The Crime Analyst's Companion 3030943631, 9783030943639

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Matthew Bland Barak Ariel Natalie Ridgeon   Editors

The Crime Analyst's Companion

The Crime Analyst's Companion

Matthew Bland • Barak Ariel • Natalie Ridgeon Editors

The Crime Analyst's Companion

Editors Matthew Bland Institute of Criminology University of Cambridge Cambridge, UK

Barak Ariel Institute of Criminology University of Cambridge Cambridge, UK

Natalie Ridgeon Norfolk and Suffolk Constabularies Ipswich, UK

ISBN 978-3-030-94363-9    ISBN 978-3-030-94364-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94364-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Crime analysis is an expanding profession that law enforcement in the twenty-first century could not be without. However, it is still a disparate profession. There have been great strides made in developing aspects of skills, training and broader aspects of professionalisation, but it is still the case today that a new analyst has no single reliable source to go to from which to draw on the collective experiences of their peers. This is not only a problem within the UK – crime analysts exist in police forces around the world and our aim with this volume is to fill this gap by assembling a collection of chapters from experienced crime analysts from policing and academic backgrounds. To this end, this book is not an instruction manual and it does not attempt to replicate other excellent books which give instruction on how to perform analytical techniques. Instead, this book is an exploration of some of the most important themes relevant to anybody thinking about, embarking on or already well into a career in crime analysis. Our goal is to establish a book that every crime analyst needs, a reference volume that gives them information about their career and ideas about how they can develop. To help us achieve this, we have assembled a group of highly experienced professionals and academics. Everyone who has contributed to this book has been an analyst or worked alongside analysts. Our authors come from Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, the UK and the USA, offering, for the first time, a unique global perspective on the profession. The variety of our authors’ backgrounds is reflected in a spectrum of different chapter styles which represent both the diversity and similarities of analyst roles around the world. In some chapters you will find a distinctly academic voice, full of references to other articles and books. In other chapters, there is an emphasis on the professional experiences of serving analysts. This is a deliberate attempt on our part to capture a cross section of the analytical community. While it will take a number of volumes to give the analyst profession its full voice, we hope these opening bars will prove useful to you in your work. Cambridge, UK  Matthew Bland October 2021

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Acknowledgements

Thanks to those who have supported us in the preparation of this book, especially Louise Bland and our wonderful contributing authors who gave up their time to impart pearls of wisdom in these pages. Undoubtedly, the best nuggets come from them.

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Contents

1 Why Every Crime Analyst Needs a Companion ����������������������������������    1 Matthew Bland 1.1 What Is Crime Analysis?����������������������������������������������������������������    1 1.2 Why Do We Need Crime Analysis?������������������������������������������������    5 1.3 What Are the Risks Involved?��������������������������������������������������������    7 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    9 Part I The Crime Analysis Profession 2 Different Kinds of Analyst����������������������������������������������������������������������   13 Scott Keay 2.1 More Than Meets the Eye: A Thriving Profession?������������������������   13 2.2 Hierarchy of Analysts ��������������������������������������������������������������������   15 2.3 Effecting Change: In It Together����������������������������������������������������   17 2.4 Conclusion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   19 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   19 3 Crime Analysis in an International Context������������������������������������������   21 Cilia Maria Ruiz-Paz 3.1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   21 3.2 What Is It? How Does It Look? Why Do We Do It?����������������������   22 3.3 What Are the Barriers?��������������������������������������������������������������������   26 3.4 Who Are the Players?����������������������������������������������������������������������   29 3.5 What Tools Are Available?��������������������������������������������������������������   35 3.6 Conclusion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   37 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   38 4 Crime Analysis and Evidence-Based Policing: Challenges and Obstacles������������������������������������������������������������������������   41 John Ng 4.1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   41 4.2 What Is Evidence-Based Policing?������������������������������������������������   43 ix

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4.3 Receptivity of Research in Policing������������������������������������������������   44 4.4 Conclusions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   49 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   50 5 Crime Analysis and Evidence-Based Policing: Strategies for Success������������������������������������������������������������������������������   53 John Ng 5.1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   53 5.2 Utilisation and Weak Integration of Analysis in Policing��������������   53 5.3 Barriers to Integrating Crime Analysis into Policing����������������������   55 5.4 The Need for Change����������������������������������������������������������������������   60 5.5 The Role of Crime Analysts in Evidence-Based Policing��������������   62 5.6 Conclusions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   68 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   69 6 Building Your Career as a Crime Analyst ��������������������������������������������   73 Rebecca Nagy 6.1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   73 6.2 Creating Opportunity����������������������������������������������������������������������   75 6.3 Education Is an Investment ������������������������������������������������������������   75 6.4 Seek Training����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   76 6.5 Experience: Learn to Be Pragmatic and Adaptable������������������������   77 6.6 Pulling It All Together��������������������������������������������������������������������   78 6.7 Conclusion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   78 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   79 7 Writing About Crime Analysis ��������������������������������������������������������������   81 Matthew Bland 7.1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   81 7.2 History of Analysis ������������������������������������������������������������������������   81 7.3 Crime Prevention����������������������������������������������������������������������������   82 7.4 Investigation and Intelligence ��������������������������������������������������������   83 7.5 Data Quality������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   84 7.6 Analytical Techniques��������������������������������������������������������������������   84 7.7 Underpinning Theories ������������������������������������������������������������������   84 7.8 Analysing Yourself��������������������������������������������������������������������������   86 7.9 Communicating Your Work������������������������������������������������������������   87 7.10 Integration Into Practice������������������������������������������������������������������   87 7.11 Conclusion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   88 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   88 8 The Future of the Role����������������������������������������������������������������������������   91 Scott Keay and Rebecca Phythian 8.1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   91 8.2 Analyst’s Beginnings: A Series of False Starts? ����������������������������   92 8.3 Analysis in a Digital Age����������������������������������������������������������������   93

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8.4 Partnerships, Chronic Problems and Complex Data����������������������   94 8.5 Less Is More: Making the Best from Existing Data ����������������������   95 8.6 EBP, Applied Research and Academic Collaboration��������������������   96 8.7 Leadership and Development����������������������������������������������������������   98 8.8 Conclusion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   99 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   99 Part II Techniques for Crime Analysis 9 An Introduction to GIS ��������������������������������������������������������������������������  105 Captain Jonas Baughman 9.1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  105 9.2 GIS Terms & Definitions����������������������������������������������������������������  106 9.3 Crime Mapping’s Role in Crime Analysis��������������������������������������  108 9.4 Effective Map Design ��������������������������������������������������������������������  108 9.5 Addressing the REAL Question at Hand����������������������������������������  112 9.6 Examples of GIS Products��������������������������������������������������������������  113 9.7 Suggested Reading��������������������������������������������������������������������������  124 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  124 10 The Development of a New Capability: Geographic Profiling Analysis in Australia����������������������������������������������������������������  125 Adam Marsden and Michael Taylor 10.1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  125 10.2 The Australian Federal Police��������������������������������������������������������  126 10.3 Geographic Profiling����������������������������������������������������������������������  127 10.4 Identifying the Need ����������������������������������������������������������������������  128 10.5 The Project��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  130 10.6 Building the Capability ������������������������������������������������������������������  133 10.7 Operational Applications: The AFP Experience ����������������������������  136 10.8 Conclusions and Future Opportunities��������������������������������������������  137 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  138 11 Integration of Geographic Profiling with Forensic Intelligence to Target Serial Crime��������������������������������������������������������  141 Michael Taylor and Adam Marsden 11.1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  141 11.2 Serial and Recidivist Offending������������������������������������������������������  142 11.3 The Crime Analysis and Criminal Intelligence Nexus ������������������  143 11.4 Integrating Analytical Models��������������������������������������������������������  144 11.5 Linking Serial Crimes ��������������������������������������������������������������������  145 11.6 Forensic Intelligence (FORINT)����������������������������������������������������  146 11.7 Geographic Profiling Analysis (GPA)��������������������������������������������  148 11.8 Operation Implementation��������������������������������������������������������������  149 11.9 Systems and Ontologies������������������������������������������������������������������  151 11.10 Projects��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  152 11.11 Tactical Example: Serial Burglary��������������������������������������������������  153

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11.12 Conclusions and Recommendations ����������������������������������������������  154 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  156 12 Cell Data Analysis������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  163 Eva Ai-Ting Ku Mazzeo 12.1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  163 12.2 Cell Data Analysis and Crime Analysis������������������������������������������  164 12.3 Key Terms ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  164 12.4 Clients and Requests ����������������������������������������������������������������������  166 12.5 Scenarios ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  167 12.6 Products������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  171 12.7 Court ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  172 12.8 Conclusion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  175 13 Measuring Harm with Crime Harm Indices ����������������������������������������  177 Sophie Curtis-Ham 13.1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  177 13.2 What Is a Crime Harm Index?��������������������������������������������������������  178 13.3 What a Crime Harm Index Is Not ��������������������������������������������������  179 13.4 Crime Harm Indices Around the World������������������������������������������  180 13.5 Crime Harm Indices in Practice������������������������������������������������������  182 13.6 CHI Traps, Tips and Tricks ������������������������������������������������������������  186 13.7 Conclusion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  188 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  188 14 Problem-Solving and SARA��������������������������������������������������������������������  193 Iain Agar 14.1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  193 14.2 Problem-Solving Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������  194 14.3 The SARA Model ��������������������������������������������������������������������������  196 14.4 Conclusion: Becoming a Problem-Solving Analyst ����������������������  207 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  208 15 Algorithms������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  213 Matthew Bland 15.1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  213 15.2 What Is an Algorithm?��������������������������������������������������������������������  214 15.3 Algorithms in Policing��������������������������������������������������������������������  214 15.4 Analysts and Algorithms����������������������������������������������������������������  217 15.5 What Can I Do?������������������������������������������������������������������������������  219 15.6 Conclusion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  221 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  222 16 Partnering With Police����������������������������������������������������������������������������  225 Noel Castillo 16.1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  225 16.2 A Tale of Two Knowledges: Procedural and Declarative ��������������  226

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16.3 Making a Connection����������������������������������������������������������������������  227 16.4 Building Trust ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������  227 16.5 Worth and Value������������������������������������������������������������������������������  230 16.6 Conclusion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  230 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  231 17 Afterword – Commanders: Crime Analysts’ Biggest Companions?�����������������������������������������������������������������������������  233 Captain Jonas Baughman 17.1 Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  233 17.2 What Do Law Enforcement Commanders Need to Know About Crime Analysis?����������������������������������������������������  234 17.3 Conclusion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  242 References��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  243 Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  245

About the Editors

Matthew Bland  is Associate Professor of Evidence-Based Policing at the Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, a research fellow at the Cambridge Centre for Evidence-Based Policing and a fellow of the Academy of Experimental Criminology of the American Society of Criminology. At the university, he supervises the dissertations of senior police leaders in the Police Executive Programme. He is the trial director for the national pilot of polygraph testing for domestic abuse offenders and has managed and contributed to experiments on offender management, hotspot policing and out-of-court disposals. His research focuses on domestic abuse, prediction algorithms in policing and exploratory analyses. He previously worked in policing for 15 years as a Head of Analysis, during which time he completed both a master’s and a PhD in criminology at the University of Cambridge. Barak  Ariel  is Professor of Experimental Criminology at the Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, and an associate professor at the Institute of Criminology in the Faculty of Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is a fellow at the Jerry Lee Centre of Experimental Criminology and at the Division of Experimental Criminology of the American Society of Criminology, which he presently chairs. Ariel has been involved in dozens of experiments representing a wide range of issues in law enforcement, including organised crime, offender management, counterterrorism, legitimacy, neighbourhood policing, restorative justice, domestic violence, crime and place, body-worn cameras, tasers, and the broader use of technology. Much of this body of work appears in over 100 academic articles and books. Ariel sits on multiple evaluation panels and has served as an adviser to policing and security agencies around the globe, reviewing their impact evaluations and evidence-based practices largely through randomised controlled trials. Natalie  Ridgeon  is a performance analyst working for Norfolk and Suffolk Constabularies in the East of England. She has been a practising crime analyst and researcher since 2014, during which time she has covered a variety of operational and strategic topics including victim surveying, tactical assessments and performance framework development. xv

Chapter 1

Why Every Crime Analyst Needs a Companion Matthew Bland

1.1  What Is Crime Analysis? From the first days of large-scale organised policing, back in Queen Victoria’s London, law enforcement officers have collected and stored information about the incidents they dealt with. Arguably ever since then people have analysed that information, trying to decipher meaningful knowledge about how to achieve justice, disrupt offender or prevent the incidents from happening at all. The process of deciphering this information is what we know as ‘crime analysis’. Of course, this is a very simple definition of what has become an international profession. There are many types of positions in law enforcement, military and even private employment sectors (such as banking) who could identify all or parts of their job as involving crime analysis. Many of the names of these positions do not even include the words ‘crime’ or ‘analyst’ in the title. But at their core, jobs such as ‘Intelligence Analyst’, ‘Performance Analyst’, ‘Tactical Analyst’, ‘Strategic Analyst’, ‘Intelligence Officer’, ‘Researcher’ and even ‘Criminologist’ involve some form of using information about crime to achieve knowledge. The breadth of job titles that involve crime analysis in some form (and that list is by no means exhaustive) is indicative of the wide range of types of information, analytical technique and resulting knowledge that the profession covers. Many words have been spent discussing the definition. After all, analysts like few things better than overthinking things. There have been some terrific attempts to create precise definitions (see the International Association of Crime Analysts’ definition as quoted in Santos, 2014, p. 7): A profession and process in which a set of quantitative and qualitative techniques are used to analyse data valuable to police agencies and their communities. It includes analysis of M. Bland (*) University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Bland et al. (eds.), The Crime Analyst’s Companion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94364-6_1

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M. Bland crime and criminals, crime victims, disorder, quality of life issues, traffic issues, and internal police operations, and its results support criminal investigation and prosecution, patrol activities, crime prevention and reduction strategies, problem solving, and the evaluation of police efforts.

Others have kept it rather simpler: Crime analysis is the act of analyzing crime. (from Osborne & Wernicke, 2003, p. 1)

The coverage of the definition came up numerous times as we prepared to write this book. In the end, we decided to keep things as simple as possible (alright, maybe not as simple as Osborne and Wernicke!), without losing the meaning – a good general principle for the profession, in fact. The definition we use in this book is best illustrated in Fig. 1.1. Let us unpick what we mean by the three key elements here a little further.

1.1.1  Information Crime information comes in all shapes and sizes. It may be administrative crime records, intelligence from humans or communications data, call records, surveys, road traffic data, information from the internet, location data, images, body worn camera footage, bank records, audio files, forensic test results, custody records, missing person files, cellular tower data, crime statistics or social media profiles. And that Is by no means an exhaustive list. These sources of information are disparate, mostly unconnected and often they are anything but ready-made for stage

Fig. 1.1  Analytical process. (Source: Author’s own creation)

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two – actual analysis. Indeed, a substantial part of the crime analysis process is the preparation of the information to be analysed.

1.1.2  Analysis Whatever your flavour of information, the glue that holds crime analysts under one (broad) banner is the analytical process. A crime analyst employs analytical techniques to transform information. Like the range of different information types, there is a dazzling array of techniques with which to analyse that information. These include, but are not limited to: statistical tests, mapping, network charting, financial transaction analysis, scenario planning, comparison of modus operandi, risk profiling, market profiling, offender profiling, evaluations, time-series forecasts and sequence of events analysis. The list is not exhaustive and some of these labels mean different things to different audiences. Rather than explore them all in depth here in the introduction, our purpose is merely to draw attention to the fact that the ‘analysis’ part of crime analysis covers many different things. We will return to many of the techniques at later points in the book.

1.1.3  Knowledge The final part of the process is to generate knowledge. This too is a very broad concept. The word knowledge is a rather intangible thing – it is hard to conceptualise it as a ‘product’, but often a crime analyst will actually produce a ‘thing’. These ‘things’ may include a report, a presentation, a verbal briefing, a video, an e-mail or even a map. None of these, however in-depth they may be, are ever trivial. The best analysis in the world is redundant if the process is completed with a sub-standard knowledge product. Our definition simplifies complex matters such as ‘what is the difference between intelligence analysis and performance analysis?’ but our intention is not to gloss over these questions. Instead, we wish to start from level playing field and explore different facets of the field in more detail throughout the book. Anyone studying or practising crime analysis cannot avoid the debate about different kinds of analysis. Practising analysts deal with the consequences of broad professional scope every day. Crime analysis is by no means alone in this – most professions have areas of expertise yet identify under a broad label. Some of the specialisms for crime analysis include: Intelligence Analyst – an analyst who primarily deals with information from human, technical or signals sources (see Innes et  al., 2005) and employs a range of mostly qualitative analytical techniques to inform predominantly operational

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decisions. There are specialist categories of Intelligence Analysts, and they are also common in military organisations. Performance Analyst – an analyst who might work predominantly with quantitative information and statistical techniques. They may operate in a corporate environment (their ‘clients’ being managers and executives) and they may work equally on external information (e.g. crime data) or internal information (e.g. investigation outcomes, sickness rates, recruitment data). Business Analyst – an analyst who deals with internal, procedural information. They tend to work in corporate/executive support commands and specialise in process improvement and techniques such as cost-benefit analysis. Operational/Tactical Analyst – a role with elements of intelligence and performance but focussed closely on the rapid, daily, weekly, monthly cycle of operational policing. Such analysts often form the ‘heartbeat’ of police information flows. They may also support live investigations and provide evidence for court. Strategic Analyst – a role which also may straddle intelligence and performance but focusses on the long-term, high-altitude issues. Instead of supporting a drug operation as an operational analyst might, the strategic analyst profiles the drug market and identifies opportunities to disrupt it or works out where drugs markets sit in the overall scheme of demands facing their organisation. Researcher – a job title sometimes seen as junior to an analyst, but often with little justification. Researchers in police organisations may be charged with information gathering and no analysis but in academic institutions (and some police organisations) their responsibilities are equal to an analyst and the label is interchangeable. Criminologists, particularly those involved in applied or experimental criminology, also rely on the techniques of crime analysis to do their jobs. I myself am a criminologist, having formerly been a crime analyst in policing for more than 15 years. When I entered the academic world, the crossover of skillsets made it feel almost as though I was ‘cheating’; I had an advantage that my fellow students did not necessarily have – experience of collecting, organising, analysing and interpreting data. Of course, the jobs are not identical. As others have pointed out (see Marrin, 2012), academics approach analysis in a different way to professionals. They are more interested in understanding cause and effect, whereas staff in operational organisations are occupied with more immediate matters. If crime analysis is a motorway, criminologists are in the slow lane, assessing the layout of the road and working out why traffic jams occur while operational analysts are driving much faster, concerned with getting to where they need to go on time and in one piece (and rightly so). Throughout my own career I have often been involved in debates about the differences between types of crime analyst. I remain steadfast in my view that all sub-­ species of crime analyst are linked by a common process. The best representation of that process I have found is the PPDAC model (see Spiegelhalter, 2019 for a very accessible description). Throughout this book, you will encounter several frameworks and models, many with more snappy acronyms, but PPDAC is the one I would like you to meet first.

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Problem

Plan

Analyse

Data

Fig. 1.2  The PPDAC cycle. (Adapted from Spiegelhalter, 2019)

As Fig.  1.2 shows, the letters stand for Problem, Planning, Data, Analysis, Conclusions. The model is circular, indicating that the conclusions inevitably lead to more problems and the restart of the process. PPDAC has many similarities with other models familiar to crime analysts such as the intelligence cycle (Johnson, 1986) and SARA (Clarke & Eck, 2005) – you will meet both later in the book – but I like PPDAC as a broader coverall of the analytic process. The word ‘data’, which is central to the model, can be liberally interpreted to apply to qualitative sources as well as the more quantitative information that the word often conjure images of. The model also neatly represents a framework for delivering the definition of analysis that I have set out in this chapter. Whether your role is specialist or generalist, strategic or tactical, the principles of PPDAC should run through your primary tasks. We will return to the concepts of problem definition, planning, data organisation and quality assurance, analytical techniques and conclusion-building throughout the book.

1.2  Why Do We Need Crime Analysis? The proliferation of data sources in the last three decades has spearheaded growing demands for specialist information skills in law enforcement, just as it has across all walks of life. This growth is no new thing. As Innes et al. (2005, p. 41) highlighted 16 years ago, …police would be significantly more effective in controlling crime if they focused their resources in a targeted fashion po those groups of high-risk, recidivist offenders, who are

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M. Bland known to commit a disproportionate number of crimes (Audit Commission, 1993)….The fundamental premise of the response to this situation is that police organizations should be structured to collect, analyse and interpret information from a range of sources.

Yet when Innes and co-wrote those words, globalism had not yet given way to nationalism, social media was in its infancy and barely anyone owned a smartphone. In Britain at least, safeguarding vulnerable people was still a secondary priority to policing anti-social behaviour and providing community reassurance. There were also fewer financial pressures on law enforcement agencies. As these (and other) tectonic pressures have been gradually applied to society, the urgency for police to consume more information, to increasingly efficient ends have supercharged the need for good analysis. At the same time, analytical capabilities have been squeezed. Civilian posts have been made redundant and technological capabilities have lagged further behind the market. But likewise, those who have remained in the analytical profession through this era are well placed to guide the next period. The explosion of analyst activity that took place in the late 90s and early 00s brought many bright, enthusiastic people to crime analysis (I was one of them!). We far outnumbered the experienced heads, and many analysts needed to learn the job mostly on their own. An analyst joining law enforcement now need not find themselves in the same position. The crime analyst of the 2020s can bring many advantages to their agency. The profession can make sense of the rivers of data that flow through police departments every day. Data capture and processing technologies now allow analysts to track live-time movements through GPS, analyse hundreds of thousands and millions of lines of data downloaded from phones and social media accounts in rapid order, or analyse live video footage streamed from Body Worn Cameras. New software allows deeper path analysis, data quality shortcuts and the advancement of complex statistical modelling. Data visualisation tools are much more common too, allowing analysts to communicate their conclusions and recommendations succinctly and with style. These are fantastic opportunities for the profession to be an active influence on operational performance, organisational culture and the delivery of effective and efficient public safety strategies. However, to be realised, these opportunities need the right people with the right skills, training, and guidance. If they are realised, then there is no limit to the benefits crime analysis can bring to the legitimacy of policing. The chapters that follow will cover these topics in more detail, but to set the scene, here is a brief overview of the main areas that crime analyst can have an impact on the business of law enforcement.

1.2.1  Triage and Prioritisation If you have ever worked on the inside of a law enforcement agency as a crime analyst, then the chances are you spent a fair proportion of your time helping to decide what to do. Demand notoriously outstrips supply in policing and even when it does

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not there is the matter of deciding what to do first. From intelligence assessments to demand forecasting, the crime analyst has many tools in their box to assist with prioritising.

1.2.2  Accountability and Transparency Legitimacy among the people being policed is at the heart of law enforcement in democratic countries. Crime analysis can contribute to this process by definition. Evidence or intelligence-based decision making, tracking of performance, standards and value for money and even investigating discipline matters can all make a difference to the public.

1.2.3  Efficiency Evaluation of police activity is often a tricky subject, but it is vital to the assessment of value for money. A core crime analytical tool is the ability to track and assess results, compare them across time, people and geographies and draw conclusions about efficiencies. These can flow directly into day-to-day resource deployments (think – where should I send patrols today?) or into executive budget setting (think – which teams should I have and how many people should there be in them).

1.2.4  Effectiveness The other side of the evaluation coin is outcome effectiveness. How do we know if police operations and strategies actually work? This is where there is much connectivity between professional crime analysts and criminologists. The evidence-based policing and ‘what works’ agendas exemplify the importance with which assessing effectiveness is regarded among key police and government decision makers around the world.

1.3  What Are the Risks Involved? Crime analysis is not magic. There are many ways it can go wrong and while learning from errors is a very important trait in a crime analyst, there can be major consequences. Throughout the book, we will touch upon the key risks that need to be managed by analysts and their leaders. Foremost among these is data quality. As you have seen with the PPDAC example, data are the lifeblood of analysis. Serving

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crime analysts will know that they are far from perfect, and much time needs to be spent making sure data are fit for analysis. The idiom ‘garbage in = garbage out’ is a perfect summary of the risk crime analysis faces with regard to data quality. Secondly, there is neglect. I was of a generation of analysts brought in with special government funding designed to breathe life into intelligence-led policing in the UK. Perhaps you are familiar with this political strategy – throw money at a problem and claim you solved it? Unfortunately, it rarely works. At that time, the police service in Britain was just learning what to do with analysts and those in rural backwaters often behind even that lagging curve. The result was 10 years or so of stagnant development; products that were ignored or misused; high staff turnover and skills-drain and a good deal of wasted time for all parties. The situation is very different now. Senior officers and police staff in Britain understand the purpose of analysis more than they did, having come through the ranks working alongside analysts. They also have higher expectations, which is a very good thing yet the spectre of analyst-neglect is never far away, particularly in times of austerity and reduced budgets. Neglect can expand beyond misuse of products, of course. Analysts recruited without proper training or development or without being given the right tools to do their job can be equally as damaging to the profession’s effectiveness in any organisation. Neglect can ultimately lead to underwhelming products from crime analysis. Similarly, it is equally possible for analysts to overstep the mark, and indeed this can have more serious consequences as confident products are usually more likely to get a response than understated ones. This is the balance a crime analyst has to strike in order to do their job properly. They do not arrest people or console victims; they cannot chase a suspect at high speed or respond to an active shooter terrorist incident. The role has limits but increasingly, those limits are receding with the advance of technology. The challenge for any aspiring or existing analyst is to learn the skills required to do the job in a challenging environment and then maintain them. Ultimately, we wanted to put together a book to help with this purpose by leveraging the wealth of experience there is in the crime analysis profession. It is an international profession, so we have included voices from across the world and we commend them to you even if the author is not from your own country. While there are naturally different aspects of the crime analyst role in different countries (and even within countries), the same blood runs through each job’s veins: take data, analyse it, turn it into knowledge. In contributing to this volume, our authors are doing just that, using their own experiences as their data, the wealth of skills and talent to analyse those experiences and these chapters as the vessel with which to impart their knowledge. In short, this book is intended as a resource I wish I had when I was beginning to learn how to be a crime analyst. Indeed, I am still learning today, and the book is as much for me as it is for you. This is one of the joys of our profession – it is always changing and there is always more to learn.

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References Clarke, R.  V., & Eck, J.  E. (2005). Crime analysis for problem solvers in 60 small steps. US Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Innes, M., Fielding, N., & Cope, N. (2005). ‘The appliance of science?’ The theory and practice of crime intelligence analysis. British Journal of Criminology, 45(1), 39–57. Johnson, L. K. (1986). Making the intelligence “cycle” work. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 1(4), 1–23. Marrin, S. (2012). Improving intelligence analysis: Bridging the gap between scholarship and practice. Routledge. Osborne, D., & Wernicke, S. (2003). What is crime analysis. In Introduction to crime analysis, basic resources for criminal justice practice (pp. 1–11). Santos, R. B. (2014). The effectiveness of crime analysis for crime reduction: Cure or diagnosis? Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30(2), 147–168. Spiegelhalter, D. (2019). The art of statistics: Learning from data. Penguin UK.

Dr Matthew Bland  is an Associate Professor in Evidence-Based Policing at the Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, a Research Fellow at the Cambridge Centre for Evidence-Based Policing and a fellow of the Academy of Experimental Criminology of the American Society of Criminology. At the university, he supervises the dissertations of senior police leaders in the Police Executive Programme. He is the Trial Director for the national pilot of polygraph testing for domestic abuse offenders and has managed and contributed to experiments on offender management, hotspot policing and out-of-court disposals. His research focuses on domestic abuse, prediction algorithms in policing and exploratory analyses. He previously worked in policing for 15 years as a Head of Analysis, during which time he completed both a master’s and a PhD in criminology at the University of Cambridge.

Part I

The Crime Analysis Profession

Chapter 2

Different Kinds of Analyst Scott Keay

2.1  More Than Meets the Eye: A Thriving Profession? It is perhaps promising to witness the blossoming growth the analyst has had in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, although it has not been an easy ride (Sissons, 2008). There have been numerous setbacks due to criticism (Cope, 2004) and public sector budget cuts (Keay & Kirby, 2018a). The profession has managed to ride the downturn and start to grow again. Whilst crime analysis has been recognised as sometimes being underutilised and not routinely integrated into police work, it has still been regarded as an essential element of policing across the globe (Belur & Johnson, 2018; Burcher, 2020; Guerette et  al., 2020; Santos & Taylor, 2014). In the UK, this is in part due to the demand for insight that comes from quality analysis (Kirby & Keay, 2021; Ratcliffe, 2016, 2018) and part due to the drive from the CoP to professionalise the analyst (College of Policing, 2021a), and other intelligence roles (College of Policing, 2021b). It may come as a surprise to those new to the profession that there are several different types of analyst roles, not just crime and intelligence analysts. Different police forces align different responsibilities to different analyst titles. Many other public sector agencies also have analysts to better understand data, develop intelligence and improve knowledge, all intended to inform decision makers. Within policing, there is also a growing list of analyst roles with a different prefix: CSE analyst, robbery analyst, business analyst, performance analyst, major investigation analyst, financial analyst, etc. This is not an exhaustive list. Perhaps this is a positive step as a growing number of departments across law enforcement agencies recognise the value that analytical work can add, but it does question who does what and

S. Keay (*) Edge Hill University, Lancashire, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Bland et al. (eds.), The Crime Analyst’s Companion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94364-6_2

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if there is collaboration between various analyst groups. Firstly, let us return to examine what may be regarded as the initial analyst roles, crime analyst and intelligence analyst.

2.1.1  Crime, Intelligence or Some Other Analysis Crime and intelligence are two words that are often used interchangeably when referring to analysts and this generates confusion about the specifics of the role (Weston et al., 2020). Peterson (1994), a significant champion of the analyst profession, noted that analyst’s job titles are often used interchangeably, and this is apparent in some forces which swap the terms ‘intelligence’, ‘performance’ and ‘crime’, as a prefix when describing analysts. Yet sometimes the responsibilities and tasks are blurred. In the USA, there is more of a distinction between the two distinct arenas than in the UK. The two types of role, crime and intelligence, are also supported through separate associations, both of which offer excellent training opportunities and a wide support network: IALEIA (International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts) for intelligence analysts, who work developing criminal intelligence analysis products, and IACA (International Association of Crime Analysts) for crime analysts who generally concentrate on crime analysis (referred to as performance analysts in some agencies). These organisations offer insightful conferences and provide a valuable resource for new analysts as well as those who are experienced and skilled. In the UK, role titles generally reflect Peterson’s comments, albeit the CoP have been helping to differentiate between certain roles with the development of distinct professional role profiles (College of Policing, 2021b). At the time of writing, however, the list of profiles does not extend to all types of analyst role, and it is unclear if additional role profiles will be added to the list. One thing all roles have in common is the requirement to provide specialist support that directs resource allocation and police action. The College of Policing (2020a:1) notes that the purpose of the analyst is to provide ‘expertise through the development and use of analytical products to assist decision making at a strategic, tactical and operational level’. So far it is established that the analyst role is growing and thriving once again in the UK.  There are a growing number of analysts in numerous law enforcement agencies and various departments of policing. Analyst managers in policing are usually senior or principal analysts (other titles do exist!) or in some instances they are police officers, such as the head of a unit, e.g. Inspector. However, when it comes to operational staff, what is the hierarchy of analyst? Is there one?

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2.2  Hierarchy of Analysts Some forces have numerous analysts within the police staff structure: business analysts, intelligence analysts, major crime analysts, partnership analysts, performance analysts, and professional standards (or PSD – professional standards department) analysts. These are listed here in alphabetical order so as not to suggest there is a hierarchy of role. Where police forces have numerous analyst teams it is not uncommon for them to be sat apart, often in different areas of the force and in different buildings. This is dependent upon the department within which they work. Skill sets often vary across the analyst types, which is largely determined by the role and function of the analyst. Basic training for all analysts1 is often the same, usually in the form of the National Intelligence Analyst Training (NIAT), which contains elements of the original ANACAPA course – if they are lucky enough to access training! In some cases, analyst staff are expected to pick the skills up ‘on the job’. There are several specialist courses on offer that not all analysts share the fortunes of attending, such as problem-solving/ problem-oriented policing, communications analysis, Microsoft Excel, to name but a few. Course provision may be guided by the role, department or simply what is left in the training budget. But training and courses should not, and do not, rank analyst roles. There should be no ranking of analyst positions (unless there are management responsibilities). All analysts offer a valuable contribution, but the missing link is steeped in analyst relationships. Analysts should be aware of their counterparts and work hard to connect the dots between their various outputs, knowledge and practical skills. This will benefit all roles and improve organisational insight.

2.2.1  T  he Importance of Training But Which Analysts Benefit? It is not the purpose of this chapter to document the various analyst training courses on offer, nor will it list the various training providers. It does, however, recognise that training staff and investment in their continuous professional development (CPD) is essential in motivating staff as well as preparing them for future challenges (Kirby & Keay, 2021). Research has been undertaken to explore what makes an effective analyst, with conclusions pointing towards communication skills (Evans & Kebbell, 2012), research skills (Keay & Kirby, 2018a), as well as data literacy and technical skills (Guerette et al., 2020; Ratcliffe, 2004; Weston et al., 2020), all of which can improve the successful application of analysis (Burcher & Whelan, 2019). There can be no doubt that analysts need long-term support through training 1  This is based on the UK model of analyst training. It is noted that analysts in other countries (notably Canada, USA and Australia) have different training programmes and certification requirements (also see Weston et al., 2020).

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and also afforded the time to apply that training in the workplace. The need for improved training of analysts has been a consistent finding in research (Evans & Kebbell, 2012; Guerette et al., 2020; Kirby & Keay, 2021; Ratcliffe, 2009). However, not all analyst roles have the same level of training options, and this is a flaw in the continuous professional development of the role. Training provision should be linked to role responsibilities, especially those detailed in role profiles and organisations, and analyst managers, need to ensure that appropriate training is available and accessible. Ideally, this needs to extend to planning for future challenges too, such as how analysts can collect, analysis and interpret new data and intelligence sources, such as ‘big data’ (Ferguson, 2017; Kirby & Keay, 2021).

2.2.2  A Division in the Ranks? Analysts need to be able to work as a collective, to share knowledge and learning as a group. This would improve consistency across products (outputs) and increase the knowledge contained therein. Without a shared learning approach, organisations and even analysts themselves, can unwittingly create an imbalance in analyst skills sets and reports, which has the potential to be divisive. Interestingly, it is not uncommon to experience a lack of interaction between different analytical groups despite various teams striving to achieve similar goals. Regardless of the role type or function being performed by an analyst, they all can offer valuable insights regarding crime, intelligence, demand, harm, data and organisational issues, and these should never be considered in isolation. Moreover, the quality of the analyst’s output and the operational and organisational impact can be far greater and further reaching. Different analysts need to be increasingly aware of what different groups are working on, the techniques being used and the findings from their work. This is becoming more apparent with forces using data visualisation techniques and getting to grips with the growing emphasis on ‘big data’ (Ferguson, 2017). All police forces operate slightly differently so it should be expected that analyst groups do too. Indeed, different forces utilise different types of analyst with a range of functions and responsibilities. It is therefore unwise to suggest a single operational model. However, Kirby and Keay (2021) suggest a potential model for a research and analysis hub that links intelligence analysis, crime (performance) analysis and data science. This model does not necessarily mean co-location of these groups, nor should it be considered prescriptive. As already considered in this chapter, there are numerous analyst groups and structures. The point of the model is that there is a growing need for collaboration and inter-group working, particularly in relation to data and intelligence development. Kirby and Keay (2021: 178) note that: …the ubiquitous nature of data will drive new opportunities. Big data will be used to predict future offending and incident patterns. However, the process will be more complex in terms of collection, analysis, dissemination and presentation of information.

Therefore, it will be increasingly important for analysts to position themselves in working together to better understand new and emerging data sets, whilst looking to

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enhance their skills in data mining, collecting, coding, synthesis and analysis of new data that will come from a variety of sources. Not all will be law enforcement.

2.3  Effecting Change: In It Together Intelligence is no longer a simple police concept. The harvesting of multi-agency data can provide a balanced and holistic picture of both individuals and communities and can improve community safety (Staniforth et al., 2019). Whilst currently there are good examples of partnership working (Drawve et  al., 2018; Florence et al., 2014) with some limited sharing of resources, this is often on the margins of policing (Keay & Kirby, 2018a, b; Asquith et al., 2017). It is possible that the future may bring aligned priorities and shared budgets across various public sector agencies. Analysts should be at the forefront of these collaborations, if not leading them. This will mean working on collaboration with analyst teams from other agencies to better understand the data collected by different agencies, as well as learning why such data is collected and how it might be understood. Along with this, analysts should look to hone their skills and broaden their skillsets. An improved intelligence flow and greater understanding of demand may well be the result of this. The nature and complexity of policing has been changing in recent years. It is recognised that approximately 20% of calls for police service are in relation to crime (Keay & Kirby, 2018b). Therefore, much of police demand is dealing with matters and incidents that very often require multi-agency responses. This means that policing and analysis must overcome divides between various public sector agencies (Bartkowiak-Théron & Asquith, 2017). Analytical provision must also be a part of understanding and servicing this complex demand. It has been suggested that using models such as the Joint Strategic Needs Assessment (JSNA) framework can help improve knowledge about local demands (Kirby & Keay, 2021). There is also growing support for the analyst profession through the National Analyst Working Group (NAWG), the Association of Crime and Intelligence Analysts (ACIA) and the Local Authority Research and Intelligence Association (LARIA). These groups offer support to all analyst professions. The NAWG is an internal group (i.e. a group of existing law enforcement analysts and analyst managers) looking to provide a national consistency and strategic direction to the development of the profession in association with all police forces and the College of Policing. Most police forces have a representative involved or linked to the NAWG.  ACIA is organised and run by volunteers who are passionate about the analyst role. ACIA offers mentorship and is involved in numerous projects to help support a growing national network of over 1100 analysts. At the time of writing ACIAs latest project is the development of a series of podcasts that offer insightful training tips, knowledge about roles, data and techniques. LARIA is an association of public sector analysts and researchers, predominately working at a local authority level. LARIA exists to promote continuous improvements in the quality and impact of local research and intelligence. Partnership and community safety analysts are

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more likely to be aware of LARIA and local authority research and analysis. It is extremely useful to work in collaboration with analysts from social care and health agencies, particularly when working on early intervention initiatives. Like all associations, these groups rely on individual support and input, and they are constantly seeking new members to bring in new ideas, skills and experience. Evans (2008:105) argued analysts need ‘critical mass’ to effect changes in their profession. By joining associations such as the ones mentioned analysts, regardless of their job title, can constantly keep evolving their role and ensure it meets future challenges.

2.3.1  R  ecommendations for Continuous Professional Development It is anticipated that there will be different analysts reading this book and chapter. There will be some new in post, there will be many that have been in post for a number of years and there will be some that have worked in various analytical posts throughout their career. Whether a job title is intelligence analyst, crime analyst or even Strategic Road Safety Partnership analyst, all analysts add value and improve the existing knowledge base. There are several simple tips that are worth considering based on the research that has prompted this chapter. The aim of these tips is to offer ideas that may support collaboration or innovation, or both: • Meet with other analysts on a regular basis, especially those that you do not necessarily work with. The benefits of meeting with other analysts, and perhaps researchers, is to explore new ideas, to discuss new techniques and understand different data. This could also include analyst teams form other agencies, e.g. from a public health intelligence team or an academic institution. • Network as much as possible to build up a support base of others with specialist skills and knowledge that can help you. Organisations such as ACIA, NAWG and LARIA will be gold dust and can offer many rewards during your career. • Ensure that learning from training courses is shared with those that may not have had the same level of training. This may include developing a mentor programme to help guide new staff or even help develop staff from different departments. • Take time to understand available data and improve data literacy. Do not just accept data as they are and consider how data might be recoded to test hypotheses or even how data might be manipulated upon extraction. This may require collaborating with data scientists or IT specialists with your organisation. Get to know those that own data and understand what data are collected, why they are collected and how data might be linked across the various data warehouses to improve organisational and operational insight. • Read. Read often. Read as much as you possibly can and keep up to date with research. This may be difficult due to ‘pay walls’ that prevent access to research, so make the most of the College of Policing library and perhaps contact research

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authors and request copies of their work. Often academic researchers want to see their work being used in a practical manner. Further, analyst managers should encourage and allow analysts time in the workplace to read and keep up to date with research. • Research methodologies and research skills remain elusive from much analyst practice and training. Take time to learn new research methods as academic and scientific research methodologies can offer so much to improving analysis and intelligence products (Chainey, 2012; Ratcliffe, 2009). The application of research methods will help scope out new ideas and seek appropriate data to help understand problems as opposed to simply describing them.

2.4  Conclusion There are analysts and there are analysts. There are growing numbers of roles and functions, and this is good news for all law enforcement agencies, as well as for the analyst’s profession. However, as the numbers grow, so must collaboration to ensure that analysts do not end up working in silos or suffer ‘mission creep’ (Kirby, 2013) from self-imposed ‘echo chambers’. This can be counter-productive to the analytical process. Solidarity across the analyst profession is much better than division and it will go a long way in helping to deal with future challenges, understanding demand and developing multi-agency responses to shared problems. Acknowledgments  Thank you to Andrew Wright, Strategic Road Safety Partnership analyst with Lancashire Constabulary, for comments on a draft of this work.

References Asquith, N. L., Bartkowiak-Théron, I., & Roberts, K. A. (Eds.). (2017). Policing encounters with vulnerability. Springer. Bartkowiak-Théron, I., & Asquith, N. (2017). Conceptual divides and practice synergies in law enforcement and public health: Some lessons from policing vulnerability in Australia. Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy, 27(3), 276–288. Belur, J., & Johnson, S. (2018). Is crime analysis at the heart of policing practice? A case study. Policing and Society, 28(7), 768–786. Burcher, M. (2020). Social network analysis and law enforcement: Applications for intelligence analysis. Palgrave Macmillan. Burcher, M., & Whelan, C. (2019). Intelligence-led policing in practice: Reflections from intelligence analysts. Police Quarterly, 22(2), 139–160. Chainey, S. (2012). Improving the explanatory content of analysis products using hypothesis testing. Policing, 6(2), 108–121. College of Policing. (2020). Delivering effective analysis. Available at https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-­content/intelligence-­management/analysis/delivering-­effective-­analysis/. Accessed 13 Apr 2020

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College of Policing. (2021a). Analyst (professional profile). Available at https://profdev.college. police.uk/professional-­profile/test-­2/. Accessed 25 June 2021 College of Policing. (2021b). Professional profiles. Available at https://profdev.college.police.uk/ professional-­profiles/. Accessed 25 June 2021 Cope, N. (2004). ‘Intelligence led policing or policing led intelligence?’ Integrating volume crime analysis into policing. British Journal of Criminology, 44(2), 188–203. Drawve, G., Belongie, M., & Steinman, H. (2018). The role of crime analyst and researcher partnerships: A training exercise in Green Bay, Wisconsin. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 12(3), 277–287. Evans, M. (2008). Cultural paradigms and change: A model of analysis. In C. Harfield, A. MacVean, J. Grieve, & D. Phillips (Eds.), The handbook of intelligent policing. Oxford University Press. Evans, J., & Kebbell, M. (2012). The effective analyst: A study of what makes an effective crime and intelligence analyst. Policing and Society, 22(2), 204–219. Ferguson, A. G. (2017). The rise of big data policing: Surveillance, race and the future of law enforcement. New York Press. Florence, C., Shepherd, J., Brennan, I., & Simon, T. R. (2014). An economic evaluation of anonymised information sharing in a partnership between health services, police and local government for preventing violence-related injury. Injury Prevention, 20(2), 108–114. Guerette, R.  T., Przeszlowski, K., Lee-Silcox, J., & Zgoba, K.  M. (2020). Improving policing through better analysis: An empirical assessment of a crime analysis training and enhancement project within an urban police department. Police Practice and Research, 1–18. Keay, S., & Kirby, S. (2018a). The evolution of the police analyst and the influence of evidence-­ based policing. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 12(3), 265–276. Keay, S., & Kirby, S. (2018b). Defining vulnerability: From the conceptual to the operational. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 12(4), 428–438. Kirby, S. (2013). Effective policing?: Implementation in theory and practice. Palgrave Macmillan. Kirby, S., & Keay, S. (2021). Improving intelligence analysis in policing. Routledge. Peterson, M. (1994). Applications in criminal analysis. Praeger. Ratcliffe, J.  H. (2004). Crime mapping and the training needs of law enforcement. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 10(1), 65–83. Ratcliffe, J. H. (2009). Intelligence research. In J. H. Ratcliffe (Ed.), Strategic thinking in criminal intelligence (pp. 108–123). Federation Press. Ratcliffe, J. H. (2016). Intelligence-led policing. Routledge. Ratcliffe, J. H. (2018). Reducing crime: A companion for police leaders. Routledge. Santos, R.  B., & Taylor, B. (2014). The integration of crime analysis into police patrol work. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 37(3), 501–520. Sissens, J. (2008). An evaluation of the role of intelligence analysts within the national intelligence model. In C. Hartfield, A. MacVean, J. Grieve, & D. Phillips (Eds.), The handbook of intelligent policing: Consilience, crime control and community safety (pp. 121–130). Oxford University Press. Staniforth, R.  A., Jennings, U., Henderson, J., & Mitchell, S. (2019). Using multi-agency, multi-professional collaboration to reduce serious violence and organized crime. Journal of Community Safety and Well-being, 4(3), 63–65. Weston, C., Bennett-Moses, L., & Sanders, C. (2020). The changing role of the law enforcement analyst: Clarifying core competencies for analysts and supervisors through empirical research. Policing and Society, 30(5), 532–547. Scott Keay  is a Senior Lecturer and Researcher in Policing at Edge Hill University, UK. Previously he worked for Lancashire Constabulary for 20 years in various analyst roles. His research interests include developing the application of crime analysis, intelligence-­led policing, evidence-based policing (EBP), problem-solving, roads policing and policing vulnerability.

Chapter 3

Crime Analysis in an International Context Cilia Maria Ruiz-Paz

3.1  Introduction The analysis of crime is a universal phenomenon and the lifeblood of all investigations. The basic elements of using systematic methods to identify and analyze patterns and trends in criminal activities are ingrained in law enforcement establishments worldwide (even if sometimes only in the most basic form). All enforcement organizations rely on information and intelligence to combat crime within their mandated jurisdictions, yet crime is ignorant of geography and with the rise of globalization simply does not respect man-made borders. This transboundary expansion forces enforcement organizations to reconsider their policing strategies and creates the need for collaboration among law enforcement agencies from different nation-states to accomplish a shared mission of combating crime. But how must the profession at a local level adjust to achieve this common purpose in a novel international arena? First, it is important to lay the foundations and examine the basis of international intelligence and crime analysis. Then, it is essential to understand the nature of transnational crime and its elements to fully comprehend why reciprocity and mutual benefit drive effective international crime analysis. Awareness of the what and the why of international criminal analysis allows for a better assessment of the how. To combat transnational crime properly and efficiently, it is crucial to first understand the cultural, structural, and legal barriers that exist and must be overcome by law enforcement. If left unaddressed, they hinder operational cross border cooperation and intelligence exchange. Realizing the value in international cooperation and the difficulties in establishing direct nation-to-nation collaboration, the global community has come together in the form of intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations C. M. Ruiz-Paz (*) Miami Beach Police Department, Miami Beach, FL, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Bland et al. (eds.), The Crime Analyst’s Companion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94364-6_3

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to create partnerships, networks and technological platforms and systems through which to secure accurate and safe information and criminal intelligence exchange. It is often a simple lack of knowledge of their existence that impedes their wider use by analysts as they handle foreign information. Only after understanding the international dimensions of the profession and of transnational crime as well as of existing limitations and available partnerships and tools can a synergy of effective transboundary responses be created. At its core, of course, lies the criminal analyst who must proficiently maneuver the layers of complexities on both the national and international realms and guide their agency’s approach to combating crime.

3.2  What Is It? How Does It Look? Why Do We Do It? To effectively carry out the functions of a criminal or law enforcement analyst, it is essential to understand both the field terminology and how it is used by an analyst. As discussed in Chap. 1, Information is knowledge in raw form received from multiple sources. Intelligence is information that is capable of being understood. Once intelligence is evaluated in context to its source and reliability it develops added value useful to generating products to support informed decision making (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011). Analysis is the logical compilation, assembly, review, and comparison of pieces of information to form patterns and significance. This evaluation gives meaning (either actual or implied) to a set of complex facts, assumptions, or situations. Systematic examination also determines pertinent information, draws valid inferences/predictions, and identifies gaps through which to form recommendations. The analysis of information and intelligence goes beyond the presentation of simple facts. Analysis is an evaluation of how good/poor and valuable material is. It provides data not previously known, leads further into what remains to be uncovered to understand a situation comprehensively, provides a guide as to where to look further, and assists in communicating the material to others (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011). Analysis also highlights information gaps, strengths, weaknesses, and suggests next steps. Criminal intelligence is a more specific subset that involves the use of systems through which to collate, store and retrieve information specifically about crime and criminals (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011). It is the product of an analytical process that provides an integrated perspective to a collection of information about crime, crime trends, crime and security threats, and conditions associated with criminality. Criminal intelligence can be generated in various forms. It can be simply investigative in order to find, compare, and make connections, or administrative through which to gain information on laws, politics, and outside factors. Intelligence can also be tactical which examines recent crimes, deployment, resources, and the identification of short-term, focused issues in an area. It presents itself through

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frequency distribution analysis, crime pattern analysis, time series analysis and geographic distribution analysis. Strategic intelligence deals with long-term patterns and evaluations and aims to define directives and resource allocation. It results in the assessment of the impact of a crime group or criminal activity on a particular jurisdiction through agency warnings, estimates of when a crime might occur, target profiles, problem profiles and threat assessments. Lastly, operational criminal intelligence assists in the completion of an investigation or prosecution and has shorter-­ term aims that actively consider and put into action both strategic goals and tactical intelligence (Riskope, n.d.) (NHTSA, IADLEST, 2020). It can be distributed in the form of target/subject analysis, network analysis, communication record analysis, flow analysis and financial analysis. Crime analysis, therefore, is the compilation, review, and articulation of conclusions drawn from criminal incident data for the purpose of optimally deploying police personnel to prevent crime and arrest offenders. It is the evaluation of criminal intelligence gathered and is mostly interested in crime/social harm that is targeted, predictable, and connected (Reeby, 2021). It allows law enforcement practitioners to establish proactive responses to criminal activity, and its advent is causally linked to the shift from individual crime into organized/group crime (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011, p. 7). International crime analysis only further stretches this definition to include the gathering, sharing, retrieving, and evaluating of pertinent criminal intelligence and information from multiple relevant national sources to combat crime at an international level. The analyst. Crime at any level requires some degree of investigation and evaluation and dedicated individuals specialized in the art of analysis. A law enforcement analyst is any person who is employed or contracted by any municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof and whose primary responsibility is to collect, analyze, and disseminate data to support, enhance, and direct law enforcement missions. In the world of law enforcement, various types of analysts exist to include crime or criminal analysts, intelligence analysts, investigative analysts, and management or statistical analysts. While the role of an analyst may vary from agency to agency, most encompass the roles of analyzing crime trends and patterns, supporting investigations, supporting prosecutions, and informing agency decision makers at their core. Crime or criminal analysts analyze crime patterns and trends through which to recommend the resource deployment needed to prevent and suppress criminal activity. They assist in the investigative process and in turn increase both the apprehensions carried out by officers as well as in the rate of clearance of cases. Intelligence analysts create tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence products to support immediate agency needs. They promote situational awareness, identify criminal enterprises, identify and circulate threat indicators, and make recommendations for strategic planning. Investigative analysts apply various analytical methods and techniques through which to support arrests, prosecutions, and the development of proactive c­ riminal

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targeting. They compile and analyze information related to investigations to make recommendations for investigative strategies. Management or statistical analysts determine budgets, and the future uses of resources based on crime analysis and strategic assessments. They ascertain how an agency uses its internal resources by examining the deployment and workload of personnel. As analysts are used in a wide array of activities, it is worth mentioning that law enforcement analysts are NOT data entry operators, clerks, secretaries, or record researchers, even while these duties may form part of the greater role.

3.2.1  W  hat is Considered International or Transnational Crime and How Is It Defined? Prior to the advent of transportation and communication technology and for the greater part of history, criminal activity had been mainly of local or regional concern (Albanese & Reichel, 2014). As globalization took its course, so did international crime and without an accepted consensus on how to define it. Interchangeable terms began to be utilized to describe the phenomenon to include international organized crime, transnational organized crime, multinational crime, cross-­ national crime, cross-border crime, transboundary crime, and global crime; transnational crime, however, is the definition that best fits into the world of international crime analysis. Global crime, for example, is most commonly used to explain crime’s distribution rather than crime’s typology. International crime often refers to activity that threatens world order and security such as war crimes or genocide. Transnational crime, however, defines criminal activities that affect the interest of more than one political state (Albanese & Reichel, 2014). The expression was developed by the U.N.  Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch in 1974 to identify types of crimes that transcended national borders, and out of all the expressions for the phenomenon this term has had the most adherents (Albanese & Reichel, 2014). In 1995, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) explicitly defined transnational crime as “offenses whose inception, proportion and/or direct or indirect effects involve more than one country” and identified 18 separate categories of transnational offenses involving more than one nation (United Nations, 1995). Crime whose inception, perpetration, and direct or indirect efforts involve more than one country as defined by the UNODC among other offences committed by organized criminal groups includes: 1. Money laundering. 2. Terrorist activities. 3. Theft of art and cultural objects. 4. Theft of intellectual property.

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5. Illicit trafficking in arms. 6. Aircraft hijacking. 7. Sea piracy. 8. Land hijacking. 9. Insurance fraud. 10. Computer crime (technological/cybercrime). 11. Environmental Crime. 12. Trafficking in persons. 13. Trade in human body parts. 14. Illicit drug trafficking. 15. Fraudulent bankruptcy. 16. Infiltration of legal business. 17. Corruption and bribery of public officials. 18. Corruption and bribery of party officials and elected representatives. In a historical context, transnational crime has evolved using some of the same trade routes established centuries ago, prior even to contemporary national boundaries. Modern drug and weapon trafficking still occurs through the Byzantium (Turkey) to Rome network, human trafficking operations from Asia continue to utilize the “Amber Route” that connects the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea, the water route from Albania to Italy is used smuggle contraband, illegal immigrants and drug trafficking continue to follow routes established by the Roman Empire from Africa into Europe, and ancient underground banking systems established centuries ago still operate next to legitimate banking systems worldwide (Albanese & Reichel, 2014). With the leaps and bounds of globalization using international transportation and communication technology, crime has not lagged, growing in networks and strength accordingly and always one step ahead of law enforcement. International crime analysis, consequently, has become increasingly crucial to combating transnational crime in which levels of complexity in criminal networks are increasingly fluid and composed of ever-evolving semi-structureless networks. Criminal organizations and networks are simply more sophisticated and dynamic with ever growing cooperation (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011).

3.2.2  Why Collaborate? Intelligence sharing and collaboration among nation-states is increasingly crucial in an age of sophisticated transnational crime where the failure to collaborate and share information effectively limits the efforts of all states involved in combating it (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011). Intelligence, therefore, is truly of no value if it is not shared or disseminated. Simply stated, a collective endeavour is potentially much more efficient and effective (Canton, 2016, p. 87). Crime analysts worldwide collaborate because it is effective in curbing transnational criminal activity and because it is mutually

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beneficial to the parties involved. Much like crime analysis at the national level, at the international level reciprocity and relationship building are key to quality data and analysis. Without reciprocity and well-constructed relationships, international data sharing is simply not useful or effective and may not even happen. The main motivations to collaborate in international crime analysis emerge when geographical criminal activity conditions mandate it, when an acceptable level of trust is achieved, when appropriate conduits for intelligence sharing are established, and most importantly, when the need for data and intelligence outweigh any real or perceived risks by a nation or agency. International cooperation is also widely sought when equipment or costs of data acquisition exceed the possibilities of an agency or institution, often forcing agencies and nation-states to leverage partnering agencies and networks to acquire it (Canton, 2016). It is simply beneficial for international agencies to avoid the duplication of services offered by other specialists when international relations allow for collaboration. Over the past few decades, there has been an increase in international policing and police collaboration that has surpassed police jurisdictions and international borders (Yakhlef, 2020). But cooperation in law enforcement is tricky and is often a barrier to effective international policing and analysis. Cooperation depends on a wide variety of factors relating to the context, the players involved, and the relationship between the players (Axelrod, 2006). It is of no surprise that certain nation-­ states choose to cooperate at varying levels with one another while others do not. Now that we understand what intelligence and international crime analysis are, can describe transnational crime and its official categories, and understand why collaboration is fundamental in this field, it is important to further explore the barriers to international analysis and cooperation.

3.3  What Are the Barriers? Analysts in any context are faced with various forms of limitations. All investigations generate information. The larger the scope and the probing, the more information that must be analyzed. No matter the system used to analyze and later store information gathered, analysts are first limited by their own skill development through which to grasp and process the information. Crucial to valid decision making, only understanding a part of the whole picture means that the analyst would only develop a partial understanding of the entire situation (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011). An analyst may also be faced with financial and structural limitations within their home agencies and national structures. Many are limited in their analytical functions by the information to which their home agency has access either due to software limitations or legal ones. Analysts are often pulled in many directions especially in agencies with limited resources and are expected to carry out their functions and collaborative efforts while under severe time constraints (Reeby, 2021) Furthermore, the inherent nature and character of law enforcement is to be suspicious (Yakhlef, 2020) which fuels interagency rivalry and

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distrust. This guarded disposition when it crosses into the context of information sharing can make the acquisition and accessibility of pertinent and quality data at a local and national level particularly difficult (Reeby, 2021). Added layers of obstacles exist when working at the international level. Barriers to obtaining key information and intelligence through international collaboration and cooperation are exhibited in three main overarching forms: cultural obstacles, structural and organizational obstacles, and legal obstacles. Cultural obstacles for cooperation are often difficult to overcome as they are inherent and ingrained within the analyst, within a law enforcement agency, and within the cultural fabric of a nation-state. While most nations agree that cooperation is in their best interest, they are immediately faced with challenges of different histories, cultures, and attitudes towards law enforcement in the agencies with which they need to collaborate (Canton, 2016). In addition to differences in cultural and religious practices and standards as well as stereotypical understandings of each other (Yakhlef, 2020), cross-lingual semantic interoperability also exists – countries lack a universal language (Kumar, 1998) and without effective communication, information sharing is close to impossible. Both a lack of understanding and acceptance of cultural norms and language barriers create apprehension which then also lead to distrust and an immediate breakdown of relationship building. Consider an international investigation involving France and Japan, for instance. First, a language must be chosen – whether one of the original ones or a third common language – through which to exchange information and/or specialized translators knowledgeable in law enforcement terms and jargon must be brought on. If a good working relationship between the two nations has not been established and massaged, in addition to an enormous time difference, Japan’s style of policing which encompasses non-violence, face-saving, conservatism, and high-power distance norms (Tran, 2017) may lead Japanese forces to interpret information received as critical of the Japanese system or its citizens. To show national respect and leave their country in good standing, they in turn may provide intelligence in an attenuated manner to the more direct “force and war” French authorities who have been known to be quite distrustful of its citizens (Terpstra et al., 2021). Structural and organizational obstacles are a second layer of additional barriers to effective international analysis. While more tangible, they can be a large barrier to overcome even when linguistic, cultural, and legal obstructions are not an issue. Structural obstacles are frequently manifested in poorer nations and in areas in which law enforcement agencies are unable to receive adequate funding. Resource and funding limitations lead to the creation of both a gap in the local infrastructure (in some instances leaving a community without any formal infrastructure altogether) and a lack of qualified professionals and institutional knowledge through which to carry out any type of analysis and intelligence-based policing. Infrastructural gaps can range anywhere from lack of facilities to unreliable phone access and internet coverage, to a lack of equipment and proper hardware and software. They can not only directly affect the access to conduits for criminal intelligence sharing, but also the means through which intelligence is gathered and more importantly its secure handling and storage. Without any of the necessary

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components, an agency lacking in physical or technological infrastructure simply is unable to fully process quality and accurate internal and/or external information or reciprocate its exchange. It is of no surprise that lack of proper infrastructure and access to information severely impairs relationship building. It leaves law enforcement organizations without the indispensable connections to proper authorities nationally and internationally as well as to any resources that they each may have at their disposal. This lack of a formal working relationship makes it near impossible to engage in any formal intelligence cooperation and only creates further mistrust between nations and agencies. Nonetheless, actors may overcome structural obstacles by creating informal networks (Yakhlef, 2020), and in recent years agencies have often found ways to share information in person or through less secure means of communication. The need to cooperate has also seen an increase in emerging hybrid networks of private and public security intersections through which to collaborate and share resources (Yakhlef, 2020). Organizational rivalry. is set as deeply in international organizations as it is in national and local ones. In law enforcement, rivalry and mistrust manifests itself in jurisdictional disputes when one entity feels the other is encroaching upon its sphere of influence and responsibility. It stems from differing agency arrangements and organization, differing responsibilities and priorities, differences in power and influence often exacerbated by agency size, differences in professional background and training and different ideas about the definition of a problem and the approach for its solution (Canton, 2016). Just as with agencies at the local and national levels, lack of trust between organizations at the international level exists and is only intensified. International collaboration is challenging as professional standards of agencies both nationally and internationally call on their officers to secretively withhold information. Suspicious dispositions and mistrust are fueled by the need of an agency or organization to guard its borders, often against actors in nations with whom they need to collaborate (Yakhlef, 2020), creating a strong all-around culture of distrust. To efficiently prevent transnational crime, agencies must first resolve issues of trust and suspicion (Yakhlef, 2020). While challenging, the establishment of agreeance about overall aims and clear guidelines regarding accountability and realistic expectations of each agency, the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of other points of view, the willingness to subsume agency loyalty to a partnership, and the ensuring of full and regular communication all contribute to sound inter-agency and international cooperation (Canton, 2016). Lastly, legal and political obstacles become barriers to intelligence exchange in various ways. Effective international cooperation and intelligence sharing requires national agencies to restructure procedural conditions so that they may operate beyond their sovereign jurisdiction (Lemieux, 2010). However, different legal systems and frameworks with varying rules, laws, and legislation are often at odds and lack harmonized procedures (European Commission, 2017). Divergences between legal systems with different legal definitions, procedures, and criminal sentences lead to inconsistencies in the application and interpretation of the law (European

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Commission, 2017) and make equivalent and substitutable criminal offenses a challenge. An individual may be considered a convicted criminal in one sovereign state and by legal definition not in another, creating an issue with extradition, for example. Following the same principle, a stateless person could present legal implications and be classified one way in one state and another way in multiple others. Divergent legal systems without outside interference simply render universal classification of crimes almost unfeasible. To further complicate matters, different governmental and administrative structures and procedures add levels of obstacles to interoperability – a democratic government may find it difficult to work with a communist one altogether. One could only imagine the challenges that would exist if a United States law enforcement agency found itself needing to work on an international investigation with an agency in North Korea, for example. Nations’ economic and political pressures or indifferences can make it difficult to convince elected officials of the importance of developing international law enforcement cooperation (Canton, 2016), not to mention leave certain nations vulnerable to political and police corruption and negative public perception with respect to abuse of authority (Kumar, 1998). Organizational practices, work methods, and police traditions can cause problems with regard to the legality of means used to obtain information and the willingness of nations to accept and exchange delicate criminal intelligence. Legal obstacles can be overcome in part by developing effective definitions of crime and punishment and establishing appropriate criminal laws (Kumar, 1998). Treaties, bilateral, and multilateral agreements specifically addressing barriers (European Commission, 2017) can also help promote international police cooperation as further explored in the next section.

3.4  Who Are the Players? Having explored the multiple layers of obstacles to national and international law enforcement cooperation and intelligence exchange it is clear nation-states cannot cooperate easily on their own. Recognizing the importance and necessity of police and intelligence collaboration and cooperation at an international scale, various intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), international agencies (IAs), and other instruments have emerged to bridge the gaps and allow interoperability and exchange among nation-states that would otherwise be unable to do so directly (Kumar, 1998).

3.4.1  Intergovernmental Organizations When states agree to form or participate in IGOs and IAs, they consent to be bound by certain regulations and to carry out obligations in line with the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of

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other sovereign nations (Zabyelina, 2019). Treaties and formal agreements are used to organize international cooperative environments at global and regional levels, and these legal instruments are drafted to overcome exchange barriers to facilitate collaboration and influence policy, practice, and processes (Lemieux, 2010). In the absence of a treaty an IGO does not exist in the legal sense as they are no longer subject to international law or able to enter into enforceable agreements among themselves or with states (Harvard Law School, 2021).

3.4.2  United Nations and Its Specialized Agencies The largest IGO is the United Nations which is also made up of multiple IAs with mandates aimed at countering transnational crime. Its specialized agencies are self-­ managing, funded by voluntary contribution and UN allocations, and have their own processes for membership, appointing administrative leaders, and establishing policy (Zabyelina, 2019). From its 15 specialized agencies and multiple funds and programs, the following carry out functions most relevant to combating transnational crime: • United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) whose activities center around the prevention of organized crime and trafficking, terrorism, corruption, drug, and health related crime, as well as criminal justice reform. • United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) carrying out functions to protect and develop standards of assistance to combat child trafficking. • United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with activities centered around combatting the formation of illicit economies and corruption. • United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) with aims to raise awareness to act against child exploitation and the coordination of operations against trafficking of art and cultural property. • United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) which carries out functions to combat environmental crime, namely dumping of electronic waste, wildlife trafficking and illegal logging. • United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) working to protect against exploitation. • United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) carrying out activities against the formation of illicit economies and corruption. • European Environment Agency (EEA) with activities centered around environmental crime. • International Labour Organization (ILO) with pursuits against human trafficking/slavery. • International Monetary Fund (IMF) providing financial and technical assistance to fight corruption, anti-money laundering, and the financing of terrorist activities. • World Bank Group (WBG) with involvement in member states’ homicide rates, illicit trade, and exploitation.

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• World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) through the execution of activities related to countering child exploitation.

3.4.3  International and Regional Police Organizations Out of the IGOs, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) is the oldest and most well-known intergovernmental policing organization. Working in four official languages with 194 member nations each with its own INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB), this organization’s sole purpose is to enable the sharing and access of criminal information and intelligence while offering a range of technical and operational support (International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL, n.d.). Formerly the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), INTERPOL works exceptionally well in the facilitation of secure intelligence sharing across multiple nations at one time, as well as in the coordination of simultaneous tactical global operations. It is a particularly useful tool to connect nations composed of complex law enforcement structures to each other and more importantly to states with simpler models. One example would be the exchange of intelligence from a nation such as the United States of America (USA) – comprising approximately 18,000 local, state, and federal police organizations – to another such as Colombia which is composed of one central national police entity. In this case, NCB Washington (USNCB) would send the information to be shared to the recipient NCB – NCB Bogota – who would then relay the information nationally to the relevant and correct individuals. Additionally, INTERPOL’s network can also act as a conduit between sovereign states who would otherwise not cooperate with one another, as would be the example of the US with Cuba. A common misconception is that the INTERPOL General Secretariat (IPSG) has dedicated agents with arrest powers. This is not the case as IPSG cannot act without the approval of national authorities and operatives are composed of a mix of national officers and international seconded or detailed officials to the organization. Due to the success of INTERPOL’s structure, six main regional police organizations largely interested in regional issues and cooperation have since emerged mimicking INTERPOL’s organizational configuration. INTERPOL and these regional law enforcement bodies work to identify areas for collaboration and intelligence exchange, while conducting investigations and arrests by respective national police and laws (Zabyelina, 2019). They include: • ASEANAPOL  – the ASEANAPOL organization was founded in 1981 and is comprised of 10 Southeast Asia member states. • AFRIPOL  – the African Mechanism for Police Cooperation was founded in 2017 and is comprised of 54 African member states.

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• EUROPOL  – the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation was founded in 1998 and is comprised of the 28 EU Member States. • AMERIPOL – the Police Community of the Americas was founded in 2007 and is comprised of 28 police organizations and 19 observer agencies. • GCCPOL – the Gulf Cooperation Council Police was founded in 2014 and is comprised of seven member states. • AIMC – the Arab Interior Ministers’ Council was founded in 1982 and is comprised of five member states.

3.4.4  Other Global and Regional Organizations Additional global and regional IGOs who carry out activities related to combating transnational crime include among others (United Nations, n.d.): • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP). Centres for Police and Customs Cooperation (PCCC). Council of Europe (CoE). El Grupo Mundial de Policías (GMPO). Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG). European Commission (EC). European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL). European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust). Kent European Liaison Unit (ELU). International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA). International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA). International Civil Defence Organization (ICDO). International Criminal Court (ICC). International Maritime Organization (IMO). International Organization for Migration (IOM). International Seabed Authority (ISA). International Telecommunications Union (ITU). International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centre (MEMAC). Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States. Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME). South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP). Southeast European Law Enforcement Center (SELEC). Southern African Forum Against Corruption (SAFAC).

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• World Customs Organization (WCO). • World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). • World Trade Organisation (WTO).

3.4.5  Nongovernmental Organizations Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are yet another formal means of bridging national and organizational gaps to combat national and transnational crime. They are distinguishable from IGOs because they are composed of two or more individuals rather than by nations, are usually independent of governments, are not-for-­ profit, and receive at least a portion of their funding from private sources (Harvard Law School, 2021). NGOs no longer just play a role in research, policy, and advocacy but have assumed an ever-growing role in law enforcement by assuming activities centered around patrolling, surveillance, investigation, confiscation of illegal material and proceeds of crime, litigation, and prosecution before courts. All these activities are carried out in an autonomous manner and many times parallel to law enforcement organizations (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Sharman, 2021). With a rise in transnational crime, NGOs have risen to the occasion to fill the gap of lagging and limited state capacity, more specifically in areas with more possibilities for transborder movement, such as the environment and corruption. Additionally, the ability of NGOs to acquire newer surveillance and data-gathering technologies provide an important opportunity for NGOs to support law enforcement and intelligence activities by monitoring and investigating more extensively, effectively, and economically (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Sharman, 2021). The following is a list of relevant NGOs available to an international crime analysis professional: • • • • • • • • • • • • •

The Alliance of NGOs on Crime Prevention & Criminal Justice. African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum Trust (APCOF). American Correctional Association (ACA). Anti-Corruption Association of NGO (ACAOFNGO). Asia Crime Prevention Foundation (ACPF). Center for Natural Resource Governance (CNRG). Center for Problem-Oriented Policing (POP). Centre de Recherche sur l’Anti-Corruption (CERC). Criminologists Without Borders (CWOB). Dominicans for Justice and Peace (DJP). Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC). Global Witness. European Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL). • International Association for Advancement of Innovative Solutions to Global Challenges (IAAI).

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International Association for the Study of Organized Crime (IASOC). International Association of Crime Analysts (IACA). International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL). International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA). International Community Corrections Association (ICCA). International Corrections and Prisons Association (ICPA). International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC). International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW). International Institute for Child Protection (IICP). International Police Organization (IPO). México Unido Contra la Delincuencia, A.C. (MUCD). Osservatorio sulla Criminalità Organizzata, (CROSS). World Society of Victimology (WSV). International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). World Wildlife Fund (WWF). Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG). Spamhaus. European NGO Alliance for Child Safety Online (eNACSO). International Association of Internet Hotlines (INHOPE). Internet Watch Foundation (IWF).

3.4.6  Legal Instruments In the vast field of international law enforcement cooperation and intelligence exchange, IGOs and NGOs are not the only instrument available for transboundary collaboration. Additionally, given the overlapping mandates of national and international agencies, treaties, conventions, memoranda of understanding (MOU), and Action Plans (AP) are some of the legal instruments used to foster partnerships and encourage collaboration. International law defines treaties as a legally binding written agreement made by states or international organizations with treatymaking powers and which is governed by international law (United Nations, 2012). At times, the distinction between the functions of an IGO and a treaty can be unclear especially given that treaties many times give way to IGOs. Scholars have, therefore, often opted to combine the two using more generic terms, such as “international institutions” (Klabbers, 2009). Legal partnerships can also be forged internationally using conventions – defined as formal agreements negotiated under auspices of an international organization (United Nations, 2012) – and MOUs. MOUs in an international law context denote a less formal instrument than a treaty or international agreement and usually set out operational arrangements. They can provide a formal basis for cooperation and joint activities, and while they do require a signature, they do not require ratification and require less time for their development (United Nations, 2012). Lastly, APs are a less binding legal agreement used more commonly in national settings to provide a

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structure and a sequence of actions to achieve a common goal. They assist in setting priorities, coordinating actions, tracking progress, and simplifying decision making (Inclusive Security, 2016). Numerous partnerships between IGOs and among nations have been created to combat transnational crime. Notable IGO partnerships in law enforcement and information exchange exist between WCO and UN agencies, as well as among UNODC, WCO, INTERPOL, IOM and OSCE in addition to multiple others (Zabyelina, 2019). Notwithstanding, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) is the main international instrument in the fight against transnational organized crime. This Convention, adopted in 2000, was a recognition of the UN Member Nations of the important need to enhance international cooperation and take a series of measures against transnational crime through the creation of domestic criminal offences, adoption of extradition frameworks, mutual legal assistance and agency cooperation, and the promotion of training and technical assistance for upgrading national authority capacity building (United Nations, 2000). The list of international players only grows with time, but their increasing interconnectedness and ability to cooperate provide valuable venues for both national and international cooperation. They also create legal and secure measures through which to acquire and share information.

3.5  What Tools Are Available? A criminal analyst both at a national and international level can easily recognize a gold mine of accurate and pertinent intelligence. It is the key to unlocking investigations and getting ahead of criminals. But knowing sources available internationally and global organizations willing to provide information can be a challenge, especially at a national level and for smaller law enforcement agencies. Below is a list of international law enforcement systems and NGO organizations to keep in mind when searching for transnational links in criminal intelligence and information:

3.5.1  International Tools • INTERPOL  – this IGO is host to the global police communications system I-24/7 which is open to any national law enforcement agency with criminal database and analysis capacity and provides information in Arabic, English, French, and Spanish; a local agency need only reach out to their respective National Central Bureau (often located in the nation’s capital) to request the transfer of intelligence; INTERPOL also provides relevant capacity building when needed.

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• UNODC – this IGO conducts research and data analysis and provides statistical expertise to enable the collection, process, analysis, and dissemination of data on drugs and crime. For coordination, agencies should directly contact the field or liaison offices in their region.1 • ViCLAS – housed under the auspices of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Violent Crime Linkage Analysis System contains data about violent crimes and focuses on the linkages that exist among crimes committed by the same offender; states that have adopted ViCLAS include Belgium, Czech Republic, France Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and certain states within the United States. To inquire about adopting the program, a request should be made to the ViCLAS National Policy Centre. • Environmental Investigation Agency  – the EIA has recently launched a new Global Environmental Crime Tracker that improves access to data collected on wildlife seizures, illegal logging, environmental crime hotspots and live mapping of incidents.

3.5.2  Regional Tools • AMERIPOL – this IGO is host to the Police Information System (SIPA) which allows for the secure transmission of information among five Latin American nations – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and the Dominican Republic.2 • CEPOL  – housed in Hungary, this EU agency provides analytical training on security issues through a network of training institutes for law enforcement officials, working with EU bodies, international organizations, and nations for collective responses to specific security threats. • EUROPOL – this IGO is host to the Europol Information System (EIS) and available in 22 languages; it gathers and stores criminal data from member countries and its use is limited to Europol officials, Member State liaison officers, seconded experts, and National Unit staff within Europe. Intelligence is gathered through various system including: (Note: if outside of the EU, national entities may be able to work through INTERPOL to acquire needed information). –– EUROSUR/FRONTEX  – European border surveillance system to improve detection of cross-border movements with information sharing among national and European systems.

1  UNODC has various published manuals available online. The Criminal Intelligence Manual for Analysts is great resource for intelligence management, techniques, and processing and can be accessed here: https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Law-Enforcement/Criminal_ Intelligence_for_Analysts.pdf 2  Outside of the region, national entities may be able to work through INTERPOL to acquire needed information.

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–– European Network for Environmental Crime  – facilitated by EUROPOL, EnviCrimeNet is an informal network connecting police officers and law enforcement agencies through the exchange of information among other activities. • European Commission – this IGO hosts the following databases: –– ECRIS – a European criminal record database available to Member State officers, judges and prosecutors that exchanges information on convictions and criminal histories. –– EURODAC  – a European fingerprint database designed to identify asylum seekers. –– SIS  – the Schengen Information System is sharing system for security and border management in Europe. • European Environment Agency – utilizes the European Environment Information and Observation Network (EIONET) to provide European environmental data, information, knowledge, and assessments to member countries. • Regional Associations Information Network – the RAIN Networks are alliances of regulatory and law enforcement agencies in Canada and the United States and provide member states/provinces with forums for information sharing.

3.6  Conclusion As technological globalization has given way to an ultra-connected world in ways previously unimaginable, it has also provided the perfect opportunity for criminals to better organize and expand into previously unreached borders. Transnational crime as defined by the United Nations has exploded and with it the need to counter it. Law enforcement agencies that were once focused on local and regional matters no longer have the luxury to remain globally disconnected. Agencies of all sizes in all corners of the world are now relying on criminal analysts to use their skills and look internationally to identify and analyze patterns and trends in the fight to combat transnational crime. The criminal analyst profession and its use of data, information and intelligence is the lifeblood to counter transnational crime in the context of national and international crime analysis. The principles of cooperation and reciprocity of information exchange and analysis for the mutual benefit of all participating states are clearly indispensable. Yet the successful and effective exchange of information is not without its challenges, namely cultural, structural, and legal obstacles which, without proper legal instruments, would be almost impossible to overcome. Important IGOs such as INTERPOL and EUROPOL, NGOs, conventions, and treaties have emerged to bridge international cooperation and foster nation-to-nation collaboration through formal and secure exchange platforms and mechanisms. It is the hope that a better

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understanding of the players, context, and tools available internationally to analysts working in national and international settings around the world will assist the wide-­ ranging efforts of global law enforcement agencies to curb transnational crime more permanently.

References Albanese, J., & Reichel, P. (2014). Handbook of transnational crime and justice (2nd ed.). SAGE Publications. Axelrod, R. (2006). The evolution of cooperation (2nd ed.). Basic Books. Canton, R. (2016). United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders - Publications. [Online] Available at: https://www.unafei.or.jp/publications/pdf/RS_No99/No99_VE_Canton_2.pdf. Accessed Feb 2021 Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M., & Sharman, J. (2021). Enforcers beyond borders: Transnational NGOs and the enforcement of international law. Perspectives on Politics, 19(1), 131–147. European Commission. (2017). Easing legal and administrative obstacles in EU border regions case study no. 8 police cooperation complexity of structures and rules on the border. European Commission. Florida Department of Law Enforcement. (2020). Florida law enforcement analyst training course #88. Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Harvard Law School (2021). Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs). [Online] Available at: https://hls.harvard.edu/dept/opia/what-­is-­public-­interest-­law/public-­service-­practice-­settings/ public-­international-­law/intergovernmental-­organizations-­igos/#:~:text=The%20term%20 intergovernmental%20organization%20(IGO,exist%20in%20the%20legal%20sense. Accessed 3 Mar 2021 Inclusive Security (2016). What Are National Action Plans and Why Do They Matter?. [Online] Available at: https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/2016/08/10/national-­action-­plan-­matter/. Accessed 5 Mar 2021 International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). (n.d.). Who we are. [Online] Available at: interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/What-is-INTERPOL. Accessed Mar 2021 INTERPOL Environmental Security Sub-Directorate. (2015). Directory of environmental law enforcement networks. INTERPOL. Klabbers, J. (2009). An introduction to international institutional law (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. Kumar, K.  S. (1998). International police cooperation: Obstacles. Security Journal, 11(2–3), 155–158. Lemieux, F. (2010). International police cooperation emerging issues, theory and practice. Willan Publishing. NHTSA, IADLEST, 2020. Analyst mastermind series part 4: Understanding what I SHOULD know as an analyst and pointers to gain the skills I need. : National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards & Training. Reeby, D. (2021). Analytical training series. IADLEST/TxDOT/DDACTS. Riskope. (n.d.). Let’s define strategic, tactical and operational planning. [Online] Available at: https://www.riskope.com/2014/04/03/lets-­define-­strategic-­tactical-­and-­operational-­planning/. Accessed 2 Feb 2021 Terpstra, J., de Maillard, J., Salet, R., & Roché, S. (2021). Policing the corona crisis: A comparison between France and the Netherlands. International Journal of Police Science & Management, 23(2), 168–181.

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Tran, K. (2017). How Japan’s cultural norms affect policing: A side-by-side policing: A side-­ by-­side comparison with the United States. Themis: Research Journal of Justice Studies and Forensic Science, 5(3), 38–62. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2011). Criminal intelligence manual for analysts. Publishing and Library Section, United Nations Office at Vienna. United Nations. (1995). Ninth United Nations congress on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders. United Nations, Secretariat. United Nations. (2000). United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto. [Online] Available at: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-­ crime/intro/UNTOC.html. Accessed 5 Mar 2021 United Nations. (2012). Treaty handbook, s.l. United Nations Publication. United Nations (n.d.). Intergovernmental and other organizations. [Online] Available at: https:// www.un.org/en/sections/member-­states/intergovernmental-­and-­other-­organizations/index. html. Accessed Mar 2021 Yakhlef, S. (2020). Cross-border police collaboration building communities of practice in the Baltic Sea area. [Online] Available at: https://www.google.com/books/edition/Cross_Border_ Police_Collaboration/y7X_DwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=yakhlef+2020&printsec=front cover. Accessed Feb 2021 Zabyelina, Y. (2019). The role of major intergovernmental organizations and international agencies in combating transnational crime. In M. Natarjan (Ed.), International and transnational crime and justice (pp. 305–310). Cambridge University Press. Cilia Maria Ruiz-Paz  is Crime Analysis Unit Manager with the Miami Beach PD in Florida, USA. She specializes in criminal intelligence management, analysis, and intelligence-led operations at the local, federal, and international level with extensive experience with project coordination, legislative tracking, government and policy, communication and translation, collaborative wildlife trafficking and environmental conservation efforts, and strategic cross-border wildlife enforcement initiatives.

Chapter 4

Crime Analysis and Evidence-Based Policing: Challenges and Obstacles John Ng

4.1  Introduction In 1998, Professor Lawrence Sherman put forward a decision-making philosophy that argued that police decision making should be based on “what works.” This means that decisions should not just be based on experience or hunches but should consider empirical research findings. He called this framework “evidence-based policing” (EBP). EBP attempts to merge the benefits of practice and academia (Piza, Szkola & Blount-Hill 2020). Part of EBP involves police agencies engaging in Sherman’s (2013) 3 Ts – targeting, testing, and tracking. That is, police should target their most serious problems, apply and test initiatives to reduce the problem, and to keep track of whether the initiatives work in the long term (Huey, Blaskovits, Bennell, et al., 2017). Conducting internal evaluations of police initiatives is a way that police can participate in EBP. Typically, these evaluations have been conducted by external researchers (Piza & Feng, 2017); however, some scholars have contended that policing needs to start owning police science (Weisburd & Neyroud, 2011). To engage in EBP, police need internal resources to assist them with generating, translating, and disseminating high quality research (Lum & Koper, 2017; Piza & Feng, 2017). Crime analysts have supported police agencies to become more data-­ driven and have supported EBP innovations over the years such as hotspots policing and problem solving (Lum, 2013; Santos & Taylor, 2014). Crime analysts engage in a variety of tasks that can help EBP thrive. This is clearly found in the definition of crime analysis described by Santos (2016, p. 2): Crime analysis is the systematic study of crime and disorder problems as well as other police-related issues  – including sociodemographic, spatial, and temporal factors  – to

J. Ng (*) The Canadian Society of Evidence-Based Policing, Saskatoon, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Bland et al. (eds.), The Crime Analyst’s Companion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94364-6_4

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EBP is also about police generating and implementing analytical work found internally and externally (Lum, Koper, Telep, & Grieco,  2012; Lum & Koper, 2017; emphasis added). Therefore analytical work that is being created internally is contributing to embedding EBP principles in police agencies. This is especially important as officers tend to rely on internal information as a main source of their knowledge (Lum et al., 2012). Analysts have an opportunity to integrate research evidence in their analytical products. Despite the value that academia and crime analysts bring to policing, studies on the receptivity of research and integration of crime analysis in policing point to a clear divide between practice and research. Decades of evaluative work have yet to be fully institutionalized in policing (Lum et al., 2012). This chapter will illustrate parallels between the obstacles that researchers and analysts experience and opportunities to bridge this gap. EBP is especially important during the current challenges that police are facing, particularly the increasing concern over growing police budgets and increased public accountability. Such concerns mean that policing needs to have rigorous analyses to target resources and demonstrate their efficiency and effectiveness (Griffiths, 2014; Public Safety Canada, 2013, 2019). Policing initiatives that are proactive, targeted, tailored, and place-based are effective ways of reducing and preventing crime (Lum, 2013). Crime analysts have a significant role in developing these evidence-­based strategies, including hotspots policing, focused deterrence, and problem-­oriented policing (Lum, 2013; Santos, 2014). As we look at the role of crime analysts in EBP, we will explore how “crime analysts can also support the development, application, and evaluation of evidence-based strategies and can translate research knowledge into practical application” (Lum & Koper, 2017, p. 227). Lastly, it is important for readers to understand that EBP and research has its limitations. Policing is complex and police leaders must take into consideration various factors. EBP is a decision-making perspective and contends that “policies and practices should be supported by scientifically rigorous evidence and analytics… and is part of the conversation about what to do about reducing crime, increasing legitimacy, and addressing internal problems” (Lum et al., 2012, p. 62). This approach does not discount policing experience as an important component of police decision making and EBP advocates would argue that science and practice can be complementary. In the next sections of the chapter, I explore what is evidence-­ based policing, receptivity to research in policing, the current use and integration of crime analysis in policing, and lastly consider the pivotal role of crime analysts in evidence-based policing.

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4.2  What Is Evidence-Based Policing? Sherman (1998) defined evidence-based policing as “the use of the best available research on the outcomes of police work to implement guidelines and evaluate agencies, units, and officers” (p. 3). EBP suggests that research, analysis, evaluation, and overall science should play a part in how these decisions are being made (Lum & Koper, 2017). It does not discount the value of policing experience, nor does it suggest that research evidence is the only guiding principle in policing decision making (Lum et al., 2012). Ultimately, EBP aims to enhance the value of contemporary policing as “implementing evidence-based policing improves resource allocation, increases transparency, and promotes better relationships with the community” (Dolly & Shawver, 2018, p. 263). For some, EBP is about researcher-practitioner partnerships to gain deeper insights into crime and discovering “what works” in policing (Huey et al., 2017; Keay & Kirby, 2018; Sherman, 1998). The philosophy encourages police to have an active role in the research process including developing the internal capacity to conduct high level evaluations (Piza & Feng, 2017; Weisburd & Neyroud, 2011). This is not easy as policing tends to be fast-paced and decision makers typically want quick analyses and solutions as they move from crises to crises (Belur & Johnson, 2018). However, good research often takes time and careful consideration is needed when methodologies are used to draw conclusions about “what works” in policing (Huey et al., 2017; Keay & Kirby, 2018; Sherman & Eck, 2002; Sherman et al., 1997; Piza & Feng, 2017). Unfortunately, impact and process evaluations are still rarely conducted in policing, which leaves policing with a lack of understanding of why initiatives work (or do not work) (Belur & Johnson, 2018; Santos & Taylor, 2014). Sherman (2013) also identified three main components of EBP which have implications for the role of analysts in policing: Targeting, testing, and tracking. Targeting refers to identifying a high policing priority, testing refers to implementing an initiative and testing whether the intervention was effective, and lastly, tracking is about tracking the effect of the initiative (and any changes to the initiative) over longer periods of time (Huey et al., 2017). There are clear parallels with the SARA model of problem-oriented policing (Eck & Spelman, 1987) which includes scanning (for problems), analyzing (root causes for those problems), implementing responses, and assessing its impact. It is obvious the analysts would be involved in scanning, analysis, and assessment, but analysts also have an opportunity to impact which responses are chosen; the selection of which may require additional analyses (Santos, 2014). When Sherman (1998) first spoke about EBP, he focused on the generation, use, and application of research to guide police decision making. Lum and Koper (2017) add to this, contending that equally important is the translation of research evidence for it to be consumable for police agencies and institutionalizing that knowledge. Analysts have opportunities to contribute to the generation, implementation, and translation of research (Lum & Koper, 2017). EBP calls for a change in how policing functions – it is no longer just about making decisions based on hunches, but about using research evidence to inform police

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practices. Analysts are natural advocates of EBP as “the role of the analyst has been introduced to challenge the established way of working and offer new options for consideration: to provide and recommend an [sic] variety of tactics for intervention that can and do challenge normal police tactics” (Sissens, 2008, p. 123). Yet as mentioned, while there is great value in EBP, there are barriers that impede the acceptance of research evidence in policing, which parallels the challenges faced by analysts.

4.3  Receptivity of Research in Policing Decades of evaluative research findings have yet to be fully embraced as part of common police practice (Lum et al., 2012; Lum & Koper, 2014; Lumsden & Goode, 2018; Rojek et  al., 2012; Sherman, 2015, 2020). Unfortunately, there have only been a handful of recent studies that examined the receptivity of research in policing and have outlined which factors affect receptivity and barriers that exist (Cherney et al., 2018, 2020; Lum et al., 2012; Kalyal, 2020). Due to culture and tradition, much of policing still relies on the standard reactive model of policing that involves random patrols, rapid response to calls, and follow-up investigations (Sherman et al., 1997; Weisburd & Eck, 2004; Lum et al., 2012). Furthermore, police decision making is still greatly based on experience and “gut” sense. While experience is helpful, perceptions can be biased and reflective of individual experiences. In contrast, research attempts to account various perspectives and systematically examine collective experiences. So, what barriers exist that would cause resistance to research if there is such value to EBP? Lum et al. (2012) succinctly indicated that “barriers to the use of research can be individual, organizational, or political” (p. 65). It is important to emphasize that analysts may not be able to influence these factors. Instead, it requires the support of progressive police leadership to drive change and have EBP be part of their agency’s standard practice. In this section, we will discuss some of this research to highlight parallels with the resistance that crime analysts experience. Importantly, it will also provide lessons learned for analysts.

4.3.1  Individual Factors Various studies have looked at individual factors such as education level (Telep & Lum, 2014; Blaskovits et al., 2018; Telep, 2017; Kalyal, 2020), rank (Hunter et al., 2015), and a variety of other personal factors none of which would have relevance to the work of analysts. For this section, we will focus on officer’s awareness of EBP, reliance on experience, exposure to research and research literature, interest in being involved in policing research and evaluation, and their knowledge of effective police practices. Analysts are encouraged to understand these ideas to reflect on

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what it means for officer-analyst relationships and their level of acceptance towards research and analysis. 4.3.1.1  Officer Knowledge Telep and Lum (2014) developed the first survey to explore police receptivity to research. Their study involved distributing their survey to officers in three US cities (Sacramento, California; Richmond, Virginia; and Roanoke County, Virginia). One question they asked was, were officers aware of the term EBP? Approximately 25.1% to 48.4% of respondents across all three sites were familiar with the term. In contrast, receptivity studies have only started in Canada recently. Blaskovits et al. (2018) replicated this study and found that there was greater familiarity with EBP amongst Canadian respondents compared to their US counterparts. However, it is important to keep in mind that familiarity may not necessarily mean true understanding of EBP concepts. 4.3.1.2  Reliance on Experience Police decision making is still heavily reliant on police experience and input from the public instead of research (Palmer, 2011; Santos & Taylor, 2014; Telep & Lum, 2014). That said, officers are also open to research (e.g., being open to collaborating with researchers and willing to engage in pre- and post-evaluations (Lum et  al., 2012; Palmer, 2011; Telep & Lum, 2014). Palmer (2011) found that this openness is dependent on “the meaningfulness, cost, and perceived risk of the research, as well as on its alignment with an officer’s own ‘sense’” (Lum et al., 2012, p. 70). Blaskovits et al. (2018) found that like their other counterparts, Canadian officers were more reliant on experience than scientific knowledge. However, Canadian respondents were more willing to accept external help and more respondents supported the belief that there should be an equal weighting of experience and scientific knowledge when making decisions. Canadian officers also indicated that they had joined the Canadian Society of Evidence-Based Policing (Can-SEBP) because of the indirect networking that was part of joining Can-SEBP.  This supports the idea that Canadian officers were like their other counterparts in that they relied on the knowledge and experience of their colleagues over science (Palmer, 2011; Lum et  al., 2012). The prominent value that is placed on personal experience and the experiences of others over academic sources is a valuable lesson for analysts. 4.3.1.3  Exposure and Acceptance While it is important that officers rely on their experience, their peers, and their community’s input, they also have the opportunity to learn about effective police practices through professional magazines and research journals. Studies have found

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that for the most part, officers are not reading research journals, but tend to read from professional policing publications such as the Police Chief or government documents (Rojek et al., 2012; Palmer, 2011; Telep & Lum, 2014; Blaskovits et al., 2018). This may be due to research articles being hidden behind paywalls or being complicated by academic jargon (Blaskovits et al., 2018). However, when officers do have access and are exposed to government publications or read two or more publications, they are more receptive to EBP (Palmer, 2011; Telep, 2017). Officers were more likely to rely on information and see3k help from inside their own agencies especially about the effectiveness of police tactics instead of external sources (Lum et al., 2012; Telep & Lum, 2014). This is a valuable opportunity for analysts to translate, disseminate, and incorporate research findings as part of their analytical products or through informal conversation (see Lum et al., 2012). Despite this opportunity, researchers, crime analysts, and their work are still viewed suspiciously (Lum et al., 2012). There were a few different reasons for this. First, officers’ acceptance of research may depend on how it is conveyed, particularly from senior leadership. They will be resistant if it is perceived as an academic exercise or part of an accountability process like CompStat (Lum et al., 2012). It also suggests that officers could be resistant because they feel they have lost their autonomy; the same has been found about some officers’ attitudes towards hot spots policing (Lum et al., 2012). Also, officers’ experiences are often based on individual disparate events (Evans & Kebbell, 2012). Unfortunately, these experiences represent one person’s perspective and can be subjective and biased (Cope, 2004). In contrast, research and analysis attempts to provide overviews of phenomenon (Cope, 2004). As Kalyal (2020, p. 9) pointed out “officers do not reject scientific evidence per se but believed that generalizations cannot be applied to police work which varies from case to case” (see also Lum et  al., 2012). This can be compounded by an internal culture that rewards and emphasizes single case arrests (Telep & Lum, 2014). What does this mean for analysts? First, police agencies need to prioritize developing in-house research. The fact that officers felt that academic research findings would not be applicable to their day-to-day experiences is reasonable, especially if those research findings do not consider the local context or their perspective. It will therefore be important for analysts to get involved in research projects using their agency’s data. It is also important to consider officers’ experiences. Lum et  al. (2012) suggest the following to researchers, but it can be equally applicable to analysts “the professional experience of officers should not be ignored in undertaking evaluation research not only because officers likely have valuable insights that will improve the overall project, but also because officers will likely be more willing to cooperate with researchers who recognize and appreciate the value of officer knowledge and experience” (Lum et al., 2012, p. 79). Lastly, when analysts are involved in the implementation of a project, not only should they consider officers’ perspectives, but they should provide recommendations that respect officers’ needs for autonomy to ensure buy-in and recognize that there are limits to police data and research. Having officers exposed to research not only improves their general receptivity to EBP, but also specifically their willingness to be involved with research evaluations

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(Palmer, 2011). Officers have been found to be more receptive of simpler qualitative methods compared to more complex qualitative and quantitative methods that can be viewed as being too complicated and removed from the realities of daily police operations (Koehle et al., 2010). Officers were also found to be more interested in less rigorous evaluations – they were less willing to stop a police tactic for the purposes of a controlled study and were more willing to engage in pre- and post-studies (Palmer, 2011; Telep & Lum, 2014). As noted above, receptivity depended on the amount of risk that is involved (Lum et al., 2012) and the potential negative impact on routine police operations (Blaskovits et al., 2018). This is insightful for analysts to realize that despite the value that more robust research methodologies have, police are more receptive of methods that are simpler and more attune to the realities of daily policing – in essence, keep it simple. 4.3.1.4  Knowledge of Effective Police Practices Officers’ knowledge of effective police practices is also important to consider. As previously noted, officers may be resistant to concepts that do not align with their beliefs or if there is a culture that emphasizes arrests (Telep & Lum, 2014). It is important for analysts to consider this as they advocate for evidence-based practices and when they are recommending innovative police tactics and strategies. For example, officers in Telep and Lum (2014) and Blaskovits et  al. (2018) studies believed that community policing was effective at reducing crime despite the evidence against that (Gill et al., 2014). Police continue to engage in what is viewed as a standard model of policing which is heavily weighted towards random patrols, rapid response to calls, and reactive investigations (Sherman et al., 1997; Weisburd & Eck, 2004). Weisburd (2008 in Lum et al., 2012) argued that a clear example of the distance between evidence-based practice and reality is the continued reliance of random patrols as a standard policing approach, despite research indicating that it has no effect on crime (Kelling et al., 1974) but instead that directed and hot spot approaches are effective (Braga et al., 2019). Indeed, officers in both Telep and Lum (2014) and Blaskovits et al. (2018) studies believed that rapid response is an effective way to respond to crime. As Lum et al. (2012) outline “deployment tactics that are proactive, tailored to specific problems, and place-based are more likely to yield effects with regard to crime prevention than reactive, general, and individual-based strategies” (Telep & Lum, 2014, p. 377). Again, this lack of knowledge about effective police practices may simply be due to how research is accessed or presented (Blaskovits et  al., 2018). For example, although innovative practices such as pulling levers and restorative justice may be familiar amongst academia, many officers from Telep and Lum’s (2014) study were not familiar with these approaches. Positively though, Telep (2016) found that officers believed that evidence-based approaches like problem-­oriented policing and hot spots policing were effective. This is important as both approaches require buy-in from patrol. Also, Blaskovits et al. (2018) found that Canadian respondents were more willing to try out new approaches than their

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US counterparts. These are important points as analysts are advocating for evidence-­ based approaches that are closer aligned with what officers believe are effective. 4.3.1.5  Attitudes Towards Researchers and Police-Researcher Partnerships While there is still skepticism towards researchers (and analysts) and their work (Lum et  al., 2012), there is some variability (Telep & Lum, 2014). For example, Blaskovits et al. (2018) found that a majority of Canadian officers reported that the information they received from analysts and researchers were useful or very useful. Studies have noted that officers feel that officer-researcher collaborations were important (Telep & Lum, 2014; Telep & Winegar, 2016; Blaskovits et  al., 2018; Blaskovits, 2018). Recall that officers were more receptive to research as long as it did not go against their beliefs or made any significant changes to their routine operations. This police-academic relationship is complicated by the fact that they tend to work on different timelines, have different expectations, have different worldviews, have differing opinions about the role science in policing, differ on how to measure police effectiveness, and what methods should be used for evaluations (Mastrofski, Willis, & Revier, 2011 in Lum et al., 2012). Likewise, police and researchers may have different opinions of what is deemed “evidence” (Buerger, 2010) – what academia may view as research evidence may be perceived as too general to be relevant to day-to-day policing. In addition, although researchers may be evaluating whether an initiative reduced crime and disorder, the goal of work done by officers might not always be about crime control (Sparrow, 2015; Telep & Lum, 2014). Kalyal’s (2020) study involving interviews with officers also provides some insights. First, respondents indicated that there has been a long-standing history of reports from academics that do not demonstrate that they have a deep understanding of police issues or how police function. Likewise, the reports that are being produced do not demonstrate that they have a clear understanding of the data and the context that it is collected, thus potentially misconstruing findings. Furthermore, police also experienced resistance when some academics were not open to feedback they received about their findings. There were concerns that collaborating with academics would lead police agencies “down an academic route” (p. 7). There were also reasonable concerns about confidential data. One lesson that analysts can take from these comments is that for analysts’ work to be better received, it is important that their products incorporate feedback from officers  – to demonstrate that it is meaningful and actionable for them. 4.3.1.6  Resourcing and Time High quality rigorous academic research takes time to produce, which is in contrast to the fast-paced nature of policing where quick solutions are needed (Lum et al., 2012). Part of this pressure comes from the public wanting immediate attention to

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their concerns and it can become a tricky situation when police start to make changes in how they conduct their work even if it is for the better. This is because the public has become used to having police act reactively to calls for service (Kalyal, 2020). In addition to time, some studies have pointed to human, technical, and financial costs as a limiting factor to adopting EBP (Kalyal, 2020; Telep & Lum, 2014). Police agencies can therefore benefit from having analysts who are already paid existing resources that can engage in research and evaluation (Piza & Feng, 2017; Piza et al., 2020). 4.3.1.7  External Factors Policing is a public institution and public opinion and political influence can affect the adoption of EBP (Lum et al., 2012). Police organizations gain legitimacy (and funding) from the public when they negotiate goals and policing approaches that align with public needs. Public opinion can also impact government policies, funding, and demands from advocacy groups which may contradict science (Davies & Nutley, 2008; Frambach & Schillewaert, 2002; Greenhalgh et al., 2004; Lum et al., 2012). Some politicians or oversight bodies might also be unconvinced by or resistant to EBP (Kalyal, 2020). Yet, adoption of EBP may be driven by current crises, a demand for police reform, or increasing demands to justify expenditures or operations (Kalyal, 2019). In these forums and in garnering support, police leaders have a responsibility to provide context, perspective, and research evidence about police work to oversight bodies especially when in many cases they are simply exposed to police statistics as a measure of police outputs and outcomes (Kalyal, 2020). Analysts can help support police leadership by providing objective analytical products that speak to political concerns and pressure.

4.4  Conclusions In this chapter, I reviewed factors that affect the adoption of EBP. The purpose was to draw upon key lessons for analysts to consider as they engage in their work and to also draw parallels to the next section on how crime analysis is currently embedded in policing. To summarize, police decision making is still heavily reliant on personal experience, resistance to EBP could be due to officers losing autonomy, and that local research that consider officers’ perspectives and context may help ground any concerns about the perceived generalities of research. In addition, we learned that officers not only rely on their own experiences but also those of their peers and communities. Similarly, they are also not being exposed to research findings in academic journals but tend to read professional policing publications. Research also suggests that capitalizing on existing internal mechanisms of communication maybe a useful way to disseminate EBP (Telep & Lum, 2014).

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This is an opportunity for analysts to complement their analytical work with research evidence. Officers were not completely resistant to research, but their acceptance is balanced by policing realities of risk, disruptions to daily operations, and resources. They were however not aware of effective police practices, and police practice continues to support a standard model of policing that emphasizes rapid response to calls, random patrols, and reactive investigations despite decades of evaluative research. Part of this may be due to access to research and how research is presented. Analysts have a key role in translating research and internalizing external research. One opportunity would be for analysts to support and expand on principles of problem-oriented policing and hot spots policing. Like researchers, analysts must be creative in how they incorporate research into their work and expose officers to EBP through various means (Lum et al., 2012; Telep, 2016). Crime analysts have the opportunity to summarize research findings in an accessible way through their work products, which must be actionable and easily consumable (see Blaskovits et al., 2018). Research has shown that when officers are more exposed to these ideas that they are more likely to support them (Kalyal et al., 2017). The challenge for researchers and analysts is not necessarily about the generation or availability of high-quality research, but how to best translate and disseminate research findings for policing (Lum et al., 2012).

References Belur, J., & Johnson, S. (2018). Is crime analysis at the heart of policing practice? A case study. Policing and Society, 28(7), 768–786. Blaskovits, B., Bennell, C., Huey, L., Kalyal, H., Walker, T., & Javala, S. (2018). A Canadian replication of Telep and Lum’s (2014) examination of police officers’ receptivity to empirical research’. Policing and Society, 1–19. Braga, A., Turchan, B., Papachristos, A., & Hureau, D. (2019). Hot spots policing of small geographic areas effects on crime. Campbell Systematic Reviews. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ doi/full/10.1002/cl2.1046 Buerger, M. E. (2010). Policing and research: Two cultures separated by an almost-common language. Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, 11, 135–143. Cherney, A., Antrobus, E., Bennett, S., Bevan, M., & Newman, M. (2018). Evidence based policing: Queensland police technical report. The University of Queensland School of Social Sciences. Cope, N. (2004). Integrating volume crime analysis into policing. The British Journal of Criminology, 44, 188–203. Davies, H.T. & Nutley, S. (2008). Learning more about how research-based knowledge gets used. Unpublished Working Paper. William T. Grant Foundation. Dolly, C., & Shawver, B. (2018). The organizational and practical considerations of starting a crime analysis unit: A case study of a midwestern police department. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 12(3), 255–264. Eck, J. E., & Spelman, W. (1987). Problem solving: Problem-oriented policing in Newport News. Police Executive Research Forum. Evans, J., & Kebbell, M. (2012). The effective analyst: A study of what makes an effective crime and intelligence analyst. Policing and Society, 22(2), 204–219.

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Frambach, R.  T., & Schillewaert, N. (2002). Organizational innovation adoption: A multi-level framework of determinants and opportunities for future research. Journal of Business Research. Special Issue: Marketing Theory in the Next Millennium, 55(2), 163–176. Gill, C., Weisburd, D., Telep, C., Vitter, Z., & Bennett. (2014). Community-oriented policing to reduce crime, disorder and fear and increase satisfaction and legitimacy among citizens: A systematic review. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 10, 399–428. Greenhalgh, T., Robert, G., Macfarlane, F., Bate, P., & Kyriakidou, O. (2004). Diffusion of innovations in service organizations: Systematic review and recommendations. Milbank Quarterly, 82(4), 581–629. Griffiths, C. (2014). Economics of policing: Baseline for policing research in Canada. Report commissioned by public safety Canada. Retrieved from http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/ pblctns/bsln-­plcng-­rsrch/index-­eng.aspx Huey, L., Blaskovits, B., Bennell, C., Kalyal, H., & Walker, T.  J. (2017). To what extent do Canadian police professionals think that their agencies are ‘targeting, testing and tracking’ new police strategies and programs? Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, 18, 544–555. Hunter, G., May, T., & Hough, M. (2015). An evaluation of the “What works centre for crime reduction” final report. Institute for Criminal Policy Research. https://whatworks.college. police.uk/About/Documents/ICPR_Final_Evaluation_WWCCR.pdf Kalyal, H. (2019). “Well, there’s a more scientific way to do it!”: Factors influencing receptivity to evidence-based practices in police organizations. Police Practice and Research, 21(6), 609–623. Kalyal, H. (2020). One Person’s evidence is another Person’s nonsense: Why police organizations resist evidence-based practices. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 14(4), 1151–1165. Kalyal, H., Peladeau, H., & Huey, L. (2017). Senior officer and recruiter views on “big topics” in policing for new recruits. Journal of Community Safety and Well-Being, 2(3), 112–115. Keay, S., & Kirby, S. (2018). The evolution of the police analyst and the influence of evidence-­ based policing. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 12(3), 265–276. Kelling, G. L., Pate, A. M., Dieckman, D., & Brown, C. (1974). The Kansas city preventive patrol experiment: Technical report. Police Foundation. Koehle, G., Six, T., & Hanrahan, K.  J. (2010). Citizen concerns and approval of police performance. Professional Issues in Criminal Justice, 5(1), 9–24. Lum, C. (2013). Is crime analysis evidence-based? Translational Criminology, 5, 12–14. Lum, C., & Koper, C. (2014). Evidence-based policing. In G. Bruinsma & D. Weisburd (Eds.), The Encyclopedia of criminology and criminal justice (pp. 1426–1437). Springer-Verlag. Lum, C., & Koper, C.  S. (2017). Evidence-based policing: Translating research into practice. Oxford University Press. Lum, C., Telep, C.  W., Koper, C.  S., & Grieco, J. (2012). Receptivity to research in policing. Justice Research and Policy, 14(1), 61–95. Lum, C., Koper, C. S., & Willis, J. (2017). Understanding the limits of Technology’s impact on police effectiveness. Police Quarterly, 20(2), 135–163. Lumsden, K., & Goode, J. (2018). Policing research and the rise of the ‘evidence-base’: Police officer and staff understandings of research, its implementation and ‘what works’. Sociology, 52(4), 813–829. Palmer, I. (2011). Is the United Kingdom police service receptive to evidence– Based policing? Testing attitudes towards experimentation (unpublished master’s thesis; supervisor: Cynthia Lum). Cambridge University. Piza, E., & Feng, S. (2017). The current and potential role of crime analysts in evaluations of police interventions: Results from a survey of the International Association of Crime Analysts. Police Quarterly, 20(4), 339–366. Piza, E., Szokla, J., & Blount-Hill. (2020). How can embedded criminologists, police pracademics, and crime analysts help increase police-led program evaluations? A survey of authors cited in the evidence-based policing matrix. Policing: A Journal of Policy & Practice.. https://papers. ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3571391

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Public Safety Canada. (2013). Summit on the economics of policing: Strengthening Canada’s policing advantage. Government of Canada. Rojek, J., Alpert, G., & Smith, H. (2012). The utilization of research by the police. Police Practice and Research, 13(4), 329–341. Santos, R. B. (2012). Crime analysis with crime mapping. Sage. Santos, R. (2014). The effectiveness of crime analysis for crime reduction: Cure or diagnosis? Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30, 147–168. Santos, R. (2016). Crime analysis and crime mapping. Sage Publications, Inc. Santos, R. B., & Taylor, B. G. (2014). The integration of crime analysis into police patrol work: Results from a National Survey of law enforcement agencies. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 37(3), 501–520. Sherman, L.  W. (1998). Evidence-based policing. Ideas in American policing series. Police Foundation. http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/Sherman.pdf Sherman, L.  W. (2013). The rise of evidence-based policing: Targeting, testing, and tracking. Crime and Justice, 42(1), 377–451. Sherman, L. W. (2015). A tipping point for “totally evidenced policing”: Ten ideas for building an evidence-based police agency. International Criminal Justice Review, 25(1), 11–29. Sherman, L.  W., & Eck, J.  E. (2002). Policing for crime prevention. In D.  P. Farrington, D.  L. MacKenzie, L.  W. Sherman, & B.  C. Welsh (Eds.), Evidence-based crime prevention (pp. 295–330). Routledge. Sherman, L.  W., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P., & Bushway, S. (1997). Preventing crime: What works, what doesn’t, what’s promising: A report to the United States congress. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. Sissens, J. (2008). An evaluation of the role of intelligence analysts within the national intelligence model. In C. Hartfield, A. MacVean, J. Grieve, & D. Phillips (Eds.), The handbook of intelligent policing: Consilience, crime control and community safety (pp. 121–130). Oxford University Press. Sparrow, M. K. (2015). Measuring performance in a modern police organization. Psychosociological Issues in Human Resource Management, 3(2), 17–52. Telep, C. W. (2016). Expanding the scope of evidence-based policing. Criminology and Public Policy, 15(1), 243–252. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1745-9133.12188 Telep, C. W. (2017). Police officer receptivity to research and evidence-based policing: Examining variability within and across agencies. Crime & Delinquency, 63(8), 976–999. Telep, C. W., & Lum, C. (2014). The receptivity of officers to empirical research and evidencebased policing: An examination of survey data from three agencies. Police Quarterly, 17(4), 359–385. Telep, C. W., & Winegar, S. (2016). Police executive receptivity to research: A survey of chiefs and sheriffs in Oregon. A Journal of Policy and Practice, 10(3), 241–249. https://academic.oup. com/policing/article-abstract/10/3/241/1753480. Weisburd, D., & Eck, J. (2004). What can police do to reduce crime, disorder, and fear? The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 593(1), 42–65. Weisburd, D., & Neyroud, P. (2011). Police science: Toward a new paradigm. New perspectives in policing. Executive session on policing and public safety. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. Special Constable John Ng  is a divisional crime analyst with a Canadian police agency in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. He has been a law enforcement analyst for over 10 years. He is a certified law enforcement analyst with the International Association of Crime Analysts and has been an active member having volunteered with their former Methods Subcommittee co-authoring a handful of technical papers on analytical methods including hotspot analysis, prioritizing offenders, and social network analysis. He is currently the Chair of their Publications Committee.

Chapter 5

Crime Analysis and Evidence-Based Policing: Strategies for Success John Ng

5.1  Introduction Crime analysis and analysts have key roles in EBP; however, it is important for analysts to understand and take stock of what role crime analysis currently has in policing. Crime analysis, like criminology, attempts to synthesise what is known about crime from a de-contextualised view (Peterson, 1990; Cope, 2004). Analysts translate information and data into actionable intelligence for operations (Cope, 2004) and are responsible for targeting and tracking crime patterns and trends, assisting decision makers with solutions at tactical and strategic levels (Evans & Kebbell, 2012). This chapter explores the integration of crime analysis in modern policing with these purposes in mind and begins with an exploration of how well analysis has been integrated to date. The next subsection examines the barriers to successful use of crime analysis setting the scene for the third and main part of this chapter, which outlines the pathway for better use of crime analysis in the context of the progression of evidence-based policing.

5.2  Utilisation and Weak Integration of Analysis in Policing Several international scholars have found there is consistent underutilisation and weak integration of analysis in policing (Sissens, 2008; Sanders et al., 2015; Belur & Johnson, 2018, Sanders & Condon, 2017; Santos & Taylor, 2014). Much work still needs to be done to ensure that analysis is a cornerstone of contemporary policing (Telep & Lum, 2014). Research has identified structural and organisational J. Ng (*) The Canadian Society of Evidence-Based Policing, Saskatoon, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Bland et al. (eds.), The Crime Analyst’s Companion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94364-6_5

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barriers including scepticism about analytical work, police hierarchy (civilian vs. sworn), the standard reactive model of policing, a lack of support for innovation, a lack of understanding of the role of analysts, poor relationships between analysts and sworn staff, limited or basic training, and a lack of promotion opportunities (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003; MacVean & Harfield, 2008; Sissens, 2008; Belur & Johnson, 2018; Taylor & Boba, 2011). Analytical work is still being used to support the standard model of policing (with analytical work emphasising statistical summaries and supporting a dominant enforcement/reactive approach to policing) and is not being used for proactive purposes. How analysts are deployed reflects how an agency views its function and purpose (Lum & Koper, 2017, p. 229).

This bold statement by Lum and Koper speaks volumes about existing research demonstrating that analysts continue to support a standard model of policing which emphasises rapid responses, random patrols, and reactive investigations (Lum et al., 2012; Sherman et  al., 1997; Weisburd & Eck, 2004). Police agencies following standard policing approaches will ask their analysts for work that helps support this mission. However, if a police agency wishes to be proactive and data-driven, then their analysts will be engaging in more proactive work. Santos (2014) contended that in a standard model of policing, there is a very limited role for analysts. Typically, this means that analysts are involved with counting crime and tracking police activity for management meetings like CompStat (Lum, 2013; Lum & Koper, 2017; Sanders & Condon, 2017; Sanders, Weston, & Schott, 2015) and providing information about offenders to support investigations for arrests and case clearance for short-term, tactical purposes (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003; Lum & Koper, 2017). It may also include identifying adequate staffing numbers based on call and crime volume to allow for rapid responses to calls (Santos, 2014). This includes routine administrative reports about the volume, location, and time of crimes through the production of weekly crime statistics, crime maps, and charts (Cope, 2004; Weisburd & Eck, 2004; Santos, 2014; Belur & Johnson, 2018). Analysis is not used for crime reduction purposes, but instead is mainly descriptive, summarising what has already occurred (Cope, 2004; Santos, 2014). Critically, analysts are busy with collecting and cleaning data, with little time dedicated to a deeper understanding of crime problems and consequently do not provide information that supports specific tailored responses to crime problems (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003; Keay & Kirby, 2017; Belur & Johnson, 2018). It is therefore not surprising that some sworn staff may not feel that analytical products are useful (Lum et al., 2017). Instead, crime analysis work should be actionable and help guide crime reduction work (Boba & Santos, 2011; Taylor & Boba, 2011). Furthermore, a standard model of policing primarily relies on reactive arrests and heavily on enforcing the law as a means of crime control (Weisburd & Eck, 2004; Cope, 2004; Taylor et  al., 2008). Indeed, Chan (2001) found that police officers valued analytical work when it helped with an arrest. Moreover, police managers are the main consumers of analytical work, but tend to focus on short-­term arrests

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by relying most frequently on tactical analysis, instead of long-term strategic work (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003; Taylor & Boba, 2011; Santos & Taylor, 2014). Interestingly, O’Shea and Nicholls (2003) also found that crime analysts valued tactical analysis over strategic analysis – this may point to analysts possibly become acculturated into police culture and equate the value of their work to whether it leads to an arrest. Similar to Lum and Koper’s (2017) statement about the use of analysts as reflective of its function and purpose, O’Shea and Nicholls (2003) stated: ‘if police operations and management are designed to identify and apprehend offenders, then the demand for data analysis will confirm to that limited philosophy. If on the other hand, a broader mission and vision is developed, one that seeks to better understand the complex nature of the criminal incident, the form of and demand for data analysis will change accordingly as will the function of crime analysts’ (p. 11).

Likewise, O’Shea and Nicholls’s (2003) work showed that crime analysis work did not include looking at problems at greater depth to understand the causes of community problems. Sanders and Condon (2017) even went as far to say that: crime analysts synthesize, articulate, and visualise crime data for police. The analytic products produced by analysts do not tell police how to address the problem, or explain why it is happening… crime analysis, therefore, does not change or challenge traditional police practices or ways of knowing, but instead reaffirms it (p. 248).

Crime analysts have the capacity to help police agencies engage in proactive, targeted, and preventative work. However, crime analysis has still not become integral to policing operations (Cope, 2004) in that it has yet to be fully realised to guide operations, to assist police agencies to be proactive, or to assist with problem solving (Cope, 2004; Santos & Taylor, 2014; Koper et al., 2015; Lum et al., 2017; and Chap. 7 in Lum & Koper, 2017). Analytical work tends to support management decision-making that seeks to justify what is already being done (Cope, 2004; MacVean & Harfield, 2008; Sanders et al., 2015). Field research done by Sanders and Condon (2017) note that the work of analysts is guided by officers who may not necessarily know what they need or how to utilise an analyst and are typically asked to verify information that officers already know: ‘The field note expert above illustrates how analytical knowledge provided to police officers both constrains analytical development and impedes the integration of analysis’ (p. 242, original emphasis).

5.3  Barriers to Integrating Crime Analysis into Policing This lack of integration is due to various structural and cultural barriers, but also because there are ‘insufficiently trained staff to fill positions, inadequate renumeration to attract the right staff, poor working conditions, and a lack of management support’ (Evans & Kebbell, 2012b, p. 81).

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5.3.1  Structural Barriers For structural barriers, let us focus on time and resourcing. It is vital that police agencies have enough analysts to ensure adequate analysis is being done. Budget cuts can affect the hiring or retention of analysts and with fewer analysts, this can equate to more superficial analyses and analysts engaging in mundane administrative tasks (Belur & Johnson, 2018; Wartell & Gallagher, 2012). This can be compounded by increasing volumes of data requiring quick analyses (Belur & Johnson, 2018). Analysts also need to be supported in terms of providing them with the right tools to do their job but also ensuring that they have enough time to do good work (MacVean & Harfield, 2008). Similar to good research, good analytical work in policing takes time (Ratcliffe, 2016; Belur & Johnson, 2018). This can differ from the tendency for policing to focus on short-term, tactical problems and reactive solutions that are quickly drawn together, instead of understanding the complexity of problems through in-­depth analysis (Belur & Johnson, 2018). One analyst who was interviewed indicated that ‘culturally the police are very impatient’ (Belur & Johnson, 2018, p. 774). Senior management can sometimes put unreasonable expectations on analysts in terms of time and resources to complete requests (Belur & Johnson, 2018). The work that analysts conduct is time consuming and rigorous, and like researchers, this can conflict with the immediate answers that police leaders are looking for (Lum et  al., 2012). Unfortunately, this means that analysts are conducting superficial analyses when they really want time to do better work (Cope, 2004). Some analysts also feel that the amount of time and effort they do spend on producing great work is underappreciated (Belur & Johnson, 2018). With the increasing volume of data and the added pressure to look for quick solutions, analysts are then sometimes simply extracting data instead of interpreting it (Belur & Johnson, 2018). As Keay and Kirby (2018, p. 4) state: If the analyst is afforded more time to conduct detailed analysis, such as develop and test hypotheses, collect wider data sets and use appropriate research methods, they would be in a better position to understand crime problems.

5.3.2  Cultural Barriers In addition to structural barriers, there are also cultural barriers. The two broad areas that we will discuss are: (1) failing to understand the role of analysis in policing (unintentional resistance) and (2) failing to appreciate the role of analysis (intentional resistance). Part of the weak integration of crime analysis stems from a policing culture that is resistant to reform and new approaches to policing (Chan, 2001; Boba Santos & Taylor, 2014; Belur & Johnson, 2018).

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5.3.3  F  ailing to Understand the Role of Analysis in Policing (Unintentional Resistance) Various scholars have pointed to one possible reason for this lack of integration – a general lack of understanding of what analysis is, what role it plays in policing, what the role of the analyst is in policing, or what analysts can do (Cope, 2004; Belur & Johnson, 2018; Burcher & Whelan, 2018). Crucially for analysts, officers lacking an understanding of the role of analysis and analysts in policing, can result in a breakdown in communication (MacVean & Harfield, 2008; Santos & Taylor, 2014; Belur & Johnson, 2018; Cope, 2004). This is complicated by the variety and a lack of conceptual clarity of the role of analysts in policing (Belur & Johnson, 2018) along with a ‘lack of agreed methodologies, techniques and even definitions of what intelligence is’ (Belur & Johnson, 2018, p. 769). This lack of understanding can lead to another problem – managers poorly tasking analysts. Clarity around tasking is incredibly important as it can lead to analysts feeling overwhelmed or underutilised resulting in poor quality analytical products and a lack of trust and legitimacy of analytical work and the analyst. One important contributor to poor tasking is simply the lack of training for managers and senior leadership (Ratcliffe, 2009). Some managers feel that they are inadequately tasking their analyst because they are unclear about what their analysts can do and the level of sophisticated analyses that can be done (Belur & Johnson, 2018). Because of this, analysts are providing products that are not actionable and simply reaffirm what officers know (Cope, 2004; MacVean & Harfield, 2008; Santos & Taylor, 2014; Sanders & Condon, 2017; Belur & Johnson, 2018). Managers are responsible for ensuring that the requests that are being sent to analysts are meaningful and will lead to action (Cope, 2004). This negative cycle of tasking leading to poor analytical work, then leading to a lack of trust and legitimacy is also compounded by the lack of task clarity, the quality of the data analysts receive and the inability of some analysts to speak up when requests are unclear because of police hierarchy (Belur & Johnson, 2018; Cope, 2004; Evans & Kebbell, 2012b). This can result in analysts not having the opportunity to really understand what officers need (Cope, 2004). This creates a ‘no-win situation’ for analysts and officers (Cope, 2004; Santos & Taylor, 2014, p. 503). One might then ask – if officers and managers are not well-versed in analytical work or what their analysts really do, then why not have the analyst guide the process? While there is merit to this, unsolicited products, even if they are well done, if they are not actionable or do not meet operational needs, do not provide any operational value (Cope, 2004; Taylor & Boba, 2011; Santos & Taylor, 2014).

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5.3.4  F  ailing to Appreciate the Role of Analysis in Policing (Intentional Resistance) Unfortunately, there are incidents where officers are intentionally resistant to analysis (Cope, 2004; Sissens, 2008; Atkinson, 2016). For example, some analysts have expressed that they feel dismissed or not supported by their sworn colleagues (Cope, 2004; O’Shea & Nicholls, 2002; Sanders et al., 2015; Taylor et al., 2008). There are a few topics we will discuss that underscore this point including: (1) Analysts being undervalued in a police hierarchy simply because they are ‘civilians’, (2) that police expertise is the only expertise that matters in policing, (3) and the resistance analysts face when providing analytical recommendations. Scholars have pointed out that one reason that the analyst and their analytical work are undervalued is because of a police hierarchy that dismisses work done by analysts who are typically civilians (Cope, 2004; Lum, 2013; Santos & Taylor, 2014; Taylor et al., 2008). Cope (2004) found that work done by sworn analysts were held in greater esteem than similar work done by civilian analysts (Cope, 2004). Atkinson (2016) also suggested that analysts are even more de-­ professionalised when they are ‘infantilised’  – that is to say, they are treated as ignorant and immature. This can sometimes result in valuable information being withheld from them due to a ‘need to know’ culture in policing (Cope, 2004). This idea of ‘infantilisation’ can come from a culture where police experiential knowledge is held at a higher value than other perspectives. However, ‘street’ experience is not the only experience that is available in police agencies, nor is it the only experience that is valuable to contemporary police agencies (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997 in Cope, 2004). To function in a fast-paced complex social world, police agencies must be progressive, effective, and efficient and this all requires varied perspectives and experiences housed within their own organisations. This may require a significant change in how ‘expertise’ is conceptualised in policing and recognising individuals based on their roles instead of their rank (Cope, 2004). The emphasis on policing experience can create resistance with analysts who function as knowledge translators, bringing in external knowledge into police operations. As policing evolves towards being more data-driven, analytical work may challenge the autonomy and discretion of officers and may put greater emphasis on the specialisation of analysts (Chan, 2001). Analytical work attempts to provide a broader, unbiased view of police data and crime, which may contrast with the personal experiences of officers (Cope, 2004). Officer autonomy is a key feature in policing culture and as we have seen, anything that appears to be different from experiences can be met with scepticism (Belur & Johnson, 2018; Cope, 2004; Crank, 1998; Lum et al., 2012; Sissens, 2008; Telep & Lum, 2014). However, recognising the complementary opportunity between capitalising on officer experience and the rigours of analytical work will create trust and legitimacy for analysts amongst sworn staff (Dolly & Shawver, 2018) and create ‘a new generation of crime

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experts’ (Cope, 2004, p.  198). In a police hierarchy, pracademics (officers with advanced research skills and education) have a key role in creating this trust and legitimacy by championing the expertise of analysts (Braga, 2016; Santos & Taylor, 2014). For analytical work to be actionable, it cannot simply be descriptive – it must outline the what, so what, and now what – meaning that it explains what a problem is, why it is important, and what can be done about it. This latter aspect cannot be emphasised enough – analysts have the opportunity to introduce research findings as part of the set of options they recommend to decision makers for courses of action. It should be a logical and natural step for analysts to describe and analyse a problem, identify key contributing factors, and then based on the analysis and combined with research evidence and police experience, provide meaningful options for decision makers. There is some research that suggests there is resistance to the idea of analysts providing recommendations (Cope, 2004; Sissens, 2008; Weston, Bennett-Moses, & Sanders, 2020; Weston, Bennett-Moses, & Sanders, 2019) while some officers expect recommendations (Belur & Johnson, 2018). For example, ‘a supervisory intelligence manager said that sometimes when analysts get creative and make original recommendations in their reports, they can get knocked back by senior officers and this can be quite demoralising’ (Belur & Johnson, 2018, p. 774–775). For the most part, analysts are expected to simply analyse, not select or assist with the implementation of solutions (Santos, 2012; Belur & Johnson, 2018). Recall there are a few reasons for this: (1) the overemphasis on experience over research/analysis, (2) officers were comfortable with research as long as it somehow matched their experiences, and (3) because analysis attempts to identify innovative solutions, this can create scepticism. Instead, analysts are expected to be ‘predicting problems and identifying trends’ (Belur & Johnson, 2018, p. 775). This again forces analysts to engage in superficial and descriptive analysis instead of deeper problem solving. Part of this resistance comes from the notion that analysis and analysts are a challenge to the status quo in policing by providing innovative alternatives to traditional policing tactics (Sissens, 2008). This reaffirms the resistance that if the solutions do not match well with experience, it is then rejected (Belur & Johnson, 2018). One main reason there is scepticism and resistance to analytical recommendations is that officers believe that analysts (because they are mainly civilian) do not have enough operational knowledge and experience to provide those suggestions (Cope, 2004; Belur & Johnson, 2017). Even analysts themselves have mentioned that they would agree with this (Cope, 2004; Sissens, 2008). Yet, it is possible that the hierarchical nature of policing where analysts cannot challenge officers especially those at a higher rank (Cope, 2004) is acculturating analysts to believe this and aligning their ‘value’ with how they can support policing (even if it means supporting standard policing approaches). On the other hand, EBP provides an opportunity for analysts to incorporate findings from existing research as a solution and incorporate that as part of their recommendations.

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5.4  The Need for Change We have reviewed existing literature that demonstrates there is poor integration of crime analysis in policing. It continues to be driven by a standard model of policing, which limits the role of analysts to effectively embed themselves into operations. There is a key focus on making arrests and analysts are not challenged to engage in greater problem solving, but instead are tied to administrative counting of crimes and identifying persons police can arrest. The barriers we saw were structural and cultural. Structural barriers spoke to the impact of not having enough time and resources for quality analytical work. Poor analysis can be influenced by police culture when there is a sense of police going from one crisis to the next and consequently needing quick solutions. We examined cultural barriers in terms of situations where there is unintentional resistance due to a lack of managerial training about analysis, general ignorance about analysts’ capabilities, and poor tasking. This creates a vicious negative cycle where analysts are conducting superficial analyses that are not helpful and because of this, there is a lack of trust and legitimacy in analysts and analytical work. This type of resistance is clearly not intentional; however, we have also seen examples of where there is intentional resistance against analysts and their work. This includes analysts being undervalued because they are simply civilians, an overemphasis on police experience without acknowledging that there are various other skills that are needed for contemporary policing to be effective and efficient, and the resistance that analysts face when they provide recommendations. As we will see in the final section of this chapter, EBP offers a renewed opportunity for analysis to become a cornerstone for contemporary policing.

5.4.1  Shifting Police Culture to be Evidence Based  It needs to be acknowledged that, in an organisational culture that has not historically relied on evidence-based analysis to inform decision-making, analysis is a specialism that has many barriers to overcome before it can be considered as a tool imperative to the policing function. Analysis, especially strategic and volume crime analysis, offers an important and valuable function that cannot be undertaken “in the heads or mindsets” of police officers. A change in culture will have to take place before analysis can really take effect and, while there is evidence that is happening, the integration of these two widely different cultures will have to take place over a long time period as analysis is contrary to established and traditional policing practices (Sissens, 2008, p. 129).

Sissens (2008) suggests that the divide between research evidence (and analysis) and practice will only be bridged if there is a significant cultural shift. Arguably, police agencies are experiencing external social and political pressures to be more effective and efficient. Adopting effective evidence-based practices in policing requires analysis to have a core function in policing (Lum, 2009, 2013; Santos, 2014). It is important to reiterate a powerful statement by Lum and Koper (2017, p. 229): ‘how analysts are deployed reflects how an agency views its function and

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purpose’ (see also Sanders & Condon, 2017). Analytical work ultimately supports the policing approach of their agency – so analysts who work for police agencies that espouse EBP should be involved in ‘the development, implementation, and evaluation of tactics and strategies…that are evidence based’ (Lum, 2013, p. 13; Lum & Koper, 2017). Effective crime analysts are well situated to be strong and effective proponents of EBP because of the skills they have to do their work including critical thinking skills, understanding of research methodology, problem solving, and effective communication (Evans & Kebbell, 2012). Importantly, the active use of crime analysis products is then an internal mechanism that can help implement EBP (Lum, 2009; Telep & Lum, 2014). Unfortunately, Lum and Koper (2017) point out that in many cases analysts are more supported when they are producing standard crime statistics than they are when they are involved in activities that support EBP. Crime analysis is pivotal for EBP and for EBP to be sustainable, police culture and sworn members must be knowledgeable about analysis, the role of an analyst, and about EBP. However, all of this is contingent on senior leadership who set the direction for the organisation including its culture. Leadership must clearly commit to effective police practices that are ‘focused, targeted, place based (when appropriate), and problem oriented’ (Lum & Koper, 2017p. 236). Leadership must also invest in crime analysis to support EBP (Lum, 2013; Lum & Koper, 2017). This means prioritising analysis through the professional development of analysts and by increasing the number of analysts (Lum et al., 2012; Keay & Kirby, 2018). Increasing the number of analysts will help sustain EBP as analysts tend to be pulled in various directions and by resourcing the availability of analysts, allows for more time to dedicate to high quality research and analysis (Lum & Koper, 2017; Piza et al., 2020).

5.4.2  Redefining the Role of Analysts in Policing Much of the discussion around the role of analysts in policing points to the idea that analysts play a supportive role in police operations. While I am not suggesting that this is not the case, there is an informal leadership opportunity for analysts. This requires an appreciation for different specialisations in policing (and not just police experience), but as mentioned, this also means a recognition for a person’s role versus their rank, which would require a significant culture shift. Analysts supporting a standard model of policing have a passive supportive role, however crime analysis is an active supporting cornerstone of policing approaches like CompStat, intelligence-led policing, and EBP. A passive role is clearly reflected in the fact that most analysts are not asked to attend management meetings, let alone being involved in problem solving discussions or the planning of solutions (Lum, 2013). Some would argue that analysts, particularly senior ones, should be treated as highly qualified professionals that should be viewed as professional equals to sworn managers, working side-by-side with command staff, and assist with guiding these meetings (Lum, 2013; Lum & Koper, 2017).

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Analysts need to take an active support role in policing. They should provide decision makers with recommendations for action (MacVean & Harfield, 2008). There is research that suggests that perception of an analyst as a technician is slowly starting to change, where analysts are now being regarded as ‘part of a support structure for decision-makers’ (Evans & Kebbell, 2012, p.  204). They are being viewed as a problem solver, a consultant, and a ‘decision-makers’ associate’ (Evans & Kebbell, 2012, p. 213; see also Keay & Kirby, 2018). The work of analysts needs to be broader than simply counting crimes, but should include ‘developing crime prevention and community engagement strategies, working on problem-­solving efforts with line-level staff, investigating and tracking problem places and persons, conducting evaluations and other research projects, and analyzing community and organizational issues that go beyond crime prevention’ (Lum & Koper, 2017, p. 237; see also Lum, 2013 and Piza et al., 2020).

5.4.3  Analysts as Informal Leaders in Policing With this renewed opportunity, analysts need to be proactive, be intentional in their influence, and to some extent become informal leaders in policing. Informal leaders do not have a formal leadership title, but they are able to influence teams to act, they are able to foster relationships, they are self-starters, and support others through their expertise (Smart, 2010). Effective analysts demonstrate leadership qualities. Evans and Kebbell (2012) found in their study on the skills and abilities for an effective analyst, that an effective analyst needs to be able to lead. Instead of having a passive support role, these analysts are not simply technicians but elevate themselves to problem solving associates supporting decision makers and are known to be ‘do-ers’, self-starters, and are highly committed to their craft (Evans & Kebbell, 2012). Analysts should be generating information that spurs discussion on creative and varied solutions (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003). Proactive analysts assist decision makers with prioritising issues and resource deployment (Belur & Johnson, 2018). In a case study, crime analysts were instrumental to the shift in culture when a police chief introduced EBP to their agency – ‘their enthusiasm for using data and evidence to solve problems was contagious, creating excitement to use their services for projects’ (Dolly & Shawver, 2018, p. 263).

5.5  The Role of Crime Analysts in Evidence-Based Policing Within an EBP framework, there is great promise for analysts to take a more active role than previously described. Crime analysts can help police agencies generate, translate, and disseminate research, but also help them identify crime issues, measure community sentiment, and evaluate initiatives (Lum & Koper, 2017; Piza et al., 2020; Piza & Feng, 2017). Crime analysts can help police agencies get involved in

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evidence-based practices such as hotspots policing or targeting individuals who are at high risk for offending (Lum & Koper, 2017).

5.5.1  Crime Analysts’ Role in Generating Research Evidence There are numerous examples of analysts being involved in the generation of research evidence. In fact, as Lum and Koper (2017) point out, many of the studies in the Evidence-Based Policing Matrix at George Mason University’s Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy were conducted with researchers getting assistance from crime analysts. However, some scholars have provided relevant critiques of current analytical practices but, more importantly, speak to what needs to be done to better prepare crime analysts to support EBP. Some scholars have suggested that analytical work does not provide an accurate reality of current crime problems, but reflect what has already occurred (Innes et al., 2005). Furthermore, some believe that analytical work is superficially descriptive, was not objective, was low quality, and not useful (Belur & Johnson, 2018; Cope, 2004; Chainey, 2012; Innes et al., 2005). Recall also the tendency for analysts to continue supporting administrative tasks instead of actually doing analysis (Sissens, 2008). Analysts interested in generating research need to enhance their research skills. Evans and Kebbell (2012) they noted that effective analysts should have good academic, research skills, which is an area that analysts have been inadequately trained in (Sissens, 2008; Townsley et  al., 2011; Belur & Johnson, 2018). Analysts also need to be aware of current research and theory (Evans, 2008  in Keay & Kirby, 2018; Weston, Bennett-Moses, & Sanders, 2020). Some have pointed out that analytical work could be more consistent and reliable if analytical processes could be improved by incorporating scientific rigour and advanced data analysis (O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003; Cope, 2004; see also Piza et al., 2020). This could be potentially developed through more academic-practitioner partnerships or if evaluation was a key skill that analysts were trained in (Piza et al., 2020; Piza & Feng, 2017).

5.5.2  Contributing to the Evidence Base Historically, police have not been involved in the evaluation of their own tactics and strategies, instead relying on the expertise of academia and yet it is one of the key ways that police can be involved in generating research evidence (Piza et al., 2020; Piza & Feng, 2017). However more recently, scholars have argued that police should be more involved in the development of policing research and evaluation, specifically with the involvement of pracademics and crime analysts (Huey & Mitchell, 2016; Sparrow, 2011; Piza & Feng, 2017; Piza et al., 2020; Weisburd & Neyroud, 2011). Pracademics and crime analysts are more frequently pursuing or have

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completed advanced degrees and are capable of running their own internal evaluations (Evans & Kebbell, 2012; Huey & Mitchell, 2016; Piza & Feng, 2017). More importantly, having internal personnel engaged in evaluations has benefits in two ways – first that they already have ‘insider’ contextual knowledge of policing and second that they will make research findings more actionable (Piza et al., 2020). Combined with their knowledge of police operations and analytical ability, crime analysts are therefore natural candidates for generating  police  research (Piza & Feng, 2017). Piza et  al. (2020) compared perspectives of police employees about various ‘roles’ in EBP and found that crime analysts were viewed as ‘easier to incorporate into police program evaluation activities than pracademics’ (p.  15). Much of the work that analysts already do for tactical and strategic purposes can be modified for evaluative purposes (Piza et  al., 2020). Analytical products are also intended to assist with crime reduction efforts, it should therefore be natural to not only identify ways to reduce crime, but to also measure this reduction (Piza & Feng, 2017). Another additional benefit of having analysts involved in evidence generation is the fact that analysts can be purely dedicated to this type of work compared to pracademics who may be taken away from other potential duties or roles (Piza & Feng, 2017). Unfortunately, researchers have found that analysts only dedicated a small proportion of their time to evaluation and when they are involved in evaluation, it is mainly for management purposes (Santos & Taylor, 2014; Piza & Feng, 2017). Indeed, police personnel rarely ever mentioned ‘evaluation’ as a key skill for effective analysts (Evans & Kebbell, 2012). It is possible that the reason that analysts are not involved in evaluations as commonly is because evaluations are infrequent in policing (Evans & Kebbell, 2012). Despite the noted value of having crime analysts engaging in evaluation, analysts may also not have sufficient skills to engage in evaluations (Cope, 2004; Boba, 2013). Piza et al. (2020) found that amongst their respondents, analysts scored the lowest (relative to pracademics and academics) in terms of research and evaluation skills. Although this may not be applicable for all analysts or agencies, Lum and Koper (2017) believe that some do have the appropriate scientific knowledge to create rigorous evaluations. Moreover, such skills could be enhanced with academic-­ practitioner partnerships or training (Piza et al., 2020; Piza & Feng, 2017).

5.5.3  Implementing the Evidence Base Analysts can also be one of the key drivers implementing EBP (Lum & Koper, 2017). They can assist police agencies to identify hot spots, target habitual and serious offenders, explore underlying factors for trends and patterns and consequently assist with future crime prevention efforts (Lum & Koper, 2017). Targeting habitual and serious offenders also helps support intelligence-led approaches and can be combined with hotspot policing or involve risk assessments of offenders (Ratcliffe, 2016; Egge, 2011; Lum & Koper, 2017). Analysts can also delve deeper into police problems and engage in problem solving, which incorporates criminological theory

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and standard crime analysis approaches with social science techniques (Eck, 1998; O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003; Lum & Koper, 2017). Through problem solving, analysts can provide decision makers with an understanding of facilitators/causes for crime and disorder (Reuland, 1997 in O’Shea & Nicholls, 2003). As analysts assist with the implementation of EBP, they must keep in mind that ultimately their work cannot just stay with management, EBP needs to be implemented at various levels of the organisation. In fact, Boba and Santos (2011) propose this exact idea in their model of stratified policing which outlines an approach to implementing EBP and crime analysis in a systematic fashion where EBP and associated crime analysis products are tailored to different ranks and roles.

5.5.4  Translating the Evidence Base One of the clearest examples of the gap between research and practice is the continued use of random patrols despite years of research demonstrating the effectiveness of directed hotspot policing (Weisburd, 2008 in Lum et al., 2012). Recall there were a couple of challenges that stifled better integration of EBP in policing: (1) a lot of research is behind paywalls and (2) research papers are lengthy and filled with academic jargon. Arguably, crime analysts have greater exposure to research and are uniquely positioned to be good translators of research because their work products must be digestible, actionable and quick to read. Therefore, crime analysts can have an important role in translating research and applying it in a police setting. Not only can analysts be involved with incorporating outside research into policing but if there is opportunity, they can provide internal insight for external research projects (Piza et  al., 2020). Lum et  al. (2012) commented that ‘research and researchers may be better received in police agencies if familiar and internal mechanisms of information dissemination are used to present their findings’ (p. 81) and they suggested that researchers need to be more creative if they want to reach police audiences; crime analysts and their work may be one avenue to do so. Police leaders and researchers (and arguably, analysts) must not simply focus on the generation of research, but also on how to ‘package’ the processes and information so it is useful for police audiences and is relatable to the everyday experiences of officers (Lum et al., 2012). Analysts can be helpful with knowledge translation because of their combined technical expertise with ‘insider police’ knowledge they have gained during their interactions with officers (Boba, 2010 in Piza & Feng, 2017). They can use their knowledge of EBP to teach officers and help police leadership with identifying whether their tactics and strategies align with research. Piza et al. (2020) found that next to pracademics, crime analysts were next best suited for translating research for police. Lastly, despite these valuable opportunities for analysts to be involved in translating research, Piza et al. (2020) also point out that this may be challenged because of where analysts are in the police hierarchy and also role clarity, where in many cases, analysts are pulled in various directions that may not necessarily support EBP.

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5.5.5  Providing Recommendations We previously discussed the controversial nature of analysts providing recommendations to sworn staff. Sissens (2008) suggested that one of the main ways to improve the utilisation of analysts was by acting upon recommendations. Police leadership has an important role in supporting these recommendations as without this support, it can undermine the value of analysis (Belur & Johnson, 2018). Analytical work, when done correctly, provides greater clarity about the problem, which should logically then lead to potential solutions and recommendations (Cope, 2004). Analytical work should provide opportunities for intervention (MacVean & Harfield, 2008). Effective analysts provide recommendations that are justified by the analysis (Evans & Kebbell, 2012). While some officers are resistant to receiving recommendations from analysts, Cope (2004) makes an important distinction: ‘Emphasizing the distinction between the capacity to make recommendations based on research and analysis with the capacity to make decisions about adopting recommendations and directing action is necessary’ (p. 191, emphasis added). In other words, there is a distinction between being able to provide recommendations and making decisions to act upon recommendations – the former of which is well within the purview of analysts and the latter being the responsibility of sworn staff. Another important aspect of providing recommendations is continuing effective communications with officers to understand what their needs, problems, and pressure points are. Doing so affords analysts an opportunity to develop and maintain trust with officers (Belur & Johnson, 2018).

5.5.6  Effective Communication For recommendations to be viewed as legitimate and for analysts to be trusted, analysts need to have effective communication skills. Such skills are vital for analysts for communicating information to various audiences in an accessible way (IACA, 2018 in Weston, Bennett-Moses, & Sanders, 2020). Analysts must be able to communicate confidently about  their work with the possibility of counterarguments (Evans & Kebbell, 2012). This may also entail analysts being able to communicate in formal settings such as when teaching sworn staff about analysis (IACA, 2018 in Weston, Bennett-Moses, & Sanders, 2020) or in informal settings where they need to demonstrate good interpersonal skills (Evans & Kebbell, 2012; Weston et al., 2020). Research has pointed out that in most cases, analysts are rarely provided clarity in terms of what is being asked of them, combined with police hierarchy which limits analysts from ‘pushing back’ against sworn requestors, analysts consequently create products that are not useful for the requestor (Cope, 2004; Chainey, 2012; Belur & Johnson, 2018) and this creates a negative cycle of distrust where such distrust leads to underutilisation of analysts (Evans & Kebbell, 2012b). Nowhere is

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it more important for analysts (and analytical managers) to have such interpersonal, informal communication skills than when it comes to task clarity (Belur & Johnson, 2018). This refers to when a requestor tasks an analyst and an analyst then clarifies with the requestor about the ‘terms of reference’, where there is a negotiation between the requestor and the analyst about what can and will be done. This should be a collaborative effort where the requestor provides context about the problem that they are bringing to the analyst and then for the analyst to provide their analytical expertise as to how to best illustrate what the requestor is looking for, so that what is asked for is done. While this can be facilitated by analytical managers, senior analysts may work directly with the requestor so that the ‘development of the product is organic’ (Belur & Johnson, 2018, p. 780).

5.5.7  Collaboration with Officers EBP is about merging academia with police experience (Piza et  al., 2020). One potential way of getting officers to invest in researchis to solicit their knowledge as the basis for research ideas, along with providing feedback on how research is done and the outputs, and if they are interested, also getting them involved in research projects (Lum et al., 2012). Similarly for the officer-analyst partnership: ‘what analysts and officers need to strive for is a balance between their words: reconciling the grounded, contextual knowledge with overviews of data’ (Cope, 2004, p. 201). For analysts to have their analysis and recommendations to be received well, analysts must build trust and legitimacy with officers (Belur & Johnson, 2018). The issues that police face are complex and nuanced, so it is critical that analysts and officers work to develop mutually beneficial partnerships (see Burcher & Whelan, 2018). Analysts can improve the receptivity of their work when such relationships provide them with the invaluable context of their analysis. In turn, these relationships are beneficial for officers in that they are introduced to new ideas and have the opportunity to share their perspectives (Boba, 2013; Evans & Kebbell, 2012; Lum et al., 2012; Weston, Bennett-Moses, & Sanders, 2020). There are some additional benefits for officer-analyst partnerships. First, we had discussed how even high quality, unsolicited analytical work can be received negatively unless it was actionable  (Belur & Johnson, 2018; Santos & Taylor, 2014; Taylor & Boba, 2011; Taylor et al., 2008). If analysts were to involve officers and their perspectives in the development of analytical products, there is a greater likelihood that their work matches operational experience and becomes more actionable. It helps analysts understand operational realities and available resources (Taylor et al., 2008; Belur & Johnson, 2018). In addition, pracademics can help champion crime analysts, which helps analysts to become more embedded in actual police practice and potentially create trust and legitimacy by working together (Braga, 2016; Huey & Mitchell, 2016; Piza et al., 2020). More broadly, getting feedback from sworn staff can help improve future analytical work (Belur & Johnson, 2018). By having sworn staff regularly interact with analysts, this can improve task clarity,

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and therefore better analytical products. These products then can improve the trust and legitimacy of analysis, which in turn increases demand for analytical work (Belur & Johnson, 2018). Conversely, building on this relationship can help educate sworn members about analysis and what analysts can do for them (Telep & Lum, 2014). To the benefit of EBP, it can help demystify pre-existing ideas that are embedded in police culture (e.g. about effective police practices) (Lum et al., 2012). As Lum and Koper (2017) point out: ‘Realizing the full potential of crime analysis in an evidence-based framework thus requires more emphasis on long-term strategic planning, more attention to developing analytical products of value to officers, and proper training, coaching, support, and reinforcement at all levels in the agency’ (p. 230).

5.6  Conclusions This chapter was intended to inspire analysts – to introduce them to their critical role in supporting EBP. Like many effective policing approaches, at the core is the use of analysis to drive decision making. This is at the heart of EBP – it is about using the best available research evidence to help guide police practice. What we have seen in this chapter is that more broadly, there are still barriers to how research and analysis is being received. We learned how analytical work is being used today and research that suggests that the full integration of crime analysis in policing has yet to be realised. Crime analysis, just like other supportive tools, is guided by the policing culture of an agency  – if the agency follows a standard law enforcement-oriented policing approach, then their analyst will create products that support this and likewise, if an agency promotes innovative data-driven approaches like EBP, then their analyst will need to delve deeper into policing problems and get involved in evaluations instead of being utilised for statistical administration. Lastly, we have seen how there are numerous opportunities for analysts to contribute to EBP  – as research generators, supporting implementation into practice and helping translate research findings into practice. Doing so requires analysts to not just tap into their technical ability, but with leadership’s support, transform their role to become associates and consultants to decision makers, taking an active and not a passive supportive role by demonstrating effective communication, collaborating with officers and providing meaningful recommendations. It is also my hope that police leaders will recognise the necessity to support their analysts through not just standard improvements in training and resourcing, but changing a culture that heavily relies on experience, valuing the importance of various types of expertise, including the specialisation that their analysts bring to policing. Leadership needs to have staff engage in problem solving and evaluation, ensure that the knowledge and responsibility of evolving EBP sits with all levels of the police agency, and create a culture where EBP is not just a ‘buzzword’ or is used as a phrase to appear progressive. It must be clear as to what the role of analysis and

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data have in how the agency functions. Police agencies are facing mounting complexities in crime and safety, but also in community trust and legitimacy and they cannot afford to not capitalise on crime analysis and EBP.

References Atkinson, C. (2016). Patriarchy, gender, infantilisation: A cultural account of police intelligence work in Scotland. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 50(2), 234–251. Belur, J., & Johnson, S. (2018). Is crime analysis at the heart of policing practice? A Case Study. Policing and Society, 28(7), 768–786. Boba, R. (2010). A practice-based evidence approach in Florida. Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, 11(2), 122–128. Boba, R. (2013). Crime analysis and crime mapping. Sage Publications, Inc. Boba, R., & Santos, R. (2011). A police organizational model for crime reduction: Institutionalizing problem solving, analysis, and accountability. U.S.  Dept. of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Boba Santos, R., & Taylor, B. (2014). The integration of crime analysis into police patrol work: Results from a National Survey of law enforcement agencies. Policing: An International Journal, 37(3), 501–520. Braga, A.  A. (2016). The value of ‘pracademics’ in enhancing crime analysis in police departments. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 10(3), 308–314. Burcher, M., & Whelan, C. (2018). Intelligence-led policing in practice: Reflections from intelligence analysts. Police Quarterly, 22(2), 139–160. https://doi.org/10.117 7%2F1098611118796890. Chainey, S. (2012). Improving the explanatory content of analysis products using hypothesis testing. Policing. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 6(2), 108–121. Chan, J. (2001). The technology game: How information technology is transforming police practice. Criminal Justice, 1(2), 139–159. Cope, N. (2004). Integrating volume crime analysis into policing. The British Journal of Criminology, 44, 188–203. Crank, J. P. (1998). Understanding police culture. Anderson Publishing Company. Dolly, C., & Shawver, B. (2018). The organizational and practical considerations of starting a crime analysis unit: A case study of a midwestern police department. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 12(3), 255–264. Eck., J.E. (1998). What do those dots mean? Mapping theories with data. In D.  Weisburd & T. McEwen (Eds.), Crime mapping and crime prevention (pp. 379–406). Criminal Justice Press. Egge, J. (2011). Experimenting with future-oriented analysis at crime hot spots in Minneapolis. Geography and Public Safety, 2(4) National Institute of Justice. Evans, J., & Kebbell, M. (2012). The effective analyst: A study of what makes an effective crime and intelligence analyst. Policing and Society, 22(2), 204–219. Evans, J., & Kebbell, M. (2012b). Integrating intelligence into policing practice. In T. Prenzler (Ed.), Policing and security in practice: Challenges and achievements. Palgrave Macmillan. Huey, L., & Mitchell, R. J. (2016). Unearthing hidden keys: Why pracademics are an invaluable (if underutilized) resource in policing research. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 10(3), 300–307. Innes, M., Fielding, N., & Cope, N. (2005). The appliance of science? The theory and practice of criminal intelligence analysis. The British Journal of Criminology, 45(1), 39–57. Keay, S., & Kirby, S. (2018). The evolution of the police analyst and the influence of evidence-­ based policing. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 12(3), 265–276.

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Koper, C. S., Lum, C., Willis, J. J., Woods, D. J., & Hibdon, J. (2015). Realizing the potential of technology in policing: A multi-site study of the social, organizational, and behavioral aspects of implementing policing technologies. Report to the National Institute of Justice. Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy, George Mason University. Lum, C. (2009). Translating police research into practice. Police Foundation (Ideas in American Policing, Series No. 11). Lum, C. (2013). Is crime analysis evidence-based? Translational Criminology, 5, 12–14. Lum, C., & Koper, C.  S. (2017). Evidence-based policing: Translating research into practice. Oxford University Press. Lum, C., Telep, C.  W., Koper, C.  S., & Grieco, J. (2012). Receptivity to research in policing. Justice Research and Policy, 14(1), 61–95. Lum, C., Koper, C. S., & Willis, J. (2017). Understanding the limits of technology’s impact on police effectiveness. Police Quarterly, 20(2), 135–163. MacVean, A., & Harfield, C. (2008). Science or sophistry: Managing analysts and their products. In C. Harfield, A. MacVean, J. Grieve, & D. Phillips (Eds.), The handbook of intelligent policing consilience, crime control, and community safety (pp. 93–104). Oxford University Press. O’Shea, T., & Nicholls, K. (2003). US Department of Justice – Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. In Crime analysis in America: Findings and recommendations. Peterson, M. (1990). The context of analysis. In P. Andrews & M. Peterson (Eds.), Criminal intelligence analysis. California. Piza, E., & Feng, S. (2017). The current and potential role of crime analysts in evaluations of police interventions: Results from a survey of the International Association of Crime Analysts. Police Quarterly, 20(4), 339–366. Piza, E., Szokla, J., & Blount-Hill. (2020). How can embedded criminologists, police pracademics, and crime analysts help increase police-led program evaluations? A survey of authors cited in the evidence-based policing matrix. Policing: A Journal of Policy & Practice. https://papers. ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3571391 Ratcliffe, J. (2009). Intelligence research. In J. Ratcliffe (Ed.), Strategic thinking in criminal intelligence. The Federation Press. Ratcliffe, J. (2016). Intelligence-led policing. Routledge Publishing. Sanders, C.  B., Weston, C., & Schott, N. (2015). Police innovations, ‘secret squirrels’ and accountability: Empirically studying intelligence-led policing in Canada. British Journal of Criminology, 55(4), 711–729. Sanders, C., & Condon, C. (2017). Crime analysis and cognitive effects: the practice of policing through flows of data. Global Crime, 18(3), 237–255. https://doi.org/10.1080/1744057 2.2017.1323637 Santos, R. B. (2012). Crime analysis with crime mapping. Sage. Santos, R. (2014). The effectiveness of crime analysis for crime reduction: Cure or diagnosis? Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 30, 147–168. Santos, R. B., & Taylor, B. G. (2014). The integration of crime analysis into police patrol work: Results from a National Survey of Law Enforcement Agencies. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 37(3), 501–520. Sherman, L.  W., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P., & Bushway, S. (1997). Preventing crime: What works, what doesn’t, what’s promising: A report to the United States congress. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. Sissens, J. (2008). An evaluation of the role of intelligence analysts within the national intelligence model. In C. Hartfield, A. MacVean, J. Grieve, & D. Phillips (Eds.), The handbook of intelligent policing: Consilience, crime control and community safety (pp. 121–130). Oxford University Press. Smart, M. (2010). The hidden power of informal leadership: What you need to know to identify your hidden leaders, build trust, inspire action and get results. Xulon Press. Sparrow, M. K. (2015). Measuring performance in a modern police organization. Psychosociological Issues in Human Resource Management, 3(2), 17–52.

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Taylor, B., & Boba, R. (2011). The integration of crime analysis into police work: A guidebook. Office of Community Oriented Police Services. Taylor, B., Kowalyk, A., & Boba, R. (2008). The integration of crime analysis into law enforcement agencies: An exploratory study into the perceptions of crime analysts. Police Quarterly, 10(154), 154–169. Telep, C. W., & Lum, C. (2014). The receptivity of officers to empirical research and evidencebased policing: An examination of survey data from three agencies. Police Quarterly, 17(4), 359–385. Townsley, M., Mann, M., & Garrett, K. (2011). The missing link of crime analysis: A systematic approach to testing competing hypotheses. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 5(2), 158–171. Wartell, J., & Gallagher, K. (2012). Translating environmental criminology theory into crime analysis practice. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 6(4), 377–387. Weisburd, D., & Eck, J. (2004). What can police do to reduce crime, disorder, and fear? The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 593(1), 42–65. Weston, C., Bennett-Moses, L., & Sanders, C. (2020). The changing role of the law enforcement analyst: clarifying core competencies for analysts and supervisors through empirical research. Policing and Society, 30(5), 532–547. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2018.1564751. Weisburd, D., & Neyroud, P. (2011). Police science: Toward a new paradigm. New perspectives in policing. Executive session on policing and public safety. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. Special Constable John Ng  is a divisional crime analyst with a Canadian police agency in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. He has been a law enforcement analyst for over 10 years. He is a certified law enforcement analyst with the International Association of Crime Analysts and has been an active member having volunteered with their former Methods Subcommittee co-authoring a handful of technical papers on analytical methods including hotspot analysis, prioritising offenders, and social network analysis. He is currently the Chair of their Publications Committee.

Chapter 6

Building Your Career as a Crime Analyst Rebecca Nagy

6.1  Introduction While studying at the University of Sussex, England, in 2003/04, I was contemplating what I was going to do with a master’s (MA) degree in Contemporary War and Peace. My studies at Sussex focused on extreme violence, such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, and my dissertation was on transnational narcotics trafficking as a threat to global security. How can I make a career with my degree? Most of my fellow university course mates were from Asian, British, or European countries, destined to work for their governments, European Union, United Nations or other international/national organizations. As an American from the west coast, I found it incredibly difficult to obtain a career in the international arena. The opportunities are just not as available when you do not live in Washington D.C. or New York City. While considering my options, I discovered the Crime and Intelligence Analysis certification program at California State University, Fullerton, CA. I found it compelling, did further exploration and was soon asking myself: “can I make a career out of this?”. I understood the dark world of globalized crime and extreme violence but was less certain that I could apply the knowledge to a domestic setting and whether I could make the leap from macro to micro. In the end, I enrolled in the certification program and entered a field I was immediately passionate about. After a year of night and weekend courses and a yearlong internship, in 2007 I was hired at the Los Angeles Police Department’s (LAPD), Harbor Division. I was one of nine hired by the department into the newly created Crime and Intelligence Analyst (CIAN) position in the City of Angels. The City of Los Angeles (LA) is big and so is the LAPD. The city of Los Angeles is one of 88 cities in Los Angeles County and is home to approximately 4 million R. Nagy (*) Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles, CA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Bland et al. (eds.), The Crime Analyst’s Companion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94364-6_6

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people from 140 nations who speak about 224 different languages. Nearly 50% of its residents were born outside of the United States (Migiro, 2019). The Los Angeles Police Department is the main local level police department for the city of LA. Currently, there are 9500 sworn and 2750 civilian personnel, four area bureaus divided into 21 geographic area divisions in the department. Each of the 21 geographic divisions has a command structure of two police captains and approximately 200–270 sworn officer/detectives and 20–30 civilian staff. I like to think of them as “small” departments within a larger department. These area divisions are responsible for policing these diverse communities. In addition to the area divisions and bureaus there are specialized ones such as Robbery Homicide Division (RHD), Commercial Crimes Division (CCD) and Major Crimes Division (MCD). I started my law enforcement career at LAPD, Harbor Division, serving communities of San Pedro, Wilmington, Harbor City, Harbor Gateway and the Port of Los Angeles. Working in a law enforcement environment was exciting and new, it was so different then working in a regular office. There were people with guns and uniforms all over my workplace and there was a command structure. I spent the first couple of months learning the various databases, computer systems and how the department works. While learning the ropes of my new position, I faced the same challenge many analysts in law enforcement encounter: how do you build a career for yourself as a civilian in the challenging world of law enforcement. As it so happens, the process of shaping my own trajectory involved figuring out how to better shape my department. In the early stages of my training in 2007, I discovered my department has a limited idea of what a Crime and Intelligence Analyst (CIAN) does and is capable of. There were no set expectations or training. At that time the position of CIAN was newly created and the CIANs already working in the department were “grandfathered” into the new position, doing mostly administrative work as management analysts. This meant that my fellow Harbor Division analysts, who were grandfathered into the position, had a wealth of institutional knowledge about the city and the department but had no formal training as Crime and Intelligence Analysts. Most of the work product produced by LAPD analysts across the department was related to COMPSTAT, Harbor Division was no exception. “COMPSTAT, short for ‘computer statistics’, is a multi-faceted system for managing police operations” (COMPSTAT, n.d.). At LAPD, there are a lot of maps with dots on different maps, corresponding statistical reports and detective/analytical summaries. Learning how to use the LAPD mapping system was necessary, but tedious, and as a new analyst, I was eager to do work more engaging—and more related to crime and intelligence analysis—than producing maps and spreadsheets. I was extremely grateful for starting a career with LAPD, but at the same time, due to inefficient systems, there was limited time for me to break out of the COMPSTAT routine. I knew I had to find a way to forge my own path.

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6.2  Creating Opportunity After working for a stretch as an analyst I decided it was appropriate to make some adjustments. The first was to create an opportunity to do something besides COMPSTAT. There were three of us in my unit, and we were spending a minimum of two days—over 48 hours combined—compiling eight binders of roughly fifteen maps that we had to create, detective write-ups that we had to complete, and analyst reports that we had to write for these COMPSTAT meetings. Thanks to a one-time grant, our unit purchased Adobe Acrobat for around $500, and suddenly we saved hours of work. For COMPSTAT alone the time saving was equivalent to 24 hours of work equivalent or three whole workdays; one for each of us a week. The purchase also streamlined other parts of our daily assignments. It was a taste of freedom. Gaining a whole day each, I now had the chance to encourage my colleagues do actual crime and intelligence analysis work. I suggested they start attending training to build their foundational skills and participate in local associations to build local and regional connections. For me, I took the opportunity to draw from my training and offered help to any detective needing it and became the enthusiastic voice of investigative support for my detective squad. My partners started to step out of their comfort zone, and I dove into offering up basic crime and intelligence analysis. The most important lesson I learned from this experience is if you want to expand beyond the basic duties of an analyst and become the analyst you want to be, invest in your education. Train and build on your foundational skills and learn to be pragmatic and adaptable to your environment. While the process may be frustrating at times, it is well worth the intellectual reward.

6.3  Education Is an Investment An education teaches you how to write, research, collaborate, question and how to have a dialogue. Due to the size, location, and diversity of the city/agency I was working for I was able to adapt my educational path to my career. There are opportunities in law enforcement to apply skills learned outside of criminal justice degree. During my time at university I spent a lot of time reading, researching, and writing papers on transnational narcotics trafficking. After about year and a half of working for LAPD, in 2009, I was asked to help on a narcotics wiretap case as the lead LAPD analyst for a taskforce with Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). The Harbor narcotics squad had noticed I was offering my analytical skills and was willing to work and to learn. They asked for help and next thing I knew I was assigned to work four days a week on a transnational narcotics case as the lead LAPD analyst on a Homeland Security Investigation (HSI) taskforce. I was able to adapt my education and knowledge from university and apply it to local structure. I worked on this taskforce for two and a half years in total. It was a challenge and opened doors to other opportunities. This chance allowed me to work a wiretap, learn cell phone

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analysis, apply intelligence analysis principles and understand how our federal partners operated. I was getting closer and closer to shaping my role into what I imagined it to be.

6.4  Seek Training Training gives you more hands-on exposure to new concepts and experiences to prepare you for what is to come in a safe learning environment. The key is to find where you can take free or low-cost quality courses. In my department there were several hoops to jump through to attend training and get them paid for. Make sure you understand all the parameters for your agency ahead of time and plan accordingly. I have also paid out of pocket for some of the lower cost training because it was just easier. I recommend tapping into local, state, and federal training or whatever is comparable to where you are in the world and to leverage law enforcement association training provisions. There are private companies and others offering training—make sure they are legitimate and have the experience to actually teach what they are offering. Do your research and review the training and the trainers. For my unit, I found a free two-week (80 hrs) Federal Law Enforcement Training (FLEAT) certification course on intelligence, sponsored by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). The training brought together local, state and federal law enforcement personnel from across the west coast and was a great opportunity to introduce my colleagues to intelligence analysis, build their foundational analytical skills and open their eyes to the intelligence process. They met others analysts in the field and the experience made them better analysts themselves. Eventually, it allowed them to provide investigative support to detectives that they had not previously been qualified to do. Training also offers an opportunity to test the waters on a subject without extensive commitment. When you find a subject you like, dig into it. For example, I am interested in emergency management and how a CIAN could offer support during an emergency or major incident. To learn more about how I can be effective, I took all the free incident management courses (ICS) courses I could online from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and then found where I could take advance courses in person. I learned a whole side to law enforcement role in emergency management I was not familiar with and how I could support its mission. Having training and certifications has expanded and diversified my skill set and prepared me for the future. I have been able to draw on the training on numerous occasions for planned events, major incidents, and civil unrest. Through continuous learning, you can not only discover where your passions lie, but specialize in something that makes your work feel more meaningful. If you like art, why not specialize in art theft? Interested in narcotics? Sign up for every class available. Do not limit yourself to the job you have; develop your skills to help you become the analyst you want to be.

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6.5  Experience: Learn to Be Pragmatic and Adaptable Experience is what you gain when you start to pull it all together. Two of my biggest takeaways from practical experiences from various cases, assignments, projects, taskforces, or major incidents I have worked is, if you do not know something, ask. If I do not know what you are talking about or you say an acronym I am unfamiliar with, I will raise my hand and ask. My reasoning is I do not have time to not know and if I do not know there are others who do not know and will not ask. As an analyst working in law enforcement there are many instances where time is of the essence so step up and be the person who asks. Leave your ego at the door. I cannot count how many times after a meeting or briefing, sworn personnel have approached and thanked me for asking a question about something they themselves were uncertain. Secondly, learn the vocabulary needed. Every specialty has its own language, and you need to learn it to effectively do your job. For example, when I was asked to be the lead LAPD analyst and liaison working in the Los Angeles/Long Beach Port Complex and the California coastline, I did not know the lingo when it came to the maritime environment supporting anti-smuggling and port security issues. I was working with 70 different agencies ranging from military, local fire and police, state and national parks and federal law enforcement. If I was going to be successful, I had to adapt from working on the “land” to working on the “water.” After calling a nautical chart a “water map,” the police dive/boat officers and United States Coast Guards personnel continue to enjoy a good laugh at my expense. It is all good natured, but it emphasized to me that knowing the “language” is a key part of an analyst’s toolkit. My maritime/ port assignment was a new specialty assignment and to help ease the way, I developed a training binder and listed courses based on what I had learned to share with those who would come after me. Eventually, for this assignment I learned basic marine navigation, law of the sea, maritime/coastal jurisdiction, multi-­ agency collaboration, maritime narcotics techniques/tactics, and human smuggling techniques/tactics. During my time in the maritime assignment I was able to support multiple critical incidents such as a helicopter crash in the port, Maersk cyberattack and planed events like LA Fleet Week. As an analyst there are unique opportunities to explore beyond traditional crime and intelligence analysis, and you will have to seek them out or be open to them. It may require you to work overtime, step outside your comfort zone, and do jobs which are below/above your skill set. Just go for it and if you make a mistake acknowledge it, learn from it, and keep going. Everybody makes mistakes in the beginning.

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6.6  Pulling It All Together Working as an analyst for MCD, I have been asked to support a variety of cases and major incidents across the department. In the incident I describe below, I was able to draw on both my intelligence training and my experience from working taskforce and understanding of emergency management/incident command. In July 2019 I received a call to help support the Robbery Homicide Division (RHD) in tracking a spree killer. It was all hands-on deck. At the time I received the call, the suspect had already killed three people and wounded one (Winsor, 2019). By the time I arrived at the command post it was 105 degrees (40.5 C), the suspect had attempted an armed robbery and killed his fourth victim on a bus. The operational (OPS) side of the house was in full “manhunt” mode, there were several hundred officers and agents from several different agencies searching for the suspect. My job was to track the suspect’s phone and develop background information on the suspects and victims, establish timeline and start building link charts and maps of the various locations, then promptly pass this information on to OPS to ensure the intelligence was making it to the people who were pursuing the suspect. This incident was volatile and fast moving and at the same time you had to wait for the information to come in to analyze it. There were three analysts and several detectives all working to make sure we are doing our part to support the overall mission of getting the suspect in custody and stopping the crime spree.

6.7  Conclusion If you work in law enforcement, you know this career path can be messy, ugly and, at times, heartbreaking. You truly have to have a passion for this type of work. When I started my career, I was hungry to learn, help and analyze. In the beginning I would help whoever asked for whatever reason. I did not say no to work requests. Now, I am more experienced and say no often. I have learned to question command staff when they make certain requests to ensure they get what they want. I was able to bridge my education of international relations, understanding extreme violence and my law enforcement career by not allowing myself to be limited to my department’s lack of expectations and understanding or what analysts do. I sought out training and opportunities and to this day I share my experiences with new analysts as a mentor. I was able to build myself to be the analyst I wanted to be by focusing on what I am good at. I strived to do more and asked to do more. I still love what I do, and I am so grateful for the opportunity to serve my community. Rebecca Nagy  of the LAPD Major Crimes Division is an experienced Intelligence Analyst with a demonstrated history of working in the public safety industry.

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References Migiro, G. (2019). World Atlas. Retrieved from The World’s Most Multicultural Cities - WorldAtlas. https://www.worldatlas.com/cities/the-world-s-most-multicultural-cities Winsor, M. (2019). ABCNews. Man charged with murder in San Fernando Valley shooting spree that killed 4, including father and brother – ABC News (go.com). https://abcnews.go.com/US/ man-charged-murder-san-fernando-valley-shooting-spree/story?id+64648057

Chapter 7

Writing About Crime Analysis Matthew Bland

7.1  Introduction This chapter explores some of the main publications about crime analysis. These are mostly in the form of books, but crime analysis has also been the subject of a small number of academic articles in peer-reviewed journals. There is a consistent group of core authors who write about the profession but, as this chapter shows, there is also a wide range of different types of literature about crime analysis which includes both textbooks, broader historical texts and analysis of specific issues. Between these publications, plenty has been written about crime analysis that we can learn from, and the purpose of this chapter is to bring some of that learning together in one place, not so that you do not have to read these papers and books but to help you navigate your way through them as is recommended by many of the other chapters in this book. The chapter is structured thematically rather than by publication but there is a full list of texts in the bibliography at the end of the chapter and in the appendix which summarises the nature of each publication. Each of these themes are pertinent to the other chapters in this book, and you will find a number of cross-­ reference points inserted in the text to help direct you.

7.2  History of Analysis Several writers have explored the origins of crime analysis in its broadest sense. The consensus is that this dates back to the 1800s when the Metropolitan Police, widely observed to be the first iteration of a ‘modern’ police organisation, created a unit for M. Bland (*) University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Bland et al. (eds.), The Crime Analyst’s Companion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94364-6_7

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solving crimes. Boba Santos (2016) traces these roots through the development of analysis in the United States from the early 1900s through to the rapid expansion of analysis linked to mapping and other computing technologies. Walker and Drawve (2018) also describe this period in some detail, referring to the 1990s as the ‘golden age of crime analysis’ (p. 20). Of course, the origins of analysis are inexorably linked to how you define it and this is not universally agreed on. Writers that have focused more specifically on intelligence analysis have cast their coverage much further back – to Elizabethan England or even the fifth century BC (see Richards, 2010). To a large extent, the origins matter much less to your understanding of your career than the recent history though and in this regard, nearly every text you will find that contains elements about the history of analysis agrees that the profession has developed exponentially in the last 40 to 50 years. This period has seen the development of important criminological theories that promote the importance of analysing crime information (you can read more about these in Chap. 14) and the rapid advancement of computerised data in policing. Throughout the accounts of history of crime analysis, the importance of key individuals is repeatedly emphasised, from Richard Mayne to August Vollmer to Herman Goldstein to David Weisburd (see Boba Santos, 2016; Walker and Drawve, 2018; Eck and Clarke, 2005; etc). The development of disciplines has been consistently central to the promotion of analysis and depending on your own interests and roles, it is never a bad idea to seek out knowledge of the histories of these disciplines. For example, if you are a performance analyst, you should read up about the history of COMPSTAT (and Rebecca Nagy’s practical experience of it in Chap. 6), the transactional accountability approach to managing crime statistics pioneered in New York by Bill Bratton (see Bratton and Malinowski, 2008). If you are an intelligence analyst, you might seek out publications on the development of the National Intelligence Model, the first national organised intelligence management framework introduced to English and Welsh police agencies at the end of the twentieth century (see John and Maguire, 2004 and Tilley, 2003). Or, if you specialise in problem solving or crime prevention, then you should definitely read up on Goldstein’s problem orientated policing (this book includes a lot on Goldstein but his original paper is Goldstein, 1979) or trace the link to analysis to its practical roots as explored for the UK Home Office by Paul Ekblom (1988).

7.3  Crime Prevention Indeed, Ekblom’s (1988) central focus is how crime analysis is the engine that drives crime prevention activity. His paper may be more than three decades old now but it contains a great number of practical techniques that still apply today. This is not to say that new things have not come about since 1988 of course. Clarke and Eck’s (2005) book Become a Problem Solving Crime Analyst in 50 Steps is a treasure trove of prevention-centric analytical techniques. The book is parsed into 50

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short chapters hung over a SARA (scanning, analysis, response, assessment – see Chap. 14 for more) framework. It remains one of the most practical textbooks on crime analysis available and has relevance across analytical disciplines. It is also emphatic in its demonstration of how crime analysis is essential throughout the crime prevention process, a notion which is also evident in evidence-based policing literature (see Lum & Koper, 2017) and intelligence writing (see Ratcliffe, 2009). Many of the ideas explored in Clarke and Eck are expanded on in detail in Wortley and Townsley’s (2016) Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis. This book, which is in its second iteration, separates its material into three parts – theoretical, analytical techniques and models for interventions based on analysis. Its authors are in many cases, the inventors of the theory or technique in question – it is a book full of ‘Big Names in Criminology’ and as such it gives much more scope than Clarke and Eck to exploring its issues in detail. While it is less practical than Clarke and Eck, which you can keep on your desk and thumb through very quickly (it also has lots of pictures!), Wortley and Townsley leaves very little ground uncovered when it comes to crime analysis and its role in crime prevention.

7.4  Investigation and Intelligence The use of crime analysis in broader intelligence or investigative police work is also an area that has been frequently explored along the lines of a spectrum of specialisms. At one end of this spectrum you have pure intelligence analysis, which is explicitly about threat assessment. Richards (2010) writes about this from state security and law enforcement angles. His book The Art and Science of Intelligence Analysis contains a detailed exposition of the intelligence cycle and specific tradecraft aspects of analysis. These themes also appear in Cariens (2016). If your role involves working primarily with human or signals intelligence, then these books may interest you. If you work in a more strategic unit, then Jerry Ratcliffe’s Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence may fit the bill. Like this book, Ratcliffe (2009) is an edited publication to which numerous authors contribute. It has a range of chapters on analysis at the various intersections of the intelligence cycle but unlike Richards (2010) it is fundamentally a text for law enforcement practitioners rather than military or state security analysts. Ratcliffe’s book sets out a vision for the strategic use of intelligence and by natural consequence, analysis. This vision identifies analysis as integral to the understanding of the criminal environment and therefore, a window to potentially successful interventions. The book has a number of technique-­ centric chapters which are applicable to those in tactical positions too, but its main benefit is in providing a lens with which to look at the overall position of analysis in the decision-making processes of law enforcement agencies. In this sense, it is truly strategic. If you are a strategic analyst searching for reading on the subject, then you may also be drawn into other interpretations of the term ‘strategic analysis’ although at their root, most agree that it concerns the identification of long-term patterns.

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Walker and Drawve (2018) write specifically about strategic analysis in terms of crime mapping, while Boba Santos (2016) leans on the definitions set out by the International Association of Crime Analysts (Gallagher et  al., 2017). Both give good introductions to the nature of strategic analysis as a counterpoint to the traditional tactical nature of investigations or intelligence operations.

7.5  Data Quality If you have been working in the crime analysis field for even a little time, it is almost certain that you have encountered issues with data quality. It is one of the principal limiters on analytical capabilities and therefore it is no surprise that writers have picked up on the subject. Walker and Drawve (2018) devotes an entire chapter to the subject, which covers both police agency data and victim surveys, both important sources that most analysts will encounter at some point. Walker and Drawve’s book is unapologetically aimed at the American analyst but the key principles apply wherever you work. What they do not consider at all though are intelligence data, so if that is your bread and butter, then consider Richards (2010) or Gallagher et al. (2017).

7.6  Analytical Techniques Without any doubt, specific analytical techniques are the most commonly visited topic in literature about crime analysis. These range from step-by-step guides such as Clarke and Eck (2005) to more philosophical discussions of the value of techniques (such as Wortley and Townsley, 2016). It would be tricky for any analyst to absorb all of the information that is out there, but on a topic-by-topic basis there is great depth to be found. Table 7.1 gives a quick reference guide to which core texts cover which analytical techniques. It does not offer an exhaustive list of analytical techniques but hopefully it will give you a good starting point for further reading.

7.7  Underpinning Theories As you will read throughout the chapters of this book, crime analysis is a crucial mechanism of and/or dependent on several major criminological theories. These are hypotheses that have been constructed to explain why or how crime takes place and have usually been subject to a variety of peer-reviewed studies. The extent to which crime analysis publications cover theory varies depending on the nature of their purpose and authors. Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis (Wortley and Townsley, 2016) contains a lot of theory because it is written by academics, for a

Critical Publication 5WH thinking Ainsworth (2013) Boba Santos (2016) Cariens (2016) ✓ Clarke and Eck ✓ ✓ (2005) Ekblom (1988) Gallagher et al. (eds) (2017) Gorr et al., (2017) Osborne and Wernicke (2003) Ratcliffe (2009) ✓ Richards (2010) ✓ Walker and Drawve (2018) Wortley and Townsley (2016)

✓

✓

✓

Geographic Forecasting profiling

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Pattern identification

✓

✓

Offender Hotspots profiling

Table 7.1  Summary of selected literature on crime analysis techniques

✓

Simulation and gaming

✓

✓

✓ ✓ ✓

✓

✓

Strategic Statistics analysis

✓

✓

Surveys

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largely academic audience. This should not put you off by any means. Most theoretical chapters are written by the people who developed the theories themselves, so these are primary accounts and rich in detail. Other publications discuss theory in the context of practical application. Clarke and Eck (2005) for example, discusses routine activity theory and rational choice theory from the perspective of how an analyst may use them to diagnose a crime problem. Boba Santos (2016) devotes an entire chapter to the theories which underpin crime analysis, setting the context for the practical technique-based chapters that follow. Walker and Drawve (2018) are less concerned with theory, choosing to focus on environmental criminology in the context of place-based analytical techniques. Deterrence theory is one of the fundamental theories that underpin crime analysis, yet surprisingly, it is the least often covered in the literature. This is probably reflective of the popularity of place-based methods which lead to a focus on environmental theories rather than an explicit focus on person-centric analysis. Deterrence has a key role to play in place-based police activity too and it is worth your time reading up on it.

7.8  Analysing Yourself You may be wondering why you should read up on any sort of theory as they seem irrelevant to your role as you know it? But if you are reading this in the first place, then it is a good sign you have an open mind about developing yourself. This chimes with Stephen Marrin’s sentiments in his book ‘Improving Intelligence Analysis’ If the value of knowledge produced by intelligence analysts has value to the policymaker, then the value of knowledge produced by the scholar may have the same kind of value for the intelligence analyst. The failure of practitioners to listen to the knowledge available to them regardless of the source may prevent them from performing at peak levels of efficiency and effectiveness Marrin (2012, p. 5)

Improving yourself is of course at the heart of why this book exists but we are far from the first authors to write on this topic for crime analysts. Eck and Clarke (2005) give one of their 55 steps to ‘rethinking your job’ and in something almost akin to a call to arms, to encourage you to become an expert in what you do. If you read little else of Eck and Clarke, step 2 ‘Rethink Your Job’, is the bit every analyst, whatever their discipline, should read. Elsewhere, Osborne and Wernicke (2003) gives a chapter specifically aimed new analysts which is more forensic, including an example of a ‘day in the life’ but this chapter also talks about how an analyst might broaden their horizons. The list of items is succinct but relevant.

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7.9  Communicating Your Work Many of the chapters in this book are unambiguous about the value of written and verbal communication of a crime analyst’s work. There is little point in perfecting your analytical skills if your perfect work is lost in translation. The theme of writing and presentation is referred to numerous times by other authors too, but naturally, there is a spectrum here. Your work can be communicated in words, numbers or pictures, with a video, over a phone line or in person, so what you may wish to read will depend on how you approach the dissemination. Osborne and Wernicke (2003) focuses on tactical bulletins, which will be familiar to many tactical or operational crime analysts as ‘daily management’ reports or Tactical Assessments. The coverage of bulletins is rather limited in scope but has some points of general relevance in terms of procedures. Boba Santos (2016) provides more detail on the content of bulletins, which although in regard to the identification of patterns specifically, could equally be applied to other topics. Boba Santos also has a subsection devoted to the dissemination of strategic analytical products which includes notes on the use of e-mail, dos and don’ts for the production of graphics and rough outlines for contents. Similar content can be found in Clarke and Eck (2005) which emphasise simplicity of message over graphical flourishes when it comes to communication. The literature is less thorough on the topic of verbal communication, which is a significant gap, particularly as its value has been highlighted numerous times in papers reflecting on the development of analysis (see Cope, 2004; Ekblom, 1988). Formal and informal briefings and presentations are vital to communicating the findings of analyses.

7.10  Integration Into Practice Alongside the publication of numerous books either specifically or peripherally on the subject of crime analysis, there have been a modest number of academic publications about the development of the profession. These can sometimes be difficult for people without access to academic databases to obtain (though Google Scholar continues to bridge this gap) so this final section of the chapter briefly summarises the output of the most prominent of these papers. Rachel Boba Santos has published multiple papers on crime analysis. Her 2014 paper in the journal of contemporary criminal justice explored the potential link between crime analysis and crime reduction and concludes that the former is a key component of the latter. By normal cause-effect standards (see Ariel, Bland and Sutherland, 2022 for more on this), Santos’ methodology does not stand up to detailed scrutiny, but as a discussion piece it is a useful contextual paper. It gives an optimistic perspective on the importance of analysis that runs contrary to previous evidence about its actual application. For example, Cope (2004) explored how well crime analysis had been adopted in the mainstream of British Policing and

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concluded that it had not been, mainly due to a poor understanding of analysts among police officers. That paper may be over a decade old but provides a good baseline of sentiments from analysts that you may find useful to benchmark your own experiences with. Similar concerns have been raised in the North American analytical community (see Taylor et  al., 2007) which indicate that this issue is broader than just a UK one. Indeed, it is not hard to make links to the broader issue of police officer’s reported tendency to favour experience over data (see Telep and Lum, 2014).

7.11  Conclusion As you have seen in this chapter, there is plenty to read about crime analysis, particularly that has been published in the last 15 years. The literature is predominantly technical, with a number of books accompanying higher education courses and written in the style of textbooks. Technology, data and analytical techniques move quickly and international contexts vary, so the literature can get out of date quickly but in this chapter we have highlighted some classic, timeless technique-based pieces that are well worth your time. Many of these books are pricey and that may put you off, but we would urge you, in the spirit of good research, to try to hunt down copies of things that interest you either from your local library, a used bookstore or by convincing your organisation to purchase copies. Every analyst can benefit from understanding the context and history of the profession so we would argue that there is a very good case for analytical departments having their own small library of key volumes.

References Ainsworth, P. (2013). Offender profiling and crime analysis. Willan. Ariel, B., Bland, M., & Sutherland, A. (2022). Experimental designs. Sage. Boba Santos, R. (2016). Crime analysis and crime mapping. Thousand Oaks, CA. Sage Publications, Inc. Bratton, W. J. & Malinowski, S. W. (2008). Police performance management in practice: Taking COMPSTAT to the next level. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 2(3), 259–265. Cariens, D., Jr. (2016). A handbook for intelligence and crime analysis. High Tide Publications. Clarke, R.  V., & Eck, J.  E. (2005). Crime analysis for problem solvers in 60 small steps. US Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Cope, N. (2004). Integrating volume crime analysis into policing. The British Journal of Criminology, 44, 188–203. Ekblom, P. (1988). Getting the best out of crime analysis (Vol. No. 10). Home office. Gallagher, K., Wartell, J., Gwinn, S., Jones, G., & Stewart, G. (Eds), (2017). International Association of Crime Analysts. Exploring crime analysis: Readings on essential skills (3rd ed). Overland Park.

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Goldstein, H. (1979). Improving policing: A problem-oriented approach. Crime & delinquency, 25(2), 236–258. John, T., & Maguire, M. (2004). The national intelligence model: Key lessons from early research. Home Office. Lum, C. M. & Koper, C. S. (2017). Evidence-based policing: Translating research into practice. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Marrin, S. (2012). Improving intelligence analysis: Bridging the gap between scholarship and practice. Routledge. Osborne, D., & Wernicke, S. (2003). What Is Crime Analysis. In Introduction to crime analysis, basic resources for criminal justice practice (pp. 1–11). Ratcliffe, J. (2009). Intelligence research. In J. Ratcliffe (Ed.), Strategic thinking in criminal intelligence. The Federation Press. Richards, J. (2010). The art and science of intelligence analysis. Oxford University Press. Taylor, B., Kowalyk, A., & Boba, R. (2007). The integration of crime analysis into law enforcement agencies: An exploratory study into the perceptions of crime analysts. Police Quarterly, 10(2), 154–169. Telep, C. W., & Lum, C. (2014). The receptivity of officers to empirical research and evidence-­ based policing: an examination of survey data from three agencies. Police Quarterly, 17(4), 359–385. Tilley, N. (2003). Problem-oriented policing, intelligence-led policing and the national intelligence model. Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science, University College London. Walker, J. T., & Drawve, G. R. (2018). Foundations of crime analysis: Data, analyses, and mapping. Routledge. Wortley, R., & Townsley, M. (2016). Environmental criminology and crime analysis : Situating the theory, analytic approach and application (pp. 20–45). Routledge. Dr Matthew Bland  is an Associate Professor in Evidence-Based Policing at the Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, a Research Fellow at the Cambridge Centre for EvidenceBased Policing and a fellow of the Academy of Experimental Criminology of the American Society of Criminology. At the university, he supervises the dissertations of senior police leaders in the Police Executive Programme. He is the Trial Director for the national pilot of polygraph testing for domestic abuse offenders and has managed and contributed to experiments on offender management, hotspot policing and out-of-court disposals. His research focuses on domestic abuse, prediction algorithms in policing and exploratory analyses. He previously worked in policing for 15 years as a Head of Analysis, during which time he completed both a master’s and a PhD in criminology at the University of Cambridge.

Chapter 8

The Future of the Role Scott Keay and Rebecca Phythian

8.1  Introduction UK police analysts have experienced troubling times during the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Questions have been raised about the analyst role and their outputs and if either offer any real value to law enforcement (Belur & Johnson, 2018; Chainey, 2012; Innes et al., 2005); a finding that has also been echoed in the USA (Santos & Taylor, 2014). However, despite the open criticism, there has been significant hope in what the analyst can offer. Research and analysis can support policing in a variety of ways that can improve organisational efficiency and operational effectiveness (Kirby & Keay, 2021; Piza et al., 2020; Santos & Taylor, 2014). So, whilst the integration of crime and intelligence analysis continues to gain momentum, in some part, kick-started by the growing emphasis on Evidence Based Policing (EBP) and Problem Oriented Policing (POP), the analyst role faces new challenges: the future. With a greater reliance on technology in an evolving digital world and a growing abundance of data from an array of sources, what skills are required by police analysts meeting these challenges? And how will host organisations support the analyst role development? This chapter examines the critical role of the analyst and argues that the role needs to evolve to meet future demand. It will outline what is needed by the analyst and law enforcement to ensure that the role develops with society, technology and criminality to effectively tackle operational and organisational challenges.

S. Keay (*) · R. Phythian Edge Hill University, Lancashire, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Bland et al. (eds.), The Crime Analyst’s Companion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94364-6_8

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8.2  Analyst’s Beginnings: A Series of False Starts? In the last two decades there has been a significant growth in police staff (civilian) analyst posts in the UK, partly due to the drive from the National Intelligence Model (NIM) that was first introduced in 2000. The analyst has been recognised as a key part of policing for several decades, yet research has suggested that the role has only provided a superficial effect on policing (Belur & Johnson, 2018; Santos & Taylor, 2014). Concerns have been raised regarding the quality of analysis, with analyst products being considered too descriptive (Chainey, 2012; Innes et al., 2005), which has often been an unintended consequence of the constant provision of statistics and basic charts for senior officers (Guerette et  al., 2020; Lum et  al., 2012, and see Nagy’s description of Compstat in Chap. 6). Austerity measures in the UK (2010–2019) compounded matters for the analyst role in which analyst numbers were cut by up to 50% (Keay & Kirby, 2018). Yet austerity also called for the police to be more efficient and effective. As police forces emerged from austerity, the introduction of the Force Management Statement (FMS) by the HMICFRS meant police forces now have to assess their capability and capacity for dealing with demand, both currently and in the forthcoming years. This means forces are having to identify emerging operational and organisational issues that will demand attention. Calls for policing to better understand the complexity of demand arrived at a time when EBP (evidence-based policing) was gaining traction, despite having been proposed over two decades ago (Sherman, 1998a). Further to this, POP has made a comeback along with a return of the much-missed national Tilley awards for excellence in police and partnership problem-solving. Given that a systematic review of POP has shown that it can lead to an average 34% reduction in crime (Hinkle et al., 2020), it is surprising that POP dropped off the national policing stage during austerity. Whilst various factors are likely to have influenced this, a lack of analytic support has been consistently associated with implementation failure in POP and problem-solving (Sidebottom et al., 2012). This is despite recognition of the value analysts can have in the development of knowledge through the implementation of EBP (Sherman & Murray, 2015). Both EBP and POP share a similar thread: the importance of dedicated research and analysis. To address EBP and POP properly, and dependent upon the topic of discussion, there needs to be a level of knowledge of relevant theory and research methods (Sidebottom et al., 2020). Understanding and applying theory is essential for thorough and competent analysis and has perhaps been a missing ingredient. How many analysts can profess an understanding and application of basic criminological theory such as routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) or rational choice theory (Clarke & Cornish, 1985) when developing crime and intelligence analysis? How many analysts can apply situational crime prevention methods (Clarke, 1980) when developing interventions or supporting POP interventions? Evans (2008) has argued that analysts need an awareness of up-to-date research, along with creative thinking and the practical skills to apply these to real-world police problems.

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Ratcliffe (2019) suggests numerous methods (e.g. the use of VOLTAGE and PANDA) to improve analysis and problem-solving that can better support police leadership. Additionally, analysts should be experts, and this is the type of specialist that is essential to law enforcement (Santos & Taylor, 2014). Sparrow (2018) has argued that scholarly support is a requirement to improve analysis; specifically, that there is a greater need for collaboration and the wider use of different techniques and processes to improve the role. Indeed, new crimes and policing challenges have been engaged in ever-expanding research areas. For example, recent research has started to show how the application of routine activity theory may have value in understanding offender and victim movements in cyberspace and therefore improving knowledge of intervening in the commission of cybercrimes (Brantingham & Brantingham, 2015; Holt & Bossler, 2008; Yar, 2005). Expanding research into new policing challenges is welcomed, but what does it mean for the analyst post? Keay and Kirby (2018a) found that analysts often lacked the ability to apply rigorous scientific methods in their analysis and that evidence-based policing practices might be an opportunity to redefine the analyst role. Yet, this is compounded in an era where technological change and demand for big data is increasing. Technological advancements mean technical skills will become more essential as the need to process and analyse big data becomes more important. Guerette et al. (2020:5) note that ‘rapid advancements in police technology and the exponential growth of available data sources had increased the technical know-how demands on analysts’. Analysts will need the skills to exploit new data forms, but also to develop new research ideas to improve knowledge of criminal enterprise and new forms of crime. This also needs to extend into improving organisational efficiency, particularly in support of FMS demands, whilst supporting the College of Policing vision to improve analytical practice (College of Policing, 2021a). To achieve these aims law enforcement agencies will need to consider the following five areas to evolve the analyst role to meet future challenges: –– –– –– –– ––

how they can keep up with technological change, the importance of partnership working and partnership data, less is more: making better use of existing data, engaging in evidence-based practices and applied research, developing analysts: how police managers can support and develop analytical teams,

This chapter now takes a look at each of these areas in turn to assess where analysts may be in the near future.

8.3  Analysis in a Digital Age The digital age is revolutionising how people go about their daily lives. Schwab (2015, 2017) argues that the world is in the early stages of a fourth industrial revolution that will exploit technological advancements in connecting the world. These

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advancements seem to have taken a significant leap during the COVID-19 pandemic with increasing people working from home. Everyday life has adopted technology and new apps to stay connected. Consider how this type of technology allowed those with access to connect with work, family and friends, even during the pandemic. On top of this, smart devices are allowing people to have remote access to their homes and to control everyday appliances. This natural evolution has grown through the varying perspectives and needs of users. The advent of ‘Big Data’ and the increase of digital data sources has become the latest dimension of criminal intelligence (Moneva, 2020; Ferguson, 2017). With information now ubiquitous, the scope for examining human behaviour is substantial, ranging from internet shopping to political interests to crimes in cyberspace (Ferguson, 2017; Brantingham & Brantingham, 2015). Existing criminological theory can be augmented with big data to understand patterns of behaviour and improve intelligence development (Holt & Bossler, 2008; Yar, 2005). This provides an ideal opportunity for the analyst to provide joined-up thinking, especially when aligned with data science and crime science approaches. The potential to aggregate this new data within existing practices will provide greater prospects of reducing and detecting crimes, whilst also improving organisational and operational efficiency and effectiveness. Indeed, ‘every contact leaves a trace’ is not only true in forensics but also in relation to the digital world (Ferguson, 2017). Therefore, analysts will need to consider developing skills in data science or forging new partnerships with data scientists to better manage the challenges of understanding and interpreting big data and new complex data sets (Kirby & Keay, 2021). Smarter methods of working will be needed for sure, particularly in understanding non-­ traditional police data, whether it be big data or partnership data. This shifts us towards collaborations and enhanced partnership working.

8.4  Partnerships, Chronic Problems and Complex Data The police have a long history of working with other agencies. Goldstein (1979) noted that the police should be working with communities in identifying and tackling shared problems. This was further supported in the UK with the introduction of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. This act made it clear that the responsibility of preventing and reducing crime was not solely the role of the police. It placed the emphasis on several agencies that should work towards reducing harm and improving community safety. This also introduced partnership analysts employed to examine shared and often ‘chronic’ problems. Ratcliffe (2019) notes that chronic problems are those long-term issues that require a long-term co-ordinated partnership response. From a growing body of research there is no doubt that problems faced by the police are becoming more complex. This research demonstrates that health issues play a key role within incidence of crime, anti-social behaviour and quality of life issues within local communities (Weisburd & White, 2019; Bartkowiak-Théron et  al., 2017). There is little doubt that police demand is

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increasing most in social welfare issues such as those suffering homelessness or mental health crises (Schuller, 2013). One proposal has been for law enforcement agencies to adhere more to a harm reduction approach (rather than traditional enforcement) and work more closely with local authorities, health and social care (College of Police, 2021b). Research and analysis of multi-agency data and partnership intelligence can provide a holistic picture of individuals and communities, improving community safety strategies in tackling chronic problems that have resulted in anti-social or criminal behaviour. Working in partnership with other agencies offers a few benefits from shared data to improved problem analysis but also collective skills, critical thinking and sustainable responses to shared problems. But working across numerous agencies exposes analysts to wider and often complex data sets and this brings several issues for analysts in understanding the context of the data, agency requirement for the data and how it can be interpreted. Certainly, the Cambridge Harm Index or CHI (Sherman et al., 2016) is one tool to support analysis of local harm issues, but this is still crime focussed. Analysts will need greater awareness of other agency demands and work more closely with different teams to better understand partnership issues beyond the symptoms (i.e. criminal behaviour/activity). Before analysts embark on jumping for as much data as possible, they perhaps need to make the most of the data that is directly available to them.

8.5  Less Is More: Making the Best from Existing Data Data analysis is an essential element of contemporary police work (Santos & Taylor, 2014) and analysts have perhaps been guilty of not making the best use of available data. Understanding data is fundamental to identifying ‘contextual variables’ (Townsley et al., 2011:161) when conducting research. Often there are arguments from analysts that they do not have enough data. Yet Stanko (2008) suggests that before searching for other data or bemoaning what is missing, analysts should make sure they explore as much of the existing police data as possible. As the police collect a lot of information, the analyst should be considering its relevance in answering specific questions. They should ensure they use data correctly by using it to test hypotheses. This is more effective in the use of time and resources than following a data-led approach, which will be unlikely to provide any additional insight, even if this means recoding available data, which is not common within policing. The issue with data and coding is perhaps down to the type of data collected. Police data is not necessarily collected for research purposes but for administrative and investigative purposes (Canter & Alison, 2003). At times, it may be necessary for the analyst to recode existing data to assess and answer questions about the topic they are researching and develop hypotheses that will generate meaningful findings. Chainey (2012) argues this approach is not common practice in crime analysis.

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8.6  EBP, Applied Research and Academic Collaboration Whilst some argue that EBP needs to be used to develop analyst input (Keay & Kirby 2018; Sherman) others argue that there is a need to develop a ‘police science’ (Weisburd & Neyroud, 2011). Research demonstrates the benefits that EBP can offer analysts (Keay & Kirby, 2018a). The application of basic research methods is essential for analysts yet has been noted as a missing link within crime analysis (Townsley et al., 2011). Researchers have argued that there is a disconnect between what the analyst does and what constitutes objective and scientific research (Chainey, 2012; Townsley et  al., 2011; Sissens, 2008). To further this, EBP advancement requires a much-underutilised form of analysis: evaluation. Evaluating impact is essential in determining ‘what works’ (Sherman, 1998b). It is also a key component of EBP and POP and is often the weaker element in the police use of SARA (Sidebottom et al., 2012). Conducting evaluations requires a greater understanding of scientific methods, which may account for the increasing popularity of police-­ academic partnerships (e.g. Bacon et al., 2021; Guerette et al., 2020; N8 PRP, 2021). The advantages of police-academic partnerships, such as the opportunities for knowledge exchange and collaboration (Fenn et al., 2020), have been recognised. Yet, challenges with this relationship remain (e.g. Brown et al., 2020). Huey and Mitchell (2018) identified ‘seven deadly sins’ of police-researcher relationships that relate to issues with listening, communication and interpersonal dynamics, as well as a failure to value each other’s roles in the partnership (i.e. seeing police solely as data sources). They recommend that academics and practitioners focus on developing the relationship to build trust and enable a meaningful partnership (i.e. Tyler, 2006; Walsh & Bull, 2012). Furthermore, police-academic relationships should consider how to create an environment of shared learning, incorporate experience as part of the research model, and demonstrate the benefits of good research (see Huey & Mitchell, 2018). The authors of this chapter argue that formalising police and researcher partnerships effectively enhances the benefits of the relationship, whilst minimising the challenges. Academic and policing collaboration in practice: Lancashire Constabulary’s Evidence Based Policing Research Team, in the northwest of England, is an example of a formalised academic-practitioner relationship. Working with researchers from local universities, the Constabulary has adopted a secondment-based approach. At the outset, contracts and data sharing agreements between the organisations are established, with the academics undergoing the process to become police staff, such as Non-Police Personnel Vetting and the provision of a staff login. Whilst this can be a lengthy process, once in place, it supports a smooth-running and effective relationship to flourish. This academic-policing model is underpinned by clear communication and shared expectations. The EBP Research Team consists of senior members from the Constabulary (i.e. Superintendent, Head of Crime and Data Science) and university (i.e. senior lecturer, Professor), who act as the policing and academic leads, joined by other staff, including Constabulary senior analysts and EBP coordinator, and university lecturers and research associates. The team meet on

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a fortnightly basis: the policing lead outlines the forces current priorities (i.e. FMS), the analyst informs on what type of data is available and could be appropriate (i.e. crime/ performance data, intelligence and organisational data contained with dashboards), and the academics propose various research methodologies that could be adopted (i.e. analytical techniques). When research has been conducted, the meetings also provide a platform to provide feedback and discuss the findings, to determine operational and organisational significance, and how to implement the findings in practice. Furthermore, the academic and police leads, in addition to the senior analyst, attend the quarterly strategic force meetings. Benefits of the formalised academic-policing partnership include: –– A streamlined approach: the regular meetings and combination of team members enable questions to be asked and answered in real-time, and for research or evaluation plans to be set. For example, it reduces the ‘back-and-forth’ between analyst and researcher, in obtaining and understanding the data. Moreover, it enables expectations to be set, in terms of what is or is not achievable and its outputs. –– Reduction on police resource/demand: typically, if an academic requests data from a police force, an analyst is required to extract and sanitise the data. This risks adding to the analyst’s workload and delaying the academics research. As the academics involved in this partnership are vetted, they can extract and/or sanitise the data onsite, both reducing the demand on the analyst and preventing delays to research. –– Build trusting relationships: due to the longevity of the secondment (i.e. renewed annually), positive team dynamics and interpersonal relationships evolve. Not only does this support efficiency, but it also aids in opening communication channels and demolishes the us/them perception. –– Translation of specialist language: related to the above point, the development of a positive and trusting relationship offers an inspiring environment in which both police and academics can ask for clarity and explanation. The police love for acronyms may sometimes exclude or isolate non-police personnel. –– Value of varied perspectives and expertise: the established relationship and familiarity with team members creates an understanding of each other’s skills and areas of speciality, as well as presenting an open and non-judgmental forum for discussion and challenge. –– Development of knowledge: working closely and regularly with varied individuals enhances the ability to share learning and develop knowledge. For example, academics develop an understanding from analysts, in terms of what police data is available and the typical format it is in, with analysts achieving an awareness of the analytical techniques available and their appropriateness to different types of data (i.e. continuous or categorical variables). –– Embedding academic insight: Attendance at strategic meetings strengthens the relationship between police and academics. The presence of senior EBP members shows the commitment to collaborate and to support the implementation of EBP at a strategic level. Moreover, it enables academics to better understand the strategic implications of research, whilst providing academic insight for the force.

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–– Mutually beneficial: whilst the primary focus of this secondment is to meet the Constabulary’s needs and requirements, academics receive support (i.e. data access) for research conducted ‘outside of’ the secondment. Whilst some research will be conducted primarily to inform the force, there is the opportunity to publish some work and disseminate the findings at conferences. –– Maintain momentum and impact: the regularity of the team meetings ensures that projects maintain momentum (i.e. prevents delays in data access/provision), as well as direct application to the workplace. This aids in conducting meaningful research with meaningful outputs.

8.7  Leadership and Development It is clear that analyst skill sets need to evolve and develop to tackle new emerging issues, new forms of criminality and meet future challenges. To do this they will need a supportive organisation and knowledgeable and influential supervisors. Wood (2020) argues that there is a need to consider the wider education, learning and professional development of all staff, especially in specialist services, of which analysis is a critical one. Analyst managers can range from police officers to senior analysts but, whatever the title, analyst management needs a strategic vision to develop analysis to meet future challenges. Analyst managers and first-line supervisors must have a thorough understanding of research methodologies, EBP, POP and new analytical techniques. The College of Policing have made this clear in their staff role profiles and is fundamental to the implementation of the Intelligence Professionalisation Programme or IPP (College of Policing, 2021a). If forces successfully introduce and adopt the IPP there will be clear benefits for analysts, particularly for those that sit within the intelligence arena, but it must not remain there. The IPP strengthens the desire to improve analytical techniques along with application of research. Analyst managers must be skilled in research and analytical techniques to develop their staff. They also need to recognise future requirements and either train staff or look to recruit future skill sets that can be shared amongst teams through CPD events. The recruitment and development of staff (including managers) will need to evolve within the analysis environment. To draw the best from competent analysts, managers need to allow their staff time to keep up to date with research and to develop and apply new learning and training to augment existing skills (Ratcliffe, 2016; Evans 2008). Often the need for a constant turn-around of prescribed products hampers analytical creativity, and it is this creativity that should be nurtured as it is perhaps a key element in evolving the role to meet new challenges. Indeed, Evans (2008) noted that analysts must be able to adapt their skills and knowledge to compete with changing landscapes. For example, Guerette et al. (2020) found that increasing workloads, staff resourcing, skill sets and training were insufficient to address the unique nature and growing complexities of policing cybercrime. Whilst their research was predominantly examining police cybercrime units, they were

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able to draw parallels with intelligence analysis teams. Further, Harkin et al. (2018) noted that management understanding was a factor in successfully developing specialist units. Development of specialist teams can be detrimental without management awareness and specialist knowledge. One element that is considered in both research articles (Guerette et al., 2020; Harkin et  al., 2018) is not necessarily the training of existing staff, but also the recruitment of new skills to improve the quality of specialist teams. The recruitment of staff (both managers and operators) will need to consider future requirements. This may mean adapting existing role profiles to consider organisational needs. Technical skills will become more essential as the need to process big data and use rigorous research techniques to enable critical analysis comes to the fore. Increasing levels of information competing for attention means that staff will need to focus on the correct issues, rather than being diverted by many other interesting, but irrelevant, elements (Kirby & Keay, 2021).

8.8  Conclusion It is clear that the benefits of analytical support can significantly enhance policing in a myriad of ways (Burcher & Whelan, 2019; Santos and Taylor, 2014; Chainey 2012). However, future challenges and emerging new crimes will bring higher expectations for specialist staff, as well as highlight shortcomings in training and skill sets. Therefore, analysts will require robust management and clear continuous professional development strategies to meet these challenges. With a growing impetus to work in collaboration with other agencies, including academia, there is clearly a desire to meet these challenges and evolve analysis. This will require significant organisational support and that will, in turn, require analyst managers to understand core business and ensure their staff have the right training, technology and skills fit for the working environment. This will require much more fundamental changes than the piecemeal approaches experienced previously, or in some cases, currently. Learning at the point of need is no longer a sustainable option (Guerette et  al., 2020). This chapter has briefly outlined some key elements that could hinder analyst development, but with the right management direction, a strategic vision and organisational support, these issues can become evolutionary steps that enhance analytical capacity and capabilities (Kirby & Keay, 2021).

References Bacon, M., Shapland, J., Skinns, L., & White, A. (2021). Fragile alliances: Culture, funding and sustainability of police-academic partnerships. Evidence & Policy: A Journal of Research, Debate and Practice, 17(1), 93–109. Bartkowiak-Théron, I., Asquith, N.  L., & Roberts, K.  A. (2017). Vulnerability as a contemporary challenge for policing. In N. L. Asquith, I. Bartkowiak-Théron, & K. A. Roberts (Eds.), Policing encounters with vulnerability (pp. 1–24). Palgrave.

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Belur, J., & Johnson, S. (2018). Is crime analysis at the heart of policing practice? A case study. Policing and Society, 28(7), 768–786. Brantingham, P. L., & Brantingham, P. J. (2015). Understanding crime with computational topology. In M.  Andresen & G.  Farrell (Eds.), 2015. The Crime Act: The role and influence of routine activity theory. Basingstoke, Palgrave. Brown, J., McDowell, A., Gamblin, D., & Fenn, L. (2020). Assessing transmission and translation of learning about evidence-based policing by graduate trainee police officers. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 14(1), 119–134. Burcher, M., & Whelan, C. (2019). Intelligence-Led Policing in Practice: Reflections From Intelligence Analysts. Police Quarterly, 22(2), 139-160. Canter, D. V., & Alison, L. J. (2003). Converting evidence into data: The use of law enforcement archives as unobtrusive measurement. The Qualitative Report, 8, 151–176. Chainey, S. (2012). Improving the explanatory content of analysis products using hypothesis testing. Policing: a Journal of Policy and Practice, 6(2), 108–121. Clarke, R. (1980). Situational crime prevention: Theory and practice. Brit. J. Criminology, 20(2). Clarke, R. V., & Cornish, D. B. (1985). Modeling offenders’ decisions: a framework for research and policy. In M. Tonry & N. Morris (Eds.), Crime and justice: An annual review of research: Vol. 6 (pp. 147–185 ). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Cohen, L.  E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach. American Sociological Review, 588–608. College of Policing. (2021a). Professional profiles: national level of policing. Available at https:// profdev.college.police.uk/professional-­profiles/profiles/national-­level-­policing/. Accessed 28 Feb 2021 College of Policing. (2021b). Our approach to public health. Available at: https://www.college. police.uk/about/public-­health. Accessed 28 Mar 2021 Evans, M. (2008). Cultural paradigms and change: A model of analysis. In C. Harfield, A. MacVean, J. Grieve, & D. Phillips (Eds.), The handbook of intelligent policing (pp. 103–109). Oxford University Press. Fenn, L., Marks, J., Christoforides, K., & Coupar, F. (2020). Applying research beyond the ivory tower: Reflections from police now. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 14(1), 135–145. Ferguson, A. (2017). The rise of big data policing: Surveillance, race and the future of law enforcement. New York Press. Goldstein, H. (1979). Improving policing: A problem-oriented approach. Crime and Delinquency, 25(2), 236–258. Guerette, R.  T., Przeszlowski, K., Lee-Silcox, J., & Zgoba, K.  M. (2020). Improving policing through better analysis: An empirical assessment of a crime analysis training and enhancement project within an urban police department. Police Practice and Research, 1–18. Harkin, D., Whelan, C., & Chang, L. (2018). The challenges facing specialist police cyber-crime units: An empirical analysis. Police Practice and Research, 19(6), 519–536. Hinkle, J. C., Weisburd, D., Telep, C. W., & Petersen, K. (2020). Problem-oriented policing for reducing crime and disorder: An updated systematic review and meta-analysis. Campbell Systematic Reviews, 16(2), e1089.  Holt, T.  J., & Bossler, A.  M. (2008). Examining the applicability of lifestyle-routine activities theory for cybercrime victimization. Deviant Behavior, 30(1), 1–25. Huey, L., & Mitchell, R. (2018). Seven deadly sins: The role of academic culture in killing potential police-academic partnerships. ANZSEBP Police Science, 3(1), 33–36. Innes, M., Fielding, N., & Cope, N. (2005). ‘The appliance of science?’ The theory and practice of crime intelligence analysis. British Journal of Criminology, 45(1), 39–57. Keay, S., & Kirby, S. (2018). The evolution of the police analyst and the influence of evidence-­ based policing. Policing: a Journal of Policy and Practice, 12(3), 265–276. Kirby, S., & Keay, S. (2021). Improving intelligence analysis in policing. Routledge. Lum, C., Telep, C.  W., Koper, C.  S., & Grieco, J. (2012). Receptivity to research in policing. Justice Research and Policy, 14(1), 61–95.

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Moneva, A. (2020). Cyber Places, Crime Patterns, and Cybercrime Prevention: An Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis approach through Data Science. Doctoral thesis. Available at https://asiermoneva.netlify.app/publication/moneva_2020/moneva_2020.pdf. Accessed 10 Feb 2021 N8 PRP. (2021). N8 Police Research Partnership Annual Report 2019/20. Available at: https:// n8prp.org.uk/wp-­content/uploads/2020/08/12455_N8_Policing_Report_2020_WEB-­1.pdf. Accessed 1st Feb 2021 Piza, E.  L., Szkola, J., & Blount-Hill, K.  L. (2020). How can embedded criminologists, police pracademics, and crime analysts help increase police-led program evaluations? A survey of authors cited in the evidence-based policing matrix. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice. Advance publication online, available at: https://academic.oup.com/policing/advance-­ article-­abstract/doi/10.1093/police/paaa019/5827736?redirectedFrom=fulltext. Accessed 28 Mar 2021 Ratcliffe, J. (2016). Intelligence-led policing. Routledge. Ratcliffe, J. (2019). Reducing crime: A companion for police leaders. Routledge. Santos, R. B., & Taylor, B. (2014). Integration of crime analysis into police work. Policing, 37(3), 501–520. Schuller, N. (2013). Is crime a question of health? Safer Communities, 12(2) Available at: https:// www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/17578041311315067/full/html. Accessed on 27 Aug 2020 Schwab, K. (2015). The fourth industrial revolution: What it means and how to respond. Available at https://www.researchgate.net/deref/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.foreignaffairs.com%2Farticle s%2F2015-­12-­12%2Ffourth-­industrial-­revolution. Accessed 5 Feb 2021 Schwab, K. (2017). The fourth industrial revolution. Crown Business. Sherman, L. W. (1998a). Evidence-based policing. Police Foundation. Sherman, L.  W. (1998b). Preventing crime: What works, what doesn’t, what’s promising. US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. Sherman, L. W., & Murray, A. (2015). Evidence-based policing: From academics to professionals. International Criminal Justice Review, 25(1), 7–10. Sherman, L., Neyroud, P. W., & Neyroud, E. (2016). The Cambridge crime harm index: Measuring total harm from crime based on sentencing guidelines. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 10(3), 171–183. Sidebottom, A., Tilley, N., & Eck, J. E. (2012). Towards checklists to reduce common sources of problem-solving failure. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 6(2), 194–209. Sidebottom, A., Bullock, K., Ashby, M., Kirby, S., Armitage, R., Laycock, G., & Tilley, N. (2020). Successful police problem-solving: a practice guide. Available at: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/ id/eprint/10093612/1/Successful%20police%20problem%20solving_%20a%20guide.pdf. Accessed 1 Apr 2021 Sissens, J. (2008). An evaluation of the role of the intelligence analyst within the National Intelligence Model. In C. Harfield, A. MacVean, J. Grieve, & D. Phillips (Eds.), The handbook of intelligent policing (pp. 121–131). Oxford University Press. Sparrow, M. K. (2018). Problem-oriented policing: Matching the science to the art. Crime Science, 7(1), 1–10. Stanko, B. (2008). Strategic intelligence: Methodologies for understanding what police services already “know” to reduce harm. In C. Harfield, A. MacVean, J. G. D. Grieve, & D. Phillips (Eds.), The handbook of intelligent policing: Consilience, crime control, and community safety. Oxford University Press. Townsley, M., Mann, M., & Garrett, K. (2011). The missing link of crime analysis: A systematic approach to testing competing hypotheses. Policing, 5(2), 158–171. Tyler, T. R. (2006). Why people obey the law. Princeton University Press. Walsh, D., & Bull, R. (2012). Examining rapport in investigative interviews with suspects: Does its building and maintenance work? Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 27(1), 73–84.

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Weisburd, D., & Neyroud, P. (2011). Police science: Toward a new paradigm. Journal of Current Issues in Crime, Issues, and Law Enforcement, 7(2), 227–246. Weisburd, D., & White, C. (2019). Hot spots of crime are not just hot spots of crime: Examining health outcomes at street segments. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 35(2), 142–160. Wood, J. (2020). Private policing and public health: A neglected relationship. In. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 36(1), 19:38. Yar, M. (2005). The novelty of ‘cybercrime’: An assessment in light of routine activity theory. European Journal of Criminology, 2(4), 407–427. Scott Keay  is a Senior Lecturer and Researcher in Policing at Edge Hill University, UK. Previously he worked for Lancashire Constabulary for 20 years in various analyst roles. His research interests include developing the application of crime analysis, intelligence-­led policing, evidence-based policing (EBP), problem-solving, roads policing and policing vulnerability. Rebecca Phythian  is a Senior Lecturer and Researcher in Policing at Edge Hill University. Following the completion of her PhD in Psychology, analysing police data, she saw the mutual benefits and value in merging research with practice. She collaborates with Lancashire Constabulary’s Evidence Based Policing Research Hub, as well as other police forces and criminal justice agencies in the UK. Rebecca is a member of RUSI’s Strategic Hub for Organised Crime Research, and she supports the sift judging process for the national Problem Solving and Crime Prevention programme’s Tilley Awards.

Part II

Techniques for Crime Analysis

Chapter 9

An Introduction to GIS Captain Jonas Baughman

9.1  Introduction One of the more forward-facing components of crime analysis is that which is often called (and perhaps oversimplified as) “crime mapping.” While the broader application of crime analysis is far more than mere mapping of crime data, as will be discussed in coming paragraphs, the notion of analyzing geographic or spatial data requires what is called a geographic information system, or GIS. As with most things nowadays, there is more than one way to define “GIS.” The United States Geological Survey (USGS) concisely defines GIS as “a computer system that analyzes and displays geographically referenced information (see http:// www.usgs.gov).” Industry leader Esri offers a similar take, claiming a GIS “is a framework for gathering, managing, and analyzing data,” adding “[a] GIS integrates many types of data” (see www.esri.com/en-­us/what-­is-­gis). While neither of these definitions is arguably wrong, the latter is slightly more applicable when applied to the field of crime analysis. This is particularly due to GIS being a framework as opposed to merely a computer-based tool. In other words, an effective GIS can provide an agency with an analytical engine upon which many other crime analysis tasks and processes can be built. As Esri further noted, the need for crime analysts, and thus any GIS at their disposal, to integrate and analyze a variety of data types is crucial. GIS has been around for the better part of a half-century, going back to the Canadian government commissioning Roger Tomlinson to develop the Canada Geographic Information System in 1963 (Esri, 2021).3 One may rightly assume the use of GIS was adopted by law enforcement shortly thereafter. While this is true in terms of the literal application of a GIS, namely the SYMAP program developed by C. J. Baughman (*) Kansas City Police Department, Kansas City, MO, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Bland et al. (eds.), The Crime Analyst’s Companion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94364-6_9

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Harvard University in the 1960s (Harries, 1995), the practice of mapping crime or other related data goes back at least another 140 years. Prominent examples of early crime mapping, rudimentary though they may have been, include Adriano Balbi and André Michel Guerry publishing a choropleth map illustrating crime and other factors in France in 1829 (Kindynis, 2014) or August Vollmer’s use of pin maps during his tenure as Chief of Police in Berkley, California in the early 1900s (https://­faculty. uml.edu//jbyrne/44.203/maca-historyofcrimeanalysis.pdf, Last accessed February 23, 2022). Despite this rich history, crime mapping has made its biggest strides in the last 25 years, including a massive surge in application by crime analysts due to increasingly affordable and powerful technology. GIS, including crime mapping, is even widely available for free, public consumption with platforms such as Motorola’s CityProtect1 or LexisNexis’ Community Crime Map.2 Given this ever-expanding presence of spatial information begging to be analyzed, modern law enforcement agencies choosing to minimize, or even worse, ignore the value GIS brings to their organizations will serve only to set themselves and their analytical functions up for failure. Readers should note the use of the term “crime mapping” will be used in this chapter to suggest an analyst using GIS to map any sort of data for analysis purposes. While this is frequently crime data, other examples include 911/999/emergency calls for service, officers’ self-initiated activity (e.g., traffic violations or pedestrian stops), locations of drug houses, social networks (e.g., gang members’ residences or turfs), locations of schools, or cell phone tower pings. Moreover, analysts should embrace the wealth of other types of data outside traditional law enforcement, such as open source/public information, social media posts (if geotagged), or municipal department data (e.g., broken streetlight locations or business licenses), to name just a few. The list of possibilities to combine with traditional law enforcement data is nearly infinite and many deep insights can be gleaned only by working with such data. This chapter is designed to introduce you to some of these possibilities.

9.2  GIS Terms & Definitions Crime analysis is full of its own jargon. Whether talking about a crime spree/series, threshold analysis, or Getis-Ord Gi* there is no shortage of terms analysts use, many of which often result in puzzled looks on the faces of those outside the world of crime analysis. GIS for better or worse, also has its own vocabulary. The most important terms readers should know are found below:

 See https://cityprotect.com  https://communitycrimemap.com

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Annotation – Text can add to describe data displayed on a map. Think of as labels for specific points of data to display on a final GIS product to be published and shared. Note this is different from other labels/text, such as a title bar. Attribute data/table  – This is the data contained behind the scenes for a given layer (defined below) used in a GIS . Think of an attribute table as the spreadsheet containing all information about the data displayed on a map. For example, attributes for a layer of crime data could include the date, time, location, report number, and offense category. Base map – This is a file used as a general for a variety of GIS tasks. tend to have nonspecific layers that can be used across multiple projects, such as city boundaries, streets, or parks. Density or hotspot map – This is a of map that uses a technique called to show concentrations of the data being displayed on a map. They often look similar in appearance to weather maps and are typically used for large data sets.  – The by which data within a spreadsheet is processed by GIS software to match addresses and display symbols on a map.  – to Esri products, a geodatabase is an amalgamation of various data sets, including layers, used by one or more projects. Whereas layers are individual sets of data that can be accessed and brought into a GIS project one at a time, a geodatabase is a warehouse for a variety of GIS data that can be accessed simultaneously. Geoprocessing – The of using tools to process data within a GIS. Analysts use tools for a myriad of tasks, ranging from geocoding, joining layers (defined below), creating density maps, or automating GIS tasks. Join – The of relating and if desired, permanently merging, two layers based on a common data feature in the layers’ attribute tables. For example, a join could be performed on layers of crime and police districts, assuming both layers contain identical attribute data containing identifiers of police districts. Such a join could be used to count the number of crimes in each police district. Layer – A set of related that is displayed on a map; the most commonly used layers come in polygonal, line, or point data. Examples include police district boundaries, streets, or crime data, respectively. Symbology – The look of data displayed on a map. This typically involves the color and shape of symbols but can also apply to color schemes used for other maps. Symbology is more than choosing random colors and shapes; attention should be paid to how symbols’ colors may blend into base layer data or not be discernible when looking at unrelated data with similar symbol shapes or colors.

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This list reflects a mere fraction of the terms found within the world of GIS. The terminology here covers the basics for a beginner GIS user; those interested in learning more are encouraged to explore the resources recommended at the end of this chapter, among others.

9.3  Crime Mapping’s Role in Crime Analysis It goes without question that crime mapping is a crucial part of crime analysis, but it is fair to remind readers (or perhaps better said, their supervisory or command staff!) crime mapping on its own does not necessarily equate to being analytical in the strict sense of the word. Unfortunately, maps are often treated as static displays of data with no decisions made as a result. Part of this could be the person requesting the map did not know which questions to ask of the analyst. Another common theme is maps are often presented as just that, a map, with no additional data or other information (quantitative or qualitative) to empower consumers to actually do something after reviewing the product. I posit crime maps should, at minimum, serve as “conversation starters” to answer a question that leads to other, more complex analysis needs. This, in turn, leads to enhanced strategy or decision-making by end users. An officer may ask for a map of residential burglaries from the last 90 days with nothing else. Such a map is really not analysis, it is simply information. Perhaps this burglary map would immediately show clustering of some sort, be it a traditional hotspot in a neighborhood or several houses along a bicycle path. Or maybe the crime analyst performs a query on the data and finds a temporal pattern in the burglary layer’s attribute data. The point here is new questions can and should be asked by both the officer and crime analyst at this juncture. Analysts can also build maps based on mnemonics such as the SARA model or CHEERS test (see Clarke & Eck, 2005 for accounts of both) to ensure products focus on answering questions and solving problems. Readers should therefore not believe a static map lacking additional context qualifies as a truly analytical product. Think of it this way: end users should always be able to easily answer the question “What should I do now that I finished reading this?” after viewing a crime map (or any analysis product, for that matter!). The map should be re-worked if the end user or even the analyst cannot answer that simple question.

9.4  Effective Map Design Borrowing from the overused phrase, creating effective crime maps is just as much an art as it is a science. Some GIS products, including crime maps, can truly be a sight to behold (see what are called Story Maps on Esri’s online gallery at https:// www.esri.com/en-­us/arcgis/products/arcgis-­storymaps/stories for examples). While

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one must have technical skill to correctly display all the elements required of a map, all does not end there. In addition to technical know-how, analysts must ensure the desired product effectively communicates what the end users need to know or learn after viewing the map. This lends itself to a more creative aspect of GIS in which crime analysts learn how a given crime map’s design can help or hinder its intended purpose. Sometimes it helps to see an example of what makes a poor example of the task at hand to learn what should be done in contrast. Figure 9.1 is an example of what not to do when publishing a crime map. While this may appear to be (and is) an incomplete map no competent analyst would likely share, it nevertheless serves its purpose for this exercise. Data are displayed on the map but there is nothing else indicating what the data represent (i.e., a title and legend for the map) or other standard elements such as a north arrow or scale. It is always possible a commander could request an analyst to create a crime map for an unexpected meeting mere minutes away. The pressure of having minimal time to create a proper map may cause an analyst to cut corners. The author speaks from his own experience as an analyst that this sort of thing happens! However, even if the commander that requested the data knows what the map’s data mean, what if the map is copied and shared with others at the meeting? How are these other consumers to know what the map means without unnecessary discussion, texts, emails, or other notes? Figure 9.2 is a second map of the same data. Note it includes the aforementioned elements to clarify the map’s contents and by extension, its message. We now know this is a map of property crime and have a sense of scale and direction. All looks good at first glance but do not be tempted to believe this is a final product worthy of distribution. There are a few remaining adjustments to make, some subtle and others more significant. First, we must keep in mind the temporal nature of the data displayed on the map. Given its inherently visual nature, GIS products often lead end users to forget the importance of time contained within the data. Applying that concept to Fig. 9.2, we currently do not know the date range captured by the property crime data. Is this a week’s worth of data? A month? A year? Again, the commander that requested the data may know but it is worth repeating this information must be explicitly included in the map. Second, more geographic context could be helpful. Base layer information provides the names of major streets and thoroughfares, but which part of the jurisdiction is displayed here? Depending on the end users’ needs, more meaningful location information should be included in the map, both in the map itself as well as the title. If the commander’s meeting is for a community group, specific neighborhoods could be listed in the title. If the meeting is internal, police district information immediately brings much-needed context to the map. When taking these first two items into consideration, a more appropriate title could be “Plaza West Neighborhood Property Crime – June 2020,” assuming the target audience is a community group. A boundary illustrating the Plaza West neighborhood’s boundary within the map could be added as well.

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Fig. 9.1  How not to make a crime map. (Source: Author’s own creation)

The final, and most substantial, adjustment this map must make is something to which many analysts fall prey time and again: getting to the heart of the matter, which leads to the next section.

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Fig. 9.2  A better map but still not good enough. (Source: Author’s own creation)

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9.5  Addressing the REAL Question at Hand Many, if not all, analysts reading this book have undoubtedly faced situations where a product is requested yet the person making the request does not know one or both of the following things: • The answer to the question they need an analysis product to address or worse… • The question that must be answered in the first place To be fair, the first point is understandable. After all, an analyst’s job is to help people answer questions, so it only makes sense a person asking for a crime map may not know the answer contained in the data. The second point is much more pernicious. The innocuous request for a map of 6 months of violent crime may not seem so ill-informed. However, it is an analyst’s responsibility to inquire about the true purpose of the desired product. Precious resources, most notably time, are all too frequently wasted due to products being created, only for the analyst to hear, “Well, what I really need to show is…” or, “Actually, the meeting organizer is more interested in…” Circumstances change, so there will be occasions when products require modification. What is being addressed here is the need for thorough discussion about the needs of a crime map before it is made. I am reminded of a request I once had from a Deputy Chief. I was working as an analyst at the time and a Deputy Chief approached me and quickly asked for “one of those weather-looking maps” for violent crime in what my agency calls East Patrol – 10 Sector. The Deputy Chief was just invited to a community group meeting that same evening to talk about violent crime (remember how I mentioned these things happen?). As the Deputy Chief began to walk away, I politely interrupted and requested to ask some questions. Knowing the Deputy Chief had limited time to spare, I quickly inquired about the date range of crime required, the preferred violent crime types, and any specific geographic parameters given East Patrol  – 10 Sector has a large footprint, including industrial areas with very little violent crime. Most importantly, I also asked the Deputy Chief what the overarching theme of her presentation was going to be. The Deputy Chief did not immediately know the date range to include but the crime types and geographic parameters were known. Continued discussion revealed the Deputy Chief wanted a hotspot map showing only firearm-related street crime (i.e., Aggravated Assaults and Armed Robberies with no Sex Offenses included), the topic of interest for the community group. We further agreed 3 months of data should keep her insights timely yet provide enough data to make a meaningful map. Next, the community group in question was located in a specific part of East Patrol – 10 Sector called the Historic Northeast. I informed the Deputy Chief we could

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easily create a map centered primarily on the community group’s boundaries. Finally, some quick talking points about the data, such as concentrations in specific neighborhoods or temporal patterns were provided to bring the map to life. The resulting map was vastly different than the original request. Had I tried to make a crime map with the limited information initially provided to me my product would have been woefully inadequate and not met the community group’s needs. But as my story shows, as little as five minutes of discussion prevented several minutes, if not hours, of wasted work and back-and-forth communication with the Deputy Chief. To tie this into addressing the real question at hand, crime analysts and their supervisors must fully understand the need to ensure crime maps are not simply “dots on a map” with no additional substance. Ideally, crime maps will answer specific questions, such as “where does our officers’ proactive activity occur when compared to auto theft hotspots?” or “which streets result in more DUIs during weekdays when compared to weekends and when do those DUIs take place?” In the end, the following should happen to ensure a crime map effectively addresses the root question: • Crime analysts should feel confident and empowered to ask necessary questions regarding a map’s purpose when receiving a request. • Supervisors should fully support analysts’ efforts to ask such questions, in particular if the person making the request is a high-ranking commander. • Members from outside the Crime Analysis Unit should be educated about crime analysis, at least at a fundamental level, to allow them to make more informed requests. Annual in-service training is the perfect opportunity for this.

9.6  Examples of GIS Products This final section provides a sampling of crime maps using a variety of GIS techniques. Explanations about the map’s design or intent are provided to enhance understanding, as well. Some of these maps are well-known to analysts, yet others may be more uncommon. Either way, they have their place in an agency’s analysis and crime-fighting efforts. I hope they serve as inspiration for analysts to re-create and ideally expand upon at their agencies to help solve problems for their communities. One final point to mention is all examples that follow were created using Esri’s ArcGIS Pro platform. Esri’s software is the industry standard in many ways but several of these maps can be created using free, open-source software such as QGIS. All maps are based in the Kansas City, Missouri (USA) area and use fictional data and scenarios unless specified otherwise.

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Fig. 9.3  How a pin map should look. (Source: Author’s own creation)

9.6.1  Basic Pinmap Figure 9.3 below re-visits the property crime map displayed earlier. Note a couple of improvements, specifically two callout text boxes added to highlight the analyst’s findings in this particular set of data. These simple additions make the map a far more actionable product.

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Each callout provides meaningful information for frontline officers and command staff for deployment and follow-up purposes, such as temporal information and suspect descriptions. This product could be shared with all officers, but useful information can be applied to different shifts. For example, the shoplifting pattern (i.e., green dots) near the bottom of the page is applicable to officers working a day shift whereas the burglary pattern (i.e., yellow dots with a matching yellow ellipsis) is relevant to officers working evenings or midnights. This one-page map should meet the majority of users’ needs in its current format. Officers and Sergeants know what to focus on during their shifts and command staff have topics for follow-up at CompStat or other purposes. Even so, some readers may be thinking, But what about the data itself? Should I include a spreadsheet of the data, too? I am a firm believer that most consumers give less than 1 min of attention to any analysis product given to them. Tell users everything they need to know up front, preferably in one page as shown here. Disclaimers such as, “Data contained in the map can be provided upon request” can be added to the bottom of your map if absolutely necessary. Another solution is to embed your attribute data into the file itself. For example, Adobe PDF files can allow for symbols on the map to be clicked, after which a box of that data point’s attribute data is provided. Even so, a good rule to follow is to avoid overloading consumers with information they may not need. A better approach is to cultivate ongoing dialogue between crime analysts and their end users. For instance, officers may stop and identify a prowler at a business during a midnight shift in the same area as the burglary pattern. This information is then shared with the crime analyst and Property Crimes Section Detectives, who then collaborate and determine this prowler is a suspect in a separate rash of burglaries elsewhere in the city. A new analysis product, including a map and other pertinent information, can then be created based on this ongoing analysis cycle.

9.6.2  Density/Hotspot Change Map Most users are likely familiar with a density or hotspot map, as defined previously. However, the ability to more easily create maps showing temporal and spatial changes in data using the density/hotspot look has come about only recently. These tools were always available in software such as Esri’s ArcMap but they were embedded deep within the software and were not always user-friendly. However, many new tools, including the Crime Analysis Solution toolbar in Esri’s ArcGIS Pro software (Esri Crime Analysis toolbar for ArcGIS Pro: https://doc.arcgis.com/en/arcgis-solutions/latest/reference/introduction-to-crime-analysis.htm) have automated much of the required steps, making it a more readily accessible map for analysts to create if they have access to the software. Figure 9.4 is an example of a density change map showing a combination of a density change layer and a point-based layer. The density change layer represents

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Fig. 9.4  Example of a density map. (Source: Author’s own creation)

officers’ self-initiated activity (e.g., pedestrian stops or traffic violations) while the point-based layer captures aggravated assaults. Both layers represent two quarters’ (i.e., six total months) worth of data. The idea behind this map is to quickly answer the following questions: • Where are aggravated assaults occurring in Metro Patrol Division? • Are officers conducting proactive activity in the correct areas based on where assaults have taken place, particularly when comparing third quarter activity to that in the second quarter? Note the density change layer shows both traditional hotspots and what could be best described as “coldspots” of self-initiated activity. So while a red hotspot denotes concentrations of increased activity, the blue coldspots indicate locations of concentrated decreases. Swift assessments can be made by looking at this map. For example, we see a rather tight cluster of aggravated assaults near the middle of the map. It looks as if officers have shifted some proactive work in the area in the third quarter, although there are pockets of decreased activity nearby, as well. There is another small cluster of assaults in the northwest region of the map with only a blue coldspot in the same area. Field commanders would be wise to direct resources to this area.

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9.6.3  Emerging Hotspot Analysis Map Taking the concept of the density change map a step further, Esri’s Crime Analysis Solution toolbar contains two tools, Create Space Time Cube and Emerging Hotspot Analysis, that provide deep insight into not only where crime hotspots or coldspots are located, but the temporal nature of those same locations. When contrasted with a density layer simply indicating concentration of incidents, analysts can use Emerging Hotspot Analysis to learn if a crime hotspot is a new or chronic hotspot based on the date range of the data set being analyzed. This type of map is also useful to determine effectiveness of formal crime reduction strategies applied over weeks or months. A simple pre/post comparison can provide statistical insight, but an Emerging Hotspot Analysis map will reveal far more actionable information than mere statistics can provide. Using Fig. 9.5 as a guide, we will assume Central Patrol Division adopted a year-long strategy to thwart stealing offenses in which property is taken from motor vehicles. This map represents an analysis of such stealings from 2020. Readers will note the admittedly busy legend created by the tool. Although there are several entries within the legend, the granularity they provide is the key to making informed decisions in the future based on the data provided. Cursory review of the map shows two large, light red-colored sections found in the north and south. These areas are classified as Sporadic Hot Spots according to the analysis results, meaning they are “on-again, off-again” as the name suggests. Several of the blue-colored areas on the east side of the map indicate a mixture of Consecutive Cold Spots, Sporadic Cold Spots, and New Cold Spots. For ease of explanation for this exercise, we will assume Central Patrol’s commanders directed resources primarily to the northern region containing Sporadic Hot Spots and the eastern region with the mixture of Cold Spots. We will further assume the southern region with the Sporadic Hot Spots was treated as a control area during the intervention with no additional resources expended there. Based on this understanding, we can see the police were effective in creating decreases in the eastern region, but relative increases remain in the northern region. The isolated cluster of dark red grid cells near the northeast section of the map also deserves attention. The cells’ symbology indicates these are New Hot Spots. Perhaps the theft reduction strategy displaced crimes from the Sporadic Hot Spots to the location of the New Hot Spots. A secondary analysis of thefts reported in these New Hot Spots is warranted. This is all powerful information in terms of assessment and follow-up; a standard density map applied to this data may well have resulted in the New Hot Spot cluster looking similar in intensity to other hot spots. This is where the Emerging Hotspot Analysis tool can empower analysts and end users with heightened awareness.

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Fig. 9.5  Example of an emerging hotspot map. (Source: Author’s own creation)

9.6.4  Crime Series Sequence Map One of the overarching goals of crime analysis is to identify patterns in data. Patterns come in a variety of forms, the most common of which are a geographic pattern, a temporal pattern, a modus operandi pattern, target pattern (i.e., a preferred victim or property type) or any combination thereof. While these patterns can be relatively

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Fig. 9.6  Example of a crime series map. (Source: Author’s own creation)

easy to identify through basic queries, there are at times no obvious indicators about how or why offenders commit crimes. It is in such instances an analyst should create a sequence map to discover further insights about the crimes at hand, specifically the order in which offenses were committed. Such knowledge may allow for enhanced intervention by law enforcement. The example shown here, Fig. 9.6, contains burglaries of car dealerships in the greater Kansas City, Missouri (USA) region in which vehicles were stolen. We will

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assume the data in this map were isolated due to analysts from multiple agencies sharing intelligence about offenses in their respective jurisdictions. As shown by the numbered labels on the map, the offenders are traveling in a clockwise manner throughout the region as they choose their targets. The offenses start in the southern part of Kansas City, Missouri, proceed west to smaller jurisdictions in nearby Johnson County, Kansas, then end up in the northern part of Kansas City, Missouri before returning south. The cycle then repeats. Beyond the visual cues provided by the numerical sequence, other key features include the callout boxes. We see an offense in Kansas, offense #5, mentions CCTV footage of three suspects, one of which was wearing a pair of uniquely-colored shoes. The most recent offense, offense #9, mentions a suspect vehicle and partial license plate. Finally, the larger text box provides quick information about the pattern, including time of day characteristics, a recommendation for surveillance, and a point of contact for all affected agencies to use for information-sharing and case management. This map conveys plenty of actionable information law enforcement should use to their advantage. Notifications should be made to car dealers in the appropriate areas that have yet to be targeted by the ring of offenders. Affected law enforcement agencies should coordinate efforts, including surveillance and take-down crews, with the goal of apprehending offenders. Both patrol and investigative elements can use this product, further expanding its use. Another point to emphasize is how this map could not have been created without analysts collaborating with one another; in this case, analysts from multiple agencies. That is a topic for another conversation, but all analysts are encouraged to share information and intelligence with neighboring agencies. Criminals do not care about geographic boundaries so nor should law enforcement.

9.6.5  Bivariate Map As the name suggests, a bivariate map displays two variables at once. Bivariate maps are not yet commonplace in the world of crime analysis when compared to other types of maps, although they are beginning to gain popularity. Even so, being able to display two variables simultaneously can allow for interventions to be custom designed to address nuances identified in the data. Bivariate maps’ symbology can be represented in different ways, two of which are most common. The method shown below in Fig. 9.7 applies a two-part color scheme to pre-defined geographic areas; examples include census tracts, zip codes, or in this example, police beats. The other approach uses a combination of graduated symbols and a color scheme. The graduated symbols can be applied to pre-defined geographic areas or to a customized grid of small cells applied to the study area. The latter approach could lead to a more fine-tuned analysis when compared to using larger geographic areas. The symbols’ sizes illustrate one variable while the symbols’ colors describe the second variable.

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Fig. 9.7  Example of a bivariate map. (Source: Author’s own creation)

The bivariate map shown in Fig.  9.7 displays vehicular collision and driving under the influence (DUI) data in Kansas City, Missouri’s Central Patrol Division. Specifically, areas of high/low vehicular collisions are combined with the ratio of high/low DUIs represented in the same collision data, all of which is aggregated to police beats.

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The key to interpreting data such as this rests in the legend. In this example, a pink color ramp is used for vehicular collisions whereas a blue color ramp depicts DUIs. An area that is primarily pink, such as Beat 114 on the west side of the map, has a high total amount of collisions but a low ratio of DUIs associated with the collisions. Conversely, Beat 143 located near the bottom of the map is primarily a blue color. This means it does not have a high overall volume of collisions, but many involve DUIs. Finally, areas with dark purple coloring indicate the presence of both variables; in other words, a large number of collisions involving a large number of DUIs. This map could be equally valuable to officers assigned patrol, an Accident Investigation Section, and a DUI Section, allowing each element to know which police beats deserve attention based on each group’s expertise. Accident investigators may be most interested in Beats 114 or 134, whereas DUI officers may increase checkpoints or other measures in Beats such as 133, 111, or 112, among others. This map offers tangible, objective data to guide operations instead of relying on officer experience or even worse, a hunch. Having such information readily available can help a police department explain the rationale behind where and why resources were deployed in a given area should criticism arise.

9.6.6  Risk Terrain Maps A risk terrain map (RTM) illustrates areas of high risk of crime as opposed to past locations of reported crime or other incidents, such as 911 calls. Put in more practical terms, RTMs show where crime is most likely to occur based on analysis of underlying environmental factors that cause or attract the crime(s) in question, allowing law enforcement agencies to proactively deploy resources to reduce and prevent crime or other events of interest to law enforcement, such as traffic collisions or where officers are being assaulted while on duty (Caplan & Kennedy, 2016). This means an RTM is more of a diagnostic, preventive tool as opposed to one rooted purely in response to incidents that have already occurred. While I am not a fan of terms such as “predictive policing” and all they entail, an RTM is intended to forecast where conditions are ripe for crime to occur. While that may give some readers (or critics, to be fair) pause, RTM has proven to be a rigorously tested approach backed by more than 10 years of evidence. This product, Fig. 9.8, is a genuine map taken from the Kansas City, Missouri (USA) Police Department (KCPD); it was used during the agency’s Risk-Based Policing strategy (Caplan et al., 2021). Adhering to the recommendation made earlier in the chapter, this product was designed to be more than “just a map.” The map above provides easy-to-comprehend information about micro-places with high risk of violent street crime as depicted by the RTM model’s blue-colored cells. The bottom left corner provides specific environmental risks the police department and

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Fig. 9.8  Example of a risk terrain map. (Source: Author’s own creation)

notably, its external partners, should seek to reduce in and around the blue-colored areas. Finally, the information in the bottom right corner provides police knowledge about when violent street crimes have occurred in the area represented by the map. Officers and commanders therefore know where to go, what to look for, and when to go there all in one succinct product. RTM maps can be made in ArcGIS Pro, but it is worth mentioning another platform, RTMDx, is available. Published by

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Simsi, Inc., RTMDx can help users easily create RTM models, maps, and reports. Several other GIS and analysis tasks can be performed within the software, as well. Interested readers can learn more at www.simsi.com.

9.7  Suggested Reading While certainly not an exhaustive list, the following works are recommended for analysts of all abilities wanting to increase their GIS and crime mapping knowledge and abilities: • • • • •

Modern Policing Using ArcGIS Pro by Eric L. Piza and Jonas H. Baughman Crime Analysis with Crime Mapping by Rachel Boba Santos Risk Terrain Modeling by Joel M. Caplan and Leslie W. Kennedy Understanding Crime: Analyzing the Geography of Crime by Spencer Chainey Foundations of Crime Analysis: Data, Analyses, and Mapping by Grant R. Drawve and Jeffery T. Walker

References Caplan, J., & Kennedy, L. (2016). Risk terrain modeling – Crime prediction and risk reduction. University of California Press. Caplan, J. M., Kennedy, L. W., Drawve, G., & Baughman, J. H. (2021). Data-informed and place-­ based violent crime prevention: The Kansas City, Missouri risk-based policing initiative. Police Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1177/10986111211003205 Clarke, R.  V., & Eck, J.  E. (2005). Crime analysis for problem solvers in 60 small steps. US Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Harries, K. D. (1995). Mapping crime: Principle and practice. US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, Crime Mapping Research Center. Kindynis, T. (2014). Ripping up the map: Criminology and cartography reconsidered. British Journal of Criminology, 54, 222–243. Captain Jonas Baughman  is an 18-year veteran of the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department (KCPD). A native of the Kansas City area, Captain Baughman joined the KCPD after obtaining a B.A. in psychology from Creighton University. He has held assignments in patrol, investigations, crime/intelligence analysis, and administration during his tenure. Captain Baughman quickly found crime analysis to be his professional passion and more than 10 of his 18 years with the KCPD have been in positions related to crime or intelligence analysis. He has served as a sworn crime analyst; helped create the KCPD’s Real-time Crime Center and supervise its first team; directed a squad of detectives tasked with gang intelligence; and worked within the Office of the Chief of Police where he provided strategic analysis and other performance metrics to executive command staff. Captain Baughman is currently assigned to the Information Services Division within the Administration Bureau.

Chapter 10

The Development of a New Capability: Geographic Profiling Analysis in Australia Adam Marsden and Michael Taylor

10.1  Introduction Prior to 2020, Australia had no geographic profiling (GP) capability available within state, territory or federal police forces so serial crime was addressed using conventional methods of policing and intelligence. In contrast, GP has been used for around 25 years in places such as Canada and the United States of America (USA) with experts from those countries often being recruited to assist on Australian cases as required. As Australia faces similar issues to international policing counterparts in relation to serial offenders, and given the success and longevity of GP use within international settings, the potential value of a domestic GP capability became self-­ evident. After an initial scoping project of 3 months, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) established an integral GP capability within their Forensic Intelligence (FORINT) unit. This team now routinely provides assistance across multiple crime types and jurisdictions. This chapter gives the reader an understanding of the process that was undertaken to set up GP as a new capability within AFP FORINT, with the intent of providing lessons learnt for anyone wishing to create such a capability within their own agency. The authors first give an overview of the AFP and GP, then discuss the implementation approach: identifying the need; sampling cases; validating in context; building the capability; creating awareness; training requirements; and providing GP capabilities to multi-jurisdictional investigations. Although relatively new in Australia, the outcomes of GP analyses will be reflected upon and discussed. To conclude, the authors identify future opportunities for the Australian policing and intelligence community to utilise this rapidly growing capability.

A. Marsden (*) · M. Taylor Australian Federal Police, Canberra, Australia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Bland et al. (eds.), The Crime Analyst’s Companion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94364-6_10

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10.2  The Australian Federal Police The Australian Federal Police (AFP) is Australia’s national policing agency, a key member of the Australian law enforcement and national security community (AFP, 2020) and has almost 6000 members (Department of Home Affairs, 2020) serving a population of just under 25 million. AFP’s role is to enforce Commonwealth criminal law, contribute to combating complex, transnational, serious and organised crime impacting Australia’s national security and to protect Commonwealth interests from criminal activity in Australia and overseas. The AFP also has responsibility for providing policing services to the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and Australia’s territories, including Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Norfolk Island and Jervis Bay, as well as having an international liaison network (see Fig. 10.1). The AFP works closely with a range of other law enforcement and government agencies at state, territory, Commonwealth and international levels, enhancing safety and providing a secure regional and global environment. Commissioner Reece Kershaw outlined three key operating principles for the organisation in AFP’s Corporate Plan (AFP, 2020): • Supporting the frontline. • Reducing red tape. • Enhancing partnerships. Overall, these principles ensure the AFP is able to appropriately address crime and proactively engage in providing policing and investigative support to partner agencies. It is objectively important to ensure that any new capability being

Fig. 10.1  AFP’s international footprint. 248 personnel in 33 locations offshore. (Image source: AFP Corporate Plan 2018–19)

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considered, such as GP, meets organisational priorities and aligns to the command’s philosophy.

10.3  Geographic Profiling Geographic profiling (GP) is a distinct sub-discipline of criminal profiling1 (Petherick, 2014) and was first implemented operationally in its modern form in the Vancouver (British Columbia) Police Department’s GP Section in 1995. GP has been successfully used in the US, the UK and Canada since the 90s on cases such as burglary, arson, armed robberies and murders. There are also instances of GP being used in the counterterrorism space, e.g. to locate militants responsible for burying improvised explosive device (IEDs) in war zones, and for understanding the geospatial structure of terrorist cells operating in Turkey (Rossmo & Harries, 2011). GP’s main goal is to focus on a crime series’ where-and-when (Rossmo, 2012) rather than the human factors within psychological profiling (Kocsis, 2003). GP benefits police through pattern identification (Muller, 2011), through facilitating search-area prioritisation for location of offenders (Wilson & Maxwell, 2007; Petherick, 2014; Breetzke, 2006), and has demonstrated validity and usefulness across a range of varying crime types (Rossmo, 2014). GP is not a standalone technique, but rather complementary to other police processes (Breetzke, 2006). In basic terms, the premise is that offenders travel small distances in familiar areas to conduct their crime (Canter & Gregory, 1994; Swope, 2001; Canter & Youngs, 2008). Because of the nature of the capability, it aligns nicely with Commissioner Kershaw’s operating principles for the AFP, making pitching the project idea to begin a GP capability to management an easier process. In policing, GP is most commonly employed in cases of serial violent or property crime. If the crimes of a serial criminal can be linked together, then they can usually be geo-profiled. Some series, often historical in nature, are unable to be geo-profiled. Instances include (i) ambiguity in the available reporting, specifically around locations of the crime sites or (ii) because the series violated one or more of the GP assumptions (Rossmo, 2005), in that: • It is difficult to determine whether the series is complete. One of the first criteria of conducting a geo-profile on a crime series is that a proper linkage analysis is complete. This means all the crimes in the series belong to the same offender or group of offenders. • There is more than one offender. Having more than one offender will affect the accuracy of the geo-profile. On some occasions, it will be evident there is more

1  In this chapter, we treat geographic profiling (GP) and geographic profiling analysis (GPA) somewhat synonymously, although it is acknowledged that GPA typically leverages environmental criminology and crime linkage as applied to volume crime, whilst GP further incorporates aspects of behavioural psychology and may focus more on violent crime.

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than one offender by the pattern displayed in the geo-profile. When this is present, the pattern will sometimes identify the decision maker of the group. • If there is more than one offender, they are not living together or close to each other. Ordinarily, if there is more than one offender, the geo-profile will still be accurate as long as the offenders are residing together or meeting at the same ‘search base’2 (café, shop, house) from which they commence their criminal activity. • The offender is a commuter. Criminals either offend close to where they live (marauder) or travel to an area before offending (commuter) (Canter & Larkin, 1993). Although a geo-profile can still be beneficial in both cases, the most ideal scenario is that the offender is a marauder, as the geo-profile can develop strategies for locating the offender’s residence rather than a location they travel to before offending. Sometimes the commuter will travel across state and territorial borders which will, in some cases, raise jurisdictional issues.3 • The offender moved residence or search base during the series of offending. This usually has the same effect on a geo-profile as when there is more than one offender residing in different locations. Because GP is not a standalone technique, a crime analyst or detective will usually be able to tell whether the suspect fits the geo-profile by looking at the history of the suspect. Note that in practice these factors do not preclude the provision of advice to case officers; it may be new information and therefore useful in framing an investigational approach. Based on the research of Canelo-Cacho et al. (1997) demonstrating offending frequency rates, Rossmo (2000, p.  35) estimated conservatively that 50% of all crime is committed by 10% of offenders; prolific offending is particularly high for sex and property crime. The exactness of this figure aside, it does not detract from the fact that ‘most criminals are not serial in nature, [but] most crime is’. The crimes selected for this project aligned to these principles regarding serial crime.

10.4  Identifying the Need Prior to 2020, if Australian policing bodies required GP analysis to inform their investigations, they would need to seek outside assistance from international experts on serial cases involving murder, robbery and rape. Australian agencies are fortunate to have excellent productive working relationships with international law

2  A ‘search base’ is the base of a criminal’s activities. It is often their residence, but can also be their work site, a past residence, or a social location such as a bar or restaurant. 3  Whilst this issue is not as prevalent in Australia, in countries with numerous local agencies, such as the USA, it causes added challenges around information access and sharing to identify, locate and apprehend the offender.

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enforcement and academia and such requests may continue. However, it also highlights a domestic gap. This provided the initial impetus for the AFP GP project: • There was an immediate and identifiable need for GP in Australia, demonstrated by the multiple requests for assistance from multiple jurisdictions. • Australian policing agencies had little firsthand knowledge of GP but were still willing to employ international experts when required, demonstrating an openness to the capability for complementary operational support. However, before drafting a project proposal and pitching the idea of a new capability to management, further justification was needed. The next stage of preparing the pitch was to clearly identify the ways in which GP could benefit operational endpoints and the different aspects of managing a policing organisation. The cost-­ benefit ratio forms a key part of policing consideration for capability investment and deployment. Experience in a policing organisation will teach you that for new ideas to gain traction, they generally must be both effective and save on money, time, and other resources. One way to think of GP is as a tool for prioritisation, which therefore leads to efficiencies: • The costs of investigations are reduced. Funding is not lost through unnecessary enquiries, overtime payments for detectives, or interpreting fees (to name just a few). The money saved can then be used on different areas of the organisation, or focusing on new and emerging crime types, or upgrading technology etc. • Fewer resources are required for investigations. This is closely linked to funding but now that investigations are taking shorter periods, offences that were previously lower priority can now be addressed sooner due to the availability of more members and resources. Specialised capabilities such as surveillance can be more effectively utilised. It is also the case that one officer or crime analyst can have a bigger impact on the criminal environment (through focused actions). • When GP is utilised, investigation time is estimated to be reduced, in turn lowering the number of victims of serial criminals (Rossmo, 2000). One of the most important outcomes of shorter investigation times is that there are fewer victims. Although this is hard to measure (talking about ‘future crime’), it makes sense that because investigations are resolved sooner with more available resources, there are fewer victims due to earlier apprehension of serial criminals. As a preliminary step, to better ensure the scoping project addressed all matters of anticipated importance, some consultation was undertaken to solicit the views of potential end-users (e.g. investigators). Further to the above points on efficiencies, Australian intelligence and police officers asked questions in relation to which crime types GP can address and how a capability like this may be utilised across the country. Australian  Police representatives were interested in having a geographic profiler examine cold-cases, particularly sexual assaults and burglaries. Around the same time, Western Australia was also subjected to the predations of a serial

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arsonist, another crime type where GP can assist.4 ACT Policing were open minded and interested in using GP in any way available. Additional conversations were raised about how GP could assist during a pandemic such as COVID-19, with thoughts around how a geo-profile5 would assist in locating the potential source of a virus outbreak and help our frontline officers6 to take extra safety precautions around peak profile areas identified as a risk of infection.

10.5  The Project The purpose of the GP capability project was to make an informed recommendation to AFP executives as to whether or not the agency should implement GP (along with associated support structures). This involved providing the AFP with an understanding of the capability and, in particular, examination of the effectiveness of GP analysis to address serial crime in an Australian context. Due to the need identified above, and noting the demand from not only the AFP but external partners, the AFP sanctioned a 3  month project7 to investigate GP in an Australian setting, which was broken into five key phases: • • • • •

Collecting and collating relevant data. Interviews with GP experts in the USA. Quantitative analysis with trial software. Geo-profiles as an intelligence product. Development and delivery of project findings.

10.5.1  Collecting and Collating Relevant Data During this phase, the project team collected data of serial offences from both ACT (community crime) and National regions covering various crime types which were solved and unsolved. The purpose of the solved crimes was to have a known reference point against which to validate results determined using GP. Unsolved crimes were used to demonstrate how GP can be used to develop investigative strategies and new leads for active investigations. The offence types related to burglary (commercial and residential); identity crime; aggravated robbery; sexual assault; motor 4  As an example, refer to Irvine Police Department’s investigation of an arson series between 2010 and 2011  in the United States: https://crimemapping.info/article/ use-geographic-profiling-crime-analysis/ 5  The term ‘geo-profile’ is a shortened version of ‘geographic profile’. 6  The term ‘front-line’ is interchangeable with ‘general duties’ or ‘patrol’. 7  The project began in February 2020 and was completed in May 2020.

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vehicle theft; and property damage. Other crime types were considered for the project (such as terrorism, people smuggling, missing persons, and arson), but were excluded due to time constraints of the project. Fifteen unique series in total were identified for the project. Of the fifteen, nine were chosen to be test cases as some were excluded due to violating one or more of the GP assumptions.

10.5.2  Interviews with GP Experts in the USA During this phase, the project manager travelled to the USA and engaged with experts in Orange County, southern California, to better understand how their teams operate. The following research was conducted: • • • • •

How teams are structured and the use of specialised software. How referrals are made. How work is prioritised. Time frames required to complete geographic profiles. Lessons learned and experiences which could be brought home to assist in developing a GP function/capability within the AFP.

Funding such a trip may not be achievable directly from your home agencies’ budget, but there are alternative funding sources such as scholarships. In this case, the project manager received a scholarship from AFP Legacy which supported travel to the USA.

10.5.3  Quantitative Analysis with Trial Software Computational tools and methodologies exist to aid GP analysis. Training in the use of any algorithms/software utilised is recommended. In our case, GP trained members of the project team employed the CGT (criminal geographic targeting) algorithm,8 as implemented in the GP software known as Rigel (ECRI, Canada).9 Rigel takes the crime data (place and date-time) as input, and the algorithm analyses these crime site locations to determine the likely ‘search base’ of active serial offenders. Like travelling for consultation, the cost of software may be prohibitive when employed for a short-term project. However, many vendors provide trial packages. In this case, the AFP received a 30-day free trial of the Rigel software to assist with the project. After completion of the project, a full licence was purchased and is

8  Further information about the CGT algorithm can be found in Rossmo (2000, p. 195) and related patent Rossmo (1998), Expert System and Method of Performing Crime Site Analysis. 9  For more information on Rigel, refer to: https://ecricanada.com/products/rigel-workstation/

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now the GP software used by the AFP.  There is other GP software and methods available (such as Dragnet10 and the CompStat11 approach) and may be more suitable or affordable for your organisational needs. Other approaches are also worth exploring, such as Canter & Larkin’s (1993) circle theory of environmental range which is deliverable without the use of technology. The circle theory is premised on a serial offender’s crime sites bearing an orbital relationship to their residential location or base (Canter & Larkin, 1993; Kocsis & Irwin, 1997). Essentially, knowledge of where the offender commits their crimes allows the geographic profiler to predict the criminal’s likely residence.

10.5.4  Geo-profiles as an Intelligence Product Careful consideration was given to the form in which geo-profiles would be presented. The GP capability sits within the AFP FORINT unit as discussed above, a unique team that generates intelligence through the fusion of scientific/technical information and expertise with all-source material. The AFP moreover has existing corporate style requirements which shaped the approach. Full geo-profile reports (including profiles generated through Rigel) were presented as (i) Intelligence Bulletins, being up to tens of pages in length and comprising Summary, Background, Analysis and Recommendations subsections; and (ii) Geospatial Intelligence Reports (GeoIntReps),12 comprising a single page that emphasises geographic considerations and highlights key analytical points through annotation and a single analysis text box. The latter were better suited to tactical reporting, e.g. in relation to property offending, while the former better suited treatments of more complex matters, e.g. serial sexual assaults, where greater detail was required. Analytical judgements are presented in a ‘BLUF’ style (bottom-line up-front), then supported by relevant premises. The project manager also presented findings of the project to various portfolios within the AFP through audio-visual presentations, video-­ conferences and round table discussions. The most valuable approach was face-to-­ face meetings with individual teams or team members and having a discussion about one of their cases, explaining how GP could assist in their case. The integration with FORINT allowed overlaying other capabilities with GP, giving access to more information and enabling more conclusions about the criminal activity.13

 Canter et al., 2000.  Vito et al., 2016. 12  An example of a GeoIntRep is explained in case study 1. 13  See chapter by Dr Michael Taylor and FA Adam Marsden, ‘Integration of geographic profiling with forensic intelligence to target serial crime’. 10 11

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10.5.5  Development and Delivery of Project Findings The project findings were summarised and effectively constituted a business case. The format of the report included: • • • •

Background to GP. Overview of demand and opportunities. Consultation and key lessons. Case studies (i.e. the Intelligence Bulletins and GeoIntReps) – including validation studies (against knowns) and active investigations. • Requirements – including personnel, training and software. • Recommended options. The key recommendation was that the AFP adopt and formally implement GP as a capability. This was ultimately endorsed by AFP executive.

10.6  Building the Capability Having a new capability in a police force is like trying to sit a multi-genre book on a shelf at a library (nobody knows where it should go). Placing it with a given crime area (or supporting intelligence function) would be an option. It was determined that FORINT was the best fit for GP in the AFP.  This is primarily because (i) FORINT is proactive and highly effective at identifying serial offending (crime linkage analysis through DNA or fingerprints is a great example of this); (ii) it is an all-source function with scientific/technical drivers, which means assessments are holistic; and (iii) placement with FORINT in Forensics facilitates support to all crime domains and jurisdictions. Having the capability sit within an intelligence function outside of Forensics was also considered, but would generally limit GP to particular crime types. The other main consideration was for integration as part of Geospatial Analyst roles, but this would result in less holistic assessments and be more responsive (rather than proactive) in nature.14 The next concern was having a redundancy plan. AFP has only one certified Geographic Profiling Analyst (GPA)  – and in fact, at the outset of the project Australia had only one certified and operational GPA in the country. One simple question we needed to answer was ‘What will happen when the only certified GPA goes on leave?’ Moreover, the high level of rigour applied to FORINT intelligence reporting necessitates review of assessments by a minimum of two peers in addition to supervisor. Once the capability was formally established, cross-training of appropriate members commenced in the basic GPA course, supplemented by relevant academic literature and case studies. Whilst at this stage these members cannot complete a geo-profile (until they have completed the advanced GPA course and are 14

 The AFP does not have a standalone criminal profiling unit so such an option was not considered.

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certified),15 it allows for increased capacity for FORINT members to identify serial crime, supplement skills of already existing members in forensic intelligence, as well as having other members act as a liaison point for external areas or agencies enquiring about GP. At time of writing, a full professional development continuum is being developed. There are currently two methods our GP capability receives work. One means is to identify serial crime proactively – this is discussed more in Chap. 11. Another is through operational support requests. It is easy to see that we are able to service ACT Policing and the broader AFP, but one of the key features of the AFP, particularly Forensics, is being able to offer specialist capabilities to our state and territory policing counterparts. This in itself brings a range of questions for the GP capability. For instance, how does an external agency request our assistance? How do we receive tasks, internally and externally? How do we prioritise those tasks? Can we assist in cases that are outside our jurisdiction? Whilst still a complex issue, the first question to address concerns prioritisation of tasks. The AFP has its own mechanisms in place for case prioritisation and uses a structured approach known as the Case Categorisation Prioritisation Model (CCPM).16 Aspects of the CCPM include the nature and timeliness of required response, the nature of the impact on society (e.g. threat to life), the impact for the client (i.e. how critical the input is to achieving the client’s objectives) and the alignment to the AFP’s role as defined by Ministerial Direction.17 This assists with the prioritisation of jobs more broadly, but with the creation of a new capability, a new criterion was needed to address multiple GP requests coming in from inside and outside of the AFP. This relates to prioritisation at a team level (once the case has been accepted, how it is managed amongst other concurrent cases) and includes consideration of the applicability of GP to the problem in question. This kind of prioritisation of tasks is largely consistent with descriptions in the academic literature; for example Rossmo (2000, p.  218) notes that: ‘[requests] are prioritized according to level of community risk – murder over rape, current cases over historical ones, active offenders over intermittent criminals’. One additional prioritisation consideration for FORINT, whilst remembering community risk, is addressing AFP operational responsibility for providing policing services to the ACT and Australia’s territories. For example, if two historical cases of volume crime are referred to FORINT, where one is from the AFP and one is from another police force, then FORINT has a responsibility to prioritise the AFP referral over that of the other police force. In practice, it is likely that both cases will be taken on provided they meet AFP criteria and the workload managed by the team leader.18  These requirements are covered in Rossmo, D.K. (2012). Recent Developments in Geographic Profiling. Policing, 6(2), 144–150. 16  More information on the CCPM can be found at: Case Categorisation and Prioritisation Model | Australian Federal Police (afp.gov.au). 17  See: Ministerial Direction, Australian Federal Police (afp.gov.au). 18  The area does not function according to an e.g. first-in, first-out (FIFO) model, rather, prioritisation is ongoing and dynamic, and new cases may continue to ‘bump’ the earlier lower-priority case. 15

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Requests for investigative assistance from FORINT therefore differ slightly depending on whether the request comes from within or outside of the AFP. Within the AFP, requests can be made through several approaches, all of which involve recording detail in line with obligations for sound information management: • Verbally – telephone conversation or face-to-face for quick queries/advice (contemporaneous notes are taken and recorded). • Via a formal Operational Support Request through the police case management system. • Via a Task through the Forensic Management System. External requests are a little more involved but can be a relatively quick process via the AFP National Operations State Service Centre (NOSSC). The NOSSC operates as the first point of contact for stakeholders, state, territory and international law enforcement and Commonwealth agencies for reports and requests. It is also possible for external agencies to consult with Forensics (including FORINT) about their case and what they are aiming to achieve. This will assist in identifying the right kind of assistance the external agency requires. • The external agency must complete what is known as a ‘Request for investigative service’.19 • Once the form is completed, it must be forwarded to the requesting agencies’ local NOSSC.  The NOSSC is the part of the AFP that receives, prioritises, accepts (or rejects) and allocates requests. • Once the management team of the respective region decides to accept the task, it then gets allocated to the FORINT team for action. The member allocated the task will contact the case officer for a conference in relation to the task to discuss timelines, information sharing, and expectations. A given task may take FORINT anywhere between hours/days, or a number of months to complete. This all depends on the complexity of the matter, the amount of available information and additional collection required, whether the case is ongoing and there is new information coming in, and the current case load of the FORINT team. By providing GP assistance to other state, territory, and international police forces, the AFP has: • Enhanced relationships between our policing counterparts. • Developed the skills of our GPA and FORINT members through exposure to many and varied crime types in different geographical regions. • Grown the AFP’s capacity to uniquely support the community.

This means that it is important to have ongoing communication with the requestor and ensure they understand the prioritisation and estimated completion dates. 19  This form and more information on requesting AFP and FORINT investigation assistance is available online at Request for Investigative Service | Australian Federal Police (afp.gov.au).

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10.7  Operational Applications: The AFP Experience After the GP capability was made operational, there were immediate applications. Representative examples include: (i) Known offender, unknown location. A series of trade vans and utility vehicles being broken into to effect the theft of tools therein. A person of interest (POI) was identified; however, police were unable to locate him as he was not using his recorded residence. A GP assessment was compiled and presented in the form of a one-page GeoIntRep. This is a concise means of conveying key information and recommendations (see Fig. 10.2 for an example). Areas of priority interest were delineated, including two possible residences (belonging to the POI’s associates) and a location of interest (possible search base) being a community centre. Ultimately the POI was located and arrested within 100 m of the nominated search base (reference point RP). (ii) Unknown offender, all-source approach. Analysis of witness statements and forensic face-fits indicated that multiple sexual assaults were part of a series, where the offender was seemingly escalating in violence. Spatiotemporal analysis was undertaken to provide priority areas (and days/times) of interest for resource allocation. A range of information sources were exploited to nominate a suspect (including criminal indices, open source and financial data). These analyses revealed other offences and behavioural insights. An intelligence

Fig. 10.2  De-identified GeoIntRep for tool theft series. (Image source: AFP FORINT)

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assessment was produced detailing the justification for the suspect nomination and suggestions for investigative strategies. One recommendation was to obtain DNA from the suspect for comparison with that recovered following the offences. As demonstrated, it was beneficial to approach serial crime utilising several methodologies and not limiting products solely to GP, but providing a more holistic evaluation informed by investigational work and crime analysis.

10.8  Conclusions and Future Opportunities Starting a new, dedicated capability in an organisation has its challenges, and pushing for the first in a country raises those challenges to the next level. Fortunately, there is usually someone, somewhere upon whose experience you can draw. The AFP was fortunate to have many people willing to share their knowledge in GP to assist in building the capability. Our key final thoughts and lessons learnt are summarised below and cover (i) proposing and forming a new capability, (ii) implementation of a GP function and (iii) future opportunities. For those wanting to establish a GP function (or any new capability) it is necessary to determine the operating principles for your organisation. At the highest level – what is it that your organisation is trying to achieve? What is your ­chief/ commissioner trying to achieve? Then with greater granularity, what are the gaps, impediments and critical vulnerabilities? How does GP address these? We have a duty to do not what is ‘interesting’, but what is ‘important’.20 Also in pragmatic terms, by ensuring your capability proposal aligns with the way your organisation operates and your commissioner’s direction, you make your idea a supportable and more obvious fit for your organisation. A business case for a new capability typically requires solid supporting documentation; we found that undertaking the trial project was key to demonstrating the utility of GP within the context of our own organisation and operating landscape. Validation against known cases aided this, and application to active unsolved cases teased out other aspects, e.g. the mechanics of interaction and information-sharing. It is also necessary to have clear estimates on resource impost (noting that case studies can also show how overall resources will be saved). Options for organisational structure and support systems will aid executive decision making. Upon endorsement, a model for task management and prioritisation is required. Organisational systems and guidelines should drive this, though additional, capability-­ specific, considerations may be applied. Part of the process should include a triage step, which considers not just priority but suitability (i.e. does the case meet criteria for GP analysis?). A training and authorisation regime is necessary to ensure that the GPAs obtain and maintain the appropriate skills, such that 20

 A good manager will try to maximise the intersection of these.

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there is sufficient capacity to meet operational demand and mitigate risk (i.e. through peer review etc.). In our case, strong cross-skilling was also initiated (i.e. to build GP fluency amongst forensic intelligence analysts and vice versa) to reinforce the framework of GP as an adjunct to FORINT. In terms of tools, the GP software Rigel, as well as the ‘circle’ method, were applied to the Australian criminal landscape and found to be successful. The underlying theories and practices around GP are also transferrable from places such as the USA and Canada, where they have been using the capability operationally since the 1990s. For Australia and the AFP, this means a great platform of knowledge already exists, which we can draw upon to build our capability to its full potential in serial crime investigation and disruption. The AFP is in a strong position to explore how GP can assist Commonwealth crime types such as: terrorism (e.g. identifying potential locations of improvised explosive device ‘factories’), people smuggling (e.g. identifying where shore parties are likely to meet), and illicit drugs (e.g. locating clandestine laboratories). There are also applications to community crimes such as homicides, sexual assaults and arsons (including cold cases), as well as missing persons and fugitive apprehension. While there is routine operational work and research elsewhere (e.g. in socio-­ politically similar nations such as the USA, the UK and Canada), it is anticipated that operational implementation in Australia will further catalyse the important research being undertaken by academia in the domestic environment. It is hoped that having GP as part of its toolkit will strengthen the AFP in its mission of policing for a safer Australia. Because of the AFP’s national and international reach, we are well placed to collaborate and explore avenues of GP that support relationships with national and international police forces, and provide assistance to cases across Australia where needed.

References Australian Federal Police. (2020). Australian federal police corporate plan 2020–2021. Australian Government: Author. Retrieved from: https://www.afp.gov.au/corporate-­plan-­2020-­21 Breetzke, G. D. (2006). Geographical information systems (GIS) and policing in South Africa: A review. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 29, 723–740. Canelo-Cacho, J. A., Blumstein, A., & Cohen, J. (1997). Relationship between the frequency of imprisoned and free offenders. Criminology, 35, 133–175. Canter, D. V., Coffey, T., Huntley, M., & Missen, C. (2000). Predicting serial killers’ home base using a decision support system. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 16(4), 457–478. Canter, D. V., & Gregory, A. (1994). Identifying the residential location of rapists. Journal of the Forensic Science Society, 34, 169–175. Canter, D.  V., & Larkin, P. (1993). The environmental range of serial rapists. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 13, 63–69. Canter, D.  V., & Youngs, D. (2008). Applications of geographical offender profiling. Ashgate Publications. Department of Home Affairs. (2020). Australian Federal Police: Entity resources and planned performance. Australian Government: Author. Retrieved from: Portfolio Budget Statements 2020–21 (homeaffairs.gov.au).

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Kocsis, R.  N. (2003). Criminal psychological profiling: Validities and abilities. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 47, 126–144. Kocsis, R. N., & Irwin, H. J. (1997). An analysis of spatial patterns in serial rape, arson, and burglary: The utility of the circle theory of environmental range for psychological profiling. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 5, 195–206. Muller, D. A. (2011). Qualitative approaches to criminal profiling as ways of reducing uncertainty in criminal investigations. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 5, 33–40. Petherick, W. (2014). Profiling and serial crime: Theoretical and practical issues (3rd ed.). Elsevier. Rossmo, D.  K. (1998). Expert system and method of performing crime site analysis (PCT/ CA98/00289. WO 99/52057. G06F 19/00, 17/60, 15/18). World Intellectual Publishing Organisation. Rossmo, D. K. (2000). Geographic profiling. CRC Press. Rossmo, D. K. (2005). Geographic heuristics or shortcuts to failure?: Response to Snook et al. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 19(5), 651–654. Rossmo, D. K. (2012). Recent developments in geographic profiling. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 6, 144–150. Rossmo, D. K. (2014). Geographic profiling. In G. Bruinsma & D. Weisburd (Eds.), Encyclopaedia of criminology and criminal justice. Springer. Rossmo, D. K., & Harries, K. (2011). The geospatial structure of terrorist cells. Justice Quarterly, 28(2), 221–248. Swope, R. E. (2001). Constructively developed analytical crime mapping approaches. The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles, 74, 42–49. Vito, G. F., Reed, J. C., & Walsh, W. F. (2016). Police executives’ and managers’ perspectives on Compstat. Police Practice and Research, 18(1), 15–25. Wilson, R. E., & Maxwell, C. D. (2007). Research in geographic profiling: Remarks from the guest editors. Police Practice and Research, 8, 313–319. Adam Marsden  is a Forensic Intelligence Officer in the Australian Federal Police (AFP) with 15 years’ experience in complex investigations including: counterterrorism; identity crime; fraud & anti-corruption; and international operations. At the beginning of 2020, Adam led a project assessing the value of geographic profiling in Australian serial crime investigations with a view to setting up Australia’s first geographic profiling capability within the AFP’s Forensic Intelligence (FORINT) unit. Adam is now the only operational geographic profiling analyst in Australia and provides forensic intelligence and geographic profiling support to serial crime and other investigations for the AFP and partner agencies in Australia. His recent experience covers: missing persons; sex crimes; burglaries; aggravated robberies; theft; and traffic offences. Adam has advanced training in Geographic Profiling Analysis, a Masters in Fraud & Financial Crime, and has researched the influence of geographic profiling in the retail crime environment and ATM skimming offences. Dr Michael Taylor  leads the Australian Federal Police’s (AFP) Forensic Intelligence (FORINT) and Geospatial capabilities. The AFP FORINT function is a specialised all-source intelligence model, which draws upon scientific information and expertise to discover leads, convergences and targetable vulnerabilities across criminal domains. The Geospatial function supports law enforcement through exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess and visually depict physical features and geographically-referenced activities. Key interests include use of scientific methods for network disruption and countering serial offending.

Chapter 11

Integration of Geographic Profiling with Forensic Intelligence to Target Serial Crime Michael Taylor and Adam Marsden

11.1  Introduction Targeting serial offenders is well justified in terms of effect (societal benefit) and efficiency (use of the limited resources available to police). The targeting approach advocated in this chapter is based on four major premises: (i) Many crimes are attributable to few offenders. (ii) Crimes occur purposively and non-randomly in space and time. (iii) A given offender’s behaviours tend to be more consistent than different. (iv) Every contact leaves a trace. These principles provide a foundation for the use of ‘forensic intelligence’ (FORINT) supplemented by geographic profiling analysis (GPA). FORINT methods provide a highly effective means of case linkage. Holistic (cross-case, cross-­ domain) interpretation of forensic findings, fused with all-source holdings, can identify convergences – key nodes with many edges – which may present targetable vulnerabilities of criminal activity. Once a crime series is identified through forensic methods (such as DNA linkage), spatiotemporal factors can be analysed quantitatively and qualitatively through GPA, which can then inform enquiries, prioritisation and resource deployment. Outcomes commonly include target prioritisation at the tactical level, and may extend to recommendations for disruption/deterrence at a strategic level.

M. Taylor (*) · A. Marsden Australian Federal Police, Canberra, Australia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Bland et al. (eds.), The Crime Analyst’s Companion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94364-6_11

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11.2  Serial and Recidivist Offending A disproportionate number of crimes are attributable to a small fraction of criminal actors (Wolfgang et al., 1972). Such offenders are often dubbed ‘serial’ offenders, after the term ‘serial killer’ became common parlance following the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s famous work in this domain (Ressler & Burgess, 1988; Ressler et al., 1988).1 There is in fact a broad related lexicon, including terms such as ‘career criminals’, ‘habitual’ or ‘prolific’ offenders, distinctions between which are discussed elsewhere (e.g. Edelstein (2016) and Nelson (2015) and references therein). It is common and practical to define serial offending in terms of a minimum number (two) of like offences committed by the same offender in separate instances (Morton & Hilts, 2005).2 Serial murders are in fact relatively uncommon in Australia, accounting for about 1% of homicides (Davies & Mouzos, 2007; Mouzos & West, 2007); the majority are attributable to family or acquaintances (Dearden & Jones, 2008). Nevertheless, the community’s fear of murder by a stranger is more severe than the latter, and the public concern and fascination with serial murder is reflected by the abundance of pop-culture on this theme (Fisher, 1997). The term ‘serial’ can also apply to a range of other criminal activities. The rates of non-partner sexual violence in Australia are, unfortunately, relatively high (Abrahams et al., 2014; Heiskanen, 2010). Like serial murder, serial rape engenders fear within the affected community (Carney, 2003). Other serial criminal behaviours – both violent and nonviolent – include such acts as arson (Brogan, 2009), stalking (Petherick, 2009), burglary (Schlesinger, 2000), bombings (Turvey, 2012; Bates, 2012) and fraud (Smith, 2003; Kapardis & Krambia-Kapardis, 2004). In the present work we treat ‘recidivist’ offending collectively with serial offending. Recidivist offending may be taken as synonymous with repeat offending after punishment for prior crime. Rates of recidivism are variously reported and outcomes can include rearrest, reconviction and reimprisonment (Fazel & Wolf, 2015). In Australia, two out of three prisoners will have previously been imprisoned; one in four prisoners will be reconvicted within 3 months of being released (Payne, 2007) and half within 2 years (ROGS, 2021). It is important to note that ‘serial’ is distinct from ‘spree’ crime (Delaney et al., 2011). The latter denotes a succession of crimes within a short timeframe, without the offender returning to his/her ‘home base’ (vide infra). Operationally, we have the following objectives when dealing with serial crime:  A search of terms such as ‘serial burglar’ or ‘serial rapist’ in the Google Books Ngram Viewer (http://books.google.com/ngrams, accessed February 2021) indicates that the terms postdate and remain less prevalent (by orders of magnitude) than ‘serial killer’. 2  This is a contentious topic and it is noted that there are also arguments e.g. that ‘serial’ should be defined in psychological terms, see KOCSIS, R. & IRWIN, H. 1998. The psychological profile of serial offenders and a redefinition of the misnomer of serial crime. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 5, 197–213. Further, Nelson (2015) define ‘prolific offenders’ as those with four or more contacts with the criminal justice system in a two-year period. This definition however does not make allowance for those serial offenders who have been arrested once. 1

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(i) Attribute: The linking of multiple criminal acts to a given actor(s). (ii) Identify: The identification and locating of that actor. (iii) Disrupt: The disruption of the actor’s pattern of offending, thereby improving the safety and security of the community. The (interrelated) advantages in prioritised targeting of serial offenders are: (i) Impact: These individuals cause relatively high harm. (ii) Efficiency: Limited resources can be used to treat multiple incidents collectively rather than independently and in parallel. (iii) Efficacy: The collective interpretation of the linked offences can translate to a better comprehension of the criminal actor than the linear arithmetic sum of that from individual investigations. This means that prioritising the disruption of serial offending yields a disproportionately higher social benefit for a given resource cost compared to arbitrary allocation.3 The process of attribution becomes trivial if the offender is known (i.e. conclusively identified) in each case. Otherwise, the linking of multiple crimes to the same offender can be achieved through (one or both of) behavioural and physical evidence. This is discussed in the subsequent section. The AFP conforms to an intelligence-led model (AFP, 2020a), which can be described as a policing approach that treats analysis and crime intelligence as pivotal to an objective, decision-­making framework that facilitates crime- and harm-reduction, disruption and prevention (Ratcliffe, 2016).

11.3  The Crime Analysis and Criminal Intelligence Nexus 11.3.1  More Information Means More Analysis, Not Less ‘Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?’ (Eliot, 2009). Any historic conception of ‘lack of data’ in policing cannot be thought to apply to the contemporary operating environment (Lemieux, 2008; Van Der Sloot et al., 2016). In general, there has been an exponential growth in global data volume, estimated to be 1.8ZB in 2011 and 175ZB by 2025 (Guo et al., 2014; Vopson, 2021).4 Information can be defined in the FORINT context as processed data, such as financial records, human source reports, and forensic results. Information includes data that may have been processed to provide meaning, but not analysed to provide contextual meaning with respect to operational propositions/implications. A corollary of the growth in data and information is the potential for ‘infobesity’ that inhibits effective decision 3  We use the term ‘disruption’; this reflects our focus on stopping the offending. Disruption is taken in a broad sense, and may be effected through traditional law enforcement actions such as arrest and criminal prosecution, or through diversion, or the deregistration of a business etc. 4  One zettabyte, ZB, is one sextillion (or 1021) bytes.

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Fig. 11.1  Mean changes in confidence and accuracy with increasing information. (Adapted from Slovic (1973))

making and use of resources (Buchanan & Kock, 2001). Moreover, it has been shown that seeking additional information does not necessarily improve assessments (Fig. 11.1). To paraphrase Heuer (1999), a typical reaction to problems is to collect more information, when in fact analysts often already have more information than they can handle. Rather, they need more useful information, improved mental models and better analytical tools. It is clear that ‘value-adding’ to information is key to both crime analysis and criminal intelligence work.

11.4  Integrating Analytical Models Crime analysis refers to systematic, analytical processes that provide timely, pertinent information about crime patterns and crime trend correlations to prevent and suppress criminal activities, assist the investigative process, and increase apprehension and clearance rates (Emig et al., 1980). Various definitions exist but all broadly align to these concepts, e.g. Boba-Santos (2017), the International Association of Police Chiefs (IACP, 1996) and International Association of Crime Analysts (IACA, 2014, 2017). As contrasted with crime analysis, ‘intelligence’ has arguably been subject to more varied definition, having developed differently in a range of milieus (Gill, 2009; Warner, 2002). ‘Criminal intelligence’ is, clearly, intelligence applied to the policing domain (for good detail see Ratcliffe, 2016). Described here,

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criminal intelligence as a process involves planning, information collection and collation, analysis and dissemination. As an output, it is a product derived from adding value to information, to provide insight and influence decision making (see also the Australian Criminal Intelligence Management Strategy, (ACIC, 2017)).5 There are natural affinities between crime analysis and criminal intelligence, to the extent that the two are sometimes consciously grouped together under the banner of analysis (Baughman, 2020 and the discussions in Chaps. 1 and 2). While distinct disciplines, there are genuine synergies and integrated models have been proposed elsewhere, key themes of which include de-compartmentalisation, a holistic interpretation of crime patterns and individual behaviours, and a greater range of analytical recommendations/opportunities (Ratcliffe, 2007). In this chapter, we focus on the integration of two key methodologies in the context of serial crime: (i) Forensic intelligence, a specialised criminal intelligence approach. (ii) Geographic profiling analysis, a specialised crime analysis tool. We argue that the combination of these methods has demonstrable efficacy in addressing serial crime.

11.5  Linking Serial Crimes ‘None can act with the intensity induced by criminal activities without leaving multiple traces of his path’ (Locard, 1920; Ribaux et al., 2016). The foremost challenge in addressing serial crime is to attribute multiple incidents to a given criminal entity. This is generally termed ‘linkage analysis’ or ‘comparative case analysis’. This can be achieved through considerations broadly classifiable into two regimes: (i) physical and (ii) behavioural. The physical is often the domain of forensics. Locard’s exchange principle is often expressed by Kirk’s (1953, p. 4) well-known phrasing that ‘wherever he steps, whatever he touches, whatever he leaves, even unconsciously, will serve as a silent witness against him’. In criminology literature, physical means of linking is sometimes glossed over as being in the criminalistics sphere and perhaps even straightforward or self-evident, although we would argue that things are more nuanced (and that the fields intersect). Consider a simple example: matching DNA profiles are recovered in multiple cases of assault where the offender broke into the victims’ homes; this is a fairly straightforward link expressible with high confidence. However, consider an example whereby no DNA was recovered, but toolmarks at points of entry exhibit consistency. Or recovered shoemarks match at a class level to a particular make of shoes. This may be significant but leaves obvious questions, e.g. how common are these shoes? 5  This is particularly true of the Australian Federal Police model, which  – insofar as its output includes explicit provision of recommendations  – is more aligned to the American (cf. Anglo) conception of intelligence.

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A similar analysis of relevance and diagnosticity is undertaken when examining the behavioural attributes. Linking of crimes through behavioural factors is broadly based upon premises of distinctive inter-offender behaviours, and consistent intra-­ offender behaviours (Canter, 1995).6 The notion has been applied to a range of crime types; see Davies and Woodhams (2019) and references cited therein. For simplicity we refer to both functionally-significant context-dependent factors as well as psychologically significant ‘signatures’ (Alison et al., 2005) collectively as modus operandi (Woodhams et al., 2007). Linkage databases can be highly effective tools to record and query case information for linkages (Davidson & Petherick, 2021; Rossmo, 2009). Simple tabular approaches are an easy way to keep track of observations/findings for each case such that they can be compared. As a rule of thumb, to establish a bonafide crime series, one would expect more similarities than differences (Rossmo, 2000). For the consideration of physical/behavioural elements, one should: (i) Take into consideration the level of confidence of a given piece of information (for instance using admiralty ratings). (ii) Determine the diagnosticity of an individual piece of information with respect to a specified proposition. (iii) Evaluate the individual pieces of diagnostic information (both physical and behavioural) in aggregate. Structured analytical techniques should be employed in the formation of judgements, such as the analysis of competing hypothesis approach (Heuer & Pherson, 2010) or Bayesian network analysis.7 FORINT is a highly effective means of illuminating serial offending. Once confident with the established series, geographic profiling can be applied. It should be noted that spatiotemporal proximity itself is a strong indicator of crime linkage, but care must be taken not to erroneously link crimes through this consideration alone (particularly for volume crimes).

11.6  Forensic Intelligence (FORINT) The term ‘forensic science’ (or simply ‘forensics’8) typically denotes the application of scientific methods to problems in courts of judicature. Like intelligence, one could argue that it has existed in some form since antiquity: consider Archimedes’ 6  It is acknowledged offenders may also modify aspects of behaviours over the course of a crime series. 7  Advantageously, Bayesian methods will be familiar to most forensics practitioners, with many types of findings expressed in terms of likelihood ratios. 8  Here we use the terms interchangeably, although distinctions exist from simply linguistic terms to perspectives on the nature of the field, see ROUX, C., CRISPINO, F. & RIBAUX, O. 2012. From Forensics to Forensic Science. Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 24, 7–24.

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assistance to King Hiero in what was effectively a third Century BCE fraud investigation (Vitruvius, 1914). The prevailing forensic paradigm is the technical application of distinct scientific disciplines (chemistry, biology, etc.) to problems of the justice system (Roux et al., 2014). A corollary of a linear conception of investigational support is the ‘trace’ funnel (Fig. 11.2), analogous to the crime funnel concept familiar to criminologists, whereby a relatively small fraction of information is ultimately of successful prosecutorial utility (Ribaux et al., 2017). However, forensic processes in fact produce a wealth of information that can be exploited upstream in the pre/peri-investigational workflow. With its capacity to illuminate criminal activity and taken in a more holistic (cross-case) view, forensic science is increasingly acknowledged as having significant intelligence value. ‘Forensic intelligence’ (FORINT) has been described as the accurate, timely and useful product of logically processing forensic case data… where collectively (across numerous investigations or various disciplines), the outcomes of forensic analyses become the source of intelligence (Ribaux et al., 2003). Within the AFP, the FORINT unit produces intelligence derived from technical and forensic information and expertise, fused with all-source material, to provide insight and influence decision making. We employ the definition that ‘forensic intelligence is intelligence derived from technical and forensic information and expertise’. Importantly, it is not a lower standard of evidence, or something not yet reviewed,

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Fig. 11.2  Example representation of the DNA ‘trace funnel’ for judicial endpoints. (Adapted from Ribaux and Talbot-Wright (2014))

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or ‘not intended for court’ etc. (Morelato et al., 2013). The output, which comes from holistic analysis of this information, does not just inform, but influences (i.e. provides recommendations for) actions. FORINT can be utilised in essentially any crime domain, drawing upon different scientific and technical inputs as discussed in more detail below. Applied to serial crime, it is particularly effective when augmented with GPA.

11.7  Geographic Profiling Analysis (GPA) Crimes may be framed as purposive acts undertaken so as to benefit the offender, per the rational choice perspective. This view emphasises the interaction between the offender and the situational environment; see Cornish and Clarke (2017) and references therein. These interactions are borne of routine, as described in Cohen and Felson’s (1979) work, whereby crime is influenced by the offender’s routine pattern of activities through the convergence of conditional elements: (i) motivated offenders, (ii) suitable targets, and (iii) the absence of capable guardians. These intersect with the offender’s ‘awareness spaces’ (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984), which are locations of familiarity, e.g. areas proximate to the offender’s home, work, school, local shops or recreation locations, and the pathways of travel between these. Crimes can moreover be thought of as occurring within a ‘backcloth’ (spatiotemporal distribution) of targets/victims in certain socio/politico-­ economic conditions superimposed on a physical environment. As such we find that crime is not randomly distributed but results from distinct choices made by the offender. Collectively, these frameworks (rational choice, routine activity approach and geometry of crime) help us understand, analyse and anticipate criminal behaviours (Wortley & Townsley, 2017). The spatiotemporal aspects of criminal behaviour are the fundamental principle of GPA. Once we have established a crime series, we can then apply GPA with the typical objective of determining an offender’s ‘search base’.9 This has particular value when: • The offender is unknown. • There is a known offender that cannot be located. • There is a long list of suspects that must be prioritised. People, including criminals, will typically act in a way that minimises cost, e.g. exertion, time, distance, etc. (Zipf, 1949); e.g. Fig. 11.3. Generalised observations of offender behaviours reveal a ‘distance decay’, whereby the number of crimes decreases exponentially as the distance increases (Rengert et al., 1999; Townsley, 2017). In other words, there is a tendency for offenders to choose targets closer to

9  The search base is the anchor point of a criminal’s activities. It is often their residence, but can also be their work site, a past residence, or a social location such as a bar or restaurant.

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Fig. 11.3  ‘Trampelpfad’ sighted in Tallinn, Estonia: people often opt for the path of least resistance (even when cost-saving may be small). (Adapted from https://i.redd.it/qb7hwsmmul371.jpg, accessed July 2021)

their search base (e.g. their residence). However, from simple geometric considerations, the number of targets must increase with distance; furthermore, factors such as a desire for anonymity may compel offending further from the base. The convolution of these factors with distance decay result in a ‘buffer zone’ closest to the search base origin, in which the person is less likely to offend; see Fig. 11.4 (Canter & Larkin, 1993; Rossmo, 2000).

11.8  Operation Implementation 11.8.1  People Organisational implementation will differ. AFP has a Forensics Command, while elsewhere forensic functions may be variously performed within law enforcement, health departments or private industry (see Welsh & Hannis, 2011 for the United Kingdom context). The AFP has benefited from a long-held forensic culture that positively embraces an upstream investigative consultancy approach, which has eased FORINT implementation. Nevertheless, a cultural shift was required and may present a significant challenge to other agencies (Raymond & Julian, 2015). From our experience we recommend (i) establishment of a dedicated FORINT unit whose

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Fig. 11.4  The picture of crimes as a function of distance from the search base starts at a non-zero point, with a ‘buffer zone’ before peaking, and then decaying with distance. (Source: Author’s own creation)

mission is well supported by the executive; (ii) continual engagement with forensic disciplines to explain how information is to be utilised10; (iii) ensuring FORINT unit members have a deep understanding of forensic sciences and ‘treat the information with respect’; and (iv) building a feedback loop, such that wherever possible the forensic disciplines/personnel can see the practical operational outcomes of their work. For further reading, the formation of a GPA capability is discussed in detail in Chap. 10 of this book. A specialised training regime that ensures FORINT unit members have a strong understanding of forensic/technical information in addition to intelligence practice within the policing context is key to success (Harrison et al., 2020; Crispino et al., 2015). In the AFP this is a seven-year programme with a range of attainments; in addition to forensic science and intelligence practice, training is also provided in areas such as critical thinking, cognitive bias, data analytics, risk analysis, project management and so on. To complement the FORINT training, AFP members using GPA undertake formal training including the programme offered via ECRI (Vancouver, Canada), which includes emphasis on volume crime (Rossmo & Velarde, 2008). With training, it is possible to make meaningful predictions that can value-add to an investigation even in the absence of specialised tools. Snook et al.

 Even explaining the intelligence cycle, SATs and the all-source approach has been reassuring to forensic scientists.

10

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(2002), for example, demonstrated that trained persons can employ the ‘circle’ (Canter & Larkin, 1993) and ‘distance-decay’ (Rengert et al., 1999) heuristics to better focus decision processes in determining an offender’s search base. Nevertheless, at the AFP various systems are used to support FORINT/GPA work.

11.9  Systems and Ontologies It is recommended that the development of suitable ontologies11 be undertaken in close consultation with forensic disciplines. This may involve intense initial engagement and periodic refinement – including ongoing exploration of new capabilities and opportunities. Considerations begin at the initial crime scene where traces can be treated within an intelligence-led framework that informs broader decision making (Ribaux et  al., 2010a, b). Example frameworks for FORINT crime linking include false identity documents (Baechler et al., 2011; Talbot-Wright et al., 2016), illicit drug seizures (Esseiva et  al., 2007; Morelato et  al., 2014), firearm crime (Spaulding & Morris, 2018; Gagliardi, 2012) and property offending (Ribaux & Margot, 1999; Ribaux et al., 2006). Collation of FORINT information in a suitable database, the design of which corresponds to the ontology, is key to effective implementation; e.g. see Rossy et al. (2013) or Oatley et al. (2020) for discussion. The AFP’s FORINT knowledge base, dubbed iForensic, can be queried and navigated through a graphical user interface with both/either commands and visual (graph) means. For smaller departments or problem sets, or where scope or resources are limited, collation in a spreadsheet (‘the poor-man’s database’) can be a sufficient option. Principles such as distance decay etc. can, at minimum, be useful heuristics. In the AFP we use a computational approach to generate a probability map derived using the ‘criminal geographic targeting’ (CGT) algorithm (Rossmo, 1995, 1998) as implemented in the software Rigel (ECRI, Vancouver Canada – also discussed in Chap. 9).12 The scores produced and visualised as a GIS layer13 essentially indicate the geographic space in which the offender’s search base is likely to be found. Other tools also exist that agencies may utilise, e.g. DragNet (Canter et al., 2000), and,

 An ontology is a set of categories of objects/ideas along with certain interrelationships; it is not a linguistic object but is dependent on natural language and word senses. For example see HIRST, G. 2009. Ontology and the Lexicon. In: STAAB, S. & STUDER, R. (eds.) Handbook on Ontologies. Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag. It is acknowledged that an ontology may differ from a data schema but here we treat the terms quite interchangeably USCHOLD, M. 2015. Ontology and database schema: What’s the difference? Applied Ontology, 10, 243–258. 12  We do not advocate any particular software, and note that others exist which may better suit a given agency. 13  Mapping and the use of geographic information systems (GIS) are a core element of crime analysis. Crime mapping refers to the spatial analysis of crime and disorder problems, and GIS are computer-based tools used to collate, visualise and analyse spatial (and aspatial) information. 11

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even without dedicated software, agencies can still apply methodologies and heuristics of geographic profiling analysis.

11.10  Projects With suitably trained personnel and a supportive infrastructure, FORINT with GPA can be brought to bear on criminal problem sets. In our parlance a ‘project’ is an intelligence probe with clear objectives (intelligence questions), a defined approach and dedicated resources. The forensic (and other) information/expertise drawn upon depends on the scope of the project. We advocate this concept because it is scalable and delineable, and so is likely to be a useful approach regardless of agency size and remit (see Table 11.1). Where FORINT projects are established to address serial offending, one may bring in GPA as an adjunct capability to aid in disruption. This overcomes the foremost challenge of GPA, namely accurately conducting linkage analysis. The next step is to evaluate the suitability, advantages and limitations of undertaking GPA for a given circumstance.14 When incorporating GPA into a FORINT assessment,15 consideration is given to (Rossmo & Rombouts, 2017): • Spatiotemporal factors, i.e. where and when (date/day/time) the crimes occurred. This is the foundation of GPA. • Offender type and ‘search and attack’ method (Rossmo, 2000). • The influence of the target backcloth (vide supra) and local demographics (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993). • Proximity of arterial roads/highways and public transport stations. These can play a major role in offender movement, as well as presenting opportunities for e.g. surveillance deployment. • The routine activities of victims. This aids understanding of how the offender identifies and selects targets and likely influences the distribution of crimes. • Spatial displacement (Cornish & Clarke, 1987). The outcome of a FORINT/GPA project is generally an intelligence product which provides recommendations for action. Common tactical examples include suspect nomination, location of interest (LOI) identification, surveillance prioritisation etc. as well as forensic-specific recommendations, such as to obtain an order for

 While a project may be planned with the intent to utilise GPA, there are instances when the added value is limited. For instance, the authors explored a series of bombings linked through FORINT (including technical signatures); however, the bombings (while linked) were widely dispersed and attributable to multiple actors thus GPA did not provide a major value-add. Of course, if it was not a priori clear from the FORINT analysis that multiple geographically dispersed actors were involved, GPA analysis would have suggested this. 15  This stage is commenced after linkage analysis is complete and selection for analysis is undertaken; the latter may include, e.g. exclusion of incidents that exhibit interdependencies. 14

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Table 11.1  In the AFP, FORINT projects are planned in a structured fashion This describes the ultimate intent of the project and may be framed as a key intelligence question (KIQ). This should provide sufficient background information to understand the relevant issues, threats or offences being addressed, and allow for prioritisation according to crime type, risk etc. Objectives The overall aim should be broken down into constituent achievable objectives; these may address intelligence requirements (IREQ) and indicate, e.g. which forensic sources will be drawn upon. Outcomes One should specify how intelligence will be conveyed, e.g. as a report or briefing. Considerations Who is the intended client? Who/what else may be impacted by the work? What forensic disciplines should be engaged? Should a privacy impact statement or risk assessment be completed? Are there legal or specialist requirements? Resourcing The staffing allocation, consumables, travel costs and so on should all be specified to ensure reasonable use of resources. Timeframes Timeliness is a cornerstone of good intelligence; key milestones should be specified, e.g. as a Gantt chart. Overall aim Context

biometric collection. Strategic opportunities can also be identified. For example, early in the COVID-19 pandemic, one AFP FORINT recommendation was for public engagement in relation to a community crime issue. Namely, to lock up even if at home in ‘lockdown’  – two-thirds of burglaries were being affected by access through unsecured doors/windows (AFP, 2020b). The ‘project’ concept can be applied to essentially any criminal activity, and often requires a bespoke framework of forensic and other information (in the form of schemas). The AFP FORINT unit manages a number of projects, which target different criminal activities incl. Illicit firearms, terrorism, counterfeit identity documents etc. as well as serial crime (to which GPA is also applied) including property offending. A routine example of the latter is provided here.

11.11  Tactical Example: Serial Burglary At a tactical level, burglaries are highly amenable to analysis and targeting through FORINT and GPA (Ribaux & Margot, 1999; Ribaux et al., 2006; Rossmo & Velarde, 2008). A suitable ontology for burglaries should include conventional ‘POLE’ (persons, objects, locations, events) fields found in a crime management system, e.g. offence type, date/time, address etc. A FORINT schema that addresses burglary would include additional forensic/technical-centric entities and fields, such as: • Latent fingerprints. • DNA. • Shoemarks.

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Toolmarks. Facial identification (for CCTV) and face-fits (for witness descriptions). Modus Operandi (e.g. categories of items stolen). Point-of-entry (POE) and method-of-entry (MOE) MOs in particular (attempted POEs should also be considered).

In the example presented here,16 it is assessed that the same offender was highly likely to be responsible for nine burglaries in a three month period. The person of interest assessed to be the offender is also the suspect for an assault in the previous year and has prior offences for burglary. As shown in Fig. 11.5 the POEs and MOEs of the burglaries are consistent – access is gained through a window by breaking, unless it happens to have been left unsecured by the resident. In each case small, portable and attractive items were stolen such as jewellery and cash, and in one instance car keys were taken. Several crime scenes were linked by latent fingerprints but the contributor was not on record. Similarly, DNA profiles linked two scenes, and the handle of a bat used in the assault for which the POI is a suspect, but there was no reference DNA on record. Shoemarks linked two scenes but no reference shoes were available for full comparison; however, the marks matched at a class level to the make/model of sneakers that the POI was witnessed wearing. A number of persons with prior burglary convictions reside in the relevant patrol zone. This cohort was prioritised by undertaking GPA of the offences; see Fig. 11.6 and inset. The POI’s residence falls proximate to the profile peak. Other known persons with criminal records for burglary had residences within the patrol zone but further from the peak. Recommendations provided to case officers included investigation of the POI as the offender such that the offending pattern could be disrupted in a timely fashion, and the collection of forensic samples (DNA and fingerprints) from the POI. The inset shows a geo-profile generated using Rigel (ECRI, Vancouver Canada); in simple terms the ‘hotter’ the colour, the higher the search priority. The nominated POIs residence is shown as a yellow marker.

11.12  Conclusions and Recommendations An Analyst’s typical roles include identification of significant/pervasive problem sets. Serial crime is a particular form of this  – one where multiple offences are attributable to the same actor. Forensic information, analysed holistically (and fused with other sources) in a systematic fashion, can be a powerful means of identifying serial offending. Once a crime series is confidently delineated, geographic profiling methods can be brought to bear against it. This facilitates investigational focus and resource prioritisation. Culture, training and systems barriers may be tricky to  Note that the material has been anonymised/modified to protect the identities and locations of victims, but is representative of routine casework.

16

Burglary 2

POE: Window MOE: Break-glass Targeted: Portable and attractive

Burglary 3

Witnessed wearing

Burglary 6

Burglary 7

POE: Window MOE: Break-glass Targeted: Vehicle keys

Shoes

Recovered from

Shoemarks

Class level similarity to

Burglary 8

Assessed offender

POE: Window MOE: Unsecured Targeted: Portable and attractive

Recovered from

POE: Window MOE: Break-glass Targeted: Portable and attractive

Recovered from

Contributor of

Unknown person

Assessed to be

POE: Window MOE: Break-glass Targeted: Portable and attractive

Burglary 4

Burglary 9

Recovered from

Fingerprints (unknown)

Unknown male

Assessed to be

POI Prior burglary arrests No biometrics held

POE: Window MOE: Unsecured Targeted: Portable and attractive

Recovered from

Contributor of

POE: Window MOE: Break-glass Targeted: Portable and attractive

Recovered from

DNA (unknown)

Suspect for

Fig. 11.5  A simple relationship chart summarising key physical recoveries (DNA, fingerprints and shoemarks) and incident modus operandi including point-­ of-­entry (POE), method-of-entry (MOE) and the nature of items targeted. (Source: Author’s own creation)

POE: Window MOE: Break-glass Targeted: Portable and attractive

Burglary 1

POE: Window MOE: Break-glass Targeted: Portable and attractive

Recovered from

Recovered from handle of

Burglary 5

Burglaries with similar MO

Baseball bat

Used as weapon in

Assault

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Fig. 11.6  Burglary example: A series of nine burglaries and one assault linked through FORINT as attributable to the same actor (green markers). (Source: Author’s own creation)

negotiate but are not insurmountable. Moreover the investment ‘pays for itself’: by disrupting serial offending, downstream resources are saved. But most importantly in our duty to the community, the prevention of offending is a key responsibility, consistent with Peelian principles and the AFP’s mission of Policing for a Safer Australia.

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Slovic, P. (1973). Behavioural problems of adhering to a decision policy. Institute for Quantitative Research in Finance. Smith, R. (2003). Serious fraud in Australia and New Zealand (Research and Public Policy Series). Australian Institute of Criminology. Snook, B., Canter, D., & Bennel, C. (2002). Predicting the home location of serial offenders: A preliminary comparison of the accuracy of human judges with a geographic profiling system. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 20, 109–118. Spaulding, J., & Morris, K.  B. (2018). Integration of DNA, fingerprint, and firearm databases into forensic intelligence networks for a real-time case assessment model. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 14, 39–61. Talbot-Wright, B., Baechler, S., Morelato, M., Ribaux, O., & Roux, C. (2016). Image processing of false identity documents for forensic intelligence. Forensic Science International, 263, 67–73. Townsley, M. (2017). Offender mobility. In R.  Wortley & M.  Townsley (Eds.), Environmental criminology and crime analysis (2nd ed.). Routledge. Turvey, B.  E. (2012). Criminal profiling: An introduction to behavioral evidence analysis. Academic Press. Uschold, M. (2015). Ontology and database schema: What’s the difference? Applied Ontology, 10, 243–258. Van der Sloot, B., Broeders, D., & Schrijvers, E. (2016). Exploring the boundaries of big data. The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR). VITRUVIUS. (1914). De Architectura. Harvard University Press. Vopson, M. (2021). The world’s data explained: How much we’re producing and where it’s all stored. The Conversation [Online]. Available: https://theconversation.com/the-­worlds-­data-­ explained-­how-­much-­were-­producing-­and-­where-­its-­all-­stored-­159964. Accessed July 2021. Warner, M. (2002). Wanted: A definition of “intelligence”. Studies in Intelligence, 46, 15–22. Welsh, C., & Hannis, M. (2011). Are UK undergraduate forensic science degrees fit for purpose? Science & Justice, 51, 139–142. Wolfgang, M., Figlio, R., & Sellin, T. (1972). Delinquency in a birth Cohort. University of Chicago Press. Woodhams, J., Bull, R., & Hollin, C. (2007). Criminal Profiling: International Theory, Research, and Practice. In R.  KOCSIS (Ed.), Criminal profiling: international theory, research, and practice. Humana Press Inc.. Wortley, R., & Townsley, M. (2017). Environmental criminology and crime analysis. Routledge. Zipf, G. K. (1949). Human behavior and the principle of least effort: An introduction to human ecology. Addison-Wesley Press. Adam Marsden  is a Forensic Intelligence Officer in the Australian Federal Police (AFP) with 15 years’ experience in complex investigations including: c­ ounterterrorism; identity crime; fraud & anti-corruption; and international operations. At the beginning of 2020, Adam led a project assessing the value of geographic profiling in Australian serial crime investigations with a view to setting up Australia’s first geographic profiling capability within the AFP’s Forensic Intelligence (FORINT) unit. Adam is now the only operational geographic profiling analyst in Australia and provides forensic intelligence and geographic profiling support to serial crime and other investigations for the AFP and partner agencies in Australia. His recent experience covers: missing persons; sex crimes; burglaries; aggravated robberies; theft; and traffic offences. Adam has advanced training in Geographic Profiling Analysis, a Masters in Fraud & Financial Crime, and has researched the influence of geographic profiling in the retail crime environment and ATM skimming offences.

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Dr Michael Taylor  leads the Australian Federal Police’s (AFP) Forensic Intelligence (FORINT) and Geospatial capabilities. The AFP FORINT function is a specialised all-source intelligence model, which draws upon scientific information and expertise to discover leads, convergences and targetable vulnerabilities across criminal domains. The Geospatial function supports law enforcement through exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess and visually depict physical features and geographically-referenced activities. Key interests include use of scientific methods for network disruption and countering serial offending.

Chapter 12

Cell Data Analysis Eva Ai-Ting Ku Mazzeo

12.1  Introduction I love investigations and solving crime by using data. Using cell phone records has been a particularly rewarding part of crime analysis because I get to be intimately involved with the details and progress of major cases. I get to investigate how a particular player in the case behaves, and my findings can be used to identify patterns, and provide insights and leads that the detectives did not have before or that the suspects may not have been truthful about. In the department where I work in Southern California in the United States, there are only three analysts in the Crime Analysis Unit. We discovered cell data analysis several years ago when we were new analysts by networking within our department. During our quest to learn, we connected with investigators who were experts in cell data analysis. They expressed that there was an increasing strain on their time, abilities, and interest when it came to cell phone data analysis, in part due to the increased popularity of this investigative technique and the ever-expanding volume and complexity of cell phone data. The investigators we spoke to felt extremely burdened by having to keep up with these demands while still having the usual responsibilities of going out into the field to conduct surveillance, interview suspects and affect arrests. In addition, the high turnover rate of personnel in their unit also meant that as soon as they became familiar with cell phone analysis, they left the unit. As the investigators got to know our background and training in data analysis, we all saw how our skills could relieve them of their burden. When investigators asked us for help, we happily accepted. Data analysts are trained and accustomed to working with and summarizing big data in meaningful ways to develop actionable intelligence, so conducting cell data analysis did not feel different to what we already E. A.-T. K. Mazzeo (*) Anaheim Police Department, Anaheim, CA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Bland et al. (eds.), The Crime Analyst’s Companion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94364-6_12

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did with other types of data. However, most of the cases that require cell phone analysis are major crimes, which was different and exciting. In the years that followed taking over cell phone analysis, we worked to establish ourselves as experts in understanding the abilities and limitations of the technology. We took on tasks such as staying on top of the changing technology and software, establishing good working relationships with our potential clients, providing help to other agencies whenever possible, finding the most suitable technology to help us save time and create the most professional product, and finding the country’s experts and resources for brainstorming and conducting peer reviews. We created in-house training for detectives, peer training, and conference presentations on the subject to exchange contents and thoughts on the latest practices. If you currently work on cell data analysis, then this chapter might help you review and compare your workflow with mine. I hope that you might be able to add some new or different tools to your toolbox. On the other hand, if you are just getting started, you can consider taking the basic structure from this chapter and build upon it.

12.2  Cell Data Analysis and Crime Analysis Cell data analysis is crime analysis by another name. Similar to the techniques in the rest of the book and in our daily work as crime analysts, the main task we do is analyze data to derive actionable intelligence. The particular technique of cell data analysis fits under criminal intelligence analysis, where the analysts focus on the person or organization involved in the crime rather than the crime event. This technique works well following the analysis cycle. It begins with data collection and management, followed by scanning and querying, analysis, dissemination, response, evaluation, and feedback. The evaluation and feedback informs the subsequent assessment and improvement in analysis thus continuing the cycle again. In the example of cell data analysis, this specifically applies to the process of receiving cell data from the requester, visualizing the data, analysing the patterns, answering the detectives’ questions and providing them leads. The detectives in turn will develop their investigation and they may have additional questions as more leads develop or the previous leads did not pan out. Once the new information is received, the cycle starts again.

12.3  Key Terms Here are some key terms referred to throughout the chapter. These are terms that you might encounter during your investigation using cell data. Some of the other telecommunication or cell carrier technical terms and acronyms differ based on country and region, and these are not fully explored here. I recommend finding a

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telecommunication glossary that fits your region. For an example in the US, I refer to the glossary from FBI, National Domestic Communications Assistance Center).1 Azimuth: Compass direction of where the mobile device potentially is in reference to the cell tower. Other Party: The mobile device that your target is communicating with. Subscriber: The person whose name is on the account and who is liable for the financial burden of the cell service. Target: The phone number or email that belongs to your suspect, victim, or any person of interest for which you have obtained cell records. This term is used synonymously to refer to the phone number or email, or when referring to the actual suspect, victim, or person of interest. Mobile device: the physical phone, tablet, laptop, smartwatch, car computer and other smart gadgets that use cell technology that are associated with your target phone number or email accounts. CDRs: Call detail records/Call charge records. These records are typically generated from phone calls, text messages, or data usage. Cell carriers keep these records often for billing purposes. Triangulation or multilateration records: Records that the cell carriers generate to improve their cell technology and customer experience. The carriers actively seek the mobile devices’ locations and other usage information, so these records are often not dependent on the subscribers to interact with their mobile devices. UTC (also abbreviated as UT, CUT, or TUC depending on the language): The initialism of UTC is a compromise between English (Coordinated Universal Time) and French (Temps Universel Coordonné). UTC is not a time zone but a time standard. No country uses it as a local time. GMT: Greenwich Mean Time is a time zone used by some countries. GMT and UTC share the same time so they are often used together or as synonyms of each other. However, GMT is a time zone while UTC is a time standard. DST: Some countries around the world observe Daylight Saving Time (DST) during different seasons of the year. The GMT time zone and the UTC time standard do not observe DST. However, while the UK uses the GMT time zone, it does observe DST and switch to British Summer Time. Depending on the country that your target is in, look up the information and make sure that you know the exact date and time of the switch during the correct year when the crime occurred. For major crimes, that hour can mean a world of difference. Cell carrier or service provider: The companies that provide cellular service. The major companies vary by country. Find yours and understand the technology that they use and provide. Cell towers or cell sites: the physical locations where the cellular antenna and base stations are. Event: A row of records in CDRs that could be a call, text, or data usage.

 https://portal-ndcac.fbi.gov/LECommunity/TechGlossary/Home.aspx

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12.3.1  Software I use commercial software to help systematically clean and visualize the CDRs and any location data that I receive. It saves time and from having to amend headers or images that prevent any software from immediately recognizing the tables containing the CDRs and visualizing them. I have been able to increase the volume of cases that I can analyze and the consistency of my products by using a software dedicated to cell data analysis. If you do not have any commercial software to help you and this is something that you need to do often then I would highly recommend that you seek approval to purchase something. The benefit of time saved, increased accuracy and consistency of the products outweigh the cost of the software. If you seldom do this, or your employer is reluctant to spend money on the software, it is still possible to clean and visualize the records manually. The ease of this manual process mainly depends on how the cell carriers provide their records to you. Some of the cell carriers provide embedded locations using a street address and/or latitude and longitude in the CDRs. You can easily map these CDRs using any free map service available on the internet. However, some carriers provide only the cell tower identification numbers in the CDRs. So you would have to look up the corresponding location in a giant list of cell sites that hopefully they provided as a part of the lawful order. If this is a necessary step in your manual work, knowing how to create a systematic lookup process in a software will save you from wasting time and making mistakes. If this is not an option, you certainly can still look the sites up manually to visualize key events. This method is time consuming, and it might not be realistic for you to try and do this for tens of thousands of records that can be typical in a set of CDRs. If you choose not to visualize all the records available to you, you will likely still get good results and evidence to support the case, but you will miss being able to establish your targets’ patterns and anomalies. Read further on this topic later in the chapter. Now that we have this out of the way, we can get started on the good stuff.

12.4  Clients and Requests I receive most, if not all, of my requests from case detectives via email with the CDRs and other related files attached or through virtual file share. Sometimes the detectives provide an external storage, such as USB or disk. My primary clients are the detectives from my agency, and sometimes from other agencies. Within their caseload, they review and choose the cases most suitable for this investigative technique. They then write search warrants to articulate the probable cause to obtain the call records lawfully. Depending on their experience level and if we have worked together in the past, the information they furnish me with can vary greatly. The unifying question that they all have is: were their targets at the crime scene?

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In the easy cases, the detectives have more than enough evidence and they are looking for icing on the cake. However, in difficult cases, the detectives may have exhausted all leads, and they are depending on you to tell them that their case is not dead and that you have a hot lead for them. Here are some questions the detectives often ask us to help them answer with CDRs: • • • • • •

Was the target at the scene on the date and time of the crime? Who did the target talk to immediately before and after the crime? Where did the target go before and after the crime? Who was the target with before, during and after the crime? Did the target leave the mobile device somewhere during the crime? Did the target turn off the phone before, during and after the crime? If so, when and for how long? In addition, is this typical behavior for the target? • Who are the target’s top contacts? How frequently do they contact each other and how? • Are there any parties with whom the target recently increased frequency and duration of contact? In the following scenarios, you will see how we go about answering some of these questions.

12.5  Scenarios Let us do an exercise together. First, think of yourself as the Target. Then answer the questions: How many mobile devices do you have with you daily as you complete your daily routines? Did you opt in or out of sharing your location with any of the applications on the devices? How about for the devices themselves? Using myself as an example for the exercise, I nearly always have at least two cell phones on me, and sometimes I have a laptop and a tablet in addition to the two phones. It seems excessive, but my situation is not unique as mobile technology becomes more commonplace. Furthermore, among my devices I have at least two to three cell service providers that the devices depend on for connection for calls, texts, and data. On the devices themselves and the applications on the devices, I opted out of some optional location sharing, but there are some applications that require location services. For example, my turn-by-turn direction application needs the location service turned on to work. So all my devices and the applications on them collect my location at various frequencies. My guess is that the high frequency with which I interact with each of the devices means that my visualized CDRs will closely match my actual routines. Once visualized, my CDRs will reveal my home, work, and other places of significance such as where my children go to school, and where my family and friends live. The records will also reveal that I leave my home to work on Monday through Friday at around eight o’clock and return around five o’clock.

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In addition to my routines, my CDRs will also reveal any anomalies such as when I take time off, visit with my family and friends, or when I travel. When there are planned events in my life, how I interact with the devices and with whom I interact, will change. For example, I talk to my husband and my co-workers on the phone every day for moderate to long durations. Therefore, in my CDRs, these Other Parties are my top contacts. If you talk to any of them, they probably will be able to give you a lot of dirt on me. However, there are a few old friends that I only talk to or text with once every few months. Thus, any contact with these friends will stand out in my CDRs as an anomaly. For example, the frequency of contact with an old friend will increase when we start to plan a visit. The CDRs will reflect these events very clearly by the sudden and rapid increase of their numbers. These increases in events ultimately result in my device actually travelling to a new location (their home) that is likely associated with their number. The visualization of my CDRs will show the exact sequence of events. Now think of the targets of your investigations. Similar to the exercise, use the records to establish their routines, key people, and key locations. Once you get to know them, the anomalies will reveal themselves to you when you examine the records. These are a couple of scenarios on how you might interpret the CDRs to find the pattern and develop leads.

12.5.1  Top Contacts Top contacts is one of the most popular requests that I would get from the detectives. You can find out a lot about the Target by who he/she communicates with on a regular basis, or who he/she starts communicating with suddenly. I assess the top contacts in a few categories: (1) overall top contacts, (2) situational top contacts, and (3) past/present top contacts. First, the overall top contacts typically reveal the constant in your Target’s life, such as a parent, spouse, or close friend. Depending on whether your Target prefers call or text, you will often see an Other Party show up in the CDRs with high frequency and/or duration and this is consistently true throughout the range of records that you have available. Second, the situational top contacts do not show up consistently throughout the CDRs. However, there is a distinct rise in frequency and duration of contacts between your Target and this Other Party. The inference you might be able to make is that this Other Party might be significant to a specific event in your Target’s life. It might be as innocuous as your Target calling a plumber because a pipe burst in his/her house, or that your Target is working with a partner in committing a crime. Regardless, the CDRs show a distinct rise and fall of the communication intensity between them surrounding the situation/event that binds them. Third, the past/present top contacts are significant to find your suspect that is using burner phones. For example, you have the CDRs from the suspect’s girlfriend/ boyfriend who you believe is helping the suspect evade detection and you are after

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the suspect that continues to change his/her phone number. The detectives that you work with might have the capabilities to ping the phone and find the suspect, if only they had the burner that is currently in the suspect’s hands. A combination of techniques are helpful in identifying a burner phone. If this is the case that you are dealing with, then you or the detective can likely justify requesting a longer period of the girlfriend/boyfriend’s CDRs to establish history and pattern. Using the Other Party, you can establish when your Target first and last had contact with the Other Party. Typically, if someone is your Target’s top contact, the communication between them maintains a consistent pattern and frequency even when the Other Party changes their phone number. What I have found is that the timeline of contacts between the Target and a previous burner would fall off, the new burner number would immediately pick up where they left off.

12.5.2  Turn Off Phone Before/After People deal with major events differently. In addition to this, the person’s response may depend on whether they planned those major events or not. For example, in one of the cases, I had at least three suspects involved in a gang retaliation shooting where several people were shot and killed. The first suspect was the driver, who claimed that he had no knowledge that a shooting was going to take place and he was just driving his friends around when they engaged in the shooting. The second suspect was the shooter, who was the main suspect that the detectives believed had planned the revenge after the rival gang shot and killed his fellow gang member several months prior. The third suspect was in the car with the other two suspects, and while it was not clear whether he knew the shooting was going to happen or not, he was along for the ride. The CDRs of the three Targets were quite different around the time of the shooting. The driver’s CDRs showed that the phone remained on before and after the shooting, and there were little outgoing events. Based on what were mostly incoming events, it showed that he traveled to their gang clubhouse, then to a rival gang territory, and finally to a location that was unusual for him to attend. After he returned home, his CDRs showed an increase of outgoing calls to two contacts that were in his top five contacts. His phone remained on and increased in outgoing and incoming events after the shooting. He only turned the phone off several days following the shooting. The shooter’s CDRs showed that the phone was near a gang clubhouse and then it turned off about 30 min prior to the shooting. The next occasion that the phone was turned on was near the same unusual location where the driver appeared. The shooter made several outgoing calls to a contact that was one of his top five contacts, and then the phone appeared to be off again until more than 12  h later at his home. The CDRs of the third suspect that was in the car, showed that the phone remained on before the shooting, and that there were few outgoing events. It showed him near

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their gang clubhouse, and then it traveled to a rival gang’s neighborhood, near the same place as the driver. Near the time of the shooting, outgoing and incoming events on his phone increased. Later, the phone was near the same unusual location where the other suspects were. The outgoing events stopped then the phone appeared to be off until approximately eight hours later at his home. My guess was that the first suspect drove the others to the rival gang territory, and it is plausible that he did not know that they were going to shoot and kill rival members based on the lack of change in his CDRs. However, since the CDRs had little change to it before and after the shooting, it is possible that the event took him by surprise. My belief was that the second suspect had planned the retaliatory shooting. He had deliberately turned off the phone before the shooting and had (we later found out) reluctantly turned his phone on to call for a ride because the driver left him stranded out of anger. He then turned his phone off again as soon as he got a ride, until he felt he was safe the next day. The role of the third suspect was less clear. He might have been along for the ride to intimidate the rival gang; however, since he did not turn off his phone like the shooter, it was plausible that he did not know it was going to happen. He kept his phone on and called his top contacts, potentially reacting to the shooting. He did not turn off his phone until after he had some time to react to and calm down from the shooting. It was perhaps then he thought that it would be best to turn off his phone until he felt safe the next day. The truth of the matter is probably somewhere in-between. What would your guesses be for their levels of involvement?

12.5.3  What Does the Data Say? Consider what the detective tells you when examining the data, but also allow the data to speak for itself. The detectives may have information that is leading them toward a certain suspect, and they may even have enough to obtain an arrest warrant to further their investigation. However, if the data tell a different story, then give the data credit. It is possible that the detectives are not correct. I learned a humbling lesson when I worked on a serial commercial burglary case a few years ago. I processed the Target’s CDRs and the patterns that were identified did not match what the detective had suspected the Target’s mobile device was nowhere near the crime scenes during any of the crimes. When I spoke to the detective about my findings over the phone, it surprised me that he was already in the middle of a two-hour drive to arrest the suspect. I explained to him what I found (or did not find), he simply said that it was probably because the suspect left his device behind. He thanked me for the information and hung up to continue his drive. Since the detective was so confident that this was the suspect, I thought that I must have missed something. Biased by the detective’s assumptions and conviction, I also convinced myself that the person left the phone behind while he committed the crimes. While the scenario is possible, the problem was that I ignored the pattern that the data showed. Unfortunately, for all of us, it turned out that the detective

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arrested the wrong person. Although I saw the mismatch between the Target and crime events in the CDRs, I did not trust what I saw. It really translated to that I did not trust my instincts and experience. Thus, when the detective disagreed with me, I did not bother trying to persuade him otherwise. It was fortunate that no one got physically hurt from the experience, but an innocent person was still arrested, jailed, and interrogated. In hindsight, I believe that the situation was avoidable based on the records that I had that showed a clear pattern of life without major shifts around the dates and times of the burglaries, nor did the person go anywhere near the location of the crime at any time. It is embarrassingly obvious to me now that I could have kept that person from going through that ordeal. I learned a valuable lesson from that experience that I should give myself, and the data more credit. In addition, while we should think outside the box as analysts, we should also be careful not to make wild guesses or assumptions to fit a convenient narrative to close a case.

12.6  Products Once I am finished with the analysis and have preliminary answers to the detectives’ questions, I send written answers accompanied by simple visualizations to illustrate my findings. This initial stage is the first run through of the analysis cycle to elicit the detectives’ response, evaluation, and feedback. I would remind the detectives not to use this initial round of findings in their official report, but only to use it for investigative purposes. I stress this point with the detectives when working any ongoing major cases with multiple Targets and a lot of moving parts. The analysis cycle for major cases typically continues with several rounds of feedback and new information before any final products take shape. There is a lot of work that goes into cell data analysis, and the techniques can be quite complex. To be effective, I try to keep the product simple and keep the opinions and conclusions clear. The products will eventually make their way to detectives, attorneys, judges, and jurors. For the audience that do not know the technology and cell data analysis, they would appreciate simple and clear products (Fig. 12.1). I am lucky to have a commercial product that gives me options for different base maps, custom color choices, annotations, and the ability to record my screen. I can easily create a report, presentation, or video within the software. It is useful to have, but it certainly is not necessary, although it is essential to have a spreadsheet software where you can manage and query the CDRs, and mapping software to visualize them. When you consider purchasing commercial software, test and evaluate several to find the one that best fits your needs and budget. In my experience, some software helped me clean up the CDRs’ extra formatting before visualizing them, while others required that I cleansed them before it visualized the records. Some companies release regular updates to keep up with the ever-changing CDR structures, and some might require you to prompt them.

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Fig. 12.1  Sample of when a Target’s mobile device is near the crime scene. (Source: Author’s own creation)

Some agencies may not have the budget to purchase a fancy tool and you might have to rely on manual work to complete the work. You might consider seeking out local partners that have tools that can do some of the heavy lifting to help you. They might be able to use their software to help you process and clean up the files and share a universally usable file with you for further analysis. I do it all the time for neighbouring agencies or any law enforcement partners that ask for help. However, software is becoming more prevalent and affordable. Therefore, it might not be a bad idea to suggest your organization to look into buying something, even if it is just a single license. The time that it will save you will outweigh the cost of the software. Overall, you can quickly deliver a more reliable and consistent product for your agency. My clients and requests grew exponentially over the years. If you already have software, I recommend that you conduct periodic evaluation to make sure that your needs are met. If not, it may be time to shop for new software.

12.7  Court Preparing for a court appearance starts long before you step foot in the courtroom. It begins with your training and experiences and continues with how you keep up with them and apply them. It is important to note that you are not limited by cell data analysis specific training and experiences. Topics such as data analysis, spatial analysis, profiling, and many general crime analysis training are all related to the topic of cell data analysis. As I mentioned earlier, our profession centers around

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how we turn data into knowledge with our analyses. Document what you have learned and you may surprise yourself that you are already somewhat of an expert in cell data analysis. I recommend that you record all the training information in detail in a log, and summarize it in a resume as an added bonus. The log and the resume are a fantastic way to start the conversation with the prosecutor and detectives you are working with. It gives them an idea of your level of expertise and a structure with which to ask you questions during voir dire. It does not have to be a formal interview. I typically give the new detectives a verbal summary of what I can do, and it gives them great confidence to trust me with the key pieces of evidence for their cases. Similarly, this is also a great confidence booster for the prosecutor, the judge presiding over the case, and yourself. For example, during a voir dire, the prosecutor referred to my log for his questioning. He established my expertise so well for the judge that the judge stopped a series of objections from the defence without the prosecutor having to re-establish my expertise. Based on my experience, I would advise logging your training soon after you attend, to keep the information accurate and current. This will come in handy in the instance of surprise subpoenas. In my logs I organize by the key training information to refresh my memory. In addition, I take detailed notes during each training to help me retain the information. I typically divide my note sections into general crime analysis training, professional conferences, carrier specific training, cell phone analysis software training, and other relevant topics if necessary. When it comes the time to prepare for the courtroom, a number of good practices will stand you in good stead. Take clear and concise notes as you analyze the records for your cases. Many of the major crime cases go to court many years after they happen. As the number of cases that you work on increases, it will be less likely that you will remember the technical details and nuances of each of them. It is up to you and your department to determine whether you should write a supplemental police report for the official record. There are different schools of thought and legal requirements concerning this. For example, it may be advantageous to keep detailed official records by writing a supplemental report because for many, even notes are subject to discovery in court proceedings. So you might as well make sure that you keep it all in the same place. Alternatively, I have heard reluctance in writing detailed official reports because it might tip the defence to some of the technology and techniques that you use to develop your opinions. The idea is that if anyone on the “opposing” team gets the information ahead of time, they will use it to discredit your work. While I understand the concern, some of those reservations might be unwarranted. It is partially because cell technology has existed for decades and that it is nothing new. There is an abundance of information about it available in the great big world of the internet for anyone to consume. Moreover, if you do your job well, then there is no need to be concerned about someone challenging you or your credibility. It might be uncomfortable, but all you need is to describe exactly what you did and let the attorneys do their jobs to ask you questions and establish their cases. Truly, I feel that this technique is more of an art than a science sometimes. It takes your experience, training, and confidence to make your opinions count but no

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matter what, you cannot definitively say that based on the CDRs, the targets are at the scene of the crime on the date and at the time that the records suggest. Your approach to courtroom behavior is best summarized with the description “simplicity,” In short, answer honestly. You do not need to embellish what is not possible. What you can do is be responsible in keeping up with the technology with training, prepare by speaking to all your law enforcement and judicial partners, speak confidently, and concede with grace when challenged with questions that have no good answers. Once, a couple of colleagues accompanied me to my testimony and took valuable notes for a debriefing afterwards. Some of their comments helped me better prepare for the future. Allow me to share them with you: • Prepare a better background, training, and experience summary. In an attempt at brevity, the summary became too vague and did not establish expertise enough. DA had to ask several follow up questions to clarify and strengthen the expertise. • Be cognizant of the microphone if available. Speak into it to be clear for everyone in the courtroom. • Avoid ambiguous facial expressions. For example, jurors might interpret the raising eyebrows to indicate confusion or amusement when it is not the intention. • Use one term to refer to the Targets (“device” sounded the best). When too many terms are used, they confuse everyone. Further, here is a list of questions that can help you with your overall preparation for court: • To use or not to use. How much manipulation does it take to make sense of the data? Is it worth it to keep the data? • Will the company that provided the data testify to the records? Will they only testify to it in generality or to its contents? Will they say whether the contents are valid as company records or how law enforcement uses it? • Will you have resources to introduce the data in court? Do you have access to independent/private experts? • Are you an expert and can you establish that in court? Are you comfortable with the validity of the data? How did you or how can you verify? • Are the prosecutors comfortable with the information, and are they willing to rely on it and use it in court? Are they convinced? • How much does the defence know? Are they comfortable with the information and what will they attack? • What is the lawful procedure in your country to obtain that information? What is the rule of disclosure to the customer? How long do you have before they find out that law enforcement officers have seized their cell phone information? Is your case time-sensitive? Do you have lawful ways of blocking or delaying the notification to the customer because otherwise it would be detrimental to your case? If not, what is your recourse? The bottom line is, be careful of how much liberty you take and manipulation you make with the records that you receive. Do not become a case law!

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12.8  Conclusion It took a few years for us to realize that we have become the experts in cell data analysis in our department, and that it was our responsibility to educate and guide the ever-changing police personnel in all matters concerning cell data analysis. Instead of waiting for the detectives to realize that their cases can benefit from using this technique, we took the initiative to inform the detectives when and how this technique would be useful. We now offer our detective individualized consultations, team training, presentations on new techniques, and mentoring. We take care not to rest on our laurels because of how rapid technology evolves. We attend professional trainings whenever possible. With the increase in free virtual training being offered, we have been able to build upon our repertoire quickly and with little limitation. In addition, attending local or international conferences, networking with industry experts to pick their brains, and keeping on top of business news regarding cellular carriers, will give you an expert edge. Remember that you are the expert in cell data analysis. Wonderful colleagues and mentors reminded me of that throughout the years. My fellow analysts and I would sometimes underestimate our expertise in the matter. A gentle nudge usually does the trick to remind us that we have a lot to offer the detectives and the cases. Allow me to remind you gently that you too are the expert. Eva Ai-Ting Ku Mazzeo  is a Crime and Intelligence Analyst who collaborates with police administrators, detectives, and patrol officers to solve crime problems and pursue leads. Eva believes what drives the crime and intelligence analysis world forward is the analysts’ shared ability to identify distinct patterns in the complex world of big data. Eva received Employee of the Year Awards for her outstanding services to the Anaheim Police Department Special Enforcement Division. She leverages her skills in geographic information systems, location-based technology analysis, link analysis, business analysis and relational databases to solve complex homicides and organized crimes. She presented at the California Crime and Intelligence Analysts Association annual conferences on human trafficking and child torture case studies. Eva has a been a government services professional of over 20 years with a Professional Certificate focused on Crime and Intelligence Analysis, and a Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology from California State University, Fullerton. Currently, she teaches the California Peace Officer Standards and Training certified Crime Analysis Core Course, and Crime and Intelligence Analysis Certification Program for California State University, Long Beach.

Chapter 13

Measuring Harm with Crime Harm Indices Sophie Curtis-Ham

13.1  Introduction An important goal for any police agency is to reduce crime and the harm it causes. Analysts play a critical role in identifying and understanding crime problems causing harm to communities, to help decision-makers with resource allocation, and development of strategies and tactics to reduce harm (and to see if they worked!). Often this process involves measuring crime in terms of counts (or ‘volume’), of specific types of crime, or of many types of crime combined. But these crime counts are a blunt instrument: they fail to capture the relative harm that any given crime causes. If we count a burglary the same as a murder, or even all subtypes of burglary equally, we are glossing over some pretty important differences in terms of harm. In recent years Crime Harm Indices (CHIs) have emerged in some jurisdictions as a potential solution, a means of quantifying relative harm from specific crimes so they can be weighted in analysis by how much harm they (typically) cause. In this chapter, I discuss how these CHIs can be used by analysts to provide valuable insights into crime problems and to support a harm-focused policing approach (Ratcliffe, 2015a). I first explain what CHIs are and distinguish them from related concepts and tools. I then outline the CHIs that currently exist in various jurisdictions and the different approaches taken to developing them. If you do not have one available, this section will point you to potential ways to create one. I then provide some practical examples of ways CHIs can be used in analysis to support tracking and targeting of crime problems and testing police responses to them. As you will see, any analysis activity that involves counting crimes can be supplemented with harm-weighted analysis. The chapter concludes by highlighting a few common

S. Curtis-Ham (*) Evidence Based Policing Centre, New Zealand Police, Wellington, New Zealand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 M. Bland et al. (eds.), The Crime Analyst’s Companion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94364-6_13

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traps and some tips and tricks for using CHIs, although often these considerations apply just as much to ‘traditional’ crime counts.

13.2  What Is a Crime Harm Index? A Crime Harm Index (CHI) is simply a list of values, one for each type of crime, that represent an estimate of the harm associated with each crime type, relative to other crime types.1 Counts of crime can be multiplied (i.e. weighted) by these values, to yield an estimate of the amount of harm from those crimes, and in total, when summed overall crime types included in an analysis.2 Figure 13.1 provides a concrete example to illustrate this process. Several elements of this definition are worth emphasising. First, the CHI values are estimates. They can be derived in different ways (as discussed later in this chapter) but all are proxies for an underlying concept of ‘harm’, which are indicated by the sentence an offender is likely to receive for a given crime. Second, the CHI values are relative. The aim of CHIs is to enable offences to be weighted by some measure of relative harm, not to identify the absolute amount of harm associated with every offence (Kärrholm et al., 2020). Wide variation in harm will naturally

Fig. 13.1  Example of the application of Crime Harm Index values to weight offence counts  Broad groupings of crime into high, medium and low harm categories are thus excluded (e.g. Crime Statistics Agency, 2020). 2  Some authors refer to these resulting harm estimates as the ‘index’ (e.g. Babyak et al., 2009). I use the term CHI to denote the list of weights, the tool in the analyst’s toolbox that enables crime harm to be calculated. These weights can be applied to crime counts in various ways, depending on the needs of the analyst, their research questions and the same analytical considerations that would be applied to unweighted counts (e.g. which crimes to include and which, if any, denominator to use to create a standardised rate, such as population). The development of consistent CHIweighted performance measures and official statistics (Bangs, 2016; Sherman & Cambridge University associates, 2020) is one of many potential CHI applications. 1

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exist within crime types, but CHIs attempt to capture the typical harm, rather than the full distribution of harm, for each type of crime. CHI-weighted crime counts provide a complementary measure to traditional, unweighted, counts that can inform a wide range of decisions, from the tactical to the strategic. The value-add comes from the identification of high harm victims, offenders, locations and times, and of changes in harm over time, that differ from the people and patterns that are identified when looking purely at crime counts (volume). If a police service or community safety partnership wants to reduce both crime harm and crime volume, measuring both helps to ensure that resources are allocated to both high-harm problems and high-volume problems.

13.3  What a Crime Harm Index Is Not It can also help to define CHIs by what they are not. As mentioned, CHI analysis is complementary to unweighted volume; it is not a replacement. It is informative to apply both lenses when scanning for and analysing crime problems. Moreover, with their focus on quantifying harm, CHIs are distinct from other methods for weighting crimes such as through monetary cost (e.g. Cohen & Farrington, 2021) or crime severity (e.g. Babyak et al., 2009; Bangs, 2016). Severity indices arguably can be differentiated from CHIs as reflecting both the harm inflicted (to the victim, or society in general) and the culpability the offender (e.g. premeditation and criminal history: Ashby, 2017; Higgins, 2017; Sherman et al., 2016a; Sullivan et al., 2017). However, since severity indices are conceptually close to, and often used in the same way as CHIs, I cover them in this chapter too. Nor are CHIs a risk assessment tool or predictive algorithm. Such tools and algorithms are typically developed through statistical analyses that identify whether, individually or collectively, a range of variables (sufficiently) accurately predict future crimes (Oswald et al., 2018; Perry et al., 2013). Then, for example, police may complete a risk assessment checklist made up of these predictive variables when attending a domestic violence incident to enable a response appropriate to the assessed risk level (Jolliffe Simpson et al., 2021; Oswald et al., 2018; Perry et al., 2013). Or patrols might be allocated to a specific location (and time), based on the output of an algorithm that uses previous crime counts, socio-demographic or environmental variables to predict future crime hotspots (Perry et al., 2013; Wheeler & Steenbeek, 2020). The incorporation of crime harm into prediction tools, either as a predictor variable, or the thing being predicted (e.g. Bland and Ariel, 2020; Neyroud, 2015), is a separate issue from their use in crime analysis which is the focus of this chapter. However, there is an inherent element of prediction in the use of CHI analysis to identify high-harm people or places to help target police resources. This targeting is based on a well-founded assumption that those who have committed, or experienced, harm are at elevated risk of future harm. As many studies of repeat offending and victimisation have established, for a wide array of crimes, past ­offending/

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victimisation predicts future offending/victimisation (Farrell, 2015; Kurlychek et al., 2006; Park & Eck, 2013). This holds true even for rare, high-harm, offences such as rape and sexual assault (Culatta et al., 2020; Przybylski, 2015) and even homicide offending (DeLisi et  al., 2019). However, the rarity of these offences means that repeats are likely to occur over much longer timeframes than repeats of ‘volume’ crime, so they are inherently less predictable. Groups of high-harm (but low-volume) people and places may thus be less stable over time, something that you can check for when conducting CHI-based analysis (e.g. Liggins et al., 2019; Norton, 2016). Lastly, a limitation common to all CHIs is that they are, by design, restricted to crimes and do not include weights for non-crime incidents (e.g. callouts relating to people in mental distress, domestic disputes, suspicious behaviour, disorder or traffic accidents). Since non-crime incidents can make up a large proportion of police ‘demand’ (Laufs et al., 2020; Ratcliffe, 2021), CHI-based analysis does not provide a complete picture of harm associated with all demand.

13.4  Crime Harm Indices Around the World Table 13.1 lists CHIs available in a range of jurisdictions (and several severity indices). It also summarises, broadly, the methods used to develop them. Common to almost all CHIs is the concept of using the likely sentence for a first-time offender to reflect relative harm, expressed as the number of days in prison an offender would serve for that sentence. Some CHIs are based on statutes or official guidelines that state this ‘starting point’ sentence, or allow an approximation of it based on stated minimum or maximum sentences.3 Other CHIs (usually in the absence of an official starting point) use data on actual sentences to estimate this starting point.4 CHIs using sentencing data differ in how this point is estimated, how non-custodial sentences are accounted for, the number of years’ worth of sentencing data used, and how offences with very few sentences are dealt with (e.g. by extending the data period or imputing values from similar crimes). Despite their methodological differences, the range of CHI values is very similar across many jurisdictions’ CHIs, although their level of granularity varies. CHIs with weights for more specific offences codes are preferable because they enable variation in harm within broader categories to be accounted for.

3  Starting point means a sentence that can be moved up or down based on aggravating or mitigating factors; minimum means the shortest possible sentence; maximum means the longest possible sentence. 4  An additional UK-based CHI used a public survey where crime seriousness was rated on a scale from 1 to 20 (Ignatans & Pease, 2016), but this method has been criticised for lacking granularity and range of weights, and being costly to implement (Bland & Ariel, 2020; Curtis-Ham & Walton, 2018). See also Fenimore (2019) and Kwan et al. (2000) for US and Hong Kong versions of the public survey approach, respectively.

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Table 13.1  Crime Harm (and severity) Indices, their methods and number and range of values Index Cambridge CHI (Cambridge Centre for Evidence-Based Policing, 2020; Sherman et al., 2016a) ONS (UK) Severity Score (Bangs, 2016; ONS, 2017) Irish Recorded Crime Index (Linehan, 2017) Swedish CHI (Rinaldo, 2015)

Source SGS

Method Starting point

N 698

Min 0.1

Max 5475

SD

Mean

250

2.6

7979

SD

Mean

160

7

5337

Mean of 5 estimates for first time offender Mean

118

14

6570

350

–

5840

Starting point

43

6

5040

Midpoint of min and max Minimum Median

715

47

3653

33 64

1 5.8

1825 7300

Survey of 5 judges Swedish CHI (Kärrholm SD et al., 2020) Danish CHI (Andersen SGS & Mueller-Johnson, 2018) Hungarian CHI SGS (Harmati, 2020) Japan CHI (Taira, 2018) SGS Hong Kong CHI SD (Chong, 2019) SD Canadian Crime Severity Index (Babyak et al., 2009, 2013; Wallace et al., 2009) SGS Philadelphia Offence Gravity Score (Ratcliffe, 2015a, b) California CHI SGS (Mitchell, 2019) SGS Florida Crime Seriousness Scale (Burton et al., 2004) US Federal Guidelines SGS based CHI (Fenimore, 2019) New Zealand CHI (Curtis-Ham & Soares Oliveira, 2020; CurtisHam & Walton, 2018) New Zealand Seriousness Score (Sullivan et al., 2017) Western Australia CHI (House & Neyroud, 2018)

Mean

Approx.