The Dialectics of Nagarjuna [First Edition] 8185072132

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THE ECTICS OF - NA RJUNA

7!•is is a str-ikingl,y oriiinal m,J innow• trvc work on .,a ar;un a·s dialectics .-:s. it g pro,•ides a clear formulation of the rno,lalily OJ Nd ,irjr a 's ml.-tho,t of g ip l'nzsangtipadapt1 rr,asoniigs. and demostralt's the s,•s.ten111tfr 11ses of ifs spc-cific fot ,JJ of Prasnj)'a ncg�tfon i,r soh•i,ag the ridd:,.. ·11-lour-fOld uegaticm 1hc book alsc, concentratrs. 011 tire l1 ic-r11rd1)' of N,igdrju,,u -s statements and gh•,·s an i,11,rpn:tation of the n;flexil·c par,ulox inl'oh·e,I in his st."lf-reft.·rcntial ."1t1tcmc11ts f on the ba$iS o bis int,-iL.·i,ft• text.� ou logic and ,\fi,ldle l\'a>· di,,lutfrs. 'Ui t·r,• is a sinct•rt· attempt iu l10ok this to clcfr.,._, det•p itilo th,· rt>ots of lhuldhist ,lialt•,·tic:s ag,li11sl a c:m;,p,t.'11 ,·,ufrc• b,•_. l.:�'=rount! ,�f l11dia11 logic It offers om· of ti,: l•1.•st to1·:!l'11ges of ti,,. progrc."s ,f lo�ical stutlks on N,,garjunll·., ,lialc·clks !i)'Stemati,·ally since thirth�.s f�{ tl,is n•,rturJ'. It "''ill be useful to sludcnt.s of l'liilosopl1,l' uml S,urslrit at tlu- post gradrwlt' lc:1•cl a.s 14•ell as lo r-e.seard,ers 11·orki11g in the _fid,l of 1.:ompar11tfr,: logic: mul liriguistics. 11,c Aulhor Horn at Chingr,tkhali. Klml,rn i,i 194 l. ,Ira Nath Ghost• Ir� read pl1ilo."oplt), V11iver$it,• of Rujshahi and sub."ctm junior tlrt· fellow of n•.scarch Commis.,ion Grants l)niversit)' l)c Rama IS/-043 GHIJ I>L'l.Al' Rnmc11dr.1 ll11i,•er.sitv tlu,�f in GIJm;e Nath qu,:ull,· asf a junior Cornn,ission, Gon�n,­ o IHdia Raj,hwa, C:h I 985menl of l11dia in th� ltluve-rsity ofjoi11e,I Rajshaki VniwrsitJ· 1962. He M'as Chair,min of He 1982 I 985. during ct M. .\. Univcrsit)· of Gujar BaKg/ade,h in l'nivt'rSll)'. shohi , CJuurman of thrs I>,partIii, snved He 8Z 1985. fo,...,,...,y of GuJanu. lndu, "' a rr in rm lkpalment of Philo1971 No,•. from period he /ndlu Philo-vuctiag lecrun:r m rite D, ,ophy d,u-i,,g 11w prru,d for I kb.. 1971

Dr. G/uue attm,ud "" � -�m,nar an Buddhum "'1d World Cral,­ hld at the Rabindra Bharm i Calcutta, In / 984, a, a ' ritccl al � p p nf Bud,lhi,t Pllilowplrf an,J p,ome anthologies. Vr. R. S. Giro., ha, l,ui/1 up a wlitl repuli,tion for himsdfin th� a.:ademic ctrcW ,,s ,, ,choltlr an,I philowphn-. THE DI.HECTICS Of ,'IAGAIIJI.JNA � a lestinwny to lus perspicacious and 4nlllyti.c ,nind. Profe"u,: Sibajiban Bhattacfaa?ca. hus add�d an interming nau on fN merit of this wock In his paper .......,. LI•,._ fruturrs of Buddhist Logic' ,..i,,islted,.. dwr /wding a,ricle in di, Proaedi..,. of dw OIi Can/l!Fotu lntrrnational flN! Ollfia_ Buddh;sm and .'\otional C""-

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THE DIALECTICS OF NAG/\RJUNA

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Preface My primary aim in this work has been to provide a logical form to Nltgltrjuna's Prasa'}gilpadana reasonings in the Madhya­ maka /:liiistra. A correct appraisal of his method of dialectics still remains a desideratum. I think that mere criticism of his dial­ ectics without this can lead us to nothing but a Pyrrhic victory. Chapter VII deals systematically with the formulation of his method and_ chapters IV-VI and VIII-X correlate_ its other aspects with regard to the grounding and principles of negation to it. Chapter I presents the bare outlines of the work. It also dwells on the need for an investigation into the rudiments of Nltgltrjuna's dialectics in the logico-linguistic components of Buddha's indeterminable questions (avyakatas). It may appear that the tetralcmmic negation of inexplicable queslions leads to the denial of tho law of Contradiction and the law of Excluded Middle. Similar problems arise in Nltglujuna's negation of catu!koti. Chapter IX consequently produces certain interpre­ tations available in the texts of Mala Madhyamaka Kiirika and Prasa11napadi1 which show that these problems can be overcome by introducing new criteria of application of predicates where both of the contradictory predicates fail in the founh position, or where the denial of the alternation of predicates is possible. Chapter I also indicates that Na:gltrjuna has always fought the battle in the opponent's camp and his object-language therefore constitutes the contents of his adversary's thoughts, ideas and presuppositions. Thon follows chaptl"r II to give a comparative exposition of the historical elements of two rival

vi

The Dialectics of Nllgllrjun_a

thought-chi.nnels of Buddhist and non-Buddhist traditions as co.1tained in N:i:gujuna's method of dialectics. This chapter also traces the roots of dialectics in the tradition of Buddhism. Chapter III orieuts the dissertation to tho specific historical context of the emergonce of the M:i:dhyamika dialectical school and N:i:g:i:rjuna. Nl[gl!:rjuna has applied the Prasajya type of negation by his method

Prasa11gllplldana

of

to

Alternatives. Chapter V makes somantic distinction between two

the

(Prasajya) and Relational (Paryudlfsa). begins with a

negation of Four-fold

a syntactic as well as a types of negation- simple The following chapter

note on N:i:garjuna's speciality of applying the

concepts of Prasajya and Prayudllsa typ.:s of negation to his own field of ep1stemological and logical analysis of the Middle way and the non-determinacy of things, as distinguished from the basically subjectivistic approach of santarak�ita e,i:plained in chapter V. I have also tried to show that N:tg:[rjuna's Prasanga method of dialectics in quite consistent with the Buddha's approach corroborated by the relevant suttas of the Nikayas to place the emphasis upon analysis rather than explication-'since students of Buddhism recognise it as religion of analysis' (Nolan Pliny Jacobson). The concluding chapter summarizes our interpretations of tho very specific sense and modality of Nagarjuna's dialectics. In preparing this work, I am profoundly grateful for the association

and advice I have obtained from my

teacher and supervisor,

Profess()r

respected

Sibajiban Bhattacharyya.

Without his generous help and perspicacious care for my work and sympathetic concern for my well-being this work would not have been completed. A special debt of gratitude is due to Pandit Bidhubhusan Bhattacharyya, Reader in Sanskrit, Jadavpur University, Ven

·Preface

vii

'ble Dr. Neluwe Jinaratana Nayaka Mahathera, General s�crc• tary of the Mahabodbi Society of India, Calcutta, Ven 'ble E. Tissa Thera of that society, Sri Hemanta Kumar Tarkatirtha of the Mahacbarya Department, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, for the pains they most often took in welcoming discussions on some fundamental texts of Pllli and Sanskrit Buddhism. I am grateful to Dr. R.K. Das Gupta, former Director, and Sri J.C. Saha, Asstt. Librarian of National Library, Calcutta, for the interest they have shown in my work and for extending mo the special facilities of the National Lihrary. Sri Saha has always taken particular care in making some rare books available to me whenever needed. I must also express my deep sense of gratitude to the authorities of the Asiatic Society Library, Calcutta, Sanskrit College Library, Calcutta and authorities of tho Varendra Research Institute Library, Rajshahi, Bangladesh, for the service I received from them in getting through the work. Dr. Mafizuddin Ahmed, Professor of Philosophy, Rajshahi University, Bangladesh and Sri Prabal Kumar Sen, Reader in Philosophy, Calcutta University, helped me in many ways in pursuing the work. 1 Should remember Dr. Karel Werner of .,_ the School of Oriental Studies, University of Durham, England, for the correspondence we had in 1974, on the need of carrying out a work on Nllg!irjuna's Dialectics. This work was completed under the scheme for foreign students and teachers of the University Grants Co=ission, Government of India. I would like to acknowledge, with gratitude, this opportunity given to me by the Governments of India and Bangladesh to undertake the research project, as a research fellow under the above scheme for four years from December 1977, at the University of Culcutta. I am Indebted to tho Rajshahi University for gPanting me study leave. R. N. GROSE

Abbreviations ALB Alt. Alts. AN AP ASU BB BI BL BSOAS BV Cat� DN DP DRP EBTOK

The Adyar Library Bulletin

Alternative Alternatives Anguttara Nikllya Abhidhammapifaka

Academy of Sciences of USSR The Bibliotheca Buddhica Series Bibliotheca lndica Buddhist Logic, 2 vols. (Th. Stcherbatsky) Bulletin of the School of Oriental and Afric"4 Studies Bhllratia Vidyll Catiqkofi Dlgha Nikllya

Dover Publications D. Reidel Publishing Company Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (Jayatillekc,

K. N.)

GAU GOS

George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

HUP IHQ 111

Harvard University Press

Gaekawad' s Oriental Series Indian Historical Quarterly lndo-lraniM Journal

The Dialectics of NiI.gi'Irjuni'I

ll

IPJ

Journal of Indian Philosophy

IPQ ISPP JASB JBORS JIBS Ka KV LC LEM MB MIPSR

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

MMK MN MOS MVS NDPS

Indian Studies : Past & Present Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies Ki'Ivyali'Imkara (Bh:tmaha) Kathi'Ivatthu

The Law of Contradiction The Law of Excluded Middle Mahi'I Bodhi

Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning. Mala Madhyamaka Ki'IrikiI. Majjhima NikiI.ya Madras Oriental Series Madhyi'Inta-Vibhi'Iga-Si'Istra Nalandi'I-DevanDgari Pi'Ili Series

NNMRP NS Ns bh (V)

Nava-Nalandil-Mahllvihllra-Research Publication

NV NVTI NVTTP OUP PAS PEW

Nyliya V1Irtika

NyDyD Satra Nyllya-Satra BhDfya (V:ttsy:tyana) Nyi'Iya-Viir tika-Tlltparya-Tikll NyDya-Vartika-Tlltparya-Tikll Parisuddhi

Oxford University Press Proceedings Aristotelian Society Philosophy East and West

pp

Prajni'Ipradipa (Bh:i:vaviveka)

PPB

Pltli Publication Board

Abbre1•iatio11s

PRAS· "PTS SDS SIS SN

xi

Prasannapadii

Pllli Text Society Sarvadarsanasamgraha Soviet Indology Series Sllmjutta Nikllya

SP

Suttapifaka

SV TJ TS TSWS UCR UH UHP UKHS

Slokavllrtika (Kumllrila)

ss

vv

Saddharmalankllvatiira.srztram Tarkajvlllll (Bhavaviveka) Tatravasamgraha (Slintarak�itll) Tibetan Sanskri t Works Series University of Ceylon Review Upllyahrdaya

University of Hawaii Press Upll.ya-Kausa/a-Hrdaya-Sllstra Vigraha-Vyllvartani

Contents Ch • • ers

Page

1. 2.

17

Introduction Historical Elements of Nllgllrjuna's Dialectics 3. Emergence of the Mlldhyamika Dialoctical School and Nltgltrjuna A Historical Study 4. The Foundation of the Madhyamaka-Prllsangika School 5. Negation (Pratifedhal}) : Simple (Prasajya) and Relational (Paryudlisa) 6. The Principles of Negation in N11g11rjuna's Dialect;cs 7. Nllgltrjuna's Method of Dialectical Negation ; Prasariglipadana 8. The Defence of the Prasariga Method in the Vigraha-Vylivartanl

9. The

Negation of Four-fold

91 126 140 174 209 231

Alternatives

(Catufkoti-nifedha)

10.

54

Some Remarks on Vita'}fll

288 300

Appendices

I The Status of MMK and VV in the Scheme of Works attributed to N11g11rjuna II A Review of Some Basic Studies on Nagllrjuna's MMS III The Logical Status of the Prasarigllplldana and the Svatantrllnumlina in the Madhyamaka Philosophy Bibliography

312 320

326 338

Introduction 1.l

Purpose and importance of the work

Nllgllrjuna was a renascent Buddhist of remarkable intellect, who flourished about the latter half of the second century, A. D. in this sub-continent. This dissertation aims at a study of his method of dialectics. To classify the nature of the study envisaged, it should be noted that it is a systematic study of tho formal type with its exclusive emphasis on the method of Prasangllplldana adopted by him in the art of debating against the opponent's positions. Buddhism in all its forms may be classified; according to its method of study, into three broadly different types, viz., (i) Historical study, (ii) Systematic study, (iii) Geographical study 1 • The Systematic study may be divided into two-(A) A formal �tudy of the Canons; (B) A study of the doctrines of the "different major and minor sects and of Buddhism in general contained in them. The formal study may again be sub-divided into two-­ (a) A study of the Sfltras and (b) A study of the Sli.stras. As in the classical Vedic philosophy we distinguish between Sruti and Smriti, so in the texts of Buddhism, anci:nt and modern, we distinguish between the Sfltras, i. e., the Nik11.yas,

18

The Dialectics of Nagllrjuna

and the S11.stras, e. g., AJvagho�a·s Sraddhotplldr: Sllstra. Nitgllrjuna's Mala-Madyamaka Sastra, · etc. The,e two kinds of study may again ·llC classified into the stitdy of (a) the inter­ pretations or Commentaries (Vyllkhyas), e.g., the commentaries of Buddhagho�a of the Pllli Nikayas and (b) the vrttis, i. e., commentaries on the Sllstras, e. g., Candrakirti's Pra,·annapadll or Commentaries of Commentaries, e. g., Karnakagomin's Pramlil'}a-Varttika-svavrttitikll on Dharmakirti's (C. 550 A. D.) PramiJ.t}avli.rttika-svavrtti and also in a sense, Kamalasila's (C. 725) Panjika on Sllntaraksita's (C. 700 A.D.) Tattvasan­ graha. Copious referenc�s to this classification of texts may be cited from the Buddhist order, but that is not our main concern at the moment. This study, being specifically a formal analysis of l'litgitr­ juna's method of refutation with ref.:rmc! to its use mainly in the Mala Madhyamaka Karikll and the Vigraha-Vyavartani. is not a GENERAL STUDY of his notions and ideas, but a PARTICULAR STUDY of his account of the Prasanga method as contained mainly in his 1\1ad:1yamaka Sastra. Thus we go into a sort of analytical or logico-linguistic study and a study of ti;.� logical procedure, whicil takes into account his principles of negation and logical thinking primarily and fundamentally in relation to the method. For a proper understanding of Nitg'i:rjuna's philosophy an analytical study with modern orientation s is felt to be necessary because he himself wa, unexpectedly cautious in the use of language and unsparingly critical in the splitting of epistemologi­ cal and logical problems. Although his prose works are not many, of which we can only mention his own commentaries of his Vigraha-Vyavartani and Paratityasamutplldahrdaya, the text Upllya kauJala Hrdaya-Sllstra and a treatise on the refutation of theism, bis aphorisms and verses possess as much rigour as an analytical discounie ought to have. So we do not thrust any approach upon him, which is not consonant with his theo-

Jnlrodaction

19

:ries. S. C. Vidyabhusana remarked about N:i:garjuna and b:s philosophy : "An attempt has b1en made to misinlerpret it wilfL,ly and even to discard it as a system of Nihilism, but it has emerged unscathed....... He may be looked at from so many distinct standpoints that we shall not be far wrong if we call him the Aristotle of India".2 While speaking of his O\\n method, a later Vedii:ntin like 3rihar�a bluntly calls himself a VaitMJt!ika while supporting .him against adverse criticisms and says that the Ma:dhyamika .method cannot be upset by logic.3 Interests in N:i:g:i:rjuna's use -of the method of negating the fourfold position of predication (Calufkoti), particularly in respect to its denial of the hw of contradiction of Aristotle (384-�22 B. C.), have been stimulated in contemporary times. Stanislaw Schayer of the Polish Iodo­ logical Sc,;hool, who learnt modern lo5ic from his teacher Lukasi­ ewicz, was probably the first to make formal analysis of Nl':gitr­ juna's tetralemma as a f.:ature of propositional logic. .1.1.1 : Nagarjuna as 'the earliest writer of the Renaissance Period' ; his exploration of a critical and analytical method

Na:gii:rjuna is regarx). Among the rnatalogical formulations we have: "Contradictory statements are not true together" 99 and '·it is not possible to assert and deny the same".90 The latter was sometimes. considered as a psychological law.91 The matalogical formula-. tion is as follows : x7. T1 X7.) The Princ­ ciple of Excluded Middle (the tertium non datur) is regarded by Aristotle as a distinct law, serving in many respects also as a corollary to the law of contradiction. It has recei,·ed from him in the same manner some (a) logical and (b) metalogical formulations ; (a ) 'there cannot be an intermediary between contradictions'92 (x, cI>) . cI>x V x) (b),93-"one of the two parts of the contradiction must be true ...... one of the two parts. of the contradiction is false.H "Every affirmation is true or false".95 Bochenski formulates them as follows:-

7.23

Tf°"'.4>X7

or

It appears clearly from the formulations of the laws stated . . above that there is no third possibility between the posits or· parts of a contradiction. "A contradiction is an opposition"', says Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics (72a9-14), "between. which in-itself there is nothing.97 Contradictory opposites are -defined in the Categories as follows: ''in the case of them alone it is necessary always for one of them to be true and one false" (10, 13a37-b3 ) The addition of 'in itself' perhaps indicates that the exclusion of a third possibility is part of a nature of a contradiction and: -not just a contingent fact. 38

Introduction

l.1"

Before we pass on to the questions regar.ling the problem of logical inconsistencies involved in the use of tetralemma by· Nll:glirjuna, to hi3 'l1etbod of prasarigii.plidana and tr the question, as to whether his method is a case of the reductio ad absurdum, it is imperative that a preface be given to the latest studies on. N�g1irjuna in this respect on the basis of his own writings. Among people who have made a creative interpretation of· the principle of contradiction on the basis of Aristotle's writings. in the current century we can mention the name of Lukasiewicz, Polish methotlologist. His paper 'on the principle of contradic- tion in Aristotle (1910)' was a historical break-through. He formulated the following three principles of contradiction and'. analysed their distinguishing featnres.39 1.

Ontological.-'No object can

2.

Logical.-'Two sentences, one of which attributes a

possess and simulta-­ neously not possess the same property.'

property to an object, and another which denies it,. cannot both be true. 3. Psychological.-'Two beliefs which are expressed by· contradictory statements cannot exist in one mind'. Of these three principles, the psychological one, which has. been referred to earlier in this section is not, according to him,. strictly the law of contradiction. It is often alleged that Indian Philosophers do not accept. the law of contradiction. E. A. Burtt states in an article : ·But. the Eastern mind is convinced that taking together all tho· circumstances in which we need our thinking to give us adequato, guidance, it would be fatal to allow ourselves to be enslaved by these principles'.40 In the same article he mentions that the:

::28

The Dialectics of Niiglirjuna

·Buddhist principle of catr�koti contradicts the Jaw of contra­ -diction. The celebrr.ted author of Bhamati states in his inter­ pretation o�the Brahma-SfJtra ii, 2, 31, tha• when the Sa11yavll­ . dins use a tetra lemma of the form, 'Reality is neither being, nor non-being, neither both nor neither', what they mean is ·that the reality of things is not analysable and he concludes from this interpretation that unanalysability is the r.:ality of things. Fritz Stall also maintains that contradictions arise between of the fourfold · alternative position. 41 �Nl!gl!rjuna shows that the various theories which claim to estab­ lish the nature of ultimate reality are singly and collectively self-contradictory, i. e., the ultimate reality remains logically missing in self-contradictory propositions ascribed to it by different metaphysical schools.

.Prasajya negations

E. A. Burtt points to an extra-logical possibility, but Indian philosophers not only accept the law of contradiction, but also make a distinction between its uses in grammar and logic. -The grammatical opposition holding bet\\ een two rules that the correct use in the case of S is P and not graha (sans)) or 'gahe1}a' be meant not only the faculty of reason but also the means of knowing' (pramQ1}a). Usually he discouraged any discussion on indeter­ minable or inexpressiblo subjects (avynkatavastu > avyllkrtavastu). Avyllkata Silt tam Aizguttllra Nikllya (Vol. III) states: He does not even analyse whether 'Tathllgata survives death', nor does he even analyso whether 'TathDgata

Historical elements

77

docs not survive death'. He de-es not even analyse whether 'Tathli.gata survives and docs not survive death', nor does he even analyse whether 'Tathagata neither survives, nor does not survi ve death' •...Indet­ errninable subjects contain unanalysable truths [avyaka ra,Ja dhammo hoti avyakatavatthusuj6 4 (cf.Candrakirti: avyakara1}11d avyllkrta infra p. 299). When a similar question of the indeterminable type was put to him, he replied in the manner 'mil h'evain' [do not (ask) thus]', 'no h'ida,n [it is not so]. Ananda K. Coomarswamy remarks: the more profound our study, the more difficult it becomes to distinguish Buddhism from Brahminism.15 Even a Plili scholar like T. W. Rhys Davids states: Gautama was born, and brought up, and lived, and died a Hindu.......There was not much in the metaphysics and psychology of Gautama which cannot be found in one or another of the orthodox systems, and a great deal of his mora­ lity could be matched from earlier or later schools."" At the moment we are not interested in all the questions including ones on morality. We are interested in that little, which marks him against the orthodox systems. We find that Buddha has criticised Vedic transcendentalism in the Tevijjil Sutta (> trvidya sutra) (XIII) of the Digha Nik:i:ya87 in the following way: A conversation sprang up in an assembly of very distin­ guished and wealthy Brli�mai:ias between Vlisettha and Bharadvaja, as to which was the true path (11.ir.­ maggo), and which false. The Addhriyil, the Titti­ riyil, the Chlia11dok11 and the Brahma-Carya teach their ways differently. Buddha told that none of the Brahmanic ways was right. Buddha said : Atthaka, V:rmaka, Vamadeva, Vess:tmitta, Yamataggi, Ai1gi­ rasa, Bharadvaja, VaseHha, Kassapa, and Bhagu,

The Dialectics of Niigiirju11a

78

the Risis well-versed in the three Vedas, ai.1d the verses of whom are chanted over centuries,-did even

they speak thus, saying : "We ,mow it, we have seen it, where Brahma is, whence Brahmlt is, whither Brahma is. 68 Verily, Vllsettha would say that none of them was reported to have seen it, but the vedas self-evidently spoke about the union. Buddha continued : •Just, Va:seHhs, as when a string of blind men are clinging one to the other, neither can the foremost see, nor can the middle one see, nor can the hindmost see-just even so, me thinks, Va:settha, is the talk of the Br:i:hmanas versed in the three vedas but blind talk. '89 Buddha said wittily that loving an invisible Being was like loving a most beautiful woman whom none had ever seen. " ...• Well ! good friend ! this most beautiful woman in all the land, whom you so love and long for, do you know what the name of the most beautiful woman is, what is her family name-is she a k#ryan,, Bramani, Vaisya or Sudran,, what is her gotra (initiational. gradation or hierarchy), whether she be tall or short or of medium height, dark or brunette or golden in colour, or in what village or town or city she dwells. "70 In the concluding portion of the sutta Buddha said that the Brahmans Versed in the three Vedas did not practice their qualities. Euphemistically he said : The Brahmans are 10 possession of wives and wealth, and that Brahma is not.71

Historical elements

79

The TevijjiJ. Sutta, some excerpts of which have been stated above, conveys in its �traightforword exposition Buddh Sakya) tribe, within which there were no Brahmins or caste-classes. 91

84

The Diafectics of N,,gllrjun{lJ

NOTES AND REFERENCES I. 2.

Broad, C. :). : Kant, p. 13. MMK XXIV. 8.

3.

Hospers, John: An Tntrod"11ction 1 Sphut)' which means 'bursting forth', They possess an innate power which is called 'Krcu' by Vatrhari. The pho­ netic sound (dhvani) and meaning of a word express this 'spof, which is enternal, universal and unique. Words are revealed to the intellect (pratibhu) of the Vedic seers as immediate expressions (pa/ya11ti viik), which in turn produce 'Vaikhan viik'. Max Muller, K. M. : Lectures on the Science of Language (Delhi, 1965 'reprint'), first edition, 1861. Cassirer, E. : Language and Myth, (New York: Dover Publ.), Eng. trans. by S. Langer, 1946. Patil, Sharad : ·Dielectics o f Caste and Class Conflicts' Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XIV, Nos. 7 & 8.

Annual Number 1979, pp. 287-%, ed. by Krishna Raj {Bombay : States' People Press, Sarneekshra: Trust Publi­ cation), p. 287. 8, Ibid., p. 287.

Historical elements 9

85

According to M. Pha1_1ibho�a\1 Tarkav:i:gifa, Gautama and Ak�ap:tda denote the same person, Nyaya-phi':>so­ phy has been designated as 'Akfapli.da darlana' ry Mad­ havacarya (1'350 A. D.) in his Sarvadarsana Samgruha. Medhlltithi was another name of Gautama. Akfapllda is identified with Gautama in the Skandhapurl!J].a (vide, Mahesvara khanda, Kumllrikll kl,anda, LV. 5) Dr. S. C. Vidylibhu�a1_,a does not accept this identification. According to him, Gautama flourished in C. 550 B. C. and Ak�aplida in C. 150 A. D. Ak�apada was influen­ ced, according to him by Aristotle. (S. C. Vidyabhu­ sana: A History of Indian Logic, 1978 edition, pp. 17, 47). Dr. S. N. Das Gupta does not agree with him on this point. He cites Kautilya's and Klltyllyana's know­ ledge of the systems in support of his contention (vide, S. N. Das Gupta: A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 279).

10. See Vidyabhusana, S. C. : A History of Indian Logic 1978, edition, p. 5. 11.

Ibid., p. 4.

12.

N. S. Adhyllya 3, Ahni/ca I.

Stcherbatsky, Th. : 'A Buddhist Philosopher on Mono­ theism', ISPP, Soviet lndology Series No. 2, pp. 1-11. ed. by Debiprasad Chatlopadhyaya, (Calcutta : Quality Printers Nov. 30, 1969 ; reprint: Nov. 25, 1975), p. 5. 14. Ibid., pp. 5-6. 13.

15. 16. 17.

N. S. Adhyaya 4, Ahnika I. See Ramanuja's f-ribhasya, 2-1-11, Chattopadhyaya Debiprasad, (ed.) :

Papers of Th.

Stcherbastsky, p. l.

18. Ibid., p. 8. The text is also edited by F. W. Thomas in Sanskrit and Tibetan.

The Dialectics uf Naglirji.ma:

8'6

19.

Cf., The Snlistamblzastltra, cited by Candrakirti in the PrasannapadlJ (p. 8, 26, :5-6) in his comments on MMK.

I. 3, states tuat by the negation of fourfold alternatives. about the appearance of a sprout i� is also meant that it is not also created by God (Nesvarasambhuta) 20. Ibid., pp. 9, 11 ; Anutpadya ca svayam tavat parii.11

2l.

22.

23.

24. 25. 26.

kartum na iaknoti. Atha ca svayam 11tpadya parlin karuti, tada kasmiit utpannah, kim svatal; kim paratal;, ubhayatal} vii. A.tra svatal; ti2vat na utpannal;, sviitmani kriyli­ virodhllt. Na hi kharatara-karaviila dharli svam iltmi211am chettwn samartha bhavati. . . . kitn ca svayam evajanyalz svayam iti evam dr!fam istam . •. . Vajrasattvam ca bhakital;. Asti punah l�varah kartli. Sa eva Vicaryatiim. Ibid., pp. 8, 11.

Kimura, Ryukan: A Historical Study, p. 22. Ibid., p. 25. 28. Bhandarkar, R. G. : Early History of the Dekka11 down to the Mohammedan Conquest (Bombay : Govern­ ment C!ntral Press, 1895). 29. Kimura, Ryukan : Ibid., p. 25. 30. Ibid., p. 28. 31. Dvirupam hi Brahma1•agamyate, ni2ma-rupa-vikara-bhe­

21.

doplJdhi-viliftam, tadvipari ta,n sarvopi2dhivivarjitam.

32.

Kim svatah him paratah, etc.

33. Etat pavitramagryam munir

34.

Asuraye' nu Kampayli pradadau/ Asurirapi Paneasikhaya tena ca vahudha krt­ am tantram/10 .Si2mkhyadarJanC1m, ed. by Sri Natavara

Chakravarty, 1316 B. S.

Samkhyadarianam, maharsi-kapila-matam lJvarakmJli­ caryaprQl}ita-karikiltmakam (Calcutta : printed and

published by Sri Natavara Cakravarty, B. S. 1316).

"SaptatylJ ki/a ye 'rthaste' rthal; Krtsya sasthitan­ trasya/A.khyayikavirahitii.l; paravaclavivarJjitiliciJ'pi/15/

JHistorica1 eTemenn

'87

35. Sii:stri, H. P. : B1ttldhadharma, p. 37. 36. Srirlimpura edition, 1821 (Ballantyne's translation i.n 3 Vols., AJ;ahabad, 1852-56 A. D. ; Richard Garbe's edition. Harvard, 1895). 37. Srirllmpur edition, 1821. 38.

"Kllllirkabhak-fitam samkhya-siist rain jnlinasudha­ karam Kalavisiffam bhsyo'pi purayi-fyet vaco'mrtai�/1 Dr. H. Ui (Tr.): Nyayapraveia tarka-iastra, p. 46. Quoted by Kimura, Ryukan : A Historical Study,

p. 22. 39. Kimura, Ryukan, ibid., p. 22. 40. Vidyabhusana, S. C. : A History of Indian Logic, pp. 47-48. 41. Nlfgllrjuna : Upayahrdayam, tran. by Giuseppe Tucci :

Pre-Dinnaga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, GOS XLIX, pp. 7-8. 42. Ibid., p. 8 fo. 43. Candrakirti : prasannapadn, Vaidya, P. L. (tran.),

p. 9. line 2. 44.

Ibid., p. 23, line 1.

45.

Ibid., p. 108, line 4.

46. ]bid., p. 246, line 23. 41.

Ibid., p. 247, lines 9-10.

48. Stcherbatsky, Th. : BL, Vol. I. p. 2. The Life of Nagarjuna from Tibetan and Chinese Sources, (Delhi. Nag Publishers (reprint),

49. Wallesser, M. :

50.

1979, pp. 11, 24, 26, 28, 29 & 31. Rhys Davids : Dialogues of Buddha.

51. Bochenski, I. M. : Ancient Formal Logic, p. 16. 52. Majjhima-Nikaya, Vol. I, Sutta 74, pp. 168-170. 53. Takakusu, Junjiro : The Essentials of Buddhist Philo­ sophy, Chan, W. T. and Moore, C. A. (ed.) (Honolulu: UHP, 1949,2nd edn; 1st edn., 1947), p. 42.

The Dialectics of Nilgllrjuna

88 j4. 55. 56. 57.

Radhakrishnan, S. : Indian Philosophy, V ol. I, PP· 352-60. Takakusu, J. Ibid., p. 42.

Kimura, R. lbid., p. 51. Bhandarkar R. G. : Early History of the Dekkan down to the Mohammedan Conquest (Bombay: Govern­ ment Central Press, 189 5), p. 17. 58. Candrakirti: P�as., Vaidya, P. L. (Tr. and ed.J, p. 19 line 25. 59. Ibid., pp. 16-17. 60. Kimura, R, op. cit., preface, 61. Ibid., p. 47. 63.

S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 466. S. Radhakrishnan : "The Teaching of the Buddha by Speech and Silence" The Hibbert Journal, XXXII, No. 3, April, 1934, p. 353.

64.

Af}guttara Nikliyapali, Vol. III, ed. by Bhikku J. Kash­

62.

yap, (Bihar: PPB, 1960), p. 205. 65.

Coomaraswarny, Ananda K. : Hinduism and B11ddhism (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1943), p. 43.

66.

Rhys Davids, T. W. : Buddhism (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1894), pp. 83-84.

67,

Rhys Davids, T. W. ·and Carpenter, J. Estlin (edd.): The Digha Nikaya, Vol. I (London: PTS, 1890), pp. 235-53. Rhys Davids, T. W. : Dialogues of the Buddha

PTS, pp. 300-320. 68.

Rhys Davids, T. W. : Dialogues, p. 304. Rhys Davids, T. W. et. el (ed.): The Digha Nikaya, Vol. I. p. 238. '' •.. te pi evam ahllf!l,su: "Mayam etamjanama mayam etam passama Yatha va Brahmayena va Brahma Yahirn va Brahma ti"?

Historical elements

69.

89

Dialogues, p. 305. D. N., Vol. I, pp. 239-40.

..... evam eva kho Vasridge University Press, 1957), p. 370. 87. Palit, Sharad: 'Dialectics', op. cit., p. 293. 88. Ibid., p. 287. 89. Basak: op. cit., p. 105. 90. Kosambi, D. D. : The Culture & Civilisation of Ancient India Ch. V. 3. ; Tbapar, Romila: A History of India, Ch. lII. 91. Kosambi, op. cit., p. 108.

3 Emergence of the Madhyamika Dialectical School and Nagarjuna : A Historical Study The M11:dhyamika dialectical school emerged along the line of progressive changes in Buddhism. Certain changes occurred in the fold of the religion itself, as a result of which the school of the Great Council (Mahiisa11ghik9s) appeared at a certain schismatic period of the historical development of Buddhism. The conflict between the old and the new adherents of Buddhism was not always only s.:ctarian exclusively from the theological standpoints. Newer philosophical dimensions often came out as a result of the conflict. The M11:dhyamika prllsangika Buddhism is often dubbed as nihilistic and ncgativistic, but we shall sec that this school is distinguishrd by its emphasis on the criti-�al and constructive aspects of Buddhism. In fact, tile schism between the traditional Hinay11:na Buddhism and the Mahlly:\na Buddhism took place initially and became gradually wido when the cessasionists from the old order sought to revolt against the rigidity of the old guards aml came forward with their own stock of interpretations

92

The Dialectics of Nugiirj1111a_

of Duddhistic crec'os. Consequently, the cult of Mah1tya:1a Buddhism grew up as a result of this conflict and substituted for the ideal of individual self-realization and salvation of the Arhats an ideal of total and universal consciousness of the Bodhisattvas for the progress and service of man. The development of Buddhist philosophy in its later phases was more complicated, because it gradually became multi­ dimensional in its philosophy and logic. Kimura has rightly observed : Buddhism, as in the case of all ;deas in fact, if we may be allowed to use the term, was developed spirally and not independently.1 The question of the emergence of the Mlidhyamika-prlisan­ gika school leads us into the following inquiries : (i) Classification of Indian Buddhism into its principal turning points, their central principles and the position of the prasa11gika school distinguished in the periods as classified ; (ii) Foundation of the school and Nl'igarjuna ; his period in the Ancient Indian History and his contributions to Buddhism ; (iii) Comparative study of the Hinayana and Mahltylina doctrines wich reference to those of the M:tdhyamika school�. 3. i : The principal turning points of Buddhism Buddhism is largely of Indian origin. It is peculiarly Indo­ centric, because the types of Buddhism which flourished in Ceylon, Tibet, China, Japan, Nepal, Burma, Siam, Malaya, Java, Sumatra, Mongolia and Korea were related formally, materially and culturally, by similarity or contrast to the contexts of Indian traditions of their growth and development. A survey of the first 1500 years of the history of Buddhist thought in

Emergence of the Madhyamika Dialectical School

93

A. D., i. c., -�p to , India, beginning from SOD B. C. up to Ratnakirti and Mok�ll:kara Gupta, the last innovative Indian logicians of the Buddhist order, 2 can give a real picture of the original initiatives which were taken in Indian Buddhism. 11

Th. Stcherbahky has roughly divided this period of 1500 years into three periods of 500 years l"ach. In his words : Roughly speaking, if we reckon, beginning with 500 B. C., 1500 years of an actual existence of Buddhism in the land of its birth, this duration is equally distributed into three periods, each having a duration of 500 years.3 His classification of the three periods is as follows :' First

Pluralism PwJga/a-JtJ11yata

(Denial of individuality) Middle

Sarva-dharma-fflnyatiZ

Concluding

Idealism

(Denial of all elements) Bllhya-artha-fflnyatiJ.

(Denial of the external world) This classification broadly includes the Abhidharmika philo­ sophy of sarvlistivada in the first period, $.tJnyatiZviida of Ni1:gar­ juna in the second and Vijnanaviida of Asanga (about 405-470 A. D.), Vasubandhu (about 410-490 A. D.), and their successors in the third. �1 1� (j J :"i } Stcherbatsky states : There are celebrated "three swingings of the law" as stated by the Tibetan historian, the first, the

middle and the last we would tell, the three periods in the deve­ lopment of Buddhist philosophy, the first which arose in ancient Magadha in the sixth century B. C. and still exists in Ceylon and in Burma, the second which arose ·n the last centuries B.C. DHAKA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

The Dialectics of Nagarjuna

94

in the Andhra country and was g:ven a definite formulation by l ·11:gllrjuna in the second century A.O. and the third which seems to have arisen in the North-West of the same time in the second century A.O. and was given a definite formulation by Asaliga of Peshwar in the fourth century A.D.6 Madhavll:cli:ryya (C 14 A.D.) has classified the principal bases of the later schools of Buddhism into Mli:dhyamika, Yogliclira, Sautr:tntika and Vaibh:t�ika with such descriptions Sarvaitlnyatva, Bahyaitlnyatva, BiJhyiJrthiJnumeyatva and Bahyllr­ thapratyakfavllda in his SarvadarJanasamgraha. 8 It is necossary that we should go into the details of the background for under standing the development of Buddhist schools in historical sequence. Professor B. M. Barua has distinguished the development of Buddhist thoughts in the following four parts : 7 Part Part

J. First period (Bimbisa:ra to K:ditsoka) II. Schismatic period (Kitla:Joka to Ka1_1i�ka)

Part

ITT. Classical period (Ka1_1i�ka to Har�avardhana)

Part

IV.

Logical period (Guptas to PitlasJ.

The following is an account of how the Modhyamika prasan­ gika Buddhism has developed in the history of Buddhism during the first 3 periods. 3. i. i

The four Buddhist Councils an d the emergence of the Mahasanghikas in the Hinayana order as the /orerun11ers of Mahayana Buddhism

After three months of Buddha's parinibbllna the first Buddhist Council (Mah:i:sai,giti) was held at R:1.jagrha in the Saptaparni Cave on the side of the Mount Vaibhl!ra (or Bebh:i:ra) under the presidency of Mahathero Kassapa in an assembly of about five hundred monks.• In this council the Vinaya was recited by UpaJi and the Sutta by A nanda.

Emergence of the Madhycmika Dialectical School

95

Mahasalighikas are known to have coined the term 'Maha­ yana' (hi g her vehicle) as being the forc-ru.mers of the J\ ·,aha­ y,rnists.9 They were excommunicated at the Vai�ali Council by the sthaviras.10 These Buddhist Councils are considered as significant, because they reflect the differences between the Hinayana sects themselves and between Hinayana and Malll!y,ma sects parti­ cularly when the texts wen· recited to the assembly of monks in the councils. It is difficult lo determine the exact date of the compilation of the Tripi!aka. Professor S. Radhakrishnan adduced that it was first compiled in 80 B. C. (- the time of Ceylonese King Vattagl!mani's rule). 11 Period- II (Kl!laJoka to Kai�i�ka) : The schismatic period began from the second Buddhist Council and the schism was officially recognised by the fourth council. The Second Buddhist Council was held at Vaisali (Vesali) a century after the first Council. Mahasthavira Revata presided over the Council. Seven hundred monks attended this Council. The proceedings and morals of the Council have been recorded in the 12th Khangakari1 of the Cullavagga section of the Vinaya pi\aka.12 A schism among the Hinayana Buddhists was noted for the first time in the Second Council. The monks of the vaJji country of Vaisali (Vesalika vajjiputtckli) rebelled against the rigidity of the monastic disciplines and customs and insisted on the practice of Ten points (dasa va11/,Uni) 13 in contravention of the pacittiya rul,s of abstaining from storing food, taking meals after midday, accepting 'gold and silver· (ruparajatam) in the form of gift, etc., and the Mahavagga rules of residence in a The venerable Yasa, son of Kakan�aka parish (sima). se r g b ou ht about the charges against them. Their conduct was declared unlawful and their demand was rejected.

96

The Dialectics of Niigli1j11na

The Dipavamsa and the Siimanta-pi'isiidikll. mention the name of a Great Council (Mahli.sang,ti), which was held in ·the reign of K,Jasoka,a descc.1dant of Ajatasatru, and attended by ten thousand monks.u Yuan chwan mentions that 'the majority of inferior brethren at Pataliputra began the Mahasanghika School.us We are not however sure of the exact origin of this school, but some evidences10 testify to their existence as the earliest cessationist school of the Hinayana Order. The revolt of the heretical vajjian Monks and the members of Greater Council, - The Mahasanghikas in the Hinayana Order paved the way for the rise of Mahllyana Buddhism. B. M. Barua thinks that the Pannaltivli.dins 17 who were nomina­ lists or conccptualists among the Mahli.samghikas of the Southern School might have 'cleared the road for the Andhakas, and they for the Madhyamikas.18 In his historical study of the terms Hinayana and Mahayllna, Kimura observes : The inquiry has led me to the conclusion that the attempt of the orthodox party to cry down the so-called heretical vajjian Monks at the Council of Vaisllli by calling them 'adhammavli.dins' (holder of heretical doctrines), 'pllpabhikfu' (sinful monk) induced them to coin words which could assert their own superiority over their rival parts.1" According to, Vasumitra, Bhllvya and Vinitadeva, the schism originated from the Five points of Mah:rdeva.20 La Vallee poussin bas shown that these points occur in the Kathllvatthu. 21 Nalin:i:k�a Dutta seems to be correct in his opinion that the schism began openly with the points of discipline (vinaya), but soon the doctrinal differences disccrnidle form in the Nikiiyas flowered forth.•• The doctrines of the Mahllsailghikas came to be regarded as Theravada (the doctrines of the elders). They accepted the cardinal principles

Acllrvavli.da which was differentiated from

Emergence of tire Mad/ryamika Dialectical Sc/roof

97

of Buddhis:n, but their main interest b!ing ontologieal-soterio­ logical, they gave more emphasis on th.: realization of svr'.,/rava (own being) through projnll.. They intrvduced into Buddhism the no.ion of Bodl:isaltva. This belief might have generated the Trikii.yii theory in Mahllyltna Buddhism. They also men· tioncd fourteen a,•yiikata theses of Mah:tyl!na Buddhism. Andhra was a stronghold of the Mahasanghika Buddhism even before Nllgl!rjuna. The Saila schools of the Malriisaiighika sect were called the Andhakas in the Ceylonese Croniclc:s on account of their great popularity in the Andhra Couutry.21 There were three Saila schools among the nine (or eight) divisions of the Mahllsailghikas according to Northern accounts. The Panna'tivl1dins ( > Pr.ljii:zptiviidins) were one of thcm·H The inscriptions at Amar:rvati and N:tg,ujuna Ko1.u�:i: mention some local branches of the Mah:tsanghika sccts. 25 It is also known that the structures at N:tgl'!rjuna Ko1_1�lt became places of pilgrimage for the Mah'.!saiighika sect.21 Pur�1ayasa anrl Kaoimala were resrectively the teachers of Asvaghota I and Nllgarjuna. These two teach!rs were of the Mahnsai,ghika line. 2' Kimura has included in his study an account of Purna­ yasa's discourse with Asvaghose I, which suggests that the former believed in the doctrine of two Truths, Conventional (sm·;ll'rita-satya) and Transcendental (paramart/ra sl1tyl1) which later on became the central theme of Madhyamaka Buddhism.28 The 'Anatml1-adharrna' do::trine of the Mah:tsanghikas was elaborated by Nag:trjuna under the term 'Sarva-kl.-zyatl1.' doo­ trine, and that of 'asa,nskrta-dharma' under tho name of 'Dharma-tathatii.' in the 'Mahllyli11a-Jrodhotpiidaiustra of Asva­ gho.ja U.28 Kimura states that 'Sarva-Sunyata' doctrine whi.:h was based directly upon MahityanJ. Sutras, sp:cially, Prajn11pl1ra1111tii-Slltras, ind.irectly was nothing but a fairly syste:natiscd and much more advanced for,n of original Mah:tsanghika tenets.30

98

The Dialectics of Nliglirj1ma

Th. Sterbatsky has drawn up a line of development from the · Ab."·idharmika pha!!l through the development of esoteric tcac1t­ ings in the Mahasai,ghika school to tantrika Buddhism.:n The view of the Mahllsagnhikas might· have exerted more influence upon the idealistic philosophy of the Yogi1clJra school. Kimura also states : Maitreyanatha as we know established the Y ogllclira school upon the basis of Mahayana Sc,tras like Ava­ tamsaka-Satra, LanklJvatura-sutra, Sandhinirmocana-Sutra, etc. All these s utras... were propounded by Mahnsai1ghika school­ men.32 The third Buddhist Council held at Pataliputra under the patronage of Priyadarsi Asoka in 249 B. C. classified the sayings of the .Buddha in three parts, Sutla Vinaya and Abhidhamma. Most of Abhidhamma Schools probably arose after the Council of Asoka. 33 Venerable Moggaliputta Tissa proclaimed 'Vibhajja­ vi1da' (the religion of analytical reasoning) as the true philosophy of the Buddha. Hinay:ma Buddhism received a powerful impetus during the reign of Asoka (.B. C. 263-B. C. 229)'. McGovern remarks: Buddhism certainly met with popular recognition during the life of its founder, though it is doubtful if it would have bt:come the great religion of India had it not been for the impetus given it by Asoka, the Buddhist constantine. 3' The fourth Buddhist Council which was held under the auspices of Ka1_1iska, officially recognised Maha:yana Buddhism and allowed the representatives of eighteen sects (ten Hinayana and eight Mahay:rna) to participate in the Congregation. 3• The Venerable Parsva, Convenor of the Fourth Council was an enlightened person in the new trends. It was due to his efforts the Mahayana Buddhimi came into prominence in the Fourth Council. Nag:i:rjuna is regarded not only as the real founder of the Madhyamika School, but also as the 'putative father'31 and

Emergence of the Madhyamika Dialectical School

99

'progenitor of the new trend. With Nligl'irjuna we probably enter into a scholastic period of Mahayana Buddhisr-.. A classical period of Bt•ddhist schools gained ground either to uphold philosophy in the service of religion, or confine it to philosophic constructions with excessive subtlety and artificia­ lity of methodical thinking, in which Buddhism, early or canonic is contrasted with Buddhism, later or scholastic.31 37

3.i.ii : Milindapanha precedes Nligllrjuna's time and it refers to an indigenous source of Buddhist dialectics. Amo ng other historic evidences, the Plill book, Milindapaiiha ('Questions of Milinda'), bears the mark of king Menander. The King Milinda and the Bauddha bhik�u Nliglisena, cons­ titute the two most distinguished characters of the book. The book in its thematic acc.ounts of Buddhist doctrines and literary form o f the dialogue to a great extent resembles the canonical texts of Tripilaka. Although it is regarded as extra-canonical, Buddhagho�a, doyen of the Elder school of Buddhist scholars of 4th C.A.D., has referred to it as point of reference and autho­ rity in his Visuddhimagga. 39 The book makes a Bactrian Greek king framing qucstions very often of purely philosophical nature to a Buddhist bhiksu. This element ascribes a special character to it. Whil.: emphasi­ sing on a point of its similarity and distim:tion with Platonic dialogues, Dr. W.W. Tarn states: What was not known in Indian literature-what had never happened before and was not to happen again-was that the interlocutor in a dialogue should be a foreign king and that the aim of the interlocutor should be a dialectical Victory; for the interlocutors in the Dia­ logues of Buddha, like those in the Dialogues of Plato, are only an aggroeable piece of machinery for eliciting the opinions of Buddha or Socrates.40

mo

The Dialectics of N,gifrjrma

His investigation into i•s distinctive aspects led him to con­ cluo. 1G 4. iv ii.

Mid,1/e P,JsitiJn & t!1e dn tattva uplidisan.

23. Thomas Watters: On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India (A.D. 629-645), Ed. by Rhys Davids, T. W. & B ussell,

·:rhc foundation of the Madhyamaka-Prlisa,igika Schou'/·

139

S. W. (London : Royal Asiatic Society ; In:iian edition, 1961), p. 222, Mr. Bunyio Nanjio's Cata/ogi1e, No. 1179. 24. MMK, p. 192, 23-24; B 44·4, 1-2. 25. Supra, p. 34. 26. Prasannapad;;, p. 158, 20-2. B 372 (Catul;sataka, 8.20). 27. Sw,yatlim S1111yatlirtham ca tata evam vihanyase­ MMK XXIV. 28. Ibid., p. 192. "Vyavaharasatye eva sthitvli Vyavahiirar­

2'). :i!O.

tham vineyajananurodhena sanyamiti vnzma]J, asanyamW, sunyasunyamityapi, naiva sanyam nasanyamityapi vra­ mal}. Sastri, N. Ayyaswami, op. cit., pp. 42-43. Madhyamarthasamgraha, o_p. ..cit., Verse IV.

5 Negation (Pratisedhah) : Simple (Prasajya) and Relation (Paryudasa) Negation is obviously th-: main operative aspect of N:tga:rjuna's dialectics. His method of negation involves the use of Pure Negation and Relational Negation. These two types of negation correspond to Prasajya-pratifedho!J and Paryudasa-pratifedho!J, of Indian logic. The Prasa'}ga method of the Madhyamika Prasatigika Buddhistic logico­ linguistic thinking initiated by Nlig:trjuna includes \"tithin it, mainly because of thi� classical doctrine of negation, a great deal of epistemology on the one hand and linguis­ tics on the other. Whether neJation is absolutc;y pure and simple, or implicative of any positive ekment, constitutes an important theme of this doctrine of negation. It contains in this respect an analysis, a part of which we should r.:fer to lin­ guistics and a part to epistemology and philosophical logic. The problem of formal logic within the scope of this doctr,ne con­ cerning the latter part relates to the principles of Contradic­ tion and Excluded Middle. The present chapter is con­ fined to the former part i i. e., to linguistic;, to the problem of reference and meaning involved in the use of these two types of_ncgatio n.

Negation (Pratisedhah)

141

Nllgllrjuna's negative judgement is prcdominnatly of the simple type, although his negative stat.:ment of the eight 'No's is of the relational type, which relates to the doctrine of Origi­ nation by inter-dependence (Pratltya Samutpada>Paticcasamup­ piida). It is commonly known that Bhllvaviveka, Dii1nltga, Dharmak1rti, Arca\a, Sllntarakfita, Kamalasila, Ratnakirti, Jiillnasrimitra, Kar1;akagomin and the Mimlinsakas like Kumli­ rila and Apadcva have extensively used both the types of nega­ tion in their systems of epistemological logic. Long before them it was Nllgarjuna who was most probably the first Bud­ dhist philosopher to apply with an ov�rwhelrning emphasis the prasjya type of negation in his prasa,iga method. This theory of negation has been used to develop a very important theory of the Scinyavadins and Vij iillnav11dins, a theory of Absolute Negation and Relative Negation, which is explained as the theory of Apoha by S11ntarak�ita. This chapter proceeds under the following three sections : (I) The syntactic as well as semantic distinction bet­ ween Prasajya-pratifedha and Paryudcesa prati­ fedha;

(2) Santaralqita ·s interpretation of the theory of Apoha with the concepts of Prasajya and Paryudiisa nega­ tion and his reply to the critics of Apoha ; (3) An appraisal of {antarak,ita's distinction between two types of negation in the light of the criticisms made against his theory.

I ] J.i :

Requisites of Syntactic analysis

Corresponding terms of 'negation', 'Contradiction' and 'pro­ hibition' in Sanskrit are 'pratifedha', 'Vipratifedha' and 'nifedha'. These terms are derived from the root 'Sidh', n:ean­ ing 'to keep away'. 'Prati' and 'ni' are simple prefixes and

142

The Dialectics of Nagilrjuna

'Viprati' is a Compound prefix. These arc used before the noun-form 'fedha' of the root 'sidh' in order to denote the sense of 'negation', 'mutual prohibition' and 'prohibition·.

In Sanskrit, as in all other languages, some basic structures correspond to possible types of negation. In order to analyse a particular case of negation it is therefore l,elpful to analyse its linguistic expression into it� syntactic and semantic components. The analysis indicates whether the negation is total or partial, absolute or relational, external or internal, exclusive or inclusive, permissive or prohibitive. Linguistic aspects arc thus found to be correlative to the logical, ontological and sociological aspects of negatinn. There are cases where some terms are there to express a particular sense of negation. As for example, the term 'var'!,a (caste)' denotes a sense of implicit negation,-a sense of mutual limitation. The term 'Sunyiita (Voidness)' may have an ontological reference. In most cases negative terms are formed in Sanskrit with such prefixes a� 'vi': nir', 'ati' or 'sama'. "Ni" (corresponding to Latin dis) expresses negation in the sense of transformation, i. e., dispersion of the former shape, but not an actual polar counterposition. "Nir expresses the same idea of transformation, but yet in a stronger way of dispersion in a kind of explosive manner (cf. 'NirvmJ,a' blown as undcr)".1 'Vinir' is a Compound prefix which expresses the same idea of strong negation (cf. CatUfko/i-Vinirmukta). Like the prefix 'ati' it refers to transgression in the sense of 'beyond'. The prefix 'Sama' has a peculiar meaning of combining the opposites and expressing a state of indifference towards the both, position and counter-position (cf. Sama-sukhadulJ,kham).

To determine the sense of relational negation the negative

'nafi' is added to a term in the determinative compound of nega­ tion (-nafltatpur14a), attributive compound (bahuvrihi) and

Negation (Pratisedhah)

143

appc>sitional compound (Karmadhuraya). Nan denotes six different meanings in forming a negative word, viz ; (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)

likeness (tatsudrlyam), non-existence (abhii.va), otherness (tadanyatram), comparative smallness (tadalpatli), non-permissiveness (apraiastyam) and contradiction, (Virodham)"

As for exampk, i. abrii.l}ma�1,1} (non-Brahmin : a Hindu belonging to any one of the tlm:c castes other than the Cdste of a brlih_mar;ia c. g. a Ksatriya), ii. aniruddha (unceascdJ, iii. agazal} (other than a jar), iv. unudara (one having a small stomach), v. akaryyam \Unpermilled action), vi. usural} (those who are opposed to the gods). In every case where nan (na) is added the negation of the given term implies a positive refc:rc:111:c:, which is not mentioueu explicitly by name, but is primarily inte11d..:d. Tile object of tbis positive referen.:e is to be distiutuished from the 'Pruliyogi of Nyliyu. The negative tern,s thus formed also bear a sense of ·polar negation', because they also indicate some polar counter­ positions or some bi-polar positions in the direct �.:nse of nega­ tion. The bi-polar position or the corre,poncow becomes indistinguishable from the ncgata, then we would have (the absurdity of) the cow being the not-cow. 7 9 Kum:trila draws on the positive account of his negation of Since Apoha is purely nega­ tive, the question of a distinction between the negation and tho negata, between the denotative and the denoted; beLween know­ ledge and language, word and meaning makes no sense at all. If Apoha is understood as the negation of its opposite, it will be involved in the fallacy of regressus ad infinitum. Tho Buddhist subjectivists, he says, do not admit of a non-Idea that could be negatived by Apoha. So this ·theory does not apply to their case also.80 Apoha that the categories are real.

2.viii.

Sn11tarakfita's classification of Apoha' into Paryudlisa and Prasajya and naming of'A11yli.poha' as a mental image distinguished from the unitary meaning of a general idea (or universal).

S:tntarakJlita's classification of 'Apoha' into Paryudasa and Prasajya sugge,ts that 'Apo/ta' (or 'Anyllpaha) is not purely

.Negation (pratisadhat)

negative. It rc,fers to a mental image, which is a construct of productive imagination and which does not have any unitary .reference to any coml"lon features of external objects. 'Apoha' (or 'Anyllpoha) is a logical principle of Exclusion Negation having no corresponding reference of its negatum in the external reality. The term 'Apoha' -etymologically means ·Reasoning of Negation'. English equivalent for the Sanskrit word •Diza (Tarka)' is 'Reasoning' (Dialectical n:asoning). The prefix 'Apa' suggests the sense of what is negative (or just nega tional), -does not merely suggest what is illicit. The term •Apavada' means •Negation' by its use in Indian logic. its Va Katham,­ antonym being 'Vidhi' (cf. Apavada-vidhi. Ts. 913. Ka 18). Since 'Negation' has logically a dialectical function, in stead of 'Negative Reasoning' (or 'Negative Dialec­ tics') the term 'Negation' may be used for 'Apona·. 'Exclu­ sion', Differentiation' are commonly used for 'Apoha', since the term 'Apoha' is an abridged form of a compound phrase 'A11yapoha', anyasmiit apahyate iti anyilpoha' (A11ya (other) + Apolza (Exclusion) ; anyasmat apahyate (as it is ex­ cluded from others) ).81

Santarak�ita has cited four reasons (a principal one and three derivative ones}82 for 'Apo/za' as 'Anyapoha' in Ts 10071009½. He has attempted a definition in the words no1ed below, which shows how he p1oposes a substitution of 'Apoha' as 'Anylipoha' for the so-called 'Universal',-a position which he has suggested in the precedin,g verses, namely, Ts. 1005-6. Ts I 007-1009½83 (I) The image is Anyapoha, because it appears as "Ex­ cluded (distinguished) from other appearances,(2) because it is the basis (cause) of the cognition of a thing as •excluded from otbers',(3) because it is cognised through an entity 'excluded' (from others),-

f6Z

Tlie- Dialectics of Nllgllrjuna

(4)' because it'is apprehended· in the form of the 'Specific· individuality' consisting in the Exclusion' of unlike· things, by its sameness,The name 'Apoha' 'Exclusion of others\ has been: given to it on the saicf basis. 84 'Relational Negation' (or 'Special Negation')85 is distingui­ shed from 'Pure Negation (or 'Simple Negation)•& in the respect that it contains an affirmation of the contrary .. Jt is, as.already noted, either. (i) logical (buddliyatmaka or (ii) ontological (arthiltmaka). 19 Its logical variety (Paryudasa (i) is qualified by mental ii:nages which are reflexively produced in our minds because of having a similar action, as we have the reflex image of a medical plant 'Haritaki' having a general febrifuge influenct' on our health. Such a reflected image, which is not constructed in the method of a universal as not being in that conceptual sense pervasive· to al I the plants of the type, is called 'Apoha, 'Anyapoha'. The image of'Haritaki' distinguishes itself refle­ xively from other plants when it is used to guide us in our action. It acts as the 'referend', i.e., as the internal cause or instrument of our purposeful action. It qualifies the 'referent" i.e., the external object, by the peculiar descriptive phrases, which it acquires in its interaction with the phenomenal quali­ ties of the object, i.e. with the object as it appears to it phe­ nomenally at the phe�omenal level of truth. It is not as real and eternal as a universal is conceived to be by Uddyo­ takara Bhlimaha, Kum:rrila and others. About the Mental Image Santarak�ita writes in Ts 910--91 I. 'As a matter of fact mere negation (nifedhamlltram) is not apprehended (naiva avagamyate) in the idea brought about by the word (i. o., the General word), -(910}.'

Negatio11 (Pratisadhar)

163

'On the contrary, 'in fhe case ·Ci! all such words as 'Cow', 'Gavaya', 'Elephant', 'Tree' and so forth (- -Gauragcvayohasti vrkJaJcetyiidi Jabdataf1), - -tho verbal cognition that results is always in the positive form ,- -(911).88 Kumnila ·contends that the term 'Apohti' does not apply :to the universal, which represents a class and carries as such a positive meaning. Apoha, he says, is neither definitely cogni­ sed, nor related (to anything), nor differentiated (from other things), nor endowed with any specific form. It is vague and unspecified [sv. A,p. 44-45, 48-49; Ts. 930-31]'.89 Slintara�ita replies to this criticism by his concept of the ontological variety of Relational Negation (-artha-iitmaka apoha). The real object is efficient point-instant (svalakfa1}a). It is really undifferentiated and unspecified. Relational Negation indirectly refers to it, 'which contains a difference form or a negation -of all other things •ao

I 3 l 2, viii �

A·n appraisal ofSiintarak,fita's dis1i11ction between two types of 11egatio11 in the light -of the criticisms made against his .theory.

S:i:ntarak�ita states m Ts. 1013-1015 that the implication of •Absolute Negation' is simple. It applies to 'AnyiI.poha' only to denote that 'Simple negativity', that 'A is not non-A'. Its emphasis is simply on the verb 'is-not', not on the nominative 'A'. Jt does not enqwre into any alternative possibility or probability, or synthesis, as to whether 'A is really A' or 'A is B/or C/or D', etc., He can accept to the extent that 'A' refers pragmatically to a mental image, which relates itself to 'non-A' and thus distinguishes its referent,-beyond that it cannot objectively establish itself on any necessary ground. The difference of meaning of 'Apoha' consists in the difference of

164'

The Diafectics of Nllgllrjuna

reference or a "Nominally bound term-negation' from a 'verbally bound predicate-negation'. Bh:rmaha charges the Apohavn:dins that a. single- word! cannot serve two functions of affirmation and negation (2. vi; Ka vi. 18, Ts. 913), Kuml[ri)a refers to the- same syntactic and semantic distinction of negation into Prasajya-pratifedha and Paryudllsapratifedha and charges the Apohavlldins that an act of negation cannot be purely negative, because it presupposes. according to him a positive reference to the ground of negation, directly or indirectly (2. vii : Sv. Ap. 33-34, Ts Ci3-64). The 'internal negation' or the two types of Apolza distin­ guished by S!iotarak�ita can be shown by a two-fold proposition and represented by an ordered couple a'> follows: 81 Vidhi p I (a) Paryudasa-pratiseaha (buddylltmaka) P = , or '->P =M ]. Notes and References

I.

2.

Dr. Betty Heimann : "The Significance of Negation in Hindu Philosophical Thought", B. C. Law Volume pp. 408-13 (Poona : The Bhandarkar Oriental Insti­ tute, 1946), pp. 410-1 I. Tatslid(tyam ab!zlivatca tadanyatvam tadalpatli.. [Aprll­ /astyam Virodhalca nanariha faE prakirttital}] Vidyll:­ sll:gar, lshwarchandra : Samagra Vyakara1}a Kaumudi (Calcutta, 1978 edn), p. 630.

"3.

Keilhorn, F, (ed.) : Pataiijali's Mahabhlifya ed. & tran. by Chatterjee, K. C. (Calcutta, 19S7), pp. 34-3S.

4.

Sharma, Dhirendra : "Buddhist Theory of Meaning (Apoha) ar:d Negative Statements', PEW, Vol. XVIII Nos. I and 2. Jan.-April, pp. 3-10 (University of Hawaii, 1968), p. 10, fn.

S.

Staal, J. F. : "Negation and the Law of Contradic­ tion in Indian Th()ught: A Comparative Study", BSOAS, Vol. XXV: Part-T, pp. S2-71 (University of London : The School of Oriental and African Studies, 1962), p. S9.

6.

Karma (Accusative) Vlicya : aahyate idam dahal} (dah (a)

+

ghan)

Kara'}a (lnstrumental)dahyate anena diihal} Vacya : Sampradlina (Dative) viicya : dahyate asmai dahal} dahyate asmiJt dlihal} Apll:ditna (Ablative)­ vlicya:

The Dialectics of N11gii.rj1111a

166

Adhikarat}a (Locative)-dalryate asmin diiha!J

vllcya: but not,

7.

8. 9. IO. It. 12. 13.

14.

15.

dahati sa!J diiha!J

['dllha!J' does not mean 'one who burns'] Dikshita, A. M. Ramanath (ed.): Mrmiimsa-Nyaya­ Prakala of Apadeva (Benaras : Knshi Sanskrit

Series, 1949). quoted by Staal, J. F., op. cit., p. 58. Ibid., p. 59. Loe cit., p. 58, fn. Loe. cit., p. 57. Ibid., pp. 60-61. Matilal, Birnal K. : Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (The Netherlands, Mouton & C Co., N.V. Publishers, The Hague, 1971). p. 163. Dr. Seyfort Ruegg: "The uses of the four positions of the Catufkofi and the problem of the desc-:iption of reality in Mahllya:na Buddhism", IPJ, Vol. 5, Nos. 1/2 pp. 1-77, Matilal, B1mal K. (ed.), (Dordrect­ Holland : DRP, September/December 1977), p. 3. Shaw. J. L.: "Negation and the Buddhist Theory of Mea ning", IPJ 6, pp. 59-77 (Dordrect, Holland: DRP, 1978), p. 60. Infra, p. 221. Staal, J. F., op. cit., p. 60. Sharma, Dhirendra, loc cit., p. 10 fn. Matilal, Bimal, K., op. cit., p. 163.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. Kajiama, Y : "Three Kinds of Affirmation and two Kinds of Negation in Buddhist Philosophy", Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens, 17., pp. 161-175 (1973), p. 171. Shaw, J. L. Loe cit., p. 61.

Negation (Pratisadhat)

21.

167

"Nifedhakam ca nifedha,n priidhiir.yenabhidhliylirthlit anyapfr/hiinamiiha. Paryyudlisa-pratipiidakantu vl1/c­ yam pratife-lhapurvakam anyavidhiinam priidhlinyeniI­

, iti., Sharma, Dllirendra : The

haityastyeva visefalJ, Meaning in

Differentiation Theory of

rndian Logic (Netherlands: foe cit., pp. 34-35.

Morton &

(Apoha)

and Nega­

Co., 1969), : "Buddhist Theory of Meaning tive statements", p. 9. 22.

"Tathiihi dvividho' poha{z Paryudiisanifedhata{, Dvivi­ pi buddha.tmiirthlitmii-bhedata/J,''

dha!J, Paryudaso'

Tattvasaingraha, Vol. I ed. by Embar Krisnama­ charya, GOS XXX, (Gen. ed. : Bhattacharya, Benoy­ tosh) p. 316. Jha, Ganganath (tr.): The Tattvasain­ graha of S:rntarak�ita with the comm. of Kamala,Hla Vol. I (Baroda: GOS LXXX, 1937), p. 533.

23.

"Taira buddhyatma.-buddhi pratibhii.so' r1hesvanu­ gataikarflpatvenadhyavasita{1 arthiitmii-arthasvabbavo vijatiyavyavrttamartha svalakfa1}amity-artha!J,. Anayor­ bhedo vibha.ga iti samlisa!J,"

24.

Text,

ibid., p.

317.

"Paryudiisiirmifedhllcca paryudiisalakfa11a{1 prasajya pratifedhaiceti yavat"

Text, 25.

ibid.,

p. 317.

"Svayain tuf/a durlitmiino naiayanti parlinapi"

English r.:ndering by Jha, G.,

op, cit.,

p. 533.

26. 27. 28.

Anugamaka vrtti

29.

"Vifaya{1 samanya-Viiefa-tadvad-bhedlit tredha!J,"

Nityam ekam anekl1nugatain siimiinyam. Vyiivarttaka vrtti

Uddotakara: N V, p. 14. Nyayadariana with Vatsyayana-bhlifya,

Calcutta Sanskrit Series 1936, 1944. 30.

Sva-lakfa1}a

two volumes,

The Dialectics �f Nllgllrjuna

168

3 I. Samllrya-lakfat}a 32. Slimli11yam anya-Vyli1•rttilakfa�iam Dharmakirti : PV. II r. 30. 33. Wittgenstein, Ludwig : Philusophical Investigations, Tran. by G. E. M. Anscombe, Pt. I (Oxford: B:i.sil Blackwell, 1958), pp. 25 e. 34.

Ibid., Pt. II.

35.

Jha, Ganganath (tra.), op. cit., pp. 466-613 Embor Krishnamacharya (ed.), Vol. I., Gos XXX.

36.

Shastri, Haraprasad : Six Buddhist Nyiiya Tracts in Sanskrit (Calcutta : Asiatic Society of Bengal, series 1226, 191U). Sharma, Dhirendra : The Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic, foe. cit, English Rendering pp. 47-101.

37. 38.

Shastri, Haraptasad, Ibid. Vatsy:i:yana criticised the Buddhist notion of voidness in his commentary on the Nyliya-Sutra (sec Nylidar­ Jana with Vatsyiiya11a-bhiifya, CSS 1944). Uddyo­ takilra (600 A. D.) wrote 'Nyiiya-Viirtika' on Vatsya­ yana's Commentary. V:tcaspatimisra (976 A. D.) wrote 'Nyiiya-Vlirtika-TiklI' and Udayanacll:rya (1050 A. D.) later on wrote Tatparya-TlkiI-Parisuddhi. Kum:i:rila brought the style of writing commentary (Vllrtika) toll. very high standard in his Slokaviirtika. Dharmakirti defended Dii'ina:ga from Buddhist point of view against Uddyotakara's criticisms in the Seventh Century A. D. "If Dln�:i:ga is the harvinger of a new era in Indian logic, Dharmakirti's contribu­ tion is so vast and so profound that after his time the whole of Indian philosophical literature, specially logic, bears the stamp of his master mind." (Sllnkr­ tyayana, Rahul : Pramiir,a-Vllrttikam of Dharmakirti,

Negation (Prath"adhat)

169

App. to I. B. O. R. S., Vol. XXIV (March-June, 1938), p. i. The debate on the nature of· reality, on the nroblems of knowledge and belief, meaning of words, language and their reference in the reality between these tw opposed camps consti­ tutes an important aspect of Indian thouJiht. 39.

The passage is an English rendering of Vlk:aSpati's text, by Bhandarkar, R. G. in his Early History of the Dekkan down to the Mohommedan Conquest (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1895) p. 59.

-40.

K. K. Raja : 'The Theory of Meaning According to Buddhist Logicians', ALB, Vol. XVIII, Pt. 3-4, p. 11.

41.

See, Sharma, Dhirendra: The Negative Dialectics (New Delhi : Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1974), p. 110.

42.

Vastve,,a hi paramlirthatal} Jahdapratyayagriihyam, ata{1 Jabdail} sll.ksad11idhinefedhlivylhn Vastusvabhliva­ pratiplldaniidvidhireva Jabdiirtha iii vidhiiabdcr thavadinlim dar/ana,n. E. Krishnamacharyya (ed.). Panjikii, p. 234.

43.

Apoha-vlidiniim tu na paramlirthatal} Jahdiiniml Kim­ cidvacyam Vastusvarapamasti. Sarva evil hi Jabda­ pratyayo bhranto bhinn!JlarthefvabhedlikiirildhyavasiI­ yena pravrttel} yatra tu piiramparyena vastu-prativan­ dhal}, tatrathusiimvlldo bhrlintatve' piti darillnam. Tatrakyattadiiropitam VikalpadhiyiI rthefvabhinnllm tada11yavyavrtta padiirthiinub/zavavaliiylitatvatsvaya,il rupain cii11ytll'yavrtaylI prakhyiinlldbhriint aiscli11ya­ vyii1•rt tllrthena sahaikyeniidhyavastitatvadanylipoqha padiirthiidhigati phalatvllccli.nyapot/ha ityucyate, Teniipohal} Jabdii.rtha iti prasiddham. lbid., p. 234. Jha Ganganath (tra.), op. cit., p. 466,

Tlie Dialectics of Nll.garjunc.,

[70

44. Yasya· -vasya Iii fabd"asya yo· yo vifaya ucyate / Sa sa samvidyate nai,•a vastanariz sn hi dharmata I/

Ts 870 Ts (text), p. 275. 4"5.

Sakyll.rtha, Viicyiirtha abhideylirtha, mukhertha.

46. Pll.ribhatika. 41.

/iikfa'!ika.

48. SaktiJca padena saha padiirthasya sambandhal}. Sa cll.smll.cchabdlldayamartho voddhavya itlsvarecchiirapa.

Visvanatha : SiddhDntamuktavall, Sabdakhan4.a, Shastri, Paiicanan : Bhiiflipariccheda, (Calcutta 1377 B. S.) pp. 415-16. 49. infra, fn.51 50. Kamalasila,. loc. cit., p. 281. "Naiya.yikastu vruvate "Vyaktyakrti jlitayastu padll.r­ thaf}'' iti ... tatra vyakti-sabdena dravyag11navisefa­ karmll.nyabhidhiyante. Tatha ca 5fltram "Vyaktieim.aviJesasrayo mflrtti" riti".

51. Jutal} sambaddha Jcetya eka{z kll./a{1 52. Jha, Ganganath, foe. cit., p. 471. Ts text, op. cit., p. 277. 53. "najll.ti Jabdo bhedll.hiim vllcaka ii.nantyiidityanena nirdifEai}'",

Ts text, E. Krishnamacarya (ed.), loc cit., p. 277. English rendering by Jha, Ganganath, Toe cit., p. 471. 54.

Yadi Jabdiinpakfayasi, tadiI 'anantyiidilyasya vaslu dharmatvlld vyiidhikar(l1Jll hetu{z.

55.

Taira svalakfa'}am tiivanna Jabdaihp ratipadyate J Samketavyavaharlip/akiila vyliptiviyogatah If Ibid., p. 471. Ibid., (Ts text), p. 281.

Negation (Pratisadhat)

171

Ibid., p. 490. Ts text, p. 210. Kamala;lla's Commentary 'Tattvasa,ngralia Panjikii\ 57. Tr. by Jha Janganath, p. 490.

56.

:58.

Yatli gau ityayam labdal} krtiirtho'nya nirkartau / Janakrisation of Causality, Substance, Number and Motion.8 He has consequently shown in tho following chapters that any form of expr.:ssion, definition, statement or proposition concerning the objectivity of Causality, Substance, Number, Motion, etc., is riddled with self-contradiction. His simple negation (Prasajya-pratifedha of his opponent's metaphysical positions is explained below :-

The Principles of Negation

177

6.i. Prasajya-pratifedha ofCausality 111 MM.A:. 6. i.i. Negation of origination.

MMK i.3. states: Entities of any kind are never found anywhere produced from themselves, from another, from both (themselves and au.other) and also from no cause.9 The Karikll negates the following four possible alternatives on the concept of origination �(I) A is caused by A. (2) A is caused by not-A. (3) A is caused by both A and not-A. (4) A is caused by nothing. Buddhap:i:lita analyses the simple negation of the alternatives �howing the fallacies involved in every sub-case following the method of Prasa,:gapadana adopted integrally by N:i:gii:rjuna. Ca ndrakirti defends them against the criticism of "Bh:\Vaviveka in the Prasannapadll. The syntactic as well as the semantic form of this Four-fold Negation corresponds to that of a verbally bound predicate­ negation. Candrakirti �tates that the negation of the first position (Koii)-e.g., A is not caused by A- does not commit the respondent to an affirmation of the contrary. For the negation intended is Prasajya (Pure Negation). A thing existing by itself does not have the need of re-originating itself (utpada­ i,aiarthiit). If it is still argued that it reoriginates itself, the argument commits the fallacy of regressus ad infinitum (atipra­ smiga dofa). The negation intended is Prasajya, because the argument only negates the proposition 'A is caused by A'. This do�s not, therefore, imply that 'A is caused by not-A' is accepted. The proposition 'A is caused by not-A' is to be separately negated. Prasajyapratifedhasya Vivakfilatvat, parato' pyutplldasya pralifetsyamlinatvlit 10

The Dialictics of NiJ.glirjurra

A thesis about migination is, thus, negated by the princip!c of pure Negation. ft shows that a coherent account of causality is not logically tenable. Neither Satkliry rvllda (Identity-theory), nor Asatkllryavllda (Non-identity theory), nor Sadasatkllryavllda both Identity and Non-identity theory), nor Yadrcchuvllda (The theory of accidental causation) is safe from logical difficulties. 6. i. ii :

Negation of 'destruction'

Nllgitrjuna does not imply by his negation of origination (utpada) that there is in reality cessation, annihilation or destru­ ction (nirodha, vinlila). In his negation of origination he does

not draw any conclusion, or does not harbour any assumption indirectly (i. e. by implication) regarding the reality or unreality of 'nirodha'. He refutes 'nirodha' for two purposes :-(i) in order to prove that the Hinayllnist concept of causation {'momentariness') is not tenable, and (ii) that the view of things conceived as momentarily perishable (K�a1Jabhaigura) is also a phenomenal view (dr!ti ). K XXV.I states that one who attains to Nirvli.ila can realise that there is in reality no origination (udayalJ) and no destruction (vyaya�) and it is not proper to state that Nirvli1Ja is desired through cessation (11irodhlit nin•li�z­ ami�yate). It is clear that the religio-cthical perspective of th6 Prlisangika Mlidhyamika typ� of Mabityana Buddhism is very deep-seated. His refutation of cessation from logical point of view is explained below. The San1khya philosophy and the Sarviistivad, Buddhism are both realistic. The former posits Causality to be a permanent feature of the underlying physical stuff, but it does not admit of absolute change. It is believed that the effect is inherent in the cause, which possesses an innermost power to effcctuate it.11 The latter enunciate the doctrine of momentariness and maintain that an effect is an altogether new event which occurs momentarily on the destruction of the cause. N1tg1trjuna has restricted origination and cessation to the domain of

The Principles of Negation

179

phenomenal knowledge (i. e. to momentariness) and mamtained that the principle of Origination by Inter-dependence (i. e. the principle of Rc'-itivity), \\hich gives the Middle Way (Madhyama Pratipad) vision of truth, is itself without cessation and origination. Candrakirti says that Nagl!rjuna has at first refuted the possibility of origination thinking that it will be then easy to refute 'destruction'. 12 Nagarjuna contends in K i. II that the postulation of Samanantara pratyaya is not proper and therefore, 'destruction' is not proved. The postulation of this particular causal condi­ tion is not proper for explaining why there is no (temporal) gap between the cause and the effect wkich succeeds its cause immediately. The cause is the immediate antecedent of tbe effect, and the effect is the immediate consequent of the cause. There can be no temporal gap between the cause and the effect. To explain this absence of any temporal gap which makes the cause the immediate antecedent of its effect, the H1nay:1nists hold that unless we postulate the destruction of the cause as the immediate antecedent of the emergence of the effect, there will be always a temporal gap of one moment between the cause and the effect. For before the effect comes into being, the cause has to cease to exist. So between the cause and the effect, there intervenes the destruction of the cause. Unless this destruction of the cause is identified with causal efficiency, there cannot be any explanation of the immediacy of the antecedent cause. Thus, for example, when a sprout comes out of a seed, the seed has first to cease to exist as a seed,-the seed has to be first destroyed,-before the sprout originates. The doctrine of Sumanantarapratyaya is put fof\\ord by the Hinay­ :tnists to identify this cessation of the cause with causal efficiency. Nliglirjuna, however, does not accept this explana­ tion of immediacy of the causal antecedence. His argument is as follows :The main point to be explained in the theory of the Hinay:iuists is-where and how is the destruction of

J80

Tlze Diafect[cs of NIIgiirj11na

the seeJ produced. If an effect is produced at all, !1' is prodnccd either in its material cause or where the cause is destroyed. But the d-,struction, wfll have to belong to something. As the seed is itself destroyed, the destruction is of the- seed, it cannot be in the seed. So it (the destruction of tho seed) has to be in the sprout. For there is nothing else than the seed and tho- sprout to which the destruction of the seed can belong, As it cannot belong to the seed, it must, therefore, belong to the sprout. But the sprout has not yet come into being. So N:1:g:,rrjuna 's objcctior: hero is, 1hat the- destruction of the seed cannot be understood as belonging to the sprout which has not yet come to be. Now if the Hmay:1:nists maintain that there is no difficulty in holding that the destruc­ tion of the seed belongs to the not-yet-existing sprout, even then, their position is not tenable. For, eveo ff it be admitted that the destruction of the seed is in the non-existent, sprout, even then, because the sprout is still non-existP.nt, it cannot immediately succeed the destruction of the seed. For again between the destruction of the seed and the non-yct­ existing sprout there will be a time-gap. As a matter of fact, on this theory of the Hinay:1:nists, both the destruction of the seed and the sprout are without any cause whatsoever. The concept of absolute destruction (aiefa niradha) is not acceptable to the authors of Ns and Ns bh (v), because they think that the causes of origination and destruction are cognis­ ablc. If a thing originated in the antecedent moment is absolu­ tely destroyed in the consequent n:ioment and if on its total destruction it is assumed that there arises an absolutely fresh thing in the next consequent moment having no relation to its antecedent thing and on the ground of this momentariness if it is assumed that a thing continues to exist in its apparent

The Fri11ciples of Negation

181

:. T

By showing the absurdity of entailed consequences from his opponent"s grounds he claims to prove that his opponent's posi­ tions are false, but he abstains from making any statement about his own presupposilional ground. He might however think that the falsity of certain views of his opponents does not mean that he should have to make a. statement about his own presupposi­ tion.

The Principles -0[ Negatfon

203

Our point is that whether he distinguhhes betwe:n ·the mani­ fest (or asserted) content and the prcsuppositional ground of his ,own negation, i.e., ,, hethcr he differentiates between his own negative expression and its implicate when he applies the princi­ ple of implied or relational negation to his case. We cannot assign a meaning to an expression unless it has reference. It may be argued that his negative expression of the Paryudllsa type (MMKI.1-2) should semantically mean that his negation and its implicate refer to the same object and it (Pratityasamut­ plida) is an ontological entity. Nitgltrjuna does not formuldte (or specify) his own grou nd of negation logically. Jt is clear that he pre.upposes the Buddhist principle of 'lhis being, that arises' in his dialectics of the Middle Way and also states that the ontological categories do not apply to it. In his logical contexts of refutation he says that he does not assume an)thing about which he can make a statement. It is one thing to sus­ pend an expression with regard to a presupposition and another thing to claim that one does not have any presupposition at all. One should distinguish between these two states of mind in a case of self-referential judgement. It is clear from his use of Catuskoti-prati§edhli that he can -dissipate both the ground and the asserted content of his adver­ sary's expressions (o r verbal cognitions) by using a single nega­ tive sentence of the Prasajya-pratifedha type and itccuse them of a fallacious their assertions. But there remains in this nega­ tion 11 defect of one who contradicts with his own expressiun (svavacana virodhaf}) if he only says : "I do not require any ground or my own, nor would it follow from my negations that I would have to make a stat::ment about my own presupposition". His self-referentioal statements amount to it and in his case also the gap is retained. NOTES AND REFERENCES I.

Supra, p. 173.

The Dialectics of NllgiJrjuna

204 2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

7. 8. 9.

IO. 11.

12. 13. 14.

15.

Supra. p. 178. Infra, Sec. 6 VI. Mark Siderits and J. Dervin o·Brien : "Zeno and N!rgarjuna on Motion", PEW, Vol. XXVI. No. 3, ed. by Eliot Deutsch, pp. 281-98 (University of Hawaii, July 1976), p. 288. Anirodhamanutpll.damanucchedamallIJvatam/ Aneklirthamanltnli.rthamanlimanigamam / 1 YalJ. Pratityasamutplidam prapancopasamam Hvam/ Deiayiimiisa Sambuddhastam Vande Vadatli.m Varam/2, Vaidya, P. L. (ed.). MMS of N:tg:i;juna, p, 4. "AnantaviJefa1]asambha1•e' pi pratityasan111tplidasya affiinllmevoplldlinameflim pradl1linyena Vii-lidamgabh11taivll.t'' op. cit., p. 4; B. 11, 4-5. "ArylI']iimabhidheyadi lakfa']ii op. cit., p. 4, B. 11, 5. Supra, p. 138. Na Svato nllpi parato na d1·avylim 11npyahetwal} I UtpannlI jlltu vidyante bhltvllh Kvacana Kecana I/ i.3 English rendering, by Ruegg, Seyfo1t : "The use, of the four positions of the Catl,lfkoti and the probl.:111 of the description of reality in Mahayana Bud­ dhism", IPJ, vol. 5, pp. 1-7, (DRP, 1977), p. 3. Pras., op. cit.. p. 5, B. 13, 5. See 'Slimkhya KliriklI (Isvarkrsi:i!rc;i:rya) Supra Ch. 2, fn. 34. "AsadkarQ']liduplld linagraha']llt Sarvvasambhavllb/ilivat I Saktasya Sakyakara']llt Kll.ranabhllvlicca satkliry­ yam//Sk. 9 'utplidapratifedhena 11irod/1adipralifedfJ.a saukarjam manymltna', MMS, p. 4; Pras., B. 12, 8-9. Niyamahetvabhaviid yathli darJanamabhyanujnli. I/ Upacyapacaya pravandhadarianllccharirlidifu/ Tarkav:tgisa Phat;1ibhu�ai:ia/Nyltyadarianam, Vol. III, Satra-bhllfya, 3-2-10 // 2 81 /!, Sahitya Parisad Pub­ lication No. 1063, p. 203. N. S. 3. 2. 13-16.

The Principles Pf Negation

205

16. Stcherbatsky, Th. : BL, Vol. I, p. 85. 17. Mookerjec, Satkari : The Buddhist Philosophy of Univorsal Flux [Calcutta, 1975 (reprint)], p. 8. Tarkav:tgisa, Phar:i,ibhu�a1.1a 8, Vol. Ill, op. cit., pp. 215-218. 18. Kamalas1la: Panjika, p. 140 Mookorjee, Satkari, loc. cit., p. 5. 19. The form of the efficient cause does not continue after it produces its due effect [Ts 415. VIII]. A fresh moment urges a fresh efficiency. Uddyotakara argues if tho term 'Kfa'}a' means 'Kfyaya' (destruction), it is not right to state that it possesses destruction. At the time there is Destruction, the thing to which it belongs is not the and the possessive affix is not used to denote things which exist at different times. :S:tntarak�ita replies to Uddyotakara : 'That fo�m of the thing which docs not persist after its production is called Kfa'}a, 'Moment and that which has this form is held to be 'Kfa'}ika' 'momen­ tary' (Ts 413). He further states : Every produced thing is p;rishable after the moment it is produced, b�cause the momentary thing repre­ sents its own destruction, "Ye tllvat lcrta/cill} bhllvlll} te sarv1•e ksa�mbha1igi11a{z / Vinlllam pratibhlivlinlim anapekfatayllsthite /I

20. 21.

Ki, 8-9. Steherbatsky, Th. : Nirvii'}a, p. 20.

The Conception of Buddhist

The Dialectics of Nllglirjuna

206 22.

Pras. 2., B 5, 5.

23.

"Pratltyalabdo 'atra Tyabanta�, prlipto.vakekfllyiim v1-rtate" "etirqatyartha�. prati� priiptyartha{1".

Pras., p. 2; B 5.1. 24. "Paticca-samuppada", a, explained by Henry C. Warren, of Cambridge, Mass., Journal of the Maha­ bodhi Society, Vol. 2., No. 5, Sept. 1893, ed. by H. Dharmapala, p. 3. 25. Quoted by Stcherbatsky, The Conception, p. 130. 26. Yadi samskrta utplldastatra Yukta trilakfa'}o Athlisaf!lskrta utpada{, katham samskrtalakfa'}am II

MMK VIL I, ibid., p 59.

27.

Utplidadyaitrayo vyas1a nli/am lakfa'}akarama'}i K

VII. 2. 28. Yadi bha'}qaka/e sthityutplidau na syatlim, ... vinlIJo'pi nastlti,-Pras. Ibid., p. 59, B 146, 14-15. 29. K VII 2. line 2.

30.

'Parasparaviruddhatvlid' Pras, ibid., p. 60 ; B 147, 2. Notpadymanaih. 11otpa1111am nanwpannam Kathmi1ca11a/ Utpadyate tathlikhyatam gamoamiinagatiigatai� II

vn.

31.

14.

Prais. p. 65. "Evamutpadyamlino bhavo notpadyate, Urpannlinutpanna-Vyatirekenot padyamlinli bhiivli t."

32.

Gatam na gomyate tiivadagatam naiva gamyate / Gatagatavinirmuktam na gamoate II Ibid., p. 33. 33.· tlivacchabdena ca pratifedha karmam dar1yati. Ibid., p. 33, B 92, 9-10. 34. na ca gatligata vyatirekeena trtiyamaparamdhvajlitari1 paJyamo gamyamanam nlima. 35. Mark Sideritis and J. Dorvin O'Brien, op. cit., p. 289.

The Principles of Negatio11

207

36.

Gamymiinasya gamanam yasya tasyapr asajyate /

37.

Prasannapadii, oc. cit.

[J.te gaterq •myamlinam gamyamanam hi gamyate /I

Kii.4.

p. 34, B 95, 8-1 l.

'·Yasya viidino gamyama11asya gomanamiti pakial} gamyamiine samjnabhute gamikriyalunye yo gamikri t­ yam lldheyabhullimicchati, tasya pakie rte gatergam­ yamlinamiti prasajyate, gatirahitam gamanam sylit . .•. tasmad gatirahitam gamanam prasajyate. ''

38.

D va11 ga111lirauprasajyete prasakte gamanadvaye /

39. Pras., op, cit., p. 25, B 96, 11-15. 40. MMK XV. 7, B 269, 7-o. Kaccahliyanaqot tasut 1am, Samjutta Nikaya, Vol. 2., Nidlinasamjutlam, Sutt a No.

41.

vv, xxm.

15.

"Pratiiedhayase yadvat p,a1i1edho'J,am tath aiva syiit"

42.

"-na nivartayitu,ii svabhi.vama/am"

VV. I. ; v1dc Ch. VIII, Sec. iii. 43.

VY XXVIlI, 1st line.

44. 45.

Vrtti, op. cit.,

Vrtti op. c it,,

p. 284,

p. 284; VV XXVI , Vide, Bhatta­ charya, Kamalesh\\ar: The Dialectic al Method of Niigiirj11na (Delhi: Motilal Baoarsidass, 1978), p. 20. 46. Ts 919; Supra p. 47. Johnson, W. E. : Logic, pt. I (Cambridgi: : University Press, 1921), p. 67. 48. Ibid., pp. 66-67. 49. 50.

Ibid., Ibid.,

p. 68. pp. 71-72.

The Dialectics of N1Ig1Irjuna

208 51.

Matilal, Bunal K. : Epistemoloqy, Logic and Grammer in Indian Philosophical Analysis, p. 164.

52.

Johnson, W. E., op. cit., p. 73.

53.

Supra, p. 179.

54. _ Ruth M. Kempson : Presuppositions and the Delimita­ tion of Semantics (London : Cambridge University Pross,_1975), p.48.

,

7 Nagarjuna's Methods of Dialectical Negation 7-i.

An illustration of the distinction between Prasailgltnum'lt:nz. and Prasailgapadana

Formal distinction IA] Prasailgllnumana (i) I. Major Premise-Ir namability (or predicability) had deviated knowability, knowability would not have been the cause of namability. 2. Minor Premise-But everyone admits that knowa­ bility is the cause of namability. 3. . ·. Namability can not deviate knowability, i. e., m,mability pervades knowabi!ity. (ii) 1. Major Premise-If the jar had been here, it would have been perceptible. 2. Minor Premise-But the jar is not perceptible here. 3. . ·. The jar cannot be here. [B] Prasmigiipiida11a (i) I. Major Premise-If knowability had been the cause of namability, the statement 'A thing which is namable is knowa• ble too' would have been true.

T11e Dialectics of Nagiirjunu 2. Minor Premi'se-But it is impo�sible that the state­ ment is true, i. e., it is necessary· that the statement is. false, (the: statement is bound to be ial�e). 3 .. · It is impossible that the assumption knowability is the cause of namability' is true. {ii) 1. Major Premise-If the jar were perceptible in its. true being, the statement 'the jar which exists [at the conventional level of truth is really perceived [as such existing independently in itself] would have been true. 2. Minor Premise-But it is imposs;ble that the state­ ment is true. 3.

It is- impossible that the assumption 'the jar is. perceptible in its true being' is. true·.

Having recogni'sed the fact that 'whatever is knowable Uiieya) or a hypothetical im­ position is deliberately made in A (i) in order to prove indirectly the relation of invariable concomitance between 'namability' (abhidheyatva) and 'knowahility' (jneyatva), which respectively constitute the vyapya (pervaded) and vyiipaka (pervader) of the relation. The ground of the reasoning' (tarka) that 'namability deviates knowability' is untrue. Here in this instance of 'reasoning' this untrue ground is hypothetically imposed and with this imposition the untrue consequent of the untrue ground is also deliberately imposed only to show that the hypoth�tical. imposition gives an undesirable consequence (anifta prasa,iga) -'knowability would not have been the cause of namability'.

rs namable (abhidheya)', an assumption

Reasoning (tar/ca) 'therefore' involves a deliberate coutrary­ to-fact assumption. This contrary-to-fact assumption is techni­ cally called 'ii.hliryya bhramal}', because in reasoning the assump­ tion is an imaginery imposition (iiharyya).> In A (i) the

Nagar_j1,1.na's Methods

211

.assumption of the untrue ground rs made in order to show that the assumption of its untrue consequent is unavoidable. A (i) is a hypothetical judgement. It consists of two members ·viz. (i) the deliberate assumption of a ground known to be false, and {ii) secondly; the assumption of lhe untrue -consequent The cons,,quent is undesirable, because its opposite is known w be the real determination of the vyllpya. 2 A (i) is an instance -of prasaliglinumiina tredactio ad absurclum) because it indirec­ tly prove; the relation of invariable concomitance between ;namability (concomitant) and knowability (that with which it is -concomitant). In A (i) 'if namability (or predicability) had deviated know­ .ability' is lipadaka (the untrue ground imposed) and 'knowa­ hility would not have been the cause of namability' is the -iiplidyii (the untrue consequent imposed). The former is taken to be the probans and the latter, to be the proba11dum of this 'reasoning'. The former memberof the hypothetical judge­ ment is· prohiins, because it indicates that the consequent is undesirable. In A (ii) "If the jar had been here (atrii yadi glzli/li syiit)" is ,h,: deliberate assumption of the ground known to be false and 'it would have been perceptible' (Uirhi ghii./avattviiya upii.lii.­ bhyetii) is the assumption of the untrue consequent. The deli­ berate imposition of 'the existence of the jar· in a place where it was not perceived is an assumption which deviates from the fact that 'all jars are perceptible'. The assumption that 'the jar was here is the vyapya (determinate) of its non-existence. The assum­ ption of the untrue consequent 'possibility of perceptibility' fol­ lows upon 11hc assumption that 'the jar was here' and the cons-e­ quent is undesirable. 'The existence of the jar' is liplidlikli and 'the possibility of p�rceptibility' is liplidyii. In B (i) the apadya or vylipliklihiiryyli. of A (i) is lipiidakl'i. and flhe liplidakli of A (i) is iiyadakii.. 'Namability really exists' is.

212

The Dialectics (If Nuglirjrma

raken to· be- an absurd consequence, because knowability of-a. things ownbcing as a necessary dctcm:ii'lant (l'yiipafcli) of its namability is taken to be an untrue imposition. N:igarjuna, as being a pruslitigikli Macfhyamika, adduces the priisa,iga­ hetu, the ground in favour of his own method of 'reasoning by absurd consequences' in VV. L VII in the particular context that when a thing is not knowable in its intrinsic nature, a name also does not really �ist. \Vhile naming is taken to be unreal, it is admitted that it has got a conventional (sli•nl'rtika) meaning. So, instead of assuming the relation of invariable concomitance between 'namability' and knowability• as a nroved fact in the presuppositional ground of his 'reasoning', he ques­ tions the ground of the inferential cognition of a thing's nama­ bility from its knowability. Similarly, in B (ii) tho upiic/ya or A (ii) is liplidaka and the llplic/aka or A (ii) is iipiidya. The prasatigiiviikya (hypothetical judgement through reasoning by absured consequences) states in its apadaka (implicans) that the possibility of percentibility in the case of the jar's real existence or intrinsic existence is a wrong imposition and therefore the consequence which this assumption leads to is an absurd one. The possibility of percentibility cannot be the decisive factor of the jar's real existence. The absurdity of the jar's real existence is the implicate (liplidya) of the prasa7J-ga-vukya, because ground 'possibility of perccntibility is a wrong imposition. N:1garjuna furnishes the reason in favour of his own contention tbat only the appearance of the jar is perceptible. The intrinsic existence of the jar in tlle substantiality, causality, motion, number, time, etc. is not perceptible. He says in VY. XXX : 'If l appre­ hended anything with the help of perception, then I would either affirm or deny.' The perceptible nature of the jar is contingent, or dependently originated (i. e., non-intrinsic) and on ths ground of the mere assumption ·possibility of percepti­ bility'. no position can be taken about the existence of the jar. Although both A and B have the form of hypothetical

Nugilrjuna's Methods

213

.·easoning of negative implication, the iipildaka and the iiplidya of A (i) and A (ii) ch�rgc their respective places in B (i) and B (ii) and in A th.: iipiidya is called 'an undesirable conse­ quent', while in B the iipiidya is called 'an absurd consequent'. 'Absurdity' indicates that the negation is pure and undesir­ ability' of the consequence indicates that the negation is relational. B(i) and B(ii) have, therefo;:e, the form of hypothetical r�a­ soning of negative implication by logically inconsistent and absurd consequences. Absurd consequences are drawn by counteracting the presupposition of invariable relations bttwcen knowability and namability, and between perceptibility and existence of a thing. The prasa1}giiplidana, thus, makes such a presupposition dialectical. It adduces contextual reasons, generally by deducing analytically absurd implications from the concept of the subject involv�d in a presupposition and thereby showing that the presupposition is self-contradictory. A pre­ supposition under the analysis of parasa1}gapadana is aiso called a prasanga. B(i) may be called jneyatvlibh1dheyatvaprasanga' and B (ii) may be called 'upalavdhfsattiiprasa,iga', as ther� are •/akfyalakfa1}aprasa1iga', 'ja11yaja11aka1'·a prasa,iga', •/asvatoc­ chedadar/anaprasai:ga' in MMK. The prasa,iga-hetu which

determines a particular presuppositional case to be self-contra­ dictory is also called a prasaiiga, e. g., gamanadvayapra.ra,iga, gantrdvayaprasanga, dar/anadvayaprasaiiga, etc. Material distinction

The prasmigapadana differs 'in a very material respect' from the prasa,igiin11111iit1a specially be.:ause it do�s not indirectly v�li­ date the ground of a syllogistic argument. The prara,iga-/zet11 of the prasangilpilda11a detects errors in the ground of the opponent's :irguments for this purpose. Prasanganumiina is applied to a ease when there arises a doubt as to whether the probans deviates from the probandum

214

The Dialectics of Nl1gilrjuna

i. e., whether in opposition to the rule of invariable concomitc iincl' admitted in the uni,·ersal proposition of :rn argumert the probandum exists in a subject where it is n0 to be absent. Doubt b rings an obstacle (prativandhika) to the knowledge of invari­ able concomitance (vyiiptigraha). 'Reasoning' takes th.: form •If smoke had deviated from fire, fire would not have been the C1\JSe of smoke. 3 In this reasoning the consequent 'fire would not have been the cause of smoke' is undesirable (-m1ista parasanga).

Prasangiinumii11a is not inference proper, for in it the iipiidya and the iiplidak are mere assumptions. 'Inference is knowledge definite, authentic and categorical, whereas assumption is only a hypothetical supposition. ' 4 Though it is essentially an assump­ tion, or a hypothetical supposit:on, it proves by implication of negation the truth of a given argument.•

The form of hypothetical reasoning which Nag:ujuna uses, i. e. his prasangiipadana, is also essentially a hypothetical sup­ position, or an imposition of the iipiidaka (consequent). neet:s­ sitated by the imposition of the ilpiidya (ground) in a subject, but it does not genuinely assume in its presuppositional ground any necessary relation between the ground and the consequent. It accepts the relation provisionally for the sake of reasoning in some cases where a reh,tion of this kind is involved in his reasoning and arrives at a conclusion which is simply negative. "For by using prasanga or reduc1io the debator can ,how that if the opponent accepts a pramii'}a say P, then the logical consequence of P with either b� inconsistent with P (directly or indirectly) or it will be patently absurd." 0 7.ii : Analysis of Prasanga arguments Candrak1rti stutes in the prasannpadiJ that the conclusion of the prasa,igl1padana is simply negative7 and Nagarjuna has largely used this method to refute his opponent's theses by drawing absurd implications from thcm. 8

Nagarjuna's Methods

215

Some of the subjects to which Nllg:trjuna has used the method of prasaiigii.pi,dana in MMK arc specified below :Chapters

Utpadaprasailga Gamanadvyaprasanga and gantrdvyaprasa,iga Dar/a11advyapra rc1iga Skandhaprasc.1iga Lakfyalakfa'J,aprasmiga Ragraktaprasanga SainskrtalakfalJ.aprasanga (utpada-sthiti.nirodha-prasaiiga) Karaka-kriyli-karma prasanga Asainskrtatvaprasanga Janyajanakatvaprasanga Sainsrffiprasanga Salvata-Ucchedadar/anaprasanga An11dayl'ivyaytvaprasa1iga Tathagataprasai:ga Viparyasaprasanga Aryastyanamabhavaprasasa,iga NirViilJ.aprasa,iga Drfliprasa1iga (Udayavyayaprasa1iga, Saintiinabhlivaprasanga, etc.)

I II III IV V VI VII VIII XI XIV XIV XV, XVIT, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI.

xx

XXII XXIII XXIV XXV XXVII

Prasangli.piidana has some similarily to the variety of reasoning (ta,-ka) called 'pratibandi', enunciated by Srihar.1a. This is a type of 'tu quoqite' (recrimation) rea�oning, which 'consists in the counter-allegation of the same or similar defect against the opponent by the proponent. ' 9

Satkari Mookerjee

The Dialectics of Nagarjuna

216

thinks that the prasangopadana can be include under prati­ bandhi, a variety of tarka enunciated by >Icier Naiyayiyakas, 10 we do not know whether any of the older Naiyayikas had enunciated 'pra11ba11dh1'. The apprehension or doubt (samkii) is called 'pratibandhtka', but it causes prasanganuml1na. Uda­ yana had classified reasoning under five heads in his Atmatattvai•iveka, viz.( I) (2) (3) (4) (S)

self-dependence (l'!tma�rya), mutual dependence (anyonylisraya), vicious circle (cakraka), the vicious infinite (all(ll'asthii),

reductio ad absurdum (anif/aprasa,iga).

Srihar�a has added pratibandi (1101 pratibant,lil) as the sixth variety in his kha'}r/a11akha'}t/akhiidya. He gave a powerful defence of Nl'!g11rjuna's prasa,iga method in the Advaita Vedl1nta tradition. He boldly proclaimed himself a vaita'}r/ika, supporter of vila'}r/ii, for which N!tga:rjuna is blamed. He did not agree with the prallli1'}.i-l'iidins that the belief in a pramii71a system must be a pre-condition for a debate. He resolved the platitude of the pramii'}a-vadins into four possible meanings in the beginning of his klta'}r/anakha'}t/akhadya, and rejects them altogether. He said that the 'Ml'!dyamikas did enter into serious philosophic debates despite their refusal to admit the existence of a pramlJna system.11 The four alternative meanings of the platitude, which he rejects one by one are as follows : (I) that debators who do not admit a praml1na system are unabJo to start a debate, or (2) that the prama,ias arc directly related to the debate as cause to the effect, or (3) that it is the practice of all people and philosophers alike first to accept a system of pramlinas and then to enter a philosophic debate,

217

Nagar]una·s Methods

·or (41 that without the acceptance of pramn,las :.nd logical .fallacies, tho twin goal of a debate, viz., the establist­ mcnt of truth and determination of victory, will never be achieved (kh. p. 6):12 The justification of 1Ldding 'prat iband,' as a variety of 1reasoning lies n the distinction between prasa,lganumana {reductio ad absurdum) aad prasanglip'ildana. Although anif{a· 1prasaizg is recognised to b a specific variety of reasoning by Udayana, it is rather the ,general ch racter of all other types of reasonin · as being a form of reductio ad absurdum in each case. Pratiband'i is distinguished from the general form of reasoning called reductio ad absurnum. Srihar�a made counter-allegation against the promlil}avadins that the admission of invariable q ;._,q/ : .'-,p] and the propositional form of B (i) and B (ii) is: IL (p:::>q) ._, Mq (e;a L ._,p) /;. --.Mp == L ._, p)]. Here in B (i) and B (ii) the form of the agrument is Modus For it is a theorem of Modal Logic (System T & others including it) that L (p:::>q) :::> (Mp:::>Mq), which gives the following derived rule of inference Toi/ens in a special sense.

1. L (p:::>q) 2. Mp/:. Mq By using Modus Tollens here, we get the rule :1. L (p:::>q) 2. ._, Mq =L--.q) /: .-Mp

(= L-p).

In the prasailgiipiidana the whole hypothetical 'if p then q' is a necessary truth [L (p :::>q), meaning ther:by that the relation of imphcalion between p and q is strict, so that it is impossible for p being true without q being true too, or it is impos,ible that p is true and q is false.

Tne Dillfectics oJNllgarjunl!

:Z'lO'

The following;rules of Ordinary and Modal forms of M. P. and M. T. illustrate the distinction bt-•.wcen the relations.of." efimplication involved in A and B ;-

M .. P.-I r.

2.

p:::>q

p/:. q

M. P.-Il (Moda�),

A I. 2.

L (p:::>q) Lp/.· .L4

J. 2.

L (p:::>q} M.p/.·.Mq

B

M.T.-B A. T.. p:::>q 2.

q) L.V.ag:arju11a's Methods

223

bas completed moving', the -sentence would be 'one that ha.i completed moving is still moving'. (ii) Minor premiseBut this is consense. (iii) Therefore ,ascribing 'is moving' to 'one that has completed moving' results in nonsense, i. e.; this ascription won's make sense. This argument takes the same form of M. T. in a special sense [L (p ::i q) ; called Vigrhya-Sambhll[lf in the sambl,iifii1•idhi of the Caraka-samhita (about 78 A. D.). 8 There is no doubt about the authenticity of the treatise. Those who have translated and retranslated the book with the auto-commentary from its Tibetan and Chinese versions attri­ bute it to N:i:g11:rjuna. 9 Nligarjuna's own commentary of the Vigraha-Vyllvartani contains an important stanza (Klirikll 10) from MMK XXIV. The Ki'irikii is quoted with the words 'yathoktam' (as it is said). MMK does not contain any refe­ rence to VV and its commentary. VV and Nag.rrjuna's com­ mentary thereon, or at least the commentary, must have been written after MMK. Candrakirti has referred to this book to establish his defence of N11:g11:rjuna's method at several places10 in his prasannapada.

The Drfence of the Prasanga

233

Candrakirti's brief references to the text of VV arc illumi­ nating of the way Nagarjuna bas developed his method against the pramii'f}a-viidins in the particular book. He refers to VY in connection with a very crucial point of criticism raised by the traditional logicians about the impact of Nagarjuna's arguments on the validity of logic. The charge of the critics is formulated on the general rule. 'The truth is obt1incd exclusively by the accredited means of knowing' ('pra111ii11iidhtnal1 prameyiidhigamal1') Candrakirti says : •If [iL is argued that the truth is obtained exclusively by the accredited means of knowing, the errors of a similar position have been exposed in tbe Vigraha­ VyiivartanI by such counter-charges as ;-by what means of knowing are they known to be true ? 11 The discourse of this reference adds a few more reflections about the development of the method of the criticism and counter-criticism in VY :(1) The critics charge N:'igl'irjuna that he persuades his oppo­ nent to believe a theory which he docs not himself believe. If it is believed that nothing originates, how is this fact known? ls the fact of non-origination (a) knowable (prami11}aja), or (b) i:ecognised as unknowable (uriiprami17Jnja) ? If (a) is accepted, the know-bow should be explained. If the alternative (b) is accepted, this is not proper (sa na juktal:i). The objection to (b) follows from the rule stated above.'" An object which is yet to be known is not possible to be known otherwise than by valid and appropriate means of cognition.12 If the case is such that without the means of cognition the cognition of an object never takes place, then it is not proper to make what a thing is not, without knowing conclusively what a thing is. If the means of knowledge do not t'Xist, it is not possible to arrive at the truth (prameyu) either by affirmation, or by negation. (2) Candrak1rti says in reply that for the Buddhists an asscrloric judl?ement (niJcaya) of the form 'this is that' is not

The Dirzfectir:s of Nngllrjilna possible; because 'this� refers to- the- 'thing-in-itself (sva/ak fa1}a)' Since it cannot also comprehend what a thing is not in itself, its counter correlate (pratipak fa)-'This is that'-is not possible to be known. For the traditional Indian logicians (pramll1Ja­ 'Pild;ns) e\ery relation, as, e. g.. short and long has an indirect (paratanrra) realitv in the underlying 'thing-in-itself'. This i s. for the pr:i:sa1_1gika M:1:dhyamika like the length and shortness of an inexis.tent thing, e. g, the horn of a donkey. 13 When an assertsoric judgement in similar cases is not possible owing to their difficulty of being only antinomical in character, there is. no point in assuming the means. (or sources) of knowlcgc to be real.14 8. i :

Table of charges and their refutation

The Vigruha-Vyllvartani consis.ts of seventy-one verses. The representation of the charges in the first twenty verses and the modality of Prasarigiipiidanu reasoning applied to counter-act them in the posterior portion suggest that the author has clarified his own concept of the prasariga method while replying to the critics- concerning some logical errors and absurdities involved in the charges. The following table shows a classification-model of the charges vis-a-vis their refutations in VY :SI. No. of the charges

Major points on which the charges are framed

2

1

Verse.·.,·ise Classifica­ tion of the charges

3

Either you accept that your I & II statement being empty cannot deny things, or if you ascribe a preferential status to your statement it becomes null and void by a six-fold dialectic (�atkotikovllda).

Verse-wise classifica­ tion of the refutation 4

XXT­ XXlV

Th.:: Defence of the Prasaiiga

235

2

4

2

If your reason is like 'Do not III & IV XXV-XXlX make a sound ; it is faulty ; ,therefore, your thesis is false. The same reason docs not apply to our negation ut' the negation.

3

H the means of knowledge V & YI were unreal, how could you know things to be unreal ?

4

If all things arc devoid of VII & V lll Lll-L VJ iutrinsic nature, goodness also docs not exist. What docs then make the distinction between good and bad things'!

5

It follows from your thesis that even a name docs not exist, because a name denotes only something that exists.

6

The counterpart of your negation must be real, because only a11 existent thing is ni:gatc:d.

7

/\n

LVJI-LX

IX & X

XI

LXI-LXIV

instance of illusion XIII-XVI

proves that all things arc not unreal. 8

If all things are unreal, a 'reason' for you is also unreal.

XXX-LI

LXV­ LXVIJ

XVII-XIX

LXVIII

Tlze Dialectics of Nliglirjurra

236 SI. No. or the charge

9

Mnjor points on which- the­ charges are framed

Verse-wise classi!ic:i­ fion or lhe charges

Verse-wise classilica­ tion or therefutation

2

3

4

The own-being of a thing is truC' to the three tense!'. of timC' (trikiilasat). It is not possibie to provC' that it does not exist after the negation applies to it, nor before the negation applies to it, nor the non-existence of a thbg is simultaneous with the negation.

xx

LX1X-LXX

By wa.y of counteracting the charges Nllga:rjuna develops the modality of his reasoning by absurdity (or impossibility) in the �emaining 50 verses. His refutation, therefore, has taken the form of a. method of making counter-charges on some epistemo­ logical, vis-a-vis, ontological issues. The concluding verse is a salutation to the Buddha. This salutation is also pronounced from the same methodological angle of addressing him as one who has taught the truth in many ways, viz. Su11yatii, Madh­ yamli pratipad and pratltyasamulpl1.da_ 15 The refutation is expressed in the form of a language which is, in fact, a language about the language of his opponents with regard to their presuppositions.16 We shall be a victim of category-mistake if we confuse the subject-matter of logic with that of metaphysics. In the Buddhist philosophy we find a reversal of the attitude from the traditional way of philosophical thinking. The traditionalists claim that metaphysics should precede epistemology, i. e., the validity of

The Defence of the Prasanga

237

kuowledge shoulJ presuppose its mechanism to be metaphysi­ cally rcal.17 The question whether metaphysics is possible should follow o:, the prooer enquiry :.mncepts should have a sharp boundary. · This requirc:ment is one which does ex­ clude a middle, for when concepts are vague or not · e-:lea.rly defined there is a boundary area o.r no man's

'Ii71e .Negation offour-fold

283

land, in which it iis not clear -whether the conaept is .applicable or not. When asked of something withiP.. .this fuzzy area whether .the concept or its negation is applicable to it, we may be unsure whether to say 4 Both' or •Neither'_ This second .requirement is, then one which is a!!Sociated with the application not -only of the Jaw of Excluded M.iddle but also of the law ,of non-contradiction' ::i• When Nl!gl!rjuna uses 'nor both", 4 nor neither' to ontologi­ ot:al.entities and notions lik.e 'sour, 'sanya (void), 'Nirvli1}a' -etc., :he suggests that we-cannot frame any intelligible meaning with :r.egard to these objects through those speculative views. This is how he maintains a non-committal attitude in ontology.31 He -comprehends the law of contradiction in its ontological formula­ tion, 'No object can possess and simultaneously, not possess the ,same property•,34 when he says:"Within a unity there cannot be .an -entity and negation ofthat cn:tity" ; "' "For ceal and non-real, being mutually -contradictory, ho�· can the two pertain to the same locus" _.ao '9. iii : Relawm between the members of the Tetralemma V\-'e shall note here in A and B two different interpretations ;given by R. H. Robinson in 1957 and 1967. We shall note two points of difference on the assumptions that the four lemmas arc modes of one proposition (A) and that they diffs:r in the quan­ tity of their constituent terms (B}. A-(1) Robinson maint:iins in 1957 that the four members ofthe tetralemma are in 'a relation of exclusive disjunction ("one of, but not more than one of 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd' is true)".37 'Buddhist dialectidans from Gautama onwards', he says, 'have negated each of the alts. and thus, have negated the entire pro­ position'. 38 The formula which he then gave for the catus. is; [Ax V '-> Ax V Ax . ...._, Ax V J Tibetan Literature (1963) that it was Wassiliew, (1818-1900), who distinguished between the Prilsangika and the Sviltantrika on the basis of a Tibetan Siddhanta of the Manjughofaha­ savajra (Jam-dbyangebzhad-pa) in 1857. Wassiliew

Appendix 11

325

was a Russian Indologist. Hi� real name was Wassilij Pawlowitsch. His work has been translated into German from its Russian Original by Schiefner in 1960. It is not however known whether Wassi­ liew bas formulated the Prasmigliplldana method. 13. Frauwallner : Die phi/osophie des Buddhismus (Ber­ lin, 1956), translated Chapters l, XV, XVITI, XXIV and XXV of MMK and Ch. I of Prasannapadii in part. 14.

15. 16.

May, J. has translated Chapters II-IV, VI-IX, XI, XVIII, XXIV XXVI-XXVII of praJa1111apadlI with kariklis (Paris, 1959). Kenneth K. Inada: Nuglirjuna (Tokyo: The Hoku­ seido Press, 1970). Schayer, S : Ein Kapital aus dem Miidhyamikaliistra des Nligllrjuna mit der Vrtti des Candrakirti (Rocznik Orientalisty czmy krak'ow, Lw'ow, Warszawa) VII, pp. 2 -52, Lwow, 1929. Das Zehnte Kapitel der PrasannapadlI (Rocznink Oricntatisty czny (Krak'ow, Lw'ow, Warszawal) VII, Lwow, 1930). Das mahliylinistische Abs/11tum 11acl1 der Lehre der Lehre der Mlidhyamikas, Orientalististischc Litera­

ture zeitung (Berlin & Leipzig), XXXVIII, pp. 401-

17.

5, l 935. "Uber die Methode der Nyiiya-Forsclzung". "Altindisclze Antizipationen der Aussagenlogik". Ji,urnal of Indian and Dnddhist Studies (Tokyo), 7.!

1958, pp. 3-21. Vide, Bibliographical references. 19. Stcherbatsky, Conception, p. 104. 20. Ramana, K. V., op. cit., pp. 35, 340 (note 58). 21. Wallesser, M. : Die Mittlere Lehre (Heidelberg, 1912). 22. Iida, Shotaro : An Introduction to Svatantrika­ Mlldhyamika, thesis Ms., preface. 23. Ramanan, K. V., op. cit., p. 341, note 71. 18.

APPENDIX III THE LOGICAL STATUS OF THE PRASANGAPADANA AND THE SVATANTRANUMANA IN THE MADHYAMAKA PHILOSOPHY The status of the two methods in the Madhyamaka Buddhist logic is to be determined by their logical efficiency and appropriateness to mould the Madhyamaka standpoint. 111.i :

Candrakirti's vindication of the Prasanga method in the

PrasannapadlJ.

Candrakirti quotes the following prasangl1pi1dana arguement of Buddhp!tlita in support of his contention that Bhitvaviveka is wrong in his objections : (1) Major premi�e-If we assert the proposition 'Entities of any kind are ever found any where produced from themselves', it leads to two absurd consequences, namely, (1) origination of something which already exists and (2) an infinite regress of its re-origination which Infringes the dialectic (-t adutplidavaiyarthyat,

atiprasa,igadofiicca).

(2) Minor premis-But this is impossible. (3) Conclusion - . ·. Entities of any kind are not ever found anywhere produced from themselves. Bhitvaviveka's objections are : (I) 'The prltsangika does not produce an independent argument consisting of a reason and an example in support of an opposite thesis of his own. (2) Objections are left unanswered (aparihiira dofa)'. 1 (3) His method of refutation is a mere deduction ad ab­ surdum. He distorts the context of his opponent's object-statement. 4. He proposes a solution which contradicts with itself. As for example, he intends to say that 'if entities are

Appendix Ill

327

assumed to be produced and destroyed out of some­ thing extraneous to them, this might serve a need and this might prevent as if the eternal new production of the already existing thing'. 2 Candrakirti thinks that Bh:tvaviveka's argument is incon­ clusive (nirupapattika), because it is self-contradictory (sulibhyu­ pagamavirodha). The pr:tsangika applies Simple Negation to refute every position independently. 'The Master Bh:tvaviveka betrayas indeed a certain bias for syllogistic reasoning. He would like a syllogism to be introduced at the wrong place (asthline).

The suggestion for an independent argument is made on the allegation that the reductio ad absurdum statement unnecessarily balances the reason and example of an argument to infinite regress. Candrakirti contends : 'What do the Sllnkhyas mean by an independent argument when they state that the mental pheno­ mena (organs of sense and the mind) do not arise out of them­ selves?' 'They should be clear as to whether they specifically mean by 'not arising out-of-themselves' the reference of the sense organs and the mind to their primordial material cause or to their own distinctive nature as effect. If they mean the reference to the cause, they contradict with their reference to their own distinctive nature as effect and vice versa. This argument against a thesis is not an unnecessary balancing of the reason. The prllsangikas rather setforth an appropriate argument to demonstrate the absurd consequence of a vague reason. Candrakirti defends the standpoint of the Pr:rsangika-Mlldh­ yamika, but says that Buddhap:tlita's statement (grahana-vllkya) of simple negation may be vindicated by a syllogistic argument (1•ivara'}a-vllkya) as follows : Thesis :

An entity does not require a second production.

328

The Dialectics of Niigiirjuna

Reason: Because it already exists. .Example : Just as a jar. Whatever already exi;ts does not require a second productioc. This argument is formally similar to the following argument: Thesis : Sound is non-eternal. Reason : Because it is produced. Example : Just as a jar. •Tf entities had originated out of themselves, such origination woul