The Economic Rivalry Between St. Louis and Chicago 1850–1880 9780231893411

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S T U D I E S IN H I S T O R Y , ECONOMICS PUBLIC

AND

LAW

Edited by tbe F A C U L T Y O F P O L I T I C A L SCIENCE O F COLUMBIA U N I V E R S I T Y

NUMBER 5 2 9 T H E ECONOMIC RIVALRY

BETWEEN

S T . L O U I S A N D C H I C A G O 1850-1880 RR W Y A T T WINTON B E L C H E R

T H E ECONOMIC RIVALRY BETWEEN ST. LOUIS AND CHICAGO 1850-1880

BY

WYATT WINTON BELCHER

AMS PRESS NEW YORK

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 529

The Series was formerly known as Studies in History, Economics and Public Law.

Reprinted with the permission of Columbia University Press From the edition of 1947, New York First AMS EDITION published 1968 Manufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number: 68-58548

AMS PRESS, INC. New York, N.Y. 10003

To my wife LELA

PREFACE AN understanding of the factors which develop and sustain large urban centers of population is important for the study of economic and social trends of history. This is especially true in a comparatively young country like the United States. When the Middle West was opened for settlement, nearly every small village had hopes of becoming a thriving metropolis. Of course, it was impossible for all the small towns to grow into large cities. What, then, caused some to succeed and others to fail ? At the outset it may be stated that the extraordinary growth of a few large cities throughout the country materially reduced the opportunities for small towns to realize their vaunted ambitions of becoming large and important centers of population. It was natural for the large cities to enter into marked competition with each other for commercial leadership over an ever widening territory as the improvement in the agencies of transportation made this development possible. An excellent illustration of this economic rivalry among large cities in the making is furnished by the prolonged and intensive contest between St. Louis and Chicago. When a city advances rapidly in population, wealth, transportation facilities, and commercial standing, it is important to seek out the causes of this advancement. The purpose of this study has been to analyze the basic factors in the growth of St. Louis and Chicago in order to explain the rivalry between them and to determine why Chicago won over St. Louis as the great city of the Middle West. In developing this monograph no seriatim account of all the multifarious branches of financial, commercial, and industrial pursuits is attempted. Arithmethical calculations are, for the most part, omitted. The study is primarily concerned with the economic geography of the two cities, the early importance of inland water transportation, the influence of the railroads, the 7

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PREFACE

shifting of the trade routes, the significance of the Civil War, the decline of the waterways, and kindred topics. The writer wishes to thank Professor Allan Nevins of the Department of History at Columbia University for his valuable advice and friendly encouragement. He is indebted to Professor John A. Krout, also Professor of History at Columbia University, for his many helpful suggestions in the preparation of the manuscript. The library staffs at Columbia University, Chicago University, the Chicago Historical Society, and the Missouri Historical Society have given generous cooperation in providing the sources of information contained in this monograph. SUPERIOR, W I S C O N S I N

WYATT W .

BELCHER

CONTENTS PAGE

PiEFACE

7 CHAPTER I

Characteristics of the Rival Cities

u

C H A P T E R II Advantages of Each City

26 C H A P T E R III

St. Louis Develops Her River Trade CHAPTER

41 IV

Chicago's Drive for Railroad Supremacy CHAPTER

55 V

St. Louis and the Railroads

72 CHAPTER VI

The Rival Cities and Western Trade CHAPTER

96 VII

Business Leadership of the T w o Cities CHAPTER

114 VIII

Impact of the Civil W a r

139 C H A P T E R IX

Aftermath of the Civil War

158 CHAPTER X

Rivalry Renewed

177 CHAPTER XI

Chicago Emerges the Victor

193

SELECTIVE B I B L I O G B A M V

207

INDEX

219

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CHAPTER I CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RIVAL CITIES THE history of a city is more than a chronicle of local events. This is particularly true when two or more cities are competing for economic supremacy in an important section that is rapidly developing. A n outstanding illustration of the national significance of urban growth is found in the intense and prolonged rivalry between St. Louis and Chicago for commercial dominance of the Mississippi Valley. This enormous region, once open to settlement, gave promise of rapid growth. Its natural wealth and the eager exploitation of its agricultural and mineral resources by a fast-swelling population made the rise of great cities inevitable. Which would achieve primacy ? The main issue in this contest was not one of survival, for both St. Louis and Chicago possessed ample resources to assure substantial growth. Each had a supreme desire to be the chief city of the Middle West. A driving ambition to surpass all rivals intensified the struggle for power and wealth. Quite naturally the story of this rivalry has been told from two points of view. Contemporaneous material on the subject falls into two contrasting categories. St. Louis writers exulted in the early start of the city and its well-established prestige; Chicagoans dilated upon the progressive spirit of their lakeside metropolis. Neither version gave the whole picture. Each city was disposed to think of its own activities and accomplishments as all-important in Western growth, forgetting other factors which should have been taken into consideration. This tendency is the more understandable because in 1850 not many reliable records were kept on internal commerce. Great need existed for correct trade statistics; but, because of the vast extent of the United States and the rapid development of the newly settled districts, only crude and inaccurate information was available about the trends of production and con11

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sumption in the various parts of the country. W i t h the figures left to conjecture, a marked confusion resulted. It was easy to compile statistics to serve almost any intended purpose, because there was no independent means of checking them. The lack of systematic commercial records explains to a large degree the unenlightened and inconsistent views of Americans as to the actual forces which by 1850 were working a transformation. Organized commercial bodies of both St. Louis and Chicago, such as chambers of commerce, boards of trade, and merchants' exchanges, furnished considerable volunteer information which obviously served the intended purpose of building up and sustaining business confidence in their respective cities. The same spirit was reflected in their newspapers and trade journals. The national government provided special facilities for the keeping of statistics in reference to foreign commerce, but neglected the field of internal trade. This left the information on the latter subject fragmentary, often unauthentic, and wanting in uniformity. A s late as 1885 the Chief of the Bureau of Statistics complained that it was impossible to discuss the internal trade of the United States in any adequate fashion because of lack of statistical data, and because of the wide variety of conditions under which such trade operated. 1 Each city was left free to tell its own side of the story. It was therefore to be expected that St. Louis and Chicago would each present dubious statistics, and would each make exaggerated claims as to its own general merits. St. Louis took the attitude that it was predestined to be the great metropolis of the Mississippi Valley—that its situation at the meeting of two rivers pointed the way to its emergence as the leading emporium of the vast interior. B y 1850 St. Louis had what it considered abundant proof of this happy destiny. The fur trade, the Mexican W a r , the settlement of the up-river country, and the gold rush all indicated that it was the strategic 1 Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States ( 1 8 8 5 ) , 3.

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gateway. 1

commercial So confident was St. Louis of its future position that it did not exhibit a jealous spirit toward its wouldbe rivals. This continued to be a characteristic of St. Louis even after its commercial dominance in the Upper Mississippi Valley had been threatened by Chicago* St. Louis, being the older city and having an established trade, possessed a spirit of calm self-confidence which was in marked contrast to the enterprise and aggressiveness of Chicago. Its people were content to work out a steady, plodding community destiny by following the old ways. For the most part, St. Louis continued on what it believed to be its true course undeterred and unspurred by the efforts and boastings of Chicago. 4 By 1850 St. Louis had urban characteristics which were not to be found in the fast-growing town of Chicago. Missourians were prone to dismiss Chicago as an upstart village whose boasts were not to be taken seriously. The attempt of Chicago to match St. Louis in population, wealth, and commerce, they declared would prove as vain as an effort to reach the horizon.* St. Louis was the most central of the large cities in the United States. A t that point was fixed the economic fulcrum which would move the commerce of the Mississippi Valley. The result would be a centripetal flow of trade from the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards, the Great Lakes of the north, and the Gulf Coast of the south, all gravitating toward the natural commercial center at St. L o u i s ' These conditions, men said, assured a permanency of trade which neither the passing of time nor the enterprise of Chicago could disturb. The city was so sure of its position that it called itself the " New York of the West." 7 Another indication of its com2 Missouri Republican, Jan. 9, 1850. 3 J. W. Million, Stale Aid to Railways in Missouri (1896), 53. 4 E. Pomeroy, " Character Sketches of Cities, S t Louis," World Today, (1906), 56. 5 R . S. Elliott, Notes Taken in Sixty Years (1883), 285. 6 The Western Journal and Civilian, I X (1852), 114. 7 Missouri Republican, Apr. 24, 1842.

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placency w a s the local movement to have the seat of the national government transferred to the city. O n e of the chief arguments for making St. Louis the capital of the United States was that since it was destined to become the commercial center of the country, it ought also to be the political head o f the nation. 8 Prophetic faith in the destiny of the river city reached its climax in the writings of L . U . Reavis, w h o freely predicted that it was on the eve of a triumph which would make it the greatest city o f the world. 9 T h e transcendent natural advantages of St. Louis made its people so confident of its destiny as the trade center of the Mississippi Valley that they lapsed into commercial inertia. 10 T h e local newspapers constantly carried stories about the rapid improvements that were taking place. Extension of the city limits, erection of new buildings, and the enlargement of the business district were noted as changing the city's appearance from year to year. T h e 'forties and early 'fifties marked an era of real accomplishment. Trade was increasing, steamboats made record trips, telegraphic connections had been established with the East, railroads were projected, streets and the levee were improved, omnibus lines were put into operation to serve the increased needs of local transportation, and the city was lighted by gas. Surely these improvements were signs of progress; w h y should St. Louis be concerned with what was happening in Chicago or other places? T h e city of St. Louis was financially self-contained. It depended upon its own capital resources to develop trade and promote enterprise. T h e business temper of the citizens was conservative, for the surviving French influence and the some8 Ibid., Jan. 9, 1850. A L . U. Reavis, St. Louis the Future Great City of the World: and Its Impending Triumph (1881), 80-108. 10 J. T . Scharf, History of St. Louis City and County, from the Earliest Periods to the Present: Including Biographical Sketches of Representative Men (1883), I I , 1010.

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what aristocratic character of the "old families" from the South caused them to cling to established traditions and methods.11 These factors also tended to make life easy and comfortable in St. Louis. Time was found for the enjoyment of leisure, culture, and wealth. The gracious manners of the South prevailed. Pleasure as well as profit was derived from business. Advances were made in easy natural steps, and the push and shove which characterized the business endeavors of Chicago were unknown." One of the principal reasons why the prophecies of future greatness for St. Louis did not come to pass was that the people thought that no special efforts were necessary, since these prophecies would fulfill themselves automatically.1* The innate conservatism of St. Louis made it more difficult for the city to face realistically the transportation problem brought about by the construction of railroads. In the early period of settlement the rivers offered an easier means of transportation than did the overland wagon trails, and as a result there was a concentration of commerce at St. Louis. The business leaders of St. Louis invested their available capital in river shipping to profit from this growing trade. The coming of the railways, however, placed St. Louis in a weak competitive position with Chicago, for the river city already had its monev tied up in steamboats which could not compete successfully with the railroads. St. Louis clung to the old method of river transportation even after it was apparent that Chicago was using the railroads to divert commerce from the Upper Mississippi Valley at a rapid rate. The railways had such a revolutionary effect on transportation that St. Louis was unable to adjust its commercial interests quickly enough to meet this changed condition. 11 C. D. Warner, " Studies of the Great West S t Louis and Kansas Gty," Harper's New Monthly Maganne, LXXVII (1888), 748. 12 Potneroy, loc. cil. 13C. T. Logan, "The Central-Continental Metropolis," Frank Popular Monthly, XLIII (1857), 337.

LetlWt

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Chicago could make freer use of the railroads, because its trade interests were not closely identified with river navigation. 14 The compromise which gave the state of Missouri to slavery undoubtedly retarded its economic development as compared with the free commonwealth of Illinois. Enterprising Easterners preferred to settle in Chicago rather than take a chance in the more populous river city. St. Louis was a border city and had business interests in both the North and the South. The city regretted the rise of a strong sectional feeling which might lead to the division of the Union and civil strife. Most St. Louisans were in favor of the compromise measures of 1850, hoping that the " centrifugal force of secession " had lost and that the " centripetal force of union " had won. 1 5 Since Missouri was a slave state, and since the Mississippi River gave St. Louis easy access to New Orleans, the city's economic interests lay chiefly in the South. St. Louis subscribed to a specious economic theory according to which commerce must move along the meridians instead of east and west. While many of the leading business men realized that this concept was too naive to explain the basic principles of commerce, yet the theory enjoyed great popularity. Great stress was placed on what was called the " natural laws of commerce." According to this philosophical concept, commerce must be considered as one of the great agents of civilization. T o enforce the design of nature, the products of the tropics were materially different from those of the colder climates. The full convenience and comfort of the people of these respective regions depended, to a great degree, upon the enjoyment of the products from both regions. Within this economy of nature, the products of the North would find a market in the South, while those of the South would go to the North for consumption. The most logical and convenient place for the exchange of these commodities would be at the center, 14 T . W . Van Metre, Transportation in the United States (1939), 55. 15 Western Journal and Civilian, I X (1852), 114.

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which, of course, was St. Louis. The natural and prevailing currents of commerce would flow from the regions of the North and the South towards the center; nor was this all, for the avenues of trade would also move outward, distributing to each section the kind and quantity of commodities required for its use.16 The Mississippi River, running from north to south, spanning some twenty-one degrees of latitude, dividing its great valley into nearly equal parts and with its system of tributaries constituted without question, the great commercial thoroughfare of the interior country. A little of the contemporary comment will show how perfectly this theory was expected to work: 17 [The current of commerce will] flow from the equator in the direction of the poles, carrying the luxuries of the tropics to the inhabitants of colder climes, and returning with the more substantial products of the temperate zones. Thus the bounties of nature will be divided among the inhabitants of every clime; and while, by the agency of commerce the physical comforts of every region will be increased, those prejudices which are so liable to exist between the people of the north and the south will be removed, and social intercourse and universal sympathy prevail in their stead. This concept was held to be as true as it was elementary. It would be as reasonable to expect that a long life of health and comfort could be enjoyed by one who daily violated the laws of his physical nature as for people to prosper any great length of time without observing the natural laws of exchange which were inherent in the physical geography and general environment of the country wherein they resided. Upon this doctrine St. Louis based both the belief in its own great commercial future and the hope that economic necessity would hold the Union together. 16 Western Journal, II (1849), 1-2. 17 Ibid., I (1848), 173.

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Perhaps the situation that St. Louis occupied may best be comprehended by an illustration. The dendritic drainage pattern of the Mississippi River system may be compared to an immense tree. The Lower Mississippi represents the trunk, the Ohio and Missouri Rivers are the main forks with their tributary streams forming the many branches, and the Upper Mississippi with its numerous watercourses fills out the top part of the tree. Next, think of the commerce of the rivers as being the sap of the tree which goes up the trunk into the many branches and then ¡flows down again with each recurring season. St. Louis held the same position in reference to the commerce of the rivers that the crotch of the tree would hold to its sap flowing under the cambium layer. All the commerce, like all the sap, would have to pass this point. With this comparison in mind, it is easy to understand the significance that St. Louis attached to its location, and the optimism with which it counted on growing and developing. The characteristics of Chicago were in marked contrast to those of St. Louis. Chicago sprang up like a young giant confident of its own strength. Commercialism was rampant; the maturing influence of age was not there to temper the people's youthful ardor. The expectations of Chicagoans as to the future greatness and glory of their city were regarded by outsiders as a sign of bumptious vanity. Chicago's growth had been so rapid that a splendid destiny seemed assured. The city was very conscious of its own merits and so very sure of its own superiority—in fact it had rather an overweening sense of its own importance. Chicagoans did not have much respect for a city such as St. Louis whose growth had been gradual. The opinion prevailed that things were always done better when Chicago did them.1* By 1850 Chicago was in the process of a speedy transition from a frontier town to a fast-growing urban community. Chicago was quick to learn its new role in the economic order 18 Chicago Tribune, Sept 10, 1871.

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wrought by this change and looked hungrily forward to fulfilling its promise as a great city. There was no dead hand of tradition to stay its progress. No reverence was felt for "natural channels of commerce " or " legitimacy of trade." The city was extremely aggressive in proclaiming its own advantages and exhibited marked covetousness toward the commercial interests of rival cities. Chicago rapidly exploited its natural advantages and was ever on the alert to start new projects. From the start it was a horn-blowing town, but it cannot be denied that great efforts were put forth by Chicagoans to have something worth bragging about. Chicago, unlike St. Louis, was never satisfied with small successes. The city took a bulldog attitude toward commerce, determined to hold what it had and to increase its grasp on the surrounding country at every opportunity. In 1850 the launching of a greater Chicago was announced, and St. Louis was picked as the chief rival to be pushed aside in gaining commercial dominance over the Mississippi Valley. 1 * Chicago did not expect or seek an easy road to trade dominion over this vast area; on the contrary, it realized that the thriving river city would be a keen competitor. St. Louis being an older city, had a better established trade and greater aggregate wealth than Chicago. Notice was served, however, that Chicago was advancing with giant strides and would become the successful competitor for commercial position and economic dominance.20 The Chicago papers seemingly took delight in discussing topics such as a cholera epidemic in St. Louis, the unhealthy climate of the South, and the deep snows of St. Paul and Milwaukee. Similar conditions were minimized at home and stories filled the columns about the number of new buildings, street improvements, increased value of real estate, and like items. It was the fastest growing city in the Union. The reasons for this unusual development got bigger and better 19 Chicago Daily Democrat, Jan. 23, 185a 20 Ibid.

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every time they were printed. The geographical importance of the site, the rapid growth of population of the surrounding region, the numerous towns springing up in the interior whose trade interests were dependent on Chicago, the remarkable ease of building railroads in every land direction, the energy and enterprise of its citizens, the fine, rich soil which insured the success of farmers throughout the western country all combined to make Chicago a great city. Stories were circulated that a farm including improvements could be paid for in two years. The flatness of the fertile terrain kept the cost of constructing railroads low, rails being the most expensive item. A s lines were built they brought to Chicago immense quantities of pork, beef, and grain and created a lively trade in lumber and all kinds of merchandise. The city was growing so fast that each fantastic statement of a speculator regarding real estate values soon became a statement of fact. It was impossible for Chicagoans to overreach themselves in making claims and predictions for their city. 21 Stories like the following were common. A newspaperman chanced to see a former resident wandering about the city in 1855 with a bewildered air. Upon being asked for what he was searching, he replied, " Why, I am in search of the city of Chicago that was here eight years ago, bat I cannot find it; I cannot even trace the spot where it stood." 22 Chicago was undaunted by ridicule from other cities. Its critics declared that according to the Chicago braggarts, the city was formerly in Illinois, but now Illinois was in it, and that Lake Michigan bordered on Chicago. The principal productions of Chicago were corner lots, statistics, and wind! The population of Chicago was about 16,000,000 and was increasing rapidly! The answers to these gibes showed how much Chicago realized the value of advertising its opportunities for advancement. Illinois was not in Chicago, but the state was 21 Daly Democratic Press, Nov. 6, 1855. 22 Ibid., Oct. 26, 1855.

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pouring its products into the city over the many lines of railway, the annual aggregates of which astounded the public and made " one-horse " towns frantic with jealousy. Lake Michigan was not on Chicago, but its fleet, and those of the other lakes, looked to Chicago for their carrying trade. Chicago did have a goodly number of corner lots, and anyone of the outside critics would consider his fortune made if he could contrive some means to secure a title to one of them. It was true that Chicago had statistics, but what was better, the city also had the stuff out of which they were made. Chicago's wind was good, and although the city had been going at a " two-forty " pace for many years and had hopelessly outdistanced all rivals, it still showed no disposition to slow down. Chicago was a bustling city, and its population was rapidly increasing. The city would be satisfied with a population short of 16,000,000, though the country for which Chicago would be, for all time, the commercial metropolis had a capacity for supporting a much larger number.2* Chicago not only removed its candle from under the bushel, but burned the basket as well to illuminate its advantages. It was not surprising that the two cities were unable to agree on anything, much less the subject of their comparative prosperity. Various testimony was adduced by each to show that it was ahead of the other. Fancy as well as fact was called into play. The St. Louis papers, however, were no match for the Chicago ones when it came to buffoonery. Chicago liked nothing better than to contrast its bustle and enterprise with the quietness and slowness of St. Louis. For example, the story was told of a certain man from the interior of Missouri who decided to take a trip East to see the country. He was traveling more for pleasure than profit, and his first stop was at St. Louis where he had his choice of rooms in any hotel and greatly enjoyed his quiet rest and sleep before moving on to Chicago. Upon his arrival in the " Windy City," to his surprise, he could 23 Chicago Weekly Press, May 22, 1858.

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not find a room in any hotel. The bustling noise and business activity of Chicago disquieted him so much that he abandoned his trip East and returned to the tranquillity of St. Louis. His rest was not for long because one morning he was rudely awakened by loud and unusual voices. Upon investigation he found, to his horror, that the commotion was caused by a delegation of Chicago " first citizens," speculators, who had called with the intention of buying St. Louis and laying it off in a new south addition to the lake port. 24 Chicago seldom veiled its contempt for St. Louis. The editor of a St. Louis newspaper proposed, in all seriousness, a bold enterprise for preventing the low stage of water in the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers which often disrupted steamboat traffic. The scheme was to connect the head streams of the Illinois River in the neighborhood of Chicago by one or more channels with the waters of the lake. This would regularize the water in the rivers and keep them in good navigable order. The editor of the Chicago Daily Democratic Press opposed the idea, saying that he would hate to see the neighbor city of St. Louis washed away in thirty-six hours' time. 25 Chicago had a robust sense of humor which was a saving grace. Chicagoans enjoyed telling stories at their own expense. A Chicago journal had an item describing the capture of an escaped wolf in one of the city streets. A New York paper took notice of this incident and declared that wolves were so numerous in Chicago that they were frequently seen on the streets. Whereupon, the Chicago paper replied that this was true, the fact of the situation being that " Chicago was growing so fast that the wild animals just couldn't keep out of the way." M One of the tall tales was that about a Chicagoan who died and aspired to enter Heaven. St. Peter at the gate inquired 24 Daily Chicago Journal, June 21, 1834. 25 Daily Democratic Press, Nov. 18, 1853. 26 A. N. Waterman, Historical Review of Chicago ami Coot County and Selected Bibliography (1903), I, 77.

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whence he came and on receiving the loud answer, " Chicago," said reflectively, " Chicago, Chicago—I can't admit you. There is no such place as Chicago, for I've never had an application from there before." " The power of steam, the flow of goods, the improvement of the country, and the movement of people—all these changes were rapidly transforming the frontier town of Chicago into a bustling city. The local newspapers had plenty to tell their readers. Descriptions like the following foretold the passing of the old order and the dawning of a new phase of economic life for Chicago:* 8 Our streets present an animated picture. Thronged with laden wagons, filled with busy people, vocal with the rattling of wheels, the rush of steam, the clank of machinery and many voices, goods gaily flaunting from awning posts and store doors, docks piled with boxes, bales and bundles of merchandise, warehouses like so many heart ventricles receiving the grain on one side, and with a single pulsation, pouring it out on the other into waiting vessels and steamers to be borne away on the general circulation, lumber yards heaped with the products of the forest, furnaces and machine shops sending out the exponents of industry and skill, . . . the multitude of strangers whose arrival every packet bugle and locomotive whistle and steamer's bell heralds, all these and more are now pictured upon every observer's eye and swell the diapason of busy life to every listening ear. The rapid growth of Chicago seemed to make the city want to grow all the faster. The population increased from 4 4 7 9 in 1840 to 29,963 in 1850 and in i860 the number had grown to 109,260. St. Louis was still the larger city, but Chicago had made impressive gains. The population of St. Louis had increased from 77,860 in 1850 to 160,773 i860. In i860 St. Louis was in eighth place among the cities of the United States 27 C. H. Jones, "Chicago," The Land We Love, V (1866), 475. 28 Chicago Daily Journal, O c t 18, 1849.

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f r o m the standpoint of size, and Chicago w a s ninth.** Both cities were able to make favorable deductions from these census figures; St. Louis was still in the lead, but C h i c a g o w a s able to point out that its percentage of gain was greater. T h i s fact, it was claimed, augured the not too distant day when the lake port would surpass its river rival. Chicago was fortunate in receiving a large number of farsighted and hard-working Y a n k e e s from N e w Y o r k and the N e w England states. These people neither surrendered to difficulties nor relaxed into complacency. T h e y were intent on reaping the profits that the city and surrounding country afforded. Chicago was a living, growing, and prosperous city, populated by industrious, progressive, and wide-awake people w h o were always looking forward to greater achievements. T h e city possessed determination and enterprise to a remarkable degree. It had the knack of supplying what it lacked. T h e harbor was improved to facilitate lake shipping, the level of streets and buildings was raised to improve drainage, and railroads were constructed to furnish needed transportation. Both time and opportunity were seized by the forelocks to speed the day when Chicago would realize its vaunted ambition of becoming a truly great city. It was Chicago, not St. Louis, that foresaw the rapid development of the great Northwest and W e s t , and Chicago prepared to make these large regions that springboard f o r its own fast growth and sure prosperity. T h e river city might well state that not a squatter built his cabin in the up-river country and not a hunter or trapper took his prey on all the broad lands that skirted the base of the R o c k y Mountains without contributing to the growth of St. Louis as a commercial emporium. Chicago was not concerned with these small, immediate gains, but looked to the day when the far-stretching prairie would obey the call of the sturdy farmer and produce the large quan29Seventh Census of the United States (1853), cviii, cxxviii; Statistics of the United States. ..in i860; Compiled from the Original Returns and Being the Final Exhibit of the Eighth Census... (1866), xviii.

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tities of wheat needed by Eastern states and European nations. The numerous corn fields would supply feed for millions of cattle and hogs which would be consumed hundreds of miles away from the farms on which they were raised. The vast forests of northern Michigan and Wisconsin would give way to the ax of the hardy lumberman, and the rich mineral deposits of lead, copper, iron, and coal would be extracted to serve an expanding industrial economy. Railroads would traverse and encircle these producing areas to bring the materials of a constantly increasing commerce to the marts of Chicago.80 Analyzing the situation, Chicago had no misgivings about the important role the city was to play in the settlement and improvement of these new lands. " Within the next quarter of a century," it was thought, " the power which will control the destinies of the Union must concentrate in that section, which has Chicago for its commercial metropolis." 81 Meanwhile, the issue was not so easily settled, for down the Mississippi River was St. Louis, a city which enjoyed a thriving trade with the up-river country. Chicago was determined to push St. Louis aside so as to obtain unquestioned commercial dominance over the upper valley. 30 Daily Democratic Press, Dec. 30, 1853; Chicago Daily Tribune, Jato. 1, 1864. 31 Twelfth Annual Review of the Trade and Commerce and Condition of the Railways Centering in the City of Chicago for the Year, i860, 54.

CHAPTER II ADVANTAGES OF EACH CITY THE development of large commercial cities is determined primarily by economic factors. There are adequate explanations for the growth and importance of St. Louis and Chicago. Both cities had natural advantages. The early immediate opportunities in the period of steamboat transportation lay with St. Louis. However, the long run and more permanent advantages ushered in by the railroads favored Chicago. Before the railroads became a reality, the Mississippi River system had no competitor as a means of travel and transportation between the vast interior and the Gulf of Mexico. In that period of water transportation the greatness of a city was determined almost solely by its location. In this respect the city of St. Louis was most fortunate, for by its dominating geographical position at the plexus of the midwestern waterways, it could make full use of these natural avenues of commerce. Here, the great river crossroads of the country afforded a navigable course from the Falls of St. Anthony on the Upper Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico and from the forks of the Ohio at Pittsburgh to Fort Benton at the head of navigation on the Missouri River; two thousand miles from north to south and as far from east to west. In addition to the Missouri and the Ohio, the Illinois River opened the way to the Chicago portage of Lake Michigan, and the Tennessee and Cumberland served as water carriers from the southern Appalachians. Streams now considered insignificant were then classified as navigable and regarded as important feeders to the commerce of the main rivers. A few examples will illustrate this point. Of the tributaries of the Upper Mississippi, the following were considered navigable to the extent indicated: the St. Croix, 80 miles; the St. Peters, 120 miles; the Chippewa, 70 miles; the Black, 60 miles; the Wisconsin, 180 miles; the Rock, 250 miles; the Iowa, n o miles; the Cedar, 60 miles; the Des 36

ADVANTAGES OF EACH CITY

27

Moines, 250 miles; and the Illinois, 245 miles. T h e Missouri River, at its best was navigable as far as the Great Falls, a distance of 2 , 1 1 1 miles from the mouth of the river. T h e following tributaries were regarded as navigable: the Yellowstone, 300 miles; the Platte, 40 miles; the Kansas, 150 miles; the Osage, 275 miles; and the Grand, 90 miles. 1 If similar charts had been made for other rivers, it would have been found that St. Louis was in a position to use some 1 5 , 4 1 0 miles of navigable waterways suitable for steamboats. 2 St. Louisans, however, did not stop with such estimates. T h e y agreed with the conclusions of their eminent citizen, T h o m a s H . Benton, that the boatable water in the Mississippi Valley added up to 50,000 miles, of which 30,000 miles were above St. Louis and 20,000 miles below the city. 8 Admittedly, all the tiny streams on which a flatboat, a keel boat, or a bateau could be floated were counted. T h e estimate was justified on the ground that every boatable tributary, even the humblest, swelled not only the volume o f the central waters, but also the commerce which floated upon them. St. Louis lies at the heart of the great central valley which extends from near the Canadian boundary on the north to the Gulf of M e x i c o on the south, and f r o m the Allegheny Mountains on the east to the Rocky Mountains on the west. T h e great extent of the Mississippi drainage basin permits a wide variety of climate and soil which, in turn, encourages a wide variety of agricultural products and economic pursuits. B y 1850 1 J. D. B. DeBow, DeBou/s Industrial Resources (1852), I, 449. 2 E. C. Semple, " Geographic Influences in the Development of St. Louis," The Journal of Geography, III (1904), 292. 3 Letter from Thomas H. Benton to the members of a committee to attend the Chicago Convention, dated St. Louis, June 20, 1847. Quoted in The Commerce and Navigation of the Valley of the Mississippi; and also that Appertaining to the City of St. Louis: Considered, with Reference to the Improvement, by the General Government, of the Mississippi River and Its Principal Tributaries: Being a Report, Prepared by Authority of the Delegates from the City of St. Louis, for the Use of the Chicago Convention of July 1847, 3'. [Cited hereafter as The Commerce and Navigation of the Valley of the Mississippi for the Use of the Chicago Convention.]

28

RIVALRY

BETWEEN

ST. L O U I S A N D

CHICAGO

St. Louisans were certain that their city would dominate the the commerce of the valley, for the very causes of its prosperity were inscribed on the face of the earth. B y its central position St. Louis w a s given an excellent opportunity for favorable growth. It was situated on a naturegiven highway and had as a hinterland the entire region of the Upper Mississippi and Missouri R i v e r s with their numerous tributaries. T h e Mississippi offered an easy means of reaching the chief routes t o the markets of the world. Furthermore, St. Louis's situation enabled it to acquire and hold an almost complete monopoly of the trade of the Upper Mississippi and Missouri R i v e r region. T h i s extensive country w a s intersected in every quarter by navigable streams reaching out like so many fingers to grasp the trade of the region and gather it into the palm of St. Louis. T h e Mississippi Valley comprises upward of half the total area of the country. Fertile soil, mineral deposits, a varied climate, many different products, excellent facilities for communication, a rapidly increasing population—all these wereconditions favorable to the growth of wealth and prosperity, and note w a s taken of every one of them. It was predicted that St. Louis, as by magnetic attraction, would draw into its port an ever increasing proportion of the ever increasing trade of that magnificent territory, and that in time it would become a rich and great city. 4 T h e visions regarding the future greatness of the Mississippi V a l l e y became realities; the reasons w h y St. L o u i s lost the commercial hegemony to Chicago constitute another part o f this story. St. L o u i s had a unique geographical location. It w a s built on a limestone bluff on the west side of the Mississippi River not far below the junction of the Missouri River. T h e bluff sloped gradually down t o the river, providing an inclined quay which was inviting to commerce. T h i s site had an advantage that w a s rare on the Mississippi, since that great river w a s gen4 Ibid., 3.

ADVANTAGES OF E A C H

CITY

2(/

erally bounded by high perpendicular bluffs inhospitable to commerce, or by low alluvial plains exposed to inundation from the annual floods. The Mississippi was notorious for cutting its channel at random, thus having within its power the making and destroying of towns. True, St. Louis had its days of apprehension and commercial inconvenience when there was grave danger that the port would be silted up, and that the main channel of the stream would move over to the Illinois side. Fortunately, improvements were made in time to save the port, and St. Louis was left undisturbed, in the main, on its rocky foundation.® St. Louis occupied a controlling position on the Mississippi River, for here the trade of the upper river terminated, and that of the lower river began. Only a few miles above the city two large tributaries, the Missouri and the Illinois, greatly increased the volume of water. Below St. Louis the minimum depth of the water was about six feet, while above the city it was from three to five feet.' This made St. Louis the terminus of navigation for the smaller boats from the Upper Mississippi and its tributaries, and the head of navigation for the larger boats from the Ohio and Lower Mississippi. It is commonly recognized that cities tend to develop at or near a point where a break in transportation occurs. St. Louis was located at such a point, for there the river traffic broke and cargoes changed hands. The upper river required boats of light draught, while the commerce of the Lower Mississippi was carried by large river steamers. This brought together at St. Louis two fleets of boats, one adapted to the shallower water above and the other to the deeper water below.7 It was not safe for the larger vessels to operate above the city; on the other hand, it was not profitable for the smaller boats to go below St. Louis, 5 S. M. Drumm, " Robert E. Lee and the Improvement of the Mississippi River," Missouri Historical Society Collection, VI (1929), 157-171. 6 N. M. Fenneman, Physiography of the St. Louis Area (Illinois State Geological Survey, Bulletin, no. 12, 1909), 71. 7 Ibid.

30

RIVALRY

BETWEEN

ST. L O U I S A N D

CHICAGO

since large ships could carry goods more cheaply. The city was consequently a reloading point where cargoes had to break bulk. Then, too, pilots working on the different sections of the river required different kinds of training. A skilled pilot for the Upper Mississippi was not necessarily a good one for the Lower Mississippi; and a good pilot for the Mississippi below St Louis might be an unsafe one for the upper river or the Missouri. Thus St. Louis was the northern terminus for one large fleet of steamboats and the southern terminus for another. There was no through river traffic at St. Louis. Goods not originally billed for that city had to be transhipped there before they could reach their various destinations. It was only natural that St. Louis should become a marketing center, as well as the great receiving and distributing depot for nearly all of the upper river country. 8 Another factor in the freight transfer business at this point was that freight coming up the river was ordinarily billed in part for the Upper Mississippi, in part for the Illinois, in part for the Missouri, and many other places on the navigable streams. This situation made some sort of classification or reclassification of the freight necessary. In general practice, freight was either consigned at the place of original loading to a vessel bound for the same destination, or else it was classified en route. Neither of these methods was used in the Mississippi River traffic at St. Louis, since the cargo had to be reshipped in any case on account of the difference of river depths. St. Louis was thus the logical place for the reclassification business.® The city, then, became a point of exchange for products going north or south; its location was indeed unsurpassed in the period of water transportation. Again, being situated in the center of the highly fertile basin of the Mississippi, it received 8 E. W. Gould, Fifty Years on the Mississippi; or, Gould's History of River Navigation (1889), 209. 9 Missouri Republican, May 31, 1855.

ADVANTAGES OF E A C H CITY

31

abundant raw products from and distributed merchandise to an ever increasing number of settlers who occupied the rich valley lands. St. Louis was also fortunate in another respect. As a rule, the sellers and shippers from the upper river country did not even attempt to sell their grain, provisions, and other raw products at New Orleans or other points, but disposed of their produce in the general market at St. Louis. The people of the upper river region had few business connections with the southern states; they made little effort to put their products in such shape, or to mass them in such quantity, as to make them suitable for disposal in the South. St. Louis was for these people the natural market. Again, the southern traders sought a market where exchanges between their commodities and products of the North and West could be easily effected. They, too, wanted a reliable place in which to transact business—a place where prices were established and orders were certain to be filled. St. Louis was the meeting place for these two sets of commercial interests.10 Until the railroads came to the Mississippi Valley, the commerce of St. Louis had, within well-defined geographical limits, an almost complete commercial monopoly. During this period the Upper Mississippi with its numerous tributary streams formed the chief feeders for the St. Louis market, and the Lower Mississippi provided the natural avenue of outlet for its trade. The commercial relations of St. Louis with the cities of Louisville, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh were in the main competitive. Because of its size, wealth, and rather firm command of the trade of the Ohio River, Cincinnati, particularly, was regarded as a rival city, more so than Chicago.11 The trade with New Orleans, however, was largely reciprocal. Large quantities of agricultural surpluses received from the upper valley were forwarded to this southern port. In return, St. Louis 10 Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States (1888), 53. 11 J. Hogan, Thoughtt About the City of St. Louis, Her Commerce and Manufactures, Railroads, etc. (1854), 6. [This is the compilation of a series of articles which were first published in the Missouri Republican.]

32

RIVALRY

BETWEEN

ST. L O U I S

AND

CHICAGO

merchants bought increasing amounts of sugar, molasses, and imported goods at New Orleans to supply the ever increasing needs of the Upper Mississippi trade territory which depended upon St. Louis as its business center. Commerce flowed with the river north and south, because this was the natural route for it to follow. The almost magical rise of Chicago made it the modern wonder among cities. Despite the charges of mushroom growth, the development of Chicago was based on solid economic foundations. W h y was the transition from a straggling village to a bounding metropolis such a short step for Chicago? The answer is found in an extraordinary combination of natural geographical advantages, a remarkable group of leaders, and a series of favorable events. T o begin with, the site of Chicago, like that of St. Louis, furnished an example of superior geographical location in reference to the development of commercial possibilities. The downward thrust of Lake Michigan with its 3 2 0 mile water barrier to routes of land transportation between the east and the west forced such traffic to bend around the lake and make its concentration at the southern end inevitable. The point where all traffic lines, both land and water, must intersect was an ideal location for a city with a great future. 1 2 From the mouth of the St. Joseph River in Michigan to Milwaukee, a distance of some 250 miles, the only good harbor to be found was at the place where the Chicago River flowed into Lake Michigan. This gash in the lake's shore ran fairly straight into the prairie for three-quarters of a mile, then divided into two forks, one going north, the other south, and both were nearly parallel to the shore line of the lake. The two branches extended for several miles until they ended in the prairie sloughs. There was no tide or flow to this harbor provided by the Chicago River except what was blown in from the lake by strong winds, and the water soon drained back to the 12 F. M. Fryxell, The Physiography of the Region of Chicago (1927), 30.

A D V A N T A G E S OF E A C H C I T Y

33

lake when the wind changed its direction or subsided. Chicago derived considerable satisfaction from the fact that it had no levee subject to inundations from floods with the resulting destruction o f property. Also, the city was glad not to be situated on a river such as the Mississippi which was sure t o be rendered less navigable, because the channel would become obstructed with silt when the trees were cleared and the adjacent country was placed under cultivation. 13 . A t first the mouth of the Chicago River was obstructed by a sand bar that would admit only vessels of thirty or forty tons, but the possibility of a good harbor was there, ready for the dredge which made it capable of handling the largest ships that sailed the lakes. T h e convenient river front provided miles of wharves, and every factory, warehouse, mill, and elevator could have its branch or basin to receive and ship all articles of commerce at its door. T h i s harbor, provided by nature on the west coast of L a k e Michigan some twenty miles from the lake's head, made it certain that Chicago would become a city of consequence. 14 T h e facilities f o r water transportation assured Chicago of a commercial future; its chief problem was the settlement and tapping of the rich hinterland. T h e i ,600 miles of water transportation to the Atlantic Ocean did not mean much when a little river extending barely thirty-five miles inland furnished the chief feeder for the trade of the city. Under these conditions Chicago was denied the commercial advantages to which it was entitled by its strategic location on L a k e Michigan; it remained a village, while the river town of St. Louis g r e w into a promising city. 13 Chicago; Her Commerce and Railroads: Two Articles Published in the Daily Democratic Press (1853), '414 I. D. Andrews, The Report of Israel D. Andrews, Consul of the United States for Canada and New Brunswick on the Trade and Commerce of the British North American Colonies and upon the Trade of the Great Lakes and Rivers, 32 Cong., 1st Sess., S. Ex. Doc. no. 112 (1853), 217.

34

RIVALRY

BETWEEN

ST. L O U I S A N D

CHICAGO

T h e g r o w t h o f a n y city necessarily depends t o a g r e a t e x tent o n transportation. T r a n s p o r t a t i o n facilities limit t h e size of a city a n d determine t o a l a r g e d e g r e e its prosperity. T h i s is especially true in r e g a r d to the development o f its c o m m e r c i a l possibilities in competition w i t h other cities. F o r the g r o w t h o f a n urban center like C h i c a g o , contact w i t h other m a r k e t s is n o t e n o u g h ; it is also necessary to h a v e r e a d y access t o p r o d u c t i v e a r e a s w h i c h f u r n i s h f o o d supplies a n d r a w p r o d u c t s . 1 5

The

problem c o n f r o n t i n g C h i c a g o , then, w a s h o w t o d r a w

these

basic materials f r o m its potentially rich hinterland and in return supply this r e g i o n w i t h the m a n u f a c t u r e d g o o d s w h i c h it consumed.

T h i s trade w o u l d be of m u t u a l benefit t o

both

C h i c a g o a n d the inland country. T o solve this problem, the city h a d t o resort t o m a n - m a d e devices such as canals, r a i l r o a d s , a n d telegraphic communications. It is interesting t o n o t e that in C h i c a g o all three of these significant c o m m e r c i a l developments had their b e g i n n i n g in the y e a r 1848. T h e o p e n i n g of the Illinois and M i c h i g a n C a n a l connected the Illinois R i v e r w i t h L a k e M i c h i g a n . T h i s w a s the first direct trade contact between C h i c a g o a n d the Mississippi R i v e r a n d placed the lake city in a position to compete w i t h St. L o u i s . T h e canal became the first important commercial feeder f o r Chicago and

showed

the g r e a t trade possibilities w i t h

the

development o f the interior. T h e lumber t r a d e of C h i c a g o received a boost f r o m the increased d e m a n d f o r building m a t e r i a l in the canal counties. W h e a t a n d other surplus f a r m p r o d u c e w e r e sent b y w a y of the canal to C h i c a g o , then transhipped via the G r e a t L a k e s a n d E r i e C a n a l to eastern m a r k e t s . T h i s r e g i o n also

began

to purchase

its

merchandise

from

or

through

C h i c a g o . B y a quick transition, then, the canal had enabled C h i c a g o to supplant S t . L o u i s as the r e c e i v i n g point f o r f a r m surpluses a n d the d i s t r i b u t i n g center f o r m a n u f a c t u r e d g o o d s US D. C Ridgley, " Geographic Principles in the Study of Cities," Journal 0/ Geography, X X I V (1925), 69.

A D V A N T A G E S OF E A C H

CITY

35

Illinois. 1 '

for a large part of T h i s w a s not the only accomplishment of the Illinois and Michigan Canal, however, for it w a s noted that more and more steamers descended the Upper Mississippi to the mouth of the Illinois River, and then turned up that stream with their cargoes to be forwarded to N e w Y o r k via Chicago. E v e r y shipment o f this kind was a commercial gain for Chicago and represented an equal trade loss for St. L o u i s . " It is easy, of course, to overestimate the importance of the canal in the commercial annals of Chicago, for railways soon sapped its vitality. W i t h i n six years after the completion of the canal the R o c k Island Railroad was competing with this waterway along its entire route from Chicago to the Mississippi River, absorbing a m a j o r share of the traffic. Even then, however, the canal played a significant role in keeping railroad freight rates at a reasonable l e v e l — a role of economic importance to Chicago, particularly in its trade competition with St. Louis. 1 8 T h e Illinois and Michigan Canal undoubtedly gave Chicago a quickened commercial impulse, for it proved what could be accomplished in the way of profitable trade if only the millions of acres of fertile land in the Chicago hinterland could be furnished with adequate means of transportation. 1 9 T h e coming of the railway released Chicago from the old domestic economy and opened up new vistas of achievement more in keeping with the idea of the city's destiny as the metropolis of the Middle W e s t . O n October 25 a locomotive with a tender and t w o cars made its first run, a distance of five miles over the tracks of the Galena and Chicago U n i o n Rail16 Commercial Review of the South and West, X hereafter as De Bow's Review.]

(1851), 442.

[Cited

17 ibid., X I (1851), 522. 18 P. W . Gates, The Illinois Central Railroad and Its Colonisation (1934), 19. 19 Chicago Magasine (1857), 389.

Work

36

RIVALRY

BETWEEN

ST. L O U I S A N D

CHICAGO

20

road. The sight aroused wonder and admiration, but the significance of the event was little realized at the time. The coming of railways altered considerably the commercial situation in the Mississippi Valley. One of the most pronounced results of railroad construction was to contract the area of exclusive commercial domination by any particular city and to expand vastly the range of competitive trade. Railroad transportation fostered the rapid development of the country through an aggressive trade, constantly expanding in territory, in influence, and in volume. The railway not only cut down both time and distance but made new sections accessible to the exchange of commodities. It became indispensable to modern commerce. 21 The close relationship between a city's commerce and its lines of transportation is plainly shown by the development of the railroads. In the era of water transportation the watercourses were the leading elements in determining the location and size of commercial centers of exchange; the waterways were the cause, and the city with its commerce was the effect. Several severe limitations, however, which were imposed on a city by water transportation could be overcome by railroad construction. In the first place, a commerce dependent upon watercourses had to develop chiefly in the direction of those waterways, whereas railroads could be built in any land direction to serve the needs of commerce; thus restriction of water navigation applied to area and extent; railroads tapped the commercial possibilities of sections which could not be served by water transportation. In the second place, the watercourses were highly unsuitable for the trading of perishable commodities that required quick transit, and for the development of any exchanges that hinged on short time as a necessary factor. The superior speed of transportation and the better facilities 20 B. L. Pierce, A History of Chicago (1937), I, 405. 21 Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States for the Fiscal Year 1881-82, 231.

ADVANTAGES

OF E A C H

CITY

37

offered by the railroads quickly gained them favor over the slow-moving river commerce. A third factor was the limitation set by the seasons upon water transportation. T h e winter's ice and the summer's drought presented difficulties every year and during certain periods suspended commercial relations entirely. For good measure, such obstructions to navigation as snags, sand bars, and rapids could be added. Because of these difficulties in river navigation, the railroads had little trouble in demonstrating that they could give a more dependable service throughout the year. Chicago made no mistake in looking upon the railroads as so many talismanic wands with which to wave to itself the fast-growing commerce of the great Northwest. It was in 1848, also, that the electric telegraph gave Chicago a quick means of communication with the outside world. The telegraph made market reports common knowledge, supplanting the old private and peculiar sources of information. While St. Louis also had this new form of communication, it was more in keeping with the newer business methods practiced at Chicago, especially with the development of world-wide markets for grain and provisions. The producer and the consumer were placed in closer contact than before, and knew each other's needs better. Supply and demand could be better adjusted and more nearly kept in balance. This spurred competition between rival cities, for produce would go to the market offering the greatest return, and goods would be sent where profits could best be realized. Orders could be placed instantly, and punctuality in delivery came to be expected. This market knowledge reduced large profits to small ones, which often consisted of parings made by close bargaining. 22 The canal, the railways, and the telegraph gave Chicago a chance to divert to itself the rich river trade held by St. Louis. These improvements in transportation and communication brought about a new tempo of restless activity which suited Chicago and enabled it to become the commercial emporium of the Middle West. 22 Western

Journal, V I I (1852), 375.

38

RIVALRY

BETWEEN

ST. L O U I S

AND

CHICAGO

A comparison of the principal receipts of the two cities as shown in Table I indicates the commanding lead which St. Louis had over Chicago in the early 'fifties. With the exception of corn St. Louis heavily overtopped the lake port in grain receipts, receiving nearly five times as much wheat, four times as much flour, and twice as many oats. St. Louis, also, held a decided edge in the provision trade consisting of pork, bacon, and beef. Whatever else these figures may show, they certainly exhibit the lack of a common unit of measurement. It is difficult to find a common denominator for such diverse units as sacks, casks, tierces, boxes, barrels, kegs, and bulk pieces. The river city also dominated the trade in coffee, sugar, salt, molasses, tobacco, and whiskey. The two items on the list extremely favorable to Chicago were corn and lumber. TABLE I COMPARISON or RECEIPTS OF PRINCIPAL PRODUCTS AT ST. LOUIS AND CHICAGO IN 1851 2 3

Articles Wheat, bushels Flour, barrels Corn, bushels Oats, bushels Barley & Malt, sacks . . . . Barley, bushels Pork, casks & tierces . . . . Pork, pounds Pork, boxes & barrels Pork, barrels Pork, bulk, pieces Pork, bulk, tons Bacon, casks & hogsheads Bacon, boxes Bacon, pieces Bacon, pounds Butter, barrels Butter, pounds Butter, kegs & firkins Lard, tierces Lard, pounds Lard, barrels Lard, kegs Beef, tierces & casks Beef, barrels Salt, sacks

At St. Louis 1,700,708

193,892

1,840,909

794,421 101,674

15,398 103,013 768,819

At Chicago 388,077 51,652 2,647,465

334,148 36,111

2,390,248 8,241

147

16,791 1,564 6,627 2,009

7,598

14,465

37.743 14.450 5.640 8,872

216,933

432,^16 369,216 2,069,625

1.571

ADVANTAGES OF E A C H CITY

39

T A B L E I—(Continued) C O M P A R I S O N OF R E C E I P T S o r

P S I N C I P A L PRODUCTS

ST. LOUIS AND CHICAGO I N

Articles Salt, bags Salt, barrels Salt, pounds Hemp, bales Hemp, pounds Lead, pigs Lead, pounds Tobacco, hogsheads Tobacco, pounds Whiskey, barrels Liquors, barrels Sugar, hogsheads Sugar, barrels & boxes Sugar, pounds Coffee, bags Molasses, barrels Molasses, hogsheads Lumber, feet Wool, bales Wool, pounds Leather, pounds Leather, packages & boxes . . . Hides, pounds Hides, bales

1851

At St. Louis

. 46,250

AT

1 1

At Chicago #.414 115,642 i,i7ojoo

65J66 1.033.648 S03.S71 1.402.135 10,371 324,923 47,991 5.189 29^76 36.689

40,231

2,563

2*84 3,765,836 13,111 2,663 450 125,056,437

1,128 1.088,553 59.796 12,409 848376 99.736

St. Louis took the matter of trade supremacy for granted. In fact, a striking feature of the early stages of the struggle over the Upper Mississippi trade was the confidence displayed by St. Louis merchants in their ability to retain their position of dominance. The trade was already coming to St. Louis, commercial relations had been formed, confidence established, and wants satisfied. These conditions afforded the opportunity for growth which St. Louis thought would make that city the leading emporium of the great central valley above New Orleans. 23 The Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, X X V I (1852), 321, 324-5, 404, 434, 439-40. [Cited hereafter as Hunt's Merchants' Magazine.]

40

RIVALRY

BETWEEN

ST.

LOUIS AND

CHICAGO

Chicago was equally sure that the contest would be settled in its favor. The trade of the fertile interior region would converge on Chicago because of the railroads. The neighboring cities to the north would find it impossible to budge Lake Michigan which interrupted the east-west railway lines of transportation. As long as Lake Michigan remained a " fixed fact," every railroad or town that was built and every farm that was settled north and west of the city would only increase the trade and prosperity of Chicago.24 St. Louis, it was thought, was in no position to compete successfully with the lake port. While St. Louis slumbered in repose, Chicago girded itself for the contest ahead. 25 24 Daily Democratic Press, Dec. 30, 1853. 25 Chicago; Her Commerce and Railroads: Two Articles Published in the Daily Democratic Press (1853), 14.

CHAPTER III ST. LOUIS DEVELOPS HER RIVER TRADE T o the city of St. Louis in the steamboat era, the Mississippi River was not only the Father of Waters, but the Godfather of Commerce as well. That trade would go with the stream was a maxim not to be disputed. Generations could come and go, conditions could change, but the river would go on forever. St. Louis in the opinion of its leading citizens could not escape a glorious destiny, for the economic factors which had made it a thriving city would continue to push it ahead. The river city regarded its commercial foundations as so secure that they could never be shaken. Before the coming of railways, steamboats contributed enormously to the rapid growth of population, the great increase of commerce, and the general development of the Mississippi Valley. 1 T h e reasons for this are obvious. The boats propelled by steam had greater speed than any boats had had before. Going upstream a flatboat would make from four to six miles per day, while a steamer could easily gain that distance in an hour. Steam power replaced human labor. Freight rates were reduced, and steamboats were used as general carriers for all classes of goods. 2 W i t h the development of steamboating on the interior waterways, St. Louis advanced with giant strides. The river interests were dominant, and the city was so preoccupied with its gains at the expense of Cincinnati and Louisville that, at first, not much attention was given to the rise of Chicago in the early 'fifties. St. Louis was jubilant when in the year ending June 30, 1850, it was able to show an enrolled steam tonnage of 24,995 t o n s a s compared with Cincinnati's 16,906, and Louisville's 14,820.® Nothing could be a surer sign of success and 1 J . H a l l , The West:

Its Commerce

and Navigation

(1848), 10.

2 Scharf, op. cit., I, 296.

3 Hogan, op. cit., 6.

41

42

RIVALRY

BETWEEN

ST. L O U I S A N D

CHICAGO

importance, then, when three years later, June 30, 1853, the following figures were announced with reference to the enrolled steam tonnage of the respective cities :* S t Louis Cincinnati Louisville

45,441 tons (an increase of 20^46 tons in the three year period) 10,191 tons (a loss of 6,715 tons) 14,166 tons (a loss of 654 tons)

With a tonnage nearly double that of its two river competitors, St. Louis assumed a position of commercial dominance in the Mississippi Valley. Over 600 steamers constantly plied to and from this port during the season of navigation. Each river which contributed to the commerce of St. Louis had its regular packets. There were packet lines with almost daily service to New Orleans, Louisville, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh. Frequent sailings were also scheduled to Peoria and L a Salle on the Illinois River, Keokuk and St. Paul on the Upper Mississippi, Lexington, Kansas City, and St. Joseph on the Missouri, and Nashville and Clarksville on the Cumberland. Cities like Alton, Cairo, and Memphis had their own packet lines with regular service between those towns and St. Louis. The steamboat service had become regularized and systematized, which made it both profitable to the boatman and the mainspring of commercial prosperity to St. Louis. 6 By 1850 the steamboat traffic between St. Louis and New Orleans had become well established. In 1844 a steamboat, the J. M. White, made the round trip between these two cities in nine days.® The arrival of steamboats at New Orleans during the 'fifties as shown in Table II indicated the growth of water-borne traffic at this southern port. Making allowance for the increased size of the newer vessels, the increase of steamboat arrivals from 2,784 in 1850 to 3,566 in i860 was far behind the growth of commercial shipments from the Mississippi Valley. 4 Ibid. 5 J . T . Lloyd, Lloyd's Steamboat Directory (1856), 220. 6 W . J . Petersen, Iowa the Rivers of Her Valleys (1941), 36.

ST. LOUIS DEVELOPS HER RIVER TRADE

43

TABLE II ARRIVAL or STEAMBOATS AT NEW ORLEANS, 1850-1860T Year ending September 30 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860

Number 2,784 2,918 2,778 3,252 3,076 2.763 2,956 2,745 3^64 3.259 3.S66

TABLE III GBOWTH OF STEAMBOAT TRAFFIC AT ST. PAUL, 1850-18608 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 ">b/ 1858 1859 1860

104 119 171 200 256 560 837 ».««" 1,090 802 776

It was chiefly to the rapid expansion of steamboating on the Upper Mississippi and its tributaries that St. Louis owed its commercial growth. Table I I I shows the development of steamboat traffic at St. Paul during the 'fifties. T h e number of steamboat arrivals at this upper river terminus increased tenfold from 1850 to 1858. B e f o r e the railroads reached the Mississippi River towns, the steamboats ruled the river and the river moved the commerce of its valley. T h e closing of navigation left these places in dreary isolation during the long winter months. A t St. Paul the river was closed by ice 143 days a year 7 F. H. Dixon, A Traffic History of the Mississippi River System, National Waterways Commission, Doc. no. 11 (1909), 15. 8 M. L. Hartsough, From Canoe to Steel Barge on the Upper Mississippi (1934). 100.

44

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on the average; at St. Louis, only 29 days. The ice barrier blocked the river between Keokuk and Dubuque each year from 75 days to 105 days.® The arrival of the first steamboat each spring was eagerly awaited by every river town above St. Louis. The opening of navigation was attended by many gala celebrations. The captain of the steamboat who ushered in the season of navigation was a popular hero. Captains sometimes endangered the lives of crew members and passengers as well as the loss of steamboats and cargoes by attempting to break through the ice barrier in order to win these laurels. 10 St. Louis welcomed the construction of the Illinois and Michigan Canal and believed that the completion of this project, connecting the Mississippi River with the waters of Lake Michigan, would open new trade possibilities for the city. 1 1 St. Louisans then would be in a position to supply this region directly with sugar, molasses, coffee, and other products from New Orleans and the West Indies, as well as with white lead and linseed oil of their own manufacture. 12 The city was somewhat surprised, therefore, when this anticipated trade never developed. On the other hand, manufactured goods from the East arrived at St. Louis via the canal instead of coming by the roundabout way of New Orleans or the Ohio River. 1 3 A t St. Louis the receipts from the Upper Mississippi lead mines declined from 749,128 pigs in 1847, 14 the year before the Illinois and Michigan Canal was opened, to 315,677 pigs in. 1 8 5 5 . " Although it was true that the lead output from the Galena district was decreasing during that time, the fact that the receipts at Chicago increased from some twenty pigs in 9 W . J. Petersen, Steamboating on the Upper Mississippi, Way to Iowa (1937), 45310 Ibid., 461. 11 Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, V I I I (1843), 543. 12 Missouri Republican, Jan. 15, 1848. 13 Ibid., Oct. 1, 1848. 14 Hunt's Merchant^ Magazine, X X V I (1852), 325. 15 Ibid., X X X I V (1856), 361.

The

Water

ST. L O U I S D E V E L O P S

HER RIVER TRADE

45

1845 t o o v e r 142,000 pigs in 1855 indicated that the lake port was making substantial progress toward diverting the up-river lead trade from St. Louis. 1 4 In the first ten years of its operation ( 1 8 4 8 - 1 8 5 8 ) the canal transported approximately 563,000,000 feet of lumber, 27,000,000 pounds of pork, 26,000,000 bushels of corn, 5,500,000 bushels of wheat, and 50,000 tons of coal. T h e canal tolls collected at Chicago during this period were in excess of $1,000,000." T h e successful operation of the Illinois and Michigan Canal, and its benefits to Chicago, proved to this city that the rich trade of the Upper Mississippi Valley lay within its grasp if only adequate transportation facilities could be brought into existence. Chicago therefore made up its mind to bring about the desired change in trade routes. T h e same object lesson should have demonstrated to St. L o u i s that it was in danger of losing its economic hold over the up-river country, but that city calmly took the position that a loss in one direction would be more than compensated by a gain elsewhere. St. Louis felt that so long as its aggregate trade showed steady gains, there was no real cause f o r concern. T h e view of its tradesmen in 1855 is well illustrated by the following comment: 1 * There has never been a time when, all things considered, the symptoms of prosperity were more visible than they are at this moment. All that may have been lost in one direction, has been amply compensated for in others. If there has been any diminution of trade with the North, it has been merely relative and very slight in any aspect. Its absolute volume has increased at the same time. New channels of trade have been opened in Kentucky, Tennessee and Arkansas, to say nothing of what may be expected from the settlement of the new Territories West of Missouri, which must be dependent on St. Louis . . . . St. Louis is now, and must continue to 16 E . A . Riley, The Development of Chicago and Vicinity as a Manufacturing Center Prior to 1880 (1911), 92. 17 G. P . Brown, Drainage Canal and Woterway (1894), 212. 18 Missouri Republican, M a y 31, 1855.

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be, the commercial centre of a vast area, with capabilities of production, the soberest statement of which would seem an exaggeration. St. Louis was so dependent on river navigation that this viewpoint continued down to the Civil War, even though before that time railroads from Chicago had reached the Mississippi River at such vital points for diverting trade as Alton, Quincy, Burlington, Rock Island, Fulton, and Dunleith. An analysis of steamboat arrivals at St. Louis from the different rivers in i860 (see Table I V ) shows that in that year the city had to look to the upper rivers for the greater share of its trade. Of the 3,454 steamboats 2,337—slightly more than twothirds of the total—came from the Upper Mississippi, Illinois, and Missouri Rivers as compared with 1 , 1 1 7 from the Lower Mississippi, Ohio, Tennessee, Cumberland, and Arkansas Rivers. The Upper Mississippi Valley was being settled and developed so rapidly that its expanding commerce gave a brisk carrying business to both the railroads and the steamboats. This condition caused St. Louis to believe that the steamboat would be able to compete successfully with the railroad and would remain in the future as in the past the chief agency of the city's growth and prosperity. T A B L E

IV

STEAMBOAT A K X I V A L S FBOM D I F F E R E N T R r v r a t s AT S T . L O U I S FOR

Upper Mississippi Lower Mississippi Missouri Illinois Ohio Tennessee Cumberland Arkansas

1,524 767 269 544 277 31 35 7

Total Steamboat Arrivals Barges, Canal and Flatboats

3454 1,724

Total Arrivals of All River Craft . . . Tonnage 19 Scharf, op. cit., II, 1129.

5,178 844.039

i86018

ST. L O U I S D E V E L O P S

HER RIVER TRADE

47

St. Louis never tired of putting forth claims for its steamboats' superiority. They excelled in beauty of ornament, completeness of detail, adaption to comfort, strength, and safety. A s carriers, they had no rivals, for they were designed to meet special river conditions. The St. Louis papers delighted in printing glowing descriptions of the " thick clusters " of steamboats which lined the levee. Steamboat navigation on western rivers had no equal anywhere on the globe. Speed, distance, cheapness, magnitude, and diversity of cargoes were all outstanding. Increased commerce from the vast stretches extending north and west of St. Louis alone was sufficient to justify great expectations for the river city. 20 In fact, the St. Louis press found considerable difficulty in assigning limits to the possible future growth of St. Louis " when all the capacities of that country whose trade can in no event be diverted from her, shall have been fully developed." 21 The decade between 1850 and i860 may be properly called the " golden age " of steamboating in the river history of St. Louis. Gold seekers, Indian and fur traders, immigrants, pioneers, and homeseekers all swelled the booming passenger business of the river steamboats. The freight shipments at times overtaxed the carrying capacity of the steamers and made this division of the river business very profitable. T h e increased number of steamboat arrivals at St. Louis from 2,897 ' n 1850 to 3,454 in i860 is indicated in Table V . There was certainly nothing phenomenal about the increase of 557 steamboat arrivals in eleven years' time when the commerce of the upper valley was expanding so rapidly. Y e t these statistics seemingly afforded the people of St. Louis with ample reason to believe that the river was the sure foundation of its continued commercial growth. St. Louis did not fear its trade rivals, for the city was able to derive some revenue from practically all traffic which passed 20 Missouri Republican, M a y 31, 1855. 21 /Wd„ Jan. 10, 1854.

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TABLE V AKJUVALS OF STEAMBOATS AT S T . L O U I S , 1 8 5 0 - 1 8 6 0

1850 1851 1852 1853 1854

2,897 2,638 3,184 3,307

1855

3,449

1857

3.443

1860

3,149 3,454

1856

1858 1859

22

3,065

3,160

along the river because of the necessity of reshipping goods at that point. St. L o u i s was not only centrally located in reference to its tributary area, but also had a like position with regard to the master streams which constituted the main avenues of commerce. Then, too, St. Louis had a crossroad position, for it was the crossing place of east-west as well as north-south traffic. T h i s g a v e added importance to its focal position. Just as once all roads led to Rome, so it may be said that all the river routes of the great interior converged at St. Louis. There were six m a j o r lines of river commerce: the L o w e r Mississippi to N e w Orleans, the O h i o River to Pittsburgh, the Upper Mississippi to the Falls of St. Anthony, the Missouri as far as the mouth of the Yellowstone, the Illinois to L a Salle, and the Cumberland to Nashville. 2 3 These routes with their many tributaries gave St. L o u i s a trade which made a thriving city and furnished an economic framework in which that city thought it could vanquish all rivals. T h e jobbing trade of St. Louis was taken as a general index of the g r o w t h of business houses in the city. T h e sales of seven wholesale grocery houses increased from $1,134,351.04 in 1845 to $5,018,677.55 in 1853. S i x dry goods houses showed a similar gain, from $1,119,057.20 to $4,074,782.01, during the 22 Dixon, op. cit., 24. I. Lippincott, " Internal Trade of the United States, 1700-1860," Washington University Studies, I V (1916), 136.

23 Annual Review of the Trade and Commerce of St. Lows for 1853, Map.

ST. L O U I S D E V E L O P S HER R I V E S T R A D E

49

same period.24 Increases like these were typical. By 1855 there were listed 444 wholesale houses in the main part of St. Louis with sales totaling $87,033,697.00." The merchants could well say that the trade of the entire Mississippi Valley pivoted around St. Louis as the point of exchange. The interests of the city were focused on this rapidly growing river trade. It is easy to see why St. Louis was so well satisfied with its achievements, and looked forward with confidence to continued growth and expansion. The near hinterland of St. Louis was sufficiently settled to provide an active selling and buying market. In addition there was a vast potential tributary region that was almost completely undeveloped; this was regarded as an untouched asset which assured the future commercial expansion of the city. From nearby Missouri and Illinois trade expanded rapidly into Iowa, Wisconsin, Kansas, Minnesota, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Kentucky. 28 The most active and fastest growing trade was with the upper river country—a fact which most St. Louisans took as a sure sign of the commercial supremacy of their city, failing to see it as a portent of the coming contest between that city and a new trade rival, Chicago. The rapid gain in population of the up-river country from 1840 to i860, as shown in Table V I , was an important factor in the growth of St. Louis in the steamboat era. This enorTABLE

VI

POPULATION GROWTH OF THE UPPEK MISSISSIPPI V A L L E Y ,

Stair MISSOURI ILLINOIS WISCONSIN IOWA MINNESOTA KANSAS

1840-186017

1840

1850

i860

383,702 476,183 30,945 43,112

682,044 851,470 30SJ9I 192^14 6,077

1,183,013 1,711,951 75&»I 674,913 172,083 107,206

24 Missouri Republican, JAN. 13, 1854. 25 Ibid., APR. 14, 1856. 26 Ibid., MAR. 14, 1855. 27 Compiled from the Census Returns of

1840, 1850,

and

I860.

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mous increase in population swelled the commerce of St. Louis and gave that city a healthy business growth. Before the railroads reached the Mississippi River, large numbers of people passed through St. Louis on their way to populate and improve the fertile land beyond. Steamboats were crowded with freight and passengers from nearly every state in the Union and many foreign countries. It was reported that, in the year ending September 30, 1855, the number of passengers carried on steamboats to and from the river gateway at St. Louis reached the impressive figure of 1,045,269.** Many dropped off here and there along the .rivers to settle farms, open stores, construct mills, and start enterprises of nearly every kind. They increased day by day the population of the surrounding region and of the little towns and villages that sprang up on both sides of the navigable streams. St. Louis was only too willing to give full credit to the navigable rivers and steamboats for the development of this entire region. Steamship travel was looked upon as the most certain way of populating and developing the region and transporting its surplus products.** The increased receipts resulting from rapid settlement did indeed swell enormously the volume of St. Louis's commerce. N o special efforts had to be made to obtain this growing trade; it was forced upon the city, and the idea of its ever being diverted from this port seemed inconceivable.*0 T o its own detriment, St. Louis developed a tendency to look backward rather than forward. It had become important without special effort; why should it bestir itself to achieve artificially, when its development had been so natural?* 1 The state of Missouri gave its chief city a rich endowment of agricultural products and mineral resources. Missouri was settled earlier than Iowa and Arkansas, because the principal tribu28 Hunt's Merchants' Magaxine, XXXIII (1855), 637. 29 Missouri Republican, Nov. 20, 1855.

30 Western Journal, VI (1851), 33.

31 Scharf, op. cit., II, 1031.

ST. L O U I S D E V E L O P S HER R I V E R T R A D E

51

taries of the Mississippi from the east, the Ohio and the Illinois, led directly to the state. The Missouri River and its tributaries made the resources of the state available to the commerce of St. Louis. Illinois was noted as a rich agricultural state and was called the feeding trough of St. Louis. In 1840, five-eighths of the agricultural trade of St. Louis was drawn from Illinois, and that state took, in return, nearly threefourths of the merchandise sold in the city.*2 The settlement of Wisconsin progressed rapidly. Its large pineries were intersected by many streams, and the logs could be floated to market. This state also comprised about four-fifths of the Upper Mississippi lead belt. Before the output of the mines declined and the trade shifted to the East, receiving pig lead, and furnishing supplies to the lead mine area, constituted an important item in the business of St. Louis." Nearly all of the trade of Iowa depended upon the Mississippi, and the main market of that trade was St. Louis; groceries, dry goods, hardware, and farm implements were brought back in exchange for grain and meat.*4 The settlement of Minnesota was so rapid when it was fully under way that the demand for essential articles far exceeded the supply, and many of these were supplied from S t Louis." The early settlements of Kansas and Nebraska were forced to depend upon the rivers as trade outlets, which meant that they, too, found their chief market in St. Louis. Increased trade from this wide extent of back country convinced St. Louis that its future growth hinged on the development and improvement of river navigation. The merchants spent their time, energy, and money in erecting buildings and 32 A. C. Cole, The Era of the Civil War, 1848-1870 (1919), 29. 33 R. G. Thwaites, Wisconsin, the Americanization of a French Settlement (1908), 295. 34 J. Van der Zee, " The Roads and Highways of Territorial Iowa," Iowa Journal of History and Politics, III (1905). 202-3. 35 Missouri Republican, June 20, 1849.

52

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CHICAGO

providing accommodations to take care of this growing business. They saw no good reason why they should exert themselves to seek new trade connections. It was said that if St. Louis had not the Mississippi River it would have nothing. One writer admitted; " Nature having done so much for us has paralyzed our efforts." *• In the annual commercial review of 1852, it was pointed out that the city had grown to its present proportions without the aid of railroads or canals, and without even the removal of any of the obstructions in the natural channels through which its commerce flowed.87 Although many business men felt alarm over the rapid building of railroads between the East and the West and the consequent tapping of St. Louis trade territory, yet the general commercial sentiment continued to rely on the rivers as the chief routes for trade and travel. During the steamboat era the levee was the best barometer of St. Louis trade. When the levee was deserted, the papers lamented the stagnation of business, and during the busy season the already great and rapidly growing commerce was acclaimed. T o accommodate the increasing trade, the levee had to be lengthened, since it could not be widened. Its extensions and improvements impressed the people and gave them a feeling of commercial security. The levee, with its paved slope along the river's edge up to the first row of buildings, was depicted as the busiest scene in the Mississippi Valley. A mile or so of steamboats unloaded and received sacks, bales, boxes, and barrels of produce and merchandise as far as the eye could see. Hundreds of drays, wagons, and carriages rushed to and fro, and thousands of men jostled each other in handling the trade. Claims were made that the levee was so crowded with goods and produce that one could walk the entire distance of the wharf without setting foot on the ground.*8 One reason why this commerce looked so im36 Missouri Republican, Aug. 5, 1847. 37 Annual Review of the Commerce of St. Louis for the Year 38 Missouri Republican, Mar. 5, 1857.

183.

ST. L O U I S D E V E L O P S H E R R I V E R T R A D E

53

pressive was that all of it could be seen. The handling of freight was simplicity itself. The steamboat tied up at the wharf, gangplanks were run out from the boat to the inclined quay, and stevedores and longshoremen supplied the motive power for loading and unloading the cargo. The lack of warehouses caused the levee to be utilized for storage space. Under these conditions the narrow strip of levee was burdened with more commerce than could be properly handled without confusion. This crowded condition was regarded as a marvel; St. Louis was proud of it. Contemporary accounts can best give the picture The business streets are almost blockaded with boxes, barrels, bales and packages, much coming in, much also, going out. It is interesting also, to see the wide scope of country supplied from this market. We saw boxes directed to Kentucky, all parts of Illinois and Missouri, Kansas, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin—a more extensive market than any other city in the world supplies; and when it is recollected that the country is yet new, and not one per cent of its natural resources developed, some idea, may be formed of the vast importance of our Western trade.89 Another description of busy St. Louis states : 40 During the year just closed [1855] nearly seven thousand arrivals and departures of steamers were noted at this port. Scarcely an hour during that period but some gallant steamer ploughed the waves of the Mississippi, bringing from the North, as far as St. Paul—from the West, beyond the Yellow Stone—from the South, almost to the Gulf, and from the Ohio to the very confluence of the Allegheny and Monongahela, the products of the richest and most extensively improved country in the world. The levee was stored from day to day with the staples of each section. The sugars of the South lay mingled 39 CarlimAlle (Illinois) Spectator quoted in Missouri Republican, Apr. 29. 185540 Missouri Republican, Jan. 8, 1856.

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with the cereals of the zation contrasted with no other mart of the diversified interests of

ST. L O U I S A N D

CHICAGO

North, and the manufactures of civilithe peltries of the Indian. Perhaps in Union are the genius, enterprise and the nation better represented.

Down to the Civil W a r St. Louis was emphatically a riparian city. A steamboat was made the emblem on its great seal. T h e titles of trade reports such as the Annual Review of the Commerce of St. Louis Together with a Very Full List of Steamboat Disasters and Complete River Statistics for the Year 1859 showed what St. Louis considered to be its true interests. The Mississippi River and its tributaries were always referred to as the natural routes of transportation. The question whether the Mississippi River system really constituted the natural avenues of transportation and trade, and if so, what were the circumstances that might alter this situation, never disturbed the economic thinking of St. Louis during the heyday of steamboating. The city was occupied with its growing commerce, and little attention was given to the inherent disadvantages of the rivers which made it improbable that they would long survive as important factors in trade and transportation. Thus St. Louis failed to prepare itself for the time when the Mississippi River would be unable to handle, much less control, the commerce of its great valley.

CHAPTER IV CHICAGO'S DRIVE FOR RAILROAD SUPREMACY E A R L Y in its economic rivalry with St. Louis, Chicago determined upon the immediate construction and successful operation of railroads as the best means of drawing to itself the rapidly expanding commerce of the Upper Mississippi Valley. T h e lake city contended that the Upper Mississippi River country chafed under the trade monopoly of St. Louis and would transfer its commercial allegiance elsewhere if business could be done on more favorable terms. The verdict of time was to reveal that the emergence of Chicago and the construction of the railroads met with the approval and answered the demands of the upper river region.

A s early as 1850 Chicagoans were driving home the point that a commercial city must, of necessity, depend upon communication with the surrounding country, the source f r o m which it drew its means of existence. It was necessary to have these extending lines of transportation not only in order to insure the continuance of its prosperity, but also to provide for future growth. W i t h the advent of the railroad, river shipping was giving way to land transportation. The city which did not improve its natural advantages would fall behind in the race. T h e following statement is a good expression of Chicago's attitude toward the impending railroad development. 1 It will thus be seen that we are most favorably situated for the construction of means of intercommunication; and that in this respect the West offers facilities for railroads which are not to be found in the older states. It will be seen also, that of all the places in the West, Chicago is the most favorably placed as the centre of a great net-work of railway communication which will yet be constructed; but which requires the 1 Chicago Daily Democrat, Apr. 15, 185a 55

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constant care of our citizens to provide that it shall inure to our benefit as well as to the general prosperity of the country. This last sentence may be taken as Chicago's code of selfinterest. The strategy of the early railroads of Illinois was based upon the connection of Lake Michigan with the Mississippi River. The newspapers took special pride in predicting that the trade of St. Louis in all the important commodities would be diminished as these railroads neared the Mississippi. It was predicted that the railroads, by their greater speed, safety, shortness, and cheapness of transportation, would first gradually and then speedily divert the course of trade from St. Louis and turn it to Chicago. Chicago's spirit at this time was well expressed as follows: " It is not what Chicago is, but what she will and must become, and what these numerous channels of communication will hasten to make her within a period so brief as to mock all past experience." 2 In 1836 a charter was obtained from the state of Illinois granting permission for the construction of a railroad to be known as the Galena and Chicago Union. A t that time Galena was a more prosperous town than Chicago, and it naturally received first place in the title of the proposed road. 3 The panic of 1837 crushed the life out of this project for a decade, but in 1847 a group of men headed by William B. Ogden bought the charter and made a determined effort to get construction of the road under way. A n attempt to secure Eastern capital to back this new venture failed, and the road in its initial stages had to be financed mainly from local sources. 4 The road was used for transportation before ten miles of the track had been completed. 5 The work of construction continued, 2 Ibid., Jan. 4, 1853. 3 T . W . Goodspeed, University of Chicago Biographical Studies 1,45.

(1922),

4 J. Y. Scammon, William B. Ogden ( F e r g u s Historical Series, no. 17, 1882), 64. 5 Pierce, op. cit., II, 35.

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57

and the railroad was opened as far as Elgin, forty-two miles from Chicago, in January, 1850. From the beginning this pioneer Chicago railway was an outstanding success. The lake city was impressed with the new development. The ruling judgment was that the Galena and Chicago Union Railroad had gone " far beyond the hopes and anticipations of its most sanguine friends, and the public must be fully satisfied of its utility and permanency, and of its superiority over all other means of communication with the country." * T h e Galena and Chicago Union was pushed westward, reaching Rockford in 1852 and terminating at Freeport, 121 miles from Chicago, in i853- t Construction was halted at Freeport, but by using the tracks of the Illinois Central, the Galena and Chicago Union made connections with Galena in 1854 and with Dunleith on the Mississippi, opposite Dubuque, the following year. 8 The Galena and Chicago Union also owned and operated the Dixon A i r Line which was sometimes referred to as the Galena (Fulton) A i r Line. The Dixon Air Line was constructed westward from Junction and reached the Mississippi River at Fulton in 1855. Although both railways used the same track to Junction, some thirty miles from Chicago, the lake city regarded the Dixon A i r Line as one of its main roads. In fact, this was the shortest rail connection between Chicago and the Mississippi River, being only 136 miles. 8 T h e Galena and Chicago Union soon demonstrated what could be accomplished by the railroad in the way of fostering commercial growth and development. Chicago's large hinterland of fertile soil, level topography, and favorable climate remained sparsely settled only because of limited means of transportation. Efficient transportation would bring to this area 6 Chicago Daily Democrat, Jan. 10, 1850. 7 Fourth Annual Review of the Commerce, Railroads, and Manufactures of Chicago for the Year 1855, 67. 8 Gates, op. ext., 86. 9 Fourth Annual Reviere of the Commerce, Railroads, and Manufactures 0/ Chicago for the Year 1855, 68.

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quick settlement, increased production, an urge to sell, and a desire to b u y — a l l the elements of a prosperous economy. This expansion would in time provide a profitable basis for railroad operation. The Galena and Chicago Union turned out to be one of the most profitable railroads in America. T h e average dividend on its capital stock for the years 1850 to 1855 was 16 per cent. 10 T h i s was a most important point for the future construction of railways from Chicago. It meant that Eastern capital would be forthcoming to build Western railroads which would tap the Mississippi River trade that had formerly gone to St. Louis and the South and help divert it to Chicago and the East. A bolder railroad enterprise was the plan for the construction of the Illinois Central. T h e main problem of C h i c a g o was to establish closer trade relations with its natural tributary territory and at the same time to cut the many economic ties binding this region to St. Louis. The Illinois Central, running through the center of Illinois and connecting the Upper Mississippi near the northern boundary of the state with the L o w e r Mississippi at Cairo, obviously would be the first great " St. Louis cut-off." 1 1 Advocates of the Illinois Central were finally forced to look to the federal government for aid in carrying out this extensive project. T h e form of aid requested was a land grant from the public domain along the railroad's right-of-way. T w o arguments were used to support this request. T h e first was the contention that the railroad was in the category of public improvements and would be of great benefit to the country. T h i s was in line with the old idea of the value of internal improvements — a n idea which was still popular enough on the frontier but had been rejected by the nation as a whole. T h e second argu10 Gates, op. cit., 86. 11 A. T . Andreas, History 0} Chicago from the Earliest Period to the Present Time (1884), I, 244.

CHICAGO'S

DRIVE

FOR R A I L R O A D S U P R E M A C Y

59

ment in favor of government aid was to the effect that such aid would be a good investment; here was an opportunity for the government to use part of the public domain in that area to advance the value of the remaining part. 12 The earlier bills introduced in Congress in behalf of the Illinois Central made no provision for a Chicago branch to connect with the main line. The proposed road which linked the Upper and Lower Mississippi together would, to be sure, divert river traffic from St. Louis; the commerce of the upper valley, however, was still directed toward New Orleans. One of the main purposes of the road was to overcome the handicaps of navigation on the Upper Mississippi: the point was stressed that the lower river (from Cairo to the Gulf of Mexico) was open at all seasons of the year. 18 This proposal, of course, did not meet with the approval of Chicago. A better turn of events came for Chicago in 1847 when Stephen A . Douglas made the windy city his home and entered the United States Senate. Under the astute political leadership of Douglas rapid progress was made toward passage of a federal land grant bill to aid in the construction of the Illinois Central. Douglas also incorporated in his proposed bill a branch line to Chicago. It is significant that this change secured more backers for the measure, especially in the Northwestern and Middle Western states, where there had been much opposition to the original bill because of its tendency to keep trade moving from the Upper Mississippi toward New Orleans. 14 The act became a law September 20, 1850. Under the provisions of this land grant measure the three states of Illinois, Mississippi, and Alabama were given a railroad right-of-way through the public lands for the construction of a main line from the western end of the Illinois and Michigan Canal to 12 F. L. Paxson, History of the American Frontier 1763-1893 (1924), 420-1. 13 Andreas, op. cit., I, 251. 14 Ibid.

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Mobile via Cairo, with one branch to Dunleith by way of Galena and another to Chicago. These states were granted alternate even sections of land to the extent of six miles on each side of the railway. In case any of this land had passed to private ownership, the three states were given permission to go nine miles farther from the right-of-way to secure the stated number of sections. The land retained by the government within six miles of the track was to be sold at double the required minimum price. The road would have to be completed within ten years or the land would be forfeited." The extension of the railroad to Mobile through the states of Mississippi and Alabama represented a successful bid for Southern support. The provision doubling the price of the land retained by the government within six miles of the right-ofway dissipated the constitutional scruples of some of the strict constructionists because they were not in reality giving any direct subsidy to this project, for the amount of money obtained from land sales would be approximately the same as if aid had not been extended. This land grant measure was a very significant act; not only did it make possible the building of the Illinois Central at an early date, but it also marked a large step forward toward solving the financial problem which blocked the construction of other frontier railways. After several legal skirmishes among parties financially interested in the road, a charter was obtained for the Illinois Central from the State Legislature in 1851. For purposes of construction the road was divided into twelve sections and work started on all divisions in 1852. 16 Construction progressed rapidly considering the difficulties involved in building a railroad through long stretches of virtually unsettled country. The entire line stood completed in September, 1856; it covered a distance of 704 miles and was the longest railroad yet built in the United States.17 15 United States, Statutes at Large (1851), IX, 466-7. Gates, op. cit., 41. 16 Gates, op. cit., 98. 17 Chicago Democratic Prtst, Oct. 3, 1856. Gates, op. cit., 98.

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6l

T h e Illinois Central contributed much to the g r o w t h of Chicago. T h e completed road extended f r o m Dunleith through Galena, Freeport, D i x o n , L a Salle, Bloomington, Decatur, and Vandalia to Cairo. T h e Chicago branch joined the main line at Centralia by w a y of Urbana. T h e Illinois Central did more than any other railroad to open up the fertile prairie state of Illinois for settlement, since it passed through the least developed region and had the greatest mileage in operation. Despite the fact that it operated generally in a north and south direction, this line aided materially in placing the commerce of the region through which it passed on an east and west basis. 18 T h e Chicago branch tapped an exceptionally fertile farming area which developed rapidly. A l t h o u g h some of the produce from this region was shipped eastward by the O h i o and Mississippi Railroad and T e r r e Haute and A l t o n Railroad, the greater bulk of it came to Chicago. T h e main line had connections with the principal western railways leading to Chicago and sent to the lake port large shipments via the Chicago and Alton, the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy, the Chicago and Rock Island, and the Galena and Chicago Union. 1 9 T h u s the Illinois Central lived up to its expectations as the great " St. Louis cut-off," and helped Chicago make substantial gains on its river rival as the leading commercial center in the Mississippi Valley. T h e first direct, continuous line of railroad f r o m Chicago to reach the Mississippi River w a s the Chicago and R o c k Island. W o r k on this road started A p r i l 10, 1852, and by February 22, 1854, the entire line was opened for traffic between Chicago and Rock Island, a distance of 181 miles. 20 T h i s important line of railroad followed the upper valley of the Illinois River, passing through the g r o w i n g towns of Joliet and Ottawa. A t L a Salle, 18 H . G. Brownson, Hittory

of the Illinois Central Railroad to 1870

(1915), 162.

19 Gates, op. cit., 140. 20 The Railroads, History and Commerce of Chicago (1854), i a

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head of steamboat navigation on the Illinois River, the road drew a lucrative trade from that water artery of commerce. From Peru to the Mississippi it passed through a district rich in argricultural possibilities. The road was not only expected to intercept river traffic to St. Louis but also to tap the resources of Iowa by bridging the Mississippi. In the fall of 1853 work started on the Mississippi and Missouri Railroad, which was to run westward across Iowa from Davenport. This brought up the question of bridging the Mississippi at Rock Island to connect the two railroads. Under state authorization and without the sanction of Congress, the Rock Island Bridge was constructed between the years 1853 and 1856. 21 A s could be expected, the steamboat interests were very hostile to the building of the Rock Island Bridge. They contended that such a bridge could not be built legally without authorization by the federal government and that it constituted an unlawful obstruction to navigation. These complaints were justified, for the bridge was badly placed at a narrow point where navigation was dangerous because of crosscurrents and submerged rocks. It was also claimed that the bridge piers were too close together to assure the safe passage of boats, especially when a strong wind was blowing.22 Aside from these legal and technical objections, there was a much broader economic principle involved. The steamboat owners wanted to stop the railroads at the river in order to compel a commercial alliance with the waterways. The construction of bridges would upset this plan, because there would be no break in the traffic to provide cargoes for steamboats. The legal right to build the bridge was challenged, but the court would not grant an injunction to prevent its construction. Soon after the bridge was opened, a steamboat, the Effie 21 G. K . W a r r e n , Report on Bridging the Mississippi River Between Saint Pout, Minn, and St. Louis, Mo. (1878), 14a 22 H a r t s o o g h , op. cit., 201.

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Afton, w a s wrecked on one o f the piers in passing the d r a w , caught o n fire, and was destroyed. T h e owners of the boat brought a damage suit against the bridge company, which w a s not granted. T h e bridge remained despite all the legal efforts to have it declared a nuisance and removed. T h i s serious obstacle to navigation lasted until 1872 when the federal government finally removed the old bridge and replaced it w i t h a new one which w a s much less dangerous to the passage of steamboats. 28 T h e prolonged bridge litigation intensified the conflict between the commercial interests of C h i c a g o and those o f St. Louis. T h e sentiment of St. L o u i s w a s opposed to the bridge, since this development caused the current of trade to travel the w r o n g w a y f o r the river city. T h e legal fight against the R o c k Island B r i d g e w a s directed by the St. L o u i s Chamber of Commerce, which stated its position as follows:* 4 The railroads reaching the East bank of the Mississippi at and above Quincy are clamoring for bridges, but the firm stand taken by St. Louis has deterred them from doing anything more than making their nominal commencement which was rendered necessary to save their State charters. If we are beaten in this suit, or abandon it, two years will not pass over our heads before we shall see the Mississippi bridged in at least three additional places, and perhaps more. A half a dozen bridges in the rapid current and changing channel of this river, would render navigation extremely hazardous, if not impracticable; and the commercial position of St. Louis, which is now the pride and boast of her citizens, would be counted among the things that were. The city always has been and must necessarily remain dependent upon her rivers for the bulk of her trade, and it well becomes her to watch with a jealous eye all attempts to encroach thereon. W e do not propose to decry the importance of railroads, nor shut our eyes to the immense benefit they have been to the country; but we cannot consent that our noble rivers should be ob23 Warren, op. cit., 140-1. 24 S t Louis Chamber of Commerce, Fifth Animal Report (i860), 5.

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structed just when and where it may suit the interests of those corporations, and we are quite sure that our position will be sustained by the highest judicial authority in the land. Chicago replied that it was puerile for St. Louis to champion a lost cause. To Chicago the Mississippi River formed a barrier to the city's expanding western commerce which would have to be overcome by building a series of railroad bridges. This was the quickest and surest way to break the economic hold of St. Louis on the country between the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. A typical expression of Chicago's attitude may be cited : 25 As well may St. Louis attempt to dam up the Mississippi as to prevent the bridging of that river at half a score of points where the necessities of commerce will soon demand it . . . . We tell St. Louis once for all that not Chicago but the genius of the age demands the bridging of the Mississippi and the Missouri and the removal of every obstacle to the great central railway of the continent. It must soon bind the States of the Atlantic and the Pacific in one brotherhood forever. Instead therefore of opposing this decree of " Manifest destiny " we again commend to the serious attention of St. Louis the project of building a bridge at her own doors, and now and hereafter Chicago offers her best wishes to her anxious sister, and asks only a fair field and an honorable struggle for the prize of commercial supremacy—the position of the great central city of the continent. Another railroad which had serious trade implications for St. Louis was the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy. Under the energetic promotion of James F. Joy and the sound financing of John M. Forbes this railway soon connected with Chicago the commercially strategic river points of Burlington and. Quincy. Forbes was president of the Michigan Central and wanted a western connection for this eastern road at Chicago. The Aurora Branch road which had been constructed between Chicago and Aurora and which was yielding a 10 per cent 25 Weekly Chicago Press and Tribune, Mar. 10, 1859.

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dividend attracted his attention. H e had only to obtain control of this road and to extend it; the route could run through some of the best land in Illinois on a direct line to Galesburg, with branches to Burlington and Quincy. There was no hurtful competition in sight. 2 * O n March 17, 1855, through service between Chicago and East Burlington, a distance o f 2 1 0 miles, was established. T h e line from Chicago to Quincy by w a y of Galesburg was opened the following year. T h u s the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy came into being. 27 T h i s road proved of great benefit to Chicago. It ran through the heart of the fertile country which lay between the Illinois and Mississippi R i v e r s — a region which had been sparsely settled because of poor transportation facilities—and it brought new life to this area. Here, again, most of the new trade created by the railroad went to Chicago. 2 8 A s in the case of the C h i c a g o and Rock Island Railroad, the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy showed no disposition to halt at the Mississippi. In fact, there was considerable rivalry between these t w o companies, a rivalry which served as an incentive for new construction. The Burlington and Missouri Railroad Company was organized to construct a line across Iowa, connecting the two points named in its charter. B y the time of the Civil W a r this road had been opened as far as Ottumwa. 2 8 The most direct railroad route between the two rival cities was provided by the Chicago and A l t o n Railroad. T h e Chicago and Mississippi Railroad, the forerunner of the Chicago and Alton, w a s completed from Bloomington to A l t o n in 1853, 26 S. F . Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes (1899),

I, 160-1. 27 R. C. Overton, Burlington West a Colonisation History of the Burlington Railroad (1941), 40-2. 28 Fourth Annual Review of the Commerce, Railroads, and Manufactures of Chicago for the Year 1S55, 69.

29 Overton, op. cit., 114.

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g i v i n g C h i c a g o its first all-rail contact with the Mississippi. T h e route, however, was very indirect, as three roads had to be u s e d — t h e Chicago and Rock Island to L a Salle, the Illinois Central f r o m L a Salle to Bloomington, and the Alton the rest of the way.* 0 T h e completed line of the Chicago and Alton permitted Chicago to reach a rich agricultural region that had been tributary to St. Louis. T h i s prairie country had developed slowly because of inadequate transportation. W i t h rail facilities it advanced rapidly and sent by far the larger share of its produce to Chicago. 8 1 T w o railroads which helped Chicago capture the lion's share of the trade from the Northwest were the Chicago, St. Paul and F o n d du L a c and the Chicago and Milwaukee Railroads. Milwaukee was Chicago's trade rival to the north, and it was the hope of diverting the trade of Minnesota and parts of Wisconsin from Milwaukee to Chicago that prompted the construction of the Chicago, St. Paul and Fond du L a c Railroad. T h i s project was being pushed forward rapidly when it w a s overtaken by the panic o f 1857. T h e road was reorganized in 1859 and formed the nucleus of the newly created Chicago and Northwestern R a i l w a y Company, which was to become one of the greatest commercial feeders to the city of Chicago.* 2 In 1855 the Chicago and Milwaukee Railroad was opened. 88 T h i s road was well constructed and well equipped. It passed through the flourishing towns of Waukegan, Kenosha, and Racine, and at Milwaukee connected with the roads running west and northwest from that city, thus giving Chicago rail connections with the interior of the prosperous state of W i s consin. Special attention was given to the prospective increase 30 C. H. Tajlor, ed., History of the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago (1917), I, 178. 31 Gates, op. cit., 88. 32 Pierce, op. cit., II, 52-3. 33 Fourth Animal Review of the Commerce, Railroads, and Manufactures of Chicago for the Year 1855, 66.

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6 j

in passenger business for the Chicago and Milwaukee. It was noted that there were a large number of inviting town sites along this road which would grow rapidly into small cities. These places were expected to provide " quiet and most desirable retreats " for Chicago's " overtasked and substantial citizens." 14 Thus the beautiful North Shore district of Lake Michigan was in the making. During the 'fifties Chicago also occupied a significant position in reference to rail connections with the East. Three main lines led eastward from Chicago, making that city the leading railway center of the country, and strengthening its position as a shipping point for a greatly enlarged east-and-west commerce. On February 20, 1852, the first train of the Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad arrived in Chicago. This line connected Chicago with Toledo. 85 Three months later, on May 21, 1852, t h t Michigan Central started running trains to Chicago, thus opening the way from that city to Detroit. 38 Eastern connections were rapidly extended, gauges of track standardized, and bridges built over rivers, so that Chicago had direct rail communication with N e w Y o r k , Boston, and other eastern points. The Michigan Southern and Michigan Central Railroads fought each other from the beginning, and Chicago was able to profit from this competition. Then, too, shipping on the Great Lakes and the Erie Canal kept rail rates eastward within reasonable limits. A third main line of railway which connected Chicago with the East was the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago. This company was formed in 1856 by a merger of three independent roads; namely, the Ohio and Pennsylvania, the Ohio and Indiana, and the Fort Wayne and Chicago Railroads. On Christ34 Fifth Annual Review of the Prospects, Condition, Traffic, Etc., of the Railroads Centering in Chicago, with a General Summary of the Business of the City, for the Year 1856, 50. 35 The Railroads, 36 Ibid.

History,

and Commerce

of Chicago

(1854), 16.

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mas Day, 1 8 5 8 , the first through train was run from Chicago to Pittsburgh.* 7 A t Pittsburgh connections were made with the Pennsylvania Railroad, and these two railroads together provided the shortest line of travel between Chicago and New York. The Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago and its conTABLE VII R A I LIOADS TRIBUTARY TO CHICAGO I N

Railroad, both Main and Branch Chicago and Milwaukee Kenosha and Rockford Racine and Mississippi Chicago, S t Paul and Fond du Lac Milwaukee and Mississippi Galena and Chicago Union Fox River Valley Wisconsin Central Beloit Branch Beloit and Madison Mineral Point Dubuque and Pacific Galena (Fulton) Air Line Chicago, Iowa and Nebraska Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Burlington and Missouri Quincy and Chicago Hannibal and St. Joseph Chicago and Rock Island Mississippi and Missouri Peoria and Bureau Valley Peoria and Oquawka Chicago, Alton and St. Louis Illinois Central Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Cincinnati, Peru and Chicago Michigan Central New Albany and Salem Total Mileage

1857**

Miles 85 Ii 86 131 130 121 34 8 20 17 32 29 136 36 210 35 100 65 182 88 47 143 284 704 383 242 28 282 284 3,953

37 H. W. Scotter, The Growth and Development of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, a Review of the Charter and Annual Reports of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 1846 to 1926, inclusive (1927), 38. 30 Sixth Annual Review of the Commerce, Manufactures, and the Public and Private Improvements of Chicago for the Year 1857: with a Full Statement of Her System of Railroads, and a General Synopsis of the Business of the City, 45.

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nections also offered the most direct route from Chicago to Baltimore and Washington.* 8 The eleven main lines of railroads with their branch connections are summarized in Table VII. Even though there was some duplication of track, and though some of the branch lines listed were not directly tributary to Chicago, this railway network enabled Chicago to win its advance over St. Louis. The established trade routes which led to St. Louis and the South were shifted to Chicago and the East. What St. Louis lost, Chicago gained. The effect on Chicago was electrifying : within a single decade it ceased to be a frontier town and became a great mart of trade. Complete accuracy is not claimed for the figures presented in Table VIII. Statistics on this subject from all sources, however, show that the railroads brought a phenomenal increase to the commerce of Chicago. According to information furnished by the Chicago Board of Trade, given in Table IX, the value of imports and exports of Chicago for 1858 reached the impressive total of $174,896,011.70. Of this aggregate the value of the part moved by Chicago railroads was $120,673,355.06, or nearly 70 per cent of the total. From the beginning of rail transportation there was a general tendency for the railroads to handle the most valuable articles of commerce. TABLE

VIII

INFLUENCE OP RAIUOASS ON THE COMUXKCE OF CHICAGO, 1652-1856

Articles received FLOUR, BARRELS WHEAT, BUSHELS CORN, BUSHELS HOGS, NUMBER LUMBER, THOUSAND FEET . . COAL, TONS LEAD, TONS

1852 124^16 937,496 2,991,011 65,158 147,816 46,233 678

1834 234,575 3,038,935 7,49,753 138,515 228.337 56,774 2,124

38 PIERCE, op. cit., I I , 58.

40 E. CHAMBERLIN, Chicago and Its Suburbs (1873), 69.

40

1856 410,989 8767,760 11,888,398 220,702 441.962 93.000 3,3M

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T A B L E IX V A L U E OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF CHICAGO FOR

Imports By Lake Vessels B y Illinois and Michigan Canal By Railroads Total Value of Imports for 1858

185841

Colite $27,194,144^4 4J77,370-55 60,064,575.71 $91,636,090.50

Exports By Lake Vessels By Illinois and Michigan Canal B y Railroads

$21,261,074.73 1,390,067.12 60,608,779.35

Total Value of Exports for 1858 Aggregate Value of Imports and Exports of Chicago in 1858

$83,259,921.20 $174,896,011.70

T h e railroads did a t h r i v i n g passenger business and were active agencies in settling the W e s t . In 1856, four of the main western railroads f r o m Chicago, the Chicago, St. Paul and F o n d du L a c , the G a l e n a and C h i c a g o U n i o n , the Chicago and R o c k Island, and the C h i c a g o , Burlington and Quincy, took 689,666 passengers w e s t w a r d and returned east with

only

532,013. It w a s estimated that for the same year the M i c h i g a n Southern and M i c h i g a n Central brought 147,794 more passengers west than they took back east. T h e total number of passengers moved in 1 8 5 6 by the railroads centering in C h i c a g o was estimated as 3,500,000. 42 T h e railroads entering C h i c a g o did a very profitable business. B y 1857 some 120 trains arrived and departed daily. T h e gross earnings of all the railroads centering in C h i c a g o increased from about $40,000 in 41 Chicago Board of Trade, First Annual Statement of the Trade and Commerce of Chicago for the Year Ending December 31, 1858, 6. 42 Fifth Annual Review of the Prospects, Conditions, Traffic, Etc., oj the Railroads Centering in Chicago, with a General Summary of the Business 0/ the City, for the Year 1856, 62-3.

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^I

1851 to $18,590,520.26 in 1857.44 The railroads sustained the commerce of Chicago, and in return the lake city grew fast enough to provide them with a profitable carrying business. Chicago and its railroads became mutually dependent on each other. By i860 Chicago had become the railroad center of America. It was the center of eleven trunk railroads with twenty branch and extension lines totaling 4,915 miles.44 The commercial interests of Chicago expanded not only as the surrounding hinterland developed, but also as the extending lines of rail communication were able to capture the trade which otherwise would have gone elsewhere. The railroads did more to promote Chicago's growth and prosperity than any other agency. 41 43 Sixth Annual Review of the Commerce, Manufacture!, and the Public and Private Improvements of Chicago for the Year 1857: with a Full Statement of Her System of Railroads and a General Synopsis of the Business of the City, 45-6. 44 Twelfth Annual Review of the Trade and Commerce and Condition of the Railways Centering in the City of Chicago for the Year i860, 54. 45 Daily Democratic Press, Mar. 11, 1854.

CHAPTER V ST. LOUIS A N D T H E RAILROADS ST. LOUIS experienced many difficulties in adjusting its commercial interests to conform with the sweeping economic changes wrought by the railroads. The city did not fully realize the significance of railways until a large portion of its best trade area had been lost irretrievably to Chicago. In marked contrast to the swift expansion of the Chicago railroads, the lines from St. Louis advanced slowly and feebly. The first mistake that St. Louis made in reference to railroads was the false assumption that the city would naturally become the future railway center of the United States. From the beginning of railway construction, the people of St. Louis expressed an interest in the eastern lines that were building westward. St. Louis was sure that its commanding position in the heart of the Mississippi Valley would make that city the logical terminus for the principal railroads from Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore as well as for those from Charleston and Mobile. 1 The chief argument used to support this naive conclusion was that the eastern roads would have to depend on the trade and travel of the Mississippi Valley for a large share of their business. The eastern railroads and cities then would increase their business in proportion to the expansion of this commerce. The advancement of St. Louis as the natural center for the collection of farm products and the distribution of manufactured goods in the central valley would bring increased opportunities for Atlantic cities with railroad connections to this leading river port. 2 Thus, St. Louis, which had achieved commercial importance through river navigation, would achieve an equal importance as the center of railroad intercommunication in the United States. 1 Annual Review of the Trade and Commerce of St. Low 1848,

3.

2 Western Journal and Civilian, V I I (1852), 228. 72

for the Year

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73

There was a great deal more enthusiasm in St. Louis for western railroads than there was for eastern. The city had justifiable ambitions to become the eastern terminus of a railroad running to the Pacific Coast. During the 'forties the West was rife with agitation for the construction of a transcontinental railroad. Acquisition of the Oregon Territory in 1846 and the Mexican Cession two years later spurred the demand that the federal government build such a road without delay. The difficulty lay in the selection of a route that would be acceptable to conflicting economic interests. Three principal proposed routes and a compromise plan were offered to the nation for consideration. The first was the northern route sponsored by Asa Whitney in 1845 to connect Lake Michigan with Puget Sound. The acquisition of New Mexico and California in 1848 permitted the South to champion a southern route from Memphis to San Diego or Monterey. Senator Thomas Hart Benton was an unyielding advocate of a central road that would connect St. Louis with San Francisco. Seeing the stumbling blocks to each of these three main plans, Stephen A. Douglas offered a compromise solution which called for a government built road from the coast to Council Bluffs with privately constructed branches from this eastern terminal to Chicago, St. Louis, and Memphis* He hoped that this plan would harmonize the widely divergent sectional interests sufficiently to permit the final selection of a transcontinental route. It should be noted, however, that this compromise proposal placed the railroad far enough north to enable that section in general and Chicago in particular to gain the principal benefits. Despite the controversy over the proposed routes, the building of a transcontinental railroad became a paramount issue throughout the West. Pamphlets were written and speeches made on the subject; periodicals and newspapers overwhelmed 3 R. S. Cotterill, " The National Railroad Convention in S t Louis, 1849," Missouri Historical Review, X I I (1918), 203-4.

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their readers with arguments. St. Louis again counted on its commanding position to win the coveted prize.4 In an effort to break the deadlock, a National Railroad Convention was called; the honor of being its host went to St. Louis. The convention met in October, 1849, and Douglas was made chairman of the meeting. From the beginning the sessions were animated by the bitter contest between the Chicago and St. Louis delegations, headed by Douglas and Benton respectively, for control of the proceedings. Despite the cloak given by the term national, each group was bent upon securing special advantages from the construction of a railroad to the Pacific.6 The proceedings sounded more like a quarrel than a deliberation. Benton made his expected uncompromising speech in favor of a transcontinental railroad between St. Louis and San Francisco. Douglas made the candid observation that it was not very good taste for Missouri to ask for outside aid in railroad construction when the state had never built a mile of railway by its own efforts. The clash between the two chief leaders of the convention caused so much animosity that Douglas resigned as chairman. His suggestion, however, that Henry S. Guyer of Missouri, a well-known political enemy of Benton, be named his successor as chairman was followed. The resolutions finally passed marked a triumph for Douglas and Chicago over Benton and St. Louis; the federal government was requested to build, at an early date, a central and national railroad from the Mississippi Valley to the Pacific Coast with branch lines to Chicago, Memphis, and St. Louis.* Sectional feeling over the burning issue of slavery, however, reinforced by rancorous divisions in Congress, made the passage of necessary legislation for the building of a transcontinental railroad only a remote possibility. The North was un4 Annual Review of the Trade and Commerce of St. Louis for the Year 1848, 3.

SCotterill, op. cit., 210. a ruj

— .

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75

willing to consent to anything that would bring a closer connection between the old South and the new Southwest; Southern leaders were equally unwilling to have the West brought into more direct contact with the North. The South had ample reason to fear that the construction of a Pacific road on free soil would bring rapid settlement by people hostile to slavery. As long as this situation remained, it was evident that all schemes for a transcontinental railroad would be balked. Besides a naive overconfidence in its own destiny as the great railroad center of the country, St. Louis made the grave error of considering the railways secondary in importance to the waterways. The railways were " artificial lines of communication," while the waterways were " natural avenues of commerce." The term " legitimate trade " was bestowed on the water-borne traffic. When other cities first began agitation for railroads, the attitude of St. Louis toward this revolutionary form of transportation was thus expressed :T It may be properly assumed, that trade, shipping, or business, cannot be diverted to any considerable extent, by mere artificial means from channels which nature, the country, population and their necessities have given it. If St. Louis then, commands at this early day, (early at least in her commercial history,) a large commerce, and this, too, without artificial aid or national encouragement, it is but a rational conclusion, that it cannot be diverted, nor can any amount of capital supply the place of the rivers which constitute her great highways. St. Louis remained loyal to the steamboat even after it became apparent that railroads would be the chief factor in controlling the commerce of the up-river country. 8 In fairness to St. Louis it should be stated that the city wanted railroad connections and advocated the building of 7 Missouri Republican quoted in Hunt's Merchant/ Magazine, IV (1846), 170. 8 Missouri Republican, June 25, 1854.

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lines to strengthen its commercial position. St. Louis realized that the lack of adequate transportation facilities placed the principal parts of the vast and productive areas of the northern and western sections of the great Mississippi Valley beyond the limits of profitable commerce. These fertile agricultural regions, capable of supporting millions of people and producing immense surpluses of cereals and livestock which would provide the basis of a growing trade, remained practically untouched, because the cost of transportation to market often exceeded the price received for the products. To open these vast stretches of rich prairie soil successfully required an easy, constant, and efficient land carriage that could be provided only by building railroads to the north and west of St. Louis.* The economic plight of the pioneer farmer several miles away from a navigable stream was desperate. He had plenty to sell at low prices, but no buyers. If he undertook to market his produce, the returns barely paid the cost of marketing, leaving nothing to pay for the cost of production. Even the fairly high freight rates on railroads were economical compared with the expense of hauling produce in wagons over unimproved dirt roads. For example, it was estimated that the cost of shipping wheat from isolated sections could be reduced from thirty-five cents to ten cents a bushel if railroad facilities were available. 10 It was no wonder, then, that the landlocked communities quickly gave their commercial allegiance to the first city that provided them with railroad transportation. St. Louis, however, looked upon the early railways as merely commercial feeders to the rivers, just as the tributary streams were commercial feeders. The railways were expected to give to the regions away from the rivers advantages that they had not had before: by a combination of rail and water facilities the people of these regions would then bring their surpluses to market at St. Louis and in return take back needed merchan9 Western Journal and Civilian, VIII (1852), 41. 10 Ibid.

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dise.11 In this way the railroads would add to instead of subtract from the commerce of St. Louis. Then, too, the railways would regularize commerce. Low water in summer and frozen rivers in winter caused irregular shipments to market; during these periods goods were stored and dealers waited for a rise in the river or for the ice to break. Business was either heavy or dull depending on the condition of the rivers. St. Louis saw the advantage of an all-weather system of transportation, though only as subsidiary to the river system. The opening of the Alton and Springfield Railroad in the summer of 1852, when the water was extremely low because of a prolonged drought, evoked favorable comments; an additional packet had to be employed between St. Louis and Alton to take care of the growth in business occasioned by the railroad. It was expected that the rails, like the rivers, would bring their trade to St. Louis. 13 Little thought was given to the possibility that through lines of railroad might afford the trade area a choice of markets, that commerce might go east and west as well as north and south, and that the greater portion of the business might be diverted to other cities. In the early 'fifties Missouri decided to embark on a general policy of generous state aid for railroads in order to develop its natural resources and to promote the commercial welfare of its chief city, St. Louis. The plan for a railroad system designed by the state through the selection of chartered lines to be aided, revealed the general pattern which Missouri thought the future development of the Mississippi Valley would follow. It was assumed that the natural flow of commerce would be from north to south, for the Mississippi River would continue to be the great central artery of commerce. The state intended to co-operate with nature instead of trying to " triumph over her."" The results obtained by this policy can be shown by a 11 Missouri Republican, May 31, 185a 12 Annual Review of the Trade and Commerce of St. Louis for the Year

i8s*. 313 Million, op. cit., 73.

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review of the progress o f the seven roads which were aided by the state of Missouri. T h e state of Missouri and the city of St. Louis showed great enthusiasm for the Pacific Railroad, which was incorporated by Missouri on March 12, 1849, and w a s to extend westward across the state from St. Louis to K a n s a s City. 1 4 F r o m the beginning, as its name indicated, this road had transcontinental ambitions. It was to be more than merely a Missouri railroad. T h e Missouri Legislature passed a supplementary act giving the Pacific Railroad Company the right to construct and operate its road to any point or points west of the boundary of Missouri. 1 5 Of course, Missouri had no jurisdiction to charter a railroad beyond the boundaries of its own state, but this action was a clear indication that transcontinental connections would be welcome. Ground was broken for the Pacific Railroad by M a y o r Luther M . Kennett of St. Louis on July 4, 1 8 5 1 . A huge celebration was staged, featuring parades, fireworks, and speeches. Orators of the day painted a rosy w o r d picture of the past, present, and future glories of the state of Missouri and its principal city, St. Louis. T h i s railroad would develop the hitherto untouched resources of Missouri and would greatly stimulate the commerce of St. Louis. 1 8 F o r once, St. L o u i s seemed to be thoroughly railroad conscious. Apparently everything augured well for the construction of this favored line. O n February 22, 1851, Missouri voted state aid to the amount of $2,000,000." T h e following year a federal land grant was received. T h e city and county of St. L o u i s contributed $1,000,000 to help underwrite the success of this promising railroad. 1 8 There was an abundance of favorable 14 Compilation of the Laws in Reference to Such Railroads as Have Received Aid from the Slate (1859), 22. 15 Ibid., 27. 16 Missouri Republican, J u l y 5, 1851. 17 Compilation of the Laws in Reference to Such Railroads as Have Received Aid from the State ( 1 8 5 9 ) , 61.

18 Million, op. cit., 80-3.

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publicity despite the slow progress made toward actual construction. The first locomotive west of the Mississippi River was put upon the tracks of the Pacific Railroad on December i , 1852. This engine was built in Taunton, Massachusetts, and was brought all the way to St. Louis by water transportation via New Orleans. 19 Eight days later the first passenger train was run over the road as far as it was completed, a distance of five miles west of St. Louis. On July 23, 1853, the Pacific Railroad Company completed and opened for business the first division of its road, which extended thirty-seven miles from St. Louis to Pacific.20 The construction of this small mileage of track had completely exhausted the financial resouces of the company. No new construction was made in the following year. It was obvious that if work was to be continued, more state, county, and municipal aid would have to be forthcoming.81 The retarded progress of building the Pacific Railroad is shown in Table X. TABLE X PROGRESS OF PACIFIC RAILROAD 2 3

Year

Old Terminus

New Terminus

1852 1853 1855 1856 1858 1859 1860 1861 1863 1864 1865

Cheltenham Pacific Hermann Jefferson City Tipton Syracuse Smithton Sedalia Dresden Warrensburg

Cheltenham Pacific Hermans Jefferson City Tipton Syracuse Smithton Sedalia Dresden Warrensburg Kansas City

Mileage Whole Line New for Year 5 37 81 135 163 168 181 188 195 218 263

5 32 44 44 38 5 13 7 7 23 65

19 C. M. Woodward, " The City of S t Louis," New England Magasin* (1892), 592. 20 Million, op. cit., 80-3. 21 R. E. Riegel, " The Missouri Pacific Railroad to 187ft" Missouri Historical Review, X V I I I (1923), 15. 22 Ibid., H.

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Fourteen years were required to build this road, which ran between St. Louis and Kansas City, a distance of 283 miles. By the close of i860 it was completed only as far as Smithton, a distance of 181 miles from St. Louis. This delay deprived St. Louis, to a large extent, of the trade benefits expected from the Pacific Railroad. The greatest hindrance to early completion of the Pacific Railroad was the lack of adequate capital. Despite popular enthusiasm for the road, Missourians seemed indisposed to build it through their own state out of their own resources. Missouri was not a wealthy state. Private subscriptions for stocks and bonds in adequate amounts to insure complete construction lagged from the beginning and many subscriptions made by farmers and townspeople in response to persuasive appeals were never redeemed or remained unpaid for many years. 24 Eastern capitalists showed no disposition to build up the railroads centering at St. Louis; they were already building railroads to foster the commerce of Chicago, and they were not anxious that other lines should compete with these. Although various forms of government aid—state aid, county and municipal subscriptions, a federal land grant—contributed materially to the finances of the company, they were not as valuable as it might seem. State subscriptions were made in the form of bonds which still had to be sold, principally in the East, to obtain the funds necessary to build the road. The financial standing of Missouri was weak, which meant that these state bonds had to be sold at a discount. The same was true, to a greater or less degree, of the bonds guaranteed by county and municipal units of local government. The Pacific Railroad was so impoverished that its stocks and bonds went begging even when offered at far below their par value; in fact, one of the chief advantages of obtaining state and local bonds was that their selling price was higher than that of the original railroad securities. The proceeds realized from the federal land 23R. E. Riegel, The Story of the Western Railroads (iga6), 21.

ST. LOUIS AND T H E RAILROADS

8l

grant depended mainly upon the actual construction of the road. The company had to rely on Eastern settlers and investors to purchase large tracts of land along its right-of-way, and a considerable part of the land remained unsold at the very time the company was so sorely pressed for funds. This naturally led to overcapitalization, which in turn dimmed the outlook for profits. 24 The Pacific Railroad suffered not only from insufficient funds and overcapitalization, but also from poor construction. On account of the difficulty in raising funds, the money that was obtained had to cover as much ground as possible. This meant that grading, bridges, and track were of the cheapest construction, and that the line was deficient in depot buildings, water stations, and rolling stock. Poor equipment and faulty construction led to inefficient service, more wrecks, and higher costs of maintenance and operation. The condition of the Pacific Railroad, which was considered the principal railway in Missouri, was weak indeed, and its growth was naturally retarded. 26 St. Louis was very much interested in securing railroad connections with the Upper Mississippi Valley to augment and stabilize its commerce from that region. With this idea in mind the State Legislature on March 3, 1 8 5 1 , chartered the North Missouri Railroad to run northward from St. Louis to the Iowa boundary. 28 It was expected that this road would in time be extended north through Iowa into Minnesota, and that, when completed, it would bring to St. Louis the growing trade of this fertile prairie country. 27 After the North Missouri Railroad was chartered, constrution proceeded very slowly. Neither the state of Missouri nor 2ilbid.,

21-2.

25 R. E. Riegel, " The Missouri Pacific Railroad to 1879," Missouri Historical Review, XVIII (1923), 3-26. 26 Compilation of the Laws in Reference to Such Railroads as Have Received Aid from the State (1859), 31-

27 Million, op. cit., 71.

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the city of St. Louis seemed to realize the enormous importance of the time factor. The company was given a period of nine years from the date of its incorporation to start the work of construction, and twenty additional years to complete the railroad to the Iowa line.28 This liberal time allowance—nearly three decades to build less than 250 miles of railroad—showed a lack of interest even in the rich trade possibilities of the undeveloped sections of Iowa, to say nothing of those of the vast regions of up-river country farther removed from St. Louis. This lethargy in regard to the construction of railroads was a bad mistake, for the upper valley soon became the chief prize sought after in the rivalry for trade supremacy between St. Louis and Chicago. The exact route that the North Missouri was to follow remained undecided for three years after the charter was obtained. The course of the line was determined and the work of construction started in 1854. The road was divided into three divisions: The first extended from St. Louis to St. Charles, a distance of 19 miles; the second from St. Charles in a northwesterly direction for 148 miles to a junction with the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad at Macon; and the third from this junction northward for 61 miles to the Iowa line, making the entire projected line some 228 miles in length. 29 The first division of the road—that between St. Louis and St. Charles—was opened for business in 1855. T h i s exhausted, for the time being, the financial resources of the company. T h e lack of adequate capital slowed down work on the second division, and the junction with the Hannibal and St. Joseph was not effected until 1859. A t that point the North Missouri halted construction until after the Civil War. 4 0 28 Compilation of the Laws in Reference to Such Railroads as Have Received Aid from the State (1859), 31. 29 Million, of. cit., 86. 30 Ibid.

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83

There were some indications that St. Louis realized the importance of making strenuous efforts to construct railroads northward in order to prevent the diversion of trade from the Upper Mississippi country to Chicago. It was clear that Chicago would soon have railway connections with several points on the Upper Mississippi, and that projects would be under way before long to extend these lines westward across Iowa and Minnesota. T o forestall this danger to its trade, St. Louis conceived the bold project of building a railway on the west side of the Mississippi from St. Louis to St. Paul in the hope of preventing Chicago from intercepting the profitable trade of that fertile and rapidly growing country. Some St. Louisans saw the issue clearly. If railroads were not built to connect St. Louis with the upper valley, commerce coming down the river would be intercepted all the way from Galena to Quincy and transported eastward to Chicago by the railroads. The trade area of St. Louis to the north would shrink to a line running east and west drawn south of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad. In time St. Louis would lose the trade not only of Iowa but also of Nebraska, and have not so much as a trace of business farther north and west. 31 The chartering of the Illinois Central Railroad caused St. Louis to take a more realistic attitude toward railroads. The federal land grant assisting the construction of this railroad was denounced as one-sided legislation which would build up Illinois and Chicago to the detriment of Missouri and St. Louis. It was the duty of St. Louis to meet the challenge by building railroads that would give the river city corresponding advantages. 82 With this object in view, another railroad convention was called. The Mississippi Valley Railroad Convention was held in St. Louis in November, 1 8 5 2 . Its purpose was to find means to construct a railroad on the west side of the Mississippi 31 St. Louis Intelligencer, Nov. 15, 1853.

32 Western Journal and Civilian, VIII (1851), 174-3.

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River from a point opposite the city of N e w Orleans to St. Louis and thence northward into the central part of Minnesota Territory with a branch line to the Falls of St. A n t h o n y . " A memorial was sent to Congress requesting aid in the form of a land grant that would be sufficient to enable the inhabitants west of the Mississippi to build railroads which would give them equal railway facilities with the citizens of the older states. T h e Illinois Central and the Mobile and Ohio Railroads were mentioned specifically, and it was pointed out that it would be a great act of injustice for Congress to encourage railroads on one side of the river and neglect them on the other.** Chicago recognized the significance of the proposed Mississippi Valley Railroad, and admitted that its completion would make St. Louis a serious contender for the trade of the Upper Mississippi country. 85 Events soon proved, however, that Chicago had nothing to fear from St. Louis on this score. Although the latter city held conventions, passed resolutions, perfected plans on paper, no real construction took place. This policy of talking and not acting caused the upper river towns to lose confidence in the business future of St. Louis. T h e following words from Galena voiced the changing commercial sentiment of the upper valley: 8 9 Until a year or two past, the business of Western Illinois and Wisconsin, and all of Iowa and Minnesota was transacted for the most part at St. Louis. Thither went the lead, pork, wheat, corn, wool, and in fact all the products of the mine and farm that this vast country had to spare. To that trade St. Louis is indebted for her growth and prosperity. She has been frequently warned, however, that her policy in reference to this country would eventually send it elsewhere; but the warnings 33Ibid., I X (1852), 17534 Ibid., I X (1853), 182. 35 Daily Democratic Press, Oct. 25, 1852. 36 Galena Jefferscmian quoted in Daily Democratic Press, Nov. 17, 1854.

ST. LOUIS AND T H E RAILROADS

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were unheeded; she remained firm in doing nothing and today her rival, Chicago, from whom she has most to fear, is in possession of what St. Louis ought long ago to have secured forever. Much of the result is due to the natural advantages of position claimed by Chicago, and the tendency of trade and travel from the West, Eastward; but more to the unaccountable supineness of the St. Louis merchants, who with this change all the while staring them full in the face, have not lifted a finger to ward off the blow. From the Falls of St. Anthony to Burlington, the whole country will be as much dependent hereafter upon Chicago, as the Missouri River country upon St. Louis. Failing to match the inducements offered by Chicago, St. Louis lost whatever chance it had of becoming the greatest city in the Mississippi V a l l e y . T h e economic development and prosperity of the up-river country depended upon the establishment o f improved facilities f o r transportation. T h e people living and doing business in this extensive area could not be expected to sacrifice a certain g o o d for a mere promise.* 7 St. L o u i s w a s also interested in building railroads t o w a r d the south. One of the first objectives w a s to make the mineral resources of Iron Mountain more accessible to the city. T o accomplish this purpose, the St. L o u i s and Iron Mountain Railroad was incorporated on M a r c h 3, 1 8 5 1 . U n d e r the terms of its charter this company was to construct a railroad f r o m St. L o u i s or some point on the main line of the Pacific R a i l road to Iron Mountain or Pilot K n o b . It also had the privilege of extending its railway within ten y e a r s — e i t h e r to the Mississippi at Cape Girardeau and to any other point below that city within the limits of Missouri, or f r o m I r o n Mountain to the southwestern boundary of the state.* 8 T h e route that the St. L o u i s and Iron Mountain Railroad was to follow f r o m St. L o u i s to Pilot K n o b , a distance o f 37 Daily Democratic Press, Feb. 14, 1853. 38 Compilation of the Laws in Reference to Such Railroads as Have Received Aid from the State (1859), 4:.

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eighty-six miles, w a s finally determined on September 8, 1 8 5 3 , and the w o r k of construction began on the north end of the line in the fall of that year. 3 * W o r k progressed slowly, and the road was soon confronted with the customary financial troubles and construction difficulties that hampered the building of other Missouri railways. A f t e r many delays the road w a s completed to Pilot K n o b in 1 8 5 8 , but no further construction took place until after the Civil W a r . 4 0 T h e Missouri railroad that exhibited the worst mismanagement and financial waste w a s the Southwest B r a n c h of the Pacific Railroad. A c c o r d i n g to the plan of 1 8 5 3 , this r a i l w a y w a s to extend f r o m Pacific Junction on the m a i n line of the Pacific R a i l r o a d in a southwesterly direction through the Gasconade Valley to Springfield, thence to the western bounda r y of Missouri in N e w t o n County, which made a total distance of 3 2 0 miles f r o m S t . L o u i s . 4 1 It w a s obvious that the road would require a large amount of financial assistance, f o r the proposed route extended through an undeveloped section of country. In fact, one of the chief arguments advanced f o r the building of the Southwest B r a n c h was that it would t r a n s f o r m isolated areas into productive communities which would increase the commerce of St. Louis. 4 2 T h e finances of the Southwestern Branch w e r e in an unsound condition f r o m the very beginning. E n e r g e t i c e f f o r t s to raise money through subscriptions in St. L o u i s and along the line were disappointing. A n attempt to negotiate a loan of $4,000,000 based upon the first mortgage bonds of this branch and a second mortgage on the main line of the Pacific w a s unsuccessful. T h e risk w a s too great, f o r the road had yet to be built through an unsettled country, and failure to construct 39 Million, op. cil., 88. 40 P. W. Gates, "The Railroads of Missouri, 1850-1870," Missouri Historical Review, XXVI (1931), 136-9. 41 Million, op. cil., 85. 42 Hogan, op. cil., 10.

ST.

LOUIS AND T H E

RAILROADS

87

the line would mean forfeiting the title of its land grant. Eastern capitalists could not be expected to invest in unsound ventures of this kind, since railway promotions east of the Mississippi offered greater security and greater earnings. 4 * A practice that w a s common in financing Missouri railroads w a s carried to extremes in the promotion of the Southwestern Branch. T o conserve the small cash resources that the company possessed, the simple expedient was devised of binding the contractors to accept stocks a n d bonds as part payment f o r their work. T h i s caused the construction companies to pad their cost accounts to take care of any possible depreciation in the value of the railroad securities. I n fact, the railroad promoters o f t e n organized their o w n construction companies, which enabled them to make v e r y satisfactory contracts with themselves on their own terms. T h e s e conditions naturally led to overcapitalization and unsound

financing,

for the promoters

expected to make more profit from overcharges of construction in building the road than f r o m the successful operation of the completed line. 44 T h e Southwest Branch had a poor construction record. O n December 22, i860, the road w a s finally completed to Rolla, seventy-six miles from Pacific Junction. 4 4 T h e state of Missouri had to furnish most o f the money for building this badly financed and poorly managed railroad, since private investors had little desire to acquire its securities. A t the close of i 8 6 0 the total expenditures o f all f u n d s by this railroad amounted to $3,900,450. T h e road had received $3,922,000 in the form of direct and guaranteed bonds of the state o f Missouri, which meant that, after deducting the discount on these bonds—which amounted to $653,273—$3,268,727 obtained from the state had been spent on the road, leaving only $631,723 that was raised 43 Million, op. cit., 103. 44 R. E. Riegel, The Story of the Western Railroads (1926), 21-2.

45R. E. Riegel, "Trans-Mississippi

Railroads During the Fifties,"

Mississippi Volley Historical Review, X (1923), 159.

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outside of state aid. 48 The Southwest Branch of the Pacific Railroad was of comparatively little value to the commerce of St. Louis. The Platte County Railroad Company was incorporated on February 24, 1853, for the purpose of constructing a railway from the western terminus of the Pacific Railroad at Kansas City to St. Joseph, with the option of extending the road to the northern boundary of Missouri. 47 This line was virtually regarded as an extension of the Pacific Railroad which would give St. Louis an additional connection with St. Joseph as well as with other Missouri River points. A further possibility was that in time the road might be extended into Iowa to draw trade from that potentially rich agricultural area. T h e work on the construction of the Platte County Railroad did not start until 1859, and in i860 only forty-four miles had been completed.48 This road was of no immediate importance to St. Louis because the Pacific Railroad was not completed to Kansas City until 1865. On February 20, 1855, the Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company was granted a charter to construct a railway from a point on the Mississippi River opposite the mouth of the Ohio at Cairo through Missouri to the northern boundary of Arkansas, where it would connect with the Cairo and Fulton of that state. 49 St. Louis hoped that the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad would be extended southward and effect a junction with the Cairo and Fulton in order to further the city's commercial interests in the southern part of Missouri and A r kansas. Like other Missouri railways, the Cairo and Fulton Railroad was slow in starting work and had a poor construc46 Million, op. cit., 123. 47 Compilation of the Laws in Reference ceived Aid from the State ( 1 8 5 9 ) , 52.

to Such Railroads

as Have

Re-

to Such Railroads

as Have

Re-

48 Million, op. cit., 138-9. 49 Compilation of the Laws in Reference ceived Aid from the State ( 1 8 5 9 ) , 56.

ST. LOUIS AND T H E RAILROADS

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tion record. On December 12, i860, only twenty-six and a half miles of this railway were in operation, running westward from Bird's Point on the Mississippi. 60 Here, again, St. Louis derived very little benefit from this road in the beginning because of the shortness of the completed line and the lack of a direct rail connection; the St. Louis and Iron Mountain did not build beyond Pilot Knob until after the Civil War. The one exception to the unsoundly financed, poorly constructed, and badly managed railroads in Missouri was the Hannibal and St. Joseph. This railroad company received its charter from the state of Missouri on February 16, 1847, t o construct a railroad from Hannibal on the Mississippi to St. Joseph on the Missouri.®1 The projected road was to pass through one of the most fertile sections of the state and was expected to develop the untouched resources of northern Missouri. Although the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad was situated well to the north of St. Louis, it was expected to contribute materially to the commerce of that city. The road was looked upon as a commercial feeder to the Mississippi River, and its traffic was expected to come to St. Louis by way of the river. Then, too, the North Missouri would cross this line at Macon, which would furnish direct rail connection with St. Louis. In February, 1851, Missouri granted $1,500,000 in the form of state aid to the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad. 82 In June of the following year further encouragement was received in the form of a federal land grant from Congress to the state of Missouri for the purpose of helping this road. 68 The actual work of construction started in the spring of 1853. The road soon demonstrated a vigor which was not possessed by any 50 Million, op. cit^ 138-9. 51 Compilation of the Laws in Reference to Such Railroads as Have Received Aid from the State (1859), 10. 52 Ibid., 61. 53 Million, op. cit., 73.

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other Missouri railroad. Eastern capitalists, guided by the sound and resolute judgment of John M . Forbes, had been persuaded to invest in the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad, and they soon gained financial control of the company. Forbes refused to let this road become a flimsily constructed line to unload on the state of Missouri and on private investors. H e insisted that the profits should come f r o m the earnings of the completed r a i l w a y — a rule which was in marked contrast to the practices of other railroad promoters in Missouri, w h o made their profits out of the costs o f construction." Another distinctive feature of this railroad was that the work of construction was not started on a scale too large for the capital invested. Forbes was so impressed by the favorable prospects of the projected line that he raised the money for its completion while other railroads were suffering from the depression occasioned by the panic of 1 8 5 7 ; it was his influence that made the Hannibal and St. Joseph the best financed of all the railroads in Missouri. 5 8 In fact, this railway was the only Missouri road which had ample resources for the completion of its line ;• it therefore became the most prosperous railroad in the state. T h e Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad was completed and opened for business in February, 1859. T h e road extended f o r a distance of 206.8 miles and was the longest completed line of railway in Missouri down to the Civil War. 8 * T h e road did not bring the expected benefits to the commerce of St. Louis, for it was virtually an extension of the Chicago, Burlington and Q u i n c y Railroad which had already proved to be of great advantage to the trade of Chicago. T h e t w o lines were controlled by the same financial interests, which were primarily concerned in diverting trade to the East by w a y of Chicago instead of letting it float down the rivers to St. L o u i s and N e w Orleans. T h e Hannibal and St. Joseph line extended farther west than 64 H . G. Pearson, An American Railroad Builder, John Murray Forbes

(1911), 95-6. 65 Ibid., 90.

56 Million, op. cit, i l l , 139.

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91

any other road then completed and afforded a direct and e x peditious route to trade and travel without the delay incident to the dangerous and difficult navigation of the Missouri R i v e r . 5 7 S t . Louis immediately felt the loss of its trade monopoly over the Missouri River country. It was said that the Hannibal and S t . Joseph Railroad Company had dismembered the state of Missouri. T h i s railroad erased the economic natural boundary o f the state, the Mississippi River, and substituted an artificial railway line which detached a wide and fertile tract of territory tributary to S t . Louis and added it to the trade interests of Chicago. T h e Chicago newspaper which best reflected the business interests of the city commented on the commercial lament o f St. Louis with customary vigor and delight. 5 8 All hands feel the better for the dismemberment. It is puerile for St. Louis to complain if the general rule is applied to the State of which she is the commercial center. She has dismembered, to a greater or less extent, Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Kansas. Let her consent therefore to the partial dismemberment of Missouri with as few wry faces as may be. This suggestion will have the more force when accompanied with the reflection that she cannot prevent it. TABLE

XI

RAILROADS BUILT IN MISSOURI TO I860 AND THEIR COST PER MILE 5»

Road Pacific Railroad Hannibal and S t Joseph Cairo and Fulton Platte County Road Southwest Branch North Missouri St. Louis and Iron Mountain

Miles 189 206 26

44 77

168 86

Cost per Mile $53,700 58,129 33,000 30,000 56,833 41,000 62,000

Total 67 Press and Tribune, Oct. 26, 1859. 58 Ibid., Sept. 7, 1859. 59 Million, op. cit., 1 2 1 ; cf. Statistics of the United States, ...in i860 Compiled from the Original Returns and Being the Final Exhibit of the Eighth Census... (1866), 331.

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A summary of the railroads built in Missouri down to i860, with the approximate cost per mile for construction, is given in Table X I . These figures show that 796 miles of railroad had been constructed in Missouri at an average cost of approximately $50,000 per mile. The record compares unfavorably with that of Illinois, which had built 2,867 m ' l e s of railroad during the same period at an average cost of $36,000 per mile.90 With the exception of the Hannibal and St. Joseph, Missouri's plans for railroad development during the 'fifties had materialized only into a few short stretches of poorly constructed and badly managed railways. The North Missouri and the St. Louis and Iron Mountain Railroad Companies failed to meet the interest payments on their bonds which were due January 1, 1859. During i860 the Pacific, the Southwest Branch, the Cairo and Fulton, and the Platte County Railroads all defaulted on their financial obligations. Of all the Missouri railways only one road, the Hannibal and St. Joseph, continued to meet regularly all its interest payments. 41 The chief factors which worked together to cause the default of so many Missouri railroads were the lack of traffic, the unproductive character of the early land grants, loose handling of finances, excessive costs of construction, inexperience in building railroads, and poor management. By i860 work had been suspended on nearly all the Missouri railroads, because all the available capital had been spent, and it seemed improbable that additional funds could be raised at an early date. During the 'fifties St. Louis was in a position to make use of three railways on the east side of the Mississippi River—the Ohio and Mississippi, the Terre Haute and Alton, and the Chicago and Alton. Of these three lines the Ohio and Mississippi made the greatest contribution to the trade of St. Louis. This line afforded a direct route between East St. Louis and 00Statistics of the United States,.. .in i860 Compiled from the Original Returns and Being the Final Exhibit of the Eighth Census... (1866), 331. 61 E. M. Violette, Some Chapters in the History of Missouri (1914), 89.

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Cincinnati, with connections to Marietta and Baltimore; it was the leading line of railroad between St. Louis and the East. T h e Ohio and Mississippi Railroad was chartered by Indiana in 1848 and by Ohio in 1849, but it was not until 1851 that permission was granted by the Illinois Legislature to build a railroad from Illinoistown, now East St. Louis, to connect with the Ohio and Mississippi of Indiana.* 2 Even after the work of building the Ohio and Mississippi got under way, the progress of construction was retarded, because the company ran into financial difficulties. Chicagoans, after noting that the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company was bankrupt in means and destitute of credit, concluded that the country would not suffer greatly by the delay, because the lake port was in a position to take care of all the business that would come to it from what the people of St. Louis considered their legitimate field of commerce.®* The construction of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, which was 341 miles in length, was completed on August 15, 1857. St. Louis hailed the driving of the last spike as the " grandest internal improvement work of the W e s t . " ** Predictions were made that the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad would become the main railway spoke in the commercial wheel of the Mississippi Valley. St. Louis and Cincinnati would both unquestionably rank as metropolitan centers over the newcomer, Chicago. This road in conjunction with the navigable waterways would make St. Louis the metropolis of the Upper Mississippi and Missouri Valleys, and Cincinnati the commercial emporium of the Ohio Valley. 8 4 62 Scharf, op. cit., II, 1179-80. 63 Daily Democratic Press, Jan. 7, 1855. (ft Missouri Republican, Aug. 15, 1857. 65 W . P. Smith, The Book of the Great Railway Celebrations of 1857 Embracing a Full Account of the Opening of the Ohio and Mississippi, and the Marietta and Cincinnati Railroads, and the Northwestern Virginia Branch of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad... (1858), 103.

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T h e O h i o and Mississippi Railroad w a s opened for business at an inauspicious time for its successful operation. T h e fond hopes for this road were upset by the panic of 1857. T h e line w a s operated as one road b y t w o companies. O n e company controlled the section of railroad in O h i o and Indiana, the other controlled the section in Illinois. In 1858 both the eastern and western divisions of the road were unable to meet their

finan-

cial liabilities. St. L o u i s investors tried unsuccessfully to effect a settlement w h i c h involved concessions f r o m all parties concerned. S o m e of the creditors, however, would not agree, and the road had to g o t h r o u g h a receivership pending its reorganization. 4 ® O n account o f its financial instability the O h i o and Mississippi Railroad failed, in its early years, to confer upon St. L o u i s the benefits expected. It w a s not until 1859 that notices appeared in St. L o u i s newspapers that the Baltimore and O h i o and the O h i o and Mississippi

were consigning freight

be-

tween St. L o u i s and all eastern cities. T h e notices pointed out t h a t ' t h i s all-rail transportation would involve less risk than river navigation, and that insurance rates w o u l d therefore be l o w e r ; also that the time of conveyance w o u l d be greatly reduced. 6 7 Both the C h i c a g o and A l t o n and the T e r r e H a u t e and A l t o n Railroads had their western termini at A l t o n , some twentvthree miles above St. L o u i s . Since there w a s no rail connection between St. L o u i s and A l t o n , these two roads tended to intercept produce for the upper valley and divert it e a s t w a r d ; thus the Missouri metropolis w a s unable to realize the full commercial benefits of these railroads. 6 8 Experience w a s a hard taskmaster for St. L o u i s , but by i860 it was evident that the Mississippi and Missouri R i v e r s could 66 L. U. Reavis, The Railway and Water Systems of the City of St. Louis

. . . (1879), 112. 67 Missouri Republican, Aug. 2, 1859.

68 Dixon, op. eit., 30.

ST. LOUIS AND T H E KAILKOADS

95

not control the commerce of their valleys. These natural avenues of trade and travel had already become inadequate to handle the increased demand for transportation, and they provided no secure basis for commercial expansion. The railroads which served St. Louis, however, were so weak and inefficient that that city still placed its chief reliance for continued commercial greatness upon the navigable waterways. By the time it realized that it had been a victim of illusion, very little could be done to remedy the situation. While St. Louis worshipped the rivers, Chicago used the iron horse to draw the trade from the valleys.

C H A P T E R VI T H E R I V A L CITIES A N D WESTERN TRADE BY 1850 a contest was starting between the North and the South to determine whether the fast-growing commerce of the great Middle West should go to New Orleans or to the Atlantic coast cities. The question reduced to its simplest terms was which cities should receive, ship, store, and sell the immense quantities of products from the vast stretch of country lying between the Appalachian and Rocky Mountains. The return business of supplying the needs of this great area with groceries, hardware, clothing, dry goods, furniture, and manufactured articles of all sorts was equally coveted. 1 In this sectional rivalry St. Louis was identified with the trade interests of the South while Chicago represented those of the East. The immediate economic rivalry between St. Louis and Chicago was a part of the larger sectional struggle between the North and the South, each seeking to win the favor of the West. The side that could offer the West the most advantages in the form of tangible results such as improved transportation, increased commercial opportunities, and adequate capital to develop its economic resources, would have the better chance to win the lucrative trade from this extensive region. St. Louis and New Orleans expected to rule the commerce of the Mississippi Valley, but other cities had definite ideas on the same subject. The rapidly growing and prosperous Atlantic ports of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston wanted to bring this valuable commerce to the Atlantic Coast. These cities also had the capital with which to build railroads westward to accommodate and secure the traffic on favorable competitive terms, both to the regions served and to themselves. The contest was by no means limited to the economic rivalry between two fast-growing cities in the Mississippi 1 De Bow's Review, III (1847), 98. 96

THE RIVAL CITIES AND WESTERN TRADE

97

Valley, for it embodied the controversial question of the direction that the trade routes o f the valley should take. I f the trade continued on a north-south a x i s , the commercial partnership of St. L o u i s and N e w Orleans would be cemented, and both cities would g r o w at the expense of C h i c a g o and eastern cities. I f , on the other hand, an economic pairing of cities like Chicago and N e w Y o r k could divert the commerce to an east-west direction, the commercial dominance of these cities would be secure. Events during the 1850's proved that the E a s t and the W e s t were to do an increasing business with each other at the expense of the business along the river route. O n e o f the chief reasons for this development w a s that St. L o u i s could not recognize the limitations imposed upon it by water transportation. These limitations were many. Besides being restricted in area, slow-moving, and plagued by ice in winter and low water in summer—drawbacks which would have been inherent in any system o f river transportation for the interior—navigation on the Mississippi had to contend with other obstacles such as snags, sand bars, and rapids. S n a g s were a constant menace to steamboating on western rivers. T h i s was particularly true of the Upper Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. T h e beds and banks of these rivers were composed largely of sand or alluvial deposits, which yielded readily to the action of the current and caused frequent changes in the channels. 2 L a r g e trees g r e w o n the banks, and when the direction of the river was changed by an obstruction in its bed or by a flood, the banks washed away and the trees fell into the river and were carried off by the current. Dirt and other substances adhered to the roots, sinking that part o f the tree and thus often anchoring it in the bed of the stream. T h e n with the passing of time the branches of the tree w e r e torn a w a y or broken off by the action of the water and ice, so that nothing w a s left but the trunk with a fairly sharp 2 Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States (1881-82), 231.

98

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point. Some of the trunks settled completely below the surface of the water, and the pilot often knew nothing of them until the boat struck. Others were not completely submerged; these could be seen, or, at least, they made a break on the surface of the water which served as a warning. These snags were very dangerous, especially in the night, in a fog, or in high stages of water. It often happened that, when a boat under full headway struck the point of a snag, a hole was made in the hull, planks were torn off, timbers were broken, and the boat sank, sometimes drowning a number of passengers or crew and always damaging or destroying the cargo. Snags were found almost everywhere, but they tended to be present in greater numbers in bends, or where the current was obstructed by islands or sand bars. Although most of the pilots were well informed on every part of the river, their knowledge did not always save them from disaster. The pilot was compelled to steer according to the current; he was helpless when his boat struck a snag. On the Missouri River boats were sometimes so completely hedged in by snags that the captains had to send out crews to clear a way through these river barriers. 8 During seasons of low water, sand bars were very troublesome. Bars were likely to be found where the river spread out to a great width so that the water was not sufficiently deep for boats; they would also form in the neighborhood of river islands and over sunken logs. Delays on account of sand bars were common, and service was sometimes completely interrupted. 4 3 Proceedings of the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce, in Relation to the Improvement of the Navigation of the Mississippi River, and Its Principal Tributaries and the St. Louis Harbor (1842), 7-8. A Memorial of the Cititens of St. Louis, Missouri, to the Congress of the United States, Praying an Appropriation for Removing the Obstruction to the Navigation of the Western Rivers, jor the Improvement of the St. Louis Harbor and for Other Purposes (1844), 5.

THE

RIVAL

CITIES

AND

WESTERN

TRADE

99

Navigation on the Upper Mississippi was beset by t w o natural obstructions in the form of rapids. T h e Lower or Des Moines Rapids were some 200 miles up the river from St. Louis and just above the mouth of the Des Moines River. About 150 miles farther upstream, near Rock Island, were the Upper or Rock Island Rapids. The length of the Lower Rapids was estimated at eleven miles, their fall at twenty-four feet; the length of the Upper Rapids was estimated at fourteen miles, their fall at twenty-five feet. A t both places the water tumbled over ledges of limestone rock and through many crooked channels that had been worn by the action of the current. In high water both series of rapids could be passed over by steamboats having a strong propelling power, but in low water passage was very difficult and could be made only by following the meanderings of the deep water in the narrow and tortuous channels. In these passages there were sharp projecting rocks. The danger of loss to steamboats through injury to their hulls was so great that the vessels had to discharge their cargoes into flatboats of light draught in which they were conveyed over the rapids. In ascending the river the flatboats were towed by horses and in descending they were floated down by the current. Since in low water, then, steamboats could not pass the rapids, and in winter the river was closed to shipping for an additional four months, the season of practicable steamboat navigation amounted to only about five months. 6 A comparison of freight charges made when the water was high enough for boats to pass the rapids without discharging their cargoes with those made when the water was too low, showed that the increased charges were about 150 per cent greater than the normal charges.* The lead trade from W i s consin and Illinois suffered from the imposition of the additional charges, for large quantities of lead were exported when 5 The Commerce Use of the Chicago 6 Ibid., 19.

and Navigation of the Valley Convention (1847), 18.

of the Mississippi

for

the

IOO

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CHICAGO

the water was low. T h e marketing of agricultural products and the bringing back of needed supplies encountered the same obstacles. Then, too, thousands of travelers and immigrants had t o pay increased fares besides putting up w i t h delay and inconvenience. It was estimated that the expense of running a a steamboat on the western rivers was six times as great as the cost of operation upon the lakes. M a n y insurance companies refused to insure the hulls of boats, and risks were taken only on the best, with rates v a r y i n g from 12 to 15 per cent. It was said that the insurers lost money even at these high rates. 7 T h e additional expense incurred in getting his products to market lessened the profits of the producer, and the same impediments to navigation forced him to pay more for the goods he bought. In the face of all these drawbacks, St. Louis expected continued and increased commercial allegiance from the up-river country above the rapids. O f course, St. L o u i s realized these handicaps to navigation, but it went o n the assumption that the federal government would be compelled in the interest of the general welfare to make the needed improvements. T h e city's case seemed to be well founded. T h e Mississippi Valley had gained so much in population and wealth through its o w n unaided efforts that national aid to further its g r o w t h seemed only a fitting reward. T h e r e would be no risk in the expenditure of federal funds for such a purpose, for the interior had already demonstrated its capacity; its trade was already outstripping the foreign commerce of the United States. 8 T h e improvement of the Mississippi River and its navigable tributaries was a national work. T h e vast extent of territory, the rapid g r o w t h of population, the great increase in trade, all imperatively required that the work o f improvement should start immediately and be pushed vigorously to completion. Snags should be removed, bars dredged, and if navigable channels could not be made through the rapids, canals should be built around them. 7 Ibid., 7, 10. % Missouri Republican, Jan. 10, 1854.

THE BIVAL

CITIES AND WESTEBN

TRADE

IOI

These improvements would not only bring gain to St. Louis but would benefit the entire country. These would cheapen water transportation, reduce the cost of food in large eastern cities, and give these cities an expanding market in the West. With such benefits to be derived, surely the whole nation would unite in urging Congress to make ample provision for the removal of obstructions to river navigation.9 The rivers were the established natural lines for trade and travel. Under a proper scheme of internal improvements they should receive attention before experiments were made with artificial means of communication. A glance at the map showed plainly that nature had drawn the outlines for a system of internal improvements conforming to the principles of an easy and natural commerce, and had left only the details to be arranged for and carried out by the intelligence, enterprise, and industry of the people acting through their national government.10 The great commercial thoroughfare of the interior, the Mississippi River system, should be and would be the basis of a general plan of internal improvements which would benefit the whole country, and would establish St. Louis beyond possible doubt as the commercial metropolis of the Mississippi Valley. 11 Events soon proved, however, that the wish was father to the thought. Besides the natural obstacles found in river navigation, the poor facilities for handling produce at the river ports of St. Louis and New Orleans constituted a serious disadvantage to the southern route. The levees were used as wharves, which were inconvenient for handling an extensive river commerce. The constantly shifting stages of the river from flood tide to low water, the extreme range being 41.4 feet at St. Louis, increased the loading and unloading difficul9 Memorial of the Citizens of St. Lotus, Missouri, to the Congress of the United States, Praying an Appropriation for Removing the Obstruction to the Navigation of the Western Rivers, for the Improvement of the St. Louis Harbor and for Other Purposes (1844), 4. 10 Western Journal, I I (1849), 2. 11 Ibid.

102

RIVALRY

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12

ties at these natural wharves. T h e hot, humid climate of New Orleans also caused much spoilage to western produce. Perishable commodities such as bacon, pork, beef, butter, and lard often depreciated in value more than 50 per cent during the summer months. 1 3 It was estimated that the loss in value per barrel ot flour varied between twenty-five and fifty cents, and in the case of corn, wheat, rye, oats, and hemp it was frequently greater. Then, too, the large number of transfers caused a proportionately greater expense for leakage, breakage, mending, and cooperage. 1 4 T h e handling of the grain trade, the chief commercial prize for which St. Louis and Chicago contended in the 1850's, typified the contrast between the two cities in the matter of facilities. Grain shipments could not be handled in bulk at St. Louis. T h e river boats shipped grain in sacks and barrels, which necessitated extra work and expense. T h e average cost of a sack was from two to four cents and of a barrel from fifteen to twenty cents. 15 A s yet, St. Louis had no grain elevators, and its warehouses were not on the immediate edge of the levee. Storage meant that grain had to be handled six times and hauled in drays twice to receive warehousing before being forwarded to New Orleans, where it received similar treatment before being exported to the Atlantic seaboard or Europe. The total expense of handling grain at St. Louis, including charges for dockage, tarpaulin hire, drayage, and storage, was estimated to be from six to eight cents a bushel. 1 6 Losses from exposure to the weather and rough handling also added considerable V2Report

of Chief of Engineers,

U. S. Army

(1878), II, 471-2, 960.

13 I. Lippincott, "A History of River Improvement," Journal Economy, X X I I (1914), 644. 14 De Bow's Review, 15 Chicago

Democratic

of

Political

III (1847), 104. Press,

Sept. 29, 1855.

16 G. W . Stephens, " Some Aspects of E a r l y Intersectional Rivalry for the Commerce of the Upper Mississippi Valley," Washington University Studies, Humanistic Series, X (1923), 287-8.

THE RIVAL CITIES AND WESTERN TRADE

I03

items to the aggregate total of costs, especially at N e w Orleans. 17 The facility and economy with which western products were handled at Chicago and N e w Y o r k were in marked contrast to the burdens resting upon commerce at the river cities. A t both Chicago and New Y o r k elevators and warehouses were built immediately adjacent to the water, so that the railroad cars hauling grain in bulk could be run alongside and emptied with economy and dispatch, and steamers could be loaded with equal facility on the other side. T o the commercial world it seemed rather presumptuous for St. Louis, without these accommodations, to contend with Chicago for the grain trade. A St. Louis newspaper in 1855, describing what it claimed to be a typical eye-picture of business at the levee, boasted that there were 58 steamboats, 240 drays, 2,000 men, and 20,500 packages all in view at one time. 18 T h e Chicago press was quick to reply that the lake city transacted twice the amount of business of St. Louis without the aid of a single dray and with the labor of less than one-fourth the number of men. T h e method of transferring grain and other commodities at Chicago docks, warehouses, and elevators, it was claimed, saved the owners and shippers more than half the charges collected for handling these things at St. Louis. 1 9 Chicago had excellent railroad terminal facilities. Spur lines were constructed to serve the large wholesale establishments, grain elevators, lumber yards, stockyards, and other key points in the city for incoming and outgoing freight. There were reciprocal switching arrangements among the railroad companies which made these facilities available to every railway entering Chicago. These superior advantages for expediting commerce at Chicago were compelling reasons for the diversion of trade from the Mississippi River to the eastern route. 17 De Bow's Review, I I I (1847), 103. 18 St. Louis Intelligencer quoted in Chicago Democratic Press, Apr. J, l®55. 19 Chicago Democratic Press, A p r . 7, 1855.

I£>4

R I V A L R Y B E T W E E N ST. L O U I S A N D

CHICAGO

St. Louis was at a decided disadvantage in that its trade with the East and Europe had to be carried on through shipments to and from New Orleans. A s a port, New Orleans compared very unfavorably with the northwestern Atlantic seaboard cities, especially New York. Besides being badly located in relation to the principal trade routes with Europe, it was not easily accessible from the sea, and it lacked good harbor facilities. Until 1858 only sailing vessels were engaged in carrying the trade between New Orleans and the Atlantic seaboard cities.20 The Crescent City was reached after navigating a tortuous channel some ninety-eight miles in length. The entrance of the Mississippi River was made difficult and uncertain by the presence of sand bars; even when trade finally was carried to New Orleans by steamboat, the best and largest steamers were discouraged from calling at that port. This was an important point, because the size of ocean steamers had increased as a result of the fuller development of steam power and improvements in ship construction, the larger vessels being much more economical to operate and having better cargo accommodations. A ship of a thousand tons could reach the levee at New Orleans only with difficulty and delay; often a part of the cargo had to be unloaded outside the bar. There was an additional expense for towage against the powerful current of the Mississippi. 21 Then, too, the delays suffered by outward bound ships often caused cargoes to be spoiled or damaged by the hot, humid weather. Delays and losses made insurance premiums and freight rates higher than they would otherwise have been. All these disadvantages hindered the development of New Orleans as a great exporting and importing center. Despite these handicaps the receipts of produce at New Orleans continued to increase during the 'fifties, but a breakdown of these receipts shows that New Orleans was a poor economic partner for St. Louis. 20 Stephens, op. cit., 290. 21 De Bow's Review, X X I V (1858), 48.

THE KIVAL CITIES AND WESTERN

TRADE

105

T A B L E XII V A L U E o r RECEIPTS o r PBODUCE A T N E W O K L E A N S 1 8 5 0 A N D

Year ending September 30 1850 i860

Cotton . .

1850 i860

Sugar

i860*3

Molastet $2400,000

$41,885,156 109J8&228

$13,396,150 18,190,880

Tobacco

Other Products

Total

$34,040,173

$96.896379

$6,166400

8.499J25

4a.881.486

6r25°JJ5

185,211,254

Table X I I shows that the value of the receipts at New Orleans during the decade of the 'fifties nearly doubled. It should be noticed, however, that while receipts of cotton increased 166 per cent, sugar 50 per cent, molasses 160 per cent, and tobacco about 33 per cent, the value of the " other products," which included the trade from the up-river country, increased only 26 per cent. Although these statistics do not show quantities of the different products, it is safe to conclude that western produce such as corn, wheat, and pork, which had increased enormously, was not seeking New Orleans as a market. The port of New Orleans became more and more identified with the economic interests of the cotton South. This was another harbinger of the impending change in the internal trade routes of the United States from the meridians to the parallels. The swelling volume of traffic, brought about by the rapid extension of agriculture, industry, and commerce in the first half of the nineteenth century, encouraged the making of every effort to improve transportation facilities. In fact, the exploitation of a vast extent of fertile country hinged upon such improvement. The advent of the railway caused a new standard of efficiency to be applied to the waterways, and they were pronounced inadequate to meet the transportation needs of the nation. Inconveniences which had been accepted as matters of course, became intolerable as soon as means of avoiding them 23 Dixon, op. cit„ 33.

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were devised. Farmers, manufacturers, and merchants alike became impatient with slow-moving wagons and uncertain boats and joined hands in working for a speedier and more certain agency of travel and transportation. Social and economic conditions peculiar to the South blighted the development of railroad transportation in that section. To begin with, the population in the South, with the exception of a few cities, was widely scattered. This situation, combined with the static social conditions of the region, meant that passenger traffic was relatively light. Nearly every locality grew the same type of crop, so there was little interchange of products among neighboring districts; the volume of freight traffic between way stations was therefore small. Also, the principal staples such as cotton and tobacco were relatively light in relation to their bulk. If need be, the planters could haul their products to river points, most of which were never closed by ice, and thus assert their independence of railroads and keep freight rates within bounds. Another awkward characteristic of trade for the railways in the South was the heavy rush of business during the marketing period and the great reduction of traffic in the spring and summer seasons. This meant that on most southern railroads, practically the whole year's profit had to be earned between September and January. The institution of slavery diverted capital from the construction of railways and the building of factories. The high price of slaves tended to make the well-to-do Southerner a debtor, seeking to borrow, instead of a capitalist, seeking to invest. The plantation system dominated the economy of the South and attracted nearly all the men of ability into agricultural management, leaving few such men to be promoters and managers of railroads and industries. Slavery did much to repel European immigration, and the production of staple crops almost completely absorbed the supply of slave labor. The upshot of this stagnant plantation economy was a dearth of both floating and skilled labor which discouraged, crippled, or

THE RIVAL CITIES AND WESTERN TRADE

IO7

ruined many railroad projects and industrial enterprises. Moreover, any joint undertakings or new developments were hampered by the marked individualism and conservatism that prevailed in the South.28 The masters of plantations in the South and the captains of industry in the North developed bitterly antagonistic sectional interests which only a bloody civil war could settle. In the East it did not take railroads long to pass through the experimental stage. There much of the population was compactly settled, large cities were in the making, a good labor supply was available, banking and finance were on a sound basis, and there was a surplus of capital for any enterprise which held the promise of large profits. When it became apparent that iron bands could bind the trade of the West to the commercial interests of the East, Yankee capital, energy, and resourcefulness were thrown into the trade contest against the South to win favor with the West. The intercity commercial rivalry of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore for western trade was also a feature of this contest.24 Before long St. Louis began to feel the effects of the railroads tapping the Upper Mississippi River. The Annual Review of the Commerce of St. Louis for the Year 1855 observed that " some customers, who formerly traded here, have gone elsewhere." 28 That " elsewhere" was Chicago, and the extraordinary growth of that city in population, wealth, and commerce compared with the moderate advance of St. Louis in these respects, showed that the lake city had taken to itself much of the trade that had formerly gone to its river rival. When the railroads reached the Mississippi, they made resolute efforts to get business away from the steamboats, and the results exceeded all expectations. It was conceded that perish23 C. E . McGill and others, History of Transportation in the United States before i860, ed. B. M. Meyer (1917), 414-5. 24 H u n t ' s Merchants' Magazine, X V I I I (1848), 344. 25 Annual Review of the Commerce of St. Louis for the Year 1855, 3.

108

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able and valuable freight would be almost exclusively handled by the railroads. Water transportation could not hope to compete successfully with the iron horse for this class of freight, as it took from twenty-four to thirty days under favorable conditions to ship goods from New York to Iowa by the way of New Orleans and St. Louis. But it was by no means so apparent that the rails could divert the relatively cheap and bulky farm products from their accustomed water transit. The inherent economics of railroad transportation, however—the joint costs principle in reference to back loading—tended to resolve this problem in favor of the rails. Given first-class freight to haul in one direction, the railroads, if necessary, could carry the bulky, low-class farm products in the back load at a rate almost as low as the cost of moving the empty cars.24 The railroads made their rates from the Upper Mississippi to Chicago cheaper than the river charges to St. Louis.27 Some of the railroads also operated river steamboats to strengthen their grip on upper valley trade and to extend the limits of their trade territory. 18 There could be no doubt about the diversion of western trade from the Mississippi River and St. Louis to the railroads and Chicago. Commercial statistics such as those exhibited in Table XIII, taken from an important Iowa trade center at Burlington, told the story of the change in trade routes. St. Louis realized increasingly as time went on that much more than the operation of the " natural laws " of commerce would be necessary if the up-river trade were to be held. Not only would river navigation have to be improved and cheapened, but north and south railroads would also be indispensable to retain and develop this commerce. One of the chief construction schemes of St. Louis was the building of a railway into Iowa.29 Iowa's rich trade was being absorbed more and more 26 Stephens, op. cit., 299. 27 Chicago Democratic Press, May 12, 1854, Oct 27, 1855, Jan. 6, 1856. 28 /«

15,000

Oats, bushels

4,984 769

Lard, barrels Pork, barrels

Bacon, pounds

Sundries, tons

By River 10,000 I7.°oo 10,000

6iooo 65.000

2,118,200

5,200,000

8,000

2,500

14,099

8,000

18,671 52J75 16,664

Flour, barrels Live hogs Dressed hogs

1856*°

Imports Sundries, tons

by Chicago railroads, and St. Louis merchants and capitalists, alarmed over the impending loss of this profitable trade, subscribed stock in several proposed north and sduth railways. These projects, however, failed to materialize at the time they were needed most. It was felt necessary to complete the roads immediately connecting with St. Louis, and sufficient capital was not forthcoming to build the proposed Iowa roads. Eastern capitalists would not invest money in them, for to do so would have defeated their main purpose—that of putting western commerce on a west-east basis. The city of St. Louis could not afford to build these railroads, since by 1856 its railway debt already amounted to $1,985,ex».*1 With the inability of St. Louis to construct north and south railroads, trade of the Upper Mississippi Valley shifted rapidly to Chicago and the East. Chicago became the throat of commerce, serving both the interests of the West and those of the East. It was the primary market for western produce that was forwarded East and the wholesale center for eastern merchandise 10 First Annual Report Burlington Board of Trade, quoted in Stephens, op. cit., 296. These figures are obviously fragmentary and no absolute accuracy can be claimed for them. They are useful, however, in pointing out the trend in the shifting of trade routes. 31 Stephens, op. cit., 298.

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that was distributed over the West. The success of the Chicago railroads in getting the business of the territory they served may be set down as the greatest single factor in making Chicago instead of St. Louis the great emporium of the Middle Valley. Another fundamental factor in the shift of the internal commerce of the United States to an east-west basis was the failure of the South to develop manufacturing. Just as railroad construction was retarded in the South, so industrial enterprises did not thrive there. In 1850 the total capital invested in manufacturing in the United States was $532,131,056 of which $85,017,552 was in the South; the total value of materials used was $553,320,848 of which $73,574,768 was in the South; and the total value of products was $1,015,879,128 of which $138,565,259 was in the South. Ten years later the total capital invested in manufacturing in the United States had risen to $1,003,201,944 of which $144,915,259 was in the South; the total value of materials used was $1,027,411,482 of which $140,361,836 was in the South; and the total value of products was $1,876,893,377, of which $245,090,580 was in the South. 82 This meant that there could not be an exchange of products on a large scale between the Northwest and the South. While the northwestern region wanted southern products, the chief need was not for raw materials, but for finished articles such as cotton goods and refined sugar. T o a surprisingly large extent, the staple products of the Northwest were also produced in the South. According to the census returns of both 1850 and i860, more corn and hogs were raised in the southern states than in the northern. 88 A s a consequence, the " natural laws of commerce " upon which so much reliance had been placed became inoperative—the more so because the 32 Report on the Manufactures of the United States at the Tenth

(1883), p. xv.

33 Report on the Production

Census (1883), 17, 2i, 22.

of Agriculture

as Returned at the

Census Tenth

T H E RIVAL CITIES AND W E S T E R N

TRADE

III

northeastern section of the United States developed manufacturing industries beyond all expectations. Even more steadily than the interchange of products between the South and the Northwest declined, the mutual trade between the latter region and the East increased. The superior banking facilities of the East also exerted a strong magnetic pull on western trade. It was even necessary to use eastern credit instrumentalities to adjust accounts for a considerable part of the commerce between the Northwest and the South. The large circulation of eastern bank notes in the Upper Mississippi River country was a clear indication that the financial interests of this region leaned to the East for support. The South bewailed the fact that these banking facilities and credit instrumentalities were doing nearly as much to draw trade from the Mississippi Valley as the canals and railways which eastern capital was constructing.34 It must not be supposed that eastern capital moved in and took the Mississippi Valley trade without effort. The advantage of business priority belonged to the southern route. Ties of custom, established credit, knowledge of preferences and prejudices in the selection of goods, and the value of personal business contacts were all in favor of St. Louis and the South. Steamboating was at its height as a going concern, with no idea of surrendering its river traffic. But the rapid settlement and development of the Middle West did not fail to attract the notice of eastern commercial and manufacturing interests. As soon as eastern capitalists became convinced that the aommerce of the Upper Mississippi Valley lay within their power of conquest, they were willing not only to invest large sums in railways, canals, lake shipping, and warehouses, but also to advance money to move western produce to market and to provide loans for the further improvement of the country.*8 34 De Bow's Review, XI (1831), 521. 35 Hunt's Merchantí Magañnt, XIX (1848), 579.

112

R I V A L R Y B E T W E E N ST. L O U I S A N D

CHICAGO

The future of St. Louis, as long as the city depended on the Mississippi River as the chief means of transit, was, of course, linked closely with that of New Orleans; the two river cities had to stand or fall together. In view of this, the apathy of New Orleans toward western trade alarmed St. Louis. New Orleans did not feel the shift of western trade in the direction of the east as keenly as its up-river partner, because increased receipts of cotton more than made up for the relative decline of the Upper Mississippi commerce. New Orleans became essentially an exporting city. In 1 8 5 1 the value of its exports was $54,413,963, while the value of its imports for the same year was only $12,958,294.®' The exports of New York, on the other hand, were valued for 1851 at $79,857,315, while its imports for the same year reached the impressive figure of $ 1 4 4 , 4 5 4 , 0 1 6 . " The significance of these figures was that the bills of exchange for agricultural commodities sold at New Orleans or those drawn upon their value in foreign markets found their way to New York or other eastern cities to pay for imported goods and eastern merchandise consumed in the West and South. This process continually drained capital from southern and western states to the advantage of the East. 38 The capital of New Orleans became increasingly disproportionate to the needs of its commerce. This caused the absence of a speculative exchange at New Orleans, which in turn affected the stability of quotations at St. Louis. A few extra boat loads of produce at the lower river city could completely swamp the market and force prices down to an unprofitable level. The dearth of capital at New Orleans helped to explain the inadequate storage and market facilities which often caused substantial losses from handling and spoilage.89 This 36 Andrews, op. cit., 758. 37 Ibid., 282-3. 38 Western Journal, VII (1851), 7. 391. Lippincott, "A History of River Improvement," Journal of Political Economy, X X I I (1914), 644.

T H E RIVAL C I T I E S A N D W E S T E R N TRADE

II3

made New Orleans an uncertain market for western produce. New Orleans and St. Louis could ill afford to ridicule the speculative markets of Chicago and the East and criticize their so-called fictitious financial " arrangements" and " operations." Even if the East did overreach itself financially from time to time, it enjoyed to an ever increasing degree the benefits of western trade. That trade did much to build up its cities, to increase the importance of its commercial marts, to supply work for its laborers, to stimulate its manufactures, to furnish customers for its importers, and to advance its general prosperity. 40 The South did not keep abreast with the improved methods of doing business that had been wrought by eastern capital and enterprise. Great changes had come about through the success of the railroads, the invention of the telegraph, the creation of an express system, and the expansion of banking and credit facilities. Valuable articles and perishable commodities could be handled with greater dispatch. Merchandise could be kept better in season, smaller stocks could be carried, and shorter time of credit was needed. A premium was put upon up-todateness in all branches of commercial activity. Uncertain methods of doing business were discredited. It was impossible for the South to hold customers long in the face of these improvements introduced by eastern competitors. 40 De Bow's Review, X I X (1855), 689.

CHAPTER VII BUSINESS LEADERSHIP OF THE TWO CITIES BOTH St. Louis and Chicago had natural geographical advantages on which to build hopes of becoming the metropolis of the Mississippi Valley. Natural conditions alone, however, do not create a large city, for the human factor of business enterprise and leadership must also be taken into consideration. Chicago's business leaders were more energetic and more astute than those of St. Louis, and it was largely this that enabled Chicago first to overtake St. Louis as a commercial rival, and then to advance rapidly ahead of that city. The early commercial growth of St. Louis had made its business men overconfident. By 1850 the majority of the St. Louisans took the attitude that nothing could keep their city from becoming the great metropolis of the far-flung Central Valley. The fact that the fast-growing commerce of the valley had oome to St. Louis without any solicitation seemed to prove that no particular efforts were needed to retain it. 1 The growth of the country and the passage of time would surely propel St. Louis on to its high destiny as the largest city of the Middle West. The business leaders of St. Louis showed a singular lack of comprehension of the real issues involved in the impending economic struggle with Chicago. Throughout the 'fifties St. Louisans continued to talk about the " natural avenue of commerce " and " legitimate trade." St. Louis regarded Chicago as an intruder who violated the principles on which the "natural laws of trade " were supposed to operate. These erroneous concepts had such mastery over the people that little was done to counteract the sweeping economic changes which were taking place. 1 Western Journal, V I (1851), 33.

114

B U S I N E S S L E A D E R S H I P OF T H E TWO C I T I E S

IIS

The ruling characteristic of St. Louis business men was their conservatism. They were not imaginative men, nor were they filled with the ambition to build up a new country. They believed in the old adage, " Attend to your own business and it will attend to you." St. Louisans waited for the advancement of the surrounding region to build up their city instead of trying to develop new resources to bring in additional business. This conservative attitude caused St. Louis to lose its initial prestige as a trade center. 2 Along with this conservatism, however, went a high sense of honor. The word of a St. Louis merchant was considered as good as his bond.3 The business leaders of the city took pride in fulfilling their agreements with complete integrity, and upholding the honor and prestige of their city. In the words of a contemporary, they did not condescend " t o the little tricks which to considerable extent, mark some business men, or rather men in business in some other places." 4 St. Louisans sought stability and permanency in all lines of economic activity. They advocated gradual growth based on prudence and thrift.® Speculation and indebtedness were frowned upon. It was claimed that St. Louis had more solid wealth with fewer debts than any other city in the West. 6 These characteristics were regarded as sure indications of an enduring prosperity. 2 Logan, op. cit., 341. 3 J . F . Darby, Personal Recollections of Many Prominent People Whom I Heme Known, and of Events—Especially of Those Relating to the History of St. Louis—During the First Half of the Present Century (1880), 4294 J . N. Taylor and M. O. Crooks, Sketch Book of Saint Louis: Containing a Series of Sketches on the Early Settlement, Public Buildings, Hotels, Railroads, Steamboats, Foundry and Machine Shops, Mercantile Houses, Grocers, Manufacturing Houses, etc. (1858), 6. 5 Logan, op. cit., 341-2. 6 H. Overstate, The City of St. Louis: (1880), 8.

Its History,

Grotuth and

Industries

Il6

RIVALRY BETWEEN

ST. L O U I S A N D

CHICAGO

T h e city took pride in its commercial strength and financial solvency. T h e leading business men were disposed to rely on their own resources at home rather than borrow money from the E a s t at high rates of interest. Profits were reinvested in legitimate trade, which was thought to be keeping pace with the rapid growth of the country. 7 While the lack of capital placed definite limitations on the expansion of business and the development of new enterprises, it also caused the makers of St. Louis to possess a rugged self-reliance. St. Louis did not regard itself as a miracle city like Chicago—such miracles were usually bubbles, and St. Louis was no bubble. 8 T h e city did not scatter broadcast information about its mercantile advantages, but relied on natural conditions to bring in the trade. That it had emerged f r o m times of short crops and economic depression was abundant proof that it was built on solid commercial and financial foundations; surely it was bound to share increasingly in the fast-developing commerce of the Mississippi Valley. 9 There was to be " no overdoing " in any branch of business, nothing which might tend to bring on inflation. The city did not seek to develop boom conditions. 1 0 T h e fact that St. Louis depended primarily on its own capital caused the bankers to occupy a dominant position; they were able to dictate to other business interests in reference to how available capital should be used. Quite naturally the bankers were concerned with making secure loans at good rates of interest. Business risks were not sanctioned; speculative ventures on the scale needed for developing a new country were 7 Annual Review of the Commerce of St. Louis Together with a List of Steamboat Disasters, for the Year 1866, 4. 8 Hogan, op. cit., 47. 9 Annual Review of the Commerce of St. Louis, Together with a Very Full List of Steamboat Disasters and Complete River Statistics for the Year 1859, 310 Hogan, op. cit., 47.

BUSINESS

LEADERSHIP

OF T H E T W O C I T I E S

117

ruled out of consideration. A small group of local financiers controlled the capital of St. Louis and hence its business interests. Generally speaking, the leading bankers were also financially involved in the larger business establishments and in real estate development. Similarly, the most successful business men were often found on the boards of directors of banks. T h i s close connection between the bankers and other business men made it very difficult for new businesses to obtain sufficient capital to start operations, especially when they offered competition to the older firms. A family very closely identified with the history and growth of St. Louis was that of the Chouteaus. Auguste Chouteau had founded the settlement of St. Louis in 1 7 6 4 under the direction of Pierre Laclede Liguest. His brother, Pierre, came to St. Louis as a boy a few months after the settlement was established, and later was a successful fur trader. 1 1 Pierre's son, Pierre Chouteau, J r . , who lived from 1789 to 1865, became one of the greatest f u r traders in the country as well as an able merchant and financier. He received his first business training while yet a boy by clerking in his father's store, and soon developed a liking f o r fur trading and the general merchandising business. His trading area grew until it included the immense stretch of territory reached by the Upper Mississippi, Missouri, Osage, Kansas, Platte, and St. Peters R i v e r s ; Chouteau was said to be the best known name throughout this region. 1 2 Pierre Chouteau, J r . , later became associated with a company formed to work the iron ore deposits in the Iron Mountain district and help finance a rolling mill in North St. Louis. He had important connections with New Y o r k business houses as a result of his extensive fur trading operations and iron in11 A. Johnson and D. Malone, eds. Dictionary of American Biography (1930). IV, 93. [Cited hereafter as Dictionary of American Biography.] 12 R. Edwards and M. Hopewell, Edwards Great West and Her Commercial Metropolis, Embracing a General View of the West, and a Complete

History of St. Louis... (i860), 538.

Il8

RIVALRY

BETWEEN

ST. L O U I S AND

CHICAGO

terests. His name was listed in 1 8 5 1 as one of the incorporators of the Ohio and Mississippi R a i l w a y Company of Illinois. A t the time of his death he had accumulated one of the great family fortunes in St. L o u i s — a fortune of several million dollars. 1 3 Pierre Chouteau, J r . , saw St. Louis grow from a mere village to a thriving city; he saw its commerce expand from small cargoes of furs and peltries brought in by canoes and flatboats from the Mississippi, Missouri, and Illinois R i v ers to a vast trade with a rapidly developing country. He felt no great concern over the rise of Chicago, and took no positive action to ward off the inroads that were being made by that city on the business interests of St. Louis. It was Thomas Allen who did most to make the people of St. Louis, and of Missouri in general, conscious of the importance of railroads. Allen was born in Pittsfield, Massachusetts; his life span covered the years from 1 8 1 3 to 1882. H e came to St. Louis in 1842, and was one of the few business leaders from New England to be found in the city. Allen soon became actively identified with the railway projects centering at St. Louis. T h e first opportunity for him to show his ability was in connection with the National Railroad Convention held in St. Louis in 1 8 4 9 ; he handled the preliminary publicity f o r this convention and wrote the memorial to Congress and an address to the public in support of its recommendations. 14 Thomas Allen helped obtain the charter for the Pacific Railroad and served as the road's first president. He was elected to the State Senate of Missouri and was instrumental in securing an initial grant of $2,000,000 in state aid for this favored line. It took a lot of hard work to arouse the Missourians to support railroad projects. Traveling on horseback along the projected route of the Pacific R a i l w a y ,

Allen

engendered

enthusiasm, inspired confidence, and gained financial support 13Ibid.-, Dictionary 14 Dictionary

of American Biography

of American

Biography

(1930), I V , 94.

(1028), I, 206.

B U S I N E S S L E A D E R S H I P OF T H E T W O C I T I E S

119

for the road from the people living in the counties through which the right-of-way extended 1 ® In 1854 A l l e n resigned the presidency of the Pacific R a i l w a y Company and retired f r o m politics. F o u r years later he organized the banking house of Allen, C o p p and Nisbet, w h i c h helped finance the early railroad projects in Missouri a n d southern Illinois. 1 * A l t h o u g h a Democrat in politics, A l l e n w a s a staunch supporter of the U n i o n cause during the Civil W a r . A f t e r the w a r he returned t o the railroad business and bought the bankrupt St. L o u i s and Iron Mountain, then only eightysix miles in length, f r o m the state of Missouri. T h r o u g h energetic management, additional purchases and consolidation of existing lines, and new construction, he was able in M a y , 1874, to start operating the newly organized road, renamed the St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern, which comprised 686 miles of track and had connections with important cities in T e x a s such as Dallas, F o r t W o r t h , Houston, and Galveston. 1 7 T h i s line helped to develop the Southwest and to bring its trade to St. Louis. A l l e n retained control of the St. Loui X w •J a < H

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I M P A C T OF T H E C I V I L WAR

153

T h e Civil W a r period made Chicago the greatest livestock market and meat-packing center in the country. T h e city w a s quick to respond to the suddenly increased demand caused by w a r conditions, which required the concentration of immense supplies of provisions. Chicago possessed unparalleled advantages at a point where the livestock as well as other f o o d products could be gathered, processed, and distributed with the greatest economy and dispatch. T h e same factors that caused Chicago to become the leading grain market, also operated to make it the greatest collecting point f o r hogs and beef cattle. Table X V shows the tremendous increase in shipments of livestock and provisions f r o m C h i c a g o during the w a r period. P r i o r to the Civil W a r , meat packing was done primarily during the winter season and w a s considered a local enterprise, f o r it was customary f o r every town to have its own slaughterhouse.

Improved

methods

of

TABLE

meat

packing

and

speedier

XV

SHIPMENT o r LIVESTOCK AND PROVISIONS FROM CHICAGO, 1859-1865

Year

Hogs1

1859 1860 1861 1862 1863-4 1864-5 1865-6

110,246 227,164 289,094 49M35 856,485 536,437 663,566

29

Cattle

Pork Barrels

Beef Barrels

42,638 97,474 124,745 112,745 187,068 262,446 310,444

96,203 91,721 65,196 193,920 449.152 298,250 284,734

129,087 85,563 50,154 151.631 137.302 140,627 103,064

* Live and dressed. railway transportation made conditions favorable f o r the concentration of the meat-packing industry. M a n y packers in small 29 These figures are compiled„from the Annual Statements of the Trade and Commerce of Chicago for the Years from j8S9 to 1866.

154

RIVALRY

BETWEEN

ST.

LOUIS

AND

CHICAGO

towns moved to C h i c a g o in order to share in the advantages which that city provided. 8 0 B y i 8 6 0 C h i c a g o had already obtained a position of leadership in beef packing and ranked second, Cincinnati being first, in pork packing. S o o n a f t e r the beginning of the Civil W a r , Chicago surpassed Cincinnati as a pork-packing center, and by the close of the conflict it was packing one-third of all the meat processed in the W e s t . 3 1 Table X V I shows the number of hogs and cattle packed during the w a r years. TABLE

XVI

BEEF AND PORK PACKING DURING THE CIVIL WAR

Year

No. of Cattle Packed

32

Year

No. of Hogs Packed 271,805 505,691 970,264

1860

34,623

1861

1862 1863

53,754

59,687 70,086

1860-1 1861-2 1862-3

1864

92,459

1864-5

1863-4

904,659

760,514

A t the beginning of the w a r the stockyards were too small and too scattered to accommodate properly the huge increase in receipts of hogs and cattle. In some instances the stockyards were two or three miles apart, and drovers were often obliged to drive their animals through the crowded streets f r o m one y a r d to another. T h i s caused dissatisfaction and inconvenience to shippers, dealers, and packers. Although most of the stocky a r d s improved their facilities and better switching arrangements were a f f o r d e d by the railroads, it w a s not until 1 8 6 5 that the problem w a s solved to the satisfaction of all parties concerned. I n that y e a r the Illinois State Legislature granted a 30 Seventh Annuel Statement of the Trade and Commerce of Chicago, for the Year Ending March 31, 186$, 37. 31 R. A. Clemen, The American Livestock and Meat Industry (1923), 78. 32 Tenth Annual Statement of the Trade and Commerce of Chicago, for the Year Ending March 31, 1868, 56, 64.

I M P A C T OF T H E C I V I L W A R charter t o the

Union

Stock

Yard

and

155

Transit

Company.*®

N i n e of the r a i l r o a d companies w h i c h s e r v e d the y a r d s i m m e diately invested a total of $ 9 2 5 , 0 0 0 in the venture. T h e p r o j e c t , w h i c h cost in the end $ 1 , 6 5 4 , 6 1 1 , g a v e C h i c a g o

permanent

facilities s o that it w a s able to m a i n t a i n , a n d e v e n t o strengthen, its s u p r e m a c y as a livestock m a r k e t a n d m e a t - p a c k i n g center. 3 4 The Civil

War

also stimulated the p a c k i n g industry at

St.

L o u i s , w h i c h as the W e s t e r n base of supplies f o r the U n i o n soldiers, filled a r m y o r d e r s for l a r g e quantities of meat.

St.

L o u i s , h o w e v e r , had not a sufficient n u m b e r of railroads t o centralize the livestock business there, n o r did the city possess adequate facilities for h a n d l i n g the livestock o r p r o c e s s i n g the meat. C h i c a g o w a s also the f o r e m o s t lumber m a r k e t in the c o u n t r y and strengthened its position in this respect d u r i n g the

war

period. T h e g r o w t h of the lumber trade d u r i n g the w a r y e a r s is indicated by T a b l e X V I I . B e f o r e the w a r a l a r g e part of the Mississippi V a l l e y w a s supplied w i t h lumber f r o m the U p p e r TABLE

XVII

GROWTH OF THE LUMBER TRADE AT CHICAGO FROM I860 TO 1865

Lumber feet

Year

Shingles No.

35

Laths No.

1860

262,494,626

127,894,000

36,601,000

1861

249,308,705

79,356,000

32,637,000

1862

305,674,045

131,255,000

23,880,000

1863

413,301,818

172,364^78

41,768,000

1864

501,592,406

190,169,750

65,953,900

1865

647.14S.734

310,897,350

66,075,100

Mississippi a n d its tributaries. A s the forests a d j a c e n t to the streams became depleted, the s a w l o g s h a d t o be hauled an in33 " The Union Stock Yards of Chicago," Transactions of the Illinois State Agricultural Society, with Reports from County Agricultural Societies, and Kindred Associations, VI (1865-66), 315. 34 Clemen, of. cit., 86. 35 A Strangers' and Tourists' Guide to the City of Chicago (1866), 35.

156

RIVALRY

BETWEEN

ST. L O U I S A N D

CHICAGO

creasingly greater distance before they could be floated down to market. W h e n this condition developed, it was cheaper to bring the lumber from Chicago. The forests bordering on Lake Michigan in the states of Michigan and Wisconsin seemed inexhaustible. Lumber from this region was forwarded to the Chicago market at a small expense. The prairie stretches of Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, and southern Wisconsin furnished a constantly increasing market for lumber. Here, again, Chicago was between the source of supply and the area of demand. Lumber prices were much cheaper in Chicago than at St. Louis, and the river city afforded but little competition to the lake port for the lumber business of the Middle West. Without question, the Civil W a r tended to strengthen the position of Chicago as the greatest primary market in the United States for grain, livestock, and lumber. Besides being a primary market for raw materials, Chicago became an important trade center. There were three reasons for this. In the first place, trade restrictions imposed by the Federal Government at St. Louis removed that city temporarily as a serious competitor. Secondly, Chicago had superior transportation facilities. Shipments of grain and provisions from Chicago to the East were bulky and required a lot of freight space; westbound freight consisted of manufactured articles which required less space than the eastbound shipments. Returning steamboats and freight trains consequently needed freight and bid against each other for the business; this resulted in low freight charges. The same situation existed in reverse in connection with the railroads from Chicago to the Mississippi Valley, for these roads brought grain and livestock to that city and needed return loads to interior points. Thus Chicago jobbers were in a position both to stock their warehouses and to ship consignments to country merchants more cheaply than competitive cities such as St. Louis, Milwaukee, Cincinnati, and Toledo. A third reason for the rapid growth of the wholesale trade was the fact that it was put on an organized basis.

IMPACT

OF T H E

CIVIL

WAR

Iff

T h e Chicago Mercantile Association had the twin objectives of introducing better business ideas in merchandising and effecting a thorough organization of all the commercial and manufacturing interests of the city. This association did a great deal to pool the commercial interests and resources of the city and to advertise the advantages of Chicago as a wholesale center. 38 The war caused an unparalleled expansion in trade and prosperity. U p to the beginning of the Civil W a r there was not a mercantile house in Chicago which had a business that exceeded $600,000; in 1866 there were some twenty-two houses not counting produce dealers and packers whose sales exceeded $1,000,000 each. 87 T h e very events which prostrated the trade of St. Louis stimulated the growth of Chicago's commerce. T h e receipts at and the shipments from the lake port were greatly enlarged by the traffic which had formerly sought the St. Louis market. The same forces also worked in favor of Chicago for the sale of merchandise and manufactured articles of all kinds throughout the upper valley. W h a t St. Louis lost in this vitally important trade territory was gained principally by Chicago. Thus the Civil W a r made the economic victory of Chicago over St. Louis both quick and sure. 38 Chicago Tribune, J a n . 4, 1861.

37 E. Chamberlin, Chicago and Its Suburbs (1873), 123.

CHAPTER IX AFTERMATH OF THE CIVIL WAR THE Civil W a r had given St. Louis a great commercial setback. The blockade of the Lower Mississippi had cut off Southern trade, and the commerce of the Northwest had been diverted to other cities, principally Chicago. Even the trade of Missouri had been prostrated by civil strife and bushwacking. With the war over these conditions could not be changed overnight ; it would be several years before the blight on commerce could be removed. St. Louis was anxious to forget the dissensions of the past, forgive the people of the South, and restore trade as soon as possible. 1 St. Louis continued to emphasize its natural advantages, which, of course, had not been destroyed by the war. T h e city still occupied a central position, had a good climate, and was surrounded by fertile soil and rich mineral resources; surely, these factors would be sufficient to push it ahead in the contest with Chicago. Yet the exigencies brought on by the Civil W a r must have taught both St. Louis and Missouri some valuable lessons. With the stagnant economy imposed by slavery removed, immigration was encouraged. Outside capital and enterprise were invited to help develop the resources of Missouri and the commercial possibilities of St. Louis. Proposals were even made for advertising the trade advantages of St. Louis throughout the Middle West and sending out " runners," as traveling salesmen were called, to secure the business of that region. 2 St. Louis resented its loss of commercial prestige in the region which before the Civil W a r it had controlled. The pas1 Annual Statement 1865, 6.

of the Trade and Commerce of St. Louis, for the Year

2 Annual Statement 1866, 9.

of the Trade and Commerce of St. Louis, for the Year

158

AFTERMATH

OF T H E C I V I L W A E

159

sage quoted f r o m the Missouri Republican may be taken as a typical expression of the general sentiment. 8 St. Louis merchants should immediately apply the Monroe Doctrine to these infringements on their commerce—take measures to drive out foreign invaders, and colonize the territory with their own enterprise. They can do it, will do it, must do it, if they would be instrumental in building up our commerce on its legitimate basis, and moulding for our city its true destiny. It will not do to be content with the influx of Northern products. A large portion of Southern products and an unincumbered Southern outlet are ours. We do not object to other cities and sections doing the best their position will command, in competition, but we should claim, work for, and treasure all our own. We should be just to ourselves before we exercise indolent, wasteful generosity to others. St. Louis has been hungry for trade, and our merchants have allowed other cities to feast at the table which nature spread for us— contenting themselves with the crumbs of waste. It was clear that trade and enterprise were deserting St. Louis for Chicago, and some of the leading St. Louis business men set to work to find out the cause. They discovered what they should have known before the Civil W a r ; namely, that railroads were needed to recapture the trade of the upper valley and to retain whatever trade was still coming to St. Louis from other sections. 4 It was believed that the people living in the Upper Mississippi country wanted to trade with St. Louis, because of the " high reputation and business standing " of its merchants ;B they were already complaining of the railroad monopolies that bound them, against their will, to Chicago. Presumably railroad facilities equal to Chicago's 3 Missouri Republican, Oct. 4 1865. 4 Annual Statement 1867, 13.

of the Trade and Commerce of St. Louis, for the Year

5 Annual Statement ¡866, 9.

of the Trade and Commerce of St. Louis, for the Year

l6o

RIVALRY

BETWEEN

ST.

LOUIS AND

CHICAGO

would bring to St. Louis a large share of the trade from the upper valley.' In the past St. Louis had depended too much on the Mississippi River system for building up and sustaining its commerce. It had neglected to establish sufficient railway connections to keep that commerce from being diverted to Chicago. St. Louis then, if it wanted to win the contest, must adopt the same " weapons " used so successfully by its chief rival. 7 It must build a network of railroads leading to St. Louis, and it must bridge the Mississippi River. In the steamboat era people had settled near the rivers; similarly, the railroads tended to develop the sections of country through which the lines extended. 8 It was pointed out that the trade of the South as well as that of Kansas, Indian Territory, and New Mexico naturally belonged to St. Louis, yet it was being shared with Chicago, because the latter city had better railroad connections with these regions. 8 H e n r y Cobb, a St. Louis booster, gave a graphic account of the situation which was not far wrong : 10 But alas! St. Louis that used to be a Samson of strength, and a ruling master of the commercial domain from the Allegheny to the Rocky Mountains . . . . has fallen a sleepy victim into the lap of the artful Delilah that is cunningly watching in the garden city on Lake Michigan. Chicago, the tool of the Philistines in the East who were jealous of the strength of St. Louis; Chicago, the Delilah, has been furnished with money by the lords of Eastern capital for shaving St. Louis of his strength, in cutting off, by means of iron railways, the trade on 'his rivers in which his strength lay; and delivered him a seduced captive into the hands of the enemy. 6 Ibid. 7 Missouri Republican, Oct. 4, 1865. 8 Ibid., Dec. 13, 1867. 9 Ibid., Sept. I, 1865. 10 Ibid., Nov. 25, 1867.

AFTERMATH

OF T H E C I V I L W A R

l6l

Not only is the trade of the upper Mississippi river, from St. Paul to Hannibal, in Missouri, cut off from St. Louis by Chicago, but also the trade of the Missouri river from St. Joseph to Omaha, and even the Rocky Mountains; not only is the trade of the Lower Mississippi, in winter, cut off by the same hand, using the Illinois Central Railway; but even the trade of the Ohio river at Pittsburgh is this day, being clipped by the Fort Wayne and Chicago Railway . . . . The Chicago capitalists are bridging the Mississippi river at Quincy, and even the Missouri river at Kansas City, and propose to draw off the trade not only of our Missouri Pacific Road, but also of the Southwest, even daringly striking at the center of our state through Booneville and Sedalia to and beyond Springfield. . . . Then might it be said to St. Louis, " The Philistines be upon thee, Samson!" and St. Louis might wake up and shake himself, but find that his strength was gone, that he was bound by the enemy in " fetters " stronger than " brass." In view of the fact that after the Civil W a r , St. Louis realized the importance of building railways in order to bring needed trade to the city, it is only natural to raise the question: W h y was not more accomplished by this method? T h e answer is not hard to find. During and following the Civil W a r , the Missouri railroads, with the exception of the Hannibal and St. Joseph, were in a condition of bankruptcy. They were unstable financially and with the disruption of Missouri commerce occasioned by the war they had so little business that they were unable even to pay operating expenses and interest charges. Confederate raids inflicted heavy damage, particularly on the Pacific and North Missouri roads; bridges were burned and tracks torn up in these raids. 1 1 None of the Missouri railroads tributary to St. Louis was completed at the conclusion of the Civil W a r , and St. Louis was therefore unable at that time to obtain the full benefit of 11 Million, op. cit., 131.

162

RIVALRY

BETWEEN

ST.

LOUIS

AND

CHICAGO

the mileage in operation. T h e Pacific Railroad w a s the longest line from St. L o u i s and was a n x i o u s to complete its road to K a n s a s City, but the company did not have sufficient funds to meet the costs of construction. St. L o u i s w a s vitally interested in having this leading line of railroad completed as soon as possible ; the city therefore came to the aid of the Pacific Railroad by issuing bonds amounting to $700,000. T h i s bond issue made a total of $6,150,000 which the C o u n t y and C i t y of St. Louis had contributed toward the development of a railway system for Missouri. 1 2 T h e s e figures completely disprove the assumption that St. Louis was not interested in railroads or did not adequately support the railway projects tributary to the city. W i t h the financial help of St. L o u i s the Pacific Railroad was finally

constructed as far as K a n s a s C i t y on September

19,

1865. T h e first passenger train made the run over the completed line the following day, leaving K a n s a s C i t y at 3 :oo A . M . and arriving in St. Louis at 5 :oo P . M . — a n event which was hailed as a turning-point in the railroad history of

St.

Louis and Missouri. 1 8 T h i s line connected the two chief commercial

centers of

Missouri and passed through the most populous section of the state. It was handicapped by a large debt, the lack of a standard gauge, and poor eastern connections but in 1869 one of these difficulties w a s overcome, since in that year the track g a u g e of the entire line was made standard. 1 4 T h e line proved to be one