The Domestic Structure of European Community Policy-Making in West Germany (Routledge Revivals) 9781315710150, 9781138890589

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Routledge Revivals

The Domestic Structure of European Community Policy-Making in Germany

The Federal Republic of Germany’s position in the European Community had been described as one of interdependence, penetration and integration. Of the three terms this research addresses itself most directly to penetration: to the links between the German political system and policy-making at the Community level. These links operated in two directions. Thus membership for the European Community (EC) imposed certain constraints on German domestic policy-making. Although this research, first published in 1986, concentrates on the structural inter-relationship between the German political system and EC decisions, its main focus of attention is the articulation of German ‘interests’ in the EC policy process. This book will be of interest to students of politics and history.

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The Domestic Structure of European Community PolicyMaking in Germany

Simon Bulmer

First published in 1986 by Garland Publishing, Inc. This edition first published in 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 1986 Simon Bulmer The right of Simon Bulmer to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Publisher’s Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent. Disclaimer The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and welcomes correspondence from those they have been unable to contact. A Library of Congress record exists under LC control number: 86014292 ISBN 13: 978-1-138-89058-9 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978-1-315-71015-0 (ebk)

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The D E

uropean

o m e s t ic

Str u c tu r e

of

C o m m u n i t y P o l ic y - M a k i n g

in

W

est

G

erm any

Simon Bulmer

Garland Publishing, Inc., New York & London

1986

Copyright © 1986 by Simon Bulmer All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bulmer, Simon. The domestic structure of European community policy­ making in West Germany (Outstanding theses from the London School of Economics and Political Science) Thesis (Ph. D.)— University of London, 1982. Bibliography: p. 1. European Economic Community— Germany (West) 2. Germany (West)— Economic policy— 19743. European Economic Community countries— Economic policy. I. Title. II. Series. HC241.25.G3B85 1986 338.94 86-14292 ISBN 0-8240-1913-X

All volumes in this series are printed on acid-free, 250-year-life paper. Printed in the United States of America

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T A B L E

OF

C O N T E N T S

Page

Table of Contents

^

List of Figures and Tables

7

Abbreviations

9

Preface

12

I

13

West German Domestic Political Structures and European Community Policy-Making 1

Introduction

13

2

The Importance of the Nation State in EC Policy-Making

15

3

The German Dimension

21

4

The Domestic Politics Approach

24

5

The Structure of EC Policy-Making

27

6

The Objectives of Analysis

Footnotes

PART ONE II

The Political Organisations Involved

The Organisation Government

35

40

ofEC Policy-Making in the Federal

44 45

1

The Representation of the Federal Government in EC bodies

46

2

Ministerial Organisation and EC Policy-Making

48

3

Interministerial Coordination and EC PolicyMaking

78

4

The Role of the German Permanent Representation

87

5

Conclusions

91

Footnotes

94

Page

III

German InterestGroups

in EC Policy-Making

1

A Framework for Analysis

105

2

The German Interests Themselves

118

3

A

Industrialistsf Employers' andCommercial Interests

B

Farmers’ Interests

C

Trade Union Interests

Conclusions

Political Parties andGerman 1

145 149 152

ECPolicy-Making

The Social Democratic Party

159 165

2

The CDU/CSU and EC Policy-Making

172

3

The Free Democratic Party and ECPolicyMaking

182

4

Conclusion

185

5

Case Study

188

6

Political Parties and the delayedintroduction of EMS

Footnotes

V

119 138

Footnotes

IV

100

The Role of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in EC Policy-Making

197 201

209

1

The distinguishing features of the legislative process and parliamentary control in the Federal Republic 211

2

The impact of EC membership on the powers of the Bundestag and Bundesrat

219

3

The establishment of special procedures for scrutinising EC legislation

223

4

The Article 2 procedure

225

5

Weaknesses in the Article 2 procedure and attempts to overcome them

227

6

The use of ’conventional’ Bundestag controls

240

7

Conclusions

Footnotes

243 246

Page

VI

Subnational Government in ECPolicy-Making 1

Cooperative Federalism

256

2

The Laender Observer

265

3

Direct Laender Contacts With the Community Level

269

4

Institutionalised Laender Participation in German EC Policy-Making

273

5

Case Study

279

6

Local Authorities and the European Community

285

7

Conclusions

286

Footnotes

PART TWO VII

CASE STUDIES

The European Community’s Proposal toHarmonise Member States’ Brewing Regulations

288

293

299

1

Introduction

299

2

The European Commission’s Proposals

301

3

The Federal Government and the EC Proposal

303

4

The Brewers’ Interests and Their Strategy

306

5

The Involvement of the Political Parties

315

6

Bundestag and Bundesrat Scrutiny of the EC Proposal on Beer

318

7

The Involvement of Subnational Government

324

8

Epilogue

325

9

Conclusions

326

Footnotes

VIII

255

The ManshoIt Plan for the Reform of EC Agricultural Structures

328

334

1

Introduction

334

2

The Commission's Proposals

335

3

The Federal Government's Policy-Making Role

338

Page

4

The Response of the German Farmers* Union and Its Strategy

343 351

5

The Involvement of the Political Parties

6

Bundestag and Bundesrat Scrutiny of the Mansholt Proposals

354

7

The Involvement of Laender Governments

361

8

Epilogue

9

Conclusions

Footnotes

IX

Conclusions

364 355 359

376

Postscript

3g6

Bibliography

3gg

Appendix I

Interviews

/ni

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Page Figure 1:1

The linkages between domestic politics and policy-making at the EC level.

29

Figure 1:2

Domestic political sources of EC policy-making.

34

Figure 2:1

German ministerial hierarchy.

52

Figure 2:2

The division of policy responsibilities in the Foreign Office

58

The organisation of the Economics Ministry’s European Division.

64

Simplified summary of interministerial committees for EC policy.

78

Hierarchical representation of interministerial committees’ authority.

79

The staff structure of the German Permanent Representation.

90

Figure 2:3

Figure 2:4

Figure 2:5

Figure 2:6

Table 3:1

Table 3:2

A breakdown of the BDI's most important position papers on EC matters, April 1979-March 1980

123

The recipients of position papers adopted April 1979-March 1980 by the BDI on EC policy matters.

128

Table 3:3

Opinions and position papers adopted by the DIHT and presented to West German policy-making agencies 137 in 1979.

Figure 4:1

Agricultural policy-making bodies of the CDU/CSU and SPD parliamentary party in the Bundestag hierarchy.

180

Figure 4:2

Party preference of farmers.

191

Table 5:1

Plenary and committee sessions of the Bundestag and Bundesrat in the 7th electoral period.

217

The referral of EC proposals to committees in the Seventh Bundestag.

231

Table 5:2

Page

Figure 6:1

Figure 6:2

Table 7:1

Table 7:2

Laender hierarchies and European Community decision-making : an outline.

258

Laender hierarchies and the 1980 Bund-Laender agreement.

275

Some statistics indicating the structure of the brewing sector in West Germany.

307

A breakdown of parliamentary questions on the EC brewing proposals.

316

Table 7:3

The proportion of unprocessed produce to raw ingredients in beer production by country (1967-68) 328

Table 8 :1

Parliamentary questions relating to the Mansholt Plan and ’Mini Mansholt’ (1967-70), by party.

352

Parliamentary questions relating to the Mansholt Plan and ’Mini Mansholt’ (1967-70), by occupation.

353

Table 8:2

ABBREVIATIONS ACP

African, Caribbean and Pacific

Ak

Arbeitskreis, working group

BDA

Confederation of German Employers' Associations

BDI

Federation of German Industry

BDM

Federation of German Small- and Medium-Sized Breweries

BEUC

Bureau of European Consumers' Associations

BGA

Federation of German Wholesale and Foreign Traders

BR

Bundesrat

BT

Bundestag

CAP

Common Agricultural Policy

CBI

Confederation of British Industry

CBMC

Working Group of Common Market Brewers

CDU

Christian Democratic Union

CFP

Common Fisheries Policy

CGT

Confederation Generale du Trade Union Confederation

CIBE

Confederation of European Sugar Beet Producers

COCCEE

Committee of Commercial Organisations of the European Community

COMECON

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

COPA

Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations

COREPER

Committee of Permanent Representatives

CSCE

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

c su

Christian Social Union

Travail, French Communist

DBB

German Brewers * Federation

DBV

German Farmers f Union

DG

Directorate-General of the European Commission

DGB

Federation of German Trade Unions

DIHT

German Conference of Chambers of Industry and Commerce

Drucks

Drucksache, parliamentary document

EC

European Community

ECSC

European Coal and Steel Community

EDF

European Development Fund

EEC

European Economic Community

EFTA

European Free Trade Area

EG

Europaeische Gemeinschaft, European Community

EMS

European Monetary System

EMU

Economic and Monetary Union

EPC

European Political Cooperation

ETUC

European Trades Union Confederation

Euratom

European Atomic Energy Community

EWG

Europaeische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, European Economic Community

FDP

Free Democratic Party

FEWITA

Federation of European Wholesale and International Trade Associations

GATT

General Agreement on Tariffs and

ILO

International Labour Organisation

IMF

International Monetary Fund

MCA

Monetary Compensatory Amount

Trade

MdB

Member of the Bundestag

MEP

Member of the European Parliament

MP

Member of Parliament

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OECD

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OEEC

Organisation for European Economic Cooperation

SGCI

General Secretariat of the Interministerial Committee for Questions of European Economic Cooperation (France)

SPD

Social Democratic Party

StenBer

Stenographischer Bericht, verbatim report (of parliamentary proceedings)

UN

United Nations

UNICE

Union of Industries of the European Community

US

United States

VAT

Value Added Tax

WP

Wahlperiode, electoral period of the Bundestag

PREFACE The research contained in this project was conducted on a full-time basis during three academic years from October 1976.

Of them the first

and third years were spent at the London School of Economics and Political Science, the second year at the University of Cologne and the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Auswaertige Politik, Bonn.

Completion of

the research has been carried out in the Department of Economics, Herior-Watt University.

A number of organisations and individuals have made contributions of varying nature but all facilitating progress in this project.

The

Social Science Research Council funded the two academic years spent in London; the King Edward VII German-British Foundation funded the period in the Federal Republic.

I am grateful also to the Deutsche Gesellschaft

fuer Auswaertige Politik for providing me with office facilities and to staff of the research institute for their help in respect of documentation.

Similarly, the staff of the Parlamentsarchiv and the

late Herr Blischke of the Bundestag assisted in opening up avenues of parliamentary documentation.

Interest in the subject area of the thesis was prompted by Roger Morgan of the Policy Studies Institute.

Of those who have offered

valuable advice during the five-year gestation period, I am particularly grateful to Michael Dillon (Lancaster University), William Paterson (Warwick University), Alistair Bruce (Nottingham University) and Andrew Scott (Heriot-Watt).

I must also acknowledge the careful and efficient

work of Mrs Jean Roberts on the typescript.

Above all, however, I am

grateful to the many German participants in EC policy-making who gave up time to discuss their work.

I must also record that I am responsible

for any errors or shortcomings in the text.

This thesis was approved in June 1982, in it is correct as of December 1981.

The information contained

In the intervening period there

have been some significant developments in West Germany, such as the change of coalition government.

In 1986 I have added a brief postscript

which sets out these developments.

I have also made a few minor

corrections to the typescript. Department of European Studies University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology (UMIST) March 1986

13

C H A P T E R

O N E

West German Domestic Political Structures and European Community Policy-Making

1.

Introduction The Federal Republic of Germany's position in the European

Community can be described as one of interdependence, penetration and integration.(1)

Interdependence stems from the linkages which

exist between West Germany and the other Community states in matters which essentially may be billed as the international political economy.

Interdependence is achieved not on a governmental level

but in terms rather of trading patterns, through the common market for industrial goods.

This is reflected in the distribution of

West German foreign trade in recent years: are from EC countries; (1978 figures).(2)

49.1% of German imports

45.8% of German exports are to EC countries

Moreover - and related to the trading patterns -

there is the currency-based interdependence centred on the Deutsche mark within the framework of the European Monetary System (EMS). The overall impression which is gained, therefore, is one of German interdependence with her Community partners.

The distinction

between integration and penetration might

appear to be rather nebulous.

Perhaps, however, penetration may be

identified as being more limited in nature for it is restricted to the governmental process and institutions, whereas integration can be observed in policy terms as well as structural ones.

Of the three

terms this research addresses itself most directly to penetration: to the links between the German political system and policy-making at the Community level.

These links operate in two directions.

Thus membership of the European Community (EC) imposes certain constraints on German domestic policy-making, by reducing parliamentary sovereignty for example.

In the opposite direction, a successful

campaign of pressure by a sectional interest within the Federal Republic can have repercussions on EC policy by forcing the use of veto powers on the part of the Federal Government.

- 14 -

Although the research concentrates on the structural inter­ relationship between the German political system and EC decisions as opposed to an examination of policy content - the approach is by no means restricted to institutional questions.

The main

focus of attention is the articulation of German interests’ (in the broad sense of the word) in the EC policy process.

One key

aspect will be to assess which are the key German interests to be analysed.

In this it will be found that ’interests’ are not

synonymous with interest groups.

Subnational government - which

clearly has considerable importance in a federal system - and the Federal Bank represent two ’interests’ with important views on EC policies.

Their very different sources of legitimacy in acting

independently of the Federal Government have an important piece of common ground.

This is the fact that they do not represent interest

groups in the sense of non-governmental organisations.

As partners

of the federal ministries in the process of government, one may legitimately ask whether this type of interest is able to achieve better participation in EC policy-making than sectional interests, such as the industrialists’ and trade unionists' organisations.

This question leads to a second area of enquiry:

what channels

do German 'interests' employ in order to influence EC policy decisions? This will entail an examination of the meshing together of West German and EC policy-making channels.

In answering this question the

objective will be to establish why certain ’interests’ are more able to get across their views on EC proposals than others.

Are political

parties involved in this process or is it the nature of direct interestFederal Government relations that is of most importance?

Before expanding upon the points and questions raised here it would appear useful to set this research into its context. be done by posing two questions:

This can

15

(1) What is the relevance of the research to the study of the European Community? (2) Why is the Federal Republic examined;

is Germany

different? These questions are answered by firstly looking at the importance of the nation state in EC policy-making

and, secondly, by assessing

the German dimension.

2.

The Importance of the Nation State in EC Policy-Making For those observers of the European Community who adopt an

intergovernmental interpretation of policy-making it is scarcely necessary to present a case arguing the nation state’s importance. However, we are not concerned here with an examination of the intergovernmentalism-versus-supranationalism debate.

Rather, the focus

of attention is on analysing within a member state how an interest is able to present its views as being of vital national interest such that the member state adopts an intergovernmental approach at the EC level.

Of course, the Federal Republic is but one member state and

any one of the remaining nine countries may create an intergovernmental style on a particular policy issue by invoking its vital interests. Nonetheless, it is remarkable how little analysis has been carried out into the domestic angle of EC policy-making.

As Spinelli has noted

in his recent analysis of the institutional crisis of the Community with reference to the Council of Ministers, "the ministers are only the tips of nine icebergs - nine national, totally independent, decision-making processes."(3)

Our focus of attention is thus the

German federal riceberg’.

Examination of EC policy-making has concentrated on the specifically ’European’ actors and institutions:

the Commission,

the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, EC interest groups (’umbrella’ groups) and, more recently, the European Council established in 1974.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s it became the

prevailing orthodoxy to identify the Council of Ministers as the most important body in EC policy-making.

It was recognised that national

- 16

governments could obstruct the ’logic' of integration because of the wish to retain their economic/political sovereignty.

This was

demonstrated most clearly by President de Gaulle’s actions in the EC framework during the mid-1960s.

The reluctance to cede national control over economic issues has characterised the 1970s and continues in the 1980s.

To list all the

examples of this new(?) nationalism would necessitate a substantial piece of work.

For many years the Federal Republic kept a low profile

when engaging in actions obstructing integration.

Morgan argues that

in the early years of the Communities German delegations were under instructions to back down in the event of conflict.(4)

More recently

the German government’s defence of its national interest has become more vociferous, with the result that the Federal Republic is catching up with the masters of the art - the French and the British.

German

’obstructionism' played a significant role in the delayed establishment of the European Regional Development Fund, to quote one example.(5)

One ijiight perhaps suggest that the Federal Government is still inclined to back down after making a big issue of its national interests and that this gives the impression in public opinion that Germany is not getting a fair deal from the Community.

Here one might cite the German

opposition to the E C ’s 'manifest steel crisis' in which free trade ideals were sacrificed in favour of interventionism.

The cynic would ask what

exactly the Federal Republic and its steel producers obtained in return for all the critical remarks made by Economics Minister, Count Lambsdorff. Another case in point concerns the proposed Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).

The Federal Government returned from the May 1980 Venice Summit

(which temporarily resolved the crisis concerning British budgetary contributions) with a commitment to a fisheries policy on the positive side and higher budgetary contributions on the negative side.

The Federal

Government's behaviour as if the CFP were 'in the bag' left it in a peculiar position when, eighteen months later, no agreement had been reached.

If one ignores the question concerning how the Federal

Government 'sells' its European policy to its electorate, one still can identify the German Government vigorously defending national interests at the Council of Ministers.

- 17

The increased intergovernmentalism in the Community generally was perhaps the main finding of the most recent case study based analysis of EC policy-making.

In the conclusion of one study

W. Wallace identifies this trend. National governments have been relatively successful at retaining control of the processes of Community policy­ making, in most areas, and at maintaining their position therefore as the most powerful intermediaries, the continuing focus for national lobbying and national debate on Community issues.(6 ) His and Spinelli's quote earlier therefore make

it rather surprising

that no in-depth analysis of member states' involvement in EC policy­ making has yet appeared.(7)

Once an item of proposed legislation is officially presented to the Council of Ministers the complex process of formulating a national reaction begins.

The EC dimension is absent during this phase of

reactive policy-making despite the subject of discussion being a Community proposal.

Viewing this from the perspective of integration,

Spinelli notes: ...to give the machinery of the national states the task of being the centres of the European decision-making process means to play the European game with loaded dice, which systematically favour national answers against European solution.(8)

Why then have national viewpoints become so important in EC policy­ making?

De Gaulle's nationalism and the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise

were central to this trend in that they saw a shift in power within the bicephalous EC executive from the Commission to the Council of Ministers.(9)

Obviously the causes of the 1965 crisis cannot be

examined here but the consequences for EC policy-making may be noted. The Commission's role in EC policy-making, although confirmed in the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise, was weakened in effect because of the French insistence on being able to invoke veto rights, thus preventing unanimity, which became - and has remained - the decisional mechanism in the Council for all issues of any substance.

Thus, on the one hand,

18 -

voting in the Council of Ministers became more intergovernmental than would have been the case under a majority principle, since all national interests had to be taken into account.

On the other hand,

the Commission’s right of initiative was to some extent qualified in nature.

It could no longer present the ’ideal’ or visionary

solution to a particular problem because ambitious proposals would be less likely to satisfy all member states.

Instead it had to present

proposals which would be acceptable to all states.

Its mediatory

role, moreover, was changed into one of package dealing between the member states - often involving trade-offs between policy areas.

When the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966 is viewed from the Council’s perspective the concept of the ’vital national interest’ becomes the main determinant of policy-making.

From the domestic

political perspective - our concern here - the introduction of this vague concept of ’vital interests' served notice on all domestic interests that they could aspire to being vital.

In other words if

European integration threatened a particular sector of society German brewers, for example - the latter could put pressure on the national government with the objective of forcing the use of the veto in the Council (Chapter Seven).

As W. Wallace has noted:

The definition of 'vital interests’ ... is both subjective and fluid.... The most important factor in the definition of what any government considers ’vital' in Community bargaining, one may... suggest is the domestic context.(10 ) It is therefore legitimate to ask whether there are any structural factors in the West German EC policy-making machinery that might facilitate/impede groups or 'interests’ pressing their claims to be a 'vital national interest’.

Are the resources open.to 'interests’ in

German EC policy-making different from those resources relevant to national policies?

19

A further factor which can be identified as heightening national awareness within EC policy-making is the ending of the period of unprecedented economic growth in Western Europe.

While

this growth continued, national governments were prepared to act more positively towards integration.

Member states had more

'assets* to invest in joint policies as opposed to the situation at present where a retreat into national measures is largely the order of the day.

In the German context the ending of ’fair weather'

conditions was reflected in Hans Apel's warnings as Finance Minister in the Schmidt Government that the Federal Republic would not play the role of 'paymaster of Europe' by automatically increasing its EC budgetary contributions.(11) budgetary payments and

a

After British complaints about excessive

settlement of that problem in the European

Council of May 1980 in Venice, German pronouncements have again become evident on this issue.

Clearly this question is highly sensitive

and bound to be a constant source of intergovernmental tension, particularly where the states concerned are pursuing restrictive domestic budgetary policies.

Under these circumstances the inter­

governmental policy-making style, in which national governments play the major roles, has been regarded as the 'least worst' EC consensus, i.e. in comparison to supranationalism or no Community at all.

The importance of the nation state may also be considered to have been increased through the first enlargement of the Community in 1973.

The EC has - at a superficial level - been regarded as a

trade-off between the German goal of trade liberalisation and the French interest in a common agricultural policy. itself be regarded as a package deal:

The Treaty of Rome can

a contract reflecting the

national and communautaire interests of the six signatory states. With the enlargement of 1973 member states were admitted, notably Great Britain, that did not feel the same commitment to the 'acquis communautaire' embodied in the treaties.

No facilities existed for the

re-negotiation of the original 'contracts’ - the original treaties. In consequence, the Six were not over-enthusiastic about new extra-

- 20 -

contractual policies such as a regional policy.(12)

British claims

that such a policy was part of a bargain struck over membership did not cut much ice.

It remains to be seen whether the second

enlargement will further accentuate divergent national interests in the Community.

This argument can be expressed in a different form by not using the enlargement as the chief factor but rather by taking the end of the EEC’s transition period as a critical stage leading into a period of resurgence of national divergencies over the direction which the EC should take.

Doubtless this could be regarded as an alternative

formulation of the argument concerning enlargement.

Nonetheless, it

should be recalled that enlargement itself followed on from the 1969 Summit Conference at the Hague, which sought to find a direction for the EC once the transition period had ended.

Whether the recent

failure to achieve major progress in integration can be explained in terms of the absence of a firm contractual programme as in the Treaty of Rome is perhaps open to question.

The inability of the Commission to develop a European strategy is symptomatic of the decline in its role since the mid-1960s. Insofar as a strategy has been adopted, the summitry of the European Council has been responsible.

The establishment of this body

(composed of the heads of state or government) in the 1970s is further evidence of intergovernmentalism among the EC states.

The various explanatory factors offered above as accounting for the importance of the nation state in EC policy-making cannot be fully examined in the present context.

However, it is against this backdrop

of increased ’nationalism* that an analysis of national policy-making channels appears relevant.

It may offer evidence regarding Spinelli's

argument that the centrality of nation states in EC policy-making loads the dice against European solutions.

Can the frequently quoted absence

21

of political will be accounted for by domestic political factors? In answering this specific question (particularly in the case studies) we may be able to establish how pressure groups can transform their views into *vital national interests’.

In concluding this section we may suggest that the EC can be seen in the light of systems theory as a political system which suffers from an imbalance between 'system needs' and self-interest on the part of the national governments.

System needs are supposedly

represented by the Commission in its role as European conscience with the task of maintaining the dynamic of integration.

However, the

system needs are heavily constrained by the domestic policies of the ten member states, each of which must submit itself to its electorate once approximately every five years.

This scarcely provides much

leeway for the national sacrifices which the system needs.

3.

The German Dimension The Federal Republic is a particularly interesting case among the

EC member states.

Firstly, as a federal state it bears some

resemblance to the political system that some would like to see at the Community level.

The governments of the federal states (the Laender)

are represented in the Bundesrat (Upper House), making inevitable a comparison with the national governments' representation in the EC Council of Ministers.

In terms of the distribution of power, however,

the Council of Ministers and the Bundesrat have rather different allocations in their respective systems.

Furthermore, the 'cooperative

federalism' extant between the Laender and federal levels in the German system certainly does

not prevail between the ten member states (qua

Council of Ministers) and the Commission. can be drawn too far;

Of course, these parallels

as publications on the EC continually repeat,

the political characteristics of the Community are of a hybrid and novel nature.

Nonetheless, the federal system in West Germany means

that there is a dispersed policy-making structure offering more options to interests seeking to shape EC policy than in a centralised system such as France.

22 -

Just as domestic federal legislation is largely executed by the Laender, so EC policy is passed down to the national level for implementation.(13)

The effect of this is that much Community

policy is administered by the Laender, rendering their involvement in its formulation justifiable.

This leads to the question of

whether EC membership has magnified the tendency towards ’administrative federalism', whereby the Laender merely implement policy formulated at a higher decisional level.(14)

Secondly, each member state has a different approach to EC policy-making, fitting in with the domestic policy-making environment. In France the process is centralised in the General Secretariat of the Interministerial

Committee for Questions of European Economic

Cooperation (SGCI)(15);

in the Federal Republic there is a rather

decentralised process involving the Economics Ministry and the Foreign Office.

The two countries’ respective styles of (Napoleonic)

centralisation and (federal) decentralisation are therefore re-created in their EC policy-making machineries.

The decentralised style of the Federal Republic is accentuated on account of the two-party coalition of Free Democrats and Social Democrats that has held power since 1969.

To what extent therefore

do the comparative lack of coordination through interministerial committees, the constitutional provision of ministerial autonomy and different views inside the coalition itself lead to a relatively ambiguous or unpredictable German position in EC negotiations?(16) This latter type of ambiguity is to be seen in the apparent contradiction between Chancellor Schmidt’s commitment to reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the fact that the Free Democratic Agriculture Minister, Ertl, has consistently sought large price increases which contribute to the surpluses and hence the need for reform.(17)

This situation

may be explained by the policy-making structures of the Federal Republic in some measure.

23 -

A third characteristic of the German political system is highlighted by EC policy-making.

This is the ’restricted

ideological space' that characterises the German party system.(18) The clustering of the party system around the middle ground of politics is reflected in shared party attitudes on many - but certainly not all - political issues.

There is an absence of controversy regarding

the EC within or between German parties which is in stark contrast with the situation in France and Great Britain. be different emphasis

Whilst there may

placed on the need for CAP reform between

the German parties, the desirability of European integration is not in doubt.

Does this mean that political parties serve no function in

the context of EC policy-making in the Federal Republic?

This is a

further question which we shall seek to answer using policy-making structures and case studies as evidence.

Moreover, this question

will involve some analysis of the role of the Bundestag (Lower House) since it is within the parliamentary framework that party differences usually find expression.

The question of parliamentary involvement leads to a fourth characteristic of West German politics that finds expression in EC policy-making.

In this case, however, it is not a characteristic

peculiar to the Federal Republic but applies generally to national politics in advanced industrial societies:

the drift of policy-making

away from representative democracy (through political parties) to the direct representation of interests.

This development has reflected

the extension of governmental activity in Western Europe into economic and social functions.

These 'new' policy areas are typically technical

in nature and require expertise on the part of those involved in the formulation of policy. characteristic

Furthermore, these 'new' policy areas are

of those functions integrated at the EC level:

agricultural policy, tariffs, competition policy, regional development and the like.

Hence the question arises as to the suitability of

political parties as instruments for influencing - to take one example the Federal Government's position in negotiations concerning national quotas for steel production.

- 24 -

The extension of state activities and the decline in democratic participation in them on account of their more technical nature are the two key characteristics of technocracy.

When one combines

this technocracy with the democratic deficit* (stemming from the lack of democratic control) that exists at the EC level, one obtains a mixture which is likely to skew EC policy-making in member states towards certain types of interests.

Some interests - those of

consumers for instance - may not enjoy such good access with the governmental administration as farmers or industry because of the domestic structure of EC policy-making.

The specific manner in which

the 'free market* of interest group forces is affected will be coloured by specifically German characteristics.

The sort of client

relationship that has been suggested as existing between the Federal Agriculture Ministry and ’its' farmers would clearly undermine the notion of free access to government of interest pressures.(19)

4.

The Domestic Politics Approach In the foregoing outline much emphasis was placed upon national

aspects of EC policy-making.

At the risk of appearing to engage in

semantics we may draw a distinction between the importance of the national interest in the EC and the domestic politics approach.

The

increased importance of the national interest is related to increased intergovernmentalism in EC decisions.

However, the term national

interest cannot be regarded as a neutral one for the purposes of analysis:

it presupposes intergovernmental policy-making.

It would

be prejudicial to the research to assume from the outset that policy­ making is characterised by any one of the ’the Community method', supranationalism or intergovernmentalism.(20)

More accurately, the

style of policy-making as viewed from a Community-level perspective is dependent upon the domestic politics of the member states.

This

categorises the domestic politics approach as a tool for the analysis of EC policy-making rather than as a theory or model of policy-making.

25

Two simple examples will suffice to explain the analysis associated with the domestic politics approach and how this may be employed - regardless of the policy-making style prevalent at the EC level.

Averyt has examined the ability of the EC farmers'

interest group, COPA, to reach agreement on individual product prices in the CAP annual review.

This was achieved on six (out of eleven)

occasions during the period 1966-75.(21)

Under these circumstances

one important element of EC policy-making cannot be seen in terms of intergovernmentalism.

For the German farmers involved, agreement

on a united front with their EC counterparts strengthened their bargaining position.

The German Farmers* Union (DBV) considered it

to be in its interest to articulate demands on an EC-wide basis. The transnational approach adopted by the DBV was the product of domestic self-interest: way.

their aims could best be achieved in that

The domestic politics approach may therefore be used to explain

this transnational dimension of EC policy-making.

Of course, this example relates only to an interest group's formulation of a negotiating position.

A less isolated instance may

be drawn from Rosenthal’s analysis of EC policy-making;

her case

study on the negotiations leading to the Maghreb association agreements will serve as an example.(22)

In this case study Rosenthal reaches

the conclusion that: a small, highly motivated, extremely dynamic group of officials from the external relations directorate general of the EEC (Commission) pushed and pulled, manipulated and cajoled, literally ’’took over” when it looked as if negotiations would be interminably bogged down in inter­ governmental wrangling.(23) In this particular case Rosenthal thus concludes that elite networks based on the Commission - rather than intergovernmentalism - represented the prevailing policy-making style.

Yet this interpretation implies

that intergovernmental forces (the national governments) allowed the Commission to play a leading role because no ’vital interests’ were entangled.

There must have been a decision in each of the member

- 26

governments not to intervene.(24)

Why such a decision was taken

could then in turn be explained in the domestic politics of the member states.

It could be argued that the Maghreb association

was not a controversial issue in any of the member states for various different reasons;

the Commission could act without ’interference*.

Although this and other supranational policy-making cases identified by Rosenthal stemmed from an earlier period in the Community between 1968 and 1972 - when intergovernmentalism had not reached its present peak, these brief details indicate that ’domestic politics’ analysis can be employed nonetheless.

We may refer back to Wallace’s

comments (noted above): The most important factor in the definition of what any government considers ’vital’ in the Community bargaining, one may ... suggest is the domestic context.(25) Thus where no government perceives a threat to vital interests, this can also be extracted from analysis of the domestic context.

The ten

national governments therefore act as clearing houses for domestic pressures.

The absence of domestic pressures, however, can result in

issues passing through the filtering process and achieving relatively rapid resolution at the Community level.

We have identified that domestic political factors can be employed to explain actions at the Community level: of the domestic politics approach. been noted:

the first characteristic

The second characteristic has also

national governments act as clearing houses which determine

whether domestic political arguments enter the EC arena.

In other

words, if a national government is swayed by the arguments of a domestic interest, it may incorporate those views into its negotiating brief for the Council of Ministers.

The centrality of national governments, as seen in the domestic politics approach, is accounted for in two ways.

Firstly, the Council

of Ministers is the key decision-making body at the Community level. Secondly, as a body composed of national ministers, it consists of the

27

authoritative decision-makers in the domestic context,too.

In

cases of less political importance the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) acts as the link between the domestic and EC levels, preparing the ground for meetings of the Council of Ministers.(26)

More recently the supreme decision-making authority

has become the European Council, the thrice-yearly institutionalised summits of the heads of state or government.(27)

Perhaps the main shortcoming of descriptions of intergovernmental policy-making is the tendency to give the impression that there are Monolithic1 national policy standpoints.

This overlooks the fact

that a ’monolithic’ position is the product generally of competing interests at the domestic level.(28) complex than that.

The situation is arguably more

Busch and Puchala - using an elite network

approach - have argued that: The EC is most usefully seen as a continuous pattern of inter-elite linkages which emanate outwards from Brussels and ultimately enmesh political leaders even at local levels within the Common Market.(29) Our perspective, by contrast, examines these linkages from the reverse direction:

from the local (German) level upwards to the Community.

Another criticism of the intergovernmental approach is that by focusing

on national governments it tends to gloss over the group theory

approach to politics, according to which each national government’s view on an issue is seen as the outcome of regulating competing domestic interests.(30)

Thus intergovernmentalism is not altogether helpful to

analysing the real reasons behind a particular EC decision.

Interest

groups - like national governments - straddle the two policy-making levels, since those interests most affected by EC activity are organised at the transnational level.

The only other link between the two levels

is provided by political parties but their significance at the trans­ national level is very limited.

5.

The Structure of EC Policy-Making A

The Community Level

Before examining the specific hypothesis which is to be tested here in respect of German EC policy-making, some outline of the policy

- 28 -

process at the Community level must be set down.(31)

In particular,

the objective in doing this is to identify the points in the policy process where German views feed into Community bodies.

Without

providing this information the whole exercise of examining the domestic (German) structure of EC policy-making would be devoid of its Community context.

Having argued that much analysis of EC policy­

making omits the domestic dimension, it would be inexcusable to perpetrate the same mistake by focusing

on the latter to the exclusion

of all else.

In purely structural terms the linkages between the domestic political system and Community institutions are shown in Figure 1:1. However, this is all that is shown;

neither the relations between

German political actors nor between Community actors can be gauged from the diagram.

We find that the European Council, the Council of

Ministers and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) are all hierarchically linked with the national governments: the Federal Government.

in this case

The Commission, by contrast, has no explicit

national ties since its task is to represent the Community interest. Nonetheless this task cannot be performed without gaining some kind of information regarding the situation in the component states of the EC. This is done by contacts with ’experts1. types:

These experts are of two

either higher civil servants from the member states;

officials from EC (umbrella) interest groups.

or

In the case of the

former - and in the relatively few cases where national interest groups are consulted - the experts are invited on the basis that they are not given instructions by their (national) paymasters. are often instructed regardless.)(32)

(These experts

As representatives of a Community

interest group, those consulted in the latter category will not by definition present national views.

Umbrella group representatives are

therefore regarded as allies of the Community cause.

The Commission

represents the main target of umbrella group activities since the Council of Ministers is not really a self-contained institution. Interest groups can most effectively influence Council decisions through

29

WEST GERMANY

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY European Council

COUNCIL

GERMAN

OF

FEDERAL C 0 R E P E R

GOVERNMENT

MINISTERS

EUROPEAN COMMISSION ’EXPERTS’

EC GERMAN

UMBRELLA

INTEREST

GROUPS

GROUPS ECONOMIC + SOCIAL COMMITTEE

GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES

TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES

DOMESTIC POLITICS

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY POLICY PROCESS

Key represents negotiations/opinion referral at EC level represents domestic sources of EC bodies represents informal delegation from domestic level to EC Commission.

Figure 1:1

The linkages between domestic politics and policy-making at the EC level.

- 30 -

contacts made at the domestic level since it is in national politics that ministerial reponsibility and democratic accountability has real significance.

Accountability cannot be achieved at the EC

level because the European Parliament has very limited powers; control powers relate to the Commission which does not make final policy decisions.

To complete the picture the Economic and Social

Committee’s powers are too insignificant to be considered here.

The E C ’s policy-making structures and their immediate linkages with the German political sub-system have been identified.

Beyond

this static outline of Community institutions lies their interaction in the policy process.

In order to show the dynamic element with

particular reference to German inputs into the Community organisations the various stages of policy-making must be identified.(33)

1

The Pre-decisional Phase a)

The Community level

On its own initiative or that of the European Council/Council of Ministers the Commission works on a preliminary policy proposal. This involves consulting ’experts* from the member states either on an ad hoc basis or in the Commission’s advisory committees.

On occasion

some preliminary consultation of the relevant committee of the European Parliament may occur.

Of greater importance than these parliamentary

contacts are those made with umbrella interest groups.

After several

working drafts have been examined in such consultations the Commission formally adopts a text.

This ends the pre-decisional phase.

b) The German domestic level. Those experts who are invited for talks with the Commission primarily higher civil servants but sometimes German interest group representatives - inform their ’superiors* of the Commission’s intentions after meetings.

At the same time, umbrella groups also

supply German member organisations with similar information.

On the

31

basis of this all German organisations participating - directly or indirectly - in the pre-decisional phase will prepare some provisional response to put to the Commission through appropriate channels (direct ’expert’ contacts, umbrella groups etc.).

2.

Formal Presentation of Proposals to Council of Ministers a) The Community level

Having adopted a firm proposal, the Commission submits it to the Council of Ministers.

In consultation with COREPER - and depending

on the policy area - referral may be made to the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. b) The German level Once a proposal is in the Council’s hands the domestic policy process commences in earnest.

The elaboration of a governmental

policy response begins in the relevant federal ministries, with coordination being provided (where necessary) in an interministerial committee at a level commensurate with the ’political1 significance of the item as perceived by the government itself.

Affected German

interest groups will formulate their own response for submission to the relevant ministry(ies).

In some cases they may alert political

parties which will in any case receive formal advice via the Bundestag from the Federal Government.

The Bundesrat and the Laender governments

will similarly receive formal advice, although in all such cases the Federal Government gives formal advice subject to certain terms of reference (to be outlined in the text).

All these political bodies

will submit their own responses to the Federal Government, which must formulate a national policy position from the views received.

German

participants may contribute to opinions formulated at the European Parliament and/or Economic and Social Committee.

3.

The Decisional Phase a) The Community level

On receiving opinions from the Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament, the Commission and COREPER decide whether any of the opinion(s) may be incorporated into the proposal before the

32 -

Council.

On the basis of the original proposals (plus any

modifications) specialist working groups of the Council seek to reach agreement.

Where agreement is achieved COREPER adopts these

items as rA* points:

here the Council merely gives formal assent.

Those items where no agreement is reached are rB f points.

They are

where substantive discussion is required in the Council.

Resolving

the matters of dispute is very complex and may require several referrals back and forth between specialist working groups and the Council of Ministers.

On sensitive political matters referral to

the European Council may prove necessary.

Decisions are taken on

almost all matters on the basis of unanimous voting.(34)

Thus the

views of member governments are ultimately of greater importance than any (non-binding) advice offered by the two consultative bodies (parliament and the Economic and Social Committee).

Following

adoption by the Council of Ministers promulgation is achieved by publication in the EC's Official Journal in one of the following forms: (i)

Regulation : legislation which is legally binding on member states and is applied directly as if a national law;

(ii) Directive : legally binding on the member state in its objectives but leaving the national authorities to formulate specific enabling legislation inside a time limit; (iii) Decisions : binding in every respect on the addressees (firms, member governments, individuals).

b) The German level German parliamentarians and interest group officials may scrutinise Commission proposals in the European Parliament or Economic and Social Committee.

Advice may be offered to German members by various domestic

interests.

Because of the composition of the two bodies, however, it

is unlikely that specifically German views will be successfully incorporated in final opinions.

If they are, this still makes no

guarantee of incorporation in the final Council decision.

33

Specialist civil servants are involved in Council working groups which are managed by COREPER.

The German Permanent

Representation is involved in arranging meetings and briefing Bonn officials - both in their ministries and those visiting Brussels for working group sessions.

Internal ministerial meetings and

inter-ministerial discussions take place as progress is made.

As

final decisions approach, higher ministerial authority becomes necessary - up to the Cabinet level if the circumstances dictate. Again according to the circumstances, negotiations between ministries and interests (groups, the political parties or the Laender) take place. Ministerial officials attend Bundestag and Bundesrat scrutiny sessions in committees.

Cooperation with the Laender in other federal bodies

occurs where subnational government has significant legislative powers.

Ultimately the ministry-in-charge adopts a negotiating brief which is defended in the Council of Ministers.

When a decision is

reached the Federal Government must implement it.

In the case of a

Directive this will necessitate introducing (German) enabling legislation.

B

The Domestic (German) Level.

The Community’s policy-making institutions have been outlined, as have the German inputs into them.

However, since the particular

concern here is with the domestic dimension it is worth making some specific references to the interaction of German bodies within the Federal Republic in respect of EC matters.

On a purely structural

basis the interaction is contained in Figure 1:2.

As with Figure 1:1,

no weighting is attached to the bodies shown, although the Federal Government’s centrality is fairly evident.

Personalities and any

number of other matters inject important variables which cannot be illustrated.

The relevant chapters will aim to sketch in the actual

behavioural involvement of the agencies shown.

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