The Earliest Economic Growth in World History: Proceedings of the Berlin Workshop [1 ed.] 9042948124, 9789042948129, 9789042948136

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PIHANS • CXXXIII

The Earliest Economic Growth in World History Proceedings of the Berlin Workshop Edited by DAVID A. WARBURTON

Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten – Leiden Peeters – Leuven 2022

THE EARLIEST ECONOMIC GROWTH IN WORLD HISTORY

PIHANS onder redactie van J.G. DERCKSEN, K. VAN DER TOORN, K.R. VEENHOF en W.J.I. WAAL

volume CXXXIII

THE EARLIEST ECONOMIC GROWTH IN WORLD HISTORY Proceedings of the Berlin Workshop

Edited by

David A. Warburton

NEDERLANDS INSTITUUT VOOR HET NABIJE OOSTEN LEIDEN PEETERS LEUVEN 2022

Cover illustration: The Tod Treasure, foundation deposit of king Amenemhat II for the temple of the god Monthu at Tod. Photo © Musée du Louvre, Dist. RMN-Grand Palais/Christian Décamps. The cover illustration shows a number of objects from a foundation deposit intended for the benefit of the Egyptian god Monthu, in a temple in Upper Egypt (at Tod, just south of Thebes/modern Luxor), ca. 1800 BC. The copper boxes (background) held a great amount of silver and lapis lazuli. The lapis lazuli (originally imported from Afghanistan, via Iran) was probably almost exclusively fragmentary bits left over from the plundered cemeteries of Mesopotamia. The silver might have been of Aegean or Anatolian origin, with the wonderfully crafted cups (upper left) reduced (in Egypt) to folded bits of silver (some as originally found, lower right) in order to be able to offer the god a maximum value in silver. Most of it will probably have been purchased in commission by the Egyptian king Amenemhat II somewhere in the Levant (in the port at Byblos, just north of modern Beirut in Lebanon, or in the port at Ugarit, just north of modern Lataqia in Syria). The find stresses the importance of material representing financial value in the eyes of the ancients – and even assigned by them to the gods. This wealth is the consequence of the earliest case of sustained economic growth, that which took place in Mesopotamia and Egypt in the era stretching from the fourth through the end of the second millennia BC – as is discussed in this volume.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN 978-90-429-4812-9 eISBN 978-90-429-4813-6 D/2022/0602/62 © 2022, Peeters, Bondgenotenlaan 153, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium D.A. Warburton (ed.), The Earliest Economic Growth in World History. Proceedings of the Berlin Workshop. PIHANS 133, Leiden & Leuven 2022. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage or retrieval devices or systems, without the prior written permission from the publisher, except the quotation of brief passages for review purposes.

In light of the state of our knowledge and understanding, this volume is Dedicated to the living memory of Two Pioneers W. F. Leemans (1912-1991) and Angus Maddison (1926-2010)

Anyone who takes history seriously will not accept a single method as definitive. Erik HORNUNG (1971) Economic history is the queen of the social sciences. Robert C. ALLEN (2011) Arguably, the most important question in all of the social sciences is: “What caused the Industrial Revolution?” Ronald A. EDWARDS (2013) It is, of course, easier to speculate than to do research, and although speculation is a good guide for research, too many insights established speculatively have tended to become dogma, and their acceptance as revealed truth has often inhibited that very research which alone could establish their validity. Nevertheless, historians of the industrial revolution have ranged widely, from inquiries into the first use of the term and the dating of the upswing, through local, business and industrial histories, to inconclusive and often confused discussion about causes and consequences. […] Indeed, the understanding of economic growth has also been found impossible by the economists, who have been unable to formulate satisfactory theories of growth and to relate them to practical policies for growth. Robert M. HARTWELL (1965) […] many contending theoretical explanations for past GDP per capita start from the assumption of stagnant economies followed by an economic take-off. Such theories need adjustment to take account of the new evidence. For all of these questions, and many others, the next few years promise exciting advances in our understanding of very long-run economic growth. Roger FOUQUET & Stephen BROADBERRY (2015) […] assume that in country X, which has belonged to the developed group for a long time, modern economic growth has run its full course—so that its aggregative and structural characteristics which would remain unchanged until some new epoch begins at some future time and perhaps in another place, indicate the terminal stage of modern economic growth. Simon KUZNETS (1966) The engines of Western wealth are faltering. […] I am not exactly happy about it but I would not be surprised if the global economy of the twenty-first century would […] be more like that of the eighteenth century before industrialization than that of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Peer VRIES (2013)

TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface ...................................................................................................................

IX

Contributors and Abstracts ....................................................................................

XV

Introduction – The Workshop on Economic Growth in Antiquity ...................... David A. WARBURTON

1

APPROACHING THE BEGINNINGS Transformations from the Neolithic to the Bronze Age in Greece: A Model of a Household in an Egalitarian Neolithic Village .................................................... Donald W. JONES Economic Growth and Development in the Ancient Near East ............................ Giacomo BENATI

25

57

EXAMPLES FROM THE EARLIEST DEVELOPED ECONOMIES The Golden Interval of Old Assyrian Trade (2000–1700 BC) ............................... Jan Gerrit DERCKSEN

75

Silver, Markets and Growth in Pharaonic Egypt ................................................... Juan Carlos MORENO GARCÍA

105

The Political Economy of Foreign Labour in Pharaonic Egypt, 2700–1069 BCE: An Assessment of Impacts on Northeast African and Southwest Asian Societies ... Christian LANGER

131

ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THIRD MILLENNIUM MESOPOTAMIA Some Thoughts on Economic Progress, Innovation and Growth in Southern Mesopotamia ......................................................................................................... Johannes RENGER

159

Economic Growth in Early Mesopotamia: General Considerations and Some Specific Examples................................................................................................... Piotr STEINKELLER

171

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EPILOGUE Postface: A Perspective on the Theory and History of Economic Growth ............ David A. WARBURTON Bibliography of Introduction and Epilogue ........................................................... David A. WARBURTON

193 293

PREFACE THE CONTEXT OF

THE

DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

In recent decades the study of economic growth has gradually become increasingly mesmerised by the phenomenon of the Industrial Revolution, which has become enmeshed in a debate about the history, sequence and causes of what happened in England in the 18th century AD as opposed to what did not happen in China in the last millennium. This debate was preceded and accompanied by a gradual realisation that many of the ordinary – technological – explanations of the First (Early, British) Industrial Revolution were not so obviously valid as is widely assumed, and that social origins probably played an important role in what was originally understood as a largely technological transformation of economics with significant social implications. As important as what did not happen in China in the last millennium is what has actually happened in China and America in this millennium. Literally as I write these closing words, it has been announced that China is slated to overtake the US economy and again become the world’s largest economy before 2030 AD. As Britain overtook China to become the world’s largest economy around 1840 AD, this means that the ascendency of the Modern Western economies (defined as overtaking the Pre-Modern Oriental economies) will be eclipsed after less than two centuries. In the last few decades – before the rise of China – such growth as had appeared to be normal in the immediate post-war era has stalled in the Western Post-Modern economies, and the nature of economics is changing. In contrast to most, but like Peer Vries, I am persuaded that unless suitable measures are taken, Post-Modern developments will take us back to Pre-Modern tendencies, and the aberration of the Modern West consigned to history. The Modern Western economic model as the only standard will ultimately be discarded, in reality if not conceptually. If we are to advance in any way, understanding economics is thus an imperative. To approach this, one must compare the economic reality we are experiencing with the basic tenets of economic theory. For decades economists have been insisting that markets be opened and deregulation replace regulation – and this was done. For more than three decades now, investments in technology have produced a multitude of innovations which have transformed human behaviour and ways of doing business. It has now finally produced some of the most valuable firms in the world. Money has been poured in extraordinary volumes into the system. In principle, the market economies of the West and Japan should be zooming ahead – but this was not happening before the COVID-19 pandemic made things economically worse, while paradoxically financially better. Somehow, the theoretical assessment and advice did not lead to the anticipated results. This means that something must be explained. And if we are to understand it, in order to explain it, then there is also good reason to try to investigate what happened before economic growth on an unparalleled scale had become normal. Yet all of economic history and theory is overshadowed by the myth of

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the Industrial Revolution. However, I see recent developments as confirming that a deeptime examination of economic growth is imperative – rather than irrelevant as those bound to the tale of the Industrial Revolution would see it. With growing doubt about the understanding of the phenomenon of economic growth in recent times, one could have wished that the entire issue of the history of economic growth would have become a priority. Such a situation should have induced a great deal of interest in what happened more than five thousand years ago when the bureaucrats of Mesopotamia began the process of social transformation as they created the first urban economies. Aside from the writing – the invention of which was the original IT revolution –, these earliest bureaucrats had only the most primitive technology at their disposal (excepting of course, the bureaucracy they themselves also unwittingly invented by using writing to keep economic records). And yet they managed to have an impact on social life which may well have no parallel in human history. That this earliest case of an economic revolution has not drawn any remarkable attention should be rather obvious to everyone. However, that does not mean it does not matter and is not relevant to the understanding of economic development. Indeed, the growing realisation that what happened in Britain in the 18th century AD was a singularity that spread to its neighbours would imply that the unfolding of the Mesopotamian urban revolution which began in the fifth or fourth millennium BC and gradually spread to its neighbours cannot be viewed as an insignificant detail. On the contrary. The ultimate question about the earliest economies is establishing just what they mean, i.e., not just how they worked, but rather their significance. However, just because what happened five thousand years ago is important does not mean that we really know a lot about it, let alone understand it. I am not alone in being interested in the question, but it is difficult for anyone to gain a full understanding of what is involved. It is for this reason that the first time that I had an opportunity, I took advantage of the chance to invite a group of authorities on different aspects of economics and history to discuss the matter. One of the first results of this encounter now lies in your hands, and the tale of what happened according to some experts is unfolded before your eyes. A couple of pages hence, we will begin to present that to you. And I will then present my theoretical perspective on why it is essential that we now commence with an unimaginably complex project of trying to untangle theoretical economics and ancient history. On these opening pages, however, my concern is not really about economics, but simply offering a glimpse at the context of how it came about that this book took on the form it has. THIS CONTEXT OF

THIS BOOK AND THE GENESIS OF ITS ORGANISATION

Early in the 21st century AD, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, the top federal agency supporting research in Germany) supported the Berlin Excellence Cluster Topoi, an interdisciplinary project uniting most of the Berlin institutions dealing with Altertumswissenschaft (meaning the “Study of Antiquity”). During one phase (2013–2017) of this era I was offered the chance to co-ordinate aspects of this Topoi project relating to the theme

PREFACE

XI

of economy. My own personal role in Topoi was insignificant, but as a member of this interdisciplinary institution I came into contact with disciplines such as the history of science which were virtually unknown to me – and was also introduced to the most recent research on fields I thought I knew about. Those years will certainly remain the most stimulating of my entire scientific career, as there was an endless parade of first-rate scholars from around the world discussing their projects with their colleagues, our students and ourselves. In this context, the Topoi leadership generously supported me while unstintingly entrusting me with the possibility of putting ancient economics on the map, organising a number of my own projects. Among these were a series of lectures on “Ancient economics & Modern economic thought” as well as a workshop on “Economic Growth in Antiquity”. I was thus able to invite colleagues whom I had never met (or only briefly), authorities with whom I disagreed, old sparring partners, experts I had never heard of before coming to Topoi, and others with whose work I could hardly claim familiarity; a number of younger scholars also managed to get in. Even on the scale of what I was accustomed to enjoying because of what others were organising in Topoi, it was a good group and a valuable experience. During the workshop (18–21 November 2016) we had an extraordinary and exhilarating time. Ultimately, I suspect it was unforgettable in some way or another for each and every one of those who participated. Unfortunately, when I tried to collect papers from the various participants, I was unable to get even a representative sample of what had been presented and discussed. One problem is that for such a meeting, you have to have experts, and experts are obliged to be specialists. The theme was doubtless a bit daunting for most of us – as even the best expert in his own field is really at a loss to understand everything that had happened in the last 10,000 years in Eurasia. Yet, without an understanding of every single step along the way, it is probably impossible for even the most qualified specialist (and that is what we require) to be able to judge what must be considered. This must be done in an interdisciplinary context and on a broad scale – deep and wide. Under the circumstances, I had intended to wait with any publication until I could gather as many papers as possible by supplementing what I had received from participants with papers from others and thus aim at something resembling what I originally wished for. However, with COVID-19 this proved unrealistic (since not only was planning meetings impossible, but many colleagues – like myself – were overburdened with remote teaching, and some will have suffered from the inaccessibility of libraries) and it became untenable to wait longer: some authors wanted to see their pieces published, and I wanted at least what I had to be published together. Thus, in the interest of setting the ball rolling, I was compelled to present the papers that I have. This has led to a volume with a rather peculiar evolutionary history, which probably requires some explanation. For the workshop, I specifically selected a number of people to give papers on various subjects. Some of these could not come and proposed others. Other people contacted me independently and asked to attend. At the workshop I was therefore exposed to a wide range of different approaches, some expected and some unexpected. This was ideal – but disappointingly I received only a couple of papers. Obliged to jump, the situation created a different work than that I had foreseen. Appreciating that this would be no more than a work-in-progress and neither a report nor even a representative view, I was very fortunate that Klaas R. Veenhof and Jan Gerrit

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Dercksen of Leiden offered to accept the idea of publishing what I had in the PIHANS series. They correctly judged that only I could explain the background of why I organised the workshop. I therefore added in some words of my own – although my own original intention had been to present the voices of more than a dozen others, and avoid adding my own voice in a prominent fashion. I have thus unintentionally added in my perspective at more length than they (or I) intended. And once we were agreed, we therefore had the luck that Bert Verrept at Peeters was entrusted with the task of transforming our documents into a book, which he did with his customary relaxed perfectionism. At the workshop, I had viewed myself as a co-ordinator who was simply filling in some blanks (e.g., Medieval economic history) and I intended the volume to consist of the voices of those present – with no academic (as opposed to editorial) participation by myself. Under the transformed circumstances, the book has become a different project. I contacted all of the original participants (and some others) and requested papers – but got no response except from those who had earlier delivered papers. I then requested all of those who were willing, to review and re-write their contributions. I myself then set about writing on a text to provide a context for the papers. Thus, this book contains introductory texts by me introducing the question and relevant details and the workshop. And then the papers organised as seemed to me to be coherent, followed by my further remarks as an epilogue. Like my other contributions, my own introductory text and the epilogue were written in 2021, but emerged largely independently of the workshop, as it endeavours to summarise some aspects of what I know that drove me to organise the workshop. The papers by the others were mostly submitted in 2017 and reworked in 2021, i.e., shortly after the workshop. Altogether this is probably more like a kaleidoscope than a continuous spectrum of viewpoints – a point which may or may not have advantages. My own hope is that this book will allow us not only to present what we have, but also to inspire those who contributed here, and those who participated then, reviewers, and everyone else who is interested, to think about the matter again, publicly declaring their own views and perhaps joining together in reformulating and developing this project further. That is for the present and the future. PARTIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS To have reached this stage of this project, I have already incurred many debts in what is now the past. On the administrative level, I can assure contributors and readers alike that none of this would have happened if it were not for the ingenuity, power and indulgence of the Topoi team, some of whom contributed far more than one could expect. Among them I awkwardly choose to name a few, but others also played their part, and must forgive me if their names do not appear here: if I were to name everyone who smiled benignly while doing something for me that was not their job, it would mean naming almost everyone who formed the backbone of Topoi. Thus, a representative sample of those in the administration who eased life in this luxurious academic atmosphere: At the very top of the hierarchy was Michael Meyer (Topoi Spokesperson and Prof. Dr. at the Freie Universität) who took me under his wing, guiding and enabling me, way

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beyond his obligations. At his right hand was Hauke Ziemssen who understands how to recognise, approach and solve every kind of problem with a smile – and is also modestly bursting with his own ideas which benefit those with whom he shares them more than himself. Just below Hauke was Kerstin Hoffmann, who always had conceptual approaches on offer and was swiftly able to find people and ways and means, despite her other heavy responsibilities. On the next level were people like the actually incomparable Birgit Nennstiel who repeatedly came through with her own personal infinite understanding of creative academic advertising. In organising, Christine Michel was always industrious and correspondingly unhappy, impatient with, and intolerant of, my sloppiness and shortcuts: without her unstinting efforts, nothing would have worked. At or near the bottom of the hierarchy was Marie Joselin Düsenberg who was always ready to cheerfully save me from my own self-made catastrophes, large and small. Those who are not explicitly identified (e.g., Tanja, Ruti) should feel accommodated: even today, I am still grateful to you all, from top to bottom. In the academic world, I owe my thanks to those who attended the workshop, those mentioned above, those whose papers follow, and those mentioned below who should have been there – and to those who might learn from this volume that they find the idea of investigating the origins of economics appealing. Everything remains to be done. This volume is a plea for participation, contribution and engagement – and neither understood nor intended as a final word. As a minor step on the way to a partial fulfilment of their dreams, this volume is dedicated to the memory of two men I never met or even corresponded with, but who have nevertheless had a decisive impact on me personally and professionally – and are also decisive influences on the matter at hand. The first is Leemans who contributed to founding and maintaining the Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient (which was once and should have remained dedicated to the study of the most important part of Pre-Modern economic activity) and was personally at the core of what has become a Leiden-based centre for the study of Ancient Near Eastern economics. The second is Maddison who personally and systematically pioneered that deep-time, long-term research into the comprehensive and solid documentation of global economic development and growth that lives on in the Maddison Project in Groningen. Let us hope that this volume contributes to fulfilling one part of their work, if only by highlighting the challenges. In this volume, I would have preferred to have been able to present a wider variety of voices testifying to the vast range of relevant material, and therefore I believe that I personally owe my sincerest personal apologies to all that this did not work out as I wished. The reality is that this book should really be entitled “Crumbs of Food for Thought in Fragments from a Topoi Workshop”. However, if this work leads to questions being raised, it means that those in Topoi who helped me in a myriad of ways will also be rewarded, quite aside from those patient souls who found the time to give me manuscripts – and those who organised the publication. My thanks to all! The only point of this endeavour is to provoke a discussion: the floor is open to those who wish to deny our claims and to those who have other narratives. I feel that I have done what I could to assure that it is now possible to discuss the matter. Siemensstadt, Berlin, October 2021

CONTRIBUTORS Giacomo Benati is postdoctoral fellow at the Department of Economic History, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen. His research targets the origins and development of political institutions in the ancient world through an interdisciplinary approach combining history, archaeology, and quantitative methods. He has taken part in archaeological fieldwork and cultural heritage projects in Italy, Turkey and Iraq and has published in high-calibre journals in the field of archaeology and Mesopotamian studies (Journal of Archaeological Research, Journal of Archaeological Science, Journal of Cuneiform Studies, Iraq) and applied social sciences (PNAS, Journal of Institutional Economics). In 2016 he received the International Assyriological Association (IAA) award for best paper on Mesopotamian studies after the PhD. Jan Gerrit Dercksen (PhD in Assyriology, 1996) is lecturer in Assyriology at Leiden University. His research and publications concern the social-economic history of Mesopotamia and Anatolia, in particular that of the Old Assyrian period, e.g. Old Assyrian Copper Trade in Anatolia (1996). He is involved in the publication of Assyrian merchants’ archives excavated at Kültepe. Donald Jones has studied Bronze Age and Early Iron Age Crete, among other topics in Aegean archaeology. His recent volumes, Economic Theory and the Ancient Mediterranean (Blackwell 2014) and Four Economic Topics for Studies of Antiquity: Agriculture, Trade, Population, and the Behavior of Aggregate Economies (BAR 2021) have endeavoured to make contemporary economic models more accessible to scholars of Antiquity. Jones is Adjunct Professor of Classics at the University of Tennessee and teaches environmental economics and introductory macroeconomics at Loyola University Chicago. Christian Langer completed his doctorate in Egyptology at the Freie Universität Berlin. His research interests revolve around the political and social history of pharaonic Egypt as well as the colonial heritage of Egyptology and the reception of ancient Egypt. His publications include the monograph Egyptian Deportations of the Late Bronze Age: A Study in Political Economy (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021) and the edited collection Global Egyptology: Negotiations in the Production of Knowledges on Ancient Egypt in Global Contexts (London: Golden House Publications, 2017). As part of his postdoctoral fellowship at Peking University School of Arts, he investigates the adoption and adaptation of obelisks in modern China. Juan Carlos Moreno García (PhD in Egyptology, 1995; Habilitation, 2009) is a CNRS senior researcher at the Sorbonne University in Paris. He has published extensively on pharaonic administration, socio-economic history, landscape organization and the structure of the state, usually in a comparative perspective with other civilizations of the ancient

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world, and has organized several conferences on these topics. He is also guest lecturer at the École Normale Supérieure (Paris) and the Autonomous University of Barcelona. Recent publications include Markets and Exchanges in pre-modern and traditional societies (2021), The State in Ancient Egypt: Power, Challenges and Dynamics (2019), Dynamics of Production in the Ancient Near East, 1300-500 BC (2016), and Ancient Egyptian Administration (2013). He is also editor-in-chief of The Journal of Egyptian History, area editor “economy” of the UCLA Encyclopedia of Egyptology and co-editor of the series “Cambridge Elements: Ancient Egypt in Context” and “Multidisciplinary Approaches to Ancient Societies (MAtAS): Interpreting Ancient Egypt” (Oxbow Books, Oxford). Johannes Renger is Professor Emeritus of Ancient Near Eastern Studies, Freie Universität Berlin. He studied Theology, Assyriology, Egyptology and Semitic Languages at the Universities of Leipzig and Heidelberg; PhD. Heidelberg 1965. Since 1966 Research Associate, Associate Professor at the Oriental Institute, University Chicago, working for the Chicago Assyrian Dictionary. 1976–2002 Professor of Ancient Near Eastern Studies at the Freie Universität Berlin. Special interests are economic and social history of the Ancient Near East, comparative economic history, history of Assyriology. He is director of the AssurProject editing the results of the German excavation in Assur from 1903–1914. Piotr Steinkeller is Professor of Assyriology in the Department of Near Eastern Languages & Civilizations at Harvard University. His research focuses on Mesopotamia during the third millennium BC, in particular, socioeconomic history, historical geography of Mesopotamia, Iran, and the Persian Gulf, Mesopotamian religion, and the history of early cuneiform writing. He has written five books and over 140 articles and book reviews. David A. Warburton studied Political Science, Archaeology and Egyptology in Lebanon and Switzerland (B.A., M.A. American University of Beirut; Dr.phil. Universität Bern; Habilitation à diriger des recherches Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne), and has taught at universities in Austria, Belgium, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, and Switzerland. He was Resident Director of the American Institute for Yemeni Studies in Sana’a (Yemen) as well as responsible for the “Key Topic Economy” in the Berlin Excellence Cluster Topoi. He has participated in and directed archaeological field projects in Egypt, France, Iraq, Switzerland, Syria and Yemen. His research interests are centred on the development of human societies and human cognition. Apart from archaeological matters, he has published extensively on economics in the ancient world.

ABSTRACTS WARBURTON: INTRODUCTION Abstract The workshop was convened because – as far as I am concerned – the recognition that Modern Economic Growth (as defined by Kuznets) was a Modern phenomenon, (a) contrasting with the growth Kuznets clearly knew preceded the Modern which itself was, in fact, (b) based on the exclusively British Industrial Revolution (as recognised by Kuznets, Allen and Mokyr), which was an historical anomaly that changed economics and the world, and meant (c) that the trade routes, navigation, science and money (etc.) upon which Modern Economic Growth sprang into existence were created in the context of a different kind of economic growth. Yet, without those foundations, Modern Economic Growth could not have taken place – and thus (d) one can hardly claim that all of the past 10,000 years was a changeless place of no importance, but (e) one could certainly not claim that it was even remotely similar to Modern Economic Growth (for Kuznets was correct about that exceptional epoch). Furthermore, (f) a close reading of Kuznets combined with (g) some modern statistics, suggests (h) that Modern Economic Growth has come to an end, and this (j) should make us more interested in the whole span of economic history. The earlier, long, era of steady but gradual change must be an important era in the history of economics. However, we do not know a lot about that earlier growth – and there is little interest in learning about it. Yet, there are a lot of people who actually know something about it, and so I attempted to bring some of them together. Only a small group of people – as opposed to the army of scholars who have some idea of what happened before Modern Economic Growth – actually submitted a paper. An additional problem is the use of archaeological theory to advance agendas which are out of touch with the facts. This means that there is a real need to try to bring together facts and theory. Therefore, the introduction is partially an effort to explain (i) what should be in this volume – but is not – and why it is not there, and why it is important, as well as (ii) introducing something about what was presented, and why some of these pieces are truly valuable. In that sense, it is an explanation of the social and historical context for the papers that follow. My own vision of the historical context of the long-term development is hinted at in the Epilogue. JONES: TRANSFORMATIONS FROM THE NEOLITHIC TO A HOUSEHOLD IN AN EGALITARIAN NEOLITHIC VILLAGE

THE

BRONZE AGE

IN

GREECE: A MODEL

OF

Keywords: Late/Final Neolithic, economy, households, egalitarian ethos, time allocation, settlement governance, public goods Abstract A model of a Neolithic Greek household is developed and used to investigate factors affecting the household’s contributions to and participation in activities that generate an egalitarian distribution of income and wealth in a village and factors and events influencing its savings behavior, both planned and opportunistic. Many external influences on egalitarian activities are found, but the most distinct is the depressing influence of larger village size on these activities. While many technological changes have small and moderate influences in both directions on savings and the concomitant

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accumulation of wealth, larger village size depresses planned savings but appears to be outweighed by additional, opportunistic savings of both agricultural and manufactured goods which could well have had idiosyncratic and differing impacts across households in a village or region. Both sets of activities offer both large and visible and small and difficult-to-discern changes in behavior that could have contributed to the transformation from relatively egalitarian Neolithic society to more hierarchical, and eventually palatial, Bronze Age society in Greece. BENATI: ECONOMIC GROWTH

AND

DEVELOPMENT IN

THE

ANCIENT NEAR EAST

Keywords: Quantitative methods, historical economics, economic growth, economic development, ancient Middle East, pre-industrial societies. Abstract The “credibility revolution” that shook economics in recent decades has pushed economists to venture beyond the common boundaries of their discipline to identify credible sources of variation. This resulted in a more systematic integration of history into economic sub-fields and in the increasing use of quantitative methods and economic theories in economic history. Although recently, social scientists interested in the deep history of crucial phenomena, such as state formation, inequality, long-distance trade, economic development, etc. have started to incorporate into their analyses archaeological data, the integration between quantitative methods and archaeology remains a very troublesome issue. Drawing inspiration from a recent strand of research in institutional economics, this paper offers a methodology for exploiting the rich ancient Near Eastern archaeological and historical records to construct proxies that are aimed at measuring empirically economic performance and development in ancient societies for the purpose of testing social scientific theories. This methodology can provide tools for producing high-quality databases of archaeological/historical data and stimulate a more systematic dialogue between historical disciplines and applied economics. DERCKSEN: THE GOLDEN INTERVAL OF OLD ASSYRIAN TRADE (2000–1700 BC) Keywords: merchants, Old Assyrian trade, Assur, Kanesh, Kültepe, silver, gold, copper, tin, textiles, Babylonia, financial structures Abstract The Old Assyrian trading period led to economic prosperity in Assur and Anatolia. An analysis of the rich documentary evidence excavated at Kültepe offers insight into what may have caused this interlude of economic growth and prosperity: apart from the entrepreneurship of the traders, there is the institutional backing from the government of the city-state of Assur in the form of legislation and international treaties, and a long-term joint stock partnership which enabled merchants to substantially increase the capital at their disposal. MORENO GARCÍA: SILVER, MARKETS AND GROWTH IN PHARAONIC EGYPT Keywords: cash crops, exports, irrigation, land sales, markets, monetization, ships, silver, textiles, trade Abstract The analysis of silver, markets and economic growth in Pharaonic Egypt remains a problematic topic in Egyptology. Usually presented as the quintessential example of a despotic, bureaucratic and redistributive “oriental” society, Egyptologists are rather reluctant to accept that markets,

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“money” and significant private transactions played an important role in the pharaonic economy before the middle of the first millennium BC. However, despite the absence of solid quantitative data (prices, demography, pottery production, etc.), there is some evidence suggesting that periods like 2150–1800 BC and 1650–1200 BC experienced some forms of economic growth. This means that economy and private transactions flourished irrespective of the existence of centralized power in Egypt. Not only the monarchy but also rural entrepreneurs, wealthy peasants, traders and craftspersons represented a dynamic sector of rural and urban society. Three case studies support this impression: the end of the 3rd millennium BC, agricultural innovations between 1650 and 1450 BC, and the activities of traders in the Late Bronze Age. In the end, markets, commercially-oriented agriculture and the circulation of silver played a greater role than commonly assumed in agricultural production, at least in certain periods of Egyptian history. As for temples, they favoured the interaction between private and “public” strategies as well as the transformation of huge quantities of agricultural production into silver. Finally, the pharaonic economy followed trends quite similar to those found in other regions of the Near East in these periods. Thus, the alleged “Egyptian exception” seems untenable whereas limited economic growth emerges as a real fact. LANGER: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN LABOUR IN NEW KINGDOM EGYPT, 2700–1069 BCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS ON NORTHEAST AFRICAN AND SOUTHWEST ASIAN SOCIETIES Keywords: political economy; foreign labour; Egypt-foreign relations; agricultural labour Abstract This paper tackles the under-researched subject of the function and economic impact of foreign labour in pharaonic Egypt as well as effects of related Egyptian policies abroad. While Egyptian history until the end of the Late Bronze Age is under discussion, the focus is on the New Kingdom due to the relative abundance of evidence. A quantitative approach based on agricultural data and figures of deportees imported by the Egyptian administration during the New Kingdom makes it possible to assess the share of foreign workers among the workforce and to approach the effects on adjacent societies. The data suggest that Egypt drained its neighbours in Nubia and Southwest Asia of workers, besides serving as punishment for anti-Egyptian acts, to facilitate, maintain and increase its economic output, thus bolstering regional domination and leading to economic growth especially in relation to and at the expense of the neighbours. RENGER: SOME THOUGHTS MESOPOTAMIA

ON

ECONOMIC PROGRESS, INNOVATION

AND

GROWTH

IN

SOUTHERN

Keywords: Mesopotamian agricultural production, technological inventions, natural resources, needed energy for sustainable agricultural production, land tenure systems, institutional households, agricultural domains, labour, demography Abstract Economic growth in a society based on agricultural production in the alluvial floodplain of Southern Mesopotamia depends solely on irrigation agriculture. Its early agricultural achievements (2nd half of the 4th millennium BC) resulted in consistent high productivity that can be observed until the Sassanian period (6th cent. AD). The production on a limited size of arable land because of natural factors was able to sustain only a certain number of people. Agricultural production in the alluvial floodplain of Southern Mesopotamia was determined and limited by the available energy needed (human and animal labour). No energy from water and wind. Hazards of artificial irrigation

XX

ABSTRACTS

(salinization, thus a restricted availability of arable land), natural disasters and warfare were additional restrictions for agricultural productivity and substantial economic growth. The neighbouring regions in the Ancient Near East operated under the conditions of a rain-fed agriculture with a significantly lower level of agricultural productivity. STEINKELLER: ECONOMIC GROWTH SPECIFIC EXAMPLES

IN

EARLY MESOPOTAMIA: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

AND

SOME

Keywords: Sargonic Empire; Ur III Empire; international trade; centralized economy; regional economic specialization; unified system of weights and measures; technological innovation; increased population growth; silver; sesame; textiles Abstract Economic historians commonly believe that, until the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, economic growth was so negligible as to be insignificant economically. A different position on this issue has recently been taken by several students of Greek and Roman economies, who argued that there did exist a degree of economic growth in Classical antiquity. This communication makes a similar claim for ancient Mesopotamia. At the same time, it acknowledges that the existence of economic growth in ancient Mesopotamia cannot be supported with any quantifiable data (such as are required by modern economics), and that, therefore, such a conclusion is mainly intuitive. This notwithstanding, it is argued that, in at least two phases of its history – the period of the Sargonic Dynasty (2350–2200 BC) and the period of the Third Dynasty or Ur (2100–2000 BC), Mesopotamia saw significant episodes of economic expansion, and, for this reason, of probable economic growth as well. This contention is supported by the presentation of extensive data culled from ancient written sources. WARBURTON: EPILOGUE Keywords: economic growth, historical development, Polanyi, markets, labour, finance, weights Abstract This epilogue aims to provide some context of the discussion about economic growth, by offering an overview of some methodological aspects of ancient economics and economic growth relevant to understanding and approaching economic growth, centring on conceptual systems and historical realities. The key points are (a) to stress that recent growth has led to exceptional prosperity, but that (b) the actual basis of this wealth is not understood, either historically or theoretically, and that (c) there is an exceptionally large amount of malign baggage among the arguments about economic thought and history which (d) make it extremely difficult to separate all of the details so as to understand what actually happened and why, which is (e) the most important point behind organising the workshop and persevering with the pursuit of understanding the nature of economic development. The Industrial Revolution, Polanyi, the history of markets, etc. all figure in the ensuing wide-ranging survey of evidence and discussions about economic growth, stressing the various stages and their characteristics. Underlying the presentation is the conviction that (f) there has been steady economic growth for at least 5000 years and (g) only an in-depth, large-scale, evidence-based survey of long-term trends can reveal the true nature of economic growth – and (h) that conceptions related to interpretations of developments in recent centuries cannot legitimately be used to understand how economic growth takes place and what pushes it. Fiscal policy and finance are among the points stressed in the discussions about markets in the Ancient World.

INTRODUCTION – THE WORKSHOP ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN ANTIQUITY* David A. WARBURTON In publications in recent decades, I have treated economic growth as an historical matter stretching back some 6000 years – but stressing the importance of understanding the nature of modern economic theory and always keeping a close eye on recent Modern and Post-Modern economic developments. I have sketched some of the problems with some of the approaches to history and economics and offered a solution compatible with the historical givens and assigning economic causes economic results. I reached the conclusions outlined during decades of working alone in an academic world hostile to the objective analysis of economic activity in Antiquity.1 In fact, it is impossible to imagine the opposition to trying to understand ancient economies as part of long-term economic history. Contemporary economists desire that their dogma be applied to ancient economics, and many oblige, either by blindly following economic dogmas (as was the unconscious project of the New Archaeology bowing to the Neo-Classical Synthesis) or of simply stating that the ancient economies were so different that modern rules did not apply (as was the claim of the Finley school), and thus avoided conflict with the economists. Students of the ancient economies were for a long time stridently opposed to any use of modern history or theory. This is now assumed to have ended – but I must admit that even among the participants of this workshop there were some who could not understand the relevance of taking modern economics and modern economic theory into account. In fact, however, the very idea of discussing ancient economic growth implies that one take an anachronistic view of the ancient economies since no one in Antiquity will have been consciously keen on economic growth as such. We must accept that our modern orientation incorporates economic growth as a given – as Schumpeter already realised in 1911 AD. However, real economic growth began with an incomprehensible discontinuity in the 18th century, when the Industrial Revolution changed economics. And all modern economic theory (about goods and demand) is based on the idea that the laws of the Modern economies are the laws of economics. Thus applying modern theory to ancient * The

bibliography for the contributions by Warburton is at the close of the volume, following the Epilogue. me, it was initially amusing to see that because I argued – simply on the basis of the facts – that one should recognise that there were markets in antiquity, some assumed that I was personally in favour of markets, and because they were against markets as a matter of ideology, they were against me. Needless to say, with the wind change, markets have now become acceptable – and this has led to the claims that, e.g., Ancient Greece must have been wealthy because it had efficient markets (as advocated by Ober 2015 mentioned below, cf. Manning & Oliver 2017). This appears to me to be an equally irrational and unbalanced conclusion from the other end of the ideological divide. 1 For

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economics (as some do) is really an unconscious anachronism, since we know that there was a change and that economic thought in the ancient world was different (based on money and utility). I have adapted an approach which combines Modern and ancient thought with 6000 years of economic history. It is possible that I am mistaken in my interpretation – but I remain persuaded that it is correct to assume that it is impossible to understand economics and economic growth without an objective discussion covering the entire story from ancient to Post-Modern times. And above all, I contend that one cannot avoid assigning money and finance a suitable role in economics and economic history since the reality is that when dealing with economics, figures in dollars are used to measure poverty, property, market capitalisation, personal wealth and income, and historical per capita GDP, etc. Unless dollars mean something, such measurements are meaningless. I thus completely agree with Robert C. Allen when he declares that Economic history is the queen of the social sciences.2

However, I find that it is not merely infidelity but actually treachery to then begin Global Economic History with the year 1500 AD – by which time all of the preconditions for Modern Economic Growth had been created over the course of millennia. Aside from the states, cities and taxation, the Ancient Near East had carved out the trade routes, developed navigation, created science, improved technology, invented prices and otherwise developed much of what was essential for the Industrial Revolution to take off. We had to wait a couple of millennia for Britain to catch up, and then a few more centuries for Britain to play the role foreseen for it in Allen’s approach. Thus Allen is in the strange position of saying that (a) because of what he himself concedes was an accidental conjunction of forces the Industrial Revolution in England changed world history but (b) that the ensuing Modern Economic Growth is the only kind of economic history he recognises, with the rest of history not even viewed as a relevant prelude to that real story. I claim that recent surveys of recent developments – above all the work of Gordon and Milanovic – imply that Modern Economic Growth has ended, and that, with this era finished, a different story has begun. In this sense, understanding the historical origins of economic growth cannot be found in truncated history, nor can it be left to a multitude of individuals each speaking their own mind alone, choosing their own frame of reference and excluding all else. And it certainly cannot be left to economists who neglect history, or fail to grapple with the details. It is essential to approach the issue with attention and contention concentrated on uncertain details rather than pursued ideologically and/or empirically in denial or ignorance of the basic facts. It must therefore be done on an interdisciplinary level with level-headed discussion including a multitude of voices. There must be some consensus about what is legitimate as a frame of reference for declaring what is relevant. That will probably appear to most to be unattainable. For me it is imperative – and my motive for bringing together groups of scholars to investigate, analyse and discuss the matter.

2 Allen

2011a: 1.

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The project of understanding economic growth is one of the most challenging imaginable – and yet it is a social necessity in an age where (a) growth has slowed in those wealthy lands where Modern Economic Growth began and took on an aura of inevitability, (b) far too high a proportion of the human race still lives in unnecessary poverty, and (c) there are ideologies and policies competing to provide economic growth at a time when (d) we really do not know its causes and are thus (e) unable to distinguish the necessary costs or (f) even identify the goals which can be achieved. Among the papers which follow we have a range of different attitudes towards, and approaches to, economic growth in the past. I have arranged what I had thematically, beginning with two completely different approaches to introduce the problem, one by an economist/archaeologist and one by an economically oriented archaeologist. And then we turn to philologists who present data, ending with two opposing views by philologists looking at the same era and the same problems. These are but some of the papers that were presented at the workshop. As stated above, I took advantage of the opportunity created by my presence in Topoi to invite a number of scholars to participate in a workshop where my understanding of my main role was simply co-ordinating and the participants were free to present their own views. It was a valuable experience. However, the outcome is unfortunately divided into two unequal parts. Only a few of the papers presented were modified for publication and the greatest part of the material was not submitted for inclusion in this volume. When some authors were impatient with my pious hope of gathering more papers, I accepted that COVID-19 rendered it impossible to get more useful papers and looked at ways of publishing what we have. Under the circumstances, I reluctantly accepted the proposal that I contribute to this volume and did so by elaborating on what I understand are the crucial issues and what I think happened (which was why I organised the workshop and wanted to make sure that it was adequately published, to make sure that other viewpoints by authorities on the ancient world were expressed and disseminated) – but that was not my original intention, because I had assumed that it would be superfluous as we should have had far more than I can offer here. WHAT WE

DO NOT HAVE

Obviously, the people that I invited to the workshop who were unable to contribute represented an extraordinary range of expertise in their own particular areas and general familiarity with economics. Their presentations of their knowledge and interpretations are sorely missed. But this actually involves three different issues: those who were present and did not contribute a written paper, those who would have been invited but could not come, and those who could not be invited because practical limits (mainly time, because what we had was already one of the longer workshops in Topoi) excluded what was really necessary. The best possible example of this trade-off is the case of Jones, whose paper is included here. Jones’s masterpiece by a professional economist familiar with the ancient world

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should have been complemented by a presentation on Neolithic Greece by an archaeologist such as Catherine Perlès or Paul Halstead, including many real cases of trade and agriculture.3 In an ideal world, it would have been perfect to have Olsson and Paik present their take on the Neolithic in the context of long-term history4 and to see how all of this looks from different perspectives. You can read what they have said – but you cannot read what they would have said if they had heard Jones. This is a great loss for all concerned. And of course any valuable discussion would have to have involved the early Neolithic of the Near East and China – and touched on exactly how the productive economy was created and what mutual influences existed. Important is that the Chinese Neolithic began with crops “that might have been domesticated in China” as well as “crops that were introduced into China from other parts of world – such as wheat and barley”.5 Important is that while “the origins of agriculture in both the Near East and China seem to follow the same pattern”, the development “seems to be 1,000 years or so later in China than in the Near East”.6 There should be little doubt that if borrowed grains appear early on, there must have been some connections. Agriculture was not invented independently several times – as is typically alleged of all the important inventions of the ancient world, and thereby diminishing their significance. It is the sequence of exchanges which brought economics into existence. If we are ready to follow Allen and accept that the Industrial Revolution would never have happened without Britain, then we should also be ready to accept that if wheat appears at the beginning of the Neolithic in China, the Neolithic might never have happened had it not happened one single time in the Near East (and spread from there). Not only can we stress that the developments were not independent, but it is also important that the Neolithic in Greece – right next to the Near East – began later than that in China. It is evident that in the case of state formation, China and Greece likewise followed developments in the Near East. Such information puts paid to the idea that all developments in early economic history were easily attained and therefore insignificant because invented independently in multiple places. There was clearly exchange of information about technology and methods. For most of the earlier period of economic development, Europe was neither participant nor contributor. However, just because Europe was disconnected does not mean that the developing world was disconnected. The evidence suggests the opposite: that it was due to economically relevant contacts that the change has been so swift in the last 10,000 years. That, however, does not explain why developments in Europe were so slow in following those in the Near East. These and other issues must be discussed with authorities. Another case is the paper by Langer on foreign labour in New Kingdom Egypt; this could usefully have been complemented by other papers. One of the most obvious would 3 Perlès

and Halstead are both cited in Jones’s bibliography. But there is much more (e.g., Perlès et al. 2011) – and indeed many other archaeologists could be mentioned, some represented in Dietz et al. 2018 (cf. Warburton 2020c). 4 Olsson & Paik 2020. 5 Zhao 2011: S295. 6 Zhao 2011: S305.

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have been something by Morkot, who can offer a comparative view of how Egypt managed Nubia.7 A different domain would have been a presentation by Ben Haring on the New Kingdom administration, where nepotism and corruption in Pre-Modern economies could have been highlighted.8 Kathlyn Cooney has done some highly original work on the craftsmen at Deir el-Medina who were paid to work on the royal tombs in the New Kingdom Valley of the Kings – but also seemed to have amused themselves and earned money on the side by manufacturing burial goods for the Theban elite in their free time.9 I could go on. However, had we included all such matters, it would have far exceeded the scope of what could realistically be discussed by a small group in a couple of days. And yet a confrontation with the facts with a large number of participants bringing expertise on different eras and times is indisputably the only way to begin to untangle developments. At this point I will therefore simply hint at some of what we are missing from what was presented: Brunke offered material about the early development of Mesopotamian equivalencies and prices (some of which I have presented elsewhere in a less expert, more interpreted, version).10 Selz understood that the documentation in the middle of the third millennium BC revealed that there were radical changes in the economic role of the ruling families in Mesopotamia at the time that the ruling houses began to understand the changing role of silver as money and took over control of the temples which used the markets to bring silver to Mesopotamia. However, in contrast to most, Selz wishes to demonstrate that there was no linear development: there were constant changes, and some of these are exceptional; others re-appear but fail to take hold, being modified before being discarded or adopted.11 Schrakamp would have treated how landed private property increased in what I view as a consequence of a changing economy in the later third millennium in Mesopotamia. The concentration of land in the hands of the royal family and military officials as a consequence of market activities and state policy is striking, and leads to unrest, as is discussed by Westenholz and Postgate.12 Zaccagnini is among those who had an interest in the earlier economies and was foreseen to come, but for health reasons was unable to.13 Textiles were basically excluded from this workshop because it is an endless project with many different economic and social aspects and there was a dedicated textiles project in Topoi, where some of the results will be appearing associated with the name Wolfram 7 E.g.,

Morkot 2001. e.g., Haring 1997; Haring 2013; Haring & de Maaijer 1997. 9 E.g., Cooney 2007. And indeed for Egypt there is more than one would expect given repeated declarations that there is little interest; aside from my own work (and Muhs 2016), cf,. e.g. also Grimal & Menu 1999; Hudecz & Petrik 2010; and Eyre 2010: 290–308. Janssen 1975 is in a class by itself. 10 Warburton 2018a; Warburton 2019a. 11 E.g., Selz 2014. For the subsequent development, cf. Steinkeller 2018. 12 Issues of the concentration of land-based economic power in this era leading to unrest are mentioned by Westenholz 1999: 44–46 and Postgate 1992: 40–41. As Westenholz stresses, it is very difficult to know that one has correctly recognised causes and results. This ties in with Selz’s problems in insisting that development was not linear – whereas we wish to impose such on history, to our loss! 13 E.g., Zaccagnini 1989. 8 Cf.,

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Schirmer.14 In this volume, I mention works by Breniquet, Lyon, Michel and Nosch who are all involved with textiles. One important sidelight of the wool sheep revolution in Syria and Mesopotamia were the herds of sheep in distant Palestine whose sudden appearance was part of the economic transformations of the third millennium, recognised and highlighted by Rosen.15 For the Old Babylonian period, I have referred to Goddeeris who also cites a good deal from others,16 as does Stol.17 As Renger points out (this volume), this was a period of privatisation, and flourishing co-operation between the states and the merchants, with strictly defined legal sanctions evidently actually applied in practice. For the Near East, we have two completely different complementary state organised and entrepreneurial traditions, one concerning orchards and the other fields. The gardens and orchards are an extremely important aspect of a complicated economy working under different pressures than those of the fields.18 However, it is the fields that attract our attention because of their role in employment and nutrition. For the fields I would have liked to have had Stolper treat the way private entrepreneurs in Achaemenid Babylonia co-operated with the state to organise labour to make landed properties fertile for both entrepreneurial and elite profit.19 Steinkeller, Stolper and I would have had very different appreciations of the value of labour in Antiquity – and this is one of the most important issues where the human being appears as an entity in the vast panorama of economic history. However, Stolper demurred and recommended van der Spek whose voice would have been welcome, but who could not come himself and present a definitive history of early markets, which is fortunately available.20 Van der Spek stresses market performance, whereas I stress market forces and employment, but will link major changes in the market prices van der Spek has for late first millennium BC Babylon to political developments. Obviously, untangling orchards, gardens, fields, employment and prices is one part of the problem – but the political is another. This is directly related to what Oliver calls the “realities” of economics in Greece, where economics was largely an issue of state power, i.e., wealth was exploited by the state to express, increase and exert its power.21 Manning is conscious that weather and climate are highly relevant to the “realities” of agricultural economies, and thus investigates the impact of abrupt changes in weather potentially contributing to social unrest and thus revealing the weakness of the dependence on agriculture upon which the Ptolemaic state depended for its power to participate in Mediterranean politics.22 Manning had also dealt earlier with land in Egypt,23 while von Reden had dealt 14 There

is one volume out: Schier & Pollack 2020, and an article, Schier et al. 2021. Rosen 2017. 16 Goddeeris 2002. 17 Stol 2004. 18 E.g., Wunsch 2000; Greco 2015. 19 Stolper 1985, and, e.g., Stolper in Baker & Jursa 2005: 323–342. 20 But, cf. van der Spek et al. 2015. 21 Oliver 2010. For more on Classical economies, cf., e.g., Migeotte 2008; Harris et al. 2016 (Warburton 2020f); and sources listed in the books reviewed in Warburton 2010b, Warburton 2020e. 22 E.g., Manning et al. 2017. 23 E.g., Manning 2003; cf. also, e.g., Monson 2012. 15 E.g.,

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with money.24 The finances of the Ptolemaic state were adjusted to accommodate the Egyptian condition – in a fashion dependent upon silver as money, and Bresson stressed the role of state-sponsored money in the Ancient Greek economy (partly adumbrated in his earlier work).25 I had invited Jursa – who has endorsed growth26 – but he declined and sent Pirngruber. In a perfect balance between the Near East and the Aegean, Pirngruber compared Babylon and Athens, persuaded that there was economic growth.27 This is very much in tune with work on the Roman economy, which was unfortunately not well represented at the workshop, but for which much is on offer.28 Hoffman would also have been appreciated for his insights on growth in the agricultural economies of the European Middle Ages.29 Von Glahn introduced the key feature of the emergence and performance of the fiscal state in the second half of the first millennium BC China.30 In a case study, Wang showed that state-managed slave labour used advanced technology to create consumer products sold on the monetised markets in Han China.31 Of those working with China who should have been invited, one should stress Wong on the importance of capitalism to industrialisation;32 Edwards on the matter of industrialisation and technology;33 and Deng on the matter of merchants, management, state policy, and development.34 One very important issue for all of us is that of “proxies”: the units we use to measure development in the ancient world. In the contribution published here, Benati reveals in an exemplary fashion how one can begin to create an image of socio-economic development in the Near East using a sophisticated analysis of archaeological and published philological material. At the workshop, Gutmann also faced this specific problem quite directly when discussing what one could use to read from the Ancient Egyptian sources, the one important economy for which we are sorely lacking in data. Römer has stressed that even where we have philological data, it is not certain that we know how to use it.35 Van der Wilt added details about the importance and nature of state-monitored weights and standards in Egypt in the Classical era, which takes us back to the origins of equivalences and another 24 von

Reden 2007; von Reden 2010. 2016; Bresson in Rahmstorf et al. 2021; and elaborated in a volume which is forthcoming. 26 E.g., Jursa 2010. 27 For one part of this, cf. Pirngruber 2017; but also Jursa and Bresson in Neal & Williamson 2014: 24–74. Cf. also Pirngruber in Moreno García 2021. 28 E.g., Scheidel 2012; Temin 2013; Jongman in Neal & Williamson 2014: 75–100. 29 Hoffman 2000. 30 This is treated in first third of von Glahn (2016), where the transformation to the fiscal state is situated in the middle of the Eastern Zhou era with the transition from the Springs and Autumns era to that of the Warring States. The fiscal state model was then adopted with enthusiasm and efficiency under the Qin and Han. Von Glahn also deals with the issue of monetisation in China (von Glahn 1996 – and number of articles since, e.g. Glahn 2010) which is an issue relevant to Greece, and stressed by Bresson (2016) and also in a forthcoming work (partially adumbrated by a contribution by Bresson in Rahmstorf 2021). 31 This will be offered in English in a forthcoming publication. 32 E.g., Wong in Neal & Williamson 2014: 125–164. 33 E.g., Edwards 2013; Edwards 2015. 34 E.g., Deng & Zheng 2015. 35 Römer 2007. 25 Bresson

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aspect of money which has largely disappeared today (stressing non-linearity) – and into the question of what we are measuring when we are missing the cargos.36 In terms of modern thought, Neal was the one who brings capitalism, finance and history together with ancient history and the most modern viewpoints and perspective.37 However, there is a considerable distance between modern economic work and the understanding of the ancient world. Wolf simply assured us that economic growth did not exist before the Modern era – and presented a lecture on how the bulk trade in grain was a characteristic of the Modern economy, not imagining that the bulk trade in grain was involved in financial speculation in the eastern Mediterranean at the end of the first millennium BC.38 Virtually no one has ventured to accept the extent and importance of the bulk trade in textiles from the third millennium onwards – although the data is easily available.39 Not even Neal realised that Steinkeller (below) illustrated a complicated financial arrangement that was already used by the state in Mesopotamia, ca. 2000 BC – of a type that Neal assumed had been developed by the Italians in the early second millennium AD.40 Given these unexpected discrepancies, it would have been essential to have had Monroe and Garfinkle on board to discuss with Steinkeller and straighten out students of the modern world about the importance of both (a) the reality of credit, money and trade and (b) entrepreneurial motivation.41 This is an essential point about the ancient economies which has been inadequately treated, and must be related to the importance of the failure of markets in the very early ancient world to deliver growth as has become evident in recent centuries. It would also have been useful to have included sessions on the dependence of Hanseatic trade on Bruges and the Italian textile traders, as well as on Medieval Italian banking, and indeed sovereign debt in the ancient, Pre-Modern, and Early Modern worlds.42 This would inevitably have taken us beyond the capacity of the participants to follow everything. However, Goetzmann does remind us that The most remarkable thing about finance in the ancient world is that virtually all of the basic financial tools were developed by early societies of the Near East and the eastern Mediterranean before the current era […]43

This issue is central to my own discussion since it is clear that like technology, finance changed in the era of the Industrial Revolution – and yet the building blocks for both were present thousands of years ago. That change only came recently is crucial to modern history, but neglecting the matter does not aid us in understanding development. 36 Cf.,

e.g. Wilt 2015; Wilt 2019; Meadows 2011. Neal 1990; Neal 2000; Neal 2015; Neal & Williamson 2014; Neal & Cameron 2016. 38 For the trade, cf., e.g., Bresson 2016: 382–414; Chankowski et al. 2018; Droß-Krüpe et al. 2016; Erdkamp 2009; Moreno 2012; for the finance, cf., e.g., Loomis 1998; von Reden 2007; von Reden 2010. 39 Wilkinson (2018) made the point in Kristiansen et al. 2018; Laursen & Steinkeller 2017 summarise materials to which I have alluded, a good part of which can be accessed through materials published by Breniquet & Michel 2014; Waetzoldt 1972; etc. 40 Neal 2015: 28–37. 41 Garfinkle 2004; Monroe 2009; Monroe 2020. 42 However, a good deal of this has been covered in Kristiansen et al. 2018; Neal & Williamson 2014. 43 Goetzmann 2016: 135. 37 E.g.,

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Furthermore, the issue of value is related to finance and money and the development of the human mind, a development which was unleashed by prestige goods and transformed by silver.44 All such papers could have thrown a good deal of light on the early history of markets and finance in ancient and Pre-Modern agricultural societies. Fortunately, a good deal of this has been published – but a series of different points of view would have been even more enriching. And more participation on the side of both the economists and the Modern economic historians – such as Robert C. Allen, Peer Vries and Jan Luiten van Zanden (to name but three) – would have been a decisive advantage. Among the most important points for modern students of the market and economic growth is the state role which was already quite visible in Antiquity – as illustrated in the papers mentioned above, and those coming below. And indeed, it should be evident that in Kuznets’s version, it was the state-sponsored polytechnics that supplied the engineering knowhow and scientific basis for the creation of Modern Economic Growth. In this light, one must realise that state policy is one of the most important and decisive elements of economic growth, a point which was unwittingly and unconsciously made by Nelson,45 and one that is frequently lost when the causes are assigned to technology and markets. The tendency for state policy to spur social unrest in the modern world is probably clear. Aside from developing a firm understanding of long-term economic history, it is absolutely imperative to develop a firm understanding of the history of (a) labour, (b) finance, (c) laws relevant to economics and (d) economic policies. A great deal of work has been done on labour.46 However the details and the long-term history of finance are still far from being firmly understood.47 Legal and policy aspects of economics have been investigated,48 but far more needs to be done. Some efforts by professional economists49 should lead to more work by historians and philologists.50 THE NATURE OF THE CHALLENGE I regret that in this volume we do not have even a representative presentation of what was presented and discussed at the workshop – let alone the full spread of what is required (as hinted at in the preceding paragraphs).

44 Cf., e.g., Goetzmann & Rouwenhorst 2005; Papadopoulos & Urton 2012; Warburton 2018a. Literally while putting the finishing touches on this text, Rahmstorf et al. 2021 was published, a volume which promises a solid state-of-the-art presentation of the subject with first-rate contributions. The same applies to a volume edited by Moreno García (2021) which was likewise too late for inclusion here, but deserves attention. 45 Nelson 1996. 46 E.g., Powell 1987; Menu 2010; Steinkeller & Hudson 2015. 47 Cf., e.g., Dercksen 1999; Ouyang 2013. 48 E.g., Bongenaar 2000; Hudson & Levine 1996; Hudson & Levine 1999; Hudson & Van de Mieroop 2002; Hudson & Wunsch 2004. 49 E.g., Neal 2015; Goetzmann 2016. 50 E.g., Dercksen 1999.

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However, I do not think that the problem lies with the people I invited. It probably lies in the nature of the problem itself. Tackling the specific theme of this project is not necessarily a priority for any of the people I invited or cited. And this is simply a reality of contemporary scholarship. To understand this, we must consider the contemporary state of research about ancient and Pre-Modern economies by glancing at – and taking a perspective on – the Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient and the Cambridge World History. JESHO Firstly, we can take a look at the Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. As I have argued here (in my contribution at the close of the volume, setting out my views), economic history began in the Orient, and there was a journal dedicated to the subject. For the publication, a decade ago, of a conference convened to celebrate that journal, the organiser (Gommans) had to concede that somehow traditional contributors to JESHO were not quite ready to enthusiastically embrace his idea of exploring the value of expanding interdisciplinary and historical globalisation.51 In fact, along with the Neolithic connections linking the Neolithic of Greece to the Near East and China, there has been a gradually increasing tendency to recognise the interconnections centring on Central Asia and the Indian Ocean.52 (I will admit that the recognition is not yet widespread, as I repeatedly read that agriculture was invented independently in China – but if it is understood that wheat appears in China at the beginning of the Neolithic, a thousand years after its appearance in the Near East, it should not take all that long to understand the significance). I myself have stressed that it was here that the earliest interregional trading networks emerged, and it was here that (thousands of years later) the Portuguese and the Dutch found these networks intact and functioning as Europe gradually began to awaken and participate in the world economy. What is imperative is to find out how economies functioned before the Dutch and Portuguese arrived, for otherwise we will never be able to approach the differences and understand real economic change. However, the theoretical evaluation of the gradually emerging historical investigation seems somehow to falter when expecting the real authorities to contribute to questions posed in an interdisciplinary context. Since Gommans’s conference and its publication, however, JESHO has indeed gone “global” – but basically by taking it into recent and contemporary history, abandoning JESHO’s original perspective. Originally, JESHO’s coverage was chronologically limited to end at the start of the 19th century – precisely because of the desire to be concerned exclusively with understanding these Pre-Modern economies and exclude discussion of Modern Western influence.53 In this sense, the original idea of the founders was to gather articles dealing exclusively with the economic history of the Orient in Pre-Modern times. 51 In Gommans’s editorial introduction to the Jubilee Issue (Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 53 [2010] Part 1-2: 3–18). 52 Cf., e.g., Horton et al. 2020. 53 JESHO 1 (1958): 1.

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However, in recent years, this has changed a bit, as a conservative survey would conclude that a good part of what is now published in JESHO falls outside the original limit.54 And many fail to understand the history that is missing – because of the concept that history is about the Rise of the West – whether one goes back to the Roman Empire, or to the Dutch. JESHO is now primarily dedicated to studying how the Orient responded to Western influence. And – obviously – this emphasis comes at the expense of the traditional scope of the journal. The purpose of the journal has been destroyed by catering to a myopic approach centring on the contemporary world – and disregarding the potential value of learning what the future might bring when placed in a deep-time perspective. And this particular journal had a very clear reason for excluding this recent period – because it is another story. Now JESHO is dedicated to sharing Allen’s truncated Global Economic History (where economic history begins in 1500 AD), stressing how the Orient has adjusted to the West, rather than investigating what the Orient contributed to the foundations of economics before the Rise of the West (and what that might potentially mean about understanding economics). However, regardless of JESHO’s present editor’s inclinations (to prefer Modern material), it is a fact that Gommans (himself also a former JESHO editor) was right that most students of the very early ancient world do not feel comfortable trying to deal with early economic history in a global fashion. From Gommans’s standpoint, he correctly concluded that the problem lay with the unwillingness of the only people who know about this long history to contribute to a broader discussion. This fact is confirmed in the ensuing publication of Gommans’s ambitious undertaking where most of the contributions dealt with what I would call the recent Pre-Modern – and the only one on the really early ancient world was that by Veenhof which treated the Assyrian material presented here in this volume by Dercksen.55 In contrast to myself – who is one who (like Gommans) has long wished that JESHO would deliver real interpretations on a larger scale – Veenhof is a meticulous scholar in full command of his material who can confidently and unhesitatingly present his material in a magisterial survey. But – (1) this is very rare material and has been transformed into a major project itself and (2) for decades there was a refusal to accept the meaning of the material (because of Polanyi). Only Veenhof’s perseverance made it possible that this material is now allowed to stand on its own. And it is extremely regrettable that this is the case – yet it must be conceded that this is the result of the problem that Gommans and I faced: very few authorities are attracted to participating in a venture such as this project where the actual theoretical significance is paramount – and the work upon which theoretical conclusions must be drawn must be a wide and dense, tightly woven, fabric with diverse interpretations based on meticulous historical and philological research. And those discussing the material least JESHO 54: 1ff.; 54: 311ff.; 54: 455ff.; 54: 478ff.; 55: 688ff.; 55: 718ff.; 55: 746ff.; 55: 771ff.; 56: 392ff.; 57: 291ff.; 57: 326.ff.; 58: Parts 1–2; 58: Part 5; 59: Parts 1–2; 59: 333ff.; 59: 408ff.; 59: 531ff.; 59: 828ff.; 60: Parts 1–2; 60: 175ff.; 60: 420ff.; 60: 488ff.; 60: 647ff.; 61: 361ff.; 61: 396ff.; a good part of 61: Part 4; 62: 1ff.; 62: 108ff.; most of 62: Part 4; a good part of 62: Parts 5–6; 63: 243–285; 63: 389–433; 63: 423–464; 63: 743ff.; 64: Parts 1–2; 64: 302ff.; 64: 425ff.; 64: 343ff. 55 Veenhof 2010, and Dercksen, this volume. 54 At

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must be in full command of the relevant information and potential approaches. This is what we require – yet lack. However, it must further be appreciated that there is very little material of the quality and quantity that Veenhof has that is fully understood. For the greatest part, it is really a matter of gathering building blocks linked by theoretical analysis – and those in the know will realise that philologists and archaeologists dealing with the earliest recognisable material are not very good at distinguishing and relating speculation, analysis, theory and evidence. Very few scholars can claim to master much of it, and be assured that their interpretation will not be disputed. And this brings us to a very different issue. At the outset above, I cited a quote from Hartwell about the problem of speculation overcoming hard work because “It is, of course, easier to speculate than to do research.”56 The reality is, I believe, quite different. There are at least four problems. First (a) is that those incredibly patient scholars who carry out meticulous philological work over decades are, in general and in principle, uncomfortable with the idea of transforming their ideas into any kind of theory, since theory oversimplifies, and disregards details – and the philologist knows “the devil is in the details!”. No theory will attract or satisfy a philologist – and for those who do go in for it, it results in a clash of theories which is treated as a matter of different opinions rather than differing interpretations of the known facts which must be compared not with each other, but with the facts. The theories are related to the people rather than the facts and details. Under the circumstances, the academic community actually contributes to the idea that scholars should believe in their work and view it as an end in itself which should be celebrated and not be oversimplified, but rather serve as a steppingstone or foundation for the next step. Hard work for the philologist is easy – and theory not attractive. Secondly (b) is that almost no one except an expert can work on the edifice or bridge (depending on the metaphor you prefer) created by the earlier generations to make a solid contribution to the next step. In this sense, philological work might lead to history, but it will not lead to theory. In practice, it generally leads to discussions of details, more grammars, dictionaries, commentaries, translations and text publications – and contributions on the history of the field. Writing real history is quite a challenge for anyone approaching the era before the birth of Thucydides. Thus we do not have satisfying debates about ancient history and certainly not elevated theoretical debates. Our methodology and source material render access to early history difficult – and contested. Thirdly (c) those in a hurry to understand the problem will generally look for real numbers because real numbers are almost the only way to provide support for formulae, equations, hypotheses, and robust theoretical conclusions. Since we do not have a lot of data – and what we have is usually not exactly “robust” – we cannot really offer anything. Long before I wrote this paragraph or introduced the quote by Hartwell, I came across an example where Hartwell’s own very good (from my perspective relatively hard and recent) data is thrown into doubt. Such scholars will offer what they can and produce results with what they have – and tend to neglect things that are not very well documented

56 Hartwell

1965: 164.

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– even if one can understand the material. This means theory is developed in a different way and treats different things – making it foreign to us. Fourthly (d) that means that we end up with theories of which we should be sceptical – but have no way of actually dealing with them. Fifthly, (e) those who are qualified are not really keen to contribute – and not confident that what they are doing is really suitable, and not interested in theory anyway. And thus sixthly (f) we find ourselves in a situation where there is no real communication – exactly there, where communication and discourse are essential if we are to get on. It is no surprise that Gommans and I were both disappointed. Most meticulous scholars are justifiably hesitant about stepping into uncertain waters where the benefits are not clear. Steinkeller is one such meticulous scholar willing to take a risk when he is persuaded that he has mastered the material – and he is therefore represented in this volume. Yet most are not quite willing, as this issue is not the most important item on the agenda. Thus, there is a failure to recognise that something important may be missing in contemporary understandings of history. In this sense, the fate of JESHO is simply a reflection of the progressive elimination of history as an input into social science thought, something inadvertently encouraged by the philological method. This would suit the sociologists and economists perfectly, since it would completely free them from the danger that anyone would be in a position to reproach them for disregarding history. From the standpoint of historians concerned with the Modern world this is logical; those dealing with ancient history do not seem to be interested in contributing, leaving the impression that there is nothing to contribute (as would have been the fate of The Earliest Economic Growth in World History in other hands). Thus, I believe that the real problem is not (merely) the readiness of the world to accept and endorse truncated history. I believe that the real problem is that many of the relevant people who are drawn to the ancient world are neither inclined nor prepared to deal with the complexities of unravelling something as complicated as economic interconnectivity and growth – and certainly not trying to sell the theme to the world. Because of our way of publishing the materials, there have even been claims that there is a dearth of studies on the ancient economies57 – but this is not the real problem. I believe that the major problem is that the issue is not of paramount importance to students of the ancient world and that it is too complicated to be dealt with as a merely subsidiary issue of one’s real interests. People do not ordinarily go into Ancient History because of an obsession with the factual interpretation of economic history and the development of theory: they know it is relevant, but it is not a priority. For this reason, scholars are reluctant to confront the issue: the dangers of making errors are far greater than the chances of being seen to make a major contribution relevant to their own view of what they (and others) consider to be the most important projects.

57 E.g.,

Hirth 2020 (for which cf. Warburton 2021b).

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The Cambridge World History And my second point relates to the fact that the gap left by the reluctance of philologists to contribute (i.e., those whom Gommans wanted to include but were not themselves ready to be included) means that the archaeologists and anthropologists step in with their own approaches, claims and agenda. The archaeologists and anthropologists have a completely different attitude towards theory than that I suspect caused philologists and historians to hesitate to join Gommans’s or my projects. Archaeologists and anthropologists are used to just taking theories off the shelves and think they will always find a suitable one – and are perfectly ready to endorse three or four if they appear relevant; and equally ready to defend ill-thought-out projects and ideas against all comers, regardless of whether they understand other positions or not, in some cases reserving an especial ire for those who use theory to critcise them, or to justify an alternative approach.58 They do not agree that we should be using our ancient material to build theories rather than using philosophers who had no idea of what we now know about the world. Instead, the ancient world is treated as some kind of place which must be different and treated differently. And the ensuing theories abound without ever having been exposed to criticism and scrutiny – because so many fail to take theory seriously (and for many it is a game). In 1987 Earle & Preucel noted that Hodder (a) believed “that focus on general laws is misguided”, (b) was basically opposed to any scientific method while not opposed to science absolutely, and (c) that Hodder was not inclined to recognize the validity of “an explicit quantitative methodology”.59 It is evident that Hodder owes his success in the following decades to realising that this specific theoretical agenda appealed to the archaeological mind when dealing with material. What he has done is to give the impression that this make-believe world is “archaeological theory”. An absolutely classic illustration of this problem are the volumes II and III of the 2015 Cambridge World History. In volume II on agriculture, there is a chapter on “agriculture and cities” which aims to dispute the importance of elites and the urban exploitation of the rural hinterland for economic purposes.60 In this chapter the authors Gallagher & McIntosh mix justified criticism of general prevailing models with a stress on the growing tendency of archaeology and anthropology to pay more attention to ordinary people than to the control allegedly exercised by the elites stressed by dinosaurs like myself. Their own conclusion is that approaches like my own are inappropriate to understanding the reality of ancient cities and Pre-Modern agriculture. I argue that this is partially because of their confusing (a) their own personal understanding of the correct orientation of the archaeological agenda (away from the elites and towards ordinary people) with (b) an objective understanding of the overall patterns of economic behaviour in the past. And this attitude towards letting the agenda dictate the conclusions is the dominant trend.

58 Cf., e.g., Warburton 2021c: 173–177. For similar reasons, opposing theory is one place where philologists and some archaeologists are united. 59 Earle & Preucel 1987: 525. 60 Gallagher & McIntosh 2015.

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In his analysis of the Ancient Economies, Hirth claims that The domestic economy is the foundation of all human societies both past and present. It is organized to support individual families and includes all of the ways that households access or produce the resources needed to meet their biological and social needs.61

It looks like a simple factual statement, but is in reality an ideological agenda. I argue that the (a) poverty of the ordinary households in the wealthy Pre-Modern Oriental economies and the (b) wealth of ordinary households in the wealthy Modern Western economies had economic causes that were not the result of household decisions, but rather the consequences of dealing with the social choices created by the institutions of their respective societies. It was the institutions of the societies that created the economic framework within which the households function.62 Household poverty was no more inevitable than household wealth. The crucial decisions defining household behaviour are not determined by the households themselves and the households are not the foundations of a socio-economy, but merely pawns of social norms. In the Pre-Modern Oriental world, the rural households had to surrender the goods and services creating urban wealth; in the Post-Modern Western world, the households must get jobs in the real economy so that they can consume with abandon to ensure that the economy can grow. In this sense, the prevailing argument – as represented by Dale, Gallagher & McIntosh, Hirth et alii – is a retreat from the facts and a refusal to confront the reality of history. Among the marvels to be found in the course of the survey by Gallagher & McIntosh is the remark that Likewise, many of the cities of classical antiquity, such as Athens and Rome, maintained sustainable agricultural systems such that the surrounding areas are still farmed today.63

This is quite surprising to learn as it is known that (a) Imperial Rome was accustomed to receiving 100,000 tons of Egyptian grain (collected as taxes) annually: While late Republican sources praise Sicily and Sardinia, together with Africa, as the main instruments in Rome’s grain supply, the two islands disappear from sight at the start of Augustus’ reign, their role being taken over by Egypt.64

Thus, even before the imperial city was growing, Rome was importing grain on a massive scale. And the Ptolemaic organisation whereby Egyptian grain was used as part of a fiscal and financial policy fell into the hands of the Romans when Augustus defeated Cleopatra. By this time (b) Athens had organised a system using silver, assuring commercially viable

61 Hirth

2020: 13; italics in original. anyone harbouring any doubts about the role of the elite in household decision-making, the significance of the Chinese hukou (戶口) “household registration” in the contemporary world is a good example of a policy going back (at least) to Qin times (and the principle was mercilessly exploited by the Japanese during their occupation, drawing on ancient laws), and still used as a device to guide social development. 63 Gallagher & McIntosh 2015: 201. 64 Erdkamp 2009: 225. 62 For

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steady imports of grain from the Black Sea, Sicily and Cyrenaica, i.e., long before the Ptolemies organised Egyptian supplies after Alexander’s conquest of the Persian Empire. However, as Bresson notes, Athens was not alone: In order to be able to find grain on foreign markets, [the other Greek, DAW] cities had to deploy an intense diplomatic activity. This translated into bestowing privileges and honors to key individuals, private citizens or dynasts, in the cities that were likely providers of grain. The case is particularly well attested for late Classical Athens, but obviously minor cities could not act differently.65

Thus, we can be certain that Gallagher & McIntosh are completely wrong about Athens and Rome; their agricultural hinterlands did not create sustainable self-sufficiency, but rather early on the cities outgrew the capacity of the hinterland to provide sufficient grain. These cities were not sustainable and did not sustain. However, Bresson’s remark is even more important because he stresses not only the dependence on imports, but also that the importing cities of the Greek world acquired their grain from other cities, meaning that the elites of these other (exporting) cities were acquiring their grain from their own hinterlands through taxation, rents and/or organised production, with the specific aim of bringing this grain into the market where there was intense competition among those organising the import of grain. Thus, the world of Classical Antiquity was not dominated by the households, autarky and self-sufficiency the archaeologists assume was the dominant feature of ancient economies. And the trade was not only guided by the cities, but the rural production of, and urban trade in, grain were fundamental elements of the economies of Classical Antiquity. That the agricultural hinterlands of Rome and Athens are still productive today reflects (a) the fact that Greece and southern Italy have not entirely freed themselves from the Pre-Modern world, and (b) the fact that the EU subsidises agriculture on an insoluble scale,66 and neglects (c) the fact that, since Antiquity, Athens has never managed to adjust to the fact that there is not enough water in the region to support agriculture and urban growth. Somehow, Athens has always managed to acquire grain and water from elsewhere, literally draining regions far beyond its own hinterland, and leaving inefficient farming villages behind while Piraeus connected and connects Athens to the world.67 In this sense, the wishes of the archaeologists to turn their eyes away from economics and elite exploitation is persuasive, because their agenda stresses that these economies were different in a sense which makes sense to them, but bears no relation to reality – and these assumptions are supported by claims depending upon a circular logic whereby economics can be excluded. But this does not depend upon an accurate appraisal of the system; it is

65 Bresson

2016: 389. The Economist, 29 May 2021. 67 The late A. P. Møller’s Danish firm Mærsk is now either the largest container shipping firm in the world or one of them (we will find out when COVID-19 is finally defeated and the world-wide distribution of containers rearranged) – but for a while Greek shipping firms were still counted among the larger ones in the world. It is no accident that 20th century Onassis would have been considered a “shipowner” by Xenophon (Πόροι, 3 [4]) who thought that such people should be offered “places of honour” in the theatre at Athens, although opera-singers might have been more interesting to Onassis than art itself. 66 “Charlemagne,”

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compatible with the Post-Processual agenda where “anything goes” – and that frees the archaeologists to study what they consider to be exemplary at the expense of a more global view, and then allege that what they want to study and want to see is actually what existed. In terms of archaeological theory, their view is legitimate. However, in terms of history their distorted view is illegitimate. In volume III of the Cambridge World History, on cities, there is neither a section nor a chapter of the volume dedicated to the political economy of cities.68 Despite the fact that in volume III Baines stresses that the Ancient Egyptian Nile Delta “contained numerous cities”69 in volume II Gallagher & McIntosh can contend that “ancient Egypt […] was not highly urbanised”,70 presumably because in volume III Baines himself stresses that the values of the elite “were rural rather than urban”.71 This persistent tendency to dismiss the Ancient Near Eastern cities as being little more than stages for performance and display inevitably supports the assumption that the Pre-Modern world was so different from the Modern that it is irrelevant (as if the contemporary financial districts of London, New York, Shanghai and San Francisco have nothing to do with display). It follows that those responsible for these projects do not consider the study of the economics of the earliest economies to be important – and since they are the experts, this means that these economies were not important. Finally, volume IV of the Cambridge World History does actually begin with a chapter on economics by Sitta von Reden, so that beginning in 1200 BC, we suddenly have economics72 – and this trend continues through to the end of the series. But, strangely, the beginning is missing; even if it begins before Allen, it is still truncated history. This is the consequence of archaeological theory – and general attitudes like that of Ober who suggest that because it is allegedly unknown, it need not be considered.73 Everything that happened during this early era is unknown, and was in any case of no importance for economic behaviour. There is nothing to be learnt. The great miracle came later. SUMMARY Obviously, under the circumstances, it will be difficult to persuade the world that the study of the earliest ancient economics is of central importance – and those who chose not to address the issue (e.g., by failing to submit a manuscript to this volume) are making a politically correct decision since it is a hopeless endeavour in the prevailing academic environment. Hudson enjoyed the support of the academic community in overtly stating that I was wrong to write an analytical account of how I understand ancient economics, meaning that those with the accepted idealistic ideological line have the right to interpret ancient economics: others do not.74 68 Yoffee

2015. in Yoffee 2015: 28. 70 Gallagher & McIntosh 2015: 202. 71 Baines in Yoffee 2015: 32. 72 von Reden 2015. 73 Ober 2015: 79. 74 Hudson 2005; mentioned pp. 274–279 below. 69 Baines

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Whether that is what the world needs is another matter. I believe that the major narrative of history is to be found in the major successful Pre-Modern economies of the Orient and that the study and understanding of these economies (by those I invited to the workshop, and those I would have like to have had) is the only rational means of understanding what happened before Modern Economic Growth. I argue that it was the religious and royal institutions behind the Pre-Modern traders along the Silk Road and in the Indian Ocean – along with those enabling the Pre-Modern bankers in northern Italy – who played a decisive role in determining the behaviour of the Dutch and British at the outbreak of the Early Modern. The symbiotic mutual dependency of the merchants and the institutions on the production of the rural hinterland enabled Pre-Modern economic growth. The basic character of the Pre-Modern economies was defined by the major economies of the Ancient Near East and thus this is where we need to look. In the mentioned chapter in volume IV of the Cambridge World History, von Reden makes the fundamental point that The income generated was only one of the functions of imperial taxation [in the ancient empires, DAW]; another was the exercise of social control […] Privileged groups and communities could be favored by reduced taxes […] There was also a close connection between taxation and the physical control of people. Both in China and Egypt there was an extensive system of forced labor to which, in principle, everyone was liable. […] Given such additional functions of taxation, it is doubtful that tax levies were calculated strictly on budgetary needs.75

Whether all the details of these statements are correct and apply to all of the ancient empires is probably open to doubt, as the claims are sweeping. However, in my view, the key point is that von Reden correctly recognises (a) that in certain economies “budgetary needs” were not paramount, (b) that state fiscal policy could favour “privileged groups” and (c) that “social control” was a priority. In this sense, her appraisal not only corresponds to my own, but also flies in the face of the claims that the households were the foundations of the economy and that the urban elites did not use policies to determine social behaviour. And beyond that she stresses that “economic” analysis of Pre-Modern economies must take account of social factors when assessing fiscal needs – which is important, e.g., for those reading Langer’s paper (in this volume). This takes us much closer to the reality of the ancient and Pre-Modern economies. It also reveals that there is a need to make a distinction between the markets and finance on the one hand, and state policy on the other. These ancient empires brought the markets and finance into existence, but markets behave according to their own rules, while state policy follows its own, both adjusting to the markets, and dictating certain tendencies. These empires were very stable, and the stability of the empire was more important than economic growth, and thus poverty and pomp accepted as the normal state of affairs. It is important to note that for Pre-Modern China, von Glahn points out that the market results were not optimal when monetary policy was not aligned with the market,76 just as Bresson concluded that 75 von 76 von

Reden 2015: 45. Glahn 1996: 252.

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the logic of the market allowed the Greek city-states to attain an unprecedented level of prosperity, but also ended up destroying them.77

In terms of contemporary politics, these aspects of market history are generally dismissed when economists praise markets, and ideologists suggest that the state should keep out of the markets. In terms of grasping history, it is thus of great importance that those who stress that the main story of the Pre-Modern world lies in the elements which were in fact peripheral to this tale78 and those who endeavour to deny the importance of ancient markets and finance79 are indeed winning the audience and thus closing off any discussion. In this sense, a narrow and inaccurate vision of economic history threatens to block understanding of the market and economics. On the other hand, among those who recognise ancient markets, there is an almost involuntary tendency to think in terms of “capitalism”, the “private sphere” and of “rational” behaviour. There is therefore considerable difficulty in freeing ourselves from our own conceptual world and recognising that markets and “capitalism” are not the same, and that the states played a role in the markets and production – and likewise that the states were keener on self-preservation and self-aggrandising than on economic growth, or assuring that ends and means were linked. In many of these states, a tendency to tax was probably not linked to a tendency to spend according to income, but rather to engage in social policies favouring those whom the state needed (e.g., gods and merchants) and those upon whom the state depended (e.g., landowners) while taking advantage of those who were threatened (e.g., small land-owners and tenants, mothers without husbands, and landless labourers). Realising and understanding how these ancient and Pre-Modern economies created the basis from which Modern Economic Growth took off is difficult. Understanding how right Allen is – that the Industrial Revolution was an accidental outcome of specific circumstances – is as important as understanding that there was nothing inevitable about cities. Appreciating that the rules of economics are historical social constructs resulting from practices of the Modern and Pre-Modern economies is a dauntingly difficult challenge. It is easier to avoid all such approaches, problems, and questions. All academic tendencies converge on denying the relevance and nature of the leading Pre-Modern economies to mainstream economic history. Therefore, I underscore that I understand the reluctance of those who failed to contribute – and we should all be grateful to the few who did, but we must take all these thoughts (theirs and mine) with large grains of salt, and remain conscious that everything that we are missing is relevant to understanding what questions we should pose. And the questions that we pose determine the answers we get. If we do not phrase the questions correctly, the answers could become speculative dogmas, as has happened so often in the past. Under the circumstances, it should be hardly surprising that truncated history, opinionated interpretations and the Polanyi paradigm have come to dominate non-expert 77 Bresson

2016: 437; more clearly expressed Bresson 2008, II: 235–236. Hirth 2020 and Gallagher & McIntosh 2015 – and many of the authors they cite. 79 E.g., Hirth 2020, along with Dale, Hudson & Co. 78 I.e.,

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discussions about ancient economics. I argue that we need to bring the authorities on the ancient world into a discussion with the authorities in economics to somehow bridge and overcome the barriers to understanding economic history and its relevance to economic theory. WHAT

WE HAVE

So we have a problem, but there is a lot out there (some in other publications and some still unpublished in the minds of scholars) that we do not have bundled together here – and it is tragic that some more of this is not available in summary form here. However, a lot has been published and we do have a few papers which throw light on some very relevant questions, and thus rather than a cumbrous cavalcade of comprehensive information and analysis, we get a glimpse through some chosen windows. We begin with Jones, who tells the story of how an economist/archaeologist might view how Neolithic society in Greece was transformed into the Aegean Bronze Age. From a didactic point of view, the experience is certainly very important as it traces in quantitative terms how growth began in the Post-Glacial era. From my own standpoint, what is important for readers to understand is that the Neolithic in Greece began long after the Near Eastern Neolithic, and did actually develop straight into a Bronze Age. In the Near East, the first Neolithic (ca. 12,000–6000 BC) collapsed in social failure, just as the Aegean Bronze Age ended in social failure (by ca. 1100 BC).80 The Near Eastern Bronze Age was a highpoint, and Benati shows how an archaeologist views the philosophical approach to studying the beginnings – which led in a straight line to our own world. Using archaeological materials and published philological sources he tries to demonstrate how proxies – dealing with warfare and city-size, etc. – can be exploited to get a scientifically based understanding of the overall socio-economic context of growth. This is probably the essential way to start. However, he also rightly stresses that this is but the beginning and that more co-operation is necessary. These beginnings are the most complicated part of the tale which must be thoroughly investigated. The following presentations offer far more details about the Bronze Age than I have hinted at in my discussion of the long-term context of economic growth. Dercksen gives us an expert’s impression of the commercial society that appeared in the wake of the collapse of the various third millennium empires. His emphasis on tracing growing private wealth based on strategic decisions and unabating action in a world which was superficially poor and unchanging should be striking. Moreno García takes us into the developments in Bronze Age Egypt, stressing that the use of silver was far more widespread than has hitherto been assumed. One of his objects is clearly to dispel the idea that Egypt was some kind of exceptional economy. Original in his approach is stressing the importance of silver and constantly binding silver into the 80 A popular version of this tale has been told in Cline (2014), who sees it from the Aegean perspective. In terms of history, the collapse of Aegean civilisation was of no importance, as the Aegean Bronze Age contributed nothing to the history of civilisation; the Near Eastern states re-grouped themselves, and began anew; in China civilisation just continued to develop. In that sense, civilisation most assuredly did not end: an incomplete shadow of what might have become a civilisation was wiped away, but no more.

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agricultural economy – which contrasts with Dercksen’s presentation of the Assyrian merchants who are distant from the agricultural background that allegedly dominated the Pre-Modern world. These two papers – by Dercksen and Moreno García – converge on the issue of markets, market behaviour and silver in the earliest economies, revealing what the documentation has to say. It is possible that the evidence of the Assyrian trade is new to some. As Dercksen shows, the object of the trade was to acquire silver and the commodities were merely a means of acquiring silver. The Assyrians did purchase copper in Anatolia – but they sold it there and were not keen on taking copper to Mesopotamia for commercial reasons, as the price was too high. However, for a long time, there was a fundamental misunderstanding about the material, as Polanyi tried to insist that the trade was about providing copper for Assur, based on the assumption that trade was exclusively about the provision of materials that were not locally available, and had to be acquired abroad. For Polanyi, “the rationale of the trading post [at Kanesh, DAW] as actually organized is the procurement of copper for the City” of Assur.81 According to Polanyi, the Old Assyrian trader’s job was to stimulate native mining activity […] to ensure delivery and deposit the copper with the gild office in Kanish. […] the copper and native cloth were exported […] All that which was bought with consignment goods went to Assur.82

Given his attitudes, Polanyi confirmed that this trade had nothing to do with markets and that If our interpretation is borne out by the facts, the question arises, How, when and where did market trade, fluctuating prices, profit and loss accounts, commercial methods of business, commercial classes and all the paraphernalia of a market organized economy originate? The history of market trade may be found to have shifted by a thousand years downwards and several degrees of longitude westwards, to the Ionia and Greece of the first millennium B.C.83

In this fashion, Polanyi endeavoured to give the impression (a) that Ancient Near Eastern trading was just about procuring materials and that money merely facilitated transactions (C–M–C and not M–C–M; in the former, the goal is the acquisition of commodities, in the latter, the goal is the acquisition of money) and (b) that it was in Europe that markets were invented – and spread from there. However, Polanyi’s interpretation is not “borne out by the facts”. 81 Polanyi

in Polanyi et al. 1971: 18. Italics in original. in Polanyi et al. 1971: 22. This is wrong: they were seeking silver, not commodities. It is probably not insignificant that Polanyi even got the textile trade wrong, allegedly with “fine cloths from the Capital” (and not second-rate textiles from southern Mesopotamia) going to Anatolia (Polanyi probably mistaking this for the Medieval and Renaissance silk trade), and local Anatolian textiles going the other way (which Veenhof 2008: 83 w/ n348; 87 w/ n369 clearly showed was not wanted, again for commercial reasons). As a minor detail, I would stress (a) that the Anatolian textiles really were not very good, but that (b) the south Mesopotamian textiles that the Assyrians sent to Anatolia were not viewed as being of high quality in southern Mesopotamia, where they were really second rate, but (c) Dercksen is correct that for the Anatolians, they were high quality (in comparison to their own). 83 Polanyi in Polanyi et al. 1971: 26. 82 Polanyi

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In fact, not only was the Bronze Age Ancient Near Eastern trade almost exclusively about getting profits in silver through trade, but we also have the evidence of fluctuating prices and profit in the Old Assyrian material (as Dercksen himself briefly mentions, and is exhaustively covered in the literature he and I have cited). Furthermore, it also transpired that the Assyrians only purchased copper in Anatolia to sell it elsewhere in Anatolia because “purely commercial reasons”84 prohibited the profitable export of copper to Mesopotamia from Anatolia. Thus, the Old Assyrian material demonstrates that prices determined production and the export of materials: supply and access alone was not the key element. The prices decided what was produced and where. The purpose of purchasing and selling copper locally was profit and the goods were not sent to Assur: the profits were. The absolute best proof of this was that – once the goods were delivered to Anatolia – most donkeys, with their harnesses, were ultimately sold in Anatolia, since only a few were needed for shipping silver, gold and persons back to Assur.85

Thus the “expensive ‘black donkeys’”86 were bred in the region of Assur and purchased in a special institution outside the city in order to take the commodities to Anatolia – and then disposed of like the commodities themselves. For the return trip, there were no goods being carried, just the silver.87 And indeed, Polanyi was mistaken because the markets began a thousand years earlier than the Assyrians, rather than a thousand years later. Since these aspects of the ancient markets and the Old Assyrian trade have become clear, there have been efforts to dismiss its relevance, to which the responses are relatively simple. Firstly: it has been claimed that the documentation of the Assyrian case is exceptional and thus cannot be used to argue about routine activities. However, the actual functioning of the Old Assyrian system suggests that it was completely integrated into a market system linking the Aegean with the Indus Region. This cannot be denied. Otherwise, the activities would make no sense. Thousands of workers in southern Mesopotamia were employed exclusively to produce textiles which far exceeded any potential local demand. This state-sponsored institutional production was dependent on private merchants taking over the arduous business of selling the textiles. The Assyrians were performing an essential role (not an exceptional one). And secondly, and more importantly, is that the sustained efforts to assert that this trade was exceptional fail, simply because the investments in the maintenance of incredible institutional herds of sheep (from third millennium Ebla to Mycenaean Knossos) in order to have (a) wool to sell and (b) wool for the manufacture of textiles for export are recorded throughout the Ancient Near East (and apparent in the Aegean). The Assyrian evidence provides the proof that the manufacture of textiles was an export driven activity (as I cited

84 Veenhof

2008: 86. 2008: 132 w/ n600. 86 Veenhof 2008: 132. 87 This is, in fact, eerily reminiscent of Xenophon’s remark that a shipowner could actually leave Piraeus with an empty hold, content with the silver he had acquired for the grain he had delivered. It is doubtless one of the crucial elements which must be grasped when reflecting how anormal this type of investment process seems to us. 85 Veenhof

INTRODUCTION

– THE WORKSHOP ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN ANTIQUITY

23

the Polanyi adherent Englund as having confirmed) – and thus the export of textiles (based on low-skilled labour-intensive industrial production) would dominate trade for millennia. Obviously, the Old Assyrian traders reveal several key aspects of the operation, including the role of the international trade routes and of international traders and the importance of silver as propelling the operation. In his own contribution, Dercksen offers a summary of the major details while making numerous observations which are highly relevant to the question at hand. Moreno García begins by stressing the misconceptions about the Egyptian economy, those which guided and guide interpretations about the Ancient Egyptian economy today. This is far more important than anyone can possibly imagine, since the image of one of the earliest and largest urban economies is utterly distorted in the minds of many observers. The earliest interpretations of the Sumerian documents seem to have demonstrated an indisputably far-and-deep-reaching temple economy and this reinforced the wide-spread acceptance of Polanyi’s vision – with the peculiar nuance that in Egypt this was seemingly reinforced by the Biblical interpretation. Given the apparent confirmation of a Sumerian temple economy at the dawn of history, many of the earliest scholars will have also been influenced by the traditions of the Hebrew Bible when developing an understanding of the Egyptian economy; Moreno García mentions the case of Joseph, but does not specify that the Old Testament relates that at the command of Pharaoh, Joseph opened the storehouses and sold corn to the Egyptians for the famine was severe throughout Egypt (Genesis 41:56).

This was a policy at times in first millennium BC China, whereby – in years of need – the state released stocks at a lower price than would ordinarily be the case.88 Whether this actually happened in Egypt is not known. However, it will be noted that this is not “redistribution” but commercial sales. What is strange, is that the part about selling the grain in Egypt is generally expunged in the modern references when quoted – and this thereby contributes to the idea of a magnanimous and just redistribution system in Egypt. However, even according to the Old Testament, the state is an actor in the market, treating subjects as tax-payers and customers, not partners. Indeed, earlier, During the seven years of abundance the land produced plentifully. Joseph collected all the food produced in those seven years of abundance in Egypt and stored it in the cities (Genesis 41:47–48).

Thus, according to the Old Testament account, the Egyptian state “collected” the grain (i.e., taxes) from the peasants in rural areas when they had too much, stored it (“in the cities”) and then sold it (i.e., market prices) to the peasants in the rural areas when they were in need. In contrast to this, in first millennium BC Wei China, Li Kui “had the state purchase grain after abundant harvests when prices were low […] selling its stocks when grain was dear”.89 (The Chinese system was more just, but neither system has anything to do with “redistribution” – whatever else one could say).

88 Von 89 Von

Glahn 2016: 55. Glahn 2016: 55.

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Silver stands at the centre of Moreno Garcia’s discussion as it appears in many texts revealing that both private and state commercial activities were based on silver. Moreno García also mentions that Amenemhat II of the Middle Kingdom engaged in commercial trade to acquire silver – and silver dating to this reign was actually found in a foundation deposit at the temple of Tôd (part of which is illustrated on the front cover of this volume – but it is not the actual silver described as purchased in the texts preserved). Significantly some of this silver is on display in the Louvre today, visible for all to see in the form of skilfully made silver cups – which may be either Anatolian or Aegean in origin. Of interest is that the cups were not offered to the god as a fine drinking set; the French archaeologist F. Bisson de la Roque observed that they were actually soigneusement pliées comme le linge (“carefully folded like linen”) to make them as compact as possible to be stuffed into copper boxes.90 They were therefore in fact plattgehämmert (“hammered flat”) as the German archaeologist Maran put it, again, hammering the vessels flat and their combination with the ingots suggests that they arrived in the treasure primarily because of their material value91

meaning that the god was being offered money and not beautiful drinking vessels. Thus, the actual materials from the Ancient Near East reveal a very different economy from that popularly imagined. Langer touches on the issue of labour in Ancient Egypt, giving his impression of what I see in slightly different terms. One of his crucial points is about what the influence of Egyptian activities was in neighbouring Palestine. On this issue, we are confronted with clear intentions of social control of conquered regions – which contrast strongly with Moreno García’s stress on the seeming independence of Egyptian women to pursue their own paths to riches. These papers which describe and analyse development are followed by two summarising two opposing points of view. Steinkeller and Renger juxtapose two different views of how growth can be appreciated in early antiquity. From here, we thus turn to “what we have”, followed by an epilogue in which I present my views on the theory and history of economic growth in a global perspective. NB: The bibliography of this Introduction can be found on pp. 293–308.

90 F.

Bisson de la Roque quoted by Deroches Noblecourt & Vercoutter 1981: 142. 1987: 222. Das Platthämmern der Gefäße und ihre Kombination mit Barrenformen wiederum legt nahe, daß sie in erster Linie wegen ihres Materialwertes in den Schatz gelangten. 91 Maran

TRANSFORMATIONS FROM THE NEOLITHIC TO THE BRONZE AGE IN GREECE: A MODEL OF A HOUSEHOLD IN AN EGALITARIAN NEOLITHIC VILLAGE Donald W. JONES Department of Economics, Loyola University of Chicago, Chicago, IL Department of Classics, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN

Multifaceted changes transformed Neolithic village society into societies with palatial administrations at their apex. These changes spanned political, economic, settlement, intellectual, and possibly religious spheres. No single model could account coherently for the full array of developments. Since the transformations occurred over at least two thousand years, and probably longer, there would have been numerous “stages” which could be identified, at least conceptually, as possible modeling targets: “from stage Blue to stage Green”, to avoid implications of numerical designations and associations of descriptive names with the plethora of theories extant in various literatures. An alternative to such a “point-to-point” approach is modeling of routine social processes which, interacting with technological changes, could lead to erosion of earlier societal norms or organization of particular types of activities. Individual process models could focus on a variety of activities which are believed to have undergone reorganization as part of the Neolithic-to-Bronze transformation. The basic problem that this paper addresses is how “more equal” societies of the Neolithic became the “more unequal” societies of the Bronze Age, culminating in Greece in the Mycenaean palatial society. The model posits particular pathways that might have operated over time to redistribute resources among households such that eventually a much smaller proportion of households possessed a much larger proportion of resources. The standard measure of such equality or inequality is the Gini coefficient, itself derived from the Lorenz curve. The Gini coefficient is a single-number measure of the degree of inequality of some variable measured on a sample of individuals or percentiles of a population. As such, it is a measure of a distribution. The model developed in this paper deals with the activities of a single householwd which would affect the equality of distribution of wealth within a village of households. Consequently, there is no need to measure the Gini coefficient, since a single household is observed at a single, initial point in time and at a single, temporally displaced point in time. What the model does employ, however, is a generalized Gini measure as a function of several variables which would be expected to affect its value. A common formula for the Gini coefficient is , where x is the measure of the variable distributed over individuals i and j, where there

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DONALD W. JONES

are n individuals. The Gini is the sum over all of the magnitude-ordered of the shortfall from equal shares of the cumulative magnitude of that variable up to each individual in the distribution, divided by the greatest value possible at that point, with complete inequality. The value of a Gini coefficient generally ranges from zero, indicating complete equality, to one, indicating complete inequality – one individual or household holding all of the variable under measure. Returning to the employment of a Gini function in this model, the actions of any household can result in either increased or decreased wealth, with other households unchanging. Of course, in any Neolithic village, many, if not most, households would undertake actions that could change the village’s distribution of wealth, and entries and exits of households also could affect that distribution, but one household’s behavior is likely to generalize, while the concept of an “open” village – open to emigration and immigration – raises forces beyond those incorporated here. The first model developed here is such a process model. It addresses how an apparent, egalitarian ethic could have been reduced and possibly largely eliminated over time by the force of small changes affecting the resources required to maintain rough equality of wealth across a village community. As Blake and Clark endeavored to achieve in their work, the approach here reverses the question of “how did inequality emerge”, to “how did egalitarianism weaken or disappear?”1 As the force of egalitarianism weakened, village sizes and settlement systems may have changed, both introducing additional forces weakening the application of an egalitarian ethic. The model here does not advance into those subsequent changes, although they remain interesting topics for further modeling.

A

PART I.

MODEL OF A HOUSEHOLD IN AN EGALITARIAN,

GREEK NEOLITHIC VILLAGE

This model studies the behavior of a household that has multiple members who devote their efforts to maximizing the well-being of their household subject to constraints on the household’s resources as well as to the norms of the village where they live. The household members produce an agricultural good – their food – and manufactured goods, which could range from stone, bone, and wood tools to ceramics and clothing. One thing the household values in addition to consumption and leisure is a measure of equality of wealth across households in the village, but maintaining any given level of equality requires the household to devote resources to that effort, resources which come out of their own consumption. However, the degree of equality across households in the village depends on the expenditures of all the households on the equality maintenance activity, making the degree of equality achieved a public good. The household can save some proportion of both their agricultural production and their manufactured production and at any given time may have some wealth in the form accumulated savings. These physical savings can deteriorate over time, so they are not

1 Blake

& Clark 1999: 57; Clark & Blake 1994.

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27

permanent, and the household may have dipped into its savings at different dates in the past. Since intra-village, and even interregional, trade was long established in the Neolithic, the household can consume some imports, which it pays for with its own exports of agricultural and manufactured goods. If the household does dip into its savings during the period modeled, it can spend those savings on either goods produced by other households in the village or imports. The ability to spend accumulated savings on imports breaks the requirement that the value of imports equal the value of exports. The household uses both labor and capital equipment in its agricultural and manufacturing activities. Some of the equipment may be left over from previous periods, according to a depreciation rate, and may be refurbished with the use of some labor in the model period. Similarly with housing: the household consumes housing, some of which remains from the previous period but is subject to maintenance or upgrading with the use of labor time. The household can receive a rate of return on previous savings, which could be achieved by loaning out some of the equipment or agricultural inventory to other villagers, although the same is not true of housing. The household need not live a life of working drudgery but can choose some leisure time as well. In numerical solutions, the household can take on a continuum of activities through the initial specification of labor allocation between agriculture and manufacturing. The specification used in the results presented here depicts the household as primarily an agricultural household, with some modest manufacturing activities, with 35 percent of household devoted to agriculture, 13 percent to manufacturing activities, 30 percent to leisure, 10 percent to repair and production of agricultural and manufacturing tools, 7 percent to ritual activities, and 5 percent to housing maintenance, repair and upgrade. These percentages could be altered to represent a household more specialized in manufacturing activities, possibly exchanging those products for all of its food. (I owe consideration of this point to Vagia Mastrogiannopoulou.) The valuations – prices by another name – that the household faces are all given to it. That is, the return to applications of labor is the same across households and may well be the same in other villages. The valuations of goods and capital equipment also are not affected by any household’s actions. Intra- and inter-village trade (exchange) determines the prices of goods, which may also be the same across the entire array of villages in the region. The model contains a number of avenues for change. First, households can accumulate wealth, which will affect their supply of labor to various activities. Second, changing labor allocations will alter patterns of production within households and can in turn make contributions to maintenance of equality across households less attractive, without any change in the fundamental preference for equality. Third, depreciation rates on productive equipment, housing, and stored inventories (physical wealth) could decrease through technological change, freeing household members’ maintenance and repair time to be used in other activities, including leisure. Fourth, prices could change, possibly beginning with the price of imports, which could increase or decrease relative to prices of locally produced items. While the model leaves prices exogenous to activities by this household, changes in the activities of many households in a village – and in other similarly affected villages – could begin to affect prices of goods and of factors of production – labor time and equipment.

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DONALD W. JONES

Fifth, technological change could affect the production functions and even introduce new products. These changes could be neutral in their effects on the productivity of time and equipment or could enhance one or the other more. As with Sahlins’ vision of the “domestic mode of production”, endorsed by Halstead,2 the household developed here engages in exchange with other households but also accumulates wealth even while engaging in activities aimed at leveling wealth. The model developed here is closer to Chayanov’s “peasant economy” model in its focus on alternative household activities, although with considerably less detail on the intricacies of agricultural operations. The agricultural household model has been developed extensively within economics in recent decades as well,3 and the model presented here follows the broad outlines of that approach. The present model shares an emphasis on agents’ pursuit of their own interests with a model of the emergence of hereditary inequality by Blake and Clark, who emphasize “… the emergence of rank, or institutionalized inequality, [as] a long-term, unexpected consequence of many individuals pursuing their own short-term interests”.4 While the model developed here stops short of establishing social rank or political power or leadership, it does provide several short-term mechanisms which contain longer-term implications for wealth inequalities, which do seem to be at the heart of rank and leadership. Proposals for processes that may have led from egalitarian societies of the Neolithic to the more hierarchical ones of the Bronze Age have tended to emphasize political negotiations as well as subsidiary economic developments,5 and looking forward in time a bit.6 Clearly the intra-village, and certainly at some point, inter-village or intra-town, negotiations and decisions regarding authority, both temporary and hereditary, must have played an important role in the transformation from Neolithic village and town societies to the palace societies of the later Middle and Late Bronze Age in Greece. The present model focuses on some economic underpinnings of those negotiations, but does not address the more general issue of social complexity.7 The Model A household’s utility is a function of its consumption of food, FC, manufactured goods, MC, imports, I, housing, H, leisure, ℓ, wealth, W, and the degree of wealth equality among the village population, V(G), where G is the Gini index, which takes a value of 0 for complete equality and 1 for complete concentration in one household.

2 Sahlins

1972: Chapters 2–3; Halstead 1999: 89–90. 1979; Singh 1986; Nakajima 1986; Key 2000; Jones 2014: 414–423; Jones 2021: Chapter 2. 4 Blake & Clark 1994: 17; Clark & Blake 1999: 57. 5 Clark & Blake 1994; Blake & Clark 1999. 6 Earle 2010. 7 For which see, e.g., the papers in Price 1995 and Price 2010. 3 Barnum

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29

in which Uj > 0 and Ujj < 0 for all arguments. Exports of the agricultural and manufactured good, FE and ME, are used to purchase imports I; since increasing FE and ME reduces consumption, equality maintenance and savings, Ui < 0 and Uii < 0 for these two choices. (Uj > 0 means that as one of the arguments in the utility function U, e.g., H, increases in magnitude, utility increases. Ujj < 0 means that additional increases in U get smaller as argument j continues to increase. This notation is developed as subscripts .) The θI are drawdowns from subsequently when that notation is clearer, e.g., wealth to finance consumption of the three goods – the agricultural good, the manufactured good, and the imported good. θF and θM 0, with negative values indicating sales of those goods within the community and saving the proceeds. θI * 0, since the household cannot sell imports; however, a reduction in θI is possible, indicating a reduction in drawdowns from savings to purchase imports. The value of the Gini index is a function of all households’ contributions to equality and accordingly is a public good:

where n is the number of households in the village. Food produced by a household, F, is allocated to consumption, C, maintenance of equality, G, and savings, S: and

where subscript S designates savings and subscript E designates exports outside the village of food and manufactures. Production of housing services involves maintenance labor applied to the structure as it existed at the end of the previous period, where the subscript t indicates the time period: ,

where δH is the depreciation rate of housing stock. Strictly speaking, Ht and Ht-1 are stocks of housing at the two dates, while H in the utility function is a flow of housing services proportional to the stock of housing. This maintenance labor may actually increase the housing stock. Liquid wealth at the beginning of any time period t is the accumulated value of savings in terms of the two goods subject to storage:

where the rj are interest rates that can be obtained on the respective, stored goods δj are the depreciation or deterioration rates, and θjt are withdrawals at previous dates t. Total wealth includes the values of physical assets such as housing and capital equipment, plus or minus current-period drawdowns:

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DONALD W. JONES

where α(n) and γ(n), αn < 0, γn < 0, represent crowding effects of additional households in a village on farm and house land respectively. The Pi, i = H, KF, KM, and T, are the prices of the respective assets, which are, of course, considerably larger than their current rental prices, the pi. The Pi are related to the pi as:

where, for example, pi ≡ r for KF and KM and k for T, ri is the own-discount (or interest) rate for the particular asset, and Ni is the anticipated economic life of the asset. The Ni and ri are inversely related to each other but are not simply inverses of each other. It has been found that contemporary consumers display strikingly different discount rates for different kinds of assets, particularly that consumers discount the value of energy efficiency in household appliances at rates well above consumer borrowing rates.8 Whether to interpret these divergences as representing irrationality of consumers or their possession of information not available to researchers has been decided generally in favor of the latter. The household’s technologies for producing food and manufactures are contained in production functions. For food production, or farming:

where τF represents the productivity of the technology, LF is labor time, T is land sown, and KF is services of capital equipment used. Land, T, is affected by the number of village households, represented by α(n) αn < 0, reflecting the effective reduction of land available to all households as an increasing number of households forces greater travel distances to fields for at least some households. For manufacturing, production technology is represented:

where τM represents the manufacturing technology, LM and KM are labor time and services of capital equipment used in manufacturing. Capital equipment used in farming and manufacturing is produced by the household:

where is the depreciation rate of capital equipment used in the previous period as upgraded by repair or maintenance with labor in the present period, . Factorspecific technological change could be modeled with additional τk terms, but I have opted to avoid the additional notational clutter. 8 Hausman

1979; Dubin & McFadden 1984.

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31

Because savings can be tapped for current expenditures, a household’s disposition of either good can exceed or fall short of its own production, even after allowing for exchange among other households within the village, an effect captured by terms θi 0, i = F, M, I, shares of liquid wealth at the beginning of the period that are spent on consumption goods:

The household’s full supply of labor time is allocated across the various productive activities and leisure:

The household’s income is derived from the following sources:

where θi is the proportion of the household’s wealth that it spends during the period. The household’s expenditures, including its saving, equal its income:

where I is imports, pF = 1, and the other pj terms are prices (valuations) of the other goods in terms of the agricultural good. Allowing unbalanced trade, or a balance-of-payments deficit or surplus, since a store of value exists,

The model clearly contains a large number of endogenous variables, 26 in all, although happily six of them, excluding constraint multipliers, can be substituted out using adding-up relationships. The household has a fixed amount of time, of which leisure ℓ can be eliminated as the residual of the fixed total household time L minus the time spent in other activities. V(G), H, and W can be substituted out of the utility function with their components, and the two categories of capital equipment, LF and LK, can be eliminated with the use of their residual stocks from the previous period and time allocated to their maintenance or supplementation during the current period. These eliminations of endogenous variables still leave a large model, since 5 constraints remain to be imposed, each with its endogenous Lagrange multiplier, which add another five variables and equations to the model. The budget constraint, with its Lagrange multiplier λ1, equates household income and expenditure. The magnitude of the multiplier tells

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DONALD W. JONES

the value of a marginal increment in the budget constraint. The second and third constraints characterize the agricultural and manufacturing technologies. The fourth constraint represents the transformation of goods and time allocated to activities maintaining an egalitarian ethic into a value of the Gini coefficient and the structure of the subsequent valuations of those values, V(G). The fifth constraint is the trade balance, allowing effectively for an imbalance of payments with θI. The Lagrangean is

The next modeling steps, detailed further in Appendix 2, involve, first, differentiation of the Lagrangean with respect to each of the endogenous variables under the control of the household. This procedure yields the configurations of variables that will maximize the utility of the household, given the external constraints it faces – known as “first-order conditions” for maximization. The second step is to differentiate totally (i.e., with respect to all variables, endogenous and exogenous) the first-order conditions. A third step converts the coefficients of the equations resulting from the second step into elasticities – the percent change in an endogenous variable caused by a one-percent change in an exogenous variable. The fourth and final step in the calculations arrays the coefficients of the thirdstep equations as a matrix and solves for the determinants of alternative versions of the basic matrix of coefficients. From this step emerge elasticities of the endogenous variables with respect to changes in each of the exogenous variables and parameters, which provide the narratives told below. Stories of the Neolithic The model contains 25 endogenous variables and 24 exogenous variables and parameters – and more of each when the endogenous variables that are substituted out of the model are accounted for, detailed in Tables 2.A1 and 2.A2 of Appendix 1 – so there is a plethora of “stories” that the model can tell. I call these results “stories” because I do not know whether they are true or accurate, which requires a combination of evaluating the logical plausibility of each result and comparing the theoretical prediction with empirical material from Neolithic Greece. Not all of these stories need be told in the same manner. In some cases, interest dwells in the consequences for one or more endogenous variables of changes in a range of exogenous variables. The prime example of this type of story is the influences on egalitarianism, represented by changes on the household’s resources allocated to maintenance of an egalitarian ethic as represented by the value of the village Gini coefficient. Others are the influences on – determinants of – household savings and influences on withdrawals of savings for particular expenditures. The other principle type

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33

of story – or set of stories – to be told is from the perspective of a particular exogenous variable, for example the depreciation rate of the housing stock, which has widespread and strong impacts on many of the endogenous variables, most of which are only indirectly affected by that variable. Readers may be accustomed to two major predictions from economic analyses of consumers and producers: that consumers are expected to purchase fewer units of a product when its cost to them, or price, is higher; and that producers are expected to produce more units of a good when its sale price is higher. The current model is a household model, however, and households are both producers and consumers, facing cost or price incentives in both directions. Consequently, some of the resource allocation responses emerging from the model may seem counterintuitive initially, although with some further reflection, the intuition behind the responses emerges. The five constraints also can push allocative forces beyond the variables initially affected by exogenous changes, such that responses sometimes appear in unexpected corners of the household economy. That said, the model is large enough to contain intricacies that I simply do not understand myself, although the great majority of understandable responses increases my confidence in the model more than in my full understanding of all its workings. Appendix 2 addresses some technical matters which some readers may value more than others. The Archaeological Setting Considerably more could be said regarding what is known about the society(ies), villages, and households of Neolithic Greece than I will report here. The findings I cite here offer some background to the structure of the model presented above and the findings reported below. First, trade (or exchange, if one prefers that term) occurred among villages, including long-distance trade from the Early Neolithic.9 Second, by later in the Neolithic, it has been established that specialized production existed at the level of the household, at least for pottery and stone tool manufacture10 and I suspect also for some stages of clothing production and building construction. This specialization, even if only relative and not absolute, implies some exchange or trade at least among households within a village, which Halstead has concluded must have existed.11 Fourth, in the Near East, the lack of common storage facilities is taken as evidence making it seem clear “that households held property separately from the community”, as Hole concludes was probably largely true for the Levantine and Anatolian early Neolithic.12 Fifth, the constancy of village size over the Neolithic, particularly toward later centuries, appears to be a matter of current question. Halstead has presented evidence suggesting year-round occupancy for settlement sites.13 Several models of village splitting with time 9 Perlès

2001. 2008. 11 Halstead 1995. 12 Hole 2000: 206. 13 Halstead 1999. 10 Souvatzi

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DONALD W. JONES

and population growth have been put forward,14 and a number of authors have cited the implied requirement for governance structures as village sizes increased.15 Sixth, the egalitarian ethic has been widely deduced or otherwise proposed,16 but the timing of its disappearance has been widely dated.17 Alongside the suggestion of egalitarianism, and apparently peaceful life, skeletal evidence from both Neolithic Greece and the Neolithic Near East reveals what may have been a fairly extensive record of personal violence, in the forms of fractured facial bones from frontal injuries18 and more extensive, non-warfare injuries.19 Clearly interpersonal conflict existed. Influences on the Egalitarian Ethic The egalitarianism constructed in this model requires that households allocate resources to maintaining its extent as measured by a Gini coefficient. Those resources – some of the agricultural good(s) and some of the manufactured good(s), combined with household members’ time – may go into feasting, ceremonies, construction and maintenance of shrines and other monuments, and so on. I do not model direct redistribution as a separate consumption item although feasting probably could be so considered. Nevertheless, the egalitarian consequences, V(G), enter the household’s utility function. But recall that the value of the village’s Gini coefficient, or the degree of the village’s egalitarian distribution of income and wealth, is the result of the actions of all households in the village, so each household contributes only a portion of the effort but receives the full results – i.e., egalitarianism or the distribution of income and wealth is a public good. While the model contains only a single household’s contributions to this public good, in a Nash equilibrium of strategic interactions across households in the village, which is a plausible condition, all the households would behave as the one under study. The model presents two principal perspectives on the progress of egalitarianism in the face of external changes: the resources allocated directly to its maintenance and their consequences, and the value the household places on an increase in achievable egalitarianism, represented by the Lagrange multiplier on that constraint, λ4. Table 2.1 reports the larger elasticities of external influences on the household’s contributions to egalitarianism. As explained above, the very large elasticities should not be taken at face value but rather as reflecting higher degrees of sensitivity. Table 2.1 reports the elasticities of the household’s allocations of the agricultural and manufactured goods, as well as their own time, to the activities that maintain egalitarianism in the village, as well as the effects on the household’s valuation of a marginal increment in a more equal distribution of wealth and income. In the case of each influence other than village household size, n, the contributions of the two goods on the one hand 14 Carneiro

1987; Jones 1999; Bandy 2004; Bandy 2008. Halstead 2005. 16 E.g., Kantner 2008; Souvatzi 2008. 17 Kuijt 2000; Orrelle & Gopher 2000; Wright 2004. 18 Papathanasiou 2005. 19 Whittle 2003: 39. 15 E.g.,

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35

and time on the other, substitute for each other: when the household reduces its contributions of physical goods, it increases the time it devotes, and vice versa. In the case of village size, however, a greater number of households leads the household to reduce all three of its contributions to equality. Amid the number of very large elasticities in Table 2.1, those in the single-digit and 10-1 range should be noted as well, as they are likely to indicate effects of sufficient size to create notable changes if sustained over a number of years. From Table 2.1, however, it is difficult to tell whether the net result of the substitution of goods for time and vice versa induced by some of these parameter changes would act to increase or reduce the village’s egalitarian status. For these conclusions, I turn to Table 2.2. Table 2.1. Effects on Household Contributions to and Participation in Maintenance of Egalitarianism MG LG λ4 FG Exogenous variable positive negative positive negative positive negative positive negative pM pH pI r w k n L Wt δH βKF βKM βH NKF rH rKF rT

-4.92 0.35

-16

12

-73

54

1.18 -22

12 82 0.01

-0.88

42 272 0.03 -116

0.01

-31 -202 -0.02 -76 -0.02

-385 0.03

-2.03 0.11

-6.77

5.03

0.11 -0.25

0.19

13 2.97

-0.83

0.62

-2.88 -1.38

2.14 1.02

-0.08 0.01

-0.48

44 9.92 -0.01

0.06

-0.08

0.64 -0.87 -0.41

-0.01

-33 -7.37 -0.04

0.01

0.03

Why does larger village size reduce the household’s contributions to ( and ) ) the activities that maintain equality of household income and and participation in ( wealth? Village size operates through four mechanisms on contributions to the maintenance of equality: the direct, negative effects on land devoted to farming and to housing; the agricultural technology constraint which involves the negative effect of village size on individual household land use; and the technology constraint on the village’s production of egalitarian income and wealth outcomes. All four effects operate to reduce the household’s physical contributions to equality, but the effects operating through the technology constraint on activities that maintain equality are by far the most powerful. When village

36

DONALD W. JONES

size increases, the aggregate contributions to the generation of income and wealth equality as measured by the Gini coefficient G increase. The increase in G which the household enjoys, generated by the increase in the number of households contributing resources devoted to maintaining equality, is sufficient to reduce the household’s contributions to those activities and still maintain its overall level of well-being. This is the classic case of a consumer of a public good stinting on its contribution to the provision of a public good because the reduction in its contribution will be too small to notice. In this case, the increase in the number of households in the village increases aggregate G sufficiently for any individual household to reduce its contributions of the agricultural and manufactured goods to those activities supporting the magnitude of the Gini coefficient. The household prefers instead to consume slightly less of the agricultural good and more of the manufactured good and to export more of both goods to increase its consumption of imports. This increase in imports emerging from the reallocation of household resources under larger village size replicates the long-distance trade to which hypotheses regarding the emergence of chiefdoms from more egalitarian societies commonly appeal, e.g., Drennan, who discusses and qualifies the issue of the political potency of goods acquired through long-distance exchange, but without the aura of exoticism those models attach to such goods.20 Of course, a marginal utility of the imported good relative to the marginal utilities of the two goods produced by the household is specified in the numerical calibration of the model, but these ratios depend only on the relative prices of those goods. There is no additional valuation of conspicuous consumption beyond the exclusionary device of relative costliness. , three small, posiIn the case of the household’s participation in these activities, tive effects operating through increments to land used in farming and housing and the agricultural technology constraints are greatly outweighed by the public-goods effect operating on the same constraint that reduced household contributions to the equality-maintaining activities. The same free-rider effect reduces all of the household’s equality-maintaining efforts. When the number of households increases, G facing any household in its utility function increases, so the household can reduce its own contributions to those efforts and maximize its utility by allocating these goods, as well as labor, to other ends. This is a classic example of free-riding on a public good: this household – and every one like it – depends on its neighbors to fund its consumption of an egalitarian distribution of income and wealth – to the detriment of the desired distribution. , where the dots indiUsing the expression cate “percent change in,” the various elasticities of FG, MG, and LG can be inserted and summed with the appropriate weights representing productivity, , and proportion, , to yield the overall change in the household’s generation of egalitarian activities. Table 2.2 reports these overall consequences for three scenarios, each representing a particularly high marginal productivity of one of the three contributions. It might not be unreasonable to suppose – or hypothesize – that in earlier periods that the marginal productivity of 20 Drennan

2006: 3966.

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37

manufactured goods to these activities would have been higher, on the additional supposition that there was a lower ratio of manufactured inputs to the other two types of input. As (if) village and subsequently town monuments such as temples increased the proportion of “manufactured” goods to time and agricultural goods – the right-most column of Table 2.2 – the marginal productivity of the household time devoted to activities using these facilities would have become higher. Moving from left to right across the columns of Table 2.2 shows that the elasticities of egalitarian outcome with respect to a number of external influences – e.g., pM, pH, and w – reverse signs. Events that would have increased egalitarian outcomes under lower marginal productivity of time now decrease those outcomes. There is an ironic dimension to this pattern: as villages build more substantial facilities in support of an egalitarian ethic, those very structures can, under the circumstances of changes from several sources, actually decrease households’ contributions to and participation in egalitarian activities, leading to a decrease in equality across the village – and all with no fundamental change in preferences for egalitarianism (specified in the utility function). That said, most of these variables are not known to have increased systematically – or decreased, for that matter – across the Neolithic-to-Bronze-Age transformation. It is not clear that the relative cost or price of manufactured goods increased or decreased other than through routine fluctuations of crop success or failure; such events could have been quite location-specific as well. However, the introduction or invention of new manufactured goods could have changed this relative cost by changing the composition of goods under consideration. As an influence on the price of imports, pI, relative to the agricultural good, transportation costs may have continued to creep downward over this transformational period, with improvements in seagoing shipping and greater – if still relatively rare – use of wheeled vehicles for land transportation. Alternatively, more efficient transportation may have reached products previously unreachable that were more costly than the products previously within reach, acting to increase the aggregate price of imports by changing their composition. Clearly the most striking result regarding egalitarianism in the model is the effect of the number of households in the village. Larger village size sharply decreases both agricultural and manufactured contributions to the equality-preserving activities as well as the household’s participation time in them. While some Neolithic villages did increase in size, possibly reaching the size and complexity of what could be called towns, the early centuries of the Bronze Age witnessed the emergence of some quite large towns – Manika on Euboeia and Knossos on Crete to note two. According to the model, the emergence of larger villages and towns would have sharply reduced the contributions to equality-preserving activities, and the prestige of these larger centers may well have influenced these practices in smaller towns through something like Wiener’s Versailles Effect.21 The modest decrease in the marginal valuation of greater equality, λ4, reported in Table 2.1, which accompanies

21 Wiener

1984.

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DONALD W. JONES

Table 2.2. Participation in & Contributions to Egalitarian Activities

Source of External Change

Price of the manufactured good relative to the agricultural good

High Marginal Productivity of Agricultural Goods Used in Ritual

High Marginal Productivity of Manufactured Goods Used in Ritual

High Marginal Productivity of Labor Time Devoted to Ritual

-0.82

-4.1

7.1

Rental price of housing

0.06

0.29

-0.51

Index of import prices

-3.65

-18

32

2.08

10

-18

14

68

-118

113

181

113

-230

-307

-255

0.0013

0.0064

-0.011

-0.34

-1.69

2.93

-0.000033

-0.000166

0.000287

2.2

11

-19

-0.000013

-0.000067

0.00012

Household’s discount rate on land

-0.002

-0.011

0.019

Expected life of agricultural equipment

-0.069

-0.35

0.60

0.5

2.48

-4.30

Productivity coefficient of labor time used in maintenance, repair or supplementation of agricultural equipment

-0.042

-0.21

0.36

Productivity coefficient of labor time used in maintenance, repair or supplementation of manufacturing equipment

-0.24

-0.27

-0.55

Productivity coefficient of labor time used in maintenance, repair or supplementation of housing stock

3306

3305

6613

Depreciation or deterioration rate of agricultural equipment

-0.001

-0.004

0.007

Depreciation or deterioration rate of manufacturing equipment

-0.001

-0.001

0.001

Depreciation or deterioration rate of housing stock

0.02

0.03

-0.04

Rental cost of capital equipment Value of labor time Implicit rental on land Number of households in the village Number of adult equivalents in the household Value of disposable wealth at the beginning of the period Expected life of housing Household’s discount rate on housing Expected life of the land asset (before it must be abandoned)

Household’s discount rate on agricultural equipment

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39

the decrease in the actual equality, is not a scarcity effect but does reflect some reordering of priorities although not a fundamental change in values. Larger household size, L, has little effect on a household’s contributions to egalitarian activities. That said, more intricate modeling of the internal composition of households might yield different results. That said, household size and family size are different matters, and although the Greek Neolithic appears to have been characterized by a predominance of single-family households, some further movements in that direction may have occurred. I am aware of no evidence that population growth rates increased, so there seems to have been no upward pressure on L from larger family sizes – more children. But at least from the current model’s perspective, fertility changes would not seem to be an important place to look for changes in egalitarian behavior. A higher wage, w – productivity (marginal) of labor – elicits greater agricultural contributions to the maintenance of equality during a hypothesized earlier period of greater marginal contributions of agricultural and manufactured goods to egalitarian activities, but that relationship reverses itself drastically under the condition of higher productivity of household time in those activities – shown looking from left to right across the w row of Table 2.2. Whether there was much labor productivity improvement, especially at the margin, over this period is questionable, or at least is an open question. Greater wealth at the beginning of the period, Wt, has the same structure of effects as does the wage rate across the scenarios of relatively higher marginal productivities in equality maintenance activities. Wealth in agricultural goods would be largely short-term inventories of foodstuffs, but would also include livestock. Inventories of stone tools or raw materials from which to make them, inventories of products such as pots, figurines, precious metals and in the model. Wealth naturally brings up the issues of savings stones are the stuff of and saving behavior, with which I deal shortly. An interesting and moderately surprising influence on agricultural contributions to egalitarian activities is the positive elasticity with respect to , the input-output coefficient for labor time used in maintenance, repair, replacement, and augmentation of capital equipment used in manufacturing. The elasticity of 0.19 may seem inconsequentially small compared with some of the other elasticities which reach the 3- or 4-digit magnitude, but among econometrically estimated elasticities using actual behavioral data, it is a respectable magnitude. I cannot trace the links between this labor productivity coefficient which has its most direct impact in the production of manufactures to its role in depressing an allocation of the agricultural good, but it is a useful example of small but not insignificant, indirect impacts of a subject of interest, that could otherwise escape attention. This relationship is surely undetectable archaeologically, but it should serve as a reminder that small, hard-to-observe or unobservable changes could help produce signifdepresses the household’s icant, long-term changes. Overall, however, an increase in generation of equality maintenance by an elasticity of -0.24, by virtue of the reduction in household time devoted to these activities that it induces. Another surprising, and large impact on the household’s production of equalitymaintaining activities comes from an increase in βH, the productivity of labor in housing maintenance, repair and upgrading, with elasticities ranging from 3305 to 6613 – values which should be considered as indicating a substantial degree of sensitivity rather than

40

DONALD W. JONES

strictly numerically. This response of the household’s participation in egalitarian activities is part of an interesting nexus of its responses to changes in building maintenance and construction technology. A larger value of δH, the depreciation or deterioration rate of = housing stock, literally sucks time out of housing activities, with an elasticity of -221 (again, do not consider this value strictly numerically) rather than pushing more time into keeping the dwelling up, apparently a case of the household declining to throw good effort after bad. And the bulk of that time goes into leisure rather than alternative productive uses. However, an increase in the productivity of the household’s efforts at pulls time into that activity even more housing stock maintenance and upgrade, strongly than a higher deterioration rate flushed it out, with an elasticity of 5670. This model result finds an intriguing parallel in Tomkins’ empirical observation from Late Neolithic Knossos of more substantial housing construction than previously as well as qualitative changes in housing design, indications of possibly improvements in construction technology and greater allocation of labor.22 The finding just above regarding the allocation of time away from house maintenance and toward leisure is important. The bare economic designation of leisure gives the appearance of a black box in which people do nothing, when in fact the activities that go on during what economists typically designate as leisure provide the reasons people allocate time to the other designated activities in models and analyses. From the ample evidence of childhood malnutrition, adult dietary deficiencies, endemic diseases, and untreated injuries in Neolithic skeletal remains, there may be a tendency to regard Neolithic households and communities as toiling all day, day in and day out, just to stay alive. Judging from the artistic evidence they have left behind in various media, that conclusion would be wrong. They had ample time to sit – or walk – and think about, experiment with, and undoubtedly discuss various subjects that enriched their lives. The external events that would have increased or decreased time allocated to these “leisure” activities are interesting and warrant further attention than can be offered here. Altogether, the requirement to devote household resources to the preservation of income and wealth inequality introduces a number of mechanisms by which the facts of egalitarianism could change – toward either greater or lesser inequality among households, one of the characteristics widely considered a feature of Neolithic Greek life and culture. The mechanisms relied upon here do not appeal to changes in ethics or beliefs, but instead hold ethics and beliefs constant. It is possible that changes in ethics and beliefs could have followed changes in the behavior modeled here. Saving and Saving Behavior Rough equality of wealth, particularly over generations, has been noted as a defining characteristic of the Greek Neolithic, and one which gradually changed as time moved into the Bronze Age, culminating in the Mycenaean palatial civilization with its more skewed

22 Tomkins

2004: 51–52.

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41

income and wealth distributions. Parts of the model address ways in which wealth could have grown, and households could have differed in their experiences of these changes. Over time, ethical changes could have followed such differentially changing family fortunes, reinforcing and exacerbating the growing income and wealth, and eventually social and moral, inequality. Wealth is an element in the household’s utility function, and real savings, of both agricultural and manufactured goods, FS and MS, and withdrawals from savings for current expenditure, θF, θM, and θI, affect the accumulation of wealth. Stored agricultural and manufactured goods can earn returns, not by collecting interest in something like a bank account – a gross anachronism – but by being loaned out for a payment, equivalent to an interest payment. Accordingly, present wealth is composed of all previous real savings which have not deteriorated according to the depreciation coefficients δF and δM, augmented by previous payments for their use by others, in effect interest payments rF and rM. The allocations of current production to savings compete with the other uses for those outputs, and discrepancies can emerge between current production and current consumption because of the ability to withdraw savings to purchase more than is produced or to add to savings if production exceeds allocations. Despite the wide array of factors that influence these aspects of savings, some exogenous variables probably experienced more substantial changes during the Neolithic-Bronze Age transformation than others and accordingly warrant greater interest. Of most direct interest to saving behavior is the relevant interest rate, rF in the case of savings of the agricultural product, rM for manufactured goods. Negatively equivalent to interest rates are the depreciation or deterioration rates on the agricultural and manufactured inventories in household savings, δF and δM. These parameters offer opposing effects: a higher deterioration rate could encourage greater saving to still have something in subsequent periods, but it also could encourage households to consume now to avoid suffering losses. Sadly, in my choices of specifications, I substituted the definition of wealth into the utility function rather than keeping a separate wealth constraint. This conferred the advantage of acknowledging that the household affects wealth through choices made on other variables – the agricultural and manufactured goods stored away as well as the more opportunity-driven choices represented by the θi – but at the cost of losing the interest and depreciation rates as parameters surviving the first-order conditions. To explain, the first-order conditions for the household’s utility maximization involve only those variables under the household’s control. The interest and depreciation rates are not under the household’s control, and they do not remain in the formulations for the first-order conditions. If either of the ri or the δi were multiplied by one of the choice variables, they would remain in the first-order conditions and be available for the total differentiation that yields the final equations of the model. Patience allowing, a subsequent version of the model will retain the wealth constraint. The current model structure allows study of the choices of the volumes of the agricultural and manufactured goods allocated to savings, as they respond to differences or and , and the more opportunistic withchanges in the exogenous variables: which have the subdrawals or unplanned additions to savings represented by the stance of responses to unanticipated changes in transitory income.

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DONALD W. JONES

Table 2.3. Influences on Saving Behavior

Source of External Change

Price of the manufactured good relative to the agricultural good

Agricultural Goods Allocated to Saving

Manufactured Goods Allocated to Saving

-0.87

-16

Rental price of housing

0.06

0.78

Index of import prices

-3.86

-48

Rental cost of capital equipment

2.2

27

Value of labor time

0.1

1.23

Implicit rental on land

0.001

0.02

Number of households in the village

-0.11

-1.44

Number of adult equivalents in the household

0.001

0.02

Value of disposable wealth at the beginning of the period

-0.36

-4.47

-

-0.004

2.32

29

-0.07

-0.91

-0.002

-0.03

-

-0.002

0.52

6.55

Productivity coefficient of labor time used in maintenance, repair or supplementation of agricultural equipment

-0.04

-0.55

Productivity coefficient of labor time used in maintenance, repair or supplementation of manufacturing equipment

0.03

0.43

Productivity coefficient of labor time used in maintenance, repair or supplementation of housing stock

-0.15

-1.9

Depreciation or deterioration rate of agricultural equipment

-

-0.01

Depreciation or deterioration rate of manufacturing equipment

-

-

0.01

0.07

Expected life of housing Household’s discount rate on housing Expected life of the land asset (before it must be abandoned) Household’s discount rate on land Expected life of agricultural equipment Household’s discount rate on agricultural equipment

Depreciation or deterioration rate of housing stock

As an overview, each parameter variation that leads to an increased allocation of the agricultural good to savings also leads to an increased allocation of the manufactured good to savings as well, and vice versa. Appendix 3 contains a table with the numerical elasticity results for each exogenous variable for FS, MS and the three θi. Additionally, the responses of the θi decisions to the same parameters that affect the FS and MS allocations tend to and elasticities are positive, counteract the FS and MS allocations. When the elasticities are negative, and vice versa, and those latter elasticities two of the three are often quite large in absolute value, considerably larger than those of FS and MS, which

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43

I consider the planned savings – except in the case of responses to n, larger village size: elasticities have the same negative sign as the and two of the three elasticities. Evidently larger village size tends to reduce combined planned and transitory savings. A similar pattern of elasticities occurs in responses to differences in rH and (negative responses). I do not understand the (positive responses), and in Wt and steps involved in these particular responses. For more specific detail, higher values of r and rH lead to notably larger allocations of contributing lesser the agricultural good to savings, with higher values of pH, w, and additions of that good to savings. Larger values of pI and pM substantially reduce allocations of the agricultural good to savings while larger values of Wt, n, βH, and NT induce smaller reductions. I do not see any systematic relationships in these patterns. A higher price of imports, pI, causes a very sharp drop in the allocation of manufactured output to savings, with an elasticity of -48, far larger than any other elasticity of the allocation of either good to planned savings. A higher price of the manufactured good also sharply reduces the allocation of the manufactured good to savings, probably a price prompt greater savings of the manufactured response. Higher values of r, rH, and good. As far as parameters whose values may have changed systematically across the NeolithicBronze Age transformation, the βi and δi production parameters and the Ni and ri asset valuation parameters stand out as prime candidates or suspects as the case might be more appropriately characterized. Rather than providing any silver-bullet explanations for structural changes across this time period, these parameters offer competing effects on both planned and transitory savings, and their cumulative impacts on households and their societies would need to be studied individually. Happily, each of these parameters may find some data in archaeological remains of equipment and structures. Influences on Leisure Leisure surely was an important component of Neolithic Greeks’ time allocation. It allowed them time to think: to think of artistic developments which remain on their ceramics and various stone, bone, and shell carvings; to think how they wanted their dwellings and other buildings to look; to think about their relations to the impersonal forces that eventually emerged as the region’s deities; and likely to think about how to develop and maintain a social order that permitted them to live in settlements with multiple families. This model does not discriminate among these various pursuits, but an increase in leisure time would be able to contribute to any of these inquiries. Nevertheless, these are possible consequences of leisure, which may in turn have questioned notions of egalitarianism. So, what external events, according to this model, might have contributed to increases in leisure? Once again, secular decreases in relative prices of manufactured goods & imports cause leisure to increase. But quite reasonably, secular increases in the productivity of labor in several activities – particularly in maintenance of agricultural equipment and housing stock – would have drawn time back into production activities, and more durable housing stock would have shifted more time into leisure.

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DONALD W. JONES

Table 2.4. Influences on Leisure Source of External Change

Elasticity of Leisure

Price of the manufactured good relative to the agricultural good Rental price of housing Index of import prices Rental cost of capital equipment Value of labor time Implicit rental on land Number of households in the village Number of adult equivalents in the household Value of disposable wealth at the beginning of the period Expected life of housing Household’s discount rate on housing Expected life of the land asset (before it must be abandoned) Household’s discount rate on land Expected life of agricultural equipment Household’s discount rate on agricultural equipment Productivity coefficient of labor time used in maintenance, repair or supplementation of agricultural equipment Productivity coefficient of labor time used in maintenance, repair or supplementation of manufacturing equipment Productivity coefficient of labor time used in maintenance, repair or supplementation of housing stock Depreciation or deterioration rate of agricultural equipment Depreciation or deterioration rate of manufacturing equipment Depreciation or deterioration rate of housing stock Technology shifter in agricultural production function Technology shifter in manufacturing production function

-100 397 -443 18 -137 -0.44 -2.71 0.15 -41 -0.22 411 -0.0029 0.06 -0.59 4.27 -4.86 8.55 -972 -0.31 -0.02 38 -0.03 -0.55

CONCLUSION A model with 25 variables and 24 shifters should have quite a few stories to tell. I have concentrated on three stories from the model: the influences on household contributions to and participation in activities promoting an egalitarian ethic, influences on saving behavior, and influences on the choice of leisure. The rationale for these stories is that the first topic deals with households’ decisions that could have affected the egalitarian structure of the income and wealth distribution within a village while the second identifies a myriad of mechanisms that could have contributed to or conflicted with the accumulation of wealth by households, with households able to differ in their outcomes in these efforts. The third story lets households sit back and think about their conditions, prospects,

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45

and ambitions. All three sets of activities and their outcomes could have led to some of the important social changes involved in the transformation from the Neolithic period to the Bronze Age in Greece. The most salient result regarding household contributions to and participation in activities that would have maintained a socially desired degree of wealth and income equality or egalitarianism in the community centered on village size. Larger village size in this model unambiguously reduces the household’s production of these activities, reducing each of the three inputs to those activities, allowing no substitution of time for materials or vice versa. Despite this prominent result, many other mechanisms operate in both directions on the household’s participation in these formative activities, mundane technological changes looming particularly important. Aside from plunder, saving is the primary route to wealth. And with plunder, those proceeds – other than slaves – tend to be inedible and unwearable and require transformation into practical things that could make one’s life more pleasant, typically by trade or exchange. The model allows for what could be considered planned savings of both the agricultural and manufactured goods as well as more opportunistic additions to or withdrawals from relatively liquid components of wealth. Somewhat of a surprise, larger village size reduces planned savings but increases the opportunist additions coming from transitory changes in income. Such transitory changes in income could have large idiosyncratic impacts across households, giving a boost to income and wealth inequality that could have become established over time, particularly when combined with the depressing effect of village size on a typical household’s generation of equality-maintaining activities. Many influences on planned savings tend to be offset by opposite changes in the unplanned, or opportunistic, savings, which tend to have elasticities larger in absolute value than do the planned savings. Increased labor productivity in maintaining agricultural equipment and in maintaining housing stock would have pulled substantial time out of leisure. Productivity in agriculture and manufacturing would have had smaller, negative effects on leisure. Other narratives emerge from the model, but to maintain the spotlight on these important stories, I do not discuss them further here. The focus on decisions at the level of the household is crucial, as that must have been where actual decisions were made in the Neolithic – and pretty much all other times as well, as long as households have existed. I have not modeled intra-household interactions, such as between spouses or mates, between adult male siblings if such were household members, between adults and children, which current economic research has demonstrated to be important for a number of issues more detailed in scope than I can examine in the Neolithic context. A logical next step would be to model a village of such households, but behavior at the village level should be consistent with what households would find optimal to do. HOUSEHOLDS IN

A SETTLEMENT WITH ENDOGENOUS GOVERNANCE

My first foray into cultural change during the later phases of Greece’s Neolithic period focused on economic decisions households made without reference to their settings with a settlement. The overarching question for that study and the following one is, “How

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DONALD W. JONES

could ordinary economic decisions by individuals and households have nudged a societal ethos from egalitarianism during the Neolithic toward a more ‘dictatorial’ ethos represented by the Late Bronze Age culmination of kingship in many parts of Greek societies, represented by the Mycenaean palatial states?” A change in ethos is represented by a change in a Gini coefficient induced by allocation of time and goods to settlement-wide social events. Household decisions that increase the value of the Gini coefficient – a larger value representing more concentration of resources – either reflect or generate ethical changes regarding the value of relative equality or an egalitarian ethos. The next analysis introduces settlement governance into the decisions of individual households. Governance helps secure agricultural property rights which otherwise require household time to secure and builds defensive architecture. Both activities of governance affect household time: the former releasing time otherwise used in agricultural defensive activities, the latter requiring time devoted outside the household. The governance activities supporting agricultural property rights involve various extents of inter-household communication which could have taken the form of, for example, single meetings of all households or more extensive, inter-household negotiations which require altogether considerably more time from both households and settlements. So the decision-making of governance requires household time regardless of its subject. These time reallocations due to the introduction of governance affect allocations of time to all household activities, including those allocated to activities devoted to maintaining egalitarianism, and affect capital accumulation which will have longer-term effects on the magnitude of a settlement’s Gini coefficient. The initial investigation into household activity and changes in egalitarian ethos used a static, or singletime, analysis. This extension into governance as well as ethos involves two extensions in the formulation of the problem. The household’s problem is extended to an inter-temporal well-being problem, and the introduction of the governance with the choice of its participatory structure involves an economic model called “mechanism design”. Mechanism design theory turns the usual structure of economic analyses inside-out, as it were. Most economic analysis assumes a particular decision structure is in place and seeks to maximize some measure of well-being given that social structure. Mechanism design (MD) theory begins with the desired goal and seeks codified incentives – laws or other social structures – which will give activity participants the best motivations to achieve those goals (Hurwicz 1973; Hurwicz and Reiter 2006; Vohra 2011). For example, does a government control-andredistribution system deliver closer to what most agents in the society want, or would a market allocation system, or a combination of government redistribution and market best deliver the array of goods and services wanted in the society, given its characteristics and preferences? While in many circumstances we could model Neolithic behavior on the presumption that individuals were maximizing well-being in either markets or dual- or multiparty negotiations, an assumption that Neolithic or even much later societies arrived at particular social structures to govern resource allocation via explicit, MD assessment is more difficult to accept. However, on the presumption that time grinds finely, some of the precepts of MD theory may have influenced, if not governed, the development of resource allocation mechanisms in Neolithic and later antiquity, simply because allocation outcomes closer to those socially desired resulted from evolving governance and related resource allocation institutions.

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So the next analysis rests on a combination of an inter-temporal household maximization model and a rather hand-waving appeal to mechanism design for characteristics and outputs of governance. Inter-temporal maximization problems have been addressed with a number of powerful, mathematical techniques: the calculus of variations and optimal control theory which find functions of time that will maximize a particular, inter-temporal objective, and dynamic programming, which simplifies multiple-decision, inter-temporal maximization problems by finding a common algorithm which will maximize the terminal period’s objective as well as the first period’s and those intervening, thus essentially short-cutting the periods between the initial and terminal periods by finding the actions that will maximize the terminal period’s objective and rolling that action forward to the present, since that algorithm will also maximize each intervening period’s objective. I have thought carefully about the possible use of each of these tools to study the behavior of a household in a settlement, subject to settlement governance decisions. Barro and Becker’s model of a dynastic household utility maximization over generations uses inter-generational – as contrasted with inter-temporal within a particular generation – utility maximization without the application of any of the three principal, programming methods.23 My program of analysis in this second effort focuses on the inter-temporal well-being choices that a household in a settlement makes, given the background of the settlement’s governance choices. I simplify to a 2-period analysis, where the periods could be individual years or decades or longer periods, but not extending beyond the life expectancy of a family of the time. I recognize that evidence long has indicated that households at times contained individuals of multiple generations and sometimes siblings and descendants of a single man and woman, so that equation of a household to a family is not generally correct. Nonetheless, life expectancies would have limited the duration of grandparents in a household of their children. Whether siblings split into separate households and to what extent is an issue beyond this analysis. Additionally, in contrast to the Barro and Becker papers, I do not consider fertility choices, on the grounds that during the period I consider – the later phases of the Neolithic, not the earliest – natural population growth was slow, and choices involved in fertility during the period are not particularly interesting. I could be proven wrong, but now that is my judgment. I will not try to hammer together the model of the household’s problem with the settlement’s mechanism design / governance problem. Nonetheless, I will keep in the background of the household’s problem the choices of governance at any particular time. The household maximization problem may be quite similar over several thousand years, except for changes in governance in the background, which might change slowly or in discrete jumps across the spectrum of egalitarianism to dictatorship, although the latter term may not capture the negotiations among a small number of households that together keep the value of the Gini coefficient closer to 1 than previously.

23 Becker

& Barro 1988; Barro & Becker 1989.

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DONALD W. JONES

APPENDIX 1. DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS OF VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS Table 2.A1. Definitions of Endogenous Variables Symbol for Variable

Definition or Explanation of Variable

FC

Quantity of agricultural good consumed

FG

Quantity of agricultural good devoted to maintenance of egalitarianism

FS

Quantity of agricultural good saved

FE

Quantity of agricultural good exported

MC

Quantity of manufactured good consumed

MG

Quantity of manufactured good devoted to maintenance of egalitarianism

MS

Quantity of manufactured good saved

ME

Quantity of manufactured good exported

I

Imports, quantity

LF

Household time devoted to agricultural production

LM

Household time devoted to manufactures production

LH

Household time devoted to housing maintenance or supplementation

LG

Household time devoted to maintenance of egalitarianism Household time devoted to maintenance, repair, or supplementation of capital equipment used in agricultural production Household time devoted to maintenance, repair, or supplementation of capital equipment used in manufactures production

TF

Land area devoted to agricultural production

TH

Land area devoted to housing

ΘF

Fraction of beginning-of-period disposable wealth spent on agricultural products from other households

ΘM

Fraction of beginning-of-period disposable wealth spent on manufactured products from other households

ΘI

Fraction of beginning-of-period disposable wealth spent on imports

λ1

Lagrange multiplier on budget constraint: marginal valuation of incremental income

λ2

Lagrange multiplier on agricultural technology constraint: marginal valuation of loosened agricultural technology constraint

λ3

Lagrange multiplier on manufacturing technology: marginal valuation of loosened manufacturing technology constraint

λ4

Lagrange multiplier on egalitarian activity constraint: marginal valuation of greater egalitarian outcomes for same inputs to those activities

λ5

Lagrange multiplier on trade constraint: marginal valuation of incremental imports available for same exports

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49

Table 2.A2. Definitions of Exogenous Variables Symbol for Variable

Definition or Explanation of Variable Cost or price of the agricultural good Cost or price of the manufactured good Current period (implicit) rental cost of housing Cost or price of imports

r w k n L Wt NH NT

Rental cost of capital equipment Remuneration to time allocation (wage rate, labor productivity) Rental (implicit) on land Number of households in the village Number of people (adult equivalents) in the household Value of disposable (liquid) wealth at beginning of current period Expected life of housing Expected life of the land asset (before it must be abandoned) Expected life of agricultural equipment Expected life of manufacturing equipment Household’s discount rate on housing Household’s discount rate on land Household’s discount rate on agricultural equipment Household’s discount rate on manufacturing equipment Housing stock left over from previous period Agricultural equipment left over from previous period Manufacturing equipment left over from previous period Value of stored (saved) agricultural goods at beginning of current period Value of stored (saved) manufactured goods at beginning of current period Depreciation or deterioration rate of housing stock Depreciation or deterioration rate of agricultural equipment Depreciation or deterioration rate of manufacturing equipment

βH

Productivity coefficient of labor time used in maintenance, repair or supplementation of agricultural equipment Productivity coefficient of labor time used in maintenance, repair or supplementation of manufacturing equipment Productivity coefficient of labor time used in maintenance, repair or supplementation of housing stock Interest rate (or profit rate from sales) on stock of wealth in agricultural goods Interest rate (or profit rate from sales) on stock of wealth in manufactured goods Depreciation or deterioration rate of saved agricultural goods Depreciation or deterioration rate of saved manufactured goods Drawdowns from saved agricultural goods in previous periods Drawdowns from saved manufactured goods in previous periods

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DONALD W. JONES

APPENDIX 2. TECHNICAL MATTERS Some details on the solution method The model is solved as a comparative statics problem. The Lagrangean is differentiated with respect to the (endogenous) variables under the household’s control to determine the utility-maximizing values of each of those variables. Then the first-order conditions for maximization of the household’s utility are differentiated totally (i.e., each condition is differentiated with respect to each and every exogenous variable) to see how the maximized values of the endogenous variables would respond to changes in all the exogenous variables. To determine the interactions among the endogenous variables as the value of each exogenous variable is incremented slightly, these second-order conditions are expressed as a matrix known as a coefficients matrix. The elements of this matrix are the coefficients of the endogenous variables in a system of equations first developed in the maximization of the Lagrangean. These coefficients represent the relationships among the variables in each equation. The determinant of this matrix, which is calculated through a series of multiplications of variables not in the same row and column of the matrix, summing all such products, is a single number establishing a measure of the interactions among the equations rather than simply within each equation. If the value of the determinant is zero, there is some combination of the rows and or columns that contains the same information as one of the rows or columns, and there is thus a redundant part of the model. Fortunately, the determinant of the coefficients matrix is non-zero. To calculate the impact of an exogenous variable on a particular endogenous variable, the column vector of that exogenous variable’s coefficients is substituted for the column vector of the endogenous variable in the coefficients matrix, and the determinant of that matrix is calculated. The ratio of the two determinants – the determinant of the supplemented matrix divided by the determinant of the coefficients matrix – reveals the impact of that exogenous variable on that endogenous variable, with all of the adjustments of the other endogenous variables to the new equilibrium maximization accounted for. I have expressed these ratios as elasticities – the percent change in an endogenous variable caused by a one-percent change in an exogenous variable – to avoid scale problems in comparing effects of different exogenous variables on the same endogenous variable and similar scale problems comparing impacts across endogenous variables. Numbers in and numbers out Many of the numbers that form the basis of the calculations are coefficients of the total derivatives of the first-order conditions. Most of them are ratios, many of which are well below 1, particularly in the matrix of endogenous variables, some of which reach the magnitude of 103. The values of the coefficients I have used for the Excel application are based on what I know about factor income distributions and production characteristics in developing countries – factor shares in various types of production, shares of products in consumption, ratios of product and factor prices, etc. – and a number of theoretical relationships between ratios of marginal products and marginal utilities and related prices. I could easily be off by one-quarter to one-half in some instances, relative

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51

to what the actual ratios were in the Greek Neolithic. I continue to study my choices of these values. Now, turning to the numbers emerging from the calculations: the determinant of the coefficients matrix is 1.12 × 10-15. This is not a case of a matrix inversion program searching for an approximation to zero for a singular determinant, as the eigenvalues of the matrix are all non-zero. The non-zero entries in the coefficients matrix are generally quite small. For example, the principle diagonal has 20 non-zero elements, all but two of them in the range of 10-1 to 10-4; the other two elements have magnitudes in the range of 102. The last five columns of the coefficients matrix contain elements ranging from nearly 100 to 104. The largest numerator determinants are in the neighborhood of 10-10 to 10-11; some are as small of 10-18. Many of the elasticities fall in the range of 101 to 10-2. I would be skeptical of an econometrically estimated elasticity based on data emerging from observed behavior of plus or minus 5. But many of the elasticities emerging from the calculations with the household model are well above that range, many in the 102 range, some as large as 106. These magnitudes are cause for concern. One possibility is that they are a consequence of erroneously chosen coefficient values, an issue I continue to study. Another possibility is that they indicate considerable model instability, an issue I continue to study with scenario analysis, varying key parameter values. Yet an alternative possibility is that with the small magnitudes of many of the coefficients, slight perturbations of these numbers can yield sums of products that are either quite large or quite small. Now, amid this wide spread of orders of magnitude among the calculated elasticities, most of the signs are intuitively correct or at least plausible, as are many of the orderings of magnitudes across elasticities of different variables. I add “or at least plausible” because, I reiterate, the model is not a straight consumer model or a straight producer model but rather a household model with the household both a producer and consumer, so there are dual effects of relative price changes and sometimes production responses can exceed consumption responses as the household can buy and sell outside the household walls. To return to the magnitude issue, however, the question is how to interpret the very large and very small (some are as small as 10-8) elasticities emerging from the calculations, particularly in comparison to the elasticities within more customary ranges of magnitude – say, in the ± 2 to 10-2 range. The elasticities between ± 2 and ± 10-2 I treat as of reliable magnitude. Those in the range of ± 10-3 and smaller in absolute magnitude I consider to be relationships of negligible magnitude and importance – but not necessarily of significance, since an absence of demonstrated relationships may be quite important – likely imposed by some adding-up relationships in which they are directly or indirectly involved. For elasticities above + 3 × 100, I treat progressively larger magnitudes as indicating greater sensitivity, but certainly not truly in the range their magnitudes would indicate.

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DONALD W. JONES

APPENDIX 3. COMPONENTS OF CHANGES TO

SAVING BEHAVIOR

In the table below, positive values of the θi elasticities indicate withdrawals of existing savings for expenditures on good i. Negative elasticities of θF and θM can indicate either absolute additions to savings or reductions in withdrawals, but a negative elasticity of θI can mean only a reduction in withdrawals for expenditures on imports, since the household cannot produce imports to add to savings, nor is saving of imports from previous periods in the specifications of the model. Once again, I encourage readers to interpret the large numerical values as indicative of relative order in size rather than as numerically exact elasticity values. Table 2.A3. Elasticities of Savings Variables Source of External Change

FS

MS

θF

θM

θI

pM

-0.87

-16

-1001

1001

4293

pH

0.06

0.78

72

-72

-69

pI

-3.86

-48

-4459

1722

4293

r

2.20

27

2540

-2540

-2445

w

0.10

1.23

114

-114

-110

k

0.001

0.02

1.69

-169

-1.63

n

-0.11

-1.44

-133

-133

128

L

0.001

0.02

1.55

-155

-9.08 -8.07 × 104

-0.36

-4.47

NH

-

-0.004

-0.04

0.04

0.04

2.32

29

2682

1.04

-2582

-0.07

-0.91

-0.02

0.02

0.02

-0.002

-0.03

-2.64

2.64

2.54

-

-0.002

-0.84

84

81

0.52

6.55

606

-606

-583

-0.04

-0.55

-51

0.93

-51

0.03

0.43

39

-39

39

-0.15

-1.90

-176

176

170

-

-0.01

-0.93

0.93

0.90

-

-

-0.17

0.17

0.16

0.01

0.07

6.87

-6.87

-6.62

βH

δH

3.92 ×

104

Wt

NT

-4.00 ×

10-4

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53

BIBLIOGRAPHY Bandy, M. S. 2004. “Fissioning, Scalar Stress, and Social Evolution in Early Village Societies,” American Anthropologist 106: 322–333. Bandy, M. S. 2008. “Global Patterns of Early Village Development,” in J.-P. Bocquet-Appel & O. Bar-Yosef (eds.), The Neolithic Demographic Transition and its Consequences (Berlin: Springer), pp. 333–357. Barnum, H. N. & L. Squire. 1979. A Model of an Agricultural Household: Theory and Evidence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Barro, R. J. & G. S. Becker. 1989. “Fertility Choice in a Model of Economic Growth,” Econometrica 57: 481–501. Becker, G.S. & R. J. Barro. 1988. “A Reformulation of the Economic Theory of Fertility,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 103: 1–25. Blake, M. & J. E. Clark. 1999. “The Emergence of Hereditary Inequality: The Case of Pacific Coastal Chiapas, Mexico,” in M. Blake (ed.), Pacific Latin America in Prehistory: The Evolution of Archaic and Formative Cultures (Pullman WA: Washington State University Press), pp. 55–73. Carneiro, R. L. 1987. “Village Splitting as a Function of Population Size,” in L. Donald (ed.), Themes in Ethnology and Culture History; Essays in Honor of David F. Aberle (Meerut, India: Archana Publications), pp. 94–124. Chayanov, A. V. 1925 [1966]. The Theory of Peasant Economy. Edited by D. Thorner, B. Kerblay, and R. E. F. Smith. Homewood IL: Richard D. Irwin. Clark, J. E. & M. Blake. 1994. “The Power of Prestige: Competitive Generosity and the Emergence of Rank Societies in Lowland Mesoamerica,” in E. Brumfiel & J. Fox (eds.), Factional Competition and Political Development in the New World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 17–30. Drennan, R. D. & C. E. Peterson. 2006. “Patterned Variation in Prehistoric Chiefdoms,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103: 3960–3967. Dubin, J. A. & D. L. McFadden. 1984. “An Econometric Analysis of Residential Electric Appliance Holdings and Consumption,” Econometrica 52: 346–362. Earle, T. & K. Kristiansen. 2010. “Organizing Bronze Age Societies: Concluding Thoughts,” in T. Earle & K. Kristiansen (eds.), Organizing Bronze Age Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 218–256. Halstead, P. 1999. “Neighbors from Hell? The Household in the Greek Neolithic,” in P. Halstead (ed.), Neolithic Society in Greece (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press; Sheffield Studies in Aegean Archaeology 2), pp. 77–95. Halstead, P. 2005. “Resettling the Neolithic: Faunal Evidence for Seasons of Consumption and Residence at Neolithic Sites in Greece,” in D. Bailey, A. Whittle & V. Cummings (eds.), (Un)settling the Neolithic (Oxford: Oxbow), pp. 38–51. Hausman, J. A. 1979. “Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of EnergyUsing Durables,” The Bell Journal of Economics 10/1: 33–54. Hole, F. 2000. “Is Size Important? Function and Hierarchy in Neolithic Settlements,” in I. Kuijt (ed.), Life in Neolithic Farming Communities: Social Organization, Identity, and Differentiation (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum), pp. 191–209. Hurwicz. L. 1973. “The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 63: 1–30.

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Hurwizc, L. & S. Reiter. 2006. Designing Economic Mechanisms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jones, D. W. 1999. “The Conundrum of Greek Population Growth in the 8th Century B.C.: Burials, Settlements, and Wells,” Opuscula Atheniensia 24: 25–50. Jones, D. W. 2014. Economic Theory and the Ancient Mediterranean. Malden MA: Wiley Blackwell. Jones, D. W. 2021. “The Economics of Agriculture,” in D. W. Jones, Four Economic Topics for Studies of Antiquity: Agriculture, Trade, Population, and the Behavior of Aggregate Economies (Oxford: BAR), pp. 7–66. Kantner, J. 2008. “Identifying the Pathways to Permanent Leadership,” in K. J. Vaughn, J. W. Eerkens & J. Kantner (eds.), The Evolution of Leadership; Transitions in Decision Making from Small-Scale to Middle-Range Societies (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press), pp. 249–281. Key, N., E. Sadoulet & A. de Janvry. 2000. “Transactions Costs and Agricultural Household Supply Responses,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82: 245–259. Kuijt, I. 2000. “Keeping the Peace; Ritual, Skull Caching and Community Integration in the Levantine Neolithic,” in I. Kuijt (ed.), Life in Neolithic Farming Communities: Social Organization, Identity, and Differentiation (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum), pp. 137– 164. Nakajima, C. 1986. Subjective Equilibrium Theory of the Farm Household. Amsterdam: NorthHolland. Orrelle, E. & A. Gopher. 2000. “The Pottery Neolithic Period: Questions about Pottery Decoration, Symbolism, and Meaning,” in I. Kuijt (ed.), Life in Neolithic Farming Communities: Social Organization, Identity, and Differentiation (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum), pp. 295– 308. Papathanasiou, A. 2005. “Health Status of the Neolithic Population of Alepotrypa Cave, Greece,” American Journal of Physical Anthropology 126: 377–390. Perlès, C. 2001. The Early Neolithic in Greece; The First Farming Communities in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Price, T. D. & G. M. Feinman (eds.). 1995. Foundations of Social Inequality. New York: Plenum. Price, T. D. & G. M. Feinman (eds.). 2010. Pathways to Power; New Perspectives on the Emergence of Social Inequality. New York: Springer. Sahlins, M. 1972. Stone Age Economics. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton. Singh, I., L. Squire & J. Strauss (eds.). 1986. Agricultural Household Models; Extensions, Applications, and Policy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Souvatzi, S. G. 2008. A Social Archaeology of Households in Neolithic Greece; An Anthropological Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tomkins, P. 2004. “Filling in the ‘Neolithic Background’: Social Life and Social Transformation in the Aegean Before the Bronze Age,” in J. C. Barrett & P. Halstead (eds.), The Emergence of Civilization Revisited (Oxford: Oxbow), pp. 38–63. Vohra, R. K. 2011. Mechanism Design: A Linear Programming Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Whittle, A. 2003. The Archaeology of People. Dimensions of Neolithic Life. London: Routledge. Wiener, M. 1984. “Crete and the Cyclades in LM: The Tale of the Conical Cups,” in R. Hägg & N. Marinatos (eds.), The Minoan Thalassocracy; Myth and Reality. Proceedings of the Third

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International Symposium at the Swedish Institute in Athens, 31 May-5 June, 1982 (Stockholm: Paul Åströms Förlag; Skrifter Utgivna av Svenska Institutet in Athen 4 XXXII), pp. 17–26. Wright, J. C. 2004. “The Emergence of Leadership and the Rise of Civilization in the Aegean,” in J. C. Barrett & P. Halstead (eds.), The Emergence of Civilization Revisited (Oxford: Oxbow), pp. 64–89.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST1 Giacomo BENATI Eberhard Karls University, Tübingen Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences

INTRODUCTION:

OF REVOLUTIONS, TRANSFORMATIONS, AND REFORMATIONS

The “credibility revolution” that reshaped applied social sciences in recent decades has pushed economists to venture beyond the common boundaries of their discipline to identify credible sources of variation. This resulted in a more systematic integration of history into economic sub-fields.2 At the same time, the increasingly common application of quantitative methods in economic history – the so-called “Cliometric revolution” – brought about an extraordinary convergence between applied economics and economic history. The incorporation of causal inference into economic history and the increasingly quantitative use of historical data not only further strengthened this convergence, but it also greatly expanded the prominence of historical analysis across core field of economics, affecting issues such as economic growth, health economics, environmental economics, economic geography, macroeconomics, and political economy. As a matter of fact, some of the most influential articles published in economics in the last few years deal with historical dynamics.3 Recently, social scientists interested in the origins of key phenomena, such as state formation, inequality, long-distance trade, development, etc. have started to extend their inquiries back to ancient societies.4 Obviously, the further back in time you go, the more archaeological evidence becomes important. However, the integration between quantitative social sciences and archaeology remains a very troublesome issue. In fact, the application of deductive methods derived from social sciences which was the trademark of the Processual or “New Archaeology” – an approach that shepherded

1 This paper is a modified version of the oral presentation delivered at the 2017 workshop in Berlin. The revision of this paper has been conducted as part of the activities connected to the interdisciplinary project coordinated by the author, in collaboration with C. Guerriero (UNIBO – DSE) and F. Zaina (UNIBO – DiSCi) and funded by the University of Bologna through an AlmaIdea 2017 grant. I wish to thank the editor of the volume and organizer of the workshop, D. Warburton, for inviting me to participate and for constant feedback and suggestions that greatly contributed to improve the current paper. 2 Cantoni & Yuchtman 2021. 3 E.g., Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001) has 14.500 Google Scholar citations. 4 Acemoglu & Robinson 2006; Alesina, Giuliano & Nunn 2013; Barjamovic et al. 2019; Benati & Guerriero 2021; Benati & Guerriero 2022; Bentzen, Kaarsen & Moll Wingender 2017; Boix 2015; Borcan, Olsson & Putterman 2017; Carugati 2020; Carugati, Ober & Weingast 2019; Fleck & Hanssen 2006; Mayshar et al. 2017; North, Wallis & Weingast 2009; Nunn 2020.

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GIACOMO BENATI

archaeology out of antiquarianism and greatly stimulated the improvement of archaeological methods and theories from the 1960s – was sharply rejected by the post-Processual and Neo-Marxist movements that, instead stressed issues of historical specificity, cultural explanations of social change, and viewed globally, moved archaeological theory in the direction of anthropology.5 The ensuing virtual abandonment of deductive methods contributed to drive archaeology away from applied social sciences. This trend generated a disengagement of archaeology from big questions and big history, as epitomized by the staunch aversion of archaeologists towards general syntheses of the past,6 such as those popularized by James Scott and Jared Diamond,7 that – in contrast to this – stimulated a great interest in expanding towards historical societies in the social sciences.8 Beyond that, it contributed to marginalize the use of archaeological sources in historical social scientific analyses. The combination of the fact that archaeological evidence is notoriously hard to access and reuse,9 and the general lack of a critical engagement of economists with primary historical/archaeological sources has so far prevented interdisciplinary work.10 This methodological drift left archaeologists and historians pivoting around deeply factual microhistories, reflective methods and narrative approaches, while economists interested in ancient societies attempt to tackle causal mechanics in big historical phenomena exploiting the most easily accessible compendia of secondary data.11 The noncritical use of secondary data – more often than not decades-old low-quality data – and the reliance on cross-sectional approaches raises serious doubts on the reliability of such empirical exercises, ultimately hampering the correct understanding of causal linkages in key historical dynamics12 and contributing to spread distrust of “mechanistic” explanations in inductiveoriented disciplines.13

5 Trigger

2007. 2018. 7 Scott 2017; Diamond 2003; Diamond 2005. 8 E.g., Diamond & Robinson 2010. 9 Kintigh et al. 2014: 19. 10 Hansen & Hansen 2016. 11 E.g., Fleck & Hanssen 2017; Reba et al. 2016; Murdock 1967. 12 Van Bavel et al. 2019; Roosen & Curtis 2018; Austin 2008. 13 The mistrust of archaeologists and philologists of large-scale syntheses and quantitative approaches (e.g., Liverani 2016: 362–365) relies on the one hand, on the idea that low chronological resolution of excavated data and uneven coverage of sources irremediably hamper data systemization and the credibility of statistical exercises, and on the other, that the uncritical use of sources by non-specialists generates “bad science” (e.g., Butzer & Enfield 2012; Laursen & Steinkeller 2017: 4; D’Alpoim Guedes et al. 2013). This “garbage-in-garbage-out” paradigm cannot be applied tout-court to investigations of past dynamics due to the tremendous improvements in archaeological chronologies (Blockley 2020), the proliferation of proxies, increasing computing power and growing availability of techniques and protocols for assessing data-quality (e.g., Palmisano et al. 2021: 5; Wei et al. 2014: 14–15; McCoy 2017: 15–19). Furthermore, econometric techniques provide simple tools for assessing the weight of unobserved factors and the relevance of statistical errors which may bias the credibility of the measurement exercises (Angrist & Pischke 2008). Although these positive trends may inspire confidence, to produce high-quality databases it is mandatory that we engage with source criticism, comparisons, and contextual analyses and ultimately combine the complementary skills of social scientists with those of philologists and archaeologists. 6 Hodder

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THE “4D REVOLUTION”: DIGITALLY-DRIVEN DATA DESIGN The combination of the tremendous growth in computing power, the steadily diminishing costs of digitization, and universal internet access triggered a “digital revolution” in virtually every field of scholarly research while we likewise yield to its strong impact on our daily lives. More specifically, the massive digitization of historical materials resulted in the creation of a proper sub-field in the humanities – digital humanities – featuring large numbers of projects and teaching curricula harnessing the potential of information science for the preservation and curation of the historical heritage.14 The massive digitization of historical materials reformed empirical research in economic history as well.15 The mix between a keener use of econometric tools and insights from economic theories and the unparalleled availability of a growing stream of digital data greatly boosted the power of economic historians to address causal questions and make advances in explaining historical phenomena. Digitally-driven data design allowed economic historians to revisit core questions that previous generations of scholars could not assess empirically and therefore remained unsolved,16 and, moreover, it opened up new vistas for interdisciplinary research, spanning epidemiology, political science, law, geography, linguistics and (to some extent at least) also archaeology. In parallel, the dramatic expansion of digital tools triggered an unprecedented proliferation of digital archaeological data that are finding their way increasingly systematically onto online platforms, such as digital repositories, archives, data banks, etc. Although methods in the field are slowly but steadily adopting new technologies that are not only optimizing data collection but also producing increasingly large amounts of digital data that are also published online,17 data analytics lag behind. The most interesting improvements in the computational analysis of archaeology data derive from borrowing methods and tools routinely employed in geography – such as GIS-based, network and ABM – and evolutionary biology (Bevan and Lake 2013; Lake 2014; Lake 2015). This new “quantitative archaeology” research stream has not yet reached methodological maturity, but many of its applications – such as GIS systems – have become mainstream tools in modern archaeological practices. From the theoretical point of view, recent years have seen a resurgence of interest for addressing big questions in archaeology and the deductive methods of the social sciences made a comeback on the agenda of many influential archaeologists.18 Indeed, many feel that the unprecedented access to “big” data, the continuous refinement of archaeological chronologies due to the improvement of absolute dating methods,19 and an increasing engagement with interdisciplinary research may very well allow archaeologists to answer broader questions that in the past decades have been left off the agenda due to the low resolution of data and/ or to the unsophistication of analytical methodologies or to the inertia of old ideas.20 14 Brennan

2018. 2015. 16 Rubio-Campillo 2016; D’Alpoim Guedes et al. 2016. 17 Marchetti et al. 2018. 18 Kintigh et al. 2014; Smith et al. 2012; Smith 2017. 19 Blockley 2020. 20 D’Alpoim Guedes et al. 2016. 15 Mitchener

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The commingling between digitally-data-driven research and the renewed interest in big questions spurred a new stream of research seeking to tackle questions related to urbanism,21 climate change,22 inequality,23 trade and connectivity,24 demographics,25 migrations,26 standards of living,27 and political institutions,28 that has the potential to put the exchange of data and practices between archaeology, ancient history and social sciences on a new and far better footing.29 QUANTIFYING ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN ANCIENT SOCIETIES: THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST If in many fields related to the study of ancient societies quantification methods for measuring the change of economic phenomena across space and time are receiving considerable attention,30 and archaeological proxies are being increasingly adopted by economic historians as well,31 the Ancient Near East has remained largely peripheral in this new trend.32 As part of an interdisciplinary project seeking to explore the determinants of early state formation, in collaboration with close colleagues, I have devised methods for constructing and analyzing digital datasets of proxy variables exploiting the incredibly rich Mesopotamian archaeological and historical records.33 The Ancient Near East (hereafter ANE) is the place where the first urban societies and states in human history emerged, phenomena that are richly documented due to the preservation of huge amounts of written records – the cuneiform corpus is second only to the Greek one34 – and due to the continuous flow of archaeological excavations that have been out since the 1800s.35 Our first aim was to understand the drivers behind the changes in political and property rights and their economic impact over the Bronze Age. To do so, we have also constructed proxy variables for capturing bioproductive conditions (paleoclimate, topography, agricultural production), political institutions, property rights over land, public goods provision, and 21 Ortman

et al. 2016. et al. 2018; Lawrence et al. 2021. 23 Kohler & Smith 2018. 24 Barjamovic et al. 2019; Knappett 2013. 25 Crema, Bevan & Shennan 2017. 26 Altschul et al. 2016; Skourtanioti et al. 2020. 27 Steckel et al. 2018. 28 Benati & Guerriero 2021; Benati & Guerriero 2022; Benati, Guerriero & Zaina 2021a; Benati, Guerriero & Zaina 2021b. 29 Cf. Canevaro 2018. 30 Bowman & Wilson 2009; Bowman & Wilson 2013; Jongman 2019; Kohler & Smith 2017. 31 E.g., Izdbeski et al. 2016, 2020; Bakker et al. 2020. 32 However, see the recent attempts to empirically assess core questions related to large-scale/long-term changes in demographic patterns (Lawrence, Palmisano & De Gruchy 2021; Palmisano et al. 2021) and long-distance trade (Barjamovic et al. 2019; Massa & Palmisano 2018) in the pre-Classical Near East which are making use of state-of-the-art quantitative tools and social scientific theories. 33 Benati, Guerriero & Zaina 2021. 34 Streck 2010. 35 Liverani 2016. 22 Haldon

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economic development. I offer in this paper an example of the methodology that we have devised to collect evidence from different archaeological and historical sources for the purpose of constructing proxies that are aimed at measuring economic performance and development, then used as instrumental or control variables in our exercises.36 Although pre-industrial societies generally lack direct statistics on aggregate production, per capita income, or exports an extensive econometric literature documents that it is possible to measure economic performance through outcome-based metrics such as levels of warfare and urbanization. Indeed, a higher urbanization corresponds to a higher level of economic development since urbanization correlates well with GDPs in both pre-industrial and industrial societies,37 whereas war-making is considered to be important in the process of state-formation and economic development by a large literature in political economy.38 In the following section I illustrate the composition of our sample first, and then the rationale for constructing our proxies of economic development. Sampling Method We selected 44 major ANE polities observed for each half-century between the Early Bronze Ages I–IV and the Middle Bronze Age I, i.e., 3050–1750 BCE.39 These are the sites that display steady urban, political, and economic importance as attested by the available information on the evolution of settlements, governments, trade, and public goods. These polities are distributed across all the four major geo-cultural regions of the ANE, i.e. Anatolia, the Levant, Mesopotamia, Iran. Second, we rely on the Ancient Near East Placemarks and the “Middle Chronology” to locate polities and events in our sample.40 Not only are these datasets widely accepted in the literature, but they also allow us to match historical to archaeological data more precisely. The chronological limits of our sample are based on both the existence of sizable variation in institutional experience and the availability of relevant information. Even if “proto-states” arose at the end of the Chalcolithic era,41 the written sources on their institutional determinants remain scant and ill-understood, and we could not include this period in our analysis.42 In contrast to the unclear events of late Prehistory, the Early and Middle Bronze Ages witnessed both unprecedented economic growth and the production of a rich array of sources on our polities’ institutional trajectory. Similarly, we selected as cut-off date the death of Hammurabi of Babylon in 1750 BCE.43 This event was followed by a shrinkage in the preserved written sources in the upper Mesopotamian regions and

36 Benati,

Guerriero & Zaina 2021: 27–31. Johnson & Robinson 2002; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2005: 552; Chen et al. 2014. 38 Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2005: 557; North, Wallis & Weingast 2009; Dincecco & Onorato 2014; Dincecco & Onorato 2017. 39 Liverani 2014: table 1.1 40 Manning et al. 2016; Sallaberger & Schrakamp 2015. 41 Algaze 2008; Benati 2018; Frangipane 2018; McMahon 2020. 42 Liverani 2014: 62–77. 43 Sallaberger and Schrakamp 2015: Table 39. 37 Acemoglu,

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Figure 3.1. Map showing the distribution of the sampled polities across the ANE [note that polities located in the “zone of uncertainty” (Wilkinson et al. 2014: fig. 3) may have practiced mixed farming regimes at times].

by the formation of regional states obscuring the evolution of the single polities in lower Mesopotamia.44 The choice of observing each variable for any of the 44 polities every half-century between 3050 and 1750 BCE is based on a vast literature on economic history keyed to 50-year time-blocks for the analysis of the long-term economic and institutional evolution.45 This choice is made feasible by the fact that the Middle Chronology is affected by errors ranging between 8 and 30 years.46 City-level urbanization Building upon the idea that only areas with high agricultural productivity and developed transportation networks can support large urban populations, there is extensive evidence that in both industrial and pre-industrial societies urbanization and income per capita are strongly correlated.47 Therefore, as our main proxy for measuring economic 44 Liverani

2014: 252–253, 271. Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2005; Boranbay & Guerriero 2019. 46 Sallaberger & Schrakamp 2015: Table 39; Manning, Barjamovic & Lorentz 2017. 47 Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2002: 1232. 45 E.g.,

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development we have constructed a variable capturing polity size – i.e. estimated urban size – for each of our sampled polities. To calculate the variable Polity-Size, we rely on the estimates of the settled area obtained through a variety of archaeological methods, such as measuring the area encircled by defensive walls or “shotgun method”,48 the distribution of pottery sherds through surface collection and scraping,49 or by observing the remains of urbanization through drone or satellite imagery and geophysical surveys.50 The resulting figures can be converted into population estimates through ethnographic parallels with modern mud-brick buildings.51 ANE cities were composed of tightly packed neighborhoods and residential space could take up to 90–95% of the total urban space.52 Hence, an expansion of the settled area of a polity implies an increase of its urbanization level.53 We have obtained the settled areas for each sampled polity by collating urbanization databases, archaeological reports and satellite imagery on walled area, distribution of shards and extent of settlement remains.54 To enhance systemization given the heterogeneous nature of the evidence, we gathered data across standardized cultural periods defined in absolute dates and then grouped the resulting information into 50-year bins across our selected time frame. Although settlement sizes are provided with a variety of chronological schemes which may generate biases, urban data for the ANE show considerable robustness across the Early and Middle Bronze Ages due to a general agreement with other archaeo-demographic proxies, such as the distribution of radiocarbon dates and raw site counts.55 Furthermore, the figures obtained and displayed in Figure 2 below, are based on archaeological survey data and consistent with general patterns.56 To elaborate, although Lower Mesopotamian (irrigation-based) polities already achieved, around 3100 BCE, urban status, and considerable size,57 after 2850 BCE the whole study area started to experience urban growth that peaked around the middle of the third millennium BCE.58 In contrast, between 2300 and 2000 BCE, the area experienced a generalized depopulation trend corresponding with the epochal 4.2 ka BP aridification event, and then after 1950 BCE a gradual reprise.59

48 Hansen

2006. 2017: 103–106. 50 Algaze 2017: 29 n4; Colantoni 2017: 95–97. 51 Widell et al. 2013. 52 Colantoni 2017: 99; Stone 2017: fig. 1, table 3. 53 Lawrence et al. 2016. A case in point is Uruk: between 3200 and 2700 BCE it grew from 250 to 400 ha with a projected population jump from 37,500 to 60,000 inhabitants, i.e., employing as a rate of conversion the present-day value of 150 people per ha (Algaze 2018: 26–27). Note, however, that these are conservative estimates since satellite imagery suggests a population density between 170 and 600 people per ha (Stone 2017: 581). 54 E.g., Lawrence et al. 2016: S1 Appendix; Lawrence, Palmisano & De Gruchy 2021: S1 Data; Benati, Guerriero & Zaina 2021b: Tables XI–XIII. 55 Lawrence, Palmisano & De Gruchy 2021: 4–5; Palmisano et al. 2021: 7–9, 23, Tables 10–11 . 56 E.g., Ur 2013; Ristvet 2017. 57 Ur 2013: 137–139. 58 Ristvet 2017: 40–44; Ur 2013: 139–143. 59 Ur 2013: 144–146; Ristvet 2017: 47–50. 49 Colantoni

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Urbanization 140 120 100 80 60 40 20

Irrigation

1750

1800

1850

1900

1950

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2100

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Rain-Fed

Figure 3.2. Estimated urban sizes in ha over the 44 sampled polities across the Early and Middle Bronze Ages.

Wars To monitor warfare levels, we have observed instances of military campaigns conducted by polities against their external enemies and internal civic “uprisings”. Although organized violence is certainly attested archaeologically during the Late Chalcolithic period,60 no evidence of large-scale external conflicts can be found in the written sources for the period 3100–2600 BCE.61 It is only after 2600 BCE that violence entered the elites’ agenda,62 when inter-state warfare expanded in connection with the formation of the Early Dynastic kingdoms,63 then picked up pace while being directed towards peri-Mesopotamian enemies during the imperial episodes of the Akkadian and Ur III period and,64 finally, becoming endemic among the fragmented Amorite kingdoms.65 In turn, civic uprisings start to be attested during the late Early Dynastic period66 and become noticeable at the beginning of the Akkadian period, with the many revolts of formerly independent Southern polities.67 A more substantial record of internal conflicts emerges with

60 McMahon

2014: 176–177. 2011: 18; Richardson 2016: 48. 62 Marchesi & Marchetti 2011: 214–222; Richardson 2012: 12–14. 63 Richardson 2011: 18; Peltenburg 2013. 64 Garfinkle 2020: 231–232. 65 Charpin 2004. 66 Marchesi 2015: 149. 67 Foster 2016: 7–8, 12–14; Yoffee & Seri 2019: 189. 61 Richardson

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Warfare 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5

External_W_RF

External_W_Irr

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Figure 3.3. Occurrence of wars in the sampled polities.

the post-Ur III Amorite kingdoms.68 To construct the conflict variables, we combined information on battles from both royal inscriptions and on categories of administrative texts, such as “year names” mentioning military episodes.69 Exploiting these sources that provide well-dated information on military episodes, we counted the number of Internal-Conflicts (revolts, uprisings, rebellions, military coups, etc.) and External-Conflicts that each polity witnessed over each 50-year time window across the sample. To construct the variable External-Conflicts, we exploited secondary polity-specific sources on warfare and post-2700 BCE monumental inscriptions reporting kings’ deeds.70 To construct the variable Internal-Conflicts, we consider civic uprisings against the institutionalized decisionmaking power and conflicts between subject and ruling and possibly external to the sampled polities. Yoffee and Seri provide an extensive review of these clashes.71 We supplemented their analysis with the sources that we employed to construct External-Conflicts. As shown by the graph below, the occurrence of conflicts in the sampled polities across the Early and Middle Bronze ages overlaps perfectly with the historical narratives mentioned above.

68 Richardson

2011: 26–33; Richardson 2016; Yoffee and Seri 2019: 190–191. 2020. 70 Such-Gutierrez 2020: Appendix; “Mesopotamian Year Names” database available at https://cdli.ucla. edu/tools/yearnames/yn index.html. 71 Yoffee & Seri 2019. 69 Such-Gutierrez

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DISCUSSION:

LONG-TERM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE

ANE

By observing the trends obtained from the proxies for urbanization and warfare, we may conclude that four main patterns emerge. First, the period between 3050 and 2650 BCE, marked by unfavorable climate,72 witnessed fairly stable levels of urbanization and negligible evidence of organized warfare. Second, the period between 2600 and 2300 BCE, characterized by a climatic optimum,73 represents the peak of the Bronze Age economic development as attested by the urban take-off and by the large number of wars fought across the transition between the pre-Sargonic and the Akkadian period.74 Third, the period between 2300 and 2100, marked by the abrupt shift towards arid climatic conditions,75 saw a sharp drop in wars – the Akkadian kings mostly fought in the Mesopotamian periphery76 – and urban levels, followed by a slight and transitory reprise of both trends between 2100 and 2000, i.e. during the Ur III period.77 Fourth, the post-2000 BCE period, characterized by extended aridity,78 witnessed a decoupling of these trends with considerable urban growth and a decrease of warfare, followed by a tremendous increase in warfare levels and by a slight decrease of urbanization. If, on the one hand, the third millennium BCE oscillations of economic development seem to be in tune with major climatic shifts driving agricultural productivity, the divergent trajectories of the second millennium seem to indicate the more prominent impact of other structural factors that certainly open further avenues of research into the drivers of economic growth and development.79 CONCLUSIONS The divergent trends experienced in recent decades in applied social science fields and archaeology seem to be reversing, and becoming increasingly convergent, coherent, and mutually re-enforcing. This is attested by the growing interest of economists and political scientists in ancient societies as testing grounds for theories and as providers of long-term records and by the increasing use of empirical tools and quantitative methods in archaeology and economic history. Although this convergence is stimulating on the one hand, a more systematic engagement of economists with historical data, and on the other, a revival of large-scale synthesis and big problems in text-based disciplines, the dialogue between social and historical fields is still uneasy.80 It is, however, a reality that, in spite of

72 Staubwasser

& Weiss 2006: 379–380; Ristvet 2017: 38–40. 2017: 40. 74 Such-Gutierrez 2020: 18–19; Sallaberger & Schrakamp 2015: Maps 6, 9. 75 Cookson et al. 2019; Lawrence, Palmisano & De Gruchy 2021; Palmisano et al. 2021: 21. 76 Such-Gutierrez 2020: 19–23; Sallaberger & Schrakamp 2015: Maps 9–10. 77 Such-Gutierrez 2020: 23–28. 78 Palmisano et al. 2021: 21. 79 Palmisano et al. 2021. 80 Boldizzoni 2011; Hodgson 2001; Hansen & Hansen 2016. 73 Ristvet

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the increasing cross-fertilization of methods between disciplines, truly interdisciplinary research remains a desideratum.81 In this paper I have attempted to illustrate how methods and theories borrowed from applied economics should inform and guide archaeological and philological data collection strategies and be applied to the analysis of archaeological and historical materials. Within the framework of an interdisciplinary project on the evolution of Mesopotamian political institutions and property rights we collected evidence on urbanization and warfare across the Early and Middle Bronze Ages in order to test theories about the impact of economic development and conflicts on state building.82 Although we found that neither urbanization nor warfare had a substantial impact on the Mesopotamian institutional development process,83 the methodology devised for measuring these variables can be easily replicated in other case studies from ancient societies displaying either urbanization or war-related records or both. Furthermore, a literature in health economics and economic history is accumulating a vast reserve of factual biometric data collected from human bones – especially stature data – that are probably the most suitable proxies for measuring economic growth and development – and even prosperity – in ancient societies due to the strong sensitivity of stature as reflecting changing life circumstances.84 In addition to creating pathways for structuring systematic cooperation between biological anthropologists, archaeologists and economists,85 this methodology can be widely applied across the full spectrum of ancient societies due to the abundance of skeletal material in archaeological excavations. Overall, these methodological advances can provide a means for archaeologists and historians to produce high-quality databases that could, not only be easily reused by a broader range of practitioners to tackle a variety of core social questions generating more credible outputs, but also encourage a more systematic engagement of social scientists with the production and use of historical datasets, fostering cross- and interdisciplinary collaboration.

81 Funding bodies and journals’ editorial boards showcase openness towards interdisciplinary research but the peer evaluation of competitive applications and submitted papers rests in the hands of field specialists whose ideas do not necessarily align with those of committees/boards, sometimes generating mixed results. For this and other reasons, interdisciplinarity is, unfortunately, often perceived as a counterproductive career path, especially by early-stage researchers who should be the one pushing the most innovative and ambitious agendas (e.g., Iwe, Feaux de la Croix & Fehlings 2017: 65). 82 Benati, Guerriero & Zaina 2021a. 83 Benati, Guerriero & Zaina 2021a: 30; Benati & Guerriero 2022. 84 Steckel & Rose 2002; Steckel et al. 2018; Koepke & Baten 2008; Baten & Blum 2014; Gowland & Walther 2018; Rostenstock et al. 2019. 85 E.g., Baten, Benati & Kjellstrom 2021.

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Colantoni, C. 2017. “Are We Any Closer to Establishing How Many Sumerian per Hectare? Recent Approaches to Understanding the Spatial Dynamics of Populations in Ancient Mesopotamian Cities,” in Y. Heffron, A. Stone & M. Worthington (eds.), At the Dawn of History. Ancient Near Eastern Studies in Honour of J. N. Postgate (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns), pp. 95–118. Cookson, E., D. J. Hill & D. Lawrence. 2019. “Impacts of Long Term Climate Change during the Collapse of the Akkadian Empire,” Journal of Archaeological Science 106: 1–9. D’Alpoim Guedes, J., T. C. Bestor, D. Carrasco, R. K. Flad, E. Fosse, M. Herzfeld, C. C. LambergKarlovsky, C. M. Lewis, M. Liebmann, R. Meadow, N. Patterson, M. D. Price, M. Reiches, S. Richardson, H. Shattuck-Heidorn, J. Ur, G. Urton & C. Warinner. 2013. “Is Poverty in Our Genes? A Critique of Ashraf and Galor, ‘The “Out of Africa” Hypothesis, Human Genetic Diversity, and Comparative Economic Development’,” Current Anthropology 54: 71–79. D’Alpoim Guedes, J., S. A. Crabtree, R. K. Bocinsky & T. A. Kohler. 2016. “Twenty-First Century Approaches to Ancient Problems: Climate and Society,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113: 14483–14491. Diamond, J. 2003. Guns, Germs and Steel. The Fate of Human Societies. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Diamond, J. 2005. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. New York: Viking Press. Diamond, J. & J. A. Robinson (eds.). 2010. Natural Experiments of History. Cambridge MA London: Harvard University Press. Dincecco, M. & M. Onorato. 2014. “Military Conflict and the Rise of Urban Europe,” Journal of Economic Growth 21: 259–282. Dincecco, M. & M. Onorato. 2017. From Warfare to Wealth. The Military Origins of Urban Prosperity in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fleck, R. K. & F. A. Hanssen. 2006. “The Origins of Democracy: A Model with Application to Ancient Greece,” Journal of Law and Economics 49: 115–146. Fleck, R. K. & F. A. Hanssen. 2017. “What Can Data Drawn from the Hansen-Nielsen Inventory Tell Us About Political Transitions in Ancient Greece?,” in M. Canevaro, A. Erskine, B. Gray & J. Ober (eds.), Ancient Greek History and Contemporary Social Science (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), pp. 213-240. Foster, B. R. 2016. The Age of Agade. Inventing Empire in Ancient Mesopotamia. London - New York: Routledge. Frangipane, M. 2018. “Different Trajectories in State Formation in Greater Mesopotamia: A View from Arslantepe (Turkey),” Journal of Archaeological Research 26: 3–63. Garfinkle, S. 2020. “Violence and State Power in Early Mesopotamia,” in G. G. Fagan, L. Fibiger, M. Hudson & M. Trundle (eds.), The Cambridge World History of Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 219–237. Gowland, R. & L. Walther. 2018. “Human Growth and Stature,” in W. Scheidel (ed.), The Science of the Roman History. Biology, Climate, and the Future of the Past (Princeton NJ - Oxford: Princeton University Press), pp. 174–204. Hansen, M. H. 2006. The Shotgun Method: The Demography of the Ancient Greek City-State Culture. Columbia - London: University of Missouri Press. Hansen, B. A. & M. E. Hansen. 2016. “The Historian’s Craft and Economics,” Journal of Institutional Economics 12: 349–370. Hodgson, G. M. 2001. How Economics Forgot History. The Problem of Historical Specificity in Social Science. London - New York: Routledge.

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Rosenstock, E., J. Ebert, R. Martin, A. Hicketier, P. Walter & M. Groß. 2019. “Human Stature in the Near East and Europe ca. 10,000–1000 BC: Its Spatiotemporal Development in a Bayesian Errors-in-Variables Model,” Archaeological and Anthropological Sciences 11: 5657–5690. Rubio-Campillo, X. 2016. “Model Selection in Historical Research Using Approximate Bayesian Computation,” PLoS One 11: e0146491. Sallaberger, W. & I. Schrakamp (eds.). 2015. ARCANE III. History & Philology. Turnhout: Brepols. Scott, J. C. 2017. Against the Grain. Plants, Animals, Microbes, Captives, Barbarians, and a New Story of Civilization. New Haven - London: Yale University Press. Smith, M. E., G. M. Feinman, R. D. Drennan, T. K. Earle & I. Morris. 2012. “Archaeology as a Social Science,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 109: 7617–7621. Smith, M. E. 2017. “Social Science and Archaeological Inquiry,” Antiquity 91: 520–528. Staubwasser, M. & H. Weiss. 2006. “Holocene Climate and Cultural Evolution in Late PrehistoricEarly Historic West Asia,” Quaternary International 66: 372–387. Steckel, R. H. & J. C. Rose. 2002. The Backbone of History: Health and Nutrition in the Western Hemisphere. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Steckel, R. H., C. Spencer Larsen, C. Roberts & J. Baten (eds.). 2018. The Backbone of Europe: Health, Diet, Work and Violence over Two Millennia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stone, E. C. 2017. “How Many Sumerians per Hectare?” in Y. Heffron, A. Stone & M. Worthington (eds.), At the Dawn of History. Ancient Near Eastern Studies in Honour of J. N. Postgate (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns), pp. 567–582. Streck, M. 2010. “Grosses Fach Altorientalistik: der Umfang des keilschriftlichen Textkorpus.” Mitteilungen der Deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft zu Berlin 142: 35–58. Such-Gutiérrez, M. 2020. “Year Names as Source for Military Campaigns in the Third Millennium BC,” in J. Luggin & S. Fink (eds.), Battle Descriptions as Literary Texts. A Comparative Approach (Wiesbaden: Springer), pp. 9–29. Trigger, B. G. 2007. A History of Archaeological Thought. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ur, J. 2013. “Patterns of Settlement in Sumer and Akkad,” in H. Crawford (ed.), The Sumerian World (London: Routledge), pp. 131–155. Wei, Z., A. M. Rosen, X. Fang, Y. Su & X. Zhang. 2015. “Macro-Economic Cycles Related to Climate Change in Dynastic China,” Quaternary Research 83: 13–23. Widell, M., McG. Gibson, T. J. Wilkinson, B. Studevent-Hickman & J. Tenney. 2013. “Household & Village in Early Mesopotamia,” in T. J. Wilkinson, McG. Gibson & M. Widell (eds.), Models of Mesopotamian Landscapes. How Small-Scale Processes Contributed to the Growth of Early Civilizations (Oxford: Archaeopress), pp. 112–129. Wilkinson, T. J., G. J. Philip, J. Bradbury, R. Dunford, D. Donoghue, N. Galiatsatos, D. Lawrence, A. Ricci & S. L. Smith. 2014. “Contextualizing Early Urbanization: Settlement Cores, Early States and Agro-Pastoral Strategies in the Fertile Crescent During the Fourth and Third Millennia BC,” Journal of World Prehistory 27: 43–109. Yoffee, N. & A. Seri. 2019. “Negotiating Fragility in Ancient Mesopotamia: Arenas of Contestation and Institutions of Resistance,” in N. Yoffee (ed.), The Evolution of Fragility: Setting the Terms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 183–196.

THE GOLDEN INTERVAL OF OLD ASSYRIAN TRADE (2000–1700 BC) Jan Gerrit DERCKSEN Leiden University

From the earliest times of which we have record – back, say, to two thousand years before Christ – down to the beginning of the eighteenth century, there was no very great change in the standard of life of the average man living in the civilised centres of the earth. Ups and downs certainly. Visitations of plague, famine, and war. Golden intervals. But no progressive, violent change. John Maynard Keynes, ‟Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren” (1930)

0. INTRODUCTION The well-documented Old Assyrian (OA) pattern of trading is relevant to the study of global economic history. It contains some of the earliest detailed evidence on quantities and prices, commercial mores and infrastructure, and the geography of trade available to scholarly research.1 The nearly 7500 published clay tablets (and about 17,000 still awaiting publication) constitute the earliest, and most comprehensive, documentation of an interregional trade system in which the traders were driven by one goal: acquiring profits, rather than procuring raw materials.2 Dating to the first quarter of the second millennium BC, the documents were left by a group of merchants from Assur, an ancient city in northern Iraq. They established a flourishing trade between their own home city and networks of towns in Anatolia, using products imported from elsewhere in order to exchange them for gold and silver in Anatolia (and thereby profit from the exchange). This trade consisted of exporting commodities (mainly tin originally mined in central Asia and textiles manufactured in southern Mesopotamia) to Anatolia. These commodities were brought to Assur by foreign traders, and by the Assyrian traders themselves to central Anatolia, nearly

1 For

a selection of letters from different dossiers in translation, see Michel 2001 and Michel 2020. Recent editions of important text groups can be found in Veenhof 2017a; Larsen 2010; Larsen 2013; Larsen 2014, and other volumes of the series Kültepe Tabletleri (see: https://emagaza-ttk.ayk.gov.tr/ara/1/Kültepe_Tabletleri). Excellent introductions to the OA period are Veenhof 2008 and Larsen 2015. For a recent overview of the trade, see Dercksen 2014. 2 For bibliographical details, see Michel 2003; Michel 2011; and Michel 2015.

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a thousand kilometres away. The Assyrian merchants then sold these goods in Kanesh (the modern site of Kültepe) and other towns in Anatolia. This documentation seems to form an appropriate (and indeed ideal) set of data to consult when posing questions about economic growth in the ancient world. Our understanding of the context of this material is far from complete. The home city of the traders – Assur – has been excavated, but we have virtually no evidence of these traders in the material found at Assur (although we learn from the documents found in Anatolia that they were, for example, purchasing houses and maintaining families in the city). And in fact, we know very little about the economy of the city-state of Assur at this time. It lay on the Tigris (a river which is quite unsuitable for irrigation) in the zone of rain-fed agriculture in northern Mesopotamia, and we have no idea how the temples functioned economically (compared with those in the south). In contrast to this, we are relatively well informed about the lives of the Assyrians in the Lower Town of the city of Kanesh in Anatolia as their houses have been excavated. From an abundance of sources, it is known that the larger temple and palace institutions of the Near East tended large flocks of sheep and supported the production of textiles, but – aside from the Assyrian material found in Anatolia – we know virtually nothing about how the sale of these textiles was organised. In fact, it is for example only from the Assyrian documentation that we learn that southern merchants had a near monopoly on sales of textiles in Syria and Mesopotamia. Thus, what the Assyrians were doing was an essential activity, but we cannot assume that their activities were representative of how textile sales were organised. What is clear is that, for the couple of centuries that this trade endured, this small group of merchants – at most a couple of hundred families – enjoyed a considerable prosperity in the economic quality of their lives. However, it is by no means evident that we can locate them within economic history in a meaningful fashion. But what they offer is indeed a treasure trove that must be investigated and understood. Studies into economic development and the possible causes of growth and decline in Antiquity often focus on the Greco-Roman world, and especially on the Roman empire during the first and second centuries AD (Hopkins 1978; Millett 2001; Saller 2002). Millett defined growth as the “increased output of goods and services per head of the population”, taking up a point made by Hopkins and again stressed by Saller, that it is “essential to distinguish conceptually between per capita growth in production and aggregate growth” (Saller 2002: 257). There are obvious differences between the Classical world and Mesopotamia around 2000 BC, but also similarities, such as the role of agriculture and means of transport. For that reason, it is useful to repeat here some of the causes for growth that are identified by economists and have been applied by specialists in Roman economic history: trade, savings used for investments, technological improvement, increase in population, and changes in the institutional framework. In all the models and case studies of the Ancient Near East and the Greco-Roman world, agriculture dominates the economy. The key to growth is the formation of a surplus and Hopkins argued that an increasingly large surplus is due to political change and technical and social innovations. Millett remarked that “(p)otential for actual growth will ultimately depend on the increasing production of an agricultural surplus to support the non-agrarian population” (Millett 2001: 28). Hopkins formulated seven propositions in which he analysed the Roman economy; in the words of

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Harris and Lewis these are:3 (1) total agricultural production rose; (2) the population of the Roman world in the first and second centuries AD increased; (3) the proportion of the total population engaged in non-agricultural production and services increased; (4) as a result of an increased division of labour, non-agricultural production rose; (5) average productivity rose; (6) the total amount and proportion of total production extracted in rent and taxes increased; (7) the expenditure of taxes in the Roman provinces stimulated local production. Hopkins concluded that in the “first two centuries AD, total production, consumption and trade were greater than they had been in the previous centuries or were in subsequent centuries.”, to which Millett commented: “The impression I have from all seven propositions is not so much of gradual growth in the surplus across 1200 years, as a spurt in the last two hundred. What Keynes (…) termed a ‘golden interval’ (albeit a long one) in the largely leaden pre-industrial age.” (Millett 2001: 31). The model outlined by Hopkins has been adapted by Jursa (2010), who developed the “commercialisation model” for Babylonia during the long sixth century BC. This model “sees population growth as a stimulus for commercial development and technological progress; rising demand generates positive feedback in the economy which offsets (for a while) the Malthusian threat accompanying demographic growth.” This dynamic model is opposed to a static view of Mesopotamian economy, which Jursa calls the “traditional model”, and which he characterises as suggesting that the most important landowners, the institutional households (temples and the royal household), dominated the economy, depended on compelled labour and produced most of the surplus that was available to society above subsistence needs. Food was redistributed and consumed within the institutional households; only a small part was marketed through private businessmen who depended on the institutional sphere for finding scope for commercial activity. Also the well-attested urban property holders strove primarily towards self-sufficiency, depending on their estates in the cities’ hinterland. The dominant household mode of production limited the importance of hired labour, craft specialisation and generally market exchange, whose impact on the subsistence strategies of Babylonians was negligible. Business in the private sphere of the economy was mostly limited to disposing of more or less accidental agrarian surplus production, and even this did not affect the communal world of the village, which was essentially a world apart, entirely untouched by silver-based exchange. Productivity levels in Babylonian agriculture, by far the most important economic activity, were static. As in every other pre-modern agrarian economy, its potential to achieve an increase in per capita production and thus sustained economic growth was very limited.4

This is a long quotation but it contains a number of salient statements that are also illustrative of the way some specialists in ancient Mesopotamia view the economy during the late third and first half of the second millennium BC, the Ur III and Old Babylonian periods, and according to which the OA trade was exceptional – an oddity. Yet, the OA economy was a-typical as all economies in the Ancient Near East were predominantly agricultural in nature. A significant limitation in our source material is the

3 Harris 4 Jursa

& Lewis 2016: 5. 2010: 784.

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nearly total lack of references to agriculture in Assur, which forms a strong contrast to the evidence from the Anatolian city of Kanesh. Comparison with other societies is further hampered by the apparent non-existence of temple households in Assur exploiting large tracts of land and cattle, such as are known from south Mesopotamia during the Ur III and Neo-Babylonian periods. Assur comes across as a more or less barren rock with little in the way of natural resources, and largely dependent on the import of essential goods. Modern research into economic growth deals with long-term developments in one economy or more, and draws on a large quantity of data collected over several centuries. Although the OA trade spans nearly three centuries and involves several, interconnected economies, the data at our disposal are unequally divided; most of the data concern OA but many stem from a relatively short spell. This makes it difficult to identify any “sustained increase”, whether in the economy as a whole or in segments of it. Rather, the growth that can be observed or hypothesised, was extensive in nature and represents one of the upsurges in world history. It is therefore important to establish what led to this growth in this phase of the Ancient Near Eastern economy and what caused it to decline or even stop; 5 the available textual evidence must be scrutinised in order to gain insight into the volumes concerned and the effect this had on people and polities. This chapter starts with the geographical and historical background of the OA trade. Next, its structure and development will be analysed in section 2, followed by a discussion of the volume of trade and its implications in section 3. Finally, possible causes for this episode of growth will be discussed in section 4. 1. OA

TRADE IN ITS GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL SETTING

Trade relations between Anatolia and southern Mesopotamia had existed since prehistoric times and had a strong impact on cultural and political developments. The political centralisation process that started in central Anatolia in the mid-third millennium and led to a region with a shared material culture to which the inland region of western Anatolia was linked, was driven by several factors, most prominently the exploitation of metal resources (copper, silver, gold) in Anatolia and the trade in these metals. The development of metallurgy in central Anatolia was probably equally stimulated by these contacts with Syria-Iraq and western Anatolia.6 Archaeological evidence from sites such as Kültepe (north-east of Kayseri) has led to reconstructions of several interregional exchange networks between Syria-Iraq and the Aegean,7 such as the ‘Great Caravan Route’ of the Early Bronze Age III period (ca. 2500–2200 BC), or, as part of a huge ‘Super Network’,8 the ‘Anatolian Trade Network’ connecting Cilicia and the Troad.9

5 See

Morris 2005: 24. 2011: 460; Bachhuber 2012; Lehner 2014; Zimmermann 2016. 7 Rahmstorf 2015. 8 Massa & Şahoğlu 2015: 71. 9 Ökse 2007; Efe 2007; Steadman 2011: 232–233. 6 Yakar

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The view that the Aegean region was the likely source of silver for traders from Anatolia is widely held and is based on the assumption that the galena deposits at Laurion were already being exploited at that time. However, recent research demonstrates that Middle Bronze Age Near Eastern silver did not stem from the smelting of lead-silver ores (such as galena), but from the smelting of argentiferous ores to which lead was added to recover the silver.10 This means that silver was probably not mined at Laurion before the mid-first millennium BC, whereas lead ores as a source of silver were not exploited in Anatolia before the seventh century AD according to Meyers (2003). Although Laurion might have been exploited at that time, it can certainly no longer be regarded as the source of silver traded in MBA Anatolia, but silver mineralisations are attested or can be assumed to have existed and exploited in other places in the Aegean, notably at Siphnos. The model according to which silver was brought from the Aegean region to Anatolia in exchange for copper and the tin and textiles imported by the Assyrian merchants, may not be completely obsolete, but part or perhaps even most of the silver circulating in Anatolia during the time of the Assyrian merchants will have stemmed from local deposits.11 It is not known whether these merchants in any way contributed to the exploitation of silver. Lead is rarely mentioned as an object of trade in the Assyrian documents.12 Were we to postulate that they might have been interested in the production of silver, they would doubtless have been eager to participate in the shipment of lead to facilitate the smelting of silver. The scarcity of references to lead suggests that these merchants were neither involved nor interested in the production of silver: only in its acquisition. As a result of the interaction in Anatolia itself and connecting it to the Near Eastern world, by the end of the third millennium, central Anatolia consisted of several polities each grouped around an urban centre, much like northern Syria and northern Mesopotamia. An important position was held by Kültepe, the ancient city of Kanesh,13 where the so-called Old Palace was constructed about 2020 BC14 and a lower town developed ca. 2000 BC. Pottery, cylinder seals, and seal impressions as well as funerary evidence found at Kültepe attest to trade contacts with Syria and Mesopotamia at the end of the third millennium.15 At the same time, Mesopotamia consisted of a highly developed civilisation concentrated in the central and southern parts of modern Iraq (Akkad and Sumer), with outlying cities in the north (Assur and Nineveh, both on the river Tigris) and the west (Mari on the Euphrates), which had witnessed two historical periods of imperial expansion, the Old Akkadian and that of the Third Dynasty of Ur (aka Ur III in this volume and elsewhere). In the south, the economy was based on irrigation agriculture (barley, wheat) and herding. Local textile production had reached high standards due to the use of high-quality wool,

10 Wood,

Hsu & Bell 2021. piece of silver found at Acemhöyük stems from the Taurus according to lead isotope analysis, see Türkekul 2001: 73. 12 An interesting passage occurs in TMH 1, 3b (HS 281): “He went to Šalahšua for gold, but I heard that he went to Hurama because there was nothing else than lead”; see also Barjamovic 2011: 193–194. 13 Palmisano 2017: 38. 14 See Barjamovic, Hertel & Larsen 2012: 29. 15 Ezer 2014; Kulakoğlu 2015; Kulakoğlu 2017; Öztürk 2019. 11 A

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weaving and finishing techniques, and the organisation of labour. Bureaucrats and merchants used writing on clay tablets to record and communicate. The principal means of transportation was by boat (especially in the south with access to the Gulf, and over the main watercourses), but also overland by wagon over short distances and by donkey over longer ones. The necessary importing of metal, stone, and timber was largely realised through trade. Late third-millennium Assur seems to have been an economically unspectacular though politically independent city.16 Possible effects of the 2200–1900 BC period of drought on caravan logistics (especially in the Khabur area in north-eastern Syria), settlements, and exchange remain unclear,17 but it is noteworthy that the early second millennium saw a growth in population not only at Assur, but in the whole eastern Tigris region18 as well as along the caravan routes, where an increase in settlement area can be observed in northern Jazira.19 The purpose of the OA network was to obtain silver and to a lesser extent gold by selling imported tin and garments in central Anatolia, which yielded a net profit of about 50% to the Assyrian traders.20 The textiles were imported from southern Mesopotamia (“Akkad”), but smaller quantities were manufactured in Assur as well.21 The main transit point for tin to the west seems to have been the city of Susa in southwest Iran. From there, it was brought to central and south Mesopotamia, to the west and to Assur. Along with tin, small quantities of luxury goods arrived, such as iron, lapis lazuli from Afghanistan, and carnelian from Pakistan. 2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF OA TRADE The extensive written records excavated at Kültepe and a few other ancient towns in Anatolia offer detailed insights into private economic activity and the reconstruction of the Assyrian eponym list makes it possible to establish a chronological framework. But for studying economic developments and issues such as growth, this material by itself is not always sufficient as a basis upon which to base firm conclusions and I shall necessarily have to resort to hypotheses. The OA period can be put into perspective by the evidence for pre-OA relations between Kanesh and Mesopotamia found at the mound of Kültepe and dating to the end of the third millennium, and by the fact that the final level of the lower town (Level Ia) at Kültepe does not contain any written evidence for the presence of Assyrian merchants. These two form the temporal corridor within which the trade existed.

16 Michalowski

2009. Massa & Şahoğlu 2015: 75. 18 Battini 2011: 130. 19 Wilkinson & Tucker 1995: 88; Ur 2010: 159. 20 Dercksen 2014. For silver, see Veenhof 2014. 21 For the significant role of textiles in various cases of ancient trade, see Droß-Krüpe 2016; for OA textiles, see Michel & Veenhof 2010. 17 Cf.

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The almost three hundred years of OA trade (ca. 2000–1700 BC) are very unevenly represented in the written record as is apparent from the comparison of attested names of year-eponyms with lists in which the names of these office holders are arranged in chronological order.22 With the help of the list of eponyms, which in its last reconstruction is referred to as the Revised Eponym List (REL), it has been possible to demonstrate that most of the main dossiers (often called “archives”) stem from a relatively short period of about thirty years (REL 80–110, ca. 1893–1863 BC). This means that there exists a wealth of information concerning only a few decades, but little or none at all from other periods. The oldest year-eponym mentioned is REL 42, ca. 1931 BC, referenced in a single text (AKT 6A, 1). A year-eponym was usually only mentioned in a document when the calculation of interest was involved and most documents lack any form of dating. Moreover, the evidence has a strong geographical bias, since most of the texts found in Kanesh deal with business in Anatolia and in Assur. To this can be added that at best only part of any given merchant’s archive has survived and that his activities can only be incompletely followed over a short period of time. In short, the Assyrian evidence is unequally distributed in time and space. Moreover, the Anatolian perspective is severely under-represented in the written record. There are no surviving documents from palace archives in Anatolia that would enable us to obtain data on local production. A small number of Anatolian dossiers written in Assyrian has been discovered, but these too add little to a discussion of economic development apart from their obvious importance as witnesses of cultural adaptation. In addition, however, there is a relatively small number of Assyrian documents – 450 texts according to Günbattı23 – dating to the Level Ib period (ca. 1800–1700 BC) from which hitherto an important source for that high quality quantification attested in the evidence from the Level II period (the letters and other texts dealing with caravans travelling between Assur and Kanesh dealt with here) is otherwise completely lacking. The absence of any contemporary evidence about this trade from south Mesopotamia underlines the unique and essential position of the Kültepe epigraphic material. At the same time, it explains our ignorance of many aspects of this trade pertaining to Babylonia and Susa. Three phases can be distinguished in the history of OA trade: its beginnings (represented by Kings Ilušuma and Erišum I and their successor), its heyday (ca. 1893–1865), and its downfall (a long period of decline from about 1865–1700). 2.1 The beginnings The transition from Early to Middle Bronze Age at the end of the 21st century BC was characterised by major changes in material culture, settlements, and political constellations. The OA trade is one of these new features. The influence on Assur of political developments in the South (the collapse of the Ur III empire and the rise of the state of Isin) will

22 Called

the Revised Eponym List, abbreviated REL, see Barjamovic, Hertel & Larsen 2012. 2014: 11.

23 Günbattı

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have been different from the impact these had on the Iraqi and Syrian Jazira. Schwartz has discussed the possible factors that led to early second millennium innovations after a period of disintegration.24 In Assur, there is apparent continuity in political structures in the form of a king who was called the “city ruler” (ensi2, an Ur III administrative term) as head of the city, but with the city assembly playing an increasingly important role, a characteristic also displayed by other cities in the Mesopotamian periphery with a strong interest in trade such as Sippar and Emar.25 External input is evident in the apparently novel possibility for the area of becoming a transit place for the export of tin, adding a new commodity to the traders living along the age-old trade routes in north Mesopotamia.26 The non-elite participation in the trade led to the rise of a new class formed by merchants with significant financial and political power, represented in the city assembly; members of this class frequently held the prestigious office of year-eponym (līmum).27 The important development of a local set of cuneiform signs based on what was employed in the Ur III period, but now characterised by a relatively small number of different signs, led to a society with high passive and active literacy, at least among the families of merchants. There is evidence of the activity of individuals from Mesopotamia in Kültepe in the post-Akkad and Ur III period (ca. 21st century BC). This consists of seal impressions on clay bullae and of cylinder seals showing Mesopotamian motives and occasionally a personal name written in cuneiform. Unfortunately, the toponym Kanesh is not mentioned in a single text from the Ur III period or shortly before; this is in contrast to Hahhum, a town situated on the Euphrates (Lidar Höyük or Samsat), which formed the frontier between Mesopotamia and Anatolia, from where Gudea of Lagash obtained gold and whose ruler made some gifts registered in Sumer.28 Texts from south Mesopotamia thus lack any supporting evidence for the contacts that seem nonetheless to have existed.29 The only positive evidence for contact with Assur consists of a cylinder seal found on the mound of Kültepe in 1953 (Kt. e/t 180),30 which contains a reference to the deity Aššur. The nature and intensity of these contacts remain unknown, but the bullae suggest trade. This may have evolved, perhaps with interruptions, into the OA trade.31 The initial phase is thought to have been characterised by venture trade, possibly resembling the preceding format of trade relations. Early evidence takes us to a complicated debate in Assyriology. From the 25th century BC onwards, a Sumerian word (amargi) is used mainly in royal inscriptions, which according to an authoritative dictionary means “release 24 Schwartz

2012: 256–259. 1987. 26 Whether or not other towns in northern Mesopotamia (such as Nineveh) to some extent participated in this trade remains unclear through a lack of sources. Ekallatum is not attested in Assyrian texts dating to the OA dynasty; only after Samsi-Addu’s conquest of Assur do we hear of merchants from that town. It may have been under the domination of the city-state of Assur before that. 27 Dercksen 2004. 28 RA 74, 47 CBL CT 116: 22 (with mention of the towns Urkeš, Talhat and Tuttu(l)); UTI 3, 2232:2. 29 The composition King of Battle, featuring Sargon of Akkade as the hero of Akkadian merchants oppressed by the king of Purušhattum, is in my view legendary as Sargon never refers to Anatolian towns in his own inscriptions; it does not inform us about pre-Old Assyrian trade contacts with Anatolia. 30 Balkan 1957: res. 12; Öztürk 2019: no. 024. 31 Veenhof 2008: 126–130; Barjamovic, Hertel & Larsen 2012. 25 Larsen

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(from slavery, debt, taxation, punishment)”, “exemption”, “freedom”, “manumission”.32 Its equivalent in Akkadian texts from the second millennium is the word addurārum. In this sense, two early kings of Assur deserve special attention: Ilušuma and his son Erišum I. King Ilušuma (?–1973 BC) proclaimed the first documented addurārum “freedom” in Assur. He stated: “I established the freedom (addurār x aškun) of the Akkadians and their children. I purified their copper. I established their freedom from the border of the marshes and Ur and Nippur, Awal, and Kismar, Dēr of the god Ištaran, as far as the city (Assur)”.33 Yet there is something peculiar about this: the people benefitting from these measures were Akkadians, the inhabitants (or rather merchants) of southern Iraq. The passage about copper may refer to a route via Assur by which the South obtained some of its copper at that time. The implication of the first measure is disputed as such “freedoms” were normally proclaimed by a ruler who politically dominated those who benefitted from it. As there is no indication that Assur effectively controlled parts of southern Iraq at this time, Ilušuma’s measure is interpreted as an attempt to make the market of Assur more attractive for foreign traders by offering the Akkadians an “exemption”, abolishing certain debts and taxes in the region under the control of Ilušuma in the north.34 Merchants from Babylonia (“Akkad”) travelled to Assur in the OA period and there was a market where caravans from Ur used to arrive.35 The second OA king to proclaim a “freedom” (addurār x aškun) was Erišum I (1972– 1933), who in the translation by Grayson “made silver, gold, copper, tin, barley, and wool tax-exempt as well as payment of bran and straw (tax)”, with a different rendering of the same Akkadian word.36 This was done in connection with construction work on the temple of Aššur and apparently served to somehow bring relief to the city. One may ask for whom this relief was intended, for the general population owing taxes and labour to the state, or for an unspecified segment of that society. Veenhof regarded it as a “measure taken to further the prosperity of Assur, in particular by stimulating a free exchange of goods”.37 A different interpretation may be obtained by considering a number of Sumerian documents from the Gudea period (21st century), to which Kraus drew attention nearly half a century ago, and in which the phrase “release granted” (ama-ar-gi4 gar-ra) occurs.38 These documents list silver, bronze items or barley. Wilcke now interprets this term (which is practically the equivalent of Akkadian addurāram šakānum) as the annulment of arrears of officials.39 Whether or not that applies to the measure of Erišum I, his addurārum may not have been so much a sign of prosperity as of indebtedness. Another episode of economic hardship may be reflected in the decision by the city assembly to meet merchants who were debtors about a century later.40

32 Sjöberg

1998: 208. 1987: 18. 34 Larsen 1976: 78–80; Larsen 2015: 96; Veenhof 2008: 127. 35 Dercksen, forthcoming. 36 Grayson 1987: 22. 37 Veenhof 2008: 128–129. 38 Kraus 1970: 30; Kraus 1984: 104. 39 Wilcke 2007: 25. 40 Veenhof 1999a. 33 Grayson

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Erišum I may have been the king during whose reign the OA trade commenced. A case fragment bearing an impression of his seal was found at Kültepe, which may have enclosed a document sent by him or in his name. He was also associated with the creation of the institution of the office of year-eponym (līmum) and with legal reforms. The creation of the office of līmum (first attested in 1972 BC) must have resulted from previous political and economic developments and may have been intended to curb royal power by imposing this on the new and perhaps young king. The same developments may have caused the creation or, if it already existed in some form, the rise to a higher status of the City Hall (bēt ālim) of which the year-eponym became the manager (hence the synonym bēt līmim “House of the eponym”). These institutions became key features of the OA trade together with the government of Assur (king and assembly), and the treaties it concluded with foreign rulers; this makes it highly unlikely that a trade on a similar scale was possible one or two centuries earlier. The abundant documentation in the form of letters, contracts, notes, and other texts unearthed in Kültepe dates to a period when trade had already reached a mature phase. An isolated piece of older evidence is derived from document AKT 6A, 1, mentioned above, which contains a reference to eponym REL 42 (ca. 1931 BC) from the beginning of the reign of King Ikunum. By the end of this initial stage, Assur had established itself as an international player by building good relations with those polities from which textiles and tin were brought to the city. It also exploited contacts with the central Anatolian city of Kanesh to enable venture trade, which around 1950 BC grew into a permanent commercial presence and, significantly, led to an Assyrian monopoly on the import of tin and textiles into Anatolia. The political and legal institutions that were created in Assur greatly supported the business of its inhabitants.41 2.2 The heyday (ca. 1893–1865 BC) Little is known of the reign of the Assyrian King Sargon (1917–1878 BC), except for the fact that he chose as a throne name the name of the first great Old Akkadian king and that he reigned for forty years (like his grandfather Erišum I). A growing local confidence can be observed during his reign, reflecting no doubt the successes of the trade with Kanesh, which expressed itself in the development of a local glyptic style and cuneiform syllabary. Documentary evidence of many of the known merchants from Level II is provided by their texts, excavated at Kültepe; these texts can be dated back to the reign of Sargon. Through the adoption of the existing southern Mesopotamian model of establishing trading posts in foreign towns, dozens of trade colonies (kārum) and stations (wabartum) were established along the caravan route between Assur and Kanesh and in central Anatolia.42 Treaties taken under oath concluded between Assur and the local rulers formed the legal

41 See 42 See

Hertel 2013. Palmisano 2017.

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framework for these settlements and their residents to thrive.43 The settlements in Anatolia enabled the Assyrian merchants to establish a long-term physical presence in the economically most relevant regions, making it possible to increase their activities. During the heyday of OA trade a significant quantity of silver and gold reached Assur, and a large part of it was used to purchase tin and textiles. The starting-point of this phase may have been around 1893 BC (REL 80), because in the decade or so leading up to that year the situation of Assyrian merchants at Kanesh seems to change. This is reflected in the major increase in the number of preserved documents. The possible causes that may have occasioned this increase during the period 1893–1863 BC (REL 80–110) have been discussed by Barjamovic, Hertel and Larsen,44 including structural changes in trade (permanent settlement and long-term partnerships, expansion leading to more debt-notes being drawn up). There are indications that the number of Assyrians active in Kanesh reached the highest level during this period. Although this coincides with the supposed end around 1900 BC of the period of drought, which began in ca. 2200 BC and caused settlement abandonment in marginal zones in northern Syria, the climatic evidence for this period is not unequivocal. One of the towns on the caravan route used by the Assyrians was Tell Leilan. The Leilan Regional Survey shows the dramatic decline in the number of sites during 2200–1900 compared to the preceding period, and the sharp rise during 1900–1700, indicating massive population growth.45 This change is attributed to the end of the arid period. But the evidence from neighbouring Tell Mozan indicates that rainfall there decreased after 1900 BC,46 from which Schwartz concluded that “The successes of urban societies in the second millennium were attained despite climatic challenges”.47 If the increase in the number of Assyrians and documentation from Kültepe may be related to better travel conditions on the caravan route across the Jazira, this probably was caused by improved infrastructure instead of ameliorated weather conditions; the increased number of Assyrians may have been due to a growth in population in Assur itself. The typical Assyrian firm during the 19th century was family-based and involved a father and his sons, often staying in Kanesh for a longer period, supported by a wife and other relatives in Assur or in Anatolia, all communicating with each other by letter.48 Some merchants in Assur seem to have used non-family personnel to handle their affairs in Anatolia.49 There were bankers (ummeanu) living in Assur, often merchants themselves, who looked after the business of several traders engaged in Anatolia by purchasing merchandise and equipping caravans. Capital could be obtained through short-time partnerships.50 A major innovation was the introduction of a long-term joint-stock capital called

43 Veenhof

2013. Hertel & Larsen 2012: 58–69. 45 Ristvet 2012: 40. 46 Pfälzner 2012: 71. 47 Schwartz 2012: 259. 48 Larsen 2007. 49 Stratford 2014. 50 Larsen 1977; Veenhof 1999b; Dercksen 1999. 44 Barjamovic,

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naruqqum “leather bag”, which enabled an independent trader to obtain credit.51 This still imperfectly understood financial tool consisted of founding a partnership to run for ten or more years into which a dozen or so individuals (other merchants, relatives, also the merchant himself) invested a sum of silver that was expressed in gold, and which the merchant managed (“carried the bag” in Assyrian) under the supervision of his bankers. After the “bag” had been established, a shareholder could acquire additional shares, mostly, it seems, by converting a claim on the merchant into a share for the same nominal amount. Moreover, shares could be inherited and sold. The original naruqqum contracts were kept in Assur and have not been recovered; only a few transcripts of original contracts have been excavated in Kültepe. The “bag” of a merchant called Elamma contained nearly 28 pounds of gold valuta (the equivalent of 112 pounds of silver) and ran for ten years starting in 1895 BC (REL 78).52 That of Amur-Ištar contained 30 pounds of gold valuta (the equivalent of 120 pounds of silver) and had a term of twelve years starting in 1908 BC (REL 65).53 It is highly unfortunate that so few of these contracts are known. The concept of adding interest to a debt was well known in ancient Mesopotamia. In OA trade, interest (ṣibtum) was mainly charged from defaulting debtors and from people borrowing silver (or copper) at “a merchant’s house” in Assur to finance pressing business transactions.54 The earliest known rate of 33.3% (once-only or per year?) dates to ca. 1931 BC (AKT 6A, 1). A slightly lower rate of 30% per year was standard among traders from at least 1906 BC onwards and was decreed by the Kanesh colony, but different rates existed as well.55 2.3 The period of decline (ca. 1865–1700) The slow downfall of the OA trade took almost a century and a half. It was inaugurated by the death of the generation of merchants who had settled in Anatolia more or less permanently, men such as Pušu-ken, Imdi-ilum, and Elamma, who disappeared from the documentation around 1870 BC (REL 103). The shortcomings of the existing social and economic system became visible and could not be mended: the firms were basically tied to one person and ended when he died. There was no firm as such to be continued by a son or other heir. The number of Assyrians active in Kanesh seemed to decrease as well and a new phase of reduced economic activity began. The decline during the final decades of the Level II settlement has been summarised by Barjamovic, Hertel and Larsen, who stated that a combination of social, legal, economic and commercial factors associated with the disappearance of the generation of family heads over a short period of time resulted in successive blackouts in interdependent parts of the commercial network. Ultimately this led to an economic recession in the overland trade around 1865 BC (REL 108) that came to affect most of the Assyrian traders.56 51 Larsen

1999. 2017a: 3–4. 53 Hecker 2004: 44. 54 Veenhof 1999b; Dercksen 1999. 55 See Dercksen 2014: 94–96. 56 Barjamovic, Hertel & Larsen 2012: 72. 52 Veenhof

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Warfare in Anatolia could severely hamper trade and the city of Kanesh itself and its lower town (Level II) were destroyed in 1834 BC, but soon resettled. The Assyrian presence in Kanesh during the 18th century, coinciding with the so-called Level Ib period in the lower town, is rather poorly documented. Yet, also during this period the caravan trade between Assur and Kanesh continued and tin and textiles were still imported, as additional evidence from texts from Mari and Tell Leilan demonstrates. But certain key elements had disappeared, notably the long-term joint-stock investments (naruqqum); moreover, the Assyrians in Kanesh became increasingly involved in the trade in Anatolia itself and many of them had been born in Anatolia and had Anatolian relatives.57 There were also political developments in Assur itself. The local dynasty exercising kingship in Assur was overthrown by Samsi-Addu (also known as Šamši-Adad I) in 1808 BC, who incorporated the city-state into his expanding empire. Trade continued under his reign and bullae found at Acemhöyük demonstrate that he sent goods to that town, perhaps as merchandise.58 From correspondence found in Mari we learn that in an as yet unclear way merchants of Assur cooperated with those from the neighbouring town of Ekallatum. During the post-Samsi-Addu period Assur participated in and suffered from military confrontations. The various uprisings in southern Babylonia against the Babylonian king Samsu-iluna led to an end of documentation (and of urban life) there by 1737 BC for southernmost Sumer and by 1719 also for northern Sumer; the disappearance of this once economically important region would have had a serious impact on any export of textiles from Babylonia to Assur if this still played a role in OA trade at that time. About a decade later, the destruction of ancient Apum (Tell Leilan and its land) in north-eastern Syria, which was on the caravan route to Kanesh and harboured an Assyrian community, by Samsu-iluna in 1728 BC, must have had a negative impact on the trade,59 as it led to a regional collapse in settlement.60 The most recent Assyrian year-eponym recorded in a text found in Kanesh (the eponym list G) dates to 1717 BC (REL 256). Not long afterwards, Kanesh was again destroyed and the an-epigraphic next level of occupation in the lower town (Level Ia) lacks any positive evidence of an Assyrian presence. With the disappearance of Assur’s main centre in Anatolia (and apparently of the other settlements as well), the OA trade as we know it came to a definitive halt. 3. GROWTH AND

DECLINE: ESTIMATION PROBLEMS

The incomplete nature of the written evidence reflecting the OA trade does not permit us to calculate the total amount of silver and gold that a merchant sent to Assur during his active years or that of the tin and textiles that he or his representatives in Assur bought and sent to Kanesh. The evidence that is available concerns several shipments within an 57 For 58 See

trade during the Ib period, see Dercksen 2001; Barjamovic, Hertel & Larsen 2012. Günbattı 2014: 91–92 for a letter relating Samsi-Addu’s attitude towards traders; Veenhof 2017b:

251–253. 59 Cf. Charpin 1988; Charpin 2004: 351. 60 Ristvet 2012: 40.

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unknown timespan, as letters and most documents related to the sending of money and the purchase of merchandise do not contain a date. Many merchants’ archives excavated at Kanesh contain a number of such texts and archival reconstruction may help to assign these to a particular moment in a merchant’s career. The quantities of silver and gold sent to Assur and of merchandise purchased in that city may differ significantly among different merchants and even within the records of a single individual. The sending of relatively modest amounts of silver or merchandise may reflect on the one hand a merchant’s status within OA society, but may also on the other hand point to a strategy to spread the risks of transport or of price fluctuations. Larsen put the number of inhabitants of Assur during the 19th century at 7000–10,000, and he reckoned that 2000–4000 (male) persons were involved in trade.61 If for the sake of argument we assume that the city had had an equal percentage of men and women, this would mean that some 1000–1500 men were active in a sector not directly devoted to trade. This number may be too low, see the 2000 soldiers of Babylon and a contingent of 2000 men of Ekallatum and Assur led by Mut-Asqur, son of Išme-Dagan, according to ARM 26/2, 411:32 (about 1770 BC). During the 18th century BC the city of Kanesh covered an area of 170 ha and had about 25,000 inhabitants, showing it to have been a major urban centre; Barjamovic estimated the population of central Anatolia at nearly 500,000.62 The minimum number of Assyrians present in Anatolia during the well-documented thirty years 1893–1863 BC (REL 80–110) is put at 700–800.63 Estimation problems relate to the number of merchants involved and the annual and long-term volume of the trade. Recent scholarship has (re)addressed these problems and various estimates of the volume of the OA trade and the number of Assyrians involved have been proposed. The first estimate was made by Veenhof,64 who collected the evidence from 189 caravan texts dating to the Level II period and arrived at about 17,500 textiles and 13,500 kg of tin, in all representing some 850 donkey-loads. In view of the considerable increase in the number of relevant texts, Veenhof later stated that these figures have at least to be tripled, while those for the whole Level II period would have been considerably larger.65 Starting from the quantities established by Veenhof in 1972 based on about one-eighth of the presently known number of texts, Larsen arrived at about “110 tons of tin and 115,000 textiles over a period of thirty years, or nearly 4 tons of tin and ca. 3,800 textiles every year. That would correspond to about 110 donkey-loads of textiles and 55 loads of tin. Those figures would seem to represent a minimum (…) so the figures could easily be doubled without much danger of error.”66 For this at least 18,000 kg of silver were brought to Assur in return.67 On average 600 kg of silver would have been shipped

61 Larsen

2000: 79. 2014: 66. 63 Barjamovic, Hertel & Larsen 2012: 60. 64 Veenhof 1972: 70–76 lists the evidence of “189 texts”; the actual numbers appear in Veenhof 2008: 90. 65 Veenhof 2008: 90. 66 Larsen 2015: 190. 67 Larsen 2015: 190–191. 62 Barjamovic

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to Assur during each of these thirty years, whereas the estimated 3800 textiles and 4000 kg of tin sold in Anatolia each year would have yielded about 1000 kg of silver. Whereas Veenhof and Larsen imagined that several hundred donkey-loads were transported from Assur to Anatolia each year, Stratford argued for no less than 5000 donkeyloads, and “[i]f this were equally divided, it would yield 62,500 textiles and 200 tons of tin” exported each year.68 He arrived at this high number through his reconstruction of the frequency of caravans and the number of merchants. Barjamovic69 suggested that the trade involved ten caravans of 150 donkeys each setting out for Anatolia each year during the well-documented three decades of the Level II period, and these 1500 donkeys would have carried 15 tons (= 500 talents) of tin and 32,000 textiles.70 The quantities of silver sent to Assur obviously differ considerably between the estimate by Larsen (more than 1 ton per year) and that by Stratford (33 tons).71 Stratford’s number of 5000 donkey-loads seems to be a postulate, as no explanation is given as to how the author arrived at it. His point of departure is what is documented for the “very wealthy” merchant Šalim-ahum: 41 donkey-loads carrying 1 ton of tin and 425 textiles,72 and in Stratford’s reconstruction of events this represents the merchant’s volume of trade for one single year. His next step is to estimate how many Assyrian traders were active at a given moment in Anatolia, and this number is put at 900–1000 individuals, which seems reasonable. The author writes: “it (i.e., a review of two archives – JGD) points toward an estimated thousand merchants, or more, involved in the trade. And it is feasible that less than half of those merchants could field the estimated 5000 donkey-loads each year. In fact, the number of donkey-loads could easily be reached with a few dozen major traders, less than a hundred middle-sized traders, and a few hundred minor traders taking a few donkeys a year.”73 An important piece of evidence adduced by Stratford and Barjamovic in their estimations are the so-called lists of declared value (awītum), which express the value of tin, textiles, and donkeys of a caravan in a single valuta of tin, to facilitate the calculation of taxes and other expenses.74 The assumption is that these lists document the value of a caravan travelling from Assur to Kanesh, formed by several merchants who wanted their goods to travel together for reasons of safety and efficiency. The caravan was named after the owner of the largest section. Two of the few surviving lists refer to very large transports and itemise the shipments of individual merchants and other owners of merchandise therein. VS 26, 155 lists the contents of the caravan (ellatum) of Imdi-ilum, that is, the caravan under his administrative responsibility. It consists of 35 sections of different volume ranging from 47 talents to a little under 1 talent, totalling 410 talents 11 minas. The

68 Stratford

2017: 292; Stratford 2019: 222. 2017: 312; Barjamovic 2018: 141. 70 Note that the much higher figures attributed to Barjamovic in Stratford 2017: 296 must be based on a preliminary and later revised version of Barjamovic 2018. 71 Stratford 2019: 222. 72 Stratford 2019: 293. 73 Stratford 2017: 305. 74 See Dercksen 2004. 69 Barjamovic

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sections were owned by 34 different persons, one of whom was a woman (Šat-Aššur). Estimates of the number of donkeys involved in this text vary greatly; Veenhof suggested that Imdi-ilim’s caravan consisted of 150–200 donkeys.75 Barjamovic argued that over 500 donkeys were involved, carrying about 6000 kg of tin and 12,000 textiles;76 in my calculation this would give a declared value of 608⅓ talents. However, if it is compared to the value of Kt c/k 401,77 the declared value in VS 26, 155 is about twenty-nine times larger, and consisted of 348 donkeys carrying 188½ talents (5655 kg) of tin and 6612 textiles. The other text is VS 26, 154, where 21 sections are listed with in all 125 talents 21 pounds as the declared value. By the same comparison, this would involve a caravan of 108 donkeys. These two cases demonstrate that caravans (if the meaning of ellatum is correctly interpreted) leaving from Assur could differ considerably in size. This, and the fact that it remains unclear how many caravans left Assur in a year hampers any reconstruction of the volume involved in the OA trade. The high amount of declared value or large numbers of animals in some texts may be misleading, as the merchant involved did not always sponsor such numbers. Imdi-ilum, for instance, is known to have had the following transports with (estimated) declared value and number of donkeys: 47 talents (VS 26, 155); 12 talents 19 minas / 7 donkeys (CTMMA 1, 75 first shipment); 10 talents 10 minas / 4 donkeys (AKT 1, 18); 9 talents 8 minas / 8 donkeys (Sadberk Hanım no.12); 2 talents 41 minas / 1 donkey (CTMMA 1, 75 second shipment). The estimated number of donkeys leaving Assur per year thus ranges from several hundred (Veenhof, Larsen) to 1500 (ten caravans of 150 donkeys each, Barjamovic) and even 5000 (Stratford). It would appear that the first estimates are low. The two lists of declared value already refer to an estimated 108 and 348 donkeys. The size of a caravan may have been determined by the season, and a caravan like that of Imdi-ilum may not have been unusual for the first major one to leave in spring. The number of animals of this particular caravan (as reconstructed here) is not so different from the one referred to in a letter found at Mari, which refers to 300 Assyrians and 300 donkeys; from that group a section consisting of 30 men and 60 donkeys was separated.78 According to another text from the Mari archives, a group of 50 donkeys and accompanying men travelled on to Kanesh whereas the rest of the caravan was held back by Asqur-Addu, ruler of Karana (A. 285, see MARI 8, 385–387). As noted by Veenhof,79 the treaty between Assur and the magnates of Hahhum refers to the size of passing caravans as “fifty (or) a hundred loaded donkeys or more”. The Assyrian caravans were then considerably larger than other known cases,

75 Veenhof,

VS 26, p. 29. 2018: 139–140. 77 Kt c/k 401 (unp. Ankara) mentions as merchandise 6 talents 30 minas tin and 228 kutānum-textiles, which would be carried by an estimated 12 donkeys. The declared value is at least 14 talents 18 minas. 78 ARM 26/2, 432: (3) 3 me lú-meš aš-šu-ru-ú ù 3 me anše-hi-a it-ti-šu-nu (4) iš-tu é-kál-la-timki ú-ṣúnim-ma a-na ka-ra-naki (5) iš-tu ka-ra-na-aki i-na šà-ba lú-meš šu-nu-ti {TI-MA} (6) 30 lú-meš ù 1 šu-ši anšehi-a ip-ru-su-ni-im-ma (7) a-na an-da-ri-igki ik-šu-d[u-nim …]. 79 Veenhof 2008: 197. 76 Barjamovic

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such as that of a group of traders from Emar with thirty donkeys laden with oil,80 or of 44 merchants with 29 donkeys carrying tin from Ešnunna.81 There will have been several caravans departing from Assur in a year, which makes one thousand animals per year a reasonable minimum number. If we use the number of one thousand donkey-loads as an indication of the annual volume of trade during the heyday of the Level II period, this implies that there were sufficient quantities of tin, textiles, and donkeys (and men) available to equip these caravans. Since these commodities did not originate from Assur itself (with the exception of a small quantity of textiles, see below), it presupposes a high level of economic integration between the city-state and the regions supplying those goods. In the following, the economic impact of the estimated one thousand donkey-loads a year will be reviewed; the following numbers have to be multiplied if a larger number should apply. The donkeys were bought in Assur, but their origin, sellers, let alone where they were bred or by whom are not mentioned. The price of a donkey varies and will have been due to the animal’s quality and availability. If the price of a donkey is put at 16–20 shekels of silver, a thousand animals per year cost 16,000–20,000 shekels, that is about 133–167 kg of silver. Each donkey needed a harness (pack-saddle, bags, leather straps, ropes) which cost about 2½ shekels; this would make about 20 kg of silver. Some of the donkeys that survived the journey to Kanesh were sold for copper or silver in Anatolia. The prices for textiles and tin varied considerably. A thousand donkey-loads could represent an annual 333 donkeys with tin and 667 with textiles. At 25 textiles (at 5 shekels a piece) per donkey this represents 16,675 textiles, which would have cost 692 kg of silver. A donkey-load of tin was 2 talents 10 minas, which at a price of 16 to 1 is about 1347 kg of silver. Tin and textiles The estimated quantities of tin and textiles transported to Anatolia and those of silver and gold which were brought to Assur are impressive. Yet, they only represent a fraction of the goods exchanged between Anatolia and Syria-Mesopotamia. The impact of three centuries of OA trade is hard to quantify but still a few comments can be made here. The tin may have come from Iran, where (now exhausted) deposits of this metal have been hypothesised. The evidence for the possible export to Mesopotamia of tin produced at the mines at Mušiston in Tajikistan, which were worked at about the same time, remains inconclusive.82 There seems to have been a steady supply of this metal to Assur, passing through Susa (south-west Iran) and brought to Assur by caravans of the “Lower Country”.83 We do not know when Assur started to be a transit place for tin and textiles, but once a regular caravan trade had been established between Assur and the supplying towns or states 27, 65: (14) 30 anše-hi-a ša lú-meš (15) i-ma-ri-i ì-giš na-šu-ú (letter from Qaṭṭunan). 16: (9) 29 anše-hi-a ù 44 lú-meš tám-ka-ru (10) ša an-na-ka-am na-šu ù iš-tu èš-nun-naki il-li-ku-nim = LAPO 18, no. 912. 82 Garner 2014: 238; Garner 2015. 83 Dercksen 2004: 29. 80 ARM 81 A.

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in Babylonia or Iran, Assur – apparently successfully – secured its position by blocking Babylonian competitors from crossing the Euphrates and participating in the Anatolian market. This need not have affected the total output of tin, but it caused a diversion of the main trading route into Anatolia and the polities profiting from it. We do not possess any evidence for the large-scale import of tin into Anatolia in the third millennium. Remains of ancient tin workings have been found in the Bolkardağ Mountains, but these tin deposits seem to have been exploited only during the third millennium.84 Small deposits of tin-containing minerals exploited during the Bronze Age were recently identified at several places near Kayseri.85 These local Anatolian sources obviously were unable to meet the total demand for tin. Warburton hypothesised that Anatolian producers of tin were unable to compete with the large-scale import of tin by Assyrian merchants, thus causing the closure of Anatolian tin mines at Bolkardağ.86 Alternatively, the end to tin production at Göltepe may have formed the opportunity to import tin to Anatolia seized by Assur and not by Sippar or Ešnunna. It is likely that part of the tin was shipped to western Anatolia and even further by non-Assyrian traders.87 Wool and textiles The bulk of the textiles imported into Anatolia were produced in southern Iraq, which was famous for the quality of the wool and for the textiles manufactured.88 This made these “Akkadian” textiles desirable luxury goods against which the coarser Anatolian garments could not compete. Unfortunately, there is scarcely any evidence from Babylonia itself that relates to export-oriented production from this period; at best, one finds isolated references to types of textile also attested in the OA inventory and references to the sale of some textiles by merchants from Sippar. The OA trade made Assur a reliable market for selling goods. Dealing in textiles in Anatolia was a profitable business and demand in Assur must have been high. Together with the availability of Assyrian capital for purchases, it is very likely that this caused an increase in the output of textiles in several manufacturing places in Babylonia. Yet, an increased supply of Babylonian textiles did not mean that the market in Assur was satisfied. There is evidence of Assyrian women engaging in the home production of textiles to be sold by male relatives in Anatolia.89 The number of textiles made in this way (likely involving slave labour) would be around 2½ textiles per woman per year.90 This caused a demand for wool, but the output of home-produced textiles to be exported to Anatolia during the 19th century (Level II period) is insufficient to explain the deliberate

84 Yener

2000; Yener 2021. et al. 2015. 86 Warburton 2000: 82; Warburton 2003: 232. 87 Earle 2015: 639. Evidence is growing that the tin traded in the Eastern Mediterranean area in the late second millennium originated from European mines, such as those in Cornwall, see Berger et al. 2019. 88 For the assortment of textiles in OA trade, see Michel & Veenhof 2010. 89 Veenhof 1972: 103–123; Michel & Veenhof 2010: 251; Michel 2016. 90 Michel 2016: 132. 85 Yener

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import of wool into Assur by local traders. Information about this type of import stems from evidence from Mari from about 1770 BC, which refers to Assyrian merchants buying wool from the Suhu region (east of Mari along the Euphrates), obviously meant for the production of textiles. Texts from Assur from about a century earlier, and contemporary with the data about home-produced textiles refer to wool of the Šurbu-type, referring to a breed of sheep named after a town south-east of Assur. This suggests a commercial interest in the acquisition of wool for the purpose of weaving it into textiles. With modest quantities needed for the export-oriented home-production, the main reason for the import of wool could have been to satisfy the domestic consumption in Assur. With an estimated 7000-10,000 inhabitants who received at least one textile a year or a wool ration of 4 pounds (in Ur III and Old Babylonian terms), the minimum demand would be 14,000– 20,000 kg of wool or the yield of 14,000–20,000 sheep.91 It remains unclear whether there was some institutional textile production in Assur itself.92 Lines 21–29 of the letter TC 2, 7 read: “And if the market for Akkadian (textiles) has normalised, I shall buy (some) for about 1 pound of silver. As for the kutānum-textiles you keep writing to me: there is no Šurbu-wool. We will buy one heavy textile on the market and send that to you.” This statement by a merchant in Assur describing the local market situation distinguishes between textiles imported from Babylonia (the Akkadian textiles), which we know were sold at the City Hall,93 and textiles of kutānum-type that were woven with Šurbu-wool in Assur itself. This will hardly mean that all kutānum-textiles were made in Assur. In TC 2, 14, a quantity of 27 fine kutānum-textiles made of Šurbu-wool is purchased at 8.2 shekels of silver a piece (and 63 ordinary kutānum-textiles at 5.7 shekels each). Home-weaving (also) used Šurbu-wool, as in the text ‘Rendell’, where a single textile is mentioned.94 It is impossible to say whether all textiles using this type of wool were made in Assur. If the number of textiles imported each year from Babylonia is rounded off at 17,000, this would be the output of 6800 persons and be a fraction of the huge quantities produced during the Ur III period. However, details about textile production during the subsequent early Old Babylonian period are almost non-existent. Despite this lacuna in our information, it is certain that Babylonian caravans brought thousands of textiles to Assur, but the particulars of their origin and composition, the number of donkeys, or the textiles carried are not known. We do have isolated references from Sippar about individual merchants, such as AbB 12, 57, according to which a trader sold 50 textiles in the Suhu region. If representative of the organisation of trade, the modest number of textiles mentioned in an Old Babylonian merchant’s archive from Sippar suggests that the textiles exported did not stem from large institutional weaving establishments, but rather from multiple, smaller workshops.95

91 For rations, see Waetzoldt 1987: 125–126 (Ur III) and Stol 2004: 862 (Old Babylonian); for the yield per sheep, see Stol 2004: 959–960. At 2.5 minas per textile, this would result in 17,500–25,000 minas and the wool of 8750–12,500 sheep. 92 Dercksen 2004: 15–16; Michel & Veenhof 2010: 213. 93 According to Kt 92/k 432, published in Erol 2019: 799–800. 94 For a translation of this text, see Michel 2020: 270 no. 167. 95 De Boer 2021: 35, mentioning TIM 7, 108 listing in all about 178 textiles, that is 7 OA donkey-loads.

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Taking advantage of opportunities to make more profit, Assyrian merchants started to trade in wool in Anatolia and occasionally even in locally produced pirikannum-textiles.96 Although the Assyrian authorities tried to stop the latter activity since it threatened to jeopardize the sale of some of the imported garments, the inner-Anatolian trade in wool by Assyrian merchants is likely to have changed existing trade patterns and the volume and production of textiles. Copper The Pontic deposit in the Tokat area apparently formed a major source of copper for central Anatolia at the beginning of the second millennium BC, with the city of Durhumit functioning as a trading centre for this metal.97 Some Assyrian firms sent their textiles and tin to Durhumit and adjacent regions to sell these commodities for copper. The metal obtained in this way was not the ultimate goal of the Assyrians, since overland transport and market prices in Anatolia made it too expensive to bring the copper to Assur, which was probably serviced by copper from Iran and possibly also from Oman via the South Mesopotamian trade with Dilmun.98 Instead, the copper was transported to major Anatolian towns: Kanesh, Purušhattum, Wahšušana, and Wašhaniya, and sold for silver or gold there. Especially Purušhattum offered an attractive market for selling copper. For the Assyrians, this indirect sale of tin and textiles diversified the risk and offered the possibility of a larger profit. It is difficult to ascertain whether the Assyrians copied existing Anatolian exchange mechanisms and whether their activities drove out any Anatolian competitors. In the absence of data on the total production and consumption of copper it is conceivable that prior to the appearance of Assyrian traders on the Anatolian market, the demand for copper was satisfied through palace-controlled trade employing local merchants. The most likely commodities which both palaces and local merchants had to offer in exchange for copper were locally produced textiles, and, depending on their accessibility, silver and gold. The Assyrian merchants revolutionised the textile trade in Anatolia: they brought highly valued textiles of a quality unavailable in Anatolia itself as well as tin and other luxury goods, possessed capital and commercial and technical infrastructure (although they often rented wagons from a local palace), and most importantly, they were neutral outsiders who were generally trusted by competing rulers. This will have made the Assyrians the preferred customers of the sellers of copper at the expense of their own regional commercial structures. The output of copper may have increased as a result of growing towns in Anatolia, leading to a higher demand for copper, and Assyrian involvement. A larger output meant intensified exploitation of deposits and workforce during the mining season.

96 Lassen

2010; Lassen 2014; Larsen 2017. the evidence for OA trade in copper, see Dercksen 1996. The role of Durhumit as one the regional economic centres in Anatolia has been stressed in Barjamovic 2008. See also the conclusion in Türkekul 2001: 70–73. 98 Hauptmann 1985; Laursen & Steinkeller 2017. 97 For

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Silver and gold With the information available on OA trade, we possess for the first time some detailed evidence on the quantities of silver and gold reaching Mesopotamia in a more or less regular way. The trade will have increased the quantity of silver that circulated in Mesopotamia. Most of the gold seems to have fallen into the hands of the city-state of Assur, which may have used it for paying for imported tin and for hoarding. The tin and textiles purchased in Assur were paid for in silver. The caravans bringing tin and textiles to Assur presumably received payment in silver or gold, but evidence for this is lacking. Gold was used to obtain tin in Elam according to some texts from Mari.99 4. WHAT CAUSED THIS GROWTH? Notwithstanding the incomplete nature of the documentary evidence, it is clear that the economic upsurge caused by the OA trade must have had a profound effect in various areas. The centuries of profitable trade led to an increase in material culture in Assur. This is visible in the archaeological record, with houses that were larger and better constructed than those of the preceding periods.100 We know that part of the profits was used to buy property.101 Royal building projects reflect the amount of money and resources kings were able to mobilise to construct or repair temples and city walls.102 The father of Ilušuma, Šalim-ahum, built the Aššur temple; Ilušuma himself is known to have built the Ištar temple and a wall, and to have subdivided “house plots”; Erišum I rebuilt the Aššur temple, the Step gate (mušlālum), walls and the temple of Adad; Ikunum rebuilt the temple of Adad; Sargon I reportedly rebuilt the Ištar temple as well; Samsi-Addu used some of the capital available in the city for prestigious building projects: the Aššur temple, the Ištar temple D, and the so-called Old Palace. A different way of spending is attested for his son, Išme-Dagan, who is said to have offered 8 talents (240 kg) of silver as bridewealth to have his own son marry a princess.103 A letter sent to the Kanesh colony by authorities in Assur (TC 1, 1) makes us aware of how the city of Assur could siphon off part of the profits realised in Anatolia to cover extraordinary expenses. In this letter, the demand is made on the colony to send ten pounds of silver to co-finance the construction of the city wall.104 A sum of ten pounds could easily be brought together by taxing all merchants, but here it is the central colony at Kanesh and the other trade settlements in Anatolia that have to collect it, probably out of their income largely consisting of taxes. In the south Babylonian kingdom of Larsa, the same sum apparently sufficed to hire 1800 persons for corvee work on a canal; the time is unspecified, but the one-third shekel of silver per person amounts to payment for 10 days.105 99 Joannès

1991: 75. 1996: 55–56. 101 Veenhof 2011: 225–228. 102 See the overview in Larsen 1976: 63. 103 Charpin 2003: 236. 104 Dercksen 2004: 62–64. 105 AbB 9, 217: “Speak to Lu-igisa: Thus says Nūr-Sin. Išar-kubi has written me about the corvée work of the canal Nubitar; in his words: ‘Hire 1800 hirelings, so that they may be ready for you’. (This) he wrote 100 Miglus

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What led to this episode of growth and who benefitted from it? A rise in agricultural surplus seems unlikely, as the economy of Assur does not appear to rely on that sector. In fact, most of the barley consumed in the city may have been imported, which might explain why the City Hall had a special functionary for barley, the “barley-eponym”. This would account for the fact that according to one text barley was bought in Ašal, a town north-east of Tell Rimah (ancient Qaṭṭara),106 some 150 km from Assur. This may or may not be due to a famine in Assur itself, if we compare a letter to King Zimrilim of Mari according to which people from Ekallatum obtained barley from Karana;107 in ARM 26/2, 411 barley from Razama seems to be brought to Ekallatum. Qaṭṭara, Karana, and Razama were situated in the same region, west of the Tigris. And Assur also lacked large flocks of sheep, as wool was also purchased. This probable lack of an agricultural surplus contrasts sharply with the possibilities in Babylonia, where such a surplus could be and was transformed into silver: barley could be used to feed workers in weaving establishments who produced textiles that could be sold for silver through trade. Assur may have experienced a rise in population and the eponym list contains a few individuals who are identified as originally non-Assyrian and who were in Assur when the trade already existed: REL 45 (ca. 1928) is Šu-Anum from Nerabtum, that is Išchali, a town located just east of the river Tigris, near Baghdad. REL 50 (ca. 1925) is another man called Šu-Anum, but he is identified as a hapirum “vagrant”. Other eponyms or their fathers have a name that is unusual for an Assyrian, such as Bal-Tutu,108 father of REL 59 (ca. 1914). But what contributed most to this episode of economic growth seems to be a combination of several factors: the location of Assur itself and the related history of trade, the role of certain families and institutional reforms, and a relatively long period of peace. The location of Assur was at or near trade routes and as a result it may be assumed that its inhabitants were accustomed to participating in trade. These routes connected Assur to its surrounding regions and we have to postulate that at a given moment it became possible to forward textiles to Anatolia and, perhaps at a different point in time, tin, because of existing communications and flow of goods, and because tin became one of the goods transported via this route, and a demand for tin arose in Anatolia.

me. Consider, and give 10 minas of silver, and hire (the) hirelings. And as long as you are free yourself, appoint anybody you want to go in front of the troops.”, translation M. Stol. For the wages, see Stol 2004: 861. 106 See MTT, at: https://books.openedition.org/cdf/4715, accessed 10-6-2021. 107 ARM 26/2, 342, letter to Zimrilim from Yamṣum: “All the people of Numha of Ekallatum keep wandering about without barley. The troops are carrying barley from Karana, 660 litres each. The troops are (almost) dead. (…) I heard as follows around me: The chief of merchants of Assur brought a present to AsqurAddu (i.e., the king of Karana), and the whole of Assur imposes its authority in Karana itself.” (5) lú nu-umha-a ka-lu-šu ša é-kál-la-t[im]ki (6) [b]a-lum še-im it-ta-na-ag-[gi-i]š (7) ù še-am ša ka-ra-na-aki ṣa-[bu-um …] (8) 2,1.0 gur-àm i-z[a-ab]-bi-[lu] (9) ṣa-bu-um mi-i-i[t …] (…) (15) ù i-na a-hi-ti-i[a ki-a-am eš-me](16) um-ma-a-mi lú ugula dam-gà[r da-šur]ki (17) šu-ru-ub-tam a-na aš-kur-dim ú-še-ri-ib (18) ù da-šurki ka-lu-šu (19) i-na ka-ra-na-a-maki uš-ta-/[a]l-la-aṭ (transliteration according to ARCHIBAB, T7514). 108 For Tutu in personal names, see Richter 2014: 242.

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The opportunities offered by these conditions were recognised in Assur. But the town as such cannot be used to explain economic growth. Rather, as argued by Abrams, the town is what has to be explained – in our case, we are curious what made Assur such a successful mercantile centre.109 Abrams introduces what he terms the complex of domination to analyse towns. This complex comprises “an ongoing and at least loosely integrated struggle to constitute and elaborate power. The conception has a certain dynamism, and it points directly towards the analysis of social action and relationships and to the construction and destruction of institutions through action and relationships”. The struggle for power between merchant families and the crown has already been discussed by Larsen (1976), who successfully adduced evidence on Italian mercantile towns to explain developments in Assur. This is indeed a valuable comparison and it explains how an oligarchy consisting of merchant families gained influence in Assur and exercised power through the city assembly and the ‘elders’. So it was human agency that created institutional change: the roles of kings Ilušuma and notably Erišum I have been described above, and merchants gained influence. Erišum’s reign saw the introduction of the office of year-eponym and probably the beginning of permanent settlement in Kanesh and other towns in Anatolia. The groups forming this city-state created legal and financial institutions to deal with the complexities of trade, notably by concluding treaties with foreign rulers through which the unhindered passage of caravans, and the protection of Assyrian lives and property was negotiated. Other examples are the formation of joint-stock partnerships (naruqqumcontracts), and the introduction of laws to deal with novel situations (e.g., the introduction of the rābiṣum-attorney). As a result, the trade led to increased output by all those Assyrians involved in the caravan trade: suppliers of donkeys, of wooden, woollen and leather equipment, food, and labour. It also created or enlarged opportunities for local families to earn from the trade by weaving textiles or buying export goods (as was done by kings and priests). In Babylonia, the export-oriented production of textiles received a boost although practically no documentation has survived to substantiate this. Along the caravan routes, the traffic with its demand for food, lodgings, and services, and the income from taxation, led to greater local and regional prosperity. The role of money needs to be addressed here. We know that the OA economy used copper and silver as money.110 As we have seen above, the flow of silver and gold enabled the Assyrian merchants to purchase the goods in Assur. As soon as the system functioned as it did during the well-documented decades in the early 19th century, a considerable part of the profit realised in Anatolia was used to buy merchandise. This can be regarded as the investing of savings in productive capital according to theories of economic growth. The purchase of property in Assur was not investment, since house prices there were high, and the houses bought were not sold again at a profitable price or rented out. So the reinvestment of profits in merchandise caused a larger volume of traded goods and, related to that, more work for all those involved.

109 Abrams 110 See

1978: 30–31. Dercksen 2021.

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Did this lead to a higher per capita income? This question can only and with due caution be answered for the merchants. Several, but certainly not all of the Assyrian traders, became rich. Their wealth was displayed in Assur, visible to anyone by the frequency of donkeys carrying silver that entered through the city-gate, and it supported or even heightened their social credit and (political) influence. For some, their wealth may have been hidden from sight and out of reach of their families in Assur, because they invested nearly all of it in merchandise. The huge sums of silver value brought together in the jointstock partnerships (naruqqum), 112 and 120 pounds of silver according to two sources (see above), were meant for long-term investments (ten years and longer). This makes it difficult to compare these to the amounts of silver that were used for trading enterprises of limited duration in the Old Babylonian period. Nevertheless, if we look at the evidence, we find there as the highest amount of silver mentioned for a commercial partnership a sum of 26 pounds of silver (20 pounds partnership money, 6 pounds tadmiqtum), which was borrowed by two persons from divine Šamaš and one of the partners in Larsa for a trade journey (text YOS 8, 145, date: Rim-Sîn 38, ca. 1785 BC). The next highest sum occurs in a text from Sippar dating to the reign of Apil-Sîn of Babylon, which mentions a capital of 12 pounds of silver (two-thirds invested by I-S, one-third by I.) for a trade journey to Larsa (BM 16470, courtesy S. A. Moore). A capital of 6 pounds of gold sold for over 32 pounds of silver seems to be used to buy tin in Susa according to TIM 1, 20.111 These figures suggest that Old Babylonian merchants operated with smaller amounts of silver than their colleagues from Assur. It is striking that the volume of trade within one year of an Assyrian trader who was stationed in Sippar around 1750 BC, is estimated to have amounted to at least 20 pounds of silver,112 which for a contemporary colleague in Kanesh would amount to the sale of about 60 textiles. Whether the turnover of this Assyrian’s business in Sippar was representative of what Sippar traders had, is uncertain. There exists some evidence on the cost of living in Assur and in Kanesh:113 two women are to receive 1½ pounds of silver a year in Assur, that is 3¾ shekels of silver each per month or one-eighth of a shekel (22½ še) per day. A man hired as an attorney received about 7 shekels of silver (2 shekels of silver and 30 litres of wheat) per month, presumably in Kanesh. A priestess living in Kanesh was to receive 1⅔ shekels of silver per month, but received food from the owner of the house she lived in (if correctly interpreted). It is not known what an ordinary hireling received; in Old Babylonian times, his wage was 1 shekel of silver per month.114 We may suspect that in this respect there was no big difference between Assur and Sippar. The difference seems to have been in the wealth of Assyrian merchants trading with Kanesh. The factors causing the end of this trade system were apparently political (an end to a period of stability, wars and the ensuing destruction of key towns) and intrinsic to the system (organisation and financing of trade, the character of colonial settlements). Fluctuations or more severe changes in the supply of tin and other commodities are also a likely 111 See

Reiter 1997: 90*–99*. 1991: 301. 113 See Dercksen 2014: 97–99. 114 Stol 2004: 861. 112 Veenhof

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cause. Yet, despite all these interruptions tin was still available in the city of Assur sometime in the mid-17th century BC according to a letter found in Haradum (east of Mari on the Euphrates).115 But by that time, Kanesh and its Assyrian colony had ceased to exist. BIBLIOGRAPHY Abrams, P. 1978. “Towns and Economic Growth: Some Theories and Problems,” in P. Abrams & E. A. Wrigley (eds.), Towns in Societies: Essays in Economic History and Historical Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 9–33. Bachhuber, C. 2012. “The Anatolian plateau,” in D. T. Potts (ed.), A Companion to the Archaeology of the Ancient Near East (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 575–595. Barjamovic, G. 2008. “The geography of trade. Assyrian colonies in Anatolia c. 1975-1725 BC and the study of early interregional networks of exchange,” in J. G. Dercksen (ed.), Anatolia and the Jazira during the Old Assyrian Period (Leiden: NINO; PIHANS 111), pp. 87–100. Barjamovic, G. 2011. A Historical Geography of Anatolia in the Old Assyrian Colony Period. Copenhagen: CNI Publications 38. Barjamovic, G. 2014. “The size of Kanesh and the demography of Early Middle Bronze Age Anatolia,” in L. Atici, F. Kulakoğlu, G. Barjamovic & A. Fairbairn (eds.), Current Research at Kültepe-Kanesh. An Interdisciplinary and Integrative Approach to Trade Networks, Internationalism, and Identity (Atlanta: Lockwood Press; Journal of Cuneiform Studies Supplemental Series 4), pp. 55–68. Barjamovic, G. 2017. “A commercial geography of Anatolia: integrating Hittite and Assyrian texts, archaeology and topography,” in M. Weeden & L. Z. Ullmann (eds.), Hittite Landscape and Geography (Leiden - Boston: Brill; Handbook of Oriental Studies Section 1, The Near and Middle East, volume 121), pp. 311–318. Barjamovic, G. 2018. “Interlocking commercial networks and the infrastructure of trade in western Asia during the Bronze Age,” in K. Kristiansen, T. Lindkvist & J. Myrdal (eds.), Trade and Civilization in the Pre-Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 133–167. Barjamovic G., Th. Hertel & M. T. Larsen. 2012. Ups and Downs at Kanesh. Chronology, History and Society in the Old Assyrian Period. Leiden: NINO. PIHANS 120, OAAS 5. Battini, L. 2011. “The Eastern Tigris region in the first half of the 2nd millennium BC,” in P. A. Miglus & S. Mühl (eds.), Between the Cultures. The Central Tigris Region from the 3rd to the 1st millennium BC (Heidelberg: Heidelberger Orientverlag; HSAO 14), pp. 111–141. Berger, D., J. S. Soles, A. R. Giumlia-Mair, G. Brügmann, E. Galili, N. Lockhoff & E. Pernicka. 2019. “Isotope systematics and chemical composition of tin ingots from Mochlos (Crete) and other Late Bronze Age sites in the eastern Mediterranean Sea: An ultimate key to tin provenance?” PLoS ONE 14 (6): e0218326. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0218326 Charpin, D. 2004. “Histoire politique du Proche-Orient amorrite (2002-1595),” in P. Attinger, W. Sallaberger & M. Wäfler (eds.), Mesopotamien. Die altbabylonische Zeit (Fribourg: University Press; OBO 160/4. Annäherungen 4), pp. 23–480. Dercksen, J. G. 1996. The Old Assyrian Copper Trade in Anatolia. Istanbul: Nederlands HistorischArchaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul. PIHANS 75.

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Dercksen, J. G. 1999. “On the financing of Old Assyrian merchants,” in J. G. Dercksen (ed.), Trade and Finance in Ancient Mesopotamia (Istanbul; Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul; PIHANS 84), pp. 85–99. Dercksen, J. G. 2001. “When we met in Hattuš. Trade according to Old Assyrian texts from Alishar and Bogazköy,” in W. H. van Soldt (ed.), Veenhof Anniversary Volume. Studies Presented to Klaas R. Veenhof on the Occasion of his Sixty-Fifth Birthday (Leiden: NINO; PIHANS 89), pp. 39–66. Dercksen, J. G. 2004. Old Assyrian Institutions. Leiden: NINO. PIHANS 98. Dercksen, J. G. 2014. “The Old Assyrian trade and its participants,” in H. D. Baker & M. Jursa (eds.), Documentary Sources in Ancient Near Eastern and Greco-Roman Economic History (Oxford - Philadelphia: Oxbow), pp. 59–112. Dercksen, J. G. 2021. “Money in the Old Assyrian period,” in L. Rahmstorf, G. Barjamovic & N. Ialongo (eds.), Merchants, Measures and Money (Kiel - Hamburg: Wachholtz Verlag; Weight and Value 2), pp. 331–359. Earle T., J. Ling, C. Uhnér, Z. Stos-Gale & L. Melheim. 2015. “The political economy and metal trade in Bronze Age Europe: understanding regional variability in terms of comparative advantages and articulations,” European Journal of Archaeology 18: 633–657. Efe, T. 2007. “The theories of the ‘Great Caravan Route’ between Cilicia and Troy: the Early Bronze Age III period in inland western Anatolia,” Anatolian Studies 57: 47–64. Erol, H. 2019. “Old Assyrian metal trade, its volume and interactions,” Belleten 83/298: 779–806. Ezer, S. 2014. “Kültepe-Kanesh in the Early Bronze Age,” in L. Atici, F. Kulakoğlu, G. Barjamovic & A. Fairbairn (eds.), Current Research at Kültepe-Kanesh (Atlanta: Lockwood Press; Journal of Cuneiform Studies Supplemental Series 4), pp. 5–23. Garner, J. 2014. Das Zinn der Bronzezeit in Mittelasien 2: Die Montanarchäologischen Forschungen an den Zinnlagerstätten. Mainz: von Zabern. Garner, J. 2015. “Bronze Age tin mines in central Asia,” in A. Hauptmann & D. ModarressiTehrani (eds.), Archaeometallurgy in Europe III (Bochum: Deutsches Bergbau-Museum; Der Anschnitt Beiheft 26), pp. 135–143. Grayson, A. K. 1987. Assyrian Rulers of the Third and Second Millennia BC (to 1115 BC). Toronto Buffalo - London: University of Toronto Press. The Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia. Assyrian Periods Volume 1. Günbattı, C. 2014. Harsamna Kralı Hurmeli’ye Gönderilen Mektup ve Kaniš Kralları. The Letter sent to Hurmeli King of Harsamna and the Kings of Kaniš. Ankara: TTK. Günbattı, C. 2016. Anadolu Tüccarlar Šarabunuwa ve Peruwa’nin Arşivleri. Ankara: TTK. Kültepe Tabletleri 10. Harris, E. M., D. M. Lewis & M. Woolmer (eds.). 2016. The Ancient Greek Economy: Markets, Households and City-States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hopkins, K. 1978. “Economic growth and towns in classical antiquity,” in P. Abrams & E. A. Wrigley (eds.), Towns in Societies: Essays in Economic History and Historical Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 35–77. Joannès, F. 1991. “L’étain, de l’Elam à Mari,” in L. De Meyer & H. Gasche (eds.), Mésopotamie et Elam. Actes de la XXXVIème Rencontre Assyriologique Internationale (Ghent: University of Ghent), pp. 67–76. Joannès, F. 2006. Haradum II. Les textes de la période paléo-babylonienne (Samsu-iluna – Ammi-ṣaduqa). Paris: ERC.

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Jursa, M. 2010. Aspects of the Economic History of Babylonia in the First Millennium BC. Economic Geography, Economic Mentalities, Agriculture, the Use of Money and the Problem of Economic Growth. Münster: Ugarit-Verlag. AOAT 377. Hauptmann, A. 1985. 5000 Jahre Kupfer in Oman. Band 1: Die Entwicklung der Kupfermetallurgie vom 3. Jahrtausend bis zur Neuzeit. Bochum: Deutsches Bergbau-Museum; Der Anschnitt Beiheft 4. Kraus, F. R. 1970. Sumerer und Akkader, ein Problem der altmesopotamischen Geschichte. Amsterdam London: North-Holland Publishing Company. Kraus, F. R. 1984. Königliche Verfügungen in altbabylonischer Zeit. Leiden: Brill. SD 11. Kulakoğlu, F. 2015. “Current research at Kültepe,” in F. Kulakoğlu & C. Michel (eds.), Proceedings of the 1st Kültepe International Meeting Kültepe, 19-23 September, 2013. Studies Dedicated to Kutlu Emre (Turnhout: Brepols; Subartu 35), pp. 9–21. Kulakoğlu, F. 2017. “Early Bronze Age Monumental Structures at Kültepe,” in F. Kulakoğlu & G. Barjamovic (eds.), Proceedings of the 2nd Kültepe International Meeting, Kültepe, 26–30 July 2015. Studies Dedicated to Klaas Veenhof (Turnhout: Brepols; Subartu 39), pp. 215–224. Larsen M. T. 1976. The Old Assyrian City-State and its Colonies. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag. Mesopotamia 4. Larsen M. T. 1987. “Commercial networks in the Ancient Near East,” in M. Rowlands, M. Larsen & K. Kristiansen (eds.), Centre and Periphery in the Ancient World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 47–56. Larsen, M. T. 1999. “Naruqqu-Verträge (naruqqu-contracts),” Reallexikon der Assyriologie 9: 181–184. Larsen, M. T. 2000. “The Old Assyrian city-state,” in M. H. Hansen (ed.), A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures. An Investigation Conducted by the Copenhagen Polis Centre (Copenhagen: Reitzel), pp. 77–87. Larsen, M. T. 2007. “Individual and family in Old Assyrian society,” Journal of Cuneiform Studies 59: 93–106. Larsen, M. T. 2015. Ancient Kanesh. A Merchant Colony in Bronze Age Anatolia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Laursen, S. & P. Steinkeller. 2017. Babylonia, the Gulf Region, and the Indus. Archaeological and Textual Evidence for Contact in the Third and Early Second Millennia B.C. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns. Lehner, J. W. 2014. “Metal technology, organization, and the evolution of long-distance trade at Kültepe,” in L. Atici, F. Kulakoğlu, G. Barjamovic & A. Fairbairn (eds.), Current Research at Kültepe/Kanesh: An Interdisciplinary and Integrative Approach to Trade Networks, Internationalism, and Identity (Atlanta: Lockwood Press; Journal of Cuneiform Studies Supplemental Series 4), pp. 135–155. Massa, M. & V. Şahoğlu. 2015. “The 4.2 ka BP climatic event in west and central Anatolia: combining palaeoclimatic proxies and archaeological data,” in H. Meller, H. W. Arz, R. Jung & R. Risch (eds.), 2200 BC – Ein Klimasturz als Ursache für den Zerfall der Alten Welt? (Halle [Saale]: Landesmuseum für Vorgeschichte; Tagungen des Landesmuseums für Vorgeschichte Halle Band 12/I), pp. 61–78. Meyers, P. 2003. “Production, Distribution, and Control of Silver: Information Provided by Elemental Composition of Ancient Silver Objects,” in L. van Zelst (ed.), Patterns and Process: A Festschrift in Honor of Dr Edward V. Sayre (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Center for Materials Research and Education), pp. 271–288.

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Michalowski, P. 2009. “Aššur during the Ur III period,” in O. Drewnowska (ed.), Here & There Across the Ancient Near East. Studies in Honour of Krystyna Lyczkowska (Warszawa: Agade), pp. 149–156. Michel, C. 2001. Correspondance des marchands de Kaniš au début du IIe millénaire avant J.-C. Paris: Les éditions du Cerf. LAPO 19. Michel, C. 2003. Old Assyrian Bibliography of Cuneiform Texts, Bullae, Seals and the Results of the Excavations at Aššur, Kültepe/Kaniš, Acemhöyük, Alişar and Boğazköy. Leiden: NINO. PIHANS 97; OAAS 1. Michel, C. 2011. “Old Assyrian Bibliography 2,” Archiv für Orientforschung 52: 416–437. Michel, C. 2015. “Old Assyrian Bibliography 3,” Archiv für Orientforschung 53: 525–559. Michel, C. 2016. Traditional Textile Craft – An Intangible Cultural Heritage? Copenhagen; Centre for Textile Research. Michel, C. 2020. Women of Assur and Kanesh. Texts from the Archives of Assyrian Merchants. Atlanta: SBL. Michel, C. & K. R. Veenhof. 2010. “The textiles traded by the Assyrians in Anatolia (19th18th centuries BC),” in C. Michel & M.-L. Nosch (eds.), Textile Terminologies in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean from the Third to the First Millennia BC (Oxford: Oxbow Books), pp. 210–271. Miglus, P. A. 1996. Das Wohngebiet von Assur: Stratigraphie und Architektur. Text. Berlin: Mann. WVDOG 93. Millett, P. 2001. “Productive to some purpose? The problem of ancient economic growth,” in D. J. Mattingly & J. Salmon (eds.), Economies Beyond Agriculture in the Classical World (London New York: Routledge; Leicester-Nottingham Studies in Ancient Society 9), pp. 17–48. Morris, I. & Manning, J. G. 2005. “Introduction,” in J. G. Manning & I. Morris (eds.), The Ancient Economy. Evidence and Models (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp. 1–44. Ökse, A. T. 2007. “Ancient mountain routes connecting central Anatolia to the upper Euphrates region,” Anatolian Studies 57: 35–45. Öztürk, G. 2019. Yeni Kazılar Işığında MÖ. 3. Binyıl’ın Sonunda ve MÖ. 2. Binyıl’ın Başında Kültepe Mühür ve Mühür Baskıları. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi. Doktora Tezi. Palmisano, A. 2017. “Drawing pathways from the past: the trade routes of the Old Assyrian caravans across Upper Mesopotamia and Central Anatolia,” in F. Kulakoğlu & G. Barjamovic (eds.), Proceedings of the 2nd Kültepe International Meeting, Kültepe, 26–30 July 2015. Studies Dedicated to Klaas Veenhof (Turnhout: Brepols; Subartu 39), pp. 27–46. Pfälzner, P. 2012. “The question of desurbanisation versus reurbanisation of the Syrian Jazirah in the late third and early second millennium BC,” in N. Laneri, P. Pfälzner & S. Valentini (eds.), Looking North. The Socioeconomic Dynamics of the northern Mesopotamian and Anatolian Regions during the Late Third and Early Second Millennium BC (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz), pp. 51–80. Rahmstorf, L. 2015. “The Aegean before and after c. 2200 BC between Europe and Asia: trade as a prime mover of cultural change,” in H. Meller, H. W. Arz, R. Jung & R. Risch (eds.), 2200 BC – Ein Klimasturz als Ursache für den Zerfall der Alten Welt? (Halle [Saale]: Landesmuseum für Vorgeschichte; Tagungen des Landesmuseums für Vorgeschichte Halle Band 12/I), pp. 149–180. Reiter, K. 1997. Die Metalle im Alten Orient unter besonderer Berücksichtigung altbabylonischer Quellen. Münster: Ugarit-Verlag. AOAT 249. Richter, Th. 2014. “Tutu,” Reallexikon der Assyriologie 14: 241–242.

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Ristvet, L. 2012. “Resettling Apum: tribalism and tribal states in the Tell Leilan region, Syria,” in N. Laneri, P. Pfälzner & S. Valentini (eds.), Looking North. The Socioeconomic Dynamics of the northern Mesopotamian and Anatolian Regions during the Late Third and Early Second Millennium BC (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz), pp. 37–50. Saller, R. 2002. “Framing the debate over growth in the ancient economy,” in W. Scheidel & S. von Reden (eds.), The Ancient Economy (New York: Routledge), pp. 251–269. Schwartz, G. M. 2012. “Northern exposures: third to second millennium BC transformations in Upper Mesopotamia,” in N. Laneri, P. Pfälzner & S. Valentini (eds.), Looking North. The Socioeconomic Dynamics of the Northern Mesopotamian and Anatolian Regions during the Late Third and Early Second Millennium BC (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz), pp. 255–263. Steadman, S. R. 2011. “The Early Bronze Age on the plateau,” in S. R. Steadman & G. McMahon (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Anatolia (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 229– 259. Stol, M. 2004. “Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in altbabylonischer Zeit,” in P. Attinger, W. Sallaberger & M. Wäfler (eds.), Mesopotamien. Die altbabylonische Zeit (Fribourg: Academic Press; OBO 160/4; Annäherungen 4), pp. 641–975. Stratford, E. 2014. “‘Make Them Pay’: Charting the Social Topography of an Old Assyrian Caravan Cycle.” Journal of Cuneiform Studies 66: 11–38. Stratford, E. 2017. A Year of Vengeance. Volume 1: Time, Narrative, and the Old Assyrian Trade. Boston/Berlin: De Gruyter. SANER 17, 1. Stratford, E. 2019. “Markets and Marketplaces in Middle Bronze Age Anatolia particularly during the ‘Colony’ Period,” in L. Rahmstorf & E. Stratford (eds.), Weights and Marketplaces from the Bronze Age to the Early Modern Period (Kiel - Hamburg: Wachholtz; Weight and Value 1), pp. 219–236. Türkekul, A. 2001. Metallurgy at Acemhöyük during Assyrian Trade Colony Period. Boğaziçi University. Ur, J. A. 2010. Urbanism and Cultural Landscapes in Northeastern Syria. The Tell Hamoukar Survey 1999–2001. Chicago: Oriental Institute. OIP 137. Veenhof, K. R. 1972. Aspects of Old Assyrian Trade and its Terminology. Leiden: Brill. Studia et Documenta ad Iura Orientis Antiqui Pertinenta X. Veenhof, K. R. 1991. “Assyrian commercial activities in Old Babylonian Sippar,” in D. Charpin & F. Joannès (eds.), Marchands, diplomates et empereurs. Études sur la civilization mésopotamienne offertes à Paul Garelli (Paris: ERC), pp. 287–303. Veenhof, K. R. 1999a. “Silver and credit in Old Assyrian trade,” in J. G. Dercksen (ed.), Trade and Finance in Ancient Mesopotamia (Istanbul: NHAI; PIHANS 84), pp. 55–83. Veenhof, K. R. 1999b. “Redemption of houses in Assur and Sippar,” in B. Böck, E. CancikKirschbaum & Th. Richter (eds.), Munuscula Mesopotamica. Festschrift für Johannes Renger (Münster: Ugarit-Verlag; AOAT 267), pp. 599–616. Veenhof, K. R. 2008. “The Old Assyrian Period,” in M. Wäfler (ed.), Mesopotamia. The Old Assyrian Period (Fribourg: University Press; Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 160/5; Annäherungen 5), pp. 13–264. Veenhof, K. R. 2013. “New Mesopotamian treaties from the early second millennium BC from kārum Kanesh and Tell Leilan (Šehna),” Zeitschrift für Altorientalische und Biblische Rechtsgeschichte 19: 23–57. Waetzoldt, H. 1987. “Compensation of craft workers and officials in the Ur III period,” in M. A. Powell (ed.), Labor in the Ancient Near East (New Haven: AOS; AOS 68), pp. 117–141.

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SILVER, MARKETS AND GROWTH IN PHARAONIC EGYPT Juan Carlos MORENO GARCÍA The analysis of markets, growth and the “monetary” use of silver in everyday transactions in Pharaonic Egypt still raises considerable suspicion in Egyptology. Most are accustomed to thinking of Pharaonic Egypt as the quintessential example of oriental despotism: rigidly hierarchical, bureaucratic and redistributive. Egyptologists have been – and still are – rather reluctant to accept that markets, “money” and private transactions played an important role in the Egyptian economy prior to the middle of the first millennium BC.1 From this perspective, the land of the Pharaohs remained a conservative agrarian order whose ultimate economic goals were mere subsistence and the reproduction of existing social order; goods and services circulated through redistributive networks provided and controlled by the state. By definition there was no place for concepts such as economic growth (either occasional or sustained in time).2 Such reluctance can be traced back to several types of considerations: • firstly, the weight of the Biblical story of Joseph. According to this narrative, Joseph managed to become an efficient administrator of Pharaoh, as his wise measures helped store grain in periods of abundance in order to redistribute it to the Egyptian population in years of bad harvests. The implicit idea was that of a highly efficient, interventionist, centralized and redistributive economy, under the supervision of a careful administration that strictly followed the instructions issued by the king; • secondly, the wealth of administrative papyrological documents recovered during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, dealing in many cases with the management of temple and crown land. Given the institutional nature of many of these documents (related to temples, the royal palace, the domains of the highest elite, etc.) and the scarcity of private archives, these texts suggested that the state controlled all aspects of the Egyptian economy. What is more, the complex and varied sets of information recorded, mostly referring to agricultural and tax matters, apparently confirmed the meticulous capacity of the royal administration to record and use economic information where and when needed.3 This also led many to believe that Pharaonic Egypt was mainly an agrarian society, little involved in commercial activities as the supposed redistributive nature of the Egyptian state marginalised the circulation of goods and services outside the institutional sphere and the networks it controlled. In fact, it was commonly thought that markets were reduced to only small-scale exchanges (barter), while foreign

1 An

overview in Moreno García 2016a; Warburton 2016. García 2014a. 3 Cf. a sensible approach to this matter in Eyre 2013. 2 Moreno

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trade was a monopoly of the state (thus leaving no place for private business) and consisted of state-organized trade missions sent in search of precious items. The diplomatic Amarna archive, for instance, seemed to support this view, as the transactions invoked involved exchanges of gifts and requests of precious goods between royal courts;4 thirdly, as an example of a hydraulic civilization, Egyptologists believed that the role of the state was crucial in the management and upkeep of the hydraulic network, not to mention the distribution of water that made possible the legendary agricultural wealth of the country. Once more, the state appeared as an essential and all-encompassing institution that regulated the economic activities of the country through a centralized management of its resources. According to this general principle, when the monarchy periodically collapsed during the so-called “intermediate periods”, the consequences were necessarily understood as catastrophic for the country. Famine, social chaos, political division and institutional vacuum must have transformed an economic crisis into a trauma – until a new cycle of prosperity and centralized organization promoted by a new monarchy was able to reunify the country and restore its administrative structure; fourthly, following this vision, private transactions and the use of precious metals were insignificant at best in an otherwise heavily centralized and bureaucratic redistributive economy. In the most extreme cases, this view led to real caricatures, in which the king controlled every economic activity and transaction, even at the most modest level. To take one example, when archaeologists found silver hoards in domestic areas, these were systematically interpreted as workshops of jewellers, even when no real archaeological evidence supported this view. It was simply inconceivable that such hoards could be the expression of private wealth stored by individuals in their houses and used in their private transactions; fifthly, private wealth thus depended on rewards, remunerations and grants of land and precious goods given by the king, to the point that patrimonies were fragile, depended on service to the crown and, given the interventionist and centralized nature of the state, left no incentive and little possibility for private business and private accumulation and investment of wealth. In a society in which private transactions were allegedly restricted to small exchanges and barter in the domestic sphere, the use of contracts would have been rather marginal until they became widely used in the first millennium BC, when the Egyptian economy became more integrated in international networks; sixthly, the role of merchants was negligible too. Their rare appearances in the epigraphic and papyrological record, only from around 1550 BC on, evoke their activities in the service of temples, as if they constituted a mere category of employees of “great” institutions. Given the virtually complete absence of archives of their own, it seemed as if they did not carry any business of their own, so the only justification of their existence was that they executed particular missions for the temples and the crown: engaged for the supply of exotic items, raw materials, etc.; finally, economic growth appears irrelevant in this perspective. Investment was reduced to the expansion of arable land and textile production in the institutional sphere, when

4 Liverani

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demographic growth and the import of foreign labourers, settled in the fields of temples and the crown as agricultural workforce, made it possible to put under cultivation new areas thanks to the provision of fields, seeds and draft animals to cultivators, or to expand cloth manufacture. Precious metals were unproductively transformed into luxury items deprived of any real economic impact. And when prices were expressed in silver, they only referred to units of change/conversion, not to actual payments in this metal. Remunerations based on rations under a rigid redistributive system meant that wages and markets had little impact on the overall economic life of the country and hardly provided any stimulus to trade and “industry” aiming to supply domestic consumption. This quick summary of common assumptions about the organization of the Pharaonic economy might help explain why ancient Egypt is usually absent from current discussions about ancient economic history, ancient markets and ancient economic growth prior to the Hellenistic period.5 However, and contrary to the traditional view just evoked, some of the oldest Egyptian continuous texts record private acquisition of wealth, while the use of sealed documents and written contracts/agreements for private operations (acquisition of houses, building tombs, hiring priests for the celebration of private rituals, etc.) are common in Egyptian sources since the third millennium BC. Private archives, such as that of Heqanakht (early second millennium BC), reveal the dynamism of a sector of rural landowners involved in leases, loans of grain, acquisitions of servants, use of pieces of copper as a means of exchange, and promoting agricultural strategies in which alternative crops were chosen depending on their expected (and profitable) return. Gold and silver circulated among common people while cities and temples paid some of their taxes in these metals (as depicted in the tomb of the vizier Rekhmire, the highest official in the land, and on some inscribed blocks from the temples built by Akhenaten), thus revealing the existence of economic circuits fuelled by precious metals about which we know virtually nothing. Finally, wealthy peasants paid their taxes in gold and managed substantial agricultural tenures, both of their own and of institutions such as temples and the crown, and they reveal that rural “entrepreneurs” were crucial in the cultivation and commercialization of crops.6 Urban growth, traders crossing the Nile Valley and lending money to peasants, the involvement of individuals in riverine and foreign trade, the traces of a “middle class” whose wealth owed little or nothing to the state, the introduction of new crops and irrigation devices in the hands of private people in a context of expanding cities (as well as urban markets and peri-urban vegetable gardens) are further indicators that the Egyptian economy was not an all-institutional one. What is more, there are serious traces of economic growth, at least for some periods and areas of the Nile Valley. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand why Egyptologists have neglected this evidence or why they have deliberately chosen to analyse the Pharaonic economy exclusively through the 5 As

happens in some recent works: Manning & Morris 2005; Bang, Ikeguchi & Ziche 2006; van der Spek, van Leeuwen & van Zanden 2015; Kleber & Pirngruber 2016; van der Spek & van Leeuwen 2018. Some exceptions: Warburton 2005; Warburton 2014; van Rinsveld 2014; Van de Mieroop 2014; Rahmstorf & Stratford 2019; Moreno García 2021a. 6 Moreno García 2014b.

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lens of an allegedly all-encompassing, all-powerful and hyper-centralized state, the very basis of which have never been seriously researched nor defined.7 Luckily, the archaeological discoveries of the last twenty or thirty years, the reinterpretation of many well-known but still insufficiently studied documents and the combination of written and archaeological sources are making it possible to abandon older reductionist views. This also opens up the possibility that Egyptology may contribute to discussions on the ancient economy and provide a plethora of historical information for economists, archaeologists and historians hardly known beyond the narrow field of Egyptological studies.8 That is why, in order to contribute to the question of economic growth (if any) in antiquity, as well as the use of silver in private transactions and the importance of markets, I would like to focus on two very particular periods, the very end of the third millennium BC and the second half of the second millennium BC, which cover, respectively, the so-called First Intermediate Period along with the early Middle Kingdom (ca. 2160–1900 BC) and the Second Intermediate Period along with the New Kingdom (ca. 1650–1100 BC). Contrary to many assumptions about the decline of political order and, consequently, of prosperity in those troubled times, recent research reveals a quite different, even counterintuitive picture, that stresses the role played by trade, private business and potential economic growth beyond the institutional sphere. TRADE ON THE NILE

AT THE END OF THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

BC

After roughly half a millennium (and more) of real growth, the Old Kingdom (2686– 2160 BC) collapsed, but in circumstances which remain obscure. Royal incompetence and official cupidity may have played a role – but these are just guesses. What is important, however, is that older ideas about an allegedly ensuing economic crisis with extensive misery and agricultural decline – as is supposed to have characterized the subsequent First Intermediate Period (2160–2055 BC) – seems to be increasingly inconsistent with recent archaeological data.9 On the contrary, it was a period in which trade flourished, in which Nubian, Asiatic and Libyan populations frequented Egypt and settled in the country, when urban life expanded and when people that did not belong to the elite displayed more wealth in their burials. So this period might provide a good starting point for the analysis of economic growth as well as about the role played by the impact of the state (and its taxes) and of trade networks on economic activities. Especially so as there is no evidence of a sudden and significant increase of population simply leading to a correlative quantitative (and not qualitative) increase of economic inputs (land under cultivation, consumption per capita, intensification of agricultural production, etc.). Furthermore, demand from the palatial sector (monumental buildings, organization of caravans, manufacture of luxury objects, courtly consumption, etc.) seems to have played a quite limited role for most of the First Intermediate Period, so the changes experienced in Egypt in those times might 7 Cf.

nevertheless Baines & Yoffee 1998; Moreno García 2019a. de Mieroop 2014; Warburton 2016; Moreno García 2016a; Moreno García 2021a. 9 Moreno García 2016b. 8 Van

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be better understood as the consequence of revitalized and reinvigorated private and local demand. Under this perspective, these economic changes and the apparent prosperity experienced by Egyptian society (in a context marked by internal conflicts and territorial competition) could be described and explained in completely different terms than those to which readers will be accustomed. One guess could be that forces were released as a result of reduced tax pressure from a weakened and divided monarchy (so more wealth remained in the hands of individuals and was accumulated or spent in different ways). Alternatively, one could propose the development of private business in a context in which people enjoyed greater autonomy of action (private texts from this period stress for the first time private enrichment, private acquisition of wealth and the use of seals in private economic operations), supporting the investment of private wealth in specific activities for profit (textile production, cattle raising, leather manufacture, specialized production for export, etc.).10 In any case, trade appears as a crucial growth driver in the absence of a unique centralized political power. To begin with, there is evidence that international trade began playing an important role in the Egyptian economy from around 2350 BC on. Several officials of this period were involved in the control of borders and the arrival of foreign goods into Egypt through “gateways” located at Elephantine, the area of Coptos and the Eastern Delta. What is more, substantial administrative changes intended to provide the logistics necessary for the circulation of officials and goods across the Nile Valley, most noteworthy by the creation of a network of production and stock centres of the crown known as ḥwt. In this process, the involvement and collaboration of local leaders with the monarchy helped enhance their status as well as the wealth they accumulated, partially spent in their own provinces (decorated tombs, extensive patronage networks, prestige items, etc.). It also seems that some of these local leaders, especially those located at strategic crossroads such as the Thebes/Coptos area, the area around Asyut/Bersheh/Beni Hassan, Elephantine, Abydos and the Eastern Delta, became more and more involved in trade activities and that, in some instances, they acted on their own by developing their own business.11 The final consequence in the long term was that some of these provincial potentates probably found it preferable to follow their own interests and strategies and began ignoring the authority of the royal palace, apparently weakened during the exceptionally long reign of king Pepi II (2278–2184 BC).12 Political and territorial division ensued shortly afterwards. Quite significantly, these emerging local powers showed little interest in conquering Memphis, the heart of Pharaonic power. Instead, they followed autonomous policies in their own territories that finally crystallized in the consolidation of two kingdoms, one at Thebes and the other one at Heracleopolis. Both localities were situated at strategic “gateways” connected, respectively, with the Red Sea and the oases of the Western Desert (in the case of Thebes), and with the Mediterranean, a burgeoning Levant and the Western Desert (in the case of Heracleopolis). In any case, foreign trade was hardly an affair depending exclusively on the agency of state commissioned Egyptians, as might be suggested by Egyptological Pharaonic ideology, 10 Moreno

García 2017a; Moreno García 2018; Moreno García 2019b. & Raue 2008. 12 Moreno García 2021b. 11 Forstner-Müller

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where foreigners were usually depicted as backward marauders with economic initiative in the hands of Egyptians. Quite the contrary, collaboration of foreigners was essential; Libyans, Nubians and Asiatics crossed and settled in Egypt and left material and iconographic evidence of their presence there, probably as collaborators, partners and indispensable specialists. The so-called execration texts (magical formulae and procedures aimed at neutralizing potentially dangerous foreign peoples and countries) further confirm this impression of limited Egyptian agency abroad and help balance the unilateral view present in official sources.13 In this context, and contrary to previous assumptions about “collapse” and “decline”, archaeology reveals instead that cities such as Edfu, Elephantine, Dendera and Asyut expanded, and that other localities in the Eastern Delta (around Tell el-Dab‛a) and in its Western margins (such as Kom el-Hisn and others) also thrived. Ports were crucial and it was precisely during the late third and early second millennium BC that the term dmj “harbour” (i.e. dmj n njwt “harbour area of a city”) began to become synonymous with “city, village”. Three main harbours operated in this period: Elephantine in southernmost Egypt, Tell el-Dab‛a in the Eastern Delta and Mersa/Wadi Gawassis on the Red Sea, while the axis Kom el-Hisn/Heracleopolis points to the increasing importance of another commercial route connecting the Mediterranean to the Fayum area and beyond through the Western Delta. The wealth and monumentality displayed in the tombs of Barnugi and Kom el-Hisn as well as the existence of a “gateway” at Heracleopolis confirms this point.14 “Warrior tombs”, typically Levantine (in fact, male burials containing quite distinctive weaponry; their occupants may perhaps have been more involved in trade than in warfare),15 as well as Levantine weapons, well attested at Kom el-Hisn and in the Fayum area, close to Heracleopolis. As for the importance of cities, expressions such as “man of the city”, “city god”, “living one of the city”, “beloved of his/the city”, etc., became current both in titles and biographies, while local leaders found it necessary to stress in their biographies that their acts corresponded to the interests of their cities and were approved by their fellow citizens (“citizens” in the literal sense of inhabitants of a city or town).16 This sudden importance of cities and dmj-harbours probably points to the relevance of ports and cities in the settlement organization of the country and to the relevance of river trade. Thus, the biography of Sarenput I, governor of the caravan and harbour city of Elephantine around 1950 BC, when Egypt was reunified again, gives some clues about the role played by river trade, harbours and foreign commodities arriving into Egypt. He was “overseer of all tribute at the entrance of the foreign countries in the form of royal ornaments, to whom the tribute of the Medja-country was brought as contribution from the rulers of foreign countries”, as well as “one who rejoices over the quay/market-place, the overseer of the great vessels of the Royal Domain, who supplies the Double Treasury, the superior of the harbours in the province of Elephantine (so that) what navigates and what moors was under his authority”.17 Leaving aside the flowery expressions usual in this kind of text, it appears that his duties 13 Moreno

García 2017a. García 2019b. 15 Kletter and Levi 2016. 16 Moreno García 2016b. 17 Obsomer 1995: 482. 14 Moreno

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included supervising traffic arriving at or departing from Elephantine, as well as supervision of tribute and activities on the quays, traditionally active centres of exchange according to many Egyptian sources.18 Such emphasis on harbour supervision suggests that commercial activity at Elephantine did not depend solely on expeditions organized by the monarchy and that private trade was probably quite significant. Such was the importance of harbours, caravans and routes that the Heracleopolitan kings seem to have followed a quite active policy of founding productive centres of the crown (ḥwt) at strategic crossroads. Thus an administrative document from the early second millennium BC enumerates various kinds of textile items delivered to an official from a warehouse, from a work camp (ḫnrt) and from a locality or royal centre named “The ḥwt of (king) Khety”. Another ḥwt was operative in the Eastern Delta, at Ezbet Rushdi, where a Heracleopolitan king Khety erected a ḥwt at a crossroads close to Tell el-Dab‛a. A literary composition referring to an Heracleopolitan king, The Teaching for Merikare, mentions that founding ḥwt in border areas was a major concern for this ruler.19 What goods were traded? Judging from the Ebla administrative tablets (2500–2250 BC) and the recently published inscriptions of Iny (from Saqqara?) and Setka of Elephantine (early 23rd century BC and 2100 BC, respectively), gold, metals, myrrh, ivory and linen were exported to the Levant through Byblos while silver, slaves, lapis lazuli, timber and tin arrived in Egypt from this area. If the identification of the land of Dugurasu (mentioned in Eblaite sources) with Egypt is confirmed, then these exchanges were quite active around 2300 BC.20 In any case, the last centuries of the third millennium BC were a period of increased commercial exchange between north-eastern Africa, the Aegean, the Levant, Mesopotamia and Central Asia.21 Egypt appears as a strategic partner in this network, as goods from the southern Red Sea, the Eastern Sahara and Nubia reached the Levant and Mesopotamia through the Nile Valley.22 The policy of the Theban king Mentuhotep II (2055–2004 BC), who reunified Egypt, was inspired by his desire to facilitate access to, and control of, the circulation of precious goods within this area. On the one hand, he led campaigns against the peoples living east of Thebes, in the mountainous desert areas between the Nile and the Red Sea, perhaps also deep into Libya and as far away as the oases of the Western Desert and Jebel Uweinat, in the eastern Sahara. An inscription found here records the import of incense and other goods from the land of Yam (Northwest Sudan? Ennedi?) and from other territories along the routes of the Western Desert crossing the oasis of Dakhla. With the incorporation/conquest of the Heracleopolitan kingdom, Mentuhotep II finally succeeded in controlling both the lower Nile (between Nubia and the Mediterranean), as well as the alternative routes by land (along the routes linking the oases of the Western Desert) and, at least partly, by sea. His kingdom, a reunified Egypt, now became an unavoidable commercial intermediary between inner Africa, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the inscriptions of several of his dignitaries show that access to precious goods was crucial for Mentuhotep II. One of them, Khety, was 18 Eyre

1998. García 2016b. 20 Biga & Steinkeller 2021. 21 Wilkinson 2014. 22 Moreno García 2017a. 19 Moreno

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“overseer of the Double Treasury” and “overseer of silver and gold, overseer of lapis-lazuli and turquoise”; two others, Dagi and Henu, were overseers of the “Double Treasury” and overseers of the “Double House of Gold”, while another official also called Khety recorded in his tomb several missions undertaken for a king Mentuhotep; they included control over (supplies of?) precious ointments, mining expeditions into Sinai and other countries and transport into Egypt of precious minerals and stones, including lapis-lazuli.23 It was also at this period that the use or distribution of a ritual object suddenly flourished, about the reign of Mentuhotep II or slightly earlier, the so-called “paddle dolls”. At this time, similar figurines became quite common over a vast territory, from India and Central Asia to the Aegean and Egypt, and they have been interpreted as some kind of protective entity associated with trade and particularly relevant at sites in which people from different cultures worked and coexisted (mines, trading posts, etc.).24 Later on, the annals of king Amenemhet II, the Tod treasure and other evidence reveal that the circulation of silver suddenly expanded amongst the Egyptian elite during the early second millennium,25 and that considerable quantities of silver, copper and bronze were imported from the Levant, such as the 22.79 kg of silver, 133.28 kg of bronze and 435.73 kg of copper brought by two ships from Lebanon in a single expedition.26 Written and iconographic evidence from Egypt also reveals that textiles, myrrh and gold suddenly enjoyed an increasing importance. Not by chance, textiles were a major driver of international exchange. It was precisely at the end of the third millennium that major changes in wool textile technology appeared across the Near East, enabling considerable progress in dying, and in weaving complex pattern designs. The cuneiform archives from the Assyrian colony at Kanesh/Kültepe, in Anatolia, provide fascinating evidence about the intense trade in metals (tin, silver) and textiles between Mesopotamia and Anatolia, as well as about the huge profits that Assyrian merchants obtained from it.27 There are also possible traces of trade contacts between Anatolia and Egypt, not only because the networks of the Assyrian traders in Anatolia reached as far as the Southern Levant, but also because Egyptian (or Egyptian inspired) textiles arrived into Anatolia. Recent evidence also confirms contacts with Syria, as seals of Syrian style dating from about 1800 BC have been recovered at Tell el-Dab‛a. Wall paintings from Ebla show similarities with motifs found in the ceiling decoration of some tombs of Middle Egypt (Hapidjefa of Asyut and Wahka II of Qaw) and fragments of Canaanite pottery have been found along trade routes in the oases of the Western Desert as well as in the Red Sea harbour of Mersa/Wadi Gawasis. Elite tombs in Middle Egypt also provide evidence for the international trade in textiles, as foreign textile patterns inspired the decoration of their ceilings and of other monuments in them, especially in the case of Aegean motifs, present in the tombs of Hapidjefa of

23 Moreno

García 2017a. García 2016c. 25 Pierrat-Bonnefois 2014: 174. 26 Marcus 2007: 141, 148 n. 34, 152. 27 Larsen 2015; Dercksen, this volume. (Egypt generally produced linen from flax rather than wool textiles [as was ordinary in the Aegean and Near East], and the quality of Egyptian linen was already appreciated in third millennium Ebla and Mesopotamia, DAW). 24 Moreno

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Asyut, Ukhhotep of Meir and Wahka II of Qaw. Finally, the importance of textiles and textile production probably explains why new scenes dealing with textile manufacture were incorporated for the first time in the tombs of some Middle Kingdom potentates, especially activities such as spinning, weaving and dyeing. Furthermore, small wooden models representing textile workshops also appeared then, in Middle Egypt (Bersheh, Beni Hassan, Rifeh), as well as in Thebes and Saqqara. Local agents of the king collected textiles at specific sites and provided rations to substantial teams of female weavers.28 Finally, textiles were also employed as a means of payment. Antef son of Myt, for instance, hired two priests to perform some rituals and paid them with 20 and 10 pieces of cloth, respectively, as well as with a male and a female servant for each one of them.29 Myrrh emerges as a crucial commodity in the international sphere during this period. The late third millennium inscription of Setka, an official from Elephantine, states that from the Nubian lands of Medja and Yam, he brought into Elephantine precious goods such as myrrh, gold and copper from “The Land of the God” (= Punt and other places), incense from Yam, ebony from Wetenet, ivory and different kinds of monkeys from other locations. Afterwards, these goods were shipped off to Heracleopolis, in the north. A Coptos leader, a “king’s son” called Hetepkamin, offered an impressive list of goods to the local temple of Min, including gold, silver and copper objects, lapis-lazuli pieces and collars, turquoise, incense and myrrh. Myrrh appears as a coveted commodity for Heracleopolitan kings, to the point that they created a specific administrative department dealing with this aromatic plant. Thus, two dignitaries buried at Heracleopolis held the title of “great (one) of the department of myrrh” while another, Hetepwadjet, was “measurer of the department of unguents”. “Myrrh from Punt” is also evoked in some of the earliest versions (about 2100 BC) of the funerary corpus of formulae known as Coffin Texts, composed in areas under Heracleopolitan control. After the reunification of the country, it seems that Bersheh replaced Heracleopolis as the main centre in control of this aromatic plant. Djehutinakht, a dignitary at the service of Ahanakht, the “great chief” of the province of Bersheh during the reigns of the last Heracleopolitan king and of Mentuhotep II, refers to his superior as “the overseer of priests to whom valuables are brought from foreign lands, (namely) myrrh and galena”; Iha, another dignitary at the service of Ahanakht, was “a chieftain of the House of [myrrh, who loc]ked away precious oils”. In fact, dignitaries from Bersheh were the only bearers of the rather unique epithet “one who loves myrrh”. Myrrh was also the main goal of the first expedition sent to the land of Punt (southern Red Sea) since the third millennium BC, as Mentuhotep III (2004–1992 BC), successor of Mentuhotep II, sent one of his officials there, Henenu, via Wadi Hammamat, in the eighth year of his reign in order to bring “fresh myrrh”.30 Gold and small pieces of jewellery suddenly appear in the tombs of many people of relatively modest status in Middle Egypt, as if this metal was now accessible to common people who were not officials in the service of regional kings. In the case of Barnugi, in the Western Delta, some monumental tombs from the First Intermediate Period contained 28 Moreno

García 2017a. 2011: 36‒38. 30 Moreno García 2017a. 29 Landgráfová

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offerings that included objects made of gold, lapis lazuli, turquoise and other semi-precious stones. Gold and copper were also part of the wealth accumulated and stocked by officials of more modest status around 2100 BC: “[I surpassed everyone who was and] who will exist therein in people, Lower Egyptian grain and emmer, gold, copper, clothing, oil, [honey], … [cattle], goats, cargo ships and everything”.31 The importance of the circulation of gold in Egypt cannot be reduced to mining operations promoted by the crown. In fact, counting gold was already occasionally celebrated in the annals of the kings of the early third millennium BC (“fourth year: first time of counting gold”), while two royal decrees (Coptos decrees C and D) enumerated the tax exemptions granted to the temple of Min at Coptos, including gold, copper and jewellery collected by the overseer of Upper Egypt in the reign of Pepi II.32 The recent analysis of some gold objects from several early and mid-second millennium BC tombs in Abydos and Qurneh reveals that the metal employed in their manufacture was of alluvial origin, not mined. In this vein, archaeological research at Hosh el-Guruf, in the region of the Fourth Cataract of the Nile, shows the presence of many grinding stones usually associated with gold mining, an activity apparently carried out on a seasonal basis by local populations during the first centuries of the second millennium BC. The gold extracted was then exported to Kerma, capital of the Nubian kingdom of Kush. Nubian gold was also traded in the Egyptian fortresses (perhaps more precisely trade outposts) in the area of the Second Cataract, where many weights used for weighing gold have been discovered; furthermore small caravans of Nubians travelled there in order to trade. So Nubian gold was partly produced by indigenous populations, not through mining expeditions organized by the crown, and it seems that part of it was extracted from alluvial ores.33 This may explain the active trade between Egypt and Nubia since the end of the third millennium BC, an activity that could have promoted Egyptian exports in exchange for the gold thus obtained (cf. infra). This could also explain the increasing presence of Nubians in Egypt as warriors and probably also as merchants and agents of Kushite rulers, providing support and collaborating with some of the petty provincial powers that then ruled Egypt, in some kind of mutually beneficial economic and political partnership. Seals and sealing became routinely evoked in everyday transactions and contracts between private individuals, such as land and houses purchases, hiring specialized priests, etc. The echoes of this practice left their mark in contemporary ritual texts; thus sealing practices became much more frequent in the late third millennium corpus of Coffin Texts than in the earlier Old Kingdom Pyramid Texts (Pyramid Texts, spell 214; Coffin Texts, spells 131, 134, 135, 137, 142, 398, 657, 992, 1080 and 1117). On the other hand, women began using the title of “mistress of the house” during the First Intermediate Period, which was to become thereafter the most common feminine title. It was a marker of social identity which denoted a sort of independent position of its holder, not preconditioned by marital status. It was also the most frequent female title attested, precisely, on scarab-seals, while “mistresses of the house” were also owners of their own monuments,

31 Moreno

García 2016b. 2005: 109‒113. 33 Moreno García 2016a: 24. 32 Strudwick

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such as stelae. In all, the title emphasizes an adult, independent woman, who was able to manage the economics of a household – with, or without a male owner, or to be involved in some other business enterprise. In fact, the analysis of female seals found in Middle Egypt reveals traces of wear and usage which show that they were not made exclusively for funerary purposes.34 A Nubian graffito from around 1938 BC reveals that a group of people from the same household, including two women (one from Kom el-Hisn and the other from Sais, in the Western Delta), left their traces at Wadi Korosko, an important route leading to some gold fields in the Eastern Desert. They were perhaps a group of “civilians”, including women, involved in logistic support for a royal expedition and/or in trading activities. Another graffito, further south, was inscribed by a certain Khesebed, from Bersheh, whose name means literally “lapis lazuli”.35 So, seals and sealing came to be more widely used, not merely by people of high status and by officials of the administration, but also by ordinary men and women. The extent of this social practice suggests a greater scope of transactions and economic initiative in which formal agreement and authentication were required.36 As for more modest commodities, the flow of large Egyptian jars arriving into Nubia, probably filled with foodstuffs, increased during the First Intermediate Period.37 During the early second millennium huge amounts of an unidentified product, carried in a distinctive pottery vessel manufactured specifically for export, were exported from Aswan to Nubia, where it was widely distributed and even reached the Fourth Cataract of the Nile, a distance as the crow flies of about 700 km from Aswan.38 Also at the end of the third and the beginning of the second millennium BC leather craftsmanship experienced an upturn in Nubia and products were later exported into Egypt, perhaps as part of a flow of leather trade across the Nile valley and the routes of the oases of the Western Desert.39 Furthermore, fish exports from the Nile also reached the Levant and the Near East40 and, judging from recent archaeological discoveries in these areas, modest Egyptian commodities reached this area too, probably independent of any royal intervention.41 Finally, slaves might have been a significant commodity judging from the possession of Asiatic men and women in the hands of wealthy Egyptians as well as from the Asiatic slaves brought into Egypt following the campaigns of pharaohs such as Amenemhat II and others (1911– 1877 BC) in the Levant.42 To conclude, the last centuries of the third millennium (the late Old Kingdom and the First Intermediate Period) witnessed a substantial increase in trading activities that, in many cases, seems to be controlled not by kings but by local notables. It was then that officials in Abydos and Elephantine conducted their own commercial

34 Moreno

García 2016b: 502. 1974: inscriptions n° 27‒28 and 211, respectively. 36 An example in Allen 2002: plates 6–7. 37 Hafsaas-Tsakos 2010: 390‒392. 38 Rzeuska 2014. 39 Moreno García 2018. 40 Linseele, Van Neer & Bretschneider 2013. 41 Cohen 2012. 42 Marcus 2007. 35 Žába

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contacts, while officials buried in the provinces (and not in the capital) practically monopolized control over goods arriving into the Nile Valley from abroad. It was also then that expeditions organized by the king were sent to Punt, the Levant and Nubia, according to the inscriptions of officials such as Iny, Herkhuf, Sabni and others. Even after the unified monarchy collapsed, Egyptian goods continued to be exported to Nubia, Asiatics settled in Lower and Middle Egypt; Aegean and Near Eastern goods and technologies (such as distinctive daggers, axes and weapons) flowed into Egypt. Asiatics probably arrived not only as slaves and/or prisoners, as has been commonly assumed, but also as independent traders judging by their material traces (such as the “warrior tombs” found at Kom el-Hisn). As for mobile populations, they were represented in Egyptian tombs leading small caravans and carrying cattle, minerals (such as galena) and weapons. Another, indirect testimony, is the diffusion in Egypt of a particular kind of female flat figurine (the so-called “paddle dolls”) found across Eurasia and the Near East from the very end of the third millennium BC, in connexion with important trade routes and probably used as a kind of protective amulet recognizable and accepted by communities of diverse origins. All these changes are concomitant with an expansion of urban centres, a significant accumulation of wealth in private hands (sometimes of relatively modest social status), an increase in the use of seals and “contracts” and the consolidation of trade networks across Eurasia and north-east Africa. Areas that had played a marginal role in previous centuries (such as the Western border of Lower Egypt), or secondary centres (Asyut, Thebes, Bersheh), suddenly became first line actors in economic life. What is more, a distinctive social characteristic of this period, that continued during the early second millennium BC, was the emergence of a “middle class” consisting of people displaying signs of wealth and status (inscribed objects, high quality funerary equipment, comfortable houses) while not bearing official titles or any sign marking their condition as that of officials and/or agents of the king.43 It seems then that trade promoted economic growth during this particular period, and that this move left its mark not only in the social but also in the political sphere and guided the actions of the kings of the Middle Kingdom both in Nubia and the Levant. All these elements can be interpreted as firm evidence about the existence of economic growth during the late third and early second millennium BC. AN “AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION” AROUND 1650–1450 BC? Private inscriptions of the third and early second millennium BC occasionally evoke gardens and small plantations, sometimes mentioned together with wells and cisterns, in a context of perennial irrigation that did not depend on the annual flood of the Nile. The earliest detailed example appears in the tomb of Metjen (around 2600 BC). There, he describes his “walled estate 200 cubits long and 200 broad, set out with fine trees, and a large pool made in it; it was planted with fig trees and vines. It is written down in a royal document, and their names are (recorded likewise) on (this) royal document. The trees and the vines were

43 Richards

2005; Vermeulen 2016; Mazé 2017.

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planted in great numbers, and the wine therefrom was produced in great quantity (or “of great quality”). A garden was made for him on land of 1 kha and 2 ta within the enclosure, which was planted with trees”.44 It is also worth noting that other passages in his tomb mention his acquisition of land (200 arouras, about 55 ha) from what appears to be a collective of private owners. Some royal inscriptions from the third millennium BC reveal that canals, wells and basins or pools were subject to census and, quite probably, to taxation, as in the case of the decree of king Pepi I (2321–2287 BC): “(My) Majesty has forbidden to reckon the canals, pools, wells, watering places (basins?) and trees in these two pyramid towns”.45 Pools in private hands were also transferred to descendants by means of wills: a late third millennium tablet inscribed with a will, from the oasis of Dakhlah, in the Western Desert of Egypt, describes the distribution of sixteen basins between the sons of a dignitary called Tjeshiu. Leaving aside these scarce references, little is known about perennial irrigation in private fields, about the plants cultivated in them or about their role in the supply of urban markets and private demand outside the (re)distributive networks of the institutional economy. Perhaps wells and gardens were not as rare as their scattered mentions in the written record may suggest; this could explain why ritual formulae from the late third and early second millennium evoke wells together with agricultural plots (“farm-lands are given and wells divided”), thus implying a diversified agricultural landscape in which wells, pools and basins were not limited to the country villas of the elite. Thus flood agriculture coexisted with other forms of irrigation and farming production. It can be tentatively inferred that, in the absence of more sophisticated implements enabling permanent irrigation introduced in Egypt later (shaduf, saqiya, etc.), wells were also used on private plots, particularly in small irrigated pieces of land, that they were subject to some form of taxation and that they probably played a role (still to be determined) in permanent irrigation and in the production of cash crops like fresh vegetables and, especially, dates.46 However, things changed around the middle of the second millennium BC, when wells and cisterns are more frequently mentioned in the administrative sources, quite often as markers of boundaries. What is more, some documents reveal that small plots provided with wells were planted with vegetables, as in Papyrus Berlin 8523, from the very late second millennium BC: “as soon as my letter reaches you, you shall attend to this field and not be neglectful of it. And you shall remove its halfa grass and plough it and farm a quarter of a hectare of land [in] vegetables at this well”. Wells and cisterns appear also enumerated in some stelae concerning the acquisition or donation of land. The most detailed example is the stèle d’Apanage, a document that lists several tenants who sold their plots to the High Priest of Amun Iuwelot in the early first millennium BC.47 Each plot is described in detail, including its size, the categories of land it encompassed and the price paid for it. In three cases the presence of one or up to three wells is mentioned; and it is noteworthy that two of these plots were the only ones in the stela that contained several types of trees, mainly date-palms: 44 Strudwick

2005: 193. 2005: 104. 46 Moreno García 2021a. 47 Ritner 2009: 275. 45 Strudwick

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• (lines 8–9)“the place of the priest of Amon, Neskhonsu, the justified, son of Hori, the justified, son of Ankhefenkhonsu, the justified: 137 arouras of field privately owned with clear title, 99 arouras of ‘tired’ field, total: 236 arouras of field, 1 well, 8 sycamore trees, 6 date palms, amounting to 8 deben, 2/3 kite of silver”; • (lines 9–10) “the place of the ‘cadet’ Djedmutiuefankh, the justified, son of Iken, the justified: 66 arouras of field privately owned with clear title, 5 arouras of ‘scrub and tired’ field, total: 71 arouras of field, 3 wells, 26 large date palms, 50 small date palms, 3 sycamore trees, amounting to 4 deben, 1 and 11/12 kite of silver”. Finally, a papyrus of around 770 BC refers to the acquisition of several plots of land made by a certain Ikeni in a year of hard times; the plots were quite small (in three cases hardly more than 1000 square meters) and in several cases they are said to be located next to “the well of Ikeni”. It seems as if Ikeni followed a calculated strategy of purchase, seeking to acquire plots around a well that bore his name or that of a possible ancestor.48 So, though rare and unequally distributed over time, there exists some evidence about private possession of wells connected with agricultural production. Not just for leisure in a pleasant and luxurious domestic environment with vineyards, small orchards and garden plots, as the abundant iconographic and archaeological evidence from Tell el-Amarna and elsewhere reveals. Wells made permanent irrigation possible and thus the production of cash crops, probably intended for local, urban markets (vegetables, dates, fruit, flowers, etc.). In some cases, as it happens in the case of Ikeni, there are traces of intentional strategies seeking to accumulate land surrounding wells. In other instances, wells were associated with plantations of date-palms. Given the lucrative but, at the same time expensive, nature of wells (because of the strenuous process of extracting water), plots associated with wells were small and probably belonged to relatively well-off tenants, capable to engage workers occupied in watering small gardens with jars or shadufs, as appears in some tomb scenes.49 In fact, the possession of small private plots with highly productive soils, “commercial” crops such as dates and fresh vegetables and, finally, small scale permanent irrigation seem to converge around the 17th–16th centuries BC, in another period of political division and crisis of the unified state. It was then that a new irrigation tool, the shaduf, was introduced into Egypt; a Semitic term, brkt “well, cistern” entered the Egyptian vocabulary; new species of plants and trees began to be cultivated in gardens; and new literary/scribal genres, such as the “Praise of the city” or the “Miscellanies” (fictional administrative documents used for training young scribes) introduced new topics, such as the opulent town surrounded by villas and luxurious gardens or the motif of the wealthy villa in the countryside provided with all kinds of agricultural facilities, including many different categories of land, fisheries and cattle raising areas. Overall, this new agricultural setting was related to wealthy landowners who, according to some references, exported some of their production

48 Moreno 49 Moreno

García 2021a. García 2021a.

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to the Levant. Archaeology confirms the importance of villas provided with hydraulic facilities (pools, cisterns and wells) and gardens around the middle of the second millennium BC. In all these cases, a new form of private wealth seems based, at least partially, on private small-scale irrigation agriculture and lucrative crops oriented towards urban markets. The case of date-palm is a good example of these innovations. Papyrus Louvre E 3226, from around 1420 BC, records administrative operations carried out along the Nile by several ships belonging to the Granary, that is to say, the institution in charge of collecting and stocking grain. Several sections of this papyrus reveal that the Granary employed two teams of agents called beneryw or “those in charge of dates”. The system operated as follows: the Granary supplied barley to both teams, and they exchanged the grain for dates at several points along their itinerary. The equivalence system was always the same: a sack of barley for a sack of dates, as also in Mesopotamia. The global quantities exchanged were not that great: single deliveries concerned between 50 and 100 sacks per year during seven years, thus making between 3.8 and 7.5 tons of dates. How the beneryw obtained the dates is not specified, but comparable papyri reveal that small fleets from temples and royal institutions travelled around the Nile and collected dates, flowers, wine and other goods from individuals. This means that, in all probability, the beneryw of the Louvre papyrus obtained the dates from individuals on a regular basis, as institutional administrative documents hardly refer to plantations of date-palms owned by institutions (temples, the crown), only to recreational basins in temples and palaces in which date-palms grew together with many other types of trees.50 As it emerged in the previous section of this chapter, ladies seem quite active in these river trade operations. Not only because tomb-scenes show crews of grain barges trading with women on the riverbank, but also because administrative documents such as ships’ logs record transactions between the crews of some ships and women, mainly involving relatively small amounts of grain bartered by the sailors in return for wine, fruits, vegetables, squash, dates, wine and oil, among other items; in other cases, finished pieces of cloth were part of these transactions.51 Furthermore, women figure as tenants of temple landholdings in the Wilbour papyrus (10.8 % of the total number of holders in the “apportioning” entries of this document) and, according to Katary, the term usually translated as “lady” or “citizeness” (‛nḫ(t) n njwt) is, in fact, equivalent to that of nbt-pr “mistress of the house” and emphasized a woman’s status as a legal person in her own right. Furthermore, they enjoyed the same position as the men smallholders of this document, so they were free to own, transfer or transmit property rights. Finally, their holdings were usually of 3 or 5 arouras (0.8–1.3 ha).52 To sum up, there is evidence that women, not only men, that cultivated vegetables and fruits and that produced wine and oil, and that were involved in perennial irrigation and in agricultural production oriented towards trade and markets and not simply to subsistence.

50 Megally

1977. 1961; Condon 1984; Hagen 2008. 52 Katary 1999: 73‒74. 51 Janssen

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The sudden importance of dates and garden crops around the middle of the second millennium BC seems thus linked to the introduction of the shaduf, which made perennial irrigation on small gardens possible. As the papyrus Louvre E 3226 reveals, this would have made it possible that private landowners cultivated date-palms, among other trees and vegetables, and supplied institutions with dates. Especially when considering that temples and the crown were hardly interested in the creation of specialized date-palm plantations, in sharp contrast to vineyards. The most probable reason is that date-palm plantations required the use of a specialized and expensive workforce. That is why, as in Mesopotamia, date-palm plantations were usually in private hands and represented a lucrative investment for urban landowners and rural potentates. This could explain the importance of wells in small plots as well as the strategies followed by some individuals in order to purchase parcels of land adjoining wells, as revealed by the documents mentioned above. This may also explain the sudden celebration of peri-urban gardens in literary texts from the second half of the second millennium BC. However, dates were not the only crop grown in gardens and irrigated plots. Also in the New Kingdom new species were introduced, such as the pomegranate, the olive tree, the apple tree and the almond tree. Extended irrigation possibilities, regular contact with the Levant and a relatively affluent class of Egyptians thus made it possible that a small “farming revolution” based on private orchards and plantations and the use of the shaduf in a context of expanding urban life and markets (Pi-Ramesses, Memphis, Thebes). It is tempting to ascribe these innovations to the Hyksos, when Tell el-Daba‛a, for instance, became an important urban centre in the Eastern Mediterranean under Hyksos rule (ca. 1700–1550 BC), and the palace of the late Hyksos period enclosed several gardens with tree pits and flower-pots sunk into the ground at regular intervals. Its vineyards and trees were celebrated in contemporary Egyptian inscriptions, as well as the wealth of the fleets that moored at this locality, bringing goods from the Levant. Thus, the agricultural innovations evoked, and their emphasis on horticulture and small irrigation, seem rather compatible with the decentralized rule characteristic of Hyksos kings. In all, small-scale irrigation and agricultural innovations, especially the introduction of new species, should be understood as part of a social, productive and technical package that included particular forms of the organization of work, of territorial management, and of peasant strategies, its whole potential being limited only by the impact of the state, its tax-system and the agricultural strategies it imposed, more centred on cereal culture than on horticulture. Limited and indirect evidence as this is, the archaeology and the texts nevertheless suggest the importance of private intensive agriculture, urbanization and markets as a potential vector of economic growth and of the integration of rural and urban areas around the middle of the second millennium BC.53

53 

Moreno García 2018.

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Egyptology has traditionally regarded Egyptian traders and merchants as employed almost exclusively in the service of institutions such as the crown and temples. Such opinions were based on three premises. The first one is that royal inscriptions recorded the expeditions organized and equipped by the king and sent outside the Nile Valley in search of precious goods. Incense from Punt was one such commodity, as shown in the reliefs of king Sahure (ca. 2487–2475 BC) and in the scenes and inscriptions of queen Hatshepsut (ca. 1473–1458 BC). In other cases, royal decrees, such as that of king Seti I (ca. 1294– 1279 BC) at Nauri, mention merchants and ships working either for the central administration or for temples. Even diplomatic correspondence, like the Amarna letters (ca. 1370– 1335 BC) or the fragmentary correspondence between Ramesses II (ca. 1279–1213 BC) and the Hittite ruling family, reveals the vitality of exchanges between courts, the diplomatic procedures involved in such transactions (including bargaining) and the quality of the goods traded, including skilled specialists like doctors or artisans. To sum up, the overwhelming visibility of official sources led most to suppose that foreign trade was practically a monopoly of the state, and that private exchange activities outside the institutional sphere were insignificant and reduced to small-scale operations. As for the second premise, administrative papyri, especially from the Ramesside era (ca. 1295–1069 BC), record the activities of fleets and captains working for temples and collecting goods from people and agricultural domains along the Nile. Administrative sources seemed thus to confirm that exchanges were indispensable but promoted by the crown or by specific institutions, mainly temples or the domains of high officials, and carried out within redistributive networks ultimately controlled by the king. Finally, the third premise is the claimed absence of the private archives of merchants detailing the scope of their operations, the balance (if any) between private business and their missions carried out for institutions, the practical conditions of their transactions (individual or collective trade ventures, use of agents based in selected areas, composition of the “capital” invested, etc.), the impact of the circulation of goods under their control on the overall economy of the country, or the operations carried out by foreign traders operating in Egypt, just to mention a few. Only scattered written and archaeological evidence, such as the two million amphorae (at least) which reached Avaris in Hyksos times, the shipwreck of Uluburun (late 14th century BC) with its diversified cargo or the references to the many ships anchored at Avaris as well as the Egyptian vessels berthed at the harbours of Byblos and Sidon (in some cases belonging to private traders), give some idea of the importance of maritime trade not necessarily controlled by institutions.54 In fact, some passages from literary texts and from the Ramesside miscellanies suggest that wealthy individuals sent ships to the Levant to trade, but these references have been often disregarded as literary exercises, especially as they were supposed to refer to activities typical of the highest elite and, consequently, hardly representative of actual economic

54 Moreno

García 2016a: 1‒6; Monroe 2015.

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practices. Nevertheless, other sources provide more precise clues about the role played by merchants in economic life. The famous tomb-robbery papyri of the late Ramesside era, for instance, record the legal procedure followed against the robbers of the New Kingdom royal tombs and temples and contain detailed accounts of the quantities of precious metals stolen as well as of the way in which they were exchanged for land, slaves, cattle, etc. Traders appear here as indispensable partners involved in the robberies and whose mission consisted in laundering the gold and silver robbed. What these peculiar transactions reveal is that precious metals circulated broadly in Egypt, to the point that huge quantities of them could be introduced in non-official circuits of exchanges in the hope that they would not be detected by the authorities.55 Other sources give a similar impression. An administrative papyrus of the Ramesside period shows that temples, priests and officials paid taxes in gold and silver, among other items.56 Inadvertently we learn from a letter written in the very late second millennium BC by a mayor of Elephantine – complaining about grain payments wrongly expected from him – that taxes were paid in gold to the royal treasury by cultivators; this means that peasants had direct access to gold, and that the crown got it from peasants as taxes rather than exclusively from royal mines.57 As mentioned earlier, some third millennium royal decrees from Coptos also refer to temples and their deliveries of precious metals and jewellery as taxes. Many more examples could be evoked, from the famous taxation scenes in the tomb of Rekhmire (late 15th century BC), in which towns and cities are depicted in official sources as having paid taxes in precious metals, to the scenes from temples built by the pharaoh Akhenaton (ca. 1352– 1336 BC), in which towns and temples also handed over taxes in gold and silver to the royal treasury.58 Other examples show that traders sought to be accepted as priests, seeking in some cases to deal with the substantial wealth that temples stocked. One of the best known (and scandalous) cases is the massive grain robbery perpetrated by Khnumnakht, a trader appointed as boat captain of the temple of Khnum at Elephantine around 1150 BC, a position he used to steal 5004 sacks of grain from this institution over a period of nine years, not to speak of 47 deben of gold (4.27 kg).59 Such thefts yielded enormous profits: the price of one sack of barley was usually 2 deben of copper; so, 5000 sacks were equal to 10,000 deben of copper or 166.6 deben of silver, about 15 kg. Finally, traders received meat and wine (probably from a temple) in exchange for a certain amount of gold and silver according to papyrus Boulaq XI and CGC 58070.60 Merchants thus appear under a different light, as necessary intermediaries who exchanged precious metals for other goods and who supplied and made it possible that substantial amounts of silver and gold circulated and stimulated economic circuits in Egypt. This aspect is confirmed by a recently published literary text that celebrates markets in the city of Pi-Ramesses: “Pleasant is the 55 Moreno

García 2016a: 12 and 21. 1991. 57 Moreno García 2016a. 58 Moreno García 2016a: 15‒23. 59 Porten 1996: 52‒54. 60 Moreno García 2016a: 17. 56 Janssen

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place of distribution/market-place with its money/silver there, mainly the vine tendrils (?) and business/commerce (t-m-k-r-i-t). The chiefs of every foreign country come in order to descend with their products”.61 Furthermore, the Great Abydos inscription of Ramesses II mentions traders operating in Egypt that “trade with their consignments, their revenue thereof being gold, silver and copper”,62 a literary Ramesside text says that “traders fare downstream and upstream as they do business with copper, carrying goods one town to another as they supply him who has not, although the tax-people carry gold, the most precious of all minerals”63 and a satirical letter reveals that traders lent grain to poor peasants, thus suggesting their involvement in small-scale economic activities in rural areas.64 These texts confirm that traders operated not only in the service of institutions, but rather will have pushed the role played by precious metals and traders outside the limits of the institutional economy, which should allow us to explore their impact on rural activities and on potential economic growth. However, Egyptology has been traditionally rather reluctant to accept the very existence of a significant non-institutional sector in the Pharaonic economy, even when historical sources were available and understood by researchers. There is another Egyptian social sector whose activities involved the use of silver: fishermen. Official missions involving the use of silver intended in some cases to acquire fish, as in the case of a scribe working for an institution and in charge of the delivery of 46 ingots of silver as well as quotas of other goods (fish, wool, etc.) in the context of trading operations involving the participation of several ship captains. Other sources reveal that fishermen routinely paid their taxes in silver. A Ramesside ostracon purporting to be a copy of an official letter, O. Gardiner 86, mentions workers involved in herding and gathering activities in the Delta, who delivered animals, salt, natron and plants to the Domain of Amun while fishermen paid instead a fixed amount of silver. Later on, when the Kushite pharaoh Taharqa (690–664 BC) endowed a sanctuary in the Memphite region, part of the revenue granted to the temple consisted again of silver delivered by fishermen as taxes. Likewise when, two centuries later, Herodotus evoked the Egyptian tribute paid to the Persian treasury, he specified that it consisted of 700 talents of silver as well as silver delivered by the fishermen of lake Moeris. All these examples reveal that fishermen sold their catch for silver and that they could thus pay their taxes in this metal. Bearing in mind that Nile perch was widely exported to the Levant, it is tempting to think that such trade networks were also a source of supply of silver for Egyptian fishermen and that traders facilitated these operations as intermediaries. Wenamun, an emissary serving the temple of Amun, mentions exports of Egyptian fish to Byblos in a cargo. In other cases, it is only possible to guess at the existence of other trading circuits that enabled the accumulation of huge quantities of precious metals. A single Ramesside official in charge of the production of natron in the area of the Fayum delivered to the royal treasury the astonishing amount of 91 kg of gold as his annual tax, thus suggesting that this gold came from customs

61 Fischer-Elfert

2016. 1992: 250‒251. 63 Castle 1992: 256‒257. 64 Janssen 1961: 103. 62 Castle

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revenue or from exports – natron was crucial in the production of glass, a flourishing industry in the Near East during the Late Bronze Age.65 Traders also played a crucial role in the transformation of agricultural produce into precious metals and their activities seem indispensable not only for temples and the crown but also for individuals. The extent of such operations is difficult to evaluate but, judging from the evidence in Papyrus Harris I and other contemporary texts, it seems to have been quite important. That cultivators from some temples in Egypt could pay about a ton of silver each year as taxes means that they or the temples for which they worked commercialized part of their production. In fact, under unusual circumstances, Egyptian grain was on occasion exported to the Levant, at least partly in the context of agreements between states. This could explain why exports of Egyptian grain to the land of Hatti were concomitant with the depreciation of the value of silver in Egypt around the reign of Merenptah (from a ratio silver/copper of 1:100 deben to only 1:60), thus suggesting that huge quantities of this metal were now arriving in Egypt as payments for the grain delivered. To sum up, an increasing role of traders and silver in institutional and everyday transactions, as well as the commercialization of fish and agricultural produce (both produced by institutions and individuals, especially horticultural goods), point to some form of “proto-monetization” and to the existence of economic circuits parallel to those dominated by the redistributive networks held by institutions. Small-scale trade also involved the use of silver and gold. A scribe, for instance, wrote to a colleague to forbid him to behave in such a reprehensible way again as he had done in the past, when he had set aside part of the rations under his care in order to convert them into silver. A papyrus recording the collection of diverse goods along the Nile evokes the delivery of silver to a woman at the meryt “quay, marketplace”, while a market scene from the tomb of Niankhkhnum and Khnumhotep (ca. 2400 BC) records the exchange of a piece of cloth in exchange for 6 shaty, a unit of value then used for gold and silver. The circulation of precious metals at the local level and in small-scale transactions can be guessed at thanks to the discovery of a small treasure at El-Amarna, the capital of Egypt under Akhenaten. Here, in a small open space beside a public well in the North Suburb, a pottery jar containing 23 bars of gold and a quantity of silver fragments and roughly made rings, as well as a silver figurine of a Hittite god was buried. The total weight of the gold was 3,375 grams (about 37 deben), while the total weight of the silver came to 1,085 grams (about 12 deben). As Kemp has stated, this discovery illustrates easily convertible wealth poised on the point of re-entering the economy at a private level. Some texts confirm this impression. Ostracon BM 5631 from Deir el-Medina, dated from ca. 1250 BC, contains a statement made by an individual, in which he mentions the discovery of a sealed jar bearing two seal impressions and inscribed with a list of its contents: 10 deben-weights of silver, 2 mine-weights of gold, 7 heart amulets, 7 chains (?) of gold, and 20 gold signet rings. Quite significantly, other metallic objects also found by the same individual are said to belong to Pharaoh, but apparently it was not the case of the jar; it may then be assumed that, quite probably, it belonged to an individual. As in the case of the Amarna treasure,

65 Moreno

García 2016a: 17.

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an amalgam of different objects and pieces of precious metals were stocked together. So precious metals circulated in the private sphere in different forms, and contemporary units of value (sha(y)t) referring to metals (copper, silver, gold) derived from verbs meaning “to cut”.66 This evidence, both archaeological and textual/linguistic, points to a crucial aspect of the circulation of precious metals in everyday operations, that discs, rings, wire, pieces of metal, etc., were stocked, cut, exchanged and held in houses. The recent discovery at the Ramesside garrison city of Beth Shean, in Israel, of three small silver hoards found in 20th dynasty (ca. 1186–1069 BC) levels is of particular interest, since they contained “chocolate bar” silver ingots and used silver objects that had a monetary function, and could have been used to pay the wages of Egyptian officials or mercenaries. It seems that this silver came from south-east Turkey and Greece. Such small hoards are well known in Early Iron Age contexts in the Levant and have inspired discussions about pre-monetary practices in the Near East and the role played by bullion Hacksilber that was cut and weighed out in every transaction. But what transpires from discoveries like those at Amarna and Beth Shean is that such practices were also common in the Late Bronze Age and that their precedents can be traced back even earlier, to the late third and early second millennium BC, at least in Mesopotamia and Syria. Also since the middle of the second millennium, but especially from the first millennium BC on, silver and precious metals also circulated in the form of sealed bags of a given weight, both in Egypt and the Near East, such as the bag with 11 deben of silver mentioned in the story of Wenamun.67 The extent of the use of silver from the middle of the second millennium BC onwards also has other implications, especially about the integration of inter-regional economies with “monetary” consequences. In the case of Pharaonic Egypt, copper appears to have been the dominant metal in the rare private transactions recording the use of metals prior to this period. Silver was then only used in the production of precious objects, jewellery, etc. But with the advent of the New Kingdom, silver became synonymous with “money” and “payment” and was widely used as a means of fixing and expressing the prices of commodities and services. However, it was also employed by temples, farmers, fishermen and institutions to pay taxes, and this raises crucial questions about its actual circulation as well as about the role played by markets to transform commodities into silver. Given the development of trade networks and exchanges that connected the Near East and the surrounding areas in the Late Bronze Age, commerce seems to have been a major force leading to some kind of proto-monetization and the growth of markets.68 Quite significantly, a unit of value used from the middle of the third millennium and restricted to gold and silver (never to copper), the shaty, was equivalent to ⅟12 of a deben in the New Kingdom; its duodecimal basis appears as an oddity given the decimal system of measures then prevailing in Egypt, probably because of near-eastern influence. As for balance weights, they appear over a vast area extending from the Aegean to western India around 2600 BC and

66 Moreno

García 2016a: 17‒18. García 2016a: 18. 68 Warburton 2013; Warburton 2018; Moreno García 2016a. 67 Moreno

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weight units are surprisingly uniform over large areas from the third millennium BC. So, the Egyptian “small” standard gold deben (13.6 gr) and the “large” copper deben (27.3 gr), in use from at least the early second millennium BC if not earlier, had the same weight as the unit used contemporaneously in the sexagesimal Eastern Mediterranean system (13.7 gr) and in the Indus area (13.71 gr), the same regions whence lapis lazuli and silver had been imported since the third millennium BC. Another element to consider is that the alleged abundance of gold in Egypt (from the Eastern Desert and Nubia) meant that in terms of value, the ratio between gold and silver in Egypt was usually 1:2, and that of silver and copper 1:100. The usual ratios in Mesopotamia were around 1:8 (gold:silver), and it is thus quite noteworthy that the lowest ratio silver/gold in the Near Eastern area is attested at Ebla and Mari, where it oscillated between 6:1 and 2:1. Both cities were important commercial nodes between the Mediterranean Sea and Mesopotamia, and contacts between Ebla and Egypt are well attested in the Early and Middle Bronze Ages. This could explain why the ratio 2:1 appeared both in Egypt and at Mari and Ebla.69 Later on, such integration by prices continued, perhaps at a modest but nevertheless measurable level, during the Late Bronze Age,70 including phenomena still little understood, such as the use of a gold standard in Babylonia during the Kassite period (1531–1155 BC).71 CONCLUSIONS To conclude then, one must admit that Egyptian sources do not provide solid quantitative data (economic, demographic, etc.) on economic growth or about economic trends in the longue durée, but an impression of a progressively monetising economy can be gained by drawing on a wide range of administrative texts, monumental records and archaeological evidence. However, significantly, when considering the three case studies selected, it seems that periods of decentralized political power, weakened royal taxation, and expanding international trade were concomitant with the development of private demand, trade and cities and that some kind of economic growth (or, at least, prosperity) touched large sectors of Egyptian society. It is probably not by chance that from 2150 BC a “middle class” (that is to say, people who were neither simple peasants nor members of the elite) expanded and that private transactions involved the use of seals and sealed documents. It is also then that archaeology reveals some traces of this alleged “middle class”, judging by the dimensions of their houses and the capacity of their storage facilities, and that private archives (such as the Heqanakht papyri and others) and ritual texts evoke the commercial activities and private possessions circulating among affluent Egyptians. The display of precious goods in modest tombs also points to a certain increase of wealth in private hands in a period in which cities and harbours developed. As for the period between, say, 1650 and 1200 BC, the expansion of perennial irrigation in small plots devoted to garden agriculture

69 Moreno

García 2016a: 18‒21. 2011; Warburton 2013; Monroe 2010. 71 Kleber 2016. 70 Warburton

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and specialized plantations seems inseparable from the expansion of urban markets, the use of silver (and, to a certain extent, gold) in economic activities and the transformation of agricultural produce and fish into precious metals through the agency of merchants. This was also a period in which the written records mention rural entrepreneurs, wealthy peasants and landholders, and even merchants, as dynamic actors in the organization of agricultural activities. Finally, markets, the commercialization of production and the circulation of silver played a greater role than is commonly assumed in agricultural production, at least in certain periods of Egyptian history. In this context, temples appear as specialized economic “agencies” a privileged sector for the study of the interaction between private and “public” strategies as well as for the transformation of huge quantities of agricultural production into silver and into rations/wages that sustained an expanding urban demand pushed by craftsmen, specialized skilled workers, artists, soldiers, traders, etc. Impressionistic as this evidence is, it nevertheless reveals that the economic evolution of the Pharaonic economy followed a path similar to those found in other regions of the Near East and that, at least in some periods, there is seeming evidence of the impact of economic growth and the impact thereof on particular social and economic sectors – but this material still awaits in-depth analysis. Thus, the too often invoked “Egyptian exception” appears untenable, while the hypothesis of potential sustained economic growth, sustained by expanding trade and urban networks, contradicts the alleged conservatism and overwhelmingly agrarian foundation of the economy of the land of the pharaohs. Finally, the increased circulation of silver since the early Middle Bronze Age provides another parallel with the economic dynamics of the Near East and can be taken, in all probability, as another indication of growth and commercialization of agricultural and craft production. BIBLIOGRAPHY Allen, J. P. 2002. The Heqanakht Papyri. New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art. Bang, P. F., M. Ikeguchi & G. Hartmut (eds.). 2006. Ancient Economies Modern Methodologies. Archaeology, Comparative History, Models and Institutions. Bari: Edipuglia. Biga, M.-G. & P. Steinkeller. 2021. “In search of Dugurasu,” Journal of Cuneiform Studies 73: 9–70. Cohen, S. 2012. “Synchronisms and significance: reevaluating interconnections between Middle Kingdom Egypt and the southern Levant,” Journal of Ancient Egyptian Interconnections 4: 1–8. Condon, V. 1984. “Two account papyri of the late Eighteenth Dynasty (Brooklyn 35.1453 A and B),” Revue d’Égyptologie 35: 57–82. Eyre, Ch. 1998. “The market women of Pharaonic Egypt,” in N. Grimal & B. Menu (eds.), Le commerce en Égypte ancienne (Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie orientale), pp. 173– 191. Eyre, Ch.. 2013. The Use of Documents in Pharaonic Egypt. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fischer-Elfert, H.-W. 2016. “In praise of Pi-Ramesse – A perfect trading center (including two new Semitic words in syllabic orthography; Ostr. Ashmolean Museum HO 1187),” in Ph. Collombert, D. Lefèvre, S. Polis & J. Winand (eds.), Aere Perennius. Mélanges égyptologiques en l’honneur de Pascal Vernus (Leuven - Paris - Walpole: Peeters; OLA 242), pp. 195–218.

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Forstner-Müller, I. & D. Raue. 2008. “Elephantine and the Levant,” in E.-M. Engel, V. Müller & U. Hartung (eds.), Zeichen aus dem Sand. Streiflichter aus Ägyptens Geschichte zu Ehren von Günter Dreyer (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz), pp. 127–148. Hafsaas-Tsakos, H. 2010. “Between Kush and Egypt: the C-Group people of Lower Nubia during the Middle Kingdom and Second Intermediate Period,” in W. Godlewski & A. Łajtar (eds.), Between the Cataracts. Part 2: Session Papers (Warsaw: Warsaw University Press), pp. 389–396. Hagen, F. 2008. “A Ramesside administrative document (P. Cambridge University Library MS. Add. 4167),” Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde 135: 30–39. Janssen, J. J. 1961. Two Ancient Egyptian Ship’s Logs: Papyrus Leiden I 350 Verso and Papyrus Turin 2008+2016. Leiden: Brill. Janssen, J. J. 1991. “Requisitions from Upper Egyptian temples (P. BM 10401),” Journal of Egyptian Archaeology 77: 79–94. Katary, S. L. D. 1999. “Land-tenure in the New Kingdom: the role of women smallholders and the military,” in A. K. Bowman & E. Rogan (eds.), Agriculture in Egypt: From Pharaonic to Modern Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 61–82. Kleber, K. & R. Pirngruber (eds.). 2016. Silver, Money and Credit. A Tribute to Robartus J. van der Spek on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday. Leiden: NINO. PIHANS 128. Kletter, R. & Y. Levi. 2016. “Middle Bronze Age burials in the Southern Levant: Spartan warriors or ordinary people?,” Oxford Journal of Archaeology 35: 5–27. Landgráfová, R. 2011. It is My Good Name That You Should Remember. Egyptian Biographical Texts on Middle Kingdom Stelae. Prague: Czech Institute of Egyptology. Larsen, M. T. 2015. Ancient Kanesh. A Merchant Colony in Bronze Age Anatolia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Linseele, V., W. Van Neer & J. Bretschneider. 2013. “The mysteries of Egyptian Nile perch (Lates niloticus). The case of Tell Tweini (Syria, Middle Bronze Age-Iron Age),” in B. De Cupere, V. Linseele & Sh. Hamilton-Dyer (eds.), Archaeozoology of the Near East X. Proceedings of the Tenth International Symposium on the Archaeozoology of South-Western Asia and Adjacent Areas (Leuven - Paris - Walpole: Peeters; Ancient Near Eastern Studies Supplement 44), pp. 209–226. Manning, J. G. & I. Morris (eds.). 2005. The Ancient Economy. Evidence and Models. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Marcus, E. 2007. “Amenemhat II and the sea: maritime aspects of the Mit Rahina (Memphis) inscription,” Ägypten und Levante 17: 137–190. Mazé, Ch. 2017. “À la recherche des ‘classes moyennes’. Les espaces de la différentiation sociale dans l’Égypte du IIIe millénaire av. J.-C.,” Bulletin de l’Institut français d’archéologie orientale 116: 123–176. Megally, M. 1977. Recherches sur l’économie, l’administration et la comptabilité égyptiennes à la XVIIIe dynastie d’après le papyrus E 3226 du Louvre. Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie orientale. Monroe, Ch. 2015. “Tangled up in blue: material and other relations of exchange in the Late Bronze Age World,” in T. Howe (ed.), Traders in the Ancient Mediterranean (Chicago: Association of Ancient Historians), pp. 7–46. Moreno García, J. C. 2014. “Penser l’économie pharaonique,” Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 69: 7–38

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Moreno García, J. C. 2016a. “Economies in transition: trade, ‘money’, labour and nomads at the turn of the 1st millennium BC,” in J. C. Moreno García (ed.), Dynamics of Production in the Ancient Near East, 1300–500 BC (Oxford: Oxbow Books), pp. 1–39. Moreno García, J. C. 2016b. “Social inequality, private accumulation of wealth and new ideological values in late 3rd millennium BCE Egypt,” in H. Meller, H.-P. Hahn, R. Jung & R. Risch (eds.), Arm und Reich – Zur Ressourcenverteilung in prähistorischen Gesellschaften (Halle [Saale]: Landesmuseum für Vorgeschichte Halle [Saale]), pp. 491–512. Moreno García, J. C. 2016c. “Métaux, textiles et réseaux d’échanges à longue distance entre la fin du IIIe et le début du IIe millénaire: les “Paddle dolls”, un indice négligé?” in N. Favry, Cl. Somaglino & P. Tallet (eds.), Du Sinaï au Soudan: Itinéraires d’une égyptologue. Mélanges Dominique Valbelle (Paris: De Boccard), pp. 173–194. Moreno García, J. C. 2017. “Trade and power in ancient Egypt: Middle Egypt at the turn of the 3rd millennium BC,” Journal of Archaeological Research 25/2: 87–132. Moreno García, J. C. 2018. “Leather processing, castor oil, and desert/Nubian trade at the turn of the 3rd/2nd millennium BC: some speculative thoughts on Egyptian craftsmanship,” in G. Miniaci, J. C. Moreno García, S. Quirke & A. Stauder (eds.), Voices, images, and artefacts of ancient craftsmen/women: encountering the material producers of Middle Bronze Age Egypt (2000–1500 BC) (Leiden: Sidestone Press), pp. 159–173. Moreno García, J. C. 2019a. The State in Ancient Egypt: Power, Challenges and Dynamics. London New York: Bloomsbury. Moreno García, J. C. 2019b. “Marketplaces, customs and hubs of trade in Bronze Age Egypt,” in L. Rahmstorf & E. Stratford (eds.), Weights and Marketplaces from the Bronze Age to the Early Modern Period (Kiel - Hamburg: Wachholz Verlag & Murmann Publishers), pp. 185–202. Moreno García, J. C. 2021a. “Markets, transactions and ancient Egypt: new venues of research in a comparative perspective,” in J. C. Moreno García (ed.), Markets and transactions in premodern and traditional societies (Oxford: Oxbow Books), pp. 189–229. Moreno García, J. C. 2021b. “Changes and limits of royal taxation in pharaonic Egypt (2300– 2000 BCE),” in I. Soto & J. Valk (eds.), Ancient Taxation: The Mechanics of Extraction in Comparative Perspective (New York: New York University Press), pp. 290–324. Moreno García, J. C. In press. “Wells, small-scale private irrigation and agricultural strategies in the 3rd and 2nd millennium BC,” in S. Rost (ed.), Irrigation in Early States: New Directions (Chicago: Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago). Pierrat-Bonnefois, G. 2014. “Les échanges entre l’Égypte et le Proche-Orient,” in F. Morfoisse & G. Andreu-Lanoë (eds.), Sésostris III pharaon de légende (Ghent: Snoeks), pp. 170–181. Porten, B. 1996. The Elephantine Papyri in English. Three Millennia of Cross-Cultural Continuity and Change. Leiden - New York - Köln: Brill. Richards, J. 2005. Society and Death in Ancient Egypt: Mortuary Landscapes of the Middle Kingdom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rahmstorf, L. & E. Stratford (eds.). 2019. Weights and Marketplaces from the Bronze Age to the Early Modern Period. Kiel - Hamburg: Wachholz Verlag & Murmann Publishers. Ritner, R. K. 2009. The Libyan Anarchy. Inscriptions from Egypt’s Third Intermediate Period. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature. Writings from the Ancient World 21. Rzeuska, T. 2014. “Cemetery PI in El-Ar Part II: Egyptian Jar from Tumulus 4,” Gdańsk Archaeological Museum African Reports 11: 73–76.

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Van de Mieroop, M. 2014. “Silver as a financial tool in ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia,” in P. Bernholz & R. Vaubel (eds.), Explaining Monetary and Financial Innovation (New York: Springer), pp. 17–29. Van der Spek, R., B. van Leeuwen & J. L. van Zanden (eds.). 2015. A History of Market Performance. From Ancient Babylonia to the Modern World. London - New York: Routledge. Van der Spek, R. J. & B. van Leeuwen (eds.). 2018. Money, Currency and Crisis. In Search of Trust, 200 BC to AD 2000. London - New York: Routledge. Van Rinsveld, B. 2014. “Le marché local au carrefour de l’égyptologie, de l’économie et de l’histoire. À propos d’un livre récent,” Bibliotheca Orientalis 71: 5–29. Vermeulen, Th. 2016. “Réflexions sur les couches intermédiaires de la société égyptienne,” Nehet 4: 139–165. Warburton, D. A. 2005. “Le marché en Égypte ancienne (à l’Âge du Bronze, 2500-1200 av. J.-C.),” in G. Bensimon (ed.), Histoire des représentations du marché (Paris: Houdiard), pp. 631–651. Warburton, D. A. 2011. “What might the Bronze Age world system look like?” in T. C. Wilkinson, S. Sherratt & J. Bennet (eds.), Interweaving Worlds: Systemic Interactions in Eurasia, 7th to 1st Millennia BC (Oxford: Oxbow Books), pp. 120–134. Warburton, D. A. 2013. “Integration by price in the Bronze Age,” in D. Frenez & M. Tosi (eds.), South Asian Archaeology 2007. Volume I: Prehistoric Periods (Oxford: Archaeopress), pp. 287– 296. Warburton, D. A. 2014. “Understanding economic growth: The importance of money in economic history and theory,” in Z. Csabai (ed.), Studies in Economic and Social History of the Ancient Near East in Memory of Péter Vargyas (Budapest: The University of Pécs & L’Harmattan), pp. 423–481. Warburton, D. A. 2016. The Fundamentals of Economics. Lessons from the Bronze Age Near East. Neuchâtel: Recherches et Publications. Warburton, D. A. 2018. “Prices and values: Origins and early history in the Near East,” in K. Kristiansen, Th. Lindkvist & J. Myrdal (eds.), Trade and Civilisation. Economic Networks and Cultural Ties, from Prehistory to the Early Modern Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 56–86. Žába, Z. 1974. The Rock Inscriptions of Lower Nubia. Czechoslovak Concession. Prague: Czechoslovak Institute of Egyptology.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN LABOUR IN PHARAONIC EGYPT, 2700–1069 BCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS ON NORTHEAST AFRICAN AND SOUTHWEST ASIAN SOCIETIES Christian LANGER Peking University

INTRODUCTION The impact of foreign labour in Pharaonic Egypt has been an under-researched but contested topic. While labour as such has been a relatively well researched topic,1 considering the marginal role of social and economic history in Egyptology,2 very few works have raised specifically and systematically the issue of the impact of foreign labour in Egyptian history; foreign labour is here widely understood as labour imported from abroad,3 in contemporary economics4 often synonymous with migrant labour.5 Perhaps surprisingly, the impact of foreigners on the New Kingdom (ca. 1550–1069 BCE) economy and their role in economic growth – during Egypt’s imperial age – has been estimated to have been minor. In this paper, I argue in the opposite sense. Since the sources are most abundant for Egypt’s New Kingdom, I start there and then summarily review the earlier evidence concerning the Middle and Old kingdoms (ca. 2700–1800 BCE) to merge the findings in the conclusions. The imbalance of sources in favour of the Late Bronze Age (LBA) Egyptian New Kingdom is striking and should perhaps be seen as a result of preservation rather than of a general absence of records now lost to history. Cemetery data may allow

1 E.g.,

Eyre 1987; Hafemann 2009. Moreno García 2015. 3 Note the more recent trend in Egyptological research to neutralize or even reject the term ‘foreigner’ by arguing for a seamless integration of foreigners into Egyptian society by adhering to Egyptian customs and that they could enter Egyptian elite circles (see Schneider 2010: 143–148). Such a generalization of foreigners aside, also note that Egyptian ideology made a sharp, total distinction between Egyptian insiders and foreign outsiders (see Assmann 1990: 150; Langer 2018: 65–66; Langer & Fernández-Götz 2020: 39), which rendered Egyptian society ideologically much less permeable than e.g. the societies of Rome or China by comparison (see Langer 2018: 65). For Panagiotopoulos 2006: 403, in Egypt foreigners were by default slaves. Moving beyond a generalization of foreigners in Egypt, Langer 2021: chapter 5 argues that the prospects of foreigners may have depended on how they came to Egypt in the first place, whether they came on their own accord or were forcibly moved by the Egyptian state or other actors. 4 See, e.g., Ismail & Yuliyusman 2014. 5 Including unfree labour. On the evolution in the acquisition of workers by states from deportation policies, mainly used in premodern societies, to the contemporary global labour migration, see Langer 2021: chapter 2. 2 See

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glimpses into local demographic developments at specific points in time,6 yet do not offer answers to Egyptian demographics on a macro-scale, as few cemeteries were continuously used over time. Alas, we have to make do with the information preserved and this contribution should be regarded as an attempt to explore what insights can be inferred and extrapolated if we do indeed work with it. However, it is necessary to lay out a theoretical approach in assessing the economic impact of workers from abroad first. APPROACHING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT

OF WORKERS FROM ABROAD

The actual impact of foreign workers on the ancient Egyptian economy is difficult to assess given the lack of hard figures at that time. One way to approach the subject matter might be to estimate how many people were needed to produce the amount of grain required by the Egyptian state. If we look for an Egyptian ideal of grain production, we may turn to texts mentioning the expected productivity per individual worker and use these figures as a basis for further analyses. A couple of texts from the Nineteenth Dynasty (ca. 1300–1190 BCE) include information on how much grain an individual worker was expected to produce. The sources are letters7 preserved on an ostracon (O.Gardiner 86)8 and a papyrus (P.Bologna 1086).9 According to these, a worker was supposed to produce 200 sacks (khar) of grain per year.10 P.Bologna 1086, an exchange between a scribe and a priest over the whereabouts of a Syrian field worker and grain yields, contains the information that three men and a boy were expected to produce 700 khar, implying 200 khar for every adult and 100 khar for the youth.11 In principle, according to revenue assessments, this implies that one worker was expected to deliver the assessed yield from a total of twenty arouras of standard land.12 One New Kingdom aroura of arable land equals 2,756.5 m² and yielded ten khar per year on average.13 The expectations of the Egyptian state and related elites regarding productivity seem to have been consistent between the Middle and New kingdoms, spanning more than half a millennium.14 Based on these parameters it is possible to infer the size 6 Recently

excavated workers’ graves at Amarna were occupied largely by children, teenagers and young adults of mainly female gender that suffered from various illnesses (incl. malaria) and work-related injuries (see Kemp 2017: 145–148). This suggests a very young workforce at Amarna that died early. 7 For translations of O.Gardiner 86 and P.Bologna 1086, consult, e.g., Wente 1990: 118–119, 124–126; Kitchen 1999. 8 KRI III 138:5–140:9. 9 KRI IV 78:10–81:12. 10 See Antoine 2015: 106. One New Kingdom khar measured 76.8 litres. 11 KRI IV 81:1–2. This may furthermore imply that expectations were based on age. 12 For more attestations and a discussion of expected grain yields, consult Kitchen 1999: 237; Warburton 2016: 195–197. 13 See Allen 2002: 160. 14 More difficult to assess are the actual wages field workers received as compensation. Reliable figures of annual wages only exist from Deir el-Medineh. Since this was the settlement of the workers of the royal tombs in the Valley of the Kings, their wage is unlikely to be taken as representative of agricultural labourers or others concerned with staple food production. In any case, a worker in Deir el-Medineh received about

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of a workforce, the area cultivated by that workforce, and the possible grain yield of that workforce. In order to provide the reader with the means to better understand the following argument and also to give a tool for future research, it may be useful to devise formulas with which to create data sets that are suitable for inquiries into the subject matter. They may help in creating a data set that could then be used to stage inquiries into Egyptian agriculture and approach possible explanations of what may have been going on. To infer how many workers were sufficient for producing the targeted annual yield the following formula may be useful. The result will give the number of workers, assuming 100 per cent productivity:

To infer the area of arable land (arouras) cultivated by an individual worker one could use the following formula:

To convert arouras into hectares one could employ the following formula:

Finally, to convert arouras into square kilometres one may employ the following formula:

O.Gardiner 86 may serve as an example in the application of these formulas. The exchange between a chief of the treasury and a priest over the possessions of the estate of Amun of Karnak in the Nile Delta mentions 8,760 field workers (jḥwtj.w) producing 200 khar of barley each.15 The total produce would amount to 1,752,000 khar of barley (134,553,600 litres),16 coming from 175,200 arouras of arable land, i.e. 482,938,800 m² or roughly 482.94 km² (48,294 hectares). Subsequently, Egyptian policies toward foreigners and their possible impact on economies and societies are assessed.

66 khar per year for an assumed household of ca. eleven people (Warburton 2016: 197, 221). If equally distributed among household members, this would mean six khar (460.8 litres) of grain per person and year, corresponding with the yield of 0.6 arouras or 0.165 hectares. However, the assumption that resources were indeed equally distributed cannot necessarily be made. 15 KRI III 139:12–13. 16 See also Kitchen 1999: 236.

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THE NEW KINGDOM Recently, Hartwig Altenmüller picked up the argument that captured foreigners, here also equated with slaves, had no great impact in the New Kingdom.17 In this, he cites other scholars like Jac J. Janssen18 and Wolfgang Helck,19 whilst citing Jean-Marie Kruchten20 for the opposite case. He also referred to a list of slaves in the Annals of Thutmosis III compiled by Helck.21 Helck came up with 2,526 slaves deported to Egypt from the territories of Levantine vassals as ‘tributes’ over the course of twelve years between the regnal years 29 and 42. Yet he only listed the Syrian deportees,22 not mentioning those from Nubian territories23 or the captives of Thutmosis’ Megiddo campaign in his 21st year. The Annals of Thutmosis III are special as they give information that is otherwise omitted. Only here are we told about the annual intake of workers from abroad as part of vassal obligations or those of occupied Nubia. Based on the information contained in the Annals, an annual average intake of roughly 470 people can be deduced; taking the standard deviation into account, the annual intake could range between 217 and 803 people. While there is no clear-cut evidence for the continuation of such deliveries beyond the reign of Thutmosis III, there is no reason to assume that these obligations were terminated following his reign. P.Bologna 1086 mentions a Syrian individual who had come to Egypt aboard a cargo ship as part of a delivery of other people. He was assigned as a field worker to the temple of Thoth in Memphis, which also operated the cargo ship.24 If we take this instance as indirect evidence for the continuation of such deliveries, we can then go on to project this figure on the remainder for the Eighteenth Dynasty (ca. 1550–1300 BCE) and even beyond until the time that Egypt’s empire in the Levant ceased to exist and Nubia was no longer under Egyptian domination.25 Indeed, evidence suggests that already Thutmosis I initiated such deliveries from Nubia,26 enabling the projections to set in earlier. Perhaps it would be prudent to distinguish between the regular and occasional influx of foreign workers, which would be due to treaties and wars, respectively.

17 Altenmüller 2015: 48. For a general outline of Egyptian expansion into the Levant during the New Kingdom or LBA, see, e.g., Redford 1995: 125–191. 18 Janssen 1975: 171–173. Janssen argued that slaves were not used in the agricultural sector and thus not used to produce any vital goods. On the contrary, in his view, they were rather utilised in the production of luxury goods. 19 Helck 1963: 515. 20 Kruchten 1979: 524–525. 21 For the list, see Helck 1971: 347. 22 Syria and Canaan may be used synonymously in Egyptological scholarship as both can refer to the area known as Retjenu in Egyptian sources; note that Retjenu can also include the northern Levant and connote West Asia generally (see Spalinger 2005: 131). In that sense, the term West Asian can also be applied, instead of the older term ‘Asiatic’ still more common in the literature. 23 In his defence, I need to say that the absolute figures for the Nubians are for the greater part no longer intact. 24 See KRI IV 79:12–80:2. 25 For details on this approach, see Langer 2020a: 7–9; Langer 2021: chapter 1. 26 See Spalinger 2006: 351–352.

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According to the extant source material,27 about 166,000 people were moved from abroad to Egypt and Egypt’s Nubian holdings during the roughly 500 years of the New Kingdom, 142,000 alone by the end of the Eighteenth Dynasty of about 250 years,28 and were integrated both into Egyptian society and economy. The remainder of the New Kingdom was marked by a continuous decrease in the intake of deportees in either case. The original values rise to a New Kingdom total of ca. 306,000 deportees, while the standard deviation results in a possible range of 229,000 and 411,000 individuals, as displayed in Table 1. Table 6.1. Projected Figures of Deportees in the New Kingdom. Source: Langer 2021.

Eighteenth Dynasty Nineteenth Dynasty Twentieth Dynasty Total

Low Estimate

Middle Estimate

High Estimate

174,989+x 39,941+x 14,182+x 229,112+x

213,665+x 65,742+x 26,434+x 305,851+x

273,685+x 99,713+x 37,999+x 411,397+x

While the fate of most of these deportees is not mentioned in the sources, where such information is given, the indication is that they were assigned to an institution called šnꜤ (pronounced: Shena) – an institution that is usually translated as a ‘granary’ or ‘storage facility’ depending on the researcher. ŠnꜤ.w were enclosed structures attached to temples and local administrations, i.e. part of the Egyptian state economy.29 They not only had storage facilities for agricultural produce but were much bigger installations that also contained granaries. Daniel Polz surmised that the šnꜤ was the actual food processing site during the New Kingdom30 and the processing of grain and meat is depicted in tombs.31 Based on information in the Annals of Thutmosis III we can add that the šnꜤ was also the site where foreign captives were assigned to work upon their arrival in Egypt, in the agricultural sector, and in the production of textiles. The captives were assigned the social status of ḥm (pronounced: hem) which designated them as members of the lowest stratum in Egyptian society from which the bulk of the unskilled workforce would be recruited;32 this intersected with the legal status of a mr-dependant (pronounced: mer), which saw 27 The

analysable source material includes royal military records, administrative letters, international correspondence, and autobiographical texts of Egyptian officials. On the available sources, see Langer 2021: chapter 3. 28 For the complete (projected) data sets, see Langer 2021; for a discussion, see also Langer 2020. 29 See Polz 1990: 46; Eichler 2000: 113; Smith 2010: 68. 30 Polz 1990: 47; see also Eichler 2000: 102–103, 112. 31 Polz 1990: 45. The šnꜤ had had this function since the Egyptian Old Kingdom. However, evidence for the transfer of foreigners to this institution does not exist before the New Kingdom. For a discussion of scholarship on the šnꜤ.w see Smith 2010: 62–69; for a recent study on the šnꜤ during the Old Kingdom, see Florès 2015: 93–163. 32 Captured members of Levantine elites could also be given the status of ḥm, but most captives seemed to come from the lowest strata of their respective communities according to the sources. This status has been equated with that of slaves at times. On the status of ḥm, see for instance Moreno García 2008: 129–134.

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them bonded to temple’s deity as a patron, probably for life – also in the case of private estates discussed below.33 The essential character of the šnꜤ seems to be that of a production and processing installation for staple foods.34 The production capacity of any given šnꜤ varied according to the importance of its temple or civil community. They were also linked to the administration of the treasury, granaries, and livestock.35 Polz estimated that there must have been approximately 640 šnꜤ.w spread around Egypt to meet the country’s demand in staple foods.36 In this sense, it seems likely that the šnꜤ – and thus the foreign workers – covered the demand of staple foods beyond the temples. However, the estimated figure itself presents no clue as to if and how many foreign workers were assigned throughout the Egyptian šnꜤ-system. In one instance, Thutmosis III had at least 1,588 Syrian males37 transferred to the šnꜤ of the temple of Amun at Karnak in order to have them produce fabrics and work the fields.38 Such instances are also known from the reigns of Amenhotep II and III; the latter, moreover, attests that foreigners who came to Egypt as sqr-Ꜥnḫ.w39 or jn.w40 were assigned to the šnꜤ.41 As indicated in P.Harris I, part of their tasks included rearing livestock.42 While these attestations revolve mainly around the administrative centre of Thebes and the temple of Abydos, this does not mean that foreigners were not delivered to the other ca. 640 šnꜤ.w in Egypt.43 On the other hand, it appears likely that the Theban area benefited from the most endowments at the time.44 By means of comparison [from outside the Theban area and in the private sector, DAW], the military officer Ahmose Son of Ibana of the early Eighteenth Dynasty employed several foreigners given to him as rewards for his wartime services. He also owned 70 to 130 arouras of arable land, which should have yielded 700 to 1300 khar per year, i.e. 53,760 to 99,840 litres of grain. Based on the above equation, 3.5 to 7 of his nineteen foreign workers would have sufficed to produce that amount of grain. A total of six estates (or households) appear in connection with the presence of foreign deportees in the source material, the size of whose deportee workforces ranged between 1 and 150 individuals; that means that these workforces could have theoretically cultivated between 20 and 3,000

33 See

Moreno García 1998; Papazian 2012: 94–95; Römer 2017: 82. Eichler 2000: 98; Smith 2010: 180–260, 406; Papazian 2012: 81. 35 Eichler 2000: 113. 36 Polz 1990: 46. 37 The figure for possible females and children is lost. 38 Urk. IV 742:10–743:9. 39 Captives. 40 Goods brought to Egypt as part of Levantine vassal deliveries, consisting of both items and people. On the matter of deliveries, see Liverani 1990: 255–266; Spalinger 1996; see also Spalinger 2006: 357–361. 41 Urk. IV 2020:13. 42 P.Harris I 10:8 (see Grandet 1994). 43 P.Harris I, for instance, names temples with foreigners working in šnꜤ.w throughout Egypt. Foreign captives were also assigned to a temple in Buhen on the southern fringe of occupied Lower Nubia (see KRI I 38:8–9). 44 See Haring 2013: 609. 34 See

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arouras of arable land, i.e. between 5.5 and 827 hectares. Handed out by the king for distinguished military and civic services, the combination of arable land and deportees as workers became a source of wealth creation by high-standing individuals. The workers produced grain for the patron and could be sold on or hired out to other clients, with the latter enabling the estate owner to waive his annual labour service to royal projects and send a deportee instead. This wealth creation made it possible for members of the military to transition to a career in the civil administration.45 As deportees could be passed on to one’s descendants,46 such policies should have formed a string of individual families that could rely on ‘old money’ generated by the exploitation of foreign labour, largely facilitated by the deportation policies of the Egyptian state.47 With respect to the estate of Ahmose Son of Ibana, Sally Katary surmised that the deportees complemented a local workforce,48 yet the numbers suggest clearly that locals were not needed to operate the estate and that Ahmose may well have relied solely on his deportees to create his family’s wealth. The king, in turn, through these policies incentivised the active participation of his leading and most capable officials in military ventures and ensured their loyalty. It is noteworthy that the ability of estate owners to sell on their deportee workers may have enabled more Egyptians to access foreign labour power, in turn increasing their own leisure or making it possible for them to pursue other ventures; more recent research indeed argues in favour of smallscale entrepreneurial activities.49 In this sense, over time, more parts of Egyptian society would have benefited materially from the state-induced import of foreign workers, that is, Egyptian deportation policies. Of course, vaster lands were attached to Egyptian institutions – ranging from hundreds to thousands of arouras. The 1,588 workers of Thutmosis III’s reign would have been able to produce 317,600 khar of grain.50 This means that they would have been able to work 31,760 arouras of arable land. Ben Haring proposed that during the Ramesside Period (ca. 1300–1069 BCE) the demand for grain for the daily cult had risen considerably from the Eighteenth Dynasty and that the mortuary temple of Ramesses II, the Ramesseum, required ca. 12,500 khar per year. The temple institutions probably produced the yield themselves.51 This grain yield implies 1,250 arouras of land, which could have been worked

45 See

Langer 2021: chapter 5. e.g., Allam 1993. 47 In a similar vein, Eyre 1987: 208 suggested that foreign labour enabled a growth in administrative and specialized occupations for locals. 48 See Katary 2013: 721. 49 See Muhs 2016: 137–140. 50 Of course, this figure is entirely theoretical as the actual yield depended on a variety of parameters. Figures from the Twentieth Dynasty rather indicate a yield of five khar per year and aroura. Here one has to keep mind, however, that a series of famines had struck West Asia and North East Africa which might have affected grain production (for some figures, see Haring 2013: 629). Originally, these famines were attributed to the Hekla III eruption in Iceland and originally radiocarbon dated to the mid-twelfth century BCE. However, the eruption has since been re-dated to the mid-tenth century BCE and as a result “there is currently no satisfactory explanation for the cause of the changes in the climatic conditions in Egypt and the Eastern Mediterranean in the LBA” (Mushett Cole 2017: 5). 51 See Haring 2013: 624–627. 46 See,

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by as few as 62–63 workers. This is considerably lower than what the Syrian captives could have achieved two centuries earlier under Thutmosis III, at a time when the requirements of the daily cult were lower. Thus, it seems likely that the temple economy, at least during the Eighteenth Dynasty, did not work merely for its own benefit. Another aspect is that in the early Eighteenth Dynasty (roughly until Thutmosis III), at least the Karnak temple might have been largely or solely supplied with foodstuffs from outside its domain, i.e. from other state institutions.52 The endowment of agricultural land to this and possibly other temples would have had several effects: it should have enabled the temples to operate independently of civic subsidies to a certain degree; it may have freed up resources that the state could spend otherwise, for example, to stock up on grain supplies or to entertain more (building) projects and similar investments that required labour power;53 or it may have enabled the Egyptian state to expand its economy by opening up previously uncultivated areas for development54 – more people also means that more people can be moved to underdeveloped areas, so these can be developed for the benefit of the state.55 The recruitment of foreign workers for the Karnak temple under Thutmosis III coincides with an expansion of the general temple economy at that time.56 How much arable land actually existed during the New Kingdom is unknown, but Karl Butzer gives an estimate of c. 22,400 square kilometres57 of cultivable floodplains during ‘reasonably good floods’.58 Based on the equation above, about 406,312 workers would have sufficed on average to produce the required yield, which is roughly 14 per cent of the estimated population of 2.9 million people at that time.59 This figure may seem dubiously low and

52 See

Haring 2013: 620. should bear in mind that workers were mainly paid in grain. 54 A relative labour shortage relative the available land was indeed assumed by Eyre 1987: 208, who linked the influx of foreign captives with ‘internal colonization’. 55 An example is the resettlement of the Nile Delta under Sneferu in the Old Kingdom. The Nile Delta had been depopulated on a large scale during intermittent Early Dynastic warfare, and its resources thus out of the state’s grasp (see Gundlach 1994: 70–94). 56 On the expansion of the Karnak temple, see Haring 2013: 621–623. 57 Which corresponds to 2,400,000 hectares or ca. 8,126,247 arouras of arable land. This does not include arable land in Nubia. 58 Butzer 1976: 83 table 4. Butzer’s study is partly based on hydrological data from nineteenth century Egypt. Rainer Nutz has concluded that the archaeological data suggests similar irrigation from Nile floods for the Middle Kingdom or the Middle Bronze Age. The introduction of more effective means of irrigation following the Middle Kingdom lay outside the scope of his study (Nutz 2014: 40). 59 The estimate is for the early Nineteenth Dynasty around 1250 BCE. For a brief discussion of population and/or workforce estimates, see Nutz 2014: 41–42; Warburton 2016: 198–199, 203–206. Nutz has argued that, despite other existing population and land estimates, Butzer’s study has not been surpassed in detail or methodological sophistication, making it the best foundation for demographic research at the moment. What diverging population estimates mean for our inquiry is that the ratio between foreign workers and Egyptians would have to be adjusted accordingly, i.e. if the population was approximately 1.2 million people rather than 3 million, the impact of foreign labour would have been higher and vice versa. Nutz also calculated that 480,208 field workers would have sufficed during the Middle Kingdom, some of them full-time, concluding that 331,817 labourers would have been a sufficient agricultural workforce on a full-time basis (Nutz 2014: 100). 53 We

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should just be taken as a low estimate.60 However, one has to consider that the production of grain was not the only occupation in Egypt. Grain would have to be processed, cattle herded and eventually slaughtered, other animals herded, linen produced, stone quarried, buildings constructed, etc.61 O.Gardiner 86 gives an indication that a lot more labour went into herding animals like cattle or birds: more than 52,000 herdsmen stand against 8,760 field workers, a ratio of nearly 6:1.62 Another factor to be taken into account may be the loss of labour due to illness. Walter Scheidel demonstrated that the sanitary conditions of Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt were poor and various illnesses common.63 Periods of illnesses should have affected productivity accordingly. Attendance lists from Deir el-Medina, the village of the workmen of the Theban necropolis, suggest that the sanitary conditions were not much better in Ramesside Egypt. Illness was by far the most frequent reason for absence from work.64 The average absence of workers may be inferred from the lists in future data sets and the totals for the required workforce adjusted accordingly. Yet, talking about the builders of the royal tombs we have to consider that these were no ordinary workers. While they may have been allowed to be absent from work to recover, the same may not necessarily have been a viable option for a ḥm working for the šnꜤ of a temple. Generally, the recruitment of additional workers may have offset a productivity loss from illness or death and thus ensured productivity at least remained stable relative to the available land. The intake of 8,475 plus an unknown quantity of foreigners could well have seen an increase of the agricultural workforce by 2 to 5 per cent during the reign of Thutmosis III.65

60 Based on the prevalent sanitary conditions and probable loss of labour resulting from them, the figure could be adjusted accordingly once a data set of absenteeism due to illness has been generated. Perhaps related to this, P.Valencay I suggests a workforce of either 300,000 or 1.5 million field workers, possibly nourishing a population of around 15 million (Warburton 2016: 198; for a translation consult Wente 1990: 130–131). The estimate of 1.5 million field workers would be roughly four times more than the khar-based calculation conveys. 61 Warburton 2016: 199 proposed unemployment rates of 85 or even 98 per cent and suggested that non-agricultural tasks did not demand substantially more labour. Warburton 2019 argued for widespread underemployment; for a debate on employment, see Warburton 2016: 203–206. 62 KRI III 139:12–140:4. If this ratio was representative of the whole of Egypt, we would have to reckon with nearly 2.5 million herdspeople. Adding the agricultural workforce of at least 400,000 people would result in the total estimate of 2.9 million inhabitants of Egypt and full employment spread over agriculture and pasturing. Leaving no room for other types of employment, the ratio conveyed by the ostracon appears highly unlikely as representative of the rest of the country. One has to bear in mind that this ratio may be specific to the economy in the Nile Delta due to greater amount of freshwater and wetland ecosystems ideal for herding as compared to the Nile Valley. Note the possibility that O.Gardiner 86 may be “an imaginary ‘school’ composition” (Kitchen 1999: 238) and that, lacking comparable texts, one cannot ascertain whether the text is a copy of an actual report, inspired by factual statistics, or (partly) fictitious. 63 Scheidel 2001: 1–117; along similar relative to early Mesopotamian urbanism, resulting in a need to replace continually the population, see Algaze 2008: 31. 64 Janssen 1980: 135–137; see also Akiyama 2000. This corresponds with the presence of, e.g., malaria in over 85 per cent of the young workers unearthed at Amarna (see Kemp 2017: 146). 65 Assuming these people received six khar of grain per year for their subsistence, the required 5,085 khar would correspond to 508.5 arouras or 140.17 hectares of arable land. However, whether foreign captives received the same amount of remuneration as Egyptian workers is not clear and appears doubtful.

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The data for other reigns suggest even higher increases. During two campaigns early in the reign of Thutmose III’s successor, Amenhotep II, more than 100,000 people were deported to Egypt, of which an undisclosed figure was assigned to the šnꜤ-workforce. Another 30,000 captives were taken during the reign of Amenhotep III.66 These figures suggest a possible increase of nearly 25 per cent for the reign of Amenhotep II and roughly 7 per cent for the time of Amenhotep III. If we adjust the figures for the annual intake of workers from abroad as a result of treaties, then the share rises to roughly 27.8 per cent and 11 per cent respectively. The share of the temples in these lands is more difficult to assess. The only reliable figures date to after the death of Ramesses III (post 1150 BCE), a time when the empire and the revenue coming from it were already in decline. At that time, his mortuary temple at Medinet Habu still possessed land holdings of 750 arouras, which could have been cultivated by a workforce of as few as 37 to 38 people. These considerations demonstrate that a big workforce was not actually required to keep at least the economy of the Egyptian temples running. Even if they were not utilised outside the temple sector, eventually the employment of foreign workers would have enabled the government to divert subsidies from the temples to other institutions. In itself, this should have provided a surge in grain production if these workers were used as a complement to the Egyptian workforce. Considering that foreigners were also employed by officials on their private estates, the impact of foreign labour could have been greater. Given that one should reckon with more voluntary forms of migration into Egypt existing in parallel with state-induced migration,67 the impact and share of foreign labour may have even been greater; the staple food production may have rested significantly on foreign labour power, although the precise scope is ultimately impossible to ascertain due to the nature of the source material. A similar observation can be made for the military sphere, where the Egyptian state increasingly relied on foreigners over the course of the New Kingdom.68 Unless the additional labour power was used to expand the economy by developing new, previously un(der)developed areas, productivity growth should have actually been negative since the same number of workers had produced the same output for a larger population; in this case, the foreigners would have enabled an easing of labour obligations for the native population. Indeed, it was recently suggested that the population was by and large un(der)employed to begin with,69 and an increasing reliance on voluntary and involuntary labour power from abroad should have exacerbated that condition. At the same time, the expansion of the available worker pool should have resulted in an increase of inequality overall,70 with wealth accumulating at the top of Egyptian society and deportations a means of generating wealth for elites. Given the estimated figures above, the share of foreigners in the Egyptian workforce employed by state institutions seems to have fluctuated between reigns, but a good low

66 Ultimately,

the validity of these figures is impossible to assess. Langer 2021: chapter 5. 68 See Spalinger 2005: 274–275. 69 See Warburton 2019. 70 In line with Scheidel 2017: 60–61. 67 See

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estimate may be around 5 to 10 per cent on average,71 and wars and deliveries from abroad might have ensured that this ratio was maintained until the demise of the Egyptian empire during the Twentieth Dynasty (ca. 1190–1069 BCE). Yet, judging by the records of the Nineteenth and Twentieth dynasties, the intake of foreigners from wars experienced a steep decline during the reign of Ramesses II in the mid-thirteenth century BCE.72 Figures are rarely given and military activity in general does not appear to have reached the extent of the Eighteenth Dynasty. However, factoring in the possibility that the foreign workforce may have produced offspring over time,73 their share may have eventually exceeded the low estimate after a couple of generations. A possible caveat in this context is that they may not have been able to procreate sufficiently to keep numbers stable, let alone assuring an increase, due to general living conditions at that time as mentioned further below. Beyond the realm of government-induced forced migration,74 foreigners appear frequently in Egyptian documents. One Ramesside court decision, for instance, deals with the arbitration over ownership of a Syrian girl who had been acquired by an Egyptian woman from a merchant in order to use her as a servant in her household. Several foreigners also appear in connection with the robberies of the royal tombs in the Theban necropolis during the late New Kingdom.75 There they usually appear as part of the lowest echelons of Egyptian society. Cases such as these may indicate that the presence of foreign workers in New Kingdom Egypt was so common in Egypt that they appear in records only in case of legal irregularities that required arbitration or punishment. In effect, one may expect the share of foreigners in Egyptian society to have been higher than the records convey. Based on the evidence, one can generally conclude that the most important factor of contemporary migrant labour between nation states – tackling a labour shortage76 – was not given in the ancient Egyptian state. Egypt obviously did not suffer from an actual labour shortage, especially in unskilled agriculture, but rather had an underemployed population. That means that wages (in grain) should have been unaffected and un(der)employment was probably not an issue that was on the mind of Egyptian policymakers; two consequences of modern migrant labour, dropping wage levels and increasing unemployment,77 were hence not an issue either, especially as wage labour did not form a significant branch of the economy.78 The question is thus why Egypt imported labour from abroad at all. Apart from punishing foreign subjects and opponents in defiance of Egyptian interests,

to roughly 20,000 to 40,000 workers. Assuming a wage of six khar of grain per person and year, the total wage would have amounted to 120,000 to 240,000 khar per year. This would correspond to the yield of 12,000 and 24,000 arouras or 3,308 and 6,616 hectares of arable land, roughly 33.08 and 66.16 square kilometres or 1.5 and 3 per cent of Butzer’s estimated 22,400 square kilometres. Hence it seems entirely possible that Egypt would have been able to support this additional amount of people (see Warburton 2016: 198). 72 See Langer 2021: chapter 5. 73 The only evidence coming in a representation of a šnꜤ-workforce in the tomb of Rekhmire (see Davies 1943: pl. LVII), himself overseer of the production at temple of Amun at Karnak. 74 On different forms of forced migration in New Kingdom Egypt, see Langer 2017. 75 On the tomb robberies, see KRI VI 743–838; Peet 1930. 76 See Ismail & Yuliyusman 2014: 658. 77 See Friedberg & Hunt 1995: 28–30. 78 See Warburton 2016: 221–222. 71 Amounting

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there are essentially three different albeit interrelated reasons: the substitution of native compulsory labour with foreign labour; the complementation of local labour power to expand the economic output; or to gain workers for menial tasks in the first place. Each of these is tied to each another through the factor of coercion, since James C. Scott argued that premodern elites generally had to coerce their subjects to perform work that primarily benefited these elites themselves, and the workers thus had little incentive to render services to them except by force; here the use of foreign labour would also have the added benefit of averting domestic unrest and bolstering the regime.79 If local compulsory labour was indeed replaced by unfree workers from abroad, the latter clearly served as substitutes to the local workforce; in case the economy was expanded and developed in addition to that, the foreign workers also served as complements to the locals. Importing labour power was generally not an economic necessity, though, unless one acknowledges that premodern elites largely ruled over subjects that were unwilling to work, resulting in a virtual labour shortage, in which case there was indeed an incentive to import labour power from abroad to facilitate the wealth accumulation at the top of Egyptian society. The economy aside, there may have been a primarily ideological incentive: through foreign labour, especially people deported to Egypt after resisting Egyptian policies,80 the king could cater to the ideological premises of the Egyptian state according to which it controlled the world and kept foreigners as the embodiment of chaos and opposition to the cosmic order in check; in turn, the wider population could benefit from an increase in leisure thanks to foreign substitutes, knowing that the latter would serve Egypt for the benefit of Egypt and, by extension, demonstrating that the cosmos was indeed exactly as official royal ideology had claimed all along.81 As pointed out previously,82 foreigners are indeed seemingly ubiquitous in New Kingdom Egypt, especially in the long run, but in the individual cases it is not possible to infer how these people had come to Egypt, nor what their degree of integration and exact life circumstances were. The same holds for the ratio of foreigners that rose up into elite circles, for which there is only very scant evidence anyway83 and may well have been overstated. Based on the available data, it seems that the vast majority of the foreigners in ancient Egyptian society were at its bottom and served as unskilled labour.84 EGYPT DRAINING ADJACENT LATE BRONZE AGE ECONOMIES In order to assess the degree to which Egypt was draining the surrounding economies during the LBA New Kingdom, it may prove useful to consider West Asian LBA demographics for the specific regions. Under discussion here are Canaan and Nubia.

79 Scott

2017: 150–182. Langer 2021: chapter 5. 81 See Langer 2018: 65–66; Langer 2021: chapter 5. 82 See, e.g., Schneider 2010: 154–155. 83 See, e.g., Panagiotopoulos 2006: 403–404. 84 See Langer 2021: chapter 5. 80 See

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Figure 6.1. Areas and sites discussed in the text (illustration: author).

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For Canaan, which was the heart of Egypt’s informal empire in the Levant and appeared as Retjenu (Rṯnw) in Egyptian sources, a most recent study provides some estimates for the LBA. Titus Kennedy analysed archaeological, anthropological, and textual data in a GIS-based approach to estimate the population of Canaan at different times during the LBA. In general, he suggests a total population between 588,000 in LBA I and 597,000 in LBA II, while Canaan may have supported 650,000 individuals as the maximum population peak during the LBA.85 Noting a very slight and surprisingly low population increase of just 1.3 per cent between the different phases, Kennedy has argued that some type of event or events took place that reducted [sic!] the population or negated population growth. The most obvious options include war, famine, disease, migration, or a combination of the four.86

Based on the archaeological evidence, he concluded that these events occurred around 1400 BCE,87 which would situate them in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty when Canaan was firmly under Egyptian control by their vassals and the Egyptian occupation of Megiddo and its fertile hinterland was in place.88 The removal of 19,159 people from Retjenu by the Egyptian army under Amenhotep II in a single campaign may well have amounted to a population decrease between 3.2 and 3.3 per cent in Canaan. With approximately 408 individuals delivered to Egypt from Retjenu on a yearly basis, the population decrease would have been roughly 0.07 per cent. This percentage may seem insignificant, yet over the years these would accumulate. Over a decade there would be a decrease of 0.7 per cent in the region. Within a generation of about twenty years, the decrease would have amounted to 1.4 per cent. Considering the Egyptians preferred taking able-bodied adults of both sexes and youths or children89 over elderly and sick people, the effect should have been a commencing or accelerating aging process of the local communities and decreased fertility. The effects may not have been

85 Kennedy 2013: 579. These figures included an estimated presence of roughly 36,000 nomadic people in Canaan (see Kennedy 2013: 587). If Amenhotep II’s claim to have deported 15,200 Shasu bedouins and 3,600 Habiru from Canaan to Egypt (see Urk. IV 1309:1) is to be taken seriously then his measure would thus probably amount to ethnic cleansing, removing more than half of the nomadic population during a single campaign. 86 Kennedy 2013: 572–573. A generally slow population growth has been attested for ancient West Asia due to a near-equilibrium of childbirth and infant mortality as well as low life expectancy (see Liverani 2014: 24). It has been acknowledged that pre-industrial societies probably approximated stable populations (see Chamberlain 2006: 26–27; Poston & Bouvier 2010: 276–278). 87 Kennedy 2013: 573. 88 It is possible to connect these observations with those of Donald Redford, who noted a destruction of Canaanite towns and a population shift from the highlands to the valleys and coastal areas around that time. He also argued that the “immediate aftermath of the Egyptian conquest involved the intentional demolition of Canaanite towns and the deportation of a sizable segment of the population” (Redford 1995: 208; see Menu 2004: 190). 89 On child labour in New Kingdom Egypt, see Matić 2017. But note that neither the ambiguity of the Egyptian terminology nor the representations as such ultimately allow us to either reconstruct the scope of child labour in ancient Egypt; nor can the identification of the affected individuals be recognised in the source material (see Langer 2021: chapter 5).

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visible over the very short-term, but they will certainly have been perceived over an extended period of several decades. This factor may well play into a general population growth of just 1.3 rather than 2 per cent or more between LBA I and II.90 Combined with a resulting population decrease due to regular Egyptian military incursions and possible side-effects, the effects on the economy and social stability in the southern Levant may have been devastating. These movements of people surely affected the size of the local workforces, and thereby the sheer availability of workers and productivity of the affected community. One has to bear in mind that the fertile Jezreel Valley91 surrounding Megiddo and the local grain production had been under direct Egyptian control since the reign of Thutmosis III.92 Any yield would go to Egypt [and also doubtless to defray the costs of the Egyptian occupation forces, administration, etc., DAW] and thus be largely unavailable to local communities, which would also render the formation of an effective resistance against Egyptian interests unlikely; the like was done with the grain production in Nubia.93 The Annals of Thutmosis III inform us that Egypt took ownership of the arable land after the battle of Megiddo94 in his 23rd regnal year in 1457 BCE and that they imported grain in excess of 207,300 khar (15,920,640 litres). The source further indicates that the Egyptian army was fed off the land beyond these grain imports.95 Assuming that arable land in the southern Levant produced about the same yield as Egyptian fields, these 207,300 khar may indicate an area of 20,730 arouras or 5,714.22 hectares of arable land. Based on calculations in ArcGIS, the Jezreel Valley holds approximately 189,410 arouras or 56,211 hectares. Without knowing the exact amount of land that was indeed cultivated during the LBA, Egypt seems to have used at least more than 10 per cent of the Jezreel Valley for the production of grain.96 The fields could have been worked by as few as 1,037 workers, which would have been 0.17 to 0.18 per cent of the Canaanite population at that time. Thus Egypt held land in Canaan greater in extent compared to the Nile Delta landholdings of the temple of Amun at Karnak as mentioned in P.Bologna 1086. The Egyptian grain imports may have affected the provision of Canaanite communities profoundly. Another scenario could be that even more land was cultivated under Egyptian jurisdiction, where the complete yield was not exported to Egypt. Rather, the Egyptians may have also controlled the grain rations for the local population, thus potentially influencing the livelihood of the entire region.

90 In which case Egyptian policies would have to be considered as exogenous demographic factors in the development of both neighbouring and Egyptian communities. (Forced) migration as an exogenous factor was missed by Jürgen Kraus in his study of ancient Egyptian demographics, considering only environmental conditions, i.e., those not originating in human agency (see Kraus 2004: 178–213). 91 The Jezreel Valley is also known as the ‘Breadbasket of Palestine’. 92 See Langer 2013: 88, 103–104, 108. 93 See Langer 2013: 86–89. 94 On this aspect of Egyptian policy, see also Redford 2006: 332. 95 Urk. IV 667:10–15. 96 If the yield of an aroura was smaller than ten khar, the percentage would increase accordingly as more land was needed.

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Figure 6.2. Megiddo and the Jezreel Valley showing the area of ca. 56 hectares calculated in ArcGIS (illustration: author).

Adding to this, Amarna letter 36597 indicates that regional vassals were also obliged to provide a certain number of corvée workers to Egypt in order to cultivate these fields.98 Hence, a certain percentage of the workforce was not available to provide sustenance for Canaanite communities which would have affected their capacity to provide welfare for the population or generate positive economic growth. Egyptian policies may have also incited Canaanite societies to compete among each other for available resources and workers. By treaty, the vassals were semi-autonomous and even allowed to go to war with each other as long as this did not interfere with Egyptian interests in the region. Egyptian removal and labour policies may well have advanced intra-regional competition as part of an early example of ‘divide and rule’, since they may have prevented Canaanite societies from mounting effective resistance against the Egyptian overlord. Considering the presence of realist thought in Egyptian policymaking, it is possible that the effects were deliberate.99 Indeed, the Amarna letters 287 and 288,100 both dispatched to Akhenaten by the ruler of Jerusalem, indicate that caravans bound for Egypt 97 Schniedewind

& Cochavi-Rainey 2015: 1154–1155, 1604–1605. Na’aman 1988. 99 The doctrines laid out in the Teaching for Merikare may be an early example of political realism (see Langer 2015). Political realism has also been associated with the Amarna correspondence (see, e.g., David 2000). 100 Schniedewind & Cochavi-Rainey 2015: 1110–1113, 1592–1593. 98 See

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carrying people and other goods for the Egyptian court were raided and captured by the ruler of Gezer, with a subsequent delivery of people handed to the Egyptian representatives at Jerusalem.101 This exchange could mean that vassals were directly competing for each other’s deliveries in people to offset the loss of their own populations caused by the Egyptian policies, assuming that people were the source of political and economic power, as suggested by Leon Marfoe.102 Given this outlook it seems understandable that some vassals tried to break free from their Egyptian overlord from time to time, which may be precisely the reason for Egyptian incursions into the area if the sources are to be trusted. The possibly devastating impact of Egyptian policies might have provided an incentive to explore in what way an alignment with other great powers like Mitanni or the Hittites could offer viable alternatives if independence could not be achieved.103 It may also be worth investigating in what way Egyptian policies might have been softer further North on the border with the sphere of influence of the Mitanni and the Hittite sphere of influence, since it is the southern Levant that is mentioned in Egyptian sources as providing labourers. A softer approach toward communities further north may have enabled local regimes to serve as an efficient buffer against Mitanni or Hittite encroachment towards the South and Egypt.104 A possible example may be Amurru, which towards the middle of the fourteenth century BCE was able to gain a certain strength on the northern edge of the Egyptian empire and eventually switched allegiance from Egypt to the Hittite empire. Future multidisciplinary endeavours could establish if there is any basis to these considerations in the regional source material. As concerns Nubia, the assessment of the impact of Egyptian deportation policies may be more difficult to assess. The main reason is the lack of solid population estimates for LBA Nubia. Stuart Tyson Smith proposed that the area around modern-day Lake Nasser, which is congruent with Lower Nubia, was able to support 20,000 people and the Kerman heartland of the Dongola Reach another 200,000 people, combining for a total estimate of 220,000.105 This distinction may be important as the Egyptians distinguished between the two regions as Wawat and Kush, respectively. In comparison, Michele Buzon suggested that New Kingdom Nubia had no more than a tenth of Egypt’s population, which she gave as 3.9 million people, misciting Butzer.106 Combining Buzon and Butzer, we would

101 See

also Langer forthcoming. line with the earlier proposition that people were the most contested commodity among the Canaanite city-states (see Marfoe 1979: 16). 103 In line with Na’aman 1981, cited after Na’aman 2005: 227–228. This suggestion runs counter to Warburton’s argument that the Levantine states in fact preferred Egyptian hegemony over the policies of the other powers from the reign of Thutmosis IV in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty onward (see Warburton 2001: 63–64). 104 Langer 2021: chapter 5 suggests that the boundary between such a North-South distinction lay just south of Byblos. 105 Smith 2003: 75, 195. 106 Buzon 2008: 168. In footnote 16, she apparently cited Butzer 1976: 85 fig. 13 erroneously; when reading Butzer’s graph closely we can see that his estimate for 1400 BCE would be between 2.3 and 2.4 million inhabitants, whereas the year 1250 BCE would correspond with 2.9 million people as laid out in Butzer 1976: 83 table 4, to which I have referred above. 102 In

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arrive at an estimated population size of 250,000 to 300,000 individuals for LBA Nubia, an estimate slightly higher than Smith’s. The problem is that both Smith’s and Buzon’s estimates have not been backed up with any study as extensive as Butzer’s. These estimates need to be confirmed in the future. For the purpose of this inquiry, I will take an estimate of 250,000 people as a compromise between the low and high estimate. Based on this estimate, a transfer of 30,000 Nubians under Amenhotep III in response to a claimed rebellion directed against the Egyptian occupation of Nubia may have represented up to 12 per cent of the population in Nubia. The Annals of Thutmosis III suggest an annual intake of Nubian individuals from Wawat and Kush, just as in the Retjenu case. On average these were fifteen people from Lower Nubia and about 47 individuals from Upper Nubia per year. Relative to Smith’s population estimates for the individual regions these removals may have resulted in a population decrease of 0.075 per cent in Lower Nubia and 0.034 per cent in Kush. Projected over a decade these would grow to 0.75 and 0.35 per cent, compared to 1.5 and 0.7 per cent over a generation of twenty years. As opposed to Canaan, however, Egyptian policies incorporated settler colonialism, i.e. Egyptians settled in Nubia. Thus, in spite of Egyptian removal policies the overall population may have been fairly stable in Nubia. Future research may find ways to shed further light into Nubian LBA demographics. Yet, it has been suggested by Buzon based on a case study from Tombos in the Dongola Reach that Egyptian colonialism in Nubia resulted in a hybridisation of the population, i.e. a mix of Egyptian settlers and ‘Egyptianised’ Nubians. Adding our data set, it seems probable that the transfer of Nubians to Egypt accelerated such a hybridisation. Egyptianisation may have served in aligning the population in Nubia with Egyptian interests and advance compliance with Egyptian occupational policies.107 Egypt’s main interests in Nubia seem to have been geostrategic security from the South and the procurement of Nubian gold, which was integral to wider security interests in the Levant.108 In addition to Egyptian settlers, there was also a certain influx of West Asian people, possibly not all of them captives. As mentioned earlier, a šnꜤ in Buhen was filled with Levantine captives of Sety I. An exchange between Amenhotep II and his governor of occupied Nubia, the king’s son of Kush User-Setet, mentions people from different West Asian places in the service of the governor.109 A letter found in Kamid el-Loz dating to the Amarna period has the Egyptian king – probably Akhenaten – request Habiru from some of his Levantine vassals. These Habiru were to be moved and settled in Nubia in order to replace people the Egyptians had removed from there in the first place.110 Consequently, not only an influx of Egyptians has to be taken into account when discussing Nubian demographics but also the (forced) migration111 of individuals from West Asia.

107 See

Smith 2003: 84–86. Langer 2013: 117–118. 109 Urk. IV 1343–1344. Mentioned are servants from Babylon, Byblos, Alalakh, Arapkha (modern-day Kirkuk, see Bryce 2012: 67–68), and Takhsy in southwest Syria; the servants are mostly female. 110 See Edzard 1970: 55–57; Schulman 1982: 314–315. 111 Leaving room for the possibility not only of deportations by the Egyptian state but also more voluntary forms of migration from West Asia to Nubia. 108 See

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As for the impact on the desert regions surrounding the Egyptian and Nubian Nile Valleys, it is difficult to assess as the population size of nomadic groups such as the Libyan tribes or those east of Nubia is unknown. Another problem is that some regions mentioned as the home of nomadic populations in Egyptian sources have not yet been clearly identified. As in the case of Canaan, future multidisciplinary research may produce new insights. In any case, from an Egyptian perspective, draining and weakening adjacent economies served both the Egyptian economy and geostrategic aims. Due to incomplete demographic data from Egypt, we can only approximate the possible demographic impact on Egyptian society. An annual population growth of 0.2 per cent has been suggested for the Roman period and included in Nutz’s discussion of Middle Kingdom demographics; barring any crises, the population would thus have doubled over 350 years.112 Incorporating the general argument of an average annual growth of just 0.04 per cent for pre-industrial societies,113 the actual growth should have been lower. In fact, the overall population growth from 2.3 or 2.4 million to 2.9 million inhabitants between 1400 BCE and 1250 BCE implied by Butzer114 points to a total population growth of about 26 or 20.8 per cent. This would mean an annual growth of 0.17 or 0.14 per cent respectively, which appears far higher than the pre-industrial average but slightly lower than the Roman period-based suggestion. This result already includes population loss due to crises. One would expect, though, that the deportations would have added to Egypt’s default growth, and Butzer generally projected a higher growth rate for the New Kingdom than the Middle Kingdom, albeit without considering the potential impact of external migration. These figures imply that either a) the estimates are incorrect and the projected demographic dynamics too low; b) the impact of external migration was considerable vis-à-vis natural growth and probably came down to Egyptian policies; or c) connecting the estimated growth of the Egyptian population during the Roman period with the Middle Kingdom is incorrect and results in too high an estimate. Generally, one has to consider that the pre-industrial [annual, DAW] growth rate of 0.04 per cent is a global average and the authors have remarked regional variability. Hence, the population growth in Egypt may have been higher than that global average anyway due to a favourable food supply compared to other regions. Further analyses of the data set may eventually approximate possible explanations. Overall, though, one can conclude that the forcible and any voluntary intake of foreign labour power from adjacent societies expanded the pool of available workers at the disposal of the Egyptian state. While that may not have increased productivity, it increased the potential for positive economic growth since additional labour power could be used to cultivate more land or engage in more state projects than would otherwise have been possible.115 112 See

Nutz 2014: 44–45. & Bouvier 2010: 276. 114 Butzer 1976: 85 fig. 13. 115 A tiny minority of foreign workers was used as palace personnel to facilitate elite consumption (see Langer 2021: chapter 5); such workers were not a factor in economic growth and their role in Egyptian society is therefore not further discussed in this paper. 113 Poston

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Yet the state of the source material hardly makes it possible to ascertain whether this potential was actually converted into tangible gains. The expansion of the New Kingdom temple economy might point to that, but it ultimately does not convey whether this sparked a general expansion of cultivation in Egypt or whether more arable land was simply placed under the control of the temples. What is certain, however, is that positive economic growth occurred in Egypt in relation to the adjacent societies, especially those of Southwest Asia. The Egyptian deportation policies severely crippled their own capacities to generate positive growth due to a drainage or workers. Where the control over people translates into political and economic power, a reduction or loss of that control has detrimental effects for governance and stability. In this sense, the Egyptian policies induced or, at the very least, exacerbated a state of inequality between Egypt and the city-states of Canaan, enabling and fortifying Egypt’s domination of the region. The effect of Egypt’s intake of foreign labour power and effective drainage of the surrounding economies may be comparable to the modern phenomenon of the brain drain, thought to stifle the economic growth and welfare of the sending society;116 in societies dominated by unskilled labour, like most premodern societies, the emigration of unskilled labour should have had similar effects. The result was therefore uneven geographical development within the cosmos of LBA West Asia and Northeast Africa. Egypt’s economic growth – and thus political dominance in the wider region – would have thus stemmed from an accumulation of wealth by dispossession.117 THE MIDDLE AND OLD KINGDOMS The evidence for foreign workers during Egypt’s Middle Kingdom (ca. 2055–1650 BCE) is – by far – not as abundant as for the New Kingdom, but still more tangible than for the Old Kingdom, although the contribution of foreign labour to the Egyptian economy cannot be approached in both cases as is possible for the New Kingdom.118 During the Middle Kingdom, the main institution of compulsory labour was the ḫnrt wr (pronounced: kheneret wer) as it appears in the administrative documents of the Lahun papyri. The ḫnrt wr was the administrative centre of the ḫnrt-system, an institution that supervised temporary labour and allocated workers according to needs in various sectors, such as agricultural production and construction works.119 Foreign workers only appear occasionally in connection with the enclosed structure of the ḫn.t wr.120 West Asians are also connected with the institution by being mentioned as servants on the verso of P.Brooklyn 35.1446. 121 Its recto contains a list of people from the Theban area who fled their assigned workplace

116 See,

e.g., Lundborg 2006, who finds a similar, albeit reduced, effect for the loss of unskilled labour. on Harvey 2006: 90–95. 118 On deportations in the Old and Middle kingdoms, see generally Langer 2020b: 21–25; 2020c: 62–66. 119 For the latest study on the ḫnrt wr and the Lahun papyri, consult Di Teodoro 2018. 120 For example, the papyri from the town of Lahun, P.Berlin P.10021 and UC 32201 (see Luft 2006: 43–48 and Collier 2002: 104–109, respectively). 121 For the list, see Hayes 1955: 87–89. 117 Drawing

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and the ḫnrt wr.122 One possible punishment for deviants included permanent labour assignments following their apprehension which occasionally encompassed the fugitives’ families as well.123 Because of often indirect evidence, it is difficult to estimate how many foreigners were employed through this institution. The so-called Annals of Amenemhat II (nineteenth century BCE), two fragments with annual inscriptions, report the capture of 1,554 male and female captives,124 some of whom were supposedly transferred as workers to the pyramid town of the same king.125 The kind of work they were expected to perform is not specified in the text. Evidence for the utilisation of foreigners during the Old Kingdom (ca. 2700–2200 BCE) is scant and only indirect. For example, the Fourth Dynasty ruler Sneferu is claimed on fragments PS r.VI.2 and CF4 r.M.1 of the Royal Annals of the Old Kingdom to have taken 7,000 Nubian and 1,100 Libyan captives, respectively.126 While some figures of foreigners being transferred to Egypt in the aftermath of wars are known, their subsequent whereabouts and status is not. While it is likely that they were somehow utilised in the workforce, the details remain obscure. Gundlach connected Sneferu’s deportations with the repopulation of the Nile Delta, which had been widely depopulated during warfare in the wake of the process of the unification of Upper and Lower Egypt in the Early Dynastic.127 In this sense, the Egyptian state may have used Libyan and Nubian deportees to redevelop the area and access its resources.

CONCLUDING REMARKS Based on the evidence for the Bronze Age, the Egyptian New Kingdom stands out in terms of the exploitation of foreign labour. While foreign labour was probably already exploited during the Old and Middle kingdoms, the scale seen in the New Kingdom was unprecedented.128 The acquisition and exploitation of foreigners in the Egyptian economy served several purposes: the maintenance of the empire by punishing people non-compliant with colonial policies – and expanding the economic output. That era probably saw a production of surplus staple foods and other goods that could have been invested elsewhere. The intake of a foreign workforce should have also freed up ‘national’ resources. It is worth noting that these considerations only relate to state-level policies and do not take into account slave markets which probably existed. At the same time, it has to remain unclear due to several unknown factors stemming from the fragmentary sources – dependent

122 See

Hayes 1955: 11–66. The names in the list are parent’s names and/or nicknames. Arguing with Luft, this may well mean that these people were of Levantine origin (see Luft 1993). 123 Di Teodoro 2017. 124 Probably in Cyprus and southern Anatolia. 125 Altenmüller 2015: 67, 116. 126 See Wilkinson 2000: 141, 235. 127 See Gundlach 1994: 70–94; see also Schneider 2010: 149. 128 The figure in the Annals of Amenemhat II may not be far off, yet the evidence suggests that the exploitation of foreign labour power took place over longer periods and on a regular basis during the New Kingdom.

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upon judging to what extent foreign labour complemented or simply replaced local workers resulting in greater leisure and wealth for the higher echelons of Egyptian society – the real degree to which foreign labour had a positive impact on economic growth for the Egyptian state. What is clear, though, in any case, is that Egypt profited politically from an influx of foreign labour, albeit primarily in the short term. Ultimately, the exploitation of foreign labour very likely contributed129 to the rise of Egypt as a regional great power – an instance which cannot be considered singular in global history. Any positive economic growth of Egypt during the LBA may have been the consequence of the redistribution of people and resources from neighbouring societies to Egypt and other parts of the empire through dispossessing Egypt’s neighbours – generating positive economic growth relative to – and at the expense of – other players in the region in the sense of a zero-sum game. The effects of Egyptian policies established during the fifteenth century BCE may have accumulated over generations, decisively altered the demographic composition, and weakened Levantine societies in particular to a certain extent. Thus, the cultural ‘glory’ and economic prosperity of Egypt might have been bought with foreign labour and suffering.130 This realization could also mean an opening to integrate ancient Egypt with universalist research into slavery.131 Eventually, it may also be worth raising the question if and to what extent Egyptian policies in the southern Levant may have contributed to the so-called ‘collapse’ of Bronze Age civilisation in the sense that local communities may have been weakened to the point that they were less able to cope with whatever challenges they were facing, and to what degree these may have enabled Egypt to weather the storm. Judging by Eric Cline’s survey and discussion of possible causes and contributors to the LBA collapse,132 demography seems to have been absent from debate.133 Note that a recent study by Jesse Millek concludes that there was no rapid wholesale transition at the end of the LBA but rather a series of regional transitions, which may well have been multifaceted.134 On the other hand, the relatively large influx of foreign workers into Egypt could have contributed to the eventual decline of the imperial structures and the takeover by the Libyans at the onset of the Third Intermediate Period (ca. 1069–750 BCE). Further analyses of the data sets may provide further insights and make possible the development of more detailed explanations.

129 See

Panagiotopoulos 2006: 402. reflecting Mario Liverani’s more general considerations that “[i]n terms of demography and production, it is clear that war is convenient to the winner and detrimental to the loser. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the effects of war over people and lands from both sides and evaluate whether its immediate negative impact is compensated through time and contributes to the overall progress of the defeated community” (Liverani 2014: 23–24). 131 Most prominently Zeuske 2019. 132 Cline 2014: 139–170. 133 More recently, Sarah C. Murray advocated factoring demographic approaches into debates on the decline of the Greek trade economy between the LBA and the Early Iron Age, and proposed a population decline of 40–60 per cent during the collapse of the Mycenaean Bronze Age society between the late thirteenth and late eleventh/tenth centuries BCE (Murray 2017: 210–211, 237). 134 See Millek 2019. 130 Possibly

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Alain Bresson (University of Chicago), Juan Carlos Moreno García (CNRS/Université Paris-Sorbonne Paris IV), Stephen Quirke (University College London), and David Warburton (NENU) for their useful comments. This paper was primarily written during my time as a Visiting Research Student at the Institute of Archaeology of University College London during the academic year 2016/17 as part of the Erasmus+ programme of the European Commission.

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Smith, V. E. 2010. Modeling the Mechanics of Temple Production in the Middle Kingdom: An Investigation of the Shena of Divine Offerings Adjacent to the Mortuary Temple of Senwosret III at Abydos, Egypt, Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations: Paper 190, Available from http:// repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/190/ [accessed 04 January 2020]. Spalinger, A. J. 1996. “From Local to Global: The Extension of an Egyptian Bureaucratic Term to the Empire,” Studien zur Altägyptischen Kultur 23: 353–376. Spalinger, A. J. 2005. War in Ancient Egypt: The New Kingdom. Malden - Oxford - Carlton: Blackwell. Ancient World at War. Spalinger, A. J. 2006. “Covetous Eyes South: The Background of Egypt’s Domination over Nubia by the Reign of Thutmose III,” in E. H. Cline & D. O’Connor (eds.), Thutmose III. A New Biography (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press), pp. 344–369. Di Teodoro, M. 2018. Labour Organisation in Middle Kingdom Egypt. London: Golden House Publications. Middle Kingdom Studies 7. Warburton, D. 2001. Egypt and the Near East: Politics in the Bronze Age. Neuchâtel: Recherches et Publications. Civilisations du Proche-Orient Serie IV. Histoire – Essais 1. Warburton, D. 2016. The Fundamentals of Economics: Lessons from the Bronze Age Near East. Neuchâtel: Recherches et Publications. Civilisations du Proche-Orient Serie IV. Histoire – Essais 3. Warburton, D. 2019. “Un(der)employment in Bronze Age Egypt: Anachronism or Insight?” Journal of Egyptian History 12: 137–258. Wente, E. F. 1990. Letters from Ancient Egypt. Atlanta: Scholars Press. Writings from the Ancient World 1. Wilkinson, T. A. H. 2000. Royal Annals of Ancient Egypt: The Palermo Stone and its Associated Fragments. London - New York: Kegan Paul International. Studies in Egyptology. Zeuske, M. 2019. Handbuch Geschichte der Sklaverei: Eine Globalgeschichte von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart. Berlin: De Gruyter (Second Edition).

SOME THOUGHTS ON ECONOMIC PROGRESS, INNOVATION AND GROWTH IN SOUTHERN MESOPOTAMIA Johannes RENGER Berlin

Among other questions, today’s economists are primarily interested in economic progress, technological innovation and growth. Growth serves them as a basic indicator of a rising GDP (Gross Domestic Product). For us, however, dealing with ancient and pre-modern economies especially the economy of Ancient Mesopotamia,1 the question is rather: can economic growth be detected in ancient economies at all? Did it perhaps exist and if it existed how could it be measured? And, was there an awareness of growth, a concern for growth? And if so, what were the preconditions and circumstances that could have generated, limited or hindered growth? This has so far not been the subject of discussion with respect to the economy of Ancient Mesopotamia. Also, the question of growth in Ancient Mesopotamia must be answered in a different way than that for classical antiquity for instance, for which I am not competent. Thus, this paper is restricted primarily to observations concerning the economy in the alluvial floodplain of Southern Mesopotamia from the fourth millennium BC onwards. For the long history of Ancient Mesopotamia, the most explicit and most detailed documentation for matters concerning this paper is to be found in several thousand administrative records from the Ur III period (i.e., the time of the Third Dynasty of Ur [2112–2004 BC]). So far, more than 95,000 administrative and legal documents have been published, many more still await publication.2 No similar and exhaustive documentation pertaining to questions dealt with in this paper is to be found in texts from other periods of Mesopotamian history. Relevant documents from the Ur III period of interest for this paper deal with the management of large agricultural domains of between fifty and two-hundred hectares each. In several documents these individual domains are summed up as ranging between two-hundred and five-hundred square kilometres in aggregate. Some of the documents state the anticipated annual yield of barley from areas between two- and five-hundred

1 For

a general overview concerning Mesopotamian economy and agricultural regimes see Renger 1995; Renger 2007; Renger 2016; Wiggerman 2011; for the history of Ancient Mesopotamia see Nissen 2012; Veenhof 2001. 2 According to Molina http://bdtns.filol.csic.es/index.php?p=about&anc=figures#figures. He estimates at least 25,000 more unpublished administrative texts, not counting an unspecified number in the Iraq Museum in Baghdad (pers. comm. Manuel Molina).

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square kilometres in amounts of between 18,000 and 21,000 metric tons – even considering fractions of one kilogram. In one of these documents anticipated and actual annual yields are compared over a period of three years.3 We know the daily barley-rations distributed for a single worker permitting demographic calculations on the basis of the available annual yield of barley. Other documents register the number of people employed in agricultural work or of plough-oxen needed to work a given area or the required workquota of the workers in institutional households.4 Such detailed documentation enables general conclusions. The position taken in this paper is that in Ancient Mesopotamia economic growth did not exist in a measurable way in a longue durée, whether growth is measurable over many centuries or over the four millennia of Mesopotamian history. Certainly, there existed periods with a strong state and a prosperous economy followed by periods of decline and succeeded again by periods of political and economic rebirth. For instance, the changing political system in Babylonia after the end of the Third Dynasty of Ur with a different regime of land tenure in the Old Babylonian period resulted in lower agricultural productivity. The same seems to be the case when at the end of the reign of Samsuiluna (1749–1712 BC) Southern Babylonia fell into disarray under the still enigmatic Sealand Dynasty (until 1415 BC). Other examples come to mind easily. Once the basic breakthroughs in metallurgy and ceramic techniques (e.g., mass production of vessels using the potter’s wheel/tournette) as well as in agricultural skills were achieved during the fourth millennium no further substantial developments can be observed for the following periods of Mesopotamian history. For ancient Egypt, M. Gutgesell points out that after the third millennium, tools remained simple; there was no significant development until the Greek conquest, no measurable change.5 The same is true for Ancient Mesopotamia. The economy of the institutional households in Southern Mesopotamia took on more complex dimensions from the middle of the fourth millennium onwards – as can be seen mainly in the archaeological and written evidence from Uruk (ca. 3200 BC), one of the oldest urban centres of Southern Mesopotamia. The need for an effective handling of a great variety of economic and administrative activities in large institutional households resulted in adequate administrative procedures. They became more sophisticated as time went on and were enhanced by the invention of a writing system to accommodate the needs of a complex administrative system serving large economic units (i.e., institutional households, including large agricultural domains). The early written evidence from Uruk also shows the implementation of a sophisticated system for measuring surface-areas, staple goods by volume and handling large numbers of objects and of people and their calculated work quotas using advanced mathematical procedures. The institutional personnel management was usually organised in a three-tier hierarchy. The deployment of labour was gradually implemented during the fourth millennium. Along with an unskilled labour force, there existed a large body of specialist personnel with professional skills.

3 Thureau-Dangin

1903: RTC 407. 2013: 269 text no. 5; Englund 1991: esp. 279–280. 5 Gutgesell 1984: 201–202. 4 Grégoire

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As there was no technological advancement after the fourth millennium in Ancient Mesopotamia the question arises why inventions or innovations of substance did not take place. Thus, why was there no further technological advancement that could have resulted in economic growth? In an economy like that of Ancient Mesopotamia, growth was only possible through an increased deployment of manpower (integration of nomadic influx or use of captives of war) or by advanced technology as an engine for sustained growth as argued by Joseph Schumpeter in 1934,6 that could have resulted in higher productivity which did not, however, occur in Ancient Mesopotamia in a longue durée. I prefer to connect growth not with the volume of circulating silver – as advocated by Steinkeller for the Old Akkadian and Ur III periods (second half of third millennium)7 – because silver is elusive, has a tendency to be hoarded, particularly when it was accumulated in institutional households like the palaces or temples.8 There – when not hoarded – it was used for ostentatious consumption or purposes of prestige. We have no indication of silver invested for productive ends which could have generated lasting growth. One must also consider the degree to which amounts of silver mentioned in administrative documents only served as a means of indicating the value of objects or transactions. Instead, I see the question of growth as being dependent on demographic circumstances. In an agrarian society, the population level depends on the productive size of agricultural land and its regular annual yield. In the alluvial floodplain of Southern Mesopotamia the cultivable land was limited in size.9 Its potential annual yield was sufficient to provide a livelihood for only a restricted number of people. There exists no indication of supplementary deliveries from outside.10 Therefore the population level remained at the level defined by the actual annual yield. The general annual yield rate in the alluvial floodplain of Southern Mesopotamia remained more or less the same over centuries as we know from administrative documents from the end of the third through the first millennium. Thus, neither demographic nor economic growth can be observed. As the well-known data of European and classical history indicate, the population level in Europe remained very low until the end of the 18th century. As for economic growth – the GDP per capita also remained steady at a low level for the time from 200 BC until around 1800 AD.11 As we are dealing with an agrarian society, agricultural production and productivity were the mainstays of the Ancient Mesopotamian economy based on artificial irrigation in

6 Quoted

from Saller 2002: 261. (this volume); see also Paoletti 2008. 8 Paoletti 2008: 157f. 9 The alluvial floodplain is bordered in the West by the Syro-Arabian steppe and in the East by the Tigris riverbed which in part lies lower than the floodplain (Butz 1983: 475–476). Thus, the plain is irrigated mostly by the Euphrates river-system. It stretches for approximately 275–300 km with a width between 50 and 75 km from the area north of Sippar down to the marshes of lower Mesopotamia: see Prinz 1913; Potts 2010: 271–292; Renger 2018: 575–584. 10 Credible Sumerian historical tradition has it that Ibbisin (2028–2004 BC), the last ruler of the Third Dynasty of Ur, begged Ishbi’erra, his “governor” of Isin farther north – and rival for supremacy over Mesopotamia – to support him with deliveries of grain at a time of dire famine caused by severe salinization in the Sumerian south (Nissen 2012: 90; Veenhof 2001: 77). 11 Saller 2002: 259 fig. 12.1; citing R. E. Lucas Jr., “The Industrial Revolution: Past and Future,” University of Chicago working paper, 1998. 7 Steinkeller

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contrast to the northern regions of Mesopotamia dependent on rainfed agriculture. The productive basis of the economy in Southern Mesopotamia was cereal agriculture, together with datepalm cultivation (including “multi-storey” cultivation of fruittrees and vegetables on the same parcel of land) and animal husbandry of sheep, goat and cattle. The importance of barley and wool as crucial (natural) resources for the economy of Ancient Mesopotamia is verbalised in a Sumerian literary work originating in the Ur III period: The disputation between “The Ewe and the Grain Goddess Ashnan”.12 Barley, the basic grain in Mesopotamia, is regarded as the most important agricultural product that sustained the population. Considered of equal importance are the large herds of sheep delivering the wool which in turn served as the basis for Mesopotamia’s flourishing textile production. Wool from sheep was the prerequisite for the production of textiles of extraordinarily high quality in large workshops (ergasteria) each employing several thousand persons, mostly women.13 The products of textile ergasteria were essential for obtaining strategic goods such as metals through long distance trade with the outside world. And we possess good evidence that in the third millennium and later imports of copper and tin and exports of textiles were directly related. Quite early in history, agriculture in the alluvial floodplain of Southern Mesopotamia was operating on a highly sophisticated level with agrarian techniques developed since the late fourth and the beginning of the third millennium and best documented in administrative records of the Ur III period (21st century) having refined their possibilities to a maximum – such as (1) arranging a distance between seed-furrows of ca. 50–75 cm,14 (2) for placing individual seeds in the top of the furrows about every three centimetres from each other for optimal growing conditions, therefore (3), the amount of seed per bùr (= 6.35 ha) was rather low, i.e. nearly 48 kg/ha according to administrative documents from Girsu, an important urban centre in the southeast of Mesopotamia (21st century), thus producing a very high yield,15 (4) using the seeder-plough drawn by teams of three oxen specifically trained for this particular task,16 (5) irrigating the fields only three (or four) times during the growing season to minimize the hazards of salinization as far as possible.17 As a result, the ratio between seed and yield ranged between 1:16 and 1:20 and sometimes even higher, that is 1:30.18 In classical Attica it was 1:7, in fertile Roman Apulia 1:10, in some places in medieval Germany only 1:3. The extraordinarily high yield rate in Southern

12 Black

1998. 1972. 14 Pettinato & Waetzoldt 1975. 15 See RTC 407 (in [Thureau-Dangin 1903) and BM 18060 for which see Grégoire 2013: 268 with footnotes 7 and 8. According to J.P. Grégoire (pers. comm.) the amount of seed grain planted depends on the number of furrows in a given area and varies from place to place (Girsu, Umma, Nippur, Drehem) at between 38 sìla/ha (= 19 kg/ha) and ca. 51 sìla/ha (= 25.7 kg/ha) with some, exceptional, higher ratios (e.g., Salonen 1968: 253–254 ad HSS 4, 28 ii 2–3: ca. 77 sìla/ha [= 39 kg/ha]). See also Civil 1994: 82 referring to the Sumerian literary text the “Farmer’s Instructions”, lines 46, 50–51: 240 sìla seed grain/bùr = 19 kg/ha which is extremely low! 16 Renger 1990b. 17 Civil 1994: 30–31, lines 64–73 and p. 88 ad lines 67–68; Nissen 2012: 88, 199. 18 Grégoire 2013: 269 and 291 ad RTC 407. 13 Waetzoldt

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Mesopotamia may well be the reason for the lack of a need to produce more, and thus also inhibiting any motivation for further agrarian advancement aimed at attaining a higher degree of productivity in cereal agriculture. Several administrative documents from the Ur III period pertaining to agricultural domains – their aggregate sizes ranging from 238 km2 to 522 km2 – state their annual yield.19 The rate of yield ranges from 18 gur (= 5,400 sìla = 4,536 litres = 2,721.6 kg)/bùr = ca. 425 kg/ha) to 30 gur (9,000 sìla = 7,560 litres = 4,536 kg)/bùr = ca. 700 kg/ha).20 In one of these documents,21 the harvest expected from an area of 4,135 bùr (= 26,258 ha = 262 km2) is given as 37,210,499 sìla (= 31,256,819 litres) = 124,035 gur (= 18,754,091 kg = 18,754 metric tons).22 The yield rate according to this document was 30 gur/bùr (= 4,530 kg = 713 kg/ha). From the documented yield approximately 30% were recorded for purposes such as seed grain, fodder for oxen, sheep and goat, and losses during storage etc.23 The remaining 70% would have sufficed for 36,190 annual rations à 720 sìla/person24 to provide the necessary nutritional requirements. Another way to calculate the nutritional requirements of a person or a group of persons is based on the size of cultivable land necessary to provide for their livelihood. According to Old Babylonian sources one bùr (= 6.35 ha; Code of Hammurapi § 58 and letters of king Hammurapi to his governor Šamaš-ḫazir at Larsa) was considered sufficient to nourish a family of about five persons.25 Other calculations are based on a required size between 1 ha and 1.5 ha per person.26 In Southern Mesopotamia agricultural production was determined by access to sufficient land suitable for agriculture in order to sustain the livelihood of a certain number of people. However, the output of agricultural production was limited by several factors: (1) It found its natural limits foremost in the inelastic stretches of arable land available in the alluvial floodplain of southern Mesopotamia defined by the Euphrates River with its canal-system developed over centuries by man, and (2) within those strict limits, the presence of fertile soil, accumulated over a long time. (3) To the West, the alluvial floodplain was defined by the topographical formations of desert and steppe adjacent to the alluvial floodplain, determined by isohypses and thus lying beyond the reach of irrigation canals. (4) To the East, the alluvial floodplain was bordered by the Tigris riverbed lying mostly lower than the Euphrates floodplain,27 and thus barely usable for irrigating fields in the Euphrates floodplain. Furthermore, (5) water available for irrigation from the Euphrates and its branches was at its lowest annual level during the growing season, that is from October until March when it was most needed. (6) A constant hazard for a flourishing cereal agriculture was the salinization of the cultivable land caused by evaporation of the 19 For

more details see Grégoire 2013: 268 for AfO 24, CT 7, TuT 5, RTC 407. 1975: 32 note 118. 21 Thureau-Dangin 1903: RTC 407. 22 See Grégoire 2013: 269. 23 See Adams 1981: 86 for total deductions of 30%; Grégoire 2013: 268 w/ n8 calculates 5% for seed grain. 24 Gelb 1965. 25 Cf. Richardson 2000: 62–63; Kraus 1968 [=AbB 4]: 2–3. [References added by DAW]. 26 Adams 1981: 87. 27 See Wirth 1962: 186–187; Heimpel 2014: 25–26 § 5; Renger 1990c; Renger 2018. 20 Nissen

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irrigation waters.28 (7) The marshes and lagoons of the extreme South could not be used as a source of water for irrigation. (8) Further restricting agricultural productivity was the competition for the use of the cultivable land in Southern Mesopotamia between animal husbandry (especially pasture for cattle) and cereal production. (9) Another factor is demographic in nature. Land is able to nourish only a certain number of people who in turn are available as the necessary labour force to guarantee the required productivity.29 Thus, agriculture in Mesopotamia operated under precarious conditions. Nevertheless, the exceptional results of Mesopotamian agriculture are an extraordinary cultural achievement that later astonished Herodotus. The limited area of arable land in the alluvial floodplain of Southern Mesopotamia was able to support only a certain number of people on the basis of a maximum productivity possible of between 20 and 30 gur/bùr (between 476 and 714 kg/ha) achieved in the Ur III period. Calculated on the basis of the annual rations provided or calculated by the size of land assigned for the sustenance of a family of about five persons and the totality of available cultivable land and its annual yield we have to reckon with a limited or stagnant population level that in turn had repercussions on the amount of manpower available to maintain the economic status quo: hardly enough to produce measurably higher economic growth over centuries. Some researchers refer to extraneous workers (in part non-sedentary people) or captives added occasionally to the native labour force. But they must still be nourished together with the resident native labour force through the agricultural product that could be obtained on the available arable land. We possess, however, insufficient quantifiable data to measure the impact of foreign workers or captives on productivity and possible growth. Relatively high productivity might have existed during part of the Old Akkadian Period (24th/23rd centuries), for instance, or during the century-long Ur III period (21st century). The reason being that agriculture was done quite effectively during the Ur III period on large plots of land many hectares in size which could be worked most efficiently by using seeder-ploughs with several teams of plough oxen.30 In the Ur III period, we are dealing with a redistributive oikos subsistence economy, which employs more or less the majority of the population. All people in the system were provided for their livelihood by daily rations on the level of subsistence requirements.31 But, as the evidence from the following Old Babylonian period indicates, the extraordinary prosperity of the Ur III period did not last. Already at its end signs of scarcity are quite obvious.32 For the Old Babylonian period (20th to 16th centuries) under a completely different land tenure regime, in comparison to that of the Ur III period, we have to do mainly with subsistence agriculture on small plots of land of approximately six hectares mostly tenant fields. Such tenant fields were worked largely by nuclear families, yielding just enough to feed a single family and to deliver parts of the yield as rent due to the palace and other 28 Nissen

2012: 88. 2018. 30 Renger 1990b. 31 Schrakamp 2013: 446–452. 32 Nissen 2012: 90. 29 Renger

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institutional households. These dues provided the palace and other institutions with the means necessary to fulfil their tasks and obligations towards society as a whole. Besides the demographic determinant several other factors indicated above were decisive to let economic growth remain at an or near a level of zero percent – the sign of a stagnant economy. In order to function, an economy depends on available sources of energy. The main sources of energy for agricultural work in an agrarian economy were human labour and animal power, the latter mainly provided by cattle. Cattle were crucial as draught animals for cereal agriculture on large domains (well documented, for instance, for the Old Akkadian and the Ur III periods, second half of third millennium – as noted at the start of my contribution). As for Ancient Mesopotamia, both human labour and animal power were only available in amounts just sufficient to support the economic status quo, but not adequate to enhance measurable growth. To use the existing labour force most effectively in the oikos-economy of the third millennium, workers were shifted from one deployment to another wherever labour was needed. Thus, workers could be mobilised for work on the irrigation system for digging canals and for dredging accumulated silt from canals, or for soil maintenance such as leaching and drainage of the fields, or the personnel of ergasteria producing textiles or grinding grain could be moved to seasonal agricultural work such as cleaning furrows from weeds or harvesting. They could also be mobilised for building projects such as the building of temples, palaces and fortifications. Essential for the manufacture of pottery, burnt bricks and for metallurgical processes was heat generated by burning shrubs, reeds, palm leaves and wood. Judging from the vast amounts of ceramic relics found in excavations, fuel was obviously available in abundance. In Mesopotamia, the power of flowing water was not used as a source of energy. Even the transport of goods by boats on the waterways needed human labour for towing. Technological breakthroughs like the waterwheel other mechanical inventions and wind driven devices are of a much later date.33 Besides sufficient energy input and demographic factors, the availability of, and the access to, natural resources are of fundamental importance for sustaining an economy. The essential natural resources for the agrarian economy of Southern Mesopotamia are cultivable fertile soil, and – in an arid region – water for artificial irrigation as well as a suitable climate. Mesopotamia was devoid of deposits of strategic goods such as copper or tin for producing bronze, quite aside from silver or even gold. Also timber for the shipyards and cedar beams for the roofing and doors of large buildings had – as reflected in the adventures of Gilgamesh as well in the inscriptions of Gudea of Lagash – to be obtained through long distance trade, in exchange for high-quality textiles produced in the ergasteria of Southern Mesopotamia.

33 For a general description and discussion concerning human and animal power, waterpower and fuel see Schneider 2007: 16–30. His treatment of the topic is, however, restricted to classical antiquity, and the situation of the Ancient Near East not considered.

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Of the natural resources readily available clay was the most important – not only for the writing tablets which have saved Mesopotamian civilisation from oblivion, but also for vessels of pottery, for the fired and sundried bricks used as building material for ordinary houses, ostentatious buildings such as palaces, temples and ziqqurats, and also for fortifications and city walls. The enormous city wall of Uruk (with a circumference of about 9 km) found its literary recognition in the tale about Gilgamesh recalled as the “ancient work of Gilgamesh” in an Old Babylonian inscription of Anam, king of Uruk (18th century).34 Another natural resource abundantly available and used for many purposes was reed: for domestic purposes such as baskets and other containers, mats, for the covering of roofs, for making fences, houses, some kinds of boats. Palm leaves and other by-products of date palm cultivation were used for making huts, boats, sturdy cables etc. Both also served as fuel. Important for the nutrition of the populace were also fish and fowl, plentifully available in the rivers, canals, lagoons and marshes of Southern Mesopotamia. Natural disasters such as flooding were supplemented by man-induced factors such as salinization of the arable land. Due to the evaporation of the irrigation waters of the Euphrates which were heavily charged with mineral salts, the arable land remained in a perpetually precarious situation even when the soil was drained or leached. Also, times of crisis induced by bad harvests causing severe periods of famine or widespread diseases or epidemics were not uncommon in ancient and preindustrial societies. A climatic change around 1200 BC, accompanied by an intruding non-sedentary population and the disastrous effects of warfare constituted further impediments to prosperity and economic growth. Finally – a word about those participating and determining economic processes, their economic and social behaviour. How did the homo oeconomicus antiquitatis of Ancient Mesopotamia understand his economic life? How did he react to economic facts? What were the driving forces of his economic undertakings? Were people stimulated by a drive to maximize gain and economic growth? For the majority of the population – living as an agrarian population – was the drive to have their subsistence needs fulfilled either by daily rations provided for their mandatory service for institutional households or – where possible – either as owners of small plots of arable land or as tenants of institutional households, just sufficient to nourish a rural family. Thus, in the rural sphere, at the subsistence level, there was no room to accumulate a surplus or riches for investing for a higher productivity thus generating growth. Moreover, most people were just able to sustain their livelihood from one year to the next as numerous consumptive borrowings and growing cases of personal indebtedness, especially documented for the Old Babylonian period, indicate.35 Custom and traditional solidarity determined social and economic behaviour.36 Traditional solidarity took place on a local, neighbourly level by assisting each other with needed goods and services in small amounts, without considering value. Such behaviour is certainly different from a profit orientation as an

34 Frayne

1990: 474–475. 1994: 196–197. 36 Renger 1990a. 35 Renger

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engine for growth. Thus, traditional solidarity can hardly be seen as part of market exchange, a market process. Because, if so, we would extend market exchange way back into Neolithic times. Therefore, the question of how to define market (exchange) should be (re)considered. Exchange under the rules of traditional solidarity is completely different from (neo)classical market exchange. On a higher level, an official in an institutional household was primarily concerned with the task of meeting his duties, of fulfilling his prescribed quota for which he was held accountable.37 By doing well he expected to gain favour from his superiors. This was his motivation.38 But his personal prestige also played an important role as motivation – but not material gain.39 A paradox of the Mesopotamian economy is the fact that a substantial productive surplus was appropriated by the state and its institutions. It was not used for the generation of economic growth, for productive “investments”40 but was transformed into goods for long distance trade, mainly textiles of high quality, which in turn provided strategic goods and luxury objects that served prestigious or ostentatious consumption of the elite, of the state and its institutions, that is – for instance – for ambitious building projects. Remarkable are references in inscriptions of the Assyrian kings Sargon II (end of 8th century) and Assurbanipal, one of his successors (7th century),41 both boasting – after a tremendous inflow of booty following successful military campaigns – that barley could now be acquired by everyone for a weighed amount of silver which before could be had with the same amount of weighed copper. In modern terms we would interpret this as inflation. Booty was not used for investment for higher productivity and thus generation of growth, but rather for generosity, prestige and ostentatious consumption. The Neo-Assyrian state (10th to 7th centuries) is characterised for its sumptuous endeavours serving prestige and ostentatious consumption. It could only be afforded through constant incoming booty through warfare. The booty obviously did not generate higher productivity as the prerequisite for growth. Once the entire Near East was conquered by the Neo-Assyrian state there existed no further regions from which booty could be taken. The result was the collapse of the Neo-Assyrian empire.42 Thus, the perception of the economy in Ancient Mesopotamia is best expressed in a Sumerian proverbial riddle of the third millennium:

37 Englund

1991. the same situation for economic motivation in Ancient Egypt see Gutgesell 1984, 204–205. The controlling official had to fulfill a given quota – he tried to deliver more than was demanded in order to receive favour in the eyes of higher authorities or the pharaoh. 39 Veblen 1899; Morenz 1969. 40 Renger 1994: 198 and Bogaert 1986: 18–19 w/ n29. 41 Renger 1984: 97–98 and Renger 1995: 299. For the inscriptions of Sargon II see Fuchs 1994: 130–131 and 325 lines 233–234; also Frame 2021: 71, 232–233; for Assurbanipal see Borger 1996: 67 § 77 lines 48–52 and p. 248: “In the middle of my land one acquires at the ‘gate for receivable goods’ camels for one or (even) for half a shekel silver. The ale wife for a serving (of beer), the brewer for a vat (of beer), the gardener for a bunch of vegetables – regularly now they accept camels and (captured) people (as equivalents).” 42 Two inconclusive articles, since they are concerned with regions of rainfed agriculture, are dealing with the breakdown of the Neo-Assyrian state at the end of the 7th century BC see Schneider et al. 2014 and Sołtysiak 2016. 38 For

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Where is there income, but nobody becomes rich(er)? Where are there expenditures but they do not come to an end? (The solution of this riddle is) The royal property.43

In conclusion I would say that quite early in Mesopotamian history the economy attained an extremely high level of productivity on the basis of initial breakthroughs in metallurgy, ceramic techniques and sophisticated agrarian skills, a highly complex economic and managerial system with structures, processes and mechanisms that persisted until the first millennium. Nevertheless, it remains – for a number of reasons that I have named – a stagnant economy, an economy without further growth and technological advancement after its early incipit. Its productive surplus was not used to generate higher productivity and thus economic growth, but served instead ostentatious endeavours and purposes of prestige. BIBLIOGRAPHY For the technical abbreviations, see: ETCSL = Electronic Text Corpus of Sumerian Literature. Adams, R. McC. 1981. Heartland of Cities. Surveys of Ancient Cities and Land Use in the Central Floodplain of the Euphrates. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Black, J. A., G. Cunningham, E. Fluckiger-Hawker, E. Robson & G. Zólyomi. 1998–, The Electronic Text Corpus of Sumerian Literature (http://www-etcsl.orient.ox.ac.uk/). Oxford. Bogaert, R. 1986. Grundzüge des Bankwesens im Alten Griechenland. Constance: Universitätsverlag Konstanz. Xenia 18. Borger, R. 1996. Beiträge zum Inschriftenwerk Assurbanipals. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. Butz, K. 1980–1983. “Landwirtschaft,” in Reallexikon der Assyriologie 6: 471–486. Civil, M. 1994. The Farmer’s Instructions. A Sumerian Agricultural Manual. Barcelona: Editorial Ausa. Aula Orientalis Supplements 5. Civil, M. 2004. The series DIRI = (w)atru. Rome: Pontificium Institutum Biblicum. Materials for the Sumerian Lexicon XV. Englund, R. K. 1991. “Hard Work – Where Will It Get You? Labor Management in Ur III Mesopotamia,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 50: 255–280. Frame, G. 2021. The Royal Inscriptions of Sargon II, King of Assyria (721-705 BC). Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns. Frayne, D. 1990. The Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia. The Early Periods. The Old Babylonian Period (2003-1595 BC). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Fuchs, A. 1994. Die Inschriften Sargons II. aus Khorsabad. Göttingen: Cuvilier Verlag. Gelb, I. J. 1965. “The Ancient Mesopotamian Ration System,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 24: 230–243. Grégoire, J.-P. 2013. “Le système après-récolte dans l’hydro-agriculture mésopotamienne à la fin du IIIe millénaire avant notre ère,” in M. Molina & St. Garfinkle (eds.), From the 21st century B.C.

43 Civil

2004: Diri V 183–184.

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to the 21st century A.D. (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns; Proceedings of the International Conference on Sumerian Studies Held in Madrid 22–23 July 2010), pp. 267–300. Gutgesell, M. 1994. “Wirtschaft, Landwirtschaft und Handwerk,” in A. Eggebrecht (ed.), Das Alte Ägypten. 3000 Jahre Geschichte und Kultur des Pharaonenreiches (Munich: Bertelsmann), pp. 197–226. Heimpel, W. 2014–2016. “Tigris,” in Reallexikon der Assyriologie 14: 24–28. Kraus, F. R. 1968. Briefe aus dem Archive des Šamaš-ḫāzir. Leiden: Brill. Altbabylonische Briefe in Umschrift und Übersetzung 4. Morenz, S. 1969. Prestigewirtschaft im Alten Ägypten. Munich: Verlag Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Nissen, H. J. 1975. “Geography,” in T. J. Lieberman (ed.), Sumerological Studies in Honor of Thorkhild Jacobsen on his Seventeenth Birthday, June 7, 1974 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Assyriological Studies 20), pp. 9–40. Nissen, H. J. 2012. Geschichte Altvorderasiens. Munich: Oldenburg Verlag. Paoletti, P. 2008. “Elusive Silver? Evidence for the Circulation of Silver in the Ur III State,” Kaskal (Rivista di Storia Ambienti e Culture del Vicino Oriente Antico) 5: 127–158. Pettinato, G. & H. Waetzoldt. 1975. “Saatgut und Furchenabstand beim Getreideanbau,” in I. Kärki (ed.), Festschrift Armas Salonen (Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakademia; Studia Orientalis Fennica 46), pp. 77–82. Potts, D. T. 2010. “Size of the Cultivable area of the Mesopotamian Alluvium as an Historical and Politico-Empirical Problem,” in G. Selz & K. Wagensonner (eds.), The Empirical Dimensions of Ancient Near Eastern Studies. Die empirischen Dimensionen altorientalischer Forschungen (Vienna: LIT; Wiener Offene Orientalistik 6), pp. 271–292. Prinz, H. 1913. “Babyloniens Landwirtschaft einst und jetzt,” Zeitschrift für allgemeine und spezielle Weltwirtschaftslehre 8/1: 2–28, Plan, Tf. I–V. Renger, J. 1984. “Patterns of Non-Institutional Trade and Non-Commercial Exchange in Ancient Mesopotamia at the beginning of the Second Millennium B.C.”, in A. Archi (ed.), Circulation of Goods in Non-Palatial Context in the Ancient Near East (Roma: Edizioni dell’Ateneo; Incunabula Graeca 82), pp. 31–123. Renger, J. 1990a. “Different Economic Spheres in Mesopotamia – Traditional Solidarity, Redistribution and Market Economies as a Means of Access to the Necessities of Life,” in E. Aerts & H. Klengel (eds.), The Town as Regional Economic Center in the Ancient Near East (Leiden: Brill; Studies in Social and Economic History 20), pp. 20–28. Renger, J. 1990b. “Report on the Employing Draught Animals,” Bulletin on Sumerian Agriculture 5: 267–279. Renger, J. 1990c. “Rivers, Water Courses and Irrigation Ditches and Other Matters Concerning Irrigation Based on Old Babylonian Sources (2000–1600 B.C.),” in N. Postgate (ed.), Irrigation and Cultivation in Mesopotamia Part II (= Bulletin on Sumerian Agriculture 5), pp. 31–46. Renger, J. 1994. “On Economic Structures in Ancient Mesopotamia”, Orientalia NS 63: 157–208. Renger, J. 1995. “Institutional, Communal, and Individual Ownership or Possession of Arable Land in Ancient Mesopotamia from the End of the Fourth to the End of the First Millennium B.C.,” Chicago Kent Law Review 71: 269–319. Renger, J. 2007. “Economy of Ancient Mesopotamia – A general outline,” in G. Leick (ed.), The Babylonian World (London: Routledge), pp. 187–189.

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Renger, J. 2016. “Weber – Polanyi – Sraffa. Considerations Concerning Modes of Production,” in G. Bartoloni & M. G. Biga in collaboration with A. Bramanti (eds.), Not Only History: Proceedings of the Conference in Honor of Mario Liverani: Roma, Dipartimento di Scienza dell’Antichità, 20–21 April 2009 (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns), pp. 16–33. Renger, J. 2018. “How Many People per Hectare? – Überlegungen zur Demographie im alluvialen Mesopotamien,” in S. Paulus, K. Kleber & G. Neumann (eds.), Grenzüberschreitungen. Studien zur Kulturgeschichte des Alten Orients. Festschrift für Hans Neumann anlässlich seines 65. Geburtstages am 9. Mai 2018 (Münster: Zaphon Verlag; dubsar 5), pp. 575–584. Renger, J. 2019. “Gedanken zur Frage von Innovationen und Wachstum,” in H. Neumann & D. Prechel (eds.), Beiträge zur Kenntnis und Deutung altorientalischer Archivalien. Festschrift für Helmut Freydank zum 80. Geburtstag (Münster: Zaphon Verlag; dubsar 6), pp. 247–255. Richardson, M. E. J. 2000. Hammurabi’s Laws: Text, Translation and Glossary. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press. Sallaberger, W. & A. Westenholz. 2011. Mesopotamien. Akkade-Zeit und Ur III-Zeit. Freiburg Göttingen: Universitätsverlag Freiburg - Vandenhoek & Ruprecht. Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 160/3. Saller, R. 2002. “Framing the Debate over Growth in the Ancient Economy,” in W. Scheidel & S. von Reden (eds.), The Ancient Economy (London: Routledge), pp. 251–269. Salonen, A. 1968. Agricultura Mesopotamica nach sumerisch-akkadischen Quellen. Eine lexikalische und kulturgeschichtliche Untersuchung. Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakademia. Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennica, Series B 149. Schneider, A. W. & S. F. Adali. 2014. “No harvest reaped”: Demographic and climatic factors in the Ancient Near East. Lanham MD: Altamira Press. Schneider, H. 2007. Geschichte der antiken Technik. Munich: C. H. Beck. Schrakamp, I. 2013. “Die ‚Sumerische Tempelstadt‘ heute. Die sozioökonomische Rolle eines Tempels in frühdynastischer Zeit,” in A. Otto et al. (eds.), Tempel im Alten Orient (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag; 7. Internationales Symposium der Deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft 2009), pp. 445–460. Sołtysiak, A. 2016. “Drought and the fall of Assyria: quite another story,” Climatic Change 136: 389–394. Steinkeller, P. 2021. “The Sargonic and Ur III Empires,” in P. Fibiger Bang, C. A. Bayly & W. Scheidel (eds.), The Oxford World History of Empires (New York: Oxford University Press), II: 43–72. Thureau-Dangin, F. 1903. Recueil de tablettes chaldéennes. Paris: Geuthner. Veblen, Th. 1899. Theory of the Leisure Class – An Economic Study of Institutions. New York: Macmillan. Veenhof, K. R. 2001. Geschichte des Alten Orients bis zur Zeit Alexanders des Großen. Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht. Das Alte Testament Deutsch. Ergänzungsband vol. 11. Waetzoldt, H. 1972. Untersuchungen zur neusumerischen Textilindustrie. Rome: Centro per le Antichità e la Storia dell’Arte del Vicino Oriente, Roma; Studi economici e tecnologici I. Wiggerman, F. A. M. 2011. “Agriculture as Civilisation: Sages, Farmers, and Barbarians,” in K. Radner & E. Robson (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Cuneiform Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 663–689. Wirth, E. 1962. Agrargeographie des Irak. Hamburg: Selbstverlag des Instituts für Geographie und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Universität Hamburg; Hamburger Geographische Studien 13.

ECONOMIC GROWTH IN EARLY MESOPOTAMIA: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND SOME SPECIFIC EXAMPLES Piotr STEINKELLER Harvard University

1. GENERAL THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS This paper investigates the question of economic growth during the earliest phases of Mesopotamian history. The geographical area I will be concerned with is the southern section of modern Iraq, roughly the region extending from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf, which historically was known as Babylonia. My timeframe is the last few centuries of the fourth millennium down to the end of the third millennium BC. The position of modern economics on the existence of economic growth in antiquity is simple and unequivocal. As uniformly maintained by economic historians, there was no economic growth in ancient times; if there was any growth, it was so negligible as to be insignificant economically. On this view, all the detectable growth in the world economy occurred during the last two centuries, since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution down to the present day. It will be sufficient to cite just two examples of this position. Having described the characteristics of modern economic growth, the well-known economist J. Bradford DeLong, an author of numerous studies on the economic history of pre-modern Europe, and his colleague Martha L. Olney, conclude that: For most of human history, however, things have been very different. Since the invention of agriculture roughly 10,000 years ago (and, as far as we know, before that), economic progress was generally glacial or nonexistent. The transition to our modern era of growth took place about two centuries ago, with what is called the Industrial Revolution.1

In the same vein, John V. C. Nye, a professor of European economic history at George Mason University, opines that: When we read about the great civilizations of ancient Egypt and Rome or of the Aztecs and the Incas, we tend to compare them with the empires of Britain or the growth of the United States. This comparison, judged in economic terms, is highly misleading. Although the great civilizations in Egypt and Rome were able to construct big buildings, the vast majority of their citizens, by today’s standards, were dirt poor.2

1 DeLong

& Olney 2006: 120. 2015; cf. also Nordhaus 2016: 64: “For most of human history, economic progress moved at a crawl. According to the economic historian Bradford DeLong, from the first rock tools used by humanoids three million years ago, to the earliest cities ten thousand years ago, through the Middle Ages, to the beginning 2 Nye

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As to what “economic growth” is, the simplest definition is that it represents an increase in aggregate productivity. Significantly, however, theoretical economists define it primarily in terms of the standard of living. In simplest terms, the standard of living means personal income. Thus, in his magisterial study of economic growth in the US economy during the last 150 years, Robert J. Gordon offers the following definition of the standard of living: The most accessible definition of the standard of living is the ratio of the real GDP (that is, the total production of goods and services adjusted for price inflation) per member of the population, or “real GDP per person”).3

But this issue is significantly more complicated, since the indexes used to measure the standard of living, and, along with it, the economic growth, also include such factors as mortality rates, improvements in diet and medical care, quality of housing, and technological improvements and innovations, to name only the most important of them. To this list, one should also add population growth, which is often thought to be one of the main indicators of economic expansion. Many of these indexes are exceedingly difficult to measure, even in modern economies. Naturally, such a task becomes incomparably more difficult when attempted for ancient situations, where the factual information on economic life is either completely absent or dramatically less extensive. I suppose that most (if not all) of us – and here I am referring to this particular gathering – would agree that there was some degree of economic growth in the ancient Old World, at least during certain phases of its history. One may be even more assertive about the occurrence of extensive periods of sustained economic expansion. But such a conclusion is practically entirely intuitive. There is very little in terms of hard economic evidence, that is, data that may be scientifically measured and quantified, that may be offered in its support. 2. ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE CLASSICAL WORLD The view that there was no detectable economic growth in antiquity has recently been challenged by a number of scholars, who have argued to the contrary, referring specifically to the civilizations of Greece and Rome. In this communication, I focus on the work of two of them, Peter Temin, a retired professor of economics at MIT, who has written extensively on the economy of ancient Rome; and Josiah Ober, a historian of ancient Greece and classical political theorist, who currently teaches at Stanford.

of the Industrial Revolution around 1800, living standards doubled (with a growth of 0.00002 percent per year). Another doubling took place over the subsequent period to 1870. Then, according to standard calculations, the world economy took off.” 3 Gordon 2016: 8–9.

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In a book that appeared in 2013, Peter Temin argues passionately that ancient Rome had a market economy, which was characterized by a high rate of growth. Temin’s goal is an ambitious one: to produce a scientifically viable estimate of the Roman GDP. Temin acknowledges the scarcity of standard economic facts that such a project would normally require. Instead, he uses toward that end various types of proxy evidence. In my opinion, this part of Temin’s argumentation (which I cannot discuss because of the limits of space) is generally convincing. More questionable is his treatment of the question of labor, which he needs to consider in order to be able to calculate the total GDP. Here the main obstacle is slave labor, which, if one follows the traditional understanding of its nature and role in Roman economy, is impossible to quantify. To overcome this difficulty, Temin assumes, first, that Rome had “a functioning labor market and a unified labor force”).4 He then conveniently makes slave labor part of the unified labor force, which enables him to calculate its overall contribution to the economy. While Temin’s first proposition seems imminently feasible, I find his treatment of labor force impossible to accept. But, not being a classical historian myself, I should perhaps suspend my judgment. I leave this issue for the specialists to evaluate. A similar project, though not as far-reaching in its conclusions, has more recently been undertaken by Josiah Ober in reference to the economy of ancient Greece. The results of this project were presented by Ober in his 2015 book, which is entitled The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece. This work has received a good deal of attention and publicity, as reflected in the following headline: “Stanford scholar debunks long-held beliefs about economic growth in Ancient Greece”.5 It should be noted here that Ober’s book depends heavily on the earlier studies of this subject by Ian Morris, his colleague at Stanford.6 Ober’s book focuses on the Greek economy between 1000 and 300 BC. During that period, according to Ober, there occurred a very significant economic growth, which on occasion he even characterizes as “amazing”. Rather than using hard evidence (which is generally unavailable), Ober relies essentially on various types of proxy data. Among those are the archaeological and textual indicators of an increased population (such as the growing rate of urbanization, etc.), various kinds of institutional and technological innovations, the improved housing conditions, the lower transaction costs over time, and other indexes of higher per capita consumption. One such index, for example, is the observation that, in the hoards of Greek coins that were either excavated or found by looters, coins from the later periods predominate. This fact is taken by Ober as evidence of the increased volume of circulated coinage during the period under consideration. All in all, even though he does not demonstrate it through the use of hard data, I find Ober’s argument to be sound and generally convincing. Personally, I am quite willing to accept that, during the period in question, the Greek economy did experience a long period of sustained economic growth.

4 Temin

2013: 114. Report, June 11, 2015; http://news.stanford.edu. 6 Morris 2004; Morris 2005. 5 Stanford

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3. EPISODES

OF LIKELY ECONOMIC GROWTH IN

BABYLONIA BC

DURING LATE FOURTH AND THIRD MILLENNIA

Turning now to ancient Mesopotamia, by recourse to the types of indexes and reasoning used by Ober, it is possible, in my view, to identify several periods within the early history of Babylonia during which significant economic growth had likely occurred. I stress that the following suggestions and conclusions rest entirely on common-sense arguments, and, as such, are intuitive at best. As in the case of the ancient Greek economy, none of them can be supported with hard – that is, quantifiable – economic data that meet the standards of modern economics. 3.1. The Late Uruk Period (ca. 3400–3000 BC) The first such episode likely occurred in the Late Uruk period. This period was a time of momentous economic, social, and political transformations, as reflected in the appearance of monumental architecture, the enormous spatial expansion of the city of Uruk, and the shift to utilitarian, mass-produced pottery. These and other facts strongly indicate that the Late Uruk society experienced a kind of industrial revolution: the breakdown of extended family structures in the countryside, with rural population moving en masse into Uruk and becoming urbanized. These revolutionary changes undoubtedly were accompanied – or perhaps had even been directly caused – by a dramatic rise of Babylonia’s population. This was also the time when the so-called “Uruk Expansion” had reached its climax – or, more likely, was already in the process of contracting.7 This network of unmistakably Babylonian enclaves occupied practically the same territory that was later claimed by the Sargonic kings – from Anatolia and the Mediterranean coast in the west to the outer reaches of the Iranian Plateau in the east (see Fig. 8.1). As best as can be ascertained, the “Uruk Expansion” was a commercial phenomenon, a system of colonies established by Uruk and other Babylonian proto-city-states without recourse to military conquest. While emphatically not an empire, the “Uruk Expansion” was nevertheless significant historically, since it was apparently this development that was responsible for the establishment of trading patterns and commercial routes existing later in the very same region. Given its prominence in Late Uruk times, it is more than likely that international trade brought various benefits to Babylonia’s population – and here I do not mean only the elites – which may have led to a higher standard of living. However, I am unable to identify any particular areas in which this may have occurred. I also cannot offer any other evidence for the rise in economic growth beyond the point that the economy, especially the agriculture and textile industry, must have significantly expanded during this period.

7 For

this phenomenon, see most recently Algaze 2008: xiii–xvii, 68–73, with earlier literature.

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3.2. The Sargonic Period (ca. 2350–2200 BC) The second episode of probable economic growth occurred during the Sargonic period, ca. 2350–2200, and here we are on much more solid ground.8 The main event of that period was the creation of the first world empire, which, in its heyday, extended from the Mediterranean coast to the borders of Kerman in Iran (see Fig. 8.1). Its founder was Sargon of Akkade. Rather than a true territorial empire, the creation of Sargon and his successors was largely a commercial enterprise, whose primary objective was to control – and thereby to exploit economically – the main trade routes of the region. In this way, the Sargonic rulers created, through the linking of a number of subregional trading networks, the first great commercial highway of the Near East. Starting in Meluhha (the Indus Valley), this highway ran along the coast of the Persian Gulf via Makkan (Oman) and Tilmun (Bahrain) to southern Babylonia, continuing then along the Euphrates and then jumping all the way to the Mediterranean coast.9 Given the great importance of international trade in Sargonic times, one may conjecture that the commerce had contributed, at least in some measure, to a higher standard of living. But it is difficult to document this point with specific examples. One benefit that Babylonia derived from international trade was the introduction of sesame, which, during the subsequent period, became a major source of oil for the Babylonians. I discuss this issue in detail under my treatment of the Ur III economy. Another contribution of the Sargonic international trade pertains to silver. As I have recently argued,10 one of the significant developments of the Sargonic period, which bears directly on the questions of economic growth, was the increased availability of silver. In the preceding periods, silver was conspicuously rare in Babylonia. It is only with the advent of the Sargonic dynasty that we read of silver being used extensively in economic exchanges; one also finds more frequent mentions of luxury objects made of this metal. The likely explanation of this situation is that, sometime in Sargonic times, new extensive sources of silver had become available to Babylonian markets. Those sources quite likely were situated in Anatolia, which was one of the targets of the Sargonic territorial expansion. Silver trade with Anatolia, which, according to my scenario (and timeframe), had been put in place by Sargon and his followers, intensified during the following centuries, reaching its apex in Ur III times. I will return to this problem later, in my discussion of the Ur III economy. Yet another, but less direct index of economic growth may be provided by the comparison of the Pre-Sargonic weights and weighing practices with those of the Sargonic period. As convincingly argued by Sarah Clegg,11 prior to the Sargonic period one finds practically no instances of the use of the talent (Sumerian gun2, representing 60 minas = ca. 30 kg) as a measuring unit in economic sources. This situation changed dramatically in Sargonic times, when the talent unit became very common in economic accounts. The obvious

8 For

an outline of the history of the Sargonic empire, see Steinkeller 2020: 44–54. & Steinkeller 2017: 30–39. 10 Steinkeller 2016: 130–133. 11 Clegg 2017. 9 Laursen

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implication of this is that the economy had grown so much during Sargonic times that it became necessary to use larger measuring units in order to reflect more adequately and to deal more efficiently with the new economic conditions. One may be fairly confident that this period also witnessed significant population growth. However, I cannot think of any data, either textual or archaeological, that would support this contention directly. Finally, one may also think of certain Sargonic institutional innovations that might have contributed to an improved standard of living. But also here our data are too limited and fragmentary to allow any confident conclusions. Therefore, rather than engage in idle speculation, I move on to the case where our information is incomparably more extensive. 3.3. The Ur III Period (ca. 2100–2000 BC) The case I am referring to is the Ur III period.12 The kings of Ur, who ruled roughly one century after the demise of the dynasty of Sargon, were in many ways the continuators of the Sargonic experiment. They too created an empire (see Fig. 8.1), and their policies were governed by objectives similar to those of their Sargonic predecessors. In a nutshell, one might say that the Ur III empire was a smaller version – though at the same time much improved – of the Sargonic one: While abandoning the idea of large-scale foreign conquests, and settling instead for a compact, highly centralized native state with a ribbon of defensive periphery, the Ur III kings still aimed at political and economic domination of much of the territories previously impacted by the Sargonic expansion. Rather than by wars, those objectives were to be achieved by diplomacy and mutually beneficial economic exchanges with other powers. The result was an exquisitely designed self-limiting – and largely defensive – imperial strategy.13

As far as it can be ascertained, the main objective of this strategy was to secure for Babylonia direct access to the natural resources not available locally, and, much more importantly, to establish Babylonian domination over the key trade routes between east and west, all the way from the Iranian highlands to the Mediterranean. In the middle of the reign of Šulgi, the second king of Ur and the most important ruler of this dynasty, there began a period of reforms that were to affect every aspect of Babylonia’s political institutions and of its social and economic organization. As a result of these reforms, which took some ten years to complete, Babylonia was transformed into a highly centralized patrimonial state.14 One of the key reforms promulgated by Šulgi was the introduction of a uniform system of weights and measures, which was operative throughout the empire.15 Equally important

12 For

an outline of Ur III history, see Steinkeller 2020: 55–70. 2020: 61. 14 Steinkeller 1987; Steinkeller 2020: 57–59. 15 See gur dŠulgi / gur lugal, “the bushel of Šulgi / royal bushel” (passim in Ur III texts); the stone weights of ½, 2, and 5 minas, “established” (mu-na-gi-in) by Šulgi (Frayne 1997: 153–155, nos. 50–52). The epochal significance of this reform tends to be underappreciated by the students of ancient Mesopotamia. Apart from 13 Steinkeller

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for the functioning of a centralized national economy was the comprehensive reform of accounting methods, which led to the creation of new types of administrative records. Particularly important among those were the various types of estimating and forecasting instruments (such as the so-called “balanced account,” a precursor of the Florentine double-entry ledgers), which permitted the state to engage in highly advanced forms of economic prognostication.16 The precision of accounting and record-keeping was significantly enhanced by the concurrent adoption of a standard dating method. Starting with Šulgi’s reign, economic records (excluding letters) were nearly always dated by year and month, and very often by the day of the month as well.17 These domestic transformations were accompanied by a prolonged phase of foreign conquests, which effectively ended with Šulgi’s death. The extent of this territorial expansion was quite modest, being limited to a narrow belt that ran along Babylonia’s northern and eastern frontiers. The economic and political organization of Babylonia in Ur III times is a truly fascinating subject. Here I concentrate only on those aspects of this phenomenon that are significant for the questions of economic growth. Perhaps most importantly, the agricultural base was greatly expanded during this period. Massive new irrigation projects were carried out throughout Babylonia, as a result of which very extensive areas of new agricultural land were developed and put under cereal cultivation. Such projects were especially common in southern Babylonia, in the provinces of Umma and Girsu/Lagaš. There, huge numbers of people had been moved from other areas of Babylonia, as well as from its periphery, to till these new fields. Concomitantly, hundreds of new rural towns and villages were established throughout that region.18 A good case in point is a rural estate called E-Šu-Suen, which was established, during the reign of Šu-Suen, near Nippur, and settled with the prisoners from Šimanum, a locality to the northwest of Babylonia. We can be certain that similar developments also took place in northern Babylonia, though they were probably smaller in scope. New agricultural land was also developed in the conquered foreign territories, especially in the area of Susa in Khuzestan and the Diyala Region.19 These facts make it abundantly clear that the Ur III period witnessed very significant population growth, concomitant with an economic expansion, pushed by state policy. There were also various institutional innovations that may be identified as technological advances. This is assuming that one defines the word “technology” broadly, i.e., as a rational process of creating means to order and to transfer matter, energy, and information to realize certain valued ends (this is more or less the definition of “technology” by Jacques Solon of Athens, who appears to have standardized weights and measures in the beginning of the sixth century BC, the only other documented instance of such a reform belongs to the reign Qin Shi Huang, the unifier and the first emperor of China (259–210 BC) (Lewis 2007: 54). Significantly, most of European countries did not possess standard systems of weights and measures until the time of Napoleon. 16 Steinkeller 2004b. 17 The practice of using year-names as a dating method was introduced during the Sargonic period. However, such usage was highly erratic. Moreover, even when a record was provided with a year-name, no month or day was indicated in it. 18 Steinkeller 2013b: 356–358. 19 See Maekawa 2016 and my discussion below.

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Ellul).20 The most important of these innovations was the conversion of the entire free citizenry into a single body of royal dependents, who were alimented by the state with the allotments of agricultural land, and were subject to a uniform taxation system.21 This system, called bala (“rotation”) in Sumerian, imposed on all these individuals an obligation to supply corvée labor and various other forms of services (primarily, military service), as well as monetary contributions. While the bala system was typical of the core area of the Ur III state, an equivalent of it was created in the areas that had been annexed to the state as the so-called ma-da territory. There, the state established a system of semi-military settlements, whose residents were required to pay a tax in livestock (gun2 ma-da), its rate depending on the payer’s military rank.22 Another institutional innovation that likely contributed to the growth of the economy was the high level of economic specialization. It appears that cereal production was concentrated in southern Babylonia, where, as I noted earlier, most of the agricultural expansion had taken place. For the state to handle the bala taxes and the livestock contributions incoming from the periphery, an efficient collecting mechanism was required. To this end, toward the close of the third decade of Šulgi’s reign a huge complex of storage facilities, offices, and industrial units, called Puzriš-Dagan, was constructed in the neighborhood of Nippur, the religious capital of Babylonia.23 This localization was chosen due primarily to logistical considerations, since Nippur, lying on the border between Sumer and Akkad, represented Babylonia’s geographic midpoint, and therefore a perfect locus for a national collecting and re-distributive center. Concurrently, subsidiary branches of the Puzriš-Dagan operation were established at Ur, Uruk, Ešnuna, and also at Susa, the last being situated in the periphery. To facilitate the movement of goods and personnel, a highly efficient transportation system was put in place. This innovation involved the building of new roads and the establishment of an elaborate network of roadhouses.24 Most of transportation, however, was done over waterways, usually through the use of human boat-towers.25 For this purpose, the Ur III kings greatly expanded the existing canal system, making many of the canals fit for the towing of large boats and barges. This involved the laying down of towing paths and the building of bridges, which could additionally be used by human carriers and animal-drawn carts. Here it must be realized that, under pre-industrial conditions, the cost of water-born transportation was four to five time cheaper and more efficient than all forms of overland transport.26 As emphasized by Mark E. Lewis,

20 As

I am reminded by David Warburton, in his classic on economic development, Joseph A. Schumpeter too considered administrative innovations to be conductive to economic development, and, accordingly, he saw them as a contributory factor to economic growth. 21 Steinkeller 1987; Sharlach 2004. 22 Steinkeller 1987. 23 Steinkeller 1987; Sharlach 2004. 24 Steinkeller 2010: 380–382. 25 Steinkeller 2001. 26 Algaze 2008: 53 with further literature.

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In the Roman Empire, it was cheaper to ship grain or wine all the way from one end of the Mediterranean Sea to another than to transport it just a hundred miles overland by wagon. Regions without water links were not integrated into the Mediterranean economy. The same was true of China. Prior to the construction of railroads in the nineteenth century, carrying grain more than a hundred miles by pack animal cost more than producing the grain itself. Except for luxury goods such as spices, silk or gems, where small amounts produced large profits, hauling goods overland was prohibitively expensive. And a lack of good natural harbors in north China made trade up and down the coast uneconomical. Consequently, almost all bulk trade relied on inland waterways.27

There can be no doubt that the primary objective of all of these Ur III innovations was to lower transaction costs. A good illustration of this is provided by the province of Umma, which, as one of the main centers of cereal production, and because of its central geographical position, served as a sort of “clearing house” for the national building projects that were conducted in southern Babylonia. As such, Umma advanced food supplies and building materials to the participating provinces, especially those that were situated in northern Babylonia. These material advances were treated as loans, which had to be repaid, probably in silver, to Umma subsequently. The purpose of this arrangement was obviously to reduce transportation costs and to simplify the logistics of corvée support more generally.28 Another illustrative case of the Ur III state’s policy of regional specialization as a way of lowering transaction costs is its textile industry. It can now be demonstrated that the main center of textile production in Ur III times was situated at the seaport of Gu’abba, which lay directly on the Persian Gulf. This center employed some 10,000 weavers and support personnel. As I argued recently,29 the presence of this operation at Babylonia’s fringe – rather than in some central location – may be explained only by assuming that the bulk of the textiles produced at Gu’abba were meant as exports for the Gulf region and southeastern Iran. The deliberate intention of placing this operation in a single and most logistically advantageous location leaves no doubt as to the intentions of the Ur III kings in this matter. Here it should additionally be noted that the region of Gu’abba showed the presence of extensive herds of sheep and goats, which provided wool and goat hair for the operation in question.30 We also know of the existence there of large tree plantations, which supplied timber for Gu’abba’s shipyard.31 One can be confident that these activities too formed part of the same deliberate plan, which aimed at the maximization of economic gains. 27 Lewis

2007: 6–7. 2013b: 371–372; Steinkeller 2015b: 183–185. 29 Steinkeller 2013a; Laursen & Steinkeller 2017: 75–78. 30 As a matter of fact, it appears that Gu’abba’s herds were the largest in the entire Girsu/Lagaš province. See the data collected by Snell 1986: 160–165, which demonstrate that most of the Girsu/Lagaš sources dealing with sheep and goat herds place them in Gu’abba. An examination of the BDTNS database yields identical results. Here is a sample of the highest-recorded numbers of animals associated with Gu’abba: sheep: 625 (WMAH 80), 687 (TUT 32), 895 (TEL 264), 1,103 (UNT 53), 1,114 (SAT 1 219), 1,151 (PPAC 5 608), 1,215 (CUSAS 16 73 = UDT 73); goats: ca. 2,800 (TIM 6 5). 31 Laursen & Steinkeller 2017: 74. 28 Steinkeller

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When considered in aggregate, all these data suggest – at least as I read them – that, during the one century that marked the effective existence of the Ur III dynasty, there was a substantial increase of the Babylonian GDP. Did Babylonia also experience a rise of the standard of living? With the expansion of trade, both foreign and domestic, and the institutional innovations I described earlier, there likely came about a greater availability of luxury foods and products. This may have led to a superior diet and various other improvements in the quality of life. A good example here is sesame oil. Sesame (Sesamum indicum), a plant native to the Indian subcontinent, is first mentioned in Babylonian sources from the second half of the Sargonic period.32 This fact makes it virtually certain that sesame found its way to Babylonia as a result of the Sargonic territorial expansion into, and commercial contacts with, the Gulf region. Sesame is a summer crop, which – and this point is highly significant – does not tolerate salinity and stagnant water.33 Sesame became a common staple in Ur III times. Although some sesame was grown in Babylonia’s core area, such plantations were few, almost certainly because of the high levels of salt that were characteristic of its soils. We know that, in the province of Umma, only 1,800 iku (= 648 ha) of land – an economically insignificant area – remained under sesame cultivation.34 Some sesame was also grown in the neighboring Girsu/Lagaš province, but its cultivation there appears to have been even less extensive.35 Aside from Umma and Girsu/Lagaš, there is practically no indication of sesame cultivation within Babylonia proper.36

32 Waetzoldt 1985; Potts 1997: 67–69; Heimpel 2013. Sumerian še giš-i (lit.: “grain of the tree of oil”), 3 Akkadian šamaššammū (etymologically šaman šammi, “plant oil”). The corresponding terms for “sesame oil?” are i3-giš, “tree oil,” Akkadian šamnu, šamaššammū. The earliest attestations of i3-giš are found in the Early Dynastic sources from Ebla in northern Syria, where “olive oil” undoubtedly is meant by it. This fact indicates that that was the original sense of the term. The identification of še giš-i3 / šamaššammū as sesame was conclusively established by the discovery of sesame seeds at the site of Abu Salabikh, in the levels dating to ca. 2300 BC. See Charles 1993; Charles 1994; Fuller 2003. 33 Ali 2004; Langham, Riney, Smith & Wiemers 2008; Ramírez, Gutiérrez, Villafañe & Lizaso 2005; Dias, de Lima, Gheyi, Nobre & dos Santos 2017; Bedigian 2011. 34 1,800 (iku) gana ki giš-i -ka (AnOr 1 303:2; no date). A closely related source records only one-half of 2 3 that area: 900 (iku) gana2 a-šag4 giš-i3-ka (Orient 21 [1985] 1–2 BM 105334 ii 3 = Nisaba 6 32; AS 2). These two texts are estimates of the total cultivated land area that was available to Umma’s “institutional economy” in year Amar-Suen 2. 35 See Heimpel 2013; Maekawa 2016: 54–66. The only certain attestations of land under sesame cultivation (ki giš-i3) in the Girsu/Lagaš province are found in the texts CT 7 32, Zinbun 21 pl. 5 38, ASJ 4 118 19, HLC 3 373, and SAT 1 329. The areas recorded there are strikingly small. Zinbun 21 pl. 5 38 v 8’–9’ mentions 6 farmers, each cultivating 3 iku of sesame land in the field Ambar-tur, while ASJ 4 118 19 rev. iv’ 11, names 7 farmers, each cultivating 4.5 iku of sesame land. Finally, HLC 373 3 ii 4’, iii 7 records two plots under sesame cultivation, measuring 18 iku and 72 iku respectively. The other extant references to ki giš-i3 in the Girsu/Lagaš sources appear invariably to involve the laborers assigned to work in the sesame plantations situated in Susa (for which see below). Thus, we read of individuals traveling to the ki giš-i3 in order to perform various duties there (e.g., HSS 4 63:7, Nisaba 3–2 38:15, RA 19 42:13, TCTI 2 3419:3, TCTI 2 3450:2, TCTI 2 4268:6). 36 A tablet from Ur (UET 3 1129) records a total of 4,250 bushels of sesame seeds, designated as a balanced account of the “sesame farmer(s) of the sabra-officials of Ur” (engar giš-i3-ka sabra Urim2ki-ma-ke4-ne). However, there is no corroborative evidence that there existed sesame fields in the vicinity of Ur. Another

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It can now be demonstrated that most of the sesame consumed by the Babylonians in Ur III times actually came from the empire’s periphery, where the conditions for sesame cultivation were evidently more favorable.37 In a recent article, Kazuya Maekawa has shown that the province of Girsu/Lagaš possessed large sesame plantations in the area of Susa in Khuzestan.38 There survive numerous records describing this operation, in particular, of the workers being sent to Susa to cultivate and harvest sesame there, and of sesame being shipped on boats from Susa to the province of Girsu/Lagaš (via the Gu’abba-Karun river connection, for which see below and Fig. 8.2).39 Another large concentration of Ur III sesame plantations existed in the upper reaches of the Diyala River, at a place called Karahar. We learn of this operation from a group of seventeen tablets involving a high state official named Guzana (covering the years Šu-Suen 4-Ibbi-Suen 3; most of them date to the period Šu-Suen 9-Ibbi-Suen 1), who remained in charge of the fields in question.40 It appears that there were other extensive areas under sesame cultivation in roughly the same geographical area. This is indicated by the tablets uncertain case is SAT 3 2137 (origin unknown), which records sesame produced by the fields eg2-gišgi6-par4 and Ki-ki-ša, apparently situated in KA2.ANki (which probably is Babylon). SAT 3 2137 was kindly collated by Agnete Lassen. 37 This remarkable Ur III practice, which deliberately concentrated sesame cultivation in the parts of the empire that were most suitable for that crop, is somewhat reminiscent of the British cultivation of indigo in India during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For similar reasons, the British planters grew indigo primarily in Bihar, using for this purpose the best soils available there (which had originally been reserved for rice cultivation), forcing the farmers to put at least 20 % of their land under indigo. Since the indigo plant has deep roots, this led to the rapid exhaustion of the soil’s fertility, making the fields unfit for rice cultivation. The final consequence of these developments was the famous “Indigo revolt”. 38 Maekawa 2016: 54–66. 39 In addition to the sources cited and discussed by Maekawa 2016: 54–66, see also CTPSM 1 112, RT 18 72–73 17, TCTI 2 4179:5–9, and CUSAS 6 1531. Particularly informative here are CTPSM 1 112 and CUSAS 6 1531. The first text lists two deliveries of sesame, totalling nearly 14 bushels of sesame, produced by 754 ¾ iku of land, the “fields under sesame cultivation, in Susa” (gana2 giš-i3 uru4-a šag4 Susinki). Importantly, one of the two suppliers of sesame was the merchant Šabi (Ša3-bi), who is documented as a supplier of sesame and timber from Susa and AdamDUN in other Girsu/Lagaš sources (ASJ 4 118 19 iv 9; MVN 11 54:1–6: 45.3.0 še gur še-ba giš kud-de3! ki Lu2-dGiš-bar-e3-ta Ša3-bi dam-gar3 šu ba-ti a-šag4 Susinki, “13,680 liters of barley, the barley wages (of the workers) cutting down trees, Šabi the merchant received from Lu-Gišbare; the barley (came from) the fields of Susa”; ITT 3 5114:1–4: 8,910 gišeme-sig A-dam-DUNki-ta ki Ša4-bi-ta mar-sa ba-an-ku4, “8,910 boat planks from AdamDUN, (delivered) by Šabi, entered the shipyard (of Gu’abba)”; cf. Maekawa 2016: 60–61, 65–66). CUSAS 6 1531 likewise is a receipt of the sesame produced in Susa. The text records over 16 bushels of sesame produced by the local fields, 21 bushels of sesame purchased there for silver (at the rate of 100 liters of sesame per 1 shekel of silver), plus the wages of the laborers hired to transport the sesame from Susa to Babylonia: 8 shekels of silver and over 2 bushels of dabin flour as a2 šag4-gal lu2-hun-ga2 ma2 giš-i3-ka, “wages and food provisions of the hirelings of the sesame ship”. The recipient of these goods was a sailor (ma2-lah4) named Nur-ili, who clearly was responsible for the transportation. The issuing party was a certain Išar-padan, who probably supervised the sesame cultivation at Susa. 40 MVN 3 260 (ŠS 4/ii), NYPL 377 (ŠS 6/x), MVN 3 278 (ŠS 7/-), MVN 3 291 (ŠS 9/iv), BPOA 6 17 (ŠS 9/vii), NYPL 381 (ŠS 9/xi), SAT 3 1902 (ŠS 9/xii), MVN 3 298 (ŠS 9/-), MVN 3 299 (ŠS 9/-), NYPL 264 (ŠS 9/-), MVN 3 305 (ŠS 9/xi-IS 1/-), SAT 3 1937 (IS 1/vi), MVN 3 304 (IS 1/viii), SAT 3 1935 (IS 1/ xii), JCS 19 28 3 (IS 1/-), NYPL 263 (IS 3/-), and MVN 3 377 (year unknown, month 10th). While Guzana (whose precise identity and title remain unknown) was also involved in the collection and distribution of large volumes of cereals and wool, the staple most commonly associated with him is sesame seeds (še giš-i3). Karahar

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Figure 8.2. Map of the western section of the Persian Gulf in Ur III times (courtesy of Jason Ur).

from the city of Urusagrig (located on the Tigris to the northeast of Nippur), which oversaw one of the main routes leading onto the Iranian plateau. These documents repeatedly talk of various individuals being sent east over this route to take care of sesame plantations.41 is identified as the source of Guzana’s sesame in MVN 3 299:4, NYPL 264:5, SAT 3 1935:6, SAT 3 1937:5, and JCS 19 28 3. In this connection, one also notes the mention of sesame grown in the fields of Maškan-tupšika (a-šag4 Maš-gan2-Dub-si-ga), which is found in a tablet from Nippur (NATN 236) (Š 30/xi-Umma calendar). Although the exact location of Maškan-tupšika remains unknown, it almost certainly was situated in the Diyala Region. This is indicated by the fact that the tablet in question belongs to a group of Nippur documents that use the Umma calendar, and record agricultural operations near the confluence of the Diyala river and the Tigris (Steinkeller 2010: 370 and n. 6). [The attribution of NATN 236 to Umma by Heimpel 2013: 201 is to be corrected accordingly.] Another peripheral locale where sesame may have been grown is Diniktum, which appears to have been situated to the east of the Diyala Region (Steinkeller 2013c: 306 n. 82). This is suggested by Nisaba 15/2 918 iii 13, a record of the royal land-holdings in Diniktum, which names, among the holders of subsistence land, twenty-five sesame farmers. 41 See Nisaba 15/2 42, 43, 45, 84, 85, 108, 109, 111, 143, 144, 174, 194, 238, 242, 247, 364, 423, 547, 552, 691, 868, 869, 871, and 916. Most commonly, individuals are said to travel (du) to (the fields of) sesame. The purpose of these trips is sometimes identified as that of guarding (en-nu) the sesame (Nisaba 15/2 109), of investigating its cultivation (uru4-a še-giš-i3 zu-zu-de3 / igi du8-de3) (Nisaba 15/2 111, 143), or of collecting it (e3-de3 / zi-zi-de3) (Nisaba 15/2 144, 238, 691). While it is evident that Urusagrig, together with its apparent

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Far from being a luxury product, sesame oil was regularly consumed by the Ur III population at large. Thus, one text from the Guzana file records an expenditure of nearly 277 bushels of sesame seeds to a group of elite soldiers (aga3-us2) and their dependents as their yearly allotment (SAT 3 1935). According to another source belonging to the same file, a detachment of ordinary soldiers (eren2) received over 135 bushels of sesame seeds for the same purpose (MVN 3 299). We also know that sesame oil was routinely given out to the workers of menial category, such as, e.g., the female weavers (geme2-uš-bar) and their children. See, especially, SAT 1 279 (= HSS 4 3 iii 14–23), which records an expenditure of nearly 23 bushels of sesame oil to 6,466 weavers residing in the province of Girsu/ Lagaš, with each weaver receiving one liter of oil. Another Girsu/Lagaš tablet names an even larger expenditure: over fifty bushels of sesame that were issued, to an unspecified number of female workers, as their wages (a2 geme2-še3) (Ngan-Tillard & de Boer 2018: 284, LB 2640). Sesame oil could even be given to prisoners of war, as shown by Rochester 151:18–19, where thirty women brought as booty from Huhnuri in southwestern Iran receive five shekels of oil each. While the wide availability of sesame oil to a general population is a convincing indicator of the improved standards of living in Ur III times, even more eloquent evidence in that regard is the greatly increased accessibility of meat. While meat was a rare treat in the preceding periods, its consumption dramatically increased under the Ur III dynasty.42 This development must be attributed to steady deliveries to Babylonia of cattle, sheep, goats, and equids as part of the tax (gun2 ma-da) paid by the military settlers residing in the periphery.43 Such deliveries were augmented by the animals brought from the periphery as booty,44 particularly during the reign of Šulgi, which marked the peak of the territorial expansion of the Ur III state and its military operations beyond Babylonia’s borders. In Ur III times, meat was widely available to all segments of Babylonian society. It was routinely distributed among soldiers, messengers and various other state employees traveling on official business,45 workers employed on national building projects,46 as well as various types of menial laborers. The latter included female weavers and their children. According

neighbor and subsidiary Anzaqar, served as a collecting and processing center of sesame, the location of the fields themselves is less clear. The only toponyms mentioned specifically in this connection are the canal NabiŠulgi (Nisaba 15/2 423:21), the field Du6-Ur-dUtu (Nisaba 15/2 84:7), and the city of Der (modern Badra) (Nisaba 15/2 111; CUSAS 16 311: 15, a record of the canal cleaning in the vicinity of Der [Uru-BAD3. AN.NA]). Urusagrig’s sesame industry was a major operation, as shown by Nisaba 15/2 423, according to which, during a period of seven years (ŠS 1-ŠS 7), some 1,405 bushels of sesame were produced by the fields situated along the canal Nabi-Šulgi. Similar indications are provided by the sources listing the man-days expended by Urusagrig’s laborers to harvest and to process the sesame, and to transport it to Urusagrig and Anzaqar. Thus, Nisaba 15/2 547 records 5,750 man-days so contributed; smaller, but equally impressive figures are given in Nisaba 15/2 916 (2,682 man-days) and Nisaba 15/2 552 (736 man-days). 42 Steinkeller 2008; Steinkeller 2015b: 199 and n. 220. 43 Steinkeller 1987. 44 These included a wide variety of wild species, see Steinkeller 1995. 45 Brunke 2011. 46 Steinkeller 2015b: 177, 199.

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to one source, during the year Šu-Suen 9 the weavers living in the Girsu/Lagaš province consumed 4,072 sheep and lambs.47 It may thus be conjectured that the Ur III population enjoyed a higher standard of living than their ancestors, especially as far as their diet is concerned.48 Given the increased productivity and efficiency of the Ur III textile industry, they may also have enjoyed cheaper garments, which likely came in a larger assortment of styles and colors. Thanks to the greatly improved transportation infrastructure, these and many other products and foodstuffs became accessible to a greater number of them. What is more, these commodities could be obtained much easier and faster than before. To illustrate this with a specific example, the residents of GARšana, a rural royal estate in the Umma province, were able to enjoy fresh seafood that was brought to them directly from the coast by human carriers.49 In this connection, one must also consider the benefits that were derived by Babylonian society from international trade. During the Ur III period, commercial exchanges with the outside world were closely controlled by the state, through the medium of an organization comparable to the modern foreign-trade ministry.50 The operations of this organization are best documented in the Gulf region, where it had at its disposal a large fleet of seaworthy vessels, called ma2-gal-gal, “big ships”. Like the textile operation I described earlier, this fleet too was based at the seaport of Gu’abba. From there Babylonian ships ventured throughout the Gulf region, as well as into inland southwestern Iran. The latter route ran eastward along the coast to the mouth of the Karun River. From there it followed, over the Karun deep, into Khuzestan, to places such as Susa and AdamDUN (see Fig. 8.2). As indicated both by the textual and archeological data, international trade in that whole region was monopolized by the Babylonians, to the virtual exclusion of local intermediaries. Babylonian exports consisted of cereals, textiles, and high quality oil. It appears that the volumes of these exports were enormous.51 In exchange, the Babylonian traders brought back copper and a variety of luxury materials. While copper was obtained by them from

47 Studies Sigrist 226. Among other sources bearing on the consumption of meat by menial laborers, see, in particular, OIP 115 325:1–4, Zinbun 18 102 7, PDT 2 1201:1–3, Babyl. 8 HG 11 i 16 – ii 3, Nisaba 15/2 603:1–9, BDTNS 194553, BDTNS 158254 vii 19, MVN 19 95, and Aegyptus 27 34 23, plus the examples cited in Steinkeller 2015b: 199 n. 220. 48 They possibly also enjoyed superior medical care. According to the text TCL 5 6166, during the reign of Šulgi, there resided thirty-three physicians in the city of Umma. Assuming that the population of Umma numbered between 14,000 and 18,000 individuals, this would translate into ca. 20 physicians per 10,000, a rate impressive even by modern standards. See Steinkeller 2017: 544 and n. 27. 49 See CUSAS 3 37:18–26, 38 iii 8–16, 46 iii 14’ – iv 1, 47 iv 1–9, 48 iv 1–7, and 49 iv 1–7, where men are sent from GARšana to purchase seafood in Gu’abba. The item in question was ku6-sim, “swallow fish” (Akk. sinuntu, CAD S 295; cf. sim-maku6 in “Early Dynastic Fish” line 88). Since the ku6-sim was measured by volume (which could reach thousands of bushels, see UET 3 1314:10), it clearly was a small fish. Because of this, and in view of its native designation, it appears that ku6-sim was a type of flying fish (Exocoetidae), which are common in the Persian Gulf and West Indian Ocean. See Ross 1881: 57, who, in the “List of Fish Found in the Persian Gulf and ‘Omán Waters,” includes under no. 164: “The Flying fish (Exocoetus Volitans?) Jarad [Arabic] Malakh-i-Darya [Persian] ‘Locust of the sea.’” For the deliveries of ku6-sim to GARšana, see CUSAS 6 1564:6. 50 Laursen & Steinkeller 2017: 57–58. 51 Laursen & Steinkeller 2017: 59.

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its sources in Oman (ancient Makkan), the latter goods, which originated in southeastern Iran and the Indus Valley, were apparently supplied to them by their Omani counterparts. Since the copper was acquired directly from its producers, it is likely that, in the Ur III period, the price of copper was considerably lower than before. While this point cannot be demonstrated with the data extant, there is convincing evidence that the prices of foreign aromatics significantly declined during the reigns of Šulgi’s successors, almost certainly as a consequence of the territorial expansion of the Ur III empire, which reached its peak during the last years of Šulgi’s reign.52 Additional benefits that the foreign trade had brought to Babylonia were the earlier-discussed importation of sesame as well as the possible introductions of the chicken and the camel.53 Accordingly, a case can be made that the Ur III international trade had contributed, at least to some extent, to an improved standard of living. We may also consider that the Ur III period witnessed various innovations of a purely technical nature. One such innovation certainly was the seaworthy ships I referred to earlier. However, this conclusion needs to be qualified. Given the history of Babylonian involvement in the Gulf region, it is conceivable that such ships had been introduced already during the Sargonic period. In identifying other possible indicators of an increased standard of living in Ur III times, one cannot omit yet another important phenomenon. And this is the role of silver in the Ur III economy. As the recent studies of this problem have made crystal clear, under the Ur III dynasty silver was available in great abundance, being accessible to all strata of Ur III society.54 Craftsmen, shepherds, and various types of agricultural producers sold their excess goods (i.e., the surplus they retained after having fulfilled the quotas they owed to the state) to merchants for silver. The latter resold these goods to other private individuals, usually collecting silver in exchange. People bought houses, orchards, slaves, and farm animals usually paying the price in silver. On occasion, silver also entered the hands of unskilled hired workers. Although hirelings were usually remunerated in grain, there are also documented instances of such laborers being paid in silver.55 Needless to say, this easy availability of silver to the population at large must have dramatically increased, like the plastic money of our times, the volume of commercial transactions, while at the same time lowering transaction costs still further. Another obvious consequence of the abundance of silver in Ur III Babylonia was the significantly increased role of private economic activity, a process that had begun in Sargonic times. This especially affected the merchants, who – while institutionally bound to assist the state in the acquisition of foreign goods, the distribution of various local products (mostly perishables), and the collection of taxes – were at the same able to engage in

52 See Brunke & Sallaberger 2010: 72 especially the following statement: Nach den Feldzügen der späten Jahre Šulgis gegen Hurti, Kimaš, Harši und andere waren die Handelswege in die iranischen Bergländer gesichert, die einst teuren fremdländsichen Güter konnten billiger importiert werden. 53 Laursen & Steinkeller 2017: 87–88; Steinkeller 2009. But since neither of these two animals appears to have been fully naturalized in Babylonia at that time, these importations had no lasting economic effect. 54 Steinkeller 2004a; Steinkeller 2017: 533; D’Agostino & Pomponio 2005; Paoletti 2008; Ouyang 2013. 55 Steinkeller 2015a: 20; see also CUSAS 6 1531 cited above n. 39.

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independent, purely private business operations. This activity greatly profited from the fact that the crown and the so-called “institutional economies” of individual provinces of the Ur III state regularly advanced capital (silver and barley) to the merchants in lieu of the expected purchases and services, which turned the latter into virtual bankers, with steady reserves of liquidity in their hands that could be used as investments or be expended as loans to private individuals.56 While enriching the merchant class, these private business activities may have also brought some tangible benefits, through the “trickle-down effect”, to other, less affluent segments of the society. Historically, economic expansion was often accompanied by the increased availability of silver and gold. One well-known case of such a nexus is the “price revolution” of the sixteenth century AD, which is often attributed to the influx of silver and gold from the Spanish mines in Bolivia and Mexico, as well as from the fabulously productive Schwaz mine in Tirol, which was operated by the Fuggers. This overabundance of precious metals in the European markets apparently led to a high rate of inflation. Unfortunately, there is no way of determining whether the great accessibility of silver in Ur III times had similar inflationary effects. There are reasons for thinking that there was a marked decline in the availability of silver during the subsequent, Old Babylonian period.57 But this point is far from certain. As far as I know, the only scholar to study this question systematically was Ronald Sweet, in his unpublished PhD dissertation of 1958. Sweet claimed that silver was a rare item in Old Babylonian times, and that it never functioned as money. Subsequently, this view became something of a dogma at the University of Chicago’s Oriental Institute (at least in the early 1970s, when I was a student there). Here it should be realized that Sweet wrote this thesis under the guidance of A. Leo Oppenheim, whose views were strongly influenced by Polanyi’s theories. Thus, I suspend my judgment in this matter. An updated and expanded study of the role of silver in the Old Babylonian period is a pressing desideratum. 4. PROVISIONAL CONCLUSION During the earliest phases of its documented history, Babylonia experienced a number of spikes of economic expansion. Particularly in Ur III times, these spikes were likely accompanied by the increases of GDP. However, these spikes cannot be measured and quantified, at least not to the satisfaction of modern economists. Therefore, our conclusions must remain largely intuitive. It is difficult to think of any means that would allow us to evaluate this issue with a higher degree of precision.

56 Steinkeller

2004a; Ouyang 2013: 117–151. I am referring specifically to the reigns of Hammurabi and his successors (ca. 1792–1595 BC). During the preceding two centuries, silver continued to be widely available. This was especially true of Assyria, as illustrated by the activities of the Old Assyrian commercial outposts in Anatolia and Northern Syria. 57 Here

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Citations of Ur III sources follow the system used by BDTNS = Database of Neo-Sumerian Texts, Centro de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, Madrid, Spain [bdtns. lol.csic.es]. Other abbreviations used: IS Š ŠS

Ibbi-Suen Šulgi Šu-Suen

Algaze, G. 2008. Ancient Mesopotamia at the Dawn of the Civilization: The Evolution of an Urban Landscape. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Ali, A. 2004. “Effect of Salinity on Growth and Yield in Three Sesame Cultivars.” Unpublished MA thesis, Department of Crop Botany, Bangladesh Agricultural University, Mymensingh. Bedigian, D. (ed.). 2011. Sesame: The Genus Sesamum. Boca Raton: CRS Press. Medicinal and Aromatic Plants – Industrial Profiles vol. 47. Brunke, H. 2011. “Food in Garšana Texts,” in D. I. Owen (ed.), Garšana Studies (Bethesda MD: CDL Press; Cornell University Studies in Assyriology and Sumerology 6), pp. 31–65. Brunke, H. 2013. “Excursus D: Rations in the Al-Šarrākī Messenger Texts,” in D. I. Owen, Cuneiform Texts Primarily from Iri-saĝrig / Al-Šarrākī and the History of the Ur III Period (Bethesda MD: CDL Press; Nisaba 15/1), pp. 207–334. Brunke, H., & W. Sallaberger. 2010. “Aromata für Duftöl,” in A. Kleinerman & J. M. Sasson (eds.), Why Should Someone Who Knows Something Conceal It? Cuneiform Studies in Honor of David I. Owen on His 70th Birthday (Bethesda MD: CDL Press), pp. 41–74. Charles, M. P. 1993. “Botanic Remains,” in A. Green (ed.), Abu Salabikh Excavations 4, The 6G Ash-tip and Its Contents: Cultic and Administrative Discard from the Temple? (London: British School of Archaeology in Iraq), pp. 203–207. Charles, M. P. 1994, “Plant Remains Recovery” (part of W. Matthews & J. N. Postgate, “The Imprint of Living in an Early Mesopotamian City: Questions and Answers”), in R. Luff & R. Rowley-Conwy, Whither Environmental Archaeology? (Oxford: Oxbow Books; Oxbow Monograph 38), pp. 181–184. Clegg, S. 2017. “Weights and Silver Use in Third Millennium BC Mesopotamia.” Unpublished paper read at the 63rd Rencontre Assyriologique Internationale, Marburg, July 24-28, 2017. D’Agostino, F. & F. Pomponio. 2005, “Due bilanci di entrate e uscite di argento da Umma.” Zeitschrift für Assyriologie 95: 172–207. DeLong, J. B. & M. L. Olney. 2006. Macroeconomics, 2nd ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill. Dias, A. S., G. S. de Lima, H. R. Gheyi, R. G. Nobre & J. B. dos Santos. 2017. “Emergence, Growth and Production of Sesame under Salt Stress and Proportions of Nitrate and Ammonium.” Universidade Federal Rural do Semi-Arido [http://periodicos.ufersa.edu.br/ index.php/sistema]. Frayne, D. 1997. Ur III Period (2112-2004 BC). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia, Early Periods 3/2. Fuller, D. Q. 2003, “Further Evidence on the Prehistory of Sesame,” Asian Agri-History 7/2: 127–137.

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Gordon, R. J. 2016. The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The US Standard of Living Since the Civil War. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Heimpel, W. 2013. “Excursus C: Al-Šarrakī and Sesame Cultivation in Sumer,” in D. I. Owen (ed.), Cuneiform Texts Primarily from Iri-saĝrig / Al-Šarrākī and the History of the Ur III Period (Bethesda MD: CDL Press; Nisaba 15/1), pp. 201–205. Langham, D. R., J. Riney, G. Smith & T. Wiemers. 2008. Sesame Grower Guide. SESACO Sesame Coordinators. [www.sesaco.net]. Laursen, S. & P. Steinkeller. 2017. Babylonia, the Gulf Region, and the Indus: Archaeological and Textual Evidence for Contact in the Third and Early Second Millennia B.C. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns. Mesopotamian Civilizations 21. Lewis, M. E. 2007. The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Maekawa, K. 2016. “Susa and Girsu-Lagaš in the Ur III Period,” in K. Maekawa (ed.), Ancient Iran: New Perspectives from Archaeology and Cuneiform Studies. Proceedings of the International Colloquium Held at the Center for Eurasian Cultural Studies, Kyoto University, December 6–7, 2014 (Kyoto: Center for Eurasian Cultural Studies, Kyoto University; Ancient Text Studies in the National Museum vol. 2), pp. 53–91. Morris, I. 2004. “Economic Growth in Ancient Greece.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160: 709–742. Morris, I. 2005. “Archaeology, Standards of Living and Greek Economic History,” in J. G. Manning & I. Morris (eds.), The Ancient Economy: Evidence and Models (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp. 91–126. Ngan-Tillard, D. J. M. & R. de Boer. 2018. “Two Ur III Texts in the Liagre Böhl Collection at Leiden.” Bibliotheca Orientalis 75: 284–285. Nordhaus, W. D. 2016. “Why Growth Will Fall [= Review of R. J. Gordon, The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The US Standard of Living Since the Civil War],” The New York Review of Books 63/13: 64–68. Nye, J. V. C. 2015. “Standards of Living and Modern Economic Growth,” in D. R. Henderson (ed.), The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund), pp. 475– 478. Ober, J. 2015. The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ouyang, X. 2013. Monetary Role of Silver and Its Administration in Mesopotamia during the Ur III Period (c. 2112–2004 BCE): A Case Study of the Umma Province. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas. Biblioteca del Próximo Oriente Antiguo 11. Paoletti, P. 2008. “Elusive Silver? Evidence for the Circulation of Silver in the Ur III State.” Kaskal 5: 127–158. Potts, D. T. 1997. Mesopotamian Civilization: The Material Foundations. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. Ramírez, R., D. Gutiérrez, R. Villafañe & J. I. Lizaso 2005. “Salt Tolerance of Sesame Genotypes at Germination, Vegetative, and Maturity Stages,” Communications in Soil Science and Plant Analysis 36, Issue 17–18: 2405–2419. Ross, E. C. 1881. Report on the Administration of Persian Gulf Political Residency and Muscat Political Residency for the Year 1880–81, Selections from the Records of the Government of India, Foreign Department, no. CLXXXI. Calcutta: The Foreign Department Press.

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Sharlach, T. M. 2004. Provincial Taxation and the Ur III State. Leiden: Brill-Styx. Cuneiform Monographs 26. Snell, D. C. 1986. “The Rams of Lagash.” Acta Sumerologica 8: 133–217. Steinkeller, P. 1987. “The Administrative and Economic Organization of the Ur III State: The Core and the Periphery,” in McG. Gibson & R. D. Biggs (eds.), The Organization of Power: Aspects of Bureaucracy in the Ancient Near East (Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago; Studies in Ancient Oriental Civilization 46), pp. 19–41. Steinkeller, P. 1995. “Sheep and Goat Terminology in Ur III Sources from Drehem.” Bulletin on Sumerian Agriculture 8: 49–70. Steinkeller, P. 2001. “New Light on the Hydrology and Topography of Southern Babylonia in the Third Millennium,” Zeitschrift für Assyriologie 91: 22–84. Steinkeller, P. 2004a. “Toward a Definition of Private Economic Activity in Third Millennium Babylonia,” in R. Rollinger and Ch. Ulf (eds.), Commerce and Monetary Systems in the Ancient World: Means of Transmission and Cultural Interaction (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner; Oriens et Occidens: Studien zu antiken Kulturkontakten und ihrem Nachleben 6), pp. 91–111. Steinkeller, P. 2004b. “The Function of Written Documentation in the Administrative Praxis of Early Babylonia,” in M. Hudson & C. Wunsch (eds.), Creating Economic Order: Recordkeeping, Standardization, and the Development of Accounting in the Ancient Near East (Bethesda MD: CDL Press), pp. 65–88. Steinkeller, P. 2008. “Joys of Cooking in Ur III Babylonia,” in P. Michalowski (ed.), On the Third Dynasty of Ur: Studies in Honor of Marcel Sigrist (Boston: ASOR; Journal of Cuneiform Studies Monograph Series 1), pp. 185–192. Steinkeller, P. 2009. “Camels in Ur III Babylonia?” in J. D. Schloen (ed.), Exploring the Longue Durée: Essays in Honor of Lawrence E. Stager (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns), pp. 415–419. Steinkeller, P. 2010. “On the Location of the Towns of Ur-Zababa and Dimat-Enlil and on the Course of the Arahtum,” in J. C. Fincke (ed.), Festschrift für Gernot Wilhelm anlässlich seines 65. Geburstags am 28. Januar 2010 (Dresden: ISLET), pp. 369–382. Steinkeller, P. 2013a. “Trade Routes and Commercial Networks in the Persian Gulf during the Third Millennium BC,” in C. Faizee (ed.), Collection of Papers Presented at the Third International Biennial Conference of the Persian Gulf (History, Culture, and Civilization) (Tehran: University of Tehran Press), pp. 413–431. Steinkeller, P. 2013b. “Corvée Labor in Ur III Times,” in S. Garfinkle & M. Molina (eds.), From the 21st Century B.C. to the 21st Century A.D.: Proceedings of the International Conference on Sumerian Studies Held in Madrid, 22–24 July 2010 (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns), pp. 347– 424. Steinkeller, P. 2013c. “Puzur-Inšušinak at Susa: A Pivotal Episode of Early Elamite History Reconsidered,” in K. De Graef & J. Tavernier (eds.), Susa and Elam. Archaeological, Philological, Historical and Geographical Perspectives, Proceedings of the International Congress Held at Ghent University, December 14–17, 2009 (Leiden: Brill; Mémoires de la Délégation en Perse 58), pp. 293–317. Steinkeller, P. 2015a. “Labor in the Early States: An Early Mesopotamian Perspective,” in P. Steinkeller & M. Hudson (eds.), Labor in the Ancient World (Dresden: ISLET), pp. 1–35. Steinkeller, P. 2015b. “The Employment of Labor on National Building Projects in the Ur III Period,” in P. Steinkeller & M. Hudson (eds.), Labor in the Ancient World (Dresden: ISLET), pp. 137–236.

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Steinkeller, P. 2016. “The Role of Iran in the Inter-Regional Exchange of Metals: Tin, Copper, Silver and Gold in the Second Half of the Third Millennium BC,” in K. Maekawa (ed.), Ancient Iran: New Perspectives from Archaeology and Cuneiform Studies. Proceedings of the International Colloquium Held at the Center for Eurasian Cultural Studies, Kyoto University, December 6–7, 2014 (Kyoto: Center for Eurasian Cultural Studies, Kyoto University; Ancient Text Studies in the National Museum vol. 2), pp. 127–150. Steinkeller, P. 2017. “An Estimate of the Population of the City of Umma in Ur III Times,” in Y. Heffron, A. Smith & M. Worthington (eds.), At the Dawn of History: Ancient Near Eastern Studies in Honour of J. N. Postgate (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns), pp. 535–566. Steinkeller, P. 2020. “The Sargonic and Ur III Empires,” in P. F. Bang, C. A. Bayly & W. Scheidel (eds.), The Oxford World History of Empire, Volume 2: The History of Empires (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 43–72. Sweet, R. F. G. 1958. “On Prices, Moneys, and Money Uses in the Old Babylonian Period.” Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Chicago. Temin, P. 2013. The Roman Market Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Waetzoldt, H. 1985. “Ölpflanzen and Pflanzenöle,” Bulletin on Sumerian Agriculture 2: 7–96.

POSTFACE: A PERSPECTIVE ON THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH David A. WARBURTON THE PROBLEM These last few centuries have been the era of the most momentous change in human social history. Lancashire took leave of its role in the ill-starred Pre-Modern Wars of the Roses to become a symbol of the origins of Modern Economic Growth, due to its coal and iron along with the port of Liverpool, which first brought cotton on sailing vessels from the sun-drenched slave society of the capitalist southern states of the American republic to the English mills, and later dispatched steamers laden with industrially produced textiles to a world which was not yet prepared for what had happened in that dark and gloomy Britain destined to change world economic history. Somehow, circumstances allowed the steam engine to play a decisive role in changing not only the nature of economics, but also the world. The late 19th century Second Industrial Revolution, triggered by the First British Industrial Revolution, changed economics so fundamentally that what we know today has come to define what we understand economics to be (and hence assume that it always was) – because it simultaneously transformed and moulded the character of social life in the West while creating a new outlook. This was an unprecedented and almost universally positive development. This type of change emerged in the Modern West and bore no resemblance to anything that had ever happened before in human history.1 These are facts: indisputable and incontestable. However, this is hardly the whole story. One part is about the actual details of economic history. It is difficult to know where to start on this since it appears that scholars are generally hesitant to speak about economic growth in Antiquity. Yet growth did not start in 18th century Britain. So it must have started sometime earlier, somewhere else – and understanding its origins and nature are imperative. It therefore seems to me that one of the problems is that there is a very important misunderstanding: when Kuznets introduced us to his mature understanding of Modern Economic Growth – in the 1960s – he had no doubt that there had been economic growth before there was Modern Economic Growth. The other part is about exactly what changed. Kuznets perceived and documented a radical change in recent centuries. Kuznets believed that “science and technology” were exclusively responsible for the change – and that this would apply to all future economic

Economic Growth is the title of Kuznets 1966, and thus so written. In the same way the British Industrial Revolution figures in the titles of, e.g., Allen 2009 and Mokyr 1998, and is likewise so written. 1 Modern

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growth.2 And he assumed that the social implications of Modern Economic Growth – increasing wages and decreasing material inequality – would accompany all future technological advance. We identify the economic growth of nations as a sustained increase in per capita or per worker product […] often accompanied by […] sweeping structural changes. […] The interplay of technological and institutional changes [… means that …] societies […] must modify their preexisting institutional structure [… with …] a diminishing importance of the old […] with […] changes […] in the relative position of various economic and social groups [… demanding …] a substantial addition to the stock of human knowledge [so that …] societies that take advantage of it necessarily undergo a prolonged process of learning, changes must ensue in the system of views that dominate and govern the behavior of men. […] The epochal innovation that distinguishes the modern epoch is the extended application of science to problems of economic production [… with …] a conscious and systematic application of scientific discoveries to problems of economic production and human welfare [… requiring …] a proper climate of human opinion in which both the pursuit and use of science could be fostered […]3

Thus Kuznets is describing how Modern Economic Growth was “sustained” and dependent upon a society prepared for change – and one which entrusted the foundations of “human welfare” to science. Kuznets was consciously concerned with “human welfare” – a phrase which appears repeatedly directly in association with “science” and “economic growth”, meaning that for Kuznets it was natural to link economic growth with prosperity and education as science is exploited through economics to improve society, served by “epochal innovations”, offered by science, the key being the phrase “application of science”. It was the application that was crucial, not merely for the economic growth that ensued but almost equally for its feedback effects upon the growth of science itself – a kind of self-stimulation of further economic growth. Even a casual reading of the history of science in the last two centuries reveals the powerful stimulus to further growth of science provided by its extensive application in production practices and for the benefit of human beings […]4

This should not be forgotten: for Kuznets, technology would determine future growth, and this contributed to social change for the better; for Kuznets, there had been an abrupt change whereby technology came to the fore – and putting technology to the fore would henceforth determine social development. For Kuznets there had been economic growth before Modern Economic Growth: and this was not based on technological change. Anyone familiar with stable societies will be conscious that what Kuznets (1901–1985 AD) was describing as the ideal conditions of economic growth were closer to Trotsky’s (1879–1940 AD) image of a “permanent revolution” than to our image of Pharaonic Egypt. Highly relevant is that Kuznets’s ideas bear a very close resemblance to Schumpeter’s, as Schumpeter (1883–1950 AD) claimed in 1911 that “the economic history of the last 150 years – and more – is one single arsenal of proofs for” the veracity of his approach to 2 Kuznets

1966: 9. drawn from Kuznets 1966: 1–12. 4 Kuznets 1966: 12. 3 Phrases

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the “basic phenomenon of economic development”.5 Thus, Kuznets associated Modern Economic Growth with science-based technology as a very specific recent phenomenon whereas Schumpeter viewed exactly the same phenomenon, but simply assumed that this was economic development tout court – and his claim was that his book offered the “explanation”6 for how all economic growth always had been and always would be. This contrasted with Kuznets who clearly understood that Modern Economic Growth was a new phenomenon and that someday Modern Economic Growth would end.7 Regardless of the fact that it is widely recognised that Kuznets was clearly right, Schumpeter’s approach seems to have become the default assumption about the actual nature of economic growth (sic). The other aspect – aside from there having indisputably been a radical change, since Kuznets is doubtless correct – is thus (a) was it really technology that changed economics?, or (b) was there some other economic change? and thus (c) how did economics get changed by something the role of which is absolutely unclear, or (d) was it some other economic change that gave technology this economic role? And what was the cause of whatever economic growth had come earlier – and what was its nature? To my mind these are not only central to the understanding of Modern Economic Growth – but equally relevant to understanding ancient economic growth. And my claim is that the answer to understanding the causes of Modern Economic Growth is to take a very longue durée perspective beginning with the era around five or six thousand years ago. Although theoretically explaining economic growth has been a nearly hopeless endeavour, there are many books by economically oriented scholars explaining how technology has decided everything social and economic in history – basically assuming that they can follow the technology and recognise the consequences (i.e., following Schumpeter and not Kuznets).8 Some archaeologists who are fond of theory inevitably assume the validity of the theory they have found suitable and apply it to what they find, regardless of what they find.9 However, the actual development and demonstration of the theory of economic growth has been a bit more complicated, with the most popular “explanation” (among economists) rather inadequate: “what it illuminated did not ultimately matter; and what really mattered, it did little to illuminate”.10 Another thinker compares “the building of economic models to writing poetry”.11

5 Schumpeter 1964: XVIII. The sentence (Dafür ist die Wirtschaftsgeschichte der letzten 150 Jahre – und mehr – ein einziges Arsenal von Verifikationsbelegen für die Grundkonstruktion des II. Kapitels [entitled Das Grundphänomen der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung]) is from the preface to the fourth German edition, which was a reprint of the second edition of 1926, with the first being 1911 – and Schumpeter stressed in the preface to the second edition that he was absolutely convinced of his original approach (Ich konstatiere, übrigens ohne jede Begeisterung, daß strengste Selbstprüfung mich von der Wahrheit dessen, was ich geschrieben damals vortrug immer wieder überzeugt hat, p. X) even though he had to admit that Böhm-Bawerk was among the severe critics. 6 Schumpeter 1964: XIV (Erklärung). 7 Kuznets 1966: 507. 8 Aside from Kuznets 1966 and Schumpeter 1964, e.g., Snooks 1999; Allen 2009; Galor 2011. 9 Recent archaeological perspectives are Klimscha et al. 2021a and Klimscha et al. 2021b, with many references (and there are many others, such as Shortland 2001 or Bourriau & Phillips 2004). 10 “Finance & Economics,” The Economist, 18 May 2006. 11 “Finance & Economics,” The Economist, 18 May 2006.

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There are thus at least six different positions: (1) Kuznets claiming that all future economic change will be based on science and technology – and that this was not the case before the Industrial Revolution; (2) Schumpeter saying – based on the Industrial Revolution – that all economic development throughout history has been a matter of innovations (including social as well as technological); (3) a theoretical explanation of this technological approach which does not even explain what the historians can see (at least in recent centuries); and (4) a position that one can think whatever one wants because the facts don’t matter and the choice of theories is endless and arbitrary. Earlier (5, following, e.g., von Hayek) it was at least implicitely and loosely claimed (or assumed) that growth was spontaneously produced by the markets alone, and that they merely needed to be freed. Others (6) believed that bringing workers off the farms allowed them to increase productivity via employment in industry. What is important is that a few decades ago, it was assumed that Modern Economic Growth would go on forever – yet it seems that in parts of the West, Modern Economic Growth is faltering.12 And there are at least two further caveats. The first is that if we take Kuznets at face value, he was claiming that something revolutionary has taken place in recent centuries and that this contrasted starkly with the past, where the hidebound societies had prevented such rapid change. That means that whatever had happened earlier had been different. Yet many assume that in looking for technological innovation in the past, they are doing the logical thing – while they are in fact taking Schumpeter and projecting Kuznets’s analysis of the great difference that had taken place in recent centuries into the distant past, rather than respecting what Kuznets had written about recent history and how he understood the future. In seeking innovation in the past, it is far from clear that one is approaching the past as it was. And beyond that, there is another problem: quite a number of respectable people have come to realise that – however Western Modern Economic Growth happened (and whatever its positive qualities) – it has certainly culminated in the distortion of reason, the wilful destruction of our planet, an acceleration of social inequality, contempt for the individual and even human solidarity, and thus the results amount to a generalised assault on the planet upon which we live, and the values upon which Western society was once based.13 A typical expression of the frustration with growth is that expressed by the anthropologist Rappaport, of whom Hart remarked decades ago:

12 E.g., Gordon 2016; Vollrath 2019; Vries 2013. This was also quite clearly the case shortly before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, when – despite a decade of massive quantitative easing since the onset of the 2007 derivatives-induced financial crisis and the following Euro crisis – the Western economies were stumbling, causing central banks to cut interest rates erratically and drastically in the Autumn of 2019 (“The world this week,” The Economist, 21 September 2019, The Economist, 2 November 2019) at a time when China’s economy fell to “the slowest rate of growth in 30 years” (“The world this week,” The Economist, 26 October 2019). In terms of monetary and fiscal policy, it meant that the Western states could borrow cheaply (even lending to themselves with the central banks buying state bonds with newly printed money) during the COVID-19 pandemic, but the central banks have no levers left for monetary policy as the pandemic eases – and the economy will eventually return to the same dismal state. 13 E.g., Gates 2021; Habermas 1969; Larrouturou & Méda 2016; Méda 1995; Méda 2014; Milanovic 2018; Piketty 2013. These examples cover climate, ideology, labour, progress, society, and inequality.

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He knows that if the pattern of our rotten century is repeated in the twenty-first, there will not be a twenty-second. This is because a pseudo-religion of money and commodity consumption is supervising the destruction of nature and society on a scale which is unsustainable even in the fairly short run.14

Thus, there is a consensus that the whole system of thought has not only awakened opposition to continued sustained growth, but also simultaneously contributed to tendencies and developments threatening the destruction of those very Western societies that created and nurtured not only economic growth, but also creativity, individual liberty, democracy and the rule of law.15 Beyond all of that is a curious observation about the relationship between firms, finance, markets, and technology in the strongest free-market economy in the early 21st century: the stockmarkets favour “buybacks”, “mergers and acquisitions” (which do not amount to investments in technology) while “those that ploughed their money into capital expenditure and R&D, which are necessary to boost long-term growth fared far worse”.16 Evidently, there is a difference between how Kuznets envisioned future economic growth and what the markets judge to be valuable, and this is obviously not what Kuznets envisioned or understood as Modern Economic Growth. Ironically, if Kuznets was right about economic growth, the markets are an obstacle, pushing investment in the wrong direction, preventing economic growth. This would mean that two different ideological and logically diametrically opposed approaches are frequently endorsed by the same people (i.e., freeing the markets and investing in technology) – and lead to very different outcomes. The difference is that the immediate result of stockmarket gains is wealth on the one hand, while investment in technology leads to increasing productivity over the longterm. Significantly, investments leading to increasing productivity necessarily diminish the need for abundant labour – and this can lead to increased profits, while impoverishing wide swathes of society. In any case, it would be worth investigating whether the markets are choosing wealth over technology or whether the markets realise that technology is not a source of wealth, as this too would have implications for employment. Thus, it would seem that finance and labour must be understood economically, as in both systems, financial power increases its leverage over labour. Does this imply that finance is decisive for growth and its nature? My own conclusion from this conundrum is that finance determines economic behaviour, since the finance pushes the markets and allows investment in technology. Thus, the issue to be investigated is finance – and finance has a long history going back thousands of years. So: we have poetry, technology, innovation, markets, labour and finance as possible inputs in explaining what determines and explains economic growth. Discussing where Modern Economic Growth might take us should bring up the question of understanding 14 Hart

in Rappaport 1999: xvi. is peculiar, as the only democratically legitimate justification for pushing economic growth is the well-being of society. However, one can defend it by agreeing with Margret Thatcher, that “There is no such thing as society”; viewed in this sense, economic growth does exist independent of society – and has no need of the ordinary humans who make up society; their only role is to serve economic growth, not profit from it. 16 “Business,” The Economist, 26 October 2019 (R&D = “research & development”, which means investment in pioneering scientific work leading to innovative products and innovative systems of production). 15 This

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what the nature of economic growth is and how it began. Thus, straightening out the understanding of economic growth – and how to deal with it – is an imperative. I will admit that there is something anachronistic about enquiring about an issue for which the ancients had no interest – i.e., early economic growth. However, there are a multitude of reasons for which it must be undertaken. One is that there is no real historical understanding of ancient economic growth, as the issue is neglected. Another is that, to my mind, many scholars seem to have the anachronistic idea that they should apply modern analytical methods to what might have been a very different type of economic system in the ancient and Pre-Modern worlds. Another is that I am persuaded that the input of ancient history can actually throw light on the way economies work. And above all, I am persuaded that current growth theory is threadbare, precisely because neither ancient nor modern growth are properly understood, and that one must take a long-term view of the problem, including both recent history and ancient history. Central to my thoughts is an observation by von Reden: The largest maritime loan known from Athens in the fourth century BC is 4,900 drachmas. The largest maritime loan attested in Roman Alexandria in the second century AD was equivalent to 1.75 million Attic drachmas. Pasion, the richest banker in classical Athens, is said to have had 300,000 drachmas on loan, which was by the standards of his time an enormous sum […] But Seneca in the second century AD allegedly had just in one province an equivalent of 10 million drachmas (40 million sesterces) in debt claims […] Not only had the ancient economy expanded over the 600 years between the classical Greek and Roman imperial periods, but the financial resources that supported such expansion had also grown.17

Andreau stresses that the Roman elite viewed money making as a means of maintaining or enlarging their wealth and power, but not as a matter of increasing production; the money-makers and the elite were involved in financial affairs for the same reason: to make money with money. Andreau quotes Cicero as remarking that the elite was concerned with “buying, selling and leasing”.18 In contrast to von Reden, I am not at all inclined to believe that the economy had grown between the Greek and Roman eras. Clearly the Roman economy was far larger than the Greek economy, but the economy had largely stayed the same agricultural economy. What had grown was finance. But this finance did not flow into a new economy, it merely aimed at making more profits from rents. It is important that even in the age of the Medicis and the Fuggers, real economic activity was not changing. Concerning Early and Pre-Modern France, Hoffman observes that the search for profits meant that there was a gradual tendency to prefer share-cropping leases to fixed rents: Sharecropping obviously seemed quite advantageous […] sharecropping seems to have spread [in Medieval France] in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, just as it had earlier in northern Italy. In the West of France […] share contracts rose from less than 5 percent of leases in the 1580s to over 90 percent one century later.19 17 von

Reden 2010: 92. For those who notice: it is indeed odd that she places Seneca in the second century. 1999: 24. 19 Hoffman 2000: 65. 18 Andreau

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The agricultural economy remained the foundation of the economy throughout the ancient and Pre-Modern eras; however, money-making – in the sense of trade and lending – had increased significantly since the third millennium BC. Yet the basis of that lending frequently remained attached to land. The entire understanding of economics in modern thought is rooted in the use of labour for production, with technology pushing change. Yet it changed nothing: Schneider, one of the greatest authorities on ancient technology, confirms that in general Technological change in the ancient Mediterranean never changed production in agriculture and craft as it did in the Industrial Revolution, and never increased productivity to a degree that would have resulted in change to the economic or social structure.20

The actual history of economics suggests that for most of the recorded history of the last 5000 years, economics was largely agricultural, and change did not come from investments in technology; however, finance grew progressively, with the economy remaining agricultural – and the growing wealth of the cities was drawn from the countryside. In my view, the importance and nature of finance in history and economics really should be examined and its significance investigated. That is why we should be looking in the past. Contemporary economic analysis assumes that the existing methods of economic analysis are completely correct and that applying modern methods to the past will explain why development failed before the Western economic miracle. By contrast, I suggest that understanding the economies of the past may actually throw more light on the social and historical nature of economics (as a global phenomenon) and that the exceptional experience of the last couple of centuries should not mislead us about the fundamental character of economics. It is not insignificant that in 1984 (the year before Kuznets died), American GDP grew by more than 7% and equally significant that since then it has never again reached the steady 5% annual growth, that I guess that Kuznets assumed was to be regularly expected – at least at intervals – for Modern Economic Growth.21 This would imply that we are drifting back to 18th century levels – despite far more money coming into circulation. To understand this, we must look at history, theory and technology and place these in a longterm perspective. And this is what I will try to do in the following pages, shifting back and forth between historical givens and theoretical assumptions and interpretations.

20 Schneider

2007: 170. from Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Dept. of Commerce. Kuznets just says the growth is typically “high” in Modern Economic Growth. It was in the 19th century that these rates were reached for the first time in world history. In my view it is not insignificant that “median real family income” (US Census Bureau, Historical Data) ceased growing significantly around 1980 (in comparison to post-war growth, where fewer families had two earners), meaning that consumer demand was muted; whether this influenced growth or was determined by growth is a relevant question. 21 Data

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AND

HOW DEEP DO WE DELVE AND HOW FAR BACK DO WE GO?

The first matter is that of understanding that the debate should be about the actual facts: not setting one faulty hypothetical vision against another, but trying to establish the facts about economic history. And developing an interpretation (or interpretations) of history with corresponding theoretical support. So first, it means dispensing with ideological certainty and dogma and finding the facts. My own attitude is that we should pose critical questions about every development and every assumption. For me, that means going through history and the history of thought while identifying the relevant phenomena and trying to isolate decisive changes. This means investigating the reality of history, including subsistence, inequality, markets, underemployment, production, productivity, science, innovation, technology, interest rates, money, investment, finance, and everything else that could potentially be relevant to understanding economic change in history at any and every time and place. This is the only way to understand the causes and nature of economic growth. It is a big order because it is a lot and it began a long time ago. Yet, however tortuous the history, and arduous the work, it might lead to some firm conclusions. Any other approach will remain dubious – and that is why I organized the workshop and aim to pursue this project. I have my own explanation of economic history. However, I am far from alone. Thus I invited others to voice their views because for the moment, there is no valid consensus and the only way to reach valid conclusions is to debate them – based on the facts upon which they are based: not opinions about what we wish to believe. Discussion and debate about the facts and the interpretation of the facts is essential. And this has hardly begun. What you have in your hands is nothing more than a hint about what one can think and what needs to be done. And it must be done. Some time ago, probably within the last three million years, an advanced ape hit a stone to improve the shape. For the first time in billions of years of life on earth, an upright standing creature with two free hands, each with an incipient opposing thumb controlled by a fair-sized brain, guided by three-dimensional colour-vision had appeared: one which could deliberately make and shape objects – drawing inspiration from the world around him to become a creator herself. The relationship between man and nature was thereby unbalanced. But it would be far more than a million more years until her descendants came together in the first villages, beginning around 15,000 years ago in the Near East. Yet the following changes did not take long. It was hardly more than 10,000 years later they began to build the first cities in the Near East where writing enabled bureaucrats to collect taxes (and landowners rents) from illiterate peasants in the countryside (to pay for the luxury in the cities). Over the next few thousand years, in the Ancient Near East, cities and civilisation spread and grew – and peasants suffered from improved property rights, increasing labour demands, higher taxes and higher rents. For most people “Antiquity” means “Greece & Rome”, or perhaps even includes Israel, China, the Mayas and the Incas – but for me, all that was but the tail end of the developments leading into the Pre-Modern (or Medieval) world. And then came the Industrial Revolution in England, and the West: peasants

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flocked into the cities, escaping the landowners, and came to serve merchants who had become industrialists or commercial imperialists. This transformed power, production and wealth – and with these social changes, change itself became the norm, rather than some vague barely perceptible phenomenon measured in millennia. I claim that all this began not in the Neolithic but in the urban civilisations of the Ancient Near East. THE FASCINATION WITH

THE INDUSTRIAL

REVOLUTION AND

ITS CONSEQUENCES

Economic historians have come to accept that there was an Industrial Revolution – and generally now agree that it began in Britain in the second half of the 18th century and spread from there. In this sense, it was like all of the other revolutions in the past: the first tool, the first village, the first temple, the first city, the first kingdom, the first sea-going ships, the first written document, the first price, the first interest rates, the first empire, the first science, the first fiat money, etc.: they all happened one time in one place and then slowly spread. However, aside from the first tool (in Africa), the first fiat money (in China), and the First Industrial Revolution (in Britain), the others were all created for the first time in the Ancient Near East. However, they were all interrelated, as the final leap to the Industrial Revolution was dependent on all the innovations which preceded it.22 It is generally understood that the Industrial Revolution was “a clearly recognisable discontinuity in English economic history”,23 because we see a radical transformative change that came out of nowhere. This change was so great and so violent that we take our world as the measure of all things and disregard the past as another world, unrelated to ours. This leads to the bizarre idea that the world we think we know and understand bears no relation to the world before the Industrial Revolution. All of us are familiar with economists who claim that economic history began in 1500 AD (as Robert C. Allen would have us believe), or in 1800 AD (as Gregory Clark proposes).24 For me, this is incomprehensible. The world was certainly not created in 4004 BC, and even less so in 1500 or 1800 AD. Yet, the Industrial Revolution has taken hold on us to the degree that the results of an unprecedented discontinuity have somehow come to be regarded as the norm. 22 For a few decades, economists debated whether one can really call such a long-drawn-out affair as “the Industrial Revolution” a “revolution” and if it was, why it was British (cf., e.g., Hartwell 1965; Crafts 1985; Crafts 1995; Berg & Hudson 1992; de Vries 1994; Bairoch 1997; Pomeranz 2000; Mokyr & Nye 2007; Allen 2009; Allen 2011b; Vries 2013; Vries 2015). Archaeologists have had a similar experience but have come to accept that the Neolithic was not really a “revolution”, since it went on for an unconscionably long time and what we understand of the phenomenon does not necessarily share a specific defined set of characteristics making it unique. But they let the term stand when laymen (ironically including myself here) use it. Thus we are left with these terms – and in effect they were revolutions, but we are simply obliged to change our understanding of “revolution” to match reality; this is more useful than creating a Weberian ideal type that does not exist. 23 Hartwell 1965: 168. 24 Allen 2011a; Clark 2007.

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It is not considered to be possible that this monumental “discontinuity” changed economics and science and that these changes became the foundations of new causes that led to the resulting changes in our lives. It is assumed that economics did not change with the Industrial Revolution, and that understanding the history of technological innovation (as archaeologists are wont to do) explains the Industrial Revolution, because the economists understand economics. And this leads to two problems. Firstly, there is no clarity about the origins of the Industrial Revolution. And secondly, reading, e.g., Saller,25 I have the impression that students of the ancient world are somehow able to recognise a problem, but unable to ask what the confusion really means. I disagree with the economists, but they really do face the problem. That people like Saller cannot offer the economists any explanations except to repeat the theories of the economists themselves to them means that economists will not look for solutions in the distant past by listening to the archaeologists. If they do turn to our field, they will come up with their own solutions (e.g., Temin 2013) and disregard us – telling us to listen to them (as Saller obligingly does). My central concern is overcoming such obstacles by asking the broader relevant questions with this text – and suggesting exchange and sharing of competitive arguments based on facts. FINANCE,

MARKETS, TECHNOLOGY, KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIAL THOUGHT

I personally am persuaded that economic phenomena demand economic solutions or explanations. I also assume that economics is a social activity taking place in socio-historical contexts: human social actions have human social responses, and these are collectively systemic. One just needs to identify causes and effects, and distinguish symptoms from causes and results. My argument is that finance developed gradually over thousands of years, taking different forms in different societies, but always serving to increase the wealth of the wealthy – and that finance is the foundation of economic growth (either hastening or retarding it, but it is finance rather than labour that determines outcomes, with labour performing that role determined by finance). With the Industrial Revolution, finance suddenly acquired another subtle role, pushing private investment in production and transforming the role of some members of the commercial classes from traders to industrialists, and that of others into scientists serving industry. This social transformation happened as banks were allegedly merely lubricating the economy with the circulation of money facilitating investment and transactions. The first Industrial Revolution was indisputably the British Industrial Revolution. Thus I say that by increasing the money supply with cheap credit, the Bank of England was increasing the money supply without any economic (in the sense of commercial or productive) activity and that this might have played a role in changing economic activity (in the sense of commerce and industry). This fact is generally disregarded.

25 Saller

2002.

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The Bank of England was creating a climate with increasing employment with wages paid in funds backed by money while offering unbelievable opportunities for personal profits to grow into widespread social prosperity and economic growth. The effects spread through Western society in a way which has never before been seen in any society in history. The most obvious change was the extensive use of private finance to employ energy and technology to increase production. In contrast to finance – which followed a more or less consistent role through history – the social histories of wisdom, knowledge, science and technology seem to have followed meandering and divergent paths, performing different roles in different societies. With the Industrial Revolution, science and knowledge were abruptly severed from wisdom – and bound to finance and technology, bringing about the most extraordinary transformation of human society (while also hitting the universities rather hard). In my eyes, the present exploitation of technology is merely a symptom resulting from economically rational behaviour in a given social environment. As an instrument, the development of technology always requires finance – and where it promises financial gains, investment in technology will draw financial investment. Thus, technology is a symptom of financial activity. Bizarrely, in industrialising Britain and Europe something extraordinary also happened: a change in spirit. With the Industrial Revolution, some ordinary people found change to be a good thing. Curiously, during the Egyptian Dynasty XII – more than 3500 years ago – a king would exalt himself for having extended the borders of Egypt beyond what he inherited from his predecessors (“I added to what was bequeathed to me”) 26 and an ordinary policeman of the same dynasty would likewise declare that for his son, he had “made for him a testament in excess of that which my father had made”.27 Thus, king and policeman had the same sense of decency familiar among the middle classes today – wanting to be known for having bettered the lives of the next generation, in the case of the king, by extending the borders of the realm; in the case of the policeman by increasing the material well-being of his son. This was not a matter of change, but of improvement under existing conditions – and this was possible because the state had changed the rules of ordinary primate behaviour among humans (as for most of human history bequeathing anything at all was inconceivable: this was only possible after the creation of states). Without the state, ordinary decency was impossible – and the state made this ordinary decency normal. This was a decisive cognitive change: investment made sense. But, before the Industrial Revolution, the Golden Age lay in the past. The best that could be hoped for was to improve the chances of one’s own family – and even in the second millennium BC, it was generally realised that even such advances could easily be reversed: “Lo, the poor men have become men of wealth”.28 Such changes happened when the state fell apart

26 Lichtheim

1975–1976: I, 119. 1957: 310. 28 Lichtheim 1975–1976: I, 151. 27 Gardiner

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and lawlessness broke down the social barriers that held society together. For the middle classes, such changes were not viewed as positive, as they negated the values of the middle classes upon whom society will always depend, just as the middle classes depend upon society. Moderate change with self-improvement is the motto of the middle class – and it serves society quite well. (And, of course, the middle classes emerged only in the earliest Ancient Near Eastern states after 3000 BC – and remained a small part of the population until the era of the Industrial Revolution). With the Industrial Revolution and the celebration of innovation, the future here on earth became the land of hope for a better life for everyone – based on the assumption that disruptive change brought about improvement by innovation. Democratic principles supporting the concept that the individual was decisive – rather than tradition or society – meant a different system of values, and a transfer of responsibility, which opened up and endorsed personal hope, craving, and striving. With industrialisation came the idea of progress, that things could and must change and improve for both the middle and lower classes at the same time. Progress became a state of normality and the future here on earth became the land of hope. In this sense, the Industrial Revolution was the most extraordinary social revolution in history – in terms of transforming mindsets, it was incomparable to anything that had ever happened in history. Instead of looking to the past as a source of inspiration or comparison, we are obsessed with the present and the future – and thus understanding “economic growth” as we allegedly understand it means justifiably dismissing the past: only the future can offer hope. But – and this has likewise not quite gotten into our heads – the Industrial Revolution lies not far behind us. Yet already many of the children of the beneficiaries of the Industrial Revolution in the West have mixed feelings about change and little hope of improvement and expect little of the future, at least as things are now organised.29 Severing the links between wisdom and science has led to a society governed by the arbitrary dictates of finance and technology, with politicians and citizens at the mercy of forces they cannot understand. Finance and wealth have been yanked out of the hands of the socially conscious leaders, awarding power to the commercial classes that had formerly been servants, with the contemporary social system cementing their hold on power.30

29 This is most eloquently expressed by the misgivings about the state of Western society that were reflected in the flow of votes supporting peculiar causes in the USA and UK in the second decade of the 21st century. 30 In a tribute to itself, The Economist recently attempted to revive the memory of the revocation of Corn Laws noting that in doing so, Peel more or less kept his party out of power for three decades, but that in the interests of progress and the country, the deed was necessary. And concluding, “What leader would be willing to do that today?” (“Finance & Economics,” The Economist, 26 June 2021). The response is, of course, to point out that in the democratic world today, we choose to elect followers, not leaders – and the self-centred attention-spans of voters and followers alike are getting shorter and shorter.

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INEQUALITY

205

AND HISTORY

Human societies will have been governed by inequality since before we had become human, but material inequality really only began to reveal itself in the Neolithic 10,000 years ago when some families will have built larger houses for themselves. But these could only attract the attention of wandering brigands. Yet even so, this insecure wealth was still a new and rare phenomenon. Among primates, one Alpha male will always try to dominate – and once he is too weak or has not negotiated successfully, he will be displaced, in an endless cycle with changing personnel in an unchanging society. Early human societies will have been no different, and there was little treasure for anyone – aside from the Alpha’s harem. In the Neolithic there will have been a few trinkets, but it will not have been possible for anyone to institutionalize a self-perpetuating social system based exclusively on wealth. Although the mobilisation of communal labour was obviously taking place, rigid hierarchies were not able to assert themselves against society over the long term; nevertheless, disparities between the leading families and the lowest families will have begun to appear and social conflict papered over, until each village society fell apart. In some places where the villages were able to survive without cities and states – as was the case in northern Europe until the late Middle Ages – there was virtually no development, except growing unstable social inequality where the threat of violence was probably more common than wealth or solidarity. The northern Europeans could plunder and destroy – but they could not build stable societies. It is ironic that the British archaeologist Andrew Sherratt referred to urbanism as a “contagious process”.31 Ancient urbanism did indeed catch on in the regions to the East of the Near East, but never infected northern Europe, which insisted on remaining marginal to human history. Thus, cities did appear, but initially there were many regions where they did not – although within this 21st century AD, it should transpire that half of humanity lives in cities, and the process of contagion gradually becomes invincible. But this is a new phenomenon – and one in which primitive Europe played no role. The primitive way of life was first consigned to the past in the cities of the Near Eastern Bronze Age, from ca. 5500 years ago. And in the Near East, the tradition of urbanism has been maintained uninterrupted up the present day, with the rural hinterland dominated by the cities. What really transformed and cemented material inequality was the moment in the Bronze Age when property and inheritance rights were enshrined in law, dictated by the urban centres. Henceforth – until today – the inheritance of material wealth would give some families an edge which was only eliminated by war or a change of government. Many families will have adjusted to changes in government – but times of social unrest and instability could level inequality briefly before some of the formerly underprivileged managed to acquire the wealth and power of the earlier leaders, meaning that some enjoyed or suffered from some minor social mobility, but social change did not often occur since the new order always involved giving the advantages of land ownership and inheritance

31 Cited

by Wilkinson in Kristiansen et al. 2018: 43.

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rights to the elite class whose members could change in a violent upheaval (in what amounted to a zero-sum game, except where the chaos resulted in more loss than gain – as happened in Greece when primitive Indo-Europeans broke in around 1200 BC, and in Europe when the Roman Empire collapsed). Those living outside state societies did not enjoy much wealth, security or stability – and those free peasants at the bottom of the wealthiest society paying rents and taxes were far better off than those outside the states. And already more than 3500 years ago in the Near East, middle class families could hope to improve their own quality of life by working steadily. That was an extraordinary change. One of the results of the Early Modern and Modern eras in the West was that the lower and middle classes first gradually and then rapidly began to grow wealthier, with the middle class as a whole gradually increasing as a proportion of the population. This had never happened before. And in Europe, the change was unparalleled in history, for northern Europe was hardly urban 1500 years ago and moved – in one long continuous development – from being far behind the Near East to being far ahead of the Near East and every other part of the world, in terms of social stability and wealth. A First British Industrial Revolution (ca. 1760–1830 AD) triggered a Second “Western” Industrial Revolution (ca. 1870–1914 AD) which transformed society, but the real wealth creation took place later. With the Second Industrial Revolution, for the first time in human history wages began a steady rise; in the West, this era of steadily and rapidly rising wages lasted from roughly from 1850 (or 1870?) to 1980 AD. During this era, material inequality was diminished in some advanced societies around the world, as the households of ordinary wage earners gained access to unheard-of wealth. However, the greatest increase in ordinary household wealth did not occur during the Industrial Revolution, but rather during the Bretton Woods era which followed the Second World War – and this was the most prosperous period (because of diminishing inequality) in human history.

ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN HISTORY It cannot be an accident that it was in 1871 that Carl Menger published his pathbreaking book on the principles of economics, where he declared that the laws of economics functioned independently of human free will.32 This was the dawning of a new era, where ordinary human beings would become the servants and beneficiaries of a transformed society, one dedicated to progress. Harnessed to the new science of economics, they harnessed civilisation to science pushing technology, creating a new world. Kuznets – the magician who unfolded the mysteries of Modern Economic Growth – stressed that the First British Industrial Revolution “ushered in the modern epoch of economic growth”.33 In doing so, he was largely using statistics that were mostly related to the period before 1960 AD. Thus in 1965 (a) Kuznets did not dispute that there was

32 Menger 33 Kuznets

1871: IX. 1966: 8.

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economic growth before the Modern era (in contrast to those like Allen and Clark) – and (b) Kuznets could not have imagined what would happen in the 1960s and beyond. So there is economic history both before and after the time that Kuznets dealt with. The societies of the Ancient Near East put us on a trajectory that allowed England to lead us into a new world. But all of Modern Economic Growth took place after the Portuguese and Dutch began to participate in the markets of the Indian Ocean where international trade had begun in the third millennium BC. Only after those discoveries did Europe begin to overtake the world, in what has been described as The Great Divergence. Perhaps what happened in the Ancient Near East was decisive for what later happened in England. Economics used to be Political Economy, a Social Science; in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution, under the influence of the Austrian school, it has increasingly become a matter of mathematics and technology rather than history and society. This is because somehow “economics” was understood in terms of firms (as in Marshall) whereas “political economy” (as in Menger’s Volkswirthschaftslehre) was larger, but “economics” (originally dedicated to firms) has now been enlarged to take in the entire economy, but treats the whole as a commercial (rather than social) venture.

THE NATURE OF LONG-TERM GROWTH IN PERSPECTIVE When – after the Meiji Restoration – the Japanese joined the West and endorsed the idea of Modern Economic Growth, it was a technologically driven state policy (as had become the norm in the West), and thus in Japan the Second Industrial Revolution culminated in aircraft carriers – in a country where swords had been the norm less than a century earlier. After some missteps, in the Post-War era Japan created powerful electronic and automobile industries which conquered an even greater part of the world than had the aircraft carriers. This changed the economy. In the third quarter of the 20th century AD, in Japan 35% of GDP (25% of employment) was in manufacturing, 5% of GDP (19% of employment) was in agriculture; in the second decade of the 21st century 26% of GDP (25% of employment) was in industry and 1% (3.7% of the labour force) in agriculture; roughly 75% of the economy is now in services – and 70% of employment. A century and a half ago, the economy was basically Pre-Modern agricultural as it had been for more than a millennium; in dollar terms the economy had grown incredibly 1950–1985 – before stability resumed in a completely different world.34 The steepest decline in agricultural employment took place in the Post-Modern era, and the increase in industrial employment during the Industrial Revolution was not as great as the increase in the size of industry in the economy.

34 The figures and statistics in this paragraph are publicly available; drawn here from various publications of The Economist (editions of The World in Figures [1976], the Atlas [1989], the Pocket World in Figures [1999, 2008, 2015], and recent issues of the actual newspaper).

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In Japan, between 1870 and 1991 GDP per capita rose from ca. $1600 to ca. $30,800. That gives a rough idea of trends. However, for Japan specifically, there is a problem with benchmarks. During the war, per capita GDP almost reached $5000, but this was not exceeded again until 1957 (1945 GDP per capita was ca. $3700). Thus the growth in per capita GDP 1955–1991 is ca. $4500 to ca. $31,000 (i.e., an increase of ca. $25,000 in 35 years). After 1991, growth slowed substantially and by 2018 GDP per capita had only reached almost $39,000 (i.e., an increase of ca. $8000 in 25 years), having more or less stagnated in recent decades in comparison to the extraordinary ascent in the post-war era. However, significant is that in comparison to all these other trends, growth during the Japanese Industrial Revolution was almost insignificant.35 Being a leading player for a couple of decades, the Japanese were also the first to experience the financial mishaps of low growth, low interest rates, low inflation – and exploding sovereign debt, accompanying the growth of a flourishing services sector where industrial production had once been seen as the main source of growth – and thus Japan adumbrated developments in what is now becoming the norm in other parts of the rich world. It will be noted that typical of the shift from the Modern to the Post-Modern economy is that agricultural employment shifts to “services” in a higher proportion than does employment from industry to services. During the Industrial Revolution, employment in agriculture remained high, and only tumbled in the Post-Modern services economy.36 The Japanese experience thus portrays not only (a) wealth in Pre-Modern economies, and (b) the era of Modern Economic Growth but also (c) the ambivalent character of Post-Modern growth based on untenable fiscal and monetary policies – and (d) also demonstrates that the contemporary performance of the Chinese economy is not exceptional, as the process of catching up with the competition can go quickly and be very successful, if guided by competent policy-makers. Highly significant is that it would seem that there is a close relationship between declining industrialisation and growing sovereign debt accompanying the growth of sputtering Post-Modern service economies. Important is that the exceptional growth of the Japanese and Chinese economies was policy-generated; but also that the course of Post-Modern growth (as the aftermath of the Modern and Pre-Modern) was accompanied by exceptional financial side-effects – and that these latter are largely neglected. One of the most important features to be drawn from the Japanese data is that the real growth did not take place during the era of catching up with the Western Industrial Revolution (Second Industrial Revolution 1870–1914), but rather in the Post-War Bretton Woods era (ca. 1950–1973). And in fact growth in the US, UK, Italy, Germany and France

35 See the Maddison Project Databases; versions 2013, 2018 and 2020 are on-line and up-to-date. Go to: Jutta Bolt, Robert Inklaar, Herman de Jong and Jan Luiten van Zanden 2018, “Rebasing ‘Maddison’: new income comparisons and the shape of long-run economic development,” Maddison Project Working Paper, nr. 10, available for download at www.ggdc.net/maddison. The source of my figures conjured for the data cited is mostly from the 2020 Maddison Project Release. 36 In my review of Scheidel 2017 (Warburton 2018c), I stressed that in Japan, policies – rather than warfare as Scheidel would have us believe – had contributed to growth and diminishing inequality. Such policies are easier for an outsider (as MacArthur was) to implement.

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was also higher during the Post-War Bretton Woods era than during the preceding Industrial Revolution. And in most places it has slowed since then (Post-Modern ca. 1980–2020), except for Britain which apparently profited from its brief membership in the EU. Holland likewise seems to have successfully adjusted to the Post-Modern37 (and indeed Holland would appear – alone of all lands in the world – to have profited from almost every economic adjustment in the last millennium; seemingly having suffered only from the French wars and the collapse of the VOC). In this sense, the Industrial Revolution represents the spontaneous beginning of growth – but the real growth came later, with consolidation and policies (and in recent decades even this has still faded in most regions, China and Holland excepted – where the policies have been radically adjusted). From Table 9.1., one can see (a) that in dollar terms Pre-Modern economic activity is insignificant in comparison to what we ourselves know, (b) that the Industrial Revolution led to considerable growth, but (c) this was largely overshadowed by the rapid Post-War growth in the Bretton Woods era, and (d) that the commercial and banking world of Italy was leading before the Industrial Revolution, and was left behind – catching up in the Post-War. In terms of statistics, important is that per capita GDP in China is generally behind other lands – even when it was still (and is again on the way to becoming) the world’s largest economy, because the large population is taken into account in per capita figures. In historical terms, Pre-Modern Italian wealth is crucial as it highlights the importance of commercial and banking activity as a proportion of income in Pre-Modern agricultural economies – a feature which is usually neglected in regarding Pre-Modern agricultural economies as subsistence economies. It is also highly probable that the highly developed financial sectors in the Post-Modern world play a role in skewing figures for growth in a similar fashion. Certainly, in 1750 Japan and China belonged to a developed Pre-Modern world, while Europe – before the Industrial Revolution – was already Modern and becoming wealthier. Significant is that technological innovation was not typical of the Bretton Woods era, in contrast to the eras that preceded and followed it. Typical of the future is that in Japan, sovereign debt as a percentage of GDP is now (2020 AD) nearing 200%; in the US it is still only at ca. 130%.38 However, US sovereign debt is predicted to exceed 200% “in 30 years time”.39 Not only would such high figures for sovereign debt in wealthy countries have been anathema during the 1960s heyday era of post-war Modern Economic Growth, but in this branch the US has already overtaken profligate Brazil, where sovereign debt is still near only 100% of GDP. Such liquidity with a growing financial sector contributed to the financial crisis of 2007/8. Indeed, such high rates of sovereign debt are more reminiscent of Pre-Modern Spain and irresponsible governments such as that of Modern and contemporary Argentina which have repeatedly declared bankruptcy. Indeed, today there is a growing awareness that the central banks of the richest Post-Modern economies have lost the ability to control monetary policy and the financial sector, but that hitherto growth and low interest rates have assured an 37 With their swift adaptability and flexibility, the Dutch even managed to profit from Brexit, “Finance & Economics,” The Economist, 20 February 2021. 38 Publicly available; figures here my roundings from the estimates of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank. 39 “United States,” The Economist, 1 May 2021.

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Country→ ↓Year

Japan

UK

Holland

Spain

USA

1 1000 1750 1830 1850 1945 1955 1975 1990 2018

n/a 1010 953 n/a 1436 3677 4417 18082 29949 38673

n/a 1151 2702 3550 4332 11247 12541 18884 26189 38058

n/a n/a 3777 3038 3779 4281 11678 21318 27515 47474

886 1000* 1429* 1679* 1706 3357 4442 12621 19215 31496

n/a n/a 2400* 3039 3631 16477 17370 25956 36982 55334

Germany France n/a n/a 1674 n/a 2276 7195 9240 19193 25391 46177

956 1100* 1677 1898 2546 4101 9881 20653 28129 38515

Italy

China

1407 n/a 2703 2657 2611 2831 7453 17123 26003 34364

n/a 1225 1061 846 858 800* 1119 1594 2982 13101

Table 9.1. Figures for GDP per capita (comparable 2011 $ values), selected countries 1750–2018; figures from Maddison Project 2020 release (https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/?lang=en), with decimal points removed; for Spain, China, France and the USA neighbouring years were on occasion used and rounded – and some were arbitrarily guesstimated.40 (The World Bank poverty line is $1.90/ set in 2015; this translates to ca. $1.80 in 2011 dollars, meaning roughly $660 of the dollars used here. Per capita GDP is not, however, income, but includes the income of the indigent and the millions of the emperors for the year 1, meaning that most people will have been near poverty in the Pre-Modern world.)

equilibrium which is incompatible with long-term stable growth.41 Significantly, in the US, this enormous increase in sovereign debt has not fuelled economic growth in a fashion 40 GDP – “Gross Domestic Product” – is usually expressed as a dollar figure estimate of the total value of economic activity in a single economic unit (e.g., the EU, China or California) in a single year; per capita GDP is the value of the total GDP divided by the population. When comparing different historical periods and geographical regions one uses “constant dollars” (i.e., figures from which the distorting effects of inflation have been removed, and – where possible – PPP [purchasing power parity] somehow estimated and incorporated into the figures) meaning that the values for different regions and years are comparable. In recent years it has become normal to take a recent benchmark, e.g., 1990, 2011 or 2015 dollars (and even some special kinds of dollars), and project this back in time. The idea is to get “real” universally valid figures. Obviously, however, such figures can never be precise since even in 2019 the purchasing power of a real dollar differed in downtown New York from its value in rural Mississippi, let alone the value of its equivalent in worth in Yemen. Complications would grow if estimating, e.g., the contemporary dollar value of an ancient Egyptian pyramid in ancient Egypt, i.e., with labour costs and no tourism (the opposite of the situation in 2019). More important is that the per capita GDP figures do not reflect the actual income of anyone since the GDP is a value of all economic activity and gives no hint at actual income or the distribution of that income. For comparing the actual distribution of income in and between societies, economists employ the Gini-coefficient which indicates whether the actual income is concentrated in the hands of a small group or widely distributed in the society. Thus per capita GDP figures are merely a proxy which gives a rough idea of how wealthy and prosperous a society is – and that was my goal in presenting this oversimplified version of the value of various different economies at different times. 41 In its “Special Report” (The Economist, 12 October 2019) The Economist details that the Post-Modern has taken economies into uncharted domains, meaning that the alleged fundamentals of economics have been

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visible in the per capita GDP figures – but it has certainly accompanied a significant increase in inequality.42 The key points are (a) that Pre-Modern economies were basically poverty-stricken, (b) there was little improvement during the Industrial Revolution, (c) the Bretton Woods era (with falling sovereign debt) was an era of growing prosperity and equality, while (d) the Post-Modern shows a tendency to stagnation compared to the Bretton Woods era.

UNDERSTANDING POST-MODERN ECONOMICS AND

RELATING CONCEPTS TO GROWTH

This recent history contains many different stories, most of which have not been fully digested. What I argue is that preceding the First British Industrial Revolution (1750– 1830)43 was a Financial Revolution (beginning before the 17th century in Holland)44 which transformed the commercial economy, creating the First Modern Economy.45 This Financial Revolution created the basis for the First British Industrial Revolution, which was accompanied and followed by a Scientific Revolution and a Second Industrial Revolution (from the second half of the 19th century), when it was realised that technology seemed to be changing society and economics in the West (and Japan). From the 19th century onwards, most economic thought thus concentrated on production and the distribution of goods, as advocated by Menger. Until this era, thought about economics – from the first millennium BC in Greece and China – was generally about agricultural production, prices, trade and money.46 This changed completely in the context of the Industrial Revolution and economic growth was assigned to innovation and technology, and Schumpeter (the prophet of the new age) specifically stated that concerns with money were “heresies” in economic thought.47 These thoughts have endured until this day, leading some to assume that there were “economic constraints” (in the sense of production) that prevented growth before the Industrial Revolution, and that these had been thrown off by exploiting technology. In this conceptual context, it became obvious that full-employment and maximum production were fundamental characteristics of economics. These concepts of “constraints” – of scarcity and full-employment and maximum production, etc. – were assumed for the

shaken and will have to be aligned with different parameters. Even today – post COVID-19 – few will appreciate the reality that five decades after the end of Bretton Woods (which began to crumble in August 1971), the arrangements which Keynes made to save capitalism – allowing Bretton Woods to enable the provisional perpetuation of the Modern – have finally collapsed. Our Post-Modern economies are not compatible with the Neo-Classical Synthesis – and the problem is money, as I have argued for decades. The Neo-Classical Synthesis was an inadequate description of how economies functioned – and the framework upon which it was founded is now recognized as foundering. 42 E.g., Milanovic 2018; Scheidel 2017. 43 E.g., Allen 2009. 44 Neal 2000. 45 de Vries & van der Woude 1997. 46 E.g., Meikle 1994; Rickett 1998; Rickett 2001. 47 Schumpeter 1964: 140. We will return to this below.

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present and projected into the past as well as the future, providing a global and comprehensive image of how societies and economies function and had always functioned. Because of the wide-ranging “powerful stimulus”48 of technological improvements resulting from the “application of science”,49 Modern Economic Growth consisted of a “Sustained increase”50 in economic growth which was “steady”.51 Kuznets therefore assumed that technological development would bring further growth and employment with rising wages, rendering “inequality” irrelevant.52 Fundamental was that The rapid growth of science and recognition of its usefulness brought about a conscious and systematic application of basic scientific discoveries to problems of economic production and human welfare.53

Modern Economic Growth meant that technology brought about the production of goods which overcame scarcity as the growth in economic output exceeded the growth in population, and this increase in “product”54 improved human welfare, presumably because of increased access to goods. However, the Post-Modern is different. The production of goods has become a mundane routine activity outsourced from the wealthy lands (along with jobs) as far as possible, while advertising actually assures profits for the contemporary technological giants, where e.g., “Facebook […] has built a $92bn-per-year advertising business by selling space alongside posts”.55 Obviously, the facts (a) of growing inequality and (b) that the most advanced technological firms rely on encouraging people to consume what they obviously do not of themselves realise that they need demonstrate that Kuznets’s Modern Economic Growth is over. The application of science in contemporary technology is no longer overcoming scarcity, but rather propagating consumption. Whether this is healthy or not is irrelevant: the point is that the whole approach is incoherent, for the claims, assumptions and reality do not coincide. Thus, I contend that there are very serious deficiencies in this entire system of thought. I have my own opinions (based on history, going from the Neolithic to the contemporary era) – but the absolute best confirmations of the deficiencies are to be found in Gordon’s Rise and Fall of American Growth,56 Milanovic’s Global Inequality,57 Lewis’s “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour”,58 and Méda’s Le travail:

48 Kuznets

1966: 12. 1966: 11. 50 Kuznets 1966: 26. Italics in original. 51 Kuznets 1966: 71. Italics in original. 52 Kuznets 1966: 14. 53 Kuznets 1966: 10. 54 Kuznets 1966: 64–65. 55 “Briefing,” The Economist, 8 May 2021. 56 Gordon 2016. 57 Milanovic 2018. 58 Lewis 1954. 49 Kuznets

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une valeur en voie de disparition,59 which together demonstrate (a) that despite widespread technological innovation in the contemporary era prosperity has ceased to grow, (b) that with increased money supplies, the wealthier are becoming incomparably wealthier, (c) that for most of history labour has had virtually no value, but has created enormous profits for capital and (d) that we are now returning to that world where labour has no value – after a brief interval of two centuries during which labour was assigned a role in diminishing scarcity because technology was stressed and money disregarded (while real wages were rising). While stressing that growth has slowed, Vollrath endeavours to deny the social implications of declining growth by assuming that complacency is in order as people are satisfied.60 There are several different points relevant to this conclusion or contention. The most obvious is that a scholar of the Ancient World could justifiably suggest that the same complacency could be allowed for Ancient Egypt – and that the lack of growth was simply a symptom of the fact that all were content with a state of prolonged and healthy leisure (evaluated by me anachronistically as underemployment and poverty).61 In this sense, the culture of growth could be viewed as an erroneous mindset, and the study of ancient economies approached in a rather different fashion. Modern Economic Growth brought healthy prosperity to an awful lot more people than any other episode in human history. I argue that this Post-Modern economy is returning to the Pre-Modern economy where finance and inequality dominated, with the important difference that in the Post-Modern world, all of society is dependent on jobs in the services economy because the economists dictated that in the Modern economy full-employment was the norm. For a time, this elevated the nature of work. However, if Gordon and Vollrath are right (which should be evident) it means that finance now approaches society in a far more threatening fashion than that familiar in Ancient Egypt and that of early 20th century China – where peasants were starving in the midst of plenty before the eyes of Lattimore and Snow, a development caused by the behaviour of landowners and merchants fully in accord with an economic scheme described by Lewis62 – and that would be the lot of Post-Modern society, if fullemployment is expected to maintain demand. Altogether, I therefore argue that deficiencies in economic thought have contributed to a misunderstanding of economics, and thereby in the Post-Modern world had negative social repercussions. If we are to understand the present and the past, we should try to understand economics as it was and is. And that is our project here. Part of it is economic history and part of it is economic thought.

59 Méda

1995. (Rough translation: “Labour: a vanishing value”). 2019. 61 Warburton 2019b. 62 More on this below, but cf. also Warburton 2019b. 60 Vollrath

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ECONOMIC HISTORY I will try to present what I see as major issues and problems relating to approaching and understanding economic history as a context for understanding growth. Among the most important obstacles is overcoming an overriding Eurocentric approach which serves as a constant illusory beacon, distracting observers from grasping the long-term story. Fundamental to the long-term story is recognising the ancient markets, as the failure to understand their nature contributes to a wide-spread tendency to trivialise Antiquity.63 As chronological and conceptual units, I will generally use some terms as shorthand referring to a chronological sequence of classification that corresponds to my conception of categories of development and economic behaviour. Stage “zero” can be divided into two parts, initially the hunter-gatherer cultures of a possibly nomadic Palaeolithic followed by the villages of the Neolithic where the basics for a production economy were created. Thus the first stage of economic change began with the urban economies of the Ancient Near East when the cities and states appropriated the rural agrarian economies, using taxes and rents to force an involuntary increase in agricultural production as a means of supporting strong fiscal states in the Orient (which I term “tax-based demand stimulus”); they also invented the trade routes and the financial mechanisms and markets. These began in the urban Ancient Near East in the late Neolithic of the fifth millennium BC and gradually spread (but did not entirely eradicate Palaeolithic and Neolithic behaviour everywhere, which even today survives in pockets). Markets, merchants and money were fundamental to the functioning of these bureaucratic fiscal states, and the market features were all adopted by all following forms of economic interaction, whereas the bureaucracies were not so common.

63 For those of us who work with the ancient economies, the positions of Finley and Polanyi are largely recognised as having been contradicted as increasing evidence was gradually produced (since the 1970s, most importantly Veenhof 1972) that there was no support for the claims for the Near East (more recently, e.g., Goddeeris 2002) or even Greece (cf. Bresson 2016). Although I have published criticism of the Polanyi school regarding Egypt and the Near East (e.g., Warburton 2003: 147–186), completely independent of my criticism Eyre (1999: 577) realised that “the work of Polanyi is simply irrelevant to pharaonic Egypt”, and Quack 1998 agreed that my criticism of the Polanyi adherents “easily refuted” their claims for Egypt. As Egypt was traditionally viewed as the firmest bastion where some evidence supported Polanyi’s position, it is important that it is indisputably not the case that Egypt provides support for the claims of Polanyi’s adherents. Thus, most of those working with the ancient economies are aware that Polanyi’s work was not a positive contribution to scholarship – and certainly abusive to the long-term dialogue about ancient economic history (of which this volume is an earnest effort at stimulating a broad-based interdisciplinary discussion). Yet my experience has been that Polanyi’s conceptual framework constantly resurfaces as if the criticism was unfounded (e.g., Axford 2013: 110–111; Dale 2013; Temin 2013; Hirth 2020). Unfortunately, the doctrines of Polanyi are so impervious to scholarly criticism that even the Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient has not only endorsed contributions favouring Polanyi’s interpretation (e.g., Hudson 2005; Dale 2013) but also prevented legitimate debate – and thus it is understandable that some may believe that there must be some truth behind these erroneous dogmas. This is, however, not the case.

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These were followed by, secondly, the Ancient Classical Mediterranean and Ancient China (and the neighbours who appeared between and around them, particularly along the Silk Road) which flowed into the Pre-Modern economies, sharing many characteristics inherited from what had begun in the Near East, with variations in China. However, the Ancient and Pre-Modern Mediterranean societies tended to have less bureaucratic states and a larger private sector than the earliest urban Near Eastern economies, and later China. Egypt and the Near East basically disappeared, being conquered by Alexander and subsequently absorbed by the Ancient Mediterranean and similar neighbouring cultures. And the difference between Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages in the Mediterranean is so minimal as to be barely perceptible, while northern Europe would have to wait further centuries before joining the Pre-Modern. Of these later ancient economies China is an extreme exception as it was highly bureaucratic and maintained many aspects of the most ancient Near Eastern agrarian economies, while constantly evolving socially, economically and technologically during the ancient and Pre-Modern periods. Pre-Modern behaviour and thought – e.g., the concept of money (rather than labour) as a means of gaining wealth – is still widespread in both economies that remained Pre-Modern and those that appear Modern. Perhaps the most significant difference between China and Greece is not merely the relative size of the economies, but rather that the philosophers in China were usually part of the state system, while the philosophers in Greece and the Church were part of the market system – with one result being, e.g., that money and labour are viewed differently. Thirdly, the Modern began in Holland during the 16th and 17th centuries AD and gradually spread to England and, with the Industrial Revolution, all across the world (with private financial activity interwoven with fiscal policies including sovereign debt leading to a transformation with mechanised privately owned productive commercial sectors). Although dominant and hegemonic, even this economy did not eliminate earlier forms of thought and behaviour everywhere. However, where it caught on, conceptually, Modern thought elevated labour into a source of wealth and relegated money to playing a role as a means of exchange. This mindset is probably the greatest feature distinguishing the Modern. Fourthly, the contemporary or Post-Modern (largely service economies based on consumption and sovereign debt feeding lucrative financial sectors), which may have begun in Japan sometime towards the end of the 20th century and has still not become dominant – but is the dismal, but only viable route to the future.64

64 From the sequence I have – in contrast to Hirth 2020 – excluded the economies of the Americas from the ancient and Pre-Modern, because (a) they had no input in the transition from the Pre-Modern to the Modern and (b) they never adopted the system of equivalencies based on weights in silver as a conceptual means of appraising of value (cf., e.g., Rahmstorf & Stratford 2019; Rahmstorf et al. 2021; Warburton 2018a). This system of prices and values expressed in silver was established in the Near East in the third millennium BC and was still very important at the start of the Modern – and thus fundamental for the understanding of the role of the most ancient world in the history of economic growth which eventually changed in the transition from the Pre-Modern to the Modern and later in Post-Modern.

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My principal concern is that people assume that the Modern economic system is an absolute, and completely understood one – whereas I view the Modern as an uneasy compromise between Pre-Modern and Modern thinking and behaviour, which is not really very well understood, and not entirely relevant to a Post-Modern world, and even less so to understanding a Pre-Modern world. One neglected point in Scheidel’s account of inequality is that he fails to realise that in the post-war Bretton Woods era, there were policies which effectively pushed economic growth (as claimed in my discussion of Table 9.1 above) and were accompanied by diminishing inequality.65 I claim that the Bretton Woods era lies behind Piketty’s trente glorieuses. However, these policies also impinged on finance, as The Economist observed: After the second world war countries shrank their debts over the course of decades, but only using a bossy combination of high taxes on capital, financial repression (forcing domestic investors to hold debt at artificially low interest rates) and inflation, which erodes the real value of debt over time.66

In my view neglecting the positive effects of the Bretton Woods era is certainly legitimate for those claiming that markets should be freed; understanding it is crucial. Thus, I stress the historically documented antiquity of markets and finance, and assign the latter a key role in determining economic trends and results while markets determine activity. Understanding this is only possible when taking a very long-term view of economic history as it really was. Understanding exactly what happened was my chief motive in bringing together the people who participated in the workshop – because I believe that key events in economic development took place throughout history, and that many of these developments still influence economic activity and policy, while our own understanding of economic activity remains riveted to the contemporary understanding of Modern economic processes, as allegedly understood by economists. The only way to understand them is not with theoretical analysis applying templates to history, but rather reading the story in the data from the past, and projecting trends based on the past (not the present, or recent past masquerading as present in the minds of economists). One must try to grasp what happened in What Hirth apparently fails to understand was that both the Spanish conquistadors and the Aztecs were Pre-Modern and that by stressing the Aztecs and neglecting the Spanish and their Italian bankers he was offering a distorted view of the Pre-Modern world. I assume that this system was created in the Bronze Age Near East and that no such system allowing “savings” in money or “systematic” equivalencies existed anywhere in the world much before 3000 BC. Jones (this volume) assumes that this type of activity took place routinely in Neolithic Greece. 65 Scheidel 2017; Warburton 2018c. 66 The Economist, 25 April 2020. It is, however, also inaccurate and unjust to claim that the inflation was part of the problem of Bretton Woods. It was the irresponsible increases in American debt that contributed to the failure of the Bretton Woods system – and that unleashed inflation. Keynes intended that the Bretton Woods institutions would assure sufficient liquidity to be available for irresponsible fiscal policies to be overcome without inhibiting growth while preventing inflation from taking off. That the Americans accepted the role that Keynes had assigned the dollar did not prevent their profligacy leading to the demise of the system since they had refused to surrender the balances he expected them to deliver for his system to function. Thus, The Economist was mixing two different points.

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terms of causes, results and symptoms. And then examine and propose possible theoretical explanations. A rounded figure of $1000 per capita GDP for China in 1750 AD is probably an illusory but persuasive example of a figure one could expect for a sophisticated Pre-Modern agricultural economy, after almost three millennia of development with relative prosperity. And this figure – as with all those which one could imagine for all ancient and Pre-Modern economies – conceals those isolated high spires and deep broad valleys which would have revealed the inequality in the distribution of material wealth and income, particularly financial income from landholdings. When taking a figure like $1000 as the outcome of millennia of ancient and PreModern economic development, it is therefore entirely comprehensible that a rounded figure of $30,000 for Japan in 1990 would mean that we can dismiss everything that happened before the Industrial Revolution. This was useful so long as it was agreed that markets are the driving force of economic history and that they gradually spread from Italy to northern Europe in the second millennium AD,67 and that Modern Economic Growth was the outcome of this process.68 However, the markets which eventually reached Italy in the second millennium AD were but the tail-end of a story that can now be traced back to Mesopotamia in the third millennium BC,69 where it was seldom argued that there was much economic growth. Before villages began to become more common – but remained exceptional (after ca. 15,000 years ago) – insecurity will have bred poverty and the earliest villages were probably still islands of mistrust set amidst a sea of hostility. Only with the growth of cities (since the fourth millennium BC) could solidarity and co-operation emerge. Even if only coercion made it possible, that coercion was the first step on the way out of the morass. The cities gave birth to institutions, including states which created laws, markets and money. Without those first steps, there would have been no Industrial Revolution: but there were around 6000 years between the beginnings of urbanism and the Industrial Revolution. In the earlier tale of the history of the markets, European scholars assumed that markets were a European creation of recent centuries. Likewise, Chinese and Japanese economic historians have long been conscious that the commercial activity of the Chinese entrepreneurial classes did not become extensively involved in investment in production for the market until long after European influences were impinging on Chinese self-confidence. Yet the Europeans were only interested in – and involved in – the Chinese markets precisely because of the products on offer there. And needless to say, those markets were there long before the ships from Lisbon and Liverpool made their way there. Thus there was once a different kind of market – and it was those markets that drove the Europeans to take to the seas.

67 E.g.,

Hicks 1973; von Hayek 2007. 1966. 69 van der Spek et al. 2015; Jursa in Neal & Williamson 2014, I: 27. 68 Kuznets

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It was the commerce in the markets that attracted the farmers, villagers, merchants and their clients – all over the world. Yet it was not always so. The conditions for real market exchange were born in the aftermath of the collapse of a Mesopotamian based state- or city-organised trading network in the Near East ca. 3000 BC. Algaze has detailed how a city- or state-sponsored system created trade networks in the fourth millennium BC.70 Trade and trade routes did not exist before the demand of the Uruk system appeared – and created trade networks to satisfy its own desires. For “unknown reasons”, this system collapsed at roughly the time that writing, balances and weighing systems were perfected and used in the Near East. THE EMERGENCE AND

IMPACT OF PRICES

The earliest texts from southern Mesopotamia demonstrate that copper was familiar in the form of tools and other objects.71 It is reasonable to assume that at that time, Mesopotamia was importing copper from Anatolia. Yet for more than a millennium, already before the end of the Uruk System, and then after the Uruk system collapsed, Mesopotamia was almost exclusively importing copper from Oman, via trade centres in the Arabian Gulf, of which Bahrain/Dilmun ultimately became the most important. 72 After more than a millennium, the Omani copper industry collapsed – and Mesopotamia was acquiring its copper from Cyprus.73 In the latter case, we know that the prices for Omani copper were higher than those for Cypriot copper.74 We also know that in the historical period, the prices of Anatolian copper lay above those of Omani copper – because the Assyrian traders could sell Anatolian copper at a profit in Anatolia, but not in Mesopotamia.75 This means that the Anatolian copper sources were not exhausted, and replaced by Omani sources, but rather that in terms of silver, the price of Anatolian copper was uncompetitive in comparison to Oman – and that since the beginning of the third millennium BC market prices (rather than resources or proximity) determined the production and distribution of copper. The concept of prices depended upon systems of weighing which were the basis of the equivalencies in silver. The development of equivalencies based on weights in silver to estimate the value of volumes of grain and oil was the revolutionary preliminary step to creating prices.76 The invention of equivalencies appearing in markets as prices was the first revolutionary successor stage to the invention of writing and the development of systems of measuring time, surface and capacity or volume. At the same time that weighing systems and equivalencies began to come into use, Mesopotamian trade shifted to an orientation towards 70 Algaze

1993. & Nissen 1993. 72 E.g., Reiter 1997: 155–159. 73 Buchholz 1999: 196–229. 74 Visible in the price tables of Reiter 1997: 132*–135*. 75 Dercksen 1996 passim; Veenhof 2008: 86 w/ n359. 76 Warburton 2016a; Warburton 2018a; Warburton 2019a. 71 Englund

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Iran and the Gulf which would become the earliest sea-based interregional trading system. The development of the system of prices and equivalencies must have been decisive for the end of Anatolian copper exports to Mesopotamia as they stopped for all time shortly after the invention of equivalencies. These prices had an immediate impact on production, since Omani production takes off and thrives for a millennium after the introduction of the prices. Obviously, the import of metals themselves demonstrates that we are not talking about subsistence economies and the fact that prices determined distribution means that the mere presence of resources was not the relevant detail. The essential inventions and conceptual developments took place in the Near East around 3000 BC – and have had an impact on trade ever since. The Mesopotamians exported wool and textiles to acquire silver, and with the silver they acquired what they desired, including copper and gold, as well as timber.77 This system was based on a deft combination of fiscal policy, industrial-scale production of textiles – and the use of merchants to bring in the silver. To understand the system, we must combine various sources together. The most extreme example of the state organisation is that of Ur III (the Third Dynasty of Ur discussed by Steinkeller and Renger, from their viewpoints in this volume), where Waetzoldt observes that the records include references to issues of almost 35 tons of wool in one single text for rations and/or salaries, aside from the usual observations about the general estimates for the minimum requirements for one province of the empire being almost 30 million litres of barley for the “about 40000 people who received rations”.78 Waetzoldt ventures that the overall number of those receiving rations “may even have reached half a million”.79 Thus, in this particular state, we have figures for a large number of people receiving rations and/or salaries as state dependents (which will include slaves and managers, and many in the state dependency categories in between). However, this was far from being the entire population of the relevant provinces or the empire as a whole. Thus what we know from the texts does not demonstrate that the entire society was under the thumb of an allegedly “redistributive state”: on the contrary, it demonstrates that part of the population can be accounted for as recipients of payments in exchange for services performed. What the documentation about the distribution of the salaries or rations demonstrates is what the priorities of the states were. In terms of the overall picture, one must recognise that others had direct access to land allotted by the state in exchange for services performed (meaning income from tilling the land i.e., no salaries or rations). Beyond that, not all state dependents were working full time. And in general, there is precious little information about the non-institutional sectors. Thus, we cannot quite get a grip on exactly how these economies functioned. However, we can understand the most important detail of the institutional sector.

77 Cf.

Steinkeller 2021. in Powell 1987: 118. 79 Waetzoldt in Powell 1987: 119. 78 Waetzoldt

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One key element common to most of the economies of the Bronze Age was the textile sector. A very large proportion of the state dependents were (a) rural workers producing wool for the production of textiles and grain for the rations and salaries of those in the textile industry aside from (b) those actually involved in spinning and weaving. Waetzoldt observes: In the weaving industries of the province of Lagaš there were more than fifteen thousand personnel, and probably far over two thousand worked in the grain grinding industry.80

Thus at least 15,000 of the estimated 40,000 ration recipients in the Ur III province of Lagash were dedicated to textile production – and required both wool and grain rations from the rural hinterland (thereby implying more labour devoted to the textile industry, bringing us to close to 50%). From the very beginning of the Bronze Age, it is clear that this production of wool and textiles went far beyond satisfying local requirements – and was therefore aimed at exports, as clearly stated by Englund who remarks that wool constituted the most heavily traded commodity in the commercial exchange with the periphery of Mesopotamia.81

Englund is clearly recognised and defined as an adherent of Polanyi82 and thus the remarks in the following paragraphs cannot be viewed as biased as they are really a matter of consensus: a very large proportion of state institutional investment in southern Mesopotamia was dedicated to an export industry. From sources in Mesopotamia, we can estimate that a girl working in the textile industry will have earned an annual salary valued at less than 2 shekels (ca. 16.6 g) of silver annually (generally paid out in grain – and the usual figures cited of 10–50 litres of grain a month in third millennium BC Mesopotamia would give a value of less than or around one shekel of silver for the actual wage costs of a year, regardless of how the bureaucrats estimated it in terms of value).83 Putting a garment together was a long process involving unskilled, semi-skilled, and low-skilled labour (as well as occasionally high-skilled labour, but not for the cheap garments making up the bulk of those despatched for international

80 Waetzoldt

in Powell 1987: 119. in Bauer et al. 1998: 146. 82 Goddeeris 2002: 392. 83 For lower figures for the rations/salaries of textile workers: Prentice 2010: 59; Lafont 2016: 158. Waetzoldt (in Powell 1987: 122) simplifies: “The normal barley allotment for women ranged from 30 to 40 liters per month”, which would amount to a value of slightly more than a shekel of silver annually (assuming 1 gur of barley 5 1 shekel of silver). Englund (1991: 279) gives a high figure of 2 shekels for the silver value of one year’s unskilled labour – but this is the value to the state in terms of workdays for the administration and not the rations actually received by the workers, which were clearly lower. I apologise for the vagueness of the equivalencies. The situation is that we know that a shekel of silver was roughly 8.33 g, and that 1 gur of barley was purchased for roughly 1 shekel of silver, but the actual barley volume in litres in a gur (from less than 150 litres to ca. 300 litres, depending upon system and time) is a matter of uncertainty (to me) – and there is no way that the actual sacks used for measuring grain will have been as accurate as the precision balances used to measure silver. Thus, we can be certain of silver prices but not of grain volumes (at least when comparing figures from different regions and periods). 81 Englund

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trade), and the administration put a value on the overall number of workdays involved, e.g., 134 textile-worker-days for one less-than-premium-garment and 536 textile-worker-days for four garments of the same quality (which means that the calculations were standardised).84 It is important that these figures offer us two visions: one of the estimated value of the work to the administration (a year of work-days was worth 2 shekels of silver but paid in grain which was actually worth less in silver than the estimated silver value of the work),85 and one in terms of the barley issued for the work (an annual salary of 120 to 600 litres, worth from less than half a shekel to roughly 2 shekels of silver, with the higher value being in the higher range for workers – and roughly the very lowest range for scribes and managers). Regardless, it should be evident that in the third millennium BC, not quite three of the standard low quality garments could easily be produced at a cost of far less than 2 shekels/ year, but this was the value assigned by the state administration (if we take the various variables into account). What the state paid out in grain – including all costs – for the production of the garments was probably less than half of that, and thus each garment will certainly have been “worth” a good deal less than a shekel of silver (and all the costs were in grain, while the product was sold wholesale for silver). Only centuries later do we have the range of retail and wholesale prices, but in the early second millennium BC, one simple garment (of the same quality as those just described) would sell for 2 shekels or less in southern Mesopotamia, which was therefore a mark-up of well over 100% before leaving southern Mesopotamia. The same garment would sell for 5 shekels or so in northern Mesopotamia and 15 shekels or so in Anatolia.86 The state institutions were investing heavily in mobilising labour for the production of textiles which were then thrown onto the market at prices low enough to act as an incentive encouraging commercial entrepreneurs to purchase and export textiles (to regions where they could acquire silver). All of the labour costs for the production were in grain and/or wool (for the girls in the textile industry and the agricultural and transport workers), all the prices paid to and by the merchants for the garments were in silver. Since the wages were paid in grain, which was acquired from the fields and did not need to be acquired for silver (since any paid labourers will have been remunerated in grain), this is not really an issue of cost (but certainly one of a massive administrative mobilisation of labour which ensured that the production far exceeded the requirements of the individual households which were somehow compelled to produce the grain). Even so, the textiles were sold at a substantial nominal profit – but at a price realised in silver. Significantly, the real profits came by transporting the textiles to distant markets – and the state institutions avoided the risks and unpleasantries of commerce by encouraging private merchants to take on the risks – with the merchants assured of solid hopes of large gains.

84 Postgate

1992: 236. 1991: 279. 86 Barjamovic 2018: 124. 85 Englund

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The risk for the state was a lack of performance, for their calculations were based on relatively low margins with high turnover. This depended on production. The foremen and managers were thus the key – and enjoyed beginning salaries roughly ten times those of the girls milling grain or weaving textiles. They were under heavy pressure to deserve those salaries and being under pressure themselves, put pressure on those for whom they were responsible. The women performing the lowest level of unskilled manual labour were under pressure simply to survive and perform until they died – and the managers had to assure that they delivered.87 The meaning of this is quite simple: (a) even remunerated productive labour had little value – and labour value had nothing to do with the actual retail value of the goods brought to market by the merchants who made the profits. Furthermore, (b) the state was dependent on the merchants for the entire logic of the investment of significant labour in the textile industry: 15,000 workers was a logistical and administrative nightmare, justified only by low margin profits on high turnover. This system of leaving production in the hands of the state institutions who co-opted the merchants to bring in silver was beneficial for all (except, of course, proportionately for the landless workers, who probably did not have any other better options in the market economy of the Ancient Near East) – but it was an organisation based on extracting revenue to produce wealth (as Scheidel has noted).88 The origins of commercial international trade thus lie in fiscal policy – and, through the merchants and the markets, that fiscal policy brought silver into private hands in Mesopotamia, leading to further developments. Among these developments was the creation of the markets as merchants trusted by the state executed commerce in a fashion which was favourable to the merchants and the state. Already from the early third millennium onwards. HISTORY AND

MARKETS

One peculiar feature is that in arguing for the economic primacy of Greece and Rome, Ober and Temin disregard the technology and stress the markets. In effect, they are advocating the extension of North’s Neo-Institutional Economics back to Antiquity, whereas North had specifically insisted that the changes took place after Antiquity.89 This methodological problem is enhanced by the fact that state support for markets can be traced

87 Detailed

by Englund (1991) and mentioned by myself and Renger (with references to Englund 1991). 2017. 89 North 2005: 127. I cite this text because it is among the most recent of his repetitions of the claim that the change started in the 10th century AD. Obviously, at this point in time, England was well behind the Tang Dynasty, and for the next five centuries Europe would still be catching up with the Orient. Usually Europeans look with disdain on other countries – like Japan and China – that speed through the era of catching up. In this case, the leisurely pace of the European developments is transformed into creating foundations. There is an allusion to a “Greco-Roman heritage” in North 2005: 128. 88 Scheidel

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back to the third millennium, and thus Greece and Rome are not exceptional – except in the sense that they are more familiar than more distant ancient history. And this leads to another issue. For the prices and wages, I have drawn on a number of sources for the third millennium, but have complemented this citing Barjamovic here for material on the Old Assyrian merchants (that Dercksen also presents in this volume). On this matter, the ancient historian Peter Bang made an interesting observation about the development of trade and production in Asia: At the level of transcontinental trade flow, Barjamovic estimates that the annual trade from Bronze Age Assur [in northern Mesopotamia, ca. 1800 BC, DAW], linking Mesopotamia and the goods from much further east to Anatolia, may have channeled some 24 tons of tin [from Iran or central Asia, DAW] and 48,000 pieces of cloth [from southern Mesopotamia, DAW]. By comparison, the combined annual imports from India to Europe by the English and Dutch East India companies counted, among other things, some 3,400 tons of pepper and 600,000 to 700,000 calicoes by the turn of the seventeenth century [AD].90

Obviously, these figures – of European imports in the 17th century AD – do not reflect overall Oriental production, as there will have been more traded among the Asians themselves, just as the Old Assyrian data (of exports of south Mesopotamian production exclusively by Assyrians to Anatolia) do not reveal the full extent of second millennium BC production. Thus, the figures from both eras are just windows. However, there must be some kind of hint here about Pre-Modern growth in the Asian economy in the roughly 35 centuries separating the Old Assyrian trade from the English and Dutch East India companies. Allen makes a relevant point in trying to depict mid-18th century cotton production. Allen estimates that in the mid-18th century AD, France and Britain each produced about “3 million pounds of yarn” annually; at the same time Bengal produced around “85 million pounds a year”.91 Bengal consumed a prodigious 60 million rupees of cloth, with “10 million rupees exported by Asian merchants and 6 million by Europeans”.92 This offers a context for Bang’s remark, as the Asian production was far greater than the share of exports to Europe. More pertinent for us is that we are probably not far from the mark if we imagine that in the third millennium BC, Sumer was perhaps producing something around an order of magnitude less than Britain in 1750 AD, and probably exporting a far higher proportion of its production. This can hardly be compared with 18th century AD production in Bengal. Measured on this basis, the economic growth of the Pre-Modern Orient was thus not negligeable (as Allen and Clark would have it). The Old Assyrians thus offer an early glimpse of the beginnings of what later became the “Silk Road”. It began and grew before the Europeans arrived. The Romans caught a glimpse of this trade, and fifteen centuries later, the Europeans reconnected with it. There can be no doubt that Bang has actually made a remarkable observation about Pre-Modern Oriental economic growth. 90 Bang

in Kristiansen et al. 2018: 495. 2009: 182 w/ n1. 92 Allen 2009: 182. 91 Allen

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Thus, to deny Pre-Modern Oriental market growth or pretend that Greece and Rome were central to this history is misleading. Both Greece and Rome failed: economically and politically (and thus historically). In fact, what the Dutch and English brought was Spanish Latin American silver, lapped up by the Asians with alacrity. And – of course – it is quite amusing that the Portuguese, Dutch and English were all state-chartered companies, acting quite close to the activity of the Assyrians. Developments in market trade followed the Oriental route – and the origins of this type of trade were Oriental. It was with the Industrial Revolution that a transformative change took place. And – significantly – just as the Europeans caught up with the Asians a couple of centuries ago, the Asians are catching up with the West now. TRADE In 3000 BC, there was virtually no European trade to speak of, and when – much later – European dealings with these markets did begin, it was not with the Mesopotamians, nor along the Chinese coast. The Classical era Periplus of the Erythraean Sea linking the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and the East93 is as important as the presence of Arab weighing systems in medieval northern Europe94 in hinting at the links to the markets which preceded the emergence of the West. The traditions of markets had continued to develop uninterrupted in the East, since long before the West emerged, and continued when the West fell into chaos. And they were still there when Europeans re-awakened. (And they will probably still be there when the Europeans are forgotten). The origins of this recent Western market trading can be traced to the time when the Italians locked into a trading system that led to the Mediterranean from the East.95 Thus, when the Portuguese rounded Africa, it was because they were seeking to cut off the Italian monopoly of links to the East. In doing so, they encountered another part of the system. When – guided by Arab pilots – the Portuguese arrived in India in 1498, the Portuguese found markets which had by that time been engaged in interregional trade for about 4000 years (ca. 2500 BC–1500 AD).96 Oman had been shipping copper to Mesopotamia (via the coast of the Gulf) since sometime after 3000 BC, and probably also soon thereafter to the Indus where a new civilisation was emerging by 2700 BC. By 2500 BC, the Mesopotamians were shipping wool and textiles into the Gulf, some of which will have reached the shores of India. The distribution of Indus seals (clearly a mark of commercial exchange) is dauntingly greater than that of the seals of any other contemporary civilisation, stretching as they do from the Indus region itself and Central Asia through the Gulf to northern Mesopotamia in the mid-third millennium BC.97 These seals testify to the

93 Briefly

and in context: Sidebotham 1996. 2019: 128. 95 There are many different versions of this, e.g., Braudel 1979; Frank 1998; van Zanden 2012. 96 Already recognised by Kohl 1978. 97 Warburton 2003: map 7. 94 Kershaw

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distribution of Indus merchants and their colleagues. The weighing system of the Indus civilisations (based on a weight of ca. 13.5 g) testifies to trade links and was known and used as far off as Egypt,98 beyond the distribution of the seals. The first social and economic revolution was that in Mesopotamia (fourth millennium BC), and the second was that which followed in Egypt (early third millennium). It follows that when the Indus was emerging, it was “catching up” with the earlier economic powers and able to grow faster, as is a familiar phenomenon known in recent centuries. However, its geographical spread is still impressive – even if it was part of a growing system. In the middle of the third millennium BC, silver was the common currency in a regional trading system that encompassed parts of Africa and the Red Sea, Egypt, the Levant, Anatolia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Iran, the Gulf, Oman, Central Asia and the Indus region. Some of the raw materials arriving in Egypt as early as the fourth millennium BC – such as lapis lazuli from Afghanistan – came from regions beyond the political control and military reach of any of the powers. Thus, no one power could dictate prices or terms, and all trade was dependent upon competitive pricing. At this time, Europe was quite literally not on the map, let alone an industrial powerhouse – and would not be for thousands of years. Later, but still long before the North Europeans began to participate in the world economy, the advisors of the Chinese princes thought of the ruler as enmeshed in a constant struggle not only with rival states, but also with merchants, moneylenders, and those who live off the revenues of the noble estates. These groups are depicted as parasites voraciously exploiting the populace for their own private gain through the instrument of the market.99

Thus the Oriental markets functioned on an interregional level – and also determined local activities within each of the individual polities. Our understanding of economic history and how economies function should have been transformed by these recent developments in the understanding of economics in the present and the past. Somehow the Europeans eventually caught up with – and overtook – the rest of Eurasia while parts of Africa and Asia remained as pockets of poverty beyond the reach of the Arab, Indian and Chinese traders who moved along the coasts. That the trade of the English completely changed – from importing textiles from the Orient (17th century), to exporting textiles to the Orient (19th century), to importing textiles from the Orient (21st century) – within a few centuries is testimony to the rapid change of European economies in recent centuries.

98 Roaf 1982; Zaccagnini 1986; cf. the “gold deben” of Egypt, Pommerening 2013. Moreno García also refers to this in his chapter above. The Indus unit of ca. 7.5 grams probably appeared shortly after the Sumerian shekel of 8,33 grams. 99 von Glahn 2016: 121.

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PRICES Fink has recently made the point that Mesopotamian rulers were concerned about price stability and ensuring that their subjects could afford what they needed;100 we know that the same was said to be true of the Chinese rulers.101 The power of the markets to determine prices was familiar, and only a powerful ruler could overcome the market – through market stabilisation, not by decree. Economic thought was expressed and determined in terms of monetary prices – confirming that this tradition goes further back than that of the philosophers, known from the Chinese Guanzi and Aristotle. Pre-Modern rulers were concerned about mobilising labour and increasing their own wealth,102 for which they were prepared to be more tolerant in dealing with merchants103 than with peasants falling behind in their taxes.104 And obviously, stable prices were more of a priority for merchants than for peasants, so that the public of the messages was also rather clear. What silver there was in Mesopotamia more than 4000 years ago flowed through the economy, as the state required various products, but some of what flowed into the private economy was also recovered by the state. Renger specifies that early on in Mesopotamia A system of value equivalencies enabled the calculation of the value of all products and labour in silver, so that the central administration could catch various different professional groups at regular intervals […]105

Noting payments in silver by herdsmen,106 and stressing (1) that the state is collecting taxes from everyone, and (2) that herdsmen had silver to pay taxes rather than giving a kid (as one would expect of a herdsmen in a primitive economy), Renger is describing a monetised market economy with an advanced fiscal system. Obviously, the herdsmen were not mining silver, and equally obviously, the silver did not come into their hands through the state, which then took it back. Even in the third millennium BC, the state realised that silver was circulating through the commercial economy, and that it could be acquired not only in commercial transactions from merchants but also from herdsmen.

100 Fink

2018. indicated by the quote from von Glahn (above) about parts of the Guanzi (for which cf. Rickett 1998; Rickett 2001) – as well as, e.g., the mid-first millennium BC Chinese minister Li Kui (von Glahn 2016: 61). 102 E.g., the mid-second millennium BC Egyptian female king Hatshepsut boasting that the entire world lived in terror of her and brought her products (Breasted 1906, II: 101). 103 E.g., De Graef in Breniquet & Michel 2014: 205, 208 – dealing with early second millennium BC Mesopotamian palatial indulgence of merchants who were tardy in paying for wool they had sold for the palace. 104 Best summarised in a difficult text prepared for budding bureaucrats in late second millennium BC Egypt, cf. the composite translation (of P. Anastasi V 15,7–17,1; LEM 64–65 / LEM 247) by Gardiner 1941: 19–20. 105 Renger 2011–2013: 163. This system developed early on and even in the highly centralised economy of Ur III (Sallaberger 1999), the equivalencies – based on silver as money – played a fundamental role in the state administration itself (Englund 1990: 13–55). 106 Renger 2011–2013: 163. 101 As

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QUESTIONS AND MISCONCEPTIONS Somehow the idea that modern markets and technology are the key to understanding economics in general is widespread. If I understand the situation correctly, in general, it is assumed that the failure to develop earlier was attributed to (a) a lack of technology, (b) a lack of markets, and (c) a Malthusian Trap which prevented Pre-Modern economies from escaping from subsistence agriculture. Because of these problems, there was no development before Modern Economic Growth broke out – and therefore the Pre-Modern economies are to be dismissed. In this fashion, growth becomes the criterion of economics. Thus the earliest economies are dismissed because they did not have the features we expect, as we automatically seek growth. At issue is ultimately nothing less than straightening out how economics works over the long term. The Near Eastern markets were the beginning of the economic system which continued to exist in the Pre-Modern world for 5000 years. It was the markets of this Pre-Modern world which drew the European merchants to the coasts of India and China. The Europeans sought and found those markets. Allen begins his economic history of the world by claiming that incomes everywhere were the same before 1500 AD and thus there is no need to discuss economic history before then.107 Yet this is odd for several reasons – not least being that the European discovery of markets was the beginning of the European tale of success. Strange is that Cameron dismissed the societies of Antiquity with ease: A society based on slavery may produce great masterworks of art and literature, but it cannot produce sustained economic growth.108

And Cameron immediately began the next chapter overleaf: To an earlier generation the phrase “medieval economic growth” would have seemed a contradiction in terms.109

From there, Cameron went on to describe how the economic development of the Middle Ages “contrasts strongly with the routine of the ancient Mediterranean”.110 In effect, he elaborates an account which is quite bluntly contradicted by the evidence as interpreted by the authorities: Hoffman’s Growth in a Traditional Society: The French Countryside 1450–1815 does offer exceptionally high medieval growth of well under 1% yearly.111 And Bresson estimates the same