The Diplomatic Enlightenment Spain, Europe, and the Age of Speculation (History of European Political and Constitutional Thought, 5) 9004469060, 9789004469068

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The Diplomatic Enlightenment

History of European Political and Constitutional Thought Series Editors Erica Benner (Yale University) László Kontler (Central European University) Mark Somos (Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law)

Associate Editors Anna Becker —​Alberto Clerici —​Adriana Luna-​Fabritius Gaby Mahlberg —​Jani Marjanen —​Eva Piirimae Advisory Board Duncan Bell —​Hans Blom —​Annabel Brett —​Lea Campos Boralevi Janet Coleman —​John Dunn —​Pamela Edwards —​Ioannis Evrigenis Xavier Gil —​David Grewal —​Oleg Kharkhordin —​Paschalis Kitromilides Anne Peters —​Christopher Smith —​Balázs Trencsényi Martin van Gelderen —​Richard Whatmore

volume 5

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/​hepct

The Diplomatic Enlightenment Spain, Europe, and the Age of Speculation By

Edward Jones Corredera

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustration: Andrés de la Calleja, José de Carvajal y Lancaster, Museo de la Real Academia de San Fernando (1754). Number 0722. Reproduced with the permission of the Royal Academy of San Fernando. The Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data is available online at http://​catalog.loc.gov lc record available at http://​lccn.loc.gov/​2021026877

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/​brill-​typeface. issn 2589-​5 966 isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​4 6906-​8 (hardback) isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​4 6909-​9 (e-​book) Copyright 2021 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau Verlag and V&R Unipress. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Requests for re-​use and/​or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill nv via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-​free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

As long as the nineteenth-​century nation-​state appeared to be the logical culmination of centuries of European political development, all attempts to create supra-​national political organizations were liable to be consigned by historians to the rubbish-​heap of the past. But a new age brings new perspectives; and a century that has seen the leviathan of the nineteenth-​century nation-state weakened from within by local and regional loyalties and from without by the rise of international organisations may well judge more sympathetically than its nineteenth-​century predecessor the attempts of earlier generations to establish supra-​national political structures. john elliott, The Count-​Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline

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Contents  Preface xi  Acknowledgements xvii The Missing Century 1  The Enlightenment, the Nation, and Modern Spain 1 1  Introduction 1 2  The Nineteenth-​Century Spanish Enlightenment 6 3  The Twentieth-​Century View of the Absence of the Spanish Enlightenment 18 4  Religion and the Spanish Political Elites 24 5  The Diplomatic Enlightenment 28 Predicting War and Peace 50 2  1  Introduction 50 2  Spain, Europe, and Arbitrary Monarchy 50 3  Crisis and Catharsis: The Dawn of the Early Spanish Enlightenment 60 4  What News Do You Bring? 68 5  Information Overload and Elite Political Debate 77 Investing in the Luces 82 3  1  Introduction 82 2  Shorting Diplomacy 83 3  Representations of the Spanish Empire 92 4  The Assembly of Public Trust 100 5  Luces in the Mines 109 6  The Seminary of Lawsuits: Law, Trade, and Corporations 115 7  José Carvajal y Lancaster and the Arbitration of Europe 124 8  Private Vices, Public Virtues, and Diplomatic Cooperation 129 9  Coins, Corporations, China, and Europe 133 10  The Naval Officer and the Aristocrat 137 Revolts and Returns 4  Free Trade and the Fear of Revolution 140 1  Introduction 140 2  Investing in a New Timepiece 141 3  Mapping Reform in Enlightenment Europe 144

viii Contents 4  Free Trade: The Farce of Independence and the Growth of Spanish Political Economic Debate 152 5  The Perils of Emulation: Corporations and the Meaning of the Spanish Empire 160 6  The Criticism of Carvajal’s Companies 169 The Lever of the Balance of Power 175 5  1  Introduction 175 2  Iberia’s Role in Europe 176 3  Borders and Trade 179 4  Investing in Peace 186 5  A Monarchy without a King 194 Carthage’s Contractors 6  The Ends of the Spanish Empire 203 1  Introduction 203 2  The Grain Monopoly and the Voice of the People 204 3  The Idea of the Nation: Outsourcing Propaganda and Colonisation 214 4  Constitutionalism in the Spanish Empire and the International Order 231 Conclusion 243 7   Bibliography 249  Index 317

­f igure 1  Corrado Giaquinto, Alegoría de la Paz y la Justicia (1754), Real Academia de San Fernando, Madrid, Spain reproduced with the permission of the royal academy of san fernando

Preface José de Carvajal y Lancaster refused to surrender the canvas to its painter. When the Italian artist Corrado Giaquinto asked Carvajal, then a leading Spanish minister and the director of both the Royal Academy of Spain and the Royal Academy of San Fernando, to return one of his paintings in order to improve it, the minister denied his request. At times inflexible and blunt, Carvajal explained that ‘he enjoyed the company of the virtues’ represented in Giaquinto’s work of art, An Allegory of Peace and Justice.1 This insight, according to two members of the Royal Academy of Spain who had been asked to review a eulogy to Carvajal, was completely inappropriate for such an important text and should not have been included. In their reviews of the eulogy, Agustín de Montiano y Luyando, official, author, and founder of the Royal Academy of History, and the fellow academic and poet Juan de Iriarte, who had studied with Voltaire at the Lycée Louis-​le-​Grand in Paris, both felt that the ‘spurious’ and ‘unserious’ anecdote was unsuitable for such a solemn piece.2 The author of the eulogy, however, the scholar and diplomat Alonso Ignacio de Verdugo, Count of Torrepalma, believed that the story captured Carvajal’s persistent and obstinate character, and ‘his lifelong ambition to deliver peace and justice’.3 In the eyes of the reviewers, it was not just this sketch that was problematic: Montiano y Luyando and Iriarte disagreed with the focus and the tone of most of the political history in the eulogy. The history of the eighteenth century, Torrepalma had claimed, would reveal whether the Spaniard’s ‘manoeuvres to achieve peace’ had successfully ‘calmed Europe’s unease’.4 In 1746, continued the author, ‘Europe’ was in a state of crisis: ‘nobody could govern over all, nobody could reap sufficient benefits from peace to go to war, nobody could initiate or end a conflict, and all courts exhibited the effects of uncertainty, poverty, and regret’.5 Faced with this situation, Carvajal had ‘moderated 1 Conde de Torrepalma, Sermón y elogio histórico de José de Carvajal y Lancaster, Archivo de la Real Academia Española, 290-​4-​1, 32. I am grateful to Covadonga de Quintana for her assistance during my visit to the archive. 2 Censura de Agustín Montiano y Luyando del elogio de José de Carvajal y Lancaster, compuesto por el Conde de Torrepalma. Archivo de la Real Academia Española. 290-​4-​3, 7; Reparos de Juan de Iriarte sobre el elogio de José de Carvajal y Lancaster. Archivo de la Real Academia Española. 290-​4-​4, 19. 3 Torrepalma, Sermón, 32. His full name was Alonso Ignacio de Verdugo de Castilla Ursúa y Lasso de Castilla. All translations are my own unless otherwise stated. 4 Torrepalma, Sermón, 34. 5 Torrepalma, Sermón, 35.

xii Preface the pretensions of the Spanish Crown’ and, ‘through diligent negotiation’, Ferdinand vi and his ministers had convinced other princes to ‘compromise’ in their ambitions.6 As a consequence of their actions, Europe could ‘rest in the system of peace’ which the Spanish minister had devised.7 And, indeed, in 1752, two years before his death, Carvajal repeatedly declared that he had achieved ‘that which the abbé Saint-​Pierre thought but a dream’: perpetual peace.8 A year later, Carvajal would build on these ideas and propose the creation of a British-​Spanish trading company to rule the world, promote peace, and establish a viable balance of European power. And yet, in his report on the eulogy, Montiano bluntly corrected Torrepalma’s account of Carvajal’s pursuits to vindicate the significance of the Spanish Monarchy: it was the advent of the new Bourbon King, Ferdinand vi, rather than the rise of Carvajal, that had put Europe at ease.9 Iriarte, in turn, complained that Torrepalma’s praise of Carvajal was ‘hyperbolic’ and overly poetic.10 The language found in the section on Carvajal’s death was, Iriarte explained, the type of rhetoric ‘one would expect when lamenting the death of a King’, or, more specifically, to mourn ‘the death of the single heir to the crown’.11 It was thus the type of language used to denote a crisis of power that characterised wars of succession. It was not, however, adequate to reflect the impact of the death of a minister. According to Torrepalma, upon ‘closing the doors to the Temple of Janus’, Carvajal had turned his attention to the ‘ancient ruins of the Kingdom’s economy’ to ‘radically’ restore commerce and augment the population.12 Like chemical cloths that failed to burn under intense fire, continued Torrepalma, the memory of Carvajal’s industrial reforms and foreign policy remained alive in the mind of Ferdinand vi.13 In a letter to his friend, the Duke of Huéscar, Carvajal had explained that to impress the need for his industrial and political reforms on the King he had to ensure the British would ‘work with us, while the

6 7 8 9

Torrepalma, Sermón, 35. Torrepalma, Sermón, 36. Carvajal to Azlor, 14 March 1752, Archivo Histórico Nacional. Estado. 3409. Censura de Agustín Montiano y Luyando, 9. On Montiano’s role as the head of the Academy see Richard Kagan, Clio and the Crown: The Politics of History in Medieval and Early Modern Spain (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 251–​289. 10 Reparos de Juan de Iriarte, 10. 11 Reparos de Juan de Iriarte, 11. 12 Torrepalma, Sermón, 28. Iriarte asked Torrepalma to remove most of the adjectives the author had used and, in particular, the unnecessary reference to the Temple of Janus. Reparos de Juan de Iriarte, 6. 13 Torrepalma, Sermón, 29.

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iron is still hot and our reforms shine brighter’.14 Torrepalma felt that Carvajal had succeeded in this task. The Spanish minister had been able to reconcile foreign and domestic reform while managing the affairs of the Academy; he would frequently, explained Torrepalma, ‘leave his pressing political matters to the side to debate with fellow members of the Royal Academy of Spain the etymology of a name or the anomaly of a verb’.15 Montiano, who had worked with Carvajal, stated that this was not meant to be a traditional eulogy: ‘were this text not to circulate around Europe its lack of focus would not matter’.16 This was why, he explained, he disliked much of the poetic tone of the piece and wished to ensure that its historical account was beyond reproach.17 The question of the nature and scope of the eulogy reflected the rich political culture that Carvajal had fostered at the Academy. Torrepalma explained that the eulogy would not be enough to immortalise the memory of Carvajal’s achievements, and that he trusted that history would perpetuate his figure.18 Iriarte asked Torrepalma to clarify this point: ‘histories and eulogies’ were both open to ‘error, misrepresentation, and neglect’.19 The querelle between ancients and moderns manifested itself when Iriarte further informed his colleague that to compare the situation of Europe with the ninth year of the Trojan War seemed ‘out of proportion’ and too ‘distant a simile or example which is suddenly brought to bear on such Modern times’.20 Other members of the academy heard about the dispute over the eulogy. José de Rada y Aguirre wrote to the Academy’s Secretary, Francisco Antonio de Angulo Puente, to explain that he wished to write an alternative eulogy that would replace Torrepalma’s account.21 Angulo Puente replied that he could issue his objections, which would receive the due consideration. However, he argued, it was simply inadmissible to try to supress the release of texts written by a fellow member of the academy.22 Torrepalma, who had been a member

14 Carvajal to Huéscar, 8 June 1748, Dider Ozanam, La diplomacia de Fernando VI. Correspondencia reservada entre D. José de Carvajal y el Duque de Huéscar, 1746–​1749 (Madrid: csic, 1975), 333. 15 Torrepalma, Sermón, 30. 16 Censura de Agustín Montiano y Luyando, 10. 17 Censura de Agustín Montiano y Luyando, 10. 18 Torrepalma, Sermón, 1–​4. 19 Reparos de Juan de Iriarte, 5. 20 Reparos de Juan de Iriarte, 9. 21 Carta de José de Rada a Francisco Antonio Angulo, Archivo de la Real Academia Española. 290-​4-​5, 1. 22 Minuta de la carta a José de Rada. Archivo de la Real Academia Española. 290-​4-​6, 2–​3.

xiv Preface of the Academia de Buen Gusto which was attended by Carvajal, was finally able to deliver his eulogy of the late minister before the other members of the academy. The original text was largely unchanged. In spite of all their criticisms, there was one aspect of Torrepalma’s text that Montiano and Iriarte did not refute. Like many contemporaries, Carvajal’s eulogist emphasised that the most surprising aspect of his reforms was the speed of industrial change: during Carvajal’s relatively short tenure in power, workhouses were built, roads were paved, and trade expanded. ‘The Commercial Companies of Seville, Granada, Toledo, Aragón, Valencia, and Extremadura were created with a prodigious promptitude’; wool, silk, linen, and glass ‘factories began to spread their goods not just within the kingdom, but beyond’; and ‘fumes’ were established in the Jarama river ‘to improve its irrigation’.23 Corporations would provide the basis for internal and foreign reform. In Carvajal’s view, the European status quo could be understood as a game of Reversis, a card game which involved a system of complex side transactions and pools, between Spain, Britain, France, and the Netherlands, whereby Spain had lost all of its cards by giving them away and allowing others to take them.24 Carvajal’s metaphor was realistic: his goal was not to win the game, but merely to restart it anew; to speculate and thus compete once again.25 To do so, Spain had to bet and invest in local and transnational corporate structures; traditional diplomatic efforts had failed, and new mechanisms had to be found to reframe the worth of the empire in Europe, renegotiate its standing and, Carvajal hoped, turn Spain into an arbiter of the balance of power. Corporations could host and regulate these negotiations. And the arbitration of Europe would be a shared enterprise, as it would rely on the cooperation with Britain through the establishment of a British-​Spanish trading company. Carvajal therefore pursued the creation of a transnational system of governance that would secure peace and encourage fairer and greater European collaboration. But Carvajal’s belief in corporations was divisive. In the most sophisticated reflection on his reforms, the ambassador to Portugal, Félix Fernando Masones de Lima y Sotomayor, Duke of Sotomayor, citing Samuel Pufendorf 23 Torrepalma, Sermón, 20–​21. 24 Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, in José de Carvajal y Lancaster, Testamento Político: reducido a una idea de un gobierno católico, político, militar y económico, como conviene para la resurrección y conservación de España por Don Josef de Carbajal y Lancaster, Biblioteca Nacional de España (bne), mss/​10446, 138–​168, 142. On Reversis see David Parlett, A History of Card Games (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 299–​303. 25 On discussions of the balance of power, games, and natural law in the works of Jean Barbeyrac, Emmer de Vattel, and Isaac del Pinto, see chapter four. The parallels with Pinto’s comments are worth noting: ‘Commerce is a game, and with beggars it is

Preface

xv

and Hugo Grotius, criticised the social and cultural impact of industrial change, and the type of changes that the joint-​stock companies that had catalysed these reforms had exerted on towns and villages throughout Spain. Sotomayor, moreover, discouraged the fulfilment of Carvajal’s greatest ambition: the creation of trading companies that would allow him to control the inter-​imperial and trans-​imperial politics of the Spanish Empire. As Carvajal gazed at Ciaquinto’s painting, he may well have reflected on Sotomayor’s cautionary words. The Enlightenment, justice, and the law of nations, Sotomayor had warned, amounted to more than quick industrial change. Carvajal was no doubt aware of this. He understood the value of culture and history, and he remained attentive to the affairs of the Royal Academy of San Fernando, which welcomed female artists from the outset.26 According to Sotomayor, the establishment of corporations and economic growth were not enough. A profound change was needed in Spain. This was, much like the debate over Carvajal’s eulogy, a discussion over the meaning of reform, and a consideration that required a profound understanding of international diplomacy. Contesting Grotius’s views, Sotomayor argued that it was the job of the Monarch to establish a fair price for all goods; ‘iusta de causa et pretio constituto’.27 Free trade followed the principles of the law of nations, and it was not to be an extension of piracy, but a form of global trade governed by natural law.28 In his writings, Sotomayor declared that many had remarked upon the paradox that if Spain were to ensure that the circulation of all gold and silver remained within the confines of its empire, European states would recover better systems of government. ‘Prior to the discovery of the Americas, nations had the same power as they do in our time’, he declared, but their focus was on the riches that corresponded to ‘reality’, to everyday utility and necessities; gold and silver had replaced these with ‘riches of representations’ and ‘signs’ which had

impossible to win. If we were to win constantly […] we must agree to return the chief part of our winnings, in order to begin the game again’. Isaac del Pinto, An Essay on Circulation and Credit: In Four Parts: and a Letter on the Jealousy of Commerce. Translated by Philip Francis (London: J. Ridley, 1774), 191. 26 Theresa Ann Smith, The Emerging Female Citizen: Gender and Enlightenment in Spain (Berkeley CA: California University Press, 2006), 51–​56. The Academy trained Jerónimo Antonio Gil who would, in turn, establish the first Royal Academy of arts in the Americas. See Kelly Donahue-​Wallace, Jerónimo Antonio Gil and the Idea of the Spanish Enlightenment (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2017). 27 Félix Fernando Masones de Lima y Sotomayor, Duke of Sotomayor, Observaciones y discurso sobre compañías (Madrid, 1749) Biblioteca del Palacio Real. ii/​1455, 156. 28 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 179.

xvi Preface come to ‘represent the consent of mankind’. Those who enjoyed ‘the real’ riches of life would live ‘happily’ without those that were merely symbols of comfort. Spain, for Sotomayor, had to foster industry, education, the arts, and trade by using history as its guide.29 In 1749, establishing Spanish trading companies to manage the empire’s trade, he argued, would be the wrong move. Spain, instead, needed to rethink its approach to the Enlightenment. 29 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 173–​174.

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Acknowledgements This book has benefitted from feedback and suggestions from Harald Braun, Melissa Calaresu, John Elliott, Francesca Iurlaro, Jenny Mander, William O’Reilly, John Robertson, Josh Smeltzer, Mark Somos, Keith Tribe, and two generous external reviewers. The ideas and main themes found therein have profited from conversations with Cátia Antunes, Sean Franzel, Michael Freeden, David Jiménez Torres, Alejandra Irigoin, Xabier Lamikiz, John McTague, Christopher Brooke, Margrit Pernau, Eva Velasco Moreno, Mónica Bolufer Peruga, László Kontler, Niklas Olsen, Koen Stapelbroek, Harmut Rosa, and Willibald Steinmetz. I am grateful to every single one of these scholars for their avuncular attitude towards me, and for their contributions to my own research. My time at the Residencia de Estudiantes allowed me to debate these ideas with outstanding young scholars and writers like Raquel López Fernández, Miguel Alirangues, and Andrea Chapela. Thanks to Juan Gómez, my time as a Fellow at the Huntington Library was a memorable one. I am therefore grateful to Trinity Hall, the Spanish Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sport, the Residencia de Estudiantes, the Huntington Library, the daad-​Cambridge Hub, the History Faculty at the University of Cambridge, and the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) for making it possible for me to conduct archival research in Spain, Portugal, Britain, and the United States, and to present at conferences in Sweden, Germany, and elsewhere. The book is based on research carried out at the Biblioteca Nacional de España, the Archivo General de Simancas, the Archivo General de Indias, the Archivo de la Real Academia Española, the Biblioteca de la Real Academia de Historia, the Archivo del Museo Naval, the Archivo del Museo Nacional de Ciencias Naturales, the Archivo de la Casa de Alba, the Biblioteca and the Archivo del Palacio Real, the Archivo de la Chancillería de Valladolid, the Archivo Campomanes, the Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, the British Library, the National Archives, and the Huntington Library. I am grateful to all the staff who made this work possible. I would also like to thank Alessandra Giliberto and Ester Lels for their attentive and efficient approach towards the production of this book. Over the years, I have benefitted from the curiosity and the patience of many close friends who have challenged me to be the best version of myself. This book would not have been possible without them. Finally, I would like to dedicate this book to my grandparents and my parents. Their creativity and their kindness continue to inspire me. Gracias por todo.

­c hapter 1

The Missing Century

The Enlightenment, the Nation, and Modern Spain

1

Introduction

What did peace mean to those who lived in an empire that was perpetually at war? The Spanish historian Javier Fernández Sebastián once declared that ‘during a great part of the last two centuries, the rejection, the negligence, or the forgetfulness of the great values associated with the eighteenth century have marked Spain’s chaotic life’.1 One may suggest that, during that time, the negligence and the forgetfulness of the eighteenth-​century pursuit of peace, an important theme of the Enlightenment, have marked the study of Spanish history. Today, the association between the failures of modern Spain and the Enlightenment continues to shape studies of the early modern Spanish Empire. The foundations of global histories of Spain have been built on past assumptions that often emerged from political debates rather than historical research. The Atlantic turn interrogated the geographical scope of the values and praxis of the eighteenth century, and broadened our understanding of the composite nature of Spain. Scholars investigated the limits of desk-​bound visions of freedom by studying the reach of institutions that perpetuated slavery;2 they problematised the dichotomy of centre and periphery by exploring the meaning of the law;3 they suggested that, beyond the humanist Antonio Nebrija’s dictum that language always followed imperial pursuits, science was the 1 Javier Fernández Sebastián, “Du mépris à la louange. Image, présence et mise en valeur du Siècle des lumières dans l’Espagne contemporaine”, in Giuseppe Ricuperati ed., Historiographie et usages des Lumières (Berlin: Verlag‐European Science Foundation, 2002), 133‐158, 133. 2 David Brading, The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriotism and the Liberal State 1492–​1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, c. 1500-​c.1800 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995). 3 Tamar Herzog, Defining Nations: Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003); Tamar Herzog, Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); Bianca Premo, The Enlightenment on Trial: Ordinary Litigants and Colonialism in the Spanish Empire (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017); Lauren A. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-​1900

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004469099_002

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Chapter 1

handmaiden of the early modern Spanish Empire.4 However, within this new wave of scholarship, older historiographical arguments about Spain’s relationship with Europe, and, in particular, the study of Spain’s engagement with the European Enlightenment that debated those ‘great values’, remained largely unchallenged. This historiographical tradition began in the early nineteenth century and saw in Spain’s approach to those values the seeds of the failed process of modernisation in the Iberian Peninsula.5 Early nineteenth-​century Spanish intellectuals in exile; mid-​nineteenth-​century reformers known as ‘Krausistas’; the influential philosophers of the so-​called Generation of 1898; mid-​twentieth-​century Hispanists, all associated education, culture, and erudition with the process of learning about those ideas and practices that were found in historicised visions of the French Enlightenment, in the works of thinkers like Edmund Burke and Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès;6 interpretations which turned on the defence of reason and the overthrow of the monarchy, and which, in their view, precipitated the French Revolution and the creation of the modern state.7 But Spanish intellectuals had a problem: Spain’s history did not follow this script. In fact, it upended this story. For nineteenth-​century peninsular Spaniards who learned about foreign teleological histories, the Spanish Revolution predated the Spanish Enlightenment: the nation, the state, the (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-​1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 4 Jorge Cañizares-​Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies, and Identities in the Eighteenth-​Century Atlantic World (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); Daniela Bleichmar, Visible Empire: Botanical Expeditions and Visual Culture in the Hispanic Enlightenment (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2012). 5 The economic historian David Ringrose explored the origins of these views of Spain’s economic development. See David Ringrose, Spain, Europe, and the “Spanish Miracle”, 1700–​1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3–​29. 6 Keith Michael Baker, “Political Languages of the French Revolution”, in Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler eds., The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-​Century Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 626–​659; Richard Whatmore, “Liberty, War and Empire”, in Béla Kapossy, Isaac Nakhimovsky, and Richard Whatmore eds., Commerce and Peace in the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 216–​43; François Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Bailey Stone, Reinterpreting the French Revolution: A Global-​Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Anna Plassart, The Scottish Enlightenment and the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 7 Jean-​René Aymes ed., España y la revolución francesa (Barcelona: Crítica, 1989); Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 203–​223; David Armitage, Civil Wars: A History in Ideas (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), 121–​160.

The Missing Century

3

patria had emerged without its own Lumières to transform the Peninsular War into ‘our revolution’, the ‘Spanish Revolution’, or ‘the glorious Spanish revolution’.8 What this imagined nation within an empire was missing, then, was culture, education, and industry. Instead, the term ‘revolution’ came to be used, both in Spain and in Europe, to describe Spain’s constant turmoil; the historian Antonio Ferrer del Río explained that a revolution took place in Spain every fifteen minutes, and Karl Marx claimed the revolution had taken on the appearance of a permanent condition.9 Drawing on the American and French Revolutions, nineteenth-​century Spanish thinkers and ministers, then, deployed eighteenth-​century political ideas, processes, and institutions, which had become part of the banners of liberalism and conservatism, to shape the course of this revolution: to give Spain an Enlightenment.10 The nineteenth century, claimed Modesto Lafuente y Zammaolla, the most important Spanish historian of the period, was the ‘offspring and heir’ of the ‘philosophical century’, and having witnessed how the century of political philosophy carried within it ‘the seeds of the ages of brute force’, the task of the century was to study ‘the fundamental principles behind the government of mankind’.11 But in the eighteenth century, ‘as Spanish culture decayed, philosophy flourished

8

9

10

11

José Álvarez Junco, ‘La invención de la Guerra de la Independencia’, Studia Historica. Historia Contemporánea 12 (1994), 75–​99, 81; Isabel Burdiel & María Cruz Romeo, ‘Old and New Liberalism: The Making of the Liberal Revolution, 1808–​1844’, Bulletin of Hispanic Studies 75:5 (1998), 65–​80; José Clemente Carnicero, Historia razonada de los principales sucesos de la gloriosa revolución de España, (Madrid: Imprenta de la Compañía, 1815). On the use of these concepts to compensate for the gradual loss of empire, see Alda Blanco, “España en la encruzijada: ¿nostalgia imperial o colonialism moderno?”, in Alda Blanco and Guy Thompson eds., Visiones del liberalismo: política, identidad y cultura en la España del siglo XIX (Valencia: Universidad de Valencia, 2008), 219–​230; Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón, ‘Los Mitos Fundacionales y El Tiempo De La Unidad Imaginada Del Nacionalismo Español’, Historia Social 40 (2001), 7–​27; José Álvarez-​Junco, Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 110–​111. Antonio Ferrer del Río, “El diputado a Cortes”, in Los españoles pintados por sí mismos (Madrid: Gaspar y Roig Editores, 1851), 360–​365, 361; Karl Marx, “Revolutionary Spain”, New York Daily Tribune, September 9 1854. José María Portillo Valdés, Revolución de nación: orígenes de la cultura constitucional en España, 1780-​1812 (Madrid: Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2000); Isabel Burdiel, “The liberal revolution, 1808-​1843”, in José Álvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert eds., Spanish history since 1808 (London: Arnold, 2000), 18–​32. Links between Spanish views on modernity, Reinhart Koselleck’s pathogenesis, and the broader German Sonderweg, remain to be explored. Modesto Lafuente, Historia General de España. Volume 1 (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico de Mellado, 1850), i-​ii. On Lafuente, see Juan Sisinio Pérez Garzón, “Modesto Lafuente, artífice de la historia de España”, in Historia general de España desde los tiempos más remotos hasta nuestros días (Pamplona: Urgoiti Editores, 2002), v-​xcvii.

4

Chapter 1

throughout the rest of Europe’ so that ‘our country followed, as in the march of politics, the inverse movement to that of other nations’. It was only ‘in the present century when zealous and enlightened Spanish thinkers’ had sought to reverse this trend, to synchronise Spain’s history with that of Europe, and to craft histories of their ‘patria’.12 While influenced by these views on early modern Spain, twentieth-​century historiographical works contributed a more nuanced interpretation of eighteenth-​century Spain’s history by shedding light on imperial reforms. But most agreed that the Spanish Enlightenment was a late and inefficient phenomenon, a short preface to nineteenth-​century Spanish liberalism, and an intellectual movement that was more radical in the periphery than it was at the centre. Atlantic history favoured archival research, expanded the breadth and depth of the discussion on the political culture of the early modern Spanish Empire, but accepted many of the assumptions about the nature and scope of the Enlightenment in Spain. Over the last two decades, however, historians have challenged long-​ held historiographical assumptions about the origins, the periodisation, and the agents of the Spanish Enlightenment. This chapter explores the political roots of these assumptions and the ways they were mobilised by intellectuals, politicians, and historians, and frames the book’s main arguments in the context of these historiographical interpretations. The progressive belief of nineteenth and twentieth-​ century Spanish intellectuals that the creation of a modern nation would lead to fundamental change enabled the crystallisation of a form of methodological nationalism that continues to shape the study of Spanish history. The failure to craft a modern nation was, in this view, the crux of Spanish history, and the establishment of the state was its telos. These interpretations of history reinforced the view that during the eighteenth century, when modern nation states had emerged throughout Europe, Spain had lost its north as it had continued to fight to rule the seas, only to find itself moored in a distant past. This logic has prompted modern scholars to suggest that the Enlightenment did not reach the shores of Spain and to argue that ‘one of the most extraordinary aspects of Spain’s sixteenth century is that many Spaniards are still living in it. In a sense, they have never left it’.13 This book is a plea to reconsider, in light of

12 13

Modesto Lafuente, Historia General de España. Volume 1, xiii-​xiv. Henry Kamen, Imagining Spain: Historical Myth and National Identity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), ix. Echoing Henry Charles Lea’s comment, made in 1898, that ‘in many respects the Spaniard is still living in the sixteenth century’. See Henry Charles Lea, The Decadence of Spain, The Atlantic, July 1898. And it continues to shape overarching narratives such as Antonio Feros, Speaking of Spain: The Evolution of Race and Nation in the Hispanic World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017).

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archival research, the history of eighteenth-​century Spain, and the origins, the networks, and the goals, of the Enlightenment in the Spanish Empire.14 It is an appeal to challenge the legacies of methodological nationalism by drawing on new insights on the nature of the Enlightenment which challenge organicist interpretations of the modern state. The recognition of modern constitutional sovereignty was, after all, an international process bolstered by transnational debates and mediated through diplomacy.15 In the case of the newly independent nations of South America, the recognition of their national constitutional sovereignty turned, inter alia, on the diplomatic management of foreign financial interests.16 Drawing on manuscripts, pamphlets, diplomatic debates, and political economic reports, and building on scholarship that frames the eighteenth century within broader early modern changes and continuities, this book recovers Spain’s engagement with European debates about the balance of power and the Utrecht Enlightenment.17 By situating and analysing the neglected political culture of early eighteenth-​century Spanish politics in the context of eighteenth-​ century European political thought, this book argues that, following the War of 14

In order to build on the growing anthropological and historical insights generated by the postcolonial turn. See Jorge Cañizares-​Esguerra ed., Entangled Empires: The Anglo-​Iberian Atlantic, 1500–​1830 (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 1–​17. 15 As Spain would be painfully made aware of at the Congress of Vienna. David Armitage, ‘The Declaration of Independence and International Law’, William and Mary Quarterly, 3:54 (2002), 39–​64; David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Janet Polasky, Revolutions without Borders: The Call to Liberty in the Atlantic World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), 273–​275; Glenda Sluga, ‘ “Who Hold the Balance of the World?” Bankers at the Congress of Vienna, and in International History’, American Historical Review 122:5 (2017), 1403–​1430, 1420; Julia Gaffield, ‘The Racialization of International Law after the Haitian Revolution: The Holy See and National Sovereignty’, American Historical Review 125:3 (2020), 841–​868. On war and constitutionalism see Linda Colley, The Gun, the Ship and the Pen: Warfare, Constitutions and the Making of the Modern World (London: Profile Books, 2021). 16 Frank Griffith Dawson, The First Latin American Debt Crisis: The City of London and the 1822–​1825 Loan Bubble (New York: Yale University Press, 1990), 92–​108. 17 J.G.A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion. Volume 1: The Enlightenments of Edward Gibbon 1737–​1764 (Cambridge, 1999), 109–​114; David Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 166–​167; Richard Devetak, ‘Historiographical Foundations of Modern International Thought: Histories of the European States-​System from Florence to Göttingen’, History of European Ideas 41:1 (2015), 62–​77. For a valuable study of the historiography of the term see Isaac Nakhimovsky, “Envisioning Europe after Utrecht: Voltaire and the Historiography of the Balance of Power”, in Alfred H.A. Soons ed., The 1713 Peace of Utrecht and its Enduring Effects (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 45–​66.

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Spanish Succession, Spanish officials debated the merits of corporate, cultural, political reform in the hope of revitalising the empire’s standing in Europe. Faced with their diplomatic failure to obtain favourable terms at the Treaty of Utrecht, Spanish officials reinvented those spaces of arcana imperii that had once allowed Spanish diplomacy to control its European empire by drawing on corporate structures and betting on an international order based on shared economic interests. Spanish thinkers and ministers drew on the writings of Saint-​Pierre, Hugo Grotius, and Samuel Pufendorf; they corresponded with Carl Linnaeus and Lodovico Antonio Muratori; and they commented on Frederick ii’s reforms, in order to spearhead processes of transnational cooperation, expand the reach of cultural and scientific knowledge, increase the accountability of monarchs, and foreclose the possibility of war. The story of the early Spanish Enlightenment, and its influence on eighteenth-​century Spanish and European political culture, has yet to be told. 2

The Nineteenth-​Century Spanish Enlightenment

Nineteenth-​century Spaniards did not study the history of the Enlightenment in Spain. Instead, they drafted, debated, and implemented their own vision of it.18 Inspired by the script of the French Enlightenment, they fashioned a nineteenth-​century ‘Spanish Revolution’ that was predicated on two factors: the fulfilment of a teleological conception of history, and the generation of the view of the nation, and not the empire, as the catalyser of progress.19 Early nineteenth-​century Spaniards made sense of the Peninsular War and the Cádiz Constitution by construing them as a singular ‘revolution’.20 In their own view, the Spanish peninsula had gradually re-​enacted a variation of the political script of 1780s and 1790s France: The Peninsular War was both an assault on the 18

19

20

Joaquín Álvarez Barrientos ed., Se hicieron literatos para ser políticos: cultura y política en la España de Carlos IV y Fernando VII (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2004). On modernity’s temporal logic see Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3–​23. Isabel Burdiel, ‘Myths of Failure, Myths of Success: New Perspectives on Nineteenth‐ Century Spanish Liberalism’, Journal of Modern History 70:4 (1998), 892–​912; P. Ruiz, “Del Antiguo al Nuevo Régimen: carácter de la transformación”, in Antiguo Régimen y liberalismo. Homenaje a Miguel Artola (Madrid: Alianza, 1994). Volume 1, 159-​92; Irene Castells, ‘La rivoluzione liberale spagnola nel recente dibattito storiografico’, Studi Storici 1 (1995), 126–​61; J. Millán, ‘Liberale Revolution und sozialer Wandel im Spanien des 19. Jahrhunderts. Ein Literaturüberblick’, Neue Politische Literatur 40 (1995), 381–​402. Álvarez Junco, ‘La Invención de La Guerra de La Independencia’, 82–​83.

The Missing Century

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economic and political structures of the ancien régime and a rejection of a despotic, albeit foreign, ruler.21 The conflict precipitated the creation of regional councils known as juntas that undermined the authority of the monarchy, and led to the gathering of the Cortes, the Spanish equivalent of the French États généraux.22 This body provided an alternative model of sovereignty that was independent of the monarchy, and was capable of declaring war, and revolting against, Napoleon Bonaparte; capable of creating, in the process, the Spanish nation.23 This nation, however, had yet to be enlightened.24 Nineteenth-​century intellectuals therefore embraced political, economic, and cultural discourses of the eighteenth century, and referred to themselves, their works, and their cultural sphere, as ‘enlightened’.25 Through their cultural and political work, these intellectuals sought to find methods to foster a Spanish public sphere, sustain the confessional side of the Spanish state, and foreclose despotism.26 Soon, however, contemporary thinkers, and particularly the afrancesados who favoured a closer proximity to French political culture, had to rewrite the script to historicise the chaos of the unfolding Spanish

21

José Álvarez Junco, Mater Dolorosa: la idea de España en el siglo XIX (Madrid: Taurus, 2001), 129–​133; Pedro Rújula López and Jordi Canal i Morel ed., Guerra de ideas: política y cultura en la España de la Guerra de la Independencia (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2011). 22 Burdiel, ‘Myths of Failure’, 899. 23 Richard Herr, “Good, Evil, and Spain’s rising against Napoleon”, in Richard Herr and Harold T. Parker eds., Ideas in History: essays presented to Louis Gottschalk by his former students (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1965), 157–​181 24 On the growth of the public sphere in Spain see David Jiménez Torres and Leticia Villamediana González eds., The Configuration of the Spanish Public Sphere. From the Enlightenment to the Indignados (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2019). M. C. Romeo, ‘Liberalismo y Revolución en España: A propósito del Trienio Liberal’, Bulletin d’histoire contemporaine de l’Espagne 15 (1992), 71–​88. 25 Joaquín Álvarez Barrientos, “Cultura y política entre siglos”, in Joaquín Álvarez Barrientos ed., Se hicieron literatos para ser políticos, 11–​25, 15; José Checa Beltrán, El debate literario-​político en la prensa cultural española (1801–​1808) (Frankfurt am Main, Madrid: Iberoamericana Vervuert, 2016), 71–​ 110; David T. Gies, ‘Playing the Enlightenment: Eighteenth-​Century Spain on the Nineteenth-​Century Stage’, Bulletin of Spanish Studies 86:7–​8 (2009), 225–​237, 232. 26 Josep Fontana, La crisis del Antiguo Régimen (Barcelona: Crítica, 1979), 82–​96; José M. Portillo Valdés, “Entre la historia y la economía política: orígenes de la cultural del constitucionalismo”, in Carlos Antonio Garriga Acosta ed., Historia y Constitución: trayectos del constitucionalismo hispánico (Mexico D.F.: El Colegio de Mexico, 2010), 27–​57. Alberto Gil Novales, “Jovellanos en el siglo XIX: el problema de la revolución liberal”, Cuadernos de estudios del siglo XVIII 5 (1995), 101–​126; José M. Portillo Valdés, Crisis Atlántica. Autonomía e independencia en la crisis de la monarquía hispana (Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2006).

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‘revolution’.27 Following Ferdinand vii’s return in 1814, many expected him to reaffirm the Cortes of Cádiz and to lead a constitutional revolution on horseback. Instead ‘The Desired’ overturned the Cádiz Constitution and banished leading Spanish intellectuals.28 Analyses of the eighteenth century during this period therefore sought to find the roots of the contemporary political chaos. During his exile in Paris, the historian and political economist Juan Sempere y Guarinos penned his Biblioteca española económico-​política, the first major evaluation of eighteenth-​century Spanish political economy, and he argued that the same intolerant, superstitious, and despotic forces that Ferdinand vii had favoured had once stalled the success of the Enlightenment reforms.29 In the introduction to his Historia de la Revolución de España, the Spanish lawyer and political economist Álvaro Flórez Estrada argued that eighteenth-​ century Spain had ‘ruined itself through constant sacrifices in favour of France’.30 In the 1820s and 1830s, popular revolt, the dissolution of feudal structures, and the dismemberment of the Spanish Empire forced intellectuals to further refine their definitions of the Spanish nation.31 As the Spanish colonies became independent states and empires, the Peninsular War came to be referred to as ‘The War of Independence’ to recast the Spanish nation as the leader of this broader transnational process of constitutional reform –​just as the philosopher Richard Price had recast the ‘Glorious Revolution’ as the origins of the tradition that had facilitated both the American and the French revolutions.32 Spanish and Spanish American visions of independence, sovereignty, and self-​rule were thus grounded in the Enlightenment ideals of the 27 Miguel Artola, Los Afrancesados (Madrid: Alianza, 1989); Juan López Tabar, Los Famosos Traidores: Los Afrancesados Durante La Crisis Del Antiguo Régimen (1808-​1833) (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2001). 28 Miguel Artola, La España de Fernando VII (Madrid: Espasa, 1999); María del Carmen Pintos Vieites, La Política de Fernando VII Entre 1814 y 1820 (Pamplona: Studium-​Generale, 1958); Antonio Manuel Moral Roncal, El Reinado de Fernando VII En Sus Documentos (Barcelona: Ariel, 1998). 29 Juan Sempere Guarinos, Memoria sobre la importancia del estudio de la economía política, rah. 9.5208; Not numbered. Sempere was a politician, a jurist, an economist, and one of the most important thinkers of the late-​eighteenth century Spanish Enlightenment. 30 Alvaro Flórez Estrada, Introducción para la historia de la revolución de España (London: R. Juigné, 1810), 127. 31 Josep Fontana, Cambio económico y actitudes políticas en la España del siglo XIX (Barcelona: Ariel, 1975), 11–​54; Gabriel Paquette, ‘The Dissolution of the Spanish Atlantic Monarchy’, Historical Journal 51:1 (2009), 175–​212. 32 Álvarez Junco, ‘La invención de la Guerra de la Independencia’, 84; Richard Price, A Discourse on the Love of Our Country, delivered on Nov. 4, 1789, at the Meeting-​House in the Old Jewry, to the Society for Commemorating the Revolution in Britain. With an Appendix (London: T. Cadell, 1789).

The Missing Century

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American Revolutionary War and in the principles of the Cádiz Constitution.33 In 1820, the Spanish General Rafael del Riego, in charge of one of the battalions fighting for the Spanish Monarchy in the colonial struggle for independence, launched a coup d’état against Ferdinand vii and demanded the restoration of the Cádiz Constitution.34 Over three years, the Spanish government explicitly sought to avoid any parallels with the violence of Jacobitism. Instead, they bolstered what scholars have suggested was a model of national sovereignty inspired by Jean-​Jacques Rousseau’s Contrat Social, and that was meant to democratise the Spanish public sphere.35 Divisions between moderates and radicals over whether sovereignty resided with the monarch, parliament, or the people allowed Ferdinand vii to regain control of the state and reinstate a reactionary model of government that relied on revitalising the Inquisition and closing down universities.36 Historians, in turn, referred to this as a ‘thwarted revolution’, an interpretation that turned on a vision of this period as one when Spain’s attempt to formulate its own democratic and universalist American Revolution had failed.37 By the 1830s, Spain was already late to the Enlightenment and its many revolutions. When Ferdinand died, Spain faced high levels of public debt, and attempts to bridge the divide between the interests of the nobility, the monarchy, and the bourgeoisie on the one side, and the popular class on the other, were only partially successful.38 As Prime Minister, Francisco Martínez de la Rosa, with 33

34 35

36 37

38

Sociedad Española de Estudios del Siglo XVIII Congreso Internacional and Fernando Durán López eds., Hacia 1812 desde el siglo ilustrado: actas del V Congreso Internacional de la Sociedad Española de Estudios del Siglo XVIII (Madrid: Sociedad Española de Estudios del Siglo XVIII, 2013); Luis Palacios Bañuelos, Ignacio Ruiz Rodríguez, and Fernando Bermejo Batanero eds., Cádiz 1812: Origen Del Constitucionalismo Español (Madrid: Editorial Dykinson, 2013). Alberto Gil Novales, Rafael del Riego, la revolución de 1820, día a día (Madrid: Tecnos, 1975). Manuel Álvaro González Fernández, ‘El Pensamiento Político de Rafael Del Riego y Su Ruptura Con Los Moderados’, Revista Historia Autónoma 11 (2017), 77-​94, 92; Burdiel & Cruz Romeo, ‘Old and New Liberalism’, 73; Jean-​Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings. Edited by Victor Gourevitch. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). Emilio La Parra, Fernando VII (Barcelona: Tusquets, 2018), 279–​317. Josep Fontana, La crisis del Antiguo regimen 1808–​1833 (Barcelona: Crítica, 1983), 31–​ 42; Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967). For a global interpretation of the long eighteenth century as a response to the revolutions, see Jonathan Israel, The Expanding Blaze: How the American Revolution Ignited the World, 1775-​1848 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017). Leandro Prados de la Escosura, “Economic growth and backwardness, 1780–​1930”, in Álvarez Junco and Shubert eds., Spanish history since 1808, 180–​190, 181–​183.

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the publication of the Estatuto Real of 1834, sought to emulate the French Charter of 1814, and established a political model drawn from the unfolding French response to its revolution and influenced by the English bicameral parliament.39 This was a compromise solution which facilitated the integration of the wealthy middle class, and generated a democratic political space that could host and preserve the political influence of the aristocracy. However, the Estatuto failed to resolve social and ideological tensions that precipitated the first of the conflicts, known as Carlist Wars, that pitted visions of parliamentary centralised government against the desire for the return to absolutism and the restoration of provincial autochthonous laws.40 When Ferdinand vii’s daughter, Isabella ii, emerged victorious, she pursued a conciliatory political approach that shaped the political culture of the period and the study of eighteenth-​century history.41 The culture of the period can be understood as one of conflict and negotiation between those who attempted to deliver Enlightenment through revolution, and those that fostered the former without precipitating the latter.42 The pursuit of histories that would frame, and reaffirm, Isabella’s ambition to perpetuate the monarchy through careful reform within broader Spanish political traditions led to a mid-​nineteenth-​century explosion of ‘philosophical histories’ of Spain, and saw the republication of the last grand history of Spain, Juan de Mariana’s Historia de España.43 The overarching theme within many of these new histories, inspired by the philosophical histories of William Robertson and the abbé de Raynal, was the study of Spanish decline; its causes,

39 40 41

42 43

José Sánchez Jiménez, La España contemporánea (1808–​1874) (Madrid: Akal, 2004). Volume 1, 279–​288; Irene Castells and Antoni Moliner eds., Crisis del Antiguo Régimen y Revolución Liberal en España (1789–​1845) (Barcelona: Planeta, 2000), 125–​157. Alejandro Nieto, Los primeros pasos del Estado constitucional. Historia administrativa de la regencia de Cristina de Borbón (Ariel: Barcelona, 1996), 35–​40. Juan Ignacio Marcuello Benedicto, “Las reformas constitucionales en la monarquía de Isabel II y la integración del carlismo”, in Antonio Moliner Prada ed., Violencias fratricidas: carlistas y liberales en el siglo XIX: II Jornadas de Estudio del Carlismo 24 -​26 septiembre 2008 (Pamplona: Gobierno de Navarra, 2009), 259–​298; On Isabella’s reign, see Isabel Burdiel, Isabel II. Una biografía (1830–​1904) (Madrid, Taurus, 2010). Jesús Cruz, “The Moderate ascendancy, 1843–​1868”, in Álvarez Junco and Shubert eds., Spanish history since 1808, 33–​49. Elisabeth Amann, Fernando Durán López, María José González Dávila, eds., La mitificación del pasado español. reescrituras de figuras y leyendas en la literatura del siglo XIX (Frankfurt am Main: Iberoamericana Vervuert, 2018). Isabel Burdiel has referred to her strategy as ‘a monarchical illusion’. See Isabel Burdiel, “La ilusión monárquica del liberalismo isabelino: notas para un estudio”, in Blanco and Thompson eds., Visiones del liberalismo, 137–​158.

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its manifestations, and its solutions.44 In response, Isabella’s government endorsed and amplified the reception of Modesto Lafuente y Zammaolla’s Historia General de España.45 Lafuente enjoyed a long journalistic career that built on eighteenth-​century aesthetic ideals and practices: he carried out his own Grand Tour of Europe, and he drew on the work of José Francisco Isla, or Father Isla, and his satire Historia del Famoso Predicador Fray Gerundio, a work banned by the Inquisition and which mocked the unrefined demeanour of priests, to establish his satirical journal Fray Gerundio.46 Between 1850 and 1867, Lafuente published his sweeping history of Spain and, in his analysis of the eighteenth century, he sought to disassociate Napoleon’s despotic restoration of the Bourbon Regime from its past and its future. He therefore argued that the eighteenth-​century Bourbons had revitalised Spain after centuries of decadent Habsburg rule.47 When assessing the years leading up to the War of Spanish Succession, Lafuente explained that ‘never had a king or a people found themselves in such a disastrous situation, in such a miserable episode, as Charles ii and Spain did then’.48 Lafuente claimed to draw his methodology from the teleological Enlightenment philosophies of history of Jacques-​ Bénigne Lignel Bossuet, Giambattista Vico, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and argued that Charles iii issued in the ‘regeneration of Spain’. Charles’s reforms, he argued, had been based on a combination of commercial and agricultural Enlightenment ideals, and a respect for Christian values and Spanish legal traditions.49 The King ‘could have been the Louis xiv of Spain’, explained Lafuente, but his death, and the ignorance of the Spanish people, had thwarted

44 Knud Haakonssen, “The History of Eighteenth-​ Century Philosophy: History or Philosophy?”, in Knud Haakonssen ed., The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-​Century Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) Volume 1, 1-​25; López Serrano, “Modesto Lafuente”, 317-​318. 45 On the historiography of the period, see Benoît Pellistrandi, “Los borbones entre historia y opinión. Los historiadores del siglo XIX y su visión de la instauración borbónica”, in Pablo Fernández Albaladejo ed., Los Borbones. Dinastía y memoria de nación en la España del siglo XVIII (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2002), 627–​643. 46 Mónica Fuertes-​Arboix, La sátira política en la primera mitad del siglo XIX: ”Fray Gerundio” (1837–​1842) de Modesto Lafuente (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, Servicio de Publicaciones, 2014); Natalia Álvarez Méndez and José Enrique Martínez Fernández eds., El mundo del padre Isla (León: Universidad de León, 2005). 47 Francisco de Asís López Serrano, ‘Modesto Lafuente como paradigma oficial de la historiografía española del siglo XIX: una revisión bibliográfica’, Chronica Nova 28 (2001), 315–​ 336, 317. 48 Modesto Lafuente, Historia General de España. Volume 23 (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico de Mellado, 1860), 258–​259. 49 Lafuente, Historia General de España. Volume 1, 3, 7, 203.

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his ambitions.50 In the pursuit of a philosophical history that preserved political stability, Lafuente limited his study of the legal debates behind the War of Spanish Succession, and portrayed the episode as another step in the process towards the ‘progressive tendency of humanity towards its perfectibility’.51 Lafuente saw himself writing a history of Spain in the style of the eighteenth century in order to compensate for the absence of such a history; ‘in essence’, he declared, after searching for it, he had concluded that there was no ‘moral or philosophical history’ of Spain.52 Nineteenth-​century Spanish historians sought to write the philosophical histories that, in their view, their predecessors had never written, and the study of eighteenth-​century Spain was therefore framed in this broader narrative of decadence and decline. The attempt to synchronise Spanish and European histories was nonetheless a political effort to reaffirm the Bourbon Monarchy’s contributions to the Spanish nation. A second significant work that aimed to bolster Isabella’s political goals was Ferrer del Río’s Historia del Reinado de Carlos iii en España, published in 1852, a history sponsored by the Queen that was central to the establishment of the periodisation and the overarching narrative about eighteenth-​century Spain.53 Ferrer saw in the reign of Charles v the rise of the spirit of conquest, the devaluation of labour, and the origins of Spanish decadence; a thesis he would develop in his book Decadencia de España.54 Ferrer argued that early eighteenth-​century Spain would see the emergence of singular figures, such as Benito Feijoo, or Melchor Rafael de Macanaz, who defended the Enlightenment against an ill-​ defined but overwhelming opposition.55 Only when Charles iii arrived from Naples did the Enlightenment –​the promotion of arts, industry, and political improvement –​really grow into a movement of reform. The attempt to weave this narrative into a broader Bourbon tradition of progress by connecting these measures to Charles iv’s reign led, however, to a series of awkward

50 Lafuente, Historia General de España. Volume 1, 217. 51 Lafuente, Historia General de España. Volume 17 (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico de Mellado, 1856), 427–​430; Lafuente, Historia General de España. Volume 1, 3. 52 Lafuente, Historia General de España. Volume 1, ix. 53 Antonio Ferrer del Río, Historia del reinado de Carlos III en España (Madrid: Impr. Matute y Compagni, 1856) Volume 1, i. 54 Ferrer del Río, Historia del reinado de Carlos III en España, Volume 1, 31; Antonio Ferrer del Rio, Decadencia de España (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico de Mellado, 1850). On the nineteenth-​century debate over Charles v and the Comuneros, see Roberto López Vela, ‘Las Comunidades: ¿lucha por la libertad o “feudalismo concejil”? El debate sobre la “revolución” en la historiografía de la Restauración’, Investigaciones históricas: Época moderna y contemporánea 24 (2004), 105–​138. 55 Ferrer del Río, Historia del reinado de Carlos III en España, Volume 1, 179–​192.

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and disconnected conclusions: Charles iii did not imitate or emulate foreign nations, or invent anything new, but merely recovered older Spanish traditions which Ferrer failed to identify; the explosion of the French Revolution confused leading Spanish ministers, who were removed from their posts. A revolt in Aranjuez put an end to the reign of Charles iv and, as a result, France invaded Spain.56 In response, as Spain called for the ‘political regeneration of the monarchy’, José Moniño, Count of Floridablanca, the ‘eminent octogenarian’, emerged as the ‘apotheosis’ of Charles iii’s reign to lead the Junta Central against France.57 Charles iii’s government, then, was to be regarded as a triumph of royal authority through the separation of Church and State and the advancement of cultural and economic reforms.58 This interpretation, shaped by Isabella’s political aims, would provide the blueprint for subsequent nineteenth-​century studies of eighteenth-​century Spain.59 Beyond these works, the Queen’s pursuit of a social stability contributed to the growth of a leading cultural movement which came to be known as ‘Krausismo’.60 This movement sought to seize on European cultural movements to bridge ideas of progress, education, and toleration with the religious beliefs of most Spaniards. A number of Spanish intellectuals spent time at German universities, including Heidelberg, and absorbed the thought of a relatively minor philosopher, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause.61 By binding together knowledge, education, and religion Krause refashioned the thought of Immanuel Kant, the greatest representative of the late German Enlightenment, and, by importing these ideas into Spain, philosophy and history professors in different universities throughout the country articulated convoluted defences of the value of religion, moderate cultural reforms that emphasised the importance of mass

56 57 58 59

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Ferrer del Río, Historia del reinado de Carlos III en España, Volume 4, 554–​557. Ferrer del Río, Historia del reinado de Carlos III en España, Volume 4, 558. Ferrer del Río, Historia del reinado de Carlos III en España, Volume 4, 558–​559. See José Luis Gómez Urdañez, “El artificio temporal y su responsabilidad en la reconstrucción histórica: la tópica periodización del siglo XVIII español”, in Jacques Soubeyroux ed., Mouvement et discontinuité: approches méthodologiques appliquées à l’histoire et aux littératures d’Espagne et d’Amérique latine: hommage au professeur A. Gutierrez (Saint-​ Étienne: University of Saint Etienne, 1995), 235–​255, 237. The literature on the topic is vast. See Gonzalo Capellán de Miguel, La España armónica: el proyecto del krausismo español para una sociedad en conflicto (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2006); and Juan López-​Morillas, The Krausist movement and ideological change in Spain, 1854–​1874 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Carlos Stoetzer, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause and His Influence in the Hispanic World (Koln: Böhlau Verlag, 1998).

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education, and the slow gestation of popular attitudes.62 The leading ‘Krausist’ of the period, Julían Sanz del Río, envisioned the movement redressing the absence of Enlightenment philosophy in Spain: ‘In philosophical matters’, he argued, Spanish culture had ‘yielded its most mature fruits in the sixteenth century. But of essentially new philosophy, the philosophy that began with Descartes, almost nothing was known’.63 The moderate Enlightenment of the ‘Krausists’, however, faced a conservative response from those who saw in the Catholic faith the essence of the Spanish state, and who drew on parallel traditions of philosophical history.64 Building on the anti-​Enlightenment thought of Joseph Maistre, and weaponizing Edmund Burke’s constitutionalist approach, the thinker and parliamentarian Donoso Cortés wrote a number of influential texts that sought to respond to the social fragmentation brought about by the Carlist Wars by reaffirming the virtues of authoritarianism.65 Alfonso xiii and the historian and prime minister, Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, in the pursuit of stabilising Spanish politics after three civil wars and the failed revolution of 1868, would draw on late nineteenth-​century European ideas of imperialism and constitutionalism. Cánovas reappraised the history of Habsburg Spain, long seen as an age of decline.66 In Cánovas’s interpretation, eighteenth-​century Bourbon Kings had perpetuated and reinforced political mismanagement on a ‘scale of imperial dismemberment that dwarfed the collapse of the Roman Empire’.67 The most influential historian and intellectual to espouse and further this view of the eighteenth century as Spain’s age of decline was Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo.68 In his first work, La Ciencia Española, Menéndez Pelayo portrayed ‘Krausists’ as unpatriotic and suggested that they failed to appreciate Spain’s contribution to European culture.69 Menéndez Pelayo sketched a 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

On Krause and Kant see Michael Sonenscher, ‘Krausism and its legacy’, Global Intellectual History 5:1 (2019), 20–​40. López-​Morillas, The Krausist movement, 9. On parallels between the thought of the Krausistas and that of Cánovas see José María Jover, Cánovas del Castillo, entre la historia y la política (Madrid: csic, 1985), 63–​84. Zeev Sternhell, The Anti-​Enlightenment Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). José Martínez Millán, ‘La dinastía Habsburgo en la historiografía española de los siglos XIX y XX’, Libros de la Corte 7 (2013), 33–​58, 42. Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, Historia de la decadencia de España, desde el advenimiento de Felipe III al trono hasta la muerte de Carlos II (Madrid: Librería Gutenberg, 1910), 758. On Menéndez Pelayo, see Antonio Santoveña Setién, Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo: revisión crίtico-​biográfica de un pensador católico (Santander: Universidad de Cantabria, 1994). Yvan Lissorgues, “El estilo de la polémica. Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo contra Manuel de la Revilla (1876)”, in María de los Angeles Ezama Gil ed., Aún aprendo: estudios dedicados al profesor Leonardo Romero Tobar (Zaragoza: University of Zaragoza, 2012), 709–​722, 711–​724.

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vision of Spanish history that proposed that Catholicism had bolstered Spain’s global empire and contrary European ideological forces had stalled its development.70 In his guerre de plume with Emilia de Pardo Bazán,71 one of the most important Spanish intellectuals of the period, Menéndez Pelayo suggested the Enlightenment, as an ill-​defined movement, had rightly overlooked the philosophy of Benito Feijoo for his prosaic style, while Bazán described the cultural life in the eighteenth century as a ‘tired and old-​fashioned’ one which Feijoo, building on Spain’s seventeenth-​century cultural vibrancy, had sought to remedy.72 The study of the eighteenth century, therefore, was selectively used to advance broader modern narratives about identity and nationhood. In this way, philosophical history and its focus –​secular culture, philosophical debate, and shifting mentalities –​dominated the national nineteenth-​century study of the eighteenth-​century Spanish Empire, and shaped debates over its meaning for the country’s politics.73 The loss of Cuba to the U.S.A. in 1898 fundamentally reaffirmed concerns about Spanish backwardness and decadence. Bereft of an empire, the state of the largely illiterate and agrarian Spain confirmed the belief of philosophers and writers in the absence of a Spanish Enlightenment –​this was a nation in need of education. The Spanish cultural world, however, sought to reconcile the literature on the ‘Golden Age’ of the sixteenth century, the nineteenth-​ century Pan-​European popularity of Romantic visions of Spain, and the legacy of economic backwardness, in the Spanish Volksgeist.74 The diplomat and intellectual Salvador de Madariaga drew on the Romantic understandings of Spain as a land of impossible contradictions. In 1920, Madariaga stated: ‘The Spanish character abounds in conflicting tendencies’ and ‘indifference, laziness, passivity, are but various appearances of passionate life quietly flowing’.75 Both Benito Pérez Galdos, one of the most read Spanish authors of the late-​nineteenth 70 71 72 73 74 75

Antonio Santoveña Setién, ‘Menéndez Pelayo y la crisis intelectual de 1898’, Anuario Filosófico 31:60 (1998), 91–​108, 96. Bazán was one of Spain’s most prolific nineteenth-​century female authors. See Cristina Fernández Cubas, Emilia Pardo Bazán (Barcelona: Ediciones Omega, 2001). Ana Maria Freire López, “Feijoo en el siglo XIX (Concepción Arenal, Emilia Pardo Bazán y Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo)”, in José Checa Beltrán and Joaquín Álvarez eds., El siglo que llaman Ilustrado. Homenaje a Francisco Aguilar Piñal (Madrid, csic, 1996), 369–​376. The same might be said about the nineteenth-​century Central European reception of the Enlightenment. See Franz L. Fillafer, ‘Whose Enlightenment?’, Austrian History Yearbook 48 (2017), 111–​25. Oscar E. Vázquez, The End Again: Degeneration and Visual Culture in Modern Spain (State College, PA: Penn State University Press, 2017), 1. Ruth Mackay, “Lazy, Improvident People”: Myth and Reality in the Writing of Spanish History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 251.

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century, and José Ortega y Gasset, the most important philosopher of the early-​ twentieth century, saw Spain as ‘uncontaminated by Europe’.76 After the First World War, Ortega portrayed the lack of a Spanish Enlightenment –​the failure to educate the nation –​as a source of vitality, untouched by the destructive tendencies of modernity, and a reservoir of energy for a weary Europe whose ‘rationalism, democracy, mechanisation, industrialism, and capitalism’ had never surfaced in Spain, and had begun to display ‘a loss of vigour’. Spain’s decadence, described as fictional vitality, could breathe new life into ‘European civilisation’.77 When writing about the Enlightenment in Spain, Ortega was categorical: the Spanish nation had avoided the eighteenth century. Spain remained in need of enlightenment: The Enlightenment is the age of culture and the education of the masses, to wit, the educating century. When one considers our history, the devastating absence of the eighteenth-​century is clear […] this was Spain’s crucible, the avoidance by a European nation of the century which educated all. Whoever believes this can have no doubt as to what this century’s national political mission should be.78 The resemblance between the remarks of Javier Fernández Sebastián at the outset of this chapter and Ortega’s own exemplifies how, to this day, scholars of early modern Spain continue to draw on conclusions drawn from philosophical histories of the Enlightenment to reframe the judgements of leading Spanish philosophers such as Ortega or Unamuno. And yet, the Enlightenment, understood as the age of culture and the education of the masses envisioned in philosophical histories of the period, was and remains a powerful utopia for the twenty-​first century; a vision for the future rather than an assessment of the past; a thinly veiled sanitation of those processes known as modernisation.79 Today, for all its capacity to inspire, the Enlightenment remains a contested concept and an elusive byword for modernity; pluralised to include geographical variety and narrowed to shed an intense light on the radicalism of its ideas.80 The self-​perception of philosophers, scientists, and historians –​the most common and affected representatives of the movement –​towards their 76 77 78 79

Raymond Carr, Spain, 1808–​1975 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 105. José Ortega y Gasset, Obras Completas. Volume 3. (Madrid: Alianza, 1982), 123. José Ortega y Gasset, Obras Completas. Volume 2. (Madrid: Alianza, 1982), 600–​601. Dan Edelstein, The Enlightenment: A Genealogy (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2010), 17. 80 Edelstein, The Enlightenment, 27.

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age has generally been accepted at face value, and has shaped historiographical interpretations of national and regional Enlightenments. Early modern scholars, however, have begun to challenge these interpretative models of the Age of Reason.81 The sixteenth-​century explosion of print, the seventeenth-​ century expansion of archives, and that which one might term the ‘literarification’ of diplomatic circles, historians have recently suggested, contributed to the creation of a variety of public spheres.82 The public sphere in the eighteenth century, some have suggested, was ‘power-​oriented, not reason-​oriented’ and, in that context, scholars have developed a ‘new diplomatic history’ that has served to reconfigure the intellectual efforts of early modern ambassadors and administrators.83 These approaches that serve to frame the eighteenth 81

82

83

A particularly grave mistake can be found in Ulrich Lehner’s book on the Spanish Enlightenment, where the author recounts Diderot’s apocryphal view of the Inquisition’s approach to Pablo de Olavide to substantiate his entire assessment of the Spanish Enlightenment. See Ulrich Lehner, The Catholic Enlightenment: The Forgotten History of a Global Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 39. For a revision of the standard definition of eighteenth-​century reform see Susan Richter, Thomas Maissen, Manuela Albertone eds., Languages of Reform in the Eighteenth Century: When Europe Lost Its Fear of Change (London: Routledge, 2019). Robert Darnton, “The Facts of Literary Life in eighteenth-​century France”, in Keith Michael Baker ed., The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture. Volume 1. The Political Culture of the Old Regime (Oxford: Pergamon, 1987), 261–​292; Kate Peters, Alexandra Walsham, and Liesbeth Corens eds., Archives and Information in the Early Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Tony Claydon, ‘Daily News and the Construction of Time in Late Stuart England, 1695–​1714’, Journal of British Studies, 52 (2013), 55–​78; Will Slauter, ‘Le Paragraphe Mobile: Circulation Et Transformation Des Informations Dans Le Monde Atlantique Du XVIIIe Siècle’, Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 67: 2 (2012), 363–​389; Chad Wellmon, Organizing Enlightenment: Information Overload and the Invention of the Modern Research University (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkings University Press, 2015); Anne Goldgar, Impolite Learning: Conduct and Community in the Republic of Letters (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); Paul Keen, The Crisis of Literature in the 1790s: Print Culture and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Edoardo Tortarolo, “Big Theories and Humble Realities: Censorship and Public Opinion in the Eighteenth Century”, in Ellen Krefting, Aina Nøding and Mona Ringvej eds., Big Theories and Humble Realities: Censorship and Public Opinion in the Eighteenth Century (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2015), 111–​133, 116. See Giacomo Giudici. ‘From New Diplomatic History to New Political History: The Rise of the Holistic Approach’, European History Quarterly 48:2 (2018), 314–​24; T.A. Sowerby, ‘Early Modern Diplomatic History’, History Compass 14:9 (2016), 441–​456; John Watkins, ‘Toward a new diplomatic history of medieval and early modern Europe’, Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 38:1 (2008), 1–​14; Lucien Bély, “Peut-​on parler d’une culture diplomatique à l’époque moderne?”, in Nathalie Rivère de Carles ed., Forms of Diplomacy (Caliban: Presses Universitaires du Midi, 2015), 13–​34; Tabetha Leigh Ewing, Rumor, Diplomacy and War in Enlightenment Paris (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2014).

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century within broader early modern trends inform this book’s interpretation of the Spanish Enlightenment. 3

The Twentieth-​Century View of the Absence of the Spanish Enlightenment

Philosophical history continued to dominate the study of history during the early twentieth century, but Spain’s neutrality during the First World War fostered efforts to research former periods of Spanish neutrality, and a limited number of studies focused on the reign of Ferdinand vi.84 Under the dictatorship of Francisco Franco history served the purpose of the regime.85 However, a generation of politically active historians who had studied law at university began to conduct archival and empirical research on early modern Spanish history. Vicente Rodríguez Casado penned important works about eighteenth-​ century Spanish foreign policy, such as his Política marroquí de Carlos iii, which served to vindicate the regime’s presence in North Africa, and later published his study titled La política y los políticos en el reinado de Carlos iii.86 Luis Sánchez Agesta studied the different types of ideologies in eighteenth-​century Spain, and wrote an influential history about Spain’s constitutional tradition.87 Vicente Palacio Atard, Antonio Domínguez Ortíz, and Teófanes Egido López unearthed and analysed a wealth of diplomatic and cultural material, and sought to show that thinkers such as Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos had once promoted a moderate Enlightenment that furthered Catholic values leading to the monarchical and confessional Cádiz Constitution.88 Their works, however, 84

85

86 87 88

Angela García Rives, Fernando VI y Doña Bárbara de Braganza (1748–​1759): apuntes sobre su reinado (Madrid: Imprenta y Encuadernación de Julio Cosano, 1917); Manuel Mozas Mesa, Don José de Carvajal y Lancáster, ministro de Fernando VI (Apuntes de su vida y labor política) (Jaén: Tipografía del Hospicio de Hombres, 1924); Luis Olbes Fernández, La paz de Aquisgrán (Unpublished Thesis) (Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1925). Nigel Hillgarth, ‘Spanish Historiography and Iberian Reality’, History and Theory 24:1 (1985), 23–​43; Richard Herr, ‘The Twentieth Century Spaniard Views the Spanish Enlightenment’, Hispania 45: 2 (1962), 183–​193; Glicerio Sánchez Recio, ‘Dictadura franquista e historiografía del franquismo’, Bulletin d’Histoire Contemporaine de l’Espagne 52 (2017), 71–​82. Vicente Rodríguez Casado, Política marroquí de Carlos III (Madrid, Instituto Zurita, Consejo superior de investigaciones científicas, 1946); La polίtica y los polίticos en el reinado de Carlos III (Madrid, Ediciones Rialp, 1962). Luis Sánchez Agesta, El pensamiento político del despotismo ilustrado (Sevilla: Secretariado de Publicaciones de la Universidad, D.L. 1979); Historia del constitucionalismo español (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1974). See Antonio Cañellas Mas, “Vicente Rodríguez Casado: premisas intelectuales para un proyecto cultural”, in Joseba Louzao Villar and Feliciano Montero García eds., La

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failed to fundamentally challenge the underlying assumptions embedded in nineteenth-​century philosophical histories. In the words of Miguel Artola, another leading scholar from this generation, ‘there was never a Spanish Enlightenment because Spain lacked a group of philosophers and political thinkers who were imbued with these new ideas’.89 Beyond Spain, in the nineteenth century the interpretation of the eighteenth-​ century Spanish Empire had been shaped by anglophone historians, such as William Coxe, who sought to criticise Napoleon and to trace the origins of Ferdinand vii’s despotism, and suggested the victory of the Bourbons in Spain had triggered its decline.90 The first American Hispanist, William Prescott, ignored the eighteenth century and used Spanish history to tell the Romantic and eclectic story of the constitutions of Castile and Aragon, the Moorish dynasty, and the Inquisition’s persecutions.91 In the mid-​twentieth century, two foreign historians sought to understand how the origins of Franco’s Spain could be found in the eighteenth century. Jean Sarraihl’s influential L’Espagne éclairée de la deuxième moitié du xviiie siècle, emphasised the cultural and economic reforms of a small number of reformers of the second half of the century, and found in figures such as the almanac writer Diego Torres y Villarroel, an important figure in this book, confirmation of widespread superstition in the Iberian Peninsula.92 Drawing on the works of Ortega and his contemporary Gregorio Marañón, in his conclusion Sarraihl made clear that he understood the Enlightenment as an ongoing process in Spain: ‘the day will come, we fervently hope, when its lessons will be understood’.93 The American historian Richard Herr, by contrast, found the seeds of the Spanish Enlightenment in Benito Feijoo’s mid-​eighteenth-​century writings on science and philosophy. Feijoo, according to Herr, ‘almost single-​handed kindled the flame that was to rouse Spain from the intellectual slumber into which it had fallen at the end restauración social católica en el primer franquismo 1939–​1953 (Madrid: Universidad de Alcalá, 2015), 45–​ 69; Vicente Palacio Atard, Carlos III. El rey de los ilustrados (Barcelona: Ariel, 2006); Teófanes Egido López, Opinión pública y oposición al poder en la España del siglo XVIII (1713–​1759) (Valladolid: Secretariado de Publicaciones e Intercambio Editorial, 2002). 89 Miguel Artola, Los afrancesados (Madrid: Alianza, 1989), 19. 90 William Coxe, Memoirs of the kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon: from the accession of Philip the Fifth to the death of Charles the Third, 1700 to 1788 (London: Printed for Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, 1813). 91 Richard Kagan, ‘Prescott’s Paradigm: American Historical Scholarship and the Decline of Spain’, American Historical Review 101:2 (1996), 423–​446, 429–​431. 92 Jean Sarraihl, L’Espagne éclairée de la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1964), 710, 96. 93 Sarraihl, L’Espagne éclairée, 712.

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of the seventeenth century’.94 Herr neglected to explore the political, intellectual, or economic context behind his writing, dismissing the period of Feijoo’s youth as ‘these dismal years’.95 His conclusion was that the French Revolution derailed the efforts of Charles iii and Charles iv, and their attempt to create a cultural environment that would support a scientific revolution and industrial expansion: ‘The critical turn in recent Spanish history therefore revolved around the loss of faith in enlightened despotism –​in the ideal of a disabused absolute monarch directing his people toward justice, prosperity, and happiness’.96 As a contemporary reviewer remarked, this vision of Enlightenment as a cultural phenomenon was solely ‘focused on the second half of the century. From the intellectual, political, or economic point of view the Spanish eighteenth century appears to begin with the reign of Charles iii’.97 Another historian argued that the first and the second halves of the eighteenth-​century had been combined into a ‘monolithic’ Enlightenment; that the first half of the century was seen ‘as a function’ of the final decades of the century.98 A group of French scholars sought to establish the importance of late seventeenth and early eighteenth-​century Spanish culture by drawing attention to a group of natural scientists and thinkers who they referred to as novatores. But the institutions they established did not generate enduring institutional memories, and eighteenth-​century reformers never referred to them as a collective. The work of these French historians was therefore overshadowed by the view that Charles iii’s writers and intellectuals stimulated the growth of the Spanish Enlightenment.99 This view of Spain’s relationship to Europe and the Age of

94

Richard Herr, The Eighteenth-​Century Revolution in Spain (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), 37. 95 Herr, The Eighteenth-​Century Revolution in Spain, 37. 96 Herr, The Eighteenth-​Century Revolution in Spain, 444. 97 Pierre Chaunu, ‘Notes sur L’Espagne de Philippe V (1700–​1746)’, Revue d’histoire économique et sociale 41:4 (1963), 448–​70, 451. On the origins of proyectismo and the arbitristas see Edward Jones Corredera, ‘The rediscovery of the Spanish Republic of Letters’, History of European Ideas 45:7 (2019), 953–​971 and Luis Perdices Blas, “El florecimiento de la economía aplicada en España: arbitristas y proyectistas (siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII)”, in Enrique Fuentes Quintana ed., Economía y economistas españoles (De los orígenes al mercantilismo) Volume 2 (Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, 1999), 451–​498. 98 Paul Ilie, ‘Franklin and Villarroel: Social Consciousness in Two Autobiographies’, Eighteenth-​Century Studies 7:3 (1974), 321–​42, 322–​323. 99 On the novatores, see the moving historiographical reflections of Jacques Soubeyroux, ‘François López y los estudios sobre la España del siglo XVIII’, Revista de hispanismo filosófico 16 (2011), 211–​216. The latest study of the novatores is Jesús Pérez-​Magallón, Construyendo la modernidad. La cultura española en el tiempo de los novatores (1675–​1725) (Madrid: csic, 2002).

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Reason would shape subsequent studies of the topic in the context of the Enlightenment at large.100 Following the development of a new corpus of literature on the Atlantic World, the growth of research on the Iberian Atlantic was built on the sedimentary layers of these assumptions, and decentred the focus on the Iberian Peninsula’s relationship with Europe. The works of John Elliott, Henry Kamen, and John Lynch favoured the reforms of Charles iii, deftly described by Lynch as a ‘giant among Bourbon midgets’, and continued to draw on the insights of intellectuals such as Unamuno and Ortega to determine their views of eighteenth-​century Spain at large.101 Building on these foundations, in an effort to explore the rich implications of Elliott’s view of the Spanish Empire as a ‘composite monarchy’, Gabriel Paquette, Tamar Herzog, Jorge Cañizares-​ Esguerra, and others studied the intellectual, legal, and scientific legacies of the second half of the eighteenth-​century in the Iberian Atlantic, and advanced the idea of a ‘polycentric empire’.102 Stanley J. Stein, and Barbara Stein, in their volumes on Bourbon Spain, enriched the discussion by emphasising the protracted nature of early modern economic imperial issues, and framed the contributions of early eighteenth-​century authors in this broader context.103 This wave of research precipitated a wider array of studies on the importance of local institutions throughout the Spanish Empire and the creation and exchange of knowledge throughout the empire.104 Spanish historiography, in 100 For Franco Venturi’s brief assessment of early eighteenth-​century Spain, see Franco Venturi, Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 118. 101 Quoted in Tim Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory. 1648–​1815 (London: Penguin), 255. John Elliott, Imperial Spain: 1469–​1716 (London: Penguin, 1963); Henry Kamen, Spain, 1469–​ 1714: A Society of Conflict (London: Longman, 1983); John Lynch, Bourbon Spain 1700–​1808 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989). 102 Brian Hamnett, The Enlightenment in Iberia and Ibero-​America (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2017); Herzog, Frontiers of Possession; Gabriel Paquette, Enlightened reform in southern Europe and its Atlantic colonies, c. 1750–​1830 (London: Routledge, 2016), Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its Empire 1759–​ 1808 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Cañizares-​Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World. 103 See, above all, Stanley J. Stein, and Barbara Stein, “Critical Voices, 1720–​1759”, in Apogee of Empire: Spain and New Spain in the Age of Charles III, 1759–​1789 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2003), 200–​230. Crisis in an Atlantic Empire: Spain and New Spain, 1808–​1810 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2014); Edge of Crisis: War and Trade in the Spanish Atlantic, 1789–​1808 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). 104 See Caizán Cesary 37; Arndt Brendecke, The Empirical Empire: Spanish Colonial Rule and the Politics of Knowledge (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016); Premo, The Enlightenment on Trial;

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turn, responded to the Atlantic turn, and the return of Spanish democracy, by developing in two differing ways that mirrored contemporary political debates: one drew on the mid-​twentieth-​century interest in constitutionalism and Charles iii’s government,105 while the other emphasised the importance of the regional channels of Enlightenment.106 Today, those scholars who reconcile the study of colonial independence and regional autonomy are producing rich and multi-​layered works on the intellectual debates of late eighteenth-​ century Spain, but continue to portray the Spanish Enlightenment as a process of foreign imitation.107 Many, moreover, draw on epiphenomenal definitions of the Enlightenment and ignore much of the research that has been conducted on its emergence in different parts of Europe over the last few decades.108 The study of these economic and political ideas, influenced by organicist and exceptionalist views of Spain, has rendered the study of eighteenth-​ century Spain into a mythology of doctrines, whereby historians analyse whether an author articulated a doctrine on themes regarded as constitutive of their subject, or ignore them altogether.109 Authors addressing concerns

105

106

107

108

109

Bleichmar, Visible Empire. Allan J. Kuethe and Kenneth J. Adrien, The Spanish Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century: War and the Bourbon Reforms, 1713–​1796 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1–​28. José Álvarez-​Junco, Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013); José Andrés Gallego, El Motín de Esquilache, América y Europa (Madrid: CSIC, 2003), Encarna Monerris, Cuando todo era posible. Liberalismo y antiliberalismo en España e Hispanoamérica (1780-​1842) (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2016). Virginia León Sanz, El archiduque Carlos y los austracistas: Guerra de Sucesión y exilio (Sant Cugat: Arpegio, 2014); Jesus Astigarraga Goenaga, Los ilustrados vascos: ideas, instituciones y reformas económicas en España (Barcelona: Critica, 2003); Ernest Lluch ed., Aragonesismo Austracista (1734–​1742) del conde Juan Amor de Soria (Barcelona: Institución Fernando el Católico, 2002); Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, La crisis del Antiguo Régimen en Guipúzcoa 1766-​1833: Cambio económico e historia (Madrid: Akal, 1975). On austracismo see Edward Jones Corredera, ‘The memory of the Habsburg Monarchy in early eighteenth-​century Spain’, Global Intellectual History 45:7 (2018), 953-​971, 953-​960. See the sweeping studies on concepts in the early modern Iberian Atlantic, Javier Fernandez Sebastián, Diccionario político y social del mundo iberoamericano. La era de las revoluciones, 1750–​1850, Volume 1 (Madrid: cepc, 2009); José María Portillo Valdés, Crisis atlántica: autonomía e independencia en la crisis de la Monarquía Hispana (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2006). Michael Sonenscher, Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Andre Wakefield, The Disordered Police State. German Cameralism as Science and Practice (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Fillafer, ‘Whose Enlightenment?’, 111–​25; Till Wahnbaeck, Luxury and Public Happiness: Political Economy in the Italian Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, History and Theory 8:1 (1969), 3–​53, 7.

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that were specific to the problems that Philip v or Ferdinand vi faced have been lumped together with Charles iii’s ministers, and their views have been condensed, abridged, and misrepresented as a prelude to the ambitions of the ilustrados of the second half of the century.110 The strain placed on Spaniards by the financial weight of Charles iii’s imperial pursuits, and their erosion of popular trust, has been generally overlooked.111 Discussions of a ‘Bourbon ideology’ avant la lettre treat the cultivation of Charles iii’s image as a benign and at times salutary aspect of the period, when political efforts to improve Charles’s image were in fact propaganda efforts designed to foster support for a reckless King.112 This book is as much an exercise in contextual analysis as it is an attempt to generate a context that accounts for the terminology, the historical references, and the changing political diagnoses of elite political actors.113 It therefore frames Spanish political thought and political reform within a comparative European perspective, in order to draw attention to the similarities and the differences with debates waged in Scotland, France, Central Europe, or North America. Over the last two decades new research has emerged from both sides of the Atlantic on the politics and the culture of the early eighteenth century in the Spanish Empire. Works on the military, economic, and diplomatic history of the early eighteenth century have contributed modern critical approaches 110 Jesús Astigarraga, A Unifying Enlightenment: Institutions of Political Economy in Eighteenth-​Century Spain (1700–​1808) (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 17–​22; Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform, 30–​35, 56–​92; Cañizares-​Esguerra, How to Write a History of the New World, 155–​203; Premo, The Enlightenment on Trial, 8–​10; Jeremy Adelman, Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2006), 13–​55. 111 Gabriel Paquette, “The reform of the Spanish empire in the age of Enlightenment”, in Jesús Astigarraga ed., The Spanish Enlightenment Revisited (Oxford: Oxford University Studies in the Enlightenment, 2015), 149–​167, 151; Kuethe and Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic World, 231–​270. 112 Kenneth Andrien, ‘The Noticias secretas de America and the Construction of a Governing Ideology for the Spanish American Empire’, Colonial Latin American Review 7:2 (1998), 175–​92. Other scholars have drawn attention to this issue: Alejandro Cañeque ‘The Political and Institutional History of Colonial Spanish America’, History Compass 11:4 (2013), 280–​291, 286–​287. 113 This book draws on the methodological tools fashioned by Reinhart Koselleck. I am grateful to Christopher Clark, Chris Young, and the daad-​Cambridge Hub for funding a number of workshops and conferences, which I co-​organised with Josh Smeltzer, on Koselleck’s legacy. Discussions during these workshops with Margrit Pernau, Axel Körner, Matilde Cazzola, Harmut Rosa, Tony Claydon, Helge Jordheim and others encouraged me think about time in a different way. I am also deeply grateful to Jenny Mander for her brilliant comments on politics and temporality in eighteenth-​century Europe.

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towards the period.114 Research by José Luis Gómez Urdáñez, José Delgado Barrado, Diego Téllez Alarcia, and Fernando Sánchez Blanco, historians who have often been overlooked by the Anglophone scholarship, has greatly improved our understanding of the period.115 Despite these efforts, the broader, century-​long, Pan-​European cultural, economic, and political consequences of the War of Spanish Succession remain to be studied. 4

Religion and the Spanish Political Elites

In historiographical analyses of early modern Spain, overarching readings of the influence of religion in the Iberian Peninsula have had a profound impact on studies of the emergence of the Enlightenment. Throughout the eighteenth century, the Jesuit Order and the Inquisition remained an important source of political and social control in the peninsula and the empire.116 The draconian nature of the Spanish Inquisition should not be overlooked: Judaism, Freemasonry, and a number of social practices were violently persecuted, and public exhibitions of the Institution’s power left a mark in the social life of the Spanish Empire.117 However, in the early eighteenth century, the Spanish 114 Christopher Storrs, The Spanish Resurgence, 1713-​1748 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016); Francisco A. Eissa-​Barroso and Ainara Vázquez Varela eds., Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era, 1700-​1759 (Leiden: Brill, 2013); Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, Materia de España: cultura política e identidad en la España moderna (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2007). 115 José Luis Gómez Urdáñez, El Proyecto Reformista de Ensenada (Lleida: Milenio, 1996); Juan Molina Cortón, Reformismo y neutralidad: José de Carvajal y Lancaster y la diplomacia de la España preilustrada (Mérida: Editora Regional de Extremadura, 2003); José de Carvajal y Lancaster, Un ministro para el reformismo borbónico (Cáceres: Diputación Provincial de Cáceres, Institución Cultural El Brocense, 1999); José Miguel Delgado Barrado, El proyecto político de Carvajal: pensamiento y reforma en tiempos de Fernando VI (Madrid: CSIC, 2001); José Miguel Delgado Barrado, Fomento portuario y compañías privilegiadas: los ‘Diálogos familiares’ de Marcelo Dantini (1741-​1748) (Madrid: CSIC, 1998); Diego Téllez Alarcia, Absolutismo e ilustración en la España del siglo XVIII: el despotismo ilustrado de D. Ricardo Wall (Madrid: Fundación Española de Historia Moderna, 2010). Blanco has drawn attention to the radicalism of Ensenada’s ideas. See Francisco Sánchez-​Blanco, “Introduction”, in Juan Enrique de Graef, Discursos mercuriales económico-​políticos (1752-​ 1756) (Sevilla: Fundación El Monte, 1996) 56-​61. 116 See, for example, Francisco Bethencourt, The Inquisition: A Global History, 1478-​1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Harald Braun and Jesús Pérez Magallón eds., The Transatlantic Hispanic Baroque: Complex Identities in the Atlantic World (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014). 117 François Soyer, Ambiguous Gender in Early Modern Spain and Portugal: Inquisitors, Doctors and the Transgression of Gender Norms (Leiden: Brill, 2012); François Soyer,

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Inquisition did not have a strong impact on peninsular high politics, or in the production, printing, and distribution among the elites of popular prints in the Spanish peninsula.118 The elite colleges in Castile based in the three historic universities of Salamanca, Valladolid, and Alcalá de Henares, continued to train those who went on to become elite officials and those who took up positions in the two main bodies in charge of censorship: the Inquisition and the Council of Castile.119 Positions in the Inquisition were distributed among the collegiate students and were reserved for the less skilled among them. The most talented aspired instead to the better remunerated jobs in the Council.120 As a result, throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, the most influential body of the Inquisition in Spain, based in Valladolid, suffered from an endemic shortage of officials.121 Philip v’s disagreements with Rome stalled the reform of Spanish universities.122 Conservative alumni would later complain that these elite colleges retained a great deal of independence: they encouraged sociability and they served to introduce the thought of Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf into Spain.123 Some of the most important officials and The Extradition Treaties of the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisitions (1500-​1700) (Buenos Aires: Universidad Católica de Argentina, 1992). 118 Paul Guinard, La presse espagnole de 1737 à 1791. Formation et signification d’un genre (Paris: Centre de Recherches Hispaniques, 1973), 44–​45; Teofanes Egido López, “La inquisición en la España Borbónica”, and Antonio Mestre, “Inquisición y corrientes ilustradas”, in Bartolome Escandell Bonet et al., Historia de La Inquisición En España y América. Volume 1 (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1984), 1204–​1210 and 1247–​1257. 119 Antonio Álvarez de Morales, Inquisición e Ilustración (1700–​1834) (Madrid: Fundación Universitaria Española, 1982), 79. 120 Morales, Inquisición e Ilustración, 80. 121 Ángel de Prado Moura, ‘El tribunal de la Inquisición de Valladolid y el control de las ideas en la España del siglo XVIII’, Cuadernos Dieciochistas 3 (2002), 13–​31, 16. 122 Rome retained the power to approve university reform. Morales, Inquisición e Ilustración, 128; Juan Luis Polo Rodríguez, ‘Reforma en la Universidad de Salamanca de los primeros Borbones (1700–​1759)’, Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie IV, Historia Moderna, 7 (1994), 145–​174. 123 Manuel Lanz de Casafonda, Dialogos de Chindulza (sobre el estado de la cultura española en el reinado de Fernando VI). Edited by Francisco Aguilar Piñal (Oviedo: Catedra Feijoo, 1973), 165; Antonio Álvarez de Morales, “La difusión del derecho natural y de gentes europeo en la universidad española de los siglos XVIII y XIX”, in Pedro Ruiz Torres, Mariano Peset Reig, and Salvador Albiñana, eds., Doctores y Escolares (Valencia: Universitad de Valencia, 1998), 49–​60, 52; Carmen Fernández Vasallo, ‘La indisciplina como desencadenante de la reforma de los colegios mayores salmantinos en 1771’, Historia de educación 21 (2002), 119–​132. On Charles iii’s university reforms see Perrupato Sebastian Domingo, ‘Antiguos y modernos en la universidad española de la segunda mitad de siglo XVIII. Avances de secularización en el plan de reforma universitaria elaborado por Gregorio Mayans y Siscar (1767)’, Historia y Sociedad 27 (2014), 165–​188.

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authors of Philip’s reign, including the marquess of Santa Cruz de Marcenado, Carvajal, and Torres, were educated in these colleges. In the Americas, the Inquisition’s control varied, but the elites in Peru were taught about René Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Baruch Spinoza.124 In the early eighteenth century, the Inquisition was involved in two significant political disputes in the Spanish peninsula. After designing the Nueva Planta, the legal decree that superseded ancient Aragonese and Valencian local laws, the jurist Melchor Rafael de Macanaz attempted to curtail the institution’s reach, and was banished to France, where he served first as an industrial spy, and later worked as a Spanish diplomatic envoy.125 In the 1740s, the marquess of Ensenada, then an ambitious administrator, attempted to undermine the leading Spanish minister, José Campillo, by denouncing his views to the Inquisition, but this effort failed to dent Campillo’s influence.126 It was only during the reign of Charles iii that ministers drew on the Inquisition’s censorship to ban a number of works. The Esquilache Revolt, a series of popular protests in the face of an agrarian crisis, encouraged the government to cooperate with the Inquisition and, paradoxically, led to a ban being placed on those religious works considered to be the philosophical foundations of the Jesuit Order.127 If religious institutions did not censor printed works and manuscripts, religious mentalities, scholars have suggested, influenced the ambition and scope of the Spanish Enlightenment. A number of works from a variety of approaches have undermined this approach to the study of mentalities: recent research has served to highlight how, in the Spanish Empire, Catholic beliefs and scientific reform were not only possible, but profoundly intertwined.128 Scholars of the scientific revolution, moreover, have challenged the anachronistic association drawn between natural philosophy and the rise of modern

124 John Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492–​1830 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 333. 125 Christopher Storrs, “The Fallen Politician’s Way Back In: Melchor de Macanaz as Spy and Secret Negotiator”, in Daniel Szechi ed., Dangerous Trade: Spies, Spymasters and the Making of Europe (Dundee: University of Dundee, 2010), 115–​138; 126 Diana Bianchi, ‘Inquisición e Ilustración: Un expediente reservado de José del Campillo’, Investigaciones históricas: Época moderna y contemporánea 22 (2002), 63–​82. 127 Luis Sánchez Agesta, El pensamiento político del despotismo ilustrado (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1953), 55–​77; Egido López, “La inquisición en la España Borbónica”, 1209. 128 Jorge Cañizares-​Esguerra’s views professing to use history to show ‘the centrality of the Iberian-​Latino past to the very constitution of this nation’ denote the growth of a different kind of methodological nationalism. Jorge Cañizares-​Esguerra, “Introduction”, in Cañizares-​Esguerra ed., Entangled Empires, 1–​17, 3–​4.

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democratic thought.129 Others have remarked upon the connections between both ‘Radical’ and ‘Catholic’ forms of Enlightenment and the Reformation and the Counter Reformation: earlier processes that saw print, reason, and, above all, the power of ideas, as precipitating transnational institutional and cultural reforms.130 In the Spanish historiographical context, however, the family of concepts surrounding science, secularisation, and progress were embedded within the epiphenomenal vision of the Black Legend –​that myth of Spanish backwardness and intolerance that established a historical divide between a pro-​European progressive Spain and a reactionary and traditional one.131 Recent works have failed to exorcise the effects of this paradigm on the historiography. By taking the value judgements generated by Enlightenment philosophes at face value, the periodisation of the Spanish Enlightenment is still determined by the study of the pace and the vigour of peninsular and colonial responses to foreign accusations of backwardness and cultural inferiority.132 Early eighteenth-​century Spanish political culture responded to two confessional themes. The first was the apocalyptic view of the War of Spanish Succession.133 Many, after all, feared this would be the very end of Spain. The conflict was seen as a continuation of the gradual Spanish erosion from Europe that had originated with the loss of the Netherlands, and had continued with the independence of Portugal.134 The second was Philip’s common 129 Lorraine Daston, Science in the Archives: Pasts, Presents, Futures (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2017); Lorraine Daston, ‘The history of science and the history of knowledge’, KNOW: A Journal on the Formation of Knowledge, 1:1 (2017), 131–​154. 130 Andrew Weeks, “From Radical Reformation to Mystical Pre-​Enlightenment”, in Carl Niekerk ed., The Radical Enlightenment in Germany (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 80–​111; Jeffrey D. Burson, ‘The Catholic Enlightenment: The Forgotten History of a Global Movement, written by Ulrich L. Lehner’, Journal of Jesuit Studies 4:2 (2017), 300–​304; Diarmaid MacCulloch, Reformation: Europe’s House Divided. 1490–​1700 (London: Penguin, 2004), 110; Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–​1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Lehner, The Catholic Enlightenment. 131 María Elvira Roca Barea, Imperiofobia y la leyenda negra: Roma, Rusia, Estados Unidos y el Imperio español (Madrid: Siruela, 2016); Julían Juderias y Loyot, La leyenda negra y la verdad histórica, contribución al estudio del concepto de España en Europa, de las causas de este concepto y de la tolerancia religiosa y política en los países civilizados (Madrid: Revista de archivos, bibliotecas y museos, 1914). 132 See Cañizares-​Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World, 155–​ 203 and “Eighteenth-​Century Spanish Political Economy: Epistemology and Decline”, in Nature, Empire, and Nation, 96–​111. 133 David González Cruz, Propaganda e información en tiempos de guerra: España y América (1700–​1714) (Madrid: Silex, 2009), 10–​40. 134 On the compatibility of these apocalyptic readings with other views of history see Judith Pollmann, Memory in Early Modern Europe, 1500–​1800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 48.

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invocation of providentialism to legitimise his ill-​founded claim to legitimacy.135 Throughout the early decades of the early eighteenth century, almanacs, natural law, and an improved understanding of diplomacy, provided new horizons that replaced these apocalyptic expectations, and contributed new foundations of power that supplanted Philip’s providentialist and patrimonial view of the Spanish Empire. Political contestation, moreover, arose in hitherto neglected spaces of knowledge in the study of eighteenth-​century Spain. Modern studies of the lost chances of the Spanish nation failed to understand the complex universe of eighteenth-​century Spain: Bourbon Spain was a self-​ estranged global empire recovering from a Pan-​European civil war. In response, early eighteenth-​century ilustrados, at the dawn of the Enlightenment, rebuilt this imperial Theseus ship, and steered it, in part, by following familiar and fading Habsburg constellations. 5

The Diplomatic Enlightenment

In 1780, Jeremy Bentham coined a new term: the international. After pointing to the term’s parallels with the law of nations, he sought to establish the form of legislation that ought to legislate ‘transactions which may take place between individuals who are subjects of different states’, and argued that ‘there remain then the mutual transactions between sovereigns, as such, for the subject of that branch of jurisprudence which may be properly and exclusively termed international’.136 Bentham sought to illustrate its meaning by referring to an incident from the time of the Pax Hispanica, drawing from a passage in the seventeenth-​century English writer John Selden’s Table-​Talk, which discussed a case where English merchants sought to sue the Spanish Habsburg King Philip

135 The conclusions of the extensive literature, particularly that on Elisabeth Farnese, or on partidos, based on court gossip has been studied but, following recent historiographical assessments about their unreliability, has been largely disregarded. Jeroen Duindam, “Royal Courts”, in Hamish Scott ed., The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern European History, 1350–​1750. Volume ii: Cultures and Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 440–​469, 447–​448; See, for example, Coxe, Memoirs of the kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon or Alfred Baudrillart, Philippe V et la cour de France (Paris: Firmin-​Ditot, 1889–​1901). 136 Italicized passages belong to the original authors unless otherwise stated. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), 327 n.1. He further noted, in page 326 n. 1, that the early eighteenth-​century French Chancellor Henri François d’Aguesseau had hinted at a similar idea when he suggested that one should refer to the droit des gens as droit entre les gens.

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iii.137 According to Bentham, Selden ‘advised them to sue the Spanish monarch in the court of King’s Bench’, and while ‘Philip, we may believe, was in no great fear of them’ he ‘happened on his part to have demands upon some other merchants, whom, as long as the outlawry remained in force, there was no proceeding against’. The Spanish ambassador settled the issue by paying the merchants, and this, explained Bentham, ‘was internal jurisprudence’ however, he continued, ‘if the dispute had been betwixt Philip and James himself, it would have been international’.138 Subsequent legal disputes in Britain drew on Selden’s passage to debate the relationship between corporations and imperial sovereignty. First, in 1791, it was used in a case about the rights of a nawab in relation to an agreement made with the East India Company, and then in 1851, to discuss the matter of the rights of the Queen of Portugal in an English Court.139 During the 1851 proceedings, Selden’s anecdote was deemed to be unreliable, as there was otherwise no record of such a suit and, according to the legal assessment of Lord John Campbell, ‘the suits alleged to have been pending between the King of Spain and the English merchants, if there were any, were probably actions brought by him on bills of exchange, or arising out of some of the commercial transactions in which His Majesty was then engaged’.140 This puzzle was thus lodged at the centre of Bentham’s definition of the international. Commercial and international law would grow to try to resolve these issues and their widespread ramifications.141 137 John Selden, The Table-​Talk of John Selden: With a Biographical Preface and Notes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 108–​109. 138 Bentham, An Introduction, 327 n.1. Alberto Gentili, whose writings would influence Grotius’s views on international law, served as counsel to the King of Spain at the High Court of Admiralty. Valentina Vadi, War and Peace: Alberico Gentili and the Early Modern Law of Nations (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 87. Following Gentili’s death, the Spanish ambassador continued to sue in the Admiralty Court on behalf of Spanish merchants and the King of Spain. See Reginald Godfrey Marsden, Documents Relating to Law and Custom of the Sea. Volume 1 (Union, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, ltd, 1999), 360, n. 1. 139 William Brown, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court of Chancery, During the Time of Lord Chancellor Thurlow, of the Several Lords Commissioners of the Great Seal, and of Lord Chancellor Loughborough, from 1778 to 1794: With an Appendix of Contemporary Cases. Volume 3 (London: W. Clarke and Sons, 1819), 300 n. a. 140 Edmund Hatch Bennett and Chauncey Smith, English Reports in Law and Equity: Containing Reports of Cases in the House of Lords, Privy Council, Courts of Equity and Common Law; and in the Admiralty and Ecclesiastical Courts; Including Also Cases in Bankruptcy and Crown Cases Reserved (Boston: C. C. Little and J. Brown, 1852), 352. 141 Armitage, Foundations, 41. See James Fitzjames Stephen, Selected Writings of James Fitzjames Stephen: The Story of Nuncomar and the Impeachment of Sir Elijah Impey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 11–​14. Anne-​Marie Slaughter has argued that ‘the measure’ of a state’s ability to act as an independent actor on the international stage ‘depends on the breadth and depth of its links to other states’. See Anne-​Marie

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One way to build an international order is to sign and abide by treaties. Another way is to bet that those treaties will fail. Historians of international law have traced the emergence of a treaty-​based order of international relations.142 This book traces a parallel story, and argues that officials throughout the early eighteenth-​century Spanish Empire continued to address those matters of transnational sovereign and corporate justice captured in Selden’s remarks by turning to political economy. Following the failure to represent their own interests at the Treaty of Utrecht, Spanish officials, aware that the treaty had granted Spain’s historic enemy, Britain, the right to trade slaves in Spanish ports, and its new ally, France, the ability to continue its smuggling in Spanish imperial shores, became increasingly cognizant of the fact that the logic of diplomacy had failed Spain. The treaty, as Robert Walpole would put it, had shown that the ‘general inclination of all the powers in Europe’ was the only factor protecting the Spanish Empire from its dissolution.143 Spaniards thus turned to political speculation, as popular writings mocked the growing failures of the main Spanish organs of diplomacy –​its king, its councils, and its allies –​and deliberated on their causes. These popular writings were then used as channels to disseminate useful and learned information about European political economy, culture, and chorography. They signalled a broader cultural transition that aimed to, in the words of one political economist, ‘end the fear of the new’, and which encouraged Spaniards to invest in the Enlightenment. By 1753, Spain had developed a corporate scheme to preserve the European balance of power in the face of challenges posed by monarchs such as Frederick ii who, after breaching the terms of a diplomatic agreement, wondered what ‘tribunal’

Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 268. Jennifer Pitts, Boundaries of the International: Law and Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018); On corporations and the international order see Andrew Phillips and J.C. Sharman, ‘Company-​States and the Creation of the Global International System’, European Journal of International Relations 26:4 (2020), 1249–​72. 142 Heinz Duchhardt has pointed to the ‘research gap’ in the study of how diplomats acquired and distributed political information in the 1710s. See Heinz Duchhardt, “Peace Treaties from Westphalia to the Revolutionary Era”, in Randall Lesaffer ed., Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 45–​58, 54. Martti Koskenniemi, Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–​1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). On internationalisms see Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin eds., Internationalisms: A Twentieth-​Century History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 1 43 Richard Chandler, The History and Proceedings of the House of Commons from the Restoration to the Present Time, Volume 10 (London: Richard Chandler, 1742), 346.

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could judge a king for breaking the promises he had made to another.144 The Spanish solution was to make them pay: to create a transnational company and a system of cooperation that would discourage war among those who had invested in the scheme for fear of incurring a financial loss, which could overpower those who threatened its interests, and which could serve as a lever of the balance of power.145 Economic equity would replace the equity of law. It was a logic that Spanish officials, hardened by the experience of the War of Spanish Succession, could trust. This book makes three overarching arguments. The first is that, contrary to the prevailing historiographical view on the birth of the Enlightenment in Spain, there was an early Spanish Enlightenment that was different in nature and in scope from the movement that emerged in the second half of the eighteenth-​century. The book argues that early eighteenth-century Spanish officials generated, discussed, and disseminated Enlightenment ideals through diplomacy and through political economic debates on corporations, in an effort to resolve transnational economic dilemmas. Abstract debates about corporations, sovereignty, and diplomacy were reified and thrown into relief in the political debates of the War of Spanish Succession, the Treaty of Utrecht, and Philip’s first decade in power. Not only did Spain fail to represent its own interests at Utrecht, but crucial organs of diplomacy and empire –​from the King to the consulados –​were shown to be unresponsive and unreliable. The principles of the Treaty of Utrecht issued in a transnational Enlightenment which sought to host war and religion within a system of civil society, based on norms drawn from diplomacy and international commerce.146 The Anglo-​French balance of power triumphed over the dynastic 144 Frederick ii, Histoire de mons temps. Ouvres posthumes de Fréderic II, Roi de Prusse. Volume 1 (Berlin: Voss et fils et Decker et fils, 1788), 15. Frederick established four reasons for breaking an alliance: where the ally failed to adhere to the agreement, where one’s ally posed a threat to one’s own interests, where there was a third stronger power that forced one to break one’s treaties, and where one lacked the means to continue to fight. Frederick ii, Histoire de mons temps, 12. On Frederick’s writings, see Avi Lifschitz, “Introduction” in Avi Lifschitz ed., Frederick the Great’s Philosophical Writings. Translated by Angela Scholar (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020), vii-​xlii. 145 Frederick would fail to establish his own Prussian East India Company. See Florian Schui, ‘Prussia’s ‘Trans-​Oceanic Moment’: The Creation of the Prussian Asiatic Trade Company in 1750’, Historical Journal 49:1 (2006), 143–​60. For the best analysis on the connections between early modern ideas of Europe and the modern European Union see Anthony Pagden, “Introduction”, in Anthony Pagden ed., The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1–​33. 146 J.G.A. Pocock, The Discovery of Islands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 110. See also Pocock, Barbarism and Religion. Volume 1, 109–​114.

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model of diplomacy that had once served to tether together the empire of Charles v and, under Philip ii, had served to establish the union with Portugal. As the mid-​eighteenth-​century Spanish minister José de Carvajal y Lancaster stated, in the context of the Americas, ‘the equilibrium was established not for us but for others. Utrecht ensured we could not trade with other nations in the Americas through any association’.147 The pursuit of a role in European discussions about the balance of power shaped Spain’s engagement with the terms of Utrecht: Spanish diplomacy and imperial management had failed, and it was reasonable to expect that it would continue to do so in the near future. Faced with Philip v’s erratic approach to power, trading and investing on the assumption that the administration of the Spanish Empire would continue to fail if it was left unchanged generated opportunities for change and improvement. When Carvajal sketched out his vision for reform, he and other Spanish officials realised that chartered corporations, modelled on Northern European companies, could function as spaces for inter-​imperial and intra-​imperial negotiation. Traditional diplomacy was therefore first challenged and then galvanised by the logic of investment, and it was reinvented in the pursuit of reform or, in the words of Ensenada, with the purpose of learning ‘that which we once taught’ Europe.148 This transformation fuelled the growth of political and economic debate, and generated calls for something more: an enlightened outlook on international relations. This book then captures the emergence of an early eighteenth-​century Spanish political discourse that gambled, speculated, and debated whether traditional structures of empire and diplomacy had failed. This speculation would sharpen the minds of Spanish diplomats, bolster the diffusion of political information, and reconfigure Spain’s role in Europe. Before Bentham coined the word international, then, Spanish thinkers invested in the Enlightenment and debated how to negotiate and rule over an empire made up of corporate structures of representation.149 1 47 Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 141. 148 Antonio Rodríguez Villa, Don Cenón de Somodevilla: Marqués de la Ensenada (Madrid: Librería de M. Murillo, 1878), 98. 149 The corporate dimension made this strand of thought distinct from those traditions of thought on the balance of power and perpetual peace that saw law as a binding element of transnational cooperation. See Stella Ghervas, Conquering Peace: From the Enlightenment to the European Union (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2021), 1–​29; Stella Ghervas and David Armitage, “Introduction: from Westphalia to Enlightened Peace, 1648–​1815”, in Stella Ghervas and David Armitage eds., A Cultural History of Peace in the Age of Enlightenment (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), 1–​18; Isaac Nakhimovsky, “Fichte’s Political Economy of the General Will”, in The Closed Commercial State: Perpetual Peace and Commercial Society from Rousseau to Fichte (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 130–​165. From a political theory standpoint, see Murad Idris, War for

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Each of the chapters in this book traces the emergence of a central theme of the Enlightenment: the growth of public debate, the rise of political economy, the implementation of colonial, scientific, and industrial reform, the attempt to establish a European system of cooperation, and the use of Enlightenment ideas to construct a modern state. Following the apocalyptic expectations of the War of Spanish Succession, Spain witnessed an erosion of the legitimacy of recurring patterns of history that foreclosed the possibility of change.150 Chapter two, with its focus on the growth of political speculation, shows that in the early eighteenth century Spanish authors drew on the popular appeal of almanacs and used the medium to circulate and propagate debates on the meaning of the news, the virtues of different European political systems, and Spain’s role in Europe. The crisis of the Spanish Empire, deepened by Philip’s erratic approach to power, became an opportunity: from low to high culture, there was speculation about a fundamentally different future that was to emerge through a greater awareness of Europe and through the generation of Enlightenment ideals. The predictable temporal sequence of almanacs was transformed into a tool to bind eighteenth-​century life with sophisticated long-​term historical processes in the history of Europe. Daily concerns about poverty were connected to imperial debates about European monarchical successions. Political economy allowed many to predict these changes more accurately. Chapter three studies the growth of enlightened political economy, and analyses how the most important investor in the Spanish Empire, Juan de Goyeneche, remarked upon the ‘paradox’ that ‘since its foundation’ the Spanish Monarchy had never been in ‘a better situation to become formidable’ by overhauling the management of the empire through corporate reform and by spearheading cultural change. One of the most influential Spanish political economists, Miguel de Zavala y Auñón, paraphrased Demosthenes and envisioned corporations as representative bodies that could reaffirm political accountability and social fairness at the Spanish Court. In Peru, the official José de Herboso sought to ‘gather the luces’ from Europe and to create a republic of mining letters. Transnational debates around the 1739 Bilbao Ordenanzas, moreover, demonstrated the limits of Spain’s capacity to use legal reform as a means to regain control over trade. Corporations, then, appeared as the only Peace: Genealogies of a Violent Ideal in Western and Islamic Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). 150 On a monarchy confronting its end in time see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition. Introduction by Richard Whatmore (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 5–​44.

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institutions that could enforce government reforms. Chapter four studies intellectual responses to writings on corporations and mid-​eighteenth-​century industrial and colonial reforms. It shows how fears of colonial independence, from Caracas to Havana, demonstrated the need to both critically engage with, and transcend, the logic of emulation.151 Diplomatic cooperation emerged, then, as a preferable alternative to the emulation of other states. Under Carvajal and Ensenada’s watch, the pace of industrial reform accelerated to such an extent that it led to philosophical discussions about the need to reconsider the origins of the Enlightenment, as authors cautioned ministers on the need to distinguish the pursuit of economic growth from the preservation of sovereignty, equity, and the law of nations. Chapter five sheds light on the Spanish attempt to build on these ideas to establish a durable balance of power, and explores how Carvajal sought to stabilise Spain’s position in Europe by using transnational investments as a way to reaffirm diplomatic agreements. As he pursued ‘the best equilibrium’ for Europe, he sought to turn Spain into the leveller of the balance of power and to transform the société des princes into a corporate board of directors.152 The chapter argues that a blind spot undermined the efforts of those who assumed that the société des princes could be managed by a republic of diplomats and investors: the arbitrariness of monarchical rule. Once Carvajal died, his closest confidant, Ricardo Wall, was forced to address the shortcomings of this system of government. At the dawn of the Seven Years’ War, Wall, who had once been charged with the responsibility of purchasing watches for the King of Spain, became prime minister, only to scour the history of the empire –​from the Comunero Revolt to Erasmus’s exchanges with Charles v –​for a model that could provide a clear path of reform for an empire of overlapping corporate interests. Across the frontier, in Portugal, the future marquess of Pombal showed how a minister could act more decisively and exploit a crisis to establish themselves as the most important political actor in a monarchical empire. For the Portuguese statesman, Spain’s recent history had shown that the only way for the Iberian powers to survive in the context of the new balance of power in Europe was to bet on the notion that diplomacy would fail and to invest in corporations. But leading Spanish officials knew that there were limits to this approach to foreign affairs. 151 Contrary to Paquette’s views on emulation and the Spanish Enlightenment, by the 1740s Spanish reformers were critically engaging with the term and searching for alternative mechanisms of reform. See Paquette, Enligthenment, Governance, and Reform, 30–​36. 152 On the société des princes see Lucien Bély, La société des princes: XVIe-​XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Fayard, 1999).

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There was, in this way, a vibrant political culture in early eighteenth-​century Spain that has generally been overlooked. Faced with a global war and a tyrannical Bourbon King, early eighteenth-​century Spanish officials invested in Enlightenment ideals to craft corporate mechanisms to recover the trust of the people and of Europe. They studied scientific and political economic ideas, they hoped for peace, and some dreamt of a European union, and soon they found their hopes replaced by the imperial ambitions of Charles iii. Chapter six, then, moves into the second half of the eighteenth century. It studies the aims of the leading Spanish reformers under the administrations of Charles iii and Charles iv, their approaches to early eighteenth-​century political debates, and how some of these officials reaffirmed European stereotypes about Spanish zealotry and backwardness. Early eighteenth-​century ilustrados sought to make the King of Spain more accountable to the people. Charles iii’s ministers sought instead to make the people accountable for the failures of the Bourbon King. Following the Esquilache Revolt and the circulation of pamphlets that defended tyrannicide, ministers saw in the idea of the Enlightenment a means to reaffirm Charles iii’s authority. There was never a Bourbon ideology, but rather a desperate attempt to foster patriotism to address the cold reception that Charles had faced, and to improve his image in Spain and in Europe. Met with popular unrest at home and with mockery abroad, Charles’s ministers blindly accepted foreign assessments of the Spanish character and, at times, uncritically imitated their policies. This had disastrous consequences, as in the case of the colonisation of Sierra Morena and Pablo de Olavide’s subsequent fall from grace, an episode which authors like Denis Diderot or Johann Pezzl would use to argue that the Enlightenment had failed to reach Spain. Spanish officials then turned to propaganda and appealed to the authority of the Enlightenment to validate regressive reforms. They reconnected the ties between the Spanish King and the colonies by successfully reconciling the logic of contractors and vice-​regal authority, and drew on the concept of the nation to rally the people in support of the Crown.153 But they failed to identify who the nation, the patria, or the empire were meant to serve. In the 1780s and 1790s, officials called for a more robust approach to reform and, ahead of the 1812 Cádiz Constitution, they recovered, and reflected on, the profound historical significance of corporations and representative political bodies as they sought to reimagine and reconfigure the Spanish Empire. Capitalising on their 153 This is not to say that debates about the nation emerged in this period, but rather that their centrality to Spanish political culture emerged then. On eighteenth-​century debates on the nation see Fernández Albaladejo, “Dinastía y comunidad política”, 485–​532.

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failure, revolutionaries like Simón Bolívar turned to a familiar source, Saint-​ Pierre’s federative scheme, to establish a model for the liberated territories in South America. Framing the Age of Revolutions in the context of century-​ long developments generates a balanced view of the debates, the motivations, the processes, and the agents that fostered the growth of the Enlightenment in Spain. The second main argument of this book, then, is that debates about corporations were crucial in the making of Spanish imperial reform. The book charts the influence of the early modern growth of foreign corporations and the failure of Spanish diplomacy on the emergence of political economy in Spain.154 The Iberian medieval corporate constitutional structure emerged from the need for political compromise, and early modern Northern European companies, by drawing on deliberative structures, grew to compensate for the fiscal and military weaknesses of European empires.155 Eighteenth-​century Spanish authors reconciled these two traditions to foster trust in the Spanish Monarchy and facilitate political and social reform.156 Corporations –​confraternities, the Cortes, merchant guilds, chartered bodies, militia companies, foreign joint-​ stock companies –​dominated the cultural, social, and administrative facets of everyday life in the Spanish Empire. There was nothing remarkable about investing in the wellbeing of the people.157 Corporations organised the social 154 On the debates surrounding the growth of political economy and the Enlightenment see John Robertson, The Case for The Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples 1680–​1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 51. 155 On early modern Spanish debates about currency and speculation see Elvira Vilches, New World Gold: Cultural Anxiety and Monetary Disorder in Early Modern Spain (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 117–​124. Joseph F. O’Callaghan, ‘The Beginnings of the Cortes of Leon-​Castile’, American Historical Review 74:5 (1969), 1503–​1537; Holden Furber, Rival empires of trade in the Orient, 1600–​1800 (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1976), 185. 156 In mid-​century Britain, corporations would serve to stimulate loyalty. In early eighteenth-​ century Spain, they served instead to generate trust in the Spanish Monarchy. See Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–​1837 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 85–​98. 157 Julia McClure, ‘The Charitable Bonds of the Spanish Empire: The Casa De Contratación as an Institution of Charity’, New Global Studies 12:2 (2018), 157–​174. On the Black Urban Atlantic see Jorge Cañizares-​Esguerra, Matt D. Childs, and James Sidbury, “Introduction”, in Jorge Cañizares-​Esguerra, Matt D. Childs, and James Sidbury eds., The Black Urban Atlantic in the Age of the Slave Trade (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). Some economic historians have sought to recover a historiographical tradition that traced the origins of corporations to the moral economy of medieval Italy. See Francesca Trivellato, ‘Renaissance Florence and the Origins of Capitalism: A Business History Perspective’, Business History Review 94 (2020), 229–​251. This is a response to an

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relations of the elite and the lay subjects: diplomats like Ricardo Wall and the Duke of Huéscar were, in Carvajal’s words, members of his ‘confraternity’.158 As he drafted his plan to set up corporations to serve the ‘common good’, and to establish twelve companies to regulate the administration of imperial trade, Carvajal stated the logic behind the establishment of a public trust in the most basic terms: ‘two hundred pesos from an old woman, a thousand from the entail, those of a mister, [those of] a minister and [those] of everyone else, when brought together in a company, can be converted from small heaps into one good heap’.159 The engagement with the autochthonous tradition of corporate governance, the pursuit of diplomatic cooperation, and the study of successful European companies, inspired the growth of Spanish political economy.160 There was no obstacle, many Spanish officials believed, innocently at times, preventing them from incorporating successful aspects of foreign companies to their corporate tradition. Traditional Spanish corporations were integrative where foreign companies were often exclusivist, and this tension was thrown into relief during protests against newly-​established corporations.161 Yet in the minds of early eighteenth-​century Iberian thinkers, corporations that combined their autochthonous malleable legal framework and foreign improvements in economic efficiency could offer successful models for the administration of both empire and trade.162 Administrators, in this way, demonstrated ambitious work: Sheilagh Ogilvie, Institutions and European Trade Merchant Guilds, 1000–​ 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 158 Ozanam, La diplomacia, 172, 200. 159 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, in José de Carvajal y Lancaster, Testamento Político, 1–​ 137, 114. 160 This complements studies of the resilience of the economic influence of corporatist structures in eighteenth-​century Spain. See Regina Grafe, Distant Tyranny: Markets, Power, and Backwardness in Spain, 1650–​1800 (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012) and Christopher Storrs’s assessment of the administrative role of the Cortes in Storrs, The Spanish Resurgence, 145–​152. Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, in turn, has written about the durability of the corporativist model in Spain, and this book emphasises instead the ways new ideas about political economy were reconciled with this autochthonous model to galvanise reform. See Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, ‘El absolutismo frente a la constitución tradicional’, Historia Contemporánea 4 (1990), 15–​30, and Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, La crisis de la Monarquía (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2009). 161 On the issue of companies and divided sovereignty see Edward Jones Corredera, ‘The History of Fair Trade: Hugo Grotius, Corporations, and the Spanish Enlightenment’, Grotiana 42 (2021), 138–​160. Edmond J. Smith, “Governance”, in William A. Pettigrew and David Veevers eds., The Corporation as a Protagonist in Global History, c. 1550–​1750 (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 163–​186, 164. 162 On the growth of these debates in Britain see Philip Stern, The Company-​ State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) and, more recently, Felicia Gottman and

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a basic understanding of the geopolitical dynamics of the ‘financial revolution’ in Britain and the Netherlands, and considered how foreign credit and forms of corporate representation had reorganised the political economy of the Spanish Empire.163 Spanish officials then studied how the same structures, in the forms of councils or regulated companies, could be used to reconfigure and harness these relations, and to foster the investment of lay subjects in the political future of the Spanish World.164 By the mid-​eighteenth century, a more critical engagement with these corporations emerged, as jurists and influential ambassadors challenged the ideas of Grotius and Pufendorf on companies and natural law, and proposed the establishment of institutions where officials could learn about public law and the rules of European diplomacy.165 This framing generated a clear image of the true stakeholders of the Spanish Empire, and demonstrated Spain’s economic shortcomings.166 This book thus encourages a reconsideration of the dominant view regarding the factors that facilitated the growth of capitalist hopes in the Global North, as officials in the Spanish spaces of the Global South reimagined and reinvented corporations

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Philip Stern, ‘Introduction: Crossing Companies’, in Journal of World History 31:3 (2020), 477–​488; Andrew Phillips and J. C. Sharman, Outsourcing Empire: How Company-​States Made the Modern World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020). A parallel vision was studied in Carl Wennerlind, Casualties of Credit: The English Financial Revolution, 1620–​1720 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2011). On the Financial Revolution in England and the Netherlands, see P.G.M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit 1688–​1756 (London: Macmillan, 1967); Oscar Gelderblom and Joost Jonker, ‘Completing a Financial Revolution: The Finance of the Dutch East India Trade and the Rise of the Amsterdam Capital Market, 1595–​1612’, The Journal of Economic History 64:3 (2004), 641–​72. Contra the interpretation found in Regina Grafe, “Polycentric States: The Spanish Reigns and the “Failures” of Mercantilism”, in Philip J. Stern and Carl Wennerlind eds., in Mercantilism Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and Its Empire (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 243–​258, 256 and Grafe, Distant Tyranny, 190–​212. On emulation see Sophus Reinert, Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). In line with Tamar Herzog’s view on the impossibility of discussing corruption in the early modern Spanish Empire, the officials in this book saw favours and fraud as tools at their disposal. Carvajal suggested bribing officials and Peruvian merchants manipulated the judicial system to lower the price of imported goods. See Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 49–​50 and Ruth Hill, Hierarchy, Commerce, and Fraud in Bourbon Spanish America: A Postal Inspector’s Exposé (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2005), 107–​140. On debates on the role of judicial corruption see Christoph Rosenmüller, Corruption and Justice in Colonial Mexico, 1650–​1755 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 1–​13 and Tamar Herzog, Upholding Justice: Society, State, and the Penal System in Quito (1650–​ 1750) (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 157.

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to respond to those transnational financial changes that were shaping their lives.167 The third core argument of this book is that diplomacy, and the migration of ideas across the transterritorial Spanish Empire, played a central role in stimulating the growth of the Enlightenment in Spain. This is a particularly critical contribution since methodological nationalism continues to shape studies of eighteenth-​century Spain.168 Scholars have argued that the Spanish Enlightenment was a distinct process which involved the imitation, or ‘application’, of economic and chorographic practical knowledge to the resolution of social and economic problems and, eventually, towards the creation of a modern state.169 In these interpretations, methodological nationalism has preserved a sense of Spanish exceptionalism, and has manifested itself in three ways. First, throughout the century Spanish thinkers engaged critically, and in a variety of ways, with ideas of ‘emulation’, with definitions of Europe, and with approaches to policy implementation. By the mid-​eighteenth century, officials had transcended the vague idea of emulating their European peers, and prioritised instead the study of concrete, granular, and operative knowledge about foreign states, from Prussia to Persia, for diplomatic ends. These studies showed that diplomatic cooperation, the creation of a closed commercial state, or historical research, were alternatives to emulation. Some, like Carvajal, understood that there was no need to imitate others when you could cooperate with them and benefit from the virtues of their own political 167 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: and Other Writings. Translated by Peter Baehr and Gordon C. Wells (London: Penguin, 2002). Max Weber’s PhD thesis, and first monograph, were studies on medieval commercial partnerships and trading companies. Pocock famously excluded the Spanish Empire from his analysis of civic republicanism, and Anthony Pagden largely avoided the eighteenth century in his study of Spanish imperial discourses. This book seeks to fill in the vaccum left by these authors. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment; Anthony Pagden, Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish-​American Social and Political Theory, 1513–​1830 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). 168 Astigarraga drew attention to the problem of nationalism in the study of the Spanish Enlightenment but then proceeded to replicate the same framework he criticised. See Astigarraga, A Unifying Enlightenment, 15–​23. On methodological nationalism and intellectual history see Armitage, Foundations, 17. The field of migration studies has also generated rich insights into this topic. See Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, ‘Methodological Nationalism and the Study of Migration’, European Journal of Sociology /​Archives Européennes De Sociologie /​Europäisches Archiv Für Soziologie 43:2 (2002), 217–​40. 169 Astigarraga, A Unifying Enlightenment, 22. Jesús Astigarraga, “Introduction: admirer, rougir, imiter –​Spain and the European Enlightenment”, in Astigarraga ed., The Spanish Enlightenment Revisited, 1–​18.

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system.170 Others, like Macanaz, defended the creation of a closed commercial state that did not rely on what ‘this or that power did’ and instead rested exclusively on the growth of manufacturing in Spain and in the Americas.171 Authors like Tomas Fernández de Mesa or the Duke of Sotomayor, in turn, sought to correct the defects of emulation by drawing on careful historical analysis. The pursuit of emulation, they believed, had in fact led states to misrepresent the origins of economic and political change in European history, and had diverted them away from their true interests. Second, European philosophers and ministers did not conceive of the Enlightenment as a theoretical adventure: it was a deeply practical endeavour.172 From Cameralist views on mining and reform to Anglo-​French debates about credit, the goal of the Enlightenment in Europe and beyond was to address material problems that affected the population.173 In this regard, Spain was no different from its neighbours. Third, the notion that the state was the inevitable and most preferable mechanism to deliver progress, inherited from nineteenth-​century histories, remains embedded in twenty-​first-​century studies of the Spanish Enlightenment.174 The projection of twentieth-century national borders and the modern regional politics of the Spanish state onto the Spanish Empire perpetuates this view, and misrepresent the contemporary spatial imagination of reformers, the flows of information, and the formation of early modern networks. This approach has foreclosed the study of channels and authors who generated their own visions of peace, accountability, and social reform, in order to address transnational, and not national, problems.175 The influential view, espoused by historians such as Pierre Vilar, that Bourbon centralism captured the ‘lively forces of the provinces’ fundamentally misrepresented a global European empire as a

170 Carvajal would praise Britain for being ‘republican enough’ to be reliable, and monarchical enough to prevent factionalism. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 14. 171 Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, 219, 137. 172 Something that Paul Ilie encouraged. See Ilie, ‘Franklin and Villarroel’, 324. 173 On Cameralism, knowledge production, and mining see Andrew Wakefield, The Disordered Police State: Cameralism as Science and Practice (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 26–​43. On Anglo-​French debates on credit see Sonenscher, Before the Deluge. On the Habsburg context see Christine Lebeau, “Negotiating a Trade Treaty in an Imperial Context: The Habsburg Monarchy in the Eighteenth Century”, in Alimento and Stapelbroek eds., The Politics of Commercial Treaties, 349–​370, 366. 174 On the role of monarchies in eighteenth-​century European political thought see Annelien De Dijn, ‘The Politics of the Enlightenment: From Peter Gay to Jonathan Israel’, Historical Journal 55:3 (2012), 785–​805. 175 On the Enlightenment’s generation of questions that remain with us today see Antoine Lilti, L’Héritage des Lumières: ambivalences de la modernité (Paris: ehess, 2019).

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nation.176 Diplomatic spaces and administrative councils which had traditionally hosted discussions about political economy, transterritorial policies, and arcana imperii, were transformed in order to generate new ideas about cultural and economic reform throughout the Spanish Empire. Spanish imperial provinces stretched far and beyond the frontiers of modern Spain: ministers in Madrid, jurists in Ostend, officials in Bilbao, and nobles in Lima, all waged theoretical debates about the balance of power, diplomacy, and financial dealings among corporations and states for the Spanish Monarchy. The study of the ideas and institutions that shaped early eighteenth-​ century Spanish political culture, and their legacies, generates new insights into the global growth of the Enlightenment. The concept of the Diplomatic Enlightenment serves to capture the locus and the focus of the early Spanish Enlightenment.177 The term draws attention to the fact that in Spain Enlightenment ideas emerged through, and sought to transform, European diplomacy. Diplomats engaged with the writings of contemporary European thinkers as they drafted policy proposals, writers responded to, reflected on, and sometimes influenced, changes in transnational affairs, and ministers studied ways to deploy Enlightenment ideas to improve Spain’s commercial and political relations with other states and empires. The early Spanish Enlightenment began as a movement of reform that sought to address the fragmentation that had occurred during the War of Spanish Succession and to encourage the peoples of the Spanish Empire to invest in the future of the Monarchy.178 By the mid-​eighteenth century, it had become an Enlightenment by, and for, diplomats and elite imperial officials –​at a time when their responsibilities included those of a civil servant, a favourite, a legislator, a political economist, a passeur d’idées, a translator, and a privileged member of the Republic of Letters.179 In the second half of the eighteenth century, this 1 76 Pierre Vilar, Historia de España (Barcelona: Crítica, 1978),76. 177 It is not, however, meant to serve as a separate category of Enlightenment. The term was inspired by a comment made by Harald Braun during my viva, as he suggested that my narrative captured something that could be best described as a ‘diplomatic’ form of Enlightenment. 178 Much like it did across the Pyrenees. See Nannerl O. Keohane, “A New Science of Politics in a Republic Protected by a King”, in Philosophy and the State in France: The Renaissance to the Enlightenment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 361–​391. 179 The reference to diplomats as passeur d’idées was made by the excellent young scholar Giulio Talini. See Giulio Talini, ‘Saint-​Pierre, British pacifism and the quest for perpetual peace (1693–​1748)’, History of European Ideas 46:8 (2020), 1165–​1182. Hillard von Thiessen, “Diplomacy in a changing political order”, in Matthias Pohlig and Michael Schaich eds., The War of the Spanish Succession: New Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 63–​84, 65; James Sheehan, “Introduction: culture and power during the long

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tradition gained a radical edge in the thought of Francisco Romá y Rosell but was then largely abandoned, as Enlightenment ideals were deployed to craft a state within an empire. Throughout the century, however, many other leading Spanish thinkers and officials debated the matter of the balance of power, including Gerónimo de Uztáriz, Juan de Goyeneche, Macanaz, Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, and León de Arroyal; all of these thinkers, as this book shows, shed light on the ways that Spain’s global empire could leverage its power in Europe. In the context of the historiographical discussion over the Enlightenment’s nature as ‘a question of social practice and sociability rather than new principles, concepts, and thinking’, the Spanish case demonstrates that the generation and discussion of Enlightenment ideas could take place in a variety of spaces.180 In the early eighteenth century, diplomatic spaces of negotiations were, in the eyes of Spanish officials, the sites where Enlightenment ideals were generated, learned, and implemented. Vincente Bacallar y Sana, marquess of San Phelipe, was born in Sardinia, served as Charles ii’s Governor of Cagliari and, under Philip v, he would be known as the author of the most important history in the Spanish language of the War of Spanish Succession, the Comentarios sobre la Guerra de España.181 One of the most influential eighteenth-​ century Spanish political economists, Gerónimo de Uztáriz, studied at the Royal Military Academy in Brussels, fought in Flanders, and was named the Viceroy of Sicily during the War of Spanish Succession.182 The Milan-​born Spanish prime minister José Patiño drew on the example of the Royal Military Academy of Brussels to establish the Compañía de Guardiamarinas, or Royal Company of Coastguards, in Cádiz, where students

eighteenth century”, in Hamish Scott and Brendan Simms eds., Cultures of Power in Europe During the Long Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1–​ 13, 13. 180 Israel, The Expanding Blaze: How the American Revolution Ignited the World, 1775–​1848 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), 13; Charles W.J Withers, Placing the Enlightenment: Thinking Geographically about the Age of Reason (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 181 Vicente Bacallar y Sanna, marquess of San Phelipe, Comentarios de la guerra de España e historia de su rey Phelipe V el animoso desde el principio de su reynado hasta la Paz General del año 1725: dividido en dos tomos. (Genoa: Matheo Garvizza, 1800). 182 Manuel García Hurtado, “Dos vidas y una misma pasión: Jerónimo de Uztáriz y Álvaro de Navia Osorio y Vigil”, in Agustín Guimera and Victor Peralta eds., El equilibrio de los imperios: de Utrecht a Trafalgar. Volume 2 (Madrid: Fundación Española de Historia Moderna, 2005), 587–​614, 589. See Reyes Fernández Durán, Gerónimo de Uztáriz (1670–​1732): Una política económica para Felipe V (Madrid: Minerva, 1999).

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studied and debated the works of Tycho Brache and Copernicus.183 Joaquin Ignacio de Barrenechaea y Erquiñigo, marquess del Puerto, was born in Bilbao and learned about politics by working for his uncle, who served as Governor of Quito. While serving as ambassador to the United Provinces at The Hague, he considered the British response to the 1745 Jacobite rebellion as an opportunity for Spain, and wrote to the Spanish Court to encourage the migration of Catholic workers to Sierra Morena.184 One of these migratory missions encouraged Juan Enrique de Graef, who was related to leading members of a Flemish guild in Cádiz, to migrate to Spain after studying at Le Havre, and to bolster Spanish cultural debates by establishing the first political economic Spanish journal, the Discursos Mercuriales Económico-​Políticos, which published a number of responses to Jean Jacques Rousseau’s Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes.185 Melchor Rafael de Macanaz, from his exile in France, recruited skilled French and Flemish workers for the Spanish government.186 During his time as ambassador in Breda, Macanaz studied European gazettes, commented on Voltaire’s Histoire Universelle and on Gabriel Bonnot de Mably’s Droit Publique de l’Europe, and developed new ideas about reform.187 He expanded on the proposals that he had sketched out in his 1719 Nuevo Sistema de Gobierno para América, a text that would have a greater impact on Spanish political culture after his death, and proposed that instead of relying on diplomacy to secure peace, Spain could thrive as a closed commercial state and become ‘the Arbiter of Europe’.188 Transnational political ambitions, moreover, encouraged the collaboration of female spies, and 183 Horacio Capel, Joan Eugeni Sánchez, Omar Moncada eds., De Palas a Minerva: la estructura institucional de los ingenieros militares en el siglo XVIII (Barcelona and Madrid: Serbal and csic, 1988), 14–​94, 32; José Luis Peset Reig, “La ciencia moderna y la nueva dinastía”, in Biblioteca Nacional ed., La Real Biblioteca Pública, 1711–​1760, de Felipe V a Fernando VI (Madrid: Biblioteca Nacional de España, 2004), 76–​86, 79. 184 Jeremy Black, A History of Diplomacy (London: Reaktion, 2010), 71; Didier Ozanam, Les diplomates espagnols du XVIIIe siècle: introduction et répertoire biographique 1700-​1808 (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 1998), 176; Taracha, Ojos y oídos de la monarquía borbónica, 78; Barrenechaea y Erquiñigo to Carvajal, October 23 1749, ahn. Estado. 2768.1. 185 Sánchez-​Blanco, “Introduction”, in Graef, Discursos, 19 and 71. 186 Ozanam, La diplomacia, 103; María Dolores Gómez Molleda, ‘El caso Macanaz en el Congreso de Breda’, Hispania: Revista española de historia 70 (1958), 62–​128. 187 Melchor de Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda. Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores. mss 218 and 219. 188 Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, 2. On Macanaz’s authorship of the text see Henry Kamen, ‘Melchor de Macanaz and the foundations of Bourbon power in Spain’, The English Historical Review, 80:117 (1965), 699–​716, 713–​714. For a more recent interpretation see Fidel J. Tavárez, ‘La invención de un imperio comercial hispano, 1740–​ 1765’, Magallánica. Revista de Historia Moderna 2:3 (2015), 55–​73.

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emboldened Margaret Elisabeth O’Brien, Countess of Lismore, an Irish dame who served Maria Theresa, the wife of the French dauphin, to spy for Ensenada in exchange for him favouring her cause at the Spanish Court.189 Between 1700 and 1808, forty-​one percent of consuls, and more than eighty percent of vice-​ consuls in Spanish service, were foreigners.190 In the years between 1740 and 1759, almost sixty percent of all diplomats were either from states that formerly belonged to the empire, or altogether foreign.191 José de Carvajal y Lancaster and Zenón de Somodevilla y Bengoechea, marquess of Ensenada, were the leading ministers who collected, organised, and harnessed the knowledge of these agents to establish Enlightenment reforms. There was a direct line between diplomats and Carvajal and Ensenada. Ministers, explained Carvajal, were expected to deal with contingencies and distractions, and ‘received people without knowing what they wish to discuss’. Spanish diplomats, however, had the benefit of foresight, and were able to ‘ponder their arguments’.192 They were, like their European peers, expected to synthesise the news from various countries.193 Described as ‘portable archives’ by a contemporary author, diplomats were indeed walking archives of arcana imperii, and while Philip v remained trapped in a web of dynastic disputes that were only relevant on paper, ambassadors and envoys studied and rewrote the paper trails that recorded Spain’s connections to Europe.194 Under Ferdinand vi, diplomats served as reformers, generated proposals, and effectively governed alongside the two ministers. The author and member of the Royal Academy of History, Francisco Xavier de la Huerta, established an influential journal, the Diario de los Literatos, and travelled with the Spanish diplomatic mission to Dresden in order to learn about the

189 Naiara Pavía Dopazo, ‘Margarita Isabel O’Brien: Condesa jacobita y dama de la monarquía española’, BROCAR 36 (2012), 65–​93, 70–​71. 190 Jesús Pradells Nadal, Diplomacia y Comercio: La Expansión Consular Española En El Siglo XVIII (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante/​Instituto de Cultura Juan Gil-​Albert, 1992), 100. 191 Ozanam, Les diplomates espagnols, 41. This complements studies of migration and the Spanish elites. See Bartolomé Yun-​Casalilla, Iberian World Empires and the Globalization of Europe 1415–​1668 (London: Palgrave, 2019). 192 Ozanam, La diplomacia, 67–​68. 193 Black, A History of Diplomacy, 74. 194 José Antonio Abreu y Bertodano, Colección de los tratados de paz, alianza, neutralidad, garantía, hechos por los pueblos, reyes y principes de España con los pueblos, reyes, principes, repúblicas y demás potencias de Europa: desde antes del establecimiento de la monarquía gótica hasta el feliz reinado del Rey N.S. Don Phelipe V. Two volumes. Volume 1 (Madrid, Diego Peralta, Antonio Marin y Juan de Zuñiga, 1740), iii-​iv.

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literature of Central Europe.195 Antonio José Álvarez de Abreu, marquess de la Regalia, served as Governor of Venezuela, and, in his correspondence with Philip v, engaged with thinkers such as Samuel Pufendorf to interrogate the limits of monarchical sovereignty.196 Álvaro Navia-​Osorio y Vigil, marquess of Santa Cruz de Marcenado, interrupted his studies in Latin Grammar and Rhetoric at the University of Oviedo to command a regiment for Philip v, and fought in Sicily, Algiers, and Sardinia.197 His idea for a chorographic universal dictionary, that predated Ephraim Chambers’s Cyclopedia and Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie, drew on the assistance of the influential Italian historian Lodovico Antonio Muratori and the French scholar Nicolas Lenglet Du Fresnoy, a future contributor to the Encyclopédie, and suggested summarising the themes of censored works so ‘the reader could decide for themselves’.198 His writings on political economy, in turn, fostered debates about the need for greater political accountability, the virtues of improved economic accounting, and the geopolitical uses of archives and academies.199 Ignacio de Luzán, born in Barcelona, studied in a Jesuit school in Milan and gained a doctorate from the University of Catane.200 The publication of his Poética, o Reglas de la Poesía, raised his standing in Spain’s cultural world, and the Spanish Court sent him to Paris to study French industry and commerce.201 There he translated diplomatic writings and penned a text on the state of French theatre and literature.202 In his works on poetry, Luzán drew on Giambattista Vico’s New Science, and on the works of Muratori, Jean Le Clerc, Jean-​Pierre de Crousaz, 195 Jesús Castañón, La crítica literaria en la prensa española del siglo XVIII, 1700-​1750 (Madrid: Taurus, 1973), 119; Francisco Xavier de la Huerta, Diario de los literatos (Madrid: Juan Muñoz, 1737). 196 Coriolano Guimerá López, ‘Antonio José Alvarez de Abreu y las regalías indianas’, in Anuario del Instituto de Estudios Canarios 35 (1992), 38–​42; Jones Corredera, ‘The memory of the Habsburg Monarchy’, 953–​971. 197 Luis López Anglada, “Vida de don Álvaro de Navia-​Ossorio, Marqués de Santa Cruz de Marcenado y Vizconde de Puerto”, in Álvaro de Navia-​Ossorio, Reflexiones Militares (Madrid: Comisión Española de Historia Militar, 1984), 43–​58, 43–​44. 198 Marcenado, “Últimas ideas del Marques de Santa Cruz”, in Santa Cruz de Marcenado, Reflexiones militares del Mariscal de Campo don Álvaro Navia Osorio, vizconde de Puerto, ò marques de Santa Cruz de Marzenado. Volume 10 (Turin: Juan Francisco Mairesse, 1724–​ 1730), Appendix 1, 62. 199 Jones Corredera, ‘The rediscovery’, 953–​971. 200 Ozanam, Les diplomates espagnols, 325; 201 Jorge Demerson, “Un aspecto de las relaciones hispano-​francesas en tiempos de Fernando VI: Las Memorias literarias de París de Ignacio Luzán (1751)”, in Catedra Feijoo ed., La Época de Fernando VI (Oviedo: Universidad, 1981), 241–​274. 202 Demerson, “Un aspecto de las relaciones hispano-​francesas en tiempos de Fernando VI”, 254.

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Bernard Lamy, and Daniel Heinsius.203 In his survey of French political culture, he praised the works of Voltaire, Montesquieu, and the abbé de Raynal.204 He then served as a spy for Carvajal and Ensenada. After establishing a Royal Academy for the study of Spanish Ecclesiastical History at the Palace of Spain in Rome, Alfonso Clemente de Arostegui y Cañavate, a former professor at the prestigious college of San Ildefonso in Alcalá de Henares, sent reports of his travels from Barcelona through Lyon, Turin, and Naples, and proposed that Ventura Rodríguez and José de Hermosilla, two of the most talented artists at the Royal Academy of San Fernando, should travel to Turin to study, copy, and design new buildings.205 It was the ‘projected symmetry’ of its roads, explained Arostegui, that made it the most beautiful city in Europe.206 The Cagliari-​born Spanish ambassador to Lisbon, Félix Fernando Masones de Lima y Sotomayor, Duke of Sotomayor, studied the writings of Hugo Grotius and Charles Dutot, and argued that before the use of credit became widespread, the discovery of gold and silver had issued in an age of fantasy that drew Europe away from ‘the real’.207 If these reflections, as a whole, did not amount to a cosmopolitan worldview, the composition of the officials who issued in the Enlightenment was among the most transnational in Europe. This process of reform turned on the collection and refashioning of familiar tools that preserved the conduits of the société des princes; the transnational agents, channels, and debates that shaped the fate of nations and empires in early modern Europe.208 The recovery of the transnational dimensions of the Spanish Enlightenment generates a new contextualisation of the emergence of political and economic reform. And, in this context, the fulfilment of any form of Enlightenment turned on the acceptance of decline, and the study of its sources. Spanish reformers came closest to effective reform when they acknowledged the political economic reality of the empire. Acceptance made the pursuit of a solution possible, and encouraged more specific and actionable policy proposals. Rather than wasting time and energy fighting stereotypes about Spanish laziness, early eighteenth-​century officials flatly rejected the notion that ‘the laziness of the nation’ was ‘inevitable’ and vividly captured the asymmetrical 203 Ignacio de Luzán, La poetica, ó, Reglas de la poesia en general, y de sus principales especies (Zaragoza: Francisco Revilla, 1737), 318, 365–​462. 204 Ignacio de Luzán, Memorias literarias de París (Madrid: Don Gabriel Ramirez, 1751), 74–​78, 139, 306, 308. 205 Arostegui to Carvajal, 19 June 1753. Archivo General de Simancas. Leg. 5857. 5; 232. 206 Alfonso Clemente de Arostegui y Cañavate, Fábricas y artes. Archivo General de Simancas. Leg. 5857. 5. 207 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 173–​174. 208 Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs, 51.

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nature of Spanish trade, as Carvajal declared that: ‘there are plenty of shepherds and labourers in the fields, and their jobs are hard, and I would add those of the laundress, [a trade] which only women carry out; and they would be more comfortable at home with their sowing wheel and weaving silk’.209 Spain continued to supply the bulk of trade to Europe for the benefit of allies and enemies with little to show for it: ‘If a kingdom, once another has declared war on it, sent to this enemy a hundred thousand men, a hundred vessels, and a hundred million, would it not be regarded as insane?’210 Early eighteenth-​ century reformers were clear-​eyed about the nature of Spain’s failure. In the second half of the eighteenth century, tortuous teleological views on the Enlightenment often misrepresented the social and political dynamics of the Spanish Empire and its ties to its neighbours. The reformers of the second half of the eighteenth century either saw the uncritical absorption of foreign European views on Spain as a panacea, as Campomanes did, or they reacted to them with the hostility that characterised José de Galvez’s incensed response to the mere mention of Guillaume Thomas François Raynal’s name.211 Both sets of views distorted their interpretations of the sources of the problems that the Spanish Empire faced. Carvajal, by contrast, was rather clear and blunt about the limits of reform, and he is a central figure in this book. As a minister he believed he had witnessed the establishment of perpetual peace, and in his writings he reconciled Spanish political economic debates and hopes for European unity. Leading figures like Juan de Goyeneche proposed replacing diplomacy and the imperial administration with a trading company. Carvajal, instead, sought to reinforce the diplomatic foundations of the empire through the logic of investment and economic interests. Carvajal envisioned a transnational corporation that would allow for inter-​imperial negotiation and guarantee peace in Europe. It would be governed by interests, utility, and the principle of generating benefits for all and harm to none. But the study of his hopes encourages the modern historian to remember that transnational structures of governance based on rational and reasonable forms of negotiation could rely on existing colonial structures of oppression and forced labour.212 The slave trade was a marginal

2 09 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 44. 210 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 44. 211 Antonio Mestre Sanchis, Apología y crítica de España en el siglo XVIII (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003), 63; Cañizares Esguerra, How to write a history of the New World, 181. 212 On the crusading dimension of Saint-​Pierre’s plan for peace see Tomaž Mastnak, ‘Abbé de Saint-​Pierre: European Union and the Turk’, History of Political Thought, 19:4 (1998), 570–​598, 590–​598.

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but consistent part of early eighteenth-​century Spanish debates about transnational corporate reform. Before the Ostend Company promised to align Spanish and Austrian commercial interests, it was Philip v’s investment in the South Sea Company, as part of Britain’s right to the asiento, that solidified the growth of the British slave trade on Spanish imperial shores and beyond. Today, it remains crucial to understand that assemblies that sought to facilitate transnational cooperation and to neutralise the desire for war were compatible with the slave trade and other forms of colonial oppression.213 When the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, ninety percent of the territorial spaces that belonged to the founding nations of the European Union were outside of the Old Continent.214 One will therefore not find, in the following pages, a triumphalist reading of the growth of the Enlightenment in Spain. Nor will one encounter the dated view that zealotry hindered its development. Rather, in this study of the ways that Spanish authors and ministers engaged with Enlightenment ideals one will discover a historicised account of their main ambition: the pursuit of a regulated transnational system of governance that would encourage fairer and greater European collaboration. Carvajal’s approach to bargaining and cooperation brought into focus many uncomfortable realities of the Spanish Empire. As Goyeneche’s companies managed essential supplies to the army and the navy; as the Dutch West India Company, Curaçao merchants, and a Company of Freed Blacks controlled the cocoa trade in Venezuela; as the South Sea Company granted loans to officials in Peru and New Spain at a better rate than the local administration, Spanish political economists became aware that a revolution was underway throughout the Spanish Empire that appeared beyond their control.215 Bernard Mandeville, 213 See Duncan Bell, Dreamworlds of Race: Empire and the Utopian Destiny of Anglo-​America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020). 214 Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 183. See also Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 1–​16. 215 Research that develops Ben Vinson iii, Nicole von Germeten, and Matthew Rectall’s excellent studies on free-​coloured militias and confraternities, and that studies their role in the political culture of the eighteenth-​century Spanish Empire, will expand our limited understanding of these corporations. See Ben Vinson iii, Bearing Arms for His Majesty: The Free-​Colored Militia in Colonial Mexico (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); Nicole von Germeten, Black Blood Brothers: Confraternities and Social Mobility for Afro-​Mexicans (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2006), 188–​220; Nicole von Germeten, “Colonial Middle Men? Mulatto Identity in New Spain’s Cofraternities,” in Ben Vinson iii and Matthew Rectall eds., Black Mexico: Race and Society from Colonial to Modern Times (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press. 2009), 136–​154;

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Robert Walpole, Diderot, Frederick ii, and Edmund Burke all agreed that Spain had become nothing more than a ‘canal’ through which riches were conveyed to Europe.216 The best solution was to acknowledge what the Spanish Empire had become –​a space for intra-​imperial and inter-​imperial collaboration –​ and establish how to regulate the economic relations of the first international space in history, to both prevent costly wars and improve the lives of the subjects of the Spanish World. Early eighteenth-​century critics and supporters of corporations were aware that commercial assessments of the Spanish Empire generated a dire picture, but the potential consequences of failing to uphold Spanish corporate interests in the face of unrest were sketched out by Carvajal before the eyes of the Council of Indies: Let your majesty be persuaded that many other provinces of your Indies are oppressed, veritably ill-​treated, and groaning with the yoke of their government. When they see that one slipped the yoke by force and that Your Majesty, after having taken such exalted measures to subject it, nevertheless drew the backbone from them, I do not know what will happen. But well does it let itself be recognised and suspicioned. […] They will paint the rising as heroism and constancy, and as immortal glory having resisted Your Majesty’s arms by land and by sea, having succeeded in throwing off the yoke and laying down the law to a sovereign whom the distance does not let them fear.217 Matthew Restall, The Black Middle: Africans, Mayas, and Spaniards in Colonial Yucatan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). 216 On the common use of this metaphor, and its origins, see chapter three. 2 17 This is a slightly abridged version of Ronald Hussey’s elegant translation of the extract found in Carvajal, “Report”, Sobre alboroto en Caracas contra la Compañía Guipuzcoana, Archivo General de Indias. Estado 63.1, 164. See Roland Dennis Hussey, The Caracas Company, 1728–​1784: A Study in the History of Spanish Monopolistic Trade (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1934), 149.

­c hapter 2

Predicting War and Peace 1

Introduction

This chapter explores the growth of political speculation in the aftermath of the War of Spanish Succession. British and French political commentators focused on the impact of the war on the future of global trade. Spanish authors, by contrast, saw the war as the culmination of a historical process: the erosion and the erasure of Spain from Europe. The Treaty of Utrecht delivered peace to Europe and installed an erratic French prince as King of Spain. Philip v’s approach to diplomacy was unreliable and unsuccessful and, disappointed by his tenure in power, the Spanish King abdicated. His abdication produced an intense intellectual response from officials, satirists, and historians. Connecting high politics to the quotidian, the almanac author Diego Torres y Villarroel mocked the Spanish Court and shaped the political culture of his day. Torres boasted about reading René Descartes and Pierre Gassendi, and inspired others to reconfigure almanacs into chorographic and political works. The predictable temporal sequence of traditional almanacs was transformed into a tool to bind reflections on eighteenth-​century life with histories of Europe. Daily concerns about poverty were connected to diplomatic debates about European dynastic disputes. Through this medium, the speed of diplomatic change became more familiar, and was reconciled with the everyday experience of politics. As Spanish officials debated the empire’s past, and faced uncertainty about the King’s future, speculation about the present generated the space to deliberate on the nature of power, monarchical authority, and Spain’s role in Europe. The almanacs in peninsular Spain allowed for the assimilation of change and fostered the growth of debate about Spain’s contemporary parallels with other European nations. Across the Atlantic, creole patriotic histories, by contrast, proved more popular. These emphasised long-​term political narratives that denoted a fundamentally different set of political expectations, decades ahead of the South American revolutions. 2

Spain, Europe, and Arbitrary Monarchy

On 5 May 1715, eighteen blind men gathered at the Convent of Carmen Calzado, in the centre of Madrid. They were deputies of a confraternity which

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004469099_003

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represented the corporate interests of the capital’s male and female blind street-​sellers. Following the terms of their constitution, they invited their leading officials to remind the new King of Spain, Philip v, that their right to the profits from the sales of popular texts like almanacs dated back to a concession made by Isabella i of Castile.1 Dynasties changed but corporate arrangements were binding, and their lawsuits against the Spanish Crown, in defence of their interests, had commenced decades earlier and would continue until the middle of the century.2 Corporations were central to the cultural life of the Spanish peninsula. And these popular texts, and their public readings, were the medium through which most Spaniards learned about the politics and diplomacy. Spanish officials needed all the information they could get in order to make sense of recent diplomatic events. In the summer of 1713, firework displays had illuminated the night skies of London, Utrecht, and the Hague. European diplomats had celebrated the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht, which formally brought an end to the costly War of Spanish Succession.3 France and Britain would, according to the terms of the treaty, preserve the balance of power in Europe. But while the idea of balance lent these ambitions a clinical and scientific appearance, British statesmen would soon complain that the diplomatic management and military preservation of such a mechanism risked turning Britain into the ‘knight errant’ Don Quixote.4 During the War of Spanish Succession, European thinkers, diplomats, and monarchs speculated about the future of Spain in Europe.5 The German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, who had drafted a project to compile a dictionary of the Basque language, declared that, under Bourbon rule, Spain 1 Cristobal Espejo, ‘Pleito entre ciegos e impresores (1680–​1755)’, Revista de la Biblioteca, Archivo y Museo del Ayuntamiento de Madrid 6 (1925), 206–​236, 224. On these corporations see Jean François Brotel, ‘Les aveugles colporteurs d’imprimés en Espagne’, Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez 9 (1973), 417–​482; Joaquín Álvarez-​Barrientos, ‘Literatura y economía en España. El ciego’, Bulletin hispanique 89:1:4 (1987), 313–​326. 2 Espejo, ‘Pleito entre ciegos e impresores’, 224. On urban spaces and almanacs see Joaquín Álvarez Barrientos, ‘Almanaque, ciudadanía y ciudad en la España del siglo XVIII’, Bulletin Hispanique 122:2 (2020), 727-​756, 745–​740. 3 Willem Frijhoff, “Fiery Metaphors in the Public Space: Celebratory Culture and Political Consciousness around the Peace of Utrecht.” Renger E. de Bruin eds., Performances of Peace: Utrecht 1713 (Brill: Leiden; Boston, 2015), 223–​248. 4 On the deployment of the terms ‘knight errant’ and ‘Don Quixote’ in British parliamentary debates see Brendan Simms, “ ‘Ministers of Europe’: British Strategic Culture, 1714–​1760”, in Scott and Simms eds., Cultures of Power, 110-​132, 126-​127. 5 On the broader context of the Utrecht Enlightenment, see Pocock, Barbarism and Religion. Volume 1, 109–​114.

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would become a colony of an imperialist France.6 In Vienna, the anonymously-​ authored text The Partition of the Lion in the Fable framed the war as a moment that would ‘determine the Fate of Europe’.7 The Habsburg King Charles vi anticipated that a balance of power which featured a fractured Spanish Empire would require too many interventions by other European nations.8 The French thinker Charles-​Irénée Castel, abbé Saint-​Pierre, by contrast, warned of the prospect of future internal Spanish imperial fragmentation if France was not allowed to form an alliance with Spain.9 Some saw this crisis as an opportunity: a document signed by the Grand Pensionary of Holland, Anthonie Heinsius, sought to establish an Anglo-​Dutch expedition, made up of six to eight thousand creoles and buccaneers, to seize the entirety of Spanish America for the Habsburg Monarchy.10 In Lisbon, King Peter ii of Portugal wrote a declaration in Spanish arguing that his God-​given possession of ‘one of the Spains, the Lusitanic side’ granted him the right to protect the liberty and ‘the name of Spain’.11 In London, Bernard Mandeville, then a humble Dutch migrant and pamphleteer, scoured the contents of seventeenth-​century texts to craft his satirical poem on the behaviour of nations and empires during the War of Spanish Succession. The text would come to be known as The Fable

6

7 8

9 10 11

Translation of a letter from Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, dated at Vienna, to John Chamberlayne, 1700. Royal Society Archives. el/​l 5/​1 13; Patrick Riley, “Introduction”, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Political Writings. Edited by Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 1–​44, 36 and 160. The Partition of the Lion in the Fable, verified in the Partition of the Spanish Monarchy or a Defence of the Emperor’s Title to the Crown of Spain […] Done from the Original printed at Vienna (London: A. Baldwin, 1701) Huntingon Library, 233305, i. Alfred Arneth, Eigenhändige Correspondenz des Königs Karl III. v. Spanien (nachmals Kaiser Karl VI) mit dem obersten Kanzler der Kgreichs Böhmen Grafen Joh. Wenzel Wratislaw. Volume 16 (Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenchaften, Archiv für Kunde österreichischer Geschichts-​Quellen, 1856), 3–​224, 181. Abbé Saint-​Pierre, A Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace, (London: printed for J. W. and sold by Ferd. Burleigh, 1714), 20. Wim Klooster, “Between Habsburg Neglect and Bourbon Assertiveness”, in Ana Crespo and Manuel Herrero Sánchez eds., España y las 17 provincias de los Países Bajos: Una revisión historiográfica (XVI-​XVIII) (Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba) 703–​718, 710. “Justificação de Portugal na resolução de ajudar à ínclita nação espanhola a sacudir o jugo francez, e a collocar no real throno da sua monarchia El-​Rei Catholico D. Carlos III; Publicada em Lisboa a 9 de março de 1704”, in José Ferreira Borges de Castro, Collecção dos tratados, convenções, contratos e actos publicos celebrados entre a Coroa de Portugal e as mais potencias desde 1640 até ao presente. Volume 1 (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1856), 198–​205, n.15. See also David Martín Marcos, ‘La paz hispanoportuguesa de 1715: la diplomacia ibérica en Utrecht’, Cuadernos de Historia Moderna 37 (2012), 151–​175, 157.

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of the Bees.12 British satires reflected the unpredictability of the outcome of the war, and mocked the government’s official news sources: ‘How long has our vile Gazetteer mistook, First made a Monarch, then redubbed a Duke! Philip was King of Spain two Months ago, And now, the Lord be prais’d, Duke Charles is so’.13 This political instability characterised both Europe’s views of Spain, and Spanish diplomacy, until the mid-​1720s. In 1725, in the midst of the peace negotiations between Spain and Vienna, the diplomat Nicolaus Zinzendorf informed the Duke of Ripperda that Charles trusted him to rule Spain. ‘All the other Spaniards are his mortal enemies, inefficient, and malicious, as they are to his Majesty’ Philip v, claimed Zinzendorf. Philip should consider making Ripperda ‘a life-​long minister and secretary of state’ who would rule ‘on behalf of both sovereigns’.14 While the idea was outlandish, it was symptomatic of broader attempts to find transnational solutions to the problems caused by the fragmentation of the Spanish Empire. As Europe debated the future of the Spanish Empire, in Spain political writers framed the War of Spanish Succession as another chapter, and perhaps the final one, in the tale of the early modern erosion of Spanish power in Europe. Supporters of the Bourbon and the Habsburg claims sought to settle the question of sovereignty in order to bring an end to the war in the peninsula.15 Agustín López de Mendoza y Pons, Count of Robres, who defended the Habsburg Monarchy, framed the raging conflict in the context of a history of Spanish civil wars.16 The author José Agustín Ibáñez de la Rentería, who favoured the Bourbon cause, by contrast compared Spain to Troy, and wrote his own history 12

13 14

15

16

Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees (London: J. Tonson, 1724), 215. To understand how the development of eighteenth-​century political philosophy in France and Scotland could be read as a response to Mandeville’s dilemmas, see Jennifer Welchman, ‘Who Rebutted Bernard Mandeville?’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 24:1 (2007), 57–​74. John McTague, ‘Censorship, Reissues, and the Popularity of Political Miscellanies’, Eighteenth-​Century Life, 41:1 (2017), 96–​115, 102. Ripperda to Elisabeth Farnese, 16 July 1725, in Antonio Rodriguez Villa, ‘La embajada del Baron de Ripperda en Viena’, Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia 30:1 (1897), 5–​79, 59–​60. On Ripperda and the Spanish administration, see José Antonio Escudero, Los Origenes del Consejo de Ministros de España. Volume 1 (Madrid: Editoria Nacional, 1979), 75–​88. The main study on the writings of the period is María Teresa Pérez Picazo, La publicísta espanola en la Guerra de Sucesión (csic, Madrid, 1966). See also González Cruz, Propaganda e información en tiempos de guerra; Teófanes López Egido, Opinión pública y oposición al poder en la españa del siglo XVIII (1713–​1759) (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 2002). Agustín López de Mendoza y Pons, Conde de Robres, Historia de las guerras civiles de España: desde la muerte del señor Carlos II, que sucedió en 1º de noviembre de 1700, distribuida en ocho libros, por los mismos años regulados hasta el de 1708 escrita por el Ilmo.

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to ensure that: ‘when people hear all Spaniards have perished, let future kings open texts like these, so they may know here was Spain, as Troy once was’.17 The vision of the War of Spanish Succession as the end of Spain was echoed in countless texts. The councils of state were seen as powerless as they ‘allowed Spain to die’.18 Europe, in turn, appeared intent on further fragmenting the Spanish Empire: ‘Instead of piecing its body back together, all we see is the dismemberment of Spain’.19 An anonymous text suggested that the Treaty of Utrecht’s defence of the balance of power was a cover to finally banish Spain from existence. Europe had ‘denied’ Charles’s ‘just right to the Austrian Crown’ and had then used ‘the pretext of the balance and the security of his interests’ to undermine the Spanish Empire. ‘Despite the profits’ European powers had accrued, they refused to end the war against Spain. There was only one explanation: they wished to end the Spanish Monarchy. The war continued ‘due to the fact that there remain Spaniards, even if these have been reduced to their famous ancient limits, with the Lower Countries lost, along with Italy, the Mediterranean islands and parts of Catalonia and Gibraltar, and a contentious Sicily’. Across the Atlantic, Spanish power had been destabilised, and those territories were likely to be the next to fall: ‘the seas bereft of our vessels, the Indies without our commerce, and their shores, like ours, lay unprotected’.20 The anonymous Teatro de Desdichas portrayed the rump Habsburg Monarchy as the original ‘balance’ of European power. The Habsburg Monarchy had ensured ‘a universal and perpetual peace’, and prevented ‘the twists and turns of wars, which regularly require such a dismemberment of the losing nation’. The Teatro anticipated that it would ‘be a struggle for a sovereign to rule it’ once peace had been achieved.21 Both European and Spanish commentaries on the standing of the Spanish Crown, then, anticipated that cooperation between states would likely play an important role in determining its future.

17 18 19 20 21

Sr. Agustín López de Mendoza y Pons (Zaragoza: Diputación Provincial Impr. Del Hospicio Provincial, 1882). José Agustín Ibáñez de la Rentería, Ensayos de vaticinios reales de las dos coronas, unos cumplidos y otros por cumplir, en gloria de la augusta Casa de Borbón (Paris: Impr. Simon Langlois, 1712), iv-​v. Egido López, Opinión pública, 105. Egido López, Opinión pública, 108. Anonymous, “Respuesta de un amigo a otro que le pregunta por el fin que vendrán a tener nuestros males en España”, in Vicente Palacio Atard, “Un escrito político de 1714”, in Anuario de Historia del Derecho 18 (1957), 642–​652, 653–​654. Agustí Alcoberro, ‘Una visió de la guerra de successió des de l’exili: el Teatro de Desdichas (Milà, 1716)’, Bulletí de la Societat Catalana d’Estudis Històrics 18 (2007), 9–​31, 17.

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During the war, Philip’s officials speculated with the prospect of novel diplomatic alliances that would bolster Spain’s role in Europe. José Grimaldo, the leading minister in Madrid, drafted a plan for a commercial treaty with Russia, and projected upon Vienna the very fate that had befallen Spain: ‘without a hope for succession, upon his death his goods will return to Europe and his lands will be the object of many’.22 Grimaldo considered Peter i to be the most suitable ally for Spain, and anticipated a strong commercial union with Russia: ‘the King of Spain’ could ‘satisfy his thirst for commerce by establishing ports in his states, such as Lübeck and Danzig’.23 Grimaldo believed that, together, Russia, France, and Spain would wage war on their enemies to regain Spain’s Habsburg territories and, once victorious, would grant the Tsar the title of Emperor.24 Geopolitical instability could generate ambitious transnational alliances: Grimaldo remarked that ‘in recent times’ new sovereigns emerged ‘every day’.25 But, for all this speculation, the reality was that the War of Spanish Succession left the Spanish administration in chaos.26 The trajectory of the early eighteenth-​century reforms of the legal and political administration was dizzying. Philip first ordered Spanish councils to continue with their traditional functions, but Louis xiv encouraged the creation of a separate government council that would oversee the management of the empire. This was to host the presidents of the sub-​councils of Italy, Flanders, and the Americas, and the governor of Castile.27 This council was established, but its sub-​councils were then disbanded. Its former members were made consejeros de Estado, who served as advisors to the King.28 In order to appease Spanish nobles, many were named consejeros. Yet while the number of advisors grew, their duties remained the same, and this precipitated disputes between them.29 The reforms of colonial 22

José Grimaldo, Carta sobre varios puntos de estado. Madrid, June 26 1724 [1714]. ii.1431, Biblioteca del Palacio Real, 164. 23 Grimaldo, Carta, 166. 24 On Russian diplomacy during this period see Jan Hennings, Russia and Courtly Europe: Ritual and the Culture of Diplomacy, 1648–​1725 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 54; Grimaldo, Carta, 167. 25 Grimaldo, Carta, 167. 26 This type of administrative disruption is overlooked in narratives that see the Spanish process of reform as a matter of linear centralisation, see Kuethe and Adrien, “Alberoni and the First Stirrings of Reform”, in The Spanish Atlantic World, 31–​67. 27 Juan Luis Castellano, Gobierno y poder en la España del XVIII (Granada: Editorial de la Universidad de Granada), 35. 28 Castellano, Gobierno y poder, 37. 29 The Council of Castile then assumed the responsibilities of the Council of Aragón, but clashed with Philip over its institutional ambitions. Castellano, Gobierno y poder, 46.

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institutions were just as piecemeal. The Secretary of the Despacho Universal was reorganised, and sub-​sections were created that divided affairs into War and the Treasury on one side, and ‘all the other matters on any other topic’, on the other.30 Orders to viceroys and imperial administrators would no longer be made by the Council of Indies, but through the vía reservada: a private correspondence between the leading minister and colonial officials.31 Four new secretaries were created and divided into Justice, Religion, War, the Navy, and the Americas. A year later, they were reformed and rearranged into State Administration, War, the Navy and Justice, and the Treasury.32 It was therefore unsurprising that throughout this period the consulados, the chartered corporations in charge of the regulation of commercial affairs, grew increasingly unresponsive and autonomous, and addressed their own affairs.33 This was symptomatic of the fact that the War of Spanish Succession, and the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, did not affect the diverse provinces of the Spanish Empire in the same way. The Miskitu were a community of mixed African Amerindians who first occupied Honduras’s Cape Gracias a Dios, and throughout the eighteenth century came to be a dominant force in Central America’s Caribbean Coast.34 For this community, the most significant change was that Britain acquired the asiento. Once Britain withdrew from slaving raids in the region, the Miskitu were thus able to subordinate other communities by virtue of tribute exaction.35 In Lima, miners and mining officials were more concerned with the expansion of mining in New Spain and the socioeconomic difficulties it had generated than they were worried by the change in dynasty.36 In Mexico City, the capital of New Spain, the 1710s were, for local officials, mostly shaped by debates about the tributes owed by men and women of various groups –​free blacks, mulattos, mestizos –​that lived in the region.37 Further 30 ‘todo lo demás de cualquier materia que sea’. Quoted in Castellano, Gobierno y poder, 65. 31 Castellano, Gobierno y poder, 65–​66. 32 Castellano, Gobierno y poder, 67. 33 Iván Escamilla González, Los intereses malentendidos: El Consulado de Comerciantes de México y la monarquía española, 1700–​1739 (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2011), 183–​228. Adrian J. Pearce, The Origins of Bourbon Reform in Spanish South America, 1700–​1763 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 77–​84. 34 Danna A. Levin Rojo, Cynthia Radding, Alejandra Boza, and Juan Carlos Solórzano Fonseca, “Indigenous Trade in Caribbean Central America, 1700s-​1800s”, in Danna A. Levin Rojo and Cynthia Radding eds., Oxford Handbook of Borderlands of the Iberian World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 239–​265, 240. 35 Rojo, Radding, Boza, and Solórzano Fonseca, “Indigenous Trade”, 245. 36 Hill, Hierarchy, 107–​140. 37 Norah L. A. Gharala. Taxing Blackness: Free Afromexican Tribute in Bourbon New Spain. Atlantic Crossings Series (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2019), 55–​64.

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north, in Pennsylvania and other British territories, local governments cited the scarcity of specie caused by the War of Spanish Succession as a reason to issue paper money. It would, they argued, be secured by mortgages on private property.38 The future consequences of this form of currency, explained Benjamin Franklin, were understood by few, anticipating the century-​long debates about the currencies that relied on, and ultimately replaced, Spanish imperial bullion as the dominant form of exchange in Europe.39 While Saint-​Pierre, Franklin, and Mandeville speculated about the future, Philip v, fuelled by revanchism, foreshortened bygone debates to set the scene for his actions. Revenge has a way of telescoping the past, of condensing time and space, and, in this case, it motivated Philip to obsess over the causes of the war and to be blind to the future benefits of peace.40 Philip’s habit of zooming in on past events, like lost battles, and zooming past others, like treaties he had agreed to, made it difficult for ministers to focus his gaze on the bigger picture. His habit of seeing everything through the lens of the war narrowed ministerial time frames for reform and foreclosed forethought. In this context, Spanish ministers were dismissive of reforms that were ‘too long-​term in conception’.41 European commentators suggested that Spanish reformers fell, or were banished, because they tried to ‘provide this state with a stable and solid form’.42 Influential state bodies sought to find stable ground by turning 38 39

40

41

42

Katie A. Moore, ‘America’s First Economic Stimulus Package: Paper Money and the Body Politic in Colonial Pennsylvania, 1715–​1730’, Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-​Atlantic Studies 83:4 (2016), 529–​57, 530. Benjamin Franklin, “The Nature and Necessity of a Paper-​Currency, 3 April 1729”, in Leonard W. Labaree ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, January 6, 1706 through December 31, 1734 (W. Labaree. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 139–​157. John Law would declare that it was dangerous to rely on an economic system that depended on the flows of gold and silver. Antoin E. Murphy, John Law: Economic Theorist and Policy-​Maker (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 108. On these complexities see Pablo Vázquez Gestal, Una nueva majestad. Felipe V, Isabel de Farnesio y la identidad de la monarquía (1700–​1729) (Madrid: Fundación de Municipios, 2013); Concepción de Castro, A La Sombra de Felipe V: José de Grimaldo, Ministro Responsable, 1703–​1726 (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2004). Geoffrey J. Walker, Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade (London: Macmillan, 1979), 95. On Bergeyck, see Reginald de Schryver, Jan van Brouchoven, Graaf van Bergeyck (1644–​1725) (Brussels: Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie, 1965). On the schemes of Nicolas Mesnager and their possible influence in Spain see Koen Stapelbroek, ““The Long Peace”: Commercial Treaties and the Principles of Global Trade at the Peace of Utrecht”, in Soons ed., The 1713 Peace of Utrecht and Its Enduring Effects, 93–​119, 109–​110. Quoted in Anna Mur i Raurell, Juan Guillermo Riperdá, and Luis Ripperda, Diplomacia secreta y paz: la correspondencia de los embajadores españoles en Viena Juan Guillermo Ripperda y Luis Ripperda (1724–​1727) = Geheimdiplomatie und friede: die korrespondenz der spanishcen Botschafter in Wien Johan Willem Ripperda und Ludolf Ripperda

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back the clock: the Council of Indies sought to redress the ‘disfiguration’ of the Spanish Monarchy and to recover ‘what was lost in the war’.43 The Council offered Philip a set of naval reforms to protect Spanish commerce from French assaults.44 Their proposals went unheard at Court, and Philip chose instead to pursue war. He drew on the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht to continue his pursuit of dominance in the Mediterranean and launch assaults on the coasts of North Africa and the shores of Italy.45 The desire to relitigate old diplomatic disagreements therefore stalled the growth of reform. While the treaty had hailed the end of the ‘most destructive flame of war’ was to be ‘extinguished by this peace’, one Spanish author, paraphrasing these terms, would proclaim that ‘the fire of war was not adequately extinguished’ at the time, and ‘in the absence of a clear target within the Spanish peninsula, it was reignited and propagated elsewhere’.46 Philip frequently drew on two sets of arguments to substantiate his policies: providentialism and diplomatic grievances.47 On this occasion, a theological view of power underpinned his decision to renew the conflict. To justify the attack on Habsburg territories that gave rise to the War of Quadruple Alliance, Philip’s first justification was a rejection of diplomatic treaties and an appeal to his God-​given rights: Kings did not have to observe temporal diplomatic agreements when essential circumstances were deemed to have changed.48 This would remain a persistent underlying logic for Philip’s actions (1724–​1727). Volume 1 (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, Área de Documentación y Publicaciones: Instituto Histórico Austriaco, 2011), 267. See G. Hanotin, Jean Orry, un homme des finances royales entre France et Espagne (1701–​1705) (Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba y Cajasur, 2009); Kamen, ‘Melchor De Macanaz’, 699–​716. 43 Consulta del Consejo de Indias al Rey sobre el comercio, 24 December 1713. Biblioteca de la Real Academia de Historia. Colección Sempere y Guarinos. Quoted in Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War, 161. 44 Consulta del Consejo de Indias al Rey; Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War, 161–​162. 45 Storrs, The Spanish Resurgence, 5; Kuethe and Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic World, 31–​67; Alonso Aguilera, La conquista y el dominio español de Cerdeña, (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1977), 53. 46 Charles Jenkinson, Lord Liverpool, A Collection of Treaties between Great Britain and Other Powers (London: Printed for J. Debrett, 1785), 7; Anonymous, Reflexiones sobre la decadencia de la Monarquía española, motivada por las guerras del siglo XVII, y medios de restablecer la paz y opulencia de las provincias, c.1739–​1748. Biblioteca del Palacio Real. ii 02861, 54. 47 On providentialist discourses during the war see David González Cruz, Une guerre de religion entre princes catholiques: la succession de Charles II dans l’Empire espagnol. Translated by Gilles Béraud. (Paris: L’École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 2006). 48 Frederik Dhondt, Balance of Power and Norm Hierarchy. Franco-​British Diplomacy after the Peace of Utrecht (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 110.

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during his reign. To buttress this providentialism, Philip traditionally turned to a second justification: reanimating anecdotal, settled, albeit contested, disputes to legitimise aggression. In this case, Philip claimed his assault on Sicily was a response to the Habsburg failure to withdraw troops from Mallorca and Catalonia during the War of Spanish Succession.49 Philip soon found that Europe would not tolerate these arguments or his arbitrary approach to diplomacy. In response to Philip’s intransigence, France, Spain’s main ally, considered approaching Spanish exiles in Vienna, and to support the British effort to attack Vigo and Guipuzcoa, along the Northern Spanish coasts.50 European writers like the French Huguenot Jean Rousset de Missy argued that in order to preserve Europe’s ‘equilibrium’, the Netherlands, Britain, France, Austria, the Kingdom of Savoy, and Prussia should invade Spanish Atlantic and Pacific territories and distribute the lands among themselves.51 Philip would have no right to protest the invasion, explained Missy, since ‘the whole world knew’ that he had ‘no right’ to the Crown of Spain.52 Spain, moreover, could not lay claim to these lands since its rationale was based on an absurd principle: nobody, Missy reasoned, would allow a shipwrecked subject of the Moghul Empire who happened to wake up on the shores of Ireland to declare that he had discovered the island, and to claim it as his own.53 By 1719, Philip was overwhelmed by the War of the Quadruple Alliance. He expressed, for the first time, his desire to renounce the crown, and promised Elisabeth he would abdicate in no less than four years’ time.54 Following the Treaty of London, which put an end to the conflict, John Dalrymple, the second Earl of Stair, reported that Philip was aware of his lack of influence in Europe, as Britain and France forced Cardinal Alberoni to step down.55 One reform encouraged some to believe that Philip may have learned his lesson: the Proyecto de Galeones, the first stable measure of economic reform, aimed to

49 Dhondt, Balance of Power and Norm Hierarchy, 110. 50 Volosyuk, “Negotiating the Balance of Power”, 157; Antonio Mejide Pardo, La invasión inglesa de Galicia en 1719 (Santiago de Compostela: csic/​Instituto P. Sarmiento de Estudios Gallegos, 1970), 20. This was not an anomaly. See Dhondt, Balance of Power and Norm Hierarchy, 157. 51 Jean Rousset de Missy, Histoire du Cardinal Alberoni et de son ministere jusqu’à la fin de l’Année 1719, Volume 2 (The Hague: Adrien Moetjens, 1720), 183 and 298. 52 Missy, Histoire, 306. 53 Missy, Histoire, 306. 54 Henry Kamen, Philip V of Spain: The King Who Reigned Twice (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 140. 55 Dhondt, Balance of Power and Norm Hierarchy, 176.

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revitalise the galleon trade, provide annual fleets to Veracruz and Portobello, and establish private contracts for the mail to Peru, New Spain, and Granada. It closely followed the terms of the Peace of Utrecht.56 But most European commentators, as they sketched speculative histories of Alberoni’s meteoric rise and his sudden fall, ignored this scheme and believed his departure was a sign of continuing chaos at Court.57 The worst was yet to come. Philip’s response to his failed revanchist policies was a turning point in Spanish history. Faced with geopolitical instability, unresponsive colonial administrations, and unable to implement durable reforms, the King of Spain abdicated. This crisis accentuated calls for change. It led to popular mockery, political speculation, and political economic debate about Spain’s role in Europe. The abdication, in short, precipitated the growth of the early Spanish Enlightenment. 3

Crisis and Catharsis: The Dawn of the Early Spanish Enlightenment

On January 10 1724, after four years of reflecting ‘deeply and profoundly’ on his life, Philip renounced his claim to ‘all territories, realms, and lordships’ in favour of his son, Luis.58 In his Comentarios sobre la Guerra de España, the first historical account of the War of Spanish Succession, published a year later, Vicente Bacallar y Sanna, marquess of San Phelipe, devoted his concluding pages to the study of the European response to Philip’s abdication. ‘Certain Courts of the North of Europe, and some in Italy’, he explained, ‘saw this as a political, and not a spiritual decision’. These Courts believed Philip was trying to

56

Kuethe and Adrien, The Spanish Atlantic World, 62–​67; Pearce, The Origins of Bourbon Reform in Spanish South America, 63–​88. 57 Voltaire commended Alberoni’s ‘powerful genius’. Alfonso de Savio, ‘Voltaire and Spain’, Hispania 7:2 (1924), 69–​110, 107. Anonymous, Glosa, ms. Real Academia de la Historia 9/​ 5966, E, 146. Quoted in Iris M. Zavala, Clandestinidad Y Libertinaje Erudito En Los Albores Del Siglo XVIII (Barcelona: Ariel, 1978), 266; San Phelipe, Comentarios sobre la guerra, 276. On foreign works about Alberoni see Dhondt, Balance of Power and Norm Hierarchy, 126 and Anonymous, The Spanish Politician: or, Some account of the management of Cardinal Alberoni. Done out of French. (London: Printed, and sold by the Booksellers of London and Westminster, 1718); Thomas Gordon, A Modest Apology for Parson Alberoni, Governor to King Philip, a minor; and Universal Curate of the whole Spanish Monarchy: the whole being a short, but unanswerable defence of Priestcraft, and a new confutation of the Bishop of Bangor (London: J. Roberts, 1719), among others. 58 Kamen, Philip V of Spain: The King Who Reigned Twice, 140.

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aspire to the Crown of France, in the event of Louis xv’s death.59 The historian explained that he thought this unlikely, but he continued with a prescriptive warning. If the claim that Philip’s abdication was a political manoeuvre was indeed true, San Phelipe considered these ‘remote hopes’ were unacceptable. These ideas were ‘ones the Catholic King should never have’, even when ‘the King of France is decrepit’. There were two reasons to avoid engaging in these schemes: it would be a breach of ‘his renunciations’, but, more importantly, it was ‘due to the manifest opposition of so many Nations’. At risk was ‘the return to the principal motives which prompted the bloody and pertinent war’.60 In the eyes of the Council of Castile, the crisis had been even more severe. On 31 August 1724, Luis I had died, and Philip had returned to Madrid with the intention of mourning the death of his son and reclaiming the Spanish Crown.61 A few days later, the Council of Castile had written to Philip, and had made clear its ‘doubts about his fidelity, affection and zeal towards his royal duty’.62 The content of Philip’s abdication in favour of Luis was a source of grave concern, for Philip had failed to anticipate the potential consequences of his son’s death. The Council had scoured legal sources and had eventually drawn on Alfonso x’s Siete Partidas to explain that since he had abdicated, Philip had no right to claim back the Crown. They had declared the crown belonged to Philip’s oldest son, Ferdinand, and since the child was underage, a group of tutors would be selected and appointed. These would both educate Ferdinand and govern as ‘cabinet ministers’ until he came of age.63 According to the Council’s letter, Luis’s rule had advanced the ‘fundamentals of a great kingdom’. The Council had dealt with ‘everyday affairs’ and had served as a ‘consultative body’. But the final decision-​making had resided firmly in Luis’s hands. Under an eleven-year-old Ferdinand, however, the Council feared 59

Bacallar y Sanna, Comentarios de la guerra de España, 305–​306. On the Duke of Orléans’s attempts to prevent Philip v from learning of the King’s death see Murphy, John Law, 125–​ 126. On French efforts to prevent the ascension of the Duke of Orléans by favouring Philip, see Arthur M. Wilson, French Foreign Policy during the Administration of Cardinal Fleury, 1726–​1743: A Study in Diplomacy and Commercial Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936), 30–​32. 60 Bacallar y Sanna, Comentarios de la guerra de España, 309. Some have argued that it was likely that Montesquieu’s views on the connections between monarchy and inequality emerged during this period and from the debates about the French royal succession. Sonenscher, Before the Deluge, 124. 61 Kamen, Philip V of Spain: The King Who Reigned Twice, 150. 62 Consulta del Consejo de Castilla para que la magestad del Rey Nuestro Señor Don Phelipe 5 volviese a admitir la corona despues de la muerte de su hijo, Biblioteca Nacional de España. mss/​1 8576/​1 5/​8 , 2. 63 Consulta del Consejo de Castilla, 3.

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divisions may be allowed to fester as it sought to rule without an adult monarch.64 No single royal authority would be able to resolve a deadlock. Philip would not be able to interfere since he no longer held power, nor could the infant Ferdinand since he was too young to wield it: the ‘political harmony’ which ‘preserved Monarchies’ would come to an end.65 With the Cambrai negotiations at stake, Charles vi would expect the King’s signature as a guarantee of trust, and failure to deliver it, they feared, would reignite war. ‘If God’, they explained, were to ‘brandish his sword of justice, that which has caused so much harm to the Kingdoms’, Europe would turn against Spain: ‘the rest of Europe will scarcely be trusted to a ministry that lacks the support of the King, and will thereby cast the monarchy into a conflict and the suspension of the possibility of the long-​sought peace’.66 But the Council had prioritised the pursuit of said peace over strict adherence to the law. They had conceded that their letters were intended to enable Philip to return to the throne. But they had established certain preconditions. Philip was to annul the abdication and swear to never repeat it. In order to avoid the issue of succession, he was to make Ferdinand his rightful heir.67 Two days later, Philip replied to the Council. He explained he had considered the matter of ‘resuming his government as a governor, and not a King, while choosing his ministers at will’.68 In pursuing this reasoning, Philip had inadvertently echoed accusations of those who had favoured the Habsburg side during the war, and who had refused to grant the role of king to Philip v, insisting instead on a viceroy or temporary governor, since he embodied different principles and styles of governance.69 In the event, Philip continued, his ‘religious advisors’ had declared his right to the Crown derived from God, and therefore, this was not a right he could renounce.70 ‘These Kingdoms are without a King, the vassals orphaned, the tribunals suspended because they lack the figurehead from whom they derive their authority’.71 His return, then, was a matter of necessity. For the council, it was a diplomatic necessity, and the means to preserve 64 65 66 67 68 69

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Consulta del Consejo de Castilla, 3. Consulta del Consejo de Castilla, 7. Consulta del Consejo de Castilla, 7. Consulta del Consejo de Castilla, 7. Consulta del Consejo de Castilla, 12. Ignacio M. Vicent López, “La cultura política castellana durante la guerra de sucesión”, in Pablo Fernández Albaladejo ed., Los Borbones: dinastía y memoria de nación en la España del siglo XVIII: actas del coloquio internacional celebrado en Madrid, mayo de 2000 (Marcial Pons Historia, 2001), 217–​244, 221. Consulta del Consejo de Castilla, 12. Consulta del Consejo de Castilla, 12.

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peace. For Philip, it was a a type of oxymoron: a providential necessity. The following day the Council prioritised stability over further debate, complimented the King’s wisdom, and thanked him for accepting the Crown. On the night of 6 September 1724, the monarchical order was restored in Spain. Philip then renounced his rights to the Crown of France, in this case, ‘for the sake of European equilibrium’.72 There was, then, a profound crisis at the heart of Spanish power. Short-​term policies and short-​lived ministers foreclosed the possibility of continuity in policy-​making. Institutions responsible for the implementation of laws therefore remained in a state of flux. They were regularly reformed in ways that undermined efforts to develop institutional memory and their proposals were ignored. The King’s source of legitimacy was questionable. Spanish subjects seemed destined to finance an empire engaged in a perpetual state of war. But a different future was possible. ‘A patient who requires this number of consultations must be very ill’.73 With this quip, the writer Diego Torres y Villarroel mocked Philip’s return to power. Torres, the most prolific Spanish author of the eighteenth century, would become the most influential writer under Philip’s reign. He was the thinker who best captured, and shaped, the political mood during these turbulent years. In his view, the King’s legitimacy had been dealt a huge blow, but so too had that of the Council of Castile. Torres ridiculed the Council for being a ‘comedy of mutations’.74 In 1724, then, Torres began his epistolary work Visiones y Vistas de Torres con Quevedo, a critical attempt at foreshortening the politics of seventeenth-​century Spain.75 Torres suggested that the Court was the cause of most evils: riches from towns, villages, and cities all flowed into the Court, where ‘everything was consumed’, and across towns, villages, and cities people ‘were consumed’ by its greed.76 His almanacs did not shy away from criticising the instability caused by Philip

72

Alejandro del Cantillo, Tratados, convenios y declaraciones de paz y de comercio: que han hecho con las potencias extranjeras los monarcas españoles de la casa de Borbón: desde el año de 1700 hasta el día cédula de renuncia (Madrid: Impr. Alegria y Charlain, 1843), 94. 73 Diego Torres y Villarroel, Glosa del decreto que firmo el rey en 6 septiembre de 1724 entre 10 y 11 de la noche; que dominaba Venus, salió a la luz el otro día que parece que la noche y se recogió por el consejo para ponerle cabeza que no la tenía, pero la cola que traca no se sabe (1725). Biblioteca del Palacio Real, ii.1431. 74 Torres, Glosa, 449. 75 Diego Torres y Villarroel, “Visiones y visitas de Torres con don Francisco de Quevedo por la Corte”, in Sueños morales. Corregidos y aumentados con el papel nuevo de La barca de Aqueronte y Residencia infernal de Plutón (Salamanca: Imp. de la Santa Cruz, 1743), 1–​259. 76 Torres, “Visiones y visitas de Torres con don Francisco de Quevedo por la Corte”, in Sueños morales, 84.

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v’s erratic behaviour, and it was precisely during those years that marked the fall of Alberoni and Philip’s abdication, at a time when politics appeared completely unpredictable, when Torres first found a receptive audience which facilitated his meteoric rise to fame and notoriety. Torres’s most significant cultural contributions were his yearly almanacs. These were full of speculations that aimed to address prospective changes and continuities at the Spanish Court: one that failed to understand that ‘no government can survive on the basis of luck’.77 Long discarded by the historiography as Juvenalian writings, Torres’s almanacs were eclectic and discordant; they proclaimed that politics was ‘an art derived from experience’, featured anti-​war allegories, and, above all, reflected yearly changes in European and Spanish politics.78 Torres grew up during the War of Spanish Succession and was educated at the prestigious Trilingual College at the University of Salamanca.79 As a student, he took a strong interest in philosophy, astronomy, and astrology. He then had to flee to Portugal for reasons that remain unclear, but were seemingly related to his scurrilous behaviour.80 He soon returned to Spain, published his first satirical almanac and, in 1720, he made his way to the capital, where his satires became the talk of the town. Torres would later reflect on the success of his works by speculating on their social utility: ‘These works were well received in Spain’, he explained, ‘perhaps due to their scarcity at the time’, or ‘perhaps due to the ridiculous novelty of its ideas’. It was possibly ‘due to the particular extravagance of their prologues; or perhaps the shamelessness of their statements’.81 Spain had a long tradition of drawing on popular writings such as these to amplify knowledge about the state of affairs in Europe and beyond. In seventeenth-​century Spain, conflicts between validos, and diplomatic events like the Spanish match between Prince Charles of England and Maria Anna of 77 Torres, Glosa, 448. 78 François López, Juan Pablo Forner (1756–​1797) y la crisis de la conciencia española, Estudios de historia (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, Consejería de Educación y Cultura, 1999), 77; Diego Torres y Villarroel, Extracto de los pronósticos del gran piscator de Salamanca desde el año de 1725 hasta el de 1753 (Madrid: Impr. de la viuda de Ibarra, 1765), 53; Torres y Villarroel, Extracto, 41. 79 Diego Torres y Villarroel, Vida. Edited by Manuel María Pérez López (Salamanca: Fundación Salamanca Ciudad de Cultura, 2005), 12. 80 Torres, Vida, 12. 81 Quoted in Zavala, Clandestinidad y Libertinaje, 191. For a recent study on their literary qualities see Joaquín Álvarez Barrientos, El astrólogo y su gabinete. Autoría, ciencia y representación en los almanaques del siglo XVIII (Oviedo: ifesxviii /​Ediciones Trea, 2020).

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Spain, precipitated the emergence of an extensive set of newsletters and other sources of political communication. These were initially aimed at the Court, but transitioned into a more popular form of political announcements.82 Under Juan José de Austria, the growth of archives and the rise of the paper state combined with lower forms of culture, rumour, and industrial espionage in the pages of the first gazettes.83 By the mid-​seventeenth century, there were a number of provincial periodicals which were nonetheless regarded with scepticism, as denoted by the popular expression used to accuse one of ‘lying more than a gazette’.84 These forms of political knowledge were accompanied by popular oral readings and visual culture in public spaces that facilitated the exchanges and transfers of knowledge among both the literate and the illiterate.85 Scepticism towards official sources continued into the eighteenth century, as many claimed that official periodicals always said the same thing, or that the information they conveyed to the public was false.86 Eighteenth-​century almanacs developed into something different. The picaresque was an elite medium which adopted the gaze of the poor. The almanacs, instead, expanded on the outlook of the average Spaniard and introduced them to elite discussions about the history of European monarchies or the geographical borders of an empire.87 Seventeenth-​century pamphlets that pinned their fates on the partisan debates over the merits of Spanish validos provided little information about foreign political ideas.88 Almanac authors, by contrast, were responsible for writing histories of diplomacy, and generated political knowledge that could be discussed by the masses and the Spanish Court. This combination of elite and popular discussion facilitated the expansion of the almanacs into educational tracts on European politics, chorography, and

82

See, for example, Fernando Bouza, Papeles y opinión: políticas de publicación en el Siglo de Oro (Madrid: csic, 2008), 203–​204. 83 María Dolores Saíz, Historia del periodismo en España. Los orígenes: el siglo XVIII (Madrid: Alianza, 1990), 50. 84 Saíz, Historia del periodismo en España, 60. 85 Fernando Bouza, Communication, Knowledge and Memory in Early Modern Spain. Translated by Sonia López and Michael S. Agnew (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 39–​56. 86 Zavala, Clandestinidad y Libertinaje Erudito, 237; Egido López, Opinión publica, 36. 87 Francisco Rico, The Spanish Picaresque Novel and the Point of View. Translated by Charles Davis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Julio Pio Baroja, Ensayo sobre literatura de cordel (Madrid: akal, 1990); Luis Díaz Viana and Araceli Godino López eds., Palabras para el pueblo: Aproximación general a la literatura de cordel (Madrid: csic, 2000). 88 See Héloïse Hermant, Guerres de plumes: publicité et cultures politiques dans l’Espagne du XVIIe siècle (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2012).

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mathematics. These works sought to popularise forms of knowledge that could be used to foster political reform. The early eighteenth-​century growth of erudite and political almanacs, moreover, was not unique to Spain. The learned almanac was a transnational phenomenon that was an essential part of the growth of a critical pedestrian outlook on socioeconomic and geopolitical questions that developed throughout the century. Their popularity in France, Britain, British America, Spain, and Central Europe, demonstrated a closer popular engagement with the politics of the age. In France, one of the main political channels for the diffusion of information about the War of Spanish Succession were almanacs which featured visual representations of turning points in the conflict. In their critical spirit, they also reflected the fragmented, overlapping, and debatable forms of knowledge transmission that emerged during the war.89 In Central Europe, the Holy Roman Empire deployed almanacs to reaffirm its imperial authority and to encourage subjects to engage with the world of the Court.90 In Britain, satirical almanacs were a huge commercial success; they attracted the satire of Jonathan Smith and gained popularity alongside other growing forms of speculative social and political commentary such as caricature.91 In the British American territories, Benjamin Franklin’s yearly almanacs fostered a more independent approach to political questions, and, in the case of the first German-​language publisher in North America, Christoph Sauer, his own High German American Almanac encouraged indigenous peoples and Europeans to collaborate and to foster peace in Pennsylvania.92 89

90 91

92

According to Fernando Bouza, the use of gazettes and periodicals differentiated these propaganda wars from older episodes. Bouza, Papeles y Opinión, 187–​188. See, for example, Almanach Royal, Representant l’Vnion des Princes, par la Paix generale, conclüe à Bade, le 7. Septembre (Chez Langlois, sur le petit Pont, à la Couppe d’Or, 1714); Fragment d’un almanach pour 1704 (Paris: chez N. Bonnart, rue S.t Jacques, à l’Aigle, 1704). Volker Bauer, “Publicité des cours et almanachs d’État dans le Saint-​Empire au xviiie siècle”, in Christine Lebeau ed., L’espace du Saint-​Empire: Du Moyen Âge à l’époque modern (Strasbourg: Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, 2004), 157–​171. John McTague, ‘“There is No Such Man as Isaack Bickerstaff”: Partridge, Pittis, and Jonathan Swift’, Eighteenth-​Century Life 35:1 (2011), 83–​101. See also Colley, Britons, 20–​22; John Sommerville, The News Revolution in England. Cultural Dynamics of Daily Information (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 152. William Pencak, ‘Politics and Ideology in Poor Richard’s Almanack’, The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 116: 2 (1992), 183–​211. On Torres and Franklin see Ilie, ‘Franklin and Villarroel’, 321–​42; Bethany Wiggin, ““For Each and Every House to Wish for Peace”: Christoph Saur’s High German American Almanac and the French and Indian War in Pennsylvania”, in Linda Gregerson and Juster, Susan, eds., Empires of God: Religious Encounters in the Early Modern Atlantic (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 154–​174.

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In Spain, almanacs helped to make sense of the times. In the midst of conflict, instability, and crisis, the future seemed unclear. The basis for political and economic predictability was hard to fathom: uncertainty made foresight precious and instability quickly rendered expectations worthless. Apocalyptic writings served to foreshorten a familiar tale during periods when the complex nature of the recent past was difficult to grasp. But these apocalyptic designs had not come to pass. Instead, many Spanish writers had struggled to find historical parallels –​when faced with Philip’s rushed abdication, the Council of Castile had declared there was no precedent for his conduct.93 Torres’s success turned on his capacity to grasp this: he quoted and capitalised on the Roman saying that ‘motion accelerates when the end is near’, and harnessed the lingering intensity of apocalyptic fears to propel his writings.94 Spanish authors then drew on the intuitive predictability of almanacs, and issued in a critical spectre behind the medium’s mask of familiarity. By doing so, they fostered public debate over political, social, and economic questions at the heart of Spanish peninsular society. Periodicity of this kind captured the pace of political change and ultimately naturalised its role in society.95 Contemporaries demonstrated an awareness of the cultural benefits of this medium of information in the aftermath of war. The most important Spanish philosopher of the period, Benito Feijoo, who was generally sceptical of the superstitious approach fostered by almanacs, suggested that the successful predictions of almanacs turned on the predictability of unstable political dynamics in Spain; ‘by drawing on the situation of the Republic, one can imagine changes that may arise. Knowing that no valido whose fortune has been questioned has rarely gained the perpetual grace of his Prince, one can easily predict his fall with a high degree of probability’.96 Feijoo, moreover, cast his mind back to the almanacs of the War of Spanish Succession to suggest that they had facilitated political speculation and debate so that ‘everyone could find that which they desired’, since almanacs reflected on a possible Habsburg or Bourbon 93

Juicio sobre la sucesión de Felipe V, 4 septiembre 1724, in Biblioteca del Palacio Real, ii/​1431, 168–​229, 168. 94 ‘motus in fine velocior’. José Torres y Villarroel, Correo de el otro mundo al gran Piscator de Salamanca: cartas respondidas a los muertos por el mismo Piscator D. Diego de Torres Villarroel (Sevilla: Impr. Manuel Caballero, 1725), 11. On the apocalypsis and acceleration see Reinhart Koselleck, “Does History Accelerate”, in Sediments of Time: On Possible Histories. Edited by Sean Franzel and Stefan-​Ludwig Hoffmann (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018), 93–​99. 95 John Sommerville argued ‘daily news makes it natural to regard society as an object of change’. See Sommerville, The News Revolution, 12. 96 Feijoo, Cartas Eruditas, Volume 1 (Madrid: Antonio Pérez de Soto, 1765), 228.

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victory.97 Feijoo explained that the almanacs had an important social, religious, and commercial function, and declared that he ‘had no desire to banish all almanacs’ but merely ‘the respect behind their predictions’. ‘These writings’, he explained, ‘are useful, and are worth little less than what they cost’. They informed the population about ‘festivities, and their respective Saints’ and provided information that facilitated trade: ‘commerce turns on the news about local markets; agriculture, and at times medicine, upon nature: this is then the useful purpose of almanacs’.98 4

What News Do You Bring?

In Spain’s state of flux, the structure of Torres’s almanacs remained consistent.99 These included a dedication to a leading minister or an important aristocrat, a prologue which discussed predictions for the effects of the year’s seasons on agriculture, and cryptic analyses of political developments in Europe and in Spain. As Torres remarked, he was not ‘looking for appreciation, but for sales’.100 These almanacs often featured rather abstruse and Juvenalian allegories, and served as a bridge between the Spanish Baroque and incipient Enlightenment ideals.101 There was perhaps no better example of this than the faux querelle he dreamt up which pitted him against leading French scholarly ministers in Paris, Jean-​Frédéric Phélypeaux, Count of Maurepas, and the abbé Jean-​Paul Bignon, on the subject of why cockerels crowed at noon regardless of their geographical location.102 In his comments, one of the censors, drawing 97 Feijoo, Cartas Eruditas, Volume 1, 218. 98 In this regard, they complemented the growth of trade handbooks, which served to educate merchants and not the general population. Astigarraga, A Unifying Enlightenment, 30–​32. Feijoo, Cartas Eruditas, Volume 1, 217. 99 On the various styles of the alamanacs of the period, see the recent and important study: Fernando Durán López, Juicio y chirinola de los astros: panorama literario de los almanaques y pronósticos astrológicos españoles (1700–​1767) (Gijón: Trea, 2015), 32. 100 Diego Torres y Villarroel, Sacudimiento de mentecatos, havidos y por haver. Respuesta de Torres al Conde de Maurepas (Madrid: en la imprenta de don Gabriel del Barrio, 1726), 13. 101 On the Baroque’s obsession with time see Peter N. Miller, Peiresc’s Europe: Learning and Virtue in the Seventeenth Century (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 134–​135. On the need to shape public opinion in the seventeenth century see José Antonio Maravall, La cultura del Barroco. Análisis de una estructura histórica (Barcelona: Ariel, 1975), 214–​217. 102 Diego Torres y Villarroel, El gallo español: respuestas dadas al Conde de Meslay, por qué el gallo canta á las doze de la noche en Portugal, y llevado á Francia canta a las mismas doze siendo assi, que ay una hora de diferencia (Madrid: Imprenta de Don Gabriel del Barrrio, 1725); Censura que el Conde de Maurepas hizo del Tratadico impresso en Madrid en octavo, cuyo titulo es: El Gallo Español; y su Autor el Bachiller Don Diego de Torres, y

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on the philosopher Baltasar Gracián’s works, compared Torres with the Italian satirist Trajano Boccalini, and to Tacitus, who ‘did not content himself with the vulgar narration of History, but wrapped it in poetry, crisis, and meditations’.103 Torres declared that he had learned about the philosophical systems of Descartes and Gassendi in his twenties, and expressed his admiration for the cosmological ideas of the German polymath Athanasius Kircher.104 A contemporary author suggested that his almanacs were popular because ‘the consumer believes this a good way of spending their money: to entertain oneself and forget about their worries for a while’.105 Others reasoned, at the time, that among the ‘sheepish’ lower classes, only ‘five in a thousand’ could read, ‘and only five in five thousand’ could pay ‘for the drugs provided by Sr. Torres’. Therefore, they concluded, his audience must have been made up of a ‘more educated public’.106 This medium facilitated the rise of a literature that engaged more critically with political ideas. Many authors drew on the popularity of the almanacs to spread scientific, diplomatic, and historical information, and to educate the public. The almanacs became unsystematic encyclopaedias on a variety of subjects. The writer Alejo de Torres published his Los Cuatro Astrólogos Peregrinos, Español, Francés, Alemán, e Italiano, and sought to use fantastic tales to teach mathematics.107 One of its censors, a priest and a teacher from Zaragoza, declared that despite the flaws of the astrological method ‘the discrete jocosity of the texts is a clear sign of the demand of the Public’.108 In the same year, the pamphleteer Germán Ruiz Gallirgos published El Sarrabal Burgales, a work that featured short histories of Spanish administrative bodies, such as the Council of Castile, the genealogies of European monarchs, and inventories of Spanish troops and naval ships.109 One of the censors praised the text for having compiled ‘curious news’ and having brought together the

Villarroel (Madrid: Imprenta Real y Joseph Rodriguez de Escobar, 1726); Torres y Villarroel, Sacudimiento de mentecatos. 103 Lucas Constantino Ortir de Zugasti, “Censura”, in Torres y Villarroel, El gallo español, 4–​ 17, 8. 104 Zavala, Clandestinidad y Libertinaje Erudito, 190; Leopoldo Sequeiros, ‘El geocosmos de Athanasius Kircher: Una imagen organicista del mundo en las ciencias de la naturaleza del siglo XVIII’, Llull 24:51 (2001), 755–​807, 802. 105 Quoted in Zavala, Clandestinidad y Libertinaje Erudito, 192. 106 Quoted in Zavala, Clandestinidad y Libertinaje Erudito, 188. 107 Alejo de Torres, Los quatro astrólogos peregrinos (Zaragoza: Joseph Fort, 1734), 194. 108 Torres, Los quatro astrólogos peregrinos, xviii. 109 Germán Ruiz Gallirgos Ruiz, El sarrabal burgales, historico, genealogico, politico, geometrico y militar (Madrid: Hipolito Rodríguez, 1734).

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work of many authors, which allowed one to avoid looking through ‘countless books’.110 Almanacs therefore compiled and streamlined chorographic, diplomatic, and cultural information. Almanacs could also be used to rewrite political histories. Blas Hipólito García de Soto, who wrote under the nom-​de-​plûme Basilio Pholt de Pyzoragra, drew on the format of an almanac in a work titled Pronóstico de lo pasado, advertencia de lo presente y desengaño de lo futuro, para el año de 1735 to publish an account of significant events in Spanish history ‘whereby each day serves to elucidate various historical events in the history of Spain’.111 García de Soto declared that he was ‘using the title of an almanac because everything that carries that title next to the frontispiece is rapidly dispatched’ and defended that the work was full of ‘truths, not history’ but that ‘these are true stories, and history is made up of these truths’.112 The purpose of the almanac was to educate the people in the daily study of politics. García de Soto explained to his ‘Dear Reader’ that he was ‘aware that given the fatigue that comes from following the succession of events that have unfolded of late’, he could have written a work for the sole focus of ‘entertaining’ his audience. Instead, however, he had ‘chosen to use this almanac for a different purpose’ in order ‘to teach you about three-​hundred and sixty-​five events long past’. The goal was to encourage the reader to approach political events with a more critical edge: ‘to provide you with the day and the year they took place, and if you assess them carefully, you will find yourself more aware of the present, and prepared for any event that may come’.113 The writer José Mañer went one step further, and commented on contemporary politics when he published his almanac titled El Piscator Erudito, a book which included a list of contemporary European kings, ‘geographical curiosities’, and summaries of the political systems of European states.114 One of the book’s censors praised Mañer’s ability to educate and amuse both lay and educated readers.115 The almanac included a reference to Mañer’s extensive work, 1 10 Alfonso Tello, “Aprobacion”, in Ruiz Gallirgos Ruiz, El sarrabal burgales, xii-​x, x. 111 Basilio Pholt de Pyzoraga, Pronóstico de lo passado, advertencia de lo presente y desengaño de lo futuro, para el año de 1735: en que cada día sirve de notable fecha para varios sucesos históricos de España (Madrid: Librería de Manuel Suarez, 1735), 1. 112 Pholt de Pyzoraga, Pronóstico de lo passado, xviii. 113 Pholt de Pyzoraga, Pronóstico de lo passado, 8. 114 Zavala, Clandestinidad y Libertinaje Erudito, 192. Joseph Salvador Mañer, El Piscator erudito para el año de 1735: en que se contienen los eclipses, lunaciones, y los demás que pertenece al año: con un catálogo exacto, y el tiempo de los nacimientos de los Príncipes de Europa que al presente reinan; y varias curiosidades dignas de la común noticia compuesto por Monsieur Le Margne (Madrid: Hypolito Rodríguez, 1735). 115 Salvador Mañer, El Piscator erudito, v.

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the Sistema Político de Europa, which was a reflection on the role of Spain during the War of Polish Succession. In the text, he openly declared the War of Spanish Succession to be unjust.116 Mañer’s politics, moreover, reflected the intellectual diversity in Spain. Born in Cádiz, Mañer was sent to Mexico by his parents to learn about the cocoa trade, but he instead developed a taste for polemics with the help of a number of clergymen who taught him poetry and philosophy.117 He became known for his satires and his debates with leading academics at the University of Mexico, and was responsible for spreading pro-​Habsburg propaganda in Curaçao and Jamaica.118 When he was brought to trial before the Casa de Contratación in Cádiz, he was sentenced to perpetual banishment from Spanish America, and to first spend six years in prison.119 One of the lawyers involved declared that his spirit was ‘capable of disrupting the peace of the entire universe’.120 Almanacs, then, facilitated the acceptance of figures like Mañer and Torres among the Spanish elite, and these writers, in turn, broadened the space for debate.121 Mañer’s success led other authors exploit his fame for their own purposes: Ignacio de Armesto y Ossorio penned a reply to Feijoo’s Theatro Crítico Universal, which Armesto titled Theatro Anticrítico Universal, a commentary on the works of Feijoo, Father Sarmiento, and Mañer. Armesto’s text was granted royal support, and its publication was announced in the Gaceta.122 The text drew on Mañer’s earlier attacks on Feijoo to voice his most provocative claims.123 Armesto commented on Mañer’s arguments against Feijoo’s 116 José Mañer, Sistema político de la Europa: diálogo entre un francés y un alemán sobre las disposiciones e intereses de los príncipes en la presente guerra, Biblioteca Nacional de España. mss/​18279, 162–​264, 163–​164. 117 Aaron Alejandro Olivas, Loyalty and Disloyalty to the Bourbon Dynasty in Spanish America and the Philippines During the War of the Spanish Succession (1700–​1715) (Unpublished PhD Thesis) (Los Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles), 95. 118 Olivas, Loyalty and Disloyalty, 101. 119 Olivas, Loyalty and Disloyalty, 105. 120 Olivas, Loyalty and Disloyalty, 106. 121 Mañer engaged in querelles with other writers regarding the ideas of Jean Le Clerc and Gassendi. See José Mañer, Crisol crítico, theológico, político, physico, y mathemático, en que se quilatan las materias del Theatro Crítico. Two volumes. Volume 2 (Madrid: Imprenta de Bernardo Peralta, 1734), 499, 592–​599. See Filippo de Vivo’s interpretation of early modern poltics and communication. Filippo de Vivo, Information and Communication in Venice: Rethinking Early Modern Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 231. 122 “Teatro Anticrítico universal sobre las obras de Feijoo, de Sarmiento y de Salvador Mañer”, Gaceta de Madrid, Number 48, 30/​11/​1745, 396. 123 For a short discussion on Mañer’s replies to Feijoo see José Manuel Rodríguez Pardo, El alma de los brutos en el entorno del padre Feijoo (Oviedo: Fundación Gustavo Bueno, 2008), 84–​85.

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claim that ‘everyone on earth believes in the existence of God, as if Atheists did not exist’. According to Armesto, Mañer had provided ‘examples of Tunquin, China, and the Moors, where Missionaries have claimed that they have found sects who live without any belief in or knowledge of the soul’.124 Mañer soon began to translate and circulate the Mercurio Político, a heavily edited version of the monthly journal on European political affairs published in The Hague. In his first issue, Mañer explained the state of Europe ‘at the time of the end of the year could only be defined as a continuous crisis’, and denoted the lack of information at Court by declaring in the preface that when ‘the Court heard about the marriage between the King of the Two Sicilies and Princess Amelia, politicians were surprised by the news’.125 Their surprise had ‘stimulated frequent conversations about the topic, which I took part in’, and one of these exchanges ‘featured a literary man, reputed in his university faculty, who upon hearing the name of the Emperor inquired whether this Prince was accountable to the Pope’.126 Mañer portrayed information about ‘the present state of Europe’127 as a necessary component of sociability: ‘most conversations at Court begin with the question: what news do you bring?’. Officials, writers, and nobles, explained Mañer, ‘therefore enquire into the news of political affairs inside and outside of the country’. The nature of these matters could vary: at times, they involved ‘a national event which has international repercussions, such as the looming threat of a conflict with Britain’. Other times, the focus was on ‘an international event that has a repercussion at home, such as the marriage of Don Carlos to the Princess of Saxony; or an event completely foreign, such as the controversy between Juliers and Bergues, the cause of the Count of Seckendorff, the War of the Turks, or the landing of French troops in Corsica’.128 Almanac writers were seen as intellectual references who stimulated political debate. Mañer was widely considered to be a prominent historian and thinker, as the Royal Academy of Spain asked him to edit the Tratado de Ortographía Castellana.129 The desire for information about Spain’s Habsburg heritage in the face of the 1741 Imperial Election prompted the Crown to support 124 Ignacio de Armesto y Ossorio, Theatro anti crítico universal, sobre las obras del muy R.P. maestro Feijoo, del padre maestro, Sarmiento, y de Don Salvador Mañer. Volume 1 (Madrid: Francisco Martínez Abad, 1735–​1737), 16. 125 The periodical would continue until 1820. José Mañer, Mercurio Histórico y Político (Madrid: Impr. Real, 1738), 5. 126 Mañer, Mercurio Histórico y Político, 2–​3. 127 Mañer, Mercurio Histórico y Político, 2. 128 Mañer, Mercurio Histórico y Político, i. 129 Mañer, Mercurio Histórico y Político, 5.

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the publication of his works on chronology, diplomatic history, and dynastic genealogies.130 Mañer, moreover, encouraged his readers to engage with the histories of territories they knew little about. He published his Vida de Thamas Kouli-​Kan, a history of Nader Shah, then Shah of Persia, to correct a ‘Dutch author who has published a history with the same title’, and he guaranteed that ‘all this information has been gathered from modern histories and famous travellers’.131 He emphasised objectivity and fairness, and sought to ‘treat this subject carefully, as is to be expected from a fair Historian’. Mañer added further geographical information about Persia, as he was aware that Spaniards lacked access to knowledge about the region.132 The reasonable historian, he explained, should ‘not abuse the credulity of the readers’ and therefore ‘only conveys that which they know, and does not seek to make the experience more enjoyable by adding extraordinary fictions, a device’ which, he argued, was ‘frequently used when the distance of other countries makes it harder to know about the more incredible aspects about them’.133 Diplomacy, social questions, and science, were at the heart of these debates. In the 1740s, female writers, such as Manuela Tomasa Sánchez, published almanacs vindicating the practical importance of mathematics.134 In the same decade, Mañer’s original almanac, the Piscator Erudito, inspired countless imitations that sought to comment on the histories of different nations in Europe. Francisco de Horta Aguilera, a member of the Royal Naval Academy of Cádiz, in his almanacs, expanded on Mañer’s encyclopaedic summary of history and customs of European nations, and included separate sections for the Americas,

130 José Mañer, Compendio Cronológico de la Historia de este siglo dedicado al ilustrísimo señor Don Joseph y Campillo y Cossio, (Madrid: Imprenta del Reyno, 1741). The desire for information about the War of Austrian Succession also led to the translation and publication by Joseph Loreno de Arenas of Oraculo de la Europa, consultado por los principes de ella sobre los negocios presentes, politicos y militares, traducido del frances al castellano (Madrid: Imprenta del Reyno, 1744); José Mañer, Colección de la Bula de Oro, con notas, Pragmatica Sancion, y ceremonias de la Eleccion, y Coronacion del Emperador dispuesto por Mr. Le Margne (Madrid: Imprenta del Reyno, 1741). 131 José Mañer, Vida de Thamas Kouli-​Kan: desde su nacimiento, hasta su entrada triunfante en Hispahan, después de sus victoriosas empressas contra el Gran Mogòl, y la grande Buckaria (Madrid: Imprenta del Reyno, 1741), ii-​iii. In 1742, James Fraser published The History of Nadir Shah, formerly called Thamas Kuli Khan, the Present Emperor of Persia (London: W. Strahan, 1742), 2 and 11. 132 Mañer, Vida de Thamas Kouli-​Kan, ii. 133 Mañer, Vida de Thamas Kouli-​Kan, 2. 134 See the excellent study on this topic: María Dolores Gimeno Puyol, ‘Las almanaqueras dieciochescas españolas y la reivindicación de la mujer escritora’. Cuadernos De Estudios Del Siglo XVIII 30 (2020), 217–​236, 222.

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Havana, Mexico, and Peru.135 In a historical work, Aguilera imitated Blas Hipólito García de Soto and wrote a more extensive history of Spanish monarchs.136 Aguilera also penned chorographic works such as La Gran Esphera de Urania y curioso divertido pronóstico, which featured ‘the history and geography of Great Britain, its costumes, commerce, geniuses, ports, cities, strengths, shortcomings and wealth’.137 He claimed that he was trying to complement the information provided by the Mercurio and the Gaceta, since these periodicals could not cover every topic or every region, nor those provinces that were at war, nor the British Kingdoms, which, he predicted, would be all the talk that year.138 This cultural approach to news and history paved the way for other authors, like José Francés del Castillo y Berenguer, who published his Historia grande, real, y discursos políticos, which sought to cover ‘the most memorable events that took place in Spain between January and November of the year 1746’.139 He emphasised the need for peace, criticised the logic of reason of state, and predicted that the War of Jenkins’ Ear would ‘remain a painful memory for many centuries’.140 He argued, like many had done, that Spain was the

135 Francisco de Horta Alguilera, El totili mundi: histórico genealógico, chronológico, y geo­ gráphico: pronóstico diario de quartos de luna, politicos, y elementares (Madrid: Imprenta y Librería de Manuel Fernandez, 1738), 37–​124, and La rueda de la fortuna y totili mundi ingerto: pronóstico el más noticioso, histórico, genealógico, chronológico, y geográfico de quartos de luna, politicos, y elementares, para el año que viene de 1740, con la descripción de los reynos, repúblicas, y señorios del orbe, nombres de principes, á que signos están sujetos (Madrid: Antonio Sanz, 1739), 42–​103. 136 Francisco de Horta Aguilera, El cordoves vacilante, y novelista en campaña: pronóstico el más noticioso, político, y elementar de quartos de luna, con sus aspectos, y chronología de todos los Reyes de España, desde Adán, hasta nuestro catholico monarcha Don Phelipe Quinto, (que Dios guarde) con otras curiosidades astrologicas, para el año de 1745 su autor el ingenio cordoves (Madrid: Librería de Antonio Sanz, 1744), 40–​54. 137 Francisco de Horta Aguilera, La gran esphera de Urania y curioso divertido pronóstico: el más noticioso, histórico, político, geográfico, y elementar de cuartos de Luna, con sus aspectos arregladísimos, y promptuario histórico, y geográfico de los reynos de la Gran Bretaña, sus tratos, comercios, genios, puertos, ciudades, fuerzas, escaseces, y abundancia de ellos, con otras infinitas curiosidades astrológicas para el año de 1746. (Madrid, 1746). 138 Horta Aguilera, La gran esphera de Urania, 38. 139 José Francés del Castillo y Berenguer, Noticia individual de la proclamación que se executó en esta imperial carpentana villa el dia diez de agosto, y de las fiestas celebradas, con el motivo de la elevacion al trono del señor Fernando VI (Madrid: Imprenta en la calle arenal, 1746). On the parallel emergence of historicism in eighteenth-​century British almanacs, see Bernard Capp, English Almanacs, 1500–​1800: Astrology and the Popular Press (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), 215–​237. 140 Castillo y Berenguer, Historia grande, 273–​274.

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‘Indies of Europe’, and its proximity to its neighbours enabled them to engage in ‘less effort and less risk’ to profit from its riches.141 In 1751, Torres quipped that the publication of almanacs in Spain had expanded to the extent that he suspected there were ‘more astrologers than there are neighbours’.142 Almanacs had become sources of intellectual diffusion, with a focus on chorographic and diplomatic information, and were intertwined with broader cultural efforts to educate the people. Faced with an arbitrary and desultory monarch, Spanish almanacs fostered a common sense of time in the Spanish peninsula, and laid the basis for a broader culture of political debate growing from below that could grapple with political unpredictability. Eighteenth-​century political communication in Spain fostered a critical, expansive, and creative interaction between the multiple actors engaged in these debates.143 Spanish authors used the popularity of the almanacs to diffuse geographical, political, and chorographic knowledge, and thereby stimulated the demand for an administration that would contribute to its advancement by fostering this early public sphere.144 This medium was not as popular in Spanish colonial spaces.145 From Manila to Barcelona, authorities sought to enforce a homogenous experience of time, and religious ceremonies and the harsh demands of labour continued to determine the rhythms of everyday life.146 But other forms of information grew in 1 41 Castillo y Berenguer, Historia grande, 219. 142 Quoted in Zavala, Clandestinidad y Libertinaje Erudito, 197. 143 On potential parallels with Venice see Vivo, Information and Communication in Venice, 16. Eighteenth-​century Britain witnessed a similar shift in its almancs. These increasingly replaced astrology with a combination of instruction and amusement. See Capp, English Almanacs, 245–​270. 144 J.A. Downie, To Settle the Succession of the State: Literature and Politics, 1678–​1750 (London: Macmillan, 1994), 3. 145 Further research on this topic, and on the reception of these peninsular writings, might generate new insights. See Rolando Carrasco’s ongoing studies on the topic: Rolando Carrasco, “Almanaques: Género ilustrado y future pronosticable en el Virreinato del Perú (s. XVIII)”, in Miriam Lay Brander ed., Genre and Globalisation. Transformación de generos en contextos (post-​) coloniales (Hildescheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2018), 163–​188. On almanacs in early modern New Spain, see Matthew D. O’Hara, The History of the Future in Colonial Mexico (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), 42–​75. 146 An important mechanism in this regard was the beatification of local saints. Cornelius Conover, “Catholic Saints in Spain’s Atlantic Empire”, in Gregerson and Juster, eds., Empires of God, 87–​105. See Bianca Premo’s excellent study of the legal understanding of age in the Spanish Empire: Bianca Premo, ‘Meticulous Imprecision: Calculating Age in Spanish Colonial Law’, American Historical Review 125:2 (2020), 396–​406. See also Bianca Premo, ‘Custom Today: Temporality, Law, and Indigenous Enlightenment’, Hispanic American Historical Review 94:3 (2014), 355–​79. For the best study on the social life in the Spanish Empire see Herzog, Upholding justice.

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popularity throughout the Atlantic and Pacific territories, and the differences in their approach to time reflected the increasingly splintered nature of political expectations in the Spanish Empire.147 Spanish authors used almanacs to register yearly changes and to provide their readers with novel diplomatic, scientific, and chorographic information. Spanish American political writings and commentaries on politics and natural philosophy were more elastic, polyvalent, and far more profound in their scope: they were generally framed within longue durée imperial histories, or through ‘patriotic astrology’, which synchronised views on daily life and science, but did not reconcile the impact of diplomatic affairs on the everyday experience of the political.148 The popularisation of gazettes and almanacs in the Atlantic spaces of the Spanish Empire would only take place in the second half of the eighteenth century, and exceptions such as the Gaceta Mexicana had more in common with the official Gaceta de Madrid than they did with the learned calendrical satire of the almanacs.149 The most influential Spanish American historian who experimented at length with almanac-​writing during this period, the Peruvian Bourbon loyalist Pedro de Peralta Barnuevo, was well-​known for his historical works.150 His writings built on the seventeenth-​century Hispanic historical tradition that lionised the ties between Spaniards and indigenous cultures by hailing the achievements of conquistadors like Francisco Pizarro.151 This historical framework facilitated the colonial contestation of Spanish power, and led to the formulation of a political approach that scholars have referred to as ‘creole patriotism’. These historiographical pursuits then precipitated discussions at the Royal Academy of History over the nature of historical evidence.152 But the Royal Academy of 147 On the uses of the oraciones panagíricas see the brilliant book by María Soledad Barbón, Colonial Loyalties: Celebrating the Spanish Monarchy in Eighteenth-​Century Lima (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2019), 5–​9. 148 Brading, The First America, 253–​464; Cañizares-​Esguerra, How to Write a History of the New World, 204–​265; Jorge Cañizares-​Esguerra, ‘New World, New Stars: Patriotic Astrology and the Invention of Indian and Creole Bodies in Colonial Spanish America, 1600–​1650’, American Historical Review 104:1 (1999), 33–​68. 149 Leonardo Ferreira, Centuries of Silence: The Story of Latin American Journalism (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009), 60. 150 On Peralta and panegyrics see Soledad Barbón, Colonial Loyalties, 19–​88. 151 David F. Slade and Jerry M. Williams eds., Lima Fundada by Pedro De Peralta Barnuevo: A Critical Edition (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016); Jerry M. Williams, Peralta Barnuevo and the discourse of loyalty: a critical edition of four selected texts (Charlottesville, VA: asu Center for Latin American Studies Press, 1996). On Peralta’s almanacs, see José Toribio Medina, La Imprenta en Lima (1584–​1824) Volume 1 (Santiago de Chile: Impreso en la casa del autor, 1904), 385–​388. 152 Brading, The First America, 293–​313; Cañizares-​Esguerra, How to Write a History of the New World, 204–​265; Carolina Ponce Hernández, “La Bibliotheca Mexicana de Juan José de

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History was not the only influential centre of historical analysis in Spain.153 And as it sought correct the foreign perception of Spain’s ‘barbarity’, it struggled to establish clear criteria and was overwhelmed by the number of requests from other councils seeking its consultation on their own rulings.154 History and time were too elusive, mercurial, and liquid to be moulded into anything concrete. But the popularisation of these two different historical frameworks may be understood as divergent cultural responses to the period that immediately followed the War of Spanish Succession, as writings that generated different expectations of political reform. 5

Information Overload and Elite Political Debate

In the early eighteenth century, Spanish officials developed a dialogue with the authors of political almanacs that intensified the diffusion of political knowledge in the Spanish peninsula.155 Starting in the 1720s, the official Gaceta announced the publication of almanacs and thereby contributed to their popularisation.156 In the 1730s and 1740s, Spanish officials granted councils of experts the right to censor works in their field. Habsburg Spain had allowed the council of each region or kingdom to legislate over the publication of works, and Philip v granted the Council of Castile the right to censor publications released throughout the peninsula. However, the sheer overload of texts, particularly those produced by minor printers, soon overwhelmed the Council. Censors demanded greater information that would allow them to keep track of authors and printing presses. They requested that texts feature the name of the author and a summary of their themes, and asked printing presses to keep

153 154 155 156

Eguiara y Eguren, obra unificadora de la cultura mexicana”, in Astrid Steiner-​Weber and Karl A.E. Enenkel eds., Acta Conventus Neo-​Latini Monasteriensis Volume 15 (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 108–​120. Cañizares-​Esguerra, How to Write a History of the New World, 160–​169. On other historiographical endeavours, such as Andrés González de Barcia’s own, see Jonathan Earl Carlyon, Andrés González De Barcia and the Creation of the Colonial Spanish American Library (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 165–​200. Eva Velasco Moreno, “Las censuras de la Real Academia de la Historia (1746–​1772)”, in Fernando Durán López ed., Instituciones Censoras: Nuevos acercamientos a la censura de libros en la España de la Ilustración (Madrid: csic, 2016), 113–​158, 131, 77, 119. Estimates on the readership are not particularly precise. See Guinard, La presse espagnole de 1737 à 1791, 72; Luis Miguel Enciso Recio, La Gaceta de Madrid y el Mercurio Histórico y Político, 1756–​1781 (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1957), 63–​88. See, for example, the earliest listed work, in 1724: ‘Se halla en la Imprenta de Juan Sanz y en la Librería de Lorenzo de Castro el Almanaque y pronóstico diario para el año 25, y el Gran Piscator Andaluz’, Gaceta de Madrid, Number. 51, 19/​12/​1724, 204.

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lists of all the works they published.157 To alleviate the workload of the censors, the Crown granted greater liberty to other state bodies to censor works on their topics. The Junta de Comercio was granted the responsibility to censor works on commerce, manufacturing, and coinage. The Secretaría de Estado was granted the authority to sanction periodicals.158 But the nature of a book, a pamphlet, or a periodical, was not always clear. And the final decision on who was to decide whether or not to publish a work was not obvious. Mañer’s translation of a work titled The Oracle of Europe was approved by the Juez de Imprentas, but not by the Secretaría de Estado.159 Booksellers had a say in the process. The administrator Juan Curiel was named Juez de Imprentas, and drafted a document collecting, reaffirming, and standardising the norms that ought to have governed censorship during the early eighteenth century. Curiel hardened many of these judgements, including one which penalised the publication of foreign works with the death penalty.160 But the complaints from booksellers and small printing presses from around the country successfully suspended the implementation of these laws.161 In 1755, the Royal Academy of History, the Royal Academy of Spain, and the Royal Academy of San Fernando were granted the right to censor and publish works without consulting another state institution.162 The relationship between censors and authors was fluid, and the process relied on a small circle of authors. Torres’s works were censored, even if many of them were still published, but Torres himself censored the works of his peers.163 The censorship of Mañer’s Mercurio and the official Gaceta was the responsibility of the former Governor of Venezuela, Antonio José Álvarez de Abreu, marquess of the Regalia.164 It was likely that Abreu and Mañer knew each other, and collaborated, as they both drafted important documents in the lead up to the negotiations at the Imperial Diet. The case of the relationship between Salvador José Mañer and Leopoldo Jerónimo Puig was particularly illustrative of the dynamics of censorship. Leopoldo Jerónimo Puig was a member of the Royal Academy of Spain who published his poetry in collaboration 1 57 Velasco Moreno, “Las censuras de la Real Academia de la Historia”, 113. 158 Velasco Moreno, “Las censuras de la Real Academia de la Historia”, 116. 159 Víctor Pampliega Pedreira, Las redes de la censura: el consejo de Castilla y la censura libraría en el siglo XVIII (Unpublished PhD Thesis) (Madrid: Universidad Complutense), 129. 160 Velasco Moreno, “Las censuras de la real Academia de la Historia”, 118. 161 Velasco Moreno, “Las censuras de la real Academia de la Historia”, 121. 162 Eva Velasco Moreno, La Real Academia de la Historia en el siglo XVIII. Una institución de sociabilidad (Madrid: cepc, 2000), 114. 163 Pampliega Pedreira, Las redes de la censura, 226. 164 Pampliega Pedreira, Las redes de la censura, 128.

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with Mañer and spearheaded the creation of the Diario de los Literatos.165 Puig, as a member of the Council of Castile, was also responsible for censoring Mañer’s works.166 This facilitated the intellectual cooperation, and the discussion of ideas, between censors and authors. Many lesser-​known authors submitted their works to the Royal Academy of History to receive comments, and attracted the attention of more senior historians and writers in Madrid.167 The Royal Academy of History enabled the association between elite administrators, such as Agustín de Montiano y Luyando, Secretary to Philip v and a member of the Council of Castile, and younger scholarly officials who would later serve as spies, such as Juan Rice de la Calzada or Bernardo Ward.168 The Academia del Buen Gusto, or the Academy of Manners, which held its first meeting in 1749 and its last one in 1751, fostered many of these intellectual connections. Josefa de Zúñiga y Castro, marchioness of Sarria, hosted the meetings in Madrid, and the salon allowed ministers, officials, and writers to discuss politics and culture. José de Carvajal, Zuñiga’s brother-​in-​law, the Duke of Huéscar, Torres, and Ignacio de Luzán frequented these gatherings.169 The marchioness of Sarria led the discussion, and, at its peak, the Academy convened once a month.170 Little is known about the education of this aristocrat. But she was involved in the world of the court, as she served as camamera mayor to Barbara of Braganza and María Amalia of Saxony.171 She would 1 65 Velasco Moreno, La Real Academia de la Historia en el siglo XVIII, 58. 166 Pampliega Pedreira, Las redes de la censura, 268. 167 Velasco Moreno, “Las censuras de la Real Academia de la Historia”, 119. It was therefore unexceptional that Feijoo’s unfavourable comments on Louis xiv were censored. See Noelia García Díaz, “Benito Jerónimo Feijoo in the Initial Stages of the Spanish Public Sphere”, in Jiménez Torres and Villamediana González eds., The Configuration of the Spanish Public Sphere, 60–​70. 168 Velasco Moreno, La Real Academia de la Historia en el siglo XVIII, 304–​313. On Bernardo Ward, see Stein and Stein, Apogee of Empire, 64–​71; Bernardo Ward, Proyecto económico (Madrid: Viuda de Ibarra, 1787). 169 Zuñiga remains understudied in the context of the substantial scholarship of the role of women in eighteenth-​century Spanish culture. See Emilio Palacios Fernández, La mujer y las letras en la España del Siglo XVIII (Madrid, Ediciones Laberinto, 2002); Mónica Bolufer Peruga, Mujeres e Ilustración: la construcción de la feminidad en la Ilustración española (Valencia: Institución Alfonso el Magnánimo, 1998); Joaquin Álvarez Barrientos, “Sociabilidad literaria: tertulias y cafés en el siglo XVIII”, in Joaquin Álvarez Barrientos ed., Espacios de la comunicación literaria (Madrid: csic, 2002), 129–​146. María Dolores Tortosa Linde, La Academia del Buen Gusto de Madrid (1749–​1751) (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1989), 17. 170 Tortosa Linde, La Academia, 18. 171 María Carmen Iglesias, “La nueva sociabilidad: mujeres nobles y salones literarios y políticos” in María Carmen Iglesias ed., Nobleza y sociedad en la España moderna. Volume 2

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later be one of the first associates of the Junta de Damas of the Royal Economic Society of Madrid.172 Her involvement in the republic of letters reflected a broader discussion that had started in the 1720s, with the publication of a collection of poems by the author Teresa Guerra, which featured the approval of the censor Torres, and the publication of Feijoo’s defence of the equality of reason between the sexes, which had led to the printing of half a dozen responses defending a variety of views on the topic.173 Torres praised Zuñiga’s role in the tertulia, and pointed to the eclectic nature of the discussions by arguing that the gentlemen brought papers that were so strange that they would be better suited for cigarettes or shotgun bullets.174 The discussions at the Academy denoted the growth of elite Spanish political culture. Each member was assigned a pseudonym, and read aloud discourses on the nature of time, Roman history, psalms, sonnets, and translations from Greek literature. One of Torres’s speeches was a farcical plea for the King to reduce the cost of tobacco.175 The sonnet, written in the voice of a Galician peasant, evoked the industrial accomplishments of Ferdinand vi’s reign, and displayed Torres’s knowledge about different manufacturing enterprises and products around Europe: bedsheets in Brittany, shirts in Holland, crystalline glass in Venice, and seats and chairs in Genoa.176 An anonymous text enquired into Louis xiv’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes, Feijoo’s analysis of canonisations, and whether there really was freedom of thought in France.177 The academy facilitated the collaboration of elite officials and authors who would later contribute to Spain’s reforms. Ignacio de Luzán translated and subsequently discussed the works of foreign authors during their meetings. Luzán would later serve as a spy and a natural philosopher under Carvajal’s command. As he drew on the works of Vico, Muratori, Le Clerc, and Heinsius, Luzán commented on a poet’s capacity to ‘serialise’ events on the basis of historical

1 72 173 1 74 175 176 177

(Madrid: Fundación Cultural de la Nobleza Española, 1996), 175–​230; Pilar Pérez Cantó, ‘Las mujeres en los espacios ilustrados’, Signos Históricos 13 (2005), 43–​69, 49–​50. Cantó, ‘Las mujeres’, 50. Anne J. Cruz, ‘Teresa Guerra, poeta entre el Barroco y la Ilustración’, Bulletin hispanique 113:1 (2011), 297–​312; Palacios Fernández, La mujer y las letras, 24–​26. On the importance of Feijoo’s text see Smith, The Emerging Female Citizen, 41. Tortosa Linde, La Academia, 13. Papeles de la Academia del Buen Gusto celebraba en Madrid. 4 junio 1750, Biblioteca Nacional de España. mss/​1 8476/​6 . Diego Torres y Villarroel, “Memorial que al Rey nuestro señor…minorar el precio del Tabaco”, in Papeles de la Academia del Buen Gusto celebraba en Madrid, 4 junio 1750, Biblioteca Nacional de España, mss/​1 8476/​6 . Untitled, in Papeles de la Academia del Buen Gusto. Not numbered.

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verisimilitude, and it was likely that Torres and Luzán discussed such matters at the academy.178 Torres and Carvajal were close friends, and, in his autobiography, the author boasted about having been invited to dine with Carvajal and Ensenada ‘over forty times’.179 Building on these friendships, Torres would advocate the creation of an academy of mathematics at Salamanca in order to teach the use, utility, and fabrication of ‘flying spheres’, based on documents found in Paris and that the university library had recently acquired.180 Learned officials, in turn, were recruited to serve as spies or to educate members of the elite: Bernardo Ward would be the tutor to the marquess of Marcenado’s children.181 As ministers, Carvajal and Ensenada remained at the forefront of European diplomatic and philosophical debates; Carvajal used his diplomatic network to acquire early editions of the abbé de Mably’s Droit Publique and Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie.182 Carvajal contributed to the creation of spaces of sociability by granting royal protection to the Academies of Manners in Seville and Barcelona. The growth of scholarly almanacs, and the debates in the academies, reflected the development of political speculation in Spain. Episodic and satirical explorations of political dilemmas allowed for a more careful consideration of societal questions, and eventually facilitated the discussion of chorographic, dynastic, and economic knowledge. The almanacs generated a sense of predictability out of a combination of familiarity and criticism, they facilitated the emergence of a form of public communication between the world of the Court and the people, and they generated original visions of the future of the Spanish Empire. This translated into institutional cultural reform. The delegation of censorship duties to various specialised state bodies; the acceptance of the austractista Mañer and the rabble-​rouser Torres, all suggested the emergence of a more critical approach to political change. Crucially, the contents of the histories, almanacs, and official reports denoted, and reflected upon, the deep connections between Spain and Europe. Spanish officials would draw on political economy to reinforce these connections, and to contribute to the establishment of a more accountable Spanish Monarchy. 1 78 Luzán, La Poética, 344. 179 Torres y Villarroel, Vida, 237–​238. 180 Juan Luis Polo Rodríguez, ‘Reforma en la Universidad de Salamanca de los primeros Borbones (1700–​1759)’, Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie IV, Historia Moderna 7 (1994), 145–​ 174, 170. 181 Mónica Bolufer Peruga, La vida y la escritura en el siglo XVIII. Inés Joyes: “Apología de las mujeres” (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2008), 56. 182 Cristina González Caizán, ‘La biblioteca de Agustín Pablo de Ordeñana’, BROCAR. Cuadernos de investigación histórica 21 (1998), 227–​267, 238.

­c hapter 3

Investing in the Luces 1

Introduction

This chapter explores the emergence of political economy in Spain. It draws on the biographies of five officials and thinkers who were central to this enterprise, Juan de Goyeneche, Miguel de Zavala y Auñón, José Herboso, José de Carvajal y Lancaster, and Zenón de Somodevilla y Bengoechea, marquess of Ensenada. It shows how it was in the context of debates on corporations, investment, and diplomacy that Spanish officials engaged with the works of Hugo Grotius, John Selden, Pierre Daniel Huet, Pierre Bayle, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Lodovico Antonio Muratori, Herman Boerhaave and studied the schemes of John Law and German mining practices. The mid-​1720s negotiations over Spain’s investment in the Ostend Company encouraged scholarly investors to propose that companies should replace the unresponsive consulados since these would create a more accountable structure of government. Juan de Goyeneche, the most important early eighteenth-​century investor in the Spanish Crown, planned the creation of a company that could educate Spanish officers and provide a space for merchants, jurists, and ministers to debate the economic governance of the Spanish Empire. Goyeneche and others believed this corporate model of empire could generate greater monarchical accountability and foster social fairness and economic efficiency. The political economist Miguel de Zavala y Auñón reconfigured Spain’s republican tradition, studied Law’s companies, and sought to ensure that the King listened to and acted on the advice of those who studied finance and trade. Encouraged by these political economic debates, elite Peruvian officials considered the best means to overhaul colonial governance, foster scientific discussion, and generate funds to improve the lives of the general population. The early eighteenth-​century Spanish Empire, then, saw the growth of a political economic discourse of improvement that prompted calls for investment in science, in culture, and in enlightened governance. In this shareholder empire, the King, the nobility, and the people would all invest in the same corporations. These organisations would educate officials and foster elite political economic debate. Corporate boards would provide funds that could be used to preserve the general welfare of the population during times of war and to improve roads and canals during times of peace. As some of these projects came to fruition, and new trade regulations were established, Spanish and European merchants protested and argued that these

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004469099_004

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changes were in breach of commercial treaties and should be handled diplomatically. But, for decades, Spain had struggled to respond to the diplomatic changes brought about by the Treaty of Utrecht. One Spanish official thought that corporations offered a solution to the problem: shared commercial interests could be used to encourage greater diplomatic cooperation. The most important Spanish political economist of the mid-​eighteenth century, José de Carvajal y Lancaster, believed that transnational corporations could bolster alliances and allow Spain to reconfigure its role in Europe. 2

Shorting Diplomacy

By 1725, the aristocrat Juan de Goyeneche had published an antiquarian history of Baztán, his birth town; he had served as a confidant to the financial reformer Count of Oropesa; and he had served as the private treasurer of Maria Anna of Neuburg and as General Treasurer of the Militias for Charles ii.1 Under Philip v, he established companies which held monopolies on the supply of victuals to the Spanish army and on the supply of wood to the Spanish navy; he gained the asiento to the Gaceta de Madrid, the first Spanish newspaper, and he asked his writers to cover the political and economic affairs of Europe and Africa.2 He participated in elite political debates as a member of a confraternity in Madrid which brought together Spanish nobles with ties to Navarra, and featured the Duke of Alba among its founders and the influential political economist Gerónimo de Uztáriz as one of its associates.3 He then created an ambitious 1 Ricardo Fernández Gracia and María Concepción García Gainza, “Prólogo”, in Ricardo Fernández Gracia and María Concepción García Gainza eds., Juan de Goyeneche y el triunfo de los navarros en la monarquía hispánica del siglo XVIII (Pamplona: Fundación Caja Navarra, 2005), 15–​17, 15. On New Baztán see Beatriz Blasco Esquivias, Nuevo Baztán. La utopía colbertista de Juan de Goyeneche (Madrid, Cátedra, 2019). 2 Antonio Bonet Correa, “Juan de Goyeneche: su palacio y la academia”, in Fernández Gracia and Concepción García Gainza eds., Juan de Goyeneche, 105–​115, 109. On the growth of periodicals as the reduction of financial risk see Sommerville, The News Revolution, 21. 3 Ricardo Fernández García, “La congregación de San Fermin de los Navarros. Devoción y cargos artísticos”, in Fernández Gracia and Concepción García Gainza eds., Juan de Goyeneche, 115–​146, 116; On Uztáriz and Goyeneche see Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War, 165–​179. On the political and cultural influence of subjects from Navarra during this period see Julio Pio Baroja, La hora navarra del siglo XVIII (Personas, familias, negocios e ideas) (Pamplona: Diputación Foral de Navarra, 1969). Rafael Torres Sánchez, “La hora de los negocios. El triunfo económico de los Navarros en el siglo XVIII”, in Fernández Gracia and Concepción García Gainza eds., Juan de Goyeneche, 195–​214; Tamar Herzog, “Private Organizations as Global Networks in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America” in Luis

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textile industrial town called Nuevo Baztán in order to acquire the exclusive right to the supply of clothing to the Spanish army.4 The manufacturing centre was transferred to Villanueva de Alcorón, a town in Guadalajara, and the enterprise was overseen by the Duke of Ripperda. Based on the aptitude he showed at managing industrial schemes, Philip v named Ripperda Spain’s prime minister.5 As dynasties changed and Spanish ministers rose and fell Goyeneche consolidated his authority.6 He managed the main source of foreign news, he controlled crucial supplies to the army and the navy, and he employed the man who was to lead the Spanish government. 1725 was a promising year for speculative men like Goyeneche. Following a dozen short-​lived proposals to establish trading companies, and the failure of the 1720 Proyecto para galeones y flotas, a new path to reform had grown out of an unlikely diplomatic alliance. Spain and Austria were close to signing a peace treaty that would safeguard their mutual trade interests, through the Ostend Company, and which would allow Spain to recover some control over the colonies.7 In spite of the fierce competition it faced, the Ostend Company had grown to manage half of the tea supply to Europe.8 This corporation had further developed in unexpected ways. It contributed to the establishment of a general lottery, advanced funds to the state, and facilitated the cross-​cultural educational exchange of young subjects from China to Naples and Ostend who trained to become imperial officers.9 Investing in this company, Spanish officials hoped, could reconfigure Spain’s role in Europe and in Asia. Gerónimo de Uztáriz published his famous Theorica to encourage support for the Ostend

4 5

6

7 8 9

Roniger and Tamar Herzog eds., The Collective and the Public in Latin America Cultural Identities and Political Order (Sussex: Sussex Academic, 2000), 117–​133. Eva Velasco Moreno, “Juan de Goyeneche y Gastón”, in Eugenio Torres Villanueva ed., Cien Empresarios Madrileños (Madrid: lid Editorial, 2017), 11–​18, 15–​17. Juan Helguera Quejada, “La introducción de nuevas técnicas: de la inmigración tecnológica al espionaje industrial”, in Manuel Silva ed., El Siglo de las luces: de la industria al ámbito agroforestal. Colección Técnica e Ingeniería en España (Zaragoza: Real Academia de Ingeniería, Institución “Fernando el Católico” y Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2005), 47–​94, 52–​53. On his companies and the War of Spanish Succession see Santiago Aquerreta González, “Financiar la Guerra de Sucesión: asentistas y compañías al servicio de Felipe V”, in Paulino Castañeda Delgado, Emilio Gómez Piño eds., La Guerra de Sucesión en España y América: actas X Jornadas Nacionales de Historia Militar, Sevilla, 13–​17 de noviembre de 2000 (Madrid: Delimos, 2001), 569–​582, 575–​576. On the proyecto, see Pearce, The Origins, 67–​69. Frederik Dhondt, ‘Delenda est haec Carthago. The Ostend Company as a Problem of European Great Power Politics (1722–​1727)’, Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire, 93:2 (2015), 397–​437, 432. Norbert Laude, La Compagnie d’Ostende et son activité coloniale au Bengale (Brussels: Institut Royal Colonial Belge, 1944), 76–​77.

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Company and framed the corporation as a mechanism that would establish a balance of power in Asia.10 ‘Reason of state’, he wrote, compelled ‘Monarchies and Republics’ to undermine ‘any power that aspires to universal control’, in this case, the Dutch Republic, which ‘possesses a type of Universal Monarchy, or Dominion’ over Asia.11 Merchants and financiers saw in these negotiations an opportunity to lobby the Crown for the creation of other companies. Alongside the foreign merchant Samuel Rognon, members of the Spanish elite, such as the Duke of Béjar, Philip’s mayordomo mayor, or High Steward, sought to establish their own corporations. Béjar proposed the creation of a number of commercial companies near Huelva, to the west of Seville, to supply clothing to the Americas, and to manage the supply of Mexican silver throughout the Pacific.12 Goyeneche, however, had even more ambitious plans. With his decades of experience, Goyeneche used the debates surrounding the Ostend Company to enlighten Philip v. In his Discurso, the financier outlined a sweeping historical account that straddled the financial dilemmas of Charles ii’s reign with analyses of contemporary rises in the price of paper in European markets.13 As he explained to his ‘dear friend’, the only solution to Spain’s troubles was to establish a company to manage the Spanish Empire.14 Goyeneche had encouraged his son to translate works of European political economy and, in his Discurso to Philip v, the learned investor drew extensively on Pierre Daniel Huet’s books and on the

10

Gerónimo de Uztáriz, Theorica y práctica de comercio y de marina (Madrid: A. Sanz, 1742), 90–​92. Reyes Fernández Durán made the argument that Uztáriz published the work to rally support for the Company. See Fernández Durán, Gerónimo de Uztáriz, 280–​290. 11 Uztáriz, Theorica, 88–​89. Uztáriz, who was critical of joint-​stock companies, supported their establishment to aid Spanish Pacific trade. See Uztáriz, Theorica, 88–​94. 12 On Rognon, see Hussey, The Caracas Company, 49–​50. On the Duke of Bejar’s project, see Memorial de Juan Manuel López de Zúñiga, xi duque de Béjar, al rey Felipe v sobre el proyecto que pretendía de la Compañía de Comercio de Gibraleón (Huelva) con las Indias. Archivo Histórico de la Nobleza, es.45168; Cartas enviadas a Juan Manuel López de Zúñiga, [xi] duque de Béjar, sobre diferentes asuntos, Archivo Histórico de la Nobleza, es.45168. 13 Sr Don J.G. [Juan Goyeneche], Discursos anónimos sobre el abatimiento en que se hallaba el comercio de España con sus Indias en el año de 1725, por la libertad y desahogo con que lo hacian los franceses en el mar del sur, provincia de caracas, e islas de barlovento, y por la permisión concedida la compañía de Inglaterra que debiendo enviar anualmente un navío del imitado porte en Veracruz, otro en Cartagena, y otro a buenos aires, cargaban tanto como una mediana flota de galones […] propone un único medio, 1725, Biblioteca Palacio Real, ii/​ 2863, 11. 14 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 18.

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writings of the Savary brothers.15 But Goyeneche also used his ambitious discourse to historicise the dilemmas Spain faced; to recover seventeenth-​century policy debates, and to rescue proposals that had been lost to the needs of the War of Spanish Succession.16 In Goyeneche’s view, Spain could subvert Europe’s expectations. ‘Europe’ would continue to ‘take pleasure in’ its ‘inaction’ while Spain secretly established a company that would replace the colonial structure of the Spanish Empire.17 It was key to preserve the secrecy of this project because European diplomacy had undermined prior attempts. ‘When the minister marquess de los Vélez’, once Viceroy of Naples and later Dean of the Council of Indies, had ‘attempted to set up a bank to emulate fellow European nations, the measure went so far that the King drafted the orders’ but the Netherlands, England, and France had all intervened.18 The Dutch and the French, in turn, had learned of an industrial project that would have rendered Spain a self-​sufficient economy, and had prevented its implementation.19 The ‘formation of a general company of the Indies’ had suffered the same fate.20 The lesson, then, was that diplomacy had failed: it was time to assume that other nations would never favour Spain’s interests, and pursue other ways to revitalise its transnational trade and reconfigure its imperial administration. The first step was to make the Spanish colonial system more efficient and its officials more trustworthy. He reassured the King that officials in European corporate ‘societies’ regularly studied their finances and carried out ‘operations and calculations’ to ensure there was ‘no way for fraud to grow’.21 Spain, however, had long-​standing institutions in its traditional chartered corporations, the consulados, that served to regulate trade. Goyeneche suggested 15

Pierre Daniel-​Huet, Comercio de Holanda, o el gran thesoro historial, y politico del floreciente comercio que los holandeses tienen en todos los Estados, y Señorios del Mundo. Translated by Francisco Javier de Goyeneche (Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1717); Jones Corredera, ‘The Rediscovery’, 958. 16 Goyeneche, however, did not refer to those scholars later known as novatores, or to Charles ii’s establishment of coporate administrative councils, as studied by Fernández Albaladejo in La crisis de la Monarquía, 476–​531. On how early modern members of the Spanish nobility harnessed imperial structures for their own ends see Yun-​Casalilla, Iberian World Empires, 435–​443. 17 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 45. 18 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 39. On the context of the reforms of Los Vélez see Christopher Storrs, The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy 1665–​1700 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 128–​150. 19 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 40. 20 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 40. 21 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 26 n. A.

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replacing them with company structures: the consulados, he explained, had once been useful organisations but their ‘divisions and the discord of their internal government’ had meant that ‘all their focus’ was ‘on getting the votes needed for the election of consuls the following year’.22 Goyeneche was not wrong. Following the War of Spanish Succession, Spanish officials frequently voiced their dissatisfaction with the unresponsive nature of these chartered institutions. The best example was the Consulado of New Spain, which collaborated extensively with the South Sea Company and sought to undermine Bourbon commercial reforms.23 According to Goyeneche, the consulados should be replaced by a company with ordinances based on a ‘careful examination of those famous ones of the British and the Dutch’, which were to include a detailed analysis of ‘the number of positions and jobs’ in each of these companies.24 All those involved would take an oath.25 The Company would have its own judges and it would discourage any collaboration with governors, audiencias, and ministers, because ‘corruption’ had ‘grown in near-​absolute abandon over so many years’. It would remain ‘a separate Body, independent, with nobody other than the King as its superior’.26 Mimicking the ‘most accredited model of the Dutch East India Company’, Philip should establish councils in various strategic locations.27 The directors would all be ‘men of trade’ who had no ‘position in government affairs’ but the councils would be manned by military officials ‘instructed in worldly affairs and with knowledge of trade’ and those who had ‘travelled to foreign lands, visited Courts, and dealt with foreign affairs’.28 A Governor General would oversee the company’s operations in the Americas and would be based in Mexico. He would manage sub-​delegations in Peru, Chile, and the Philippines. The members of the councils in Peru and Chile would be elected or replaced by their colleagues every ‘one or two years’. 22 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 13–​14. On the early eighteenth-​century Spanish lack of control over expenditure allocation see Regina Grafe and Alejandra Irigoin, ‘A Stakeholder Empire: The Political Economy of Spanish Imperial Rule in America’, The Economic History Review 65:2 (2012), 609–​51. 23 Escamilla González, Los intereses malentendidos, 183–​228. On trends in the use of credit in Mexico see Linda Greenow, Credit and Socioeconomic Change in Colonial Mexico. Loans and Mortgages in Guadalajara, 1720–​1820 (Epping: Bowker Publishing Company, 1983). On the limited reform of the consulados, see Pearce, The Origins, 77–​84. 24 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 27. 25 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 27–​28. 26 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 28. 27 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 31. 28 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 32. The British East India Company ‘pioneered’ the term “civil service”. See Gregory M. Collins, Commerce and Manners in Edmund Burke’s Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 348.

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The Governor General would, in turn, be replaced every ‘three to four years’.29 Following the military victories against the Portuguese, the Dutch East India Company had replaced the Portuguese elective municipal councils and ecclesiastical institutions with a powerful council which effectively coordinated policy-​making.30 Goyeneche had taken note of these changes. Prima facie, this was an ambitious investment scheme. There was a clear mercantilist inspiration behind the plan.31 It would, in principle, allow Goyeneche to fulfil the oligarchic ambitions of any investor, since the scheme would have likely served to favour his family, his confraternity, and their commercial connections in Peru.32 There was, moreover, a profound understanding of the risks of being seen as a valido in Goyeneche’s choice to anonymise his ideas for posterity. But this, above all, was a proposal to carry out deep political and cultural reform. This company was to stimulate learning, establish fair prices, encourage elite political debate, and foster trust in the King, through the reorganisation of the administration of the empire.33 Officials in Spain and in the colonies would be educated, and they would draft and debate political economic policies. Company officers would establish two academies, one in the colonies and one in peninsular Spain, to teach male officers, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-​four, about the navy, trade, and mathematics. To be admitted students would have to take an exam. The most talented young men would be ‘sent to the main Port Cities in Europe’ with specific instructions, and they would frequently correspond with members of the company. In the colonies, academies of hydrography and construction would be established in each port to instruct officers.34 The company would then foster debate among its members. It would ‘offer great rewards’ to those who wrote ‘memorials or papers’ on how to stimulate its utility. Their proposals would be recorded to guarantee accountability and prevent ‘speculation’.35 The directors would vote to form a council of five to seven judges to ‘avoid parties’ and divisions. The benefits of a judicious tribunal such as this 29 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 32–​33. 30 Furber, Rival Empires, 187. 31 On the argument that Spain was merely trying to import Colbertism see Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War, 152–​153. 32 See Herzog’s case study in Herzog, “Private Organizations”, and Brian Hamnett, The End of Iberian Rule on the American Continent, 1770–​1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 45. 33 On the Spanish pursuit of an oligopoly in the second half of the seventeenth century and in the early eighteenth century see Stein and Stein, Silver, trade, and war, 71. 34 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 36. 35 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 36–​37.

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were demonstrated by a number of examples: Venice had secured its trade through its ‘Council of Ten’, the Lacedaemonians had benefited from their ‘tribunal of Ephors’, and Spain had its own tribunal of ‘Catholic Ephors’ in the tribunal of the Inquisition.36 These officials were then to encourage trust in the Spanish King in a world that was steadily redefining the meaning of reputation through political economy.37 French and British smuggling, Goyeneche argued, had removed ‘the foundations of wealth and public happiness’ from Spanish ‘Kingdoms’ and companies, which were to be seen as ‘oracles’, would improve the lives of people and encourage them to trust the King: ‘since, in a state of ruin and with poor subjects, no prince can be rich nor respected, and this only generates further evils and undermines the pillars that are justice and power’.38 The company would guarantee foreign investors that an absolute monarch like Philip v could be trusted with their funds. It was important to establish structures that would ensure that the King did not abuse his power. Binding the King’s economic interests to those of his subjects and the company’s investors would protect the investments. Goyeneche reasoned that ‘nobody in their sane mind would argue that the best way to ensure someone’s health is by using a knife, and nobody will believe that one of our Princes would use their authority and power to draw on the company’s wealth’.39 This, he explained, would be a ‘violent and tyrannical injustice, an extreme evil, which will result in harm and hatred towards one’s own, and in the general ruin of the subjects, deprived of the conduits that generate the greatest happiness’.40 It would therefore not be in the King’s interests to use the company’s funds for his own ends, and it was reasonable for merchants to consider ‘the natural inconvenience in Monarchical states that the King may seize it all’ at any time.41 The way to ensure this never happened was to establish two separate funds for the company. One would be made up of private investment, a savings bank, while the other would be a commercial bank made up of the funds generated from the royal privileges that the company would oversee.42 It was therefore crucial 36 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 38. 37 On the influence of reputation in Habsburg Spain see John Elliott, The Count-​Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 55–​58 and 82. On the growth of the political influence of economic opinion in the eighteenth century see Wennerlind, Casualties of Credit, 5–​12. 38 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 21. 39 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 51. 40 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 52. 41 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 50. 42 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 50.

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that the King understood that while the company was gaining investors war was avoided: ‘we must take great care to ensure the preservation of peace, fleeing from all that could disturb us, even if this causes some harm’.43 The political economy of a commercial company could curb the excesses of an arbitrary monarch and grant the King an interest in promoting peace. Philip v could demonstrate that he could be entrusted with people’s fortunes. In the worst-​case scenario, were the King in fact decide to take control of these funds to respond to a crisis, Goyeneche argued, Spain would still retain a greater share of its wealth. Once the crisis had been averted, ‘there would be easy ways of re-​establishing this form of trade’.44 The company, then, would ‘become the distributor and depositary of the wealth of those vast Territories’ in the Americas, and would establish factories and workshops ‘that we lack today’.45 The shipment of goods between Cartagena and Veracruz, and from Peru to Mexico, would be managed by the company, with the assistance of the Spanish navy.46 All trade ‘to those territories of those goods they need from Europe’ along those routes would be conducted through company vessels. This would allow the company to ‘impose the prices they preferred’ which should always ‘follow the maxims’ of fairness and justice.47 Goyeneche emphasised the logic of economies of scale, arguing that the benefits of ‘buying in bulk’ through the company would be ‘understood by anyone of limited intelligence’.48 The company would profit from second-​mover advantages: it did not need to conquer new territories like the Dutch companies, whose corporate enterprises had originally been ‘surrounded by risk and contingencies’. The Dutch had been forced to ‘engage in costly efforts to fight powerful enemies’ while the Spanish would benefit from already having established territories and legislation that would accommodate the company.49 United in their loyalty to the King, the Cortes, and merchants from the Carrera de Indias, would promptly invest in its success.50 Goyeneche concluded his proposal by making it clear that colonial reform would allow the Spanish Crown to disrupt the balance of power in Europe. Goyeneche quoted a report written by an anonymous French official who had 43 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 50. It was more, then, than the pursuit of ‘the Dutch model’, as argued in Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War, 153. 44 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 52. 45 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 53–​55. 46 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 29. 47 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 30. 48 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 65. 49 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 62. 50 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 54.

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served as an engineer and Lieutenant General under Jean-​Baptiste Colbert’s eldest son, the marquess de Seignelay. The report suggested that ‘those territories’ in America ‘had belonged to Spain but had in some sense been Europe’s own’ since other monarchies and republics had managed their trade. They had ‘made gains in proportion to that which they put into providing manufacturing and sales to the Spanish, and by selling goods both to Spain and to the Indies’.51 Those countries ‘which had contributed the most’ were the wealthiest ones in Europe. If Spain could recover and retain ‘an eighth’ of all trade in the Americas, the French official had reasoned, it would be the ‘most powerful country in the world’.52 There was ‘no doubt that there would no equilibrium in Europe’ because ‘within twenty years that Power would dominate all others’.53 In Goyeneche’s view, as a shareholder empire, Spain could replace unresponsive corporate structures by emulating the best foreign examples. Existing legal structures and trade routes, Goyeneche hoped, would facilitate the company’s integration into the political system of the empire. Educated officials, and an accountable board of directors, would debate and decide on the best policies for the Spanish Empire. The King would be encouraged to avoid war, and to understand that his own interests were bound to the economic success of the empire. This republic of merchants hiding under the form of a monarchy would monopolise trade and disrupt the balance of power in Europe.54 Eighteenth-​century ministers and thinkers, from Robert Walpole to Diderot, stressed that Europe was fortunate that the Spanish Empire was managed by Spaniards.55 They had watched the empire become a canal that allowed foreign nations to access the riches of Peru and Mexico without restrictions.56 As the Savary brothers argued, the Dutch, the French, and the British held a larger share of its trade. For Montesquieu, who like Diderot paraphrased the Savarys’ Dictionnaire, Spain absorbed the bulk of the commercial risk.57 Frederick ii, in turn, declared that Spain had become an ‘entrepôt’ through which ‘riches 51 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 75. 52 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 76. 53 Goyeneche, Discursos anónimos, 76. 54 Montesquieu famously described England as a nation where ‘the republic hides under the form of monarchy’. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 70. On this phrase see Annelien De Dijn, ‘Was Montesquieu a Liberal Republican?’, Review of Politics 76:1 (2014), 21–​41, 29. 55 Quoted in Etienvre Françoise, ‘Avant Masson, Jaucourt: L’Espagne dans l’Encyclopédie de Diderot et d’Alembert’, Bulletin Hispanique 104:1 (2002), 161-​180, 167. 56 Another metaphor used was that of a sieve. See Elliott, Empires, 408–​409. 57 Jacques Savary des Bruslons, Dictionaire universel de commerce (Paris: Chez Veuve Estienne, 1741) (Volume 1), 237; Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 313.

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flowed’ and were ‘sold’.58 Bernard Mandeville claimed that Spain was no more ‘than a barren and empty Thorough-​fair, through which Gold and Silver pass from America to the rest of the World’.59 For Robert Walpole, there was a ‘paradox’ in the fact that Spain’s weakness was its very strength: ‘her greatest security lies in her visible weakness’. The ‘preservation’ of the monarchy ‘entire and dismembered’ was due to the ‘general inclination of all the powers in Europe’ who knew that if any other empire were to manage these riches ‘the rest of Europe’ would soon be ‘drained of its treasury’.60 Echoing Mandeville, Walpole declared that Spain was ‘the canal through which all these treasures are conveyed over the rest of Europe’.61 Edmund Burke would later denote the erosion of this canal: ‘the tide of wealth that constantly flowed from America into Spain, ran through that kingdom like a hasty torrent, which, far from enriching the country, hurried away with it all the wealth which it found in its passage’.62 Those who hoped to change Spain’s role in the world, then, had to consider ways of regaining control over this fluid space and generating trust in an absolute monarchy that was gradually losing its hold over its own trade. 3

Representations of the Spanish Empire

Goyeneche proposed a radical reconfiguration of the Spanish Empire and was profoundly sceptical of diplomacy. It was an alternative to the other main proposal on the table in 1725, the transnational treaty-​based investment in the Ostend Company which, by contrast, offered continuity. The Ostend Company would serve to support established Habsburg commercial networks that had survived the War of Spanish Succession. During the conflict, Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean trade routes were severely disrupted, but one branch of trade continued with relative ease: the Baltic. Overshadowed by the two most active Spanish ports, Cádiz and Barcelona, the ports of Biscay had long connected the Spanish peninsula to the United Provinces, Britain, and other Baltic markets. Spanish exports and the crucial importation of wood to build ships

58 Frederick ii, Historie de mon temps, 46. 59 Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees (London: J. Tonson, 1724), 215. 60 Chandler, The History and Proceedings, Volume 10, 346. 61 Chandler, The History and Proceedings, 346. 62 In his book Account of the European Settlements, which he wrote with William Burke. Edmund Burke and William Burke, An Account of the European Settlements in America. Volume 1 (London: R. and J. Dodsley, 1760), 296.

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relied on these routes.63 During the war, this trade continued via the port of Dunkirk.64 Existing networks received royal support: Spain renewed the ‘special and privileged nation’ status of the ‘Flemish Nation of Cádiz’, a confraternity of Dutch and Flemish merchants who had long enjoyed a special commercial relationship with Spain.65 José Patiño, as Intendant General of the Navy, President of the Court of the Casa de la Contratación, and Intendant of Seville, supported an initiative to collaborate with other Flemish traders and sought to implement Dutch shipbuilding techniques in the peninsula.66 Following the loss of the Spanish Netherlands to Vienna, Patiño expressed his willingness to negotiate with the Emperor on matters of trade.67 In 1720, the Treaty of the Hague signalled the end of the War of the Quadruple Alliance and authorised commerce between merchants of enemy nations.68 Encouraged by these developments, merchants from Vienna and the corporate ‘Flemish Nation of Cádiz’ submitted proposals aimed at improving the terms of trade between the Baltic, Central Europe, and the Spanish Empire.69 Wool exports from the Basque region rose, the migratory flocks of the Mesta outgrew their sixteenth-​ century dimensions, and European merchants sought out Basque ore containing low concentrations of phosphorus.70 As the War of Spanish Succession and the Treaty of Utrecht dismembered many of the Northern and Southern European political ties that bound the Habsburg Monarchy together, reaffirming the long-​standing commercial networks that linked Spain and Central Europe was in the interest of both Madrid and Vienna. The mid-​1720s negotiations of the Treaty of Vienna around a Spanish-​Austrian Ostend Company were therefore no anomaly, but sought to coordinate and expand these successful trade networks. 63 Ringrose, Spain, Europe, and the “Spanish Miracle”, 193; Jonathan Israel, Conflicts of Empires: Spain, the Low Countries and the Struggle for World Supremacy 1585–​1713 (London: Hambledon, 1997), 63; E. John B. Allen, Post and Courier Service in the Diplomacy of Early Modern Europe (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972), 10. 64 Joseph Lefevre, Étude sur le commerce de la Belgique avec l’Espagne au XVIIIe siècle (Brussels: M. Lamertin, 1921), 17. 65 Ana Crespo Solana, ‘Merchants and Observers. The Dutch Republic’s Commercial Interests in Spain and the Merchant Community in Cádiz in the Eighteenth Century’, Dieciocho 32:2 (2009), 1–​31, 4 and 15. 66 Ana Crespo Solana, Mercaderes atlánticos. Redes del comercio flamenco y holandés entre Europa y el Caribe (Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, 2009), 63; Ana Crespo Solana, ‘Merchants and Observers’, 8. 67 Crespo Solana, Mercaderes atlánticos, 8. 68 Crespo Solana, Mercaderes atlánticos, 19. 69 Lefevre, Étude sur le commerce de la Belgique avec l’Espagne, 25. 70 Ringrose, Spain, Europe, and the “Spanish Miracle”, 223.

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The terms of the treaty, however, threatened to upend the balance of power in Europe as it had been sketched out at the Treaty of Utrecht. They addressed some of the more problematic issues that the Utrecht negotiations had failed to resolve, such as ‘the restitution of fiefs, material goods, titles and ecclesiastical rights’.71 They also granted the Ostend Company the same privileges that British and Dutch merchants enjoyed, and committed Spain to the support of the Company.72 But, as Uztáriz had suggested, Spain and Austria would only collaborate on matters regarding Pacific trade: Ripperda initially approved the Company’s rights to trade in the Americas, but explicitly rejected the proposal to interfere in the trade between Portobello and Cartagena, because he feared that this would foster Dutch smuggling in Northern South America.73 In the event, the final terms established the freedom of trade between the enemy nations, ‘without restrictions or formalities’.74 In response, officials serving rival European corporations reworked early seventeenth-​century debates on free trade. The British East India company sought to undermine the Ostend Company by suing merchants in British Courts and seizing any British subject involved in its schemes.75 The Dutch East India Company employed the services of Jean Barbeyrac and other jurists, and threatened violence against Emperor Charles vi. After studying how Hugo Grotius’s ideas could be used to favour Dutch interests, Barbeyrac’s strongest argument was a rather disappointing one: the Dutch East India Company’s right to trade was based on privileges granted to inhabitants of the Southern Netherlands as a result of conquest.76 The Huguenot author Jean Dumont, one of the officials who wrote in support of the Ostend Company, countered that the Dutch had allowed other commercial corporations to trade in the region, and suggested that if privileges relied on right of conquest the Spanish Monarchy would surely have legitimately been able to forbid other empires from pursuing trade in the region.77 71 Raurell, Diplomacia secreta y paz, 270. 72 Raurell, Diplomacia secreta y paz, 270. 73 Raurell, Diplomacia secreta y paz, 270. A number of problematic factors which clashed with Spanish imperial sovereignty were not addressed: the Ostend Company, largely based on the British East India Company, had originally been granted the rights to conquer and acquire land, build ports, set up colonies, and sign treaties with indigenous peoples. See Laude, La Compagnie d’Ostende, 38–​39. 74 Raurell, Diplomacia secreta y paz, 270. 75 Stern, Company-​State, 195–​196. 76 Dhondt, ‘Delenda est haec’, 408–​410. 77 Dhondt, ‘Delenda est haec’, 415. In the seventeenth century, the English East India Company had been forced into making a similarly tortuous argument. See Stern, Company-​State, 55.

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One official, Karel Filips Pattijn, even wrote a book connecting the ideas of Grotius’s Mare Liberum to the establishment of the Ostend Company.78 But the debate over the law of nations was shown to have been superseded by the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht: British and French pressure, along with rumours about Ripperda’s secret negotiations, forced the Spanish Crown to disavow both the minister and its participation in the Ostend Company.79 For Britain, the possible loss of privileged corporate information was a source of great concern: many of the investors and interested parties in Ostend were either Jacobites or had connections to Catholic communities based in Cádiz.80 Many were former employees of British companies and a substantial number of ships built for the Ostend Company came from London.81 Ostend Company officials regularly received information from Paris, London, Madrid, Cádiz, Livorno, and Anvers, as well as reports on the value of the Mexican peso and other currencies, and British officials feared that the Company’s Scottish and Irish employees would draw on this information to set up a rival company in Sweden or in Spain.82 The Company was however formally disbanded soon after, although interlopers continued to use its flag and its name to conduct trade over the next few decades.83 The project revealed how transnational corporations could, in a matter of months, threaten to realign European political relations. For Henry St John, Viscount of Bolingbroke, the negotiations were a reaffirmation of political realism and a vindication of the political economy of empire; a demonstration that ‘reason of state will determine the conduct of princes, not old stale resentments’.84 But in response to the treaty, argued Jean-​François Melon, Europe had shown that war would always remain an option, as it had responded with ‘jealousy’. European states had shown that they were ready to, yet again, take up arms against Spain and Austria to protect their commercial interests.85 Perhaps, then, Goyeneche had been right to distrust diplomacy. 78

Karel Filips Pattyn, Mare Liberum ex Jure Naturae, Gentium & Civili Assertum, Vindicatum, Redivivum (Regensburg: typis Hieronymi Lenzii, 1727). On this text see Dhondt, Balance of Power, 382. 79 On Utrecht and the new hierarchy of norms see Dhondt’s excellent book, Balance of Power, 1–​40. 80 Furber, Rival Empires, 219. 81 Furber, Rival Empires, 220; Laude, La Compagnie, 30. 82 Laude, La Compagnie, 56; Stern, Company-​State, 196. 83 Furber, Rival Empires, 219. 84 Bolingbroke, The Work of Lord Bolingbroke: With a Life, Prepared Expressly for this Edition, Containing Additional Information Relative to His Personal and Public Character, Selected from the Best Authorities. Volume 1 (Philadelphia, PA: Carey and Hart, 1841), 254. 85 Lebeau, “Negotiating a Trade Treaty in an Imperial Context”, 355.

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Over the next decade, Spanish imperial designs sought to compensate for the failure to establish the transnational Ostend Company. The creation of the Royal Guipuzcoan Company of Caracas was to regulate the silver trade in Europe and the Atlantic and undermine Dutch smuggling in the Caribbean. A range of European merchants invested in the company, as did Goyeneche. The Company promised to facilitate the smuggling of silver to Bayonne, the main coin market in Europe, from where it would be exported to markets in the Baltic, London, Amsterdam, and Hamburg.86 In an effort to reconfigure Spain’s control over the silver and silk trade between Peru and the Pacific territories, Patiño banned the introduction of Chinese silk into the Spanish peninsula, and sought to establish a Philippine Company six times before it received a royal decree, only to flounder soon after.87 When the Spanish Empire was framed in terms of profit, investment, and corporations the impact of overlapping and conflicting forms of authority was thrown into stark relief. As the Caracas Company sought to establish its monopoly over the cocoa trade, the zambo Andrés López del Rosario led his Company of Freed Blacks in their rebellion against the Company’s authorities.88 Ministers in Madrid had to reckon with the outcomes of trans-​imperial competition, which had encouraged the cooperation of multiple corporate bodies that challenged racial hierarchies and colonial legislation. Companies of freed blacks, which had emerged in the sixteenth century as a form of slave containment had, by the early eighteenth century, become powerful commercial communities in regions like New Spain and Venezuela.89 The rebels in Caracas made clear that theirs was not an attack on the Spanish King, but one on the company’s control of the tobacco and the cocoa trade.90 But their repeated complaints against the company’s monopolistic ambition were not 86

Álvaro Aragón Ruano and Alberto Augulo Morales, ‘The Spanish Basque Country in Global Trade Networks in the Eighteenth Century’, International Journal of Maritime History 25:1 (2013), 149–​172, 154. 87 On the study that Patiño ordered Abreu to carry out on Pacific trade see Antonio José Álvarez de Abreu, Extracto historial del comercio entre China, Filipinas y Nueva España. Edited by Carmen Yuste López. Two volumes (Mexico: Instituto Mexicano de Comercio Exterior, 1977). 88 Hussey, The Caracas Company, 66–​69; Jesse Cromwell, The Smugglers’ World: Illicit Trade and Atlantic Communities in Eighteenth-​Century Venezuela (Chapel Hill, NC: North Carolina Press, 2018), 88–​100. 89 See Vinson iii, Bearing Arms for His Majesty, 1–​20; Linda M. Rupert, “Seeking the Water of Baptism: Fugitive Slaves and Imperial Jurisdiction in the Early Modern Caribbean”, in Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross eds., Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500–​1800 (New York, NY: New York University Press), 199–​232. 90 Hussey, The Caracas Company, 67–​69.

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founded on economic principles. Instead, theirs was a fundamental criticism of the political and economic inefficiency of the Spanish empire, for the grievance against the Caracas Company turned on the notion that the government-​ sponsored company could not adequately supply the region.91 In Manila, the nature of the Consulado’s response was similar, but their arguments were more nuanced. They alleged that Cádiz merchants had exploited the announcement of the creation of the Philippine Company to trade under its banner and this deceitful manoeuvre demonstrated that their sole interest was to increase their profits.92 Their use of the short-​lived Philippine Company, they argued, had harmed Spanish interests: it had facilitated the silver trade of Chinese and rival European merchants and threatened Manila’s control over trade routes. The Consulado saw no need to respect the distinction between Habsburg laws and the Bourbon legislation: against the accusation that Chinese silk imports via Manila ruined Spanish industries, they countered that in 1696 ‘the city of Seville’ had confessed that it was the increasing success of the French, English, and Dutch merchants since the middle of the century, and the lack of application of Spaniards, that were to blame for the lacklustre results of the peninsular textile industry.93 They also reminded the Crown of the terms they had established with other corporate bodies: the South Sea Company was authorised to trade, with its annual ship, ‘in the goods which it shall choose’ and to introduce them ‘into Mexico’. The Philippine Company surely had to adapt to these terms.94 In the 1730s, local authorities were therefore far more aware of the commercial networks of the Spanish Empire than the councils in Spain, and they understood that this knowledge granted them a great deal of leverage. The consulados at times directly challenged ministerial orders: when José Patiño asked the Viceroy of Peru to ensure that the Lima Consulado elected two deputies to regularly confer with him, members of the Consulado replied that they felt no need to address the matter. One official arrived in Spain two years later to discuss this issue.95 For Spanish ministers in Madrid, acquiring accurate information about the state of the Spanish Empire was therefore not an easy

91 Hussey, The Caracas Company, 67–​69. 92 Antonio Álvarez de Abreu, “Extracto Historial” (Madrid, 1736). Edited and translated by Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson in The Philippine Islands 1493–​1898, Volume 45 (1736) (Ohio: The Arthur H. Clark Company), 11–​89, 46. 93 Abreu, “Extracto Historial”, 50. 94 Abreu, “Extracto Historial”, 68. 95 Walker, Spanish Politics, 195.

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task.96 Corporate efforts to revitalise the Spanish Crown’s control over imperial trade complemented measures that sought to discover and study the true state of each region of the empire –​its credit networks, its trade relations, its hierarchy –​through censuses, cadastres, or tax reforms.97 But these generated protests that revealed the power inequities between Madrid, peninsular provinces, and the colonies. Uztáriz had claimed that companies were better suited to spaces where Spanish control was weaker.98 Yet, when surveyed by Spanish officials, the Bourbon management of the empire appeared to be under challenge in Atlantic, Pacific, and Caribbean dominions. In Peru, a devastating epidemic reduced the number of indigenous peoples in the region and precipitated the establishment of a census to register the remaining population.99 The Spanish Viceroy, the marquess of Castelfuerte, was met with social unrest from mestizos and, in spite of the long-​term benefits brought about by the improved registration that accounted for a larger number of subjects, the process was slow and burdensome due to local resistance.100 The Governor of Venezuela, Martín de Larzidabal, attempted a more radical solution to the lack of information about trade in his territories. Larzidabal accepted that as a Viceroy, he would be unable to legislate, and prevent, smuggling, and sought instead to tax covert trade.101 The problem of the lack of information about the economic reality on the ground extended to the Spanish peninsula. The diplomat and scholar, Álvaro Navia-​Osorio y Vigil, the marquess of Santa Cruz de Marcenado, collaborated with Lodovico Antonio Muratori and Nicolas Lenglet Du Fresnoy, and wrote the most translated Spanish text of the century, the eleven-​volume Reflexiones Militares.102 Marcenado asked ‘the Spanish Republic of Letters’ to invest their funds and their minds in the creation of a ‘Universal Dictionary’. Marcenado hoped to foster an improved understanding of the history of Spain in the 96

On the profound and historic connection between the acquisition of chorographic knowledge, the creation of the urban spaces, and the politics of the Spanish Empire, see Richard Kagan, Urban Images of the Hispanic World, 1493–​1793 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000). 97 On the origins of the difficulties in processing and harnessing this type of information see Arndt Brendecke, “Practices of knowledge acquisition”, in The Empirical Empire, 192–​234. 98 Uztáriz, Teorica, 90–​92. 99 Adrian J. Pearce, ‘The Peruvian Population Census of 1725–​1740’, Latin American Research Review 36:3 (2001), 69–​104. 100 Pearce, ‘The Peruvian Population Census’, 90–​104. 101 Cromwell, The Smuggler’s World, 60–​61. 102 See Pelayo García Fernández, “Las reflexiones militares del tercer marqués de Santa Cruz de Marcenado fuera de España”, in Felix Labrador Arroyo ed., Líneas recientes de investigación en Historia Moderna. (Madrid: Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, 2015), 647–​704.

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peninsula, in the overseas territories, and in Europe, through the establishment of this popularising work.103 Drawing on the works of Pierre Bayle and Johann Burckhardt Mencke, the main objective of the Universal Dictionary was to summarise the ideas published in the newest publications of the European Republic of Letters into a readable and affordable format because, Marcenado argued, ‘only two out of a hundred Spaniards’ had ‘access to correspondents who can send them Books from Rome, Bologna, Padua, Lipsia, Geneva, Lyon, Paris, Holland, Britain, Ambers, or Cologne’.104 The dictionary would be cheaper than the rest of its kind, and the revenues would ‘not leave Spain’.105 Scholars would eventually transform the dictionary into an archive of chorographical knowledge with ‘blueprints for Armies, Hydrographical and Geographical entries on coasts, rivers, and Mediterranean nations’. They would take note of animals, plants, and machines ‘that served practical purposes, particularly Physics, Nautical, Civil, and Military Architecture, and other dependencies of Mathematics, and of War’.106 The desire to improve the knowledge of Europe in the Spanish Empire, and to spread information about the Spanish Empire in Europe, demonstrated Marcenado’s cultural ambition.107 But it also revealed that there was a dire need for Spanish officials to better understand the true nature of the Spanish Empire, and its place in the world. There was ‘no other Educated province in Europe with poorer Libraries than ours’ and ‘almost all the vast and rich Countries of the Indies’, he explained, lacked ‘a Dictionary’.108 Framing the Spanish Empire in terms of investment and profits reaffirmed the importance of a perennial set of questions at the heart of politics: who was the empire for? Whose interests were represented by the Crown? How 1 03 See Jones Corredera, ‘The Rediscovery’, 12–​13. 104 Álvaro José Navia-​Osorio y Vigil, marquess of Santa Cruz de Marcenado, Reflexiones militares del Mariscal de Campo don Álvaro Navia Osorio, vizconde de Puerto, ò marques de Santa Cruz de Marzenado (Turin: Juan Francisco Mairesse, 1724–​1730) Eleven Volumes. “Proyecto”, in Reflexiones, Volume 8, Appendix 1, 13. On the compression of knowledge, see Peter Burke, A Social History of Knowledge: From the ‘Encyclopédie’ to Wikipedia (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012). 105 Marcenado, “Proyecto”, Reflexiones, Volume 8, Appendix 1, 14. 106 Marcenado, “Proyecto”, Reflexiones, Volume 8, Appendix 1, 20. On the Republic of Letters and the pursuit of scholarly reputation, see Anne Goldgar, Impolite Learning: Conduct and Community in the Republic of Letters (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995). 107 Richard Yeo, Encyclopaedic Visions: Scientific Dictionaries and Enlightenment Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), xiv; Barbara Shapiro, A Culture of Fact. England 1550–​1720 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 66–​72. 108 Marcenado, “Últimas ideas del Marques de Santa Cruz”, Reflexiones, Volume 10, Appendix 1, 87; Marcenado, ‘Proyecto’, Reflexiones, Volume 8, Appendix 1, 15. On the project’s fate see Jones Corredera, ‘The Rediscovery’, 10–​11.

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could the Bourbon Crown represent them? In his Representación, the political economist Miguel de Zavala y Auñón provided answers to these questions. He drew attention to the inefficient and protracted Bourbon attempt to establish a cadastre. Ministers, he argued, lacked accurate information and fundamentally misunderstood the history of the administration of power.109 Zavala studied ways of gathering information about social inequality in the peninsula and ways to address it. Drawing on the economic success of European shareholder companies, Zavala drafted an ambitions plan to regenerate the political economic influence of the Spanish Cortes.110 Corporate assemblies would effectively control company revenues which, Zavala made clear, could not be used by the King or a minister to secure anything other than the wellbeing of the people.111 The creation of these councils that managed companies, and their public trusts, would serve to underwrite the Spanish Monarchy, to ensure that dynastic crises would no longer throw the social fabric of the Spanish peninsula into disarray, and to reaffirm the representation of corporate interests.112 Once the effects of dynastic crises had been neutralised, political debate and popular investment would determine the policies of the Spanish Empire. 4

The Assembly of Public Trust

Miguel de Zavala y Auñón was born in the late seventeenth century in Badajoz, a frontier town with Portugal. His father served in senior local administrative

109 Miguel Zavala y Auñón, Representación al Rey Don Felipe V para el más seguro aumento del Real Erario, y conseguir la felicidad, mayor alivio y abundancia de su monarquía (1732). Biblioteca Pública de Burgos –​Signatura: 6088. Digital Copy (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León. Consejería de Cultura y Turismo, 2009–​2010) Signature: 2, A-​Z2, 2A-​2Y2, 37–​46. 110 For a broader analysis of the Spanish republican tradition and Zavala’s text see Edward Jones Corredera, ‘The Assembly of Public Trust: Republicanism and the Birth of Spanish Political Economy’, in Carolina Armenteros and Edward Castleton eds., Special Issue: Monarchy and Modernity, History of European Ideas (2021) (Forthcoming). On the Cortes see, in particular, Xavier Gil, ‘Parliamentary Life in the Crown of Aragon: Cortes, Juntas De Brazos, and Other Corporate Bodies’, Journal of Early Modern History 6:4 (2002), 362–​395. 111 Zavala, Representación, 157. 112 This was an early effort to solve the problem of the excessive influence of asentistas and corporate structures in Spanish political life, as studied in Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, ‘El decreto de suspensión de pagos de 1739: análisis e implicaciones’, Moneda y Crédito 142 (1977), 51–​85 and Anne Dubet, ‘José Campillo y las secuelas de la suspensión de 1739: un proyecto político para la Hacienda Real’, Cuadernos de Historia Moderna 42:2 (2017), 629–​652.

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positions in the town, as both regidor and alcalde, but Miguel inherited his position as regidor of Badajoz from his mother’s side, Juana de Auñon Torregroso.113 Early eighteenth-​century Spanish women, according to recent research, actively participated in the workforce, frequently provided credit to merchants, and served as intermediaries between Spanish and foreign merchants.114 Spanish legislation banned women from acting as local administrators, but allowed them to possess titles which their sons could inherit.115 During the War of the Spanish Succession, Zavala was involved in the administration of Badajoz, and favoured diplomacy and debate over conflict. He was asked to travel to the Spanish Court to represent the interests of Badajoz and the neighbouring Portuguese town of Campo Mayor, since the two, while Spain and Portugal waged war, had reached a pact of non-​aggression that would ensure the economic recovery of the area. The goal was to ‘reduce the price of crops’ and to ‘repopulate those frontier territories’.116 The following year, in response to the Junta de Comercio’s demand that a local administrator should study the ‘causes of decadence of Badajoz and the means of progress’, Zavala outlined the negative impact of repeated dynastic conflicts with Portugal on the local economy, and called for industrial reform.117 In 1714, following a meeting with the representatives of the main officials of the province’s towns, he was asked to draft a text to reform the taxes and tributes in the region.118 It was at this point that Zavala began his study of the economic dimension of the Bourbon policy of the Nueva Planta, which replaced the ancient privileges of the Crown of Aragón with the laws of Castile, removed its taxes and its tributes, and implemented a poll tax.119 Zavala analysed and recorded the process of its implementation in detail, and his analysis demonstrated how, over ten years, robust urban structures of accountability negotiated and contested 113 The most comprehensive biographical study of Zavala is Miguel Ángel Melón Jiménez, “Las rentas provinciales y la idea de una sola contribución real de Miguel de Zavala y Auñón”, in José Luis Pereira Iglesias ed., Felipe V de Borbón 1701–​1746 (Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, 2002), 61–​90, 65. 114 Carmen Sarasua, ‘Women’s work and structural change: occupational structure in eighteenth‐century Spain’, The Economic History Review 72 (2018), 481–​509; Paloma Fernández Pérez, El rostro familiar de la metrópoli: redes de parentesco y lazos mercantiles en Cádiz, 1700–​1812 (Madrid: Siglo xxi, 1997), 10–​14. 115 Felipe Lorenzana de la Puente, ‘Sobre la incapacidad legal de mujeres para ejercer oficios públicos. Las regidurías de Badajoz: 1648–​1700’, Norba 8/​9 (1987–​88), 189–​194. 116 Melón Jiménez, “Las rentas provinciales”, 66. 117 Melón Jiménez, “Las rentas provinciales”, 66. 118 Melón Jiménez, “Las rentas provinciales”, 67. 119 Jean-​Pierre de Dieu, ‘La Nueva Planta en su contexto: Las reformas del aparato del Estado en el reinado de Felipe V’, Manuscrits 18 (2000), 113–​139.

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the heavy-​handed and inefficient measures of Bourbon administrators.120 He concluded that the successful implementation of a poll tax turned on negotiation and coordination.121 By the time his Representación was published in 1732, Zavala was familiar with the political economy of dynastic wars, and occupied influential regional positions as a member of the Council of Castile and a General Superintendent of Annuities.122 In his Representación, Zavala studied how dynastic conflicts, which he referred to repeatedly as ‘urgencies’, had led to excessive and arbitrary taxation and to the loss of public trust. Finding solutions to this problem, he explained, was ‘the main purpose of writing this text’. The provision of sufficient funds to meet ‘the daily needs of the State, even if a crisis or several crises arose’ would ensure that the use of economic resources would be limited. It would allow the state to make ‘demands that each individual could satisfy’ and guarantee that ‘there was enough for everyone’.123 The three problems facing Spaniards were the multitude of local taxes, Spain’s poor agricultural production, and the lack of trade.124 As regidor of Badajoz, Zavala was one of the officials in charge of the management of the taxed income and the wealth of the town, and his ownership of the title by virtue of his ancestors reflected the seventeenth-​century expansion of patronage in Habsburg Spain.125 It was significant, then, that he reserved his harshest criticisms for those local officials in charge of collecting people’s taxes who ‘lived off the blood of the poor’.126 Elites, he explained, ‘failed to pay the small fee they are asked to contribute’.127 The ‘wealth of the state’, he explained, was ‘not founded on that of one individual or the other; it consists on the ability of individuals to live free of need’.128 It was ‘the poorest and those most in need’ who paid ‘the bulk of these tributes’.129 Small producers contributed what little they made in taxes, and some even had to turn to theft simply to cover 1 20 Zavala, Representación, 37–​46. 121 Zavala, Representación, 44–​45. 122 Ricardo Calle Saiz, ‘La Hacienda Pública en España (El proyecto de Vauban y su influencia sobre el pensamiento financiero de Zabala y Auñón)’, Revista de economía política 77 (1977), 7–​28; José Miguel Delgado Barrado, ‘Entre Reyes y Ministros de Hacienda. Bernardo Francisco Aznar y el «nodo 1732»‘, Espacio Tiempo y Forma. Serie IV, Historia Moderna 30 (2017), 57–​84, 59–​61. 123 Zavala, Representación, 155. 124 Zavala, Representación, 5. 125 See Charles Jago, ‘The Influence of Debt on the Relations between Crown and Aristocracy in Seventeenth-​Century Castile’, The Economic History Review 26:2 (1973), 218–​36. 126 Zavala, Representación, 10. 127 Zavala, Representación, 10. 128 Zavala, Representación, 8. 129 Zavala, Representación, 8.

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the cost of the tributes. This explained ‘the shortage in the Republic of those who could work in the mechanical arts’ and those who could labour in the fields.130 This tax system also fostered population decline: unable to pay their own taxes, bachelors were unlikely to marry because they knew they would be incapable of providing for their wife and children.131 To remedy this issue, Zavala proposed the establishment of a cadastre, the cancellation of all local tributes and taxes, and the introduction of a tax system which would reflect people’s income; ‘a tax over all fixed rents, and on possessions that deliver annual outputs’.132 In this context, companies could encourage the circulation of wealth ‘that people from various spheres and estates have saved up’.133 Zavala argued that the example of ‘all Nations’ showed ‘that the way to foment trade, build consistency, and augment their power, is to establish companies’.134 Zavala studied the history of the establishment of companies in the Netherlands, Britain, and France, and considered five objections to the establishment of similar schemes in Spain. The first was that the Spanish character prevented its people from engaging in trade. The second was that the nobility’s pride would preclude their investment in such schemes. The third was the lack of public trust, which would discourage everyone from investing in the same enterprises.135 The fourth was that these companies were despotic, and assumed responsibilities that belonged to the sovereign. The fifth was that European states would simply oppose and obstruct the establishment of these companies.136 There was nothing, he explained, in the Spanish character that undermined the commercial ambitions of its people. ‘Histories of Spain’ were replete with ‘examples of their commercial inclinations’, and the ‘establishment of trade in

1 30 Zavala, Representación, 10. 131 Zavala, Representación, 10. 132 Zavala, Representación, 10–​11. 133 Zavala, Representación, 137. On the establishment, during the War of the Spanish Succession, of a similar scheme in Austria, the Vienna City Bank, and its role as a caisse d’emprunt, see Simon Adler, Political Economy in the Habsburg Monarchy 1750–​1774: The Contribution of Ludwig Zizendorf (London: Palgrave, 2020), 89. On the banking services provided by the early eighteenth-​century British East India Company see Murphy, John Law, 113. 134 Zavala, Representación, 136. 135 Zavala, Representación, 146. On how the shared eighteenth-​century engagement with risk generated ideas of civic faith in the North American territories see Jennifer Baker, Securing the Commonwealth: Debt, Speculation, and Writing in the Making of Early America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 2–​16. 136 Zavala, Representación, 147.

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the Americas’ was the most obvious one.137 Spanish labourers, in turn, worked ‘day and night, in summer and in winter’, and demonstrated the necessary patience and foresight ‘over the long periods of time’ required to grow crops and engage in trade.138 This experience was bound to ensure their success as investors: labourers would understand ‘the need to wait’ to benefit from their investments.139 Nobles, too, would promptly ‘accept that being a merchant’ was ‘nothing other than engaging in the act of buying and selling’.140 Foreign nations, ‘rational and political’ as they were, would never pursue interests they had no right to through ‘force or tyrannical means’ to prevent ‘an Independent Sovereign’ from drafting and implementing their own political and economic policies; this would be an affront to the ‘Law of Nations’, and a betrayal of the terms that had been agreed through treaties.141 But, above all, the establishment of regulated companies could solve the most pressing problem in Spain, the need to ‘re-​establish and conserve public trust through the satisfaction of the funds that are used during times of crises’. Zavala believed that ‘the most efficient means to do so is to trade through companies’.142 Since the lack of political and economic predictability undermined people’s trust in investment and trade, establishing corporations that fostered confidence in the Spanish Monarchy would revitalise commerce. Honour and trust were two traits of the Spanish character that foreign authors, he explained, always praised and sometimes mocked: ‘Foreign authors, who are not used to praising anyone, and particularly us, in their writings, praise the fidelity of Spaniards, and claim there is no nation in Europe more consistent in honouring agreements’.143 Indeed, in The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu, when discussing the Spanish character, would claim that ‘the faithfulness they had of old they still have today’. But this trustworthiness had been mixed with laziness, and had contributed to Spanish imperial decline.144 The Scottish historian William Robertson would later, in his History of America, cite Zavala’s work in order to draw the same conclusion about Spaniards.145 But Zavala had 1 37 Zavala, Representación, 148. 138 Zavala, Representación, 148–​149. 139 Zavala, Representación, 150. 140 Zavala, Representación, 151. 141 Zavala, Representación, 164. 142 Zavala, Representación, 155. On early eighteenth-​century French debates on trust and banking see Murphy, John Law, 144 and 333. 143 Zavala, Representación, 153–​154. 144 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 313. 145 William Robertson, The Works of William Robertson, D.D. To which is Prefixed, An Account of the Life and Writings of the Author, by Dugald Stewart. In Eight volumes. Volume 7 (London: T. Cadell, 1840). “The History of America”, 378.

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pushed back against this view. Honour and trust, he explained, were not incompatible with trade; they were profoundly commercial values that relied on ‘the credit of truth’.146 ‘Neither threats, nor promises, nor self-​interest’, according to Zavala, stood in the way of the commitment of Spaniards to an agreement or a treaty.147 Companies would reaffirm this social value of honour: if Spaniards ‘were bound by a company’, and individuals failed to deliver on their commitments, ‘their reputation, their wealth, and their identity’ would be exposed.148 Self-​interest would not replace the principles of honour.149 Instead, it would reinforce the commercial values of trustworthiness, predictability, and reputability embedded in the principle of honour.150 These companies, therefore, would ensure the state had sufficient funds to safeguard the wellbeing of its subjects. Zavala, moreover, hoped that these companies would generate mechanisms of elite political debate. Officials and the nobility would not just lobby the King: they would remonstrate with him and defend their interests. Concerns and comments about the companies ‘would reach Your Majesty’s ears with great force’ since ‘subjects from both genders of the highest class of society, and those closest to you’, would invest in the firm, and would ‘continually publish the just motives of the Companies in clear and lively terms’.151 Political economic debate would, in this way, serve to generate political accountability and social fairness since all would be ‘obliged to contribute on the basis of our means and our circumstances’.152 Companies would increase people’s wealth and this economic growth would ‘foster a disposition in the Royal Treasury and in the Subjects to help them’. Officials, nobles, and the Treasury would remind the King of the importance of the companies. ‘Even when these interests were not obvious, or when considerations of justice and convenience were 1 46 Zavala, Representación, 154. 147 Zavala, Representación, 153. 148 Zavala, Representación, 153. 149 On European depictions of Spanish pride and laziness, see Ruth Mackay, “Lazy, Improvident People”: Myth and Reality in the Writing of Spanish History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 111–​120. 150 On trustworthiness and credit in early modern Spain, see Scott Taylor, ‘Credit, Debt, and Honor in Castile, 1600–​1640’, Journal of Early Modern History 7:1 (2003), 8–​27. 151 Zavala, Representación, 157. In 1741, the austracista Amor de Soria would propose the creation of a General Assembly of Commerce at Court, along with the creation of three regulated companies, and the establishment of a single tribute. Lluch ed., Aragonesismo Austracista, 100. 152 Zavala, Representación, 157. On d’Argenson’s plans to foster a virtuous nobility, and to establish a network of district assemblies that were, in this case, accountable to the King, see Sonenscher, Before the Deluge, 164.

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ignored, which should not happen’, explained Zavala, ‘there would be so many interested subjects in the conservation of the companies near Your Majesty that, beyond what the company representatives suggested, Your Majesty’s eyes would see the inconveniences’ of ignoring them ‘very clearly’.153 The interests of the companies would be drafted ‘into a permanent law’, and those who did not obey its rules would suffer an exemplary punishment.154 The interests of the people would, in this way, be aligned with those of the nobility and would be represented at the Spanish Court. The needs of the companies, moreover, were to trump all other state interests. Even when an ‘urgent’ event occurred that required unplanned spending, when the King’s ‘hold over religion, the defence of his honour and his Kingdom were challenged, and the Royal Treasury lacked sufficient funds to react, it would be not be precise, convenient, nor particularly safe’ for a Minister to draw on the capital of these companies to fund these urgencies.155 Companies, therefore, would underwrite the Spanish Monarchy, provide enough funds for the state to function, and encourage elite political debate at Court. Compared to the polysynody conceived across the Pyrenees by French nobles to regain power from the Monarch and reorganise tax and trade, Zavala, drawing on a range of seventeenth-​century authors who had proposed the simplification of Spanish taxes, favoured investment as a form of political participation for both nobles and lay subjects:156 ‘Those stagnant funds of people of all estates and classes and from communities of both genders’ could be ‘deposited in these companies’.157 Companies, in this scheme, were understood as a demiurgic force that would generate wealth for everyone.158 Other corporations would be established, and these would strengthen the influence of political economists. Two regulated companies, one for trade with Tierra Firme, and another for trade with New Spain, would be set up and

1 53 Zavala, Representación, 158. 154 Zavala, Representación, 158–​9. 155 Zavala, Representación, 157. 156 Andrew Mansfield, ‘The Burgundy Circle’s plans to undermine Louis XIV’s “absolute” state through polysynody and the high nobility’, Intellectual History Review 27:2 (2017), 223–​245. Many have seen Zavala’s text as an imitation of Sebastian Le Preste Vauban’s La Dîme Royale (1707), but it is far more likely that Moncada’s writings, which he cited, influenced his views. See Calle Saiz, ‘La Hacienda Pública en España’, 7–​28. On Navarrete, see Zavala y Auñón, Representación, 169–​170. 157 Zavala, Representación, 139. 158 On European views of money as a demiurgic force see Thomas Kavanagh, Enlightenment and the Shadows of Chance: The Novel and the Culture of Gambling in Eighteenth-​Century France (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1993), 87.

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managed by a council of ‘Commercial Deputies’ who would work with ‘other ministers’ to assess ‘projects that had been proposed to date’, acknowledge the efforts ‘made by curious and applied people who might not be in the council’, and study ‘the conditions that preceded the creation of foreign companies’.159 The King was to inspire subjects ‘from all estates’ to invest in these corporations.160 Once he invested his wealth in these companies, other members of the royal family and Spanish nobles would follow his lead.161 ‘The main cities and towns’ would invest ‘some of their funds’ in this scheme and, on the basis of their profits, would build ‘bridges, roads, and other public works’ which Spain urgently needed.162 The trustworthiness of the Spanish character, the contractual nature of trading companies, and a fair and accountable Spanish Monarch, would regenerate public trust in trade and bolster investment in the future of the Spanish Empire. As Zavala argued, commerce and trade constituted the ‘re-​establishment of monarchies’.163 Public trust would be restored, and the economic effects would be felt throughout the peninsula, but not in the colonies.164 Zavala did not feel the need to consider their impact on colonial power structures. The companies would, he hoped, increase and regulate trade in Spanish colonial ports and, eventually, they would manage all of Europe’s trade to the Spanish Americas.165 Existing legal structures, he believed, would facilitate, rather than obstruct, the establishment of companies because they provided clear guidance for merchants to follow.166 Public funds and companies would enhance the political influence of political economists and repair the social fabric of the Spanish peninsula. In this regard, Zavala’s ideas could be understood as a reinvention of the Spanish parliamentary Cortes.167 These companies would serve as checks on the King and as representative bodies that reflected the interests of the Spanish people. As Zavala explained in his introduction, he hoped that, in writing his text, the appreciation of useful knowledge ‘would banish the fear of the

159 Zavala, Representación, 171. This echoed the schemes of Goyeneche and Marcenado. See Jones Corredera, ‘The Rediscovery’, 5. 160 Zavala, Representación, 178. 161 Zavala, Representación, 177. 162 Zavala, Representación, 178. 163 Zavala, Representación, 180. 164 Zavala, Representación, 155. 165 Zavala, Representación, 155. 166 Zavala, Representación, 160–​62. 167 Roger Bigelow Merriman, ‘The Cortes of the Spanish Kingdoms in the Later Middle Ages’, American Historical Review 16:3 (1911), 476–​495, 487.

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new’.168 The role of Philip v in Zavala’s plan was to foster trust towards these ventures, mirroring contemporary European ideas behind the establishment of Law’s companies and Bolingbroke’s The Idea of a Patriot King.169 Zavala was aware of John Law’s schemes, as he cited the example of the French East India Company’s loan of five million to the French state, and the colonial dimension of his plan had close ties to the proposals of the Scottish financier.170 Officials in other parts of the Spanish Empire had similar ideas. Peruvian officials had a name for this type of reform: the luces. Three years after the publication of Zavala’s text, two Spanish scientists, Jorge Juan and Antonio Ulloa, joined a French exploratory expedition to Peru to test whether the new scientific insights provided by Isaac Newton and other European scientists were correct, and to consult the best means to measure the Meridian.171 Juan and Ulloa would have a huge influence on the formulation of Spanish imperial policy: they would reform the Army, they would conduct industrial espionage throughout Europe, and Ulloa would serve as Governor of Huancavelica.172 After completing their travels, they penned their Noticias Secretas, a devastating report on the impact of smuggling on the Spanish Americas.173 Their journey and their report inspired officials in Peru to propose that a polyglot scientist and a miner should tour Europe’s leading universities to gather information about how to reform the mines, or, in the words of the administrators, to ‘compile the luces found in Europe’.174 168 Zavala, Representación, 6. The parallels between early eighteenth-​century Irish and Spanish political economic debates on public trust and banking deserve their own separate study. See Patrick Kelly, ‘Berkeley and the Idea of a National Bank’, Eighteenth-​Century Ireland /​Iris an Dá Chultúr 25 (2010), 98–​117; C. George Caffentzis, ‘Why Did Berkeley’s Bank Fail? Money and Libertinism in Eighteenth-​Century Ireland’, Eighteenth-​Century Ireland /​Iris an Dá Chultúr 12 (1997), 100–​15. 169 Michael Sonenscher, “Republicanism, State Finances and the Emergence of Commercial Society in Eighteenth-​Century France –​or from Royal to Ancient Republicanism and Back”, in Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner eds., Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, Volume 2. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 275–​292. 170 Zavala, Representación, 40. On their broader context, see Thomas E. Kaiser, ‘Money, Despotism, and Public Opinion in Early Eighteenth-​Century France: John Law and the Debate on Royal Credit’, The Journal of Modern History 63:1 (1991), 1–​28. 171 On the context of this expedition, see Neil Safier, Measuring the New World: Enlightenment Science and South America (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 2008), 166–​199. 172 The most recent evaluation of their legacy can be found in Armando Alberola Romá, Cayetano Mas Galvañ, and Rosario Die Maculet eds., Jorge Juan Santacilia en la España de la Ilustración (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 2015). 173 Andrien, ‘The Noticias secretas’, 175–​92. 174 José Herboso, Carta sobre el modo de alentar el Beneficio de las Minas de America. Archivo Histórico Nacional. Estado. Legajo 2941. Exp. 1, 3.

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Luces in the Mines

Peruvian officials were familiar with the international politics of credit.175 In 1728, the year the Caracas Company was founded, reports showed that the South Sea Company generated nearly one-​third of illegal trading in Peru.176 The Peruvian elites openly collaborated with the Company: a single official, Pedro Navarro, collected the alcabala, the excise duty, and represented the South Sea Company’s interests in Potosí.177 Navarro, moreover, gradually consolidated his control over the most crucial credit instrument in the region: the avío. Over the seventeenth century, silver merchants had monopolised the credit-​lending activities necessary for the mining industry. They delivered the silver to the mint and sold the minted species, thereby reaping most of the profits from the industry. The azogueros, the miners and the mining officials who had to rely on this form of credit to carry out their daily work, bore the brunt of the exploitation of local officials and silver merchants.178 Some administrators believed that granting the miners an investment fund to free them from these financial demands would remedy some of the worst inequities of the mining trade. In 1737, the Malaga-​born merchant Pedro García de Vera, who owned a pewter factory in Lima and had close ties with the Peruvian elite, presented a proposal to the Audiencia to establish a company to manage the wealth of miners in Peru, who ‘found themselves in a state of miserable poverty’.179 The scheme was conceived as a regulated company that would allow the miners to ‘be in charge and to manage investment, credit, costs, and purchases, for all they need’.180 This would, in his view, not only help the wellbeing of the miners, but it would appeal to their self-​interest, and spur them to discover new mines; it would ‘encourage many to search for, and discover, other mines, and arrange their benefits and the necessary respite needed 175 On the early modern origins of these debates in Peru see Orlando Bentancor, The Matter of Empire: Metaphysics and Mining in Colonial Peru (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017), 1–​39; Kenneth Andrien, Crisis and Decline: The Viceroyalty of Peru in the Seventeenth Century (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1985), 199–​206; Kenneth Andrien, Andean Worlds, Indigenous History, Culture, and Consciousness under Spanish Rule, 1532–​1825 (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2001), 95–​100. 176 Hill, Hierarchy, 115. 177 Enrique Tandeter, Coercion and market: silver mining in colonial Potosί, 1692–​ 1826 (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), 118. 178 Tandeter, Coercion and market, 117. 179 Alejandro Reyes Flores, “Huancavelica, “Alhaja de la Corona”, 1740–​1790”, in Gabriel Ramón Joffré ed., Ensayos en ciencias sociales Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales (San Borja: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 2004), 35–​79. 180 Pedro García de Vera, Relación y testimonio de los autos (Lima: Santa Catalina, 1738), 2.

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to work them in the form of these companies’.181 García de Vera cited the examples of the Caracas Company, the British East India Company, as well as other European corporate institutions, such as the banks of Genoa and Amsterdam, as evidence that corporations could stimulate political and social reform. They had created ‘wealth and opulence’, strengthened ‘their governments’, and delivered ‘public benefits to all’.182 Building on the racial hierarchy established in Peru, he sought to ban black and mulato subjects from participating in the scheme, and tried to exclude foreigners from investing in the company.183 The Audiencia approved the project but rejected the idea of excluding any of these groups by citing Spanish imperial laws.184 Elite officials in Peru shared de Vera’s enthusiasm for corporate social reform. The former President of the Audiencia of Quito, Dionisio Alcedo y Herrera, who assisted Jorge Juan and Antonio Ulloa in their scientific enterprises, defended the establishment of corporate structures as means to reform the administration of the empire, and suggested the Caracas Company had bolstered Spanish control over the region, where its ‘jurisdiction’ had formerly been ‘moribund’.185 In his Aviso Histórico y Geográfico, he suggested the creation of yet another Guipuzcoan Company for the ports of Tierra Firme to combat Dutch smuggling.186 However, on his death bed, García de Vera lamented that his scheme had never been implemented.187 In their Noticias Secretas, Ulloa and Juan praised de Vera’s proposal for the way it drew on the logic of appealing to the interests of miners to generate public benefits, and they encouraged the government’s support of ‘the Company of Miners of Don Pedro García de Vera’. There was ‘no desire among the inhabitants’, they explained, ‘to invest their wealth in the mines since’ they did not ‘value them highly’ and were sceptical of their capacity to generate profit.188 The establishment of the company could ‘easily destroy these concerns’: the corporation would become ‘the main creditor’ for the miners who, encouraged by their financial prospects, would rush to reopen

1 81 182 183 184 185 1 86 187 188

García de Vera, Relación, 2. García de Vera, Relación, 12. García de Vera, Relación, 12. García de Vera, Relación, 6. A number of similar proposals emerged in the 1740s. See David Brading, Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico 1763–​1810 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 160–​161. Dionisio Alcedo y Herrera, Aviso histórico, político y geográfico con las noticias más particulares del Perú, Tierra Firme, Chile y Nuevo Reyno de Granada (Madrid: Diego Miguel de Paralta, 1740), 304–​305. Alcedo y Herrera, Aviso histórico, 305. Reyes Flores, “Huancavelica”, 40. Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, Noticias Secretas. Volume 1 (London: R. Taylor, 1826), 557.

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many of the mines that had been abandoned.189 Skilled miners would generate more efficient means of perfecting mining practices, and thereby improve the region’s economic output.190 Peruvian political elites took heed of García de Vera’s project and followed the logic of Juan and Ulloa. Alonso de Rivera y Vadillo, secretary to José Manso de Velasco, the Viceroy, was one of García de Vera’s trustees.191 Bishop Francisco Herboso y Figueroa served as secretary to José Manso de Velasco, who selected Francisco’s brother, the accountant José de Herboso, to analyse and reform the Lima Treasury. The Herbosos were members of the privileged class in Lima.192 In 1747, the local elites considered ways to harness the economic disruption caused by the Lima earthquake to undermine the lending capacity of the church.193 During a meeting of the members of the Casa de la Moneda, José de Herboso revived de Vera’s initiative and suggested the creation of the company.194 On 28 August 1747, he penned his text, Carta sobre el modo de alentar el Beneficio de las Minas de America.195 In the preface to his proposal, Herboso described the underdevelopment of the mines as the result of the Spanish Monarchy’s failure to deliver Enlightenment science to Peru. Herboso explained that ‘the backward state of the mines is evident because of the imponderable abundance and richness which are locked in His Majesty’s territories in the New World, and how little is extracted from them’.196 By contrast, ‘the sciences have reached their perfection in Europe’ since ‘over more than a century, the greatest minds and academies from the most learned nations have worked to develop them, encouraged by their sovereigns’ so that the state of pre-​existing science was deemed so ‘imperfect’ that it was ‘seen as if it was in its infancy’.197 The texts used in Peru to discuss science dated back to the early seventeenth century and ‘did not contain any of the improvements that have been made since then’. From ‘the

1 89 190 191 192

Juan and Ulloa, Noticias Secretas, 558. Juan and Ulloa, Noticias Secretas, 558. Reyes Flores, “Huancavelica”, 41. On these and broader connections to other members of the elite, see Hill, Hierarchy, 326–​ 327, n.31; Guillermo Lohmann Villena, Los Americanos en las Ordenes Nobiliarias. Volume 2 (Madrid: csic, 1993), 348. 193 Charles F. Walker, Shaky Colonialism: the 1746 Earthquake-​Tsunami in Lima, Peru, and Its Long Aftermath (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 107. 194 Rose Marie Buechler, Gobierno, minería y sociedad: Potosí y el “renacimiento” borbónico, 1776–​1810. Volume 1 (Bolivia: Biblioteca Minera Boliviana, 1989), 22–​23. 195 The author made no reference to the tragic social impact of the 1746 earthquake. 196 Herboso, Carta, i. 197 Herboso, Carta, 1.

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text written by Jorge Juan and [Antonio] Ulloa’, he explained, ‘we now know this is the state of affairs throughout the Americas’ and not just Peru.198 This led to a critical conclusion: the Spanish Monarchy had deprived its empire of the Enlightenment: ‘the subjects of the new world are deprived of the modern discoveries and the luces that are most essential for the improvement of the mines’.199 The proposal set out the negative social and economic effects of the miners’s debt to creditors. When miners were ‘able to find, by chance or through the aviadores, the necessary funds’ they had to deal with ‘a rate of 30 percent of interest’. According to Herboso, it would be cheaper if they could finance their daily needs with their own funds, without having to engage with predatory lenders.200 The first goal, then, was to set up a company which allowed miners to pool and invest their funds and to avoid relying on the credit of the aviadores.201 This was accompanied by a more ambitious goal to set up a ‘Company of Merchants’ to study and establish the best mining practices throughout the empire.202 Herboso, inspired by Jorge Juan and Antonio Ulloa, set out a scheme to send a learned official ‘to conduct a tour of Europe’ to learn about the mining practices in ‘Hungary, Silesia, and other parts of Germany’. Their job would be to ‘gather all the luces’ from their travels, and on that basis officials would ‘formulate the best method to remedy the ills that we suffer today’.203 In an effort to stimulate a republic of mining letters, ‘those who directed the mines of America’ should meet and form a ‘group’ so they could draft ‘point by point’ the defects and the areas of improvement that should be discussed.204 One of the travellers should ‘speak the languages of the countries he was to travel to’ and should ‘understand the most basic aspects of the sciences related to the functioning of the mines’. In order to assist the polyglot, a miner or a mining official was to travel with him.205 Having learned ‘from the greatest masters the latest news on the subject of mines’, the ‘best books on the topic’ would be gathered together and delivered to Spain, ‘so the King may order a learned subject to extract all the useful insights they can generate’.206 A work that had appeared in London, by the Dutch natural scientist Herman Boerhaave, most 1 98 Herboso, Carta, ii. 199 Herboso, Carta, ii. 200 Herboso, Carta, 1. 201 Herboso, Carta, 1–​2. 202 Herboso, Carta, 2–​3. 203 Herboso, Carta, 5. 204 Herboso, Carta, 4. 205 Herboso, Carta, 5. 206 Herboso, Carta, 6.

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likely his De mercurio experimenta, on how to improve the extraction of silver, would be translated. Three hundred copies would be printed to ‘instruct’ those in charge of the mines in Potosí.207 Upon returning to Spain, the polyglot would recount his experience, ‘and provide the minister with whatever he may have discovered or discussed throughout his trip and, on the basis of these luces, we will form a new [mining] method’. Orders would be provided ‘for the establishment of a Company of Merchants, or whatever the King deems best, in order to implement these practices in the new world’.208 Widows, who played an important role as creditors in eighteenth-​century Peru, and other women would be able to participate in the scheme.209 Colonial mining reform would foster fairer lending practices throughout the empire. The mines in Germany, Herboso explained, were more efficient because of the advanced techniques they used.210 Reliable, predictable, and innovative mining mechanisms generated trust: the British and the Dutch were ready to grant Germans ‘loans’ and ‘huge sums of money’ because of the efficient mining output in Germany.211 These forms of transnational credit and trust produced greater individual happiness. There was a strong contrast, Herboso explained, between the ‘miserable and poor’ workers in the mines and those Germans who could rely on their mines as ‘insurance’.212 Reform would facilitate a more efficient approach to mining, and stimulate the miners’s self-​interest in the results of their toil.213 Science, debate, culture, and political economic reform would encourage officials to finance the improvement of the mines. The scholarly debates

207 Herboso, Carta, iii. Herman Boerhaave, De mercurio experimenta. Some experiments concerning mercury. By J. H. sic Boerhaave, Professor of Physic at Leyden. Translated from the Latin, communicated by the author to the Royal Society (London: J. Roberts, 1734). Published in Dutch in 1732 and in English in 1734. On Boherhaave, see John C. Powers, Inventing Chemistry: Herman Boerhaave and the Reform of the Chemical Arts (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2012). 208 Herboso, Carta, 2. On the mine as a model state in Cameralist thought see Wakefield, The Disordered State, 31–​33. 209 Jane E. Mangan, Trading Roles: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Urban Economy in Colonial Potosí. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 161–​177; Bianca Premo, ‘From the Pockets of Women: The Gendering of the Mita, Migration and Tribute in Colonial Chucuito, Peru’, The Americas 57:1 (2000), 63–​93, 87–​93. 210 Herboso, Carta, 14. 211 Herboso, Carta, 4. 212 Herboso, Carta, 14. 213 On Germany, political economy, and mining see Wakefield, The Disordered Police State, 26–​48; Ernst P. Hamm, ‘Knowledge From Underground: Leibniz Mines the Enlightenment’, Earth Sciences History 16:2 (1997), 77–​99.

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among the creole elites, spurred by Herboso’s contributions, led to the establishment of a short-​lived academy that was to educate miners and study the best means to reform the mining techniques used in the region, and Herboso’s successor expanded the company into a bank which was to increase the revenues of the mining officers.214 A contemporary would later reflect that, by the time Herboso stepped down from his role at the head of the company, the interests of the company were ‘free and safe from harmful contingencies’.215 Spanish ministers in turn worked closely with the Peruvian elites to rebuild Lima in a way that suited local commercial interests.216 1747 also saw the publication in Madrid of Mariano Machado de Chaves’s Estado Político del Reyno de Perú. The author, a Peruvian merchant who resided in the capital, demonstrated an acute understanding of the mining industry in Peru and of European politics.217 In his Estado Político, Machado issued a plea to the King: ‘Having listened to the concerns of Don Miguel de Zavala, listen now, Your Majesty, to those of Peru’. Companies, in the Spanish Empire, would generate political accountability: ‘In other nations, Companies are established to enrich their Sovereigns and their people; but this scheme would instead advance many causes, for a nation is not and can never be rich if it does not have a government, nor is it beneficial for a people to live in a lawless state’.218 The text may have served to lobby the Crown for the creation of Herboso’s company. The first half of the script was a criticism of the political mismanagement of viceroys, while the second half proposed the establishment of companies throughout the Americas to separate legal and economic affairs.219 Chaves drew on the ideas drafted by Zavala and the marquess of Marcenado to demonstrate that Spanish peninsular and Peruvian visions of companies were the same.220 Machado de Chaves proposed the creation of an alternative Audiencia ‘for Commerce’ that would be independent of viceroys and

214 Pearce, The Origins, 161–​2; María Concepción Gavira Márquez, ‘La Academia de Minas de Potosí. La corta trayectoria de una institución minera, 1779–​1782’, Diálogo andino 58 (2019), 23–​41. See also Kris Lane, Potosi: The Silver City That Changed The World (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2019), 159–​166. 215 Buechler, Gobierno, 26. 216 Cameron D. Jones, ‘The Evolution of Spanish Governance during the Early Bourbon Peru: The Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion and the Missionaries of Ocopa’, The Americas 73:3 (2016), 325–​348, 338–​340. 217 See, in particular, Mariano Machado de Chaves, Estado político del Reyno de Perú (Madrid, 1747), 19–​22. 218 Machado de Chaves, Estado político, 41. 219 Machado de Chaves, Estado político, 1–​25. 220 Machado de Chaves, Estado político, 43.

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the juridical institutions of the empire.221 The King would invest in the company and order officials to ensure that anyone in Lima who owned more than twenty pesos was to invest it in a fund that delivered a five percent interest rate.222 A second company, the Miners’s Company, would serve to motivate the people to work since its goal would not be to generate wealth for the elites but to ‘pay the workers well’, and would therefore encourage ‘many more people to volunteer to work there, many more than those who are forced to work there today’.223 Machado de Chaves did not develop a detailed plan on how to implement said company, but concluded his proposal with a powerful comment on the South Sea Company that denoted his awareness of contemporary debates on corporations, trust, and loyalty: Since Companies provide wealth and power for Kings and Republics who do not have huge funds, what will these be to a Sovereign who has everything that which others desire? A Company today constitutes Britain’s power; it rests on Your Majesty’s shoulders, and is favourable to a single Nation which complains about its Kings and whose sovereignty is divided, what then will it be for Your Majesty, King of the Spaniards, whose subjects adore their sovereigns, and who, in the Annals of History, have always invested their loyalty in them.224 6

The Seminary of Lawsuits: Law, Trade, and Corporations

In the 1730s and 1740s, these discussions about corporations encouraged a more critical engagement with European diplomacy and with the Spanish Monarchy’s approach to transnational trade.225 Reformers made their voices heard in Madrid. Mañer, by then a reputed historian, translated the French antiquarian Pierre Massuet’s Vie du Duc de Ripperda. Mañer declared that he felt a need to correct Massuet’s misconceptions about Ripperda and his time

2 21 222 223 224 225

Machado de Chaves, Estado político, 28. Machado de Chaves, Estado político, 27. Machado de Chaves, Estado político, 31. Machado de Chaves, Estado político, 44. The 1730s were also ‘the most prolific decade for the production of merchants’ handbooks’ in Spain and saw a growing British disenchantment with the balance of power issued in by the Peace of Utrecht. See Astigarraga, A Unifying Enlightenment, 34 and Doohwan Ahn and Richard Whatmore, “Peace, Security, and Deterrence”, in Ghervas and Armitage eds., A Cultural History of Peace in the Age of Enlightenment, 117–​132, 128.

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in power.226 Massuet had analysed the discussions surrounding the Spanish diplomatic approach to the negotiations over the Ostend Company. Mañer explained that when the Dutch claimed that the establishment of the Ostend Company infringed the terms of treaties, they were merely reflecting the reluctance of the ‘Estates General, who are the lords of the Orient’ to allow ‘others to trade with China, the Moghul [Empire], Siam, and Cambodia and other dominions that have their own Kings’.227 The Dutch pursued ‘illicit trade’ which was ‘forbidden by the most solemn treaties’ and foreclosed the capacity of others to trade with these sovereign empires. This was, according to Mañer, a ‘prohibition’ in contradiction of ‘the law of nations’.228 The inconsistent diplomatic reasoning of European powers was clear to Mañer and his contemporaries, and the failure of the Ostend Company remained a source of irritation. Spain needed to formulate a more robust approach towards European diplomacy. These debates over treaties, corporations, and empires, encouraged the leading Spanish minister, the marquess of Villarias, to ask Antonio José Álvarez de Abreu’s son, José Antonio Abreu y Bertodano, to draft a history of the treaties Spain had signed since the Visigothic period.229 José Antonio Abreu used this work to introduce a new term into Spanish political culture: public law. To understand the ‘utility and necessity’ of his book, Abreu explained, ‘it will suffice to know that treaties’ were ‘the sovereign laws of agreements, the foundations of public trust, and the security of towns, the basis of all other political laws’ and ‘what they properly call public law, or law of nations’.230 His book, which discussed what, he claimed, ‘may be called diplomatic history’, would help ‘the many nobles who currently seek to write or edit histories’, and those ‘plenipotentiary ministers’ who negotiated at congresses and ought to be understood, according to Abreu, as ‘portable archives’.231 Abreu drew attention to the French scholar and diplomat François de Callières’s De la manière de négocier avec souverains, which he claimed to have translated, Jean Dumont’s works, and Leibniz’s writings on the subject of diplomacy.232 Abreu would later translate Antoine Pecquet’s Discours sur l’art de négocier and Gabriel 226 Pierre Massuet, La Vie Du Duc De Ripperda, Seigneur De Poelgeest, Grand D’Espagne (Amsterdam: Ryckhoff, 1739); José Mañer, Historia del Duque de Ripperda (Madrid: José López, 1796). The Historia was first published in 1740. 227 Mañer, Historia, 104, n. 1. 228 Mañer, Historia, 104, n. 1. 229 Abreu, Colección, ii. His brother Felix would draw on the ideas of Grotius and Pufendorf in his Tratado jurídico-político sobre pressas de mar (Cádiz: Impr. Real de la Marina, 1746). 230 Abreu, Colección, ii. 231 Abreu, Colección, iii-​iv. 232 Abreu, Colección, viii–​xiii.

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Bonnot de Mably’s Droit public de l’Europe.233 However, it would be his father, Antonio José Álvarez de Abreu, who would draw on his profound understanding of European legal debates to challenge Philip v’s views on European diplomacy. In the 1740s, Philip sought to claim as his own the right to inherit the Habsburg Crown. This relied on an inconsistent argument about dynastic lineage that the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht had sought to overrule, and overlooked the fact that Philip had repeatedly abdicated his claim to the Habsburg Crown. Faced with this blatant imposition of arbitrary rule, and the prospect of the renewal of the dynastic crisis, the Spanish jurist Antonio José Álvarez de Abreu felt compelled to draw on Samuel Pufendorf’s writings and the terms of Utrecht to remind the Spanish King that denying the value of treaties could lead to the resumption of war, and that it was incumbent on a wise ruler to avoid overtaxing their subjects by frequently asking them to finance unnecessary wars.234 Frustration with the Crown’s political inaction continued to grow. Mañer wrote that European authors knew that Spanish political economists were ‘preaching to a room without an audience’, that the writings of ‘Don Gerónimo Uztáriz and Miguel de Zavala’ were nothing ‘but scraps of paper to our Nation, and a source of laughter for foreigners, who know us better than we do’. European states knew that, when it came to trade, they ‘have in the Spanish Nation a more efficient agent of their interests than themselves’.235 Officials tried to recover Goyeneche’s ideas to convince the Court to listen to them. While Philip approved the establishment of a Whaling Company in Galicia that was to train mariners, and which soon floundered, the marquess of Marcenado published his Rapsodia, a collection of writings which featured some of Goyeneche’s economic proposals.236 The book featured the approval of Zavala and had benefited from Uztáriz’s feedback.237 The following year, Feijoo dedicated an issue 233 José Antonio de Abreu y Bertodano, Arte de negociar con los soberanos. Por Monsieur Pecquet. (Madrid: en la oficina de Diego Miguel de Peralta, 1740); Derecho público de la Europa. Traducido del Idioma Francés al Castellano (Madrid: en la oficina de la Viuda de Diego Miguel de Peralta, 1746). On Pecquet see Aurélien Colson, ‘Le Discours sur l’art de négocier (1737) d’Antoine Pecquet, ou l’esquisse d’une théorisation de la négociation’, Négociations 33:1 (2002), 151–​160. 234 Jones Corredera, ‘The Memory of the Habsburg Monarchy’, 10–​21. 235 Mañer, Historia, 116, n. 1. Mañer, in this case, praised Philip v. 236 The marquess of Marcenado was likely inspired by his son’s godfather, Eugene of Savoy, and his commercial ambitions for the Ostend Company. Hussey, The Caracas Company, 170–​171; Laude, La Compagnie d’Ostende, 29; Álvaro José Navia-​Osorio y Vigil, marquess of Santa Cruz de Marcenado, Rapsodia Económico-​Política-​Monárquica (Madrid: Antonio Marin, 1732), 210–​238. Walter Markov, ‘La Compagnia Asiatica Di Trieste (1775–​1785)’ Studi Storici 2:1 (1961), 3–​28. 237 Marcenado, Rapsodia, 8.

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of his Teatro Crítico to Goyeneche.238 The aristocrat, Feijoo explained, ‘embodied’ Europe’s best traits: ‘along with the Spanish Faith, the Politics of Rome, the Flemish Honesty, the French Police, the German Constancy, English Bravery, Batavian Ability, and Swedish Generosity; in essence all those intellectual and moral virtues that one searches for in other Regions’.239 He was ‘this century’s Solon’, and the hope was that others, like his son, could follow his ‘prototype’.240 Led by an uninspiring King, authors hoped that men like Goyeneche could solve Spain’s problems. Instead, Spain found itself at war once again due to familiar monarchical concerns, in the War of Polish Succession, and as a result of its inability to negotiate with foreign corporations, after skirmishes with the South Sea Company precipitated the War of Jenkins’ Ear.241 Goyeneche’s vision of change had not been implemented, and Spain had no way of competing with the industrial reforms of its neighbours. As Mañer explained in his annotations to the Vie du Duc de Ripperda, ‘British merchants’ who supported the war were drawing ‘on the same principles’ used by the Dutch during the negotiations over the Ostend Company. Both the Dutch and the British hoped that ‘their lack of legal justifications’ would be overlooked, and that the ‘de facto’ state of affairs on the ground would be accepted.242 The Spanish Monarchy had simply not found a way to adequately respond to these ideas. Bankruptcy and war finally prompted the Spanish Monarchy to pursue some reforms. In spite of all the debates about credit and corporations, the King was forced, as the first shots of the War of Jenkins’ Ear were fired, to default on his loans.243 The reliance of the Spanish Crown on asentistas and corporations was exposed when a debt moratorium was decreed to save the interests of Goyeneche and his circle.244 The predicament, which Zavala had sought to avert through his scheme, was another crisis generated by Spain’s involvement 238 Following Goyeneche’s death, Feijoo dedicated his fifth volume to his son, and repeated his praise for his father, who had sponsored the publication of some of Feijoo’s writings. Benito Feijoo, Theatro critico universal, ó discursos varios en todo género de materias, para desegaño de errores comunes. Volume 7 (Madrid: Joachin Ibarra, Real Compañía de Impresores y Libreros, 1769), i-​xiii. 239 Feijoo, Theatro critico, xi. 240 Feijoo, Theatro critico, xii. For a reading of these ideas in relation to the construction of the nation, see Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, “Dinastía y comunidad política: el momento de la patria”, in Fernández Albaladejo ed., Los Borbones: Dinastía y memoria de nación, 485–​532, 508–​510. 241 Walker, Spanish Politics, 166–​173. 242 Mañer, Historia, 104, n. 2. 243 The war prompted Montesquieu to worry that the ‘spirit of commerce’ was fading. See Ahn and Whatmore, “Peace, Security, and Deterrence”, 127–​128. 244 Fernández de Albaladejo, ‘El decreto de suspensión de pagos de 1739’, 51–​81.

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in yet another costly imperial war. This was one of two factors that finally prompted the implementation of significant colonial reform. New legislation ensured that registros, or single ships, travelled through Cape Horn to ensure more predictable trading schedules, and strengthened Bilbao’s trade with Buenos Aires through Cádiz.245 The second factor, bankruptcy, demonstrated the need for new legislation around corporations, and was associated with the general grievance towards the commercial ambitions of the Caracas Company. In response, one of the most important maritime legal reforms of the century was implemented: the Ordenanzas, drafted by the Bilbao Consulado, were a set of trade regulations based on the French Code Savary.246 The Ordenanzas raised a crucial question: could the Spanish Empire establish and enforce new laws to regulate trade in its territories? The Bilbao Ordenanzas provided the perfect opportunity to gain greater control over corporate interests and other terms of trade throughout the Spanish Empire. Protests against the Caracas Company offered the Bilbao Consulado a chance to rein in the influence of the chartered corporation based in the neighbouring region of Guipuzcoa. Many merchants and officials, after all, wanted the Company to be subject to stricter regulation. The foundational document of the first Spanish trading company had declared its creation was premised on the desire to reduce to cost of cocoa for the sake of the ‘common good of Spain’.247 But not everyone trusted their commitment to the wellbeing of the Monarchy. In addition to the rebellion in the capital of the province against the Caracas Company’s monopolistic ambitions, European and Spanish merchants failed to understand how its privileges were compatible with the rest of the Spanish colonial administration. The Cádiz Consulado protested its creation; foreign and local merchants posed searching questions about the commercial scope of the company; members of a merchant guild in Seville wondered 2 45 Ruano and Morales, ‘The Spanish Basque Country’, 152; Lamikiz, Trade and Trust, 91–​96. 246 The Ordenanzas, and the reform of the consulados, would later facilitate intra-​imperial negotiation with the local elites. Lamikiz, Trade and Trust, 90–​98; José Martínez Gijón, “El Capítulo X de las Ordenanzas del Consulado de Bilbao de 1737 (“De las compañías de comercio y de las calidades y circunstancias con que deberán hacerse”) y el título IV de la Ordonnance sur le commerce de 1673 (“Des sociétés”) a propósito de la influencia del Derecho francés en el Derecho mercantil de Castilla y de los Reinos de Indias en el siglo XVIII”, in Congresos del Instituto de Historia del Derecho Indiano: actas y publicaciones, Volume 5 (viii Congreso Internacional de Historia del Derecho Indiano. Tomo iii) (Madrid: Digibis, 2000), 159–​176. 247 “Real Cedula de Fundación de la Compañía Guipuzcoana de Caracas de 25 de septiembre de 1728”, in Raquel Rico Linage, Las Reales Compañías de Comercio con América: Los Organos de Gobierno (Sevilla: csic, 1983), 265–​276, 265. Advocates of the British East India Company often made the same argument. Stern, Company-​State, 48.

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whether Spanish traders could embark on other commercial ventures without the Company’s approval; officials asked whether merchants from Biscay and Navarre ought to carry evidence to show they belonged to these communities. Administrators worried about the Company’s political influence and the Spanish King received a petition to forbid company directors from participating in consulados, ayuntamientos, or local councils.248 These complaints were not unreasonable: the Company had, over time, acquired new responsibilities that were beyond its jurisdiction. It was tasked with protecting ports, repairing canals, and the Board of Directors had considered the merits of engaging in the iron trade.249 Above all, the establishment of the Company had sent a signal to the consulados and threatened to challenge their commercial networks. The Bilbao Consulado had begun to revise the laws that legislated the terms of trade in the Spanish Empire a decade earlier, but it was only in 1737 that members of the consulado approached the Council of Castile about the prospect of publishing the new guidelines.250 This followed repeated complaints against the Caracas Company, and the first of many proposals from Bilbao to establish its own companies. One was to trade with Buenos Aires and to use its profits to establish a school ‘to teach mathematics and modern philosophy’.251 Instead of establishing harsher or clearer laws around corporations, the Ordenanzas merely complemented the Bilbao Consulado’s ambitions to set up their own companies. There was therefore no interest in limiting the growth of corporations. The Bilbao Ordenanzas settled a wide range of issues on how to deal with bankruptcies, bills of exchange, and ship crews. They also established a clear set of norms to govern trading companies.252 But these norms, as foreign merchants observed, failed to draw any distinction between the various types of companies.253 Indeed, the decree reverted to a medieval definition of a company that was all-​encompassing: ‘a commercial company is a contract or

248 Domingo Ignacio de Egaña, El guipuzcoano instruído en las reales cedulas, despáchos, y ordenes, que há venerádo su madre la provincia (San Sebastian: Lorenzo Montero de Espinosa, 1780), 106–​108. 249 Egaña, El guipuzcoano, 106–​108. 250 Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad y Casa de Contratación de la M. N. y M. L. Villa de Bilbao, (insertos sus reales privilegios), aprobadas y confirmadas por el Rey Nuestro Señor don Phelipe Quinto. Año 1737 (Madrid: Imprenta de Sancha, 1796), 2. 251 On Bilbao’s attempts to establish companies to trade with Buenos Aires see José María Mariluz Urquijo, Bilbao y Buenos Aires. Proyectos dieciochescos de compañías de comercio (Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1981), 71–​119. On the proposal to establish a school see Mariluz Urquijo, Bilbao y Buenos Aires, 90. 252 Lamikiz, Trade and Trust, 42–​45. 253 Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad, 317, 329–​335.

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covenant between two or more individuals’.254 The failure to regulate the status of regulated corporations, including the Caracas Company, established the Company’s relative autonomy in relation to the rest of the organisation of the empire, and shortly thereafter the Company was asked to serve as a creditor to the Spanish Monarchy.255 The Ordenanzas had profound diplomatic repercussions. Foreign merchants immediately protested the implementation of the new regulations: were they to believe that the Bilbao Consulado was the new centre of Spanish power? Were they to respect the terms of commercial treaties or were they to follow these guidelines? The Ordenanzas fundamentally failed to provide a legal mechanism to address the relationship between Spanish commercial authorities, the consulados, foreign corporations, and the wider world. European merchants, in response, emphasised the limitations of the traditional organs of Spanish power. Selden’s anecdotal dilemma, which considered a lawsuit involving English merchants and Philip iii, was reified when Dutch, French, and British merchants asked to voice their complaints about the Ordenanzas to the Spanish authorities. ‘Francisco Lory, Lorenzo de Barrou, Juan Laules Rouselet, Salvador Dantés, Joseph Daugerot, Juan Michel, and Juan Fortocarrera’, and other displeased foreign merchants were invited to attend a meeting of the Casa de Contratación in Bilbao.256 Officials read out the terms of the Ordenanzas, and the foreign merchants explained that these norms flew in the face of treaties that mediated trade with other European states. The implementation of these changes required a diplomatic touch: since the regulations ‘did not conform with many of their own laws’, the foreign merchants explained, Spanish diplomats ought to travel to their respective courts and explain their terms ‘to prevent any harmful consequences’.257 The officials promised to study their concerns and, in particular, to resolve whether ‘any of these laws’ were an ‘affront to the law of nations, the reciprocal freedom of Trade’, or treaties. Officials consulted the King of Spain, who ignored these complaints and endorsed the new set of regulations.258 The group of foreign merchants protested this ‘assault on the Rights’ of their respective ‘Monarchs’,

2 54 Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad, 71. 255 Hussey, The Caracas Company, 107. 256 Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad, 305. 257 Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad, 306–​307. 258 Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad, 306–​307. This debate paralleled the terms of the East India Company’s suit against the interloper Thomas Sandys. But, crucially, in this case, the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht overshadowed discussions about natural law or the law of nations. Stern, Company-​State, 53.

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and the terms ‘agreed between all of them’.259 The rule that required merchants to provide detailed information about shareholders involved in corporate ventures based in the Spanish Empire, and the norm stating that the funds of foreign companies should be registered in Spanish consulados, according to the merchants, constituted an attempt to render ‘the Bilbao Consulado the owner and the arbiter of the laws which govern each State’.260 The terms that threatened to upend the terms of bills of exchange in turn risked turning the Consulado into a ‘Seminary of Lawsuits’.261 Spanish officials failed to understand the norms that governed transnational trade and the diplomatic significance of the Ordenanzas. To ‘admit’ these protests would be to ‘limit Royal Sovereignty’, they argued, and would ‘constitute the Crown of Spain as dependent on the other Powers’, since ‘their writings sought to bind it to Foreign Laws’.262 The officials decided that there should be ‘an absolute imposition of perpetual silence towards these merchants’ and the issuing of penalties ‘for their temerity and their bad faith’.263 Spain had a right to establish its own laws ‘with the support of’ the King just like other countries had a right to determine the legislation of their own territories. These merchants ‘were free to vacate their businesses and move to States where their trades were of greater use’.264 Spain, argued the Consulado officials, treated all merchants favourably. The Monarchy ‘did not distinguish nor in law nor in any other way’ between foreigners and locals. Other states, like Britain, actively prevented Spanish merchants from trading with ‘Italy, France, the Levant, and anywhere else, even in the Americas’.265 Here, then, was the crux of the international Spanish Empire: how was Spain, which nominally managed an empire which stretched from Manila to Barcelona, to engage with this new world where its legal authority was determined by European diplomacy? How was Spain to reform its trade regulations when it lacked the diplomatic weight to influence efforts to legislate international affairs? How could it reform its intra-​imperial laws when the economic relations within the empire were shaped by inter-​imperial collaboration? Europe had provided a clear answer to this question. Global trade could not depend on the King of Spain’s beneficence. It could only depend on diplomatic

2 59 260 261 262 263 264 265

Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad, 314. Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad, 316. Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad, 319. Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad, 334. Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad, 326. Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad, 327. Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad, 335.

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agreements. Barrou, Rouselet, and the other merchants, explained that the Bilbao Consulado did not, in fact, have the authority to ‘derogate, extinguish, or limit a legislation uniformly agreed and convened by the main Powers in Europe through both general and particular treaties of peace’.266 They drew attention to the diplomatic steps that had been taken to implement the Code Savary, the ordinances that had inspired Bilbao’s own: Louis xiv had named ‘able and intelligent people’ to debate these matters and, before publishing them, these officials had consulted foreign ambassadors who could, ‘in the name of their sovereigns’, ensure that ‘none of the terms undermined the terms of prior treaties of Commerce’.267 A number of treaties, the Peace of Münster, the Treaty of the Pyrenees, and the Treaty of Utrecht, they explained, had convened that foreign merchants established in Spain had the right to benefit from the same franchises and privileges as Spaniard traders.268 The lesson was clear: diplomacy could restrict or expand the authority of a sovereign. Treaties were, in this case, mobilised to remind the Spanish Monarchy of the limits of its legal authority. In response to these protests, Philip banned the ‘extraction, exhibition’, or publication of texts issued by the Bilbao Consulado by anyone other than the institution’s printer.269 He then approved the creation of yet another regulated company: The Havana Company.270 Modelled on the Caracas Company, it was to increase the Monarchy’s revenues over the tobacco trade, and to reaffirm its military and naval presence in the region. However, the majority of investors were not, as in the case of the Caracas Company, peninsular Spaniards, but members of the local elite in Cuba.271 They fostered the growth of the tobacco trade and generated resources for the Monarchy, but they also mobilised the corporation to engage in the slave trade with British merchants and facilitate smuggling. They therefore fostered further transnational collaboration with Jamaica and other territories in British America.272 By the mid-​eighteenth century, then, it was clear that legal reform was inefficient. The establishment of singular government-​sponsored companies 2 66 267 268 269 270

Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad, 337. Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad, 338. Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad, 346. Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad, 353. On the Havana Company, see Gárate Ojanguren, Comercio Ultramarino e Ilustración: La Real Compañía de la Habana (San Sebastián: Departamento de Cultura del País Vasco, 1993). 271 Elena Schneider, The Occupation of Havana: War, Trade, and Slavery in the Atlantic World (Williamsburg, VA: Omohundro Institute of Early American History & Culture, 2018), 94–​97. 272 Schneider, The Occupation of Havana, 109.

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was too fragmentary a solution to the problems of Spanish colonial trade. Polycentrism had transformed into something different: creole elites, European ministers, and foreign merchants had a more sophisticated understanding of, and greater control over, the overlapping corporate interests throughout the Spanish Empire than ministers in Madrid. Four possible models of corporate reform had been put forward to address these issues: Goyeneche’s reconfiguration of the administration of the Spanish Empire; the Ostend Company’s model of transnational collaboration; the establishment and management of public trusts in Spain and Peru by erudite councils; and the enforcement of new legislation through chartered corporations like the consulados. One thing, however, was certain. The principles that governed transnational trade and diplomacy had, as the foreign merchants had declared, been set out in Treaty of Utrecht by ‘the signatory states’.273 And Spain had not been one of them. Spanish ministers thus had to find a way to edit the terms of Utrecht while learning from failed expectations. 7

José Carvajal y Lancaster and the Arbitration of Europe

No one was as enthusiastic about the potential of regulated companies to reform the Spanish Empire’s relationship with Europe as José de Carvajal y Lancaster. Carvajal was born in Extremadura in 1698. He was the descendant of Henry ‘The Navigator’, who spearheaded Portugal’s colonising enterprises. As Zavala had made clear in his writings, eighteenth-​century Extremadura was a porous territory subject to frequent scuffles between Spanish and Portuguese troops, and Carvajal’s older brother held the title of Duke of Abrantes, a title originally granted by Philip iv to the Portuguese nobleman Alfonso de Lancaster.274 Carvajal’s transnational patrician identity shaped his personality. He was an assiduous thinker from an early age, and the historian Gregorio Mayans recalled witnessing his impressive performance during his viva voce at the University of Salamanca.275 Carvajal then worked as a lawyer in Valladolid,

2 73 Ordenanzas de la Ilustre Universidad, 353. 274 On Carvajal’s lineage see Delgado Barrado, El proyecto político, 257–​258. On these scuffles see Herzog, Frontiers of Possession, 191–​242. 275 Gregorio Mayans, “Dedicación a Don José Carvajal y Lancaster”, in Juan Bautista Corachan Presbitero, Avisos de Parnaso (Valencia: Viuda de Antonio Bordazar, 1747), 11–​15, 13. However, Carvajal failed to show any interest in supporting Mayans’s historiographical endeavours. See Antonio Mestre, Historia, Fueros y Actitudes Políticas. Mayáns y La Historiografía del XVIII (Valencia: Artes Gráficas Soler, 1970), 232–​3.

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in the town’s Chancillería. Although he was an austere man, he nonetheless enjoyed the benefits of a noble office that Zavala had criticised so harshly. He was also privy to the Bourbon failure to challenge or compel the authority of the nobility and the Habsburg institutions that governed Spanish towns.276 Made up of members of the local aristocracy, and with links to other peninsular institutions, the Chancillería focused on estates, wills, and, at times, criminal charges. But they also participated in public events and shaped the social life of the region: they provided town criers with the relevant diplomatic news to be announced to the people, they headed the processions during the local carnivals, and they ensured that luminary nights were implemented following military victories or the birth of a member of the royal family.277 The detailed archival records of the matters discussed during their meetings shed light on Philip’s justifications for his policies.278 One of the Chancillería’s reports suggested that, following the end of the War of Spanish Succession, the Bourbon establishment of new councils was complemented by an effort to transform entrenched Habsburg institutions like the Chancillería into information-​gathering bodies. The King had ordered the Chancillería to study and to ‘learn about all the arbitrios written, or that may be needed, for the utility and common good’, to ‘inform His Majesty through consultations’ about the preservation of bridges and the provision of goods, and to set the norms for ‘laws’ regarding the extraction of ‘silver, gold, horses, and other goods’. The Chancillería was to conduct ‘whatever research and make any visits that may be needed’.279 The Chancillería had strong misgivings about the King’s orders. They ignored some of Philip’s demands and followed others. When Philip asked the jurists to find a learned official to head the establishment of new authorities in Manila, with the incentive of later being promoted to a position in Mexico or

276 The best study of the institution is Lourdes Amigo Vázquez, Epifanía del poder regio: la Real Chancillería en el Valladolid festivo (siglos XVII y XVIII) (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 2013). 277 See, for example, Libro de Actas del Real Acuerdo, Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Valladolid, Real Chancilleria. Libros, 172, 52. 278 I am grateful to Javier Requejo for his help in navigating the wealth of documents at the archive in Valladolid. The records of the Actas del Real Acuerdo, which feature the minutes and discussions of the Chancellery’s meetings, have since been digitalized and contain invaluable information about the daily administration of power in the Spanish Empire. 279 Libro de Actas del Real Acuerdo, Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Valladolid, Real Chancilleria. Libros, 172, 214.

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‘the village of Los Angeles’, none were found.280 Philip was forced to extend his deadline and the project was only finalised decades later.281 Local structures survived the dynastic change: in 1738, when a number of guilds went on strike, it was the ancient figure, the Procurador del Común, who settled the issue.282 Structures of patronage continued: the Count of Montijo, a former member of the Chancillería, and then President of the Council of Indies, asked Carvajal to become a member of the Council.283 At the age of 40, Carvajal had spent the bulk of his adult life dealing with provincial affairs surrounding contracts about land and inheritances. And it was his profound understanding of the law that encouraged Montijo to choose this ‘reputed legal thinker’ as an envoy to accompany him to represent Spain at the Imperial Diet.284 At Dresden, Carvajal displayed an important facet of his personality. In his letters, he demonstrated that he felt no reason to show any respect to the Spanish King. It would take the King ‘two minutes’ to understand the legal processes that were being discussed, wrote Carvajal in a letter to Philip’s secretary. If he happened to be wrong, Carvajal announced, ‘everyone could call’ him ‘an idiot’.285 Charged with writing the final draft of the text in defence of Philip’s claim to the Habsburg Crown, he, like Abreu, showed a reluctance to lie about the merits of the demands of the Spanish King, and demonstrated a strong lack of confidence in the sovereign.286 He complained about having to fetch relevant sources in Dresden in a foreign language, and his repeated suggestions that Spain could reach some kind of agreement with Frederick ii went unheard.287 Carvajal was forced to confront the fact that many European officials shared his views regarding Philip v’s approach to diplomacy. Carvajal’s uninspired defence of Philip’s dynastic rights was the subject of an acerbic anonymous pamphlet which appeared in Dresden and was titled Reflexiones de un 280 Libro de Actas del Real Acuerdo, Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Valladolid, Real Chancilleria. Libros, 172, 262. 281 Ventura Pérez, Diario de Valladolid (Valladolid: Librería Nacional y Extranjera de Hijos de Rodríguez, 1885), 222. Ventura Pérez’s diary provides a rich account of the life of a literate lay man in eighteenth-​century Spain. 282 Ventura Pérez, Diario de Valladolid, 149–​150. 283 Juan Carlos Lavandeira Hermoso, “La estancia de José de Carvajal en Alemania integrando la embajada del Conde de Montijo (1741–​1743)”, in José Luis Gomez Urdañez and Jose Miguel Delgado Barrado eds., Ministros de Fernando VI (Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, 2002), 157–​74. 284 Antonio José Álvarez de Abreu, Memorias de la Negociación de Alemania, Bibilioteca Nacional de España. ms.13237, 194. 285 Carvajal to de la Cuadra, 26 April 1741, Archivo General de Simancas. Estado, 7563. 286 Carvajal to de la Cuadra, 23 January 1742, Archivo General de Simancas. Estado, 7563. 287 Carvajal to de la Cuadra, 23 January 1742, Archivo General de Simancas. Estado, 7563.

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particular sobre el escrito publicado en nombre del Conde de Montijo en asunto de las pretensions de la Corte de España (Reflections on the particular text published under the name of the Count of Montijo regarding the pretensions of the Court of Spain). The text explained that the King of Spain was playing a dangerous game: ‘all of his current rights’ depended on the choices made by ‘mediators’ who had ‘granted’ him the rights to the Spanish Empire ‘allegedly for the common good of Europe’. The anonymous author reaffirmed the role of the Treaty of Utrecht as a ‘mature and impartial reflection’ on the sovereignty of the Spanish Empire.288 By failing to respect this and later diplomatic agreements, however, Philip risked losing ‘the last legitimate title that assures his present situation’.289 And if Philip were able to claim a dynastic right to the Habsburg Monarchy, reasoned the author, the menace of a universal monarchy, which Utrecht had sought to prevent, would return. All of Europe would be under threat: Portugal, which relied ‘on the good faith of treaties and renunciations supported by the Peace of Ryswick’ would find that ‘the pretended representative of Philip iii’ would soon find an opportunity to strike. The Low Countries would, in turn, ‘have to prepare for Philip ii’s arrival’. Britain would ‘soon see the invincible armada return’.290 The Black Legend repeated itself, first as tragedy, then as farce. The King of Spain, Carvajal, Abreu, and Montijo read this sharp commentary on Spanish diplomacy.291 The message could not be clearer: as the philosopher François Fénelon, once Philip’s teacher, had written, a king who remained ignorant of the law of nations remained a ‘half-​king’, and the Bourbon King, like many others, had ignored this consideration.292 The publication of the Reflexiones confirmed Abreu’s worst fears about how Philip’s reliance on dynastic rights would lead to the public embarrassment to the King. This diplomatic episode catalysed the development of an enlightened approach to diplomacy. This experience would lead Carvajal to declare that European diplomats understood that Spain remained a part of the Habsburg Monarchy. Diplomats, not kings, he would later argue, shaped foreign policy.293 This was an important lesson: it led him to believe that he could,

2 88 Abreu, Memorias, 763. 289 Abreu, Memorias, 763. 290 Abreu, Memorias, 765–​766. 291 Abreu offered to write a response but the King’s Secretary advised him against it. Abreu, Memorias, 642. For a more comprehensive study of this episode see Jones Corredera, ‘The memory of the Habsburg Monarchy’, 953–​971. 292 Quoted in Dhondt, Balance of Power and Norm Hierarchy, 500. 293 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 18.

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with the help of other fellow-​minded ministers in Europe, establish peace in the Old Continent. Carvajal soon found a way to use shared interests to establish diplomatic agreements. Upon his return to Spain, Carvajal was named Superintendent of Quicksilver.294 Mercury was almost as important to the Spanish Empire as silver since it was a necessary component of the mining process and its production was linked to an important number of financial institutions in the empire. And just as Abreu had been dragged into the local affairs of Caracas and had eventually been named Governor of the province, Carvajal’s responsibilities stretched far beyond what his title suggested. He coordinated the signing of peace treaties with the sovereigns of Jolo and Mindanao, commonly known as the Southern Philippines today. He negotiated the entry of Jesuit priests into the Sulu islands, and the conversion of the Sultan of Jolo to Catholicism.295 The islands had remained contested between the Dutch, the Spanish, and local forces. In exchange for admitting Jesuits into their territories, the Spanish Empire promised protection to the Sulu Emperor, who assumed the name of Ferdinand i.296 In 1745, Carvajal was selected to serve as President of the Council of Indies. After a near-​death experience, he decided to jot down his thoughts on a vast array of subjects, and wrote his Testamento Político.

294 Real Cédula a José Carvajal y Lancaster, gobernador del Consejo de Indias, dándole título de superintendente general del ramo de azogues. es.41091. Archivo General de Indias. 23. Indiferente. 447.L.45.F.287–​289V. 295 On the Jesuits and the Spanish Empire, see Evelyn Hu-​DeHart, Missionaries, Miners and Indians: Spanish Contact with the Yacqui Nation of Northwestern New Spain, 1533–​ 1820 (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1981); H. Henrietta. Salvation Through Slavery: Chiricahua Apaches and Priests on the Spanish Colonial Frontier (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2008); Herbert Bolton, ‘The Mission as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish-​ American Colonies’, American Historical Review 23:1 (1917), 42–​61. 296 Jesuit forces were used to exact one of their last conversions of a ruler to Christianity before their banishment from the Spanish Empire in 1767. The Spanish Crown retained control of the territory until 1878. Real Decreto a José de Carvajal y Lancaster para que el Consejo, teniendo presentes los tratados de paces que se celebraron con los reyes de Mindanao y Joló, regle con el padre [Juan] José Calvo la expresión de un rescripto prometiéndoles que no serán sojuzgados y que, admitiendo a los misioneros, quedarán bajo la protección real. Archivo General de Indias, Filipinas, 96, n. 52. For eighteenth-​century sources on this underexplored topic, see Padre Agustin Maria de Castro, “Osario Venerable”, in Manuel Merino, Misioneros agustinos en el extremo oriente 1565–​1780 (Madrid: csic, 1954), Isaac Donoso Jiménez, El Islam en Filipinas (Siglos X-​XIX) (Unpublished PhD Thesis) (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 2011), and and the appendix in the bibliography.

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Private Vices, Public Virtues, and Diplomatic Cooperation

The writing of the Testamento Político was rushed and the text was full of incomplete sentences. Carvajal described the manuscript as ‘an Index’ since writing a book that suitably addressed the political matters he hoped to cover ‘would require a long period of time, the examination of long manuscripts, the provision of immense funds, and the drafting of a dozen volumes’.297 But there was one theme that underpinned most of his ideas: the generation of trust in Spain and in Europe. When establishing his system of alliances, he explained how Spain’s relationship with Portugal could be understood as a dilemma between ‘trusting or conquering’ the region.298 While Spain was to distance itself from France, the King of Spain should preserve ‘the appearance of trust and unity’ with the empire across the Pyrenees.299 Britain, in turn, was a ‘valiant and trust-​worthy nation and I have never read anywhere that it ever stopped being a faithful ally whenever we engaged in an alliance with them’.300 Carvajal, moreover, could not stop himself from praising Britain for being ‘enough of a Republic to prevent any King from undermining its alliances for his own ends’ and lacking ‘the weaknesses of an absolute government, where a multitude of voices create division that grows until it destroys it’.301 Carvajal thus understood the importance of trust for the internal functioning of monarchies and the stability of transnational alliances. He concluded that the ‘utility’ of the alliance with Britain was clear: ‘united’ the two powers would become ‘lords of the seas’.302 By appealing to a combination of economic interests and dynastic collaboration, Carvajal believed his alliance would serve to preserve the balance of power in Europe: ‘Do not be fooled: this is a safe system: the Alliance of Spain, the German Austrian House, Britain, and Portugal, well directed, is the true equilibrium of Europe, whereby no one can dare pursue that which hinders them, and if other Nations quarrel amongst them, the [alliance] can stand to one side, safe in the knowledge that if it were to intervene

2 97 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 3. 298 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 6. 299 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 13. Carvajal was extremely critical of France and believed French officials had sought to ‘exterminate’ Spain. See Edward Jones Corredera, ‘Perpetual peace and shareholder sovereignty: the political thought of José de Carvajal y Lancaster’, History of European Ideas 44:5 (2018), 513–​527, 518–​519. 300 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 15. 301 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 15. 302 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 17.

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to pacify affairs they would all come to their senses’.303 Together, this European alliance would foreclose the possibility of war. To encourage diplomatic cooperation with Spain, foreign opinions about Philip had to change: ‘the disavowal of the Monarchy’, Carvajal explained, ‘is notorious’. It had always inspired confidence based on the management of its riches, and once Spain showed signs of reform ‘they would all come to our aid’.304 In order to restore its standing, the King should be prevented from engaging in further questionable debts.305 Carvajal’s source of inspiration was clear, as he argued that Zavala’s scheme should be ‘copied to the letter’.306 But who would encourage, or force, the King to act in this way? For Carvajal, the answer was not the Cortes or the nobility, but a prime minister, charged with educating the King on the true nature of his interests: Some will say that this is to ask for the impossible, and that nobody will be able to bind a King to such rules, but I cannot accept this, and I believe that a talented Minister will no doubt achieve it because, if the King is just and reasonable it will be easy to show him that this is his duty, the source of his authority, and that it is in his interest: if he is arrogant and not at all reasonable he will be shown that to maintain his sovereignty and achieve his vast expectations this is a valid and necessary change.307 Ministers had a duty to speak plainly and forcefully before the King. Carvajal would present Philip with two possibilities, one whereby the Monarch ‘enjoyed a large army with large arsenals and squadrons that are not missing a single nail, and a treasury ready to be deployed quickly’. In the other scenario, the Monarch would ‘own twenty fancier dresses’, and finance ‘flatterers’. Carvajal reasoned that the King would ‘surely choose the former.308 By ‘reducing and removing debt’ and ensuring there was a ‘surplus in our rents’ foreign views on the Spanish Monarchy would change: ‘when any Power learns that we are using this surplus to fight a war, that everyone in the Kingdom is contributing and yet not a single tax has been imposed on the people, they will soon call for an end [to the conflict]’. Economic growth would deter others from waging war against the Spanish Monarchy.309 3 03 304 305 306 307 308 309

Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 19–​20. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 29. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 30. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 32. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 30. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 30. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 31.

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Carvajal understood that the logic of utility and interests had largely relegated seventeenth-​century debates about the law of nations to the margins of European diplomacy. He briefly outlined the main arguments of these debates: Spain and Portugal retained the right to the Americas by virtue of the right of ‘first occupier’ and the Treaty of Tordesillas.310 John Selden, he argued, had shown that claims to land entailed claims to the control of the sea. Grotius in turn had argued the opposite. And, as a whole, Carvajal thought ‘there is not much point in discussing this’: Seraphim de Freitas ‘wrote for the Portuguese, and our [Fernando Vázquez] Menchaca and Selden wrote for purely theoretical reasons’.311 Spanish officials, he explained, ‘would do well to read’ Selden’s work, but these debates had been eclipsed by ‘Peace Treaties’.312 Diplomacy now provided a platform for Spain to reorder its empire to suit the new global politics of trade. In order to implement his schemes, Carvajal argued that Spain needed peace to address its three basic economic issues. ‘It would suit Spain to preserve Peace for at least as many years as it has been engaged in War, which has rendered it lifeless through three illnesses: depopulation, a shortage of liquid capital, and a lack of trade’.313 The answer to these problems, as Zavala had made clear, was not to generate wealth for the sake of imperial pursuits, but to establish public trusts to serve the everyday needs of the people and commerce. Greater cooperation with Britain was integral to this plan of internal reform. The collaboration of the two empires would benefit the everyday administration of the Spanish Empire by enhancing the bargaining position of Spanish merchants: ‘once our customs are well-​governed, our merchants will be able to sell at a lower price than foreigners will’, Carvajal reasoned, and this would give them a competitive edge: ‘all that will be left will be the perfection of the establishment of factories and their laws’.314 Carvajal believed this would encourage others to ‘bring useful instruments that can advance and improve labour’ to Spain.315 To facilitate borrowing, funds would be established for traders and merchants. One of these funds would be generated by the tobacco trade.316 The tobacco trade was in need of reform, and Carvajal hoped that commercial cooperation with foreign nations would increase the benefits that Spain

3 10 311 312 313 314 315 316

Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 94. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 95. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 95. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 22. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 50. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 50. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 50.

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derived from the crop.317 As Carvajal stated, ‘the foreign and Spanish love of Seville’s tobacco began to fade when Havana started producing one with a sweeter smell’.318 Carvajal opposed the monopolisation of essential goods but defended this monopoly on the basis that tobacco was ‘a vice’.319 Enhancing Spain’s control over this trade was depicted as a means to increase imperial authority: ‘The goal should be for the King to seize all Tobacco that is produced in Havana, with the exception of that which we sell to the [North] American Colonies’ and ‘burning the surplus’ that was produced each year’.320 This had, in fact, been the original purpose of the tobacco monopoly when it was established decades earlier but revolts had led to a renegotiation of its terms.321 Smuggling, Carvajal explained, would ‘be cut at its roots, because the product of any other colony cannot be confused with that of the Havana, and we will make huge savings by avoiding the costs of storage, and make clear to the French, the Italians, the Chinese, the Persians, to the whole world, that if they want to buy good Tobacco, they must buy it from the King’.322 Consuls, moreover, would be established throughout Europe and, in particular, in Hanseatic territories, to encourage investments in the scheme.323 The tobacco monopoly would be turned into an investment scheme, a deposit bank, and a public trust, and the funds it generated would be used to safeguard the wellbeing of the people. Corporations and commercial agreements that encouraged foreign and local investment would therefore generate funds for the provisions of public goods: ‘the Decree can declare its general public utility, and establish that it will have no other purpose’.324 ‘The fund’, would be used ‘to assist in the building of roads and bridges, and to make canals and rivers navigable so they may be connected, and this would be a huge treasure, and a tremendous improvement for 317 On the Spanish tobacco monopoly see Laura Náter, “The Spanish Empire and Cuban Tobacco during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries”, in Peter A. Coclanis ed., The Atlantic Economy during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Columbia, SC: University of North Carolina, 2005), 252–​277, 262–​267. 318 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 39. On elite European political economic views of Havana in the 1740s and 1750s see Stein and Stein, Apogee of Empire, 53. 319 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 37. 320 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 38. Carvajal suggested studying foreign popular strands of tobacco and growing ones with a similar taste in the Spanish Empire, in order to eventually replace them. The Caracas Company would seek to do just this in 1762. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 38–​40; Hussey, The Caracas Company, 239. 321 Hussey, The Caracas Company, 207–​208. 322 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 38. 323 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 39. 324 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 50.

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our trade’.325 Carvajal hoped that this reform would ‘double the navigation of the rivers’ in the Spanish peninsula.326 The creation of roads and canals would, in turn, lower the prices of goods.327 As Carvajal observed, ‘a truly useful indirect effect of this practice, which Zavala did not discuss’ was ‘the reorientation of the Kingdom’s wealth, since it is currently in the hands of those who own the land and manage the rents, and we must orient the bulk of this towards trade with the Indies, or with Europe, or manufacturing’.328 Carvajal may have been aware that John Law had combined tobacco farms with a range of other corporations to establish the overextended Mississippi Company.329 But this scheme had a different purpose: to drive social reform. The efficient use of this monopoly would therefore provide the funds needed for the expansion of roads, canals, and rivers, and to ease the cost of life. Private vice would thus generate public virtue. There was, however, a striking lack of consideration for the general wellbeing of colonial subjects, and his reflections on vice and tobacco did not extend to its method of production. 9

Coins, Corporations, China, and Europe

Carvajal’s views on the politics of corporations were complex. He was critical of monopolies on goods ‘other than tobacco, cards, and gunpowder’ and believed that those who defended them were ‘enemies of the King and the Patria’.330 Indeed, one of the reasons he believed that Britain’s control of the asiento could be negotiated was the unpopularity of the South Sea Company, as the British ‘nation as a whole does not benefit from this trade; only a few individuals do’.331 He was also critical of those who blindly advocated for free trade. He could ‘already hear the shouting’ against his projects ‘from the Council [of Indies], Ministers, and others’, as they all screamed ‘that trade should be free (and so it is for foreigners)’.332 But Carvajal entreated those who disagreed with him to consider what they meant by free trade: ‘why would you want a poor neighbour from Buenos Aires to dress with whatever arrives 3 25 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 50. 326 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 50. 327 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 81. 328 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 34. 329 Murphy, John Law, 165–​168. 330 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 34. 331 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 16. On the economics of loyalty in Britain see Colley, Britons, 56–​71. 332 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 114.

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from Callao? Is this liberty?’. The restrictions imposed on trade throughout the Spanish Empire were incoherent and required a better organisation, but free trade was not the answer. The bigger problem was ‘the Cádiz trade’ which, in his view, was a corporate enterprise: ‘Cádiz is nothing but an informal and an ill-​managed company’.333 The question was therefore not whether to manage the imperial trade through a corporation, but to establish what kind of chartered corporate institution was to be charged with this responsibility. Twelve companies would be set up to coordinate trade.334 Manufacturing in provinces in the Iberian Peninsula would be connected to specific provinces in the Americas, in order to reconnect commercial networks and stimulate industrial reform. The New Castile Company and the Old Castile Company would bridge the commercial interests between the northern regions of Spain and Guatemala, Portobelo, and Campeche, the Company of Andalucia would cover the Banda Oriental, and the Catalan Company would establish close ties with Santo Domingo.335 The goal of the Catalan Company was to undermine British interests in the Caribbean. The asiento had granted the South Sea Company the right to trade with Buenos Aires, Cartagena, Portobelo, and Vera Cruz, and Britain exploited these terms to smuggle goods into the Spanish Americas through Jamaica.336 In response, Carvajal hoped to turn Puerto Rico into a free port that could replace Jamaica as the main port for the slave trade in the Caribbean.337 But Carvajal’s most ambitious plan sought to harness Europe’s reliance on Pacific trade to recalibrate the balance of power.338 The history of the plans to set up the Philippine Company was a story of early modern Spanish diplomatic failure: in the seventeenth century, France and the Netherlands had curbed the fate of a company with enormous potential. Louis xiv and Dutch officials had opposed Spain’s use of the trading route that traversed the bay of Good Hope,

3 33 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 114. 334 An admirer of Colbert, he may have been aware of the French statesman’s decision to diversify risk by separating the companies. See Philippe Haudrère, La Compagnie française des Indes au XVIIIe siècle. Volume 1 (Paris: Indes Savantes, 2005), 24. 335 Delgado Barrado, El proyecto político, 179. 336 Theodore C. Hinckley, ‘The Decline of Caribbean Smuggling’, Journal of Inter-​American Studies, 5:1 (1963), 107–​121. 337 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 122–​123. 338 On Isaac de Pinto’s views, and his understanding of the link between the American silver mines and Pacific corporate trade, see Stapelbroek, “The Long Peace” 112–​113. On Johann Heinrich Gottlob Justi’s views on the balance of power during the Seven Years’ War see Ere Nokkala, From Natural Law to Political Economy: J.H.G. von Justi on State, Commerce, and International Order (Vienna: Lit Verlag, 2019), 183–​203.

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and Spain had been expected to renounce its trade with Asia.339 The establishment of a Philippine Company, however, could ‘rob the French, the British and the Dutch of their trade with China’ and ‘deliver this trade to’ Spain.340 Carvajal explained his scheme in clear terms: ‘The Chinese have subjected all nations with whom they have traded. The Chinese have done so by buying their goods with specie, and particularly Mexican pesos. Therefore, if the King were to take these [the pesos] from the Chinese, he would thereby end their commerce. If the King proceeded to supply the company with this currency, the Chinese would flock to Manila to beg with all their goods’.341 Chinese merchants trusted the pesos due to their intrinsic value and the quality of the stamp, which reduced transaction costs.342 The Qing government had in turn confined the right to trade with Europeans to a group of merchants –​the Co-​ Hong –​and in 1750 would restrict all trade to Canton, today’s Guangzhou.343 Carvajal’s plan would have transformed Manila into the base of the Philippine Company and the centre of Sino-​European trade.344 The implementation of Carvajal’s plan emulated previous trade practices.345 Spain frequently lowered the silver content in coins used across the peninsula.346 Under the guise of drawing on the usual practice of lowering the silver content in the currency, Carvajal suggested Philip v should place in Cádiz ‘5,000 pesos, or a million in gold’, and exchange the gold for Mexican pesos. Over two years, Spain would gradually come to control trade by reducing the amounts of available pesos in China. Carvajal’s solution to the prospect of Chinese and European hostility was to store pesos in Manila and thereby draw traders to the town.347 He recommended ‘releasing some coins, recollecting them later, and calmly 339 Delgado Barrado, El proyecto político, 179. See also José María Delgado Barrado, “Ideas y escritos sobre la formación de la Compañía privilegiada de Filipinas (1724–​1756)”, in María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-​Grueso ed., Las relaciones internacionales en el Pacífico (siglos XVIII-​XX): colonización, descolonización y encuentro cultural (Madrid: csic, 1997), 91–​125. 340 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 127–​128. 341 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 128. 342 Alejandra Irigoin, ‘The End of a Silver Era: The Consequences of the Breakdown of the Spanish Peso Standard in China and the United States, 1780s-​1850s’, Journal of World History 20:2 (2009), 207–​243, 235. 343 Arturo Giráldez, The Age of Trade: The Manila Galleons and the Dawn of the Global Economy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 172, John M. Carroll, ‘The Canton System: Conflict and Accommodation in the Contact Zone’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch 50 (2010), 51–​66, 53. 344 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 128–​129. 345 Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War, 40. 346 Irigoin, ‘The End of a Silver Era’, 223. 347 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 128.

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regulating’ this practice at will.348 If it became an ally of Spain, Britain would be granted pesos ‘as a reward’ in order to strengthen its influence in the region.349 Carvajal, then, envisioned Spain as an arbiter of European politics, empowered by its ability to regulate the currency at the core of Sino-​European trade. This ambition was reflected in the unsteady combination of a universal monarchy and the concept of an arbiter of Europe, as he hoped that ‘the King can become arbiter of Europe, and through the use of the Philippine Company he can achieve a universal monarchy of benefits without causing any inconveniences’.350 In a world where the King of Spain’s dynastic ambitions were openly mocked by foreign authors, and where Spanish legal reform was challenged on the basis of diplomatic treaties that Spain had been unable to meaningfully participate in drafting, the only option was to turn to transnational corporate negotiation. The European and Asian demand for the peso provided Carvajal with a bargaining chip, a trump card in the card game of diplomacy, as he would later describe it. The scheme was the type of gamble that would have likely caused his friend Diego Torres y Villarroel to smile. Where politics and diplomacy had failed the logic of economics would thrive. But Spain’s main problem was an internal one. Early eighteenth-​century Spanish political economic reform faced a colossal challenge: Philip’s arbitrary sovereignty. It was arbitrary in principle because, as contemporaries remarked, European powers had chosen to grant him those rights. And it was arbitrary in practice because of the way Philip wielded his authority. Spanish reformers accepted the principle: the choice of Philip at the Treaty of Utrecht had yielded peace. Spain now had to find a way to limit the damage that Philip had caused and gain a seat at diplomatic gatherings. The regulation of the mines, the silver, and the trade routes, that Europe depended on, would grant Spain the necessary leverage to acquire one. Under Carvajal’s scheme, Spain would become a leading shareholder and a market maker. But in order to become a trustworthy ally, Philip’s authority had to be controlled. Treaties, social reform, the dissemination of culture, and economic growth, depended on the capacity of reformers to check and regulate Philip’s impulses. A solution was to establish a minister who would remind the King of his true interests.351 It was all that was left in an empire disenchanted with its unpredictable sovereign. A few months after writing his manuscript, Carvajal would be granted the opportunity to carry out his vision. 3 48 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 128. 349 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 128. 350 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 129. For a more extensive assessment of Carvajal’s ideas see Jones Corredera, ‘Perpetual peace’, 518–​527. 351 In line with the early modern shift studied in Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political. Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).

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The Naval Officer and the Aristocrat

In 1746, Philip v died and his son Ferdinand was named the new King of Spain. Zenón de Somodevilla y Bengoechea, the marquess of Ensenada, a skilled official with a long military record, and Barbara of Braganza, the Queen, facilitated Carvajal’s rise.352 Born in La Rioja, the marquess of Ensenada came from a family of local hidalgos.353 He was not, like Carvajal, a Spanish grandee. But, at the age of 42, he was granted a number of offices and responsibilities that effectively rendered him the prime minister.354 As a young man, he stood out as a naval officer and was involved in construction tasks in the ports of Cantabria and Cartagena.355 In Oran he fought under the orders of the Duke of Montemar, a learned military officer and historian, and alongside the political economist and officer marquess of Marcenado, who died during the conflict.356 Soon after, again under the command of Montemar, he participated in the war in Italy to acquire Naples and Sicily.357 Following the successful venture, the infante Charles vii of Naples granted him the title of marquess of Ensenada.358 He then drafted an impressive number of financial reforms for the army which included the standardisation of salaries and rations, the establishment of an arsenal in Cartagena, and an increase in the production of vessels.359 In his writings, Ensenada was disarming and reaffirmed his low-​standing origins to appear urbane, sincere, and trustworthy. When he was made prime minister he claimed to ‘know nothing’ about ‘the treasury or war’ or transatlantic trade.360 That he had political ambitions from an early age was clear from the fact that, at the age of 24, he was one of the signatories of the denunciation to the Inquisition against José Campillo who, by then, was already an important officer in the navy.361 That he was skilful at dealing with sensitive matters was evidenced by the fact that Campillo not only pardoned his transgression but collaborated with him extensively years later.362 That he was learned was evident from his

3 52 Urdañez, El proyecto reformista de Ensenada, 76–​77. 353 Urdañez, El proyecto reformista de Ensenada, 60–​61. 354 Rodríguez Villa, Don Cenón de Somodevilla, 19. 355 Rodríguez Villa, Don Cenón de Somodevilla, 4. 356 On the works of Montemar and Marcenado see Jones Corredera, ‘The Rediscovery’, 958–​963. 357 Rodríguez Villa, Don Cenón de Somodevilla, 6. 358 Rodríguez Villa, Don Cenón de Somodevilla, 6–​7. 359 Rodríguez Villa, Don Cenón de Somodevilla, 9. 360 Rodríguez Villa, Don Cenón de Somodevilla, 21. 361 Diana Bianchi, ‘Inquisición e Ilustración. Un expediente reservado de José del Campillo’, Investigaciones históricas: Época moderna y contemporánea 22 (2002), 63–​82, 74. 362 Bianchi, ‘Inquisición e Ilustración’, 74–​75.

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library, which included Bayle’s Dictionnaire Historique et Critique; Pufendorf’s De jure naturae et gentium; Juan and Ulloa’s Observaciones; Pedro Giannone’s Storia civile del reyno de Napoli; Muratori’s Rerum italicarum; Mariana’s Historia general de España; the Savary brothers’s Dictionnaire; and a range of official documents, such as the Bilbao ordinances, the Caracas Company’s founding document, or the regulations for the Military Academy of Barcelona for the instruction of mathematics.363 Ensenada was an accomplished minister: he built an impressive network of agents throughout the empire which included members of the Peruvian elite like Manso de Velasco, and carried out reforms regarding the accounting of the wealth from the Indies that allowed the Depositaria de Indias to enjoy the highest level of returns of the century.364 Ensenada, however, did not trust grand schemes. He once remarked in passing that ‘the dreamed equilibrium of powers’ was nothing other than ‘the pretext of all conflicts’.365 Like Carvajal, Ensenada understood that Spain needed peace to restore the treasury, and that the Cádiz monopoly had to be overhauled. But as Benjamin Keene, the British ambassador, observed, Carvajal thrived on the peaceful diplomatic stage while Ensenada’s skills as a naval officer made him a valuable asset during war-​time.366 The overarching responsibilities that Carvajal was granted when he was elevated to become one of the leading ministers at Court soon became a source of tension. Carvajal was named ‘Dean of the Council of State’ and was asked to address ‘any business or incident related to foreign crowns or in foreign lands’.367 The decree allowed Carvajal to draw on any of the documents in the Council of State, ‘the departments of war, the Indies’, or the ‘treasuries within the Court and outside of it’ which would provide him ‘with whatever document or information you may need’.368 Carvajal, moreover, retained his influence over the Council of the Indies and remained president of the Junta de Comercio. As they worked together, the ambitions of

3 63 Urdañez, El proyecto reformista de Ensenada, 273, 289, 281, 280, 285, 282, 290, 289, 286. 364 Cristina González, La red política del Marqués de la Ensenada (Madrid: Fundación Jorge Juan, 2004); Kuethe and Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic World, 203. 365 “Exposición del marqués de la Ensenada al Rey sobre fomento de la Marina. Aranjuez 28 de mayo de 1748”, in Cesáreo Fernández Duro ed., Armada Española (desde la unión de los reinos de Castilla y Aragón). Volume 6 (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1895–​1903), 376–​377, 377. 366 Keene to Newcastle. Lisbon 28 Dec 1747, British Library, ms 21438, 36. 367 Quoted in Didier Ozanam, “La Administración Central en el reinado de Fernando VI”, in Ramón Menéndez Pidal ed., Historia de España (Madrid: Cervera Pery, 1985), 131–​142, 133. 368 Ozanam, “La administración central”, 133.

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the two men proved increasingly incompatible: Carvajal’s corporations undermined Ensenada’s capacity to oversee Spain’s transatlantic trade and harmed his ability to negotiate directly with imperial authorities. Carvajal pursued complex alliances and the improvement of Spanish trade by frequently short-​ circuiting the Spanish administration; Ensenada preferred straightforward solutions and wrote to viceroys asking them for greater contributions because, quite simply, the Americas had ‘more riches’ than Spain.369 Over time, the two men grew weary of each other. By 1752, Ensenada ignored Carvajal and signed a treaty with Rome on his preferred terms.370 He also denounced Carvajal’s companies, which led the King to temporarily abolish their privileges and which encouraged both men to pen texts defending their views.371 It was then that Carvajal proceeded to amass information on Ensenada with a view to remove him from his position of power.372 In eighteenth-​century Europe, the unclear separation of power led to disagreement, and in this respect the tensions between Carvajal and Ensenada were not particularly remarkable.373 The two men, however, were effective when they worked together. This was made clear during the first few months of their government. In an impressive policy reversal, Carvajal and Ensenada encouraged the new King to sign a text declaring that ‘since the Treaty of Utrecht, or perhaps the years following 1714, the maxims followed by the Spanish Monarchy have gone against its true reason of state’.374 It signalled a reconfiguration of Spain’s approach to the Treaty of Utrecht. Spain thus issued in a new era of governance, focused on investment, transnational cooperation, and political accountability. One factor, above all, remained crucial, elusive, and mercurial: the preservation of trust in reform. 369 Quoted in Anne Dubet, ‘El marqués de la Ensenada y la vía reservada en el gobierno de la Hacienda americana: un proyecto de equipo’, Estudios de Historia Novohispana 55 (2016), 99–​116, 102. 370 Historians disagree over whether Carvajal was involved in the process, or whether it was Ensenada’s work and he was entirely unaware of the process. See Gómez Urdáñez, El Proyecto Reformista de Ensenada, 192 and Antonio Mestre Sanchis, Don Gregorio Mayans y Siscar, entre la erudición y la política (Valencia: Diputación de Valencia, 1999), 265–​306. 371 José Carvajal y Lancaster, “Representación hecha al Rey”, in Blas Roman ed., Semanario Erudito. Volume xxii (Madrid: Despacho Principal del Semanario, 1789), 235–​54. 372 Diego Téllez Alarcia, El ministerio Wall: la ‘España discreta’ del ‘ministro olvidado’ (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2012), 58. 373 John C. Rule and Ben S. Trotter, A World of Paper: Louis XIV, Colbert de Torcy, and the Rise of the Information State (Montreal: McGill-​Queen’s University Press, 2014), 377. 374 Instrucciones a D. Melchor de Macanaz Ministro Plenipotenciario a las Conferencias de Breda, Instrucción de lo que vos D. Melchor de Macanaz habéis de observar y cumplir en el destino de un Ministro Plenipotenciario, Archivo Histórico Nacional. Estado. 3457, exp. 39.

­c hapter 4

Revolts and Returns

Free Trade and the Fear of Revolution

1

Introduction

This chapter sheds light on the intellectual responses to the economic and cultural reforms spearheaded by Carvajal and Ensenada, as Spanish authors considered the perils of emulation, the politics of alienation, and ways to craft an enlightened form of governance that could improve the lives of all subjects. The two ministers developed extensive information-​gathering networks throughout Europe and implemented sweeping financial reforms, like the establishment of the Real Giro, the first Spanish bank. By the late 1740s, Spanish political economic debates had grown in scope and ambition. Carvajal’s decision to establish corporations to stimulate industrial growth in the Spanish peninsula generated sophisticated cultural responses. But it was his defence of the Caracas Company in the face of a local revolt in Caracas that precipitated a debate on the meaning of the Spanish Empire. Following the revolt, the Council of Indies, along with Carvajal and Ensenada, convened a board to study the causes of the unrest. Advocates of the Company emphasised the possibility of civil war and a wave of colonial independence. Fears regarding the creation of an assembly for the estates to meet in Caracas, comparisons with the political tensions in New England and the popularity of the South Sea Company in Britain, and vindications of pactismo shaped the debate. During these discussions, free trade emerged as a viable alternative to the Cádiz monopoly and the establishment of corporations. The language used to defend free trade, moreover, would be based on a political economic discourse that had developed in the early eighteenth century, and which focused on efficiency, fairness, and accountability. But the debate about the Caracas Company was merely a piece of the larger puzzle, as Carvajal had proposed the establishment of companies to effectively coordinate the Spanish Empire. Drawing on Grotius, Pufendorf, and a wide array of debates on the history of European trade, the Duke of Sotomayor, the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon, formulated a critique of these ambitions in the most sophisticated text of political economy of eighteenth-​century Spain. In his Observaciones, Sotomayor emphasised that wise political rule did not rest solely on the creation of wealth and that companies were not suited to legislate transnational affairs.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004469099_005

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Investing in a New Timepiece

On 5 August 1748, Carvajal wrote a letter, on behalf of Ferdinand vi, to Ricardo Wall, who had been sent as a Spanish envoy to the Court of Saint James. The Spanish King sought the service of the best English watchmaker and Wall, who had established a friendship with William Pitt and other members of the London elite, approached John Ellicott, a Fellow of the Royal Society and renowned clockmaker, who acceded to his request and manufactured a watch for the Spanish Monarch.1 When the machine arrived in Madrid, however, the King found it to be defective. Carvajal explained that after a local watchmaker made the changes Ellicott had recommended, the watch lasted a mere two hours before stopping again. A drop of oil did not help, and the Spanish statesman clarified that the King took great care of it. Whenever Ferdinand danced he made sure to leave it on the shelf.2 Carvajal understood that investing time and energy in establishing contacts with leading scientists served two purposes. They could craft extravagant items which fulfilled the King’s curiosity and preserved his trust in the ministers who delivered them. They also could provide chorographic knowledge that would allow Spain to improve its industrial production. And while he watched the King dance, the Spanish minister dreamt of ways of using the information provided by these passeur d’idées to create a number of companies that would allow ministers, diplomats, and officials to rule the world. As his leading minister, Carvajal did not take his proximity to the Spanish King for granted. Validos like the Count-​Duke of Olivares had been encouraged to follow, perpetuate, and harness institutions and norms.3 Carvajal, by contrast, had to extoll the virtues of change. Unfamiliar expectations had to be rendered more agreeable than tradition in order to signal a departure from Philip’s rule. In a letter to his friend the Duke of Huéscar, Carvajal underlined how his failure to deliver results would encourage Ferdinand to reaffirm the Bourbon alliance: 1 John Ellicott (1702–​1776) penned his own works about the craft of clock-​making, such as A description of two methods, by which the irregularities in the motion of a clock, arising from the influence of heat and cold upon the rod of the pendulum, may be prevented. By John Ellicot, F.R.S. Read at the Royal Society, June 4, 1752 (London: R. Willock, 1753). Ellicot would later endorse the applications of Joseph Ignacio de Torres and Pedro de Alcántara Alonso de Guzmán el Bueno, Duke of Medina Sidonia, to the Royal Society. Joseph Ignacio de Torres, Royal Society Archive. ec/​1758/​10, Pedro Alonso Pérez de Guzmán, Duke of Medina-​Sodina, Royal Society Archive. ec/​1749/​15. 2 Carvajal to Wall, 5 August 1748, Archivo Histórico Nacional. Estado, 2941. 3 Elliott, The Count-​Duke of Olivares, 132.

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‘I do hope that the British will soon begin to work with us, while the iron is still hot and our reforms shine brighter, for if it were to cool down we would start to see the vapours rise, and comments along the lines of “I am a Bourbon” would follow; these ideas that have so far undermined my policies a number of times. However, if my calculations are correct, he will be quiet until his time comes.’4 The traditional slowness of Spanish political and military responses had, according to one contemporary author, led to a popular saying in Europe: that one was ‘as late as Spanish help’.5 In their first few years in power Carvajal and Ensenada successfully catalysed reform: the pace of manufacturing enterprises increased, the precision in the coordination of diplomatic negotiations was sharpened, and cultural academies stimulated chorographic studies. These reforms served to forestall the re-​emergence of the type of doubt and hesitation that had characterised Philip’s approach to power.6 In their Observaciones, Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa introduced infinitesimal calculations to the Spanish public, and demonstrated that Isaac Newton’s theory of the rotation of the Earth was correct.7 The General Inquisitor demanded the two scientists include a note referring to the fact that this was a system rightfully condemned by the Church.8 However, full censorship of their work was never considered, and the summary of their findings, at the beginning of their publication, made no reference to theology.9 Jorge Juan and other instructors at the Royal Company of Coastguards would continue to contribute to the scientific development of Spain, in part through the creation of the Friendly Literary Assembly in Cádiz, which hosted discussions of scientific discoveries.10 These 4 5 6

7 8 9 10

Carvajal to Huéscar, 8 June 1748, in Ozanam, La diplomacia, 333. Lorenzo Sagarzazu, “Reglas y Documentos dados al Rey Fernando VI”, in Antonio Valladares de Sotomayor ed., Semanario Erudito. Volume 13 (Madrid: Blas Román, 1788), 217–​232, 226. Some scholars have pointed to the emergence of an early modern temporal revolution that focused on ‘specialised temporal communities’ that rested on precision and accuracy. See Paul Glennie and N. J. Thrift, Shaping the Day: A History of Timekeeping in England and Wales 1300–​1800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 411. On their enterprise see Safier, Measuring the New World, 166–​199. Francisco Aguilar Piñal, Historia literaria de España en el siglo XVIII (Madrid: Trotta/​c sic, 1996), 442 and 1007. Jorge Juan and Antonio Ulloa, Observaciones astronómicas y physicas (Madrid: Juan de Zuñiga, 1748), i-​xvi. Miguel Sanz, Breve noticia de la vida del Excmo. Sr. D. Jorge Juan y Santacilia, reducida a los hechos de sus comisiones, obras y virtudes, que a instancia de sus apasionados. Edited by Armando Arberola Romá y Rosario de Maculet (San Vicente del Raspeig: Universidad de Alicante, 2013), 80.

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changes were reflected in the debates held at other academies: Abreu, during a gathering at the Royal Academy of Spain, claimed that access to the nobility should be based on merit because there was ‘no King who’ had not ‘descended from a slave, or a single slave who’ could not ‘claim a King as an ancestor’.11 Contemporary authors came to believe that in Spain, ‘among the higher and lower classes’, the ‘clouds of fear and superstition’ were fading.12 But if authors had once lamented the slow pace of the Spanish Monarchy, some writers now complained about the speed of change, and claimed that ‘not all things’ could be ‘organised in a second’ by establishing corporations and factories.13 Contemporary discussions over trading companies bolstered the growth of the genre of political economic writing that generated pressing questions about the need to create enlightened institutions and transcend the limits of emulation. An antiquarian working on the recovery of Spanish imperial archives deduced that sovereignty in the original Spanish constitution did not rest with the King; a jurist sought to reconcile the teachings of foreign natural law thinkers with those of Spanish philosophers; and a scholar argued that to develop a true ‘science of state’ the ‘generalities’ of Grotius and Pufendorf had to be overcome.14 The solution, according to the latter, was to establish royal academies for the study of science and law in the style of the Academia Naturae Curiosorum in Halle or the Royal Society in London. Between 1752 and 1759, more newspapers were published in Madrid than in the prior fifty years.15 Debates over the benefits and shortcomings of corporations and diplomacy

11

Quoted in Francisco Precioso Izquierdo, ‘Un problema académico: la idea de nobleza en la primera mitad del siglo XVIII. Los discursos de Pedro Scotti y José Antonio de Abreu en la Real Academia Española’, Hispanic Research Journal 19:4 (2018), 345–​360, 355. 12 Alfonso Echanove Taro, La preparación intelectual del Padre Andrés M. Burriel S.J (1731–​ 1750) (Madrid: csic, 1971), 82. 13 Quoted in José Miguel Delgado Barrado, Aquiles y Teseos: Bosquejos del reformismo borbónico (1701–​1759) (Universidad de Granada, Universidad de Jaén, 2007), 167. 14 Bartolomé Clavero, ‘ “Leyes de la China”. Orígenes y ficciones de una Historia del Derecho Español’, Anuario del Derecho Español (1982), 193–​222; Pedro José Pérez Valiente, Aparato del Derecho Público Hispánico. Edited by Pablo Álvarez Albaladejo. Translated by Maria de los Angeles Durán. (Madrid: cepc, 2001); Tomas Fernández de Mesa, “Representación hecha al Excmo. Sr. Marques de Ensenada”, in Antonio Valladares de Sotomayor ed., Semanario Erudito. Volume 13 (Madrid: Blas Román, 1788), 218–​284. 15 Saiz, Historia del periodismo en España, 130. Military academies, during this period, contributed to the stimulation of scientific knowledge. Antonio Lafuente and José Luis Peset, ‘Las academias militares y la inversión en ciencia en la España ilustrada’, Dynamis 2 (1982), 193–​209. Until the 1780s, the systematic production of gazettes throughout the empire was rare. See Pablo Martínez Gramuglia and Mariana Rosetti, ‘Opinión pública y prácticas culturales en el cambio de siglo: Presentación del dossier’, Dieciocho 42:1 (2019), 111–​118.

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stimulated the growth of new visions of educational, cultural, and political reform. As debate grew in Spain, dissent erupted in the Americas. The most important contestation of Spanish imperial power came from Venezuela. In Caracas, hundreds rose in protest against the monopolistic tendencies of the Caracas Company. The Council of Indies studied whether the riots were a ploy to spur a wave of independence throughout the Americas, or whether the protests had been caused by the administration’s reluctance to disband the Caracas Company. Officials drew on the memory of the Dutch Revolt, they studied ways to bore foreign merchants into leaving Spanish shores, and they considered the fairness of free trade. This was part of a sophisticated elite discussion about the past and the future of the Spanish Empire that engaged with the views of leading European Enlightenment thinkers in order to support the notion that the Spanish Monarchy was more than a company. 3

Mapping Reform in Enlightenment Europe

Diplomats who acted as passeurs d’idées, migrant skilled workers, and officials who relentlessly pursued the latest chorographic and political information facilitated the implementation of reform. In one of his proposals to the King, Ensenada explained that Spain needed to ‘send people beyond the Kingdom to learn about the arts, commerce, manufacturing, agriculture’ which were once ‘all products of our own that other nations appreciated’.16 This approach to the gathering of chorographic information, he explained, was ‘well known in fifteenth-​century Spain’ but had since been ‘forgotten’. It was ‘important to teach and instill’ the desire to travel and learn in ‘our subjects so that they may invent on their own’.17 For Ensenada, Europe could remind Spain of its priorities and of its past: the goal was to bring foreigners, and foreign ideas, to Spain so ‘they may educate us with what we once taught them’.18 Carvajal and Ensenada therefore set out to learn about Europe. The two men drafted a text for the Department for the Affairs of State and Foreign Negotiations.19 The text instructed Spanish diplomats, scholars, and polyglots to gather information regarding the history and the politics of European nations. The state 16 17 18 19

Rodríguez Villa, Don Cenón de Somodevilla, 98. Rodríguez Villa, Don Cenón de Somodevilla, 98. Rodríguez Villa, Don Cenón de Somodevilla, 98. En lo que debe consistir el Departamento de los negocios de Estado y de las negociaciones extranjeras, Archivo Histórico Nacional. Estado, 3497.

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of political affairs in each of these countries and provinces, their antiquity, their moeurs, their religions, the habits of their Princes, information about those who occupied the most important offices in Republics, the reach of their states, the nature of their taxes and rents, their mountains, their troops, their alliances, their enemies, who they were at war with and what the motives were.20 Carvajal and Ensenada established skilled consuls at important port cities such as Genoa, Hamburg, Marseille, Livorno, Saint Petersburg, Naples, Ostend, and Rotterdam.21 Carvajal, moreover, sought to undermine French information-​gathering enterprises. First, he drew on the principle of reciprocity and established a Spanish consul in Paris to inform the Spanish Court about French trade and industry.22 He then abolished the position of the French consul in Spain since it allowed French officials to take part in meetings and councils regarding the state of the Spanish navy.23 Ensenada, in turn, sent Jorge Juan to London to conduct industrial espionage and assemble information about political affairs: ‘to learn about science and mathematics’ and to report on ‘the news of Knowles and his ships in Havana’.24 These missions were successful: science, industry, and sociability allowed Antonio Ulloa to submit reports about a new astronomical clock to Ensenada and Ulloa and Jorge Juan were both elected fellows of the Royal Society.25 Carvajal and Ensenada circumvented many of the bodies which had traditionally been responsible for gathering information. They connected the work of those providing political information and scientific knowledge about Europe to specific learned councils which they controlled. Carvajal corresponded with ambassadors, and then tasked the Junta de Comercio, responsible for trade, mining, and the post to study a specific issue or to harness a piece of commercial information.26 Carvajal enlisted Teodoro Ventura de Argumosa, a former director of the Royal Factory of Guadalajara, to the Junta. Argumosa 20

Miguel Artola, La Hacienda del Antiguo Regimen (Madrid, Alianza Editorial/​Banco de España, 1982), 217; En Lo en que debe consistir el Departamento. 21 Pradells Nadal, Diplomacia y comercio, 49. 22 Taracha, Ojos y oídos de la monarquía borbónica, 61. 23 Pradells Nadal, Diplomacia y comercio, 279. 24 Ensenada to Jorge Juan, 10 December 1748, Archivo Histórico Nacional. Estado, 2941; Jorge Juan to Ensenada, 24 April 1749, Archivo Histórico Nacional. Estado, 2941. 25 Informe de la machina de Antonio de Ulloa, description d’une pendule astronomique. 13 December 1748. Archivo Histórico Nacional. Estado. 3028.1. Arthur P. Whitaker, ‘Antonio de Ulloa, the Délivrance, and the Royal Society’, Hispanic American Historical Review 46:4 (1966), 357–​370. 26 Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 102–​124; Didier Ozanam and Fabrice Abbad, Les intendants espagnols du XVIIIe siècle (Madrid: Casa de Velazquez, 1992); Delgado Barrado, El proyecto político, 146.

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had travelled to France, the Netherlands, and Britain, to examine their factories and their systems of government.27 He was the author of Erudición Política, a work that plagiarised the ideas of Jean-​François Melon, introduced William Petty’s views on political arithmetic into Spain, and proposed the establishment of an investment bank.28 Carvajal ordered Spanish ambassadors at London, Lisbon, and Paris, to gather information regarding the most efficient method of coin production, and these reports were then discussed by the Junta.29 In Paris, the Duke of Sotomayor and his assistants encouraged the migration of dozens of French cloth manufacturers to the peninsula, and secured apprenticeships for young Spaniards to learn about the production of jewellery and cloths. The ideas suggested by these passeurs d’idées included the creation of Spanish guilds in select European capitals, a measure which was promptly implemented.30 Ensenada, by contrast, expanded the peninsular system of intendants, which former ministers had sought to implement without much success.31 Other scholars, diplomats, and scientists were sent to different parts of Europe. The scientist Enrique Enriqui travelled to Paris, Alsace and Lorraine, Sweden, and Russia, in order to gather information on ‘the method of improving metals, both copper and steel, for artillery’.32 The Irish political economist, Bernardo Ward, was asked to travel around Europe to study possible reforms, and proposed the establishment of trusts ‘based on a secure line of public credit’, he encouraged ministers to think of ‘ways to make Spain’s rivers navigable’, and he argued that the growth of factories, commerce, and population went hand in hand and, together, propelled the wealth and the power of the state.33 Ulloa travelled to the Low Countries, where he employed architects and experts in

27 28

29 30 31 32

33

Teodoro Ventura de Argumosa y Gandara, Erudición política (Madrid, 1743), iv. Anne Dubet, “Pour une autre politique économique en Espagne au milieu du XVIIIe siècle? Teodoro Ventura de Argumosa Gandara, traducteur pirate de Melon (1743)”, in P. Meunier y E. Samper eds., Mélanges en hommage à Jacques Soubeyroux (Mons: Université de Mons-​ Hainaut, 2008), 171–​188. Ventura de Argumossa y Gandara, Erudición política, 391–​393. Representación del secreto de la junta sobre que se encargue a los ministros en París, Londres, y Lisboa averiguen el modo de ensayar el oro y la plata, Archivo Histórico Nacional. Estado, 2941. Pradells Nadal, Diplomacia y Comercio, 281. Dubet, ‘El marqués de la Ensenada’, 99. Victor Navarro Brotons, “La renovación de la actividad científica en la España del siglo XVII y las disciplinas físico-​matemáticas”, in Manuel Silva Suárez ed., Técnica e ingeniería en España: El Siglo de las luces: de la ingeniería a la nueva navegación (Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2004), 33–​69, 64. Bernardo Ward, Proyecto Económico (Madrid: Joaquín Ibarra, 1779), ix.

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hydraulics to learn about their techniques.34 At The Hague, Ulloa learned about novel methods to manufacture canons, and in Potsdam, Frederick ii and Pierre Louis Maupertuis, President of the Academy of Science, hosted the Spaniard.35 In Karlskrona, Sweden, Ulloa learned about new methods to build ships and vessels.36 Two scholars, José Manes and Francisco Estaheria, sought to gather further information about metals and were the first Spaniards to enrol in the Bergakademie, the mining academy in Freiberg.37 Improved chorographic knowledge led to more sophisticated evaluations of Spain’s industrial shortcomings. The Director of the Junta de Comercio, Francisco de Samilies, penned a Representación on the topic of coin production and suggested gathering further information on the way France trained its assayers.38 Like Samilies, Enriqui reported that Spanish officials needed to receive better training, based on the best European practices.39 As Ensenada read through these reports on European industrial reforms, he was particularly fascinated by Prussian and Habsburg policies. He praised Frederick’s Prussian Civil Code, and appeared to follow the example of Friedrich Wilhelm von Haugwitz, who, in 1744, had begun to reform local administrations in Habsburg territories in order to increase the standing army, and who established a system of deputations to regulate the local allocation and collection of funds.40 The Bohemian chancellor Friedrich August von Harrach-​Rohrau’s opinions on taxation echoed Ensenada’s view that ‘every vassal contributes his share based on what he has’.41 Above all, Ensenada’s plans mirrored Vienna’s efforts to develop the General Commercial Directorate, or Universalcommerzdirektion, which sought to establish economic unity among the various Habsburg territories.42 There was a clear goal behind all of these initiatives: Ensenada, according to the British ambassador Benjamin Keene,

34 Navarro Brotons, “La renovación”, 60. 35 Taracha, Ojos y oídos de la monarquía borbónica, 45; Navarro Brotons, “La renovación”, 63. 36 Navarro Brotons, “La renovación”, 63. 37 Navarro Brotons, “La renovación”, 67. 38 Representación del secreto de la junta, Londres averigüen el modo de ensayar el oro y la plata. 39 Navarro Brotons, “La renovación”, 65. 40 Hamish Scott, “Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy”, in Hamish Scott ed., Enlightened Absolutism Reform and Reformers in Later Eighteenth-​ Century Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), 145–​188, 154; Charles W. Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1618-​1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000),162. 41 P. G. M. Dickson, Finance and Government under Maria Theresa, 1740–​1780. Two volumes. Volume 2 (New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press, 1987), 13. 42 Scott, “Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1740–​90”, 151.

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wished to make the Spanish King into the main ‘merchant and banker’ of the Spanish Empire.43 Carvajal’s mid-​century reforms, by contrast, were influenced by his views on European corporations.44 He hoped to stimulate industrial reform in a way that would bind the revitalisation of provinces in the peninsula with the restoration of Spanish control in the Americas. The Royal Company of Commerce and Factories of Zaragoza was established in order to assist the companies of Caracas and Havana. Together, they would undermine foreign trade, and bolster the decayed factories in Zaragoza by facilitating trade and navigation along the Ebro river.45 Further companies were established throughout the peninsula: Carvajal inaugurated the Royal Company of Granada, the Royal Company of Toledo, and the Royal Company of Commerce and Factories of Extremadura.46 These companies were granted exclusive trade with Portugal for a decade, and they were united into the Company of the Union.47 Industrial ventures of this kind, in Spain as in Europe, were frequently short lived, and therefore Carvajal defended the benefits of absorbing early losses for the state on the basis that these factories would eventually produce silk at such a low price that they would end Portugal’s trade with foreign nations.48 Corporations could therefore expand the reach of Spanish trade in Europe and beyond. Under Carvajal’s watch, the Royal Tobacco Monopoly was used not to attract foreign investors, an approach he had discussed in his Testamento Político, but instead to reach the markets in Peru and Chile. This was one of the most successful financial reforms of the century, and the returns on the investment would grow exponentially years after these measures were implemented.49 Carvajal and Ensenada collaborated on one of the most outstanding projects implemented in eighteenth-​century Spain: the establishment of a bank to manage bills of exchange throughout Europe on Spanish silver and gold. It was based on a plan drafted by the astute marquess del Puerto, the Spanish 43 Urdañez, El proyecto reformista de Ensenada, 139. 44 For views among elite officials in the Habsburg Monarchy that resembled his own see Adler, Political Economy in the Habsburg Monarchy, 45–​51. 45 José Ignacio Gómez Zorraquino, ‘El fracaso de las compañías y fábricas privilegiadas en Aragón’, Studia H. Historia Moderna 17 (1997), 213–​233, 223. 46 Delgado Barrado, El proyecto político, 206. 47 Mariano García Ruipérez, La Real Compañia de Comercio y Fábricas de Toledo (Toledo: Caja de Ahorro de Toledo, 1986), 27. 48 Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory, 122; María Jesús Matilla Quizá, “Las Compañías privilegiadas en la España del Antiguo Régimen”, in Miguel Artola ed., La economía española al final del Antiguo Régimen. IV: Instituciones. (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1982), 269–​402, 387. 49 Kuethe and Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic World, 208.

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ambassador to the Netherlands. Carvajal ordered him to study European banking and the diplomat delivered. He surveyed investment practices in Sweden, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hamburg, and Copenhagen. He praised the example of the Bank of England, because of the way it benefited both merchants and the King, and he criticised John Law’s investment scheme as a perilous endeavour.50 He proposed the creation of banks in Madrid, Cádiz, Malaga, Bilbao, and Barcelona.51 The King should ensure that Spanish nobles, foreign traders, and European monarchs, such as the King of Sicily and the prince of Brazil, invested in the scheme.52 The goal was to establish a monopoly over the bills of exchange on the gold and silver that came from the Americas.53 The elected directors would be members of the nobility and the merchant community but the central administration would be delegated to the King and the ministers.54 The Cádiz bank would seek to establish a monopoly over the slave trade to Spanish imperial ports. The Bilbao bank would have a monopoly over whaling and cod fisheries. The Malaga bank would reaffirm trade with Asia. The Barcelona bank would develop the production of salt in the Balearic Islands, supply it to the North of Spain, and provide the Canary Islands with wine.55 These banks would have a monopoly on grain exports and imports.56 Based on this proposal, Carvajal and Ensenada established the Real Giro. Consuls were sent to Paris, Rome, Naples, Amsterdam, and Lisbon.57 Rates of exchange were established.58 The more creative aspects of the plan were ignored and the bulk of the investors remained Spanish.59 The profits were so high that the bank’s surplus was used to fund the establishment of the Royal Barcelona Company.60 The implementation of the Real Giro, and the improvement of Spain’s management of currency and silver was significant for a second reason: it served to address two of the most important economic problems that

50

Earl J. Hamilton, ‘Plans for a National Bank in Spain, 1701–​83’, Journal of Political Economy 57:4 (1949), 315–​336, 317. 51 Hamilton, ‘Plans’, 317. 52 Hamilton, ‘Plans’, 318. 53 Hamilton, ‘Plans’, 318. Law had in 1715 suggested a similar project for a deposit bank. Murphy, John Law, 140–​145. 54 Hamilton, ‘Plans’, 318. 55 Hamilton, ‘Plans’, 319. 56 Hamilton, ‘Plans’, 320. 57 Ildefonso Pulido Bueno, El Real Giro de España: Primer proyecto de banco nacional (Huelva: Universidad de Huelva, 1994), 99 and 136. 58 Bueno, El Real Giro, 108. 59 Bueno, El Real Giro, 131. 60 Bueno, El Real Giro, 131.

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Spain faced throughout the early modern period.61 As Zavala had explained in his Representación, foreign factories used Spanish imports to manufacture goods. They then sold their products to Spain in exchange for silver. And, for Zavala, ‘gold and silver’ constituted ‘the most precious blood of this Monarchy’ and this drain of imports and silver ‘rendered’ Spain ‘poor’.62 It allowed other nations to ‘grow stronger’ while weakening Spain. And it perpetuated Spain’s dependency on its neighbours: foreign nations were the ‘arbiters’ of Spain’s ‘riches’.63 The creation of corporations, and the establishment of the Real Giro, served to address both of these issues. These reforms generated an intense political economic debate. They propelled a cycle of new publications, and the republication of works by early modern thinkers like Saavedra Fajardo. These facilitated the growth of the ‘economic turn’ of the 1750s and 1760s.64 Drawing attention to these debates, literary works reflected and remarked upon these industrial changes, and denoted the growth of the press. Torres praised Carvajal’s industrial reforms in his Arte nuevo de aumentar colmenas, and saw in them a broader change in the population’s attitude to labour. Torres claimed that, through the example of his reforms, Carvajal had reformed those ‘lazy spirits’ who now contributed to ‘the invention of new pathways’.65 Echoing Ensenada’s dictum that these efforts were part of a broader recovery of the sources of Spanish influence in Europe, Torres reconciled the memory of Spain’s Habsburg past with Enlightenment ideas about general welfare, and suggested Carvajal had helped ‘to discover long-​forgotten routes towards the precious commerce of common utilities’.66 One of these methods, for Torres, was the forced migration of people. In Arte, he proposed employing idle labourers to work in workshops where they could apply their labour to different industrial enterprises to ‘maintain a sound

61 Bueno, El Real Giro, 108. 62 Zavala, Representación, 14. 63 Zavala, Representación, 14. 64 Mariano García Ruiperez, ‘El Pensamiento Económico Ilustrado y Las Compañias De Comercio’, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 4:3 (1986), 521–​48, 532–​ 536; Jesús Astigarraga, “Spain and the Economic Work of Jacques Accarias De Serionne”, in Sophus Reinert and Steven Kaplan eds., The Economic Turn: Recasting Political Economy in Enlightenment Europe (London: Anthem Press, 2019), 607–​34, 612; Delgado Barrado, Aquiles y Teseos, 168–​171. 65 Diego Torres y Villarroel, Arte nuevo de aumentar colmenas: reglas seguras para governar avejas y para coger con abundancia la miel y la cera segun las nuevas observaciones y practica de don francisco moreno, vecino de la villa de Autor (Madrid: Impr. Del convento de la Merced, 1747) Biblioteca del Palacio Real. iii/​5 619, 3. 66 Torres, Arte, 3.

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economy and foster sociability’.67 Those in power showed an interest in similar schemes: Gaspar Vázquez Tablada, Bishop of Oviedo, studied the possibility of mobilising the Roma population to bolster manufacturing in Spain.68 Vázquez would provide Ensenada with a proposal for the Gran Redada: the attempt to conduct the mass reallocation of Roma people, and vagrants, to a number of workshops, factories, and shipyards in both the peninsula and the Americas.69 For decades, Portugal had carried out a similar practice by expelling their Roma population to the Americas, and Ensenada, who approved of Vázquez’s measure, sought information about this policy from the Duke of Sotomayor, the Spanish ambassador at Lisbon.70 The marquess of Victoria, a senior military officer, complained to his friend Nicolas de Carvajal y Lancaster, marquess of Sarria, about the tyrannical purpose of the enterprise. He wondered whether Nero had returned from the dead to implement this policy. He questioned the efficacy of the plan. He asked his correspondent whether there was a single ‘verse in the Bible’ which permitted ‘the civil execution of a generation’.71 But the Spanish Crown faced even harder questions. These were to be found in Feijoo’s ingratiating dedication to Ferdinand vi in his Carta Erudita. Change had arrived: there is now what there never was […] we watch materials grow in abundance for the development of the Marine […] every day we see the stimulation of manufacturing centres, which Spain sorely lacked […] we see the fortification of ports, and the development in Ferrol, Cartagena, Cádiz of great arsenals […] we watch commerce grow thanks to the creation of a number of companies.72 67 Torres, Arte, 4. 68 Antonio Gómez Alfaro, The Great Gypsy Round-​up, Spain: the general imprisonment of Gypsies in 1749. Translated by Terence W. Roberts (Madrid: Gypsy Research Centre, 1993), 12. 69 Antonio Gómez Alfaro, ‘La polémica sobre la deportación de los gitanos a las colonias de América’, Cuadernos hispanoamericanos 386 (1982), 303–​336. 70 Timothy J. Coates, Convicts and Orphans: Forced and State-​Sponsored Colonizers in the Portuguese Empire, 1550-​1755 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 46; Manuel Martínez Martínez, Los Gitanos y Las Gitanas de España a Mediados Del Siglo XVIII: El Fracaso de Un Proyecto de ‘Exterminio’ (1748-​1765) (Almería: Universidad de Almería, 2014), 24. 71 Victoria to Sarria, 1 marzo 1749, in Cartas familiares del Marques de Victoria al Sr Don Nicolás de Carvajal y Lancaster, Marques de Sarria, 1748–​1769. Archivo del Museo Naval. mss. 2462. 72 Benito Feijoo, Cartas eruditas y curiosas (1742–​1760). Volume 3 (Madrid: Imprenta Real de la Gaceta, a costa de la Real Compañía de Impresores y Libreros, 1774 [1750]), iii-​xxxii.

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Yet Feijoo’s dedication unwittingly underlined an issue with this economic development: ‘And how have these things come about? Who is paying for these changes?’ Spaniards, according to Feijoo, had been alleviated of heavy duties, leading some to wonder ‘whether your Ministers have discovered a philosopher’s stone, or whether in Ferdinand vi the legend of the King of Frigia, who turned all he touched into gold, came true’.73 Feijoo was thereby upending Montesquieu’s criticism of the Spanish Empire as King Midas.74 And yet the question about the true sources of Spanish power and wealth remained an important one. In 1749, Spain’s colonial mismanagement of precious metals and goods like tobacco and cocoa was exposed once again, and the intensity of its political implications caught both Ensenada and Carvajal by surprise. After carrying out an impressive number of reforms in the peninsula, a local revolt in Venezuela against the Caracas Company generated questions about the social impact of the new credit networks, and how they affected the social bond that maintained the Spanish Empire together. In response, political economic debate expanded as officials tried to answer a basic question: who was to profit from the wealth of the Spanish Empire? 4

Free Trade: The Farce of Independence and the Growth of Spanish Political Economic Debate

The advent of Ferdinand vi had encouraged new hopes of reform throughout the empire. In Peru, Fray Calixto de San José Túpac Inca penned an incendiary narrative and travelled to Spain to express his complaints to the new King. His report, which was sent to the Council of Indies, suggested that the self-​rule of indigenous communities would remedy the effects of imperial mismanagement.75 The rebel Juan Santos Atahualpa Apu-​Inca Huayna Capac, in turn, believed that British naval cooperation would allow him to lead indigenous peoples to reconquer Peru for the ‘Incan Crown’ that ‘Pizarro’ and the Spaniards had once usurped.76 In Caracas, merchants, officials, and farmers who had benefited from the long-​standing trade relations with the most powerful company

73 Feijoo, Cartas eruditas, iii-​xxxii. 74 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 395. 75 Alcira Dueñas, Indians and Mestizos in “the Lettered City”: Reshaping Justice, Social Hierarchy, and Political Culture in Colonial Peru (Boulder, CO: University of Colorado, 2010), 65–​71. 76 Francisco A. Loayza, Juan Santos: el invencible: manuscritos del año de 1742 al año de 1755 (Lima: Editorial Domingo Miranda, 1942), 10–​11.

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in the region, the Dutch West Indies Company, sought to contest the authority of the Crown by other means. The War of Jenkins’ Ear had undermined the Caracas Company’s ability to supply the region. Locals had revived smuggling with Curaçao and Martinique to compensate for these losses.77 The South Sea Company, moreover, continued to supply the region with slaves in exchange for cacao, which was subsequently sold in New Spain.78 The Caracas Company disrupted these networks. As a result, during the war leading officials had written to the Crown to stress the need to disassemble the Company.79 When the war came to an end and the Company sought to restore its control over the region’s trade, men and women of all races and classes staged a revolt that produced a sweeping reconsideration of the politics of corporations.80 On 20 April 1749, hundreds of isleños, mulatos, blacks, zambos, and Indians, marched into Caracas and gathered around the Venezuelan governor’s house to protest against the Caracas Company.81 The earliest reports submitted to Ensenada, Carvajal, and the Council of Indies, informed its members that ‘many’ locals in Caracas had ‘loudly proclaimed’ that if the Company was not disarticulated ‘they would follow a different King’.82 For Spanish officials like Antonio José Álvarez de Abreu, this was a familiar story: ‘History’, he explained in his analysis of the causes of the revolt, ‘shows that all rebellions begin like tumults. They start by exalting justice and the King’s clemency’.83 Abreu could not overlook the parallels between this riot, the recent uprising in Genoa against the Habsburg Monarchy, and the most devastating rebellion against the Spanish Empire. He reminded his peers of the other times these chants had been heard: ‘Long live the King, and death to the bad government is a common saying’. He recalled how the Dutch Revolt had begun this way: ‘the Prince of Orange, as he galvanised the Dutch Republic, kept this costume on until he

77 Hussey, The Caracas Company, 77–​81. Complaints had also been registered by the local elites throughout the 1730s. See Robert J. Ferry, The Colonial Elite of Early Caracas. Formation and Crisis 1567–​1767 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 184–​186. 78 Kuethe and Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic World, 162. 79 Casimiro Uztáriz would note this in his report. See Sobre alboroto en Caracas contra la Compañía Guipuzcoana, Archivo General de Indias. Estado 63.1, 454–​455. 80 Hussey, The Caracas Company, 123. 81 For a comprehensive study of the local dynamics of the revolt see Jesse Cromwell, “The Political Power of Covert Commerce: The Rebellion of Juan Francisco de León, 1749–​1751”, in Cromwell, The Smugglers’ World, 271–​301 and Jesse Cromwell, ‘Illicit Ideologies: Moral Economies of Venezuelan Smuggling and Autonomy in the Rebellion of Juan Francisco De León, 1749–​1751’, The Americas 74:3 (2017), 267–​97. 82 Anonymous, Sobre alboroto en Caracas, 15. 83 Antonio José Álvarez de Abreu, “Report”, Sobre alboroto en Caracas, 125–​144, 126.

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was sure that the Spaniards could no longer contain him. He then published his famous 1581 manifesto, and thereby removed his mask’.84 In this cyclical history of insurrections against the Spanish Monarchy, ‘the case of Caracas’, Abreu explained, showed ‘the same signs of these repeated examples that are offered by History’.85 The ‘means’ they had used to ‘achieve their freedom from the Company’ were the same as those used ‘by the Prince of Orange: to threaten and demand justice from the King with weapons in their hands’.86 The motives the leaders had offered for the revolt were familiar to the members of the Council: the Company could not adequately supply the region, and the Biscayans were an oppressive mercantile community that increased the costs of basic goods and cared only about their own profits. While this was an argument frequently made by local elites throughout the Spanish Empire, on this occasion their explanations appeared unconvincing. When the Governor, Luis Francisco Castellanos, explained that he had complied with his demands, that all Biscayans had left the island, and that the King would study the ‘utility’ of the company, Francisco de León, a cocoa trader, a local teniente, and the leader of the revolt, was not satisfied. León called for a council of members representing the nobility and the commons to establish whether the Company was useful or harmful to the people of Caracas, and the meeting was used to demonstrate the general discontent.87 The creation of this corporate representative body, according to the reports made by the officials of the Council of Indies, was one of the rebellion’s greatest pretensions, while the ‘pretext of the revolt’, explained a report claiming to represent the views of the King of Spain, was ‘more offensive’ than the protest. Ferdinand ought to be trusted to deliberate fairly on these matters, and he alone retained the supreme right to decide whether to ‘create and disband this corporation’.88 A number of officials, moreover, suggested harsh punishments for those who had stolen the Spanish imperial flags from the University of Caracas.89 The university was one of the few colonial institutions that was directly dependent on the King, and it was responsible for training the ruling elites.90 Through the 84

Abreu, “Report”, Sobre alboroto en Caracas, 127. Abreu established the parallels with the Genoa revolt in page 128. On the politics of the nobility in Caracas see Ferry, The Colonial Elite, 166–​169. 85 Abreu, “Report”, Sobre alboroto en Caracas, 127. 86 Abreu, “Report”, Sobre alboroto en Caracas, 128. 87 Anonymous, Sobre alboroto en Caracas, 7. 88 Sobre alboroto en Caracas, 26–​27, 164. 89 Sobre alboroto en Caracas, 138 and 167. 90 See Alí Enrique López Bohórquez, ‘Establecimiento de las primeras universidades en Venezuela (siglos XVIII y XIX)’, Educere 13:45 (2009), 385–​398.

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symbolic use of the university’s flags, the protesters had subverted established forms of representation and challenged the structure of Spanish imperial rule. The revolt focused the minds of reformers and led to a debate over the various networks and corporations that shaped trade relations throughout the Spanish Empire. For Carvajal, León’s efforts to publicise news of the revolt throughout the province and in other colonies were particularly concerning. León successfully pressured the Governor to publish bandos, public notices, explaining that the Biscayans would not be allowed back until the King studied the matter.91 The Governor ordered town criers to announce that León represented the voice of the nobility and the commons of the whole province.92 Carvajal drew on a number of letters that suggested that an individual had travelled from Caracas to Cuba to meet local officials in a clear attempt to incite a revolt in the ‘hugely important’ island of Cuba in the city of Havana.93 Their goal had been to encourage a rebellion against the Havana Company, which had, according to this report, served to restore imperial rule: ‘before there was a company, governors were imprisoned and deposed, and those who fought against illicit trade were dismissed and made to die miserably’.94 It was in this context that Carvajal anticipated that yielding to León and his followers would grant an example for other colonies to follow.95 The management of the Spanish Empire, therefore, was understood as a negotiation of interests that were both political and economic, as a mediation over disputes about shareholding institutions, states, and empires which had invested in the future of the Spanish Empire, local networks of commercial association, and the Spanish imperial administration. As Carvajal remarked, the question surrounding the reform of the Caracas Company was really about the tension between corporate and monarchical sovereignty: did ‘the Dutch and the locals each hold half of the commercial rights to Venezuela’ or did the region ‘belong to Your Majesty?’96 Yet, in practice, this was a false dichotomy. Further correspondence showed that the situation was not as dire as these earlier reports suggested. Protesters had, in fact, shouted ‘long live the King and out with the Company’.97 Most of the information that had been made available to the Council of Indies had 91 Anonymous, Sobre alboroto en Caracas, 9. 92 Anonymous, Sobre alboroto en Caracas, 11. 93 José de Carvajal y Lancaster, “Report”, Sobre alboroto en Caracas, 149–​184, 156. 94 Carvajal, “Report”, Sobre alboroto en Caracas, 163–​164. This resembled the argument made in the seventeenth century by representatives of the East India Company to show that the Company was not a monopoly. They alleged that there would simply not have been any British trade in the East Indies without it. Stern, Company-​State, 48. 95 Carvajal, “Report”, Sobre alboroto en Caracas, 164. 96 Carvajal, “Report”, Sobre alboroto en Caracas, 152. 97 Ferry, The Colonial Elite, 154.

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been supplied by the Governor and by Jacobo Berbegal, a local official, both of whom had an interest in exaggerating the difficulties brought about by the revolt to render their responses more acceptable. The naval officer Julian de Arriaga was sent to Caracas to establish a military presence in the region and assess the situation on the ground. His reports on the state of affairs were level-​ headed and demonstrated sympathy towards the concerns of the locals.98 Arriaga explained that León had eventually bent the knee. Calm had been restored because the locals believed that the King would agree to disband the Company. Based on what he had seen, the use of force against the locals, he argued, should be discouraged.99 Regardless of the original intent of the rebels, the question of the local demand for greater representation had simply been a self-​defeating one: Arriaga had named a junta made up of the nobles and it had led to a ‘shouting match’ since they had received ‘so many opinions that they had no way of addressing them decisively’.100 Arriaga explained that he had considered the idea of establishing a junta made up of members of the three estates ‘to listen to their pretensions’ and that this was futile since there was ‘no mechanism to reach a solid agreement’.101 Crucially, there were no demands for one. Arriaga established a common theme of discontent which had largely remained the same since the 1730s revolt led by the Company of Freed Slaves: the Company’s use of the alternativa, a system censored by the local officials that allowed the corporation’s officials to load their vessels before all others, and to ship cocoa to Veracruz, Trinidad, Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, Margarita, and New Spain.102 The Council of Indies studied the matter and delivered a range of responses. Those in favour of preserving the Company sought to exaggerate the need to prevent the growth of revolts throughout the empire: the Company had come to represent imperial authority, and thus its removal would be seen as a political failure, not a commercial one. The marquess of Matallana, an experienced naval official, suggested that conflict would spark a costly ‘civil war’ that could potentially spread to other imperial territories. The King should therefore preserve the Company, which had helped undermine contraband, but commit to redress its excesses.103 The Count of Torrealta, who for a decade had served 98

On Arriaga, see María Baudot Monroy, “Jorge Juan y Julián de Arriaga: una relación difícil”, in Alberola-​Romá, Mas Galvañ, and Maculet eds., Jorge Juan Santacilia, 280–​301. 99 Anonymous, Sobre el alboroto, 55–​58. 100 Anonymous, Sobre el alboroto, 72. 101 Anonymous, Sobre el alboroto, 73. 102 Anonymous, Sobre el alboroto, 88. 103 Matallana was one of the few officers who had served in the navy and not in the Council of Indies prior to taking up a position in the influential institution. Marquess of Matallana,

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as Governor of Venezuela, explained that the Spanish Crown should ‘prevent other Provinces from drawing on this example in the attempt to emulate temerities like these’.104 ‘Free trade’ had existed for decades prior to the establishment of the Company and this experience had shaped ‘the memory of their old liberty which they knew as their golden age’.105 The most sophisticated analyses did not hint at civil wars and did not speculate over golden ages. Instead they grasped the significance of the politics of loyalty in the Spanish Empire and its moral economy, and compared the situation in Caracas to that of other foreign imperial spaces.106 Francisco Varas y Valdés, who worked closely with Ensenada, reaffirmed the importance of pactismo when he argued that the Company was undermining the locals’s ‘love towards the King’ by siphoning the communal wealth for private ends.107 ‘Free trade’, by contrast, ‘divides among all that which the companies share among the few, and the common good should prevail over private interests’.108 The official Francisco Javier Cornejo y López Cotilla, with experience in the army and in the administration of the Spanish treasury, further emphasised the need to demonstrate the King’s ‘paternal love’, and suggested that a local guild of cocoa traders should take control of the Caracas Company to ‘formally and safely secure the conduct of cocoa to Spain at their own risk and on their own account’.109 Cornejo, rather than drawing to the fatalistic determinism behind the expectations of another Dutch Revolt, pointed to the example of the British Empire, and emphasised just ‘how much they have tolerated from the peoples of New England, negotiating and granting them privileges until they calmed protests’.110 The crux of the Caracas revolt lay in the fact that the Dutch provided the goods that the Spanish Empire failed to supply to the region. Cornejo thus suggested the provision of three years’ worth of supplies of wheat, clothing, wine, and wax to neutralise the benefits of trade with the

1 04 105 106 107 1 08 109 110

“Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 189–​197, 194. On Matallana see Guillermo Burgos Lejonagoitia, Gobernar las Indias: Venalidad y méritos en la provisión de cargos americanos, 1701–​1746 (Almería: Universidad de Almería, 2015), 138–​139. Count of Torrealta, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 201–​237, 204. Torrealta, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 223. On the origins of this type of authority see Elliott, Empires, 131–​132. Francisco Varas y Valdés, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 253–​371, 263. On pactismo in the Spanish Americas see Elliott, Empires, 121. Varas y Valdés, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 264. On Cornejo see Francisco Andujar Castillo, Consejo y consejeros de guerra en el siglo XVIII (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1996), 194. Javier Cornejo y López Cotilla, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 279–​280. Cornejo, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 281. On New England, see Elliott, Empires, 179–​183.

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Dutch. Dutch merchants would ‘get bored’ and discouraged by the narrow profit margins that were to be gained in the region, and would stop populating the Venezuelan shores.111 The debate, moreover, was not partisan: Sebastián de Eslava, one of Ensenada’s closest confidants and the former Viceroy of New Granada, issued a balanced report that considered the merits of transferring the management of the company to local merchants. But he concluded that this measure would fail to resolve the matter of the jurisdiction over price controls.112 In this debate, clear political economic analyses of incentives and profits eroded the legitimacy of those recurring patterns of history that foreclosed the possibility of change, such as the Dutch Revolt. Casimiro de Uztáriz y Azuara, marquess of Uztáriz and the son of the political economist Gerónimo de Uztáriz, believed European political economic and diplomatic history should inform the Spanish Crown’s response. He penned one of the most erudite proposals to demonstrate how different the company system was from the traditional system of galleons and fairs that underpinned Spanish imperial trade.113 The privilege of the Basque mercantile community, he explained, was necessary because the region was a bulwark against French expansion. During the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of the Pyrenees, Cardinal Jules Mazarin had revealed to the Spanish delegation that if Louis xiv crossed Guipúzcoa the Spanish King would be forced to vacate Madrid.114 Favouring Basque mercantile interests therefore served geopolitical interests. Applying a political economic lens to perennial questions surrounding the Spanish Empire –​how to contest a revolt or how to organise the colonisation of a territory –​enabled Uztáriz to relate these themes to the latest political debates in Europe: Britain had just rescinded the South Sea Company’s rights to the slave trade. This showed, in his view, that while European nations had once trusted in companies to bolster their empires this approach to empire was now a thing of the past.115 But reform was indeed needed. While French and British trading companies had faced bankruptcy and ought not to be emulated, it was clear that foreign nations such as the British ‘as they confess in their writings’

111 Cornejo, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 290. Sebastián de Eslava, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 297–​327, 321. 112 On Eslava, see the excellent study by Víctor Peralta Ruiz, Patrones, clientes y amigos. El poder burocrático indiano en la España del siglo XVIII (Madrid: csic, 2006), 115–​149. 113 On Casimiro de Uztáriz see Andujar Castillo, Consejo y consejeros, 277. Casimiro de Uztáriz, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 333–​552. 114 Uztáriz, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 429–​432. 115 Uztáriz, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 521.

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and the Dutch ‘as they declare in their books’ effectively controlled ‘almost all trade in the Americas, and if this continues we risk losing it all’.116 Uztáriz, like his father, believed that the best approach to reform lay in the gradual improvement, and not the overhaul, of the Spanish administration. The Council of Indies, he declared, could be useful if it remembered its duty to address complaints from the colonies, which it had not done when members of the Caracas elite registered their concerns about the Company in the 1730s.117 It also needed to understand that ‘our main trade with the Americas is done through the commerce in Cádiz’, and the town’s merchants had formed a monopoly. They constituted ‘a body that is basically a company’. This was a company that could assist the Crown, one ‘that could easily provide the million pesos that are needed for reforms’. From 1580 to 1680, claimed Úztariz, Spain had revitalised its trade by dispatching more fleets and galleons.118 Portugal, he explained, had adapted this policy, and their example should serve as a source of ‘instruction’ for Spain.119 Vessels should be made larger and dispatches should be more frequent. This would reduce the cost of Spanish goods, and allow subjects throughout the empire to purchase autochthonous products.120 By appealing to the self-​interest of merchants, this policy would undermine smuggling. It would enjoy the support of governors, who would ensure it was implemented. As Cádiz’s hold over trade declined, the industrial production of other areas in the peninsula would flourish and, inspired by the possibilities of trade, more Spaniards would become mariners.121 There was another way, then, of speeding up the recovery of Spanish trade. Companies promised quick returns but merely concentrated the wealth in the hands of a small group of people. One had only to look to the Dutch stadtholder, John de Witt, who had condemned the monopolies of the Dutch companies. For de Witt, explained Uztáriz, companies offered a model for a nation where ‘the enemies of the republic were too strong for each individual’ to combat.122 To 1 16 Uztáriz, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 521. 117 Uztáriz, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 454–​455. See Ferry, The Colonial Elite, 184–​186. 118 As John Elliott showed, the 1580s saw the emergence of the English interest in the Spanish model of colonisation. Elliott, Empires, 6. Uztáriz, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 528. 119 Uztáriz, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 532–​533. 120 Uztáriz, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 527. Uztáriz thought that merchants would oppose these changes because they would require decreasing the capacity of each vessel, thus diminishing the profits accrued from each trip. The same argument had led to the early eighteenth-​century rejection by French merchants of the monopolistic ambitions of the French East India Company. See Haudrère, La Compagnie, 465. 121 Uztáriz, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 527 and 536. 122 Uztáriz, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 504.

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fight for freedom, they had to unite all of their wealth into a single corporation, the Dutch East India Company. But eventually the Company’s interests had harmed both ‘public interests’ and Dutch interests in Brazil. Had other areas of trade been monopolised by companies, argued Uztáriz, the social impact would have been greater: less than ten percent of the Dutch population would be employed.123 The revolt against the Caracas Company therefore generated a sweeping debate over the political economic and diplomatic history of European empires, and allowed leading ministers, elite imperial officials, and learned administrators, to deliberate over their future. In the event, Carvajal and Ensenada resolved the situation in Caracas by implementing a number of changes. The Governor of Venezuela was replaced, orders were made to seize the leaders of the rebellion, and it was agreed that the Company should continue to trade but adhere strictly to the terms of its foundational decree. Venezuelan planters and natives were allowed to trade with a select number of countries, and the Governor was to hear disputes and ensure that sufficient cocoa reached Spain. Company officials were granted a voice in the administration of the territory: a committee made up of the Governor, a regidor, and the Company’s factor, was to set a fair price for cocoa and other produce, and to ensure that there would be enough to repay the labourers.124 5

The Perils of Emulation: Corporations and the Meaning of the Spanish Empire

Following the Caracas revolt, broader questions about the merits of corporate imperial reform remained unresolved, and they encouraged discussions about representation, natural law, and chorographic knowledge.125 When the decree declaring the abolishment the alcabala, the main excise duty, was implemented, Zavala’s text was reprinted with an alternative proposal. The author, Martín de Loynaz, Director General of the Tobacco Rent, explained that few would believe that a ‘concerted union’ strove for the common good in Spain, as it did in the Netherlands, where ‘wise and prudent men’ in power ‘love and preserve the republic’s liberty’ and ensured it remained a trustworthy ally to its

1 23 Úztariz, “Report”, Sobre el alboroto, 506. 124 Hussey, The Caracas Company, 152. 125 Garcia Ruiperez, ‘El Pensamiento Económico Ilustrado’, 529–​535; Astigarraga, “Spain and the Economic Work of Jacques Accarias De Serionne”, 612.

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neighbours.126 Loynaz believed that a large part of the Dutch success turned on their observation and emulation of the proposals made by José González, the Count-​Duke of Olivares’s personal lawyer, and a member of Olivares’s Council of Finance.127 Loynaz went on to praise and study, in great detail, an idea that the Spanish government discussed under Philip ii, and which has been the subject of research among historians of the industrious revolution: the introduction of taxes on flour mill production, rather than on bread itself.128 In 1590, the Dutch introduced a new system of bread price regulation. The goal was to standardise the price and quality of bread, legislate over the organisation and scale of the milling and baking industries, and to redistribute costs among consumers. Its implementation generated the Dutch Republic’s largest single source of tax revenues.129 In his proposal, Loynaz explained that ‘the main tax’ in the Netherlands was based on flour production. Officials analysed ‘all the mills to take count of the production of wheat, and the causes behind it’ and those who did not contribute according to the registry had to compensate the state.130 Through careful calculations, Loynaz suggested that taxing mills in Spain would compensate for the income generated from taxes on a vast range of products like alcohol, soap, and gun powder.131 Loynaz explained that ‘there was no shortage of texts in Spain’ that had proposed similar policies, but made clear that, even if this policy was introduced, it was best to ‘submit the proposal to those cities with votes in the Cortes, so they may send their one representative of their choosing’.132 Loynaz’s reference to González –​who had once felt the need to remind Philip iv that his duty was to defend and conserve his Kingdom, and not to favour private entitlements –​was not incidental. It was symptomatic of the broader tone of Loynaz’s text, which ended on a rather ominous note regarding the benefits of political representation: ‘the Kingdoms are themselves the most interested, and the best instructed, in that 126 Martín de Loynaz, “Instrucción”, in Miguel de Zavala y Auñón, Miscelanea economico-​ politica (Pamplona: Herederos de Martínez, 1749), 181–​270, 200. It was, again, not a ‘Dutch model’ that thinkers of this period followed, but rather they recovered and compared the parallels between early modern Spain and the Netherlands. For the ‘Dutch model’ interpretation, see Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War, 153. 127 Loynaz, “Instrucción”, 200. On González, see Alistair Malcolm, Royal Favouritism and the Governing Elite of the Spanish Monarchy 1640–​1665 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 140. 128 Jan de Vries, “The Political Economy of Bread in the Dutch Republic”, in Oscar Gelderblom ed., The Political Economy of the Dutch Republic (London: Routledge, 2009), 85–​114. 129 de Vries, “The Political Economy”, 85–​86. 130 Loynaz, “Instrucción”, 200. 131 Loynaz, “Instrucción”, 204. 132 Loynaz, “Instrucción”, 216.

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which benefits and harms them, and with their consent one would guarantee its success, and to proceed without it would be dangerous’.133 Other authors believed that Spanish reformers needed a more robust source of political knowledge than that drawn from the study and the emulation of other nations. Tomas Fernández de Mesa, a leading legal theorist among the Valencian community of ilustrados, criticised efforts that ‘sought to resolve all of Spain’s problems at once’ through the principle of ‘emulation’.134 He wrote about the need to establish a ‘science of state’ that transcended the general proposals of Samuel Pufendorf, Hugo Grotius, and the Christian logic of Francisco de Quevedo.135 To understand how emulation could lead empires down the wrong path, he explained that Europe had once sought to learn from Charles v’s wise rule.136 But Europe had misunderstood the ambitions of Charles’s project, which they had regarded as imperial expansion, and Tomasso Campanella’s works ‘spurred fears of a universal monarchy in Europe’. This misunderstanding, based on emulation, had prompted a defensive response from neighbouring states.137 Fernández de Mesa offered an alternative approach to reform: the creation of academies of Public Law, National Law, Science, in the style of the Academia Naturae Curiosorum in Halle or the Royal Society in London.138 Politics, he explained, was the ‘art of understanding that which is most useful and beneficial to the public’.139 Political economic change would accompany scientific reform: encouraging manufacturing in the Americas and in Spain would allow the Crown to supply its colonies and encourage population growth.140 He further proposed the establishment of joint-​stock companies in certain locations and discouraged their use in others.141 It was a matter of establishing whether the corporations suited local economic

1 33 Loynaz, “Instrucción”, 216. Malcolm, Royal Favouritism, 95. 134 Tomas Fernández de Mesa, “Representación hecha al Excmo. Sr. Marques de Ensenada”, in Antonio Valladares de Sotomayor ed., Semanario Erudito. Volume 13 (Madrid: Blas Román, 1788), 231. 135 Fernández de Mesa, “Representación hecha al Excmo”, 218–​284. 136 On the growth of emulation in European political economic debates see Reinert, Translating Empire, 1–​12. 137 Fernández de Mesa, “Representación”, 233. 138 Fernández de Mesa, “Representación”, 224. The second half of the text was published in volume 15 and detailed the means to establish these academies. See Fernández de Mesa, “Tercera Parte de la Representación”, Antonio Valladares de Sotomayor ed., Semanario Erudito. Volume 15 (Madrid: Blas Román, 1788), 3–​49, 40–​47. 139 Fernández de Mesa, “Representación”, 235. 140 Fernández de Mesa, “Representación”, 280. 141 Fernández de Mesa, “Representación”, 265.

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conditions: where, in locations like Extremadura, companies oppressed farmers they should be removed.142 The creation of academies to study diplomatic and chorographic knowledge, and the growth of manufacturing in the Americas, would regenerate the Spanish Empire. Fernández de Mesa encouraged drafting a series of reports based on close readings of diplomatic treaties and negotiations that Spain had conducted over the last century. Treaties should be signed with Portugal to improve the protection of shared frontiers and allow Spain to recover its trade with the Americas and Africa.143 This was to be a predatory alliance, as Spain was to gradually further its interests in those territories at the expense of Portugal. Ensenada, impressed by the proposal, endorsed the creation of two academies to study public and national law and, together, Carvajal and Ensenada created the Casa de Geografía in Madrid to promote scientific research. They brought together an international committee of scientists including the Spanish Antonio de Ulloa and the Irish William Bowles.144 The two ministers established a chair in mathematics at the Imperial College of Madrid, which was assigned to the Bohemian John Wendligen, a former professor at the Charles University in Prague, and who later received financial support to set up an Academy of Mathematics.145 Their patronage extended to Fernández de Mesa, who praised Carvajal for providing him with a copy of Nicolas Bergier’s Histoire des grands Chemins de l’Empire Romain to refute the French author’s comments on the legacy of Roman roads in Spain.146 But the most significant intellectual response to the mid-​eighteenth-​century debates over the Spanish corporate turn arrived in the form of a diplomatic report. It provided a sweeping history of European imperial trade to establish a distinction between the pace of industrial growth and the impact of wise political rule. It was written by the ambassador to Portugal, Félix Fernando Masones de Lima y Sotomayor, after Ensenada asked him to pen a report on the history of corporations. Sotomayor was born into a noble Spanish family in Sardinia. He fought for Philip v during the War of Spanish Succession and entered the Spanish public administration rather late in his life. In 1746, he was appointed as ambassador to Portugal.147 In this report, Sotomayor cited 1 42 Fernández de Mesa, “Representación”, 266. 143 Fernández de Mesa, “Representación”, 277. 144 Maria Catalayud Arinero, ‘Antecedentes y creación del Real Gabinete de Historia Natural de Madrid’, Arbor 123: 482 (1986), 9–​33. 145 Capel Sáez, Sánchez, Moncada, De palas a Minerva, 177. 146 Tomas Manuel Fernández de Mesa, Tratado legal, y político de caminos públicos, y posadas (Valencia: Joseph Thomàs Lucas, en la Plaza de las Comedias, 1755), xxxv-​xxxvi. 147 Ozanam, Les diplomates espagnoles, 346.

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the Savary Brothers’s Dictionnaire, Jean Le Clerc’s Histoire des Provinces-​Unies des Pays Bas, alongside the writings of Samuel Pufendorf, Hugo Grotius, and Charles Dutot. The discourse could, in a sense, be construed as a rebuttal of Hugo Grotius’s definition of monopoly, as his criticisms of the Dutch thinker’s commentary on the matter bookended his text.148 In his Observaciones, Sotomayor did not mince words. He spoke about Spain’s need to ‘recover’ the Americas as its rightful owner.149 The five-​hundred-​page study, through serpentine explorations of the history of European joint-​stock and regulated companies, sought to establish what principles should underpin elite Spanish political economic thought. First, it was clear that the efficacy of corporations depended directly on the constitutional arrangement of a territory. Sotomayor conceded that some states could benefit from the establishment of companies. He drew on Polybius’s political ideas and political economy and considered the relationship between corporations and anacyclosis.150 Sotomayor declared that democratic republics that relied on the health of each of its parts, rather than on the coordinated movement of all its parts, could at times adequately maintain joint-​stock companies.151 Aristocratic governments, by contrast, relied on the preservation of harmony, and joint-​stock companies constantly threatened to splinter their union. Monarchical governments, in turn, could only survive if a single ruler coordinated all movement; the fate of the ‘aggregated’ Habsburg Spanish Monarchy testified, in Sotomayor’s view, to the inconvenience of trying to reconcile a variety of interests in a monarchical form of government.152 Yet nations and empires with these systems of government had ignored this logic because they had been spellbound by the success of the Dutch Empire.153 The historical processes behind the rise and fall of empires, translatio imperii, and the emulation between territories, had been corrupted by the success of the Dutch. While Fernández de Mesa had warned against trusting emulation 1 48 Jones Corredera, ‘The History of Fair Trade’, 138–​160. 149 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 90. 150 Melon would also draw on this trichotomy to explore the effects of credit. See Jean François Melon, Essai politique sur le commerce (Paris, 1736), 304. On mechanistic language and the Enlightenment, see Reinert, Translating Empire, 186–​232; David Wootton, Power, Pleasure, and Profit, Insatiable Appetites from Machiavelli to Madison (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 135–​154. 151 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 68. 152 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 68. 153 Isaac del Pinto would suggest Europe had been ‘ébloui’, or dazzled, by the success of the French East India Company. See Isaac del Pinto, Traité de la circulation et du credit (Amsterdam: Marc Michel Rey, 1771), 283; Pinto, An Essay on Circulation and Credit, 235.

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to draft reforms, Sotomayor blamed a blind adherence to emulation for the historical growth of joint-​stock companies. This reading started with a criticism of Grotius’s assertion, made in the second volume of De iure belli ac pacis, that exclusive privileges allowed the Alexandrians to develop their commercial pursuits in India and Ethiopia; these were, Sotomayor argued, the product of the geopolitical situation at the time, as demonstrated by the works of the Greek geographer Strabo.154 Prior to the relatively recent emergence of joint-​ stock companies, the management of trade had been central to the art of government.155 Contributing to the mid-​eighteenth-​century European interest in emulation as the motor of global trade, Sotomayor suggested that imperial growth was a story of translatio imperii among empires that supported cooperation in trade.156 Xenophon had encouraged traders to share their wealth on the basis of their expectations, and Ancient Rome had established its Academy of Merchants.157 History showed that trade had encouraged cooperation between nations and empires: thirteen-​century ‘Hanseatic Cities’ had truly harnessed the power of cooperative trade practices by uniting over seventy independent cities, and they had become so powerful that they were able to make alliances with Kings and end wars.158 Over time, other empires blossomed and withered. The Portuguese Empire, united with Spain, ‘stopped paying attention to emulation’. The Portuguese had ‘slumbered in their prosperity’ and they had allowed the Dutch to conquer much of their territory. But the causes of the subsequent rise of the Netherlands as a commercial power, had, according to Sotomayor, been misunderstood. Sotomayor praised the virtues of the Dutch stadtholder John de Witt, and argued that the success behind the Dutch companies lay in the republic’s broader political and cultural standing. The Low Countries were a nation of merchants and a people who appreciated the value of the arts, and it was impossible to divorce the assessment of the merits of the companies from the broader processes of reform that had surrounded their creation.159 Yet other countries had failed to grasp this lesson. European nations and empires had marvelled at the emergence of the Dutch Empire ‘that was suddenly regarded as opulent and active’, which had 154 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 10. This may have been taken from Barbeyrac’s comments on this passage; see Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace. Edited and with an Introduction by Richard Tuck, from the Edition by Jean Barbeyrac. Volume 2 (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005), 749. 155 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 11. 156 Reinert, Translating Empire, 1–​10. 157 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 12. 158 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 12–​13. 159 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 24–​25.

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led other nations to believe that ‘as if by Magic, they had raised their reputation through the power of the new invention of the company’. This ‘opinion’ then had ‘spread so extensively’ that the ‘imitation’ of the Dutch companies had ‘continued to this day’.160 Some had acted more wisely than others. France, ‘as prone to invention as she is to imitation’, had wisely adapted a range of reforms: Cardinal Richelieu both exploited ‘the errors’ of the Spanish government and ‘emulated the Spanish minister’, the Count-​Duke of Olivares.161 Jean-​ Baptiste Colbert, too, had succeeded, not by virtue of reforming companies but, like Elizabeth i, by emerging as a ‘Protector of Trade’.162 While European contemporaries focused on luxury and credit as the sources of moral corruption, Sotomayor saw in the blind emulation of the Dutch joint-​stock companies the origins of European political mismanagement.163 Sotomayor was therefore calling on Spanish ministers to escape from the enchantment that had ensorcelled the rest of Europe. To discourage the blind emulation of the Dutch East India Company, he drew attention not to economic growth, but to the wellbeing of the population.164 Drawing on his earlier Polybian division of power regimes, Sotomayor explained that the creation of the company had granted too much influence to one side of the state which failed ‘to follow the movements’, the decisions, and the common good, of the state.165 The people of the Dutch Republic did not benefit from supporting the company because their sovereignty, and their control over the company’s dominions, was not real: Sotomayor compared the Dutch Republic to the host of a rich tenant. The Spaniard recalled how, when Louis xiv’s troops reached the gates of Amsterdam, these investors rushed to the bank to save their money instead of thinking about the general wellbeing of the republic.166 The entire system of Dutch government, its treasury and its fleets, were but the patrimony of seventy directors.167 History, according to Sotomayor, demonstrated that opulent power of this kind traditionally resulted in social discontent.168 The 1 60 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 23. 161 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 51 and 50. 162 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 52. 163 Istvan Hont, Mark Goldie, and Robert Wokler, “The Early Enlightenment Debate on Commerce and Luxury”, in Mark Goldie, and Robert Wokler eds., The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-​Century Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 377–​418. 164 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 34–​35. 165 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 37. 166 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 39. 167 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 40. 168 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 42.

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death of William iii had put an end to the government’s regulation of these companies. France and Britain had benefited from the weakness of the Dutch, and wealthy men had acquired leading roles in administering the war, the navy, and the government.169 They had then siphoned the wealth of their state and gained control of its administration.170 Before David Hume evoked the fear that either credit or the state would survive when faced with bankruptcy, and before Edmund Burke accused the East India Company of usurping the British state, Sotomayor argued that there was a fundamental incompatibility between solid political management and the proliferation of joint-​stock companies.171 Companies, and their relentless pursuit of profit, were in fact agents of conquest and war. Joint-​stock companies in the Netherlands, Britain, and France had been established to conquer territories and, as vehicles of conquest, they were an affront to the law of nations.172 This was not defined on the basis of the works of the Spanish scholastics, which Sotomayor never cited, but in relation to the ideas of Samuel Pufendorf and Hugo Grotius. Upending their narratives, Sotomayor argued that it was not the Iberian Empires who established monopolies which undermined the law of nations, but the joint-​stock companies who prevented the natural functioning of the circulation of wealth and trade. Sotomayor challenged Pufendorf’s views by citing his De Jure Naturae et Gentium and, in particular, his argument that sovereigns may be justified in legitimating monopolies for the sake of public convenience to ensure the success of trade with far-​flung nations.173 To refute Pufendorf’s argument that joint-​stock companies could assist the state, Sotomayor drew on Jean Le Clerc, ‘another writer who is no less esteemed by those nations most applied to public law’, and the second volume of his Histoire des Provinces Unies.174 Le Clerc had narrated the comments of Count Maurice of Nassau on the Dutch East India Company.175 Nassau had declared that the Company was motivated solely by the prospect of making a profit for its investors, and its military, economic,

1 69 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 45. 170 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 46. 171 On Hume, credit, and time see Edward Jones Corredera, ‘‘Amazing Rapidity’: Time, Public Credit, and David Hume’s Political Discourses’, Contributions to the History of Concepts 14:1 (2019), 17–​41. 172 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 190–​191. 173 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 102. 174 Jean Le Clerc, Histoire des Provinces Unies des Pays-​Bas. Volume 2 (Amsterdam: Chez Z. Châtelain, 1728). 175 Le Clerc, Histoire des Provinces Unies, 187.

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or political assistance tended to be ‘rare and late’.176 Against Pufendorf’s argument that companies could foster trade, Sotomayor reasoned that this estimation had to be framed in relation to the number of merchants that benefited from said trade and the fairness behind the distribution of its profits.177 The origins of global commerce, moreover, demonstrated there was a fairer, and more efficient, alternative to joint-​stock companies: guilds.178 Guilds such as those created by the Spanish conquistadors, and backed and regulated by the Catholic Kings were, Sotomayor suggested, the original ‘commercial companies’.179 Where the wealth of the people was siphoned and squandered by a few investors in a ‘Company of Shareholders’, guilds allowed for the free cooperation of all merchants; they could be regulated by government, and they returned the wealth to the people who it belonged to.180 These corporations were behind the commercial success of France, the Low Countries, and Britain, and should be followed in Spain. The organisational structure of guilds, argued Sotomayor, had facilitated the success of the first English trading company, the Company of Merchant Adventurers of London.181 The goal of the Company, claimed Sotomayor, was to encourage a more regular, and better regulated, trade with foreign nations.182 These guilds therefore served to regulate trade, preserve the state’s wealth, and ensure the freedom of trade for all merchants.183 But the success of Dutch corporations had spellbound European ministers. Grotius’s ideas, in turn, had corrupted the true meaning of freedom of trade which, prior to the publication of his writings, had been considered so essential to a state that no territory would have ‘wanted to limit or privatise it for the benefit of a small number of people’.184 The present success of empires, he argued, should not fool Spanish ministers: it reflected the return on investments made centuries earlier. Britain, which, according to Sotomayor, had shown that in the eighteenth century it had enough commercial strength ‘to support the balance of Europe’, owed its power to Elizabeth i’s wise rule.185 The Queen was credited for welcoming 1 76 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 103; Le Clerc, Histoire des Provinces Unies, 187–​188. 177 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 103. 178 This point was noted by Delgado Barrado in his analysis of the text, but the author overlooked the variety of sources used by Sotomayor. See Delgado Barrado, Aquiles y teseos, 171–​176. 179 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 9–​11. 180 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 143–​144. 181 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 13. 182 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 13. 183 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 13–​17. 184 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 10. 185 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 45.

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skilled migrants. Huguenot exiled workers and manufacturers facilitated and perfected cloth factories and, in response to the ‘shock’ of the defeat of the Spanish Armada, she had sought to protect pirates.186 Under her rule, the terms that had regulated the creation of English joint-​stock companies had always permitted free trade, and had not made it exclusive for companies. This had bolstered its military successes and, in the early eighteenth century, Britain had led the way in the European ‘conquests’ of Spanish territories. But, in order to satisfy the needs of its companies, its focus had changed, as it now sought to generate capital ‘for urgencies, and to pay debts’ and, much like the Dutch companies, was entirely focused on the ‘conquest’ of the Spanish Empire.187 Indeed, according to Sotomayor, the same could be said about the Dutch, the French, and the British: those nations whose corporations were hailed as exemplary as a result of their wealth had in fact been powerful before these companies were established, and had acquired their power by strengthening their navies and encouraging the growth of arts, agriculture, and trade.188 Companies were not vectors of Enlightenment. Their profits were siren songs that only led towards alienation. 6

The Criticism of Carvajal’s Companies

Sotomayor studied eighteenth-​century Spanish plans to establish corporations and encourage industrial growth in the peninsula. He focused, in particular, on Carvajal’s factories in Extremadura, Toledo, and Granada, which were managed as joint-​stock companies and which had been granted exclusive privilege to trade with Portugal.189 With the same earnestness that characterised the tone of the rest of his work, Sotomayor declared that the early success of these companies could not be extrapolated because it had been entirely accidental.190 Spanish ministers should certainly build on these early achievements but they should reconsider the utility of preventing other merchants from engaging in

1 86 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 45–​47. 187 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 47. 188 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 60. For a study of parallel French critiques of monopolies, and a reconsideration of doux commerce, see Anoush Fraser Terjanian, “Indigne Atelier: Monopoly and Monopolists”, in Commerce and Its Discontents in Eighteenth-​ Century French Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 137–​81. 189 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 78–​79. On these companies see Matilla Quizá, “Las Compañías privilegiadas”, 269–​402. 190 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 79.

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this form of trade.191 The privileged status of these companies fostered corruption, it restricted the competition between factories, and it limited the perfection of goods and the growth of trade.192 Indeed, if the goal was to supply silk goods to Portugal, argued Sotomayor, the participation of a greater number of merchants would benefit a greater share of the population.193 This was a paternal duty of the Monarch, who had the obligation to distribute his wealth in relation to people’s needs and in relation to the benefit that each province could draw from it.194 Furthermore, in terms of fulfilling people’s needs, the outcome of these joint-​stock companies was disastrous. According to Sotomayor, the people of Extremadura lived in ruin and relied on begging for money from the landed gentry.195 The people of Toledo, a city which had once had factories that supplied Northern Africa with cloths, lived poorly. Their economy relied on clergymen and travellers who visited the Cathedral.196 These companies were therefore failing to contribute to the common good.197 Carvajal’s companies were failing to establish enough workshops to manufacture goods out of silk; seventy-​thousand looms were needed to ensure the growth of the silk industry and yet, according to Sotomayor’s calculations, Spain only had over forty-​ thousand.198 Guilds would be more efficient and fairer: these corporations that tended to the needs of ‘labourers, pickers, shepherds, artisans, workers, labouring women, the owners of lands, entails, and livestock’, would contribute to the general wellbeing.199 They were the foundations of the common good, and the weight of the ‘Republics of the World’ rested on their shoulders.200 Sotomayor was perhaps aware of Carvajal’s belief in the capacity of companies to render Spain into a universal monarchy. Many Spaniards, he claimed, had expressed a desire to establish shareholder companies that ‘transcended the scope’ of existing ones. Their reasoning was that if these were efficiently established throughout the empire, Spain would overwhelm France, the Netherlands, and Britain, since it would see its trade grow at their expense.201 Indeed, Spain, he pointed out, had trusted Ripperda’s vision for the Ostend 1 91 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 81. 192 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 83–​86. 193 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 84. 194 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 85. 195 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 86. 196 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 86. 197 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 128. 198 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 129. 199 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 137. 200 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 137. 201 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 92.

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Company, which would have revitalised Spain’s longstanding trade relations with Dutch and Flemish merchants, and reaffirmed their control over the Pacific trade.202 Little had come of it. The example of the Mississippi Company, in turn, had not deterred other Spanish ministers from emulating foreign companies. But their interest in these ventures was in no way patriotic: investors had grown accustomed to the lifestyle afforded by the large sums of money they made on the basis of their knowledge of commerce, and they had encouraged the creation of the Caracas Company on the basis that they could improve the Spanish control over the cocoa and sugar trades.203 The Havana Company, in this context, had merely increased the private gains of those investors.204 And, together, the companies in Havana and Caracas had only served to raise the general cost of sugar and chocolate in Spain.205 These companies harmed consumers and producers. By catering only to these companies, the wages of labourers, he explained, were kept low, and their best hope was to make just enough to live on. The failure to provide incentives to improve their labour led labourers to produce less profitable crops.206 This, in turn, failed to stimulate a comfortable life for the many and stunted population growth.207 Joint-​stock companies, moreover, could act as local despotic forces. These required the use of violence to ensure the adherence to their rules, and it was this practice that encouraged the companies of the ‘three maritime powers’ to engage in bellicose behaviour towards the locals. Quoting Charles Dutot’s little-​known work, Histoire de la Navigation, Sotomayor explained that French colonies were reduced to a miserable state through the distribution of privileges.208 According to the letters of the Jesuit thinker António Vieria to João iv, Brazil had become a despotic space where the King was not respected because avarice had destroyed loyalty.209 Sotomayor’s solution to all these issues, following the principles of natural law, and the lessons of Dutot, was to 2 02 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 92. 203 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 95–​96. 204 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 97. 205 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 109. 206 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 112. 207 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 113. 208 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 115. Charles Dutot was known for his work Réflexions politiques sur les finances et le commerce (La Haye: chez les Frères Vaillant, 1754). The best introduction to his ideas is Paul Harsin, “Introduction”, in Charles Dutot, Reflexions politiques sur les finances et le commerce, ou l’on examine quelles ont ete sur les revenus, les denrees, le change etranger, et consequemment sur notre commerce, les influences des augmentations et des diminutions des valeurs numéraires des monnoies. Edited by Paul Harsin (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1935), xi-​xxviii. 209 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 115.

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establish clear guidelines for Spanish trade.210 The government was to reconfigure the trade between factories in the peninsula and the empire. The commercial ties between the factories in Zaragoza and the companies in Caracas and Havana would be strengthened, and their cloths would have a preferential access to the Americas over those crafted by foreigners.211 Different manufacturing centres throughout the peninsula –​from Aragón to Murcia –​should be allowed to trade freely.212 Drawing on volume one of Dutot’s Réflexions politiques sur les finances et le commerce, Sotomayor argued that the people were the King’s true wealth.213 Overall, companies distracted ministers and oppressed labourers. In effect, they fostered alienation. In a comment that resonated with contemporary debates about luxury, Sotomayor explored the true meaning of the Spanish Empire.214 Without the Americas, remarked the Spaniard, Spain was powerful enough to control the Atlantic and the ‘great Kingdoms and Provinces in Europe’.215 Trade with locals and foreigners alike, and the promotion of the arts, constituted the foundations of the most prosperous European states.216 Privileged joint-​stock companies were not necessary to reform the Spanish Empire. Instead, reform could only be based on wise government, as determined by natural law. Sotomayor paraphrased and transformed Grotius’s arguments by arguing that it was the job of the Monarch to establish a fair price for all goods; ‘iusta de causa et pretio constituto’.217 Free trade followed the principles of the law of nations, and it was not to be an extension of piracy, but a form of global trade governed by natural law, whereby sovereignty

2 10 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 118. 211 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 120. 212 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 123. 213 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 142. 214 Further research could explore parallels between these views, self-​deceit, and the early Neapolitan Enlightenment. See Koen Stapelbroek, Love, Self-​Deceit and Money: Commerce and Morality in the Early Neapolitan Enlightenment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 1–​11; Hont, Goldie, and Wokler, “The Early Enlightenment Debate on Commerce and Luxury”, 377–​418. 215 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 138. 216 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 139. 217 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 156. On the use of the phrase in Latin see Hugo Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis libri tres: in quibus ius naturae et gentium, item iuris publici praecipua explicantur: cum annotatis auctoris. Edited by Philip Christiaan Molhuysen. With a preface written by C. van Vollenhoven. (Clark, NK: The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 2005), 269. On Grotius and monopolies see Hans Blom and Mark Somos, ‘Public-​Private Concord through Divided Sovereignty: Reframing societas for International Law’, Journal of the History of International Law /​Revue d’histoire du droit international 22:4 (2020), 565–​588.

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remained firmly in the hands of political leaders.218 In his text, Sotomayor declared that many had remarked upon the paradox that if Spain were to ensure that the circulation of all gold and silver remained within the confines of its empire, European states would recover better systems of government. Prior to the discovery of the Americas, ‘nations had the same power as they do in our time’, but their focus was on the riches that corresponded to ‘reality’, to everyday utility and necessities; gold and silver had replaced these with ‘riches of representations’ and ‘signs’ which had come to ‘represent the consent of mankind’. Those who enjoyed ‘the real’ riches of life would live ‘happily’ without those that were merely symbols of comfort. Spain, for Sotomayor, had to foster industry, education, the arts, and trade in accordance to natural law.219 Spain, then, needed to invest in enlightened institutional reform. In Sotomayor’s study, natural law and political economy served to refocus the minds of reformers. Scholars of the German Enlightenment have argued that the study of natural law improved the organisation of the government administrations in Central Europe, and contributed to the intellectual developments at German universities. Historians have depicted Francis Hutcheson’s writings on the merits of natural law as the foundations of the Scottish Enlightenment. More recently, studies on eighteenth-​century Italy have recovered the influence of Giambattista Vico in reconfiguring Italian debates over natural law.220 The impact of Sotomayor’s text was more immediate, but arguably less enduring and far less profound. The text likely entrenched Ensenada’s view that freedom of trade among Spaniards should not be limited by monopolies.221 It likely refined Carvajal’s ideas about the possibility of a transnational corporate approach to power; ideas that would form the basis for his diplomatic strategy over the following years in power. The disagreement between Carvajal and Sotomayor was an equally substantial one. Carvajal saw the establishment of local and transnational corporations as a mechanism to achieve escape velocity from the gravitational pull of French commercial ambitions. Sotomayor, 2 18 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 179. 219 Sotomayor, Observaciones, 173–​174. 220 Tim Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1–​30; Ian Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1–​ 39; Knudd Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy. From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); J. Moore, “The two systems of Francis Hutcheson: on the origins of the Scottish Enlightenment”, in M.A. Stewart ed., Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 37–​59; Robertson, The Case for The Enlightenment. 221 Kuethe and Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic World, 206.

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by contrast, believed this focus on quick industrial reform served to distance Spain from its true interests. This debate demonstrated the changes that had taken place in the Spanish government. In their first four years in power, Carvajal and Ensenada had created a peninsular bank, opened a number of factories to foster intra-​ imperial trade, sent scholarly officials to study the political and economic culture of other European nations, and improved the state of the Spanish navy. Philosophers and writers had praised their efforts, and debated the future of their reforms. The publication of Juan Enrique Graef’s Discursos Mercuriales, a gazette focused on European debated ideas of political economy, was symptomatic of a broader growth in the production of culture.222 But these debates only served to convince Carvajal of the need to pursue more ambitious reforms. In 1750, the question of Spain’s control of its empire came to the fore during the negotiations with Portugal over the Treaty of Limits. A discussion about the reconsideration of the Treaty of Tordesillas became a discussion about how best to stretch the limits of Iberian influence in Europe. The Caracas Company, moreover, was ordered to assist in this task and participate in the protection of another porous frontier in Venezuela, in the Orinoco river, in an attempt to undermine Dutch and French trade in the region.223 The Barcelona Company was created in part to reinforce Spanish control over the alternativa, the source of irritation and anger among the merchants in Caracas, as it sought to strengthen peninsular trade with Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico, and la Margarita.224 It was part of a broader attempt engineered by Carvajal to reconfigure the role of the Iberian empires in the world. Little did he know that a Portuguese diplomat had been following his reforms, or that this Portuguese official would eventually rise to prominence and receive an important title: the marquess of Pombal. 222 Saiz, Historia del periodismo en España, 130. On the contents of Graef’s periodical see Astigarraga, A Unifying Enlightenment, 47–​58. 223 Hussey, The Caracas Company, 165–​168. 224 Rico Linage, Las Reales Compañías, 328.

­c hapter 5

The Lever of the Balance of Power 1

Introduction

This chapter studies how Carvajal sought to implement his ideas on European cooperation and how others sought to counter them. Carvajal drew on the assistance of scientists and scholars to learn about frontier trade, and he appealed to the logic of utility and interests in his correspondence with his European counterparts to gain their support. He spearheaded the project to construct a Roman Catholic church in Berlin, he established a dialogue with Carl Linnaeus, and he signed treaties with his British and Portuguese counterparts. In 1752, at the Treaty of Aranjuez, Carvajal settled the struggle between Spain and Austria over Italy. Once this was resolved, he declared perpetual peace had been achieved. Instead, the treaty galvanised those who opposed it into action. The settlement over Italy brought Charles vii of Naples, and future Charles iii of Spain, closer to France. Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, later known as the marquess of Pombal, observed Carvajal and Ensenada’s reforms, and feared that closer cooperation between Britain and Spain would damage Portugal’s interests. As his influence grew, Carvalho consistently used his authority to undermine Spanish diplomatic negotiations with Portugal. Carvajal nonetheless remained hopeful that a better system of cooperation could be achieved. He penned his Mis Pensamientos, where he envisioned the establishment of an Anglo-​Spanish trading company to establish political equilibrium in Europe and in the Americas. This, he anticipated, would grant Spain a role in ‘rebalancing the scales of power’ in Europe. But Carvajal did not account for the role of the absolute monarchy in his scheme. Following the collapse of the royal structures of power, one of Carvajal’s closest collaborators, Ricardo Wall, became the leading minister at the Spanish Court. A cosmopolitan official, Wall found himself in a paradoxical position of having power without authority, as he believed that without the King’s consent none of his resolutions would gain any diplomatic acceptance. Carvalho, however, showed there was another approach to ministerial power as, following the Lisbon earthquake, he consolidated his authority, established councils that fostered elite political debate, and pursued corporate reforms. On the diplomatic front, however, Carvalho and Wall soon found that the growing focus on the Americas gradually reconfigured the meaning of the balance of power in

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004469099_006

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Europe. The Seven Years’ War, more broadly, reminded Europe of the limits of diplomacy. 2

Iberia’s Role in Europe

On 8 August 1746, Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo was serving as the Portuguese ambassador in Vienna. The diplomatic negotiations at Breda over the future of the Habsburg Monarchy fostered rumours about the reconfiguration of alliances. As he waited for Queen Maria Theresa to receive him, Carvalho found himself ‘with some time to spare’, and sketched out his thoughts on those debates in a letter to a leading minister in Lisbon, Marco António de Azevedo Coutinho.1 He began his reflections with a bold declaration: ‘Liberty, I believe, is the primary pursuit of man, and the main reason of state’.2 In this reading of Europe as a republic of states, Carvalho feared that negotiators at Breda were promoting a union of European powers which would end ‘public freedom in Europe’.3 The balance of power preserved the liberty of monarchies and republics. A union between ‘France, Spain, and Prussia’, which he believed to be on the cards, threatened to ‘oppress’ the other European states and empires.4 Carvalho was responding, in part, to changes that were taking place at the Spanish Court: while pursuing industrial reform, Carvajal had set out to harness the société des princes to coordinate his system of alliances, and the chosen space for dialogue with Austria and Britain was the Portuguese

1 Carvalho to Acevedo, 8 August 1746, Pombaline Collection, Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo. 663.10, 1. 2 Carvalho to Acevedo, 8 August 1746, 1. On this view of liberty see Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory, 309. Jürgen Overhoff, ‘Benjamin Franklin, Student of the Holy Roman Empire: His Summer Journey to Germany in 1766 and His Interest in the Empire’s Federal Constitution’, German Studies Review 34:2 (2011), 277–​86. On his intellectual sources see Francisco José Calazans Falcon, A época pombalina: política, económica e monarquia ilustrada (São Paulo: Editora Atica, 1982) and Gabriel Paquette, “Views from the south: images of Britain and its empire in Portuguese and Spanish political economic discourse, ca. 1740–​1810”, in Sophus A. Reinert and Pernille Røge eds., The Political Economy of Empire in the Early Modern World (London: Palgrave, 2013), 76–​104; José Luis Cardoso and Alexandre Mendes Cunha, ‘Enlightened Reforms and Economic Discourse in the Portuguese-​Brazilian Empire (1750–​ 1808)’, History of Political Economy 44:4 (2012), 619–​41. 3 On mid-​eighteenth-​century debates on Utrecht and the balance of power in Europe see Armitage, Foundations, 166–​167. 4 Carvalho to Acevedo, 8 August 1746, 2.

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Court.5 The networks of the société des princes could catalyse otherwise burdensome and slow procedures; the results of any negotiations would enjoy the acceptance, tacit or otherwise, of both the negotiating parties, their administrations, and other states. In Vienna, Carvajal found a receptive audience. On 16 November, Count Rosenberg presented the Queen of Portugal, Mary Anne of Austria, with a letter that declared that France had sought the destruction of the House of Austria, the only source of European equilibrium, and to harm Spain and its interests.6 France had, moreover, supported efforts to depopulate Spain and to increase its dependence on the Bourbon alliance.7 Only an alliance made up of Spain, the House of Austria, Britain, and Portugal could guarantee the true equilibrium of power in Europe.8 The recovery of the Habsburg discourse of the War of Spanish Succession encouraged further negotiations between these states.9 The English ambassador to Spain, Benjamin Keene, was dispatched to Portugal to reassure João v and Mary Anne of Spain’s intentions, and Barbara of Braganza the Queen of Spain, also expressed her support for the plan.10 In the short term, then, Carvajal’s hopes of drawing on diplomacy to foster new alliances appealed to both Vienna and Lisbon. They soon proved effective: the Duke of Huéscar, whose family had supported the Habsburg cause during the War of Spanish Succession, and who had been born in Vienna, was asked to represent Portugal’s interest at the Congress of Breda.11 Joint diplomatic representations were complemented with the court practice of donating constructions and monuments.12 A statue of João was installed in the palace courtyard in Madrid, and Carvajal sought to reinforce the image of Spain as

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

For a more extensive assessment of the connections between Carvajal and Carvalho see Edward Jones Corredera, ‘The Making of Pombal: Speculation, Diplomacy, and the Iberian Enlightenment. 1714–​1755’, History 105:365 (2020), 229–​251. Memoria presentada por el Conde de Rosenberg a la Reyna de Portugal, Archivo Histórico Nacional. Estado, 2595. Not numbered. Memoria presentada por el Conde de Rosenberg. Memoria presentada por el Conde de Rosenberg. See also Jeremy Black, ‘The Theory of the Balance of Power in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century: A Note on Sources’, Review of International Studies 9:1 (1983), 55–​61. Memoria que se remitio a la reyna de portugal, por la reyna su hija Maria Barbara, Archivo Histórico Nacional. Estado, 2595. On Keene, see Richard Lodge, The Private Correspondence of Sir Benjamin Keene, K.B (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Minuta de carta al Duque de Huescar en San Lorenzo a 21 de noviembre de 1746 avisandole que el rey de portugal le querian hacer mediador en las Congerencias de Breda, Archivo Histórico Nacional. Estado. 2595. Jeroen Duindam, “Royal Courts”, 440–​469, 454.

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the most Catholic empire in Europe by funding the construction of a Catholic church in Berlin and a hospice for Catholic orphans.13 Carvalho followed these changes closely. As a diplomat, Carvalho understood that, in the short term, Portugal could benefit from an alliance that guaranteed peace, but in the long run it could never trust its neighbours. Spain, he argued, was Portugal’s ‘natural ally’ but ‘their obsession with conquering us’ foreclosed the possibility of a closer union.14 He nonetheless welcomed cooperation because he believed it would buy Portugal time: ‘we can collaborate with Spain. We can, through this close union, revitalise our commerce, and drive back the Dutch and the British to the limits established by treaties. We can increase our strength, so it is equal to theirs’.15 The closer union would serve to undermine rival empires, it would allow more time to reform, and it would ready Portugal for the time when diplomacy failed. ‘When we find ourselves no longer at unison with her Catholic Majesty, who currently governs, we will have nothing to fear, for everyone will want us to grow closer to them in proportion to our mounting strength’.16 Diplomacy would grant Portugal more time to reform but peace, in Carvalho’s view, would never be perpetual. The Iberian outlook on Europe was clear. Carvajal and Carvalho shared a vision of the geopolitical problems facing their empires: since the early eighteenth century, the Iberian powers were understood as satellite states under threat from their allies and their enemies. The lesson of the first half of the eighteenth century for the Iberian reformers, as their allies infringed treaties and followed, in the words of Carvalho, the behaviour of the famous highwayman Louis Dominique Garthausen, was that shareholder structures provided a carapace for interlopers, and could serve as company-​states to expand and consolidate empires.17 This logic was behind the successful establishment of 13

14 15 16 17

Adolf Poschmann, ‘Subvención de Fernando VI, Rey de España, para la construcción de la primera iglesia católica en Berlín’, Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia 75 (1919), 56–​65, 59; Alzado de la fachada principal de la Catedral de Santa Eduvigis de Berlín, con carta del Conde de Bena a D. José Carvajal, Dresde 5 de mayo de 1748. Archivo General de Simancas. Secretaría de Estado, Legajos, 06555. “Parecer de Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melho sobre um projecto de tratado de comércio com a Espanha”, in Luis Ferrand de Almeida, ‘Problemas do comercio luso-​espanhol nos meados do século XVIII’, Revista de História Económica e Social 8 (1981), 95–​131, 111–​31, 113. João Lúcio de Azevedo, O Marquês de Pombal e a sua época, 77–​78. Lúcio de Azevedo, O Marquês, 77–​78. As Diego Gambetta suggested in his study of communications between criminals, one way to generate enough trust to ‘cooperate’ with one another without drawing on threats is to appeal to the other party’s interests, and ‘by putting themselves and their partners in a condition whereby “honesty” rather than cheating is their best course of action’. Diego Gambetta, Codes of the Underworld (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

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the Company of Grão Pará and Maranhão and the Douro Wine Company.18 As Carvalho wrote in his report on the industrial reforms carried out by Carvajal and Ensenada, the War of Spanish Succession had reminded Europe that one of the ‘maxims of reason of state’ was that the scales of the balance of trade represented the true balance of power.19 The weight of treaties, even when they oppressed smaller allies, was ‘measured in diamonds’; commercial considerations made nations and empires extremely reluctant to challenge their outcomes, or to go to war in defence of smaller allies in order to revert them ‘unless it was absolutely inevitable’.20 Carvalho believed that European affairs turned on commercial interests, and only the government-​led investment in the emerging Enlightenment principle of economic self-​interest could generate the necessary resources needed to preserve the Iberian empires. Carvajal’s solution to Spain’s imperial decline was to harness economic interest; to try to administer the transnational commercial networks that operated in Iberian Atlantic spaces through shareholder companies, and to find a role for Spain in the management of the European balance of power. 3

Borders and Trade

Carvajal’s diplomatic strategies were largely based on the ideas he developed in his Testamento Político. And while he did not expect much from the Breda peace talks, which sought to bring an end to the War of Austrian Succession, he drew on the ongoing negotiations to explore potential commercial strategies and develop a rapport with British diplomats.21 In a set of guidelines for Ferdinand vi, Carvajal considered ways to undermine the shared interest in defending the principle of free trade that united the Low Countries, Britain, and France.22 Conflicts between Spain and Britain, explained the Spaniard, had usually emerged from two factors: the rise in tariffs and the aggressive behaviour of Spanish coastguards toward British merchants. One solution to 2011), 29. Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, Escritos económicos de Londres (1741–​1742) (Lisbon: Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, 1986), 25. 18 On the success of these companies see Kenneth Maxwell, Pombal: Paradox of the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 60–​75. 19 “Parecer de Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melho”, 113. 20 “Parecer de Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melho”, 113. 21 On Breda see M. S. Anderson, The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740–​ 1748 (London: Longman, 1995), 195–​207. 22 José de Carvajal y Lancaster, Proyecto de ajuste con ingleses, Archivo Histórico Nacional. Estado, 2595.

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both problems was to use the British navy to protect Spanish ports and fend off French and Dutch merchants. In exchange, Carvajal suggested a return to the commercial terms of 1670, which allowed the free navigation of British subjects, and the extension of the asiento.23 The idea was not new: during the War of Spanish Succession, negotiations between Britain and Austria had led Charles vi to agree to the establishment of British security ports. The prospect of defensive cooperation had fostered the initial interest in establishing the South Sea Company.24 In one of his earliest letters to the Duke of Newcastle, however, Carvajal took a different approach.25 Britain, he argued, should commit to guarding and ­protecting Spain’s shores in the Americas in exchange for a ten percent return on all of Spain’s imperial profits.26 A reciprocal friendship would be cultivated between the two nations, and commerce would be carried out without obstacles between the two kingdoms and the Americas, which would, Carvajal hoped, encourage the consumption of goods produced in Spain.27 By forefronting British interests, he engaged the minds of ministers in London. Carvajal declared to Newcastle that this treaty would protect their ‘real interests, and leave the uncertain events of war to others, without any of this causing anyone harm’.28 There was, however, a different way to reconfigure Spain’s role in Europe.29 The Spanish representative at the negotiations in Breda, Melchor de Macanaz, studied and annotated, at times on a weekly basis, copies of the Mercure de France, the Gazette d’Hollande, and the Gazette de Paris, and added his reflections on the publications discussed in each issue to a manuscript he titled Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda.30 He reflected on the confessional politics of Nagasaki and Macao that were featured in a French translation of 23 Carvajal, Proyecto de ajuste con los ingleses. 24 Nuala Zahedieh, “Commerce and conflict: Jamaica and the War of the Spanish Succession”, in A.B. Leonard, David Pretel eds., The Caribbean and the Atlantic World Economy. Circuits of Trade, Money and Knowledge, 1650–​1914 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 68–​ 86, 77. 25 Carvajal to Newcastle, 27 December 1747, British Library. ms. 32810, x, 356. 26 Carvajal to Newcastle, 27 December 1747, 364. Possibly inspired by Saint-Pierre’s Idées pacifiques sur les demelez entre l’Espagne et l’Angleterre (Paris: 1741). 27 Carvajal to Newcastle, 27 December 1747, 364. 28 Carvajal to Newcastle, 27 December 1747, 366. 29 For the broader context of Macanaz’s Memorias see Edward Jones Corredera, “Remembering the Early Spanish Enlightenment and Inventing the Late Ilustración: Macanaz’s Memories and the Contexts of Reform in Bourbon Spain”, in Ere Nokkala, Adriana Luna-​Fabritius, Marten Seppel and Keith Tribe eds., Political Reason and Language of Change: Reform and Improvement in Early Modern Europe (London: Routledge, 2021) (Forthcoming). 30 Melchor de Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, ms 218 and ms 219.

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The Voyage of Captain John Saris to Japan.31 He commented on Gabriel Bonnot de Mably’s analysis of the death of Charles xii of Sweden in his Droit Public de l’Europe and he noted which bookseller sold Lorenzo Boturini Benaduci’s Historia general de la América Septentrional in Madrid.32 He discussed a passage from Voltaire’s Histoire Universelle, published in the French Mercure of 1746, regarding the politics of twelfth-​century Spain.33 He further addressed the developments at the diplomatic congress, and explained that he was following Carvajal’s ‘secret instructions’ and that ‘the negotiation with the British regarding the Mexican pesos is going well’, in reference, perhaps, to Carvajal’s corporate scheme.34 Macanaz, in his seventies, had served as a minister, a legislator, an ambassador, and a spy.35 As the negotiations dragged on, his conclusion, based on his decades of experience and on his readings on European politics, was that Spain should stop drawing on diplomacy to reform its standing in Europe. Macanaz argued that that ‘even if you brought a Demosthenes’ as a Spanish representative to diplomatic negotiations, Spain would continue to be ‘sold out’.36 It would be impossible ‘to revert the treaties made since the start of the century’ since Europe was ‘focused on preserving that which they had occupied from us, and increasing their trade’.37 Like Carvalho, Macanaz believed

31 Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, ms 218, 59. Featured in Antoine Francois Prevost d’Exile, Histoire generale des voyages ou nouvelle collection de toutes les relations de voyages par mer et par terre (The Hague: Pierre de Hondt, 1747), 416–​441. 32 Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, ms 218, 65 and 71. Abbé de Mably, Le Droit Public de l’Europe, fondé sur les Traités. Volume 2 (The Hague: Chez Jean van Duren, 1746), 110; Lorenzo Boutirini Benaduci, Idea de una nueva historia general de la América septentrional (Madrid: J. de Zuniga, 1746). 33 Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, ms 218, 49. “Suite de l’Histoire Universelle de M. Voltaire Historiographe de France & l’un de Quarante de l’Académie Françoise”, Mercure de France. Juin 1746. Volume 1 (Paris: Chez Guillaume Cavellier, rue S. Jacques, La Veuve Pissot, Quai de Conty à la descente du Pont-​Neuf, Jean de Nully, au Palais, 1746), 3–​13. Macanaz would later write more extensively about Voltaire’s work. See Kamen, ‘Melchor de Macanaz’, 714–​715. 34 Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, ms 218, 884. Also featured in a second document: Melchor de Macanaz, Carta de Don Melchor de Macanaz, al Duque de Huescar, escrita desde Breda a principios de mayo de 1747. Biblioteca Nacional de España. mss/​1 1261/​1 9. Covid-​19 meant that I was unable to track down documents at the National Archives that might have facilitated a better understanding of the scheme from the British diplomatic side, but I hope to do so in the future. 35 For the most recent interpretation of his diplomatic roles see Storrs, “The Fallen Politician’s Way Back In”, 115–​138. 36 Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, ms 218, 917. 37 Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, ms 218, 917.

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that foreign powers were acting like ‘nothing more than thieves’, and there was ‘nobody to hold them accountable for their robberies’.38 Instead of following what ‘that power or this power did’, Spain should merely act as a closed commercial state, reform its own empire, and ‘rule Europe’.39 Amid his reflections on European gazettes and his letters to Carvajal, Macanaz expanded on his views on imperial reform.40 Spain did not need to ‘wait for peace’, or establish ‘marriages’, or analyse the behaviour of other ‘Powers’: it could reform its own economy by ‘opening the door’ to skilled foreign workers since no foreign power could prevent them from ‘taking their factories to the New World’.41 Spain should produce its own clothing and ban foreign products from entering the Spanish Empire as a means to further encourage the migration of skilled workers to the Americas who, unable to trade with Spain or the New World, and faced with the ‘decadence’ of their commerce, would ‘move there’.42 Macanaz praised Carvajal’s desire to ‘open the door to foreigners’, to establish a cadastre, and to lower the price of goods, and considered how ‘the public utility of Government’ could be further improved.43 The companies of Caracas and Havana, explained Macanaz, should limit the import of alcoholic beverages ‘to encourage’ the locals to produce their own.44 Those goods that were missing in the Americas would, in turn,be supplied ‘via the Philippines’.45 In his Nuevo Sistema, Macanaz had defended the need to establish manufacturing in the New World.46 This time, Macanaz reiterated some of his proposals and introduced new ones. He recommended the reform of the system of intendants, who should be made to ‘manage the public, juridical, and .

38 Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, ms 218, 482. 39 There are interesting parallels between this reaction to diplomatic stasis and Fichte’s idea of a closed commercial state that might be discussed in future research. See Nakhimovsky, in The Closed Commercial State, 130–​165. 40 Macanaz wrote over two hundred works, as he told ministers in his letters. Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, 219, 137. 41 Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, ms 218, 53. 42 Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, ms 218, 54. 43 On the cadastre see Concepción Camarero ed., El Catastro de Ensenada. Magna averiguación fiscal para alivio de los Vasallos y mejor conocimiento de los Reinos. 1749–​1756 (Madrid: Ministerio de Hacienda. Dirección General del Catastro, 2002). 44 Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, ms 218, 53. 45 Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, ms 218, 54. 46 José de Campillo y Cossio [Melchor de Macanaz], Nuevo sistema de gobierno económico para la América: con los males y daños que le causa el que hoy tiene, de los que participa copiosamente España; y remedios universales para que la primera tenga considerables ventajas, y la segunda mayores intereses (Madrid: Benito Cano, 1789), 112–​141.

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economic government’, and ‘anything related to the Treasury’.47 He encouraged the reform of the audiencias, the chancillerías, and the tributes of the native peoples, he proposed the establishment of hospices for the poor, the establishment of Visitadores Generales, and the stimulation of the trade between ‘the Spaniards from here and the Spaniards from there, in the style of nations which have colonies there [in the Americas]’.48 He suggested the creation of a free port to manage the slave trade, something that Carvajal had proposed in his writings.49 Overall, a closed commercial state, he hoped, would soon allow Spain to ‘become arbiter of Europe’ and to deliver ‘peace’.50 Macanaz therefore engaged with Enlightenment ideas in diplomatic spaces and through diplomatic publications, but he no longer trusted that Spanish transnational negotiation could yield change. Macanaz had argued, decades earlier, that the ‘mistake’ of the Spanish ‘government of the last century’, under the Habsburg Monarchy, had been to approach politics through the lenses of ‘a Mercantile Guild’.51 The mistake of Carvajal’s administration, he believed, was its reliance on diplomacy to drive reform.52 Carvajal, however, continued to exchange letters with European diplomats and Spanish envoys, which improved relations with potential allies and provided him with more accurate commercial and political information. The 1748 Treaty of Aix-​la-​Chapelle included an article that established that Austria and Spain would be favourable trading nations.53 This allowed for the establishment of a Spanish consul in Trieste, who sent Carvajal reports declaring that the port would become the most famous one in Europe, exploring the means to establish a closer connection with Catalan commerce, stimulating discussions around the creation of the Royal Company of Barcelona, and considering the possibilities of importing grain, glass, metal, wood, and luxury items into the Iberian Peninsula.54 Carvajal and Ensenada asked for further information 47 Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, ms 219, 55. On the intendants see Macanaz, Nuevo sistema de gobierno, 142–​154. 48 Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, ms 219, 57. 49 Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, ms 218, 867. 50 Macanaz, Memorias para la historia y juntas de Breda, ms 219. 65. On Justi’s idea of a universal monarchy as a way to ensure the balance of power, and a satire thereof, see Nokkala, From Natural Law to Political Economy, 171–​182. 51 Quoted in Kamen, ‘Melchor de Macanaz’, 713. 52 On Macanaz’s subsequent imprisonment see Jones Corredera, “Remembering the Early Spanish Enlightenment and Inventing the Late Ilustración”. 53 Pradells Nadal, Diplomacia y Comercio, 409. 54 Pradells Nadal, Diplomacia y Comercio, 413–​414. José María Oliva Melgar, Cataluña y El Comercio Privilegiado Con América En El Siglo XVIII: La Real Compañía de Comercio de Barcelona a Indias (Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona, 1987), 36–​38.

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on how to profit from the abundant mercury trade taking place in the port between the Dutch and the British.55 And while Carvajal understood the connection between better diplomatic information and commercial reform, he also grasped the symbolic nature of diplomacy. He described the otherwise unsubstantial Treaty of Aix-​la-​Chapelle as a great success for Madrid. In a letter to Huéscar, he stated that ‘if the treaty stands as it is, it will be the best peace treaty Spain has made in a long time’ because the accord constituted the first instance where Bourbon Spain had been able to conclude a treaty without France.56 Spain had entered into the negotiations still under the influence of Philip’s rule and, following his death, had been able to display Ferdinand’s determination to pursue greater independence from France: ‘it is a lost treaty which we entered without the means to act freely, and which has nonetheless provided us with certain advantages. In a word, it must be seen as a resurrection’.57 Building on this symbolic success, Carvajal’s dialogue with his British counterparts facilitated the 1750 Treaty of Madrid. Spain purchased the asiento, and signalled the shift away from France, and the break with Philip v’s diplomacy, by favouring Britain’s commercial interests over those of the other side of the Bourbon House.58 Britain had already established extensive networks throughout the Caribbean and had developed commercial relations with the Havana Company, and contemporary works published in Spain, like Marcelo Dantini’s Diálogos, remarked upon the fact that the asiento was, in itself, relatively unprofitable.59 But, in Carvajal’s view, discussions over the asiento would always stand in the way of further negotiations: while others believed that freedom of trade was the cause of repeated conflicts, the issue of the contract, he argued, would merely come up again and prove to be an obstacle at the next diplomatic negotiation.60 Clashes over porous frontiers were also frequently cited as a source of conflict with Britain, and with Portugal. The global diplomatic negotiations of the 1740s demonstrated the difficulties of settling issues over contested spaces in the Atlantic and the Pacific through treaties.61 The British government launched a scheme of immigration to Nova Scotia that drew on German

55

Pradells Nadal, Diplomacia y Comercio, 414; Taracha, Ojos y oidos de la monarquía borbónica, 106. 56 Ozanam, La diplomacia, 391. 57 Ozanam, La diplomacia, 391. 58 Jenkinson, A Collection of Treaties, 410. 59 Delgado Barrado, Fomento Portuario, 93. 60 Ozanam, La diplomacia, 163. 61 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 8.

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and Swiss migrants, the “Foreign Protestants”, to populate the region. The French government, in turn, considered how to establish greater control over the Ohio River to prevent the expansion of British settlers.62 Spanish negotiations with Portugal, then, were symptomatic of a broader European shift towards using the mobilisation of peoples to consolidate territorial gains. For Portugal, the discovery of gold mines in territories that, according to the Treaty of Tordesillas, belonged to Spain, had led to repeated skirmishes and required new legislation. For Spain, diplomatic negotiations with Portugal could reinforce the Caracas Company’s efforts to secure Spanish trade in the Caribbean, and could benefit from the shared interest in securing the borders in the Banda Oriental and in undermining Dutch and French smuggling in the region.63 Carvajal sought to find a way to foster the insurrection of indigenous peoples against the Dutch and the French strategic settlements, he considered how to best mobilise the Jesuit Order, and he enlisted the assistance of Carl Linnaeus, his student Pehr Löfling, and other scientists.64 Carvajal suggested an expedition should conduct geographical research on how to gradually expand the Spanish presence in the region, ordered the study of cocoa, and asked for other rare plants and minerals to be sent to Spain.65 The eventual accord, the Treaty of Limits, established that ‘all the land between Marañón and Orinoco belongs unquestionably to the two crowns, and all establishments by foreigners in that area must be regarded as unlawful’.66 The language of the treaty foreclosed the option of mutual defence, but implied a degree of military cooperation: ‘even if the two courts have not found it agreeable to fight with open force […] they

62 63 64

65

66

Daniel Baugh, The Global Seven Years War: Britain and France in a Great Power Contest (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 36–​53. A.J.R. Russell-​Wood, “Colonial Brazil: The Gold Cycle, c. 1690–​1750”, in Leslie Bethell ed., The Cambridge History of Latin America. Volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 547–​600, 549. Carvajal to Iturriaga, 8 October 1753, Archivo General de Simancas. Estado, 7375. Silvia Marzagali, “The French Atlantic World in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries”, in Nicholas Canny and Philip Morgan eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World: 1450–​ 1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 235–​251, 243; Jonathan Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–​1740 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 189–​207. 91 and 105; Carvajal to Iturriaga, 6 November 1753 Archivo General de Simancas. Estado 7375. On Linnaeus and Carvajal see Linnaeus to Carvajal, 14 January 1751, in Correspondencia entre Linneo y Löflin [sic] con motivo de la venida de Löflin [sic] a España para el estudio de su botánica (1751), Archivo del Museo Nacional de Ciencias Naturales. 334, 50–​52. Carvajal to Iturriaga, 18 November 1753, Archivo del Museo Naval. 572. Quoted in Manuel Lucena Giraldo, Laboratorio Tropical: la expedición de límites al Orinoco, 1750–​1767 (Caracas: Monte Ávila Latinoamericana, 1993), 90.

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have agreed to procure the expulsion of others in their lands, the Spaniards via the Orinoco river and the Portuguese in the Marañón’.67 This particular dimension of the treaty would prove to be a tipping point for Carvalho. He questioned the viability of the treaty, and expressed his concerns that the Spanish Crown would be able to acquire a better understanding of the region through its scientific investigations.68 He also understood the treaty’s impact on the balance of power: Spanish cooperation with Britain was a direct threat to Portugal’s interests in Europe and beyond, as he wrote of the concluding accord that ‘it created a League with Spain’ with respect to the Americas ‘which was incompatible with those alliances and guarantees we had established with Britain through prior Treaties’.69 After all, in Carvalho’s view, it was ‘well known that Britain’ preserved ‘the European equilibrium between France and Spain’ to prevent them from ‘oppressing smaller nations with their great power’.70 An alliance with Britain was necessary to prevent the Bourbon House from attacking and invading Portugal and to safeguard Portuguese imperial trade.71 4

Investing in Peace

In 1752, after six years in power, Carvajal thought he had found a way to stabilise European politics. Building on the closer cooperation established between Spain, Britain, Portugal, and Austria, Robert Darcy, Earl of Holderness and Secretary of State for the North, wrote to Benjamin Keene to convey Vienna’s interest in signing a treaty with Spain and Sardinia in order to settle the disputes over Italy that had caused conflicts since the start of the century. Darcy asked Keene to encourage Carvajal to consider the participation of Britain and Portugal in the treaty.72 The Treaty of Aranjuez was agreed to by Sardinia, Austria, and Spain, to regulate the limits of the three powers in Italy. This marked the end of the aspect of Philip v’s policy that had provoked the greatest anger and frustration throughout European Courts and, at times, among 67 68

Carvajal to Iturriaga, 18 November 1753, Archivo del Museo Naval. 572. Guillermo Kratz, El tratado hispano-​portugués de límites de 1750 y sus consecuencias: estudio sobre la abolición de la Compañía de Jesús (Madrid: Ediciones Jura, 1954), 37. 69 Kratz, El tratado hispano-​portugués, 43. 70 Carvalho, Escritos Económicos de Londres, 14. 71 Carvalho, Escritos Económicos de Londres, 18. 72 Holderness to Keene, 4 October 1751, in Vol. xv (ff. 297). Oct. 1751-​March 1752. Ferdinand VI of Spain: Papers conc. foreign relations: 1748–​1757.: Engl., Lat., and Fr. Francis i and Maria Theresa of Germany: British diplomatic papers rel. to: 1751–​1757, British Library. Mss. 43426.

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Spanish ministers: the revanchist approach towards Italy. Sir Robert Murray Keith, a British envoy in Vienna, wrote that the treaty marked the firm separation between Spain and France, and ‘the honour regarding its concept and its execution belong almost entirely to Mr. Carvajal and in many ways it will become for His Excellency a glorious monument to posterity’.73 Leading British ministers saw these diplomatic reforms as the basis for an enduring peace in Europe. After learning of Carvajal’s correspondence with Count of Estherházy on the topic, Holderness reported the Spaniard’s views to George i. The King, according to Holderness, praised: ‘the great and noble principle of disengaging themselves from the degree of influence which the court of Versailles has of late years had over all their councils, and serving their own independence, by proper alliances with those powers, which only can support them in this salutary view, and assist them in freeing themselves from the yoke of France’.74 Why, then, did Carvajal not embrace an even closer form of cooperation? In a letter to Holderness, Benjamin Keene reported an exchange with Carvajal which illuminated the Spaniard’s approach to a diplomatically-​independent Spanish Empire: ‘and as I frequently cite passages antecedent to his experiences on Spain’, Carvajal had conveyed that, ‘Spain would have been much better without’, as he described them, ‘those projects of the late reign’.75 Keene asked Carvajal whether Spain, after rejecting countless treatises with France, would consider a closer alliance with Britain, to which Carvajal responded by saying: ‘it would be taking off the mask before the Time […] the only way to do work with that court, is to do it with civility, and to make up by exterior usage what we refuse internally’. ‘The time’, he had explained, ‘will come’.76 Keene pressed Carvajal further still, and drew on the Spaniard’s own thoughts about French diplomatic abuse and his project for peace: If ever you mean anything by revenging Spain on France, either for former injuries in time of war, and the worse usage possible in the last 50 years of what was called friendship or during even a later epoch; you must think of adopting the great Ideas you are acquainted with –​many things, he replied, must happen before nations can so totally change their systems.77

73 74 75 76 77

Keene to Holderness, 6 November 1751, British Library. Mss. 43426, 99. Holderness to the Earl of Rochfold, 15 September 1751, British Library. Mss. 43426, 27. Keene to Holderness, 6 November 1751, 99. Keene to Holderness, 6 November 1751, 99–​101. Keene to Holderness, 6 November 1751, 103.

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Keene registered this exchange in his letter and concluded the only discernible reason for Carvajal’s views was ‘the difference between the reign of Philip 5th and Ferdinand 6th’.78 In March 1752, Carvajal himself wrote that thanks to the treaty there was no need to defend anything since there was nothing to invade, that this was ‘something that the abbé Saint-​Pierre had thought but a dream. This is Perpetual Peace’.79 Carvajal reiterated his belief that ‘Perpetual Peace had been achieved’ in subsequent letters to Wall and other diplomats who served the Spanish Empire.80 What, then, did Carvajal understand by perpetual peace? Perhaps it was simply that European diplomats had solved a dynastic conflict that had shaped half a century of war and peace in the Old Continent and beyond.81 In 1753, Carvajal wrote his Mis Pensamientos, and explained that, in the current configuration of Europe, Spain could be ‘the middle party’ which would maintain the balance of power and ensure that others did not shift their positions. The weight of the vested European interests in the success of the Spanish Empire, he hoped, would ensure that the balance of power was not disturbed.82 In his view, the logic of the existing system of equilibrium had to be reconsidered: ‘Everyone talks about equilibrium but nobody wants it’. For Carvajal, this was a problem for large empires and small states alike because their goals were incompatible: ‘the most powerful’ empires, he explained, ‘hoped’ that nobody ‘would moderate them or become their equal’; the ‘weakest’ powers, in turn, hoped ‘to become the most powerful’ and that ‘the balance’ would become ‘favourable towards them’. Everyone, he lamented, cynically ‘defended equilibrium’ because of the benefits they derived from the way it was enforced: ‘the most powerful’ players found that it was a way ‘to lull others’ into submission. But, in Carvajal’s view, the weakest states used it to become stronger and eventually challenge the most powerful powers.83 The fragile equilibrium of forces was therefore unsustainable. After years of reading elaborate reports on industrial techniques from around the world, requesting and receiving a copy of Diderot and d’Alembert’s 78 Keene to Holderness, 6 Novemeber 1751, 103. 79 Carvajal to Azlor, 14 March 1752, Archivo Histórico Nacional. Estado, 3409. 80 Urdañez, El proyecto reformista de Ensenada, 111–​112. 81 On the need to separate the complexities of peace, pacification, and pacificism, see Murad Idris, “Peace, Pacificism, and Religion”, in Ghervas and Amitage eds., A Cultural History of Peace, 71–​86. 82 This was the main parallel with Frederick’s own vision in the Anti-​Machiavel. Isaac Nakhimovsky, “The Enlightened Prince and the Future of Europe”, in Kapossy, Nakhimovsky, and Whatmore eds., Commerce and Peace, 44–​77, 65. 83 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 138.

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Encyclopédie, and debating the scientific works written by Jorge Juan and Antonio Ulloa, Carvajal turned, in Mis Pensamientos, to his understanding of equilibrium based on eighteenth-​century scales. ‘Let us take equilibrium at face value’, he explained: ‘the goal is to have both plates in parallel or in equilibrium so that neither outweighs the other and pulls it down without a counterweight’.84 For Carvajal, the two plates were Austria and France. The established equilibrium, whereby both countries pursued military superiority, was ‘a medium that perpetuates wars’.85 Carvajal believed there was a better alternative: ‘the best equilibrium must take a different shape which I will explain by turning to the same metaphor of a balance or weights which they all use’.86 Carvajal thus inserted his work into the Pan-​European conversation on equilibrium, the balance of power, and perpetual peace: ‘on the one side rests that which is to be weighed and on the other the plate that indicates how heavy it is. For greater safety and certainty, there is in the middle of the scale a cord that pulls the top’.87 Carvajal then reasoned that ‘it then follows that the more equal the weight is between both plates the easier their movement’. A disruption to one of the plates ‘pulls the other; and this one by its movement returns to its place and pulls the one that moved it’ thereby generating a ‘different collision which lasts longer the more equal the two are’.88 To avoid the pendulum swing, therefore, a third power was needed: ‘the only way to prevent this is to introduce a hand that holds the cord at the top’.89 The result then, was that ‘the movement ceases and the balance is stable and in permanent stillness’.90 The introduction of a regulatory power, then, was, according to Carvajal, the way to secure peace; ‘the perfect equilibrium: a respectable, impartial, and equitable Power that places its hand on the cord in the middle and which prevents the movement or stops it when it begins’.91 This would be Spain’s role in the configuration of the European balance of power. But where, in his Testamento

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Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 138–​139. On Carvajal and the Encyclopédie see González Caizán, ‘La biblioteca de Agustín Pablo de Ordeñana’, 227–​267, 238. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 139. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 139. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 139. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 140. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 140. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 140. Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 140. Saint-​Pierre rejected the balance of power and saw his project as an alternative to it, but many of his contemporaries were not as doctrinal. On Saint-​Pierre’s scheme, the balance of power, and trade, see Koen Stapelbroek, “Republics and Monarchies”, in Richard Whatmore and Brian Young eds., A Companion to Intellectual History (London: Wiley, 2015), 276–​287.

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Político, Carvajal had considered the establishment of a universal monarchy, he now understood that this project would only work through cooperation: the Dutch and the British, given their investments throughout the Spanish Empire, ‘should have an interest in our progress and can help us if others stand in our way’.92 This was the only way of granting Spain a role in the management of the balance of power: in one of his most detailed writings on Spain’s position in his system of peace, Saint-​Pierre argued that Spain lived in fear of both colonial revolts and foreign invasions.93 The preservation of the empire was expensive and its administration had so far been rendered inefficient.94 The establishment of Saint-​ Pierre’s union would therefore secure their possessions: managing territories would be half as costly for Spain.95 It would facilitate the prevention of foreign smuggling in Spanish imperial spaces. It would, he argued, ensure that Spain’s claims to Naples were respected. Spain would benefit from the military support of the other members in the alliance, who would commit to securing the union’s borders, and would therefore benefit from reinforcements in Mediterranean spaces like Ceuta.96 But this scheme would also leave Spain completely powerless and devoid of influence in Europe. There were three important weaknesses to Saint-​Pierre’s plans for perpetual peace.97 First, there was no obvious incentive for states and empires to enter into the union.98 Second, the establishment of an equitable distribution of territories was elusive.99 Third, the plan failed to adequately address the question of its relationship to non-​European empires: as Voltaire implied in one of his most acerbic satires of Saint-​Pierre’s scheme, it was unclear why a large empire like China would ever accept his terms, and just how their interests would

92 93

Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 142. Charles-​Irénée Castel de Saint-​Pierre, Abrégé du project de paix perpétuelle (Rotterdam: Jean Daniel Beman, 1729), 125. 94 Saint-​Pierre, Abrégé, 125. 95 Saint-​Pierre, Abrégé, 125. 96 Saint-​Pierre, Abrégé, 125–​126. 97 For a more comprehensive analysis of these issues see Anthony Pagden, “Definitions of Peace”, in Ghervas and Armitage eds., A Cultural History of Peace in the Age of Enlightenment, 19–​34. 98 Sonenscher, Before the Deluge, 113. For the latest book on Saint-​Pierre, characterising him as a utilitarian political economist, see Carole Dornier, La Monarchie éclairée de l’abbé de Saint-​Pierre. Oxford University Studies in the Enlightenment. (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2020). 99 Sonenscher, Before the Deluge, 113.

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be represented in this union.100 Perhaps the profits of the French East India Company, he quipped, could be used to pay for their representative.101 Carvajal’s corporate union appealed instead to interests, utility, and profits as mechanisms of safeguarding peace and encouraging cooperation. In his Pensamientos, Carvajal denoted a greater concern about the persistent European struggles for greater control of Spanish Atlantic and Pacific possessions than he had in his earlier writings.102 The Habsburg Crown, according to Carvajal, should always be protected because it was the bulwark against both ‘the Turk and the false religion of Germany’ and constituted a ‘brake on France’. But, with the dispute over Italy settled, an alliance would fail to contribute to the safety of the Americas.103 For Carvajal, Spain’s most important allies were Britain and Portugal. The alliance with Britain would deter France from attacking Spanish possessions.104 No rival coalition could challenge their joint power and Britain had no ‘desire for supremacy’ in ‘Europe or America, for it does not want to populate deserts, but merely enjoy the benefits of commerce’.105 Unlike most of his contemporaries, Carvajal projected the concept of equilibrium to the Americas.106 He chose a card game as a metaphor to capture the state of the inter-​imperial disputes in the Atlantic. Eighteenth-​century European thinkers frequently drew on the parallels between diplomatic affairs and card games –​Jean Barbeyrac explored the connections between games and natural law, and Emer de Vattel quipped that the utility of games was such that if his treatise on the subject was understood by politicians it would serve the same function as Saint-​Pierre’s plan for perpetual peace.107 In the pursuit of 100 Voltaire, Rescrit de L’Empereur de la Chine à l’ocassion du Projet de Paix Perpetuelle, Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire. Volume 46 (Paris: Société Littéraire Typographique, 1785), 69–​72, 71. 101 Voltaire, Rescrit, 72. 102 Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 143. 103 Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 147. 104 Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 147. 105 Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 148. 106 On later studies of the sustainability of the balance of power both in the Americas and in Europe see Sonenscher, Before the Deluge, 361. On nineteenth-​century visions of perpetual peace see Nakhimovsky, The Closed Commercial State, 84–​102. 107 Jean Barbeyrac, Traité du Jeu: Où l’on examine toutes les Questions de droit naturel et de morale qui on du rapport à cette Matiere. Two volumes. (Amsterdam: Pierre Humber, 1709); Emer de Vattel, Le Loisir Philosophique, ou Pieces Diverses de Philosophie, de Morale et d’Amusement (Dresden: George Conrad Walther, 1747), 198. On Isaac del Pinto’s views on games, speculation, and the balance of power, see Pinto, An Essay on Circulation and Credit, 191–​192. I owe Francesca Iurlaro a great deal of gratitude for drawing my attention to these debates between natural law, diplomacy, and games. See her forthcoming book: Francesca Iurlaro, The Invention of Custom: Natural Law and the Law of Nations

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equilibrium in Spain and in the Americas, Carvajal contributed to this debate. Britain, Holland, and Spain were the three key players in the card game of Reversis.108 Not only did the other players take a large proportion of Spain’s imperial trade, but Spain had to then pay in order to purchase the goods that were subsequently produced abroad.109 In his Mis Pensamientos, Carvajal was blunt about the limits of reform. Spain could not hope to achieve ‘commercial superiority’ over other empires because of its underpopulation, the outsized influence of an aristocracy that contributed little to economic growth, and its general lack of production.110 Carvajal’s thought, then, denoted the growth of the critique against the ‘manos muertas’ of the nobility, and his schemes to train naval officers resembled later calls for the establishment of institutes for the study of minerology and the navy.111 But these critiques were of a relatively small importance in the face of Spain’s geopolitical constraints. The best and only path to reform was a utilitarian union with Britain. Carvajal listed the benefits Spain would draw from such a union: there would be greater funds to invest in the Americas and, crucially, Spain would have a firmer control over trade. Cooperation would prevent fraud and it could foster the generation of industry in the Spanish peninsula. A vital aspect of this scheme was that Britain ‘would be invested in ensuring that its subjects did not pursue illicit trade on our shores’ and would grant Spain a ‘significant deposit’ which would deter it from waging war against the Spanish Empire.112 Spain, Carvajal explained, ‘cannot fight the rest of the world, and alliances are achieved precisely through compensation’.113 Carvajal considered the benefits that Britain would gain from this union. Imperial trade with the Americas would no longer be hampered by Spanish interference; its revenues would be fixed and predictable; and the

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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021). As she rightly suggests, scholars like Arild Saether have pointed to the connections between treaties on play and the growth of political economy in Europe. Arild Saether, Natural Law and the Origin of Political Economy: Samuel Pufendorf and the History of Economics (London: Routledge, 2019), 174. The game in question was Reversis. The goal of the game is to either end with the least number of points or to acquire all of them. The latter move reverses the rules of the game and gives it its name. Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 142. Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 142. Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 154–​155. On the debate between Olavide, Campomanes, and Jovellanos on the ‘manos muertas’ see Herr, The Eighteenth-​century Revolution in Spain, 46. On Jovellanos’s plan to set up an institute for the study of minerology see Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, Obras publicadas é inéditas de D. Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos. Volume 50 (Madrid: M. Rivadeneyra, 1839), 399–​420. Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 163. Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 163.

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sheer size of the investment would grant investors a great deal of power in Parliament which would, in turn, embolden the institution’s support for transnational collaboration with Spain.114 The corporate dimension of Carvajal’s scheme was the most distinct aspect of his vision of cooperation. A strand of early eighteenth-​century French thought saw in the establishment of sound public credit in France and Britain a way of reaffirming peace in Europe.115 But Carvajal’s proposal to create an Anglo-​Spanish company entailed instead the collaboration of empires based on their shared investments: Britain would promptly collaborate in the efforts to prevent illicit trade on Spanish soil, and would ‘never enter into a war against it’, because London ‘would lose capital’ in the process.116 Faced with the complaint that Spain ‘would not be able to take part in these discussions’, Carvajal answered ‘can it in any way provide the necessary capital? No, it cannot, therefore it cannot be involved’.117 The company would require the agreement of ‘one or two [British] directors of the Bank [of England] or respectable institutions, and certain members of the opposition party’, and the creation of the companies Carvajal declared ‘I discussed elsewhere’, possibly referring to the plan for the creation of twelve companies in his Testamento Político.118 To this end ‘the [Spanish] King will declare his interest in one fifth of the enterprise and provide the capital’.119 Carvajal’s view of the corporate structure as the framework for an alliance denoted a profound trust in Britain, and a vision of companies as mechanisms to buttress the transnational negotiation, scope, and economic weight of the société des princes.120 Carvajal understood how the British constitution enhanced its reliability as an ally: the constitution was ‘republican enough’ to prevent a monarch from separating it from its allies for their own private gain, and it lacked the disadvantages of absolute governments which were vulnerable to divisions and fragmentation.121 The alliance with Portugal, in turn, sought to mutually bind the military interests of the Iberian powers: Madrid and Lisbon would combine their armies and their navies, and the contested frontiers in the Americas would be 1 14 Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 164. 115 Sonenscher, Before the Deluge, 117. 116 Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 163. 117 Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 164. 118 Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 165. 119 Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 165. 120 Stern, The Company-​State, 41. 121 Carvajal, “Testamento Político”, 14. Spanish views on Britain were thus less uniform and more complex than some historians have suggested. See, for example, Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform, 36–​45.

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defended by these joint forces.122 Carvajal did not comment on the disruptive impact of the Treaty of Limits on the calibrated and contentious relationship between the Jesuits and the Guarani people in the region, but likely believed that it would be solved through greater cooperation with Portugal.123 Carvajal even justified assisting Portugal in India, noting that ‘it is not in our interest for another European nation to build over the ruins of the Portuguese’.124 Overall, Mis Pensamientos sought to reverse Spain’s trade relations with Britain, and to create a corporate structure to regulate imperial dividends and establish a lasting peace in Europe. The Spanish Empire had traditionally provided the raw materials for other nations in Europe to develop their goods: this model of transnational cooperation would see Britain contributing the capital for the development of a transnational Anglo-​Spanish company in exchange for an agreed and consistent share of the profit of the Americas and the guarantee of peace. With the interests of the two empires secured by the capital invested by both monarchs and by British shareholders, the logic of finance would prevent further conflict. These, then, were the possibilities, and the limits, of Spanish diplomacy. This equilibrium would, Carvajal, hoped, mark the end of major wars.125 United, Catholic Spain and Protestant Britain could control the balance of power in Europe and manage their trade networks in the Americas. United, they could deliver peace. 5

A Monarchy without a King

One crucial aspect of Saint-​Pierre’s plan for peace was the assumption that diplomats would be granted the capacity to act as supranational political agents and determine the affairs of each state.126 When he commented on the plan, the marquess d’Argenson declared that his scheme should be buttressed by a strong legal and military French involvement: ‘here is the true universal monarchy. To judge is to govern; equitable decision-​making must be the only empire over men’.127 Carvajal had little interest in drafting a legal basis for his scheme.

1 22 Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 167. 123 Lía Quareli, Rebelión y Guerra en las fronteras del Plata. Guaraníes, Jesuitas e Imperios coloniales (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2009), 161–​204. 124 Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 166–​167. 125 Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 148. 126 Bély, La société des princes, 724. 127 René-​Louis de Voyer, Marquis d’Argenson, Considérations sur le gouvernement ancien et présent de la France. Volume 1 (Paris: Marc Michel Rey, 1764), 328. On the context of this

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But he had since his time at Dresden believed that diplomats, in the context of transnational negotiations, could dictate imperial policy. The French Empire, in d’Argenson’s view was, one of ‘taste and arts’.128 For Carvajal, the Spanish Empire was made up of corporate interests. Carvajal thus prioritised the corporate logic of shared interests to make Spain an ‘equitable and impartial’ player that was to regulate the balance of power.129 These interests were, in line with the early eighteenth-​century Spanish experience with diplomacy, more durable and predictable than treaties. But, however appealing transnational funds, investment, and utility may have been to potential investors, the dynastic demands of an absolute monarchy, as Goyeneche had acknowledged, would always remain a source of concern. On 2 June 1752, as Carvajal was celebrating his success, d’Argenson, who considered Carvajal honest but small-​minded in his political ambitions, made a record in his diary of his reading of three new volumes of abbé Montgon’s memoirs.130 Philip v had sent Montgon to France to win over support when he believed Louis xv’s death was near, as Philip had hoped this would allow him to take over the French throne. After reading these reflections, d’Argenson was left feeling ‘disgusted by the Spanish example of monarchical government’.131 Unless ‘philosophical opinions relieve us from ignorance’, he declared, ‘we will march straight towards this form of rule’.132 Spain’s ‘absolute monarchy’ had turned its subjects into ‘children oppressed by stupid and unjust principles’, and the ‘negligence and absurd actions’ of the French administration threatened its own future.133 The example of Spain should be to France ‘what drunk men were to the education of Lacedaemonian children’: their display of ‘these absurd excesses’ should encourage France to avoid them.134 Carvajal felt a strong animosity towards Philip v, and he believed he could control Ferdinand vi. In effect, he believed that diplomats and ministers could work see Andrew Jainchill ed., Considérations sur le gouvernement, a critical edition, with other political texts. (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2019), 1–​10. 128 d’ Argenson, Considérations, 328. 129 Carvajal, “Mis Pensamientos”, 145. 130 René-​Louis de Voyer, Marquis d’Argenson, Journal et mémoires du marquis d’Argenson. Publiés pour la première fois d’après les manuscrits autographes de la Bibliothèque du Louvre, pour la Société de l’histoire de France, par E. J. B. Rathery. Volume 7 (Paris: E. J. B. Rathery, 1859–​1867). Bibliothèque nationale de France. 8-​LB38–​1362, 241. For his views of Carvajal, see d’Argenson, Journal, Volume 5, 25, 33, 369. 131 d’Argenson, Journal et mémoires, 241. 132 d’Argenson, Journal et mémoires, 242. 133 d’Argenson, Journal et mémoires, 242. For d’Argenson’s own views on credit see Murphy, John Law, 179. 134 d’Argenson, Journal et mémoires, 242.

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take the reins of a monarchy. Carvajal could not have anticipated that the trappings of monarchical dynasties would thwart his ambitions; that Queen Barbara, a key liaison with Portugal, would die, and that Ferdinand, once an engaged political agent, would subsequently retire from power. Carvajal had largely assumed that diplomatic disputes could be settled without the active involvement of monarchs, and that the impact of dynastic intrigues that characterised Philip’s reign could be neutralised. Carvajal had also accrued so much power in his hands that, following his death, it would have been difficult for any single official to piece his networks and ideas back together. According to his first biographer, on 4 April 1754, as he was conversing with the King, Carvajal reportedly had an anxiety attack.135 The King and the Queen carried him out of their chambers on their shoulders, and he was forced to lay in the bed that he had ‘installed a few months earlier’ to avoid wasting time walking from his home to the palace.136 According to this report, a fever took hold of him that night. He passed away four days later.137 Within three years, his networks and schemes dissipated. Ensenada was ousted, Barbara died, and, in the first study of melancholic-​manic illness, conducted by the physician and antiquarian Andrés Picquer, Ferdinand was diagnosed as suffering from this mental illness. Ferdinand followed in his father’s footsteps and withdrew himself from the administration of the Spanish Monarchy.138 In Naples, Charles vii had understood the Treaty of Aranjuez as a threat to his interests in Italy, and had signed a secret compact with France that would foster greater cooperation between the two countries and would allow Charles to retain control over both Naples and Spain if he became King of Spain.139 The battle to fill the vacuum of power at the Spanish Court precipitated the rise of the French-​born Irish soldier and official Ricardo Wall to the role of prime minister. Carvajal had relied on Wall for diplomatic missions, for industrial espionage, and to discuss the coverage of the British press of European 135 José de Rojas y Contreras, Historia Del Colegio Viejo De S. Bartolomé. Volume 2 (Madrid: Andres Ortega, 1768), 682. Torrepalma’s account of events, in his eulogy, was slightly different. 136 Rojas y Contreras, Historia, 682. 137 Rojas y Contreras, Historia, 683. 138 Jesús Pérez, Ross J Baldessarini, Núria Cruz, Paola Salvatore, Eduard Vieta, ‘Andrés Piquer-​ Arrufat (1711–​1772): Contributions of an Eighteenth-​Century Spanish Physician to the Concept of Manic-​Depressive Illness’, Harvard Review of Psychiatry 19:2 (2011), 68–​77. 139 Rohan Butler, “The secret compact of 1753 between the kings of France and Naples”, in Ragnhild Marie Hatton, Robert Oresko, G. C. Gibbs, H. M. Scott eds., Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of Ragnhild Hatton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 551–​580.

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politics. Wall was entirely aware of Carvajal’s schemes and his networks, and there was nobody closer to British politics in Spain than Wall. Wall, a descendant of an Irish Jacobite family, had served both for the Duke of Berwick and Charles vii before he was recommended to Carvajal.140 Under Carvajal’s employment, Wall became a part of London’s high society, a friend to a number of members of parliament, and a member of the Royal Society. He was known to frequent famous spaces of sociability in London, such as the opera, and even travelled with William Pitt the Elder to Tunbridge.141 As Prime Minister, William Pitt the Younger anticipated the possibilities and shortcomings of Wall’s position at the helm of the Spanish Empire: ‘he has it in his power to be an instrument of much good, or consequently, mischief, from the great knowledge of the inside of this kingdom which he carries with him’.142 On 23 August 1754, Michell Berichet, one of Frederick ii’s diplomats based in London, wrote to the Prussian King. Berichet believed that Wall would be able to ‘erase all the differences between the two crowns’ and that ‘it appears from their appraisal of the man that Spain will open their trade to the New World to the English and that this Crown will entirely divorce herself from France’.143 Wall’s first move was to try to study and organise all the information-​gathering projects and the commercial ventures that Carvajal had once managed. Wall established the Royal Company of Barcelona, as drafted by Carvajal, which was to revitalise the commercial ties between Barcelona, the Mediterranean, and the Caribbean.144 The dawn of the Seven Years’ War, and the death of Barbara of Braganza, created a crisis at the heart of the Spanish Monarchy. After Ferdinand retired to San Ildefonso, Wall was unable to issue essential orders that required the consent of the King. In this state of stasis, the court intrigues returned and the former Duke of Huéscar, then Duke of Alba, organised for Ferdinand’s testament to declare that his male offspring were to be the rightful heirs to the throne, thereby undermining Charles vii of Naples’ claim.145 In anticipation of his arrival in Spain, however, Charles named Wall his Secretary for War, and the French-​born Irish statesman found himself holding two titles for two separate Spanish kings: in charge of the State Department for Ferdinand, 140 Diego Téllez Alarcia, D. Ricardo Wall. Aut Caesar, aut nullus (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2008), 73–​93. 141 Alarcia, D. Ricardo Wall. Aut Caesar aut nullus, 133. 142 Quoted in Alarcia, D. Ricardo Wall. Aut Caesar aut nullus, 169. 143 Secrétaire Michell to Frederick, 23 August 1754, Politische Correspondenz Friedrich’s des Großen, in Œuvres de Frédéric le Grand –​ Werke Friedrichs des Großen (Trier: Digitale Ausgabe der Universitätsbibliothek Trier, 2010), 6451. 144 Oliva Melgar, Cataluña y El Comercio Privilegiado, 24. 145 Alarcia, D. Ricardo Wall. Aut Caesar aut nullus, 231.

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and responsible for the Secretary of War for Charles.146 Ricardo Wall, who had once embraced the motto of aut Caesar aut nullus, either a Caesar or a nobody, found that, in the absence of a clear sovereign of Spain, his absolute interim power was useless. Wall, who a few years earlier had been in charge of finding clockmakers in London, and who was perhaps best equipped to reaffirm the transnational networks that Carvajal had established, found himself in an impossible situation. A cosmopolitan official, Wall had once declared to the Duke of Huéscar: ‘I was born without a patria and the kindness of Kings granted me one’.147 But his power, too, derived from the Spanish King, as he noted that ‘since Europe has learned that the King is no longer capable of governing, that this monarchy is a body without a head, no state counts on us for anything’.148 Wall, then, found himself wondering just what the Spanish Monarchy was without a King. He turned to Spanish history and noted that the absence of Charles v had prompted the Revolt of the Comuneros, and that Charles had hesitated over whether he should arrive in Spain secretly or receive the welcome of a King.149 Wall recalled how Erasmus attributed the possession of America, a good part of Italy, Bourgogne, and even Castile, to unforeseen chance; how Erasmus had claimed that the valour and the conduct of Charles v played no part in his success.150 But history, in this case, was of no help. Wall was overwhelmed by the circumstances and the speed of change. He reflected upon the role of contingency in his own political life: ‘government amid the whims of fortune tends to arise from good conduct’, he wrote, ‘but there are times when the cost of one or the other consists of diligence and speed, for there is a reason why, to this day, Victory is depicted as a winged figure’.151 Once again, satires and popular writings decried another monarchical crisis, and denounced the state of stasis and inertia at the heart of the Spanish Crown.152 In a letter to Nicolas de Carvajal y Lancaster, the marquess de la Victoria, Director General of the Army, deployed the figure of a broken watch to evoke the chaos at Court, and the sense of temporal cataclysm: 1 46 Alarcia, D. Ricardo Wall. Aut Caesar aut nullus, 234. 147 Alarcia, D. Ricardo Wall. Aut Caesar aut nullus, 338. 148 Wall to Tanucci, 24 July 1759, Archivo General de Simancas. Estado, 6090. 149 Wall to Tanucci, 24 July 1759, Archivo General de Simancas. Estado, 6090; José Luis Urdañez and Diego Téllez Alarcia, “1759. El “Año sin rey y con rey”: la naturaleza del poder al descubierto”, in E. García Fernández, ed., El poder en Europa y América: Mitos, tópicos y realidades (Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 2001), 95–​110, 109. 150 Wall to Tanucci, 22 June 1762. Quoted in Urdañez and Alarcia, “1759”, 297. 151 Wall to Tanucci, 22 June 1762. Quoted in Urdañez and Alarcia, “1759”, 297. 152 Urdañez and Alarcia, “1759”, 229.

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God keeps pressing down on the clock’s hands, so we are with a King and without a King; the hands of the clock of the government are flying off the handles because all the wheels lack the Motor which directs them, and they are all moving as best they can, or by following their own interests.153 In the event, Wall considered creating a council made up of senior officials such as Alba, Sotomayor, and the marquess de la Mina to govern. But the pronouncements of such a council would have lacked weight in the absence of a royal authority. Instead, Wall forced Charles to travel to Spain by rescinding his title of the Secretary of War, and symbolically leaving Spain without a minister, or a sovereign.154 Spain, in the midst of the Seven Years’ War, was left without a ruler. Yet this was not the only way respond to a crisis or the only way to fill the gap left by an uncooperative monarch. Following the 1755 Lisbon earthquake, Carvalho took decisive action. As the natural disaster devastated the capital and the nobles fled, King José I turned to Carvalho to reorganise the Portuguese Empire. His views on Spain influenced his reforms. Carvalho had watched in horror as Spain and Portugal had negotiated a closer alliance, and had warned the treaty was the product of the ‘solid and strong plans of José de Carvajal and the marquess of Ensenada’.155 By establishing corporations and workshops throughout the peninsula, the two had stimulated Spain’s ‘factories’, and favoured Spain’s ‘active commerce’ to the detriment of Portugal’s economy.156 Building on a history of British and Spanish abuses of the terms of treaties with Portugal dating to those of Methuen and Utrecht, Carvalho explained that his close analysis of Spanish reform, a process ‘which had begun to awaken in 1720’, facilitated his understanding of Carvajal’s design: ‘it is important to consider, in these circumstances, that Spain has for some years now carried out these solid reforms’.157 Under the direction of Carvajal and Ensenada, argued Carvalho, Spain’s production of silk could potentially threaten to overtake not just Portugal, but Britain and France.158 To respond to these threats to Portuguese trade, Carvalho turned to the ideas he had developed while

153 Victoria to Sarria, 27 June 1759, in Marques de Sarria, Cartas familiares del Marques de la Victoria a Nicolas Carvajal y Lancaster, 1748–​1769, Archivo del Museo Naval. mss 2642. 154 Urdañez and Alarcia, “1759”, 229. 155 “Parecer de Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melho”, 126. 156 “Parecer de Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melho”, 126. 157 “Parecer de Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melho”, 117–​127. 158 “Parecer de Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melho”, 117.

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serving as an ambassador in London, when he had advocated for the establishment of a corporation like the British East India Company for the Portuguese Empire.159 Carvalho would go on to create the Company for Grão Pará and Maranhão, which was granted exclusive rights to trade with Brazil and successfully undermined the influence of foreign traders in the region. He also created a commercial council which served to both foster political economic debate and educate the nobility in these matters.160 And yet, when it came to establishing a clear diplomatic approach for Portugal, Carvalho struggled. The Seven Years’ War marked a turning-​point in eighteenth-​century European politics. It marked the end of the Utrecht Enlightenment and exposed the limitations of early eighteenth-​century Iberian pursuits of European cooperation.161 As the British politician and pamphleteer Philip Francis wrote, in his translation of Isaac del Pinto’s Traité de la circulation et du credit, ‘Pombal’ had imagined that ‘the authority of government in Portugal would produce the same effect that credit does in other countries’ and had failed to note that ‘the interposition of arbitrary power in matters of trade and property destroys all credit and confidence among men’.162 During and after the war, Carvalho appealed to many of the principles of Utrecht to strengthen Portugal’s relationship with Britain: he warned that the 1761 Family Pact between Madrid and France, which fundamentally shifted Spain’s foreign policy, was the revival of Louis xiv’s project.163 He appealed to Britain’s self-​interest by arguing that failure to protect Portugal would undermine its national credit by harming the flow of money between Lisbon and London.164 He returned to those early mid-​seventeenth-​century agreements that bound Portugal and Britain financially and politically to argue that these were the result of tyranny.165 Following the start of the American Revolution, in his 1 59 Jones Corredera, ‘The Making of Pombal’, 241. 160 Kenneth Maxwell, ‘Pombal and the Nationalization of the Luso-​Brazilian Economy’, The Hispanic American Historical Review 48:4 (1968), 608–​631, 610. 161 Pocock, Barbarism and Civilisation, Volume 1, 113. 162 Pinto, An Essay on Circulation and Credit, 245. On Francis see Linda Colley, ‘Gendering the Globe: The Political and Imperial Thought of Philip Francis’, Past & Present 209 (2010), 117–​48. 163 Dauril Alden, ‘[Marquis of Pombal to George III]’, The Americas 17:4 (1961), 377–​82, 379. The most important study of this topic is still Vicente Palacio Atard, El tercer pacto de familia (Madrid: csic, 1945). See also Gallego, El Motín de Esquilache, 352–​360. On European debates about Louis xiv, Utrecht, and the Seven Years’ War, see Armitage, Foundations, 166–​167. 164 L.M.E Shaw, The Anglo-​Portuguese Alliance and the English Merchants in Portugal, 1654–​ 1810 (London: Routledge, 2017), 191. 165 Shaw, The Anglo-​Portuguese Alliance, 149.

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letter to George iii, Carvalho explained that the British subjects in ‘British America’ were simply ‘copying and following to the letter the plans’ of the Bandeirantes in seventeenth-​century colonial Brazil; a group of Jesuit settlers who conducted expeditions to find rare minerals, and expanded the reach of the Portuguese Empire.166 Carvalho argued that upon discovering, in 1640, that Portugal had achieved independence from Spain, they improved the organisation of their settlements, and managed to counter the attacks of the Dutch Empire, ‘which at that time was fighting over land and sea against the strongest European powers’.167 If this small group of men, who had never experienced war, could fight the Dutch, argued Carvalho, the colony of Philadelphia would certainly defeat a British attack. George iii should therefore draw on the same principles that governed England, Ireland, and Scotland, grant these colonies a voice in parliament, and thereby secure their support during parliamentary debates.168 Iberian ministers understood the politics of negotiation, contestation, and lobbying all too well. The Seven Years’ War, more broadly, reminded Europe that treaty-​bound alliances were mercurial. European thinkers considered the meaning of the war.169 Jean-​Jacques Rousseau returned to Saint-​Pierre’s plan for perpetual peace to explore what had gone wrong.170 The most insightful part of Rousseau’s scheme to establish a Federation to arbitrate war and peace was his analysis of treaties. Once hailed as the result of a broader chain of events to negotiate peace, the conflicts of the 1740s and 1750s had demonstrated that treaties could only provide, according to Rousseau, a temporary truce and not a real peace.171 They were forms of legitimation of might and not right, for ‘the public Law of Europe has never been passed or sanctioned by common agreement’; they were not based upon any ‘general principles’; they varied ‘from time to time and from place to place’; they were but ‘a mass of contradictory 166 Alden, ‘[Marquis of Pombal to George III]’, 381. On the Bandeirantes, see A.J.R. Russell-​ Wood, The Portuguese Empire, 1415–​1808: A World on the Move (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 126–​129; Elliott, Empires, 268. On Spanish attitudes to the American Revolution see Gabriel Paquette and Gonzalo M. Quintero Saravia eds., Spain and the American Revolution: New Approaches and Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2020). 167 Alden, ‘[Marquis of Pombal to George III]’, 382. 168 Alden, ‘[Marquis of Pombal to George III]’, 382. On the British debates over the prospect of war with the Thirteen Colonies, see Colley, Britons, 136–​141. 169 On Vattel’s thoughts on the War of Spanish Succession see Armitage, Foundations, 165–​168. 170 On ‘enlightened despotism’, see Scott ed., Enlightened Absolutism. Jean-​Jacques Rousseau, A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe and The State of War. Translated by C. E. Vaughan. (London: Constable and Co., 1917). 171 Rousseau, A Lasting Peace, 47.

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rules’ which ‘nothing but the right of the stronger can reduce to order’.172 The wars that followed their failures, in turn, merely undermined the calibrated terms of each treaty, and blurred the meaning and context of each iteration in the perpetually expanding script of diplomacy: ‘all is confusion and bewilderment; the truth is obscured so hopelessly that usurpation passes for right and weakness for wrong’. The study of history no longer contributed to the reform of this pattern of behaviour since all that was the product of solid and robust negotiations melted into air: ‘In this general welter, all bearings have been so utterly lost that, if we could get back to the solid ground of primitive right, few would be the sovereigns in Europe who would not have to surrender all that they possess’.173 The terms of the 1763 Treaty of Paris, which put an end to the Seven Years’ War, reaffirmed Rousseau’s views, as representatives from Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal all agreed to the farcical article two that stated that every major treaty, from the Peace of Westphalia to the ratification of the Treaty of Utrecht, was to serve as ‘the base and foundation for the peace and present treaty’.174 The legacy of these treaties, therefore, became symbolic: per article two, all of these treaties would be renewed, and any former treaty between any of the parties involved would also be included, ‘as if they were here inserted in this treaty word for word’.175 In his Memorial to the General States, Louis xiv had appealed to the spirit of the law to justify his expansionism.176 The Treaty of Paris in turn appealed to the spirit of European treaties to legitimise the reconfiguration of imperial domains. The model of Utrecht had failed. In its absence, patriotism thrived. 1 72 Rousseau, A Lasting Peace, 47–​48. 173 Rousseau, A Lasting Peace, 48. Pocock has suggested that the ‘master works of Enlightenment historiography’ were produced and published around the time of the Seven Years’ War, and signalled that ‘the Europe of Utrecht which had occasioned that historiography came to an end’. See Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1, 113. 174 Cantillo, Tratados, 487. 175 Cantillo, Tratados, 487. 176 Louis suggested that once the representatives considered ‘the infinite Troubles which the Treaty of Partition would produce’, the States would no longer demand its implementation, as ‘the Misfortunes of obtaining it, will be common to all of Europe’. The States would understand that ‘there’s nothing can be a greater contradiction, than to abandon the Design of the Treaty, for the sake of adhering to the Terms of it’. Adhering to the terms would cause ‘Universal War’. Breaking the terms of the treaty, Louis insisted, would maintain peace. He entreated the States General to grasp the spirit of the treaty and ‘to distinguish betwixt’ the terms and the purpose of the treaty. Memorial from his Most Christian Majesty, presented by the Count of Briord. Containing his Reasons for Accepting the late King of Spain’s will, in favour of Philip of Anjou (London: J. Nutt, 1700). Rare Books. Huntington Library. 433175, 3–​10. See also Reflections upon the Memorial from his Most Christian Majesty (London: J.C. Merchant, 1700), Rare Books, Huntington Library. 55538, 3–​4.

­c hapter 6

Carthage’s Contractors The Ends of the Spanish Empire

1

Introduction

This chapter shows that the Esquilache Revolt was a manifestation of a political culture that understood the harmful effects that imperial ambitions had on everyday life. Charles vii, after travelling from Naples to Madrid to become Charles iii of Spain, focused on consolidating his influence over commercial networks in the Mediterranean and outsourced the implementation of key policies to contractors. These choices led to the disruption of the grain trade and sparked riots throughout the peninsula. Rioters, pamphleteers, and scholarly officials called on Charles iii to ‘listen’ to the Spanish people, reaffirmed the need for peace, and reimagined Spain’s role in the balance of power. Following the revolt, reformers sought to reorganise the administration of Spanish power and remedy the reputational crisis caused by the protests: the Jesuits were blamed for the riots and were banished from the Spanish Empire, and a colony that was to be governed on the basis of Enlightenment values was established in Sierra Morena. Instead of improving Spain’s image in Europe, the failure of these reforms drew attention to the shortcomings of the Spanish Crown. To counter these criticisms, ministers sought to create a Spanish nation state, and they increased censorship to narrow and oversee spaces of political debate. In the 1780s, following the American Revolution, radical Spanish thinkers began to challenge this approach to reform and called for fundamental political and social change. Constitutional ambitions emerged from political economic ideas, commercial networks, and cultural institutions that had gradually grown throughout the century. Long-​standing debates on corporations and sovereignty, in turn,were central to the pursuit of South American independence, Jeremy Bentham’s views on the future of the Spanish Monarchy, and the emergence of modern international law.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004469099_007

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The Grain Monopoly and the Voice of the People

On Sunday 23 March 1766, a crowd gathered outside the royal palace in Madrid and chanted ‘long live the King and death to Esquilache’.1 Charles iii, however, decided to take no risks and fled the palace.2 The riots quickly spread to cities like Zaragoza, Cuenca, Azcoitia, and Seville to protest against the reforms of Charles’s leading minister, the marquess of Esquilache. Official reports noted the generalised complaints about hunger and pointed to the high cost of bread as the cause of the riots.3 The years 1765 and 1766 were characterised by poor harvests throughout Europe, but the crisis in Madrid was the result of an attempt to monopolise the supply of grain to the capital.4 During Charles’s last years as King of Naples, the region had suffered a shortage of grain.5 Upon arriving in Spain, Charles diverted the circulation of grain through Madrid to furnish Naples. And one man controlled the supply. The marquess of Esquilache, who had worked as a contractor in Italy, managed the connection between the grain markets of Naples and Madrid and granted his family the exclusive contract to supply the Spanish capital.6 Esquilache then directed the Council of Castile to administer the supply of grain to the other parts of the peninsula. Yet his monopoly on the provision of grain to the capital upset the long-standing networks that had facilitated its circulation, as he mandated that all forms of transport in the east coast of Spain were to be made available to carry the crop from the Iberian to the Italian Peninsula.7 The disruption caused to the internal supply of grain was aggravated by two factors. The first was Esquilache’s introduction of new taxes, which were accompanied by the familiar demand, criticised by Zavala thirty years earlier, that tributes should be paid in a prompt fashion.8 The second was the attempt by an increasingly prominent official, Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, to introduce the free

1 Gallego, El Motín, 269. 2 Gallego, El Motín, 77. 3 Gallego, El Motín, 444–​447. 4 José Andrés Gallego, Esquilache y el pan (New Orleans, LA: University of the South, 1996), 1–​7. 5 José Miguel López García, El Motín Contra Esquilache (Madrid: Alianza Ensayo, 2006), 2–​30. 6 Gallego, El Motín, 333–​334. This chapter focuses on the heightened political influence of contractors during this period, and not on the growth and the dissolution of the economic networks of contractors throughout the empire. On the economic history of the rise of contractors in eighteenth-​century Spain see Rafael Torres Sánchez, Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 7 Gallego, El Motín, 333–​334. 8 Gallego, El Motín, 185.

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trade of grain.9 Campomanes and Esquilache implemented their policies at the same time, and thus provoked a crisis in the provision of the most essential crop to the people. In defence of his policy, Campomanes drew on a term that would become central to Charles iii’s political discourse –​the nation –​and argued that the implementation of free trade counted with ‘the great applause of all in this enlightened Nation’.10 The question of who made up the Spanish nation would haunt Charles iii’s reformers, and the answer would only emerge in the aftermath of the Peninsular War. This disruption to the grain trade was, however, necessary for Charles to achieve his imperial aims. It was a stunning demonstration of the new Bourbon King’s desire to maintain his control over Naples and establish a Mediterranean empire. A Carthaginian vision hovered over his ambitions: following Charles’s arrival from Naples, he sought to rule both territories and to establish a dialogue with the Sultan of Morocco.11 Campomanes was happy to assist him, as Charles had first approached him to praise his writings on the Carthaginian Empire.12 French diplomats were pleased with this shift: the abbé Beliardi, the French ambassador to Spain, believed the terms of the new 1761 Family Pact between Spain and France were the first steps towards the establishment of a Mediterranean Navigation Act that included Spain, France, Naples, and Venice, and which would undermine British trade in the region.13 By signing the Family Pact, Charles reverted to an ideal of dynastic diplomacy that was long gone –​as Choiseul wrote to the Duc d’Ossun, the French representative in Spain, the goal of an ambassador was to bolster the trade of the state they represented.14 Charles thus allowed French diplomats to achieve that which 9 10 11 12

13

14

On physiocracy and eighteenth-​century Spanish economic thought see Jesús Astigarraga and Javier Usoz, ‘Algunas puntualizaciones en torno a la fisiocracia en la Ilustración tardía española’, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 26:3 (2008), 489–​498. Quoted in Gallego, Esquilache y el pan, 184. On the policy towards Northern Africa, see Gallego, El Motín, 389–​396. Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, Antigüedad maritima de la republica de Cartago: con el periplo de su general Hannon (Madrid: Imprenta de Antonio Pérez de Soto, 1756). Jorge Maier Allende, Noticias de Antigüedades de las Actas de Sesiones de la R.A.H. (1738–​1791) (Madrid: Real Academia de Historia, 2011), 39–​40. See also Rafael Olaechea, ‘La diplomacia de Carlos III en Italia’, Revista de Historia Moderna: Anales de la Universidad de Alicante 8–​9 (1988), 149–​166; Felipe Álvarez Requejo, El Conde de Campomanes. Su obra histórica (Oviedo: Gráficas Summa, 1994), 75–​81. Alimento and Stapelbroek, “Trade and Treaties: Balancing the Interstate System”, in Alimento and Stapelbroek eds., The Politics of Commercial Treaties, 1–​77, 35. On Beliardi, see Didier Ozanam, ‘Les débuts de l’abbé Beliardi en Espagne (1749)’, Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez 5 (1969), 343–​361. Quoted in Gallego, El Motín, 353.

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they had pursued for half a century: the terms of the Pact, as Carvalho had anticipated, declared that it would ‘perpetuate the way of thinking of Louis xiv and his glorious memory’.15 A year later, Spain declared war on Portugal. Who, then, represented Spain’s economic interests? A week and a half before the start of the riots a series of texts titled Constituciones circulated the capital. Their goal was to establish ‘a body of defenders of the true interest of Spain’, to bring down Esquilache, and to secure a ‘decrease in the cost of those goods that are necessary for human life’.16 The revolt was accompanied by a flurry of pamphlets.17 These texts built on the main themes of the satirical writings and the political economic debates of the early eighteenth century: they vindicated the importance of peace, manufacturing, and, crucially, emphasised the need to ‘listen’ to the people. The anonymous ‘Letter to the Noble Corregidor of Madrid’ defended the riots by arguing that ‘reclaiming our rights was not a crime: informing the King of the deplorable state of our constitution was a heroic act’.18 A ‘Political Sketch’ reminded Charles iii of the seventeenth-​century writings of Diego de Albornoz to Charles ii: ‘government fails’, the author explained, ‘when a Prince forgets about public utility; those who are forgotten naturally forget about he who forgets them’.19 The satire ‘Confessions of the Women of Madrid’ claimed that women ‘who composed the plebs’ would rather ‘hang themselves’ rather than forgive the marquess of Esquilache for his usurpation of power.20 The anonymous ‘Petition to the King from the Plebs’ explained to the King that ‘the flock of people’ that ‘was granted to you’ had always respected the Monarchy, but were now threatening to show resistance if he did not follow their demands. Framing the revolt in a comparative European outlook, and in the context of the Seven Years’ War, the author declared that Britain, ‘prudent and sensible’ had armed its people and built its navy; France stood and watched; Naples was ‘all talk’, and all the Spanish King ‘thought about’ was ‘chopping hats’, in reference to Charles iii’s edict banning certain types of headwear.21 These texts were therefore not just 15 Cantillo, Tratados, 468. 16 Gallego, El Motín, 268–​269. 17 See Gallego, El Motín, 693–​722; Macías Delgado, El Motín de Esquilache a través de sus documentos. 18 Quoted in Macías Delgado, El Motín de Esquilache a través de sus documentos, 117. 19 Quoted in Macías Delgado, El Motín de Esquilache a través de sus documentos, 119. 20 “Confesión que han hecho las mujeres de Madrid para cumplir con el precepto de la Iglesia, siendo su confesor la Marquesa de Esquilache”. Reprinted in Gallego, El Motín, 719–​721, 720. 21 “Petición que hace al Rey Nuestro Señor la plebe de Madrid sublevada hoy 24 de Marzo de 1766”. Reprinted in Gallego, El Motín, 71–​713, 713.

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critical of Esquilache. The criticisms made against the Spanish King were serious ones: most of the writings that emerged before and immediately after the riots depicted Charles iii as either ignorant or tyrannical.22 One of the most widely issued pamphlets, Gemidos de España, defended tyrannicide.23 The revolt stirred up debates about systems of political representation and Spain’s role in Europe. One of the most sophisticated accounts of the riots was written by the Jesuit and diplomat Miguel Antonio de la Gándara y Pérez. A reader of Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, Jean-​Jacques Rousseau, Voltaire, and the Anti-​Machiavel, Gándara argued that the Council of Castile –​overshadowed by the Bourbon establishment alternative institutions –​remained the ‘true voice of the people’.24 Gándara disapproved of Philip’s penchant for war and praised Ferdinand’s policy of neutrality. Above all, he emphasised the need for peace to revitalise the empire.25 It was no surprise, then, that when the revolts exploded Gándara depicted them as the result of the people’s unhappiness with the King over his management of taxes and foreign affairs, and asked the King to ‘listen’ to his subjects.26 Subjects had ‘sacrificed their lives’ to establish the rule of the Bourbons in Spain, he explained.27 Spaniards were merely trying to ‘represent’ before Charles the true state of the empire.28 In Barcelona, Francisco Romá y Rosell, a lawyer and a local official, wrote his Las señales de la felicidad de España, a radical text, where he defended the public benefits of guilds and corporations, and reimagined Spain’s role in the balance of power.29 Romá encouraged Spanish officials to read Jakob Friedrich von Bielfeld’s Institutions Politiques and the Savary brothers’s Dictionnaire, and 22 23 24

Reprinted in Gallego, El Motín, 693–​721. Quoted in Gallego, El Motín, 477. Miguel de Gándara, “Apuntes sobre el bien y el mal en España”, in Almacen de Frutos Literarios Inéditos. Volume 1 (Madrid: Imprenta de la viuda de López, 1820), 3–​177; Jacinta Macías Delgado, El Abate Gándara y la Reconstitución Nacional de España en el siglo XVIII (Madrid: Editorial de la Universidad Complutense, 1986) Four volumes. Volume 1, lxxxvi and 91. 25 Gándara, “Apunte sobre el bien y el mal en España”, 119–​120. 26 Jacinta Macías Delgado, “La idea de la restauración de España y el motín contra Esquilache”, in José Ignacio Fortea López and Carmen María Cremades Griñán eds., Política y hacienda en el Antiguo Régimen. Actas de la II Reunión Científica de la Asociación Española de Historia Moderna. Volume 1 (Moratalla: Universidad de Murcia, 1993), 389–​ 396, 390. 27 Macías Delgado, “La idea de la restauración”, 396. 28 Macías Delgado, “La idea de la restauración”, 396. 29 A definition of felicidad that was in tune with early eighteenth-​ century Spanish writings on trust. For a more detailed analysis see Adriana Luna-​Fabritius, ‘Signs of Happiness: A Proposal for a New Spanish Empire’, History of Political Economy (Early View) (2021), 515–​532.

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engaged with a wide range of political and scientific works, including Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, comte de Mirabeau’s Théorie de l’impot, and a speech delivered at the Academy of Saint Petersburg by the natural scientist Johann Ernst Hebenstreit. He explained that facilitating ‘the involvement of Plebeians’ in the government of the empire would make ‘the Artisan class respectable’.30 Drawing on a foreign example to reflect on the politics of the Esquilache Revolt, he explained that Britain had ‘over the past two centuries’ demonstrated the benefits of this practice, and cited the example of the radical John Wilkes who, Romá suggested, had incorporated the support of the ‘Weaver’s Guild’ in order to ‘enter parliament’.31 In terms of European trade, Romá defended luxury as ‘a Public Dance which the whole village can join in’ and explained that it befell this ‘enlightened government’ to continue the industrial growth which the Carthaginians and the Romans had initiated.32 Above all, he considered the balance of power in Europe, and explained that perhaps one day ‘a plan that would amuse the more curious minds, such as the plan for Universal Peace of the Abbé de Saint-​ Pierre’ would emerge.33 Until then, he argued, Spain was fortunate to have lost control over its currency, since it meant that ‘to tilt the balance of power in its favour’ Spain would have to turn to ‘Population, Agriculture, Factories, and trade’ which were the ‘true and most robust riches of the state’.34 He then declared that a ‘very modern’ Spanish author had recently suggested that Spain could ‘incline the balance of power’ by drawing on ‘America’s treasures’ without fostering ‘Factories and Workshops’, in all likelihood referring to Carvajal’s plan.35 Romá explained that it would simply not be possible ‘that the metals that Spain’ received would somehow outnumber those that foreign nations acquired ‘through their Colonies or through smuggling’. These ‘coins’ already placed ‘greater weight on the balance’ of power than all those that Spain could

30 31

32 33 34 35

Francisco Romá y Rosell, Las señales de la felicidad de España, y medios de hacerlas eficaces (Madrid: en la Imprenta de Don Antonio Muñoz del Valle, 1768), 133. On Wilkes and his riots see Colley, Britons, 105–​116; Arthur Cash, John Wilkes: The Scandalous Father of Civil Liberty (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 221–​276; E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 62–​77. Romá y Rosell, Las señales, 133. Romá y Rosell, Las señales, 52, 136. Romá y Rosell, Las señales, 246. Romá y Rosell, Las señales, 10. Romá y Rosell, Las señales, 108. He appeared to refer to the schemes outlined in Carvajal’s Testamento Político and his Mis Pensamientos. We know that the Testamento was read by other contemporary Spanish officials, including those who served at the Council of the Indies.

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acquire.36 The Seven Years’ War had made that clear. Romá therefore rejected Carvajal’s scheme on the basis that it would not be possible to limit the smuggling of gold, silver, or Mexican pesos to other European territories. And as he offered solutions, or ‘pillars’, to establish reforms, Romá returned to Carvajal’s metaphor of the scales of power. If there were only ‘two Empires in the World’ the two would constantly tilt the balance, ‘which would never stop’ moving until one emerged victorious. This was precisely the type of disturbance –​the perpetual motion of war –​that Carvajal had tried to prevent. But ‘Europe’, Romá continued, was composed ‘of a multitude of Nations’ governed by ‘the system of equilibrium’ which ‘unites them every time pride threatens to ruin them all’.37 It followed ‘from this principle’ that any ‘debilitated or exhausted Power’ did not need to fear ‘its enemies’ since it could rely on ‘another one defending its cause’. The balance of power was a self-​correcting mechanism. And yet a nation that relied on this logic would merely be ‘another Power’s colony’.38 Spain’s goal should be, instead, to exploit ‘a war between two powerful rival Nations’, and improve its standing while the two commanding powers were at war.39 Romá returned, then, to the matter of the Esquilache Revolt. For such a nation to thrive, he continued, it had to foster ‘unity’. It had to accept the ‘Laws and Customs’ of the ‘victors’.40 The Austrian Queen Maria Theresa, he explained, had only resolved the tension between ‘Hungarians and Germans’ when the ‘Archduke’ had ‘appeared in Hungary dressed’ in their style, and ‘secured their perpetual union’.41 One could interpret this as a reference either to Charles iii’s arrival from Naples, and his need to adapt to Spanish traditions, or to austracismo; a call for the Spanish Bourbon King to accept Habsburg norms.42 But the lesson was clear from Romá’s concluding remarks: states ‘would allow themselves to be led by those who showed them love’, and ‘almost all misfortunes of societies, the annihilation and seditions, mostly [against] absolute Monarchies, where People only aspire to tranquillity, have their 36 37 38 39 40

Romá y Rosell, Las señales, 109. Romá y Rosell, Las señales, 282. Romá y Rosell, Las señales, 282–​283. Romá y Rosell, Las señales, 284. Romá y Rosell, Las señales, 305. For Pinto’s remarks on commerce and the harmful effect of weak neighbours on the general state of European trade see Pinto, An Essay on Circulation and Credit, 191. 41 Romá y Rosell, Las señales, 311. On this episode see Benedek Varga, ‘Making Maria Theresa ‘King’ of Hungary’, Historical Journal 64:2 (2021), 233–​54, 235 n. 7. 42 On austracismo see Jones Corredera, ‘The memory of the Habsburg Monarchy’, 953–​971.

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origins’ in the ‘lack of Patronage’.43 The implications of Romá’s arguments were damning: to avoid being a French colony, Spain should profit from the conflict between Britain and France, and the King should foster ‘public education’, and pay attention to the ‘public dance’ of luxury which would bring the people together.44 The riots thus reflected the influence of early eighteenth-​century efforts to connect debates about Spain’s role in Europe to the wellbeing of the people, draw on corporate structures to hold the King of Spain accountable, and make the provision of basic goods such as grain a more equitable one. Time after time throughout the century, Spanish political economists had explained that grain merchants and labourers shouldered the cost of war. Zavala, in his Representación, had tacitly criticised Goyeneche’s economic management when he had argued that the diversion of grain to supply the troops during and after the War of Spanish Succession had been one of the most harmful factors in undermining the wellbeing of the Spanish people.45 One of the anonymous pamphlets published during the revolt explained that Aragón and Castile lacked ‘grains to encourage labour’ as a result of Esquilache’s greed and his efforts to ‘hoard’ the supply for Madrid and the Court.46 Manuel Luengo, a Jesuit and a historian, wrote about the causes of the revolt, and explained that Esquilache had ‘irritated the character of the Spanish people’ by undermining the grain trade by virtue of the war with Portugal and the agrarian integration with Naples. War with Portugal, explained Luengo, had forced labourers to divert grain to supply the Spanish troops. Their cattle had gone unattended and the production of other goods had been ignored.47 The protests precipitated reform: the people were granted greater political representation to express their views regarding the grain trade. Within 43

The term used by Romá was ‘patrocinio’, which could mean protection, favour, or financial support. Romà y Rosell, Las señales, 324. 44 Romá y Rosell, Las señales, 285. On the influential austracista Amor de Soria’s views on Europe see Lluch ed., Aragonesismo Austracista, 25–​32. 45 Zavala y Auñón, Representación, 75–​76. On the supply of bread to the troops during the war see Anne Dubet, Un estadista francés en la España de los Borbones Juan Orry y las primeras reformas de Felipe V (1701–​1706) (Madrid: Editorial Biblioteca Nueva, 2008), 231–​232. 46 Gallego, El Motín, 78. 47 This Spanish view contrasted with the perception in Britain that by and large the people had benefited from war. Colley, Britons, 69–​70. Constancio Eguía Ruiz, El P. Isidro López y el Motίn de Esquilache. Estudio hecho sobre las fuentes (Madrid: Razón y Fé, 1935), 73. On Luengo, see Padre Luengo, Memoria de un exilio: Diario de la expulsión de los jesuitas de los dominios del rey de España (1767–​1768). Edited by Immaculada Fernández Arrillaga (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 2001).

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two weeks of the start of the riots, the Council of Castile passed a motion to allow lay subjects to vote on an annual basis, and to choose four deputies to represent and voice their views on the grain supply, at the town hall.48 A few days later, the Council of Castile wrote to the King to explain that these bodies ought to be consulted since they were ‘the abbreviated voice of the people’ and the mechanism ‘to represent or propose that which is convenient to the common good’.49 It was a reminder, and a reaffirmation, of the social pact at the core of the Spanish Monarchy: ‘these are the limits and rules prescribed by Laws, and by the general pact of society which is constituted in the political Constitution of the Monarchy’.50 The small but symbolically significant reform of the representation of the people’s voice reflected early eighteenth-​century expectations about corporate assemblies and their capacity to ensure political economic accountability.51 The Council of Castile continued to challenge Charles’s authority, and reminded him to ‘consult’ policy ‘reversals’ with its members.52 The Council argued that the introduction of new clothing standards was economically unsound: ‘luxury’, or consumption, was only beneficial if it contributed to the employment of Spaniards and to the growth of peninsular industries.53 Outside of Castile, officials based in Zaragoza and Barcelona further reminded the King of the importance of corporate representative bodies and their privileges.54 While dealing with these issues, however, the Crown had to confront a more significant challenge: the creation of a respectable environment for the King to return to Madrid. A few years earlier, Wall had considered forming a council to govern while the tensions between Ferdinand and Charles were resolved. But Wall had concluded that the council would have lacked the necessary authority to implement reforms without the approval of a King. Following the revolt, however, this plan was put into action, and a council was established 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

Consejo de Castilla, Auto-​acordado de los Señores del Consejo, consultado con su Magestad, por el qual se anulan las bajas de abastos hechas ó que se hicieren en los diferentes pueblos del Reyno por asonada, ó alboroto, etc (Madrid: Antonio Sanz, 1766), 3. Consejo de Castilla, Dictamen de 9 Junio de 1766. Archivio Segreto Vaticano. Segreteria di Stato. Spagna. 302, n. 22 and 23. Quoted in Gallego, El Motín, 311. Consejo de Castilla, Dictamen de 9 Junio de 1766. Stein and Stein, Apogee of Empire, 97–​98. On the Quito revolt, see Anthony McFarlane, ‘The “Rebellion of the Barrios”: Urban Insurrection in Bourbon Quito’, The Hispanic American Historical Review 69:2 (1989), 283–​330. Macías Delgado, “La idea de la restauración de España”, 389–​396. Macías Delgado, “La idea de la restauración”, 389–​396. Pablo Sánchez León, ‘Conceiving the Multitude: Eighteenth-​Century Popular Riots and the Modern Language of Social Disorder’, International Review of Social History 56:3 (2011), 511–​33, 524–​527.

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to find a way to ensure corporate bodies and members of the nobility disavowed the claims made by protestors. In a meeting presided by the Count of Aranda, Ricardo Wall, the Duke of Alba, the Duke of Sotomayor, the marquess of Grimaldi, and other prominent officials gathered to debate the matter.55 In the midst of another crisis, Spain was, once again, without a King. On paper, the list of Charles’s colonial reforms during his early years in power was impressive.56 But eight years after his arrival in Spain, the impact of his policies in the peninsula left much to be desired. The alliance with France, which Charles had agreed to by signing the secret pact of 1753, and Spain’s subsequent entry into the Seven Years’ War, had led to important territorial losses to Britain. Foreign observers like Count Rosenberg, the Austrian ambassador to Spain, feared that the taxes needed to finance the war would ruin the empire.57 Attempts to update the census and increase tax revenues throughout the empire led to riots in Chucuito and Quito.58 In the Spanish peninsula, tax collectors were met with legal suits and death threats.59 It was unsurprising that Spanish ministers considered how to use popular unrest to destabilise other empires, as a memoir sent to the French government discussed the means to resuscitate Jacobite ambitions in Britain.60 But if Charles’s lack of popular support intensified the search for ways to improve his image, the nobility’s reluctance to assist the Crown encouraged the King to gain greater control over Spain’s political and economic administration. On Sunday 31 March 1766, Esquilache and his family arrived in Tobarra, a town in the southwest of Spain, and spent the night at the mayor’s house. The scholar Antonio Capdevila, a local, wrote to Gregorio Mayans to inform him that he had sent letters to Carl Linnaeus and Albrecht von Haller through one of Mayans’s correspondents, and to recount how he had visited Esquilache at seven in the evening only to hear how, after arriving with the weekly delivery of the Gaceta de Madrid, the carrier had, upon walking past the mayor’s house,

55 Gallego, El Motín, 453. 56 These colonial reforms will be studied in a different book. The study of whether or not these reforms contributed to the growth of independence movements has overshowed the study of their role in undermining trust in the Spanish Monarchy in Spain. The best examples of this trend are Gabriel Paquette, “The reform of the Spanish empire in the age of Enlightenment”, in Astigarraga ed., The Spanish Enlightenment Revisited, 149–​167, 151; Kuethe and Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic World, 231–​270. 57 Gallego, El Motín, 163. 58 Kenneth J. Andrien, ‘Economic Crisis, Taxes, and the Quito Insurrection of 1765’, Past and Present 129 (November 1990), 104–​131; Gallego, Esquilache y el pan, 187. 59 Gallego, El Motín, 185. 60 Gallego, El Motín, 731.

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‘repeatedly shouted Long live the King, long live Spain, and death to the bastard Esquilache’. Capdevila had lied to Esquilache and told him that the man was likely a drunk.61 It was unlikely that the carrier was ordered to articulate these views, yet some historians have suggested that the Spanish nobility planned the riots and authored and circulated the incendiary pamphlets.62 According to this interpretation, the protests constituted a demonstration of aristocratic authority in the face of the publication of Campomanes’s 1765 Tratado de la regalia de amortización, which sought to vindicate the need to strip land and property from the ‘dead hands’ of the Church and the nobility.63 There was no evidence of coordination among the nobility in Madrid, let alone across the various Spanish regions where the revolts took place.64 Members of the Spanish aristocracy certainly used the riots to ensure that the King listened to their opinions. Isidro Carvajal y Lancaster, Bishop of Cuenca, claimed that Esquilache had ‘lost the Indies’, and Nicolas de Carvajal y Lancaster, marquess of Sarria, refused to deploy his troops against the people of Madrid.65 But the riots also generated conflict among sections of the elite, as the Council of Castile criticised the second most powerful commercial association in Spain, the Royal Society of Ranchers of the Mesta, a merchant guild which managed a great deal of the land and a significant share of the wool trade in Spain.66 One institution which had clearly challenged the King’s authority was the Council of Castile. Following the revolt, Pedro Pablo Abarca de Bolea y Ximénez de Urrea, Count of Aranda, was made the head of the Council, and he gradually removed some of the nobility’s hold over the Spanish political

61

Antonio Capdevila to Gregorio Mayans, 31 March and 1 April 1766, in Antonio Mestre Sanchis ed., Espitolario: Mayans y los médicos (Valencia: Deputación de Valencia, 2006), 224–​229. 62 For the latest analysis see Stein and Stein, Apogee of Empire, 81–​115. On the historiography of the topic see Gallego, El Motín, 34–​39. 63 Gallego, El Motín, 34–​42. Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, Tratado de la regalía de amortización (Madrid: Imprenta Real de la Gaceta, 1765). 64 Pierre Vilar compared it to the French “flour wars”. See Pierre Vilar, ‘El “motín de Esquilache” y las “crisis del antiguo régimen”‘, Revista de Occidente 107 (1972), 199–​249, 206. A comparative study of the revolt and Prussian responses to Frederick’s introduction, in 1766, of urban excise taxes would be valuable. On the latter see the Prussian popular response to the introduction of these new taxes in Florian Schui, ‘Taxpayer opposition and fiscal reform in Prussia, c. 1766–​1787’, Historical Journal 54:2 (2011), 371–​99. 65 Gallego, El Motín, 194–​196. 66 Carla Rahn Philips and William D. Philips Jr., Spain’s Golden Fleece: Wool Production and the Wool Trade from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press 1997), 77. On Father Sarmiento’s critique of the Mesta see Philips and Philips Jr., Golden Fleece, 78.

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administration.67 Aranda, however, was a traditional patrician Spanish minister with deep-​seated convictions: educated in Italy, he served as an ambassador in Portugal, where he clashed with Carvalho, and in Poland, a country he described as ‘a commercial society’ in his letters to Wall.68 During his time in Warsaw, he proposed the establishment of chorographic periodicals in Spain; he familiarised himself with the debates in European gazettes; and he engaged critically with the legacies of previous Spanish governments.69 He praised the growth of manufacturing in Spain under Carvajal, while acknowledging its modest success, and expressed admiration for Alberoni’s military tactics.70 Overall, the revolt demonstrated the peninsular discontent with Charles’s policies. Yet it also fostered speculation about its causes throughout Europe, and damaged the King’s image on an international scale.71 Many of the policies of the late 1760s in Spain were propaganda efforts which sought to show the transnational Republic of Letters, and other European courts, that Spain had embraced the Enlightenment values of reason and public happiness. They were bolstered by a particular vision of change in Spain, based on patriotism and the drive to carve a nation out of an empire. But providing a clear and consistent sense of who constituted the patria in a polycentric empire, or how the nation was meant to serve the average subject or the King, was not an easy task. 3

The Idea of the Nation: Outsourcing Propaganda and Colonisation

Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, Count of Campomanes, led the effort. Born in Asturias in 1723, he studied law and moved to Madrid, where he set up his own law firm in his early twenties.72 There he published a historical dissertation on the Knights Templar, which he dedicated to Carvajal, whose erudition, 67 Gallego, El Motín, 37. 68 Alarcia, Absolutismo e Ilustración, 113–​124; Cristina González Caizán, Cesary Taracha, Diego Téllez Alarcia eds., Cartas desde Varsovia. Correspondencia particular del Conde de Aranda con Ricardo Wall (1760–​1762) (Lublin: Twerset, 2005), 120. 69 On Aranda, Romá y Rosell, and Cameralism see Adriana Luna-​Fabritius, “Cameralism in Spain Polizeywissenschaft and the Bourbon Reforms”, in Ere Nokkala and Nicholas B. Miller eds., Cameralism and the Enlightenment: Happiness, Governance and Reform in Transnational Perspective (London: Routledge, 2019), 245–​266. 70 González Caizán, Taracha, Téllez Alarcia eds., Cartas desde Varsovia, 114, 136, 148–​163. 71 Gallego, El Motín, 462. 72 The best biography of Campomanes remains José María Vallejo García Hevia, ‘Campomanes, la biografía de un jurista e historiador (1723–​1802)’, Cuadernos de historia del derecho 3 (1996), 99–​176. See also Vicent Llombart, Campomanes, economista y político de Carlos III (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992).

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Campomanes claimed, ‘was well known throughout Europe’.73 This text caught the attention of the members of the Royal Academy of History. Carvajal then invited him to participate in a number of cultural enterprises.74 Over a short period of time, Campomanes wrote a number of works on law, history, and political economy that earned him honours and praise from academies in Corsica and Paris, and by the early 1760s he was an influential official with roles in the Treasury and in the Council of Castile, and was serving as the Director of the Royal Academy of History.75 On 2 April 1767, a commission dedicated to the exploration of the origins of the Esquilache Revolt, led by Campomanes, delivered its report and suggested that the Jesuits were to blame for the riots.76 In this report, the expulsion of the Jesuit Order was depicted as a form of fundamental historical renewal. The Jesuits, claimed Campomanes in his Dictamen, had historically fomented revolt from within and their latest disruptions had led to the Esquilache Revolt.77 The Jesuit Order had always been a ‘despotic’ body inside the Spanish Monarchy, and their despotism was partly responsible for the waning of the Spanish Empire: ‘In Spain, they favoured the revolutions of Catalonia and Portugal in 1640’; they ‘wreaked havoc, disarmed all of the branches of government’, and, Campomanes went on to argue, ‘the subsequent decline of this monarchy was derived from their actions’.78 Campomanes sought to portray the expulsion of the Jesuits as the end of fanaticism and ignorance in Spain: the Spanish Empire had, he hoped to show, exorcised the source of their social, political, and historical, problems.79 The diplomat, Jesuit, and author Miguel 73

Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, Dissertaciones Historicas Del Orden, Y Cavallería De Los Templarios, O Resumen Historical De Sus Principios, Fundación, Instituto, Progressos, Y Extinción en El Concilio de Viena (Madrid: Antonio Pérez de Soto, 1747), x. Campomanes implied that Carvajal and his ‘House’ were Portuguese. 74 Such as the translation of an Arabic treatise on agriculture, which was published as an appendix to a translation of Henri-​Louis Duhamel du Monceau’s own commentary on the British agronomist Jethro Tull’s work on the principles on land cultivation. Álvarez Requejo, El Conde de Campomanes, 88. 75 García Hevia, ‘Campomanes’, 126, 146–​171. 76 Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 266; Francisco Sánchez Blanco, El absolutismo y las luces, 86. 77 Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, Dictamen fiscal de expulsión de los Jesuitas de España. Edited by Jorge Cejudo and Teofanes Egido (Madrid: Fundación Universitaria Española, 1977), 69. 78 Campomanes, Dictamen, 115. On the semantic changes in the political discourse of the period see Sánchez León, ‘Conceiving the Multitude’, 522–​33. 79 On Carvalho’s use of propaganda and the Portuguese expulsion of the Jesuits see Kenneth Maxwell, “Pombal: the Paradox of Enlightenment and Despotism”, in Hamish Scott eds., Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and Reformers in Later Eighteenth-​Century Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 75–​118, 79.

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Antonio de la Gándara y Pérez, was, however, imprisoned for his commentaries on the revolt.80 And a few years later, in the mid-​1770s, the Spanish government decided to contract and finance those Jesuits who had migrated to Italy after they were banished from the Spanish Empire, and who were willing to write propagandistic defences of Spain’s character and the colonisation of the Americas.81 Their writings generated quarrels with Italian writers, who blamed the Spanish for ruining their language, and these debates were followed by the more significant Querelle de Movilliers, which saw a French encyclopaedist question whether Spain had ever contributed anything to Europe. In response, Spanish authors wrote long-​winded patriotic histories.82 But it was not clear that the Republic of Letters, or European rulers, were particularly interested in these stories. In the midst of the Querelle, when the Count of Mirabeau sought to undermine the establishment of the Spanish National Bank of San Carlos, which he saw as a threat to French financial interests in the Spanish Empire, he did not deploy stereotypes about Spaniards, but simply pointed to the parallels between the institution and the failed experiment of John Law.83 The problems that affected Spain’s international credit were not about to be solved by cultural battles. They were to be resolved by shrewd political rule and, in an attempt to demonstrate that Spain was pursuing serious reform, Charles iii sought to show Europe that he could enlighten one of the poorest regions in Spain. The same day that the report issuing the banishment of Jesuits from the Spanish Empire was delivered to the King, the Crown approved a project for the colonisation of Sierra Morena, which featured the migration of thousands of German and Swiss migrants.84 The genesis of this development was to be found in the letter written by the marquess del Puerto to Ensenada. The former 80 81

Macías Delgado, El abate Gandara, Volume 1, 1780–​1781. Niccolò Guasti, ‘Rasgos del exilio italiano de los jesuitas españoles’, Hispania Sacra 61 (2009), 257–​278. Kuethe and Andrien’s positive assessment of the profits generated by the banishment of the Jesuit Order overlooked its negative administrative consequences. See Kuethe and Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic World, 231–​270; Elliott, Empires, 308–​309. 82 Mestre Sanchis, Apología y crítica, 66–​68. Clorinda Donato and Ricardo López eds., Enlightenment Spain and the Éncyclopedie méthodique (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2015). 83 Honoré-​Gabriel de Riqueti, Comte de Mirabeau, De la Banque d’Espagne, dite de Saint-​ Charles (Paris, 1785), 79–​87. On this episode see Franco Venturi, The End of the Old Regime in Europe, 1776–​1789, Part I: The Great States of the West. Translated by R. Burr Litchfield (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 300–​302. 84 Edward Jones Corredera, “The ‘Indians of Europe’ in Sierra Morena: Reputation, Emulation, and Colonisation in the Spanish Enlightenment”, in Jenny Mander, David Midgley, Christine Beaule eds., Legacies of Conquest: Transnational perspectives on the Conquest and Colonization of Latin America (London: Palgrave, 2019), 182–​194.

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had expressed his fascination over the forty thousand Central European labourers, the “Foreign Protestants”, who, in 1749, had migrated to the British colony of Nova Scotia.85 Ferdinand vi studied the project as a means to populate desolate areas of the peninsula and the Americas but decided against it.86 Charles iii, by contrast, consulted the creole Pablo de Olavide on whether a project of this kind would reinforce Spanish imperial control over Puerto Rico, which had become the focus of inter-​imperial disputes during the Seven Years’ War.87 Olavide’s response denoted the need, once again, for the Crown to gain a better understanding of the reality of the Spanish Empire: ‘the matter of populating the Americas’, he argued, was ‘one of the most important ones for this Monarchy’ but ‘those territories are so different from one another that it is important to distinguish between them’.88 Olavide provided a sweeping report on the racial inequalities in the Americas: ‘the Blacks carry out all the labour’, he explained. According to Olavide, they served ‘under the greatest misery’; they were ‘exposed to the whims of their owners’; and they were regarded as ‘inferior’ by the white population. ‘It is incredible’, remarked Olavide, ‘how much the dignity of a White individual grows in those territories by virtue of nothing more than their colour’.89 If Germans and the Swiss were sent to Puerto Rico, they would ‘compare themselves to their peers upon arrival’, and would look down on the manual labour which was carried out by mulatos and mestizos. Olavide, moreover, warned that ‘a colony made up of foreigners could never be a Spanish colony’.90 He concluded that a government-​led process of creolisation was a viable option: Spaniards and Germans should cohabitate and the use of Spanish should be mandated in those territories. Endorsing Spain’s historical approach to empire, Olavide argued that it was the only way to stimulate loyalty to the King; the only way to avoid hosting a ‘congregation of peoples who would only think about itself without any love or fidelity to the King’. The risk was that Spain would create ‘a venal society, ready to throw itself at the first to seduce them with better conditions, and who could not be relied on to vigorously

85

Cayetano Alcázar Molina, Las colonias alemanas de Sierra Morena. Discurso leído en la solemne inauguración del Curso académico 1929–​1930 por el Doctor D. Cayetano Alcázar Molina Catedrático de Historia de España (Madrid: Universidad de Murcia, 1930), 7–​8. 86 Alcázar Molina, Las colonias, 8. 87 Alcázar Molina, Las colonias, 12. 88 Pablo de Olavide, Informe. Archivo Histórico Nacional. Estado 3465. Number 6. Not numbered. 89 Olavide, Informe. 90 Olavide, Informe.

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respond to an invasion’.91 Olavide concluded that there was a simpler solution to the problem of the lack of population in the Americas. Spain should simply increase the population by introducing a higher number of ‘blacks’ into the colonies so that they could labour the land cheaply.92 Olavide’s report was submitted to the King on the same year that a proposal drafted in Santo Domingo to establish a Spanish Code Noir was discussed by Spanish officials, but was ultimately rejected.93 Olavide’s views suggested, perhaps, the possibility of a more ambitious programme of reform. Hoping to depict Spain as a nation in the midst of enlightened reform, Charles did not want to draw on established imperial practices to ensure the success of the colonisation of Sierra Morena. Instead, the Crown looked to the migration of peoples carried out by Frederick ii and other European powers.94 But the imitation of other European nations in no way ensured the success of a venture and, in this case, it encouraged Spanish ministers to overlook the complexity of the task. Spanish officials drew attention to examples where this type of colonisation had failed, and warned that the establishment and the governance of a colony could not be outsourced: one Spanish administrator referred to the Mississippi Company scheme and explained that a ‘French Company formed in 1718 for the population and commerce in New Orleans’ had sought to carry out a similar project and had failed. The project was too costly and most of the migrants had left the area.95 Olavide may have known about these foreign examples: he had a close personal connection to the Peruvian elites and an acute understanding of their debates about speculation.96 He had, after all, arrived in Spain to be tried and imprisoned after he and his father had sought to defraud the colonial authorities in the aftermath of the 1746 Lima earthquake.97 Charles iii ignored the warnings of his officials. He took a chance on another contractor and he made Olavide the intendant of the projected settlements. Johan Kaspar von Thürriegel, the recruiting agent in charge of facilitating 91 Olavide, Informe. 92 Olavide, Informe. 93 Marcela Echeverri, Indian and Slave Royalists in the Age of Revolution: Reform, Revolution, and Royalism in the Northern Andes, 1780–​1825 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 99–​100. 94 Jones Corredera, “The ‘Indians of Europe’ ”, 186. 95 Anonymous, Informe. Archivo Histórico Nacional. Estado 3465. Number 8. Not numbered. On the way the migration scheme fitted within Law’s broader financial ambitions see Murphy, John Law, 165–​168. 96 Hill, Hierarchy, 135–​146. 97 Perdices Blas, Palbo Olavide el ilustrado (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1992), 31–​34.

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the travel of the Central European migrants to Sierra Morena, took advantage of the situation. While the King’s orders had mandated that the majority of migrants were to range between the ages of sixteen and forty, Thürriegel, who was paid on a per capita basis, introduced many older men and women who had never worked the fields.98 By the summer of 1768, the colony had made some progress, and featured over two thousand migrants.99 However, by September the number of deaths due to disease or poor living conditions had risen to four hundred and eighty-​seven.100 European courts and authors followed the scheme closely. The implementation of the plan was a disaster. German and Swiss settlers, upon witnessing the poor living conditions in the area, asked to return to their homes, rebelled against authorities, and were attacked by neighbouring villages. When German Franciscan priests were recruited and asked to bring peace to the colony, they found their compatriots in such a poor state that they defied the local Spanish officials. The priests sought to emphasise German customs and refused to speak to the Spanish ecclesiastical authorities. The Franciscan priests clashed with Olavide, who had hoped to integrate and assimilate the migrants into Spanish culture, and to encourage an exemplary work ethic in the colony.101 The priests sought to create an insurance company for the provision of basic goods, and Olavide rejected this proposal because he believed it stood in the way of the development of self-​interest and loyalty to the King.102 Tensions escalated. The leading Franciscan priest, Fray Fribourg, built a case against Olavide by writing to the Inquisition, the Austrian ambassador, and the Prince of Kaunitz, and he denounced the creole’s lack of piety.103 Leading reformers at Court warned Olavide of the growing influence of these claims. In response, Olavide drafted a letter to Charles iii. Olavide argued that the Franciscans had acted as a despotic body within the colony. By doing so, he evoked Spain’s unstable place in the realm of European civilisation. Olavide accused the Franciscans of treating Spanish lands as the Jesuits had treated the Americas: 98 99 100 1 01 102 103

Juan Marchena Fernández, El tiempo ilustrado de Pablo de Olavide: vida, obra y sueños de un americano en la España del S. XVIII (Seville: Ediciones Alfar, 2001), 65. Alcázar Molina, Las colonias, 40. Rafael de Lera García, “Conflictividad social en las Nuevas Poblaciones de Sierra Morena, 1767–​70”, in M. Aviles Fernández and G. Sena Medina eds., Carlos III y ‘las nuevas poblaciones’, Volume 3 (Córdoba: Junta de Andalucía, 1998), 41–​56. Jones Corredera, “The ‘Indians of Europe’ in Sierra Morena”, 182–​194. Perdices Blas, Pablo Olavide el ilustrado, 384–​385. Alcázar Molina, Las colonias, 53; Marcelin Defourneaux, Pablo de Olavide: el Afrancesado. Translated by Manuel Martínez (Seville: Padilla Libros, 1990), 215.

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…these priests want to see themselves as the missionaries of Sierra Morena, under the impression they were coming here to their missions and expecting a despotic and absolute degree of authority which their fellows had in the missions of the Indies.104 Olavide was condemned by the Inquisition and banished from Spain. Books on the experiment of Sierra Morena were published in Britain, France, Germany, and Russia, and the European understanding of the colony, and Charles’s reforms more broadly, was largely mediated through fictional tales about Olavide. The radical German author, Johann Pezzl, penned Faustin oder das philosophische Jahrhundert, a fictional work that saw its main character travel to Spain to meet Olavide in the utopian lands of Sierra Morena, where ‘no priest’ was ‘allowed to enter’.105 The philosopher August Adolph von Hennings wrote Olavides, a book about Olavide’s life which envisioned Sierra Morena as a failed utopia.106 The Italian bon vivant, Giacomo Girolamo Casanova, boasted in his Memoirs of having sketched the plans for the colonies, and claimed that, in 1768, he had sought to become governor of one of the settlements.107 The most influential analysis of the project, however, was the one written by the philosopher Denis Diderot in his work Don Pablo de Olavides.108 In this short book, Diderot portrayed Olavide as a bearer of the Enlightenment, and the text became the basis of the understanding of the colonisation of Sierra Morena as a struggle between fanaticism and progress. Diderot claimed that religious zeal had undermined the development of the colony: certain Protestants slipped into the group made up of Catholics, and we must observe that religious fanaticism is nowhere in Europe as violent as it is among Swiss Catholics. They are mostly coarse, superstitious, ignorant, intoxicated by the absurdities preached by their ministers.109

1 04 Olavide, 12 July 1772. Archivo Histórico Nacional. Estado. Estado 3465. Number 20. 105 Thomas Freller and Lola Campoy Felices, ‘El Faustino de Johann Pezzl. Ecos de la «cruzada de las luces» de Olavide en una novela alemana’, Cuadernos Dieciochistas 6 (2005), 299–​331, 319. 106 August Adolph von Hennings, Olavides (Copenhagen: gedrukt mit Godichischen Schriften, 1779). 107 Freller and Campoy Felices, ‘El Faustino’, 311. 108 Denis Diderot, Don Pablo Olavides; précis historique rédigé sur des mémoires fournis à M. Diderot par un Espagnol, in Oeuvres de Denis Diderot, Mélanges de littérature et de philosophie, Ouevres complètes de Diderot. Volume 3 (Paris: J.L.J. Brière, 1821). 109 Diderot, Don Pablo Olavides, 388–​389.

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According to Diderot, ‘upon ascending to the Spanish throne, Charles iii’s first act was to curtail the unlimited power of the Inquisition,’ but influential voices from within the Inquisition had corrupted the monarch, who had allowed the religious body to recover its influence. ‘What was needed’, explained Diderot, ‘was a new grand victim’: Olavide.110 The project that had aimed to show that Spain had embraced the Enlightenment instead reaffirmed the image of a backward and fanatical country that was incapable of reform.111 In this context, the idea of creating a Spanish state, distinct from the empire, became of the focus of Charles iii’s ministers. Campomanes, along with José Moñino, the future Count of Floridablanca, suggested that the Americas could no longer be regarded as colonies. The empire should instead be reconfigured as a ‘national body’.112 The idea of the nation, however, had yet to be defined. The process that had begun following the Esquilache Revolt gained momentum, for there was then a need to reorder the Spanish Empire –​the people, the administration, and the nobility –​in order to bolster trust in the Spanish Crown and improve its reputation abroad. Campomanes accepted and adopted much of the analysis of the philosophes regarding the inherent laziness of Spaniards. He echoed Montesquieu’s physiological and climatological theory when he stated that ‘this false self-​love of my nation is a pride born out of weakness and the lack of labour’, and he suggested that it was ‘well known that all lazy nations are proud’ and that ‘when they come to learn the benefits of work, they would rather perpetuate their ways and mock the work they do not want to do’.113 Campomanes believed Spanish reformers had failed ‘to provide the 1 10 Diderot, Don Pablo Olavides, 390–​392. 111 A study of the similarities and the differences between the Gálvez-​led Sonora Expedition and Sierra Morena would enrich our understanding of Spanish governance during this period. On Gálvez and the Sorona see Michael E. Thurman, ‘The Establishment of the Department of San Blas and Its Initial Naval Fleet: 1767–​1770’, Hispanic American Historical Review, 43:1 (1963), 65–​77. 112 Elliott, Empires, 321. 113 The French thinker believed that the performance of Northern European troops in Spain during the War of Spanish Succession was evidence of the relaxing effects that the warmer climate had on the individual. Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, 232 n. 3–​4; Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, Bosquejo de política económica española: delineado sobre el estado presente de sus intereses. Edited by Jorge Cejudo (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1984), 144. On Montesquieu’s influence on Campomanes’s commercial ideas about the Spanish Empire see Stanley J. Stein, “ ‘Extender a todo el Reino el comercio de América’: Pedro Rodríguez Campomanes as proyectista (1762)”, in Thomas Calvo and Alain Musset eds., Des Indes occidentales à l’Amérique Latine. Volume 2 (Mexico: Centro de Estudios Mexicanos y Centroamericanos, 2006), 461–​476.

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necessary means to awake it and encourage it to emulate the other active nations’.114 He encouraged the establishment of workshops that would ensure that the lay subjects were occupied, employed, and learning about mechanical arts.115 For Campomanes, it was clear that Spanish decline arose from within. A key shift took place in the administration of the empire. Charles iii’s leading officials –​José de Gálvez and Alexander O’Reilly –​reconciled the mechanisms of the traditional vice-​regal authorities with the tenacity of a contractor. These officials successfully ensured the improvement of tax collecting schemes, the partial erosion of structures of power dominated by creoles, and the fortification of territories.116 Government ministers sought to draw attention to the introduction of works by enlightened scholars into Spain, but the cultural policies that emerged were characterised by fear of dissent.117 Charles iii’s government revived and mobilised the Inquisition’s censorship to shape the nature and the scope of political debate.118 During Ferdinand vi’s reign, the Royal Academy of History had censored only four works.119 Under Campomanes’s tenure as the director of the institution, the rate of censorship increased exponentially.120 On the basis that they were crucial to the thought of the Jesuits, Spain banned the works of Francisco Suárez, Juan de Mariana, along with those written by many of the thinkers associated with the Jesuit Order.121 Campomanes defended the measure by drawing on recent European policies that had aimed to expand the power of the sovereign. The censorship of these works was ‘not a doctrinal and dogmatic prohibition’, rather, for the Spaniard, it was ‘economic providence, to free the Kingdom from sanguinary and seditious doctrines which are contrary to the necessary obedience and respect of the subjects to the law’.122 Campomanes studied the most popular genre in Spain, the almanacs, and 1 14 Campomanes, Bosquejo, 144–​150. 115 Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, Discurso sobre el fomento de la industria popular (Madrid: en la Imprenta de D. Antonio de Sancha, 1774), iv-​v. 116 Elliott, Empires, 307–​321. 117 See Pablo Sánchez León, ‘Conceiving the multitde’, 532–​533; Pablo Sánchez León, ‘Science, Customs, and the Modern Subject’, Contributions to the History of Concepts 12:1 (2017), 98–​120. 118 Mestre, “Inquisición y corrientes ilustradas”, 124. 119 Velasco Moreno, “Las censuras de la Real Academia de la Historia”, 117. 120 Velasco Moreno, “Las censuras de la Real Academia de la Historia”, 119. 121 Sánchez Agesta, El despotismo ilustrado, 109–​111. Elliott, Empires, 329. 122 Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, Juicio imparcial sobre las letras en forma de breve que ha publicado la Curia Romana en que se intentan derogar ciertos edictos del serenísimo señor infante Duque de Parma y disputarle la soberanía temporal con este pretexto (Madrid: Impresor de Cámara, 1769), 276–​277.

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described these as ‘the miserable remains of centuries of ignorance’.123 Yet he considered the merits of using them as vehicles for learning, and pondered whether this ‘route’ could be used to ‘demonstrate the enlightened nature of the government’ to the people. Instead, he banned all almanacs.124 The discussions over the translation and publication of the Scottish historian William Robertson’s History of America, in turn, denoted concerns about Spain’s image at home and abroad.125 As the disillusionment with the Charles iii’s administration grew, Campomanes and others would seek to construct a Bourbon, and a distinctly Spanish, tradition of century-​long reform, and hailed Philip v’s reign as the origins of Spanish structural changes. When drafting their policies, ministers embraced an uncritical form of foreign imitation to avoid the cycle of economic decline. There were, moreover, a range of successful reforms, including the introduction of a transatlantic postal service and the implementation of Ensenada’s cadastre. But the officials in power never answered the question of just whose interests they sought to represent and reaffirm. The self-​fashioning of the idea of the Spanish Enlightenment during this period was unstable: undefined ideas about the constitutive elements of the nation, and querelles with foreign authors, constantly reinforced the sense that reform was being pursued for the sake of external approval, which would never come, rather than for the sake of its own subjects, who were derided as ignorant.126 Ministers stressed Charles iii’s providential mission and encouraged subjects to trust the ‘Patriot King’, in the words of Olavide, since ‘heaven had reserved the great task for this century which is presided by an enlightened government that will know how to rule equitably’.127 Yet attempts to reconcile the model 123 Quoted in Emilio Martínez Mata, “Pronósticos y predicciones de Diego Torres y Villarroel”, in Manuel María Pérez López and Emilio Martínez Mata eds., Revisión de Torres y Villarroel (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca), 93–​104, 99. 124 Martínez Mata, “Pronósticos”, 99. 125 Gabriel Paquette, ‘Enlightened Narratives and Imperial Rivalry in Bourbon Spain: The Case of Almodóvar’s Historia Política de los Establecimientos Ultramarinos de las Naciones Europeas’ (1784–​1790)’, The Eighteenth Century 48:1 (2007), 61–​80. 126 On the construction of Philip’s image see Ricardo García Cárcel, De los elogios a Felipe V (Madrid: cppce, 2002) and Ricardo García Cárcel, ‘La opinión de los españoles sobre Felipe V después de la Guerra de Sucesión’, Cuadernos de Historia Moderna. Anejos 1 (2002), 103–​125. 127 The literature on enlightened despotism, now dated, failed to consider the political importance of propaganda. On enlightened despotism and the historiography of eighteenth-​century Spain see Hamnett, The Enlightenment in Iberia and Ibero-​America, 16–​23; Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform, 15–​18. Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, Tratado de la regalia (Madrid: La Gaceta, 1765), iv; Pablo de Olavide, Informe sobre la Ley agraria y cálculo sobre ella, Biblioteca Nacional de España. mss/​ 18547/​4. Not numbered.

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of a nation with the principles of the patria and the Spanish Monarchy were unsuccessful.128 This was particularly clear when considering the parallels and the differences between Goyeneche’s scheme and Aranda’s own. Goyeneche had sought to establish royal corporate councils in Peru, Mexico, and the Philippines subject to a learned assembly in Spain that would limit the influence of the King; the Count of Aranda’s scheme to establish three independent Kingdoms relied on trusting Spanish princes, or royal offspring, to manage those territories and provide annual contributions to the Spanish Crown.129 Goyeneche’s scheme was to render Philip more accountable; Aranda’s goal was to unify all territories around the idea of the Spanish Monarchy, and while the plan was soon forgotten, its underlying principle remained influential. As Britain implemented reforms to make the international organisation that the East India Company had become more responsive to the nation’s needs, Spain continued the search for a national model that could bolster the reputation and accommodate the necessities of the Crown.130 Ministers emphasised the novelty of Charles’s reforms. But many of the most important reforms carried out during this period emerged from older administrative debates. In his influential Comentarios a las Ordenanzas de Minas, the Mexican-​born jurist Francisco Javier de Gamboa, one of the most important creole reformers of the second half of the eighteenth century, recovered and reinterpreted debates over regulated companies to declare, in line with Herboso’s views, that the silver mines produced merely ten percent of the silver that could be extracted with better management. Gamboa proposed the establishment of a company to solve these financial issues.131 His text collected many of the plans for reform that José de Gálvez would later enact, and it was the source used by the foremost explorer of the Enlightenment, the German natural scientist Alexander von Humboldt, to write about the mining industry in his influential Essai Politique.132 Humboldt, in turn, reified

128 On the idea of a composite imperial nation see Josep Maria Fradera, Citizens and Subjects in the British, French, Spanish and American Empires. Translated by Ruth Mackay (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018). 129 Elliott, Empires, 367. 130 Colley, Britons, 85–​98. L. Stuart Sutherland, ‘The East India Company in Eighteenth-​ Century Politics’, The Economic History Review 17:1 (1947), 15–​26; L. Stuart Sutherland, ‘Lord Shelburne and East India Company Politics, 1766–​9’, The English Historical Review 49:195 (1934), 450–​486. 131 Brading, Miners, 160. Charles iii sent German mining experts to improve the state of the mines. See Lane, Potosi, 171–​173. 132 Brading, Miners, 129.

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Herboso’s vision of a traveller who would amplify knowledge of the Spanish American mining industry in Europe.133 One of the most important reforms of the period was the implementation of the decree that proclaimed the introduction of ‘free trade’ in the Spanish Empire. The ports of Cuba, Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico, Trinidad, and Margarita were to be connected to those in Cádiz, Sevilla, Málaga, Alicante, Barcelona, Cartagena, Santander, La Coruña and Gijón.134 The bulk of these connections reflected Carvajal’s projected trade routes, and his proposal to establish corporations that connected these areas of the empire, as sketched out in his Testamento Político. The decree tied together the provincias outlined in Carvajal’s text but did not rely on corporations to conduct trade: the proposed goal was to, once again, try to undermine the Cádiz monopoly and to regain control over trade.135 The debate over the alternativa was likely a part of the institutional memory of the Council of Indies: in 1778, when the free trade decree was edited, members of the Council cited Carvajal’s unpublished Testamento Político to justify the reform.136 In the 1780s, under the government of José Moñino, Count of Floridablanca, a more challenging and critical form of enlightened critique of Spanish governance emerged.137 Drawing on familiar complaints about diplomatic betrayals, Floridablanca accused France of failing to uphold the terms of diplomatic agreements, and declared that the King of Spain could not tolerate this behaviour from France.138 Paradoxically, as Floridablanca sought to distance Spain from France, Spanish historians mirrored the French shift towards the study of the merits of seventeenth-​century parlements, and began to reconsider and reinterpret Spain’s Habsburg representative bodies.139 Thinkers, historians, and ilustrados all sought to transcend the limits of previous debates: discussions on 133 For a problematisation of Humboldt’s work see Cañizares-​Esguerra, Nature, Empire, and Nation, 112–​128. 134 Virginia León Sanz and Niccolò Guasti, “The Treaty of Asiento between Spain and Great Britain”, in Antonella Alimento and Koen Stapelbroek eds., The Politics of Commercial Treaties in the Eighteenth-​Century Balance of Power, Balance of Trade (London: Palgrave, 2017), 151–​172, 171, n. 55. 135 Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform, 102. In response to the introduction of free trade, the Caracas Company issued a report outlining its military and economic contributions to the Monarchy which drew on the writings of Uztáriz, Zavala, Argumosa, Marcenado, and Ulloa. See Hussey, Caracas Company, 233. 136 Stein and Stein, Apogee of Empires, 161. 137 Elliott, Empires, 367. 138 Juan Hernández Franco, La gestión política y el pensamiento reformista del Conde de Floridablanca (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 1984), 193. 139 Francisco Sánchez Blanco, “Dinastía y política cultural”, 569–​596.

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the meaning of public happiness or the works of leading Enlightenment philosophers had taken place, but many increasingly wondered to what end.140 Lay men and women were to be instructed in mechanical arts rather than formally educated; the nobility was to give up its authority but there was no desire to develop a middling class; creole elites retained control of the colonies, and therefore it was natural to wonder just whose interests the Spanish Monarchy was representing. Charles iii and his ministers used nascent ideas of the nation to paper over the shortcomings of the Spanish Crown instead of pursuing the construction of a modern nation state. They never resolved the question of who the Spanish Empire was for. Other European empires and, gradually and more outspokenly, local officials, colonial elites, and indigenous communities throughout the empire, answered that question for them instead.141 There was, however, one official who continued to support Charles iii’s propaganda after his death in 1788. In 1792, in the midst of the French Revolution, Campomanes was asked to assist in the establishment of the Consejo de Estado. In his writings, he continued to advocate for agricultural and industrial reform, and he rejected the possibility of negotiating commercial treaties with other states. Catherine’s League of Armed Neutrality, and Alexander Hamilton’s writings about the union in the Federalist Papers, had emphasised how armed neutrality could increase a territory’s creditworthiness, bolster transterritorial alliances, and ultimately favour the power at the helm of an alliance.142 As Hamilton had remarked, adherence to the union would allow the emerging United States ‘to become the arbiter of Europe’ and to ‘incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate’.143 Campomanes defended the establishment of armed neutrality but opposed 140 On translations and political economy see Jesús Astigarraga, “Connecting with the Enlightenment. European Political Economy in Eighteenth-​Century Spain”, in Elizabeth Franklin Lewis, Mónica Bolufer Peruga, Catherine M. Jaffe eds., The Routledge Companion to the Hispanic Enlightenment (London: Routledge, 2019), 99–​111. 141 Hamnett, The End of Iberian Rule, 53–​71. 142 Mark Somos, ““A price would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality”: Alexander Hamilton’s political economy and early American state-​building”, in Koen Stapelbroek ed., War and Trade: The Neutrality of Commerce in the Inter-​State System (Helsinki: Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, 2011), 184–​211. 143 Mark Somos, “Open and Closed Seas: the Grotius-​Selden Dialogue at the Heart of Liberal Imperialism”, in Edward Cavanaugh ed., Empire and Legal Thought: Ideas and Institutions from Antiquity to Modernity (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 322–​361, 349; Alexander Hamilton, “The Utility of the Union in respect to Commerce and a Navy”, in The Federalist (The Gideon Edition). Edited with an Introduction, Reader’s Guide, Constitutional Cross-​reference, Index, and Glossary by George W. Carey and James McClellan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 49–​55, 51.

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commercial treaties, and pointed to the difficulties Portugal faced as a result of agreeing to them. He noted that a treaty of this kind with Britain would lead to nothing short of the ‘perpetual slavery of our trade’.144 He believed, instead, that acquiring further information about colonial trade was the answer. The Spanish government could ‘gather more material on the best means to supply those possessions’ in the Atlantic and the Pacific.145 He repeatedly emphasised the need for ‘neutrality’ and patience, since events altered the situation in Europe on a daily basis. But he also wondered how long Spain could ‘quietly watch the scene that will shake the system and equilibrium with which we have governed’, and bemoaned the fact that Spanish officials had not paid enough attention to the growing power of the United States.146 Campomanes feared that France and Poland would implode, and that Europe would be at the ‘mercy’ of the ‘arbitration’ of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. All other European nations should, in his view, present a united front to preserve the old equilibrium, and launch a ‘counter-​revolution’.147 He carefully surveyed the political constitution of each country and, once again, he returned to the idea of the nation, and compared the situation of the masses in France and in Spain.148 The French National Assembly, he argued, was unsustainable, because ‘every well-​ordered government’ had to follow a number of ‘principles’, he explained, and on the margin of his manuscript he wrote the words: ‘aristocracy, arms, army, navy, commerce, rents, peoples, colonies, conquests, and propaganda’.149 Campomanes then proceeded to study the causes behind the popular support for the French Revolution. The ‘vulgo’, or the masses, he explained, would 144 Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, Borrador de las segundas observaciones que van formando el Conde de Campomanes par combinar el sistema político de Europa en el estado actual que tiene en el presente mes de mayo de 1792, Archivo Campomanes. 26/​ 17, 26. See also María Victoria López-​Cordón Cortezo, ‘Relaciones internacionales y crisis revolucionaria en el pensamiento de Campomanes’, Cuadernos de historia moderna y contemporánea 1 (1980), 51–​82. 145 Campomanes, Borrador, 27. 146 Campomanes, Borrador, 32 and 93–​94. 147 Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, “IV Observaciones”, in Extracto y observaciones sobre los papeles reservados que han circulado en consecuencia de lo acordado en el Consejo de Estado de 28 de mayo de 1792, Archivo Campomanes, 26/​17, 1–​10, 4–​5. 148 Campomanes, Estado mayor de los negocios políticos de la Europa en la actualidad consideradas las dos revoluciones de Francia y Polonia, en que directa o indirectamente interesa el equilibrio de las naciones, Archivo Campomanes 26/​27, 30. On debates about public opinion in the 1760s see Astigarraga, A Unifying Enlightenment, pp .196–​198. For a more detailed study on those debates from the 1780s to the 1810s see Antonio Calvo Maturana, ‘ “Is it useful to deceive the people?” The Debate on Public Information in Spain at the End of the Ancien Régime (1780–​1808)’, Journal of Modern History, 86:1 (2014), 1–​46, 13–​40. 149 Campomanes, Estado mayor, 29.

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always rally behind any ‘novelty that could improve its situation’ without first reflecting on its merits.150 The revolutionaries had ‘won them over by granting them real advantages’ which were ‘there for all to see’.151 But Campomanes then shifted his tone and provided a surprisingly sympathetic reading of the behaviour of the French subjects. Their revolution was, in fact, a call for liberty against those ‘authorities’ that had ‘shackled them’ with ‘feudal servitude’.152 The freedom that came from ‘the abolition of feudal servitude’, he argued, was one of the ‘rewards’ that the French people had ‘recovered’ through the present revolution.153 The ‘constitution’ of the French crowd, Campomanes explained, resembled that of ‘Germany and other parts of the North’.154 To expect the French people to return to the old order was ‘like expecting a slave who had, through his own effort, recovered his own liberty and escaped from captivity’ to return to his master.155 But the Spanish masses, he clarified, were not like their French counterparts. ‘The calls for liberty and freedom’ sought to liberate the French masses from feudalism and ‘the Spanish people’, Campomanes continued, had ‘never been subject to feudal servitude’. This explained why these calls ‘had not been well perceived in Spain’.156 It was striking that the author of a treatise on the ‘dead hands’ of the nobility and the clergy should suggest that the Spanish people had not had to endure the hardships of feudalism.157 In his report on the need to foster more ‘free hands’, Campomanes had sought to establish that any feudal norms and institutions in Spain were an affront to Spain’s history and its legislation, but he had accepted that ‘many’ would ‘see this as paradoxical given the reception of these practices’.158 And yet Campomanes’s views were consistent with one strand of his writings. In the midst of the French Revolution, Campomanes continued to tilt at windmills and focused his attention on another querelle. 1 50 151 152 153 154 155 156 157

Campomanes, Estado mayor, 30. Campomanes, Estado mayor, 30. Campomanes, Estado mayor, 31. Campomanes, Estado mayor, 30. Campomanes, Estado mayor, 31. Campomanes, Estado mayor, 31. Campomanes, Estado mayor, 31–​32. On the shifting meaning of the term ‘dead hands’, or ‘manos muertas’, see the excellent study: Justo García Sánchez, “El Tratado de la Regalía de amortización”, in Gonzalo Anes Álvarez ed., Campomanes en su II centenario (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 2003), 251–​306. 158 Campomanes, Tratado de la regalía de amortización, 280. Campomanes used the term ‘free hands’ or ‘manos libres’ a number of times throughout the text. See Campomanes, Tratado de la regalía de amortización, 47, 107, 263, 246.

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Campomanes’s attempts to engage with philosophical history fundamentally distorted his appreciation of Spain’s past. To show Europe, and William Robertson in particular, that Spain had not endured feudalism, had been one of Campomanes’s ambitions for decades. In one of his earliest letters to the Scottish historian, Campomanes had praised his History of America, and had explained that he hoped to find the time to show Robertson that ‘feudalism’ had ‘never taken root in Spain’.159 Their correspondence had continued and Robertson had drawn on the Spanish sources that Campomanes had provided him with to show that Bourbon Spain had carried out important reforms.160 The fire of the War of Spanish Succession, had, in Robertson’s reading, not been a destructive force but had instead ‘kindled’ and ‘called forth’ the ‘ancient spirit’ of Spain.161 Campomanes, in turn, had addressed Robertson’s questions regarding the ‘admission of the Indians to the Clergy and the Regular Order’ in the Spanish Empire, which touched on the matter of the ‘dead hands’ in the Americas.162 Campomanes had argued that there were plenty of examples of ‘Indians’ who had become clerics: ‘here we have an elderly Tlaxcalteca, a priest’, Juan Cirilo de Castilla. Castilla had sought to establish a school dedicated to the formation of indigenous priests.163 He arrived in Madrid ‘at the age of 34’, explained Campomanes, with the ‘sole goal’ of ensuring the admission of ‘Indians’ to ‘Colleges and Seminaries’ so that those with ‘vocation’ could teach others in their own tongue and spread the faith, ‘to the greatest advantage of their closest ones’.164 Castilla’s proposal, Campomanes continued, ‘received favourable responses’ in Madrid, which included the commission of a college that had been recently vacated by the Jesuits following their expulsion from the Spanish Empire.165 Predictably, however, Castilla’s efforts had been stalled by the ‘dead hands’ of the local elites: these ‘dispositions’ and changes made

159 Reproduced as a historical curiosity in London’s newspapers. See The Gentleman’s Magazine. Volume 67 (London: John Nichols, 1790), 125. 160 See Frederick G. Whelan, ‘Eighteenth-​ century Scottish Political Economy and the Decline of Imperial Spain’, Journal of Scottish Historical Studies 38:1 (2018), 55–​72; Gabriel B. Paquette, ‘The image of imperial Spain in British political thought, 1750–​1800’, Bulletin of Spanish Studies 81:2 (2004), 187–​214, 202–​205. 161 William Robertson, The History of America. Volume 2 (London: W. Strahan, T. Cadell, 1777), 406. 162 Campomanes to Robertson, 27 June 1787. Archivo Campomanes 21/​20. I would like to thank Felix Waldmann and Jeffrey Smitten for bringing this letter to my attention. 163 On Castilla see Margarita Menegus and Rodolfo Aguirre, Los indios, el sacerdocio y la Universidad en Nueva España, siglos XVI-​XVIII (Mexico: unam, 2006), 110–​111. 164 Campomanes to Robertson, 27 June 1787, 3–​4. 165 Campomanes to Robertson, 27 June 1787, 3.

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by the Spanish Crown to the ‘Laws of the Indies’ had not ‘taken effect’ because of the resistance of the ‘Superiors and the local employees’ on the ground.166 Campomanes had never addressed the issue of feudalism in full. He had, instead, chosen to focus on implementing the empire-​wide ban on Robertson’s work.167 He had frequently portrayed the true Spanish constitution, which in his view had originated with the Visigoths, as a bulwark against the advance of feudalism and its abuses, and had published a ‘Discourse’ on the ‘Chronology of the Visigothic Kings’ on this theme.168 Other thinkers had assisted him in this task. The Piedmontese historian Carlo Denina, writing in defence of Spain’s contributions to Europe, had contributed to Campomanes’s campaign, and had explained that if Robertson had, in his History of the Reign of Charles V, been more careful in his research, he would have noted that feudalism had not spread equally throughout Europe: he would have noticed the parallels between the constitutions of England and Aragón, and he would have realised that contemporary European authors had shown that Spaniards ‘had enjoyed greater liberty at that time’ than their contemporaries.169 Campomanes, then, in depicting the popular support for the French Revolution as the pursuit of freedom from feudalism, was merely trying to win another round in another querelle. It was another attempt to wage a cultural battle that fundamentally distorted the difficulties that the Spanish people faced and misrepresented the nature of the political changes that were happening in Europe. It was, like many of the policies he oversaw, not Enlightenment reform but propaganda.

166 Campomanes to Robertson, 27 June 1787, 3–​4. Campomanes was rather open about the fact that, to his knowledge, there were no ‘Indian clerics or friars’ in Tierra Firme, very few in New Spain, and ‘perhaps’ a more sizeable group in Peru ‘because there are a larger number of families of natives with the possibility of providing them with the means to gain literacy’. The Archbishop of Manila, according to Campomanes, ‘had a habit’ of recruiting ‘Indians’. Campomanes to Robertson, 27 June 1787, 6. 167 On this saga see Cañizares-​Esguerra, How to write a history, 160–​201. 168 Jesús Cañas Murillo, ‘Vicente García de la Huerta y los “Retratos de los Reyes de España” un problema bibliográfico y una aclaración’, eHumanista: Journal of Iberian Studies 27 (2014), 89–​168; Antonio Mestre, “La imagen de la Iglesia visigoda en la mentalidad de los ilustrados españoles. El caso de Mayans y Campomanes”, in Cabildo Insular de Gran Canaria eds., Homenaje a Antonio de Béthencourt Massieu. Volume 2 (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: Ediciones del Cabildo Insular de Gran Canaria, 1995), 463–​483; Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, “Campomanes medievalista”, in Anes Álvarez ed., Campomanes en su II centenario, 35–​116. Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform, 78–​79. 169 Carlo Denina, Lettres Critiques pour servir de supplement au discours sur la question que doit-​on a l’Espagne? (Berlin: George Jacques Decker, 1786), 49–​51. See Edward Jones Corredera, ‘Carlo Denina’s Lettres Critiques: Transnational History in an Age of Information Overload’, Journal of Early Modern History 23:6 (2019), 519–​541.

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This would not be the last time that Campomanes used a tortuous teleological account of Spanish history to paper over the inadequacies of his views on the nature of the nation, and to avoid critically engaging with the failures of the Bourbon Monarchy, since Campomanes went on to resume his role as Director of the Royal Academy of History. But he also spent the last few years of his life trying to reaffirm trade ‘with those remote territories’ which individuals would find too costly to trade with by themselves, ‘like the Philippine Islands’, and regulating a corporation: the Philippine Company, established in 1785.170 While he was critical of its privileges, he accepted that they should remain in place because they were the outcome of the King’s will, and therefore had to be respected.171 There was, he explained, one way for the Company to be useful for the nation. Since Spanish merchants in the region frequently found themselves ‘in the dark’ as they pursued their commercial interests in China, Company officials should collect and study ‘geographical, historical, and commercial writings’ about Pacific trade.172 4

Constitutionalism in the Spanish Empire and the International Order

Constitutional debates throughout the Spanish Empire benefited from ideas and institutions that emerged throughout the eighteenth century and which have frequently been overlooked. At least four of them deserve our attention: the legacies of archival legal debates, the enduring impact of corporate cultural institutions, the intellectual consequences of transatlantic migration, and the role of commerce in shaping diplomacy. Under Napoleonic occupation, Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, the most influential thinker in the drafting of the Cádiz Constitution, claimed that Spain already had a constitution in its medieval code of laws.173 Spain’s ‘historical constitution’ demonstrated the 170 Reflecting Uztáriz’s views on the topic. Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, Reflexiones sobre el comercio español en Indias (1762). Edición y estudio preliminar de Vicente Llombart Rosa (Madrid: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1988), xxxviii-​xxxix. 171 José María Vallejo García Hevia, ‘Campomanes y la Real Compañía de Filipinas sus vicisitudes de organización y funcionamiento (1790–​1797)’, Anuario de historia del derecho español 63–​64 (1993–​1994), 847–​896, 870. 172 Quoted in García Hevia, ‘Campomanes y la Real Compañía de Filipinas’, 872. 173 On Jovellanos, see Silverio Sánchez Corredera, Jovellanos y el jovellanismo: una perspectiva filosófica (Oviedo: Pentalfa Ediciones, 2004). The historiography on the Spanish constitution is extensive but for a deft analysis see José María Portillo Valdés, “La Constitución Universal”, in José Álvarez Junco and Javier Moreno Luzón eds., La Constitución de Cádiz: historiografía y conmemoración (Madrid: cepc, 2006), 85–​100.

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body of the state was indivisible and supreme and it turned on the balance between the Cortes and the King.174 To explain himself he drew on the writings of an unlikely thinker: the Jesuit antiquarian Andrés Marcos Burriel. Burriel was born in Cuenca on 8 December 1719.175 He was formally educated by the Jesuits and informally taught by Gregorio Mayans, who encouraged him to read Johann Gottlieb Heineccius’s writings on natural law.176 As a teacher at the Colegio Imperial de Madrid, he wrote to Mayans that Spaniards had much to learn from Leibniz, Descartes, and Gassendi.177 When the founder of the Royal Academy of Spain sought to ban the entirety of the works of Hugo Grotius, he sought to prevent it. When he discovered that the Inquisition had asked Jorge Juan and Antonio Ulloa to state, in their Observaciones, that Newton’s theories clashed with the teachings of the Church, Burriel immediately wrote to Jorge Juan to ask him to do no such thing. ‘The common feeling in Europe’, and the Church’s attitude towards writings such as these, he explained, could be understood by reading Lodovico Antonio Muratori’s writings. Everyone agreed that Newton was, in fact, correct.178 In the 1750 edition of the Observaciones, Burriel wrote a brief history of natural science which featured a summary of the debates between Giovanni Domenico Cassini and Newton regarding the latter’s theory of relativity. In order to further contribute to these scholarly endeavours, he drafted a sweeping educational programme that drew on the oldest handmaiden of the Spanish Empire: the Company of Jesus. Jesuits from each region would select the four best students and educate them so they could serve ‘as the nation’s credit’ abroad.179 They would be educated in Latin, French and Italian; they would learn about geography and chronology; and they would study universal and Spanish histories. They would then advise the Spanish King as to how to best rule the Spanish Empire.180 The proposed professionalisation of counsellors who could deal with global affairs reflected the changes that, Burriel believed, had taken place in the eighteenth century. In his view, most contemporary European writers described the sixteenth-​century as

174 José Luis Fernández Fernández, Jovellanos: antropología y teoría de la sociedad (Madrid: Universidad Comillas, 2001), 191–​192. 175 Alfonso Echánove Taro, La preparación intelectual del P. Andrés Marcos Burriel, S. J: 1731–​ 1750 (Madrid: csic, 1971), 9. 176 Taro, La preparación, 48. 177 Taro, La preparación, 18. 178 Taro, La preparación, 79. 179 Taro, La preparación, 192. 180 Taro, La preparación, 189–​197.

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the critical century, the seventeenth century as the philosophical age, and the eighteenth century as the era of diplomacy.181 Impressed by his ambition, Carvajal recruited Burriel to lead his reform of Spanish administrative archives. An important strand of his research focused on gathering and collecting all of Spain’s legislation.182 Burriel’s original goal, as he framed it, was to emulate other European nations who enjoyed collections of their own laws, and the publication of a syncretic work on the topic was intended to educate both Spanish and European readers.183 This project of archival consulting soon became an attempt to overhaul the study of Spanish history: the study of privileges facilitated an improved understanding of geography and the analysis of chronology could refine contemporary views of the origins of legislation.184 Burriel decided to focus, above all, on the reappraisal of the medieval legislation, the Siete Partidas.185 Burriel argued that the medieval Fuero Real, issued by Alfonso x, had never been the Fuero of Castilla, but one that simply collected, and represented, the legal frameworks of León, Castile, and other regions.186 The conclusion of Burriel’s investigations, which he explained in a letter to the Council of Castile, was that Castile’s original constitution had been a ‘foral’ one. It was not the product of monarchical intervention.187 Burriel’s letter was republished in 1787 and Jovellanos, in turn, drew directly on Burriel’s conclusions to re-​evaluate the origins of Spanish sovereignty.188 It was not just early eighteenth-​century ideas that facilitated ambitious schemes of constitutional reform. Early eighteenth-​century corporate institutions provided a template for the creation of cultural and administrative councils. The second royal economic society, the Basque Society of Friends, was founded by the Count of Peñaflorida, the son of one of the founders of 181 Pedro Álvarez de Miranda, Palabras e Ideas: el léxico de la Ilustración temprana en España (1680–​1760) (Madrid: Real Academia Española, 1992), 210. On Burriel’s role in the creation of ‘patriotic histories’ see Cañizares-​Esguerra, How to write the history of the New World, 145–​154. 182 Margarita Gómez Gómez, ‘Critica histórica y archivos: el caso de España en el siglo XVIII’, Historia. Instituciones. Documentos 12 (1985), 199–​232, 218–​232. 183 Dolores del Mar Sánchez-​González, “El padre Burriel y los orígenes de la Historia del Derecho”, in J. Alvarado ed., Historia de la literatura jurídica en la España del Antiguo Régimen (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2000), 607–​639, 612. 184 Sánchez-​González, “El padre Burriel”, 612. 185 Sánchez-​González, “El padre Burriel”, 616–​620. 186 José María Portillo Valdés, Revolución de Nación: Orígenes de la cultura constitucional en España 1780–​1812 (Madrid: boe/​c epc, 2000), 73. 187 Portillo Valdés, Revolución de Nación, 73–​74. 188 Santos M. Coronas González, ‘España: nación y constitución’, Anuario de historia del derecho español 75 (2005), 181–​212, 194–​195.

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the Caracas Company, and Manuel Antonio de Altuna, a scholar who had corresponded with Rousseau in Paris.189 The founders had originally established an academic salon which featured an electrical machine, and which hosted debates on the mechanics of electricity and Benjamin Franklin’s scientific writings.190 Building on this assembly, an economic society was established in 1765. Modelled on the logic of a corporation, most members were Basque individuals who did not reside in the region but who had commercial or military positions throughout the empire.191 The society had a representative at the Spanish Court in Madrid and agents in Seville, Cádiz, and throughout the Americas.192 This was the model exported to other parts of the peninsula and the empire in order to encourage the discussion of useful knowledge among the Spanish elites, and to provide the nobility and wealthy merchants with a space to discuss political matters in spaces that could be overseen by the Spanish Monarchy.193 These societies facilitated the growth of a model of agrarian economic development that saw the traditional Spanish labourer as a symbol of patience, predictability, and peace.194 To complement these reforms, and to facilitate communication between the Crown and the creole elites, the second half of the eighteenth century saw the expansion the consulados.195 Drawing their policies from the Bilbao Ordenanzas, these were largely successful institutions and worked together with the establishment of intendants throughout the empire.196 Unlike the early eighteenth-​century corporate schemes that devolved greater authority to the elites in the Spanish peninsula, the consulados granted greater power to local colonial authorities.197

189 Robert Jones Shafer, The Economic Societies in the Spanish World, 1763–​1821 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1958), 27. 190 Jones Shafer, The Economic Societies, 28. 191 Jones Shafer, The Economic Societies, 32–​33. 192 Jones Shafer, The Economic Societies, 33. 193 Jones Shafer, The Economic Societies, 48–​50; José Antonio Maravall, ‘Las tendencias de reforma política en el siglo XVIII español’, Revista de Occidente 52 (1967), 53–​82, 59. 194 On their ambitions see Koen Stapelbroek and Janni Marjanen eds., The Rise of Economic Societies in the Eighteenth-​ Century Patriotic Reform in Europe and North America (London: Palgrave, 2012), 1–​25. 195 Stein and Stein, Apogee of Empire, 169. 196 Gabriel B. Paquette, ‘State-​ Civil Society Cooperation and Conflict in the Spanish Empire: The Intellectual and Political Activities of the Ultramarine Consulados and Economic Societies, C. 1780–​1810’, Journal of Latin American Studies 39:2 (2007), 263–​98. 197 Fidel J. Tavárez, ‘Colonial Economic Improvement: How Spain Created New Consulados to Preserve and Develop Its American Empire, 1778–​1795’, Hispanic American Historical Review 98:4 (2018), 605–​634.

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The cross-​cultural connections that emerged from transatlantic trade, in turn, led to the migration of families from Central Europe and from Ireland. The Irish Joyes family were based in Southern Spain. Through their family firm, they managed a great deal of bills of exchange between Spain and Britain, and were helped by their ties to the influential political economist Bernardo Ward.198 Inés Joyes y Blake was born in Madrid in 1731 and, despite not receiving a formal education, she hosted the English traveller Joseph Townsend and translated Samuel Johnson’s The History of Rasselas, Prince of Abissinia.199 But her major work was the appendix attached to her translation: her Apología de las Mujeres.200 Like Mary Wollstonecraft, whose work she may have read, she was ‘no friend of citing times past with each step’ for tradition was no longer a valid form of authority, and she appealed to the authority of ‘popular opinion’ instead.201 Dignity and reason, she claimed, ‘should be the only chains that hold us’ together.202 It was incumbent upon women to ‘use the luces that God’ had given them to reform custom and practice, and to understand that a woman’s self-​worth was not based on her appearance.203 Women, therefore, ought to spearhead social reform by educating the men around them, and their own male children, on the importance of the equality of the sexes, and in order to create a ‘virtuous future’.204 The migration of merchants contributed to the development of other ideas and corporations in Spain: François Cabarrus, who established the National Bank of San Carlos, was the son of wealthy French merchants who had migrated to Bilbao and who had invested in the Caracas Company.205 The Spanish thinker who was to prove most influential outside the peninsula, in turn, emerged from the rich intellectual life of the entrepôts in the Basque 1 98 Bolufer Peruga, La vida y la escritura, 45, 50. 199 On the intellectual context of her work see Mónica Bolufer Peruga, “Translation and Intellectual Reflection in the works of enlightened Spanish women: Inés Joyes (1731–​ 1808)” in Anke Gilleir, Alicia Montoya, and Suzan van Dijk, eds., Women Writing Back /​ Writing Women Back (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 327–​345. On Townsend’s visit see page 330. 200 The most important analysis of her life remains Bolufer Peruga, La vida y la escritura. 201 Inés Joyes y Blake, El Príncipe de Abisinia: Novela. Traducida del inglés por Dª Inés Joyes y Blake; va inserta á continuación una apologia de las mugeres en carta original de la traductora a sus hijas (Madrid: en la imprenta de Sancha, 1798), 189. Bolufer Peruga, “Translation”, 339. Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Men and a Vindication of the Rights of Woman and Hints. Edited by Sylvanna Tomaselli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 41. 202 Joyes y Blake, El Príncipe, 190. 203 Joyes y Blake, El Príncipe, 203. 204 Joyes y Blake, El Príncipe, 204. 205 Aragón Ruano and Augulo Morales, ‘The Spanish Basque Country’, 152.

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territories.206 The Biscayan Economic Society hosted a seminary to teach students mathematics, algebra, geometry, dancing, Latin, French, history, and fencing. One of the best pupils was Valentin de Foronda y González.207 In a Disertación, Foronda y González reconciled two of the most important tropes of eighteenth-​century Spanish reformist thought: the peaceful and industrious labourer and the investor. Those who opposed the privileges granted to the Philippine Company should understand it as a ‘skilled labourer’ who grew crops where there were none only to ‘share’ the crops fairly among his ‘compatriots’ in due time.208 Foronda y González was later appointed Consul-​General to the United States and became a member of the American Philosophical Society.209 In 1803 he proposed the transfer of the bulk of Spanish imperial territories to Britain in exchange for Portugal and Gibraltar. Some of those spaces in the Americas, he argued, could be traded to ‘commercial companies, and to those princes who have a mania for possessing territory thousands of leagues away, when they have more than they need in their own home’.210 The similarities with Carvajal’s scheme denoted the lack of change regarding Spain’s geopolitical dilemmas. But, in this time of flux, constitutional reform was possible. Foronda y González penned a number of reflections on the ongoing Spanish constitutional debates and, as part of his correspondence with Thomas Jefferson, shared his ideas about the need for a legislative body that was capable of keeping the three branches of government ‘in equilibrium’.211 Jefferson praised Foronda y González’s reflections on constitutional discussions, and noted that his proposal had ‘one feature which I like much; that which provides that when the three co-​ordinate branches differ in their construction of the constitution,

2 06 Venturi, The End of the Old Regime, 248. 207 On Foronda’s intelectual context see Maravall, ‘Las tendencias de reforma política en el siglo XVIII español’, 80–​82; José Manuel Barrenechea, Valentín de Foronda: reformador y economista ilustrado (Álava: Diputación Foral de Alava, Departamento de Publicaciones, 1984). 208 Valentin de Foronda, “Disertación sobre la nueva compañia de Indias Orientales”, in Miscelania, o colección de varios discursos (Madrid: Manuel González, 1793), 42–​61, 59–​60. On the strand of thought that saw the peaceful labourer as the ideal subject see Edward Jones Corredera, ‘Labouring Horizons: Passions and Interests in Jovellanos’ Ley Agraria’, Dieciocho 38:2 (2015), 267–​290. 209 Robert S. Smith, ‘A Proposal for the Barter and Sale of Spanish America in 1800’, Hispanic American Historical Review 41:2 (1961), 275–​286, 275. 210 Ahead of the Adams-​Onís Treaty, or Florda Purchase Treaty, of 1819. Smith, ‘A Proposal’, 276. 211 Valentin de Foronda, Apuntes ligeros sobre la nueva Constitución: proyectada por la Magestad de la Junta Suprema Española, y reformas que intenta hacer en las leyes (Philadelphia: En la ymprenta de Thomas y Jorge Palmer, 1809), 8.

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the opinion of two branches shall overrule the third. Our constitution has not sufficiently solved this difficulty’.212 The matter of the character of the Spanish constitutional government was the central question of the 1810s Cádiz debates. The most revolutionary thinker of this period was León de Arroyal.213 After studying at the University of Salamanca, he was involved in the Royal Academy of Arts of Seville, which brought him into contact with leading thinkers like Olavide.214 Arroyal then worked as a local official and was radicalised by the lack of interest of the Spanish Court in his schemes for local reform.215 In his Cartas al Conde de Lerena, he revived older questions of representation and corporations.216 In one of the most acerbic satires of eighteenth-​ century Spain, Arroyal provocatively stated that Spain was the only nation that held its ‘assemblies’ in a bullfighting ring.217 When censors asked him to explain the meaning of his satires, he defended his writings by arguing that they belonged to a Spanish political satirical tradition. This tradition, he explained, featured Quevedo, Cervantes, and the popular writer Diego Torres y Villarroel.218 In the concluding remarks of his Cartas, Arroyal criticised those who defended ‘the hereditary nobility as a pillar of the monarchy’ when this was in fact ‘a ghost’.219 He explained that ‘the ignorance of centuries, failing to make a difference between King and Kingdom, has confused the needs of the body and the head’, and he suggested instead that ‘a kingdom is comparable to a shareholder Company’ whereby benefits should depend on contributions.220 Arroyal’s constitutional plans for reform reconfigured earlier schemes in order to re-​establish public trust in Spain. He cited Zavala and concluded his text by praising and developing ‘Loynaz’s thought’ on shifting the tax burden so that ‘everyone’s contribution was based on their consumption and their property’.221 ‘Civil liberty’ was ‘enslaved’ and the ‘citizens’ lacked 212 Jefferson to Foronda, 4 October 1809, in Thomas Jefferson, The Works of Thomas Jefferson. Federal Edition (New York and London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904–​5), 118. 213 José Pallarés Moreno, León Arroyal o La aventura intelectual de un ilustrado (Oviedo: Instituto Feijoo de Estudios, 1993). 214 Pallarés Moreno, León Arroyal, 26. 215 Pallarés Moreno, León Arroyal, 43. 216 Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes [León de Arroyal], Cartas político-​económicas. Edited by Antonio Rodríguez Villa. (Madrid: M. Murillo, 1878). Scholars initially believed that Campomanes was the author of the Cartas. 217 León de Arroyal, Pan y Toros (Mexico: Imprenta de Ontiveros, 1820), 12. Pallarés Moreno, León Arroyal, 255. 218 Pallarés Moreno, León Arroyal, 45. 219 Arroyal, Cartas, 268. 220 Arroyal, Cartas, 30, 240, 247. 221 Arroyal, Cartas, 252. For his critiques of Loynaz’s plan see 11 and 171.

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‘representation’.222 The establishment of a cadastre and a fairer system of taxation would, Arroyal explained, ‘return civil liberty to the citizens’.223 Throughout the century, then, Spain’s most radical and impressive efforts at reform were most effective when they acknowledged and confronted the reality of the Spanish Empire. Arroyal understood that, in the face of imperial discontent, the generation and dissolution of trust would shape the world that was to come: he considered how Britain had successfully ‘inclined’ the ‘balance of trade’ to its benefit, and criticised the East India Company’s influence on Britain’s social fabric; he argued that the practice of jobbing had ruined Europe; and he anticipated that ‘Africa’ would soon free itself from the shackles of slavery.224 The rivalry of Britain and France on the one side, and of Austria and Prussia on the other, preserved ‘the equilibrium of power in Europe’: Spain had to focus instead on the source of its true wealth which, he argued, lay in the Iberian Peninsula, and stimulating trust therein should be the government’s focus. The ‘Spanish constitution’ remained a monarchy ‘as defined by Archytas’, the Greek philosopher; a form of mixed government that was represented in the ‘admirable organisation of our primitive Cortes’.225 In the late eighteenth century, generating trust in this constitution remained an urgent topic of discussion: ‘freedom of thought’ and ‘freedom of speech’, he argued, would foster ‘a spirit of trust and mutual interest’.226 Trust, after all, would be needed to face the great challenges that loomed ahead, as Arroyal wondered: ‘we lost Flanders, we lost Italy; why then would we not lose Peru and Mexico? And, if we did, what role will we then play in the world?’227 A creole official who was all too familiar with the politics of corporate interests had a very clear answer to Arroyal’s dilemma. For Francisco de Miranda, selling information about the state of the Spanish Empire granted him entry to elite diplomatic spaces. Once he had gained access to the privileged spaces of power, he used his time to convince thinkers, diplomats, monarchs, and prime ministers of their mutual interest in an independent United States of South America. Diplomacy, he believed, could allow him to achieve the freedom he desired for his people.

2 22 Arroyal, Cartas, 20. 223 Arroyal, Cartas, 254–​257. 224 Arroyal, Cartas, 159, 155, 235. 225 Arroyal, Cartas, 160, 27. On Archytas’s view of harmony see Carl Huffman, Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean, Philosopher and Mathematician King (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 603–​604. 226 Arroyal, Cartas, 156. 227 Arroyal, Cartas, 161.

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Nobody exploited the many identities available to Spanish imperial officials quite like Miranda. Born in Caracas, Miranda owed his earliest experience with Spanish imperial politics to a clash between his father’s corporate militia and the local elites. Sebastián de Miranda was afforded a number of privileges by virtue of the colour of his skin which allowed him to set up his business in Caracas after migrating from the Canary Islands.228 He was made captain of a new local militia, the Company of White Canary Islanders. However, his commercial interests soon threatened those of the local Caracas elites, like the Bolívar family, who profited from the status quo and supported the Caracas Company throughout the eighteenth century. Along with other families that made up the local elite, they created their own rival militia, and sought to undermine Sebastián de Miranda.229 Francisco Miranda sought to remove himself from the situation: he first served as a naval officer for the Spanish Crown; he documented his travels around the Mediterranean; and he took note of cultural sites and of his reading of the Quran.230 After serving the Crown for years, he would later claim to have received a letter from members of the Caracas elite who had once opposed his father. In the letter, these individuals allegedly asked him to return to Venezuela and to liberate the colony from Spanish oppression.231 The resolution of a racialised corporate conflict was thus integral to Miranda’s autobiographical revolutionary script. Miranda then conducted his own Grand Tour as a soldier, diplomat, thinker, and scientist, in order to garner support for his independence project. He visited the United States, where he used his credentials as a learned official to gain access to meetings with Alexander Hamilton and Samuel Adams.232 He travelled around Europe and met Catherine ii in Russia, who he provided with information about the fur trade. Together, they studied the possibility of a conquest of the west coast of the Spanish Empire.233 He then sought to capitulate on the Nootka Sound crisis to gain British support for his project and thus travelled to London. When the British failed to support his independence project, he migrated to France in the midst of the French Revolution, and, by virtue 228 Ricaurte Bohanerges Carrero Mora, ‘Los blancos en la sociedad colonial venezolana: Representaciones sociales e ideología’, Paradígma 32:2 (2011), 107–​123. 229 Karen Racine, Francisco de Miranda: A Transatlantic Life in the Age of Revolution (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2003), 5–​6; Ferry, The Colonial Elite, 208–​210. 230 Racine, Francisco de Miranda, 15. 231 Racine, Francisco de Miranda, 28. 232 Joselyn M. Almeida, ‘Border crossing with Rousseau: Emile and Francisco de Miranda’s Tour of the United States, 1783–​1784’, Atlantic Studies 9:4 (2012), 387–​408, 388. 233 Joseph O. Baylen and Dorothy Woodward, ‘Francisco De Miranda in Russia’, The Americas 6:4 (1950), 431–​449, 437.

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of his military skills, he was given a job as commander of the Revolutionary Army.234 Disappointed by the violent turn of events, Miranda summoned a series of fellow prospective South American revolutionaries in Paris to write a declaration of self-​determination titled the Act of Paris. Olavide declined the invitation to sign the document but appeared as one of the collaborators in the final text.235 The terms of the Act of Paris were inspired, in part, by the writings of the Jesuit Juan Pablo Viscardo, who depicted British cooperation with a liberated South American empire as a form of perpetual peace, and thus the visions of two Jesuits, Burriel and Viscardo, who reconciled their antiquarian practices with Enlightenment ideals, were at the heart of Hispanic constitutional reform.236 The terms of the Act of Paris were, moreover, remarkably similar to those that Carvajal had once pursued with Britain but this time, instead of granting Spain greater independence from France, they were to liberate the overseas territories from the shackles of the Spanish Crown. According to the Act of Paris, the independence of the Spanish Americas would be secured by a treaty with Britain, and, in exchange for their naval and military cooperation, Britain would receive financial compensation.237 The ‘Bank of London’ was to establish a ‘close association with banks in Lima and Mexico City’, and the treaty was to grant the ‘most favourable nation’ status to Britain, along with the concession of exclusive rights to ‘a canal route’ through Central America.238 But instead of coordinating the alliance through the transnational corporation, Miranda was to serve as military leader of all the regiments in the Spanish Americas.239 Miranda then travelled to London to try, once again, to convince the British government of the benefits of Spanish American independence and, on this occasion, he met Jeremy Bentham.240 Miranda and Bentham developed an 2 34 John Moreau, ‘The Trial of Francisco De Miranda’, The Americas 22:3 (1966), 277–​91. 235 Marchena Fernández, El tiempo ilustrado, 100. 236 Merle Edwin Simmons, Los Escritos de Juan Pablo Viscardo Y Guzman Precursor de la Independencia Hispanoamericana (Caracas: Universidad Catolica Andres, 1983), 77. 237 “The Act of Paris”, in Sarah C. Chambers and John Charles Chasteen eds., Latin American Independence: An Anthology of Sources (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2010), 54–​ 56, 54. 238 Viscardo had suggested the creation of a canal in Panama. See Edwin Simmons, Los Escritos de Juan Pablo Viscardo, 77. On the influence of these ideas on Miranda see George L. Bastin, “Francisco de Miranda, intercultural forerunner”, in John Milton and Paul Fadio Bandia eds., Agents of Translation (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 2009), 19–​42, 31–​35. “The Act of Paris”, in Chambers and Chasteen eds., Latin American Independence, 55. 239 “The Act of Paris”, in Chambers and Chasteen eds., Latin American Independence, 55. 240 Racine, Francisco de Miranda, 181.

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extensive correspondence, and Bentham dedicated a significant amount of ink to the task of affirming the viability of a mutually beneficial relationship between Spain and the Spanish Americas.241 Spain, he argued in one of these writings, had drawn few profits from the empire, and the re-​establishment of its colonial rule would merely generate profits for a few aristocrats, leading to the establishment of a ‘corruption fund’ that would only facilitate the return of despotism.242 As someone who collaborated with employees of the East India Company like James Mill, Bentham was aware of contemporary debates over its imperial ambitions and its abuses.243 But he was also aware of its uses: Bentham proposed the establishment of a joint-​stock company to create Miranda’s canal in Panama; ‘for the Junctions of Two Seas –​The Atlantic and the Pacific’.244 The canal would not be managed by any single state, but by the company. The investors, moreover, would be British, not Spanish American. In this scheme, British geopolitical interests were compatible with humanitarianism: no slave labour could be used in its construction and no slaves could be traded through it.245 Spain, as Mandeville, Walpole, Diderot, Frederick ii, and Burke, had pointed out, was a canal which facilitated the flow of riches to the rest of Europe. It was now time to seize this channel, and to regulate it as the corporate enterprise that it was. As he studied the merits of perpetual peace and defined the international, Bentham developed a range of utilitarian schemes to reinvent the crumbling Spanish Empire.246 And in so doing he faced the very constraint 241 See Stephen Conway ed., The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham. Volume 8: January 1809 to December 1816. The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham. Edited by F. Rosen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); Jeremy Bentham, Colonies, commerce, and constitutional law: Rid yourselves of Ultramaria and other writings on Spain and Spanish America. Edited by P. Schofield and F. Rosen (The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 242 Philip Schofield, Utility and Democracy: The Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 208–​209. 243 On Bentham and empire see Jennifer Pitts, ‘Legislator of the World? A Rereading of Bentham on Colonies’, Political Theory 31:2 (2003), 200–​34. 244 Annie L. Cot, “Jeremy Bentham’s Spanish American Utopia”, in José Luís Cardoso, Maria Cristina Marcuzzo, María Eugenia Romero Sotelo eds., Economic Development and Global Crisis: The Latin American Economy in Historical Perspective (London: Routledge, 2014), 34–​52, 46. 245 Cot, “Jeremy Bentham’s Spanish American Utopia”, 46. On British diplomacy towards Spain and the Spanish Americas during this period see D. A. G. Waddell, ‘British Neutrality and Spanish-​American Independence: The Problem of Foreign Enlistment’, Journal of Latin American Studies 19:1 (1987), 1–​18. 246 As David Armitage has shown, ‘the modern conception of international law’ emerged during this period, and further research might analyse how analyses of the Spanish

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that Carvajal had once encountered. Once Simón Bolívar replaced Miranda as the leader of the independence movement, Bentham wrote to Bolívar to restate the merits of his sweeping constitutional projects for Spanish America. It was notable that Bentham felt the need to clarify one point: how to avoid reaffirming dynastic structures while wielding absolute power as a minister and as a leader. As to your own children of all colonies, I am not in a condition to form any judgment how far they are in a condition to go alone: but this I have a notion of-​viz., that if it be not your design to form to yourself a Monarchy transmissible to natural descendents, you would during your life time, with little more nominal power than the President of the Anglo-​American United States, have as much effective power as if you were acknowledged absolute, and exercise it in a manner much more pleasant to all parties.247 In Bentham’s view, a new transnational effort to limit despotism, harness absolute power, and balance the international order, was on the rise. Empire were used to carry out this process. Armitage, Foundations, 41; and on ‘globalising’ Bentham see Armitage, Foundations, 172–​188. 247 Quoted in Theodora L. McKennan, ‘Jeremy Bentham and the Colombian Liberators’, The Americas 34:4 (1978), 460–​75, 466. This question would be at the core of another influential assessment of the connections between modernity and the constitutional politics in South America: Juan Linz, ‘The Perils of Presidentialism’, Journal of Democracy 1:1 (1990), 51–​69. On the connections between global diplomacy, revolution, and South American independence see Rafe, Blaufarb, ‘The Western Question: The Geopolitics of Latin American Independence’, American Historical Review 112:3 (2007), pp. 742–763.

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Conclusion In the eyes of early eighteenth-​century reformers in the Iberian Peninsula, the Spanish Monarchy was a self-​estranged global empire recovering from a Pan-​ European civil war. Carvajal feared ‘that our fate will be that of Midas –​to die hungry, dejected, and full of gold’.1 Spain’s inability to leverage the wealth of the empire in diplomatic settings stimulated the generation of the Enlightenment; it encouraged satire, debate, and a critical engagement toward imperial achievements and failures. But the understanding of the empire shown by the ilustrados in power throughout the century remained largely speculative despite their best efforts –​locals were more familiar with regional networks and their transnational economic relations. By the early nineteenth century, Spanish reformers had a sophisticated understanding of diplomacy and political economy, but their information about the empire was wanting. Members at the 1810 debates in Cádiz lacked an accurate census of the population in its overseas territories, and had to rely on the estimates of Alexander von Humboldt.2 Delegates exploited the effects of this shortage of information, and argued that there were no individuals of African descent in Spain, and black subjects, while considered Spaniards, were not granted citizenship.3 As colonial unrest intensified, scientific discourses, ideas on pedagogy, and racial attitudes continued to influence plans for transnational cooperation and perpetual peace around the world. Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, in his writings on public and civic education, portrayed the cultural and material improvement of Europe as a symptom of its providential mission: to lead to a global confederacy which would strive to preserve a ‘perpetual and inviolable peace’.4 The Dutch physician Jan Ingenhousz, in a letter to Benjamin Franklin, suggested that the

1 Ozanam, La Diplomacia, 49. 2 Elliott, Empires, 384; Nicolaas Rupke, “A Geography of Enlightenment: The Critical Reception of Alexander von Humboldt’s Mexico Work”, in Livingstone and Withers eds., Geography and Enlightenment, 319–​344. 3 Tamar Herzog, ‘How Did Early-​Modern Slaves in Spain Disappear? The Antecedents’, Republics of Letters: A Journal for the Study of Knowledge, Politics, and the Arts 3:1 (2012), 1–​7. 4 Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, “Bases para la formación de un plan general de instrucción pública”, in Francisco de Paula Mellado ed., Obras de Don Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos. Volume 2 (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico de Francisco de P. Mellado, 1845), 647.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004469099_008

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defensive military use of balloons might secure perpetual peace.5 Thomas Jefferson, in turn, considered that American interests in the Mediterranean would be safe if ‘the Pyratical states’ could be compelled ‘to perpetual peace’.6 In the pursuit of a new balance of power in Europe, scientific imperial visions would filter into, and shape, the geopolitical discussions of the 1815 Congress of Vienna.7 Following the event, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause, the father of ‘Krausismo’, would draft a plan for a European Union as the basis for universal peace, but this dimension of this writings would be largely overlooked by his Hispanic readers.8 These discussions about peace and federations generated visions and narratives of race, ethnicity, and geopolitical alterity that remain with us to this day. The study of the Spanish investment in the Enlightenment is just one of these histories. The legacy of this outlook remains to be studied, for the imaginative appeal of corporations and credit was not lost to nineteenth-​century Spaniards. Henri de Saint-​Simon, who travelled through Spain in his youth in the company of Cabarrus, inspired others in France and in Spain to reevaluate John Law’s experiment.9 In the Spanish polymath Ramón de la Sagra, Saint-​Simon found a skilled collaborator and a propagandist for his public bank that aimed to offer free credit.10 Ramón de la Sagra, born in 1789 into a wealthy merchant family in the north of Spain, founded a revolutionary newspaper and participated in a project to reform the sugar monopoly in Cuba and create ‘a government-​ funded house’ that ‘protected the workers, priced work, stimulated discoveries 5

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8 9

10

Richard Whatmore, “Shelburne and Perpetual Peace: Small States, Commerce, and International Relations within the Bowood Circle”, in Nigel Aston and Clarrisa Campbell Orr eds., An Enlightenment Statesman in Whig Britain: Lord Shelburne in Context, 1737–​1805 (London: Boydell & Brewer, 2011), 249–​274, 262. Francis D. Cogliano, Emperor of Liberty: Thomas Jefferson’s Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 68. See Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); Stella Ghervas, ’Balance of Power vs. Perpetual Peace: Paradigms of European Order from Utrecht to Vienna, 1713–​ 1815’, The International History Review, 39:3 (2017), 404–​425; Réné Albrecht-​Carrié, A diplomatic history of Europe since the Congress of Vienna (London: Harper, 1958). ‘Karl Christian Friedrich Krause’s Entwurf Eines Europäischen Staatenbundes (1814)’, Die Friedens-​Warte 40:5/​6 (1940), 245–​48. I am grateful to Edward Castleton for his comments on de la Sagra and Saint-​Simon. See Gilles Jacoud, “L’Analyse du système de Law par les saint-​simoniens” in Florence Magnot-​ Ogilvy ed., “Gagnons sans savoir comment”. Représentations du Système de Law du xviiie siècle à nos jours (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2017), 289–​305. Alfonso Sánchez Hormigo, “Introductory Study”, in Ramón de la Sagra, Lecciones de Economía social y otros escritos económicos (1838–​1849). Edited by Alfonso Sánchez Hormigo (Madrid: ico, 2018), 127–​232, 214.

Conclusion

245

and guaranteed profitable sales, to free them from the terrible struggles of contingency’.11 After travelling to France and the United States to study industrial relations, he became a deputy of the Cortes and wrote an essay in favour of the abolition of slavery in the island of Cuba.12 In his writings, Sagra connected his ideas on material inequality and his visions of education and progress. The French economist Constantin Pecqueur had shown that ‘granting credit to a worker’, Sagra explained in his Lecciones de Economía Social, was ‘to grant them the ability to pursue comfort, knowledge, and liberty’; it served to ‘connect those who own unproductive capital to those men who know how to make it count’.13 However, Sagra clarified, this would merely deliver material prosperity: a comprehensive education system was necessary to foster progress.14 Sagra’s ideas reflected broader changes that were taking place throughout the Spanish World. The fellow Saint-​Simonian Spanish thinker, José Andreu Fontcuberta, believed that the establishment of banks funded through a cosmopolitan group of investors could replace taxes and finance the construction of roads, canals, or mines.15 On the other side of the Atlantic, Simón Bolívar hoped that the Isthmus of Panama would be to South America ‘what the Isthmus of Corinth was to the Greeks’, a space to host representatives in the way that ‘the abbé de Saint-​Pierre’ had hoped to establish ‘a European congress to decide the fortunes and interests of those states’.16 Instead, emerging South American nations turned to foreign credit to establish and demonstrate their independence, thereby issuing in Britain’s informal empire in the region.17 By 1821, The Times was drawing its readers’ attention to the financial possibilities behind the establishment of a canal that would unite the Atlantic and the Pacific.18

11

Quoted in Ascensión Cambrón Infante, ‘Ramón de la Sagra, un Gallego ilustrado’, Anuario da Facultade de Dereito da Universidade da Coruña 2 (1998), 215–​228, 218. 12 Cambrón Infante, ‘Ramón de la Sagra’, 220. 13 Ramón de la Sagra, Lecciones de economía social (Madrid: Imprenta de Ferrer y Cia, 1840), 294. 14 Sagra, Lecciones, 300. 15 Alfonso Sánchez Hormigo, ‘Saint-​Simonism and economic thought in Spain (1834–​1838)’ History of Economic Ideas 17:2 (2009), 121–​154, 135. 16 Simón Bolivar, Carta de Jamaica (Madrid: Verbum, 2020), 31. On the context of the work see John Lynch, Simón Bolívar: A Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 92-​93. 17 Rory Miller, “Informal Empire in Latin America”, in Robin Winks ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume V: Historiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 437–​449. 18 Griffith Dawson, The First Latin American Debt Crisis, 13. This scheme sought to exploit trade via Lake Nicaragua.

246 

Chapter 7

But the most significant lesson of the Spanish Enlightenment is the importance of the acceptance of diplomatic failure as a first step to generate reform. The War of Spanish Succession revived the trauma of the seventeenth-​century loss of European territories. The Treaty of Utrecht exposed the true nature of European diplomacy, whereby treaties, to use Carvalho’s phrase, were weighed in diamonds, and were settled on the basis of economic considerations. The war and the treaty prompted a nuanced reconsideration of Spain’s political economic role in Europe and the world. The Netherlands and the Spanish Road, which Francisco de Quevedo had referred to as the graveyard of Europe, were no longer the financial responsibility of Madrid.19 Commercial relationships could be prioritised, as José Patiño’s tenure in power demonstrated. Treaties, in turn, had accrued greater weight when they severed the Spanish Empire. Madrid, then, could enhance and deploy its diplomatic weight to avoid incurring in bloody and costly wars. This paradox, whereby the traditional dimensions of imperial decline, including territorial loss, were in fact associated with broader possibilities for reform, was repeatedly captured by contemporary political economists. This interpretation of history encouraged Spaniards to look to regulated companies and European diplomacy not just as means to reform Europe, but as means to reconfigure the Spanish Empire; to reaffirm political accountability, economic predictability, and the value of arts and academies. It was a new political outlook: both the Count-​Duke of Olivares and Carvajal complained about the lack of learned administrators in Spain, and the latter’s work largely echoed the former’s calls to establish ‘companies and consulados’ to ‘turn Spaniards into merchants’.20 They drew on councils that were created on an ad hoc basis and side-​lined the Spanish administration to speed up reform.21 But their understanding of political timing was fundamentally different: Olivares drafted yearly forecasts about potential conflicts; Carvajal considered how to take control of the course of history and make peace perpetual.22 Olivares sought to reaffirm his own power; Carvajal, no stranger to political intrigue, drew on a recurrent expression that, in the absence of studies about the Spanish scientific vocabulary on ‘checks and balances’ during the period, may be deemed its equivalent: to benefit all while harming none. Indeed, the crucial difference from earlier diplomatic schemes was that plans for eighteenth-​century reforms envisioned a different foundation of 19

Francisco de Quevedo, La Hora de todos y Fortuna con seso. Edited by Lía Schwartz (Madrid: Castalia, 2009), 299. 20 John Elliott, Richelieu and Olivares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 52. 21 Elliott, The Count-​Duke of Olivares, 504–​507. 22 Elliott, The Count-​Duke of Olivares, 507 and 542.

Conclusion

247

international power, predictability, and trust. Seventeenth-​century jurists, diplomats, and writers like Saavedra Fajardo, Pufendorf, and Leibniz all reaffirmed the value of diplomacy and treaty-​based transnational relations. Saint-​Pierre’s plans for perpetual peace expanded on these ideas, and proposed the establishment of a group of diplomats who would reside in Utrecht.23 Unaccountable to their monarchs, their ‘memoirs’ of discussions held therein would inform state policies.24 In the words of Lucien Bély, the goal of the project was not a process of democratisation, but a broadening of elites that included the authors of these ‘memoirs’: the reaffirmation and empowerment of ‘enlightened men’.25 Ideas of the European public sphere that forefront proto-​national communities traditionally begin in the mid-​eighteenth century because the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries produce a different image; one of political communication that followed the ebb and flow of international diplomacy. The public was not an ‘incubator of rationality’ instead it was ‘power-​oriented, not reason-​oriented. It was authority-​oriented, not truth-​oriented’.26 The demand for knowledge about war and peace propelled the correspondence of Torcy and Bolingbroke, and the French minister warned his British counterpart about those adventurers who sold information and misinformation to warring governments; it encouraged Jonathan Swift and Spanish almanac writers to comment on international relations in short and pithy texts; it fostered the growth of newspapers and books at the heart of that which Benedict Anderson referred to as ‘empty time’; that time during which reflection, debate, and the development of one’s ideas grow.27 To an empire with long-​standing networks in Central Europe, Italy, and the Americas, the meaning of the ‘centralisation’ of power and knowledge turned on recasting these commercial and intellectual connections with Europe through figures like Abreu, Marcenado, or Mañer. This period of reform was therefore far from ‘the unbroken continuation of Spanish history’.28 It was the last attempt to reintegrate the Spanish Empire into a community of European nations and empires; an effort to bolster the strength of a greater union by regulating its multifaceted geopolitical and commercial relations with Pacific and Atlantic territories. Many European thinkers

23 Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs, 724. 24 Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs, 704. 25 Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs, 712. 26 Tortarolo, “Big Theories” in Krefting, Nøding, and Ringvej eds., Big Theories, 116. 27 Rule and Trotter, A World of Paper, 349; Sheila Briddle, Bolingbroke & Harley (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975); 24–​30. 28 Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 1; Anthony McFarlane, “The Bourbon Century”, in Eissa-​Barroso and Vázquez Varela eds., Early Bourbon Spanish America, 181–​198, 181.

248 

Chapter 7

at the time failed to note this: in the words of Carlo Denina, who served for Charles Emmanuel iii, Frederick ii, and Napoleon Bonaparte, Spain had dispersed itself throughout its vast empire. As a result, claimed Denina, Spain had forgotten about Europe, and other Europeans had forgotten its influence on the cultural and political life of the Old Continent.29 But early eighteenth-​century Spanish thinkers and ministers, informed by their experiences in Italy and the Netherlands, had not forgotten about Spain’s ties to other parts of Europe. Instead, they shed light on shared European memories to assemble transnational solutions to war and to regulate global trade within a union of European nations and empires. Eighteenth-​century Spanish political debates generated two ways of understanding the role of the Spanish Empire in Europe –​as one of many shareholders in an integrated union, or as a nation forever haunted by, and perpetually struggling against, Black and White legends. This was the core division between the thought of the early and the late eighteenth-​century ilustrados, and remains the central choice for twenty-​first-​century Spain. The new language of Enlightenment granted these eighteenth-​century Spanish pursuits a distinct purpose: behind the effort to reaffirm the société des princes was not an effort to vindicate monarchical power, but the power of diplomats to dictate the futures of states and empires in an international setting. In 1752, four years before the explosion of the second world war of the century, Carvajal believed he had solved the protracted legacies of the first. After re-​negotiating the Treaty of Tordesillas that had split the world between the Portuguese and the Spanish Empires; after brokering a commercial alliance with Britain; after settling the protracted Habsburg-​Bourbon conflict in Italy, Carvajal declared that perpetual peace had been achieved. His was an Enlightenment that replaced the historical discourse of dynastic legitimacy with a codified language of utility and law which arbitrates international relations to this day. Corporations, legal codes, and international treaties, however, remained and remain just as vulnerable to the abuse of power as do dynastic disputes. Perhaps, then, two centuries of Spanish intellectuals were not wrong when they proclaimed that the Enlightenment, far from being over, had yet to begin. 29 Denina, Lettres Critiques, 28.

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Index Abreu, Antonio José Álvarez de  biography 45 Memorias de Alemania 126–​127 views on Caracas 153–​154 Abreu y Bertodano, José Antonio de 116 Academia del Bueno Gusto xiv, 79, 80 Academia Naturae Curiosorum 143, 162 Alberoni, Giulio, Cardinal, 59–​60, 64, 214 Alcedo y Herrera, Dionisio 110 alcabala tax 109, 160 alternativa (trade route) 156, 174, 225 Alfonso x 61, 233 Alfonso xiii 14 almanacs 50–​51, 63–​77 American Revolution 3, 8, 9, 200, 203 Aranda, Pedro Pablo Abarca de Bolea y Ximénez de Urrea, Count of 212–​ 214, 224 arbitrary monarchy 50, 59, 75, 90, 130, 136 Argumosa, Teodoro Ventura de 145–​146 Arostegui y Cañavate, Alfonso Clemente de 46 Arroyal, León de 42, 237–​238 asiento 48, 56, 83, 133–​134, 189, 184 austracismo 209 balance of power xii, xiv, 5, 30, 31–​34, 41–​42, 52–​60, 85, 90–​95, 115, 127, 129, 134, 168, 175–​191, 195, 203, 207–​209, 225–​226, 238, 242–​246 Baltic trade 92–​96 banking 86, 89, 110, 114, 132, 146, 149, 166, 193, 216, 235, 240, 244 See also Real Giro Barbeyrac, Jean 94, 165, 191 Béjar, Duke of 85 Bentham, Jeremy 28–​32, 203, 240–​242 Bilbao Ordenanzas 33, 119–​124, 234 Buenos Aires, 119–​120, 133–​134 Black Legend 27, 127, 248 Boerhaave, Herman 82, 112–​113 Bolívar, Simón 36, 239, 242 Brache, Tycho 43 Burriel, Andrés 232, 233, 240 Burke, Edmund 2, 14, 49, 87, 92, 167

British East India Company 29, 94, 167, 200, 224, 238, 241 Cádiz Constitution 6, 8–​9, 18, 35, 231, 237 Cádiz trade 43, 93, 97, 119, 134–​135, 138, 140, 159, 225 Campomanes, Pedro Rodríguez de 42, 47, 192, 204–​205, 213–​215, 221–​223, 226–​231 Canal  metaphor 49, 91–​92 Panama canal 240–​241 Cánovas del Castillo, Antonio 14 Capdevila, Antonio 212–​213 Caracas  Company 96–​97, 109–​110, 117–​121, 123, 138, 140, 144, 148, 152–​160, 171–​172, 174, 182, 185, 225, 234–​235, 239, 240 1749 revolt 153–​160 Carvajal y Lancaster, José  biography 124–​128, 137–​139 eulogy xi–​xv  political writings 129–​136, 188–​194 On Caracas 49, 155–​156 Carvalho e Melo, Sebastião José de, marquess of Pombal 175–​179, 186, 199–​201, 206, 214, 246 Casa de Greografía 163 Casanova, Giacomo Girolamo 220 Catalan Company 134, 183, 197 Catherine ii 226, 239 chancillerías 125–​126, 183 Charles iii 11–​13, 20–​26, 34–​35, 175, 203–​ 209, 214–​226 Charles iv 12–​13, 35, 44 Charles v 12, 32, 34, 162, 198, 230 Charles vi 52–​54, 62, 94, 180 Charles vii of Naples 145, 183, 204, 205 China 72, 84, 116, 133, 135, 190, 231 Companies of freed blacks 48, 96 consulados 31, 56, 82–​87, 97, 119–​124, 234 Copernicus, Nicolaus 43 Cortes 7, 8, 36, 90, 100, 107, 130, 161, 238, 245 Council of Castile 25, 55, 61–​69, 79, 102, 120, 204–​207, 211, 213, 215, 233

318 Index Council of Indies 49, 56, 58, 86, 126, 128, 133, 138, 140, 144, 152–​159, 225 Counter-​Enlightenment 14 Credit 38, 40, 46, 101, 109–​113, 118, 121, 152, 166, 216, 226 Public credit 146, 167, 200 Creole patriotism 50, 76 Demosthenes 33, 181 Denina, Carlo 230, 248 Descartes, René 14, 26, 50, 69, 232 Dutch East India Company 87–​88, 94, 160, 166–​167 Dutch Revolt 127, 144, 153 d’Argenson, marquess of 194–​195 debt 9, 112, 130, 169 public debt 9, 118–​119 Diderot, Denis 35, 45, 49, 81, 91, 188, 220–​ 221, 241 Diplomatic Enlightenment 41–​42

French Revolution 2, 3, 8, 13, 20, 226, 227, 228, 230, 239 Gaceta de Madrid 71, 74, 77, 78, 83, 212 Gaceta Mexicana 76 Gálvez, José de 47, 224 Gándara y Pérez, Miguel Antonio de la 207, 216 García de Vera, Pedro 109–​111 George i 187 George iii 201 Grand Tour 11, 239 Grotius, Hugo xv, 6, 25, 46, 38, 46, 82, 94, 95, 131, 140, 143, 162, 164, 165, 167, 168, 172, 232 González, José 161 Goyeneche, Juan de 33, 42, 47–​48, 82–​92, 95–​96, 117–​118, 124, 195, 210, 224 Graef, Juan Enrique de 24, 43, 174 grain 149, 183, 203–​205, 210–​211

emulation 34, 38–​40, 140, 143, 160–​166 Encyclopédie 45, 81, 189 equilibrium 32, 34, 59, 63, 91, 129, 138, 175, 177, 186–​189, 192–​194, 209, 227, 236–​238 Ensenada, marquess of 26, 32–​34, 44–​46, 140, 144, 147–​148, 151, 153, 173, 199 Biography 137–​139 eschatology 27–​28 Esquilache, marquess of 204–​205 Revolt of Esquilache 26, 35, 203–​215, 221

Habsburg Monarchy 52, 54, 58, 62, 92–​93, 103, 127, 147, 153, 164, 176, 183, 209, 225 Hamilton, Alexander 226, 239 Havana Company 123, 148, 155, 171, 184 Herboso, José de 33, 82, 111, 112–​114, 224–​225 Humboldt, Alexander von 224, 243

Family Pact (1761) 201 See also Secret Compact Feijoo, Benito 12, 15, 19–​20, 67–​68, 71–​72, 80, 118, 151–​152 Ferdinand vii 8–​10, 19 Ferrer del Río, Antonio 3, 12–​13 Floridablanca, José Moñino, Count of 13, 221, 225 Foronda y González, Valentin 236 Franklin, Benjamin 57, 66, 234, 243 Frederick ii 6, 30, 49, 91, 126, 147, 197, 218, 241, 248 Free trade  debates xv, 133–​134, 153–​173 decree 225 French East India Company 108, 191

Jacobitism 43, 95, 197, 212 Jefferson, Thomas 236–​237, 244 Jesuit Order 24, 26, 45, 128, 185, 194, 201, 219, 222, 229, 232 expulsion of 203, 207, 215–​216 Jovellanos, Gaspar Melchor de 18, 192, 231, 233, 243 Joyes y Blake, Inés 235 Juan, Jorge 108, 110, 112, 138, 142, 145, 189, 232 Junta de Damas 80

Inquisition 9, 11, 19, 24–​26, 89, 137, 219, 220, 221, 222, 232 Isabella ii 10–​13, 51

King Midas (of Phrygia) 152, 243 Krausismo 13–​14, 244 Lafuente y Zammaolla, Modesto 3–​4, 11 Law, John 82, 102, 133, 149, 216, 244

319

Index Law of nations xv, 28–​30, 32–​34, 95, 104, 116, 121, 127, 131, 167, 172 Le Clerc, Jean 45, 80, 164, 167–​168 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 11, 26, 51, 52, 82, 116, 232, 247 Legislation 28, 90, 96–​101, 119–​124, 185, 228, 233 León, Francisco de 154–​156 Linnaeus, Carl 6, 175, 185, 212 Louis xiv 11, 55, 80, 123, 134, 139, 159, 166, 200, 202, 206 Loynaz, Martín de 160–​162, 237 Luis i 60–​62 luxury 166, 172, 183, 208, 210–​211 Luzán, Ignacio de 45–​46, 79–​81 Macanaz, Melchor Rafael 12, 26, 40–​43, 180–​183 Mably, Gabriel Bonnot de 43, 81, 117, 181 Mandeville, Bernard 48, 52–​53, 57 92, 241 Mañer, José 70–​73, 78–​81, 115–​118, 247 Maria Theresa 44, 176, 209 Mariana, Juan de 10, 138 Mayans, Gregorio 124, 212–​213, 232 Mercurio Político 72, 74, 78 Mesa, Tomas Fernández de 40, 143, 162, 163 methodological nationalism 4–​5, 23, 39–​40 migration 39, 43, 146, 150, 168, 184, 216–​218, 231, 235 mining 33, 40, 56, 82, 109–​114, 128–​129, 145, 147, 224–​225 Miranda, Francisco de 238–​242 Miskitu community 56 Mississippi Company 133, 171, 218 Monopoly  Debates about 96, 132–​140, 148–​149, 155–​ 159, 164–​173 Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, baron de 46, 91, 104, 152, 221 Muratori, Lodovico Antonio 6, 45, 80, 82, 98, 138, 232 National Bank of San Carlos 216, 235 Natural law xv, 28, 38, 160, 171–​173, 191, 232 See also law of nations Newton, Isaac 108, 142, 232 New Spain (Mexico) 56, 71, 74, 87, 90–​91, 97, 125, 224, 238, 240

Olavide, Pablo de 35, 217–​221, 223, 237, 240 pactismo 140, 157 patria 3–​4, 35, 118, 133, 198, 214, 224 peace xi–​xiv, 1, 35, 40, 57–​59, 62, 66, 90 perpetual peace 47, 54, 175, 186–​194 criticisms of 48, 190, 138 Peralta Barnuevo, Pedro de 76 Peru 26, 33, 48, 60, 76, 82, 108–​114, 115, 218 Machado de Chaves, Mariano 114–​115 Mexican peso 95, 115, 135–​136, 159, 181, 209 Olivares, Gaspar de Guzmán, Count‑Duke of 141, 161, 166, 246 Patiño, José 42, 93, 96–​97, 246 Philip ii 32, 127 Philip iii 28–​29, 121 Philip iv 124, 127, 164 Philip v 23, 25, 26, 27–​28, 31–​33, 42–​45, 48, 50–​53, 55, 57–​59, 77–​79, 83–​85, 117, 123, 126 abdication of 59–​62, 67 Philippine Company 96–​97, 134–​136, 231, 236 propaganda 23, 35, 71, 214, 227, 230 Puerto, Joaquin Ignacio de Barrenechaea y Erquiñigo, marquess del 43, 148–​150, 216–​217 Quevedo, Francisco de 63, 162, 246 Raynal, Guillaume-​Thomas Raynal, abbé de 10, 46–​47, 287 Ripperda, Johan Willem, Duke of 53, 84, 94–​95, 115–​118, 170 Real Giro 140, 149–​150 Republicanism 82, 91, 100, 193 Reversis xiv, 192 Robertson, William 10, 104, 223, 229 Romá y Rosell, Francisco 42, 207–​210 Rousset de Missy, Jean 59 Royal Spanish Academy xi–​xiii, 78, 143, 232 Royal Academy of History xi, 44, 76, 78–​79, 215, 222, 231 Royal Academy of San Fernando xi–​ xv, 46, 78 Royal Academy of Arts of Seville 237 Royal Company of Coastguards 42, 142

320 Index Royal Economic Societies 80, 233–​234 Royal Naval Academy of Cadiz 73 Royal Society (London) 141, 143, 145, 162, 197 Rousseau, Jean-​Jacques 9, 43, 201–​202, 207, 234 Santa Cruz de Marcenado, marquess of 26, 45, 81, 98, 99, 114, 117, 137, 247 Saint-​Pierre, Charles Irénée Castel, abbé xii, 6, 36, 52, 57, 188–​191, 194, 201, 208, 245, 247 Saint-​Simon, Claude Henri, comte de 244–​245 Secret Compact (1753) 196 Selden, John 28, 29, 82, 131 Seven Years’ War 34, 176, 197, 199–​202, 206, 209, 212, 217 Siete Partidas 61, 233 Sierra Morena 35, 43, 203, 216–​221 Silk xiv, 47, 96–​97, 148, 170, 199 Silver xv, 46, 57, 85, 92, 96–​97, 109, 125, 128, 135–​136, 148–​150, 173, 209, 224 Slave trade 1, 48–​49, 217–​218, 238, 241, 243 See also asiento Societé des princes 34, 46, 176–​177, 193, 248 Sotomayor, Félix Fernando Masones de Lima, Duke of xiv–​xvi, 40, 46, 140, 146, 151, 163–​173, 199, 212 South Sea Company 48, 87, 97, 109, 115, 118, 133–​134, 140, 153, 158, 180 Sugar 171, 244 Swift, Jonathan 66, 247

Treaty of Utrecht 6, 30–​31, 50–​58, 83, 93–​ 95, 117, 121–​124, 127, 136–​139, 199, 202, 246–​247 Tobacco 80, 96, 123, 131, 132, 133, 152 Royal Tobacco Monopoly 148 Torres y Villarroel, Diego 19, 26, 50, 63–​71, 75–​81, 136, 150, 237 Thürriegel, Johan Kaspar von 218–​219 Ulloa, Antonio 108, 110, 112, 142, 145, 163, 189, 232 Utrecht Enlightenment 5–​6, 51, 200 Uztáriz, Gerónimo 42, 83–​85, 94, 98, 117, 159 Uztáriz, Casimiro 158–​160 Validos 64–​65, 141 Vélez, marquess de los 86 Vico, Giambattista 11, 45, 173 Viscardo, Juan Pablo 240 Voltaire xi, 43, 46, 181, 190–​191, 207 War of Jenkins’ Ear 74, 118, 153 War of Polish Succession 71, 118 War of Spanish Succession 5–​6, 11, 12, 24, 27, 31, 33, 41–​42, 177–​180, 201, 210, 221 Cultural responses to 50–​59 War of the Quadruple Alliance 58, 59, 93 Witt, John de 159, 165 Zavala y Auñón, Miguel de 33, 82, 100–​106, 210 Zuñiga y Castro, Josefa de 79