The Dragon and the Bear: A Study of Communist Involvement in the Arab World
The Dragon and the Bear presents a comprehensive study in the interests and involvement of the Soviet Union and the Peop
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A Seu, · o ommunist Invo vement in t_,.e Ara_
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Compiled by . '·, AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT RESEARCH STAFF • •
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. . Editors : · RIAD N. EL-RAYYES & DUNIA NAHAS
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Copyright.@ 1973 An-N~ Prest . Services. S.A.R.L. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be r~roduced in any _form ·wit~out _the·· pettnission of the publishers. · ,· .
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Printed tn Lebanon • Cooperative Prfntmr Co. S.AL. ,
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DUDt EY KNOX lfBR.l\Ry NAVAL POSTGRADL'ATE
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IVJONTEREY, CALIFO :'IN SCHOOL ,\ IA 9j94CJ
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the necessity to review Arab - communist relations in the wake of the Egyptian decisiOn t.o expel its S.oviet military advisors, and the changes . that thi.s wrought. The scope of the study extends · from the early years of the century until the end of 1972. · . . -
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The three sections of this b,o.ok deal respec-
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picture of local Arab communist m,ovements, drawing on data gathered by direct oonta,ct and research.
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Soviet and Chinese relati:ons with the Arab .. w-orld are examined at length in the first two sec-
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The Drag.on and the Bear was prepared · by the research staff of An-Nahar· Arab Report with ' the , contribution of authorities on communism in · .the Ara\, world. It is based on existing studies ,of
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PART ONE: THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ARAB WORLD 5 : Introduction 1917-54 ' 12 Political relations 1954-59 19 Economic relations 1954-59 27 Military aid 1955-67 33 Political relations 1960-67 46 Economic relations 1960-72 68 Military aid 1967-72 Pol itica I relations 1967-72 64 •
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PA.RT TWO: CHINA AND ·T HE ARAB WORLD · ·
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Introduction , The establishment of relations Cornpetition with the USSR ''The Barrel of a Gun'' . A new drive for influence Con cl usion ·
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PART THREE: MAJOR COMMUNIST PARTIES AND
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LEFTIST MOVEMENTS IN THE ARAB WORLD 123 The Algerian Communist Party 125 The Iraqi Communist Party . . 129 The Lebanese Communist Party 136 The Moroccan Communist Party 142 The Sudanese Communist Party 149 The Syrian Communist Party 156 The Palestine Resistance Movement 162 . The revolutionary movement in the Arabian Gulf '
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Arab communist parties and their organs •
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PART ONE
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THE SOVIET UNI . . . . AND THE · ·
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INTRODUCTION, 1917 - 54
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SPORADIC INTEREST
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Although there are instances of sporadic Soviet interest in the Arab countries during the period between the Russian Revolution and the end of World War II, one can hardly say that the Soviet Union at any time formulated a policy toward the area distinct from the general ( and fluctuating) definitions of Soviet policy toward Asia, the national liberation movement and the colonial question. Seen from Moscow, the Arab countries during this period had little to commend • them: the rising foreign influence in the area was that of the West while the dominant indigenous influence was Islam, traditional by nature and different from other religions because of the extent to which it penetrated Arab social and political life and the Arab world outlook. ·
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· The Soviet Union made an exceptionally low assessment of the possibilities inherent in the Arab nationalist and independence movements, and the bourgeoisie which led them. There was virtually no proletariat end the communist parties which were formed around 1930 not only drew their membership almost exclusively from the bourgeois intelligentsia - this, in itself, was not a particular disadvantage
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in the circumstances - .but were, above all, weak and incapable of taking advantag~ even of those oppo~unities · that presented themselves to increase their influence. Finally, .the Soviet Union, during these years of ''socialism in one country'', was frequently preoccupied with the internal · problems of building the Soviet state and consolidating Stalinist power among the peoples of the Soviet Union itself. •
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_. This is not t9 say that the Soviet Union did not fol low · events on its southern borders with great interest. But. · · looming over these southern borders were two countries, Iran and Turkey, which · were at that time undergoing na- ·. • tionalist revolutions under Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) and Reza Shah. These events tended to dominate Soviet thinking on ·the Near East, monopolizing most of the debate on the problem of policy toward independence movements and the - national bourgeoisie~ Beyond Iran and Turkey the Arab world stretched - a shadowy region, not yet offering any tangible opposition to Western domination. '
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· There were some sporadic attempts to· grasp this phenomenon. In 1928, the Sixth Comintern Congress proclaimed that the ·~vast colonial and semi-colonial world has become an unquenchable, blazing hearth of the revolutionary mass movement''.. In the same year, the Soviet Union concluded a treaty with Yemen. The Lebanese-Syrian Communist Party took shape at about this time, and seemed likely to . . establish itself as the most important communist movement in the Arab East. But the uncertainty of Soviet policy is best reflected ·in the fluctuations in Moscow's attitude toward Egypt, and in particular tow~rd the Wafd, which the Sixth Comintern Congress heard described as ''the greatest enemy of the workers and peasants''. The Egyptian struggle for · independence was seen to have brought the country to the threshold of a revolutionary situation,' but no commu·n ist party or group was able to take advantage of :this. The popular ·movements which did exist, such as the Wafd (founded in 1918 by Saad Zaghlul to demand Egyptian autonomy)~ were interpreted as serving mainly the _interests of Britain and the local bou~geoisie. . . . ·· . · · : i •
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In 1935 the Seventh Comintern Congress adopted a more liberal line on collaboration -with the national bourgeoisie, and the Wafd was given rather better treatment in Soviet propaganda. The Arab world as a whole briefly aroused some interest within the context of the popular front, but its relative unimportance in Soviet thinking is demonstrated by the willingness of the Soviet Union during this period to see it totally within the context of the primary concern of the moment, the struggle against fascism, and by the total lack of understanding among Soviet writers for the motives and preoccupations of Arab nationalists. The activities of German and Italian fascism in the Middle East increased Soviet suspicions. The support of · the Axis for Arab independence movements directed against the West, and German ·antisemitism - presented to the Arabs as hostility to Zionism - contrasted with Soviet ambiguities on these questions. The result was a chain reaction, the Axis gaining popularity among Arab nationalists and this in turn leading to a downgrading of the Arab nationalist movement in Soviet thinking. The situation was given further uncertainty by shifts in Soviet policy toward Nazi Germany, reflected in the changing Soviet attitudes toward Haj Amjn · al Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem, and the Iraqi Rashid Ali. Haj Amin was alternately seen as a ''fascist agent'' and as a reputable nationalist leader; Rashid Ali's revolt of 1941 was at first greeted favorably, and the Soviet Union was the first country to give him·· diplomatic recognition. A few weeks later, however, the Soviet Union was at war •with Germany, and Rashid Ali promptly became a ''fascist hireling''. . •
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In fact, the end of the 1930s saw a spectacular waning of Soviet interest in Arab affairs; not a single book on the contemporary politics of the Middle East was published in the Soviet Union between 1936 and 1948. The periodical Revolutionary East was discontinued in 1937. One reason was the disappearance of many Oriental experts in the purges of the period, while those who survived found it more prudent to engage in purely historical research. The ubsence of expert knowledge made the definition of a Soviet strategy toward the Arab world virtually impossible, and the situ·ation in the '
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The end of World War II confirmed the previous trend by bringing Iran and Turkey once more into the forefront of Soviet concern on its. southern borders. Iran, in particular, with its relatively strong communist movement (the Tudeh Party and the Azerbaijani Democratic Party and the establishment in 1945-1946 of the independent republi.cs of Azerbaijan and Mahabad, seemed to offer concrete opportunities for the . extension of Soviet influence on the lines of Soviet expansion into East Europe after World War II. The Arab world, on ·the other hand, lay beyond the reach of the Soviet army and was - apparently becoming settled within the Western ''sphere of influence''. The Peace Partisans · and other ''front'' organizations were encouraged as a possible irritant to Western · interests and pro-Western governments and for their part in the overall Soviet view of world affairs, but by 1950, every.thing appeared to _have confirmed the Soviet estimate of · the low revolutionary potential of the Arab peoples. Soviet orientalists continued to give low. priority to Arabic studies and, as. in t_ he period before the war~ l~ttle was published on - contefDporary Arab problems. · . ~ · · '
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By 1950 the Soviet Union· had established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia (February 1926), Iraq (May 1941, - although it was more than three years before embassies were set up), Egypt {July 1943), Syria {July 1944), and Lebanon ( August 1944). As,, previously mentioned, an agreement on : the establishment of relations with .Yemen had been made in . -· 1928, but it was not until 1956 that this decision was fully implemented and the exchange of missions agreed. By con. trast, diplomatic relations were established with Turkey in November 1920; with -Iran in February 1921; and with Israel in May 1948 - this last only three days after the termination of the British mandate and the establishment of the Israeli state. . _T wo interesting points emerge from this list: firstly, the early establishment of relations with Saudi Arabia (where lbn Saud was appreciated for his anti-British stand) and ·. Yemen, confirming the Soviet view of the Arab world as a :. region in which it was the least socially · and politically developed countries which were felt to have the greatest
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Arab countries continued to seem unpromising to the ·s oviet Union. · · ·. •
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potential from the communist point of view, offering a clean slate for Soviet influence. Secondly, the immediate recognition of Israel, despite consistent Soviet hostility to Zionism ( because it violated the principle of communist internationalism, as well as for reasons not openly admitted, such as the existence of a ''Jewish problem'' in the Soviet .Union). . , .
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In 1948, Soviet disillusionment with the Arab world was such that the Soviet Union immediately recognized Israel, , and even went so far as to condemn the Arab ''act of aggression'' against the new state. Soviet propaganda attacked \ Britain and the United States for alleged open or covert hostility toward Israel and for a few months Soviet newspapers pressed the line that the Soviet Union was the only true friend of Israel. The attitude was soon reversed when it became clear that support for Israel was not going to bring any substantial gains for Soviet policy, but the reversal was not accompanied by a more favorable attitude toward the Arab countries, or their political organizations: in the Large Soviet Encyclopaedia (2nd ed.) of 1950, the Arab League was attacked as a ''creation of the imperialists'' which was ''used by reactionary Arab governments to slow down the national liberation movement in the Middle East''.
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Some interest was aroused in the Soviet Union by popular unrest in Egypt during the autumn of 1951 and the early months of 1952, but the July Revolution was viewed with suspicion or indifference, as merely a military takeover, promising no great changes for the country. The Soviet Encyclopaedia in 1952 spoke of ''cruel violence against the · workers' movement'' instigated by the ''reactionary officer group linked with the USA, headed by General Neguib'', which had seized power in Cairo. Soviet newspapers showed slightly greater caution than such academic works or the newspapers of European communist parties, like L'Unita or L'Humanite, which were outspoken in their attacks on the . new Egyptian leadership. But the overwhelming impression . during this period is that the Soviet Union considered the · 1952 Revolution to be of little significance either for its own policies toward the country or for the Egyptian people themselves. ·
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· There were nonetheless isolated signs of a change in the · Soviet picture of the Arab countries during the immediate postwar period, encouraged by ''united front'' tactics and by the graqual (and still only ·very limited) implantation of the Arab communist parties and of ''front'' organizations, notably . the Peace Partisans, who were very active in the eastern . . Arab world during the late 1940s. An article by V. Lutski, ''The National-Liberation Struggle in the Arab Countries'', published in the May 1952 issue of Problems of Economics, · . attempted a. classification of the Arab countries according • to their level of social and economic development.. Lutski described three ·categories, the most highly-developed -of which - industrial countries with a large p·roletariat - could ~ be applied to none of the Arab states. The other two. cate- . . gories were: 1) Underdeveloped .countries without a prole. tariat; and 2) countries with some industrialization, a small proletariat, and a large peasantry. In Category 1 he put Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, .(Trans)jordan, Sudan, Libya and the Gulf states: in Category 2, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia and Iraq. The second category he compared to China. The chief difference between the two categories . in social composition is the existence in Category 2 countries of a differentiated bourgeoisie, subdivided into big, middle and petty; the existence of an intelligentsia and a communist party; and the relative weakness of feudal landlords. In Category 2, Lutski saw in general greater prospects for the ' national liberation movement, though under the leadership of the communist party, working largely through the ''front'' organizations - communist-controlled but not openly communist groups, seeking to mobilize sympathizers according to professions (writers, lawyers, etc.) or world movements such as the World Peace .Council. . ~ · · . •
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· Lutski's classification was not difficult to arrive at, though some of his choices of .category might be questioned: for example, why differentiate· between Morocco and Tunisia, putting the first in the category of underdeveloped states with no proletariat and the second in· the more-developed states group? But he did manage to draw a rough line between what were to become during the next decade the ''progressive'' and the ''reactionary'' states of the region, in the Soviet view. It was the more important states in Category 2,
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Egypt, Algeria, Syria and Iraq, which were to offer the best prospects for Soviet penetration during the 1960s. But Lutski clearly had no idea of the extent of these prospects, nor the form th.a t they would take, nor the importance that these ''progressive'' Arab states would soon assume in Soviet foreign policy as a whole. Indeed, his view of the national liberation movement and of Soviet interest in it in the Arab world is archaic, with its emphasis on local communist leadership and Soviet-dominated ''front'' organizations.
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By 1954, the Soviet view of the Arab world had changed to the extent that countries such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen were no longer thought to hold any interest for Soviet policy: if change of a ''progressive'' character was to come to the Arab world, it would come not from the countryside, but from the towns. But it was still believed that such change would be accomplished only over a long period, through the gradual development of the Arab proletariat and the Arab communist movement, while the Arab bourgeoisie was readily dismissed as totally subservient to Western values and interests. There was no conception of the importance of the military (which is not even mentioned by Lutski). Events were to bring ·about a rac;jical shift in this view of the region and to give rise to new theories to justify one of the most unpredictable features of the period since World War II: the development of the Soviet role in the Arab world.
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POLITI~AL RELATI: ·Ns, 1954-59
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· · THE. REJECTION OF THE WEST
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. · . The fact that the Western powers were already present in considerable strength in the· developing countries was not · entirely to their advantage. Anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism were facts, not slogans: they represented an almost universal desire for greater political and economic independence. The Western powers had neither the will nor the · ability to m~intain a· colonial presence, and they had the difficult task of defending their present policies against the background of the imperial role of the previous hundred years. The Soviet Union had no such .history of an imperialist
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past, and could take advantage both of the new confidence . expressed in the April 1955 Bandung Conference, at which Nasser emerged as a major leader of the developing world, and of local hostility to Western attempts at maintaining influence while devolving responsibilities, through groupings such as the Baghdad Pact. •
· It was Egypt that was to provide the focus for the first great period of Soviet intervention in the Arab world, although from the point of view of international communism, Syria seemed to offer better prospects for revolutionary development. The Syrian Communist Party was strong and well established, with a dynamic and powerful Secretary General, Khaled Bikdash. In contrast to Egypt, which had .retained a moderate and cosmopolitan atmosphere, Syria was somewhat austere and strongly anti-Western. It had a history of chronic political instability, and the fall of Shishakli in 1954, followed by the elections of September in that year (which resulted in Bikdash's election to the Syrian parliament), brought in governments that were sympathetic to the Soviet Union and anxious to eliminate the remnants of proWestern forces in the country's political life. The Soviet Union automatically supported Syria in the crisis of .1957 (when the Syrian ambassador in Washington was declared persona non grata as a result of American fears of a Syrian . threat to the regime in Jordan), and took advantage of Syria's willingness to expand economic and political relations.
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In July 1955, Shepilov, editor of Pravda and head of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet, visited Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. Egypt was anxious to make a positive assertion of its independence from the West, and was deeply concerned by the establishment in February 1955 of the Baghdad Pact, and by continued tension with Israel in the Gaza Strip. In September 1955 it announced its . decision to buy arms from Czechoslovakia, including Soviet tanks and aircraft. .
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The Soviet Union, although uncertain about Nasser's policies, and in particular his continued hostility to local communists, could not ignore this opportunity to establish
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its in_fluence in the area, just as in the following year, it could not fail to declare its support for Egypt ·in its confrontation with Israel, Britain and France at the time of the Suez .crisis . These developments were in no way inspired by the Soviet Union, but Western policies and Arab anti-imperialism combined to offer irresistable opportunities for Soviet penetration . Moreover, the trend continued, and the status of Cairo as the center of the anti-imperialist movemeflt in the develop~ ing countries -was confirmed at the · conference of the AfroAsian Peoples' Solidarity Organization · (AAPSO) which opened there in December 1957. The decade was thus to see an immense movement of anti-Western forces in the ·· Arab . world, highlighted by ~he Egyptian revolution, . the independence of Libya in 1.951,· of Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan in 1956, the outbreak of the Algerian war in. 1954, and the Iraqi revolution in 1958. . ·. . ·· . . •
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. . -· As early as 1954 there had been a revival of Soviet oriental ·studies, a·nd this gathered · momentum during the next five years, reflecting the renewed political interest of · . the region. In .19~6, B. G. Gafurov, first secre·t ary of the · Central Committee of the Tadzhikistan Communist Party, was appointed director of the Institute for Oriental Studies in the _Soviet ,Academy of Sciences and editor of the magazine S.ovremmenniy .Vostok (''The Modern East''): his political . rank was a cle~r indication of the importance attributed to the post. Gafurov was to play a leading role in the June 1957 Tashkent Conference of Soviet orientalists, • which dealt among other subjects with the anti-imperialist movement in · . eastern· .countries,_and with the Soviet Asian republics, the latter both as ex~mples of a ''correct'' ·attitude to nationalist . .sentiments in a communist society and as models for noncommunist countries in other parts of Asia of the '~non-capi. taf ist path'' of economic and social development - a theme· that was to take a central place in Soviet theory on the . ''progressive'' Arab states during the next decade. . · ' .·
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This period was to see the development of the ·debate among Soviet orientalists and Middle East experts on the basic question behind Soviet policy ·toward the new, revolutionary Arab regimes: that of cooperation with bourgeois nationalists in such regimes, rather than exclusive reliance
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on the weak and generally ineffectual Arab communist parties. The question was not new - it had assumed crucial importance in China during the 1920s and 1930s, when the Soviet Union had pressed the Chinese Communist Party to devote its efforts to cooperation with the Kuomintal'.lg, The problem had been a focus of discussion in th~ inte.rnational ;·communist movement since 1917, and the Soviet leaders, . from Lenin onwards, had taken fluctuating and sometimes contradictory lines on · it: Lenin supported temporary and opportunist collaboration at the Co~intern Congress in 1920 ( opposed by the Indian delegate, Roy), and while the 6th · Comintern Congress had taken a ''hard'' line again~t such collaboration, the ''popular f r_ont'' of the 1930s revived a policy f avora ble to it. · •
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A new ''soft'' line was inspired by Bandung. An editorial in K ommunist ( No. 8, 1955), unsigned and authoritative, declared that ''serious mistakes have been committed in appraising the role of the national bourgeoisie of the countries of the East in the anti-imperialist movement''. Peaceful coexistence being a necessity in view of the alternative of nuclear war, and the Soviet leaders reali_ zing that ''neutrality'' • and ' non-alignment'' could be given an ''anti-imperialist'' content, Soviet theorists began to stress the possibilities of Third World countries reaching communist . ''socialism'' without violent upheavals, via the ''non-capitalist path'', as · an ideological justification for Soviet policies toward such countries. In an unsigned leading article in 1959, Problemi Vostokovedeniya {No. 3, 1959), said that ''up to now, Soviet · orientalists have paid insufficient . attention to the peaceloving foreign policy of a number of non-socialist countries in the East and the link between it and the fight . of the whole socialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union, for peace and the relaxation of international tension''.. Revi~wing current · tasks of Soviet oriental studies, the article continued: ''the , Soviet orientalists are faced with the task of making a profound investigation into the peculiar ways, means and forms of the operation of the general laws governing the movement of society to communism in the specific historical . conditions of the countries o.f the· East''. The Tashkent Con. ference had stressed the need for· the Soviet Union to ,concentrate on producing the basic conditions for more informed
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research, through the training of experts ( needed for publishing houses, tourist agencies, and a number of institutions such as youth, women's and trade union organizations), and ' the teaching of Arabic and other oriental languages in Soviet schools and universities: two new oriental institutes were · set up in Tashkent and Baku in the year of the conference. •
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Developing rela.tions ~ith nati•onal-bourgeois govern- • · ments was bound to mean a down-grading in the importance of the Middle East communist parties in Soviet strategy for the Arab world. For a long time, however, the Soviet Union · . . continued to hope that the Arab communists had a central · · part to play, and Soviet writing during the late 1950s gives an emphasis, which was soon to become out-dated, to the activities of the Arab ·communist- parties. A study, The · . ,· Nationa/-/Jberation Movement in the Arab Countries after the • -- Second World War, edited by L.N. Vatolina and E. A. Belyaev · and published by the State Publishing House for Political , Literature in Moscow . .(1957), wildly overestimates the ' potential of the communist parties in Syria, Lebanon and• Arab North Africa, saying that they have .''become exper. ienced leaders of the working class in these countries'' and . . . . claiming that ''their successes and influence on the masses · . · . are caused by the fa~t that they ·are the really progressive • - fighters against ·imperialism. and that their programs put forward demands which accord with national interests''. An · indication of the distance between the reality of Arab . ·. · politics and the opinions of the contributors to this book is their assertion that ·in Libya ''the young working class'' was · · ''led by its vanguard, the Libyan communists''. In 1957, not . only did Libya not have a ·communist party, but it was even . ludicrous to speak of the Libyan working class as a political force, at a time before any .major development of the Libyan \ ' ·oilfields. Such assertions . might serve a morale-boosting purpose within the Soviet Union, but they tended to have a detrimental effect· whe_ n they were tak~n as a basis for · · . -Soviet policy. · . . _ ... \. , .· ·.•
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- Nasser's anti-communism was an established fact from · the time of the Egyptian revolution, and was not difficult . for the Soviet Union to live with; the Communist movement . was small, split and ineffectual. The formation of the United •
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Arab Republic on 1 February 1958, however, was largely brought about by Syrian _ leaders' fears of the growth of influence of the Syrian Communist Party and th~ir inability to curb it alone. It faced the Soviet Union with a crossroads . for its Arab policy: union with Egypt meant a confrontation for ·the Syrian communists. whose leader, Bikdash, was . opposed to Nasser and to Nasserism. In the event, the union _was to result in a decisive weakening of the Syrian Com- · · munist Party, and to have repercussions on all the Communist parties of the region .
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· The Soviet Union chose to do nothing; or rather, it : realized that it was not in a position to oppose the union, so it gave it cautious propaganda approval, while at the same time trying to use its influence to moderate Nasser's anti. communist policies and protect, physically if not politically, · the thousands of arrested Syrian and Egyptian communists. Sovremmenniy Vostok (No. 5, 1958) wrote that ''the creation of the UAR was welcomed by all the peoples of· Asia and Africa, who rightly saw in this important event yet another victory over colonialism''. But by the end of the year, communist sources in Europe were carrying on a violent campaign accusing Nasser of ''selling out'' to the West and of persecuting Syrian and Egyptian communists. The World Marxist Revie·w in June · 1959 spoke of ''savage repressions against the Syrian people'' in a letter from Damascus; /'Unita ( 1 September 1959) described the Cairo communist trials as being the persecution of ''democrats'' against whom ''the indictment does not contain a single concrete element''. One . far-reaching result of the anti-communist campaign was the arrest in Damascus of a leading Lebanese communist, Farjal lah Helou, who was allegedly tortured to death in a Syrian jail: Helou was not only to become a martyr for the • Lebanese Communist Party: the circumstances surrounding his arrest, while he was in Syria in an attempt to make contact with Syrian communist cells, were to cause profound dissensions within the Lebanese and Syrian communist parties. ,
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The fall of the Iraqi monarchy on 14 July 1958 was in appearance a further development of the ''anti-imperialist struggle'', favorable to the Soviet Union. But, just as the • •
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Syrian-Egyptian union had shown the Soviet Union that a· choice had to be made between support for local communists and support for nationalist regimes, so· the Iraqi revolution was to demonstrate that the Soviet Union would have to tread carefully to avoid becoming involved in a network of . inter-governmental and inter-state rivalries in the Arab world . . The same is true of the Lebanese crisis, during the same year, when the Lebanese government asked for American troops to be sent to prevent a civil war in the country. The American intervention provided the opportunity for the Soviet Union to make political capital out of the crisis . which was eventually solved peacefully under the auspices . of the United Nations - but it had served as a warning both of the instability of Middle East politics and of the dangers of local conflicts spreading as a ·result of great power involvement. · · •
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By the end of the decade, despite these indic.a tions of problems to come, the Soviet Union· could congratulate itself · on some - astonishing achievements. In 1959, 0. Tuganov wrote in Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodonye Otno. sheniya {No. 6, 1959) with evident satisfaction that ''events .. of 1956-1958 in the Near and Middle East formed one of the great post-war battles between imperialism and the forces of national liberation; .imperialism suffered ·in this battle a series of grave defeats''. . ··· ,,
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ECONO IC RELATIONS, 1954-59 '
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THE ''BATTLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM'' •
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The ''battle against imperialism'' - in other words, t~e struggle for Soviet influence in the Middle East - was being described in terms of ''friendship'', ''solidarity'' and ''liberation''. But with it went another battle which was to use Soviet money, expertise and arms as a counter to Western economic aid. Many Arabs felt that their independence could only be achieved by the demonstration of their non- · dependence on the West. They showed no sign of finding communism itself attractive and no willingness to abandon thei·r political, cultural and religious traditions in favor of it, but they were able to appreciate the advantages of playing off the great powers against each pther, and hoped that in so doing they might· be able to move toward a solution of their economic and social problems, as individual states, and as Arabs find a solution to the political problems of the · region: Israel, inter-Arab rivalries, political instability and lack of self-confidence. Economic and military-independence were essential to the solution of all these problems, and cooperation with· the Soviet · Union might not only bring Soviet capital and expertise into the region, but also stimulate · the generosity of the Soviet Union's Western rivals whose •
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aid was welcome provided it carried nQ political commitments.
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The Soviet Union also appreciated the political gains to be made from economic relations with the Arab states: ··the \ foreign trade policy of the USSR is an integral part of global -Soviet foreign policy'', the Large Soviet Encyclopaedia wrote •. ( 2nd ed., 1951). s·u t stable economic relations take longer to build up than political rela~ions, because a country needs time to establish new markets for its products, and gear itself to new suppliers and navy_sources of financial and technical help. In the early 1950s, Egypt and Lebanon seemed to be the countries which pror11ised the best markets · for an expansion of s·o viet trade and economic relations: in Egypt, the Soviet Union had .already established commercial ties, selling Soviet wheat in exchange for Egyptian cotton, though it only accounted for a very small part of Egypt's foreign trade. Between Syria and the Soviet Union there was prac- . · tically no trade at all up to 19~6. · -· • , •
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.· The political developments of the. period 1955-1960 were to produce significant changes both in the quantity of trade .. . exchanges ·and in their nature. The Soviet Union continued to import from .the Arab world mainly primary products, such as Egyptian· cotton, but · its ··-exports shifted -increasingly toward industrial goods and equipment, and exports of Soviet wheat to Egypt had ceased by the late 1950s (by which time .Egypt was getting American wheat to supply its needs). Between 1957 and. 1960 there was a 50 percent increase in exports of Soviet industrial· ·machinery to Egypt, relating partly to equipment for the chemical, paper and building industries, but above all in the export of complete factories, the value of which rose from $4.85,000 (1957) to $15.8 million ( 1960) . . ·., . ·. . . . ·· .' · ·: . . .. · ~ . · .
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Economic relations· were one ·subje•c t discussed by Shepilov during his visits to Egypt, Syria and Lebanon in the summer of 1955. In the following yea·r, the Soviet Union still . accounted for only 4.1- percent of Egypt's foreign trade, but · it was to continue to rise throughout the period, reaching · nearly 20 percent by 1959.. In_· Syria. trade also began to -
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improve in 1956, and rose spectacularly after the creation of the UAR in ·1958. The same pattern was apparent in Yemen and -in Iraq (after the 1958 revolution), with the same emphasis on the . export of · industrial goods, machinery, factory installations, etc. . I
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The new pattern of commercial exchanges brought some difficulties, and the Arab countries were not always satisfied with Soviet performance in this field. There was some disappointment at the poor quality of. Soviet goods and at Soviet economic practices, especially over re-exports. The Soviet Union . was itself an exporter of cotton, producing enough to satisfy its home market and supplying some of the needs of its European allies, but high-quality long-staple Egyptian cotton was also valuable to the Soviet textile industry. The basic difficulty was that growing dependence on trade with the Soviet Union was liable to mean a reduction of convertible currency earnings through diversion of exports to the Soviet bloc, encouraging traditional importers to seek alternative sources of supply and raising the danger of falling into an economic dependence on the Soviet Union which would be no more advantageous than their relationship with the ''old imperialist'' powers. ·
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Soviet aid was offered on advantageous interest terms at rates of up to 2.5 percent, but with repayments extended over not particularly generous periods of usually twelve years. By 1961, the Soviet Union had offered credits totalling $500 million to Egypt, $100 million to Syria, $182 million to Iraq, $20 million to Yemen and $22 million to Sudan between 1953 and 1961. ... . •
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The High Dam at Aswan is both economically and politically the most significant Soviet aid project in the Middle East, contrasting with the West's negligence of the needs of the area. The Free Office,·s who took power in Egypt in 1952 · showed early interest· in the project, and by 1953 outline plans had • been agreed upon. Egypt then turned to the United States and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to ask for money to finance the project. But U.S.-Egyptian relations, which were satisfactory
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during the first three years following the Free Officers' coup, had started deteriorating since the n~w regime began - seriously to request arms from Washington. •
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Ali Sabri was sent to Washington at ·the head of a military mission to supervise _personally the loading of the first ·shipment of American arms to Egypt. The agreement was not . . concluded, however, because Washington requested that Egypt join a ''defense alliance'' aimed at encircling the Soviet Union and preventing any expansion of Soviet influence. Officials explained t~ the Egyptians that they would be . unable to justify the provision of arms to Egypt before the U.S. Congress unless .Egypt agreed to cooperate in resisting the common enemy, the Soviet Union. · ·
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Egypt refused and · the pe_ riod of understanding ended · · with the acceptance of Soviet arms by Cairo,-a move which .. opene~ the door to Soviet penetration in the area .
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·. · The period from 1955 to 1958 was marked by tension . wliich peaked with the decision by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to withdraw the American offer to · finance the projected Aswan High Dam. This followed the February 1956 agreement signed by Egypt with the World Bank which provided in .principle for the fin·ancing of the dam's construction. On 18 July 1956 Dulles informed the Eg.yptian ambas. sador to Washington of the government's decision, saying: ''One day you will thank me for this attitude. It is a humane attitude which we have taken out of concern for the Egyptian people. The Hign Dam project is bigger than Egypt's potential . If you decide one day. to implement it, the Egyptian people will curse the day on which they agreed to put it into effect. It is such a heavy burden that no small .power can undertake it.'' . -
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. Six days later, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal ''so that we can ·construct the dam''. The American refusal once again opened the door to the Soviet Union, which offered to finance the project. · . •
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· There was no further visible progress until Octobe·r 1958 when, during a visit to Moscow by ·Egyptian Vice President I•
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Amer, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union was willing to offer a credit of $100 million for Stage I ( the cofferdam) of the project. There was no indication that the Soviet Union would be willing to undertake the whole of the . dam, or that the Egyptians would invite it to do so: in fact 'there were signs that Egypt was anxious to obtain help from other sources for subsequent stages. But the Soviet loan covered only between one-third and a half of the cost of the first stage ( as it was estimated at the time) and it was evident . that the Russians were envisaging at least some involvement in the entire project. By November .1959 Khrushchev had confirmed Soviet readiness to participate in Stage II, and in January 1960 Cairo Radio announced that Stage II would also be undertaken with Soviet aid. · •
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Actual construction of the dam (Stage I) began in the same month. The Egyptians were pleased with the detailed project plans submitted by the Soviet experts. Mohammad . Hassanein Heykal, writing in Al Ahram on 19 January 1960, said that Nasser hoped that by granting Stage II to the Russians, as well as Stage I, he would ensure that Egypt saved time and money, and that the project was in fact carried out, not remaining a mere ''paper hope'' .
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The Aswan Dam project and SovieJ aid for it belong properly to the period of the 1960s, to be dealt with in a later section. But the political impact of the dam was evident from the time of the U.S. refusal to provide the necessary • finance in 1956. The failure of the West to realize the importance of the scheme and U.S. willingness ·to gamble on the hope that the Soviet Union would not be prepared to risk investment in such a vast undertaking, provided a unique op. portunity for the Soviet Union to score a major political point not only in Egypt; but also in the Third World as a whole. Khrushchev's decision in 1958 was a turning point in Soviet relations with the Arab world, and the dam itself, with the · Bhilai steelworks in India, is the most spectacular Soviet aid project in any of the Third World countries .
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· The Aswan Dam is not however the only Soviet aid project in Egypt. Financial .aid and economic cooperation •
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between the two countries were established under the agreement of 29 January 1958; four months later, Nasser managed to obtain certain alterations to the terms of this agreement, both on the cost and method of repayment of Soviet arms sales, and on the cost of industrial equipment, which was reduced by 15 percent. The agreement allows for Soviet aid in mining and geological exploration; heavy and light industries; medical aid; nuclear research; the supply of Soviet equipment; and the provision of Soviet experts. The Soviet Union offered a loan of $175 · million, repayable over 12 years at 2.5 percent, e.ither in cor,vertible currency or in cotton. . . •
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_Figures published in May 1961 showed that the Soviet - · Union by that time was involved in 53 projects in the UAR, the total value of the contracts for economic cooperation between the two countries being $133 million. East Germany, • Czechoslovakia and. Hungary accounted for 23, 13 and one project respectively, with a total value of $28.9 million. Total foreign participation in UAR industrial projects amounted at , this time to $445 million ( over 300 projects in all), with West Germany providing no less than $153 million for 76 projects. Italy $55.5 million, the United- States $4 million, • Britain $15.9 million and Switzerland $11.9 million. In other words, Soviet and East European involvement in UAR industry through economic aid was by 1961 still only slightly over one-third of total foreign participation, and considerably less than the amount provided by West European countries . • •
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The other country to benefit from Soviet economic aid by the end of the 1950s was Yemen. Here an agreement had been signed in 1956 for aid to various industrial projects · and in the modernization of the port of Hodeida; the latter project was completed in April 1961. A further agreement, providing for a Soviet loan of $20 million, was signed in 1959 for aid to agricultural and irrigation projects. The loan was interest-free and repayment was spread over a very long period. · . ,,
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and various Western powers failed to supply the finance necessary for development schemes in Egypt and Syria; for political reasons, the Soviet Union stepped in to take their place. .. : ' \ •
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ILITARY AID, ·1955-67 •
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The Czechoslovak arms deal with Egypt in September 1955 was the turning point in the process of Soviet penetration in the Middle East. The Soviet Union, through its East · European ally, agreed to supply tanks, guns, submarines and jet planes to the Egyptian armed forces. By 1965, following visits to the Soviet Union by Egyptian military delegations under Vice President Abdul Hakim Amer in 1957, 1958, 1960 and 1963, the Egyptian armed forces were effectively equipped solely by the Soviet Union. By the same date, Syria, Iraq (after 1958), Yemen (after 1962), Morocco (1960-1963), and Algeria ( during the war for independence and after independence in 1962) had also accepted varying degrees of military aid from the Soviet Union. In the case of Morocco · and Algeria, the Soviet Union found itself in 1963 arming both sides in a local frontier war. Syria, Iraq and Algeria were, like Egypt, to become the major recipients of Soviet military aid in the Arab world.
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Military aid to the Arab countries served a number of ends. Firstly, it provided an opportunity for undermining Western influence; the decision to purchase a weapons sys- ,
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tern from a particular source is a substantial one, since weapons systems depend on spares and training; the more extensive the distribution of weapons from one supplier throughout a. country's armed forces, and the more sophisticated the system, -the \ more dependent the purchasing . country will become on the continuation of supplies from . . , the producing country. Moreover, the number of countries producing modern weapons and able to equip all sections of a purchaser's armed forces, is very small, and the major producers are inhibited in this field more than in any other · by considerations of military balance and the maintenance of stability.. Political considerations become paramount and the decision to change one's supplier for arms is a major political decision. -·
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Secondly, in 1955, the Soviet Union was able to achieve considerable propaganda and political advantage at comparatively littl~ cost by selling .arms to the Arab countries. The weapons involved ·were not only surplus to Soviet requirements; they were also often more or less obsolete . -
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Finally, the Soviet Union began to realize during the late . 1950s the importance in the Arab world of the military officer · class. In orthodox Soviet thinking, this class formed part of · · the petty and middle bourgeoisie, and tended to be reactionary rather than otherwise .. In fact, the military character of the Egyptian revolution in 1952 was one reason for the low · · · Soviet estimate·of its importance, and it was to be some time before Soviet theorists came to realize that military coups . . . could have ''revolutionary'' potential in the context of the Middle East. Gradually, the view of the officer class changed, and at least a section of this· class was acknowledged to be . capable, when in power, of undertaking ''progressive'' changes an~ ,ii:,itiating radical policies . .
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. Against these. advantages of Soviet-Arab military pacts, ,. the Soviet· Union had to put the evident disadvantage that it · was entering a more or less· open-ended commitment, and . one which would have serious implications for the world balance of power and the preservation of peace. Nonetheless,' there were strategic advantages which outweighed these -
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possible disadvantages. For the Soviet Union, the end-product would be the diminution of Western influence and the , acquisition of military allies on its southern borders. For the Arabs, of course, the arms deals were seen in the. context of internal security of military regimes, of international prestige, and of the confrontation with Israel. The Soviet Union was indifferent to these considerations; it was not particularly favorable to military regimes as such and the possibility · of an Arab-Israeli war was one it increasingly wished to avoid. Soviet and Arab interests, which appe_ared to coincide, were in fact contradictory, and the contradiction was to emerge dramatically in June 1967, highl_ighting the Soviet Union's very limited interpretation of its responsibility to its Arab allies. .
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In August 1966, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated the strength of the Egyptian army at 160,000; it had 1,200 tanks and assault guns, most of them Soviet T-34 and T-54 and Su-100 (though including 30 Mark Ill Centurions). The navy, with a strength of 11,000 men, had four ex-Soviet Skory-class destroyers, nine exSoviet 'W' -class submarines, 10 ex-Soviet Komar patrol boats and 44 ex-Soviet and Yugoslav torpedo boats. The air force, with a total strength of 15,000 men, had 130 MiG interceptors with air-to-air missiles, 150 MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighter bombers, 80 MiG-19 fighters, 70 Tu-16 and 11-28 medium and light bombers, transport aircraft and trainers. In addition Egypt had about 20 batteries of Soviet SA-2 missiles in the anti-aircraft command operated jointly by the army and the · air force. By this time, the MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19 and 11-28 aircraft were considered to be absolescent, nd there was reason to criticize much of the other equipment supplied . by the Soviet Union: the MiG-21 has a short range and its visibility and maneuverability are poor. In the army, the T-55 tank, as the June war was to prove, was unsuited to desert warfare - one Italian newspaper described it as ''a card- • board tank''. · · •
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Similar criticisms have been levelled at other classes of Soviet tank supplied to the Egyptian armed forces.
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The June war showed that while the Soviet aim in . supplying weapons to the Arab states could be achieved with obsolete weapons and cardboard tanks - since the Soviet Union was more interested in the propaganda effect and the statistical alteration in the balance of East-West relations than in · any use that might be made of the arms in actual conflict - these weapons were not sufficient to achieve the aims of their Arab purchasers. As a result of the war, the Soviet Union was obliged to examine the military · situation .in .the area from a totally new point of view. If it was not to l~se its previous political and economic investment, - it would have to re-arm the Arab states, and it would have to supply them with-weapons that would lend credibility to the claim that they were restoring some balan_ce in Arab defensive power against Israel. But the postwar situation made it imperative for the Soviet Union to avoid any actual resumption of hostilities. It was therefore to increase enormously its supply of arms to the area, while hoping they would never be used. ·
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· By June 1967, the Egyptian army,·· with a postwar strength of 140,000, had about 340 Soviet tanks, 150 selfpropelled guns and rocket-launchers. The navy, with a strength of 11,000, had six Soviet Skory-class destroyers, eight submarines, 12 missile patrol boats and 40 motor tor. · · pedo boats. The air force; badly hit by the war, had a strength of 15,000, armed wit~ 20 11-28 light bombers, 100 - MiG-21 interceptors, · 45 MiG-19 fighters, 60 MiG-15/17 fighter-bombers, 40 transports, 30 helicopters, and 150 train,• ers. ( Pre- and postwar strengths of the Egyptian armed · forces in Soviet weapons are summarized in the table below, compiled from statistics published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.) · ·
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Egyptian strength in Soviet arms, August 1966 and 30 June 1967
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Army · · T-34 tanks T-54 tanks T-55 tanks Su-100 guns JSU-152, ZSU-157 guns
30 June' 1967
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Syria, by June 1967 (after the war), had some 200 T-34 tanks, 150 T-54 tanks, and 10 surface-to-air missile batteries; some ex-Soviet minesweepers ~nd patrol boats; and MiG-15, -17 and -21 aircraft, of which only some 25 were estimated to have survived the June war. Iraq had about 400 operational tanks, mostly T-34 and T-54, and 170 combat aircraft, including MiG-21 interceptors, MiG-17 and MiG-19 fighters, medium ·and light bombers, transports and helicopters. In the war, Egypt lost 600 tanks, 340 aircraft, and four ships; Syria lost 50 tanks and 50 aircraft; and Iraq lost 20 aircraft. .
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Even before the June war, Soviet military aid to the Arab states had created some political problems. In Algeria and · Morocco, the Soviet Union found itself in 1963 arming both sides in a frontier war; in supplying arms to Egypt, the Soviet Union was involved indirectly in the war in Yemen; in Iraq, . arms supplies to Qassem after 1958 were used in the early 1960s by both Qassem and .his ,. successors (the Ba'athist · regime of 1963 and the Aref regimes) in the war against the Kurds. Both the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Communist Party were sympathetic to the Kurdish cause for ideological reasons, and it was ironical that. they should be arming the Iraqi government, while arms for the Kurds were channelled through a number of mainly non-communist sources. Soviet military aid to the Arab countries was to prove, even before - · the June war, that arms are the most loaded of all forms of aid. · · · · •
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POLITICAL RELATIONS, 1960-67 THE HEYDAY OF INFLUENCE •
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The period of the 1960s, up to the June war, was to see the confirmation of the principal trends in Soviet-Arab relations. Above all, events during the period were to contirm . that the Soviet Union was interested almost exclusively in · establishing and confirming relations with governments, ignoring or at least giving faint encouragement to the Middle . East communist parties, which were advised in most circumstances to join ''united fronts'' with the existing government in left-wing or progressive states, and where they were active in the non-progressive states, to avoid any action that might cause embarrassment to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was above all anxious to avoid any direct confrontation with the West, though its own rules for ''peaceful coexistence'' did not exclude the supply of arms and moral support to national-liberation movements when these were a threat to pro-Western governments. On the other hand, governments in the Third World which might seem ''reactionary'' and repressive in their internal policies, were granted some immunity from Soviet interference, even when they were opposed by - leftwing liberation movements, provided they did not follow foreign policies that were hostile to Soviet government interests. , .
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Up to 1967, this policy was to achieve what might appear in retrospect to have been the heyday of Soviet influence in the Arab world. Since 1967 the Soviet Union has managed to extend its presence in certain areas and to build on the foundations laid in the previous decade; but , its relations with the Arab countries have been increasingly clouded, and Arab governments, even those which are favorable to many of the Soviet Union's international policies, have · approached the development of relations in every field, from the military to the economic, cultural or political, with an element of caution and sometimes suspicion that was not . present in precisely this form before the disaster of June 1967. ,
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Already events during the early 1960s had indicated · _ both a trend favorable to Soviet policies, and the circumstances of Arab politics which were to make it- difficult for · ~he Soviet Union to put these policies ·into effect. There was much to justify the Soviet assertion that time favored the progressives and that the Arab world was in a state of revolt against the ·past and against the old imperialism · represented by the West. The Egyptian revolution of 1952 ·seemed to have ·initiated a series of revolts against Western influence, all of which might be beneficial to Soviet influence: 1954. saw the outbreak of war in Algeria, which was to culminate in independence in 1962; 1956 brought indepen. dence to Morocco and Tunisia; 1958 was the year of the ' revolution in Iraq, a fatal blow to British influence in that , country and the crushing of the cornerstone of Western policy in the region, through the breakup of the Baghdad Pact. In June 1964 a Constitutional Conference in London . decided that by 1968, at the latest, Aden would become independent, and the succeeding years saw the growth of the nationalist parties and · an escalation of violence in south Arabia, marking the end of British rule in that part of the Arab world. . . · ·· •
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But the Soviet Union, now"'confirmed in its support for .. Egypt as the most progressive Arab country, was finding itself involved in a complex of inter-Arab political rivalries . that made conditions. in the area unstable and created difficulties for the formulation of a policy toward the Arab world as a whole. As Egypt became more dependent. on the •
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Soviet Union, so the Soviet Union became more dependent on Egypt, as the only consistent and reliable ally it had. Outside Nasser's Egypt, Moscow was continually reminded of ·the sudden threats to its position and that of its friends. · In Iraq, where Qassem was overthrown in 1963 by a violently anti-communist regime, which decimated the Iraqi Communist Party through executions, imprisonment or exile; in Algeria, where Ben Bella, a Hero of the Soviet Union, was · deposed overnight by . a military coup and replaced by a government under Houari Boumedienne. Even the union of Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic, which had seemed to offer prospects for greater Arab unity, and consequently at least a simplification of the problems presented by the region, produced nothing beneficial to Moscow: to begin with . the UAR was anti-communist; and the union broke up after three years, in 1961. Syria, like Iraq, witnessed a Ba'athist coup in--1963;~and lapsed 1ntoa -·t:,er1od-of ··chrc>nic internal ·unrest. The proposed Iraqi-Egyptian union, ·a fter November 1963, was clearly doomed to failure (although Iraqi President Aref accompanied Nasser and Khrushchev on their visit to Aswan during Khrushchev's UAR tour in 1964). Algeria was in 1964 engaged in a war with Morocco in which both sides used Soviet arms. Iraqi governments tried in turn, with no success, to crush the Kurdish minority in the . north - a minority whose case for the recognition of their national rights was upheld by both the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Communist Party. Egypt was engaged in a wasteful and unsettling war in Yemen. · .. ,
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· .Th~~ -c~roDic instability of the Arab world was irritating to Soviet strategists and confusing ·to· Soviet ideologists·... Th·e usual propaganda explanations did not seem ·to fit the actual l circumstances in the region.· On the question of the Ba'ath Party, for example, Soviet writers were obliged to fall back on unconvincing arguments about the various class elements in the party, to explain how the Ba'ath in Iraq could be viciously anti-communist while the Ba'ath in Syria adopted a policy of improving relations with the Soviet Union: in this case the widening split in the party was convenient in that it allowed Soviet ideologists to speak of ''progressive'' and ''reactionary'' wings in the Ba'ath: the Iraqi coup in -1968 ~ was. to undermine this explanation. In the same way, the . 1 I
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Iraqi governments of Qassem and the two Aref brothers were _ said to contain ''reactionary'' and ''progressive'' elements; ~he . "progressive'' elements were those which believed in buying arms from the Soviet Union,· the ''reactionary'' ones wished · to use them against the Kurds. Such comment was nt made specific enough for the reader to guess that certain • Iraqi ministers might fall into both categories at once. Most dangerous of all, for long-term Soviet strategy, was the growing disaffection of the Arab communists, who were most worried by the gap between the reality of Soviet p_olic_ies toward Ara.b governments and the ideological rational1zat1?n of the policies. The unhappiness of the Arab communist parties was aggravated, but not caused, by the Sino-Sov!et split, and led to divisions- in a number of the communist . I parties in the area·~ In particular the veteran Arab Communist : ~ Khaled Bikdash, although he remained in the last resort loyal to the Soviet Union, was a fervent critic of Soviet policies toward Nasser and of Nasser's influence in the Arab revolu. tionary regimes. · .. .
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·, . · Thus, the tendency throughout the Arab world may have been correctly diagnosed in Moscow as one of nationalist . . revolutions, but it was incorrectly thought that since these revolutionary movements were fi, the main. inspired by · . Nasser; they would lead to the growth of a fairly cohesive group of revolutionary Arab regimes. It was evident, on the · contrary, that even at this time the tendency was for the creation of regimes which were not only ''nationalist'' i~ the . pan-Arab sense, but were also jealous of their local national . .. independence as individual states, and intended to assert · this independence· against any threat either from within the region or from outside. , .._. . •
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Nonetheless, at the beginning of the decade, the Soviet . Union could ' look with optimism on the future of its relations with the Arab world. This optimism became translated into · ideological terms by the resurrection and adaptation to modern conditions of. a thesis elaborated at the second Comintern congress, but allowed to lapse since the 1920s. This was the idea that non-communist states in the developing countries could arrive at communism with the nelp of the Soviet Union via the non-capital_ist path; in other words,
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that these states, in rejecting Western values and the political systems inherited from the West, could be influenced toward · the gradual and perhaps non-violent adoption of a communist system. This was given a class interpretation by the explanation that although the leaders of these regimes were members of intermediate classes, such as the petty bourgeoisie or the state bourgeoisie, and not proletarians, they were able because of their hostility to ''colonialism'' - to identify their interests with those of the mass of their compatriots; and in the absence of a proletariat quantitatively in a position to . assume the leadership of the revolutionary movement, the Soviet Union itself, as leader of the ''world proletariat'' could ally itself with ''progressive'' elements from all classes in the developing society and for the time being compensate for the absence of a local working class leadership. The rationalization of an opportunist Soviet policy appears specious to outside observers and has been treated with contempt by Maoists: Mahmoud Hussein includes a scathing dismissal of . it in his study of the Egyptian working class. But it had the advantage not only of justifying Soviet support for Nasser and other ''progressive'' leaders and the increasing abandon- · , ment of the Arab communist parties, b·u t also of explaining why certain Arab socialist regimes were given priority treatment, while others such as Tunisia, with apparently similar internal systems, were virtually ignored: quite simply, those regin1es which developed close relations with the representative of the ''world proletariat'' were ''progressive'', while those which preferred to maintain economic and political · links with the West were ''reactionary'', regardless of the nature of the system they chose to adopt. As time went on, . however, and the difficulties of the Soviet position in the Middle East became clearer, there was a reaction among Soviet theorists to the originally very high estimate of the possibilities of the ''progressive'' regimes. · •
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The aim of the Arab policy initiated by Khrushchev and continued by his successors was therefore to work as far as possible throug~ existing and established regimes, , emphasizing the image of the Soviet Union as a country anxious to see peace and justice in the region rather than violence and oppression, t~ defend Arab independence while rem~i.ning conscious of its responsibilities as a great power
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for the stability of the Middle East and for world peace. Support for the Arabs meant a steady deterioration in relations with Israel; in 1960 the Soviet government refused to permit a meeting between Khrushchev and Ben Gurion, and there were serious diplomatic incidents between the two countries, with the expulsion of Israeli diplomats from Moscow in 1961 and 1966; in fact, more Israeli diplomats were declared persona non grata by the Soviet authorities in the period up to 1967 than · those of any other country. This, however, was the extent of Soviet action against Israel, apart from propaganda activities. There was nothing to suggest that the Soviet Union wished its Arab allies to -go to war with Israel; on the contrary, it had itself made enormous gains in the region and elsewhere during this period of peaceful coexistence by nonviolent means, and any sudden outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East would threaten _more to undermine the -So'(iet position than to provide it with opportunities for further gains . •
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- - In · fact, the Soviet Union had managed to take the · ~ situation in the Arab world - including the Arab confrontation with Israel - as a means of extending its own influence without being seen to intervene directly and without the danger of a direct confrontation with the United States. It attempted to continue this policy throughout the pe~iod of deteriorating Arab-Israeli relations during the autumn of 1966 and the spring of 1967, though without any real ability to control events or to exercise a responsible restraint on any of the powers involved. The great powers .were implicated in the Arab-Israeli situation but they were to be allowed no opportunity to resolve it in the United Nations, or in bilateral discussions, as they had done, for example, five years earlier in the Cuba crisis. Israel's pre- emptive strike in June 1967 was so immediately successful that the defeat of the Arab armies became inevitable from , the first day of the ..war, and the only action the Soviet Union could take - without risking an extension of the conflict - was to call for a ceasefire in the United Nations. Its Araq policy of the previous fifteen years had been reduced to the single question: should the USSR continue to support . the progressive Arab states and assist in the rebuilding of their armies and their economies with the . increased - · ·
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commitment that this would imply - or should it take this opportunity to retire from the Arab scene?
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in Iraq and Syria had proved disap-pointin-g·: - Q-assem, i" particular, had fallen short of Soviet and Iraqi communist hopes. The Iraqi Communist Party, brought to the crest of · a wave by events in Mosul in March 1959, was allegedly dissuaded by the Soviet Union from attempting to seize power; but it had come close enough to dominating the Qassem regime for Qassem to react against it and take · measures to curb · its power. Qassem was unstable and had few friends elsewhere in the Arab world; his attempt to offer an alternative Arab nationalism to that of Nasser was not founded on a secure enough base in· Iraq itself and consequently attracted little support. The stage was thus set for the Soviet Union to concentrate all its efforts on the Egyptian regime, as offering the best hope of establishing a foothold in the region. •
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There was to be a slight setback to this policy, however, in 1961 when for a few weeks Soviet and Egyptian newspapers engaged in a propaganda war following increasing accusations of persecution of communists in Egypt; the Soviet news media took the opportunity to bring up the Farjallah Helou case again. Anwar Sadat, following a visit to the Soviet Union, wrote an . open letter to Khrushchev stressing his country's stand on the question of communism; Egypt did not believe, he said that ''the development of man runs along a blind alley 01 which capitalisn, is the beginning and communism the end. We believe that the field for ideological thinking is open to all peoples. All benefit from the rich ideological. wealth of the entire human race and all add to the world experience their nations' assets, which are derived from the historical roots of each of them." The Egyptian attitude to communism, he added, was restricted to Egypt and had been generated ''by the attitude which the communists have adopted toward the national revolution''. In the following year, the basis of Nasser's. Arab socialism, with its rejection of the principle of class struggle and its belief in the need for each nation to find its own variety of socialism, based on its historical • •
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. experience and the needs of its people, was further strengthened by the publication of Egypt's Charter for ·National Action .
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Despite these demonstrations of the gap between . Soviet and Egyptian · views on ideological questions, relations improved, and following Amer's visit to Moscow in mid-1963 the majority of the remaining communist ' detainees . • in Egypt were released. The Soviet position in the area as a whole was improving, thanks to the triumph of Ben Bella in Algeria in 1962 and in spite of the crises in Iraq. In the latter country, November 1963 saw the fall of the Ba'athists and the establishment of a moderate nationalist regime . under Abdul Salam _Aref, who was a strong supporter of the idea of Arab ~nity and proclaimed his intention to work immediately- for 1:Jnity with Egypt. The triumvirate, Nasser, Ben Bella and A ref, met at Aswan in May 1964 to mark the turning-point in Soviet-Egyptian relations with the triumphal visit of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev and Nasser were meeting for the first time in six years. Much · had changed in the Arab world since 1958, and the extensive economic agreements concluded during the visit were to confirm Soviet support for the Nasser regime and to make ~ . . ~gypt one of the principal recipients of Soviet aid among the · developing countries. • .· . •
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Khrushchev spoke warmly about the social and political transformations being undertaken in Egypt under Nasser: ''the question of non-capitalist development for independent countries which have broken the chains of imperialist oppression is more and more becoming the order of the day'', he told the National Assembly. At Port Said, he went - further and recalled the stand of Egypt against Britain, · France and Israel in 1956, ·claiming that the Soviet Union had felt it to -be its ''fraternal international duty to come to · the aid of the Egyptian peopl.e''. On that occasion, the aid _had· taken the form -of support in the United Nations, but · it seemed that in future confrontations the Egyptians might be able to expect something more substantial: ''Moscow's · · position must be clear to all'', Khrushchev went on; ''the .. Soviet people is always on the side of the national liberation movement, on the side of the young independent states ..
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struggling for their independence in both political and economic relations. The Soviet Union is prepared to use all its authority and opportunities to inflict defeat on the forces of imperialist aggression." And on his return to the Soviet Union he told Moscow radio and television audiences that peoples fighting for their independence could rely on the Soviet Union to support them ''by deeds, including arms''. Khrushchev's support for the Arab cause was also emphasized during this visit by his meeting with Ahmad Shukairi, Palestine representative at the Arab League and chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization .
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Khrushchev's fall in October 1964 was believed to be in part due to his promises of massive support to Egypt, at a time when the Soviet Union itself was facing economic difficulties. But the new leaders were anxious to assure Nasser of their continued support for Egypt. Nasser paid a return visit to the Soviet Union in August 1965, and Kosygin visited Cairo iD May 1966. .
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Nasser's 1965 visit came after the dissolution of the Egyptian Communist Party, which had paved the way for the development of close relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ( CPSU) and the Egyptian Arab Socia list Union ( AS U). These relations, an essential element in the theory of the non-capitalist path, were to be mirrored in Soviet relations with other Middle East parties considered · to be ''progressive'' and to be initiating radical socialist policies in their countries. Such were the Algerian FLN and later the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'ath Parties. But the year 1965 also saw the fall of Ben Bella, a Hero of the Soviet Union, and one of the most promising Arab leaders - f ram the , Soviet point of view - whose close cooperation with communist advisers had seemed to offer the possibility • that the FLN might even overtake the ASU among the ''progressive'' parties of the region. Ben Bella's dismissal was a serious blow to Soviet strategy. The new regime was more anti-communist than Ben Bella had been and its · attitude to the Soviet Union itself was for a time uncertain. Above all, perhaps, Ben Bella had been personally very close to Nasser, and while Algeria was far from the center
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of the Arab world, the existence of a pro-Nasser and proSoviet regime there provided a comforting support for the Soviet drive to establish its presence in Egypt. Notably, Ben Bella had given support to the Soviet campaign to gain participation in the Afro-Asian ·Conference, due to be held in Algiers in the summer of 1965, against Chinese attempts · to exclude the USSR as a European and not Asian power.
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Gradual Soviet acceptance of the thesis of the noncapitalist path was · reflected in attendance at CPSU congresses. In 1961, at the 22nd congress, Arab delegations from Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordanr Sudan, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia attended, all representing the communist parties of these countries. By March 1966 the communist delegations from· these countries were joined by two representing the ASU and the FLN - ·although the FLN delegation walked out -during the proceedings when they realized that the Algerian Communist Party delegation -had been invited as full participants in the congress while the FLN were only there as - observers. The trend for the acceptance of ''progressive'' parties continued, however, and by the 24th - congress in 1971, no less than six non-communist Arab · delegations (from the ASU, the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'ath Parties, the Iraqi Kurdistan -Democratic Party, the Sudanese Revolutionary Council, and the National Front of South · Yemen) joined commu.n ist delegations from six Arab countries. · · •
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_. ·one ~esult of the : upheavals ·in the internal affairs of certain Arab states was beneficial to the Soviet Union: this was the increasing need by parties and governments in . these states for outside support to ensure their own survival. ,, This was especially true ·in Syria and Iraq, two countries · chronically prone to , factional strife. In Iraq, the Ba'athist government established after the coup in February 1963 fell in November the same year and was replaced by a nationalist and pro-Egyptian : regime under Abdul Salam A ref. Neither the Ba' athists nor the Aref brothers ·were to succeed in solving the Kurdish dispute in the· north of the country, and their regimes had to rely on Soviet arms both for
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internal security and in the conflict with the Kurds. The Ba'athist purges during the summer of 1963 virtually destroyed the Iraqi Communist Party organization within the country and the party had to be re-formed from Prague, under the auspices of the Higher Committee of the Movement for the Defense of the Iraqi People. Aref continued to imprison communists · a_ nd to work against attempts to revive the party, though with less aggression than the Ba'ath · had done; but his regime was still heavily dependent on Soviet aid, and made no attempt to switch its source of foreign aid or to alter its international alignment. The Ba'ath had briefly made overtures to China, and Syria was to . attempt this same game of playing off one communist power against the other. But such maneuvers were more a sign · of the weakness of the regime which engaged in them than of its independence, and the Soviet Union could afford to ignore them, realizing that China could never hope to replace it as a supplier of arms and economic assistance.
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The view taken by Soviet commentators of the Syrian Ba'ath was at first the same as that taken of the Iraqi Ba'ath, and indeed accorded with the Soviet estimate of the Ba'ath since the party was founded in the 1940s: that is, that it was basically an extreme Arab nationalist group. But the nationalization decrees initiated in Syria in January 1965 were welcomed by Soviet commentators and the attitude of the Soviet press began to change, speaking of ''progressive'' elements within the Syrian Ba'ath Party. The February 1966 coup d'etat was generally greeted in the Soviet press as a further victory for the left wing of the Ba'ath, although Syrian affairs were treated with considerable caution. Premier Youssef Zeayen visited Moscow in April 1966 and discussed political and economic relations, in particular the question of the Euphrates Dam. In the joint communique signed ·at the end of this visit, the Soviet Union expressed ''complete understanding and ,a high assessment of social-economic transformations which are being carried out and are planned in the Syrian Arab Republic which has set for itself the aim · of developing the country on a non-capitalist path''. The two / sides were said to have established that they had ''all the objective necessary conditions for further developing cooperation in the political, economic, commercial, cultural and
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other fields'', while the Soviet Union promised aid for the Euphrates Dam project, and the two sides agreed to increase trade between them. •
As early· as 1965 there were reports that Kha led Bikdash, the Syrian communist leader, had returned to Damascus; in fact he did not return until· April 1966, shortly before Zeayen's visit to the USSR. Bikdash had strongly opposed the dissolution of the. Egyptian Communist Party in 1965, and his hostility to this move was to find some support among Soviet ideologists who believed that Khrushchev had gone too far in his attempts to merge communists and revolution. ary nationalists within ·the framework of such parties as the ASU: the Boumedienne coup in Algeria in June 1965 was -t o give further support to this view by demonstrating the extent to which a communist party was risking its organizational discipline when it put too much faith in the survival of a nationalist regime. Bikdash agreed, in an article for the World Marxist Review (May 1965), that communists should cooperate with other ''revolutionary and progressive'' forces . ''in order to face · imperialist and reactionary plots'', but stressed that this should not imply ''dissolution of Commu. nist Parties, nor should it mean absorption of communists inside other political parties''.
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By June 1967, therefore, the Soviet Union could look with some satisfaction on its achievements in the Arab . . world. Egypt remained the leading ·''progressive'' state in the 'i . region, but events in Syria were encouraging, and the over: throw of Ben Bella in .. Algeria two·. years before had not . ; , resulted in a reaction against Soviet influence, even though · \ it had meant a severe and possibly permanent setback for - :.. the Algerian communists. The trend in other countries had · ' also tended to confirm that the Soviet Union was now a · · major power in the Arab world: General Abboud of Sudan . . ' ·visited the Soviet Union · in 1961, and the Sudanese · · · · ··c ommunist Party had established itself as an influential · force _in the country's trades unions. In December 1965 the Sudanese Constituent Assembly voted to ban the Sudanese Communist Party, as well as any other organization professing atheist or communist principles, but . the ban was challenged and a further ruling in December 1966 restored • •
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the party's legality. The party was to continue in a state of semi-legality, which did not prevent it from building up a considerable . organizational strength. But despite the difficulties of local communists, .many of the Arab countries, including the non-progressive ones, recognized the need to expand their relations with the Soviet Union in the diplomatic, cultural and economic fields. Jordan and the Soviet Union exchanged ambassadors for the first time in 1963; Tunisia, which banned its communist party in 1963 and continued to follow generally pro-Western policies, had turned briefly to the Soviet Union at the time of the 1960 Bizerta crisis with France, and this was resulting in a considerable -increase in trade and economic relations; Morocco, which had also gone through a crisis in its relations with France as a result of support for the Algerians, and again in 1965-66 during the Ben Barka affair, banned its communist party in 1964 (though the party was to be allowed some freedom of activity despite the ban). Once more, however, policies toward local communists were not allowed to disrupt relations with the Soviet Union, and King Hassan II visited the Soviet Union in October 1966, concluding his stay with agreement on economic, cultural and technical cooperation. France's difficulties with its former colonies in North Africa, and Britain's troubles in Aden, seemed to offer prospects for an extension of Soviet penetration toward the periphery of the Arab world, while the continuing internal upheavals in the Arab states to the east and the Arab-Israeli conflict helped to establish the Soviet Union as a force to be reckoned with in the Middle East.
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ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 1960- 72
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Soviet political influence was backed up by Soviet economic aid and trade, both in the form of massive prestige operations such as the Aswan and Euphrates Dams, and in the steady increase in trade exchanges from low levels which affected not only the Arab socialist states, but almost every country in the region. Soviet economic policies helped to reinforce the image of the Soviet Union· as a responsible great power, interested in aiding Arab development: the Soviet Union managed to overcome the main problem facing China in its relations with foreign countries - that of the conflic_ t between ideological support for nationalist move. ments and the desire to build up stable relations with established governments - by engaging in economic and technical cooperation with a. variety of differing regimes, _though at the same time concentrating the bulk of its economic aid on industrial projects in state-owned industries . -
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By the end pf 1964, the Soviet Union had offered a total of $835 million to Egypt for industrial projects, including the Aswan Dam, the ~elwan steel complex, engineering works, power stations and 1a·nd reclamation. Algeria had •
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been offered $227 million for various industries, principally the Annaba steelworks and the Boumerdes oil and natural ·gas institute. Offers to Iraq totalled $182.5 million, for rail. way projects, fertilizer factories, etc. Offers to Syria total led $130 million~ also for railway projects, fertilizer plants and hydroelectric projects. $87 million had been offered to Yemen for the port at Hodeida and for schools and hospitals. Tunisia had been offered $33 million and Sudan $22.2 million for various agricultural and industrial projects. The majority of these offers had been made in agreements in 1961 or earlier.
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By the end of 1968, Egypt had drawn about $650 million of offers which by that time totalled $1,000 million. The greater part of this aid was earmarked for the Aswan Dam and for the Helwan steel complex. The agreement for a loan of $225 million for the second stage of the dam had been signed in August 1960, and in the following month the two countries signed a protocol on shipyard construction. In October, the Soviet Union and Egypt concluded a long-term trade and payments agreement, and in November a protocol on aid for various industrial projects. Subsequent years were to see the conclusion of a series of major economic agreements between the two countries. In March 1962 the Soviet Union signed a protocol on aid for the construction of three steel mills at Helwan; in June 1963 the two countries signed a credit agreement covering the supply of power equipment variously reported as amounting to $57 million and $44 million; in May 1964 Khrushchev, during his visit to Egypt, signed a credit agreement for $277 million for the Egyptian .Second Development Plan; in addition, agreements and protocols on a number of industrial projects, and concerning trade and payments, were concluded. •
The first stage of the Aswan Dam was completed in time for Khrushchev's visit in 1964, and the project as a whole was said by Nasser to have been in operation by May · 1970. Although the project ran into difficulties at various times, it stands as one of the most notable Soviet achievements in the Arab world with considerable propaganda value
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for the Soviet Union. Kosygin is reported to have called it ''the most· improb.able edifice since the Pyramid of Cheops''. By 1963, some 2,000 Soviet technicians were working on the dam, though relations between them and their Egyptian colleagues were not always good. Despite delays in the work and reported ecological side-effects, Sidki Suleiman alleged in January 1970 that the dam would pay for itself within two· years. In addition, Egypt had gained considerable technical expertise: a total of 12,000 Egyptians were reported to have been trained in the Soviet Union for work on the dam, and in 1970 Egyptian engineers were said to be working in Syria on the Euphrates Dam Project. A technical school has b·een set up at Aswan to train some 600 students a year. The final benefits of the dam to the Egyptian economy and the seriousness of the ecological effects will not be known for some years; but in any event, the Soviet Union can justifiably claim to have aided the Egyptians in a project which they wanted and which could aid the country toward industrial and economic development.
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Al Ahram reported in May 1968 that the cost of the Helwan steel complex would be $965 million ( of which $161 - · · millio.n would be contributed by the Soviet Union in equip·ment and machinery). The first stage of the project - a blast furnace, two· converters and three continuous steel casting units - is due to come into operation in the summer of 1973; the second stage will be completed ( according to · a . Tass report in September 1970) by 1975, and the steelworks . : should make Egypt self~sufficient in steel. In all, the Soviet .. Union is involved in about 1QQ. industrial projects in Egypt. •
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Repayment terms for Soviet credits continue to be on a 12-year basis and the Soviet Union has been obliged at times to negotiate on extending periods of repayment. But the Russians are hard bargainers and are anxious to arrive at the . most favorable terms possible. The then Egyptian Industry Minister, Aziz Sidki, .w as reported in 1969 to have complained that the Russians were quoting artificially high prices for equipment supplied to industrial aid projects. The Egyptians are repaying a considerable part of the Soviet loans in Egyptian cotton, and Egypt has complained at the resale of . Egyptian ~otton ·by the Soviet bloc. .
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Even before the change in the Soviet attitude to the Syrian Ba'ath Party, following the nationalization measures in 1965, the two countries were discussing extensive economic cooperation during the· month-long visit of the Syrian Industry Minister Adel al Sa'adi in August-September 1964. Sa'adi was to discuss the implementation and extension of the agreements of 1957 and 1960, and the granting of an increase over the amount fixed in previous agreements to implement projects in oil prospecting, railway construction, etc. The question of the Euphrates Dam was also apparently discussed during this visit, but it was not until Zeayen's visit in 1966 that real progress was made, with the Soviet Union offering a loan of $132 million for the dam. In 1965 a long-term agreement on trade and payments was signed, superseding the economic agreement of 1956. ·
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The Euphrates Dam project had originally been offered to West Germany, which had signed an agreement in principle on the execution of the project in February 1963. But Syria and West Germany severed diplomatic relations in 1965 over West German relations with Israel, and the Syrians set about persuading the Soviet Union to take up · the project. The loan offered to Zeayen in 1966 was to be repaid on standard terms at 2.5 percent ( less than the West German loan offer) in Syrian products and local currency, over twelve years. Work was officially inaugurated on the dam on 7 March, 1968, and in the following year there were reported to be some 500 Soviet experts at the site. The first two stages are expected to be completed by 1974, and the whole project should be completed in the 1980s. Soviet trade with Syria also increased steadily during the early 1960s and doubled between 1960 and 1965.
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Economic relations with Iraq, which had been active under Qassem, tended to stagnate under subsequent regimes; trade even declined noticeably between 1962 and 1966. Nonetheless the Soviet Union offered aid for various agricultural and industrial projects, and in December 1967 signed an ~greement on oil prospecting. The project for a dam on the Euphrates, on which a survey was completed by the Soviet Union in 1965, has apparently been allowed to lapse . •
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. The Ba'athist coup of July 1968 provided further stimulus for improved economic and political relations. The new government declared its intention of seeking better relations with the communist countries. Political relations were not to proceed without some setbacks, but the Soviet Union undoubtedly had an interest in the potential · Iraqi economy which it did not intend to allow political considerations to · disturb. This was Iraq's oil industry. Although the principal Soviet motive was to lessen Iraq's ties with the West, and in the long run, have control of Iraqi oil supplies to the West, the Iraqis in the meantime found help in Soviet aid to rid themselves of Western monopoly of their oil sector .
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In June 1969 former Vice President Saleh Mahdi Ammash visited the Soviet Union and concluded an agreement worth .. · about $70 million { repayc1ble partly in Iraqi oil) for the development of the · North Rumeila oilfield. In June, the two countries had concluded another agreement on commercial terms . : •for the supply of machinery for the oil industry to the value of $72 million. ·in August 1970 the two countries concluded extensive economic agreements covering supplies for the Iraqi oil industry, trade, payments and aid to other branches · of Iraqi industry and agriculture. A joint Iraqi-Soviet economic .. .. and technical committee was set up to alternate annual . . meetings in Moscow and Baghdad and to follow up implementation of Soviet-aided projects in Iraq . •
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In 1971 the Soviet Union agreed with Iraq a loan of · $222 million, to .cover various industrial projects and to be repaid, also in Iraqi oil, at 2 percent. The period was one of considerable ·upheaval in the world oil industry, in relations . . between the producing countries and the major oil companies. Iraq itself, the governmen·t had been negotiating with the Iraq Petroleum Company since Qassem's promulgation ·_.. of Law No . .ao, cancelling the oil companies' unexploited . concessions, ten years before. The year also saw the Tehran .negotiations on oil prices, the nationalization of the assets of British Petroleum in Libya and the conflict between Algeria · and the French national oil companies, ending in Algeria's assumption of control over ~its oil industry. .
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The Soviet Union is itself a major producer and exporter of oil and natural gas. But Soviet writers have pointed out that the USSR may find advantage in imports of foreign oil, despite its home industry, because of the conditions in which Soviet oil has to be extracted and the inaccessibility of · some deposits. N.P. Shmelev, writing in 1970 (Problems of the Economic Growth of Developing Countries), therefore pointed out that ''real possibilities are being created for lessening the fuel deficit in the Comecon [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] countries by deliveries of oil and gas from the developing countries'', while another writer in the previous year saw imports of fossil fuels as ''advantageous even for the USSR, although it has the largest reserves of these forms of fuel among the Comecon countries''. In addition the rapid development of industry, particularly consumer industries, in the USSR and East European countries as their standards of living rise to approximate that of the major Western industrial nations will increase the demand for such fuels during the next decade in the communist world.
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The Soviet Union has gained considerable advantage by contributing to the development of the Arab economy. It successfully managed to arrange barter contracts and special trade deals to pay for its imports of · oil from the Arab countries rather than the hard currency provided by the Western oil companies. Ironically, Iraq, after the nationalization of IPC, had to renegotiate these arrangements in order to pay for all or the majority of its imports from Russia and other Eastern countries in crude oil.
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The first sales of Middle East oil to the East European communist countries began in 1967, and in 1971 are thought to have reached 7,500,000 tons ( mostly in the form of Iranian sales to Ru mania). The North Rumeila field was inaugurated officially at the time of Kosygin's visit to Iraq in April 1972, and at that time Iraq was to sell 1,000,000 tons to the Soviet Union for the current year, and 2,000,000 tons annually in subsequent years (a minute quantity by comparison with , . Iraq's potential which includes some 57 million tons annually from I PC's nationalized Kirkuk field). A trade agreement signed between Iraq and the Soviet Union on 7 June, following the IPC nationalization, was also reported to have includ-
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ed an agreement on oil shipments, though Tass dec·lined to confirm this. •
The Soviet Union's two major projects in Algeria, the Boumerdes Hydrocarbons Institute and the Annaba steelworks, are financed through two long-term loans of $100 million and $127.5 million, offered in 1963 and 1964. The Hydrocarbons Institute was established under an agreement signed in May 1964, which provided for Soviet aid to the creation of a school to train technicians in the oil and natural gas industries from all African countries; however the majority of the students _so · far have been Algerians. By November 1966 the institute had about 2,000 students and a staff of 150, mostly Russians. In early 1972, 250 Soviet teachers were working at the school and it could claim to · have trained some 500 technicians for Algeria's hydrocarbons . industry. In addition, the Soviet Union has helped in the creation of technical schools elsewhere in Algeria and cur·rently imports about 1,000,000 tons of Algerian oil a year.
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· The Annaba steelworks is another vital project in Al, geria's development program. Not all of the project has been undertaken with Soviet aid, Italian and West German firms contributing to the equipment of the rolling mill and tubeproducing sections; there were delays in completion of the · Soviet sections of the complex,· in part because of difficulties · . in relations with Soviet enterprises involved in the work. In trade, exchanges rose dramatically after 1966. Exchanges in 1969 reached $119 million and again rose to $131 million in 1970; in 1972-1973, according to the trade agreement signed - between Algeria and the Soviet Union in February 1972, trade ·· was to increase by a further 50 percent. One reason for the increase had been the Soviet Union's agreement to purchase Algerian wine, because of Algeria's loss of its French market . for this product: by 1970; Algeria was selling nearly 500,000 · tons of wine a year to the Soviet Union. In addition, the 0 Soviet Union has helped Algeria to dispose of its surplus of this commodity by giving aid tc;, plant in Algeria to transform · wine into cognac. . ~. ,
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$88 million for the metallurgical industry, dam-building, construction of a lead and zinc plant, and exploitation of Morocco's oil resources. The Soviet Union is also a major importer of Moroccan citrus fruit. In 1970 the Soviet Union entered into a contract of $19 million within the credit for the construction of a hydroelectric plant near Marrakesh. Trade between the two countries rose considerably during the period following 1965, though it was consistently in the Soviet Union's favor; in 1971, however, imports from the Soviet Union dropped 14.5 percent and exports to the Soviet Union rose 25.9 percent - the biggest drop being in imports of oil products and the biggest rise in the export of Moroccan citrus fruit resulting in a trade deficit of only $10.3 million in favor of the Soviet Union, compared with a deficit of $18.8 million in the previous year.
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Following the Bizerta crisis in 1960, the Soviet Union offered Tunisia a credit in 1961 of about $28 million, and a scientific and technical cooperation agreement was signed. Trade nearly doubled over the years 1965-1966, but Tunisia's relations with the Soviet Union have been . hampered by its pro-Western foreign policies . . The Soviet Union gives aid in training Tunisian engineers (Tunisia's first higher institute for engineering was reported in 1970 to have eight Soviet lecturers) and a· further cultural, scientific and technical cooperation agreement was signed in February 1971.
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Sudan's relations with the communist countries improved under General Ibrahim Abboud, but remained stagnant after 1966 under Al Sadeq al Mahdi. Following the 1967 war, the · new government improved economic relations with the Soviet Union. Trade has also fluctuated, but the 1967 trade agreement provided for an increase - though trade with the Soviet · Union only represents a small proportion .of total Sudanese foreign trade and the agreement signed following the assumption of power by the Numeiri government in May 1969 provided for a ''substantial increase'' according to the communique issued after the visit of a Sudanese delegation to Moscow in November of that year. In January 1971 a long-· term trade agreement, covering the years 1971-1973, was · . signed in Khartoum, providing for a further increase. Most Sudanese exports to the Soviet Union consisted of cotton ,,
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by March 1971 the London Financial Times could assert that . . - most of the Sudanese cotton crop was mortgaged for at least the next year to the Soviet Union and China. But Sudan discovered that the Soviet Union was reselling its cotton on the . market an.d it was also alleged that the Sudanese found that medecine supplied by the USSR was costing 42 percent more than equivalent supplies bought from the West. The discovery of these practices by the Numeiri government and the attempted coup in 1971 led to a deterioration in SovietSudanese relations with a consequent effect on economic cooperation. . .
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. Economic .relations between Libya and the Soviet Union were relatively unimportant up to the time of the September 1969 revolution. Libya exported tobacco and small amounts of oil to the USSR, and by· 1969 trade had shown some . . increase, rising considerably over the period 1965-1967. The , - revolution was expected to bring a marked improvement in · relations in all fields, ~ut these expectations were not , entirely fulfilled. The new government signed an agreement for the supply of sugar from the Soviet Union worth · $1,250,000, and by ·the end of ·1959 trade was expected to increase by some 30-35 percent. But relations have not developed in any direction as the Russians must have hoped, . and the Soyiet Union did not take part in the 1972 Tripoli International Trade Fair. In March 1972 an economic agreement between the two countries was signed in Moscow, . . . following the visit to Libya in th·e previous month of a Soviet economip delegation; the agreement covered especially prospecting, extracting . and refining of oil, prospecting for ther: minerals and gas, training Libyan specialists, and developing ppwer generation. In. the long term, however, Soviet · prospects in Libya are largely dependent on the development of Libya's · rela.t ions with other members of the Federation of Arab Republics, and c.loser union between the three countries involved in the federation could help to extend Soviet economic relations with Libya. · · •
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The Yemen Arab Republic has attracted Soviet aid chie~ly .as a response to the Chinese economic effort in the country . ·, The Soviet Union during the 1960s became involved in the construction of a road between Hodeida and Ta'iz, and in
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other construction projects, including the modernization of . the port of Hodeida, housing projects, the construction of a hospital, and an experimental farm. Soviet specialists were engaged on these projects. By 1967, with China preoccupied with its internal affairs, Soviet influence seemed to be on the rise. A number of new aid projects were decided upon during the year, including the drawing up of plans for the irrigation of Tuhama Valley, and an agreement on the con. struction of a cement factory with a capacity of 50,000 tons a year. Credits offered from 1958 to 1964 totalled $92 million, and a further offer of $35,000,000 was made following President lryani's visit to Moscow in December 1971. Repayment · · of the loan is to be in kind (from production of factories) and to start in 1981: in addition to the cement factory, the aid covers construction of a fish factory and of silos, drilling of artesian wells and supply of fishing boats.
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As in North Yemen, the Soviet Union's major concern in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen ( PDRY) since it became independent in 1967 has been to counter the influence of China, rather than that of the Western powers. To some extent, Chinese and Soviet aid to the PDRY are directed toward the same ends: developing the country's agriculture through irrigation projects and other schemes; and both countries give medical aid to the PDRY. The Soviet Union is also giving aid to South Yemen's fishing industry and in 1970 the two countries discussed the possibility of setting up a joint Soviet-PDRY fishing company. In April 1972 Soviet experts were reported to be about to visit South Yemen to draw up a ten-year plan for the country's fisheries. . •
The Soviet Union was reported in 1969 to be offering the PDRY a credit of $13.4 million for various development projects; by February 1972 a Tass correspondent reported . that Soviet specialists had participated directly in some 30 projects in the country. Agreements on aviation, economic and technical cooperation were signed in December 1971, and a cultural and scientific cooperation plan, with provision for 40 scholarships for development projects and 15 for petroleum studies, was signed in April 1972. In all, Soviet aid ( presumably civil only) to the PDRY by the •
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beginning of 1972 was claimed by Soviet sources to amount to some $29 million, of which one-third was a gift and two-thirds a long-term loan. However the Soviet. ''Radio Peace and Progress'' on 13 August 1969 warned that Chinese attempts to undermine the NLF and to spread Maoist propaganda might endanger the PDRY's chances of getting aid from the Soviet Union. This perhaps explains the USSR's apparent slowness to offer aid to South Yemen immediately following independence, both because 'it was unwilling to be used as a pawn in possible South Yemeni atte_m pts to play off the two · major communist powers against each other, and because it was uncertain of the stability of the N LF government. . .
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In the long run the kind of arrangement the Soviet Union favors for its relations with the Arab progressive countries is probably not as close as the economic inter- · dependence established between· the USSR · and the East ·. _ · · European communist countries, reflected in the fact th~t over 60 percent of trade exchanges take place among these coun-• tries themselves. But closer relationships do seem to be envisaged for manufacturing industry, especially that set up with Soviet aid. Following the ·visit to the Soviet Union of ~ an Egyptian economic delegation led by Dr. Taher Amin, - Moscow Radio on 15 June 1972 quoted Dr. Amin as saying that Soviet-Egyptian relations · had ''taken another step forward'' which might ''assume the qualities of economic integration between the two countries''. The agreement signed during Amin's visit provided for Soviet aid to Egypt's textiles, ceramics and glass industries, of which according · to Amin ''the products will basically be exported to the Soviet Union''. · . . : , , . . . . . This circular arrangement, by which the· Soviet Union · provides aid for the establishment of industry and then agrees to take the products of that industry once the factories are operational in payment for the original credit, continuing to import when repayment is completed, has evident advantages for the country receiving the aid; at least in the short term. But in the long term it could imply an exces~ive degree of dependence on . Soviet supplies, technology, markets and •
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political goodwill. The closer economic relationship between Egypt and East Europe has further been stressed by recent . agreements for supplying Egyptian workers to remedy labor shortages in communist countries: in early 1972 it was announced that 15,000 Egyptian workers were to go to Czechoslovakia and 12,000 to Bulgaria. Soviet aid policies have not avoided open criticism by spokesmen for the developing countries, in particular at meetings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and in the UNCTAD group of ''77'' · . developing countries - Algeria, in particular has played a leading role within these groups. •
Events such as the deterioration of Soviet relations with Sudan and Egypt seem to suggest that Soviet investment in the Arab world is not producing the required political dividends, but the Soviet Union may be inhibited from more direct attempts to influence the policies of developing states because it is already sensitive to the charge that it has ''imperialist'' aims little different from those of the old imperialist countries. It tries to smoothe over difficulties and keeps its aid programs going even when communists are imprisoned and suppressed.
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- MILITARY AID, 1967 - 72
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RECOVERY OF DEFENSIVE POTENTIAL •
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The imm~diate need of the Soviet Union's Arab allies following the June war was for the recovery of their defensive potential. The problem of a return on the Soviet investment in these countries was posed in an acute form. In fact the Soviet Union's options were limited to the alternatives of helping to restore Arab military strength at the necessary - cost to its own resources, or refusing to do so, and thus throwing away all. the economic investment and political gains of the previous decade. There was little doubt about . the Soviet choice: it set to work to rearm the Arab progressive . states; but at the same time it was reinforced in its determination to achieve greater control over Arab military action and to ensure as far as it could that there be no repetition of the events of May-June 1967. The pressure of Arab public opinion was such, however, that Egypt was obliged to undertake some action against the Israeli occupier in Sinai, and the rise of tt1e fedayeen created an atmosphere of revolutionary fervor in all Arab countries which threatened to sweep away the established governments on which the Soviet Union had based its Arab policy since the 1950s. A revolution from the . · · left could have consequences as disastrous for the Soviet position in the region as the revolutions of the post-war
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period had had for the Western position. It was therefore necessary - as the Soviet Union realized - for these gov .. ernments to demonstrate that they were actively pursuing a policy of military opposition to Israel, while at the same time avoiding a further outbreak of full .. scale hostilities.
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Egypt had been particularly hard-hit by the war, both in terms of men and materiel. New and effective arms were needed both for the reinforcement of Egypt's defensive potential and to strengthen the morale of the armed forces. The Soviet Union set about supplying them.
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During his ''secret'' visit to Moscow in January 1970, President Nasser obtained from the Russians a greatly increased commitment to Egypt's air defense, including the provision ·of an extended missile complex. By 1971, this complex consisted of about 70 sites with six launchers each of SA-2 missiles and some 65 sites with four launchers each of SA-3 (and possibly SA-4). MiG .. 21J aircraft and MiG-23 aircraft were coordinated with this defense system, as well as a radar network and six squadrons of MiG-21 interceptors. The deployment in Egypt of this up-to-date system required an increased Soviet military presence, both because Egypt lacked the technical expertise to operate it and because the Soviet Union needed to have operational control of the missiles and greater immediate control over the actions of the Egyptian armed forces. The Soviet military presence increased dramatically and was estimated at between 15,000 and 20,000 men when President Sadat decided on their expulsion on 18 July 1972. The SA-3 sites, the MiG-21J and MiG-23 fighters were all Soviet-operated. Russian pilots have been killed in action in Egypt, and the Soviet Union was apparently also directly involved in the reorganization of the Egyptian officer corps immediately after the war. Soviet advisers were attached to units of the Egyptian army down to company level, and exercised considerable control over the actions of the Egyptian forces: in December 1969 a Russian colonel was reported to have died in an Israeli attack ·· after refusing to give the Egyptian missile crew the fuses necessary to return fire from Israeli ships - an indication of the Soviet desire to restrain Egyptian response to Israeli attack .
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· The Egyptian army, navy and air force were also restored to well above prewar strength. It is impossible to give even a rough estimate of the cost of these supplies to Egypt (though one source estimated the notional value of weapons supplied in the two years 1967-1969 at about £856,000,000 sterling, and other estimates have claimed that Egypt was receiving arms to the value of $1,000,000,000 a year). Evidently the Soviet Union was allowing its Egyptian allies very generous terms for the repayment of this enormous debt ''gene_rous•''at least_in the sense that repayments were to be staggered over a long period, and much of the materiel would probably in theory have been supplied ''free'' . •
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Other Arab countries receiving considerable military aid from the USSR are Algeria, Iraq, Sudan and Syria. The Soviet Union has also supplied ·instructors and pilots for the Southern _Yemeni air force, and has helped in the building ' · · . of three military airfields·; the Russians are reported to be in command of the military and civilian airport at Khormaksar. The PDRY army is supplied with Soviet tanks and artillery . · Morocco has some Soviet and Czech artillery and tanks, and . Libya made an agreement with the Soviet Union in July 1970 for the delivery of 200 T-54 and T-55 tanks as well as artillery and amphibious vehicles. North Yemen's armed forces too were, by 1970, equipped with Soviet weapons .
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On 18 July 197i President Sadat announced the decision to end the services of Soviet military experts and advisers in Egypt. His move fol,owed an eight-hour visit to Moscow 1 by Premier Aziz Sidki in a last-minute attempt to prevent the . deterioration in Soviet-Egyptian relations from reaching this · point. . . .
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The move was based on the suspicion that agreement had been reached between President Nixon· and Soviet leaders during their summit meeting in . May to prevent an Arab. Israeli military confrontation and to do everything possible for a peaceful settlement - a suspicion that was strengthened ~Y the repeated refusal on the Russians' part ~o respond to Egyp't ian requests for offensive arms. Sadat told the ASU Central · Committee after the eviction order had been given •
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that there had been much mistrust between Soviet and Egyptian military personnel ''since the days of Nasser''. The Soviets, he said, ''did not abide by the timetable agreed upon for the delivery of sophisticated weapons'', and were opposed to a resumption of the battle.
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The eviction of the Russians was followed by a virulent anti-Soviet campaign in the Egyptian press, which accused Moscow of failing in its promises on arms and not matching American support for Israel. The Soviet media replied that ''it was not a question of weapons but of willingness and · ability to fight''. Al Ahram came back with the revelation that in June 1970 five Russian-piloted Soviet jets had been shot down within minutes in a dogfight over the Suez Canal.
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These exchanges were cooled in mid-October when Premier Sidki made a two-day conciliatory visit to Moscow, at the end of which a joint communique stated that the USSR would do ''everything possible to bring about Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and to preserve the legitimate rights of the Palestinians''. No mention, however, was made of future Soviet aid to Egypt, whereas promises to this effect had invariably been made in communiques prior to July 18. .
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Sidki told the ASU Central Committee on 25 October that he had received assurances from the Soviets that no agreement had been reached with .the U.S. ''at the expense of the Arab cause'', and that Moscow ''will, and is now, carrying out and its commitments to boost Egypt's fighting power''. '
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Three days later, in a move clearly designed to appease the Soviet Union, Sadat. ''accepted the resignation'' of War Minister General Mohammad Ahmad Sadeq - a man strongly · opposed to Soviet presence in Egypt. On the same day, however, lhsan Abdul Quddous, editor of Akhbar al Yom and confidant of the president, wrote that ''Egypt can rely in its armament entirely on Moscow only if the latter is to strengthen Egypt militarily so as to equal the level of Israel''. Informed sources had indicated that Soviet leaders would visit Cairo in late October or shortly afterwards for a summit I
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meeting with Sadat, but this had not materialized. Equally, the Soviet ambassador, who had returned to the Egyptian capital on 3 October after a· two-month stay in Moscow, was no longer a frequent and informal visitor to the president.
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After 18 July there were no reports of substantial Soviet arms shipments to Egypt, and observers felt that Moscow had shifted its sights to Syria. In September there was talk of an air bridge to Damascus carrying Russian weapons; U.S. · Defense Secretary Laird stated on the 24th that ''the Soviet Union has · begun airlifting personnel · and equipment into Syria''; and on the 29th Pravda confirmed that the USSR was ''supplying Syria with modern weapons and training its armed forces in their use''. These were thought to include SA-3 missiles. Moscow denied it was engaged in constructing a bloc out of Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, and the Palestinian resistance as a counter to the Egypt-Libya union; but its heart was no longer in Cairo.
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This extensive Soviet military presence in the Arab world is backed up by the Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union is sensitive to the accusation that it is establishing ''bases'' for its navy in the Arab countries, but it has acquired extensive facilities in Alexandria and Latakiya, as well as at other ports along the eastern Mediterranean . -
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The Cairo newspaper Al Gomhuriya asserted in January 1969 that the Soviet Mediterranean fleet was dependent for it$ survival on the revolutionary regimes in Syria, Egypt and Algeria ( and added that this meant that Moscow could not allow the triumph of a counterrevolution in these countries). - The signing of the Iraqi-Soviet treaty in April 1972 suggests that the Soviet Union hopes to obtain facilities in Iraqi ports to back up the presence of its fleet in the Indian Ocean: the . Iraqi treaty, unlike that with Egypt, specifically mentioned -· contributions by both sides to strengthening each other's ·.defensive capabilities. But there has been strong opposition to the increase in super-power rivalry in the Mediterranean region since 1967 from the Mediterranean powers themselves, ~nd Algeria has played· a leading part in this. During the visit •
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· of Tunisian President Bourguiba to Algiers in May 1972 President Boumedienne called for ''the emergence of a policy that would make this vital region safe from foreign ambitions and rivalries, by calling for the removal of foreign bases and the factors of tension which continue to cast a shadow over it..." Replying to this speech, Bourguiba also emphasized his view ''that it is the duty of the countries on the two shores of the Mediterranean to coordinate their attitudes in order to find a solution that may remove the possibility of a destructive world war'' . •
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. The aftermath of the June war brought its own direct contribution to the changing state of relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab world. The war itself had demonstrated how far the Soviet Union was prepared to go in defen_se of its Arab allies - not far enough, in the opinion of many citizens of these countries, who demonstrated their disillusion ment in front of Soviet embassies; it also showed. the extent to which the Arab countries would continue to be dependent on Soviet arms in their conflict with Israel, unless a peaceful solution could be found to this conflict. In November 1967 the Soviet Union accepted Security Council resolution 242 on the Middle East, and Pravda attacked ''hotheads'' in some Arab capitals who saw no solution but the continuation of armed conflict. In fact, the Soviet Union was obliged to achieve a balance between reassurances to the Arabs of its continued support and reassurances to the other ''great powers'' · that it was prepared to act in a responsible manner to avoid the outbreak of a still more serious conflict, with perhaps global repercussions. Its propaganda during the months following the war, alternating between attacks on the Western powers (which it tried to show as
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totally committed to the Israeli cause) and appeals for moderation and a political solution, reflected the attempt to achieve this balance. The war both accentuated certain existing trends in Soviet-Arab relations, and introduced new factors into these relations. On the Arab side, suspicion of long-term Soviet motives and the desire to achieve some form of nonalignment between the major powers, had always been a basis for the formulation of policies, even though it was often inhibited by the immediate needs of the countries concerned for Soviet support and aid. The Soviet Union, for its part, had already felt doubts about its policy of total commitment to Arab Socialist governments and abandonment of the local communist parties in the form which this had taken during the early 1960s, culminating in the voluntary dissolution of the Egyptian Communist Party. The war provided one opportunity to test the results of this policy and the debate on the weaknesses of the leadership ( both military and political) in the Arab progressive states accentuated the feeling among some Soviet theorists that the policy might have been mistaken in its assumption that these leaderships were the best force available for the Soviet Union to support. Five years later, these two trends have become easier to follow: they are revealed on the_one hand in the growing resistance to the Soviet Union in a number of Arab socialist states, and on the other in the abandonment of the recommendation to Arab communists to support existing single ruling parties ( such as the ASU and the FLN), in favor of the national front solution which allows the communists to cooperate with a number of left-wing parties while at the same time retaining their organizational independence. The national front policy is not, of course, new: it has been a feature of communist policy in the Arab world for many decades, but during the 1960s it was submerged by what appeared· to be the greater possibilities of working within the most progressive political movements in power in the region .
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the abortive pro-communist coup in Sudan, has been increased Soviet interest in a ''red crescent'' of countries in the eastern Arab world, from Syria through Iraq to the PDRY, accompanied by a shift in immediate attention away from the states on which the USSR based its policies during the early 1960s: Egypt and Algeria. This does not, however, imply that the . Soviet Union in any way intends to abandon . its interest in the countries of Arab North Africa: merely that it intends to back up this investment by strengthening its position elsewhere, for it realizes that its very power represents its greatest attractive force, and an increase in Soviet influence anywhere in the Arab world will have the effect of supporting this influence throughout the region .
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Above all, the June war confirmed the Soviet Union's determination to rely on cooperation with established forces and · governments rather than on parties or movements with , doubtful power bases. A right-wing government willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union is thus virtually ensured of Soviet support if necessary against a left-wing opposition. This has been most evident in Soviet attitudes to ·the fedayeen, who represent the most striking new element to have entered Arab politics in the aftermath of the war. Of course, the PLO existed before June 1967, but it was not until after the war, in the wake of the massive shock of defeat, that the . Palestinians - could c~pture the imagination of people throughout the Arab countries and even beyond. The Soviet Union at first attempted to ignore the fedayeen organizations: even in 1969, when Vasser Arafat's visit to Algeria coincided with that of President Podgorny, it was reported that the Soviet president had refused to meet the Fateh leader (although Arafat first went to Moscow with Nasser in 1968). During the year 1969, however, it became evident that Fateh at least could not be ignored as a political force, and in order partly to counter Chinese influence among the fedayeen, the Soviet Union not only made some token offers of arms and money, but also began increasingly to speak of the Palestinian guerrillas in terms reminiscent of those applied to · resistance movements in occupied Europe during World War II. The communist countries' statement on the Middle East question, issued by the governmen·t s and parties of the · USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and
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Czechoslovakia and broadcast on 27 November 1969. spoke of the ··problem of ensuring the legal rights and interests of the Arab people of Palestine who are waging a courageous struggle for national liberation and against imperialism··- Since the events in ,, ~.rdan in September 1970 - which the Soviet Union bJamed on ''imperialist intrigues··, lauding the contribution of Soviet ·diplomacy to the achievement of a ceasefire and also condemning ''extremists'' among the more left-wing fedayeen groups - Soviet interest in the guerrilla organizations has declined. Arafat was invited to visit d,e Soviet Union in February 1970, and again in October 1971; · but in the main the Soviet Union-was -relieved at the reduction . in the influence of .the fedayeen, who would have remained a force outside Soviet control and basically opposed to Soviet interests in the area.
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Soviet diplomacy has found it easier to come to ter111s with those Arab countries such as Algeria, Syria and Iraq 1 which reject the principle of the search for a political solution i and believe that in the long run the conflict can only be set- l tied by force of arms. The divergence in the views of these progressive states and those of the Soviet Union on this fundamental question in Middle East politics has led to so1ne tension in relations, particularly in Algeria, whose policy on Palestine is· the application of a fundamental principle of Algeria's view of world affairs; on the other hand. the Soviet Union has no interest in stressing such divergences and can take comfort from the fact that differences of opinion on this issue do not appear to have damaged its relations with Iraq.
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In any case, Soviet policy toward Israel has managed to retain an element of ambiguity, and shows evidence of Soviet caution and the desire not to commit future Soviet policies too deeply. The Soviet Union was after all among the first to recognize the existence of the Israeli state in 1948. Relations were broken off after the June war,, but this in no way implied Soviet denial of the central fact of Israel's existence. In 1971 there were exchanges of unoffic;ial delegations between the two . countries, ·and other small but significant signs of a changed Soviet attitude; in addition the Soviet Union granted exit permits to vastly increased numbers of Soviet Jews.
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Up to the time of Nasser's death, and despite the upheaval of the June war with its revelations of the weaknesses of the Arab progressive governments and administrations, Soviet hopes for the gradual achievement of communism in the revolutionary states of the Arab world through the use of non-communist socialist parties continued to form the framework of Soviet policy. In 1970, the publication, Political Parties of Africa, saw the possibility of this happening in at least the Egyptian ASU and the Algerian FLN, though adding: · ''although the process of transformation of present-day parties into socialist avant-garde parties has in practice begun, ., it is continuing in an extremely slow and contradictory manner!'. Another publication of 1969, ·The Worker's Movement in the Countries of Asia and North Africa at the Present Stage, described the ASU as recognizing ''the leading role of the working class and the principles of Scientific Socialism'', and explained the. decision of the Egyptian communists to dissolve their organization as being founded on the belief that they could have greater influence on the masses if they worked within the established political organization. It ~~s thought in the Soviet Union that enough communists and pro-communists were in significant positions within the ASU to form a veritable vanguard - one might say ''fifth column'' - to transfo·rm .the organization during the next generation; and there was evidence to support this belief. , • •
At the same time, the Soviet Union was anxious to bols~er the action of this vanguard within the party by . · exte,:iding state relations with Egypt. in every conceivable sphere. S_o viet influence on the actions of the Egyptian government was strong, but the Russians had come to rely on Egypt's diplomatic support in international affairs and they were beginning to look beyond this - their original aim in ·· developing relations with the country - in the hope that they might achieve much closer penetration of its internal . · affairs through cooperation with Egyptian administrative organs. The Egyptian revolution had resulted in the creation · of a centralized state administration, not so dissimilar from that of the communist countries that the Soviet Union could not see the possibility of gradual assimilation. Egypt was considered in some ways a testing-ground for techniques that could be applied ultimately _to all the progressive Arab coun•
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tries. The Soviet cultural center in Cairo was greatly extended in June 1968; Russian language teaching was provided, and Soviet books appeared in large numbers at the Cairo book ' fair. Cooperation with youth organizations, trades unions, women's organizations, and cinema and television producers were encouraged and extended; in May 1968 Cairo Radio began to broadcast in Russian, and Egypt gave up its membership of the European Broadcasting Union in favor of the com'rnunist-controlled OIRT. In July 1969 the Egyptian Interior Minister, Shaarawi Gom'a, visited the Soviet Union and East Germany, and signed agreements on cooperation between the police forces of the three countries. Even in religious matters, despite the Soviet Union's anti-religious propaganda and its campaigns against Soviet Muslims, exchanges were arranged, and Mufti Babakhanov led a delegation to Egypt in 1968, while the Grand Sheikh of Al Azhar visited the USSR in 1970 (as a result of which Al Azhar offered scholarships to the Soviet Union and agreed to send lecturers to Soviet universities). .
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The death of President Nasser in September 1970, was a blow to the Soviet Union; any upheaval in the course of de• velopment in relations between the two countries was bound to make the Soviet leaders anxious, and Nasser had been a stabilizing influence in the Middle East as a whole - indeed his death came at the moment of triumph of his policy of conciliation, when he had managed to get the two sides in the Jordanian civil war to cease hostilities. But there was no reason to suppose that Nasser's successor would be more aggressive or that he could afford to make any move against Soviet interests. Nonetheless, Moscow was worried, and Sadat's speech of 14 May 1971, in which he revealed the plot against the regime led by members of the ASU, seemed to confirm not only that Sadat was intending to move against the ''pro-Soviet'' elements in the party, but also that he might be considering a rapprochement with the United States. Egypt's internal affairs were one thing; what the S.o viet Union could not allow was a significant change in Egypt's foreign policy. •
A commentary-discussion on Moscow Radio on 30 May therefore accused Western media of making too much of
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~~ . ·, ~ d,e gover1u11t?1;t changes in an ·a ttempt to undermine Egyptian • unity, pointtd:to-the signing of the Egyptian-Soviet friendship .
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and ·quoU>I _the New York Times, which had written that from the start of Podgorny's visit it had been evident that neither side wished Egypt's internal political changes t~ dis~pt cooperation. The joint communique issued following ·. Podgomy·s talks · also specifically, mentioned the determination of the two sides to ''mobilize all capacities for the con~nued development'' of relations ·between them, and a9reec1ie11t on implementing the 1971 program for ASUCPSU party contacts. Podgorny, in his speech on the occasion of the conclusion of the treaty, saw Egyptian-Soviet relations entering a ·•qualitatively new era''. In fact, everything was done by both sides to suggest that the dismissal of Ali Sabri (who had visited the Soviet Union no less than three times during_the previous year and might reasonably be seen as the leader of the avant-garde faction within the ASU) would make no difference at all to the close relationship established between the two countries. . .
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This of course was less than the truth, and was realized to be so by commentators in the Middle East and elsewhere.
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But the friendship treaty was a measure designed to give imrPediate support to a threatened structure. •
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President Sadat's decision in July 1972 to expel Soviet military advisors and experts from Egypt marked the lowest point weaclaed in Soviet-Egyptian relations. . .
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The Soviet Union is now disappointed by the growing
evidence of resistance to its influence in Egypt arid some · of the other Arab ··progressive'' states but it realizes that Arab communists are too weak to play a significant role even wid1~n national fronts. There is no question but that its _ relations with the Arab world in g·eneral and ~gypt . in · .: particular will continue to be on a state-to-state basis, taking · into consideration not the views or needs of local communist parties, but the demands of Soviet foreign policy and the place (If the Arab worl~ in the Soviet global view of world •
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affairs. A deter1ninin9 factor, however, in Moscow·s future policy toward Egypt will be the foreign policy Sadat follows in the wake of the withdrawal of the Soviet military presence • from Egypt. -
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The early seventies saw equally dramatic developments in Sudan. President Numeiri, who had announced his country's intention of seeking closer union with Egypt. and Libya, and in April 1971 had joined in the formal declaration of the Federation of Arab Republics between the three countries, appealed to the Sudanese Communist Party to follow the example of the Egyptian Communist Party and dissolve itself: this would have created in Sudan an ASU similar to the Egyptian one, with the communists participating as individuals. But the SCP was a powerful political force (unlike the Egyptan party in 1965) with considerable influence particularly in the trade union movement. Its leader, Abdul Khaleq Mahgoub, who had at one time called for closer Sudanese-Egyptian links (when a federation of the two countries would have been in the interest of Soviet policy) now rebelled against this demand for the dissolution of his party. Ha was arrested but escaped from prison on 30 June and was therefore free at the time of the abortive coup in the following month.
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The proposal for a union between Egypt and Sudan was part of the measures adopted in the Tripoli Charter, signed by Sudan, Egypt and Libya in September 1969; Syria later adopted the charter. These proposals for increased Arab unity were generally welcomed by the Soviet press; Pravda on 18 April 1971 spoke of ''an Arab revolutionary front'', and said that ''the main feature of the federation is its progressive, anti-imperialist character''. Not all the states involved were treated in precisely the same way, however, for President Kaddafi's regime, established in Libya following the 1969 revolution, had already demonstrated its Islamic and anticommunist character. Pravda, therefore, distinguished plainly between the four states: while Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic were said to be · ''successfully achieving social changes'', Libya and Sudan were described merely as ''taking steps toward the removal of imperialist footholds''. It was · quite clear that the Soviet Union hoped that greater unity •
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between the four countries would make for changes in the Libyan and Sudanese positions, and ultimately lead to an increase in Soviet influence in all the countries in the federation. It was equally clear, on the other hand, that it did not intend to allow the misgivings of the Sudanese Communist Party to impede this design for a pro-Soviet ''Arab revolutionary front''.· ·
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But events were to decide otherwise. On 19 July a coup supported by the Sudanese communists put President Numeiri out of power for three days. The precise role of the communists - and of. the East European countries - in the coup is uncertain, although the Sudanese government was afterwards to accuse Soviet and Bulgarian diplomats of complicity. In the counter-coup Mahgoub and other leading . communists and pro-communists were executed. The Sudanese Communist Party was broken, as the Iraqi Communist Party had been at the ti.me of the 1963 Ba'athist coup. Ironically, it was now Iraq which among the Arab countries proclaimed its solidarity with the leaders of the coup and condemned Numeiri's repression of the Sudanese communists. . ·
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On 24 May 1971, marking the second anniversary of the Numeiri regime, lzvestiya said that the country's leadership had ''tal