The Emergence of Nationalist Politics in Morocco: The Rise of the Independence Party and the Struggle Against Colonialism after World War II 9780755610822

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In Loving Memory of Anne Zisenwine

Acknowledgements

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his book could not have been written without the generous support and encouragement of many institutions and people – first and foremost, the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies and the Department of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University, both of which supported this project in many ways and have become a wonderful professional home for me. I am extremely grateful for their support. Professor Eyal Zisser, Director of the Dayan Center, and his predecessor, Professor Asher Susser, enthusiastically supported this study and valued its contribution to research on North Africa at the Dayan Center and at Tel Aviv University. Dr Uzi Rabi, chair of the university’s Department of Middle Eastern and African History, offered assistance at critical junctures and helped bring this book to completion. The centre’s researchers expressed their interest in this study from its early stages through to its completion and have become close colleagues and friends. I would like to mention three colleagues at the centre who offered guidance, encouragement and advice along the way. Dr Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, who was instrumental in bringing me to the Dayan Center and steering me towards a career in North African studies, has since become a teacher, mentor and friend. Bruce has introduced me to research questions pertaining to modern Moroccan history, which are part of this study, and encouraged my entry into an exciting scholarly arena. Professor Meir Litvak, whom I was fortunate to have as a teacher during my undergraduate studies, was the first person to expose me to the study of Middle East social and political history and inspired me to pursue these themes in my own graduate studies. I continue to admire his scholarly dedication and interest in a wide range of historical topics, including this study. Dr Joshua Teitelbaum, whom I have known since childhood, has offered countless advice on many academic questions and was particularly helpful with practical tips on conducting archival research and documenting sources. I am also thankful to Professor Michel Abitbul of the Hebrew University of ix

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN MOROCCO

Jerusalem, and Professor Yaron Tsur of Tel Aviv University, for sharing their expertise on North Africa with me while I was working on this study. This book originates from a doctoral thesis written at Tel Aviv University under the supervision of Dr Martin Kramer. During his tenure as director of the Moshe Dayan Center, Dr Kramer actively promoted the expansion of North African studies at the centre and encouraged this study as well. Several fellowships and research grants have enabled me to pursue this project. The Jenny and Harry Lewis Program in the Humanities and the Professor Uriel and Lora Dann Scholarship at Tel Aviv University made it possible for me to travel to Morocco. Research grants from the cultural department at the French embassy in Israel enabled me to carry out research in French archives and libraries. Research for this book was also conducted at the US Library of Congress and was greatly facilitated by the staff of the African and Middle Eastern Division Reading Room, which provided me with important sources that enriched the book’s historical record. Staff members at the National Archives in Washington DC were helpful in locating documents and records, which proved invaluable. Special thanks to Ari Leifman, Michael Leifman and Sharon Samber for their warm welcome and hospitality during my many visits to Washington. As this book neared completion, several people were instrumental in navigating the manuscript through the challenges and obstacles that often emerge at that stage. Belina Neuberger provided excellent assistance as an editor. Along with her keen eye for details, her good cheer and enthusiasm was very much appreciated. Selina Cohen of Oxford Publishing Services provided professional copy-editing and other services in preparing the book for publication. At I.B.Tauris, Joanna Godfrey and Maria Marsh offered sound advice and professional guidance along the way. My father, David Zisenwine, was a source of encouragement and support. He and my late mother Anne Zizenwine, to whose memory this book is dedicated, were my first role models of intellectual curiosity, learning and scholarship, which underpinned their personal and professional lives. These interests, along with their love and devotion to their children, created a home environment that continues to inspire me as an adult and a parent. And above all, my wife Ifat and children, Yotam and Shira, accompanied me on this journey, providing love, joy and so much more. x

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A Note on Transcription of Arabic In general, this study relies on the standard Arabic transcription used by the International Journal of Middle East Studies and its publisher, Cambridge University Press. However, I have at times used the transcriptions of Moroccan names that the individuals in question use, rather than impose spellings that may be more accurate but would not be recognizable even to the people to whom they apply. I have also relied on the official transcriptions of the Moroccan monarchy in presenting the names of the Moroccan royal family. This exception also applies to a number of cities and places, which appear in the common form in which they appear in English – such as Fez rather than Fās. While this may lead to a degree of inconsistency, I have tried to follow a sensible approach that I hope will be acceptable to readers.

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Introduction

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n 7 September 2007, Moroccan voters went to the polls to elect a new parliament. The elections were viewed as another step in Morocco’s democratization process, which accelerated after the accession to the throne in 1999 of Mohammed VI, King Hassan II’s successor. The accession of a young monarch was regarded both at home and abroad as the dawning of a new political era in which Morocco would move further away from the repressive authoritarianism that characterized the kingdom’s political life after 1956, when Morocco regained its independence. Throughout those years, commonly referred to in Morocco as the ‘years of lead’, the monarchy had relentlessly pursued its critics and muzzled dissent. The authorities routinely arrested political activists, tortured opposition leaders and were widely suspected of involvement in killing the regime’s critics. In the early 1990s, however, the monarchy sought to steer Morocco in a new direction. Mounting international pressure to improve the country’s human rights record and the regime’s increased selfconfidence ushered in a period of political change. King Hassan II sought to improve his political image and prepare the ground for a peaceful transition, with Crown Prince Sidi Mohammed his designated heir. He reached out to political opposition parties, eased restrictions on public life and established an alternance government (a coalition headed by parties from the opposition) in 1998, the first of its kind in Moroccan political history. By the time of King Hassan’s death, the groundwork for a new political era had been laid.1 Following his accession to the throne, Morocco’s new king, Mohammad VI, expressed his commitment to promoting democracy in Morocco and strengthening the country’s political system. The young monarch’s early years on the throne were marked by impressive efforts to promote political pluralism, address the grievances of Moroccans who felt alienated from political life and reach out to opposition parties. Although his father had already instituted some of

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these measures, the new king’s commitment further embedded them in Morocco’s political culture. Despite these developments, Moroccan voters remained largely indifferent to the prospect of political change. They demonstrated indifference and a lack of faith in the possibility of genuine political change, and refrained from active participation in politics. These sentiments lay at the root of the low voter turnout in the 2007 parliamentary elections. Only 37 per cent of the voters made their way to the polling stations, a low figure historically, which indicated the public’s lack of interest and trust in the country’s political system. Although disenchantment with Morocco’s political parties was linked to the public’s earlier disappointment with the alternance government’s performance, the weak position of Moroccan political parties was not new. In fact, the weaknesses of the political parties, and their inability to secure a prominent place within the political system bedevilled post-independence Moroccan politics. Apart from their own internal squabbles and difficulties, parties were affected first and foremost by the fact that political power in the kingdom remained in the monarch’s hands. These circumstances offered scant opportunity for political parties to assert themselves and secure their place in political life. The situation of Moroccan political parties has overshadowed political developments since Morocco received its independence in 1956.2 Several studies have stressed the continuity of a number of questions – ranging from issues such as human rights, the economy and the environment – to earlier periods. The developments within Moroccan nationalist politics, however, are largely underrepresented in academic research.3 This study examines the rise of the Istiqlal (independence) party in French Morocco, from its establishment at the end of 1943 through the early 1950s, and outlines the early years of the anticolonial struggle against the French. Istiqlal is presented in many studies as the central nationalist party in French Morocco, as it was the first party to raise an unequivocal demand for independence. The public support Istiqlal enjoyed in the 1940s reflected the changes in Morocco’s Muslim society during the colonial era, which officially began with the establishment of the French protectorate in 1912. The rapid economic development and urbanization that Morocco experienced during this period led to changes in the country’s political and

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INTRODUCTION

social structure, and was the backdrop to the establishment of the first modern political party in Morocco’s history. In this study I focus on political and social developments in the French protectorate of Morocco. France established a colonial apparatus in the kingdom that preserved the Moroccan sultan’s sovereignty, while transferring most government affairs to the French colonial administration. Morocco’s northern region was placed under Spanish rule and developed differently from the French protectorate. The Spanish zone in northern Morocco also formally maintained the Moroccan monarch’s sovereign position, ‘protecting’ the sultan’s official representative, the khalifa, while establishing a bureaucratic apparatus responsible for various government services. The Spanish colonial rule was far more direct than the French one, and made little effort to conceal its true colonial colours. The Spanish protectorate in Morocco witnessed extensive anti-colonial ferment and violence, including the rebellion in the Rif mountains led by ʿAbd al Karim alKhattabi, but it was not the centre of Moroccan nationalism.4 Earlier studies of Moroccan nationalism have emphasized that nationalists from Spanish zone cities such as Tetouan never rose above the second or third rank in the Moroccan nationalist movement, and that the important nationalist leaders were from the French zone and were influenced by French, rather than Spanish policies. They also record the limited nationalist political activity in the Spanish zone, as the Moroccan nationalist movement launched its struggle.5 The events and developments of the nationalist movement in the Spanish zone are beyond the scope of this study, although we shall assess the Istiqlal party’s organizational difficulties within the Spanish zone. These difficulties raise doubts about whether the Istiqlal party succeeded in establishing itself as a nationalist party, or remained restricted to the French zone. Another geographic arena deeply affected during the colonial era, the city of Tangier, had received international status and was governed by foreign powers. Tangier provided an important setting for Istiqlal’s development, especially during and after the sultan’s visit in 1947. The French protectorate treaty, signed on 30 March 1912, imposed a foreign administration on Morocco. France committed itself to preserving, strengthening and developing Morocco’s political institutions and social structures, but from the outset the protectorate was fraught with contradictions. The first paragraph of the protectorate

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THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN MOROCCO

treaty underlined France’s intention to institute administrative, legal, educational, economic and military reforms, while preserving the sultan’s religious and personal prestige.6 These two poles – modernization on the one hand and the preservation of Morocco’s past structures on the other – underpinned relations between France and Morocco throughout the protectorate era. Theoretically, Moroccan political structures were to be rehabilitated and adapted to modern life. But, in reality, the French had established their own administrative structures, which overshadowed and eclipsed the Moroccan institutions. The treaty promised to maintain the sultan’s sovereignty, but did not detail how this would be guaranteed. In addition, France was granted control over Morocco’s military and foreign affairs, which further weakened the Moroccan administration. The French repeatedly contended that they did not wish to replace Moroccan institutions with their own, but only sought to add to them and thus uphold the position of the Moroccan establishment, known as the makhzen (literally a storehouse or treasury chest). Their strategy was to retain traditional Moroccan structures, while effectively neutralizing them of any practical content. Every French administrative unit that paralleled a Moroccan one quickly acquired most of its prerogatives, without damaging its formal structure.7 The Moroccan sultan was officially responsible for all legislation in the kingdom, but under the protectorate the French took over all legislative initiatives. In reality, the sultan had limited authority over political life. No longer involved in foreign and military affairs, the Moroccan administration lost much of its power under the protectorate. It consisted mainly of the office of the grand wazir, seen as the Moroccan monarch’s prime minister and agent in charge of implementing his decisions. Other Moroccan ministries were responsible for supervising the Muslim legal system and religious endowments. The French administrative structures that overshadowed the sultan’s ministers consisted of the Service des contrôles civils, which supervised the grand wazir and was later reinforced by the Direction des affaires politiques. The latter coordinated all matters concerning Moroccan politics and managed an extensive intelligence network that gathered information on Moroccan public life.8 At the top of the French structure was the French general residency, headed by the residentgeneral. The French resident-general was the highest French authority in Morocco; he managed the entire French administrative

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INTRODUCTION

apparatus and commanded the French military forces. He was also in charge of Morocco’s military and foreign affairs, as stipulated in the protectorate treaty. The resident-general was responsible for the French and European settler population in Morocco, and issued the decrees pertaining to this group. Local government was placed in the hands of a pasha, the sultan’s personal representative in each city. In some cases, the pasha was able to build his own power base and gain prominence in the community. But in terms of governmental authority the pasha was overshadowed by a French official, the contrôleur civil, and by the services municipaux, established in 1917. The head of each department was in charge of urban planning and effectively held the reins of power in each community. In rural communities, a tribal chief, known as a qaʿīd, managed daily affairs, administered local justice and collected taxes. The French favoured these tribal leaders, regarding them as local aristocrats who could enhance their indirect rule over Morocco. Later on, they became the target of nationalist criticism and were accused of collaborating with the French, neglecting Moroccan interests and promoting their own political power at the expense of the local population. These chieftains, however, were also subjected to French supervision, largely through military officers responsible for native affairs (affaires indigènes). The protectorate’s political framework eventually became the focus of Moroccan nationalist ire. According to the ʿclassicʾ view of Moroccan nationalism, its emergence as an ideological force dates back to the early 1930s, following 25 years of French colonial rule, which re-established internal order and developed a modern communication network alongside financial institutions. According to this approach, the system provided an appropriate framework for nationalist politics. Disputing certain aspects of this theory, other scholars identified earlier examples of nationalist stirrings.9 Notwithstanding the historiographic disputes concerning the beginning of the nationalist struggle in Morocco, many of its features have been inadequately represented in historic studies of twentieth-century Morocco. The nationalist movement that emerged sought to restore independence, abrogate the protectorate treaty and reassert Morocco’s traditional political structures. According to this approach, the movement’s early activists identified with Muslim Salafi ideology, which advocated the need to rid Islam of outside influences that

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corrupted its original practices. Early Moroccan nationalists emphasized the need for a cultural and religious revival, which was perceived as a precondition for ameliorating the country’s standing. Their call for government reforms was outlined in a plan submitted to the French administration in 1934.10 Implementing these reforms remained the focus of nationalist activity throughout the decade. Moroccan nationalists faced French repression during this period, which diminished their ability to influence the Moroccan public. Their numbers, estimated at a few hundred, were small. Most nationalist activists were urban-based and educated, and represented a social stratum that had traditionally played a prominent role in Moroccan politics. During the Second World War, Moroccan nationalist activity ground to a halt. Istiqlal’s establishment reflected the revival of nationalist politics only towards the end of the war. Istiqlal sought to absorb diverse social sectors into its ranks, and to transform Moroccan nationalism from a movement of intellectual activists to a mass movement. After the party’s earlier hopes for international support were dashed, much of the energy spent throughout its formative years was devoted to recruiting new members, and imparting its ideology to the wider public. These endeavours met with success, so that the party became a significant force in local politics, notwithstanding the objective difficulties it faced. Indeed, French authorities repressed its activities, arrested and imprisoned its members, and exiled its leaders. Along with its aspirations for independence, Istiqlal sought to establish a constitutional monarchy in Morocco, and to embrace the sultan as a national symbol and Morocco’s senior leader. Throughout the colonial era, the changes within the monarchy and the personality of Sultan Sidi Mohammed bin Yusuf (known in the post-independence era as King Mohammed V) affected the relationship between Istiqlal and the monarchy, as well as the party’s standing in Moroccan politics. The weakness of Morocco’s political parties in the postindependence era, and the monarchy’s emergence as the country’s decisive political force raises questions with regard to the development of Moroccan political parties. The emergence of a central party like Istiqlal highlights the roots of political developments that affect Moroccan politics to this very day. This study raises questions concerning both Istiqlal’s ability to become a major political player in Morocco, and the sultan’s political leadership and its effect on the

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INTRODUCTION

party’s broader perspectives. Previous scholarly research on Istiqlal is very general in its approach, and thus overlooks internal developments within the party and refrains from probing political groups and individual personalities more deeply. The methodology employed in this study, consisting of reading archival documents, including official communiqués, diplomatic dispatches and journalistic accounts, offers a more focused approach to the party. This increases our knowledge of the period and illuminates additional aspects of modern Moroccan political and social history. This new approach focuses less on general questions, than on political and cultural processes that were initiated by political actors with the aim of strengthening the public’s allegiance to the Moroccan nation. This study is an examination of different facets of the development of Moroccan nationalism, as reflected in the emergence of Istiqlal and the early stages of the struggle against French colonialism. It outlines Morocco’s intensifying anti-colonial struggle, the changes within nationalist ideology after the establishment of Istiqlal, the party’s approach to Moroccan society, and the developing ties between the nationalist movement and the monarchy. It further questions the extent to which Istiqlal was a ‘national’ nationalist party, or a regional one confined to the mostly urban areas of the French protectorate. These questions also affected Istiqlal’s relationship with other political parties in the post-independence era, which are beyond the confines of this study. Recent studies of Arab nationalist movements and new theoretical approaches to Arab nationalism seek to fill the wide gaps in our knowledge of a phenomenon that has deeply affected twentiethcentury Middle Eastern and North African societies. Earlier scholars tended to overlook many aspects of Middle Eastern and North African nationalist movements, often depicting Arab nationalism as part of a local struggle against European imperialism, or as an ideology fashioned by intellectuals and political leaders. They presented Arab nationalism as a reaction to European imperialism, as an imitation of European political and cultural phenomena, or as a means of spreading European ideas across the region. Little attention was devoted to the examination of an emerging nationalism within the context of culturally and politically diverse identities in a given society, and to the study of non-elitist facets of nationalism. Today, most theorists no longer view nationalism as a homogenous

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phenomenon limited to elite groups, but rather as a wider socioeconomic process, experienced by a wide variety of social groups.11 Although other Middle Eastern nationalist movements have been studied through the lens of these new theoretical approaches, research on Moroccan nationalism is still in its early stages. Few studies have focused on Istiqlal, and on the nationalist struggle for independence. Much of what accompanied this process remains unknown – this is true even without addressing present-day questions about Arab nationalism in North Africa. By initiating a close and detailed analysis of the emergence of a Moroccan nationalist party, the study enriches the debate on Moroccan nationalist identity and the country’s political history. While the focus of this book is restricted to Morocco, an examination of Istiqlal’s emergence and early years provides a unique example of a nationalist movement in the wider North African context. As we shall see, the party was conservative in its social approach and, unlike other Maghribi movements (such as Algeria’s Front de Libération Nationale, FLN) largely shied away from social radical ideas that could potentially undermine prevailing social norms.

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1 The Nationalist Movement in French Morocco during the Second World War

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he establishment of the Istiqlal party towards the end of 1943 was a turning point for Moroccan nationalism, transforming a nationalist movement that consisted of a small circle of young intellectuals into a political force that gained momentum throughout the 1940s. The new movement reflected a nationalist revival after a prolonged period of inaction during the Second World War. However, the process in which Moroccan nationalism assumed a new identity did not draw to a close with the establishment of Istiqlal. On the contrary, it was only the beginning of a slow, gradual process that went hand in hand with a structural and ideological change within the nationalist movement’s ranks. While earlier nationalist activities in the 1930s focused on demands for comprehensive reforms within the framework of the French protectorate, nationalist demands changed once the new party was founded. Unlike earlier demands for change within the framework of colonial rule, which had previously characterized the national movement, its later endeavours included a complete abrogation of the protectorate, and the restoration of Moroccan independence. This shift was an outcome of the movement’s previous activities, which served as a backdrop to the Istiqlal party. In this chapter I examine the state of Moroccan nationalism during the war, providing the background to the new party’s establishment.

Moroccan Nationalism in the 1930s Moroccan nationalism underwent several phases of development between 1930 and 1943, before reaching a ‘ripeness’ level that, 9

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according to both scholars and veteran nationalist activists, underlined the establishment of the Istiqlal party. Generally speaking, nationalist activity in Morocco became completely paralysed during the war. Earlier struggles and protests of Moroccan nationalists against French colonial policies had largely waned – without achieving substantial results. This was mostly due to French repression of the small group of nationalist activists, who were burned out by the end of the decade. Prewar nationalist activity was confined to a small group, which according to one estimate consisted of no more than a few dozen individuals, comprised mostly of young adults from affluent families. These were not necessarily young Moroccans who had been exposed to French and Western culture, but were part of a ‘traditional’ milieu of religious individuals who viewed the protectorate as a threat to Morocco’s cultural identity. Though it had little opportunity to influence the Moroccan government, this group had long expressed an interest in politics (even during the precolonial era). In that sense, their activities did not deviate from time-honoured traditions in Moroccan public life, and did not represent a departure from Morocco’s political patterns. Nationalist activity throughout the 1930s did not penetrate into new social groups, such as an emerging proletariat in new urban areas, but continued instead to develop according to traditional patterns that had oiled Moroccan politics for generations. These patterns included limited public involvement in politics, complemented by ideological discussions among a small group of intellectuals largely removed from an active role in government affairs. Prior to 1930 the Moroccan nationalist movement amounted to very little. It lacked unity, a formal organizational structure and a clear programme. Its ideas were far from conclusive and its propaganda efforts were minimal.1 Armed anti-French opposition, however, was strenuous and ongoing. Although Moroccan cities were under French control, the country’s ‘pacification’ process (as the French referred to their takeover of those areas) did not officially end until 1934. This anti-French struggle in the countryside, though, did not embrace nationalist ideas and resembled Morocco’s traditional peripheral revolts against any form of political authority. The rising opposition to French colonial rule in the 1930s would thus differ from the initial Muslim protests against the French protectorate a decade 10

THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN FRENCH MOROCCO

earlier. Initially, the older Moroccan generation found it difficult to face the realities of colonial rule and were reeling from the shock of the French takeover of Morocco. Under these circumstances, it was difficult for them to crystallize into a potent opposition force. The younger generation, though better acquainted with French rule and more able to confront it, had not yet come of age. Moroccan opposition to the colonial system therefore remained quite limited, and awaited the emergence of a new generation willing to confront French colonialism. Moroccan scholarship tends to depict the rise of a nationalist movement as a linear development, which established the goal of independence as its main objective, even when it had not yet voiced it publicly. In reality, the idea of independence was not on the agenda of the nationalist activists, who had met in the early 1930s in Fez and Rabat in order to discuss political and ideological issues. They were organized under different banners and names (such as the ‘Maghribi League’ or the ‘Cultural Association’), and later served as the nucleus for Morocco’s nationalist parties. There was little coordination between these groups, which were numerically rather small and whose impact on political developments was clearly limited.2 The major ideological criticism against French rule in the 1920s was not voiced by these groups, but rather by adherents of Salafi and neoSalafi ideologies. Salafi ideology was of paramount importance in the crystallization of Moroccan nationalist political and social positions. According to one analysis, this reflected the deep intertwining of religious and political questions in early twentieth-century Morocco. In this context, the French takeover of the country was considered in these circles as a Christian plot designed to repress Islam and disseminate Christianity in Morocco. Any contact between French officials and Moroccans was depicted as an affront to Islam. Collaboration between the local population and the foreign, occupying forces was often explained in religious terms, and not as political or national betrayal. These terms were as yet unheard of in the Moroccan political discourse. Salafi adherents in Morocco emphasized the importance of the concept of freedom, which made it possible for individuals to embrace a lifestyle of their choice. They underlined the importance of political parties through which social groups could achieve their goals by non11

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violent means. The shift to organized political and social activity through political parties and other organizations was a novelty in the Moroccan political landscape. These basic Salafi ideas led to the emergence of a secondary movement, the neo-Salafiyya. This stream went one step further, seeking to organize Muslim society in a liberal, political framework, where sharīʿa (Islamic law) would serve as the basis for legislation, while a new approach that would adapt its strictures to the modern era was embraced.3 In the 1930s, an organized nationalist movement emerged in French Morocco. It combined traditional social groups with the new political reality that grew out of colonial rule. The mounting protests against French colonial policies in the 1930s encouraged many nationalist activists in their belief that their ideas would soon become more widely known among the Muslim public. Nationalist groups became active against the backdrop of rising public resentment of the protectorate’s policies. A plague of locusts, which damaged the country’s agricultural crops in 1929, increased public anger over what was perceived as the protectorate’s preferential treatment of European settlers at the expense of the Muslim majority.4 Other disruptive forces, such as drought and economic depression, increased the discontent.5 The protectorate’s policies were particularly noticeable in areas such as taxation, land distribution, and employment in government offices. Westerneducated young Muslims who were not employed in government positions frequently channelled their feelings of rejection and anger into growing support of nationalist circles. Other developments increased the people’s resentment of colonial rule even more. One initiative, namely a plan to channel the water of a river near Fez, to the benefit European settlers, was ultimately shelved after widespread protests broke out in the city. Many Moroccans became increasingly cognizant of the fact that serious protests would be most effective in bringing about political change in colonial Morocco. It was clear to nationalist activists that to make their struggle against French policies more effective, they would need a stronger organizational framework that could direct and coordinate their actions. Despite these changing perceptions, it remained unclear whether the Muslims would be able to establish a political framework that could coordinate and lead the protests against French rule. Not only did the French authorities oppose such an organization, but Muslim politics 12

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were also fraught with internal divisions that could overshadow such a framework. In addition, it was also difficult to assess the amount of public support on which the nationalist activists could rely. Young activists in early nationalist circles were interested primarily in disseminating their ideas among the wider public. Most of their efforts at this early stage centred on circulating their ideas outside Morocco, especially in France. This was an outcome of the residency’s severe restrictions imposed on nationalist publications in Morocco, which made it difficult to propagate nationalist ideas to a domestic audience. The first nationalist protest, which encompassed some features of mass politics and reflected the broad social potential of Moroccan nationalism, erupted after the infamous Berber Dahir (decree) was issued in May 1930.6 Some see this protest as the crucial point at which Moroccan nationalism evolved from a small cadre of intellectuals into a popular and ambitious political movement. The events surrounding the decree shifted the emphasis of nationalist activity from cultural to political, as the religious-based reform movement was invested with a political flavour. After the decree was issued, the political and social platform (heavily influenced by the Salafiyya) put forward by Morocco’s early nationalists changed. Protests against the decree became a unifying force, which reflected Muslim anger against French rule and against the perceived threat to Islam that many Moroccans felt derived from the Berber Dahir. Since religion remained the only sphere left largely untouched by the French, this new policy was seen as a decisive act against the remnants of Moroccan sovereignty. The call to ‘defend Islam’, which had become the rallying cry of this protest, became the main slogan promoted by nationalist activists in the early 1930s. On a practical level, this was a simple, recognizable slogan, which linked the broader public to the nationalist protest, even though the nature of the protest and its long-term goals had not yet been developed. The Berber Dahir sought to redefine the status of Morocco’s Berber population and reformulate their legal and political frameworks, which had remained intact after the establishment of the French protectorate. French authorities considered the Berber population a separate group from the rest of the country’s Muslims, and sought to nurture Berbers as a loyal local elite. Although this assumption was incorrect, it remained a cornerstone of French policy in Morocco, and 13

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provided the background to French endeavours to preserve the precolonial political and legal structures that underpinned Berber life.7 These measures were interpreted as favouritism towards the Berbers, to the detriment of other Moroccan Muslims. This policy was enacted in the early days of the French protectorate, but was never outlined officially. The 1930 decree, a French initiative to formalize Morocco’s legal system, was not expected to give rise to any objections. The decree was officially sanctioned by the sultan. It established that the criminal law imposed on the Berbers would be the French legal system, while civilian matters would be settled in accordance with the customary tribal system. The essence of the French plan was to distance the Berber population from the Muslim sharīʿa, and was interpreted by the Moroccan public as another blow to the country’s Islamic identity, along with an attempt to remove the Berbers from the broader Moroccan public and undermine Moroccan unity. Though the public outcry against the decree was particularly bitter, it was directed only at the French residency, not at the sultan, who had signed the decree. In fact, nationalist activists considered the sultan to be a victim of a French intrigue, designed to undermine his prestige. At no time did they accuse him of collaborating with the French or neglecting Moroccan national interests.8 Those who objected to the decree also argued that it affected the monarch’s position as the country’s sovereign and that this resulted from the preferential status accorded to French law at the expense of indigenous legal codes. They viewed this as a violation of the protectorate treaty, which emphasized the sultan’s sovereignty. The protests that erupted after the issue of the decree included the recitation of special latif prayers (prayers traditionally recited in times of crisis) at mosques throughout the major cities – concomitantly with massive non-violent demonstrations. The protests were particularly potent in Fez and to a lesser extent in Rabat, Salé, Tangier and Casablanca. The Fez protests arose over the political and economic difficulties French rule brought to the city and to the emergence of new urban centres like Casablanca, which lowered Fez’s standing. The rural population, especially the Berbers, did not participate in the protests. While the Berbers did not on the whole support the decree, they felt no identification with the urban nationalists. Although the protests were widespread and attracted large turnouts, it was difficult to cast the participants as fully-fledged supporters of a nationalist 14

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cause, for there was as yet no organized nationalist movement that could absorb such masses of sympathizers. The protests subsided after a few months, for the authorities harassed or arrested the leading figures involved in them.9 Although the anti-Dahir protests affected the residency’s position in Morocco, the nationalist activists were unsuccessful in channelling the popular anger against the French into a vibrant political force. There was little room within the Moroccan political system for such activity. As the anti-French protests waned, nationalist activists secretly continued their activities on a smaller scale. In the summer of 1930, a secret society known as the ‘Zāwiyya’ (literally a small oratory or prayer room) was established in Fez; a similar organization was established in Rabat a short while later. Graduates of Morocco’s traditional education system, who felt estranged from Western education and culture, formed the core of this group. By 1933 the group had expanded its activities to other cities such as Salé, Casablanca and Marrakech. They were organized in secret cells, known as ṭāʾifa (faction or party). These groups were quasi-religious, secretive and heavily centralized. That only a few dozen activists participated in their activities limited their impact on Moroccan society.10 The French authorities were dismissive of Moroccan nationalists during this period, mostly because they argued that the nationalists represented a very small group, and lacked a coherent plan of activity. In the autumn of 1934 nationalist activists made an effort to overcome this criticism and published a platform for change, which served as the central ideological policy of Moroccan nationalism up until the establishment of the Istiqlal party. The plan, published by the Comité d’action marocaine, did not demand independence, but strove to achieve what its authors called ‘a true implementation of the protectorate treaty’. The nationalist activists preferred to adhere to the legal framework of French rule in Morocco, while raising the demand for a ‘real’ protectorate, which would promote Moroccan interests according to the principles established in the treaty signed between Morocco and France in March 1912. The plan reiterated that the protectorate’s main purpose was to institute a comprehensive reform of Morocco’s government. It reflected the French administration’s commitment to Morocco. Basing their requests on this premise, the nationalists demanded a com15

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plete change in government practices. They called for economic reforms (in areas such as taxation and land ownership), social innovations (in education and health), and political reforms (including elections and an elected government), while insisting that the sultan’s position be maintained. Conservative Muslims were uncomfortable with the plan, and were critical of its new educational orientation (such as educating Muslim girls). Younger, educated Moroccans, however, welcomed its principles. But overall, the plan did not strike a chord among the Moroccan masses, which were largely detached from political life. The French residency dismissed it altogether. The French resident-general, Ponsot, described it as a ‘good doctoral thesis’ and refrained from making any serious comment on the ideas and principles it included. France’s dismissive approach remained unchanged throughout the decade.11 Throughout the 1930s, the nationalists made attempts to establish an institutional framework that would replace the ṭāʾifa’s limited activities. This was the motive behind the establishment of the nationalist Kutla (bloc) in October 1936. Its leadership included figures such as Allal el-Fassi, as its president, and Mohamed Hassan Ouazzani, as its secretary.12 The Kutla was unable to continue its activities for long since it was banned in October 1937 by the French, who were concerned it might disrupt public order. The party was later reestablished as the National Party for the Implementation of Demands – as its name indicates, the 1934 plan remained the essence of its activities. At the helm of the new party was an executive committee, again led by el-Fassi. The party’s demands were reformist, not revolutionary. They included calls to establish educational institutions for women, develop industry and improve the living conditions of Moroccans in urban areas. Another nationalist party also active in the social arena, the National Labour Party, was led by al-Ouazzani. It claimed to be more radical in its ideology, but was only minimally different from el-Fassi’s party (which was the larger of the two). The rivalry between the two groups was more personal than ideological. The nationalist activists were in need of widespread support to further their cause. They often took advantage of local incidents, such as the diversion in September 1937 of a river near the city of Meknes, which benefited French settlers, or of the Catholic pilgrimage to Khemisat, which recruited public support for the nationalist movement and increased protests against French rule. Each of these affairs 16

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roiled the Moroccan public, which became increasingly impatient with the French residency and its policies. The at times violent Meknes protests were a source of deep concern to French officials because they reflected the potential for widespread nationalist activities. At this stage, however, the harsh repressive measures against nationalist activities sufficed to deter Moroccans from participating in them. In addition, the majority of Moroccans still considered nationalism as too vague an ideology and its activities as too sectarian. Nationalism was associated with the interests and aspirations of more prosperous Moroccans. This, along with the lack of organized parties, was the main reason for the absence of a unified nationalist movement in the 1930s. Though the nationalists tried to expand the social base of their activities, they refrained from making aggressive efforts to recruit public support. This stemmed from the practical difficulties caused by a sometimes harsh French repression, and from a lack of genuine will among nationalist leaders to reach out to social circles with which they had little in common. In such circumstances, the prospects of establishing a large nationalist movement were indeed dim. In the late 1930s Morocco’s nationalist activists were lacking in both a cohesive leadership and a set course of action. The French residency initiated a widespread repressive offensive against Moroccan activists in October 1937, following an attempt to stage a nationalist demonstration in Fez. Over 400 people were arrested and prominent nationalist leaders were exiled. Among them was Allal el-Fassi, who was deported to Gabon, while al-Ouazzani and others were banished to the Sahara desert. The early nationalist stirrings, which had become quite conspicuous at the beginning of the decade with the publication of the Berber Dahir subsided within a few years. The lack of a united leadership and its enduring sectarian character affected the Moroccan nationalist movement’s development, and inhibited its growth.

Moroccan Nationalism during the Second World War The political situation that developed in Morocco after France’s defeat in the Second World War created deep concern among Moroccan Muslims. The main thrust of these feelings of uncertainty concerned Morocco’s political future in the wake of the French capitulation to Germany. France, which was generally perceived as invincible, suddenly appeared weak and vulnerable. For the first time since the 17

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protectorate’s establishment in 1912, French rule in Morocco was no longer taken for granted. Many Moroccans expected French rule to change after the war, and anticipated that new powers would become involved in Morocco. Some even went further in their expectations, and pondered the possibility of a complete French withdrawal. Even after the landing of the Allied troops in Morocco and their victories against Axis forces on other fronts, many Moroccans remained convinced that France would no longer be able to maintain its prewar position. Moroccan nationalist activists began to prepare for the emerging postwar reality.13 These preparations went hand in hand with changes in the organizational structure and ideological ambitions of the nationalist movement. Nationalist activity throughout the war was characterized by the lack of a coordinated position of the various factions vis-à-vis the Allies and the Axis. While some nationalist leaders were associated with Germany at the outset of the war, others kept a more neutral position, and refrained from associating with foreign parties. The nationalist leadership never made a concerted decision regarding contacts with Germany, which left all options open. One of the most glaring examples of a direct link established with Germany was that of Ahmed Belafrej, a prominent Moroccan activist in the 1930s. Belafrej, a scion of a prominent Rabat family, became a central figure in nationalist circles. He left Morocco before the outbreak of the war and settled in Berlin in June 1940. Belafrej’s sojourn in Berlin raised questions about wartime relations between the nationalist movement and Nazi Germany. The French later presented his contacts with German officials as evidence of Germany’s influence on the Moroccan nationalist movement. French protectorate officials contended that the Moroccan nationalist movement was but an artificial creation of German intelligence agencies, and served Germany’s propaganda machine. Belafrej’s contacts with German officials were in fact quite ambiguous. Though French sources portray close contacts between him and low-level German officials, Belafrej neither embraced Nazi ideology nor became an active spokesperson or apologist for the Germans.14 His contacts with German officials left no significant imprint on either the Moroccan nationalist movement or on any of the leading personalities within the movement, including Belafrej himself. Despite French claims that the nationalists sought to obstruct the war efforts of the 18

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Allies, there are no indications of German involvement in wartime nationalist activity in Morocco or of extensive, long-term contacts between Moroccan nationalists and Germany. French residency officials admitted that they had no record of contacts between Belafrej and German officials following his return to Morocco in 1943. Nationalist publications published after the war adopted an apologetic approach to Belafrej’s involvement with German officials during his stay in Berlin. They were inclined to minimize these meetings, depicting them as marginal, and also emphasized the negative view Moroccan nationalists had of Nazi Germany’s racial ideology. Addressing the allegations of wartime nationalist involvement with Germany, the Istiqlal party’s senior executive committee claimed that this was a ‘monstrous allegation’, which they completely rejected.15 In truth, there was little support for the Nazis among Moroccan Muslims, and few attempts to establish fascist-style organizations. Any wartime contacts between Moroccan nationalists and German officials had been limited, even at the peak of German military victories. These ties can be characterized as primarily utilitarian, and were initiated in the light of a possible Axis NorthAfrican takeover. Accordingly, they decreased even further once the Allied forces gained the upper hand on the battlefield. Throughout the war, Moroccan nationalist leaders were influenced by the statements of British and American leaders that underlined the right of all nations to liberty. This was one of the ideological goals of the Allied forces, as stated in the 1941 Atlantic Charter. These principles paved the way for an ideological shift in the nationalist movement, which came to light as the war reached its final stages. The main component of the change was the move away from earlier demands for internal reforms within the protectorate frameworks towards an unequivocal demand for independence. The reduction of nationalist activity during the war reflected the dismal state of the nationalist movement before the outbreak of the war. After visiting the city of Fez in March 1940, a Moroccan employee of the American consulate in Casablanca reported that nationalist activity there had ceased altogether, even though some members were attempting to revive it. Most Moroccans apparently feared that a French defeat or a hasty French withdrawal from Morocco would lead to chaos and anarchy. In these circumstances, most nationalists avoided taking action against the French.16 19

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At the outbreak of the war, and even more so after the FrancoGerman armistice of 1940, many Moroccans assumed that the days of the French colonial empire were numbered. They asserted that they had little to lose in the war because of the difficult political and economic situation in Morocco, and that the possibility of a change in the country’s status did not pose a threat. But even those Moroccans who harboured hopes for an end to France’s colonial rule did not speak about achieving complete independence. That aspiration, which was to become Istiqlal’s main goal, was not mentioned at this stage. In various discussions with foreign representatives during the war, the Moroccans admitted that they lacked the ability for self-rule, and spoke of the need to obtain some form of foreign assistance in governance. They recognized that complete independence was still a distant vision. One observer noted that Moroccan Muslims were indeed ‘aware of their weakness and lack of available resources’.17 Accordingly, they refrained from embracing long-term political plans. An American diplomat, who was engaged in contacts with nationalist activists throughout the war, was under the impression that most of them believed that the institution of widespread reforms within the colonial-based legal, educational, and economic structures would solve the country’s problems.18 This was compatible with the nationalist position in the 1930s, which focused on demands for political reform and not for independence. Reforms were viewed as a more viable alternative to independence, which was seen as unrealistic. One activist in Fez, who later commented on the violent clashes that engulfed Morocco in early 1944 (after the establishment of Istiqlal), argued that the Muslims demanded independence (in 1944) when they were not ready for it.19 Others added that, in any case, French authorities should have granted more rights to the Moroccan people, and should have addressed their grievances and the problems caused by their disenfranchised position. As the war progressed, nationalist activists recognized the need to alter their ideological framework and to reconceptualize their political aspirations. This shift involved discarding the former objective of reforming the protectorate system, and seeking alternatives. Activists began to see the protectorate’s framework as the root of Morocco’s political predicament, and focused on other solutions, which would address their difficulties. This was the background to the nationalist espousal of independence. 20

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The fact that in the 1930s the nationalist movement only represented a limited circle of urban intellectuals, and not wider social classes, makes it difficult to assess the nationalist position during the war. Most observers agreed that the nationalist movement was highly regarded by most Muslims, particularly in view of the heavy-handed repressive measures employed by the protectorate. The majority of Moroccans rejected the French presence in their country, and disdained the residency’s policies. However, it is difficult to determine the level of understanding they had of Moroccan nationalism, and the extent to which they had internalized its principles. The need to reform the protectorate was emphasized by the nationalists – especially on matters that did not directly affect the lives of most Moroccans. The nationalist demands at this stage reflected their sectarian nature, and their upscale social and economic background. Nationalist spokespersons before the war were critical of the residency’s condescending attitude towards Moroccans, the latter’s lack of educational opportunities and inability to obtain employment within the protectorate administration, and the preferential treatment French settlers received. These sentiments later served as an important basis for recruiting members into Istiqlal party ranks, but were not enough to induce Moroccans to join small-scale nationalist circles, whose chances of achieving any of these goals seemed unrealistic. The price that Moroccans would have to pay (in terms of French harassment and imprisonment) for embracing such activities deterred many from openly identifying with these groups. Throughout the war, both French residency officials and the Vichy government were concerned about the impact of the French defeat and declining French prestige. In September 1940, shortly after the Vichy government was formed, two emissaries were sent to Morocco on its behalf to examine local public opinion. Upon their return, they submitted an optimistic report, noting that ‘amongst the indigenous population … France’s prestige has so far suffered only [in a] minor [way]’, and that most of the Moroccan population had remained loyal to France. Residency officials who met the Vichy representatives told them that the Moroccan nationalist movement had lost much of its vigour and vitality, when compared with the violent clashes that had erupted between the authorities and protesters in 1937. The two Vichy officials nevertheless did note that 21

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many Moroccans were concerned about their political and economic future. Some of the Moroccans they met raised questions about France’s ability to maintain its rule, regardless of Spanish or German ambitions. The two representatives stressed the need to persuade Moroccans that France had no intention of abandoning Morocco, and that the new Pétain government was an independent French government that would adhere to earlier French commitments in Morocco.20 Similar statements were voiced by senior members of the French National Liberation Committee, led by Charles de Gaulle, after the Allied North African landing in 1942. Although nationalist activity decreased dramatically during the war, the assessments given by committee members argued that the nationalists were waiting until the end of the war, in an effort to request the plan of reforms they had submitted ten years before.21 This assessment suggests that French intelligence officials had not yet considered the possibility of a nationalist demand for independence. In an effort to maintain domestic stability and guarantee local support, both the Vichy government and the residency emphasized the importance of securing adequate food supplies for the Moroccan population.22 This concern propelled the Vichy government to reach an agreement with the United States in January 1941 (before the USA entered the war), securing food supplies for Morocco.23 The arrival of Allied forces did not ease the difficulty of securing sufficient food supplies. The problem intensified in October 1943, to the point where the French resident-general openly raised the possibility of an anti-French flare-up. The residency claimed that the unrest was economically motivated and disconnected from politics, but again expressed its concern over the question of food supplies, which directly affected the French political position in Morocco. These economic difficulties created a climate conducive to general feelings of discontent among Moroccans.24 At the outbreak of the war – and even before the French defeat – the French authorities became concerned about the impact of German propaganda on Moroccans, and the reluctance of the latter to enlist in the French army. Despite these concerns, the mobilization of Moroccan forces proceeded without difficulty. The number of Moroccan recruits into the French army reached 400,000 soldiers.25 Some nationalist leaders hoped that this would assist their cause at a 22

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later date, ‘rewarding’ them in some undefined way for their contribution to the French war effort. French officials continued to be concerned about their position in Morocco after the landing of the Allied forces, and the presence of General de Gaulle’s forces in North Africa. The French residency was convinced that the upheavals France experienced during the war would have a cumulative affect on a local population that had ceased to consider France an invincible superpower. Their main concern was that urban political discontent would evolve into large-scale, anti-French protests. They noted, however, that rural areas had been less affected by the war. Indeed, most peasants were hardly aware of the war and were not particularly concerned about France’s defeat in 1940. According to one source, ‘They have heard that Britain and France were defeated, but it seems that this news does not particularly affect them. They remain loyal to France’.26 French concerns over potential urban unrest led to a policy shift towards the Muslims. Fearful that a possible German invasion could gain local support, protectorate authorities were more forthcoming towards the Moroccans between 1940 and 1942. They granted them more freedom of expression than the Moroccans had been given in the past. French officials refrained, for example, from intervening in their activities and turned a blind eye to them tuning in to foreign radio stations that were not under French censorship.27 On the other hand, maintaining their prewar policies, the French authorities did not allow the publication of nationalist material. The residency’s new policy towards the nationalist movement found expression in General Lausanne’s somewhat surprising comment that the Moroccan nationalists were ultimately a product of French culture and ideas, and were therefore worthy of a more positive approach. Resident-General Charles Noguès seems to have adopted this position, as part of his effort to solidify France’s hold on Morocco and bolster his position. Noguès was even pleased with the prospect of reviving nationalist activities, so long as they centred on the sultan as a symbol of Morocco’s national aspirations, and did not focus on concrete political platforms and demands. The resident-general considered this sort of minor nationalist activity as ‘progressive, sensible’ nationalism, and objected to a complete transformation of the political system, which in his view 23

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was far-fetched and unrealistic. Noguès was aware of the difficulties France was facing in nurturing the sultan’s image as a national symbol, and of the possibility that the sultan might overshadow the French residency. However, since Noguès viewed such an eventuality as an immediate threat to French interests, he chose not to take any direct action. On the other hand, after the 1944 riots, some residency officials argued that the French policy of appeasement towards the sultan had ultimately affected the country’s position with regard to Moroccan politics, and encouraged the Moroccans to take action against France.28 In any case, the more positive French approach towards nationalist groups at the outset of the war was to some extent a policy change, compared with the French measures of the 1930s.29 This new approach towards the nationalists should not be overstated. Their activities remained restricted, and most of their leaders were either exiled or imprisoned. The limitations imposed on publications made it difficult for the nationalists to disseminate their opinions. A positive French approach to the nationalists was not translated into concrete measures vis-à-vis the nationalists or their leaders. A complete makeover of the residency’s policies towards Moroccan nationalism was never suggested. As Morocco prepared for the end of the war, the question of France’s position gained importance. France, which sought to rehabilitate its position as a superpower in the postwar years, found it difficult to discard its colonial policies. General de Gaulle declared in January 1944 that it would be possible to make progress in French Africa only in a slow, controlled manner. Only thus, he stated, would the region’s peoples be able to reach a level of development that would enable them to manage their affairs.30 After France’s liberation, a widescale purge of Vichy officials began, which catapulted new individuals into key posts. Clearly, France was now a modest European power, overshadowed by the United States and the Soviet Union. This reality should have driven French leaders to reconsider their approach towards the nationalist movements in territories that were under French rule.31 But most French leaders, including de Gaulle, found it difficult to break away from old colonial myths and change their positions. Their approach did not herald a significant change in France’s policies in Morocco. 24

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Moroccan Nationalism at the End of the Second World War: Embracing the Idea of Independence The Allied landing on Moroccan shores in November 1942 marked the end of the war in the region, and strengthened the sense of political stability in Morocco. The presence in their midst of American troops who interacted with the public and took an interest in the local economy and society encouraged the Moroccan public. Moroccan nationalists and other political circles were impressed with the Americans, and the expressions of support for the Moroccan people issued by American commanders and senior officials.32 Under these circumstances, they began to prepare for the future, assuming that the impending end of the war would be propitious for pressing ahead with their cause. The rekindled nationalist activity towards the end of the war and the establishment of the Istiqlal party were not induced by foreign troops, but were an outcome of the dynamics of a small group of Moroccan nationalists.33 The state of affairs in the Moroccan nationalist movement during the war was not unknown to the French. Colonel Spillman, who visited Morocco in November 1943 as a representative of de Gaulle’s forces, described the nationalist movement at that time quite accurately. Moroccan nationalism, he contended, was in a state of slumber – not, however, in a state of decline. Spillman argued that most Moroccan nationalists awaited the end of the war in Europe in order to demand the implementation of the political reforms they had formulated in the 1930s. Spillman made no mention in his report of any significant ideological change in the upcoming nationalist position, such as a shift from plans to reform the colonial administration to a demand for independence.34 As the end of the war approached, the French residency in Rabat became more interested in the nationalist movement. The French assumed that nationalist activity would resume in Morocco, and sought information about the nationalist movement’s level of development and areas of activity. The final report on the subject, issued towards the end of the Second World War, presents a portrait of a nationalist movement as it was understood by the residency at the time. According to this report, nationalism in Morocco remained a completely urban phenomenon. Its centres were in Fez, Rabat, Salé, with a more modest representation in Marrakech. Merchants and craftsmen, particularly from Fez, were identified as the movement’s 25

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most enthusiastic supporters. Fez retained its position as Morocco’s ‘most sensitive city’ in terms of politics from the 1930s onward, and became known as the centre of nationalist activity. This went hand in hand with its reputation as a traditional political and intellectual centre.35 Although Fez lost some of its lustre and prestige in the colonial period to Rabat, which was designated the kingdom’s capital after the establishment of the protectorate, it remained an important urban centre.36 Since in their views nationalist activity was a function of the local economic reality, residency officials predicted that the merchants and craftsmen in Fez would renew their nationalist activity should economic conditions worsen. During the war these groups remained relatively uninvolved in nationalist activities, but nevertheless remained, at least according to the French report, open to any form of ‘xenophobic or religious propaganda’.37 According to one report, nationalist activists in Casablanca were mostly intellectuals and merchants from Fez. In that sense, the report concluded with a sense of relief, it was difficult to speak of a true nationalist nucleus that operated in the city and represented its residents. Nationalist activity in Casablanca was thus no more than an extension of the nationalist centre in Fez. This focus on Casablanca underlined the special attachment the French colonial administration had formed to the city. They considered Casablanca to be their most important urban creation since the beginning of French rule in Morocco, and had allocated much of their resources towards the development of a city they viewed as Morocco’s economic and industrial centre.38 The French sought to keep the nationalists out of Casablanca, and were pleased that so far this endeavour proved successful. In spite of the influx of many rural Moroccans, who sought better employment and new economic opportunities in Casablanca, there was little to suggest at the end of the war that these new residents had embraced nationalist ideas. Residency officials were also interested in the nationalist movement’s social base. The information they received indicated that its members and activists were mostly young, educated people, from affluent backgrounds. At the end of the war, the students of the Qarawiyyin (Morocco’s highest religious centre of learning) in Fez, along with students or graduates of the French schools, Moroccan Muslims employed by the French administration, and teachers at 26

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Muslim educational institutions were described as the social reservoirs from which most of the nationalist movement’s supporters and activists were recruited. Their number was assessed to be no more than a few thousand. Urban workers were not included among these nationalist activists. At the end of the war, they were described as an ‘amorphous mass’, mostly preoccupied with securing its daily existence. This sector struggled to eke out a meagre living, with little time left for political involvement. These workers, however, did harbour many grievances and complaints against the protectorate’s administration in areas such as employment, wages, welfare and education. The wartime economic difficulties and the shortage of food supplies only increased their bitterness. Many of them had been displaced by colonial-related rural policies, and arrived in the city with strong anti-French sentiments. These sentiments would later serve as an important recruiting source in enlisting urban workers in the Istiqlal party, but did not embolden them to join the nationalists during the war. The French residency also considered the Moroccan countryside as ‘immune’ from nationalism. Although France’s defeat in 1940 did not affect the daily lives of most rural Moroccans, the French were nevertheless concerned about the influence of local religious leaders on the rural population. These clerics, graduates of the Qarawiyyin and of other religious institutions, were exposed to nationalist ideas in the course of their studies and could potentially spread the nationalist gospel. But, despite these concerns, the French still identified the rural sector as loyal to them, and detached socially and culturally from the urban nationalist groups. Indeed, nationalist activity in the 1930s ignored most of the countryside. Although the protectorate’s policies and the privileged position of the French settler population frustrated many residents in rural areas, they had little in common with urban nationalists. One problem that hindered the dissemination of nationalist ideas in the rural sector was the lack of an all-encompassing national Moroccan identity. It was clear to most nationalist leaders that they would need to strengthen the country’s national identity and forge a sense of unity between the various social sectors, economic classes and geographical regions. For most Moroccans, a locally based identity continued to be the defining factor in determining their personal affiliations and political allegiances. They took little interest 27

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in political questions that extended beyond their immediate surroundings. National identity was a vague, undefined concept for them, as was their attachment to an overarching Moroccan nation. The social composition of the nationalist movement further complicated the spread of nationalist ideology across the Moroccan countryside. But the negative feelings towards the French were real, and seethed beneath the surface. Many rural residents also suffered from the repressive measures of the local qāḍis (judges), who were viewed as accomplices of the French. The residency’s concerns over a possible nationalist eruption in the rural countryside were thus not unfounded. Seeking to formulate a new policy towards the nationalist movement at the end of the war, senior residency officials recommended that the nationalists not be viewed as inherently anti-French. Some of these officials recognized that Moroccan nationalism was an idea that the French would be unable to repress completely, but that could be contained and channelled into a less radical form. The idea of a middle-of-the-road approach to Moroccan nationalists, which would provide some form of cooperation with them, was discussed at this stage. The recommendation was made to have the French residency work together with the nationalist activists, the vast majority of whom were not vehemently anti-French, to institute legal and educational reforms.39 This proposal, however, disregarded the shift within Moroccan nationalism that occurred towards the end of the war and focused on embracing independence as the main goal of the nationalist movement, and on an unequivocal demand for the abrogation of the protectorate treaty. Turning to the idea of independence and the complete removal of French colonial rule, which replaced earlier demands for reforms within the protectorate’s framework, was the most significant ideological shift of the nationalist movement during the war. As the war ended, and with the establishment of the Istiqlal party, the ideological focus turned from various reform plans that had been devised by nationalist activists throughout the 1930s towards an unequivocal demand for independence. This change surprised French authorities, who had remained unaware of the new orientation among nationalist activists during the war. The idea of independence did not come up in discussions held between Moroccans and French officials during the war. Moreover, in 28

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those years many activists and supporters of the nationalist movement openly expressed their doubts over Morocco’s ability to sustain some level of self-government. They opposed the idea that the end of the war would present an opportunity to demand independence. Moroccan nationalist literature does not focus on the shift to the idea of independence. These writings emphasize the continuity and coherence that underlined the development of the nationalist idea in Morocco, which is presented as a linear process, steadily progressing towards the demand for independence. The authors of these texts do not portray this as a turning point in the emergence of Moroccan nationalism. On the contrary, they claim that their movement strove to remove French rule and reconstitute the Moroccan state from the outset. The shift towards independence was, however, an important milestone in the history of the nationalist movement. Previously, however, the idea had received little attention and, even when mentioned, was openly dismissed by many nationalists. The ideological change was an outcome of the war and its developments. It was a confluence of several factors. One was the Atlantic Charter, which defined the Allies’ ideological goals; its emphasis on the right to self-determination was greatly appreciated by the nationalists in Morocco, who were convinced that their wartime efforts on behalf of the Allies would be rewarded after the war. The impact of the American landings in Morocco was also profound. It features prominently in nationalist historiography, which emphasizes a supposed American promise of independence to Morocco. Many Moroccans were taken by the American troops’ friendliness and largesse. Moroccan nationalists hoped that the new international order that seemed to be emerging at the end of the war would compensate them for their efforts and sacrifices. It would, they thought, give them a real chance to bring about deep changes in Morocco’s political status. The French defeat and its impact on French rule in Morocco also deeply affected Moroccan nationalists. They sensed that the colonial empire had collapsed as a result of that defeat and that France would no longer be able to project itself as a colonial power. The economic problems that intensified towards the end of the war were another key factor in further eroding French authority in Morocco. As we shall see, French officials were aware of food shortages and other difficulties the Moroccan population encountered at that time, and 29

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warned that these would increase anti-French sentiment and feed into nationalist protests. These developments led Moroccan nationalists to concede that some form of self-rule was no longer inconceivable. Some prominent nationalists discarded earlier notions and doubts surrounding the question of Morocco’s ability to maintain self-rule. Towards the end of the war, the idea of independence became the preferred option for Moroccan nationalists. Morocco’s ‘nationalist historiography’ tends to emphasize the consensus among Muslims towards the end of the war as centring on the idea of independence. These publications underline that the idea had long been entrenched among Moroccans, and that the Istiqlal party merely went one step further in a direction that had previously not been promoted or publicized. According to this view, the nationalist ideas did include the seeds of the idea of independence.40 Ultimately, the domestic political developments that engulfed Morocco towards the end of the war surprised both the French and the Moroccans. Although the idea of independence seemed to be gaining ground as the war ended, the Moroccan nationalist movement was still unorganized. The organizational development of Moroccan nationalism will be discussed in the next chapter.

30

2 The Establishment of the Istiqlal Party and the 1944 Riots

T

he founding of the Istiqlal party, the publication of its political platform and the subsequent riots that erupted in several Moroccan cities in 1944 were new developments in the emergence of Moroccan nationalism. The events following the party’s establishment were dramatic in the context of nationalist politics in Morocco, and elevated the struggle against the French to new heights. For nationalist activists, Istiqlal represented a reawakening of the nationalist movement and the end of the quiescent period of the early 1940s. The new party, which was established at the end of 1943, united various nationalist groups into one framework. Besides denoting a new form of political organization in Morocco, Istiqlal presented a new ideological programme, which was to become the rationale for its existence. Istiqlal unequivocally demanded that independence be granted to Morocco and the French protectorate be dismantled. Its establishment offered the Moroccan public a revitalized Moroccan nationalist platform, which the French colonial authorities too had to confront. According to the French, the nationalist protest was characterized by ‘xenophobic and religious fanaticism’, which led to the murder of several French citizens.1 Violent clashes that erupted between Moroccan protesters and French security officers at the end of January 1944 were repressed, but left the newly established party weakened and perplexed about its future. In this chapter I overview the events surrounding the establishment of Istiqlal and their impact on Moroccan politics.

31

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Revival of Moroccan Nationalism and Establishment of Istiqlal American and French intelligence reports indicated a growing state of ferment among the Muslim population in Morocco in early 1944, as nationalist circles appeared to take a growing interest in independence. However, it appears that the nationalist activists did not greatly impress the French intelligence agencies, and that many French circles did not take the Moroccan nationalist ideas very seriously. The residency neither enacted any special measures against the rising ferment nor attempted to curb it.2 Subsequent French assessments and opinions, issued after the 1944 riots, argued that the riots were motivated by economic concerns, following the rise in food prices and supply problems in various cities, and were detached from the party’s demands. American officers who observed the riots noted that the participants were, by and large, curious, idle bystanders. The Americans could not identify any prior planning by Istiqlal in these riots.3 Despite this report, and even though the question of mass participation did not yet reflect a full identification with the messages and ideological content the new party sought to impart, its ability to recruit supporters reflected its potential as a new nationalist party. Some senior French officials nevertheless responded very seriously to the riots. They feared that the new political activity in Morocco would worsen over time and threaten their political future.4 Seeking to understand the developments within Muslim society that had engendered the new nationalist protest, several French observers distinguished between these riots and previous cycles of nationalist protests, and closely followed the increasing nationalist activities. They admitted, albeit privately, that the nationalist protests were no longer the realm of a few excited youngsters seeking a place in politics and society. The number of young activists had risen, and after the 1944 riots they could no longer be dismissed as an insignificant minority.5 According to nationalist activists, the same that had inspired the Allied forces during the war – an ideology that emphasized the right of nations to enjoy liberty – influenced the diffusion of the idea of independence and the conviction that the international arena was undergoing profound changes. Moroccan nationalists felt that in the emerging postwar order, colonial administrations, like the one in Morocco, would be anachronistic and obsolete. But, despite these 32

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perceptions, embracing the idea of independence was not an easy choice for Moroccan nationalists. The demand for the abrogation of the protectorate treaty and for a move towards independence was new to the nationalist agenda. The name given to the new party, Istiqlal (independence), nonetheless reflected the nationalist movement’s new direction. The French, for their part, had no problem identifying the ideological change that swept through the ranks of Moroccan nationalists. The new political organization received the blessing of the Moroccan political establishment, the makhzen. This endorsement was not public or direct, but clearly showed a different facet of Moroccan nationalist politics, not observed in earlier nationalist protests. In the past, senior makhzen officials preferred to keep their distance from nationalist activists, even if they privately expressed their support of the activists’ actions and positions, at least in principle. The new political reality, which emerged after the French defeat, drew these officials nearer to nationalist positions. The growing disillusionment with French rule, which spread throughout Moroccan society in the 1940s, also became more widespread among the Moroccan political elite. In addition, the sultan’s personal agenda became more compatible with nationalist aspirations, a development that strengthened his public position during the war. French reports also pointed out that the new party sought to expand the scope of its activity among wider segments of the population, and was no longer limited to affluent urban circles. The colonial officers sought to avert this development as far as possible.6 By mid-January 1944, British and US sources in Morocco had become aware of increasing political activity among Muslim groups, which were united in their opposition to the French protectorate. The Istiqlal party was established in December 1943, but without being widely publicized. The party’s founders were keen to unite the ranks of the various nationalist groups within the framework of their new political organization. One French assessment contended that the nationalist leadership was fully aware that if they were to succeed, they would have to secure a united front. An American intelligence officer, who was stationed in Fez in December 1943, reported a plan devised by local nationalist activists, including a petition to the sultan and the French resident demanding greater Moroccan participation in the government after the war. The plan, according to this report, did 33

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not mention independence.7 The nationalists later altered it and replaced the plan with a petition calling for independence to be submitted to the sultan. This petition was Istiqlal’s manifesto, and it articulated the party’s objectives. Senior residency officials later argued that the 1944 riots had been planned well in advance by the leaders of the new political party. Other sources presented a similar assessment of these events, which they claimed had been planned meticulously by the nationalist leaders, who anticipated an outbreak of popular riots once their petition was publicized. Istiqlal leaders, according to this source, expected the riots and the clashes between Moroccans and French to strengthen their efforts to present the new party as representing the positions of the people.8 Other archival sources suggest that French officials in Morocco were aware of increased nationalist activity during this period.9 But the testimonies, memorandums and reports filed after the riots reflect the senior residency officials’ surprise at the intensity of these protests. Istiqlal leaders and senior party activists adopted a very serious approach to the events surrounding the party’s establishment. Their memoirs underlined the extent to which they considered these events as a formative, edifying experience.10 Several activists described the riots, which engulfed several Moroccan cities after publication of the party’s manifesto, as memorable, claiming that the riots had contributed to the party becoming a political reality and an active player in the political system. Foreign observers also noted how the presentation of Istiqlal’s petition had revitalized the nationalist movement in Morocco. The reports that local French officers and regional officials wrote shortly after these events did not emphasize their uniqueness, unlike those of earlier nationalist protests such as the clashes that followed the publication of the Berber Dahir decree in 1930 or the riots in Meknes in 1937. They considered the new party a component of the ongoing, continuous Moroccan protest against the protectorate and not a dramatic turn in Moroccan politics. Senior residency officials, however, felt growing concern about the events that accompanied the party’s entry into political life. They saw the new party primarily as an anti-French organization and as an explosion of religious and racial fanaticism.11 René Massigli, who was in charge of foreign relations in Charles de Gaulle’s French liberation committee, noted that in the 34

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long term the impact of these events on French interests in Morocco would be profound.12 The French resident-general, Gabriel Puaux, also underlined in a private conversation that the situation in Morocco after the riots was ‘very serious’. He personally did not believe that the difficulties faced by the French administration in Morocco would disappear before long.13 A serious problem related to Istiqlal’s establishment, and of special concern to the French, was the sultan’s attitude to the new party. The residency was concerned about increasingly close relations developing between the sultan, Sidi Mohammed and nationalist leaders. This development was related to what they detected as the sultan’s new attempts to play a more active role in local political life: ‘the decisive role of the sultan in planning this plot must be emphasized’, wrote one French official in an internal memorandum following the riots.14 French officials sought to understand the background and motives that spurred the revived nationalist protests and the foundation of Istiqlal. They noted a decline in France’s stature among Moroccans, especially after the defeat of 1940 and the establishment of the Vichy government. They also emphasized the positive impact of the presence of Allied forces in Morocco, and the apparent AngloAmerican support of Moroccan nationalist aspirations, as positive factors that hastened the nationalists’ call for independence. By late 1943, more than a year after the American landing in Morocco, the degree of American influence on Moroccan nationalists was significant. Many of them were impressed by the positive, friendly demeanour of US troops in Morocco towards the local population and, on a more sublime level, were taken by the ideological position of US and Allied forces during the war. In the summer of 1943, Moroccan nationalist activists established the ‘Roosevelt Club’, a forum that organized meetings between members of the Moroccan elite and US military officers stationed in Morocco. This forum strengthened ties between Moroccans and Americans prior to Istiqlal’s establishment. The French mentioned the hasty replacement of former resident General Noguès (accused of representing the Vichy regime) as another expression of weakness. French officials were indeed convinced that their country’s prestige in Morocco had suffered greatly. It was this decline, they argued, that drove many nationalist activists to demand independence. They also asserted that the country’s economic situation played a role in driving many Moroccans towards 35

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the nationalist movement.15 Morocco experienced high inflation rates, which increased the price of basic food items, putting them out of reach for most Moroccans. In early 1944 the French authorities requisitioned much of Morocco’s wheat crop, which added to the public’s bitterness. All of the above, French officials said, created a ‘bad psychological climate’ in Morocco.16 In addition, senior officials in de Gaulle’s National Liberation Committee contended that German and Spanish intelligence agents fomented the riots. This latter allegation was repeatedly raised by residency officials after the foundation of Istiqlal and served as a good excuse for them to avoid a serious discussion of the party and its goals. They viewed the new party as a propaganda tool of the Axis, and contended that it far from reflected the aspirations of the local population. Allied representatives were undecided about whether or not German officers had incited these clashes. They found it hard to believe that Istiqlal was motivated by the Germans, and that Moroccan nationalists would be interested in collaborating with Germany when that country was clearly militarily weak in North Africa. Other French commentators argued that the events that surrounded Istiqlal’s establishment were ultimately about internal Moroccan developments, and had to be viewed accordingly.17 This was clearly a more realistic assessment.

Istiqlal’s Manifesto Side by side with reports about the establishment of a new party, rumours about a petition, to be submitted to the sultan and sponsored by Istiqlal, also circulated. The petition was to inform the sultan and the French residency of the party’s demands, and would serve as a blueprint of the new party’s principles and intentions. This protest pattern, namely filing petitions, was well grounded in Morocco’s political tradition. Throughout the 1930s, nationalist activists submitted memorandums and petitions to the authorities, with a focus on demands for reforms and on improving the status of Moroccans within the protectorate. The office of the resident-general was, however, quick to recognize the difference between previous petitions and the new, Istiqlal-sponsored manifesto. While earlier petitions demanded reforms in Morocco’s political structures, this time, as Puaux noted, ‘the demands for reforms were abandoned’. Istiqlal came forward with 36

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an unequivocal demand for independence – for the first time since the protectorate was established. This, according to Puaux, made a ‘huge difference’.18 Senior protectorate officials were convinced (even if they did not express their thoughts publicly) that the subsequent petition and riots symbolized the end of an era in the protectorate’s history, and that the party would become a political force with which they would have to reckon in the future.19 Before Istiqlal’s petition was publicized, its main points were transmitted to foreign representatives as part of the party’s effort to secure international support. The British consul-general in Rabat, who read a draft of the party’s petition a week before it was formally submitted to the sultan, reacted dismissively to the text, noting that its contents and style were ‘childish’. The British diplomat thought that neither the French resident-general nor the sultan would take the petition seriously and that it would not even attract the support of Moroccan intellectuals. He most certainly did not expect it to spur a wave of protests, riots and clashes, and to affect the political system.20 American diplomats were also privy to the petition before its official publication. Two prominent nationalist leaders, Mohammed Lyazidi and Ahmed Belafrej, visited the American consulate in Rabat in early January and told their American interlocutors about the party’s intention to submit the petition to the sultan, including a demand for a basic change in Morocco’s international status. The two Moroccans informed the Americans that the proposed document was still being drafted, but emphasized that its major political demand would be Morocco’s independence. In response to the American consul’s query about the sultan’s support of their demands, Lyazidi and Belafrej noted that they had reason to believe that the sultan was aware of their plans, and that they hoped to obtain his public endorsement. They did not, in the consul’s opinion, have a satisfying answer to his question about the level of local Moroccan support on which they could rely. Like his British counterpart in Fez, the American consul did not think that the majority of Moroccans harboured true nationalist aspirations. Minimizing the impact of Moroccan nationalists on the wider segments of society, he wrote that the vast majority of residents in Morocco had no interest in affairs that are not local in nature, and the small minority interested in politics was divided over their goals.21 Other observers who followed these events raised the Moroccan 37

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willingness to demonstrate against their unequal status compared with Morocco’s European population. They also contended that the new political organization should not be dismissed so easily, and were concerned about its impact on Moroccan public life.22 A textual analysis of the Arabic version of Istiqlal’s manifesto, which served as the new party’s manifesto, clarifies the cultural dimension of the political lexicon used by the party’s founders. It paves the way for a deeper understanding of the party’s guiding principles concerning the monarchy and Moroccan nationalism. The manifesto, which served as an introduction to the party’s goals and purposes, reflected the party’s stance vis-à-vis the Moroccan political system. These positions, which later overshadowed the party’s efforts to solidify its position in Moroccan public life, were already evident at the time of its establishment. Right at the outset of the document, the party introduced itself to the sultan and to the Moroccan public, noting that it comprised both former members of earlier nationalist groups and new members. Apart from this one sentence, the document never discussed the party’s organizational framework. It did not mention Istiqlal leaders or institutions, and refrained from discussing its plans and aspirations for Morocco’s political future. Following this short introduction, the discussion then turned to the party’s main objective: justifying the demand for independence. The document emphasized that Morocco had maintained its sovereignty and its independence over the centuries, until the imposition of the French protectorate. The protectorate’s initial intention and rationale, the document charged, was to institute a wide array of reforms in areas such as administration, law, finance and the military, without harming the Moroccan people’s sovereignty or the sultan’s status. The manifesto charged that the protectorate, contrary to these initial objectives, had become an authoritarian, colonial regime, which placed the benefit of the French at the top of its agenda. The French regime maintained hegemonic political control over Morocco, and barred Moroccans from actively participating in managing their political affairs. It also deprived them of their personal and public liberties. The manifesto underlined the Moroccan contribution to the war effort, alongside that of the Allied forces, and the help Morocco had provided in France’s struggle for liberation. The impact of the Moroccan involvement in the French war effort was significant; 47,000 Moroccans 38

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enlisted in the French colonial army (of whom more than 2000 had been killed by the time France surrendered in 1940), and there was much economic hardship. Poor harvests and food shortages compounded the economic difficulties, and left many Moroccans on the verge of starvation. In this context, the text mentioned the Atlantic Charter, which sanctified the right of nations to self-determination. Istiqlal asserted that the Allies had repeatedly invoked this point throughout the war, and emphasized the need to implement this principle. Another concept mentioned in the text, immediately following that of the right to self-determination, and linked to the new party’s practical demands, was that of the Moroccan nation (al-umma alMaghribyya). The manifesto asserted that the Moroccan nation was entitled to ‘democratic rights and liberties compatible with the principles of our religion [Islam]’. The text demanded that Morocco regain its complete sovereignty, as well as full independence and recognition of its territorial integrity. The document, which was addressed to the sultan, requested that the monarch do his utmost to realize this goal. Concomitantly, the manifesto called for Morocco to be added to the list of countries that had signed the Atlantic Charter, and for its participation in the proposed peace conference after the war to be assured. This demand totally opposed the protectorate treaty, which had transferred the management of all of Morocco’s foreign affairs to France. The last paragraph in the manifesto focused on the need to change the domestic situation in Morocco. The new party asked the sultan to engage in efforts to institute reforms that would defend the rights of all Moroccans. The document did not detail the nature of the required changes, leaving this question open to further discussion. One important point is that the manifesto does not devote much attention to Istiqlal as a political organization. As noted, the document does not detail the party’s institutions, its leadership, or its long-term intent to play a major role in Morocco’s political life. Although an initial manifesto is not the most appropriate setting for discussing such questions, the emphasis on the sultan’s role and the party’s focus on the monarch hinted at what was to become Istiqlal’s weak spot – favouring the pursuit of diplomatic efforts to obtain independence over strengthening the party’s structures. The manifesto emphasized the need for international involvement in the quest for independence and, for the most part, paid little attention to domestic 39

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political developments. The fact that Istiqlal gave preference to diplomatic efforts over local political life would continue to overshadow the party during its formative years. Another conspicuous point in the document was the preferential position accorded to the sultan, who was recognized as the country’s leader in the struggle for independence. Inherently recognizing the monarchy’s seniority in political life, the party turned to the monarchy for help in realizing the goal of independence. By doing so, Istiqlal’s founders put themselves in a subordinate position politically, thus acknowledging the need to promote the monarchy as Morocco’s leading political force. The manifesto also contained a number of political concepts used by party founders. These concepts were part of the debate in Morocco with regard to the character and nature of Moroccan nationalism and of the party system. The first concept the party leaders highlighted was that of ‘Muslim peoples’. The newly established nationalist party’s Islamic orientation reflected the traditional orientation of its founders, but also implied that Istiqlal was not a Western import that could threaten the prevailing political order in Morocco. Indeed, the connection between nationalist demands and religious convictions established Istiqlal as a political organization that supported tradition and was committed to its principles. The second concept that conspicuously appears in the manifesto is the use of the term ‘Moroccan nation’. This was a charged concept in the Moroccan political and cultural context at the time. Its usage in such a text was innovative in the local political discourse. The idea of Moroccan national identity was still alien and unfamiliar to many social circles in Morocco, which continued to promote local, limited identity frameworks, rather than focus on an overarching, unifying national identity. Even if the idea of demanding independence for Morocco was gaining traction in some Moroccan circles, the nature and meaning of the concept were not fully probed and elaborated in Istiqlal’s manifesto. Did the term refer only to Moroccan Muslims? What were the criteria for determining who would qualify as a Moroccan? Would it be possible to speak of ‘citizens’ in the prospective independent state, or would the term ‘subjects’ be more fitting, considering the sultan’s position as a national, non-democratic ruler? These and other questions would continue to overshadow the party. They remained unanswered at this stage. 40

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Finally, it should be noted that the manifesto does not mention a concrete plan or vision of Morocco once it had obtained its coveted independence. Apart from the general statement about reclaiming Morocco’s independence, it is unclear from the document what the nature of the anticipated state was to be. Its future government, its political and economic structures, educational policies, and the country’s cultural orientation were not discussed at this stage. Although the analysis of the manifesto raised many questions and doubts about Istiqlal’s future, it nevertheless outlines some of the party’s central beliefs, such as its endorsement of the monarchy, and its affiliation with religion and tradition. These tenets have underlined Istiqlal’s ideology from its establishment. Some 58 people signed the Istiqlal manifesto. In their memoirs, some of the party leaders emphasized that this group embodied the entire Moroccan nation, and endowed the new party with unique attributes from the moment it was established.23 This claim seems somewhat exaggerated. Though the signatories hailed from diverse geographical locations, they did not differ in their social background. For the most part, they were affluent urbanites with a traditional or Western education. This group was the nationalist movement’s veteran social foundation. The nationalists were originally mostly urban, and their foray into rural areas and peripheral social settings was a later development. Initially, hardly any representatives of these groups could be counted among its members. The party’s social profile was in reality far more limited than the image its leaders attempted to convey. A closer examination of the 58 signatories reveals that they were representative of the various nationalist groups in Morocco at the end of the Second World War. Some of them were recognized as nationalist activists and had earlier participated in nationalist protests. They were mostly young, educated scions of prominent Muslim families. The majority lived in traditional urban centres, such as Rabat and Fez. Careful scrutiny of the names of signatories reveals a high level of personal and often familial relations between them, with almost half of them associated with each other either through family ties or through social or professional relations. For example, Omar Abdeljalil, an early nationalist activist who helped draft the manifesto, was the brother-in-law of another senior nationalist leader, Mohammed Lyazidi. Lyazidi’s brother, Ahmad Lyazidi, also appears on the list. 41

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Another individual, Ahmed Cherkaoui, was known to be a close friend of Ahmad Lyazidi and a business partner of Mohammed Lyazidi. Ahmad Ben Boucetta, who signed the petition, had also been involved in business dealings with Mohammed Lyazidi, and had leased a house from him in Rabat. The degree of personal involvement between the signatories emphasizes that, despite Istiqlal statements that the party was a comprehensive political framework, its early members and supporters still remained a closed, limited group, largely distanced from other social groups. The signatories of the party’s manifesto did not deviate from the narrow dimensions of Moroccan nationalists. New urban centres like Casablanca, however, were more modestly represented among Istiqlal’s early supporters. Only two of the people who signed the petition were residents of the modern port city; four others hailed from Kenitra (Port Lyautey), and one from Sidi Kacem, two locales that greatly expanded during the colonial period. Although these urban centres, which had absorbed a large number of migrants during the colonial era, were seen as potential support bases of the new nationalist party, their residents still abstained from the political stage. One report, which commented on the nationalist movement’s situation in Casablanca, noted that the movement there ‘benefits from limited, if any, support from … the population, which was largely disinterested in it’.24 As many as 23 of the manifesto’s signatories came from Fez; there are a number of explanations for such prominent representation of residents of that city among the party’s founders and early supporters. Throughout the protectorate, Fez retained its position as a centre for religious learning, but lost its economic power.25 Fez suffered economic difficulties during the colonial period, which increased its residents’ bitterness towards the French residency. The large investments of French capital mostly bypassed the city and its environs. The modern banking system, instituted by the French, weakened Fez’s traditional money-exchange businesses. The emergence of new urban centres, particularly Casablanca, affected the city’s economic footing. The decline in the city’s fortunes increased the residents’ bitterness towards the protectorate administration, and drove many of them into the arms of the nationalist movement. Another explanation of the nationalist movement’s popularity in Fez contends that during the Second World War many residents improved their financial situation by going into trade and small-scale industry. 42

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It was precisely this boost that raised their dissatisfaction with the colonial administration, as they sought to improve their political status and equate their rights with those of French residents.26 The fact that Casablanca was not a centre of nationalist activity underlines the city’s unique position in Morocco at the time. Casablanca was in many ways a separate entity, one of the protectorate’s impressive accomplishments, having evolved from a small fishing village to a sprawling metropolis. Many rural Moroccans flocked to the new city in search of employment and a new life. During the colonial period, Casablanca remained less attached to the traditional political culture and well-entrenched social patterns that were common across Morocco. For many Moroccans, Casablanca was a ‘new frontier’, differing from other Moroccan cities. It provided a setting for new lifestyles, different from the prevailing social norms. Many of its residents had arrived there from the countryside in search of employment. They had no previous experience of city life, and upon arrival were separated from traditional social structures, such as family, clan, and other tribal-rural foci of identity. As a result Casablanca acquired a unique complexion in the colonial era. Its residents had more extensive contacts with European residents, who were much more numerous there than in other cities. Casablanca also saw the rise of a Muslim proletariat, comprised of recent arrivals to the city, which found employment in the colonial economic enterprises. In that sense, Casablanca’s class structure was also unique.27 But the city had not yet achieved a critical mass that could lead widespread nationalist protests. Many of its Muslim residents still harboured a host of grievances against the preferential status of French residents, without, however, transforming these sentiments into concrete political action. The list of signatures included the names of 11 activists, all from Rabat (which became the centre of Moroccan political life during the colonial period) reflecting, according to one commentary, the growing affiliation between the makhzen and nationalist circles.28 Alongside the Rabat representatives were seven more from the adjacent city of Salé, six from Meknes, five from Marrakech, and several people from Safi, Oujda, and Khmeisat. The nationalists later asserted that all the individuals who had signed the petition were dismissed from their jobs because of their support for the new nationalist party. Another group of party founders included alumni of various 43

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secondary schools. These alumni associations constituted an important segment of colonial Moroccan society and provided the few young educated Moroccans with an opportunity to play an active role in social and political life. Although the number of educated Moroccans was minuscule, the associations commanded an important position among the local population. They were identified as the key element in what Muslim Moroccans labelled the ‘new Morocco’ of the twentieth century. They differed in their educational background from older nationalist figures such as Allal el-Fassi (who had always emphasized the centrality of Islam and religious traditions in nationalist ideology).29 The alumni associations became involved with nationalist circles in the 1930s, partially due to the French colonial administration’s refusal to offer them any hope of gaining employment. The 11 members who had signed the Istiqlal’s manifesto expressed their emerging position within the nationalists’ ranks.30 There is a degree of controversy surrounding one interesting signatory of the manifesto, Malika el-Fassi. Nationalist writings repeatedly mention that el-Fassi was the only woman to sign the petition, achieving a unique position in Moroccan society both during and after the struggle for independence. However much this assertion is mentioned in nationalist writings, her name does not appear among the signatories. It is difficult to determine whether Malika el-Fassi actually signed the petition or not, although el-Fassi was involved in early Istiqlal activities. The fact that the nationalists promoted the idea of a woman signing the petition indicates the importance they ascribed to women in political and party life. This, too, was a new development in Moroccan politics. Malika el-Fassi achieved a unique position in Moroccan society both during and after the struggle for independence. El-Fassi, who was married to Mohammed el-Fassi, the head of the Qarawiyyin in Fez, led an unusual life, certainly by what was customary for women in Moroccan society at the time. Unlike most Moroccan women, Malika el-Fassi was educated and, having attended school, championed the cause of expanding educational opportunities for women. Following in her husband’s footsteps, she became active in nationalist politics and was involved in the establishment of the Istiqlal party. She later recalled how she had supported the idea of founding a mass party, which would demand independence for 44

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Morocco. As a woman, her involvement in political life was unprecedented, but she herself claimed that her gender had not affected her ability to participate in nationalist politics: ‘They [men] did not look on me as a woman, and I did not look on them as men, but rather as brothers. Nationalism had linked us together’, she later recalled.31 El-Fassi’s family background was not very different from that of other nationalist activists, so she fitted the profile of the party’s other founding members. At a later stage, her presence as a woman helped her pave the way for more women to become active in nationalist politics. The Istiqlal party officially submitted its petition to the French residency, the sultan, and several foreign diplomatic missions on 11 January 1944. The sultan privately met a delegation of party activists on that day. The French resident-general refused to meet the delegation, which submitted the petition to a staff member. Party representatives were disappointed at the refusal of the US and British consuls to meet them. Istiqlal activists had hoped to obtain foreign endorsement of their cause, which was one of their primary goals. The British and US diplomats were instructed in advance by their governments not to deviate from the accepted practices in their contacts with local Moroccans, and conduct all diplomatic activity through the French residency, which was responsible for the country’s foreign affairs. Neither Britain nor the United States wanted a confrontation with the French at this stage, when war was still raging. In a series of cables dispatched to London in 1943, British diplomats stationed in Morocco suggested a clear policy towards the nationalist movement. They noted that while it was impossible not to be sympathetic to Moroccan sentiments that France had rescinded its duty to serve as a protective superpower, it would be a mistake to allow these sentiments to blind reality. Morocco’s French protectorate, they asserted, could not change its status overnight. The British diplomats warned against undermining France’s position in Morocco, which would threaten domestic stability. Even a long-term process that would change the protectorate’s status over a 100-year period, they argued, would lead to chaos and unwanted turmoil.32 The USA tried to present a slightly different approach. American diplomats in Morocco dispatched numerous negative assessments of Moroccans and their political acumen, though they were clearly aware of Moroccan expectations that Americans would back their 45

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aspirations.33 American representatives estimated that Moroccan nationalists envisaged securing at least some form of autonomy, if not complete independence, after the war. Most Moroccan nationalists felt that the United States could facilitate these goals.34 American representatives were aware of the delicate situation they were facing. They were concerned about being manipulated by Moroccan nationalists, particularly because of their lack of familiarity with Moroccan mores and political tactics, and mentioned this as an obvious reason to refrain from contact with the nationalists. Other American officials noted the American ideological commitment to the spirit of the ‘Atlantic Charter‘, and called on the USA to address the Moroccan question.35 The White House sought to implement a more friendly policy in Morocco. Secretary of State Hull was told that President Roosevelt preferred to adopt a more positive approach to the Moroccan sultan than the State Department recommended.36 Ultimately, the USA preferred a cautious approach to Moroccan nationalism, and refrained from any measure that could be interpreted as an attempt to undermine France’s position in Morocco. Reports on the wartime activities of several American agents in Morocco, who had supposedly given vague promises to support the Moroccan nationalist movement, were received angrily in Washington. A wartime American intelligence report warned that the willingness of several American officials to meet an Arab delegation emboldened the nationalists. The report noted that Arabs often misinterpreted a willingness to listen to their claims as a token of endorsement.37 The USA, contrary to French assessments and Moroccan hopes, had no interest in gaining any form of direct or indirect rule over Morocco. American policy in 1944 did not convey any particular closeness to Istiqlal, and did not raise any expectations among its activists. In fact, America’s policy towards Moroccan nationalism in 1944 was dictated by the need to strengthen ties between the USA and de Gaulle’s forces. After receiving Istiqlal’s petition on 11 January, diplomatic missions conveyed the new party’s demands to the French authorities, and advised them to treat the matter quietly, and avoid generating tension with the local population. The American consul in Rabat had discussed the matter earlier with the French resident-general Puaux, and warned him not to take harsh action against Istiqlal. Puaux said that he would treat the matter firmly, and added that in any case he 46

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did not intend to take any preventive measures, such as arresting nationalist leaders, as some of his predecessors had done in earlier rounds of nationalist protests in the 1930s. American diplomats in Rabat learned that the French residency was determined not to be dragged into a direct confrontation with Istiqlal supporters. Foreign observers surmised that the French would be willing to make some gestures of goodwill towards the nationalists in order to avert riots and unrest. They estimated that the residency would seek to increase the number of Moroccans employed by residency agencies, and thus reassure many of the young, educated Moroccans, who were angry about the French unwillingness to employ them.38 The Istiqlal manifesto shook up the Moroccan political system and unleashed a host of reactions. Shortly after news of the petition was publicized, delegations throughout French Morocco set out for Rabat to inform the sultan of their endorsement of the manifesto. These delegations had apparently been set up in advance, underlining the high level of grassroots organization that went hand in hand with the establishment of Istiqlal. But, although the news about the new nationalist party certainly generated excitement among the urban population, not many reports about the reaction among the rural and tribal groups are available. There is little to suggest that these segments of society were aware of the establishment of a new nationalist party or were in any way involved in its activities.39 The day after submission of the petition, the sultan convened a special meeting with his ministers to discuss the new situation. The ministers refrained from expressing an opinion on the subject, and actually found it difficult to understand the sultan’s position.40 French residency officials were also interested in the monarch’s approach to the new nationalist party as they grappled with the broader implications of its establishment and activities. The French resident-general rushed to meet the sultan after returning to Rabat from Marrakech on 14 January. Encouraged by the promises he had received from the allies, which clearly conveyed that they had no interest in revising France’s position in Morocco, Puaux felt that he could deal with the new nationalist stirrings in Morocco and curb the expansion of Istiqlal. The residency issued a statement on that same day, announcing new government reforms, which would be based on the ‘current treaties’, thus implying that the protectorate framework would be maintained.41 The statement underlined that 47

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these new measures had received the sultan’s endorsement. The American consul in Rabat noted that the announcement was part of a French effort to avert clashes with the nationalists.42 In his meeting with the sultan, Puaux presented a firmer approach to Istiqlal, compared with his earlier meetings with foreign diplomats. He informed the sultan that the French authorities would be willing to engage in political discussions only with him and not with any nationalist activists.43 Subsequently, the resident-general insisted that the sultan publicly make known whether he was ‘with or against France’. In his response to Puaux’s question, the sultan emphasized his support of France, noting that he did, however, expect France to leave Morocco eventually. He also added that he would be unable to rule against the popular will.44 The sultan intended to convene his ministers, including five representatives of the nationalist movement, to discuss the nationalists’ most recent demands.45 Puaux argued that he could not agree to a measure that would grant preference to one local group. He did add that the sultan and the ministers were free to consult whomever they wished informally. Although he recognized that some of the individuals who had signed Istiqlal’s petition were prominent Moroccans, Puaux also emphasized that others were ‘professional agitators’, who had been arrested and released only after promising not to engage in politics, but were now reneging on this promise. The sultan finally agreed that the unofficial, private consultations between his ministers and the signatories of the petition would take place outside the palace walls. He pledged that these contacts would be conducted in an orderly fashion and would not lead to riots or unrest.46 Later that day, the sultan asked the resident-general to discuss the situation with his council of ministers. The sultan’s ministers adopted a conciliatory approach to the residency throughout the meeting. Puaux was informed that the three ministers, who were to meet representatives of the petitioners outside the palace, would demand that the Istiqlal representatives calm their supporters. They were also to inform them that discussions about French rights in Morocco were not on the political agenda, and that the sultan and the residentgeneral intended to promote reforms within the context of the protectorate. The resident-general pointed out the danger of nationalist unrest in a country that was officially still in a state of war and warned that, if necessary, France would maintain order by force. 48

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Puaux noted that despite Istiqlal’s expectations, Britain and the United States had no intention of intervening in Moroccan affairs.47 Istiqlal’s leaders were aware of the pressures exerted on the sultan by the residency, which intended to thwart any contact between the palace and the party. They were concerned that the sultan would lose interest in their party. On 16 January they therefore sent him another memorandum, reiterating the idea of independence as the only outlet for Morocco’s predicament.48 Despite this appeal, the sultan preferred not to confront the residency directly and withdrew his tacit endorsement of Istiqlal. That same day, 16 January, an official statement by the sultan was broadcasted on Radio Morocco and published in Moroccan newspapers. The statement, which followed negotiations between the sultan and the residency, noted that Morocco would develop within the framework of its friendship with France and respect all treaties, a clear allusion to the protectorate treaty. The statement left little doubt that, due to heavy French pressure, the sultan was not affiliated with the new nationalist party. This, alongside the recognition that the USA and Britain would not challenge France’s position in Morocco and would not endorse the nationalists’ demand for independence, convinced the sultan that for the time being he would be better off avoiding a direct confrontation with the French, and refrain from openly endorsing the new party.49 The sultan’s statement made no mention whatsoever of Istiqlal’s demands for independence. Istiqlal leaders were concerned that the sultan and his associates would distance themselves from them, and thus weaken their cause. In response to the sultan’s statement, they claimed that the text did not reflect the monarch’s wishes. A telegram dispatched to the palace on 18 January repeated the party’s demand for national independence. The residency, on the other hand, saw the sultan’s statement as a repudiation of Istiqlal’s petition and was clearly relieved. The political tension in Morocco subsided and many residency officials breathed a sigh of relief that they had avoided clashes between supporters of the new nationalist party and the protectorate authorities for the time being. Residency officials remained concerned about what they saw as the negative drift of the new nationalist party. They hoped to divert the public’s attention from Istiqlal’s demand for independence to various political and economic reform plans they had initiated.50 This was the 49

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backdrop to René Massigli’s visit to Rabat on 27 January, which was intended to help strengthen ties between the sultan and the French liberation committee. In his private meetings and public statements, Massigli emphasized the special connection between France and Morocco, embodied in the protectorate treaty, and France’s interest in further advancing these ties. He had a meeting with the sultan, and also participated in a joint radio programme with the monarch. In his speech Massigli focused on Morocco’s postwar prospects, and publicly expressed his commitment that France continue to ‘guide’ Morocco, as specified by the protectorate treaty.51 Residency officials remained concerned about the incipient ties between the palace and Istiqlal, ties that strengthened the new party and intensified the level of nationalist protest in Morocco. They continued to emphasize the protectorate treaty and its provisions, exerted pressure on the sultan, and sought to convince the Moroccan public that they were serious about instituting new reforms. French officials emphasized that they had no intention of abandoning Morocco. Despite their efforts to downplay the importance of Istiqlal and its demands, senior residency officials understood that in some way they would have to react to the very challenge the new nationalist party posed to the future of their rule in Morocco. Meanwhile, Istiqlal focused on strengthening its position among the Moroccan people. The new party commanded a great deal of attention in many Moroccan homes. Many Moroccans were convinced that France’s rule would soon come to an end, and expected the new nationalist party to hasten the dissolution of the protectorate. Other Moroccans, particularly among the rural and tribal population, were completely oblivious to political developments and frequently unaware of the new party’s existence. It was clear that if Istiqlal sought to become a mass-oriented party, it would have to reach out to and incorporate these segments of society. American intelligence agents stationed in Morocco reported continuous efforts by nationalist activists to reach out to the population, even to Moroccan Jews. Some of the new party’s leaders sought to impart an all-Moroccan character to the party, and were interested in spreading their message among the country’s Jewish population. The party’s overtures to the Jewish community were surprising considering the Islamic character that had been evident from the Moroccan nationalist movement’s earliest days. One study of the relations 50

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between the Jewish community and Istiqlal emphasized the difficulty in securing a sense of unity or a collective ethnic identity between Muslims and Jews in Morocco, particularly because of the widespread Jewish endorsement of the French protectorate and the acculturation of many Moroccan Jews to France.52 Overall, though, contacts between Istiqlal and the Jewish community remained limited.53 At this stage, Istiqlal’s activities involved the distribution to the general public of two additional petitions, both to be submitted to the sultan: the first expressed general support of the new party’s demands, while the second was a general statement supporting the sultan as Morocco’s leader. This endorsement of the monarchy was one of Istiqlal’s main ideological features. Both petitions helped Istiqlal improve its standing with the public. Istiqlal’s ongoing activities troubled the French authorities. They claimed that those who refused or were reluctant to sign the petitions were publicly denounced as ‘disloyal or rebellious’, or depicted as ‘bad Muslims’ by party activists. French publications presented Istiqlal as a problematic political organization, which even included criminal elements that threatened the stability of Moroccan society. On 20 January Puaux again met the sultan and demanded that he adopt a clear and firm position that would clarify his strong opposition to Istiqlal. The sultan acceded to the resident-general’s demand. Speaking to his ministers, he asserted that the word independence ‘must disappear from people’s vocabulary’. He instructed his ministers to refrain from all contact with nationalist activists.54 Istiqlal leaders responded angrily, yet refrained from blaming the sultan. The party, once again, emphasized that its initial manifesto was not intended to agitate the public or harm the war effort. It also stated that it had no intention of realizing its aspirations through the use of violence.55 Regardless of these statements, the sultan’s positions profoundly affected the development of Istiqlal, its chances of receiving royal endorsement of their demand for independence, and the party’s hopes that this goal would be realized forthwith.

The 1944 Riots After the petition was submitted to the sultan, several observers expressed the hope that France would not react too harshly to the new political organization, which could lead to a violent response from the Moroccan public and destabilize domestic life. Although the 51

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first few days following the publication of the manifesto passed without incidents, within a short time Morocco was swept by an unprecedented wave of violence. Moroccan nationalists later portrayed the January 1944 riots as an important event, which influenced their party’s development and placed it under the shadow of French persecution. As a result, the goal of instantly securing independence in the postwar period now became a more long-term ambition than originally anticipated. The French residency set out to avert Istiqlal’s expansion. Among the first measures enacted against the party were efforts to avoid its public endorsement by the sultan and his ministers. Once this was achieved, the residency sought to minimize the new party’s influence on the broader public. Although the French resident stated that he did not intend to subdue the new party, the colonial authorities began arresting its leaders towards the end of January. As a result, the atmosphere in the major Moroccan cities became even tenser. Several prominent nationalist leaders, including Mohammed Lyazidi and Ahmed Belafrej, were arrested on 29 January. Residency officials had not carefully weighed up the arrests. Senior residency sources later contended that the initiative had originated from military commanders and not from them. Later on, residency officials would claim that they had been carried out because of rising suspicions of espionage and cooperation of the new party’s leaders with enemy forces, and had nothing to do with nationalist political activity.56 This seems to have been a French attempt to justify the harsh measures against nationalist leaders before American and British representatives. The French in fact took the reports of German and Spanish contacts with Muslim circles seriously. Even without substantial proof of foreign influence on the Istiqlal establishment, many French officials believed that foreigners were behind the new party and its activities. The first arrests led to violent outbursts in several cities. Close to 1000 protesters gathered in Rabat outside the grand wazir’s office the next morning and called for the release of the leaders. According to the French report, the demonstrators, ‘in a state of fanatic frenzy’, turned from the royal palace to the city centre. Another report asserts that the demonstrations and street processions were mostly quiet and that it was the reaction of the French police that spurred the violent Muslim response and subsequent riots. In any event, within a short 52

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time clashes erupted between Moroccan demonstrators and French security forces. One French passerby was killed by the angry mob. Protesters pelted the security forces with rocks and vandalized property. Two French citizens were killed in these clashes. French security forces were able to force the protesters back towards the old city, the medina, and started arresting them.57 During and after the riots, Istiqlal activists maintained that the clashes were a direct outcome of the arrests and of French repressive measures against nationalist activists, and that the French were fully responsible for them. Istiqlal activists were not surprised by the French measures and claimed they had been prepared for them. Malika el-Fassi later recalled that the party’s founders expected the French to react harshly to their call for independence. Nationalist activists in various cities planned in advance how to confront this threat: they determined who would organize the protests, who would be responsible for party statements, and who would attend to the victims should there be any. Secret groups were entrusted with these issues.58 Alongside the protests in Rabat, there were reports of violent clashes in neighbouring Salé, a city not previously identified as a particularly vibrant nationalist centre. The riots that erupted there attested to the general, widespread interest in the new party. The city witnessed demonstrations against the arrest of nationalist leaders: demonstrators demanding their release gathered around the French government building in the city. In the ensuing clashes with the police, one police officer was killed and 40 Moroccans were arrested, including the police officer’s assassin. Most of the demonstrators were described as upper class. They were largely students and youth, along with some Moroccans who worked for the government. This account contradicts other reports that claimed that most of these demonstrations had focused on unemployment and economic questions. But the profile of nationalist demonstrations in Salé reflected the party’s true social core at the time of its establishment. The Moroccan suspected of killing the French police officer was described as a ‘young bourgeois’, whose father was employed by the makhzen. He was promptly sentenced to death by a military court.59 Following the nationalist leaders’ arrests, other Moroccan cities, too, witnessed increased tensions. News of the protests in Rabat and Salé reached Casablanca within a few hours. Nationalist activists immediately organized meetings that lasted well into the night, at 53

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which they discussed how to react to the arrests and to the clashes in Rabat. They decided to organize a commercial strike the next day and organize demonstrations in front of the American and British consulates in Casablanca, once again seeking to rally international support. The planned protests combined two elements that underpinned Istiqlal activities at this early stage: political action on an international level and attempts to increase public support for the party. The commercial strike began the next morning, but the planned protest marches did not materialize because of the widespread deployment of security forces, dispatched in advance to avoid rallies and clashes.60 French reports noted that 30 January remained relatively quiet across Morocco, apart from one incident in Casablanca, where security forces denied Muslim protesters entrance to a European neighbourhood. One protester was killed in that clash.61 The situation in Fez, however, was far from calm. The city – in political ferment for months – was now on the verge of eruption. A French intelligence report from December 1943 noted the growing nationalist activity, which included collecting contributions from residents and painting nationalist slogans on walls. The creation of Istiqlal was welcomed enthusiastically in Fez. The French army commander there reported that after the party’s manifesto was publicized, a ‘spirit of insanity’ engulfed the city. He too had noticed the local population’s early preparations for a possible confrontation with French security forces. Slogans supporting independence were painted almost nightly on city buildings, and a rebellious spirit was discernible among the Muslim population. Local storekeepers, for example, refused to pay taxes.62 The French authorities in Fez later learned that the nationalists had decided to launch immediate protests if the French were to arrest one of Istiqlal’s leaders. On 28 January several nationalist activists in Fez were arrested for allegedly fraternizing with the enemy.63 French security forces were deployed at key locations throughout the city in anticipation of protests and riots. Blockades were set up near government buildings, and army units circled the city. The arrests in Fez continued over the next few days, and included protesters and rioters. By 18 February the number of detainees had risen to 586. In addition, 600 students of the religious Qarawiyyin institution, who had also participated in the demonstrations, were also arrested. On 30 January, when news of the arrests spread in Fez, most stores 54

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across the city closed down in protest. In a number of schools and educational institutions, students refused to attend classes, and embarked on student strikes. Security forces rushed to sensitive locations, such as the medina gates, in an effort to avert any form of protest. By the early afternoon, protesters had begun to march from inside the medina towards one of the old city’s gates, which was immediately closed to prevent them from leaving the medina. The old city’s gates were closed and French guards hurled grenades at the approaching protesters, several of whom were wounded. As the evening approached, tensions rose even further. More nationalist activists were arrested, and more nationalist supporters gathered, chanting nationalist slogans. Violence in Fez increased the next day, when a large group of demonstrators clashed with security forces. The latter opened fire, killing between 25 and 30 people. On 1 February French forces reported that calm had been restored to Fez, but that tension between the French and the city’s Muslim residents remained high. They noted that the funerals of the January casualties, along with the ‘jihad’ ambience in the city, further increased the level of tension.64 The riots in Fez were far more violent than in any other Moroccan city, bringing the French resident-general himself to the city. He arrived there on 2 February and reported that he found the stores open and operating as usual, and a high ‘level of fatigue’ among the residents. Puaux met a number of them, including a delegation of religious leaders, and asked for their assistance in calming the situation in Fez.65 Nationalist attempts to prolong the Fez protests and organize a fully-fledged commercial strike were unsuccessful. By 8 February life in Fez had been normalized. It was nevertheless clear to both the French and the Moroccans that they were on the threshold of a new era in their relations. The bitterness that many residents harboured towards the French, and the high number of casualties, overshadowed relations between the two sides. The city of Oujda also witnessed a number of incidents when nationalist supporters tried to organize a commercial strike. Their endeavour was unsuccessful, however, and they were promptly arrested. Hundreds of residents took to the streets, chanting slogans and demanding the release of the arrested activists. They reached the local French government building and clashed with security officers. Order was eventually restored, although it was clear that even a more 55

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remote urban community like Oujda was now under the sway of the nationalists. For our purposes, the attempt is noteworthy because it was organized by workers and not by nationalist activists of a more affluent background. The effort to organize a strike in Oujda reflects Istiqlal’s ability to recruit workers into its ranks. The new political party, along with an increasingly restless population in some cities, concerned the French, who examined and analysed the reasons and motives behind the violent events. Protectorate authorities also paid close attention to the geographic locations in which violence had erupted. They emphasized that the riots were largely confined to well-established urban centres, such as Rabat, Salé and Fez. The French authorities were particularly pleased that Casablanca (apart from the incident that had occurred there on 30 January) had remained above the fray. The relative quiet in the city reflected, in their opinion, the fact that Casablanca lacked a nationalist cadre that could prompt a violent struggle against the protectorate and support the nationalist ideology Istiqlal was keen to promote. As for cities like Rabat and Salé, there was less concern among the French about the nationalist protests in these locations, for the smaller size of the medina in each made it easier to contain the violence there. The situation in Fez was a different matter. The ferment there, according to the French, was extreme. Despite exceeding all earlier violence and of an intensity unfamiliar to the French, Fez was known as a traditional nationalist hotbed, so French officials therefore received the violent clashes there with a degree of understanding. They hoped that the situation would eventually calm down and would not spread to other Moroccan cities.66 Although the 1944 riots were more extreme than previous clashes, some French officials viewed them as within the established parameters of nationalist protests in Morocco. They likened the 1944 events to previous outbursts of nationalist fervour, and were confident in their ability to confront the protests – the shift in nationalist demands from earlier calls for government reforms to an unequivocal demand for independence notwithstanding. The French authorities emphasized that most of the Moroccan population had not participated in the 1944 protests and had kept their distance from the violence. They saw the nationalist demonstrations as limited in scope, and felt that they could face them without difficulty. The general position within the residency was to belittle the 56

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dangers that the Istiqlal party posed to French rule in Morocco. It is worth noting that in their statements senior residency officials once again completely disregarded the new party and its demands. They even refrained from mentioning Istiqlal by name, seeking to minimize its influence, while expressing their confidence in their ability to overcome the new party. Following the events as they unfolded, Colonel Spillman, de Gaulle’s emissary to Morocco, warned that, though quiet reigned in Morocco, the protests had entered a ‘latent’ stage and were far from over. He contended that the riots had merely reached a cease-fire and warned that the roots of the problem had not been treated properly by the residency.67 As time went by, and the Istiqlal party gained traction, more French officials realized that the 1944 riots were a turning point in the history of French rule in Morocco, and that the reality in the country had greatly changed. ‘It is already clear’, a French report from 1945 noted, ‘that the events of January 1944 will leave a profound imprint on the history of Morocco’. The report’s author did feel that there was no real need to pay too much attention to the Istiqlal petition or to the protests that followed, while at the same time asserting that one ‘must not downplay the influence [of these events] on the general mood in Morocco, and not forget that they reflect the development of a new mentality among the local population’.68 Another report discussed the differences between the 1944 protests and previous violent nationalist stirrings. Earlier nationalist protests never focused on the existence of the protectorate itself, and were not accompanied by physical violence against Europeans, as was the case in 1944. A unique facet of the 1944 riots was the sultan’s position towards the nationalist movement and the new Istiqlal party. In the past, the sultan and his close advisers had been rather cool towards nationalist activity, and had not complained about French repressive measures against it. This time, the palace indicated some support for the new party and its demands, and engaged in contacts with political activists. The sultan only expressed his reservations about the party after the French resident had specifically demanded that he do so.69 The 1944 riots were also identified as more national in scope. Considering the lack of a comprehensive Moroccan national identity, however, the riots reflected the emergence of national political interests, which combined nationalist rhetoric and activities. 57

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Although French officials took note of the unique features of the 1944 riots, they did not seriously relate to the political demands that underpinned them. The possibility that Istiqlal’s demands expressed a genuine quest for political independence, supported by broad segments of the Moroccan population, was not seriously discussed among residency officials, or among de Gaulle’s close aides stationed in Algiers. Rather than discussing this possibility, French officials tried to identify the direct and indirect factors that had spurred the riots. The various explanations offered by the French for the riots provide an insight into the emerging French policy towards Istiqlal. French officials were convinced that France’s defeat in 1940 had a lingering impact on the Moroccans. This expressed itself in the decline of French power and prestige with the Moroccan public. The military weakness exposed during France’s capitulation to Germany seriously damaged France’s image among Moroccan Muslims. According to the French, this was the mainspring behind the development of the new nationalist party.70 French intelligence reports, written shortly before the 1944 riots, noted that the economic situation in Morocco and concerns over securing adequate food supplies were a source of deep anxiety among residents. The reports raised concerns that these difficulties might be channelled into political protests.71 Although the Moroccan population was subjected to economic difficulties, portraying the riots as an economic protest remains problematic. The riots were largely a political protest of nationalist supporters critical of colonial rule. Another factor, which according to the French affected the rise in nationalist sentiment and indirectly spurred the 1944 riots, was the direct, yet subtle, support many Moroccans felt they were receiving from the Allied forces and governments. As previously noted, the Allied landings on the Moroccan coast in November 1942 raised new hopes among nationalist activists.72 France felt that, for a variety of strategic and economic reasons, both Britain and the USA were interested in ending French rule in Morocco and in dismantling the entire French colonial apparatus. This led them to support the Moroccan nationalist movement by holding out the promise of an independent political future to Moroccan leaders and to the sultan himself. Actual assistance was far less tangible than what the French described in their reports, however, and there is little evidence that American or British officials indeed expressed early support of the Istiqlal party and its goals. 58

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The French assessed that the return of veteran nationalist leaders to Morocco also contributed to the renewal of nationalist fervour. Among those who returned were well-known leaders such as Lyazidi and Belafrej. Their return provided the national movement with the leadership it needed, and was conducive to the foundation of Istiqlal.73 The French analysis of the 1944 riots touches on a number of factors that instigated violence, but all of these reasons could not, according to one analysis, explain the sudden appearance of a new party, whose actions were unexpected. Most French residency officials found it difficult to grasp the new party’s goals and intentions.74 As the 1944 riots died down, France sought to adopt a clear policy towards the new political party, particularly as the Second World War was drawing to an end. The Istiqlal activists, for their part, sought to retain the momentum that had pushed forward their party’s establishment, and to strengthen both the popular support they had received during the riots and the national identity expressed during that period. Although they had expressed the hope that their party’s establishment would not be accompanied by violence, and that they would be able to realize their goal of independence by peaceful, political means, they were increasingly cognizant of the fact that the party’s course might not conform to these earlier expectations. They quickly recognized the need to secure widespread popular support for their party, and strove to achieve such support. Strengthening Istiqlal, while many of its leaders were imprisoned and the party outlawed, was a difficult challenge for the party in the aftermath of the 1944 riots. These activities remained the focus of party life throughout the latter half of 1944.

59

3 The Istiqlal Party in the Aftermath of the 1944 Riots

A

s the riots that had erupted in Morocco in early 1944 waned, the Istiqlal party was at a crossroads, and uncertain about its future development. Although the party’s petition had granted it public recognition, it did not initiate further measures. In the months following the riots, Istiqlal faced technical and organizational difficulties. Moreover, the French authorities restricted its activities, and its political position and relations with the sultan remained unclear. Broadly speaking, Istiqlal’s chances as a new Moroccan mass party were also open to question. Party leaders and activists had yet to adopt well-defined organizational goals, as many general questions concerning the party’s development had not yet been formally discussed. The main question that overshadowed Istiqlal’s growth in the aftermath of the riots concerned the party’s profile: was the new party to act as a mass party, discarding the nationalist movement’s elitist nature that had been a central thrust of nationalist politics until then? This question generated additional concerns over the nature of the party’s leadership, and the absorption of new social and political forces into its ranks. Another question that concerned party activists was whether to limit the scope of their activities to urban protest, or expand it to rural areas? Towering above these concerns was the question of relations between the Istiqlal party and the sultan. Although the Moroccan monarch adopted a positive approach to the party after its establishment, relations with him were not formalized, so it was difficult to assess their future direction. In the light of these uncertainties, the remaining months of 1944 were a transitional period in the development of the party. Towards the end of the year 61

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new beginnings of activism appeared – expressions of fresh, creative developments within the party. In the present chapter I shall examine these activities. Ideologically, the call for Moroccan independence remained Istiqlal’s central message, but to secure widespread public support, the party also needed to adopt a wide array of social and economic principles. These areas had been neglected by the nationalist movement since 1934, when the reform plan was submitted to the French residency. While the 1944 riots seemed to indicate widespread support for the Istiqlal party, the protests remained limited to traditional centres of opposition. The riots, and the tepid American and British reaction to the party’s establishment, led to a growing recognition among Istiqlal activists that realizing the goal of independence would be a longer and more difficult process than had originally been envisioned. Many Moroccans had mistakenly assumed – at least according to the French resident-general, Gabriel Puaux – that the act of demanding independence was the same as achieving it. In the aftermath of the riots, they found themselves perplexed and confused about their political and organizational future.1

The Aftermath of the 1944 Riots The harsh repressive measures the French residency imposed against Istiqlal chilled the initial enthusiasm and euphoria that marked the establishment of the party. The reality of the post-riot period introduced a more sober mood among Istiqlal activists. The euphoric sentiments that accompanied the submission of the party’s petition to the sultan, the efforts to strengthen relations with the monarchy, and the hopes of obtaining foreign endorsement for their party quickly disappeared. Many activists realized that they would in future have to proceed at a much slower pace than they had expected to if they aimed to expand their support base. Concomitantly, they also needed to continue pursuing their main goal of ousting the French from Morocco and obtaining independence. This, along with the recruitment of widespread public support, turned out to be particularly difficult. In the months that followed the upheaval of 1944, party activists who had not been imprisoned sought to address the party’s difficulties in the aftermath of the riots. Their initial concern was to release the leaders and party activists who had been arrested; only then did they turn their efforts to solidifying the party base. 62

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On the other side of the fence were the protectorate authorities, who did everything they could to impede the party’s growth. They were concerned about the threat of new riots, and in their reports described the tense political situation that prevailed in Morocco after the January riots. The French residency sought to remove the party’s demand for independence from the Moroccan political agenda, and initiated a social and economic reform plan. The plan was intended to address pressing economic questions, which the French considered to be the main trigger of the riots. After the riots, Istiqlal faced the harsh restrictions imposed by the colonial authorities, severely curtailing its activities. The party was forced to act clandestinely, away from the public spotlight, and to confront the difficulties that emerged, following the repression of the riots. As already noted, its efforts centred on releasing imprisoned leaders and activists, and helping their families. Another topic on the party’s agenda was the reopening of educational institutions, which had been closed after the riots. The residency’s reform plan forced the party to advance ideas that threatened to check Istiqlal’s unequivocal demand for independence. On an organizational level, the outcome of the 1944 riots was a serious blow to the party. The newly established political organization found itself outlawed and actively pursued by the authorities. Most of its leaders were imprisoned. It was difficult for the party to propagate its messages among the public, as reflected in the limited number of pamphlets and publications that were distributed. These publications were mostly statements about and reactions to French actions – not new initiatives. Their passive character reflects the party’s weakness and difficulty in developing new political ideas.2 Broadly speaking, party activity during this period was minimal. One report on the subject tells of groups of Fez-based activists who would periodically meet in secret settings. The party’s clandestine underground activities – a far cry from those of an established political party, which Istiqlal sought to be – underline the organizational difficulties it faced at the time. While Fez remained the centre of nationalist politics, Istiqlal activists, fearing additional French repression, avoided open activities in the city. They focused on assisting political prisoners and their families, and discontinued the massive protests against the protectorate. Party activists tried to maintain close contact with each other, particularly through modest meetings 63

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held in private homes. Pamphlets and publications that reflected political positions were also circulated among active party members. These publications emphasized Istiqlal’s commitment and adherence to the idea of independence. The bulk of the propaganda efforts focused on Morocco’s independence, although local grievances against the protectorate, such as the level of food supplies in Morocco, were also raised. Such topics could have attracted additional public support for the new party, but they were still far from being at the heart of party policies at the time. The party’s focus on independence is understandable considering that it was a revolutionary idea in Morocco. According to French officials, party pamphlets distributed in Fez aimed to rekindle public protests against the protectorate and provoke even more extreme riots than those of January 1944. French sources described the situation in Fez as volatile, and claimed that nationalist activists would use any possible excuse to ignite a new round of anti-French violence. But nationalist activity did not resume straightaway. In 1944, for example, the anniversary of the famous Berber Dahir (16 May 1930), which had become a traditional day of nationalist protest, passed in Fez without incident.3 The low level of nationalist activity that day reflected Istiqlal’s weak position and inability to stage mass protests.4 Nationalist activity in Casablanca in the months following the riots was even more subdued than in Fez. Confined mostly to student groups, it included frequent trips to Fez in an effort to strengthen ties between the nationalist centre there and the industrial port city of Casablanca. Nationalist activists were aware that their activity in Casablanca was still extremely limited, and that the city was still uncharted territory as far as the party was concerned.5 Foreign observers found it difficult to appraise Istiqlal’s strength at the time, since much of the party functioned clandestinely. French authorities estimated that the total number of party members did not exceed 2000. The party’s public influence, however, was far greater than its membership.6 Despite later difficulties, it was clear that Istiqlal still commanded widespread support, and that its difficulties were organizational rather than ideological. It enjoyed latent public support, by and large that of urban residents. The doubts raised in public mainly concerned its ability to survive amid French repression. Promoting outspoken social and economic policies, and engaging more actively in public affairs would undoubtedly have increased the 64

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public’s support of Istiqlal and bolstered its position in Morocco’s political system. But, as we shall see, such activities were not initiated until some months after the 1944 riots. Despite organizational difficulties, party activists staged public demonstrations in an effort to attract public attention. Although the party was unable to instigate nationalist public events openly, it tried to take advantage of more general events in order to disseminate its positions. For example, hundreds of young Moroccans repeatedly marched through Casablanca in support of independence. They later told French investigators that these processions had been intended only to mark the liberation of Paris, not to criticize the residency’s policies.7 The fate of party activists who were arrested during the riots and the need to assist their families remained a central concern of the party, requiring its unremitting attention. Efforts to release these prisoners overshadowed other party activities, including promoting the ideal of independence. The number of activists arrested in Fez alone was close to two thousand, in addition to the several hundred arrested in other cities. According to one American diplomat, these arrests were carried out with a high degree of brutality, further increasing the nationalists’ anger towards the French.8 The detainees constituted the nucleus of Istiqlal, so that the sense of responsibility that the remaining free party leaders felt towards them was high. Muslims in Fez continued to criticize the residency’s policies during the riots, but ceased, according to a French report, to focus on Istiqlal’s nationalist demands. ‘The only aspiration’, the report noted, ‘is to release all detainees’.9 Releasing prisoners was also considered an initial condition for calming the rising political tension in Morocco. In a letter to the French resident-general, written by two senior Istiqlal activists on 9 February 1944, the writers emphasized that ‘in order to create [a positive ambience], a general amnesty seems imperative in order to restore the country to the situation that prevailed on 28 January [before the outbreak of the riots]’.10 Other Istiqlal publications noted the difficulties facing the prisoners and their families. Nationalist circles in Fez and other cities provided material assistance to the families of detainees, through contributions discreetly collected from Istiqlal supporters. Each family received financial assistance equivalent to half the wage of their arrested family member.11 Although this was a modest 65

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contribution, which usually did not cover the needs of a family, the party’s ability to collect funds while being pursued and repressed by colonial authorities reflects the high level of support it enjoyed among prosperous Moroccans. In addition, the party also relied on its rudimentary internal administrative structure, which facilitated the collection of contributions. The conditions in which prisoners were held provoked mounting criticism by Istiqlal. Nationalist prisoners were hauled off to large urban prisons, as well as to remote detention camps. Reports about the conditions in these camps featured prominently in Istiqlal’s propaganda during this period. So, they claimed, detainees at the Garnier camp near Rabat suffered from physical abuse inflicted upon them by the guards. The prisoners were subjected to crowded physical conditions, pointless hard labour (such as moving rocks from place to place) and dismal sanitary conditions. Memorandums sent to various government offices in Fez criticized the exile of prisoners to ‘Siberian regions of the Atlas’, an exile the authors of these dispatches likened to a ‘slow and painful death’.12 The reports of harsh prison conditions drove another wedge between the Muslims and the French in Morocco. In an effort to defuse the situation, meetings were arranged between Muslim representatives (who were not Istiqlal members) and residency officials. Istiqlal opposed these encounters, during which the Moroccan participants displayed a submissive approach towards the residency. On 9 March 1944 a delegation representing residents of Rabat and Salé visited the resident-general to offer an apology for the riots, and to deliver money collected for the families of the four French casualties of the riots. The president of the Moroccan section of Rabat’s chamber of commerce (a pro-residency organization) apologized in the name of the city residents for what had occurred, and noted the interest of city residents in friendship and trust with the French. The resident-general noted during the meeting that the murders that had occurred ‘required true justice’. The meeting, ultimately, would not seriously affect Moroccan–French relations, and offered little hope for a change in French policy. But it was a first attempt to mediate between the two sides. The resident-general, Gabriel Puaux, thanked the Moroccan participants for their actions, adding that France was not interested in revenge (against the Muslims), and that French policies towards Morocco and its residents 66

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would remain unchanged. Puaux later denied that the residency had initiated the Moroccan donations for the families of French victims, but admitted that some residency officials had probably informed Moroccans that such contributions ‘would make a good impression’. Countering the resident-general’s claim, Istiqlal noted that residents of the medina in Rabat had been forced to pay compensation of one and a half million francs, and that the resident-general himself had refused to collect fines for repairing the damages caused by the riots and to compensate the French victims.13 Despite the positive atmosphere at the meeting, it should be noted that the Moroccan participants were not representatives of Istiqlal and were deemed to be close to the residency. The meeting, therefore, carried little weight and had scant impact on Muslim–French relations.14 As the residency sought to stabilize the situation in Morocco, senior officials acknowledged the need to release some of the detainees. In early July the residency announced its intention to pardon prisoners from Rabat, Salé and Fez who had been sentenced for minor misdemeanours during the riots. Meanwhile, the imprisonment of scores of residents continued to affect daily life in Fez. Families of prisoners incarcerated at a local detention facility gathered daily outside the building in an effort to catch a glimpse of their relatives during the daily walks on the prison rooftop. It was clear that many residents would maintain their interest in the prisoners so long as the latter remained in Fez. At the end of March, over five thousand residents signed a petition expressing regret over the January riots. The petition expressed full support for the sultan and the protectorate, but unequivocally demanded the release of the prisoners. Such a step was expected to renew the spirit of friendship between Moroccans and the French authorities. In a meeting with an American representative, General Suffren, who served as the military governor of Fez, expressed his belief15 that the situation in the city would remain quiet, although he was concerned about a possible shortage of flour and other basic food supplies.16 The quantities of food in the old city of Fez in March 1944 were indeed described as inadequate. Commenting on the tense atmosphere prevailing in the city, one American officer warned about additional outbreaks of violence. Although he tried to create the impression that political order in Morocco had been restored, Puaux 67

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himself, in an unofficial meeting with American officials, admitted that the situation in Fez was unsatisfactory. These statements expressed the lack of confidence that troubled protectorate officials in the months following the riots. The residency’s decision to release prisoners was also a response to the pressure Fez notables exerted on the sultan and on senior makhzen officials to act on their behalf. The residency viewed the release of detainees as part of an effort to strengthen these pro-protectorate notables, who could be expected to mediate between the authorities and nationalist activists. At a later stage Muslim notables in Casablanca presented it as a positive response by the French to nationalist demands. Residents of Rabat were pleased by the pardon awarded to local prisoners, which led to the release of some 200 prisoners. Fez residents, on the other hand, saw the release of prisoners in their city as a sign of residency weakness, and hardened their approach towards the colonial administration.17 All in all, the residency’s decision to release prisoners did not indicate a shift in its approach towards Moroccan nationalism. The release was not part of a French effort to reach out to the nationalist movement or engage in some form of dialogue with the party’s leadership, and was not followed by any further overtures on the part of the residency.18 In early July 1944 it was reported that close to one hundred detainees in Rabat remained in custody, awaiting further investigation. In neighbouring Salé, however, only a few individuals remained under arrest. Though close to half the people arrested in Fez had been released, Muslim sources indicated that 1300 additional prisoners were still in custody at a detention camp outside the city. Eight Muslims, who had been sentenced to death after the January riots, still awaited their execution. Meanwhile, Fez nationalists attempted to continue their planned activities, such as a memorial service held 40 days after the execution of one of their comrades. Speakers at the event labelled the deceased a ‘martyr’ and ‘victim of French colonialism’. His photograph, encircled by illustrations of the Moroccan flag, was distributed to residents with the aim of capitalizing on the public’s bitterness towards the residency.19 The French initiative to release prisoners in Fez was not motivated by political considerations only. At the end of July 1944, rumours about bribes offered to French officials in return for the release of nationalist prisoners circulated in various cities. Although the 68

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American military authorities who reported these rumours could not provide any tangible proof, they assessed that the rumours could not easily be dismissed since the local French government in the city was ‘far from ideal’ and many French officials were obsessed with the desire to accumulate personal wealth. Later that summer, a few Moroccans who had been arrested during the riots were also released. On 19 July a military court in Meknes released three nationalist activists from Fez and a number of other detainees from Oujda, after concluding that no evidence had been provided for their alleged contact with German officers (the ploy used for their arrest). Istiqlal welcomed their release, but party activists wondered why other prisoners, arrested for less serious offences, had not yet been released and remained in custody. A clandestine nationalist publication entitled En Avant (Forward), which appeared after the release of the Meknes detainees, observed that the release would certainly please Muslim residents in Fez, and commended the French judge who had ordered it. The publication, however, went on to direct harsh criticism at the protectorate. That these prisoners were acquitted and released after having been detained for seven months was a ‘scathing indictment of those responsible in Rabat and Fez’. The writers noted that if the authorities had adopted a more humane approach, ‘in the best of French tradition’, towards the nationalists and their demands, the January riots would never have broken out. They took comfort in the fact that ultimately ‘history would judge [the protectorate authorities] for their deeds.’20 Concern for the release of prisoners continued over the following months and remained high on Istiqlal’s agenda. The residency’s pardon did not avert nationalist protests against the ‘scandalous imprisonment’ of their leaders later that year.21 By August 1944, most of the remaining nationalist prisoners in Fez had been released. An article published in En Avant noted that the release would be warmly received by Muslims in Fez, but reiterated that the residency was to be held responsible for the deterioration that led to the outbreak of the 1944 riots.22 Other Istiqlal activities during this period included the organization of nocturnal political gatherings during the month of Ramadan, in which participants focused on preparations for the anticipated peace talks that were expected to begin after the war, and on the need to ensure that Morocco’s future remain on the agenda.23 69

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The Ramadan meetings focused on political themes, rather than on social or economic questions. In that sense, little had changed in Istiqlal’s political behaviour. The party continued to attract mostly urban intellectuals, interested primarily in political questions. Nationalist activists were often accused of behaving selfishly towards the rest of Moroccan society and of strengthening their own political position at the expense of other social groups.24 The first anniversary of the 1944 riots, which the French feared would trigger new violent protests and clashes, went almost unnoticed: the main concern of the nationalists was still ‘to release their arrested comrades’, and not to engage in activities that could lead to new confrontations with the protectorate’s security forces, a French report contended. Although the Istiqlal party in Fez had planned to hold memorial ceremonies commemorating those who had died in the riots, the overall morale in the party was described as ‘low’, adversely affecting the day’s events.25 Another topic that concerned the residency in the months following the 1944 riots was the fate of nationalist leader Belafrej. As noted, Belafrej’s arrest in January 1944 angered many Moroccans. According to one report, residency officials admitted that they ‘did not know what to do with Belafrej’. The man had not committed any offence (apart from disregarding his questionable earlier commitment to refrain from engaging in political activity in return for being allowed to return to Morocco). French officials realized that they would be unable to keep him imprisoned indefinitely. They resorted to the idea of exiling him, as they had done with other nationalist leaders.26 In the early morning of 6 July 1944 Belafrej was put on a plane and flown to Corsica. His exile angered nationalists, but did not lead to a new round of violent clashes between Muslims and the protectorate authorities. Following the blow it had received in January, Istiqlal was in a weakened position and could not afford another round of violence, for such a confrontation could lead to the party’s complete demise. Much of the nationalists’ anger was over the fact that Belafrej was neither put on trial nor charged with any crime. In a public statement Istiqlal criticized Belafrej’s ‘incomprehensible’ exile and condemned the residency for it. Apart from this, the party did not initiate any further protests against the exile.27 On the anniversary of the American military landing in Morocco (November 1942), the party refrained from lavishly commemorating the event (as it had originally planned to do), because of what one of 70

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Istiqlal’s leaders referred to as ‘the need to maintain “temporary discretion” towards the French authorities’. As the main reasons for this policy, he mentioned the still ongoing imprisonment of party activists, the restrictions imposed on the Moroccan public, and the party’s intention not to hinder the war effort.28 The need to refrain from any further unrest until the end of the war, the fear of provoking a negative reaction from allied governments towards the nationalist movement and its demands were also mentioned as reasons for the party’s low profile during this period.29 Beyond all these political considerations was the undeniably weakened position of the party at the end of 1944. That same year, another issue on the Moroccan agenda required Istiqlal’s immediate attention, namely the demand that the country’s educational institutions be reopened. The majority of Morocco’s secondary schools had remained closed during the riots by residential decree. Although they were few in number, these schools functioned as important centres for the nationalist movement. Many of the students and teachers were active participants in the 1944 riots, and in a number of locations student strikes broke out as part of nationalist-inspired protests. According to nationalist activists, this ‘was the only way [students] could express their discontent’ with Morocco’s situation. The authorities closed down the schools in response, considering this an important step towards minimizing the scope of the nationalist protest. They were therefore in no hurry to reopen them. The residency was also concerned about the approaching matriculation exams (scheduled for September), and the possibility that they would spark additional nationalist protests if students were displeased with the results and were to demonstrate in protest.30 The schools remained closed until the start of the new school year in September 1944. As a result, students missed the school year, and remained idle for the duration of the academic year. This intensified their bitterness towards the residency. They and their families, most of whom supported Istiqlal, were angry over the school closures, and demanded that they be reopened. A communiqué issued by the party in Fez in March 1944 discussed the school question. The party statement expressed the widely felt anger at the school closures, which further harmed Morocco’s chances to advance – especially since the residency had failed from the outset to develop education in Morocco. 71

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Only in the autumn of 1944 did the authorities begin preparations to reopen the educational institutions. In September, the public education administration issued guidelines concerning the return of secondary school students to the classrooms. The return date was set for 1 October. The residency prepared well in advance to avert any clashes at the reopening of the schools. A number of measures were enacted, geared to deny students the possibility of protest. Students at the Moulay Idriss secondary school in Fez were asked to have their parents sign a commitment that their children would refrain from participating in any form of nationalist political activity. This demand, initiated by Pasquier, the residency official in charge of public education, angered the students and their families. The American consul in Casablanca reported in this context that the entire matter was coarsely handled (by Pasquier), and blamed him for providing ammunition to the nationalist supporters in Morocco. He added that the residency was displeased with Pasquier’s unsatisfactory handling of the problems and his disdainful approach towards Moroccans.31 In addition to Pasquier’s demand, students also protested over the attempt to have them face ‘disciplinary committees’ before they returned to school. These committees were intended to expel students who were responsible for the strike and for the protests that had broken out during the riots.32 Fortunately for the Moroccans, none of these measures were applied, as the residency preferred to avoid further tensions. Both parties were relieved that the new school year began without any difficulties in all of these institutions.

The French Reform Initiative and the Resumption of Party Activity Despite the organizational weakness that affected Istiqlal and thwarted the staging of most political activity, the general tenor of the relationship between French and Muslims during this period remained tense. The residency was concerned about the possible reawakening of nationalist ferment and protests, the repressive measures taken against Istiqlal notwithstanding. French officials continued to view the nationalists as an immediate threat to French rule in Morocco, despite its weakened state.33 Istiqlal’s demand for independence rattled the residency and continued to reverberate around the country. One Moroccan described the situation as ‘unhealthy’, although in meetings with foreign 72

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diplomats French officials emphasized that it was improving. One French intelligence survey of the situation in May 1944 described how Muslim residents refrained from any contact with the French authorities. The report viewed this as passive resistance to the protectorate. The authors recognized that the continuous ferment among nationalists was rooted in ‘external influences’, such as the Axis countries, and in the harsh economic conditions prevailing in Morocco.34 Similar allegations had been made in the past, so that they did not convey a new approach. The French authorities were greatly concerned about ruling over the Moroccan population. The city of Casablanca was the focus of the residency’s concern because of the large number of Muslims who had formerly been employed by the American military, but had lost their jobs after the US army reduced its presence in Morocco. The growing discontent in the city was also linked to a shortage in consumer products, which the Muslims found difficult to understand and blamed on the protectorate authorities. According to one American report, the Muslims in Casablanca had lost all respect towards the residency and the French law enforcement authorities. A widespread wave of crime and theft further dampened their spirits. The French were equally concerned about the continuing migration of peasants from the countryside to the city following a severe drought, and about its socioeconomic consequences. The newly arrived residents, already affected by economic difficulties, would no doubt face additional predicaments in Casablanca and, as a result, easily come under the influence of nationalist ideology. They assessed that under these circumstances difficult measures would be required to avert a complete collapse of French authority, not only in Casablanca, but across the whole of Morocco. Even after the January riots were quelled, and the Istiqlal party was no longer in a position to threaten the protectorate, residency officials were concerned about losing control over events. They became aware of the need to examine a new policy, which would restore Muslim trust in French rule, and strengthen the protectorate’s position in the postwar era. This policy was intended to divert Moroccan public opinion from Istiqlal and its demands. The residency’s reform plan was the only official French reaction to the January riots and became the cornerstone of its activity towards the end of 1944. The political approach that guided the plan’s archi73

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tects largely reflected the French position vis-à-vis Istiqlal’s ideological challenge to the colonial regime. Resident-General Puaux eventually admitted to senior French government officials that in his opinion the plan was France’s last chance to survive in Morocco.35 Puaux unveiled the reform plan at a press conference convened in Rabat on 16 February, shortly after the riots. His comments at the conference were the residency’s first public acknowledgement of the riots. The Moroccan press (including the French language newspapers that served the settler community) was subjected to the residency’s harsh censorship and did not report on the establishment of Istiqlal. It mentioned neither the submission of the party’s petition to the sultan nor the January riots. Only after the riots did French language newspapers publish short, indirect reports about what had happened. These reports mentioned the sentences imposed on the people on trial without discussing the wider context of these events. For example, the newspapers reported on the funerals of French citizens killed in the riots without explaining the circumstances of these events. The censorship naturally limited the ability to cover political developments in Morocco, but even without these restrictions the French language press paid scant attention to events and developments within Moroccan Muslim society. An American report of 1944 noted that many French citizens in Morocco were poorly informed about the lives of Moroccan Muslims, or about the nationalist movement and its aspirations. The author commented that even after several months most French people in Morocco still viewed the 1944 riots as a German initiative, intended to weaken French control of Morocco and harm the Allied war effort, and not as an expression of local discontent and Moroccan aspiration for independence.36 While speaking to reporters at the press conference, Puaux downplayed the scope of the riots, emphasizing that France intended to maintain its control over Morocco. Although he never once mentioned Istiqlal and its demands, the number of casualties during the riots, or the repressive measures adopted against the protesters, Puaux nevertheless admitted that three Moroccan cities had been in a ‘situation of ferment’ at the end of January. This emerged, according to him, as a ‘surprising flame’, and led to acts he described as ‘violent and thoughtless’. Puaux underlined the calmness that was obtained once these ‘misunderstandings’ between the residency and the Muslims had been settled, and emphasized the need to draw the 74

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appropriate lessons from the ‘short storm’ that had engulfed Morocco. He summarized the lesson he himself had drawn from these events, and his outlook on Morocco’s future in three words: ‘the protectorate continues’. Puaux’s comments indicated that the residency unequivocally rejected Istiqlal’s demand for independence, and had no intention of ending French rule in Morocco. Puaux explained that France’s ‘mission’ in Morocco was far from over. A country like Morocco, which had reached a state of stagnation in 1912, he contended, to make headway still required French support. Puaux emphasized that Morocco’s modernization process would be slow, and would have to take into consideration the country’s social traditions, while at the same time providing technological training to younger generations. He recognized the growing impatience of Moroccan social sectors with the slow pace of Moroccan development after so many years of French rule, but asserted that the Moroccan public had to recognize France’s goodwill towards the country, which had underpinned French policy ever since the protectorate’s establishment. Puaux claimed that this positive approach, which placed the Moroccan public’s well being at the forefront of its activities, was the moral foundation of French rule in Morocco. Puaux went on to explain that the residency began to prepare legal reforms to the country’s penal code and religious court system as early as summer 1943. He reminded his audience that a special committee had been established to discuss comprehensive legal reforms. These reforms, he argued, were proof of France’s determination to continue its enterprise in Morocco. Puaux took advantage of the press conference to announce a residency plan to develop additional reforms. Four committees under Puaux’s chairmanship were to discuss possible reforms in the government’s administration, law and educational system, as well as in agriculture and small businesses. The committee in charge of administrative reforms was expected to discuss how to integrate a larger number of Moroccans in government offices, and improve the working conditions of Moroccans already employed in government. The legal committee was to continue examining plans that had already been discussed by the residency. Puaux noted that the topics on the education committee’s agenda were of great importance. The committee was given a wide variety of tasks – to examine Morocco’s educational system, enquire whether French educational institutions in Morocco would be 75

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prepared to open their doors to a larger number of Moroccan students, reconsider the systematic separation between French and Moroccan students and discuss the possibility of integrating the two groups. The committee was also instructed to discuss the idea of establishing a joint French–Moroccan university. Concern for Moroccan farmers, whom Puaux described as ‘the country’s backbone’, lay behind the decision to form a committee devoted to their needs. The committee was to discuss ways to improve working conditions, introduce new technologies, protect farmers from sharp price fluctuations, help them during periods of drought, and improve health and hygiene in farming communities. All the committees included French and Muslim representatives, and experts in various fields were invited to assist the committees in their work. The sultan approved of these plans, though at an earlier meeting with Puaux, he raised objections to the idea of introducing reforms, and dismissed Istiqlal’s intention to enact immediate socioeconomic changes in Morocco. Eventually, displaying a more moderate approach to the idea of change, he told Puaux that one should not listen to old men who did not wish to change anything, and also not to young people who wanted to change everything at once.37 The residency considered the reform plan an appropriate, balanced response to the January riots, and an effective basis for a new French policy in Morocco. According to an American diplomat, Puaux believed that the committees would contrive to appease and silence Muslims keen on changing Morocco’s government. The reform plan was intended to allow Morocco to continue to develop as a modern state, with a political elite that would pursue this goal, and help improve socioeconomic conditions in the country. Puaux admitted, however, that these measures were not expected to affect the ‘professional inciters’ active in Istiqlal.38 Despite the spirit of goodwill the residency expressed, the reform initiative made no mention of Istiqlal’s demand for independence. The resident-general never mentioned the party, not even indirectly, and the residency had no intention of negotiating with the new party. The emerging policy resembled earlier recommendations by French specialists for a more prudent French approach to the nationalists. In fact, their main recommendation was to avoid any contact with the national movement and to refrain from negotiating with it, thus belittling the party’s role in Moroccan society.39 76

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As much as the reforms commanded its attention throughout 1944, it was difficult to view them as a real solution to the difficulties the French residency encountered following the rise of Istiqlal. For their part, the French viewed the reforms as the harbingers of a new, more positive era. Even before the committees submitted their recommendations, it had become clear to most observers that the impact would be minor. Most Muslims reacted sceptically to the reform initiative, arguing that it was mere propaganda, and did not aim to bring about significant change.40 In a commentary on the January riots, a French commentator warned that Moroccan nationalists would view the plan as proof of France’s permanent occupation of Morocco. He argued that under the current conditions in Morocco, the plan would not appease the young activists involved with Istiqlal, and would further complicate the French position in Morocco.41 The residency, meanwhile, adhered to the plan and proceeded with the work of the committees. The work began in March, starting with invitations for young Muslims to present memorandums and ideas before the committees.42 Their participation was, however, minimal. The committees did not become forums for the exchange of ideas and proposals, and most of the work was left in the hands of French officials, who had little interest in genuine reforms. On 26 November 1944, Puaux announced the various committee recommendations approved by the sultan. The reforms, according to the resident-general, were a ‘milestone in the development of the Sherifian Empire’ and an expression of France’s renewed commitment to the protectorate’s basic principles. But despite the festive tone Puaux tried to inject in his speech announcing the reforms, he refrained from presenting a concrete timetable for implementing them, leaving many questions unanswered. American commentators who researched the proposed plan found fundamental weaknesses in them, and raised further doubts about their implementation.43 Among the committee’s recommendations was the institution of limited reforms in the legal system (which would initially be implemented only in major cities). Much of this proposed plan centred on revoking the local pasha’s authority to preside over civil and commercial legal cases, valued at less than five thousand French francs. This was intended to provide better protection against arbitrary decisions taken by pashas with little legal training, and thus 77

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strengthen the court system. In addition, work on the country’s penal code was to continue as planned. As for the colonial administration, the committee recommended that the salaries of Moroccans employed in the civil service be increased, and that the wages and working conditions of Moroccan and French employees be evened out. Puaux emphasized, however, that certain positions should remain in French hands, since the number of skilled Moroccans in these fields was insufficient. The resident-general also mentioned educational programmes to help young Moroccans train for senior administrative positions. Part of the plan was to establish 200 new educational institutions within the next ten years, and increase the number of Moroccans in schools annually. As in other areas, the resident-general’s comments on the proposed educational reforms were very general and did not include any practical discussions regarding their implementation. Another proposed reform was in agriculture; it called for government assistance to help farmers develop irrigation and to establish a new agricultural board with both French and Moroccan representatives. This plan was also presented in very general language, without any reference to viable practical steps. Despite the good intentions of these committees, the announced reforms were limited in scope and did not change the form or nature of the protectorate administration. It was therefore difficult to see how the plan could improve the residency’s relations with Moroccans, or appease angry nationalists. Outside observers were convinced that the residency’s preoccupation with policies relating to the Moroccan population would inevitably continue.44 Istiqlal’s position on the reform plan was negative. First and foremost, the party criticized the long delays in releasing the plan. A further complaint was that the party was forced to respond to the plan with a written, anonymous statement, because under the repressive regime facing it, this was the only option available to the party. In any case, Istiqlal rejected the ideas on which the proposed reforms were based. Istiqlal claimed that the plan contained so many restrictions and caveats that its implementation became impossible. The reforms outlined in the plan were not intended ‘to find a real solution to the crisis in Morocco … but rather to create, in different ways, an ambiguous situation, which was mostly the continuation of the delays and postponements [of government reforms]’ that the 78

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colonial administration had pursued.45 ‘Much ado about nothing’, the party’s statement concluded.46 Istiqlal’s criticism of the reform plan expressed the rising mistrust many Moroccans felt towards the residency. Foreign observers also reported the Muslim public’s general lack of interest in the reforms. Most Moroccans felt that the French administration had no intention of keeping its promises, or changing its policies. The lingering impact of the 1944 riots, along with the continued imprisonment of nationalist leaders, had dealt a serious blow to relations between the Moroccans and French, and in the Moroccans’ opinion no proposed reform plan would be able to restore the status quo ante.47 A special announcement Istiqlal published a week after the resident-general’s statement on the reform plan outlined the party’s criticism of the proposed reforms. It included the major tenets of Moroccan nationalist propaganda against colonial rule, which Istiqlal had distributed in its early years and which provided a portrait of the party’s principles and its major contentions in the aftermath of the 1944 riots. The main emphasis in this, as in other party statements, was on the French inability to live up to its commitments following the establishment of the protectorate in 1912. The conclusion centred on the need to abrogate the protectorate immediately and grant independence to Morocco. Istiqlal criticized the work of officials involved in the planning, contending that the reforms had not been discussed in any depth by the party committees, but had been issued extemporaneously by the residency. Istiqlal claimed, for example, that the committee on judicial reforms met only once after it had been established formally. The colonial administration, so they argued, ultimately aspired to retain its control over the country and ‘frighten the public [which would] passively obey arbitrary laws’, instead of improving the population’s living conditions. Detailing the proposed judicial reforms, the party claimed that they sanctified two traditional pivots of French policy in Morocco. The first was France’s de facto control over the judicial system, even if the system was, theoretically at least, in the hands of Moroccan tribal leaders, whom Istiqlal described as ignorant, greedy individuals adhering to their traditional political power base. Istiqlal repeatedly criticized tribal leaders who did not support them, viewing them as French accomplices. The second problem outlined in the party’s 79

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publication was the lack of a regulated set of laws. As a result, many Moroccans faced arbitrary trials and sentences, imposed by tribal leaders, French judges, or administrative decrees dictated by the residency. Istiqlal also criticized plans to bring about change in the government administration, particularly in the initiative to increase the number of Muslims employed in the civil service. The party claimed that few Moroccan Muslims sought government jobs, since their role in such positions would at the very most be secondary. The assumption was that it was not the residency’s main intention to employ a lager number of Moroccans in senior positions, but to subordinate them to France. The administrative reform committee noted the ‘deficiencies’ of the Moroccan public and the ensuing difficulty in finding ‘suitable’ personnel. The party demanded to know who was responsible for this: ‘Isn’t it painful’, the document’s authors asked, ‘to admit that after thirty-three years of protectorate rule, the country subordinated to this framework finds itself lacking the necessary infrastructure for change?’ Istiqlal also focused its attention on a topic that quickly became its major lightning rod against the colonial administration and attracted wide public support for the party and its main goal, namely education. The party asserted that colonial officials had always been reluctant to develop a Muslim education system, fearing that such a system would foster political ambitions among young Moroccans and threaten the future of French rule in the country. The party claimed that the protectorate government had for many years opposed the establishment of modern educational institutions in Morocco, which the party felt were the only way to further the public good. The party found strong evidence of the protectorate’s disgraceful failure – after 33 years of rule – in the negligible number of Moroccan professionals. At the time there were only three Moroccan physicians, six attorneys (four of which were still training) and half a dozen agricultural engineers. It was hard to expect, the party noted, that the addition of 10,000 Moroccan children to the school system, which was the proposed educational reform, would yield significant social change. Indeed, out of two million Moroccan school-age children only 30,000 had found a place in the Moroccan school system. Istiqlal was convinced that the proposed plan could not, under any circumstances, offer a solution to the growing educational crisis in Morocco. 80

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The weakness of the country’s educational system and the fact that so few Moroccan children received basic schooling raised the public’s interest in Istiqlal. One Moroccan source in Marrakech complained in July 1944 that 30 years of French rule had improved only three things in Morocco –personal security, roads and the electricity network. The French approach to education was a complete failure, he argued – a sentiment shared by many Moroccans.48 Similarly, according to Istiqlal, proposals for improving the lives of rural peasants and craftsmen were ‘negligible’. The idea of establishing a council that would supervise agricultural production was deemed to be insulting. Past experience showed that establishing committees and councils to treat specific problems was akin to neglecting them. ‘Our farmers should not expect any significant or immediate results from the commission.’ The party argued that any agricultural reform that was not intended to support Moroccan farmers and provide them with sufficient guidance and improved crops was doomed to fail. The residency’s reform plans were not ‘a true solution to the Moroccan problem … which remained intractable’.49 An American intelligence report assessed the 1944 reform initiative, emphasizing that the plan did not reflect any change in France’s traditional policies in Morocco, which above all guaranteed the former’s dominance.50 Although the reform plans were never implemented, they occupied a prominent place on Morocco’s political agenda in 1944, and entailed Istiqlal’s total attention. It was clear to the party that the plan was completely detached from, and diverted attention from its main objective, namely independence. Disappointed about their lack of success in gaining international support, Istiqlal activists sought ways to bolster the party’s presence within the Moroccan political system. These efforts centred on recruiting supporters among Morocco’s urban youth, and on political efforts to strengthen the party’s relations with the sultan (see chapter 5). Many young Moroccans participated in the January riots, so Moroccan nationalist activists now pinned their hopes on the new generation. This led the party to take a keener interest in young Moroccans. In the latter part of 1944, the party initiated several modest programmes with the intention of attracting young Moroccans to its ranks (in addition to the student groups who had seemingly supported the nationalist ideas during the riots). 81

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One arena of party activity was the Moroccan scouts movement, the members of which were known as the ‘Hassanian scouts’. The Hassanian scouts, who received official recognition from the sultan in 1930, were known as an ideologically nationalist organization funded by contributions from wealthy Muslims. The movement was antiFrench and its leaders endeavoured to instil a nationalist ideology in its younger members.51 During the summer months of 1944, Moroccan teenagers, accompanied by one or two adults, were seen practising military marches in Casablanca. According to one estimate, the movement numbered close to 700 members. During the marches, the scouts wore khaki hats, adorned with rank badges. The ‘officers’ who supervised them were equipped with wooden swords. Particularly striking to outside observers was the spirit of order and discipline that reigned in the group. For a while the French authorities refrained from interfering in these activities, but the moment the scouts asked merchants within the local medina for contributions for a party they wished to throw, the authorities began to pay closer attention to them. In response to French queries, the organizers claimed that the group had organized spontaneously, and that its actions were nothing more than young people ‘playing soldiers’. The French authorities remained unconvinced and suspicious. On 23 September they announced a ban on future scout activities. Reporting the incident, the American consul in Casablanca wrote that there were many reasons to believe that this innocent ‘youth movement’ was inspired by the nationalists.52 French measures against the scouts’ socio-educational activities were linked to broader efforts to repress Moroccan nationalism. The Istiqlal party’s social projects among Moroccan youth drew these groups into the party’s ranks, and over time increased its social impact. Along with its endeavours to mobilize young Moroccans in the months following the January riots, Istiqlal also became concerned about its relations with the sultan and the makhzen’s position on Moroccan nationalism. For Istiqlal, this question embodied widespread political and strategic concerns. The repressive measures against the party caused disquiet about its ties to the sultan, Sidi Mohammed. The sultan himself refrained from publicly endorsing the new party and, accepting Puaux’s dictates, expressed discomfort with the party’s demands. In the months following the riots, he appeared to be distancing 82

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himself from Istiqlal and from the nationalist movement. On various occasions, he criticized the organizers of these riots. The Sultan described the riots as a superficial impulse. In a meeting with General Catroux, the French governor-general of Algeria and senior official of the French National Liberation Committee, the sultan contended that the activists responsible for the riots did not represent the Moroccan people. The sultan also emphasized that the liberation of France was the more urgent issue.53 Due to French pressure, the sultan moved away even further from Istiqlal and voiced his concern over rupturing his ties with the residency, which could have threatened his position. He was ‘determined to maintain full discretion concerning the Moroccan nationalist groups’ and, according to one report, even punished his eldest son, Hassan, for making ‘irresponsible’ statements in which the prince repeated nationalist propaganda slogans.54 This conciliatory approach to the residency was evident during the celebrations of the Prophet’s birthday in March 1944, during which Sidi Mohammed projected a conciliatory approach towards the protectorate government and reiterated his loyalty to France: ‘Even if the last few days have witnessed unfortunate events, which are affecting the French–Moroccan feelings of friendship’, he said, ‘the positive atmosphere [between the two countries] will return thanks to the trust and friendship [between them]’. In the light of his apparent reservations towards Istiqlal, party leaders did their best to maintain relations with the sultan. They continued to speak highly of him, arguing that the monarch was still on their side, and displayed a more conciliatory approach towards the protectorate because of escalating French pressure. The nationalists were impressed that the sultan continued to distinguish between ‘educated young Moroccans’, who called for reforms and did not commit any sort of offence, and ignorant youths, who turned to violence. They saw these statements as an attempt to reach out to the party’s ideologues, even when the sultan publicly kept his distance from them. Other accounts reported on the sultan’s continuing ties with nationalist activists. The months following the riots did not lead to a severance of these ties and the sultan’s statements on Istiqlal did not represent a departure from his initial, positive approach to the party. He did, however, point out the need to refrain from any sort of violent activity that would endanger the long-term prospect of realizing the 83

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party’s goals. Likewise, he was interested in averting any further clashes between Moroccans and French security forces and preferred, for example, not to hold public events during the traditional Throne Day Celebrations in November, fearing that they might lead to violent clashes. The level of violence, alongside the high number of detainees and casualties in the January riots, raised the sultan’s concern about the threat of political instability, and ultimately led him to distance himself from the nationalists. He did not completely reject Moroccan nationalism during this period – he did, however, keep his distance from Istiqlal’s leaders.55 The monarch did not completely disengage from politics during this period, but acted more as an independent agent in the local political arena, seeking to protect his own interests. Several reports related to a number of royal initiatives for ‘another campaign against France’, which differed from party positions as the sultan’s plans did not include a full commitment to Istiqlal’s idea of independence. His ambitions were described as far more moderate than those presented by Istiqlal activists. One of Sidi Mohammed’s close confidants disclosed that at this stage the sultan was not considering achieving full or partial independence for Morocco. He apparently understood that Morocco would not be in a position to maintain self-rule in the near future.56 Another source argued that the sultan was willing to abandon nationalist demands for independence, preferring to serve as the head of a revised protectorate the Allies would establish after the war. This new framework would further enhance his domestic political position.57 The sultan did not openly discuss these suggestions, so it is difficult to determine whether they reflected the official political positions the monarchy adopted. But they do represent prevailing attitudes within the palace towards Istiqlal and its ideology. Although party leaders aspired to consider the sultan a political ally, the relationship between the party and the palace in 1944 remained unsettled. The sultan seemed to be attracted to Istiqlal, but refrained from directly engaging with the party because of intensive French pressure. Increasingly aware of his own special position within the political system at the time, Sidi Mohammed examined independent measures intended to bolster his position. These measures were not necessarily compatible with the Istiqlal leaders’ plans, and were not discussed with them. As much as the party saw the monarch as an ally and partner on its 84

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political course, towards the end of 1944 the sultan proved that he was an independent, non-aligned political force in Moroccan politics. Relations between Istiqlal and the monarchy remained fluid and reversible, while the sultan strengthened his position and Istiqlal struggled to advance its goals. Throughout the 1940s, the nature of relations between the party and monarchy continued to serve as background for the former’s development. Meanwhile, Istiqlal sought to expand its activities on the Moroccan political stage.

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A

cknowledging that the struggle for independence would be a more complex process than originally envisioned led Istiqlal activists to reconsider their activities after 1944. Initially, Istiqlal’s leaders focused mainly on diplomatic contacts with the Allied countries and French government officials. Although party leaders felt confident that the public supported the idea of independence, they did not initiate widespread public activity that would focus on achieving this goal. Before the party’s establishment, nationalist leaders refrained from initiating widespread public events. Subsequently turning to such activities required a shift in the nationalists’ attitude to public ventures. While they had previously been considered important complements of the party’s diplomatic pursuits, they nevertheless remained of secondary importance. Istiqlal’s growing involvement with the Moroccan public led party leaders to reconsider their approach to public activities. This shift affected Istiqlal’s development and had a significant impact on Moroccan politics.

Towards New Activities Even as we recognize this shift, it is equally important to note that prior to Istiqlal’s existence, Morocco lacked a tradition of mass politics. Over the course of Moroccan history, there were periodic confrontations between the central authorities and broad strata of the Moroccan public. During these confrontations, the parties involved followed traditional patterns. Overall, the political behaviour of most Moroccans was passive. They rarely expressed political opinions, and for the most part were detached from the government. Contacts between the Moroccan people and the authorities were usually conducted with the assistance of intermediate agents, such as tribal 87

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chiefs or the leaders of Sufi orders. Although these traditional forces still retained a high level of political clout in Morocco, the new circumstances under the protectorate paved the way for new political forces. This was the background to Istiqlal’s social activism. In the latter part of the 1940s, Istiqlal’s activities were no longer confined to the political sector. Throughout the decade the party began to pay closer attention to Morocco’s social and economic ills, and initiated a number of social activities, thus providing an opportunity for many Moroccans to become involved politically, and reconfiguring much of Morocco’s political system. Inspired by Istiqlal, it witnessed significant changes between 1945 and 1949. Much of the change was reflected in a move towards mass politics. In this chapter I survey the changes within Istiqlal during this period, and discuss the party’s social, educational and welfare activities as it gained political strength. The 1944 riots made Istiqlal leaders recognize that their struggle for independence could not be limited to politics and diplomacy, but would have to include various activities incorporating the Moroccan public. They were aware of the importance of securing the public’s support for the party, which would strengthen its position within Moroccan society and increase support for the nationalist cause. Istiqlal activists understood that much of Morocco’s political future depended on the impact they had on the lives of the very Moroccans they sought to represent politically. A foreign observer assessed that it gradually became clear to the nationalists that they would have to work on their own in order to realize their goals, and to stop relying on foreign support.1 According to one young Moroccan who anonymously discussed the political situation with an American intelligence agent in the country later that year, the 1944 riots indicated the Moroccan public’s support of Istiqlal and its goals. Even so, there were increasing doubts about the party’s ability to realize its objectives quickly. Some wondered how many of Istiqlal’s leaders actually had any political experience or the ability to cope with complex political issues. In conversations with American intelligence officers, other Moroccans (who remained anonymous) voiced their disquiet about personal and family rivalries between party members, which might impede the development of an independent political movement detached from a particular Moroccan class or milieu. This clearly 88

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reflected the rising doubts about Istiqlal and its ideology, and its potential to develop over time. Despite the enthusiasm the party’s establishment generated, the Moroccan masses did not join it. Once the 1944 riots were over, Istiqlal found itself at a crossroads. Although the riots had drawn many towards the party’s ideas and messages, its overall level of public support was still questionable.2 Despite these doubts, which expressed concern about the party’s ability to realize its aims, Istiqlal remained popular among the public, and its activists sought to attract new supporters.3 This work involved educational and social activities, which took place under the party’s sponsorship. Given the French measures against nationalist activity, these activities were not easily contrived after the 1944 riots. Ultimately, despite the restrictions against it, the party did manage to expand, thus reflecting the party activists’ intent to promote their ideas. The immediate focus of Istiqlal’s actions after its establishment was, as already mentioned, in the diplomatic arena. This course of action did not achieve immediate results, so party leaders began to search for alternative options. The residency’s repressive measures against Istiqlal after the publication of the 1944 manifesto, changed the party’s approach to relations between Morocco and France. The 1944 petition demanded an immediate end to French rule, but the residency’s repression and France’s determination to maintain control over Morocco in the aftermath of the riots altered the party’s position and forced it to adopt a more low-key approach in its struggle. Istiqlal leaders recognized that their contacts with Allied representatives in Morocco would not yield the expected results, and would not lead to an immediate abrogation of the protectorate. Britain and the USA did not intervene in the 1944 riots and kept their distance from the party. Altering their strategy, Istiqlal activists became more involved in domestic French politics and reduced their contacts with the Allies. They now hoped to take advantage of political disputes in France to gain popular support. They also continued the nationalist movement’s tradition of turning directly to French public opinion, seeking to inform French citizens about the party. Capitalizing on growing French opposition to the residency’s policies in North Africa, they expected these measures to lead to a change in its stance toward Morocco.4 However, the party’s difficulties 89

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and France’s repressive policies induced Istiqlal to discard its activities abroad and to focus on the Moroccan public instead. Despite this new strategy, it was difficult for Istiqlal leaders to present a constructive plan of action that would bolster public support of the party and its goals, a mere two years after it was formed. Party activity in the late 1940s was not an outcome of early planning, but was comprised of hastily crafted programmes, often devised from the grassroots in an effort to respond to the public’s immediate needs.5 Foreign observers who followed events in Morocco throughout the 1940s agreed that the Moroccan public’s dissatisfaction with French rule was almost total, clearly benefiting Istiqlal’s broader appeal. They also noted that the public would by and large welcome the end of the protectorate’s rule, but cautioned that the Moroccan public was nowhere near being ready to initiate violent measures against the French. The possibility of an armed Moroccan struggle against the protectorate was unlikely at that stage. However, the possibility that Istiqlal might adopt a more aggressive approach towards the French in the late 1940s seemed more likely as time went on and the French intensified the repressive measures against Moroccan nationalists. On various occasions, Allal el-Fassi spoke of the ways and means he considered appropriate for the party’s struggle for independence. In a number of speeches he gave after his return from exile in Gabon in 1946 (see chapter 6), el-Fassi emphasized the strategic importance of establishing modern educational institutions, which he saw as a critical part of the struggle against the French. In his view, education was a vital tool in training a new young Moroccan elite that would lead society towards progress and prosperity. He was less enthusiastic, however, about providing educational opportunities to wider sectors of the population. His envisioned educational programme was aimed at creating a cadre of professionals who would serve the makhzen.6 El-Fassi’s comments reflected the elitist approach of many leading figures in the Moroccan nationalist movement. This approach was still evident in the statements of party leaders in the late 1940s, and was at variance with their professed intention to expand Istiqlal’s social framework. This contrast between statements and broader goals was the upshot of the personal background of party leaders, who were unused to working within a more inclusive political framework and found it difficult to adjust to the idea of engaging with broad sectors of the Moroccan public. 90

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Istiqlal devoted much attention to building a social infrastructure to bolster its position. By establishing educational and social institutions, it drew new groups into its ranks. In the short term, these initiatives increased the number of party members and supporters, and in the long term, they were expected to help the party play a key role in building an independent and modern Morocco, in the spirit of Istiqlal’s vision of a constitutional monarchy. The mobilization of new members into the party ranks, and the establishment of organized party frameworks conformed to familiar patterns of modern mass politics. Efforts to recruit new social forces ultimately altered the party’s character, transforming Istiqlal from a small party of urban intellectuals to a large, organized framework. It became active among social sectors that had previously been marginalized in political life, and gradually distanced itself from the elitist approach of its early leaders and founders. Supporters were recruited from the emerging urban proletariat and the lower-class urban population, which had previously not had any contact with the nationalist movement. These groups grew more and more restless, demanding changes and improvements in people’s lives. Reaching out to the urban workers required that Istiqlal embrace new programmes and tactics. Efforts to expand the party’s social foundation were also intended to negate the French claim that Istiqlal only represented the interests of a ‘traditional urban bourgeoisie’ and was oblivious to the needs of other social groups. Towards the end of 1944, Istiqlal intensified its activities in a number of Moroccan cities. After a period of recuperation and adjustment to the harsh political reality following the January riots, the party began to emerge from stagnation. Several reports noted this in May, commenting on a renewed party activity and closer coordination between senior party officials.7 By September 1944 French authorities had recognized an increase in routinely held party meetings. Although Istiqlal’s activities were still largely limited to small meetings held in the homes of party activists, they now attracted a larger number of supporters. This activity was mostly confined to traditional nationalist centres, like Fez and Rabat, but French intelligence sources warned the residency that nationalism in Morocco could not be expected to disappear, and predicted its resurgence in the near future. Despite this warning, the residency did 91

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not change its policies towards Istiqlal or towards Moroccan nationalism, and continued to repress its activities. Rather than directly confront the French, Istiqlal became more focused on its internal affairs. Party activists sought to avoid further clashes with the protectorate authorities, which would have aggravated Moroccan relations with the residency even further, unleashed a new round of violence and repression, and endangered Istiqlal’s future. The party was in a tenuous situation. Allal el-Fassi repeatedly called on his supporters to refrain from any type of demonstration that could lead to a violent reaction from the French administration.8 From the French residency’s perspective, the situation in Morocco in the latter part of the decade was quiet and stable, despite Istiqlal’s growth. Puaux noted in August 1945 that ‘Morocco is calm now, more calm than it has ever been since 1939.’ French journalists who visited Morocco in August 1948 also reported that the political situation in Morocco was ‘satisfactory’.9 Despite these assessments, some French officials did not believe that Moroccan nationalism was on the retreat.10 They closely monitored Istiqlal’s actions and remained interested in its affairs. Although the residency did not explicitly allow the party to conduct wide-scale public activities, it did not always stop them. This policy left some room for party activity, which benefited Istiqlal. The gradual increase in nationalist activity after the 1944 riots and their aftermath was evident in Casablanca. Unlike Fez, which was still recovering from the riots, the atmosphere in Casablanca was more relaxed. Casablanca did not experience wide-scale violence during the riots and was not noted as a hotbed of nationalist activity that required the residency’s constant supervision. Few people were arrested in Casablanca after the riots and life in the city continued uninterrupted. The lack of political tension in Casablanca, unlike in other urban centres, led many nationalist activists to move their operations to that city. They were attracted by the possibility of engaging politically and culturally in a city teeming with potential supporters, and of expanding the scope of their activities to new settings. The arrival of such activists towards the end of 1944 increased the scope of nationalist activity in Casablanca. The more relaxed political ambience that prevailed there allowed Istiqlal activists to be less concerned about political repression. They began to appear on public occasions such as sports events and the opening of public buildings, 92

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attracting greater public attention, so that many observers now perceived Istiqlal as an important political force.11 Istiqlal’s new members and supporters were expected to strengthen the party’s political position in Moroccan society, and to improve its image in the eyes of the French residency. The party’s endeavours in Casablanca signalled to the Moroccan public and to the French residency that Istiqlal intended to continue its activities, despite the difficulties it faced. It also reflected the party’s recognition of the changes within Moroccan society, and the rise of new urban centres that were gradually eclipsing the traditional cities economically and socially. By the end of 1944, Casablanca was recognized as an ‘active centre’ of Moroccan nationalism.12 The French authorities were well aware of Istiqlal’s intention to strengthen the party’s organizational framework, particularly within the major cities. In various forums, French officials presented the party’s efforts to establish local branches, similar in structure to large French political organizations. Istiqlal’s leaders, they argued, were keen on establishing organized structures that would manage the party’s institutions and its political course. These hierarchical structures were to include an executive committee that would supervise the local committees to be established across the country. By the end of the decade, the party’s executive committee comprised veteran, well-known nationalist figures. Its secretary general was Ahmed Belafrej, and its acting secretary general, substituting for Belafrej who had been exiled from Morocco in July 1944, was Mohammed Lyazidi. Most committee members, including Allal elFassi and Mohammed Ghazi, were nearing the age of fifty and shared a common social and intellectual background. The committee was responsible for most of the party’s executive affairs. Its members managed Istiqlal’s finances, oversaw the publication of party pamphlets and statements and, since its foundation in 1946, had been associated with the newspaper al-ʿAlam (The Banner). Along with the executive committee, a party ‘senior committee’ was also set up. The number of its members changed periodically. It advised the executive committee on a wide range of issues, but met only at the secretary-general’s request.13 The increase in the number of party members and the scope of Istiqlal’s activity did not significantly alter the nature and composition of the party’s leadership. Istiqlal’s elite-oriented leadership 93

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remained unchanged. In the long run, this situation was not helpful to the growth of Istiqlal. Not all the party’s supporters could identify with its leaders, who were mostly from traditional, well-to-do urban backgrounds. The sultan, however, who widely embodied the aspirations of most Moroccans, was emerging as a powerful political leader and overshadowing the nationalist party (see chapter 5). In the light of the monarch’s growing importance, the composition of the Istiqlal leadership stood out as a factor that ultimately weakened Istiqlal’s position in the Moroccan political system. Istiqlal’s basic organizational unit remained the local cell, which coordinated the party’s ongoing activities. Each cell’s chairman was also a member of the party’s local municipal committee, the next rung in Istiqlal’s hierarchy.14 The emerging party structure was flexible enough to serve Istiqlal openly or clandestinely, and could cope with the French authorities’ oppressive measures. The measures enacted against the party, and the fact that it had been outlawed, obstructed its public actions and forced it to embrace a more clandestine modus operandi. The party’s leadership in Casablanca, for example, was largely compartmentalized and remained unknown to many local Istiqlal members. There was also a minimal level of contact between the various cells because of the need to maintain a level of secrecy, due to the aggressive French policies.15 This situation existed in other locales as well. The structure of the party in Marrakech offers a better understanding of how Istiqlal developed and functioned in the mid-1940s. Marrakech was not known as a centre of nationalist activity, and was influenced by the conduct of the local pasha, Thami el-Glaoui, who opposed Istiqlal (see chapter 8). But the city did harbour a contingent of nationalist activists, who participated in nationalist affairs from the outset. Nevertheless, nationalist activity in Marrakech was less intense than in other Moroccan cities. Its residents did not participate in the 1944 riots, and the city was not known as an important Istiqlal base. According to one assessment, the number of party members in the city was estimated to be several hundred. As in other cities, Istiqlal activities were organized through local cells that were established through social, or commercial contacts. Each cell consisted of ten members, with each chairman serving on the city’s local committee, the party’s highest organizational structure in the city. The meetings 94

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of the individual cells were kept secret in order to ward off French harassment. The cells were involved mainly in implementing the instructions and guidelines of senior personnel, and in local issues, such as education and finances.16 The absence of large party structures, and the small size of the party cells, made it possible for many individuals to join the party without abandoning their other social commitments to, for example, tribes or Sufi orders. This was particularly important in new urban centres, which absorbed large numbers of rural migrants. Morocco’s rapid urbanization was often accompanied by personal and social upheavals that profoundly affected individuals’ lives. The ability to join small social units such as party cells, in which activities were conducted in an intimate atmosphere and which did not threaten other social allegiances, was therefore greatly welcomed. It also provided people with an outlet for political expression and for addressing the numerous social and economic problems with which many recent arrivals had to cope. This frequently encouraged them to join the new party, even when its broader nationalist ideology was largely unfamiliar to them. Istiqlal’s independence slogan, on the other hand, was clearly understood by every one and required little elaboration. The idea was lucid and simple and, along with Istiqlal’s flexible organizational framework and the party’s educational and welfare initiatives (see below), increased party membership. Istiqlal’s flexible structure did not, however, allow for local party activity to be conducted haphazardly. The party established fixed rules and regulations for conducting meetings. Each local committee was required to meet on a weekly basis to discuss topics and issues on the local and party agenda. This requirement averted the possibility of an uninvolved, remote membership, and kept the party cells dynamic and prominent on a local level. The official ban on party activities forced Istiqlal activists in Marrakech, as in other locations, to seek other secret meeting locations, away from the residency’s prying eyes. Indeed, throughout Morocco, party activists sought out secure meeting locations. Most of the meetings took place in local markets and in small shops owned by party supporters and members. Other meetings were held at city parks. Some of the party meetings outside the city were staged as picnics, to be enjoyed by all. 95

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Over time, the number of party members – some of them quite prosperous – increased. The activities the party organized, such as the aforementioned picnics, reflected the ‘bourgeois’ ethos that underpinned Istiqlal’s spirit in the early years, and was a far cry from the lifestyle of other social classes. Since many of the recent arrivals to the city were inspired by that lifestyle, it was not particularly difficult for them to adapt to the party’s reigning ethos. Indeed, many of the party’s activities in Marrakech resembled those in other cities.17 The Sufi orders, for their part, were suspicious of the young nationalist activists and disapproved of their ideology, which they suspected of undermining the prevailing social order. They opposed the idea of promoting an all-encompassing Moroccan national identity. As time went by, the differences between the Sufi orders and the nationalists became more pronounced, and further intensified with the establishment of the Istiqlal party.18 Another force opposing the party was the tribal leaders. While the party sought to increase its activities among the tribes and the peripheral population, it did not meet with much success during the 1940s. Most tribal leaders did not support the new nationalist party, which they thought extended itself beyond its capability. They also opposed the party’s aspirations to function as a mass party, which would incorporate diverse groups and social sectors. Like the Sufi orders, they were wary of the possibility that the new party would overshadow their own public standing. Despite objections from some religious orders and tribes, Istiqlal’s public position went from strength to strength with party activity in Marrakech and other cities increasing throughout 1945. In fact, French intelligence officers noted the numerical growth in the number of party members in Marrakech, and also mentioned that most of the new members recruited into the party belonged to intellectual circles or wealthy families. For Istiqlal, there was still much work to be done.

The Party’s Social Activities and their Meaning The volume of Istiqlal activities grew in 1945 and 1946. The party initiated diverse activities, which situated Istiqlal in a unique position in Morocco. It was now recognized as a political force with concerns that extended beyond the political arena. Many studies on political parties in Arab societies have questioned the extent to which political 96

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organizations such as Istiqlal can be effective agents of political and social change. During this period, Istiqlal was indirectly preoccupied with its status as an agent of social change, while it also sought to expand its broader political influence. Though the party’s main effort was geared towards securing Morocco’s independence, its social activities also addressed questions on a number of other issues, such as the status of women in Morocco. Istiqlal’s educational and welfare activities did not significantly change the dismal situation in Morocco in these areas, but its involvement in these matters nevertheless set the party apart from other political actors.19 As noted, Istiqlal’s main activities centred on secret meetings of activists and leaders, and on the distribution of pamphlets and publications that promulgated its views.20 Nationalist circles in Casablanca were more openly active. Istiqlal activists participated in practically every public event that took place in the city, such as welcoming the French authorities’ official guests, or sporting events. In these events, nationalist activists and supporters did not hesitate to chant nationalist slogans like ‘long live Morocco, long live the nation [umma]’.21 It is interesting to note that these slogans were very general: they expressed national ideas and messages, but did not directly relate to the Istiqlal party as an independent political entity. The public was called upon to endorse Moroccan independence and support the sultan, but not the Istiqlal party. The ideas that the party sought to impart on the public were gaining support, but the public’s general identification of these ideas with the Istiqlal party remained weak. Even as Istiqlal’s position strengthened, it was still not recognized as a key player in the political arena. There was a growing gap between general support for nationalist ideology, and Istiqlal’s weakness as a political player. This became even more obvious in the light of the sultan’s rising prominence as a national leader, overshadowing all other political groups and parties. This gap weakened Istiqlal as an independent agent in public life, even as it gained strength in the political system. The gap also affected the party’s achievements throughout the 1940s. An analysis of party slogans exposes early signs of Istiqlal’s weakness in the post-independence period, at the very same time that the party was honing its ideological messages and slogans. Most of the party leaders were unaware of the broader implications of solidifying the monarchy’s political stature, which ultimately was carried out at 97

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the party’s expense. They saw their first priority as the recruitment of public support for independence, and worked towards realizing that goal. Their public slogans during this period, which promoted independence without directly referring to the party, reflected this position. In the long run, however, the party did not do enough to strengthen its own position among the Moroccan public. Slogans such as ‘long live the king/umma/Morocco’ did not directly promote the party but reinforced other political players. Istiqlal was successful in disseminating its ideals among the public, but these efforts were at the expense of its own stature. Among other activities, the party made a special effort to recruit young people. Young Moroccans, who had grown up under the protectorate and were familiar with its deficiencies, were viewed as the most promising reservoir of new members. Among the cultural and educational activities the nationalists sponsored were the ‘Ramadan camps’. These camps were set up in various cities, often in poor neighbourhoods, throughout the holy month of Ramadan. Nationalist activities offered at that time were often the only forms of entertainment in such areas that had been completely neglected by the French residency, and were on the margins of Muslim society. Appealing to this population represented a new approach to Moroccan public life, and helped introduce Istiqlal’s nationalist ideas to a new audience. These events combined traditional religious-related observances, such as Ramadan, with new nationalist ideas. Youngsters in the Ramadan camps in Casablanca in 1946 performed short plays and skits that mocked the protectorate and its officials. This combination fitted the general approach of the Istiqlal party, blending the old and the new in a fashion that appealed to many of Morocco’s younger generation.22 Meanwhile, Istiqlal’s regular party activities continued, alongside its expanding educational and cultural pursuits. Towards the end of 1945, the topics of discussion in the Istiqlal cells in Casablanca corresponded to the broad themes confronted by the party. These included issues regarding the reform plans proposed by the residency after the 1944 riots (see chapter 3), and demands on the protectorate government to guarantee freedom of the press and establish a Moroccan legal system. Other topics concerned education and local government management. These issues had much resonance with Morocco’s affluent population, indicating that at this stage, Istiqlal’s concerns 98

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were still those of Morocco’s more prosperous social strata, and alien to the concerns of less fortunate Moroccans. The topics were also largely imposed on the nationalists by the residency, and did not come from internal policy discussions. Istiqlal refrained from submitting additional political plans that clearly prioritized the independence cause. Given the restrictions the protectorate imposed on the party, this reluctance to raise new political programmes was understandable. But as a result the party took on quite a passive role, for which it would later have to pay the price. Istiqlal did not present a cohesive ideology that could address a variety of social issues, but limited itself to political questions concerning Moroccan independence. Although this helped promote the idea of independence among the public, it impeded Istiqlal’s development as a mass party. Istiqlal’s identification with prosperous Moroccan circles clearly restricted its social activities. Observers doubted its sincerity when it reiterated its wish to help less fortunate Moroccans, and even argued that the party’s adherence to nationalist ideals was nothing more than a ploy to increase the influence and social power of wealthy Moroccans at the expense of others. Their association with affluent Moroccans made it difficult for Istiqlal leaders to portray themselves as authentic representatives of Moroccan society. They repeatedly attempted to shed this upper-crust image. In reply to a question about the worry of left-wing French parties that the Moroccan nationalist movement was nothing but a ‘gathering of bourgeois concerned with their political situation and not with improving the lot of workers’, Ouazzani argued that such a concern was unjustified: ‘Moroccan nationalist activists were not fighting for their cause from a bourgeois mentality, but from a sense of solidarity and loyalty towards their people, and concern for [their] moral and material well-being.’ He emphasized that these goals were no less important to the nationalist movement than the goal of independence itself, and pledged to work towards their implementation.23 But, despite such statements, the party leaders’ sincerity remained questionable. The Istiqlal leadership included merchants, businessmen and professionals, most of whom kept their distance from the working and lower classes. Istiqlal was also subjected to French repression, which limited its activities and created a negative ambience around it. Despite this situation, Istiqlal party sources and documents present 99

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a portrait of widespread local activities among various social groups, which led to Istiqlal’s emergence as a central player in Moroccan politics. The party sought to establish its presence in the Moroccan political landscape, while simultaneously increasing its involvement with the country’s youth and initiating educational, cultural, recreational and welfare activities. Among these were programmes aimed at providing economic and social assistance to needy families, and a literacy campaign for adults (see chapter 8). Another focus of attention was the position of Moroccan women. Istiqlal’s approach to women as a distinct group was unprecedented in Moroccan politics. Previously, Moroccan women had occupied a marginal space in public life and were not considered part of the political system. Traditionally, Moroccan women rarely left their homes and did not engage in social contacts with individuals outside their families. For most women in Morocco, including the urban bourgeoisie, little had changed as the nationalist movement emerged. They continued to be largely secluded from public life, and led a restricted life. Their role had assumed a symbolic importance, and was viewed as the bedrock of Moroccan tradition, and the basic cell of Moroccan Muslim society. Moroccan nationalists emphasized the family and the Moroccan nation as key concepts, and considered women to be important owing to their traditional family roles. They did not, however, seek to change the foundations of the Moroccan family, but rather to strengthen them. This did not leave much room for significant changes in the status of women. The changes Morocco experienced during the colonial era, namely the substitution of new ideas for the old social norms and traditions, did allow some women (particularly from affluent families) to reconsider their social position. The nationalist movement devoted attention to the question of women when it initiated its activities in the 1930s. This attention, however, was limited mainly to the more Western-oriented wing of the new movement, particularly Frencheducated young Moroccans, who took Europe as a point of reference and a model for gender relations. The focus on women was an outcome of the broader debate among early nationalist activists concerning legal rights and education for women. The position of Moroccan women was an embarrassment to these Western-educated Moroccans, who rejected the old social structures that underpinned Moroccan life and sought to project a modern image. Many women 100

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were impressed with the Istiqlal party and its demand for independence, and hoped that the removal of the colonial government would improve their situation. Moroccan women from diverse backgrounds tended to blame colonial rule for the hardships and iniquities they endured during this period, and considered the anticolonial struggle as a way out of their situation.24 They sought to utilize the new party’s framework to voice their opinions. In 1946 an Istiqlal-sponsored women’s movement, Akhwat al-Safa (Sisters of Purity) was established. By establishing such a movement, Istiqlal indicated that it recognized the connection between the nationalist movement and the emerging demands of women. The organization, like other women movements that were later founded, was not officially part of the party, but was guided politically by Istiqlal’s leadership. Malika el-Fassi related after many years that she had witnessed numerous women facing social obstacles that blocked any progress. She tried to find a framework through which women could participate in party activities. The women’s movement was to recruit women’s support for the nationalist movement, coordinate efforts to help the needy, and establish educational institutions for girls. As women became more active in party activities, they began to discuss sensitive questions publicly that had to do with their status as women, including polygamy, divorce, early marriage and wearing the veil. The debate over true social issues in the nationalist press did not last very long, as newspapers like al-ʿAlam began in the early 1950s to take a greater interest in the rights of workers and distanced themselves from women’s issues.25 Malika el-Fassi added that, in the pre-independence period, it had been unacceptable in Morocco to organize joint social activities for men and women. This led to the idea of establishing a separate women’s organization, associated with the party, rather than incorporating women in the party’s ongoing activities. Women thus became active in this separate framework and were involved in different pursuits from men. The limited integration of women into Istiqlal’s network of activity underlines the impact of social taboos on the party, even at a time of political upheaval. In addition, the leaders were usually linked to conservative groups keen on securing Morocco’s independence, but opposing a radical transformation of the reigning social norms. The party’s attitude to women was a new development in Moroccan 101

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politics, but it did not indicate a dramatic departure from prevailing social norms. Despite Istiqlal’s innovative approach to Moroccan politics, it never purported to be a revolutionary social movement. In that sense, the party had let down those who hoped it would undermine anachronistic social norms and replace them with new structures. More women participated in public life after the party’s establishment, but it would be difficult to describe the party as an organization deeply committed to altering the status of women, or striving to introduce structural changes into Morocco’s social fabric. In any case, the meetings organized for women were a useful platform for promulgating the party’s ideals, and for mobilizing women to support nationalist goals. Many women, introduced to the party this way, benefited from a wide range of social and welfare activities. The women’s movement assisted the families of prisoners and helped children from poor families attend the free schools sponsored by the party. One important goal of Istiqlal-sponsored activities was to improve the level of women’s education and allow them, as one woman put it, to ‘win their liberation’. For women, the struggle for independence was combined with their personal struggle to overcome the illiteracy that afflicted many of them. The party’s activities in this area were limited, however, and it is difficult to assess their level of success. Istiqlal devoted much of its efforts to distributing its messages to the public and expanding its media outlets. Although the vast majority of Moroccan Muslims were illiterate, and relied on oral messages and not on printed material, the party felt the need to establish itself as a central political organization through a printed publication. This was the background to the establishment of the Rabat daily, alʿAlam, in September 1946. The newspaper was quickly recognized as Istiqlal’s organ, promoting the main ideas on the party’s agenda – securing Morocco’s independence, emphasizing its glorious past, advancing the monarchy’s position and the sultan’s role as a national leader, and strengthening Morocco’s orientation towards Arab countries and the Arab League. The newspaper also devoted attention to social issues that concerned the party, such as the status of women and the future of education in Morocco. A weekly section for women included informative articles on raising children and other familyrelated matters.26 Another topic, which became prominent in later years, was the status of Moroccan workers and Moroccan trade unions 102

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(see chapter 8). The newspaper’s editors were aware of the importance of the publication and of its role in the struggle against French colonial rule. Al-ʿAlam was subjected to incessant harassment by the French censors, who often banned articles and features, leaving many columns and pages blank. This interfered with the editors’ efforts to use the newspaper as a tool for examining the growth of Istiqlal. The paper nevertheless did reflect issues important to the party’s leaders and helped assess the expansion of the Moroccan struggle for independence. One of Istiqlal’s efforts in the latter part of the 1940s was to strengthen the general public’s awareness of its very existence. The gap between the public’s recognition of the party as a political movement and as a vehicle for the propagation of general slogans favouring the sultan was already noticeable in the early stages of the party’s existence, and over time affected the party’s standing with the Moroccan public. A French report from 1946 noted the party’s efforts to increase its support in Fez. The French authorities exposed a ‘special type of [nationalist] propaganda’ in that city. Istiqlal representatives were reported to have been present at wedding ceremonies attended by large numbers of people. They spoke on the party’s behalf at these events in an effort to increase public support for the party. The speeches concluded with slogans like ‘long live the sultan, long live Allal el-Fassi’. It is unclear how the public reacted to these speeches, but they clearly helped promote the party’s social standing and ideology. The public’s willingness to allow party representatives to speak at private, family events such as weddings, indicates general support for the party’s ideals, but also underlines a certain lack of familiarity with Istiqlal and a need to become better acquainted with it, even in nationalist centres like Fez. French officials concluded that Istiqlal had gained prominence in Fez but that, as in other instances, this was more of a general, uncommitted support of its ideas and did not reflect widespread public support of the party as an individual political player.27 By 1947 Istiqlal was organizing mass public celebrations to commemorate the prophet’s birthday, a religious public event. These celebrations included public gatherings, at which nationalist activists spoke, and emphasized themes such as Istiqlal’s ideology, the importance of education in Morocco, and the need to unite all 103

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nationalist groups in the struggle against the French. The speeches concluded with calls in support of the sultan, the crown prince and independence. Special loudspeakers also transmitted them in other neighbourhoods and thus helped spread the party’s message. These gatherings included public chanting of nationalist hymns, and also provided an ideal opportunity for collecting donations to support nationalist activities. Throughout the decade, the party recruited a growing number of supporters. But a closer look at the reports on rallies and public gatherings the party organized raises questions about its attempts to strengthen the public’s support of its institutions. The various slogans that nationalist supporters uttered at the end of gatherings in Fez, intended to energize the audience, focused on the sultan and independence. They largely glossed over the party itself and did not promote Istiqlal as an independent organization. The political slogans in Fez, for example, which supported Allal el-Fassi, a well-known nationalist leader and city native, are understandable within the local context. The sultan, also mentioned at these rallies, was a national leader endorsed by Istiqlal. But the party itself was not mentioned. The usage of the term ‘independence’ (istiqlal) was aimed at the term itself and not linked to the party.28 This reinforces a trend identified in earlier sections of this study, where Istiqlal promoted ideas and concepts that were central to its political ideology, but failed to strengthen support for its own institutions. While the nationalist struggle for independence was raging, the party’s disregard of the need to strengthen the public’s affiliation to it, contributed to its failure to become a leading political force in the post-independence era. Although Istiqlal was successful in mobilizing public support for Morocco’s independence, and served as a platform for articulating political opinions, it did not overshadow other identities such as tribes and religious orders, let alone the monarchy. The Moroccan public endorsed the ideal of independence and was willing to make sacrifices for it, but it was uninterested in fully supporting the Istiqlal party as a political organization. Another source of Istiqlal’s weakness in the early years was the nature of its collective leadership, as well as the absence of a charismatic leader who could guide the party and play a pivotal role in formulating its policies. In short, Istiqlal was not led by a national hero who could easily have swept the masses. For most Moroccans, 104

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the country’s national figure was the sultan. Foreign representatives who met Istiqlal’s leaders received the impression that the latter were not allowed to speak on the party’s behalf, unless explicitly permitted to do so. Party policies were set only after discussions by Istiqlal’s senior committee. The committee was chaired by the secretary general, who later announced the committee’s decisions. The secretary general was prima inter pares, not a full-fledged leader. Within Istiqlal ranks, recognized leaders like Allal el-Fassi were unable to dictate the party’s course. The collective nature of its leadership combined conservative, traditional leaders (such as elFassi), and more Western-oriented individuals influenced by Western and French culture (such as Belafrej). The party also brought together nationalist factions that had previously acted on their own and whose leaders were frequently locked in bitter rivalries with competing nationalists. These rivalries were often of a personal nature and had little to do with ideology. For Istiqlal, the collective leadership helped iron out these differences and overcome tensions. Most foreign observers agreed that this form of collective leadership was a good way to manage the party effectively, and allowed diverse groups to participate in its activities. Nevertheless, certain individuals within this collective leadership were more prominent than others. Allal el-Fassi, for instance, was identified as the ‘party’s political mind’. In Muslim circles and among Istiqlal activists he was widely regarded as a guiding figure. Many considered him to be a party symbol. But, despite this, el-Fassi was neither perceived as the party’s supreme leader nor did he consider himself as such. In fact, el-Fassi advocated the ideal of diffusive leadership. People who met him after his return from exile in Gabon in 1946 (see chapter 6) heard him say that he thought it would be better if each party branch managed its affairs independently, ‘according to the democratic principles upon which the party was established’. Directives, el-Fassi said, should not be issued by a centralized leadership removed from the rank and file of Istiqlal.29 This form of collective, diffuse leadership was also compatible with Istiqlal’s clandestine nature, which it was forced to adopt immediately upon its establishment, and with the fact that many of its central figures had been imprisoned or exiled. This leadership structure helped incorporate diverse social streams into the party and allowed for different ideological currents to come to the fore. But, the 105

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collective leadership ultimately weakened the party, particularly when up against the sultan and makhzen. While the sultan became a prominent, well-known political figure (compounding his qualities as a religious and a spiritual leader), Istiqlal was without a recognized leader to speak for the party and attract supporters. Although its structure suited the circumstances of the early 1940s, in the long term not having a central figure at its helm damaged Istiqlal’s position in the political arena. Even as the party became more established among the Moroccan public, observers identified the lack of an effective, recognized leadership as a source of weakness and political immaturity, and as a major reason for its inability to live up to the widespread expectation that it could recruit broad sectors of the Moroccan public into its ranks.30 Throughout the 1940s Istiqlal made continued efforts to increase the involvement of small town residents, who until then were largely uninvolved with nationalist politics. Istiqlal leaders resented the criticism that they represented an ‘urban’ party, and sought to establish themselves in smaller communities. Reports of party activities in these locales confirmed this. Donations were collected in the town of Khemisat, for example, as they were in other cities. By 1946 nationalist propaganda had spread to the southern city of Agadir, which, according to a French report, until then had been ‘immune’ from such activity. An increase in party members was also reported in Marrakech, though the new members there still came from the better educated classes, which were considered staunch Istiqlal supporters.31 Meanwhile, the party’s pull in rural areas remained weak and at the end of the decade it was still difficult to speak about a large Istiqlal presence in Morocco’s tribes and villages. This was also connected to the opposition of tribal leaders to the new nationalist party, and their fear that such a party would threaten their own power. Towards the end of the decade, the party intensified its efforts to bolster support among urban workers. Attempts to establish trade unions for Muslim workers (which the French authorities banned) were indicative of this change. Although the nationalist movement had demanded the right to organize trade unions in its reform plan of 1934, Istiqlal was not overly interested in the problems of Moroccan workers in the period that followed the party’s establishment. But, as time went by, party activists recognized the potential benefits of recruiting the support of Moroccan workers and sought to engage 106

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them in party affairs. The May Day commemoration provided an opportunity for the party to express an interest in the working class. A special edition of al-ʿAlam was published on 1 May, focusing on Istiqlal’s policies with regard to workers’ rights and labour relations, and on its efforts to protect Moroccan workers. Many articles in this edition were censored, including an item about a meeting between Istiqlal labour representatives and the sultan, which had taken place a day earlier, and in which the sultan had emphasized his ongoing concern over Moroccan workers, and noted that he was continuously working to assist that sector. He also added that he did not oppose the idea of organizing trade unions. The meeting underlined how this topic had become a central feature of Moroccan politics and how a sectorial question, which concerned Moroccan workers, had become a national political issue. The French residency was infuriated by the attempts to portray Istiqlal as a workers’ party, and tried to avert its efforts to grow closer to this segment of society. The French depicted Istiqlal as a party solely concerned with the interests of the ‘affluent bourgeoisie’ – an image that was, by and large, quite true – and sought to convince the emerging Moroccan working class to keep its distance from the newly established nationalist party. Despite French efforts, Istiqlal continued its efforts to reach out to workers, and endorsed the idea of organizing trade unions. Obtaining permission to establish trade unions was at the top of the workers’ agenda during this period.32 Throughout 1945, no exceptional political events were recorded in Morocco. Despite this perceived tranquillity, however, observers noted an ‘undercurrent of disquiet’ percolating behind the scenes. Many Moroccans continued to confront increasing economic hardship, exacerbated by a severe drought that affected the country and severely damaged agricultural output. Large quantities of imported wheat averted the danger of famine, but most of the Moroccan public found it difficult to adjust to a harsh economic reality, and to purchase even basic food items. Against this deteriorating economic backdrop, anti-French propaganda intensified and increased the anticolonial political ferment across Morocco. This ferment caused many Moroccans to become better acquainted with Istiqlal’s nationalist ideology. Many embraced its ideals, and joined its ranks. They found that the party could serve as an effective medium for expressing their political views and addressing some of 107

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their personal grievances. They did not, however, entertain the idea of resorting to violence against the French at this stage. Most Moroccans considered this to be counterproductive, and lacked the energy to engage in such activities. Moreover, France had increased its military presence in Morocco after the 1944 riots, and Moroccan Muslims were well aware of this. It could hardly be expected that the Moroccan public would turn to violence under such circumstances. Though Istiqlal embarked on new initiatives and expanded the scope of its activities, foreign observers believed that the local political culture still appeared unready to assume any form of selfrule.33 Segments of the Moroccan public also had reservations about the party’s unequivocal demand for independence. Though they conceivably supported the ideal, they were nevertheless unsure about the party’s ability to carry it out. They felt that independence could only be obtained with the help and assistance of France, and not by confronting it. The more moderate approach also contended that Morocco would have to maintain its economic and cultural ties with France after obtaining independence. This position was later accepted by Istiqlal leaders, including Allal el-Fassi, who emphasized that his party sought to redefine Morocco’s relations with France, and not to turn its back on them.34 Other commentators argued that, despite the party’s growth and expansion, Istiqlal still lacked political maturity. They noted the lack of internal cohesion within party ranks, not to mention its diffusive leadership. The party’s ability to succeed depended, according to them, on the existence of a coordinated organization that would maintain internal discipline among party members. These observers saw the prospect of securing such an organization in Morocco as remote. Although Istiqlal was considered the central nationalist party in Morocco, an American representative who had met its leaders felt that the party had become ineffective. In the late 1940s many party leaders expressed their disappointment over their inability to present political achievements to the public. They were also frustrated that there was no sign of change in the residency’s policies towards Morocco, or in its attitude towards Moroccan nationalist aspirations.35 Nevertheless, by the late 1940s it was hard not to be impressed with Istiqlal’s progress both as a political party and a social movement. Its diverse activities reflected its expanding membership. Non-Istiqlal sources claimed that the number of active party members was 108

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approaching 100,000 in August 1950. Notwithstanding these impressive figures, Istiqlal still suffered from internal weaknesses that affected its broader social position. Foreign observers claimed that in the early 1950s there were no more than a few hundred party members and fans. Much of Istiqlal’s concern during this period focused on recruiting new members, for party leaders were aware that their opposition to France and demand for independence was weak. Only the sultan was able – at least up to a point – to oppose the protectorate’s rule; even so, widespread public opposition to French rule would have forced the French to re-examine their rule in Morocco. Istiqlal, however, focused on strengthening its internal cohesion and was not viewed as a serious threat to French policies in Morocco. Although Istiqlal’s party leaders recognized the party’s weakness vis-à-vis the colonial administration, they did not probe the party’s internal state of affairs. They were encouraged by Istiqlal’s development and by the fact that it had become a well-established reality in Morocco’s political system. They did not appear to grasp its weak points, which were already becoming evident. Party leaders were impressed with the public recognition they had received (which was an achievement from their perspective), but they did not devote attention to the situation lurking in the background, despite their ostensible popularity and acceptance. Istiqlal’s numerical strength and organizational unity, impressive as they were, were still questionable at the end of the decade. Allal elFassi was proud that his party represented close to two million supporters, although the party’s true strength had not yet been tested. Its leadership still comprised only a small group of intellectuals, who lacked practical governmental and administrative experience. While the number of party members had increased, most of Morocco’s population was still described as ‘politically ignorant’.36 Another issue that preoccupied Istiqlal’s leaders in the early 1950s was the difficulty in controlling their supporters. They faced growing discontent among younger party members, who opposed the leadership’s ‘moderate’ policies towards the French residency. They demanded a more aggressive approach in driving the French out of Morocco. Their demands rippled through the party, and were especially noticeable in the light of Istiqlal’s lack of success in realizing its political goals. The growth of the party’s strength in the Moroccan political 109

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system boosted the leaders’ confidence in confronting the protectorate. The party fought against increasingly negative articles published in local French language newspapers. Serving the French settler community, these publications had always depicted Istiqlal as a marginal group, connected to criminal elements, and inspired by European fascist political parties. In their reports, Istiqlal’s very existence was presented as a negative phenomenon within Morocco’s political landscape. In the early 1950s, as the party gained political strength, the attacks and criticism from French circles in Morocco intensified. Istiqlal did not remain silent and responded in kind. After publication of a report that accused the party of undermining Islamic principles of unity by accepting only ‘devout believers’ as members, Istiqlal officials filed a libel suit against the French newspapers that carried this report.37 Istiqlal’s growth in popularity among the Moroccan public did not reflect a complete embrace of nationalist ideology. One commentator, discussing the importance of nationalist ideology, argued that most Moroccans saw nationalism as a symptom rather than the essence of the social and economic problems that underpinned the lives of most Moroccans. They did not understand nationalism as it was understood in European countries, so nationalism had to be viewed as a different phenomenon in Morocco. According to this argument, Moroccan nationalism was a mechanism through which Moroccans hoped to secure their basic economic and social needs. The need to confront a modern world appeared to clash with Islamic principles. As such, nationalism expressed Islam’s struggle for survival and its attempt to fashion the social and spiritual philosophy of every Muslim and adapt it to the dynamics of the Western world. Accordingly, many Moroccans considered Istiqlal’s statements and goals unrealistic. Meanwhile, Istiqlal faced the rising authority of the Moroccan sultan and his impact on Moroccan society. The sultan, Sidi Mohammed, emerged as a political leader who embodied nationalist sentiments. In the late 1940s, he championed a number of measures that attracted the attention of the French residency and the Moroccan public. His public stature increased during this period, affecting Istiqlal’s growth.

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s the anti-colonial struggle intensified, French suspicions of the sultan’s stance on the protectorate and Istiqlal’s demands for independence increased. Even before the establishment of Istiqlal, residency officials closely monitored the sultan’s political moves and his contacts with nationalist activists. French officials reported these meetings with dismay and consternation, compounding French concerns about the sultan’s influence as a popular leader closely involved in national politics. Senior residency officials increasingly depicted the sultan as an ungrateful leader, who undermined France’s position in Morocco and manipulated France’s goodwill towards the Moroccan monarchy. Residency officials were uncertain about the sultan’s positions on a number of questions on Morocco’s political agenda, in particular with regard to Istiqlal’s demand for national independence. They were determined to learn the monarch’s views on the protectorate’s future, and to distance him from the nationalist movement. After its establishment, the Istiqlal party sought to strengthen its ties with the monarchy. These relations were an important component in the party’s efforts to secure its position within the political system. The public’s esteem of the monarchy during the colonial era, and the general feeling that the sultan’s support would help the party increase its political power were the backdrop to these efforts. At this early stage, Istiqlal was less concerned about its position with regard to the sultan’s role as a political leader, or the monarchy’s place within the political system. The question of the monarch’s political position would eventually become part of an important debate concerning Morocco’s political profile in the post-independence 111

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period, but remained latent at this stage. The developing relations between the party and the sultan were part of the sultan’s emergence as a political leader and a national symbol. They added new dimensions to the sultan’s status as Morocco’s sovereign and spiritual leader. This chapter surveys the developing relations between the sultan and Istiqlal, the increasing tension between the sultan and the residency, and its impact on the development of the party.

The Sultan’s Relations with the French Residency In retrospect, the changes in the sultan’s position during the relatively short period of French rule constituted a significant development in twentieth-century Moroccan history. Generally speaking, his position became stronger after the establishment of the protectorate, contrary to his stature at the outset of colonial rule. Throughout the precolonial era, the Moroccan public widely perceived the sultan as a religious figure and associated his name with religious sermons and prayers, rather than with political life. Traditionally, the sultan’s authority was limited to the religious and spiritual spheres. Rural tribes more easily recognized that type of authority; in fact they often refused to accept the sultan’s political authority and rebelled against it.1 Generally speaking, the sultan’s political rule was less widely accepted, and frequently triggered challenges to his political authority.2 Under French rule, both colonial officials and local leaders engaged in Moroccan politics. The residency’s dominant position, which was established in Morocco’s urban and rural areas, provided France with an efficient governing mechanism. It was an authoritarian political system that relied on relations of patronage between tribes and clans, and on the repression of its rivals. Istiqlal viewed this traditional government structure as anachronistic and inadequate, and sought to modify certain aspects of Morocco’s political movement. Party leaders viewed the centrality of the monarchy as the key element of the political system they envisioned. The monarchy’s legitimacy was to be based on strong popular consensus. The party sought to establish an active partyparliamentary system, within the framework of a constitutional monarchy. This vision of an independent Moroccan political life gained traction as the nationalist movement developed, and as it became clear that the struggle against the French protectorate would 112

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be a protracted one. The sultan’s growing interest in the nationalist movement also contributed to this approach. The first step in realizing this vision involved nurturing the monarchy as a national symbol. Morocco’s nationalist leaders recognized how the monarchy could serve as a focus of identity for many Moroccans. Considering the divisions and contrasts between different segments of the Moroccan population – urban versus rural, tribal versus religious – any structure that could strengthen Morocco’s national identity was warmly embraced by the nationalists. The effort to crystallize a cohesive national identity, which would tower over other foci of identity led the nationalist movement to review the monarchy’s essence and position, and adopt a policy that placed the monarchy at the focus of political life in Morocco.3 The changes the monarchy underwent upon the establishment of the protectorate led the French to ‘reinvent’ the Moroccan monarchy, approaching it from a different perspective. Under Sultan Moulay Youssef, who acceded to the throne after the French takeover and with their endorsement, the monarchy was far more exposed to the public than in the past, when distance and mystery shrouded its conduct. Inspired by the residency, public processions, ceremonies and official events in which the sultan participated were held regularly. By the time of Moulay Youssef’s death in 1927, the monarchy had regained some of the honour that was lost in the period preceding the protectorate. The monarchy now exuded a more active, involved image, which would later serve the sultan’s interests. Moulay Youssef’s successor was his third son, Sidi Mohammed, who was 17 years old when he acceded to the throne. His coronation surprised many Moroccans. At the time, one could hardly envisage that this little known young monarch would play such a central role in twentieth-century Moroccan politics. His accession to the throne was marred by tension and friction between him and his brother Moulay Idriss, who also aspired to the throne. Historically, such power struggles were common during transitional periods in Morocco. Morocco lacked established criteria and mechanisms for securing smooth transitions between monarchs, and heirs to the throne had not been designated in advance. Succession struggles were traditionally settled only when one of the potential heirs succeeded in securing the support of important power bases, particularly that of the 113

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religious establishment, which would pledge its allegiance to him. For senior makhzen personnel, young Sidi Mohammed, who had been raised in relative isolation from political life, seemed the more suitable candidate, mainly because he was under their influence. The French, careful not to intervene openly in the succession procedure, indirectly supported him as well. Sidi Mohammed received the ʿulama’s endorsement and was crowned as Morocco’s new monarch in Fez on 18 November 1927.4 Sidi Mohammed had received a traditional education, which focused on Arabic and Islam. He did not receive any form of training or preparation that would help him confront serious political questions, or deal with foreign representatives. For the most part, Sidi Mohammed avoided becoming involved in politics in the early years of his rule, and devoted much of his time getting acquainted with issues that were on the Moroccan agenda. He quickly realized that although he was Morocco’s sovereign, true political power was in the hands of the French. He had no real way of displaying his sovereignty, or of promoting his own policies. Even a simple matter such as travelling abroad required French permission. The events surrounding the famous Berber decree of 1930 reportedly shocked the sultan. Although he had until then assumed that the French were progressive and enlightened in their policies towards Morocco, he henceforth began to take a greater interest in politics. Another change in relations between Sidi Mohammed and the French occurred in 1937 with the appointment of General Noguès as the French resident-general. Unlike his immediate predecessors, Noguès attached greater importance to the monarchy. He became friendly with the sultan and encouraged him to become more active in public life. The sultan’s initiatives in the 1930s and 1940s went beyond the boundaries set by the French, and angered many residency officials. They were uncertain how to curb his growing influence and tried to convince themselves – not always very successfully – that the sultan’s reassuring statements to the residentgeneral about his and Morocco’s loyalty to France would guarantee the palace’s support for continued French rule in Morocco. The sultan’s position in the protectorate was one of dependency on the French resident-general. The protectorate treaty stipulated that the resident-general was expected to protect the sultan. But the 114

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protectorate system created a confusing reality in which France, as a European superpower, expressed its recognition and support of Morocco’s sovereignty by strengthening its traditional, and often archaic, political structures. Relations between the sultan and the French administration were extremely complex, and were influenced by the rapport that existed between the sultan and the French resident-general, and by the general political atmosphere in Morocco.5 French policy in Morocco made it difficult to establish a well-defined relationship between the monarchy and the residency. France’s policies were not based on an ongoing dialogue with local political forces, and were not long-term in their approach. The lack of such a policy forced France, and hence the sultan, to confront a host of problems that arose along the way.6 French officials closely monitored the sultan’s growing relations with nationalist circles. Throughout the 1940s they became more and more aware of a new shade of Moroccan nationalism, which they viewed as ‘sultanian nationalism’, and which sanctified the monarchy and Sidi Mohammed’s persona. The sultan was now not only Morocco’s spiritual leader, but also a political figure and a national icon, widely recognized as the unifying force that embodied the national aspirations of many Moroccans.7 Sidi Mohammed was not indifferent to his national image, which also helped him strengthen his political position. According to the French, his support of nationalism was an outcome of the ‘personal politics’ the sultan had increasingly adopted after his accession to the throne. A special paper, compiled by the residency in Rabat and dispatched to Paris in the spring of 1945, analysed this development and reflected the residency’s stance towards the sultan. The document analysed Sidi Mohammed’s general approach to the French residency, surveyed his positions with regard to Moroccan nationalism, and outlined the methods he employed to realize his ambitions. The report underlined the residency’s ambivalent approach to the monarchy, and reflected the growing French recognition that Sidi Mohammed remained reserved towards French rule, despite French efforts to engage the sultan and strengthen ties with him. Residency officials noted that, in hindsight, signs of rivalry and tension with the sultan were evident almost from the outset of Sidi Mohammed’s reign. Even as early as 1927, some French officials voiced their disapproval of him. One French adviser warned that the 115

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young monarch would yet ‘greatly embarrass us’. It is unclear what prompted this warning, since the new monarch was still unknown to the French and lacked political experience. This comment was apparently based on the assumption that the new monarch was younger than his predecessor, and might hence be more aggressive towards the residency, even if he had previously been kept at a distance from politics. The residency nevertheless tried to view the new sultan’s personality in a positive light. Sidi Mohammed was portrayed as ‘obedient’, and described simultaneously as ‘young, enthusiastic and clever’, and as ‘arrogant’ and ‘stubborn’. This duality reflected France’s ambivalence towards him. Later on, French officials would find it difficult to distinguish between the sultan’s actions as Morocco’s sovereign, and his ‘personal, ambitious’ goals.8 Throughout the first decade of his reign, relations between the sultan and the French remained remote and cool, and residency officials were concerned over the estrangement between the royal palace and the residency. They noted that there were no French officials among the small group of advisers that was in daily contact with the sultan. Such contacts, they argued, could have ‘balanced’ the influence of Moroccan advisers who promoted ‘nationalist sentiments’. In their assessment, the sultan was rather alienated from nationalist ideas in the early years of his reign. According to them, this resulted from the fact that the nationalist movement was young and small, with an undefined ideology that could not attract widespread support, which would benefit the sultan politically. Personal advantages, they argued, were the main motive behind the monarch’s engagement with the nationalist movement. These comments reflected the increasingly negative approach of the residency officials towards the sultan, and the feeling that he was a narrow-minded, selfish figure, who lacked political vision and was merely seeking to improve his own standing. French officials had no doubt that the sultan would play a role in nationalist politics, based on his desire to aggrandize his public image and overshadow any alternative political organization in Morocco. In 1944, after the establishment of Istiqlal, the French resident-general Puaux estimated that the sultan would play a ‘quiet’ role within the new party, as part of an effort to strengthen his position as a national leader.9 He did not expect the sultan to lead the new party, but saw him as a symbolic figure that could unite the Moroccan public behind the banner of independence. 116

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The impact of the Second World War, and of the French defeat, also affected the sultan’s political position and his relationship with France. Although the sultan remained committed to France during the war, he was clearly aware of the rising prominence of other powers, particularly the USA. After the war, as the nationalist struggle intensified, French officials accused the sultan of taking advantage of these events to advance his own position and become a dominant force within Morocco’s political system. These accusations ignored the fact that it was the French residency itself that had initiated many of the public wartime events in which the sultan had participated. These public events were intended to emphasize Morocco’s commitment to the French protectorate, regardless of the war. At the end of the war, the residency became increasingly angry over the sultan’s wartime conduct, which was seen as an effort to break away from a longstanding French sponsorship of his affairs. Like other developments in Morocco, the war accelerated political changes and promoted the sultan as a national leader. A French intelligence memorandum noted that overall, the sultan benefited from the wartime situation. The sultan asserted, at least according to this report, his own political rights, and became a ‘true sovereign, a real ruler over the kingdom, who was increasingly resentful’ of France’s role in Morocco.10 France’s dismay intensified when officials learned that the sultan had, unbeknown to French officials, engaged in contacts with foreign leaders and diplomatic representatives during the war. Under the protectorate’s stipulations, the responsibility for Morocco’s foreign affairs had previously been transferred to France, which sharply limited the sultan’s contacts with foreign representatives. Nevertheless, the presence of foreign leaders in wartime Morocco provided an opportunity for the sultan to bolster his international relations. He met foreign leaders on several occasions, but refrained from involving the residency in these encounters. Both the French residency and de Gaulle’s headquarters, were extremely suspicious of these contacts, and concerned that they might endanger France’s hold over Morocco. The most important development in this context was the sultan’s meeting with US president Roosevelt near Casablanca in January 1943. It was the sultan’s first independent diplomatic encounter with a foreign leader, and was later described as an important source of inspiration for the monarch’s diplomatic activities.11 Roosevelt arrived 117

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in Morocco to participate, along with other Allied leaders, in a summit in Casablanca. As part of his interest in Moroccan affairs, Roosevelt sought a meeting with the sultan. Throughout the war, Sidi Mohammed had reportedly attempted to draw closer to the United States and increase America’s involvement in the protectorate after the war. He therefore seized the opportunity to meet Roosevelt in person.12 No minutes were taken during the meeting of the two leaders, leaving numerous unanswered questions about what was discussed. French officials viewed it as the starting point that would later lead to the sultan’s endorsement of the nationalist cause. The main dispute over the meeting’s impact surrounded putative promises of the American president to the Moroccan monarch, specifically concerning the question of independence. One account of the meeting noted that the two leaders had met alone, without the French resident-general’s participation. Roosevelt, according to this source, was interested in learning about the living conditions of Morocco’s residents. During the conversation the American president repeatedly stressed that Morocco’s independence was a matter ‘close to his heart’ and that, after the war, he would make every effort to realize that goal. Another account of the meeting also reported that the sultan reiterated that it was Morocco’s goal to achieve complete independence within a period of thirty to forty years.13 The 14-year-old Moroccan crown prince, Hassan, who attended the meeting and provided a public account of it, recalled years later as king that Roosevelt spoke against the colonial system and that he hoped that, after the war, Morocco would regain its independence according to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Hassan noted that Roosevelt promised that the United States would not put any obstacle in the way of Moroccan independence, and would help Morocco with economic aid. Regardless of the controversy over what exactly transpired at the meeting, the important point is what many Moroccans – and particularly the king himself – said happened at the meeting, and particularly their impression that the USA would back their demand for independence. The sultan was clearly impressed by Roosevelt and, in the months that followed, appeared increasingly reserved towards the French. The meeting raised the ire of the residency, since it seemed to reflect the sultan’s efforts to unite the Moroccan public behind him, at the expense of the residency. Residency officials also argued that throughout the war the sultan 118

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had appointed some of his close associates to key positions, as part of a systematic effort to assert his authority as a ruler. In hindsight, the sultan did seem to try and strengthen his position, while remaining careful not to challenge France openly. Ironically, the support France gave the Moroccan monarch during the war proved to have borne fruit. By the end of the war, the sultan had become a political public figure, widely supported by the Moroccan populace. French officials began to regret their policy, which had bolstered the sultan’s position far more than anticipated, allowing the Moroccan monarch to take control of various domestic initiatives.14 Local developments in French politics, and the difficulties the fourth republic faced, also influenced France’s growing discomfort with the sultan. France was in the midst of a complex postwar rehabilitation process, unwilling to abandon any of its foreign territories, which were seen as an embodiment of French grandeur, and an important key to postwar national revival. This sentiment was very much illusory. Most of the territories under French control (including Morocco) could no longer sustain the political illusion of a country maintaining its colonial holdings. A discernable rise in local patriotism was recorded in French controlled territories during the war. This was explained as an outcome of the blow to French prestige during the war; it was also affected by a heightened American interest in local nationalist movements, and by the indirect encouragement they received from the presence of foreign Allied military forces in their midst. At this stage, France was unwilling to accept the new reality and recognize the changes that had occurred within the territories under its control; it was also unwilling to adapt to a new postwar order in which the USA emerged as the major Western superpower. This unwillingness led to many missed opportunities in French-controlled territories, and had tragic consequences for France’s colonial aspirations. Still caught up in many of the myths that sustained their colonial rule, French leaders found it difficult to assess the dimensions of the nationalist movement in Morocco and other countries realistically.15 Their encounter with nationalist demands often yielded a confused, contradictory approach towards nationalist movements.16 It is difficult to understand the resentment many French officials felt towards the sultan, considering their efforts to strengthen the Moroccan monarchy over the years, or their reliance on the 119

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monarchy for mobilizing public support. The residency found it difficult to comprehend the sultan’s political ambitions and apparently assumed that it would be able to change the sultan’s actions once the war ended. Not only the sultan’s status had changed during the war, however. The future of French rule had become uncertain, and while there was no immediate threat to the residency’s existence, French officials realized that the protectorate’s future would be high on the postwar international agenda. The changes in wartime Morocco were not limited to the royal palace. Moroccan society, too, was transformed. It experienced growing urbanization, and was less attached to the political and social frameworks that had underpinned public life in the past. Various components of Moroccan society were at the inception of a national identity-building process. This process raised the need for national leaders, which increased Sidi Mohammed’s efforts to bolster his position as a national figure. The sultan now tried to demonstrate publicly (as he told the French after the 1944 riots) that he was neither a minion of France, nor a nominal figurehead in Morocco. He considered himself to be a sovereign leader in search of ‘complete internal autonomy’ in Morocco, without elaborating on the meaning of the term. Even if this idea did not directly undermine French rule in Morocco, it angered the French since it was another expression of the sultan’s stand. The 1944 riots added to the French awareness of the need to isolate the sultan from any contact with foreign representatives – Americans in particular – and hamper his efforts to strengthen his position as a Moroccan national leader. Over the coming years, the residency increasingly resented the sultan’s growing assertiveness. The residency viewed the monarch and his close advisers as a greedy set, which placed its own goals above all else. French officials doubted their integrity and credibility, and found it hard to believe the sultan’s commitment to France and the protectorate. The French complaints and allegations reflected the change in the residency’s stance towards the sultan. The Moroccan sultan was no longer seen as a viable partner and integral component of French rule, but as a hostile figure who threatened France’s position in Morocco. Residency officials had no doubt that the sultan’s main goal was to strengthen his domestic support. They based this assumption on the sultan’s nationalist-oriented activities, and were concerned about the 120

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sultan’s ability to capitalize on his spiritual qualities among the Moroccan population. They assessed that it would be difficult for them to confront this kind of religious-based power in the event of a direct confrontation with the Moroccan public, and were pessimistic about their future relations with the sultan. Their concerns increased as Istiqlal emerged as a nationalist party.

Relations between Sidi Mohammed and his Subjects The nature of the relations between the sultan and his subjects was totally unfamiliar to the French. The ties were based on both religious and spiritual foundations, and on political patterns that were beyond France’s control and comprehension. They intensified during Sidi Mohammed’s reign, as the sultan emerged as a national figure and a leader who embodied the national, political and religious aspirations of Moroccan Muslims. Following a long-standing Moroccan tradition, the sultan was a holy figure. Traditionally, the monarch’s limited contact with his subjects granted him an aura of mystery. As a descendant of the Prophet, he was endowed with religious charisma (baraka). As already noted, the protectorate’s changing political and social circumstances had altered the nature of the monarchy. Due to his position as sultan, Sidi Mohammed was able to strengthen his relations with the Moroccan public, and inject new qualities into the institution of the monarchy. Increasingly, he tended publicly to emphasize his role as Morocco’s religious leader and his power as the country’s ‘commander of the faithful’. This power, according to the French, was far more dangerous than the sultan’s political authority. The French resented the fact that any ceremony, religious holiday, or travel around the country (often initiated by them) presented an opportunity for the sultan to garner public manifestations of support. The French claimed that the sultan did not conceal the enjoyment he derived from these displays of support. Sidi Mohammed was well aware of the impact of his personality and stature on the residents, and skilfully used it. Throughout the protectorate period, the sultan became a recognized figure with whom many Moroccans could identify. The emergence of the sultan as a national symbol was, however, a gradual development. Only in the late 1940s did the sultan obtain recognition as a national political personality. 121

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According to one description of a visit the sultan paid to a Muslim school in Fez in May 1932, the new relationship that developed between the sultan and his subjects was already evident, and catapulted him to the status of national political leader. A number of statements by local personalities indicated that at an early stage – five years after his accession to the throne and less than two years after the events that followed the issuing of the Berber decree – the sultan was viewed as the embodiment of Moroccan national and political aspirations. The excitement surrounding Sidi Mohammed’s visit, his direct interaction with students and teachers, the high level of respect he commanded, and the national ambience that underpinned the visit would later be viewed as clear expressions of support for the sultan and as part of what the French later coined ‘sultanian nationalism’. The above description of the sultan’s visit to Fez indicates that the monarch’s standing was evident long before the French recognized it as such. It is also clear that many Moroccans appreciated the sultan as a national political leader, at the same time realizing that the French authorities would not be pleased with excessive public admiration towards the monarch at such an early stage in the nationalist struggle. The rise in the sultan’s stature was evident not only in his public appearances or official visits, but also in his contacts with Morocco’s social and political elites. His unique spiritual qualities helped him gain the trust and support of public figures and local leaders, who wielded their own independent political power. Although French officials claimed that these leaders secretly opposed the sultan’s growing political stature, they could not remain indifferent to the religious halo that surrounded the monarch. This was a new development for the residency, which could no longer rely on tribal and local leaders’ reluctance to endorse the sultan’s politics, and could hence not counterbalance Morocco’s established political leadership.17 The French felt that the political system they had carefully constructed throughout their first decades in Morocco was on the verge of collapse. Unlike previous Moroccan clashes with French authorities, the 1944 riots reinforced French fears that the sultan and the political establishment would not oppose the rising anti-French sentiments, which added to their concern about the future role of France in Morocco. While the sultan continued to strengthen his status with the 122

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general public, his political standing with local rural leaders was still a matter of debate. Among them were leaders who remained hesitant about endorsing the monarch’s political aspirations and were concerned that such an endorsement would undermine their own political fortunes. French sources argued that the sultan, aware of French indecisiveness, sought to improve his standing among these leaders.18 He took advantage of events such as the Prophet’s birthday celebrations to meet tribal leaders and garner their support. At such meetings, the sultan made a point of greeting each leader personally, pointing out that better days were on the horizon as the Second World War was coming to an end. He linked these prospects with his own leadership, adding that after the war the Moroccan people would gain strength and ‘remain united’ behind their sovereign. The ties between the sultan and his subjects, and the growing dependency of many Moroccan officials on the sultan, signified a profound change in the monarch’s stature in the late 1940s. These ties, which greatly concerned residency officials, were all part of what the residency deemed ‘sultanian nationalism’. ‘Come what may’, they wrote, ‘the sultan’s activities put us in a delicate situation’. French officials, worried that many Moroccans would be dismissive of them in the postwar era, considered the growing contacts between Istiqlal and the sultan to be ‘the most central phenomenon that characterized the development of [Moroccan] nationalism in recent years’. They emphasized that the sultan’s political superiority was far more threatening than the establishment of the new nationalist party. The French were less concerned about Istiqlal’s emergence as an opposition force than about the sultan’s rising political power.19 The special role the sultan would later play in promoting nationalist ideals in Morocco warrants a closer look at his relations with the nationalist movement, and at the practical meaning of what the French coined ‘sultanian nationalism’.

The Sultan’s Relations with the Nationalist Movement and Istiqlal Relations between Moroccan nationalists and the sultan developed gradually, matching the monarch’s rising interest in political affairs. The close associations between the two, already evident in the late 1940s, had not always been taken for granted. In the early 1930s, some nationalists voiced subtle criticism of the monarchy, focusing on the 123

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ties between the sultan and the colonial administration. The sultan’s involvement in issuing the Berber Dahir compounded the difficulties between the two sides, as did the openness some nationalist activists displayed towards republican political ideas opposed to the very existence of the monarchy. In the late 1930s, and more dramatically in the 1940s, a significant change occurred in the nationalist approach to the sultan. The nationalists embraced the monarch and surrounded him with support and admiration, capitalizing on public sentiment towards him. According to the residency, the nationalists had become the sultan’s most ardent supporters. The French explained this development by noting that the nationalists had learnt from experience that they were unlikely to achieve anything with a violent uprising. They now saw him as a person who possessed valuable spiritual power that they could use for their own purposes. They saw him as a national symbol able to attract public support and endow nationalist ideology with a level of prestige they could not command. The sultan was aware of the personal benefit he could derive from his cooperation with the nationalists. He could not ignore their rising social and political power, in particular their ability to command the support of Moroccan youth. Relations between the sultan and the nationalists were initially pursued through intermediaries and various brokers. An area in which the two sides first cooperated was education – one of the nationalist movement’s main concerns. It became, according to the French, a ‘priority subject’ for the sultan. His efforts in this field included the establishment of ‘free’ schools, in which the teachers were Moroccan, the language of instruction Arabic and studies not subjected to any form of French supervision. These schools were intended to replace an educational system supervised by the residency, extremely restricted and disappointing to many Moroccans, due to the limited educational opportunities it offered. Even before the onset of the 1940s, nationalist activists had begun to endorse the sultan as a symbol of Morocco’s nationalist aspirations. The nationalists’ stated objective was to ‘defend the sultan’s sovereignty’ throughout Morocco. This made it easier for the movement to assert its presence in the Moroccan political arena and promote a cause that was compatible with the residency’s policies of promoting the sultan. Nationalist activists bolstered popular support for the 124

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monarchy by organizing mass events such as the celebration of Throne Day – an annual occurrence marking the sultan’s coronation. The first ceremony commemorating the event took place in Fez on 18 November 1933. Although Moroccan activists launched the ceremony, it had the residency’s support. The celebrations were modest, but attracted much public interest. In view of the public’s growing enthusiasm, the residency began to sponsor the celebrations, seeking to supervise their content. An official decree, issued by the residency in October 1934, designated 18 November as an official holiday, which would include popular musical events and celebrations. To avert any potential political protests that might disrupt the events, the colonial administration refused to authorize processions or rallies.20 Nevertheless, the celebrations did become a national event and helped increase the monarchy’s popularity among the general public. As the nationalist struggle intensified, however, the population’s disappointment with colonial rule and dashed hopes for a better future marred the celebrations. In 1948, the newspaper al-ʿAlam defined the holiday as a ‘holiday of hope’.21 Other public displays of nationalist support for the monarchy included references to Sidi Mohammed as ‘king’ (rather than ‘sultan’), a more modern appellation that was now deemed more appropriate. The title ‘king’ implied that Sidi Mohammed was not a weak, oriental ruler, but rather a modern leader who combined spiritual qualities with political and national leadership. Despite the nationalists’ growing support of the monarchy in the 1930s, there was minimal contact between them and the royal palace during this period. The sultan pursued his own political course, and did not publicly address the nationalist movement or its demands. Even so, by the end of the decade several nationalist leaders began to meet privately with the sultan to exchange ideas and seek his advice on various matters. The two sides became closer throughout the 1940s.22 Nationalist activities, however, remained independent, and were not dictated by the sultan. The establishment of the Istiqlal party had been an outcome of internal dynamics of the nationalist movement towards the end of the war, detached from the monarchy. It was nevertheless clear that the sultan was becoming more interested in nationalist politics, and more aware of developments within the movement. Later publications by nationalist veterans discussed the developing 125

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relations between the two sides during this period. The turning point dated back to the year 1942, when nationalist activists increased their meetings with the monarch. The frequent discussions between them were the outcome of intermediary efforts of several former ministers of the sultan’s. Recognizing the sultan’s interest in education, the nationalists were particularly impressed by his intent to expand educational opportunities for women, which was a matter many of them sought to promote. This question had previously thwarted nationalist cooperation with the sultan and the makhzen, whose conservative leadership opposed any changes that might affect gender relations in Moroccan society. One chronicle of the nationalist movement’s history documents a secret nocturnal meeting in May 1943 between five nationalist leaders and the sultan, at which a binding alliance between the two sides was concluded. According to this account, the nationalist activists were sworn to secrecy on the Qur’ān; they also pledged not to engage in any political activity without prior consultation with the sultan, while the monarch noted that he would consult them about any future policies he intended to pursue.23 Other sources did not report this meeting, which raised doubts about its accuracy. Notwithstanding the account’s questionable veracity, its importance lies in its representation of the ideal relationship the nationalists sought with the sultan. They agreed to subordinate themselves to the sultan and follow his instructions, while Sidi Mohammed expressed his willingness to consult them, despite his unquestionable seniority. The nationalists did not question the sultan’s ascendancy, but as in other cases, it remained unclear to what extent they considered the long-term implications of a situation in which the sultan presided over political life and overshadowed all political parties. They may conceivably have assumed that they would be able to voice their opinion and influence policymaking. However, the unfolding nationalist struggle, led by the sultan, largely discredited such a possibility. As the sultan’s political activities intensified, it became evident that he was pursuing an independent policy, which largely conformed to Istiqlal’s nationalist ideology, but nevertheless served the monarchy’s, not Istiqlal’s, interests. Ultimately, contact between the nationalists and the sultan remained fluid and open to change. After Istiqlal’s establishment, the earlier reservations of some nationalists about the monarchy and the makhzen gave way to a 126

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systematic effort to solidify relations with the sultan. This effort is reflected in the pages of the nationalist al-ʿAlam newspaper. The paper provided daily coverage of events and ceremonies in the royal palace, and reported the activities of royal family members.24 The sultan’s visits to Moroccan cities were also widely covered, along with reports about the enthusiastic welcome he received in these cities.25 But, despite these developments, relations between the two sides were still not formalized in the mid-1940s, and their mutual contacts remained circumspect. This was partly because Istiqlal was officially an illegal organization, which made the sultan’s contacts with it problematic. For Istiqlal, however, the ties with the monarchy carried a more utilitarian purpose. The party expected its contacts with the sultan to increase public support for it and its ideas, and sought closer cooperation with the monarchy. For nationalist activists, the sultan’s name was quite useful.26 The sultan, for his part, did not seem to object to their use of his name and status. For all its ambitions and public support, Istiqlal was in no position to achieve the type of power the sultan enjoyed, so it ultimately remained a secondary political force. This was not, however, how nationalist activists considered things at the time. Istiqlal activists saw the monarchy as vulnerable, weak and in dire need of public support, and demanded the residency strengthen the sultan’s powers. The request appeared in a memorandum presented to the newly appointed resident-general, Eirik Labonne, prior to his arrival in Morocco in March 1946.27 In stark contrast to the nationalists’ perception of a weak monarch, the residency increasingly viewed the sultan as a serious threat to its rule. French officials were in no doubt that the sultan supported the nationalist ideology. They were far more concerned about the sultan’s positions and policies than about the impact of the new nationalist party. The French saw Sidi Mohammed’s direct involvement in nationalist politics as the more significant development in Moroccan public life, and not the establishment of Istiqlal. The residency, according to various French sources, did not view the party as a serious threat, and although they did not hesitate to repress its activities, they were confident that they would be able to withstand the new nationalist party’s appeal. French sources did not threaten the new nationalist party to the same extent as they threatened the sultan. Accordingly, they were determined to reduce his political 127

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powers, particularly in rural parts of Morocco, where tribal leaders often had greater influence over the public. The sultan himself remained extremely cautious about his contacts with the nationalists. Whenever admonished by French officials about his alleged contacts with nationalist figures, he argued that he was keeping in constant close touch with his subjects, but not with any particular political organization. He refrained from engaging in direct, open discussions with Istiqlal, and pursued his own independent policies. In his messages to the party, the sultan urged caution and patience and advised them to avoid any activity that would raise France’s ire. The sultan’s associates repeatedly emphasized that, despite misleading impressions, the sultan was not Istiqlal’s president or chairman. In fact, they added, while he later supported the party’s demand for independence, he actually kept his distance from party politics. But, despite these remarks the residency had no illusions about Sidi Mohammed: ‘The sultan … emerged as the number one nationalist … and the [nationalist] movement’s true leader’, was the conclusion of a special report on the subject. The French thought there was little prospect of changing the sultan’s positions in the near future, and braced themselves for new developments. Istiqlal continued to emphasize the goal of independence as its top first priority. A new stage in the struggle for Moroccan independence was recorded with the appointment of Eirik Labonne as the French resident-general, an appointment that was to have a profound effect on Istiqlal’s activities.

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6 Labonne’s Reform Policies and their Influence on Istiqlal

T

he repressive measures against Istiqlal after the 1944 riots reflected the approach of the resident-general, Gabriel Puaux, to Moroccan nationalism. Puaux, who was appointed to his post in June 1943, was known as a strong-willed official, who was keen on preserving France’s colonial power, and as an opponent of Moroccan nationalism. He did not conceal his desire to remove nationalist activists from influential positions, and was willing to use force in order to remove any threat to France’s position in Morocco. Puaux’s policies confirmed Istiqlal’s allegations against the protectorate administration. Moroccan pressures eventually led to his removal, and to the appointment of Eirik Labonne in his stead. The Moroccan sultan also had reservations about Puaux, who had exerted pressure on and even threatened him after the establishment of Istiqlal. So long as Puaux maintained his position, there was little possibility that there would be a change in French policy in Morocco. Puaux’s removal from office in 1946 raised hopes in Morocco for a shift in French positions towards Moroccan nationalism, and for a more forthcoming approach to Istiqlal.

Background and Reactions to Labonne’s Appointment Labonne’s short term as France’s resident-general in Morocco (March 1946 to May 1947) was an interim period in Morocco’s nationalist struggle. During this period, France made its most serious effort ever to institute reforms in its policy in Morocco. Personally, Labonne had a more moderate approach to the Moroccan public than his predecessor, and sought to ameliorate the lives of ordinary Moroccans. The increasingly peaceful political atmosphere during this period also 129

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contributed to Istiqlal’s growth. The new resident-general put his prestige at risk by initiating political and economic reforms and tying his personal career to their implementation. His inability to institute these changes and the fierce opposition he encountered ended what could have been a reversal in French policy towards Morocco. This chapter highlights Labonne’s reforms and assesses their impact on the Moroccan nationalist struggle. Relations between the sultan and residency continued to deteriorate during Puaux’s tenure as resident-general. The sultan never forgave him for the threatening tone he used during the 1944 riots. After the riots, the sultan reduced his level of cooperation with the resident-general. Under these circumstances, the colonial administration found it difficult to function, so replacing Puaux became a high priority for Sidi Mohammed. The sultan felt that, as a first step in an anticipated shift in French policy towards Morocco, he would have to turn to the French government in Paris at the end of the Second World War and demand Puaux’s replacement. He therefore approached Charles de Gaulle, who served as the prime minister of France’s postwar provisional government at the time. De Gaulle was sympathetic to the sultan’s complaints against Puaux, particularly since he was eager to maintain stability in French-controlled territories, and since the sultan’s proposals were in line with his own approach to these areas.1 The two leaders met during the sultan’s visit to Paris in June 1945, a visit intended to strengthen relations between the sultan and the French government at the end of the Second World War. De Gaulle told the sultan that he understood the sultan’s desire to establish a ‘modern state’ in Morocco, but warned him not to be hasty. At no point did he mention Istiqlal or its demand for independence, so that the entire meeting reflected only the French approach to the sultan. Despite the symbolic importance they attached to his position, the French did not view the sultan as a leader they needed to consult or include in French policy initiatives. One of the sultan’s ministers noted that Sidi Mohammed had accepted the French invitation to visit Paris only after much hesitation, fearing that he would not be taken seriously.2 Although the French did not spare any efforts and showered much honour on him during his visit, the Moroccan leader maintained his reserved approach to French rule in Morocco. During the course of his stay, he refused to issue the customary statement of 130

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support for the protectorate and for France, as the French had asked him to do. The Moroccan minister described the sultan’s relations with France as very delicate. An American diplomat who heard this account concluded that relations between the sultan and de Gaulle were far from ideal.3 Nevertheless, the sultan’s insistence that Puaux be replaced with a more amenable person was not dismissed outright. The sultan managed to convince the French government of the need to reduce tension between the residency and palace by replacing the residentgeneral, even though this was unlikely to entail a shift in French policy in Morocco. The decision ultimately to replace Puaux underlined France’s interest in starting a new period in its relations with Morocco. The French foreign ministry was aware of the poor relations between the sultan and Puaux, and de Gaulle concluded that, under the circumstances, replacing Puaux was vital if France wished to maintain its control over Morocco.4 France’s policy on Morocco varied widely during this period. One approach supported the implementation of a tough line in Morocco, and even argued for the removal of the sultan from his throne, as part of a broad effort against Moroccan nationalism and the sultan’s apparent support of that ideology. Others pressed for a more moderate policy, which would ease the lives of Moroccans. Such an approach would reduce Istiqlal’s appeal and strengthen the Moroccan public’s support for the colonial administration. The French government adopted the latter approach in early 1946 and, with a view to ushering in a period of closer collaboration, was willing to consider replacing its top representative to Morocco. Much of French public opinion at the time was focused on domestic affairs, however, so the Moroccan question was not on the French government’s political agenda. More than anything, the government wished to maintain stability in Morocco and to minimize the impact of an emerging nationalist movement.5 France also sought to maintain good relations with the sultan, which was an important factor in the decision to appoint a new resident-general in Morocco in early 1946. The announcement of Eirik Labonne’s appointment was published in Morocco’s French-language newspapers on 4 March 1946. It was preceded by a wave of rumours about Puaux’s successor. News of Labonne’s appointment was met with surprise in France and Morocco. Although Labonne, a French diplomat, was mentioned as a possible 131

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candidate for the position, he was not considered one of the leading contenders. He differed from other candidates both in his professional background and his personal interests. Most of the other candidates were former military officers who had held such positions before and were considered appropriate choices for this one. The most likely candidate was General Alphonse Juin, who had formerly served in Morocco as a military officer; he had been offered the position before but had turned it down when his request to have the residentgeneral’s authority expanded was rejected. Juin kept his distance from the local Muslim population, while identifying closely with the French settler community. The settlers, for their part, were eager to have someone like him as resident-general. They sought, above all, to repress the Moroccan nationalist movement and blamed Puaux for not being firm enough in his opposition to Istiqlal. Juin, from their perspective, appeared to be the more suitable candidate for the post. Moroccan nationalists were concerned about the prospect of a resident-general known to be hostile to their cause. Lacking any other alternative, they preferred to wait and see how things developed. Left-wing French parties opposed Juin’s candidacy, as they considered him a ‘reactionary’ figure and a poor choice for the post. Their opposition weakened Juin’s chances and shifted attention to Labonne. The decision to appoint Labonne reflected a cautious, hesitant shift in France’s policy in Morocco. Unlike Juin, Labonne was not a product of the French military. He had served in various positions in the French foreign service and had acquired a great deal of diplomatic experience in and familiarity with Morocco, which had been one of his former posts. He also served as France’s resident-general in Tunisia and was well acquainted with the concept of the protectorate. At the time of Labonne’s appointment, French policy in Morocco was fluid and undefined. Many Moroccans expected that at the end of the Second World War France would adopt a more liberal policy towards their country, and many thought Labonne would be able to implement such a policy. He was described as a generous, dynamic person, with scores of innovative ideas about Morocco’s future. Foreign observers were more sceptical about his ability to bring about profound changes, and raised concerns that any such changes would generate anarchy and instability in the country. The main distinction between Labonne and other officials was in Labonne’s approach to French colonialism. He was influenced by de 132

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Gaulle’s wartime ideas concerning French-ruled territories, which spoke of the need to pay greater attention to the local population in each region. De Gaulle’s aides sought to promote political programmes that would improve relations between these populations and France. Their approach was more positive and based on good intentions, but was often adopted too late and was thus a far cry from the more aggressive approach local populations demanded in the postwar era. As we shall see, Labonne’s policies met a similar fate.6 Morocco’s French-language newspapers, which served the settler community, noted Labonne’s past experience in the protectorate administration when they announced his appointment. Most of the settlers were disappointed that Juin, their preferred candidate, had not been appointed to the post. They were unsure how Labonne would act and whether he would adopt a firm policy towards Istiqlal. They opposed liberal initiatives that would have accommodated some of the nationalists’ demands.7 The residency’s reactions to the appointment were also mixed. Some officials voiced scepticism and uncertainty about the new resident-general. Notwithstanding Labonne’s association with liberal policies and leftwing politics, residency figures accused him of being an untalented policy planner. He was also accused of misreading the situation in Morocco and supporting an unrealistic left-leaning ideology. Muslim reactions to the appointment were also mixed. Many makhzen officials expressed their satisfaction with the choice, and saw it as a measure that would strengthen the sultan’s political influence. They regarded Labonne’s appointment as a symbolic victory for the sultan, who had demanded that Puaux be replaced. In their view, the French government’s acceptance of the sultan’s request signified his importance to France. Makhzen circles expected the new residentgeneral to introduce a new approach in French–Moroccan relations, and viewed the sultan as an equal partner in the renewed efforts to promote political and economic changes. Other Muslim groups were more reserved about Labonne. Some were concerned about his putative ties to the French left, which earned him the nickname al-lisari (the leftie). Such ties could potentially help the communists undermine domestic stability. Moroccan nationalist groups were more enthusiastic about the new resident-general. According to Allal el-Fassi, Labonne was known for 133

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his balanced and penetrating judgement and his personal experience in Morocco.8 Nationalist circles in Fez expected Labonne’s appointment to strengthen the sultan, and help bring change to Morocco. Once again, these nationalists did not speak about strengthening their party, but rather emphasized the sultan’s position as a national leader. As in other instances, efforts to bolster the sultan’s position overshadowed the party’s development. A number of nationalist leaders, who had previously known Labonne, expected him to be more amenable and attentive than his predecessors. They expected to benefit from the removal of residency officials who were hostile towards Istiqlal. Many nationalists felt that Labonne’s appointment came at a critical time in French–Moroccan relations. Overall, they expected Labonne to implement a more liberal policy, and alter the nature of Morocco’s colonial administration.9 Under these circumstances, Istiqlal assumed that it would be possible to improve relations with France. They awaited Labonne’s arrival and sent him various messages, in which they conveyed their ideas and ambitions.10 Compared with previous residents-general, Labonne was undoubtedly a different, more colourful figure. The very fact that he had a civilian, rather than a military, background suggested the possibility of change in the colonial administration’s character. A number of Moroccans emphasized Labonne’s civilian background as an indicator of this expected shift. Though they could not assess the wider significance of this measure, it was nevertheless seen as a symbolic gesture of openness. They were also impressed with the new residentgeneral’s interest in economic and commercial issues, unlike his predecessors, who did not devote much attention to these matters. The main questions raised in Moroccan political circles related to the extent to which the new resident-general had a mandate to improve the lives of Moroccans, and to whether he would be able to bring significant change to Morocco. For the French government, Labonne’s main task would be to appease the sultan, improve the general atmosphere in Morocco, and provide an opportunity for true cooperation between France and Morocco, which would ultimately solidify France’s position there.11 In newspaper interviews, granted before his arrival in Morocco, Labonne acknowledged the great sacrifices of the Moroccan public for France’s victory in the Second World War, and the economic 134

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difficulties Morocco was experiencing. The Istiqlal party often raised these two issues and suggested that the new resident-general pay special attention to them. Labonne expressed concern about the particularly low rainfall in Morocco that year, and the ensuing agricultural problems. However, as the American consul in Rabat understood them, his initial statements transmitted a mixture of patronizing statements, along with some naïve assumptions about Morocco, which in turn created an approach based on some degree of compassion towards the Moroccan public. Labonne’s comments to journalists, as the American representative noted, sounded more like those of a religious minister trying to console his congregation facing a calamity than the statements of a new colonial official. The new resident-general had earned a reputation for being impractical.12 On the other hand, Labonne’s acknowledgement of Morocco’s economic difficulties reflected the new resident-general’s empathy towards the Moroccan public. He arrived in Morocco with new ideas for change and reform within the government, and was keen to implement them. He intended to contact nationalist activists and engage in open dialogue with them. Above all, he was interested in improving the living conditions of Moroccan Muslims, developing the country’s resources, and liberalizing the French administration, without fundamentally changing its structure. This, at least, was, according to el-Fassi, what most Moroccans expected after learning about the new resident-general.13 How Labonne would be able to institute such changes remained an open question. Despite the openness he expressed towards Moroccans, Labonne intended neither to abolish the protectorate nor abrogate the protectorate treaty. He merely sought to implement its articles in a more authentic manner, since his predecessors had, in his opinion, deviated from the treaty’s original intentions. Although he recognized Istiqlal’s importance – he held a series of meetings with party leaders after his arrival in Morocco – the new resident-general was careful not to recognize the party or its ambitions officially. Labonne refused to acknowledge any party publications or memorandums, expressing his concern that such an acknowledgement might be viewed as a blow to France’s position in Morocco. He was also careful not to harm the sultan’s position by engaging in intense contacts with Istiqlal.14 135

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Labonne’s Policies: Release of Imprisoned Istiqlal Leaders As he prepared for his post, Labonne sought to change what he saw as the general direction of France’s policies in Morocco. The new resident-general did not publicly disclose his ideas, but several years after leaving his post he outlined his then positions in a conversation with an American diplomat.15 Labonne geared most of his policies to the economy, which he considered to be of particular importance to France. He was less interested in implementing the slight changes in the political system that had been suggested in the past. His main goal was to strengthen ties between the Moroccan public, the residency and French economic enterprises in Morocco, in the hope that this would improve the living conditions of most Moroccans. By involving Moroccans in French business initiatives, Labonne hoped that the Muslim elites, if not the entire public, would channel their energies away from political disputes. He expected Morocco’s political development to be an outcome of his new socioeconomic policies, and was convinced that his idea of prioritizing economic development was the only realistic solution to the nationalist question in Morocco and in other areas of the Maghrib.16 Labonne did not discuss the question of Moroccan nationalism or the possibility of a change in the status of French rule while he served as resident-general. Although he was sympathetic to the Moroccan public, he never intended to recognize the Moroccan demand for independence. Nevertheless, his political and economic plans stirred Morocco’s public opinion and jolted its political system. The short interim period between the announcement of Labonne’s appointment and his arrival in Morocco was a period of disquiet and internal ferment for Moroccan Muslims. This unrest emphasized the expectations and hopes that preceded the arrival of the new residentgeneral. One French report from this period discussed the numerous ‘slogans, rumours [and] the sick inclination for exaggeration’ that spread through Moroccan circles. With the arrival of the new resident-general, many Moroccans anticipated the replacement of French officials and a change in France’s policies, which were considered hostile and negative. In many of the meetings held prior to Labonne’s arrival between Istiqlal senior members and foreign diplomats, Moroccan nationalists expressed the hope that the new resident-general would implement such measures and thus grant greater liberties to Moroccans. 136

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At the time of Labonne’s arrival, many Istiqlal activists were restive, and disappointed with their lack of success in realizing the goal of independence. Although the party had evolved over the twoyear period since its establishment, and was now a central player in Moroccan politics, Moroccan nationalism had still not made a significant diplomatic breakthrough that could be viewed as a sign of success, such as for instance recognition of the party by a foreign superpower, or a change in French policy towards Morocco. Very little had, in fact, changed in the everyday lives of ordinary Moroccans since the establishment of the party. Many party activists were particularly bitter over the lack of any French recognition of their wartime efforts on France’s behalf, and still awaited some form of compensation. This raised expectations among Moroccans of a change in residency policies as the war ended. Labonne’s arrival was interpreted as a possible breakthrough.17 There was little to suggest, however, that France would seriously reconsider its policies on Morocco. France’s policies at the time were affected by unstable governments and a weakened political system. This weakness emboldened supporters of French colonialism to adopt hardline policies towards French colonial rule in general, and Morocco in particular. This hardline approach was evident in French foreign minister Georges Bidault’s approach and statements. Bidault had a very negative view of Moroccan nationalism. He considered it to be an obstructionist movement that hindered the benefits of French civilization that accompanied (in his opinion) French rule. Bidault seemed particularly loyal to France’s glorious past and was determined to defend its national heritage, which included its colonial assets.18 The French domestic context, although ostensibly distanced from Istiqlal’s emergence, underpinned much of what transpired in Morocco during this period. For Istiqlal, the unequivocal demand for independence remained the party’s primary objective. Party activists were unwilling to consider any interim solutions, or to contemplate the French reform proposals that were raised even during Labonne’s term. Their refusal to study such proposals also reflected their complete mistrust of France’s policies in Morocco. The only concession the party had made towards the French was a willingness to maintain some sort of political connection to France if the protectorate treaty were to be abrogated. This was, according to an American representative in 137

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Morocco, a more realistic approach, considering the party’s circumstances. Istiqlal, however, did not provide any details about this proposed liaison with France, and remained focused on its demand for independence.19 The party’s lack of detailed planning was emblematic of Istiqlal’s inability to prepare for changes if and when the French departed from Morocco. An American survey of Istiqlal, written in 1946, noted that after nearly three years of activity, it was clear that the party’s leaders lacked the ability and skills for constructive political work. Apart from the nationalist movement’s reform plan of 1934, no comprehensive, documented and clear plan for Morocco’s future was ever presented. Nor did the nationalists provide practical answers on how to improve Morocco’s political, social and economic situation. This inability was to affect Istiqlal’s future role in the political life of the country and its contribution to the political order within independent Morocco. Although these developments exceed the chronological outline of this study, it is nevertheless worth noting that they were already apparent in the party’s early years. Despite its success in establishing an organizational framework suitable for a mass party, Istiqlal did not provide the detailed plans and clear political outlines that could have sharpened its goals. The party was still recognized as a representative of the Moroccan elite, which had a limited understanding of the problems Morocco faced along the road to self-government. Aware of these shortcomings, some party members hoped that the release of prominent leaders like el-Fassi (which, as we shall see, had indeed been ordered by Labonne) would help the party devise such programmes, and strengthen Istiqlal’s responsibility towards Morocco.20 Moroccan expectations of a change in the residency’s policies continued after Labonne’s arrival in Morocco. The new resident-general’s comments immediately following his arrival disappointed some Moroccans. Contrary to expectations, Labonne refrained from making any political statements and limited his comments to general observations about the country’s economic situation. He spoke about the need to combat poverty in Morocco, while the nationalist party had hoped to hear him discuss the country’s political situation and nationalist aspirations.21 Istiqlal activists were still uncertain about the new resident-general’s positions on these questions, and awaited his opinion. In the light of Labonne’s prioritizing economic questions, it is 138

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important to stress that Istiqlal had not yet linked socioeconomic issues to the political questions at the top of its agenda. In that sense, party activists remained loyal to the agenda that had dictated their actions since the establishment of the party. Despite their growing sensitivity to social questions, party leaders did still not display much interest in socioeconomic questions. Giving primacy to these questions could have expanded support for the party, and contributed to the success of the reforms Labonne later proposed. In hindsight, Istiqlal’s objection to any French-initiated reform strengthened the French, who objected to the nationalists’ demands and hindered Labonne’s chances of success. These reforms could have given the party an opportunity to bolster its internal organization and expand its activities. If Istiqlal had realized that Labonne’s failure to implement reforms would lead to his replacement with a more hostile, conservative figure, it might have reconsidered its position towards Labonne’s policies. This, however, was not the case. One reason for Istiqlal’s objection to Labonne’s programmes was its concern about how to explain such a compromise to its many supporters, particularly after spending time and energy organizing these supporters, and emphasizing the goal of independence.22 Although it is difficult to estimate whether Labonne’s reforms would really have changed the situation in Morocco, Istiqlal’s complete rejection of them did not help in the long run. Labonne, who recognized the party’s importance and maintained contact with its leaders, found himself entirely alone after his plans were rejected. He lacked a Moroccan partner, and was forced to rely solely on the sultan’s support. As the new resident-general assumed his duties on 30 March, Istiqlal sent him a special memorandum. The document detailed the party’s well-known allegations against colonial rule, including France’s economic manipulations and restrictions on free speech in Morocco, along with criticism of the limited educational opportunities provided to Moroccans after the protectorate’s establishment. The memorandum rejected the whole idea of instituting political reforms, so long as France maintained its political position in Morocco, and continued to undermine its sovereignty.23 The document indicated that the party had no interest in discussing any reform plan with the new resident-general, and emphasized that abrogating the protectorate treaty and securing the country’s independence remained the party’s primary objectives. 139

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Despite these reservations, Labonne hastened to meet three senior party members upon his arrival in Morocco. The meeting itself was a novelty, and punctuated the change Labonne sought to bring about in the residency’s approach to the local population. This was the first time since Istiqlal’s establishment that a French resident-general had met nationalist leaders. His willingness to do so could also be interpreted as unofficial residency recognition of Istiqlal’s public standing. However, the residency’s official policy towards Istiqlal remained intact and the party was not officially recognized; in fact, the demand for recognition was not even discussed. Curiously, party leaders never raised the idea either, preferring to focus on other demands, rather than initially secure their legal status. This was probably a realistic assessment, based on the fact that it was doubtful whether the protectorate authorities would ever have recognized the party officially. Istiqlal preferred to concentrate on questions that seemed more urgent. But this can also be viewed as another example of Istiqlal’s activists’ attitude towards their own party. The first meeting between the new resident-general and Istiqlal activists took place on 22 April 1946. Labonne invited three senior members to dine with him, along with several residency officials. After the meal, the participants discussed the current situation in Morocco for three hours. Istiqlal representatives stressed the need for what they described as a ‘radical change’ in Franco-Moroccan relations. They contended that it would be difficult to implement such a change within the protectorate’s framework, and emphasized that France did not implement the necessary changes to allow Morocco an independent existence in the modern world, as stated in the 1912 protectorate treaty. It impressed the nationalist leaders that Labonne listened carefully to their arguments and promised to consider the new policies they sought to implement. Beyond a general wish for improvement, Istiqlal had a number of concrete demands that its representatives had raised in meetings with Labonne prior to his arrival in Morocco. These included permission to publish an Arabic newspaper, organize rallies and political meetings, release imprisoned and exiled party leaders, and reduce the residency’s control over ordinary Moroccans.24 These topics underpinned all the discussions and contacts between Istiqlal and the residency after the first dinner meeting. Labonne’s second meeting with Istiqlal leaders took place on 7 June 140

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when he again invited four party representatives to a meal. According to the account of one of the guests, both the meal and the meeting proceeded in a friendly atmosphere. Allal el-Fassi later noted that all meetings with Labonne were marked by mutual understanding and appreciation. During this June meeting, however, which lasted four hours, Istiqlal representatives revealed their dissatisfaction with French rule and took a tough position on the resident-general’s proposals and ideas. They reiterated their objection to French rule in Morocco and were unwilling to cooperate with it in any way. Labonne heard from them directly that they would not cooperate with the residency, so long as the protectorate administration remained unchanged. Labonne saw the meeting an opportunity to discuss the ‘misunderstandings and difficulties between French and Moroccans’, and to provide Istiqlal representatives with a detailed account of his intended reforms. These included plans to develop industry in Morocco, as well as to expand local government by absorbing Moroccans into its ranks. These Moroccans would gradually replace the French officials currently in charge. Labonne sought Istiqlal’s cooperation with these ideas. The party representatives rejected his proposals, and argued that it would be difficult to find suitable young Muslims (whom the resident-general was interested in recruiting) for these positions as long as France continued to rule over Morocco. Labonne asked the representatives to bring these proposals to the party leadership’s attention, which they politely refused to do. It was clear that a wide gap existed between Istiqlal and Labonne. While Istiqlal sought to change fundamentally Morocco’s status and replace the protectorate, the resident-general was committed to the colonial approach to Morocco, despite his empathy towards its residents. Labonne still tried to recruit Istiqlal’s support for his ideas, without forcing them to abandon their demand for independence.25 Despite the difficulties that arose during his initial contacts with Istiqlal, Labonne proceeded with his plans. Taking another independent step, which was to be part of the political openness he wished to promote, in June 1946 Labonne ordered the release of three exiled Istiqlal leaders, namely Allal el-Fassi, Ouazzani and Belafrej. (El-Fassi was exiled in 1937 to Gabon, and Ouazzani to the Atlas mountains that same year.) Labonne apparently sought to initiate a political dialogue with these leaders, who commanded a high degree of respect among Moroccan Muslims. Although Belafrej held the title of Istiqlal’s 141

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secretary general, it was el-Fassi who was recognized as Morocco’s senior nationalist figure and was expected to emerge as the party’s primary leader upon his return to Morocco. Labonne made some personal gestures of goodwill with the release of these leaders, such as dispatching his personal aircraft to return el-Fassi from exile, and extending a dinner invitation for the very day of his return to Morocco.26 The Istiqlal party and its supporters received these gestures warmly. They injected a measure of confidence in the party’s ability to realize its goals. Many, particularly excited about el-Fassi’s return after an absence of nearly ten years, welcomed him enthusiastically upon his arrival in Fez. Various delegations from across Morocco rushed to greet him, and congratulated him on his release. But, despite the enthusiasm that surrounded the release of these leaders, Labonne’s initiatives did not signify any great progress. Istiqlal did not endorse the resident-general’s programmes, but merely strengthened its resolve to secure Morocco’s independence. The release of these leaders reignited Istiqlal’s dilemma about the nature of its leadership. The party, as noted, did not have a united, recognized leadership. Most of its efforts and energy during this period were oriented towards the struggle against the French. With many of its leading figures imprisoned or in exile, Istiqlal did not reach any agreement on the composition of its own leadership. The party incorporated various factions, each representing a distinct social stratum. Broadly speaking, they included Western-oriented groups, as well as more traditional, conservative nationalist circles, led by Allal el-Fassi. This traditional-leaning, Fez-based faction was the largest among Istiqlal’s founding groups, and emerged as the more powerful force within the nationalist arena. It was only natural that upon his return to Morocco, el-Fassi would assume a leading role in the party. El-Fassi was generally described as a modest, pleasant figure, who embodied the traditional milieu he represented. He commanded a great deal of respect among Moroccan conservative groups as well as among the wider public, unlike Belafrej, for example, who according to foreign sources was more modern and down-toearth.27 Labonne was interested in meeting the released leaders as soon as possible and, according to information received by Istiqlal, planned to present them with an offer concerning planned reforms. As far as the 142

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party was concerned, however, there was no room for debate with the residency about reform plans, all of which they opposed.28 Much to Labonne’s disappointment, no serious dialogue between the residency and the party leaders emerged in the months that followed the leaders’ release. And, despite the ongoing contacts between them, there was little change in the nature of the relations between the two sides. Meanwhile, Labonne embarked on a number of further measures intended to strengthen the Moroccan public’s trust in him. He abolished the Direction des affaires politiques (DAP), which supervised political life inside the country. Scores of Moroccans had consistently repudiated this office and welcomed its demise. They argued that the DAP had created an unnecessary buffer between them and the resident-general, who relied on the department’s reports. Labonne, who sought to be more directly involved in Moroccan public life, replaced this department with two smaller offices, both charged with supervising the political system and providing various services to the Muslim public. He also appointed two political advisers, who reported directly to him. But Istiqlal was not impressed with any of these modifications, and continued to press for immediate changes, including a greater degree of freedom and permission to publish newspapers. In conversations with foreigners, Istiqlal activists contended that they remained sceptical of the new resident-general’s ability to deliver on his promises. They noted that in the past they had heard many nice words from senior residency officials – promises that never materialized. Istiqlal’s assumption was that so long as the protectorate framework remained intact, there was little chance of instituting significant reforms and changes in political life.29 It is difficult to determine to what extent Labonne’s overtures towards Istiqlal reflected a profound change in the French position towards Moroccan nationalism. Some Istiqlal activists, along with foreign observers, regarded them as harbingers of a more conciliatory French approach. Labonne’s willingness to address the concerns of a Moroccan political group was already a departure from France’s traditional policy of viewing the sultan as the Moroccan public’s sole representative. Over the years, the residency refused to acknowledge any Moroccan political entity other than the monarchy, and never recognized Moroccan nationalist groups. In that sense, Labonne proposed a new stage in French–Moroccan relations, which did not, however, progress very much. 143

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Istiqlal’s refusal to discuss any administrative changes or political reforms created a vacuum in the Moroccan political system, which the sultan quickly filled. The developing relationship between the monarch and the new resident-general ultimately came at Istiqlal’s expense. Labonne’s disappointment with Istiqlal drove him towards the sultan, in an effort to engage in some form of dialogue with a Moroccan political figure. Istiqlal, following its usual approach, coordinated its responses to Labonne’s offers with the sultan. Party officials and foreign observers claimed that at this early stage the sultan supported Istiqlal’s rejection of the resident-general’s suggestions. The sultan preferred to wait for the abrogation of the protectorate treaty before discussing the proposed reforms. Once again, Istiqlal subordinated itself to the monarchy, which emerged as the leading political player in the Moroccan arena. Labonne, for his part, was aware of the sultan’s prestige and searched for ways to strengthen his ties with the monarch. This was an important part of his post, and conformed to the French government’s interests at the time, mainly in strengthening its ties with the sultan. In his early months in office, Labonne tried hard to pacify the sultan, frequently letting him have the upper hand if disputes broke out between them.30 He showered him with praise, and would commend Sidi Mohammed for his calm and tranquillity. The residentgeneral was pleased with his personal relationship with the sultan, and was convinced he had cultivated a trusting relationship with him. Nevertheless, in his conversations with Labonne the sultan repeatedly referred to the question of independence and to Istiqlal’s existence, indicating that the two ideas remained important to him.31 Therefore, relations between the sultan and resident-general had not significantly improved. Sidi Mohammed rejected the resident-general’s reform plans and was not overly impressed with Labonne’s reconciliation efforts. Using various excuses, he avoided expressing his opinion on Labonne’s proposals. He finally put forward his position on the reform plans, arguing that they were not aggressive enough. The sultan demanded a number of changes that would eventually have led Morocco to independence and would have ended the current political struggle.

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Labonne’s First Reform Plans and their Impact on the Political System Although Istiqlal was critical of Labonne’s activities, his term as resident-general benefited the party. Istiqlal became a recognized, prominent player in local politics and attracted international attention, obviously an outcome of the resident-general’s own interest in the party. The residency’s more tolerant policies towards the party and the more relaxed political atmosphere during Labonne’s tenure were used to advance the party’s activities. Istiqlal increased its activities among remote tribes in the Middle Atlas region, and intensified the cultural and educational programmes it sponsored in various Moroccan cities.32 The most significant development in the party during Labonne’s term was the licence it acquired to publish a nationalist newspaper. This led to the establishment of a daily, al-ʿAlam, in 1946, which gained popularity among Moroccan readers. The newspaper relied on a number of correspondents at home and abroad, and printed about 7000 copies a day. The number of readers was assumed to be much higher, since many illiterate Moroccans heard the articles read out aloud in public. Although the newspaper was subjected to harsh censorship, which often left many of its columns blank, its existence provided Moroccan readers with the opportunity to become acquainted with nationalist positions.33 Foreign observers estimated that even modest reforms initiated by the residency would convey France’s intention to give its Moroccan policies a more liberal orientation. These reforms were intended to silence the ‘nationalist genie’ and extend a hand in friendship and peace to the Moroccan public. Even if many residency officials and French government ministers considered Istiqlal no more than a tiny organization and no threat to French rule in Morocco, the government was keen to minimize potential tensions. French diplomatic and political figures hoped that modest concessions would not threaten France’s position there, but would ultimately strengthen French rule in Morocco and reduce Istiqlal’s appeal. They were concerned about articles on Moroccan nationalism, recently published in French newspapers, which were sympathetic to the cause and attracted much public attention. Fearing rising public pressure to modify the status of the protectorate, they endorsed efforts to institute reforms in Morocco. 145

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Although Istiqlal remained reserved towards Labonne and perhaps did not trust his ideas, the party did not confront him. According to one account, this position was based on the sultan’s directives. Most Istiqlal leaders were quite sympathetic towards the resident-general. Belafrej, for example, noted that the party had not lost trust in Labonne’s good intentions, even if Istiqlal had other ideas about the desirable objectives for Morocco. The party did not wish to obstruct Labonne’s plans completely, and waited to see whether they would indeed indicate a far-reaching change in France’s policy in Morocco.34 As time went by, Istiqlal leaders grew increasingly impatient with the resident-general and his policies. They felt that the openness Labonne displayed towards the party on his arrival in Morocco did not lead to concrete policies. They were also disappointed that not all his promises were kept. Although they welcomed some of the residentgeneral’s measures, such as releasing exiled or imprisoned leaders and abolishing the much reviled DAP, they remained sceptical. They were angry that Labonne, despite the favourable impression he created, had not yet embraced the explicit measures that could change the situation in Morocco. Some also contended that there was little difference between Labonne’s proposals and previous reform plans presented by the residency. There was, however, a significant difference between Labonne’s proposals and earlier French plans, which stemmed from the changed political circumstances in Morocco. Labonne’s proposals were inspired by a rising nationalist sentiment in Morocco, and were affected by the new nationalist party. Another difference was the resident-general’s personal involvement in reforms based on Labonne’s personal initiative, and quickly became identifiable with his term in office. Moreover, they became linked to Labonne’s personal fate as resident-general. His inability to implement these reforms successfully affected the resident-general’s position and ultimately led to his removal from office. The party leaders’ exasperation with the residency mirrored rising dissatisfaction among the Moroccan population, which was obvious to foreign observers as well. Labonne himself expressed concern over the outbreak of riots in Moroccan cities. He considered the rising ferment to be nationalist, and was convinced it had less to do with specific Moroccan grievances against the French administration, than with the population’s general objection to the mere existence of the 146

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protectorate.35 In August 1946, Istiqlal activists were planning a series of protests and demonstrations, which were eventually cancelled because of the sultan’s personal intervention. The sultan was no doubt concerned about the outbreak of another round of violence between Moroccans and French, which could affect his own position. According to reports that circulated in Rabat, he summoned Istiqlal leaders and forbade them to hold demonstrations. He argued that such events would not benefit Morocco, and would not yield any positive results. Istiqlal, loyal to its policy of accepting the sultan’s directives, acted accordingly.36 In July 1946 foreign observers warned that a violent revolt in Morocco could erupt in the very near future, unless a significant change were implemented in Morocco’s political situation. According to certain reports, nationalist activists had amassed weapons and were willing to sacrifice their lives for the benefit of what they described as their country’s future.37 Rising tension in Morocco, and the expectations raised by the promise of future comprehensive actions, led Labonne to present a detailed account of the initial reforms he intended to implement. The announcement led to widespread opposition to him, which further weakened his position. Labonne outlined his plans for Morocco at the Government Council’s annual meeting in Rabat. The council, which included French settler representatives, was eager to hear the new resident-general speak. Labonne began by noting that there had already been improvements in food supplies in Morocco and promised, despite the ongoing economic difficulties, to continue to ameliorate local living conditions. The resident-general then turned to his reform plans. He announced his intention to implement a more equal policy towards the Muslim population, as he had hoped to do ever since assuming office. He also planned to recognize Moroccan trade unions. This initiative was revolutionary for a residency that had previously refused to allow Moroccan workers to unionize. Labonne emphasized that his plan related exclusively to economic questions and that the Moroccan unions would not be allowed to engage in political activity. A second initiative announced by Labonne concerned financing economic and infrastructure projects. His intention to allow Moroccan participation in such projects was also a departure from the residency’s previous policies, which kept most economic affairs under 147

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French control. The new plan raised the possibility of reduced French involvement in Moroccan economic affairs. In addition, Labonne proposed to change the structure of local government in Morocco and establish rural, municipal and regional councils. These new bodies would include Moroccan and French representatives, to be appointed by general election – also a revolutionary idea for the protectorate. Labonne’s plan called for the establishment of an advisory central council, which would oversee local government. It, too, was to be elected by popular vote, and would replace the Government Council. Although Labonne’s initiatives were modest in scope and were not intended to dramatically change the lives of most Moroccans, they did express a genuine desire on his part to change some aspects of French rule in Morocco. They were also expected to allow the Muslim elite to play a more active role in Morocco’s political and economic development. Labonne left no doubt among his listeners that the residency was serious about these reforms and was interested in their implementation. Many Moroccans eagerly awaited the resident-general’s speech before the council. Its main points had been distributed a week earlier to various individuals, and circulated among the country’s political class. Many people reacted to it angrily. The French settlers’ representatives walked out in protest after Labonne concluded his remarks, because they resented the fact that he had not consulted them before announcing his support for the establishment of Moroccan unions. They also argued that by bringing a political matter before the council Labonne had acted in an unprecedented fashion from the procedural point of view. They claimed that the council was not the proper forum for discussing the resident-general’s policies, and certainly not such far-reaching ones. The French representatives contended that in any case they would refuse to support these reforms, which in their view endangered French interests and prestige in Morocco.38 Settlers were especially concerned that Labonne’s plans would undermine the prevailing order in Morocco. The proposed reforms were too daring, and the settlers worried that after their implementation they would have to renounce the privileges they enjoyed and the monopoly they held over the local economy and over some aspects of political life.39 French conservative politicians, who feared that France’s prestige would suffer from Labonne’s policies, held 148

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similar views. Both these groups expressed their dismay over the resident-general’s conciliatory approach to the sultan and his ambitious political actions. From the settlers’ perspective, concerns over the ramifications of Labonne’s ideas were justified. It was hard to see how his plan could strengthen the protectorate’s hold over Morocco, which was after all the main goal. Morocco’s French and European residents increasingly found themselves with their back up against the wall, and with the feeling that their only remaining alternative was an uncompromising fight against the resident-general. Personally, Labonne was shocked by the residents’ reaction to his plan and could not believe that they would boycott the council’s deliberations. It was only thanks to the French government’s backing and support that Labonne was somehow able to maintain his position. Widespread opposition to his plan ultimately weakened him and affected his image among Muslim Moroccans, specifically the Istiqlal leaders, who closely followed events as they unfolded in Morocco. Meanwhile, Labonne’s policies continued to attract attention in France. Paris-based newspapers, though at that time not particularly interested in North African affairs and colonial policies, nevertheless widely covered his speech and proposals.40 This new interest underlined the French public’s awareness of Labonne’s policies, and their possible impact on France’s position abroad. Most newspapers reviewed the resident-general’s proposals favourably. The more conservative publications, such as Le Figaro, noted the strong opposition Labonne’s programmes generated among members of Morocco’s European population who argued that these initiatives were against French interests.41 In addition to the settlers’ opposition, Labonne also confronted senior residency officials who opposed his plans. The proposed reforms clearly affected professional relations within the residency, which were fraught with tension and subtle hostility. Many officials openly opposed Labonne’s ideas and several directors of government departments threatened to resign during his tenure. Philippe Boniface, the regional commissioner in charge of the Casablanca area, was the leading opposition figure among the senior protectorate officials. Boniface has been described as the individual who effectively oversaw Moroccan politics between 1944 and 1956, and left his imprint on French policies towards Moroccan nationalism. Boniface’s 149

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views on Moroccan nationalism were extremely negative. He dismissed the Istiqlal party as nothing more than a group of intellectuals with murky ideas about democracy and the French revolution. He was also less concerned about the sultan’s influence and argued that the monarch’s powers were not as extensive as one might imagine. Most Moroccans considered him to be responsible for the events that led to the outbreak of the 1944 riots. Boniface found himself increasingly at odds with Labonne and felt that the new resident, who sought to implement policies that clearly differed from his approach, had demoted him. These sentiments fuelled Boniface’s opposition to Labonne, which undermined the resident’s position.42 These tensions further affected Labonne’s ability to implement his plans and threatened his position within the administrative hierarchy. Despite the criticism and considerable opposition, Labonne stuck to his policy. At the end of the council’s meetings, he stated that the French government had endorsed his political programme and expressed his hope that the settlers’ representatives would once more cooperate with him. The representatives did suspend their boycott and relations between the two sides were restored, albeit on a superficial level. Labonne’s public standing had, however, been affected and the resident-general was left without any supporters or staunch allies among Morocco’s European population. Istiqlal leaders were clearly aware of this as they reacted to Labonne’s proposals. Labonne’s ideas generated strong criticism among Istiqlal’s leadership, which had also managed (much to the resident-general’s chagrin) to drag the sultan into the dispute. This was another blow to Labonne, who had lost most of his personal leverage and was now alone in a three-front struggle, facing the European residents and protectorate officials, as well as Istiqlal and the sultan. Istiqlal leaders were disappointed with what they saw as Labonne’s unimpressive reform proposals, and argued that they did not indicate a significant change in Morocco’s political reality. Belafrej, for example, contended that the entire plan was based on failed colonial policies in Morocco, which had been in place for 34 years. He did not think that including makhzen officials in new economic enterprises would reduce France’s general control over the local economy. He also contended that Labonne’s plan did not discuss individual liberties, and harmed Morocco by securing a French monopoly on the country’s riches. The Istiqlal party was concerned with expanding the economic power of 150

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French industrialists and their growing involvement in the local economy, which would only reinforce France’s control over the country. Another nationalist allegation raised against Labonne’s plan was his intention to strengthen Morocco’s local government. Istiqlal argued that this proposal would strengthen the powers of tribal leaders and impede the development of modern political parties. They saw this as a continuation of France’s policy in Morocco, which sought to separate the peripheral population from the urban centres and transform the tribes into local allies. For Istiqlal, the idea of establishing local municipal councils was nothing more than a new incarnation of France’s traditional policy of encouraging a ‘feudal’ agricultural land policy, at the expense of the Moroccans.43 Istiqlal sent an official protest to the sultan on 24 July, denouncing the proposed policies of the resident-general. It not only encompassed all of the above-mentioned allegations, but also adopted a threatening tone, noting that the Moroccan people would not stand by if a policy so dangerous to their ‘heritage’ were to be implemented.44 In its statement, the party again called on the sultan to denounce the 1912 protectorate treaty and establish a government that would renegotiate a new treaty with France. This new agreement would fully secure Morocco’s rights, but (and this in a more conciliatory tone) would also defend French ‘legitimate interests’.45 Istiqlal’s anger over Labonne’s inadequate proposals was particularly noteworthy in the light of the expectations and hopes that had been raised before the arrival of the new resident-general. Activists, calling for independence, now began to prepare for a new round of protests. The demonstrations, planned for 27 August, were postponed after the sultan’s personal intervention. Sidi Mohammed’s position was that such rallies would not produce any positive results and he persuaded Istiqlal leaders to change their planned course of action. The sultan argued that direct negotiations with France – under his auspices – would enable the nationalists to achieve at least some of their demands.46 Beyond the sultan’s growing involvement in political life, which was evident in this affair, Istiqlal’s rising impatience with Labonne and his policies became ever more obvious. Istiqlal leaders indicated to senior residency officials that it would be impossible to appease Moroccan nationalist sentiments through reforms, which might improve the lives of certain Moroccans but would not funda151

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mentally alter the country’s political situation. Labonne was disheartened to hear Istiqlal’s reaction to his plan, which only added to the embarrassment he felt after the Government Council’s session. He sought to convince the nationalist party leaders that his intentions were serious, and dispatched one of his associates to appease them.47 Some Istiqlal leaders still believed in Labonne’s good intentions. Belafrej emphasized this in a conversation with an American diplomat several weeks after the Government Council’s meeting.48 Despite their anger over his proposed reforms, party leaders could not deny that during Labonne’s tenure Istiqlal was able to function more freely. Once the initial anger over Labonne’s proposals had abated, party officials continued to maintain their ties with the resident-general. On a personal level, many of them were fond of Labonne and recognized his good intentions. But overall they remained ambivalent towards him and were wary of his proposals. Istiqlal closely followed the European settler community’s mounting opposition to Labonne, for party leaders were afraid that the resident-general would be unable to function professionally in the face of such dissent. Concerns about Labonne’s future were another factor in their approach to him. If he were to fail, the party preferred not to be identified with him and not to face any negative repercussions. Others, on the contrary, were concerned about Labonne succeeding in implementing his plans, which they feared might strengthen the protectorate and weaken Moroccan nationalist aspirations. These concerns seem exaggerated. It was hard to see how the colonial institutions could remain intact after absorbing such large numbers of Moroccans into their ranks. Istiqlal’s opposition to Labonne’s proposals was less fierce than its public reactions suggested. Indeed, over the following months, the party pursued contacts with the residency. Unofficially, some party leaders expressed their support of Labonne’s plans, after a series of meetings with him throughout the summer and autumn of 1946.49 As resident-general, Labonne also displayed a liberal approach and genuine interest in expanding the Moroccan educational potential. The number of educational establishments increased considerably during this period. He also stated his intention to expand freedom of the press in Morocco, even though the Arabic press was still heavily censored. In addition, Moroccans were now able to hold public gatherings; these events were, however, also subjected to police 152

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supervision. In a speech to the Government Council in Rabat on 31 January 1947, Labonne emphasized that the protectorate government intended to respond to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people. But for the nationalist movement, these developments were marginal to the more important goal of obtaining complete independence for Morocco. While Labonne expressed more sympathy for the nationalist movement than any of his predecessors had done, he never hinted in any way that he intended to abrogate the protectorate treaty. Despite settler criticism of him, and notwithstanding the Moroccans’ contacts with him, most nationalist activists were unimpressed with his policies. Not enough had changed, in their view. When the anticipated changes failed to materialize, nationalist disappointment with Labonne’s policies grew.50 In short, French policy in Morocco was left untouched during Labonne’s term as resident-general. Regardless of his moderate statements and proposed initiatives, the colonial administration continued to pursue its familiar, harsh policies.51 Internal French opposition to Labonne reached its peak after the Moroccan sultan’s visit to Tangier in April 1947. This visit had important ramifications on political life in Morocco and on Istiqlal’s position. Ultimately, it also led to Labonne’s dismissal and to an even harsher French approach to Moroccan nationalism.

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7 The Sultan’s Visit to Tangier and its Impact on the Emergence of Istiqlal

A

s seen before, the main political development in Morocco in the 1940s was the rise of Istiqlal as a pivotal political organization, which placed national independence and the abrogation of the protectorate treaty as the foci of its political agenda. This, together with the rise of sultan Sidi Mohammed as a major political leader, led to collisions with the colonial administration. The French closely monitored the sultan’s political initiatives. Initially, Sidi Mohammed expressed his discontent with French rule through diplomatic means, and avoided confronting the residency. He encouraged Moroccan education and expressed his support for his subjects in public speeches. For the French, his statements, supported by Qur’ānic quotes, left no place for doubt about his backing of the nationalist ideology. Besides their suspicions about the sultan’s support of Moroccan nationalism, residency officials were also angry over the sultan’s contacts with American officials. These contacts contradicted patterns established at the outset of the protectorate, when France took control of Morocco’s foreign relations and supervised the sultan’s contacts with foreign representatives. Although the sultan’s contacts with American representatives were limited and did not yield substantial results, they suggested a renewed international interest in Moroccan affairs. Domestically, they allowed the sultan to play a more active role in public life, and project his image as a national leader. French officials were less than enthusiastic about the American military presence in Morocco after the Second World War, and feared 155

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that the USA intended to reduce France’s influence in Morocco and emerge as the new central power. They also expressed their worry about what they saw as American moral support (including allegations of political support) for the sultan. They traced the American approach to President Roosevelt’s 1943 meeting with the sultan. Although every American representative in Morocco repeatedly told French officials that the USA had no interest in expanding its involvement in Morocco, many residency officials remained unconvinced. They were certain that the USA was interested in removing France from North Africa and supported the sultan and Istiqlal in order to achieve this goal. French suspicions of the sultan’s growing involvement with the USA increased after the sultan visited an American air force base near Marrakech in the summer of 1945. He refrained from notifying the French authorities about the visit. Sidi Mohammed later argued that the visit had been a private one, and had therefore not required prior coordination with colonial officials. He also reiterated his commitment to maintaining the protectorate treaty in matters concerning his public activities, but argued that his private life was his own concern.1 These testy exchanges between the French resident-general and the Moroccan monarch underlined the deterioration in French– Moroccan relations, as well the sultan’s growing independence. They were the background to the sultan’s visit to Tangier in April 1947. The visit and its political ramifications were an important milestone in Istiqlal’s development and Morocco’s struggle for independence. The visit also had an impact on the sultan’s emergence as a political leader, and his endorsement of nationalist ideas. During his visit to Tangier, the sultan voiced his support for Moroccan independence, and publicly displayed his displeasure with French colonial rule. After the visit, there was little doubt that he had become Morocco’s senior nationalist leader and that his importance far exceeded that of Istiqlal. The sultan effectively bypassed Istiqlal, claiming to represent the entire country. His trip through the Spanish zone while en route to Tangier, and his reception there, underlined his prominence. The visit also affected the French residency. It led to Labonne’s removal from his post and to a new, tougher French policy towards Moroccan nationalism. This chapter surveys the sultan’s journey to Tangier and its impact on Istiqlal’s emergence. 156

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Tangier in the Precolonial and Colonial Eras The sultan’s visit to Tangier, the northern Moroccan port, transfers the historical account of Istiqlal’s emergence to a new setting, officially detached from the French protectorate. It refocused political attention in French Morocco on Tangier’s official status. The Second World War revived Moroccan interest in Tangier, which in the precolonial period had been a source of controversy between Morocco and European colonial powers. In the colonial period, Tangier went through a number of political changes, which placed it in a unique position, compared with other Moroccan cities. To appreciate the symbolic importance of the sultan’s visit to Tangier and its impact on Istiqlal’s development, a brief account of life in Tangier in both the precolonial and colonial periods is essential. In the 1940s the question of Tangier’s future and its ties to other areas in Morocco resurfaced, gaining importance in the aftermath of the war. With its unique social and urban milieu, many Moroccans felt a special attachment to Tangier, which was quite different from other Moroccan cities. The arrival of European merchants and commercial representatives in the nineteenth century altered the city’s social texture. Their presence changed many features of city life in Tangier, and had an impact on matters such as public health and city maintenance. As the new European residents gained control of various city services, they became a leading force in local politics. They were also the beneficiaries of expanding privileges that were granted to them in the nineteenth-century, which exempted them from paying taxes to the Moroccan sultan and released them from the need to deal with the Moroccan authorities. Other Moroccan cities did not witness a similar flux of European arrivals, and did not develop in the way Tangier did. By the mid-nineteenth century a new urban reality had emerged in Tangier. In 1849, for example, a municipal health council was established. The council included foreign diplomatic representatives and emerged as the city’s managing authority. Its influence was so great that in 1897 Muslims were barred from departing to Mecca for the annual ḥajj pilgrimage because of the outbreak of an epidemic in Tangier. Another example of growing European involvement in Tangier was the establishment of foreign postal services in the city, which underlined Tangier’s expanding ties with the outside world. Nevertheless, most of the city’s residents (numbering 60,000 in the colonial period) were Moroccan Muslims, so the city preserved much 157

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of its local character. Like other Moroccan cities, Tangier experienced periods of prosperity and decline throughout the nineteenth century, and suffered from outbreaks of the plague and other diseases. On the eve of the colonial era in Morocco, Tangier was already feeling the effects of the presence of foreigners, and of declining relations with the makhzen. The city had, in many ways, become a separate entity from other parts of the country. Throughout the nineteenth century, most foreign powers that had an interest in Morocco (Spain, France, Britain and, to a lesser degree, the USA) sought to gain influence in Tangier. Along with the broader colonial scramble for territories across Africa, its strategic position as a port played a large part in any colonial ambitions involving Tangier. An international conference, convened in the Spanish port of Algeciras in 1906, placed the management of city affairs in the hands of the colonial powers. In the light of the physical presence and varying interests of foreign countries, the colonial powers agreed that Tangier would require a special type of colonial rule. A secret treaty concluded between France and Britain in 1905 related to Tangier’s particular position. Unlike elsewhere in Morocco, France was forced to recognize the presence of other colonial powers in Tangier. This influenced the nature of the colonial administration established there. The 1912 protectorate treaty stipulated that Tangier would preserve its special character, thus affecting its municipal organization. The city’s fate in the colonial era was therefore unique, compared with other parts of the country. Tangier developed its own form of local government. The city was not placed in the hands of one European colonial power, but was under international jurisdiction that included several countries. The sultan’s personal representative in the city, the mendoub, served as the chairman of a municipal supervisory committee composed of foreign diplomats. A municipal assembly managed the city’s ongoing affairs. Tangier did not benefit from an organized, concentrated local government. Three different legal systems underpinned public life – a European, Muslim and Jewish, each serving its own community. Two separate police forces were in charge of maintaining law and order – a Spanish-led military police and a civilian force commanded by a French officer. These duplicities led to confusion and disarray in urban affairs and frequently complicated daily life. A positive outcome of this political structure was the emergence of 158

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a fluid political culture that allowed diverse individuals and ideological groups to participate in public life. This kind of political life could not have taken place in any other part of the French or Spanish protectorates. The outbreak of the First World War increased the international presence and involvement in Tangier. After the war, Tangier remained a bone of contention. France argued that the city had to remain under the sultan’s sovereignty, albeit indirectly under French influence. Spain demanded that the city be incorporated into its zone of control, while Britain sought to preserve its international supervision. In December 1923, the Tangier treaty, which established the city’s status, was signed by various foreign powers. The treaty did not significantly change the city’s local government structure, which had been established after the 1906 Algeciras treaty. If anything, foreign involvement in managing city life became more pronounced. The treaty reduced the mendoub’s authority, limiting it to the supervision of Muslim religious matters. He also served as chairman of the International Legislative Council, whose decisions could be vetoed by local European diplomats. The management of daily affairs was handed over to a European administrator. Local government in the interwar period, conducted in three languages and in a rather chaotic manner, was often described as ‘absurd’. Life was not particularly comfortable for the city’s Moroccan residents. The administration frequently suffered from fiscal difficulties, and local residents shouldered a heavy tax burden. Although they were forced to carry this burden, they received minimal urban services. They were subjected to harsh police tactics, and treated as second-class citizens in their contacts with local authorities. They were not included in government decisions, and were largely excluded from local politics. Most of the city’s development was concentrated in the European residential areas. Moroccan nationalists, who would later describe life in Tangier, emphasized that all the agreements and treaties signed between foreign powers were concluded without the participation of Moroccans and without consulting the local population. The Istiqlal party contended that the international administration in the city did not bring any great benefits to the residents, who lived in difficult material conditions (compared with other parts of the country), and were largely detached from the political and social experiences of Moroccans who lived under the French protectorate.2 159

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But, despite Istiqlal’s allegations, Tangier exuded a unique ambience during the colonial period; it was affected by the relative facility with which diverse ideological groups engaged in political activity there. Such activities were not possible in other Moroccan urban areas. While the Moroccan residents of Tangier may have benefited less from economic modernization, they indirectly profited from a developed political culture. This distinction was evident in the city’s local government. The general atmosphere in Tangier was far less restricted than in other Moroccan cities, and was the source of the city’s designation as a cosmopolitan urban centre.3 The political culture that developed in Tangier also affected the local population’s political identity, which relied far less on family origins or local traditions than on political choice. The opportunity to engage in diverse forms of political activity facilitated Istiqlal’s emergence in other parts of Morocco, but was especially noteworthy in Tangier. The city became a point of interest among Moroccan nationalists, who took issue with the fact that its residents lived under foreign domination and were separated from the rest of the country. In these circumstances, it was only natural that Tangier would evolve as a focal point of nationalist aspirations. Nationalist activists in Tangier faced less supervision and persecution, and were able to move about more freely. Tangier had a nationalist past and its residents had participated in earlier rounds of nationalist protests. During the Second World War, the city experienced another change, as Spanish forces took full control in the wake of the French surrender to Germany. Although the official pretext for this measure was to guarantee Tangier’s neutrality, Spain sought to incorporate the city into the area it controlled. Spain also acted against the sultan by forcefully removing the mendoub from the city, and closing the Moroccan postal and customs services there. The sultan demanded Spain’s withdrawal from Tangier, asserting that the Spanish takeover undermined his position as Morocco’s sovereign and violated international law. Throughout the war, the Moroccan monarch repeatedly referred to Tangier’s plight and expressed his objection to the city’s wartime situation. While the French residency was pleased with the sultan’s statements against Spain, there was little it could do to change the situation under the circumstances.4 Tangier was a wartime centre of espionage and intrigue and, as such, remained detached from Moroccan politics. Nationalist activists 160

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expected the city’s status to change after the war. In the meantime they attempted to pursue contacts with various foreign representatives with regard to the future status of the city. The end of the Second World War reignited the debate over the status of Tangier. Recognizing the Allies’ victory, Spain expressed willingness to restore the city’s previous international status, while France demanded that the city’s future be discussed in a wider context. The conference, convened in Paris in August 1945, led to an Anglo–French agreement stipulating that the city should continue to be ruled according to the 1923 treaty until a new permanent treaty, involving countries that had signed the Algeciras treaty, was concluded. The agreement also stated that Spain would withdraw its troops from Tangier by 11 October 1945, after which the international commission would restore its rule. The future of Tangier still awaited a solution, and the city’s political status remained fragile and fluid.5 The French press in Morocco covered the question of Tangier’s future extensively in September–October 1945. The French warmly welcomed news of the Spanish withdrawal from Tangier, and the general expectation was that it would be possible to restore what the former referred to as the ‘sultan’s sovereignty’ in Tangier. Such sovereignty implicitly suggested that France should maintain a major role in managing the city’s affairs.6 Tangier’s future also attracted public interest in France. After the conference on Tangier, the French newspaper Le Monde noted with satisfaction that France had not only been able to preserve its role in the city, but had also obtained the agreement of other Allied countries to remain in charge of it. While French colonial officials in Morocco were pleased with the possibility of restoring the sultan’s status in Tangier, they also had to contend with the Moroccan monarch’s rising political aspirations. Notwithstanding the nature of his political activities, the residency maintained that its relations with the sultan were based on trust and mutual agreement, and reflected the two countries’ interests in Tangier.7 This was the stance French officials put forward to the Allies as well. Ironically, it was precisely the question of Tangier that led the two parties to an open confrontation.

Istiqlal’s Position on Tangier Although one could hardly say, after more than thirty years of colonial rule, that Morocco had made any headway, France was still 161

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able to convince other powers that its continued presence in Morocco (and its expansion to Tangier) was vital to the country’s continued development. France also emphasized its commitment to maintaining the sultan’s sovereign position within the protectorate’s framework. Istiqlal, on the other hand, adopted a different approach to the sultan’s sovereign status, which the party viewed as completely detached from France. The sultan was viewed as Morocco’s most powerful leader and as naturally self-ruling. Party officials preferred to minimize France’s presence in Morocco, rarely mentioning it, and opposed the possibility of an expanded French presence in postwar Morocco, specifically in Tangier. Tangier’s status was discussed at the international Paris conference, and was also on Istiqlal’s agenda. The party’s interest in the city reflected its commitment to Morocco’s territorial integrity and concern with major political questions, even while its main focus was on internal development (see chapter 4). Istiqlal’s involvement in the debate about Tangier’s status was also an opportunity to emphasize that the party had widespread political interests, and was not a small organization preoccupied with promoting the interests of what the French portrayed as a ‘traditional urban bourgeoisie’. The forthcoming international conference on Tangier’s future led Istiqlal to demand the participation of a Moroccan delegation, which would represent and defend Morocco’s interests. France failed to respond to this request, which came from a party it did not recognize. Nor did French officials, who placed their country’s interests at the top of the agenda during the deliberations over the city’s future, pay any attention to Moroccan demands concerning Tangier. A party memorandum issued in 1945 included Istiqlal’s main demands on Tangier’s future, and emphasized Tangier’s position as an integral part of Morocco. As such, it required legal and administrative structures in the city that would also serve as symbols of Moroccan sovereignty. The memorandum did not include any detailed plans for strengthening ties between Tangier and the rest of Morocco. For Istiqlal, the question of Morocco’s sovereignty was directly linked to the sultan’s status, and was part of the party’s nationalist ideology. As in other instances, the party emphasized the sultan’s role in Tangier as a national leader, and did not assert its own position in the city’s political life. The Istiqlal memorandum also pointed out that there was no justi162

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fication for the special privileges foreign powers enjoyed in Tangier. This position was compatible with the party’s emphasis on strengthening Moroccan sovereignty. The party noted that foreign rule over Tangier did not affect the residents’ sense of Moroccan identity. Istiqlal remained committed to being the voice of the entire Moroccan public and, as such, emphasized that the Moroccan public was intent on preserving Morocco’s position in Tangier, and would not accept any further damage to the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.8 The sultan’s initiative to visit Tangier was brought up within this atmosphere of contrasting demands and rising tension surrounding the city. The proposed visit and its outcome increased nationalist-related tension in Morocco, and deeply affected Istiqlal.

The Sultan’s Visit The sultan’s visit to Tangier in April 1947 and its ramifications affected the special position France sought to consolidate in that city. During his visit, the sultan repeatedly refused to acknowledge the French interpretation of Moroccan–French relations. These ties were already fraught with tension and, after the visit, evolved into open confrontation. For the sultan, the visit solidified his position as Morocco’s central political leader, strengthened his spiritual leadership and raised his profile among the Moroccan public. While in Tangier, the sultan stood by the nationalist movement and its goals. Even if his statements in Istiqlal’s favour were subtle and understated, his words in Tangier nevertheless enhanced the prestige and legitimacy of Istiqlal’s core demands. For Istiqlal, the visit was a high point and an expression of its rising position within the political framework. The sultan’s interest in Tangier had crystallized long before he set out on his journey. Sidi Mohammed began to pay more attention to the city’s fate following the changes brought about by the Second World War and his own expanding involvement in political issues. The wartime Spanish occupation of the city was largely the reason behind his decision to visit Tangier, which had not had an opportunity to welcome a Moroccan sultan for many years. For the sultan, the visit’s main purpose was to emphasize Tangier’s affiliation with other parts of Morocco. Despite the city’s different colonial trajectory, the sultan sought to prove to France and to other foreign powers that he did not see any difference between Tangier and the rest of Morocco. The sultan’s efforts to visit the city 163

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once again underlined the monarch’s personal and political ambitions. Under these circumstances, it was clear that the sultan’s visit would not be perceived as a minor event. The visit to Tangier signified a new low point in the monarchy’s relations with the residency. The tension that had marked the sultan’s relations with France after the 1944 riots increased throughout the decade. The sultan’s visit to Paris in June 1945 did little to improve the tense relations between the two sides. For the residency, the sultan’s decision to visit Tangier was a new development that perplexed them. According to one account, French officials initially responded favourably to the idea, since they thought the visit would strengthen France’s position and its influence in the city in the postwar period. As in other incidents related to the sultan, the residency at first encouraged the monarch to discount the long-term consequences of his decision and its impact on French rule in Morocco. In this case, the French paid no attention to the huge public fanfare that would accompany the sultan’s arrival in Tangier. French officials preferred to focus on the short-term benefits they could reap from such a visit, while attempting to strengthen their own hold over the city. But as the sultan’s visit approached, the residency expressed more and more reservations about it. The Istiqlal party contended that residency officials were making a concerted effort to prevent the visit. They opposed Labonne, who in principle supported the visit once the sultan had clarified several issues. This was not the first time residency officials had opposed the resident-general, and argued that his policies threatened France’s position in Morocco. Allal el-Fassi noted that French approval of the trip had been issued only after a long period of negotiations with the sultan. French demands relating to the visit reflected the residency’s new concerns about the sultan’s presence in Tangier, and came exactly at a time when Labonne sought to promote his reforms. He therefore sought to reduce the visit’s symbolic impact by suggesting that the sultan sail to Tangier rather than travel there by land. He feared that a land trip could potentially become a royal victory procession that would affect France’s position in Morocco. The sultan refused to travel by ship. Other French demands included a request that the resident-general accompany the sultan and introduce him to the foreign representatives, as outlined in the protectorate treaty. The residency also wanted to see all the sultan’s speeches in advance, and 164

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asked him to refrain from making political statements while in Tangier. The sultan was willing to have Labonne accompany him, but refused to allow him to introduce him to foreign officials. He argued that, since Tangier was not part of the French protectorate, there was no room for any sort of French involvement in his contacts with such officials. The sultan did agree to submit his speeches for advanced French approval, underlining that he did not intend to make any unusual statements while in Tangier.9 Ultimately, perhaps in an attempt to strengthen his ties with the sultan, which was part of the resident-general’s policy as outlined in chapter 6, Labonne approved the sultan’s trip, despite objections from his close advisers. The permission given to the sultan was described as a ‘calculated risk’, considering Labonne’s already shaky position in the French settler community and its widespread opposition to his reforms. Regardless of what the residency’s decision about the visit might have been, it is doubtful whether the French could have blocked the sultan’s trip, particularly at a time when Labonne was in need of support for his policies. Palace advisers shared this assessment. They argued that the French would be unable to avert the visit, if only because of the popular enthusiasm with which the sultan was greeted wherever he went, and the possible impact of the Moroccan public’s disappointment on the position of France in Morocco should the visit be cancelled.10 The sultan’s visit to Tangier was much more than a symbolic public journey. It became the first stage of a political campaign the sultan was about to wage against French rule in Morocco. The sultan’s previous measures already suggested his support of Moroccan nationalism and his rising objection to the protectorate, but did not directly confront him with the French. While French officials could in the past interpret the sultan’s statements and actions in a number of ways, the events and outcome of his visit to Tangier were indubitably a direct assault on France and its interests in Morocco. After the visit, Sidi Mohammed was clearly identified with Moroccan nationalism, and was viewed as a strong opponent of French colonial rule. The sultan reached the final decision to visit Tangier in mid-1946. Various rumours about the planned visit appeared in French newspapers. The sultan accepted French entreaties to postpone his journey until a final decision concerning Tangier’s future status could be reached. But once it became clear that such a decision was a long 165

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way off, Sidi Mohammed was determined not to wait any longer and to travel to Tangier in the spring of 1947. Questions about Tangier’s future induced the sultan to enter an arena in which he would be able to leave his mark as a political leader, without being overly concerned about France’s reaction. The residency saw the sultan’s involvement in Tangier as only strengthening France’s claim to the city. This view relied on the idea that the sultan would not pursue any policy without first securing French consent, but once Sidi Mohammed arrived in Tangier such an assumption turned out to be no longer realistic and a grave French miscalculation. In the months preceding his arrival in Tangier, the sultan’s involvement in nationalist politics increased. In February 1947 he demanded that nationalist groups unite their activities. Although the subsequent discussions between nationalist groups did not go very far, that they took place at all reflected the sultan’s position as a senior nationalist leader who could promote a common political agenda.11 The sultan’s decision to travel to Tangier also affected developments within Istiqlal. His visit took place during a period of disappointment with the party’s inability to present tangible results after two years of activity. Despite the party’s growth, French colonial rule continued, and the possibility of securing significant changes or reforms within the framework of the protectorate seemed unrealistic – even during Labonne’s tenure as resident-general. Early hopes of obtaining support from the USA or Britain were also dashed and, as a result, the party faced rising disappointment within its own ranks. Commentators who followed Istiqlal’s development pointed to the party’s ‘technical inability’ to confront changing political realities. This was one of the nationalists’ main weaknesses in the late 1940s and early 1950s.12 Others blamed the party for being too preoccupied with levelling accusations against the French, rather than working towards the nationalist goals of the Moroccan people.13 Internal disappointment within the party led to public ferment, which threatened Morocco’s domestic stability. One week before the sultan’s expected arrival in Tangier, the American consul in Casablanca warned against the rising impatience of nationalist circles, caused by their inability to realize their goals. The consul warned that such discontent could quickly degenerate into violence. Istiqlal became ever more committed to the idea of independence, and showed less and less faith in Labonne’s proposed reforms. The Ameri166

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can consul warned that, while the party leaders had until then behaved in a very responsible manner, he could now point to the existence of ‘fanatics’ who were beyond the leaders’ control and could severely disrupt the public order. Meanwhile, the situation in Morocco was becoming increasingly tense. Although no violent clashes between the French and the Moroccan population had been recorded since the 1944 riots, many observers feared that at the beginning of 1947 conditions were ripe for a new wave of violence. There seemed to be good deal of public anger against French colonial rule across Morocco, and the American consul warned that Istiqlal was rapidly reaching a point of no return in terms of violence. The sultan departed for Tangier as Morocco’s economic situation improved. Many sectors that had been affected during the war began to recuperate, and the country’s agriculture recorded improved harvests. The improved economic situation allowed many Moroccans to address the unsatisfactory political situation, a process that coincided with Istiqlal’s emergence on the Moroccan political scene. Morocco’s urban population was definitely ready for a new political message that could lead to political changes in the country. The sultan’s allusive statements in favour of Moroccan nationalism in Tangier were therefore a timely development, and answered some of the Moroccan public’s political needs and ambitions at the time. The sultan’s acts once again highlighted his ability to relate to his subjects’ needs, and his success at correctly reading the political map.

In Anticipation of the Sultan’s Visit The sultan’s expected arrival in Tangier was the source of great excitement, and political ferment increased after news of his planned visit reached the city. It was more than 50 years since the city’s residents had hosted a Moroccan monarch on an official visit and they started to prepare a festive welcome. City streets were festooned with nationalist symbols, homes were decorated with Moroccan flags and many residents planned to greet Sidi Mohammed personally upon his arrival.14 The flags and other symbols provided appropriate scenery for the sultan’s visit, which became a nationalist-inspired event. Throughout the colonial period, Tangier remained a political centre that absorbed nationalist leaders and activists who fled or were exiled from the French-controlled zone. The city’s international regime was more open to such political activity than the regime in the 167

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French zone. Tangier, for example, was the centre of the Moroccan Unity Party, led by Mekki Naciri. It was considered extreme in its positions, compared with other nationalist groups, for it opposed any form of future Moroccan cooperation with France. Although the party was not large, its more aggressive positions could only be articulated in a relatively liberal setting like Tangier.15 The sultan’s departure for Tangier was nearly postponed when violent riots erupted in Casablanca. These riots deeply disturbed senior residency officials who feared that they would spread to other cities. Even Labonne hesitated over whether to proceed with the planned trip in the wake of these clashes. He contended that it would be unwise to conduct such a charged visit in an atmosphere of unrest, and sought to postpone the trip. On the morning of Sidi Mohammed’s departure (9 April), the resident-general personally called on the sultan to suggest he postpone his visit. The sultan replied that the riots, in his opinion, were not serious enough to cause him to change his plans, and rejected Labonne’s request. The Casablanca riots were the most serious clashes between Moroccan Muslims and French security forces since the 1944 riots, underlining how strained Moroccan–French relations had become. Allal el-Fassi argued that the events in Casablanca directly affected the sultan’s conduct and statements during his visit to Tangier, and that under different circumstances the sultan would have refrained from making those comments.16 The origins of the riots were linked to a non-political argument over a street game between some members of the Senegalese police force (which served the residency) and a group of Moroccan teenagers. It was hardly credible that a simple quarrel could have such serious consequences. Although the argument between the two groups eventually quietened down, the Senegalese policemen began shooting indiscriminately at the crowd that had gathered around them, killing ten people in the fray. It was later reported that the French commanders of these forces had not appeared on the scene. Many Moroccans interpreted this as a licence to the Senegalese policemen to harm the local population, and it angered them greatly. Many demanded to know how such a massacre could have occurred; they were convinced that the entire incident was intended to sow turmoil in Moroccan society and prevent the sultan’s planned visit to Tangier. They relied on reports that local hospitals had been 168

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instructed several days earlier to discharge as many patients as possible to clear beds for the anticipated casualties. It was also reported that Muslim policemen were given the day off, even though it coincided with the Christian Easter holiday, which normally would have been a regular work day for them, and that the Senegalese forces were told to secure weapons.17 Istiqlal leaders set out immediately for Casablanca to avoid any further unrest. Party officials were eager to calm the situation in the city, and avoid any disruptions of the sultan’s planned trip. The visit to Tangier was extremely important to the party, which at that stage had no interest in further clashes between Moroccans and French security forces. Istiqlal leaders were able to avert the planned protests in Casablanca, but the tension and bitterness of many Muslims against the residency remained. While the sultan did not think that the clashes in Casablanca warranted changing his plans, they nonetheless overshadowed his trip to Tangier. Many residents in the Spanish zone began to collect donations with a view to assisting the victims and their families, and delivered them to the Moroccan monarch.18 The riots left a grim impression on the monarch and underlay his criticism of the French protectorate during his sojourn in Tangier. The protest voiced in his speeches was relatively low key, but nevertheless reflected the monarch’s frustration over the situation in Morocco, his personal status as the country’s leader and his deteriorating relations with the colonial administration. The sultan remained in Tangier from 9 to 13 April. Nationalist activists and local Istiqlal figures took the visit as an opportunity to strengthen their position. They increased their criticism and protests against the local government, demanding greater participation in local affairs and protesting against the authorities’ harsh approach to the Muslim population. They also demanded that the local administration take action against a number of social issues in Tangier, such as prostitution.19 This charged atmosphere already awaited the sultan as he embarked on his journey. The Istiqlal branch in Tangier began its preparations long before the sultan’s arrival. The party’s presence in the city was less extensive than in other Moroccan urban areas, and the upcoming royal visit provided an opportunity to expand Istiqlal’s activities. It also helped promote local support of the party and its ideology. The sultan’s visit 169

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also gave the party a chance to exhibit its organizational skills. As Allal el-Fassi recalled, the party organized groups of ushers responsible for maintaining public order throughout the visit. It also established a special information office, which distributed pamphlets containing reports about the visit.20 These actions strengthened the party’s position in Tangier and raised its profile among the city’s residents. The nationalist ferment, which was felt throughout the sultan’s visit to Tangier, began as the royal entourage made its way to the city. Earlier French concerns that the visit would become a nationalist frenzy proved to be true, as thousands of Moroccans gathered to cheer the sultan along the way to Tangier. The sultan made brief stops at several points throughout the journey, and was greeted warmly by local residents. These stops quickly became popular displays of support for the sultan. At one stop, in Asilah, the sultan was greeted by one speaker who noted that ‘Morocco is one nation with one sovereign’, and added that the Moroccans who lived in the Spanish zone expressed their allegiance to ‘the sultan … the commander of the faithful, and the only leader of Morocco’.21 Upon his arrival in Tangier, throngs of local residents enthusiastically greeted him. Thousands cheered as the sultan’s motorcade drove along the city streets, in a welcome el-Fassi described as ‘a glowing display of loyalty to the Moroccan crown and sovereign’. On the first evening of the sultan’s visit, spectacular fireworks compounded the festive atmosphere, which was evident even before the sultan gave his official opening speeches.22 During his stay in Tangier, the sultan gave four public speeches, which emphasized one message: Morocco was an Arab country and its leader, the sultan, was committed to securing the country’s political freedom and the personal liberty of his subjects. The monarch’s speeches emphasized his status as Morocco’s spiritual and temporal leader. Although the sultan had submitted the texts of his speeches for the residency’s approval, they generated a great deal of unrest. The already delicate ties between the sultan and the residency deteriorated further. The speeches attracted interest for what they lacked rather than for their actual content. Conspicuously absent were the customary expressions of support for France and of gratitude for its contributions to Morocco. Ever since the establishment of the protectorate, such comments had routinely been woven 170

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into royal speeches. Their omission, which was unusual, surprised and embarrassed the French, who had sought to prevent such an occurrence by approving the monarch’s speeches in advance. As agreed, Labonne read the speeches in advance and made a few corrections to make them more appealing to French ears. He suggested adding a sentence praising Morocco’s cooperation with France, to which the sultan agreed. But, at the last minute and without informing Labonne, Sidi Mohammed omitted the sentence from his speech. Although this appeared to be a spontaneous move by the sultan, Istiqlal argued that the omission of references to France had been planned in advance. Other commentators argued that the sultan had made this decision only after the Casablanca riots, and that they were not a calculated diplomatic manœuvre in which the sultan took advantage of the heated nationalist atmosphere to express his support for the idea of Moroccan independence.23 The sultan gave his first speech in Tangier on 10 April. He emphasized Morocco’s role in the Arab world and praised the newly established Arab League, thereby introducing the Moroccan public to the world of inter-Arab politics.24 Historically, Morocco’s ties to the Arab Middle East had been weak, so the sultan’s discussion of Morocco’s role in the Arab world opened new political horizons for the kingdom just when its struggle for independence was gaining ground and Moroccans were becoming more aware of ideas like Arab nationalism. Prior to 1947, Moroccan nationalist activity was detached from that of other Arab nationalist movements. Contrary to the residency’s allegations about cooperation between the Moroccan and other Arab nationalist movements, Istiqlal acted primarily on its own. Its leaders noted that they had been influenced by Arab nationalists, but repeatedly emphasized that their interests were exclusively Moroccan. By drawing attention in his speech to the link between Morocco and the Arab League, the sultan was signifying the direction in which he aimed to lead his country. A mere reference to the league was an affront to the French protectorate and an impediment to future relations between France and Morocco. The sultan argued that Morocco’s relations with other Arab countries were on a par with its ties to France. This statement was a further snub to France, which always claimed to have the upper hand in Morocco. The sultan’s position was the opening salvo of a barrage of critical comments against France. 171

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The sultan continued criticizing France, directly attacking the French ‘who burdened us with inequality and repression’, and praised the USA for ‘rescuing us from repression [during the Second World War]’. For French officials, the sultan’s comments on the USA added insult to injury. Since the sultan sought to express his gratitude to the USA in an effort to strengthen his ties with the Americans, the French considered his comments particularly irksome.25 On his second day in Tangier, the sultan emphasized his role as Morocco’s spiritual leader in a sermon delivered during Friday prayers at a local mosque. He reminded his audience that Islam guaranteed justice and personal freedom, thus adding a religious component to the political demands previously raised. During the latter part of the visit, the sultan publicly presented his offspring, who had accompanied him to Tangier. In that sense, the visit was not only political but also an opportunity to present the royal family and underline its public role. Several of the sultan’s children identified with Moroccan nationalism and openly discussed it during their stay in Tangier. The crown prince, Hassan, spoke of the need for national unity, while his sister, Leila Aisha raised similar themes when she appeared without a veil before her audience. Both her speech and her appearance were later cited by Moroccan women as important factors in their decision to join the nationalist movement.26 The sultan’s statements in Tangier could be considered as no more than mere hints at the monarch’s displeasure at the residency and its Morocco policies. The Tangier visit was another step backward in the deteriorating ties between the sultan and the residency, compounded by the fact that the visit occurred shortly after the Casablanca riots. Although Sidi Mohammed did not include any demand for independence in his speeches, his criticism of France and his use of terms such as personal liberty left no doubt among his audiences that the sultan was determined to bring the French protectorate to an end, and that he sought to restore Morocco’s full independence. In retrospect, the sultan’s speeches in Tangier do not seem dramatic. The importance attached to them at the time had more to do with what was excluded from them rather than their actual content. Nationalist leaders, as well as Moroccan writers who later 172

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described the visit, saw the sultan’s failure to mention France as an expression of support for the nationalist movement, for the abrogation of the protectorate treaty, and for Morocco’s independence. Nationalist publications, which praised the sultan’s courageous speeches in Tangier, expressed the sense of legitimacy many nationalist leaders felt. They had sought to receive some form of royal endorsement over the years, and considered the sultan’s appearance in Tangier to be his most significant public gesture towards Moroccan nationalism. Accordingly, they were interested in taking full advantage of the new situation, even though the sultan’s actual support of Istiqlal remained debatable.

Impact of the Sultan’s Visit on French Policy and on Istiqlal The events in Tangier had an immediate impact on French policy in Morocco. Labonne’s hopes that the visit would help promote his reform plan and increase local support for his policies were dashed. In that sense, the resident-general’s calculated risk in allowing the visit was a political error on his part. The Tangier visit affected the already tense relations between the sultan and the residency. In his remarks in Tangier, the sultan had dealt a final blow to any hopes for better relations between the residency and the monarchy. It was difficult to see how Sidi Mohammed could serve as a partner and ally of the French colonial administration in the changing circumstances. Observers commented that the sultan’s conduct in Tangier did not reflect political wisdom, and had damaged his image in the eyes of the French. Contrary to the earlier restraint and careful manner that had characterized his position vis-à-vis Moroccan nationalism up until then, the sultan expressed himself more freely in Tangier. A new stage in the relations between the sultan and the French residency had begun.27 Even if the sultan had, for some time now, been far from a close ally of the protectorate administration, France officially continued to consider him a positive force in Morocco. In the aftermath of the Tangier visit, the sense in the residency was that the sultan should from then on be viewed as an adversary rather than a partner. This approach became necessary for the continuation of French rule in Morocco, with the political situation expected to deteriorate even further. Indeed, residency officials now expressed considerable animosity towards the sultan, in a manner that would have been 173

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unthinkable previously. In a series of patronizing statements, officials described the sultan and his entourage as a group of ungrateful people, clearly unworthy of all the gestures and goodwill France had showered upon them over the years. Residency officials repeatedly referred to the corruption that underpinned all levels of Morocco’s ‘indigenous administration’. Others lamented France’s mistake in supporting the sultan, instead of strengthening ‘democratic tribal traditions’ that were viewed as a more appropriate framework for nurturing democracy in Morocco, a goal to which France was officially committed. The sultan and his advisers were seen as ‘feudal’ in their approach to public affairs, and if France had only promoted ‘the Moroccan people’s democratic instincts’ rather than the sultan, officials argued, their position in Morocco would have been entirely different. It was difficult to see how the French could continue to tolerate the sultan’s presence as a nationalist leader who implicitly challenged their rule in Morocco.28 Before attending to the sultan, however, French decision-makers had to confront the question of Labonne’s continued role as residentgeneral. Opposition to Labonne intensified among Morocco’s settler population after the visit. The sultan’s speeches and political conduct in Tangier were seen as an affront to France and a failure of Labonne’s conciliatory approach. The growing chorus of criticism of the resident-general made his removal almost inevitable. Labonne mentioned this to the sultan on their joint train ride back to Rabat from Tangier. The possibility of the resident-general’s removal worried many Moroccans, who were concerned that a tougher French policy towards Morocco might be implemented. The sultan was also concerned about Labonne’s removal, fearing that sooner or later the French would depose him as well.29 In the short term, the sultan’s remarks in Tangier did not defuse the situation in Morocco. For Labonne’s opponents, Sidi Mohammed’s visit to Tangier was the last straw in their criticism of Labonne’s liberal policies. Having aimed for some time to have the residentgeneral replaced, they found the opportunity to do so after the sultan’s departure from Tangier. The French government unanimously dismissed Labonne on 13 May. It was even more critical of the Moroccan monarch, depicting him as a leader who aspired to impose a theocracy on Morocco, and openly discussed the possibility of deposing him. Clearly, Moroccan–French relations had reached a low 174

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point.30 Labonne’s replacement, General Alphonse Juin, was known for his conservative views and was described as a ‘bitter enemy of North African nationalism’. Juin, it should be noted, was not a newcomer to Morocco and was well acquainted with the country and the protectorate. Having graduated from a French military academy in 1912, he was dispatched to Morocco and served under Lyautey, the first French Resident. He remained involved in the protectorate’s administration, while maintaining his military credentials in Morocco during the Second World War. Juin was highly regarded in France for his military expertise, and was considered a successful military figure.31 For the French government, the deteriorating situation in Morocco was yet another colonial failure. The events surrounding the sultan’s visit to Tangier overshadowed the grave economic difficulties France was facing at the time. The country suffered from a lack of credit and cash, which eroded consumer purchasing power; poor harvests, which further affected dwindling food supplies; and a wave of strikes that affected the country in the summer and autumn months of 1947. In an attempt to maintain the status quo, the French government adopted survival tactics that affected French policy in Morocco as well. Under these circumstances, to avert any further crises that might command its attention and resources, the government endeavoured to silence the rising discontent in Morocco as quickly as possible. It was this approach that led to Labonne’s dismissal. Later on, Labonne bitterly recalled that French settlers in Morocco had ‘celebrated’ his removal. Meanwhile, the political atmosphere in Morocco continued to deteriorate as the new resident-general assumed his post. In the months following his return from Tangier, Sidi Mohammed emerged as a political leader who initiated and participated in events that overshadowed, and in many ways even eclipsed, the nationalist party. The sultan’s institution of a women’s celebration one day after the official Throne Day holiday was one example of the monarchy’s new engagement with social groups that were not closely involved with the royal palace.32 The idea of reaching out to the country’s women was a departure from earlier traditions, and also made inroads into turf that had previously been Istiqlal’s domain. Once again, the monarchy seemed to be overshadowing Istiqlal. The ramifications of the sultan’s visit to Tangier were evident at the Throne Day celebrations, which took place six months later. The 1947 festivities were particularly noteworthy, as the sultan celebrated 175

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his twentieth anniversary on the throne. Large crowds participated in the celebrations. Although the tension between the monarchy and the residency was well known, the colonial administration officially maintained a conciliatory approach to the sultan. In his Throne Day greetings, the sultan acknowledged the friendship between Morocco and France, but in another speech, Sidi Mohammed emphasized his commitment to progress and reforms, which would lead to ‘the realization of our aspirations and will permit us to enjoy real democracy which is the lot of the nations of the present era’.33 These remarks gave little indication that the sultan was reconsidering the political direction he had officially adopted in Tangier. France remained concerned about the sultan’s activities, particularly since Sidi Mohammed became more openly identified with the nationalist movement. The Throne Day celebrations in 1948 were marred by residency attempts to restrict them. Istiqlal charged that the residency distributed leaflets calling on Muslims to refrain from taking part in the festivities. The leaflets also noted that traditionally Morocco had not organized such commemorations, and that the celebrations were a source of ridicule to foreigners who observed them. According to this text, they also contradicted the spirit of progress that Morocco had embraced in the modern era. These claims suggested a shift in France’s policy towards the sultan, which had previously promoted him as a central component of the protectorate. The leaflets suggested that France was reconsidering its former focus on the sultan. In any case, the leaflets had little impact on the celebrations, which went ahead as usual. The official speeches delivered by the sultan and the resident-general suggested that both sides attempted to improve relations. Istiqlal activists were concerned that the sultan was withdrawing from his earlier support for their cause, due to pressure from the residency and the lack of support he received from other countries. Regardless, Morocco’s nationalists continued to view the sultan as their leader.34 While Istiqlal enthusiastically welcomed the sultan’s indirect endorsement of its nationalist ideology in Tangier, the question of whether the monarch would now become the symbol and leading figure in the country’s nationalist struggle at the party’s expense remained open. In their reaction to the Tangier visit, Istiqlal leaders emphasized that their party had always fought for the goals the sultan specified. They expected the party to grow stronger after the visit, 176

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and to establish itself as the uncontested leading nationalist organization, which would also include social and welfare programmes. A special party communiqué, issued after the visit, reiterated the party’s position as a faithful expression of Moroccan demands, and stressed its determination to conduct a non-violent struggle for independence. In a similar vein, al-ʿAlam adopted the line after the visit that a new stage in Morocco’s struggle had begun.35 It is noteworthy, however, that despite Istiqlal’s enthusiasm, the sultan did not express his direct support for the party, or for any other political organization while in Tangier. The speeches he gave there were not the beginning of a symbolic alliance with the party, contrary to what many Istiqlal activists believed at the time, and unlike what was later written in studies of Moroccan nationalism.36 His comments expressed the sultan’s support for Moroccan independence and for his position as Morocco’s senior political leader, but did not catapult the monarch into a leadership position within the Istiqlal party. The sultan’s associates noted upon returning from Tangier that the monarch did not see himself as the leader of any party, but sought instead to lead the Moroccan people from a perspective that would stand out against all political disputes. The sultan maintained this approach and solidified his independent political leadership, a stance that would over time affect Istiqlal’s standing. The sultan’s identification with nationalist ideology did not conceal the fact that Istiqlal could still not show any concrete results in its struggle against colonial rule. Although the party had become an important element in national politics, it was still nowhere near realizing the goal of independence. The French protectorate was still intact and had no intention of altering its activities in Morocco. Labonne’s reform plans had been discarded and, after his dismissal, France had imposed a tougher policy towards Morocco. It remained unclear how the party would function within the political system and whether it would engage in a dialogue with the residency. The sultan was clearly in a better position to carry out such activities. Observers who followed events in Morocco considered the monarch to be the only force that would be able to achieve a new political arrangement for the country’s future.37 This approach was similar to the earlier French colonial view of the sultan, which had also endorsed the monarchy as the sole political entity worthy of their attention. As the sultan’s nationalist orientation became more obvious, the need for 177

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political parties that could promote the goal of independence decreased. Meanwhile, France gave no indication that it was willing to negotiate with Moroccan nationalist leaders. According to one Moroccan source, by the early 1950s Istiqlal’s situation had become desperate.38 At a press conference during a visit to Stockholm in 1952, Allal el-Fassi warned that if the French government failed to recognize Morocco’s legal right to independence, members of his party (which he claimed numbered two million) would turn to violence.39 He also warned that if the United Nations once again refused to discuss the Moroccan question (after two earlier attempts to place Morocco on its agenda had failed), events in Morocco would take a turn for the worse. El-Fassi’s comments differed from the remarks he made to party activists several years earlier, when he opposed the use of violence and emphasized Istiqlal’s commitment to a non-violent struggle. But, persistent French repression and the lack of any significant progress led the party to consider violence to achieve its goals. A study by US diplomats on the situation in French Morocco at the time warned that, as the movement expanded its membership and became more experienced with opposition tactics, French policy towards the nationalist movement was becoming less realistic. The study warned that a point might be reached when moderate nationalists were pushed towards violence.40 Meanwhile, the sultan’s position as a national leader remained intact. In the aftermath of the Tangier visit, every public appearance he made became a pageant of support for Moroccan nationalism and a popular endorsement of the sultan and his family. One example of this was a prayer gathering in Casablanca (June 1947), which included a mass welcome for the sultan and his family. Moroccan flags and pictures of the sultan adorned the city streets, and thousands cheered as the monarch made his way to the mosque. While public support for the sultan increased, the residency retained its disdain for the monarch and France sought to undermine his prestige. Nationalist activists contended that they found the French position towards the sultan unacceptable, adding that the monarch himself was unhappy about the situation.41 Such sentiments underlay the sultan’s position as a national leader and the support he received from nationalist activists. Expressions of support for the sultan had now become a central component of nationalist political activity, providing yet 178

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another example of how Moroccan nationalists subordinated their political aspirations to the sultan’s, and paid less attention to their own political needs. By the end of the 1940s Istiqlal had grown tremendously and had built a hierarchical internal structure. The party nevertheless appeared to be at a critical juncture. Its leaders remained largely identified with the prosperous urban population, causing some groups within Moroccan society to sense that their interests were being neglected by the nationalist leaders. Istiqlal was also affected by its inability to present tangible results in its struggle against the French, while France’s policies towards Morocco had not only not eased, but had in fact become tougher. The party’s efforts to recruit international support for its cause were also unsuccessful. At the very time when the party faced numerous questions about its internal structure and its diplomatic activities, the sultan emerged as a central political figure, dwarfing all political movements in Morocco. The sultan’s identification with Moroccan nationalism helped promote the idea of independence, even though it was not beneficial to the development of Istiqlal. By the end of the 1940s, the party’s efforts resembled a public interest group involved in education and cultural activities, rather than a leading political party.42 In the aftermath of the sultan’s visit to Tangier, Istiqlal remained in the shadow of the monarchy. The party’s internal dynamics were no longer the main narrative of Moroccan nationalism. The sultan’s actions would from now on capture almost all the attention. It is unclear to what extent Istiqlal’s leaders were aware of this outcome, or considered its impact on the development of their party.

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8 An Intensified Nationalist Struggle: The Crisis of 1950–51

A

lthough Istiqlal and the Moroccan nationalists gained political momentum in the late 1940s, little changed in the French residency’s policies. Broadly speaking, France did not initiate a new approach to Morocco and did not adapt to the postwar international reality. As a result, France faced rising internal ferment in Morocco, and focused international attention on events there. France’s stagnant policy and unwillingness to initiate conciliatory gestures towards the Moroccan public drove Istiqlal to step up its criticism of the residency and intensify its demand for independence. Istiqlal reacted angrily to the new resident-general Juin’s speech before the Moroccan Government Council in 1949, which did not include any promises of change in French policy. After Juin’s appointment it quickly became evident that he conformed to the French settlers’ earlier expectations of him. He opposed French concessions towards Morocco, and had no intention of pursuing his predecessor Labonne’s liberal-oriented reforms. Juin did not have to face any interventions by the French government, which was preoccupied with domestic affairs at the time.1 Istiqlal, for its part, maintained its anti-French position. It reiterated the claim that, contrary to the protectorate treaty, France had instituted direct colonial rule in Morocco, which weakened the Moroccan government and affected the sultan’s sovereignty. The party also criticized Juin’s comment on France’s supposed ‘mission’ in Morocco, which he defined as bringing the Moroccan people to the capacity of administering themselves. The party asserted that Morocco had not relinquished its sovereignty with the protectorate treaty, and never discarded its ability to manage its own affairs. That 181

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Morocco needed technical help, they argued, should not be an obstacle to realizing its sovereignty. ‘The protectorate is nothing more than a form of colonialism which cannot be adapted to the spirit of the United Nations charter.’ Istiqlal’s statement also asserted that if France were indeed interested in respecting its agreements and establishing true friendship with the Moroccan people, it must immediately abrogate the 1912 treaty and recognize Morocco’s indeendence.2 While expressing their lack of confidence in the residency’s policies, Istiqlal leaders continued to promote the idea of independence. Their frustration over the lack of progress was evident. At a nationalist rally in Tangier, held in December 1949, Allal el-Fassi expressed this frustration, while noting that ‘we do not believe whatever General Juin has to tell us. We want acts, not words.’ He declared that Morocco would be independent ‘whether the French like it or not’, and emphasized that the responsibility for achieving independence was up to the Moroccans and no one else.3 This statement contradicted party efforts to bring the Moroccan question before the United Nations and to recruit international support for its struggle; it also suggested that Istiqlal was aware of the need to continue rallying the Moroccan public behind its cause. In early 1950 Istiqlal focused on events in the Spanish-controlled zone of Morocco, and began to consider its position on Spanish Morocco’s future. This irked Juin, who was now forced to consider Spanish demands that the French should confront Moroccan nationalist aspirations in their zone. Istiqlal’s criticism of the Spanish colonial regime was similar to its criticism of the French. The party protested against the repressive colonial administration, the lack of civil rights and a flagrant violation of the agreements that led to the Spanish protectorate’s establishment.4 A sense of frustration over a lack of any political progress in the Spanish zone compounded these allegations. Besides the lack of diplomatic progress, the party faced internal difficulties. A glaring problem confronting Istiqlal was the absence of a recognized leadership, which impeded the party’s development. Istiqlal lacked a clear hierarchy, which affected its ability to function effectively. It nevertheless maintained its harsh criticism of French rule. In a Tangier rally commemorating Istiqlal’s 1944 manifesto, Allal el-Fassi adopted a firm approach by attacking French and Spanish 182

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imperialist policies, adding that their repressive measures against the Moroccan people were intolerable. El-Fassi also mentioned the lack of any progress within the nationalist struggle. Although six years had passed since the party’s manifesto was issued, Istiqlal did not receive any substantial response from the residency concerning its demand for independence. Even the residency’s limited administrative reforms, announced after the 1944 riots, were not implemented. ElFassi again raised the option of turning to violence if necessary, despite the party’s preference for pursuing non-violent tactics.5 Another indication of the intensifying nationalist rhetoric was the distribution of nationalist leaflets at the beginning of 1950 in reaction to Juin’s remarks about the situation in Morocco. Istiqlal had not issued these leaflets. Their criticism of the residency was far more intense than the party’s more measured approach. Clearly, the tension in Morocco was rising.6 This chapter discusses developments within Istiqlal in the early 1950s, and the intensifying nationalist struggle during this period.

Istiqlal’s Involvement with the Working Class While Istiqlal’s leadership and activists remained largely identified with the more affluent urban population, other groups such as organized labour, which had become involved with the party, felt that their interests were being overlooked. These sentiments reflected the party’s growing diversity in the early 1950s. Istiqlal expanded its areas of interest and intensified its activities among organized groups of workers. These groups were the products of a new social and economic reality, and of the process of industrialization and urbanization during the protectorate period. Scores of young migrants, from rural areas and in search of employment, became increasingly interested in political questions. Istiqlal took an interest in these groups, adopting their growing demand for the establishment of recognized trade unions.7 Moroccans were not allowed to establish such organizations. The residency had banned them because the colonial administration feared they would become potent centres of protest that would undermine domestic stability in Morocco. Initially, many Moroccan nationalists were not overly interested in the question of Moroccan trade unions, arguing that they constituted an inappropriate forum for promoting the nationalist cause. Some were also concerned that they would be influenced 183

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by communism, which they opposed. In March 1945, after pressure on the residency, Moroccan workers were allowed to participate in activities organized by the French-run Union générale des syndicats confédérés du Maroc, but were barred from joining the union. Over time, this union became more ‘Moroccanized’, thus increasingly attracting the attention of Istiqlal.8 For the first time in its history, the party participated in the 1 May workers’ holiday in 1950, demonstrating a growing interest in this sector. The party dispatched one of its rising leaders, Mehdi Ben Barka, to participate in a 1 May rally in Rabat. Ben Barka was regarded as one of Istiqlal’s promising young activists. In his speech, he emphasized that both Istiqlal and the sultan took a great interest in the welfare of the working class and its ambitions, and highlighted the Moroccan workers’ right to form a union. He also declared that the party would never abandon its struggle for independence. Ben Barka left the rally immediately after delivering his speech, careful to avoid later events organized by the Communist Party.9 It was also reported that Istiqlal activists participated in the May Day celebrations in Casablanca, where they were warmly greeted. The party’s daily, al-ʿAlam, covered these and similar events extensively. The newspaper devoted space to the meaning of 1 May to Moroccan workers and Moroccan society in general. One such item was an interview with the secretary of the Moroccan railway union’s chapter in the city of Meknes. He noted that ‘for us, 1 May has no festive meaning since we are not free to celebrate it’. He coupled the ‘colonial exploitation that had been going on for 38 years’ and that was ‘only getting worse’, with the struggle of all workers for their rights. While these comments did not make any mention of Istiqlal, they indicated the association of ideas and demands raised by an emerging working class with nationalist ideals. Concomitantly, Istiqlal continued to attract workers to its ranks. The activities of Abderrahmane Youssoufi among Casablanca workers highlighted these efforts. Youssoufi (who became Morocco’s prime minister in the late 1990s) grew close to groups of urban workers, and introduced them to Istiqlal and its goals. In a series of meetings, he emphasized how Morocco’s independence would improve the workers’ standard of living and ameliorate their situation. Istiqlal’s main message was that a successful nationalist struggle would improve their living conditions. Seeking to prove that 184

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the party took these goals seriously, Youssoufi initiated a number of cultural and welfare-related projects that would serve the working class. He established a soccer team for workers, alongside a special assistance fund aimed at improving the financial situation of many workers. This combination of nationalist rhetoric and workers’ demands gained traction within Istiqlal. An article published in 1950 in al-ʿAlam discussed the demands of Moroccan workers to end ‘French tyranny’, and described the efforts of Casablanca workers to establish their own union.10 But, despite such apparent concern, Istiqlal did not become a proletarian party. It was unclear to what extent party leaders identified with the emerging working class or how eager they were to incorporate such issues in party activities. They largely refrained from adopting a radical ideological platform, and adhered to demands that did not directly threaten Morocco’s social order but were nevertheless important to workers. This mixture of nationalist ideals with some of the workers’ demands continued to command Istiqlal’s attention in the early 1950s. A party newsletter distributed in January 1951 included an article on the worsening conditions of Moroccan railway workers, claiming that the residency intended to reduce their numbers and avoid promoting Moroccans to senior positions. Istiqlal criticized the railway company for offering various perks to its European workers at the expense of its Moroccan employees. Another article in the newsletter discussed the rising cost of living in Morocco and the declining purchasing power of Moroccan workers. 11 The May Day celebrations continued to attract the party’s interest. An al-ʿAlam article published on 1 May 1951 emphasized the need to ‘combine the social liberation of Moroccan industrial and agricultural workers’ with the political struggle for Moroccan independence. Cooperation with Moroccan workers, according to the article, was not an ad hoc decision but a matter of principle. As part of its involvement with Moroccan workers, Istiqlal dispatched a delegation to the sultan, aimed at advancing the workers’ arguments and supporting the monarch’s dispute with the residency over Moroccan participation in French-led trade unions.12 In 1952, al-ʿAlam devoted its entire 1 May edition to the struggle of Moroccan workers for stable working conditions. The newspaper reflected the party line, which combined the political struggle against the French with the fight against Morocco’s socioeconomic plight. In an article entitled ‘The Holiday of 185

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Union and Struggle’, the author stressed the need to combine questions about the class struggle with achieving political freedom. Other articles in that edition, written by labour activists, also linked Moroccan workers’ struggle for professional rights to the struggle for ‘the country’s revival’. Al-ʿAlam continued to cover news and developments among Moroccan workers, indicating Istiqlal’s interest in them. A weekly section entitled ‘the workers’ page’ reported the activities of organized workers across Morocco. The articles focused on the double challenge of workers’ groups that were fighting simultaneously for their professional rights and against the residency’s repressive policies. Their struggle, according to al-ʿAlam, went well beyond an ideological dispute over workers’ rights.13 While the party seemed to take a greater interest in Moroccan workers, who in turn embraced nationalist ideals, it was unclear to what extent Moroccan workers identified with Istiqlal as a political organization. Once again, there appeared to be a gap between general support for Moroccan independence and active involvement with the Istiqlal party. The sultan was also closely following developments concerning Moroccan workers. As in other instances, however, he remained at this stage largely above the fray, perceiving his role to be that of a national leader who would not become directly involved in such questions. In an attempt to expand its activities among Moroccan workers, the party held discussions in the summer of 1950 about how to orient Istiqlal in new directions. Party officials agreed at a special meeting to try and distance workers from communist propaganda and engage them in party life. Istiqlal adopted Secretary-General Belafrej’s plan to initiate a widespread literacy campaign across Morocco, including a special ten-week course taught by party members to develop basic reading skills. Although this programme was aimed at men, a parallel track was also established for women. Party membership was not a prerequisite for registration, but Istiqlal members were given priority. By most accounts, the programme was successful. The number of participants was estimated at 100,000, and their exposure to the party through these classes was widely acknowledged.14 For Istiqlal’s executive committee, the literacy programme was part of a quiet revolution aimed at expanding the party’s support base and transforming Istiqlal’s image as a distant, elitist group to that of an accessible, central component of Moroccan public life. This pro186

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gramme’s success was clearly a source of satisfaction for the party, but it also raised questions about Istiqlal’s position among the broader Moroccan population.15 That the party felt the need to focus its energies on such enterprises suggests that Istiqlal still found it difficult to establish its presence as a prominent political organization, even six years after its establishment. It seemed that the party had a long way to go to gain the popular acceptance its leaders sought. Meanwhile, the party faced increased French repression of its activities. The censorship imposed in 1950 on al-ʿAlam was so severe that most of the newspaper’s editions contained blank columns and pages, along with the caption ‘disqualified by censorship’.16 Throughout that year, according to the newspaper’s accounts, the censor blocked 184 editorials, 109 readers’ letters and 105 feature articles. On average, three items were disqualified by the censor every two days. The editors of al-ʿAlam openly noted their difficulties with the French censor, and the extent of their frustration caused by the censor’s ‘tyrannical scissors’. The censorship against al-ʿAlam was so severe that the newspaper’s management took legal action against the French residency in 1950. The suit filed was a reaction to French demands for clarifications, corrections and the retraction of a critical article.17 This did not help the party in spreading its views among the public. As part of an effort to circumvent French censorship, Istiqlal began to distribute a mimeographed newsletter toward the end of 1950. Its main objective was to inform the public about political and economic events – information that was mostly censored. Istiqlal attached great significance to the newsletter, and viewed it as an important way to interact with the public. Its 10,000 copies were distributed on a biweekly basis; it contained news items and articles that criticized European colonialism, and could therefore not be printed in al-ʿAlam. At first, the residency did not act against its publication, but after the third newsletter was published, Istiqlal’s acting secretary-general was summoned to a Rabat court and charged with violating protectorate censorship and press laws.18 While the party encountered difficulties in reaching out to the public, it was far more successful in organizing its ranks. By 1950 it could take pride in its strong, efficient internal structure. Istiqlal members were channelled to clandestine cells, each of which was 187

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overseen by a six-member senior executive committee. The number of members in each cell varied from city to city. Larger cells in Rabat, for example, included close to 100 members. At the next level was the Comité supérieur, which consisted of 35 members. The total number of party membership was unclear, but was estimated at between 50,000 and 80,000. Party members did not carry any sort of membership identification, and membership lists were carefully guarded to avoid French harassment. While Istiqlal claimed a larger number of members and supporters, these still constituted a small percentage of the Moroccan public, as the French repeatedly emphasized. Most Moroccans, particularly those in rural areas, remained indifferent to the nationalist struggle and were essentially apolitical. Istiqlal could still take pride in the fact that its supporters represented a small but significant social stratum that was interested in political affairs, but could not yet claim to be an all-encompassing Moroccan nationalist party.19 Another indication of Istiqlal’s rising prominence on the Moroccan political stage was the effort Mohamed Hassan Ouazzani invested in uniting his breakaway nationalist party with it. In a letter to Istiqlal’s acting secretary-general (9 February), Ouazzani noted the importance of obtaining complete independence for Morocco, and suggested that both parties examine ways to engage in joint activities to realize this goal. Istiqlal reacted coolly to this idea, suspicious of the motives behind Ouazzani’s political initiative. They were altogether ambivalent about Ouazzani, particularly about his meetings with residency officials, which raised questions about his authenticity as a nationalist leader.20 The number of activists in Ouazzani’s party was also small, which made it easy for Istiqlal to dismiss his party. Despite its structural and leadership deficiencies, Istiqlal remained Morocco’s leading nationalist party throughout the early 1950s. It was during this period that the party absorbed new personalities, such as Mehdi Ben Barka. These new personalities would eventually alter the composition of Istiqlal’s leadership.

New Istiqlal Personalities: The Rise of Mehdi Ben Barka Istiqlal’s wish to reach out to Morocco’s emerging working class affected the composition of its leadership. The party’s activities led to the rise of new leaders, who assumed prominent positions in Istiqlal’s hierarchy and changed the nature of Morocco’s nationalist leadership. 188

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Among these new figures, whose background differed from that of veteran nationalists, was Mehdi Ben Barka. Over time, Ben Barka became one of Morocco’s most fascinating political figures. His life story and mysterious assassination in 1965 remain a source of interest inside Morocco and abroad. Moroccan historiography underlines Ben Barka’s complex and frequently misunderstood personality. Ben Barka differed from other Istiqlal leaders, not only in his personal background, political philosophy and social positions, but also in his political activities, which exceeded his local activities in Morocco.21 Like many others, Ben Barka, born in 1920 and a native of Rabat, became interested in nationalist politics at the young age of 14. He assumed prominence in the nationalist movement and, at the age of 24, was one of the youngest to sign Istiqlal’s petition. One biographical study of his life labelled him a product of his time, influenced by French colonial rule, compounded by Moroccan traditional mores. Ben Barka came from a modest background, but managed to seize opportunities generally associated with colonial rule. He was among the few Moroccans accepted to a French school, where he was exposed to the French language and to a very different social environment from the one into which he had been born. He excelled in his studies and later attended a French university in Algiers. Upon completing his studies, Moroccan nationalist leaders asked him to return home to take an active role in nationalist politics. He was hired as a secondary-school teacher and worked as a private tutor in the royal palace, where he taught Crown Prince Hassan.22 His close relations with the royal family clearly played a role in the sultan’s rising interest in nationalist politics. Following the sultan’s request in 1943, Ben Barka wrote a report recommending that girls be given a modern education. The sultan endorsed the report, and dismissed opposition to the idea that came from religious clerics. Although it is difficult to assess the extent of Ben Barka’s influence over the developing relationship between Istiqlal and the palace, it undoubtedly helped introduce the party’s ideology to the sultan. While still at school, Ben Barka began to formulate his ideas about Morocco’s future. He was more interested in the country’s present and future than in glorifying its past, as many nationalist leaders did. His views departed from the consensus. Ben Barka had reservations about the nationalist demand to promote Arabic as a language and felt disinclined to reject French culture in toto. His positions on a number 189

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of other issues were also unusual. The most glaring contrast between him and other nationalist leaders concerned the monarchy’s place in public life. Unlike leaders such as el-Fassi, who sanctified the monarchy’s centrality, Ben Barka advocated the need to reorganize Morocco’s political balance in a way that would assign a greater role to political parties and reduce the monarchy’s influence on public life.23 He employed terms such as ‘popular sovereignty’ in his speeches. He called for free general elections, alongside a comprehensive agrarian reform, the development of Morocco’s infrastructure, and a political struggle for national independence. Ben Barka placed sensitive social issues at the centre of the country’s political agenda. It should be noted that many of Ben Barka’s positions developed much later, after Morocco’s independence. During the struggle for independence, Ben Barka was adamant that it would be impossible to guarantee Morocco’s political stability without the sultan, and therefore largely adhered to the party’s consensus. He gained prominence in the early years of the party’s power struggle, when many of its senior leaders were imprisoned or exiled, and the need for talented leaders was particularly acute.24 Among his early social and political activities was the establishment of youth sports centres in less affluent urban areas, which reflected Ben Barka’s broader interest in reaching out to these groups. He published articles on political and national questions and gained prominence as a nationalist leader. Ben Barka was among Istiqlal’s founders, but unlike other nationalist leaders, the French authorities did not immediately arrest him and he was therefore able to pursue his political activities for a while. Later on, however, he was arrested and sentenced to a two-year prison term. After his release, Ben Barka returned to nationalist politics, becoming a well-known public speaker and commentator. He turned out to be a charismatic leader, surrounded by enthusiastic supporters. His appointment as the party’s administrative secretary furthered his political advancement. Although Ben Barka became known as Istiqlal’s ‘conscience’, he was still somewhat removed from other party leaders, who were less comfortable with his political orientation, and his more radical social and economic positions. Nevertheless, a growing number of party supporters saw him as a prominent, popular leader. After Allal elFassi’s departure for Cairo in 1947, where he coordinated Istiqlal’s diplomatic activities, Ben Barka remained as one of the last prominent 190

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nationalist figures in Morocco.25 Following the 1951 crisis in Morocco (see below), Ben Barka was arrested and sentenced to ‘internal exile’ in a remote southwestern Moroccan village. He remained largely isolated from political life until his release in 1954. Meanwhile, however, he had already become established as a unique nationalist leader, the ‘son of the people’, who would continue to contribute to Istiqlal’s expansion and its struggle for national independence. At this stage of its development, Istiqlal’s leadership remained diversified. The party lacked an official senior leader. Although Ahmed Belafrej maintained his position as the party’s secretarygeneral, his rank was no higher than that of other leading figures, such as Allal el-Fassi. El-Fassi was highly regarded among party members and had achieved a special, almost spiritual position within the party (reflected in his Arabic title of al-zaʿīm, the leader). Belafrej was recognized as the party’s organizational boss, while el-Fassi was seen as the senior ideological leader who embodied the party’s positions. But el-Fassi, who at that point was based outside Morocco, found it difficult to maintain contact with party leaders and activists, and was somewhat removed from its ongoing activities.26 Throughout the year 1950, the residency continued to repress all Istiqlal activities, seeking to remove the party from the political arena. Residency officials maintained that the party lacked widespread support. Activists were barred from travelling outside the French-controlled zone, and even small political gatherings held in private homes were forbidden. These measures reflected the residency’s discomfort with Istiqlal and the growing support for its demands for independence.

The Sultan’s Deteriorating Relations with the Residency: The 1950–51 Crisis and its Impact on Istiqlal In the autumn of 1950, the Moroccan monarch made new political demands on the French government during a visit to France. These demands were a reaction to France’s unwillingness to consider any political change in Morocco. The speech delivered by Juin in November 1949 was particularly irksome to Sidi Mohammed. Juin mentioned the possibility of establishing a joint French–Moroccan sovereignty in Morocco. The sultan considered this suggestion a violation of Morocco’s sovereignty and an affront to his own position. He was determined to end Juin’s tenure and have him replaced. 191

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Sidi Mohammed left for Paris in October 1950, bitter and disappointed with the residency’s policies. Relations between the residency and palace had already deteriorated prior to the sultan’s visit – a consequence of a mutual lack of confidence. The sultan hoped to find a sympathetic ear among French government ministers in Paris, despite his experiences during earlier visits to the French capital, which did not yield significant changes in French policy.27 While the French seemed intent on reducing Sidi Mohammed’s role as a national leader, they also appeared resolved to revive their relations with the sultan. Istiqlal was already aware of these French expectations prior to the monarch’s departure. Although the party refrained from openly expressing its unease over the possibility of improved relations between the sultan and the residency, it was worried that the sultan would ‘defect’ and abandon his support for the nationalist cause. From a French perspective, the sultan’s visit was unsuccessful. Although the sultan held talks with senior French officials, and impressed his hosts with his moderate positions, the two sides were unable to issue a joint statement. The French were powerless to renew the former spirit of cooperation they had established in the past, and confronted a Moroccan monarch determined to change France’s policies in Morocco. The sultan’s statements during the visit were harsher than the memorandum presented to the French government. Sidi Mohammed was unable to convince his French interlocutors about the need to amend relations between France and Morocco, while the French mistakenly thought they would be able to appease the sultan by making the same vague promises for reforms as in the past. French president Auriol, who met the sultan, felt that the Moroccan monarch was ‘rather fair’ in his approach; the visit nevertheless only exacerbated the tense relations between the sultan and the French.28 In a statement at the end of the visit, Auriol noted the ‘difference in opinion’ between the two sides. He demanded a ‘general revision’ in Moroccan–French relations, which in his opinion was the only way to place these ties on a ‘more sane and stable foundation’.29 The content of the sultan’s memorandum on this topic was leaked to the public even before the sultan left for France, which strengthened the widespread public support in Morocco for the sultan’s political leadership. Istiqlal immediately joined the sultan’s struggle and spread his message across Morocco. 192

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Despite the growing disagreement with France, the sultan still publicly stated that he was confident that a new agreement could be reached that would define and improve relations between the two countries. France’s president also felt that some sort of entente with the sultan was feasible, noting in his personal journal that ‘the sultan asked to change his former policy, and that is what is important.’30 The sultan, however, was disappointed with the official French response. The French government promised reforms, but dismissed the sultan’s request to redefine Moroccan–French relations.31 Juin’s May 1950 recommendations to the French foreign ministry regarding French policy in Morocco reflected that approach. He suggested incorporating a larger number of Moroccans into the management of state affairs, along with expanding local government structures (whose powers were still strictly advisory). These measures were to make it possible for more Moroccans to become involved in public life, but they did not come close to Istiqlal’s demands for independence or for shifting the management of their lives onto the shoulders of the Moroccans themselves.32 French president Auriol was angry about Juin’s recommendations, noting that they were a far cry from the generally accepted concept of a protectorate. He was furious at the way the residency preferred to humiliate the sultan, rather than cooperate with him. Auriol wrote in his personal journal that the residency suffered from ‘terrible stupidity’. He agreed with some of the sultan’s complaints and blamed Juin for pursuing a misguided policy in Morocco, which did much damage to France.33 Such comments point to the widening gap between the residency in Morocco and the French government in Paris. The sultan’s unsuccessful visit to France in October 1950 raised the level of tension in Morocco, further affecting the negligible Moroccan trust in France.34 The tension reached new heights in the winter of 1950–51, when a new crisis broke out between the residency and the sultan. The crisis concerned the nationalist party’s status and it was compounded by the growing involvement in politics of Thami el-Glaoui, the pasha of Marrakech. Residency officials increased their attacks on Istiqlal, asserting that they did not oppose the party’s nationalist goals, but were against the methods it employed. They blamed Istiqlal for embracing terror and dismissed its legitimacy as a political organization and social movement. Publicly, French officials continued to downplay the party’s strength, arguing that it represented no more 193

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than a group of black-market merchants. But, despite such dismissive remarks, Istiqlal’s ideology had become a serious threat to the residency and to French rule in Morocco. This concern led the French to increase their repressive measures against the party and was the backdrop of the new crisis between the residency and the sultan. The crisis began at a Government Council debate in 1950. This advisory forum served the colonial administration, mostly as a rubber stamp to approve its policies. During a December meeting, convened to discuss the residency’s proposed budget, a number of Moroccan council members who supported Istiqlal criticized the budget, arguing that it only served the protectorate’s policies. Juin, reacting angrily to this criticism, stated that he would not allow the council to criticize France. In response, 11 Moroccan council members left the meeting and headed for the royal palace, where the sultan officially welcomed them. Although this was not an earth-shaking development, the residency saw it as yet another anti-French measure endorsed by the sultan. This development emphasized once again how the palace, and not Istiqlal, had become the focal point of nationalist politics.35 El-Glaoui’s growing prominence further exacerbated the rising tension between the residency and the monarchy. Within a very short time he had become a force that openly threatened the sultan’s position and the political order in Morocco. El-Glaoui was a prominent tribal leader in the High Atlas region who attracted much French media attention. By the time of Istiqlal’s establishment, el-Glaoui was recognized as a towering figure on Morocco’s political landscape, and as someone who allied himself with the French from the early stages of the protectorate. The Glaoui clan had supported the French as they consolidated their rule in Morocco and its leader was rewarded with an appointment as the sultan’s representative in Marrakech. He also benefited from French economic policies, and consolidated his own personal wealth through corrupt land deals. Throughout the 1920s he acquired large estates around Marrakech. He was disinterested in modernizing and reforming the state, guided almost entirely by selfinterest. El-Glaoui thus became a well-known figure at home and abroad, with an uncompromising attitude towards those who opposed him. Despite his personal style of government, el-Glaoui was heavily dependent on France. Much of his support for France over the years was seen as opportunistic, motivated primarily by materialistic interests. Morocco’s King Hassan later described him as an example of 194

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‘anachronistic feudalism’, a relic of a bygone political era, ‘an egotistical person … who would do anything to defend his privileges’.36 In the early 1950s, the residency began to promote el-Glaoui, whom it viewed as a useful opponent to the sultan and Istiqlal. To the French, el-Glaoui represented the local tribal leaders who were concerned about the rise of a new nationalist leadership that could threaten their political power. At that point, however, el-Glaoui was still very much a local leader and far from being a national figure. For the time being, he acted against nationalist politics in the region under his control, but very quickly became entangled in a serious clash with the sultan. The deteriorating relations between el-Glaoui and the sultan at the end of 1950 were an indication that the Marrakech pasha was interested in creating domestic opposition to the sultan, and was being indirectly encouraged by the French. By 1953 his rivalry had become a real threat to Sidi Mohammed. The dispute between el-Glaoui and the sultan erupted in December 1950. El-Glaoui openly criticized the sultan’s ‘modernization’ efforts, which he viewed as an attack on Islam. This accusation was an effort to turn the subtle rivalry with the sultan into a struggle over religion. El-Glaoui went beyond merely criticizing the sultan, and refused to participate in the traditional ceremonies commemorating the prophet’s birthday. In a difficult meeting between the sultan and pasha, which took place on 12 December 1950, el-Glaoui expressed his displeasure at Istiqlal’s activities. Disregarding the Istiqlal leaders’ long-standing allegations against Moroccan tribal leaders, he described the nationalist party as a group of ‘hooligans’ and provocateurs. El-Glaoui contended that Istiqlal was mainly intent on harming the Moroccan monarchy. He seemed personally to despise the party’s leaders, calling Mehdi Ben Barka a ‘short creature’. During the meeting, the pasha rejected the idea of Moroccan independence because, he argued, Morocco was not yet ready for it, and was far from being a united country. The pasha personally offended the sultan during the meeting, when he allegedly declared that he was ‘not the Moroccan sultan, but Istiqlal’s sultan’. In any case, the meeting ended with the sultan banishing el-Glaoui from the palace and refusing to meet him again. A palace statement on this matter noted that the pasha had spoken disrespectfully to the sultan and had therefore been dismissed. The palace also refuted claims that el-Glaoui had merely expressed 195

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the concerns of religious circles over the political situation in Morocco. El-Glaoui’s account of the meeting noted that he had attempted to denounce Istiqlal’s actions, and that he had not criticized the sultan. But the dispute between the pasha and the sultan became an established fact, fomenting discord in the Moroccan political system.37 The discord threatened to affect the monarch’s pre-eminence, and his status among Morocco’s entire population. The sultan’s legitimacy depended directly on him appealing to the whole country – urban and rural. The sultan did not directly align himself with Istiqlal out of fear of being dominated by the party, but because it would have reduced his stature as a national leader, which is why el-Glaoui’s taunt that he was the sultan of Istiqlal was so insulting. Many Moroccans considered the clash to be a French attempt to foment a local uprising against the sultan. Such actions were common in Morocco’s political history, when tribal or other leaders lost confidence in the monarch and rebelled against him. By the end of 1950, however, this sort of practice had become anachronistic and contradicted France’s stated commitment to the modernization of Morocco. Such a revolt was nevertheless still possible at that stage. Residency officials denied this, but noted that the roots of the dispute had to do mainly with basic personality differences between the two. They tended to downplay the emerging rivalry. The resident-general stated that there would be no change in the residency’s approach to the sultan or to local tribal leaders. The residency’s involvement with the monarchy, and on a more local level with tribal leaders and the pasha, was expected to continue. This was not how these events were perceived on the Moroccan side. Palace dignitaries were concerned that the sultan would be deposed sooner or later, and that France would take advantage of an international crisis to implement this plan. Istiqlal was concerned about the new wave of French repression against its activities. Its leaders were unhappy with el-Glaoui’s accusations against them and disputed the pasha’s claim that they represented a small minority. They also resented the pasha’s efforts to cast himself as the representative of traditional Moroccans who rejected nationalism. El-Glaoui’s ostentatious personal lifestyle was a far cry from the image of a pious Muslim; the sultan, on the other hand, was known for his abstemious way of life. For Istiqlal, the clash was nothing more than a French 196

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attempt to weaken the sultan’s position and pave the way for his removal from the throne.38 El-Glaoui proceeded with his oppositional stance, and, so as to express his views more openly, established the Movement of Opposition and Reforms to express his views. The residency supported him, and sought to burnish his credentials as an opposition leader while concomitantly attempting to weaken Istiqlal. Residency officials still described Istiqlal as a monolithic, limited group that was far from being the mass party it purported to be. Although there were no further clashes between the sultan and el-Glaoui that year, political life in Morocco had become strained and edgy. Istiqlal was again subjected to accusations and harassment against its activists, which included incitement by France against Istiqlal’s alleged contacts with communism. While the party was subjected to more intensive pressures, a new crisis between the residency and the monarchy erupted. The public row between the residency and sultan broke out on 26 January, when Juin told the sultan to denounce Istiqlal, claiming that he needed to do so to avert a serious threat to public order. The meeting between Juin and the sultan was unusually tense.39 King Hassan later wrote that he was shocked by the meeting and saw Juin’s demand as a serious humiliation of his father. Hassan recalled being so angry that he even considered assassinating Juin. He was not at all impressed with the resident-general, whom he viewed as the epitome of French colonialism and a ‘not very intelligent person’ who ‘lacked class’.40 According to one account, Juin’s demand was a reaction to the sultan’s calls to redefine Moroccan–French relations and was not coordinated with the French government.41 The differences between the residency and Paris government were evident in a meeting between Juin and President Auriol in early January. Juin gave a very negative appraisal of the sultan’s conduct, claiming that the monarch had become a problematic figure in Morocco, who continued to oppose the idea of French reforms. ‘He wants independence, not reforms.’ Seeking to avoid a confrontation, the French president encouraged Juin to try and find a way to avoid a head-on collision with the sultan.42 Juin answered that French rule in Morocco was in jeopardy, a comment that ultimately procured him the French government’s endorsement. Nevertheless, French ministers had no doubt that Juin was not following their instructions, and was intent on 197

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deposing the sultan. President Auriol felt he should be dismissed from his post, and was concerned that his activities in Morocco would only compound France’s international difficulties. Juin later revised his demands, and now asked the monarch to criticize Istiqlal’s activities and not its long-term goals. Although the sultan rejected this demand as well, some sort of compromise between the two sides seemed likely. The sultan was willing to criticize all forms of violence and radicalism, and to call on his subjects to respect France. He refused, however, to issue a statement that would single out some of his subjects. In conversations with American diplomats, residency officials claimed that while their policies towards Morocco’s nationalist ferment had until then been ‘exceptionally tolerant’, they would no longer tolerate Istiqlal’s actions. Juin’s deputy, General de Blesson, contended that Istiqlal’s propaganda had become far more hostile and anti-French.43 Publicly, Juin sought to reduce the residency’s friction with the sultan, but at the same time he continued to use el-Glaoui’s opposition as a way of applying pressure on the palace. With Juin’s tacit support, el-Glaoui began to organize tribes that would rebel against the sultan. Many of these forces, however, did not consider themselves to be part of a spontaneous uprising against the sultan, but rather as a local militia aiming to defend the pasha’s position. Anxious that the growing tribal unrest and the residency’s disapproval might endanger his rule, the sultan adopted a compromise that would put an end to the crisis. On 23 February he signed an agreement with the residency approving several reforms initiated by Juin. In addition, a number of ministers within the makhzen were dismissed from their positions and the Sharifian government issued a statement criticizing the methods used by ‘a certain party’, without mentioning Istiqlal by name.44 These steps cleared the air somewhat, but relations between the monarchy and the residency remained tense. The French continued to view the sultan (and not Istiqlal) as the major stumbling block to their continued rule in Morocco. Residency officials contended that the sultan refused to sign government decrees intended to implement changes in Morocco. According to French newspapers that covered the events, the situation in Morocco remained unresolved.45 The crisis attracted a great deal of interest abroad. A number of American and British newspapers dispatched reporters to Morocco to 198

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cover the unfolding events. The expanded media presence reignited the political tension in Morocco. In an interview to the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahrām, also published in the French Le Monde, the sultan claimed that the February agreement with the residency had been forced upon him. He asserted that Juin’s disapproval of him had nothing to do with his refusal to sign government decrees, but was an outcome of his refusal to denounce Istiqlal. One of the sultan’s close aides later recalled that the French pressure on Sidi Mohammed was part of a wider effort to remove him from the throne. Indeed, he had been given the alternative of either signing Juin’s decrees or facing deportation from Morocco. Istiqlal’s general secretariat issued a statement that noted that the sultan faced the prospect of being removed from the throne by force, a possibility that, according to the party, had already been raised in 1944 following the establishment of the party. The sultan was said to have felt that his presence in Morocco was more important, so he therefore signed the agreement with the residency. Istiqlal adopted a very cautious approach throughout the crisis between the sultan and the residency. Its supporters were instructed to avoid any confrontation with the authorities. The party was concerned about new clashes with security forces on the anniversary of its 1944 manifesto, and cancelled all commemorations of the event. In a statement addressed to the French government, the residency and the United Nations, the party reiterated its traditional demands for independence, at the same time emphasizing the ‘feudal’ nature of Morocco’s tribal leaders. The driving force behind this was the party’s wish to strengthen the sultan’s position. The crisis once more indicated Istiqlal’s secondary role in the sultan’s nationalist politics. Istiqlal was more concerned about the sultan’s weakened position, which it feared would affect the party’s chances of realizing its goals. Under these circumstances, Istiqlal pursued a moderate course. At the end of the crisis, Allal el-Fassi held a press conference in Tangier at which he emphasized his party’s willingness to help mend Moroccan–French relations, and disputed Juin’s allegation that Istiqlal was an anti-French party.46 In a conversation with an American diplomat, el-Fassi contended that Istiqlal was a peaceful movement and would not turn to violence.47 The sultan’s troubled relations with the residency had only a minor impact on the nationalist party. Contrary to Istiqlal’s claims, only several dozen party activists were 199

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arrested during this period. Many of the party’s activities continued undisturbed. A party bulletin published in February 1951 rejected the residency’s negative portrayal of its goals, and claimed that the colonial administration was intent on conducting a widespread campaign of repression against it. Istiqlal argued that the crisis between the monarchy and the residency stemmed from the sultan’s quest to reconsider the nature of Moroccan–French relations, and from the French refusal to do so. Instead, Istiqlal contended, the French preferred to pursue a ‘reactionary’ policy, in which the residency cooperated with ‘feudal’ tribal leaders such as el-Glaoui. The party asserted that the French had appointed these people, who could hardly be considered authentic public leaders. Along with a number of Sufi leaders who also collaborated with the residency, the party viewed these individuals as no more than colonial agents. The party furthermore disputed the residency’s allegation that they were cooperating with the Moroccan Communist Party, and once again denied that it endorsed violence. It disputed Juin’s claim that there were no political prisoners in Morocco and asserted that the protectorate administration was a de facto police dictatorship that had arrested hundreds of its supporters as part of its ongoing repression of Istiqlal. The party bulletin emphasized Istiqlal’s wish to avoid any direct clashes with France, and called on the French public to become more familiar with its long-term goals. According to Istiqlal, Juin’s appointment as resident-general had led to a direct confrontation with the sultan, so that the possibility of his removal by force was no longer a theoretical question. The residency’s main goal was perceived as maintaining colonial rule in Morocco. For Istiqlal, the crisis between the monarchy and the residency remained unresolved.48 In the latter part of 1951, the residency’s policies in Morocco remained unchanged. The only initiative the residency pursued was the expansion of the role of local government, which the sultan feared would weaken the central government’s authority. Although the sultan was compelled to sign a decree concerning the status of rural administrative councils at the end of 1951, he continued to oppose reforms aimed at inflating municipal councils that included French residents. No one in France or Morocco had any illusions that the crisis between the sultan and the residency had come to an end.49 Where that crisis had left Istiqlal remained an open question. 200

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A

s the year 1951 progressed, nationalist-related tensions in Morocco intensified. The French resident-general, Juin, continued to maintain a firm approach towards Moroccan nationalism, and was disinclined to reconsider his policies. Speaking in Rabat on Bastille Day, the resident-general emphasized the need to fight Morocco’s ‘anachronistic’ nationalism, which he argued was based on hatred and greed. He noted that Moroccan nationalism was not a passing phenomenon and that it would be necessary to fight against it again.1 In general, the residency displayed a dismissive approach towards Moroccan nationalism, and viewed it as a mere slogan, concocted to serve anti-French sentiments. The idea of a ‘Moroccan nation’ was adopted, in the residency’s opinion, by a small group of urban intellectuals and did not represent an accepted concept. The residency argued that it was difficult to identify a Moroccan nation, considering the geographic and social diversity that divided Moroccan society. In the French view, Istiqlal’s leadership, which comprised mostly affluent city dwellers, was alienated from the majority of Morocco’s population. The French were nonetheless concerned about the rise of nationalist protests in Morocco, and therefore intensified their negative campaign against Istiqlal. Party members and leaders were described as a dangerous criminal band that lacked public legitimacy and was nowhere near being potential partners in any political process.2 201

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Increased Tension between the Residency, Monarchy and Istiqlal In July 1951, Juin was appointed as NATO’s commander of the newly established Central European troops, ending his term as residentgeneral. Juin insisted on being actively involved in selecting his successor, vying for a candidate who would pursue his policies. On 29 August 1951, General Augustin-Léon Guillaume was appointed to the post. Guillaume had previously served in the residency and was well acquainted with Morocco. Upon assuming his position he stated that he hoped to work in the spirit of the ‘veteran French–Moroccan friendship’, but he left no illusions about his position towards Moroccan nationalists: ‘I will make them eat straw’, he declared.3 One source described Guillaume as undiplomatic and lacking any political sensitivity. Guillaume later recalled that he was aware of the ‘very serious’ situation in Morocco, and was concerned about the outbreak of violent clashes with Moroccan nationalists. His main goal was to avert such confrontations and maintain domestic stability. Within the residency, however, some officials now called for a reappraisal of the failed French policies towards Moroccan nationalism. They argued that repression would not guarantee continued French rule in Morocco, and called for a new approach and for the implementation of changes in the residency’s policy.4 Juin, for his part, published a long article in Le Monde after leaving his post, outlining his opinion about the Moroccan nationalist question. He expressed his genuine commitment to France’s ‘mission’ in Morocco, which he viewed as the moral force that underpinned French actions there. Juin argued that Morocco would be able to gain autonomy only after the interests of France and its citizens in Morocco were guaranteed. The outgoing resident-general did not even raise the possibility of abrogating the protectorate treaty and ending French rule in Morocco. Juin severely criticized the Istiqlal party, arguing that its leaders were mostly selfish and greedy and a far cry from being model leaders. In his mind, there was little reason to believe that such leaders would cooperate with other social groups in governing Morocco. He also charged that Istiqlal’s leaders ought to use their personal wealth to improve conditions in Morocco, rather than constantly protesting against the lack of various services. Juin asserted that their nationalist activity disguised their condescending attitude towards most of the Moroccan population. For him, Istiqlal 202

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was nothing more than an anti-French movement that adopted radical methods to achieve its goals. He emphasized that France must not abandon its mission in Morocco and continue to lead the kingdom towards independence. Istiqlal spokesmen, reacting to Juin’s article, argued that France’s colonial policies were radical and uncompromising, while their party sought to achieve Moroccan independence through non-violence. So long as the French administration stuck to this approach, Istiqlal maintained, they would not be able to cooperate with it.5 Moroccan–French relations suffered another blow with the outbreak of riots in Casablanca on 1 November 1951. Clashes between nationalist activists and French security forces erupted when activists attempted to disrupt elections to the Moroccan Chambers of Agriculture and Commerce, which operated under the residency’s auspices. The new resident-general, Guillaume, argued that the nationalists were anxious to attract international attention to the situation in Morocco, prior to the UN General Assembly meeting, and to stoke up anti-French sentiments. Six Moroccans were killed during the clashes, and fifteen were wounded.6 Strikes broke out across the country, involving butchers in Oujda, fishermen in Safi, and numerous labour disputes in Casablanca, which was now a hotbed of nationalist inspired protests. In reaction, Istiqlal reiterated its loyalty to the sultan, whom it continued to view as the embodiment of the Moroccan nation. The party commended the monarch for avoiding additional French provocations, and noted that the violence had not spread to other cities in Morocco, a fact that in their eyes reflected the Moroccan people’s political maturity. Recognizing the growing French pressure against them, some Istiqlal leaders declared that their party was troubled by the harsh campaign of rumours and lies that the French had spread against them. The campaign, which began during Juin’s term of office, continued under Guillaume’s watch.7 The sultan attempted to build a more positive relationship with the new resident-general and to move beyond the crisis that erupted in the early months of 1951. Speaking on Throne Day in November 1951, Sidi Mohammed called for a new treaty between Morocco and France, reiterating his intent to rebuild relations between the two countries. He stated that he and his subjects awaited the opening of such negotiations. The sultan’s moderate speech also stated that, despite the difficulties of the previous year, he intended to pursue diplomatic 203

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efforts to reach a solution. The sultan mentioned his visit to Paris in 1950, as well as the fact that he still awaited France’s response to the memorandums he had presented at the time. He called on the Moroccan people to remain calm and to serve the country’s national interest by refraining from violence.8 The speech underlined the sultan’s emergence as Morocco’s senior nationalist leader whose comments would fashion the nature of the nationalist struggle. Istiqlal, in that sense, had become a more passive force in nationalist politics. Sidi Mohammed pursued his moderate approach by stating in a meeting with Guillaume one month later that even if there were differences of opinion between Morocco and France, ‘so long as the two countries have a joint purpose in Morocco, it doesn’t matter what the road there will be like’.9 Guillaume stated his administration’s plans for Morocco at the end of 1951. He intended to pursue the development of the country, and to nurture local elites who would play a more active role in managing the country’s affairs. Morocco’s new budget, which was still under review, was intended to prioritize social and welfare services. Guillaume made no mention of Istiqlal’s demands for independence or the sultan’s memorandums on the structure and essence of Moroccan–French relations. On the eve of 1952, the situation in Morocco remained tense and uncertain. Throughout 1952, relations between Istiqlal and the residency deteriorated even further. In a March conversation with French president Auriol, Guillaume noted that Istiqlal had become even more dangerous since the residency had eased the restrictions imposed on the party. Guillaume attempted to convince the president not to give credence to Istiqlal’s harsh criticism. He warned that if France did not react, Moroccan nationalists would interpret this as a sign of weakness, which would further endanger France’s position in Morocco. Guillaume also emphasized that the sultan was Istiqlal’s de facto leader, and indicated that the Moroccan monarch was a problematic figure for France.10 Meanwhile, Istiqlal continued to express its impatience with French policy and warned that the situation in Morocco was spiralling out of control. A lead editorial published in al-ʿAlam warned the French public that the residency’s repressive policy and resort to force would only worsen the situation in the country. The article was written after the newspaper had been closed for two weeks, in the 204

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aftermath of riots that erupted in Tangier. The editorial, entitled ‘Methods That Have to Change’, called for a new French policy that would reduce tension between the residency and the Moroccan public. The newspaper called on the French to reconsider their policy and expressed hope that a new French approach would significantly reduce the tension between France and Morocco.11 But, despite the party’s rhetoric, there was little to suggest that Istiqlal was in command of the nationalist struggle. It did not initiate any independent political moves and remained close to the sultan’s agenda. Istiqlal still awaited the French response to the sultan’s memorandums, presented two years earlier. Rumours of France’s reaction to the monarch’s proposals were published in French Moroccan newspapers, and left little room for Moroccan optimism. A report in La Vigie Marocaine on 28 July 1952 stated that the French were interested in establishing Moroccan advisory councils, which did not, however, suggest a new French policy towards Morocco. Similar French suggestions had already been made in the past, without addressing the Moroccan demands to revise fundamentally the protectorate treaty.12 Meanwhile, the French media became more interested in Istiqlal, seeking to reach a better understanding of the party and its goals. An article about the party in Le Monde argued that the Moroccan nationalist party did not enjoy widespread support, and that for most Moroccans nationalism remained a vague ideal. Despite the fact that Istiqlal was the largest of Morocco’s nationalist groups and apparently benefited from the sultan’s genuine support, the article correctly identified a host of unanswered questions concerning it, including questions about the meaning of Moroccan independence, the nature of its government and the position of local government bodies. After nearly ten years of activity, it was still difficult to fathom the party’s main positions and policies on major issues. Its ongoing difficulties, such as the lack of an identifiable leader, ideological differences between its senior figures and confusion over the party’s immediate goals, all cast a shadow on Istiqlal’s development, which harsh French repressive policies further compounded.13 An unnamed resident of Fez close to nationalist circles reported in late 1952 that the party was almost dead. The source noted the party’s lack of leadership, which left its members confused about the situation, and claimed that because many of the party’s leaders had held their posts for so long, Istiqlal was in a state of stagnation.14 205

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Even if these comments were somewhat exaggerated, they nevertheless reflected the sentiments then prevailing within Istiqlal. The nationalist struggle against the French had intensified, yet many questions about the party and its long-term goals remained open. The lack of a clear leadership, along with the secondary position it had assumed, made it difficult for the party to play an important role in political life. These handicaps became clearly evident in 1952, when the tension between the nationalists and the residency reached new heights. Istiqlal’s goals remained unchanged throughout 1952, including the abrogation of the protectorate treaty and the establishment of a ‘national’ government under the sultan’s leadership. The party also demanded that a special assembly be convened with the purpose of framing a democratic constitution for Morocco. This constitution would reflect the ideals of Islamic jurisprudence, alongside other Muslim ideals. Istiqlal also stated that it was interested in furthering a new type of relationship with France, which would guarantee cooperation between the two countries. In the eyes of party activists, the goal of independence still seemed a long way off, considering the party’s difficulties. Al-ʿAlam sought to comfort them by noting that ‘the road to independence is difficult, but its result is guaranteed.’15 Although Istiqlal organized a large share of the nationalist protests throughout 1952, a closer examination of these events raises questions about the party’s position in contemporary political life. In many ways, Istiqlal had realized its ambition to become the leading force in the nationalist struggle. The party had initiated the struggle for independence, established the patterns of that struggle, adapted them to Moroccan mores and supervised them. But the ultimate result of these efforts was that Istiqlal had become the organizer of nationalist protests, not the driving force behind the formulation of policy and the struggle against the French. Moreover, Istiqlal had lost its seniority to the sultan, whether as a result of its own decisions or the prevailing format of Moroccan nationalist politics. By the end of 1952 the residency had become exceedingly impatient with the situation in Morocco, both with Istiqlal’s activities and with the sultan’s conduct. Guillaume attributed much of France’s difficulties in Morocco to the excessive speed with which it implemented changes – too fast-moving for the Moroccan public – and thus creating social dynamics that were spiralling out of control. 206

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The resident-general was angry about events surrounding the Prophet’s birthday celebrations, which were marred by mass rallies attended by large Moroccan crowds chanting pro-Istiqlal slogans. Due to the residency’s rising anger at the sultan the very notion of removing the sultan from his throne was becoming more likely, and posed a real threat to the nationalists. Some dissenting voices among the residency, however, warned that such a measure could potentially backfire, increase the sultan’s popularity and lead to violence. Further deterioration in Morocco could lead to new international involvement there, and complicate France’s position in Morocco even further. Despite the residency’s tougher approach towards the sultan, Guillaume still hoped to reach some sort of understanding with the monarch. But, regardless of these hopes, Morocco seemed to be heading for an inevitable clash between the French, the monarchy and the nationalists. As for Istiqlal, by this time the residency had lost all patience with the party. Guillaume continued to maintain that the nationalist party was linked to the Moroccan communists, and embraced a firm, repressive policy in the wake of the Casablanca riots of 1952 (see below). This approach aimed to exclude the party from the public domain altogether. The available sources do not support the residentgeneral’s allegations about Istiqlal involvement with communism, which seemed to have been an excuse for the residency to pursue Istiqlal without attracting international criticism. The residency banned all Istiqlal-related activities in December 1952 and announced that severe punishments would be imposed on anyone who violated the law. Senior Istiqlal leaders were arrested and the political tension in Morocco reached new heights.16 With renewed clashes between Moroccan and French security forces seemingly inevitable, any incident was liable to lead to violence. Indeed, the assassination of a Tunisian activist, Ferhat Hashad, on 5 December 1952 angered Moroccan union activists who called for a general protest strike. Istiqlal, seeking to bolster its support among Moroccan workers, endorsed the strike. On 8 December, violent clashes between demonstrators and some European residents in Casablanca broke out, prompting French security forces to open fire. According to various estimates, the number of casualties reached several hundred. The residency put the number at 40. The atmosphere across Morocco was one of ‘lynching and shootings’.17 Guillaume 207

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asserted that Istiqlal had planned the riots in advance, and that Hashad’s assassination had only been a pretext. French sources added that Istiqlal had instructed its supporters to prepare for violent clashes with the French, to gather weapons and await further instructions. The residency swiftly reacted to the riots by arresting hundreds of Istiqlal activists and by intensifying its repressive campaign against the party. The year 1952 ended with added violence and tension. The French resident-general Guillaume remained adamant in his belief that most Moroccans did not support Istiqlal. He continued to reject any idea of independence and warned against ‘the danger in the illusion of untimely independence’. Guillaume outlined France’s responsibilities in Morocco, which included efforts to ‘develop political and social institutions … and guarantee the welfare of Morocco and its residents’.18 The residency’s policies, accordingly, remained unchanged. Close to ten years after Istiqlal was established, French officials still dismissed the idea of Moroccan nationalism and did not envisage significant changes in Morocco in the near future. Nevertheless, contrary to these dim prospects, 1953 turned out to be a pivotal year for Istiqlal and a turning point in the struggle for independence.

The Year 1953: The Sultan’s Deposition The year 1953, which proved to be a pivotal decisive one in the nationalist struggle, began with conciliatory statements by the sultan towards France. At that point, no one predicted that within a few months he would be deposed and that Morocco would face domestic turmoil. For his part, the sultan strove to reduce the tension that followed the Casablanca clashes. He sought to renew the dialogue between Morocco and France, and reach a new understanding that would be the foundation for future ties between the two countries. In several speeches delivered in the early months of 1953, the sultan emphasized the need to maintain and develop French–Moroccan amity in a way that would allow Morocco to manage its affairs in a democratic fashion, while maintaining France’s interests.19 These conciliatory efforts, however, did not succeed. Within a short time the tension between the two sides increased, and Morocco found itself in the midst of the worst political crisis since the protectorate’s establishment, which ultimately led to Sidi Mohammed’s removal from the throne. His deposition altered the nature of Morocco’s nationalist struggle, which became an all-out war for independence. 208

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The situation in Morocco deteriorated further in the months preceding the sultan’s deposition, and the weakness of the French government affected it. In January 1953 the French government fell again. The new government returned Georges Bidault to the foreign ministry. His appointment was enthusiastically received by right-wing French residents in Morocco, who were alarmed over the prospect of a weakened French policy towards Istiqlal. These residents went a step further by establishing their own terrorist group, known as Présence Française. Guillaume and his close advisers, primarily Philippe Boniface, abandoned any pretence of carrying out French policy, and largely pursued their own course without seeking approval from Paris.20 El-Glaoui’s domestic opposition to the sultan, along with the residency’s rising disapproval, were the two main factors that ultimately led to the sultan’s deposition in the summer of 1953. The sultan had managed to maintain his position until then largely thanks to the French government, which objected to his removal by force and preferred not to upset Morocco’s internal stability. But, as the year progressed, the sultan’s relations with the residency deteriorated, further complicating the domestic situation in Morocco. Internal Moroccan opposition to Sidi Mohammed became more vocal in its attacks against him. El-Glaoui, with unofficial backing from the residency, pursued his public campaign against the sultan. ElGlaoui opposed the idea of independence and rejected all proposals to alter Morocco’s diplomatic status. He openly defended the protectorate, declaring that in his opinion the Moroccan people were not yet ready for self-rule. El-Glaoui argued that the protectorate’s activities were beneficial to Morocco and contended that the clashes in Casablanca could have been averted had the sultan not encouraged the ‘agitators’. The sultan, he alleged, assisted parties such as Istiqlal, whose main goal was to harm Morocco’s domestic stability. He argued that the sultan had forgotten that, as a sovereign, he was to be ‘over and above parties’ and was not supposed to give them any encouragement. In another statement, el-Glaoui criticized the sultan’s religious leadership, which he claimed was ‘disrespectful’ towards Islam.21 Such religious rhetoric against the sultan had been traditionally invoked in Morocco during periods of political unrest, and in that sense el-Glaoui represented a political culture that from Istiqlal’s point of view was antiquated and anachronistic. Istiqlal championed 209

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new forms of political identity and representation, and introduced new concepts, such as that of the Moroccan nation, into the public debate. The developing struggle between el-Glaoui and the sultan in 1953 was also a battle between two political cultures or visions. The leaders of key Moroccan Sufi orders, led by the Kitaniyya, supported el-Glaoui. The Kitaniyya’s animosity towards Istiqlal’s nationalist ideology dated back to previous decades, in which Sufi leaders such as ʿAbd al-Hay al-Kittani attacked the Salafi ideology and its impact on the emerging nationalist ideology. Leaders of Sufi orders, like other rural tribal leaders, benefited from the French protectorate and were closely associated with it. They personally profited from the possibility of collecting contributions and other payments from the local population, which enhanced their personal wealth. AlKittani, who also opposed the monarchy after Sultan Moulay ʿAbd alHafiz had his brother flogged to death, had associated himself so closely with the French that he was recognized as their most important agent after el-Glaoui. El-Glaoui pointed much of his criticism at Istiqlal’s emerging political culture. He took issue with the very idea of a Moroccan nation, arguing that such a concept was a foreign element on the landscape of local Moroccan politics, and that the nationalists were merely a group of agitators. El-Glaoui advocated a slower, more gradual progress towards independence. Although the nationalists dismissed him as a collaborator of the colonial regime and far from being a genuine critic of political life, his condemnation of the sultan eventually led to the sultan’s removal from the throne. Notwithstanding el-Glaoui’s criticism of the sultan, the residency continued to harass Istiqlal activists and leaders. The residency maintained that Istiqlal was nothing more than a totalitarian party organized along the same lines as ‘communist terrorists’, and thus once more sought to link the nationalists to communist activity. A new wave of arrests among nationalist activists followed these statements. The situation of nationalist figures in Marrakech, where el-Glaoui was the local authority in charge, was described as particularly difficult. El-Glaoui continued to attack the Moroccan monarchy and nationalist movement. He combined his criticism of the sultan with general remarks against Istiqlal, arguing that the sultan played a central role in the party and was the moving spirit behind it. His main argument against the sultan’s alleged involvement in Istiqlal’s affairs 210

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was that it undermined his position as Morocco’s spiritual leader. ElGlaoui also discounted the religious clerics’ support of the nationalist party on the grounds that they had traditionally backed various political movements, and that their relationship with the monarchy was erratic and unrepresentative. El-Glaoui disregarded Istiqlal’s political power, and contended that the number of its supporters among the Moroccan public was no more than 10 per cent. In his opinion, this figure considerably weakened Istiqlal’s role in Moroccan politics.22 El-Glaoui’s criticism of the monarchy did not limit itself exclusively to rhetoric. He initiated a petition against the sultan, signed by more than 270 pashas and tribal leaders. Here again, el-Glaoui resorted to a traditional Moroccan political pattern. While Istiqlal, as noted in chapter 2, injected new political content into the traditional political practice of submitting a petition to the sultan, el-Glaoui adhered strictly to the established approach towards voicing political dissatisfaction with a ruling monarch. He did not establish a political party or an organized movement that could promote a political agenda, but was satisfied with submitting a petition and benefiting from its outcome. In fact, it is difficult to determine what exactly el-Glaoui sought to achieve, apart from deposing the sultan. He did not promote any idea or principle, and was seen as a henchman of the French, a local ruler who sought to preserve his own position without taking any particular interest in the situation, fate and ambitions of the residents under his rule. El-Glaoui’s petition, published on 21 May, accused the sultan of being impious and called for his deposition. The main thrust of the petition was religious, which led many rural leaders to endorse it. Not all of Morocco’s rural leaders opposed the sultan, and many of those who signed the petition were coerced to do so by el-Glaoui.23 Though the extent of the opposition to the sultan remains uncertain, the residency undoubtedly encouraged the dissent. Guillaume denied any involvement with the petition, and even argued that the effort to depose the sultan had gone too far. He himself, as he later told a British diplomat, had tried to prevent the petition from being circulated. But he found it difficult to oppose el-Glaoui and his supporters who, after all, were France’s strongest allies in Morocco. Contrary to these denials, the resident-general did not entirely reject the idea of removing the sultan, and when asked about the proposition gave the noncommittal answer of ‘maybe’.24 211

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Domestic political instability in France provided el-Glaoui with an opportunity to take action. It was unclear to observers whether elGlaoui’s opposition to the sultan was spontaneous, and to what extent outside forces had encouraged it.25 They contended that most of the tribal leaders who signed the petition had been appointed by the French and hence did not act independently. Furthermore, in their opinion the residency endorsed the petition, and did not hesitate to take advantage of the rift between el-Glaoui and the sultan.26 Despite Guillaume’s repeated denials to the contrary, the residency seemed to be moving towards the sultan’s deposition, thus backing elGlaoui and his opposition. By indirectly endorsing el-Glaoui, the residency did not have to confront the sultan head on, and could apply indirect pressure on him. The sultan’s position among the French seemed to be weakening. Even within the French government in Paris, which was more supportive of the sultan, the mantra demanding that ‘the sultan must change or else we will have to replace him’ was gaining traction.27 Many Moroccans doubted the residency’s claim to neutrality in the brewing conflict between the sultan and el-Glaoui, because such a political move would have been impossible in Morocco without the residency’s knowledge and approval. The nationalists’ argument that the petition violated France’s commitment to protect the Moroccan monarchy seemed valid. Publicly, residency officials sought to calm the situation. Towards the beginning of July they hinted that they would try to curb elGlaoui’s criticism if the sultan were willing to denounce Istiqlal and approve their proposed plan for local government reforms.28 The sultan continued to deny any involvement with Istiqlal. When asked about his position vis-à-vis Moroccan political parties and Istiqlal, the monarch responded that he was above all political partisanship, and therefore could not denounce or support any party or movement. He also emphasized that he could not criticize Muslims, hinting that he had no intention of acceding to the residency’s demand that he denounce Istiqlal.29 El-Glaoui’s petition, which criticized the sultan, led to a counter petition supporting Sidi Mohammed. This petition, known as the ‘intellectuals’ petition’, was signed by intellectuals and merchants from Fez. It reflected many well-known nationalist principles, but was more moderate in its approach towards France. It noted the 212

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protectorate’s achievements, commended certain aspects of French culture and expressed the hope for a continued Moroccan–French friendship. The text also touched on the lack of improvement that had been recorded in Morocco in the previous months. While the nationalist opposition had been completely silenced, el-Glaoui’s fictitious opposition sought to maintain the existing order and simultaneously ‘revive the customs and mentality of the darkest medieval periods’.30 The counter petition strongly condemned elGlaoui’s recent actions and the ‘shameless attempt’ to deal with political and religious questions he and his supporters were not qualified to discuss. The petition also reaffirmed the signatories’ loyalty to the monarchy and the sultan. While calling for the establishment of more harmonious relations between France and Morocco, the petition warned France not to threaten the sultan. Any harm inflicted on the sultan, the document stated, was akin to harming the entire Moroccan nation.31 The petition underlined the growing internal crisis in Morocco and the genuine fear in nationalist circles that the sultan was under threat. El-Glaoui and his supporters indicated they would not be deterred from resorting to violence to achieve their goals. At the beginning of August, el-Glaoui set out on a trip across Morocco, venturing as far north as the Spanish protectorate frontier. He was publicly received in many places, and took part in rallies and ceremonies organized in his honour. While these events did not reflect widespread support for el-Glaoui’s politics, they did acknowledge his prominent position in Moroccan political life. El-Glaoui’s threats against the sultan at this point were so serious that the sultan’s continued rule had become exclusively a question of France’s position.32 The crisis between the residency and sultan intensified as the summer of 1953 approached. Although relations between the two sides had not yet turned into a blatant conflict, the sultan indicated through one of his close associates that the situation in Morocco was ‘very serious’. In a difficult meeting with Guillaume, which took place on 30 May, the sultan contended that France had de facto abrogated the protectorate treaty, since he had not approved most of the tribal leaders appointed since 1951, which, he argued, violated the protectorate treaty. Reacting to el-Glaoui’s petition, Sidi Mohammed noted that those who signed it had done so under duress. He saw this as treason on el-Glaoui’s part, and emphasized that only ʿulama were 213

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in a position to appraise a reigning monarch’s piety. He reiterated his objection to the French proposed reforms, and asserted that he would never give in to the residency or to el-Glaoui’s blackmail.33 Publicly, the sultan maintained his high spirits, and did not display a sense of threat. Meanwhile, el-Glaoui’s demands that the residency curb the monarchy increased, while the little remaining trust between the colonial administration and the palace dwindled. The crisis in Morocco had reached such a low point that on 11 August the monarchy took the unusual step of issuing an official statement to the French president, government and public. The statement was issued ‘with the hope that your attention will be given to the serious consequences of the subversive plots’ the sultan claimed were threatening Morocco’s relations with France. The statement described the growing crisis, urged on by the residency, between elGlaoui and the sultan. The latter called on the French government to intervene to end the crisis. He mentioned his longstanding loyalty to France, which he pledged to maintain.34 In truth, the document is more an emotional, almost desperate plea, than a political statement issued by a confident sovereign. Meanwhile, el-Glaoui continued his attacks against the sultan, giving no indication of his intention to change his approach. His travels across Morocco raised his political profile, while his critics accused him of merely sowing fear among the public, and increasing the residency’s concerns over Morocco’s descent into anarchy. In his speeches, el-Glaoui emphasized the monarchy’s weakness, and its total reliance on France. Moving beyond these allegations, el-Glaoui’s supporters argued that the Moroccan people should be allowed to replace their monarch.35 The French government, at the time heavily embroiled in a wave of crippling domestic labour disputes that affected the economy and weakened the government’s position, preferred to try and compromise with the sultan to avert a further crisis in Morocco. This was not the residency’s approach. Its officials were convinced that a different leader in Morocco would improve France’s position there, and ensure its future rule. They supported el-Glaoui, already recognized as a veteran ally, and hoped that his protests against the sultan would lead to the latter’s removal from the throne. By now, Guillaume and other officials openly raised the possibility of deposing the sultan, and sought to realize that goal. Although the Paris government 214

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opposed the idea, it was unable to influence the residency, which functioned as an independent agent increasingly detached from the central government. On 12 August el-Glaoui took a bold step in declaring his intention to depose Sidi Mohammed and anoint a new sultan. The statement was tantamount to an open revolt against the sultan. Sidi Mohammed now turned directly to the French president, requesting his intervention. This call showed the sultan’s desperate situation and his rising concern about his position. It also reflected his status as a national leader, for he stated that he would maintain French interests in Morocco.36 The crisis set off a flurry of diplomatic activity. Guillaume was called back to Paris for consultations with French leaders. Upon his return he declared that the protectorate’s intention was to maintain order in Morocco, and implement political reforms without delay. He refused to say whether Morocco was on the brink of political mayhem in the light of el-Glaoui’s initiative to depose the sultan.37 Guillaume ordered the deployment of troops around the royal palace, ostensibly to protect the sultan from el-Glaoui’s threats, but in reality to force the sultan to sign the residency’s proposed reforms, which had become a wider issue involving the sultan’s position within the country’s political system.38 On the day el-Glaoui set out to proclaim a new sultan in Marrakech (14 August), Guillaume met Sidi Mohammed in an effort to reach a compromise. The French foreign minister had previously instructed Guillaume to make every effort to calm the situation in Morocco and avert a potential el-Glaoui led revolt. Guillaume’s main aim was to obtain the monarch’s consent to the residency’s proposed local government reforms. The sultan, who was also keen to reduce tension in Morocco, accepted the resident-general’s demands. Many in Morocco felt that the crisis was heading towards a peaceful solution.39 French newspapers reacted favourably to the agreement and supported the sultan. Even the conservative Le Figaro emphasized the French government’s commitment ‘to support and strengthen his majesty the sultan’. In another expression of support for the monarch, the newspaper noted that it was essential that el-Glaoui understand France’s true interests in Morocco, and temper his criticism of the sultan. Stressing the need for France to emerge stronger from the Moroccan crisis, the newspaper called on the French government to act sensibly.40 These comments reflected the fact that metropolitan France had no grasp of the developments and overall situation in 215

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Morocco. Many French citizens were confused about el-Glaoui’s demands and unfamiliar with the residency’s policies. El-Glaoui, on the other hand, reacted to the agreement with anger. He criticized France’s lack of determination, and emphasized that he would not retreat from his positions. Concerned about a further deterioration in Morocco, French ministers dispatched a foreign ministry official to mediate between el-Glaoui, the residency and the sultan. Publicly, the French government refused to accept the appointment of a new Moroccan sultan and remained committed to maintaining Sidi Mohammed’s position.41 Contrary to the residency’s earlier announcement, the crisis in Morocco was far from over. In mid-1953 most observers agreed that senior residency officials had become so involved with el-Glaoui that they were unlikely to abandon him. They assessed that combined pressure from the French and el-Glaoui, which was gaining momentum, might make the sultan abdicate voluntarily. The opposition that many rural and tribal leaders expressed to the sultan had more to do with concerns over their own political positions than the sultan’s relations with Istiqlal. In that sense, the Moroccan political crisis of 1953 fitted the traditional pattern of Moroccan politics and relegated Istiqlal to a more passive role. Traditional political dynamics in Morocco centred largely on the level of personal trust tribal leaders had in the sultan. From their perspective, as the sultan’s position as a national leader grew alongside a new all-encompassing national identity championed by Istiqlal, the current crisis was mostly about their fear of losing their local political powers. The political crisis brewing up in Morocco was thus not merely a personal squabble between the sultan and the Marrakech pasha; it was also a symbolic struggle between the ‘old’ Moroccan politics embodied in el-Glaoui and the ‘new’ politics nurtured by Istiqlal. The sultan was caught in the middle of a crisis between these two political orientations. Many observers commended the sultan’s conduct throughout the crisis. They emphasized the degree of popular support he received, and his ability to face mounting French pressure. The Moroccan monarch was also viewed as a stabilizing force.42 The situation in Morocco remained ‘critical’, however, because the sultan still refused to sign the residency’s decrees. The French government was forced to choose between deposing him or withdraw its support from el-Glaoui.43 216

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As the crisis unfolded, Istiqlal continued to play a very passive role. Although the party was the focus of el-Glaoui’s criticism, and was subjected to the residency’s repressive policies, it was not at the centre of the 1953 political crisis. As a result of the residency’s policies, Istiqlal’s leaders were largely unable to voice their opinions. They were also concerned about alienating the sultan and losing his tacit support. Many of the issues that were part of the process of establishing Istiqlal, such as its social outreach and development as a new party, had by then already been resolved. Moroccan nationalism had also matured and became a recognized ideological force. But Istiqlal nevertheless remained secondary to the monarchy, which had taken over the leading role in the struggle against the French. Paradoxically, though the French residency repressed the party’s activities, imprisoned its activists and pursued its leaders, it did not view Istiqlal as a significant or powerful adversary. For the French, the sultan filled that role and, while many observers recognized Istiqlal’s influence on nationalist politics, the party’s position was downplayed. The conflict between el-Glaoui and the sultan had less to do with Istiqlal than with traditional Moroccan tensions between the central political establishment and tribal leaders keen on preserving their grip on local power. As a result, Istiqlal was not directly involved in the fateful events that took place in the summer of 1953. The tension in Morocco reached its climax on 15 August when el-Glaoui proclaimed Mohammed Ben ʿArafa, a little-known cousin of Sidi Mohammed, as sultan. It was clear that Ben ʿArafa was merely a figurehead and would rule on behalf of el-Glaoui and the residency. Seeking to justify his act, el-Glaoui contended that Sidi Mohammed could no longer serve as a legitimate religious leader, and that his replacement was necessary. In an effort to intensify the threat against Sidi Mohammed, el-Glaoui dispatched tribal forces to Rabat. Violent clashes broke out in Casablanca on 16 August between nationalist protestors and French security forces that opened fire and killed several protestors. Similar clashes were reported in Oujda, where 18 Moroccans were killed. Two French policemen were killed in Marrakech. Morocco was rapidly descending into violence and was on the verge of spiralling out of control.44 The impact of these events, and concerns about further deterioration in Morocco led the French government to change its position with regard to the sultan. It now endorsed the removal of Sidi Mohammed, 217

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since most ministers were now convinced that the sultan’s deposition was the only way to preserve French rule in the country, and avert impending chaos. Guillaume emphasized that el-Glaoui and his supporters were determined to continue their campaign against the sultan and would refuse any compromise. He appealed to French ministers not to confront a figure such as el-Glaoui, who was after all a true supporter of French rule in Morocco.45 Most French ministers concluded that there was no other choice but to depose the sultan. Only two cabinet ministers opposed the decision; one of them, François Mitterrand, resigned in protest. The decision to depose the sultan was a victory for radical elements in the residency that were keen to muzzle Moroccan nationalism. It is unclear to what extent French government ministers were familiar with the situation in Morocco, or were aware of the possible consequences of their policies. Some of them later contended that they had been misled all along by the residency. By the time it became clear that implementing a new French policy in Morocco had become essential, the situation there had deteriorated to the point where there was no alternative other than to remove the sultan from the throne. They argued that they had been forced to choose between two evils, and that what convinced them to depose the sultan was the need to avert a civil war in Morocco and maintain the country’s stability.46 The French decision to depose the sultan was also linked to rising concerns within the French political establishment that military commanders and colonial administrators were unduly influencing elected leaders. Some French leaders wondered whether the government was still in a position to implement its policies in Morocco. ‘What a comedy’, President Auriol wrote in his diary regarding the deposition and the events leading up to it. Auriol did not consider the sultan to be overly loyal to France, but was worried about the deposition’s implications for France: ‘There is no longer a government in France, no country either … there [are] a number of gentlemen who make decisions according to their own will and interests.’ But while French leaders were uncomfortable with the decision, French public opinion was largely silent on the issue and did not protest against it.47 The events that surrounded the sultan’s removal from the throne were dramatic for Morocco. On 18 August el-Glaoui delivered an ultimatum to the French government demanding Sidi Mohammed’s deposition and recognition of Ben ʿArafa as his successor. El-Glaoui also stated that he would be unable to stop his supporters from 218

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advancing further north beyond Rabat. Guillaume felt that under these circumstances he could no longer guarantee domestic stability. Since Sidi Mohammed refused to abdicate, the residency had to resort to force to remove him from the throne. Security forces stormed the palace on 20 August and, under threat of guns, led Sidi Mohammed and his family to waiting vehicles that drove them to a nearby airport. From there, they were put on an old military aircraft, without seats, and flown to Corsica. This was the lowest point French– Moroccan relations had ever reached.48

Istiqlal’s Reaction to the Sultan’s Deposition The sultan’s deposition infuriated Istiqlal’s leaders. Much of the party’s anger (voiced more freely outside Morocco) was directed primarily at el-Glaoui, whom Allal el-Fassi accused of treason and of being nothing more than a French figurehead acting on the residency’s behalf. The party announced that it would not recognize Ben ʿArafa as sultan, and that Sidi Mohammed remained Morocco’s legitimate leader.49 It was clear that the new situation would force Istiqlal to change its tactics towards the nationalist struggle and its stance towards the residency. The other major target of Istiqlal’s criticism was the French government. El-Fassi described the sultan’s deposition as a violation of Morocco’s sovereignty and a flagrant misreading of the protectorate treaty. He called on the United Nations to intervene, and on Arab countries to sever their ties with France. El-Fassi sent a letter to the French president, emphasizing that no Moroccan would be willing to accept France’s arbitrary measures in Morocco. He pledged to continue the struggle for independence. El-Fassi called on the religious establishment not to bestow any form of religious or political legitimacy on the sultan’s ‘replacement’.50 Sidi Mohammed’s deposition only enhanced his prestige with the general public. The deposed monarch was now seen as a martyr paying a heavy personal price for his loyalty to the Moroccan people. He quickly became a messianic figure for Moroccans and was believed to possess supernatural qualities. Many Moroccans claimed they had seen his image looking down at them from the moon. The French expectation that the sultan’s removal would calm the situation in Morocco, weaken the general appeal of the nationalists and strengthen their position, had clearly backfired. Morocco quickly deteriorated into a warlike state. Its residents were subjected to arrests, curfews and 219

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interrogations, and the fear of French measures increased. There were several, failed attempts on the life of the new sultan, Ben ʿArafa. This was a far cry from the expectations that had marked the establishment of Istiqlal in 1944, namely the quick realization of the goal of independence in a non-violent struggle. The situation changed towards the end of 1955, when the French government agreed to Sidi Mohammed’s return to Morocco and began talks about Morocco’s future. These discussions paved the way for Morocco’s independence in 1956. The events that followed the sultan’s return were to a large extent beyond Istiqlal’s control, indicating that its formative period had come to an end and that it had maybe even reached its zenith, as the anticolonial struggle now began to be conducted in a different manner. The political negotiations, which eventually led to Morocco’s independence, were conducted by the sultan and not the nationalist party. In that sense the Moroccan nationalist struggle had shifted, leaving the Istiqlal party behind. The deposed sultan was now largely identified as Morocco’s national leader, eclipsing Istiqlal. But, while the party’s role in the country’s political affairs remained uncertain, the political culture it sought to impart had gained traction. Indeed, although el-Glaoui could claim victory with the sultan’s deposition, he quickly fell out of favour with the Moroccan public. His political style had lost much of its appeal and ceased to underpin Moroccan politics. Istiqlal’s model of a large political party that blended diverse social elements and was united in the quest for independence, was increasingly recognized as the appropriate framework for political life. Whether such a structure would be able to confront the monarchy’s powerful position, or would eclipse tribal loyalties remained to be seen. Istiqlal faced hard times after the sultan’s deposition, when the prospects for independence seemed dim. Despite those difficulties, the party could view the changing political landscape with satisfaction. Its ideology and principles had become central to Moroccan politics and could no longer be ignored. For a party that faced harsh French repression and an evolving political landscape, this was an important achievement. The progress of Moroccan nationalism was now irreversible and Istiqlal had become a dominant force in Moroccan society. It helped devise a party system in a country that was unfamiliar with such frameworks. The nature of such a system and the question of Istiqlal’s position within this framework would remain part of Morocco’s political agenda during the struggle for independence and in subsequent years. 220

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he struggle over Morocco’s political character has been a prominent feature of its public life since its independence in 1956. The fragile position of political parties precluded the rise of a new political culture. Throughout the anti-colonial struggle, nationalist leaders aspired to establish an independent state that the monarchy ruled over but political parties governed. After achieving independence, Morocco was officially declared a constitutional monarchy, led by the king along with a parliamentary party system. In reality, Morocco was a far cry from a country where political parties wielded power and influenced policy. Within a very short period, the monarchy assumed control of political life, and the parliament was relegated to the sidelines. Morocco’s party system weakened throughout the first decade following independence. This process reached its peak in 1965, when King Hassan abolished the constitution, and announced that he would rule by decrees. In the aftermath of this measure, the Moroccan parliament ceased to be an effective player in the political system. Although the parliament regained its official position, it still lags behind the monarchy in its ability to exercise political power. After his accession to the throne in 1999, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI pledged to promote the parliament as part of a broader democratization process. A decade later, Morocco’s legislature remains weak. Compounding the parliament’s stature are Morocco’s political parties, which for the most part lack internal cohesion, leadership and an inspiring vision for Morocco’s future. Throughout the nationalist struggle for independence, the role of the Moroccan monarch expanded. He was no longer a mere symbol or arbitrator between different groups. Since the colonial system preserved the monarchy and promoted it, this institution was in reality the only political structure ready to assume control at the time of Morocco’s independence. Historically, the country lacked a tradition of political parties. The first parties, like Istiqlal, were established 221

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during the colonial period. They faced harsh French repression and were unable to secure their position within the political system. The lack of a political party tradition, along with the Moroccan king’s charisma and prestige, made it difficult for political parties to gain power, which raises questions about Istiqlal’s emergence in the 1940s and its ability to become a leading force in Moroccan politics. Istiqlal was established primarily to bring an end to French rule in Morocco and to renew the country’s independence. In the period immediately following its establishment it focused on diplomatic activity in an effort to recruit international support for its cause. Over time, Istiqlal adopted other social and economic goals as it sought to secure its position as a leading political force in Moroccan society. The party was successful in disseminating the idea of independence and gaining public support for it, but not all of Moroccan society embraced its message. There was much resistance from rural leaders, who felt threatened by the party’s nationalist ideology, which is partly why Istiqlal is branded as an ‘urban’ party. Istiqlal did manage to recruit a large number of mostly urban supporters, which provided the party with a mass backing that was unusual in Morocco. The party’s nationalist ideals were favourably adopted not only by prosperous, intellectual urban residents but also by new groups of workers who had recently migrated from the countryside to urban areas. Women and young Moroccans were also attracted to the party’s activities. This was an impressive achievement considering that the party had limited material resources at its disposal and faced heavy French repression. As this book has shown, a number of developments that were evident during the party’s early years affected Istiqlal’s position as a mass nationalist movement. Although the party was successful in imparting nationalist ideals to the public, its leaders never joined the ranks of the establishment, failed to offer the public a charismatic figure and found it difficult to attract the support of unfamiliar social sectors. There are several explanations for this. First, Istiqlal never claimed to be a revolutionary social party that sought, in addition to achieving Morocco’s independence, to alter the country’s social structures. Most of its leaders came from traditional backgrounds and tended to avoid embracing Western social ideas. They were also relatively affluent, so disconnected from the material deprivations of large swaths of Moroccan society. Despite their 222

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interest in nationalist politics, they were less successful than they had hoped in becoming a potent social force in Moroccan society. This may have resulted from the nationalist leadership’s difficulty in addressing the needs of unfamiliar social sectors. That, along with the prominence given to the sultan, hindered the party’s prospects. Istiqlal ultimately had no idea how to establish a social movement among the Moroccan populace. While the party initiated an impressive array of novel social activities in Moroccan public life, Istiqlal refrained from radical social transformations. The party’s activities for women, for example, never challenged the prevailing norms and expectations about women’s role in society. While this conservative orientation made it easier for Istiqlal to promote its ideology throughout Moroccan society, it did not allow the party to establish a solid social dimension that would complement its ideological base. Once the party’s main goal of restoring Morocco’s independence had been realized, it found it difficult in the post-independence period to be a serious political alternative. Other Istiqlal weaknesses were also evident in the early stages of nationalist struggle. Its collective leadership failed to promote a senior leader who would be recognized as the party’s guiding light. Even Allal el-Fassi, who in many ways served as such a figure, repeatedly emphasized that he was not the exclusive decision maker in the party and that he was part of a broader leadership. The party also neglected to promote itself as a political organization, focusing instead on nationalist slogans and ideas. Limited attention was given to the need to cultivate public support with the party’s institutions, beyond the demand for independence. Although this may have been an outcome of France’s repressive policies towards the party, it was not a priority for Istiqlal during its early years. While these difficulties were not always evident at that time, they were at the root of Istiqlal’s later difficulties in finding its place in Moroccan politics. Istiqlal’s most significant problem during its early years was the need to define a place and position for itself vis-à-vis the monarchy. From the party’s perspective, this was an easy task. Istiqlal endorsed the monarchy and viewed the sultan as Morocco’s national leader. Party leaders were already calling on him in early 1944 to lead the country’s struggle for independence. Istiqlal sought to provide the sultan with political and organizational backing, and to cooperate with him in realizing the goal of ending French colonial rule and 223

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restoring independence. However, despite these ambitions, the party never seriously discussed the possible terms of this desired relationship with the sultan and his close associates. Although the party cultivated a relationship with the sultan, its efforts to secure an alliance with him ran into difficulties and disappointments along the way. The sultan, for his part, was careful not to identify directly with Istiqlal and preferred to avoid any confrontation with the French residency. While Istiqlal endorsed the sultan as Morocco’s national leader, it saw itself as a partner of sorts with him. The political situation that emerged during the nationalist struggle, but that was more evident in the post-independence period, ran counter to the party’s expectations. It is also important to note that the sultan never recognized Istiqlal as an exclusive political force. This later surfaced as a source of political tension between the nationalist party and the monarchy. Those events, and their impact on Istiqlal, are a separate story, worthy of its own recount and analysis. In addition to being an internal development that influenced the anti-colonial struggle, the emergence of the Istiqlal party raises interesting questions about the numerous personalities and groups in Moroccan society, besides the monarchy, that played an active role in public life at the time. Their presence was evident earlier than is often realized and they eclipsed the early stages of Morocco’s struggle for independence. As the nationalist struggle intensified, these factors grew in importance and overshadowed questions concerning the nature of the political system and the monarchy’s position in public life. Although Morocco is now in its sixth decade of independence, many of these questions remain unanswered, and will undoubtedly remain part of the kingdom’s political agenda.

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Notes

Introduction 1. Marvine Howe, Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) pp. 7-8, 230–40. 2. For an analysis on political parties in Morocco see Willis, ‘Political Parties in the Maghrib: The Illusion of Significance’, The Journal of North African Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, 2002, pp. 1–22. On the 2007 elections see Kristina Kausch, ‘Elections 2007: The Most Transparent Status Quo in Moroccan History’, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 13, no. 1, 2008, pp. 79–85; Lise Storm, ‘Testing Morocco: The Parliamentary Elections of September 2007‘, The Journal of North African Studies, vol. 13, no. 1, 2008, pp. 37–54. 3. C. R. Pennell, Morocco since 1830: A History (New York: New York University Press, 2000) pp. xx–xxiv. 4. Ibid., pp. 166–7, 188–95. 5. John P. Halstead, Rebirth of a Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism, 1912–1944 (Cambridge: Harvard University Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1967) pp. 136–7, 201–2. 6. Moulay Abdelhadi Alaoui, Le Maroc du Traité de Fès à la Libération (Rabat: La Porte, 1994) pp. 247–8. 7. Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) pp. 151, 174–5. 8. For a detailed discussion of this administration see Roger Gruner, Du Maroc traditionnel au Maroc moderne: Le Contrôle civil au Maroc, 1912–1956, (Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Latines, 1984) pp. 19–56. 9. See Abdallah Laroui, Esquisses historiques (Casablanca: Centre Culturel Arabe, 1993) pp. 126–33. 10. Ibid. 11. James L. Gelvin, ‘“Arab Nationalism” Meets Social Theory’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 41 no. 1, February 2009, pp. 10–12; Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, ‘Introduction’, in Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski (eds) Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) pp. ix–xxvi; Hassan Rachik, Symboliser la Nation: Essai sur l’usage des identités collectives au Maroc (Casablanca: Éditions Le Fennec, 2003) pp. 7–12.

225

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN MOROCCO 1. The Nationalist Movement in French Morocco during the Second World War 1. Halstead, Rebirth of a Nation, p. 176. 2. Mostafa Bouaziz, Aux Origines de la Koutla démocratique (Casablanca: Éditions de la Faculté des Lettres, Aïn-Chock, 1997) pp. 38–41. 3. Jamil Abun-Nasr, ‘The Salafiyya Movement in Morocco: The Religious Bases of the Moroccan Nationalist Movement’, Middle Eastern Affairs, no. 3, St Antony’s Papers, no. 16, edited by Albert Hourani (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963); Halstead, Rebirth of a Nation, pp. 134, 164. 4. The number of European and French settlers in colonial Morocco was smaller in comparison with the foreign settlement in Algeria. The number of settlers in Morocco in the mid-twentieth century reached 350,000, compared with close to a million in Algeria. See Abu-Lughod, Rabat, pp. 154–5. 5. Halstead, Rebirth of a Nation, p. 178. 6. The Berber Dahir was intended to institutionalize the Berber population’s tribal legal system, and separate that population from the rest of the Muslim public, which was subjected to Islamic law. The decree effectively removed the Berber population from Islamic law, subjecting them to tribal laws and the French legal system. The decree was perceived as a threat to Morocco’s religious identity, and unleashed widespread nationalist anger. See David M. Hart, ‘The Berber Dahir of 1930 in Colonial Morocco: Then and Now’, The Journal of North African Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, 1997, pp. 11–33. 7. Halstead, Rebirth of a Nation, p. 179; Charles-André Julien, ‘La Politique berbère du Protectorat marocain’, Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, January–March 1971, pp. 50–90. 8. For a discussion on the sultan’s relationship with Moroccan nationalist activists, see Chapter 5. 9. Joseph Luccioni, ‘L’Élaboration du Dahir berbère du 16 Mai 1930’, Revue du Monde musulman et de la Méditerrannée, vol. 38, 1984, pp. 75–81; Pennell, Morocco since 1830, pp. 211–16; Rachik, Symboliser la Nation, pp. 43–80. 10. Halstead, Rebirth of a Nation, pp. 191–3; Pennell, Morocco since 1830, p. 228. 11. Bouaziz, Aux Origines de la Koutla démocratique, pp. 54–5; Pennell, Morocco since 1830, pp. 232–3. 12. Allal el-Fassi (1907–73) was born to a Fez notable family. He attended the Qarawiyyin and participated in early Moroccan nationalist activity, influenced by the Salafiyya. He served as a teacher at the Qarawiyyin, but was dismissed after a French intervention that followed his negative comments against French rule. El-Fassi then became politically active, and helped establish ‘Free schools’, which provided religious education influenced by Islamic modernism. El-Fassi participated in protests against the Berber Dahir in 1930, and helped outline the nationalist movement’s

226

NOTES

13. 14.

15.

16. 17. 18.

19.

20.

1934 reform plan. His activities as a prominent nationalist figure led the French authorities to exile him to Gabon in 1937, from which he returned to Morocco in 1946. After returning to Morocco, he left for Cairo to promote the nationalist struggle and obtain Arab support. He emphasized a traditional/religious approach among the Istiqlal leaders. For more on el-Fassi, see Mohamed el-Alami, Allal el-Fassi: Patriarche du nationalisme marocain (Rabat: Arrisala, 1972); and Attilio Gaudio, Allal el-Fassi ou l’histoire de l’Istiqlal (Paris: A. Moreau, 1972). Mohamed Hassan Ouazzani, also of Fez, was active in the Comité d’action marocain and other nationalist groups established in Morocco in the 1930s. Stéphane Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) p. 16. ‘Bulletin de renseignements politiques no. 5, Histoire du nationalisme marocain, Annexe IV, fiches concernant les principaux nationalistsfiches no. 6 – Ahmed Ben Abdelsalam Balafredj – Présidence du gouvernement provisoire’, Comité de l’Afrique du Nord, Secrétariat général; Charles-André Julien, Le Maroc face aux impérialismes, 1415–1956 (Paris: Éditions Jeune Afrique, 1978) pp. 188–9. Archives nationales, Paris (henceforth AN) F/60/846. ‘Istiqlal Executive Committee Report’, 30 March 1946, National Archives, Washington (henceforth NA); Record Group (henceforth RG) 59/881.00/5-646; American Consulate, Rabat, to Secretary of State, 22 February 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2809; Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 1 June 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2891; Captain H. M. Hooker to Colonel E. W. J Glavin, ‘Deportation of Nationalist Leader’, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 10 July 1944, NA, RG 226/97; Charles-André Julien, Le Maroc face aux impérialismes, 1415–1956 (Paris: Éditions Jeune Afrique, 1978) pp. 188–9. Goold to Secretary of State, 15 March 1940, NA, RG 59/881.00/1743; Ghalab, p. 238. Goold to Secretary of State, 28 May 1940, NA, RG 59/881.00/1750. Ibid. ‘Speculation on the political future of Morocco’, White to Secretary of State, 9 September 1940, NA, RG 59/881.00/1763, 1764; Goold to Secretary of State, 21 October 1940, NA, RG 59/881.00/1783. Browne to Henry S. Villard, Chief, Division of African Affairs, 28 March 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2845; OSS Report, 4 January 1945, NA, RG 226/97; Russell to Secretary of State, 17 December 1943, NA, RG 226/97/56190; 108697; ‘Miscellaneous political opinions and information’, 8 December 1944, NA, RG 226/97; ‘Mr El-Khazen’s June Observations’, Goold to Secretary of State, 21 October 1940, NA, RG 59/881.00/1783. Rapport de MM de Boisanger et de Corostarzu, 17 September 1940, Ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris (henceforth MAE), Guerre 1939– 45, Alger CFLN-GPRF, 960.

227

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN MOROCCO 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36.

Colonel Spillman, ‘Rapport de mission au Maroc – 1 au 10 novembre 1943, AN, F/60/885. Rapport de MM de Boisanger et de Corostarzu, 17 septembre 1940, MAE, Guerre 1939–45, Alger CFLN-GPRF, 960. Leon Borden Blair, Western Window on the Arab World (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970) p. 84. ‘L’agitation nationaliste de janvier-février 1944’, Direction des affaires politiques, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945, Alger CFLN-GPRF, 959. Goold to Secretary of State, 21 October 1940, RG 59/881.00/1783. Goold to Secretary of State, 28 May 1940, NA, RG 59/881.00/1750. ‘Conversations with French Protectorate Officials at Rabat’, Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 8 March 1941, NA, RG 59/881.00/1862. ‘Political situation’, Goold to Secretary of State, 15 March 1940, NA, RG 59/881.00/1743; Military Intelligence Division WDGS, Military Attaché Report, Madrid, 25 February 1944, OSS, NA, RG 226/97/63618. White to Secretary of State, 9.9.1940, NA, RG 59/881.00/1763; 23 December 1940, NA, RG 59/881.00/1828. Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 1944–1958 (translated by Godfrey Rogers) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) pp. 85–7. D. Bruce Marshall, The French Colonial Myth and Constitution-Making in the Fourth Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973) p. 3. Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, pp. 15–16. Studies of Moroccan politics and society identify developments in a similar way. They view Moroccan nationalism as an ideological current that developed on the basis of local needs, and not as a result of external developments. These studies embrace what Edmund Burke III refers to as ‘nationalist historiography’, which underlines the historic continuity of the Moroccan struggle for independence. These studies were a reaction to a stream of colonial literature that stressed the European contribution to the development of colonized nations, which according to Burke were already in decline before the Europeans arrival. Later writings took a more nationalist historiographical slant, and examined events through this prism. See Edmund Burke III, ‘Theorizing the histories of colonialism and nationalism in the Arab Maghrib’, Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 2, Spring 1998, pp. 5–19. For an example of nationalist historiographic writings, see Laroui, Esquisses historiques, pp. 125–45. Spillman, ‘Rapport de mission au Maroc’, 1–10 November 1943, AN, F/60/885. ‘Native and other reactions’, Goold to Secretary of State, 28 May 1940, NA, RG 59/881.00/1750. See ʿAbd al-Raḥim al-Wardifi, Fās fi ʿahd al-istiʿmār al-faransī, 1912–1956: Uṣūlha, taghayyura, ḥālatha al-ijtmāʾyyia wa al-siyāsīyya (Rabat: Maṭbaʿa almaʿārif, 1992).

228

NOTES 37.

38.

39.

40.

‘Note sur l’état présent du mouvement nationaliste au Maroc – synthèse des réponses fournies par les regions au questionnaire de la région Rabat, 9 novembre 1943’, Centre des Archives diplomatiques de Nantes (henceforth CADN), Nantes, Maroc DI 378; ʿAbd al-Karīm Ghālāb, Taʾrīkh al-ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya bī al-Maghrib, al-juzʾ al-awaal, (al-Dār al Baiḍa: Maṭbaʿa al-Nājaḥ al-Jadīda, 2000) pp. 250–2. Pennell, Morocco since 1830, p. 172. For a discussion of French efforts to develop Casablanca, see André Adam, Casablanca: Essai sur la transformation de la société marocaine au contact de l’occident, (Paris: CNRS, 1968). ‘Note sur l’état présent du mouvement nationaliste au Maroc – synthèse des réponses fournies par les regions au questionnaire de la région Rabat – 9 novembre 1943’, ADN, Maroc DI 378. Ghālāb, Taʾrīkh al-ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya bī al-Maghrib, p. 249.

2. The Establishment of the Istiqlal Party and the 1944 Riots 1. Discours de Massigli, Assemblée Consultative Provisoire, Commission Plénière, 8 March 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945, Vichy, Maroc/13. 2. OSS Report, 30 November 1943, NA, RG 226/97/109168; Intelligence Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Intelligence Report, RG 226/97/64919; Discours de Massigli, Assemblée Consultative Provisoire, Commission Plénière, 8 March 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945, Vichy, Maroc/13. 3. Military Intelligence Report 13750, 20 April 1944, NA, RG 226/97/70456; Report from Commander of Moroccan Sea Frontier Forces to Commander, US Naval Forces, no date, NA, RG 226/97/62702C. 4. Discours de Massigli, Assemblée Consultative Provisoire, Commission Plénière, 8 March 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945, Vichy, Maroc/13. 5. R. Le Tourneau, ‘Le nationalisme marocain’, Centre des hautes études sur l’administration musulmane (CHEAM), 1 December 1945, AN, F/60/885. 6. ‘La Situation au Maroc’, 11 February 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945, Alger: CFLN-GPRF, 959. 7. ‘Forthcoming Appeal of Moorish Nationalists for Greater Share in the Administration of French Mandate’, Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 28 December 1943, NA, RG 59/881.00/2732; 3012; NA, RG 53/881.00/2722. 8. Mayer to Secretary of State, 31 January 1944, NA, RG, 59/881.00/2771; OSS Report, 4 December 1943, NA, RG 226/97/53414. 9. OSS Report, 30 November 1943, NA, RG 226/97; ‘Forthcoming Appeal of Moorish Nationalists for Greater Share in the Administration of French Mandate’, Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 28 December 1943, NA, RG 59/881.00/2732. 10. See for example Abu Bakr al-Qādiri, Muḍakkiratī fi al-ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya al-maghribiyya, al-juzʾ al-thānī (al-Dār al Baiḍa: Maṭbaʿa al-Nājaḥ al-Jadīda, 1993) p. 203.

229

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN MOROCCO 11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28.

29. 30.

31.

Direction des affairs politiques, ‘L’agitation nationaliste de janvier– février 1944’, AN, F/60/814. Ibid. Intellignece Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Intelligence Report, OSS Report, NA, RG 226/97/61787; Discours de Massigli, Assemblée Consultative Provisoire, Commission Plénière, 8 March 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945, Vichy, Maroc/13. Mémoire, February 1944, AN, F/60/885. Intelligence Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Intelligence Report, NA, RG 226/97/64919. Mémoire, February 1944, AN, F/60/885. Discours de Massigli, Assemblée Consultative Provisoire, Commission Plénière, 8 March 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945, Vichy, Maroc/13; R. Le Tourneau, ‘Le nationalisme marocaine’, Centre des hautes études sur l’administration musulmane (CHEAM), 1 December 1945, AN, F/60/885; Intelligence Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Intelligence Report, NA, RG 226/97/64919. Ibid., Puaux to Massigli, 17 January 1944. ‘Aftermath of Nationalist Agitation’, Mayer to Secretary of State, 27 January 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2760. Mayer to Secretary of State, 5 January 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2739. Ibid. OSS Report, 16 January 1944, NA, RG 226/97/58469. Hervé Bleuchot, Les libéraux français au Maroc (1947–1955) (Paris: Éditions Ophrys, 1973) p. 33. Earle-Russell to Secretary of State, 31 January 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2787. Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Arab Maghrib in the Islamic Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) p. 383; Lewis to Secretary of State, 1 June 1945, NA, RG 59/881.00/6–145. Earle-Russell to Secretary of State, 17 January 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2772. Abu-Lughod, Rabat, pp. 96–100. Puaux à Massigli, 17 January 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945, Alger: CFLNGPRF 960; Direction des affaires politiques, ‘L’agitation nationaliste de janvier–février 1944’, AN, F/60/814. ‘Native Politics: Association des anciens élèves du collège Moulay Idriss, Fez’, OSS Report, 4 July 1943, NA, RG 226/97. For an extensive discussion of the Istiqlal’s first members and their background see Abu Bakr al-Qādiri, Muḍakkiratī fi al-ḥaraka al-waṭanīyya al-maghribiyya, pp. 357-500. Alison Baker, Voices of Resistance: Oral Histories of Moroccan Women (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998) pp. 63–9.

230

NOTES 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38.

39.

40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52.

Substance of Telegram of British Consul at Rabat (29 January 1943), 20 February 1943, NA, RG 59/881.00/2528. Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 15 June 1943, NA, RG 59/881.00/2571. OSS Report, NA, RG 226/16/54313. Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 11 September 1944, NA, RG, 59/881.00/9-1144; Kirby-Green to Secretary of State, 12 June 1943, NA, RG 59/881.00/2569. White House to Secretary of State, 26 April 1943, NA, RG 59/881.00/2536. JICA Report, 25 May 1943, NA, RG 226/97. Marchal to Commissariat des Affaires Étrangères, Algiers, 12 January 1944, ibid.; Intelligence Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department Intelligence Report, NA., RG 226/97/64919; Mayer to Secretary of State, 5 January 1944; NA, RG 59/881.00/2739; ‘Moorish Nationalists Aspirations’, Mayer to Secretary of State, 11 January 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2751.; Military Attaché Report, 21 January 1944, NA, RG 226/97/60243. Abu Bakr al-Qādiri, Al-Mujāhid Muhammad al-Yāzidi (al-Dār al Baiḍa: Maṭbaʿa al-Nājaḥ al-Jadīda, 1999) p. 59; Military Attaché Report, 3 March 1944, NA, RG 226/97/64214. Puaux to Massigli, 17 January 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945: Alger: CFLNGPRF, 959. Military Attaché Report, 3 March 1944, NA, RG 226/97/64214. Mayer to Secretary of State, 21 January 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2764; 11 January 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2751. Navy Department Intelligence Report, 3 March 1944, NA, RG 226/97/64919. al-Qādiri, Al-Yazidi, p. 61. Puaux to Massigli, 17 January 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945: Alger: CFLNGPRF, 959. Mayer to Secretary of State, 15 January 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2744. Puaux to Massigli, 17 January 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945: Alger: CFLNGPRF, 959. Military Attaché Report, 3 March 1944, NA, RG 226/97/64214. Intelligence Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department – Intelligence, NA, RG 226/97/64919; Mayer to Secretary of State, 17 January 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2745. al-Qādiri, al-Yazidi, p. 64; OSS Report, 16 January 1944, NA, RG 226/97/58469. Discours de M. Massigli, 28 January 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945, Alger: CFLN-GPRF, 959. Yaron Tsur, A Torn Community: The Jews of Morocco and Nationalism 19431954 (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 2001) pp. 75–6 (in Hebrew).

231

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN MOROCCO 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66.

67. 68. 69.

70.

71.

72.

‘Arab-Jewish Situation in French Morocco’, OSS Memorandum, 15 March 1944, NA, RG 226/97; Tsur, A Torn Community, pp. 75–6. Puaux to CFLN, 2 February 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945, Alger, CFLNGPRF, 959. Istiqlal Party Statement (19 January 1944), OSS Report, 25 February 1944, NA, RG 226/97/118658. Navy Department Intelligence Report, 3 March 1944, NA, RG 226/97/64919. Discours de Massigli, Assemblé Consultative Provisoire, Commission Plénière, 8 March 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945, Vichy, Maroc/13. Baker, Voices of Resistance, p. 69. ‘Native Situation’, OSS Report, 2 February 1944, NA, RG 226/97. Earle-Russell to Secretary of State, 31 January 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2787. Discours de Massigli, Assemblé Consultative Provisoire, Commission Plénière, 8 March 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945, Vichy, Maroc/13. Direction des affaires politiques (section politique), ‘Bulletin de renseignements politiques no. 63, (5 December 1943–20 January 1944), AN, F/60/814. Rapport du Général Suffren, Chef de la région de Fés, 26 February 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945, Alger, CFLN-GPRF, 959. Ibid. Puaux to CFLN, 2 February 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945, Alger, CFLNGPRF, 959. ‘Direction des affaires politiques (section politique)’, Bulletin de renseignements politiques, no. 1’, 20 January 1944, 20 February 1944, AN, F/60/814. Colonel Spillman, ‘Voyage au Maroc en fin mars 1944’, AN, F/60/885. Lt.-Col. Manuel, ‘Études sur le Maroc janvier–février 1944’, 19 March 1945, AN, F/60/885. Direction des affaires politiques, ‘L’agitation nationaliste de janvier–février 1944’, AN, F/60/814; André Adam, ‘La crise nationaliste au Maroc en 1944: ses origines, ses conséquences’, Rabat: 1946, CHEAM, Paris, 818; Puaux to Massigli, 17 January 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945: Alger: CFLN-GPRF, 959. Puaux to Massigli, 17 January 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945: Alger: CFLNGPRF, 959; ‘Note de la section de Rabat du front national de libération au sujet des évènements du 29 janvier 1944.’ MAE, Guerre 1939–1945, Alger CFLN-GPRF, 959. Direction des affaires politiques (section politique), ‘Bulletin de renseignements politiques no. 62’, (20 November–5 December 1943), no. 57 (5–20 September 1943), AN, F/60/814. Direction des affaires politiques, ‘L’agitation nationaliste de janvier– février 1944’, AN, F/60/814.

232

NOTES 73.

74.

‘Observation on the Position of the Moorish Nationalists’, White to Secretary of State, 9 September 1940, NA, RG 59/881.00/1763; Direction des affaires politiques, ‘L’agitation nationaliste de janvier–février 1944’, AN, F/60/814. Colonel Spillman et Robert Montagne, ‘La crise marocaine de janvier 1944’, AN, F/60/885.

3. The Istiqlal Party in the Aftermath of the 1944 Riots 1. Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 17 June 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/1744. 2. ‘Note de renseignements’, 9 March 1944, ADN, Maroc CDRG 217. 3. ‘Note de renseignements’, 5–20 May 1944, ADN, Maroc CDRG 217. 4. Direction des affaires politiques, section politique, ‘Bulletin de renseignements politiques 4 (20 April–5 May 1944), 5 (5–20 May 1944), 6 (20 May–5 June 1944), 9 (5–20 July 1944), 14 (20 September–5 October 1944)’, AN, F/60/814. 5. Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 11 September 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/9-1144; Brooks to Secretary of State, 16 October 1944, NA, RG 59/881.9/3044; Direction des affaires politiques, section politique, ‘Bulletin de renseignements politiques 11 (5–20 August 1944)’, AN, F/60/814. 6. Direction des affaires politiques, section politique, ‘Bulletin de renseignements politiques 9 (5–20 July 1944)’, AN, F/60/814; Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 11 September 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/9-1144. 7. Direction des affaires politiques, section politique, ‘Bulletin de renseignements politiques 9 (5–20 July 1944), AN, F/60/814. 8. Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 9 September 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/91144. 9. Directeur des services de securité, Rabat, ‘Mémoire’ 3 May 1944, ADN, Maroc CDRG 217. 10. Lyazidi and Abdeljalil to French Resident General, 9 February 1944, JICANA Report, 25 February 1945, Appendix N, NA, RG 226/97/118658. 11. ‘Renseignments – Fez’, 13 June 1944, ADN, Maroc CDRG 217. 12. ‘General picture of the tortures at Camp Garnier’, JICANA Report, 25 February 1945, Appendix J, NA, RG 226/97/118658; ‘Native situation in Fez’, 21 March 1944, OSS Report, NA, RG 226/97. 13. ‘The terror at Rabat’, JICANA Report, Appendix L, NA, RG 226/97/118658. 14. ‘Native Situation in Fez’, 21 March 1944, OSS Report, NA, RG 226/97; ‘Native Situation in Fez’, 4 April 1944, OSS Report, NS, RG 226/97. 15. ‘Native Situation in Fez’, OSS Report, 4 April 1944, NA, RG 226/97. 16. Cole to Secretary of State, 18 March 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2828. 17. Direction de la securité publique, Service de la police générale, ‘Note de renseignements, 5 May 1944, 20 April–5 May 1944’, ADN, Maroc 217; ‘Fez: Political Prisoners’, OSS Report, 12 June 1944, NA, RG 226/97; ‘Fez:

233

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN MOROCCO

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25.

26. 27.

28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34.

35.

nationalist leaders’, OSS Report, 11 June 1944, NA, RG 226/97; ‘Political situation in French Morocco’, 8 May 1945, OSS Report, NA, RG 226/97; ‘Native situation in Fez, 21 March 1944’, OSS Report, NA, RG 226/97. Cole to Secretary of State, 27 April 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2862. ‘Note sur la situation politique dans la zone française du Maroc no. 320.3.-20 April 1944’, AN, F/60/814. Earle-Russell to Secretary of State, 11 August 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/81144. Direction des affaires politiques, section politique, ‘Bulletin de renseignements politiques, no. 1 (janvier 1945), AN, F/60/814. ‘Underground Moroccan newspaper–Fez’, OSS, 5 August 1944, NA, RG 226/97. Commandant supérieur des troupes du Maroc, Bureau des affaires musulmanes, ‘Rapport mensuel sur la situation politique en milieux indigènes (mois d’aôut 1944)’, 11 September 1944, AN, F/60/815. Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 11 September 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/9-1144. Direction des affaires politiques, section politique, ‘Bulletin de renseignements politiques no. 1 (janvier 1945)’, AN, F/60/814; OSS Report, 28.12.1944, NA, RG 226/97/109143. Cole to Secretary of State, 4 July 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/7-444. Cole to Secretary of State, 6 July 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/7-2444; Commandant supérieur des troupes du Maroc, Bureau des affaires musulmanes, ‘Rapport Mensuel sur la situation politique en milieux indigènes (mois de juillet 1944), 11 September 1944’, AN, F/60/815; Istiqlal Party, ‘Synthesis of the Moroccan National Movement’, JICANA Report, 25 February 1945, Appendix M, NA, RG 226/97/118658. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 16 November 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/111644. Direction des affaires politiques, section politique, ‘Bulletin de renseignements politiques, 20 June–5 July 1944’, AN, F/60/814. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 26 September 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/92644; ‘Fez: College Moulay Idriss’, 25 April 1944, OSS Report, NA, RG 226/97. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 29 September 1944, NA, RG 881.00/9-2944. Puaux to Commissaire d’État, 22 September 1944, AN, F/60/83. Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 11 September 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/9-1144. Cole to Secretary of State, 4 July 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/7-444; RivesChilds to Secretary of State, 15 August 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/8-1544; Cole to Secretary of State, 18 March 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/3-1844. Brooks to Secretary of State, 8 December 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/12844.

234

NOTES 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

53. 54. 55.

56. 57.

Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 11 September 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/9-1144. La vigie marocaine, 17 February 1944; Puaux to Diplofrance Alger, 15 February 1944, ADN, Maroc GDRG 218. Cole to Secretary of State, 4 July 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/7-444. Colonel Spillman, ‘Rapport de mission au Maroc, 1–10 November 1943’, AN, F/60/885. ‘Renseignements’, 20 February–20 March 1944, ADN, Maroc CDRG 217; Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 11 September 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/9-1144. R. Montagne, ‘Réflexions sue la crise marocaine’, 31 January 1944, AN, F/60/885. ‘Renseignements’, 20 March–20 April 1944, ADN Maroc CDRG 217. ‘The Reform Programme of Protectorate Authorities in French Morocco’, 4 January 1945, OSS Report, NA, RG 226/97. Speech by Puaux, 26 November 1944, JICANA Report, 25 February 1945, Appendix Q, NA, RG 226/97/118658; Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 11 September 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/9-1144. ‘Subject of Recent Moslem Reforms’, Istiqlal Party, 1 December 1944, JICANA Report, 25 February 1945, Appendix S, NA, RG 226/97/118658. ‘Synthesis of the Moroccan National Movement’, JICANA Report, 25 February 1945, Appendix M, NA, RG 226/97/118658. ‘Reaction to Moroccan Reforms’, 8 December 1944, NA, RG 226/97/107898. ‘One Moroccan’s Views on Education’, 5 July 1944, OSS Report, NA, RG 226/97. ‘Synthesis of the Moroccan National Movement’, JICANA Report, 25 February 1945, Appendix M, NA, RG 226/97/118658. ‘The Reform Program of Protectorate Authorities in French Morocco’, 4 January 1945, OSS Report, NA, RG 226/97. Earle-Russell to Secretary of State, 26 November 1941, NA, RG 59/881.4081/1; Pennell, Morocco since 1830, pp. 228–9. ‘Transmission of Memorandum on Recent Arabic Political Movements’, Earle-Russell to Secretary of State, 28 September 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/9-2844. Cole to Secretary of State, 22 May 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2876. Cole to Secretary of State, 25 April 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2660. Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 15 August 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/81544; Pasquet to Secretary of State, 27 November 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/11-1744. Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 29 August 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/82944. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 26 September 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/92644.

235

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN MOROCCO 4. Istiqlal’s Social Initiatives 1. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 29 January 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/1-2946. 2. ‘God and the Nationalists’, 6 July 1944, OSS Report, NA, RG 226/97. 3. ‘Réflexions d’un jeune marocain sur la situation politique actuelle’, Puaux to Massigli, 9 June 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945, Alger, CFLN-GPRF, 949. 4. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 12 August 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/1246; 16 January 1946, NA, RG 559/881.00/1-1646; 29 January 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/1-2946. 5. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 12 August 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/1246. 6. Secrétariat Politique, ‘Réunion des chefs de region du 14 novembre 1946’, ADN, Maroc CDRG 214. 7. ‘Note de renseignements’, 30 May 1944, ADN, Maroc CDRG 217; ‘Bulletin de renseignements politiques no. 14, 20 September–5 October 1944’, AN, F/60/814. 8. Secrétariat Politique, ‘Réunion des chefs de région du 14 novembre 1946’, ADN, Maroc CDRG 214. 9. Direction de l’intérieur, Section Politique 1948, ADN, Maroc CDRG 219. 10. Exposé de Puaux à la séance de l’Afrique du Nord, 9 August 1945, AN, F/60/885; ‘Bulletin de renseignements politiques no. 16, 1–30 November 1944’, ADN, Maroc DI 378. 11. ‘Renseignements’, 19 October , 31 October 1944, ADN, Maroc DI 378. 12. ‘Renseignements’, 31 October 1944, ADN, Maroc DI 378. 13. McBride to Department of State, 20 January 1950, NA, RG 59/771.521/12050. 14. ‘Renseignements-Marrakech, 13 June 1945’, ADN, Maroc DI 348. 15. ‘Renseignements-Casablanca’, 17 November 1945, AN, F/60/814. 16. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 29 January 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/1-2946. 17. ‘Renseignements-Marrakech, 13 June 1945’; ‘Note de renseignements, 15 May 1945’; ‘Note de renseignements, Police de Casablanca, 14 August 1945’, ADN, DI 348. 18. Contrôleur-civil chef de la région de Casablanca au directeur des affaires politiques, Rabat, 5 July 1945, ADN, Maroc DI 378; Abun-Nasr, ‘The Salafiyya Movement in Morocco’. 19. Shana Cohen, Searching for a Different Future: The Rise of a Global Class in Morocco (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004) pp. 24–5. 20. ‘Aide-mémoire politique, 22–30 September 1944’, Secrétariat Politique, ADN, Maroc CDRG 214. 21. ‘Renseignemnets-Casablanca, 20 October 1945’, ADN, Maroc DI 348. 22. Secrétariat Politique, ‘Bulletin de renseignements politiques no. 8juillet-aôut 1946’, ADN, Maroc CDRG 214; ‘Renseignements-Casablanca, 15 November 1945’, ADN, Maroc DI 348. 23. Inquiétudes et perspectives marocaines, Interview Mohamed Hassan Ouazzani, Le Parisien, n.d., AN, F/60/885.

236

NOTES 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30.

31.

32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37.

Baker, Voices of Resistance, pp. 20–4. Baker, Voices of Resistance, p. 73; Pennell, Morocco since 1830, pp. 274–5. ‘Safḥa al-Marʾa’, al-ʿAlam, 17 November 1948. Secrétariat Politique, ‘Aide-mémoire politique du 22 au 30 septembre 1946’, ADN, Maroc CDRG 214. Ibid. Plitt to Secretary of State, ‘Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation with ʿAlal el-Fassi’, 24 January 1949, NA, RG 59/881.00/1-2449; ‘Tenseness in Morocco’, Restricted Appendix, Pasquet to Secretary of State, 26 June 1947, NA, RG 59/881.00/6-2647. Alling to Secretary of State, 13 June 1947, NA, RG 59/881.00/6; ‘Transmittal of Specimens with Additional Reports on Moroccan Nationalist Activities Submitted by Moorish Scribe Employed by Legation’, Pasquet to Secretary of State, 29 January 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/1-2946. ‘Aide-mémoire politique du 22 au 30 septembre, 30 September 1946, 19 au 25 aôut, 26 August 1946’, ADN, Maroc CDRG 214; ‘Note de Renseignements’, 15 May 1945, ADN, Maroc DI 378. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 5 May 1949, NA, RG 59/881.00/5-549. Alling to Secretary of State, 11 September 1946, NA RG 59/881.00/9-1146. Alling to Secretary of State, 26 February 1947, NA 59/881.00/2-2647. ‘Transmission of Nationalist Memorandum Addressed to French Government and of Protest Addressed to HM the Sultan’, McBride to Secretary of State, 13 June 1947, NA, RG 59/881.00/6-1347; ‘Feeling of Disillusionment among Moroccan Nationalists’, Alling to Secretary of State, 13 September 1949, NA, RG 59/881.00/1349; ‘Report on Morocco by British Ambassador to France’, Alling to Secretary of State, 15 September 1949, NA, RG 59/881.00/9-1549. ‘A Field Study of the Moroccan Problem’, 8 September 1952, NA, RG 59/771A.00/9-852. Dorman to Department of State, 4 March 1952, NA, RG 59/771A.00/3-452.

5. Istiqlal and the Sultan: The Rise of a National Leader 1. Robin Bidwell, Morocco under Colonial Rule: French Administration of Tribal Rule, 1915–1956 (London: Frank Cass, 1973) p. 63. 2. Penell, Morocco since 1830, pp. 12–18. See also Abdellah Hammoudi, Master and Disciple: The Cultural Foundations of Moroccan Authoritarianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997) pp. 73–5. 3. David M. Hart, ‘The Berber Dahir of 1930, pp. 11–33; Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, ‘Modern Morocco: Political Immobilism, Economic Dependence’, in Richard Lawless and Allan Findlay (eds) North Africa: Contemporary Politics and Economic Development (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1984) pp. 56–8.

237

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN MOROCCO 4. Mohamed el-Alami, Mohammed V: Histoire de l’Indépendence du Maroc (Rabat: Les Éditions API, 1980) pp. 51–2; Jamaâ Baida, ‘Mohammed V’, The Maghreb Review, vol. 27, no. 1, 2002, pp. 22–34; Ahmed Farouk, ‘Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef: Le sultan inattendu et sa politique face au protectorat’, The Maghreb Review, vol. 27, no. 1, 2002, pp. 3–21; Joseph Luccioni, ‘L’Avènement de Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef au Trône du Maroc, 1927’, Revue de l’occident musulman, 1972, pp. 123–9. 5. Pennell, Morocco since 1830, p. 209. 6. Rioux, The Fourth Republic, p. 117. 7. ‘Le nationalisme sultanien’, Puaux to Bidault, 3 April 1945, ADN, Maroc CDRG 213; McBride to Department of State, 2 June 1950, NA, RG 59/771.52/6-250. 8. ‘Le nationalisme sultanien’, Puaux to Bidault, 3 April 1945, ADN, Maroc CDRG 213. 9. Mayer to Secretary of State, 5 January 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/2739. 10. Mémoire, février 1944, AN F/60/885. 11. Memorandum by Brahim Abdullah, 29 April 1947, Alling to Secretary of State, 13 June 1947, NA, RG 59/881.00/6-1347. 12. Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 11 September 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/9-1144; Esya N. Sangmuah, ‘Sultan Mohamed Ben Youssef’s American strategy and the Diplomacy of North African Liberation, 1943– 1961’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 27 no. 1, 1992, pp. 129–48. 13. Jean-Claude Demory, Georges Bidault, 1899-1983: Biographie (Paris: Éditions Juillard, 1985) p. 316; Rives-Childs to Secretary of State, 11 September 1944, NA, RG 59/881.00/9-1144. 14. ‘Mémoire’, février 1944, AN, F/60/885. 15. Rioux, The Fourth Republic, pp. 85–9, 94. 16. Marshall, The French Colonial Myth, p. 82. 17. Rapport Spillman-Montagne, ‘La crise marocaine de janvier 1944’, 26 January 1944, AN, F/60/885. 18. Memorandum by Brahim Abdullah, 29 April 1947, Alling to Secretary of State, 13 June 1947, NA, RG 59/881.00/6-1347. 19. ‘Le nationalisme sultanien’, Puaux to Bidault, 3 April 1945, ADN, Maroc CDRG 213. 20. Robert Rezette, Les partis politiques marocains (Paris: Armand Colin, 1955) pp. 79–80. 21. ‘ʿĪd al-ʿarsh–ʿid al-amal’, al-ʿAlam, 18 November 1948. 22. Baker, Voices of Resistance, pp. 67–8. 23. Ghālāb, Taʾrīkh al-ḥaraka. 24. ‘Anbāʾ al-qaṣr al-malīki al-aʿmar’, al-ʿAlam, 26 January 1946, 28 January 1946. 25. ‘Istiʿdād sukkān Meknas lil iḥtifāl mulna al-imām al-muʿaẓẓam’, al-ʿAlam, 12 April 1949; ‘Al-Yawm: Tastaqbil al-ʿaṣima al-idriṣṣiyya jalālat al-malik’,

238

NOTES

26. 27.

al-ʿAlam, 20 April 1949; ‘Fās tastaqbil jalālat al-malik Muhammad alkhāmis istiqbal la mankta al-naẓīr’, al-ʿAlam, 21 April 1949. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 29 January 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/1-2946; ‘Native Troubles’, OSS Report, 20 January 1944, NA, RG 226/97. ‘Réflexions d’un jeune marocain sur la situation politique actuelle’, Puaux to Massigli, 9 June 1944, MAE, Guerre 1939–1945, Alger: CFLNGPRF, 949; ‘Extraits du bulletin hebdomadaire de renseignements sur l’opinion marocaine, 6–12 March 1946’, ADN, Maroc CDRG 213.

6. Labonne’s Reform Policies and their Influence on Istiqlal 1. Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p. 41. 2. Alling to Secretary of State, 11 September 1945, NA, RG 59/881.00/9-1145. 3. Alling to Secretary of State, 11 September 1945, NA RG 59/881.00/9-1145. 4. Caffrey to Secretary of State, 18 May 1947, NA, RG 59/881.00/5-1747. 5. Nevill Barbour, ‘Nationalism in Morocco’, Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. 4, no. 11, November 1953, pp. 363–4; Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p. 41. 6. For a discussion of Gaullist approaches to French colonialism, see Marshall, The French Colonial Myth, pp. 176–7, 115–19. 7. Demory, Georges Bidault, p. 317. 8. Allal el-Fassi, The Independence Movements in Arab North Africa (New York: Octagon Books, 1970) p. 251. 9. Ibid. 10. ‘Extraits de bulletin hebdomadaire de renseignements sur l’opinion marocaine, 6–12 March 1946’, ADN, Maroc CDRG 213. 11. Caffrey to Secretary of State, 18 May 1947, NA, RG 59/881.00/5-1747. 12. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 11 March 1946, NA, RG 59/881.001/3-1146; 4 January 1946, NA, RG 59/881.001/1-446; Caffrey to Secretary of State, 15 March 1946; NA, RG 59/881.00/3-1546; 23 March 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/3-2346; 23 June 1948, NA, RG 59/881.00/6-2348. 13. Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, pp. 41–2; el-Fassi, The Independence Movements, p. 251. 14. Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p. 55. 15. Caffery to Secretary of State, 23 June 1948, NA, RG 59/226/6-2348. 16. Ibid. 17. Lewis to Secretary of State, 18 February 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/2-1846. 18. Pennell, Morocco since 1830, p. 273. 19. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 12 August 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/8-1246. 20. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 12 August 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/8-1246. 21. ‘Extraits de bulletin hebdomadaires de renseignements sur l’opinion marocaine, 12–18 March 1946.’ ADN, Maroc, CDRG 213. 22. Douglas E. Ashford, Political Change in Morocco (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961) pp. 64–5.

239

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN MOROCCO 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

‘The Moroccan Crisis’, Report by the Istiqlal Party, 30 March 1946, Cowan to Secretary of State, 6 May 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/5-646. Dumont to Secretary of State, 30 April 1946, NA , RG 59/881.00/4-3046. El-Fassi, The Independence Movements, p. 253. Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, pp. 42–3; Pasquet to Secretary of State 12 August 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/8-1246. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 12 August 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/8-1246; Plitt to Secretary of State, 24 January 1949, NA, RG 59/881.00/1-2449. ‘Meeting between the French Resident-General and Moroccan Nationalists’, Lewis to Secretary of State, 17 June 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/6-1746; Pasquet to Secretary of State, 29 July 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/7-2946; el-Fassi, The Independence Movements, p. 253. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 19 June 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/6-1946. Caffrey to Secretary of State, 18 May 1947, NA, RG 59/881.00/5-1747. Demory, Georges Bidault, p. 317; ‘Reception by Sultan in Honor of Feast of the Throne’, Pasquet to Secretary of State, 21 November 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/11-2146. Ashford, Political Change in Morocco, p. 64; Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, pp. 42–3. Rezette, Les partis politiques marocains, pp. 159–60. ‘Rapport politique hebdomadaire (semaine du 18 au 25 juin 1946), 25 June 1946’, AN, F/60/885; ‘Memorandum of Conversation with Nationalist Leader Hadj Ahmed Balafrej’ (Enclosure), Pasquet to Secretary of State, 26 August 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/8-2646. Alling to Secretary of State, 1 July 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/7-146. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 26 August 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/8-2646. ‘Memorandum-Cowan’, 13 June 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/7-1646. ‘1946 Council of Government Meeting’, Pasquet to Secretary of State, 29 July 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/7-2946. Barbour, ‘Nationalism in Morocco’, p. 364. ‘Reactions of the Paris Press to Speech by Mr Eirik Labonne, ResidentGeneral of Morocco’, Fullerton to Secretary of State, 25 July 1946, NA, RG 59/881.001/7-2546. Fullerton to Secretary of State, 25 July 1946, NA, RG 59/881.001/7-2546. Julien, Le Maroc face aux impérialismes, pp. 192–5. Barbour, ‘Nationalism in Morocco’, p. 364. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 12 August 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/8-1246. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 29 July 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/7-2946. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 26 August 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/8-2646. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 12 August 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/8-1246; Barbour, ‘Nationalism in Morocco’, p. 364. Enclosure to Dispatch no. 81, 26 August 1946, NA, RG 59/881.00/8-2646. Julien, Le Maroc face aux impérialismes, p. 199.

240

NOTES 50. 51.

‘Nationalist Movement in the French Protectorate of Morocco’, Lewis to Secretary of State, 2 April 1947, NA, RG 59/881.00/4-247. McBride to Secretary of State, 15 September 1945, NA, RG 59/881.00/91549.

7. The Sultan’s Visit to Tangier and its Impact on the Emergence of Istiqlal 1. Alling to Secretary of State, 11 September 1945, NA, RG 59/881.00/9-1145. 2. al-Qādiri, Muḍakkiratī fi al-ḥaraka, pp. 316–18. 3. Susan Gilson Miller, ‘Watering the Garden of Tangier: Colonial Contestations in a Moroccan City’, The Journal of North African Studies, vol. 5, no. 4, Winter 2000, pp. 25–50. 4. al-Qādiri, Muḍakkiratī fi al-ḥaraka, p. 320; Graham H. Stuart, The International City of Tangier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955) pp. 143–7. 5. Stuart, The International City of Tangier, pp. 149–55. 6. ‘Political Notes-September 1–30, 1945’, Lewis to Secretary of State, 1 October 1945, NA, RG 59/881.00/10-145. 7. Caffrey to Secretary of State, 8 September 1945, NA, RG 59/881.00/9-845. 8. Ghālāb, Taʾrīkh al-ḥaraka, pp. 357–8. 9. El-Fassi, The Independence Movements, pp. 266–7. 10. Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p. 57. 11. ‘Projected Union of Moroccan Nationalist Parties’, Alling to Secretary of State, 26 February 1947, NA, RG 59/881.00/2-2647; Plitt (Tangier) to Pasquet (Casablanca), 22 December 1947 (Enclosure no. 1 to Dispatch no. 9 from Tangier Dated 14 January 1948), Plitt to Secretary of State, NA, RG 59/881.00/1-1448. 12. Barbour, ‘Nationalism in Morocco’, p. 369. 13. Eurafrican Cooperation Committee, ‘Letter from Morocco’, Confidential Newsletter from Near East and North Africa, 1 August 1952. 14. El-Fassi, The Independence Movements, p. 271. 15. Alling to Secretary of State, 26 February 1947, NA, RG 59/881.00/2-2647. 16. El-Fassi, The Independence Movements, p. 269. 17. ‘Sidelights on Sultan’s Visit to Tangier and on Casablanca Disturbances on April 7, 1947’, Pasquet to Secretary of State, 18 April 1947, NA, RG 59/881.00/4-1847; ‘Disorders in Casablanca on April 7’, Lewis to Secretary of State, 10 April 1947, NA, RG 59/881.00/4-1047. 18. ‘Sidelights on Sultan’s Visit to Tangier and Casablanca Disturbances on April 7, 1947’, Pasquet to Secretary of State, 18 April 1947, NA, RG 59/881.00/4-1847. 19. Ghālāb, Taʾrīkh al-ḥaraka, pp. 358–359; Julien, Le Maroc face aux impérialismes, p. 199. 20. El-Fassi, The Independence Movements, pp. 269–70. 21. Pennell, Morocco since 1830, p. 271.

241

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN MOROCCO 22. 23. 24.

25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

El-Fassi, The Independence Movements, pp. 271–2. Pasquet to Secretary of State, 18 April 1947, NA, RG 59/881.00/1847. Charles E. Gallagher, ‘North-African Crossroads: Part I: The Reign of Muhammad V’, American University Field Staff Reports Service, North Africa Series, vol. 7, no. 2, Morocco, April 1961. See Egyo N. Sangmuah, ‘Sultan Mohamed Ben Youssef’s American Strategy and the Diplomacy of North African Liberation, 1943–1961’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 27, no. 1, 1992, pp. 129–48. Baker, Voices of Resistance, p. 107; Fatima Mernisi, The Harem from Within: Tales of a Moroccan Girlhood (London: Bantam, 1995) p. 190. Barbour, ‘Nationalism in Morocco’, p. 364. Madonne to Department of State, 7 March 1951, NA, RG 59/771A.00/3-751. Ibid. Julien, Le Maroc face aux impérialismes, p. 201. For more on Juin, see Alphonse Juin, Mémoires (Paris: Fayard, 1960) vol. 2; Secrétariat Général pour l’Administration Direction de la Mémoire, du Patrimoine et des Archives, ‘Alphonse Juin (1888–1867)’, Collection Mémoire et Citoyennete, www.defense.gouv.fr Baker, Voices of Resistance, p.124. ‘Celebration of Twentieth Anniversary of Accession to Throne of Present Sultan of Morocco’, Pasquet to Secretary of State, 21 November 1947, NA, RG 59/881.415/11-2147. ‘Celebration of the Feast of the Throne’, Pasquet to Secretary of State, 1 December 1948, NA, RG 59/881.415/12-148. ‘Marhala Jadida fi Kifaḥ al-Maghrib’, al-ʿAlam, 16 April 1947; ‘Bian min Ḥizb al-Istiqlal’, al-ʿAlam, 30 April 1947. Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, pp. 57–8. ‘A Field Study of the Moroccan Problem’, 8 September 1952, NA, RG 59/771A.00/9-852. Dorman to Department of State, 21 March 1952, NA, RG 59/771A.00/3-2152. Green to Department of State, 30 July 1952, NA, R.G 59/771A.00/7-3052. ‘A Field Study of the Moroccan Problem’, 8 September 1952, NA, RG 59/771A.00/9-852. ‘Continued Tension between Sultan and France’, Pasquet to Secretary of State, 14 November 1947, NA, RG 59/881.00/11-1447. John P. Halstead, ‘A Comparative Historical Study of Colonial Nationalism in Egypt and Morocco’, African Historical Studies, vol. 2 no. 1, 1969, pp. 85–100.

8. An Intensified Nationalist Struggle: The Crisis of 1950–51 1. Rioux, The Fourth Republic, p. 147; Martin Thomas, The French North African Crisis: Colonial Breakdown and Anglo-French Relations, 1945-62 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000) pp. 38–9.

242

NOTES 2. Communiqué of the Secretariat General of the Istiqlal party, 28 December 1949, Plitt to Department of State, 9 January 1950, NA, RG 59/771.00/1-950. 3. Plitt to Department of State, 21 January 1950, NA, RG 59/771.00/1-2150. 4. McBride to Department of State, 3 February 1950, NA, RG 59/771.00/2–50. 5. Ibid. 6. ‘Sixth Anniversary of the Nationalist Manifesto Observed in Tangier’, Plitt to Department of State, 28 January 1950, NA, RG 59/771.00/1-2850. 7. Al-ʿUmmal al-maghribiyya yātālibun bi-huqūqhim’, al-ʿAlam, 16 September 1946. 8. Baida, ‘Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef’, pp. 312–13. 9. Zakya Daoud and Maâti Monjib, Ben Barka (Paris: Éditions Michalon, 1996) pp. 8–9. 10. ‘Al-ʿUmmal al-maghribiyya yātlibun bi-rafʿ al-ujūr’, al-ʿAlam, 20 December 1950. 11. ‘Eighth Issue of Istiqlal Party’s Confidential and Documentary Informational Bulletin’, McBride to Department of State, 25 January 1951, NA, RG 59/771.00/1-2551. 12. Charles R. Tangay to Department of State, ‘Moroccan Activities on May Day’, 4 May 1950, NA, RG 59/771.00 MAY DAY/5-450. 13. ‘Fatḥ mai-ʿid al-ʿummal: al-taḥrir al-ijtimāʿī’, al-ʿAlam, 1 May 1951; ‘Nashat al- ʿummal bi al-Rabat-Safḥat al- ʿummal’, al-ʿAlam, 8 June 1952; ‘al-Usbua al-niqābī: Nashat al-ʿummal fī al-Rabat wa Sla’, al-ʿAlam, 22 June 1952. 14. ‘Membership of Istiqlal party’, McBride to Department of State, 21 July 1950, NA, RG 59/771.00/7-2150. 15. ‘Annual meeting of sections of Istiqlal party’, McBride to Department of State, 13 June 1950, NA, RG 59/771.00/6-1350; ‘Membership of the Istiqlal party’, McBride to Department of State, 21 July 1950, NA, RG 59/771.00/7-2150. 16. See for example ‘Ḥaflat ‘Īd al-ʿarsh fi al-mamlaka’, al-ʿAlam, 22 November 1950. 17. ‘Al-Ḥaqiqa hawālā al-daʿwa allatī iqāmatha al-ʿalam ʿalā raqāba’, al-ʿAlam, 10 November 1950; ‘Al-ʿalam tāqtabal sanatha al-thālitha’, al-ʿAlam, 11 November 1948; ‘Al-ʿalam tāstāqbal sanatha al-rābiʿ’, al-ʿAlam, 11 November 1949. 18. ‘Istiqlal Information Bulletin’, McBride to Department of State, 31 August 1950, NA, RG 59/771.00/8-3150; ‘Second Number of Istiqlal Information Bulletin’, McBride to Department of State, 15 September 1950, NA, RG 59/771.00/9-1550; ‘Third issue of Istiqlal Bulletin’, McBride to Department of State, 13 October 1950, NA, RG 59/771.00/10-1350; ‘Current Nationalist Thinking on World Problems’, McBride to Department of State, 24 March 1950, NA, RG 59/771.00/3-2450; ‘Eighth Issue of Istiqlal Party’s Confidential Documentary and Informational Bulletin’, McBride to Department of State, 25 January 1951, NA, RG 59/771.00/1-2551.

243

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN MOROCCO 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41.

McBride to Department of State, 20 January 1950, NA, RG 59/771.00/12050; ‘Notes on Present Status of Political Parties in Morocco’, McBride to Department of State, 5 April 1951, NA, RG 59/771.00/4-551; ‘Membership of Istiqlal party’, McBride to Department of State, 21 July 1950, NA, RG 59/771.00/702150. ‘Meeting of Istiqlal Party: Discussion of Wazzani propositions’, McBride to Department of State, 3 March 1950, NA, RG 59/771.00/3-350. Daoud and Monjib, Ben Barka, pp. 8–9. Ibid., pp. 59–63, 73–7. Ibid., pp. 63–7. Ibid., pp. 12–13. Ibid., pp. 105, 112–15. ‘Position of Allal el-Fassi in Istiqlal Party’, McBride to Department of State, 19 January 1951, NA, RG 59/771.00/1-1951. Georges Spillman, Du Protectorat à l’Indépendence: Maroc 1912–1955 (Paris: Plon, 1967) pp. 143–4. Vincent Auriol, Mon Septennat, 1947–1954: Notes de journal présentées par Pierre Nora et Jacques Ozouf (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1970) pp. 296–7. Ibid., pp. 147–9. Ibid., pp. 296–7. ‘Al-Jawāb al-faransī ʿan al-muḏakkira al-maghribyya’, al-ʿAlam, 3 November 1950. Auriol, Mon Septennat, p. 147. Nack Young An, ‘President Auriol and External Affairs’, Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 22, no. 3, 1969, pp. 258–69; Auriol, Mon Septennat, p. 301. ‘First Impressions of Sultan’s Trip to France’, McBride to Department of State, 6 November 1950, NA, RG 59/771.00/11-650; ‘Istiqlal Party Stickers Appear in Rabat’, McBride to Secretary of State, 6 November 1950, NA, RG 59/771.00/11-650; Pennell, Morocco since 1830, p. 278. Daoud and Monjib, Ben Barka, pp. 112–13. Hassan II, Le Défi (Paris: Albin Michel, 1976) p. 45. ‘Le Glaoui a été congédié par le sultan, affirme un communiqué du grand vizir’, Le Monde, 6 January 1951. ‘Incident between Sultan and Pasha of Marrakech’, McBride to Department of State, 4 January 1951, NA, RG 59/771.00/1-451; Jacques H. Guerif, ‘La crise marocaine est inséparable des préoccupations stratégiques de l’occident’, Le Monde, 10 January 1951; Pennell, Morocco since 1830, p. 278; Spillman, Du Protectorat à l’Indépendence, p. 150. Jules-Albert Jaeger, ‘Au Maroc: Le sultan condamnera-t-il l’Istiqlal?’, Le Monde, 2 February 1951. Hassan II, La Mémoire d’un Roi: entretiens avec Eric Laurent (Paris: Plon, 1993) pp. 27–9; Hassan II, Le Défi, p. 45. McBride to Department of State, 1 March 1951, NA, RG 59/771.00/3-151.

244

NOTES 42. 43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

Auriol, Mon Septennat, pp. 316–17. ‘Memorandum of Conversation, McBride and General de Blesson, 31 January 1951, McBride to Department of State, 5 February 1951, NA, RG 59/771.00/2-551; Pennell, Morocco since 1830, p. 278. ‘Détente franco-marocaine’, Le Monde, 27 February 1951; ‘Le désaveu public de l’Istiqlal’, Le Monde, 28 February 1951; Pennell, Morocco since 1830, p. 278. ‘Impression of Present Political Situation in French Morocco’, McBride to Department of State, 29 March 1951, NA, RG 59/771.00/3-2951; ‘Revue de la presse parisienne’, Le Monde, 25 February 1951. ‘Si Allal el-Fassi affirme que l’Istiqlal veut “assainir” les bases de la collaboration’, Le Monde, 27 February 1951; ‘Nadwa ṣiḥafiyya lil ustāḏ’ ʿalal al-Fāṣi’, al-ʿAlam, 25 February 1951. ‘Impressions of Present Political Situation in French Morocco’, 29 March 1951, NA, RG 59/771.00/3-2951; Plitt to Secretary of State, 12 January 1951, NA, RG 59/771.00/1-1251; ‘Memorandum of Conversation with ʿAllal el-Fassi’, Plitt to Department of State, 17 January 1951, NA, RG 59/771.00/1-1751. ‘Eighth Issue of Istiqlal’s Party Confidential Documentary and Informational Bulletin’, McBride to Department of State, 25 January 1951, NA, RG 59/771.00/1-2551; ‘L’anniversaire de la fondation de l’Istiqlal s’est deroulé dans le calme au Maroc’, Le Monde, 14–15 January 1951. ‘Le sultan approuve la réforme des djemâas’, Le Monde, 10 July 1951; Satterthwaite (Tangier) to Secretary of State, 18 August 1953, NA, RG 59/771.00/8-1753.

9. Turning Point of the Nationalist Struggle: The Deposition of the Sultan 1. Carter-Vincent to Department of State, 20 July 1951, NA, RG 59/771.00(W)/7-2051. 2. Pierre et Renée Gosset, ‘Le Maroc est-il majeur?’ Le Monde, 5 January 1951; ‘Vérités sur l’Istiqlal ‘, Le Monde, 14 February 1951. 3. ‘Le général Juin s’entretient avec le général Guillaume’, Le Monde, 30 August 1951; Pennell, Morocco since 1830, p. 279; Spillman, Du Protectorat à l’Indépendence, pp. 155–6. 4. Carter-Vincent to Secretary of State, 14 December 1952, NA, RG 59.771.00/12-1452; Demory, Georges Bidault, p. 321; Rioux, The Fourth Republic, p. 147; Thomas, The French North African Crisis, p. 51. 5. Le Monde, 1 September 1951; Dorman to Department of State, 13 September 1951, NA, RG 59/771.00/9-1351; Spillman, Du Protectorat à l’Indépendence, pp. 144–6. 6. ‘L’agitation des nationalists dégénère en baggares à Casablanca’, Le Monde, 3 November 1951; ‘Après les incidents de Casablanca’, Le Monde, 4– 5 November 1951; ‘Des mots d’ordre ont été lances pour susciter de

245

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN MOROCCO

7.

8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18 19.

20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25.

26. 27.

nouveaux troubles au Maroc, affirme le général Guillaume’, Le Monde, 6 November 1951. ‘L’Istiqlal annonce qu’il poursuivra son action dans la légalité, Le Monde, 8 November 1951; ‘Ḥizb al-Istiqlal yāstāhādf lī ḥāmla ʿanīfa mīn arājīf wā al-kāḍaˆib’, al- ʿAlam, 8 November 1951. Beach to Department of State, 19 November 1951, NA, RG 59/771.00(W)/ 11-1951; ‘“Nous attendons toujours l’ouverture de négociations francomarocaines” déclare le sultan dans le discours du trône’, Le Monde, 21 November 1951; Pennell, Morocco since 1830, p. 280. ‘Le sultan du Maroc au général Guillaume’, Le Monde, 15 December 1951. Auriol, Mon Septennat, p. 435. Al-ʿAlam, 22 April 1952. Carter-Vincent to Department of State, NA, RG59/771.00/8-152. Pierre Frédérix, ‘Où en est le Maroc?’, Le Monde, 5 March 1952. Dorman to Department of State, 23 December 1952, NA, RG 59/771.00/12-2352. Dorman to Department of State, 16 January 1952, NA, RG 59/771.00/11652; ‘Ṭarīq al-Istiqlal shaq lākinnhu maḍmūn al-ʿāqiba’, al-ʿAlam, 11 November 1952. Spillman, Du Protectorat à l’Indépendence, pp. 157–8. Pennell, Morocco since 1830, pp. 280–1. ‘Le général Guillaume évoque “les dangereux mirages d’une indépendance prématurée”’, Le Monde, 2 December 1952. ‘Le sultan du Maroc demande la reprise du dialogue avec la France’, Le Monde, 28 January 1953; ‘“L’amitié franco-marocaine doit être maintenue et développée” affirme un communiqué du palais du sultan’, Le Monde, 18 June 1953. Pennell, Morocco since 1830, p. 281. ‘Le général Guillaume rend visite au sultan’, Le Monde, 2 June 1953; Spillman, Du Protectorat à l’Indépendence, pp. 162–4. ‘Le Glaoui réitère ses accusations contre le sultan du Maroc’, Le Monde, 1 August 1953. Gavin Maxwell, Lords of the Atlas: The Rise and Fall of the House of Glaoua, 1893–1956 (London: Cassell & Company, 2000) p. 218; Pennell, Morocco since 1830, pp. 280–2; Spillman, Du Protectorat à l’Indépendence, pp. 162–4. ‘The Resident-General’s Estimate of the Situation’, Dorman to Department of State, 30 June 1953, NA, RG 59/771.00/6-3053. ‘Les Pachas de Fés, de Sefrou, de Meknès et de Salé s’élèvent contre l’attitude d’El Glaoui et la petition des “270”’, Le Monde, 4 June 1953; Pennell, Morocco since 1830, pp. 281–2. Dorman to Secretary of State, 3 June 1953, NA, RG 59/771.00/7-753. Maxwell, Lords of the Atlas, p. 218; Spillman, Du Protectorat à l’Indépendence, pp. 165–9.

246

NOTES 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34.

35. 36.

37.

38. 39.

40.

41.

42. 43.

‘Official Residency Position on Pasha’s and Caid’s Petition’, Dorman to Department of State, 7 July 1953, NA, RG 59/771.00/7-753. ‘En Afrique du Nord: “Nul ne peut dire que j’ai encouragé l’Istiqlal” déclare le sultan du Maroc’, Le Monde, 22 July 1953. ‘Intellectuals’ Manifesto and Other Petitions Supporting the Sultan’, Stokes to Department of State, 5 August 1953, NA, RG 59/771.00/8-553. Ibid. ‘A son retour de France: Le Glaoui a entrepris une tournée au Maroc’, Le Monde, 11 August 1953. ‘Dans sa nouvelle déclaration: Le sultan s’affirme de nouveau prêt à reprendre le dialogue avec la France’, Le Monde, 19 June 1953; ‘Le sultan du Maroc se rendrait prochainement en France’, Le Monde, 19 June 1953. ‘Sultan’s Communiqué of 11 August 1953’, Stokes to Secretary of State, 13 August 1953, NA, RG 59/771.00/8-1253; ‘L’appel du sultan du Maroc au président de la république’, Le Monde, 13 August 1953. ‘Le Glaoui et le chérif el-Kittani poursuivent leurs attaques contre le sultan du Maroc’, Le Monde, 12 August 1953. ‘Le sultan demande au président de la république de ramener le calme au Maroc’, Le Figaro, 12 August 1953; ‘L’appel du sultan’, Le Figaro, 12 August 1953. ‘“Maintenir l’ordre et promulguer les réformes” tel est le but immuable rappelle le général Guillaume à son retour à Casablanca’, Le Figaro, 14 August 1953. Thomas, The French North African Crisis, pp. 52–3; Tsur, A Torn Community, pp. 79–81. ‘Vers l’apaisement au Maroc? Les caids convoqués par le Glaoui n’ont pas été réunis ce matin: Le sultan a accepté les propositions du général Guillaume’, Le Monde, 15 August 1953; ‘Déception et nervosité des partisans du Glaoui après l’intervention de la résidence’, Le Monde, 16–18 August 1953. ‘Premières reactions de la presse’, Le Monde, 15 August 1953; ‘“La France n’acceptera pas l’intronisation d’un nouveau sultan” déclare-t-on au Quai d’Orsay’, Le Figaro, 15–16 August 1953; ‘Revue de la Presse – Le Figaro’, Le Monde, 16–18 August 1953. ‘Les troubles du Maroc: Le Glaoui reproche à la France de manquer de fermeté’, Le Monde, 19 August 1953; ‘Nouvelles démarches françaises auprès du Glaoui, Le Monde, 18 August 1953; ‘Déception et nervosité des partisans de Glaoui après l’intervention de la résidence’, Le Monde, 16– 18 August 1953; Thomas, The French North African Crisis, pp. 52–3. Satterwaite (Tangier) to Secretary of State, 17 August 1953, NA, RG 59/771.00/8-1753. Dorman to Secretary of State, 18 August 1953, NA, RG 59/771.00/8-1853; ‘Heures cruciales au Maroc’, Le Figaro, 14 August 1953.

247

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN MOROCCO 44. 45.

46.

47. 48. 49. 50.

Lamont to Secretary of State, 18 August 1953, NA, RG 59/771.00/81853. Dorman to Secretary of State, 20 August 1953, NA, RG 59/771.00/8-2053; ‘Le Gouvernement français a décidé d’éloigner le sultan du Maroc qui a refusé d’abdiquer’, Le Figaro, 21 August 1953; Spillman, Du Protectorat à l’Indépendence, p. 168. Rioux, The Fourth Republic, p. 214; Thomas, The French North African Crisis, pp. 52–3; Philip Williams, Politics in Post-War France: Parties and the Constitution in the Fourth Republic, 2nd edition (London: Longmans, 1958) p. 135. Auriol, Mon Septennat, pp. 560–1; Williams, Politics in Post-War France, pp. 410–11, 405. Eric Ollivier, ‘Le sultan a quitté le Maroc dans l’avion du général Guillaume à destination d’Ajaccio’, Le Figaro, 21 August 1953. ‘“Nous accepterions avec la France une alliance librement consentie” déclare Si Allal El-Fassi’, Le Monde, 21 August 1953. ‘L’Istiqlal demande aux pays arabes et asiatiques de rompre les relations diplomatiques avec la France’, Le Monde, 23–24 August 1953.

248

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253

Index

1944 riots, 24, 32, 34, 52, 56–9, 62–3, 65, 69–71, 74, 79, 88–9, 92, 94, 98, 108, 120, 122, 129–30, 164, 167–8, 183; see also riots

Axis, 18–19, 36, 73 Belafrej, Ahmed, 18–19, 37, 52, 59, 70, 93, 105, 141–2, 146, 150, 152, 186, 191 Ben ʿArafa, Muhammad, 217–20 Ben Barka, Mehdi, 184, 188–90, 195 Berber Dahir, 13, 17, 34, 64, 124; Berber decree, 114, 122 Berlin, 18–19 Bidault, Georges, 137, 209 Boniface, Philippe, 149, 209 Boucetta, Ahmad Ben, 42 Britain, 23, 45, 49, 58, 89, 158–9, 166

Abdeljalil, Omar, 41 Africa, 24, 158 Agadir, 106 agrarian reform, 190 agriculture, 75, 78, 167; chamber of, 203 al-ʿAlam, 93, 102, 107, 125, 127, 145, 177, 184–7, 204, 206 Algeciras, 158; treaty, 159, 161 Algeria, 83 Algiers, 58, 189 Allies, 18–19, 29, 39, 89, 161 alternance, 1, 2 alumni associations, 44 anti-colonial struggle, 111, 221, 224 Arab League, 102, 171 Asilah, 170 Atlantic Charter, 19, 29, 39, 46, 118 Atlas mountains, 141 Atlas region, 66 Auriol, Vincent, 192–3, 197, 204, 218

Cairo, 190 Casablanca, 14–15, 19, 26, 42–3, 53, 56, 64–5, 68, 72–3, 82, 92–4, 97–8, 117, 149, 166, 168–9, 178, 184–5, 203, 207, 217; riots, 168, 171–2, 203, 207–9 Catroux, General, 83 censorship, 23, 74, 145, 187 Cherkaoui, Ahmed, 42 civil service, 78, 80 colonialism, 11, 68, 132, 182, 187, 197; colonial administration, 25–6, 43–4, 68, 78–80, 109, 124–5, 130–1, 134, 153, 155,

255

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN MOROCCO France, 3, 13, 15–17, 20–1, 23–4, 27, 29, 35, 38–9, 45–51, 58–9, 66, 74–5, 77, 79–81, 83–4, 89, 108–9, 111–12, 114–17, 119–22, 128–37, 139–41, 143, 145–6, 148–51, 155–6, 158–9, 161–6, 168, 170–79, 181, 191–4, 196–8, 200, 202–6, 208, 211–16, 218–19, 223, 237, 242, 244, 246–7, 253 free schools, 124 French protectorate, 9, 13–14, 18, 31, 33, 38, 45, 51, 112, 117, 157, 159, 165, 169, 171–2, 177 French residency, 14, 16–17, 19, 21, 23–5, 27–8, 36, 42, 45, 47, 52, 59, 62–3, 77, 92–3, 98, 107, 109–10, 115, 117, 156, 160, 173, 181, 187, 217, 224 French–Moroccan relations, 76, 83, 133–4, 143, 156, 191, 202, 208, 219

158, 169, 173, 176, 182–3, 194, 200, 214 Comité d’action marocaine, 15 commerce, 66; chamber of, 203 communism, 184, 197, 207; communists, 133, 186, 207, 210 Communist Party, 184, 200 constitution, 206, 221 Corsica, 70, 219 Cultural Association, 11 Dahir, 13, 15; see also Berber Dahir de Blesson, General, 198 de Gaulle, Charles, 22–5, 34, 36, 46, 57–8, 117, 130–1, 133 deposition of sultan, 208–9, 211–12, 218–20 Direction des affaires politiques (DAP), 4, 143, 146 education, 15–16, 20–1, 27–8, 41, 44, 55, 63, 71–2, 75, 78, 80–2, 88–91, 95, 97–8, 100–3, 114, 124, 126, 139, 145, 152, 155, 179 espionage, 52, 160

Gabon, 17, 90, 105, 141 Garnier camp, 66 Germany, 17–19, 36, 58, 160 Ghazi, Mohammed, 93 el-Glaoui, Thami, 94, 193–8, 200, 209–20 Government Council, 147–8, 152–3, 181, 194 Guillaume, General AugustinLéon, 202–4, 206–9, 211–15, 218–19

farmers, 76, 78, 81 al-Fasi, Mohammed, 44 el-Fassi, Allal, 16–17, 44, 90, 92–3, 103–5, 108–9, 133, 135, 138, 141–2, 164, 168, 170, 178, 182, 190–1, 199, 219, 223 el-Fassi, Malika, 44, 53, 101 Fez, 11–12, 14–15, 17, 19–20, 25–6, 33, 37, 41–2, 44, 54–6, 63–72, 91–2, 103–4, 114, 122, 125, 134, 142, 205, 212 First World War, 159

al-Hafiz, Sultan ʿAbd, 158 al-Hafiz, Sultan Moulay ʿAbd, 210 Hashad, Ferhat, 207 Hassan II, King, 1

256

INDEX Hassan, Crown Prince, 83, 118, 172, 189, 194, 197, 221 Hassanian scouts, 82 High Atlas region, 194 Hull, Cordell, 46

al-Khattabi/Khemisat, ʿAbd al Karim, 3, 16, 43, 106 Kitaniyya, 210 al-Kittani, ʿAbd al-Hay, 210 Kutla, 16

illiteracy, 102 imperialism, 7 independence, 9, 11, 15, 19–20, 22, 25, 28–32, 34–5, 37–41, 44, 46, 49, 51–4, 56, 58–9, 62–5, 72, 74–6, 79, 81, 84, 87–8, 90, 95, 97–9, 101–2, 104, 108–9, 111, 116, 118, 128, 130, 136–7, 139, 141–2, 144, 151, 153, 155–6, 166, 171–3, 177–9, 181–6, 188, 190–1, 193, 195, 197, 199, 203–6, 208–10, 219–24 industrialization, 183 industry, 16, 42, 141 International Legislative Council, 159 Islam, 11, 13, 39, 44, 110, 114, 172, 195, 209 Istiqlal, 2–3, 6–10, 15, 19–21, 25, 27–8, 30–42, 44–54, 56–9, 61–7, 69–74, 76–85, 87–112, 116, 121, 123, 125–47, 149–53, 155–7, 159–64, 166–7, 169, 171, 173, 175–9, 181–212, 216–17, 219–24, 227, 229–31, 233–5, 237–40, 242–7, 251; manifesto, 40–1, 44, 47, 89

Labonne, Eirik, 127–9, 131–53, 156, 164–6, 168, 171, 173–4, 177, 181 Lausanne, General, 23 Le Figaro, 149, 215 Leila Aisha, Princess, 172 local government, 98, 141, 148, 151, 158–60, 169, 193, 200, 205, 212, 215 Lyautey, Louis Gonzalve, 175 Lyazidi, Ahmad, 41 Lyazidi, Mohammed, 37, 41–2, 52, 59, 93 Maghribi League, 11 makhzen, 4, 33, 43, 53, 68, 82, 90, 106, 114, 126, 133, 150, 158, 198 Marrakech, 15, 25, 43, 47, 81, 94–6, 106, 156, 193–5, 210, 215–17 Massigli, René, 34, 50 May Day, 107, 184, 185 Mecca, 157 Meknes, 16, 34, 43, 69, 184 mendoub, 158–60 Middle Atlas region, 145 Middle East, 171 migrants, 42, 95, 183 military, 19, 38, 52–3, 58, 67, 69–70, 73, 82, 108, 119, 132, 134, 155, 158, 218–19 Mitterrand, François, 218

Jews, 50; Jewish, 50, 158 Juin, General Alphonse, 132–3, 174, 181–3, 191, 193–4, 197–203 Kenitra, 42

257

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN MOROCCO nationalist movement, 9, 11–12, 15–19, 21, 23, 25–6, 28–31, 33–4, 36, 41–2, 45–6, 48, 51, 57–8, 61–2, 68, 71, 74, 83, 89–91, 99, 101, 106, 111–13, 116, 119, 123–6, 131–2, 138, 153, 163, 172–3, 176, 178, 189, 210, 222 NATO, 202 Nazi, 18–19 Noguès, Charles, 23–4, 35, 114 North Africa, 8, 23, 36, 89, 156, 172 North African landing, 22

Mohammed V, King, 6 Mohammed VI, King, 1, 221 monarchy, 38, 40–1, 51, 62, 84–5, 91, 97, 102, 104, 111–15, 119, 121, 123–7, 143–4, 164, 173, 175–7, 179, 190, 194–8, 200, 207, 210–14, 217, 220–1, 223 Moroccan–French relations, 66, 163, 168, 192–3, 197, 199, 203–4, 213 Moulay Idriss, Prince, 113 Moulay Idriss school, 72 Moulay Youssef, Sultan, 113 Movement of Opposition and Reforms, 197 Muslims, 2, 4–5, 12–14, 16–17, 19–21, 23, 26–7, 30, 32–3, 40–1, 43–4, 51–5, 58, 65–70, 72–4, 76–7, 79–80, 82, 98, 102, 105–6, 108, 110, 121–2, 132–3, 135–6, 141, 143, 147–9, 157, 158–9, 168–9, 176, 196, 206, 212; Muslim society, 12, 32, 74, 98

Ouazzani, Mohamed Hassan, 16–17, 99, 141, 188 Oujda, 43, 55, 69, 217, 203 Paris, 65, 115, 130, 149, 161–2, 164, 192–3, 197, 204, 212, 214–15 Pasquier, M., 72 penal code, 75, 78 Pétain, Philippe, 22 petition, 33–4, 36–7, 42–3, 45–9, 51, 57, 61–2, 67, 74, 89, 189, 211–13 plague, 12, 158 Ponsot, M., 16 Port Lyautey, 42 Présence Française, 209 press, 161, 178, 187, 199; Arabic, 152; conference, 74–5; freedom of the, 98, 152; Moroccan, 74 prostitution, 169 protectorate, 9–10, 12, 15, 18–21, 23, 26–8, 34, 36, 38, 42–3, 45,

Naciri, Mohammad Mekki, 168 National Labour Party, 16 National Liberation Committee, 22, 36, 83 National Party for the Implementation of Demands, 16 nationalism, 5–9, 13, 15, 17, 21, 23–5, 27–32, 38, 40, 46, 68, 82, 84, 91–3, 110, 115, 122–3, 129, 131, 136–7, 143, 145, 153, 155–6, 165, 167, 171–3, 175, 177–9, 196, 201–2, 205, 208, 217–18, 220; see also Sultanian nationalism

258

INDEX Rif mountains, 3 riots, 31–2, 34–7, 47–8, 51, 53–9, 61–74, 76–7, 81–3, 89, 91–2, 130, 146, 168–9, 207–8; see also 1944 riots; Casablanca riots Roosevelt Club, 35 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 46, 117–18, 156 rural leaders, 123, 211, 222

47–50, 56–7, 63–4, 67–70, 73, 75, 77–80, 83–4, 88–90, 92, 98, 109–13, 117–18, 120–1, 129, 131, 133, 140–1, 143, 145, 147–50, 152–3, 155, 162, 165–6, 170, 173, 176, 183, 187, 193–4, 200, 208–9, 213, 215; treaty, 3, 5, 14–15, 28, 33, 39, 49–50, 114, 135, 137, 139–40, 144, 151, 153, 155–6, 158, 164, 173, 181, 202, 205–6, 213, 219 Puaux, Gabriel, 35–6, 46–7, 48, 51, 55, 62, 66–7, 74–8, 82, 92, 116, 129–30, 131, 133 public health, 157

Safi, 43, 203 Sahara, 17 Salafi, 5, 11, 210 Salé, 14–15, 25, 43, 53, 56, 66–8 schools, 26, 44, 55, 71–2, 78, 102 Second World War, 6, 9, 17, 25, 41–2, 59, 117, 123, 130, 132, 134, 155, 157, 160–1, 163, 172 Senegalese police force, 168 Service des contrôles civils, 4 settlers, 12, 16, 21, 132, 148–50, 175, 181 Sidi Kacem, 42 Sidi Mohammed, Crown Prince, 1, 6 Sidi Mohammed, Sultan, 35, 82–4, 110, 113–15, 118, 120–2, 125–8, 130, 144, 151, 155–6, 163, 165–8, 171–6, 191–2, 195, 199, 203, 208–9, 212–13, 215–19 Soviet Union, 24 Spain, 158–61 Spanish, 22, 36, 52, 158, 160–1, 163, 182, 213; Morocco, 159, 182; protectorate, 182; zone, 169–70, 182 Spillman, Colonel, 25, 57 Stockholm, 178 strikes, 54–5, 71–2, 175, 207

Qarawiyyin, 26, 27, 44, 54 Rabat, 11, 14–15, 18, 25, 37, 41–3, 46–7, 50, 52–3, 56, 66–9, 74, 91, 102, 115, 135, 147, 153, 174, 184, 187–9, 201, 217, 219 railway workers, 185 Ramadan camps, 98 reforms, 9, 16, 19–20, 22, 25, 28, 36, 38–9, 47–8, 50, 56, 75–9, 83, 129, 139, 141–9, 151–2, 164–6, 176, 181, 183, 192–3, 197–8, 200, 212, 214–15; reform plans, 28, 50, 81, 98, 143, 144, 146–7, 177 residency, 13, 15, 21–6, 28, 32, 34–6, 45, 47–50, 52, 57–8, 63, 65–81, 83, 89, 91–3, 95, 98, 108, 111–18, 120, 122–4, 127–8, 130–1, 133–4, 136–8, 140–1, 143, 145–9, 151–2, 155–6, 161, 164–6, 168–73, 176–8, 181–3, 185–8, 191–204, 206–19

259

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALIST POLITICS IN MOROCCO UN General Assembly, 203 Union générale des syndicats confédérés du Maroc, 184 United Nations, 178, 182, 199, 219 United States, 22, 24, 45–6, 49, 58, 89, 118–19, 156, 158, 166, 172 Unity Party, 168 urbanization, 95, 120, 183

students, 26, 53–5, 71–2, 76, 122 Suffren, General, 67 Sufi leaders, 200; Sufi orders, 88, 95–6, 210 sultanian nationalism, 115, 122–3 Tangier, 3, 14, 153, 156–79, 182, 199, 205 Tangier treaty (1923), 159 Tetouan, 3 Throne Day, 84, 125, 175–6, 203; Celebrations, 84 trade unions, 102, 106–7, 147, 183, 185 tribal leaders, 5, 79, 96, 106, 123, 128, 151, 195–6, 199–200, 211–13, 216–17 tribal unrest, 198 Tunisia, 132

Vichy, 21, 22, 24, 35, 229, 230 Washington, 46 White House, 46 women, 16, 44, 97, 100–2, 126, 172, 175, 186, 223 working class, 107, 183–5, 188 Youssoufi, Abderrahmane, 184 Zāwiyya, 15

260