The Displaced Rohingyas: A Tale of a Vulnerable Community 1032066083, 9781032066080

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The Displaced Rohingyas

This volume offers a comprehensive overview of the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh. It analyses the socio-cultural and humanitarian challenges of the crisis, along with the discourses that have developed on this issue via the local and international media and literature. The volume also suggests ways to build sustainable solutions for the Rohingya refugees. It discusses wide-ranging issues including a historical overview of the Rohingyas; the Rakhine State of Myanmar and the issue of religious toleration; the struggle for existence in Malaysia and Thailand; vulnerable Rohingya in Bangladesh; and stratified lives in Bangladeshi camps. It also sheds light on social insecurity among Rohingya adolescent girls; understanding gender-based violence in camps; the portrayal of the crisis in Chinese and Indian newspapers; and Bangladesh’s policy in addressing the Rohingya crisis and repatriation. This book will be useful for scholars and researchers of sociology, social anthropology, refugee studies, peace and conflict studies, international relations, human rights, political studies, gender studies, and South Asian studies. Sk Tawfique M Haque is a Professor of Public Policy and Governance and Chair of the Department of Political Science and Sociology of North South University (NSU), Dhaka, Bangladesh. He is also the Director of the South Asian Institute of Policy and Governance (SIPG) at NSU. He has published 6 books, 12 book chapters, and a​good​ numb​er of​ scie​ntifi​c res​earch​ pape​rs. H​is ar​ea of​ rese​arch inter​est covers​ geop​oliti​cs, m​igrat​ion a​nd re​fugee​ cris​is, l​ocal gover​nment​, the​ories​ of g​overnance,​ deve​lopme​nt ma​nagem​ent, and c​limat​e cha​nge. Bulbul Siddiqi is an Associate Professor of Anthropology and Sociology at the Department of Political Science and Sociology, North South University, Bangladesh. He completed PhD in Anthropology of Religion at Cardiff University in 2014 researching the Tablighi Jamaat in the UK and Bangladesh. He published books and journals from reputed publishers at home and abroad. He is currently researching in several areas of the Rohingya Crisis, Madrasa Education and Social Changes, Violent Extremism Narratives, and Religious Pluralism and Tolerance. Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Sociology at North South University, Bangladesh. His research primarily examines the nature and trends of welfare state development in developing nations and the issues of forced displacement and resettlement in developed and developing areas.

The Displaced Rohingyas A Tale of a Vulnerable Community

Edited by Sk Tawfique M Haque, Bulbul Siddiqi, and Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 selection and editorial matter, Sk Tawfique M Haque, Bulbul Siddiqi and Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Sk Tawfique M Haque, Bulbul Siddiqi and Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-06608-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-13330-0 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-22870-7 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003228707 Typeset in Sabon by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

To All Displaced Rohingya in the World

Contents

Notes on Contributors Foreword by Bob Rae

ix xiii

PART I

Forced Displacement and Statelessness 1 Introduction: Forceful Displacement and the Rohingya

1 3

MAHMUDUR RAHMAN BHUIYAN, BULBUL SIDDIQI, AND SK TAWFIQUE M HAQUE

2 A Historical Overview of the Rohingya: The Nexus among Refugeeness, Religion, and Geopolitics

19

ISHRAT ZAKIA SULTANA AND ABANTEE HARUN

3 The Rohingya Muslims’ Crisis in the Rakhine State of Myanmar: “Recognition as Toleration” and “Religious Toleration” 35 MD. ISHRAT IBNE ISMAIL AND MUHAMMAD MIZANUR RAHMAN

4 A Right to Exist: The Rohingya and Their Struggles in Malaysia and Thailand

52

MD. MAHBUBUL HAQUE AND SK TAWFIQUE M HAQUE

PART II

Humanitarian Issues and Uncertainties 5 Living in Uncertainty: Vulnerable Rohingya in Bangladesh

75 77

BULBUL SIDDIQI, PALASH KAMRUZZAMAN, AND MOHAMMAD EHSAN KABIR

6 Division through Registration?: Rohingya Refugees in Bangladeshi Camps ISHRAT ZAKIA SULTANA

94

viii Contents PART III

Women, Children, and Vulnerability 7 Challenges of Security and Self-Dignity for Rohingya Adolescent Girls in Bangladeshi Camps

113 115

MAHMUDUR RAHMAN BHUIYAN

8 Healthcare-Seeking Behaviour for Reproductive Tract Infections among Rohingya Refugee Adolescent Girls

138

LUCY CHRISTINE NDERITU, SAHLIL AHMED, ABDUL AWAL, BACHERA AKTAR, AND A.S.G. FARUQUE

PART IV

Rohingya Voice, Media, and Representation 9 The Rohingya People’s Voice for Justice: An Inheritance and Influence of Oral Narratives

159 161

A.Q.M.A. RAHMAN BHUIYAN

10 A Closer Look: How Major English Language Newspapers Portrayed the Rohingya Crisis in India and China

178

HARISUR RHAMAN

11 Representation of Forcibly Displaced Rohingyas in Bangladeshi Newspapers 198 PALASH KAMRUZZAMAN, MOHAMMAD EHSAN KABIR, BULBUL SIDDIQI

PART V

Policy and Sustainable Solution

223

12 The Rohingya in Bangladesh: An Analysis of the Policy, Law, and Practice

225

SHIVANI DUTTA

13 Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and Resolution of Rohingya Crisis: A Foreign Policy Perspective

237

SHAHIDUL HAQUE AND SUFIUR RAHMAN

Index 265

Notes on Contributors

Sahlil Ahmed is a PhD student and works as a Research Assistant at the Sociology Department at The University of Utah,  USA. She also holds an MBBS degree and an MPH degree. Her current research is focused on understanding how early life stress and war-related traumas influence risks for cognitive decline, sarcopenia, and Alzheimer’s disease. Bachera Aktar is a public health researcher with more than 11 years of experience in implementing community-based public health interventions and conducting health systems research. Her research interests include health systems research, urban health, humanitarian health systems, implementation science, community-based participatory research, participatory action research, and maternal health. Abdul Awal is currently doing his Masters in mathematics specialization in operations research and statistics at the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, USA. Prior to that, he was a Research Associate (study leave) at BRAC James P Grant School of Public Health, BRAC University. A.Q.M.A. Rahman Bhuiyan is a Professor and Chair at the Department of English and Modern Languages, North South University, Dhaka, Bangladesh. He teaches graduate and undergraduate courses in Contemporary Literary Theory, Postcolonial Theory, Romanticism, World Literature, and Nineteenth-Century British Fiction. He was a Fulbright Scholar-in-Residence at Keystone College, Pennsylvania. Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Sociology at North South University, Bangladesh. His research primarily examines the nature and trends of welfare state development in developing nations and the issues of forced displacement and resettlement in developed and developing areas. Shivani Dutta is a Research Scholar at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore, India. She completed LLM with a Gold Medal from NLUJA, Assam, India. It’s been seven years since she has been into academics. During this course, her interest area specifically inclines towards

x Notes on Contributors the human rights law and the consumer law. Her doctoral study is on the broad theme of migration laws. A.S.G Faruque is currently working as an Emeritus Scientist in icddr,b, Dhaka, Bangladesh. He holds MBBS and MPH degrees. The length of his clinical and public health research experience is more than 40 years. These research fields broadly are maternal and child health, nutrition, enteric infections, and emergency and crisis settings. Md. Mahbubul Haque is currently working as faculty at the Faculty of Law and International Relations at University Sultan Zainal Abidin (UNISZA) Malaysia and was formerly a faculty member of the Political Science at Prince of Songkla University, Thailand. Of Bangladeshi origin, Mahbub conducted research and advocacy work for rights of non-citizens in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. He obtained a PhD in Human Rights and Peace Studies from Mahidol University in Thailand in 2014. Shahidul Haque is a Professor at North South University, Dhaka, Bangladesh. He is also a Senior Advisor on migration and humanitarian policy of IOM, Dhaka. He was the Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh from January 2013 to December 2019. Shahidul Haque served as a Director for Migration Policy and Global Relation Division of IOM based in Geneva. He has also been extensively engaged in negotiations associated with the Rohingya crisis. Sk Tawfique M Haque is a Professor of Public Policy and Governance and Chair of the Department of Political Science and Sociology of North South University (NSU), Dhaka, Bangladesh. He is also the Director of the South Asian Institute of Policy and Governance (SIPG) at NSU. He has published 6 books, 12 book chapters, and a good number of scientific research papers. His area of research interest covers geopolitics, migration and refugee crisis, local government, theories of governance, development management, and climate change. Abantee Harun teaches at the University of Liberal Arts Bangladesh (ULAB), Dhaka, Bangladesh and the Department of Social and Cultural Sciences at the Fulda University of Applied Sciences. Her research has had two thematic and areal foci: ethnicity and identity politics; and, second, Islam, public sphere, and Islamic activism in South Asia, especially in Bangladesh. Md. Ishrat Ibne Ismail is a Comparative Literature PhD Candidate at Western University, Canada, Ishrat is an Associate Professor of English at Shahjalal University of Science and Technology, Bangladesh. He received his MA in English, Film, and Theatre from the University of Manitoba, Canada. His research interests include South Asian Partition Literature, Human Rights and Literature, and Diaspora Studies.

Notes on Contributors  xi Mohammad Ehsanul Kabir came from a multi-disciplinary background combining MA in International Development, PhD in Environmental Studies, and Bachelor in Social Science. He has over 12 years of teaching and research experience in Bangladesh, Australia, and the United Kingdom. His research interests include internal displacement, climate change adaptation, rural poverty, youth geographies, and forced migration. Palash Kamruzzaman is a Professor of Social Policy at the University of South Wales, UK. He has published three books and several journal articles in international journals. He has also published in the areas of approaches to development, participation in policymaking, aid ethnographies, global development goals (e.g., SDGs, MDGs), civil society, and extreme poverty. Mohammad Mizanur-Rahman is a third-year doctoral student at the School of Cultural and Critical Studies, BGSU, USA, Rahman completed his undergraduate and graduate studies in English at Shahjalal University of Science and Technology, Bangladesh. He earned his Masters in English from the University of Guelph, Canada. He is interested in indigenous literature, diaspora studies, and ecocriticism. Lucy Christine Nderitu is a public health researcher at LVCT Health. She holds a BSc in Foods, Nutrition, and Dietetics and Masters in Health. She is currently involved in the evaluation of HIV programs implemented by LVCT Health. Her interests also include nutrition, non-communicable diseases, and health ageing. Harisur Rahman is an Associate  Professor at North South University in Dhaka, Bangladesh. In December 2016, he was awarded a PhD degree in Anthropology from the University of Auckland, New Zealand. He published a book and journal articles from reputed publishers at home and abroad. Sufiur Rahman is currently serving as the Bangladesh High Commissioner to the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji. He Joined Bangladesh Foreign Service in 1988. He also attended several UNGA sessions, Conferences/meetings of the World Health Organization, ILO, United Nations Compensation Commission, WIPO, IOM, Conference on Disarmament, UNFCCC, and Asia Dialogue on Forced Migration (ADFM). Bulbul Siddiqi is an Associate Professor of Anthropology and Sociology at the Department of Political Science and Sociology, North South University, Dhaka,  Bangladesh. He completed PhD in Anthropology of Religion at Cardiff University in 2014 researching the Tablighi Jamaat in the UK and Bangladesh. He published books and journals from reputed publishers at home and abroad. He is currently researching in several areas of the Rohingya Crisis, Madrasa Education and Social Changes, Violent Extremism Narratives, and Religious Pluralism and Tolerance.

xii Notes on Contributors Ishrat Zakia Sultana teaches Sociology at North South University, Bangladesh. Her research interests include refugees, citizenship, identity, children, policy, and Asia. Before doing her PhD in Canada, Ishrat worked in the government and with FAO, UNDP, and UNICEF Bangladesh, offering technical and strategic advice to government and development partners.

Foreword Bob Rae Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations in New York

This book is a welcome addition to the burgeoning literature on the Rohingya refugee crisis. The word “crisis” is overworked, but certainly merited in this instance. With each passing day, the humanitarian, indeed existential, challenges facing the Rohingya people become more difficult and severe. Even the word “Rohingya” is contested. Myanmar politicians and army generals made a point of interrupting me in discussions on the crisis by saying, “there’s no such people as Rohingya. They simply do not exist”, insisting that I use the term “Bengali” to indicate that there were people living in Myanmar simply did not belong—they came from what is now Bangladesh and that is where they should return. They see the use of the word as invented as tendentious—“the word itself is an argument, because it asserts that they come from Rakhine when they do not”. As Shakespeare said “Ay, there’s the rub”. This is the key argument that must be resolved. The Rohingya are a real people, and they are not alien to Myanmar. They have lived there, particularly in the Rakhine state, for hundreds of years. They have built homes, communities, schools, and are part of the land. They should not be stateless. The steady erosion of their legal and political rights since the independence of Burma, must now end, because its consequences have proven literally catastrophic for hundreds of thousands of people. Too many lives have been lost because a narrow ideological construction of history, identity, and social and political rights has triumphed over the recognition of a human reality: the vitality of a community whose attachment to home cannot be denied. This book adds much to our knowledge to this reality—each article painstakingly takes us further down the path to a much deeper awareness of the depth and complexity of the Rohingya struggle. For too long, it was denied a reality and name—as in too many other disputes around the world, the refusal to accept the existence of a people, with their own culture, language, and historical narrative, has led to efforts to destroy and expel. The growing depth of scholarship that has exposed these policies and practices is commendable, with journalists and scholars pointing out the reality of the Rohingya experience, the dangerous ideologies that have tried to wipe out the history, identity, and current lives of the Rohingya, and the challenges of trying to resolve the current crisis.

xiv Foreword The last few decades have been marked by an even deeper deterioration in the condition of the Rohingya people. “Burma for the Burmese” was the rallying cry of those seeking to bring British rule and the Indian Empire to an end, and it had a double meaning—both an end to foreign hegemony and a rejection of ethnic and political pluralism as the path to a new governing system. The assassination of Aung San just before independence and the damage of civil conflict in the 1950s were followed by the 1961 military coup and mobilization of Buddhist nationalism under the mantra of “Socialism in One Country”. Millions of “foreign nationals” were either expelled from the country or forced into an ongoing civil war that is still under way. In the vertical mosaic that was such a feature of different Burmese/ Myanmari constitutions, the Rohingya were in an increasingly ignominious position. They were vilified and excluded, expelled, and driven out of the country, a situation that actually became more intense and painful as popular opinion also became engaged in political revolt and reform. It is a terrible irony that the mobilization of the majority against the Tatmadaw through social media also marked the ultimate threat to the very existence of the Rohingya people. A religious, ethnic, and national minority was seen as the embodiment of the “stranger” and the “other” in the midst of a purely Buddhist and Bamar identity insisting on their majoritarian right to define the country. The explosion of anger and resentment meant death and loss of property to over a hundred thousand Rohingya in Sittwe in 2012 and again in 2016. The world failed to respond to this event, choosing largely to overlook it, and instead ended sanctions and engaged with a new civilian administration that had Aung San Suu Kyi as its leader. Aung San Suu Kyi did appoint former UN Secretary General to chair a panel on the violence in Rakhine state, and it was the very day of the report’s release in August 2017 that the destruction of villages and the loss of thousands of lives led to the forced departure of nearly a million Rohingya, who left for camps in Bangladesh, where they have lived in difficult conditions ever since. Bangladesh has allowed the Rohingya to take temporary shelter in the region near Cox’s Bazar but has not recognized them as refugees, pointing out that the Bangladesh government has never signed the refugee convention, and insisting that they are “illegal migrants” whose forced departure is the responsibility of the government of Myanmar. As many of the authors point out, both the government of Bangladesh and many locally based NGOs have played a vital role in dealing with the multiple challenges facing the Rohingya community. Lockdowns and further restricting physical movement contribute to hardship, and in the past year, both the physical and mental wellbeing of the Rohingya in Cox’s Bazar have deteriorated. The creation of a new camp at Bhashan Char, which now has a population of about 19,000, has been marked by ongoing controversy about its isolation and the lack of job and other opportunities.

Foreword  xv The COVID-19 crisis has only magnified the humanitarian crisis. The outbreaks in the camps have been serious, but it must be emphasized that the whole region has been affected by both the health and economic and social impacts of the disease. As problems have increased, donor countries have not always increased their funding—this remains a serious challenge. The Tatmadaw coup in Myanmar, the increased level of conflict throughout that country, and the ongoing and worsening humanitarian crisis (economic downturn of at least 20 percent) all make for a profoundly difficult situation for all groups in Myanmar, and this especially includes the Rohingya of Rakhine state. It is important to remember that there are well over a hundred thousand Rohingya in long-standing IDP camps in Rakhine, without access to education, work, and basic rights of mobility. This grave crisis in both countries is still not receiving the attention it deserves. The Rohingya’s quest for political recognition is a necessary part of their empowerment and improving their situation—global engagement remains necessary, as is the need in both Myanmar and Bangladesh to improve the dire condition of the people who richly deserve better. Their struggle for human rights, human security, and human dignity is worthy of our greater attention and support.

Part I

Forced Displacement and Statelessness



1

Introduction Forceful Displacement and the Rohingya Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan, Bulbul Siddiqi, and Sk Tawfique M Haque

Introduction The contemporary world has witnessed a consistent increase in the number of forcibly displaced people. In 2019, according to the UNHCR, there were 79.5 million forcibly displaced people in the world, and this number was 70.8 million in 2018, 68.5 million in 2017, and 59.5 million in 2014 (UNHCR, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2014). Thus, the number of forcibly displaced people in the world increased by 34% in 2019 compared to 2014. People become forcibly displaced for a variety of reasons, such as political oppression, persecution, torture, and other serious human rights violations (as a result of ethnic conflict or communal violence), war, conflict, poverty, political instability, natural or human-made disasters, and pandemics (Martin, 2018). A displaced population can be defined as “those who cannot find a state to recognise it as a member and who remain in a state of limbo, caught between territories, none of which desire one to be its residents” (Benhabib, 2004: 55). A displaced person is different from a refugee, a difference often misunderstood or not taken seriously. According to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (known as the “Refugee Convention”), a refugee is understood as an individual who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of the country (Article 1a). According to this definition, to be eligible for the status of refugee, one has to satisfy three conditions: (a) be individually persecuted; (b) be persecuted on the basis of one of the five reasons identified in the Convention definition—race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political opinion; and (c) be outside their home country; that is, they must have crossed an international border (Parekh, 2017). This means that the forcibly displaced are defined more broadly than refugees. Thus, besides refugees, there are other kinds of displaced populations. They include those who are often identified by many as “economic immigrants,” or people in “refugee-like” situations, defined thus by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2014). “Economic DOI: 10.4324/9781003228707-2

4  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan, Bulbul Siddiqi, and Sk Tawfique M Haque migrants” are those who are perceived to have left their country of origin, not due to any form of “well-founded fear of being persecuted,” but rather they left their home country “‘in order to improve their economic situation” (Parekh, 2017). People in a “refugee-like” situation are those who face the same risks as refugees but are unable to gain refugee status “for political or other reasons” (UNHCR, 2014). One’s status as a refugee has significant implications. Those who are recognised as refugees by the host country are entitled to the legal protections conferred by both international law and domestic law, such as (depending on the nation) the right to non-refoulment1 when claiming asylum, in addition to other benefits and services. They also, generally, receive more sympathy and concern than those who are not (International Labour Organization, 2016). Those who are not recognised as refugees (even those who have been forced to relocate due to generalised violence, massive violation of human rights, or serious disturbances of public order) are generally excluded from the entitlements under the international definition of refugee (Martin, 2018; van Selm, 2003). Instead, the denial of refugee status may have severe consequences, as they may be put into another category, usually one which carries negative connotations: illegal, detained, rejected, expelled, false refugee, etc. Such negative categorisation allows the host nation to ignore the displaced population as well as deprive them of different rights and provisions, including fundamental human rights (Parekh, 2017). Considering such vulnerability of different categories of forcibly displaced population, UNHCR includes the refugees as well as the “refugee-like” people in its mandate. UNHCR also considers those who flee war or generalised violence to be “prima facie” refugees and extends protection to Internally Displaced People (IDPs)—“people who have involuntarily been uprooted and displaced but remains in their own countries” (Ryan and Childs, 2002: 49). At the outset of any instance of forced displacement, a common response of concerned agencies and actors is to provide shelters to the displaced people in camps, often referred to as encampments. Initially, it is often thought that the displaced people will be repatriated or resettled shortly and their stay in camps is temporary. Host nations also prefer providing the displaced shelters in camps so that the displaced people cannot affect their socio-demographic structures and arrangements. Camp-dwellers are supported to meet their minimal subsistence needs. Their basic human rights and political participation in the host nations are not included in considerations, instead, seen as “unaffordable and unnecessary luxury” (Parekh, 2017). However, this approach has raised questions in the emerging context of encampment periods becoming increasingly longer. Since the end of the Cold War, when repatriation replaced resettlement as the preferred mode of solution to displacement, the number of people living in camps is consistently increasing. Currently, about one-fourth of the displaced population in the globe live in camps, and only a small portion of those (1/2%) who

Introduction  5 are estimated to be in need of resettlement are relocated to a third country (Centre for Global Development, 2017; Soft and Rehberg, 2021). With the shift in preference from resettlement to repatriation, the encampment has gained significant importance. Both host countries and other countries, which once preferred to resettle forcibly displaced people in their own countries, now expect that the displaced people be repatriated to their countries of origin. However, as repatriation is deterred for various reasons,2 the length of stay of the displaced people in camps increases. Currently, the average length of the camp life of encamped displaced people is 17 years (Parekh, 2017), meaning that an increasing number of people are spending a significant portion of their lives in camps for extended periods of time. Camp life is no longer a temporary haven, but rather, a long-term and enduring place of residence. The subsequent denial of basic human rights of the forcefully displaced has raised moral and ethical questions. When people’s stay in camps become longer, the availability of sufficient provisions for basic needs becomes an issue. Many basic rights, including political rights, the right to education and employment, and several forms of social protections, are compromised in camps with the excuse that these people are “going to leave soon” (Parekh, 2017). However, as days go by, such arguments come into doubt. In addition, since most (88%) displaced populations are located in low- or medium-income countries, many of which struggle with poverty, hunger, poor infrastructure and governance, and political instability, life in camps without adequate facilities and support in those countries is likely to be filled with diverse forms of deprivations and risks (Centre for Global Development, 2017). In addition, lives of people in camps become more complex over time, and new social, cultural, and psychological issues emerge. The confined population begins to experience a loss of purpose as past generations, traditions, and cultures begin to fade. This intensifies their sense of uncertainty about the future. Their dependence on aid and the precarious situation they find themselves in push them to act differently, willing to play an active role within their communities, resulting in social reformations ushering in new possibilities, but, at the same time, creating new tensions, conflicts, and challenges. Therefore, it is now argued that encampment should be considered a long-term condition. A growing number of scholars define the period of encampment as the “period of human rights violations” and suggest that this practice not be considered “the accepted norm.” These scholars advocate the promotion of “policies and practices that treat the forcibly displaced as fully human and with dignity” in camps (Parekh, 2017: 3). At the same time, it is also to be considered that as encampment is accepted as a means to repatriation, it should not be seen as a de facto solution to the problem of forcible displacement, something often complained against the Western nations. That is, while in cases of prolonged encampment, opportunities for dignified living and rights are to be promoted; it should not replace repatriation as the ultimate

6  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan, Bulbul Siddiqi, and Sk Tawfique M Haque solution to the problem of forced displacement if resettlement or integration into the host countries—two conventional alternatives to repatriation—is not deemed feasible. After all, encampment is a state of statelessness, with no sovereign authority to ensure protection, rights, and accountability for the displaced population. The perspective from the Rohingya crisis is a new addition to the existing dilemma, difficulties, and challenges in resolving the issues of the forcibly displaced population, which is also the primary focus of the present book. About 1.2 million forcibly displaced Rohingya have been living in Bangladesh, some of whom have been living in camps for about three decades, some have grown up in camps, some have been living in camps since their birth up to their adulthood, and some have entered the camps in 2017, but their exit is uncertain. These people are living in camps with the collaborative support of the host nation and diverse humanitarian agencies but without fundamental human rights and dignity. Many other displaced Rohingya reside in other nation-states without rights and legal protections. Although the problem of forced displacement of the Rohingya exists for several decades, what justifies their humanitarian provisions and what justifies their deprivations from fundamental human rights and dignified living remain key but unanswered paradoxical questions. The aim of this volume is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the state of the displaced Rohingya in camps and beyond to establish a ground for a more objective and ethical understanding of the problem, the state of living of the displaced Rohingya, and a sustainable solution to the crisis. The next section of this introductory chapter provides an introduction to the displaced Rohingya, which is followed by a critical overview of the contemporary approaches to understanding forced displacement. The final section briefly introduces the chapters included in this volume. The Displaced Rohingya The Rohingya are a Muslim ethno-cultural group, historically located in the Northern Rakhine state of Myanmar, whose political rights were discontinued by the state in the early 1980s. Since that time, this population has been subjected to systematic oppression and persecution by the Myanmar government and their rival ethnic community, Rakhine, which forced them to seek refuge in other countries such as Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and several other countries. However, as the closest neighbour, Bangladesh has been the most popular country for them to seek shelter to escape persecution. There have been four significant influxes of the Rohingya to Bangladesh (in 1977, 1992, 2012, and 2017), which have resulted in the accumulation of about 1.2 million Rohingya living in camps and surrounding areas of the southern part of Bangladesh, particularly the District of Cox’s Bazar. According to the population figures of the Rohingya in Bangladesh, the total number of Rohingya in Bangladesh is 884,041 out of which 733,343 Rohingya entered Bangladesh during the last exodus in

Introduction  7 20173 who have been living in 34 camps in two sub-districts—Ukhiya and Tekhnaf—of the same district. The government of Bangladesh has recently started to relocate some Rohingya in Bhasan Char4 that has a capacity of about one hundred thousand. Over the last five decades, the problem of forced displacement of the Rohingya has become more complex, generating diverse geopolitical, diplomatic, socio-economic, cultural, and political issues. Since the last exodus, efforts to repatriate the Rohingya to Myanmar have not been successful, although Bangladesh and Myanmar signed a bilateral agreement in November 2017 (two months after the exodus) to support the quick repatriation of the newly displaced. Bangladesh also did not recognise the newly entrant Rohingya as a refugee, instead, identified them as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN) (Uddin, 2020). As a result, they remained unrecognised as refugees and outside of the coverage of refugee rights according to international and domestic law. Bangladesh still considers their stay in camps temporary and hopes that the displaced Rohingya will return to Myanmar sooner in light of the bilateral agreement between the two nations. However, the repatriation of the displaced Rohingya remained to be an illusion. Bangladesh is not a signatory of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugee and the 1967 Protocol. As a non-signatory state, Bangladesh considers itself exempted from the legal obligations to ensure refugee rights of the Rohingya living in the camps according to the Convention. International organisations, however, normally use the term “‘refugee”‘ to identify the Rohingya. Within this complex context, Bangladesh, in collaboration with various international communities, including the UN agencies, national and international NGOs, and community-based organisations, has been hosting the displaced Rohingya within its territory for decades, primarily by responding to their emergency and subsistence needs. However, as repatriation has not taken place yet, the management of the displaced in the form of mere emergency response is increasingly becoming insufficient. A dignified living of these people, their economic and psychosocial well-being, health, future of the new generation, their healthy growth, education, and sociocultural and political identity, and relationship with the host community are appearing as pressing issues. In addition, the issues of social order and control within camps are being intensified as there are frequent media reports of the displaced being engaged in deviant activities such as drug dealing, involvement with gangs, conflict with the host community, and attempts for illegal migration to other locations and countries (Ahmed and Mohiuddin, 2020; Khan, 2020). Stability of family life is an emerging concern as gender-based violence and polygamous relationships are reported to be increasing in the camps (Ainul et al. 2018). Moreover, natural hazards and other forms of disasters (such as fire) are sources of fear and harm for the Rohingya in camps. In a recent fire in March 2021, 15 Rohingya died and many have been suffering from burn

8  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan, Bulbul Siddiqi, and Sk Tawfique M Haque injuries.5 All these are closely related to the dignified living of the Rohingya in Bangladeshi camps, in addition to the issues of basic provisions, administration, and management. The Rohingya escaped to other countries only to face similar conditions as host countries (such as Malaysia and Thailand) do not recognise them as refugees since they are not signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The COVID-19 pandemic and the February 2021 military coup have resulted in much political instability in Myanmar, generating further uncertainties around the process of repatriation. Instead, there is a fear that, with the military in power, the Rohingya could be subjected to more persecution, resulting in new episodes of displacement (Westerman, 2021). Such deepening uncertainties about the repatriation and the likelihood of extended stay of the Rohingya raise some pertinent questions: What needs to be done to ensure the well-being and dignified living of the displaced Rohingya? Why should these issues be considerations for policy and management? How do we define the responsibility to address them? How to devise a permanent solution to this crisis? An Overview of the Frameworks for Addressing Forced Displacement There are three conventional approaches to addressing forced displacement: resettlement, repatriation, and integration. Resettlement refers to the transfer of refugees from an asylum country to another state that has agreed to admit them and ultimately grant them permanent residence (UNHCR, 2021). There is a general agreement that resettlement had been the preferred solution to forced displacement following World War II until the end of the Cold War (Parekh, 2017). Aleinikoff (1992) identifies three reasons for the preference of resettlement, particularly among the Western nations: (a) refugees from the war could not be asked to return to their war-ravaged countries; (b) the rival parties of the Cold War wanted to take the credits of humanitarian intervention; and (c) Western nations held that refugees would be better off if they were settled in Western nations, an approach that Aleinikoff refers to as “Eurocentric humanitarianism.” The resettlement-centric approach to intervening in the crises of involuntary displacement still dominates mainstream normative theories related to refugees in the West, which are primarily concerned about whom to be resettled and why and how many to be resettled (Parekh, 2017). Repatriation refers to the return of displaced people to their country of origin. It is generally expected that repatriation is voluntary, based on the free and informed choice of the displaced population (UNHCR, 2008). Repatriation has gained more importance over resettlement in the post-Cold War period with the pragmatic and moral arguments that: (a) resettlement exempts states from the responsibility for causing the crisis, which may create disincentives for other states to address the displaced people’s human rights and security challenges; (b) the displaced people ought to be able to return to their home

Introduction  9 country as their membership in their own state is a fundamental good. As Parekh (2017: 25) puts it, repatriation is believed to be “a way of returning an individual to her state, and thus restoring the relationship between the individual and the state.” The third generally acknowledged durable solution to force displacement is local integration. It refers to allowing the displaced population to become full members of their host community in their first country of asylum (Hovil, 2014). However, the effectiveness of this approach depends on the willingness of host states. Oftentimes host states refuse integration due to the fear that it is a threat to its national security or that it may make repatriation of the displaced difficult in the future. However, when the conventional solutions to forced displacement become less effective, long-term encampment becomes a de facto solution (Parekh, 2017). Many analysts tend to see the problem of forced displacement in terms of the refugee regime, particularly the 1951 Refugee Convention and related protocols (particularly that of 19676), and thus emphasise the formal, legal obligations of actors with regards to the rights of the forcibly displaced population. These scholars point at those nations which conceded the covenants while tending to exempt those which have not. That is, a nation which is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention has no responsibility to the displaced. Their focus is responsibility of rather than responsibility for. To them, the issue of the statelessness and resulting harm, suffering, and loss of a dignified life are only secondary considerations, and, therefore, responses to be defined in light of legal obligations, rather than moral or ethical. This approach makes it discretionary for nations to respond to a problem of forced displacement unless they are obligated by international or domestic laws. It also exempts many nations, particularly developed nations in the West, from any legal obligation to resettle displaced populations who are geographically located far away from their territories or are not able to reach them.7 The practical implication of this approach is evident in the fact that only a handful of nations resettle refugees in their territories or contribute to the UNHCR fund.8 Moreover, this legal approach excludes some displaced populations from the right to protection and assistance under the refugee regime, particularly those who do not meet the criteria for refugee status. But the problem of forced displacement can be seen from moral and ethical perspectives too, by focusing on the experiences of the displaced living in camps—in terms of their treatment and need for a dignified living. There are two ways to do it. First, to see the problem of forced displacement from the point of view of sovereign states (in light of the ethical principle of state sovereignty), that is, the sovereign states are the final authorities on regulating the movement of people across national territories, irrespective of purpose—as tourists, scholars, diplomats, business people, economic migrants, refugees, or asylum seekers. If necessary, states can make international arrangements to determine and collectively regulate cross-border movement as members of a society of states (Frost, 2003). As in the case of the 1951 Refugee

10  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan, Bulbul Siddiqi, and Sk Tawfique M Haque Convention, the sovereign states have agreed under which circumstances it is an obligation for them to grant asylum and how to treat these asylum seekers. This perspective is positively linked with the legal approach described above, usually known as the “traditional order” (Frost, 2003: 115). The other ethical approach can be put under deontological logic, which sees the suffering of the forcefully displaced people as morally and ethically unacceptable (Olsen, 2011). While this perspective is fairly new, it is becoming increasingly relevant in the context of the intensification of encampment. This approach necessitates paying attention to the harm caused to the people by displacement and long-term encampment. Parekh (2017) identifies two kinds of harms experienced by the forcibly displaced people, both of which have significant implications for moral and ethical responses. These are: (a) legal or political harm and (b) ontological deprivations directly resulting from legal/political harms. The first kind of harm involves the loss of political community and legal identity in the form of citizenship (Parekh, 2017). As people lose political identity, they lose the ability to participate in the political process in the conventional and widely recognised forms of interest articulation, interest aggression, and political communication as described by Almond and Coleman (1960), or in the input and output functions of the political system, outlined by David Easton (1953). They are practically disconnected from the political processes of the nation-state system (democratic or nondemocratic), and they lose their voice and representation, turning them into an alienated segment of the population. Such consequences of statelessness and living outside of the nation-state system hardly receive attention in the Western normative and legal theoretical discourses of forceful displacement. The second kind of harm, as identified by Parekh (2017), is ontological deprivation, fundamental to humanity, a condition that threatens one’s existence with human dignity. Parekh points out the “structural injustice” displaced people are subjected to when they live in camps. Such injustice results from poor living and subsistence arrangements in camps, and restrictions on movement, education, and economic activities. As Parekh suggests, this injustice is not often the result of deliberate policies of a given state intended to harm the displaced nor the result of ill-intention on the part of the international agencies. It arises as a result of different sovereign states acting in their own best interests. (Parekh, 2017: 6) In fact, structural injustice can be better understood by looking at the actors’ responsibility for unjust outcomes instead of looking at the responsibility of actors for their own actions. Displaced populations’ statelessness and loss of political identity make it difficult for them to fight against or overcome the ontological deprivations and structural injustice they experience while living in camps. Capturing a moral perspective to forced displacement allows us to take the issues of

Introduction  11 ontological deprivations more seriously. It also lifts the limits of looking at the problem of forced displacement from merely political and legal perspectives and allows it to be observed through moral and ethical lenses. Capturing a moral perspective, Hannah Arendt suggests that we should be concerned about all those who are without any form of effective citizenship or political belonging, regardless of how they are categorised legally since they “belong to no internationally recognisable community and are effectively outside ‘of mankind as whole’” (Arendt, 2003: 150). Pointing out the potential moral role of individual states, Parekh (2017: 10), similarly, suggests that those states that have a vested interest in seeing themselves as upholding justice and is committed to broader moral principles, such as universal human equality and dignity, ought to reconsider the moral, as opposed to legal or political obligations that they have. Again, the moral focus on the lived experiences of the encamped population should not downplay the moral call for the repatriation of the displaced to their home countries. While it is important to re-establish the fundamental relationship between the displaced population and their country of origin, it is also imperative that nations that provide shelter to the forcibly displaced are not penalised for responding to a humanitarian call. The role of Bangladesh in hosting the Rohingya can be seen and explained from the second ethical perspective as Bangladesh is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol does not have a leading role in creating refugee regimes and is even not a resettling country or nation-state that accepts displaced people or refugees for economic purposes. Bangladesh has responded to four exoduses since the 1970s purely on moral, humanitarian grounds to save the Rohingya who had crossed the border to flee Myanmar military persecution. Since the 1990s, about two hundred thousand Rohingya have been living in the camps in Bangladesh. This number has been topped by another eight hundred thousand displaced Rohingya who fled the latest Myanmar military campaign in 2017. Due to the COVID19 pandemic and the February 2021 military coup in Myanmar, it is likely that the displaced Rohingya’s stay in Bangladesh will be even longer than initially anticipated. Viewing their lived experiences from legal as well as moral and ethical grounds is now, therefore, imperative. For example, defining the new entrants (those who entered Bangladesh during the 2017 exodus) as FDMN and, thus, not recognising them as refugees have significant implications in contributing to deprivation and structural injustice. These people are not entitled to the legal protections that refugee status confers in both international and/or domestic law systems and do not receive the sympathy and concern that refugees tend to do. As such, this collection of essays seeks to provide a deeper understanding of the statelessness of the Rohingya and the kind of harm it engenders, with the objective to situate ourselves, nation-states, and the global community in a better position to understand

12  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan, Bulbul Siddiqi, and Sk Tawfique M Haque our moral obligations to the people in this situation. While our objective in this book is not to suggest any direct solution to the Rohingya crisis, we want to draw attention to what needs to be done and why—both to support a dignified living of the Rohingya in camps and to solve the crisis itself. As Carens (2013: 201) points out, it is important to figure out what is “right in principle before moving to the question of what we should do in practice.” A majority of the chapters of the book try to address two main questions: (a) What should happen and/or what can be done if the Rohingya cannot be repatriated within a reasonable period of time and why? (b) What can be done to ensure that the displaced Rohingya do not remain confined in camps indefinitely? The authors investigate the state of the displaced Rohingya largely from a non-ideal viewpoint, focusing instead on the circumstances of the Rohingya in Bangladeshi camps and in other locations (particularly in Thailand and Malaysia) and derive an empirical understanding of the harm caused and what course of actions would minimize their suffering while also coming to a possible long-term solution to the crisis. Themes Covered in This Volume This volume comprises thirteen chapters (this being the first) written by authors from eight different countries who have utilised their disciplinary expertise to provide sophisticated analyses of the complex conditions of the Rohingya crisis. Thus, the book intends to provide the readers with a holistic understanding of the Rohingya crisis at this point in history. It will cover the following thematic areas: • • • • •

Theme 1: Forced Displacement and Statelessness Theme 2: Humanitarian Issues and Uncertainties Theme 3: Women, Children, and Vulnerability Theme 4: Rohingya Voice, Media, and Representation Theme 5: Policy and Sustainable Solution

The second chapter by Ishrat Zakia Sultana and Abantee Harun begins with a historical overview of the Rohingya crisis within Myanmar and the beginning of their marginalisation. Although the settlement of the Rohingya goes back to the ninth century, persistent denial of this by the dominant ruling class of Myanmar forced them to live a marginalised life and eventually try to leave Myanmar and seek refuge in Bangladesh and other countries. Such denial has first turned the Rohingya ethnic community into stateless refugees and then made them victims of genocide. This chapter concludes that the complexity of the Rohingya crisis is rooted in its history, which is unchangeable, yet useful to gain knowledge about in order to contribute to the solution of their crisis. In the third chapter, Md Ishrat Ibne Ismail and Muhammad Mizanur Rahman refer to the atrocity of the Rohingya as an act of state-sponsored

Introduction  13 genocide. The chapter shows how most segments of the Buddhist Burmese population promote religious intolerance through “religious othering.” The authors examined the discourse of religious tolerance with Anna Galeotti’s theory on “‘toleration as recognition”‘ and Locke’s “‘theory on toleration’.” The authors argue that religious tolerance is important for the co-existence of the marginalised Muslim and the dominant Buddhist. They also emphasised the need to develop trust between these two communities and pointed out that the government should be secular in its treatment of its citizens and not prioritize one religion over another. Next, Md Mahbubul Haque and Sk Tawfique M Haque discuss the struggle of the Rohingya in two South-East Asian countries: Malaysia and Thailand. The Rohingya are treated in these countries as undocumented asylum-seekers, illegal migrant workers, and/or as stateless individuals. Malaysia and Thailand are not signatories to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees, and for that reason, the displaced Rohingya living in these two countries fail to get assistance from national and international agencies. Despite this fact, Malaysia has become the most popular destination for the Rohingya among the Southeast Asian countries. Thailand is a less favourable place for the Rohingya Muslims due to religious and cultural differences. In most cases, they are trafficked, or they use Thailand as a transit route to Malaysia. The Rohingya in these countries lack dignified protection or legal rights and live with limited access to healthcare and education. Bulbul Siddiqi, Palash Kamruzzan, and Ehsan Kabir, in Chapter 5, discuss the vulnerabilities of the Rohingya in Bangladesh, living lives of constant uncertainty since repatriation continues to be an unsolved issue. The delay in repatriation has created serious concerns about health, education, human trafficking, gender-based violence, and the overall well-being of these vulnerable people. Moreover, more frustration is caused to the entire community because of restricted mobility outside the camps. This research demonstrates that despite various interventions in the camps, the uncertainties and vulnerabilities of the Rohingya have compounded over time as repatriation has become a distant reality, forcing them to seek unsafe migration and high-risk unauthorised work. In Chapter 6, Ishrat Zakia Sultana investigates the stratified lives of the Rohingya and the relationships between the registered and the unregistered Rohingya in Bangladesh. It reveals the consequences of the registration process on the lives of the Rohingya, which aggravates their statelessness. Based on the long ethnographic research among the Rohingya refugees, this chapter demonstrates how the living conditions, education, health, and employment have been affected by registering them as refugees and FDMN (Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals). Sultana argues that the registration has created stratification among the Rohingya community where unregistered Rohingya who entered Bangladesh in 2017 are not entitled to receive the benefits and services as they are not recognised officially as refugees by

14  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan, Bulbul Siddiqi, and Sk Tawfique M Haque the Government of Bangladesh. In this context, Sultana’s chapter raised an important yet neglected debate. Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan, in Chapter 7, explores the nature of social insecurity among Rohingya adolescent girls. Bhuiyan’s chapter shows that inadequate functioning of the major agencies of socialisation such as schools and religious and community institutions and due to the urgency to respond to the demands of survival, adolescent youth boys and girls living in the camps are at risk of being involved in conflicts, violence, and different forms of deviant behaviour. Such a situation has created several risks for the adolescent girls in various Rohingya camps, for example, human and sex trafficking, forced and child marriage, rape and sexual harassment are the most notable. Bhuiyan also points out that since the repatriation has been uncertain, appropriate measures should be taken to create an enabling environment for adolescent girls for a dignified life in the camps. In Chapter 8, Lucy Christine Nderitu illustrates the healthcare behaviour for reproductive tract infections among adolescent Rohingya girls. Moreover, Nderitu discusses the general health perspectives of adolescent girls in the camps. Adolescent girls and their health have always been neglected in most developing countries, the Rohingya adolescent girls even more so. Nderitu shows that most refuse to go to the doctor unless they have a serious issue and mostly consult with informal providers, with less than one-third of adolescent girls with symptoms visiting healthcare service providers. In Chapter 9, AQMA Rahman Bhuiyan demonstrates how the very oral accounts reconstruct a sense of selfhood, develop representation, provide agency to the Rohingya refugees, and advance markers of resistance against the injustice perpetrated upon the victims. Bhuiyan argues that Rohingya oral narratives are powerful tools for representing their struggle and to make the world sit up and listen to their vulnerabilities. Moreover, such a shared narrative develops an appeal for support, accountability, and justice for the inhuman persecution of the Rohingya. The oral accounts and narratives of the Rohingya refugees have been critically examined in this chapter from theoretical perspectives of narratology and postcolonial discourse. Bhuiyan concludes that oral narratives can be seen as a strong political instrument for facilitating the sustainable resolution to the Rohingya crisis. Chapter 10 by Harisur Rahman examines the portrayal of the Rohingya crisis by two online leading Chinese newspapers, the People’s Daily and the Global Times, and two Indian newspapers, Times of India (TOI) and The Hindu. Rahman observes that due to the mutual and beneficial interest of China and India in Myanmar, analysis from the news published shows a pattern of leniency towards Myanmar. Moreover, Rahman indicates that China and India also oppose various multilateral initiatives of the West to resolve the Rohingya crisis, where the role of the West is critically seen to be detrimental to Myanmar’’s peace and stability by Chinese newspapers. In Chapter 11, Palash Kamruzzaman, Ehsan Kabir, and Bulbul Siddiqi bring out the representation of the Rohingya in two leading Bangladeshi

Introduction  15 newspapers, The Daily Star (English) and Prothom Alo (Bengali), as a newspaper can be a useful tool for shaping agenda. The analysis of Kamruzzaman et al. show a discrepancy in the total numbers of Rohingya who entered Bangladesh in 2017, which might be a problem for the wider community in repatriating the Rohingya in Myanmar. They also show that as repatriation is seen as the highest priority, many short-term needs have to be treated with urgency. Besides, in the present geopolitical context, repatriation may not be the immediate reality for the Rohingya. The sense of declining sympathy of the host community towards the Rohingya has also been reported in their analysis. Moreover, demonization of the Rohingya continues to grow, as evident in many newspaper articles. Thus, the authors have suggested a careful consideration to address these problems for a cohesive existence of the Rohingya and the host community. In Chapter 12, Shivani Dutta provides an overview of the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh, focusing on policy, law, and practice. Dutta observes that the Rohingya in fear of returning to the same horrific conditions they fled, may not wish to go back to their country. She brings out a few crucial points in dealing with the Rohingya crisis: ensuring refugee rights through the municipal law in Bangladesh; issuing them work permits by which they would also contribute to the local economy; pursuing the bilateral agreement with Myanmar to accept the Rohingya as their citizen. China can play an important role as a mediator between Bangladesh and Myanmar. Under such a context, UNHCR should play the supervisory role to make sure this entire process is carried out. Finally, Shahidul Haque and Sufiur Rahman provide a detailed analysis of the Rohingya policy articulations of Bangladesh to show the rationale in the context of larger domestic opinion and foreign relation imperatives in Chapter 13. They argue that adopting a multilateral channel would help Bangladesh to create pressure on Myanmar to address the root causes of the crisis and facilitate a sustainable return of the Rohingya. Moreover, diplomatic windows for the international community to seek accountability and justice for the persecuted Rohingya would also be a timely initiative. Haque and Rahman state that Bangladesh will need to intensify engagements with regional countries and others more friendly towards Myanmar and show them the relative value of Bangladesh over Myanmar. In conclusion, we observe that, as the Rohingya crisis continues to exist, it has become more complex over time and generated new problems of different nature: geopolitical, diplomatic, socio-economic, developmental, cultural, and political. While continuing with the persistent efforts to bring a sustainable and dignified resolution to the crisis, it is also essential to ensure a healthy and dignified living standard for the Rohingya living in various camps. The lack of a presence of both long-term and medium-term approaches to the Rohingya crisis would put the lives of the Rohingya in further vulnerabilities where the current progress towards repatriation does not show any immediate hope. Thus, measures should be taken to deal with the present problems

16  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan, Bulbul Siddiqi, and Sk Tawfique M Haque at the camp level. Besides, multilateral, hybrid, and pro-active diplomatic efforts have to be adopted for the dignified and voluntary repatriation of the Rohingya population. Notes 1 It suggests that state cannot send individuals back to their home countries when they have a genuine fear of persecution. As stated in the 1951 Refugee Convention (Article 33), “States have no obligation to admit refugee, but they do have obligation not to refoule (return) a refugee to frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” (UNHCR, 2010: 33) 2 There are many reasons for which repatriation is delayed. These include the persistence of the cause of displacement, unwillingness or reluctance of the home country to bring the displaced people back, extended periods of time required to repair damages caused to the home community, inability of the home country to implement reconstruction of the damage of the habitat of the displaced population, and policies of the home country affecting return and settlement related to land use, property rights, political rights, social welfare, housing, employment, and other frameworks that determine the likelihood of a decent and dignified living (Martin, 2018). 3 Population figures retrieved on 15 July 2021 from https://data2​.unhcr​.org​/en​/situations​/myanmar​_refugees 4 A remote island located in the Bay of Bengal where the GoB has developed it with all modern facilities for the Rohingya. 5 “‘Rohingya Refugee Camp Fire: Several Dead, Hundred Missing and Thousands homeless”‘ retrieved on 16 July from https://www​.bbc​.com​/news​/world​-asia​ -56493708 6 The protocol which eliminated geographic (that refugees be from Europe) and time limits (pre-1951) on the Convention, making it a universal document (Martin, 2018). 7 Most (85%) forcefully displaced people in the world are located in the global South, migrated internally or into neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2019) 8 The United States, Japan, and the countries in the European Union account for 94% of the budget of UNHCR (Parekh, 2017), and only 26 countries resettled a total of 107,800 refugees in 2019 (UNHCR, 2019).

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18  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan, Bulbul Siddiqi, and Sk Tawfique M Haque ______. (2017). Global trends: Forced displacement in 2017. Retrieved from https:// www​.unhcr​.org​/globaltrends2017/ ______. (2014). World at war: Global trends forced displacement in 2014. https:// www​.unhcr​.org​/statistics​/country​/556725e69​/unhcr​-global​-trends​-2014​.html ______. (2010). Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees. Available at https://www​.unhcr​.org​/protection​/basic​/3b66c2aa10​/convention​-protocol​ -relating​-status​-refugees​.html ______. (2008). Policy framework and implementation strategy: UNHCR’S role in support of the return and reintegration of displaced population. Retrieved from https://www​.unhcr​.org​/partners​/guides​/4c2203309​/policy​-framework​ -implementation​-strategy​-unhcrs​-role​-support​-return​-reintegration​.html Westerman, A. (2021). What Myanmar’s coup means for the Rohingya. Available at https://www​.npr​.org​/2021​/02​/11​/966923582​/what​-myanmars​-coup​-means​-for​ -the​-rohingya (accessed 20 April 2021).

2

A Historical Overview of the Rohingya The Nexus among Refugeeness, Religion, and Geopolitics Ishrat Zakia Sultana and Abantee Harun

Introduction Forcibly displaced people and refugees have received much attention in the academic as well as political fields in the last two decades, both nationally and globally. From Syria to Afghanistan to South Sudan to Myanmar and beyond, there are 32.5 million refugees among the 103 million forcibly displaced people around the world, which includes millions of stateless people (UNHCR, October 2022). While it is not possible to resolve the crisis of the forcibly displaced people overnight, surely examining the history and background of forced displacement and refugeeness is necessary to understand the root of this problem. Refugeeness is not a modern phenomenon. Although factors such as politicization and securitization of modern states have affected it in many ways, it is still rooted in the past. History, politics, economics, geographical locations, religion, etc. are some of the key factors that have created, changed, and complicated the issue of forced displacement and refugeeness from time to time. The historical overview of the Rohingya will remain incomplete if the factors that have affected refugeeness globally are not taken into consideration. While a significant number of past events confirm that refugeeness is deeply connected with religion, little attention has been paid to it. Religious leaders of different religions often took asylum in other countries due to persecution in their home countries. On the other hand, people were forcibly displaced because of the states’ demonstration of political power and expansion of territory. Similarly, trade and economic relations between and among the countries, geographical locations of the countries, etc. significantly contributed to the forcible displacement of people from their own countries. Today, geopolitics is a widely used term to indicate how geography and politics have blended together to make states more powerful than they were in the past, deciding the fate of the people. All these factors have been addressed in this chapter. This chapter focuses on the historical overview of the Rohingya in connection to religion and geopolitics. Tracing the Rohingya origin and their crisis, the chapter shows how from the past both of these factors have played important roles in their refugeeness. DOI: 10.4324/9781003228707-3

20  Ishrat Zakia Sultana and Abantee Harun Religion and Migration Gozdziak and Shandy (2002) in their work on Religion and Spirituality in Forced Migration note that public debates as well as scholarly work tend to neglect the connection between religious faith and forced migration, displacement, statelessness, and assimilation into host countries. Is the discussion around religion and migration too sensitive? Levitt (2003) informs us that scholars and researchers often disregard such discussions. Yet, the world has experienced quite a good number of instances that confirm the connection between religion and migration. One such example out of many is found in Ai, Peterson, and Huang’s (2009) work on the role of spiritual resources and religiosity in coping with the mechanism for 138 Bosnian and Kosovan refugees resettled in Michigan and Washington states. Whether the relationship between religion and refugeeness has been brought to the discussion or not, the relationships among faith, religious persecution, and displacement have been long considered as a root cause of conflict and flight as well as living in peace. Although many historians consider refugees as a distinctly modern phenomenon (Marfleet, 2007; Bessel & Haake, 2009; Elie, 2014), which emerged as a result of the First and Second World Wars, some argue that people fleeing war and persecution “have tramped across the European continent since time immemorial,” as suggested in Marrus (1985, p. 3–5). In retrospect, the nexus between religion and forced migration is highly complex, in part because religious communities have diverse self-categorizations and act in different ways. At the same time, it might also be taken into consideration how communities put their respective migration into narratives. Such narratives often inform violent forms of religious persecution that are evident in all major religions (Grim & Finke, 2011). Whether or not religious migration is violent, faith and religious beliefs often work as tools to find out and utilize the opportunity to form a new episode in life in the host country. According to Dupre (2008), it is about defining an identity, albeit hybrid, in the combination of two cultures—the original one and the host country’s one, “which could be important for both societies” in terms of similarity of values between the two groups—the refugees and the host community (p. 8). The narratives of three major monotheistic traditions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—depict Abraham as the first migrant who, upon God’s call, migrated from his home in Ur (modern-day Iraq) to the land of Canaan, present-day Israel as shown in Levitt (2003), that “Abraham began a journey, guided by his faith, that millions have followed” (p. 29). Abraham’s followers, known as the Hebrew/Israelite people, experienced several waves of migration and counter-migrations. The Jewish narratives and history also describe the flight of Israelites fleeing from Assyrian conquest and “the influence of the Babylonian exile upon the religion of Israel was enormous” (Barton, 1911, p. 369).

A Historical Overview of the Rohingya  21 The New Testament’s Gospel of Jesus’ “flight into Egypt” with Mary and Joseph (due to King Herod’s efforts to destroy the infant Jesus) resembles the Hindu mythological story of Lord Krishna who, as shown in Hindustan Times (August 23, 2019), right after his birth, was taken from Mathura to Gokul to avoid his uncle’s threat of persecution. In most religious traditions of the ancient period, historically or mythologically, migration and exile play central roles in the founding narratives. In addition to the Hindu God Lord Rama, the Pandavas also spent a substantial period in exile. In Islam, Hijrah, the event of the Prophet Muhammad’s forced migration from Mecca to Medina (622CE), is considered one of the founding stones of the Muslim community. Fleeing persecution at the hands of the Quraysh, the dominant clan in Mecca, the Prophet and his followers’ migration was inspired by a commitment to uphold the belief in the oneness of God in the face of religious persecution, and by threats he and his followers faced from those holding political and commercial power (Casewit, 1998). Armstrong (2007) in her essay puts that the “hijrah (migration) was a test of intelligence” which was demonstrated in the act of leaving Mecca because of persecution and beginning life in Medina embracing new customs and “foreign practices,” such as seeing women enjoying “more freedom than in Mecca” (Financial Times, April 27, 2007). Over time, as world religions became more organized and aligned with state power, religious violence followed by exile and migration became more common, which later took the form of sectarian clashes. In the early modern period, displacements, caused by religious issues and other factors, took place in large flows. Starting from the sixteenth century, many displacements were caused not only by war but also by religious clashes (Poussou, 2008), which include the migration of 170,000 Huguenots from France; eviction of 100,000 Jews from Spain after 1492; and 240,000 Moors from Spain after 1609 (Poussou, 2008, p. 43–6, as cited in Elie 2014, p. 5). This is the time when some laws were codified to offer refuge to the displaced people in churches or other religious institutions in Europe. Arguably the “refugees,” in the current sense of the term, became a markedly modern phenomenon (Bessel & Haake, 2009, p. 3) when waves of refugees poured into the European nations. The early religious practice of tolerance toward displaced persons shifted to hostility and state policies began to be linked to nationalism, policies which were suspicious and unwelcoming of outsiders (Marrus, 2010). The consequences of the violent massacre and riots in Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries followed by mass Jewish displacement and the migration of European Muslims to Turkey and the Greek Turkish refugees of the Balkan wars changed the demography of Europe and the evicted people were officially designated as refugees (İçduygu & Sert, 2015). Since the World Wars, the number of modern refugees escalated at a rate not seen before, posing problems on a radically new scale. Between the two World Wars, contemporary nationalism in various manifestations embraced religion in different capacities. The massive atrocities,

22  Ishrat Zakia Sultana and Abantee Harun genocide, and violence of the wars were accentuated by theocentric nationalism. As Jews were categorized as a separate “nation” during the Holocaust (Becker, 2022), the Hindus and Muslims of India were also identified as separate nations (Bennett, 2018, Hossain, 2010) and, therefore, became subject to atrocities and forced migration during the Indian Partition in 1947 (Talbot, 2008). Once again, these new categorizations not only gave birth to new nationalisms, but also resulted in continuing animosities, hatred, and slow but steady displacements. In the post-war era, forced migration with religious dimensions moved beyond all previous legacies. Simultaneously, the states began to impose religious politics on the people—for instance, “Erdogan’s Turkey and Modi’s India with their various brands of religious politics” (Keim, 2021, p. 2); or the manifestation of rage, anger, and hatred, etc. have been attached to religious identity—for instance, the actions of the “saffron-robed Buddhist ethnic-cleansers in Myanmar” (Mishra, 2017, p. 104) against the Rohingya who were forced to migrate. Eventually, forced migration has become a tool for the states to begin and continue their geopolitical games. This is not an exception in Southeast Asia as well as the behaviors of politically and economically allied states outside Southeast Asia but affecting the displaced ones, such as the Rohingya, significantly. Before examining the twenty-first-century geopolitical situation that has victimized the Rohingya, the following section presents the key elements for their exclusion in which geopolitics and religious prejudice play vital roles. Rohingya and the Key Elements for Their Exclusion The geopolitical games in the twenty-first century have taken a new dimension, such as establishing deep sea-port, making highways, selling arms, etc., to the allied states for mutual benefits at the cost of human rights, and affecting mobility and migration of people. However, although the internal dynamics of Myanmar with the Rohingya issue may not be directly connected with the long-term plans of the allied states, Myanmar conducted a fact-finding exercise on how its internal strategies may have led to the exclusion of Rohingya. Some of the elements of their strategy including Citizenship Act, religious prejudice and bigotry, constant denial of Rohingya’s existence, and overall persecution have forced statelessness upon the Rohingya community. Literature shows that a few deny the ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya, such as Merle Jacobs—an academician of human rights in Canada—who asked: “Have 500,000 been crossed over and moved? Yes. Are all Muslims in Myanmar being moved out? No? … So how is ethnic cleansing happening?” (Warnica, 2017). However, a great consensus in the literature is noticeable on the history of Rohingya in relation to Myanmar and their exclusion due to the factors mentioned above. The following passages examine the factors.

A Historical Overview of the Rohingya  23 Exclusionary Citizenship Act

According to Uddin (2015), “Arakan was an independent kingdom until 1784, when it encompassed the Chittagong region in the southern part of today’s Bangladesh” (p. 66). Later, as Yusuf (2014) notes, the “British Empire in Burma created identities based on people’s religions and ethnicities, as evident through the creation of the census in 1872” (p. 2)—which did not record its inhabitants’ identity according to their birthplace—creating a greater division between the local Burmese and other ethnicities. In the past, the British had excluded the Rohingya community from the census, and the Burmese, more recently by virtue of the 1982 Citizenship Act, excluded them from among 135 legally recognized ethnic groups, calling them illegal migrants. According to U Nyi Nyi, the former director of the Attorney General’s Office of the Burmese government, the Rohingya “are not in conformity with either the 1948 or 1982 Act. That is the main reason that they are not entitled to become Myanmar citizens” (Nyi, 2014). Similarly, the Burmese military regime claims that the reason for the noninclusion is that the “Rohingya were ‘Bengalis’ who migrated from Chittagong in South-eastern Bangladesh after 1823, and thus were ineligible for citizenship” (MacLean, 2018, p. 88). Ullah (2016), MacLean (2018), and others reject these claims as historical records, such as Buchanan’s travel records of 1798 which prove that the Rohingya’s presence in Burma “predates the 1823 cut-off by centuries” (MacLean, 2018, p. 88). Yet, it is important to know the strategies the 1982 Act used in order to exclude the Rohingya from citizenship. The Act confers Burmese citizenship under three categories: citizenship, associate citizenship, and naturalized citizenship. For the first category, the Act states that if someone fails to produce proof of his/her linkage to ancestry and/or their settlement in Burma before 1823, they will not be provided citizenship under this category. The second, Associate Citizenship, applies to “those who did not obtain citizenship but applied for it under the 1948 Union Citizenship Act as per Chapter III of the 1982 Citizenship Law” (Chakma & Ahmed, 2017). The final category, Naturalized Citizenship, applies to an individual “who has entered and resided in the State anterior to the 4th January 1948 and off springs” (Chakma & Ahmed, 2017) who were born within the State, and the individual who has not yet applied under the Union Citizenship Act 1948 (Chakma & Ahmed, 2017). Furthermore, if at least one parent of an individual holds any of the above three categories of citizenship, that individual is also eligible for Burmese citizenship. The divisive 1982 Citizenship Act still has scope to grant citizenship to the Rohingya, particularly under categories 1 and 3. The Rohingya have been living in Burma from long before 1823, fulfilling the condition of the first category, and have resided in Burma long before January 4, 1948, and Rohingya mothers have given birth to children within Burma, fulfilling the condition of the third category.

24  Ishrat Zakia Sultana and Abantee Harun However, the purpose of the 1982 Act is to exclude the Rohingya community by denying the truth. The racist and fascist nature of the Act of 1982 snatched away the Rohingya’s right to citizenship in a clever manner— by breaking the splintering legal bond between a state and an individual. Such a de-nationalization process was implemented by the issuance of three different colored cards to its citizens: pink cards for the full citizens, blue cards for associate citizens, and green for naturalized citizens. Based on a Joint Statement between Bangladesh and Burma signed on April 28, 1992, Rohingya repatriation began. While all parties agreed that the returnees would be given “appropriate identification” in Burma, in practice they received “returnee identification cards,” “yellow colour cards which only identified them as persons having returned from Bangladesh by giving them no legal status” (Ullah, 2019). As expected, the yellow card did little for the repatriated Rohingya. Rather, the purpose of this card was to identify them as returnees from Bangladesh. In fact, the 1982 Act successfully represents the Burmese government’s unfair attitude toward its ethnic communities through its exclusionary strategies. This Act includes Karen, another ethnic community of Burma, as citizens. The Karen demand an independent state. In order to fulfill their demands, the Karen community has been operating the longest selfdetermination movement in Burma since 1949 (McConnachie, 2012). This Act excludes the Rohingya community who desire for a legal status and a separate identity but not a separate state. As victims of the 1982 Act, the Rohingya and Karen communities have been living as refugees in Bangladesh and Thailand, respectively. Religious Prejudice and Bigotry

Another key source of the conflict surrounding the Rohingya identity is religious difference. The Rohingya are Muslims. Most Burmese citizens are Buddhists. Rakhine Buddhists and Arakanese Muslims lived together in Burma until the Second World War (Uddin, 2015), a massacre of Muslims was carried out by Rakhine Buddhists, instigated by the Japanese invasion of Burma. Later, in 1962, the Burmese military introduced propaganda and threats identifying Burma as a country not for the Muslims. The Rohingya are disqualified on the basis of their religion. Like other minority ethnic communities, the Rohingya in Burma have become “otherized.” Burma’s nationalist, anti-Islam, Buddhist perspective considers the Burmese as “civilized,” and the Rohingya as “unruly” (Wade, 2017). Ironically, a contrast between beliefs and actions is manifested in the way Buddhism is practiced in Burma. For instance, the Buddhist monks led organization Ma Ba Tha – the organization for the Protection of Race and Religion in Myanmar – aims to “promote Buddhist interest in Myanmar” (Bilay, 2022, p. 94) and the organization claims that “Buddhism stands for truth and peace” (Wade, 2017, p. 5). But the world has witnessed how in the name of

A Historical Overview of the Rohingya  25 promoting peace, the Buddhist community persecuted and killed the Muslim ethnic community – the Rohingya – in Myanmar. To them, these acts are justified in the name of preserving the religion, along with their race and nation. The first major exodus of Rohingya to Bangladesh took place in 1796, and their descendants returned to Burma in 1885, after almost one hundred years. So, the Rohingya’s connection to Bangladesh is longstanding, although the Rohingya hold a sense of belonging to Burma, not Bangladesh. This is illustrated by the narratives of my research participants, presented later. However, the anti-Muslim Burmese government uses the Rohingya’s connection to Bangladesh to label them as Bangladeshi Muslims. Anwar (2013) notes that more than half of the Buddhist community living in today’s Rakhine state of Burma migrated from Bangladesh and settled during Ne Win’s era from 1958 onward. Indeed, the Rakhine community’s multiple back and forth movements between Burma and Bangladesh took place until Burma’s independence, and many of their ancestors and descendants still live in the southern region of Bangladesh. Yet, the Burmese government does not have any problem with the Buddhist Rakhine community’s connection to Bangladesh. Moreover, the 1982 Act demands valid evidence of residence only from the Muslim Rohingya, not from Buddhist Rakhines. Interestingly, the Buddhist Rakhine, if asked, would not be able to show any evidence to support their connection with their ancestors in Burma (Anwar, 2013). To sum up, the communal attitude of the Burmese government is one of the main reasons for Rohingya persecution. Such attitude made the Muslim Rohingya disappear as the homes, mosques, and shops of the Muslims were burnt by the Burmese who arming themselves “with machetes, swords, homemade guns, Molotov cocktails, and other weapons descended upon and attacked Muslim villages in nine townships throughout the state” (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Very few scholars, except Ullah (2016), Wade (2017), and MacLean (2018), clearly indicate that it is the state-sponsored communal violence that has fueled the flame of exclusion of the Rohingya in Myanmar since the purpose of the Burmese government is “to build a mono-religious nation” (Ullah, 2016, p. 289) where Muslims have no place. Denial of Existence

The use of the term “Rohingya” is offensive to the Burmese government. Both Burmese historians and politicians are committed to their refusal to use the term “Rohingya.” They ignored multiple references to the widespread use of the term Rohingya even long before the Burmese conquered Arakan. Although tracing the exact period of the origin of the Rohingya in Arakan may seem difficult, available references suggest that the origin of the term Rohingya is rooted in Arakan, and so is the Rohingya ethnic community. In fact, “Rohingya” is a phonological derivation of words like “Rakhanga” (Leider, 2012), and “Reng,” “Roung,” Rossawn,” “Russawn,” “Rung”

26  Ishrat Zakia Sultana and Abantee Harun (Buchanan, 1992). Arakan historian Leider (2012) confirms that the term “Rossawn” is “Roshang,” the Bengali word for Arakan. While traveling through British India in 1798, renowned European traveler Francis Buchanan, whose book was published in 1992—almost two hundred years after recording an account of his journey—mentions the name Roang as an alternative to that of Arakan (p. 104). Buchanan (1992) also informs that the “Roang language was spoken by people who used to live in Arakan” (p. 108). The evidence reaches one single conclusion, and that is the Rohingya community did exist in Burma long before 1823. The evidence eliminates the validity of the Burmese government’s deliberate denial of the Rohingya’s existence in Arakan, or Burma in history. The stateless Rohingya community did not recently manufacture their identity. They identify themselves as the Rohingya because they have been living in Burma as a native of Rohang. There may be a lack of research or historical evidence on the ways in which the Rohingya formed their identity as a group of people, but regardless, sufficient historical research confirms their existence in Burma as an ethnic group for hundreds of years. Consistent Persecution in Burma

The coercive power of the British colonial regime dismissed the indigenous territorial boundaries in Burma (Lang, 2002). As Pittaway (2008) observes, the Rohingya Muslims “were promised that if they supported the British, they would be given their own national area, but the British later reneged that promise” (p. 86). Amid violence, some of the Rohingya stayed behind while, according to a UNHCR (2007a) report, many fled to East Bengal (now Bangladesh) during the invasion of Japan. Later, Rohingya people merged into the local community, which was facilitated by their cultural, religious, and linguistic similarities. The following years after Burma became independent in 1948 brought further suffering into the lives of the Rohingya as the Burmese government continued treating the Rohingya as illegal migrants and denied their citizenship (Pittaway, 2008). Although the Rohingya people claim themselves residents of NRS (the Northern Rakhine State in Burma), the discrimination and violence against the Rohingya began in Burma “when the military junta took over, curtailed ethnic minorities’ rights, and used scorched-earth tactics against some ethnic armed organizations” in 1962 (Maizland, 2022). In order to exclude the Rohingya, the Burmese military registered all of its citizens prior to a national census in 1977 (Pittaway, 2008). This event caused extreme violence, widespread killings, and rape; 200,000 stateless Rohingya were pushed to Bangladesh by the military authority of Burma in 1978 (Loescher & Milner, 2008, Ullah, 2011). Because of consistent persecution in Burma, another major wave of 210,000 and 250,000 Burmese Rohingya fled from Burma to neighboring Bangladesh between December 1991 and March 1992 (Refworld, 2001). Geographical proximity between Burma and Bangladesh—one of the main factors of the exodus—enabled

A Historical Overview of the Rohingya  27 Rohingya easy access to Bangladesh. In addition, as Farzana (2011) states, “when they were forced to come to Bangladesh, leaving behind everything, the Rohingya thought they would have a peaceful life in this new country; after all, they thought, they belong to the ‘same religion’” (p. 225). However, from the beginning, they were unwanted in Bangladesh, an already overpopulated country with limited resources. Although the Bangladeshi government has imposed restriction on the permanent stay of the Rohingya, it has granted them temporary residence—in cramped and unhealthy conditions—in two government-run makeshift camps at Nayapara and Kutupalong in the Cox’s Bazar district. Cox’s Bazar is located in the border area of Bangladesh where forced labor, violence, persecution, and lack of security are everyday phenomena (Pittaway, 2008). After a series of unsuccessful negotiations between the government of Bangladesh and the UNHCR, as well as some forms of repatriation and refoulement (forcible return of refugees), 32,000 registered Rohingya have been housed in the two camps for years while a large number of unregistered Rohingya have been able to manage temporary shelters in the nearby villages. The Role of UNHCR

While the United Nations has described them as “the most persecuted people in the world” (Mahmud, 2018), UNHCR’s passivity in response to the Rohingya crisis since 1978—the first exodus of persecuted Rohingya in the independent Bangladesh—until today is reminded in two quotes. One says, “There comes a time when silence is betrayal” by Martin Luther King; and the other, “If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor,” by Desmond Tutu. UNHCR has a mandate to protect refugees and stateless people, and it has failed to do so for the Rohingya over the last four decades. UNHCR does publish dozens of thick reports with colorful illustrations and heartbreaking photos of Rohingya refugees and assists goodwill ambassadors of other UN agencies and internationally renowned persons in visiting refugee camps. And yet, even when other UN agencies facilitate discriminatory census conducted by the Burmese government, UNHCR remains silent. For example, with the help of United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the Burmese government conducted a census in early 2014, which did not count the Rohingya. According to Human Rights Watch report (2015), in 2014 election “1.09 million people were not counted.” UNHCR’s neutral and/or silent position in Rohingya crisis has raised questions about its mandate in dealing with the refugees. The Current Trend of the Geopolitical Situation Geopolitics, which include political relations, borders and geographic proximity, trade and commerce, etc., in Southeast Asia play a crucial role in shaping the relationships between and among the states. On the one hand, the

28  Ishrat Zakia Sultana and Abantee Harun states are very much aware about protecting their borders; on the other, they interfere, regulate, and coerce the internal strategic issues of another state for the demonstration of their power in the region and expansion of their trade and commerce. While border controls the movements of human beings and specifies the sovereignty of the state, Walters (2006) raises an important question about the role of borders. He asks, “haven’t the borders always been in the business of distinguishing the wanted from the unwanted, the same from the dangerous, the national from the foreigner” (Walters, 2006, p. 198). Historically and geographically, refugees and forcibly displaced people have always been viewed as unwanted, dangerous, and outsiders, who are also considered as “human waste” (Bauman, 2005). The situation of the Rohingya is not an exception to this. The geopolitical complexities between Myanmar and Bangladesh have brought quite negative consequences for the Rohingya. Geographically, among five neighbor states—Bangladesh, Thailand, India, China, and Laos—Myanmar shares the longest border with China (2,129 km) and the second shortest border with Bangladesh (271 km) affecting the political relations with Myanmar’s neighbors. Since “refugee problems are in fact intensely political” (Malkki, 1992, p. 504), political relations between and among these countries determine the fate of the refugees. Geographically, Myanmar is located at the connecting point of South and Southeast Asia, which draws a great deal of business potential for China and India in Myanmar. Bangladesh also maintains business relations with Myanmar, but the dissimilarities between these two countries regarding the socio-cultural differences are also noticeable. Despite resolving the 41-year-old maritime boundary dispute in 2012 between Bangladesh and Myanmar, lack of trust and confidence between these two countries has been clearly visible, which has been fueled by the Rohingya issue. As a result, Bangladesh failed to tap the opportunity of creating and expanding business with Southeast Asia and China through Myanmar. Tension and mistrust have become unavoidable in the relationships between these two countries as they could not decide whether the improvement of bilateral relations comes first or solution to the Rohingya crisis. Although such tension impacts on some formal business between these two countries, informal business continued. Yet, rarely fruitful discussions on the solution to the Rohingya crisis took place between these two countries. There is no way to label the Rohingya issue as a bilateral issue due to the gravity of the problem. Therefore, support and interventions from the international community has been necessary. Unfortunately, the members states of the UN failed to take action against the Rohingya genocide committed by Myanmar. As India and China are viewed as Asian superpowers, trade relations between India–Myanmar and China–Myanmar are one of the key reasons that did not bring any hope in favor of Bangladesh to resolve the Rohingya crisis.

A Historical Overview of the Rohingya  29 Among the five emerging economic powers—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—two are located in Asia, which indicates the strength of geopolitical power of these two countries, i.e., India and China. These two countries, including other superpowers such as Japan, have huge investments in Myanmar. Economic interest is a priority to them instead of humanity. The voice of these countries on the Rohingya issue has always been silent. For China, forming a special industrial zone, establishing a deep seaport, building oil and gas pipeline and railways, and most importantly the famous BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) are all part of the billion-dollar investment in Myanmar. Clearly, such highly ambitious infrastructural projects in Myanmar will enhance and expand the power of China in Asia as well as in other parts of the world in future. Hence China is not interested to go against Myanmar on the Rohingya issue, which will turn China to acquire a strong position in the world economically and politically. On the other hand, considering the influence of China over Myanmar, India has been trying to improve its relationship with Myanmar in the areas of diplomacy, economy, and military policy. Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, a very important project of India’s Look East Policy (LEP), is going to connect India’s eastern seaport of Kolkata with Sittwe seaport in Myanmar. This will help India to establish its political and economic power in Asia. Moreover, India depends on Myanmar to fulfill its oil and gas demand. In this situation, standing against Myanmar on the Rohingya issue remains outside the agenda of India. Ironically, the regional forums, such as ASEAN, BIMSTEC, and OIC, failed to resolve the Rohingya crisis. They have either remained silent, or played a passive role, or considered the Rohingya issue as an internal issue of Myanmar. To conclude the discussion on geopolitical situation, we must note the series of events that took place in the world in 2021–2022 affected the Rohingya issue in a completely new dimension. One of such events includes the establishment of the military regime in Myanmar. According to the Chinese foreign minister, “No matter how the situation changes, China will support Myanmar in safeguarding its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, and in exploring a development path suited to its national conditions” (Strangio, 2022). In order to continue their support to Myanmar—a country that is geopolitically and economically strategic point for China— China has always remained silent on the Rohingya issue. On the other hand, the military-focused growing bilateral ties between Russia and Myanmar not only strengthen the position of the military regime in Myanmar but also pave the way for this country to seek global recognition (Ganesan, 2022). Research emphasizes that during the rising geopolitical tensions between China and USA, Russia “established some footholds in Myanmar” (Lutz-Auras, 2015, p. 190), which is noticeable in selling Russian “fighters’ jets and armored vehicles” to Myanmar to use against its civilians (DW, February 22, 2022).

30  Ishrat Zakia Sultana and Abantee Harun Conclusion People migrate for various reasons, torn by war and persecution, epidemics and other natural disasters, and poverty. Since the early 1990s, there has been an upsurge in the number of publications on the history of displacements and refugee flows. Nevertheless, the study of refugee and history requires multidisciplinary endeavors. In the discourses of forced migration, religion appeared as an important feature in addressing the historical roots, politicization of causes, and experiences of forced migration. A number of studies also highlight the role of religion in the efforts to mediate and support refugees. However, the role of religion in global migration, particularly in forced migration, needs to be understood both globally and locally, where the meanings and manifestations of religion often become manifold depending on context. As such, together with conventional historical research, other non-conventional methods, such as oral history, personal testimonies, and local narratives, may offer new directives in understanding the history of displacement and forced migration. For instance, Butalia’s (2000) work on the oral history of the Partition may be useful here to understand how oral testimony can become a powerful tool to include the unheard voices and individual experiences of displacement and religiosity. Analyses of the dynamic relationships of religion with conflict, humanitarian crises, and forced migration can provide new ways to perceive contemporary crises and their reasons. The failure of the state, regional, and global forums to change the trend of religious persecution causing forced displacement discloses their negligence and weakness in intervening in issues related to violations of human rights. Today, the Rohingya “do not fit in our particular image of the world” (Johnson, 2014, p. 134). That is why they are forced to embrace delegitimization, discrimination, and an exile status, and finally turn into “human waste,” because they have “no useful function to play in the land of their arrival and temporary stay, and no intention or realistic prospect of being assimilated and incorporated into the new social body” (Bauman, 2005, p. 97). References Ahmed, I. (2009). The Rohingyas: From Stateless to Refugee. Dhaka, Bangladesh: University of Dhaka. Ai, A. L., Peterson, H., & Huang, B. (2009). RESEARCH: The effect of religiousspiritual coping on positive attitudes of adult Muslim refugees from Kosovo and Bosnia. The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 13(1), Retrieved from https://www​.tandfonline​.com​/doi​/abs​/10​.1207​/S15327582IJPR1301​_04 Anonymous. (February 22, 2022). China, Russia arming Myanmar junta: UN rights expert. DW. Retrieved from https://www​.dw​.com​/en​/china​-russia​-arming​ -myanmar​-junta​-un​-expert​-says​/a​-60868089 Anwar, M. S. (2013, May 5). 1982  Citizenship law of Burma: Is or isn’t it applicable today? Rohingya Vision: People’s Voice. Retrieved from http://www​.rvisiontv​ .com​/1982​-citizenship​-law​-of​-burma​-is​-or​-isnt​-it​-applicable​-today​-2/

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32  Ishrat Zakia Sultana and Abantee Harun Grim, B. J., & Finke, R. (2011). The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and Conflict in the 21 Century. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hossain, A. A. (June 22, 2010). Hindu–Muslim separateness in Bengal: A review of some historical issues from a contemporary Bangladesh Muslim standpoint. pp. 64–382 | Published online: https://www​.tandfonline​.com​/doi​/citedby​/10​.1080​ /00856400802192952​?scroll​=top​&needAccess​=true Human Rights Watch. (January 13, 2015,). Burma: Amend biased citizenship law. 1982 Act Fuels Repression, Deprives Rohingya Muslims of Basic Rights. Retrieved from https://www​.hrw​.org​/news​/2015​/01​/13​/burma​-amend​-biased​ -citizenship​-law Human Rights Watch. (April 22, 2013). All You Can Do is Pray. Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State. Retrieved from https://www​.hrw​.org​/report​/2013​/04​/22​/all​-you​-can​-do​-pray​/ crimes​-against​-humanity​-and​-ethnic​-cleansing​-rohingya​-muslims İçduygu, A., & Sert, D. (2015). The changing waves of migration from the Balkans to Turkey: A historical account. In H.Vermeulen, M.Baldwin-Edwards, & R.Boeschoten (Eds.), Migration in the Southern Balkans. IMISCOE Research Series. Cham: Springer. Johnson, H. L. (2014). Camps and detention centers: Spaces containing irregularity. In H. L. Johnson (Ed.), Borders, Asylum and Global Non-citizenship: The Other Side of the Fence (pp. 124 –150). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Keim, W. (2021). The rise and strength of authoritarian restoration: Constructing a comparative logic for research. In G.Olivier, & L. Michel (Eds.), Decentring Comparative Analysis in a Globalizing World: International Comparative Social Studies (pp. 1–25). USA: Brill Publishers. Retrieved from https://shs​.hal​.science​/ halshs​-03512870​/document Kipgen, N. (2013). Addressing the Rohingya problem. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 1–14. Retrieved from http://jas​.sagepub​.com​/content​/early​/2013​/10​/17​ /0021909613505269​.full​.pdf​+html Lang, H. J. (2002). Fear and Sanctuary: Burmese Refugees in Thailand. Ithaca, NY: S EAP Publications. Leider, J. P. (2012, August 26). Rohingya: A historical and linguistic note. Retrieved from http://www​.burmalibrary​.org​/docs21​/Jacques​-P​-Leider​-2012​-On​_the​_term_​ %93Rohingya​%94​-en​.pdf Levitt, P. (2003). “You know, Abraham was really the first immigrant”: Religion and transnational migration. International Migration Review, 37(3), 847–873. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1111​/j​.1747​-7379​.2003​.tb00160.x Loescher, G., & Milner, J. (2008). Burmese refugees in South and Southeast Asia: A comparative regional analysis. In G. Loescher, J. Milner, E. Newman, & G. Toeller (Eds.), Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications (pp. 305–355). Tokyo, JPN: United Nations University Press. Lutz-Auras, L. (2015). Russia and Myanmar: Friends in need? Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 34(2), 165–198. Retrieved from https://journals​.sagepub​ .com​/doi​/pdf​/10​.1177​/186810341503400207 MacLean, k. (2018). The Rohingya crisis and the practices of erasure. Journal of Genocide Research, 21(1), 83–95. Retrieved from https://www​.tandfonline​.com​/ doi​/full​/10​.1080​/14623528​.2018​.1506628 Mahmud, F. (2018, May 14). Bangladesh students demand abolition of job quota system: Thousands of students launch a fresh movement as government fails to

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34  Ishrat Zakia Sultana and Abantee Harun Ullah, A. K. M. A. (2011). Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh: Historical exclusions and contemporary marginalization. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 9, 139–161. Ullah, A. K. M. A. (2016). Rohingya crisis in Myanmar: Seeking justice for the “stateless”. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 32(3), 285–301. Ullah, A. K. M. A. (2019). Rohingya and the residents of Burma registration act. The Rohingya Post. Retrieved from https://www​.rohingyapost​.com​/rohingyas​-and​-the​ -residents​-of​-burma​-registration​-act/ UNHCR. (2007). Bangladesh Analysis of Gaps in the Protection of Rohingya Refugees. UNHCR report, 8–38. UNHCR. (2018). UN launches 2018 appeal for Rohingya refugees and Bangladeshi host communities. Retrieved from http://www​.unhcr​.org​/news​/press​/2018​/3​ /5aabd2564​ / un​ - launches​ - 2018​ - appeal​ - rohingya​ - refugees​ - bangladeshi​ - host​ -communities​.html Wade, F. (2017). Myanmar’s Enemy Within: Buddhist Violence and the Making of a Muslim “Other.” London, UK: Zed Books. Walters, W. (2006). Border/control. European Journal of Social Theory, 9(2), 187–203. Warnica, R. (October 25. 2017). York University human rights professor denies ethnic cleansing of Rohingya, questions rape reports. National Post. Retrieved from https://nationalpost​.com​/news​/york​-university​-human​-rights​-professor​ -denies​-ethnic​-cleansing​-of​-rohingya​-questions​-rape​-reports Yusuf, A. (2014). Human Rights: Betrayed, denied, and abandoned. The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://www​.thedailystar​.net​/betrayed​-denied​-and​-abandoned​ -31430

3

The Rohingya Muslims’ Crisis in the Rakhine State of Myanmar “Recognition as Toleration” and “Religious Toleration” Md. Ishrat Ibne Ismail and Muhammad Mizanur Rahman

Introduction The Rohingya crisis is not a new issue for the world. There are historical shreds of evidence of a long, violent relationship between Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims living in the Rakhine state: “The contemporary conflict can be traced at least to the World War II, when the Rohingya remained loyal to the British colonial rulers, and the Arakanese sided with the invading Japanese” (Human Rights Watch, 2013). In post-independent Myanmar, the bigotry continued as after the formation of Myanmar in 1948, the Muslim minority needed to confront a steady anti-Rohingya crusade described by the refusal of their privileges and discernment. However, the crisis has been severe in recent times as the Rohingya people record for more than one in every seven stateless people around the world (Mahmood et al., 2017, p. 1841). There is no example on the planet, where following many years of citizenship and practicing the rights to choosing their delegate for parliament, a whole populace gets stateless without security to life, property, and honor, none other than in Nazi Germany (Iqbal, 2017). A report on the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar in National Geographic informs that the Rohingya, a generally Muslim ethnic minority in Myanmar, have been known as the world’s most abused and victimized minority, and current happenings have added significantly to their wretchedness. Until recently, the military junta that controlled Myanmar, paying little heed to when the Rohingya showed up in Myanmar, denied them citizenship in 1982, leaving them stateless and susceptible (Gibbens, 2017). The Myanmar military force refuses humanitarian aid from entering into the Rakhine state, making it impossible for the international aid organizations to provide assistance to the socially isolated Rohingya. The Rohingya: Discourses and Recognition The Rohingya, linguistically, religiously, and culturally, are a particular group of people who self-distinguish themselves as Rohingya and have lived in Arakan State for quite a long time. This Muslim group is 2% of DOI: 10.4324/9781003228707-4

36  Md. Ishrat Ibne Ismail and Muhammad Mizanur Rahman the Myanmar populace and communicates in the local Rohingya language, compared with the Burmese language spoken by Myanmar’s Buddhist majority (Mahmood et al., 2017, p. 1842). The Rohingya trace their roots in the locale to the fifteenth century, when a massive number of Muslims went to the previous Arakan Kingdom. Numerous others showed up during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when Rakhine had been ruled by colonial rule as a part of British India. Since independence in 1948, succeeding governments in Burma, renamed Myanmar in 1989, have disproved the Rohingya’s historical cases and denied the group recognition as one of the nation’s 135 ethnic groups (Albert, 2017). About this connection, Sarah Wildman (2017) references Economist, which traces the Rohingya history back to the eighth century. She notes that the Muslims most likely came in what was then the sovereign kingdom of Arakan, presently Rakhine, as quite a while in the past as the eighth century. They were sailors and brokers from the Middle East and were participated in the seventeenth century by a massive number of Bengali Muslims caught by the ravaging Arakanese. Some had to serve in the lord of Arakan’s military, others were sold as slaves, but more had to get settled in Arakan. “Rohingya” just signifies “occupant of Rohang,” the early Muslim name for Arakan. The kingdom was then occupied by the Burmese armed force in 1785 (Wildman, 2017). Although all of these references clearly indicate that the Rohingya are a part of Burma’s/Myanmar’s history, their nativity is challenged by the majoritarian policies by the Burmese/Myanmar government all the time. The Rohingya’s claim is supported by the Scottish Physician Francis Buchanan’s (who lived 15 years in the region) 1799 report. Buchanan records that among the Mohammedans, Arakan was called the “Rovingaw,” who addressed themselves as the Rooinga or natives of Arakan, settled in the Arakan even twentyfive years before the conquest of Burma by the British in 1826 (Mahmood et al., 2017). However, “in writing the Rohingya out of Burmese history—a process that included omitting them from the official list of national ethnic groups in the 1974 Constitution and 1982 Citizenship Law” (Schonthal, 2016, p. 6), the Myanmar Parliament sanctioned a series of racial and religious protection laws in 2015. In the laws, prejudicial strategies against the Rohingya incorporate the disavowal of citizenship, limitations on their activities, limitations on marriage, and a two-kid strategy, including a boycott of unregistered children. Local Buddhists and state and central government authorities unregister the expression “Bengalis” or “unlawful Bengalis” and decline to acknowledge the term Rohingya, inscribing them as expatriates from neighboring Bangladesh, in spite of the way that a considerable lot of the Rohingya have been living in Burma for quite a long time, even for centuries. Their movement is carefully controlled, restricting their admittance to business sectors, work, medical services, and education (Brooten, 2015, p. 136). About this connection, Sagarika Naik (2022) records, “Rohingya Refugee crisis is an outcome of the state-sponsored camping, decade-long persecution and violation of their fundamental rights. The Rohingya non-recognition of

The Rohingya Muslims’ Crisis in the Rakhine State of Myanmar  37 citizenship status which was created institutionally by the state has led to inequalities between citizens and non-citizens” (Naik, 2022, p. 136). Adding to this discussion, Matteo Fumagalli (2022) notes that the Myanmar authorities have disenfranchised and later persecuted this group, which has for very long been indigenous to the territory of Arakan/Rakhine. It has done so through a combined discourse of national unity centred around “Myanmafication” (or Burmanization) and the Bengalization of the country’s Muslims. (Fumagalli, 2022, p. 229) So, the Rohingya people in Myanmar are historically oppressed and relegated by the Buddhist majority1 and by the Myanmar government to make them stateless although they were treated as equals to the Burmese, practicing similar rights the Burmese were enjoying since Burma got independence from British rule in 1948. Almost suddenly and immediately, they were deprived of their rights of citizenship (Calamur, 2017). General Min Aung Hlaing, the Myanmar military chief, aggressively declares that the Rohingya who have asked for recognition as Rohingya have never been a part of Myanmar or the existing ethnic groups in Myanmar (Wildman, 2017). However, the seeds of the conflict between the Buddhists and the Muslims in Myanmar were sown by the British who strategically moved the slogan from “Burma for the Burmese” to “Burma for the Buddhist Burmese” (Debu, 2016). In this regard, Stephen Keck (2016) argues that the British discourses had the impact of separating Islam from things Burmese. In general, the British would speak of Islam as something that was not a characteristic component of life in Burma. Alternately, the ethnographic information that the British amassed about the nation’s numerous ethnic groups guaranteed that Burma came to be perceived as a place with one prevailing populace and multiple minor ethnic groups. All of this had the unintended impact of making Muslims, a minority characterized by religious distinguishing proof and practice, undetectable as a minority in colonial Burma (Keck, 2016, p. 2). The British discourses worked as the basis of many communal riots in Myanmar. As there is historical evidence of communal riots due to religious intolerance in South Asia/Asia, it was not new that religious intolerance had led the Buddhist majority and the Myanmar rulers to start ethnic cleansing and marginalize Muslims. But, as John Locke put it, one thing is sure about religion that no religion that one does not accept to be genuine can be valid and valuable to him/her in terms of use. A ruler is draining his energy and time, compelling his subjects to follow his own religious administrations on the affection of saving their souls because an individual can’t be compelled to be saved (Vernon, 2010, p. 21). So, the rhetoric of “Burma for the Buddhist Burmese” and that every other religious people should join them to live in Burma/Myanmar is an example of extreme religious intolerance and a foolish idea. Nasir Uddin (2020) talks about the responsibilities

38  Md. Ishrat Ibne Ismail and Muhammad Mizanur Rahman of a state in such a situation and writes that “it is the nature of the state; the state’s very approach of dealing with people of cultural, religious, and ‘racial’ difference; and the exclusionary policy of a majoritarian framework of nationhood that are responsible for these happenings” (Uddin, 2020, p. 3). Uddin (2020) further notes that the Rohingya are in a state of acute vulnerability and endless uncertainty because of the nature of the state (militarized and majoritarian) and its approach towards the people of ethnic (Rohingya versus Burman), religious (Islam versus Buddhist), and racial (South Asian origin versus Southeast Asian ones) differences. (p. 3, 189) So, the Myanmar state is acting contrary to the “responsibility” of a state to secure the “rights” of a minority group in the country. Furthermore, in this process of “overlooking” and sometimes “supporting” the majoritarian unlawful demands, the authority is encouraging, if not instigating, the dislocation of the Rohingya from the Rakhine state. The dislocating narrative is not new to world politics. The development of human civilization has examples of dislocation of many human races as scars in its body. The recent displacement of the Rohingya people from their Rakhine state is a massive addition to those scars. Ashley Kinseth (2017) claims that the Rohingya killing is one of the most escalating mass exoduses, which can be termed one of the largest humanitarian devastations. The 1994 Rwandan genocide, when more than 8000,000 Hutus and Tutsis were butchered, could be an example of such an exodus before the Rohingya catastrophe. The conflict between the Buddhists and the Muslims escalated currently questions human beings’ attitudes toward others as “peers” and “others.” The Rohingya crisis results from the majority of Buddhists’ stance against the recognition of the Rohingya as a separate identity. Although a unitary parliamentary constitutional republic, Myanmar’s societies break “because of a lack of (perceived) recognition of the equal worth of one group [the Rohingya Muslims] by another [the Buddhists]” (Taylor, 1994, p. 64). Peoples’ identities “are formed by recognition, [which demands] that we all recognize the equal value of different cultures; that we not only let them survive, but acknowledge their worth” (Taylor, 1994, p. 64, emphases in original). As the Myanmar government does not recognize the Rohingya people as citizens of the country, it inflicts the Rohingya with an identity crisis. Due to the Buddhists’ nationalist “Burmese” attitude, the Muslims felt pressure to create a “Burmese identity” for themselves. For example, “Muslim women wear traditional Burmese dress[es]…leaving their head uncovered. These efforts are reflected in signs in some community buildings that specifically emphasize their ‘Burmeseness’” (Crouch, 2016, p. 5). However, the Rohingya Muslims’ acceptance of Burmese identity in the form of outfit consequently complicates the authenticity of their own identity of being

The Rohingya Muslims’ Crisis in the Rakhine State of Myanmar  39 Rohingya Muslims as Taylor (1994) argues that “[b]eing true to [oneself] means being true to [one’s] own originality, which is something only [one] can articulate and discover. In articulating it, [one is] also defining [oneself]. [One is] realizing a potentiality that is properly [one’s] own” (p. 31). Because of the “misrecognition,” the Rohingya are “imprison[ed] in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being” (Taylor, 1994, p. 25). “Misrecognition,” it could be argued, results from “religious intolerance.” Rajeev Bhargava (2014), while defining “tolerate” says that “to tolerate is to refrain from interference in the activities of others, although one finds them morally disagreeable, even repugnant, and despite the fact that one has the power to do so” (p. 193–194). Bhargava further notes, “[t]he basic idea of toleration is that A does not accept B’s views or practices but still refrains from interfering in it, even though one has the power to do (p. 194). “Toleration requires that people who fall on the wrong side of differences should still be treated as equals and must be equally entitled to determine society in ways they see best” (Bhargava, 2008, p. 14). Religious toleration is an even more critical concept than the idea of toleration. According to T. M. Scanlon (1996), religious toleration is a risky policy with high stakes, even within the framework of a stable constitutional democracy. The risks involved lie not so much in the formal politics of laws and Constitutions (though there may be risks there too) but rather in the informal politics through which the nature of a society is constantly redefined. (p. 238) Anna Elisabetta Galeotti (2002) examines the issues related to toleration. She argues that it is neither the religious nor the moral dissent but the asymmetrical social status of other groups in a society, the bone of contention. She further argues that the liberals fall short of understanding the situation with an unacceptable normative solution of “non-interference.” Galeotti (2002), however, recommends an alternative—“toleration as recognition,” which is “a revision and expansion of the traditional conception” of the liberals’ idea of toleration (p. 100). In her “Introduction” to Toleration as Recognition, she articulates the connection between tolerance and recognition, emphasizing the importance of the excluded, marginalized identities, the acceptance of the minority difference, and the equality of minority and majority in the public sphere. Tolerance can be viewed as reacting to and fulfilling the necessities of equity if it is perceived as an acknowledgment and recognition of avoided, excluded, marginalized, and mistreated identities. It can, be that as it may, function as a type of acknowledgment and recognition just in the event that it is considered emblematically as a public motion planned to legitimize the presence of variances/differences and spot them on a similar balance as the propensities and practices of the dominant part (Galeotti, 2002, p. 11). She claims that “toleration as recognition aims at the equal standing and equal

40  Md. Ishrat Ibne Ismail and Muhammad Mizanur Rahman respect for members of minorities compared to members of majorities” (Galeotti, 2021a, p. 97). She further claims that “[l]iberal neutrality tends to bracket all social differences together as equally irrelevant politically, thus obscuring the asymmetries among social differences and their implications in terms of inclusion in the polity” (2021a, p. 92). But “[t]oleration as recognition intends to overcome this specific blindness, by making room for all social differences (within the bounds of the harm principle), while yet reaffirming the principles underlying liberal neutrality, that is non-perfectionism and impartiality” (Galeotti, 2021a, p. 92). Therefore, Galeotti’s (2002) “recognition” asks for the acceptance of the minority’s differences through “specific measure [and] test,” which might make it complicated for a liberal state to avoid the discourse on “impartiality.” But again, without this “risk of recognition,” it would be difficult to establish “justice” among the people of a state: minorities and majorities. She, contemplating on this problematic issue, opines for a “revised neutrality, which makes room for the public recognition of differences…[which] should make all citizens feel positively at ease with their particular identity in public as well as in private” (Galeotti, 2002, p. 16). Paradigm Shift: Exploitation to Toleration Let us look at the possibility of a solution to the problem of the Rohingya crisis through Galeotti’s “toleration as the symbolic recognition of differences [rather than] toleration as non-interference” (Galeotti, 2002, p. 67). Toleration, Galeotti remarks, “represents the standard solution to conflicts concerning clashes of values, religious doctrines and ways of life (Galeotti, 2021b, p. 162). It “is a compromised solution, acceptable within definite boundaries, for it accommodates minorities estranged from the proper membership in the polity, and not relating on a reciprocal basis with other citizens” (Galeotti, 2021b, p. 172). She further remarks that the battle over the public acknowledgment of variances can be perceived not just as an issue of similarity with the ideal and the act of liberal objectivity but instead as a challenging endeavor to beat idiosyncrasy and ostracism and to accomplish reasonable access. Since people are marginalized and ostracized because of their participation in minority clusters, the positive affirmation of differences in the public space is viewed as the principal emblematic advance toward full inclusion. On the off chance that this is the thing that is in question in contemporary contentions about toleration, at that point, the regularizing reaction can’t be toleration as non-impedance, however toleration as the emblematic acknowledgment and recognition of differences as authentic alternatives of pluralist democracy (Galeotti, 2002, p. 67). As the Rohingya are continually marginalized and excluded from the Rakhine state’s history for being the Muslim minority by the Buddhist majority, Galeotti reasons that the Buddhist majority should accept the Rohingya’s different identity as Muslims to achieve “the symbolic recognition” of the Rohingya in Myanmar.

The Rohingya Muslims’ Crisis in the Rakhine State of Myanmar  41 Peter Jones argues that Galeotti might have asked for toleration that concurs acknowledgment to the Rohingya minorities. Hence, they stop enduring mortifying attacks upon their dignity and self-possession and are empowered to work and act as individuals having the satisfaction of belonging to that society where they live (Jones, 2006, p. 127). Jones (2006) further points out that Galeotti’s “‘recognition’ in relation to identity and difference intend[s] to convey something affirmative. [Because to Galeotti, to] accord recognition is to accord some sort of positive value to whoever or whatever is recognised” (p. 128). So, Jones (2006) opines that while Galeotti persuades people to “tolerate by recognising,” she implies that we ought to identify understanding the fact that the majority groups should endure and accept the minority groups not simply by permitting them to live as they desire but by reaching out to them with the attitude of acknowledgment, “recognition” (p. 128). If we let this recognition happen in Myanmar, then the Buddhist majority should tolerate the Rohingya Muslim minority with a “positive good of recognition” (Jones, 2006, p. 128). But this “positive good” is essentially related to the basic/general identity of the Rohingya as a human being, as a person. And the “positive good identity,” in the case of the Rohingya, could be their “Muslim identity” which might not be possible for the Buddhist to recognize, although it could be tolerated. Richard Vernon (2010) in his “Introduction” to Locke on Toleration claims that what is commendable in Locke’s defense of toleration is his acknowledgment and recognition that others’ conceptions of truth and significance cannot be expected to corroborate his own and that the interest for consistency over the true and the significant is not merely unreasonable, unrealistic, yet sums to such an unopinionated dream in which the genuine presence of others is smothered (p. xxxi–xxxii). Here it looks like Locke’s “defense of toleration,” the “non-interference” would be a better choice because while one Buddhist is trying to recognize the “positive good” of a Rohingya Muslim, it may result in religious confusion and consequently may result in the clash between individual/religious groups. It was “noninterference” that preserved peace in the Rakhine state. While the Myanmar state (along with the Buddhist majority’s desire) started to interfere and annihilate the Rohingya Muslims from the Rakhine state, the Rohingya Muslims began to count on their acceptances in public. So the type of “uniformity” Galeotti is looking for through the recognition of the “positive good” of the Rohingya Muslim minority by the Buddhist majority is not practical. Galeotti (2002) considers a few circumstances under which her concept of toleration would work, such as she asks for an “enough larger and stronger” minority group that could “resist intolerance and abuse, … otherwise toleration is not an issue” (p. 93). Galeotti (2002) further notes that during the religious wars which followed the Reformation, toleration was proposed as an exit from a troublesome and apparently perpetual war when it became obvious that no side was sufficiently able to win authoritatively. A portion of the religious gatherings included military power, which prompted the possibility of a non-military settlement and opened the best approach to toleration as the

42  Md. Ishrat Ibne Ismail and Muhammad Mizanur Rahman resolution. As such, with the end goal for the constraint to be precluded on realistic grounds, the minority cluster should not exclusively be willing, yet in addition sufficiently able to oppose it. The issue for the Muslims in Bosnia has been that they were not many and militarily feeble. This made suppression a suitable choice for the Serbs, and the Muslims’ demand for a multiethnic Bosnia, engaging the guideline of toleration, turned out to be absolutely superfluous (p. 94). Here, she might sound reductionist in her analysis. How will we decide “the minority group is small or powerless” (Galeotti, 2002, p. 93), and who is going to do that? In Myanmar, the total population is more than 514 million, whereas the Rohingya Muslim is 1 million (Kyaw, 2015, p. 51), 89% are Buddhists, and 4% Muslims (Frazer, 2015, p. 83). So, are they not the “enough” minority group to be considered for toleration? Here, Galeotti (2002) also argues that toleration is impossible in an imbalanced power structure between rival groups. In Myanmar’s existing political structure, it is evident that the Rohingya Muslims have no space to represent themselves. However, they represented their Rohingya community in the past, but due to the Buddhists’ opposition, the government had to withdraw their political rights in Myanmar. If we follow Galeotti’s arguments, toleration is not possible in such an imbalanced political power structure between the Buddhists and Muslims in Myanmar. This might be a problem of Galeotti’s “toleration as recognition,” which only identifies toleration in relation to politics and political power. However, Locke’s religious toleration asks to swipe away the unwarranted state-permissible discernment, modify the laws, and eliminate the danger of penalty. All will be free from the sense of insecurity (Vernon, 2010, p. 39). Because Locke argues that “[t]hose who dissent from the ruler’s religion will feel particularly obliged to preserve the peace of the commonwealth because they enjoy better conditions there than are commonly found elsewhere” (Vernon, 2010, p. 39). And in the case of the Rohingya crisis, this seems to be a feasible solution. If all the discriminatory laws that were taken, approved, and sanctioned socially, religiously, and finally governmentally at the parliament of Myanmar are abolished, peace is possible in the Rakhine state. So, it is not the balanced power structure between the majority and the minority; instead, religious tolerance and government’s non-interference and neutrality are essential for peace in the Rakhine state. Galeotti (2002) argues that “[i]t is the cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious majority of a given society which is in fact in command of the standards of that society, and which defines the status quo” (p. 89). She further points out that the “majority’s dislike of the minority may be due to the perception [that the minority] social group [is] unduly upsetting traditional and customary ways of life [of the society]” (p. 93). In the case of the Rohingya crisis, the Myanmar Buddhists claim that the Rohingya Muslims are “unduly upsetting” Myanmar’s “traditional and customary ways of life and thinking” with their Muslim thoughts and ways of life. The Buddhist majority perceived the Rohingya Muslim “as an actual threat to the traditional social and political order of [Myanmar]” (Galeotti,

The Rohingya Muslims’ Crisis in the Rakhine State of Myanmar  43 2002, p. 93). The Buddhists are assuming, due to the higher birth rate among the Rohingya Muslims, that a time will come when the Rohingya will be the majority, and they will be the minority, and consequently Rohingya will rule the country in the future. To continue to relegate the Rohingya, the Buddhists planned a technique to use against the Muslims in Myanmar. The Buddhists arranged, rather instigated, a movement against the Muslim minorities. According to Nathan G. Thompson’s (2013) remarks on the movement: The 969 Movement portrays itself as a peaceful, grassroots movement dedicated to “promoting and protecting religion.” [However, the] underlying theme of their rhetoric is the view that Islam is threatening to “overrun” Burma, and that Buddhists must stand up and “save” their way of life. (The 969 Movement) Because of the fear of becoming the minority in Myanmar, the Buddhists organized this inflammatory anti-Muslim discourse of the 969 campaign, which alleged that “786 stands for a total of 21 (that is, 7+8+6 = 21). The widespread conspiracy theory behind this is that the number 21 refers to the Muslim plot to Islamize Myanmar by the end of the 21st century” (Kyaw, 2016, p. 17). The popular Islamophobic ideas circulated by the 969 leaders from Mawlamyine and other Buddhist monks are provocatively anti-Muslim. Ashin Wirathu’s speeches, the nationalist Burmese Buddhist monk, are highly inflammatory anti-Muslim. About the incendiary anti-Muslim languages, Green notes that “[r]acism is Burma’s political fault-line and…the central fracture [of the ethnic cleansing of Burma’s Rohingya community in Arakan]… must be understood as institutionalized Islamophobia, deeply embedded and historically informed” (Quoted in Farrelly, 2016, p. 23). The “Buddhist nationalist monks portray an imminent apocalyptic future in which the size of the Myanmar Muslim community surpasses the Buddhist counterpart, and the latter loses its political and social power” (Kyaw, 2015, p. 57–58). Benjamin Schonthal (2016) articulates the situation saying that the fundamental all of the Islamophobic discourses are fears that the legitimate status is given to Islam—Islam digressively developed as a network religion that recommends a solitary arrangement of regularizing commitments and limits—has the ability to subvert the deliberate options of Muslim people or converts and thusly to drive Muslim populaces forward with a tightening impact: having transformed over to Islam, they can’t exist. In Buddhist pundits’ thoughts, this tightening dynamic prompts a consistent and irreversible move in religious demographies, which takes steps to change Islam from a tolerated minority religion to one that rivals Buddhism for support, force, and power (p. 13). So, creating the Islamophobic discourses eliminates the religion’s (Islam’s) effort to convert more people toward Islam which might counter the Buddhists in the future.

44  Md. Ishrat Ibne Ismail and Muhammad Mizanur Rahman In fear of losing control over the minority population, the majority group uses the 969 rhetoric as an instrument to instigate the Buddhists against the Rohingya Muslims by creating the myth of “religious conversion” in Myanmar. “Organized political forces calling for the protection of ‘race and religion’ have gained increasing prominence as they have identified Islam as an existential threat to Buddhist nationhood, and Muslims within Myanmar as the vanguard” (Schissler, 2016, p. 12). The discourse of 969 as a counter to 786 is not reasonable as the “Buddhist shops commonly displayed other Buddhist symbols before the emergence of 969….Buddhist shops in Myanmar display (the first quality of Buddha meaning the Worthy One) or (Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha)” (Kyaw, 2016, p. 16). However, there is no proof that such “practice has…aimed or claimed to compete with or counter the use of 786 by Muslims. Like their Muslim counterparts, Buddhist shops use either of the two Buddhist symbols to pay homage to the religion of their affiliation and practice” (Kyaw, 2016, p. 16). It is an exaggeration of a myth to generate fear among the Buddhists. Galeotti’s argument in such a case is that the Buddhist majority should tolerate the Rohingya’s different identity, i.e., Muslim/Islam. But this is not effective because if the protest/hostility to individual identity is driven or triggered simply by abhorrence or some other type of savage aversion, the best approach would appear to be one aimed at eliminating the disdain. Encouraging “toleration” of the despised individuality will arise as a suitable alternative technique to address the crisis (Jones, 2006, p. 143). Islamophobia describes silly feelings of trepidation or abhorrences coordinated toward the Muslims, and it is better to eliminate a “phobia than to indulge it” (Jones, 2006, p. 143). Galeotti (2002) condemns the liberal view as naive, which perceives toleration as the standard following which everybody should be allowed to attend their principles and way of life insofar as no mischief is done to any other individual (p.118). She brings up the example of the headscarves controversy in France and condemns further that the oversimplified way to deal with the case recommends that toleration is the conspicuous resolution; however, in doing as such, it camouflages “the raison d’ˆetre of the controversy” (Galeotti, 2002, p. 118, emphases in original) as it discharges the religious and cultural ramifications of wearing the veil and compares or parallels it with any piece of spendthrift or unconventional garments (p. 118). Here, Galeotti might be overtly political in looking into the headscarves case. She is looking for hidden “religious and cultural implications,” which might not be available at all in this case. Nowadays, many Muslim (even non-Muslim) girls wear headscarves and do so just for “fashion.” So, the ascriptive value she is looking for complicates the issue further, was originally might not be accurate. The Buddhists in Myanmar took on the Muslim’s use of the 786 as a religious sign, which complicates their understanding of the sign and the users’ intention of using it. The religious ascription of the sign 786 instigated the Buddhists to counter it with 969. However, there is no evidence of the use of

The Rohingya Muslims’ Crisis in the Rakhine State of Myanmar  45 786 at the time of the Prophet Muhammad (“Meaning of 786” n. d.). Usually, the 786 connotes Muslim’s Arabic phrase “Bismillah al-Rahman al-Rahim,” which means in English: “In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.” “The Number ‘786’” (2015) notes that “786 is probably the most popular number in the Indian subcontinent. Irrespective of which religion an individual belongs to, most of the people here consider this number as ‘holy’ or ‘lucky.’” So, 786 is not an issue until it was dealt with Galeotti’s hidden “religious ascription.” It might be that Rohingya people were using 786 as a simple sign of “luck,” as they were and still are not in a position to think of using it as a sign of religious aggression even if they use it as a “holy” sign. About this connection, Rajeev Bhargava comments, “Christianity in France can be seen by many not as a religion but as a basic part of their heritage” (Dusche, 2010, p. 170). Bhargava further comments that putting a cross on the walls of the classroom [in France] was made mandatory. The argument for this differential treatment was that the cross was not only Christian but part of their cultural heritage… [and] a very important constituent of democracy and human rights. (Dusche, 2010, p. 170) Galeotti’s symbolic meaning of the headscarves, in this case, the 786, complicates the sign’s simple definition, which could be fashion or luck, or according to Bhargava, only a “cultural heritage,” which people follow just to maintain their cultural integrity. In A Letter Concerning Toleration, John Locke, edited by Richard Vernon (2010), argues that the drive for a religious affiliation is public adoration of God and the achievement of interminable life through it. There is and can be no worry in this relationship with the ownership of public or worldly possessions. No power is to be utilized here under any circumstance (p. 11). But in the case of the 969 Movement, the Buddhists are contravening this “purpose.” They are using the religious association as a means to instigate the Buddhists against the Muslims. It is outside of their concern as the instigation is related to earthly/civil goods. In the instigation process, the Buddhist initiators of the 969 Movement are imposing a rude idea of Islam as a religion on the Buddhist religious people on a mass level, although there might be Buddhists who are not at all coercive to Islam/Muslim. So, the Buddhists’ religious association is coercing not only Islam but also Buddhism. Because it is destabilizing the lives of the Rohingya Muslims in the Rakhine state and disrupting the peaceful life of the Buddhists all over Myanmar who were having no coercive attitude toward the Rohingya Muslims or Islam. On the recognition of the differences of the minorities, Galeotti (2002) depends on the assumption that the informative speculation which offers backing to a strategy of lenience as an emblematic acknowledgment and recognition of variances is that the mortification and hesitancy experienced by

46  Md. Ishrat Ibne Ismail and Muhammad Mizanur Rahman minority individuals can be switched by legitimizing the public presence of disagreements. The contention for the emblematic significance of toleration as recognition depends on the speculation of a causal chain connecting the legitimization of various identities, as the representative consequence of their public toleration, with the sensation of public regard of one’s character/identity and, therefore, the occasion to develop confidence and dignity, feeling certain about themselves as individuals from the country and of society on the loose (p. 101). As is said, this is hypothetical. In the process of “legitimizing the public presence of differences” to reverse the disgrace, mortification, and diffidence encountered by the minority groups, they may ask for the security of their non-identical individualities in public spheres (Jones, 2006, p. 138). Does that not mean that they might eventually ask for a separation from the majority? And her idea is contradictory too as “[r]ecognising differences as ‘legitimate, viable, normal,’ if taken at face value, still seems to involve a public evaluation of those differences of a sort that [Galeotti] wants to avoid” (p. 138). Peter Jones (2006) further articulates this contradiction with an example of Muslim–non-Muslim rhetoric: In the event that you are a Muslim and I am not, the acknowledgment I offer you as a Muslim should be based not from the esteem I provide for Islam (which might be zero or negative), yet from the esteem Islam has for you. So, I offer acknowledgment to your character since that personality matters to you as opposed to me. In any case, that position appears to depend upon the intervened acknowledgment decisively on the grounds that I remember you personally (autonomously of a specific character you have), I credit an incentive to whatever personality you have—not on the grounds that I esteem that personality all by itself but since regarding you as an individual necessitates that I regard the character that you grasp. That type of acknowledgment offers power to the general as opposed to the particular, to personhood instead of to contrast, and its regard for a character is predictable with a proceeding with the contrary gauge of that identity (p. 139). So, in relation to the Rohingya crisis, a Buddhist must recognize a Rohingya Muslim not as a person but as a Muslim. But, in recognizing the Muslim, as the Buddhist must respect the Rohingya as a person, the Buddhist, in reality, is recognizing and respecting the Muslim person in turn. Galeotti’s (2002) question: “How can a liberal democracy affirm the value of all the different, and often incompatible, religions, cultures, and forms of life?” (p. 103) sounds like an agenda, an agenda to “secure the majority and their ideas” (Vernon, 2017). Peter Jones (2006) argues that Galeotti assumes of toleration as a onesided act, where the majority groups should recognize and accept the minority groups (p. 139–140). Jones (2006) points out that she legitimizes her argument on the ground that as the majority groups control and govern the society and describe and establish such control/govern as the legal and standard norm, it is not essential for the majority groups to look for any recognition from the already relegated minority groups (p. 140). But she

The Rohingya Muslims’ Crisis in the Rakhine State of Myanmar  47 falls short of understanding the fact that “the model of recognition more commonly proposed is one of mutual or reciprocal recognition: everyone should accord recognition to everyone else” (Jones, 2006, p. 140, emphases in original). Everything seen from the majority’s perspective is not going to solve the problem of toleration in the Rakhine. The Buddhist majority and the Rohingya Muslim minority should respond with reciprocity to the crisis; otherwise, “toleration as recognition” is impossible. The crisis between the Rohingya Muslims and the Buddhist majority in Myanmar is escalated by the political engagement of the Buddhist monks in Myanmar. About this connection, Edmund Leach notes: Coherently, this would suggest that every individual who tries to be a decent Buddhist, yet more especially any individual who turns into a monk, should be absolutely impartial in governmental issues and less interested in politics. Formal teaching, as articulated by present-day Buddhist priests, makes this very unequivocal. However, both the historical and contemporary realities are very different (Quoted in Kyaw, 2016, p. 5). So, the religious majority, major religion, has influenced Myanmar’s political mechanism in the past and is still influencing the present democratic government of Aung San Suu Kyi. Although religion must not have any role in politics, it works otherwise in Myanmar, which instigates communal riots and complicates after riots situations as well. Roger Trigg (2012), in his Equality, Freedom, and Religion, argues: Religion cannot be ignored. Its existence as an influence on human behaviour, for good and ill, is obvious…. Whatever the regime and official ideology, and however oppressive [in persecution and coercion] it may be, its role in human life cannot be removed permanently. (p. 17) And John Locke has warned about the disastrous outcome of religious intolerance: History has without any doubt given more than sufficient proof that this has been the method of things previously, and reason illustrates that it will be so later on, as long as this conviction in mistreatment for religion’s purpose endures in the psyches of the ruler and the individuals, and those who ought to be the envoys of space and concordance sound the invitation to battle and blow the trumpet for war with all the control of their wings (Vernon, 2010, p. 42). Conclusion A coercive attitude toward the Rohingya Muslims in the name of religion will surely complicate Myanmar’s future, as history shows, because “[o]utward expression of religion may be prohibited, but the basic impulses remain and eventually are manifested again” (Trigg, 2012, p. 17). The impossibility of

48  Md. Ishrat Ibne Ismail and Muhammad Mizanur Rahman the inhuman annihilation of the Rohingya will lead to a chaotic future for Myanmar, which will impact its economic and democratic political growth of the country. It is religious toleration which is vital at this time to achieve stability in the Rakhine state of Myanmar as Locke further notes that most of the quarrels and wars that have arisen in the Christian worlds are not triggered by the diversity of faith (which cannot be avoided), but by refusing tolerance, refusing to accept others who have different views (Vernon, 2010, p. 42). The violence against the Rohingya Muslims in the Rakhine state of Myanmar should not be overlooked. It is a moral obligation that the Myanmar government should act fast along with the international community to end the ongoing massacre in the Rakhine state. However, for a longterm solution to the conflict between the Buddhist majority and the Rohingya Muslim minority, the Myanmar state should remain neutral about the religious performances of different religious groups like Buddhist, Muslim, Hindu, and Christian. Developing trust between the rival groups is important, and the state should promote religious tolerance within the different religious groups so that the rival groups find a suitable platform to continue the trust development. The state should intervene at the time of distortion of religion like “Islamophobia.” Any Islamophobic comment from any government official is not accepted, which will encourage anti-Muslim attitudes. Above all, religious differences should be addressed with greater tolerance because “[t]olerance is the mark of a civilized society, or so goes the rhetoric encompassing a wide range of discursive frames that includes liberalism and interfaith dialogue” (Beaman, 2013, p. 120). Peace does not come from a vacuum, it results from continuous and united efforts and discussions from people of different colors and faiths, and “tolerance” could be the starting point of those efforts and discussions. Bangladesh, as a developing nation, struggles to accommodate the humanitarian and material needs of the Rohingya people. Respecting others and others’ rights is an integral part of a peaceful environment. Bruno Reginald Russell (2016) remarks that “we are required to be moral based on the justifiability of our actions, and the relationship of ‘mutual recognition’ that all inherently seek to stand in along with others” (2016, p. 37). Bangladesh, one of the most populated countries in the world, has shown tremendous courage in offering shelter, food, and the services needed for the Rohingya to survive. The international community [should] uphold the idea of “burden-sharing” to help Bangladesh as well as to form a “collective & global force” to compel Myanmar to comply with the UN Human Rights resolutions to bring the Rohingya back to Myanmar with safety, dignity and legal recognition by conferring citizenship to them. (Uddin, 2022, p. 17)

The Rohingya Muslims’ Crisis in the Rakhine State of Myanmar  49 Note 1 When I say Buddhist majority, I mean not all the Buddhist people of Myanmar but those who followed the majoritarian policies without questioning the illogical grounds of the majoritarian policies and are involved in the unjustified dislocation of the Rohingya people from Myanmar.

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50  Md. Ishrat Ibne Ismail and Muhammad Mizanur Rahman Gibbens, S. (2017, September 29). Myanmar rohingya are in crisis: What you need to know. National Geographic. Retrieved from https://news​.nationalgeographic​.com​ /2017​/09​/rohingya​-refugee​-crisis​-myanmar​-burma​-spd​.html Human Rights Watch. (2013, April 13). All you can do is pray: Crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing of rohingya muslims in Burma’s Arakan State. Retrieved from https://www​.hrw​.org​/report​/2013​/04​/22​/all​-you​-can​-do​-pray​/ crimes​-against​-humanity​-and​-ethnic​-cleansing​-rohingya​-muslims Iqbal, I. (2017, September 27). Locating the rohingya in time and space. Aljazeera. Retrieved from http://www​.aljazeera​.com​/indepth​/opinion​/locating​-rohingya​-time​ -space​-170927100542729​.html Jones, P. (2006). Toleration, recognition and identity. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 14, 123–143. Keck, S. (2016). Reconstructing trajectories of islam in British Burma. In M. Crouch (Ed.), Islam and the State in Myanmar: Muslim-Buddhist Relations and the Politics of Belonging (pp. 1–24). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kinseth, A. S. (2017. October 18). What’s happening in Myanmar is genocide. Aljazeera. Retrieved from http://www​.aljazeera​.com​/indepth​/opinion​/happening​ -myanmar​-genocide​-171016114145271​.html Kyaw, N. N. (2015). Alienation, discrimination, and securitization: Legal personhood and cultural personhood of muslims in Myanmar. The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 13, 50–59. Kyaw, N. N. (2016). Islamophobia in buddhist Myanmar: The 969 movement and anti-muslim violence. In M. Crouch (Ed.), Islam and the State in Myanmar: Muslim-Buddhist Relations and the Politics of Belonging (pp. 1–25). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mahmood, S. S., Wroe, E., Fuller, A., and Leaning, J. (2017). The rohingya people of Myanmar: Health, human rights, and identity. The Lancet, 389, 1841–1850, https://doi​.org​/10​.1016​/S0140​-6736(16)00646-2 Meaning of 786. (n.d.). In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful. Retrieved from http://submission​.org​/meaning​_of​_786​.html Naik, S. (2022). Representation of refugee, migration and displacement. In N. Uddin (Ed.), The Rohingya Crisis: Human Rights Issues, Policy Concerns and Burden Sharing (pp. 127–148). New Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd. Russell, B. R. (2016). Contractualism, consequentialism and the moral landscape: A new ro-contractualist picture of ethical theory. PhilonoUS, 1, 36–46. Scanlon, T. M. (1996). The difficulty of tolerance. In David Heyd (Ed.), Toleration: An Elusive Virtue (pp. 226–239). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Schissler, M. (2016). New technologies, established practices: Developing narratives of muslim threat in Myanmar. In M. Crouch (Ed.), Islam and the State in Myanmar: Muslim-Buddhist Relations and the Politics of Belonging (pp. 1–18). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schonthal, B. (2016). Making the muslim other in Myanmar and Sri Lanka. In M. Crouch (Ed.), Islam and the State in Myanmar: Muslim-Buddhist Relations and the Politics of Belonging (pp. 1–19). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Taylor, C. (1994). The politics of recognition. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (pp. 25–74). Princeton: Princeton University Press. The number ‘786’: Its origin, meaning and significance. (2015, June 06). Vargis Khan. Retrieved from http://vargiskhan​.com​/log​/the​-number​-786​-its​-origin​-meaning​-and​ -significance/

The Rohingya Muslims’ Crisis in the Rakhine State of Myanmar  51 Thompson, N. G. (2013). The 969 movement and the Burmese anti-muslim nationalism in context. Buddhist Peace Fellowship. Retrieved from https://bud​dhis​ tpea​cefe​llowship​.org​/the​-969​-movement​-and​-burmese​-anti​-muslim​-nationalism​ -in​-context/ Trigg, R. (2012). Equality, Freedom, and Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Uddin, N. (2020). The Rohingya: An Ethnography of ‘Subhuman’ Life. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Uddin, N. (2022). The Rohingya Crisis: Human Rights Issues, Policy Concerns and Burden Sharing. New Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd. Vernon, R. (2017, December 04). Alternatives to toleration (3): Recognition. In Seminar: Politics 9503a/Philosophy 9121a: Political Theory II: Toleration and Political Disagreement. Western University. Vernon, R. (Ed.). (2010). Locke on Toleration. Trans. Michael Silverthorne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wildman, S. (2017, September 18). The world’s fastest-growing refugee crisis is taking place in Myanmar. Here’s why. Vox. Retrieved from https://www​.vox​.com​ /world​/2017​/9​/18​/16312054​/rohingya​-muslims​-myanmar​-refugees​-violence

4

A Right to Exist The Rohingya and Their Struggles in Malaysia and Thailand Md. Mahbubul Haque and Sk Tawfique M Haque

Introduction The Rohingya are an ethnic, linguistic, and Muslim religious minority group who have been living in the Rakhine state of Myanmar over the past several centuries. The Muslims of Arakan–Rohingya trace their ancestry to ancient Indian people of the Chandra dynasty of Arakan, Arabs, Turks, Persians, Bengalis, and some of Indo-Mongoloid people. Thus, ethnic Rohingya have emerged from different ethnical backgrounds over the centuries (Haque, 2014. p, 77). The Rohingya are unwanted by Myanmar due to their identity, ethnicity, and religion. Before the militarisation of the country, the Rohingya did not face any issues in Myanmar, not until the 1982 Citizenship Law which was developed based on so-called indigenous ethnicity. The law does not accept the Rohingya as an ethnic group even though their presence in the country predates the British colonisation of Myanmar. It serves as an oppressive legal tool particularly against the Rohingya people, rendering them stateless in their homeland, evidently on grounds of their religion and ethnicity. This provides justification for the United Nations labelling the Rohingya as “the most persecuted minority in the world” (UNHCR, 2020f). Due to large-scale persecution and mass violence, mass exodus of Rohingya into Bangladesh and other countries has continued. The Rohingya situation has not improved inside Myanmar and, in fact, has only gotten worse after the 2012 Buddhist–Muslim communal riots. In 2016, Myanmar’s first democratically elected government in a generation came to power, but critics say it has done nothing to help the Rohingya and other Muslims for fear of alienating Buddhist nationalists (Chatzky, 2016). The Aung San Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy (hereafter NLD) government introduced a few positive changes in the Myanmar political spectrum, but the Rohingya situation has continued to deteriorate. The 2012 attacks on the Rohingya ushered in an era of increased oppression that laid the groundwork for more brutal and organised military crackdowns in 2016 and 2017. “In August 2017, following attacks by an ethnic Rohingya armed group, security forces launched a campaign of mass atrocities, including widespread killings, rape, and arson, against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine State” (Human Rights Watch, 2020a). “At the peak of the DOI: 10.4324/9781003228707-5

A Right to Exist  53 crisis, thousands crossed into Bangladesh daily. Since the operation in August 2017, more than 742,000 Rohingya have sought refuge in Bangladesh as of 31 July 2019” (UNHCR, 2020f). The Myanmar Central and Rakhine State governments have made new policies to expel the Rohingya community from their ancestral land. The Rohingya’s right to life, freedom of movement, livelihoods, and other fundamental rights have been grossly violated by the Myanmar government. Moreover, the government alleges that the Rohingya constitute a threat to national integrity in many ways, including insurgency, population growth, and Islamic militancy. From a human rights perspective, the right of every person to a nationality is enshrined in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which also refers to the concurrent right not to be arbitrarily deprived of nationality. There are many UN human rights treaties articulating the right to nationality. These include: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 [Article 24 (3)], the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965 [Article 5 (d) (iii)], and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989[Article 7 (1)] (UNICEF, 1989). It is worth noting that Myanmar is not a signatory of many UN human rights treaties except the CEDAW, CRC, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. This chapter focuses particularly on the struggles of the displaced Rohingya in Southeast Asian countries. The treatment of the Rohingya varies from host country to host country. All international actors and the host countries and their governments are aware of the atrocities that have been committed against the Rohingya. But the various policies of each of these nations make the Rohingya vulnerable, and often they are accused of being a burden and a threat to each nation’s peace and stability. This chapter specifically examines how Malaysia and Thailand have dealt with the displaced Rohingya within their own borders. For this chapter, data were collected mainly through various secondary documents, and fieldwork in Malaysia and Thailand. During the fieldwork, interviews were taken from different categories of respondents: Rohingya community, NGO and INGO representatives, and the Rohingya experts. This study is also based on observations of the socio-economic and security conditions of Rohingya residential areas in Malaysia and Thailand. Ethical standards of preserving the confidentiality of the documents and interviews were maintained, especially where non-citizen Rohingya community was concerned. The ethical guidelines were attached in the informant consent sheet. The authors of this chapter were also concerned about the risk of physical danger to the interviewees. During the data collection, the authors did not pressurise the Rohingya community as non-citizens, or NGO officials, to be interviewed. The authors were careful and assured the informants that the investigation would not endanger them. In some cases, they used pseudonyms for the interviewees. The authors explained the purpose of the research before

54  Md. Mahbubul Haque and Sk Tawfique M Haque conducting interviews and only audio recorded their statements after they had given verbal consent. What Is a “Refugee”? There are multiple factors that cause the displacement of communities en masse. It can be due to international/national armed conflict, state and nonstate-based persecution, regime-induced displacement, or sometimes even due to natural disasters. Displaced people face various difficulties in host countries because the relationship between the spirit of the Refugee Convention and today’s reality regarding refugee rights and the status determination process is very complex. Though the concept of the protection mechanism surrounding refugees is defined and described in the Refugee Convention, Refugee Protocol, UNHCR statute, and regional treaties, unfortunately, customary international law is non-binding and difficult to enforce. Academics and rights activists emphasise the legally binding treaties to protect the people who are persecuted and fled from their countries of origin. Even though the Rohingya meet all the criteria for refugee status, they failed to seek necessary refugee protection in Malaysia and Thailand. This chapter will explore the Rohingya’s status by referring to the definition of the term “refugee” in Article (1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention: owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (UNHCR, 2020a) Madsen (2001) argues that central in current definitions of “refugee” is the notion of persecution. Some writers maintain the view that any infringement of human rights amounts to persecution and consequently may justify a claim to recognition as a refugee and thus to asylum. (p.77) If that is true, then anyone harmed due to political ideology, race, or religion may justify a claim of persecution and, hence, have a right to asylum and be recognised as a refugee. Madsen (2001) further explains that persecution means taking of life or deprivation of physical freedom (for more than a negligible period), such as a systematic denial of a possibility to earn a livelihood, exclusion from institutions of learning, and deprivation of civil and political

A Right to Exist  55 rights. Discriminatory policies of the Myanmar government since the late 1970s have compelled hundreds of thousands of Muslim Rohingya to flee from their homes, homes which are in a predominantly Buddhist country. Most have crossed by land into Bangladesh while others have taken to the sea to reach Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (Albert and Maizland, 2020). Commonly, asylums are spaces reserved for persecuted people. Price (2009) states that “asylum provides not only protection to the refugee, but also chastises the persecutory state for its misconduct” (p.103). However, which kind of harms are considered persecution is yet to be agreed upon. Generally, political dissidents and ethnic and religious minorities face statesponsored policies designed to discriminate against them, making them vulnerable inside their country of habitual residence. In such situations, staying in their country of origin becomes almost impossible. The UNHCR Handbook, meant to provide interpretive guidance to courts and administrative agencies, begins its discussion of persecution with a striking disclaimer: “There is no universally accepted definition of ‘persecution’ and various attempts to formulate such a definition have met with little success” (Price, 2009, p.103). Additionally, the definition and interpretation of the word “refugee” varies. Earlier, especially during the Cold War, the term “refugee” referred only to individuals uprooted due to political disharmony. Now, new types of refugees have emerged, such as climate refugees, who are not even addressed in the Refugee Convention or Protocol. Hence, Africa, America, and Europe have developed their respective regional mechanisms to address the new phenomenon of refugee status. In 1969, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention defined a refugee as any person compelled to leave his or her country “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality” (OAU, 1969). Similarly, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration1 states that refugees also include persons who flee their country “because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order” (UNHCR, 1984). According to different rights organisations’ reports2 the Rohingya exoduses are certainly linked to well-founded fears and persecution because of their racial and religious identity in their country of origin. In this context, displaced Rohingya are refugees (“person with a well-founded fear of persecution”) according to the 1951 Refugee Convention’s definition, and so are entitled to international protection. These evidences should have been sufficient enough for the Rohingya to claim refugee status in Malaysia and Thailand; however, that has not been the case. According to the refugee convention and scholarly interpretations, refugees must be protected under international human rights law. But, currently, refugee protection mechanisms are politicised by the countries providing asylum. To some extent, due to a lack of enforcement mechanisms, thousands of

56  Md. Mahbubul Haque and Sk Tawfique M Haque refugees are denied their rights as non-citizens. Their fundamental rights are ignored and they receive little attention from international agencies beyond the occasional human rights report which mentions their situation. Such reports may receive press coverage but that do little to bring about change in their lives. For the Rohingya, the case is no different in Malaysia and Thailand. There are conceptual gaps among the refugee-hosting countries. Many hosting countries think that only recognised refugees can enjoy civil, social, and economic rights. In these countries, most asylum-seekers and people in refugee-like situations are deprived of some of their most basic rights. Since there is no consensus or legal obligation to address the situation, refugee protection and assistance depend entirely on the generosity of the countries providing asylum, which is often linked to grander political issues. Status of the Rohingya: Migrants or Refugees? Migrant workers constitute a significant part of the labour force in Southeast Asian countries like Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. In fact, Malaysia has become the largest importer of labour in Southeast Asia, taking in more than a million workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Pakistan (Pappusamy, 2014). It should be noted that the majority of those migrating to Malaysia are doing so to seek better economic opportunities. Regardless, a substantial number of migrants come to the country seeking protection from violence, persecution, and human rights violations in their home countries. As a developing country, Thailand has also significantly benefited from the migrant workers of neighbouring Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. “It can be estimated that 3.9 million documented and undocumented migrant workers, 480,000 stateless persons, 110,000 skilled professionals, 100,000 refugees and asylum seekers are staying in the kingdom” (cited in Chaijaroenwatana and Haque, 2020, p.13). The International Organization for Migration (2020) states that, between 2010 and 2017, the number of documented foreign workers in Malaysia increased from 1.7 million to 2.2 million and, as of the end of 2018, there are an estimated two to four million additional undocumented migrant workers in Malaysia. Nearly 180,000 refugees and asylum seekers are registered with the UN’s refugee agency, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in Malaysia, including more than 101,000 Rohingya and 52,000 others also from Myanmar. Refugee community groups estimate tens of thousands more are undocumented, awaiting UNHCR appointments. (Fishbein, 2020) According to the data published by UNHCR in July 2021, Thailand continues to host some 91,635 refugees from Myanmar in the nine Royal Thai

A Right to Exist  57 Government (hereafter RTG)-run temporary shelters on the Thai/Myanmar border, in addition to approximately 5,000 urban refugees and asylum-seekers from over 40 countries, and some 480,000 persons registered by the RTG as stateless (UNHCR, 2021). It is worth mentioning that the number of displaced Rohingya is not significant in Thailand compared to other refugees. “It can be assumed that approximately three to four thousand Rohingya have been living since the mid-1970s” (cited in Chaijaroenwatana and Haque, 2020, p.19). In both Malaysia and Thailand, the displaced Rohingya are treated as “economic migrants” or “illegal migrants.” The plight of these undocumented refugees is closely linked with persecution in their country of origin. Both countries see the Rohingya as a drain on public resources which has persisted for years, and a perspective which has only worsened amid the countries’ worst economic crises in decades (Minter, 2020). To explore this argument further, it is necessary to briefly discuss the difference between a refugee and an economic migrant. The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol states that economic migrants can be distinguished from refugees under sections 62, 63, and 64. A migrant is a person who, for reasons other than those contained in the definition, voluntarily leaves his country in order to take up residence elsewhere. He may be moved by the desire for change or adventure, or by family or other reasons of a personal nature. If he is moved exclusively by economic considerations, he is an economic migrant and not a refugee. (UNHCR, 2011) According to this section, anyone who leaves a country for economic reasons cannot claim refugee status. The international community is concerned for the Rohingya and their forced displacement, discussing this issue several times in various forums, including the UN Security Council. Over a million Rohingya have fled from violence in Myanmar in successive waves of displacement since the early 1990s (UNHCR, 2020e). Rohingya migration into Thailand and Malaysia was not due to economic factors; rather, it is linked to their well-founded fear of persecution in Myanmar. As such, “migrant” is not a fitting term for the Rohingya. Host countries like Thailand and Malaysia, however, still fail to address the Rohingya and their non-citizenship under any sort of human rights obligation. Instead, they impose various discriminatory policies against them. Experiences from Other Regional Powers In the absence of any effective enforcement authority, current human rights protection mechanisms cannot directly work for survivors. The jurisdictions of most UN human rights treaty bodies often overlap. It should be noted that

58  Md. Mahbubul Haque and Sk Tawfique M Haque existing mechanisms in Southeast Asia are not supported by a court like the European Court of Human Rights which was established by the European Convention on Human Rights. The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was established in 2009, but has been widely criticised for not working effectively to guard human rights in the region as had been expected, including civil society organisations (CSOs). Charles Santiago, an ASEAN Parliamentarian for Human Rights (APHR) Chairperson and Malaysian MP, “raised question about the effectiveness of AICHR” (as cited in ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, 2019). In the ASEAN context, member states created a human rights monitoring committee rather than a court procedure to establish a regional protection mechanism. This was criticised by scholars and rights activists because of its ineffective role in the human rights arena (Supriadi & Benedict, 2018 & Hara, 2018). In November 2012, the ASEAN Heads of States adopted the legally nonbinding ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. Article 16 of the Declaration states: “Every person has the right to seek and receive asylum in another State in accordance with the laws of such State and applicable international agreements.” However, ASEAN members have been reluctant to put asylum seeker issues on ASEAN’s formal agenda because of the perception that it would involve a breach of the Charter principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states; this eventually also led to the AICHR’s failure in taking any initiative to protect the Rohingya. In Asia, around half the countries have yet to accede to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. However, in some countries, for example, India, UNHCR-registered cardholders enjoy basic human rights and have access to essential services such as the government healthcare system, educational services, and the employment sector (Towle, 2017). This strengthens refugees’ self-reliance, increases their resilience, and reduces the burden on the host state. Similarly, in Nepal, UNHCR has collaborated with the government to conduct registration and verification activities and is also assisting refugees in finding complementary pathways which would prepare them for potential issues in the future. Pakistan has been a host country for refugees since the late 1970s. Presently, 1.4 million registered Afghan refugees are living in different places in Pakistan for over three decades, many of whom are second- or third-generation Afghanis (UNHCR, 2020c). Due to civil war in Afghanistan, it is not possible for these refugees to return to their country of origin. The Situation in Malaysia Malaysia is home to more than two million illegal immigrants, in addition to around 180,000 refugees and asylum-seekers; around 101,000 of them are Rohingya (AP News, 2020). There are no formal refugee camps in Malaysia. Most of the Rohingya, along with other asylum-seekers, stay in urban/suburban areas. Their livelihoods depend on secondary and tertiary sectors like

A Right to Exist  59 manufacturing and services. Malaysia is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 protocol. It also has no legal framework, guidelines, or administrative procedures to address or provide humanitarian assistance to refugees. This raises the question: How have thousands of non-citizens been living in Malaysia for decades? There is a good number of publications on irregular migration in Malaysia; however, unlike those, this chapter will be focusing on the singular issue of the lives of non-citizen Rohingya in Malaysia. From a legal point of view, the displaced Rohingya cannot enjoy refugee rights due to the absence of effective domestic law since asylum-seekers and refugees are viewed as prohibited immigrants as per Malaysian immigration laws, leaving them vulnerable to threats of arrest, detention, and deportation contrary to international law (Asen, 2018). The Rohingya have been seeking refugee status in Malaysia since the 1980s. As of October 2020, there are some 178,450 refugees and asylum-seekers registered with UNHCR in Malaysia. Some 153,800 are from Myanmar, comprising some 102,020 Rohingya, 22,440 Chins, and 29,340 other ethnic groups from conflictaffected areas. There are some 24,650 refugees and asylum-seekers from 50 countries fleeing war and persecution, including some 6,640 Pakistanis, 3,660 Yemenis, 3,250 Syrians 3,230 Somalis, 2,690 Afghans, 1,740 Sri Lankans, 1,220 Iraqis, 750 Palestinians, and others (UNHCR, 2020b). This data showcases the fact that the displaced Rohingya are larger in number, but many of them are still not registered. “Malaysia hosts the largest number of Rohingya refugees in ASEAN countries and the fourth highest number worldwide. Supporting the Rohingya is a long-standing element of Malaysia’s global Muslim solidarity agenda in its foreign policy” (Sukhani, 2020). Due to the existing legal framework in Malaysia, the forcefully displaced Rohingya fail to receive protection as refugees. Recently, the situation has worsened. Malaysian Home Minister Hamzah Zainudin issued a statement on the Rohingya’s legal status and rights in Malaysia, stating that “Rohingya nationals who are holders of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees card have no status, rights, or basis to make any claims on the government” (Al Jazeera, 2020). Without recognition, the Rohingya ultimately become “illegal immigrants.” Sukhani (2020) states that, from 2016, local complaints increased against the Rohingya for operating businesses without licences and using government land without permission. However, rights groups responded by saying that the Malaysian government routinely violated the Rohingya’s rights. Muslim rights activist and lawyer Azril Mohammad Amin during the interview rejected this complaint and argued that Malaysians are very sympathetic to the Rohingya cause and wished to assist them within their limited capacities.3 Freedom of movement is an important issue with regard to protracted refugee situations in countries with limited national resources or limited legal frameworks for protecting refugees who nonetheless host large refugee

60  Md. Mahbubul Haque and Sk Tawfique M Haque populations. In Malaysia, displaced Rohingya are not confined to camps, and international agencies cannot comprehensively work for them. Many among the Rohingya are self-employed in rural and suburban areas. The Rohingya community leaders have stated that employers routinely exploited and terminated them due to their vulnerable position as illegal migrants.4 Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 26 of the 1951 Refugee Convention suggest that states shall provide refugees the right to choose their place of residence within the territory and to move freely within the state. Meanwhile, Refugee Convention Article 28 obliges state parties to issue refugees travel documents permitting them to travel outside the state “unless compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require” (UNHCR, 2020a). One of the primary issues is that Malaysia is not a signatory to any of the major international human rights treaties and legally has no obligation to provide fundamental rights to the Rohingya. A huge number of Rohingya children are born in Malaysia, but since Malaysia does not practise the principle of jus soli, citizenship is not granted to these children. Despite these limitations, refugees can access public healthcare and are provided with a private health insurance scheme. However, there is no medical subsidy or discount available, making health facilities unaffordable and inaccessible for them. “The Rohingya, as most of them are undocumented, live in fear of being detained, arrested or deported, explained Ustaz Rafik, a leader of the Rohingya community in Selayang, on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur” (Radu, 2016). Due to their identity, they are often harassed by law enforcers and sometimes detained in jail. Such a precarious situation also discourages Rohingya parents from sending their children to school. Rohingya refugee children spend their childhoods confined to their neighbourhoods, almost never leaving their communities. Children sometimes attend community schools funded by philanthropists. In many places, Rohingya refugee children or learning centres are operated by the community and faith-based organisations with the assistance of UNHCR. At the learning centres, they are mostly taught about Islam, Malay language, and basic literacy skills. They are not taught about Rohingya history or their country of origin, Myanmar. There are about 120 learning centres in West Malaysia, mostly in Klang Valley, Johor, and Penang. The majority of the teachers in these schools are from the refugee communities themselves with locals and foreigners volunteering on a regular basis (Abdullah, Dali, & Razak, 2018). As a result, due to a lack of formal education, the Rohingya people fail to contribute to Malaysian society. According to a report by UNHCR, only 63% of refugee children worldwide are enrolled in primary school, 24% in secondary, and 3% in higher education (UNHCR, 2019: p. 5). For Rohingya children in Malaysia, the situation is even worse. As of December 2016, only 39% of school-age children had access to any education, while the remainder are categorised as being out of school, according to UNHCR’s education unit in Malaysia (Sanmartin, 2017). In many cases, refugees do not have

A Right to Exist  61 the necessary documentation, such as birth certificates, required to enrol in school, making it difficult to get entry into the national education system. Furthermore, Rohingya learning centres have no institutional recognition. In most cases, classes are conducted by the Rohingya elders, who do not possess adequate knowledge to provide primary-level education. These Rohingya instructors are also insufficiently paid. All of them are considered illegal immigrants since Malaysian law does not distinguish between international refugees and illegal immigrants. For decades, the UNHCR has been trying to convince the Malaysian government to ratify the 1951 Convention in its bid to improve refugee protection and conditions in the country. Unfortunately, the effort has been futile. The convention and its contents are perceived as threats to Malaysia’s sovereignty because the government is expected to comply with its requirements instead of local law, with some of the provisions in conflict with the Federal Constitution and other Federal legislations. It is the same scenario in many other developing countries. However, it cannot be denied that, despite such reservations, countries like Malaysia, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Pakistan have been carrying the burden of millions of refugees since the early 1970s. As a developing country, the financial implications of the Convention are huge, and the current Malaysian economy cannot afford these expenses because of debt problems, plummeting oil prices and knock-on effects on trade and tourism from the global shutdown. Despite legal barriers, the Malaysian government has allowed the Rohingya to stay on humanitarian grounds, and the Malay people in general are sympathetic. The Rohingya were given a reprieve in 2006 when the Malaysian government began issuing IMM135 permits, which provided some form of legitimacy to their status (Letchamanana, 2013). This would protect them from being harassed or arrested by the authorities. Unfortunately, the efforts to legitimise the Rohingya were halted when the government decided to again analyse the overall refugee situation. It was reported in 2009 that a sizable number of the Rohingya had embarked on journeys across the Bay of Bengal towards Malaysia, many of them perishing on their way due to dehydration and other causes. Chris Lewa, director of the Arakan Project, a Bangkok-based monitoring group, stated that many refugees are desperate to leave the precarity, insecurity and hopelessness in the refugee camps in Bangladesh, in particular those with relatives in Malaysia. And they have no other way to do so other than undertaking risky journeys by boat in spite of the vigilance by Bangladesh security forces. (Reuters, 2020) During the movement control period, immigration officials conducted a series of raids against the illegal migrants. There is some debate on this matter among Malaysian law makers. Former Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin

62  Md. Mahbubul Haque and Sk Tawfique M Haque stated in June 2020 that “Malaysia could not take any more Rohingya immigrants because the economy had been too badly hurt by the coronavirus pandemic. He added that those already residing within Malaysia will not be sent out” (Latiff, 2020). On the other hand, former main opposition leader and PKR president Anwar Ibrahim also urged Malaysia’s political leaders to speak up on behalf of the Rohingya refugees on humanitarian grounds, stating, “The Rohingya refugees who landed here did not demand any rights.” He went on: “If we send the refugees back to Myanmar, they will be suppressed and might even be shot to death” (Bunyan, 2020). In the wake of hate campaigns on Malaysian social media against the Rohingya community, former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad urged Malaysians to sympathise with the Rohingya as they had been persecuted in their home country. He instead urged Malaysians to criticise Myanmar’s State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and reject trade with the nation (Babulal, 2020). Amnesty International (2017) has concerns over the discrimination and propaganda against the Rohingya. The Rohingya community in Malaysia has no right to make demands on the government, as stated by Home Minister Hamzah Zainuddin, further reminding that Malaysia is not a signatory to the UN Convention on Refugees, and hence, has no legal or administrative framework to handle them. The shifting state response, intertwined with mounting tensions of the COVID-19 era, has spilled over on to social media, where digital unrest has included a bombardment of comments, memes, and hashtags denouncing the Rohingya presence in the country in terms much harsher than before. Lilianne Fan, international director of the humanitarian group Geutanyoe Foundation, has said that she had never heard of a Rohingya push for citizenship in Malaysia. “They’re asking for citizenship in Myanmar,” she stressed. “Not a single Rohingya I’ve met, and I’d say I’ve met tens of thousands, asks for citizenship here. They would like to return to Myanmar, they’d like to go back” (Haffner, 2020). In addition, Rohingya leaders and activists have faced harassment and received death threats after it was falsely claimed that they were demanding Malaysian citizenship. The rapid proliferation of threats of violence and hate speech against the Rohingya community immediately followed the government’s decision in April 2020 to repel boats containing Rohingya refugees attempting to land in Malaysia. This action by the Malaysian government violated the principle of nonrefoulement under international human rights law, threatening the lives of hundreds of Rohingya. It is well documented that the Malaysian government has raised the Rohingya issue in various international forums, including the 75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Former Prime Minister clearly stated at the time that Malaysia currently hosts the largest number of Rohingya refugees in Southeast Asia. As a developing nation, coping with the cost of managing

A Right to Exist  63 and providing protection to nearly 180,000 registered refugees and asylum-seekers, our resources are stretched thin. Yet, Malaysia is expected to do more. Is that fair? (The Star, 2020) Earlier, Malaysia supported The Gambia’s action against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. To some extent, Malaysia’s recent actions towards these refugees have been contradictory. The National Security Council proposed to shut down the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) office in Malaysia. To respond to this issue, Bukit Bendera MP Wong Hon Wai reminded the government that Malaysia was a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council for the 2022–2024 term and had the moral obligation to uphold human rights in the country and region. “Malaysia cannot unilaterally shut down a UN agency office without holding negotiations, all the more when the number of refugees remains high” (FMT Reporters, 2022). It is noted that Director General of the Nation Security Council in Malaysia also accused UNHCR of issuing refugee cards without checking with the authorities and ultimately ignoring and disrespecting the host country’s government decision (ibid). From preventing boatloads of them from entering Malaysian waters in April to immediately arresting and detaining hundreds of them on arrival on 8 June 2020, the government has made no progress towards acknowledging the rights or internationally recognised refugee status of the Rohingya. In that context, former Foreign Minister Sayed Hamid Albar argues that Malaysia has always taken a moral and compassionate position on the status of refugees although legally any person who comes to the country without proper documentation is considered to be an illegal immigrant. Recently, Malaysia has been hardening its position regarding illegal migrants, including refugees. The best course of action for Malaysia would be to have a policy specific to refugees despite not being a signatory to the 1951 Convention. There is empathy towards fellow Muslims, but certain incidents are wearing this sympathy out.6 The Situation in Thailand Thailand has also been hosting thousands of refugees since the 1970s with most of them originating from around the Southeast Asian regions. According to the UNHCR (2020d), “Thailand continues to host some 91,803 refugees (as of December 2020) from Myanmar.” It should be mentioned that the Thai government does not want to acknowledge formal refugee camps, and hence, the areas where the displaced live are mostly situated near the ThaiMyanmar border (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Many were born in the camps and have never set foot outside. There are nine camps, and in most of them, the majority are labelled as Karen people, an umbrella term that refers

64  Md. Mahbubul Haque and Sk Tawfique M Haque to heterogeneous ethnic groups without a shared language, culture, or religion. The living conditions in the camps are extremely poor. However, there are no displaced Rohingya living in these temporary shelters. There is no accurate data regarding the Rohingya in Thailand. It is not a popular destination for them, and they have generally been brought to Thailand by human traffickers. As a result, Rohingya numbers are small in Thailand compared to other displaced minorities from Myanmar. Rohingya community leaders have claimed that there are no more than five thousand Rohingya residing and engaged in various professions in Bangkok, Mae Sot, Nonthaburi, and a few other places in Thailand. Human rights organisations often claim that, due to a lack of documentation, Thai authorities have often sent the Rohingya to detention centres or deported them (BBC News, 2014). The Rohingya issue was highlighted in Thailand during the boat people crisis in different periods. In early 2009, the Thai government was highly criticised by the international community for their harsh treatment of the Rohingya boat people. Thousands of Rohingya were stranded at sea without food or water after traffickers had abandoned the ships, fearing arrest if they came to shore. Due to international media attention and pressure from human rights groups, Thai authorities were eventually forced to take various measures against the traffickers. It was also reported that a section of senior Thai officials was involved in the trafficking. More than 60 people were sent to jail including former army general Manas Kongpan, who was sentenced to 27 years for trafficking and organised transnational crime (Bendix, 2017) Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol. Partly because of this, Thailand does not have specific legislation or administrative mechanisms governing asylum and refugee affairs. Policies that impact refugees are formulated by different executive bodies concerned with national security, such as the National Security Council (NSC), the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), and the military (Chaijaroenwatana & Haque, 2020). In the absence of a national refugee policy, Thailand has historically passed off the responsibility of refugee protection to the UNHCR. The UNHCR has utilised internationally recognised criteria to determine who fulfils the criteria for recognition as “refugees.” However, even if they are found not to fall under the criteria, they should not be returned to states where they risk persecution. In Thailand, Provincial Admission Board is the responsible agency for refugee status determination, for all asylum-seekers from Myanmar. Due to statelessness, Rohingya failed to provide any documents and were treated either as trafficked persons or as illegal migrants. Though UNHCR does operate in Thailand and provides some degree of protection to urban refugees from nationalities other than Myanmar, Rohingya are unable to access this protection (Ostrand, 2021). Human rights expert Surapong Kongchantuk has stated that Thailand’s treatment of the Rohingya as illegal migrants is done so without considering

A Right to Exist  65 their circumstances in Myanmar (Ganjanakhundee, 2018). Surapong also argued that most of the Rohingya were survivors of trafficking and deserve better treatment from the Thai authorities. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the situation has changed in Thailand. The Ministry of Labour in Thailand issued an announcement advising Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodian migrant workers to quickly renew their work permits before the end of October 2020. If they failed to do so, they were threatened with stiff punishment and being immediately deported back to their countries (Xinhua, 2020). Thailand’s Ministry of Public Health has called on local businesses to desist from re-employing migrant workers from Myanmar, which was experiencing a renewed flare-up of COVID-19 at the time (UCA news, 2020). According to Thailand’s immigration law, a valid passport or document used in lieu of a passport is required for lawful admission into the country, and any foreigner who enters or stays in Thailand without lawful admission is subject to deportation. Rights activist Debbie Stothard strongly argued that “in the Thailand context, the Rohingya refugees are seeking humanitarian support to save their life from persecution. It is not justifiable to compare Rohingya situation with other illegal migrants’ groups in Southeast Asia.”7 Nevertheless, Thailand has for decades accommodated many displaced people from Myanmar in temporary camps along the Thai–Myanmar border. But as irregular migrants in a country that does not recognise the rights of refugees, the Rohingya in Thailand live in constant fear. Haji Ismail, President of the Rohingya Peace Network in Thailand, stated that “we are in a critical situation because our nationality cannot be verified as citizens of Myanmar”; further claiming “after military takeover of State power in 2021, it is literally impossible for Rohingyas to get any consular facilities from Myanmar embassy in Thailand.”8 The situation has become dire for all Rohingya after Operation Clearance9 in 2017 in Rakhine State. As a result, many Rohingya were desperate to flee the country, and some of them entered Thailand subsequently. Customary international law and Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Thailand is a state party, forbids the arbitrary, unlawful, or indefinite detention of any person, including refugees and migrants. Migrants may only be detained as an exceptional measure of last resort following an individualised assessment and after the exhaustion of all alternatives to detention. Any detention must also take into consideration the effects that such detention may have on the mental and physical health of the individual. But the government of Thailand has detained more than 200 refugees, including 15 refugee children, and hundreds of other migrants in its 22 immigration detention facilities throughout the nation (Fortify Rights, 2020). According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),

66  Md. Mahbubul Haque and Sk Tawfique M Haque immigration detention centers are too often overcrowded and lack adequate healthcare and sanitation. In order to avoid a rapid spread of the virus, States should put in place the necessary measures to protect the health of migrants in these facilities and urgently establish non-custodial alternatives to detention as a measure to mitigate these risks. (OHCHR, 2020) Additionally, rights groups are concerned about the unlawful and indefinite periods of Rohingya detention in Thailand. Brad Adams, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, has stated that “Thailand should help the oppressed Rohingya from Myanmar, not worsen their suffering,” and that “The Thai government should recognize the plight of Rohingya and allow them access to desperately needed protection” (Human Rights Watch, 2020b). In addition, Thai authorities should allow UNHCR unhindered access to the Rohingya to determine whether they qualify for refugee status. Observations from human rights groups and interviews with community leaders suggest that the Thai government has often arrested the Rohingya upon arrival and detained them for indefinite periods of time. UNHCR has the technical expertise to screen for refugee status and the international mandate to protect refugees and the stateless. But the Thai government categorised them as either trafficked persons or illegal migrants, leaving the Rohingya out of the realm of protection of international agencies. Additionally, the situation is further exacerbated by the history of separatist violence in the Malay Muslim-dominated southern provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, and parts of Songkla, going back nearly half a century. But the unrest in these parts of Thailand has captured growing national, regional, and international attention over the past decades. Some have alleged that the Rohingya might have connections to Southern Thailand-based Malay Muslim insurgents. In contradiction, NGO leader Rukchart Suwan has stated that the “Rohingya couldn’t do any harm to Southern Thailand. They are facing various difficulties in Myanmar. Thailand should help them and not send them back” (Chaijaroenwatana & Haque, 2020). However, there is no substantial evidence to suggest that the region has been decisively transformed into a new battlefield for an Islamic extremist movement. Despite this barrier, many Rohingya have settled in Thailand, some of whom have been operating businesses there for years. A common trend is to get married to Thai women. The second generation of Rohingya has adopted Thai culture and has studied at local academic institutions.10 In addition, it is perceived during the informal conversation with the Rohingya community, some of them might be supporters of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) as well as involved with human trafficking.11

A Right to Exist  67 The Rohingya Situation: A Comparison between Thailand and Malaysia (Danish Refugee Council:2020) Issues

Thailand

Malaysia

Spatial Distribution of Refugees

Most of the refugees live in nine Most of the refugees live in camps in four Thai provinces urban areas since there along the Thai-Myanmar are no refugee camps in border. Malaysia. International Thailand is not a signatory to the Malaysia is not a signatory Policy 1951 Refugee Convention or to the 1951 Refugee its 1967 protocol. Convention or the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions. National Policy/ In 2017, Thailand adopted As of March 2020, there is no Law Cabinet Resolution national policy/domestic 10.01, B.E. 2560, which law differentiating between established a “Committee asylum-seekers, refugees, for the Management of and undocumented Undocumented Migrants migrants. and Refugees” to formulate policies related to the screening and management of undocumented migrants and refugees. Access to Thailand’s labour laws Due to the absence of a services restrict refugees from legal national policy/law, employment inside the refugees and asylumcountry. seekers have no access The UN Convention on the to legal residence, legal Rights of the Child was employment, affordable ratified by Thailand in 1992. healthcare, certified and Thailand has an “Education accredited education, and for All” policy. other public services.

While both nations are non-signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention, Thailand in 2017 did show commitment under the ICCPR to protect refugees. Furthermore, while Malaysia lacks coherent domestic laws regarding refugees, migrants, and asylum-seekers, Thailand, in 2017, adopted policies to address issues related to migrants and refugees. For instance, when it comes to accessibility to education, Thailand’s policy of “Education for All” allows more learning opportunities to Rohingya children unlike the informal community schools in Malaysia. However, in terms of the living conditions of the Rohingya, even though both countries lack formal refugee camps, the Rohingya in Malaysia reside in more privileged urban areas compared to those in Thailand, where they reside near the city outskirts. This chapter has tried to identify the role of the governments of both nations and their existing laws when it comes to dealing with the forcefully displaced

68  Md. Mahbubul Haque and Sk Tawfique M Haque Rohingya. The discussion above is based on data derived from available literature and the authors’ interviews with Rohingya community leaders and policy makers in Malaysia and Thailand. Both Malaysia and Thailand have not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol. This implies that refugees in these countries do not enjoy any protection from the law, do not possess the legal right to live with dignity, and have restricted access to public resources such as healthcare and education. The Rohingya in both countries are primarily urban dwellers residing in urban settlements instead of designated refugee camps. In the absence of a formal legal framework, the Rohingya encounter harsh treatment from law enforcers in both countries, often facing harassment and detention. It should be mentioned that the displaced Rohingya’s freedom of movement is restricted, so they are not able to seek jobs or move around the country. The absence of formal livelihood opportunities contributes to the Rohingya remaining financially vulnerable. However, there are some differences between Thailand and Malaysia. “Malaysia serves as an intermediate destination for refugees—the country of first-asylum—with the understanding that refugees will eventually be resettled to other countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States” (Alhadjri, 2020). The third country refugee resettlement12 programme of Malaysia has been halted due to various political reasons. Thailand, on the other hand, is not a popular destination for the Rohingya. In most cases, they are trafficked, or they use Thailand as a transit route to Malaysia. In addition, due to religious and cultural differences, Thailand is a less favourable place for the Rohingya Muslims. It acts as one of the major differentiators between the Rohingya and other displaced ethnic minorities living in Thailand. Thailand and Malaysia have not clarified their policies on refugees or asylum-seekers. Both countries have often changed their respective positions, wavering between welcome sympathy and self-preserving hostility. Basically, both countries tend to adopt ad hoc policies in response to specific circumstances when it comes to their refugees. As member states of the United Nations, Malaysia and Thailand have the responsibility to protect the general norms of human rights for these non-citizens. However, in reality, the Rohingya are frequently denied their rights in both countries. In addition, even though under customary international law Malaysia and Thailand cannot reject asylum-seekers at the border and send them back, unfortunately, customary international law is non-binding and as such difficult to enforce. The crimes and atrocities by the Myanmar government towards the Rohingya have by now been acknowledged by major international actors as well as the host nations. As they fail to hold Myanmar accountable, some continue to sustain the vicious cycle of persecution with their restrictive laws. Despite that, Thailand and Malaysia have continued to support the Rohingya community within their capacities despite lacking any official or legal mandate to do so. However, it is also evident that the Rohingya still face accusations

A Right to Exist  69 of being a burden and a threat to peace and stability in both countries. They are denied access to essential services, which in turn perpetuates their existence as societal pariahs, exploited and discriminated against and mislabelled as “migrant workers.” The Rohingya should not have to struggle to fight alone for their right to exist. Host nations and international bodies need to be speaking up for the Rohingya community and hold Myanmar accountable for genocide and the forceful displacement of Rohingya. Notes 1 The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees is a non-binding agreement which was adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Latin America, Mexico and Panama, held at Cartagena, Colombia from 19 to 22 November 1984. 2 Human Rights Watch (2021) Rohingya Crisis, Human Rights Watch (2017b) Burma: Security Forces Raped Rohingya Women, Girls, Human Rights Watch (2017a) Burma: New Satellite Images Confirm Mass Destruction, Amnesty International (2017), Who are the Rohingya and why are they fleeing Myanmar? Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (2016) Maritime Movements of the Rohingya and Recommendations to Improve Human Rights Protection for Rohingya Refugees, Allard K. Lowenstein (2015) Persecution of the Rohingya Muslims: Is Genocide Occurring in Myanmar’s Rakhine State? A legal Analysis. 3 Interview with Malaysian lawyer and human rights organisation CENTHRA’s CEO Azril Mohammad Amin, September 2020 in Putrajaya. 4 Interview with anonymous Rohingya refugee leaders, April 2019 in Selangor. 5 IMM13 documents would allow Rohingya refugees to stay in the country. This is a kind of a permit that allows them to work and receive health or education services for a period of one year. 6 Telephone conversation with Sayed Hamid Albar, former Foreign Minister in Malaysia, November 2020. 7 Interview with Secretary General of the International Federation for Human Rights and Coordinator ALTSEAN-Burma, Debbie Stothard, March 2019 in Bangkok. 8 Email conversation with Haji Ismail, President, Rohingya Peace Network in Thailand, July 2019 and September 2022. 9 From the military point of view, “operation clearance” means an operation designed to clear or neutralise all mines and obstacles from a route or area. In Rakhine State, the Myanmar military and other law enforcers carried out the “operation clearance” from October 2016 to 2017. During the operation, the world was horrified by the images of hundreds and thousands of innocent Rohingya men, women, and children fleeing mass atrocities. The United Nations’ Human Rights Council (HRC)-mandated Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) on Myanmar concluded that the operations had “genocidal intent.” Both the Myanmar government and military have denied the accusations. 10 Informal conversation with displaced Rohingya community in Thailand, April 2019 in Tak province and 2018 in Lamphun province. 11 There were estimated two to three million migrant workers in Thailand, most of whom were illegal trans-border labourers from Myanmar. Prominent English daily Bangkok Post and the Nation several times published reports that Thai Police arrested traffickers and trafficked persons from Myanmar at border town Mae Sot in Tak province. It is noted that many Rohingya people have also been living in Mae Sot since the late 1970s. The author, Dr Md Mahbubul Haque con-

70  Md. Mahbubul Haque and Sk Tawfique M Haque ducted two round field visits in border town Mae Sot. During that time, he had long conversation with different ethnic communities from Myanmar including Rohingya Muslims. It should be mentioned that many in the Rohingya community in Thailand were afraid of talking about their matters because of their legal status in Thailand. During the informal conversations, a few of them boldly support the ARSA. They believe that Rohingya have no choice but to start arms struggle against the Buddhist regime in Myanmar, especially after the 2012 communal riot. Some Rohingya and other ethnic Myanmar communities argue that cross-border movements at Mae Sot are relatively stress-free. For that reason, most of the Myanmar people favour the Mae Sot-Myawaddy border corridor. Few Rohingya based in Tak province worked as middlemen for trafficking in Thailand. In addition, it was not possible to interview any women members of Rohingya families. 12 Many refugees cannot go home because of continued conflict, wars, and persecution. Many also live in perilous situations or have specific needs that cannot be addressed in the country where they have sought protection. In such circumstances, UNHCR helps resettle refugees to a third country. Resettlement is the transfer of refugees from an asylum country to another State that has agreed to admit them and ultimately grant them permanent residence.

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72  Md. Mahbubul Haque and Sk Tawfique M Haque report​/2020​/10​/08​/open​-prison​-without​-end​/myanmars​-mass​-detention​-rohingya​ -rakhine​-state> Human Rights Watch. (2020b). Thailand: Let UN Refugee Agency Screen Rohingya End Inhumane Indefinite Detention of Asylum Seekers. Retrieved from https://www​.hrw​.org​/news​/2020​/05​/21​/thailand​-let​-un​-refugee​-agency​ -screen​-rohingya> Latiff, R. (2020). Malaysia Can’t Take Any More Rohingya Refugees, PM Says. Retrieved from https://www​.reuters​.com​/article​/us​-myanmar​-rohingya​-malaysia​ -idUSKBN23X19Y> Letchamanana, H. (2013). Myanmar’s Rohingya refugees in Malaysia: Education and the way forward. Journal of International and Comparative Education, 2(2), 86–97. Retrieved from https://doi​.org​/10​.14425​/00​.50​.24 Madsen, A. G. (2001). The Land Beyond. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher. Minter, A. (2020). Coronavirus Is Bringing Out the Worst in Malaysians. Retrieved from https://www​.bloomberg​.com​/opinion​/articles​/2020​-05​-15​/coronavirus​-is​ -bringing​-out​-the​-worst​-in​-malaysians> OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights). (2020). COVID-19 Does Not Discriminate; Nor Should Our Response. Retrieved from https://www​.ohchr​.org​/en​/NewsEvents​/Pages​/DisplayNews​.aspx​?NewsID​ =25730​&LangID=E> OAU (Organisation of African Unity). (1969). OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa. Retrieved from https://www​.unhcr​ .org​/about​-us​/background​/45dc1a682​/oau​-convention​-governing​-specific​-aspects​ -refugee​-problems​-africa​-adopted​.html> Ostrand, N. (2021). The Stateless Rohingya in Thailand. Retrieved from https:// cmsny​.org​/the​-stateless​-rohingya​-in​-thailand/> Pappusamy, I. (2014). Migrant workers contribution towards the Malaysian economic transformation. Paper presented at the Asian Conference on Globalization and Labor Administration: Cross-Border Labor Mobility, Social Security and Regional Integration, November 19–21, 2014, Manila, Philippines. Price, M. E. (2009). Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose and Limits. Cambridge: Cambridge University. Radu, A. (2016). Rohingya Children in Malaysia, An Undocumented Life. Aljazeera​ .co​m; Al Jazeera. Retrieved from https://www​.aljazeera​.com​/gallery​/2016​/6​/20​/ Rohingya​-children​-in​-malaysia​-an​-undocumented​-life Reuters. (2020). Dozens of Rohingya Muslims Found on Malaysian Beach, Officials Say. Retrieved from https://www​.reuters​.com​/article​/us​-myanmar​-rohingya​ -malaysia​/dozens​-of​-rohingya​-muslims​-found​-on​-malaysian​-beach​-officials​-say​ -idUSKCN1QI4S3”> Sanmartin, E. D. (2017). Rohingya Refugee Beats the Odds to Get Schooling in Malaysia. Retrieved from https://www​.unhcr​.org​/en​-my​/news​/stories​/2017​/6​ /593aaa3f4​/rohingya​-refugee​-beats​-odds​-schooling​-malaysia​.html. Sukhani, P. (2020). The Shifting Politics of Rohingya Refugees in Malaysia. Retrieved from https://thediplomat​.com​/2020​/07​/the​-shifting​-politics​-of​-rohingya​-refugees​ -in​-malaysia/ Supriadi, I., & Benedict, J. (2018). Human Rights at Risk for ASEAN Citizens. Retrieved from https://www​.thejakartapost​.com​/academia​/2018​/04​/26​/human​ -rights​-at​-risk​-for​-asean​-citizens​.html>

A Right to Exist  73 The Star. (2020). Find Moral Courage, Political Will to do What’s Right, Muhyiddin Tells UN. Retrieved from https://www​.thestar​.com​.my​/news​/nation​/2020​/09​/26​/ find​-moral​-courage​-political​-will​-to​-what039s​-right​-muhyiddin​-tells​-un> Towle, R. (2017). Challenges and way forward in handling Rohingya refugees in Malaysia. Presented at International Conference on Rohingya 2017, Marriot Hotel, Putrajaya, Malaysia, 14-16 March 2017. UCA News. (2020). Thai Authorities Detain Illegal Myanmar Migrant Workers. Retrieved from https://www​.ucanews​.com​/news​/thai​-authorities​-detain​-illegal​ -myanmar​-migrant​-workers​/89336#> UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (1984). Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. Retrieved from: https://www​.unhcr​.org​/en​-my​/about​ -us​/background​/45dc19084​/cartagena​-declaration​-refugees​-adopted​-colloquium​ -international​-protection​.html> UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2011). Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Retrieved from UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2019). Setting Up: Refugee Education in Crisis. Retrieved from https://www​.unhcr​.org​/steppingup​/ wp​-content​/uploads​/sites​/76​/2019​/09​/Education​-Report​-2019​-Final​-web​-9​.pdf> UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2020a). Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Retrieved from UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2020b). Figures at a Glance in Malaysia. Retrieved from https://www​.unhcr​.org​/en​-my​/figures​-at​-a​ -glance​-in​-malaysia​.html> UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2020c). Four Decades and Counting: An Urgent Need to Rekindle Hope for Millions of Afghan Refugees. Retrieved from https://www​.unhcr​.org​/en​-my​/news​/briefing​/2020​/2​/5e4272d64​/ four​-decades​-counting​-urgent​-need​-rekindle​-hope​-millions​-afghan​-refugees​.html> UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2020d). Refugees in Thailand. Retrieved from https://www​.unhcr​.org​/th​/en> UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2020e). Rohingya Emergency. Retrieved from UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2020f). Rohingya Refugee Crisis. Retrieved from UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2021). UNHCR in Thailand. Retrieved from https://www​.unhcr​.org​/th​/en​/unhcr​-in​-thailand> UNICEF. (1989). The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Retrieved from https://www​.unicef​.org​.uk​/what​-we​-do​/un​-convention​-child​-rights/> Xinhua News. (2020). Thailand Warns Migrant Workers to Renew Work Permits or Face Deportation. Retrieved from https://www​.thestar​.com​.my​/aseanplus​/ aseanplus​-news​/2020​/10​/10​/thailand​-warns​-migrant​-workers​-to​-renew​-work​ -permits​-or​-face​-deportation>

Part II

Humanitarian Issues and Uncertainties



5

Living in Uncertainty Vulnerable Rohingya in Bangladesh Bulbul Siddiqi, Palash Kamruzzaman, and Mohammad Ehsan Kabir

Introduction It was a sunny and humid day in late October 2018 when one of the authors reached a Rohingya camp located in Ukhiya, Cox’s Bazar, in Bangladesh. Most of the camp was built in a hilly area. The area lost most of its green zone, for the entire area was covered by thousands of small houses built for the displaced Rohingya by various national and international organizations. At the camp entrance, a group of people queued up to receive cooked food provided by an international organization. Some men and women were sitting idly on the roadside. Most of them looked tired, pale, and anxious about their uncertain future as a result of fleeing to Bangladesh because of inhuman torture in Myanmar. Many of them left behind their valuables to save their lives, while fleeing to this part of Bangladesh. The Rohingya influx in Bangladesh is not a new phenomenon; instead, it has an extended historical context (Karim, 2016; Uddin, 2017). However, the Rohingya influx in 2017 in Bangladesh occurred because of the brutal persecution of the Rohingya, termed as the ‘textbook example of ethnic cleansing’.1 The forced displacement put the lives of nearly one million Rohingya in a vulnerable situation. Although the Rohingya managed to survive the atrocities of Myanmar by taking refuge in Bangladesh, living in the makeshift camps in Cox’s Bazar with limited facilities failed to ensure a dignified life for them. The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) did not recognize the Rohingya as refugees; instead, it termed them as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN)2. Despite several initiatives, the repatriation has not started yet since the last Rohingya influx in 2017 in Bangladesh. Although the GoB and various NGOs have been working to improve Rohingya’s lives in the camps, many such supports only fulfil some of their basic needs. It is estimated that about 130 national and international agencies have been working in these camps to support Bangladesh to deal with the Rohingya crisis since the initial days of the influx (Khan, 2018). These humanitarian organizations provide them with facilities to meet their daily needs, including food, shelter, and medication, both for mental and physical well-being. Many dedicated spaces have been created for different age groups of the Rohingya, for example, child-friendly space, play zone for children, DOI: 10.4324/9781003228707-7

78  Bulbul Siddiqi, Palash Kamruzzaman, and Mohammad Ehsan Kabir elder-friendly space, women-friendly space, and skills training centre. Many other services are available for the Rohingya in camps, such as Islamic education centres (madrasas), praying spaces (mosques), community radios, medical camps, outpatient therapeutic programmes, centres for acutely malnourished children, safe drinking water plants, and community kitchens with gas cylinders. Despite such coordinated interventions in the makeshift Rohingya camps, the vulnerabilities of the Rohingya still exist as repatriation and alternative sustainable solutions are non-existent. Based on qualitative research, this chapter investigates the vulnerabilities of the Rohingya, who await repatriation with a consuming sense of uncertainty. The chapter also evinces that there has been a serious concern about a generation growing without a cultural root and a sense of identity. Background It is estimated that 68.5 million people had been uprooted from their homes worldwide at the end of 2017 and 101.1 million by the middle of 2022.3 The displaced Rohingya are among the recent additions to the global refugee crisis. More than half a million Rohingya entered Cox’s Bazar in the year 2017. The Rohingya crisis started in the late 1970s, and the Rohingya have continued to flee to Bangladesh already for several decades. In the past, Bangladesh successfully repatriated some of the Rohingya to Myanmar during 1991– 1992 (Karim, 2016). However, a smaller number stayed in two registered camps4: Kutupalong and Nayapara. A good number (i.e., about 200,000) has immersed into the Bengali population in various places in Cox’s Bazar district and many parts of the country (Ahmed, 2019). The Rohingya community was not only forcibly displaced, but also suffered rape, inter-ethnic violence, and extrajudicial killing before fleeing to Bangladesh (Beyrer & Kamarulzaman, 2017; Prasse-Freeman, 2017; Hossain et al., 2018). The risk of human trafficking (including child trafficking) is also a growing concern (Rahman, 2010; Mahmood et al., 2017) in the Rohingya settlements in Cox’s Bazar, already a trafficking-prone area. Human trafficking gangs have been luring the Rohingya women into the sex trade. Gender-based violence (Hossain et al., 2018; Akhter & Kusakabe, 2014) and various health problems (Mahmood et al., 2017; Milton et al., 2017) are also increasing among the Rohingya community. A recent study on the Rohingya shows that reproductive health services are generally inaccessible to women because of the gender norms among the Rohingya (Ainul et al., 2018). The safety of women and children in the camps are the two most concerning areas (Goodman & Mahmood, 2019; Zinia, 2018) that require urgent attention. Because of their existing cultural norms and religious beliefs, the practice of child marriage among the Rohingya was already there. However, the mass displacement of the Rohingya has been exacerbating the increased nature of child marriage in the camps (Melnikas et al., 2020). The Rohingya women do not want to report their experience of rape, gender-based violence, and

Living in Uncertainty  79 domestic violence in the camps with others because of social stigma and the idea of ‘shame’, associated with their perception of dignity (Oxfam, 2018). Melnikas et al. (2020) also argue that the Rohingya enjoy less strict rules in marrying off their young children with others in the camps. It also puts children’s lives in a more vulnerable situation than ever, both from health and gender perspectives. The crisis has been affecting the well-being of both the refugees and the host community (Hossain et al., 2018 and Milton et al., 2017). Without an informed resolution to the problem, various short-term strategies have been creating debate on managing donor aid, which is claimed to be consumed significantly by the increased staff of various organizations (The Daily Star, 2019). In a recent press conference, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, mentioned that ‘we took steps for their [Rohingya people] repatriation. However, a section of the Rohingya launched a movement against their return. Who instigated them? International volunteers do not want the repatriation’.5 The statement implies that there has been a growing concern among the GoB on the roles of many development organizations (both national and international) working on the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh. However, we also need to consider that repatriation of the Rohingya refugees and their safety after returning to their homeland is not solely dependent on the role of various national and international NGOs. Furthermore, the GoB has started shifting the Rohingya population to a remote Island called Bhashan Char (Islam et al., 2022) as the repatriation has not been started yet, which is contested by many international stakeholders. Besides, the UN’s weak and indecisive role in taking a pragmatic measure for their dignified repatriation (Khan & Ahmed, 2019) has been making the process of Rohingya repatriation uncertain. The growing nature of the tension between the Rohingya and the host community is also creating further vulnerability among the Rohingya (Siddiqi, 2022b; Ahmed & Mohiuddin, 2020). Besides, it was evident that many Rohingya were also engaged in violent conflict among themselves.6 The host community in Cox’s Bazar was very sympathetic about giving shelter to the extremely vulnerable Rohingya during the influx. However, the sentiment of the host community gradually dwindled. Because of the price hikes and lower wages in the Rohingya camps’ neighbouring areas, the host community has started to face various difficulties as the cost of living has risen (Sattar, 2019). This is one of the factors responsible for creating tension between the host and the Rohingya, although the host communities sympathized with the Rohingya at the beginning of the 2017 influx in Bangladesh. A recent study, however, suggests a decline in social cohesion between the host and the Rohingya and empathy for the Rohingya among the host community (Olney et al., 2019). Finally, inadequate facilities in the camps and uncertain life have created frustration among the Rohingya. Therefore, inadequate facilities and uncertainty for a sustainable solution to the problem in many cases force them to

80  Bulbul Siddiqi, Palash Kamruzzaman, and Mohammad Ehsan Kabir choose alternative strategies for their survival. Under such a complex circumstance, the chapter elaborates on the key challenges that the Rohingya have been encountering ever since they arrived in Bangladesh. Methods The chapter was formulated by applying a qualitative research method. The key tools used here were In-depth Interviews (IDIs), Informal Discussions, and Observations in the Rohingya camps. Several field visits were carried out from 2018 to 2022 (i.e., October 2018, March 2019, April 2019, January 2020, and July 2022) to understand the complex nature of this crisis. Institutional Review Board at NSU approved the research protocol. Informed consent was taken before taking any interview and all other ethical protocols were followed. Because of the enormous vulnerability of the Rohingya, it was noticed initially that they were hesitant to discuss their problems. We found them apparently nervous, particularly while discussing the tendency to unsafe migration from the camps and other gender-related issues. The language barrier was also a major issue while discussing with them. Although the dialect the Rohingya speak is very close to the Chittagonian dialect, it was very difficult—but not impossible—for the authors to understand their dialect as we developed confidence while working with them for an extended period. However, sometimes, it was hard to continue with the discussion. Therefore, we also had to rely on local research assistants for a better understanding in many cases. Sometimes, we found some Rohingya, who would understand Bengali (for example, Rohingya teachers who teach the Burmese language at various learning centres in camps) and we could communicate with them effectively. We also found enthusiastic volunteers, generally known as majhi,7 who helped us understand the conversation clearly. We found from our subsequent field visits that we could understand their conversations without any translators. Apart from speaking with the Rohingya, we interviewed Law Enforcing Agencies (i.e., Police and Border Guard Bangladesh), humanitarian actors based in Cox’s Bazar (national and international), and volunteers. Living an Uncertain Life Many Rohingya have been living in Bangladesh for the last four decades anticipating their repatriation. However, their hope has remained a dream as the repatriation has not turned into a reality. The future of the repatriation of the Rohingya, living in the registered camps has been uncertain because of the recent influx of the Rohingya. Several initiatives of the GoB to repatriate the Rohingya in Myanmar failed on several occasions. Such failures have created frustration among the Rohingya living with limited space and facilities without other basic requirements. Besides, there is a fear that raising a generation in the camps for a prolonged period may cause a further loss of their identity as the next generation may not get appropriate socialization

Living in Uncertainty  81 opportunities in their own culture and society. Limited or no chance to work and the risk of unsafe migration complicate their lives with an uncertain future. Furthermore, the risk of human and sex trafficking (including child trafficking) is also very high in the camps in Cox’s Bazar, already a trafficking-prone area besides being the source district for trafficking victims. The following section will elaborate on these problems further based on the findings of the research. Uncertain Future: A Generation Detached from Cultural Root

While visiting the camps during the fieldwork in April 2019, an elderly Rohingya man, who was also working as a volunteer to help his community, mentioned that they were eagerly waiting to return home if the government ensured the safety, security, and the right to their citizenship in Myanmar. Despite uncertainties in the camp, he was amazed by the hospitality of the host community in Bangladesh, which helped him adapt to the new environment. However, knowing the experiences of the Rohingya who had been living in Bangladesh for the last 30–40 years, many of these newcomers have lost confidence to be repatriated shortly. This stagnant situation entices many to initiate informal ‘migration’ to a third country. The concept of home is very complicated for the Rohingya because of the denial of citizenship in Myanmar, which caused their displacement. They desire to return to Myanmar only when they would be recognized as citizens. In this context, a middle-aged man mentioned, Who wants to live a life as stateless? I also want to go back to my country, but I will not be able to return to the current situation. We need to have the safety and security of our lives. A middle-aged Rohingya man and a majhi [The interview was taken on 6 April 2019 at a registered camp located at Shamlapur at Cox’s Bazar] This majhi has been living in Bangladesh for 35 years, and he still desires to go back to his country. He, along with the rest of the Rohingya in the camps, has been surviving in Bangladesh as refugee. They are displaced and dispossessed to grapple with various difficulties. Among various limitations, education for the children is a critical concern, as many Rohingya reported. The children in the Rohingya camps do not have access to formal education. Instead, many learning centres were established by the GoB and other international organizations to provide non-formal education for the children. Nonformal education cannot be an alternative to formal education. Thus, many parents do not feel motivated to send their children to these learning centres. We found during our fieldwork that many learning centres have remained empty and unused. Besides, as it is unknown how long the Rohingya will stay in such a situation, only non-formal education will not bring positive changes

82  Bulbul Siddiqi, Palash Kamruzzaman, and Mohammad Ehsan Kabir for many children in the camps. Thus, children and their parents do not envision any scope for future achievements and directions. Education is one of the priorities of the Rohingya crisis management. The Government of Bangladesh and other stakeholders initially deemed that many would be returning to their country at some point in time, which accounted for the temporary arrangement of education for Rohingya children. However, learning centres struggle with a lack of qualified teachers and resources. A young Rohingya teacher who teaches the Burmese language at a learning centre mentioned, I teach the Burmese language at the school. There is a shortage of human resources almost in every camp. Therefore, low qualified teachers who do not know this language are running the schools [learning centre]. Thus, children are not learning very well. A young Burmese teacher, Rohingya camp, Leda [The interview was taken on 5 April 2019 in a camp located at Leda at Cox’s Bazar] Such a situation implies that a generation of Rohingya children are in danger of leaving their language and culture behind if they are required to stay at the camps in Bangladesh for a prolonged period. They are more exposed to Bangladeshi culture and language than to their own culture and language. These children live in a limbo and between two cultures, where they are neither learning Bengali nor Burmese properly. Linguistic skill is a considerable area of worry for them, as they do not have many experienced teachers of the Burmese language who could help the children to learn Burmese. Language is more than just a verbal way of communication, as it is also a vehicle of orientation towards one’s society and culture. After moving around many camps, we found many Rohingya adults who think that their children do not learn effectively from the learning centres. Many Rohingya guardians complained that teachers did not teach them well at the learning centres, and children did not feel obligated to learn from them. They also added that children went to learning centres for food provided by these centres and play or spend time with their friends given that schools or learning centres have better spaces for children to play than the spaces allocated for their families. It means that they gradually lose interest in education despite the Rohingya parents and many national and international agencies have been trying to provide them with at least some primary education. Apart from education, our research findings demonstrate that living conditions in the camps prevent the Rohingya from practising their cultural norms or expressing them widely. In other words, it is challenging for the Rohingya to get used to living in small rooms within the congested camps with tiny spaces for cooking and other facilities. In Myanmar, Rohingya women traditionally maintained seclusion, while their houses used to be covered with fences to protect their privacy from being seen by unrelated

Living in Uncertainty  83 males or strangers. Women usually socialized in the front yard of their homes (within the fence) with relatives, neighbours, and friends. In contrast, the existing dwelling shelters (with no wall and space for the yard) in camps offer women no scope to stay out of their houses. During the field visits, almost no Rohingya women were seen in open places, including streets, shops, tea stalls, or in markets, seemingly all occupied by men. However, continuous living in a confined shelter (house) restricts both adolescent girls and women from proper socialization. The Dilemma with Working Opportunities

Most of the Rohingya males intend to work for waged income in the camps, as we observed in this study. They need cash to maintain an economically viable life with their families. During the early days of the 2017–2018 influx, they mainly focused on saving their lives with basic foods provided by humanitarian organizations and by the local host population. But a dignified life requires something more than day-to-day essential food support and healthcare services provided across the camps. Many of them are now in need of paid employment. Some men can find casual work as day labourers to build new shelters or infrastructures within the camp area. However, such waged employments are not seen regularly. Many Rohingya have managed to work with the NGO offices in various camps with their basic literacy skills; examples include working as night guards (for men) and community health workers (for women). However, the number of vacancies is low compared to many unemployed Rohingya candidates. Some Rohingya, especially those with leadership skills, were selected to help the camp management authority distribute relief goods and to ensure discipline within the community. After talking to the majhis, it was discovered that in return they received some extra relief goods compared to other Rohingya in the camps. Since there is no cash reward provision, some of them discontinued working as majhis because working as a day labourer somewhere instead can bring higher rewards, especially when cash seems vital for survival. One former majhi explained his views in this context that I was a majhi once, but I left the role. I do not work as a majhi anymore. I did not find any financial benefit in carrying out this task. Thus, I lost my motivation for serving as majhi in camps. A Majhi does not get much economic benefit. Generally, they get some extra food as an incentive, which I find very little for me. Therefore, I decided not to work with the camp authority as majhi. A middle-aged Rohingya man [The interview was taken on 5 April 2019 in a camp located at Leda at Cox’s Bazar] Although he explained his views regarding working in camps as majhi, he preferred not to disclose any information (e.g., type of work or location of

84  Bulbul Siddiqi, Palash Kamruzzaman, and Mohammad Ehsan Kabir work) about his waged work. One of the reasons for hiding such information is that working for wage income is banned in the Rohingya camps, with few exceptions, as discussed above. However, it was noted that many Rohingya were actively looking for job opportunities outside the camps to earn extra cash. As a Rohingya man mentioned, Some Rohingya men work in these camps as day labourers. They do not have a regular job. The wage rate for them is not fixed by the various NGOs [who employ them as day labourers]. Therefore, many people go to nearby villages to work with fishermen in fishing boats. Some work as construction workers, and some as carpenters. People can earn from 50–400 BDT every day depending on their negotiation with the job providers. 36 years old Rohingya man [The interview was taken on 6 April 2019 at a registered camp located at Shamlapur at Cox’s Bazar] Like this Rohingya man, many others secretly go outside the camps and put serious efforts to find a job. In such cases, they rely on the social network with other Rohingya and the host population. Moreover, the Rohingya dialect and Cox’s Bazar dialect are apparently alike. Hence, most of the study respondents did not face any major problem working outside the camps. They find more waged income outside the camps than within the camp areas. While talking to a group of young Rohingya men in a camp, we realized that sometimes the police arrested them from their outside workplace and sent them back to their respective camps if caught working ‘illegally’. The Rohingya living in the camps closer to the host community in Cox’s Bazar usually have a much higher chance of finding informal waged employment. This is particularly the case for the camps located in Leda and Shamlapur, which are closer to the host community. For example, the Rohingya living in Camp 23, situated in Shamlapur, are leasing smaller plots of land from the local landowners for farming. A Rohingya man reported that they are usually required to pay about 10,000 BDT to rent a piece of land (i.e., smaller than one katha. In Bangladesh, one katha is equal to 67 square metres) for a cropping season. He reported that he cultivated some peanuts in that land. Another male living in this camp for about the last 35 years now had adopted a boatman’s profession in the nearby river. However, finding jobs to continue working in Bangladesh has never been easy for the Rohingya. Lacking a regular income, many Rohingya struggle to find casual work for their survival. Moreover, wage discrimination is a commonly experienced occurrence in the local labour market, where the Rohingya workers are forced to accept a lower wage than those from the host population. In brief, the daily living of the Rohingya is constrained in either way—while not working, stop fulfilment of basic necessities; on the other hand, illegal employment exposes them to manipulation and wage discrimination. The Rohingya intend to live

Living in Uncertainty  85 a dignified life and improve their livelihoods, as reported during the fieldwork of this study. Nevertheless, some NGOs are now conducting different skill-training programmes for male and female Rohingya living in the camps. We found that the most common types of such training were tailoring, block and batik, mobile phone servicing, producing sanitary napkins from leftover clothing for women, and homestead gardening to fulfil the household’s nutritional needs. In this context, an NGO professional mentioned that Many NGOs have been working to improve the living standard of the Rohingya. Therefore, many of them introduced training for the Rohingya to work inside the camps and earn some money. This is mainly a campbased training program run by different national NGOs funded mainly by international NGOs or donors. Some NGOs have already created display centers to sell goods produced by the Rohingya. The earning and profit go back to these people. The entire idea of having such display centers is to promote and sell goods among themselves. A mid-level NGO worker, Cox’s Bazar [The interview was taken on 25 October 2018 Cox’s Bazar] Although this type of income-generating procedure is increasing, this is not adequate to meet the needs of the vast population living in camps. For many, not having the opportunity to work and lack of a dignified life in camps create frustration and desire to opt for various means of unsafe migration with a hope for a better life. Journey towards Uncertainty

Our findings demonstrate that many Rohingya families have relatives living in different Asian countries, including Malaysia, Pakistan, and several Middle Eastern countries. Many of these expatriates maintain regular communication with their relatives staying in the camps. Many of them also send money to their relatives by using various electronic payment systems. For instance, an elderly Rohingya male who has been living in Bangladesh for more than 30 years now mentioned that one of his sons-in-law regularly sends money from Malaysia to support his family. These expatriates bring a demonstration effect and thereby motivate many young Rohingya living in various camps to attempt illegal or unsafe migration to go abroad. Those who desire to migrate often end up as a classic case of human trafficking, when deaths during such precarious journeys are also common. The following paragraphs describe how human traffickers lure the Rohingya, including married women, to go abroad, making them victims of human trafficking. We found that male family members living (either legally or illegally) abroad call their partners or wives to migrate to join them in countries like

86  Bulbul Siddiqi, Palash Kamruzzaman, and Mohammad Ehsan Kabir Malaysia, described as a ‘safe destination’ for a ‘better future’ for many Rohingya in the camps. In response, with the help of their family members or relatives, many women try to contact local dalals (brokers who fix the travel arrangements for cash) connected with internationally organized groups of human traffickers. In many cases, women blindly follow the instructions of dalals and their male counterparts abroad without having any proper understanding of the risks of the journey they tend to embark upon. Women who start a journey towards uncertainty hoping to reunite with their beloved family members in many ways put their lives into serious jeopardy. It was found that many women with young children initiate journeys for a better future to join their husbands living in other countries. During our fieldwork in April 2019, a group of Rohingya were seen rescued at a local police station while we were interviewing a police officer in Shamlapur of Cox’s Bazar. A group of 150 Rohingya were rescued from Shamlapur (near the Marine Drive towards Tekhnaf) by local police with the help of BGB (Border Guard of Bangladesh). Most of them were women. The interviewee police officer revealed that this group aimed to go to Malaysia. As he mentioned Although none of them disclosed at the police station that they were going to travel to Malaysia, I know from the long experience of working in the areas that they were indeed travelling towards Malaysia. There is no logic that they would be travelling during the night without permission to see their relatives, as the captured Rohingya repeatedly uttered in custody. The traffickers also train them very well not to disclose anything to the police or others. They entirely keep everything hidden as they were instructed. An officer at the police station [The interview was taken on 6 April 2019 at the police station located at Shamlapur at Cox’s Bazar] A similar explanation came from an officer of the BGB in a security check post in Shamlapur. According to him, ‘this is the usual way or strategy that these people deliberately decide not to open up to the police and other law enforcing agencies. Given that they are not being charged with any criminal offence as they are from ‘refugee’ camps, many Rohingya tried several times to escape the camps’. Both the BGB and police representatives reported that there must have been a strong presence of dalals and pimps in the camps who secretly contacted potential candidates willing to travel abroad. The most frequently reported desired destination is Malaysia, as they confirmed it. However, our study also discovered that many pimps and dalals were very active since the beginning of the Rohingya influx in 2017. As the human traffickers adopt a cunning strategy, they do not disclose their identity to the Rohingya while engaging them in any unsafe migration procedure. Moreover, relatives who fled from Myanmar to abroad before the 2017 influx are now willing to help their family member(s) in Cox’s Bazar. One way to help them

Living in Uncertainty  87 is to facilitate/support an overseas journey. They help family members financially. Many unfortunate women became victims of the sex trade during the initial months of the mass Rohingya influx in Bangladesh. A humanitarian actor mentioned, It [trafficking] started right after the influx when people were more vulnerable than they currently are. The camps were also not very organised in the beginning. The massive human trafficking, particularly in sex trafficking, took place during the initial phase. Human traffickers always look for an opportunity like this. A middle-aged humanitarian actor [The interview was taken on 25 October 2018 Cox’s Bazar] Most adult Rohingya were seen using mobile phones, whereas many of them have multiple handsets classed as smartphones. We also noticed that they used different android-based communication applications like ‘Imo’ and ‘WhatsApp’ frequently to stay in touch with their relatives, friends, and other people in other countries. They also use these android-based applications to keep them updated about the current situations in Myanmar as online videos and news are easily accessible from mobile. We found it challenging to find the Rohingya to interview to start a conversation on unsafe migration attempts. They were frightened to discuss the trafficking network. Besides, many of them consider such migration as an opportunity to start a new life in other countries. Many humanitarian actors also did not want to disclose the migration tendency of the Rohingya because of the sensitivity of the problem. Discussion The situation of the Rohingya in Bangladesh, who came in 2017, is different from many other refugee communities worldwide as they are not officially recognized as refugees. Such a status restricts the Rohingya to avail themselves of many basic needs in Bangladesh. Formal education for the Rohingya is one such concerning area. Without proper education, the Rohingya children in the Bangladeshi camps are at risk of becoming a lost generation, i.e., becoming disoriented and directionless. However, all the camps have facilities of non-formal education for Rohingya children. About one-third of Rohingya children who fled the 2017 persecution in Myanmar were able to access temporary learning centres in Cox’s Bazar (Aljazeera, 30 January 2020). Low quality of education without any future direction and solid content would not help them enter the next stages. Under such a context, the GoB has recently declared to allow schooling and skills training opportunities for the Rohingya children of a certain age in Cox’s Bazar.8 The UNICEF has recently announced establishing schools for 10,000 students on a pilot basis (Reidy, 2020). Besides ensuring education facilities for the Rohingya, it is essential to continue with the psycho-social services to help manage the

88  Bulbul Siddiqi, Palash Kamruzzaman, and Mohammad Ehsan Kabir horrific traumas, psychological distress, and experiences these children experienced during the atrocities in 2017 in Myanmar. A stable social environment is essential for children to learn about their heritage and other intangible elements of culture. It is difficult for the children in camps to learn and retain their traditional cultural aspects as the environment around the camps is entirely different from their home. We have observed opportunities to access some non-formal education and childfriendly spaces in the camps. An equitable social environment ensures more facilities, including healthy family space, neighbourhood, and free movement and interactions of people in a particular society, which are not yet there as the camps are being set up as temporary shelters assuming that the Rohingya would be repatriated soon. However, the process of repatriation has not been started yet and has been uncertain (Siddiqi, 2022a and 2022c March 29). In this context, letting the next generation grow up precariously and hopelessly would be another injustice for this group. Furthermore, this would undoubtedly be an additional burden for Bangladesh. As a developing nation with its own challenges, Bangladesh has been facing severe difficulties to protect the Rohingya (Chowdhury, 2018). The Rohingya consider working opportunity as an essential means of their dignified life that significantly lacks in the camps. The Rohingya find it hard to live without cash as they only receive selected food items (e.g., rice, lentils and oil) from the humanitarian agencies. Along with other reasons, it forces them to look out for wage employment opportunities (mostly informal and prone to exploitation) to add protein to their familial food habits. Very few Rohingya males get the opportunities to work as volunteers or paid workers in the camps employed by some humanitarian agencies, thus getting some financial benefits. Limited opportunities to work in the camps force many Rohingya to work outside the camps with a lower wage without informing the camp authority. Previous studies showed that the lack of income opportunities in camps attracted many Rohingya to travel to neighbouring areas, to find cash employment (Radio Free Asia, 1 November 2017)). However, such a tendency to work outside is creating a negative impact and dissatisfaction among the host communities as the Rohingya work at a lower wage rate compared to the host community. Thus, the Rohingya has the higher demand in the local labour market (Siddiqi, 2022b). Moreover, the working tendencies of many Rohingya harm the local labour market as many local people prefer to hire Rohingya labourers because of their availability at lower wages. Therefore, many day labourers and other workers from the informal labour market in the host community often find it challenging to compete in the local labour market. The increased cost of living resulting from price hikes is also a problem for many people in the host community (Sattar, 2019). Because of the vulnerabilities of the Rohingya, many organized criminal groups in and around the camps victimized the Rohingya. Motivating for an unsafe migration is a widely used approach where many Rohingya

Living in Uncertainty  89 ended up as victims of human trafficking. With the desire to go to Malaysia, Indonesia, and several other Middle Eastern countries, many people choose unsafe migration to become easy prey to human traffickers (Kamruzzaman & Kabir, 2019). The children are at serious risk of human trafficking and other forms of exploitation (Mccaffrie, 2019). Sex trafficking and bonded labours in other parts of the world are other associated risks of dangerous journeys (Karim, 2019). We found that some managed to flee from the camps to other countries, though they did not disclose how they managed legal documents, including the passport required for such journeys. The desperation for unsafe migration of the Rohingya put many of their lives in danger as adopting the marine route is the most common strategy of the Rohingya. Many Rohingya were stuck at sea for an unlimited time, as many countries did not welcome them (Beech, 2020). However, many Rohingya consider migration as an opportunity despite knowing the high risk involved. Overall, the Rohingya have been facing multifaceted problems and issues in the camps, as they cannot live a healthy and normal life. They do not know about their future and the plan for them by the relevant stakeholders. Living such a difficult life has already created frustration and dissatisfaction among the Rohingya, affecting their overall well-being (Hossain et al., 2018; Milton et al., 2017). Repressed frustration and dissatisfaction can sometimes turn into hostilities towards the host communities, creating a less than welcoming environment for the Rohingya. We contend that a supportive environment is critical to their further stay in Bangladesh. Conclusion Forced displacement of the Rohingya from the Rakhine State of Myanmar in Bangladesh put the Rohingya in a vulnerable situation with an uncertain future as there is no sign of repatriation yet. It has already been a few years that this displaced population has been living in the makeshift camps with minimal facilities, depriving them of their human rights and basic living standard in many ways—as observed in our study. It presents some critical risks for their children, where they do not have access to formal education. Although many NGOs have been working to provide some non-formal education for their children, this will not guarantee their children to move forward for formal education. The Rohingya parents are concerned about the low quality of non-formal education for their children as they identify two barriers: first, the content is not helping their children. Second, the quality of many teachers is not up to the mark as they are not well educated and trained. It discourages many children from going to learning centres for nonformal education. Our study finds another concern: the children have been growing up in a hostile and unhealthy environment. A healthy environment, as we know, is a key element of learning social norms and culture to be a competent member of society. It is also accentuated by the inability of the Rohingya parents to help their children in this regard.

90  Bulbul Siddiqi, Palash Kamruzzaman, and Mohammad Ehsan Kabir Furthermore, their present status as the FDMNs as offered by the GoB created barriers for them to working and availing rights in Bangladesh. The direct impact of such policy is having minimal and restricted physical mobility outside the camps and no formal employment opportunities. However, we observed many Rohingya male adults go outside their camps to work without informing the camp in charge. They utilize their social network to find jobs despite restrictions on their physical mobility. Sometimes law enforcement agencies catch the Rohingya from their workplace and bring them back to their respective camps as they do not have the right to work in Bangladesh. The aggravated nature of vulnerability has a pervasive impact on their lives, particularly in their overall well-being. Thus, it has become apparent for them to seek alternative ways to survive and adapt to the present situation. The Rohingya from the Rakhine State of Myanmar have been using the sea route to migrate to Malaysia and other countries illegally for many years. The Rohingya diaspora in Thailand, Malaysia, and many other countries is the direct outcome of seeking a safe and secure life. The Rohingya are endangering their lives to travel in the sea without knowing what awaits them eventually. Although the Rohingya situation in Bangladesh is better than it is in Myanmar, the lack of a long-term and sustainable solution continues to worsen the vulnerabilities and uncertainties in an environment of pessimism without an identity. Notes 1 ‘Myanmar treatment of Rohingya looks like “textbook ethnic cleansing”, says UN’ retrieved from https://www​.theguardian​.com​/world​/2017​/sep​/11​/un​-myanmars​-treatment​-of​-rohingya​-textbook​-example​-of​-ethnic​-cleansing accessed on 11 November 2019 2 The Government of Bangladesh officially decided to call Rohingya people as ‘Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN)’ instead of ‘refugees’. Please see more on the following link. https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/city​/forcibly​-displaced​ -myanmar​-nationals​-1469374 accessed on 20 August 2019 3 ‘Forced Displacement at Record 68.5 Million,’ UNHCR, Available at https://www​ .unhcr​.org​/news​/stories​/2018​/6​/5b222c494​/forced​-displacement​-record​-685​-million​.html. Accessed on 13 December 2018; ‘Global Forced Displacement’ UNHCR, Available at https://www​.unhcr​.org​/globaltrends​.html#:~​:text​=At​%20the​%20end​ %20of​%202021​,rights​%20violations​%20was​%2089​.3​%20million. Accessed on 20 December 2022. 4 The GoB accepted the Rohingya as refugee who entered Bangladesh before 2017 who have been staying in camps that are termed as registered camps. 5 ‘Voluntary organisations don’t want Rohingya repatriation: PM’. Retrieved from https://en​.prothomalo​.com​/bangladesh​/news​/196999​/Voluntary​-organisations​ -don​%E2​%80​%99t​-want​-Rohingya. Accessed on 24 June 2019. 6 ‘16 arrested for clash in Kutupalong Rohingya camp’. Retrieved from https:// www​.dhakatribune​.com​/bangladesh​/nation​/2020​/10​/10​/16​-arrested​-over​-clash​-at​ -kutupalong​-rohingya​-camp. Accessed on 7 December 2020. 7 A majhi generally refers to a ‘community leader’ from the Rohingya camps.

Living in Uncertainty  91 8 ‘Bangladesh grants Rohingya refugee children access to education’. Retrieved from https://www​.theguardian​.com​/global​-development​/2020​/jan​/29​/bangladesh​ -grants​-rohingya​-refugee​-children​-access​-to​-education. Accessed on 6 June 2020; ‘Expanding education for Rohingya refugee children in Bangladesh’. Retrieved from https://www​.unicef​.org​/rosa​/stories​/expanding​-education​-rohingya​-refugee​ -children​-bangladesh. Accessed on 6 June 2020.

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92  Bulbul Siddiqi, Palash Kamruzzaman, and Mohammad Ehsan Kabir .reuters​.com/ artic​le/us​-bang​lades​h-mya​nmar-​traff​i ckin​g/roh​ingya​-refu​gees-​in-ba​ nglad​esh-w​arned​-to-b​e-war​y-wit​h-hum​an-tr​affic​king-​risin​g-idU​SKCN1​VD0XD​ Karim, D. A. (2016). The Rohingya: A Short Account of their History and Culture. Dhaka: Jaitya Sahitya Prakash. Khan, M.T. (2018). The coordination conundrum, in life goes on: As the World watches. Star Weekend, 2 September, 2018. Dhaka: The Daily Star. Khan, M.T. & Ahmed, S. (2019). Dealing with the Rohingya crisis: The relevance of the general assembly and R2P. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 1–23. SAZE https://doi​.org​/10​.1177​/2057891119868312 Mahmood, S. S., Wroe, E., Fuller, A., & Leaning, J. (2017, May 6). The Rohingya people of Myanmar: Health, human rights, and identity. The Lancet. Lancet Publishing Group. https://doi​.org​/10​.1016​/S0140​-6736(16)00646-2 Mccaffrie, C. (2019). Displaced Rohingya children and the risk of human trafficking. Journal of Human Rights and Peace Studies, 5(1), 47–67. https://www​.tci​-thaijo​ .org​/index​.php​/HRPS​/index Melnikas, A. J., Ainul, S., Ehsan, I., Haque, E. & Amin, S. (2020). Child marriage practices among the Rohingya in Bangladesh. Conflict and Health, 14(28), 1–12. https://doi​.org​/10​.1186​/s13031​-020​-00274-0 Milton, A. H., Rahman, M., Hussain, S., Jindal, C., Choudhury, S., Akter, S., … & Efird, J. T. (2017, 21 August). Trapped in statelessness: Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. MDPI AG. https://doi​.org​/10​.3390​/ijerph14080942 Olney, J., Badiuzzamn, M., & Hoque, M. A. (2019). Social Cohesion, Resilience and Peace Building Between Host Population and Rohingya Refugee Community in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. Study Report by BRAC University and UNDP Bangladesh. Retrieved on 6 June, 2020 from https://www​.bracusa​.org​/wp​-content​ /uploads​/2019​/08​/UNDP​-CPJ​_Social​-Cohesion​-Study​_Final​-Report​.pdf Oxfam (2018) One Year On: Time to Put Women and Girls at the Heart of the Rohingya Response. Oxford: Oxfam GB. Prasse-Freeman, E. (2017). The Rohingya crisis. Anthropology Today, 33(6), 1–2. https://doi​.org​/10​.1111​/1467​-8322​.12389 Rahman, U. (2010). The Rohingya refugee: A security dilemma for Bangladesh. Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, 8(2), 233–239. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​ /15562941003792135 Radio Free Asia. (1 November 2017) Bangladesh: Thousands of Rohingya escape refugee camps in search of jobs, available at: https://www​.refworld​.org​/docid​ /5a9427c84​.html [accessed 16 November 2022]. Reidy, K. (2020) Expanding education for Rohingya refugee children in Bangladesh. UNICEF. Retrieved on 6 June 2020 from https://www​.unicef​.org​/rosa​/stories​/ expanding​-education​-rohingya​-refugee​-children​-bangladesh Sattar, Z. (2019). Rohingya crisis and the host community. Retrieved on 6 June, 2020 from https://thefinancialexpress​.com​.bd​/views​/reviews​/rohingya​-crisis​-and​ -the​-host​-community​-1564498784 Siddiqi, B. (2022a). The ‘Myth’ of repatriation: The prolonged sufferings of the Rohingya in Bangladesh. In Uddin, N. (Eds.), The Rohingya Crisis Human Rights Issues, Policy Concerns and Burden Sharing. New Delhi: SAGE. Siddiqi, B. (2022b). Challenges and dilemmas of social cohesion between the Rohingya and host communities in Bangladesh. Frontiers in Human Dynamics., 4, 944601. https://doi​.org​/10​.3389​/fhumd​.2022​.944601

Living in Uncertainty  93 Siddiqi, B. (2022c, March 29). Will Rohingya repatriation ever happen? The Daily Star. https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/views​/opinion​/news​/will​-rohingya​-repatriation​ -ever​-happen​-2992656 The Daily Star (2019, 14 March). Tk 150 crore spent on hotel bills in 6 months. Retrieved on 20 March, 2019 from https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/city​/news​/tk​-150​ -crore​-spent​-hotel​-bills​-6​-months​-1714909 Uddin, N. (2017). Rohingya noy Royangya: Ostitter Sonkote Rastrohin Manush. Dhaka: Mordhunno (In Bengali) [Not Rohingya, but Royangya: Stateless People in the Crisis of Existence]. Zinia, J. (2018). The unmet need of Rohingya refugee children in Bangladesh. International Journal of Scientific Research and Management, 6(5). https://doi​.org​ /10​.18535​/ijsrm​/v6i5​.sh01

6

Division through Registration? Rohingya Refugees in Bangladeshi Camps Ishrat Zakia Sultana

Introduction Bangladesh has hosted the largest number of Rohingya who are the victims of persecution, ethnic cleansing, and genocide in Myanmar. In Bangladesh, they are stateless, but not refugees. While the whole world calls them “refugees,” Bangladesh does not. In general, the Rohingya crisis is a complicated problem, but in the context of Bangladesh, it is even more complicated. The strategies of identifying them as “refugees” or not have made the lives of the Rohingya living in Bangladesh further complex. It is the registration of the Rohingya through which they are identified as “refugees.” The overall ramifications of the Rohingya registration process in Bangladesh are the division of one Rohingya community into two. Perhaps the division was not intended; yet very little literature addresses this issue. While the exodus of the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017 draws global attention, decade-long stratified lives of the Rohingya community in Bangladesh often go unnoticed. What most people notice and discuss is about relief and various forms of humanitarian support for the Rohingya. The difference between the status of the Rohingya—who were registered as refugees and those who were not—however, created an extra layer of discrimination and inequality for the unregistered Rohingya community, which is rarely brought into the discussion. This chapter focuses on the divisions between the two groups of the Rohingya in Bangladesh and the results of such division between them. In Bangladesh, the Rohingya are categorized into two groups: registered and unregistered. There are debates as to what serves as the basis of a small number of Rohingya refugees being granted temporary residence, labeling them “registered,” while a large number of them have remained unregistered. Abrar (1995) demonstrates that immediately after their arrival, the Government of Bangladesh granted them shelter and relief. Since then, they have been known as registered refugees. However, a forced repatriation occurred during 1992–1994. But because of insurmountable violence against the Rohingya in Burma, many of them came back to Bangladesh despite the repatriation. These Rohingya remained unregistered and formed their camps just beside the government-run registered camps in both Ukhia and Teknaf in DOI: 10.4324/9781003228707-8

Division through Registration?  95 Cox’s Bazar district. The registered camps receive support from the government, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and other national and international agencies. The unregistered camps receive nothing and yet manage to survive. The situation, however, has changed since 2016 as the number of Rohingya and their camps, number and scope of service providers in the camps, and modalities of providing services to them have changed. The Rohingya who arrived in—and after 2016—are called “Forcefully Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN),” not refugees. The FDMNs receive support from the Government of Bangladesh and non-government organizations but have failed to achieve refugee status. The previously undocumented Rohingya refugees have been merged with the FDMNs while the registered Rohingya have remained in their previous status as before. Questions may arise: What is the problem if a smaller number of the Rohingya is registered and a larger number is not? In what ways such division may affect the repatriation process? This chapter looks for the answer to these questions. Although both the registered and the FDMNs have been going through vulnerabilities, the differences in the treatment they receive have created stratification between these groups. This chapter attempts to reveal the unexplored stratified lives of the Rohingya and the relationship between the registered and the unregistered Rohingya in Bangladesh. More specifically, it examines the consequences the registration process has brought to the lives of the Rohingya in terms of their basic and other entitlements. The chapter mainly demonstrates how the living conditions, education, health, employment, and other factors of both unregistered and registered Rohingya are affected by the registration process. I argue that registration of a small number of Rohingya as “refugees” has created stratification within the entire Rohingya community in Bangladesh. I also argue that such stratification on the one hand benefits one group—those who have been registered—and deprives the other—who have been unregistered. The chapter is divided into two sections: the history and background of the Rohingya camps in Bangladesh until 2016, and the patterns of inequality and stratification within one community. Before presenting two sections, it is important to know the methodology of data collection. Methodology Both Kutupalong and Nayapara of Ukhia and Teknaf respectively were the locations for this research. I started the data collection in January 2016 and continued until August 2016, which was immediately before the exodus of the Rohingya in October the same year. In this study, I employed a qualitative strategy. I conducted semi-structured individual interviews along with focus group discussions (FGDs) with 19 Rohingya—ten from the registered camps

96  Ishrat Zakia Sultana and nine from the unregistered camps. All participants were between 18- and 60-year-old male and female Rohingya who provided informed consent in order to participate in the research. The research was conducted before the exoduses of the Rohingya in 2016. Therefore, the post-exodus events are beyond the scope of this research. History and Description of Rohingya Camps Literature reveals that an estimated 250,000 Rohingya sought refuge in Bangladesh between 1991 and 1992 (Abrar, 1995; Milton et al. 2017). Initially, the Government of Bangladesh thought that a bilateral meeting with Burma would be helpful to resolve the problem. The situation, however, soon became unmanageable due to the arrival of an increased number of Rohingya in Bangladesh (Abrar, 1995). Gradually, assistance and intervention from donor countries and the UNHCR became essential. After several dialogues and negotiations with the Bangladeshi government, the UNHCR and international relief agencies opened 21 makeshift camps in Cox’s Bazar to accommodate the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. Until 2016, there were two government-run temporary camps in Bangladesh after shutting down 19 camps that were in operation at the beginning. These two camps were in Nayapara and Kutupalong, located respectively in Teknaf and Ukhia upazila, at the southernmost tip of Bangladesh. Although the Bangladeshi government website showed that several organizations—such as the UNHCR, the World Food Program (WFP), Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS), Technical Assistance Inc (TAI), Research Training & Management International (RTM), and Action Against Hunger (ACF)—were involved in providing services to the Rohingya (Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief website, May 2014 cited in Sultana, 2019), literature indicates that the Rohingya have been living in a vulnerable situation (Pittaway, 2008), which is compounded due to limited support for them and by their non-citizenship status. The registered camps, until 2016, used to receive support from the government, the UNHCR, and other national and international agencies. Except for a few interventions by some NGOs regarding health and sanitation, the unregistered camps receive nothing, and yet manage to survive. The Rohingya issue in Bangladesh took a new turn with the arrival of “about 87,000 Rohingya” in Bangladesh as a result of the “crackdown on Rohingya, blaming them for the rebellion” in Myanmar in 2016 (Ali & Duggal, 2022). The following two sub-sections provide basic information of the unregistered and the registered camps in Bangladesh, which now seems like a history but has surely laid foundation of discrimination between two groups of Rohingya. Unregistered Camps: World’s Largest Camp, a Taal?

Kutupalong and Leda were two unregistered camps located 36 and 68 kilometers away from Cox’s Bazar town, respectively. The unregistered camp at Ukhia, known by the name of its local area Kutupalong, is

Division through Registration?  97 over-populated, chaotic, and sprawling and has sprung up without planning (Sultana, 2019). In the past, there were multiple entry points to the camp, indicating a lack of security measures for protecting the residents. Kutupalong’s unregistered camp was locally known as Taal—a derogatory term literally indicating a pile of garbage. It is shapeless, unorganized, and insecure. The muddy roads inside the camp intersect to climb up and down the hills that are inhabited by the Rohingya as I have found during my fieldwork. The “homes”—in other words “shacks”—were built of plastic sheets and bamboo sticks. At the end of the camp, there was a thin forest that ends at the shore of the Bay of Bengal. “Kutupalong is not only the biggest refugee camp on the planet, with a population of one million and counting, it is also the most densely populated” (Altman, 2018)—ahead of Dadaab or Kakuma in Kenya. The unregistered camp at Teknaf is also known by its local area, Leda. This camp is relatively organized and on flat land yet is situated in an almost identical environmental setting—thin forest and ocean at the end of the camp. There were 40 schools at the Kutupalong unregistered camp that are run by the local NGOs. The unregistered Rohingya youth and young adults used to serve as teachers in the schools. A hospital run by the MSF (Medecins Sans Frontieres) is dedicated to the unregistered Rohingya (Sultana, 2019). Some of the unregistered Rohingya were employed by the local NGOs who used to undertake construction projects such as building drains and toilets and watertight seals to protect against landslides within the camp. Others used to work as laborers in agriculture or in small industries and grocery shops in the nearby villages, which are owned by the Bangladeshis. There were several tube wells in each block at the Kutupalong unregistered camp for drinking water, but the residents must line up for the toilets or tube wells as there was no private washroom in the camp. Sometimes the waiting period was unexpectedly longer as mentioned by a 29-year-old female unregistered Rohingya, We never imagined to be in the queue for such a long time for washroom when we were in our country (Myanmar). But today our helpless situation forces us to stand in a long queue sometimes in the rain, sometimes under the scorching sun, and even in the dark of night, which is completely embarrassing but we are bound to do so just for washroom use. She also informed that the registered ones do not need to go through such a situation because of their “good fortune.” Having a refugee ID card is a matter of fortune to her because this card differentiates the two groups of Rohingya significantly. However, they have trained themselves to lower the times they need to go to the toilets because these are in open spaces and a ten-minute walk from their shacks. They try not to use the toilets at night because of the distance and because of the lack of electricity. Many Rohingya women would rather wait until it is dawn to use the toilets.

98  Ishrat Zakia Sultana In the past, the Leda camp residents received housing support from the local NGOs. The homes were organized in rows in a relatively cleaner environment. The local NGOs set up latrines and garbage stations for the residents. Unfortunately, there was no school in this camp. Children only used to go to madrasas which were set up by the residents themselves. Madrasas are religious institutions where curriculum barely has any connection to mainstream education curriculum as these institutions are operated by the Rohingya alone. The most difficult part of living in Leda camp is the ongoing water crisis. Because of geological conditions, the ground of the camp was filled with hard stones where setting up tube wells was extremely challenging. This causes longer queues for water at the collection point where water is stored by the local NGOs and supplied to the residents only twice a day. Like the residents of Kutupalong camp, Leda residents also struggle with their extremely limited scope of employment; although, they, too, can find their sources of income outside the camp. Registered Camps: Supported by the Government and the UNHCR

Both Kutupalong and Nayapara registered camps began their operations in 1992. The distance to Kutupalong and Nayapara registered camps is 36 and 70 kilometers from Cox’s Bazar town, respectively. According to the record of the Government of Bangladesh, Kutupalong registered camp accommodated 15,389 Rohingya (Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief website, February, 2022). The camp compound is situated on 75 acres of land. There are 11 primary schools offering education from Grades 1 to 5, and one secondary school offering education for Grades 6 and 7 as of March 2016. After the completion of Grade 7 in the registered camp, children were not legally allowed to enroll in Bangladeshi schools outside the camp, and such restrictions still exist for the Rohingya. Out of the total 2972 primary students at Kutupalong registered camp, the numbers of male and female students in the primary schools are 1,426 and 1,546, respectively. Among the 483 secondary students, there are 267 males and 216 females. Shared tube wells and toilets are available for residents. A significant number of government agencies have been involved in providing services to the registered Rohingya. Nayapara registered camp is situated on a land of 85 acres as shown in the government record. It accommodated 21,225 registered Rohingya (MDMR website, October 2022). Available facilities at Nayapara included a library with a poor collection of books, community technology access, a 26-bed hospital, 108 garbage pits, 955 latrines, 415 bathing units, and 69 water distribution points. Many families had private tube wells and toilets located within the premises of their houses. There were 12 schools in the registered camp. The number of students in these schools was 3,760, comprising 1,820 males and 1,940 females. Like Kutupalong camp, the children studying in

Division through Registration?  99 this camp’s school were not permitted to get admission into Bangladeshi schools. In both camps, the situation before and after 2016 remains almost the same. The government, in collaboration with the local and the international NGOs, ensures basic services in terms of food, shelter, clothing, education, health, drinking water, sanitation, and skill development training. Other than basic services, both camps receive different types of services from the UNHCR, international agencies such as the WFP, the WHO, the UNFPA, and several local NGOs. These agencies mainly distribute non-food items and nutrition supplement, provide education and health services, and assist in self-help activities such as home gardening, tree-planting, tailoring, and carpentry. Given the average housing condition in rural Bangladesh, homes in both registered camps fulfill minimal requirements for the residents. Registration Process and Its Ramifications: Inequalities and Stratifications Based on the narratives of the Rohingya, this section shows how registration has become a means of stratification and inequality within one community. This section is divided into two sub-sections. The first begins with the discussion on the unregistered Rohingya and is followed by the discussion of the registered ones. Unregistered Rohingya: Remaining Unregistered Is Akin to Being Helpless Living Conditions

The housing conditions of the unregistered Rohingya used to be deplorable when it rained. Heavy downpour not only filled the drains and ditches passing through their shacks but also weakened the mud walls of those shelters. The mud walls of many shacks collapsed during the monsoon. For some, the leaky plastic roofs and broken bamboo partitions of their shacks made it impossible to protect their kids from the rain and the storm. The ground remained wet and slippery for several days as rainwater entered the room through the holes in the plastic roof of the shack. The 25-year-old unregistered Rohingya woman—a mother of three children—expressed her concern about the coming summer, which is generally accompanied by heavy rain and storm: The summer is coming, I am worried about the storm, our shacks are so weak, but how to build a strong home, whether we will fill up our stomach or save money in empty stomach, I don’t know who will give us money This narrative is echoed in a 19-year-old woman, whose shack was relatively in a better condition:

100  Ishrat Zakia Sultana I don’t like rains because children can’t go outside and my house is … you see the condition of my house. We can neither stay inside, nor go outside during a storm, and we can’t go to work if it rains heavily […] sometimes we starve when there is a storm or heavy rainfall, people even die when roofs or walls fall down. Rain used to make it difficult for the unregistered Rohingya to walk through the slippery, sloppy walkways which are common for most parts of the camp. There was no drainage system in this area. Plastic bags full of sand were left near the doorways to step on when the walkway was flooded by rainwater. Most of the shacks were completely dark inside, with no windows. Bamboo chips, plastic sheets, and mud were used as construction materials to adjust the shape of the shacks to the sloppy land. The average household size was six to seven persons in a shack. The population increased each year, but the place remained the same. The tube wells and toilets at the Kutupalong unregistered camp were often located in inconvenient places. The tube wells provided facilities for showers and washing clothes in a publicly open space. Using the toilets at night was difficult because of the distance from the shack and the lack of light. There were several tube wells in each block at Kutupalong unregistered camp. People lined up for the toilets or tube wells as the lack of a private washroom persists. Nonetheless, they considered themselves privileged to have public toilets and shared tube wells because the other unregistered camp at Leda did not even have any tube well. Despite living on a flat land, the unregistered Rohingya at Leda faced an acute water crisis. The water pitchers were always found lined up by Leda residents to collect water at the water collection points. Given the characteristics of the soil in this location, setting up tube wells was extremely difficult. Beneath the surface, there were plenty of hard stones in this area, apparently responsible for the scarcity of water. In 2007, the UNHCR introduced water reservoirs both for registered and unregistered Rohingya refugees at Nayapara and Leda camps. Water was collected from a lake, purified, and supplied through a few supply units from the reservoirs twice a day, 7 am and 3 pm. However, water collection points were quite far from Leda camp causing another serious problem for the residents, especially for women who were mainly responsible for collecting water. At Leda camp, homes were pucca (cemented floor). Although the floors were cemented, the walls and roofs of most of the houses were made of bamboo chips, and a few residents at Leda camp had tin-shed houses. Considering the housing patterns, with a wide and clean drainage system, garbage collection points, and a well-constructed pucca toilet system, the Leda unregistered camp, except the water crisis, was a better living place than the Nayapara registered camp and the Kutupalong unregistered camp.

Division through Registration?  101 Hunger, A Common Problem

The unregistered Rohingya in both Kutupalong and Leda were trapped in hunger. Dry fish and vegetables were the only usual items they consume making hunger a serious problem in this community. The 25-year-old woman shared her family’s struggle to manage food with little income: “It’s not sufficient at all, sometimes we can’t manage food for all of us. We borrow money from others to feed our kids. They don’t see fish and meat for a long time.” The unregistered Rohingya received no food support—neither from the Government of Bangladesh nor from the NGOs—except some recent initiatives taken by several NGOs. The NGOs provided free baby food, such as semolina, but no food support is given for the adults. During Ramadan and Eid-Ul-Adha (the second important religious festival for the Muslims), the Turkish Red Crescent used to send them meat and other food items as relief. In the past, the Turkish Red Crescent sent blankets, too. Unfortunately, as some of my research participants mentioned, the interference of the local political leaders in the relief distribution process often made it difficult for the unregistered Rohingya to receive the relief items. They also informed that the supporters of the political parties collected information on the arrival of relief items in the camp and received instructions from the concerned political leaders to take part in the relief distribution process in the camp so that they (the supporters of the political parties) can take away a certain portion of the relief items. Sometimes the distribution ends before some Rohingya even see the items arrived for them.

Health and Hygiene

Maintaining hygiene to remain healthy was a great concern for the Rohingya living in the unregistered camps. The predominant health problems were related to the substandard living conditions in the unregistered camp. A hospital was founded by the Médecins Sans Frontier (MSF) for the unregistered Rohingya. The hospital complex is located outside the unregistered camp in Kutupalong—beside the Dhaka–Teknaf highway as I have visited. Many Rohingya used to complain that they did not get necessary medication or advice when they visited the hospital. Rather, in most cases, they used to wait the whole day and returned home at the end of the day without even seeing a paramedic. Long queues of patients, poor management system, and lack of monitoring of the services were some of the key reasons responsible for making the wait time long, as the research participants informed. In a 20-year-old male participant’s words, “MSF hospital opens at 8 am and shuts down at 4 pm. If I reach there at 8 am, sometimes I come back at 12 pm, even sometimes at 4 pm.” Even if they can see a paramedic, in most cases, patients were given paracetamol as a common medicine. The hospital staff did not behave well with the unregistered Rohingya patients. Serious cases were referred to other hospitals by MSF because it lacks adequate treatment

102  Ishrat Zakia Sultana facilities. Regarding the quality of health services at MSF hospital, a 25-yearold woman says: We wait in the long line at MSF. Sometimes they give us medicine; sometimes we come back without medicine. Their service is not good. On the other hand, we have to see outside doctors if there is any serious health issue. But that is too expensive. Although the MSF used to pay for expenses required by the referred patients, what happened when MSF referred serious patients to other hospitals such as childbirth cases? A 19-year-old woman responds: When MSF fails, they refer the case to the Cox’s Bazar Hospital. Unfortunately, the hospital pays little attention to normal delivery; it prefers cesarean. And if the Cox’s Bazar Hospital fails to deal with it, the patient is sent to Chittagong, and that’s the last point for us to reach for health services. At MSF hospital, there was always a line of 30–40 patients, most of whom were women with kids, sitting on the wooden benches in a rectangular waiting room with a tin roof on bamboo poles, and no wall on its three sides. My participants complained about the services offered by this hospital. Nonetheless, this was the only place to go for free health services. Although the purpose of the hospital was to serve the unregistered Rohingya, in practice, it was dedicated to the registered Rohingya and local village people. In order to avoid the crowd in the registered camp hospital, the registered Rohingya went to the MSF hospital. They were privileged at MSF hospital over the unregistered ones. According to a participant, They (local rich people) are welcomed by the security guards and the doctors at MSF while we keep waiting. They are very rich, and they come here for free treatment. But everyone knows that this hospital serves the unregistered refugees. We were exploited in Burma and are being exploited in this country, too. Education

Parents in the unregistered camps were concerned about the future of their children because the Rohingya children grew up with little or no education. Grade 3 was the highest level of education for an unregistered Rohingya child. There were 40 schools at Kutupalong unregistered camp. Unregistered Rohingya who completed their education up to level 7 in the registered camp schools worked as teachers in the unregistered camp schools. The registered camp management approved the education of the unregistered refugee children in the registered camp’s school. According to the school teachers, many

Division through Registration?  103 students at Kutupalong unregistered camp continue going to Grade 3 for several years instead of attending the schools at the registered camp. It was mainly because many parents of the unregistered camp felt uncomfortable sending their children to the registered camp’s school due to the patterns of relationship between these two camps. The Rohingya of the unregistered camp were aware that the registered ones did not like them because they (the registered ones) were in a higher social position due to their registration status. However, no written record is available with the unregistered Rohingya on how the schools started their operations. Literally, the classrooms were huts—mud houses—with approximately 160 sq feet space. Construction materials of the classrooms included mud, thatch, water, bamboo, and plastic. Most schools were shaped as rectangular huts. Some of the classrooms have two to four small windows through which sunlight and air enter the room. The walls and the floor are made of natural earth plaster made of clay. There is only one classroom in each school at Kutupalong unregistered camp, with insufficient light and without any furniture. Students used to carry their own plastic bags to use as mats to sit on the floor. There was no electric or solar-powered bulb inside the classroom. Natural light was the only resort. Despite all these poor infrastructures with limited education facilities in the unregistered camp schools, Kutupalong unregistered camp’s Rohingya children were luckier than the ones living in the Leda unregistered camp given that Leda camp had no school, except a few madrasas. Employment and Freedom of Movement

Employment and freedom of movement of the unregistered Rohingya are restrictive. The magnitude of their struggle and sufferings for survival were doubled by their employment and movement restrictions. Some managed to find work with the local NGOs as contractual or irregular workers inside the camp and nearby villages, while others managed to go to another city in search of work despite the restrictions. Making fishing nets was a common source of employment for some of the unregistered Rohingya. For a 25-year-old woman, it took three months to make the first net that was sold for 1,000 taka, which indicated that making fishing net was a poor source of earning for them. In a 20-year-old man’s words: “I work outside, building and repairing people’s houses, and fencing their lands.” His wife added that sometimes he earned 100 or 200 taka a day and they survived somehow. There was no formal hiring process in the job market. Clusters of unregistered Rohingya were found every day sitting beside the Kutupalong Bazar early in the morning. The Kutupalong Bazar was a Bangladeshi market where everything, from brooms to jewelry, was available, and, interestingly, many of the storekeepers are registered Rohingya. Many participants acknowledged that both registered and unregistered Rohingya, along with the Bangladeshis, work as

104  Ishrat Zakia Sultana either salespersons or suppliers of products in this market. Regarding the hiring process, a 20-year-old participant says, It’s like when you purchase vegetables, you ask the price, right? Similarly, when we … say 10 people gather somewhere near the bazar [the market], they [employers] come and ask us whether we are interested in working at his farm or land or house. If I say yes, wage negotiations begin between the employer and me. He may want to give me 300 taka while I ask for 400 … this way we come to an agreement. We ask them what kind of jobs are available with him, and the person may tell me that he has jobs like cutting earth [earthmoving] and building fences of houses. If it fits my expertise, I accept; otherwise, I wait for the next hirer, and he approaches the next worker. The above narrative is an example of a verbal contract of employment between an employer and an unregistered Rohingya. No one is available to offer legal support for the workers if the contract is violated or the worker is discriminated. Because of their “illegal” status, their payment of wages often ends up falling between the cracks. The 20-year-old man’s wife explained that her husband worked for 15 days, but later he had to walk a long way to get the due payment. The 20-year-old man added that his employer still owed him 10,000 taka for several days of work. But the employer denied that. While it is a fact that they used to go to work outside the unregistered camp, they were exploited by the employers. Safety

Although the vulnerability of the unregistered Rohingya is exacerbated by their unsecured life, my participants had mixed experiences regarding safety and security in their everyday lives. For some, the registered Rohingya are “the people of the UNHCR, and the Government of Bangladesh” because “they are supported by them [the UNHCR and the Government of Bangladesh], and we came late, so we were not included in the registration process.” According to my Focused Group Discussion (FGD) participants in an unregistered camp: If a kid from the registered camp is beaten up by a local villager, the UNHCR will go and stand beside that kid, and resolve the matter in favor of the refugee kid, but in our case if the entire taal [unregistered camp] is burnt down, nobody is there to support us. We have no place to go for justice. Lack of security is undoubtedly a crucial issue. People live in an unprotected place in a hilly area near forests and sea, making it convenient for the miscreants to harm this helpless community. A 19-year-old woman, and other

Division through Registration?  105 participants too, acknowledged that although nobody evicted them from their living place in Bangladesh, they have been oppressed in Bangladesh as they were in Burma. They experienced such oppression not on a regular basis, yet some forms of oppressions generated fear among them. According to some of the research participants, in the unregistered camp, the Bangladeshis came at night and abducted unregistered Rohingya from their shacks. Then they call the families of the abductee asking for money. The abductees were released if money was sent, otherwise were killed. Such abductions included both men and women. Furthermore, women were raped and tortured by the gang. While the Rohingya express concern about their security, Zafar (2021), Hossain et al. (2020), and Haque and Salleh (2022) show how the Rohingya face challenges in terms of their security as well as how such challenges raise security concerns for Bangladesh. Registered Rohingya: Being Registered Is Being in Better Living Conditions Living Conditions

The living conditions of the registered Rohingya were remarkably different from those of the unregistered Rohingya, mainly because of the structural setup. While many of the registered Rohingya homes at Kutupalong had muddy floors, some had cemented floors. The Nayapara registered camp had a different scenario; most of their homes had cemented floors. Most of the houses in the registered camp at Nayapara had more than one room. These houses both at Kutupalong and Nayapara were made of tin and bamboo; although they shared tube wells and toilets, the location of these facilities was convenient for the families. Some even had private tube wells and toilets. Life in the registered camps was relatively peaceful for several reasons, such as receiving all kinds of support from the government, the UNHCR, and other NGOs, being able to work outside the camps, and having a refugee ID card given by the government and the UNHCR. Free Food Card

The registered Rohingya in both the camps had food cards. It was introduced in 2015. In a Bangladeshi national newspaper, the Daily Star, Karmakar (2014) reports on this in detail: As per Bangladeshi law, the Rohingya refugees are not allowed to go outside of their camps for shopping. They only can buy items from the registered food shops inside the camps for a certain amount of money. The costs are borne by the WFP. There are six food shops in the two refugee camps, said WFP officials. Under the new system, the refugees will get eight more items—potato, semolina, green leaf, dried fish, onion, garlic, chili and turmeric. Earlier, each Rohingya family maintained a log to collect rice, pulses, sugar, salt and oil. Each family will be allocated a

106  Ishrat Zakia Sultana Food Card and each member of the family will have over Tk 700 loaded on the card for a month. Whenever a cardholder will produce the Food Card at a shop, the staff there will check the card with a machine for the balance amount in it. Once the shopping is complete, the staff will adjust the amount from the card balance. To prevent misuse of Food Cards, fingerprints of cardholders will be stored in a database and it will be verified during every purchase of commodities. The WFP supplied all necessary food items, supported training programs for food, provided biscuits to school children, and monitored food distribution. The WFP’s food distribution system had no provisions for the involvement and interference of the local political leaders. Some of the participants expressed their satisfaction with the WFP services. The food card ensured access to free food and non-food items for every family member. Therefore, residents did not need to spend money on food unless they desired to have a food item that is not listed on the card. Interestingly, the residents often used to sell the surplus food items to the unregistered Rohingya and the local villagers. While most of the registered Rohingya have no complaints about the food distribution system, a few of them complained about the amount and the quality of food. In their view, the little ration they received through the food card was insufficient for a family. They had mixed responses about the quality of food—for some the quality was average and others thought that the quality should be improved. Nonetheless, in terms of food, the registered Rohingya were in a better position compared to the unregistered ones. A few of them, however, thought that they were in a crisis of food. According to a participant, “we get rice but don’t get fish; we get food but don’t get clothes.” A few registered Rohingya were even envious of the unregistered Rohingya because they (the unregistered ones) received occasional food items through international relief initiatives. A 20-year-old woman at Nayapara registered camp was one of them. Being a food card holder, she was upset for not receiving the occasional relief items that arrive for the unregistered Rohingya, a community having no free food card: 20-year-old woman: They don’t have it (food card). But they often get help from people who come from abroad [Turkish Red Crescent]. Me: You don’t get those help in the camp? 20-year-old woman: No, no, we don’t. Once we got little, but most of the reliefs go to them. Despite complaints about food, the value of a food card was immense to any registered Rohingya refugee as it ensured access to free food.

Division through Registration?  107 Health

There was a hospital in the registered Rohingya camp for its residents. Another was under construction during my fieldwork in 2016. Yet they often rush to the MSF hospital to avoid bribing and long waiting periods in the registered camp’s hospital. The registered Rohingya are given priority when they visit the MSF hospital. The 42-year-old man from Nayapara registered camp felt that it was their status that lowered their dignity, and their disadvantaged position made the hospital authority apathetic toward them. He recalled the hospital authority’s disgraceful and humiliating behavior toward the Rohingya refugees: Let me give you a practical example. [He rolls up his sleeves to show me a lump on his right arm] it has been on my arm for last 4 years, I went to them [to the hospital] for 4 to 5 times, they gave me very ordinary medicines, they told me that it’s nothing serious, come later … I feel ashamed to go there again and again, but … [lowers his gaze] it’s like they serve against their will, and they know that we continue visiting the hospital because we have no alternative, we keep nagging because we forget our dignity. The registered camps had physical structures dedicated to providing health services. Yet, the quality of the services was always debatable, and many of them have the same answer, “In simple word, there is no health service for us.” Poor health services in the registered camp hospital involved limited resources and corruption. According to one of my participant’s narrative, the hospital doctor took money from an old lady but the lady did not get services. I was a block leader at that time, so she told me everything. I took this issue to the magistrate. Each month we have a coordination meeting … the UNHCR and the officials from the Government of Bangladesh remain present in the meeting. I raised this issue in the meeting and proved it clearly. But nothing happened! He [the doctor] secretly offered me 50,000 taka to convince the lady to give false statement. I refused it. But he resorted to conspiracy and proved that the old lady was wrong, and he is still in his job in the hospital! According to the registered Rohingya, the camp hospital provided poor treatment in exchange of bribes from the patients. That is why they used to go to the MSF hospital where the service may not be satisfactory, but it did not ask for bribes from the patients. Interestingly, the registered Rohingya were reluctant to admit that they went to the MSF hospital: Me: Don’t you go to the MSF hospital?

108  Ishrat Zakia Sultana A 23-year-old man: We are not entitled to go there. That hospital is for the unregistered ones Me: Oh really? But I have heard that the registered ones are given priority than the unregistered ones in that hospital. A 23-year-old man: That is for the unregistered refugees. Me: Sure, but what I am saying is I have heard that although that hospital is for the unregistered refugees, it actually serves the registered ones A 23-year-old man: We cannot tell them that we are registered, we have to keep it secret that we are registered. Otherwise, they would tell us that you guys have a hospital in the camp, why do you come here. The number of unregistered refugees is much more than registered ones, that’s why it is for them. Also, local poor people go to that hospital for treatment. Both the registered Rohingya and Bangladeshis visited MSF hospital for free treatment. Education

The Government of Bangladesh prioritizes “education” for the registered Rohingya in Bangladesh. Rohingya children in the registered camps, however, were allowed to receive education only inside the refugee camps up to Grade 7. After that, they were neither allowed to go to Bangladeshi schools nor could utilize their certificate in the Bangladeshi job market. Regarding the restrictions on the Rohingya’s education in Bangladeshi institutions, the New York Times, referring to a human rights activist, shows that the Government of Bangladesh is afraid that “if the next generation of Rohingyas are educated here, they will never leave the country” (Hasnat & Yeasir, May 2, 2022). Earlier it was Save the Children, a British humanitarian aid organization, that used to fund Rohingya’s education in the camp; later Community Development Center (CODEC), a Bangladeshi NGO, became the implementing agency of the education program with support from the UNHCR. Education program in the camp expanded gradually throughout the period of 1992 to 2000. Although education inside the camp is free, one must note that it is available only up to Grade 7. In the registered camp, Bengali textbooks were used secretly while the camp-approved curriculum included Burmese textbook, Math, and English textbooks. The Burmese book is made available with the help of a local NGO. The Rohingya in the registered camp do not—or rarely—speak Burmese. Nonetheless, the reason for including the Burmese book in the curriculum is to establish the claim of the Government of Bangladesh that the Rohingya are the Burmese citizens, and they have to return to Burma. Therefore, they should learn Burmese. Interestingly, they were taught Bengali, too, and

Division through Registration?  109 children in these camps are fluent in local language because they were born and raised in Bangladesh. Rohingya children’s school performance was poor. Many students failed in the exams and remained in the same grades for years. On the one hand, registered Rohingya were privileged than the unregistered ones for their (registered Rohingya) access to education. On the other hand, the limited scope of education—only up to Grade 7 and its poor quality—made little changes in their lives. Because of the limited education opportunity in the camp and the restrictions of admission of the Rohingya into Bangladeshi schools, which exists even after the 2016–2017 exodus, many registered Rohingya were able to use their social networks with Bangladeshi citizens to manage admission to Bangladeshi educational institutions. Employment and Free Movement

The registered Rohingya were not officially allowed to get an employment and to move freely in Bangladesh. They required Camp in Charge’s (CIC) permission in order to work or travel outside. The permission did not involve any written procedure; rather, it was granted by the CIC’s satisfaction regarding the reasons for going outside the camp. According to some of my research participants: If a Rohingya is caught by the police who has left the camp secretly, it’s not the responsibility of the CIC. But he [the Rohingya] may inform the CIC, and leave the camp for important reasons like going to see a relative in the hospital. However, many registered Rohingya are involved in different professions outside the camp such as driving, running grocery stores, and doing small businesses. Some even work in other districts such as in Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong. While a few of them acknowledge the fact that some registered Rohingya work outside the camp, others tend not to admit it as the following conversation shows: A 23-year-old man: They are unregistered Rohingya. Me: I know someone like this who is a registered Rohingya. A 23-year-old man: They go there secretly, without permission. Although the CIC allows them to work outside the camp, it is kept secret from the high officials of the government because officially Rohingya’s free movement is restricted. The People of the UNHCR

According to the unregistered Rohingya, the registered Rohingya are “the people of the UNHCR.” This is because the registered Rohingya are privileged

110  Ishrat Zakia Sultana and protected by the UNHCR. They are protected by the Government of Bangladesh, too, because of their status. A few registered Rohingya recognize that they are in a better situation in Bangladesh, which validates their label of being “the people of UNHCR”: The most important thing for us is to live in peace. In Burma we were persecuted, here in Bangladesh, although there was oppression at the beginning, things have improved, our life is much better than the past, and we are thankful for that. The registered Rohingya have hotline support given by the UNHCR. A laminated sticker, with a hotline number and the UNHCR logo on it, is available in the registered Rohingya’ homes (Sultana, 2019). The hotline number gives them a sense of security. They use the hotline number during emergency situations, such as an accident, or a possible risk of murder resulting from rivalry among themselves. The above comparative discussion of the status and entitlements regarding the living conditions, food, health, education, employment, and security of both the unregistered and registered Rohingya in Bangladesh demonstrates that the unregistered Rohingya were more vulnerable than the registered ones. While both groups are stateless and originated from the same place, a division between them is clearly visible. The division is the outcome of a refugee registration process. Conclusion The registration system, devoid of putting the long-term impacts into consideration or foresightedness, has successfully divided an ethnic community into two groups. This division is clearly a consequence of the registration process. Both belong to the same ethnic community, and both belong to Myanmar. But the registration process of the Government of Bangladesh has created polarized groups within an otherwise equally stateless population. The registered Rohingya refugees, although to a limited extent, are entitled to enjoy minimal standard of living including access to free food, access to education, and freedom of movement. On the other hand, the unregistered Rohingya are deprived of their basic entitlements. They, having no refugee identity card, face challenges with their food security as well as free movement. Such division is the outcome of an unrealistic hindsight of the Government of Bangladesh concerning the issue, which needs to be reviewed to dismantle discriminatory treatments with the same group of vulnerable population. Bangladesh has attempted the institutionalization of the term FDMN instead of “unregistered” Rohingya since the exodus of the Rohingya in 2016–2017. But not recognizing them as “refugees” neither solved the Rohingya crisis nor facilitated the repatriation process. The discrimination between today’s FDMN, once who were “unregistered,” and the registered

Division through Registration?  111 Rohingya has empowered the registered ones and created a negative impression about the FDMNs. To conclude, the division between the member of the same group may give a wrong message to the Myanmar government that Bangladesh has already registered some of the Rohingya, it may admit the others in future. Secondly, if repatriation takes place, whether or not to include the registered Rohingya may appear as a question because of their status in Bangladesh – they are registered, they have been quite familiar with Bangladeshi culture, and their second and third generations will be strangers in Myanmar as they did not even see how their country looks like. References Abrar, C. R. (1995). Repatriation of Rohingya refugees. Online Burma/Myanmar Library. Retrieved from http://www​.burmalibrary​.org​/docs​/Abrar​-repatriation​ .htm Ali, M., & Duggal, H. (August 25, 2022). Rohingya exodus explained in maps and charts. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from https://www​.aljazeera​.com​/news​/2022​/8​/25​/ rohingya​-exodus​-explained​-in​-maps​-an Altman, M. J. (2018, February 14). Rohingya crisis: A firsthand look into the world’s largest refugee camp. World Food Program USA. Retrieved from Canal, G. (2017, February 10). Citizenship: Rohingya Muslims are the most persecuted minority in the world: Who are they? Global Citizen. Retrieved from https://www​.globalcitizen​ .org​/en​/content​/recognizing​-the​-rohingya​-and​-their​-horrifying​-pers/ Haque, M. M., & Salleh, M. A. (2022). Rohingya refugee camps and security threat for Host Country. Conflicts and Peace Studies journal Retrieved from https://so07​ .tci​-thaijo​.org​/index​.php​/cpsj​_psu​/article​/view​/1044 Hasnat, S. & Yasir, S. (May 2, 2022). Bangladesh shutters dozens of schools set up by Rohingya in camps. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www​.nytimes​ .com​/2022​/05​/02​/world​/asia​/rohingya​-bangladesh​-school​-closings​.html Hossain, M. S., Zhang. H., & Hossain, M. S. (2020). Rohingya refugee crisis: Security concerns for Bangladesh. South Asian Journal of Social Studies and Economics, 8(2), 24–34. Retrieved from https://www​.researchgate​.net​/publication​/34482909 Karmakar, P. (September 13, 2014). Food cards for 32,000 Rohingya refugees. The Daily Star. Retrieved from https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/food​-cards​-for​-32​-000​ -rohingya​-refugees​-41471 Milton, A. H., Rahman, M., Hussain, S., Jindal, C., Choudhury, S., Akter, S., Ferdousi, S., Mouly, T. A., Hall, J., & Efird, J. T. (2017). Trapped in statelessness: Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 14(8), 1–8. Retrieved from file:​///C:​/User​s/ISH​RAT/D​ownlo​ads/i​​ jerph​​-14​-0​​0942-​​v​2​.pd​f Pittaway, E. (2008). The Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh: A failure of the international protection regime. In H. Adelman (Ed.), Protracted displacement in Asia: No place to call home (pp. 83–106). England: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Retrieved from https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/food​-cards​-for​-32​-000​-rohingya​-refugees​-41471 Sultana, I. Z. (2019). Rohingyas in Bangladesh: Owning Rohingya Identity in Disowning Spaces. A Dissertation Submitted to The Faculty Of Graduate Studies In Partial Fulfillment Of The Requirements For The Degree Of Doctor Of Philosophy.

112  Ishrat Zakia Sultana Retrieved from https://yorkspace​.library​.yorku​.ca​/xmlui​/bitstream​/handle​/10315​ /36310​/Sultana​_Ishrat​_Z​_2019​_PhD​.pdf​?sequence​=2​&isAllowed=y The Government of Bangladesh. (28 February, 2022). Updated Report at a Glance. Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief. Retrieved from http://www​.modmr​ .gov​.bd​/site​/download​/95f5fdd8​-945e​-4370​-b8e8​-cb64f73da2f3/​%E0​%A6​%8F​ %E0​%A6​%95​%E0​%A6​%A8​%E0​%A6​%9C​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​%A7​%87-​ %E0 ​ % A6 ​ % B6​ % E0​ % A6​ % B0​ % E0​ % A6​ % A8 ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % BE ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % B0​ %E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%A5​%E0​%A7​%80-​%E0​%A6​%95​%E0​%A6​%B0​ %E0​%A7​%8D​ % E0​ % A6​ % AE​ % E0​ % A6​ % B8​%E0​%A7​%82​%E0​%A6​%9A​ %E0​%A7​%80 Zafar, A. (2021). The Rohingya refugees: A review of security threats for Bangladesh. Global Scientific Journal. 8(9), Retrieved from https://www​.researchgate​ .net​ / publication ​ / 355734262 ​ _ THE ​ _ ROHINGYA ​ _ REFUGEES ​ _ A ​ _ REVIEW​ _OF​_SECURITY​_THREATS​_FOR​_BANGLADESH, https://docs​.google​.com​/ document​/d​/1jG​hYJn​Ce1e​eJcp​BWEi​tsf3​DEtO​2K6J​uGTt​zgne5QyTY​/edit​?hl​=en​ _GB#

Part III

Women, Children, and Vulnerability



7

Challenges of Security and SelfDignity for Rohingya Adolescent Girls in Bangladeshi Camps Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan

Introduction The August 2017 exodus brought along with it significant changes in the familiar experiences of the Rohingya living in Bangladesh. Unlike those who entered the country during three previous exoduses, the experiences of those who came in August 2017 had been more disgraceful and painful and involved higher levels of uncertainty. Although the Government of Bangladesh was initially unwilling to allow entry for the persecuted and frightened Rohingya, it subsequently did it. However, this time, its treatment and policy stance had been different from the past. The government offered the new entrants the status of Forcefully Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN), not of refugees which it offered to those who entered during the previous exoduses. From the very beginning of the exodus, the Government of Bangladesh had been stern about the immediate repatriation of the new entrants and was unwilling to develop any arrangements that might create any hope among the Rohingya to stay in Bangladesh for a long time or generate any indication of the government’s willingness to host them for a long period of time. The government also made a hasty bilateral agreement with Myanmar in November 2017 to begin repatriation (Kipgen, 2019). However, quick repatriation has not taken place. In fact, no repatriation has taken place at all since the last exodus until 2022. Upon the arrival of the new entrants, the Government of Bangladesh, with the support of the international community, especially the United Nations (UN) agencies, donor nations, and international non-government organizations (INGOs), built shelters for them in 32 camps in the southern district of Cox’s Bazar where they still live. As quick repatriation efforts failed, the Government of Bangladesh is now in the process of fencing the Rohingya camps with barbed wire to prevent their integration into the host community (Barbed wire fence around Rohingya camps in Bangladesh condemned, May 11, 2021).1 With the emergence of COVID-19 as a global pandemic, political instability in Myanmar resulting from the military coup of February 2021, and the changed global refugee context due to the Ukraine–Russia War, the repatriation of the Rohingya has now become uncertain.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003228707-10

116  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan Experiences of refugees elsewhere in the world suggest that while the camps offer them shelters in safer locations, these living arrangements do not necessarily provide them with a worry-free environment. With an uncertain future and lack of durable earning and basic necessities, safety, security, and the preservation of self-dignity emerge as new concerns as different forms of crimes, conflicts, violence, and illegal trades start to develop in the camps. Due to the inadequate functioning of the major agencies of socialization such as schools, religious institutions, and community and due to the urgency to respond to the demands of survival, adolescent youth boys and girls living in the camps are at risk of being involved in conflicts, violence, and different forms of deviant behavior. Adolescent girls are particularly at higher risk under such circumstances due to their age and gender. The literature on life in refugee camps suggests that adolescent girls are common victims of trafficking, forced and child marriage, rape, teenage pregnancy, early motherhood, child labor, sexual harassment, sex trade, and other forms of insecurities (Schlecht et al., 2017; UNICEF et al., 2014). Are the Rohingya camps different from other refugee camps in the world? Do they offer different experiences to the adolescent girls living there? These are some important questions which require urgent answers to ensure the safety and well-being of the adolescent Rohingya girls in Bangladeshi camps as repatriation is now uncertain. About two in every ten Rohingya living in the camps in Bangladesh are adolescent girls (Inter Sector Coordination Group, 2018). This chapter addresses several specific questions related to the safety and human dignity of the Rohingya adolescent girls living in Bangladeshi camps. These include: (a) What are the issues and sources of insecurity among the Rohingya adolescent girls? (2) How have these grown, changed, consolidated, or mitigated over time? (3) How do fears of insecurity affect the self-concepts of the female Rohingya adolescents in the camps? (4) Have any protection mechanisms developed at the community or the administrative level? (5) What are the formal and informal arrangements to address the issues of insecurity in the camps? (6) How have the perceptions of insecurity and sources and capacity for resilience evolved among the adolescent girls over time? Finally, (7) what can be done to effectively address the issues of insecurity and challenges of self-dignity of the Rohingya adolescent girls? This chapter is based on a qualitative inquiry carried out in the second half of 2019. The author visited Rohingya camps in Ukhiya in June and July 2019 and collected primary data through in-person interviews with Rohingya adolescent girls, parents, and NGO workers working in the Rohingya camps. The study ethics protocol was approved by South Asian Institute of Policy and Governance, North South University. Accordingly, permission to enter the camps and access potential research participants was solicited from the camp authority through submitting a written application. Once permission was obtained, cooperation was solicited from a World Vision staff working in the camps (who used to be the author’s past student) to help find potential

Security and Self-Dignity Challenges for Rohingya Adolescent Girls  117 research participants. The author spent three days from 10:00 am to 5:00 pm in three camps (on June 21 in Camp 7, July 11 in Camp 13, and July 12 in Camp 15) to collect primary data. Conveniently selected adolescent girls, parents or guardians having adolescent girls at home living in camps 7, 13, 15, and service providers working in those camps were interviewed in person and through focus groups to collect information to address the questions listed above. Ten (10) adolescent girls (ages 15–19) seven (7) parents (five mothers and two fathers) and five (5) service providers participated in personal interviews. Besides, 15 adolescent girls participated in two focus groups (7+8 = 15). Thus, the data was collected from a total of 27 participants. Informed consent was obtained from participants above 18 years of age prior to their participation. Informed consent of the parents/guardians of minors (adolescent girls below 16) and minors’ assent were obtained before the minors participated. To ensure a sense of safety and comfort among the girls, in-person interviews with them took place in their own places, where their parents were present at visible distances in their homes. Focus groups were held in two Safe Spaces for Women and Girls2 located in Camp 13 and 15, arranged in cooperation with the World Vision office in Ukhiya. Interpretation support was taken from a local NGO staff who signed a Confidentiality Agreement before being involved with the study. The data collected through personal interviews and focus groups were recorded, upon consent of research subjects through the consent form as well as verbal consent, in an electronic device. A Research Assistant transcribed the recorded data into English who signed a Confidentiality Agreement at the time of the job contract. The chapter runs through four major sections. It begins with an overview of the camp life experiences of adolescent girls from a global perspective. Then it provides a brief introduction to the Rohingya adolescent girls living in Bangladeshi camps, where it sheds light on socio-cultural contexts and the educational and behavioral patterns of the Rohingya adolescent girls. The chapter then provides an account of the physical conditions of camps that shape their lived experiences. In the following section, it provides a critical analysis of the nature and sources of insecurity among the adolescent girls in Rohingya camps. Finally, the concluding section substantiates the discussions in the chapter and focuses on possible policy and programming options to improve protective measures and reduce risk factors associated with safety and a sense of honor and dignity among the Rohingya adolescent girls. A Global Scenario of Camp Life Experiences of Refugee Adolescent Girls Naturally, adolescence is a critical period of life since kids go through several physical changes and emotional and developmental experiences at this time, requiring more parental and societal care. The future of children’s lives to a great extent is affected by their experiences during adolescence. It is the time when many become married, sexually active, leave school, become orphaned,

118  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan establish work outside the home, survive physical or sexual violence, or become the caretakers of their own children, parents, or siblings (Schlecht et al. 2017). Transgenerational transmissions may significantly affect the lives of adolescents as poor adolescent girls may give birth to impoverished children. National social, economic, and political conditions may seriously change their life. Limited access to education and restrictive gender roles during these early years may force young girls into situations of child labor, child marriage, domestic violence, and early childbearing, which may significantly affect their ability to realize their potential and develop (Schlecht et al. 2017). Therefore, the decade of adolescence is very important for every human life. Robert Blum and his colleagues (Blum et al. 2014) have developed a framework for understanding aspects that contribute to healthy growth and development in adolescence. They have identified five central goals for successful completion of adolescence: (a) engagement with learning; (b) emotional and psychological safety; (c) positive sense of self/self-efficacy; (d) acquisition of life/decision-making skills; and finally (e) physical and mental health. However, as indicated above, not all children get the opportunity to attain these goals of adolescence. Situations such as war, conflict, and displacement significantly disrupt the lives of many adolescents. Adolescent girls are generally one of the most vulnerable sections among the refugee people living in camps as conflict and displacement affect all aspects of their life. The entire socio-cultural setup of their growth and development is destabilized. Their education is disturbed, their peers and friends are lost, and their recreational and fun arrangements are withered away. The ability of their families to take care of them and their parents’ attention to them are significantly decreased. All these factors severely damage the sense of safety and security among the displaced adolescents. A situation analysis conducted by UNICEF et. al. (2014) on the impact of displacement on the lives of Syrian adolescent refugees in Lebanon suggests that it altered every aspect of their daily life and decreased the quality of personal care. For adolescent girls, it increased their fear of safety. According to another study (Delong et al. 2017), loss of educational opportunities and financial strains that resulted from displacement had the most significant and longlasting negative effects on the lives of Syrian adolescents who took refuge in Lebanon. Studies such as League of Arab States (2011) and Dejong et al. (2017) suggest that parents in refugee camps tend to marry off their daughters as soon as possible and limit their mobility as coping strategies to address these impacts of displacement help them lessen, to some extent, their worries about the safety of their daughters and financial strains. However, these coping strategies become new sources of insecurity and uncertainty for adolescent girls. Due to early marriage, school dropout rates among refugee youth go higher and early pregnancy and early motherhood among adolescent girls increase. Sahbani, Al-Khateeb, and Hikmat (2016) report that early marriage increased three times and under-18 deliveries increased by 76% among

Security and Self-Dignity Challenges for Rohingya Adolescent Girls  119 Syrian refugee girls in Jordan between 2011 and 2014. Thus, child marriage, forced marriage, teenage pregnancy, early motherhood, and lack of education and skills emerge as a new social issue regarding the safety and security of adolescent girls in refugee camps. Adolescent girls also become more concerned about safety in camps. Their conventional social control and protection arrangements have already vanished as a result of displacement. Unless and until new and effective formal or informal social control mechanisms develop in camps, they feel unsafe. They are afraid of physical harm and sexual violence (including rape and abuse), kidnapping, trafficking, and arrest by the authorities. Based on a study on Congolese Refugee Adolescent Girls in Nyarugusu Refugee Camp in Tanzania, Paik (2012) suggests that due to domestic duties and feelings of unsafety, girls are more likely to cluster around their homes and stay with other girls in their peer groups in camps Moreover, the physical and mental health of adolescent refugee girls is an important concern in camps. Studies on refugees’ lives in camps across different geographical settings such as Potts, Barada, and Bourassa (2021) and Women’s Refugee Commission (2012) confirm such concerns. Restrictions on mobility along with poor living conditions constitute a source of the poor health of adolescent girls in camps. Crowded and poor housing with lack of ventilation, the flow of natural air and light, and water supplies are unconducive to their health, as they now always have to stay home or around home. Again, due to restrictions on mobility, adolescent girls’ opportunity to enjoy life becomes narrow. They lose the freedom to play outside the home, in the park, or in open places. The frequency of their interactions with peers and engagement in programs decreases (Women’s Refugee Commission, 2012). Often, there are not sufficient domestic arrangements for amusement and socializing. Besides, adolescent girls become aware that the age of marriage is changing, that there may be pressures on them to get married any time, and that they have to bear the responsibility of parenthood soon. These worries negatively affect their mental health. A survey by ABAAD, a Lebanese organization working on all aspects of gender-based violence prevention and response, and the US-based Global Women’s Institute (GWI) among Lebanese, Palestinian, and Syrian refugee women in Lebanon, finds that forced or child marriage as one of the largest factors for psychological distress among adolescent girls (Potts, Barada, and Bourassa, 2021) Once they understand their families’ intentions to marry them off, they realize that this will lead to the end of their education and they lose hope in their future. Thus, adolescent girls live through several challenges in camps, and this may significantly limit their ability to flourish and realize their potential. Again, there are differential distributions of risk factors among adolescent girls falling into different socio-demographic categories. The study by Women’s Refugee Commission (2012) on Somali refugee adolescent girls at Sheder and Aw Barre camps in Ethiopia finds that unaccompanied adolescent

120  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan girls and those separated from parents are at higher risks of abuse. In addition, those who live with foster families, work as domestic helpers, are young mothers, or are under financial strain are at risk of abuse and being trafficked into sex work. Scholars such as Siddiqqi (2012) and Maguire (2012) suggest considering adolescent girls as separate demographic categories in emergencies given the unique issues affecting their safety and well-being in camps. It is critical to have enough programs in camps targeting adolescent girls to increase their protective factors and decrease their risk factors so that they can realize their adolescent goals. These programs must reach them at the earlier stage of their adolescence so that they are protected from security risks and feel supported. As Schlecht et al. (2017: 6) suggest programs for VYAS [very young adolescents] serve to provide critical information, skills or resources to adolescents before they enter their highest risk years – when they are most at risk for child marriage, drop out from school, unplanned pregnancy, and transmission of sexually transmitted disease among others. Therefore, it is important to critically understand the living arrangements of Rohingya adolescent girls in Bangladeshi camps, take policy measures, and initiate appropriate programming to enhance the prospect of their successful transition through adolescence and promote their well-being. The Rohingya Adolescent Girls in Bangladeshi Camps Among about one million Rohingya living in those camps, about 200,000 are adolescent girls (Inter Sector Coordination Group, 2018). These girls have some unique characteristics shaped by both their cultural background and camp environments. Since the Rohingya are largely Muslim, the beliefs and behavior of the Rohingya girls are, to a significant extent, influenced by Islamic norms and values. They begin their education by learning to recite the Quran in nearby Moktabs (religious schools) or at home, and, normally, they do not go to school seeking formal education. Puberty is an important stage in their lives. At this stage, both their family and society impose limits on their mobility. They mostly stay around home and assist their mothers with cooking and cleaning. They wear borka (veil) if they need to go outside. A local NGO worker who had been working in the Rohingya camps for two years describes Rohingya girls: They [Rohingya girls] help their father at the shop [those who have family businesses in local markets] at a younger age. But they think they should not go out when they are sexually mature [reach puberty]. They think they should not be seen by men; they consider it to be a sin. They also think school is no more necessary. But there are some educated families. They think education is essential for their daughters.3

Security and Self-Dignity Challenges for Rohingya Adolescent Girls  121 Puberty is also the culturally appropriate time for them to get married. This means, what are commonly known as early marriage and forced marriage in contemporary human rights literature are embedded in Rohingya society and considered normal. To the Rohingya, these practices are not social issues but reflections of cultural conformity (Alam, 2018). As a result, many girls get married before they reach 15, and, by the end of their adolescence, many become parents of children. Childhood is, therefore, short for the Rohingya girls, and adolescence is normally a period of motherhood for them. However, as a result of these cultural practices, maternal health and neonatal health remain concerns around Rohingya adolescent girls. After they have entered Bangladesh, camps offer the Rohingya adolescent girl a different living arrangement. They are safe from the persecutions of the Myanmar army, and by now, after five years, many of those who experienced violence and trauma during conflict and displacement may have recovered to some extent. The social fabric that was destabilized is taking a new shape, and the Rohingya may still carry over many of their own cultural values in camps. Yet, they are now under new administration and governance with the laws, policies, and regulations of the host nation, the expectations of the service-providing agencies active in camps, and the desires and wishes of the host community that surround them. These new social structures and control mechanisms are creating opportunities and constraints for them and constantly shaping and reshaping their lived experiences in camps as well as their cultural practices. For example, although early marriage is a common cultural practice among the Rohingya, it is legally prohibited in Bangladesh and strongly discouraged by the humanitarian agencies supporting the Rohingya in camps. Similarly, working outside is not popular among Rohingya girls, but now an increasing number of Rohingya girls are working with the NGOs active in camps. As one female young NGOs officer (originally from Dhaka) shared her observations in an informal discussion: I see big changes among both local and Rohingya girls. In the early days, local girls had negative perceptions about us. They thought we were bad girls. Now many local girls work with us in the camps. Rohingya girls were culturally even more conservative. Now many Rohingya girls work with the NGOs, and many others look for opportunities to work in the NGOs. I see changes in their mindsets.4 Moreover, several local and international NGOs such as UNICEF and BRAC run schools, learning centers, and skills development centers in the camps, where they offer literacy and numerical skills as well as vocational skills. While generally Rohingya children and youth living in camps are not entitled to enroll in the mainstream educational institutions in Bangladesh, few of them (10,000) have been allowed by the Government of Bangladesh to enroll in camp-based schools operated following the Myanmar curriculum up to Grade 9 under a pilot program (Van Esveld, 2020). Moreover, Rohingya

122  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan girls have access to diverse hygiene and reproductive health services and care offered by NGOs, which were largely unavailable to them while living in Myanmar. These services include the delivery of an essential health package, a range of contraceptives (such as condoms, oral contraceptive pills, injectable contraceptives), and abortion and postabortion care (SRH Working Group, 2021). Thus, these opportunities and constraining structures as well as the geographical landscape, population density, housing arrangements, structures of facilities, and services in camps (such as public infrastructures, energy and water sources, lighting, sanitation, income earning opportunities) play an important role in shaping the nature and sources of insecurity, risks and protective factors, and lived experiences of adolescent girls in the camps discussed in the next section. Challenges of Security and Self-Dignity for Rohingya Adolescent Girls in Camps No one probably dreams of a camp life although many are destined to it like the Rohingya girls living in the camps in Bangladesh. Rohingya adolescent girls do not want their camp life to be long. They want to go back to their home in Myanmar. Although they fled to Bangladesh to save themselves from military attack, they do not find the camps safe either. To them, the entire camp area is a horrific geography irrespective of whether it is worse or better than their military-invaded homeland. They define their life in camp as full of restrictions, “stuck in the hole” (as one adolescent Rohingya girl used this phrase).5 In general, Rohingya adolescent girls think that their life in their own country was better than it is in the camp. Before the military attack in August 2017, they had a routine life guided by their own cultural norms and practices; they were younger, without a developed sense of political rights or deprivation. They could move freely in their neighborhoods and villages, play in the fields or their backyard, and go to school. They miss those days, and this makes them feel that their camp life is sorrowful and painful. As one adolescent girl stated “[Our life was] completely different than the life in Bangladesh. We felt better in Burma [Myanmar]. That was the life of joy if we compare these two.”6 A similar feeling was expressed by another girl who said, “I don’t feel like moving here. The feeling has gone when we moved here from Burma. I don’t want to stay here, but I can’t move to Burma either. So, it’s kind of a stuck here.”7 The Rohingya girls are yet to fully overcome the trauma they experienced during displacement. The sense of missing is still very strong among many of them. Due to military attack or campaign, they ran with their lives for a safer place. They crossed the border with many other people of their community and entered Bangladesh. After they reached the camps, they realized that there was a big change in their life. They left behind their stable life and all belongings. They had a decent living arrangement there, appropriate to their

Security and Self-Dignity Challenges for Rohingya Adolescent Girls  123 own culture. Now they are absolutely empty. Although some girls want to see this as their fate as a coping strategy, it is difficult for them to accept such a fall in their life. A strong sense of helplessness is prevalent in their minds, and this leaves them with feelings of being mentally weak, submissive, and, at the same time, thankful to the host community. This is reflected in the following statement of a Rohingya girl: Burma is my birthplace, my home. We had houses, land, properties, and cattle, everything we needed. We didn’t have to depend on anybody. But here, we have nothing. Though we are refugees, we were welcomed very warmly. We got a shelter. We never imagined that would get a shelter or get everything we have got here. We don’t know what would happen if you guys wouldn’t help us. We are really very grateful to the Government of Bangladesh and the Bangladeshi people.8 Camps are safer for the Rohingya in the sense that the threat of death is low here, yet it is an arena of distress, uncertainty, and misery for the Rohingya adolescent girls. A constant fear of safety, poverty, limits on mobility, problems with toilets and washrooms, fear of crime and theft, excessive supervision and surveillance by parents and local authority, and disturbances of NGOs inform the lived experiences of Rohingya adolescent girls in camps. The sources of insecurity and related perceptions of unsafeness and uncertainty among Rohingya girls in the Bangladeshi camps can be ordered into seven categories. These include: (a) concerns of safety; (b) mistrust of the local community; (c) poorly planned and developed toilet and water facilities; (d) poor housing; (e) poverty; (f) lack of educational and work opportunity; and (g) prevalence of human trafficking. These issues are discussed in the following section: (a) Concerns of safety There are fears of abuse, rape, and kidnapping among adolescent girls in the camps. The girls feel that the camp area is very unsafe for them to move freely because there are “bad people” (boys and adult males) in camps who can harm them. As an adolescent girl informed, she never went out for walking in the camp as she felt it was not safe to do it. As she said, “Never, it’s not safe. I feel very afraid. There are many bad boys out there. They might disturb.”9 Another girl expressed her concerns about safety, “We have a constant fear that the males of this place might try to molest the girls.”10 The safety of children is also a primary concern for parents in the camps. As one mother passionately said: We have nothing to lose but dignity. We have no money, no gold, we just have rice, oil, and lentil [supplied by NGOs]. I only worry about my sons and daughters. My sons are too young. They may be abducted.

124  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan My daughters may also be abducted. They may be sexually harassed, even raped. It’s really frightening. I live in fear at night.11 The worries of the girls and parents are grounded in facts too. It was clear from their words that incidences of rape and kidnapping are common in the camps. As one adolescent girl informed, “A few days ago they [kidnappers] abducted a girl. They kept the girl for four to five days. After harassing her a lot, they released her.”12 The girl also informed about another case of child abduction. In that case, a child was abducted for money and later was released as the family met the kidnappers’ demands. As she told, “They kidnapped a child. The mother of the child had some money. In exchange of that, she got her son released.”13 Another girl informed about an incident of one person being murdered by ransom seekers. According to her, the robbers abducted that person who had one son and four daughters and asked for ransom. The family of that man was poor and unable to pay. So, they killed that man. Many similar stories of kidnapping were shared by several participants. There are also rumors of child lifting all around the camps. As one adolescent girl said, “There is a rumour about child-lifters. I feel very insecure in public transport. They say there are people who kidnap the girls.”14 Thus, fear of rape, harassment, and kidnapping is very prevalent among the adolescent girls and their parents in the Rohingya camps. By mid-October 2020, the camp authority has recorded 61 cases of murder, 35 cases of rape, and 16 cases of kidnapping (Rahman, 2020). The occurrences of such a high number of crimes in an area of 6,000 square kilometers within three years validate the concerns of safety among the Rohingya adolescent girls and their parents. Many people think that the camps go under the control of criminals at night. The incidences of murder and similar crimes occur as competing groups of drug and illegal traders and smugglers are active in the camps (Rahman, 2020). (b) Mistrust of the host community Rohingya girls are afraid of the host community population. As one adolescent girl said, “They [those who disturb them] are just outside of the camp.”15 One female parent reported that some Rohingya children were beaten by the local people as they went to a nearby forest to collect fuel. She also mentioned incidences where Rohingya children were exploited and abused by the local people in the name of employment for earning. As she reported, “Some children went to collect fuel outside the camp. Some local people called them and said they would be paid if they did some work for them. Later, they were beaten but were not given any payments.”16 There are mistrust and suspicion among the Rohingya girls about the host population. This is largely because the Rohingya and host community are not known to each other. The Rohingya population are still strangers to the host community, and there is a lack of communication and interaction between the peoples of the two communities. This contributes to a

Security and Self-Dignity Challenges for Rohingya Adolescent Girls  125 continued fear among the Rohingya populations about the host ­community. Therefore, the camps which are surrounded by the host communities or very close to the host communities, where shelters are scattered and distant from each other, and the host community people have free access to the camps are felt more unsafe by the Rohingya population. As one Rohingya adolescent girl whose family had been living in Alikhali [camp 25 located in the Ukhiya sub-district] before they moved to a different camp shared her experiences: There were few houses [Rohingya shelters] in the neighbourhood in Alikhali. Also, they [host community] were stronger than us [greater in number]. So, we could not go out. Besides, the village people were very problematic [an indication of disturbances].17 However, once the family moved to their present camp, they felt safer because here they could live with people who were previously known to them. As she expressed her feelings, “We don’t feel afraid here. The people we used to live with in Burma, live here with us. They are our neighbours. The village people of Alikhali used to disturb us a lot.”18 Thus, it means that not all camps are equally unsafe for everyone. Where shelters are close to each other and the neighbors can trust each other, the camp dwellers feel safer. Relationship with the host community is an important factor for the safety and security of the Rohingya living in camps as both communities live in close proximity. While anecdotal reports suggest that the host community had been fairly welcoming to the Rohingya during the early days of the August 2017 influx, emerging literature and media reports, however, find gradual deteriorations of trust, positive attitude, and tolerance and rising tensions between the two communities. Daily-based, small-scale conflict and violence between the communities as observed in this study have also been reported in situational and thematic analyses such as Acaps (2018) and Strategic Executive Group (2019). Some findings of a study on the host community’s attitude toward the Rohingya by Jerin and Mozumder (2020) are particularly alarming. As the study reports, a majority of the host community think that the Rohingya were displaced due to their own fault, that they are ungrateful to the host community, and that their morals and values are incompatible with those of the host community. It is feared that such attitudes of the host community toward the Rohingya may act as a basis for denial and discrimination against the Rohingya (Jerin and Mozumder, 2020). The study also finds that, according to a majority of the host community adults, the Rohingya are creating problems including security threats, social problems, and environmental imbalance. Almost all participants of that study believed that the long stay of the Rohingya would be problematic and most of them held the view that Rohingya should be repatriated as soon as possible. These findings are indicative of intolerant attitudes of the host community toward the Rohingya. Thus, we find that mistrust and negativism exist in both communities toward each other, and these may become

126  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan critical sources of insecurity and fear among the Rohingya adolescent girls in camps. Of course, there are eve-teasers (people who annoy women in a public place) from the Rohingya community too. But their behavior is seen by the Rohingya girls as a response to an unusual situation in camps, different from what they had in Myanmar. Girls did not go outside in Myanmar, and boys also did not have the opportunity to see them. Since there are chances for them to see girls in camps, they do not know how to behave. As one girl explained the boys’ behavior in camps: When we used to live in Burma, we did not need to work outside of the house. But here as the condition demands us to involve in jobs, we have to face these difficulties. Many of our own people think we are becoming deviants after coming here. Muslim girls are not supposed to go outside in Burma. So, the boys couldn’t get in touch of the girls. Here that’s why they are losing their mind after seeing the girls.19 Thus, the deviant behavior of some Rohingya boys, such as eve-teasing (annoying women public a public place), is seen by Rohingya girls as a result of the disruption of their original social control structure. Fear of safety, harassment, and teasing force the girls to limit their mobility. Parents also do not allow girls to go far alone. As a result, girls mostly stay home. Often, they find other girls in the neighborhood to visit them to talk, and often they simply stay home. As one girl reported, “We can gossip inside our houses. Girls from other houses come here.”20 Another girl, similarly, said, “I have two/three friends here; they come here to visit me.”21 Some girls, of course, mentioned that they would appreciate if there were safe places for them to hang out with other girls. As one girl said, “If we found a place where there are no boys to disturb us and to gossip among ourselves that would be good.”22 However, a girl’s mobility in camps is a more complex issue than simply being a function of fear. The conservative culture of the Rohingya also plays a determinant role in this respect. As mentioned above, Rohingya girls are expected to stay home once they become adolescents. The movement of women is strongly regulated by the norms of their culture. As one Rohingya adolescent girl confirms their cultural practices: “after a certain age, girls are not allowed to go out during the daytime. When it is necessary, a girl can go out with a male family member – husband, father, and brother.”23 (c) Poorly planned and developed toilet and water facilities The most serious problem and the threat to privacy and dignity, as identified by the adolescent girls in Rohingya camps, are related to toilets, washroom, and water. The toilets, generally located in the downhills, are not only far away from many shelters but also insufficient compared to the number of

Security and Self-Dignity Challenges for Rohingya Adolescent Girls  127 people who use them. As a result, people have to wait in line for a long time to use the toilets. Girls feel shy to stand in cues with men. Although male and female toilets are separately identified, there is no difference in their actual use since there are not enough toilets. For these reasons, girls are afraid of being harassed as they go to use the toilets. Also, the toilets are unclean and unhygienic. As one adolescent girl reported, “toilets and water are the main problems here. There are very few toilets. We need to use others’ toilets. There is absolutely no toilet in this bloc.”24 As another girl informed, “[toilets are] very bad, to be honest. Also, very unhygienic.”25 Again, many toilets are made of plastic sheets which are often ripped having holes in them. These are not usable by women and girls during day time. An elder male Rohingya reported about the miserable state of toilet facilities for women in camps as follows: Using the toilet is a severe problem, especially for women. There is only one toilet for every one hundred families. Everybody has to stand in a long line to use toilets and wait until their turn comes. It’s very troublesome. The washroom is very far from here. It is made of plastic sheets. There is no security for women’s privacy. But they have to use it. So, they do it anyway.26 To avoid harassment and protect privacy, many women and girls choose to go to toilets only at night along with their other family members. As one female parent reported about toilet facilities and the use of these, They are on the side of the road. They are just some ramshackle sheds made of plastic sheets, very poor situation. For women, these are totally unsuitable. Moreover, these washrooms don’t have curtains. So, we prefer the night time to use the washroom.27 However, while this practice is harmful to their health, it is also inconvenient and risky for the personal safety of girls and women due to insufficient lights in camps at night. There is no electricity in the camps, except for some solar lampposts in the main streets. As a result, the camps become dark after sunset. Women and girls, therefore, do not feel safe to go to toilets during the night times either. As one female parent reported, We have to go far away for a toilet. After sunset, it becomes very dark as there is no lighting. Besides, we have to wear “burqa” [veils] every single time we go out of the house. It’s very disturbing. I do not let my daughters go to the toilet alone; I go with them.28 Similarly, an adolescent girl said, “At night we feel very afraid going out to the washroom. Also, there are plenty of robbery and loot cases.”29 Therefore, there are dire safety concerns around the use of toilets for adolescent girls in the camps.

128  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan Besides toilets, bathing is a serious problem for women and girls in the camps. There are no ponds or bathing facilities near the water points. Families cannot make bathrooms inside their houses since the houses are too small. Therefore, they make bathing corners adjacent to their shelters with plastic sheets or tarpaulins, supplied by the NGOs. Normally, these bathing corners do not have doors, curtains, or covers on the top, and women cannot use them during the daytime. As a result, women and girls have to wait until it becomes night and dark to take bath. As one female parent informed: Bathrooms are beside the walkways, made of tarpaulins, and do not have doors or curtains. It is very difficult for the girls to take bath. They cannot do it but at night. The house is small and we, many people live in it. We have to cook and eat inside. The floors will remain wet if we make a bathroom inside the house. We cannot do it. Even it is problematic, girls have to take bath at night. They cannot take bath during the daytime.30 This practice is unhealthy and uncomfortable for the girls, particularly during the summer when the heat is excessive and temperatures are high. Since people of different ages live in the same house, adolescent girls also have to wear decent clothing at home where there is little or no ventilation to allow natural air to flow inside the house, nor do they have electric fans. As a result, adolescent girls develop skin diseases such as heat rash as they cannot take shower when they need to or want to. As one parent reported, “there is heat from tarpaulins. The girls’ skins are getting burned, developing sweatpants. It is too hot, not comfortable at all.”31 Therefore, poor toilet, bathroom, and water facilities are major threats for the health and safety of adolescent girls in the camps. (d) Poor housing Poor housing is a source of multiple forms of insecurity for adolescent girls in the camps, which include an unhealthy home environment, fear of theft, lack of privacy, and fear of safety. The shelters built of bamboos and tarpaulins are quite weak, vulnerable to wind and storm. Sometimes strong winds blow away the roofs or rip the tarpaulin sheets. As a result, water spills into the houses during rains, making the homes wet and sultry and causing misery for all dwellers. As one adolescent girl reported, “wind blew away the tarpaulins of our roof three or four times.”32 Another girl reported, “Tarpaulin of the rooftop is totally torn. If it rains, there are continuous leakages of water, making our life totally miserable.”33 Moreover, many houses have broken doors, or they cannot be locked. As a result, strangers have easy access to the houses, and there is a constant fear of theft and harm to children and adolescent girls. As one adolescent girl said, “We feel very insecure about people taking our food or things of daily use.”34 One female parent, similarly, reported:

Security and Self-Dignity Challenges for Rohingya Adolescent Girls  129 [The house is] not good at all. Anybody can easily get in the house. I am very much worried about my daughters. I cannot sleep well at night. I always have a fear that some bad guys may break into my house and harm us.35 However, the camp residents have no permission to upgrade or renovate their shelters on their own as these are temporary dwelling arrangements for them. They can only report to the camp administration if something is wrong in their houses, and wait until they receive any responses about fixing it. In other words, the Rohingya are expected to live in poor housing. As one NGO employee commented, “nobody is allowed to build a house. They may save money or buy some good food. They cannot do anything else with the money.”36 (e)   Poverty and lack of educational and work opportunities Deteriorated material conditions, delayed marriage, and lack of educational facilities significantly impact the psychosocial well-being of the Rohingya adolescent girls in the camps. The Rohingya were a self-sufficient community in South-Western Myanmar. Generally, the families were well off based on an agricultural economy. They had land, cattle, and poultry. They could meet their everyday needs from their own productions, and they had a decent ability to purchase whatever they needed to. As one female parent said, “we had a brick house there. We had our own income sources in Burma. So, we had financial independence. We had no expenses to buy vegetable, we could cultivate them.”37 Similarly, one male parent reported: I was a rich person there. I owned 160 Kani (almost 80 acre) of land and one hundred cows and buffalos. I had 10 thousand “ari” of paddy (1 ari = 16 kg). We are 5 brothers. We had 5 two-storied houses, made of wood …We had all we need: lands, cattle, everything. We had a fishing boat. We would catch fish with it. Life was happy there.38 However, after migration, the families have become fully dependent on the NGOs, while the provisions of the NGOs cover only a portion of what they need or feel necessary. For example, NGOs supply rice, flour, oil, and lentils, but do not provide clothes and cosmetics. For some adolescent girls, they are at an age when they are fond of fashion and style. However, their limited material condition does not allow them access to these items as most of the families do not have work to earn income. This generates a sense of deprivation among adolescent girls in the camps, making them feel unfortunate. As one adolescent girl said: We had sufficient money. I used to have wardrobes full of clothes. We could shop whatever we felt like. Also, I could dress up on my wish.

130  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan Here, I only have a pair of clothes. We don’t have anything to keep our clothes. In Burma, we had hennery. We used to live a decent life. But here these things are missing.39 In addition, the absence of educational opportunities for the adolescent girls in camps intensifies their feeling of uncertainty. The elementary level education (up to grade 4) and the pilot project-based high school education (up to grade 9) that are permitted in camps do not normally target adolescent girls. While some families continue their adolescent daughters’ education by hiring private tutors or religious teachers (hujur), many families are unable due to poverty. As a result, many adolescent girls in the camps do not have access to education. As one adolescent girl reported: I wish to study, and I wish to learn some skills. However, there is no scope. We had a hujur who used to come to our place to teach us Urdu. We had to pay Tk. 200 per month to keep him, but now we do not have the money. I am waiting for a time when I would be able to study again.40 Again, the vocational training programs that several NGOs (such as BRAC) run have very limited capacities and cover only a small portion of the adolescent boys and girls in the camps. As a result, a large number of adolescent girls who want to participate in those programs cannot have access to them. This leaves little opportunity for many girls to gain skills to be productive. This develops frustration among some girls. One adolescent girl expressed her experiences of being deprived of education and vocational training opportunities as follows: It looks nice when I see girls going to the centres with umbrellas to learn sewing. I would feel good if I had an opportunity, but nobody invites us. If I was called, I think, my parents would permit me. But nobody calls. If I could learn some skills if I could work, earn some money, pay for hujur, and help my family. I would feel really happy.41 Such a feeling of deprivation, however, does not seem to be uniform among the girls. Some girls tend to stick to their own cultural values and think that they should stay home until they are married off rather than looking for jobs for earning. They are afraid that going to school or working for earning may bring social stigma to them. Their primary concern is marriage, which may become uncertain, as they fear it, due to going to school. As one Rohingya adolescent girl stated: We want to study, but we prefer not to go against our family and society. Marriage is a very important event in the life of every Rohingya girl. We have a fear that if we go against society, it will be an obstacle to marriage.42

Security and Self-Dignity Challenges for Rohingya Adolescent Girls  131 Thus, poverty and the absence of educational opportunities have a significant psychological impact on Rohingya adolescent girls. This observation is consistent with UNICEF et al.’s (2014) study on Syrian youth and Schlecht et al.’s (2017) study on the Somali refugee adolescent girls in Ethiopia as discussed above. That is, the mental health of the Rohingya adolescent girls can be a critical issue. Grønlund (2016) observed the presence of grieving for losses, shortage of food, limited access to education, poor camp and shelter conditions, health problems, restrictions in movement, and uncertainty about citizenship status among the Rohingya living in Aceh in Indonesia. Considering the protracted stay of the Rohingya in Bangladesh, Tay A. K. et al. (2019) feared the Rohingya’s greater vulnerability to a wide array of mental health problems including posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression, and suicidal ideation. However, the mental health of the displaced Rohingya in Bangladesh has largely remained unexplored. (f)  Prevalence of human trafficking Again, lack of educational opportunities, economic strains, and uncertainty of marriage put many adolescent girls at higher risk of trafficking. Girls who have some education and vocational training may work with NGOs. However, those who do not have education or any skills, do not have an earning person at home, or do not have a guardian to protect them (such as those who are orphans or have elderly parents) are often the targets and prey of human traffickers. It was informed by some humanitarian practitioners working in the camps that human traffickers or their brokers take the opportunity of free access into the camps. They target particularly those girls who are materially in need or orphans to allure them in the name of giving jobs and take them out of the camps to engage them in domestic work, the sex trade in local hotels, or sell them to international human traffickers. Often, some local people exploit the vulnerability of such girls to sexually abuse them through the false promise of marriage or false marriage. As one NGO worker reported, “many girls have gone the wrong way because of poverty. When the administration finds out, they are brought back.”43 As another practitioner informed, “there are many girls who do not have parents. There are many families with an old mother and three or four daughters. Many local people take away these girls with the assurance of marriage.”44 The problem of human trafficking in Rohingya camps is evident through different investigations and research reports. The 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report of the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons of the US Department of State informs that the humanitarian organizations active in Rohingya camps identified a total of 543 victims of trafficking between December 2018–2019 (US Department of State, 2021). International Organization of Migration (IOM, 2022) directly identified and assisted over 1,300 Rohingya victims of trafficking by August 2022, a majority of whom were women and girls. Case information analyses of IOM (2022) suggest

132  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan that most victims were transported to Chittagong, Dhaka, and different areas of Cox’s Bazar where they were engaged in exploitative tasks of domestic work or caregiving without or with little payments. Related to the above sources of insecurity and uncertainty, two other issues exist as constant sources of discomfort, subjugation, and control for the Rohingya adolescent girls in the camps. These are a complex and multilayered form of surveillance and demands of the NGOs. The formal and informal social regulation systems in camps have overlapping control over the everyday life of Rohingya adolescent girls. While it is expected that the camp dwellers submit all their demands and complaints to the camp administration, the majhis (Rohingya community leaders at the camp level) act as an essential mediator in the relation between the two entities. The majhis normally compromise the autonomy of the camp dwellers and require the camp dwellers to inform them first of any issues they might have. The formal administration may also have to depend on the majhis to maintain order in the camps. Thus, if the adolescent girls have to go to another camp or if they have any issues or problems, the majhis and sub-majhis (community leaders at the bloc level) expect that they are informed first. One’s failure to comply with this expectation is treated as deviance and may involve repression. The Rohingya are also loyal to the majhis as they are from their own community and they can trust them. As one adolescent girl informed: If something bad happens here, first, I will tell the [sub] Majhi [at the bloc level]. If that doesn’t work, I will complain to the site Majhi [at the camp level]. Then we go to the Resource Centre if we don’t find any solution. There is a Resource Centre for every bloc. If that doesn’t go well too, we have to go to the CIC.45 Non-government organizations (NGOs) active in the camps are a source of stress for adolescent girls. While the NGOs are the sources of many provisions for them, the girls perceive it as an obligation for them to respond to the calls of the NGOs either for programming or meetings. Therefore, the girls often find contacts from NGOs disturbances to their personal life. As one girl expresses her reactions to NGO contacts: They [NGOs] call on every house in the sector to attend the meetings. They teach us to stay clean so that we can stay free from many diseases. We can learn many things if we attend the meetings. We have to attend many meetings. We don’t feel good about that, but we are bound to attend those meetings. Every day we need to attend meetings though we don’t like it. We need to abide by their orders. That’s why we don’t like it here.46 Thus, we see that almost all the sources of insecurity particularly involving adolescent girls that are seen in other refugee camps in different locations are

Security and Self-Dignity Challenges for Rohingya Adolescent Girls  133 also present in the Rohingya camps in Bangladesh. In some cases, the risks in the Bangladeshi camps are more severe. For example, the absence of educational opportunities. Moreover, not having the recognition of refugee status deprives them of different opportunities that are needed for their healthy growth. The girls see the camps as arenas of fear which prevents them from moving freely in the camps and forces them to stay home. Water, toilet, and washroom facilities are health hazardous and uncongenial for their personal safety and privacy. Poor housing is a source of the fear of crime and theft and is unhealthy. Lack of educational and economic opportunities develops a feeling of deprivation among them. Parents cannot marry off their daughters due to financial constraints and legal barriers. While this may reduce the risk of early/forced marriage and early motherhood, it also creates mental stress and feelings of uncertainty among both the girls and their parents. A porous security system allows human traffickers’ access into the camps and puts many girls, particularly those who are orphans and are in economic need, at risk of being trafficked into the sex trade or exploitative domestic work. Finally, an overlapping administrative structure and over-dependence on NGOs limit the girls’ ability to self-control and exercise personal autonomy. If we relate these sources of insecurity for Rohingya adolescent girls to Robert Blum and Colleagues’ (Blum et al. 2014) five requirements for the successful completion of adolescence, we can see that the Rohingya adolescent girls in the Bangladeshi camps are at dire risk. Lack of educational and skill development opportunities puts their future into uncertainty. A majority of the girls find their life “stuck in a hole”—a state of deep frustration. With no education or employment, the girls could seek hope in marriage. However, marriage is delayed too due to legal restrictions and/ or financial constraints. Dependent on their families, the girls hardly have any resources to practice decision-making. Their self-concept and sense of self-efficacy are seriously compromised due to constant fear of safety in the camps where there is no light at night and improper toilet or bathroom facilities. They have to confine themselves inside the home to stay safe, and, thus their time is passed unproductive. This deep situation of uncertainty negatively affects their mental well-being, and they find their life at a loss, simply “stuck.” Conclusion When the Rohingya adolescent girls left Myanmar in 2017, the safety of life was their primary concern. In camp, it is the meaning of life. There are multiple barriers to the successful transition through adolescence. There is fear that the lives of the young Rohingya population may be wasted. As Olney, Haque and Mubarak (2019) urge, “We must prevent a lost generation.” When Bangladesh responded to the global call for accepting the Rohingya in August 2017, there was a general expectation that the crisis was only temporary, there will be a quick solution, and the displaced Rohingya will

134  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan return to their own places soon. However, this has not happened. Global realities have changed dramatically and significantly over the last five years. While some measures of repatriation had been in process in light of the bilateral agreement between Bangladesh and Myanmar and offered mediation support from some countries, specifically China, everything halted as COVID-19 emerged as a global pandemic in early 2020. Every nation’s priority became saving its own population. Potential nations which could create pressure on Myanmar on the question of repatriation are under severe threats of economic recession, livelihood deterioration of citizens, and political destabilization. The military coup of February 2021 in Myanmar further deepened the uncertainty around quick repatriation of the Rohingya for two reasons: first, the Myanmar military government is apparently unwilling to take the Rohingya back in their country47; second, their current priorities are to control domestic militant insurgencies and political unrest. Now the Russia–Ukraine War has made repatriation further uncertain as global focuses regarding forced displacement has largely shifted to Eastern Europe. Under such changed circumstances, prospects are dim that the process of repatriation of the Rohingya will gain enough progress in the recent future. Instead, the possibility is high that their stay in Bangladesh will be infinitely prolonged. However, the lives of the Rohingya in camps go on. The kids are turning into adolescents, the youth are becoming adults, and the adults will grow old. As quick repatriation of the Rohingya is becoming uncertain, the barriers to the successful transition through adolescence for the Rohingya girls need to be considered seriously. Measures must be taken to create a favorable environment and infrastructure to enhance the possibility that Rohingya adolescent girls can effectively use their time to prepare for a meaningful future and dignified life. Notes 1 This initiative began in September 2019, and by April 2022, 80 percent of the project has been completed (80pc fencing around Rohingya camps completed: Kamal, April 10, 2022). 2 Safe Spaces for women and girls are women-friendly spaces (sheds) in Rohingya camps supported by UNFPA. These are locally called Shanti Khana (Home of Peace), where NGOs run programs on safety and awareness for Rohingya women and girls (Women-Friendly Spaces for Rohingya refugees: A place for protection and care, July 13, 2018). 3 Author Interview, July 12, 2019. 4 Author Interview, July 11, 2019 5 Author Interview, June 21, 2019. 6 Author Interview, July 11, 2019. 7 Author Interview, July 11, 2019. 8 Author Interview, June 21, 2019. 9 Author Interview, July 11, 2019. 10 Author Interview, July 12, 2019. 11 Author Interview, July 11, 2019.

Security and Self-Dignity Challenges for Rohingya Adolescent Girls  135 12 Author Interview, July 11, 2019. 13 Author Interview, July 12, 2019. 14 Author Interview, July 12, 2019. 15 Author Interview July 11, 2019. 16 Author Interview, July 11, 2019. 17 Author Interview, July 12, 2019. 18 Author Interview, July 12, 2019. 19 Author Interview, July 11, 2019. 20 Author Interview, June 21, 2019. 21 Author Interview, July 11, 2019. 22 Author Interview, July 12, 2019. 23 Author Interview, July 11, 2019. 24 Author Interview, July 12, 2019. 25 Author Interview, June 21, 2019. 26 Author Interview, July 12, 2019. 27 Author Interview, July 12, 2019. 28 Author Interview, July 12, 2019. 29 Author Interview, July 11, 2019. 30 Author Interview, July 11, 2019. 31 Author Interview, July 11, 2019. 32 Author Interview, July 11, 2019. 33 Author Interview, July 12, 2019. 34 Author Interview, June 21, 2019. 35 Author Interview, July 11, 2019. 36 Author Interview, July 12, 2019. 37 Author Interview, July 12, 2019. 38 Author Interview, July 12, 2019. 39 Author Interview, June 21, 2019. 40 Author Interview, June 21, 2019. 41 Author Interview, June 21, 2019. 42 Author Interview, June 21, 2019. 43 Author Interview, July 12, 2019. 44 Author Interview, July 12, 2019. 45 Author Interview, June 11, 2019. 46 Author Interview, June 21, 2019. 47 As the Myanmar military chief recently remarked that his government would not take any measures about the displaced Rohingya that goes against their country refugee related legislations (Myanmar junta leader casts doubt on return of Rohingya (2021).

References 80pc fencing around Rohingya camps completed: Kamal (2022, April 10). The Daily Sun. Retrieved from https://www​.daily​-sun​.com​/post​/615043​/80pc​-fencing​ -around​-Rohingya camps-completed:-Kamal Acaps/NPM Analysis Hub (2018). Rohingya crisis: Host communities review. Thematic report. Retrieved from https://www​.acaps​.org​/sites​/acaps​/files​/products​ /files​/20180131​_npm​_acaps​_rohingya​_cr isis​_host​_communities​​.pdf Alam, M. (2018, January 5). Violence at home, insecurity here, uncertainty ahead: The predicament of Rohingya women and girls. The Daily Star. Retrieved from https:// www​.thedailystar​.net​/star​-weekend​/violence​-home​-insecurity​-here​-uncertainty​ -ahead​-1514953

136  Mahmudur Rahman Bhuiyan Barbed wire fence around Rohingya camps in Bangladesh condemned (2021, May 11). NewAge. Retrieved from https://www​.newagebd​.net​/article​/137751​/barbed​ -wire​-fence​-around​-rohingya​-camps​-condemned Blum, R.W., Astone, N.M., Decker M.R., & Mouli, V.C. (2014). A conceptual framework for early adolescence: A platform for research. International Journal of Adolescent Medical Health, 26(3), 321–31. Delong, J., Sbeity, F., Schlecht, J., Harfouche, M., Yamout, R., & Fouad, F. M (2017). Young lives disrupted: Gender and well-being among adolescent Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Conflict and Health, 11(23, Suppl 1), 25–34. Grønlund, C. A. (2016). Refugees in exodus: Statelessness and identity: A case study of Rohingya refugees in Aceh, Indonesia (Master’s thesis). University of Agder, Norway. International Organization of Migration (2022). IOM calls for increased support and lasting solutions to Rohingya refugees crisis, five years on. Retrieved from https:// www​.iom​.int​/news​/iom​-calls​-increased​-support​-and​-lasting​-solutions​-rohingya​ -refugees​-crisis​-five​-years Inter Sector Coordination Group (2018). Situation report: Rohingya refugee crisis (February). Retrieved from https://www​.hum​anit​aria​nresponse​.info​/en​/operations​ /bangladesh​/document​/situation- repor​t-roh​ingya​-cris​is-co​xs-ba​zar-1​1-feb​ruary​ -2018​ Jerin, I., & Mozumder, M. K. (2020). Exploring host community attitudes towards Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. Intervention, 17(2), 169–173. Kipgen, N. (2019). The Rohingya crisis: The centrality of identify and citizenship. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 39(1), 61–74. League of Arab States (2011). Family health survey of the Arab Republic of Syria 2009: Principal report. Central Bureau of Statistics. Maguire, S. (2012). Putting adolescents and youth at the centre. Forced Migration Review, 40, 4–5. Myanmar junta leader casts doubt on return of Rohingya (2021, May 24). Reuters. Retrieved from https://www​.reuters​.com​/world​/asia​-pacific​/myanmar​-junta​-leader​ -casts​-doubt- return-rohingya-2021-05-24/ Olney, J., Haque, N., & Mubarak, R. (2019). We must prevent a lost generation: Community-led education in Rohingya camps (PRIO Paper). Oslo: Peace Research Institute of Oslo. Paik, K. (2012). The path to hope Congolese refugee adolescent girls in Nyarugusu refugee camp, Tanzania. New York: Women’s Refugee Commission. Potts, A., Barada, R., & Bourassa, A. (2021). GBV and mental health among refugee and host community women in Lebanon. Forced Migration Review, 66, 29–31. Rahman, N.U. (2020, October 11). Keno Rohingyarai Rohingyaderke hotya korchhe. Bangla Tribune. Retrieved from https://www​.banglatribune​.com​/columns​ /646900/​%E0​%A6​%95​%E0​%A7​%87​%E0​%A6​%A8​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​%A7​ %8B ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % B9 ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % BF ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % 99 ​ % E0 ​ % A7 ​ % 8D ​ % E0 ​ % A6​ %97 ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % BE ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % B0 ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % BE ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % 87- ​ % E0 ​ % A6​ %B0 ​ % E0 ​ % A7​ % 8B​ % E0​ % A6​ % B9​ % E0​ % A6 ​ % BF ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % 99 ​ % E0 ​ % A7​ %8D ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % 97 ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % BE ​ % E0 ​ % A6​ % A6​ % E0​ % A7​ % 87​ % E0​ % A6​ %B0 ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % 95 ​ % E0 ​ % A7 ​ % 87- ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % B9 ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % A4 ​ % E0 ​ % A7​ %8D​%E0​%A6​%AF​%E0​%A6​%BE-​%E0​%A6​%95​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​%A6​ %9B​%E0​%A7​%87

Security and Self-Dignity Challenges for Rohingya Adolescent Girls  137 Sahbani, A., Al-Khateeb, M., & Hikmat, R. (2016). Early marriage and pregnancy among Syrian adolescent girls in Jordan; do they have a choice? Pathogens and Global Health, 110(6), 216–218. Schlecht, J., Lee, C., Kerner, B., Greeley, M., & Robinson, C (2017). Prioritizing programming to address the needs and risks of very young adolescents: A summary of findings across three humanitarian settings. Conflict and Health, 11(31, Suppl 1), 1–8. Siddiqqi, A. (2012). Missing the emergency: Shifting the paradigm for relief to adolescent girls. The coalition for adolescent girls. Retrieved from https://www​ .humanitarianlibrary​.org​/sites​/default​/files​/2014​/02​/2012​-05​-23​-Missing​-the Emergency​-FINAL1​%20​%281​%2​9​.pdf SRH Working Group (2021). Strategy on family planning for the Rohingya humanitarian crisis 2021–2023. Retrieved from https://bangladesh​.unfpa​.org​/sites​ /default​/files​/pub pdf/c​​lean_​​final​​_srh_​​wg​_s_​​famil​​y​_pla​​nning​​_stra​​teg​y_​​2021.​​pdf Strategic Executive Group (2019). Joint response plan for Rohingya humanitarian crisis (January–December). Retrieved from file:​///C:​/User​s/bhu​iy/Do​wnloa​ds/20​ 19%20​JRP%2​0for%​20Roh​ingya​%20Hu​manit​arian​%20Cr​isis%​20(Fe​bruar​ y%202​019).​​compr​​essed​​.pdf Tay, A. K., Riley, A., Islam, R., Welton-Mitchell C., Duchesne, B., Waters, V., Varner, A., Moussa, A., Alam, A. N. M., Elshazly, M.A., Silove, D., & Ventevogel, P. (2019). The culture, mental health and psychosocial wellbeing of Rohingya refugees: A systematic review. Epidemiology and Psychiatric Sciences, 28, 489–494. UNICEF, UNFPA, UNESCO, UNHCR, & SCI (2014). Situation analysis of youth in Lebanon affected by the Syrian crisis. Retrieved from https://reliefweb​.int​/report​/ lebanon​/situation​-analysis​-youth​-lebanon​-affected​-syrian​-crisis US Department of State (2021). 2020 trafficking in persons report: Bangladesh. Retrieved on January 5, 2021 from https://www​.state​.gov​/reports​/2020​-trafficking​ -in​-persons- report/bangladesh/ Van Esveld (2020). Bangladesh allows kids to receive formal education. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www​.hrw​.org​/news​/2020​/01​/29​/step​ -forward​-10000​-rohingya- refugee-children# Women-Friendly Spaces for Rohingya refugees: A place for protection and care (2018, July 13). UN News. Retrieved from https://news​.un​.org​/en​/story​/2018​/07​ /1013892 Women’s Refugee Commission (2012). In search of safety and solutions: Somali refugee adolescent girls at Sheder and Aw Barre Camps, Ethiopia. Retrieved from https://reliefweb​.int​/sites​/reliefweb​.int​/files​/resources​/in​_search​_of​_safety​_and​ _solutions​_ethiopia​_2012​-1​%5B1​%5D​.pdf

8

Healthcare-Seeking Behaviour for Reproductive Tract Infections among Rohingya Refugee Adolescent Girls Lucy Christine Nderitu, Sahlil Ahmed, Abdul Awal, Bachera Aktar, and A.S.G. Faruque

Introduction Reproductive tract infections (RTIs) and associated symptoms are a major cause of gynaecological morbidity among women of reproductive age, especially due to different anatomical structure of female reproductive tract and improper hygienic practices (Kabir et al., 2014). RTIs include sexually transmitted infections (STIs) as well as other infections of the reproductive tract that are not sexually transmitted which according to the World Health Organization (WHO) (2012), while STIs are major contributors of the global burden of diseases, non-sexually transmitted RTIs are the most common among women. Particularly, endogenous infections such as yeast infections and bacterial vaginosis are influenced by, among other factors, environmental, hygienic, and hormonal factors (Inter-Agency Working Group on Reproductive Health in Crises, 2010). According to the same report, the risk of STIs in humanitarian settings increases due to increased sexual violence, alcohol and substance abuse, transactional sex, high mobility work, overcrowding, and lack of access to reproductive health information as well as poor reproductive hygiene practices due to lack of privacy. Reproductive tract infections can also result from poor menstrual, sexual, and personal hygiene, with the risk further increasing among those with; irregular menstrual cycles, married at below 19 years, get pregnant at below 20 years, deliver at home, and where delivery is conducted by non-health personnel (Kafle & Bhattarai, 2016). Reproductive tract infections are characterized by symptoms such as abnormal vaginal discharge, fishy smell, swelling in the groin, genital itching, genital ulcers, vaginal pain, lower abdominal pain, low backache, burning sensation during urination as well as painful intercourse (Kafle & Bhattarai, 2016). Preventable and treatable RTIs which go untreated can cause pelvic inflammatory disease (PID), ectopic pregnancy, infertility, adverse birth outcomes, increased risk of acquiring and transmitting human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), and even death (Darmstadt et al., 2010). DOI: 10.4324/9781003228707-11

Healthcare-Seeking Behaviour among Rohingya Adolescent Girls  139 Adolescent girls in developing countries are increasingly being affected by RTIs where the global burden of RTIs is estimated to be about 80% to 90% (WHO, 2013). In times of conflict, women and girls are disproportionately affected, and as a result of their increased vulnerability, they experience additional specific sexual and reproductive health (SRH) needs including higher risk of infectious diseases (Munyuzangabo et al., 2020). Such crises further disrupt access to healthcare services leading to poor sexual and reproductive health outcomes (Nabulsi et al., 2021). Notably, adolescent girls (aged 10–19) become extremely vulnerable to detrimental physical, sexual, and psychological effects as they are orphaned or separated from their families, and as other social structures that offer them protection are broken, exposing them to physical or sexual exploitation (United Nations Children’s Fund, 2011). However, as they are often overlooked in sexual reproductive health interventions (United Nations Population Fund, 2018), and as their independent ability to access quality reproductive care is grossly compromised because of the prevailing conflict situation, they rarely access the available health interventions or quality evidence-based sexual reproductive health (SRH) services (Schlecht, Lee, Kerner, Greeley, & Robinson, 2017). Studies show high prevalence of symptoms that were increased by impaired hygiene practices after defecation, sexual intercourse and menstruation, inadequate water supply as well as water contamination. There is, however, poor health-seeking behaviour due to lack of knowledge and cultural practices. Among Somali refugees, culturally, parents do not talk about sexual health before the age of 15 or 18 years (Ortiz-Echevarria et al., 2017), while SRH services are mostly availed by married persons (Lee et al., 2017). The Rohingya Refugee camp in Cox’s Bazaar Bangladesh is home to an estimated 943,529 refugees, 52% among who are women and girls (UNHCR Bangladesh, 2022) and a majority of the refugees are living in 34 camps and settlements in Teknaf and Ukhia Upazilas (UNHCR, 2022) and on the island of Bhasan Char (OCHA, 2022). The camps are crowded with small makeshift houses that up to eight people live in (United Nations Population Fund, 2018). As reported by Plan International (2018), girls have challenges accessing adequate water and sanitation facilities. Tube wells, which are poorly designed and operate very slowly, are few and located far away from the houses. This discourages personal hygiene practices like bathing. Further, as the tube wells were poorly installed, seasonal health threats such as illnesses from contaminated water occur during the rainy seasons (Inter Sector Coordination Group (ISCG), 2018). At the same time, girls lack designated toilet or bathroom facilities which with the lack of sufficient lighting in camps exacerbate safety risks and negatively affect the girls’ mobility, access to services, and hygiene practices (ISCG, 2018). Further, according to the same report, many households have constructed their own informal bathrooms posing further challenges to monitoring, drainage, and space. The Rohingya crisis situation disproportionately affects women and girls by maintaining and aggravating pre-existing persistent gender inequalities, gender-based violence, and discrimination (UN Women Bangladesh, 2018).

140  Nderitu, Ahmed, Awal, Aktar, and Faruque Inadequate basic living facilities in the camps further coupled with cultural barriers further exacerbate Rohingya women and girls’ vulnerability to sexual reproductive health issues (Yousuf et al., 2020), Pandit et al., 2022). Sexual and reproductive health needs and health-seeking behaviour of adolescents are yet to be understood (Blum, Bastos, Kabiru, & Le, 2012). The needs of high risk and special needs populations, including adolescents in the camp, have not yet been systematically addressed as they are largely not understood (United Nations Population Fund, 2018). This lack of data on adolescents’ SRH needs and services, including evidence on RTI prevalence and existing interventions for them in the refugee camps, negatively impacts the implementation of SRH programmes (United Nations Population Fund, 2018). This study aims to provide evidence on the healthcare-seeking behaviour for reproductive tract infections among Rohingya refugee adolescent girls aged 14–18 years and to give an understanding of common RTI symptoms and the health-seeking behaviour and subsequent barriers to seeking treatment. These findings will facilitate the implementation of adolescent SRH programmes, including awareness creation and education of adolescent girls, demand creation for services, as well as capacity building of healthcare providers so that they provide quality SRH services, and in an adolescentfriendly manner. Methodology (a) Study Design

This was a convergent mixed method study (Creswell, 2014) that applied both qualitative and quantitative approaches. (b) Study Site

The study was conducted in refugee camps located in Ukhia Upazilla as it was the newest camp since the influx in August 2017. Since we had limited time and resources, the camps where the study was conducted were selected purposively to include only those that had BRAC-operated child-friendly spaces (CFSs) as they would be easier to access. In Ukhia Upazilla, BRAC operates 194 CFSs in 19 camps. To each CFS, four pockets (home-based spaces) are attached, and it is in the pockets that adolescent girls received group counselling. We used the pockets since through them we would have easier access to the adolescent girls. The interviews and focus group discussions were conducted in the selected pockets and the nearby homes, as the adolescents preferred. (c) Study Population

The study was conducted among Rohingya refugee adolescent girls aged 14–18 years living in the selected refugee camps.

Healthcare-Seeking Behaviour among Rohingya Adolescent Girls  141 (d) Sample Size Determination

1 Quantitative sample size: We took 16% prevalence of pregnancy among Rohingya adolescent girls (Plan International, 2018) to calculate the sample since it was one of the key outcomes of the summative learning project (SLP) group and the calculated sample size of 634 was the second largest and feasible considering the available resources. The formula used to calculate sample size is, n = (z^2 pq)/d^2 × d.e., where n = the required sample size p = 16% q = 1-p z = 1.96 (95% confidence) d = error (precision), i.e., 5%. d.e.= design effect Therefore, n 

z 2 pq

 d.e.  n 

1.962 0.16  0.84

 1.5 d 0.052 Calculated sample is 340 with 10% non-response rate. 2 Qualitative sample: For the qualitative study, eight in-depth interviews (IDIs) with adolescent girls, 11 IDIs with frontline healthcare providers, doctors, midwives, nurses, and two focus group discussions (FGDs) with mothers of adolescent girls were conducted. Data was collected until reaching the saturated level. 2

(e) Sampling Technique

Quantitative: A multistage sampling strategy was applied. First stage: A list of BRAC-operated child-friendly spaces (CFS) was collected from the BRAC Humanitarian Response Program. There are approximately 10 adolescent girls in each pocket under each CFS. Therefore, it was required to cover the catchment areas of at least three to four CFSs to get the required sample size. Given, the camps having less than six CFSs were excluded from the list. Then five camps: 11, 13, 14, 8E, and 8W were randomly selected from the filtered list. Second stage: From the list of CFSs under each selected camp, one CFS was randomly selected. The data were collected from pockets under the selected CFS as well as its adjacent two to three CFSs. Third and final stage: The adolescents were selected from the households under each pocket of the selected CFSs, conveniently following the selection criteria. If households did not have a qualifying adolescent girl, or she was not willing to participate in the study, then the next household was approached. 60 adolescent girls were interviewed from each camp. Qualitative: Camp 11 was purposively selected for all the qualitative data. Adolescents were selected either from the survey interviews, door to door, or by convenience, following referrals by other adolescents.

142  Nderitu, Ahmed, Awal, Aktar, and Faruque Mothers and healthcare providers were also selected as per convenience. Data collection continued till data saturation was observed in each group. (f) Study Tools

(i) Quantitative: Data was collected using an interviewer-administered questionnaire. The questionnaire was translated from English to Bangla and pretested in a camp different from the ones sampled. The tools were corrected and revised after pre-testing. The SurveyCTO software and Open Data Kit (ODK) were used for collecting data electronically through a tablet. (ii) Qualitative: Data was collected using separate in-depth interview guidelines for adolescent girls and healthcare providers and through focus group discussions. All the study tools were translated from English to Bangla and pre-tested. They were then revised by incorporating feedback from the pre-test before being used for collecting data for the study. Checklists, cassette recorders, and simultaneous note-taking were also used. (g) Data Collection Procedure

Data collection took place from 18 November to 3 December 2018. Qualitative and quantitative data was collected simultaneously. 1 Quantitative data collection: Data from a sample of 340 adolescent girls was collected electronically using open access software, and the questionnaire was administered by five research assistants recruited from among local Cox’s Bazar inhabitants who were familiar with refugee camps and knew the Rohingya dialect from their parents who had migrated to Bangladesh in 1978, 1991, and 1992. Since the study was conducted in the Rohingya language, research assistants translated and back-translated the questions. The research assistants were trained on all the tools prior to the data collection exercise. The quality of data was checked at various steps throughout the data collection process. Identified errors were brought to the attention of the research assistants and necessary corrections were made. 2 Qualitative data collection: All data collection tools were pre-tested in a camp different from the ones sampled and revised according to the gaps identified in the pre-test. Eleven IDIs with healthcare providers (doctors, midwives, and a nurse), eight IDIs with adolescent girls, and two FGDs with mothers of adolescent girls were conducted. Data quality control was ensured throughout the data collection process. (h) Data Analysis Procedure

Quantitative analysis: Data was analyzed using the Stata software, Version 13. Univariate and bivariate descriptive analyses were conducted.

Healthcare-Seeking Behaviour among Rohingya Adolescent Girls  143 Qualitative analysis: Data was analyzed deductively and inductively. A priori codes were developed prior to data analysis. Transcripts were translated from the Rohingya language to Bangla, and from Bangla to English. Data familiarization was done, and a priori codes were refined. Inductive codes were identified from emerging themes. Conceptually ordered data that displayed matrices were used to group similar items based on the predetermined themes: RTI symptoms, risk factors, treatment-seeking behaviour, and barriers to treatment seeking. Data was verified and validated through data triangulation of observation notes, interviews and focus group discussions, and peer and literature review. Quotes were generated and used to supplement the data collected using the structured interviews. Ethical Considerations Ethical approval for the study was acquired from the Ethics Review Board of the James P. Grant School of Public Health, BRAC University. The reference number given was 2018-035-IR. We also took permission from the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC) and obtained a written document for entry to the camp. Prior to conducting interviews, the purpose of the study was explained. Assent was then taken from the adolescents and verbal consent from the adolescents’ mothers. Verbal consent was also taken for audio recordings. Written consent was taken from the healthcare workers with whom we conducted in-depth interviews. Respondents’ right to withdraw from the study was explained, and they were reassured of no consequences in case they withdrew. The Open Data Kit (ODK) tool was used for quantitative data collection while unique identifiers were used instead of using identification markers. The de-identified data was only accessible to the researchers, their mentors, the assistant supervisor, and the supervisor. Confidentiality and anonymity were maintained by ensuring research assistants signed a non-disclosure agreement before the start of the study. They also left the data-collecting tablets with the principal investigators at the end of each day. Any respondent that was found to have an RTI and was not getting treatment was referred to the nearest health facility for medical care. (j) Limitations of the Study

Most of the people involved in the study did not understand the local language. Since a significant amount of translation was done, this could have led to loss of some data, particularly qualitative data. There was also high chance of recall bias since we were collecting data on past experiences, and, therefore, depending on the respondents’ memory. We also had a very short time and limited resources; therefore, it was not possible to do a larger and much more extensive study, and the participants were selected conveniently, and, as a result, the findings are not generalizable.

144  Nderitu, Ahmed, Awal, Aktar, and Faruque Results and Discussion (a) Social Demographic Characteristics

As shown in Table 8.1, the average age of the survey respondents was 15.5 years. Among them, 30.6% had ever been married, while 69.4% were unmarried. Most of the adolescents (72.1%) lived with their parents or parents’ in-laws in households with an average of 5.9 members. Among the ever married, 51% of them did household work while majority of the unmarried (81.4%) were not employed. All the respondents were Muslims. Profile of the qualitative interview respondents: Among the seven adolescent respondents, three had no schooling. Of the four who had gone to school, three had studied up to primary level grade three, and one up to higher secondary. Only two of the seven were married, of whom one was expecting

Table 8.1 Sociodemographic characteristics of study participants Variables Frequency (%) Age (years) [Mean (SD)] Age at menarche (years) [Mean (SD)] Religion Muslim Education level Schooling No schooling Number of HH members [Mean (SD)] Household head Father Mother Husband Self Brother/sister Others Current occupation Paid household work Tailoring/handicraft volunteering with I/NGOs Not employed Main source of HH income Daily/weekly/monthly labour Shop keeping Service at I/NGOs Teaching Relief Others

Ever married Never married Total 104 (30.6) 17.3≠1.1 12≠0.65

236 (69.4) 15.5≠1.3 13≠0.70

340 (100) 16.0≠1.5 12.0≠0.07

104 (30.6) 38 (36.5) 66 (63.46)

236(69.4) 137 (58.05) 99 (41.95)

340(100) 175(51.47) 165 (48.53)

4.4≠2.0

6.5≠2.5

5.9≠ 2.5

9 (8.65) 5 (4.81) 81 (77.9) 5 (4.8) 4 (3.9)

177 (75) 39 (16.5) 4(1.7) 12(5.1) 12 (5.1) 4(1.7)

186 (54.7) 44 (12.9) 81 (23.8) 9 (2.7) 12 (3.5) 8 (2.4)

53 (51) 7 (6.7) 3 (2.9) 41 (39)

1 (0.4) 29 (12.3) 12 (5.1) 192 (81.4)

54 (15.9) 36 (10.6) 15 (4.4) 233 (68)

44 (42) 6 (6) 6 (6) 4 (4) 60 (58) 2 (2)

67 (28) 19 (8) 18 (8) 16 (7) 216 (63) 15 (4)

111 (33) 25 (7) 24 (7) 20 (6) 216 (63) 15 (4)

Healthcare-Seeking Behaviour among Rohingya Adolescent Girls  145 her first child. All the other girls had never been pregnant. Among the adolescents, only one was working (as a schoolteacher). Among the healthcare providers, ten were females and one was male. Seven of the respondents were married and four unmarried. Among them, there were six midwives, two doctors, one nurse, and two paramedics. Seven of them had worked in the camp for two to six months, three of them for a period between six months and one year, and one for two-and-a-half years. Their age ranged between 22 and 28. Among the focus group discussion respondents, ten were married and four widowed. Two of them were tailors while the others performed household chores. Their age ranged between 23 and 50 years. (b) Common Symptoms

Quantitative Findings: Prevalence of symptoms: The prevalence of RTI symptoms as shown in Figure 8.1 was 18.2%. Among the “ever-married” adolescents, 27.4% had experienced symptoms while among the never married, 72.6% had experienced symptoms since coming to Bangladesh. As is seen in Table 8.2, abnormal vaginal discharge was the most common symptom (79%). Genital itching and burning sensation during urination were also commonly reported at 29% and 27%, respectively. Our findings also showed 32 cases of existing symptoms at the time of the study, with individuals experiencing more than one symptom. Abnormal vaginal discharge was also the most common symptom (90.6%) among those who had symptoms at the time of the study.

Figure 8.1  Prevalence of symptoms

146  Nderitu, Ahmed, Awal, Aktar, and Faruque Table 8.2 Common RTI symptoms RTI symptoms

Adolescents reporting symptoms

Having symptoms at the time of the study

Frequency (%) Lower back pain Abnormal vaginal discharge Fishy smell Swelling in the groin Genital itching, genital ulcers Vaginal pain Pain during intercourse Burning sensation during urination Heavy menstruation

n=62 10 (16) 49 (79) 4 (6.5) 10 (16) 18 (29) 6 (10) 2 (3) 17 (27) 2 (3)

n=32 3 (9.4) 29 (90.6) 2 (6.3) 7 (22) 11 (34.4) 4 (12.5) 1 (31.3) 10 (16) -

*Multiple responses *Two (20%) of the respondents could not remember how long the symptoms lasted

Qualitative Findings: From the interview, adolescent girls reported lower back pain, difficulty in urination, pain in the lower abdomen not related to menses, and white discharge as the symptoms they or other girls had experienced since coming to Bangladesh. One reported having white discharge with itchiness and rash that lasted two to three months. They, however, said they had themselves not experienced these symptoms in Myanmar. Some mothers, however, said that the RTI problems happened in Myanmar as well as in Bangladesh. As one mother said: “Those who do not have problems now did not have them when in Burma, those who had in Burma have it now. It just happens.” (12.12.2018) Another mother, however, disagreed with the others saying they had suffered more symptoms in Myanmar. “Everyone just said that it is not occurring because of coming here. People had more disease there. It is less now.” (12.12.2018) According to the healthcare providers, RTIs were more common among married adolescents compared to those who were unmarried. A majority of the healthcare providers said that married adolescents often suffered pelvic inflammatory disease (PID) while the unmarried adolescents suffered leucorrhoea, adding that adolescents stayed with symptoms for long and only went to the hospitals when the symptoms got complicated. (c) Risk of Developing RTIs

In this study we looked at the living conditions because, as other studies have shown, poor living conditions in humanitarian settings influence hygiene practices and, consequently, are associated with reproductive tract infections.

Healthcare-Seeking Behaviour among Rohingya Adolescent Girls  147 Quantitative Findings As is seen in Table 8.3, among the respondents having symptoms, 98.4% reported having access to toilets in the camp while 1.6% did not. The average time required for the participants to reach the toilets was 4.2 minutes. Regarding bathing, most of the adolescents (75.6%) used bathrooms made inside the houses with water from tube wells (95.3%). The average time taken to reach the source of water was eight minutes, the longest time being one hour. As seen in Table 8.4, 16.7% of the respondents with symptoms felt that the water wasn’t sufficient, while 18.5% felt that it was. Results also showed that 24.1% of the respondents with symptoms were not satisfied with the quality of water. Some of reasons given for being dissatisfied with the water were that the water was dirty and caused sickness. As is seen in Table 8.5, most of the respondents (64.4%) cleaned their genital areas with water only after visiting the toilet. Among the 102 participants who responded on how they cleaned up after sex, 16% had RTI symptoms while 84% did not. In both cases, adolescents mostly cleaned up with water and soap after sex. During menstruation, a majority of the adolescents (93.8%) cleaned up with water and soap. In observing personal hygiene, 62.7% took baths every two days compared to 13.5% who took a bath daily and 23.8% who took a bath after two days or more. Among those who had symptoms, a majority of them (66.1%) took a bath every two days. According to our findings, sanitary pads are the most commonly used absorbents (70.9%). As shown in Table 8.5, majority of the adolescents with symptoms (75.8%) also used sanitary pads to manage menstruation. As shown in Table 8.6, changing the absorbent three times a day was the most common practice, followed closely by twice a day. Among those that changed the absorbent three times a day, only 18.9% experienced RTI symptoms.​

Table 8.3: Access to hygiene facilities Having symptoms No symptom Total Toilet Yes No Time taken to reach the toilet Min (Mean [SD]) Bathroom Inside home Communal Others Source of bathing water Tube well Tap water NGO

62 (98.4) 1(1.6)

271(97.5) 7(2.5)

332(10) 8(100)

4.3≠3.8

4.2≠3.1

4.2≠3.2

45 (72.6) 12 (19.4) 6 (9.7)

212 (76.3) 48 (17.3) 19 (6.8)

257 (75.6) 60 (17.7) 25 (7.4)

60 (96.8) 1 (1.61) 2 (3.2)

264 (95) 13 (4.7) 5 (1.8)

324 (95.3) 14 (4.1) 7 (2.1)

148  Nderitu, Ahmed, Awal, Aktar, and Faruque Table 8.4  Living conditions Water is sufficient Yes No Satisfied with the quality of water Yes No

53 (18.5) 233(81.5) 9 (16.7) 45 (83.3)

286(100) 54 (100)

42 (16.3) 215 (83.7) 257(100) 20 (24.1) 63 (75.9) 83 (100)

Table 8.5 Personal hygiene practices Hygiene practice Frequency (%) Cleaning the genital area after toilet use* Water only Water and soap Cleaning the genital area after sex Water only Water and soap Cleaning the genital area during menstruation Water only Water and soap Other Taking bath Daily Every 2days After 2 days or more Total

Having symptom

No symptom

44(71) 17(27.4)

175(63) 103(37.1)

219(64.4) 120(35.3)

0 15(93.8)

7(8.1) 79(91.9)

7(6.9) 94(92.2)

3(4.8) 58(93.6) 1(1.6)

16(5.6) 261(93.9) 1(0.4)

19(5.6) 319(93.8) 2(0.6)

4(6.5) 41(66.1) 17(27.4)

42(15.1) 172(61.9) 64 (23)

46(13.5) 213(62.7) 81(23.8)

62 (100)

278(100)

340(100)

* One respondent with symptoms mentioned other methods of cleaning after toilet use * 102 participants responded to how they cleaned up after sex

Table 8.6 Menstrual management practices MM/symptoms

Having symptoms

No symptom

Total

Frequency (%) Cloth Cloth/sanitary pads Sanitary pads Cotton Don’t know Others Total

12(19.4) 2(3.2) 47(75.8) 1(1.6) 62(100)

65(23.4) 11(4) 194(69.8) 2(0.7) 3(1.1) 3(1.1) 278(100)

77 (22.7) 13 (3.8) 241(70.9) 2 (0.6) 4 (1.2) 3 (0.9) 340(100)

Total

Healthcare-Seeking Behaviour among Rohingya Adolescent Girls  149

Table 8.7 Reusing absorbent per day Once

Twice

Thrice

>3

Total

Having symptom 10 (17.2) 24 (20.9) 23 (18.9) 4 (9.5) 61 (18.1) No symptom 48 (82.8) 91 (79.1) 99 (81.2) 38 (90.5) 276(81.9) Total 58 (100) 115 (100) 122 (100) 42 (100) 337 (100) Table 8.8 Reproductive tract infections after sexual intercourse

Frequency (%) No symptom Having symptom Total

Yes

No

Total

3 (3.5) 4 (23.5) 7 (6.8)

83(96.5) 13 (76.5) 96 (93.2)

86(100) 17 (100) 103 (100)

As shown in Table 8.8, among those who reported ever having sex, 23.5% had suffered an infection after sex and only one respondent had used a condom. Qualitative Findings Toilets were shared among houses ranging from 20 to 100 within a block. There were community bathrooms but many households have made bathrooms inside and beside their houses. The bathrooms inside the houses were only used by females, while men took baths outside the house. The main source of water was tube wells. However, two of the adolescent girls reported not being able to get adequate amount of water for their personal hygiene needs. As one of them said: “The tube-well is far away. So, I take bath once every 2 days”. (21.11.2018) Among other adolescent girls, two reported taking a bath daily, one on alternate days, while three others bathed every two days. Mothers, however, said that their daughters took baths daily, noting that adolescents nowadays are more informed compared to previous generations. She went on to say: “One does not have to teach children of today. They know more than us. They wash clean the panties that they wear and keep them in a clean place. And if the panty becomes dirty and needs to be buried, then they bury it. And they take baths daily.” (1.12.2018) When menstruating, three of the girls said they took a bath daily, while one took a bath on the first day of her period, and, thereafter, alternately. Among the other girls, three said they took a bath every two to three days.

150  Nderitu, Ahmed, Awal, Aktar, and Faruque Healthcare providers, however, said that most adolescent girls did not observe hygiene, regardless of being on their periods. As one of the healthcare providers said: “they are getting cured but as they are not maintaining hygiene properly, they are coming again with the same problem after one month … they are coming back with more complications.” (Doctor, 1.12.2018) To manage menstruation, mothers reported teaching their daughters how to observe hygiene. One mother said: “I tell them to wash from waist down every day; to use napkin and panty, and not to keep the same one too long, that is, change every morning and evening. I also told them that, if kept for a long time, there may be the growth of ‘poka’ [insects] in the genitalia. I told them to bury the used napkins and not to reuse.” (1.12.2018) According to the girls, sanitary pads were used more often than the cloth, although they were sometimes used alternately depending on availability of the pads. One of the respondents was also using a re-usable sanitary pad. Regarding the frequency of changing sanitary pads, four of the 12 responses were that girls changed one to two times a day but increased frequency of changing when they were using a cloth or when they had heavy flow. One respondent, however, only changed once. At the same time, only one reported reusing absorbent two to three times. According to the mothers, they advised their daughters to discard sanitary pads after one-time use, and not to reuse for more than one day. As one mother said: I used to tell her to take baths once every day in the morning. I also told her not to reuse the same pad or cloth for more than one day. (1.12.2018) From our interviews, most of the girls said they hang the absorbent outside to dry, but in a place where it cannot be seen. Only one girl among those interviewed dried her sanitary cloth in her room. However, according to the mothers, girls have challenges drying the absorbents outside because they do not have hanging lines or pegs to hold the pads or panties. One mother said: Though there is space outside, there is no rope. Moreover, the girls feel shy to hang them outside. It is convenient for those who have rope, and inconvenient for those who do not. (1.12.2018) They also do not hang sanitary clothes outside as they feel shy and don’t want men and boys to see them, choosing therefore to hang them in the bathroom. As one mother said:

Healthcare-Seeking Behaviour among Rohingya Adolescent Girls  151 When there are no men or boys in the house, they put it to dry outside. When men or boys are in the house, they feel shy to dry these outside. (1.12.2018) Other mothers also said that in the event the adolescents had no other absorbent or panty to use, then they had no choice but to dry it in the sun for it to dry it quickly, since they could not use if it was still wet. They, however, dry it in a way that it cannot be seen or they put clothes on top of it. (d) Treatment-Seeking Behaviour

Quantitative Findings: Adolescent girls mostly visited informal providers to seek treatment for RTI symptoms (49.4%) as is seen in Table 8.9. These informal providers included drug stores, hujur/imams, Burmese self-trained medicine providers as well as other local remedies. Adolescents also used multiple remedies for their symptoms while a few used home remedies or did nothing about the symptoms. Qualitative Findings: Majority of the adolescent girls used multiple health providers for different symptoms. Two of the girls reported going to see a doctor while one reported NGO hospitals as where girls with RTI problems preferred to go. In addition, one girl reported that some went to the local drug stores, while another reported that, when they could afford it, some girls went to hospitals outside the camp while those who could not afford it went to the community clinic. Among the FGD respondents, eight of them reported that girls went to the health centres, doctors, and NGO hospitals. Mothers seemed to agree with the adolescent girls saying they mostly went to seek treatment from hospitals, but added girls wanted to be attended to by female doctors. As one mother said: “when they tell us, we take them to doctors. But girls do not go to male doctors.” (1.12.2018) According to four of the health care providers, however, adolescent girls went to the traditional kobiraz, imam, and used other traditional methods and only went to the health centres when all else failed. One doctor said:

Table 8.9 Adolescents treatment-seeking behaviour Health providers

Frequency % (n= 79)

Formal providers Informal providers

24 (31.6) 40 (49.4)

*Multiple response

152  Nderitu, Ahmed, Awal, Aktar, and Faruque “they go to kobiraz, imam ... they first try to get healed by going there. At first, they follow their traditional beliefs. When they see that those are not working for them, they come.” (20.11.2018) According to two other healthcare providers, some did nothing when they had RTI symptoms, while others went to the Burmese medicine providers or the local drug stores. As for who they consulted first when they had symptoms, majority of the girls said they first confided in their mothers. They also reported that they needed to ask for permission to go to the hospitals which was often granted by fathers for the unmarried girls, and husbands or mothers-in-law for the married girls. According to one of the health workers, however, inlaws seemed to have more influence than husbands who accompanied the women to the hospitals. “Mothers-in-law are above the husbands. When they come with their husbands and in laws, we see that the husbands are not saying anything and every decision is being taken by their in-laws most times.” (Doctor, 20.11.2018) Where girls came from supportive families, however, they did not need to take permission to go to the hospitals. Healthcare workers, however, said that the adolescent girls were very shy and conservative and would often shy away from going to the hospitals. As one of the health workers said: “they (girls) are taught to be shy and after their marriage they are given the chance to open up a bit ... but there is no difference between their conservativeness or their decision taking ability.” (Doctor. 20.11.2018) Both quantitative and qualitative findings showed that adolescent girls used multiple remedies for their symptoms, often opting for informal care such as home and local remedies, and only going to the hospital when symptoms became severe. (e)Barriers to Seeking Treatment

Quantitative Findings: As shown in Table 8.10, 27.3% from those who had experienced symptoms but did not seek treatment were from individuals who did not feel the symptoms needed to be treated. Lack of knowledge about RTI symptoms and lack of support from family were also popular responses (11.4%), followed closely by lack of awareness on the available facilities (9%). Qualitative Findings: Three adolescent girls reported that they did not seek treatment because either the hospitals were too far from their homes, they

Healthcare-Seeking Behaviour among Rohingya Adolescent Girls  153 Table 8.10 Reasons for not seeking treatment Reason

Frequency n=44 (%)

Symptoms not perceived as abnormal and worth treating Lack of knowledge about RTI symptoms Lack of support from family Not aware of the services available at health facility Insecurity Stigmatizing attitude Domestic responsibility Restricted movement Perceived poor quality of care

12 (27.3) 5 (11.4) 5 (11.4) 4(9.0) 3 (6.8) 2 (4.6) 1 (2.3) 1 (2.3) 1 (2.3)

*Multiple response

had to queue for too long, or they were afraid of being examined by the doctors. According to one mother, girls did not want to go to the same facilities where men went, while another said the girls failed to seek treatment because they did not know the symptoms. Lack of knowledge on how to identify RTI symptoms was also identified as a barrier to seeking treatment by healthcare providers as one of them said: “they come as they feel uncomfortable, they come with the problems but lack the knowledge about reproductive health. They know details after discussing with us.” (Midwife, 27.11.2018) In addition, according to the healthcare providers, some adolescent girls did not seek treatment because they did not feel the symptoms were worth treating. Oftentimes, girls tried other treatments from local drug stores and the kobiraz first, and only went to the hospital when it became complicated. As one healthcare provider said: “They don’t come at the initial stage, they come with the symptoms of long duration when they get complicated. When there is foul smell, itching, lower abdominal pain, they come.” (Midwife, 27.11.2018) Adolescent girls also did not go for treatment because they were shy, especially if unmarried. According to the healthcare providers, the married adolescents have more access than the unmarried ones, as marriage gives them some level of freedom to move. According to one of the health workers, having children gave them an opportunity to go to the hospital: “as they have children, they come primarily to the facilities with their child’s problem. But they will also discuss their own issues.” (Midwife, 27.11.2018)

154  Nderitu, Ahmed, Awal, Aktar, and Faruque The community conservative culture which restricts girls’ movement as well as their shyness were also reported as barriers to treatment. Almost all of the respondents reported insecurity as a barrier, saying there had been reports of girls being sexually harassed and abused in the camp. Discussion Common RTI symptoms, the factors contributing to their development, and the treatment-seeking behaviours for RTIs were identified quantitatively. The perceived risk factors of RTI, health-seeking behaviours, and barriers to healthcare seeking were identified qualitatively. Qualitative findings were used to support the quantitative findings, so as give to a deeper understanding of the findings. According to Sabarwal and Santhya (2012), married women were more likely to have RTI symptoms compared to unmarried women. This is contrary to our survey findings where the unmarried adolescents were found to have more RTI symptoms than the married adolescents. This could be due to most of the RTI symptoms being attributed to poor personal and menstrual hygiene that are characteristic of humanitarian settings. In refugee villages, where boreholes are the main sources of water, there was an increased risk of RTIs from using contaminated water, particularly during the rainy season (Darmstadt et al., 2010). Masterson et al.’s (2014) findings are supported where, in their study, Syrian women of reproductive age living in refugee camps in Turkey reported lack of access to amenities for basic hygiene, feminine hygiene products, washing water, soap, and bathing facilities as the main contributing factors for poor reproductive health. From our FGDs and IDIs with healthcare providers, poor hygiene was also identified as a major contributor of RTI symptoms among adolescent girls. Some girls reported poor menstrual hygiene as well as unsatisfactory hygiene practices due to difficulties in accessing sanitary towels and water, respectively. This supports findings from Uster and Masterson (2015) who in their study found that lack of water and sanitation and discrimination in aid distribution contributed to the Syrian refugee women of reproductive age living in Lebanon not giving priority to their reproductive health. According to our study findings, majority of the adolescent girls with symptoms went to informal health providers rather than to formal health providers, while others used home remedies or did nothing at all. This is in line with other research findings where there are relatively low proportions of adolescents who seek treatment for their RTIs (Kabir et al., 2014). From our study, we found that adolescents would often try other alternatives including traditional providers before seeking care from a skilled doctor. Kabir et al. (2014) have attempted to explain this, saying that adolescents tend to seek care from providers with whom they feel comfortable and familiar, as well as those who are most accessible, affordable, and private. There is also the

Healthcare-Seeking Behaviour among Rohingya Adolescent Girls  155 influence of community, religion and culture. As we also found from our study, adolescents need to take permission to visit the health facility from their fathers, husbands, or in-laws. This aligns with Nagarkar and Mhaskar (2015) who identified adolescents as having limited decision-making power. Hyder, Noor, and Tsui (2007) in their study also found that Afghan women did not seek treatment because they could not get permission from their husbands or mothers-in-law. Uster and Masterson (2015) found cost, distance to health facilities, fear of discrimination, and mistreatment as primary barriers for accessing reproductive health services. According to Chauhan, Patel, and Solanki (2016), adolescents with RTIs rarely seek treatment because of feeling shy, lack of finances, and cultural barriers. In Pakistan, Afghan refugee women do not seek treatment because they fail to recognize the symptoms (Darmstadt et al., 2010). Similarly, from our study, distance to health facilities and fear of being discriminated against was reported. In addition, our respondents reported insecurity as a barrier for seeking treatment, which was also commonly reported by the healthcare providers. At the same time, respondents also reported embarrassment and being unsatisfied with the services provided as barriers for seeking treatment, while some lacked knowledge of the symptoms and, therefore, did not seek treatment. They also preferred being attended to by female doctors. This is supported by Reese Masterson et al., (2014) whose findings identified shame, security concerns, and unavailability of female doctors and inadequate provision of services as some of the barriers for accessing reproductive health treatment. Conclusion and Recommendation Reproductive tract infections are common among adolescent girls and are, as this study shows, also a common occurrence in humanitarian settings. However, adolescents face many barriers in seeking treatment. Thus, majority of the adolescents seek treatment from informal health providers, often use multiple treatments for symptoms, and only seek treatment from formal providers when symptoms become severe. Reproductive health education is thus required for adolescents. Available adolescent-friendly spaces should be used to provide SRH education. In addition, community health workers should be trained to provide SRH services for adolescents. Service providers also need capacity building so that they can provide adolescent-friendly quality services. Acknowledgement The study was conducted with support from the James P. Grant School of Public Health-BRAC University. Special thanks to the Adolescent Sexual Reproductive Health Team Working with Rohingya refugees who were particularly helpful in study site selection and throughout the study process. I am

156  Nderitu, Ahmed, Awal, Aktar, and Faruque also grateful to the institution for allowing us to use the data from the study. Special thanks to BRAC who gave us easy access to our study population by allowing us to use their child-friendly spaces for sampling and the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC) for granting us access to the camp. Special thanks also go to my co-authors: Sahlil Ahmed, Shagoofa Rakshanda, Samuel Saidu, Basanta Thapa, Abdul Awal, Nadia Farnaz, Atiya Rahman, Bachera Aktar, and A.S.G. Faruque, who made this study successful, and we gratefully acknowledge the time and experiences shared by the respondents in the study. References Blum, R. W., Bastos, F. I. P. M., Kabiru, C. W., & Le, L. C. (2012). Adolescent health in the 21st century. The Lancet. https://doi​.org​/10​.1016​/S0140​-6736 (12)60407–3 Chauhan, M. G., Patel, H., & Solanki, H. (2016). Reproductive health problems and treatment seeking behavior among adolescent girls of UHTC Field Practice Area, Govt. Medical College, Bhavnagar. National Journal of Community Medicine. Creswell, J. (2014). Research Design: Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed Method. Research design. Darmstadt, G., Balsara, Z., Wu, I., Marsh, D., Ihsan, A., Nazir, R., Owaso, E., & Robinson, C. (2010). Reproductive tract disorders among afghan refugee women attending health clinics in Haripur, Pakistan. Journal of Health, Population and Nutrition, 28(5). https://doi​.org​/10​.3329​/jhpn​.v28i5​.6159 Hyder, A. A., Noor, Z., & Tsui, E. (2007). Intimate partner violence among Afghan women living in refugee camps in Pakistan. Social Science and Medicine. https:// doi​.org​/10​.1016​/j​.socscimed​.2006​.11​.029 Inter-agency Working Group on Reproductive Health in Crises. (2010). Inter-Agency Field Manual on Reproductive Health in Humanitarian Settings: 2010 Revision for Field Review. [online] PubMed. Geneva: Inter-agency Working Group on Reproductive Health in Crises. Available at: https://pubmed​.ncbi​.nlm​.nih​.gov​ /26203479/. Inter Sector Coordination Group (ISCG). (2018). Situation Report: Rohingya Refugee Crisis. Kabir, H., Saha, N. C., Wirtz, A. L., & Gazi, R. (2014). Treatment-seeking for selected reproductive health problems: behaviours of unmarried female adolescents in two low-performing areas of Bangladesh. Reproductive Health, 11(1). https://doi. org/10.1186/1742-4755-11-54 Kafle, P., & Bhattarai, S. S. (2016). Prevalence and factors associated with reproductive tract infections in Gongolia village, Rupandehi District, Nepal. Advances in Public Health, 2016, 1–5. https://doi​.org​/10​.1155​/2016​/8063843 Lee, C., Aules, Y., Sami, S., Lar, P. K., Schlect, J., & Robinson, C. (2017). Sexual and reproductive health needs and risks of very young adolescent refugees and migrants from Myanmar living in Thailand. Conflict and Health. https://doi​.org​ /10​.1186​/s13031​-017​-0130-0 Munyuzangabo, M., Khalifa, D. S., Gaffey, M. F., Kamali, M., Siddiqui, F. J., Meteke, S., Shah, S., Jain, R. P., Als, D., Radhakrishnan, A., Ataullahjan, A., & Bhutta, Z. A. (2020). Delivery of sexual and reproductive health interventions in conflict

Healthcare-Seeking Behaviour among Rohingya Adolescent Girls  157 settings: A systematic review. BMJ Global Health, 5(Suppl 1). https://doi​.org​/10​ .1136​/bmjgh​-2019​-002206 Nabulsi, D., Abou Saad, M., Ismail, H., Doumit, M. A. A., El-Jamil, F., Kobeissi, L., & Fouad, F. M. (2021). Minimum initial service package (MISP) for sexual and reproductive health for women in a displacement setting: A narrative review on the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon. Reproductive Health, 18(1). https://doi​.org​ /10​.1186​/s12978​-021​-01108-9 Nagarkar, A., & Mhaskar, P. (2015). A systematic review on the prevalence and utilization of health care services for reproductive tract infections/sexually transmitted infections: Evidence from India. Indian Journal of Sexually Transmitted Diseases and AIDS. https://doi​.org​/10​.4103​/0253​-7184​.156690 OCHA. (2022). Rohingya|Global humanitarian overview. Gho​.unocha​.org​. https:// gho​.unocha​.org​/rohingya Ortiz-Echevarria, L., Greeley, M., Bawoke, T., Zimmerman, L., Robinson, C., & Schlecht, J. (2017). Understanding the unique experiences, perspectives and sexual and reproductive health needs of very young adolescents: Somali refugees in Ethiopia. Conflict and Health, 11(S1). https://doi​.org​/10​.1186​/s13031​-017​ -0129-6 Pandit, K., Hasan, M. J., Islam, T., & Rakib, T. M. (2022). Constraints and current practices of menstrual hygiene among Rohingya adolescent girls. Heliyon, 8(5), e09465. https://doi​.org​/10​.1016​/j​.heliyon​.2022​.e09465 Plan International. (2018). Adolescent Girls in crisis: Voices of the Rohingya. Reese Masterson, A., Usta, J., Gupta, J., & Ettinger, A. S. (2014). Assessment of reproductive health and violence against women among displaced Syrians in Lebanon. BMC Women’s Health, 14(1). https://doi​.org​/10​.1186​/1472​-6874​-14​-25 Sabarwal, S., & Santhya, K. G. (2012). Treatment-seeking for symptoms of reproductive tract infections among young women in India. International Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health, 38(02), 090–098. https://doi​.org​ /10​.1363​/3809012 Schlecht, J., Lee, C., Kerner, B., Greeley, M., & Robinson, C. (2017). Prioritizing programming to address the needs and risks of very young adolescents: A summary of findings across three humanitarian settings. Conflict and Health, 11(S1). https:// doi​.org​/10​.1186​/s13031​-017​-0126-9 UN Women Bangladesh. (2018). Gender Brief on Rohingya Refugee Crisis Response in Bangladesh. https://www2​.unwomen​.org/-​/media​/field​%20office​%20eseasia​ /docs​/publications​/2017​/10​/gender​-advocacy​-paper​-for​-rohingya​-refugee​-crisis​ -response​-in​-bangladesh​-r10​.pdf​?la​=en​&vs​=2521 United Nations Population Fund (2018). UNFPA Rohingya Humanitarian Response Monthly Situation Report (November 2018), Last Accessed on 9 June 2023 from https://bangladesh.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/UNFPA-ExternalSitRep-%20November-2018.pdf UNHCR. (2022, September 7). Joint Government of Bangladesh—UNHCR Population factsheet—Block level as of 31 August 2022. UNHCR Operational Data Portal (ODP). https://data​.unhcr​.org​/en​/documents​/details​/95382 UNHCR Bangladesh. (2022, September 25). Bangladesh Operational Update: August 2022. UNHCR Operational Data Portal (ODP). https://data​.unhcr​.org​/en​ /documents​/details​/95790 UNICEF. (2011). The State of the World’s Children 2011: Adolescence - An age of opportunity. [online] UNICEF DATA. Available at: https://data​.unicef​

158  Nderitu, Ahmed, Awal, Aktar, and Faruque .org ​ / resources ​ / the​ - state​ - of​ - the​ - worlds​ - children​ - 2011​ - adolescents​ - an​ - age​ - of​ -opportunity/ [Accessed 1 May 2023]. UNICEF. (2017). Rohingya Crisis. Unicef​.org​. https://www​.unicef​.org​/emergencies​/ rohingya​-crisis Usta, J., & Masterson, A. R. (2015). Women and health in refugee settings: The case of displaced Syrian women in Lebanon. In Gender-Based Violence: Perspective from Africa, the Middle East, and India. https://doi​.org​/10​.1007​/978​-3​-319​ -16670​-4_6 WHO. (2012). Global incidence and prevalence of selected curable sexually transmitted infections-2008. Who. https://doi​.org​/10​.1016​/S0968​-8080(12)40660-7 WHO. (2013). Report on global sexually transmitted infection surveillance 2015. World Health Organization. https://doi​.org​/ISBN 978 92 4 150740 0 Yousuf, R., Salam, M. M., Akter, S., & Salam, A. (2020). Safety and security of sexual-reproductive health and gender-based violence among rohingya refugee women in Bangladesh. International Journal of Human and Health Sciences (IJHHS), 5(2), 163. https://doi​.org​/10​.31344​/ijhhs​.v5i2​.254

Part IV

Rohingya Voice, Media, and Representation



9

The Rohingya People’s Voice for Justice An Inheritance and Influence of Oral Narratives A.Q.M.A. Rahman Bhuiyan

Preamble During the 50th Anniversary of the NeMLA Convention in Washington, DC, on March 21–24, 2019, Harvard Professor Homi Khurshed Bhabha presented the keynote address on Tribal Nationalism, Migrants, and Refugee Crisis (Bhabha, 2019). Unfortunately, during the entirety of the presentation, references to Syria showed up a number of times, but he glossed over the world’s largest humanitarian disaster of the time and that which continues till today. More than a million Rohingya refugees from Myanmar have taken shelter in the southern districts of Bangladesh since their mass exodus in the August of 2017 making it by far one of the largest refugee camps the world has ever seen. Fleeing the military-led crackdown in the Rakhine state, these refugees have brought with them harrowing details of their survival. Why was such an event skipped during a serious talk, at a serious venue by a highly respected scholar who treats questions of migration, and refugee crises very seriously? What does it take to be noticed on the world’s stage? When do people begin to listen? Why is it important to be heard? The Rohingya refugee crisis does not have the same strategic political association with the Western world. It is not another Syria as it is not close to the doorsteps of Europe and therefore, the socio-economic ramifications of the crisis remain far away from any immediate tangible consequences to the Western world. Of course, Syria is at civil war, because the two opposing forces are capable of posing an armed threat, or resistance against each other. We have seen the world powers mobilizing their military behind both sides, conducting strategic strikes against specific targets in the region. The political ramifications of being located in the heart of the Middle East and straddling between Russian and US strategic interests will keep the Syrian issue on the discussion table for years to come. However, with the Rohingya crisis, the world’s political response has been tame and diplomatic to say the least. There were no threats of aggression against Myanmar, beyond an appeal for sanctions at the UN which was quickly and easily blocked by China and Russia at the Security Council. Closer in the neighborhood, China and India who don’t usually see eye to eye, and have recently been embroiled in a border “skirmish” which DOI: 10.4324/9781003228707-13

162  A.Q.M.A. Rahman Bhuiyan had led to injuries and deaths on both sides, seem to agree on the point ­regarding the Rohingya Crisis that the Rohingya refugees ought to be repatriated. While India continues to limit its involvement beyond the latter appeal, China, along with Russia, continues to block resolutions against the regime at the UN. With specific economic interests (China, Japan, India, Russia) in Myanmar, these countries respond to the atrocities committed by the military with a cosmetic moral appeal for restraint. Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi continues to terrify the world with her refrain that the Rohingya crisis is “complicated” and requires more than just a quick fix (“How Aung San Suu Kyi sees the Rohingya crisis” 2018). Some Western supporters of “The Lady” like Rena Pederson (2018) are swayed to focus on her inability and vulnerability as a political leader, given the might of the Myanmar military with whom she has to negotiate democracy and rule, and instead to channel blame toward the Tatmadaw, General Min Aung Hlaing, for carrying out “a campaign of ethnic cleansing” (Pederson 2018). What remains clear and unequivocal is the fact that a million Rohingya refugees have been driven out of their ancestral homes, with threats on their lives, due to their ethnicity and religion, and their suffering continues to hang on the conscience of the world. The UN’s role in ignoring or failing to draw world opinion or any traction regarding the crisis has placed the onus squarely on Bangladesh. Had Bangladesh responded using military efforts due to a violation of its borders, the world powers would have responded by asking for restraint on both sides, and the UN may have dispatched Blue Helmets to maintain a ceasefire in the best-case scenario. In the meantime, hundreds and thousands of lives would have been lost. The economic prosperity that the region has witnessed in the past decade would have taken a hard hit, while the hawks on both sides of the borders will argue that the militarization of the region would also benefit the economy. Thankfully none of this happened, but Bangladesh continues to be chastised by international NGOs for not doing enough for the Rohingya people, while other institutions take back accolades that were showered on Aung Sung Suu Kyi, displaying a well-meaning token of protest. Bangladesh will continue to house the refugees until they are promised secure return to their country of origin-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has already made that promise. Not too long ago during its birth, Bangladesh witnessed its own humanitarian crisis and may therefore be more empathetic to the plight of the Rohingya people. As nations, argue about a possible resolution to the Rohingya crisis and leadership in Myanmar continues to deny, or downplay the genocide, the voices of the Rohingya community remain muffled and largely ignored. Their voices have not been heard enough, which is why they are not discussed in the places they could be discussed. One may argue that one of the reasons for this silence is due to the lack of political representation among the Rohingya people. This may have been the direct result of the 1982 Citizen’s Act which denies the Rohingya citizenship. The Myanmar Government has been able to maintain the subjugation and marginalization of the Rohingya people through Burmese nativist myths,

The Rohingya People’s Voice for Justice  163 and through constructivist historical narratives. They have cherry-picked and twisted historical documents to continue to support and validate the 1982 Act while continuing to ignore the recommendations of the 2016 Annan Commission Reports (Annan 2017 and “Discrimination in Arakan” 2000). Part I In Search of a Sustainable Solution: The Rhizomorphic Narrative

For any sustainable solution to the Rohingya crisis, the Rohingya people must be allowed to speak fearlessly, and the world must carry out its obligation to listen. This does not necessarily mean that a political representative’s voice must be heard. In fact, given the magnitude of the crisis, one voice may not represent the plight of the people. However, in many voices, accounts of the truth may be found. These voices and the words that are uttered constitute the vocabulary of the Rohingya refugees’ plight for anyone who is willing to listen and extend a hand. Whether to build trust, evoke emotions, or seek justice, each of their words is a weight that weighs on the conscience of the people of the world. Social power constructs, or discursive formations, have muffled their voices over the past decades which has in turn led to their present sufferings. Listening to a few accounts can remove these voices from their social context universalizing the suffering, and even desensitizing it as something which humankind has experienced over millennia. To see these accounts grounded in the Rohingya experience is therefore important. In other words, reading the journalist accounts, and news reports, photos, and video footage of the violence in conjunction with the accounts of the people experiencing the violence presents a more powerful mind-numbing experience. Such an encounter produces the Rhizomorphic narrative. As Deleuze and Guattari point out, any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be … not every trait in a rhizome is necessarily linked to a linguistic feature: semiotic chains of every nature are connected to very diverse modes of coding (biological, political, economic, etc.) that bring into play not only different regimes of signs but also states of things of differing status. (Deleuze & Guattari 7) Thus, to reiterate, a humanitarian crisis of this proportion produces a Rhizomorphic narrative discourse of its own, which is an ongoing burst of narrative processes under extreme psychological distress with no real center but constantly growing, in a nonlinear, non-binary, multi-voiced output connected by threads and ideas which are constantly attacked and wounded by discursive formations at various junctures. The power of many voices along with the human ability to empathize with those voices can work as a defense against the discursive formation that allows the targeting of people with a

164  A.Q.M.A. Rahman Bhuiyan common language, religion, and ethnicity. The series of survivor’s accounts can be so horrific and far removed from the lives of the listeners that it creates a distancing as seen between a play and an audience. The Rhizomorphic narrative approach embedded in journalist reporting, camera footage, etc. can keep these words rooted in the context of the refugee trauma. But the overarching question to be asked is whether these accounts can sway public opinion enough to bring about social change and a sustainable solution to the crisis. The world needs to listen to these voices firsthand, and their stories of discrimination and suffering, escape, and survival, along with their aspirations for their future. Also, the people of Myanmar need to know the real stories of the Rohingya people as well. To listen to someone is an act of extending respect and human decency. It is not a privilege to be extended to the Rohingya people but a right that the Rohingya people can command of the rest of us, as a part of this world’s community. They can and have exercised this right of theirs on us. We cannot have posterity accuse us of doing nothing while the Rohingya people were raped, murdered, and driven out of their homes, with their livelihood set on flames. As naïve as this may sound, how is it possible, and is such an appeal really naïve? The Rohingya people don’t just lack power and authority, like other migrant or refugee populations around the world. In their own country, they lacked agency, they lacked representation, their identity was in question, and their patriotism was constantly being challenged. Their religious practices are seen with suspicion, and their citizenship and dignity were stripped away. Their language, culture, religion, and ethnicity are being rewritten into an alternate history where they are maligned and associated with the Bangladeshi people who live across their national border. They had been subjected to outright discrimination and discursive formations (Foucault in, Rabinow 2000) which rendered them persona non grata in a country they have called home for centuries and in a world where passports matter. These discursive formations have both quelled and completely repressed their voices and have been used to justify the murder, arson, and their subsequent exile. None of this is new of course; rhetorical zeal in identifying a minority population and blaming them for antinational mischief is a time old tale with genocidal consequences seen by the world too many times: the Holocaust, the Japanese and Chinese internment camps in the US during WWII, modern day Islamophobia, Casteism, and Racism. Hardline Buddhist organizations, such as Ma Ba Tha in Myanmar, have exploited such narratives to advocate the protection and promotion of Buddhism and the state against perceived threats from within and outside the country (Gunasingham 1). They stoke fear of Islamophobia and talk of the Muslim demographic explosion, which will overtake the Buddhist population. Arjun Appadurai argues that, for large-scale violence to occur between ethnic and religious groups who have lived together, there must be a combination of high certainty and uncertainty among the majority about the intentions

The Rohingya People’s Voice for Justice  165 of the other (minority communities). In an era of globalization, which has eroded settled connections between territory and identity, a dismayed majority can turn predatory by creating fears of a minority group taking over the country from the demographic majority (for example, the Muslim birth rate or family size is used as a potential threat that can change the demographics of the nation, or the Muslim majority enclaves are deemed to pose a potential to secede from the union if not simply harbor antinational elements within). This hostile interpretation of the intentions of the other (minority groups) mobilizes the masses to use violence as a form of self-defense (Gunashingham 2). “Many claims made by the Ma Ba Tha, in the form of sermons, statements and publications, feed into ‘larger scripts’ which tap on broader sentiments of Islamophobia playing out globally” (Gunashingham 3). While researchers like Gunashingham focus on the Muslim issue as being fueled by global Islamophobia, in the South Asian region, it is also wrapped closely with the idea of being so-called “Bengali Muslim infiltrators”—a rhetoric which has been adopted by the ultra-right-wing Indian BJP government, with their recent enactment of the Indian Citizenship Amendment Bill (CAB) and National Register Board (“Citizenship Amendment Bill: India’s new ‘antiMuslim’ law explained” 2019). Thus, as Appadurai points out minorities are not born but made, historically speaking … So, rather than saying that minorities produce violence, we could better say that violence, especially at the national level, requires minorities. And this production of minorities requires unearthing some histories and burying others. (Appadurai 1998) Gunashingham also points out that radicals, leaders like Ashin Wirathu of the Ma Ba Tha, have exploited the open climate to spread an exclusivist and extremist agenda where they attend and speak at mass rallies and demonstrations where they stoke anti-Muslim sentiments and preach “pro-Buddhist affirmative action” (Gunashingham 3). Their rhetoric calls on Buddhists to refrain from, for example, buying from Muslim-owned shops, socializing with Muslims, and also allowing their children to marry Muslims. History recalls the erstwhile Nazi party of Germany and Hitler’s 1933 call for a boycott of Jewish shops, and the terrifying chant “es ist Zeit fur Rache, Wir mussen die juden ausrotten! Translated to be: It’s time for revenge, we must exterminate the Jews” (“The history place WWII”). In such a toxic environment, where does one even begin to search for a sustainable solution? Is Diplomacy or military action the only paths to redemption? Time will tell which path will liberate the Rohingya people, but a powerful instrument for a sustainable solution may be found in the dissemination of the oral accounts of the Rohingya people throughout the world. When the human being is stripped off of all power, what remains in such a vulnerable state that a human being can fall back on? The only expression

166  A.Q.M.A. Rahman Bhuiyan of our will to survive, or keep a will to justice alive, is in the need and ability to tell our stories. Joan Didion (1990) said, “We tell ourselves stories in order to live” (24). Tony Robbins (2007) famously pointed out that “We are defined by the stories we tell ourselves.” This applies not only to the privileged individuals but even more so to the disenfranchised. The post-colonial critic, Spivak (1989) said that the subaltern must be allowed to speak, where “a line of communication must be established between a member of subaltern groups and the circuits of citizenship or institutionality,” even if it means to insert the subaltern into the long road to hegemony. The need to speak and tell one’s story is not only a basic human drive, a faculty that defines our species, but rather works as an act of survival and agency, and drives a will to justice. Plato stated that the one who tells the story governs. In other words, the owner of the story—the narrator—resorts to discursive exercises of power. Unlike during the exercise of force and coercion, the source of such power lies in discursive reality and the mental realm (Polkinghorne, 1988). The storyteller aspires to influence the social reality with a view to shaping it in a desirable direction. This, in fact, addresses the ethical dimension in leadership stories. While investigating leadership stories, Takala, T. & Auvinen, T. (2016) point out that Storytelling may involve attempts to seduce or even manipulate with evil purposes. Indeed, the narrator may conceal her/his intentions with indoctrination and manipulation, whereupon listeners are not aware of the attempts to wield power over them. Consequently, exercising leadership power in this manner is typically seen as rather bad and unethical. Influential Buddhist monks, as mentioned earlier, have not held back their resentment of the Rohingya Muslims as they appear in interviews conducted by international news agencies, comparing them to excrement, vermin, and other unspeakable comparison to incite support against the Rohingya and providing false evidence against them. Mark Zuckerberg in a congressional hearing pointed out how Facebook has hired a large number of Burmese language content reviewers to identify the large volume of hate speech spreading against the Rohingya (Oliver 2018, Noah 2017). Such vitriol narratives by religious leaders not only catapult them into the limelight by stoking nationalist impulses but also fan the ongoing genocide and massacre by rationalizing violence against the Rohingya population. Such a situation, along with the Citizens Act of 1982 and a Nobel Laureate in the form of Suu Kyi reminding the world that the Rohingya situation is complicated without unequivocally condemning the atrocities, leads to the state-funded pogrom that was experienced in the August of 2017. The need to hear the Rohingya voice is therefore more important since the voices of aggression against them are so loud and influential. From rumors at the local level and social media hate speeches, to the Buddhist Monks, to the

The Rohingya People’s Voice for Justice  167 Nobel Laureate, the proverbial decks are stacked high against the Rohingya people, whose claim for justice is just a pipe dream at the moment. How Do We Empower the Disenfranchised? We Start by Listening to Them The act of an oral narration is a very powerful act. Human experiences and stories are the basis of identity, memory creation, and the formation of a collective consciousness. The disenfranchised who lack power and authority, lack agency, and lack representation can gain through the act of oral narration a sense of identity, agency, and a will to justice. The narrative act, as a form of resistance, leads to empowerment of the individual. Those who seek a sustainable solution to the Rohingya crisis must assist the Rohingya people to speak and tell their stories. This particular crisis is deeply entrenched in the question of identity, the Rohingya people’s identity, their understanding of a homeland, and now their suffering, their sense of trauma, and even their prosthetic memory (Landsberg 2004), and post-memory generation who are born in the Ukhiya camps in Bangladesh (Hirsch 2012). As human beings, we are wired and trained to respond to stories and empathize with the tellers of the accounts, if they situate themselves in the story. The sharing of these narrative experiences, hence, not only develops an appeal for support but also for accountability and justice. We need to hear their voices and stories and allow the stories to be disseminated, including, to other Myanmar ethnicities. Thus, oral accounts can be seen as a much-needed political instrument that may create a sense of urgency to attain sustainable solutions to the crisis. The moral responsibility lies with the good conscience of the world. The reason why the world’s largest humanitarian crisis can be overlooked is that the stories of the people have not been told or retold enough. This will raise questions, regarding authenticity, evidence, etc., and appeal to the consciousness of the people of the world. The world has seen the power of slave narratives, as well as the Holocaust narratives, which have not only brought about change and social justice, but have also allowed the healing of the self to begin, and allowed the victims to get on with their lives. And while such narratives may not be held up in court as evidence, they will develop a sense of urgency in public opinion so that the world may at the very least dispatch investigators to verify the concerns again and again. As Abreham Alemu, (2007) cites Novitz who points out that in stories where “we assert and maintain our own interests not just by advancing a particular view of ourselves, but by undermining the views that others advance of themselves.” The nationalist’s narrative is no different. The nationalist narrative becomes the epic of a nation state, and in Myanmar, that nationalist narrative is corrupted by hate speeches, misinformation, and fabricated historical myths that have engineered a racist Citizen’s Act (of 1982). Members of various communities in a nation state would try to have their ethnicity or community inscribed into the nationalist epic, or collective

168  A.Q.M.A. Rahman Bhuiyan consciousness of the nation state to seek legitimacy in the nation state. But for those who are written out, their very existence threatens the nationalist discourse with a counternarrative. It is the voice of this counternarrative of the Rohingya people that must be amplified in order to empower the disenfranchised people and attain some social justice for a sustainable solution. The very act of storytelling has an impact on the storyteller; it empowers the individual by providing a sense of dignity and agency. This is a dire need for the refugees. As Alemu (2007) points out, The stories people tell about their lives and those of others are, thus, of considerable importance, for there is an intimate connection between the ways in which people construe themselves and others, and the ways in which they are likely to behave, i.e. how we view and think of ourselves strongly influences our behaviour. This makes studying and challenging the stories that people tell about themselves a worthwhile undertaking. What matters most to the Rohingya people while stranded in a foreign land are the stories they have based on their experience, memories, trauma, the values, opinions, and their preferences. These refugees, many of whom are unlettered, or lack the ability to use language with sophistication (for the lack of a better word) are easily rendered voiceless by their political/nationalistic opponents (in this case, the Burmese national rhetoric, which considers Rohingya and Bengalis to be synonymous, and for whom the word Rohingya itself which is a word silenced in the national rhetoric as the powerful political class in Myanmar refuse to use the word Rohingya and prefer to use Bengali in order to associate them with the Bangladeshis across the border (Ferrie, 2013). Also, the repeated response that the Rohingya issue is complex seems to divert attention toward the colonial legacy, and cultural and religious significance, as Suu Kyi repeatedly claims that there is fear on “both sides Muslims and Buddhist” but dodges the question regarding the disproportionate consequences and suffering between the Muslims and the Buddhists (Noah, 2017). While such arguments are welcomed in academic settings by scholars and sophisticates who have the luxury of time, and the seeming abilities to exercise linguistic calisthenics, a few hours spent in the Ukhiya refugee camps will simply display, without the sophistication of academic linguistic frills, verbal utterances which project deep-rooted violence, racism, casteism, and human degradation. In the refugee camps, the discrimination becomes palpable, and one sees that devious linguistic and rhetorical markers allow for a path to genocide, as has been documented again and again in the Third Reich. In the camps, as murmurs of the survivor’s accounts are being shared among the community, more details appear and perspectives are cleared as the narratives are examined, embellished, generalized, magnified, undercut, downplayed, or even missed. These fragmented and traumatized oral accounts of violence and survival, including elusive and undocumented

The Rohingya People’s Voice for Justice  169 narratives retold through memory, constitute an intangible social reality with practical manifestations—manifestations which include modes of survival, alleviating the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), feelings of not being alone, and the formation of a collective consciousness for survival. The Rohingya must be empowered to tell their stories to a decent world. And the process of empowering people is by allowing them to tell their stories and by listening to their stories. Responding to their stories with empathy or action reasserts the process of empowerment. This very process of empowerment is the first step toward self-determination, representation, a collective identity, and maybe even providing the basis of a collective consciousness which may even be the initial spark of a homeland and nation state. But this sense of empowerment, gradually developed, can lead to a sustainable solution for the Rohingya people. They must tell their stories to each other and their stories must be heard by the world, which include other ethnicities of Myanmar. As language is a defining faculty of our species, the human need to express one’s inner feeling, whether it be through a laugh or a scream in pain are foundational in conveying empathy. Part II The Oral Accounts

Therefore, to reiterate, one way of moving toward a sustainable solution is by creating greater public awareness of the struggles of the Rohingya people. From here on, this chapter will be focusing on the victim’s oral accounts. For a long-term sustainable solution, these oral accounts are vital. The exchange of stories is a primary mode of human contact. For the Rohingya, it first provides the community a sense of identity through a sense of shared atrocities and develops a collective consciousness. It allows them to survive, organize, and regain their dignity. The retelling of these accounts, documented or undocumented, embellished, symbolic, or truthful, will empower their voice when the world chooses to listen to them. It can also draw attention to the world given the mass scale of those who suffered these atrocities and lost lives. To create a communal political identity, that will ensure the security of their people. Therefore, this chapter will now demonstrate how oral accounts of victims reconstruct a sense of selfhood, develop representation, provide agency, and advance markers of resistance against the injustice perpetrated upon them. But most importantly, it helps the victims to survive and live on. For example, the role, effect, and impact that the slave narratives had on the mobilization and emancipation of the African-American slaves are well documented. The importance of Holocaust survivor’s accounts delivering justice and acquiring deliverance is also well researched. Both accounts are rooted in the survivors’ narrative accounts as mentioned above. Therefore, oral narratives become a powerful inheritance and influence, not only for the Rohingya people’s struggle but also as an instrument to make the world sit up and listen since as

170  A.Q.M.A. Rahman Bhuiyan human beings we are “linguistically wired” and conditioned to engage with narratives. These stories must be heard and shared both for the victims and for us. The sharing of these narrative experiences, hence, not only develop an appeal for support but also for accountability and justice as discussed above. Thus, oral narratives can be seen as the much-needed political instrument that may create a sense of urgency to attain sustainable solutions to the crisis. In order to illustrate these points, we can begin with a simple discourse analysis and address the formulation of a Rhizomorphic narrative of the oral accounts of Rohingya refugees. To illustrate, 13 accounts have been identified, all available in the public domain. These accounts and many like them have been brought into the public domain through the initiatives carried out by journalists, international NGOs the UN and its allied bodies, other nations, private individuals, credible, non-partisan groups, civil society groups, and forums within Myanmar including international organizations—all of whom have tried to highlight the genocide of the Rohingyas. These are just a few of the harrowing details that the Rohingya people have willingly shared. They are comparable to some of the slave narratives and holocaust victim accounts, given the indiscriminate murder, rape, and arson: 1. “Through the smoke and heat strode the uniformed executioners and rapists. They went house to house and shot the men. Rohima saw her husband killed. The women were gathered in the village school. Rohima, five months pregnant, held her four-year-old to her chest, and her six-year-old to her side. The older of the two was screaming. A soldier marched forward, picked him up, and threw him into the burning flames of a house. Then the raping began. Somehow Rohima, in a state of shock, managed to slip through the smoke and into the jungle. She saved herself, her four-year-old, and her unborn child.” “Every single moment I remember this,” she says. “And I get emotional, because I lost my neighbour, my husband, my child, my relatives” (Hammond, 2018). 2. Murder: Shawkat Ara, 38, hid in the jungle and watched her village burn after it was attacked by soldiers in the middle of the night. She said: “The military told the young boys to stand in a line and told them to run. When they were running, they rushed them from behind and they were falling in ditches. Some were cut into pieces and thrown into ditches. They were all between 10 and 12 years old. The military were actually playing with the boys. They were telling them to run and then cutting them” (BBC News, 2017). 3. Arson: At that time, my father was in our house and the army caught him and dragged him out with them while they kept beating him. We could not do anything and just watched helplessly as it was happening. After my father was taken away, all of us in the family became very weak. We felt so helpless and we could not decide what to do. How could we bring our father back? What should we do? Our relatives made us feel even

The Rohingya People’s Voice for Justice  171 more frustrated. They said that nothing could be done to bring him back, and that if we would try to do something, the army would kill him. I was very worried and angry at the army. I considered approaching the army people and ask them why they did these things to us. But I could not do this. Because the army was continuously firing, I was unable to go near them. Suddenly, along with firing, they started setting houses on fire and started burning everything. We felt trapped because they came from all sides and there was no way to escape. But there was a river next to our village, with another village on the other bank of the river. The people from our village crossed the river instantly and in great fear. From the other side, we saw our village burning. Nothing was left standing. We were unable to come back to our village anymore. The saddest thing was that when they started burning the village, there were still homes with people in them, who had not been able to cross the river. These people were burned alive in their own houses, along with their children! We stayed for two days in that other village and then escaped to another village. But after two days, that village was also attacked and we had to move again to yet another village. After three days, this village was also attacked, and we moved toward the big river from where we were able to cross by boat. On September 1, 2017, we reached Bangladesh (Sumi & Uddin, 2019). 4. Arson: Tosmin lost everything—including her father, who was brutally murdered by the soldiers. Tosmin watched her home, village, and everything she once knew burn. Shouldering the loss, she began walking: it took nine days for Tosmin, her two brothers, and a group of relatives to arrive in Bangladesh. They walked by foot—with no food—for the trip’s entirety. She said: “We lost our freedom. We lost our identity. In the camp, we are extremely exposed. It’s a wide open and overly crowded place. We live in a tiny room, and though we get shelter, food and health care, I am not comfortable here” (UNICEF, 2019). 5. “My sister was killed after gang rape in front of me, and they threw hot water on my body, Fatima1, 30. I can’t sleep. My life is a nightmare,” she said. “I can’t bear the pain of losing my sister” (UNFPA, 2017). 6. “They took me along with another four women inside a house,” Rajuma recounted, speaking at a school in Kutupalong refugee camp. “They ripped my son from my arms and threw him [on the ground] and cut his throat,” she said, before burying her head in her hands and starting to wail. “I am thirsty to hear someone calling me ‘ma’,” Rajuma said between sobs. “I had a younger brother who is 10 years old. I’m sorry to him because they took him and I couldn’t save him” (Al Jazeera, 2017). 7. She recalled. Eight soldiers entered her house. They kicked and punched her children aged four, six, and eight. She covers her mouth with her shawl, looks down, and speaks in a low voice. When the children were taken out of the house, she said five soldiers of different ages raped her while three waited outside. “I’m not able to express this completely,” she

172  A.Q.M.A. Rahman Bhuiyan said through tears. Her youngest child, a girl, wandered over, sat quietly next to her mother, and put her hand on her lap. “I thought that I was dying,” she said. The family fled several days later and paid a boatman to take them across the Naf River to Bangladesh. “In Myanmar, I can’t sleep properly. There is safety in my life, so I feel better here,” she said (Al Jazeera, 2017). 8. “We were shot at and attacked. They burnt all of the houses. There was nothing left and nowhere to take shelter so we fled. They burnt the whole village down. Eight people died in the burning” (Shelter Box, 2017). 9. I ran to a nearby hill. From there I saw the military and members of the Rakhine community take my wife from the house and rape her. I saw them do whatever they wanted to her. Then 20 people, mostly women, were put inside a house and burned alive. The world went dark for me at that moment, I was so sad for my wife. I was inconsolable so other people from my village had to carry me to Bangladesh. I don’t remember the journey (Arnold, 2017). 10. Once the crisis started, the military returned to the village. They burned down my house and shot my two cows. With my husband gone, my only option was to come here to Bangladesh. I sold my jewelry and paid someone to take my family across the border. We were walking for five days; my feet were so swollen. I am finding life here very difficult on my own. No one helped me build a shelter for my family, even though I am pregnant. What type of world am I bringing my child into? (Arnold, 2017). 11. I lived with my eldest daughter who was suffering from malaria at the time. She was too weak to flee the house. I had to make a decision so I grabbed my grandchildren and ran to the nearby forest.They burned my daughter alive. When we went back to the house, all I could see were the black remains of her skull. I feel like a terrible mother—I saved my own life but not that of my daughter (Arnold, 2017). 12. Husson has been working as a volunteer for Doctors of the World since the beginning of 2018. “The raid on our village started at 3am. I saw a child being thrown onto a fire, and my sister was raped.  The violence continued for hours.  We escaped by hiding in the mountains. On the way we found a 10-year-old boy crying that his parents had been killed. He walked with us all the way to the camps. Today, the boy has become a member of my family and we live together. The camps are filled with children living in similar circumstances. Many Rohingya have adopted children who lost their families” (Doctors of the World, 2018). 13. “I have no identity card and documents. All our cards said we are ‘Bengalis’ living in Myanmar. The access card we received for shopping were to be displayed at all time, otherwise we would be subject to beating in public (much like the yellow star of David). I had a family picture which is a mandatory document ordered by the Burmese Government. If there were more than three children, then the Rohingya were subject to

The Rohingya People’s Voice for Justice  173 either fine or imprisonment. Through maintaining a family picture, the government officials would make sure if there were more children after the previous year."—Rafiqa from Khing Chong, Boli Bazar, Myanmar, who arrived in Ukhiya, Bangladesh with her children and husband after August 25 (Hoque et al., 2018). Such a series of traumatic episodes become more intimate for a reader who now bears witness to the “final solution” perpetrated upon the Rohingya people in Myanmar. Accounts such as these constitute an ethical oral narrative: a narrative with an ethical purpose that works against evil in changing perception by dispelling shards of complexities and showing horror and evil for what it is. The onus for the verification and credibility of such accounts lies not only with the academic investigator or researcher but also the journalistic conscience, political will, and sense of social justice of the good people of the world. In other words, to hear of atrocities being committed upon millions of people, and not feel the need to verify and investigate, is a shameful act. The Ukhiya camps are a testimony of violence committed upon human beings. With the Rohingya people, their narratives, thus, don’t only address the ongoing refugee crisis, but also expose their socio-political conditions in their home country. From the deep-seated discrimination based on religion and ethnicity to the political silencing of their voice. From the culturally embedded discrimination to outright political persecution, and the subsequent violation of human rights. The Rohingya people have been made to lose their selfhood and human agency. The reversal and the restoration of this agency can begin by listening to their accounts. A discourse analysis of these accounts along with countless others will produce a series of recurring words like: beat, hit, rape, dead, kill, military, “mong” (the Rohingya people use this word to refer to the Buddhist monks), burn, run, hide, cattle, farm, village, fire, burn, scream, shout, cry, father, mother, brother, sister, grandmother, grandfather, child, baby, river, boat. Through these key words and numerous accounts, we can hear the collective experience of the Rohingya people providing a context to their struggle, trauma, aspirations, desire to live, and search for justice. A quick read of an autobiography of an American Slave by Fredrick Douglas will also draw a very similar set of words as would a series of Holocaust victim accounts. These words and sentences constitute the state of the Rohingya refugees for anyone who is willing to listen and extend a hand. Such a discourse analysis removes these words from its social context universalizing the suffering, as something which humankind has experienced over millennia. As mentioned earlier, to see these accounts grounded in the Rohingya experience is to experience these accounts as a Rhizomorphic Narrative and, therefore, also grounded in the contemporary, socio-political context. The series of the above accounts are so horrific and far removed from the lives of the listeners that it creates a distancing as seen between a play and an audience when approached from a discursive analysis, and must therefore be

174  A.Q.M.A. Rahman Bhuiyan placed in a socio-political context, as it appears in this chapter. Therefore, a Rhizomorphic narrative approach keeps these words rooted in their context of the refugee trauma. One may see a similar trajectory at work in the Slave Narratives and the Holocaust narratives. One can begin by asking, for instance, what effect did Fredrick Douglas’ Narrative of an American Slave have on its readers, and the emancipation of the African American people and the subsequent Civil Rights movement? “Douglas felt that the purpose of his autobiography was as he viewed it, to shake people out of their lethargy and goad them into action, not to discover reasons for sitting on the fence” (“Fredrick Douglas”). While another reason for the influence of the Narrative is its credibility. The book is soundly buttressed with specific data on persons and places, not a single one of them fictitious. Indeed, one reason that Douglass produced an autobiography was to refute the charge that he was an impostor, that he had never been a slave. No one seems ever to have questioned the existence of any person mentioned in the Narrative. (“Fredrick Douglas”) In the context of the Rohingya people, there are already evidence of mass graves, shooting, looting, and destruction, from satellite imagery to many third-party observers who are being denied access to certain regions, and are kept away from actual sites. Accounts of violence and mass uprooting that are recorded as testimony appear in international reports and newspaper columns. During an interview at Manhattan’s Museum of Jewish Heritage, Bronia Brandman a survivor of Auschwitz laments that 60 percent of millennials between 18 and 34 don’t know that Auschwitz existed. “This is so painful” while talking to a reporter she says adding that “we need to teach our children what words, what racism, what lies mean” (Henao 2020). Thousands of miles away in the Ukhiya refugee camps of Cox’s Bazar, Chittagong, Bangladesh, victims of another genocide and ongoing crimes against humanity continue. 75 years have allowed the Jewish community to categorize, study, propositonalize, verbalize, and disseminate knowledge of the holocaust. And for what purpose? Remembering those who have died does not benefit those. It, however, does benefit us by reminding us how to act and what to look out for. Even monuments to respect their memory helps them the least, but helps us the most. The survivor accounts that have been complied and published have been used to usher in new disciplinary areas. And yet legal scholars like William Schabas who share that experience firsthand as a member of the post-memory generation of the Holocaust, through legal hair splitting, use phrases like “genocide-like” rather than emphasizing on the certainty that genocide was committed (Deutsch, 2019).

The Rohingya People’s Voice for Justice  175 This reminds us of Mauric Bardeche’s ("known as the father of Holocaust denial"), denial of the holocaust and claim that the testimonies were not reliable since they came from Jews and communists (Bardèche 1948). With camera footage of burning houses, the Myanmar government can still deny the genocide of the Rohingya people. This chapter has tried to explain how oral accounts or the Rhizomorphic narratives of the Refugee can develop in them a voice and become markers for an identity, which must disseminate in order to expose the truth, of their sufferings to the world including the people of Myanmar. While this may seem naïve, one should not underestimate the power of oral narratives, in the formation of identities, nation-states, in the liberation of people as in the African American experience, to its ability in providing the ability to survive, as seen with the victims of the Holocaust. When military engagement is not an option and diplomacy denies justice due to its delay, the power of the narrative may be exercised to make the sufferings of the Rohingya people more vocal. Note 1 Considered to be among the “Top 50 Business Intellectuals” by Accenture; one of the “Top 200 Business Gurus” by the Harvard Business Press, and in 2007 was ranked on the Forbes Celebrity 100.

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The Rohingya People’s Voice for Justice  177 Rabinow, P. (2000). Michel Foucault Ethics: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984 Vol. 1. Penguin Books. Shelter Box (October 2017). Life in Cox’s Bazar refugee camp. [Online] Available at: https://www​.shelterbox​.org​/impact​/hasinas​-story/ Spivak, G.C. (1989). Can the subaltern speak. In Cain, W. E., Finke, L. A., Johnson, B. E., McGowan, J., Sharpley-Whiting, T. D., & Williams, J. J. (Eds.) The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism (2nd ed.), WW Norton. Sumi, H., & Uddin, A. (2019). The story of a Rohingya refugee: Becoming a community psychosocial volunteer. Intervention, 17(2), 296. https://doi​.org​/10​ .4103​/intv​.intv​_46​_19 Takala, T., & Auvinen, T. (March 2016). The power of leadership storytelling: Case of Adolf Hitler. Tamara: Journal for Critical Organization Inquiry, 14(1), 21–34. Robbins, T. (2007). Awaken the Giant Within: How to Take Immediate Control of Your Mental, Emotional, Physical and Financial Destiny. Free Press. ISBN 978-0-671-79154-4. The history place WWII. https://www​.historyplace​.com​/worldwar2​/timeline​/boycott​ .htm) retrieved June 19, 2020. UNFPA. (20 October 2017). Sexual violence devastating, humanitarian needs mounting in Rohingya crisis. [Online] Available at: https://www​.unfpa​.org​/es​/ news​/sexual​-violence​-devastating​-humanitarian​-needs​-mounting​-rohingya​-crisis UNICEF. (25 September 2019). The right to an identity for Rohingya children: Tosmin’s story. [Online] Available at: https://www​.unicef​.org​/rosa​/stories​/right​ -identity​-rohingya​-children​-tosmins​-story

10 A Closer Look How Major English Language Newspapers Portrayed the Rohingya Crisis in India and China Harisur Rhaman Introduction The Rohingya people are deemed to be the most persecuted ethnic community on Earth. They have been displaced from their homeland for the past several decades, but in recent times, the exodus of Rohingya in Bangladesh, followed by atrocities orchestrated by the Myanmar military regime, has attracted severe international outcry. Major international stakeholders and powers have criticised the Myanmar government and the military’s role except for two regional powers, namely China and India. The apparent silence of China and India has raised serious concerns and criticism among many Bangladeshis about whether the Rohingya crisis will ever be resolved. Against this backdrop, several questions arise: What roles do the Chinese and the Indian mass media, especially newspapers, play in portraying the Rohingya crisis? What are the Chinese and Indian newspapers’ positions on the ongoing crisis, and what solutions do they bring to resolve it? To what extent do the Chinese and the Indian government and media collide or co-exist on the Rohingya issue? This chapter addresses these questions using critical discourse analysis (CDA), analysing online news headlines of two leading Chinese newspapers: the  People’s Daily and the Global Times, and two Indian newspapers entitled the Times of India (TOI) and The Hindu. Background The suppression and forced eviction of the Rohingya ethnic community in the Rakhine State of Myanmar have been significant concerns for several nation-states worldwide. Bangladesh has been the most impacted by this crisis that began decades ago. However, the most recent exodus of Rohingya in 2017 has drawn much international attention. All major international actors and powers have criticised the Myanmar government and the military’s roles except for two regional powers, namely China and India. The apparent silence of these two countries has raised concerns and criticisms among many Bangladeshis about whether the Rohingya crisis will ever be resolved in the absence of their cooperation. Both the Chinese and Indian governments DOI: 10.4324/9781003228707-14

A Closer Look  179 have maintained silence on the issue. These institutions have adopted the utmost leniency towards the ongoing atrocities and injustices committed by Myanmar. Looking through the façade, one might wonder what role the media plays in representing the crisis. Do the Chinese and Indian newspapers take different positions in favour of their respective governments while representing the crisis? To what extent are the Chinese and the Indian newspapers different in portraying the Rohingya crisis? With the help of notable media concepts such as representation, framing, priming, agenda-setting, and critical discourse analysis, this chapter attempts to analyse the two most widely read online English dailies from China and India to find some convincing answers to the abovementioned questions. Objectives Framing theory (Goffman, 1974) reminded us that the media not only manipulates us into thinking about a certain subject but also instigates us to adopt a pre-defined pathway towards the issue. Stuart Hall (1997) argued that media does not reflect reality as a mirror image; instead, it reconstructs reality through representational politics. Critical discourse analysis methods have been employed to explore how the Rohingya issue is represented in the Chinese and Indian news headlines. More specifically, I have attempted to investigate the role of the media in framing public opinion and government policy on the Rohingya issue by analysing the Chinese and Indian news headlines. To achieve these aims, I have identified three objectives: (a) to investigate the role played by the Chinese and Indian mass media, mainly online news headlines, in the portrayal of the Rohingya crisis; (b) to understand the ways of the Chinese and Indian online news headlines in the depiction of their role and position in resolving the Rohingya crisis; and (c) to explore how the Chinese and Indian governments and media converge on the Rohingya issue. Literature Review A comparative study of Chinese and Indian media is under-researched, and a few researches have been undertaken to study the Rohingyas in India but not in China. Mohanty (2020), for example, tried to understand how media constructs a negative image by portraying Rohingyas and creating a narrative of nationalism. Anderson (1998) defined “print capitalism” as the precursor of the national imagination. Media is vital in creating psychic unity across society based on language and culture. While the media create imagined community, they also create “otherness” and hatred by portraying someone negatively. This othering happens through asymmetric power relations between the society’s dominant and marginal groups (Mohanty, 2020). In another study, Mohanty (2022) claimed that “the religious turn of media has become instrumental in constructing refugees’ image and creating the

180  Harisur Rhaman ‘other’ in India” (p. 825). So, the Rohingyas are described as others based on religion and culture. Interestingly in India, Afghan or Tibetan refugees are not discriminated against the way Rohingyas are defamed and disparaged (Mohanty, 2020). Media create public opinion through streamlining information (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Mohanty (2020) found that the Indian media used derogatory words such as “terrorists” to refer to Rohingyas. In some cases, Rohingyas are homogenised as perceptive threats of terrorism. The Indian press hardly follows journalistic ethics and responsibility in portraying real news. Instead, they fabricate information and demonise Rohingyas (Mohanty, 2020). The reasons, however, are not evident in Mohanty’s work. The negative portrayal might be that the media are structurally constrained and hardly set their agenda; instead, they converge with the government’s position and work like propaganda machines. Government sets the plan based on its interests and makes the dominant class of society happy. Media also join the hegemonic community group, creating a binary with the marginal group in society. Walia and Öztürk (2022) analysed the portrayal of Rohingyas in Indian newspapers, namely the Times of India, and television, New Delhi Television, or NDTV. They reported that TOI did not use words such as “violence”, “genocide”, “atrocities”, and “persecution” in the news headlines (Walia & Öztürk, 2022, p. 300). How, in some contexts, it used these words inside the reports. Both the TOI and NDTV reported that Rohingyas threaten India’s security issues. They argued that Indian media, instead of seeing the Rohingya crisis as a political one, portrayed it as more of a humanitarian crisis leaving aside the perpetrator and taking any stance on behalf of the repatriation of the Rohingyas in Myanmar. They claimed that Indian media did not criticise the Myanmar government or its military for committing a humanitarian crisis, mass atrocity, or genocide. The authors, however, did not talk about why the Indian media was not critical of the Indian government, which supported the Myanmar government at the beginning of the crisis in 2017. Fatima and Torun (2022) claimed that most Bangladeshi media use sympathetic and empathetic words to represent the plights of Rohingya. Most of the newspapers portrayed the Rohingyas in a very positive way. They analysed one month’s content, dated from August 28 to 28 September 2017. This short period, however, is not enough to understand the different attitudes of the host community, the Bangladesh government, and the media against the Rohingyas that changed with the times (Siddiqi, 2022). At the beginning of the Rohingya exodus, the Bangladesh media, government, and the host community sympathised and empathised with the Rohingyas. However, the situation changed later, given the uncertainty of the expatriation of Rohingyas and the loss of environment, food security, human trafficking, drug trafficking, security threat, and so on (Siddiqi, 2022).

A Closer Look  181 Conceptual Scheme It is not the common people who set their agenda or prioritise what is important in their day-to-day lives; instead, it is the media that defines the subject of public discussion. In prioritising a certain agenda, the media facilitates false narratives that subconsciously dictate what should be the matter of concern for the general public (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Through the frequent representation of a certain idea, the media can create an order of importance for various issues. The media’s attention to a particular story in a particular way persuades the audience to understand and evaluate the story in its intended way. According to Iyengar and Kinder (1987), priming refers to “changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations” (p. 63). In this effect, exposure to a certain issue works as a future reference for the audience to draw conclusions or pass judgement on the subject (Iyengar, Peters & Kinder, 1982). In this chapter, I focus on analysing the Chinese and Indian news headlines to determine how they set the agenda and prime and frame the news to serve the interests of certain quarters and push people’s viewpoints in a specific direction. Whether online or in print, the media does not operate in a vacuum, given that it has a specific territory and is governed by a particular regime. In their seminal book, Manufacturing Consent, Herman and Chomsky (1988) offer a propaganda model of the media where they claim that the media, especially old media in capitalist countries, is governed by five filters, irrespective of the degree of freedom it enjoys. These five filters are the licence of ownership, source of income or advertisement, news source, flak or criticism, and anti-communist position, or anti-Islamic position, which are combined now to serve as the controlling system of present-day media in Western capitalist countries. Admittedly, the five filters are not working in new media as in traditional media because new media’s fluidity, ubiquity, global outreach and complexity, and various local and global gatekeepers are still there to filter any news. For instance, while in the age of traditional media, it was only the state government that could censor the news, now it is not only the state/national government that can shut down a news outlet but social media, corporate entities such as Facebook, YouTube, or Twitter, which can delete any news without any explanation (Fuchs, 2018). Keeping this in mind, I will try to see whether the old media-based propaganda model is applicable in analysing new media-based headlines that cover the Rohingya issue. This chapter also uses the critical discourse analysis (CDA) method to analyse the news headlines. According to Michel Foucault (1972), discourse is a knowledge-producing apparatus. It is a certain way of talking about particular things. Discourse is also related to the power that could be made hidden by manipulating words, clauses, and sentences. Critical discourse analysis tries to unpack the hidden meaning of texts and representation by reading between the lines and putting text into socio-political, historical,

182  Harisur Rhaman economic, and cultural contexts. According to Teun Van Dijk (2001), “critical discourse analysis is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” (p. 252). Norman Fairclough has developed critical discourse analysis as a hegemonic struggle whereby power is exercised to construct social reality (Widdowson, 2008, p. 147). Fairclough’s (1993) critical discourse analysis explains a three-dimensional framework. The first dimension is discourseas-text or linguistic analysis, in which choices and patterns in vocabulary (such as wording and metaphor), grammar (such as transitivity and modality), cohesion (such as conjunction and schemata), and text structure (such as episodic and turn-taking) should be systematically analysed. The passive verb in the reporting can obscure the doer or subject in a sentence (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000, p. 448). The second dimension is discourse-as-practice, where attention is given to coherence, and intertextuality, which draws upon other texts, or texts are made up of heterogeneous elements such as generic conventions, discourse types, register, and style. Textual meaning is not fixed as every text as a signifier could represent something else along with its meaning. As Stuart Hall (1997) reminds us, any sign or symbol has its referent or meaning, but that sign or symbol at the same time can stand for something else or can carry different meanings or referents. This is also the crux of representation, in which texts, signs, or symbols are used not to reflect reality but to construct the meaning of something anew (Hall, 1997). In the representation process, texts can create ideologies, binary opposition, and power hierarchies using rhetorical devices and persuasive techniques, which might be logically fallacious at the same time; in cases of discursive practices, a producer of discourse influences the consumer and vice versa.

The third dimension is a discourse-as-social practice in which society, culture, politics, or economy influences the producer or author and the reader. Socio-cultural contexts or dominant practices, values, and ideologies might affect both the writers and the readers. At the same time, texts and readers can also influence societal norms and practices. No one is mutually exclusive and deterministic (Fairclough, 1993). In other words, in this dimension, discourse is a feature of ideological effects (Althusser, 2014) and the hegemonic process (Gramsci, 1999). Society creates dominant discourse for the social practices in which an individual’s consent is taken via internalisation, integration, and cooptation. In the final process of critical discourse analysis,

A Closer Look  183 context is taken into consideration in which society, culture, politics, or economy influence the producer or author and the readers. In the production process, a writer can support, oppose, or negotiate a social phenomenon. This can happen to a reader as well. A reader can also do the same in which he or she might agree or disagree or negotiate with the writer’s point of view.

In this chapter, I use the CDA to understand how media texts are influenced by society’s dominant ideology, culture, and politics, which impacts the readers, many of whom can take that ideology and belief for granted. Circulation and Online Following The Indian English dailies, namely the Times of India (TOI) and The Hindu, are very old and date back to the British colonial period of 1883 and 1887, respectively, in comparison to the Chinese newspapers entitled the People’s Daily  and the  Global Times, which were first published in 1948 and 1993, respectively. While both the  TOI  and  The Hindu  started publishing their newspapers in English from the beginning as an independent venture, Chinese communist party-owned the  People’s Daily  and the  Global Times  were first published in Chinese language and only with the advent of the Internet during the 1990s onwards did they start publishing these newspapers online in English for an international audience. Besides Chinese and English, the People’s Daily is published in other major languages, such as Spanish, Japanese, French, Russian, and Arabic. In terms of print circulation in 2019, the  TOI  had around 3 million readers (Audit Bureau of Circulations, 20191). China’s  People’s Daily, established in 1948, also has 3 million readers (People’s Daily Website, 20232). China’s  Global Times, which was established in 1993, had a daily print circulation of 2.5 million (Global Times Website, 20233), while  The Hindu,  established about 150 years back, had a circulation of 1.4 million (Audit Bureau of Circulations, 20194). As for Facebook followers, there are about 85 million followers (as of 03/05/2023) of the  People’s Daily, followed by China’s  Global Times, which  has a whopping 74 million (as of 03/05/2023) followers. In India, the  TOI has 11 million (as of 03/05/2023)  Facebook followers, followed by The Hindu, which has 5.3 million followers (as of 03/05/2023). In my research, I found 11 news headlines in the  People’s Daily  concerning the Rohingya, whereas 49 were found in the  Global Times, 36 in the TOI, and 22 in The Hindu.

184  Harisur Rhaman Chinese Newspapers

Indian Newspapers

The People’s Daily (1981)

The Global Times (1993)

The Times of India (1838)

The Hindu (1878)

News (Own source: 4) News (Other sources: Xinhua 7) Op-ed column/ opinion (nil) Editorial (nil)

News (Own source: Nil) News (Other Sources: AFP 12; Xinhua 7) Op-ed column/ opinion (30) Editorial (nil)

News (Own source: 19) News (Other sources: PTI 13; AFP 3: Reuters 1) Op-ed column/opinion (nil) Editorial (nil)

News (Own source: 17) News (Other sources: nil) Op-ed column/ opinion (5) Editorial (nil)

Source: Created by the author.

Among the headlines in the  People’s Daily, only four headlines have been framed based on their inside sources, while seven headlines are copied from the Chinese state news agency  Xinhua. There is no op-ed or editorial related to the news headlines. As for the Global Times in China, it has no news headlines from its sources. Among 49 news headlines, more than half are related to opinion columns, and the remaining news is related to other news agencies, among which 12 are from AFP and seven are from Xinhua. As for the Indian newspapers, 36 headlines are related to Rohingya news in the TOI. More than half of the news is based on the newspaper’s primary source, while 13 headlines have been used from the Indian state-run news agency  Press Trust of India  or  PTI; three news headlines have been used from AFP, and one from Reuters. Interestingly, this newspaper has no opinion column related to the Rohingya issue. Twenty-two news headlines have been used in The Hindu, of which 17 are based on its sources. There is no news from foreign agencies or sources. Unlike the TOI, The Hindu has five opinion columns related to the Rohingya issue. I have taken the news headlines of those four newspapers for about two years, from August 2017 to July 2019. Words Used to Depict the Rohingya and the Rohingya Crisis In referring to the Rohingya, most online newspaper headlines have used the “Rohingya crisis” or the “Rohingya issue”. Other words such as “Rohingya woes” and “Rohingya influx” have also been used by the Global Times and the TOI, respectively. Interestingly, most of the headlines seem to be devoid of Rohingya history, ethnicity, and their longstanding habitation in the Rakhine region of Myanmar (Blakemore, 2019). In referring to the Rohingya victims, words such as “Myanmar refugees”, “Rohingya Muslim”, “Rohingya people”, “Rohingya people”, “Rohingya migrants”, “displaced people”, “refugees”, and “displaced ethnic groups”

A Closer Look  185 have been used by the Chinese newspaper the  People’s Daily. In contrast, the  Global Times  has used a couple of signifiers, namely “Rohingya refugees” and “Rohingya Muslims”. Signifiers such as “Myanmar refugees” have certain connotations, indicating that in Myanmar itself, the Rohingya ethnic community used to live as refugees. Other signifiers, for example, “Rohingya Muslim”, are religiously and communally charged, in which the word “Muslim” could insinuate “terrorist”. This is directly reflected in the Indian newspapers, notably the Times of India, which has referred to the Rohingya as “Rohingya Terrorists”. On the other hand, the Times of India has also referred to the Rohingya victims as “refugees”, “Rohingya”, and “Rohingyas”. Along with Rohingya victims, the  TOI  has used other terms such as “Rohingya terrorists”, “Rohingya girls”, “Rohingya women”, and “Rohingya Hindus” to make its news headlines. The Hindu has used various terms such as “Rohingya”, “Rohingya refugees”, “Rohingya girls”, and “Rohingya women” in its headlines. The Indian newspapers have also used words such as “Rohingya girls” and “Rohingya women” to signify the subjects’ vulnerability. The Times of India has used another signifier, “Rohingya Hindus”, a group that was also attacked in Myanmar and fled the genocide. Words Used to Identify the Attackers and the Victims While Rohingya people have been framed with different words, some of which are negatively connotated, and attackers of the Rohingya in Myanmar have been connotated with positive words such as “Myanmar government” in the People’s Daily. Words such as “Myanmar activists” “Myanmar voices”, “Myanmar army chief”, “Myanmar’s policemen”, and “revered leader” have been used by the Global Times. These positively charged words such as “revered leader” downplaying all the atrocities of the Myanmar government, its army, and its police. The Indian newspaper, the TOI, on the other hand, has used relatively negatively charged words such as “Myanmar hardline monks”; the same goes for The Hindu, which has termed the Myanmar army as “junta”. While some selective words have been used to refer to Rohingya victims, many emotion-provoking and legally connotative, sympathetic, and empathetic terms have been left out. Among these words are “human”, “Rohingya ethnic people”, “victim”, “tortured”, “rape victim”, “Myanmar Muslim”, “innocent”, “local villagers”, “oppressed”, “wretched”, “persecuted”, “displaced people”, “forced migration”, “locals”, “genocide”, and “ethnic cleansing”, “Citizen of Myanmar” have not been cited in any news headlines, neither the Chinese nor the Indian newspapers. As for the Rohingya attackers, all the newspapers have mainly used positively connotated words, but words such as “attacker”, “human rights violator”, “oppressor”, “military regime”, “Burmese military”, “Tatmadaw”,5 “Buddhist monk”, “Ma Ba Tha”,6 “assailant”, “army”, “police”, “Burmese

186  Harisur Rhaman militia”, “arsonist”, “Burmese/Buddhist terrorist”, and “military crackdown” have not been used at all in any of the news headlines. While most international newspapers7 or agencies8 have used these words, the newspapers mentioned above have avoided all the words that prompt the general public to insinuate the attackers’ role amid this crisis. The Roles of China and India The headlines that have been used to depict China and India’s roles in the newspapers published in the respective countries are widely responsible for the misconstruction of favourable images. For example, in the People’s Daily, headlines such as “Peace role in Myanmar sought” (Baijie, Nov 27, 2017) and “China calls for further efforts towards early repatriation in Rakhine” (Sep 29, 2018) are purposefully constructed to signify China as a peace-loving and problem-solving nation to both Myanmar and Bangladesh. In line with the CDA, the doer or the subject has been obscured using the passive voice in the first sentence. One might ask: Who is seeking peace in Myanmar? Who will play that peaceful role? Seemingly, it refers to China that can ensure stability in Myanmar. Similarly, the second headline undermines the doer’s role in that it is unclear who will further attempt to repatriate the Rohingya to Rakhine. As in the People’s Daily, the Global Times has positively framed China and its role in Myanmar in most of its opinion columns. Its major headlines such as “China’s proposals drive Rohingya crisis solution” (Hongliang, July 3, 2018), “China’s proactive diplomacy in solving Rohingya crisis” (Jun, July 3, 2018), “China’s pragmatic solution to Rohingya crisis” (Hongliang, Nov 26, 2017), “Why China’s plan helps solve Rohingya crisis” (Qingrun, Dec 28, 2017), and “China, India can lead efforts to solve Rohingya crisis” (Jun, Oct 15, 2017) depict China as a peaceful mediating nation. These headlines hardly talk about China’s roles in mediating and mitigating the crisis in 2017 and before. Interestingly, while all these articles have been written in the last two years, there is no visible Rohingya repatriation progress in sight. Instead, China’s role in the Rohingya crisis remains dubious despite giving Bangladesh hope to solve the problem. Like the Chinese newspapers, the Indian newspaper TOI also depicts the Indian government’s role positively in resolving the Rohingya crisis. Indian newspapers also do not spell out what exactly India’s role has been in mitigating the Rohingya crisis or what interests India has in Myanmar that have kept it silent. While the Indian newspapers talk about Myanmar’s importance, they also try to convince its Bangladeshi counterpart by utilising some positive words. Examples of headlines include: “India extends support to Bangladesh for resolving Rohingya crisis” (Apr 9, 2018), “India for multidimensional approach to Rohingya issue” (Bagchi, Sep 17, 2017), “India sends 2nd Relief Consignment for the Rohingya in Bangladesh” (May 9, 2018), “India sends food aid to B’desh for the Rohingya” (Gupta, June 6,

A Closer Look  187 2018), “In India, Hasina seeks help on Rohingya” (Niyogi, May 26, 2018), “Hasina seeks India’s help on Rohingya” (Oct 6, 2019), “Rajnath offers more aid to Dhaka for Rohingya” (Jain, July 15, 2018), “India draws flak from UNHCR over Rohingya deportation” (Bagchi, Sep 11, 2017), and “Why Myanmar matters so much for India” (Dec 10, 2018). In “India in touch with Myanmar, Bangladesh on Rohingya issue: Jaishankar to Parliament” (Nov 6, 2017), we can see that TOI refers to the importance given to Bangladesh and Myanmar. However, in another headline, “Why Myanmar matters so much for India” (Dec 10, 2018), TOI frames Myanmar as more important than Bangladesh. In the headlines of its opinion columns, The Hindu comparatively takes a critical stance, depicting both the Indian and the Chinese government’s positions and roles in resolving the Rohingya crisis. While it shows Bangladesh’s efforts to persuade India and China, it highlights India’s and China’s tryst with Myanmar. Examples of opinion column headlines in The Hindu include: “Bangladesh seeks help from India, China” (Bhattacherjee, Sep 22, 2017), “Rohingya crisis reinforces China-Myanmar bond” (Sep 15, 2018), “Such a strange silence: India’s stand on the Rohingya crisis” (Haidar, Dec 1, 2017), “Can India ignore the Rohingya crisis?” (Kipgen, Sep 15, 2017), and “China reinforces mediation call as Rohingya crisis spirals” (Aneja, Oct 8, 2017). Among others, these headlines show how The Hindu portrays Bangladesh’s efforts to pursue China and India’s help to resolve the Rohingya issue. The headlines also remind us of the importance of India’s role in resolving the Rohingya issue when China is said to be showing good gestures to mediate the Rohingya crisis. The Hindu headlines also remind the Indian government that China intends to become more closely associated with Myanmar and Bangladesh by intervening in the Rohingya issue. At the same time, India seems to be ignorant on the matter. The Hindu also criticises the Indian government’s position by referring to India’s deafness following the Rohingya crisis. India’s dogged support towards Myanmar created an uproar among the Bangladeshi population9 and mainstream10 and social media. The Hindu has dealt with the matter critically in its various op-eds. The  TOI  and  The Hindu  differences are apparent; at the same time, the  TOI’s  framing of the Rohingya is uncritical and lenient towards the Indian government; the Hindu’s anti-establishment stance is quite understandable. Depictions of Myanmar There are hardly any headlines in Chinese and Indian newspapers where Myanmar has been portrayed negatively. Instead, news headlines in the People’s Daily show positive attitudes towards Myanmar, for example, “Peace role in Myanmar sought” (Baijie, Nov 27, 2017) and “Aung San Suu Kyi appeals to int’l community to help Myanmar find peace” (Sep 20, 2017). In the  Global Times, headlines of opinion columns appear as “Rohingya crisis reveals larger problems besetting Myanmar” (Shihong, Oct 18, 2017),

188  Harisur Rhaman “Enhancing development through China-Myanmar economic corridor” (Nov 28, 2017), “International community should listen to Myanmar voices” (Jun, Sep 4, 2018), “Myanmar needs investment, not lecturing, from West” (Lulu, July 10, 2018), “Investment, not criticism, will heal Rohingya woes” (Jincui, Mar 28, 2019), “US pressure on Myanmar shows flimsy friendship” (Jun, Nov 14, 2017), “West’s criticism of Suu Kyi misses big picture of Myanmar” (Tan, Sep 21, 2017), and “Why West is reluctant to invest in Myanmar” (Hongliang, July 16, 2018). Most of the Chinese news headlines directly oppose the West’s intervention and sympathise with Myanmar when it comes to the Rohingya crisis. In various news headlines, the roles of the actors are either passivised or nominalised. As in the headline, “Peace role in Myanmar sought” (Baijie, Nov 27, 2017), who is seeking peace? Is it the Myanmar military, the Chinese military, or some other entity? Who is the one to have created a situation where peace is absent? Again, another headline, “Enhancing development through China-Myanmar economic corridor” (Nov 28, 2017), may sound very innocuous and apolitical. However, it also reminds us of the Rohingya’s dislocation from the Rakhine state through which the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor has taken its route. In China–Myanmar relations, India’s The Hindu framed a headline that reads, “Rohingya crisis reinforce China-Myanmar bonds” (Aneja, Sep 15, 2018). The Hindu headlines indicate that while Myanmar faces Western criticism on the Rohingya issue, China is taking Myanmar’s side more than ever. Nevertheless, another headline in the Global Times, “Investment, not criticism, will heal Rohingya woes” (Jincui, Mar 28, 2019), indicates that the Chinese investment in Myanmar will make all the people, including the Rohingya, affluent and bring peace and prosperity to Rakhine. All the headlines hide more than they tell us. Some headlines in Indian newspapers also carry similar connotations when it comes to the portrayal of Myanmar. During the Rohingya exodus in 2017, the TOI’s headline read, “India in touch with Myanmar, Bangladesh on Rohingya issue: Jaishankar to parliament panel” (Nov 6, 2017), placing India in a more neutral position before Myanmar and Bangladesh. However, after a few months, the same  TOI  reads, “Why Myanmar matters so much for India” (Dec 10, 2018). This headline shows India’s leniency towards Myanmar on the Rohingya issue.  The Hindu  also published a sympathetic headline, “A difficult year for Myanmar” (Kipgen, Jan 11, 2018). The headline seems quite ironic, given that the Rohingya ethnic community and Bangladesh bore the brunt of Myanmar’s military brutality and the aftermath. The Illustration of Bangladesh The depiction of Bangladesh in the Chinese and the Indian media is interesting, given that both the Chinese and Indian governments want to keep Bangladesh on their respective sides. The  People’s Daily, for example,

A Closer Look  189 has headlines such as “China, Bangladesh to bolster ties” (July 6, 2019). The Global Times headlines also show a similar attitude towards Bangladesh. For example, it has headlines such as “Bangladesh wants amicable ties with all neighbors, says PM” (Nov 26, 2017), “Bangladeshi PM asks for early repatriation of Rohingya refugees” (Sep 28, 2018), and “Hasina in balancing act between China, India” (July 7, 2019). These headlines corroborate Bangladesh’s helplessness to cultivate China’s interest which may seem to be budging from its previous position, whereas in reality, it is not. The Chinese newspapers also highlight the Chinese government’s humanitarian efforts for the Rohingya. Still, they hardly talk about China’s role in swaying Myanmar to take the Rohingya back into the country. China has great leverage over Myanmar and Bangladesh, but its more significant stake in Myanmar favours the former. At the same time, it pretends to show Bangladesh that it is helping out on the pressing issue, but how far China will go remains a critical question. One of the Chinese newspapers’ headlines refers to Bangladesh’s efforts to pursue China and India, knowing that Bangladesh can hardly go against either. The Indian news headlines also depict Bangladesh in a similar light, where Bangladesh is portrayed as a loyal nation to India and where the Indian government is trying its heart and soul to resolve the Rohingya crisis. Like the Chinese newspapers, the Indian newspapers also highlight India’s relief support for the Rohingya. Examples of such headlines in the  Times of India include: “In India, Hasina seeks help on Rohingya” (Niyogi, May 26, 2018), “India sends food aid to B’desh for Rohingyas” (June 6, 2018), and “Rajnath offers more aid to Dhaka for Rohingya” (Jain, July 15, 2018), “Rohingya crisis: Bangladesh for greater Indian role, says ‘fire may engulf entire region’” (Oct 16, 2017), “India in touch with Myanmar, Bangladesh on Rohingya issue: Jaishankar to parliament panel” (Nov 6, 2017), “Sushma Swaraj calls Sheikh Hasina, vows to back Dhaka on Rohingya issue” (Sep 16, 2017), “Rohingya refugee crisis: Desperate need of food, water at Bangladesh shelters” (Khanna, Sep 17, 2017), and “Will not allow our soil to be used for any terrorist activities against India: Bangladesh” (July 15, 2018). Interestingly, the promising headlines of good bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh do not reflect reality. The Rohingya crisis lingers for many years, but India has not taken any visible action to pursue Myanmar or resolve the problem. From the headlines, it is clear that India shows to be helping out Bangladesh, providing some aid for the Rohingya, or vows to back Dhaka on the Rohingya issue but does not take any actual initiative to resolve the problem. While offering help to Bangladesh, India is also aware that Bangladesh is on its side to tackle the terrorism problem in its NorthEastern states, also called the Seven Sisters. While the  TOI  emphasises the Indian government’s role,  The Hindu, on the other hand, tries to push the Indian government to support Dhaka on the Rohingya issue. It also highlights the Bangladeshi government’s efforts to convince China and India. As some headlines from The Hindu clarify: “Bangladesh

190  Harisur Rhaman seeks help from India, China” (Bhattacherjee, Sep 23, 2017), “Hasina floats five-point peace plan” (Habib, Sep 22, 2017), “India takes back 31 stranded Rohingya; BSF, Bangladesh Border guards stand-off ends” (Haidar & Singh, Jan 22, 2019), “Rohingya issue dominates India-Bangladesh discussions” (Bhattacherjee, Feb 08, 2019), “The disaster next door: on the Rohingya issue” (Khasru, Sep 11, 2017), “Can India ignore the Rohingya crisis?” (Kipgen, Sep 15, 2017), and “Myanmar: human rights under the junta?” (Nov 14, 2017). Interestingly, though there are some opinion columns in The Hindu, there is hardly any spot news or hard news coverage about Rohingya’s plight and the Bangladesh government’s struggles in the TOI or The Hindu. In both the newspapers, there is no first-hand account of the Rohingya camps, the atrocities of Myanmar, or the Rohingya’s current situation. Commonalities and Differences Given that India and China are at odds regarding their geopolitical and economic interests across South and South East Asia, the Rohingya issue has again brought the matter to the forefront. For example, in the Global Times, headlines frame India and China’s roles in resolving the Rohingya crisis. Two Global Times headlines read, “China, India can lead efforts to solve Rohingya crisis” (Jun, Oct 15, 2017), or “Hasina in balancing act between China, India” (July 7, 2019). These headlines show how a smaller country such as Bangladesh depends on two regional powers and is caught between keeping both of them happy. While it is hard to assume from the Chinese headlines about India’s role in resolving the Rohingya issue as both are at loggerheads on various issues, Indian newspapers such as The Hindu directly frames China leveraging on the Rohingya crisis, for example, “Rohingya crisis reinforces China-Myanmar bond” (Sep 15, 2018). The geopolitical strategies centring on China and India regarding the Rohingya issue are apparent in the headlines of op-eds. Despite their differences in portraying each other’s roles on the Rohingya issue, most news headlines indicate one common thing—that is, two regional powers, China and India, are the keys to resolving the Rohingya crisis. From the headlines, one might insinuate the relations between China and India, China and Myanmar, China and Bangladesh, India and Bangladesh, and Myanmar and Bangladesh. Without considering the power dynamics and complex geopolitical strategies of each nation, it is hard to understand the crisis and come up with possible solutions. This is understandable from the headline: “Hasina in balancing act between China, India” (July 7, 2019). A small power like Bangladesh cannot overlook any of these two big powers. In other words, Bangladesh cannot turn its back on India because of its geopolitical and economic position and power. At the same time, because of its economic dependency on China, the country cannot leave China either. So, China is taking this opportunity while neglecting Bangladesh’s appeals for assistance in resolving the Rohingya crisis and pressurising Myanmar to

A Closer Look  191 take the Rohingya population back from Bangladesh. Similarly, India is also taking the upper hand on Bangladesh because of its geographical position and regional hegemony, which the latter can hardly avoid. While Bangladesh is trying to maintain its relationship with both powers, it can scarcely compel any of them to put pressure on Myanmar. Given that there is hardly any utterance against Myanmar, it is not hard to assume that Myanmar is more important than Bangladesh for both India and China. Admittedly, India and China have stakes in Bangladesh, and both want to have Bangladesh on their respective sides. India has security issues in its Seven Sisters states, for which it needs Bangladesh’s and Myanmar’s cooperation. China has a large amount of investment in the infrastructural development sector of Bangladesh. However, both India and China have interests in Myanmar’s mining industries.11 Myanmar’s natural gas reserve is an attraction for both countries, which could put Bangladesh on the back foot to some extent.12 Because of their geopolitical and economic interests in Myanmar, regional powers such as China show a lacklustre attitude to resolving the Rohingya crisis.13 For the reason that India and China are in favour of Myanmar on the Rohingya issue, Bangladesh can hardly become tough against Myanmar. Instead, Bangladesh tries to maintain a delicate balance in tackling India and China to press Myanmar. The Role of the UN and the West While the Indian newspapers do not directly mention Western powers or international agencies such as the UN, the Chinese newspapers go against them, as is reflected in “Myanmar needs investment, not lecturing, from West” (Lulu, July 10, 2018) and “International community should listen to Myanmar voices” (Jun, Sep 4, 2018). The difference of opinions between the Chinese and Indian newspapers is quite clear. The Chinese newspapers are very much against Western intervention in resolving the Rohingya crisis, while the Indian newspapers are mostly muted regarding the West’s roles. The West, including the US, Canada, and the EU nations, and the UN have been quite critical of Myanmar, and its rulers have been accused of crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The US and the EU have taken various measures, including an embargo on Myanmar military leaders from visiting Western countries. The International Court of Justice has also given a verdict against Myanmar and demanded to safeguard of the remaining Rohingya in the Rakhine region. The Western countries have also criticised China and Russia for vetoing any actions taken by the UN Security Council. Against this backdrop, Chinese newspapers such as the Global Times oppose Western intervention in Myanmar without mentioning any reason for believing so. The Chinese newspapers divert people’s attention from the main issue and necessitate development issues for Myanmar, which could be ensured by China, not by the West. The Chinese newspapers hardly talk about the Rohingya

192  Harisur Rhaman plight and crisis, blaming the Myanmar government; instead, they commiserate with the Myanmar government and urge the international community to listen to Myanmar. Discussion and Conclusion The word “Rohingya” has been such a derogatory and floating signifier that even ordinary people use the term “Rohingya” as a pejorative term. The metaphorical use of someone’s word against another from the same class connotes the triviality of the Rohingya community, who have no power, status, or wealth. The Myanmar government smeared the Rohingya and branded them as Muslim terrorists and illegal Bangladeshis. The same goes for the Chinese newspapers, which support the Myanmar government and deliberately blackout the narratives of the Rohingya, at least in the first couple of years since the latest exodus started in late 2017. My analysis of news headlines between August 2017 and July 2019 shows that the People’s Daily has focused more on hard news, the Global Times has emphasised more op-eds, features, and other such bylined articles, and both publications have described the Rohingya plight very lightly, showing leniency towards Myanmar. In India, the TOI has covered diverse stories and news on the Rohingya, in addition to many op-eds and feature articles. They have noted the Rohingya people, especially women and children, and their vulnerability and precarious situations in Cox’s Bazar. However, they rarely talk about India’s silence or its role in the Rohingya saga. The Hindu, on the other hand, has covered more op-eds than the  TOI.  The Hindu  has provided some criticism in its opinion columns regarding India’s silence over the issue. The Hindu’s headlines have pressurised the Indian government, and India’s double-dealing with Myanmar and Bangladesh has seen better exposure in those headlines. As for the vernacular related to stories, events, and perspectives included and omitted in the headlines, neutral words have been mainly used to refer to both the victims and attackers, undermining the magnitude of mayhem and destruction of the Myanmar military or Buddhist monks. They have also understated the Rohingya’s plight in Myanmar and Bangladesh. With the headlines, it is hard to understand the role of Myanmar and the Rohingya’s plight. Most headlines are neutralised, leaving action words or adjectives out of their descriptions. The TOI, for example, did not use the words such as “violence”, “genocide”, “atrocities”, and “persecution” in their headlines. This finding is in line with Walia and Öztürk’s work (2022) on the same issue. In addition, most of the headlines have undermined the actor’s roles and the victim’s plight through passivity and nominalisation. Most news headlines tend to decontextualise the crisis, avoiding Myanmar Rohingya’s historical, socio-cultural, and economic backgrounds. They deliberately omit most of the allegations against Myanmar. Instead of talking about China’s economic ambition in Myanmar, most Chinese news headlines try to necessitate Myanmar’s development, in which China plays a big role.

A Closer Look  193 They try to depoliticise and demarcate Myanmar’s developmental issue of the Rohingya crisis and regional politics. Most Indian news headlines, similarly, try to highlight India’s economic relationship with Myanmar. They also focus on Myanmar’s role in helping India’s peacekeeping efforts in the Seven Sisters states. Interestingly, both the Indian and Chinese newspapers tend to show the Rohingya issue as a matter of Myanmar’s internal affairs. They emphasise the bilateral solution to the Rohingya crisis instead of a multilateral endeavour. The Chinese newspapers vociferously criticise Western governments, claiming them to be the enemies of Myanmar. In India, The Hindu is more critical than the TOI against the Indian government’s position on the Rohingya issue. The Chinese newspapers directly talk on behalf of the Chinese government and the Myanmar government. However, India’s new headlines, mainly The Hindu, try to keep a little distance from the government’s position on the Rohingya, emphasising India’s greater role in resolving the crisis. However, due to the recent decline of press freedom in India, the stances of Indian newspapers against their government might be in jeopardy, as mentioned by Reporters sans frontières (RSF14). In its 2020 Press Freedom Ranking, the RSF placed India at 142 and China at 177 among 180 countries. Referring to this Indian newspaper, a columnist in the Deccan Herald stated in one headline: “Press freedom in India has taken a beating”.15 As we have seen, the Chinese news sources hardly differ in their portrayal, whereas the Indian newspapers do. The Chinese newspapers suffer from what Bob Franklin called McJournalism (2005), in which, similar to the process of McDonaldisation, newspapers use McDonald’s four criteria—namely efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control—to homogenise the news (Ritzer, 1993), made obvious by the sameness of opinion. While the Indian newspapers try to accommodate spot news, news from the agencies, op-eds, editorials, features, and opinion columns on the Rohingya, the Chinese newspapers utilise only a couple of press agencies,  Xinhua,  and the occasional columnist. Because of their beneficial relationships with Myanmar, both China and India assert their leniency towards Myanmar and oppose any multilateral initiative, especially the intervention of the West in resolving the Rohingya crisis. The Chinese newspapers also label Western countries and agencies, including the UN, as conspirators and intruders, detrimental to Myanmar’s peace and stability. While the Indian news headlines are somewhat more strategic and do not blame the West directly, the Chinese news headlines vociferously criticise the West for pressurising Myanmar and spoiling Myanmar’s progress on the Rohingya crisis. They see China as a vital development partner to Myanmar. The limitation of my study was that I could not extensively analyse the inside matter of these four newspapers related to Rohingyas due to time constraints. Further research could be carried out on the people’s opinions regarding the portrayal of Rohingyas in Chinese and Indian media and the apparent changing tones that both the Chinese and the

194  Harisur Rhaman Indian government and their media take nowadays due to geopolitical and geo-economic reasons. Notes 1 http://www​ . auditbureau ​ . org ​ / files ​ / JD ​ % 202019​ % 20Highest​ % 20Circulated​ %20(across%20languages).pdf 2 http://en​.people​.cn​/other​/about​.shtml 3 https://www​.globaltimes​.cn​/adv​.html 4 http://www​ . auditbureau ​ . org ​ / files ​ / JD ​ % 202019​ % 20Highest​ % 20Circulated​ %20(across%20languages).pdf 5 It is the official name of the armed forces of Myanmar. 6 It is an ultra-nationalist Buddhist organisation based in Myanmar. 7 https://www​. nytimes ​ . com ​ / 2017 ​ / 09 ​ / 11 ​ / world ​ / asia​ / myanmar​ - rohingya​ - ethnic​ -cleansing​.html. 8 https://www​.reuters​.com​/article​/us​-myanmar​-rohingya​-timeline​/two​-years​-on​-a​ -look​-at​-the​-rohingya​-crisis​-idUSKCN1VD044. 9 https://thewire​.in​/diplomacy​/bangaldesh​-rohingya​-crisis​-myanmar​-india. 10 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/frontpage​/mayanmar​-rohingya​-refugee​-crisis​-dhaka​ -expects​-help​-delhi​-beijing​-1460839. 11 https://www​. scmp ​ . com ​ / week ​ - asia ​ / geopolitics ​ / article ​ / 2115839 ​ / why ​ - do ​ - china​ -india​-back​-myanmar​-over​-rohingya​-crisis. 12 https://www​.eastasiaforum​.org​/2018​/04​/11​/china​-and​-indias​-geopolitical​-tug​-of​ -war​-for​-bangladesh/. 13 https://www​.bbc​.com​/bengali​/news​-48881061​?ocid​=socialflow​_facebook​&fbcli​​d​ =IwA​​R29ez​​QCw1z​​IOp​_g​​_jdkT​​LDBKz​​4cqxv​​Z​-TWt​​B6-​_A​​ZeqSe​​uz88y​​HL9zC​​i3I. 14 https://rsf​.org​/en​/ranking​_table. 15 https://www​.deccanherald​.com​/opinion​/press​-freedom​-in​-india​-has​-taken​-a​-beating​-812087​.html.

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196  Harisur Rhaman www​.thehindu​.com​/news​/national​/bsf​-hands​-overs​-31​-rohingya​-to​-tripura​-police​ -ending​-standoff​-with​-bangladesh​/article61549698​.ece. Hall, S. (Ed.). (1997). Culture, Media and Identities. Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Herman, E. S., & Chomsky, N. (1988). Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon Books. Hongliang, G. (2017, November 26). China’s pragmatic solution to Rohingya crisis. Accessed 08 11 2020. https://www​.globaltimes​.cn​/page​/201711​/1077254​.shtml. Hongliang, G. (2018, July 03). China’s proposals drive Rohingya crisis solution. Accessed 06 10, 2020. https://www​.globaltimes​.cn​/page​/201807​/1109289​.shtml. Hongliang, G. (2018, July 16). Why West is reluctant to invest in Myanmar. Accessed 15 10 2021. https://www​.globaltimes​.cn​/page​/201807​/1111010​.shtml. Iyengar, S., Peters, M. D., & Kinder, D. R. (1982). Experimental demonstrations of the “not-so- minimal” consequences of television news programs. American Political Science Review, 76(4), 848–858. doi: 10.2307/1962976. Iyengar, S., & Kinder, D. R. (1987). News that Matters: Television and American Opinion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Jain, B. (2018, July 15). Rajnath offers more aid to Dhaka for Rohingya. Accessed 12 11 2020. https://timesofindia​.indiatimes​.com​/india​/rajnath​-offers​-more​-aid​-to​ -dhaka​-for​-rohingya​/articleshow​/64993080​.cms. Jincui, Y. (2019, March 28). Investment, not criticism, will heal Rohingya woes. Accessed 16 10 2021. https://www​.globaltimes​.cn​/page​/201903​/1143867​.shtml. Jun, A. (2017, October 15). China, India can lead efforts to solve Rohingya crisis. Accessed 06 10, 2020. https://www​.globaltimes​.cn​/page​/201710​/1070428​.shtml. Jun, A. (2017, November 14). US pressure on Myanmar shows flimsy friendship. Accessed 16 10 2021. https://www​.globaltimes​.cn​/page​/201711​/1075217​.shtml. Jun, A. (2018, July 03). China’s proactive diplomacy in solving Rohingya crisis. Accessed 07 11, 2020. https://www​.globaltimes​.cn​/page​/201807​/1109347​.shtml. Jun, A. (2018, September 04). International community should listen to Myanmar voices. Accessed 15 10 2021. https://www​.globaltimes​.cn​/page​/201809​/1118338​.shtml. Khanna, R. (2017, September 17). Rohingya refugee crisis: Desperate need of food, water at Bangladesh shelters. Accessed 15 10 2021. https://timesofindia​.indiatimes​ .com​/world​/rest​-of​-world​/rohingya​-refugee​-crisis​-desperate​-need​-of​-food​-water​-at​ -bangladesh​-shelters​/articleshow​/60716401​.cms. Khasru, S. M. (2017, September 11). The disaster next door: On the Rohingya issue. Accessed 15 10 2021. https://www​.thehindu​.com​/opinion​/lead​/the​-disaster​-next​ -door​/article19656058​.ece. Kipgen, N. (2017, September 15) Can India ignore the Rohingya crisis? Accessed 14 11 2020. https://www​.thehindu​.com​/opinion​/op​-ed​/can​-india​-ignore​-the​-rohingya​ -crisis​/article19686341​.ece. Kipgen, N. (2018, January 11). A difficult year for Myanmar. Accessed 15 10 2021. https://www​.thehindu​.com​/opinion​/op​-ed​/a​-difficult​-year​/article62112124​.ece. Lulu, L. (2018, July 10). Myanmar needs investment, not lecturing, from West. Accessed 16 10 2021. https://www​.globaltimes​.cn​/page​/201807​/1110250​.shtml. McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1972). The agenda-setting function of mass media. Public Opinion Quarterly, 36(2), 176–187. doi: 10.1086/267990. Mohanty, B. (2020). Understanding media portrayal of Rohingya refugees. In N. Chowdhory & B. Mohanty (Eds.), Citizenship, Nationalism and Refugeehood of Rohingyas in Southern Asia (pp. 97–111). Singapore: Springer.

A Closer Look  197 Mohanty, B. (2022). Media representation of Rohingya refugees. In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Refugees in India (pp. 825–841). India: Routledge. Niyogi, S., & Boral, S. (2018, May 26). In India, Hasina seeks help on Rohingya. Accessed 01 11 2020. https://timesofindia​.indiatimes​.com​/india​/in​-india​-hasina​ -seeks​-help​-on​-rohingya​/articleshow​/64326178​.cms. Qingrun, S. (2017, December 28). Why China’s plan helps solve Rohingya crisis. Accessed 08 11 2020. https://www​.globaltimes​.cn​/page​/201712​/1082514​.shtml. Ritzer, G. (1993). The McDonaldization of Society: An Investigation into the Changing Character of Contemporary Social Life. Newbury Park: Pine Forge Press. Sengupta, N. (2017, November 14). Myanmar: Human rights under the junta? Accessed 15 10 2021. https://www​.thehindu​.com​/opinion​/op​-ed​/human​-rights​ -under​-the​-junta​/article20395908​.ece. Shihong, B. (2017, October 18). Rohingya crisis reveals larger problems besetting Myanmar. Accessed 14 11 2020. https://www​.globaltimes​.cn​/page​/201710​ /1070956​.shtml. Siddiqi, B. (2022) Challenges and dilemmas of social cohesion between the Rohingya and host communities in Bangladesh. Frontiers of Human Dynamics. 4, 944601. Doi: 10.3389/fhumd.2022.944601. Tan, S. (2017, October 08). West’s criticism of Suu Kyi misses big picture of Myanmar. Accessed 15 10 2021. https://www​.globaltimes​.cn​/page​/201710​/1069318​.shtml. The Global Times (2023). Audience. Accessed 03 05 2023 https://www​.globaltimes​ .cn​/adv​.html. The People’s Daily (2023). Introduction to People’s Daily. Accessed 03 05 2023. http://en​.people​.cn​/other​/about​.shtml. Van Dijk, T. A. (2001). Critical discourse analysis. In D. Tannen, D. Schiffrin, & H. Hamilton (Eds.), Handbook of Discourse Analysis (pp. 352–371). Oxford: Blackwell. Walia, K., & Öztürk, S. (2022). Unfolding Rohingya refugee crisis through mass media: A thematic analysis of Indian print and electronic media. In K. Bulbul, M. N. Islam, & M. S. Khan (Eds.) Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Myanmar (pp. 291–311). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Widdowson, H. G. (2008). Text, Context, Pretext: Critical Issues in Discourse Analysis. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Xiaofeng, Y. (2017, November 28). Enhancing development through ChinaMyanmar economic corridor. Accessed 15 10 2021. https://www​.globaltimes​.cn​ /page​/201711​/1077702​.shtml. Xiaoyu, Z. (2019, July 07). Hasina in balancing act between China, India. Accessed 15 10 2021. https://www​.globaltimes​.cn​/page​/201907​/1157050​.shtml.

11 Representation of Forcibly Displaced Rohingyas in Bangladeshi Newspapers Palash Kamruzzaman, Mohammad Ehsan Kabir, Bulbul Siddiqi Introduction The forcibly displaced Rohingyas1 represent one of the most marginalised and vulnerable groups of people living in current time. The crisis is historically rooted as the Rohingyas have been facing atrocities by the Myanmar government for many years (Kingston, 2015), leading some scholars to claim these  state-supported ​violent e​vents  as a slow-burning genocide or ethnic cleansing (Zarni & Cowley, 2014​;  B ​ eyrer & Kamarulzaman, 2017). The Rohingyas have been historically denied their rightful citizenship under successive governments in Myanmar. They have also experienced humiliation and social exclusion while their properties and lands have been continuously confiscated. There have been waves of state-led violence against the Rohingyas (see Chapter 1 of this volume), and the latest episode of these brutal events took place in 2017. These state-led violence against the Rohingyas have forced them to flee their ancestral land and take refuge in many countries, and Bangladesh hosts the largest of this displaced group of people (see Chapter 1 of this volume). Haunted and persecuted by their own government, around 1.2 million Rohingyas now live in Bangladesh, predominantly in makeshift camps in Cox’s Bazar. The congested camps in Cox’s Bazar have been described as the largest refugee camps in the world (Rae, 2018), in the circumstance where the two states are not involved in violent conflicts. Bangladesh’s role has been widely acclaimed by the international community, and a great number of projects led by the government of Bangladesh and many international as well as national non-government organisations are functioning in the Rohingya camps. It is reported that more than a hundred organisations have been working in various makeshift camps to provide different life-saving basic needs support (Khan, 2018). The crisis has become an important issue for the academics as well as the practitioners, as a range of stakeholders are seemingly highly active for an effective solution to this crisis. The crisis has also received major international media coverage. National and international media have played an important role in revealing the plights of the Rohingyas, unfolding their experiences in Myanmar, recording cross-border journeys to save their lives, and urging the world to help these people. However, very few researchers pointed out the common ways of DOI: 10.4324/9781003228707-15

Representation of Forcibly Displaced Rohingyas  199 representing the Rohingyas in the media, both in Bangladesh and in international contexts. For example, Chandha et al. (2018) show that the Rohingyas are generally represented in the global media as impoverished, stateless, and inhumanely treated victims. It was also found that the notion of vulnerabilities of the Rohingyas was emphasised in representing the Rohingya crisis. Mohanty (2020), on the other hand, shows that the way the Indian media represented the Rohingyas facilitates the construction of negative image of the Rohingyas and shapes public imagination around narratives of nationalism. Islam (2018) shows that initially while publishing news about the Rohingya crisis, particularly focusing on the 2017 crisis, Bangladeshi newspapers adopted a more humanitarian ground to protest against the genocide committed by Myanmar. Fatima and Torun (2022), based on their study of Bangladeshi newspapers, agree that initially the main focus was on the ‘humanitarian’ element of the crisis, while the newspapers also gave special treatment to the women, children, and elderly people and published a significant number of special reports about them. Walia and Öztürk (2022) argue that the humanitarian aspect was also predominant in the Indian media coverage about the Rohingyas. Nevertheless, as time passed, Rohingyas were demonised by the media including the local newspapers (Shishir, 2019; Mohanty, 2020; Walia and Öztürk, 2022) perhaps contributing towards developing a negative mindset for the host community around Cox’s Bazar and to some extent nationally. The agenda of demonising the Rohingyas is rooted in their historical persecution in Myanmar (Gorlick, 2019). How this was also adopted in the Bangladeshi media is worth exploring, especially in the context that Bangladesh hosts the majority of the displaced Rohingyas, and there was a sympathetic tenor by the government of Bangladesh as well as the mainstream news media at the beginning of the latest episode of this crisis in late 2017. In order to deepen the understanding of the Rohingya crisis with a view towards possible sustainable resolutions of this crisis, it is imperative to critically interrogate the narratives of the media representation of the host country as Hall (1997) suggests that the meaning of a given issue is not fixed; it can be constantly changing. Power consistently strives to fix meaning to support an agenda (ibid), and in the event of the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh, national newspapers wield some power in shaping the making of the meaning around the topic. The competition over meaning among social groups and actors is referred to as the ‘politics of representation’ (Holquist 1983, Shapiro 1988), and it is the task of anthropologists (as well as other social scientists) to understand how the meaning makers understand the issue (Asad, 1973). If we look into the context of the Rohingya, the representation of the Rohingyas in various Bangladeshi media received less attention among the academics, researchers, and practitioners. It shows a gap in understanding the setting up of the mindset of the host community through such representations of the Rohingya. For example, Fatima and Torun (2022) insist that Bangladeshi media portrayed Rohingyas with utmost sensitivity that made a huge impact

200  Palash Kamruzzaman, Mohammad Ehsan Kabir, Bulbul Siddiqi on the people and the policymakers of Bangladesh and the world to support the Rohingyas who are ‘as vulnerable and helpless people who needed shelter, food, healthcare, proper sanitation facilities, drinking water, and safety’ (ibid: 285). They also suggest that in doing so labelling these people as ‘Rohingyas’ instead of ‘refugees’ is a marker that the media took a cautious approach not to offend or challenge the government of Bangladesh’s official position in this case. This was somewhat similar to the arguments of Walia and Öztürk (2022) where they show that the Indian media also used the terms such as Rohingya, Rohingya Muslim, Rohingya refugees, and Rohingya Minority, identifying these people as an integral part of Myanmar which coincides with the Indian government’s approach towards Rohingya refugees who see it as a humanitarian crisis while these people could also pose some threats towards security, law, and order. Media’s turn (initially from a largely sympathetic one) to depict negative images of the Rohingyas is quite intriguing. Mohanty (2020) questions the ethics of journalism while Rohingyas have been described in the Republic TV as potential terrorists. He goes on to suggest that this brings in the question of identity politics and resource constraint argument that attempts to set the communal political agenda of the elites (ibid: 109). In this context, this chapter assesses how the displaced Rohingyas are represented in Bangladeshi newspapers. News media, both printed and electronic, can have a huge impact on shaping an agenda for its readers and the wider community. This is particularly notable for the Rohingya crisis. Various news items published in Bangladeshi newspapers showed a sympathetic tone toward the host community during the initial phase of the Rohingya influx in August 2017. This trend took a different route and can become clear if we look at the news on a mass event while the Rohingyas gathered to observe two years of their displacement at various camps in Cox’s Bazar. Thus, it is important to delve into the national newspapers in understanding how Rohingyas are represented because a systematic analysis would (i) enable all related stakeholders to obtain a deeper perspective of the crisis and formulate policies based on the evidence those are closer to ground reality, and (ii) potentially fill any knowledge gap about the crisis as the outcomes of different studies are not yet published or have become a common knowledge. Methods News archives are a key research resource for academics across the humanities and social sciences, as a source of information, as a subject for investigation in their own right, and as a litmus of broader social, political, and cultural trends (Deacon 2007). Innovations in computer and information technology offer ways of alleviating the problems associated with storing, retrieving, and accessing news material. Newspaper content is now routinely stored in various digital formats, which means it can be searched comprehensively, quickly, and reliably, and in many cases can be accessed remotely. The broad scope and consistency of their coverage, as well as their wide availability,

Representation of Forcibly Displaced Rohingyas  201 make newspapers especially attractive as a source of data (Oliver, CadenaRoa & Strawn, 2004). Instead of directly observing, interviewing, or asking someone to fill in a questionnaire for the purposes of research inquiry, a review of newspaper data is dealing with something produced for other purposes. This is an example of obtrusive research (indirect observation), that is, the nature of the document is not affected by the fact that it is being used for a research project (Robson 1993). A total of 293 news items from two national daily newspapers (one published in Bengali and the other in English) were selected for this work. There is no official data for newspaper readership in Bangladesh, but it is widely accepted that both these papers are two of the most popular newspapers in the country, while the Bengali newspaper (Prothom Alo), on its website, claims a readership of 7.6 million people. After carefully checking that no news item is used twice, this piece develops its arguments based on 96 news items from the Daily Star and 197 news items from the daily Prothom Alo. The earliest news item used in this work was published on 28 August 2017, and the latest news item was published on 16 July 2019. ​ The news items comprise a range of general reports, investigative reports (where someone was assigned to produce a report based on some journalistic investigation and discussion with various stakeholders), opinion pieces and editorials (op-eds), interviews with ministers and visiting foreign diplomats, and a special report on a roundtable that focused on Rohingya issue and engaged a range of members like government officials, humanitarian actors, academics, and civil society members (see Figure 11.2). Selected news items and public comments at the bottom of many news items were subject to qualitative content analysis in depicting how the Rohingya issue is being portrayed in two of the country’s leading newspapers.

Figure 11.1  Source of news items

202  Palash Kamruzzaman, Mohammad Ehsan Kabir, Bulbul Siddiqi

Figure 11.2  Types of news items

Rohingyas: As Represented in Bangladeshi Newspapers Assorted issues on forcibly displaced Rohingyas are covered in Bangladeshi newspapers, and below we offer some of the major themes that emerged from the selected news items. The representations of the Rohingya issue, as can be seen below, touch upon multipronged yet highly interconnected elements of the topic at hand. The following offers some details about the crisis, the impact that the Rohingya influx has on ecology and environment, geopolitics around the crisis, and the Government of Bangladesh (GoB)’s current intention to move forward. It is anticipated that our analyses offer a fuller picture of the crisis, as represented in the Bangladeshi newspapers. The Crisis

Selected news items provide a profuse picture of the crisis. While the newspapers include calls for accommodating Rohingyas for humanitarian reasons, the event (Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar to save their lives) has consistently described Rohingyas as genocide victims for their religious background.2 Citing from a study of the Ontario International Development Agency (OIDA), it is reported that almost 24,000 Rohingyas were killed and nearly 18,000 were raped by the military of Myanmar. There are also details of how the habitats were torched and destroyed and how Rohingyas were shot at and thrown to fire.3 Since late August 2017 both newspapers have regularly updated the number of displaced Rohingyas who entered Bangladesh. According to news reports in Prothom Alo, on 16 January 2018, the number of Rohingya refugees who registered through biometric details

Representation of Forcibly Displaced Rohingyas  203 crossed over one million (to be more specific 10047824), and on 16 April 2018, it was claimed that Bangladesh Army, Bangladesh Border Guard, and UNHCR collected biometric details of 1,103,2725 Rohingyas who entered Bangladesh since the crisis unfolded in September 2017. This number is significantly different from various official statistics provided by international organisations insisting that around 700,000 new Rohingyas entered Bangladesh since September 2017, while the total number of Rohingyas would be around one million (for example 906,600 by the UN, 2019, and 911,359 by ISCG, 2019; see Section 2 for more details). High officials of the GoB also acknowledge the variance in statistics such as the Foreign Minister who claims the number of Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs) as over 1.2 million.6 Some reports also highlight the fact that many Rohingyas have taken refuge in other countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. While the crisis is portrayed as a long-term blueprint for ethnic cleaning,7 it is also reported that Rohingyas feel they are ‘thousand times better off in Bangladeshi camps than what life used to be in Myanmar’.8 However, many reports describe the condition of the camps as poor with forecasts of a potential health crisis due to weak infrastructural facilities and expected number of babies in already overcrowded camps.9 This trend continues until the very moment of writing this chapter while it is reported that thousands of Rohingyas are at the risk of cyclones10 and landslides from monsoon rains.11 Impact on Local Ecology and Environment

One important objective of the reports and other news items was to inform readers about the ecological and environmental impacts of the Rohingya crisis. A prominent environment and climate change scholar insists that a year ago satellite images of the region contained pristine forest where wild elephants were roaming. But that same location now shows the world’s biggest refugee camp in Kutupalong-Balukhali, and the fourth largest city in Bangladesh is struggling with the overflow of displaced Rohingyas, living in makeshift shelters perched on the hills.12 This view was echoed by the foreign minister of Bangladesh who also alleged that the Rohingya refugees are creating an environmental disaster by destroying much of Bangladesh’s forest.13 This was further illustrated through some investigative reports. For example, one report suggests that, as per the estimate of Cox’s Bazar Forest Department, more than 2,000 hectares of forest have been lost as a result of the expansion of Rohingya campsites since August 2017. Tens of thousands of trees, both big and small, have been cut down to set up camps, and concerns are raised that the pace will destroy the whole of the forest in Ukhiya and Teknaf in the next few years. It is estimated that each month the Rohingya refugees living in the camps use almost 7000 tons of fuel woods merely for cooking purposes.14 All these reports also highlight that there are issues of poor sanitation in the camps, leading to mismanagement of human

204  Palash Kamruzzaman, Mohammad Ehsan Kabir, Bulbul Siddiqi waste, while other hazardous elements such as plastics are deteriorating the local environment further. Geo-politics and Diplomacy

One key theme that came repeatedly in the news reports is the geo-politics in South-East Asia as one of the main reasons for prolonging the crisis. The news reports highlight the fact that while the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and a majority of the Muslim countries were sympathetic to the plights of the displaced Rohingyas (and blaming Myanmar for instigating the crisis), India, China, and Russia were not on board in this narrative.15 India and China’s geo-political interests with Myanmar were outlined as major constraints to exert adequate international pressure either to stop brutalities towards the Rohingyas or to take them back with the assurance of a dignified and safe life after their return. Instead, reluctance of India and China to strongly condemn Myanmar allowed it to pass on the blame to the Rohingyas who are identified as victims of despicable violence, torture, and other atrocities in major international research and fact-finding missions.16 India, on the one hand, deported some Rohingyas to Bangladesh, not to Myanmar,17 and on the other hand extended its aid support to build homes for Rohingyas in Myanmar who one day might return to Myanmar.18 Myanmar’s military chief even identified China as an ‘eternal friend’19 and thanked China for countering international pressure on Myanmar over the Rohingya crisis during a visit to Beijing in April 2019.20 Patronage from India and China has allowed Myanmar to accuse the Government of Bangladesh for the delay in the repatriation of the displaced Rohingyas.21 As stated above, since the inception of the crisis, Bangladesh has received political support from the UK, the US, EU, and most Muslim countries.22 Statements from the leaders including presidents of the US and Turkey and the Queen of Jordan got significant coverage in Bangladeshi newspapers,23,24,25. A number of diplomats also visited Rohingya camps in Bangladesh, and those events were also covered well in the newspapers.26,27,28 Attempts to use stronger political warnings were also visible where these are reported that the US, EU, and the UK want to put sufficient pressure on Myanmar to resolve the crisis.29,30,31 There are reports that one US diplomat resigned from Suu Kyi’s international advisory panel32 for ethical and moral reasons. Moreover, in a budgetary discussion for the Asia-Pacific sub-committee in the US national congress, the Chairman of the sub-committee proposes to change the political map of the countries. In his suggestion, the Chairman asks the US Foreign Office to consider attaching the Rakhine state to Bangladesh, like South Sudan.33 There has been, however, a visible shift in the recent stance of the international community. The Prime Minister of Bangladesh visited China in early July 2019 and met with the Chinese Premier34 and top leaders of Chinese

Representation of Forcibly Displaced Rohingyas  205 Communist Party.35 The outcome of those meetings, as reported in the newspapers, seems to suggest that China will use its ‘good will’ and talk to Myanmar to resolve the crisis. A similar change in position is also being reported about India when India’s Foreign Secretary visited Bangladesh in April 2019 and assured Bangladesh counterpart that India would ‘provide support at every level towards a peaceful resolution’36 of the Rohingya crisis. As recently as June 2019, Japan who was initially silent about the crisis has also announced, after Bangladesh’s Prime Minister’s meeting with her counterpart in Tokyo, that Japan would support a sustainable solution for the crisis. For Japan, a sustainable solution would entail the displaced Rohingyas to return to their homeland in a dignified manner.37 It seems that the Government of Bangladesh accepts that Myanmar will not do anything unless the international community exerts serious pressure on them – this was the view by the State Minister of Bangladesh, after his official trip to Myanmar, expressed in an interview with one newspaper in October 2017.38 While geo-politics came heavily in the selected news items, activities on diplomatic movements also featured frequently. For example, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh has repeatedly urged the international community to put pressure on Myanmar to resolve the crisis.39,40 Bangladesh has maintained a diplomatic emphasis to resolve the crisis through discussions, not by conflicting with Myanmar.41 As evidenced above, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh visited countries like China, Japan, and Brunei42 to make her case, while high-profile delegates travelled other countries for diplomatic support on this issue. For example, the President of Bangladesh visited India in March 2018 and met the Indian Prime Minister. This was seen as a constructive visit as India assured that they would support Bangladesh in the repatriation of displaced Rohingyas.43 Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister also visited the US to meet his US counterpart. While the Foreign Minister was very upbeat about his visit,44 the news items suggest that the US Secretary of State was highly complementary about Bangladesh’s generosity to accommodate the Rohingyas and mentioned that the US would be with Bangladesh in finding a solution to the crisis.45 Through diplomatic channels, Bangladesh constantly told the world that Rohingya crisis needed to be resolved quickly and the main responsibilities lay with Myanmar.46 Bangladesh also clearly indicated that the United National Security Council (UNSC) could not avoid responsibility over Rohingya crisis.47 Bangladesh’s diplomatic efforts led a number of high-profile foreign delegates to visit Rohingya camps and voice their support for Bangladesh. This includes visits from a US Senator,48 Canadian Prime Minister’s special envoy to Myanmar,49 British High Commissioner to Bangladesh,50 and State Minister of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), among others. In addition, a number of high-profile global celebrities have visited Rohingya camps in Bangladesh and met high-level officials of the Government of Bangladesh. Among those visitors include Angelina Jolie, Cate Blanchett, Michelle Yeoh, Gigi Hadid, and Priyanka Chopra – these visits also gained further global media attention on this issue.

206  Palash Kamruzzaman, Mohammad Ehsan Kabir, Bulbul Siddiqi Intent of GoB and Ways Forward

Bangladesh has given shelter to one of the most vulnerable and victimised groups of people of the current time. The Rohingyas have received sustained media coverage often outlining the vulnerabilities and painful experiences they have gone through before taking refuge in Bangladesh. Despite giving Rohingya shelter (and other support towards their basic needs), the Government of Bangladesh has made it very clear that the only solution they see to the crisis is repatriation of the FDMNs – as the Prime Minister of Bangladesh (as well as various other Ministers and high-level government officials51) clearly indicated that ‘the Rohingya nationals, who took shelter in Bangladesh, must return to their homeland in Myanmar’s Rakhine State’.52 Initially, at the start of the crisis, there was some optimism in showing generous care for a vulnerable group who have similar religious identity like the vast majority of Bangladesh’s population. On 7 October 2017, one newspaper reported Bangladesh Prime Minister’s optimism of resolving the crisis very soon. She was given a mass parade reception for bringing the world’s attention to the Rohingya crisis in her UN General Assembly speech and giving shelter to the displaced Rohingyas in Bangladesh for humanitarian reasons.53 The diplomacy and international pressure led Myanmar to come to the discussion table, and in November 2017 a bilateral treaty was signed in a Joint Working Group (JWG) level meeting in Naypyidaw. It was agreed that the displaced Rohingyas would return to Myanmar within two years at a rate of 300 to 500 per day (Bangladesh suggested that each week 15,000 Rohingya return to Myanmar).54 In addition, a treaty was signed between the Governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh in Geneva in April 2018, and to ensure international standard, safety, and security of the Rohingyas, the UNHCR was also a party to that treaty. Clearly, the above treaties were not followed up accordingly leading to a change in the tone of the Government of Bangladesh. As in September 2018, at a UN Global Compact on Refugees, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh asserted that ‘Myanmar must create conducive environment by building trust and guaranteeing protection, rights and pathway to citizenship for all Rohingyas. If needed, it should create a “safe zone” inside the country to protect all civilians’.55 A sense of irritation and frustration is also visible in the news reports as the Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh informed in a UN Security Council meeting in March 2019 that ‘Bangladesh would no longer be in a position to accommodate more people from Myanmar’.56 This is visible in the planning of relocating some 100,000 Rohingyas to an isolated island in the Bay of Bengal called Bhashan Char. The island was not readily available for resettlement. There has been little assistance from the international community in this regard,57 and Bangladesh government spent around $280 million to transform this 20-year-old uninhabited island to a secured and planned settlement with flood defence embankments, roads, housing quarters, water supply, solar panels, power, emergency shelters, helipad,

Representation of Forcibly Displaced Rohingyas  207 and other infrastructural amenities.58 The international community and various civil society actors have raised concerns about the endeavour of relocating Rohingyas to Bhashan Char. To illustrate, the UN enquired to the Government of Bangladesh about the modalities of Rohingya relocation to Bhashan Char59 while the Human Rights Watch (HRW) likens Bhashan Char as a prison for the Rohingyas.60 Concerns from the international community and civil society actors have led the GoB to take a more cautious approach but anger has also been visible. For example, in one instance, the State Minister for Disaster Management and Relief of Bangladesh said that ‘we are going a little slow. There’s no exact date to relocate … . we are not in a hurry and it will start only when all these UN bodies and Rohingya people feel the area is ready.’61 On a different occasion, the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh reacts to the critics of the plan suggesting that organisations opposing the relocation of Rohingyas to Bhashan Char should take the responsibility if there is any casualty in Cox’s Bazar camps during monsoon, not the Government of Bangladesh.62 This has possibly resulted in some form of consensus as it can be seen that a high-level UNHCR official informed that the UN has no objection in relocating Rohingyas to Bhashan Char.63 Analysis The section above (Section 3) highlights some of the persistent issues cognate to the displaced Rohingyas. These issues (such as the crisis, environmental and ecological impact of the crisis, geo-politics, and the will of Bangladesh government) are common parlance in Bangladeshi newspapers whenever there is an update about the Rohingyas now living in Bangladesh. In addition to these issues, in our analysis, we have also observed a few current and instantaneous issues. These can be found both in Bangladeshi newspapers and in the global media. Unlike the above issues, these issues may not either feature persistently or represent longstanding aspects of the crisis. In contrast, these often feature in the newspapers when such an incident takes place and thus can be described as short-term issues. However, these short-term instantaneous issues have a wider socio-political effect on the displaced Rohingyas. Three such issues were dominant in our analysis: (i) risks of human trafficking, (ii) engagement in drug-peddling or other criminal activities, and (iii) associated risks for the Rohingyas’ search for a better life. We offer some details about these below. Thousands Are at Risk of Human Trafficking

While repatriation of Rohingya refugees is a complex and cumbersome process, criminal gangs are far from inactive putting thousands of displaced Rohingyas at the risk of human trafficking (IOM, 2018). The figures (see Figures 11.3 and 11.4), based on the data collected from one of the selected newspapers (Prothom Alo) for four months (February–May 2019), reveal the extent of the

208  Palash Kamruzzaman, Mohammad Ehsan Kabir, Bulbul Siddiqi

Figure 11.3  Rohingyas rescued from trafficking from February to May 2019 (n = 513)

Figure 11.4  Proportion of men, women, and children rescued from trafficking (n=513)

Representation of Forcibly Displaced Rohingyas  209 risk and challenges as globally about 5% of total trafficked persons come from South Asia, mostly from Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar (UNODC, 2018). While human traffickers are playing their role, many refugees are making risky choices by themselves, and  many are now stranded in rickety boats off the coasts of Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia with dwindling supplies of food and water (BBC, 2015). The sheer volume of displaced Rohingyas increases further concerns about the global migrant crisis and the number of boat-capsizing incidents in the seas. A great number of Rohingyas are stuck in captivity for years in detention camps in Malaysia and other countries (Kingsley, 2016). Some have even managed to travel to Saudi Arabia and then deported back to Bangladesh (Werleman, 2019), even though it is not known how they managed to obtain Bangladeshi passports (Straits Times, 2019). Engagements in Drug Peddling, Violence, and Extremist Activities

While Bangladesh is struggling to cope with the ‘Yaba epidemic’ (popular meth pills smuggled from Myanmar), the Rohingya crisis has deteriorated the situation further. Displaced Rohingyas are viewed as easy prey by drug dealers (Das, 2017), and both men and women are recruited as drug mules. Such activities often make them subject to organised crime and severe forms of violence including death (The Times 2018). There are growing concerns that some Rohingya refugees are getting involved in criminal and violent activities. Between September 2017 and August 2018, at least 22 Rohingyas have been killed, and official records reveal six cases of rape, 68 narcotics-related cases, and 142 cases for robbery and other offences (Daily Star, 2018a). What is more worrying for the host country Bangladesh and, potentially, South-East Asia is that the refugee camps may become recruitment grounds for terrorists. Witnesses suggest that some refugee members in the camps indeed claim ties with the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) (Weaver & Thompson, 2019). The Quest for a Better Life and Associated Risks

The displaced Rohingyas living in Bangladeshi camps are unemployed. The majority of them are hungry and frustrated about their precarious situation. Being stuck in the camps, some of them try to venture whether they can find local jobs, while others, mostly women, are getting married to local men in the hope for a better future. Refugee camps are having detrimental impacts on local ecology and environment, and enhancing risks to public health as a  recent survey by Bangladesh’s health and welfare ministry identifies the Rohingyas as a major threat for HIV/AIDS epidemic in the Chittagong region. The World Bank anticipates that this huge influx of displaced Rohingyas will strain Bangladesh’s economy (World Bank, 2018), and donor contributions such as £129 million by the Government of UK (DFID, 2019) would only go a little distance. These unmistakably have negative impacts on host communities escalating tensions and conflict between the local Bangladeshis and

210  Palash Kamruzzaman, Mohammad Ehsan Kabir, Bulbul Siddiqi displaced Rohingyas (Bhuiyan, 2019), while the latter are often described as ‘a burden’ in popular discourse (Chowdhury, 2018). While we present our persistent and short-term representations of displaced Rohingyas in Bangladeshi newspapers, we are aware that representation refers to the language used in a text or talk to assign meaning to groups and their social practices, to events, and to social and ecological conditions and objects (Fairclough 1995, van Dijk 2001). Modes of representation can vary depending on the perspective from which they are constructed (Fairclough 1995, Wodak, 2001). In this case, it was found that the majority of news items represented the Rohingyas as victims of violence in Myanmar. Most of the newspaper reports provided limited scope and space for the displaced Rohingyas to share their direct experiences and sufferings, rather presented them as silent victims of violence. More specifically, voices of female Rohingya were significantly low in the studied media reports. Another finding emerging from this analysis is the portrayal of Rohingya themselves. The Rohingya have lost Myanmar’s citizenship since a military coup in 1962 (Jones, 2019). More recently, Myanmar authority rendered them as displaced foreign nationals who are illegally staying in the country (Mahmud et al., 2017). The term ‘Rohingya’ is heavily disputed in Myanmar as it was historically perceived as holding the status of one of the ethnic groups among many others within the country. The problem of not recognising the Rohingya as Myanmar nationals started right after the Second World War when Myanmar became independent (Karim, 2016; Ahmed, 2019). The mass exodus to Bangladesh in 2017 has given a new dimension to their identity crisis as the Rohingyas were not granted refugee status in Bangladesh, driven by the country’s fear that such status would make their return to Myanmar more difficult (Zaman, Dec, 2017). Unsurprisingly perhaps, the studied newspapers have mostly described them as ‘Rohingya’, instead of describing them as refugee or national of a certain country. However, the Government of Bangladesh prefers to describe these people as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN) as highlighted in the beginning of the chapter. Our analysis of selected news items suggests that the media paid disjointed attention to the diplomacy of Bangladesh to resolve the crisis. This was perhaps because the GoB has been busy juggling with different elements cognate to the crisis and diplomacy was not always at the forefront of their visible activities. When diplomacy got some coverage in the media, there were, however, little follow-up reports on the progress in international negotiations to resolve the crises. Again, this might suggest multi-layered complexities surrounding the issue, and the newspapers published reports that were more current. In addition, scattered information was made available to the public about the geo-politics and a lack of progress on Rohingya’s repatriation whereas little focus has been noticed on the opinions from the global communities. Until November 2018 (when the first attempt for Rohingyas repatriation became unsuccessful), very limited coverage of diplomacy crises was

Representation of Forcibly Displaced Rohingyas  211 noticed compared with other types of news items, and the ongoing diplomacy crises between Myanmar and Bangladesh were hardly mentioned. Such tensions were more visible after the first failed attempt of repatriating the Rohingyas. For instance, when Myanmar blamed Bangladesh for failure in repatriation in November 2018, demands from Bangladesh were published asking for Myanmar’s apology (The Daily Star 2018): Dhaka yesterday protested the ‘derogatory and provocative’ remarks of Myanmar Religious Affairs Minister Thura Aung Ko on Rohingya refugees and asked the country to apologise. In brief, most of the news items were published without signposting proactive political implications. For example, a large number of articles reported the displaced Rohingya as a persistent threat to law and order in Bangladesh. There were some suggestions that, due to their excruciating experience, the Rohingya camps may offer a fertile ground for recruiting members for extremist groups. Our analysis found such reports were initially published without any evidence, often citing assumptions from different sources.64 However, this must be noted here that at a later stage some investigative reports did come up with stronger claims of extremist activities among some sections of the Rohingyas.65 Therefore, at best, it seems that unfounded claims might deteriorate this already complicated issue, and at worst such claims might offer Myanmar an upper hand to justify their actions in the Rakhine state. Ecological and environmental impact was repeatedly discussed in the selected items. This mainly shows how the displaced Rohingyas caused a negative impact on the environment.66,67 Poor living conditions in the camps and potential hazards such as rainfall and landslide were frequently featured and perhaps rightly so in highlighting imminent risks of living in the camps. Discussion on prospective solutions to the crisis was not very consistent in the newspaper reports. Although the statements of Bangladeshi politicians were largely covered, the most frequently cited responses were some vague calls for zero tolerance to the Rohingya population (against criminal activities and drug peddling) in Bangladesh. Apart from these vague statements and in terms of actual potential solutions to the crisis, there were only a handful of articles that focused on the need to resolve the crises at the global level, instead of dealing with it as a bilateral issue between Bangladesh and Myanmar. This is indicative of Bangladesh’s emphasis on diplomacy highlighted in the previous section. Bangladesh’s intention to follow the standard diplomatic procedure without confronting Myanmar would make them highly dependent on international communities without knowing to what extent this strategy would be successful. This approach is coherent with the Milton et al. (2017) study that also suggests diplomatic efforts as the most effective solution. The Rohingya crisis is historically rooted (see Section 2), and the problem was not solved effectively in the past as Bangladesh faced multiple conundrums in building effective policies for dignified and safe

212  Palash Kamruzzaman, Mohammad Ehsan Kabir, Bulbul Siddiqi repatriation of the displaced Rohingyas (Steinberg, 2019; Fink, 2019). Thus, depending only on diplomacy where Bangladesh would have to rely on the goodwill of the global stakeholders may not bring a sustainable solution to the problem. Relocating some of the Rohingyas to Bhashan Char (see above) seemed to be another temporary solution that got frequent coverage in the selected news items. This plan has received widespread criticism from local and international civil society as well as donors and humanitarian actors. Although a seemingly tough stance from the Government of Bangladesh has made the UN bodies and international organisations support the plan for the time being, it is however not at all clear whether this will come to fruition, and if yes at what cost. Furthermore, there have been rising tensions between the host community and the displaced Rohingyas mainly because of shrinking work opportunities among the local poor and negative media reports (such as criminal activities and drug peddling). This has become intense after the mass gathering by the Rohingyas on 25th August 2019 to observe the second anniversary of their stay in Bangladesh68 (Aljazeera, 2019). Various news agencies in Bangladesh started to ‘demonise’ the Rohingya after this peaceful mass rally (Shishir, 2019). One element is clear that the Government of Bangladesh sees the only solution to the crisis is quick repatriation of the Rohingyas to Myanmar (this is also supported by most of the people and civil society). While this might be the most natural solution, especially for the Government of Bangladesh and its people, the past incidents of the Rohingya exodus in Bangladesh do not reflect a positive hope for a speedy repatriation of this large group of people. This represents a possible humane danger too. Focusing too much on repatriation gradually keeps out of sight the current problems (health, gender, population growth, safety, education of Rohingya children, living in uncertainty, and so on) that the Rohingyas are facing in camps. These are some fundamental challenges, and any slippage in ongoing humanitarian efforts might become costly. To what extent Bangladesh’s intention to relocate the displaced Rohingyas to Bhashan Char (see above) and repatriate them to Myanmar or possibly to a third country (Bhatia et al. 2018) would meaningfully contribute to the solution to the crisis is a matter that remains to be seen in the future. However, we would like to emphasise here that we have hardly seen any evidence that the selected news items indicate that the Rohingyas were consulted with due care and respect in coming up with the prospective solutions. In achieving a dignified and sustainable solution to the crisis, this could turn out to be a major setback in the near future. Conclusion We set out our objective to outline how Rohingyas are represented in two leading Bangladeshi newspapers. We have found that the crisis has been represented in a well-rounded manner. A range of news items were

Representation of Forcibly Displaced Rohingyas  213 available for our analysis (see Section 2), and at the time of writing more news items kept coming in those newspapers on the issue. Our observations can be substantiated by seven broad points. Firstly, one important element here is that there is a significant difference in the total number of displaced Rohingyas who entered Bangladesh since August 2017 and currently living there. The newspaper reports are suggesting, citing the Government of Bangladesh sources, that the total number is about 1.2 million whereas the official statistics of various international organisations seem to cite a number of around one million refugees. We contend that this discrepancy needs to be resolved with sufficient care as a correct figure would play a pivotal role in devising appropriate policies for a dignified solution to the crisis and in helping avoid further tensions between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the near future. Secondly, the news items highlight the ecological and environmental side of the crisis that has turned most of the green zone and the natural habitat of many wild lives into one of the largest refugee camps in the world. Both of the newspapers have been publishing various reports on this issue frequently to highlight the impact of the crisis on the environment. Thirdly, geo-politics constitutes a crucial element of the crisis. While Bangladesh seems to have opted a non-confrontational approach with Myanmar to resolve the crisis, it is imperative that the global community steps up their efforts to ensure justice on this issue. Bangladesh appears to be doing what it can through its diplomatic efforts. While some powerful countries such as the US, the UK, and the EU are supportive, countries such as India, China, and Russia are not so supportive, which is presumably the reason for prolonging the crisis. Myanmar may feel upbeat by the roles of India, China, and Russia, but this also highlights every reason for the international community to get the geo-politics right in moving ahead to resolve the crisis in a dignified and sustainable manner. Fourthly, currently repatriation seems to be the sole focus for all major stakeholders (except the displaced Rohingyas and some international organisations) without highlighting the prolonged nature of the crisis and the complexities of initiating the process of repatriation that has already been delayed. In addition, no one really knows when it may happen. Thus, a serious attention has to be given to this interim period until repatriation becomes a reality as the overall living condition in various camps does not show a dignified one. Fifthly, while a majority of the people of the host community and local civil society seem to be sympathetic to the Rohingya, some sections of the host community have a negative perception towards the Rohingyas (burden, criminals, etc.). Rohingyas are also becoming easy targets for trafficking and other criminal activities. The tensions between the host community and displaced Rohingyas have become a real threat for the sustainable solution to the crisis as the Rohingyas have been ‘demonised’ by many newspapers (both local and national).

214  Palash Kamruzzaman, Mohammad Ehsan Kabir, Bulbul Siddiqi Sixthly, security and spreading of extremism seems to be a real issue according to newspaper reports. While some are engaged in criminal activities, a large number of them are vulnerable to human trafficking. The search for a safer and better life is making them take risks to escape the camps, ending up with criminal gangs or drug peddling and escalating security concerns for the Government of Bangladesh as well as other major international organisations. Seventhly, many short-term and long-term issues are associated with the Rohingya crisis. While we perceive from the selected news items that repatriation of the displaced Rohingyas is the preferred long-term solution to the crisis, it is also clear that the basic needs of the Rohingyas, their safety, primary health, and education for their children also pose some major immediate concerns. As much of the attention (especially from the Government of Bangladesh) on legally binding safe repatriation is important, it is also imperative that short-term challenges get adequate and serious attention from policymakers, international community, and global civil society. We acknowledge that this chapter has some limitations (e.g. the roles of global civil society, NGOs, local organisations are not adequately described and reflected in the selected news items). How the ways forward, as described in the selected news items, contribute to the academic and policy debate is not given much attention in this work. The stories and agencies of the displaced Rohingyas are not included here either. We could neither delve more into the nitty-gritty of the legal treaty nor could we delineate security risks and health hazards for the Rohingyas as well as members of the host community. This is mainly because we wanted to focus on how Rohingyas are represented in two leading Bangladeshi newspapers. Notes 1 Given this chapter focuses on the forcibly displaced Rohingyas currently living in Bangladesh, we would like to clarify that the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) uses Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs) to describe this group. Instead of accepting the displaced Rohingyas as refugees, the GoB identifies them as ‘Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals’ right after the 2017 influx in Bangladesh. See more at https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/city​/forcibly​-displaced​ -myanmar​-nationals​-1469374 accessed on 20 November 2019. 2 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/news​/rohingyas​-victims​-genocide​ -1667323 3 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/bangladesh​/article​/1554039/​%E0​%A7​%A8​%E0​ %A7​%AA-​%E0​%A6​%B9​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%9C​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​ %A6​%B0-​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​%A7​%8B​%E0​%A6​%B9​%E0​%A6​%BF​%E0​ %A6 ​ % 99 ​ % E0 ​ % A7 ​ % 8D ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % 97 ​ % E0​ % A6​ % BE​ % E0​ % A6​ % 95​ % E0​ %A7​%87-​%E0​%A6​%B9​%E0​%A6​%A4​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%AF​%E0​ %A6​%BE-​%E0​%A6​%A7​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%B7​%E0​ %A6​%A3​%E0​%A7​%87​%E0​%A6​%B0-​%E0​%A6​%B6​%E0​%A6​%BF​%E0​ %A6​%95​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%B0-​%E0​%A7​%A7​%E0​%A7​%AE-​%E0​ %A6​%B9​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%9C​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%B0

Representation of Forcibly Displaced Rohingyas  215 4 https://www​. prothomalo​ . com​ / bangladesh​ / article​ / 1410406/নিবন্ ধিত-রোহিঙ্ গারসংখ্যা-১০-লাখ-ছাড়াল 5 https://www​. prothomalo​ . com​ / bangladesh​ / article​ / 1471081/নিবন্ ধিত-রোহিঙ্ গারসংখ্যা-১১-লাখ-ছাড়াল 6 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/bangladesh​-forest​-getting​-destroyed​ -rohingya​-refugees​-fm​-1706611 7 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/bangladesh​/article​/1560877/​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​ %A7 ​ % 8B ​ % E0​ % A6​ % B9​ % E0​ % A6​ % BF​ % E0​ % A6​ % 99​ % E0​ % A7​ % 8D​ % E0​ %A6​%97​%E0​%A6​%BE-​%E0​%A6​%A4​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%A1​%E0​ %A6​%BC​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%A8​%E0​%A7​%8B​%E0​%A6​%B0-​%E0​ %A6​%9B​%E0​%A6​%95-​%E0​%A6​%86​%E0​%A6​%A1​%E0​%A6​%BC​%E0​ %A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%87-​%E0​%A6​%AC​%E0​%A6​%9B​%E0​%A6​%B0-​%E0​ %A6​%86​%E0​%A6​%97​%E0​%A7​%87​%E0​%A6​%B0 8 https://www​. prothomalo​ . com​ / bangladesh​ / article​ / 1413726/মিয়ানমারের-চাইতেহাজার-গুণে-ভালো-আছি 9 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/48000​-rohingya​-refugee​-babies​-set​ -be​-born​-bangladesh​-camps​-in​-2018​-myanmar​-1515775 10 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/news​/ifrc​-warns​-over​-cyclones​-rohingya​-camps​-1703836 11 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/bangladesh​/article​/1601078/​%E0​%A6​%AA​%E0​ %A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%B9​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%A1​%E0​%A6​%BC​%E0​ %A6​%A7​%E0​%A6​%B8​%E0​%A7​%87​%E0​%A6​%B0-​%E0​%A6​%9D​%E0​ %A7 ​ % 81 ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % 81 ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % 95 ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % BF ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % A4 ​ % E0​ %A7​%87-​%E0​%A6​%A6​%E0​%A7​%87​%E0​%A6​%A1​%E0​%A6​%BC-​%E0​ %A6​%B2​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%96-​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​%A7​%8B​%E0​ %A6 ​ % B9 ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % BF ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % 99 ​ % E0​ % A7​ % 8D​ % E0​ % A6​ % 97​ % E0​ %A6​%BE 12 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/opinion​/politics​-climate​-change​/note​-the​-environmental​-aspects​-rohingya​-camps​-1610368 13 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/bangladesh​-forest​-getting​-destroyed​ -rohingya​-refugees​-fm​-1706611 14 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/bangladesh​/article​/1584580/​%E0​%A7​%AC-​%E0​ %A6​%B9​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%9C​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%B0-​%E0​ %A6​%8F​%E0​%A6​%95​%E0​%A6​%B0-​%E0​%A6​%AC​%E0​%A6​%A8-​%E0​ %A6​%A7​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%AC​%E0​%A6​%82​%E0​%A6​%B8 15 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/bangladesh​/article​/1329716/​%E0​%A6​%A8​%E0​ %A7​%80​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​%A6​%AC-​%E0​%A6​%AD​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​ %A6​%B0​%E0​%A6​%A4-​%E0​%A6​%9A​%E0​%A7​%80​%E0​%A6​%A8-​%E0​ %A6​%93-​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%B6​%E0​%A6​%BF​%E0​ %A6​%AF​%E0​%A6​%BC​%E0​%A6​%BE 16 https://www​. prothomalo​ . com​ / opinion​ / article​ / 1315301/কে-যে-কী-স্ বার্ থে-কথাবলছে-বা-চুপ-থাকছে 17 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/news​/un​-human​-rights​-experts​-condemn​-rohingya​-deportation​-india​-1724275 18 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/international​/article​/1569517/​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​ %A7 ​ % 8B ​ % E0​ % A6​ % B9​ % E0​ % A6​ % BF​ % E0​ % A6​ % 99​ % E0​ % A7​ % 8D​ % E0​ %A6​%97​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%A6​%E0​%A7​%87​%E0​%A6​%B0-​%E0​ %A6​%9C​%E0​%A6​%A8​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%AF-​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​ %A6 ​ % BE ​ % E0​ % A6​ % 96​ % E0​ % A6​ % BE​ % E0​ % A6​ % 87​ % E0​ % A6​ % A8​ % E0​ %A7​%87-​%E0​%A7​%AB​%E0​%A7​%A6​%E0​%A6​%9F​%E0​%A6​%BF-​%E0​ %A6​%AC​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%A1​%E0​%A6​%BC​%E0​%A6​%BF-​%E0​ %A6​%A6​%E0​%A6​%BF​%E0​%A6​%B2-​%E0​%A6​%AD​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​ %A6​%B0​%E0​%A6​%A4

216  Palash Kamruzzaman, Mohammad Ehsan Kabir, Bulbul Siddiqi 19 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/news​/myanmar​-military​-chief​-thanks​ -beijing​-support​-rohingya​-issue​-1728628 20 The report also suggests that the Myanmar military chief said that ‘Myanmar is thankful of China as a good neighbour for its correct stance and standing against the international community over the Rakhine State issue’. 21 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/news​/rohingya​-crisis​/speed​-rohingya​-return​-bangladesh​-suu​-kyi​-1623853 22 https://www​ . prothomalo ​ . com ​ / bangladesh ​ / article​ / 1594475/রোহিঙ্ গা-ইস্ যু কেআন্তর্জাতিক-আদালতে-উত্থাপন-করতে 23 https://www​. prothomalo ​ . com ​ / bangladesh ​ / article​ / 1434361/বাংলাদেশের-গভীরপ্রশংসা-ট্রাম্পের 24 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/international​/article​/1318111/​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​ %A7 ​ % 8B ​ % E0​ % A6​ % B9​ % E0​ % A6​ % BF​ % E0​ % A6​ % 99​ % E0​ % A7​ % 8D​ % E0​ %A6​%97​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%A6​%E0​%A7​%87​%E0​%A6​%B0-​%E0​ %A6​%AA​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%B6​%E0​%A7​%87-​%E0​%A6​%A6​%E0​ %A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%81​%E0​%A6​%A1​%E0​%A6​%BC​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​ %A6​%A4​%E0​%A7​%87-​%E0​%A6​%AA​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​ %A6​%B8​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%A4​%E0​%A7​%81​%E0​%A6​%A4-​%E0​ %A6​%A4​%E0​ % A7​ % 81​ % E0​ % A6​ % B0​ % E0​%A6​%B8​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​ %A6​%95-​%E0​%A6​%8F​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​%A6​%A6​%E0​%A7​%8B​%E0​ %A6​%AF​%E0​%A6​%BC​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%A8 25 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/bangladesh​/article​/1350126/রোহিঙ্গা-নিধন-করছেমিয়ানমার-জর্ডানের-রানি 26 https://www​ . prothomalo​ . com​ / bangladesh​ / article ​ / 1575018/রোহিঙ্ গা-শিবিরেজার্মান-রাষ্ট্রদূত 27 https://www​ . prothomalo​ . com​ / bangladesh​ / article​ / 1442721/উখিয়ার-রোহিঙ্ গাক্যাম্প-পরিদর্শনে-লিসা-কার্টিস 28 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/opinion​/article​/1468366/ভারতের-পররাষ্ট্রসচিবেরসফর 29 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/bangladesh​/article​/1587536/মিয়ানমারের-ওপর-চাপবজায়-রাখতে-বিশ্ব-সম্প্রদায়ের 30 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/international​/article​/1434371/মিয়ানমারের-সঙ্গেইইউর-সম্পর্ক-বিবেচনার-আহ্বান 31 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/news​/us​-focused​-improving​-situation​ -rohingyas​-1672558 32 https://www​. prothomalo ​ . com ​ / international ​ / article​ / 1416766/সু - চির-নৈতিকতারপ্রশ্ন-তুলে-পদত্যাগ 33 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/opinion​/article​/1601351/​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​%A7​ %8B ​ % E0 ​ % A6​ % B9​ % E0​ % A6​ % BF​ % E0​ % A6​ % 99​ % E0​ % A7​ % 8D​ % E0​ % A6​ %97​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%A6​%E0​%A7​%87​%E0​%A6​%B0-​%E0​%A6​ %9C​%E0​%A6​%A8​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%AF-​%E0​%A6​%AE​%E0​%A6​ %BE​%E0​%A6​%A8​%E0​%A6​%9A​%E0​%A6​%BF​%E0​%A6​%A4​%E0​%A7​ %8D​%E0​%A6​%B0-​%E0​%A6​%AC​%E0​%A6​%A6​%E0​%A6​%B2​%E0​%A7​ %87​%E0​%A6​%B0-​%E0​%A6​%AA​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​%A6​ %B8​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%A4​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%AC 34 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/bangladesh​/article​/1602793/​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​ %A7 ​ % 8B ​ % E0​ % A6​ % B9​ % E0​ % A6​ % BF​ % E0​ % A6​ % 99​ % E0​ % A7​ % 8D​ % E0​ %A6​%97​%E0​%A6​%BE-​%E0​%A6​%B8​%E0​%A6​%AE​%E0​%A6​%B8​%E0​ %A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%AF​%E0​%A6​%BE-​%E0​%A6​%A6​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​ %A6​%B0​%E0​%A7​%81​%E0​%A6​%A4-​%E0​%A6​%B8​%E0​%A6​%AE​%E0​ %A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%A7​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%A8​%E0​%A7​%87-​%E0​ %A6​%A2​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%95​%E0​%A6​%BE-​%E0​%A6​%AC​%E0​ %A7​%87​%E0​%A6​%87​%E0​%A6​%9C​%E0​%A6​%BF​%E0​%A6​%82-​%E0​

Representation of Forcibly Displaced Rohingyas  217 %A6​%AE​%E0​%A6​%A4​%E0​%A7​%88​%E0​%A6​%95​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​ %A6​%AF 35 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/bangladesh​/article​/1602772/​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​ %A7 ​ % 8B ​ % E0​ % A6​ % B9​ % E0​ % A6​ % BF​ % E0​ % A6​ % 99​ % E0​ % A7​ % 8D​ % E0​ %A6​%97​%E0​ % A6​ % BE-​ % E0​ % A6​ % B8​ % E0​%A6​%82​%E0​%A6​%95​%E0​ %A6​%9F-​%E0​%A6​%A8​%E0​%A6​%BF​%E0​%A6​%AF​%E0​%A6​%BC​%E0​ %A7​%87-​%E0​%A6​%AE​%E0​%A6​%BF​%E0​%A6​%AF​%E0​%A6​%BC​%E0​ %A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%A8​%E0​%A6​%AE​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​ %A7​%87​%E0​%A6​%B0-​%E0​%A6​%B8​%E0​%A6​%99​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​ %A6​%97​%E0​%A7​%87-​%E0​%A6​%95​%E0​%A6​%A5​%E0​%A6​%BE-​%E0​ %A6​%AC​%E0​%A6​%B2​%E0​%A6​%AC​%E0​%A7​%87 36 https://www​ . prothomalo​ . com​ / bangladesh​ / article​ / 1466636/রোহিঙ্ গা-সমস্ যারসমাধানে-সহযোগিতা-দেবে-ভারত 37 h t t p s : / / w w w​ . p r o t h o m a l o ​ . c o m ​ / b a n g l a d e s h ​ / a r t i c l e ​ / 1 5 9 6 6 8 6 /রো হি ঙ্ গা প্রত্যাবাসন-ইস্যুতে-বাংলাদেশকে-জাপানের 38 https://www​. prothomalo​ . com​ / bangladesh​ / article ​ / 1352641/আন্ ত র্ জাতিক-চাপসরলে-ওরা-কিছুই-করবে-না 39 h t t p s : / / w w w​ . p r o t h o m a l o ​ . c o m ​ / b a n g l a d e s h ​ / a r t i c l e ​ / 1 5 7 6 8 3 2 /রো হি ঙ্ গা প্রত্যাবর্তনে-বিশ্ব-সম্প্রদায়ের-সহায়তা 40 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/news​/force​-myanmar​-take​-back​-rohingya​-refugees​-1631413 41 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/rohingya​-repatriation​-through​-discussions​-not​-conflict​-with​-myanmar​-1724830 42 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/news​/brunei​-sultan​-just​-and​-permanent​-solution​-rohingya​-crisis​-1733023 43 h t t p s : / / w w w​ . p r o t h o m a l o ​ . c o m ​ / b a n g l a d e s h ​ / a r t i c l e ​ / 1 4 4 8 4 1 1 /রো হি ঙ্ গা প্রত্যাবাসনে-সব-রকম-সহযোগিতার-আশ্বাস 44 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/bangladesh​/article​/1587835/​%E0​%A6​%AA​%E0​ %A6​%AE​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%AA​%E0​%A7​%87​%E0​%A6​%93​%E0​ %A6​%AF​%E0​%A6​%BC​%E0​%A7​%87​%E0​%A6​%B0-​%E0​%A6​%B8​%E0​ %A6​%99​%E0​%A7​%8D​% E0​%A6​%97​%E0​%A7​%87-​%E0​%A6​%86​%E0​ %A6​%B2​%E0​%A7​%8B​%E0​%A6​%9A​%E0​%A6​%A8​%E0​%A6​%BE-​%E0​ %A6​%85​%E0​%A6​%A4​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%AF​%E0​%A6​%A8​%E0​ %A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%A4-​%E0​%A6​%AB​%E0​%A6​%B2​%E0​%A6​%AA​%E0​ %A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​%A6​%B8​%E0​%A7​%82-​%E0​%A6​%AE​%E0​ %A7​%8B​%E0​%A6​%AE​%E0​%A7​%87​%E0​%A6​%A8 45 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/frontpage​/news​/rohingya​-crisis​-us​-be​-bangladesh​ -finding​-solution​-1727662 46 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/bangladesh​/article​/1604599/​%E0​%A6​%AE​%E0​ %A6​%BF​%E0​%A6​%AF​%E0​%A6​%BC​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%A8​%E0​ %A6​%AE​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​%A6​%95​%E0​%A7​%87-​%E0​ %A6​%85​%E0​%A6​%AC​%E0​%A6​%B6​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%AF​%E0​ %A6​%87-​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​%A7​%8B​%E0​%A6​%B9​%E0​%A6​%BF​%E0​%A6​ %99​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%97​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%A6​%E0​%A7​%87​ %E0​%A6​%B0-​%E0​%A6​%AB​%E0​%A6​%BF​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​%A6​%BF​ %E0​%A6​%AF​%E0​%A6​%BC​%E0​%A7​%87-​%E0​%A6​%A8​%E0​%A6​%BF​ %E0​%A6​%A4​%E0​%A7​%87-​%E0​%A6​%B9​%E0​%A6​%AC​%E0​%A7​%87 47 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/news​/unsc​-cant​-avoid​-responsibility​ -over​-rohingya​-crisis​-1735141 48 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/news​/us​-assures​-assistance​-rohingya​ -repatriation​-1727749 49 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/news​/canada​-wants​-transitional​-plan​ -rohingya​-1697815

218  Palash Kamruzzaman, Mohammad Ehsan Kabir, Bulbul Siddiqi 50 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/bangladesh​/article​/1593253/​%E0​%A6​%B0​%E0​ %A7 ​ % 8B ​ % E0​ % A6​ % B9​ % E0​ % A6​ % BF​ % E0​ % A6​ % 99​ % E0​ % A7​ % 8D​ % E0​ %A6​%97​%E0​ % A6​ % BE-​ % E0​ % A6​ % B8​ % E0​%A6​%82​%E0​%A6​%95​%E0​ %A6​%9F-​%E0​%A6​%B6​%E0​%A7​%81​%E0​%A6​%A7​%E0​%A7​%81-​%E0​ %A6​%AC​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​%A6​%82​%E0​%A6​%B2​%E0​%A6​%BE​%E0​ %A6​%A6​%E0​%A7​%87​%E0​%A6​%B6-​%E0​%A6​%A8​%E0​%A6​%AF​%E0​ %A6​%BC-​%E0​%A6​%AC​%E0​%A6​%BF​%E0​%A6​%B6​%E0​%A7​%8D​%E0​ %A6​%AC​%E0​%A7​%87​%E0​%A6​%B0-​%E0​%A6​%9C​%E0​%A6​%A8​%E0​ %A7​%8D​%E0​%A6​%AF 51 https://www​ . prothomalo ​ . com ​ / bangladesh ​ / article​ / 1596324/রোহিঙ্ গা-ইস্ যু তেবাংলাদেশের-অবস্থান-তুলে-ধরলেন 52 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/backpage​/news​/rohingyas​-must​-return​-home​-1732414 53 https://www​ . prothomalo​ . com​ / bangladesh​ / article​ / 1338711/রোহিঙ্ গা-সমস্ যাসমাধান-করতে-পারব-শেখ-হাসিনা 54 h t t p s : / / w w w​ . p r o t h o m a l o ​ . c o m ​ / b a n g l a d e s h ​ / a r t i c l e ​ / 1 4 0 9 9 7 1 /রো হি ঙ্ গা প্রত্যাবাসনে-মাঠপর্যায়ের-চুক্তি-চূড়ান্ত 55 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/bangladesh​-prime​-minister​-sheikh​ -hasina​-places​-3​-point​-recommendation​-1638079 56 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/news​/bangladesh​-wants​-safe​-repatriation​-rohingyas​-1709101 57 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/bangladesh​-sees​-little​-foreign​-funds​ -rohingya​-refugee​-island​-Bhashan​-char​-bay​-of​-bengal​-crisis​-myanmar​-1554067 58 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/opinion​/human​-rights​/news​/risks​-and​-responses​-rohingya​-relocation​-plan​-1721704 59 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/news​/un​-wants​-know​-modalities​ -rohingya​-relocation​-Bhashan​-char​-1720132 60 https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/bangladesh​/article​/1583735/ভাসানচর-রোহিঙ্গাদেরজন্য-কারাগারতুল্য-এইচআরডব্লিউ 61 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/backpage​/news​/rohingya​-relocation​-Bhashan​-char​ -dhaka​-not​-hurry​-1720381 62 https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/rohingya​-crisis​/news​/anti​-Bhashan​-char​-campiagners​ -should​-take​-responsibility​-rohingya​-1734622 63 https://www​. prothomalo​. com​/ bangladesh​/ article​/ 1585339/​% E0​% A6​% 9C​ %E0​% A6​% BE​% E0​% A6​% A4​% E0​% A6​% BF​% E0​% A6​% B8​% E0​% A6​% 82​ %E0​% A6​% 98​% E0​% A6​% 95​% E0​% A7​% 87-​% E0​% A6​% A8​% E0​% A6​% BF​ %E0 ​ % A6 ​ % AF ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % BC ​ % E0 ​ % A7 ​ % 87 ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % 87- ​ % E0 ​ % A6​ %AD​% E0​% A6​% BE​% E0​% A6​% B8​% E0​% A6​% BE​% E0​% A6​% A8​% E0​% A6​ %9A​% E0​% A6​% B0​% E0​% A7​% 87-​% E0​% A6​% B0​% E0​% A7​% 8B​% E0​% A6​ %B9​% E0​% A6​% BF​% E0​% A6​% 99​% E0​% A7​% 8D​% E0​% A6​% 97​% E0​% A6​ %BE- ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % B8 ​ % E0 ​ % A7 ​ % 8D ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % A5 ​ % E0 ​ % A6 ​ % BE ​ % E0​ %A6​% A8​% E0​% A6​% BE​% E0​% A6​% A8​% E0​% A7​% 8D​% E0​% A6​% A4​% E0​ %A6​%B0 64 See more at https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/bangladesh​/article​/1353371/রোহিঙ্গাশিবিরে-জঙ্গিবাদ-উত্থানের-শঙ্কা 65 Further details can be found here https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/bangladesh​/article​ /1596250/কক্সবাজারের-শিবিরে-সক্রিয়-১৪-রোহিঙ্গা-সন্ত্রাসী 66 See for example, https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/opinion​/politics​-climate​-change​/ note​-the​-environmental​-aspects​-rohingya​-camps​-1610368 67 Further details can be found here https://www​.prothomalo​.com​/bangladesh​/article​ /1394846/জীববৈচিত্র্য-মারাত্মক-হুমকিতে 68 See more at https://www​.aljazeera​.com​/news​/2019​/08​/day​-thousands​-rohingya​ -rally​-bangladesh​-camps​-190825055618484​.html accessed on 20th November 2019

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Part V

Policy and Sustainable Solution



12 The Rohingya in Bangladesh An Analysis of the Policy, Law, and Practice Shivani Dutta

Background In the global world, sovereign states are demarcated by well-defined boundaries within which they have jurisdiction to govern their citizens and noncitizens. The national laws of the country are framed in such a way that the citizens of the country enjoy the fundamental rights as enshrined in the Constitution, and the non-citizens are provided with those rights which are necessary to protect the life and liberty of the person along with human dignity. However, a person may also go through trauma when his citizenship is doubted and is subsequently forced to leave the country on the allegation of being illegal migrants. One such situation has been witnessed by the Rohingya community of Myanmar, who were denied citizenship and, due to proximity, are alleged to be indigenous to nearby Bangladesh. Myanmar has been an independent country since 1948, where Buddhism is followed by the majority. Myanmar geographically has the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea to the south; it shares its borders with China in the northeast, with Laos in the east, with Thailand in the southeast, with Bangladesh in the west, and with India in the northwest. Rakhine is located on the west coast of Myanmar, where the Muslim Rohingya are a majority, and their lineage is believed to be a combination of Arabs, Mughals, and Bengalis. The ascendants of the Muslim Rohingya are perceived by Burmese society as settlers who migrated for work during the colonial period from Bangladesh (Bhonsale, 2015). Hence, they are alleged to be illegal settlers who share their religion with the Bangladeshis. The Rohingya were denied the right to acquire citizenship rights in Myanmar under the 1982 Citizenship Law, and the Myanmar government at the time laid down severe restrictions, including on their right to freedom of movement and access to education and healthcare. The violence against the Rohingya has been condemned by many countries, and the UN Human Rights Office has stated that Myanmar is likely guilty of “crimes against humanity”, even “ethnic cleansing” (Anwary, 2018). The Rohingya certainly are refugees who fall within the “category of persons who are persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion have to find shelter in some other country” (UN Refugee Convention, 1951). The country which hosts the refugees is under an obligation to provide basic human rights DOI: 10.4324/9781003228707-17

226  Shivani Dutta as laid down under the global Convention. While there is an absence of global convention to tackle irregular migration, the states are free to frame their own rules. However, even though there is a formulated Refugees Convention, all the states have not given its accession to it; the Government of Bangladesh, for example, is not a signatory to it. The atrocities which the Rohingya had to face in their country can be considered no less than a genocide, where human lives have been taken away mercilessly. The Rohingya were compelled to seek refuge in different parts of the world, including India, Malaysia, Thailand, and Bangladesh. The Rohingya refugees have knocked on the door of Bangladesh to seek shelter twice before, which the host nation accepted: once in 1977– 1978 and again in 1991–1992, with 200,000 and 250,000 Rohingya refugees taken in, respectively (Bhatia, Mahmud, et al 2018). The Government of Bangladesh has always proven to be the pillar of support for the displaced Rohingya in times of distress by providing a conducive environment to a dignified life. Even though Bangladesh is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention, 1951, they have accepted the refugees by an executive order. However, they have always upheld the customary principle of non-refoulement which is one of the important principles retained under the 1951 Convention. This is evident in the agreement with Myanmar to repatriate the Rohingya to their country of origin. The policy, law, and practice of Bangladesh towards the Rohingya have been studied thoroughly where the Government of Bangladesh has put in the effort not only to accommodate the Rohingya but also to provide them with basic rights to education, food, and shelter. It is indeed a global crisis when a national government suddenly has to make arrangements to accommodate a group of people who have fled their place of origin due to persecution. Although a developed nation offers citizenship to the refugees, Bangladesh being a developing nation would certainly face difficulty to take responsibility and accommodate such a large number of refugees for an indefinite period of time. The question then is until when can the Government of Bangladesh provide for the refugees, considering its limited resources and its own citizens. Moreover, the issue regarding the Rohingya children born in Bangladesh and whether or not they should be given Bangladeshi citizenship remains a cause of concern. This issue can only be resolved by the joint efforts of the Government of Bangladesh and Myanmar. Before discussing the policies enacted by the Government of Bangladesh to tackle the Rohingya refugees within their territory, it is pertinent to look at the citizenship laws of Myanmar which have denied citizenship to the Rohingya. Modes of Acquiring Citizenship in Myanmar “Rohingya” is a term of recent origin. The Muslims in Arakan have a long history, since the beginning of the Mrauk-U dynasty (1430–1785) of Arakan, with some believing that they have lived there even before the emergence of the kingdom (Bhonsale, 2015). The residents of Rakhine have claimed political autonomy from Myanmar due to which there have been ongoing conflicts

The Rohingya in Bangladesh  227 between Rakhine leaders and the Myanmar government, the Burmese military government alleges that the minority Rohingya are not indigenous people but have migrated from Bangladesh who shares the similar dialect with Bengalis. When Myanmar gained independence in 1947, the Rohingya were not recognised as one of the country’s own ethnic groups (Sohel and Saudi 2017). The Myanmar government has insisted on using the term “Bengali” instead of Rohingya to describe the largest group of Muslims in Rakhine state. In 1982, the Rohingya were formally declared as illegal migrants who had failed to claim citizenship under the Myanmar Citizenship Law. The Rohingya are the victims of ethnic cleansing. The ethno-linguistic group of the Rakhine state of Myanmar caught the attention of the international community when, under fear of persecution from the Myanmar military, they crossed the Naf River to enter Bangladesh and find shelter. They have not only been denied citizenship rights in their own country but have also been forced to leave and seek shelter in neighbouring states. For a better understanding, the methods of citizenship acquisition in Myanmar are discussed. The three categories of citizenship acquisition are extremely difficult for the Rohingya to pursue. The first category of “Full citizenship” is conferred on those members who are affiliated to the “national races” settled in Myanmar prior to the first Anglo-Burmese War in 1824, with the list of “races” prepared by the state authorities. Unfortunately, despite generations of the Rohingya residing in Myanmar, they continue to be excluded by officials (Guhathakurta, 2017). Another category is the “associate citizens” governed by the Union Citizenship Act (UCA), 1948, and The Citizenship Law (TCL), 1982. As per the requirement of Sec. 23 of the TCL, 1982, the formation of a central body is required to determine the applications. An application for citizenship made under the UCA 1948 will by default fall under TCL, 1982, and on fulfilling the conditions one could be granted associate citizenship under the Citizenship Law (Sec.24-26). The modes of acquiring citizenship and the technicality associated with the rules are further made difficult, also putting a halt on the right to appeal by the declared non-citizens on the finality of orders made by the constituted body (Section 41). The experiences shared by the Rohingyas of Myanmar have commonality where they not only are prevented from accessing collective legal rights to citizenship or full citizenship but also face roadblocks when they seek to progress claims to associate citizenship based on their residency in the country. The system is crippled with long delays, sometimes the resistance by the authorities leads to procedural delays which extend for decades after they are lodged. There was no dispute to the fact that the Rohingya were considered as the citizens of Burma, at the time of independence in 1948 (Burke, 2016) The problem started to erupt with the appointment of Tatmadaw leader General Ne Win who was confined with all state authority – executive, legislative, and judicial. The ideology of Ne Win was reflected in the changes to the arbitrary citizenship laws (Lee, 2019). The majority of Rohingya at that time did not make any application to acquire citizenship

228  Shivani Dutta as they were treated as citizens by the governments prior to Ne Win, where gradually the window to qualify as associate citizens also was permanently closed. The generations which have stayed in the Rakhine state and established their residences are now being doubted with no official document to prove their history in the region. More than the physical torture which has been witnessed, the emotional and psychological trauma undergone by the Rohingya will certainly take years to overcome. Another method of citizenship acquisition is through “naturalisation”. It may be applied for by individuals and their children who can provide “conclusive evidence” that they entered and have resided in Myanmar prior to January 1948, the date of state succession from the British. It is indeed an extremely difficult task to provide documentary evidence of their legacy. The migrants who were brought by the British as a potential workforce may not have carried their documents with them. Even if they had, the generations who were born in Myanmar may not have kept their hands on them. Also, the international law principle of conferring citizenship to children born in the country shall be adhered to and prevent them from being declared stateless. The criteria to acquire citizenship are indeed difficult, leaving no path for the Rohingya which they can pursue in order to prove their citizenship, making them vulnerable to statelessness in their own country. The series of atrocities against the Muslim Rohingya and the denial of citizenship have placed the Rohingya as the world’s most persecuted minority. Since August 2017, more than 900,000 Rohingya refugees have fled from Myanmar and have settled in the camps of Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh (Swanson, 2019). Even though Bangladesh has always been sympathetic towards the Rohingya, at a certain point, it is necessary that a legislative framework is enacted to tackle the situation which can act as a precedent for future uncertainties. The Government of Bangladesh has already formulated a policy to govern the refugees in a structured manner. In addition, there has been a continuous effort to enter into a mutual agreement with Myanmar and resolve the dispute amicably. The Challenges of the Rohingya Refugees and the Efforts Formulated by the Government of Bangladesh to Overcome Them The geographical proximity plays an important role when seeking refuge in a country. The helpless refugees cannot find it more convenient to approach the neighbouring country Bangladesh, who also shares a similar religious ideology for seeking shelter. Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh is the world’s largest refugee camp, having accommodated nearly a million stateless Rohingya refugees as of March 2019. The vast majority of refugees are spread across 34 camps which over time has become congested and is considered as one of the important challenges, as mentioned by the United Nations, with KutupalongBalukhali camp being the largest, hosting approximately 626,500 Rohingya refugees (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

The Rohingya in Bangladesh  229 Affairs, 2019). The international standards recommend a minimum surface area of 45 square metres per person, including kitchen and vegetable gardening space or, at the very least, 30 square metres per person, excluding kitchen and garden space (The Sphere Handbook: The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, 2018). While the reports indicate a much lesser area available for the refugees and denote the heightened risk of communicable diseases, fires, community tensions, and domestic and sexual violence (Human Rights Watch, 2018). To overcome the crisis of overcrowding, the Government of Bangladesh has set up Bhasan Char, a remote island where the refugees can be shifted; the island, however, is hit by floods during the monsoon seasons (Uddina, S., Candace, S., & Victor, O, 2019). In this scenario, it was pertinent to find a permanent place of abode for the Rohingya, and it is commendable that a specific place has been identified for that purpose; however, the island is being hit by floods, is a remote silt island in the Bay of Bengal, and is not a safe place of abode for the refugees. During monsoon almost all parts of Bangladesh receive rainfall in abundance which certainly is not only a problem confined to Bhasan Char but also to other parts of Bangladesh, for which necessary precautionary measures and emergency action plan have to be prepared beforehand. Bhasan Char was formed as a result of silt deposit in the delta in the past 20 years, and its shape and shorelines have repeatedly shifted. It takes around three to five hours from the mainland by boat which is inaccessible in high winds, and lacking an airstrip for fixed-winged planes; Bhasan Char has limited capacity for evacuation in the event of a cyclone. During severe weather, the island is cut off from the rest of the world. Experts are worried about the safety of the refugees and the officials located on the island especially during monsoon as transportation to the island is severely cut off due to weather conditions and the people will end up confined on the island without the availability of basic needs (Human Rights Watch, 2021). The need of the hour is to provide a permanent shelter to the oppressed, where they are not secluded from society but rather are provided with an atmosphere where they can overcome the psychological and physical abuse they have faced. Once the basic right to provide shelter is identified, another challenge is to provide adequate food to all the refugees. It is one of the topmost priorities in the settlements in Ukhiya and Teknaf, including the camps, subcamps, and the mega camp (UNHCR, April 2018). UNICEF (2017) also mentions that most of the pregnant and lactating mothers require prevention from and treatment of malnutrition through nutritious supplementary food. Nutritious food is not readily available to the refugees. The variety of food consumed by both the refugees and host communities was limited to rice, oil, vegetables, and pulses, which excluded protein-rich foods such as meat, fish, and eggs, in addition to sources of nutrients essential for growth such as fruit or dairy. Also, the distribution of food is based on the number of members in the family, and there is no standard while distributing ration cards to the families. While an eight-member family gets a single ration card, a family

230  Shivani Dutta with nine members gets two. Thus, it is essential to create a uniform policy and adequately count the number of members for whom to provide food in order to not only prevent starvation but to prevent malnourishment and other deficiencies. The food requirements can be categorised on the basis of males, females, and children. The introduction of the World Food Program to support the country to end hunger and reduce malnutrition by 2030 will definitely help in achieving the goal. World Food Programme aids refugees in Cox’s Bazar in two different ways. Three-quarters receive food distributions of rice, pulses, and fortified oil while the rest receive an assistance card which is pre-loaded with a monthly entitlement, which they can use to purchase food from the contracted shops in the camps. The e-voucher food assistance system has seen an increase in the years between 2018 and 2019, with a range of diverse food items, including fresh fruit and seasonal vegetables (UNHCR, World Food Programme, 2019). One of the plans is to provide food security and nutrition to the most vulnerable populations of Cox’s Bazar, the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and areas affected by a disaster. For the preparation of food, the refugees were most dependent on firewood, which has now been resolved with the introduction of energy efficient Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), which will cater to the needs of households comprising more than 200,000 refugees (Arnold Roger, 2018). This is indeed commendable work by the Government of Bangladesh to provide for a more convenient means to be used in the households, a safer replacement for burning firewood inside the households. The congestion in the camps has also put the refugees at risk of infection of water-borne diseases such as measles and polio. Diphtheria has recently been added to the disease list, where 5,710 suspected diphtheria cases have been reported as of February 2018, which includes 35 deaths (Ahmed & Orcutt, 2018). World Health Organisation (WHO) and its partners have been working hard to combat communicable diseases and have conducted a number of successful large vaccination campaigns. Nearly three of every four births get delivered in refugee shelters, presided over by untrained traditional birth attendants who are not certified medical professionals and are incapable of handling life-threatening complications. Only a few births occur in health facilities, and it is only when complications occur, such as eclampsia, that women are taken to healthcare units. The time required to travel between the refugee camps and maternity hospitals may take away the life of both the pregnant mother and the unborn child (Sreeparna Banerjee, 2019). WHO and the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) have trained public health experts in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, to use a newly developed software called  Go.Data to create awareness amongst the refugees regarding the availability of medical facilities, helping further to identify people who were in contact with infected individuals so that appropriate treatment can be administered at the right time, preventing further spreading of the disease (Bercaru, WHO). In addition to the efforts put in to protect the refugees from various diseases, equal importance must also be given to

The Rohingya in Bangladesh  231 counsel victims of psychological trauma brought about by their experiences in Rakhine. It is said that one of the keys to bringing change in any society is by imparting education which also is one of the fundamental human rights recognised by many international treaties (Article 26, UDHR, 1948). The Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1951, requires all children within the borders of a country to be provided the basic right to education, regardless of their status as citizens or non-citizens. More than 73% of Rohingya in Rakhine State self-identify as illiterate today (Bhattacherjee, 2014). The Bangladesh government, which has ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), is complying with its duty to provide education to the refugees. The refugees in the southeast camp are provided with the facility to attend UNICEF-learning centres; however, the majority of adolescents aged 15 to 18 do not receive any kind of education, being extremely vulnerable to child marriage, child labour, human trafficking, abuse, and exploitation (UNICEF). However, due to shortcomings in drafting the content of teaching, which contains no formal curricula, it sometimes overlaps with the study material already studied in Myanmar. Due to the unstructured content and demarcation of the age group, even the imparters find it difficult to teach it to different target groups, who usually require special attention based on differences in ability to perceive. Further, to help parents with their household chores, the children either do not go to the learning centres or have to drop out early. The Government of Bangladesh has announced that it will offer schooling and skill-training opportunities to Rohingya refugee children, which indeed is a welcome provision. This can also prove as a potential asset for the country as, without formal education being provided to the Rohingya, they cannot be employed, becoming a further burden for the host country. The plan of the Bangladesh government to provide formal education and launch of the Myanmar Curriculum Project (MCP) was hit by the unforeseen global outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. To avoid the transmission of the disease in the camps, even the learning centres had to be shut down. Also, the new mode of continuation of learning which has been adopted by the world at large, that is e-learning, is indeed a challenge for the children in the camps which demands a steady internet service and devices such as smartphones and laptops. There are also incidents where refugees fall prey to criminal activities from petty theft to drug peddling, abduction to murder which have been on the rise. A series of killings and the unsolved murders of 19 people in  the Cox Bazar’s  area camps, along with robberies and myriad violent crimes, have caused fear among the displaced community (Stephan Ottom and Rock Rozario, 2020). To cite an incident, the Dhaka court, in 2014, sentenced three Rohingya refugees for connections to extremism and carrying out a bomb attack in the Burdwan district in the neighbouring Indian state of West Bengal, who were allegedly members of the defunct Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), an insurgent outfit that was most active in Myanmar’s

232  Shivani Dutta Rakhine  State and the Rohingya camps in Bangladesh in the 1980s and 1990s (Stephan Ottom & Rozario, 2019). When a refugee indulges in criminal activity, the host country has to take responsibility for such activity too. This must be monitored by the Government of Bangladesh by deploying police forces in the camps. While it is evident that the Rohingya are facing many challenges, the efforts of the Government of Bangladesh have eclipsed these to a certain extent. Another commendable effort put in by the Government of Bangladesh is identifying the refugees and maintaining a database of the refugees in Bangladesh. The process of registration in the designated booths was kickstarted in June of 2018 with the avowed objective of safeguarding the rights of the Rohingya refugees (UNOCHA, 2018). International Convention and Treaties As providing shelter to the refugees is a joint effort of all countries, the global convention of the Status of Refugee 1951 and its Protocol 1967 were formulated as the core legal framework for refugee protection. The Convention has legal, political, and ethical significance, providing the basic standards on which the policies of the host country can be formulated. Under the Convention, an exhaustive definition of a refugee is provided. Also, the principles enumerated have over the past few decades become the basis of refugee protection. The principles of “non-refoulement” and “non-discrimination” are the two founding principles which have been enshrined in a number of international conventions such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966, the 1984 Convention against Torture, and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. One of the potential reasons for the resistance of ratifying the Refugee Convention, 1951, has been the obligation to adhere to the principles under the Convention, particularly the principle of non-refoulement which protects the refugees from forcefully returning to a country where they are at risk of being persecuted. This principle protects the refugee from being subjected to brutality and violent episodes again. Certainly, the Government of Bangladesh is complying with these principles where they are making all efforts to discuss with Myanmar and formulate a policy for the safe repatriation of the refugees. The “non-discrimination” principle of the basic right to life and liberty is extended to all refugees without discrimination. It proposes to give the same treatment as nationals with respect to certain basic rights, such as freedom of religion, access to courts, possession of property, as well as matters pertaining to public relief, rationing, and elementary education. However, to practise this in reality is indeed a difficult task for any government as the resources available are limited and it has to cater to the needs of its citizens as well. The rights to freely move within the territory of the contracting state; assistance for assimilation and naturalisation; freedom of

The Rohingya in Bangladesh  233 association; and access to justice are some of the rights guaranteed by the Refugee Convention in addition to prioritising their consent of not returning to their country of origin. The Convention is a comprehensive international instrument in addition to other regional conventions to protect the refugeeseekers for the overall protection of their rights, to help them feel at home, overcome their past lives, and shape a better future. Despite the testimonies from a number of refugees about attacks by the military in Myanmar and the condemnations by the international community which have called it out for being genocidal, the Myanmar government has time and again denied any such accusation and refused to take responsibility, sternly refusing the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar as well as preventing UN Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee from entering the country (Roberts, 2011). On December 12, journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo were arbitrarily arrested by Myanmar authorities under the Official Secrets Act for reporting on the refugee situation in Rakhine State (BBC, May 2019). This indicates that the Myanmar government is not very keen to discuss the atrocities faced by the Rohingya within their territory and come to any sort of agreement. Bangladesh’s Refugee Policy and Practice As mentioned earlier Bangladesh is neither a signatory to the Convention Relating to Status of Refugee nor its protocol of 1967. However, Bangladesh has ratified a number of major international human rights instruments pertaining to the basic human rights. The Rohingya Refugees were accorded refugee status by the Government of Bangladesh only under an executive order there is no specific domestic law or national policy which speaks about the rights of refugees in Bangladesh in particular, who are legally on par with the treatment provided to foreigners governed under the Foreigners Act of 1946 [Section 2(a)]. The laws which govern the entry, stay, and exit of a foreigner in Bangladesh include the Registration of Foreigners Act 1939, the Passport Act 1920, the Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provision) order 1972, the Extradition Act 1974, and the Naturalization Act 1926. The Constitution of Bangladesh also accords some basic rights to non-citizens including the right to protection of law (Article 31) and respects international law to promote peace (Article 25). However, there is no specific legal framework adopted by the Bangladesh government to govern refugees, with the rules scattered across different legislations. With no uniform law, it might sometimes become difficult to differentiate the various categories of asylum seekers in the country: while some may be identified as refugees others may be deemed to be illegal migrants. Even Bangladeshi nationals after a few decades might feel the burden of accommodating the refugees on their soil and demand a separate legislation, which is why it is necessary to start working towards formulating a comprehensive legislation in compliance with customary international principles. A step was taken towards finding a workable

234  Shivani Dutta solution when Bangladesh and Myanmar entered a contract to repatriate the refugees in the span of two years. The contract is only applicable to those who fled Rakhine during 2016 and 2017. However, the agreement has been criticised by some for not formulating a full-fledged plan of repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration of the returnees, and for also not fully involving the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the process (Kapur, 2018). It is important that the Rohingya must be keen to go back to their country of origin; without their consent any effort to push back will not only violate the principle of “non-refoulement”, and the efforts taken by both countries will be in vain. In the midst of vague laws, it is certain that refugees are bound to suffer, for which it is time to frame a legislation to govern the refugees and instil a ray of hope for them to live their life with freedom and dignity. Conclusion The hundreds and thousands of refugees who were compelled to leave Myanmar is one of the worst episodes in human memory. It is an obligation for all the nations to join hands to find a workable solution towards conferring a nationality to the Rohingya refugees and identifying their interests in achieving social justice. Bangladesh has put in the effort to give shelter to these asylum seekers; however, the continuous influx of the refugees has also raised questions regarding the Bangladeshi government’s ability to tackle the situation. In the absence of an agreement to the Refugee Convention, 1951, the entire responsibility to provide shelter to the refugees is brought within the jurisdiction of the municipal laws of Bangladesh. In addition to the tremendous efforts by the government of Bangladesh, there could be certain other measures which can be incorporated into the municipal legal framework to further aid the process. Firstly, in order to maintain transparency, the Government of Bangladesh may enumerate in their municipal laws the rights which shall be given to refugees and notify accordingly in the official gazette. Secondly, the government of Bangladesh may allow the refugees to work for their livelihood by issuing work permits which will subsequently contribute to the economy of the country. The Constitution of Bangladesh demarcates certain rights which are exclusively conferred on a citizen and rights which can be enjoyed by a non-citizen. The refugees can be put in the latter category. Thirdly, the Government of Bangladesh can enter into a bilateral agreement with the government of Myanmar as no law will be helpful if the two countries are not working towards finding an amicable solution. It is also important that the Government of Myanmar accepts the fact that the Rohingya are their citizens and have fled due to religious persecution and accept them back in the country. The consent of the Rohingya plays an important role in this process as they should not be forced to go back. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees can be the authority who can supervise the entire process. China, which is one of the largest

The Rohingya in Bangladesh  235 investors in Bangladesh, can play the role of a mediator between Myanmar and Bangladesh to formulate a treaty of friendship. Also, India, who is a neighbour to Bangladesh, has always been appreciated for their tolerance towards maintaining the principle of non-refoulement and being sympathetic towards asylum seekers and can also be a partner in the journey towards finding an amicable solution to the global crisis. Another measure which can be adopted at the border of Bangladesh and Myanmar is the maintenance of registration desks which can be chaired by representatives of both the countries to hand over the refugees from Bangladesh to Myanmar. Those who choose to go back to Myanmar should be monitored, and annual reports should be shared between the two countries. Help desks in both the countries with phone numbers should be displayed which can be contacted in times of necessity. This process shall only be finalised only when not only the two countries share common objectives, but also when the refugees have agreed to move back to Rakhine. While the territorial boundaries are drawn by humans, it is certainly we humans who can formulate policies to overcome the uncertainties which have arisen due to forced displacement without hurting the sentiments and rights of the refugees. However, till present day, Myanmar has resisted talks regarding this issue which leaves the government of Bangladesh to provide facilities and support to those who are currently settled in the camps. References Ahmed, B., & Orcutt, M et al (May 1 2018). Humanitarian disaster for Rohingya refugees: impending natural hazards and worsening public health crisis. The Lancet Global Health, 6(5), 487–488. Anwary, A. (2018). Atrocities against the Rohingya Community of Myanmar. Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, 31(1/2), 91–102. Arnold, R. (23 November 2018). Rohingya Refugee Camps in Bangladesh Switch to Environmentally Friendly LPG, Briefing Notes, Last Accessed on 9 June 2023 from https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing-notes/rohingya-refugee-camps-bangladeshswitch-environmentally-friendly-lpg. Banerjee, S. (July 2019). The Rohingya Crisis: A Health Situation Analysis of Refugee Camps in Bangladesh, ORF Special Report No. 91, Observer Research Foundation. Bhatia, A., Mahmud, A., Fuller, A., Shiin, R., Rahman, A., Shatil, T., … & Balsari, S. (2018). The Rohingya in Cox’s Bazar: When the Stateless Seek Refuge. Health and Human Rights, 20(2), 105–122. Bhattacherjee, A. (Ed.). (2014). (Rep.). Myanmar’s National Census: Fuelling Ethnic Crises. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Bhonsale, M. (2015). Evolution of the Arakan ‘Problem’ in Burma. Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 76, 631–636. Burke, A. (2016). New Political Space, Old Tensions: History, Identity and Violence in Rakhine State, Myanmar. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 38(2), 258–283. Guhathakurta, M. (2017). Understanding Violence, Strategising Protection: Perspectives from Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh. Asian Journal of Social Science, 45(6), 639–665.

236  Shivani Dutta Human Rights Watch. (2018). Bangladesh is Not My Country, The Plight of Rohingya Refugees from Myanmar. Human Rights Watch. (2021). An Island Jail in the Middle of the Sea. Bangladesh’s Relocation of Rohingya Refugees to Bhasan Char. Kapur, R. (16 March 2018). The Repatriation of the Rohingya: The Flawed Bangladesh-Myanmar Agreement? ISAS Working Paper No 287. National University of Singapore. Lee, R. (2019). Myanmar’s Citizenship Law as State Crime: A Case for the International Criminal Court. State Crime Journal, 8(2), 241–279. Mahecic, A. (17 May 2019). Over 250000 Rohingya Refugees Get Identity Documents, for Many as First. https://www​.unhcr​.org​/in​/news​/briefing​-notes​/over​ -250​-000​-rohingya​-refugees​-get​-identity​-documents​-many​-first. Ottom, S., & Rozario, R. (May 9, 2019). Struggling Rohingya Seduced by Crime at Refugee Camps. Union of Catholic Asian News. Ottom, S., & Rozario, R. (October 12, 2020). Crimes and Murders haunt Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. LaCroix International. https://international​.la​-croix​.com​ /news​/world​/crimes​-and​-murders​-haunt​-rohingya​-refugees​-in​-bangladesh​/13159. Roberts, C. (2011). Changing Myanmar: International Diplomacy and the Futility of Isolation. Security Challenges, 7(4), 77–101. Sohel and Saudi. (2017). The Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar: Origin and Emergence, Humanities Soc. Sci., 2(11A), 1007–1018. Sphere Association (2018). The Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, fourth edition, Geneva, Switzerland, 2018. www​.spherestandards​.org​/handbook. Uddina, S., Candace, S., & Victor, O. (28 June, 2019). A Tour Through the ‘Floating Island’ that 100,000 Rohingya Refugees May Have to Call Home.​https:/​/abcnews​ .go​.com​/International​/tour​-floating​-island​-100000​-rohingya​-refugees​-call​-home​/ story​​?id​=59895516. Joint Response for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). (March-December 2018). https://www​ .unhcr​.org​/media​/37091. UNHCR. (April 2018). Rohingya Refugee Crisis, Camp Settlement and Protection Profiling, Cox Bazar, Bangladesh Round 3. https://reliefweb​.int​/report​/bangladesh​ /bangladesh​-unhcr​-camp​-settlement​-and​-protection​-profiling​-round​-3​-april​-2018. UNHCR-WFP Joint Assessment Mission Report. (2019). Bangladesh: Cox Bazar. https://data​.unhcr​.org​/en​/documents​/details​/72273. UNICEF. (2017). United Nations Children’s Fund. Bangladesh Humanitarian Situation Rohingya Influx Report 8 New York. https://www​.bbc​.com​/news​/world​ -asia​-48182712 Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo: Reuters Journalists freed in Myanmar. (May 7, 2019). https://www​.bbc​.com​/news​/world​-asia​-48182712. The United Nations Refugee Convention, 1951. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948

13 Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and Resolution of Rohingya Crisis A Foreign Policy Perspective Shahidul Haque and Sufiur Rahman

Introduction The Rohingya from Myanmar have been forced to leave their own country over the course of the last four decades. Most of them have crossed over to Bangladesh, seeking shelter and protection. This exodus has resulted in a formidable challenge for Bangladesh, and the issue of Rohingya repatriation to Myanmar continues to remain a complex and controversial issue. For decades, the Myanmar government has propagated an anti-Rohingya narrative, which has included false accusations of fomenting insecurity as well as of continued illegal migration from Bangladesh. Despite Bangladesh’s efforts to address these ill-conceived narratives, they have significantly influenced Myanmar’s perception and its approach towards bilateral relations with Bangladesh. The policy of securitisation on the part of the Myanmar government on the Rohingya issue and the prevailing lack of security in Rakhine have rendered it difficult for the Rohingya to secure their rights. Furthermore, Bangladesh has not had enough upper hand to counter Myanmar’s propaganda and bring about the desired result. Bangladesh has never pursued any antagonistic approach as a counter-narrative to Myanmar’s policy. Rather, it adopted a policy which sought to prioritising friendly relations with Myanmar and has subsequently depended to some extent on the international community’s commitment and support. Bangladesh’s attitude towards Myanmar has had little success in terms of bringing about a friendly environment. Bangladesh’s approach to the problem also suffered from certain limitations as the regional countries stuck to their self-interests and the international community remained disinterested to actively contribute towards differing considerations. This chapter is an attempt to analyse the contours of Bangladesh’s approach towards Myanmar and how Bangladesh has tried and continues to try seeking avenues through bilateral relations and arrives at workable solutions for the Rohingya refugee1 crisis with international support. While the present chapter seeks to trace outlines of a not-clearly-defined foreign policy orientation towards Myanmar, it makes no attempt to do the same on Bangladesh’s approach and position since early 2021.2

DOI: 10.4324/9781003228707-18

238  Shahidul Haque and Sufiur Rahman Methodology This study is based on the mainly primary data and information collected through key informant interviews, personal interviews, communication, and observations. The key informants were four diplomats (D1, D2, D3, D4), three foreign policy analysts (F1, F2, F3), three security experts (S1, S2, S3), and two journalists (J1, J2). Due to the sensitive nature of the data and information most of the key informants and personal interviewees preferred to be anonymous. This study also includes the personal insights, experiences, and observations of the authors. Because the two authors were directly involved in the negotiation process between Bangladesh and Myanmar as well as with the UN actors and NGOs. Moreover, some secondary sources are also used like various journal articles, book chapters, newspapers, reports, diplomatic documents, note verbale, letters, agreements, acts, etc. Identity Formation in Myanmar, Complexities in Rakhine, and Marginalisation of the Rohingya General Aung San, while charting the vision of a would-be-free and independent nation from out of a colonial Burma, clarified aspects of attributes and limits of Burmese nationalism. While addressing the Anglo-Burman Council in December 1946, he argued that every nation should “develop such a nationalism as is compatible with the welfare of one and all, irrespective of race or religion or class or sex” (San, 1946). He declared that he hated “imperialism whether British or Japanese or Burmese. Aung San at the same time, resisted pressure to make “Buddhism the state religion” as considered “national harmony was a key priority” (Wade, 2017, p. 52). Perceptible was a demand for assimilation into a Bamar3 – Buddhist way that was equally applicable to the Indians in Burma, who were keen to maintain their own cultural identity and as such were called Kalars – outsiders or strangers. They were seen as lackeys of the British colonialists and considered untrustworthy. They were considered an anomaly in the context of the Burmese nationstate’s pursuit of a national identity, dominated by Bamar nationalism and Buddhism. The same notion of the “other” applies more strongly to Muslims of Arakan, who, despite having lived for generations in Mrauk-U and the Mayu region, have maintained their ethnic and religious identity. Over the decades, the Rohingya, and by extension Chittagonians and Bengali Muslims, became a target of exclusion for their lack of assimilation with the Burmese and, as such, for them, Kalars remained a permanent pejorative identification, inferior to the Burmese. Following independence, the Mujaheed movement by a section of the Rohingya helped create among the Burmese the idea that Rakhine might fall prey to the notion of a greater Bengal, though there was no evidence to suggest so. Many Rakhines paint the movement as it was intended to convert Northern Arakan into Dar alIslam (Chan, 2011).

Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and Resolution of Rohingya Crisis  239 General Ne Win assumed power in 1962 through a military coup and tried a different strategy in order to create a common identity. The General affirmed the “Bamar Buddhists as the true heirs to the land and all others, whether indigenous or not, as threats to the master ethnicity” (Wade, 2017, p. 54). In later decades, Rakhine nationalists, Buddhist extremists and Bamars, prejudiced by a virulent form of majoritarianism, continued to project the Rohingya as a community that would breed fast to permanently alter the demography of northern Rakhine to the disadvantage of the Rakhines. Hence, the Rohingya became a legitimate target for persecution. In 1974 the Constitution of Burma consolidated the preponderance of national races and introduced layered citizenship (Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1974, Article 12 and 145). The Rohingya, not considered as a national race, were reduced to inferior residents of Burma. The first major exodus of the Rohingya to Bangladesh occurred around 1978 in this context. Following the return of the expelled Rohingya from Bangladesh, Myanmar authorities issued the infamous Citizenship Law of 1982. The 1982 Law regarded them as neither citizens nor a minority, effectively making them stateless. The Rohingya were excluded from the 135 recognised races which were considered to be national races and eligible for citizenship (Lewa, 2008). Following their return to Myanmar from Bangladesh, from 1994 onwards, they became the subject of greater discrimination and alienation within Rakhine State. By the early years of 2010, Tatmadaw (Myanmar Military) and Myanmar authorities used religion to bring Rakhines and Burmese Buddhists as well as other minorities namely, Mro, Chakma/ Diagnet, Chin and alike under an anti-Rohingya platform using Islam as the common threat. In parallel, Myanmar started a campaign of calling them Bengalis to contradict their centuries-long linkage to the land of the MroHaung Kingdom or Rakhine as the first step to establish them as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Myanmar also sought to dilute the preponderance of Muslims in North Rakhine by inviting Buddhists, since the early 1990s, to come and settle on confiscated Rohingya lands, and Na Ta La villages were established (Min & Aung, 2015). Even incentives were offered to attract Mro people from the Chittagong Hill Tracts to balance demography in the region (“The Mro nationals”, 2015). Various social, cultural, and economic restrictions were imposed, including restrictions on freedom of movement, in addition to overall political disenfranchisement – a calculated process of multi-dimensional marginalisation to destroy the Rohingya from all sides. A diplomat (D1) opined the following on the policy of Myanmar in Rakhine, Myanmar argued that the “development deficit” of Rakhine, which made the scramble for economic opportunities and political influence more intense, was the root cause of tensions and obfuscated any discussion on denial of civil and political rights. It sought to buy time for

240  Shahidul Haque and Sufiur Rahman reconciliation among the communities in Rakhine. But the controversial Rakhine Action Plan for development of the Rakhine effectively bypassed the Rohingya. Moreover, the persecution of the Rohingya increased with episodes of violence committed on them in Rakhine in 2012, 2016, and 2017 that got support from the majority in Myanmar. The Exodus of the Rohingya: Then and Now In 1978, Bangladesh mounted adequate bilateral and international pressure on a somewhat isolated Myanmar and secured clear concessions in a bilateral agreement where the Rohingya refugees were accepted to return to Burma as lawful residents within a year. While Bangladesh did not feel the need to pursue the Rohingya’s rights as citizens of Burma, Myanmar continued the policy of exclusion with greater determination. National Registration Cards, held by members of the community, were subsequently annulled and a white card system with no legal basis was introduced in the early 1990s. This led to the second exodus around 1992–93. In the hurry to commence repatriation, Bangladesh agreed as Myanmar called the Rohingya former residents of Burma in the then bilateral return agreement with Bangladesh. The legal aspect of their resident-ship was compromised. As the Rohingya refugees4 were returning, Bangladesh did not pursue their basic rights on return while Myanmar committed to integrating them as “members of Myanmar society”. But a determined Myanmar used this time to spread a new narrative to confuse the international community, which made the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), etc. allow Myanmar unprecedented access and influence like it had never enjoyed. In a background paper circulated by Myanmar Embassies to ASEAN countries and beyond, the Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA-2017a) argued that “these Bengalis are descendants of two generations since the time under the British and illegal migrants of the current days from the country at the other side”. Besides, the Tatmadaw, aided by Myanmar Embassies and the government, continue to propound that the people of Bangladesh, of natural disasters and impoverishment, flee to Myanmar and neighbouring countries as illegal migrants, “posing a threat to the national interest, territorial integrity, border security and stability of the neighbours and regional countries” (DPRPW, 2018, p. 22). Similar narratives were propagated to paint the Rohingya as “Muslim terrorists”. A foreign policy analyst (F1) opined the following on the geopolitics behind this crisis, Besides, the geopolitical landscape this time is qualitatively different as Myanmar has increased her engagements with the international community since the 2010 elections and has successfully attracted investments to the tune of tens of billions of dollars in energy, natural resources, banking, hospitality, etc. China has extended its significantly increased

Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and Resolution of Rohingya Crisis  241 clout to offer a shield of protection, while ASEAN also emerged as a major protector by default. India, Japan, the US, and the European countries also wanted to increase engagement to reduce Myanmar’s dependence on China and by extension have been extremely accommodating of any errors on the part of Myanmar. The General Direction of Bangladesh Policy towards Myanmar Since its independence in 1971, Bangladesh has been seeking to develop mutually beneficial, interdependent bilateral relations with Myanmar. It can, however, be argued that such efforts have either been inadequate or ineffective as Bangladesh has remained busy in resolving bilateral issues with India and Pakistan in the first few decades of its independence, while domestically its focus was firmly on addressing pervasive poverty and nation-building. Sharing of water, low-key insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and insecurities in neighbouring Indian states have kept Bangladesh preoccupied and, as a result, it has been able to invest enough time and resources to follow up on what has been happening in Myanmar. In the last two decades, Bangladesh gradually started attaching greater focus on Myanmar to develop multi-layered relations and avail this to intensify cooperation with the ASEAN countries under a “strengthening relationship with neighbours” policy. While Bangladesh has encouraged Myanmar not to see bilateral relations only through the prism of the Rohingya issue and its perceived demographic insecurity, Myanmar remained primarily focused on securing gas from Rakhine and building transport connectivity. In a decade where persecution of the Rohingya intensified, Bangladesh sided with Myanmar and voted against the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions concerning the situation in Myanmar in 2006, 2007, and 2009 in the spirit of good neighbourly relations. A diplomat (D2) stated in this regard, Later, from 2008, Bangladesh’s principal focus was on the resolution of tensions with Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal maritime dispute. Its keenness to develop bilateral relations with Myanmar increased further after the assumption of an elected government in Nay Pyi Taw in 2011, a year in which the Prime Minister of Bangladesh visited Myanmar. The maritime dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar was peacefully resolved through the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in 2012. After an initial air of positivity following the peaceful resolution of the maritime dispute, relations soured as a result of the apartheid-like situation in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps after the 2012 violence in Rakhine and subsequent violence of 2014. Bangladesh’s trust in assurances provided by Myanmar on possible progress regarding the Rohingya crisis perhaps led to the continuation of its

242  Shahidul Haque and Sufiur Rahman conciliatory and less proactive approach. Bangladesh’s policy formulation often suffered due to shallow analyses of the Myanmar military and also from unrealistic expectations of dividends from sectoral collaboration in the areas of connectivity and energy. Hence, Bangladesh remained silent at the UN in 2012 and 2013 when Myanmar forces unleashed terror in 2012, which resulted in over 130,000 Rohingya being detained in Myanmar in socalled camps for internally displaced persons (IDP). During the Foreign Office Consultation (FOC) of 2013, the Bangladesh side agreed to use “Muslims of Rakhine” to denote the Rohingya, provided Myanmar stop using the term “Bengali”5. In continuation of Bangladesh’s efforts, Bangladesh proposed a few mechanisms to enhance mutual trust and strengthen cooperation at the next FOC on August 31, 2014. In that consultation, Bangladesh proposed a draft “Framework Arrangement for Trust and Cooperation for Development”, intending to focus on areas of convergences, while insulating divergences in one or two areas (meaning the Rohingya issue and insecurity at the border, as perceived by Myanmar). Bangladesh was keen to help stabilise Rakhine economically and to provide humanitarian assistance and social development support to Rakhine State. Bangladesh has never considered any extreme ideas of interference in the affairs of the Rakhine and Chin states, not to mention any military confrontation. Rather, Bangladesh has been supportive of Myanmar, helping its neighbour tackle insecurities in the bordering areas in the Rakhine-Chin states through actions taken against various insurgent groups operating in those regions.6 Despite all these efforts, there has not been any perceptible change from the Myanmar side. A lack of interest and engagement on the part of Myanmar has continued. Visits to Bangladesh from the President and Foreign Minister of Myanmar, the Speaker of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, and the Senior General of the Tatmadaw (scheduled for February 2015) did not materialise. Despite this, Bangladesh decided not to change its policy and course of action towards Myanmar. The boatpeople crisis of 2015 in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea compelled Bangladesh to critically examine the developments. Regardless, Bangladesh proceeded with assistance –cyclone shelters, ambulances, solar home systems – for Rakhine to present a Rakhine-friendly posture as a part of its multi-layered approach towards engagement with Myanmar. During that period, Bangladesh invited a trade delegation from Rakhine to show them the relative strengths of the Chittagong area and how Rakhine stands to gain by through greater engagement with Bangladesh in trade and economy, education, health, etc.

Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and Resolution of Rohingya Crisis  243 Myanmar’s side, however, remained non-responsive to such overtures as it remained busy with mending relations with the West, China, and India in addition to much-needed domestic reforms and peace-building efforts with the ethnic insurgent groups. To recalibrate bilateral relations within months of assuming power as the State Counsellor in April 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi visited all neighbouring countries except Bangladesh, despite an invitation from the Bangladesh Prime Minister in June 2015.7 In October 2016, the Bangladesh Prime Minister, referring to support being extended for stabilisation in Rakhine, assured more support. She underscored the “need for candid interaction to overcome divergences, consolidate trust and realise sectoral gains”.8 Despite Daw Suu Kyi’s stated importance of cooperation and exchange of information to “maintain peace and stability along the border”,9 she took three months to reply to the Bangladesh Prime Minister’s letter. The letter reflected Myanmar’s narrow focus on regional security. In this context about the bilateral engagement with Myanmar, another Diplomat (D3) opined that Bangladesh tried to intensify engagement with Myanmar on sectoral areas so as to create enough trust and work towards a resolution to the Rohingya issue, but that yielded no concrete response from an indoctrinated Myanmar. Bangladesh’s continuous friendly gestures and non-confrontational approach were perhaps interpreted by Myanmar as either weakness or desperation to develop bilateral relations, regardless of the status of the Rohingya. In the meantime, Myanmar Embassies and high-level civil and military leaders continued their twin propaganda on illegal immigration and insecurity at the “western gate” from across the border. An Overzealous Sense of Security Insecurity remained a defining factor, changing with time and contextual events. Myanmar authorities sometimes highlighted the issue of Muslim terrorist groups operating in Rakhine and allegedly from Cox’s Bazar area, while at other times referred to the ethnic insurgent groups operating in the Rakhine and the Chin states. Myanmar sometimes justifies insecurity to avoid discussion on transport connectivity and export of gas between the two countries, and at other times it is used to punish the Rohingya. The blame is usually put on Bangladesh, but Bangladesh itself has always stayed away from interfering in the internal matters of Myanmar and has avoided stoking insurgency in Rakhine. Myanmar’s concept of insecurity in Rakhine or the “western gate” visualises two perceived threats. First, a demographic threat from the fast-growing Muslim Rohingya, that Dr. Aye Chan (2011) termed “influx viruses” in his article on the development of a Muslim enclave in Arakan. This then gained further importance as Islam became a greater obstacle to national

244  Shahidul Haque and Sufiur Rahman unity and “the new threat in Myanmar”. According to Burmese people, “They were the race that would swallow the people of Myanmar … to extinction” (Wade, 2017, p. 57). Second, the apprehension that there was a serious threat from the Bangladesh side of the border began to gain ground. The claim was based on an uncorroborated reason on Rakhine on historical grounds and on the ethnic association of the Rohingya with their Chittagonian and Bengali roots as such, a notion of irredentism was quietly attributed to Bangladesh, as if Bangladesh were pursuing a greater Bengal. One can come across another notion of irredentism in Myanmar that cites Rakhine control of Chittagong in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. The idea even goes beyond to fanciful inclusion of “twelve” districts of Bengal in the old Rakhine Kingdom. In reality, Bangladesh has never sought to play any role in Rakhine, barring some local-level support from enthusiastic Chittagonians, when insurgency broke out right after the independence of Burma. The same policy of non-interference continued even during and after two major exoduses of Rohingya Muslims in 1978 and 1992, respectively. Some ineffectual groups like the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) lost its military potency in the late 1990s (Advisory Commission on the Rakhine State, 2017, p. 19), the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF), and the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO), sometimes used the Rohingya population in Cox’s Bazar to maintain infrequent and minimally disruptive activities inside Rakhine in the decades that followed. Citing these entities, Rakhine nationalists and Myanmar security establishments sought to enliven memory of the Mujaheed uprising of the 1950s and create a hype of conversion of Buthidaung and Maungdaw into Dar al-Islam. To justify this, they contend that the Rohingya organisations see these territories as Dar al-Harb, the territory of the Holy War (Chan, 2011). After the deadly communal violence of 2012, a new group, Harkat al Yakin, began emerging. Gaining some acceptance among the persecuted community, it rebranded itself as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and conducted attacks in 2016. Unlike preceding armed groups that sought to follow hit-and-run attacks from across Bangladesh, it placed members within the Rohingya villages in Rakhine and operated from within. On its part, Myanmar exhibited no real intention of getting involved to destabilise the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the two decades till the mid-1990s by taking advantage of her leverage on Marma and other communities of Myanmar origin. However, Myanmar has always tried to amplify threats from rag-tag Rohingya groups to create the myth of an unstable border with Bangladesh. According to a letter from Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) Commanding Officer, addressed to Regional Commander, BGB, Chittagong (Personal Communication, 2015) there were mentions of only a few border incidents (where two Bangladeshis and one Burmese life were lost) between 2012 and 2016 as opposed to hundreds losing lives due to clashes within Rakhine.

Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and Resolution of Rohingya Crisis  245 In such a context, Myanmar started highlighting the Arakan Army (AA) insurgents along Bangladesh-Myanmar border areas from 2015 and demanding that Bangladesh act against the AA operatives when they sometimes moved to the other side of the border in Myanmar territory.10 Bangladesh even conducted a few operations in the bordering area as a result. While these risky and costly operations deserved recognition and appreciation, Myanmar authorities inexplicably objected to the creation of Border Outposts along with the Mowdok range (Bangladesh-Myanmar border) and the creation of air surveillance capacity for Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB). Bangladesh hoped that if it could effectively engage with Myanmar on security matters, trust could be established. The Bangladesh Army, Navy, and Air Force Chiefs as well as the head of the Security Intelligence visited Myanmar in quick succession in 2014 and 2015. But these overtures yielded no desired reciprocation from Myanmar. Bangladesh continued to highlight the necessity of an agreed legal framework on security cooperation to enable Bangladesh to extend further support to help Myanmar to address her internal security issues in the Rakhine. Bangladesh took the lead and suggested an MoU for security level dialogue and cooperation. As for operationalisation of border-level engagements through establishing Border Liaison Offices (BLOs), the Myanmar side even suggested the deletion of an article in the proposed MoU which was on sharing of advanced information on the deployment of forces in the bordering areas as well as conducting other activities in those areas.11 Interestingly, Myanmar showed no interest in enhancing engagement with Bangladesh Law Enforcement agencies to ensure security in the bordering areas. For example, when security level cooperation was an urgent need in the context of the attacks of October 2016, the Myanmar Army cancelled the scheduled army-to-army meeting scheduled at the end of October. Border Guard/Police level interactions were also cancelled. This was the response despite Bangladesh closing the border and handing over a few insurgents in mid-October 2016. The aforementioned two instruments on security dialogue and the border liaison were finally signed after Myanmar effectively deported the vast majority of the Rohingya community in 2017, citing combatants as an excuse. In hindsight, it may be argued that Myanmar wanted Bangladesh to solve its security problems by acting against all insurgent groups (in particular, the Arakan Army) and non-state actors operating in the bordering areas while Myanmar itself would take no initiative to resolve insurgency within its borders and would continue her campaign against the Rohingya.12 Strategy of Bi-lateral Engagement on the Rohingya Issue From around 2013, Bangladesh again sought to engage Myanmar on the question of repatriation of the remaining Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar (residual cases from the 1992 exodus). A Joint Working Group was agreed upon to pursue repatriation of the remaining Rohingya. During the 7th FOC

246  Shahidul Haque and Sufiur Rahman in 2013, Bangladesh notionally agreed to the usage of the term “Muslims of Rakhine” with the expectation that a less emotional debate could allow compromises and ultimately help integration of the Rohingya into Myanmar society. Bangladesh continued to maintain that a solution could also be explored within Myanmar’s construct of the Constitution of 1948 and by building on whatever flexibility that was available in the 1948 Citizenship Act (Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1948, Section 11​.​iv). To systematically deal with the Rohingya issue, the Bangladesh Cabinet debated the matter in 2013 and eventually approved a “National Strategy Paper on the Myanmar Refugees and undocumented Myanmar Nationals” (UNHCR, 2014). Key elements of the paper included a survey of undocumented Myanmar nationals (staying in Bangladesh, outside the two recognised refugee camps), meeting basic needs, strengthening border management, sustaining diplomatic engagement at bilateral and multilateral levels, enhancing security cooperation for curbing transnational crimes, and national-level coordination. A ministerial-level national coordination committee and a National Task Force (NTF) were created. The aim was to ensure proper management of the rather complex and multi-dimensional issue of Myanmar refugees and undocumented Myanmar nationals with the ultimate objective of eventually facilitating their voluntary repatriation to Myanmar through bilateral and plurilateral processes. The NTF continued to play the lead role in policymaking and coordinating implementation of various activities, even after the exodus of over 700,000 Rohingya following the violence in 2016–17. The NTF acted as Bangladesh’s focal point, even dealing with humanitarian and geopolitical issues surrounding the Rohingya. A Dysfunctional UN and a Nonchalant International Community Given the extent of atrocities and blatant violation of human rights and humanitarian laws, Bangladesh expected the United Nations (UN) and the international community to be more active and be able to adequately respond to the crisis. The UN entered Myanmar after the devastating Cyclone Nargis of 2008. In the following years, the UN generally followed a policy of nonconfrontation with the view to securing a fully-fledged country programme and for its own “political space” in Myanmar (Rosenthal, 2019). Though the UN at the global level condemned the atrocities of 2012 and confinement of the Rohingya in IDP camps, many UN agencies in Yangon were keen to give Myanmar more time to address the “development deficit” in Rakhine. During the 2012–16 period, the voice raised by the UN agencies and the international community, in general, remained limited to basic amenities for the Rohingya, neglecting the deteriorating human rights and economic conditions. This continued despite the atrocities of 2016. In Myanmar, the “human rights pillar” was overshadowed by the “development pillar” and the “peace and security pillar”, which made the UN in

Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and Resolution of Rohingya Crisis  247 Myanmar dysfunctional to some extent. This incoherence and internal turf fight did limit the activities of the global body to pursue a durable, rightsbased, and comprehensive approach. Rosenthal’s (2019) report gives an account of “fragmented strategy” and a “systemic failure” on part of the world body. Myanmar on its part fully exploited this non-human rightsbased soft approach of the UN. This paralysis of the UN and the preference for “quiet diplomacy” emboldened the Tatmadaw and their partners in unleashing unprecedented atrocities on the Rohingya in August–September 2017. Embassies of important countries in Yangon (the US, EU countries, ASEAN members, Japan, and India included) were influenced by the abovementioned UN position in Myanmar. They also tended to think that Myanmar deserved more time and space. Furthermore, the alleged actions of the ARSA allowed Myanmar to highlight the insecurity aspect as a justification for the use of brute force. The US, preoccupied by local problems under the Trump administration, remained far from proactive on the Rohingya issue and exhibited a scant interest in the ongoing genocide. The EU, owing to the rise of nationalism in Europe and for a growing anti-refugee-bias, lost its capacity to lead. China, Japan, and India maintained silence to ensure greater acceptability in Myanmar. The Chinese Permanent Resident at UNSC stated in 2017 that China considered violence in Rakhine as “internal matters”. A divided UNSC, however, abandoned its responsibility to protect vulnerable Rohingya because of its narrow focus and the absence of creative diplomacy. A foreign policy analyst (F2) stated the following on the role of ASEAN and UNSC: The ASEAN countries found an excuse in the non-intervention principle of the ASEAN Charter to avoid actions. Immediate geo-political dynamics and big power politics prevented the UNSC from making strong united pronouncements against the atrocities by Myanmar in the period 2016-2017, despite Bangladesh’s strong demarche in New York and Geneva. Meanwhile, Myanmar took full advantage of her participation in the international community (ASEAN, ARF, ASEM in particular) and continued to spread false narratives against the Rohingya and Bangladesh. Internationally, Myanmar has remained unapologetic regarding crimes committed by their armed forces. Rather, Myanmar has expressed displeasure in Bangladesh allowing access to the UN Fact-Finding Mission in early 2017. Myanmar Minister U Kyaw Tint Swe, referring to developments in Geneva and New York in early to mid-2017, rather warned Bangladesh against “internationalising” the Rakhine issue and asserted that this would “not yield good results” for Myanmar having “friends in the UNSC”. He underscored “bilateralism” while nothing concrete was considered bilaterally on repatriation

248  Shahidul Haque and Sufiur Rahman till then. For Myanmar, bilateralism meant a few sporadic exchanges of visits with Bangladesh without outcomes and any meaningful follow-up. An Unexpected Source of Hope At Myanmar’s request, the Advisory Commission on the Rakhine State, chaired by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, was established on September 5, 2016, with the mandate to make recommendations within five thematic areas: conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, reconciliation, institution-building, and development (Rakhine Advisory Commission, 2017, p. 12). Bangladesh engaged the Commission to provide information, clarification, and analyses. The Bangladesh Ambassador in Myanmar remained engaged with the Commission members individually and collectively. Bangladesh facilitated the visit of members of the Commission to Dhaka and Cox’s Bazar. Bangladesh’s engagement with the Commission also continued in Geneva.13 While Myanmar’s civilian leadership made welcoming remarks about the interim recommendations of the Rakhine Advisory Commission of March 2017, no concrete initiatives were being taken which would assure the Rohingya of their return. The final report of the Rakhine Advisory Commission (2017) remarked the Rakhine situation as a development crisis, a human rights crisis, and a security crisis,14 going much beyond the development deficit narrative propounded by the Burmese and accepted by the UN in Myanmar (Rakhine Advisory Commission Report, 2017, p. 53). It went beyond the expectation of the Myanmar authorities and made strong pronouncements on the citizenship of the Rohingya. It identified deficiencies of the 1982 Citizenship Law and recommended inter alia the government to align the law with international standards and treaties, ensuring that individuals are not deprived of citizenship or forced into statelessness in addition to presenting a plan for the start of the process to review citizenship law (Rakhine Advisory Commission, 2017, pp. 31–32). While discussing border issues and the bilateral relationship with Bangladesh, the Commission (2017) remarked that “Existing offers from Bangladesh to work together with Myanmar on these issues should be taken up urgently” (p. 59). It also recommended “joint verification” of the eligible refugees. Bangladesh was reasonably satisfied with its efforts to help the Commission arrive at well-informed inferences and recommendations. The final report of August 2017 was internationally acclaimed but was not acknowledged by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the Tatmadaw. They found the recommendations too concrete and forward-looking. Finding it difficult to discard the report, Myanmar started to create bodies (such as the international level Advisory Board for the implementation of recommendations of the Commission report, the national-level Committee for implementation of recommendations on Rakhine State, Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement, and Development, etc.) with conflicting mandates

Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and Resolution of Rohingya Crisis  249 and ill-conceived notions (Myanmar President’s Office, Press Release, January 23, 2018). Coalescing of Positions of the NLD and the Tatmadaw on the Rohingya State Counsellor Daw Suu Kyi began internalising the same old USDP and military policy as cornerstones of her policy towards Bangladesh and the Rohingya. Some analysts warned about the incapacity of the NLD to “manage a fractious society” and “find space” for the Muslim Rohingya. Farrelly (2018) stated that “the NLD helped shape both the social conditions leading to the dehumanisation of the Rohingya and the widespread support for the military action that has purged them from a long-term residence on Myanmar soil” (p. 3). One resident Ambassador of a powerful regional country in Yangon stated, “Daw Suu Kyi also has deep misconceptions about Bangladesh”. Another Ambassador remarked that there was “no gap between the NLD leadership and the Army on the Rohingya issue”. Suu Kyi truly believed that “the Rohingya do not belong to Myanmar”. Suu Kyi left no opportunity to trivialise atrocities in Rakhine. While addressing an event in Singapore in December 2016, she laughed out loud on “fabrications” of rape and even urged the Burmese to counter the allegations. Informed sources reveal that she indirectly blamed Bangladesh for facilitating the spread of the fake news of rape, arson, and atrocities. Despite such adversarial attitudes, Bangladesh continued to invest in efforts to bilaterally engage Myanmar to solve the Rohingya crisis. In July 2017, Bangladesh Foreign Minister invited National Security Advisor (NSA) U Thaung Tun to find out possible areas of convergence. The NSA offered no clear pathway to normalise relations as he avoided substantive discussion on the Rohingya issue. It was evident that Myanmar, under the NLD administration, was rather happy at Bangladesh’s offering security support without any reciprocity. There was no sign of Myanmar having any serious interests in long-pending offers on sectoral collaboration (coastal shipping, road connectivity, gas, and power connectivity) as in previous years.15 Bangladesh’s Approach to the Full-blown Rohingya Crisis In Rakhine, in the build-up to the violence of August 2017, there was an “uptick in ARSA training and preparation” and Buddhist villagers blocked all access roads to the Rohingya villages (International Crisis Group [ICG] report,2017, pp. 3–4). UN entities were barred to conduct routine humanitarian works. Thousands of soldiers were flown into Rakhine on 10 August and deployed around the Mayu range to conduct future “clearance operations”. Myanmar Forces, fully prepared for an onslaught, unleashed indiscriminate force against civilians and combatants alike, resorting to arson and destruction of property, rape, and murder.

250  Shahidul Haque and Sufiur Rahman A full-blown forced displacement and exodus to Bangladesh erupted within weeks. The Rohingya civilians assembled near the Bangladesh border, seeking safety. Bangladesh had no option but to open its borders for the incoming Rohingya, choosing the humanitarian path and preventing the deaths of thousands of Rohingya. As a nation whose birth in 1971 was the direct result of decades of oppression, violence, and marginalisation, when millions took refuge in India, certainly played a part in Bangladesh’s decision to let the Rohingya in. In 2017, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, at the 72nd session of the UNGA, explained16: I can feel the pain and suffering of countless people around the world, persecuted and expelled from their homes like the Rohingya. It is impossible to build peaceful, just, and sustainable societies by ignoring such situations … As fellow humans, we can neither ignore nor remain silent about the plight of the Rohingya … Another foreign policy analyst (F3) analysed the Bangladesh’s Rohingya policy and opined that Bangladesh’s Rohingya policy has been guided by the philosophy of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who believed in standing up for the exploited and vulnerable people around the world. The policy has been a sub-set of Bangladesh’s overall approach to international engagement, succinctly captured in Bangabandhu’s cardinal principle: “Friendship to all and malice to none”. Of course, these values have also coincided with Bangladesh’s geopolitical and geostrategic priorities. But Myanmar’s continued denial of atrocities and failure to effectively engage Bangladesh over months compelled Bangladesh to look beyond bilateralism. Bangladesh joined other interested countries, seeking solutions at the UNSC and other forums. Faced with a difficult situation with the arrival of over a million Rohingya and the non-responsive attitude of Myanmar, Bangladesh decided to adopt a multi-layered policy approach, combining bilateral, regional, and multilateral initiatives. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina raised the issue of the Rohingya exodus at the UNGA on September 21, 2017.17 In her speech, she made a five-point proposal for actions: 1. Myanmar must unconditionally stop the violence and the practice of ethnic cleansing in the Rakhine State immediately and forever. 2. Secretary-General of the United Nations should immediately send a FactFinding Mission to Myanmar.

Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and Resolution of Rohingya Crisis  251 3. All civilians irrespective of religion and ethnicity must be protected in Myanmar. For that, “safe zones” could be created inside Myanmar under UN supervision. 4. Ensure a sustainable return of all the forcibly displaced Rohingya to their homes in Myanmar. 5. The recommendations of the Kofi Annan Commission Report must be immediately implemented unconditionally and in its entirety. This was a bold and visionary statement on the part of the Bangladesh Prime Minister. Following her proposals at the UNGA, the UN reinvigorated its activities. The decision to take the Rohingya crisis to a multilateral platform added new dimensions to the situation and set the course for a multi-prong course strategy for Bangladesh. In addition to the UN, Bangladesh increased its activities with the OIC, ASEAN, and other international organisations. Simultaneously, Bangladesh continued to pursue its bilateral negotiations with Myanmar. Bangladesh requested the UN agencies and international community to do the needful to protect children, women, and non-combatants. Bangladesh also pursued the Prime Minister’s proposal at UNGA to establish safe zones in northern Rakhine. Conceptually, the safe zones were to be occupied by civilians, overseen by interested regional countries, in particular, ASEAN. The zones were to be connected by safe corridors so as not to become yet another type of IDP camp. The UN was found unwilling to take forward the ideas for it was “difficult for the security forces to distinguish between villagers and insurgents …” Bangladesh approached the ICRC in Geneva on 30 August but was unable to secure Myanmar’s endorsement of the idea either.18 Moreover, a security expert (S1) said about Bangladesh’s pacifist approach, When the Rohingya were fleeing Rakhine, seeking refuge in Bangladesh, Myanmar forces laid land mines along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border and fired upon the people running for life. Myanmar also violated Bangladesh’s airspace a few times to perhaps draw Bangladesh into a full-blown bilateral armed conflict so that the Rohingya issue would get relegated. On the other hand, Bangladesh logically maintained a non-confrontational stance while keeping the border open for the fleeing Rohingya. Bangladesh’s pacifist approach, despite instigations from Myanmar forces along the border, helped international focus to remain firmly on atrocities committed against the Rohingya community in Rakhine. Over the next few months, there was no request from Myanmar for joint inspection, coordinated patrol, and coordinated operations at the border

252  Shahidul Haque and Sufiur Rahman when these could have been the most useful. Rather, it was Bangladesh who was willing to conduct these (MoFA, 2017b). Compulsions and Options Under the new understanding of the situation and a revised multi-layered and multi-pronged Rohingya policy, Bangladesh was quick to allow the UN factfinding mission access to collect evidence of atrocities and remained firmly engaged in New York and Geneva after the 2017 Rohingya exodus. The resolution was brought back at the UNGA, with a stronger one adopted at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva. Bangladesh allowed and facilitated various delegations to visit the camps in Cox’s Bazar to see for themselves the conditions the Rohingya had endured and the atrocities they had sustained. Bangladesh also accorded greater access to foreign media. The international processes were examining the violations of humanitarian law and human rights of the Rohingya in Rakhine. It could be seen as the outcome of Bangladesh’s strong diplomatic moves in this regard. Reflecting on the durable solution to the Rohingya crisis another security expert (S2) mentioned that As earlier exoduses in 1978 and 1992-93 had led to greater oppression of the Rohingya, Bangladesh by 2017 had become fully convinced of the need to create the conditions necessary in addressing the “root causes” for sustainable return and to avoid recurrence of similar episodes. Bangladesh considered the Rohingya crisis as Myanmar’s internal problem but one which was having direct consequences on Bangladesh: it was not the outcome of any conflict between Bangladesh and Myanmar. Hence, Bangladesh maintained that seeking a durable solution on the Rohingya issue was internal to Rakhine and Myanmar and, as such, not a bilateral matter. On repatriation, Bangladesh policy has been aimed at securing sustainable return as part of durable solutions inside Myanmar, as summed up in the remarks of the Bangladesh Prime Minister at the 73rd UNGA session19 in 2018. The Rohingya crisis has had its origin in Myanmar. As such, its solution has to be found in Myanmar … As a military solution has never been an option for Bangladesh, it has always sought to pursue diplomatic and development options. Internally, Bangladesh had no option but to maintain close security surveillance of the camps to quash any organised acts of militancy. This prevented the potential militant attacks flourishing within the camps. Concerns of international jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda getting involved did not

Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and Resolution of Rohingya Crisis  253 materialise, primarily due to extensive surveillance by Bangladesh’s security forces and agencies (ICG report, 2017, pp. 11–12). Meanwhile, in Myanmar, the NLD-led government joined the Tatmadaw and the extreme Buddhists to spread a different narrative that was full of hate for the Rohingya while also targeting Bangladesh. Myanmar’s media continuously highlighted an imaginary threat supposedly originating from Bangladesh, which could make its way into Rakhine (“Dangers of steps”, 2016). The Global New Light of Myanmar, a government-supported media outlet, questioned Bangladesh’s foreign policy despite Bangladesh handing over several combatants involved in the violence that ensued on October 9, 2016 (“Don’t let”, 2016). The Rohingya attacked the Rakhine Myanmar citizenry, and a campaign of Islamic terror was made the popular narrative in Myanmar (“Myanmar and”, 2020). Myanmar’s statements did receive some support from its neighbours. Many were willing to accept Myanmar’s version of so-called insecurity and terrorism, including India.20 Emboldened by the support, Myanmar Minister U Kyaw Tint Swe remarked that talks in the UN and another forum would have no “material consequence” (Bangladesh Embassy, Yangon, dispatch, 26 September 2017). At the UNSC meeting on September 28, 2017, the Chinese Permanent Representative Wu Haitao stated that China supported “Myanmar’s efforts to maintain domestic stability and asked the international community to encourage and support dialogue between Myanmar and Bangladesh”. The Russian representative Mr. Nebenzia warned against radicalisation in the region, which could be used by terrorists and extremists. He highlighted that “excessive pressure on Naypyitaw in the current situation can only aggravate the situation” (UNSC, pp. 14–16). On the other hand, they remained silent on the restoration of normalcy and conducive atmosphere in Rakhine and underscored “bilateralism” while there was no armed conflict between Bangladesh and Myanmar. About the repatriation process a diplomat (D4) told that Finding no concrete action from a divided UNSC, Bangladesh widened the door for bilateral engagement. On the other hand, a nervous and embarrassed Myanmar – primarily for extensive and detailed revelation of atrocities and wide-ranging condemnation in the media – started showing some eagerness to engage Bangladesh bilaterally but showed no interest in the restoration of normalcy in Rakhine. Federal Minister U Kyaw Tint Swe reached Dhaka in early October 2017 to open a discussion on repatriation. Meanwhile, China urged Bangladesh to move bilaterally with Myanmar. The Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Hong Liang expressed concern to his Bangladesh counterpart on October 30, 2017, that Bangladesh was “trying to internationalise the issue”. He even remarked that further pressure on

254  Shahidul Haque and Sufiur Rahman Myanmar would also be seen as “pressure on China” (Bangladesh Embassy in Yangon, dispatch, October 31, 2017). On the other hand, western countries, led by the US and the EU, continued to provide assurances but without any major noticeable initiative beyond financial assistance for the Rohingya. Crafting a Deal for Repatriation Since 2017, Bangladesh has sought to negotiate an arrangement with Myanmar in political, human rights, economic, and security contexts. The primary objective has been to finalise a deal that could facilitate a sustainable return in a conducive environment in Northern Rakhine, ensuring basic rights to the returnees. It was also expected to build some trust with Myanmar as well as reduce gaps between the Rohingya and Rakhines. But the Bangladesh negotiating team was soon faced with a lack of flexibility and understanding. A strong sense of sovereignty and control, rather than rights of the minorities and addressing their vulnerabilities, dominated the Myanmar position. Unlike the bilateral instruments of 1978 and 1992, Bangladesh tried hard to incorporate the rights essential for sustainable return and reintegration in the text beyond mere repatriation provisions, which Myanmar sought to dilute or delete such provisions.21 In the negotiation process, Myanmar was all for a “pure” bilateral mechanism and wanted no reference to the nomenclature “Rohingya” and even the phrase “forcibly displaced”. In order to proceed further, Bangladesh had agreed to the terms “displaced Myanmar residents”22 or “displaced persons” to refer to the Rohingya in Bangladesh. Myanmar was against the involvement of the international community, including the UNHCR. Myanmar was fiercely opposed to any suggestion of joint verification of the returnees and the role of international observers in the repatriation process. Myanmar tried hard to secure clear assurances that one party’s actions “bilaterally and multilaterally will not be inimical to the interest and well-being of the other party”.23 In spite of these unreasonable demands, Bangladesh still went ahead with incorporating these elements into the return agreement with the assurance that the status of the Rohingya would be promoted to have “access to basic services and livelihood”. Bangladesh also secured a place for the UNHCR and interested international partners in the process at “various stages of return and resettlement” and to “assist returnees to carry on life and livelihood as members of Myanmar society”.24 In return, Bangladesh had to accept unreasonable demands like National Verification Cards and dropped its own demand for joint verification. Bangladesh had to also keep the Rohingya of about 200,000 who arrived before October 2016 out of the purview of the 2017 return arrangement. Bangladesh thus conceded to a less-​than-​desir​ ed-bu​t-bes​t-in-​the-c​ircum​stanc​es arrangement with the hope that it would ensure the return of the Rohingya to Myanmar.

Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and Resolution of Rohingya Crisis  255 In its analysis of the arrangement, the UNHCR was satisfied that the Arrangement “commits both Governments to uphold international standards of refugees’ repatriation”. It also appreciated that elements of physical, legal, and material safety were envisaged by the arrangement and formed the backbone of the sustainability of returns (UNHCR, 2017, pp. 1–2). A few other elements such as “go and see” visits and other details of the involvement of the UNHCR were incorporated over the course of two additional meetings: the “Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Joint Working Group” and the “Physical Arrangement for the Displaced Myanmar Residents”. Bangladesh also succeeded in emphasising that repatriation would also include reintegration into Myanmar society, an indirect commitment to addressing their statelessness and creating a pathway towards citizenship in due course. The UNHCR, however, criticised the Arrangement25 in other areas, such as the identity cards for national verification (ICNV), despite clarification that verification for return is different from the previously carried out and ongoing national verification for those who are residing in Rakhine.26 Despite having a much wider and forward-looking arrangement than a normal instrument for return (that does not contain elements on rights and basic services, legal protection in the country of return27), the international community (human rights defenders, global media in particular) was not enthused. They criticised Bangladesh without appreciating Bangladesh’s sincere efforts to secure commitments on conducive atmosphere for voluntary return, safety, and pathway to citizenship. About China and Russia’s role, a security expert (S3) stated that China and Russia continued to endorse Myanmar’s characterisation of instability and highlighted the need for time to address the complex situation in Rakhine. The US and a few others raised the issue of accountability for the atrocities committed but did not put forward any specific pathways through which these notions could be realised. Implementation of the JWG Mechanism Given Myanmar’s obduracy in not committing to specifics on a conducive atmosphere for return and the security concerns of future returnees, the Joint Working Group (JWG) failed to secure any semblance of progress in the next four meetings. Myanmar continued to insist on the construction of mega transit camps instead of ensuring access to livelihood and mobility issues. It made no effort to simplify the procedures for professional licences, occupational permits, and land-use rights concerning household and farmland following arson.28 On basic services, Myanmar refused to ease restrictions on freedom of movement and sought to make movement contingent upon accepting NVC and movement-specific permissions – a notion the Rohingya had rejected

256  Shahidul Haque and Sufiur Rahman in the pre-2016 period (Independent International fact-finding mission on Myanmar, para. 46). During the first 14 months of the verification process, Myanmar arbitrarily placed around 25% of the 8,032 Rohingya in a list of “individuals not found in the registered list of households” from the list of 8,032 individuals in the first 14 months of verification and sometimes even categorising one or two members of a family different from the rest, making it difficult for a family to return together. Until April 2020, Myanmar recognised 13,201 (a little over half) individuals as “former residents of Myanmar”. In addition, Myanmar refused to create any sort of mechanism through which disputes could be resolved as per paragraph 10 of the Arrangement and paragraph 26 of the Physical Arrangement. Most importantly, Myanmar showed no urgency and interest in the recommendation of the Rakhine Advisory Commission to review the Citizenship Law of 1982, the root of Rohingya discrimination and statelessness. Myanmar argued that its security forces would ensure safety when they themselves were the main source of insecurity for the Rohingya. In this context a journalist (J1) opined that Myanmar rejected any notion of foreign monitoring of the security situation, whether from ASEAN or other friendly countries. Myanmar is yet to agree to allow a “go and see visit” for the members of the JWG, the Rohingya, and media representatives. As such, safety and security remained the weakest link. However, in the face of increasing pressure from China and accusations that Bangladesh’s intentions were insincere regarding repatriation (“Bangladesh to blame”, 2018), Bangladesh agreed to two phases of return, in August and November 2019. In this process, the UNHCR was given the task to ascertain the voluntariness of the 3450 prospective returnees, but it found none of the selected willing to return (UNHCR, 2019). As anticipated, the international community, comprising 42 aid agencies and civil society groups, expressed concerns regarding the safety of returnees and the risk of the Rohingya being forced to return (ICG, 2018, pp.3). Accountability and Justice While the UNSC remained hamstrung and progress on the bilateral front was negligible, Bangladesh sought to generate pressure on Myanmar at the UNHRC and at the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), both of which demanded accountability for the Rohingya atrocities. Bangladesh facilitated the work of the independent fact-finding commission mandated by the UNHRC, which brought out a damning report and indicated genocidal intent on the part of the Tatmadaw. To pursue OIC member states, Bangladesh moved a resolution along with the Gambia at the 45th Council of OIC Foreign Minister’s meeting in

Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and Resolution of Rohingya Crisis  257 Dhaka on May 5–6, 2018. The meeting adopted a resolution on accountability including setting up an ad-hoc ministerial committee (with the Gambia as Chair and Bangladesh as Vice-Chair). Subsequently, the OIC summit in Mecca in 2019 decided that the Gambia would bring a case against Myanmar to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Finally, the Gambia lodged a case against Myanmar for violations of the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948. Bangladesh’s support of the ICJ process helped renew media focus on the plight of the Rohingya and their right to return. The process also questioned the hollowness of Myanmar’s moral and ethical standpoints and may invalidate the perception of insecurity propagated by Myanmar and that the Rohingya are not interlopers from Bangladesh. Meanwhile, the ICJ has issued a provisional verdict declaring the Rohingya as a vulnerable community in Myanmar, asking Myanmar to ensure the protection of the Rohingya. The court also issued some provisional measures in this regard (Choudhury, 2020). In the same vein, when the International Criminal Court (ICC) decided to examine crimes and asked whether Bangladesh would be a party, Bangladesh became a party given the weight of the evidence of crimes and the future pressure that it could generate on Myanmar. An MoU was signed with the Office of the Prosecutor in November 2019 to help in the investigation. Clear evidence and mounting pressure compelled Myanmar’s legal team for the ICJ to accept some culpability regarding excessive force, war crimes (as has been indicated by its own Independent Commission of Enquiry-ICOE). Myanmar’s President Office accepted war crimes that were committed by members of Security forces and by civilians. This “confession” is likely to help the case in the International Criminal Court (ICC) immensely while giving the Gambia an advantage in the merit case at the ICJ. Challenges in Rohingya Camp Management Many in the international community remained vocal on the difficult conditions of the Rohingya in the camps in Bangladesh, while they remained soft on Myanmar (to continue engagement in the area of business and investment in Myanmar). They started suggesting improvements that could be made in the living conditions at the camps, training the refugees, and providing job opportunities outside the camps. As the refugee situation protracts, Bangladesh has appreciated the need for education and training for the Rohingya children and youth. Bangladesh subsequently established over 3,200 learning centres according to the Myanmar curriculum, entitled Learning Competency Framework and Approach (LCFA). For secondary level education (grades 6–9), a Myanmar Curriculum Pilot has been adopted. Meanwhile, ideas like local integration and third-country resettlement have started spreading. The UNHCR and the World Bank have been pushing Bangladesh, a densely populated country already facing serious economic,

258  Shahidul Haque and Sufiur Rahman environmental, social, and cultural consequences. But local integration was not considered an option. The Bangladesh Cabinet in July 1997 had rejected a UNHCR proposal on local settlement and integration of residual refugees of 21,000 (UNHCR, 2011, para. 30). There has always been a national consensus to this effect in Bangladesh (UNHCR, 2011, para. 24). Bangladesh rejects any suggestion on programmes and investments which could directly or indirectly prolong the Rohingya crisis and create newer pull factors for the remaining Rohingya inside Rakhine to cross over. Similarly, Bangladesh has limited interest in resettlement to another country, since recent resettlement events have made it amply clear that it would be unlikely that any other nation would share the burden of over a million Rohingya. Bangladesh finds strong merit in creating safe zones and appreciates the presence of international monitoring of safety and security for the returnees in Rakhine. It supports compensation demanded by the Rohingya against the destruction of their homes, fields, property, and livelihoods. Bangladesh also subscribes to the demand for compensation on account of loss of lives, injury, and trauma. However, discussions on this gained little momentum. Meanwhile, Bangladesh proceeded with a plan to relocate up to 100,000 refugees to a faraway island, Bhashan Char, to reduce pressure on the camps in Cox’s Bazar (Regan and Wright, 2020). The facilities on the island have proven to be satisfactory after Cyclone Amphan hit the area, which left the island unscathed. These well-built facilities have provisions for adequate health, sanitary facilities, and vaccination, with a referral system for complicated health conditions, safe drinking water, a sewage system, and electricity. Bangladesh has also provided opportunities for employment on site. The more than three thousand refugees currently there have been doing well. About the international support for the displaced Rohingyas another journalist (J2) stated that However, it soon became quite common to hear influential nations heap responsibility in Bangladesh, while the same countries refrained from demanding the same of Myanmar so that it would take corrective measures and make material changes in Rakhine. Recent visits by representatives of resident diplomatic missions and UN agencies have somewhat helped allay some apprehensions. Bangladesh expects fuller support for the relocated refugees from the international community. A Changed Scenario Bangladesh has been attempting to revive the JWG mechanism, which has not been met since July 2019. Meanwhile, influential countries started articulating those conditions in Rakhine were not suitable for return but have made no visible efforts to make conditions conducive. Rather, many quietly continued their economic investments and sectoral engagements with

Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and Resolution of Rohingya Crisis  259 Myanmar. It is in this context that Bangladesh, not being fully convinced of its utility, remains engaged with the Bangladesh, Myanmar, and China tripartite mechanism, promoted by China. Myanmar with Chinese endorsement has proposed a “pilot project” in May 2020 to relocate 840 verified former residents to two village tracts (not to their original villages) in Rakhine to start repatriation on a small scale (MoFA, Myanmar, 2020). Myanmar requested Bangladesh to discreetly encourage prospective returnees for early commencement of return. But the outbreak of COVID-19 in Bangladesh and the camps halted progress. A meeting between the Foreign Secretaries of Bangladesh, Myanmar, and China was held in January 2021, where follow-up meetings to operationalise the commencement of return were agreed upon. This has now become uncertain due to the Myanmar military coup on February 1, 2021. Since then, Myanmar has been sliding towards anarchy and runs the risk of greater instability. The democracy-craving youth and National League for Democracy supporters from the Bamar majority, sprung-to-action ethnic insurgent groups, and the Buddhist clergy in addition to the changing ethnopolitical landscape in Rakhine will shape the future of Myanmar as a state. Accordingly, these will also shape her approach to the Rohingya, who have all through been kept out of. Bangladesh, consistent with its policy of non-interference, has so far stayed clear of Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG), created by the opposing forces after the military take-over. The Rohingya are reported to have commenced engaging the opposing forces to negotiate acceptance as an ethnicity. The NUG has pledged to comply with the 2020 directives of the ICJ (“Myanmar’s NUG”, 2021) and seems to treat the Rohingya better, which again cannot be accepted without doubt due to Bamar nationalism. At the regional level, the ASEAN community felt the imperative to stop its sinking credibility and held a Summit in Jakarta on April 4, 2021. The global community, as divergent and opportunistic as they are, have found it convenient to rely on the ASEAN nations for redressal of the burning problems of Myanmar. Given the primacy on security, stability, and territorial integrity as reflected in its Charter and deep divisions within its members, restoration of stability in all likelihood will relegate the demand for the rule of law and restoration of democracy to a lesser position and priority, regardless of the efforts of the NUG and the yet-to-be-established National Unity Consultative Council. Bangladesh cannot afford to remain a bystander as ASEAN proceeds on the Rohingya issue. Full inclusion of the Rohingya as one of the ethnic groups of Myanmar continues to remain uncertain. Concluding Remark The Rohingya issue, after decades of Myanmar propaganda, has become intertwined with complicated security issues and cannot be unwound by Bangladesh alone. As such, Bangladesh has tried within its capacity to

260  Shahidul Haque and Sufiur Rahman leverage the strengths of diverging stakeholders but has so far remained unsuccessful on the issue of voluntary Rohingya repatriation, primarily due to regional powers and their respective national interests. However, such an approach has resulted in immense pressure on Myanmar, legally, politically, and economically. It has also secured plaudits for Bangladesh as a peaceloving nation, one which follows a value-based foreign policy, very distinct from Myanmar – perennially non-compliant when it comes to global norms and universally recognised rights. The analysis of the contours of the past practice of foreign policy makes it evident that Bangladesh, unlike Myanmar, has sought to devise policies outside general fault-lines of power politics. Free from a firm strategic preference and mooring, it has been trying a wide range of options, sometimes with somewhat unrealistic hopes but often also with good analytical understanding of the situation. However, Bangladesh’s approach more often than not has suffered from over-expectation within a short period of time, leading to frequent adjustments. Bangladesh also has not pursued a policy of wider national consultations involving all stakeholders which is a precondition to counter a firmly fused, however unfounded they are, narrative that has evolved in Myanmar over decades. The Bangladesh policy generally receives good support from the global media and human rights defenders. It has the capacity to bring additional pressure onto the hitherto disinterested regional countries and important global players. If Bangladesh remains unsure as to how to engage them, plans of increasing mounting pressure will be ineffectual. Similarly, how Bangladesh seeks to avail itself of the advantages available from international accountability exercises at the ICJ and the ICC, despite opposition from some quarters, would remain another major determinant in achieving a peaceful resolution to the Rohingya crisis. On bilateral relations with Myanmar, interdependent, mutually beneficial relations cannot be founded on the false notion of the twin insecurities of demography and irredentism. Bangladesh’s pacifist approach towards Myanmar remains a strong selling point. Bangladesh’s openness to resolve conflicts peacefully in this manner needs to be highlighted cogently with greater forcefulness and clarity to various stakeholders in Myanmar to convince them of the incorrectness of false claims of insecurity. Continuation of a multi-layered and multi-pronged approach is a precondition to secure qualitative changes in Rakhine and sustainable return of the Rohingya. On conditions of return, Bangladesh must convince all to work towards guaranteeing security for the returnees and proceed with an assurance of a pathway to a gradual integration into Myanmar society and eventual citizenship. While the past approaches may not have resulted in concrete progress towards the Rohingya repatriation, the changing situation has the potential to challenge Myanmar’s monolithic and entrenched position (in the postcoup situation, a new convergence has a real chance of emerging among various ethnic communities). Bangladesh will need to intensify engagements with

Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and Resolution of Rohingya Crisis  261 regional countries and others more friendly towards Myanmar and show them the relative value of Bangladesh in terms of its economic significance and its role as a source of regional stability. Bangladesh’s foreign policy establishment should rise above frustration and remain confident in the value of her past strategy and approaches to peacefully resolve the Rohingya crisis. They ought to seek to solidify an alliance among like-minded forces and leverage their strength. The focus should remain on collecting dividends on past efforts, rather than frequently tweaking and altering its approach to the Rohingya issue and Myanmar. Passivity at this crucial time will be disastrous. Notes 1 Bangladesh, not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, did not recognise the Rohingya who entered Bangladesh in various phases, but accorded them treatment akin to the refugees; in the recent years Bangladesh used Undocumented Myanmar nationals, Forcibly Displaced Myanmar nationals (FDMN) to denote the de-facto refugees; the word refugee in this chapter is used in a general sense, without reference to their full legal and other entitlements under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol of 1967. 2 This chapter generally covers developments till the end of 2020 and does not adequately cover the recent political upheavals since February 1, 2021. 3 Myanmar’s major ethnic group practising Buddhism. 4 During the negotiation between Bangladesh and the UN for drafting the Joint Response Plan (JRP), it was agreed that the JRP could use “Rohingya Refugee” without any legal implications in the context of 1951 Refugee Convention. 5 FOC in 2013 was led by the then Foreign Secretary Shahidul Haque. 6 Ambassador Rahman was directly involved in these initiatives as Bangladesh’s Ambassador to Myanmar. 7 The then Foreign Secretary Haque handed over the invitation letter to Aung San Suu Kyi as a special envoy. 8 Letter from Bangladesh Prime Minister, October 2016. 9 Letter of Myanmar State Counsellor, January 2017. 10 Aide-Memoire of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Myanmar, March 2016. 11 The authors own experience and knowledge. 12 Aide-Memoire of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Myanmar, March 2016. 13 Both the authors were involved in those activities. 14 Defined insecurity as emanating from armed struggle by both Rakhine and Muslim non-state armed groups (such as AA and ARSA); from the security forces; and from drug smuggling, aggravating the sense of lawlessness and insecurity along the border with Bangladesh (Page 53, Final report, Advisory Commission on Rakhine State). 15 Both the authors had insights of the discussion. 16 Speech by the Bangladesh Prime Minister at the 72nd Session of UNGA in New York, 2017. 17 Speech by the Bangladesh Prime Minister at the 72nd Session of UNGA in New York, 2017. 18 Exchanges between the Bangladesh Permanent Representative in Geneva and ICRC, 2017. 19 Speech by the Bangladesh Prime Minister at the 73rd Session of UNGA in New York, 2018.

262  Shahidul Haque and Sufiur Rahman 20 Statement Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India while visiting Myanmar in September 2017. 21 Both the authors were engaged in these negotiations. 22 1992 arrangement used the term “Myanmar residents or refugees”, while 1978 Repatriation Agreement used the term “lawful residents of Burma”. 23 To deny Bangladesh any scope to resort to multilateral processes and bilateral means with other parties. 24 Arrangement on return of displaced persons from Rakhine State between Bangladesh and Myanmar, signed on November 23, 2017, Nay Pyi Taw. 25 Although the tripartite understanding (MoU) reached among UNHCR, UNDP and Myanmar a few months later in June 2018 could not proceed beyond what Bangladesh could secure in the arrangement. 26 Reference to ICNV despite this clarification emerged as a major bone of contention in the meetings of the Joint Working Group; the returnees remained opposed to such a card that has no legal basis. 27 As an example, the MoU signed on November 5, 1993, between Myanmar and UNHCR on return on “Myanmar residents from Rakhine State” has no such elements. 28 Myanmar laws automatically transfer title to the Union in case of fire instances.

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Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and Resolution of Rohingya Crisis  263 International Crisis Group, ICG (2018, November 12). Asia Briefing No. 153, p.3. Lewa, C. (27 April 2008). Issues to be raised concerning the situation of Rohingya Children in Myanmar (Burma). Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO). Retrieved from https://www​.rohingya​.org​/issues​-to​-be​-raised​-concerning​-the​ -situation​-of/ (last accessed on 3 August 2021). Min, M., & Aung, M. (2015, September 23). The welcome migrants from Bangladesh. Frontier Myanmar. Retrieved from https://www​.frontiermyanmar​.net​/en​/the​ -welcome​-migrants​-from​-bangladesh/ (last accessed on 4 August2021). Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Bangladesh. (2017a, 28 August). Note Verbale no. 19.22.0007.001.09.001.14-524. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Bangladesh. (2017b, 18 January). Background on Rakhine State Attached to the Information Sheet on Recent Developments in Rakhine State. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Myanmar. (2020, 4 May). Note Verbale no. 27 67 (18) 01/20 (546). Myanmar and the Rohingya: Time for a domestic reckoning. (3 June 2020). Frontier Myanmar. Retrieved from https://www​.frontiermyanmar​.net​/en​/myanmar​-and​ -the​-rohingya​-time​-for​-a​-domestic​-reckoning/ (last accessed on 4 August2021). Myanmar President’s Office. (2018, 23 January), Press Release. Myanmar’s NUG pledges to comply with ICJ directives. (2021, 1 June). The Daily Star. Retrieved from https://www​.thedailystar​.net​/backpage​/news​/myanmars​-nug​ -pledges​-comply​-icj​-directives​-2102469 (last accessed on 4 August2021). Regan, H. and Wright, R. (2020, 8 December). Fears of forced removals as Bangladesh moves hundreds of Rohingya refugees to remote island. CNN. Retrieved from https://edition​.cnn​.com​/2020​/12​/03​/asia​/rohingya​-relocations​-bhasan​-char​-intl​ -hnk​/index​.html (last accessed on 4 August2021). Rosenthal, G. (2019, 29 May). A Brief and Independent Inquiry into the Involvement of the United Nations in Myanmar from 2010 to 2018. United Nations, p.10. San, A. (1946). Burma’s challenge. Address delivered at the City hall, Rangoon on 8 December 1946, pp. 175–177. The Mro nationals from Chittagong hill region migrate to Kyauktaw due to the difficulties of livelihood, (2015, 31 December). The Democracy Today. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, Dhaka. (2019, 22 August), Press Release. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR. (2011, December). States of Denial: A Review of UNHCR’s Response to the Protracted Situation of Stateless Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh, no. PDES/2011/13, para-24, para-30. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR. (2014). 2014 Year-End Report. Retrieved from https://reporting​.unhcr​.org​/sites​/default​/files​/pdfsummaries​ /GR2014​-Bangladesh​-eng​.pdf. last accessed on 4 August2021. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR. (2017, 19 December). Analysis of the Arrangement on Return of Displaced Persons from Rakhine State Communicated Video Note Verbal (pp. 1–2). United Nations Security Council, UNSC. (2017). Document-S/PV.8060 on the Agenda: The Situation in Myanmar (pp.14–16). United Nations Security Council, UNSC. (2017). Statement of the Chinese Permanent Resident at UNSC. Wade, F. (2017). Myanmar’s Enemy Within. Zed Books. p. 52, 54, 57.

Index

1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 3 1951 Refugee Convention 8, 9, 11, 16n1, 59, 67 1984 Cartagena Declaration 55 1994 Rwandan genocide 38 2012 Buddhist–Muslim communal riots 52 2016 Annan Commission Reports 163 Abrar, C. R. 94 academics and rights activists 54 accountability 170 Adams, B. 66 adolescence: in Bangladeshi camps see Rohingya adolescent girls; goals of 118 Ai, A. L. 20 Aleinikoff, A. T. 8 Alemu, A. 168 Al-Khateeb, M. 118 Almond, G. 10 Al-Qaeda 252 Amin, Azril Mohammad 59 Amnesty International 61 Andaman Sea 225 Anderson, B. 179 android-based applications 87 Anglo-Burman Council 238 Anglo-Burmese War 227 Annan, K. 248 anti-Muslim attitudes 48 anti-Muslim Burmese government 25 Anwar, M. S. 25 Appadurai, A. 164 Arakanese Muslims 24 Arakan Kingdom 36 Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) 66, 244 Arendt, H. 11

Armstrong, K. 21 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 58 ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) 58 asylum seekers 10 attackers and victims 185–6 Aung San Suu Kyi 47, 62, 162, 243, 248 Auvinen, T. 166 Bangladesh: basic needs 77; and Burma 24; COVID-19 in 259; host community in 81; illustration of 188–90; legal obligations 7; refugee policy and practice 233–4; Rohingya adolescent girls see Rohingya adolescent girls; Rohingya registration process in 94; Ukhiya camps in 167 Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provision) 233 Bangladeshi newspapers: crisis 202–3; drug peddling, violence, and extremist activities 209; geo-politics and diplomacy 204–5; human trafficking 207–9; intent of GoB and ways forward 206–7; local ecology and environment 203–4 Bangladesh-Myanmar relations: accountability and justice 256–7; approach to full-blown Rohingya crisis 249–52; Bangladesh policy 241–3; bi-lateral engagement on Rohingya Issue 245–6; compulsions and options 252–4; exodus of Rohingya 240–1; JWG mechanism 255–6; methodology 238–40; repatriation deal 254–5; Rohingya camp management 257–8; sense of security 243–5; UN dysfunctional and nonchalant international community 246–8 Barada, R. 119

266 Index Bay of Bengal 60, 225 Bengali Muslims 36 Bhabha, Homi Khurshed 161 Bhargava, R. 39, 45 Bhuiyan, M. R. 14 bilateral relations 237 Blum, R. 118, 133 Bourassa, A. 119 British colonial rulers 35 Buchanan, F. 26, 36 Buddhist Burmese population 13 Buddhist monks 43, 47 Burma/Burmese: and Bangladesh 24; book 108; Buddhism in 24; citizenship 23; consistent persecution in 26–7; ethnic communities 24; identity 38; language 82; military 24; Rohingya’s presence in 23 Butalia, U. 30 Camp-dwellers 4 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees 69n1 Chauhan, M. G. 155, 199 China 14, 161, 162, 186–7 China–Myanmar relations 188 Christian/Christianity 20, 48 Citizens Act 166 citizenship acquisition 227 Citizenship Act 22, 23, 52, 162, 225 The Citizenship Law (TCL) 227 civil war, in Afghanistan 58 climate refugees 55 Coleman, J. S. 10 commonalities and differences 190–1 communal political identity 169 Confidentiality Agreement 117 Congolese Refugee Adolescent Girls in Nyarugusu Refugee Camp 119 conventional approaches 8 COVID-19 pandemic 8, 11, 62, 115 Cox’s Bazar 27, 77, 78, 81, 84, 86, 87, 95, 115, 198, 228, 230, 248 critical discourse analysis (CDA) 178, 179, 181 The Daily Star 15 dalals 86 Deleuze, G. 163 Delong, J. 118 de-nationalization process 24 Didion, J. 166 diphtheria 230 discriminatory policies 55

displaced population 3 dominant Buddhist 13 Douglas, F. 173, 174 Dupre, A. 20 Dutta, S. 15 Easton, D. 10 economic interest 29 economic migrants 57 economic prosperity 162 education 82, 108–9 employment and free movement 109 ethnic and religious identity 238 ethnic groups 37 Eurocentric humanitarianism 8 European Court of Human Rights 58 European Muslims 21 European nations 21 Exclusionary Citizenship Act 23–4 Extradition Act 233 Fairclough, N. 182 Farzana, K. F. 27 Fatima, M. J. 180, 199 focus group discussions (FGDs) 95 forced migration 22 Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN) 7, 95, 115 Foucault, M. 181 freedom of movement 59 free food card 105–6 Fumagalli, M. 37 fundamental rights 56 Galeotti, A. E. 13, 39, 40, 42, 44 gender-based violence 7, 13 geopolitical situation 27–9 global community 11 Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) 230 Greek Turkish refugees 21 Guattari, F. 163 Hall, S. 179, 182, 199 Haque, Md Mahbubul 13 Haque, N. 133 Haque, S. 15 Harun, A. 12 Hasina, S. 162, 250 health 107–8 Herman, E. S. 181 Hikmat, R. 118 The Hindu 14, 183, 184 Hlaing, A. 37, 162

Index  267 host community 9, 84, 88, 200 Huang, B. 20 human and sex trafficking 81 human rights 5, 57; organisations 64; violations 5 human traffickers 86, 87 human trafficking 13, 85 Hyder, A. A. 155 idiosyncrasy 40 illegal employment 84 illegal immigrants 61 illegal migrants 57 illegal migration 7 in-depth interviews (IDIs) 80 India 14, 161, 162, 186–7; Hindus and Muslims of 22 Indian Citizenship Amendment Bill (CAB) 165 Indonesia 6 influential Buddhist monks 166 informal labour market 88 Institutional Review Board 80 Internally Displaced People (IDPs) 4 international agencies 99 international communities 7, 48, 57, 115 international convention and treaties 232–3 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 191, 257 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 53, 60, 65, 232 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 232 International Criminal Court (ICC) 257 international law and domestic law 4 international organisations 7 International Organization for Migration 56 international refugees 60 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 241 Islam 20, 21 Islam, K. M. 199 Islamophobic discourses 43 Ismail, Md Ishrat Ibne 12 Iyengar, S. 181 Jerin, I. 125 Jews 22 Joint Working Group (JWG) 206 Jones, P. 41, 46

Joseph 21 Judaism 20 Kabir, E. 13, 14 Kabir, H. 154 Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project 29 Kamruzzan, P. 13–15 Karen community 24 Keck, S. 37 Kinder, D. R. 181 King, M. L. 27 Kinseth, A. 38 Kongchantuk, S. 64 Kutupalong 97 Kutupalong-Balukhali camp 228 Kutupalong camp 98 learning centres 81 Leda camp 98 legal obligation 9 Leider, J. P. 26 Lewa, C. 60 linguistic skill 82, 83 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) 230 Locke, J. 37, 45, 47 Lord Krishna 21 Lord Rama 21 MacLean, K. 23, 25 madrasas 98 Madsen, A. G. 54 Maguire, S. 120 majhi 80, 81 Malay language 60 Malaysia 6, 13; migrants/refugees 56–7; regional powers 57–8; situation in 58–63 marginalised Muslim 13 Mary 21 Masterson, A. R. 155 Milton, A. H. 211 Mohamad, M. 62 Mohanty, B. 179, 180, 199, 200 Mozumder, M. K. 125 Mubarak, R. 133 Muslims: in Arakan 226; in Bosnia 42; community 21; demographic explosion 164; ethno-cultural group 6; Muslim Rohingya 225; in Myanmar 43; in North Rakhine 239; in Rakhine 227 Myanmar: British colonisation of 52; Buddhist monks in 47; Buddhists

268 Index in 44; crimes and atrocities by government 68; depictions of 187–8; historical persecution in 199; influence of China over 29; military force 35, 69n9; modes of acquiring citizenship in 226–8; Muslims in 22; Myanmar Muslim community 43; political instability in 8; “religious conversion” in 44 Myanmar Citizenship Law 227 Myanmar Curriculum Project (MCP) 231, 233 Naik, S. 36 National Register Board 165 National Security Council (NSC) 64 National Task Force (NTF) 246 Naturalization Act 233 Naturalized Citizenship 23 Nayapara 98 Nayapara registered camp 98 Nazi Germany 35 Nderitu, L. C. 14 news items: selected news items and public comments 201; source of 201; types of 202 non-formal education 81, 89 Non-government organizations (NGOs) 132 non-refoulement 226 Noor, Z. 155 nutritious supplementary food 229 Nyi, U Nyi 23 Open Data Kit (ODK) tool 143 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention 55 organised transnational crime 64 ostracism 40 Öztürk, S. 180, 192, 199 Pakistan 6, 58 Parekh, S. 10 Passport Act 233 Patel, H. 155 Pederson, R. 162 Peterson, H. 20 Plan International 139 Plato 166 political: disharmony 55; dissidents 55; identity 10; ideology 54; ramifications 161 post-Cold War period 8 post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 169

Potts, A. 119 primary data and information 238 principle of non-refoulement 62 print capitalism 179 Prothom Alo 15 Provincial Admission Board 64 psycho-social services 87 qualitative research method 80 racial and religious identity 55 Rafik, U. 60 Rahman, H. 14 Rahman, M. M. 12 Rahman, S. 15 Rakhine Advisory Commission 248 Rakhine Buddhists 24 recognition, model of 47 refugee: communities 87; crises 161; defined 54–6; international definition 4; international refugees 60; in Pakistan 58; Somali refugees 119, 139; Syrian adolescent refugees in Lebanon 118 Refugee Convention 54, 60, 226 refugeeness 19, 20 registered Rohingya: education 108–9; employment and free movement 109; free food card 105–6; health 107–8; living conditions 105; people of UNHCR 109–10 Registration of Foreigners Act 233 registration process and ramifications: education 102–3, 108–9; employment and freedom of movement 103–4; employment and free movement 109; free food card 105–6; health 107–8; health and hygiene 101–2; living conditions 105; people of UNHCR 109–10; registered Rohingya 105–10; safety 104–5; unregistered Rohingya 99–105 religious: beliefs 20; clashes 21; communities 20; leaders 19; toleration 39 repatriation 8 reproductive tract infections, among Rohingya adolescent girls: common symptoms 145–6, 146; data analysis procedure 142–3; data collection procedure 142; discussion 154–5; ethical considerations 143; prevalence of symptoms 139; qualitative findings 149–54; quantitative findings 147–9;

Index  269 results and discussion 144–6; risk of developing RTIs 146; sample size determination 141; sampling technique 141–2; social demographic characteristics 144–5; SRH needs and services 140; study design 140; study population 140; study site 140; study tools 142; treatmentseeking behaviour 151–2; water and sanitation facilities 139 right to education and employment 5 right to non-refoulment 4 Robbins, T. 166 Rohingya: background 78–80; in Bangladesh 6, 13; see also Bangladesh; in Bhasan Char 7; in Burma 23; denial of existence 25–6; elements for exclusion 22–7; geopolitical situation 27–9; historical overview of 19; and Karen communities 24–5; within Myanmar 12; in Myanmar 15, 25; refugee crisis 237; religion and geopolitics 19; religion and migration 20–2; rhizomorphic narrative discourse 163–7 Rohingya adolescent girls: childhood 121; child marriage 119; concerns of safety 123–4; cultural conformity 121; early motherhood 118, 119; early pregnancy 118; education 118; forced marriage 119; formal or informal social control mechanisms 119; human trafficking 131–3; informed consent 117; Islamic norms and values 120; lack of educational and work opportunities 129–31; local and international NGOs 121; mistrust of host community 124–6; national social, economic, and political conditions 118; physical and mental health 119; poor housing 128–9; poor toilet and water facilities 126–8; poverty 129–31; psychological distress 119; reproductive tract infections see reproductive tract infections, among Rohingya adolescent girls; restrictions on mobilty 119; socio-demographic categories 119; teenage pregnancy 119; transgenerational transmissions 118 Rohingya camps: registered camps 98–9; unregistered camps 96–8 Rohingya Muslims: discourses and recognition 35–40; paradigm shift 40–7; violence against 48

Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) 231, 244 Rosenthal, G. 247 Sabarwal, S. 154 Sahbani, A. 118 Santhya, K. G. 154 Santiago, C. 58 Saudi Arabia 6 Scanlon, T. M. 39 Schlecht, J. 120 sense of uncertainty 5 sex trade 87 sex trafficking 89 sexual harassment 14 sex work 120 Siddiqi, B. 13, 14 Siddiqqi, A. 120 social differences 40 socialisation 14 socialization 80 social justice 167 social order and control 7 social reformations 5 socio-economic ramifications 161 socio-political conditions 173 Solanki, H. 155 Somali refugee adolescent girls 119 Somali refugees 139 South-eastern Bangladesh 23 Spivak, G. C. 166 Stothard, D. 65 structural injustice 10 Sukhani, P. 59 Sultana, I. Z. 12, 13 Syria 161 Syrian adolescent refugees, in Lebanon 118 Taal 97 Takala, T. 166 Tay, A. K. 131 Thailand 6, 13, 225; migrants/refugees 56–7; migrant workers in 69n11; regional powers 57–8; situation in 63–9 Times of India (TOI) 14, 183 Torun, A. T. 180, 199 trafficking 64 Tsui, E. 155 Uddin, N. 37, 38 Ukhia 96 Ukraine–Russia War 115

270 Index Ullah, A. K. M. A. 23, 25 UNICEF 87 Union Citizenship Act (UCA) 23, 227 United National Security Council (UNSC) 205 United Nations 52; human rights treaty bodies 57; role of 191–2; UN Human Rights Office 225; UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar 233 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 53 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions 241 United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 3, 4, 63, 95, 99, 234; role of 27; UNHCR Handbook 55; UNHCR-registered cardholders 58 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 27 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 53 unregistered Rohingya: education 102–3; employment and freedom of movement 103–4; health and hygiene 101–2; safety 104–5

UN Security Council 57 US-based Global Women’s Institute (GWI) 119 Usta, J. 155 Van Dijk, T. A. 182 Vernon, R. 41, 45 Wade, F. 25 wage discrimination 84 wage employment opportunities 88 Walia, K. 180, 192, 199 Walters, W. 28 Win, Ne 227 Women’s Refugee Commission 119 World Food Program 230 World Health Organisation (WHO) 138, 230 World War II 8 World Wars 21 Wu, Haitao 252 Yusuf, A. 23 Zainudin, H. 59, 61 Zuckerberg, M. 166