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs summoned the British Ambassador and told him they considered Sharjah’s surrender of Abu Musa “illegal,” while the Iranian occupation of the Tunb islands was “barefaced aggression.” He added that Britain had “betrayed the Arabs once again.”68 The following day Iraq severed diplomatic relations with Great Britain. The PDRY of South Yemen condemned the landing of “the Iranian stooge forces” that it claimed exposed “the weakness and treachery of the puppet governments  BNA: Dubai to Bahrain, 1 December 1971, FO 1016/918.  BNA: Dubai to FCO, 1 December 1971, FO 1016/918. 67  BNA: Kuwait to FCO, 2 December 1971, FO 1016/918. 68  BNA: Baghdad to FCO, 30 November 1971, FO 1016/918. 65 66

250 

B. FRIEDMAN

of the area.”69 The revolutionary PFLOAG (Popular Front for the Liberation of Arabian Gulf) issued a statement on 1 December that said that the only way to combat these reactionary plans and to recover the islands was through “organized revolutionary violence.”70 Somewhere in the middle of the spectrum of reactions was Kuwait, which had a prolonged and heated debate in its parliament regarding the Iranian action. A “wide cross section” called for breaking off relations with Iran, the U.K., and the U.S. On 2 December, Kuwait’s Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs said that Kuwait would issue official protests to the U.K. and Iran; however, it did not sever diplomatic ties.71 Egypt also mildly condemned the action but did not say much on the issue. At the more conservative end of the spectrum, the Royal Court in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, issued a bland official statement on 2 December expressing its surprise at the Iranian action and hoped “Iran will reconsider this position in order to guarantee the future order and stability of the area.”72 While Libya unilaterally nationalized British oil assets, vigorous attempts by the revolutionary Arab states (Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, and Algeria) to prompt strong action against Iran in the U.N. or in the Arab League ultimately came to nothing, particularly since they lacked support from the conservative monarchies in Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. In fact, Saudi Arabia had closely coordinated its muted response to the Iranian occupation with Egypt as well.73 Mahmud Riad, Egypt’s Foreign Minister, told Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah that the Tunbs were “taken by force” and “could only be retrieved by force,” and, unfortunately, “sufficient force was not available to the Arabs.” Riad added, “those who told him otherwise were liars,” and underscored his point by explaining to Saqr that the Arabs had two million refugees and had lost three large areas to Israel: therefore, the Arabs were not prepared to take up an armed struggle for “the return of one barren island and another small one with about 100 inhabitants.”74

 BNA: Aden to FCO, 4 December 1971, FO 1016/918.  BNA: Aden to FCO, 2 December 1971, FO 1016/918. 71  BNA: Tehran to FCO, 2 December 1971, FO 1016/918. 72  BNA: Jedda to FCO, 2 December 1971, FO 1016/918. 73  BNA: Jedda to FCO, 5 December 1971, FO 1016/918. 74  BNA: Dubai to FCO, 15 January 1972, FO 1016/920. 69 70

9  GRANDEUR AND INDEPENDENCE 

251

The End of the Trucial States On 1 December, Britain ended its protectorate treaties with the seven rulers of the Trucial emirates that dated back to the early nineteenth century. The following day, the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Qaiwain met and declared that the constitution of the United Arab Emirates would go into effect that day. The Supreme Council met and elected Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahyan as president, Shaykh Rashid bin Said Al Maktum vice president, and Dubai’s Crown Prince, Shaykh Maktum bin Rashid the prime minister. The UAE also signed a new treaty of friendship with Great Britain. The UAE submitted its application for membership to the Arab League and the U.N. , and, on 6 December, the Arab League approved the UAE application for membership, despite the objection from the PDRY (People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen) and the reservation from Saudi Arabia, presumably as a result of its outstanding territorial dispute with Abu Dhabi. On 9 December, the UAE became the 132nd member of the U.N. following a vote in the General Assembly. Nevertheless, King Faysal remained steadfast, and maintained his position that there would be no Saudi recognition of the UAE as long as its territorial dispute with Abu Dhabi remained unresolved. ʿUmar Saqqaf, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, noted that while Shaykh Zayid is full of respectful compliments for Faysal, as well as other brotherly comments, he is not to be trusted. Saqqaf noted that Shaykh Zayid has a British-supplied army that he intends to expand rapidly, therefore Saudi Arabia must regard the implications of Zayid’s policies with careful concern.75 A week later, Shaykh Zayid issued a decree naming an eighteen-­member cabinet to be presided over by Dubai’s Shaykh Maktum bin Rashid, the prime minister. Six ministries were allocated to Abu Dhabi, four to Dubai, three to Sharjah, and two to Ajman and Umm al-Qaiwain, and one to Fujairah. Two of Shaykh Rashid’s other sons were named heads of two key ministries: Defense (Shaykh Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktum) and Finance, Economy, and Industry (Shaykh Hamad bin Rashid Al Maktum). Shaykh Hamad was also appointed deputy prime minister. Zayid’s chief adviser, Ahmad Al Suwaydi, was appointed Federal Minister of Foreign 75  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Jidda to Washington, 4 December 1971, Jidda 04083 051547Z, RG 59.

252 

B. FRIEDMAN

Affairs. Zayid’s nephew Shaykh Mubarak bin Muhammad Al Nahyan was named as interior minister. Therefore, the key centers of powers of the new UAE were to be firmly controlled by Abu Dhabi and Dubai. A month after taking power, Zayid appeared confident and in control to American officials. He was confident as a result of the strong show of support he was receiving from his fellow shaykhs, particularly Rashid of Dubai. Shaykh Zayid also emphasized that improving the atmosphere among the Gulf riparian states was one of his priorities. He said the UAE had no ability to recover the islands and “we have to live with Iran,” and acknowledged that the shaykhdoms have to reconsider their positions. It was better to solve their problems by talking rather than shooting. He confided that he had asked Yasir Arafat, the head of al-Fatah and with whom he had good relations, to use his influence with the Iraqis, Syrians, and Libyans in order to encourage them not to “waste words on Iran in the Gulf” because the Gulf shaykhs have to live with Iran. Zayid intimated that he had helped Arafat in the past and that he had promised Arafat “special help” in exchange for his influence with the revolutionary states.76 While Shaykh Zayid and King Faysal still remained at odds with each other over Buraimi, and territorial issues near the Khor al-Udaid, they both appeared to see the importance of trying to maintain harmonious relations with Iran.

The United Arab Emirates Shaykh Saqr bin Sultan Al Qasimi, the former ruler of Sharjah, and cousin of the ruler Shaykh Khalid, initiated a coup d’état on 24 January 1972, during the ʿId al-Adha feast and celebration. Shaykh Saqr had been deposed by the British in 1965 for his strong Nasserist Arab nationalist sympathies and his disinclination to cooperate with the British. Shaykh Saqr’s plot was an opportunistic attempt to take advantage of Shaykh Khalid’s vulnerability following the late November 1971 deal to cede Abu Musa to Iran. Late in the afternoon on 24 January Shaykh Saqr bin Sultan and Bedouin armed with hand grenades stormed Khalid’s palace at a time when most of the Sharjah police force was on leave celebrating the Muslim holiday of ʿId al Adha. The group seized control of the palace but did not 76  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 16 February 1972, Dhahran 00318 161434Z, RG 59.

9  GRANDEUR AND INDEPENDENCE 

253

take control of the radio station in Sharjah, and so the local population did not know there was a coup taking place. As a result, the security forces did not have to contend with street demonstrations in support or opposition to the plot. This allowed the Sharjah police force, led by Shaykh Khalid’s brother, Shaykh Saqr (not to be confused with the coup’s leader, Shaykh Saqr bin Sultan) to quickly regroup and respond to the attack. They were supported by the United Arab Defense Force (formerly the Trucial Oman Scouts) and a little later by the Abu Dhabi Defense Force based in Al ʿAyn, which was informed of the coup at six o’clock and by eight o’clock had flown into Sharjah with Saladin armored cars at Shaykh Zayid’s command. In the battle to retake the palace, nine of Saqr’s rebels were killed and four members of the security forces were wounded. Saqr and twenty-eight others were arrested. However, Sharjah’s ruler, Shaykh Khalid, was killed along with three others during the coup d’état. Shaykh Zayid told American officials that Shaykh Saqr (not to be confused with the Shaykh Saqr who led the coup or the Shaykh Saqr of Sharjah who led the Sharjah security forces’ response) of Ras al-Khaimah provided support to a group that carried out the plot in Sharjah. As of mid-­February, the investigation had not produced direct evidence, but Zayid believed the group had traveled to Ras al-Khaimah from Basra in Iraq. Zayid said that an Iraqi ambassador had called on him on behalf of President Hassan al-­ Bakr to request leniency for Shaykh Saqr bin Sultan. Apparently, al-Bakr’s wife was related to the Al Qawasim. British officials doubted Shaykh Zayid would execute Shaykh Saqr bin Sultan due to his stature among the Al Qawasim.77 The group had spent the week before the attack in Ras al-­ Khaimah, and were said to have traveled to Sharjah by boat provided by Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah. Zayid also claimed the boxes of ammunition they used during the plot were said to bear markings of having come from Ras al-Khaimah. Shortly after the failed coup d’état in Sharjah, Shaykh Saqr of Ras al-­ Khaimah agreed to join the United Arab Emirates. A roundtable meeting of the seven rulers was held for the purpose of Ras al-Khaimah joining the UAE. When Shaykh Saqr signed the constitution and stood to leave the room, all of the six other rulers remained seated. Normal tribal etiquette demands that when one shaykh stands, the others also stand in respect. When no one moved, Saqr, after a short hesitation, turned and left the 77  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 16 February 1972, Dhahran 00317 161357Z, RG 59.

254 

B. FRIEDMAN

room. None of the seated rulers had moved. Observers believed this was a powerful message of disapproval of Saqr’s involvement in Shaykh Khalid’s death.78 Sharjah’s selection of Shaykh Sultan bin Mohammad as the new ruler was considered a positive development for the region. His brother Shaykh Saqr, the Police Chief, was not well liked. Further, Shaykh Sultan was not tainted by Shaykh Khalid’s deal with Iran, and for that reason the neighboring rulers in Ajman and Umm al-Qaiwain felt it might be possible to come to compromise with him on the outstanding dispute regarding the division of the revenues from the offshore oil field between their coastlines and Abu Musa.79 On 26 January, the Iranian daily newspaper Kayhan noted that had Iran not occupied the islands in November they might have fallen into “irresponsible hands with consequences of a far graver nature for the region as a whole.” The editorial also claimed the incident illustrates what a “group of determined terrorists can do in a virtually defenseless mini-­ state.”80 In contrast to the Iranian perception, the Arab rulers in the Gulf viewed Shaykh Saqr’s support for the Sharjah coup attempt as a last gasp effort to create a radical ally in Sharjah and carve out an independent Arab nationalist niche along the littoral. Others saw it as revenge for Shaykh Khalid’s deal with Iran on Abu Musa that ostensibly left Ras al-Khaimah completely isolated and vulnerable. Whatever the case may be, the episode was not a serious security challenge to the stability of the United Arab Emirates, and Shaykh Zayid’s effective response ultimately convinced Shaykh Saqr to avoid isolation and accept Ras al-Khaimah’s place in the United Arab Emirates on 11 February 1972.

78  U.S.  Department of State Telegram, Dhahran to Washington, 16 February 1972, Dhahran 00317 161357Z, RG 59. 79  U.S.  Department of State Outgoing Telegram, Washington to Kuwait/Dhahran, 26 January 1972, 015158, RG 59. 80  U.S. Department of State Telegram, Tehran to Washington, 27 January 1972, Tehran 00564 271048Z, RG 59.

CHAPTER 10

Conclusion

The British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf between 1968 and 1971 transformed regional politics. The British enforced a regional system was rooted in patrimonial security-seeking behavior that James Onley and Sulayman Khalaf referred to as “shaikhly authority.”1 Withdrawal meant that the British were abandoning the role of “Chief of the Gulf (raʾis al-­ khalij)”2 in the system, and the political system that had been in place since the first quarter of the nineteenth century would no longer exist. Mohammad Reza Shah viewed the British decision to withdraw from the Gulf as his opportunity to make Iran the successor to the British as the predominant power in the Gulf. Indeed, as the largest and most modern military power in the region, Iran was well-positioned to assume the role. Further, the British withdrawal meant that the primary constraint on Iranian power was removed. However, the Shah was not only shaped by this change to the system, between 1968 and 1971, the Shah’s choices shaped the system as well.

1  James Onley and Suleyman Khalaf, “Shaikhly Authority in the Pre-oil Gulf: An Historical– Anthropological Study,” History & Anthropology, Vol. 17, No. 3 (September 2006), pp. 200–201. 2  James Onley, “The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the Nineteenth Century,” New Arabian Studies, Vol. 6, pp. 30–92.

© The Author(s) 2020 B. Friedman, The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1971, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56182-6_10

255

256 

B. FRIEDMAN

The narrative presented in this book illustrates how Iran’s naked ambition ultimately sent it down a road that was self-limiting.3 Its heavy hand towards Iraq in the Shatt al-Arab dispute in 1969, and then its military operation to seize Abu Musa and the Tunb islands in 1971, turned its strength into weakness. The Shah’s ambitious and aggressive behavior prompted Iraq to court closer military ties with the Soviet Union from 1969 forward4 and led King Faysal to tacitly oppose Iran’s regional leadership. The Shah was pursuing national prestige that he perceived in terms of reputation based on military power. The Shah’s personal ambition to fill the vacuum and make Iran the next regional military power in the Gulf did not make it so. Faisal bin Salman Al Saud argues that “Although most weapons purchased [by Iran] in the late 1960s and 1970s were not delivered until at least the mid-1970s, there was a psychological dimension to arms sales that led Iran to conduct policy as if these weapons were in full operation.”5 Yet, Mohammad Reza Shah had serious doubts about his military’s true capabilities during this period. Further, the Shah’s ability to pay for his military expansion was in real jeopardy in 1969 and 1970. Al Saud’s observation is important, but it was not U.S. arms sales that drove the conduct of Iranian foreign policy during this period. Arms and oil were the means not the end. Iranian foreign policy during this period was driven by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Shah’s belief, rooted in his personal ambition and nationalist interpretation of Iran’s glorious ancient past, that it was Iran’s rightful role to succeed the British as the guardian of the Gulf. It was the firmness of the Shah’s conviction, rather than oil and U.S. arms sales, which set Iran to strive for regional dominance. Iran’s escalation of tension with Iraq over the Shatt al-Arab is what led Iraq to seek the fifteen-year treaty with the Soviet Union. Iraq understood article 8 of the 1972 treaty to be a Soviet commitment to supply Iraq with the weapons it needed in the context of its growing cycle of hostility with 3  This effect is described in Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 139–142. 4  “According to a Western intelligence source, in the period from the summer of 1969 to the summer of 1971, the number of Soviet made T-54/55 tanks in the Iraqi army increased from 300 to 800, the number of SU-7 fighter-bombers from 20 to 50, and the number of MiG-21 interceptors from 60 to 85,” as quoted in: Haim Shemesh, Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1968–1988: In the Shadow of the Iraq-Iran Conflict (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 32, fn. 85. 5  Al-Saud, p. 127.

10 CONCLUSION 

257

Iran.6 For its part, “the Soviet Union’s growing interest in Iraq…marked an incipient shift in Soviet Middle Eastern policy: move toward strengthening links with Iraq to offset a possible decline in the Soviet-Egyptian relationship.” Indeed, the Soviets appeared to resent Sadat’s policy of “de-­ Nasserization” and “his readiness to weaken ties with the Soviets in exchange for U.S. pressure on Israel to withdraw from the Sinai…”7 The Nixon administration, which in May 1972 chose to make the Shah its regional security partner under the Nixon Doctrine, was trying to determine whether the Shah was up to this task during the period of British withdrawal. Roham Alvandi argues that “Iran’s uncompromising defense of its regional primacy against the challenge from Iraq in the 1969 Shatt al-Arab crisis and its covert support for Pakistan during the 1971 South Asian crisis demonstrated the Shah was more than ready for this newfound role.”8 The Shah seemed indifferent to the notion that if he sufficiently menaced others, they would act to resist his power.9 In response to Iran’s “uncompromising” approach to the Gulf, Iraq sought to bolster its ties to the Soviet Union.10 On December 1, 1971, Iraq severed diplomatic ties with Iran, and on April 9, 1972, Iraq signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union.11 Ultimately, as Iran and Iraq grew closer to their respective patrons in the early 1970s, the Gulf grew increasingly militarized. This meant that Iranian primacy had an important, yet unanticipated, second-order effect. The escalating cycle of rivalry and competition between Iran and Iraq during and after British withdrawal allowed Saudi Arabia to maintain closer (if not close) relations with both Iran and Iraq than they maintained with one another. Therefore, Saudi Arabia enjoyed greater freedom of action than its two more powerful neighbors. The Iran-Iraq rivalry made it more difficult for either Iran or Iraq to become a dominant regional power in the Gulf during the 1970s. The enhanced Iraqi-Soviet cooperation also fueled King Faysal’s perception that the Shah’s ambition was dangerous and counterproductive to  Shemesh, p. 74.  Shemesh, pp. 45–46. 8  Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and The Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War, p. 176. 9  For a theoretical description of this effect, see: Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 281–282. 10  Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, pp. 65–68. 11  Shemesh, pp. 72–76. 6 7

258 

B. FRIEDMAN

stability in the Gulf. Moreover, Iran’s open confrontation with Iraq in 1969 made it more difficult for Saudi Arabia to coordinate with Iran, without provoking the ire of revolutionary Arab nationalists. Yet King Faysal was first and foremost concerned with protecting Al Saʿud ascendancy in Saudi Arabia. As long as Iran was supportive of Al Saʿud and did not threaten its raison d’état, King Faysal tolerated the Shah’s aspirations and even acquiesced to a certain level of security dependency, particularly with respect to Gulf waters. King Faysal viewed his relationship with Iran as a temporary alliance for the purpose of securing his regime (and those of the neighboring shaykhdoms) from subversive Soviet-backed Arab nationalist revolutionaries along his borders in South Yemen and Iraq. This kind security-seeking behavior was consistent with the protection customs of traditional tribal chieftaincies, which viewed alliances as temporary and shifting.12 To be sure, it would be an overstatement to conclude that the Saudi posture toward Iran conformed to the old adage that “an enemy of my enemy is my friend,” (ʿadu ʿadui hua sadiqi) rather it might be closer to the mark to say that the Saudi view was, the enemy of my enemy is not my enemy for now. In fact, a large part of the history presented here has described and contextualized the fragile and tentative nature of the Saudi-Iranian relationship under King Faysal and Mohammad Reza Shah. The limited political cooperation was grounded in the fact that both leaders recognized where their respective raison d'état converged: A mutual interest in limiting the subversive opportunities of Soviet-backed revolutionary Arab nationalism. They shared an interest in preventing their countries from being encircled by hostile, Soviet-supported revolutionary states. Nevertheless, King Faysal remained deeply suspicious of the Shah’s ambitions (ʾatmaʿ) in the Gulf. King Faysal’s acquiescence to the Shah’s aspirations was tested when the Shah’s regional aggression threatened to boomerang back against the Saudi kingdom. The Shah, for his part, was deeply skeptical King Faysal could maintain Al Saʿud power in Saudi Arabia. He feared a scenario where the monarchy collapsed in Saudi Arabia and gave way to a socialist South Yemen–style government, which could then spread along the entire coast and threaten Iranian shipping across the Gulf to the Red Sea. Despite these obstacles to a more meaningful bilateral relationship, Iran and Saudi Arabia were able to come together to coordinate on regional  Onley and Khalaf, pp. 200–201.

12

10 CONCLUSION 

259

security when they both believed Soviet power was encroaching upon the Gulf through regional rivals. When King Faysal and the Shah believed that the Soviets were taking active steps to increase their military support to Iraq, South Yemen, Syria, and Egypt, they were able to cooperate and support one another on issues of shared security interest. In 1971, the view of the Soviet position in the region as weakened may have contributed to a tacit quid pro quo between King Faysal and the Shah regarding their longstanding territorial claims with neighbors, which both rulers viewed as a matter of personal honor and prestige: Iran stayed out of Saudi Arabia’s territorial disputes with Abu Dhabi, and Saudi Arabia remained relatively passive in the face of Iran’s occupation of Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands. The Saudi-Iranian behavior in response to Soviet support for Arab nationalism in or around the Gulf region between 1968 and 1971 illustrates that the Shah and King Faysal believed that the Soviet-backed Arab nationalist threat to the region was still a serious threat even after Abdel Nasser’s June 1967 defeat. This perception was validated when the Soviets ultimately increased their military support to Egypt during the March 1969–August 1970 War of Attrition with Israel. As Nigel Ashton has noted, “Egypt would have been simply unable to launch and sustain the struggle,”13 without Soviet support during the War of Attrition. The power of Nasserism to mobilize the Arab masses outside of Egypt’s borders may have receded after June 1967, but Soviet military support to Arab nationalist allies continued during the period of British withdrawal, between 1968 and 1971. Saudi Arabia’s chief concern was that the Arab shaykhdoms of the Gulf would be susceptible to a “domino effect” and go the way of South Yemen, leaving the Saudi kingdom encircled by hostile enemies. King Faysal’s perception was shaped by Saudi Arabia’s grinding proxy war against Soviet- and Egyptian-supported republican forces in North Yemen from 1962 to 1970. Egypt’s sustained intervention in Yemen would not have been possible without direct Soviet military support.14 The fighting between royalists and Soviet-backed republicans in North Yemen continued in early 1968, after the British announcement of withdrawal from the 13  Nigel Ashton, ed., The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967–1973 (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), p. 6. 14  Jesse Ferris, Nasser’s Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013).

260 

B. FRIEDMAN

Gulf in January 1968. And the revolutionary upheaval in South Yemen continued well after the British withdrawal in late 1967. Therefore, the British withdrawal from the Gulf between 1967 and 1971 must be viewed within the context of the evolving situation in North and South Yemen (as well as the instability in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman) during this period. The process of a revolutionary Arab nationalist regime coming to power in South Yemen in the aftermath of British withdrawal in 1967 came to be articulated as a “power vacuum.” The Gulf rulers wanted to avoid such a scenario repeating itself in the Gulf at their expense. Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad has described the process of weaker states using the power of imperial powers to advance their own interests as “empire by invitation.”15 If, in fact, Pax Britannica in the Gulf was “empire by invitation,”16 then, following the British decision to withdraw in 1968, the rulers felt that they were ultimately forced to revoke the invitation or face a revolutionary Arab nationalist backlash. In the absence of future British military protection, the ruling Arab shaykhs had to find ways to accommodate both Iranian and Arab nationalism. Ignoring Arab nationalism invited domestic and regional challenges to an Arab ruler’s legitimacy and security, which, in some cases, emboldened revolutionaries to engage in violent subversion or sabotage.17 Moreover, at the same time, some of the smaller shaykhdoms were also considering how they might use Iranian regional ambition to enhance their own dynastic security. These new constraints and new opportunities were illustrated by the interlocking nature of the political challenges in the Gulf during this period. Iran saw new possibilities in reviving its claim on Bahrain and reasserting sovereign control over Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands. As a result, Iranian claims became deeply intertwined with the political process of creating a union of shaykhdoms, constraining the creation of a union of nine. Saudi Arabia, for its part, took up its territorial claims on the Buraimi 15  As described in W. Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 202. See, also: Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation?” The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,” Journal of Peace Research 23:3 (September 1986), 263–277. 16  As noted in the introduction, Takriti and Al Naqeeb would take issue with this characterization, while Onley has convincingly argued the relationship was mutually beneficial. 17  According to Michael Barnett, norms express identities, and violating norms invites domestic unrest. See: Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 1–19.

10 CONCLUSION 

261

Oasis and wide swathes of territory the British had claimed were part of Abu Dhabi. This dispute also had a powerful impact on the process of creating a viable union. Moreover, relations between the shaykhs fed off of the ebb and flow in bilateral relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Political interactions in the Gulf were densely interconnected: an advance or setback in one influenced the progress or stagnation of the others.18 The uncertainty surrounding the question of whether a new British government in 1970 would reverse the 1968 decision to withdraw was just one example. Until mid-1971 the ruling shaykhs still held out hope for a British reversal. For more than three years. British domestic politics undermined the British Foreign Office’s attempts to dispel the rulers of this notion. Conservative Party leader Edward Heath’s visit in the spring of 1969 left the shaykhs doubting whether the British were indeed going to carry out their policy of military withdrawal. These doubts removed a sense of urgency that King Faysal had worked hard to impress upon the rulers. Through much of 1968 King Faysal quietly and continually pressed the shaykhs to form a union of nine. However, British vacillation on withdrawal, a product of differences between Labour and Conservative politicians on the issue, and a change in government in June 1970, also undermined the British Foreign Office’s dedicated efforts to get the rulers to earnestly prepare for the end of Pax Britannica. Instead of cooperating and coordinating to secure a strong political union, the ruling shaykhs maneuvered to be first among equals in such a union.19 Ultimately, once it became clear to the shaykhs that Iran did not intend to conquer or absorb the shaykhdoms outright, the Shah became another tool in the rulers’ maneuvers to become the first among equals along the Gulf littoral. These maneuvers were acted out according to historical patterns of dynastic and tribal rivalry which often consisted of preserving autonomy (independence of action) while resisting hegemony (domination) by a stronger rival.20 In other words, if Iran aspired to replace Britain as the benign imperial power in the Gulf, the smaller shaykhs would simply continue their centuries-old practices of trying “to harness the power and 18  These processes are described in: Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 139. 19  Fuad I. Khuri, Tents and pyramids: games and ideology in Arab culture from backgammon to autocratic rule (London: Saqi Books, 1990), p. 14. 20  James Onley and Suleyman Khalaf, “Shaikhly Authority in the Pre-oil Gulf: An Historical–Anthropological Study,” History & Anthropology, Vol. 17, No. 3 (September 2006), pp. 200–201.

262 

B. FRIEDMAN

influence of stronger patrons to their own [dynastic] interests.”21 This could be understood as an example of a socio-political norm continuing amid a process of systemic change. In the end, the historical pattern of preserving autonomy and resisting dominance on the eve of British withdrawal contributed to the emergence of three independent states [Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates], rather than one independent federated union of nine shaykhdoms.

 Fain, p. 202.

21

Bibliography

Official Documents 1.  British National Archives, Kew, London England: • FO 248: Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Embassy and Consulates, Iran (formerly Persia): General Correspondence • FO 371: Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence • FO 1016: Foreign Office, Records of the Persian Gulf Residencies and Agencies • FCO 8: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Arabian Department and Middle East Department, 1967–1972 2.  U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland: Central Intelligence Agency, Reports, Analyses, and Estimates, 1945–1971. General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 • Subject Numeric Files, 1967–1969 • Subject Numeric Files, 1970–1973 •  Lot Files, Office of Near East Affairs—Records of the Arabian Peninsula desk • Lot Files (Iran and Iraq) 3.  Richard M. Nixon Presidential Materials Project, College Park, Maryland: • Files of the National Security Council, 1969–1973 Subject Files Country Files – Middle East • National Security Council Institutional Files

© The Author(s) 2020 B. Friedman, The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1971, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56182-6

263

264 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

4.  U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian Publications • Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula. • Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68, Volume XXII, Iran. •  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970. •  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972.

Arabic Language Media al-Hawadith   (Beirut – Weekly) al-Hayat   (Beirut) al-Jumhuriyya   (Baghdad) ar-Ray al-Amm   (Kuwait)

Persian Language Media Ayandegan Ettela’at

English Language Media Baghdad Observer Daily News           (Kuwait) The Echo of Iran           (Tehran) Financial Times Kayhan (International)           (Tehran) Manchester Guardian Middle East Economic Survey Middle East Economic Digest New York Times Washington Post The Times           (London)

Serials United Kingdom, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) United States, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

265

Books and Articles (English) Abdullah, Mohammad Morsy. The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History. London: Croom & Helm, 1978. Abir, Mordechai and Aryeh Yodfat. The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula: Soviet Policy Towards the Persian Gulf and Arabia. London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin’s, 1983. Abir, Mordechai. Oil, Power, and Politics: Conflict in Arabia, the Red Sea and the Gulf. London: Frank Cass, 1974. ——— Saudi Arabia: Government, society, and the Gulf Crisis. London: Routledge, 1993. Adamiyat, Fereydoun. Bahrein Islands: A Legal and Diplomatic Study of the British-­ Iranian Controversy. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1952. Adamsky, Dima. “‘Zero-Hour for the Bears’: Inquiring into the Soviet Decision to Intervene in the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition, 1969–1970” Cold War History 6, No. 1 (February 2006):113–136. ——— “How American and Israeli intelligence failed to estimate the Soviet intervention in the War of Attrition,” In The Cold War in the Middle East. Edited by Nigel Ashton. Oxon: Routledge, 2007. Adib-Moghadam, Arshin. The International Politics of the Persian Gulf: A Cultural Genealogy. London and New York: Routledge, 2006. Agwani, M.S. Politics in the Gulf. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978. Ahmadi, Koroush. Islands and International Politics in the Persian Gulf. Oxon: Routledge, 2008. Ajami, Fouad. The Arab Predicament. Cambridge University Press, Canto Edition, 1992. Alam, Asadollah. The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran’s Royal Court, 1969–1977. Introduced and edited by Alinaghi Alikhani, and translated by Alinaghi Alikhani and Nicholas Vincent. London: I.B.Tauris, 1991. Algosaibi, Ghazi A. “King Faisal’s foreign policy,” Arabian Essays. London: Kegal Paul International, 1982. al-Alkim, Hassan Hamadan. The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates. London: Saqi Books, 1989. Alvandi, Roham. Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. ——— “Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question, 1968–1970,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 37, No. 2 (2010): 159–177. ——— “Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf,” Diplomatic History 36, No. 2 (April 2012): 337–372. Alvandi, Roham. Ed. The Age of Aryamehr: Late Pahlavi Iran and its Global Entanglements. London: Gingko Library, 2018.

266 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Amirahmadi, Hooshang, ed. Small Islands, Big Politics: The Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Gulf. London: Macmillan, 1996. Anthony, John Duke. Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics and Petroleum. Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1975. ——— “The Union of Arab Amirates.” The Middle East Journal 26, No. 2 (1972): 271–287. Arjomand, Said. The Turban for the Crown. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Ashton, Nigel, ed. The Cold War in the Middle East. Oxon: Routledge, 2007. Ayoob, Mohammed. “The Dynamics of Iran’s Foreign Policy,” Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis Journal 3 (1970): 249–350. Ayubi, Nazih. Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris, 1995. Al-Barhana, Husain M. The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States. New  York: Oceana Publications, 1968. ——— “The Fact-Finding Mission of the United Nations Secretary-General and the Settlement of the Bahrain-Iran Dispute, May 1970,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 22 (July 1973). Badeeb, Saeed M. Saudi-Iranian Relations, 1932–1982. London: Centre for Arab and Iranian Studies, 1993. Balfour-Paul, Glen. The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain’s Relinquishment of Power in Her Last Three Dependencies. Cambridge University Press,1991. Barnett, Michael. Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order. New York: Cmolumbia University Press, 1998. ——— “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East,” In The Culture of National Security. Edited by Peter J.  Katzenstein, 400–447. New  York: Columbia University Press, 1996. Bayne, E.A. Persian Kingship in Transition: Conversations with a Monarch Whose Office Is Traditional and Whose Goal is Modernization. New  York: American Universities Field Staff, 1968. Belgrave, Charles Sir. Personal Column. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1972. Beling, Willard A., ed. King Faisal and the Modernisation of Saudi Arabia. London: Croom and Helm; Boulder, Colorado: Westview: 1980. Ben Dor, Gabriel. “Political Culture Approach to Middle East Politics,” The International Journal of Middle East Studies 8, No. 1 (January 1977): 43–63. Bill, James A. The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. Bill, James A. The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes, and Modernization. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1972. Bronson, Rachel. Thicker Than Oil : America’s uneasy partnership with Saudi Arabia Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

267

Burell, R.M. “Britain, Iran and the Persian Gulf.” In The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics. Edited by Derek Hopwood. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972. Chubin, Shahram, and Sepehr Zabih. The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zone of Great Power Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. Commins, David. The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006. Cook, Michael. “The Expansion of the First Saudi State: The Case of Washm,” The Expansion of the First Saudi State: The Case of Washm.” In The Islamic World from Classical to Modern Times: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lewis. Edited by C.E. Bosworth. Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1989. Cottam, Richard. Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988. Daigle, Craig. The Limits of Détente, The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab Israeli Conflict, 1968–1973. Unpublished PhD dissertation, George Washington University, 2008. Al Dakhil, Khalid. Social Origins of the Wahhabi Movement. Unpublished PhD dissertation, UCLA, 1998. DeVore, Marc. “The United Kingdom’s Last Hot War of the Cold War: Oman, 1963–1975,” Cold War History 11, No. 3 (2011): 441–471. Dishon, Daniel, ed. The Middle East Record, Vol. IV–V, 1969–1970. Jerusalem, Israel Universities Press, 1977. Eilts, Herman. “Saudi Arabia: Traditionalism versus Modernism  – A Royal Dilemma.” In Ideology and Power in the Middle East. Edited by Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger, 56–88. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988. Erdmann, Gero and Ulf Engel. “Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered: A Critical Review and Elaboration of an Elusive Concept,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 45, No. 1 (March 2007): 95–119. Fain, W.  Taylor. American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Farid, Abdel Magid. Nasser: The Final Years. Reading, U.K: Ithaca Press, 1994. Fiennes, Ranulph. Where Soldiers Fear to Tread. London: Houghton and Stoughton, 1975. Gause III, F. Gregory. Saudi-Yemeni Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). ——— “British and American policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1973.” Review of International Studies 11, No. 4 (October 1985): 247–273. Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretations of Cultures. New York: 1973: paperback Basic Books, 2000. ——— Local Knowledge. New York: Basic Books, 1983.

268 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abu Hakima, Ahmad Mustafa, History of Eastern Arabia, 1750–1800. Beirut: Khayats, 1965. Halliday, Fred. Arabia Without Sultans. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1974. Healey, Denis. The Time of My Life. London: Penguin, 1990. Heard-Bey, Frauke. From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition. London: Longman Press, 1982. Heikal, Mohamed. The Road to Ramadan. London: Collins, 1975. ——— “The Saudi Era,” Journal of Palestine Studies 6, No. 4 (1977): 158–164. Hillman, Jason. ‘A Storm in a Tea-Cup,’ The Iraq-Kuwait Crisis of 1961: From Gulf Crisis to Inter-Arab Dispute. Tel Aviv, Israel: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 2011. Holden, David. “The Persian Gulf: After the British Raj.” Foreign Affairs 49, No. 4 (July 1971): 721–735. Holden, David and Richard Johns. The House of Saud. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1981. Hudson, Michael. Arab Politics. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977. Hurd, Douglas. An End to Promises: Sketch of a Government 1970–1974. London: Collins, 1979. James, Laura M. “Military/political means/ends: Egyptian decision making in the War of Attrition.” In The Cold War in the Middle East. Edited by Nigel Ashton, 92–112. Oxon: Routledge, 2007. Jensen, Eric. “The Secretary General’s Use of Good Offices and the Question of Bahrain,” Millenium: Journal of International Studies 14, No. 3 (Winter 1985): 335–348. Jervis, Robert. System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. Joyce, Miriam. Ruling Shaikhs and Her Majesty’s Government, and Kuwait, 1960–1969: An Anglo-American Perspective. London: Frank Cass, 2003. Kelidar, Abbas R. “The Arabian Peninsula in Arab and Power Politics.” In The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics. Edited by Derek Hopwood, 145–159. London: Allen and Unwin, 1972. Kerr, Malcolm. The Arab Cold War: Gamal ʾAbd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970. London: Oxford University Press, 1971, third edition. Khadduri, Majid. Socialist Iraq: A study in Iraqi politics since 1968. Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1978. Khalaf, Suleyman and James Onley. “Shaikhly Authority in the Pre-oil Gulf: An Historical–Anthropological Study,” History & Anthropology 17, No. 3 (September 2006): 189–208. Kelly, J.B. Arabia, the Gulf and the West: A Critical View of the Arabs and their Oil Policy. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

269

——— “The Buraimi Oasis Dispute,” International Affairs 32, No. 4 (July 1956): 318–326. ——— “The Persian Claim to Bahrain,” International Affairs 33, No. 1 (Jan. 1957): 51–70. Kechichian, Joseph. Faysal: Saudi Arabia’s King for All Seasons. Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 2008. Khoury, Phillip S. and Kostiner, Joseph. “Tribes and the Complexities of State Formation in the Middle East,” in Tribes and state formation in the Middle East. Edited by Philip S.  Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, 1–24. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990. Khuri, Fuad I. Tents and Pyramids: games and ideology in Arab culture from backgammon to autocratic rule. London: Saqi Books, 1990. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Faisal Speaks. Riyadh: Ministry of Information, no date. Korn, David A. Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967–1970. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1992. Kostiner, Joseph. The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916–1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. ——— The Struggle for South Yemen. London: Croom & Helm, 1984. Levy, Jack S. “The Theoretical Foundations of Paul W. Schroeder’s International System,” The International History Review 16, No. 4 (Nov. 1994): 715–744. Lienhardt, Peter. Sheikhdoms of Eastern Arabia. Posthumously edited by Ahmed Al-Shahi. New York: Palgrave, 2001. Litwak, Robert. Detente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Louis, William Roger. Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization: Collected Essays. London, New York: I.B.Tauris, 2006. ——— “The British Withdrawal from the Gulf, 1967–1971.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 31, No. 1 (2003): 83–108. Luce, William Sir. “Britain in the Persian Gulf: Mistaken Timing Over Aden.” The Round Table 57, No. 227 (1967): 277–283. ——— “A naval force for the Gulf,” The Round Table  59, No. 236, (1969): 347–356. Macris, Jeffrey R. The Politics and Security of the Gulf. New York: Routledge, 2009. Mandani, Nizar Obaid. The Islamic Content of the Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia: King Faisal’s call for Islamic solidarity, 1965–1975. Unpublished PhD dissertation, The American University, Washington, D.C., 1977. Mattair, Thomas. The Three Occupied UAE Islands. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2005. Mawby, Spencer. “The ‘Big Lie’ and the ‘Great Betrayal’: Explaining the British Collapse in Aden,” in The Cold War in the Middle East. Oxon: Routledge, 2007. Edited by Nigel J. Ashton, pp. 173–179.

270 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Matin-Asgari, Afshin, “From social democracy to social democracy: the twentieth century odyssey of the Iranian left.” In Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran. . Edited by Stephanie Cronin, 37–64. London, New  York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004 Menashri, David. Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution. Holmes & Meier, 1990. Milani, Abbas. The Shah. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz. Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf, A Maritime Political Geography. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999. Mottahadeh, Roy. The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1987. Moshirzadeh, Homeira. “Discursive Foundations of Iran’s Nuclear Policy,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 38, No. 4 (December 2007): 521–543. Mylroie, Laurie. Regional Security After Empire: Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1985. Nahas, Maridi. “State-Systems and Revolutionary Challenge: Nasser, Khomeini, and the Middle East.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 17, No. 4 (Nov. 1985): 507–527. al-Naqeeb, Khaldoun Hasan. Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula. Translated by L. M. Kenny. London and New York: Routledge and Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1990. Onley, James. “The Politics of Protection in the Gulf: The Arab Rulers and the British Resident in the Nineteenth Century,” New Arabian Studies 6 (2004): 30–92. Al-Osaimi, Mohammed. The Politics of Persuasion: The Islamic Oratory of Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz. Riyadh: King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, 2000. Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza. Mission for My Country. London: Hutchison, 1960. Petersen, Tore T. Richard Nixon, Great Britain and the Anglo-American Alignment in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula: Making Allies out of Clients. (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2009). ——— The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East, 1961–1969: A Willing Retreat. (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2006). ——— The Middle East Between the Great Powers: Anglo-American Conflict and Cooperation, 1952–1957. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000). Peterson, J.E. Oman’s Insurgencies: The Sultanate’s Struggle for Supremacy. London: Saqi Books, 2007. ——— “Historical Pattern of Gulf Security.” In Security in the Persian Gulf. Edited by Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, 7–31. New York: Palgrave, 2002. Potter, Lawrence G. The Persian Gulf in History. New  York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. ——— The Persian Gulf in Modern Times. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

271

Podeh, Elie. “The Struggle over Arab Hegemony after the Suez Crisis.” Middle Eastern Studies 29, No. 1 (January 1993): 91–110. Quandt, William B. Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981. Rabi, Uzi. The Emergence of States in a Tribal Society: Oman under Saʿid bin Taymur, 1932–1970. Brighton, England: Sussex Press, 2006. ——— “Britain’s ‘Special Position’ in the Gulf: Its Origins, Dynamics and Legacy.” Middle Eastern Studies 42, No. 3 (May 2006): 351–364. ——— “British Possessions in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Arabia.” In Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner. Edited by Zach Levey and Elie Podeh, 264–280. Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2008. Ramazani, R.K. The Persian Gulf: Iran’s Role. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972. ——— Iran’s Foreign Policy, 1941–1973. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975. ——— “Iran’s Search for Regional Cooperation.” The Middle East Journal 30, No. 2 (1976): 173–186. Riad, Mahmoud. The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East. London: Quartet Books, 1981. Sato, Shohei. Britain and the formation of the Gulf States: Embers of Empire. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2016. Al-Saud, Faisal bin Salman. Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Power Politics in Transition, 1968–1971. London, I.B. Tauris, 2003. Safran, Nadav. Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985. Schofield, Richard, ed. Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States. London: UCLA Press, 1994. ——— “Anything but Black and White: A Commentary on the Lower Gulf Islands Dispute,” In Security in the Persian Gulf. Edited by Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, 171–187. New York: Palgrave, 2002. ——— “The crystallisation of a complex territorial dispute: Britain and the Saudi-­ Abu Dhabi borderland, 1966–1971,” Journal of Arabian Studies 1, No. 1 (2011): 27–51. Sharabi, Hisham. Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society. Oxford University Press: 1988. Sharifi-Yazdi, Farhad Cyrus. Arab-Iranian Rivalry in the Persian Gulf: Territorial Disputes and the Balance of Power in the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2015. Shwadran, Benjamin. Middle East Oil: Issues and Problems. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing, Co., 1977.

272 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Smith, Simon C. Britain’s Revival and Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States, 1950–71. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. ——— “Power Transferred? Britain, the United States, and the Gulf, 1956–1971.” Contemporary British History 21, No. 1 (2007): 1–23. ——— “Britain’s Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf: A Pattern Not a Puzzle.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 44, No. 2 (2016), 328–351. Standish, John F. Persia and the Gulf: Retrospect and Prospect. London: Curzon, 1998. ——— “British Maritime Policy in the Persian Gulf.” Middle East Studies 3, No. 4 (1967): 324–354. Steinberg, Guido. “The Wahhabi Ulama and the Saudi State: 1745 to the Present.” In Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs. Edited by Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman, 11–34. New  York University Press, 2005. Stookey, Robert. South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Sullivan, Robert R. “Saudi Arabia in International Politics.” Review of Politics 32, No. 4 (October 1970): 436–460. Takriti, Abdel Razzaq. Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans, and Empires in Oman, 1965–1976. Oxford University Press, 2015. ——— “Colonial Coups and the Wars on Popular Sovereignty.” American Historical Review 124, No. 3 (June 2019), 878–909. Taryam, Abdullah Omran. The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, 1950–85. London: Croom Helm, 1987. von Bismarck, Helene. British Policy in the Persian Gulf, 1961–1968: Conceptions of Informal Empire. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Watt, D.C. “The Decision to Withdraw From the Gulf,” Political Quarterly 39, No. 6 (July–September 1968): 310–321. Walker, Jonathan. Aden Insurgency: The Savage War in South Arabia, 1962–1967. Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount Ltd., 2005. Wilkinson, J.C. “The Oman Question: The Background to the Political Geography of South-East Arabia,” The Geographical Journal, Vol. 137, No. 3 (Sep., 1971), pp. 361–371. Winder, R. Bayly. Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century (London: Macmillan and Co.mpany, 1965). Wright, Sir Denis. The English Among the Persians. London: Heinemann, 1977. ——— “Ten Years in Iran, Some Highlights,” Asian Affairs 22, No. 3 (October 1991): 259–272. Al-Yassini, Ayman. Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Boulder, Colorado and London: Westview Press, 1985.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

273

Zabih, Sepehr. “Iran’s International Posture: De Facto Nonalignment within a Pro-Western Alliance.” Middle East Journal 24, No. 3 (Summer 1970): 302–318. Zahlan, Rosemary Said. The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: A Political and Social History of the Trucial States. London: Macmillan Press, 1978. Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Books (Arabic) al-Lawzi, Salim. Rasāsatān f ı ̄ al-Khalı ̄j. Bayrut: Mawassat al-Hawadith lil-Sahafat wi al-Nashar, 1971. al-Rayyis, Riyād Najı̄b. Sirā al-wāhāt wa-al-nift, humūm al-Khalı̄j al-Arabı ̄ bayna 1968–1971. Bayrut: Al-Nahar al-Khidamat al-Sahafiyah, 1973. ——— Wathā’iq al-Khalı̄j al-Arabı̄, 1968–1971 [Arabian Gulf Documents, 1968–1971]. London: Riyād al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-al-Nashr, 1989. Salame, Ghassan. al-Siyassa al-Kharijiyya al-Sa’udiyya mundhu ‘Am 1945 (Bayrut: Ma’had al’Inma al-‘Arabi, 1980).

Index

A Abdeljalil, Mehdi Ben, 132–133 ʿAbdulaziz bin Muhammad, 38 Abu Dhabi Council of Ministers of, 227 demonstrations against Iran in, 249 National Consultative Assembly of, 227 position of, on union of shaykhdoms, 38, 219–220 relations with Al Qawasim, 36–37 relations with Dubai, 36–39 relations with Qatar, 95–97 relations with SA, 164–170 relations with UK, 4 ruler of (see Zayid bin Khalifah, ruler of Abu Dhabi) ruling family of, 5 Abu Dhabi Defense Force, 58, 94, 98, 100, 209, 253 Abu Dhabi-Dubai agreement, 38–39 Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC), 164–165, 167–169 Abu Khader, Tawfiq, 240, 241 Abu Musa Island

dispute over territorial water of, 157–162 Iran’s claim to; in general, 65–67, 88–91, 202–206, 210–214, 260; media coverage of, 215–219; negotiations on final settlement of, 232–236; package deal proposed by SA on, 65–67, 80 Iran’s occupation of; backlash of, 248–250; in general, 246 and UAE, 232–233 Aden Protectorate, 15–16, 20 Adham, Kamal, 150, 189, 214, 229–230 ADPC, see Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company Afshar, Amir Khosrow and Shatt al-Arab conflict, 106–107 and U.N. brokered solution to Bahrain conflict, 148 views of; on Bahrain conflict, 56, 67, 76, 86, 87; on Iran’s claim to Abu Musa and Tunb islands, 88–89, 211; on meeting Faysal and Shah, 77; Shatt al-Arab conflict, 105

© The Author(s) 2020 B. Friedman, The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1971, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56182-6

275

276 

INDEX

Agence France-Presse (AFP), 216 Agnew, Spiro, 113, 225 Ahmad bin ʿAli Al Thani, ruler of Qatar announcement of union of shaykhdoms, 39, 40 and Khor al-Udaid dispute, 96 mention of, 71 and Supreme Council of Rulers; as chair of, 73, 99; meeting of, 126, 128 and union of shaykhdoms, leadership of, 71 views of; on Abu Dhabi-Dubai agreement, 39; on Bahrain, 173–174; on Qatar as leading military power, 63–64; on UK’s withdrawal, 22–23; on union of shaykhdoms, 125 Ahmad bin Rashid Al Mualla, ruler of Umm al-Qaiwain, 176 al-Ahram (Egyptian newspaper), 121–122 Ajman, 4, 38, 101–102, 157–162 Alam, Asadollah, 105–106, 145, 154–155, 177, 233 Algeria, see Boumedienne, Houari Ali, son of the ruler of Ajman, 63 Alif-Baʾ (Iraqi weekly), 142 Alvandi, Roham, 257 American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region (Fain), 7–9 Amin, Ahmad Jasim, 63 ʿAmmash, Saleh Mahdi, 104, 107, 108 Amuzegar, Jamshid, 196 Analytical themes, 13–16 al-Ansari, Sayyid Ali bin Ahmed, 218 Al Aqsa Mosque (Jerusalem), 121 Arabia, the Gulf, and the West (Kelly), 10 Arab-Israeli conflict

and Arab Summit Rabat 1969, 134–135 and pan-Islamic solidarity, 120–121 Islamic Holy Places and, 120–121 Rogers Plan for, 131, 177, 195, 217 Six Day War, 19, 117, 120, 132 War of Attrition, 113, 124, 131, 140, 259 al-Arabiya Island, 60 Arab Joint Defense Council (11th), 131–132 Arab League, 175, 191, 234, 248, 251 Arab Nationalism influence in Gulf of, 259–260 and Iran’s claim to Abu Musa and Tunb islands, 66 vs. Iranian nationalism, 110–112 and security pact, Western sponsored, 33 Soviet backing of, 258–259 supranational ideology of, 34 Arab Summit (Rabat 1969) agenda of, 121–123, 134 boycott of, 122 Egypt and, 121–122 in general, 120–121 outcome of, 122–124 Arafat, Yasir, 252 ARAMCO, 31, 59, 167 Arthur, Geoffrey, 146 Ashton, Nigel, 259 as-Sayyad (Lebanese weekly), 144 Ayandegan (Iranian newspaper), 27, 111, 149 B Baharna, 68 Bahrain and Arab League, 191 independence of, 152–153, 226–227

 INDEX 

plebiscite on, 67–70 population of, 67–68 position of, on UK’s withdrawal, 208 relations with Iran (see Bahrain conflict) relations with Qatar, 35–36 relations with SA, 28–31, 226–227, 231 relations with UK, 4, 5 and security pact, Western sponsored, 33–34 sovereignty of, 27–28 (see Bahrain conflict) and union of shaykhdoms, 38, 100–102, 124–126, 152–153, 173–175, 192–193, 219 U.N. Mission to; execution of, 151–152; groundwork for, 149–150; Iran and, 146–148; possibility of, 85–86 Bahrain conflict in general, 260 historical context of, 28 Iran’s claim in, 62, 66, 67, 75–76 Kuwaiti diplomacy in, 85–88 package deal proposed by SA on, 66–67, 80 and union of shaykhdoms, 126–128 U.N. solution to, 85, 146–149, 151, 152, 174–175 Bakhtiar, Teymour, 104, 111, 143–144 al-Bakr, Hassan, 218, 253 Balfour-Paul, Glen, 246 Bamberg, James, 183, 200 Bani Yas tribal confederation, 36, 37 Barzani, Mustafa, 143 Behrouz, Jahangir, 27 Blitz (Indian publication), 216 Boumedienne, Houari, 123, 133

277

British Petroleum Company, 183 Al Bu Falah, 5, 36 Al Bu Falasah, 5, 36 Bunche, Ralph, 85–86, 146 al-Bunduq oil field, 97 Buraimi Oasis area mention of, 76, 164, 167 plebiscite in, 167 SA’s claim to, 15, 27, 95, 97–98, 164–170, 188–189, 204, 261 Buttes Oil & Gas Company, 157, 159, 247 C Caradon, Lord, 85–86 Chubin, Shahram, 9 Churchill, Winston, III, 112, 157 Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers, 154 Conservative Party (UK), 64, 92, 164, 176, 185, 195, 261 Continental shelf agreement, 58–60 Council of Ministers (of union of shaykhdoms), 99 Council of Senior Representatives of the Gulf States, 38 D al-Dawalibi, Maʾruf, 47 The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle East, 1961-1969 (Petersen), 7–9 Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF), 78 Dhofar rebellion, 25 Dinsmore, Lee, 241 Djam, Fereydoun, 145 DLF, see Dhofar Liberation Front Douglas-Home, Alec, 185, 204, 207, 247

278 

INDEX

Dubai demonstrations against Iran, 248, 249 relations with Abu Dhabi; dual federation between, 38–39; historical conflict between, 36–37 relations with SA, 42 relations with UK, 4 ruler of (see Rashid bin Saʿid Al-Maktum, ruler of Dubai) ruling family of, 5 and union of shaykhdoms, 38 E Egypt and Arab Summit, 121–122 position of; on Iran’s claim to Abu Musa and Tunb islands, 214, 216–217; on Iran’s occupation of islands, 250 relations with Soviet Union, 224, 257 relations with US, 223–224 (see also Rogers Plan) rulers of (see Nasser, Gamal Abdel) (see Sadat, Anwar) (see Six Day War) (see War of Attrition) and U.N. Mission to Bahrain, 150 Eilts, Herman, 169 Eliot, Theodore, 113 Ely, Northcutt, 212 Empire by invitation, 260 The End of Empire in the Middle East (Balfour-Paul), 246 Eqbal, Manuchehr, 60 The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, 1950-85 (Taryam), 101 Ettelaʿat (Iranian newspaper), 43–44

F Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Prince of Saudi Arabia, 118–119, 165, 227 Fain, W. Taylor, 7–9, 115 Faisal bin Salman Al Saud book of, 10 views of; on median line dispute, 60; on reconciliation Iran and Saudi Arabia, 46–49 Farazian, Ali, 80, 88–91 al-Farisi Island, 59, 60 al-Fasi, Ahmad Abdullah, 118 Faysal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain conflict, 30–31 call for pan-Islamic solidarity, 120–121, 154 leadership of, 123–124 mediation between Egypt and US, 223–224 meetings with rulers of shaykhdoms, 176 personal status of, 15 plots against, 117–119 relations with Fahd, 119 relations with Nasser, 133–134 relations with Shah; in general, 56–57; median line negotiations, 60–61, 80; proposals of package deals, 58–61; reconciliation between, 44–49, 75–78, 83–84 relations with Zayid, 95–99, 163–164 and SA’s claim to Buraimi, 97 and Saudi presence in shaykhdoms, 54–55 views of; on Bahrain conflict, 75–76; on Bahrain’s independence, 226; on Baʿthists in Iraq and Syria, 51; on Buraimi, 188–189; on

 INDEX 

Iran’s claim to Abu Musa and Tunb islands, 66, 89, 188, 203, 213–214; on plebiscite for Buraimi, 167; on plebiscite in Bahrain, 68–69; on Qatar’s independence, 230–231; on SA’s claim to Abu Dhabi territory, 167–168; on security in Gulf, 76–77, 80–81, 154–155, 220–221, 223–224; on Shah’s ambitions, 257–258; on UAE, 231, 251; on UK’s withdrawal, 25–27, 93–94, 187–188, 190; on union of shaykhdoms, 39–40, 43–44, 187–188, 209–210; on Zayid, 95, 166–167 visit to Kuwait, 42 Foot, Hugh, Baron Caradon, 85–86 The Foreign Relations of Iran (Chubin & Zabih), 9 Free Officers Movement, 110 Fujairah, 38, 101–102, 249 ruler of (see Muhammad bin Hamad Al Sharqi, ruler of Fujairah) G Ghārāt (sea-raids), 4, 6 Greater Tunb, see Tunb islands Guardian (UK newspaper), 43–44 Guerrilla attacks, 215 Guicciardi, Vittorio Winspeare, 151 Gulf region historiography on, 6–11 power vacuum in, 16, 20, 138, 140, 191, 260 rulers of (see Gulf rulers) shaykdoms in (see Gulf shaykhdoms) Soviet presence in (see Soviet Union) Gulf rulers contributions to UK’s military expenditure, 24, 32

279

historical mistrust of, 19–21 and Iranian diplomatic charm offensive of, 61–64 personal status of, 14–15 and security pact, Western sponsored, 32–35 views of; on Gulf politics, 19–21, 80–81; on Iraq, 51–52 Gulf shaykhdoms treaties with UK, 3–6, 34–35 and UK’s message of withdrawal to, 20–27 union of (see Union of Gulf shaykhdoms) H Hamad bin ʿIsa Al Khalifa, Crown Prince of Bahrain, 81 Hamad bin Rashid Al Maktum, 251 Hammadi, Saadun, 196 Hassan II, King of Morocco, 45–47, 130–133 al-Hayat (Lebanon-based newspaper), 72 Healey, Dennis, 32 Heath, Edward article on Gulf tour, 94 statement on reversal of withdrawal of UK, 64, 90, 91 tour of the Gulf region, 92–95, 164, 185 al-Helaissi, Abdul Rahman, 137 Hoveyda, Amir Abbas mention of, 62 views of; on co-existence with shaykhdoms, 73; on increasing oil prices, 183; on Iran’s claim to Abu Musa and Tunb islands, 216, 247; on Iran’s claim to Bahrain, 31 Hussein, Tayyeb, 27 Huwala, 68

280 

INDEX

I Idxintern11, 25 Idxintern33, 157 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 69, 70 Iran and Abu Musa; claim to (see Abu Musa Island); dispute over territorial waters of, 158–159, 161–162 defense spending of, 179–180, 196 demonstrations against, 248–250 diplomatic charm offensive of, 61–64 financial budget of, 177–181, 201–202 foreign policies of, 9 Gulf policies of; as dominant power, 34, 136–138, 156–157, 201–202, 221–222, 255–256; in general, 139–140 and oil crisis, 182–183 position of, on union of shaykhdoms, 126–127 relations with Iraq; deterioration of, 2–3, 142–145; infiltration of Iran by Iraq, 224–225; plot to overthrow Iraqi regime by Iran, 144–145 (see also Shatt al-Arab conflict) relations with Lebanon, 104, 111 relations with SA; continental shelf agreement, 58–60; deteriorating of, 28–31; in general, 83–84, 257–259; historical mistrust between, 14–15; improvement of, 153–156; issues in, 155–156; median line negotiations, 58–61; military aid of Iran to SA, 153–154; reconciliation between, 44–49; studies on, 9–10

relations with Soviet Union; in general, 48; Soviet-Iran Treaty, 140–141 relations with UK; and Iran’s occupation of islands, 245–246; and islands settlement, 232–234 ruler of (see Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi) support for Iraqi Kurds, 143 and Tunb islands (see Tunb islands) and union of shaykdoms, 43, 55–58 and U.N. Mission to Bahrain, 146–148 visits to; of Khalid bin Mohammed Al Qasimi, 202; of Muhammad bin Hamad Al Sharqi, 62–63; of Rashid bin Saʿid Al-Maktum, 73; of Saqr bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi, 62, 78 Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf (Al-Saud), 10, 13 Iran’s Foreign Policy, 1941-1973 (Ramazani), 9 Iraq Baʿthist regime in, 51, 103–104, 109, 144–145 boycott of Arab Summit 1969 by, 122 position of; on Iran’s claim to Abu Musa and Tunb islands, 203–205, 217–218; on Iran’s occupation of islands, 249–250; on UK’s withdrawal, 207–208 relations with Iran; deterioration of, 2–3, 142–145; infiltration of Iran by Iraq, 224–225; Iranian plot to overthrow regime, 144–145 (see also Shatt al-Arab conflict) relations with Soviet Union; in general, 108–109; Treaty of Friendship, 256–257

 INDEX 

and U.N. Mission to Bahrain, 149–150 Iraqi Kurds Iranian support for, 143, 144 self-rule for, 142, 143, 177 Irwin, John, 197–198 ʿIsa bin Salman Al Khalifah, ruler of Bahrain institutional activities of, 175 and union of shaykhdoms, leadership of, 74 views of; on Bahrain issue, 28–31, 69–70, 85; on plebiscite, 68–69; on security pact, Western sponsored, 34; on UK’s withdrawal, 19, 22–23, 93–94, 190–191, 208; on union of shaykhdoms, 56–57, 101–102, 189–190, 209–210 Islamic Holy Places, 120–121 Israel, see Arab-Israeli conflict J Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Saba, Crown Prince of Kuwait, 50, 190 Jabir al-Ali Al Sabah, 95 Jaʾfar, Dhia, 160 Jamali, Abdul Hussein, 205 Jarallah, Ahmad, 45 al-Jumhurriyah (Iraqi newspaper), 107 K Kamal, Hassan, 39 Kayhan (Iranian newspaper), 31, 84, 149, 233, 254 Kelly, John Barrett, 10, 198, 200 Khalaf, Sulayman, 255 al-Khalid, Badr, 86–87 Khalid bin Mohammed Al Qasimi, ruler of Sharjah

281

and Abu Musa, dispute over territorial waters of, 157–160 and Abu Musa, Iran’s claim to; agreement on proposal of settlement, 245–247; negotiations over, 89–91; refusal of proposal, 212–213; reluctance to negotiate, 211; as ruler of Abu Musa, 65; Sharjah counter proposal of settlement, 242–243; UK-Iranian counter proposal of settlement, 244–245; UK-Iranian proposal of settlement, 238–239 anti-Iranian stance of, 89–90 coup d’état to dispose of, 252–253 death of, 253 views of, on union of shaykhdoms, 38 visit to Iran, 202 Khalid bin Saqr Al Qasimi, Crown Prince of Ras al-Khaimah, 78–79, 89, 240 Al Khalifah, 27–28, 35–36, 40 Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani, deputy ruler of Qatar chairman of the Provisional Federal Council, 54, 71 development of independent military force by, 57–58 foreign visits by, 124 Prime Minister of Qatar, 175 views of; on Qatar’s independence, 226; on union of shaykhdoms, 52 visit to SA, 73 Khalifah bin Salman Al Khalifah, deputy ruler of Bahrain mention of, 175 views of; on Bahrain conflict, 69–70, 85–86; on Bahrain’s withdrawal from union, 193; on UK’s withdrawal, 93–94, 191, 208; on union of shaykhdoms, 40, 103

282 

INDEX

Khalifah bin Zayid Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, 227 al-Khalij (Sharjah newspaper), 239 Kharg Island, 59 Khartoum Agreement, 172 Khor al-Udaid corridor leading to, 167 dispute between Qatar and Abu Dhabi about, 95–97 mention of, 188 Kissinger, Henry, 113, 197, 198 Kosygin, Alexei Nikolayevich, 48 Kurds, see Iraqi Kurds Kuwait demonstrations against Iran, 249 mediation by; in Bahrain conflict, 69–70, 85–88; between Nasser and Shah, 72; and union of shaykhdoms, 52–55 position of; on Iran’s claim to Abu Musa and Tunb islands, 203, 213–215; on Iran’s occupation of islands, 249–250; on UK’s withdrawal, 207–208; on union of shaykhdoms, 219–220 relations with Saudi Arabia, 42 relations with UK, 5 ruler of (see Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah, Emir of Kuwait) ruling family of, 5 and security pact, Western sponsored, 33–34 L Laraki, Ahmed, 45, 46 al-Lawzi, Salim, 47, 128 Lebanon, 104, 111 Lesser Tunb, see Tunb islands Libya, 181–183, 196, 197 Litwak, Robert, 115 Liwa Oasis, 165, 167

Luce, William and Iran’s claim to Abu Musa and Tunb islands, 205–206, 210, 212–213 mediation in islands settlement, 233–240, 242–245 mention of, 185, 187–192 and union of shaykhdoms, 209 views of, on Qatar’s independence, 226 Lundestad, Geir, 260 Luti, Ashraf, 55 M MacArthur, Douglas, II, 139, 179, 198 Al Maktum, 5, 36 Maktum bin Rashid Al Maktum, Crown Prince of Dubai, 71, 251 Mardi, Mahmud, 92, 102 Maritime raiding, 6, 37 Maritime Truce, 4 Masirah Island, 94 Massoudi, Abbas, 85 Mattair, Thomas, 246 Median line negotiations, 58–61, 80 Meyer, Armin, 29–31, 46, 47 Military forces in Gulf region of federation, 100 (see also Trucial Oman Scouts) See also Abu Dhabi Defense Force Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi claim on Bahrain (see Bahrain conflict) defense spending of, 177–179, 256 meeting with Nixon, 113 New Delhi declaration on Bahrain by, 83–84, 149 and oil crisis, 183–184, 197–201 personal status of, 15, 153 plots to overthrow, 143

 INDEX 

relations with Faysal; in general, 56–57; median line negotiations, 60–61, 80; proposals of package deals, 58–61; reconciliation between, 44–49, 75–78, 83–84 relations with Nasser, 72 relations with Nixon, 114 relations with US; credit agreement, 179; negotiation about military equipment, 136–137, 179–180; and US oil imports, 179–181 and Shatt al-Arab conflict, 105–107 views of; on Bahrain conflict, 29–31, 48–49, 75–76, 83–84, 148–149; on Bahrain plebiscite, 69; on Baʿthists in Iraq and Syria, 51; of Churchill III, 112; on deaths of his adversaries, 221–222; on Iran as dominant power, 136, 201–202, 255–256; on Iran/Iraq relations, 145; on Iran’s claim to Abu Musa and Tunb islands, 205–206, 210–213, 215–218, 225–226, 242–244; on military capabilities of Iran’s army, 184–185, 256; on security in Gulf, Soviet threat to, 80–81, 111–117, 139–142, 154–155, 177, 184–185, 195–196; on Shatt a-Arab crisis, 109–110; on stability of Faysal’s regime, 130–131; on UK’s withdrawal, 21–22, 92; on U.N. brokered solution to Bahrain conflict, 146–149; on union of shaykhdoms, 43–44, 56, 78, 220–221; of US, 2 visit to SA, 75–78 Morris, Willie, 189

283

Mubarak Al Sabah, 5, 45 Mubarak bin Muhammad Al Nahyan, 252 Muhammad bin Hamad Al Sharqi, ruler of Fujairah, 62–63, 176, 189–190 Muhammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, 85–86, 124–125, 149–150 Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktum, 251 Mylroie, Laurie, 9 N Al Nahyan, 5, 95–96 Nasser, Gamal Abdel at Arab Summit Rabat 1969, 134–135 death of, 3 mention of, 150 relations with Faysal, 133–134 relations with Shah, 72 and Rogers Plan, 131 and South Yemen attack, 130 views of, on Arab Summit 1969, 121–122 Nassiri, Nematollah, 62, 78–80 National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), 59, 183 National Liberation Front of South Yemen (NLF), 25, 42 Nawwaf bin Abdulaziz, 89 New York Times (US newspaper), 43–44, 48 NIOC, see National Iranian Oil Company Nixon Doctrine, 1–2, 114–115, 257 Nixon, Richard, 113, 114, 199–201 NLF, see National Liberation Front of South Yemen North Rumaila oil field, 109

284 

INDEX

O Occidental Petroleum, 157–161, 182 Oil companies and OPEC countries, 183, 196–199 Oil crisis (1970–1971) Iran and, 182–183 Libya and, 181–182 OPEC vs. big oil in, 196–199 Onley, James, 6, 255 OPEC countries, oil companies and, 183, 196–199 P Pachachi, Adnan, 237 Package deal, proposed by SA, 60–61, 66–67, 80 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 123, 134, 154 Pan American Petroleum Corporation, 59 Pearl fishing trade, 37 People’s Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), 78, 207, 250 Peoples Republic of South Yemen, see South Yemen Persian Gulf as inland or closed sea, 156–157 See also Gulf region The Persian Gulf, Iran’s Role (Ramazani),Iran, 9 Petersen, Tore, 7–9 PFLOAG, see People’s Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf PFLP, see Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Pharaon, Rashard, 53, 118, 169, 189 Piercey, George T., 201 Piracy (qarsānā), 6, 37 PLO, see Palestine Liberation Organization

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 117, 215 Power vacuum in Gulf region, 16, 20, 138, 140, 191, 260 Provisional Federal Council establishment of, 54 first meeting of, 71–72 replaced by Council of Ministers, 99 status of, 71–74 Q al-Qaddafi, Muammar, 181–182 Qarib, Hormuz, 62 Qarsānā (piracy), 6, 37 Qasimi Empire, 4 Qatar and Arab League, membership of, 175 independence of, 175–176, 230–232 position of, on union of shaykhdoms, 219 relations with Abu Dhabi, 95–97 relations with Bahrain, 35–36 relations with SA; claim to Buraimi, 95, 97–98; and Qatar’s independency, 230–232 relations with UK, 5 ruler of (see Ahmad bin ʿAli Al Thani, ruler of Qatar) ruling family of, 5 and union of shaykhdoms, 38–39 Al Qawasim, 6, 36–37, 65–67 al-Quddus, Ihsan ʿAbd, 121–122 R Radio Ahwaz, 144 Radio Baghdad, 144 Raʾfat, Wahid, 45 Ramazani, R.K., 9 Ras al-Khaimah and Abu Musa, dispute over territorial waters of, 157–162

 INDEX 

demonstrations against Iran in, 248 relations with US, 241–242 ruler of (see Saqr bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi, ruler of Ras al-Khaimah) and UAE, 240–241, 253 and union of gulf shaykhdoms, 38, 101–102 Ras Tanura, 172 Rashid bin Saʿid Al-Maktum, ruler of Dubai development of independent military force by, 57–58 foreign visits of, 125 and Supreme Council of Rulers meeting, 128 views of; on dual federation with Abu Dhabi, 39; on establishment UAE, 236–237; on military forces in Gulf, 99; on UK’s withdrawal, 23, 92–93, 208; on union of shaykhdoms, 40–41, 43, 125, 219, 227, 228 visit to Iran, 73 Raʿuf, ʿAdnan, 109 al-Rawi, ʿAbd al-Ghani, 144 al-Ray al-ʿAam (Kuwaiti newspaper), 45–46, 103 al-Rayyis, Riyad Najib, 128 Reuters (news organization), 239 Riad, Mahmud, 134, 214, 237, 250 Roberts, Goronwy, 19, 21–27, 124 Rogers Plan, 131, 177, 195, 217 Rogers, William, 112, 113, 197 Rostow, Eugene V., 32–35, 115 Rostow, Walt, 49 Royal Dutch Shell, 90, 183 Royal Saudi Air Force, 129 al-Rumaih, Mansur, 127–128 Russia, 48, 72–73, 108–109, 136–138, 140–141, 184–185, 220–221, 224, 258–259

285

S Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah, Emir of Kuwait, 22, 29 Sabkhat Matti district, 167, 188 Sabotage, of Tapline oil pipeline, 117, 170–171 Sadat, Anwar, 121, 257 Said, Abdul Aziz Hussein, 215 al-Samarraʾi, Salih Mahdi, 144 Samii, Mehdi, 178–180 Sanhuri, ʿAbdal-Razzaq, 53–54, 100 Saqqaf, ʿUmar and Buraimi dispute, 98 mention of, 77, 154, 231 views of; on active policy in Gulf, 42; on Arab-Israeli conflict, 132; on Arab Summit, 131–132; on meeting Faysal and Shah, 77, 84; on SA’s policy in the Gulf, 110–111; on Shatt al-Arab crisis, 109–110 Saqr bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi, ruler of Ras al-Khaimah and Abu Musa, dispute over territorial waters of, 158 and Council of Rulers meeting, 127–128 independent position of, 102 involvement in Khalids death, 252–254 and Iran’s claim to Tunb islands; counter-proposal of, 237; final rejection, 237–238; and Iran’s occupation of islands, 247, 248; looking for external support, 88–89, 211–212, 240–242; negotiations over, 79–80, 211; Saqr as ruler of Tunb islands, 65; UK-Iranian proposal to settlement of, 234–236 signing UAE constitution, 253–254

286 

INDEX

Saqr bin Muhammad (cont.) views of, 38; on distribution of ministries within union, 126; on UAE, 241–242; on UK’s withdrawal, 24–25; on Zayid’s overtures, 41 visit to Iran, 62, 78 Saqr bin Sultan Al Qasimi, 252–253 Al Saʿud clan, 15 Saudi Arabia (SA) and Arab-Israeli conflict, 131–132 claim to Buraimi Oasis (see Buraimi Oasis area) and communist pressure, 132–133 disinterest in lower Gulf area, 42 financial losses from Tapline rupture, 171–172 foreign policy of, 9–10 Gulf policies of, 110–111, 164–165 implementation of income tax in, 172 and Iran-Iraq rivalry, 257 package deal proposed by, 60–61, 66–67, 80 position of; on Iran’s occupation of islands, 250; on UAE, 229–230; on union of shaykhdoms, 53–55, 220–221 relations with Abu Dhabi, 164–170 relations with Bahrain, 28–31, 226–227, 231 relations with Dubai, 42 relations with Iran; continental shelf agreement, 58–60; deteriorating of, 28–31; in general, 83–84, 257–259; historical mistrust between, 14–15; improvement of, 153–156; issues in, 155–156; median line negotiations, 58–61; military aid of Iran to SA, 153–154; reconciliation between, 44–49; studies on, 9–10 relations with Kuwait, 42 relations with Qatar; claim to Buraimi, 95, 97–98; and Qatar’s independence, 230–232

relations with South Yemen, 129–130 relations with Syria, 170–173 relations with UAE, 231–232 ruler of (see Faysal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia) security crackdown in, 117–120 and security pact, Western sponsored, 33–34 stability/instability of Faysal’s regime, 117, 130–133, 135, 137–138 visits to; of Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani, 73; of Shah, 75–78 Saudi Royal Air Force, 129 Sawt al-Arab (Voice of the Arabs; radio station), 64 Sawt as-Sahil (radio station), 246 Schofield, Richard, 11 Sea-raids (ghārāt), 4, 6 Security in Gulf region Soviet threat to, 51–52, 72–73, 115–116, 136–142, 177, 184–185, 195–196, 220–221, 258–259 Syria, Iraq, and Southern Yemen as threat to, 154–155 Security pact, Western sponsored, 32–35 Sharaf, Sami, 133 Sharjah and Iran’s claim to Abu Musa (see Abu Musa Island) rulers of (see Khalid bin Mohammed Al Qasimi, ruler of Sharjah) (see Sultan bin Mohammad Al Qasimi, ruler of Sharjah) and union of gulf shaykhdoms, 101–102 Shatt al-Arab conflict escalation of, 105–110 in general, 103–106 Shaybah oil fie, 167 al-Shaykhli, ʿAbd al-Karim, 104, 108, 218

 INDEX 

Shaykhly authority, 3–6, 255 Shell, Royal Dutch, 90, 183 Shirawi, Yusuf, 50 Sirri Island, 61, 91 Sisco, Joseph, 113–114, 240, 241 Six Day War, 19, 117, 120, 132 al-Siyasa (Kuwaiti newspaper), 45–46, 218 Skeet, Ian, 200 Sources, 11–13 South Yemen, 78, 129–130, 140–141, 249 Soviet-Iran Treaty, 141 Soviet-Iraqi oil agreement, 109 Soviet Union presence in Gulf region of; as threat, 51–52, 72–73, 136–142, 177, 184–185, 195–196, 220–221, 258–259; weakening of, 223–254 relations with Egypt, 224, 257 relations with Iran, 48, 140–141 relations with Iraq; in general, 108–109; Treaty of Friendship, 256–257 Stewart, Michael, 124 Sultan bin Mohammad Al Qasimi, ruler of Sharjah, 254 Sunday Time (UK newspaper), 94 Supreme Council of Rulers establishment of, 53 May 1969 meeting, 99–102 October 1968 meeting of, 73–74 October 1969 meeting of, 125–126 Al-Suwaydi, Ahmad Khalifa, 166, 228, 251 Syria Baʿthists in, 51 boycott of Arab Summit 1969, 122 relations with SA, 170–173

287

T Taheri, Amir, 156–157 al-Tajir, Mehdi, 174, 228, 237 Tapline oil pipeline rupture in 1970, 170–173, 182 sabotage in 1969, 117, 170–171 Taryam, Abdullah Omran, 101, 128 Territorial disputes in general, 10–11, 260–261 Al Thani, 5, 35–36, 95–96 al-Thawra (Iraqi newspaper), 94 The Three Occupied UAE Islands (Mattair), 246 al-Tikriti, Hardan, 104, 107, 109 The Times (UK newspaper), 114, 159, 160, 208 Trans-Arabian pipeline, see Tapline oil pipeline Treaty of Erzurum, 103 Treaty of Friendship (Iraq-Soviet Union), 256, 257 Trucial Coast Development Fund, 71 Trucial Oman Scouts, 58, 71, 100, 161, 169, 176, 207, 230, 248–249 Trucial system, 3 Tunb islands in general, 26 Iran’s claim to; different views on, 88–91, 202–206, 210–214; in general, 65–67, 260; media coverage of, 215–219; negotations on final settlement of, 232–236; negotations over, 78–80; package deal proposed by SA on, 60–61, 65–67, 80 Iran’s occupation of; backlash of, 248–250; in general, 247–248 al-Turabi, Hassan, 100 Twin pillars policy, 2

288 

INDEX

U U Thant, 147–148, 151 Umm al-Qaiwain, 38, 101–102, 157–162 ruler of (see Ahmad bin Rashid Al Mualla, ruler of Umm al-Qaiwain) Union of Gulf shaykhdoms and Abu Musa, dispute over territorial waters of, 161–162 announcement of, 39, 40 Bahrain and, 152–153 Bahrain’s withdrawal from, 192–193 Council of Ministers, 99 diplomatic activities surrounding, 41–45 distribution of ministries in, 125–126 divergent views on, 219–221 equal representation in, 126 and Faysal’s opposition, 209–210 federal capital of, 125, 126, 192 in general, 37–41, 51–52 internal politics of, 101–102 July 1968 Abu Dhabi meeting on, 53–54 last rounds of discussions on, 228–229 leadership of, 44, 57, 70–74 May 1968 Abu Dhabi meeting on, 43–44 military forces of, 100 proportional representation in, 100, 192 provisional constitution of, 100–101 Provisional Federal Council, 54, 71–74, 99 Supreme Council of Rulers, 53, 73–74, 99–102, 125–126 (see also United Arab Emirates (UAE)) and UK’s withdrawal, 260–261 and Zayid’s ultimatum, 227–229

Union of the People of the Arabian Peninsula, 118 United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Abu Musa, 232–233 establishment of; cabinet and ministries of, 251–252; in general, 229–230, 251; timetable for, 244 (see also Union of Gulf shaykhdoms) and Ras al-Khaimah, 240–241 relations with SA, 231–232 relations with UK, 4 use of word united in, 229–230 United Arab Emirates Armed Forces (formerly the Trucial Oman Scouts), 253 United Kingdom (UK) and Abu Musa, dispute over territorial waters of, 158, 160–161 interference in Supreme Council of Rulers meeting, 126 position of, on Iran’s claim to Abu Musa and Tunb islands, 216–218 presence in Gulf region; and Aden Protectorate, 15–16, 20; as empire by invitation, 260; in general, 1–3, 35; treaties with Gulf States, 3–6, 251; withdrawal from, 15–16, 207, 225, 255; withdrawal from, delivering message of, 20–27; withdrawal from, five components after, 207; withdrawal from, reversal of, 64, 90–95, 164, 176, 260–261 relations with Iran; and Iran’s occupation of islands, 245–246; and islands settlement, 232–234 United Nations

 INDEX 

Mission to Bahrain of; execution of, 151–152; groundwork for, 149–150; Iran and, 146–148; possibility of, 85–86 solution to Bahrain conflict, 85, 146–149, 151, 152, 174–175 UAE’s membership of, 251 United Nations Security Council, 69, 70, 152 United States Gulf policies of; in general, 113–114; Johnson administration, 2, 114–115; Nixon administration, 1–2, 115–116, 180–181, 256–257; studies on, 7–9 Nixon Doctrine, 1–2, 114–115, 257 and oil crisis, 196–201 position on, Iran as leading power in Gulf, 221–222 relations with Egypt, 223–224 relations with Ras al-Khaimah, 241–242 relations with Shah; credit agreement, 179; negotiation about military equipment, 136–137, 179–180; and US oil imports, 179–181 and security pact in Gulf, 32–35 USSR, see Soviet Union V Vakil, Mehdi, 147, 152 Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, 146 Voice of Asifa (Palestinian radio station), 123 W Wadiʾa, 129–130 Wahhabism, 36, 37

289

War of Attrition, 113, 124, 131, 140, 259 Washington Post (US newspaper), 114 Weir, Michael, 185–186 Weston, Richard, 80 Wheeler, Earle G., 180 Willoughby, John, 99, 100 Wilson, Harold, 29, 124 Wright, Denis, 85, 106–107, 148 Y Yamani, Ahmad Zaki, 31, 60, 196 Z Zabih, Sepehr, 9 Zahedi, Ardeshir mention of, 30, 70, 136 and Shatt al-Arab conflict, 105–107 views of; on Bahrain conflict, 62, 76, 148–149; of Churchill III, 112; on Iran’s claim to Abu Musa and Tunb islands, 202–205, 215; on meeting Faysal and Shah, 77, 84; on reconciliation between Iran and SA, 45, 47; on SA’s claim to Buraimi, 204 Zandfard, Dr., 62 Zarrara, 165, 167–169 Zayid bin Khalifah, ruler of Abu Dhabi, 5 and contributing to UK’s military expenditure, 24, 32 foreign visits of, 124 institutional activities of, 227 interim chairman of the Supreme Council of Rulers, 53 and Iran’s claim to Buraimi, 97–98 and leadership of union of shaykhdoms, 70–74

290 

INDEX

Zayid bin Khalifah (cont.) and maritime boundaries agreement with Qatar, 96 mention of, 26 military build up by, 57–58, 94, 98–99, 169, 209 relations with Arafat, 252 relations with Faysal, 95–99, 163–164 and UAE, establishment of, 227–229, 236 views of; on dual federation with Dubai, 39; of Faysal, 95; on his

visit to Faysal, 165–166; on Kuwait’s role in formation of union, 55; on Provisional Federal Council, 72; on security in Gulf, 165–166; on Soviet-­ Arab nationalist connections, 137; on UAE, 251–252; on UK’s withdrawal, 23–24, 186–187; on UK’s withdrawal, reversal of, 92–93; on union of shaykhdoms, 41, 44–45, 185–186 Zelli, Manuchechr, 149