The Community, the Individual and the Common Good: Τὸ ’´Ιδον and Τὸ Συμδέρον in the Greco-Roman World and Paul 9781472550873, 9780567395979

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Library of New Testament Studies

480 Formerly the Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series

Editor Mark Goodacre Editorial Board John M. G. Barclay, Craig Blomberg, R. Alan Culpepper, James D. G. Dunn, Craig A. Evans, Stephen Fowl, Robert Fowler, Simon J. Gathercole, John S. Kloppenborg, Michael Labahn, Robert Wall, Steve Walton, Robert L. Webb, Catrin H. Williams

THE COMMUNITY, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMON GOOD Τὸ Ἴδιον and Tὸ Συμφέρον in the Greco-Roman World and Paul

Kei Eun Chang

LON DON • N E W DE L H I • N E W YOR K • SY DN EY

Bloomsbury T&T Clark An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

50 Bedford Square 1385 Broadway London New York WC1B 3DP NY 10018 UK USA www.bloomsbury.com First published 2013 © Kei Eun Chang, 2013 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Kei Eun Chang has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury Academic or the author.

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978-0-56739-597-9

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Contents Acknowledgments ix Abbreviations xi Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION A. Statement of the Problem B. Some Clarifications and Definitions 1. Part-Whole Rhetoric of Tὸ Συμφέρον 2. The Part-Whole and Its Connective 3. Part-Whole Hierarchy and Related Issues of Tὸ Συμφέρον 4. Organic vs. Apolitical Part-Whole C. Methods and Limitations of the Study D. Contributions, Significance and History of the Research 1. Tὸ Συμφέρον in New Testament Studies 2. Tὸ Συμφέρον in Classical Studies E. Chapter Summaries

1 1 8 10 13 20 23 25 29 29 37 41

Chapter 2: THE PART-WHOLE ARGUMENT AND ΤῸ ΣΥΜΦΈΡΟΝ IN ANTIQUITY 45 A. Part-Whole Socio-Cosmology and Ethical Development 46 1. Household, City-State, and Kosmos 47 B. Tὸ Συμφέρον and Its Ethical Development 51 1. Stoic Part-Whole Rhetoric and Its Ethical Implications 52 2. Tὸ Συμφέρον and Stoic Οἰκείωσις 54 3. Tὸ Συμφέρον as Priority Ethics 61 4. Tὸ Συμφέρον as Ideological Mainstay 64

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Contents

Chapter 3: THE PART-WHOLE BODY POLITIC AND FUNCTIONS OF ΤῸ ΣΥΜΦΈΡΟΝ 69 A. The Body Metaphor and Its Functions 69 1. Body as Part-Whole (Constitution) 71 2. The Whole 73 3. Parts 76 4. Ideological Part-Whole Hierarchy 79 5. Organic Part-Whole 81 6. Apolitical Part-Whole 83 B. Applications of Tὸ Συμφέρον to the Body Politic 87 1. Tὸ Συμφέρον and Concord 87 2. Tὸ Συμφέρον and Correct Civic Constitution 92 3. Tὸ Συμφέρον and Laws 94 C. Related Issues: Tὸ Συμφέρον and Other Ethical Categories 96 1. Tὸ Συμφέρον and Tὸ Δίκαιον 96 2. Tὸ Συμφέρον and Tὸ Καλόν 97 3. Either (Tὸ Συμφέρον) Or (Tὸ Δίκαιον/Καλόν) 99 4. Not “Either-Or” But “Both-And” 102 Chapter 4: ΤῸ ΣΥΜΦΈΡΟΝ AND CICERO’S DE OFFICIIS 110 A. Cicero’s De Officiis: A Treatise on Utilitas (Tὸ Συμφέρον) 112 1. Book I: On Honestum 114 2. Book II: On Utile 117 3. Book III: Conflict between the Right and the Apparent Advantage 119 B. Cicero’s Ideal of Gloria and Utilitas 125 1. A Value System in Greco-Roman Antiquity 125 2. Definition of Gloria and Utilitas 128 C. Conclusion 133

Contents Chapter 5: PAUL’S USE OF PART-WHOLE ARGUMENT OF ΤῸ ΣΥΜΦΈΡΟΝ IN 1 CORINTHIANS A. Summary and Introduction B. “Discerning the Body” and Tὸ Συμφέρον 1. One Body in Christ: Paul’s Part-Whole Argument C. Divisions in the Body: Problems of Τὸ Ἴδιον 1. Tension between Τὸ Ἴδιον and Tὸ Συμφέρον; Chapters 1–4 2. The Lord’s Supper and the Problem of Τὸ Ἴδιον D. The Cross and Ἀγάπη: A Remedy for the Problems of Τὸ Ἴδιον 1. The Story of “Christ Crucified” and Tὸ Συμφέρον 2. Ἀγάπη and Tὸ Συμφέρον E. Further Application of Tὸ Συμφέρον and Related Issues in 1 Corinthians 1. Tὸ Συμφέρον, Tὸ Δίκαιον(Καλόν), Ἔξεστιν, and Ἐλευθερία 2. Tὸ Συμφέρον and Ἀδίαφορα 3. Tὸ Συμφέρον and Giving Priority F. Conclusion Chapter 6: CONCLUSION – ΤῸ ΣΥΜΦΈΡΟΝ FOR THE ADVANTAGE OF THE GOSPEL TO THE MANY A. What Is Unity For? B. Ὁμόνοια and Σωτηρία C. Paul’s Argument of Tὸ Συμφέρον for the Advantage of the Gospel to the Many D. Further Study 1. Ethics and Soteriology 2. Pauline Σωτηρία: Individualistic or Communal E. Conclusion

­vii 135 135 140 140 162 162 172 182 182 190 195 195 200 202 205 207 207 208 210 218 218 219 220

Bibliography 223 Index of Ancient Sources Index of Modern Authors

243 253

Acknowledgments This book, a slightly revised version of dissertation (May 2009), has grown from a class paper (“Paul’s Use of Τὸ Συμφέρον”) that I wrote for Prof. J. Paul Sampley’s seminar on “Paul and Rival World Views in Hellenistic Times” in the Fall 1999. He used to recommend that his students also consult on paper topics or other classical issues with regard to Paul with Prof. Wolfgang Haase (editor of ANRW and Professor of Classical Studies) to benefit from such an eminent scholar in the area of the Greco-Roman world (and Paul). Having heard about the class paper topic in a conversation with him, Prof. Haase expressed, I recall, the need of a monograph on the topic and directed me how to start my research. I am grateful for these two professors who continued to direct my research along with Prof. James C. Walters. All three are to be thanked for their proficient, careful, and dedicated service that has immensely enhanced and benefited not only my critical thinking and writing ability, but also my development as a scholar. I extend particular thanks to Professor Sampley for his challenging teaching in the areas of Paul and his Hellenistic world during my coursework and for his unrelenting insistence on solid argumentation in this project. In addition, my study at Boston University (and through BTI program) has brought me into contact with a number of helpful scholars. I am appreciative to Drs. Joel Marcus, Paula Fredriksen, J. Albert Harrill, Daniel J. Harrington, Simon Parker, and Anthony J. Saldarini who have all helped me in my study in important ways. Former teachers also have stimulated and challenged my thinking about biblical studies, the New Testament in particular. To Drs. Robert Hull Jr, Rollin Ramsaran, Bruce Shields, Paul Blowers, Fred Norris, and Beauford Bryant, I extend my thanks. I also wish to thank Dr. Jeff Miller for our longtime friendship and particularly for his helpful suggestions for Chapter 5. Here I must include Wendy Murray who has done an excellent job of revising the style of each chapter and making it more readable. So many friends, colleagues, ministers, and churches have cheered me on during this journey. I am thankful for Mr. & Mrs. Kyu Sok and Young Soon Seo, members of Yettrang Church, Restoration House Ministries, and Dr. & Mrs. Dennis Helsabeck for their encouragement and support in many different ways. I am also grateful to the members of New Hampshire Korean Christian Church, who have spared their pastor’s time and energy for this project, even at times when they needed me. My special gratitude goes to Mr. & Mrs. Brad and Linda Thompson (and First Christian Church in Bristol, TN) for their generous support and unending love for me and my family. All of these people

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Acknowledgments

of God have taught me the way I am supposed to live as a Christian, a leader, and a teacher. Of course, I am truly thankful for my brothers and sisters who have sacrificed many things for their eldest brother’s vision and education in the United States. In fact, my academic achievement is theirs as well, and to them I dedicate this book. Most of all, I am truly grateful to my two sons (Paul and John), and especially my wife Young, for graciously tolerating my “foolish” desire to learn and grow more. To be on my side along the way, how many times have they had to give up their wish list of activities to do with their dad and husband, I cannot count. Yet their endless love and support have enabled me to complete PhD studies. Truly, they are a gift from God and my joy each day! Now my accomplishment in return, I hope, is a gift and a challenge to my loved ones that learning and growing should be continued until the last breath. Remember our motto: “Grow like a tree!” Finally, to God be all the glory and praise! May τὸ συμφέρον of the gospel come to the many (οἱ πολλοί)! Kei Eun Chang Boston, USA April 2013

Abbreviations Anchor Bible Ancient Philosophy Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschicht und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung. Edited by H. temporini and W. Haase. Berlin, 1972AnSoc Ancient Society BAGD Bauer, W., W.F. Arndt, F. W. Gingrich, and F. W. Danker. Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature. 2d. ed. Chicago, 1979 Bib Biblica BR Biblical Research BSac Bibliotheca sacra BTB Biblical Theology Bulletin CBQ Catholic Biblical Quarterly CJ Classical Journal CurBS Currents in Research: Biblical Studies EDNT Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament. Edited by H. Balz, G. Schneider. ET. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990-1993 EvQ Evangelical Quarterly ExAud Ex Auditu FRLANT Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments GBBS Geek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies HSCP Harvard Studies in Classical Philology HTR Harvard Theological Review Int Interpretation JSNT Journal for the Study of the New Testament JSNTSup Journal for the Study of the New Testament: Supplement Series JBL Journal of Biblical Literature JETS Journal of Evangelical Theological Society LSJ Liddell, H. G., R. Scott, H. S. Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon. 9th ed. with revised supplement. Oxford, 1996 LCL Loeb Classical Library Neot Neotestamentica NICNT New International Commentary on the New Testament. NIB The New Interpreter’s Bible AB AncPhil ANRW

xii NISB NIV NLT NRSV NTS NovT NovTSup OCD

Abbreviations

New Interpreter’s Study Bible New International Version New Living Translation New Revised Standard Version New Testament Studies Novum Testamentum Novum Testamentum Supplements Oxford Classical Dictionary. Edited by S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth. 3ed. Oxford, 1996 OSAP Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy PhilR Philosophy and Rhetoric PT Political Theory PAS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society ReP The Review of Politics RevExp Review and Expositor RB Revue biblique RBL Review of Biblical Literature RSV Revised Standard Version SBL Society of Biblical Literature SBLDS Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series SBLSP Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers SJP Southern Journal of Philosophy SNTSMS Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series SVF Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. H. von Arnim. 4 vols. Leipzig, 1903 – 1924 SVTQ St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly TDNT Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Edited by G. Kittel and G. Friedrich. Translated by G. W. Bromiley. 10 vols. Grand Rapids, 1964 – 1976 TLG Thesaurus linguae graecae: Canon of Greek Authors and Works. Edited by L. Berkowitz and K. A. Squitier. 3 ed. Oxford, 1990 TynBul Tyndale Bulletin WUNT Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament ZNW Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche

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Chapter 1

Introduction A. Statement of the Problem A: “All things are permissible for me” (πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν, 1 Cor 6:12a).1 B: “But not all things are beneficial [to the whole]” (ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πάντα συμφέρει, v.12b). A: “A person[’s sinful behavior] is outside the body” (ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματός, v.18b). B: “But the fornicator sins against the body itself” (εἰς τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα, v.18c).2 A: “Because I am not a hand, I do not belong to the body” (12:15a; part-whole detached). B: “It would not cease to be a part of the body” (v.15b; part-whole connected).3 Μηδεὶς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ (= τὸ ἴδιον) ζητείτω ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου (= τὸ συμφέρον) (10:24). (“Do not seek your own advantage, but the common advantage.”)

Above I have presented a series of contrasting couplets that offer the reader a purview of the seminal issues in the church in Corinth that resulted in internal conflicts and community breakdown. Such factionalism probably involved different socio-ethical perspectives (“parties”), which, for my purposes, I denote as groups A and B. I have highlighted the three couplets above because they relate to conflicting outlooks over specific issues, which, I believe, clearly encapsulate the critical points of dissension that sabotaged community health because of divisive moral and ethical behavior (or lack thereof). I feature these couplets so the reader can grasp from the outset the key elements that define ethical behavior, or the lack of it, which ultimately spawns ongoing tension within the community. For the purpose of this study I will argue that tensions arise when there is a collision between the interests of the individual “I” (meaning a “part”) and the wider interest of the 1 Biblical texts in this book are, unless indicated otherwise, from NRSV. Translations in the following couplets are modified in part. 2 In my adaptation of 6:18, I simply highlight, for my purposes, the essence of community breakdown between groups A and B. The original full verse goes: “Shun fornication! Every sin that a person commits is outside the body; but the fornicator sins against the body itself.” 3 My translation.

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The Community, the Individual and the Common Good

communal “we” (the “whole”); between an individual’s private morality and its relationship with the communal good; and when individualistic choices result in detachment and/or isolation from the whole (ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματός). This collision, in its various forms, distorts the part-whole connective intention ([μέλος] εἰς τὸ σῶμα) and introduces divergent, even alien, ethical perspectives: the individualistic non-communal part-whole vs. the organic part-whole. At the end of the couplets I have included a single citation that juxtaposes the tension-revealed and the solution-provided maxim. Not only does it encapsulate the essence of the conflicts that arose as a result of tension between choosing τὸ ἴδιον (private advantage/morality; in A’s statements) over seeking τὸ συμφέρον (the common advantage; in B’s statements),4 but also highlights the singular root cause of the conflicts within the community, as well as the antidote for them. With this in mind, the purpose of this monograph is to vigorously explore Paul’s use of the Greek ethical concept of τὸ συμφέρον as he addresses the individual-community (“part-whole”) scenario playing out within the Corinthian community. That is, he strives in 1 Corinthians to elevate the importance of the connective ethic within the congregation wherein its respective members might seek the “common advantage.” In the letter Paul employs the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον to confront factional problems (tὰ ἴδιa) that plague various relationships within the community at Corinth and, in so doing, advances his gospel ministry in a way that overrules the divisive socio-ethnic boundaries of the community’s respective parts. By a rhetoric of the part-whole, I mean a traditional Greco-Roman ethical discourse in which the community (“whole”) and/or the seeking the advantage of the whole (τὸ συμφέρον)5 become the criterion for the proper behavior of its individual members (“parts”). The conventional subjects Paul addresses in his argument for τὸ συμφέρον include divisions (σχίσματα), conflicts (ἔριδες), party strife (στάσις), and the contrasting concord (ὁμόνοια) within the community. Tὸ συμφέρον, we shall see, becomes his ethical antidote for resolving the partwhole relational problems at Corinth. Its primary aim is to summon individuals and/or divided cliques within the community to abdicate personal advantage in deference to the common good of the community. Anyone seeking private interests (tὰ ἴδιa) must do so within the context of the advantage it renders for the whole (τὸ συμφέρον). Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον as an ethical device to address divisiveness in Corinth, I will demonstrate, is consistent with its common use in Greco-Roman culture. Further, I will also show how Paul develops a distinct concept of τὸ συμφέρον for the Christian community of the “called ones” (οἱ κλητοί), and that this, in turn, becomes the basis for Paul’s confronting the conflicts between himself and the Corinthians, as well as a guide for their proper behavior within the community. 4 In due course I will discuss in what way each couplet reflects the tension between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ συμφέρον. 5 For the discussion of my rendering of τὸ συμφέρον as the “common advantage” or “common good,” see the section below under “Some Clarifications and Definitions.”

Introduction

­3­

Scholars of 1 Corinthians have failed to recognize completely the significance of τὸ συμφέρον as an elemental feature of socio-political, philosophical, and religious aspects of part-whole issues in antiquity. For example, recent studies of 1 Corinthians understand τὸ συμφέρον as a technical term of deliberative speech appealing to seek concord (ὁμόνοια) within the community, in which the speaker highlights advantage.6 However, in early Greek philosophy and Hellenistic ethical traditions as an ethical category, τὸ συμφέρον is closely associated with two fundamental convictions. First, all things exist in the context of the partwhole relationship; and second, that relationship is hierarchical. These two interrelated convictions, as will be discussed later, significantly influenced philosophical, ethical, and political theories in antiquity, and in particular the rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον. Since, as we shall see, τὸ συμφέρον appears extensively as an ethical standard in part-whole rhetoric in antiquity, any study of Paul’s use of the term is incomplete unless this context is similarly incorporated; only in that context can his use of τὸ συμφέρον be properly understood. Scholars who see 1 Corinthians as a ὁμόνοια speech have not paid sufficient attention to the fact that Paul, above all else, seeks to lay a strong foundation for the organic part-whole (i.e., the church as “the body of Christ”) to which he brings the ethical force of τὸ συμφέρον to resolve the divisive problems in Corinth. Therefore, I will first demonstrate that the concept of part-whole is both the background and thus the required context in which τὸ συμφέρον becomes an ethical criterion (rather than preferential) for proper behavior. Second, in that context, I will demonstrate how it plays a symbiotic role that embraces both the whole and the parts in it. Third, this analysis of τὸ συμφέρον’s function puts it in the proper framework and in turn illuminates understanding of Paul’s use of the term as well as the socio-political context in which Corinthian problems were embedded. Many scholars have not discerned the specific nuances of Paul’s instructions to Corinth because they have not recognized Paul’s modification of common 6 Broadly, two trends of the exegetical tradition have emerged regarding Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον. First, following J. Weiss’ study of the New Testament against Hellenistic philosophy, Der erste Korintherbrief (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910), some scholars believe that the word συμφέρον/συμφέρειν in Paul is a technical term of popular Stoic philosophy. But their assumption is incorrect; its usage, as we shall see, widely occurs in Greco-Roman socio-political and ethical discussions and is not monopolized by Stoics only. The other tradition is from the recent rhetorical analysis of 1 Corinthians, according to which the document resembles ὁμόνοια (concord) speeches, a well-known topos in the socio-political discussions. See L. L. Welborn, “On the Discord in Corinth: 1 Corinthians 1–4 and Ancient Politics,” JBL 106 (1987): 89–90. Likewise, Margaret Mitchell contends that “the content of 1 Corinthians is a series of arguments ultimately based in the subject of factionalism and concord.” See Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991), 65. Although these studies, recent rhetorical studies in particular, have brought some significant merits to understanding the document, it is mistaken, however, to limit Paul’s usage of the vocabulary either within one philosophical school or within a particular type of political speech. In fact, the “deliberative rhetoric” of seeking concord by appealing to the advantageous course should be understood as a form of widespread communitarian part-whole rhetoric in antiquity.

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assumptions. For example, the Corinthian problems reflect ethical tensions between τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ ἴδιον, and between τὸ συμφέρον and other ethical categories (see below) in the individual-community relationship. These tensions in turn are inextricably related to the ethical dilemmas caused by ideological7 misuse of τὸ συμφέρον as an “apolitical,” 8 or individualistic, rather than “organic” part-whole, a critical distinction I will make in order to clarify the nature of the ethical debates commonly found in Greco-Roman moral discussion. The proper context of τὸ συμφέρον as an organic ethical standard establishes a connection between the individual’s private interest and the common benefit. An individual person properly achieves what is good to him or to her (τὸ ἴδιον) as part of a greater organic whole and based upon what is advantageous to the whole (τὸ συμφέρον). Thus, within this social fabric, the whole9 does not ignore the interests of the individual. In the deviant conceptions of part-whole that emphasize the individual, the upper class, or politically powerful often appropriate the idea of τὸ συμφέρον to seek their own benefit while sacrificing the good of others (usually that of the lower class). This attitude, as will be examined in detail, creates further significant ethical confusion about the concept of τὸ συμφέρον in tension with such ethical norms as τὸ δίκαιον (justice), τὸ καλόν (moral goodness), ἔξεστιν (what is permissible), and/or ἐλευθερία (freedom).10 The agent operating from the individualistic standpoint within the part-whole context often fails to account for how his or her self-serving actions (tὰ ἴδιa) negatively affect others of the community. This, in turn, creates a problem of justice (τὸ δίκαιον) or moral goodness (τὸ καλόν). The divisive community issues in antiquity are commonly associated with tensions and varying ethical perspectives between the apolitical and organic part-whole units.11 Moral philosophers and politicians in Greco-Roman antiquity try to establish the proper context by using organicbody metaphors to pave the way for two-way reciprocity for the benefit of the parts and the whole. 7 I adopt Dale Martin’s conception of ideology which “usually refers to the system of symbols that supports and enforces the power structures of the dominant class and ruling groups.” See The Corinthian Body (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), xv. Similarly, John B. Thompson views ideology as “symbolic forms” that serve “to establish and sustain relations of domination.” See his Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory I the Era of Mass Communication (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 58 (emphasis his). 8 The word πολιτικός in Greek socio-political discussions is not derogatory. It means “relating to citizens,” “belonging to the πόλις,” or “living in a community” (hence τὸ πολιτικόν = the community), from which the general meaning of the word is derived as “political,” “public,” “civil/ethical,” or “communal.” In this study, the term “apolitical” conveys the opposite sense of the πολιτικός in its original Greek thought. See “πολιτικός,” in LSJ and in An Intermediate GreekEnglish Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994); also see Christian Meier, The Greek Discovery of Politics, trans. David McLintock (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 13. 9 In Greco-Roman part-whole-logy, the whole is often equated with the image of power or perfectness. For example, see Epictetus, Diss. 2.10.5: κυριώτερον δὲ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους (“the whole is more sovereign than the part”). 10 These issues were often discussed among Greco-Roman moral philosophers. See the section below on “Tὸ Συμφέρον and Related Issues” and Ch. 3. 11 For further discussion, see the section below on “Apolitical vs. Organic Part-Whole.”

Introduction

­5

Paul’s rhetoric, I will argue, reflects that some of the Corinthian believers have based their conduct on an individualistically motivated understanding of the part-whole, thus creating a tension with Paul himself, whose ethical perspective lies within an organic part-whole. For members of the higher status (“the strong”)12 whose ethical view corresponds to apolitical (individualistic) part-whole hierarchy,13 any action which seeks one’s own advantage is “permissible” (ἔξεστιν), regardless of whether it adversely affects other members of the community. Paul offers a corrective imperative to the Corinthians’ individualistic perspective by recasting their behaviors into his distinctive organic part-whole ethic: “your bodies are members of Christ” (τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν μέλη Χριστοῦ ἐστιν, 6:15), and “you are not of your own” (οὐκ ἐστὲ ἑαυτῶν, v.19).14 Paul, I will demonstrate, hopes to redirect the Corinthians’ apolitical ethical outlook that misappropriates part-whole ideology and imposes on them the ethical mandate to undertake any individualistic action in connection with the good of the whole. For him, any behavior that hurts other members and does not concern the “whole,” is therefore not advantageous (οὐ συμφέρει). It seems that beyond the individualistic/communal confusions mentioned above, problems within the Corinthian community also arise from their failure to differentiate between ἐκκλησία and οἰκία in function and ethics. As Jorunn Økland recently has argued, ἐκκλησία (church) is sacred “space marked off and defined through ritual” even if it occurs in a private house which, in Paul’s time, was usually the case.15 This “sanctuary space” may have confused some people at Corinth, blurring the lines between public and private context, because the house church shared material space both for the ἐκκλησία and οἰκία. Nevertheless, for Paul, ἐκκλησία is a part-whole communal context (“the body of Christ”) in which τὸ συμφέρον must operate as the standard for proper behavior, individualistically and communally. Paul’s explicit criticism in 11:22, for example, indicates that certain members of higher social strata continued to privatize the public domain, that is, seek advantage for the self (τὸ ἴδιον) in the public part-whole realm of τὸ συμφέρον. I will demonstrate that Paul appropriates τὸ συμφέρον as the foundational building block upon 12 A circle of contemporary New Testament scholars say that the divisive problems among the Corinthians derive from issues related to social status. For example, see G. Theissen, The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 96, 106 and 121–43; Welborn, “On the Discord in Corinth,” 96–7; David G. Horrell, The Social Ethos of the Corinthian Correspondence (Edinburgh: Clark, 1996), 124. Cf. Justin J. Meggitt, Paul, Poverty and Survival (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), who doubts of the sociological understanding of the Corinthian conflicts. But my reading of 1 Corinthians as Paul’s argument of τὸ συμφέρον leads to a different conclusion. 13 See the sections below on “Part-Whole Hierarchy” and “Apolitical vs. Organic PartWhole.” 14 Scripture citations are from NRSV unless indicated otherwise. 15 Jorunn Økland, Women in Their Place: Paul and the Corinthian Discourse of Gender and Sanctuary Space (JSNTSup 269: London/New York: T & T Clark International, 2004), 131– 67, 132.

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which the sacred body of the community must stand. For Paul, τὸ συμφέρον is to be the dominant part-whole common denominator for the community’s gathering as a “church” (“when you come together,” 11:17). One critical issue remains. As Paul attempts to bring the Corinthian partwhole relationships under the authority of τὸ συμφέρον, as I propose, does Paul then expose himself to the possible charge of pursuing self-interest in his refusal to support the actions of the Corinthians? His rejection of Corinthian favor might scandalize certain sub-groups there (ch. 9; cf. 2 Cor 11), setting him up for a possible confrontation: “Paul, you are the one violating the principle of τὸ συμφέρον, since you are seeking your own advantage by rejecting our social conventions.” This line of argument, however, is easily dismissed. In the subsequent chapters, Paul interprets his action explicitly and implicitly as “not seeking for my own advantage, but that of the many” (μὴ ζητῶν τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ σύμφορον ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, 10:33; emphasis added). This further highlights how, along with the differing perspectives between the apolitical and organic part-whole, there existed stark differences in the ways Paul and his letter’s recipients interpreted the concept of τὸ συμφέρον. However, if the rhetorical high ground belongs to Paul in his interpretation of the fractious issues at Corinth (in light of the “true” τὸ συμφέρον that he develops; see below), then he must put to rest the threat that his criticisms arise from selfinterest in his approach to preaching the gospel even without Corinthian support. If Paul, on the one hand, seeks τὸ συμφέρον, he must develop an indisputable understanding of it through which his actions can be understood as concern for the “whole.”16 But what is the nature of τὸ συμφέρον that Paul is presenting to the Corinthians? Does it free Paul from the charge of seeking his own advantage while serving as a pastoral criterion for proper behavior of the entire community? Paul develops his distinctive concept of τὸ συμφέρον as one that is inextricably married to the idea of the benefit (“salvation”) that the gospel is to bring to all. The τὸ συμφέρον Paul seeks renders the advantage of the gospel for the whole. Paul evaluates the Corinthians’ divisive behaviors by this measure, as well as his own. He presents his actions as one called (κλητός) to bring the advantage 16 Pauline scholars have been unsatisfied with the explanations of 1 Cor 9’s relation to the arguments of chs. 8-10 and the larger letter. However, if Paul interprets his conduct in ch. 9 (including his behavior of not receiving monetary support from the Corinthians) as seeking “the good of the many” (τὸ [σύμφορον] τῶν πολλῶν, 10:33) and as imitatio Christi (11:1), not (divisive) personal benefit (μὴ ζητῶν τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ σύμφορον, 10:33), he must develop his idea of “true” advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) by which he can present his actions as those of one concerned for the “whole” prior to dealing with the confrontation issues in the rest of chapters. In ch. 9, Paul shows that he chooses to do as he does, not because he is manipulated by the Corinthians but because Christ and the gospel free him to adjust all that he does in order to serve the good (σωτηρία) of the many (see below). Paul does what he thinks is best for the community, and puts the common advantage above his own; this is a key point for the Corinthians to imitate Paul (11:1). Thus an important function of ch. 9, as we shall see, lies in the meaning and centrality of τὸ συμφέρον in determining Paul’s own behavior toward others which puts him rhetorically on the high ground in addressing conflicts at Corinth.

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of the gospel so that “the many” (οἱ πολλοί) might be “saved” (σωθῶσιν, 10:33). In seeking τὸ συμφέρον Paul sees himself ἐν Χριστῷ, as one who voluntarily sacrifices or chooses not to exercise his private rights or benefits in deference to his concern for the “whole.” Paul exemplifies this behavior by eschewing the exercise of his own personal power (ἐξουσία) or freedom if doing so may hurt the community (cf. ch. 8). For Paul, factions in the body of Christ are problematic and disadvantageous because they create serious obstacles for realizing the benefit of the gospel for all. This is the main reason, I will argue, for his appeal for accord within the Corinthian community by way of ὁμόνοια (concord) speech. The rhetorical analysis of Paul’s use of ὁμόνοια in 1 Corinthians, however, does not adequately address why Paul utilizes the rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον. His concern is not simply unity of the Corinthian community in the socio-political sense.17 This book will address why, for Paul, “unity” or “concord” within the Corinthian community is important, why Corinthian unity is expedient, and why their “factionalism” is problematic in light of the Greco-Roman moralist tradition and disadvantageous for the gospel in light of Paul’s outlook. We will understand that his appeal for concord arises from and for the purpose of συμφέρον as he distinctively defines it. Paul develops his “part-whole theology” in light of his understanding of the cross and its benefits to “the many” (οἱ πολλοί). This transcends social, ethnic, and cultural boundaries. Paul’s interest in the salvation (σωτηρία) of “the many” (including Jews, Greeks, slaves, and free, 12:13) lies in his concept of the advantage of the gospel to all nations (“the whole”), rather than to a specific ethnic group (“part”) (cf. 9:19-23). He makes it clear that his choice of “not seeking for my own advantage, but that of the many” arises out of concern for the advantage of the gospel to all peoples. I will argue that Paul’s part-whole theology focuses on Christ’s crucifixion and its advantage for all parts. This forces him to traverse the divisive boundaries of parts – caused by ethnic, social, economic, gender, and religious differences in Corinth – toward the universal whole. In summary, this book explores Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον, “the common advantage” (see below), by comparing his employment of τὸ συμφέρον with the practices of the Greco-Roman moralists and by analyzing how his idea of advantage is affected by his understanding of the death and resurrection of Christ. I further demonstrate how Paul applies the rhetoric of part-whole to his own context, making it a criterion for the proper behavior of believers, and provides an impetus for his universal mission that moves across socio-ethnic boundaries of the parts to bring the advantage of the gospel to the whole. For an understanding of such a distinctive application of τὸ συμφέρον in its own context, it is necessary to study antecedents or parallels to Paul’s usage in Greco-Roman antiquity. I will then proceed to study Paul’s part-whole 17 For the scholars who see Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον as a concrete evidence of analyzing 1 Corinthians as a deliberative speech for concord, this is the main reason that Paul adopts a particular rhetorical genre as he does. But in Ch. 6 below, I will argue, Paul has a more important agenda.

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rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον in 1 Corinthians. I will first make some preliminary clarifications for this research.

B. Some Clarifications and Definitions To begin with, my rendering of τὸ συμφέρον as the “common advantage” or “common good” signifies “true advantage.”18 It is an ethical norm that embraces both private (ἰδιᾳ συμφέρον) and communal benefit (κοινῇ συμφέρον) in the part-whole context. Like any word, τὸ συμφέρον is a general term that simply means “advantage” or “benefit” or “utility.” What matters, for my purposes, is the issue regarding to whom, specifically, the advantage refers. Usually the term συμφέρον is qualified either to designate the advantage to a group or individual person(s) (by such specification as ἰδιᾳ, ἑαυτῷ, ἐμαυτῷ, or ἑκάστῷ),19 or to refer to the “common advantage” of the whole (as it is qualified by κοινῇ, κοινόν, τῇ πόλει or τῷ ὃλῳ).20 Such being the case may raise questions about my particular identification of τὸ συμφέρον in this book and how it relates to “the common advantage/good.”21 It is important to notice that τὸ συμφέρον in the part-whole context stands as an independent ethical value for the whole community. Striking evidence of this comes out of the Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition. According to Aristotle, the goal (τέλος) of deliberative rhetoric is τὸ συμφέρον (utilitas in Latin) (Rhet. 1.3.5 and 1.6.1; cf. Quintilian, Inst. 3.8.22-42). In their effort to end civic divisions (στάσεις) in the community or the state, rhetoricians provide a course of action by appealing to what is advantageous (τὸ συμφέρον), of common value, to be pursued by the community as a whole for concord. For example, in his discussion on the topic of “persuading and dissuading” (προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν), Aristotle argues that “all persons are persuaded by the common advantage [τῷ συμφέροντι; “expediency” in LCL], and that is what saves the state.”22 Here his use of τὸ συμφέρον is identical with τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον or “the common advantage” and I translate it as such. Without an understanding of τὸ συμφέρον as identical to τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον, the goal of preserving the state from divisions is unattainable. Divided groups or individuals that are 18 Isocrates, Paneg. 18; De pace, 28; Dio Chrysostom, Or. 14.6-7. 19 For example, see Isocrates, Ep. 6.14; Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.10.2; Epictetus, Diss. 1.19.13, 2.11.15. 20 For example, see Demosthenes, Ep. 1.5; Isocrates, De pace 10; Aristotle, Pol. 1278b 20-4; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.85.1; Epictetus, Diss. 2.21.1-2; Dio Chrysostom, Or. 34.16-22; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 12.23. 21 On the problem with this rendering, see Michelle V. Lee, Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 117–24. She (119) argues that “one cannot presuppose that τὸ συμφέρον means ‘common good’ but rather should examine how the author defines the content of the ‘advantage.’” Also see Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 31. 22 Aristotle, Rhet. 1.8.2: πείθονται γὰρ ἅπαντες τῷ συμφέροντι, συμφέρει δὲ τὸ σῶζον τὴν πολιτείαν.

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not persuaded against seeking their own advantage (ἰδιᾳ συμφέρον) while ignoring those of their counterparts destroy the state. Aristotle clearly asserts that when each part desires its own benefit, “the common interests go to ruin” (τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλλυται) and “discord” appears (στασιάζειν) in the community.23 Tὸ συμφέρον as the end (τέλος) of deliberative speeches means the common value (τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον) for the whole community. By rendering τὸ συμφέρον as “the common good/advantage” (see below), I also mean an ethical norm in semantic parallel with such other ethical categories including τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ ἀγαθόν/καλόν, and τὸ δέον (see Ch. 3 below). For example, when philosophers speak of justice (τὸ δίκαιον) as being advantageous (συμφέρον/συμφέρειν), they mean advantageous to both sides (ἀμφότεροις), which means “the common advantage” (τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον or τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον).24 As Joanna Yatromanolaki concludes in her study of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Aristotle’s “notion of sympheron, defined as politikon agathon, entails the subordination of private to public interests.”25 Therefore, when τὸ συμφέρον is used as an ethical criterion in part-whole context, there is “one advantage to be considered and that [is] the common advantage” (ἕν τὸ συμφέρον καὶ κοινόν) that heals the divisive problems in the community as well as provides guides for the proper behavior.26 Its function of binding/preserving (σώζειν) divided groups and individuals into a unified whole works only if τὸ συμφέρον entails both ἰδιᾳ and κοινὸν συμφέρον as Aristotle clearly implies.27 Thus I agree with the major English translations (e.g., NIV and NRSV) and Pauline scholars that Paul’s πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον means “for the common good,” as well as with its rendering by many scholars and commentators of “for the common advantage.”28 In sum, τὸ συμφέρον, in the true context of a part-whole 23 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 9.6.4; cf. Cicero, Off. 1.25.85. 24 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.9.4; Pol. 1282b 16-7; Thucydides, His. 5.90. Plato also contends that a form of justice that is executed for the benefit of only a certain group is an incorrect one, and this creates party-divisions (Leg. 4.715b). This is the same case with τὸ δίκαιον/καλόν. Aristotle (Rhet. 1.6.1) states, “the expedient is good” (τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν). Cf. Epictetus, Diss. 1.22.1: “the good is advantageous” (τὸ ἀγαθόν συμφέρον ἐστί). For the relationship of τὸ συμφέρον with τὸ καλόν = honestum in Latin, see Cicero’s De Officiis and Ch. 4 of this book. 25 See her Sympheron, Dikaion and Nomoi in Deliberative Rhetoric: Studies in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Demosthenes’ Deliberative Speeches (Dardamitsa, Athens, 1997), 27. With regard to τὸ δέον (right or advantageous course of action), see Isocrates, De pace, 28, in which he identifies it with the “true advantage” (τὸ συμφέρον). 26 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 7.54.1. Throughout, all citations from classical texts are from LCL unless otherwise indicated. 27 Further, τὸ συμφέρον in the ethical part-whole context can mean “the common advantage” as Epictetus’ ethical maxim goes (Diss. 3.7.33): “Govern us as rational beings by pointing out to us what is profitable [τὰ συμφέροντα], and we will follow you; point out what is unprofitable [τὰ ἀσυμφορα], and we will turn away from it.” For Epictetus, like other philosophers, humans as “rational beings” (λογικοί) are un-detachable “parts of the whole.” For example, see Diss. 2.10.3. Therefore, in this context, as we shall see further, τὸ συμφέρον means the path that is beneficial to the whole, but which necessarily includes the personal benefit (τὸ ἴδιον) as well – because the part belongs to the whole. 28 For example, Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids:

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ethic (as I will argue), “always means τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον, which includes the ἰδιᾳ συμφέρον.”29 With the above definition in mind, I now proceed to define the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον from ancient writers whose features are comparable to Paul’s. Forms of part-whole rhetoric are found in Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Hierocles, Dio Chrysostom, and the later Stoic philosophers (Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius), among others.30 Two examples from among these will suffice to illustrate and clarify methodological issues in the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον which are comparable to Paul’s. The first example is from Hierocles (early second century C.E.), highlighting the Hellenistic moral tradition, while the second comes from the classical philosophy of Plato.31

1. Part-Whole Rhetoric of Tὸ Συμφέρον a. Example One (Hierocles) In his Stoic ethics, Hierocles highlights essential features of the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον. The person who prefers one finger to the five is stupid, but he who prefers the five to the one is most reasonable, for the former esteems lightly even the preferred finger, while the latter in the five preserves also the single finger. In the same way, that person also is stupid who wishes to save himself more than his fatherland, and in addition acts unlawfully and desires the impossible, while he who honors his fatherland more than himself is dear to the gods and firm in his reasoning. Nevertheless, it has been said that even if one were not numbered with the system but were examined separately, it is fitting that he prefer the preservation of the whole government [σωτηρίας…τοῦ συστήματος] rather than his own. For the destruction of the city [πόλεως ἀπώλεια] shows that there is no preservation of the citizen [πολίτου σωτηρίαν], in the same way that the destruction of the hand involves the destruction of the finger as part of the hand. Let us then sum up, that we should not separate what is publicly profitable from what is privately profitable [τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον τοῦ ἰδιᾳ μὴ χωρίζειν], but to consider them one and the same. For what is profitable to the fatherland is common to each of its parts [τό τε γὰρ τῇ πατρίδι συμφέρον κοινόν ἐστι καὶ τῶν κατα μέρος ἑκάστῷ], since the whole without its parts is nothing. And what is profitable to the citizen is also fitting to the city, if indeed it is taken to be profitable to the citizen [τό τε τῷ πολίτῃ Eerdmans, 1987), 589; Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 38; Richard B. Hays, First Corinthians (Interpretation; Louisville: John Knox, 1997), 210–11; Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1999), 450 and 453; A. C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 936. Also see Lee, 118 n.49. 29 K. Weiss, “συμφέρω,” TDNT 9:71. 30 Thucydides, 2.60.2-4; Plato, Leg. 10.903b-d; Aristotle, Pol. 1337 a 28-31; Cicero, Fin. 3.19.64; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.86.1-5; Dio Chrysostom, Or. 34.16-22; Seneca, Ira, 2.31.7, Ep. 95.51-2; Epictetus, Diss. 2.22.15-18; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 10.6-7. 31 I will present Hierocles’ first for the explicit terminological reason for the term συμφέρον.

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συμφέρον προσήκει καὶ τῇ πόλει, ἐαν γε ὡς πολίτῃ συμφέρον λαμβάνηται]. For what is of advantage to a dancer [χορευτῇ λυσιτελὲς] as a dancer would also be of advantage to the entire chorus [ὅλῳ χορῷ κερδαλέον]. So if we store all this reasoning in our minds we shall have much light on particulars and shall on no occasion neglect our duty [καθῆκον] to our fatherland.32

Here Hierocles provides the primary evidence that the technical term τὸ συμφέρον (and its related words) appears in the rhetoric of seeking the common advantage.33 In fact, τὸ συμφέρον, as we shall see later in detail, is a term widely used in ancient political, rhetorical, philosophical, and ethical contexts.34 Plato and Aristotle frequently use τὸ συμφέρον in their ethical-political part-whole rhetoric;35 Dio Chrysostom incorporates it in his socio-political orations;36 and other philosophers utilize the term in deliberative rhetoric and ethical part-whole contexts.37 Tὸ συμφέρον also appears frequently in Stoic ethical discussions that are similar to Paul’s employment of the part-whole argument and συμφέρον.38 A word study of συμφέρον, however, is not sufficient for a study of partwhole connective ethics because τὸ συμφέρον has a semantic overlap with a wide range of terms, including τὸ κοινόν, τὸ πρέπον, τὸ αγαθόν, τὸ καλόν, τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ βέλτιστον, τὸ ἄριστον, τὸ χρήσιμον, τὸ λυσιτελοῦν, τὸ κερδαλέον, and τὸ ὠφέλιμον.39 These related terms when they appear in part-whole contexts, 32 Hierocles, On Duties in Stobaeus 3.39.34-36. Trans. from Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 89–90 (emphasis and Greek added). For Greek text, see Ioannis Stobaei Anthologium, recensverunt Curtius Wachsmuth et Otto Hense (Berolini: Apud Weidmannos: 1884; repr., 1958), 3.732-33. Also Ilaria Ramelli, Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics, Fragments and Excerpts, trans. David Konstan (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009), 68–71. 33 See the discussion below on semantic overlap of τὸ συμφέρον with other terms in the part-whole context. 34 Cf. LSJ. s.v. “συμφέρω”; K. Weiss, TDNT 9:69–78. 35 Plato, Leg. 9.875a. Aristotle says that for “the common advantage” (τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον) human beings are brought together into the State. See his Pol. 1278b 20–1284a 3. 36 For instance, see Or. 34.16-22. 37 Aristotle, Rhet. 1.3.5-6; Cicero, Inv. 2.51.156, 2.56.168-69. Cf. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 25–32. 38 For example, Epictetus, Diss. 1.18.2, 1. 22.1, 1.27.14, 2.22.15-26; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 10.6; cf. Cicero, Off. 3.3.11. 39 For example, see Thucydides, 5.90, 98, 105-6; Plato, Resp. 342e, 344c; Leg. 9.875a; 10.903c-d; Aristotle, Rhet. 1.3.6; Pol. 1282b 16-9; Epictetus, Diss. 1.22.1. Hierocles in this example incorporates the three terms συμφέρον, λυσιτελοῦν, and κερδαλέον into his part-whole arguments. Marcus Aurelius (Med. 6.44; cf. 5.16, 35), for example, alternates between four terms – τὸ κοινόν, τὸ αγαθόν, τὸ ὠφέλιμον, and τὸ συμφέρον – in a single discussion of the function of the common advantage in the organic relationship of the parts to the whole. For Epictetus and other writers, τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ ὠφέλιμον are closely related in their part-whole arguments (See Epictetus, Diss. 1.19.12-5; Dio Chrysostom, Or. 27.6; Philo, Jos. 143; Aristotle, Rhet. 1.6.19-20; Plato, Crat. 419a; Isocrates, Ep. 6.14). A passage in Plato’s Resp (343c), uses τὸ ὠφέλιμον, τὸ λυσιτελοῦν, τὸ κερδαλέον, and τὸ ξυμφέρον (an older Attic form of συμφέρον) synonymously in discussing the idea of justice (τὸ δίκαιον) and its relation to other ethical considerations, including τὸ συμφέρον (336d). In Plato’s Cratylus (419a; also see 417a-c), Socrates maintains that ξυμφέρον is identical (τὸ ἀυτό φαίνεται) to δέον (obligation, right), ὠφέλιμον, λυσιτελοῦν, κερδαλέον, and ἀγαθόν.

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as the following example from Plato signifies, therefore, will not be neglected in identifying a part-whole connective rhetoric that is comparable with Paul’s. b. Example Two (Plato) In Leges 10.903b-d, Plato provides a classic form of the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον: Let us persuade the young men by arguments that all things [i.e., parts] have been arranged by the overseer of the universe for the security and excellence of the whole [πρὸς τῆν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ ὅλου]; and the parts of the universe each act or are acted upon appropriately according to their capacity. Each of these parts down to the smallest feature of its condition or activity is under the direction of ruling powers [ἄρχοντες], which have perfected every minutest detail. And you, you stubborn man, are one of these parts, minute though you are, which always contributes to the good of the whole [μόριον εἰς τὸ πᾶν ξυντείνει βλέπον ἀεί]. You have failed to see that every act of creation occurs for the sake of the universe, that it may enjoy a life of well-being; creation occurs not for your sake but you [i.e., the part; τὸ μέρος/μόριον] occur for the sake of the universe [τὸ πᾶν/ὅλον]40…. You are peeved because you fail to realize how what is best [τὸ ἄριστον] for you is best for the universe [τῷ παντί] as well as yourself [σοί].41

In this example, τὸ συμφέρον does not occur in the immediate context, but it nevertheless is implied in the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον due to the passage’s explicit part-whole politic (μέρος/μόριον-ὅλον/πᾶν) and use of terms such as ἄριστον and βέλτιστον, which are related to τὸ συμφέρον in part-whole contexts describing “advantage.” Furthermore, the phrase σωτηρία τοῦ ὅλου/τῆς πόλεως (“security or preservation of the whole/city”) is frequently associated with the part-whole rhetoric of seeking the common good.42 In sum, given this semantic overlap, the proper study of τὸ συμφέρον as a community ethic requires careful attention to the larger semantic range of part-whole argument. Beyond linguistic considerations, our two examples further illustrate several classical features, already noted, in the use of τὸ συμφέρον in part-whole argument: these include, 1) that τὸ συμφέρον as an ethical force appears in part-whole contexts; 2) that parts are created and ordered systematically for the sake of the whole; 3) that when each part performs its function appropriately according to its capacity, it benefits the whole; 4) that τὸ συμφέρον plays a connective role and can not be separated (μὴ χωρίζειν) from the advantage 40 Plato here in the same passage uses synonymously both τὸ μέρος and τὸ μόριον, and τὸ πᾶν and τὸ ὅλον, respectively. 41 Trans. from A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (Duckworth, 1974), 151 (emphasis and Greek added). 42 For example, Thucydides, His. 2.61.4: ἀπαλγήσαντας δὲ τὰ ἴδια τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς σωτηρίας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. Aristotle states (Rhet. 1.8.2): πείθονται γὰρ ἅπαντες τῷ συμφέροντι, συμφέρει δὲ τὸ σῶζον τὴν πολιτείαν (“for all people are guided by considerations of expediency, and that which preserves the state is expedient”; emphasis added); cf. Pol. 1276b 29: a common object for citizens is “the security of the community” (σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας).

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of its respective parts; 5) that ethical implications stem from the partwhole connection, in which individual persons’ actions are judged by their contribution to the common good; 6) that the organic body politic is prominent in the ethical rhetoric of part-whole – the organic relationship of each part to the whole presupposes that there is no such thing as private welfare apart from the whole; and finally, 7) that the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον can be ideologically applied to social orders in support of established powers (ἄρχοντες). While each of these features is essential to this study, what is most striking from the two examples of Hierocles and Plato is that part-whole rhetoric creates a moral space in which the κοινὸν συμφέρον takes priority over the ἴδιον συμφέρον, and the former appears as a connective to preserve (σώζειν) both the whole and its individual parts. This thesis requires further comment and clarification.

2. The Part-Whole and Its Connective A basic assumption that underlies early Greek socio-political and ethical thought is the connectivity of all things in a part-whole relationship. Many Greco-Roman philosophers and moralists describe the κόσμος (world/universe) as an organic whole (ὅλον) to which human beings belong as “parts.”43 Plato views the κόσμος as a single living being (ζῷον) and all other living creatures as constituent parts (μόρια).44 Aristotle, likewise, conceives of the universe as ὅλον composed of many parts.45 The same is true of Zeno (who believes individual living beings are organic parts of the cosmic whole),46 and Seneca (who contends that the universe is one single living body, and living creatures “are all attached to the one, being parts and members of a single whole”).47 In fact, many Hellenistic moralists, as we shall see later, subscribe to this classic conception.48 Consequently, this part-whole socio-cosmology provides a vehicle for basic moral reasoning; Greco-Roman philosophers and politicians often used this cosmology to reinforce the concept of the individual person as a part of the whole in their socio-political theories.

43 Jonathan Barnes, “Bits and Pieces,” in Matter and Metaphysics: The Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum (eds. J. Barnes and M. Mignucci; Naples: Bibliopolis, 1988), 223–94. 44 Plato, Tim. 30b-c; cf. 32b-33a, 34b. 45 Aristotle, Cael. 268b 6, 278b 10. 46 SVF 1.111-14. D. Hahm believes that “the similarity between Zeno’s conception of the cosmos as a living, intelligent animal and Plato’s discussions of this subject makes it probable that Zeno was directly influenced by Plato.” See David E. Hahm, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology (Ohio State University Press, 1977), 139. 47 Seneca, Ep. 113.9: quia ex uno religata sunt et partes unius ac membra sunt. 48 For example, Epictetus says, “I am a part of the whole Universe,” or “you are a citizen of the world, and a part of it” (πολίτης εἶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ μέρος αὐτοῦ). See his Diss. 2.10.3. Also see Seneca, Ep. 92.30, 113.9; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.3. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.878; SVF 3.4. For a discussion of Stoic cosmology, see Hahm, Origins of Stoic Cosmology, 91– 215; Michael Lapidge, “Stoic Cosmology,” in The Stoics (ed. J. M. Rist; Berkeley/Los Angeles/ London: University of California Press, 1978), 161–85.

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This connectivity, accordingly, applies not only to the human’s position in the larger cosmos (μέρος ὅλου τινός), but also to the Greco-Roman sociopolitical and ethical scheme.49 Aristotle insists that the human being is a creature (ζῷον) designed by nature to be a member of the various social groups such as the household (οἰκία), civic association (κοινωνία), and larger city-state (πόλις).50 His famous maxim that “the human being is by nature a social-political animal” (ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον)51 presupposes that the individual citizen is a member of the larger πόλις.52 (An isolated, selfsufficient individual is not a part of the state, and thus must be either a beast [θηρίον] or a god [θεός]).53 Aristotle further contends that every household or other association, itself a social whole, is a “part of a state” (μέρος πόλεως).54 In fact, without his part-whole assumptions, Aristotle’s political theories are almost inconceivable. He begins his Politica, for instance, by establishing a part-whole relationship between the individual and the state (πόλις), where the πόλις is understood as an association of people (κοινωνία), and all other (smaller) associations (κοινωνίαι) are thus respective parts (μόρια) of the state.55 The state stands in relation to its citizens, for Aristotle, as an organic body to its members: “Just as the body is composed of parts [ὥσπερ γὰρ σῶμα ἐκ μερῶν σύγκειται]…so also a state is composed of parts [οὕτω καὶ πόλις σύγκειται ἐκ μερῶν].”56 Such part-whole (μέρος-ὅλον) rhetoric is prevalent in Greek ethical development because Greek social and ethical ideas, as Wayne Meeks maintains, are “conceivable only within a community.”57 In early Greek society where there existed no established form of ethics,58 the part-whole relationship became the context of ethical decision-making regarding acceptable behavior in the community.59 Aristotle believes that 49 Epictetus, Diss. 2.5.25. 50 His expression of a human as ζῷον can be rendered as “a living being” or “animal.” 51 Aristotle, Pol. 1253a 2-3; cf. 1253a 8: πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον; 1278b 20: φύσει μέν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πολιτικόν. Cf. Eth. nic. 1.7.6: φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος. 52 Aristotle, Pol. 1253a 1-29, 1274b 35-42, 1326a 20-22, 1328a 22-4. 53 For such discussion, see Pol. 1253a 19-29. 54 Aristotle, Pol. 1260b 12-16. 55 Aristotle, Pol. 1253a 1-29; cf. Eth. nic. 8.9.4-6. 56 Aristotle, Pol. 1302b 35-1303a 2. Aristotle uses both μέρος and μόριον to describe citizens as parts of the state. See 1326a 20-22. 57 Wayne A. Meeks, The Origins of Christian Morality: The First Two Centuries (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), 38. 58 For example, W. Jaeger states in his study of educational settings in ancient Greek society, “there is neither a code of laws nor a system of ethics. The only standards for the conduct of life are provided by a few practical religious injunctions and by a store of proverbial wisdom handed down from one generation to another.” See his Paideia: Ideals of Greek Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), I. 32. 59 Cf. Meeks, Origins of Christian Morality, 8 and 38. Also see J. Paul Sampley, Walking Between the Times: Paul’s Moral Reasoning (Minneapolis, MN.: Fortress, 1991), 37–43. In fact, the observation of the community or state (πόλις) as the context for Greek ethics is not new. Jaeger, for example, followed by Meeks and others, treats the πόλις as the context of all Greek ethical reasoning. He writes: “From it [πόλις] are derived all the norms which governs the life of

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moral habits “are formed as a result of the corresponding activities” in communal relationships.60 Similarly, Epictetus contends that ethical “duties [τὰ καθήκοντα] are in general measured by our social relationships.”61 The individual part, in itself, may not need personal morality, but its relationship to the community as a whole demands it.62 In this way, individual-community relationships drive ethics in the Greco-Roman society. Epictetus further states that our ethical duty (καθῆκον) is bound with one’s relations, “both natural and acquired” as a member of the larger social whole.63 In short, ancient Greek ethical theory is “not an exact system” (οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει) but should be understood in the context of praxis, because its ethics were by definition relational and communal.64 As J. Barnes observes, “it is our parthood [to the whole] which determines our moral position in the world and which ought therefore to determine our moral attitude to our worldly lot.”65 We thus face an additional fundamental question: what, in ancient GrecoRoman society, was the principal ethical standard for determining the individual’s appropriate conduct in relation to the community as a whole? The problem of στάσις (party strife), for example, is frequently discussed as a defining social issue in Greek political development.66 No healthy community or city-state exists without suffering a degree of discord. As M. Schofield observes, “Greek and Roman political theory is above all else the search for a remedy for the malaise of stasis.”67 What then is the prominent ethical imperative that solves existing problems of discord and prevents future ones from occurring within the context of individual-community relationships? its citizens. Conduct that injures it is bad, conduct that helps it is good.” See Jaeger, Paideia, I, 108–9. See also Meeks, Origins of Christian Morality, 37–8; id., The Moral World of the First Christians (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 20–3. Likewise, in his study of Greek ethics in the city-state, N. White accepts the part-whole rhetoric in Greek ethical developments. He argues that “the polis is the source of all of the norms and standards that govern the life of an individual in it.” See Nicholas White, Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), 124. But the function of τὸ συμφέρον in the ethical context of individuals and community as this research investigates is not treated yet among these scholars. 60 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.1.7: ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. 61 Epictetus, Ench. 30: Τὰ καθήκοντα ὡς ἐπίπαν ταῖς σχέσεσι παραμετρεῖται. 62 As Meeks states, “individuals do not become moral agents except in the[ir] relationships” to the community. See Origins of Christian Morality, 8. 63 For example, “as a religious man, as a son, a brother, a father, a citizen.” See Epictetus, Diss. 3.2.4. 64 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.2.3, cf. 1.3.1-4. According to Aristotle, unlike geometry, for example, in which the student seeks precise angles, ethics is not an exact science. See Eth. nic. 1.7.17-23, 2.2.3-5. 65 Barnes, “Bits and Pieces,” 225. 66 Cf. W. Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia (Cambridge, MA.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1961), 13. 67 Malcolm Schofield, Saving the City: Philosopher-Kings and Other Classical Paradigms (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 1. Schofield deals with how philosophers attempted to cement political communities together and “to save the city,” but he does not discuss τὸ συμφέρον which, I think, is one of the most significant ethical principles in ancient politics to solve the problem of divisiveness.

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The Community, the Individual and the Common Good

What, in other words, brings the blessings of concord into ancient ethicopolitics?68 More fundamentally, what drives primitive Greek individuals to form various social groups which make a part-whole relationship possible in a culture where there is no established ethics?69 According to Aristotle’s Politica, the part-whole constitution is made by and for “the common advantage” (τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον συνάγει).70 Thus, τὸ συμφέρον, as we shall see, plays a significant role in Aristotle’s ethico-political philosophy on which he bases his part-whole assumptions. In his household ethics, Aristotle explains the slave-master relationship in light of part-whole and τὸ συμφέρον.71 He writes, “the slave is a part of the master…a part of the body, alive but yet separated from it.”72 This constitution, he maintains, is a “community of interest” (συμφέρον), constituted for mutual benefit in the proper relationship of part-whole, and qualified by nature (φύσει). It is the reciprocity of advantage that holds together a variety of social units, and therefore τὸ συμφέρον becomes a primary reference point for governing and guiding an individual’s conduct in relation to the community. The part-whole constitution generates an inter-related (connective) ethical imperative (τὸ συμφέρον) within which private interest (τὸ ἴδιον) is not be separable (μὴ χωρίζειν) from the common advantage of the whole. Individual persons as parts of the whole must consider what effects their actions will carry and how they will benefit the social whole (τὸ συμφέρον). Aristotle syllogizes the ethical part-whole connective as follows: 1) a citizen does not belong to him- or herself; 2) each citizen is a part of the state; and 3) therefore, “it is natural that care for each part should look to care for the whole.”73 For Aristotle, the construction of the individual person as a part of the whole subordinates the interests of the individual to those of the larger community. Likewise, in Stoic moral philosophy, the concept of the part-whole generates the moral reasoning of τὸ συμφέρον. Seneca insists that the part-whole dynamic prohibits harming any individual parts of the whole “because it [the individual] is to the advantage of the whole” (totius interest).74 Similarly, Epictetus maintains that God has instituted the part-whole “to serve the needs 68 Cf. Jaeger, Early Christianity, 13–14. 69 This research is not the study of all ancient ethical theories in that context. It limits to searching what we will call a part-whole connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον which will serve an interpretative key to Paul’s moral reasoning in his part-whole rhetoric in 1 Corinthians. 70 Aristotle, Pol. 1278b 20-4. 71 Aristotle contends that some people are free persons and others are slaves by nature, and that slavery is “both expedient and just” (συμφέρει τὸ δουλεύειν καὶ δίκαιόν έστιν). See Pol. 1255a 1-3. 72 Aristotle, Pol. 1255b 10-13 (emphasis added): τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ συμφέρει τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ ὃλῳ καὶ σώματι καὶ ψυχῇ, ὁ δὲ δοῦλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οἷον ἔμψυχον τι τοῦ σώματος κεχωρισμέμον δὲ μέρος. 73 Aristotle, Pol. 1337a 23-31: ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ τινὰ εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς πόλεως, μόριον γὰρ ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως, ἡ δ’ ἐπιμέλεια πέφυκεν ἑκάστου μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τῆν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιμέλειαν. Cf. 1260b 8-20. 74 Seneca, Ira, 2.31.7.

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of the whole” (πρὸς χρείαν τῶν ὅλων).75 Therefore, τὸ ἴδιον of the individual cannot exist in separation from τὸ συμφέρον of the whole because, as Seneca contends, they are under one yoke. Cicero provides perhaps the most explicit locus classicus for the part-whole rhetoric that generates the ethical referent of τὸ συμφέρον. Following Stoic part-whole cosmology, he states: They [Stoics] hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and law-abiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual.76

Here, Cicero formulates a part-whole rhetoric which incorporates the ethical imperative of utilitas (= τὸ συμφέρον),77 that is, seeking what is advantageous to the whole. As we shall see in more detail later, many classical philosophers and Greco-Roman moralists apply such cosmopolitan part-whole ideas, identifying the city as “whole” and its citizens as “parts,”78 thus developing a significant ethical principle of τὸ συμφέρον in their treatment of the proper relationship of the parts to the whole. Although their cosmo-ethical maxim of τὸ συμφέρον appears in slightly different forms, the message is the same: “seek what is advantageous to the whole.”79 As the above examples indicate, τὸ συμφέρον, as a part-whole connective, not only brings respective parts into wholeness, but also prescribes the ideal relationship that (presumably) prevents disruption, and mends brokenness.80 75 Epictetus, Diss. 4.7.6. 76 Cicero, Fin. 3.19.64 (emphasis added): Mundum autem censent regi numine deorum eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unumquemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequi ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. 77 No doubt Cicero’s Latin equivalent of τὸ συμφέρον is utilitas. For example, in his direct reference to Aristotle’s rhetorical theory, Cicero translates Aristotle’s τὸ συμφέρον into utilitas. See Aristotle, Rhet. 1.3.5 and Cicero, Inv. 2.51.156. Also compare Plato, Resp. 342e with Cicero, Off. 1.25.85. 78 Seneca, Ep. 92.30, 113.9; Epictetus, Diss. 2.10.3; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 4.4, 6.44; cf. Aristotle, Pol. 1337a 25-32. 79 For example, Aristides, Or. 23.7 (φρονεῖν ἃ κοινῇ πᾶσιν  ὑμῖν  συμφέρει); Plato, Leg 10.903c (μόριον εἰς τὸ πᾶν ξυντείνει βλέπον ἀεί; also, πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ ξυντείνων βέλτιστον); Isocrates, De pace, 10 (ζητεῖν τὸ τῇ πόλει συμφέρον; cf. Paneg. 18, Archid. 34); Dio Chrysostom, Or. 34.16 (τὸ συμφέρον ζητεῖν); 1 Cor 10:24 (μηδεὶς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ζητείτω ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου), 10:33 (μὴ ζητῶν τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ σύμφορον ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν); 1 Clem. 48.6 (ζητεῖν τὸ κοινωφελὲς πᾶσιν, καὶ μὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ); Hierocles, On Duties in Stobaeus 3.39.35 (τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον τοῦ ἰδιᾳ μὴ χωρίζειν). Also Thucydides, His. 2.61.4 (ἀπαλγήσαντας δὲ τὰ ἴδια τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς σωτηρίας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι); Cicero, Fin.3.19.64 (communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus); Marcus Aurelius, Med. 12.20 (τὸ κοινωνικὸν…ποιεῖσθαι). Cf. Philo, Agr. 48. For more possible references, see Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 25–39, 142–9. 80 In this manner, I will call τὸ συμφέρον a “part-whole connective ethics” in this study.

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The Community, the Individual and the Common Good

According to Greco-Roman socio-political and moral philosophical discourses, divisive problems usually come from seeking or emphasizing the private interest (τὸ ἴδιον) above the true advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) that benefits the larger community.81 Plato points out that when the common advantage (τὸ κοινόν = τὸ συμφέρον)82 is properly performed in civic orders the whole is preserved. Emphasizing the part and its private interest (τὸ ἴδιον), however, splits the whole (διασπᾷ τὰς πόλεις) into “party-divisions” (στασιωτείαι).83 Tὸ συμφέρον plays the connective role of binding the split parts into a unified whole by mending division within the community. The “common advantage,” as Plato maintains, “benefits both public and private interests alike” (ξυμφέρει τῷ κοινῷ τε καὶ ἰδίῳ, τοῖν ἀμφοῖν).84 In this manner, τὸ συμφέρον preserves both the whole and its parts.85 Given such connective function in the community, the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον was commonly used by politicians, rhetoricians, and moral philosophers in antiquity to heal divisiveness and bring a community together in unity.86 These ancient thinkers saw individual private interest as the source of all evils in the civic μέρος-ὅλον (part-whole) relationship,87 and sought to constrain this individual interest (τὸ ἴδιον) by connecting or subordinating it to the good of the whole (τὸ συμφέρον). The ideal of part-whole thus establishes a hierarchy of behavior that dictates an individual must first seek the true advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) of the whole over private interest (τὸ ἴδιον). Therefore τὸ συμφέρον, as we shall see, plays a 81 As we shall see later, this is the same case with Paul’s community in Corinth as his explicit and implicit instructions indicate. 82 In the rhetoric of part-whole of seeking the common advantage these two terms are interchangeable. See the discussion above on their semantic overlap. 83 See Plato, Leg. 9.875a and 4.715b. 84 Plato, Leg. 9.875a (emphasis added). 85 Such a connective idea and communal exhortation is possible because τὸ συμφέρον constitutes an organic part-whole (see below). Plato, for example, creates an organic part-whole relationship between the individual citizen and the polis when he compares the city to the body of an individual person. He writes that if the finger is wounded, the community of bodily parts “feels the pain as a whole, though it is a part that suffers.” He continues, “The best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism” in which “when anyone of the citizens suffers aught of good or evil…[the entire citizenry] will share the pleasure or the pain as a whole” (Resp. 462 c-e; cf. Leg. 8.829 a). In such an organic part-whole τὸ συμφέρον sits as a connective, and only in that context such a connective logic is possible. As Aristotle states, “for the same thing is advantageous for a part and for the whole” (Pol. 1255b 10: τὸ γὰρ ἀυτὸ συμφέρει τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ ὃλῳ). Given the sympathetic part-whole organism, as we shall see later, individual persons as parts of the whole must consider the connective effect of their action on the life of the social whole. Therefore, τὸ συμφέρον in the proper (organic) context directs a two-way traffic between the parts and the whole. To use Aristotle’s expression, it brings connective advantage “both collectively for all its members [κοινῇ πᾶσι] and individually [χωρίς].” See Pol. 1278b 24. 86 Mitchell writes, “Calling the audience to work for the common advantage is a topos in political literature from antiquity urging concord on divided groups.” See her Paul and the Rhetoric, 143 87 For example, see Epictetus (Diss. 1.22.14) who considers the emphasizing personal interest over the common advantage is the primary “source of wars [πόλεμοι], seditions [στάσεις].” For further discussion, see Ch. 3 below.

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dynamic role in imposing the hierarchical structure of the social fabric. In this sense, τὸ συμφέρον is an ideological ethic. Plato contends that a part is created “for the sake of a whole, and not a whole for the sake of a part.”88 Strictly speaking, however, in the proper context where connective benefit is made, the concept of priority is not necessary because “what is advantageous to the part is beneficial to the whole as well as the part.”89 It seems here that, for Plato, prioritizing the part or the whole is irrelevant because either way it embraces the whole in his body “organism” as noted above. Nevertheless, he elsewhere proposes the priority of the whole. In Greco-Roman civic discussions, once a part-whole is established, τὸ συμφέρον usually takes precedence over τὸ ἴδιον because the agent who seeks the latter, that is to live individualistically, tends to flee from the common good and/or to disregard the benefit of others. The apolitical part-whole outlook changes the flow of traffic, which in turn becomes one way. The opportunistic agent is contemplating his or her own advantage instead of embracing the reciprocity of mutual advantage between the individual parts and the whole. Plato elsewhere sets the priority of the whole over the part: “We have to foster the public interest of the community/ state before the private interest, and the latter should follow after or in company with the common advantage.”90 Ideological priority, or hierarchy, of common good or advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) does not harm or ignore the private interest (τὸ ἴδιον).91 To summarize, from the interrelation of the part-whole and τὸ συμφέρον, I argue that τὸ συμφέρον is a connective ethic, a moral reasoning, not based on the needs of the individual part per se, but on the individual’s connection to the community. As Epictetus maintains, the proper part-whole relationship creates a morality that duty (τὸ καθῆκον) is what brings “the profitable” (τὸ συμφέρον) to the whole, and “what is contrary to duty” (παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον) brings “the unprofitable” (τὸ ἀσύμφορον).92 Our ethical conduct is judged by “what is profitable [λυσιτελοῦς], or what is not fitting [μὴ καθήκοντος]” in part-whole relationships.93 In sum, the appeal to the true advantage of the whole (τὸ συμφέρον) is a symbouleutic rhetoric of part-whole that connects the

88 Plato, Leg. 10.903c: μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου καὶ οὐχ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται. Also see the Example Two above. 89 Plato, Leg. 10.903d (my translation): τὸ περὶ σὲ ἄριστον τῷ παντὶ ξυμβαίνει καὶ σοὶ. Remember the semantic relationship of τὸ συμφέρον with τὸ ἄριστον, as already noted. 90 Plato, Leg. 9.875b (my translation): διαβιῶναι τὸ μὲν κοινὸν ἡγούμενον τρέφων ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον ἑπόμενον τῷ κοινῷ. This use of τὸ συμφέρον as an ethical standard asserts that what is good for the whole is necessarily to the advantage of each individual member. 91 Yet, ideological appropriation of τὸ συμφέρον in the apolitical part-whole, we will see later, creates other ethical problems in the part-whole context. See the discussion below on “PartWhole Hierarchy and Related Issues of Tὸ Συμφέρον.” 92 Epictetus, Ench. 30 and Diss. 1.28.5. Thus, for him, the behavior for τὸ συμφέρον is “appropriate to me” (τὸ [καθῆκον/συμφέρον] κατ’ ἐμὲ) and the action that brings τὸ ἀσύμφορον is “not appropriate to me” (οὐ κατ’ ἐμὲ). Cf. Diss. 3.7.33. 93 Epictetus, Diss. 3.22.43.

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The Community, the Individual and the Common Good

individual’s behavior/benefit to its influence/advantages for the whole.94 Thus, we may define the connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον as concerning what is “expedient in regard to our actions” (τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ τὰς πράξεις) in partwhole relationships.95 As shown above, part-whole (μέρος-ὅλον) relationships are the cradle of ethical norms in ancient Greek society, and in that partwhole context, τὸ συμφέρον serves as the primary ethical point of reference for making judgments of one’s “right conduct of life” (ὅντινα τρόπον χρὴ ζῇν),96 providing impetus for “appropriate action” (καθῆκον), and prescribing a remedy for “strife” (στάσις). Before discussing such functions of τὸ συμφέρον, however, more preliminary clarifications regarding the part-whole hierarchy are required.

3. Part-Whole Hierarchy and Related Issues of Tὸ Συμφέρον The symbolic worldview of the part-whole in antiquity as briefly discussed above is fundamentally hierarchical.97 As Plato states in his Phaedo: “When the soul and the body are joined together, nature directs the one to serve and be ruled, and the other to rule and be master.”98 Greco-Roman philosophers, by contextualizing the idea of the body politic as reflecting the inherent design of the cosmos, assume that all elements of the cosmos are hierarchically ordered. Aristotle conceives of the cosmos as a hierarchically arranged whole in which all things have their proper places. The heavens are above the earth, and animals are higher than plants. Living beings, for Aristotle, are also ordered hierarchically. The human being, the only animal with logos, is the highest 94 The Greek word συμβουλευτικός means “deliberative,” or “of/for advising” in ancient rhetorical tradition. In deliberative speeches, as we shall see later, the technical term συμφέρον is often employed. Stanley Stowers points out that literary works of seeking what is advantageous is classified as συμβουλευτικαι or “letters of advice.” See Stanley K. Stowers, Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity. Library of Early Christianity 5 (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 107– 9. Cf. id., “Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason,” in Greeks, Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe (eds. David L. Balch, Everett Ferguson and Wayne A. Meeks; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 266. For more on “Ancient Deliberative Speeches and Letters,” See Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 21–3. 95 Aristotle, Rhet. 1.6.1. Here Aristotle discusses the deliberative rhetoric whose chief purpose, as we shall see later, is to appeal to τὸ συμφέρον. 96 Plato, Resp. 352d. Julia Annas renders the phrase as “How should I live?” as if Socrates poses it so. Anyway the fundamental question on the “right conduct of life” is a context-related praxis. Thus, the individual “I” in her reflection implies a part-whole (μέρος-ὅλον) relationship because a moral life is conceivable only in that context. See J. Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 27 and n.1. Her rendering is quite right because, as she argues elsewhere, “any ethical theory has to answer the question, ‘What are our obligations to others . . .?’” See “Aristotelian Political Theory in the Hellenistic Period,” in Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy. Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum (eds. A. Lakes and M. Schofield; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 75. 97 A helpful discussion on this matter is found in Martin, Corinthian Body, 29–37. 98 Plato, Phaed. 80a: ἐπειδὰν  ἐν  τῷ  αὐτῷ  ὦσι  ψυχὴ  καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν.

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and most relational “animal” (ζῷον πολιτικόν). The highest being of all is God, the primary, unmoved mover of all things. In such a hierarchical partwhole ideology, higher beings are more complex and perfect (τέλειος) than the lower beings. For philosophers, just as the human body has a governing part (the mind),99 the social body is similarly constituted.100 For example, they conceive of a political hierarchy in the household between husband and wife, parents and children, and owners and slaves.101 Arius Didymus, the Stoic philosopher, sums up a similar part-whole cosmic ideology: “the world is like a city consisting of gods and men, with the gods serving as rulers and men as their subjects. They are members of a community because of their participation in reason.”102 Tὸ συμφέρον plays the ideological role of maintaining and imposing this hierarchical structure of the social fabric. In his household ethics between the master and slaves, Aristotle argues that the proper relation between the ruled party, and the one exercising authority, which nature naturally intends, brings advantage to both parties (συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τὸ δουλεύειν τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν).103 The reverse is true, however, when the part-whole hierarchy is broken, and slavery rests merely on legal constraint (κατὰ νόμον) instead of mutual advantage. Therefore, an unjust exercise of his rule by a master is disadvantageous for both master and slave. Tὸ συμφέρον, in its hierarchical sense, often relates to and is sometimes in tension with other ethical considerations, such as τὸ καλόν (moral goodness) and τὸ δίκαιον (justice). These terms can create a semantic overlap in the partwhole context, qualifying each definition, one in relation to the other. For example, Socrates, in Plato’s Republic, attempts to prove that τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ συμφέρον are basically the same over against sophistic and certain popular (mis)understandings of these categories in a socio-political and ethical context. Aristotle considers the terms identical in the political field.104 For him, τὸ 99 For example, Seneca (Clem. 1.3.5) considers the parts of the whole body (corpus) as “the servant of the mind” (animo) as he writes, “the hands, the feet, and the eyes are in [the soul’s] employ; the other skin is its defense; at its bidding we lie idle, or restlessly run to and fro; when it commands, if it is a grasping tyrant, we search the sea for gain; if covetous of fame, ere now we have thrust a right hand into the flame, or plunged willingly into a chasm.” Also see Philo, Abr. 74. 100 For a detailed discussion on the body and hierarchy, see Martin, Corinthian Body, 3–136. 101 Aristotle, Pol. 1252a 26-34, 1253b-1255b; Eth. nic. 8.10.4-6; Aristides, Or. 24.32-33. Aristotle also sees a hierarchical relationship between the state and different kinds of associations as “parts of the state” (αἱ κοινωνίαι μόρια τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι). See Eth. nic. 8.9.4-6. 102 SVF 2.528: ὁ κόσμος οἱονεὶ πόλις ἐστὶν ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων συνεσῶσα, τὼν μὲν θεῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐχόντων, τῶν δ’ ἀνθρώπων ὑποτεταγμένων. κοινωνίαν δ’ ὐπάρχειν πρός ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸ λόγου. Trans. from Long and Sedley, 1.431. For further study on the Stoic idea of the cosmic city, see M. Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City (Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 57–114. 103 Aristotle, Pol. 1255b 4-15. 104 Aristotle, Pol. 1282b 16-7: ἔστι δὲ τὸ πολιτικόν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον (here he uses τὸ ἀγαθόν instead of τὸ καλόν). Also see Eth. nic. 8.9.4: δίκαιόν φασιν εἶναι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον; Rhet. 1.6.16: καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. συμφέρον γάρ τι κοινῇ ἐστιν.

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συμφέρον is a standard measure for rules concerning τὸ δίκαιον.105 According to Cicero, honestas and utilitas (Latin equivalents of τὸ καλόν and τὸ συμφέρον, respectively) qualify each other in definition, and are inseparable in the socioethical context. He contends that justice is always advantageous.106 Nevertheless, in Greco-Roman socio-political, ethical, and philosophical discussions, we come across numerous instances of τὸ συμφέρον in tension with the two other ethical principles. No ethical principle is free from situational dilemmas, and τὸ συμφέρον is no exception. Are τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ καλόν/ δίκαιον always harmonious with one another or do they oppose each other in certain situations? Can the same action be both advantageous (συμφέρον) and right (καλόν) or just (δίκαιον)? What is the function of τὸ συμφέρον’s frequent coupling with other norms (i.e., τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον) as in Demosthenes and Cicero, to name a few? Is τὸ συμφέρον too narrow as a practical guide to be the sole criterion in ethico-political contexts?107 Ancient Greek socio-political and ethical discussions provide ample instances of situational confusion in interpreting τὸ συμφέρον in relation to τὸ καλόν/δίκαιον. When τὸ συμφέρον seems to oppose these two ethical considerations, it is not clear whether συμφέρον should have priority over καλόν (or δίκαιον).108 Thucydides, for instance, points out the conflict between arguments from τὸ δίκαιον (justice) and from τὸ συμφέρον in political affairs among countries during heroic war ages. According to him, the Athenians, in attempting to resolve a quarrel between the Corcyraeans and Corinthians, faced an ethical dilemma in having to choose between the principles of τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ συμφέρον.109 Threatened by the Corinthian fleet, the Corcyraeans sent envoys to Athens to ask for an alliance. The Corinthians, too, sent emissaries to Athens to present their position. According to Thucydides, the Corcyraeans made their appeal on the grounds of the “many advantages” (πολλά…τὰ ξυμφέροντα) that would arise from the alliance. The Corinthians opposed the appeal made by the Corcyraeans from the vantage point of τὸ δίκαιον. They argued that “advantage is most likely to result when one errs least.”110 Having heard both sides, the Athenians choose τὸ συμφέρον. Such practice of eschewing τὸ δίκαιον in favor of τὸ συμφέρον appears to have been quite common in Greek socio-political discussions.111 In fact, Thucydides, as he provides other instances of “the one against the other” (ἀντιπάλων πρὸς

105 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 5.7.5; cf. Rhet. 1.1.7. 106 Cicero, Off. 3.25.96: iustitia…semper est utilis; cf. 3.3.11. See Ch. 4 on Cicero’s τὸ συμφέρον/utilitas. 107 Thus, a critical issue for understanding τὸ συμφέρον as an ethical category is its relationship to other ethical principles. 108 See Cicero, Part. 25.89-90; Ora. 2.82.334-335; and his De Officiis. 109 Thucydides, His. 1.31-43. 110 Thucydides, His. 1.42.2: τό τε γὰρ ξυμφέρον ἐν ᾧ ἄν τις ἐλάχιστα ἁμαρτάνῃ μάλιστα ἕπεται. 111 John H. Finley, Three Essays on Thucydides (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1967), 33; id., Thucydides (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1942), 51–4. Also see L. Pearson, Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 20–33.

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ἀλλήλας),112 that is, discord, between τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δίκαιον/καλόν, establishes a fundamental ethics of τὸ συμφέρον: “consider what is agreeable to be honorable, and what is expedient just.”113 The problem of τὸ συμφέρον’s tension with τὸ δίκαιον/καλόν is, however, not that simple. Sometimes the idea of τὸ συμφέρον is used by the politically powerful for their own benefit while sacrificing that of the people of lower status, either by “ignoring the principle of justice” (παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον)114 or leaving out goodness (οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλόν).115 For example: Can the idea of advantage in (a certain) hierarchical part-whole ideology be justified, as in Aristotle’s slave-master relationship and the “community of interest” (συμφέρον)? Can the egocentric filing of a list of “many advantages” (πολλά… τὰ ξυμφέροντα) by certain powerful individuals or countries – including fame, honor, peace, wealth, and military power for them – justify sacrificing what is right (τὸ καλόν) or just (τὸ δίκαιον)? The crucial distinction for evaluating these questions is the organic nature of the part-whole connection which allows one to analyze critically the authentic dynamics of τὸ συμφέρον.

4. Organic vs. Apolitical Part-Whole To fully understand these problems that we face in interpreting τὸ συμφέρον as a part-whole connective ethic, it is necessary to clarify the hierarchical part-whole constitution. The part-whole constitution can be classified into an “apolitical” (individualistic) part-whole and an “organic” part-whole.116 For Greco-Roman philosophers (as well as for Paul), the organic part-whole is the proper context of τὸ συμφέρον, in which the individual’s interest is inextricably tied to the good of the community as a whole. The individualistic part-whole is a variant form that often creates tensions between private (ἴδιον) and communal (κοινόν) advantages. Because I will substantiate its distinction and related problems later, let it suffice for now to suggest that the individualistic appropriation of the part-whole hierarchy produces ethical strife related to τὸ συμφέρον, particularly regarding categories such as τὸ δίκαιον or τὸ καλόν. In certain instances of the part-whole hierarchy, the governing party, the ruling class, or even the socially high class are understood as representing the whole, and τὸ συμφέρον is often ideologically exploited in order to maintain and reinforce the political hierarchy. In this variant form, τὸ συμφέρον is often used for the self-seeking benefit of the superior power, even when the upper class violates justice (τὸ δίκαιον) by harming or exploiting politically lower status people.117

112 Thucydides, His. 3.49.1. 113 Thucydides, His. 5.105.3: τὰ μὲν ἡδέα καλὰ νομίζουσι, τὰ δὲ ξυμφέροντα δίκαια. 114 Cf. Thucydides, His. 5.90. 115 Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 2.13.9. 116 See n.8 above for the term “apolitical” in this study. 117 See Ch. 3 for such discussion.

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The concept of τὸ συμφέρον embodies the desire not to harm others. This is an important feature of the part-whole argument, striking the proper balance between the individualistic and the organic whole. Instead of dismantling the problematic social hierarchy, philosophers and rhetoricians attempt to maintain the balance of reciprocity of advantage for all and not simply for the benefit of the superior power. Balance (though not perfect) can be maintained by restoring the organic concept of the part-whole, wherein neither individual interest (τὸ ἴδιον) overrides the common good of the community (τὸ συμφέρον) nor the agents in places of power dismiss τὸ δίκαιον or τὸ καλόν in favor of τὸ συμφέρον. For this purpose, rhetoricians and moral philosophers frequently use body metaphors in their part-whole argument because the organic relationship of members to the whole body best illustrates the idea of reciprocity between individuals and corporate entities.118 By using the body metaphor, they establish the fundamental principle driving the two-way relationship of τὸ συμφέρον that connects and preserves the whole and the parts therein. In this dynamic, τὸ δίκαιον or τὸ καλόν does not abandon τὸ συμφέρον nor is the latter separated from the sphere of the former. Here, as Aristotle, Cicero, and others show, these three norms are considered identical119 but they only appear to be in conflict with one another in certain situations.120 Tὸ συμφέρον appears to oppose other norms only in the apolitical/individualistic appropriation of the part-whole in which the advantage of the ruling class is not concerned with the good of the larger community, but often sacrifices the good of another. In the proper relationship of the part to the whole, τὸ συμφέρον needs no help; it stands alone as a single criterion. When the balance leans too far off course ideologically, however, τὸ συμφέρον needs moral reinforcement by invoking ethical considerations such as τὸ καλόν or τὸ δίκαιον. When, in this context, an emphasis on τὸ συμφέρον leads to abuse by the powerful, τὸ καλόν or τὸ δίκαιον can be used as checks to prevent this abuse of τὸ συμφέρον by the strong. In sum, τὸ συμφέρον as an ethical criterion demands the proper relationship of part to the whole in which the benefit of a part is connected to the benefit of the whole: if one member suffers, all suffer; and if the whole rejoices, its benefit is connective to its individual members as well.121 It is in this ethical framework that τὸ συμφέρον, as an ethic, is rooted and developed.

118 Cf. Seneca, Clem. 1.3.5-1.5.3; Cicero, Off. 3.5.21-6.32; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.86.1; Dio Chrysostom, Or. 34. For a detailed discussion, see Ch. 3 below. 119 Aristotle, Pol. 1282b 16-9; Cicero, Off. 2.3.9-11. Socrates, in Plato’s Resp., attempts to prove that τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ συμφέρον are the same. See Pearson, 162. 120 Cf. Polybius, His. 21.32c, who shows that τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ καλόν are often in contradiction in real life. 121 For example, Plato, Resp. 462c-d; cf. 1 Cor 12:26.

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C. Methods and Limitations of the Study Having established the context of τὸ συμφέρον in Greco-Roman moral tradition, its scope and application, as well as its potential for misappropriation, I now turn to the intention and methodology of my examination of the same in the 1 Corinthians. The primary investigative methods used in this book are exegetical and comparative. The narrative framework I employ in analyzing Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον in 1 Corinthians applies the historical-critical tools of linguistic analysis, rhetorical criticism, and a comparative approach (analogical-functional). In the last two decades of the twentieth century, an interest in the narrative aspect of Paul’s letters has emerged.122 This theory avers that Paul’s letters reflect a symbolic universe that possesses narrative features – that is, a story, so to speak – and thus his epistolary discourse “is best understood as the product of an underlying narrative bedrock.”123 The story Paul tells is that of God’s saving activity in Christ (the “gospel”). This in turn undergirds Paul’s interpretation and articulation of his part-whole rhetoric and his understanding of τὸ συμφέρον in response to the Corinthian situation. Throughout 1 Corinthians, the story of Christ-crucified and risen drives Paul’s argumentation; it begins and ends with the gospel story (1:18-25 and ch. 15). At the early stage of his rhetoric in which he confronts the divisive behavior of the Corinthian community (1:18-2:5), he emphasizes the gospel story of “Christ crucified” as the “power of God.” He concludes the argument by explicitly returning to Christ’s death and resurrection. Moreover, he includes within the story Christ’s ongoing eschatological work of subduing the enemies of God – with death as the last enemy – before the kingdom is finally returned to God (ch. 15).124 In short, the story of the gospel appears as the narrative bedrock upon which Paul constructs his part-whole rhetoric. Therefore, this project adopts the narrative 122 R. Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ: An Investigation of the Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1-4:11 (Chico, Calif.: Scholars, 1983; 2nd edn. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001); S. Fowl, The Story of Jesus in the Letters of Paul (JSNTSup 36, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1990); N. R. Petersen, Rediscovering Paul: Philemon and the Sociology of Paul’s Narrative World (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985); N. T. Wright, The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1991); id., The New Testament and the People of God (London: SPCK, 1992); B. Witherington III, Paul’s Narrative Thought World: The Tapestry of Tragedy and Triumph (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1994); J. D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998). For a discussion of current scholarship, see Bruce W. Longenecker, ed., Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment (Louisville/ London: Westminster John Knox, 2002). 123 Longenecker, 3. According to R. Hays who laid the first solid foundations for a contemporary scholarly interest in a narrative approach to Paul, the “story’ of Jesus appears beneath the text as a narrative substructure, which undergirds, animates, and generates features of Paul’s theological arguments. 124 Thus, the gospel story forms an inclusio. According to M. Mitchell’s compositional analysis of 1 Cor as a unified deliberative letter urging concord, 1:18-15:57, after “thesis statement” (1:10) and “statement of facts” (1:11-17), is classified as argument for “proofs” of seeking and maintaining concord in the community. See Paul and the Rhetoric, 184–291.

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method as a tool for analyzing patterns of argument in Paul’s theology of the part-whole, especially focusing upon the advantage of the gospel. In addition, this study directly relates to a modern sociological analysis of religion, especially with respect to the thought of Emile Durkheim.125 Paul’s understanding of the part-whole is better understood in light of Durkheim’s concept of “collective representations.” Here Durkheim emphasizes the attachment of individuals to social organisms as a whole and their successful integration therewith. For Durkheim, religion and “the sacred” help to sustain the collective consciousness and provide the morals and obligations which make social life possible.126 Similarly, this research argues that Paul invites people to become part of a collective entity of the κλητοί (“called ones,” 1:24). For Paul, in the context of this socio-religious community he develops and applies his moral reasoning of τὸ συμφέρον to the Corinthian situations.127 Rhetorical analysis is also especially crucial for understanding συμφέρον in Paul because the appeal to “advantage” (τὸ συμφέρον) is the most discussed feature128 in deliberative speeches and letters in Greco-Roman antiquity.129 Therefore, Paul’s letters will be studied on the basis of Greco-Roman rhetorical handbooks and conventions130 as well as actual speeches and letters from antiquity. Along with Paul’s use of part-whole technical term συμφέρον, in GrecoRoman socio-political and ethical discussion, a number of words related to συμφέρον are found as well throughout 1 Corinthians – terms that, for example, describe “advantage,” “benefit,” “interest,” “the good,” or “reward”: καλόν (1 Cor 5:6, cf. 7:8, 26); κρεῖττον (the comparative adjective of ἀγαθός) (7:9; 11:17); μισθός (9:18); ὠφελέιν (13:3; 14:6); ὄφελος (15:32).131 Moreover, the verb συμφέρειν (“to be advantageous/beneficial”) evidences considerable semantic overlap with οἰκοδομεῖν (“build up”) and pursuing ἀγάπη (love) 125 E. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (New York: Free Press, 1965). 126 For, Durkheim, “A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things…which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.” See Elementary Forms, 47. 127 Cf. Sampley, Walking between the Times, 37–43. 128 For example, Aristotle, Rhet. 1.6.1; [Cicero], Rhet Her. 3.2.3; Cicero, Inv. 2.51.156; 2.56.168-69; Quintilian, Inst. 3.8.34-35. For a discussion of the appeal to advantage and other features in deliberative rhetoric, see Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 20–64. 129 Rhetorical handbooks categorize the rhetorical genre into three: epideictic, deliberative, and forensic. See Aristotle, Rhet. 1.3.1-3; Cicero, Inv. 1.5.7; Quintilian, Inst. 2.21.23; 3.3-4. 130 The standard handbooks are Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric; [id.], Rhetorica ad Alexandrum; Cicero, De Inventione; Pseudo-Cicero, Rhetorica ad Herennium; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria. For a discussion of ancient rhetoric and its development as a method of biblical interpretation, see G. A. Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984); B. L. Mack, Rhetoric and the New Testament (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990). For an excellent survey of rhetorical criticism in Pauline studies, see D. F. Watson, “Rhetorical Criticism of the Pauline Epistles Since 1975,” BS 3 (1995): 219–48. 131 Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 33 n.57.

Introduction

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because ἀγάπη seeks “upbuilding” (οἰκοδομήν) of the whole community (“body of Christ”) and does not seek its own advantage (τὸ ἴδιον), for example, as in 8:1, 10:23, 13:5, and 14:3-5, 26.132 Paul’s frequent use of the soteriological term (σώζειν) in 1 Corinthians also parallels the rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον. For him, as we shall see, seeking τὸ συμφέρον equates the idea of the σωτηρία the way the Greco-Roman part-whole rhetoric refers to the common good.133 Therefore, this study will explore how Paul develops and identifies what is “beneficial” by carefully exploring the context of each use of συμφέρον, and by paying careful attention to the larger semantic field reflected in Paul’s use of the term.134 For the comparative discipline,135 I will use an “analogical-functional approach.”136 Because Paul’s use of συμφέρον functions analogously to that of contemporary Greco-Roman moralists in their discussions of the part-whole relationships, this approach facilitates the determination of the Hellenistic texts to be used for comparison.137 To compare Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον, its function, and social context with conventions in comparable literature in Greco-Roman antiquity, I will include Cicero, Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, 132 As K. Weiss (TDNT 9:76–7) states, “What really builds up the community is love.” Thus, we will notice that Paul’s lengthy ἀγάπη discourse in the letter is not unrelated to his argument of τὸ συμφέρον. The building metaphor is pervasive in 1 Corinthians. See Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 99–111. For a discussion of the Wortfeld or “word field” of οἰκοδομή, see I. Kitzberger, Bau der Gemeinde: Das paulinische Wortfeld oikodomē/(ep)oikodomein (Forschung zur Bibel 53. Würzburg: Echter, 1986). 133 Of course, his concept of σωτηρία in light of Christ’s death and resurrection is not the same; but, interestingly, as indicated above, Paul associates the idea of τὸ συμφέρον with that of σωτηρία as Greco-Roman moral philosophers often do. 134 Thus, my study does not merely consist of lexically-based linguistic arguments as in Kittel’s influential TDNT. For a critique of TDNT, see J. Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (London: SCM Press, 1961), 21–45, 206–62. Also for scholarly discussion about biblical semantics, see E. A. Nida and J. P. Louw, Lexical Semantics of the Greek New Testament: A Supplement to the Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains (Atlanta: Scholars, 1992); M. Silva, Biblical Words and Their Meaning, rev. and exp. ed. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994). 135 For a discussion of scholarly attempts to rehabilitate the comparative approach as a valuable tool and its continuing necessity in religious studies of postmodern age, see Kimberley C. Patton and Benjamin C. Ray, eds., A Magic Still Dwells: Comparative Religion in the Postmodern Age (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 2000), esp., Wendy Doniger’s “Post-modern and -colonial -structural Comparisons” in pages 63–74. 136 That is, to examine structural and functional similarities in the status of τὸ συμφέρον in Paul as well as in the context of other historical writings; from this, then, to compare and contrast similarities and differences to attain a clearer understanding. 137 For example, in his study of Paul’s psychagogic guidance in comparison with the practices of his philosophic contemporaries, Clarence Glad uses the same approach in selecting the Greco-Roman texts. See Paul and Philodemus, 3. A search of the TLG Database reveals 36 occurrences of the term συμφέρον/συμφέρειν in Epictectus, 75 in Dio Crysostom, and c.300 in Aristotle, for example. I can hardly compare all these instances with Pauline συμφέρον. And not every occurrence of the word in the moralists functions in the way that Paul uses it (i.e., advantage in part-whole relationships). Thus I select the texts in which συμφέρον functions analogously to Paul’s.

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Diogenes Laertius, Aelius Aristides, Arius Didymus, Sextus Empiricus, Stobaeus, and later Stoic philosophers (Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius) as well as Philo and other Hellenistic Jewish writers in this study. I will also refer to early philosophers/historians as well as classical writers such as Thucydides, Demosthenes, Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle. In addition, Cicero deserves particular attention. He emerges as arguably the most important spokesperson for the ethic of τὸ συμφέρον in the Greco-Roman antiquity. And because he is a bridge between Classical and HellenisticRoman philosophy, Cicero “is the most important single source available” that provides a “connected exposition” of Greek philosophical enquiry for the Roman world.138 Cicero heavily exploits Greek philosophy in his political thought.139 The same is true with his dealing with the classical part-whole ethics of seeking common advantage (utilitas = τὸ συμφέρον) in his moral and political philosophy. Not only does Cicero provide the most explicit locus classicus for the ethics of τὸ συμφέρον, but his idea of utilitas/τὸ συμφέρον constitutes “the subject matter of [Cicero’s] moral and political philosophy.”140 More importantly, Cicero wrote a treatise, entirely devoted to the classical part-whole ethics of τὸ συμφέρον/utilitas and to redefining issues such as situational dilemmas, conflict (related to τὸ καλόν in particular), and ideological misuse (by political power). His De Officiis, I will demonstrate, is an exposition and clarification of the classical part-whole rhetoric of seeking τὸ συμφέρον for his Roman readers. This treatise contains perhaps the best summary of the connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον/utilitas in all ethical discussions of τὸ συμφέρον in antiquity.141 Cicero, as will be examined in depth later, incorporates the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον/utilitas in multiple contexts in rhetorical, political, and moral-philosophical discussions. In shaping my arguments of Paul’s appeal to τὸ συμφέρον for dealing with Corinthian problems, I will use

138 J. G. F. Powell, “Introduction Cicero’s Philosophical Works and Their Background,” in Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers (ed. J. G. F. Powell; Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 2. 139 For example, as scholars have noticed, he attempts to emulate Plato by writing De Re Publica and De Legibus to define Roman political theory in parallel with Plato’s two-volume works in Greek. In such a way, Cicero tries “to provide a philosophical encyclopaedia in Latin for his Roman audience.” See E. M. Atkins, “Cicero,” in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (eds. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 477–516, 503. Also see W. Miller (xiii) who contends that Cicero “made Greek philosophy a possibility for Roman readers.” Likewise, A. Malherbe (Moral Exhortation, 13) says, “Greek philosophy was introduced to Rome in a systematic manner by Cicero in the first century B.C.” For Cicero’s use of Plato and other Greek literary sources, see A. A. Long, “Cicero’s Plato and Aristotle,” in Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers (ed. J. G. F. Powell; Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 37–61 and J. G. F. Powell, “Cicero’s Translations from Greek,” 273–300 of the same book. 140 Walter Nicgroski, “Cicero’s Paradoxes and His Idea of Utility,” PT 12 (1984): 561. 141 For example, to illustrate the ethic of business transactions, he says, “utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua sit” (“your interest shall be the interest of the community and conversely that the interest of the community shall be your interest as well”). See Off. 3.12.52.

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Cicero’s writings as a major voice for identifying τὸ συμφέρον/utilitas142 as part-whole connective ethics supported by the other philosophers indicated above.

D. Contributions, Significance and History of the Research This monograph will appeal to a wide and varied audience, particularly to scholars in both Classical and New Testament studies. In spite of the widespread use of τὸ συμφέρον and its prominent appearance in early Greek morality down to the later Hellenistic moral philosophy, surprisingly few classical studies explore its functions, contexts, and related issues. No survey, as far as I know, has ever been made to classify τὸ συμφέρον as an ethic. This book not only thoroughly explores this neglected principle but corrects the inadequate and sometimes problematic understanding of it by scholars (for example, in Stoic theory as it relates to moral progress). Furthermore, in the context of New Testament studies, numerous scholars and interpreters have emerged with theories about the Corinthian conflicts. In examining Paul’s redress of these problems, my book asserts that 1 Corinthians represents the definitive part-whole argument of τὸ συμφέρον against the individualistic (what I call idionistic) orientation of the Corinthian believers, which lay at the root of their internal factions and breakdowns. My book further asserts that Paul introduces a new way of looking at the concept of “advantage” and elevates it to soteriological significance. I argue that he brings a salvific element in his use of τὸ συμφέρον to address the problems of factionalism and discord in Corinth. For Paul, τὸ συμφέρον becomes a communo-soteriological ethic. This study, therefore, is original in its exploration, examination of and conclusions about τὸ συμφέρον both in antiquity and in Paul’s work. Below I will further elaborate on the significance of my study by briefly exploring how scholars of New Testament and Classical studies have understood τὸ συμφέρον.

1. Tὸ Συμφέρον in New Testament Studies a. Paul’s Use of Tὸ Συμφέρον and the Greco-Roman Moral and Rhetorical Tradition While this study locates and analyzes Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον in 1 Corinthians within the framework of Greco-Roman ethical and philosophical traditions, the possible connection between Paul and Hellenistic philosophers, especially 142 One might still raise a linguistic problem between Cicero’s Latin and Paul’s Greek. Though we cannot tell if Paul had a direct contact with Cicero’s literary works in Latin, but we can assume that Paul could have Greek sources by Panaetius’ (or his followers’) “Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος” which was the main source for Cicero’s De Officiis. See Ch. 4 on this issue. Anyway, by Cicero as a principal voice, I mean his De Offiicis as a treatise on τὸ συμφέρον, in which he shows his “shared” moral reasoning on this ethical category with classical philosophers as well as with Hellenistic moralists.

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Stoics, has long been a topic of interest and controversy and consequently must be examined.143 Early in the twentieth century, with the emergence of excellent editions of Hellenistic philosophers’ works, biblical scholars began to see the affinity between these authors and the New Testament writers. Johannes Weiss, for instance, contended that students of the New Testament should know Hellenistic philosophers intimately and “pursue the study of the New Testament with Hans von Arnim’s collection of Stoic texts at their elbows.”144 He followed his own advice in his commentary on 1 Corinthians by attempting to situate Paul in his larger Hellenistic context.145 Weiss argued that the word συμφέρον in Paul was a technical term of Stoic popular philosophy, citing Diogenes Laertius, Cicero, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.146 Weiss’s understanding of Paul’s use of συμφέρον has shaped the subsequent exegetical tradition.147 Don Jacques Dupont in Gnosis, for example, cites Weiss’ research and contends that Paul uses a Stoic term.148 Similarly, other scholars have recognized the frequent occurrence of the term συμφέρον in Stoic teachings and accordingly interpreted Paul’s use of συμφέρον within the specific philosophical school of Stoicism. Notable among them are H. Conzelmann,149 J. Murphy-O’Connor,150 and S. Vollenweider.151 In his discussion of the problem of “freedom” among the Corinthians (6:12-20), S. K. Stowers argues that Paul addresses the Stoic teaching that “only the wise man is truly free” and “all things are permitted” for the wise man.152 In Stoic thought, according to Stowers, “what is beneficial” (τὸ συμφέρον) is “that which lies within the power of one’s moral character.”153 143 For a historical survey from late antiquity to the 1980s, see Marcia L. Colish, “Stoicism and the New Testament: An Essay in Historiography,” ANRW II.26.1 (1992): 334–79. Also see Abraham J. Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament,” ANRW II.26.1 (1992): 267–333. 144 See Abraham J. Malherbe, Paul and the Popular Philosophers (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 3. 145 J. Weiss, Der erste Korintherbrief (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910); Malherbe, Paul and the Popular, 3. 146 Weiss, Korintherbrief, 158. 147 Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 33. 148 Don Jacques Dupont, Gnosis (Paris: Louvain, 1949), 307: “Johannes Weiss a montré, avec de nombreuses references à l’appui, que l’emploi de συμφέρω pour exprimer l’idée d’un avantage spiritual et moral fait partie de la terminologie la plus caractéristique du stoïcisme populaire.” 149 H. Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians (trans. J. W. Leitch; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 108–9. 150 J. Murphy-O’Connor, “Freedom or the Ghetto (1 Cor 8:1-13; 10:23–11:1),” BR 85 (1978), 543–74. 151 S. Vollenweider, Freiheit als neue Schöpfung. Eine Untersuchung zur Eleutheria bei Paulus und in seiner Umwelt (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 61–2. 152 S. K. Stowers, “A ‘Debate’ over Freedom: 1 Corinthians 6:12-20,” in Christian Teaching: Studies in Honor of LeMoine G. Lewis (ed. E. Ferguson; Abilene: Abilene Christian University, 1981), 59–71. 153 Here Stowers cites Epictetus, Diss. 4.7.9, 2.22.27, 2.26.2. J. N. Sevenster writes, “Paul may occasionally have derived terms and expressions from the Hellenistic world around him even

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Although these scholars, including Weiss, have addressed the term συμφέρον, this project will argue that their treatment has been inadequate for two reasons. First, they confine Paul’s terminology to its use in popular Stoicism instead of recognizing that Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον should be interpreted within the broader perspective of the part-whole rhetoric and advantage in Greco-Roman antiquity. Second, their scope of interpretation fails to recognize that the concepts of advantage and part-whole are coherent and pervasive throughout Paul’s arguments in 1 Corinthians. This does not mean, however, that a wider use of συμφέρον has gone completely unnoticed. In an article that discusses Paul’s use of the word συμφέρος in 1 Cor 7:35, Stowers maintains that “the term συμφέρειν is important both in Hellenistic philosophical ethics and in rhetoric.”154 Nevertheless, he does not discuss the other contexts, nor does he relate Paul’s usage to them. Similarly, D. B. Martin briefly discusses the matter and asserts that τὸ συμφέρον, as an argument in Paul, should be compared with a wide variety of ὁμόνοια (concord) speeches from antiquity where the theme of benefit frequently occurs.155 Just as Greco-Roman rhetoricians urge unity by appealing to the advantageous course for the whole community, Martin maintains, so Paul insists that individuals must not seek their own advantage but that of others. However, Martin does not develop further the rhetorical function of τὸ συμφέρον in Paul or in ancient rhetoricians, nor does he discuss τὸ συμφέρον as an ethical determinant in part-whole contexts. Even so, Martin’s Corinthian Body is beneficial for the current study. Martin argues that the Corinthian conflicts spring from different Greco-Roman ideological constructions of the body, both individual and social. He classifies the Corinthian community primarily into two opposed groups by the difference in status: the upper class (or the “strong”) and the lower class (or the “weak”). Thus the Corinthian problems, according to Martin, are related to two somatic ideologies over the construction of the body. One view, held by the high-class persons, emphasized “the hierarchical arrangement of the body and the proper balance of its constituents.”156 In contrast, the low-class group, to which the majority of the Corinthians belonged, was concerned about the boundaries and pollution of the social and the human body. “Throughout 1 Corinthians,” concludes Martin, “Paul attempts to undermine the hierarchical ideology of the body prevalent in Greco-Roman culture” and to modify their behavior by making “the strong weak and the weak strong.”157 Because τὸ συμφέρον and its related issues are associated with the socio-political part-whole hierarchy, from the Stoic school.” In this case, he includes τὸ συμφέρον among others but he never develops its usage in Paul and the Stoics. See Paul and Seneca (trans. H. Meyer; NovTSup 4. Leiden: Brill, 1961), 240 n.1. 154 Stowers, “Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason,” 266. 155 D. B. Martin, Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990), 143–4; id., Corinthian Body, 39–46. 156 Martin, Corinthian Body, xv. 157 Martin, Corinthian Body, 248.

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as argued above, Martin’s analysis of the Corinthian body provides clearest insight for my study. But, seen through the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον, as I argue, Paul does not have a problem with the hierarchical arrangement of the body per se; rather he embraces the ideology but in a theo-cosmic sense (cf. 3:21-23, 11:3, 14:33). What concerns Paul is the division of the body by seeking personal interests and not considering its negative effect on the community as a whole. Rather than chipping away the hierarchical ideology of the body, Paul corrects this by asserting that no member in the organic partwhole relationship is isolated and the individual benefit must be an organic aspect of the good of the whole body. A recent rhetorical analysis of 1 Corinthians by Margaret Mitchell has examined Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον in light of a wide range of socio-political/ rhetorical and ethical discussions in antiquity.158 In her discussion of 1 Corinthians, however, Mitchell confines the range of comparable materials to deliberative speeches and concludes that the term is “a part of the technical vocabulary of deliberative rhetorical texts.”159 Συμφέρον functions for her as proof that 1 Corinthians is an example of “deliberative rhetoric” that seeks the advantageous course for concord of the community.160 Mitchell does not present τὸ συμφέρον as an ethical category, whereas I assert the opposite in Paul’s understanding of τὸ συμφέρον. Taking Mitchell’s study as a point of departure, this project will propose that Paul uses a popular part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον to deal with individual-community (“partwhole”) problems, and thus his use of τὸ συμφέρον should be understood in light of wider part-whole contexts of Greco-Roman ethical discussions, not just deliberative rhetoric. Furthermore, it will explore the christoethical and soteriological nature of τὸ συμφέρον Paul seeks and the role of the gospel in shaping his rhetoric of it, a matter left untreated by Mitchell. She does not adequately develop the advantage of the gospel and her rhetorical analysis of 1 Corinthians does not adequately address why Paul utilizes the rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον. My work addresses more thoroughly Paul’s salvific application of τὸ συμφέρον to the Corinthians. b. Tὸ Συμφέρον and Paul’s Part-Whole Theology This book also sheds new light on socio-ethnic issues in Paul’s letters by connecting the concept of τὸ συμφέρον with salvation for the many (οἱ πολλοί; cf. 9:19-23, 10:31-33).161 Paul’s mission to the gentiles is related to τὸ συμφέρον because Paul conceives of the relation of Jews to Gentiles as a part158 Margaret Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1991). 159 Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 32. 160 Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 25–39. 161 Paul’s eight ἵνα-clauses, including ἵνα σωθῶσιν (“that they may be saved”), in 9:1923 and 10:31-33, clearly define τὸ συμφέρον as the salvation of the whole. See Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 179. For further discussion, see Ch. 6 below.

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whole relationship.162 Paul does not believe he has “started” a new religion. Both before and after encountering Jesus (cf. Gal 1:11-17; 1 Cor 15:8-11), Paul remained a Jew, yet he makes a significant shift from Jewish particularism to the gentile mission. His mission to the gentiles is not a rejection of his Jewish identity. Rather, he sees his mission in continuity with God’s promises to Israel and conceives of a cosmological part-whole theology ἐν Χριστῷ that embraces all parts – Jews and Gentiles/Greeks (1:22-24; 12:13; cf. Rom 9-11).163 As in part-whole body politics among moralists, no part can be detached from this part-whole theology, and each part (whether Jews or Gentiles) is “called” to work toward τὸ συμφέρον of the whole. The application of Paul’s part-whole theology is not limited to addressing ethnic issues.164 In 1 Cor 9, for example, he confronts the divisive attitude of those seeking personal advantage on the basis of γνῶσις (knowledge, ch. 8). Paul shows that he chooses not to exercise his rights because of his commitment to τὸ συμφέρον of the whole. Instead, he presents himself as the seeker of τὸ συμφέρον, saying, “I have made myself a slave to all” and “I have become all things to all people,” that is, to Jews (“those under the law”), to Gentiles (“those outside the law”), and “to the weak” (9:19-23). Paul makes it clear that his behavior is adapted for the gospel and its “advantages” for all people: “I do it all for the sake of the gospel, so that I may share in its blessings” (v. 23). Paul applies the concept of τὸ συμφέρον, I will argue, to bring a variety of factions [parts] in Corinth into a single community of οἱ κλητοί (“the called ones,” 1:24). His idea of each individual’s being “called” 162 Of course, this study is focused primarily on the 1 Corinthians, but the way these issues are interrelated in Paul’s part-whole rhetoric will be examined in this study by referring to other letters. 163 Cf. In his provocative A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley/ Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1994), Daniel Boyarin argues that Paul was “motivated by a Hellenistic desire for the One…beyond difference and hierarchy” (5–7), and was interested in “producing a new, single human essence, one of ‘true Jews’ whose ‘circumcision’ does not mark off their bodies as ethically distinct from any other human bodies” (94). Boyarin contends that Paul sought to unify all humanity, a universal Israel under God beyond the limitations of ethnic Israel while taking the baptismal formula in Galatians 3:28 that declares “the new humanity of no difference” in Christ as the hermeneutical key for interpreting Paul’s universalism. “Paul’s theme in Galatians” maintains Boyarin, “is his dissent from the notion that one particular people could ever be the children of God to the exclusion of other peoples” (23). But, in baptism believers put off the individual body as Jewish or Gentile, male or female, and put on “the body of Christ of which the baptized are part” (24), and in which all ethnic and gender difference is obliterated. Boyarin continues, “the vision of the risen Christ is what enabled Paul to understand the allegorical structure of the entire cosmos as the solution to the problem of the Other” (111). 164 The juxtaposed references to “Jews and Greeks” clearly indicate ethnic implications as a social reality in Corinth. See C. Stanley, “‘Neither Jew nor Greek’: Ethnic Conflict in GraecoRoman Society,” JSNT 64 (1996): 101–24. In addition to 9:19-23, scholars recognize ethnic implications in 1:18-31; 7:17-24; 10:32; 12:13. See Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 88 n.131; B. R. Braxton, The Tyranny of Resolution 1 Corinthians 7:17-24. SBLDS 181 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2000), 71–93. The way Paul deals with the ethnic issues is closely associated with Paul’s understanding of the nature and the function of the advantage of the gospel.

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for the gospel or “for sharing of his Son” (εἰς κοινωνίαν τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, v. 9) clearly carries the idea of the σωτηρία of οἱ πολλοί (i.e., whole; 10:33) beyond socio-ethnic boundaries of parts. c. Paul’s Συμφέρον and Stoic Οἰκείωσις This study will make a contribution to the understanding of Paul’s own social and rhetorical context, particularly his relation to the Greco-Roman moral tradition, which is a growing and important field of work in New Testament studies. Looking at Greco-Roman moralists for help in interpreting Paul is not new. However, the approach one takes in pursuing this task and the assumptions that guide the pursuit have evolved markedly. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, Abraham J. Malherbe’s reading of Paul in light of contemporary philosophic traditions has served as a leading methodology. His method in reading Paul is what J. Louis Martyn has recently called a “twostep approach.” The first step finds “similarities” in terminology, concepts, historical background, or strategies to the philosophers. The second focuses on significant “differences.”165 Therefore, Malherbe’s numerous comparative works “point out Paul’s adaptation of [the Greco-Roman moral philosophic] tradition and how Paul differs from it.”166 Malherbe reveals discontinuity or differences between Paul and moral philosophers often reflected in the apostle’s christocentric or theocentric commitments, that is, “the apostle’s cosmological/apocalyptic theology centered in the story of God’s action in Christ.”167 Recently, Troels Engberg-Pedersen challenged Malherbe’s thematic approach of focusing primarily on individual philosophical motifs, claiming that this approach is not enough to offer a coherent reading of Paul. EngbergPedersen argues that there is “a historical relationship between Paul and Stoicism” that Malherbe and other scholars have failed to appreciate. In his provocative book, Paul and the Stoics, Engberg-Pedersen demonstrates how Paul’s letters are directed to community formation and then attempts to interpret Paul’s community-oriented concerns in light of the Stoic theory of οἰκείωσις, an ethical theory by which the Stoics explain how a person turns away from self-directed basic instinct to other-directedness.168 Engberg165 J. Louis Martyn, “De-apocalypticizing Paul: An Essay Focused on Paul and the Stoics by Troels Engberg-Pedersen,” JSNT 86 (2002): 61–102. 166 Malherbe, Paul and the Popular Philosophers, 6. Cf. id., “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament,” 268–333. In examining 1 Thessalonians, for instance, Malherbe argues that Paul models his pastoral and missionary strategy after the moral philosophers. He writes: “the philosopher who gathers listeners around himself as he works at his craft was indeed a wellknown ideal in antiquity, and 1 Thessalonians suggests that Paul operated in a similar manner in Thessalonica.” See his The Letter to the Thessalonians (AB 32B; New York/London/Toronto: Doubleday, 2000), 66. 167 Martyn, 63 (italics his). 168 Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000); cf. id., “Discovering the good: Οἰκείωσις and καθήκοντα in Stoic ethics,” in The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics (eds. M. Schofield and G. Striker; Cambridge:

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Pedersen maintains that Paul’s ethical message is identical to the Stoic theory of conversion: a moral progress of turning away from self-seeking (egoism) to other-seeking (altruism).169 Thus, Engberg-Pedersen contends that Paul appears to follow the Stoic moral tradition as he formulates his picture of the Christian life.170 Engberg-Pedersen’s conclusion in light of Stoicism, however, is inadequate because he does not include Paul’s Corinthian correspondence and accordingly does not discuss Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον and his explicit community-focused rhetoric of part-whole.171 A study of Paul’s community ethics is not complete Cambridge University Press, 1986), 145–83; id., “The Relationship with Others: Similarities and Differences Between Paul and Stoicism,” ZNW 96 (2005); 35–60. 169 Based on his previous study of the Stoic theory of οἰκείωσις (self-appropriation or selfidentification), Engberg-Pedersen proposes a model (called “I-X-S”) which outlines the moral progress and transformation that the individual (“I”) undergoes including a total re-identification with reason (“X”), abandonment of a self-oriented life-style, and move to community-oriented concerns (“S”) and adoption of a new value-system in a social “We.” See Paul and the Stoics, 33–79. 170 Engberg-Pedersen argues that this Stoic anthropological model is a genuine option for our understanding of Paul’s ethics. In a sense his bold thesis has revived the Bultmannian ethical debates on the relation of Paul’s ethics and his apocalyptic eschatology. EngbergPedersen, following the ancient ethical tradition of Stoicism, sets aside apocalyptic “theology cum cosmology” in Paul’s ethical reasoning. He argues that Paul’s “basic apocalyptic and cosmological outlook…does not constitute a real option for us now” (Paul and the Stoics, 17). Rather, EngbergPedersen attempts to read Paul’s ethics apart from Paul’s apocalyptic theology, which Martyn (“De-apocalypticizing Paul,” 67) criticizes as “a mistake rigorously to be avoided.” Martyn (77) maintains that “Paul was concerned to offer a message for his hearers’ consideration… that cannot be confined to ethics as separated from theology” (italics his). He (85–6) argues that “Paul’s parenesis would lose its own potency” if we fail to grasp “the irreducible character of an eschatological narrative of God’s powerful activity ἐν Χριστῷ” (italics his). On this debate, RBL 9 (2002) presents review articles by Kathy L. Gaca, Victor Paul Furnish, Harold W. Attridge, Stanley K. Stowers, and John T. Fitzgerald, of Paul and the Stoics, as well as Engberg-Pedersen’s response to their criticism. In his recent study of Paul’s ethics in light of contemporary ethical debate, David G. Horrell also challenges a dichotic approach that draws the sharp distinction between theology and ethics. See his Solidarity and Difference: A Contemporary Reading of Paul’s Ethics (London/ New York: T & T Clark International, 2005), 10–46. However, as Furnish (RBL 03/2007) criticizes, “Horrell’s exposition of Paul’s ethics includes no discussion of the apostle’s eschatological outlook or the apocalyptic character of his thought.” Though such debates are beyond the purpose of my study, I concur with the view that Paul’s ethics are inextricably tied to his apocalyptic-theological vision of God’s action ἐν Χριστῷ. My analysis of Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον as an ethic further supports that Paul’s idea of believers’ moral progress from egoism to altruism cannot be isolated from his christoethical vision “that the power of the gospel is precisely the potency of God’s love to liberate human beings from the enslaving powers of the present evil age [and from self-seeking idionistic life], and to ignite their faithful obedience to him ἐν Χριστῷ, in the new community of mutual love,” that is, to the life of other-seeking communal life of τὸ συμφέρον (Martyn, 92). On Paul’s apocalyptic eschatology, see Howard Clark Kee, “Pauline Eschatology: Relationships with Apocalyptic and Stoic Thought,” in Glaube und Eschatologie: Festschrift für Werner Georg Kümmel zum 80 Geburtstag (eds. Erich Grässer and Otto Merk; Tübingen: Mohr, 1986), 135–58; Martinus C. de Boer, “Paul, Theologian of God’s Apocalypse,” Int 56 (2002): 21–33. 171 Engberg-Pedersen chooses only three undisputed Paul’s letters: Romans, Galatians, and Philippians. For his rationale of doing so, see Paul and the Stoics, 30–1.

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without exploring his part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον. If Engberg-Pedersen had incorporated Paul’s part-whole ethics of τὸ συμφέρον into his study of Paul’s community-oriented concerns, he would have reached a different conclusion. Its widespread occurrence in a variety of rhetorical, ethicopolitical, and philosophical discussions clearly indicates that a particular philosophical school or religion did not monopolize the part-whole ethics of τὸ συμφέρον.172 Particularly, my book addresses how my examination of Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον relates to Engberg-Pedersen’s study, highlighting his problematic interpretation of Paul within the Stoic context. Furthermore, many scholars, including Engberg-Pedersen, believe that the οἰκείωσις theory is the core of Stoic ethics.173 One of their foundational passages for the theory is Cicero’s Fin. 3.19.64 that I have already defined as the locus classicus for the part-whole ethics of τὸ συμφέρον/utilitas.174 In that passage, which Engberg-Pedersen also cites for his theory,175 the word οἰκείωσις does not occur; rather, the term utilitas (= τὸ συμφέρον) explicitly appears as an ethical determinant for the direction toward the communal interest. But no scholar has related the Stoic social οἰκείωσις to the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον. The problematic transition of Stoic moral obligation from selfconcern to other-concern is not adequately resolved without its relation to the widely-used ethics of τὸ συμφέρον that more clearly asserts re-direction from the personal to the communal.176 To repeat Cicero’s passage in part, “each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own.” It seems that the Stoic οἰκείωσις theory is a “Stoic-ized” development of τὸ συμφέρον, for Cicero’s passage above explicitly features part-whole connective ethics along with the 172 See Chs. 2 and 3 below. 173 S. G. Pembroke, “Oikeiōsis,” in Problems in Stoicism (ed. A. A. Long; New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 114–49; Gisela Striker, “The Role of Oikeiosis in Stoic Ethics,” OSAP 1 (1983): 145–67; Herwig Görgemanns, “Oikeiōsis in Arius Didymus,” in On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus (ed. William. W. Fortenbaugh; New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1983), 165–89; Brad Inwood, “Comments on Professor Görgemanns’ Paper: The Two Forms of Oikeiōsis in Arius and Stoa,” in On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus (ed. William. W. Fortenbaugh; New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1983), 190– 210; Troels Engberg-Pedersen, The Stoic Theory of Οikeiosis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy (Aarhus University Press, 1990), 122–6; Mary Whitlock Blundell, “Parental Nature and Stoic Οἰκείωσις,” Ancient Philosophy 10 (1990): 221–42; Annas, Morality, 262–76; M. R. Wright, “Cicero on Self-love and Love of Humanity in De Finibus 3,” in Cicero the Philosopher. Twelve Papers (ed. and intro. by J. G. F. Powell; Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 171–95; Ilaria Ramelli, Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics, Fragments and Excerpts, trans. David Konstan (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009), xxx–xlvii. Ramelli also provides other references on the study of the doctrine of οἰκείωσις in xxxii n.33. 174 For example, Maximilian Forschner, “Oikeiosis. Die stoische Theorie der Selbstaneignung,” in Stoizismus in der europäischen Philosophie, Literatur, Kunst und Politik: eine Kulturgeschichte von der Antike bis zur Moderne (eds. Barbara Neymeyr, Jochen Schmidt, and Bernhard Zimmermann; Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), I. 169–91. 175 See Paul and the Stoics, 69. 176 For a detailed discussion, see the section on “Tὸ Συμφέρον and Stoic Οἰκείωσις” in Ch. 2.

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technical term utilitas, the Latin equivalent of τὸ συμφέρον. It is more likely that Paul’s communitarian thrust better parallels widespread conventions of seeking common advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) in the part-whole relation than the “abstract” model of Stoic οἰκείωσις.177 It is therefore necessary to investigate a wide spectrum of Greco-Roman moral tradition, not limited to one philosophical school, in studying Paul’s community-focused part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον.

2. Tὸ Συμφέρον in Classical Studies Finally, a study of Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον will contribute to classical studies as well. As noted above, seeking the advantage of the community (τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον) as an ethical norm is a long-established convention among GrecoRoman moral philosophers. However, in spite of its wide use and appearance in numerous classical writings, surprisingly few classical studies explore the ways and contexts in which the moralists use the rhetoric of part-whole together with the term συμφέρον/συμφέρειν. S. Sambursky’s important study of the Stoic continuum theory deals with the Stoic cosmological ideas of the universe as a whole and the continuous generation of cohesion in relation to its parts. In Stoic cosmology, according to Sambursky, the universe is filled with an all-pervading substratum called pneuma, a symmetrical force that “keeps the earth in equilibrium but also preserves the unity of the cosmos as a whole and maintains its stationary state.”178 However, Sambursky does not even discuss συμφέρον in his section on “The Whole and Its Parts.”179 He finishes his book with a short comment that later Stoic philosophers founded basic ethical principles on those of physics, but made no mention of τὸ συμφέρον.180 177 Although the idea of οἰκείωσις is considered as a distinctive component of Stoicism (but not “distinctively Stoic” when viewed through the part-whole connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον that I propose), it is still controversial regarding its exact role, status and origin. See Teun Tieleman’s review article of Engberg-Pedersen’s Stoic Theory of Οikeiosis in Mnemosyne 48 (1995): 226–35. Also for a long history of the theory of οἰκείωσις in other philosophical schools (e.g., Peripatetics and Epicureans) as well in a biological and medical context, see Roberto Radice, Oikeiōsis: Ricerche sul fondamento del pensiero stoico e sulla sua genesi. Introduction by Giovanni Reale. Temi metafisici e problemi del pensiero antico: Studi e testi 77 (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2000), 121–82, 263–312. I am indebted to Ramelli (xxxiii and n. 34, xxxix) for help with this reference. 178 S. Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), 109. 179 Sambursky, 81–115. Of course, Sambursky studies Stoic “physics,” not “ethics.” But at least in his section “The Whole and Its Parts,” he should have indicated the idea of “advantage” in Stoic part-whole cosmology because, before its ethical application in part-whole contexts, the Stoic sympathetic connection of all parts is clearly for the advantage of the whole (ὑπὲρ συμφωνίας τῶν ὅλων). See Epictetus, Diss. 1.12.16, 1.14.1-5. Epictetus (Diss. 4.7.6) in his discussion of cosmology also insists that “God has made all things in the universe, and the whole universe itself…and the parts of it to serve the needs of the whole” (πρὸς χρείαν τῶν ὅλων). Likewise, Marcus Aurelius (2.3) says that a part (μέρος) is to contribute to the “advantage of the whole” (τὸ τῷ ὃλῷ κοσμῷ συμφέρον). So the idea of “advantage” is already there in Stoic physics. 180 Similarly, in his study of The Origins of Stoic Cosmology, David Hahm frequently mentions the Stoic idea of part-whole, but he does not discuss the role of τὸ συμφέρον in Stoic

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Further, articles by Jonathan Barnes181 and Dirk C. Baltzly182 also treat the part-whole relationship in ancient metaphysical and ontological merē-ology183 among Stoics and other philosophers, but they do not discuss τὸ συμφέρον and its ethical implications in their part-whole discussions. A. A. Long briefly points out the idea of “the part and the whole” in Stoic ethics and the notion of συμφέρον in Stoic philosophy. Yet, he simply cites a few Stoic moralists and fails to develop the use of the term in the larger Greco-Roman moral tradition.184 Similarly, Andrew R. Dyck in his commentary of Cicero’s De Officiis (which can be understood as an exposition of the ethical principle of τὸ συμφέρον)185 devotes a few pages simply to mentioning the occurrence of συμφέρον in Stoic (Panaetius’s) teaching “as a criterion for judging actions” but does not discuss τὸ συμφέρον as an argument in part-whole relationships.186 Some scholars who studied early Greek history have noticed diplomatic functions of τὸ συμφέρον in international relations. John H. Finley, for example, in his dealing with heroic war ages described by Thucydides, mentions τὸ συμφέρον’s conflict with τὸ δίκαιον (justice) in political affairs between countries.187 The “practice of refuting τὸ δίκαιον by τὸ συμφέρον,” insists Finley, “seems to have been well known.”188 Likewise, in his sketch of Greek ethical thought reflected in Thucydides and Plato’s Republic, Lionel Pearson points out that the conflict “between ‘the just’ (τὸ δίκαιον) and ‘the expedient’ (τὸ συμφέρον) is a recognized commonplace in all discussions of conduct in

part-whole cosmology. See his Origins of Stoic Cosmology, 75, 79, 109–12, 123–5. Based on Chrysippus (SVF 2.550), Hahm writes (163): “the cosmos is permeated and given life by pneuma, the same substance that permeates a living thing and makes it alive. Just as this pneuma makes a man a living, organic whole, so the cosmic pneuma makes the cosmos a living, organic whole, with each single part grown together.” 181 Barnes, “Bits and Pieces,” 223–94. 182 Dirk C. Baltzly, “Who Are the Mysterious Dogmatists of Adversus Mathematicos ix 352?” AncPhil 18 (1998): 145–69. 183 Merē-ology includes such discussion as “a part of a part of a whole is thereby a part of the whole.” For instance, Aristotle notes (Hist. an. 486a 10-13) that some parts (μέρη), being wholes, have other parts within them (e.g., the face, the whole arm). And Galen further specifies: “Each of these membranes is first and foremost a part of the eye. But because the eye is part of the face, for this reason they too are parts of the face, in a secondary way. And thus they are also parts of the whole body; for the face is a part of the whole body” (meth. med. X.47-8 k). See Barnes, 236–59, 239; cf. Baltzly, 145–52. 184 Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 179–84. Long also points out the idea of part-whole in his most recent study on Epictetus, but he does not engage it as an ethical theory of τὸ συμφέρον as I do in light of Greco-Roman moral tradition, not specific to the Stoic school. See also A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Live (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 153–6, 163, 176, 200–6. 185 For a detailed discussion on my reading of De Officiis as an exposition and clarification of τὸ συμφέρον for the Roman audience, see Ch. 4 below (“Τὸ Συμφέρον and Cicero’s De Officiis”). 186 See his A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1996), 353–9. 187 Finley, Thucydides, 51–4; id., Three Essays, 75. 188 Finley, Three Essays, 33.

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the fifth century.”189 He asserts that “Thucydides presumably intends to show the standard of international ethics,” “a [proper] course of action which is both just and expedient.”190 Finley and Pearson do not elaborate in their study on how τὸ συμφέρον functions in conflict/agreement with τὸ δίκαιον in early Greek civic discussions.191 However their observation of problems of either τὸ δίκαιον or τὸ συμφέρον as being the sole criterion in international relations at the expense of the other is important for later discussion of τὸ συμφέρον and related issues in classical and Hellenistic moral philosophy.192 Other scholars of Greek classical philosophy also have noticed the ethical argument based on τὸ συμφέρον in individual philosophers’ socio-political discussions. At the end of his study of Greek morality in the classical period, K. J. Dover briefly points out the contrast between “justice and interest” in judicial and political decisions as well as in international relations.193 Mainly based on Demosthenes, who often aligns justice with advantage, Dover, as mentioned, contends that Demosthenes uses “just and advantageous” as an ethical “formula,”194 but he does not explicate the function of the coupling of these terms. R. C. Lodge in his study of Plato’s ethical principles notes that what is “expedient or beneficial” to the individuals and “towards the life of the whole” appears as ethical values along with other standards.195 Though he does not focus on the technical term συμφέρον, Lodge points out that the good of the community becomes a norm by which one’s actions and situations are evaluated. Lodge does not elaborate upon how the ethical standard is applied in various social situations. But he makes a critical point that, against the ideological misuse of it by political power, Plato makes an organic part-whole relation an essential feature of the connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον that I already pointed out. (That is, the whole includes its parts, and individual good is “an organic portion” of the welfare of the whole community.) Thus, to destroy the whole is to destroy the parts, and the ideal ruler does not sacrifice the advantage of the state for his own personal benefit.196 189 Pearson, 20. 190 Pearson, 29. 191 In fact, their study is not on τὸ συμφέρον; rather, in their sketch of Greek ethics, Finley and Pearson show how Greek ethical argument is centered on τὸ δίκαιον, and they simply point out how the just plea is refuted on the grounds of the advantage. 192 For further discussion on the issue of justice and advantage, see Pearson, 161–79. 193 K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), 309–16. 194 Dover, 312. Cf. Demosthenes, Or. 7.46. 195 R. C. Lodge, Plato’s Theory of Ethics: The Moral Criterion and the Highest Good (New York: Archon Books, 1966), 62–5, 86. Lodge points out ten moral principles of distinguishing between good and evil in Plato’s ethics: “the universal assent,” “the writings of the legislator,” “quantity of pleasure,” “aesthetic quality,” “expediency or benefit, especially to individuals,” “contribution towards the life of the whole, “orderliness,” adequacy and selfsufficiency,” “consistency,” and “objectivity.” For discussion of each norm, see pages 58–87. 196 Lodge, 371, 463–4.

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The Community, the Individual and the Common Good

Aristotelian scholars Fred Miller and Richard Kraut also observe that the idea of the “common good” is a fundamental concept in Aristotle’s political philosophy.197 Aristotle uses the notion to distinguish between correct and deviant constitutions, for example. In correct regimes, the rulers aim at the common advantage of citizens (τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον); by contrast, in deviant constitutions they govern for their own benefit. Furthermore, of the three species of rhetoric – deliberative, judicial, and epideictic – according to Aristotle and other Greco-Roman rhetorical handbooks,198 deliberative rhetoric (συμβουλευτική) appeals to the common advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) in weighing a specific course of action.199 Tὸ συμφέρον becomes a criterion for judging a contemplated action as either “better” or “worse.”200 Stephen Halliwell insists that, for Aristotle, τὸ συμφέρον “is not a single or invariable criterion,” and thus it often couples with other ethical values such as τὸ δίκαιον.201 He further argues that τὸ συμφέρον appears as a “self-regarding criterion,” “a criterion of value detachable from ethical virtue” that “refers always to the advantage or benefit of an ‘interested party.’”202 As shown above, the ethical argument based on τὸ συμφέρον appears in the part-whole context from early Greek morality down to the later Hellenistic moral philosophy.203 And some scholars in their study of individual 197 Fred D. Miller, Jr., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 194–213; Richard Kraut, Aristotle: Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 264–73, 353–6, 399–402. 198 For example, Aristotle, Rhet. 1.2.3; Quintilian, Inst. 3.4.12-15; cf. Diogenes Laertius, 7.42. For a brief discussion on each genre, see George Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World: 300 B.C–A.D.300 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 7–23; id., “The Genres of Rhetoric,” in Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 B.C–A.D. 400 (ed. Stanley E. Porter; Leiden/New York/Köln: Brill, 1997), 44–50. Cf. Markus H. Wörner, Das Ethische in der Rhetorik des Aristoteles (Munich: Verlag Karl Alber Freiburg, 1990). 199 Stowers, Letter Writing, 107. 200 Aristotle, Rhet. 1.3.5; cf. Cicero, Inv. 2.51.156, 2.56.168-69, Or. 24; Quintilian, Inst. 3.8.34. 201 Stephen Halliwell, “Morality, Philosophical Ethics, and the Rhetoric,” in Aristotle’s Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays (eds. David J. Furley and Alexander Nehamas; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 211–30, 224; Also almost identical article is reprinted as “The Challenge of Rhetorical to Political and Ethical Theory in Aristotle,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric (ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty; Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1996), 175–90. 202 Halliwell, “Morality,” 223. However, it is important to notice that τὸ συμφέρον in the proper part-whole context stands as an independent single criterion. Tὸ συμφέρον, as argued above, is enhanced sometimes by being coupled with other ethical considerations, not because it is not a single ethical standard but because it is often misused either ideologically or out of selfish motivation, detached from moral goodness. For a fuller discussion, see Ch. 3 below. 203 Therefore, any study of τὸ συμφέρον without incorporating it into the rhetoric of partwhole is unsatisfactory. Aristotle’s statement (Pol. 1337a 28-31) that “we ought not to think that any of the citizens belongs to himself, but that all belong to the state, for each is a part of the state, and it is natural that care for each part should look to care for the whole” is a classic expression of the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον that asserts that citizens are to contribute to the common advantage to the whole or state/community.

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philosophers have noticed the idea of advantage in their ethical discussion. Yet no diachronic survey, as far as I know, has ever been made to classify τὸ συμφέρον, particularly in connection with “part-whole” dynamics, as an ethic.204 This study, however, traces wide traditions of antiquity where the rhetoric of part-whole appears and profiles them to propose an ethical theory of τὸ συμφέρον. The outcome serves as a hermeneutic key for reading Paul’s part-whole rhetoric in 1 Corinthians. In short, classicists also should find this study of Paul informative because, after all, Paul is a champion of the use of such terminology and the part-whole theory of advantage in the classical world.

E. Chapter Summaries With the clarifications, definitions, methods, and significance in mind (as laid out in this introductory chapter), I will proceed to study in detail the partwhole connective rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον in Greco-Roman moral tradition. In Chapter 2, I examine in depth how and why and in what context the notion of συμφέρειν/συμφέρον appears and is developed as an ethical category in Greco-Roman moral discussions, highlighting especially the Stoics. To this end, I first explore the common thought-world of the Greco-Roman sociocosmology that all things – humans included – are bound to one another in part-whole relationships. I examine how philosophers applied this dynamic to various patterns within the cosmic order (the kosmos) as well as to social relationships, such as the household and the city-state. I then proceed to discuss the Stoics’ part-whole rhetoric in their ethical development, highlighting their theory of moral progress (οἰκείωσις). This study reveals problems in some of the current scholarship of Classical and NT studies in understanding the Stoic morality of the οἰκείωσις theory. Some scholars (e.g., Engberg-Pedersen) believe that Stoics developed their communal ethics of οἰκείωσις as a moral theory that simply involves recognizing oneself as one among equals in the generic societal ‘We.’ My study, however, demonstrates that Stoic moral theory advances the classic part-whole argument, emphasizing regard for the other as the defining feature of the morality of τὸ συμφέρον. I make a careful study of the sources traditionally taken as the basis for Stoic communal ethics and demonstrate that their moral theory further develops the part-whole connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον. In the remainder of the chapter I explore how the ideal of the part-whole establishes a hierarchy of behavior: An individual must reverse his/her priority 204 Paul’s usage of τὸ συμφέρον as an argument occurs within the ethical (and theological) issues of individual-community relationships. As my study will investigate, this is true with Greco-Roman moralists. For example, τὸ συμφέρον appears in ὁμόνοια speeches of seeking socioreligious and political concord through appeals to what is beneficial (συμφέρειν) for the citizen as part of the whole city. Thus, an adequate dealing with τὸ συμφέρον in Paul and moralists cannot be done apart from their part-whole argumentation.

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from pursuing self, τὸ ἴδιον, to embracing the good of the whole, τὸ συμφέρον, in order to save both the whole and any part therein. I argue that τὸ συμφέρον, when thus appropriated, becomes the mainstay that bolsters socio-political underpinnings and prevents misuse of power, both in politics and human relationships. In Chapter 3, I will discuss various functions and applications of τὸ συμφέρον in Greco-Roman part-whole body politics and related issues. I first examine how the use of the “body” metaphor promotes the reciprocity of the community and thus demonstrates the mutual benefit of working for the whole. The human body (σῶμα), for the Greco-Roman writers, serves as the most explicit analogy for the socio-political and ethical application of τὸ συμφέρον. For them, it represents the clearest example of the proper functioning of the part-whole and embodies the “classic features” of the ethics of τὸ συμφέρον. It rigorously demonstrates, in an accessible way, the model in which respective yet distinctive members must work together for the benefit of the common good. Set against the tendency of some to elevate self-interest (an “apolitical” non-connective dynamic) that results in tension between private pursuit and common advantage, I highlight that the moral philosophers and politicians developed a theory of the organic part-whole from the analogy of the body. This analogy serves to build consensus about the mutual benefit between individual parts and the whole. I map out further how, for the moral philosophers, the rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον functions in society as an ethical imperative as well as a social constraint. As a social constraint it implies a hierarchy of ethical behavior. The diversity (and “hierarchy”) was assumed by the early philosophers as being designed inherently in the universe and thus ought to be applied to social structures. Yet sometimes the dynamics within the diversity/hierarchy get blurred, particularly when “self” (or τὸ ἴδιον) overrides τὸ συμφέρον. The result is social discord and injustice. I then move to make a critical analysis of τὸ συμφέρον’s relationship with other ethical principles and related issues. In particular I examine the possible dilemma in which someone might be forced to make a choice between τὸ συμφέρον and what is right (καλόν), just (δίκαιον) and permissible (ἔξεστιν), even if doing so comes at the expense of another. I explore how, for the moral philosophers, these principles are not of necessity mutually exclusive. They build the argument that upholding the principle of τὸ συμφέρον does not dichotomize private morality (τὸ ἴδιον) from the common good (τὸ συμφέρον), nor pit τὸ συμφέρον against τὸ καλόν/δίκαιον. Chapter 4 is devoted to Cicero’s De Officiis, which I take as a single literary work (a sort of “handbook”) that deals with τὸ συμφέρον (= utilitas) as an ethic. In the previous chapters, I have referred to numerous Greco-Roman sources that similarly define τὸ συμφέρον as an ethic. Those sources, however, are fragmentary. In this chapter, I present Cicero’s De Officiis as a singular, unified example of a philosophical work among the extant literary sources of Greco-Roman antiquity that highlights τὸ συμφέρον as an ethic, elaborates

Introduction

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on its functions, and explores troubling issues related to its misuse. Cicero’s De Officiis, I assert, serves as an exposition and clarification of the classical part-whole rhetoric that enables his Roman readers to aspire to and realize τὸ συμφέρον. Particularly, De Officiis exemplifies the enduring ethical tension between balancing what is right (τὸ καλόν) with what is beneficial (τὸ συμφέρον) in the body politic. I then move to discuss Cicero’s “ethics of glory” that looms large in De Officiis. I argue that Cicero incorporates gloria in his discussion of the utile/ συμφέρον because seeking personal fame and glory exemplifies the damaging effects for the welfare of the state. For him, seeking personal glory is an expression of seeking τὸ ἴδιον, often at the expense of the common good (utilitas/τὸ συμφέρον) and the right (honestum/τὸ καλόν). The above four chapters are all intended to define τὸ συμφέρον as (what I call) “the part-whole connective ethic” that Paul employs in 1 Corinthians, and they are all necessary (and useful) for the readers of his letters. These chapters will guide them to Paul’s thought world of Hellenistic ethical koinē, and his moral reasoning of τὸ συμφέρον in particular. Chapter 5 will present the major study on Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον in this book. Based on the research of the above four chapters, I will attempt to read 1 Corinthians as part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον and discuss Paul’s use of similar categories as well as his own distinctive features. This lengthy chapter is comprised of four blocks. It begins by highlighting several points from the previous discussion of the use of τὸ συμφέρον in GrecoRoman socio-political and moral-philosophical thought. I assert that Paul builds on his rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον from its widespread use in this tradition. I address first how Paul features τὸ συμφέρον in his directives to the Corinthians by using the metaphor of the body as his primary analogy. In Paul’s understanding, the Corinthian believers compose the corporate body of Christ (thus forming a sacred and ethical entity). He defines their relationships as connective parts one to another and thus not detached. In turn, this captures succinctly his argument that τὸ συμφέρον should govern conduct within that entity. In the next block, I examine the first four chapters of 1 Corinthians, addressing how Paul sets out the underlying tension between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ συμφέρον behind the factions and conflicts at Corinth. Paul’s rhetoric reflects a bifurcation in a series of paired opposites (e.g., two wisdoms, two spirits, two groupings [“those perishing” and “those being saved”], two levels of spirituality [infants and mature], etc). This, in turn, provides a window into the problem of τὸ ἴδιον in tension with τὸ συμφέρον among the Corinthian believers. As a test case, I examine Paul’s argument about the Lord’s Supper. This issue most strikingly reflects the Corinthians’ self-serving (what I call “idionistic”) behavior that violates their communal space of τὸ συμφέρον (the church). The third block addresses Paul’s remedy for the problem of τὸ ἴδιον. I here focus on Paul’s alternative expressions and distinctive features of τὸ συμφέρον. Not only are the Corinthians the “body of Christ” but they are the

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body of “Christ and him crucified.” For Paul, the image of the crucified Christ exemplifies the highest model of the morality of τὸ συμφέρον that seeks to benefit others. This stands in stark contrast to the behavior of the Corinthians, whose self-seeking mode of life (τὸ ἴδιον) sabotages the advantage of the whole. In the remainder of the chapter, I discuss the ways in which Paul further applies τὸ συμφέρον to cope with other problems of τὸ ἴδιον in Corinth. I also discuss the ways Paul associates his idea of τὸ συμφέρον to the related ethical categories of δίκαιον, καλόν, ἔξεστιν, ἐλευθερία, and ἀδιάφορα. Here my study clarifies, and even corrects, some New Testament scholarship that has misunderstood Paul’s moral reasoning in relation to Greco-Roman tradition. As a conclusion, I will use Chapter 6 to summarize the research and discuss Paul’s distinctive application of τὸ συμφέρον in his evangelism. I explore Paul’s understanding of τὸ συμφέρον that moves beyond simply a moral and sociopolitical model. Many scholars concur that Paul’s intent of using τὸ συμφέρον as his point of entry into the troubled heart of the Corinthian congregation, as in the Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition, was to urge them to overcome factionalism in a general sense. I argue, however, that for Paul, unity alone was not his singular goal. I make the case that, more importantly, his understanding (and application) of the principle embodies soteriological implications. This aspect, in conjunction with the associated social and political elements of τὸ συμφέρον, enables Paul to address the problems of factionalism and discord in Corinth. Paul has a more important agenda that far surpasses the sociopolitical unity. In this chapter I further argue that Paul imposes a salvific or soteriological purpose in bringing the advantage of the whole. The term σωτηρία does not mean specifically “advantage.” However, I argue that Paul’s development of the concept of τὸ συμφέρον is integral to his notion of salvation or σωτηρία of the gospel for the many, οἱ πολλοί. I support this assertion with an overview of (the Greco-Roman socio-political tradition and of) Paul’s use of ὁμόνοια (i.e., a unified part-whole) and σωτηρία, which are inextricably linked to his part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον. For Paul, the salvific advantage (σωτηρία) of the gospel for the many is the ultimate realization of the true advantage that is meant to benefit all (i.e., both Jews and Greeks) regardless of social, ethnic, religious and gender distinctions. Thus, I conclude that Paul’s argument of τὸ συμφέρον is a soteriological ethic that seeks the σωτηρία of the many and therefore should guide the Corinthian believers in their relationships. With this conclusion, I raise an issue for further study on the relationship between ethics and soteriology and on the aspects of Paul’s σωτηρία (individualistic vs. communal) in the moral vision of other Pauline letters.

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Chapter 2

The Part-Whole Argument and ΤῸ ΣΥΜΦΈΡΟΝ in Antiquity When a term can be classified as an ethical category, it requires a context. The word συμφέρειν of itself does not bear ethical connotations until it meets a certain criterion. It is a general term, used to identify something “to be useful,” “expedient,” or “advantageous.”1 It is not an esoteric word meant to convey a particular ethical concept for a certain philosophical school.2 Likewise, its neuter substantive form τὸ συμφέρον may simply mean “profit,” “advantage,” or “expediency.” However, as Eric A. Havelock has observed, the term συμφέρον, in conjunction with χρήσιμον and ὠφέλιμον, plays a role in Greek political and moral theory.3 No politician and moral philosopher down through the Hellenistic and Roman world, maintains Havelock, was ignorant of these terms because τὸ συμφέρον in particular had become an ethical norm in their socio-political and ethical discussions.4 In this chapter, I will discuss how and why, and in what context, τὸ συμφέρον came to be an ethical force in Greco-Roman ethico-political thought, highlighting especially the Stoics. I will demonstrate that the concept of the part-whole is both the background and the required context in which τὸ συμφέρον functions as a moral imperative and criterion for proper relationships between individuals and the community. In that context, τὸ συμφέρον plays a connective role, embracing both the whole and its respective parts.

1 See s.v. συμφέρω in LJS and BAGD. 2 For example, Weiss, Korintherbrief, 158, considered (wrongly) the word as “ein term. techn. der stoischen Popular-Philosophie,” mainly based on such Stoic sources as Diogenes Laertius, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. He failed to consider its widespread use in Greco-Roman socio-political and ethical traditions beyond the Stoic moral discussion. The term συμφέρειν/ συμφέρον “was not exclusively a Stoic catchword.” See Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 33–4. Contemporary scholars of classical studies also (wrongly) consider the word as “a common Stoic term.” See D. Obbink and P. A. Vander Waerdt, “Diogenes of Babylon: The Stoic Sage in the City of Fools,” GRBS 32 (1991): 374. 3 Eric A. Havelock, The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 391. 4 As already noted, these three terms have semantic overlap with one another particularly in the part-whole argument. For example, see Aristotle, Rhet. 1.6.19-20; Epictetus, Diss. 1.19.125; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 6.44.

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A. Part-Whole Socio-Cosmology and Ethical Development A popular idea in classical Greek and Hellenistic Roman philosophy is that the κόσμος (world/universe) is an organic whole and the connective ethic of τὸ συμφέρον is rooted in and arises out of that part-whole socio-cosmology.5 In his study on cosmology in early Greek philosophy, Charles H. Kahn points out that ancient authors use the word κόσμος “to denote the organic view of the natural world” as a whole (ὅλος ὁ κόσμος). Trees, animals, the earth, and heavenly bodies are all “parts” of that whole.6 The universe, they believed, is a single living body (ζῷον ὁ κόσμος) in which all things are connected in unity as parts of the greater whole.7 Human beings are part of this; they constitute various groupings of social organisms as well as being citizens of a universal state that surpasses territorial boundaries.8 Further, the human being in and of itself is considered a mini-cosmos (μικρὸς κόσμος); the human body reflects the part-whole nature of the universe in which all parts work for the common good.9 For philosophers in antiquity, all things are subject to the part-whole socio-cosmology. Such an understanding of the universe as an organic whole bears moral implications and facilitates the connective morality of seeking the “common advantage” of the whole. Such a view of the κόσμος presupposes an analogous idea of the sociopolitical organism of the πόλις.10 Early philosophers projected part-whole relations and rules observed in civic organisms upon the whole universe. They also conceptualized the cosmos as a hierarchical system in which human

5 For example, Plato, Tim. 30b-34c, Phileb. 29d-e; Aristotle, Cael. 268b 6. Cf. Jonathan Barnes, “Bits and Pieces,” in Matter and Metaphysics. Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum (eds. Jonathan Barnes and Mario Mignucci; Pontignano, Italy: Bibliopolis, 1988), 224–94; Hahm, Origins of Stoic Cosmology, 91–135. 6 Charles H. Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960; repr., Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 219–30. 7 For example, see Plato, Tim. 60c; Cicero, Ora. 3.5.20; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.139, 142-43; SVF. 2.633-37. 8 For example, Seneca, Otio, 4.1, talks about two citizenships: one is cosmic state – “a vast and truly common state [magnam et vere publicam], which embraces alike gods and men.” Its boundary is measured “by the path of the sun”; the other is a territorial state that is “assigned by the accident of birth” like “the commonwealth of the Athenians or of the Carthaginians, or of any other city that belongs…not to all, but to some particular race of men.” 9 Such an analogy between macrocosm and microcosm is extremely ancient. David Hahm traces it back to the pre-Socratic philosophers such as Anaximenes, Pythagoreans, Empedocles, and Euripides. Democritus (Fr. 34) is reported to have said that the human being is a little cosmos (μικρὸς κόσμος). Cf. Aristotle, Phys. 252b 26. See Hahm, Origins of Stoic Cosmology, 63–4. Also see Edward Adams, Constructing the World: A Study in Paul’s Cosmological Language (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000), 42–75, 66. 10 Of course, the cosmic part-whole experience (i.e., kosmopolis) is secondary which begins with the πόλις, but, for many philosophers, the cosmopolitan part-whole is taken for granted in their civic discussions.

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beings are parts of nature and are subject to its part-whole laws.11 In her study on the origins and development of cosmological ideas in antiquity, M. R. Wright states that philosophers politicized the cosmos as a great organism or kosmopolis (= mundus communis) and the individual as a microcosm, that is, “an ordered system comparable to the whole.”12 Utilizing this part-whole idea, philosophers drew a natural relationship between the cosmic order and the civic order. Philosophers applied the organic part-whole cosmology to various patterns of social orders to reinforce part-whole ideas in civic politics.13 Thus, according to this socio-cosmology, human beings are members of at least the three part-whole orders of the household, the city-state, and the κόσμος.

1. Household, City-State, and Kosmos First, the household (οἰκία) is the most basic unit of the larger part-whole constitution (πολιτεία). The first coupling (πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι) of male and female grows into the primary social institution composed of paterfamilias, wife, children, relatives, and slaves (see below).14 The household even includes “the union of natural ruler [master] and natural subject [slave]” as Aristotle justifies slavery as a natural part-whole development.15 This primary civic organism, according to Aristotle, is developed for mutual benefit (ταὐτὸ συμφέρει) among those members.16 Likewise, the author of On the Nature of the Universe17 proposes that the coupling of man and woman is intended for the common advantage of the community (πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τῷ κοινῷ), of which they are parts.18 Second, Greco-Roman civic discussions picture a well-ordered city as a part-whole construction. Families in turn form a village, and the association (κοινωνία) of many villages finally becomes a city-state (πόλις).19 Thus, as 11 Cf. Kurt A. Raaflaub, “Poets, Lawgivers, and the Beginnings of Political Reflection in Archaic Greece,” in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (eds. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 49. 12 M. R. Wright, Cosmology in Antiquity (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 56. For her discussion on “Macrocosm and Microcosm,” see 56–74. Also see Adams, Constructing the World, 41–81. 13 Cf. Nicholas White, Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), 149–51. 14 Aristotle, Pol. 1252a 26-34; Cicero, Off. 1.17.54. 15 Aristotle, Pol. 1252a 26-1255b 40. 16 Likewise, Dio Chrysostom (Or. 14.10) states, “the master, if indeed he is wise, will order his servant to do that which is equally to the servant’s advantage; for that will prove to be of advantage to himself as well.” 17 Mistakenly known as Ocellus Lucanus (early 1st cent. B.C.). The text “shows considerable traces of Aristotelian influence…as well as many Platonist formulations.” See “Ocellus of Lucania” in OCD, 1058. I am using the text as provided by Will Deming in his Paul on Marriage and Celibacy: The Hellenistic Background of 1 Corinthians, SNTSMS 83 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 230–1; 2nd edn. from Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 231–7. 18 [Ocellus Lucanus], Univ. nat. 45 and 48. 19 Aristotle, Pol. 1252b 28-35.

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Cicero maintains, home (domus) is the foundation and nursery of the state (seminarium rei publicai).20 Not only is a person a member of the household, but also the individual citizen is a part of the πόλις, as already noted in the previous chapter. Further, the household, itself a part-whole collective representation, becomes a constituent “part of a state” (μέρος πόλεως) as Aristotle, Arius Didymus, and others had already proposed.21 Such a well-layered social fabric represents a healthy city-state, as we shall see further in detail. The part-whole dynamic between the household and the πόλις is only possible when the part looks to the good of the whole. Aelius Aristides maintains that any social institution should “imitate the form and fashion of a household.” By this he means that the powerful in a household in particular – that is, “fathers” in relation to children or “masters” to slaves –voluntarily give up their private interest for the common good.22 Aristotle, too, argues that it is the natural duty of an individual citizen to act with regard to the whole (πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιμέλειαν).23 Stoic philosophers define the household as beneficial to the whole. Epictetus insists that it is the person’s duty to “marry, get children, be active as a citizen” and this brings benefit to the state.24 Similarly, according to On the Nature of the Universe, marriages should be undertaken “with respect to the whole” (πρὸς τὸ ὅλον).25 The author of On the Nature of the Universe further contends that failure to have the proper relationship of the part to the whole is not only “contrary to the law of nature,” but also makes both the household and the city-state miserable: the households are the constituent parts of the city-states. Now, the make-up of the whole and the entirety depends on the parts. It is therefore reasonable that whatever happens to characterize the parts also characterizes the whole and the entirety that is composed of such parts.26

20 Cicero, Off. 1.17.54. 21 Aristotle, Pol. 1260b 12-16; Arius Didymus, 148.5 in Annas, “Aristotelian Political Theory,” 89; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 2.24.2: every state (πόλις) consists of many families (ἐκ πολλῶν οἴκων). In his commendation of marriage, Hierocles contends that “there would be no cities if there were no household” (οὔτε γὰρ πόλεις ἄν ἦσαν μὴ ὄντων οἴκων). Hierocles, On Duties in Stobaeus 4.22.21-24 (Hense, 4.502); Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 100; Ramelli, 72. 22 Aelius Aristides, Or. 24.32-33. See Martin, Corinthian Body, 42. 23 Aristotle, Pol. 1337a 27-32; cf. 1253a 18-25. On Aristotle’s reasoning of the city as a whole, see Jeff Chuska, Aristotle’s Best Regime: A Reading of Aristotle’s Politics VII.1-10 (Lanham/New York/Oxford: University Press of America, 2000), 133–6. 24 Epictetus, Diss. 3.21.5. Also see 2.23.38: “But your purpose is…to do the duties of a citizen yourself, to marry, bring up children, hold the customary offices.” Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.121. On early Stoic view on marriage, see M. Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1991), 119–­27 (Appendix D: “Descending to marriage”); cf. Ramelli, 72–81. 25 [Ocellus Lucanus], Univ. nat. 45 and 48. 26 [Ocellus Lucanus], Univ. nat. 50: μέρε γὰρ τῶν τόλεων οἱ οἶκοι. ἐκ δὲ τῶν μερῶν ἡ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ τοῦ παντὸς σύνθεσις. εἰκὸς οὖν, ὁποῖα τὰ μέρη τυγχάνουσιν ὄντα, καὶ τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν τὸ ἐκ τοιούτων συντιθέμενον τοιοῦτον εἶναι.

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Thus, seen through the part-whole perspective, one’s duty to one’s household equally benefits the state.27 Dynamic connectivity between the household and the city-state is also expressed in the development of household ethics or household management (οἰκονομία), as well as in its application to other (greater) social organisms. In Greek culture, “the household is the primary school of morality” for the body politic.28 Well-administered internal harmony or a proper relation among individual members of each household greatly benefits the welfare of the state (τὸ συμφέρον).29 Thus part-whole ethics are developed from the relationships between the household members. Aristotle, for example, conceives three major forms of political theories from the associations between master and slave, between husband and wife, and between father and children within the household: kingship, aristocracy, and republic, respectively.30 Aristotle then applies those rules to the city-state.31 In the context of these part-whole rules, the advantage to the whole (τὸ συμφέρον), as we shall see later (Ch. 3), determines whether a constitution is or is not a correct form of the part-whole. In sum, the household (οἶκος), as Arius Didymus suggests, is a micropolis. This basic part-whole unit not only provides “seeds of the generation of the polis,” but it develops various part-whole ethics.32 Philo sums up the dynamic relationship of the part to the whole between the household and the state: For the future statesman needed first to be trained and practiced in house management; for a house is a city compressed into small dimensions, and household management [οἰκονομία] may be called a kind of state management [πολιτεία], just as a city [πόλις] too is a great house [οἶκος μέγας] and statesmanship the household management of the general public. All this shows clearly that the household manager is identical with the statesman.33

The household then plays a microcosmic role for the development of the ethics of τὸ συμφέρον in the context of a variety of social relationships.34 For ancient Greeks and Romans, the socio-political structure of a society is analogous to the cosmic order. This idea, that the kosmos is a megacity (μεγαλόπολις) in which the human being is a citizen of the universe 27 Cicero, Fin. 3.20.68. 28 Meeks, Origins, 38–9. 29 [Ocellus Lucanus], Univ. nat. 51; cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 2.24.127.5. 30 Aristotle, Pol. 1253b-1255b; Eth. nic. 8.10. Cf. Arius Didymus (148.5) who is reported to say, “There is a sketch of kingship in the home, and of aristocracy and of democracy. The form of community of parents with children is kingly; that of a man with his wife is aristocratic; that of the children with one another is democratic.” Trans. from Annas, “Aristotelian Political Theory,” 89. Also see Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 145–6. 31 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.10.1-6; Pol. 1278b 31–1280a 6 32 Arius Didymus, 148.5 in Annas, “Aristotelian Political Theory,” 89. 33 Philo, Jos. 38–9. 34 Aristotle, Pol. 1260 b 12-16. See Meeks, Origins, 38–9; id., Moral World, 21.

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(κοσμοπολίτης), further develops the idea of the cosmopolitan part-whole. Socrates, according to Stoic sources, refused to be a citizen of a certain country, but rather thought of himself as a citizen of the universe.35 Plato,36 Aristotle,37 and Zeno38 all conceived of the kosmos as a whole (ὅλον) of which human beings are members, parts, and citizens.39 Stoic philosophers, as well, according to Cicero, Diogenes of Laertius, and Arius Didymus, subscribed to the classic part-whole cosmology that the universe is a city-state and each person is a part of this great city.40 Later Stoic philosophers in particular developed much of their moral philosophy based upon the cosmopolitan part-whole dynamic.41 Seneca, for example, contended that living creatures are all attached to the single body of the universe.42 Epictetus believed that “this universe is a single city,”43 and “you are a citizen of the world, and a part of it.”44 Moreover, Epictetus maintained that all human beings are by nature made of one household, a microcosm of the universal state.45 He widely applied this cosmopolitan part-whole idea to various civic organisms, as we shall see further later. Similarly, Marcus Aurelius likened the cosmos to a city-state (ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις ἐστί).46 He called himself a citizen or a part of the whole (μέρος εἰμὶ τοῦ ὅλου),47 and referred to other “citizens” (πολῖταί) as “fellow-members” of the universal state.48

35 Epictetus, Diss. 1.9.1; Cicero, Tusc. 5.37.108. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 6.63. 36 Plato, Tim.30b-34b. In Gorg. 508a 3, κόσμος is interchangeable with τὸ ὅλον. Also for a discussion of Platonic idea of the universe as a whole with parts, see Mary Margaret McCabe, Plato’s Individuals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 163–74, 201–2. Her discussion is based in part on Tim. 30c, 31a, 33a-c, 34b, 55d, and 92c among others. 37 Aristotle, Metaph. 1069a 19; Cael. 268b 6. 38 SVF 1.111-14. See Hahm, Origins of Stoic Cosmology, 139. 39 On Plato’s tradition among later writers, see Joseph Moreau, L’âme du monde de Platon aux Stoïciens (Georg Olms Hildeshein, 1956), 173–86; A. A. Long, “Cicero’s Plato and Aristotle,” in Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers (ed. J. G. F. Powell; Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 37–61. 40 Cicero, Fin. 3.19.64; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.87-8; Arius Didymus (SVF 2.528) in Long and Sedley, 1.431. Cf. Ramelli, 29. 41 Cf. G. R. Stanton, “The Cosmopolitan Ideas of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius,” Phronesis 13 (1968): 183–95. The Stoics are generally divided into three phases, the Early, the Middle, and the Later (Roman) Stoicism. See David Sedley, “The School, from Zeno to Arius Didymus,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (ed. Brad Inwood; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7–32. 42 Seneca, Ep. 113.9: quia ex uno religata sunt et partes unius ac membra sunt. 43 Epictetus, Diss. 3.24.10: ὁ κόσμος οὗτος μία πόλις ἐστί. 44 Epictetus, Diss. 2.10.3: πολίτης εἶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ μέρος αὐτοῦ. See Stanton, 184–93. 45 Epictetus likens the “great city” (μεγάλη πόλις) to “a well-ordered house” (οἰκία καλῶς οἰκουμένη). See Diss. 3.22.3-5; 3.24.11. Cf. 2.5.27: an expression of the individual person as “a small copy of the universal whole” (μικρὸν τῆς ὅλης μίμημα). 46 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 4.3 and 4.4. 47 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 10.6; cf. 5.24. 48 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 4.2 and 4.4.

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To sum up, for Greco-Roman philosophers, all things – humans included – are bound to one another in part-whole relationships. Human beings in particular are constituent parts of various socio-cosmic units, including οἰκία, πόλις, and κόσμος. Being respective members of a part-whole organism, and operating as such within the bounds of each organism, carries significant ethical implications. Marcus Aurelius, for instance, applies it to himself when he says, “I am a limb of the organized body” allotted from the whole (ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου) for the “common interest” (τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον).49 Having established that the part-whole dynamic of connectivity was operative and robust on many levels in antiquity, I now proceed to show how the part-whole conception precipitated an ethical dynamic and how τὸ συμφέρον came to serve as an ethical category in preserving the relationship between the individual and a variety of respective socio-cosmic units.

B. Tὸ Συμφέρον and Its Ethical Development In the Greco-Roman world, the part-whole conception created ethical space.50 That is to say, the fact that this concept recognized that an individual is a part of a civic organism and of the cosmic whole became a starting point for ethical theories in antiquity. Virtuous behavior was conceivable only within the context of these individual-community relationships,51 because, as Epictetus maintains, ethical duty (καθῆκον) means to “act in an orderly fashion” and “do nothing irrationally” in “our [part-whole] relations in society.”52 Thus, acting morally involved identifying oneself as a part of the whole and living as such, ever mindful of the greater good. This is the main reason that Aristotle’s starting point for his socio-political and ethical theories was establishing a clear understanding of a strong part-whole civic relationship. That is, the citizen is a part of the πόλις.53 Since, in the previous chapter, I sampled mainly 49 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 7.13; 10.6. 50 We can put what is at issue in the preceding discussion with the following question: How do I know if any given behavior is “appropriate to me” (τὸ [καθῆκον/συμφέρον] κατ’ ἐμὲ) or is “not appropriate to me” (οὐ κατ’ ἐμὲ)? See Epictetus, Diss. 1.28.5-6; cf. 3.7.33; Ench. 30. An answer to the question requires a context or an ethical space. 51 For example, see Aristotle, Pol. 1253a 2-8, 1260b 12-16, 1274b 35-42, 1326a 20-22, 1328a 22-4; Eth. nic. 1.7.6, 8.9.4-6. 52 Epictetus, Diss. 3.2.2 and 4.4.16 (emphasis added). Cf. 1.7.2: “our aim in every matter of inquiry is to learn how the good and excellent man [καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός] may find the appropriate course through it and the appropriate way of conducting himself in it.” On the discussion of Aristotle’s idea on this issue, see Ch. 1 under “The Part-Whole and Its Connective.” 53 For him, the human being is a πολιτικὸν ζῷον, an animal designed by nature to live in socio-political part-whole relationships, for and in which τὸ συμφέρον becomes an ethical force. See Pol. 1253a 2-3; cf. 1253a 8: πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον; 1278b 20: ὁ φύσει…ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πολιτικόν. Cf. Eth. nic. 1.7.6: φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. For example, the first partwhole πολιτεία, composed of husband, wife, children, and slaves, is a “community of interest” (συμφέρον) in which each member seeks “the same advantage” (ταὐτὸ συμφέρει). See Pol. 1252a 24-35 and 1255b 4-15.

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Aristotle’s part-whole rhetoric to highlight this ethical connective, here, for the most part, I now focus on the Stoics and their development of the ethics of τὸ συμφέρον from the part-whole socio-cosmology that we just noted above. Tὸ συμφέρον, we will notice, becomes the lodestar for guiding appropriate courses of action (τὰ καθήκοντα) in their part-whole relationships.

1. Stoic Part-Whole Rhetoric and Its Ethical Implications Stoic moral discourses stress the examination of the part-whole law of nature (φύσις) as “propaedeutic for virtuous behavior.”54 Nature provides a “sound basis for a scientific rule of human conduct.”55 For example, Chrysippus, according to Plutarch, maintained that human beings should study the universe to discover the foundation of ethics. He argued that there is no appropriate way to approach the ethical idea of good and evil apart from the natural universe and its administration.56 Chrysippus also maintained that “living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature.”57 For the Stoics, a life in agreement with nature is virtuous because “nature leads us to virtue.”58 Stoic emphasis on the study of φύσις as the guide for virtuous behavior is predicated upon a part-whole cosmology. Not only are human beings respective parts of the cosmos; but further, “our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe.”59 Sextus Empiricus says that Posidonius, among other Stoics, contended that the universe is a unified single body in which parts or units are sympathetically linked together.60 54 Robert B. Todd, “Monism and Immanence: The Foundations of Stoic Physics,” in The Stoics (ed. John M. Rist; Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1978), 137–60; Lapidge, “Stoic Cosmology,” 161–85; Nicholas P. White, “The Role of Physics in Stoic Ethics,” SJP 23, Supplement (Spindel Conference: Recovering the Stoics) (1985): 57–74; Gisela Striker, “Following Nature: A Study in Stoic Ethics,” OSAP 9 (ed. Julia Annas; Oxford: Clarendon, 1991): 1–73; A. A. Long, Stoic Studies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); esp. 134–55; Brad Inwood and Pierluigi Donini, “Stoic Ethics,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (eds. Keimpe Algra et al.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 675–738; Malcolm Schofield, “Stoic Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (ed. Brad Inwood; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 233–56. 55 E. Vernon Arnold, Roman Stoicism (New York: The Humanities Press, 1958), 155, 184–5. 56 Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1035c: οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως οὐδ’ οἰκειότερον ἐπελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον…ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως καὶ ἀπὸ τὴς τοῦ κόσμου διοικήσεως. Cf. Cicero, Nat. d. 2.37. 57 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.87. 58 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.87: ἄγει γὰρ πρὸς ταύτην [ἀρετὴν] ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις. 59 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.87: μέρη γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ἡμέτεραι φύσεις τῆς τοῦ ὅλου. 60 Sextus Empiricus, Math. 9.78-92. Also according to Stobaeus, it is Cleanthes who revived the ideas of the old Stoa that human beings are “parts” of the kosmos. See Stobaeus, Ecl. 1.17.3; cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.87. As noted above, Roman Stoic philosophers also subscribed to this classic part-whole idea. It is virtuous, argued Marcus Aurelius, to follow the part-whole nature of the cosmos because the universe/whole does not bring any harm to its parts and in its way “there can be no evil” (οὐδὲν δὲ κακὸν κατὰ φύσιν). See Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.17; cf. Epictetus, Diss. 1.26.1.

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Stoic part-whole rhetoric, as a moral discourse, establishes and advances the idea of socio-cosmic part-whole units.61 Nature, according to Stoic philosophy, established a part-whole law of seeking the common good; thus violating the common good is a crime against nature.62 Stoics contend that the human being possesses reason, which is imparted from the cosmic reason that governs the universe.63 Φύσις is a perfect whole64 and stands before all rational beings as a moral law commanding them to live by rational principles.65 This cosmic reason prescribes or prohibits what ought to be or not to be done.66 Thus to live the good life is “to live continually selecting what is in accordance with nature and rejecting what is contrary to nature.”67 In the tradition of the Stoics the human being (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) is “connected,” not “detached.” Seeking the advantage of the whole becomes the criterion by which one makes the appropriate decisions to live according to what is advantageous (τὰ συμφέροντα) and conversely to turn away from what is disadvantageous (τὰ ἀσυμφορα).68 Breaking this part-whole law ultimately destroys the whole.69 The Stoic teaching of “living in accordance with nature” (φύσις) is synonymous with following the part-whole law of nature; all appropriate actions (πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα) are recommended and evaluated in connection with “what is natural” for the whole.70 Stoic natural law theory is inextricably linked to the part-whole socio-cosmology that human beings are parts (μέρη) of the whole (τὸ ὅλον). Stoic philosophers base their ethical developments, the communal ethics of τὸ συμφέρον, in particular in their socio-cosmic part-whole arguments, as discussed below. 61 Sambursky in his important study on Stoic physics concludes that one can hardly find Stoic philosophy of life without touching “the borderland between Stoic physics and ethics.” He states, “Acting in accordance with the moral law meant for the Stoics acting from a point of view which takes into account ‘universal nature’ (koine physis), i.e. the endeavors of the individual as an organic part of the endeavors of society as a whole.” See Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, 115. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Math. 7.133. 62 Epictetus, Diss. 1.26.1; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.1; [Ocellus Lucanus], Univ. nat. 4550. 63 Cicero, Nat. d .2.18-40. 64 For example, Chrysippus, according to Cicero, maintained that the human being is “a small fragment of that which is perfect.” See Cicero, Nat. d. 2.37. 65 A. A. Long, “The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics,” PAS 71 (1970–1): 101–2. 66 Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.108: “Befitting acts are all those which reason prevails with us to do” (Καθήκοντα μὲν οὖν εἶναι ὅσα λόγος αἱρει ποιεῖν). 67 Arthur J. Pomeroy, trans., Arius Didymus, Epitome of Stoic Ethics (SBLTT 44; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1999), 6a. 68 Epictetus, Diss. 3.7.33. 69 For example, see Cicero, Off. 3.5.21-23. 70 According to Diogenes Laertius (Vit. phil. 7.87-8), Stoics defined the end (τέλος) as “living virtuously” which is the same as life in accordance with nature. For them, because “our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe,” virtuous life comes “when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe.” For this, Diogenes here refers to such Stoics as Zeno, Cleanthes, Posidonius, Hecato, Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Archedemus.

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2. Tὸ Συμφέρον and Stoic Οἰκείωσις The self-identification of the individual as a part of the whole demands the recognition of other (“fellow”) parts and of the moral obligation to these parts, who together stand in relation to the whole.71 Stoic philosophers develop a concept of οἰκείωσις (appropriation, affinity, or familiarization) to discuss the origin of ethics in such a symbiotic relationship.72 For them, all animals and human beings (in particular) are motivated solely by self-interest (τῷ  ἰδίῳ συμφέροντι).73 Yet, at the same time, rational animals have a “progressive” innate disposition to identify themselves with other human beings as “belonging” (οἰκεῖος) to one another.74 This Stoic οἰκείωσις is a theory by which scholars of classical philosophy explain how a person – endowed with those two instincts – makes moral progress. In Stoic moral reasoning, he or she recognizes his or her identity in relation to other parts, and turns from selfconcern to the community-oriented concern. A common mistake that many scholars of classical (and NT) studies have made is to adopt the view that Stoics had their own unique idea of otherregarding morality in the concept of οἰκείωσις as the foundation of their communal ethics.75 S. Pembroke maintains that “if there had been no oikeiosis, there would have been no Stoa.”76 But I argue that Stoic moral progress theory is nothing other than a form of what I call the wider classic part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον in the Greco-Roman world, as demonstrated below.77 71 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 10.6. Cf. Epictetus, Diss. 2.10.3. 72 The meaning of the word οἰκείωσις is notoriously difficult, but it “primarily refers to a process or activity, innate in all animals, which explains why, from the moment of birth, they behave in self-regarding ways.” See A. A. Long, “Stoic Philosophers on Persons, Propertyownership and Community,” in Aristotle and After (ed. Richard Sorabji; London: Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 1997), 13–31, 25. Cf. Herwig Görgemanns, “Oikeiōsis in Arius Didymus” in On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus (ed. William. W. Fortenbaugh; New Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Books, 1983), 186–7. 73 Epictetus, Diss. 2.22.15. 74 “Stoic οἰκείωσις is the process by which we recognize our natural affinity first to ourselves and subsequently to various features of our relationship, which we pursue as being οἰκείωσις or ‘belonging’ to us.” See Mary Whitlock Blundell, “Parental Nature and Stoic Οἰκείωσις,” AncPhil 10 (1990): 221–42, 221. Also see Malcolm Schofield, “Social Political Thought,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (eds. Keimpe Algra et al.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 760–70. 75 Based on such sources as Cicero, Off. 1.12; Fin. 3.62-8; Leg. 1.15, 43; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.84-5; Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1038b; Hierocles, 1.34-9, 51-7; 2.1-9; 9.3-10; 11.14-18 in Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 57C-D. See G. Striker, “Role of Oikeiosis in Stoic Ethics” OSAP 1 (1983): 145–67, esp. 146 n.5; Görgemanns, “Oikeiōsis in Arius Didymus,” 165–89; Wright, “Cicero on Self-love,” 171–95; Robert Bees, Die Oikeiosislehre der Stoa (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann), 2004), 120–290. 76 Pembroke, “Oikeiōsis,” 114–15. Similarly, in his Stoic Theory of Οikeiosis (7) Engberg-Pedersen states that “I aim to show that the doctrine of oikeiosis locates the foundation [of Stoic ethics] elsewhere than in teleology and pantheism.” 77 This observation will therefore rebut a recent study (e.g. Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics) which argues that Paul bases his ethical idea on the Stoic conversion theory. Viewed

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From the human being’s natural tendency toward self-regard and toward regard of others, scholars in general conceive two forms of “personal” and “social” οἰκείωσις.78 Cicero states, “the new-born creature instinctively seeks self-preservation and the things conducive to it.”79 According to Hierocles, this egoistic primary impulse for self-preservation is “the best starting-point for the elements of ethics.”80 This personal οἰκείωσις then extends to grasp a social “we,” that is, a part-whole relationship of identifying oneself as a part of various other units. For Stoics, according to Cicero, parental love for children is the starting point from personal to social οἰκείωσις. He writes, “nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities.”81 Cicero continues to argue that out of this instinctive impulse social altruism is developed. Human beings are driven by nature to care for posterity and to move further toward an embrace of the common society in which individual members are parts working for the common benefit.82 Thus, primary οἰκείωσις extends from self to family, then to community or city, and finally to kosmopolis.83 A critical issue for scholars of classical studies, however, is to explain how egoistic, personal οἰκείωσις becomes a social οἰκείωσις. An important explanation is that human nature evolves over time as reason develops through different phases of a human life. Seneca believes that “at different stages of life each individual has a different constitution.”84 Children in the prerational phase are self-oriented, but a transition from self to others is possible through the gradual development of human reason. In full-grown adults, reason intervenes and tells us to prefer the common good to our own.85 Other scholars such as Brink and Blundell think that social οἰκείωσις is akin to Aristotle’s theory of friendship.86 According to Aristotle, friends are other

through the part-whole argument that generates the ethical idea of advantage, as we shall see, the ethical categories and concepts that Paul uses are those of the Hellenistic ethical koinē from which Stoics derive their moral progress theory, not distinctively Stoic. For further criticism, see Chs. 1 and 5. 78 See Inwood, 193; Engberg-Pedersen, Stoic Theory of Οikeiosis, 122–6; Blundell, 221–42; Annas, Morality of Happiness, 262–76. 79 Cicero, Fin. 3.16. 80 Τῆς ἠθικῆς στοιχειώσεως ἀρχὴν ἀρίστην ἡγοῦμαι τὸν περὶ τοῦ πρώτου οἰκείου τῷ ζῴῳ λόγον (“I consider the best starting point for the elements of ethics to be a discussion of the ‘first thing that is one’s own and familiar’ [πρώτον οἰκεῖον] for an animal.”) in Ramelli, 2–3; cf. Bees, 259. 81 Cicero, Fin. 3.19.62. 82 Cicero, Fin. 3.19.62-20.8. 83 See Engberg-Pedersen, Stoic Theory of Οikeiosis, 122–6; Annas, Morality of Happiness, 262–76. 84 Seneca, Ep. 121.5-15, 14. 85 See Cicero, Fin 3.64-5; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.85-6. 86 C. O. Brink, Oikeiōsis and Oikeiōtēs: Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in Moral Theory,” Phronesis 1 (1956): 133–4; Blundell, 228–30.

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selves just as children are their mother’s other selves or parts.87 Likewise, “the community,” argues Blundell, “is perceived as an extension of the self, so that there is no conflict between the interests of self and others.”88 For Blundell, the social whole is an extension of the self, and other-regarding is a form of self-love. Thus, “social οἰκείωσις is subsumed under personal οἰκείωσις in a perfect unity of concern for self and others,”89 and the individual’s selfinterested action should necessarily bring advantage to the whole.90 The problematic transition from egoism to altruism in Stoic moral discussion is never adequately resolved until we consider the part-whole connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον. In fact, Stoic οἰκείωσις theory parallels the communitarian rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον, widely used in antiquity. This is the reason, I think, why Arius Didymus treats the theory of οἰκείωσις, usually taken as “typically Stoic,” as a part of his discussion on Peripatetic ethics, not of Stoic ethics. This issue has puzzled scholars of classical studies. Some think that this is an evidence for syncretistic interrelation or “cross-fertilization” among the philosophical schools during the Hellenistic period.91 Others suppose that Arius made a mistake in taking a Stoic source for a Peripatetic one. H. Görgemanns rebuts these views. Instead, he maintains, “Arius must have followed a Peripatetic source which had the oikeiōsis concept built in.”92 Görgemanns is partially correct in that both schools share the same concept. I think, however, that the reverse is true. The Stoic concept of οἰκείωσις is their development of the widespread part-whole communal ethics of τὸ συμφέρον, and Arius reflects this tradition. Stoics stand on common ground for their developmental concept of the origin of moral obligation, and the part-whole connective rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον is the source from which their οἰκείωσις theory is closely derived. Rather than the independent developmental concept of οἰκείωσις, the widespread part-whole connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον, I suggest, better explains the Stoic moral progress of turning away from selfconcern to connective communal-concern. But no scholar, as far as I know, relates Stoic social οἰκείωσις theory to the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον. For Stoic philosophers, as for Plato and Aristotle, the social “we” is made for the “common advantage,” and this idea of the communal good plays a connective role in and becomes an ethical force for the part-whole relationship or the life of social οἰκείωσις.93 Careful study of the sources traditionally taken as the basis for Stoic communal ethics will tell that their progressive moral theory converges on the 87 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.7.2. Cf. Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1038b. 88 Blundell, 225. She further suggests a possibility of resolving the tension between the two forms of οἰκείωσις based on the Stoic “symbiosis between part and whole” that the universe is compared to a human body in which the whole suffers when a member hurts. 89 Blundell, 236. 90 Cf. Epictetus, Diss. 1.19.13. 91 For such discussion, see Görgemanns, “Oikeiōsis in Arius Didymus,” 165–89. 92 Görgemanns, “Oikeiōsis in Arius Didymus,” 165 93 For example, Seneca, in Clem. 1.3.2, contends that a human being is “a social animal, begotten for the common good” (hominem sociale animal communi bono genitum).

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part-whole connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον. In the metaphor below, Hierocles provides a graphic image of one’s drawing larger and larger social part-whole circles or social boundaries starting from one’s relation first to the family, then extending to a community (i.e., village or tribe), and then to a still larger one (i.e., community or state), and finally to all humankind, extending just like a tree’s annual rings: Each one of us is as it were entirely encompassed by many circles, some smaller, others larger, the latter enclosing the former on the basis of their different and unequal dispositions relative to each other. The first and closest circle is the one which a person has drawn as though around a centre, his own mind. This circle encloses the body and anything taken for the sake of the body. For it is virtually the smallest circle, and almost touches the centre itself. Next, the second one further removed from the centre but enclosing the first circle; this contains parents, siblings, wife, and children. The third one has in it uncles and aunts, grandparents, nephews, nieces, and cousins. The next circle includes the other relatives, and this is followed by the circle of local residents, then the circle of fellow-tribesmen, next that of fellow-citizens, and then in the same way the circle of people from neighboring towns, and the circle of fellow-countrymen. The outermost and largest circle, which encompasses all the rest, is that of the whole human race.94

For scholars of Stoic moral philosophy, this circle metaphor serves as a basis for social οἰκείωσις which means that the human being as a rational animal evolves gradually as a child becomes a mature person with other-regarding attitudes. Scholars of classical studies often refer to Hierocles’ circle metaphor of widening one’s social relationship as a striking pattern of social οἰκείωσις, but I take it as a typical part-whole conception, making a moral space in which the other-regarding morality of τὸ συμφέρον becomes a principal criterion for proper behavior. Hierocles’ circle metaphor of widening relationships, therefore, is clearly referring to social part-whole units. Like Aristotle, Hierocles talks about a variety of ethical part-whole spaces in which the other-regarding morality is a key ethic. In these concentric circles, the individual person at the center enters a part-whole relationship within each social boundary. Accordingly, each radius represents a social part-whole in which an individual “I” grasps a communal “we” within that circle, thereby creating an ethical space. For instance, in the smaller circle of one’s immediate family, I become a member of the household as a whole, a community of advantage (συμφέρον) as Aristotle defines it; likewise, in the outermost circle circumscribing the whole human race, I am a part of the whole of humanity. Rather than presenting an abstract theory of social οἰκείωσις, Hierocles elsewhere states, “We are an animal, but a gregarious one which needs someone else as well. For this reason too we

94 57G.

Hierocles (Stobaeus 4.671.7-673.11) in Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers,

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inhabit cities; for there is no human being who is not a part of a city.”95 For him, this part-whole generates the connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον that “we should not separate what is advantageous to the whole from what is beneficial to the part.”96 In short, Hierocles’ circle metaphor is clearly a part-whole argument in which a person exists within a variety of socio-cosmic part-wholes (i.e., οἰκία, πόλις, κόσμος, as discussed above) and grasps the connective morality of τὸ συμφέρον within each category. Moreover, scholars of classical studies consider Cicero as the most important source for the οἰκείωσις theory as the origin of Stoic morality. However, Cicero merely subscribes to the classic part-whole rhetoric of seeking the common advantage (utilitas) in his moral philosophy (see below). Strikingly, in De Finibus III, on which scholars base their οἰκείωσις theory, Cicero explicitly interprets Stoic other-regarding morality as that of seeking the common good generated from a variety of part-whole units. Much as Aristotle’s theory conceives of the natural growth of civic units from respective parts, Cicero points out how one perceives of a larger social community closely bonded to him or her and thus constructs various social part-whole units such as “unions” (coetus), “societies” (concilia), and “states” (civitates).97 He argues that such a part-whole development is ultimately extended to the cosmos: “each one of us is a part of this universe” (eius mundi esse partem). For Stoics, according to Cicero, the part-whole generates the connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον (= utilitas) that “we should prefer the common advantage to our own.” So clearly, Stoic other-focused morality, I suggest, is a form of the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον that embraces both the parts and the whole. Yet, the study of Stoic ethical development of οἰκείωσις is not complete until we pay sufficient attention to the Stoic moral part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον, as the later Roman Stoic philosophers strikingly exemplify it. Seneca, building upon his supposition that the citizen’s relationship to the state is connective, develops the attendant connective morality: “To injure one’s country is a crime; consequently, also, to injure a fellow-citizen – for he is a part of the country…consequently to injure any man is a crime, for he is your fellow-citizen in the greater commonwealth.”98 Seneca’s ethical precept for not injuring another person is clearly located in the context of part-whole. “All the members of the body are in harmony one with another,” and they all work together for “the advantage of the whole.”99 In this ethical 95 Hierocles, 9.3-10; 11.14-18 (emphasis added): [ἔσ]μεν ζῷιον, ἀλλὰ [συνα]γελαστικὸν καὶ [δε]όμενον ἑ[τερο[υ]. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ π[όλει]ς οἰκοῦμεν. Οὐ[δεὶ]ς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος [ὅ]ς οὐχὶ πόλεως ἔστι μέρος. See Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 57C-D; See also, Ramelli, 28–9. 96 Hierocles On Duties in Stobaeus 3.39.35 (Hense 3.732): τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον τοῦ ἰδιᾳ μὴ χωρίζειν. 97 Cicero, Fin. 3.19.63-4. 98 Seneca, Ira, 2.31.7 (emphasis added): Nefas est nocere patriae; ergo civi quoque, nam hic pars patriae est…ergo et homini, nam hic in maiore tibi urbe civis est. 99 Seneca, Ira, 2.31.7 (emphasis added): Ut omnia inter se membra consentiunt, quia singula servari totius interest.

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dynamic, the advantage of the whole serves as the standard for proper action. Seneca continues, “if we revere the whole, the parts are sacred.”100 Seneca, as we shall see, develops much of his moral philosophy based upon the classic part-whole socio-cosmology that “we are the parts of one great body” (membra sumus corporis magni). In this ethical framework, he says, “I can lay down for mankind a rule…for our duties in human relationships.”101 Likewise, Epictetus derives the connective morality of τὸ συμφέρον from similar classic part-whole rhetoric. God has instituted the part-whole102 for you to be “a citizen of…both the large state and the small” (πόλεως πολίτην καὶ τῆς μεγάλης καὶ τῆς μικρᾶς).103 Accordingly, the rational creature (λογικὸν ζῷον), unlike other animals, conceives a progressive knowledge in a syllogistic way that: 1) he or she is a part; 2) he or she plays a role in relation to the whole; and 3) such a recognition of one’s identity generates the other-regarding connective morality “that it is well for the parts to yield to the whole.”104 Perhaps the most important issue in Epictetus’ moral philosophy is therefore to define the question of “what is man?” (τί  ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος;). For him, the human being (ἄνθρωπος) is not a thing detached (ἀπόλυτον) from the whole, but an organic part, connected to the whole (μέρος τῶν πάντων; μέρος πόλεως ).105 Utilizing the body metaphor, Epictetus asks: What are you? A man [ἄνθρωπος]…a part of some whole [μέρος ὅλου τινός]…Do you not know that as the foot, if detached, will no longer be a foot, so you too, if detached, will be no longer be a man? For what is a man? A part of a state [μέρος πόλεως]…a small copy of the universal whole [μικρὸν τῆς ὅλης μίμημα].106

For Epictetus, the symbiotic connection creates ethical space wherein the other-regarding morality of τὸ συμφέρον appears as the prime consideration. It is fitting for a citizen, he continues, “to treat nothing as a matter of private profit [ἰδίᾳ συμφέρον], not to plan about anything as though he were a detached unit [from the whole], but to act…by reference to the whole [ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον].”107 The person who seeks his own advantage (τὸ αὑτῷ συμφέρον) is therefore a thief, he stresses.108 As such, the part-whole context becomes the foundation of his moral philosophy, and in that moral space, τὸ συμφέρον emerges as the most important criterion for the appropriate course of action (τὸ καθη̄κον).109 100 Seneca, Ira, 2.31.7: sanctae partes sunt, si universum venerabile est. 101 Seneca, Ep. 95.51-2. 102 For example, see Diss. 4.7.6-9, 2.9.3-4; cf. 1.12.26, 1.14.6-10, 2.5.24-26, 2.8.11, 3.24.10-11. 103 Epictetus, Diss. 2.15.10. 104 Epictetus, Diss. 4.7.7: τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀφορμὰς ἔχει…ὅτι τε μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ ποῖόν τι μέρος καὶ ὅτι τὰ μέρη τοῖς ὅλοις εἴκειν ἔχει καλῶς. 105 For example, as indicated above, Diss. 1.14.10, 2.5.13-26, 2.10.1-6, 2.15.10. 106 Epictetus, Diss. 2.5.25-26 (emphasis added). 107 Epictetus, Diss. 2.10.4-5. 108 Epictetus, Diss. 2.21.1-2. 109 Again, as his maxim goes: “Govern us as rational beings by pointing out to us what is

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The part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον is even more striking in Marcus Aurelius’ moral reasoning. For him, the universe, through the sympathetic connection of all parts, constitutes a single organism.110 Marcus Aurelius contends that the universe is like a state (ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις), and “I am a part of the whole” (μέρος εἰμὶ τοῦ ὅλου).111 Thus, “we are fellow-members of an organized community.”112 The important question that “must always be borne in mind,” he asserts, is “what is the nature of the whole universe, and what [is] mine, and how this stands in relation to that, being too what sort of a part of what sort of a whole?”113 From this syllogistic triple understanding of the individual as a part in connection with its kindred parts and with the whole,114 Marcus Aurelius develops the other-regarding morality of τὸ συμφέρον as the primary ethical consideration. He maintains that the social connection of the part-whole exists for the advantage of the whole.115 The person who fails to conceive of his or her identity in relation to the whole is therefore “an alien in the universe” (ξένος κόσμου). Such a person, argues Marcus Aurelius, is: an exile, who exiles himself from civic reason…an [abscess] on the universe, he who renounces, and severs himself from, the reason of our common nature…a limb cut off from the community, he who cuts off his own soul from the soul of all rational things, which is but one.116

The human being as a “rational and civic” (λογικὴ καὶ πολιτική) creature is subject to socio-cosmology,117 and thus, no relationship of the part to the whole profitable [τὰ συμφέροντα], and we will follow you; point out what is unprofitable [τὰ ἀσυμφορα], and we will turn away from it.” See Epictetus, Diss. 3.7.33 (emphasis added). 110 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 5.26, 7.13; cf. 7.9: “All things are mutually intertwined… together help to order one ordered Universe. For there is both one Universe, made up of all things, and one God immanent in all things, and one Substance, and one Law, one Reason common to all intelligent creatures, and one Truth.” 111 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 10.6; cf. 5.24. 112 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 4.4. 113 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.9: Τούτων ἀεὶ δεῖ μεμνῆσθαι, τίς ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις, καὶ τίς ἐμή ἡ ἠμή, καὶ πῶς αὕτη πρὸς ἐκείνην ἔχουσα, καὶ ὁποῖόν τι μέρος ὁποίου τοῦ ὅλου οὖσα. 114 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 10.6: “As long then as I remember that I am a part of such a whole…Insofar as I am in intimate connection with the parts that are akin to myself [ἔχω πως οἰκείως πρὸς τὰ ὁμογενῆ μέρη], I shall be guilty of no unsocial act, but I shall devote my attention rather to the parts that are akin to myself.” Cf. Epictetus, Diss. 1.12.26, 2.5.13, 2.10.1-6, 4.7.7-8. 115 For example, see 2.3: τὸ τῷ ὃλῳ κόσμῳ συμφέρον, οὗ μέρος εἶ. Παντὶ δὲ φύσεως μέρει ἀγαθόν, ὅ φέρει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις, καὶ ὅ ἐκείνης ἐστὶ σωστικόν. 116 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 4.29. Cf. 11.8: “A branch cut off from its neighbour branch cannot but be cut off from the whole plant. In the very same way a man severed from one man has fallen away from the fellowship of all men. Now a branch is cut off by others, but a man separates himself from his neighbour by his own agency in hating him or turning his back on him; and is unaware that he has thereby sundered himself from the whole civic community. But mark the gift of Zeus who established the law of fellowship. For it is in our power to grow again to the neighbour branch, and again become perfective of the whole.” 117 Marcus writes (Med. 6.44), “my nature is rational and civic; my city and country, as Antoninus, is Rome; as a man, the world.”

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is against nature (παρὰ φύσιν).118 In his thinking, what is advantageous to the socio-cosmic unit is beneficial to the individual part as well.119 He confesses that I must “direct every impulse of mine to the common interest” (πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον),120 and further stresses that the life of a citizen, who steadily directs the course of his action beneficial to the fellow-citizens and to the whole community, flows smoothly: “for what is advantageous to the whole can in no wise be injurious to the part.”121 Marcus Aurelius sums up his moral reasoning of the part-whole: “Just as you are a part perfective of a civic organism, let your every action be a part perfective of civic life.”122 Otherwise, the result is schism (στασιώδης) that tears (διασπᾶν) the whole asunder. Therefore, “take as the only goal of conduct what is to the common interest,” he says.123 As these examples have shown, Stoic moral progress theory is a form of the classic part-whole argument that generates the other-regarding morality of τὸ συμφέρον. Their moral reasoning of οἰκείωσις theory is integrated with part-whole argument. One’s identification as a part of some relational unit (μέρος ὅλου τινός) carries moral implications, and that part-whole moral space demands an ethical assertion of τὸ συμφέρον that brings connective benefit for each member (ἕκαστος) and the whole community (τὸ ὅλον) and individual members of the whole. Identification as a part of the whole (always) implies an ethical priority, as we will discuss next. That is, “I must direct my energies to” a certain course of behavior that is conducive first “to the common interest” (εἰς τὸ κοινῇ χρήσιμον).124

3. Tὸ Συμφέρον as Priority Ethics The part-whole constitution generates an ethic in which the well-being of the whole takes precedence over that of the part in a given space. In other words, it is deemed a priority. According to Aristotle’s civic theories, parts constitute the whole, and a final form of the natural growth from citizens or households is the πόλις. Thus, in origin (in a temporal or chronological sense) the part seems to precede the whole. Aristotle, however, views the whole as naturally “prior” 118 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.1. 119 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 6.44: τὰ τοῖς πόλεσιν οὖν ταύταις ὠφέλιμα μόνα ἐστί μοι ἀγαθά. 120 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 10.6. 121 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 10.6: οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβερὸν τῷ μέρει, ὅ τῷ ὃλῳ συμφέρει. 122 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 9.23: Ὥσπερ αὐτὸς σὺ πολιτικοῦ συστήματος συμπληρωτικὸς εἶ, οὕτως καὶ πᾶσα πρᾶξίς σου συμπληρωτικὴ ἔστω ζωῆς πολιτικῆς (trans. modified from Haines, LCL); cf. 10.6-7. The following repeated expressions in his Meditations further highlight his partwhole connective rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον: “That which is not hurtful to the community cannot hurt the individual” (5.22: Ὅ τῇ πόλει οὐκ ἔστι βλαβερόν, οὐδὲ τὸν πολίτην βλάπτει); “All that befalls the individual is to the interest of the whole also” (6.45: Ὡσα ἑκάστῳ συμβαίνει, ταῦτα τῷ ὃλῳ συμφέρει); “That which is not in the interests of the hive cannot be in the interests of the bee” (6.54: Τὸ τῷ σμήνει μὴ συμφέρον οὐδὲ τῇ μελίσσῇ συμφέρει); “Nothing that harms not the city can harm individual person whom Nature has made a citizen” (10.33: τὸν φύσει πολίτην οὐδὲν βλάφτει, ὅ πόλιν οὐ βλάπτει, οὐδέ γε πόλιν βλάπτει). 123 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 12.20: τὸ κοινωνικὸν τέλος τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ποιεῖσθαι. 124 For example, Marcus Aurelius, Med. 7.5.

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(πρότερον) to its parts125 in the sense that the whole possesses “honorableness” over the parts. In his discussion of the concept of the term “prior,” Aristotle explicitly proposes that if one thing is “more honorable” than another, it “is said to be naturally prior.”126 Thus, by the whole being more honorable than its parts, he means that the whole and its advantage (τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον) are prior to each part and its respective benefit (τὸ ἰδιᾳ συμφέρον). Similarly, Cicero views the priority of τὸ συμφέρον over τὸ ἴδιον as the “natural consequence” (natura consequi) of the part-whole constitution. Marcus Aurelius states that “I am a part of the whole” (μέρος εἰμὶ τοῦ ὅλου) and therefore must “direct every impulse of mine to the common interest and withhold it from the opposite [ἀπὸ τοὐναντίον] of this” for a healthy part-whole integration.127 In short, failure to keep this honorableness of the whole by emphasizing the part and its private interest (τὸ ἴδιον) can destroy the whole along with its parts.128 According to Aristotle’s part-whole discourse, the whole can exist without certain parts but parts cannot exist without the whole.129 He adduces this ontological priority from the relation of individual limbs to the whole body: “The whole must necessarily be prior to the part; since when the whole body is destroyed, foot or hand will not exist except in an equivocal sense.”130 Aristotle contends that (the common good of) the state as a whole is prior by nature to the individual citizen because each individual (ἕκαστος), when isolated, is not self-sufficient (μὴ αὐτάρκης). “He must be related to the whole state,” argues Aristotle, “as other parts are to their whole.”131 The part (and its respective benefit) can no longer exist if it is detached from the whole. Therefore, the whole (and its benefit) should be prior and more honorable than the part, and preserving that priority is the way of preserving both the whole and parts in it. It is clear that τὸ συμφέρον is a core aspect of ethical priority in Greek and Roman writers’ discussions of part-whole body politic. The principle of τὸ συμφέρον always takes priority over τὸ ἴδιον. According to Thucydides, Pericles advises the Athenians who suffered individually as victims to put the common good (τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς σωτηρίας) above private concerns (tὰ ἴδιa).132 125 See Aristotle, Pol. 1253 a 19-35; cf. Metaph. 1035a–1036a 25. 126 Aristotle, Cat. 12.14b 4: τὸ τιμιώτερον πρότερον εἶναι τῇ φύσει κοκεῖ. On Aristotelian concept of "priority", see Kraut, 255–76. 127 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 10.6: πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον πᾶσαν ὁρμὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἄξω καὶ ἀπὸ τοὐναντίου ἀπάξω. 128 Cicero, Fin. 3.19.64; Hierocles, On Duties in Stobaeus 3.39.34-6 (Hense 3.731-34); Marcus Aurelius, Med. 9.23. 129 Miller provides a fine discussion on this topic. See Miller, Nature, 45–56. 130 Aristotle, Pol. 1253a 20-2: τό γάρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους. ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χεὶρ εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως. Also, on Aristotle’s discussion of priority and posterity between the whole and the part, see his Metaph. 1035a–1036a 25. 131 Aristotle, Pol. 1253a 27: ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἕξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον. 132 Thucydides, His. 2.61.4. In the speech (2.60.2-4), Pericles states: A state [πόλις] confers a grater benefit upon its private citizens when as a whole commonwealth it is successful, than when it prospers as regards the individual but fails as a community. For even though a man flourishes in his own private affairs, yet

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Plato, as already noted, argues that τὸ κοινόν goes before (ἡγέομαι) τὸ ἴδιον, or the latter follows after (ἕπομαι) the former in the civic politics.133 In the true civic system of life, he argues, the common advantage of the whole community is “the object of first importance,” and “the private interest is but secondary.”134 Similarly, Aristotle, as noted, maintains that the whole (and/ or its respective benefit) is prior (πρότερον) to the part (and/or its respective benefit). Cicero conveys Stoic moral reasoning that the part-whole generates a reverse priority that we put the common advantage before (anteponamus) the personal benefit. “It is our duty,” he says, “to be more ready to endanger our own than the public welfare and to hazard [private] honor and glory more readily than other [public] advantages.”135 Seneca states, “men of sense put public interests above private.”136 Josephus praises Ananus as a person of this quality, who “put[s] the public welfare above his private interests.”137 Hierocles maintains that there is no preservation (σωτηρία) of the part in the destruction (ἀπώλεια) of the whole. Therefore, we have to choose before all else (προκρίνειν) the common good of the whole.138 Likewise, Marcus Aurelius stresses that we must “set before ourselves as our goal the common and civic weal” (τὀ κοινωνικὸν καὶ πολιτικόν).139 As these examples demonstrate, the part-whole creates a particular space in which the human inclination to give oneself priority is kept in check, and the whole becomes the governing concern. Such a moral imperative of setting a “priority” of τὸ συμφέρον over τὸ ἴδιον lies in the supposition that individual citizens properly achieve what is beneficial to them in service to what is advantageous to the whole.140 In this manner, τὸ συμφέρον not only possesses an ideological aspect in the partwhole relationship, but is in fact a mainstay. if his country [πόλις] goes to ruin he perishes with it all the same; but if he is in evil fortune and his country in good fortune, he is far more likely to come through safely. Since, then, the state may bear the misfortunes of its private citizens but the individual cannot bear its, surely all persons ought to defend it, and not to do as you are now doing – proposing to sacrifice the safety of the community because you are dismayed by domestic hardships you suffer at home. For a detailed discussion on the “priority of the πόλις” in Thucydides, see Cynthia Farrar, The Origins of Democratic Thinking: The Invention of Politics in Classical Athens (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 153–87. 133 Plato, Leg. 9.875b. 134 Plato, Leg. 9.875b. 135 Cicero, Off. 1.24.83: Promptiores igitur debemus esse ad nostra pericula quam ad communia dimicareque paratius de honore et glore quam de ceteris commodes. Cf. 1. 30.110. 136 Seneca, Clem. 1.4.3: sanis hominibus publica privatis potiora sunt. 137 Josephus, B.J. 4.320: πρό τε τῶν ἰδίων λυσιτελῶν τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον ἀεὶ τιθέμενος. Similarly, a certain Lucius Caecilius is praised for his “neglecting his own safety for the sake of the public good” when he snatches up the holy things out of the burning temple. See Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 2.66.4. 138 Hierocles, On Duties in Stobaeus 3.39.35 (Hense 3.732). 139 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 11.21. 140 See Ch. 3 below for this sort of the connective idea of advantage in part-whole arguments.

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4. Tὸ Συμφέρον as Ideological Mainstay Tὸ συμφέρον plays the ideological role of being a mainstay that supports (and prevents misuse of) the hierarchical infrastructure of socio-political dominion in society. As noted, the symbolic worldview of Greco-Roman antiquity is that all things are “arranged” in part-whole relationships, and the relationships are hierarchical, or “under the direction of the ruling powers” (ἄρχοντες).141 Aristotle maintains that citizens as parts, rulers included (see below), are to be subordinate (ὑπό) to the state.142 In the same vein, Stoics believe that the universe as a whole is perfect and is superior to all parts, including human beings.143 For them, φύσις, as a perfect whole, stands before all its parts as a moral law commanding them to live a life toward the perfection of the whole.144 The ethical force of τὸ συμφέρον makes this hierarchical ideology of society possible.145 Greco-Roman philosophers believe that the hierarchical part-whole structure is divinely given for the advantage of the whole. Plato maintains that the overseer of the universe arranged all of its parts “for the preservation and excellence of the whole” (πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ ὅλοθ).146 Epictetus argues that God has instituted the part-whole arrangement for the good of the whole.147 “God has made all things in the universe, and the whole universe itself…and the parts of it to serve the needs of the whole.”148 Particularly, God has ordained that a rational being be governed by the ideology of serving the whole so “that he can attain nothing of his own proper goods [τῶν ἰδίων ἀγαθῶν] unless he contributes something to the common interest [ἄν μή τι τὸ κοινὸν ὠφέλιμον προσφέρηται].”149 For Epictetus, God is the very one who seeks the common advantage, and he does not act “unless he proves himself useful to the common interest” (τὸ κοινὸν ὠφέλιμον). In this way seeking the common advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) not only serves as an ideal to which to aspire, but

141 Plato, Leg. 10.903b. 142 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.9.4-6. 143 According to Chrysippus, “The cosmos is a perfect body, but the parts of the cosmos are not perfect in that they have a relationship to the whole and do not exist by themselves.” See SVF. 2.550. Also see Hahm, Origin of Stoic Cosmology, 123; White, “Role of Physics,” 63. 144 Cicero, Nat. d. 2.18-40; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 9.23. Cf. Long, “The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics,” 101–2. Epictetus, Diss. 2.10.5: κυριώτερον δὲ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ  μέρους καὶ ἡ πόλις τοῦ πολίτου (“the whole is more sovereign than the part, and the state more sovereign than the citizen”). 145 See Seneca, Clem. 1.3.2, 2.6.3. 146 Plato, Leg. 10.903a-c. 147 For example, see Diss. 4.7.6-9, 2.9.3-4; cf. 1.12.26, 1.14.6-10, 2.5.24-26, 2.8.11, 3.24.10-11. 148 Epictetus, Diss. 4.7.6 (emphasis added): ὁ θεὸς πάντα πεποίηκεν τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῷ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν κόσμον ὅλον…τὰ ἐν μέρει δ’ αὐτοῦ πρὸς χρείαν τῶν ὅλων. Also see Cicero, Off. 1.35.126. 149 Epictetus, Diss. 1.19.13. For Epictetus and many writers, as in this case, συμφέρον and ὠφέλιμον are interchangeable. See Dio Chrysostom, Or. 27.6; Aristotle, Rhet. 1.6.19-20; Plato, Crat. 419a.

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is the ideological ethical mainstay, which is engrained in the pattern of the universe itself.150 Therefore, what befalls the part is evaluated in terms of how it brings benefit to the whole. For instance, any seemingly negative action that happens to individual parts is not so in that ideological frame of thought. Epictetus contends that everything that happens to the parts “comes from the orderly arrangement of the whole,”151 and the parts can gladly take upon themselves even all troubles and hardships that the divine nature brings because they are for the advantage of the whole (ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων).152 To the question, “what is dying?” (τί ἐστι τὸ ἀποθανεῖν;), Marcus Aurelius answers that it is “a function of nature” (φύσεως ἔργον) for the benefit (συμφέρον) of the whole.153 Just as Aesculapius, a god of healing, prescribes many “bitter pills” for the parts such as exercise, cold baths, or walking barefoot, which, he thinks, is conducive to the health (πρὸς ὑγίειαν) of the patient,154 the universe does the same thing. Parts should welcome whatever happens “in the hope of health [advantage]” of the whole body.155 This means, as well, that seeking the advantage of the whole functions as bedrock for Greco-Roman socio-political structure. Rulers or persons who occupy the upper strata of the social and political hierarchy are not exempt from the connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον. Among Greco-Roman writers, the metaphor of the ship often represents a political body or the state as a whole.156 Its structure is hierarchical; the crew is under the authority of the pilot.157 This sort of socio-political structure, according to Aristotle, is possible under the part-whole construction that demands its proper connective good among members. Aristotle argues that “the pilot is always a member of the crew,” who 150 See Epictetus, Diss. 1.19.11-15. So the rational being “must act as an imitator of God” (2.14.13). On the individual’s private interest in this ideological part-whole frame, see Ch. 3 below. 151 Epictetus, Diss. 2.10.5: ὅτι ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὅλων διατάξεως τοῦτο ἀπονέμεται. 152 Epictetus, Diss. 3.24.64; cf. 1.12.16. Like all Stoics, Epictetus believe that “the world is providentially organized by a divine power” attributed to God/Zeus/Nature. On orthodox Stoic theism, see Long, Epictetus, 142–79. 153 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.12. Cf. 9.3. 154 Cf. Plato, Leg. 10.903c, who maintained that the one who “always contributes to the good of the whole” is like “every physician and every trained craftsman [who] works always for the sake of a whole, and strives after what is best in general, and he produces a part for the sake of a whole, and not a whole for the sake of a part” (πᾶς γὰρ ἰατρὸς καὶ πᾶς ἔντεχνος δημιουγρὸς παντὸς μὲν ἕνεκα πάντα ἐργάζεται, πρὸς το κοινῇ ξυντείνων βέλτιστον, μέρος μὲν ἕνεκα ὅλου καὶ οὐχ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται). 155 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 5.8. 156 Hence the Greek term κυβερνήτης (gubernator in Latin) which means helmsman or pilot has also such a metaphorical meaning of governor or ruler. For example, see Plato, Resp. 342d-e. For a discussion of the ship as a symbol of the state in ancient Greek and Roman literature, see Earle Hilgert, The Ship and Related Symbols in the New Testament (Assen: Royal Vangorcum, 1962), 19–42. Hilgert provides a large number of sources including Isocrates, Demosthenes, Plato, Polybius, Cicero, Philo, and Plutarch. 157 Dio Chrysostom, Or. 38.14, 39.6.

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has to “contemplate the common good of those under his authority; when the pilot himself also becomes one among them he incidentally shares the benefit, for the pilot is a sailor in the ship” as well.158 By extension, what each of the citizens aims at is the salvation of the community (ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας).159 In this way, τὸ συμφέρον maintains the hierarchical structure of society on the one hand because, as Plato and Aristotle propose, even the governor (κυβερνήτης) or the “true ruler” (ἀληθιωὸς ἄρχων) is subject to seeking the advantage of the whole community of which he is also a part.160 On the other hand, τὸ συμφέρον as an ethical argument does not allow ideological appropriation of the part-whole hierarchy. Because I will also discuss this tension and related issues in detail in Chapter 3, one example suffices here. From the perspective of the whole, any part (or even political power) that abuses socio-political structure and injures the welfare of the whole can be banished from the whole. This is the case with tyrants, for instance. In his discussion of utilitas (= τὸ συμφέρον), Cicero likens them to lifeless members that “jeopardize the health of the other parts of the body.” He continues, “We have no ties of fellowship with a tyrant.”161 Just as certain members of the body are amputated for the health of the body, maintains Cicero, “savage monsters in human form should be cut off from what may be called the common body of humanity.”162 Accordingly, the ideological perspective of the whole justifies the assassination of a tyrant who wrongly occupies the top of the social hierarchy and individualizes (συμφέρει μοι = τὸ ἴδιον) what should be public.163 Cicero considers the murder of a vile tyrant as one of the noblest deeds (pulcherrimum) because it stops the damaging of the whole.164 By contrast, “the life of the good man” (ὁ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνθρώπου βίος), as Marcus Aurelius agrees with Cicero’s view of the “good man” (bonus vir), is evaluated by “what is allotted to him out of [and for] the whole.”165 In 158 Aristotle, Pol. 1279a 4-8: ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερνήτης εἷς ἐστὶν ἀεὶ τῶν πλωτήρων…κυβερνήτης σκοπεῖ τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀγαθόν, ὅταν δὲ τούτων εἷς γένηται καὶ αὐτός, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχει τῆς ῶφελείας, ὁ μὲν γὰρ πλωτήρ. 159 Aristotle, Pol. 1276b 20-32. As noted above and will be discussed more later in Ch. 6, the resulting advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) that comes after unity is often expressed by the σωτηρία (saving, security, preservation). 160 Plato, Resp. 347d; Aristotle, Pol. 1279a 17-1279b 10. For further discussion on this matter, see Ch. 3 under “Tὸ Συμφέρον and Correct Civic Constitution.” 161 Cicero, Off. 3.6.32: Nulla est enim societas nobis cum tyrannis. 162 Cicero, Off. 3.6.32; cf. 2.7.23-8.28, 3.8.36, 3.20.82-21.83. 163 According to Epictetus (Diss. 1.22.14), tyranny is the problem of τὸ ἴδιον. He states that if “it is my interest” (συμφέρει μοι) to appropriate what should be neighbors’ benefits, this behavior is the source of tyrannies (τυραννίδες). Likewise, Seneca (Clem. 1.11.4-13.1) maintains that tyrants seek personal interests. Cf. Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.10.2: τύραννος τὸ ἑαυτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ (“a tyrant studies his own advantage”). 164 Cicero, Off. 3.4.19. Though not explicitly mentioned, it seems clear that Cicero here and at 3.6.32 has the assassination of Julius Caesar in mind. Elsewhere Cicero repeatedly justifies the assassination of the vile tyrant. For example, see Att. 14.6.2, 9.2, 13.2; Second Philippic 85-7, 110, 116. 165 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 4.25. On Cicero’s argument of “good man” (bonus vir) in connection with utilitas, see Off. 3.19.75-77.

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short, if the advantage to an individual member appears to be a fatal disease to the life of the social whole, the agent should be cut off to protect the whole.166 As such, τὸ συμφέρον, as an ethical connective in part-whole context, becomes a mainstay ethic that upholds the socio-political structure and even defines the nature of the political power.167 In conclusion, the part-whole socio-cosmology, as shown above, becomes the context for the connective moral reasoning of τὸ συμφέρον in its application to various patterns of social organisms that demand necessary part-whole relationships. When a part-whole is constituted, it occupies a particular moral space. That space, to use an image from the chemistry classroom, becomes a Petri dish in which a new “chemical reaction” takes place. Though the whole grows from parts, the reaction in this ethical space sets the priority of the whole over the parts and resists the reverse (τοὐναντίον) direction. Such a “chemical” reaction is necessary in any part-whole circle, and it is the proper way of making part-whole life possible. In that context the concern for the whole occupies a prime ethical force that helps govern all part-whole circles of society from the smallest to the greatest. In other words, the act of creating the socio-cosmic part-whole – that is, identifying the human being as a part of some wholes (i.e., of the οἰκία, of the πόλις, or of the κόσμος) – generates a connective moral imperative that the advantage of the parts coincide with that of the whole. The best way of achieving this goal is to direct priority toward the whole. Why do we have to seek the benefit of the whole first? The answer is, because “What the whole brings to each one is for the benefit of that part,” but not always vice versa.168 More critically, it is because, as we shall see further later, maintaining the priority of τὸ συμφέρον over τὸ ἴδιον is the proper way of saving both the whole and any part therein. In fact, the moral imperative of setting an ethical priority assumes a particular form of part-whole, an organic part-whole, in which individual citizens properly achieve what is truly beneficial to them as an organic portion (μέρος) of what is advantageous to the community/state/universe.169 Otherwise, such connective ethical reasoning is logically impossible. By connective, I mean a connective effect of an action both to the individual agent and to the community of which the person is a member. Therefore, the individual agent, as a part, should consider what advantage his or her actions bring to the whole. The above conclusion, however, raises further issues.170 The ideological aspect of τὸ συμφέρον is sometimes misused and accordingly exposes some problems 166 Also see Seneca, Prov. 3.1-2; Epictetus, Diss. 2.5.24. 167 For further discussion on this matter, see Ch. 3 below. 168 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 10.20: Συμφέρει ἑκάστῳ, ὅ φέρει ἑκάστῳ ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις. 169 For example, Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2:3: τὸ τῷ ὃλῳ κόσμῳ συμφέρον, οὗ μέρος εἴ. 170 For example, including a question if the idea of “priority” is pertinent to the organically understood part-whole; for in that context prioritizing the whole to the part seems to be irrelevant because one’s seeking personal benefit is necessarily connected to the whole. But why do moral philosophers continue to emphasize the priority of a particular direction in ethical part-whole making?

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in certain hierarchical structures of part-whole relationships. These issues are the subject of the next chapter. We will notice that moral philosophers develop a particular part-whole notion exemplified in the organic human body as both a remedy to these problems and as the proper context of τὸ συμφέρον.

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Chapter 3

The Part-Whole Body Politic and Functions of ΤῸ ΣΥΜΦΈΡΟΝ A. The Body Metaphor and Its Functions Probably the most explicit and frequent application of the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον is the use of the body metaphor in socio-political and ethical discussions. The body metaphor conveys the idea that the social body is an organic whole and its respective members work together in unity for the benefit of the common good. In antiquity, moral teachers used the metaphor of the body primarily in the part-whole context of the community or the state because, in this setting, they found multitudinous relational problems among its citizens, such as discord, sedition (στάσις), lack of cooperation, selfishness, all of which fail to seek the common benefit. Livy, for example, recounts the famous fable of Menenius Agrippa that highlights the severe implications of discord and, conversely, the importance of co-operation among bodily members for the benefit of the whole. In the fable, the hands, mouth, and teeth revolt against the belly: In the days when man’s members did not all agree among themselves, as is now the case, but had each its own ideas and a voice of its own, the other parts thought it unfair that they should have the worry and the trouble and the labor of providing everything for the belly, while the belly remained quietly in their midst with nothing to do but to enjoy the good things which they bestowed upon it. They therefore conspired together that the hands should carry no food to the mouth, nor the mouth accept anything that was given it, nor the teeth grind up what they received. While they sought in this angry spirit to starve the belly into submission, the members themselves and the whole body were reduced to the utmost weakness. Hence it became clear that even the belly had no idle task to perform, and was no more nourished than it nourished the rest, by giving out to all parts of the body that by which we live and thrive, when it has been divided equally amongst the veins and is enriched with digested food – that is, the blood.1

This metaphor emphasizes the importance of recognizing the mutual interdependence of diverse parts of the same body, and how each member plays a significant role for the common good of the entire body. The fable of 1 Livy, His. 2.32.9-12; cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.86.1-5.

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Menenius Agrippa was summoned repeatedly throughout the Hellenistic era to argue for “unity” or “concord” (concordia; ὁμόνοια) in city-states and other individual-community issues.2 Scholars have taken note of the frequent use of the body metaphor in the Greco-Roman socio-political and moral philosophy.3 My purpose, however, is not a mere reiteration of previous studies of the body analogy in antiquity. Any study of the metaphor of the body, of itself, is inadequate for our purposes unless we illuminate its proper functions within the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον. In point of fact, the part-whole organic body appears as the context for the connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον.4 The human body as microcosm best sums up the part-whole socio-cosmology conceived first in the household, then in the city-state, and ultimately in the kosmos (discussed earlier). Accordingly the body metaphor is most commonly employed in the part-whole political and moral context in discussion related to the common good.5 In what follows, I will show how the body analogy correlates with the ethical connective idea of τὸ συμφέρον, and how the correlation functions among Greco-Roman politicians, rhetoricians, and moral philosophers in their part-whole body politic. This will further demonstrate that the organic part-whole of the body is the context for the ethical reasoning of τὸ συμφέρον. It will also demonstrate how its rhetoric is applied to various socio-cosmic entities in developing ethico-political theories as well as in dealing with individual-community issues. To this end, we first recall some of the “classic features” of the part-whole connective rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον that I have already defined (in examples of Plato and Hierocles). They include the ideas of the social body as a part-whole collective representation, common purpose, cooperation; and the whole as criterion for proper behavior, priority of the whole, parts as “connected” to the whole, each part working for the advancement of the whole; and the organic part-whole as opposed to a deviant (individualistic) form of part-whole. Strikingly, the human body embodies all of these respective features in the partwhole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον as highlighted by the moral philosophers and politicians in their ethico-political discussions. We now proceed to elaborate each of these features briefly.

2 It is believed that the fable of Menenius Agrippa is the product of a sophistic idea at the end of fifth century B.C.E. See Dyck, 526–7. 3 For example, E. Best, One Body in Christ: A Study in the Relationship of the Church to Christ in the Epistles of the Apostle Paul (London: SPCK, 1955), 215–25, 83–114; Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 88–9, 93–5, 150; Matthias Walter, Gemeinde als Leib Christi: Untersuchungen zum Corpus Paulinum und zu den “Apostolischen Vätern” (Freiburg, Schweiz: Universitätsverlag; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 70–104. 4 This is particularly important and should be pursued for proper understanding of Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον because, as we shall see, he exactly incorporates τὸ συμφέρον into the body rhetoric, that is, the community of believers at Corinth as “body of Christ.” 5 For example, Xenophon, Mem. 2.3.18-19; Cicero, Off. 3.5.22-23; Seneca, Ira 2.31.7-8; Epictetus, Diss. 2.10.4-5; Maximus of Tyre, Or. 15.4-5 in Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 149–50; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.1, 7.13.

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1. Body as Part-Whole (Constitution) The human body is a microcosm and best represents, in miniature, various aspects of the part-whole socio-cosmic constitution. It symbolizes “collective representations,” to use Durkheim’s sociological analysis, in which individuals make successful integration with the social collectivity as a whole. The body bears the collective consciousness of many members but is a single unit. The body also implies a common morality that makes a life of collectivity possible within it. Above all, the body metaphor highlights the diversity of its “many parts” in unity while also demonstrating the wholeness of the “one body” in diversity. Accordingly, the body and its limbs (τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος) unite to form one organism (πρὸς μίαν τινὰ συνεργίαν κατεσκευασμένα).6 Greco-Roman politicians and moral philosophers apply this image to their understanding of the socio-political and cosmic entities. Plato contends that the best form of social-political government resembles the human body. Dionysius of Halicarnassus argues that a state (πόλις), as the human body, is “composite and consists of many parts.”7 Seneca writes, “We are the parts [membra] of one great body [corporis]” beyond territorial boundaries. A common agenda emerges from this part-whole dynamic of the body. “[F]or the harmony of the whole” (ὑπὲρ συμφωνίας τῶν ὅλων), maintains Epictetus, God “has given each of us a body, and members of the body” (ἑκάστῳ σῶμα καὶ μέρη τοῦ σώματος… ἔδωκεν).8 a. Common Purpose The body and its members have a common purpose, namely, the health of the whole body. Likewise, as already noted, the social body has a common agenda, namely, the health of the socio-political body as constituted in and for the common advantage of the whole. Marcus Aurelius advises us to “take as the only goal of conduct what is to the common interest.”9 The good of the whole is the common goal (τέλος) of individual action. This outlook, in turn, results in the health of the social body (again, as noted in the fable of Menenius Agrippa). Moreover, seeking the common good is the way the individual member can attain its own proper good.10 In expressing the primacy of the common agenda, moral philosophers and politicians frequently employ σωτηρία terminology in their part-whole argument.11 For them, σωτηρία (safety, preservation, deliverance, saving, welfare), which is synonymous with τὸ συμφέρον in the part-whole rhetoric 6 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 7.13. 7 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.86.1. 8 Epictetus, Diss. 1.12.16; cf. 1 Cor 12. 9 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 12.20: τὸ κοινωνικὸν τέλος τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ποιεῖσθαι. Cf. 5.16; 11.21. 10 Epictetus, Diss. 1.19.13. 11 For example, Thucydides, His. 2.61.2-4; Plato, Leg. 10.903b; Aristotle, Rhet. 1.8.2, Pol. 1276b 25-30; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.85.1; Epictetus, Diss. 2.22.17-18; Hierocles, On Duties in Stobaeus, 3.39.35; cf. Cicero, Inv. 1.38.68-9.

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(as already indicated), is the common object for the community as a whole.12 For example, Aristotle argues that one citizen differs from another in function, but the welfare of the community (σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας) is their common business.13 Philosophers often use nautical metaphors to reinforce this idea of the common objective, a metaphor not unlike the health of entire body. Citizens, just like “sailors” on a boat, have different functions, but they all serve a common goal: safety in navigation (σωτηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας).14 Likewise, Dio Chrysostom often employs a popular nautical simile to show how it is crucial for all sailors on board to have the same mind to reach port in safety (σωτηρία). He states, “any ship which sails the sea with concord [common purpose] existing between the skipper and his crew not only is safe itself [σῴζεται] but also maintains in safety [σῴζει] those on board.”15 By contrast, abiding in discord (στασιάζειν), or not having a common purpose, leads the community to destroy (ἀπόλλυμι) the whole, including its individual citizens.16 As Aristotle’s and Dio’s examples indicate, the purpose of Greco-Roman ὁμόνοια (concord) speeches is not just for the purpose of seeking concord, but more importantly for pursuing the σωτηρία of the whole.17 b. Cooperation (“Working Together”) The body analogy further emphasizes the idea of “cooperation” between members of the community.18 As bodily limbs work together for the overall health of the entire body, human individuals are meant to work together (συνεργεῖν ἀλλήλοιν) for the common good.19 Maximus of Tyre argues that our body’s proper function “is preserved by the joint contribution of the body’s parts to the functioning of the whole: the feet carry, the eyes see, the ears hear, and so on.”20 Likewise, Maximus maintains cooperation among members of a social body is necessary for the common advantage because “a city is an entity 12 This observation of the semantic connection of σωτηρία with τὸ συμφέρον is significant for our later assessment of Paul’s part-whole rhetoric of 1 Corinthians in which he develops and applies the idea of τὸ συμφέρον to his unique concept of σωτηρία of the community. 13 Aristotle, Pol. 1276b 28-9. 14 Aristotle, Pol. 1276b 20-7; cf. Epictetus, Diss. 2.5.10-14. 15 Dio Chrysostom, Or. 39.6: ναῦς  ἥτις  ἂν  μετὰ ὁμονοίας  πλέῃ τοῦ κυβερνήτου  καὶ τῶν ναυτῶν, αὐτή τε σῴζεται καὶ σῴζει τοὺς ἐμπλέοντας; cf. 38.14. Notice here σωτηρία is the resulting advantage for all as the passive and active verbs (σῴζεται καὶ σῴζει) clearly imply. 16 Dio Chrysostom, Or. 38.14. As in this case, the opposite result of σωτηρία, which is linked to factionalism and to emphasis on τὸ ἴδιον, is expressed by ἀπόλλυμι/ἀπώλεια terminology. Cf. Paul’s use of the paired expressions of “those who are being saved” (οἱ σῳζομένοι) and “those who are perishing” (οἱ ἀπολλυμένοι) in 1 Corinthians. For further discussion, see Ch. 6 below. 17 This is a significant observation by which we can figure out Paul’s intention of employing the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον in addressing factionalism among the Corinthian believers. I will demonstrate that Paul uses a form of ὁμόνοια speeches not simply for unity of the community, but for the σωτηρία (= τὸ συμφέρον) of the whole. See Ch. 6. 18 For such discussion, see Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.1; 6.14, 42-45; 7.13; 9.40; 10.6-7. Cf. Livy, His. 2.32.9-12; Xenophon, Mem. 2.3.18. 19 Xenophon, Mem. 2.3.18. 20 Maximus of Tyre, Or. 15.4-5 in Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 149–50.

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blended together by the cooperation of all.”21 Similarly, Marcus Aurelius sees the part-whole cooperation as bedrock for the welfare of the society.22 He claims that human beings “have come into being for cooperation” (γεγόναμεν… πρὸς συνεργίαν) as the feet, hands, eyelids, and teeth are collaborating for the benefit of the whole body.23 Marcus says further, “We are co-workers [συεργοῦμεν] towards the fulfillment of one [ἕν] object.”24 This one aim, for Marcus, as already noted, is “the welfare of the whole” (τὸ συμφέρον τῷ ὃλῳ).25 Thus a significant ethical feature of the body metaphor is that bodily members do not simply exist together, but work together for the sake of the whole. So should it be for the members of a social entity. This then imposes an ethical imperative, that is, the advantage of the whole depends upon the cooperative forward movement of the respective parts.

2. The Whole a. Criterion In the body politic, the whole determines the drive and aspirations of each individual. More precisely, the advantage of the whole is the standard by which individual actions or situations are evaluated and executed in part-whole relationships.26 For example, Plato speaks of how the beauty (τὸ καλόν)27 of the whole becomes a criterion for judging the action of each part: It is as if we were colouring a statue and someone approached and censured us, saying that we did not apply the most beautiful pigments to the most beautiful parts of the image, since the eyes, which are the most beautiful part, have not been painted with purple but with black – we should think it a reasonable justification to reply, “Don’t expect us, quaint friend, to paint the eyes so fine that they will not be like eyes at all, nor the other parts [μέρη], but observe whether by assigning what is proper to each [ἑκάστοις] we render the whole beautiful [τὸ ὅλον καλόν].”28

For Plato, each part of the body should contribute to the beauty of the body, and this is the measure by which an isolated individual’s action should be seen and judged. Thus the implied ethical injunction asserts that every individual, in his or her actions, should consider what benefit it brings to the whole. As the

21 Maximus of Tyre, Or. 15.4-5. 22 Cf. Seneca (Ep. 95.53) states, “Our human relations with one another are like a stone porch, which would collapse if the stones did not mutually support each other.” 23 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.1. Cf. Elizabeth Asmis, “The Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius,” ANRW 36.3: 2248. 24 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 6.42-3. 25 Cf. Marcus Aurelius, Med. 2.3; 5.16; 6.42; 11.21; 12.20, 23 26 Cf. Lodge, Plato’s Theory of Ethics, 64–5. 27 Τὸ καλόν belongs to the semantic category of τὸ συμφέρον in part-whole rhetoric. See Ch. 1 above and “Τὸ Συμφέρον and Τὸ Καλόν” below in this chapter. 28 Plato, Resp. 420c-d.

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Stoic Arius Didymus later conceives a Platonic idea of the part-whole,29 “the beauty of the body is a due proportion of the limbs as they stand in relation to each other and in relation to the whole.”30 In short, the advantage of the whole (τὸ συμφέρον) becomes a criterion or goal for the individual and thus determines proper action. In a similar vein, the protection of the whole (body) likewise becomes an ethical value. In his philosophical ethics in which he addressed the problems of anger, Seneca, for example, defines anger as “the most hideous and frenzied of all the emotions.”31 His reason is the destructive connective effect it brings to the whole house or to the whole community. Against the contrary view that anger is, in some way, useful because it makes us more warlike, Seneca argues that fury is contrary to nature (non est naturalis ira) because it brings about mutual destruction.32 His interlocutor still insists: “Although anger be contrary to nature, may it not be right to adopt it, because it has often been useful? It rouses and incites the spirit, and without it bravery performs no splendid deed in war.”33 Seneca, however, rebuts that anger is a vice that “embodies nothing useful [utile], nor does it kindle the mind to warlike deeds; for virtue, being self-sufficient, never needs the help of vice.”34 More importantly, anger incites connective destruction. It destroys the whole and all of its members; “it silently and quietly wipes out whole families…together with wives and children; it tears down their very houses, leveling them to the ground.”35 Other vices affect only individual members, but anger, he contends, is the only passion that can at times possess a whole state. No entire people has ever burned with love for a woman, no whole state has set its hope upon money or gain; ambition is personal and seizes upon the individual; only fury is an affliction of a whole people. Often in a single mass they rush into anger; men and women, old men and boys, the gentry and the rabble, are all in full accord, and the united body, inflamed by a very few incendiary words, outdoes the incendiary himself; they fly forthwith to fire and sword, and proclaim war against their neighbors or wage it against their countrymen; whole houses are consumed…with the whole family inside.36

29 As A. Long points out, we see many anticipations of Stoicism in Plato’s cosmic ground for his ethical ideas. Long maintains that “Plato’s distinction between part and whole is of central importance to Stoic ethics, and it has…a fundamental common ground both in the attitude towards the universe and in its ethical implications.” See his Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), 151. 30 Arius Didymus, Epitome of Stoic Ethics, 5b4 (in Pomeroy): ὥσπερ τε τὸ κάλλος τοῦ σώματος ἐστι συμμετρία τῶν μελῶν καθεστῶνων αὐτῷ πρὸς ἀλληλά τε καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον. 31 Seneca, Ira, 1.1.1-2. 32 Seneca, Ira, 1.5.1-2. 33 Seneca, Ira, 1.6.5-7.1. 34 Seneca, Ira, 1.9.1. 35 Seneca, Ira, 1.19.2. 36 Seneca, Ira, 3.2.2-3 (emphasis added).

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Here we notice that Seneca’s moral discourses on anger are woven into the connective ethic of τὸ συμφέρον; anything that damages the whole cannot be acceptable in that ethical frame. For Seneca, anger has a negative connective power to destroy the individual parts as well as the whole. Rather, he maintains, a people can conquer their problem with anger when they understand the destructive connective effect it brings to the whole.37 For Seneca, the body politic should constrain any action that damages the whole. He contends that God himself has a greater concern for the whole than for a part.38 b. Priority Because I have already discussed the ideological aspect of “priority” of the whole in the chapter above, here I simply point out how the body provides the background for and enforces the ethical reasoning of connective priority. Philosophers and politicians also use the body metaphor to propose the principle of priority in the part-whole dynamic. Aristotle, as already noted, emphasizes the nobility of the whole because when the whole body is destroyed, no limb will exist.39 Maintaining the priority of the whole in such a way is the proper path for saving and preserving the lives of its respective parts as well as that of the whole. In a similar vein, Hierocles uses the fingerhand (part-whole) analogy to illustrate the way a person preserves (σωτηρία) or destroys (ἀπώλεια) both the whole hand in preferring one of the five fingers or vice versa. The resulting advantage of either σωτηρία or ἀπώλεια depends upon the person’s priority (the choice between one finger or five), that is, his or her connective body reasoning that, to extend the metaphor, a single finger cannot exist apart from the whole hand. Hierocles applies this idea of priority to our duty (καθῆκον) to “what is publicly profitable” (τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον) in connection with (μὴ χωρίζειν) “what is privately profitable” (τὸ ἴδιον).40 Pericles argues in his speech to the Athenians, to sacrifice the private concerns (τὰ ἴδια) in order to preserve the safety of the state (τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς σωτηρίας), that when the polis as a whole prospers, its private citizens benefit as well. By contrast, “even though a man flourishes in his own private affairs,” adds Pericles, “yet if his country goes to ruin he perishes with it all the same.”41 In such a way, the body becomes moral space of a part-whole entity that demands the priority of the whole over the parts. Seeking the priority of the whole necessarily secures the welfare of the parts and an individual citizen properly 37 For instance, Seneca exemplifies how Quintus Fabius Maximus conquered Hannibal by burying resentment out of concern only with advantage of the whole state (utilitatem); “he conquered anger before he conquered Hannibal.” See Ira, 1.11.5. 38 Thus, in cases, an individual member can be amputated to protect the whole body as mentioned in the previous chapter. See Cicero, Off. 3.6.32; Seneca, Prov. 3.1-2; Epictetus, Diss. 2.5.24. 39 Therefore, the whole and its respective benefit should necessarily be prior to the part and its respective benefit. See Aristotle, Pol. 1253a 20-1: τό γάρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους. 40 Hierocles, On Duties in Stobaeus 3.39.35 (Hense 3.732). 41 Thucydides, His. 2.61.2-4.

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achieves what is beneficial to him or her as part of what is advantageous to the state.42

3. Parts a. Made for the Whole If the part-whole is constructed and maintained for the good of the whole, then for what reason does the part exist? As already noted, individual parts constitute the whole and are made to serve the good of the whole.43 In the body, each member has a unique role to play in concert with other members for health and benefit of the whole body. This is true in the case of the social body politic as well. Just as a bodily member with a different function works for the health of the body, so does an individual citizen, in his or her personal capacity, work for the well-being of the community. In the Aristotelian body politic, for example, parts are assigned to fulfill their proper functions for the whole.44 When each citizen achieves its specific assigned portion, maintains Aristotle, each accomplishes the security of the community.45 In striving after this goal, no one is excluded; every part (μέρος) adds to (ἐπιβάλλειν) and benefits the good of the whole community.46 According to Epictetus, God assigns and determines a role for each person as for an actor in a play.47 Epictetus also uses a popular nautical metaphor to illustrate the role of the part in life as well as its role in its termination (“death”). For him, even the death of a sailor on a voyage by a storm is simply a completion of that particular part’s role in the context of the whole.48 For Epictetus the world is a well-ordered house or a great city. In it “there is a Lord of the Mansion who assigns each and every thing its place.”49 In this big 42 Cf. Julia Annas, “Aristotelian Political Theory in the Hellenist Period,” in Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy: Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum (eds. André Laks and Malcolm Schofield; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 76. 43 For example, see Plato, Leg. 10.903a-c; Cicero, Off. 1.35.126-27; Epictetus, Diss. 4.7.6-9, 2.9.3-4. 44 Just as sailors have such different functions as roles of rower, pilot, and lookout man, but all have the goal which is safety in navigation (σωτηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας). See Aristotle, Pol. 1276b 20-7. 45 Aristotle, Pol. 1276b 29: ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστι. 46 Aristotle, Pol. 1278b 22-3. 47 See Ench. 17, where Epictetus states: “if He wishes the play to be short, it is short; if long, it is long; if He wishes you to play the part of a beggar, remember to act even this role adroitly.” 48 Epictetus, Diss. 2.5.10-14: “But we act very much as though we were on a voyage. What is possible for me? To select the helmsman, the sailors, the day, the moment. Then a storm comes down upon us. Very well, what further concern have I? For my part has been fulfilled. The business belongs to someone else, that is, the helmsman. But, more than that, the ship goes down. What, then, have I to do? What I can; that is the only thing I do; I drown without fear, neither shrieking nor crying out against God, but recognizing that what is born [as ‘a part of the whole’; μέρος τῶν πάντων] must also perish…like an hour [as ‘part of a day’; ὥρα ἡμέρας] pass away.” 49 Epictetus, Diss. 3.22.3-8.

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household, each member is to do what is expected for the well-being of the whole. Failure to grasp the fact that each part has its own unique service and function for the greater good of the whole leads to divisions in the body and ultimately to its destruction. In a retelling of the fable of Agrippa, Dionysius of Halicarnassus argues that among the many parts of the human body “no one of their parts either has the same function or performs the same services as the others.”50 Accordingly, no individual part can expect or require the same duty from its neighboring parts. In the fable, other body members revile the belly for not doing the same thing expected of other parts, which (in their estimation) contribute “many other advantages toward the common good” with their own unique functions. The insurgency, however, reveals from its result51 that no part has an idle task to perform. Even the seemingly idle belly has a unique and decisive contribution to make in preserving the health of the body. Dionysius makes his case as he argues that a commonwealth, likewise, is “composed of many classes of people not at all resembling one another, every one of which contributes some particular service to the common good, just as its members do to the body.”52 b. No discrimination Therefore, no discrimination of any part must exist in the body. No bodily member is unnecessary or unimportant. Moral philosophers used the body analogy to prevent discrimination against any part (weaker members in particular) in the larger social body. In his speech to the assembly of Tarsus, Dio Chrysostom contends that no matter how small a group of the guild in the city is (e.g., here “linen-workers”) or how certain it is of its opinions, even when they differ from those of the general assembly, it should be also considered “as a part of the city” of Tarsus (μέρος…τῆς πόλεως). Dio uses body metaphor to make his point: “it is not fitting to disfranchise them [weak members] or to cut them off from” the civic constitution. He writes, “Take for example the human body: the bulk that comes with the passing years, if it is in keeping with the rest of the person and natural to it, produces well-being and a desirable stature, but otherwise it is a cause of disease and death.” Dio thus advises the assembly “to regard them [linen-workers] as members of your body politic.”53 For the health of the body, “no part must be lacking and none must be diseased or enfeebled.”54 It is unnatural for a member of the body to injure itself by bringing injury to its fellow members. Seneca argues that to injure a fellow-member is a crime, “for he is a part of the country” (pars patriae). Such self-inflicted violence, for him, is completely impracticable in the context of the body. “What if the hands 50 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.86.1. 51 See Livy, His. 2.32.10-11. Cf. Cicero, Off. 3.5.22. 52 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.86.3-4. 53 For such discussion, See Or. 34.21-23. 54 Cicero, Fin. 5.12.35.

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should desire to harm the feet, or the eyes the hands?” “[A]ll the members of the body are in harmony one with another…[for] the advantage of the whole” (totius interest), he says emphatically. Any individual member thus should remain unharmed.55 He continues to assert that the social body “can be kept unharmed only by the mutual protection and love of its parts.”56 c. No Deprivation The body metaphor is also employed to overrule the deprivation of one’s neighbor for self-seeking purposes of personal gain. Cicero argues that if a person furthers his or her own advantage at the expense of another person’s loss, such behavior not only violates the symbiotic law of nature (contra naturam), but also destroys the human fellowship of the part-whole. Cicero reinforces his argument by means of the body metaphor: Suppose, by way of comparison, that each one of our bodily members should conceive this idea and imagine that it could be strong and well if it should draw off to itself the health and strength of its neighboring member, the whole body would necessarily be enfeebled and die.57

A bodily member, as Cicero correctly argues, does not defraud its neighbor for its own profit. Nor does it impair the health of the whole body or of other parts for its own private benefit. For Cicero, the body analogy is sufficient to make the point that the connective ethics of the part-whole require that “no man shall be allowed for the sake of his own advantage to injure his neighbour.”58 The principle of upholding the common advantage, maintains Cicero, should be 55 Seneca, Ira, 2.31.7 (emphasis added). Cf. Xenophon, Mem. 2.3.18-19. 56 Seneca, Ira, 2.31.7: Quid si nocere velint manus pedibus, manibus oculi? Ut omnia inter se membra consentiunt, quia singula servari totius interest, ita homines singulis parcent, quia ad coetum geniti sunt, salva autem esse societas nisi custodia et amore partium non potest. After my research was complete, I discovered the work of Michelle Lee (Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ). Because of our common interest in the ethical concept of the body, I noticed she and I shared some of the same Greco-Roman texts and similar arguments as we pursued different ends. Those sources include Seneca (Ira. 2.31.6-8 as here and in the previous note; Clem. 1.3.51.5.3; Ep. 95.51-53), Cicero (Fin. 3.19.63-4; Off. 3.12.52), Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. rom. 6.83.2-4, 6.86.1-5), Epictetus (Diss. 2.5.24-28, 2.10.2-5), Marcus Aurelius (Med. 2.1, 7.13). See her Paul, the Stoics, 29–101, esp. 29–45, 83–100, 123, 141, and 176–7. Lee states (21) that her purpose was “to analyze the content and function of the [body] language which Paul uses in 1 Cor. 12 within the context of Hellenistic moral philosophy.” She concludes (200): “Paul is influenced by Stoicism in the way in which he conceives of the Corinthians as a unified body through their membership in the universal new humanity…. Paul desires to instruct the Corinthian community so that they may truly grasp their corporate identity in Christ…. Paul believes that they need to comprehend their connections as members of unified humanity in order to behave rightly as a community [body].” 57 Cicero, Off. 3.5.22: Ut, si unum quodque membrum sensum hunc haberet, ut posse putaret se valere, is proximi membri valetudinem ad se traduxisset, debilitari et interire totum corpus necesse esset. 58 Cicero, Off. 3.5.23: non liceat sui commodi causa nocere alteri.

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the injunction to keep unbroken any unifying bonds of social fabric between citizens. In the body, no strong member overrides or ignores the interest of a weaker member. Moral philosophers, as they refer to the body analogy, imply that the social body could not stand if an individual part, particularly a stronger one, were to seek its own advantage at the expense of the other parts. This leads to another important function of the body metaphor. That is, the establishment of the hierarchical societal structure prevents the misuse of power to the detriment of any weak member within the social body.

4. Ideological Part-Whole Hierarchy In popular Greco-Roman thought, the body reflects the hierarchy of the bodysoul dualism.59 The one is to serve and the other is to be master. Seneca, for example, states, “The whole body is the servant of the mind…yet the hands, the feet, and the eyes are in its employ.”60 This body hierarchy also serves to picture society as a dualistic class structure: “The one class is born to obey, the other to command.”61 Political leaders and moral philosophers employ the body metaphor not only to illuminate, but also to sustain the hierarchical structure of society. For example, Menenius Agrippa likens the work of the belly to the ruling class of the senate, and other bodily members to lower class people, plebeians. Dionysius uses the fable to enforce a similar ideological part-whole structure of the social entity. In the fable, bodily members revolted against the belly in the hope of freeing themselves from structures that “compel us to serve you and to bring things to you from everywhere for the gratification of your desires.” As these rebellious respective members stopped performing their assigned functions, the condition of the entire body worsened, leading to starvation and death. Dionysius applies this idea to support his ideological structure of the social body. Plebeians or lower class people62 rise against the senate, asking, “What good do you do us, and for what reason do you presume to rule over others?” Thinking that the senate does nothing for them, they want to free themselves from the ideological “tyranny” (τυραννίς). So they quit their usual services and “live without [the] leader.” What such anarchy brings the state, according to Dionysius, to a condition of “famine, war and every other evil.” His lesson is clear: Learn therefore, plebeians, that, just as in our bodies the belly thus evilly reviled by the multitude [ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν] nourishes [τρέφει] the body [whole] even while it 59 For example, see Plato, Phaed. 80a. 60 Seneca, Clem. 1.3.5. Similarly, Philo, Abr. 74: “there is a mind appointed as your ruler which all the community of the body obeys and each of the senses follows” (ἐν σοὶ μὲν νοῦς ἐστιν ἡγεμὼν ἐπιτεταγμένος ᾧ καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἅπασα κοινωνία πειθαρχεῖ καὶ ἑκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἕπεται); cf. Isocrates, Panath. 138. 61 Seneca, Const. 1.1: altera pars ad absequendum, altera imperio nata sit. 62 Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. rom. 6.86.4) specifies them as farmers, soldiers, traders, and craftsmen.

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is itself [part] nourished [τρεφομένη], and preserves [σώζει] it while it is preserved [σωζομένη]63 itself, and is a kind of feast, as it were, provided by joint contributions, which as a result of the exchange duly distributes that which is beneficial to each and all, so in commonwealths the senate, which administers the affairs of the public and provides what is expedient for everyone.64

Plebeians should “cease” (παύσασθε), therefore, to grumble against the senate. Here again, the body metaphor serves as analogous to a hierarchical ideology of society. On the other hand, in some ways the notion of the body metaphor limits (and/or prevents) ideological misuse of the part-whole hierarchy. Dionysius supports a hierarchical structure of society. But it is clear in this hierarchy that the senate (the “belly”) does not override the hard work of the lower class people. Rather, the senate is to provide connective good to “everyone” of the social body, not only for their own benefit.65 In this way, moral philosophers and ideal political leaders do not dismantle the part-whole hierarchy.66 Rather, they provide a corrective form against misguided exploitation of part-whole structures. For example, in discussing how mercy is requisite for kings, Seneca establishes a part-whole hierarchy between Nero and Rome in light of the classic idea of the hierarchical relationship of the soul (ruler) to the body (ruled) (as noted). He says that the king is the soul of the state, the state is his body (corpus), and citizens are his members. Seneca concedes that the soul can be a “grasping tyrant…[or even] covetous of fame.” Nevertheless, he clarifies that the resulting advantage of the behavior must have a connection with the body of the people. When the king is merciful to his people, Seneca argues, he is merciful to himself as well.67 In this part-whole rhetoric “even reprobate citizens should have mercy as being the weak members of the body.”68 In brief, moral philosophers and ideal politicians conceive and develop a particular form of an organic part-whole in which connective benefit of what is “beneficial to each and all” is made between upper and lower class strata in the social hierarchy.

63 Notice here two sets of verb forms in active and passive voices that signify my connective idea in part-whole dynamics (see below): by nourishing (τρέφει) and being nourished (τρεφομένη); preserving (σώζει) and being preserved (σωζομένη). 64 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.86.5. 65 Also notice the expression “beneficial to each and all” in the above citation. 66 Contra Martin (Corinthian Body, 248), this is the same case with Paul in 1 Corinthians. 67 For such discussion, see Seneca, Clem. 1.3.5-1.5.3. 68 Seneca, Clem. 1.5.1.

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5. Organic Part-Whole a. Part as Connected to the Whole Most importantly, the body is the clearest picture of the organic part-whole, which, as noted already, is the proper context of τὸ συμφέρον. The body conveys the idea of all limbs organically connected to the whole in unity.69 Moral teachers often employ the metaphor to insure the individual members’ connection to the community as a whole against divisive behaviors and disruptive socio-political issues. Party strife would arise among the bodily members if “these parts of the human body should be endowed, each for itself, with perception and a voice of its own” (ἰδίαν) apart from the whole.70 Seneca argues that one cannot withdraw oneself from the whole and restrict oneself to a part71 because we are all formed to be “one great body” (corporis magni).72 Similarly, Epictetus maintains that if a person (ἄνθρωπος) is detached from the social body, he should “no longer be a man” just as a detached foot should “no longer be a foot.”73 In the body, when a member performs its proper function to its full potential, its benefit extends to the whole and is reciprocal among all the members of the body. Likewise, any negative experience is also corrosive. Therefore, in the “well governed” (εὔνομον) form of a state resembling the human body (εὖ οἰκουμένην πόλιν σώματι πρὸς μέρος αὑτοῦ), if any one of the citizens suffers pain or pleasure the entire community shares it.74 The body, to change the metaphor, opens two-way (“connective”) traffic between you and me because in the body, as Seneca states, “the same thing is advantageous to me which is advantageous to you.”75 No doubt this connective reasoning generates the ethical idea that “[t]he advantage of the state and that of the individual are yoked together.”76 As such, the body analogy facilitates the ethical reasoning of the organic connection of one action to the others. In the organically understood thought frame, living things are all attached to a single whole in unity in which an action necessarily affects the whole and the other parts of it.77 Aristotle conceives an organic relation between the civic orderings and the cosmic order when he asks: if something “can happen to a living thing, why not [the same thing; τὸ αὐτό] to the universe [τὸ πᾶν].” He continues: “if [it happens; γίγνεται] in a lesser cosmos [μικρῷ κόςμῳ; “microcosmos”], why not in a greater [cosmos]?” (μεγάλῳ [κόςμῳ]; “macrocosmos”).78 Similarly, Stoics believe that all parts of 69 Epictetus, Diss. 2.5.25-26. 70 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.86.1; cf. Livy, His. 2.32.9. 71 Seneca, Ep. 65.19; Prov. 1.1. 72 Seneca, Ep. 95.51-2. 73 Epictetus, Diss. 2.5.25-26. 74 Plato, Resp. 462c-e and 464b. 75 Seneca, Ep. 48.2 (emphasis added). 76 Seneca, Ep. 66.10: iuncta est privata et publica utilitas. 77 Seneca, Ep. 113.9: quia ex uno religata sunt et partes unius ac membra sunt. 78 Aristotle, Phys. 252b 25-7.

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the universe are interconnected to one another by pneuma, a connective spirit that penetrates the entire body of the cosmos and makes it an organic whole just as the bodily spirit inhabits all parts of the human body.79 Therefore, all cosmic parts feel as one.80 Epictetus maintains, “what is on earth feels the influence of that which is in heaven” because all things are “so closely bound up with the universe” and “they so intimately share its affections.”81 This cosmic sympathy (συμπάθεια) provides the basis for the development of the idea that movement in one part necessarily produces a corresponding experience in another part because they each belong to the same whole.82 In its ethical context, such a perspective can easily advance the part-whole connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον: consider how your negative action affects other members; it does not damage you alone, but it affects both the agent separately/individually and all collectively. Conversely, when the individual part contributes to the advantage of the whole community, that in itself brings the benefit to the part as well. In short, the organic body metaphor reinforces the connective role of τὸ συμφέρον that propels “both public [τῷ κοινῷ] and private [ἰδίῳ] interests alike.”83 Therefore, the essential feature of the partwhole connective argument is that “what is to the interest [τὸ συμφέρον] of one person [ἀνθρώπῳ] is also to the interest of other persons [ἑτέροις ἀνθρώποις],”84 and “what is advantageous to whole is beneficial to the part” as well.85 b. Under One Yoke: Τὸ Ἴδιον and Tὸ Συμφέρον In the organic part-whole, there exists such a thing as private interest (τὸ ἴδιον). Yet, when properly understood, τὸ ἴδιον is yoked with τὸ συμφέρον of the whole. Maintaining and reversing the priority of the whole over against the advantage of the part, as I argued above, does not rule out the personal benefit. Epictetus admits, “It is my nature to look out for my own interest” (πρὸς  τὸ  ἐμὸν συμφέρον). But he emphasizes that individuals cannot attain their own benefit apart from τὸ συμφέρον of the whole.86 In the proper partwhole context, private interest is inseparable from the benefits of the whole 79 SVF. 2.473; cf. 416, 439, 442; Manilius, Astronomica 2.60-66; cf. Virgil, Georg. 1.3513. On Stoic pneuma, see Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, 1–48; Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 156–63; Hahm, Origins of Stoic Cosmology, 158–74; Michael Lapidge, “Stoic Cosmology and Roman Literature,” ANRW 36.3 (1989): 1388; id., “Stoic Cosmology,” 167–85. 80 See Cicero, Nat. d. 2.19, 30, 115. 81 Epictetus, Diss. 1.14.1-5. 82 Cicero, Div. 2.34; Vergil, Georg. 1.351-3. Cf. Lapidge, “Stoic Cosmology and Roman Literature,” 1391, 1415. 83 Plato, Leg. 9. 875a; cf. Resp. 462c-464b. 84 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 6.45 (emphasis added). 85 Cicero, Off. 3.12.52: communis utilitas tua sit (emphasis added). Cf. Marcus Aurelius, Med. 6.45: Ὅσα ἑκάστῳ συμβαίνει, ταῦτα τῷ ὃλῳ συμφέρει (“All that befalls the individual is the interest of the whole also”). 86 See Epictetus, Diss. 1.19.13: The human being as a part of the whole “can attain nothing of his own proper goods unless he contributes something to the common interest” (τῶν ἰδίων ἀγαθῶν…ἂν μή τι εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ὠφέλιμον προσφέρηται).

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community;87 otherwise, the agent is like a limb detached from the body. Τὸ ἴδιον exists and is preserved as a part of the common good. Epictetus makes this argument: It is a general rule – be not deceived – that every living thing is to nothing so devoted as to its own interest [ὡς τῷ ἰδίῳ συμφέροντι]…For its nature is to love nothing so much as its own interest [ὡς τὸ αὑτοῦ συμφέρον]; this to it is father and brother and kinsmen and country and God…For this reason, if a man puts together in one scale his interest and righteousness and what is honourable [τὸ συμφέρον καὶ  τὸ  ὅσιον καὶ τὸ καλὸν] and country and parents and friends, they are all safe [σῴζεται ταῦτα πάντα]; but if he puts his interest in one scale, and in the other friends and country and kinsmen and justice itself, all these latter are lost because they are outweighed [καταβαρούμενα] by his interest.88

The scale of the συμφέρον that Epictetus proposes is not having two dishes on opposite ends, thereby putting one’s private interest on one side dish and the public advantage on the other. His repeated use of the metaphor of a detached limb in his argument of τὸ συμφέρον is similar to this scale metaphor: a hand is detached and is laid on the scale of one side seeking its own profit, whereas the rest of the body is on the other side of the scale. The detached limb is no longer a hand, and there is no such thing as its own private benefits, which are always, for the limb, attainable within the whole body. Thus the acceptable form of scale in Epictetus’ theory of τὸ συμφέρον has just one dish in the middle of it in which both private and common advantage are placed (“connected”). So the individual’s self-interest motivated actions should necessarily bring the advantages to the whole. Similarly, if we draw a mathematical diagram for the ethical connective of τὸ συμφέρον, the circle of one’s private interest is organically within the circle of τὸ συμφέρον of the whole; it is not a separate circle outside the circle of the whole. To be sure, private benefit exists as an organic portion of the common good under the same yoke. But there is a variant form of the part-whole that often overrides and sacrifices personal benefit or even common benefit in certain situations. As already indicated, I call such a deviant form an “apolitical” (individualistic) part-whole.

6. Apolitical Part-Whole By apolitical part-whole I mean an ideological appropriation of the sociopolitical structure/hierarchy that fails to make connective benefit among members and produces tensions between private and communal advantages.89 87 For example, Seneca, Prov. 1.1; Ep. 65.16, 66.10. 88 Epictetus, Diss. 2.22.15-18 (emphasis added). 89 It also produces conflicts between τὸ συμφέρον and other ethical categories of τὸ καλόν and τὸ δίκαιον (see below). In Greek civic discussions the word πολιτικός, which means “public,” “communal,” “ethical,” or “political,” is not disparaging (see n.8 in Ch. 1 above). However, by the “apolitical” part-whole, I mean “non-ethical” part-whole constitutions in which the powerful or the governing body or even socially upper class appropriate what is pertained to the πόλις/

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In this defective symbiosis, the ruling class or the upper stratum of the social pyramid often misunderstand the whole as representing them only and “common advantage” to be that which benefits the powerful at the expense of the lower class people. When a civic part-whole is constituted, some sort of central authority is naturally developed to direct the activities of the community for its safety (σωτηρία) in peace or in war. We may define such a governing party as a concentrated central power.90 Τὸ συμφέρον, as argued above, maintains such a concentrated political-ideological structure of society. For example, the ideological hierarchy between master and slave is sustainable because they seek “the same advantage” (ταὐτὸ συμφέρει), as noted already.91 Concentrated power, however, often manipulates the part-whole ideology to subordinate the common advantage mainly in the interest of the ruling class. A classic example is the Thrasymachian ideology that citizens (“sheep”) are in one way to serve and bring benefits to the concentrated power (“shepherds”). According to Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, “shepherds” (metaphor for rulers)92 do not aim at what is good for their sheep, but for their own benefit.93 Thus, by deviant (“apolitical”) form of the part-whole, I mean the sociopolitical situation in which the connective benefit (“two-way traffic”) is not made between the individual members and the whole community or state. Rather, the traffic is one way toward the upper strata of the social hierarchy. In the fable of Menenius, other members of the body (plebeians) misunderstood that they were working just one way for the belly (senate). Against such a misunderstood form of the part-whole, Menenius, according to Dionysius, provides a corrective, a two-way traffic in the organic part-whole, in which when the part “nourishes” (τρέφει) the whole, the individual part itself is “nourished” (τρεφομένη); when the individual member “preserves” (σώζει) the

community or to the common good (τὸ συμφέρον) for private benefit (τὸ ἴδιον) at the expense of others, particularly the lower class people. Here we see ideological tensions between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ κοινόν as discussed below. 90 Cf. Lodge (370), who defines such phenomena as “political power.” But I avoid the word “political” because those of the governing body often exercise their concentrated power unethically or apolitically (see below). As just noted, in its original derivative sense and in its actual application, the word πολιτικός means “communal” or “ethical,” and it has no modern derogatory sense when early Greek philosophers used the term. 91 It seems more advantageous to the master. But Aristotle has in mind an organic partwhole in hierarchy as he states: “…when slavery for the one and mastership for the other are advantageous [συμφέρει], and it is just and proper for the one party to be governed and for the other to govern by the form of government for which they are by nature fitted, and therefore by the exercise of mastership, while to govern badly is to govern disadvantageously [ἀσυμφόρως] for both [ἀμφοῖν] parties (for the same thing is advantageous for a part and for the whole body or the whole soul [τὸ γὰρ αὐτο συμφέρει τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ ὃλῳ καὶ σώματι καὶ ψυχῇ], and the slave is a part of the master – he is, as it were, a part of the body, alive but yet separated from it; hence there is a certain community of interest [συμφέρον] and friendship between slave and master).” See, Pol. 1255b 4-15 and 1252a 24-35. 92 For example, see Philo, Agr. 45-48. 93 Plato, Resp. 343b.

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whole, the part itself is “preserved” (σωζομένη).94 Likewise, Dio Chrysostom, who supports the hierarchical structure of society in which citizens must obey the governor (τῷ  κυβερνήτῃ πείθεσθαι),95 maintains that the resulting advantage of seeking the one (μία) common good is connective to all of the state, not just moving one-way for the benefit of a select few; it covers (“is saved and saves”; σῴζεται καὶ σῴζει) both the whole and the members in it.96 In the organic thought frame of the social fabric, as Seneca maintains, if a person presents himself as beneficial to the whole, he is serving the interests both of the public and of the individual.97 By contrast, the distorted manifestation of the part-whole sees those with concentrated power “utiliz[ing] public resources largely for their own purposes, subordinating the interest of the community as a whole to what they understand to be the interest of their own party.”98 In this case, what might benefit the individual is not understood as being connected to the whole, nor an organic portion of what is deemed beneficial to the whole community. Rather the central power often appropriates part-whole ideology to seek its own benefit while sacrificing the good of the people in the lower class. The body analogy, however, obviates such one-sided distortions of power that so often create serious civic problems, including στάσις (party strife) and revolution. Philosophers use the body metaphor to emphasize and advance the idea of connective benefit that goes both ways (“two-way traffic”) in the part-whole relationship. By implication they propose that any body-politic that exists “for the interests of one’s party should be extended so as to cover the whole community, of which the [governing] party is only a part.”99 Their logic is connective, for they know that “to plunder the whole in the supposed interest of the part is, ultimately, to destroy the part along with the whole.”100 94 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.86.5. These two sets of “active” (τρέφει, σώζει) and “passive” (τρεφομένη, σωζομένη) benefits that the individual action makes in the body, as I argue, are a striking evidence for my metaphor of the “two-way connective traffic” in organic part-whole as opposed to the “one-way road” of the apolitical or non-ethical part-whole. 95 Dio Chrysostom, Or. 38.14. 96 Dio Chrysostom, Or. 39.6. 97 Seneca, Tranq. 3.1: Nam cum utilem se efficere civibus mortalibusque propositum habeat, simul et exercetur et proficit, qui in mediis se officiis posuit communia privataque pro facultate administrans (“For, whenever a man has the set purpose to make himself useful to his countrymen and all mortals, he both gets practice and does service at the same time when he has placed himself in the very midst of active duties, serving to the best of his ability the interests of both the public and of the individual”). Also see Otio, 3.5: Nam cum se utilem ceteris efficit, commune agit negotium. Quomodo qui se deteriorem facit non sibi tantummodo nocet, sed etiam omnibus eis, quibus melior factus prodesse potuisset, sic quisquis bene de se meretur hoc ipso aliis prodest, quod illis profuturum parat (“For when he renders himself useful to others, he engages in public affairs. Just as the man that chooses to become worse injures not only himself but all those whom, if he had become better, he might have benefited, so whoever wins the approval of himself benefits others by the very fact that he prepares what will prove beneficial to them”). 98 Lodge, 371. 99 Lodge, 371. 100 Lodge, 371. N. White observes that in the organic body politic, “the good of the

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Prioritizing the whole over against its respective parts, if we rightly recognize that in the connective context, means that individual interest serves the interest of the community while the interest of the community also serves individual interest.101 Τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ συμφέρον are “one and the same” (ἕν) in that ethical frame.102 Marcus Aurelius maintains that the path of seeking τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ κοινόν is “one” (μία).103 Moral philosophers continue to propose the priority of τὸ συμφέρον in their ethical discussions, I suggest, for two reasons. First, the socio-political partwhole body, strictly speaking, is not a human organism, but only resembles (ἔοικέ) one.104 Philosophers and politicians liken human society to an animate body in the hope of seeing the anthropological part-whole body features mentioned above in the social body as well. But unlike in the real body, problems such as discriminating against weaker members or depriving another of private benefit is a problem in the social body. By comparing the polis to the human body, Greco-Roman moral philosophers clearly place priority on the whole and, in this way, seek to preserve (both) the whole and its parts. Second, they argue for the priority of τὸ συμφέρον because of the human proclivity toward seeking τὸ ἴδιον (self) without making a connection to the common good (see further below). As mentioned, this feature reflects the distorted apolitical portion of the part-whole. Here again, moral philosophers use the body metaphor to keep in proper proportion the balance between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ συμφέρον.105 The body metaphor is the best and most accurate representative of the connective aspect of τὸ συμφέρον. The metaphor functions to swing the pendulum from the apolitical (“non-connective”) distortions of the part-whole back to the correct alignment that reflects the proper balance of the organic part-whole. To change the metaphor, the language of the “body” helps move away from the notion of one-way traffic to two-way traffic, the latter of which benefits the travel of both the individual and the community – and vice versa. Thus, the rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον, as we shall see, encapsulates an anti-individualistic ideology. Perfect balance is difficult to achieve. The body analogy, not only in applying it to constituent parts of civic institutions but more so in quelling political uproar, enables moral philosophers and idealist politicians in antiquity to assert, in terms everyone can understand, the “mean” (μέσος), that is, the benefit of mutual reciprocity. By it, they demonstrate the advantage for all in not leaning too far in either direction – toward the upper

individual is inseparable from the good of the polis…and the norms of the polis themselves determine what an individual should aim at.” See his Individual and Conflict, 154. 101 Again Cicero, Off. 3.12.52: ut utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua sit. Cf. Plato, Leg. 10.903d: τὸ περὶ σὲ ἄριστον τῴ παντὶ ξυμβαίνει καὶ σοὶ; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 6.45: ὅσα ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἑτέροις ἀνθρώποις. 102 Hierocles, On Duties in Stobaeus 3.39.35 (Hense 3.732). 103 Marcus Aurelius, Med. 5.3. 104 For example, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.86.1; cf. Plato, Resp. 462c-d. 105 For example, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.86.1-6; Epictetus, Diss. 2.22.15-18.

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class or toward the lower class – but show the connective mutual benefit (ὠφελείᾳ ἀλλήλοιν) of both.106 In sum, τὸ συμφέρον, whose ethical idea is best expressed in the body metaphor, is a connective embracing and enforcing the divided parts under the common value. It is not meant to serve only the needs of the ruling class. According to a second-century C.E. inscription, a proconsul of Asia rebukes the bakers who are striking in Ephesus and accuses them of failing to seek “the advantage of the city” (τὸ τῇ πόλει συμφέρον). The same inscription describes the leaders of the community as “those in charge of the common advantage” (τοῖς ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος ἐπιταττομένοις).107 It is clear, in this example, that τὸ συμφέρον means the connective common value for both bakers and the members of the upper class, not simply for one side. At this point, we need to look at how philosophers and politicians utilize and apply the connective rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον in a practical manner in making civic part-whole constitutions and in their body politics.

B. Applications of Tὸ Συμφέρον to the Body Politic Because the part-whole is made by and for the advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) of the whole, the advantage of the whole becomes the criterion for guiding an individual’s actions in relation to the whole community. Τὸ συμφέρον of the whole appears as the dominant moral norm for guiding proper behaviors and serves as the standard for judging and solving related problems. Having established that the body metaphor emphasizes that τὸ συμφέρον comes only when a community functions in proper balance in its respective parts, I will now discuss the way τὸ συμφέρον plays a connective role in the Greco-Roman body politics. Τὸ συμφέρον becomes the major remedy for healing divisiveness in the community and the standard for framing the laws of the state, for interpreting social justice, and for making correct constitutions.

1. Tὸ Συμφέρον and Concord Τὸ συμφέρον promotes unity or concord (ὁμόνοια). The problem of στάσις (party strife) was widespread in the ancient Greek city-states and was the most discussed social issue in individual-community relationships.108 Thus, as W. Jaeger has correctly contended, “Concord (homonoia) had always been the 106 Cf. Xenophon, Mem. 2.3.19. 107 I Eph 215 ll. 3,8; cited by Bruce W. Winter, Seek the Welfare of the City: Christians as Benefactors and Citizens (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 1. Similarly, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 11.9.1: τοὺς προεστηκότας τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἁπάντων συμφέρον οὐχι τὸ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἰδίᾳ λυσιτελοῦν ὀφείλοντας σκοπεῖν (rulers “are in duty bound to consult the common interest of all rather than your private advantage”). 108 Schofield, Saving the City, 1.

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slogan of peacemaking leaders and political educators, of poets, sophists, and statesmen in the classical Greek polis.”109 They presented τὸ συμφέρον of the whole as the most important remedy for the problem of στάσις in Greek political thought. It brings divided parts into unity under the terms of the idea of the “common good.” The common good and concord are inextricably tied together as Demosthenes appeals to the Athenians, “it is necessary that you bring about harmony among yourselves for the common good of the State.”110 In Greco-Roman socio-political speeches, the part-whole connective discourse, when dealing with factionalism, appeals to the common advantage in deliberative rhetoric. The specific term συμφέρον (and/or related terms) appears sufficiently in this rhetorical genre.111 According to Greco-Roman rhetorical handbooks, the deliberative speaker seeks to describe what is advantageous or harmful (τὸ συμφέρον καὶ βλαβερόν) to the audience; the speaker “recommends a course of action as better” or “advises against it as worse.”112 In this context, τὸ συμφέρον (utilitas in Latin) becomes a fundamental criterion for the action to be undertaken in dealing with individual-community issues.113 Primary subjects of deliberative discourses include civic divisions (στάσεις) and concord (ὁμόνοια).114 The speaker or writer intends to seek concord and end factionalism in a political body. In the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, for instance, we are told that the orator “who wishes to advocate a law [against divisive opinions] has to prove that it will be equal for the citizens, consistent with the other laws, and advantageous for the state [συμφέροντα τῇ πόλει], best of all as promoting concord [πρὸς ὁμόνοιαν].”115 In their appeal for concord, speakers demonstrate that the proposed action exists for the common advantage, neither 109 Jaeger, Early Christianity, 13. 110 Demosthenes, Ep. 1.5: Δεῖ δ’ ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρῶτον μὲν ἁπάντων πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁμόνοιαν εἰς τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον τῇ πόλει παρασχέσθαι; also noted by Lee, 118–19 n.55. 111 See Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 25–39. Greco-Roman rhetorical handbooks present three species of rhetoric: deliberative, judicial, and epideictic. See Aristotle, Rhet. 1.2.3, 1.3.1-3; Quintilian, Inst. 3.4.12-15. These three kinds of oratory, according to Aristotle, are determined by three types of hearers of speeches. If the listener must decide regarding some future action, the speech is deliberative; if the hearer is a judge of things past, the rhetoric is judicial; and if the hearer is simply an observer of what the speaker praises or blames, the speech is epideictic. For a brief discussion on these three species of rhetoric, see George Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 4–10; id., “The Genres of Rhetoric,” in Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 B.C–A.D. 400 (ed. Stanley E. Porter; Leiden/New York/Köln: Brill, 1997), 44–50. 112 Aristotle, Rhet. 1.3.5; cf. Cicero, Inv. 2.51.156, 2.56.168-69, Or. 24; Quintilian, Inst. 3.8.34. For further references, see Duane F. Watson, “1 Corinthians 10:23–11:1 in the Light of Greco-Roman Rhetoric: The Role of Rhetorical Questions,” JBL 108 (1989): 302. 113 With regard to the “end” (τέλος) of each rhetoric, a specific purpose is allocated to each of these three kinds of rhetoric. Aristotle assigns συμφέρον/βλαβερόν to deliberative rhetoric as its τέλος, δίκαιον/ἄδικον to the judicial or forensic rhetoric, and καλόν/αἰσχρόν to the epideictic rhetoric. See Rhet. 1.3.5, 1.6.1. 114 A. R. R. Sheppard, “HOMONOIA in the Greek Cities of the Roman Empire,” AnSoc 15–17 (1984–6): 229–52; Welborn, “On the Discord,” 83–113. 115 Rhet. alex. 2.1424b; cited by Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 61 n.191.

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for their own interest nor for that of any other divisive group.116 They attempt to present a unified course of action that is expedient to the community as a whole. Greco-Roman moral philosophers and rhetoricians regard τὸ ἴδιον as the source of all socio-political conflicts (πόλεμοι), an imbalance that splits (διασπᾶν) the community into civic divisions (στάσεις).117 Cicero, for example, defines public administrators as those who care for the common advantage of the whole body and do not emphasize the private interests of one party at the expense of the rest.118 “[T]hose who care for the interests of a part of the citizens and neglect another part,” maintains Cicero, “introduce into the civil service a dangerous element – dissension and party strife.”119 He points out that the Athenians experienced great dissensions and civil wars because of this fractured party spirit. Likewise, Epictetus contends that seeking personal interest (τὸ ἰδιᾳ συμφέρον) over τὸ συμφέρον of the whole is the primary source of social conflicts and divisions. He vividly illustrates this point: If it is my interest [συμφέρει μοι] to have a farm, it is my interest [συμφέρει μοι] to take it away from my neighbor; if it is my interest [συμφέρει μοι] to have a cloak, it is my interest [συμφέρει μοι] also to steal it from a bath. This is the source of wars [πόλεμοι], seditions [στάσεις], tyrannies, plots.120

116 At the beginning of his speech (exordium) “To the Nicomedians on concord with the Nicaeans,” Dio Chrysostom (Or. 38.1) defines his orations as “advice [συμβουλεὐειν] on the interests of the commonwealth [περὶ τῶν κοινῇ συμφέροντῶν]” and tries to prove that his proposed action is “useful to your city [τῇ πόλει χρήσιμος] in the future.” In the process, Dio keeps reminding his audience that his speech is for τὸ συμφέρον: “I pray to all gods, both yours and theirs, that if what I now say is said because of goodwill to you alone and not in pursuit of any personal glory or advantage to be derived from your reconciliation, and above all if it is destined to be of advantage to the state – if this is true, I pray that the gods may not only grant me such eloquence as is worthy of my cause, but that they may also make you willing to take my advice in the matters which are to your advantage [τὰ συμφέροντα].” See Or. 38.9. 117 Plato, Leg. 4.715b and 9.875a; Josephus, B.J. 1.218; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 9.23. 118 Cicero, Off. 1.25.85: ut totum corpus rei publicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant. 119 Cicero, Off. 1.25.85: Qui autem parti civium consulut partem neglegunt, rem perniciosissimam in civitatem inducunt, seditionem atque discordiam. 120 Epictetus, Diss. 1.22.14 (emphasis added). In a similar vein, Epictetus points out that ignorance (ἄγνοια) of τὸ συμφέρον is the source of conflict (Diss. 2.24.21-24; cf. 1.22.5-6). He demonstrates this point from Homeric stories: Why did Agamemnon and Achilles quarrel? Was it not because they did not know what things are expedient [συμφέροντα] and what are inexpedient [ἀσύμφορα]? Does not one of them say that it is expedient [συμφέρει] to give Chryseïs back to her father, while the other says that it is not expedient [οὐ συμφέρει]? Does not one of them say that he ought to get some other man’s need of honour, while the other says that he ought not?…Do you see the sort of thing that ignorance of what is expedient leads to [ἄγνοια περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων]?

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Other writers also disclose that when a single part asserts its own voice, sedition inevitably arises among members of the body.121 Dionysius of Halicarnassus mentions a speech by Manius Valerius, a senator who was a friend to the plebeians. The speech addresses the subject of the advantage of ὁμόνοια. In the speech, Valerius criticizes senators who “sought to divide the plebeians from the patricians and for trifling causes [personal benefits] to rekindle the flames of civil strife.”122 Similarly, Josephus describes a political upheaval after the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 B.C.E., which arose because of some discarding the common benefit. He states that the political leaders “split up into factions; each joined the party which he considered would best serve his personal ambitions.”123 Concerning the problem of the “Discord of Council and Assembly, of the Youth and the Elders” in Tarsus, Dio Chrysostom argues that the problem of discord in this city comes from persons seeking their own advantage (ἰδίᾳ τὸ συμφέρον) as if “when a ship is putting in for shore, the sailors should seek their own advantage [ἰδίᾳ μὲν οἱ ναῦται τὸ συμφέρον αὑτοῖς ζητοῖεν], the pilot his [ἰδίᾳ δὲ ὁ κυβερνήτης], and the owner his [ἰδίᾳ δὲ ὁ ναύκληρος].”124 For Dio, divisive social evil (κακός) occurs when a party or an individual strives “to promote one’s own welfare at the expense of both one’s native land and the common advantage.”125 Dio says, “Is it not true that but a day or two ago the Assembly took one course and the Council another and that Elders still maintain a position of independence, each body clearly consulting its own interest (ἰδίᾳ τὸ συμφέρον)?” He argues that nothing is more harmful to the community than the individual who willfully stands detached “from the common interest” (τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος).126 In short, Greco-Roman writers assert that the splitting of a community or a state into factions comes from the spurning of the common interest by individual members or individual groups of the community. Such behavior is “just like the diseases in our bodies” (ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν αἱ νόσοι) ultimately leading to destruction of all.127 Τὸ συμφέρον of the whole, therefore, becomes the primary remedy for this social malaise, assuming a connective role that binds divided groups into unity. Aristotle maintains that concord (ὁμόνοια) comes “when the citizens agree as to their interests.”128 Cicero asserts, “harmony [concordia] is very

121 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.86.1. 122 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 7.54.1. 123 Josephus, B.J. 1.218: διαστασιασθέντων  τῶν δυνατῶν  ἕκαστος  ἐλπίσιν  οἰκείαις ἐχώρει  πρὸς  ὃ  συμφέρειν  ὑπελάμβανεν. Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 5.10.2: ἀντὶ  τῶν  κοινῇ  συμφερόντων  τὸ ἑαυτοῦ  σκοπῶν λυσιτελές (“considering his private advantage instead of the public good”). 124 Dio Chrysostom, Or. 34.16. 125 Dio Chrysostom, Or. 34.19: κακῶν…τοῦ  ζητεῖν  ἕκαστον  αὔξειν  ἑαυτὸν  [καὶ] τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. Also see Or. 38.13. 126 For such discussion, see his Or. 34.16-22. 127 Dio Chrysostom, Or. 38.10-14; also see Or. 34.16-22. 128 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 9.6.1.

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easily obtainable in a state where the interests of all are the same, for discord [discordia] arises from conflicting interests.”129 Τὸ συμφέρον prevents and heals factions because, when applied as a common value, it is advantageous for both sides of social and political parties. In a letter to Philip regarding a military expedition, Isocrates, for example, exhorts Philip to take the course of τὸ συμφέρον “which is advantageous both for the city and for you” (περί τε τῶν τῇ πόλει καὶ τῶν σοὶ συμφερόντων, ἐξαρκούντως ὡς ἐμαυτὸν ἔπειθον).130 When Jason, tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly, was assassinated and tumult followed, Isocrates urged the children of Jason to follow a moderate course of political action. “For in the absence of a common ground of interest [κοινοῦ…τοῦ συμφέροντος],” begins his speech, “I do not see how I could please both sides [ἀμφοτέροις].”131 Isocrates exemplifies that considering the connective benefit of both sides should be the overarching feature in anyone’s doing “as I wish.” “[T]he best course of action” (τὰ βέλιστα), he argues, serves to please “both the personal benefits and all other considerations.”132 Paying due regard to τὸ συμφέρον heals factionalism, for it advances the true advantage and is non-divisive in bringing symbiotic benefit to both (ἀμφοῖν) public and private domain. Likewise, Plato develops and applies τὸ συμφέρον for the promotion of political unity. He argues that it is important for humans “to perceive what is of benefit to the civic life” (γνῶναί τε τὰ συμφέροντα ἀνθρώποις εἰς πολιτείαν) and to exercise (πράττειν) “what is best” (τὸ βέλτιστον) for the community: “the public interest binds states together, whereas the private interest rends them asunder.”133 Thus, a true civic system of life, maintains Plato, “necessarily cares for the public, not the private, interest.”134 Equally, τὸ συμφέρον appears to be an Aristotelian solution to the problem of discord,135 bringing into concord (ὁμόνοια) respective parts. Unity prevails in the state when citizens agree on their common interests.136 On the other hand, when each part fails to participate in the “share of advantages” (ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις) and each desires its own benefit, Aristotle argues, “the common interests go to ruin” (τὸ κοινὸν 129 Cicero, Rep. 1.32.49. 130 Isocrates, Ep. 3.1. 131 Isocrates, Ep. 6.3 (emphasis added). 132 Isocrates, Ep. 6.14. Elsewhere (Ep. 9.19), he counsels the Spartan king Archidamus to consider things that “are practicable, expedient for you, for your city, and for all the Hellenes at large” (Ὡς δ’ ἐστὶ ταῦτα δυνατὰ καὶ συμφέροντα καὶ σοὶ καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν). I am indebted to Mitchell (Paul and the Rhetoric, 30–2) for the references to Isocrates used in this paragraph. 133 Plato, Leg. 9.875a-b (see below); cf. 9.821a. 134 To quote the citation in Greek including the previous note (Leg. 9.875a): πολιτικῇ καὶ ἀληθεῖ  τέχνῃ  οὐ  τὸ  ἴδιον  ἀλλὰ  τὸ  κοινὸν  ἀνάγκη  μέλειν – τὸ  μὲν γὰρ  κοινὸν  συνδεῖ, τὸ δἐ  ἴδιον  διασπᾷ  τὰς  πόλεις – καὶ  ὅτι ξυμφέρει  τῷ  κοινῷ  τε  καὶ  ἰδίῳ, τοῖν ἀμφοῖν ἤν τὸ κοινὸν τιθῆται καλῶς μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἴδιον. 135 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 9.6. 136 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 9.6.1: τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι; cf. Pol. 1278b 20-25.

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ἀπόλλυται) and “discord” occurs (στασιάζειν) in the political community.137 For Aristotle, ὁμόνοια arises only from seeking τὸ συμφέρον of the whole:138 “That which preserves the state is expedient.”139 Other writers of Greco-Roman antiquity also attest to τὸ συμφέρον’s role in binding together split parts into a unified whole. Cicero contends that public administrators prevent dissensions when they “further the interests of all” and avoid the private interest.140 Against some senators who seek their personal benefit and thus cause civil strife by dividing the plebeians from the patricians, Dionysius of Halicarnassus presents as models those “who held that there was but one advantage to be considered and that the common advantage [ἕν τὸ συμφέρον καὶ κοινόν], and regarded everything else [private benefit] as secondary to harmony [ὁμονοίας].”141 Elsewhere Dionysius stresses that the common advantage (τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον) preserves both political parts (ἀμφότερα…σώζεσθαι τὰ μέρη) of the state.142 Moreover, it “is the first and only assurance that draws us together [συνάγει τε ἡμᾶς εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ], and it will never permit us to be sundered from each other.”143 Our investigation thus far has shown that Greco-Roman philosophers and rhetoricians present the principle of ethical priority of the whole to heal civil strife and bring divisions into a political unity. Emphasis on τὸ ἴδιον is the primary source of dissension in the part-whole relationship.144 In conclusion, the overriding importance of the common advantage (περὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος) asserts: “how excellent a thing harmony [ὁμόνοια] is and how terrible a thing sedition [στάσις].”145 Τὸ συμφέρον cements the parts into unity and brings the security (σωτηρία) of the whole in which all realize their individual “good” in the connective “good.” It reinforces unity and defends against further divisions and thus generally strengthens a healthy part-whole constitution as discussed next.

2. Tὸ Συμφέρον and Correct Civic Constitution Τὸ συμφέρον becomes the measure, then, for whether or not any social institution (government) is strong. In his political orations, for example, 137 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 9.6.4. 138 Cf. Eth. nic. 9.6.2: ἡ ὁμόνοια…περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γάρ ἐστι. 139 Aristotle, Rhet. 1.8.2: συμφέρει δὲ τὸ σῶζον τὴν πολιτείαν. 140 Cicero, Off. 1.25.86. 141 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 7.54.1 (emphasis added). 142 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.85.1. 143 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 8.85.1; cf. 7.39.2. 144 Again, Dionysius (Ant. rom. 2.62.1-5) describes a situation in which, after the death of Romulus, the senate and the citizens split into factions (στασιάζειν). To solve the problem, Numa prioritizes “the sole consideration of the public good” (ἕνα τὸν τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος λογισμόν) to other divisive politics. Similarly, Plutarch (Thes. 24.1-5) explains how Theseus, after the death of Aegeus, settled all the residents of Attica in one city. He contends that it was “the common interest of all” (τὸ κοινὸν πὰντων συμφέρον) that made “one people of one city out of those who up to that time had been scattered about and were not easily called together.” 145 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 7.53.1.

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Isocrates contends that a healthy state depends on citizens who seek the common advantage.146 He advises politicians to organize their political clubs for the benefit of people, not for personal advantage (οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίᾳ συμφερόντων, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ πλήθους ὠφελείᾳ). Likewise, in Plato’s political thought, τὸ συμφέρον functions as a criterion for whether a constitution is acceptable or not. He argues that a correct constitution promotes the common interest of the whole city (ξυμφάσης τῆς πόλεως ἕνεκα τοῦ κοινοῦ).147 The correct constitution is distinguished from constitutions that seek the benefits of only some individuals, just as the primary object for a citizen is to seek the interest of the whole. “The true ruler does not naturally seek his own advantage but that of the ruled,” maintains Plato.148 According to his sociopolitical body politic, any civic formulation or policy that does not embrace the public advantage of the whole is not a true polity (οὐ πολιτεία).149 Likewise, in Aristotle’s political discussions, a state or community that seeks τὸ συμφέρον of the whole is correct, whereas the one that aims at members’ own advantage is faulty. Aristotle does not possess a preference on any given form of the constitution; what matters for him is that the common interest prevails (πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον) against the private interests of the rulers (τὸ σφέτερον μόνον τῶν ἀρχόντων). He writes that either “a monarchy that aims at the common advantage” (πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν…συμφέρον) or an aristocracy that seeks “what is best for the state and for its members” (πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς  κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς) would be an acceptable form of constitution. In other words, any form of government that produces the common advantage (πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον) must necessarily be the right one (ὀρθὰς ἀναγκαῖον).150 By contrast, abnormal ones are such governments in which, for example, monarchy rules in the interest of the monarch, oligarchy government in the interest of the rich, democracy government in the interest of the poor, and none of these forms governs with regard to the benefit of the community.151 Τὸ 146 Isocrates, Panath. 133. 147 Plato, Leg. 4.715b. 148 Plato, Resp. 347d: ἀληθινὸς ἄρχων οὐ πέφυκε τὸ αὑτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ. So against Thrasymachian ideology (347e) that “justice is the advantage of the superior” (τὸ δίκαιον ἐστι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον); cf. 412e. 149 See Leg. 4.715b, where Plato defines civic policies enacted in the private interest of one section as “feudalities,” not as “polities.” 150 For such discussion, see Aristotle, Pol. 1279a 17–1279b 10. Likewise, Arius Didymus in Stobaeus, 2.7.26: “It is good when the ruler aim at benefiting the public and bad when they aim at their personal interest” (trans. from Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 145). On Aristotle’s thought on constitutions, see Christopher Rowe, “Aristotelian Constitutions,” in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (eds. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 366–89; Miller, 143–308. 151 Aristotle, Pol. 1279b 7-10: πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, ἡ δ’ ὀλιγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόφων, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελοῦν οὐδεμία αὐτῶν. Cf. Eth. nic. 8.10.2: “a tyrant studies his own advantage” (ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ αὑτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ). For further discussion on Aristotle’s “most correct constitution” (ὀρθοτάτη πολιτεία; Pol. 1293b 25) in light of the common advantage and of the relation between the state as whole and citizens as parts, see Miller, 191–234.

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συμφέρον, therefore, becomes the criterion for “the correct constitution” (ὀρθὴ πολιτεία).152 Not only is τὸ συμφέρον the authentic mark of the healthy body political, it likewise, in Roman public administration, should characterize the political actions of its respective civic officers. Seneca, for example, contends that such people of the public order as kings, princes, and civic guardians should put common interests above their private benefits. He separates the definition of a tyrant or a king based upon which seeks the advantage of the whole. The former are cruel and serve their own pleasure; the latter can kill, but only “for a reason and by necessity” (ex causa ac necessitate). Though tyrants seek personal interests, kings are induced to let blood only “for the advantage of the whole” (publica utilitas) and “for the common safety” (ad communem salutem).153 Thus, as for Greek philosophers, so also in the Roman political tradition, seeking the advantage of the whole becomes a criterion of a correct constitution.

3. Tὸ Συμφέρον and Laws Τὸ συμφέρον plays a role not only in marking the healthy state and the upstanding king, but also in framing the laws and determining whether or not they are acceptable in part-whole socio-political dynamics. Isocrates contends that laws must be just and advantageous (τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον).154 Plato asserts that laws are not true laws unless they are enacted in the interest of the advantage of the whole state.155 Aristotle argues that because all associations of the state are formed for the common advantage of their members, lawmakers (οἱ νομοθέται) should aim at “the interest of the whole state” (πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον) and “the common welfare of the citizens” (πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν) as a whole.156 Hellenistic Roman political traditions also correlate τὸ συμφέρον (= utilitas) with the framing of laws for the state and with interpreting them. Regarding the nature of the law, Cicero reminds his readers that their ancestors, when framing the laws for the state, had a single object in view, that is, the safety and common advantage of the whole (salutem atque utilitatem rei publicae), not personal benefits. As “the art of medicine produces nothing except what looks to the health of the body [ad corporis utilitatem],” argues Cicero, “nothing comes from the laws except what conduces to the welfare of the state, since the laws were made for this purpose.”157 For Cicero, “all laws ought to be

152 Aristotle, Pol. 1279a 18-21. 153 See Seneca, Clem. 1.11.4-13.1. 154 Isocrates, Nic. 17. 155 See Leg. 4.715b. 156 Aristotle, Pol. 1283b 41-4; cf. Eth. nic. 8.9.4: “the aim of lawgivers is the good of the community, and justice is sometimes defined as that which is to the common advantage.” 157 Cicero, Inv. 1.38.68.

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related to the advantage of the state,” and the individual’s obedience to the laws is therefore inseparable from the contribution to the safety of the whole state (saluti rei publicae).158 Accordingly, Cicero advises the jury in the court to interpret all laws for “the advantage and profit of the community” (ex rei publicae commodo atque utilitate interpretemur). Jurors should not interpret the laws according to the literal expression but in concern for the public good (utilitate communi). Cicero states, “Cease to search the letter of the law and rather…examine the law in relation to the public welfare” (ex utilitate rei publicae considerate).159 Gifted jurors always know what the body-politic requires for the common safety and the interests of the citizens as a whole.160 This correlation of τὸ συμφέρον with civic laws leads us to another ethical category of τὸ δίκαιον (justice) and to the discussion of how τὸ συμφέρον engages with it. In fact, no ethical criterion, defined by itself, is fully self-evident; its meaning or correct usage is often qualified by other ethical considerations.161 Τὸ συμφέρον in particular needs qualification by the ethical categories of τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ καλόν (moral goodness). Any policy or course of action taken in consideration of τὸ συμφέρον, without giving proper attention to other ethical tensions, is likely to be a false one. Therefore, a study of τὸ συμφέρον as an ethic is incomplete without a critical analysis of its relationship with other ethical principles and related issues in Greco-Roman political and moral philosophical traditions.

158 In his words (Inv. 1.38.69), the individual “cannot by the same act have promoted the common interest and have failed to obey the laws.” Also see 1.40.73: “If then, all laws should be related to the advantage of the state, and he contributed to the safety of the state [utilitatem rei publicae], he certainly cannot by one and the same act have had regard for the common safety [saluti communi] and have disobeyed the laws.” Notice here (Inv. 1.38.68-9, 1.40.73), for Cicero, such phrases as commodum rei publicae or rei publicae commodo, utilitate communi, utilitatem rei publicae or rei publicae utilitate, and saluti rei publicae or saluti communi, have semantic overlaps, meaning “the common advantage” (τὸ συμφέρον in Greek). 159 Cicero, Inv. 1.38.69. 160 Cicero, Flac. 98: Semper graves et sapientes iudices in rebus iudicandis quid utilitas civitatis, quid communis salus, quid rei publicae tempora poscerenti, cogitaverunt. 161 For example, this kind of instance would be Plato’s struggle in defining of “justice” in his Republic in which he employs Socrates against sophists’ definitions from various traditions. For instance, Socrates criticizes a certain sophist’s definition of justice as “the interest of the stronger.” He provides a correct form of justice in connection with the true meaning of advantage (συμφέρον) that the stronger should exercise their power for the common good of the people, not just for their interest. Similarly, in his discussion of what is good (honestum/καλόν), Cicero defines it in terms of the four cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, magnanimity, and the fitting in Book I of his De Officiis. Then in Book II and III, as we shall see later (Ch. 4), he qualifies utile/ συμφέρον by honestum/καλόν, and vice versa.

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C. Related Issues: Tὸ Συμφέρον and Other Ethical Categories 1. Tὸ Συμφέρον and Τὸ Δίκαιον In the part-whole body-politic of the Greco-Roman world as noted above, a representative political maxim goes: “Seek laws that are altogether just and expedient” (Ζήτει νόμους τὸ μὲν σύμπαν δικαίους καὶ συμφέροντας).162 As this dictum indicates, τὸ συμφέρον is often connected to and is qualified by τὸ δίκαιον (and, as we shall see, τὸ καλόν). According to Aristotle, the true aim of the political community is for the common advantage of its members, and the laws (οἱ νόμοι) hit the same target (κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν).163 When citizens promote the common advantage, they can and must attain social justice. Therefore, Aristotle defines justice as what is advantageous to the whole.164 For him, the common advantage is a political good, whose benefit falls to each of the members in the polis.165 Further, what is just or right (τὸ ὀρθόν), maintains Aristotle, is inseparable from the common advantage of the whole.166 Likewise, Cicero states, “justice is always expedient,” and he expects the reverse to be true as well.167 In brief, τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δίκαιον qualify each other in Greco-Roman socio-political and ethical discussions. To provide an example from a philosophical school, τὸ συμφέρον occupies the Epicurean discussion of justice. Diogenes of Laertius, at the end of Book X of his Vit. phil., presents Epicurus’ view of τὸ δίκαιον as “a symbol or expression of expediency, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another.”168 For Epicurus, what is not τὸ συμφέρον is not just: Among the things accounted just by conventional law, whatever in the needs of mutual intercourse is attested to be expedient, is thereby stamped just, whether or not

162 Isocrates, Nic. 17. 163 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 5.1.13. Also see Pol. 1278b 20-24. 164 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.9.4: δίκαιον φασιν εἶναι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. 165 Aristotle states, “the good in the political field, that is the general advantage, is justice” (ἔστι δὲ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον). Thus, τὸ δίκαιον is identified with τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον in his political discussion. See Pol. 1282b 16-19; cf. Eth. nic 8.9.13-14; Rhet. 1.6; Plato, Crat. 416e-419a. In general, what is good is considered as advantageous by Stoics. For example, see Epictetus, Diss.1.22.1 (τὸ ἀγαθὸν συμφέρον ἐστί); cf. 1.18.2, 1.27.14, 1.28.5, 2.22.20; Diogenes of Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.87-9; also see Cicero, Off. 3.3.11: Stoici assensi, ut et, honestum esset, id utile esse censerent nec utile quicquam, quod non honestum (“Stoics maintain that if anything is morally right, it is expedient, and if anything is not morally right, it is not expedient”). 166 Aristotle, Pol. 1283b 40-4: τὸ δ’ ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως, τὸ δ’ ἴσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν πολιτῶν. 167 Cicero, Off. 3.25.96: iustitiasemper est utilis. 168 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 10.150: Τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιόν ἐστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι. Notice the term βλάπτειν or its neuter adjective form βλαβερόν (“disadvantageous”) is used as an opposite of συμφέρειν/συμφέρον. For example, see Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.3.5; Pol. 1253a 15. Also see Cicero, Off. 1.7.20.

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it be the same for all; and in case any law is made and does not prove suitable to the expediencies of mutual intercourse, then this is no longer just.169

Thus τὸ συμφέρον is the criterion that establishes whether or not a law is acceptable (just). Epicurus further argues that laws could be deemed just “when they were expedient for the mutual intercourse of the citizens, and…[they] ceased to be just when they ceased to be expedient.”170 For him, justice is what (τι) brings the mutual advantage to one another in the community (συμφέρον… ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ).171 Therefore, Epicurus’ understanding bears a classic notion that justice means “the advantage of both” sides (χρησίμως… ἀμφοτέροις) and that considering only one side goes against “the principle of justice” (παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον).172 Plato labeled such a form of “justice” as an “empty” (μάτη) one.173 In short, the agreement (ὁμολογεῖν) between τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δίκαιον further guides the proper body politic and personal behavior in the community.174

2. Τὸ Συμφέρον and Τὸ Καλόν In a similar vein, τὸ συμφέρον in its correct application to the body politic does (and should) not conflict with what is right (τὸ καλόν). In his Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle contends that there are three things that determine our actions: “the noble” or “what is morally right” (καλόν), “the expedient” (συμφέρον), and “the pleasant” (ἡδύ). Conversely, their opposites point out three factors that determine avoidance in human conducts, namely, “the base” (ἀισχρόν), “the harmful” (βλαβερόν), and “the painful” (λυπερόν).175 Aristotle qualifies the three positive motives of choice by commenting, “Both the noble and the expedient appear to us pleasant.”176 He continues to argue that the right manner of conduct in society is the one that is “guided by considerations of honor and expediency” (πρὸς τὸ καλόν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον).177 This juxtaposition of καλόν and συμφέρον reflects, as discussed below, ethical issues of τὸ συμφέρον in 169 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 10.152: Τὸ  μὲν  ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον  ὅτι  συμφέρει ἐν ταῖς χρείαις  τῆς  πρὸς  ἀλλήλους  κοινωνίας τῶν  νομισθέντων  εἶναι δικαίων  ἔχει  τὸ  ἐν  τοῦ δικαίου χώρᾳ εἶναι, ἐάν τε τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι γένηται ἐάν τε μὴ τὸ αὐτό. ἐὰν δὲ νόμον θῆταί τις μὴ ἀποβαίνῃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας, οὐκέτι τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν ἔχει. 170 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 10.153: ἐνταῦθα δὲ τότε μὲν ἦν δίκαια, ὅτε συνέφερεν εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν τῶν συμπολιτευομένων. ὕστερον δ’ οὐκ ἦν ἔτι δίκαια, ὅτε μὴ συνέφερεν. 171 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 10.151. For further discussion of the Epicurean concept of justice and law, see Antonina Alberti, “The Epicurean Theory of Law and Justice,” in Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy: Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum (eds. André Laks and Malcolm Schofield; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 161–90. 172 Thucydides, His. 5. 90. 173 Plato, Leg. 4.715b. 174 Isocrates, Nic. 15.5. 175 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.3.7. 176 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.3.7: τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται. 177 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 4.6.6.

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relation to τὸ καλόν: It implies that what is morally good is advantageous, and what is beneficial should coincide with what is right. Likewise, in his De Officiis Cicero maintains that legitimate ethical obligations (officia) arise from the consideration and agreement of the advantage (utilitas = τὸ συμφέρον) and the right (honestas = τὸ καλόν).178 Because I will devote a chapter to Cicero’s idea of utilitas (Ch. 4), suffice it here, for the present purpose, simply to mention that, for Cicero, seeking what is advantageous (utile) without considering its quality of being what is right (honestum) renders a policy likely to prove neither good (καλόν/honestum) nor beneficial (συμφέρον/utile).179 Thus, what is truly συμφέρον or utile is also καλόν or honestum. In sum, ethical categories of τὸ συμφέρον, τὸ δίκαιον, and τὸ καλόν are simply different expressions for the same endeavor of defining a single ethical ideal (τὸ καθῆκον), that is, namely, that adequate behavior and obligation in human relationships qualify each other.180 An expression of τὸ συμφέρον that is not concerned about the question of justice and injustice, or of right and wrong, is not a correct form of action or body politic. The real, often messy, life of the body politic, however, compromises this qualifying status. In Book II of his Politica, Aristotle asks whether the happiness (εὐδαιμονία) of a state is the same as that of the individual citizen.181 The answer, he says, is “the same” (τὸ αὐτό). Nevertheless, often in practice different pictures emerge in the practical outworking of the body politics of the Greco-Roman world. Often private interest clashes with the common advantage, and thus with τὸ συμφέρον and its related ethical categories. Polybius, for example, contends that the morally good (τὸ καλόν) very seldom coincides with the expedient (τὸ συμφέρον) in real life situations, and few people can bring τὸ καλόν and τὸ συμφέρον into harmony with one another (πρὀς ἄλληλα).182 In many cases, an agent or a body politic has to choose “the one against the other” (ἀντιπάλων πρὸς ἀλλήλας) between these ethical categories.183 But none of these ethical considerations, as we shall see, is correctly applied in the body politic if one is taken against the other. Both τὸ συμφέρον and either τὸ δίκαιον or τὸ καλόν qualify each other, and accordingly, by definition, they are inseparable. How then can situational confusions in 178 See Nicgroski, 563. 179 For example, see Off. 2.3.9. Also see Andrew Thomas Cole, Jr., “Anonymous Iamblichi and His Place in Greek Political Theory,” HSCP 65 (1961): 135. 180 Cf. Cole who considers τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ καλόν (“the useful and the honorable”) as “two aspects of a single ideal, τὸ καθῆκον, which lies at the basis of all ethical judgment.” See his “Anonymous Iamblichi,” 135. 181 Aristotle, Pol. 1324a 5-23. On εὐδαιμονία as the goal of life, see Rhet. 1.5.1-18 182 Ὅτι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον σπανίως εἴωθε συντρέχειν, καὶ σπάνιοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν εἰσιν οἱ δυνάμενοι ταῦτα συνάγειν καὶ συναρμόζειν πρὸς ἄλληλα. But Polybius argues that Philopoemen brought these two norms into harmony, and he actually attained it. He states, “It was a good act [καλόν] to restore to their country the Spartan exiles who were prisoners, and it was an advantageous one [συμφέρον] to humble the city of Sparta by destroying the satellites of the tyrants.” See Polybius, His. 21.32c. 183 Thucydides, His. 3.49.1.

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which τὸ συμφέρον appears in conflict with other ethical considerations be resolved? Can an ethical norm be defined in relation to other categories in such a way as to be applicable to real life situations? The real issue for these problems lies in which form of the part-whole (i.e., “organic” vs. “apolitical” as already argued) τὸ συμφέρον is placed. In the proper part-whole context, τὸ συμφέρον as an ethic in its true sense and in its correct usage does not depart from other ethical categories (as in Epictetus’ scale metaphor above). Accordingly, any behavior or body politic taking either τὸ συμφέρον or τὸ δίκαιον/καλόν at the expense of the other is unthinkable. Both categories are taken into consideration. But it is in the deviant form of the part-whole – τὸ ἴδιον – that clashes with τὸ κοινόν. Thus I can formulate the related issues of τὸ συμφέρον as arguments of “either-or” vs. “both-and,” to illuminate more succinctly the nature of the ethical debates among Greco-Roman moral philosophers. The former formula delineates ethical behavior primarily associated with the apolitical part-whole. Whereas the latter characterizes a course of behavior in the body politic associated with the organic part-whole.

3. Either (Τὸ Συμφέρον) Or (Τὸ Δίκαιον/Καλόν) The part-whole connective ethics often faces the situational dilemma wherein one is forced to make a choice between either τὸ συμφέρον or τὸ δίκαιον/καλόν. Such an antithesis (ἀντιπάλων πρὸς ἀλλήλας) chiefly arises out of human nature: “all human beings crave their advantage and desire theirs to be greater than the rest”184 and “where there is one’s interest, there is also his or her piety.”185 Xenophon describes this human proclivity when he states, “For I think that all men have a choice between various courses, and choose and follow the one which they think conduces most to their advantage.”186 Though the partwhole constitution, as argued above, generates the ethical priority of the whole over the part, the human inclination often leads to the antithetic course of action. In his study of ethical arguments from expedience (τὸ συμφέρον) in Thucydides, John Finley states, “the concept that men are primarily moved by their advantage forms the obvious antithesis to the ideals of justice and honor, τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ καλόν.”187 Thucydides, as noted, provides many instances of antithetic “either-or” politics between τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δίκαιον in early Greek socio-political discussions.188 To show here another example, in Book III of his History, Thucydides presents a debate on whether the Athenians should punish the 184 Isocrates, De pace 28 (Or. 8.28). 185 Epictetus, Ench. 31.4: ὅπου γὰρ τὸ συμφέρον, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ εὐσεβές. 186 Xenophon, Mem. 3.9.4: πάντας γὰρ οἶμαι προαιρουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἃ οἲονται συμφορώτατα αὑτοῖς εἶναι, ταῦτα πράττειν. 187 John Finley, Thucydides (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), 51. 188 Finley discusses such practices of rebutting one another as reflected in Thucydides. See his Thucydides, 51–4; id., Three Essays, 33.

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Mytilenaeans for their disloyalty to the Athenians. The Athenian politician Cleon supports the death penalty for the national foes. His appeal for severe punishment is based on the two ethical considerations of τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ συμφέρον as his speech concludes: I can sum up what I have to say in a word. If you take my advice, you will do not only what is just [δίκαια] to the Mytilenaeans but also at the same time what is expedient [τἀ ξυμφόρα] for us.189

Diodotus, however, stands against Cleon and argues that the proper goal of the Athenian assembly is to seek their best political interest (ξυμφέρον = συμφέρον). He speaks to the assembly: For the question for us to consider, if we are sensible, is not what wrong they have done, but what is the wise course for us [εὐβουλίας]…And I beg you not to be led by the speciousness of his [Cleon’s] argument to reject the practical advantages [τὸ χρήσιμον] of mine. For embittered as you are toward the Mytilenaeans, you may perhaps be attracted by his argument, based as it is on the more legal aspects of the case [δικαιότερος]; we are, however, not engaged in a law-suit with them, so as to be concerned about the question of right and wrong; but we are deliberating about them, to determine what policy will make them useful [χρησίμως] to us.190

After much debate about the considerations of τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ συμφέρον, according to Thucydides, Athens finally decides to give credence to the advantages by sparing Mytilene.191 Now, with regard to an instance of choosing τὸ δίκαιον over against τὸ συμφέρον, Dionysius of Halicarnassus reports a situation of turmoil after the Roman monarchy was overthrown, after which the senate had difficulty choosing an “either-or” course of action between τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δίκαιον. The Roman people, after the expulsion of the tyrant Tarquinius and his sons, made a perpetual oath that they would never restore a monarchy either through the exiled king Tarquinius or his posterity or by making anyone else king of Rome. Upon this solemn covenant, Brutus and Collatinus were chosen to be the first two consuls with royal power. On the other hand, in an effort to restore his power, the banished king sent ambassadors to plead before the senate based upon the principle of justice (διὰ τὸ δίκαιον), that is, that Tarquinius had done nothing worthy of expulsion and he did not have even the chance to defend himself before the assembly of the people. So the envoy asked permission from the senate for the return of Tarquinius or – at the very least – for the authorization of his remaining in Rome.192

189 Thucydides, His. 3.40.4. 190 Thucydides, His. 3.44.1-4. Also see White, Individual and Conflict, 140–43. 191 Thucydides, His. 3.49.1. Cf. Pearson, Popular Ethics, 24–5. 192 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 5.3.3–5.4.3.

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Brutus, however, rejected their petition because the vote regarding the exiled king was a perpetual banishment sworn by the gods. Thus no such person could be restored to power. Then, the envoy came forward and asked “to perform an act of justice of another kind” (προκαλούμεθα…εἰς ἕτερόν τι δίκαιον), that is, to restore the king’s property and other inherited wealth formerly possessed by his ancestors.193 The envoy further insisted that no current Roman law hindered doing so. But Brutus also rejected this plea. He justified retaining the fortunes of the exiled king “both as a penalty for the injuries they had done to the city…and for the advantage [τοῦ συμφέροντος] that would result from depriving them of these resources for war.”194 Brutus continued, “the Tarquinii would not be contented with the recovery of their possessions nor submit to leading a private life, but would bring a foreign war upon the Romans and attempt by force to get back into power.”195 On the contrary, Collatinus, the other consul, advised that It was not the possessions of the tyrants, but the tyrants themselves, that had injured the commonwealth, and he asked them to guard against these two things: first, not to incur the bad opinion of the world as having driven the Tarquinii from the power for the sake of their riches, and, secondly, not to give the tyrants themselves a just cause for war [πολέμου δικαίαν] as having been deprived of their private property.196

Having heard these opinions of the consuls, according to Dionysius, many people spoke in favor of each, and the senate was perplexed for many days in their attempt to take the proper course of action. “[W]hile the opinion of Brutus seemed more expedient [συμφορώτερα], the course urged by Collatinus was more just [δικαιότερα].” At last the people became “the judges between expediency and justice” (τὸν  δῆμον ποιῆσαι  τοῦ  τε συμφέροντος καὶ τοῦ δικαίου  κριτήν), and the exiles heard that their petition had been approved and that justice, in this case, prevailed over expediency (τὰ  δίκαια  πρὸ  τῶν συμφερόντων).197 These examples have shown that the conflict between the advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) and justice (τὸ δίκαιον) occurred commonly in Greek real-life civic situations as well as in international disputes.198 Accordingly, subsequent discussions attempting to resolve these tensions (and provide an ideal course of action) are plentiful among Greco-Roman philosophers.199 In his Republic, Plato makes Socrates reject the ethical argument of choosing either advantage or justice, one at the expense of the other.200 From his many instances of 193 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 5.5.2. 194 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 5.5.3. 195 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 5.5.3. 196 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 5.5.4. 197 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 5.6.1-2. 198 Finley, Thucydides, 51–4; id., Three Essays, 33; Pearson, Popular Ethics, 20. 199 Cf. Pearson, Popular Ethics, 29. 200 He rebutted a sophistic attitude that a person should be guided by considerations of τὸ συμφέρον rather than τὸ δίκαιον. For such discussion, see Pearson, Popular Ethics, 20–33.

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sophistic argument from τὸ συμφέρον, it seems that Thucydides advises us to consider what is advantageous also to be just (νομίζουσι, τὰ δὲ ξυμφέροντα δίκαια), an acceptable form of policy that embraces both norms.

4. Not “Either-Or” But “Both-And” In its acceptable usage, τὸ συμφέρον as an ethical category entails considerations of τὸ δίκαιον and (or) τὸ καλόν.201 A course of action that is either the one (τὸ συμφέρον) or the other (τὸ δίκαιον/καλόν) is not acceptable. In a speech for the people of Megapolis, Demosthenes reflects this ethical tension when he contends: “But the proper course is in all things to find out what is just and then do it, though at the same time we must take care that what we do is expedient as well.”202 In his comparison of the character of the young (νέοι) and the old (πρεσβύτεροι), Aristotle observes that the young “prefer the noble to the useful” (πράττειν τὰ καλὰ τῶν συμφερόντων);203 the old, by contrast, “live not for the noble, but for the useful.”204 For Aristotle, however, either mode of life, of itself, is inadequate. He argues that the ethically ideal behavior “is neither the noble nor the useful alone, but both at once.”205 For him, this concept of the “mean” (μέσος) indicates that both norms are inseparable and that they qualify each other.206 The right kind of action lies in embracing both categories at the same time.207 A prominent area in which the harmony between τὸ συμφέρον and other ethical considerations exists is found in Greco-Roman discussions of friendship. A characteristic feature according to which people are deemed friends in antiquity is the matter of personal benefit.208 As Cicero points out, “Friendship is originally sought after from motives of utility.”209 Democritius discusses the συμφέρον in warring situations. For him, advantage (συμφέρον) or disadvantage (βλαβερόν) is the criterion by which one is considered as a true friend or an enemy.210 According to the Epicureans, the important goal 201 Also what is “permissible” (ἔξεστιν) should agree with these ethical norms. See Dio Chrysostom, Or. 14.16-8. But I will not discuss ἔξεστιν here and spare it until Paul’s engagement of it with τὸ συμφέρον in Ch. 5 below. 202 Demosthenes, Or. 16.10 (emphasis added): δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν  μὲν  καὶ  πράττειν ἀεὶ τὰ δίκαια, συμπαρατηρεῖν δ’ ὅπως ἅμα καὶ συμφέροντ’ ἔσται ταῦτα. 203 Aristotle, Rhet. 2.12.3-16. 204 Aristotle, Rhet. 2.13.9: καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ζῶσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλόν…τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ καλόν ἁπλῶς. 205 Aristotle, Rhet. 2.14.2 (emphasis added): καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντες μόνον πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄμφω. 206 Aristotle equates justice with what is advantageous to the whole, and the advantage with good. See Eth. nic. 8.9.4: δίκαιον φασιν εἶναι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. Also Pol. 1282b 16-18: ἔστι δὲ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον; Rhet. 1.6.1: τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν; 1.6.16: καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. συμφέρον γάρ τι κοινῇ ἐστιν. 207 For further discussion of Aristotle’s concept of “mean,” see Eth. nic. 2.6. 208 Arius Didymus, Epitome of Stoic Ethics (in Pomeroy), 11c. 209 Cicero, Fin. 2.26.84: Utilitatis causa amicitia est quaestita. 210 Κ. Weiss, TDNT 9:70.

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throughout one’s life is the acquisition of friends, for “nothing enhances our security so much as friendship.”211 Friendship is formed based on our needs (φιλίαν διὰ τὰς χρείας), and a friend on occasion can die for another friend.212 This sort of courage, according to the Epicurean school, “comes from calculation of expediency” (λογισμῷ…τοὺ συμφέροντος).213 Furthermore, for the Epicurean school, συμφέρον and ἀσυμφόρον became a “landmark” (ὅρος) between “delight” (τέρψις) and “non-delight” (ἄτερπίη).214 Epicureans consider such a hedonistic conception of συμφέρον as the beginning (ἀρχή) and the end (τέλος) of the blessed life.215 Thus an Epicurean maxim goes, “friendship cannot be divorced from pleasure.”216 Other philosophers, however, criticize so-called friendship that is based on pleasure or expediency alone. For example, Aristotle speaks of three kinds of friendship based on utility (χρήσιμον),217 on pleasure (ἡδονή), and on virtue (ἀρετή/καλόν/ἀγαθόν). For Aristotle, the first two are inferior because they are easily dissolved when one side ceases to derive benefit and pleasure. People develop these types of friendship “for their own good or their own pleasure,” argues Aristotle, usually “between two bad men, between one bad man and one good, and between a man neither good nor bad and another either good, bad, or neither.”218 But the perfect (τελεία) form of friendship is the one between persons of virtue who bring out the good of each other for the other’s sake. Aristotle further argues that the friendship that benefits both sides is perfect 211 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 10.148. 212 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 10.120. It seems that for Epicurus, according to Diogenes Laertius, the συμφέρον and χρεία mean the same thing as the following parallel expression indicates at 10.152: συμφέρει ἐν ταῖς χρείαις τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας. 213 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 10.120. For further discussion of Epicurus’ notion of συμφέρον, see 10.149-54. 214 Κ. Weiss, TDNT 9:70; cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 9.69, 10.8. It seems this kind of idea is pre-Socratic. According to fragment B 188, ascribed to Democritius by Clement of Alexandria, “the distinguishing mark of what is beneficial and harmful is pleasure and displeasure.” Also in B 74, a maxim goes, “Accept nothing pleasant, unless it is beneficial” (συμφερει), which, according to Gosling and Taylor, is “a rule for the choice of particular pleasures; a particular pleasant thing…[that] is to be rejected if it is not advantageous in the long run;” yet B 188 “tells us what marks off what is advantageous from what is disadvantageous…as a test for the long-run outcome of actions.” In any case, it appears “that what makes something useful is that it promotes the enjoyment of life.” See J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), 31–2; also see Farrar, 219–20. 215 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 10.128: τῆν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν. 216 Thus, pleasure is an highest form of expediency. Cicero, Fin. 2.26.82: amicitiam a voluptate non posse divelli. 217 Here Aristotle prefers τὸ χρήσιμον for the idea of advantage to other semantic terms, yet he uses it interchangeably with τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ λυσιτελοῦν. See Eth. nic. 8.4.2. 218 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.3.2 and 8.4.2.

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because it includes other friendships that are both pleasant and beneficial.219 For him, “friendship is a virtue” (ἀρετή) and is “noble in itself” (καλόν), not merely a matter of benefit.220 The truest (μάλιστα) friendship rests on both (ἄμφω) the ἀγαθόν (καλόν) and the ἡδύ (pleasure as an “advantage”).221 Similarly, Cicero criticizes those who falsely assume expediency to be the basis of friendship.222 “It is not the case,” he says, “that friendship attends upon advantage (utilitas), but, on the contrary, that advantage attends upon friendship.”223 If expediency creates friendship, argues Cicero, that friendship will last only as long as it is beneficial (utilitas).224 Cicero further points out that in friendships, people often make the mistake “either to fail to do for a friend what one rightly can do, or to do for him what is not right.”225 He further contends that a good person will never sacrifice public good (contra rem publicam) to promote a friend’s interest. For Cicero, friendship should not be separated from the category of what is right. But, in a case “when we are weighing what seems to be expedient in friendship against what is morally right,” he advises, “let apparent expediency be disregarded and moral rectitude prevail,” for the latter is eventually expedient.226 Likewise, Seneca criticizes friendship that is based on personal benefit. He says, “Anyone thinking of his own interests and seeking out friendship with this in view is making a great mistake.”227 In short, true friendship seeks both “what is noble and beneficial” (τὸ καλὸν καὶ συμφέρον) as Plutarch reflects it in his famous address How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend.228 As such, τὸ συμφέρον is often juxtaposed either with τὸ δίκαιον or with τὸ καλόν, in the Hellenistic moral discussion, as if τὸ συμφέρον in and of itself is not a single criterion.229 This phenomenon, I suggest, is an ethical assertion 219 Thus pleasure in friendship does not depart the category of moral goodness. Such discussion of Aristotle’s friendship is found in Book 8 of Nichomachean Ethics. 220 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.1.1 and 8.1.5. 221 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.5.4. 222 See Cicero, Fin. 2.24.78-2.26.85. 223 Cicero, Amic. 14.51: Non igitur utilitatem amicitia, sed utilitas amicitiam secuta est. 224 Cicero, Fin. 2.24.78. 225 Cicero, Off. 3.10.43. 226 Cicero, Off. 3.10.46: Cum igitur id, quod utile videtur in amicitia, cum eo, quod honestum est, comparator, iaceat utilitatis species, valeat honestas. 227 Seneca, Ep. 9.8. Elsewhere Seneca states that “I am not your friend unless whatever is at issue concerning you is my concern also. Friendship produces between us a partnership in all our interests. There is not such thing as good or bad fortune for the individual; we live in common. And no one can live happily who has regard to himself alone and transforms everything into a question of his own utility; you must live for your neighbor, if you would live for yourself.” See Ep. 48.2-3. 228 Plutarch, Adul. amic. 55d. By the coordination of the καλόν and συμφέρον, it seems to me that Plutarch reflects a Ciceronian way (reflected in De Officiis) of not separating συμφέρον/ utile from καλόν/honestum (what is morally right or noble), thereby qualifying the friendship. For Cicero, as we shall see further (Ch. 4), what is beneficial (utile) does not conflict with what is noble (honestum); they should go together. 229 For example, Thucydides, His. 5.105.3; Demosthenes, Or. 7.46; Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.3.7, 4.6.6; Cicero, Inv. 2.51.156.

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of taking both norms for proper behavior “at once” (πρὸς ἄμφω; “both at once”). Their semantic overlap aside, the juxtaposed use of τὸ δίκαιον/ τὸ καλόν and τὸ συμφέρον reflects situations in which the individual or the community struggles to make an ethical decision between τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ καλόν/τὸ δίκαιον in real life.230 As Polybius commented, a course of action for immediate advantage or profit (τὸ λυσιτελοῦν), particularly in a certain context, often repels what is morally good (τὸ καλόν).231 In such a puzzling situation, τὸ συμφέρον’s coupling with τὸ καλόν indicates a kind of Aristotelian ethical reasoning, as shown above, of taking “both at once,” not “either-or.” Accordingly, the juxtaposition of τὸ συμφέρον with τὸ καλόν or with τὸ δίκαιον appears as an ethical “formula.”232 This phenomenon frequently occurs in a variety of socio-political and ethical discussion not because τὸ συμφέρον is not a single ethical value but because it appears in conflict with and actually often does in fact depart from other norms. Τὸ συμφέρον’s coupling with either τὸ δίκαιον or with τὸ καλόν, however, bolsters the idea that these norms are not three separate measures of human conduct but rather different aspects of the single common value for an accepted behavior in human society.233 For example, in his speech against Leptines, Demosthenes, in favor of a proposed law, rejects other arguments based both on what is disadvantageous to the city (ἀσύμφορον εἶναι τῇ πόλει) and on what is unjust (οὐδὲ δίκαιον).234 Elsewhere Demosthenes argues that we must (δεῖ) keep τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δίκαιον together (συμπαρατηρεῖν) for a proper course of action.235 In short, the coupling prevents “either-or” arguments. Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition also reflects this sort of ethical tension of preventing the “either-or” argument. As already noted, deliberative rhetoric aims at setting up the advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) of a proposed course of action. Cicero, however, maintains twofold purposes, namely, utilitas (= τὸ συμφέρον) and honestas (= τὸ καλόν). “In the deliberative type…Aristotle accepts advantage as the end,” argues Cicero, “but I prefer both honor and advantage.”236 He contends that, based on “the principles of advantage and honor” (utilitas et honestas), the speaker shows how the course of conduct that he directs is “advantageous [utile] and honorable [honestum]” against how

230 For example, see Demosthenes’ discussion of τὸ συμφέρον as a course of policy and his revealing of the problem of injustice (οὐ δίκαιον) with the policy, and then his advice for the proper course that combines both norms. See Or. 16.1-10; cf. Isocrates, Nic. 17. 231 Polybius, His. 21.32c. 232 Dover, Greek Popular Morality, 309–16, 312. Cf. Demosthenes, Or. 7.46. 233 In part-whole rhetoric, as Aristotle and others have insisted, these three norms are considered identical, and they should be considered together in taking a course of action. See Aristotle, Pol. 1282b 15-23; Cicero, Off. 2.3.9-11. Socrates, in Plato’s Resp., attempts to prove that τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ συμφέρον are the same. See Pearson, Popular Ethics, 162. 234 Demosthenes, Or. 20.112. 235 Demosthenes, Or. 16.10. 236 Cicero, Inv. 2.51.156: In deliberativo autem Aristoteli placet utilitatem, nobis et honesatem et utilitatem.

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the opponents’ request is “inexpedient [inutile] and base [turpe].”237 Cicero’s coordinate aims of deliberative speeches as “advantage and honor,” I suggest, are intended to prevent the tempering of τὸ συμφέρον in certain situations by leaving τὸ καλόν out of consideration. In proposing his double purposes of deliberative rhetoric, Cicero explicitly mentions a certain Antonius who justifies situational dilemmas in which τὸ συμφέρον conflicts with τὸ καλόν.238 However, Cicero presents himself as a counter-example to that claim, and, as will be shown in greater detail in the next chapter, argues that what is morally right (honestum/καλόν) is beneficial (utile/συμφέρον) and what is advantageous does (and should) not conflict with the right. His frequent coupling (adiungitur) of utilitias with honestas enforces the argument of “both at once” against that of the “either-or.”239 Cicero’s twofold purposes of deliberative speeches do not contradict other rhetorical handbooks, in general, or Aristotle’s single object, in particular. In fact, the connection of τὸ συμφέρον to τὸ καλόν does appear in Aristotle. In Rhetorica, Aristotle makes it clear that the aim of the deliberative speaker is τὸ συμφέρον. Yet he further qualifies that τὸ συμφέρον is inseparable from the sphere of ἀγαθόν (καλόν). He states: because “the expedient is good [τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν], we must first grasp the elementary notions of good and expedient in general”240 and “we must draw our arguments in reference to good and the expedient.”241 Similarly, in Nichomachean Ethics, as already noted, Aristotle argues that the right manner of conduct in society cares for both “honor and advantage” (τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον).242 This exactly matches with Cicero’s coordinate aims of deliberative rhetoric that both “honor and advantage [honestas et utilitas] are the qualities of things to be sought, and baseness and disadvantage [turpitudo et inutilitas], of things to be avoided.”243 To be sure, Aristotle’s τὸ συμφέρον as a single aim (τέλος) entails the consideration of τὸ καλόν, and thus agrees with Cicero’s twofold aims.244 Cicero has situational reasons for his Roman audience in explicitly making the coordinating phrase of honestas et utilitas in his argument of expediency as I will discuss in the next chapter. 237 Cicero, Inv. 2.48.141, 2.51.156. 238 See Cicero, De or. 2.82.334-35: “differences of opinion arise either on the question which of two alternatives is more expedient, or even supposing there is agreement about this, it is disputed whether the chief consideration should be integrity [honestas] or expediency [utilitas]; and as these two considerations often seem to conflict, the champion of expediency will reel off a list of the advantages of peace and wealth and power and revenue and military strength and all the other things whose value we measure by expediency.” 239 Cicero, Inv. 2.55.166. 240 Aristotle, Rhet. 1.6.1: τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν, ληπτέον ἄν αἴη στοιχεῖα περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἁπλῶς. 241 Aristotle, Rhet. 1.6.30: περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐκ τούτων ληπτέον τὰς πίστεις. 242 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 4.6.6. 243 Cicero, Inv. 2.52.158. 244 Cf. [Cicero], Rhet. Her. 3.2.3.

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Furthermore, coordination of τὸ καλόν or of τὸ δίκαιον with τὸ συμφέρον prevents and limits the ideological abuse of τὸ συμφέρον by the powerful. Τὸ συμφέρον, as already noted, is ideologically appropriated in the apolitical part-whole context. Sometimes, the idea of τὸ συμφέρον is used by the politically powerful for their own benefit while leaving out τὸ δίκαιον/καλόν. According to Plato’s Republic, for example, Thrasymachus defines justice as whatever serves the advantage of the stronger (τὸ δίκαιον ἐστι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον).245 In this case, the ruling class legislates to keep the hierarchical part-whole structure and to advance its own benefits.246 Here, the Thrasymachian ideological understanding of τὸ δίκαιον conflicts with Socrates’ and Plato’s true use of τὸ συμφέρον, which cannot include sacrificing another for one’s own advantage.247 In this sort of ideological thought frame, both norms often appear as opposites, and the advantage for the ruling class is not necessarily concerned with the good of the community as a whole, even sacrificing the common good of the whole (as in the case of tyrannical rule).248 In speeches regarding the Athenian expedition against Melos in Book 5 of his History, Thucydides illustrates this sort of ideological appropriation of τὸ συμφέρον by the powerful for their own advantage without giving proper attention to τὸ δίκαιον. In their policy toward the island of Melos, the Athenians contend that the principle of justice (δίκαια) depends only on the equality in power of both sides, thus “the powerful [the Athenians] exact what they can, while the weak [the Melians] yield what they must.”249 In an effort to justify their military expedition and dominion over the Melians, the Athenians appeal to “the advantage of both” sides (χρησίμως…ἀμφοτέροις), saying, “it is the benefit of our empire that we are here, and also the safety of your city.”250 From the perspectives of the Melians, however, the Athenian interpretation of the advantage to both sides is problematic; the Melians ask, “And how could it prove as advantageous for us to become slaves, as it is for you to have dominion?” The Athenian envoys answer: “Because it would be to your advantage to submit before suffering the most horrible fate, and we should gain by not destroying you.”251 The Melians, against such an ideological appropriation of the idea of τὸ συμφέρον for the powerful (δυνατά), argue that it is impossible to speak of the common advantage of both sides (τὸ ξυμφέρον 245 Plato, Resp. 438, cf. 338, 344, 367. Plato’s Socrates refutes Thrasymachus. The ideal ruler is not to seek his own advantage but that of his subjects. See 347a-e. 246 For example, see Plato, Leg. 714c: τοὺς νόμους ἐν τῇ πόλει ἑκάστοτε τὸ καρατοῦν. 247 Thrasymachus consistently prefers advantage to justice, and he believes that it is foolish for a man if he does not choose the former. See Pearson, Popular Ethics, 19–23. Against Thrasymuchus’ definition of justice of not considering the interest of the subject, Socrates argues that just as a physician studies and exercises his ability in the interest of a patient, not in his own interest, any constitution should be concerned for the good of the people. 248 For example, see Cicero, Off. 3.6.32; Seneca, Prov. 3.1-2; Epictetus, Diss. 2.5.24. 249 Thucydides, His. 5. 89 (emphasis added): δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν. 250 Thucydides, His. 5. 91. 251 For such dialogues, see 5.92-93.

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λέγειν) while “ignoring the principle of justice” (παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον). They insist that “it is expedient [χρήσιμον]…that you should not rule out the principle of the common good [τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν].”252 For the Melians, the advantage must be mutual on the basis of the principle of τὸ δίκαιον and accordingly Athens should consider the benefit of its subjects as well. The Melians continue to speak: For here also it is necessary, just as you force us to abandon all pleas of justice [τῶν δικαίων] and seek to persuade us to give ear to what is to your own interests [ξυμφορῳ], that we, too, tell you what is to our advantage [χρήσιμον] and try to persuade you to adopt it, if that happens to be to your advantage also.253

From this Melian-Athenian dialogue, Thucydides may intend to show that a policy of seeking one’s advantage should keep balance with τὸ δίκαιον, not harming the counterpart, and that the policy then would result in the connective reciprocal benefit to both sides on an equal basis. To sum up, I have indicated that in antiquity divisive issues in a community were frequently associated with tensions between the apolitical and organic part-whole. Divisive issues include problems caused by tensions between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ συμφέρον, and conflicting issues of τὸ συμφέρον with regard to other ethical categories of τὸ δίκαιον or τὸ καλόν. The practical difference between the apolitical and the organic part-whole is that the former has, to use Epictetus’ scale image again, two dishes on opposite ends whereas the latter has just one dish in the middle of the scale. The picture seems to be clear. If an agent or a body politic places the “advantage and righteousness and honorable [τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ καλόν] together in the onedish scale,” maintains Epictetus, “all are saved” (σῴζεται), which necessarily means that there is no conflict between these norms.254 By contrast, it is the ideologically appropriated part-whole that provides situations in which the conflict of τὸ συμφέρον against other norms may take place, because one puts his or her private interest on one side and τὸ δίκαιον (and other norms) on the other. Because “all human beings crave their own advantages,”255 this human tendency weighs down (καταβαρεῖν) one against the other in real life, i.e., rebutting τὸ δίκαιον/καλόν for τὸ συμφέρον, or vice versa.256 This is the place where the body metaphor works. Moral philosophers and politicians in antiquity used the body analogy to lay a foundation for the organic part-whole to which they could properly bring the ethical force of τὸ συμφέρον in preventing or resolving problems in the community. They “compare[ed] human society to an organic body to show that the advantage of the parts or members coincides with that of the whole.”257 In this ethical frame, τὸ ἴδιον and 252 Thucydides, His. 5. 90. 253 Thucydides, His. 5. 98. 254 Epictetus, Diss. 2.22.16-18. 255 Isocrates, De pace 28; cf. Xenophon, Mem. 3.9.4; Epictetus, Ench. 31.4. 256 Epictetus, Diss. 2.22.18. 257 Striker, “Following Nature,” 47 (emphasis added).

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τὸ συμφέρον are yoked together, and so are τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δίκαιον (and τὸ καλόν). This ethical “formula” is the juxtaposition of τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δίκαιον/καλόν among moral philosophers to maintain the mean (μέσος) for the right kind of behavior, to use Aristotle’s moral reasoning above, and to put them together into the proper form of the organic part-whole in which both norms agree (ὁμολογεῖν) and do not conflict, as discussed above. Therefore, one does not sacrifice or harm another for one’s own advantage. When a part benefits another, it benefits the whole; conversely, if one member suffers, all suffer with it as parts of one organic whole.258 Moralists hoped to see the body image at work in their socio-political body politic as well.259 In this manner, the connective rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον, summed up in the body metaphor, presents an anti-idionistic (apolitical/individualistic) ideology,260 an antidote to the severe social malaise in the part-whole relationship. My arguments regarding τὸ συμφέρον, thus far, have been based on a variety of Greco-Roman sources, which have shown, on the one hand, its widespread usage in socio-political, rhetorical, ethical, and philosophical traditions. But, on the other hand, information from these sources is fragmentary. By this, I mean my study looks like a puzzle game of gathering little pieces here and there from various works in antiquity to define τὸ συμφέρον as a part-whole connective ethic, its functions, and its related issues. Nevertheless, the picture seems to be clear enough and pervasive enough to show that τὸ συμφέρον is the primary socio-political and ethical guide for action within the part-whole social constitution, as I proposed. But, beyond the fragmentary pieces of information here and there, one is compelled to ask if there remains any single literary work among the extant philosophical sources of the Greco-Roman antiquity that deals with τὸ συμφέρον as an ethic, its functions, and related issues, including the ideological misuse of it in particular. This literary work, if there is any, will validate my study thus far and will further clarify the connective rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον that Paul employs for his purpose in 1 Corinthians. For this, I refer to Cicero’s De Officiis as a case in point.

258 Plato, Resp. 462c-e. 259 Therefore, I should say, the above qualifying definition of one another between τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δίκαιον, as reflected in Isocrates, Epicurus, Aristotle, Cicero, and Epictetus, is possible in the organic thought frame. 260 Cf. Xenophon, Mem. 2.3.18-19; Cicero, Off. 3.5.22-23; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.86.1-5; Seneca, Ira. 2.31.7-8; Livy, His. 2.32.9-12; Plutarch, Arat. 24.5.

Chapter 4 ΤῸ ΣΥΜΦΈΡΟΝ and

Cicero’s De Officiis

Cicero introduced Greek philosophy, politics, and rhetoric in a systematic manner to the Hellenistic Roman world of the first century B.C.E.1 Among his many efforts he is particularly prominent in his “connected exposition”2 and clarification of the classical part-whole connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον (utilitas in Latin) for his Roman audience. For example, Cicero made Plato one of the most important classical philosophers and attempted to interpret his political theory for Roman practices.3 He maintained that those in charge of government affairs should remember two precepts of Plato’s (duo Platonis praecepta): 1) they must seek the interests of all citizens (utilitatem civium) in everything they do and not think of personal advantage,4 and 2) public administrators should “care for the welfare of the whole body politic [totum corpus rei publicae]” and not serve “the interests of some one party [partem] to betray the rest.”5 Failure to follow these rules, Cicero argued, introduces destructive elements into the state, namely “dissension” (seditio) and “party strife” (discordia), because those who seek the advantages of a single part of the citizenry (parti civium) overlook another part.6

1 Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 13. 2 For Cicero’s role as a bridge between classical and Hellenistic Roman philosophy, see J. G. F. Powell, ed., Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers (Oxford/New York: Clarendon, 1995). 3 Scholars believe that Cicero wrote De Re Publica and De Legibus in his effort to define Roman political theory in parallel with Plato’s Respublica and Leges. For Cicero’s use of Plato and other classical writers, see A. A. Long, “Cicero’s Plato and Aristotle,” in Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers (ed. J. G. F. Powell; Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 37–61, 60; Gisela Striker, “Cicero and Greek Philosophy,” HSCP 97 (1995): 53–61, 56; E. M. Atkins, “Cicero,” in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (eds. Christopher Rowe and Malcolm Schofield; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 503. 4 Cf. Plato, Resp. 342e, 420b, 465d-6c; cf. Leg. 4.715b. 5 Cicero, Off. 1.25.85 (emphasis added). 6 Cf. Plato, Resp. 420b. Another salient evidence for Cicero’s exposition of the classic connective ethics is his clarification of τὸ συμφέρον in Greek rhetorical tradition (Aristotle’s in particular), as I argued in Ch. 3. To be brief, I suggested that Cicero’s twofold purposes of deliberative rhetoric as “advantage and honor” are sort of checks to prevent misuse of τὸ συμφέρον in certain situations by leaving τὸ καλόν out of consideration.

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For Cicero, the idea of utilitas (τὸ συμφέρον)7 becomes the “subject matter” that pervades all his political, rhetorical, and moral-philosophical discourses.8 Cicero, however, has often been charged with inconsistency in his attempts to connect philosophy with political action (see below). His commitment both to political life and moral philosophy, favoring action over inquiry, and his dual commitment to Stoicism and academic skepticism have forced his readers “to question Cicero’s integrity and importance as a philosopher” and “to regard him as opportunistically eclectic or, at least, as hopelessly muddled.”9 Nicgorski maintains, however, that the idea of utilitas appears as a coherent and consistent principle of Cicero’s moral and political philosophy and answers the question of Cicero’s integrity in his socio-political theories as well as his philosophical works.10 For Cicero, “the goal of philosophy was not primarily to know but to do. Its end was to point out the course of conduct.”11 As he attempted to integrate ideals of philosophy with rhetoric and politics in his Roman climate,12 his idea of utilitas, as we shall see, shows forth this effort in his political and moral philosophy. For Cicero, philosophical inquiry focusing on knowing what is good (καλόν = honestum in Latin) should be integrated with the socio-political tendency of outweighing τὸ συμφέρον in practical (“doing”) body politics. For him, τὸ καλόν is to “knowing” as τὸ συμφέρον or utilitas is to “doing.” In his moralpolitical philosophy, knowing demands doing, and the latter should not depart from the former. Therefore, τὸ καλόν and τὸ συμφέρον are not two separate possibilities for measuring human conduct; they are meant to operate in conjunction with one another in any course of action. Cicero has problems with the Roman socio-political culture that divorced the good (καλόν) from the expedient (συμφέρον), as we shall see. He asks, “How long will people 7 As already noted, Cicero rendered the Greek words καλόν and συμφέρον as honestum and utile, respectively. Cf. P. G. Walsh, Cicero. On Obligations (De Officiis) (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), xxix; Andrew Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 17, 353–5. 8 Walter Nicgroski, “Cicero’s Paradoxes and His Idea of Utility,” PT 12 (1984): 561. 9 Nicgorski, 557. 10 Nicgorski, 557–78. 11 Cicero, Off. (Walter Miller’s “Introduction” in LCL), xii (emphasis added). 12 Long, “Cicero’s Plato and Aristotle,” 39. Powell (Cicero the Philosopher, 2–3) attempts to solve the problem of inconsistency in Cicero’s philosophical thought: Politicians and men of action are often either hostile to any form of abstract and systematic thought, or else painfully doctrinaire in their attempts to apply one particular system. Cicero is a rare example of a man whose circumstances and instincts led him to a practical career in public life, but who was also fascinated by the ideals of philosophy, and who firmly believed in the value of philosophical study for the education of the intellect and personality. His gifts as an advocate, combined with his literary emulation of the Platonic dialogue and his adoption of the skeptical methods of the later Academy, enabled him to present alternative points of view with apparently equal conviction, a deliberate technique that should not be mistaken for vacillation and inconsistency.

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venture to say that a thing that is not morally right can be expedient?”13 Facing this sort of socio-political hegemony of his time, Cicero wrote a treatise entirely devoted to the connective ethics of utilitas, in which he endeavors to narrow the polarity between “knowing” and “doing” in the body politic. His De Officiis (On Duties), I suggest, is an exposition of the classic part-whole ethic of τὸ συμφέρον and culminates his effort to integrate the two categories of honestas and utilitas into a single norm for proper behavior and politic in Roman society. In what follows, I will study De Officiis in such a way (along with his other works as needed) to show how Cicero develops and applies the classic part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον to his socio-political and moral philosophy in an eclectic way.

A. Cicero’s De Officiis: A Treatise on Utilitas (Τὸ Συμφέρον) As mentioned, I suggest that (a correct reading of) Cicero’s De Officiis is an exposition and clarification of the classical part-whole rhetoric of the common advantage for his Roman readers. As such, De Officiis appears to be “a sort of handbook” that deals with the ethical principle of τὸ συμφέρον (= utilitas) and related issues with other ethical categories, τὸ καλόν (= honestum) in particular.14 By handbook, I mean a kind of manual in which Cicero, in discussing the ethical principle of utilitas, provides definitions, lays out “rules for the solution” to the problems caused by the political hegemony, corrects misuses, discusses ethical tensions of utilitas in relation to other ethical norms, and offers ample illustrations from various socio-political and ethical situations. De Officiis is the realization of Cicero’s earlier promise to provide rules for the proper behavior “aimed at avoiding the sacrifice of advantages for the sake of what is worthy or of moral goodness for the sake of utility.”15 Such a pursuit is the ideal course for individual conduct and the body politic, but his Roman socio-political culture has lost its way when it comes to the path to moral duty (ab officio).

13 Cicero, Off. 3.22.87: Quousque audebunt dicere quicquam utile, quod non honestum? 14 In his study “On the Intention of Cicero’s De Officiis,” Douglas Kries concludes that De Officiis “is a sort of handbook of duties or obligations…that would be suitable to aspiring republican statesmen.” See The Review of Politics 65 (2003): 391–2. Gary Remer views De Officiis as “a work on practical ethics” in his “Cicero and the Ethics of Deliberative Rhetoric,” in Talking Democracy: Historical Perspectives on Rhetoric and Democracy (eds. Benedetto Fontana, Cary J. Nederman, and Gary Remer; University Part, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 147. Similarly, Prentice Meador writes, “De Officiis is a theoretical treatment of the obligations which a citizen should render to the Commonwealth, that is, a manual of civic virtue.” But Meador does not make the connection between De Officiis and the ethics of τὸ συμφέρον. See Prentice A. Meador, Jr., “Rhetoric and Humanism in Cicero,” PhilR 3 (Winter, 1970): 11. 15 Cicero, Part. 25.90.

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De Officiis,16 addressed to his son Marcus who was studying in Athens,17 “is of all Cicero’s philosophical works the one most deeply affected by his experiences of Roman public life.”18 According to A. Dyck, De Officiis “was written in uncertain and troubled times, with a tyrant [Caesar] recently killed but his [negative] legacy beckoning others to imitate him.”19 Cicero was attempting to stop “the tendency of adventurers like Caesar and now Antony to strive for tyrannical powers,” that is, of seeking egotistical glory and benefit at the expense of the common good.20 Further, statesmen often face difficult situations in which they have to make an “either-or” choice between two moral categories of what is beneficial or advantageous (utile) and of what is morally good or noble (honestum), thereby sacrificing one against the other.21 Based on the classical part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον, Cicero was convinced that sacrificing the common advantages would result in the destruction of the overall unitive social structures. For Cicero, anyone who gains a throne or political power by wrongful actions and who “justifies destruction of law and liberty” to obtain it, and yet thinks such actions are glorious, is a lunatic (amens).22 Taking his son “as representative of the young men of senatorial families in whose hands lay the political future of Rome,”23 Cicero attempted to reform socio-political culture at Rome in light of the classical part-whole ethics of τὸ συμφέρον, as once Panaetius had argued in an incomplete treatise.24 The core of his teaching in De Officiis is that any form of doing (“politics”) that seeks advantages (either personal or communal) should entail the sphere of knowing what is right. Particularly, Cicero provides a corrective for the ideological misapplications of utilitas, namely the use of the political power in sacrificing public interests for personal glory, fame, and power. Strikingly, the structure of the work clearly indicates that De Officiis is a treatise on the part-whole connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον or utilitas. Cicero bases De Officiis (Books I and II in particular) on the Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος by Panaetius, a leading Stoic of the Middle Stoa. According to Cicero, Panaetius originally planned to compose his work in three books but did not complete the third book. But Panaetius did raise three types of questions: 1) whether a conduct is honestum (καλόν) – “morally right or morally wrong”; 2) whether it is utile (συμφέρον); and 3) what people should do when what seems advantageous (συμφέρον) also seems to be in conflict with what is morally 16 For helpful introductory overviews on De Officiis, see Dyck, 1–56; Walsh, ix–xlvii. 17 Yet Cicero intended public circulation and had wide audience in mind. Dyck, 10–16. 18 Walsh, ix. 19 Dyck, 1. 20 Dyck, 31–3. Also see A. A. Long, “Cicero’s Politics in De Officiis,” in Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy. Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum (eds. A. Lakes and M. Schofield; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 213–40. 21 Cf. Kries, “On the Intention of Cicero’s De Officiis,” 375–93. 22 Cicero, Off. 3.21.83. 23 Walsh, xxvii. 24 Cicero, Off. 1.3.9; 3.2.7-12.

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right (καλόν).25 In the De Officiis, each question corresponds to a Book, and is thus composed of three Books: moral goodness (honestum), expediency (utilitas), and the conflict between the right (honestum) and the advantageous (utilitas). Structurally speaking, therefore, Books II and III explicitly involve the topic of utilitas (τὸ συμφέρον). But Book I seems to present problems for my reading of De Officiis as a treatise on the connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον because its subject matter is τὸ καλόν, as scholars have traditionally understood it. However, this issue can be solved if we grasp the important reasons why Cicero discusses τὸ καλόν here in his exposition of the classic part-whole connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον. Cicero has first to define καλόν (honestum) in order to discuss how συμφέρον (utile) is misused and ideologically appropriated at the expense of what is right. For him, τὸ συμφέρον cannot be correctly understood without τὸ καλόν because “whether you begin with the useful or the right as your primary concern, a full and proper understanding of either will reveal that the truly expedient or useful is the right and that the truly right is the useful.”26 As its three-volume structure implies, De Officiis is about τὸ συμφέρον/utilitas in relation to τὸ καλόν/honestum, as a brief analysis of each Book will show.

1. Book I: On Honestum In Book I, Cicero discusses the honorable or the right (honestum/καλόν) in terms of its four constituent virtues: prudence, justice, magnanimity, and the fitting. These are, in fact, as scholars have observed, basically the four cardinal virtues of Plato’s wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance.27 It is significant to notice that, in defining what the honestum/καλόν is for Cicero, all these virtues of honestum “are connected and interwoven” with the ethical imperative of seeking the communal advantage (utilitas/τὸ συμφέρον). Prudentia, for example, as “the practical knowledge of things to be sought for and of things to be avoided” for social duty (officium), is a way of service to the community as a whole.28 For Cicero, the mental activity of gaining knowledge is for “a good and happy life” (ad bene beateque vivendum) on moral goodness; yet, the life of happiness promoted by the search for truth is communal, not individual.29 Cicero contends that acquisition of knowledge is justified when it contributes to the advantages of the whole community, rather than pursuing knowledge for its own sake. Thus, people of knowledge are “to apply their own practical wisdom and insight to the service of humanity” (ad 25 Cicero, Off. 3.2.7: Panaetius “classifies under three general heads the ethical problems which people are accustomed to consider and weigh: first, the question whether the matter in hand is morally right or morally wrong; second, whether it is expedient or inexpedient; third, how a decision ought to be reached, in case that which has the appearance of being morally right clashes with that which seems to be expedient.” Cf. Att. 16.11.4. 26 Nicgroski, 561. 27 See Cicero, Off. 1.5.15; cf. Plato, Resp. 427d; Cicero, Inv. 2.53.159-54.165. 28 Cicero, Off. 1.43.153 and 1.44.156. 29 Cicero, Off. 1.6.18-19.

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hominum utilitatem).30 For Cicero, pursuit of knowledge should be for the public benefit and in service to the community. The second subdivision of honestum is justice (1.7.20–1.18.60), which Cicero defines as “the crowning glory of the virtues.”31 Cicero lays down two fundamental principles of justice that govern part-whole relationships: “no harm [should] be done to anyone” and “the common interests [should] be conserved.”32 These principles clearly highlight the classic features of τὸ συμφέρον (as we have already observed in earlier chapters). Thus, the honestum qualified by justice is clearly associated with the idea of utilitas, which Cicero emphasizes throughout De Officiis. This corresponds exactly to our investigation in the previous chapters that the three ethical considerations of τὸ συμφέρον, τὸ δίκαιον, and τὸ καλόν qualify each other and simply reflect different aspects of a single norm for proper behavior.33 The third of the four virtues by which Cicero discusses moral duty (honestum) is greatness of soul (magnitudo animi) (1.18.61–1.26.92). Here too, Cicero defines this virtue in light of its connective benefit in the community. For him, the magnanimous person “looks to the welfare of the community rather than to the prestige of the individual.”34 At this point, Cicero, having the current socio-political culture of Rome in mind, broaches the topic of “glory” (gloria) to highlight the problems of obstinate ambition for personal fame, power, and glory while sacrificing other people or other virtues.35 The theme of glory runs throughout the three books of De Officiis in his effort to correct misapplications of the utilitas in his Roman political culture. Thus I will discuss this theme later in detail as the clinching point of my argument that the entire De Officiis is a treatise on the utilitas/τὸ συμφέρον. Here, in brief, the passion for personal fame and glory often leads to injustice and sacrifices the communal good. For Cicero, any magnanimous behavior that lacks justice and hurts the rest of the people cannot be morally right (honestum).36 Magnanimity, the third part of the honestum, is the virtue that seeks common advantages, not personal fame.37

30 Cicero, Off. 1.44.156. 31 Cicero, Off. 1.7.20: iustitia, in qua virtutis est splendor maximus, ex qua viri boni nominantur. 32 Cicero, Off. 1.10.31: quae posui principio, fundamenta iustitiae, primum ut ne cui noceatur, deinde ut communi utilitati serviatur. Also see 1.7.20. 33 For further discussion on Cicero’s justice in De Officiis, see E. M. Atkins, “‘Domina et Regina Virtutum’: Justice and Societas in De Officiis,” Phronesis 35 (1990): 258–89. 34 Walsh, xx. 35 Cicero, Off. 1.19.62-65 (84). 36 Cicero, Off. 1.19.62. 37 This conclusion clearly implies that Cicero’s discussion of honestum is qualified by the idea of the utile as he states (Off. 1.24.83): “It is our duty, then, to be more ready to endanger our own than the public welfare and to hazard [personal] honor and glory more readily than other [public] advantages.”

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Finally, Cicero discusses the virtue of decorum (“propriety”) or τὸ πρέπον (“the fitting”) in Greek (1.27.93–1.42.151).38 He epitomizes this virtue in the maxim: “what is proper is morally right, and what is morally right is proper.”39 How can one then decide if an action is proper and morally right? Here comes the ethical idea of seeking the common advantage (τὸ συμφέρον), a moral reasoning of seeking what is “fitting” (τὸ πρέπον) in and for the proper relationship of the part to the whole. We should note, as already indicated, that τὸ πρέπον belongs to the semantic sphere of τὸ συμφέρον, along with ὠφέλιμον, χρήσιμον, καλόν.40 Cicero derives the moral reasoning of what is “fitting” from the natural part-whole advantage context that generates the connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον that I discussed in Chapter 2. For him, parts (partes) are given to serve the needs of the whole (natura).41 Cicero argues that what is proper or fitting is to follow nature, and if we follow the part-whole law of nature, we never go astray in moral duty because “nature is our teacher and guide” (magistra et duce).42 Furthermore, nature ordained the principles of the partwhole human fellowship (communitatis et societatis humanae) to contribute to the common advantage (ad communem utilitatem).43 What is fitting (τὸ πρέπον) therefore comes from proper relationships of parts to the whole in which τὸ συμφέρον or utilitas appears to be the prime ethical determinant. Cicero finishes Book I with a brief comparison of the four-pronged virtues of honestum (καλόν) because among these categories “a conflict and comparison may frequently arise as to which of two moral actions is morally better” (1.43.152-1.45.161). In a puzzling situation in which a choice is offered between two moral actions, service to the whole (utilitas) becomes the criterion that takes precedence over another. For example, justice (a moral obligation of not harming and of seeking the common advantage as Cicero defined it above) takes precedence over wisdom, magnanimity, or temperance. Cicero concludes that nothing is more sacred than moral obligations prescribed by justice, for they look to the benefit of humanity.44 In sum, the analysis of honestum (καλόν) thus far in Book I clearly indicates that its sphere is inextricably linked to the idea of the utile (συμφέρον), expressed in the four cardinal virtues. For Cicero, honestum/τὸ καλόν is a moral goodness that necessarily brings advantage to the whole community (utilitas/τὸ συμφέρον), as each category of the four virtues explicates. He then explicitly develops the relationship between honestas and utilitas, and their 38 Cicero (Off. 1.27.93) renders what is called πρέπον in Greek as decorum. 39 Cicero, Off. 1.27.94: nam et, quod decet, honestum est et, quod honestum est, decet. 40 Cf. Aristotle, Top. 135a 13: ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον; Epictetus, Diss. 1.22.1: τὸ δίκαιον καλόν ἐστι τὸ πρέπον. 41 Cicero, Off. 1.35.126-27. 42 Cicero, Off. 1.28.100 and 1.35.129. Also see 1.7.22. 43 Off. 1.16.50-52. 44 Cicero, Off. 1.43.155: Quibus rebus intellegitur studiis officiisque scientiae praeponenda esse officia iustitiae, quae pertinent ad hominum utilitatem, qua nihil homini esse debet antiquius.

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related issues in the subsequent two Books. Thus, our working conclusion would be that Cicero wrote De Officiis as a treatise on utilitas or τὸ συμφέρον, first studying honestum or τὸ καλόν to prescribe that what is utile/συμφέρον entails what is honestum/καλόν, and maintaining that both norms are inseparable, as he emphasizes in the later two Books. De Officiis, as further discussed below, is a climactic voice of his public life and arguably the most mature of his political and philosophical literary works, in which he attempts to integrate the knowing of what is right (honestum) on the philosophical side with the doing of what is beneficial (utile) on the socio-political side of the quotidian life.

2. Book II: On Utile In Book II Cicero addresses utile (= συμφέρον or ὠφέλιμον).45 He proceeds to discuss the topic by pointing out that the use of the word utile in ethical reasoning has become “corrupted and perverted.” He asserts that it has gradually come to the point at which what is considered morally right (honestum) is separated from what is advantageous (utile).46 Cicero argues that separating right action from expediency signals a departure from the correct usage of the word utile. The two ethical considerations of the utile and honestum, Cicero states, “shall seem in sound only to be different but in real meaning to be one and the same.”47 Nothing is more pernicious, he says, than the teaching that detaches honestum from utile.48 Whether an action is utile or inutile depends upon its agreement with the honestum.49 Cicero then examines the topic of glory (de gloria) in a lengthy discussion (2.9.31–2.14.51). Dyck outlines two-thirds of Book II as a discussion of “glory” (2.9.31–2.24.85), and thus he maintains, “The attainment of glory is the real subject” of the second Book.50 Such a view is misleading, however.

45 Cicero, Off. 2.1.1. Andrew Dyck comments that “[p]rior to Panaetius the συμφέρον or ὠφέλιμον (= utile) played only a very minor role in Stoic philosophy. No treatises περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος or the like are attested.” He contends that it is Panaetius who first treated the συμφέρον in Stoic philosophy “as a criterion for judging actions,” and was followed by Cicero. See Dyck, 353–5. 46 Cicero, Off. 2.3.9-10. 47 Cicero, Off. 3.21.83: Honestate igitur dirigenda utilitas est…ut haec duo verbo inter se discrepare, re unum sonare videantur. Dyck (33) comments that “perhaps Cicero’s major contribution to Roman political thought is his radical identification of honestum and utile.” But it seems to me that Cicero’s integration of what is right (honestum) with what is beneficial (utile) reflects the long line of ethical tradition that I discussed in Ch. 3 above. In other words, De Officiis is Cicero’s version, through Panaetius, of the classical argument of taking the course of “bothand” against choosing “either-or” course of action between these two ethical categories. 48 Cicero, Off. 2.3.9. 49 Again, this also supports my argument that Cicero first discusses honestum to define utilitas and correct misuses. According to Cicero, Socrates condemned the person who separated τὸ συμφέρον from τὸ καλόν. See Leg. 1.33-34. 50 Dyck, 355–6, 412.

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The subject matter is utile (συμφέρον), as Cicero himself clearly indicated;51 thus, we have to incorporate the topic of glory into Cicero’s discussion of utilitas and should know why he does so. I will discuss his “ethics of gloria” later in this chapter. Suffice it here only to mention that Cicero presents the topic as a real and brutal problem of divorcing the utile from honestum, a “perverted” example that has caused serious ethical problems in the Roman political culture. This is the reason why the topic of glory looms large here (and briefly in Book I as mentioned, and in Book III as well) in treating the ethical principle of utilitas even though Cicero had just recently published two books on that subject (De Gloria) a few months ahead of his De Officiis.52 In short, the topic of gloria is a thematic link among the three books of De Officiis in discussing a certain ethical category, and I will take the topic as the decisive evidence that De Officiis is a treatise on the ethical category of utilitas or τὸ συμφέρον that embraces the quality of honestum/τὸ καλόν, as opposed to “corrupted and perverted” exercises of divorcing these two norms in Roman society. After the lengthy discussion of gloria, Cicero moves to illustrate two means of sharing benefits: gifts of money (2.15.52–2.18.64) and personal service (2.19.65–2.24.85).53 First, he makes a distinction between the extravagant waste of the public feasts and games, and generous giving to relieve the urgent needs of individual citizens. Lavish expenditure of money is justified, he maintains, for those public works such as walls, docks, and aqueducts “which are of service to the community” (ad usum rei publicae). Particularly Cicero recommends generous private gifts of money as a service to the community. He exhorts that we should distribute “to the worthy poor… with discretion and moderation.”54 Cicero claims that our purse “should not be closed so tightly that a generous impulse cannot open it, nor yet so loosely held as to be open to everybody.”55 What is the criterion of closing or opening one’s purse? Cicero is concerned with the utilia of serving the whole community. “The justification for gifts of money,” maintains Cicero, “is either necessity [necesse] or expediency [utile].”56 For him, an action’s necessity is determined by advantage or honor (utilitas atque honestatis) that will result 51 At the end of Book II (Liber Secundus), Cicero makes it clear by stating, utilitatem, de qua hoc libro disputatum est (“expediency, and that is the subject of the present book”). See Off. 2.24.87; cf. 2.1.1, 2.3.9. 52 Cicero (Off. 2.9.31) writes, “Let us now take up the discussion of Glory, although I have published two books on that subject [de gloria] also.” Scholars believe that Cicero wrote De Gloria (now lost) in 44 b.c.e. a few months prior to his De Officiis. A. A. Long maintains that this close “chronology” between De Gloria and De Officiis “would help to explain why the topic of glory looms so large in the [latter work].” See Long, “Cicero’s Politics in De Officiis,” 219–24, 224. That may be the case, but I think Cicero had a more important reason to incorporate the topic of gloria into his discussion of utile (see below). 53 Cf. Walsh, xxii–xxiii. 54 Cicero, Off. 2.15.54. Cf. Paul’s collection in 1 Cor 16:1-4. 55 Cicero, Off. 2.15.55. 56 Cicero, Off. 2.17.58.

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from that action.57 In short, the utilitas or “a service to the state as well as to the individual” becomes a criterion for expenditure of money.58 Cicero then provides directives on personal services both to the individual citizens and to the community as a whole.59 Personal services are rendered in the law courts with legal expertise and eloquence in defense of worthy individuals without compensation. Cicero contends that such services that impart benefits to individual citizens should bear equal relation in the service to the community. He admits that certain public services affect individual citizens only, but recommends “those which [at the same time] touch the whole body politic and the state” and “concern the whole body of citizens.”60 Any socio-political policy that is “both practicable for the state and necessary for the commons,” argues Cicero, is “a blessing both to the citizens [parts] and to the state [whole].”61 In short, in De Officiis, Cicero explicates that the true utile embraces both parts and the whole, while opposing any self-serving or ego-centric application of this virtue.

3. Book III: Conflict between the Right and the Apparent Advantage In this final Book, Cicero deals with cases that suggest an apparent conflict between the honestum (καλόν) and the utile (συμφέρον) (a matter untreated by Panaetius). His analysis of the cases, as Dyck comments, “involves two utilia, an apparent utile, which turns out on closer inspection not to be utile, and a true utile, which coincides with the honestum.”62 The latter is the feature of part-whole connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον that “[w]hat is useful to us individually is what is useful to the human community.”63 Throughout Book III Cicero insists that what is beneficial belongs to the sphere of what is right, and that there can be no actual conflict between utile and honestum because one cannot prevail over the other. In clarifying and correcting the misuse of the connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον, he establishes rules and provides many illustrations. Cicero bases his exposition and correction of the connective ethics on the classic part-whole law of nature (as I examined in a previous chapter). For him, the part-whole law of “nature is the source of right,”64 and it does not separate the honestum from the utile. Nature does not allow its part to advance its own advantage by doing wrong to its neighboring part(s): 57 On “necessity,” see Cicero, Inv. 2.56.169-58.175, esp. 2.57.172. 58 Cicero, Off. 2.18.63. 59 Cicero, Off. 2.19.65: haec tum in universam rem publicam, tum in singulos cives. 60 Cicero, Off. 2.21.72. 61 Cicero, Off. 2.21.72: et rei publicae tolerabilis et plebi necessaria; ergo et civibus et rei publicae salutaris. Also, as we shall discuss the relation between τὸ συμφέρον and glory, for Cicero, such service to the whole (utilitate rei publicae) is a way of winning popularity and glory (gratiam et gloriam). See Off. 2.24.85. 62 Dyck, 493. 63 Walsh, xxiv. 64 Cicero, Off. 3.17.72: iuris natura fons sit. Cf. 3.6.27.

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If nature ordains that one man shall desire to promote the interests of a fellow-man, whoever he may be, just because he is a fellow-man, then it follows, in accordance with that same nature, that there are interests that all men have in common. And, if this is true, we are all subject to one and the same law of nature; and, if this also is true, we are certainly forbidden by nature’s law to wrong our neighbor.65

Any act that sacrifices another’s advantage inherently violates honestum and undermines laws of nature (contra naturam).66 For Cicero, true utilitas (τὸ συμφέρον) does not sacrifice honestas (τὸ καλόν), and utilitas and turpitudo (what is not right) cannot thus co-exist.67 What is morally right, he repeats, is expedient, and what is morally not right is not expedient: “the morally right is the only good.”68 Cicero applies this principle of honestas-utilitas, a principle of integrating knowing and doing, to all civic part-whole constitutions in which “no man shall be allowed for the sake of his own advantage to injure his neighbor.”69 He argues that making “the interest of each individual and of the whole body politic identical” should be the chief end of any human society/state of partwhole constructions.70 He continues, “If the individual appropriates to selfish ends what should be devoted to the common good, all human fellowship will be destroyed.”71 For Cicero, seeking one’s own advantage at another’s disadvantage undermines the basis of human society. To enhance his point, Cicero, too, likens the image of society to an organic body: Just as if each member of our body thought that it could be strong itself by drawing on the strength of the members around it, the whole body would inevitably be weakened and die, so if each one of us were to rob another of what is to his advantage and take all that he could for his own advantage, then the bonds of human society would inevitably be destroyed.72

In short, disrespect of the “common interests” (communis utilitatis) in partwhole civic organisms violates the law of nature (contra naturam) and is

65 Cicero, Off. 3.6.27: si hoc natura praescribit, ut homo homini, quicumque sit, ob eam ipsam causam, quod is homo sit, consultum velit, necesse est secundum eandem naturam omnium utilitatem esse communem. Quod si ita est, una continemur omnes et eadem lege naturae, idque ipsum si ita est, certe violare alterum naturae lege prohibemur. 66 Cicero, Off. 3.5.21-24. 67 See Cicero, Off. 3.10.40 and 3.8.35. 68 Cicero, Off. 3.3.11-12. 69 Cicero, Off. 3.5.23: ut non liceat sui commodi causa nocere alteri. 70 Strikingly, this, among Cicero’s numerous instances, is the core feature of the connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον that the interest of the whole is that of the part. See the next footnote for full citation. 71 Cicero, Off. 3.6.26: Ergo unum debet esse omnibus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas unius cuiusque et universorum; quam si ad se quisque rapiet, dissolvetur omnis humana consortio. 72 Cicero, Off. 3.5.22. Trans. from Higginbotham. Cf. Xenophon, Mem. 2.3.18; Seneca, Ira, 2.31.7; Livy, His. 2.32.

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unjust (iniusta), and ultimately “demolishes the whole structure of civil society” (omnem societatem distrahit civitatis).73 Τὸ συμφέρον or utilitas, in its true sense as an ethical argument, is an inherent extension of the ethical category of τὸ καλόν, and the combination of utilitashonestas thus becomes a standard for judging a person as evil or good. For example, this ethical principle creates problems for tyrants. As already noted, for Cicero, they are beasts in human form and lifeless members that endanger the health of the other parts of the body. Therefore, such evil ones must be banned from the common body of humanity just as certain members of the body are amputated to stop damaging the whole. Cicero’s ethic of utilitas justifies the assassination of a vile tyrant as an action of what is right, for it saves the whole.74 Cicero, on the other hand, regrets a good man’s death because it is a great loss to the common advantage (communi utilitate) since he “will always perform his duty, promoting the general interests of human society.”75 In sum, Cicero’s utilitas qualified by honestum, as we further see, has no place for behavior of wrongful gains, including political power.76 Cicero, therefore, lays out a “general rule” (formula) that “we every-day people must observe and live up to”77 the ethical principle (τὸ συμφέρον) that what is beneficial (utile/συμφέρον) goes hand in hand with what is good (honestum/καλόν). It helps us to “decide without error” in any situation in which what we think advantageous (συμφέρον) conflicts with what we understand to be morally right.78 Thus his working maxim, which appears frequently in slightly different forms throughout the entire De Officiis, goes: quod autem bonum, id certe utile; ita, quicquid honestum, id utile (what is good is certainly beneficial; and so whatever is morally right is also expedient).79 If we stay on this rule in a conflicting situation of making a choice between the apparently beneficial and the morally right, Cicero is convinced, “we shall never swerve from the path of duty.”80 With this principle in mind, Cicero devotes the main section of Book III to conflicts between moral goodness and the apparently useful (3.10.40– 3.33.120). Here, he addresses the problem of possible conflict between personal and communal benefits. Cicero’s ethical theory of the common advantage does not by any means reject personal interests. In the classic understanding of τὸ συμφέρον, the 73 See Cicero, Off. 3.6.28-31. 74 See Ch. 2 above. 75 Cicero, Off. 3.6.31. On “good man” (bonus vir), also see 3.19.75-78. Cicero defines good man by the standard of τὸ συμφέρον as “one who helps all [whole] whom he can and harms nobody” (3.19.76). Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 2.13.9. Cicero also exemplifies Hercules as a panHellenistic sage hero who denied himself and underwent toil and trouble for the sake of the common benefit. See Off. 3.5.25. 76 Cicero, Off. 3.5.21-6.31. 77 Cicero, Off. 3.4.17. 78 Cicero, Off. 3.4.19. 79 Cicero, Off. 3.8.35; 3.15.64; 3.20.81. 80 Cicero, Off. 3.4.19.

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advantage of the whole, for Cicero, is identical with that of the parts (and vice versa) and the benefit of the part can be realized only within the context of the whole. Cicero further asserts that individual interest is obtained only within the sphere of justice. He cites Chrysippus to illustrate this point. A man running a race in a stadium must strive and compete with all his strength to win, but he must not trip up his fellow-competitor. Likewise, in the stadium of life, there is nothing wrong with individuals seeking what is needful for them, but it is not right to take away by force what is needful for their neighbors.81 Utilitas does not require us “to sacrifice our own interests [nostrae nobis utilitates] and surrender to others what we need for ourselves, but each one should consider his own interests,” without causing injustice to his neighbor (sine alterius iniuria fiat).82 Personal benefit gained by harming another is not just; justice whose sphere entails the common advantage should scale it.83 Cicero also applies this rule of honestas-utilitas to the case of friendship.84 Friendship often creates a conflicting situation in which a fellow asks you to do what is morally not right. In such a case, argues Cicero, let the scruple of conscience – which God himself has given to humans – take precedence over friendship.85 Again, for Cicero what is useful in friendship (of any level) should not depart from what is right. In both international and domestic politics, utilitas also goes together with honestas. Cicero thus condemns wrongdoings committed for political expediency between states. For example, he contends that the destruction of Corinth by his own country, though it “seemed to be expedient” (visum est utile), was cruel of the Romans; and “no cruelty can be expedient,” he says.86 Likewise, the Athenians must be condemned for their cruelty in cutting off the thumbs of the Aeginetans. What is the case with political cruelty is also true in domestic policies. Even though an apparent advantage motivated Romulus, the mythical founder of Rome, to kill his brother Remus, it was in fact not expedient because of the moral wrong involved.87 Furthermore, it is wrong “to debar foreigners [peregrine] from enjoying the advantages of the city” because no part can be excluded from the advantages of the whole.88 For Cicero, non-citizens are also parts of the whole under the laws of humanity, 81 Cicero, Off. 3.10.42. 82 Cicero, Off. 3.10.42. 83 Cf. Cicero, Off. 1.10.31. 84 Cicero, Off. 3.10.43-46. 85 Because I have discussed the problem of τὸ συμφέρον/utilitas in Greco-Roman friendship discourses above, including Cicero’s, this short note is to indicate the scope of Cicero’s application of the ethical principle of honestas-utilitas to his friendship discourses. See Ch. 3 under “Not ‘Either-Or’ But ‘Both-And.’” 86 Cicero, Off. 3.10.46. 87 Cicero, Off. 3.10.42, 3.21.83. By contrast, Cicero also provides “many examples” (plena exemplorum) of rejecting what was apparently advantageous to the whole state out of regard for what is morally good. See 3.11.47-49. 88 But it is not right to allow one who is not a citizen to act as a citizen (Nam esse pro cive, qui civis non sit, rectum est non licere). See Off. 3.11.47.

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and they can enjoy the advantages of the city. His part-whole ethics of the utilitas prevents any political action done by the state from being divested of the moral goodness that embraces the whole. Cicero applies the true form of the connective ethics to commercial transactions (3.12.50–3.15.64) in business relations also. What is seemingly beneficial must not prevail over what is morally right. He illustrates: when the Rhodians suffered shortage because of great famine and provisions were extremely expensive, a good businessperson imported a large cargo of grain from Alexandria while also knowing that several other merchants had set sail from Alexandria behind his ship. Now the ethical question arises: should he report this to the Rhodians or not – in order to sell his own grain at the highest possible market price? On this issue, Cicero employs the examples of two spokespersons: Diogenes of Babylonia, an eminent Stoic, and his pupil Antipater. Their opinions are divided: Diogenes believes, according to Cicero, that the seller has the obligation to report any defects in his goods (insofar as the civil law requires) and otherwise he should conduct the transaction to sell his goods to the best possible advantage.89 Antipater on the other hand insists that everything should be divulged so that the buyer knows all the facts that the seller knows. To this, Diogenes responds, “concealment is one thing, and silence is another” (aliud est celare, aliud tacere). A further question arises: is “silence” dishonorable? One side insists that the conduct is personally advantageous without being morally wrong, and the other argues that the action should not be performed because it is morally wrong. Antipater, on whose side Cicero stands, declares: “it is your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-men and to serve society.” For him (and Cicero), the true utile embraces the advantage of both the agent and the community as a whole. At this point, Cicero derives the best expression of the part-whole connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον/utilitas, as prescribed by the mouth of Antipater: “utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua sit” (“your interest shall be the interest of the community and conversely that the interest of the community shall be your interest as well”).90 This part-whole law of nature (principia naturae) makes human beings, contends Cicero, “duty bound to obey and follow.”91 89 Cicero, Off. 3.12.51. 90 Cicero, Off. 3.12.52. 91 Cicero, Off. 3.12.52. Cicero (Off. 3.13.56-7; cf. 3.16.65-6) introduces another transaction case in which a man tries to sell his house because of certain defects: it was unsanitary, with vermin found in all the rooms, had rotted timber, and was about to collapse; yet, no one except the owner knows these undesirable features. The question is: if the seller does not inform buyers of these facts and sells the house for a higher price than what he anticipated, is his action unjust and dishonorable? Again, opinion differs: one side defends morality, and the other argues on behalf of expediency that it is not only morally right to do what seems advantageous, but it is even morally wrong not to do it. Cicero’s decision is that, as the grain-dealer should not conceal the facts from the Rhodians, neither should the vendor of the house. He argues that concealment is not simply reticence, but it is not right because it keeps others from finding out something publicly advantageous that they would promote from it. The vendor or the grain-dealer, however, seeks

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To sum up, the above illustrations that provide definitions, lay out rules, and correct misuses of the utilitas in multiple situations, make clear that Cicero’s De Officiis is a handbook that expounds and clarifies the classical part-whole connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον for his Roman audience. The idea of utilitas appears a key principle of Cicero’s moral and political philosophy, and συμφέρον/utile qualified by καλόν/honestum becomes the primary criterion of ethical judgments and a guide for proper behavior in part-whole contexts. For Cicero, as argued, all laws – civil and international – are inherent in the cosmic part-whole law of nature, and an individual’s advantage coincides with the benefit of the whole. Doing for the sake of any advantage in real life situations must not conflict with knowing what is morally right.92 Therefore, the una regula (one rule) that has to be applied in all cases is: “that which seems expedient must not be morally wrong; or if it is morally wrong, it must not seem expedient.”93 The major function of Book I (on honestum) of De Officiis, we now know, is therefore intended to construct this “one rule” of honestasutilitas against a socio-political culture in which the two ethical categories had been polarized as if they were different norms.94 In conclusion, honestas and utilitas are only different aspects of the single moral duty (officium),95 not divorced in any situation.96 They simply appear (videatur) to conflict in certain situations. But they are “one and the same” (unum).97 Therefore, for Cicero as for Aristotle and others, the argument of “either-or” is misleading. Yet one critical issue remains. Of all illustrations that Cicero employs, the topic of “glory” (gloria/εὐδοξία)98 is most prominent, particularly in correcting misuses of utilitas. As mentioned, this theme looms large in De Officiis because seeking personal fame and glory is the best example of damaging to advance his own advantages by keeping his knowledge hidden from the public. Thus, seeking the advantage of the whole becomes the criterion of right action, a correct form of taking both (τὸ συμφέρον) and (τὸ καλόν) at once, not “either-or” in personal behavior as well as in the body politic. The seller’s behavior is neither a correct form nor a proper application of the connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον or utilitas, because, as Cicero concludes, “it is never expedient to do wrong, because wrong is always immoral; and it is always expedient to be good, because goodness is always moral” (Off. 3.15.64: Numquam igitur est utile peccare, quia semper est turpe, et, quia semper est honestum virum honum esse, semper est utile). 92 See Cicero, Off. 3.16.65-17.72. 93 Cicero, Off. 3.20.81: quod utile videtur, turpe ne sit aut, si turpe est, ne videatur esse utile. 94 Cicero’s making of “one rule” by combining both categories is another clear evidence of his moral philosophical and socio-political method of integrating the “knowing” and “doing” together. This is similar, as I argued in the previous chapter, to Aristotle’s argument of the “mean” of taking “both [norms] at once” or Epictetus’ metaphor of the one-dish scale of not separating both categories in human behavior. 95 Hence the title of the treatise is De Officiis (On Duties or Obligations). 96 When we divorce them from each other (cum utilitatem ab honestate seiungunt), Cicero concludes, we undermine the foundations of nature (fundamenta naturae), that is, the partwhole structure(s) of our society. See Off. 3.28.101. 97 Cicero, Off. 3.21.83. 98 See Dyck, 357.

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the whole in separation from the sphere of honestum. Any courageous action or lofty spirit, unless it fights for the safety of the whole, is not beneficial (non esse utilia).99 Cicero’s discussion of glory not only binds all three Books thematically on the utile (in agreement with the honestum) but also illuminates the most important and immediate concern for Cicero in writing the treatise. The critical issue that prompted him to clarify the part-whole ethic is the latter’s ideological misappropriation by his contemporary leaders or by people of the upper stratum. This misuse involved the Roman honor code of seeking personal glory and fame, as discussed below.

B. Cicero’s Ideal of Gloria and Utilitas 1. A Value System in Greco-Roman Antiquity Pursuing gloria and its associated public recognition became a vital part of the value system in Greco-Roman antiquity. Φιλοτιμία,100 a desire to be great after noble examples of honor and glory, carries important symbolic value in Greco-Roman society. It is elevated as one of the highest human ideals.101 Cicero, whose life was fired by the desire for fame, states, “ambition is a universal factor in life, and the nobler a man is, the more susceptible is he to the sweets of fame”102 and “deep in every noble heart dwells a power which plies night and day the goad of glory.”103 99 Cicero, Off. 3.37.115, cf. 1.19.62. 100 Of the three kinds of human psychological desire, a desire for honor and glory (φιλοτιμία) over love of money (φιλοχρηματία) and love of knowledge (φιλοσοφία) was considered as the leading one in Greco-Roman antiquity. Cf. Thucydides, His. 2.44.4; Plato, Menex. 247b; Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.5.4-6; 4.3.17-4.5.4. Aristotle says (4.3.18) that “the great-souled man [μεγαλόψυχος]…is especially concerned with honour [περὶ τιμάς].” Cicero divides humankind into two classes: “one uninstructed and uncultivated” who prefers utilitas to morality and seeks the profits and emoluments of personal gain first: and the “humane and cultivated” one who gives “the first place to distinction, honour, glory…” See Part. or. 25.90. Cf. Elsewhere (Phil. 1.12.29) Cicero contends that a “man of honor” does not aspire for profit (pecuniam) “which has always been despised by every man of the highest station and reputation” but “for glory” (gloriam). On the Greco-Roman concept of glory, including that of Cicero, see A. D. Leeman, Gloria. Cicero’s waardering van de roem en haar achtergrond in de hellenistische wijsbegeerte en de romeinsche samenleving (Rotterdam: WIJT, 1949). Leeman provides an excellent summary in English in 177–90, esp., 177–8 on φιλοτιμία, φιλοχρηματία, φιλοσοφία, and μεγαλόψυχος. 101 Cicero writes: “there is no higher ambition for a human being, nothing more desirable, nothing more excellent than civil office, military command and popular glory [populari gloria]; it is to this that all the noblest are attracted.” See Cicero, Tusc. 3.2.3. Cf. H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity (London: Sheed and Ward, 1956), 12; N. Wood, Cicero’s Social and Political Thought (Berkeley/Los Angels/London: University of California Press, 1988), 103. 102 Cicero, Arch. 11.26: Neque enim est hoc dissimulandum, quod obscurari non potest, sed prae nobis ferendum, trahimur omnes studio laudis et optimus quisque maxime gloria ducitur. 103 Cicero, Arch. 11.29: Nunc insidet quaedam in optimo quoque virtus, quae noctes ac dies animum gloriae stimulis concitat. Also see Tusc. 1.2.4: “All men are fired to application by fame” (incenduntur ad studia gloria). On Cicero’s (and Hellenistic discussion of gloria,

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In fact, Cicero himself confesses, “From my youth up, nothing is to be greatly sought after in this life save glory and honour.”104 He says that from his early age (a puero), he took the well-known Homeric motto as inspiration: “far to excel, and tower above all others.”105 He talks about how the great ancient authors have provided incentives for emulation (ad imitandum): “These I have held ever before my vision throughout my public career, and have guided the workings of my brain and my soul by meditating upon patterns of excellence.”106 In the quest for gloria, Cicero was willing to endure “all bodily pains and all dangers of death or exile”107 because “excellence looks for no other reward of its toils and perils except praise and glory.”108 “Among all the rewards of virtue,” Cicero says, “the noblest is glory.”109 Therefore, not only is he passionate for pursuing gloria, but also he calls Roman youth and his friends to aspire for the same reward: You, young Romans…I will rouse to imitate the example of your ancestors; and you who can win nobility by your talents and virtue, I will exhort to follow that career in which many new men have covered themselves with honour and glory.110

Toward the conclusion of his lengthy speech for Sestius, Cicero raises his voice: “let us imitate…the honour and glory of our bravest and most illustrious citizens,”111 and “let us disregard present [personal] advantages, let us work see Francis A. Sullivan, “Cicero and Gloria,” 72 (1941): 382–92; Leeman, 177–90; Maurice B. McNamee S.J., Honor and the Epic Hero: A Study of the shifting Concept of Magnanimity in Philosophy and Epic Poetry (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 40–50; Kaus Bringmann, Untersuchungen zum späten Cicero (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971): 196–205; Long, “Cicero’s Politics in De Officiis,” 213–40. These works provide ample references to Cicero’s discussion of gloria which I found useful for my study. 104 Cicero, Arch. 6.14: ab adolescentia suasissem nihil esse in vita mango opere expetendum nisi laudem atque honestatem. 105 See Cicero, Quint. fratr. 3.6.4. Cf. Homer, Il. vi. 208; xi. 784. 106 Cicero, Arch. 6.14: quas ego mihi semper in administranda re publica proponens animum et mentem meam ipsa cogitatione hominum excellentium conformabam. Plutarch also shows how Cicero is deeply associated with Greek and Roman philosophers, poets, and orators for his greater accomplishments. See Plutarch, Cic. 2.2-4.7. 107 Cicero, Arch. 6.14. On how Cicero’s sufferings and exile have brought him more honor and glory, see Rep. 1.4.7. Elsewhere he states: “the desire of glory [studio gloriae] made me leave Rome just that I might have such a return.” Sest. 60.128. For a discussion of how Cicero portrays his exile as a sacrifice for the state (devotio pro re publica), see J. M. May, Trials of Character: The Eloquence of Ciceronian Ethos (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 97–9. 108 Cicero, Arch. 11.28 (my translation): Nullam enim virtus aliam mercedem laborum periculorumque desiderat praeter hanc laudis et gloriae. 109 Cicero, Mil. 35.97: ex omnibus praemiis virtutis…amplissimum esse praemium gloriam. 110 Cicero, Sest. 65.136: adulescentes…ad maiorum vestrorum imitationem excitabo, et qui ingenio ac virtute nobilitatem potestis consequi, ad eam rationem, in qua multi hominess novi et honore et gloria floruerunt, cohortabor. 111 Cicero, Sest. 68.143-69.144: imitemur…fortissimorum et clarissimorum civium

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for glory in years to come.”112 In short, Cicero’s life and his treatises carry the predominant value system of pursuing gloria as the highest aim in human life in Greco-Roman society.113 Cicero’s ambition is not a blind hunger for gloria, however. In some cases, he downgrades glory and even warns us to be aware of greed for glory (gloriae cupiditas).114 He maintains that anyone who lusts for fame stands on a slippery slope (lubricus), because “the higher a man’s ambition, the more easily he is tempted to acts of injustice by his desire for fame” (gloriae cupiditate).115 A more critical reason lies in the ethical problems that Cicero confronts with the long-lived and current value system of aspiring for superiority over others, particularly with its problems among his contemporary leaders.116 His life is inspired by fame, but he rejects glory being sought without considering the advantage of the whole (τὸ συμφέρον), as his political leaders do. Cicero recognizes that unceasing striving for supremacy over others often evokes the ethical dilemma of harming the rights and benefits of the whole community. This, I suggest, is the reason he incorporates the topic of gloria in his exposition and clarification of the utile and the honestum in De Officiis. In so doing, he illustrates the problem of the noble desire to attain honor and glory and to provide a corrective to the honor code.117 For Cicero, seeking personal glory is another expression of seeking personal benefit, in most cases at the expense of ethical categories of the common advantage and the right. Therefore, passion for glory is problematic in light of his part-whole ethics of utilitas. It becomes “a euphemism for personal ambition [interest] at the expense of the health and stability of society.”118 Therefore it is destructive dignitate et gloria. In paragraph 143, Cicero provides lists of the “great old men” in Roman history such as Brutos, Camillos, Maximos, etc. 112 Cicero, Sest. 68.143: praesentes fructus neglegamus, posteritatis gloriae serviamus. For Cicero, here and as we will see later, this “immortal glory” (immortale gloria) comes from great services to the whole. 113 Cicero says (Off. 1.33.121) that “the noblest heritage [optima hereditas]…that is handed down from fathers to children, and one more precious than any inherited wealth, is a reputation for virtue [gloria virtutis] and worthy deeds; and to dishonour this must be branded as a sin and a shame.” 114 For example, see Off. 1.20.68. Long, “Cicero’s Politics in De Officiis,” 225. 115 Off. 1.19.65. According to Plutarch (Cic. 6.4), at some point in his life Cicero lost much of his ambition because he was “convinced that the fame towards which he was emulously struggling was a thing that knew no bounds and had no tangible limit” (ὕστερον δὲ  λογισμὸν  αὑτῷ  διδοὺς πολὺ  τῆς  φιλοτιμίας  ὑφελεῖν, ὡς  πρὸς  ἀόριστον  πρᾶγμα  τὴν  δόξαν ἁμιλλώμενος καὶ πέρας ἐφικτὸν οὐκ ἔχουσαν). See Sullivan, 383. 116 For further discussion on this issue, see Long, “Cicero’s Politics in De Officiis,” 223– 33. 117 Cf. J. M. Steadman, “The Pattern of a Christian Hero,” in The Hero in Literature (ed. V. Brombert; Greenwich: Fawcett Fremier, 1969), 165–85; id., “The Arming of an Archetype: Heroic Virtue and the Conventions of Literary Epic,” in Concepts of the Hero in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (eds. N. T. Burns and C. J. Reagan; Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), 147–96. 118 Long, “Cicero’s Politics in De Officiis,” 216.

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both to the whole and to the part(s). Facing the problem of his contemporary leaders’ passion for personal glory at the expense of the welfare of the state, Cicero tries “to reintegrate the utile and the honestum.”119 Cicero’s “ethics of glory” reflects tensions between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ κοινόν, and between the private greed of fame and its connective impact (mostly negative) upon the whole community. He attempts to redefine the human value system of winning superiority but with the ethics of advantage of the whole in mind (which entails the moral goodness of honestum).120 Upon closer investigation of Cicero’s ideal of glory in De Officiis, backed up by his other works, we understand why he broaches the topic prominently in his discussion of the utile, and the desire for honor and glory to conform to the ethics of τὸ συμφέρον. Cicero’s definition of gloria reveals this point and further demonstrates his philosophical and socio-political principle of integrating utilitas and honestum.

2. Definition of Gloria and Utilitas In an early manual of rhetoric, De Inventione, Cicero defines gloria as “a widespread reputation accompanied by praise.”121 This definition of gloria as fama cum laude does not carry any qualifications. But in his later (more mature) works, glory means to Cicero something more than mere fama cum laude.122 In Philippic, for example, the definition of gloria as fama cum laude is qualified by three criteria: 1) approved by both the individual and the multitude (“the whole”); 2) won by the right actions (i.e., honestum); and 3) done great services to the whole (i.e., utilitas).123 This ethically qualified gloria features the same part-whole ethics of utilitas seen in De Officiis. A detailed study of each qualification will further support my reading of De Officiis as Cicero’s exposition of utilitas, and his discussion of honestum in Book I serves this purpose. More importantly, we notice that Cicero discloses the problem of the then-current “Roman honor code” and provides his connective ethics of utilitas as a corrective.124

119 Long, “Cicero’s Politics in De Officiis,” 217; cf. Leeman, 187, 141–2. 120 Thus, integrating τὸ συμφέρον with τὸ καλόν or “doing” with “knowing.” Dyck in his recent commentary on De Officiis, contends that Cicero disregards glory based on “the Stoic valuation of the external goods” and “the transitory nature of what passes for glory in this world.” See Dyck, 194. But these reasons do not explain Cicero’s lengthy dealing with the topic of gloria in his discussion of utilitas. I argue that Cicero’s topic of glory should be evaluated through the ethics of advantage (utilitas = τὸ συμφέρον) in part-whole relationships. 121 Cicero, Inv. 2.55.166: Gloria est frequens de aliquo fama cum laude. Also see Long, “Cicero’s Politics in De Officiis,” 216. 122 Sullivan, 383–7; J. C. Plumpe, “Roman Elements in Cicero’s Panegyric on the Legio Martia,” CJ 36 (1941): 281–2. 123 Cicero, Phil. 1.12.29-30: Est autem gloria laus recte factorum magnorumque in rem publicam meritorum, quae cum optimi cuiusque, tumetiam multitudinis testimonio comprobatur. Cf. Marcel. 8.26. Also see Off. 2.9.31-2.11.38. 124 “A central element of his politics in Off. is a reform of the Roman honour code.” See Long, “Cicero’s Politics in De Officiis,” 224.

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a. Gloria: Approval by the Whole True glory (vera gloria) for Cicero is the agreed-upon approval of the multitude (multitudinis testimonio). He means that personal gloria should benefit the community as a whole. In this manner, conversely, it also means that any deed seeking the common good achieves personal honor and praise. Cicero argues that self-approved gloria, based on personal interests and apart from the advantage of the whole, is like an imperfect statue (adumbrata imago). However, “true glory is a thing of real substance,” approved by the whole community. It should be unanimous praise by moral persons who have the ability to judge excellence of the action (excellenti virtute).125 By contrast, pseudo-glory126 is “a copy of the true” (imitatricem) because it is not linked with the whole.127 It is dangerous because the quest for one’s own best (optima) is often propped up by faults and errors that ruin the whole. Its “counterfeit” (simulatione) corrupts “the fair beauty of true honour” that comes only from seeking the common advantage. Furthermore, those who are blinded by such illusion overthrow their communities (“the whole”) and ruin even themselves (“parts”). Fame without the “agreed approval” of the whole (consuntiens laus) is false glory. Personal deeds that do not benefit the whole are not worthy of honor. “The highest and perfect glory” (summa et perfecta gloria), which in Cicero’s idea does not depart from the context of the whole, consists of three factors qualified by the whole: the affection of all the people, the trust of all the people, and their belief mingled with admiration that certain persons are worthy of honor.128 These elements resonate in the community as a whole the same way they are awakened in individuals who achieve glory. In short, personal glory is inseparable from the sensibility of the whole community.129 The whole community should “love,” “trust,” and “admire” the individual. But Cicero has problems with the Roman honor code that disregards these qualities. It seems that by these three elements of glory, Cicero lays a standard that the advantage of the whole serves as a criterion for judging who is worthy of gloria. The true and perfect glory, therefore, as Seneca later opines similarly,

125 For such a discussion, see Cicero, Tusc. 3.2.3-4; Phil. 1.12.29-30. Cf. Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.5.5: “Moreover, men’s motive in pursuing honor seems to be to assure themselves of their own merit; at least they seek to be honored by men of judgment and by people who know them, that is, they desire to be honored on the ground of virtue.” 126 Cicero frequently makes a sharp distinction between vera and ficta/falsa gloria. See Sullivan, 382–7. For example, the glory won by Gracchus, a son of Publius, is a false one. See Off. 2.12.43. 127 For the following discussion, see Cicero, Tusc. 3.2.4. 128 Cicero, Off. 2.9.31: Summa igitur et perfecta gloria constat ex tribus his: si diligit multitude, si fidem habet, si cum admiratione quadam honore dignos putat. On discussion of each element, see the subsequent sections 2.9.31–2.11.38. Also see Long, “Cicero’s Politics in De Officiis,” 229. 129 Cicero contends that justice secures these three elements for obtaining glory because it seeks to benefit the whole, not simply the part or individual groups. See Off. 2.11.38.

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“demands the agreement of many men”130 or “depends upon the judgments of the many.”131 It exists within the context of the whole. However, the fame and honor that Cicero’s contemporary leaders seek are not so.132 b. Gloria: Accompaniment to the Right Action (Honestum) Glory for Cicero attends right actions (recte factorum).133 Any individual’s acceptable glory should be based not only on the approval of the many or the community, but also founded on virtue or what is right (honestum). Cicero argues that “blessings of fame and glory” follow “virtue like a shadow” (umbra).134 True glory “gives back to virtue the echo of her voice,” and the right actions are followed by it.135 In Tusculan Disputations, he maintains that for the person who attempts great deeds “not from a thirst for fame (non gloriae cupiditate)…but from a thirst for virtue,” glory is a necessary consequence (nescessario gloria), even if it is not the object.136 Further, the nearest path to glory is justice. Cicero maintains that persons who wish to gain true glory (veram gloriam) should “discharge the duties required by justice.”137 He admits that many people, when fired by ambition for glory, usually “lose sight of the claims of justice.”138 However, if the quest for glory sacrifices moral principles, then it is not vera gloria. For Cicero, the individual’s pursuit of glory should be in perfect harmony with “what is morally good” (honestum) and advantageous to the whole. If one’s greatness of soul (= courage)139 lacks justice and battles for personal interests instead of for the common advantage (salute communi), Cicero says, “it is a vice.” Following Plato’s thought on the virtue of courage,140 Cicero argues that heroic courage is faulty if it fights not for the common advantage (utilitate communi) but for selfish interests (sua cupiditate).141

130 Seneca, Ep. 102.12: Gloriam…consensum enim multorum exigit. 131 Seneca, Ep. 102.17: gloria multorum iudiciis constat. 132 Cicero writes (Phil. 1.14.33): they “are totally blind to the true way of glory. To be a citizen dear to all, to deserve well of the State, to be praised, courted, loved, is glorious” (totam ignores viam gloriae. Carum esse civem, bene de re publica mereri, laudari, coli, diligi gloriosum est). Also cited by Long, “Cicero’s Politics in De Officiis,” 230. 133 Cicero, Phil. 1.12.29-30. 134 Cicero, Tusc. 1.45.109; cf. Seneca, Ep. 79.13. 135 Cicero, Tusc. 3.2.3. 136 Cicero, Tusc. 1.38.91. 137 Cicero, Off. 2.13.43. 138 Cicero, Off. 1.8.26. 139 Cicero contends that the greatness of spirit (animi magnitude) is motivated by gloriae cupiditas. See Off. 1.19.65. Cf. Dyck, 206. 140 Plato, Menex. 246c; Laches 197b. 141 Cicero, Off. 1.19.62. Also, based on the Stoic definition of courage (“that virtue which champions the cause of right”), Cicero (Off. 1.19.62) claims: “no one has attained to true glory who has gained a reputation for courage by treachery and cunning; for nothing that lacks justice can be morally right.”

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Cicero further argues that the ambition for power and glory should not cause one to commit wrong.142 If a person seeks power for the sake of glory (gloriae causa), he or she should exclude crime, “for there can be no glory in crime.”143 Any supremacy, whatever the cost, says Cicero, if it is bound up with shame (infamia), cannot be advantageous (utile) both to the individual and to the whole community. Thus, Cicero criticizes explicitly and implicitly Caesar’s political ambition, which went in the wrong direction and precipitated the end of the Republic.144 Ambition for power and glory either through military145 or civil offices should be married to moral principles benefiting the whole.146 Cicero states: But I cannot discover any advantage anywhere except in honor, in glory, and in right action, therefore I consider these goals to be primary and supreme over all others. Advantage should not be thought of as something separate and glorious in itself, but as something bound up with these higher goals.147

According to Cicero’s connective ethic of utilitas, the person who loves honor and glory (φιλότιμον) is at the same time “a lover of what is noble” (φιλόκαλον), to use Aristotle’s expression.148 c. Gloria and the Advantage of the Whole According to the third qualification of Cicero’s definition of glory, the true value of glory is earned by great services to the state (magnorumque in rem publicam meritorum), that is, seeking the common advantage (utilitas).149 He argues that those who seek true glory “must sweat for the common interests” (sudandum est iis pro communibus commodes), even if it entails going through dangers and risks.150 Cicero defines the “only true glory” (sola vere gloria) as fame won by those who seek the profits of the whole community, not

142 Cicero, Off. 1.8.26. Cf. Aristotle, Eth. nic. 4.4.3: “We blame a man as ambitious if he seeks honour more than is right, or from wrong sources; we blame him as unambitious if he does not care about receiving honour even on noble grounds.” 143 Cicero, Off. 3.22.87: Si gloriae causa imperium expetendum est, scelus absit, in quo non potest esse gloria. 144 For Cicero’s passages denigrating Caesar, see Off. 1.8.26-27, 3.21.82-83. 145 The primary vehicle by which a Greco-Roman man gains glory is military service. See Cicero, Off. 2.13.45. For discussion of cupido gloriae through war, see H. H. Turney-High, Primitive War (Columbia: S.C., 1949), 145–9; W. V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327–70 B.C (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), 17–32, and on “Roman Attitudes towards War,” see 9–53. 146 Cicero, Off. 1.8.26. 147 Cicero, Off. 3.28.101: Sed quia nusquam posumus nisi in laude, decore, honestate utilia reperire, propterea illa prima et summa habemus, utilitatis nomen non tam splendidum quam necessarium ducimus. Translation from H. G. Edinger, Cicero: De Officiis/On Duties. 148 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 4.4.4. 149 Cicero, Phil. 1.12.29-30; Marcel. 8.26. See Sullivan, 384. 150 Cicero, Sest. 66.139.

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individual reputation or other selfish interests.151 Thus, vera gloria in Cicero is inseparable from the advantage of the whole.152 Furthermore, Cicero contends that honor and glory should be given only to persons who, with heroic distinction, bring great advantages to the state. “The rewards for heroism and devotion to duty,” maintains Cicero, “ought to be considered sacred and holy and should not be shared with inferior men nor made common [ne…pervulgetur] by being bestowed on men of no distinction.” He warns that we should not awaken the dead who in old days “were deemed worthy of such honour because of their outstanding heroism,” by degrading the quality of their glory and making it common.153 In old days, great admiration and glory were given to those who performed the highest advantage to the whole state (summa utilitate rei publicae),154 not for personal benefit (non sui commodi causa).155 Another vehicle by which a Greco-Roman man gains honor and glory is by holding public office, because those who hold political office, by definition,156 are those who should perform great services to the state (magnorumque in rem publicam meritorum) and care for the interests of the whole (utilitatem civium). In his discussion of “the character of the ideal statesman,” Cicero, however, argues that Pompey and Caesar, for example, did not have the notion of the ideal statesman in mind; the aim of each, Cicero maintains, was his own absolute power rather than the “happiness and honour of the community” (beata et honest civitas). These men thus failed to attain to true glory but achieved only “a shadowy phantom of glory” (adumbratam imaginem gloriae).157 Having Caesar in mind, Cicero asks: “what is more foolish than to prefer unprofitable power…to solid glory?”158 As Dio Cassius later describes Caesar and Pompey,159 Cicero criticizes them for not seeking the

151 Cicero says that this “alone can be called true glory” (quae sola vere gloria nominari potest). See Sest. 66.139. 152 Cicero, Fam. 10.12.5. 153 Cicero, Inv. 2.39.114. 154 Cicero, Off. 2.24.85. 155 Cicero, Inv. 2.38.112. 156 As noted, for his Roman public offices, Cicero adopts Plato’s two precepts (duo Platonis praecepta) for those in charge of government affairs that public administrators should seek the common advantage (utilitatem civium) and “care for the welfare of the whole body politic” (totum corpus rei publicae). See Off. 1.25.85; cf. 2.13.45; Phil. 1.12.29. 157 Cicero, Tusc. 3.2.3. Here Cicero does not mention Caesar and Pompey explicitly, but scholars (cf. Bringmann, 198–9; Dyck, 360) believe that Cicero has them in mind. See footnotes of the text in the Loeb Classical Library edition, pages 227–8; Off. 1.8.26; 3.21.82. Also see Sest. 66.139 and footnote “a” in that section. 158 Cicero, Phil. 5.18.49-50. 159 According to Dio’s Roman History (41.17.3), Caesar and Pompey called themselves fighters for the public advantages (ἑαυτοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν πολεμεῖν λέγοντες) whereas their opponents were enemies of the country. Dio stresses both leaders actually were ruining the public interests while seeking only their own personal interests (τά ἲδια μόνα). See Atkins, “Domina et Regina Virtutum,” 274.

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good of the state but rather their own interests.160 The ideal statesman gives “honorable glory” (gloria ampla) to citizens.161 For Cicero, fama cum laude is not merely achieving civic offices and political honors. It is the high reward for the remarkable advantages that the individual brings to the state. Cicero maintains that those who seek their own glory (like some of his contemporary leaders) rather than the advantage of the whole, therefore, ought to eschew public office.162 In the summary of his ethics of glory and advantage in Book II of De Officiis, Cicero says that the “great men” (magnorum hominum) look after the utilitas reipublicae (“the advantage of the whole/state”). When individuals render the utmost advantage to the whole (summa utilitate rei publicae), he concludes, “they will win popularity and glory [gratiam et gloriam] for themselves.”163 Therefore, as these examples have shown, Cicero’s idea of gloria is subject to the connective ethics of utilitas communis (common advantage). The individuals, when they take the path of the “great men,” contribute to the advantages of the whole community and at the same time gain gloria for themselves.164 Cicero’s ideal of gloria cannot be realized apart from the advantage of the whole (utilitas/τὸ συμφέρον). It is bound up with public benefit for the whole community.165

C. Conclusion I have suggested that Cicero’s De Officiis, written at the end of his life, is an exposition of what I have called “the part-whole connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον” handed down from the classical philosophers for the Roman audience. It is the single existing literary work of the Greco-Roman moralphilosophical traditions that deals with τὸ συμφέρον (utilitas) as a prime ethical norm, its socio-political contexts, functions, related issues, and ideological 160 Sullivan, 390; Syme, 145. 161 Cicero, following Scipio, writes: “As a safe voyage is the aim of the pilot, health of the physician, victory of the general, so the ideal statesman will aim at happiness for the citizens of the state to give them material security, copious wealth, wide-reaching distinction [gloria ampla] and untarnished honour.” See Att. 8.11. 162 Cicero, Sest. 66.138f. On how Cicero sets himself as an example and how he cares for personal fame (meam gloriam) and for the welfare of the citizens (ad communem salutem omnium vivium), see Sest. 16.38; Arch. 11.28. Cicero justifies his political offices when he states that he took his “consulship for the safety of the empire, the lives of our citizens, and the common weal of the state.” See Arch. 11.28: in consulatu nostro vobiscum simul pro salute huius urbis atque imperii et pro vita civium proque universa re publica gessimus. 163 Cicero, Off. 2.85. Dyck (479) considers the paragraph as the last section of Cicero’s topic on glory, and calls it a “peroration.” 164 Dyck, 479. 165 Sullivan, 384. Long comments that Cicero “treats glory not as a self-sufficient objective of the just man, but as something he should seek to acquire because of its utility to his role in the life of the community.” See his “Cicero’s Politics in De Officiis,” 231.

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misuses. Cicero’s De Officiis bears the enduring ethical tension of integrating what is right (τὸ καλόν) with what is beneficial (τὸ συμφέρον) in the body politic. For Cicero, as in Greek ethical tradition, the utilitas communis or τὸ συμφέρον (being integrated with τὸ καλόν) becomes the criterion for guiding proper behavior and judging individual actions, including “the highest human ideal” of pressing toward superiority. In particular, Cicero highlights the human value system (as a critical example of the perverted application of the utile) predominantly among his contemporaries of the upper stratum in the social hierarchy who damage social part-whole relationships.166 Their “ambitions and eminence for glory” (cupidi splendoris et gloriae) are far removed from moral duty (ab officio) and are dangerous because they “rob one to enrich another” (qui eripiunt alliis, quod aliis largiantur) and sacrifice public benefits.167 In solving the socio-political problems caused by greed for personal interest or glory (gloriae cupiditatem), he applies the ethics of utilitas (τὸ συμφέρον) as a corrective by which he identifies personal glory and private benefit with bringing, or seeking for, advantages to the whole community. Cicero does not reject personal glory, or private interest. Rather, he exhorts his audience to “invest” (conlocare) it and earnestly strive for it if it is advantageous for the whole (τὸ συμφέρον), being grounded on the principle of moral goodness (τὸ καλόν). Vera gloria or the highest form of (seeking) the personal fame and benefit, according to his part-whole ethics of utilitas/ τὸ συμφέρον, comes from unselfish devotion to the benefit of the whole community, sacrificing, when necessary, what would render personal glory in deference to the advantage of the whole community.168

166 Cicero censures their moral and political footprints, including those of Julius Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus. For example, see Off. 1.8.25-26, 1.14.43, 2.7.23, 2.8.27-29, 3.20.82-21.85. Cf. Sullivan, 390; Bringmann, 197–9. 167 Cicero, Off. 1.14.43. 168 Cicero, Sest. 32.70; Phil.1.12.29; Off. 1.24.83-4.

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Chapter 5

Paul’s Use of Part-Whole Argument of ΤῸ ΣΥΜΦΈΡΟΝ in 1 Corinthians A. Summary and Introduction In previous chapters I discussed τὸ συμφέρον in the Greco-Roman moral tradition, its context and functions, and related issues. From this study we can conclude that τὸ συμφέρον, understood as common advantage (ἕν τὸ συμφέρον καὶ κοινόν),1 is a part-whole connective ethic that guides appropriate actions (τὰ καθήκοντα) within the individual-community relationship. Five points from this discussion can be highlighted for an adequate grasp of Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον. First, τὸ συμφέρον as an ethical category appears in a variety of Greco-Roman socio-political, rhetorical, and moral-philosophical traditions. The common assumption that a certain philosophical school (e.g., Stoicism) monopolized the term συμφέρειν/συμφέρον is therefore mistaken.2 Paul’s use 1 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 7.54.1; cf. Dio Chrysostom, Or. 14.6-7. 2 Scholars, following Weiss (Korintherbrief, 158), commonly confine Paul’s use of the term to Stoic moral discussion (e.g., Dupont, 307; Conzelmann, 108–9). The frequent occurrence of συμφέρον in Stoic moral teachings has prompted some scholars’ assumption that Paul borrows his communitarian thrust from Stoicism. It is misleading, however, to interpret Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον within the philosophical school of Stoicism, for moral philosophers and politicians from early Greek to the Hellenistic Roman moral traditions discuss the term. See Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 33–4; cf. Havelock, 391. In Paul and the Stoics, Engberg-Pedersen argues that Paul’s communal ethics exactly parallel Stoic moral progress (οἰκείωσις theory) of turning away from a self-oriented lifestyle to other-seeking communal life, and thus he concludes that Paul (and his ethical model) is Stoic. Following this line of argument, Albert Garcilazo contends that “the issues revealed in 1 Corinthians may be understood against the backdrop of one particular philosophical tradition, namely Stoicism.” See his The Corinthian Dissenters and the Stoics, Studies in Biblical Literature 106 (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 14. Engberg-Pedersen’s study has two flaws. First, he does not include 1 Corinthians in his study of Paul’s ethical model parallel with Stoic ethical theory of οἰκείωσις. As I have already noted, a study of Paul’s other-regarding community ethic is not complete until we include Paul’s communitarian rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον which appears explicitly in his discussion of individual-community issues in 1 Corinthians. Second, Stoic οἰκείωσις theory is a Stoicized development of the widespread communitarian partwhole argument of τὸ συμφέρον. Stoic moral progress of identifying the individual person as a part of the communal “we” must be understood in light of the Greco-Roman part-whole argument that generates the other-regarding communal ethics of τὸ συμφέρον. Paul’s communal ethics should be placed within this tradition, not confined within Stoic conversion theory. For a detailed discussion, see “Tὸ Συμφέρον and Stoic Οἰκείωσις” in Ch. 2.

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of τὸ συμφέρον as a line of argument must be understood within a wider set of conventions beyond seeking the common advantage. More specifically, Paul’s appropriation of the term includes the Hellenistic ethical koinē and is not to be understood simply within the particular philosophical school of Stoicism. Second, τὸ συμφέρον to be classified as an ethical category requires its proper context. Previous studies of τὸ συμφέρον have neglected its inextricable ties to part-whole argumentation and have therefore been found wanting. As shown above, τὸ συμφέρον appears in the part-whole context from early Greek morality down to later Hellenistic moral philosophy. In that context it becomes the primary socio-political and ethical norm that addresses individual-community issues. Τὸ συμφέρον of the whole plays a connective role, binding together parts that had been previously split, into a unified whole for the common benefit of both the public and private spheres. Its purpose surpasses the benefits to a particular group or to a private person.3 Third, as an ethical category τὸ συμφέρον faces multiple interpretations and is complicated and nuanced in the Greco-Roman moral tradition. In many cases, for example, τὸ συμφέρον requires a specific definition regarding those who gain advantage;4 the meaning and correct usage of τὸ συμφέρον is not self-evident and often must be qualified by other ethical considerations such as what is right (καλόν), just (δίκαιον), or permissible (ἔξεστιν). Furthermore, there is an ethical tension between τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ ἴδιον, as well as between τὸ συμφέρον and other moral categories in real life situations. The idea of “advantage,” whether private (τὸ ἰδιᾳ συμφέρον) or communal (τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον), confronts the situational dilemma in which τὸ συμφέρον remains in tension behind other ethical categories, thus forcing a choice between one norm against another (e.g., rebutting τὸ καλόν by τὸ συμφέρον).5 To analyze these ethical choices, I have constructed two sets of formulae, that is, two ways to determine how it is being used: arguments of choosing “either [τὸ συμφέρον] or [τὸ καλόν]” vs. “both-and”; and “apolitical” vs. “organic” part-whole.6 I have argued that the “either-or” argument describes ethical tendencies primarily associated with the apolitical approach to the part-whole. By contrast, the “both-and” argument characterizes the organic approach to the part-whole, which allowed moral philosophers to propose a communal 3 For example, Dionysius Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.85.1: ἡ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον εἰσάγουσα καὶ δι’ ἀλλήλων ἀμφότερα ποιοῦσα σώζεσθαι τὰ μέρη. αὕτη μέντοι πρώτη καὶ μόνη συνάγει τε ἡμᾶς εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ οὐκ ἐάσει ποτὲ δίχ’ ἀλλήλων γενέσθαι (“It is the assurance that introduces the common advantage and preserves both parts of the state through their mutual assistance. This, after all, is the first and only assurance that draws us together, and it will never permit us to be sundered from each other”). Also as cited, Plato, Leg. 9.875a-b; Plutarch, Arat. 24.5. 4 Such as ἰδιᾳ (ἐμαυτῷ, ἑκάστῳ) to assign the advantage to a group or individual person(s), or κοινῇ (τῇ πόλει, τῷ ὃλῳ) to refer to the “common advantage/good” of the whole. 5 In addition, there is a dispute regarding which one is more advantageous (μᾶλλον συμφέρον) or serves the greater good (μείζον ἀγαθόν) when both of two proposed courses seem to be beneficial. See Aristotle, Rhet. 1.7.1-41. Cf. Cicero, Off. 2.25.88; 1 Cor 7:9, 11:17, 12:31, 13:13, 14:5). 6 On the meaning of the term “apolitical” in this book, see n.8 in Ch. 1 and n.89 in Ch. 3.

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ethical principle and common advantage that embraces both private (ἰδιᾳ συμφέρον) and common benefit (κοινῇ συμφέρον) in the part-whole dynamic.7 Fourth, in this organic approach to the part-whole, τὸ συμφέρον remains the ethical connective. This proper part-whole framework does “not separate” (μὴ χωρίζειν) private morality from the common good. Rather, it prevents ideological misuse of personal rights and seeking one’s own benefit that sacrifices the good of others. Thus the organic part-whole paradigm does not allow an agent or a policy to make a conflicting “either-or” choice, for example, between τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δίκαιον or τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ συμφέρον/δίκαιον/καλόν. With regard to the “either-or” aspect of the apolitical part-whole, τὸ συμφέρον is often coupled (explicitly or implicitly) with so-called ethical values, but is often misused ideologically or out of selfishness, being detached from justice and moral goodness. Fifth and finally, the primary purpose of the Greco-Roman ὁμόνοια (concord) speeches conforms consistently with Paul’s part-whole argument of τὸ συμφέρον in 1 Corinthians. The Greco-Roman ὁμόνοια does not simply define the unity of the community. Rather, it is the resulting “advantage” commonly expressed by the σωτηρία/σώζειν terminology. Of course, unity is a major concern for rhetoricians and politicians, but it is not the end purpose in itself. As noted, the “security or preservation of the whole/community/ city” (σωτηρία τοῦ ὅλου/τῆς πόλεως) comes first by establishing concord, the common goal. Ὁμόνοια (i.e., a unified part-whole) and σωτηρία (i.e., the resulting common advantage) are inextricably interrelated and align exactly with Paul’s part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον in 1 Corinthians. Recent rhetorical studies have brought significant merit to understanding 1 Corinthians as a deliberative speech advocating ὁμόνοια. While the correlation between ὁμόνοια and σωτηρία has not gone completely unnoticed,8 scholars have not adequately addressed the interrelation of these two ideas as they are juxtaposed in Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians. Paul hopes to achieve an important agenda through unity (see Chapter 6 below). In advancing it, he uses the same σώζειν/σωτηρία terminology as that of his contemporary philosophers. Yet for Paul, the meaning of σωτηρία includes a distinct definition in light of Christ’s death, resurrection, and future revelation (ἀποκάλυψις, 1 Cor 1:7).

7 For example, see Aristotle, Pol. 1255b 10: τὸ γὰρ αὐτο συμφέρει τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ ὃλῳ. Also see Cicero, Off. 3.13.56-7; Dionysius Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 7.54.1: there is “one advantage to be considered and that [is] the common advantage” (ἕν τὸ συμφέρον καὶ κοινόν); Hierocles, On Duties in Stobaeus 3.39.35: we should not separate the common advantage from the private advantage but they are to be considered “one and the same” (τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον τοῦ ἰδιᾳ μὴ χωρίζειν, ἀλλ’ ἕν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ταὐτόν). 8 For example, Martin (Slavery as Salvation, 144) observes that “the public good is often expressed as the salvation of the community.” Martin (212 n.16) cites Epictetus, Philo, Dio Chrysostom, and Isocrates; Glad (Paul and Philodemus, 251) comments that σώζειν is “a common term among moralists used to connote their concern to benefit others.” But they do not go further to discuss how these two ideas (ὁμόνοια and σωτηρία) are correlated.

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The above summary will provide the basis for a study of Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον, a technical term that shows up significantly in his part-whole rhetoric in 1 Corinthians.9 Against the background laid out in Chapters 1 to 4, 1 Corinthians features a Greco-Roman part-whole connective sense of seeking the “common advantage” (τὸ συμφέρον) that Paul uses to overcome “idionistc” (individualistic) ideology10 and/or private morality (τὸ ἴδιον).11 The latter had become a major source of internal problems for the church at Corinth. In this chapter I argue that divisive conflicts among Corinthian believers arise from their distorted emphasis on τὸ ἴδιον (personal benefit, honor, glory, prestige, status, etc.). According to Greco-Roman part-whole discourses, socio-political conflicts (πόλεμοι) and civic divisions (στάσεις) arise from conflicting interests within the community and from the spurning of the common interest by individual members or individual groups.12 As in the Greco-Roman socio-political part-whole schemes we have examined, Paul’s part-whole “body of Christ” creates a particular moral space in which a singular part’s priorities should be reoriented from seeking τὸ ἴδιον to seeking τὸ συμφέρον, or the concern for the whole. Τὸ συμφέρον must be the criterion for proper behavior in a healthy part-whole social dynamic. Furthermore, idionistic behavior among the Corinthian believers is linked to their honor codes and social values, thus is characterized by boasting, arrogance, and status, particularly among the socially powerful who claim wisdom, power, and wealth (cf. 1:26-30). Paul presents τὸ συμφέρον as the primary remedy for this factionalism and as the counter-balancing moral code over against the

9 Paul uses the term συμφέρον or its cognate forms five times in 1 Corinthians (6:12; 7:35; 10:23, 33; 12:7). In addition, the definite article alone in 10:24 and 13:5 indicates that the neuter adjective συμφόρον is ellipsed, a usage commonly found in Greek literature. See Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 33 n.58. Mitchell cites Aristotle, Pol. 1279b 7-10. 10 Ideology in this book is understood as “the system of symbols that supports and enforces the power structures of the dominant class and ruling groups” in society. See Martin, Corinthian Body, xv; Thompson, Ideology, 58. Cf. Charles A. Wanamaker, “A Rhetoric of Power: Ideology and 1 Corinthians 1–4,” in Paul and the Corinthians: Studies on a Community in Conflict. Essays in Honour of Margaret Thrall (eds. Trevor J. Burke and J. Keith Elliott; Leiden/ Boston: Brill, 2003), 116–20. As noted above, early Greek and Hellenistic understanding of the socio-cosmic part-whole argument is basically ideological, for example, as Epictetus (Diss. 4.7.7) succinctly states that parts are created “to serve the needs of the whole” (πρὸς χρείαν τῶν ὅλων). Cf. Plato, Leg. 10.903b-d; Cicero, Off. 1.35.126. In a socio-ethical part-whole context, the emphasis on τὸ ἴδιον is also ideological, as shown in our previous discussion of the Greco-Roman part-whole argument, in that the socially powerful or the upper strata of the social pyramid often appropriate the idea of advantage and think that the less powerful or the lower status exist for their advantage. The problem of τὸ ἴδιον among the Corinthian believers reflects this pattern. 11 By private morality I mean an ethical attitude that “I can do what I want” in seeking personal benefit (τὸ ἴδιον) and not considering its effect upon the community (cf. 6:12). This attitude may result from an exaggerated misapplication of Paul’s view of freedom in Christ. 12 Cf. Plato, Leg. 4.715b and 9.875a; Cicero, Rep. 1.32.49; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.86.1; Epictetus, Diss. 1.22.14; Josephus, B.J. 1.218; Dio Chrysostom, Or. 34.16; Marcus Aurelius, Med. 9.23. See my discussion in Chs. 2 and 3 above. Also see Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 142–7.

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Corinthians’ idionistic apolitical ideology13 that overrides the common good. In this chapter I demonstrate that τὸ συμφέρον, in tension with τὸ ἴδιον, is the consistent pattern throughout Paul’s line of argumentation in 1 Corinthians.14 Before proceeding, I digress to highlight two notable features about Paul’s use of συμφέρειν/συμφέρον. First, in 1 Corinthians he does not limit the concept of seeking common advantage only to the term συμφέρειν/συμφέρον.15 He employs “alternative linguistic expressions” with semantic overlap, such as τὸ καλόν (the good, 5:6), ἀγάπη (love, 8:1; 13:5-7; 14:1; 16:14), ὠφελεῖν (to benefit, 13:3; 14:6), οἰκοδομεῖν (to edify, 10:23), and σώζειν (to save, 9:22, 10:33). All of these advance the development of his other-focused morality as expressed in τὸ συμφέρον as a corrective to idionistic behavior among the Corinthian believers.16 Two expressions stand out: the cross and ἀγάπη (love). For Paul, Christ died for others, and this image of the crucified Christ exemplifies the seminal behavior that seeks the benefit of others.17 Further, Paul develops an ethic of ἀγάπη as an alternative expression for the sentiment he asserts in his use of τὸ συμφέρον.18 Ἀγάπη, like τὸ συμφέρον, represents a constructive (οἰκοδομεῖν) element in the community (8:1; cf. 14:12) and its other-regarding quality of not seeking each one’s own benefit (13:5). These two elements set apart Paul’s discourse of τὸ συμφέρον from other GrecoRoman part-whole arguments.19 The second notable feature is that, while 1 Corinthians displays major “classic features” of τὸ συμφέρον as defined in previous chapters, it also presents the Corinthian body as a part-whole collective with the added significance of their being members of the body of Christ. As discussed, the human body in the 13 See the discussion below under “Apolitical vs. Organic Part-Whole and Idionistic Ideology.” 14 Similarly, David Hall states, “The whole of 1 Corinthians is an attempt to turn the Corinthian mindset from an individualistic, competitive assertion of one’s own gifts and rights into an ethic of consideration for others.” But Hall does not grasp the issue in terms of the connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον as I do. See his The Unity of the Corinthian Correspondence (JSNTSup 251; London/New York: Clark, 2003), 74. 15 For a helpful graphic chart of Paul’s use of the verb συμφέρειν, or the neuter participle and neuter adjective συμφέρον in his letters to the Corinthians (1 Cor 6:12; 7:35; 10:23, 33; 12:7; 2 Cor 8:10; 12:1), see Ingrid Kitzberger, Bau der Gemeinde. Das paulinische Wortfeld oikodome/ (ep)oikodomein (Wuerzburg: Echter Verlag, 1986), 254–7. 16 Similarly, in his discussion of a degree of the Corinthians’ maturity, Sampley states, “Paul has alternative linguist expressions” such as “babies,” “unspiritual person,” and “spiritual person.” See J. Paul Sampley, “Faith and Its Moral Life: A Study of Individuation in the Thought of the Apostle Paul,” in Faith and History: Essays in Honor of Paul W. Meyer (eds. John T. Corroll, et al.; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 227. 17 Therefore, the image of the cross is pervasive in his argument of τὸ συμφέρον throughout 1 Corinthians. For further discussion, see below under “The Story of ‘Christ Crucified’ and Τὸ Συμφέρον.” 18 As we shall see, in Paul’s argument, “love” is inextricably linked to τὸ συμφέρον. 19 Of course, beside these two, there are more distinctive features of Paul’s use and application of τὸ συμφέρον in 1 Corinthians, as we shall see in our analysis of his part-whole argument.

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Greco-Roman part-whole socio-cosmology serves as a microcosm intended to represent the same features on a larger scale. In what follows I will discuss how features of “the body” undergird Paul’s response to the divisions and conflicts at Corinth. The (part-whole) body image pervades the letter, not simply chapter 12.20 In fact, the body analogy represents the essence of the part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον, as previously discussed. I will therefore use the body, which symbolizes the social collectivity in both the ancient and modern moral tradition,21 as the guiding principle in 1 Corinthians for my argument for understanding Paul’s part-whole paradigm as the context of τὸ συμφέρον. I will demonstrate that the Corinthian problems arise from their apolitical ideology that emphasizes τὸ ἴδιον rather than a life of common good characterized by τὸ συμφέρον.

B. “Discerning the Body” and Τὸ Συμφέρον 1. One Body in Christ: Paul’s Part-Whole Argument In 1 Corinthians Paul grounds his arguments and ethical directives on the partwhole idea of the body.22 Like Greco-Roman moral philosophers, he employs the image of the body to provide the proper understanding of the exercise of τὸ συμφέρον.23 His body metaphor, however, differs from that of popular moral and political philosophy “because its distinctive and identifying feature is that it is the body of Christ.”24 In his lengthy discourse on the body (ch. 12), Paul emphasizes that God “arranged” the part-whole body mechanism (ὁ θεὸς συνεκέρασεν τὸ σῶμα)25 for three major purposes: to prevent “dissension within the body” (μὴ ᾖ σχίσμα ἐν τῷ σώματι, v.25a); “for the common good” 20 Jerome H. Neyrey, “Body Language in 1 Corinthians: The Use of Anthropological Models for Understanding Paul and His Opponents,” Semeia 35 (1986): 129–70. 21 For example, see Emil Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (trans. George Simpson; New York: Free Press, 1933), 76–115; id., The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (trans. Karen E. Fields; New York: Free Press, 1995); Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 65–70; id., Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London/New York: Routledge, 2000). 22 Paul uses the term σῶμα forty-six times in 1 Corinthians whereas it appears only thirteen times in Romans. See Neyrey, “Body Language in 1 Corinthian,” 129–70; Walter, Gemeinde als Leib Christi, 105–47. This fact will further support my argument that 1 Corinthians features a part-whole body rhetoric of seeking the common good to combat the improper exercise of the private morality. 23 For my discussion on the part-whole socio-cosmology as the context for τὸ συμφέρον, see Chs. 2 and 3 above. On Paul’s use of the body metaphor, see Best, One Body in Christ, 215– 25; Neyrey, “Body Language in 1 Corinthians,” 157; Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 157–64; James D. G. Dunn, “‘The Body of Christ’ in Paul,” in Worship, Theology and Ministry in the Early Church: Essays in Honor of Ralph P. Martin (eds. M. J. Wilkins and T. Paige; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1992), 157–60; Walter, Gemeinde als Leib Christi, 105–47 (70–147). 24 James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 551 (italics his). 25 Several times Paul uses the phrase (“God arranged”) in ch.12. See vv.18, 24, and 28.

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(πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, v.7); and to realize the connective mutual “care for one another” (τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων μεριμνῶσιν τὰ μέλη, v.25b). These elements characterize Paul’s part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον that addresses the individualistic and apolitical outlook that emphasizes τὸ ἴδιον, creating the problems in Corinth. The resultant divisions (σχίσματα) include the failure to discern the notion of the body, that is, as members who care for one another (cf. μὴ διακρίνων τὸ σῶμα, 11:29).26 In the first half of this chapter, I will demonstrate how these three features of the body undergird Paul’s part-whole rhetoric that defines the communal aspect of the body of Christ and reorients the Corinthians to see themselves as parts of a greater whole, “both as the body of Christ, and as the body of Christ.”27 a. “No Dissension within the Body”28 The body is “the most common topos in ancient literature for unity.”29 Likewise, Paul’s body metaphor is “a vital expression of the unity of a community despite the diversity of its members.”30 Particularly, Paul emphasizes oneness to advance his concern to seek unity over factionalism in the community (cf. 1:10, 13, 3:3; 11:18-9).31 The letter is replete with “unity” terminology. As Dale Martin notes, from the very beginning of the document Paul “provides a rhetorical flourish by repetition of the p sound” to emphasize “all(one)ness.”32 Paul states, “those who are sanctified in Christ Jesus” include “all [πᾶσιν] those who in every [παντί] place” (1:2). The Greek term for “all” (πᾶς) occurs four times in verses 4 and 5. Paul’s emphasis on oneness then reaches its crescendo with his thesis statement from which the rest of his argument naturally unfolds, highlighted in verse 10: “you all [πάντες] speak the same thing.”33 Moreover, Paul’s repeated use of the Greek word for “one” (εἷς) further reinforces his assertion of unified wholeness within the community.34 In response to the Corinthians’ divisive puffing up one leader over another, Paul 26 Paul’s phrase “without discerning the body” is an expression that denotes the apolitical ethical stance among Corinthians in their individual-community relationships. See my discussion below on the “Organic vs. Apolitical Part-Whole and Τὸ Συμφέρον in 1 Corinthians”. 27 Dunn, “The Body of Christ,” 162 (italics mine). In a distinctive sense, Paul’s ethical rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον is the rhetoric of the body of Christ. 28 Paul writes, “God so arranged that body…that there may be no dissension within the body” (ὁ θεὸς συνεκέρασεν τὸ σῶμα…ἵνα μὴ ᾖ σχίσμα ἐν τῷ σώματι, 12:24-25). 29 Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 161. 30 Dunn, Theology of Paul, 550. 31 John K. Chow, Patronage and Power: A Study of Social Networks in Corinth (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1992), 176. 32 See Martin, Corinthian Body, 56–8. 33 According to recent rhetorical studies, 1:10 is the “thesis statement” (πρόθεσις) for the entire letter. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 66–8, 198–200. Other verses in which p sound for “all”-ness include 10:17 and 12:12-13. 34 The word εἷς occurs 31 times in 1 Corinthians. See Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 90–1, 180.

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argues (in 3:8) that all workers (in this case, himself and Apollos) are one (ἕν), but with differing functions. In his introduction to the lengthy discourse on the body, in chapter 12, Paul uses ἕν four times to emphasize the oneness of the social body as one “body of Christ” (σῶμα Χριστοῦ).35 Similarly, elsewhere in the epistle – his discourse about the Lord’s Supper – Paul appropriates the metaphor of the body of Christ (10:16-17): “Because there is one bread, we who are many are one body, for we all partake of the one bread” (emphasis added). By his use of the image of one loaf (εἷς ἄρτος) Paul asserts the unity of the community. In short, Paul’s emphasis on the oneness of the body characterizes his rhetoric that underscores ὁμόνοια (concord) among the Corinthian believers. Paul’s argument for oneness among the Corinthians continues in his discussion of baptism. Baptism, for Paul, marks a transition from self alone to the new relationship in the part-whole body of Christ. As a ritual, it breaks a boundary, transcending previous social, ethnic, status, and gender distinctions (12:13; cf. Gal 3:28). Diverse groups become one body (ἓν σῶμα) through entrance to a new community marked in baptism.36 In this way, Paul’s partwhole paradigm is more inclusive than the Greco-Roman socio-political appropriation of part-whole ideology.37 At the beginning of his letter Paul has already implicitly declared that the Corinthian believers constitute an inclusive universal body (ἐκκλησία, 1:2; κοινωνία, 1:9), comprised of diverse people in every place (ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ).38 The phrase ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ clearly implies a boundary-crossing universal category for Paul’s part-whole paradigm. He demonstrates this later in the letter (e.g., 9:19-23) when he explicitly develops the idea (in 12:13) that by “one Spirit we were all baptized into one body – Jews or Greeks, slaves or free – and all made to drink of one Spirit” (emphasis added). Paul’s image of “drink[ing] of one Spirit” in baptism echoes his discourse on spiritual gifts as being given “by one and the same Spirit” (τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα, 12:11) to each for the “common purpose” (ἕν, 3:8) and common advantage (πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, 12:7). He anticipates the discussion of χαρισμάτα (gifts) in subsequent chapters (13-14) noting that the multiplicity of spiritual gifts (διαιρέσεις χαρισμάτων) is distributed by the same divine source39 to each member individually (ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ, 12:11). For Paul, 35 David G. Horrell, Solidarity and Difference: A Contemporary Reading of Paul’s Ethics (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 106 n.27. 36 Similarly, Horrell states, “baptism constructs a new form of human solidarity which transcends the lines of previous distinctions.” See his Solidarity and Difference, 106. 37 For example, slaves and females are often excluded from the Greek ἐκκλησία in a polis. See Demosthenes, Or. 9.3. Paul’s ἐκκλησία as a part-whole constitution, however, is more inclusive. It crosses over the boundaries of social status, birth, gender, and ethnicity. In Ch. 6, I will discuss how Paul develops and applies the idea of “advantage” to his more inclusive partwhole argument. 38 Of course, by ἐκκλησία Paul usually refers to a local church; but his vision even with the local church in Corinth is universal to embrace ethnic diversity (see below and Ch. 6). 39 Paul emphasizes the “one and same” divine source for the gifts in 12:4-11: τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα (v.4); ὁ αὐτὸς κύριος (v.5); ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς θεὸς (v.6); τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα (v.8); ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πνεύματι

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individuation (e.g., τὸ ἴδιον) is unthinkable apart from the communal body (e.g., τὸ συμφέρον) of Christ. He explicitly develops this notion in chapter 12 and beyond. Baptism transforms believers into a new “pool,” a moral context wherein the individual member’s outlook is reoriented from self- to other-regarding. In other words, the Corinthians, in baptism, have experienced a transition from the previous self-serving libertine orientation of τὸ ἴδιον to an outward-focused life as “members of Christ,” of τὸ συμφέρον (6:11, 15). Paul applies this ethical paradigm in his discussion of sexual immorality and lawsuits among believers in chapters 5 and 6. Here Paul reminds the Corinthians that they were changed through baptism from a former life to the new life of “one spirit with him [Christ].” He defines the new category with the question: “Do you not know that your bodies are [now] members of Christ?” (6:15). In the same context Paul uses a slave market metaphor to emphasize the transition from the idionistic outlook to that of τὸ συμφέρον. Paul implies that the Corinthians no longer live in the realm of τὸ ἴδιον (οὐκ ἐστὲ ἑαυτῶν; “you are not your own,” 6:19) because they have been “bought with a price” (v.20). Moreover, the individual member belongs to the larger body of Christ as a “temple of the Holy Spirit” (see below), a new dimension of the part-whole concept of τὸ συμφέρον. Paul argues in the slave metaphor that within the new slave-owner’s (God’s) “house”40 personal self-serving freedoms (cf. 6:12) are overruled by concern for the other members of the same house (cf. ch. 9). Paul expresses the same principle in his metaphor of the community as “God’s building” (θεοῦ οἰκοδομή) and “God’s temple” (ναὸς θεοῦ) (3:9-17). The οἰκοδομή metaphor is a political topos often used by moral philosophers and politicians.41 For Paul, however, the community is a temple in which God’s (2 times, v.9); and τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα (v.11). Here Paul’s undivided image of the divine source (θεός, κύριος, and πνεῦμα) that activates all the gifts in everyone (ἐνεργῶν τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν) concentrates in v.7: “To each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the common good” (ἑκάστῳ δὲ δίδοται ἡ φανέρωσις τοῦ πνεύματος πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον; emphasis added). Paul’s implied yet clear argument is that God, the Lord, and the Spirit work together for a single purpose (cf. 3:89) and where God activates (e.g., in the ecclesial body at Corinth) there should be no dissension. This image echoes ch. 3 where Paul discusses how each worker (e.g., Paul and Apollos) performs the task that “the Lord assigned to each” (ἑκάστῳ ὡς ὁ κύριος ἔδωκεν, v.5) and workers (διάκονοι) are “working together” (συνεργοί) for the same (ἕν) purpose of edifying “God’s building” (θεοῦ οἰκοδομή), that is, here, the ecclesial body of Christ as Paul develops particularly in chs. 12-14. In ch. 3 as well, Paul features the unified image of God (e.g., κύριος, v. 5; πνεῦμα, v.16; θεός, multiple times) working among the Christian community (cf. “among you” [ἐν ὑμῖν]) at Corinth. In ch. 12 and in the following chapters Paul’s concern becomes clear with his argument that there should be no dissension among members as in the “body” (ch. 12) because they have drunk of the same Spirit, likely a reference to the Lord’s Supper (ch. 11). 40 Remember Paul’s metaphor of the part-whole institution of God’s building/house/ temple, cf. 3:16 and 6:19; also see below. 41 Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 99–111; also see Bruno Blumenfeld, The Political Paul: Justice, Democracy and Kingship in a Hellenistic Framework (JSNTSup 210; London/New York: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001), 108.

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Spirit resides, thus emphasizing solidarity.42 When he asserts “God’s Spirit dwells in you,” the plural “you” (ὑμεῖς) signals that the Spirit resides in the midst of the community as a whole.43 Paul maintains that the community is God’s building, upheld in unity by the divine pneuma and thus should not (and cannot) be divided. As John Lanci has shown, a deity’s temple in the Greco-Roman religious tradition “was a powerful symbol of the unity of the people.”44 Paul’s building metaphor also implies each member’s role within the house.45 For the θεοῦ οἰκοδομή (God’s building) Paul’s role was to lay a foundation (θεμέλιον = Jesus Christ, 3:11) on which other workers would build. He designates himself a σοφὸς ἀρχιτέκτων (“skilled master builder,” 3:10), an expression similar to that used for an expert in the Greek political theory of community-building.46 No foundation is necessary beyond the one that has been skillfully laid (3:11). Therefore, Paul insists that there should be no division (θεμέλιος ἄλλος) in the community.47 He and others are co-workers (συνεργοί), “called” for the single purpose (ἕν, 3:8; cf. “the same mind and the same purpose,” 1:10) of building the θεοῦ οἰκοδομή, that is, the corporate body of Christ. Indeed, Paul declares, “You are the building of God” (θεοῦ οἰκοδομή ἐστε). Paul’s distinctive understanding of “parts” and their place within the unified whole insists that individuals are called by God, who forms them a new whole. To summarize, Paul’s emphasis in 1 Corinthians on believers’ one body-ness in Christ is pervasive and packed with such metaphors of oneness as baptism into one body, drinking of one Spirit, community as one bread, and members as God’s building/temple, and also the body of Christ. Paul lays out a unified Corinthian social body that will serve as the context for defining proper ethics within that body.

42 As W. Jaeger has pointed out, Paul applies the building metaphor to the Christian community “so that its members would join together to form an organic whole.” See “Tyrtaeus on True Arete,” in Werner Jaeger. Five Essays (trans. A. M. Fishke; Montreal: Casalini, 1966), 140; cited by Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 101 n.219. 43 This is similar to the cosmic pneuma (yet materialistic) in Stoic philosophy that permeates the universe to form a unified cosmic body. For example, Manilius, Astronomica 2.6368. See my discussion on Stoic pneuma in Ch. 2 above. 44 John R. Lanci, A New Temple for Corinth: Rhetorical and Archaeological Approaches to Paul’s Imagery (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), 89–134, esp. 105 and 134. Also see Wanamaker, 132–3. 45 Cf. Epictetus, Diss. 3.5. 46 For example, at the beginning of his Eth. nic. (1.2.4), Aristotle considers the art of politics (πολιτική) as “the most authoritative of the sciences” and “a master-art” (δόξειε δ’ ἄν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς). See Blumenfeld, 108. H. Williams sees a possible echo from Isa. 3:3 (σοφὸν ἀρχιτέκτονα) of LXX in 1 Cor 3:10 (σοφὸς ἀρχιτέκτων). See H. Drake Williams III, The Wisdom of the Wise: The Presence and Function of Scripture in 1 Cor. 1:18– 3:28 (Boston: Brill, 2001), 257–300. 47 Paul’s οἰκοδομή metaphor also enforces proper relations among the individual persons. Each worker and member should be careful not to destroy God’s building (cf. ch. 3).

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i. (Parts) “Called” into the Body 1 Corinthians abounds with κλητός (called) terminology,48 which is a distinctive feature of Paul’s part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον. For Paul, believers are not coincidentally there to constitute a body; they are called by God. Thus they are “the called ones” (κλητοί, 1:24).49 In the Greco-Roman part-whole argument, as we have studied, parts are born to bring benefit to the whole.50 The concept of the “divine call” in the context of a part-whole formation is rare. Outside Paul there is no Greek attestation for the sense of being “called by God” to be a part of the whole.51 Κλητός is a “technical term for the divine call”52 found predominantly in Paul’s part-whole paradigm in 1 Corinthians. Paul begins his letter by describing himself as being “called [to be] an apostle” (κλητός ἀπόστολος, 1:1); so too, are all (πάντες) believers, “called [to be] saints” (κλητοῖς ἁγίοις, 1:2). He then closes his salutation and thanksgiving (1:1-9) with the statement: “By him [God] you were called into the fellowship of his Son, Jesus Christ our Lord” (v.9); thus verse 9 forms an inclusio with verses 1 and 2. Paul’s κλητός terminology nuances τὸ συμφέρον in four ways. First, it establishes his part-whole body paradigm and its proper ethic. Individual believers are called by God to form an assembly (ἐκκλησία) of his family in which the other-focused morality of τὸ συμφέρον is a prime guide.53 Paul calls this symbiosis the κοινωνία (fellowship, sharing) of God’s Son (1:9).54 By identifying the Corinthians as called to κοινωνία with Christ, Paul implies that “the individual does not stand apart from the whole people of God.”55 For Paul, being called “to be in Christ…means to be in the community of Christ,”56 embracing the morality of τὸ συμφέρον; his gospel is a call from individualism to community. Further, Paul’s use of κλητός plays a connective function. The call for the Corinthians “to belong to their Lord is at the same

48 Out of 37 occurrences of κλητός (called) terminology in Paul’s seven undisputed letters, 16 uses appear in 1 Corinthians, whereas the phrase appears 13 times in Rom, 4 in Gal, 3 in 1 Thess, and 1 in Phil. See Stephen J. Chester, Conversion at Corinth: Perspectives on Conversion in Paul’s Theology and the Corinthian Church (London/New York: T&T Clark, 2003), 59–60. 49 For “Paul’s Theology of Calling,” see S. Scott Bartchy, Mallon Chrēsai: First-Century Slavery and the Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7 (SBLDS 11; Missoula, Mont.: Society of Biblical Literature, 1973), 127–59. 50 For such discussion, see the Chs. 1 and 2 above. 51 K. L. Schmidt, “κλητός,” TDNT 3:494-5. Cf. Epictetus, Diss. 1.29.44. 52 J. Eckert, “καλέω, κλῆσις, κλητός,” in EDNT 2:240–44. 53 Sampley (NISB, 2039) notes: “The notion of call is very important for Paul and in this letter. God’s call is God’s claim or invitation for a person to become part of God’s people.” Also see his Walking between the Times, 38–9, 44–5. 54 Donna Geernaert, “Called to Koinonia: Reflections on 1 Corinthians,” in Faith and Order at the Crossroads (Geneva: WCC, 2005), 397–405. 55 Victor P. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul (Nashville: Abingdon, 1968), 203 (italics his). 56 Furnish, Theology and Ethics, 203 (italics his). Cf. Sampley, Walking between the Times, 37–43.

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time a call to belong to one another.”57 In this way, Paul establishes the calling to a part-whole social body as the primary moral context of τὸ συμφέρον in 1 Corinthians.58 Second, the divine call also should bring the divisive community into unity. The community is rife with conflicts and divisions. Paul’s emphasis on the κλητός at the beginning of his letter signals his call to a variety of factions (“parts”) at Corinth to become a unified community of κλητοί (called ones). As such, Paul’s κλητός functions as an antidote to divisions. This point is made clear in his appeal to unity that immediately follows his statement of God’s call of the Corinthians into κοινωνία (v.9): Now I appeal to you, brothers and sisters, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that all of you be in agreement and that there be no divisions [σχίσματα] among you, but that you be united in the same mind and the same purpose (v.10).

Leon Morris points out that the unified κοινωνία in verse 9 into which the Corinthian believers “were called” (ἐκλήθητε) is the direct opposite of σχίσματα (divisions) in verse 10.59 By the fellowship (κοινωνία) Paul means the unified community of believers as the body of Christ. He explicitly combines the two images of σῶμα (body) and κοινωνία later in 10:16-17.60 Therefore, κοινωνία (1:9) signals a unified wholeness of the Corinthian body (v.10) “together with all those who…call on the name of our Lord” (v.2). He then uses the unified image of the community for his “immediate ground of a plea for unity” in verse 10 and in subsequent arguments throughout 1 Corinthians against factionalism at Corinth.61 In short, Paul’s κλητός functions to highlight his part-whole paradigm that seeks the concord (ὁμόνοια) of the community at Corinth. Third, Paul’s κλητός draws a wider, more inclusive circle around his partwhole community. God’s call comes universally to “both Jews and Greeks [Gentiles]” (1:24),62 not just to one ethnic or socio-political group such as the “wise” (σοφοί), the “powerful” (δυνατοί), or the “well-born” (εὐγενεῖς; cf. 1:26). Paul’s community of “called ones” (κλητοί; later developed as “the 57 Furnish, Theology and Ethics, 203. 58 Cf. Sampley, Walking between the Times, 37–43. For a brief survey on Paul’s moral vision on the basis of ecclesial body, see Richard B. Hays, “Ecclesiology and Ethics in 1 Corinthians,” ExAud 10 (1994): 31–43. Hays (40) maintains that “to do ‘ethics’ apart from ecclesiology is utterly unthinkable for Paul. Ethics is ecclesiology.” 59 Leon Morris, 1 Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985; repr., 1998), 39. 60 Furnish, “Theology in 1 Corinthians,” in Pauline Theology Volume II: 1 & 2 Corinthians (ed. David M. Hay; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 85–6. 61 Richard B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament: A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1996), 33; id., “Ecclesiology and Ethics,” 36. 62 Paul’s shift of terms from “Greeks” to “Gentiles” and vice versa in 1:22-24 indicates that two terms are interchangeable. See Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 76 n.40.

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body of Christ”) embraces all (πάντες) people across territorial, socio-ethnic, and gender boundaries. Early in the letter Paul indicates that this inclusiveness comes through baptism. Believers come from “every place” (ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ, 1:2), not simply from Corinth, and not from any specific ethnic group. In subsequent chapters, particularly ch. 9, Paul further exemplifies how he crosses previously-exclusive boundaries by seeking the good of others. Paul’s wider circle of the part-whole arises from his understanding of the death (for all) and resurrection of Christ.63 Lastly, while for Paul κλητός serves as the general call of all believers (1:2) by God “into the fellowship” of God’s Son (1:9), he also employs κλητός (and cognate verbs) to indicate the individual’s role in and contribution to the larger body. In the Greco-Roman part-whole rhetoric, certain parts have specific functions and assigned roles in relation to the whole.64 In Paul’s argument, the Lord assigns various gifts; accordingly, that “each has a particular gift from God” is a recurring theme in 1 Corinthians (3:5; 7:7, 17; 12:11, 18, 24; 14:26).65 In the ecclesial body, for Paul, each member is called to play a role for the health of the whole congregation (πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, 12:7), echoing his earlier statement that defines his own call and his role (1:1, 17; cf. 3:5; 9:16). Before examining further the idea of part-whole as a consistent pattern in 1 Corinthians, I need to point out some exegetical merits that have arisen from my reading of Paul’s κλητός in 1 Corinthians as it relates to his distinctive use of τὸ συμφέρον. ii. Parts as Co-Workers, Not Rivals Understanding Paul’s use of κλητός terminology in light of his use of τὸ συμφέρον illuminates two critical issues in the exegetical history of 1 Corinthians: the problem of defending his apostleship and that of a “competing mission” among Paul and his rivals. In his reconstruction of the historical situation at Corinth, Gordon Fee, for example, argues that the conflict at Corinth was mainly between Paul and the church “over his authority and his

63 As will be discussed in Ch. 6, the gospel for which Paul has “an obligation” (ἀνάγκη) compels him to go beyond social, ethnic, and gender boundaries (cf. 9:16-23). For him the “advantage” this gospel brings is accessible to “all” (πάντες) or “the many” (οἱ πολλοί), including the foolish, weak, low and despised, and poor, who are often excluded from the Greco-Roman socio-political part-whole paradigm. For example, the poor and those of lower status are despised and “excluded” in a certain sense from the Lord’s Supper at Corinth (11:18-34), and the “weak” are dishonored by other powerful members of the community as reflected in Paul’s body metaphor (12:14-26; cf. 1:26-29, 8:7-13). For Paul, “God chose” them and “Christ died” also for them. God invites all to enjoy the benefits (i.e., σωτηρία; cf. 9:19-22) rendered through Christ’s death, and no individual of any race, gender or class is excluded (cf. 1:26-31; 12:17-34). 64 For example, see Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.7.10-15. 65 Paul’s κλητός terminology most densely appears in 7:17-24 (9 times in 8 verses). For example, in his discussion of marriage and sexuality, Paul admonishes each person to live “the life that the Lord has assigned, to which God called you” (7:17, emphasis added). Paul develops this idea in his discussion of spiritual gifts and related problems in chs. 12-14.

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gospel.”66 He argues that Paul’s inconsistent conduct had been criticized in Corinth because Paul ate idol-meat in Gentile settings but refused in Jewish circumstances (9:19-22). This “vacillation does not seem worthy of an apostle” to the Corinthians.67 Thus, according to Fee, Paul in chapter 9 vehemently defends his social behavior (vv.19-23) and “reasserts his apostleship (vv.12)” as of divine origin.68 But there is no such evidence for Paul’s inconsistent conduct; rather Paul presents his behavior as a model after Christ (11:1) to be adopted by the Corinthians as well.69 In a similar vein, David Hall contends that in 9:4-14 Paul defends his apostolic rights against accusations of his critics that he is not a genuine apostle and thus has no right to receive support. Hall argues that in 1 Corinthians Paul addresses Hellenistic-Jewish missionaries who were proclaiming a message of sophistic wisdom and they were the instigators of conflicts and divisions at Corinth. The problem with Hall’s view is that he sees the situation behind 1 Corinthians as that of 2 Corinthians.70 But in 1 Corinthians there is no reference to conflicts with instigators from outside as in 2 Corinthians.71 In brief, scholars who maintain that Paul defends his apostleship in 1 Corinthians read chapter 9 primarily as apostolic defense (ἀπολογία).72 A growing number of scholars, however, consider chapter 9 as an exemplary argument for the proper use of personal freedom.73 Paul elaborates his apostolic right (ἐξουσία) and exemplary behavior not to defend them but to 66 Fee, First Epistle, 6, 28–30, 392–441. 67 Fee, First Epistle, 393. 68 Fee, First Epistle, 392–4. Fee argues that Paul makes a fervent defense of his rights in this chapter because his own apostolic status had been questioned in Corinth. “The defense is structured around the opening two questions, which he answers in reverse order: ‘Yes, I am an apostle’ (vv.1b-14); and ‘My apostleship makes me free to give up my rights to your support’ (vv.15-18) ‘and to eat or reject food of any kind’ (vv.19-23). Most likely the crucial matter is his freedom to act as in vv.19-23. But to get there he must first defend his apostleship itself.” See pp.393–4. 69 David G. Horrell, The Social Ethos of the Corinthian Correspondence: Interests and Ideology from 1 Corinthians to 1 Clement (Edinburgh: Clark, 1996), 205. 70 Hall (181–2) argues that 1 and 2 Corinthians “represent two stages in a single conflict” and “Paul faces the same opponents” who came to Corinth from outside. Hall rejects any internal tension among the Corinthians. 71 James Walters, “Civic Identity in Roman Corinth and Its Impact on Early Christians,” in Urban Religion in Roman Corinth: Interdisciplinary Approaches (eds. Daniel N. Schowalter and Steven J. Friesen; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 399. 72 For example, Barrett contends that “Paul would hardly have spent so long on the question of apostolic rights [in ch. 9] if his own apostolic status had not been questioned in Corinth.” C. K. Barrett, A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 200. 73 For example, Wendell Willis, “An Apostolic Apologia: The Form and Function of 1 Corinthians 9,” JSNT 24 (1985): 33–48; Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 243–50; Sampley, 1 Corinthians in New Interpreter’s Bible. A Commentary in Twelve Volumes. Volume 10. Acts, Introduction to Epistolary Literature, Romans, 1 Corinthians (Nashville: Abingdon, 2002), 903– 12; Rollin A. Ramsaran, Liberating Words: Paul’s Use of Rhetorical Maxims in 1 Corinthians 1–10 (Valley Forge: Trinity International, 1996), 51–6.

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argue from them,74 and to demonstrate choosing to restrain his ἐξουσία for the good of others (9:12, 15). Concerning the forensic term ἀπολογία, he simply uses it in 9:3 “to justify rhetorically his use of himself as the example for imitation, a rhetorical stance paralleled in antiquity, because he is well aware of the risks he takes in using himself as the example for imitation.”75 In the words of Grosheide, Paul “explains what his rights are as an apostle and states that he does not use those rights. He does so to summon the Corinthians not to use their Christian liberty if by using it they would cause their brothers in Christ to sin.”76 Neither Paul’s affirmation of himself as an apostle of Christ by God’s call nor his discussion of his apostolic ἐξουσία is a defense speech of his apostleship. Paul’s κλητός terminology in service of his argument of τὸ συμφέρον further clarifies that Paul does not primarily defend his authority and his gospel in 1 Corinthians. Rather, Paul’s claim of being “called to be an apostle” (1:1; cf. 9:1-2) and his seeming defense rhetoric should conform to the part-whole paradigm he champions, that is, that each member is called to play a role in the body of Christ. In Paul’s case, he had carried the mission of laying out the foundation of the community (3:10-15) and of preaching the gospel (1:17; 3:6; 9:15-23). Paul’s κλητός terminology and his apostleship do not function as a defense but rather highlight, as further discussed below, the notion of each person’s role in his body rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον. Furthermore, this understanding of Paul’s use of κλητός in service of τὸ συμφέρον sheds light on the issue of Corinthian rivalries. A critical issue in the study of 1 Corinthians is how to interpret the Corinthians’ party “slogans” of belonging to particular leaders: “‘I belong to Paul,’ or ‘I belong to Apollos,’ or ‘I belong to Cephas,’ or ‘I belong to Christ’” (1:12). Interpreters have made a variety of proposals on these divisive voices. They include such views that Paul stands against Jewish-Christian legalists,77 “spiritual enthusiasts” or 74 Willis, “Apostolic Apologia,” 40. 75 Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 146–7. Mitchell cites Isocrates, Or. 15.8. 76 F. W. Grosheide, Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953), 200–1. 77 In 1831, F. C. Baur proposed that these voices of groupings represent competing theologies that were essentially divided into two factions between Paul and Apollos on one side representing Gentile or Pauline Christianity, and Peter and Christ on the other side for Jewish Christianity. So Paul, according to Baur, was fighting against Jewish-Christian nomists or legalistic Judaizers at Corinth. See F. C. Baur, “Die Christuspartei in der korinthischen Gemeinde, der Gegensatz des paulinischen und petrinischen Christentums in der ältesten Kirche, der Apostel Petrus in Rom,” Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie 4 (1831): 61–206; repr., in F. C. Baur, Historischkritische Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament (Ausgewählte Werke 1; Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann, 1963), 1–146. Also see id., Paul: The Apostle of Jesus Christ, vol.1 (ET of 2nd ed.; Edinburgh and London: Williams and Norgate, 1873), 267–320. For a brief introduction to Baur’s thesis and for an extract from his Paul, see “The Two Epistles to the Corinthians,” in Edward Adams and David G. Horrell eds., Christianity at Corinth: The Quest for the Pauline Church (Louisville/London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002), 51–9. Though Baur’s thesis was influential for over a century in understanding the conflicts at Corinth as well as issues in early Christianity, not many scholars now maintain Baur’s view. Michael D. Goulder is an exception as

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“pneumatic libertines,”78 Gnostics,79 Hellenistic Jewish wisdom theology,80 Hellenistic moral-philosophical sage and rhetorical traditions,81 or against a group of women.82 More recently, many scholars and commentators have concluded that “Paul is not describing groups that actually existed at Corinth but is using fictitious examples to illustrate the ludicrousness of Christ’s [body] being divided.”83 Mitchell argues that the claims of identity with respective groups are not real slogans but Paul’s “caricatures” of the Corinthians’ childish behavior.84 My analysis of τὸ συμφέρον in 1 Corinthians further clarifies that Paul is not competing with any rival theology or doctrine. In the context of the body, individual members’ differences and functions are “indispensable” for the good of the whole, as explicitly developed in chapter 12. Several times Paul describes himself and Apollos as fellow workers, not as rivals (1:12; 3:5-9; 4:6).85 Paul affirms that both leaders are “servants” (διάκονοι, 3:5) working together (συνεργοί, 3:9) “as a team with the same purpose” (ἕν, 3:8; NLT).86 As such, he vehemently supports Baur’s competing missions between Paul and Peter. See his “Sophia in 1 Corinthians,” NTS 37 (1991): 516–34; id., A Tale of Two Missions (London: SCM, 1994); id., Paul and the Competing Mission in Corinth (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2001). 78 W. Lütgert, Freiheitspredigt und Schwarmgeister in Korinth (Göttingen: Bertelsmann, 1908. Horrell and Adams, Christianity at Corinth, 15–16. 79 Walter Schmithals, Gnosticism in Corinth: An Investigation of the Letters to the Corinthians (ET. Nashville: Abingdon, 1971); Ulrich Wilckens, Weisheit und Torheit (Tübingen: Mohr, 1959). For a brief criticism to Gnosticism in Corinth, see Robin McL. Wilson, “Gnosis at Corinth,” in Paul and Paulinism: Essays in Honour of C. K. Barrett (eds. M. D. Hooker and S. G. Wilson; London: SPCK, 1982), 102–14; Martin, Corinthian Body, 70–1. 80 According to this view, Corinthians believed that they are “spiritual persons” or pneumatics because they possessed divine wisdom (σοφία). For example, see Richard A. Horsley, “Wisdom of Word and Words of Wisdom in Corinth,” CBQ 39 (1977): 224–39; James A. Davis, Wisdom and Spirit: An Investigation of 1 Corinthians 1.18-3.20 against the Background of Jewish Sapiential Traditions in the Greco-Roman Period (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1984). 81 For example, Weiss, Der erste Korintherbrief, 158–9 (See Adams and Horrell, 21); Abraham J. Malherbe, “Determinism and Free Will in Paul: The Argument of 1 Corinthians 8 and 9,” in Paul in His Hellenistic Context (ed. T. Engberg-Pedersen; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994), 231–55; Will Deming, Paul on Marriage and Celibacy: The Hellenistic Background of 1 Corinthians 7 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); F. Gerald Downing, Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches: Cynics and Christian Origins II (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 85–127; Stephen M. Pogoloff, Logos and Sophia: The Rhetorical Situation in 1 Corinthians (SBLDS 134; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992); Duane Litfin, St Paul’s Theology of Proclamation: 1 Corinthians 1–4 and Greco-Roman Rhetoric (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 82 For example, Antoinette Wire, The Corinthian Women Prophets: A Reconstruction through Paul’s Rhetoric (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), who maintains that the voice of “women prophets” have shaped Paul’s arguments throughout the letter. For a brief introduction to these scholarly proposals mentioned above and for more references, see Horrell and Adams, Christianity at Corinth, 13–43. 83 Sampley, NISB, 2040. 84 See Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 83–6. 85 He depicts Apollos positively in 3:5-9. 86 The Greek text reads that both persons “are one” which in context emphasizes a

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Paul and Apollos are neither rivals nor do they represent rival factions with differing theologies. They are not rivals, but are simply operating with different functions, which the Lord assigned to each for the same (ἕν) purpose (cf. πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, 12:7). In “God’s field” (θεοῦ γεώργιον) one “plants” and the other “waters” (3:6). For “God’s building” (θεοῦ οἰκοδομή) (noted above), one lays a foundation and the other builds on it (4:10).87 Accordingly, the Corinthians’ “boast[ing] about allegiance to human leaders” (3:21) “one against another” (4:6b) is unacceptable. Paul’s vision of the body of Christ (12:27) asserts that all believers, including leaders, are together called (κλητοῖς…σὺν πᾶσιν, 1:2) by and for the same purpose and are working together in the same field for the same project. In short, Paul sets his theology of κλητός in service to τὸ συμφέρον in order “that there be no dissension within the body” (ἵνα μὴ ᾖ σχίσμα ἐν τῷ σώματι, 12:25; emphasis added). These distinctive features of Paul’s part-whole idea now lead us to the second point that the unified body has a single (ἕν) purpose (3:8), that is, the health of the whole body (πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, 12:7). b. “For the Common Good” (Πρὸς Τὸ Συμφέρον)88 For Paul, the unified ecclesial body allows and needs multiple functions, and they are all designed for the well-being of the whole body (πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον). He argues that God “arranged” diversity in the body in the way of “varieties of gifts,” “varieties of services,” and “varieties of activities” (12:4-7) for the single purpose of building up the whole body of the community (cf. πρὸς τὴν οἰκοδομὴν, 14:12, 26).89 One’s exercise of a certain gift, for instance, should bring a symbiotic benefit to the community (e.g., gift of prophecy in ch. 14). Therefore, in the body the advantage of the whole or what I call “the connective morality of τὸ συμφέρον” becomes the criterion for the proper behavior of the individual part. An individual’s action should be reoriented, and τὸ συμφέρον subsumes and/or limits the exercise of an individual’s rights (ch. 9). Paul extends his argument by saying that the part itself should be cut off, if necessary, for the protection of the whole (ch. 5). In short, Paul’s body ethic overrules the individualistic self-interest that claims “I can do what I want” (cf. 6:12; 10:23) without considering the consequences to the community. unified action of working as a team for a “common purpose” (NRSV). Paul’s argument resembles his later contemporary Marcus Aurelius’ part-whole argument: “We are co-workers [συνεργοῦμεν] towards the fulfillment of one [ἕν] object.” Marcus Aurelius, Med. 6.42-3. 87 Again, this is a powerful image of oneness, as noted above, that members of the body are working together for the good of the whole. 88 The phrase πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον is often rendered either as “for the common good” (e.g., NRSV) or more commonly “for the common advantage.” On this matter, see Ch. 1 above under “Clarifications and Definitions.” 89 In Paul’s argument, πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον has semantic overlap with πρὸς τὴν οἰκοδομὴν (cf. 10:23). Paul’s image of constructing “God’s building” is already laid out in his opening chapters (3:5-4:7) where he discusses how God’s workers are “working together” for a “common purpose,” that is, building the ecclesial body of Christ at Corinth as Paul develops in the following chapters.

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Paul shows this part-whole perspective, for example, in his dealing with the first two problems (sexual immorality and litigation) in chapters 5 and 6.90 In chapter 5, Paul condemns an instance of sexual immorality (πορνεία) among Corinthians “that is not found even among pagans” (v.1). Paul considers the problem so urgent that, before discussing the issue, he first insists that the guilty man must be “removed from among you” (ἀρθῇ ἐκ μέσου ὑμῶν, v.2). Paul’s prescription is similar to the Greco-Roman part-whole paradigm. He considers the sexual behavior a kind of disease that encroaches upon and ultimately destroys the whole body. In the Greco-Roman part-whole body politic, a disease must be removed to protect the whole.91 Paul’s directive accords with this tradition: “Drive out the wicked person [part] from among you [the whole]” (v.13, cf. v.2).92 Paul further compares the sexual immorality to a little yeast93 that affects the whole batch of dough. To enforce his theological justification for expelling the immoral person, he invokes the Passover ritual during which all that is unclean and immoral must be removed from the house. Paul argues that the Corinthians must remove “the yeast of malice and evil” because “our paschal lamb, Christ, has been sacrificed” (v.8), and believers should be as unleavened bread. His point is clear and enforces the mandate that Corinthian believers have to “clean out the old yeast” from among them (v.5). For Paul, sexual immorality does not simply damage the individual person who commits it, but more importantly it affects and damages the whole community.94 In short, Paul’s rhetoric of the body politic of τὸ συμφέρον resists private morality (τὸ ἴδιον) that harms the community (6:12).95 The whole governs the attitudes and actions of the individual part.96 In chapter 6, Paul condemns the Corinthians who oppose one another over “ordinary matters” (βιωτικά) at Roman courts. As with the issue of sexual immorality, Paul attempts to settle the problem by appealing to its symbiotic effect upon the community. He locates the issue within the family setting, the fundamental part-whole unit in Greco-Roman moral tradition.97 Paul rebukes 90 Scholars and commentators agree that in chs. 1-4, “Paul sets a context for the rest of the letter” (Sampley, NISB, 2039), and then discusses specific issues from ch. 5 on. 91 For such discussion, see Ch. 3 above. 92 In the opening chapters (1-4), Paul already has signaled this kind of harsh banishment: “You [plural = the community] are [ἐστε] God’s temple…If anyone destroys God’s temple, God will destroy that person. For…you [ὑμεῖς] are that temple” (3:16-17). 93 A metaphor for evil, see vv.8, 13. 94 A. Y. Collins, “The Function of ‘Excommunication’ in Paul,” HTR 73 (1980): 251–63. 95 As discussed below, in 6:12-20 Paul sums up his discussion to this point, and in this summary argument he explicitly points out that the issues that he has dealt with to this point are problems of τὸ ἴδιον. 96 As such, Paul’s argument is clearly a part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον in that he has a greater concern for the whole and that the wholesomeness of the community is his central concern. 97 His repeated and emphatic use of the family language ἀδελφός establishes this point. The term ἀδελφοί “occurs thirty-eight times in 1 Corinthians, more than twice as many times

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the action of suing “brother against brother” (ἀδελφὸς μετὰ ἀδελφοῦ κρίνεται, v.6; cf. v.8)98 – family members each for whom Christ died (cf. 8:11). Here “brother” bears ethical implications for one’s behavior within God’s family. In this “part-whole” context of οἰκία, such acts of “doing wrong” (ἀδικεῖν) and of defrauding (ἀποστερεῖν) “brothers” are unthinkable, as Paul insists in 6:8.99 Furthermore, Paul points out how the problem of suing “brother against brother” carries a part-whole connective effect. He argues that “to have lawsuits at all with one another is already a defeat for you” (v.7) because even if there should be a winner and a loser at the litigation, the whole family loses.100 In a similar vein, Paul’s concern for the whole family of God goes beyond a matter of an individual’s pursuit of personal justice (e.g., lawsuits). He resists the sort of private morality (τὸ ἴδιον) that may cause harm to other community members. Paul grounds his moral reasoning on his understanding of the Corinthian congregation as a corporate body of Christ into which believers are all “called” (1:9). All are connective parts of one another and thus not detached in their conduct. In that context, Paul develops and advocates the connective morality (τὸ συμφέρον) to heal the broken community as he further unfolds his argument. He is convinced that the problems and conflicts arise from the assertion of private morality seeking τὸ ἴδιον. c. For “the Same Care for One Another” Finally, I will move to discuss my third feature (“the same care for one another,” 12:25) of Paul’s understanding of the God-arranged body mechanism. Before proceeding, it is important to note that Paul’s emphasis on unity does not suggest uniformity (cf. 12:4-30).101 Nor by connective morality does he reject individuation or seeking personal benefit (cf. v.26). Rather, Paul’s unified body always admits individuality within diversity; yet the individuation must be in connection with the community as an organic whole. The Corinthian problems, as we shall see further, arise from their failure to grasp such a connective individuation. Their private benefit (τὸ ἴδιον) should be only an organic portion of the good of the whole (τὸ συμφέρον). This part-whole framework echoes, for example, Aristotelian and Ciceronian connective perspectives that what is as in any other Pauline letter…The term depicts the reconciling resocialization of Corinthians from all sorts of social settings into the new family of God and invites them to view each other accordingly.” See Sampley, 1 Corinthians, 807. 98 As R. Hays points out, NRSV’s inclusive rendering of the ἀδελφός as “believer” here and elsewhere loses the point. See his First Corinthians (Louisville: John Knox, 1997), 95. 99 This pattern of putting the Corinthian problems within the family setting (οἰκία) is consistent in 1 Corinthians. For example, hurting “weak” believers in the community “sin[s] against members of your family” (8:12). 100 Hays, First Corinthians, 95. Paul’s argument is similar to Seneca’s discussion of “anger” as discussed in a previous chapter above. Even though anger has a positive role at war time, Seneca considers it as evil because of its connective effect negatively on the whole family, community, and the whole country. See Ch. 3 above. 101 Paul rejects this view, for example, at 12:17: “If the whole body were an eye, where would the hearing be? If the whole body were hearing, where would the sense of smell be?”

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beneficial to you is the same (τὸ αὐτό) as what is beneficial to me, as discussed in previous chapters. Paul defines this symbiotic reciprocity (12:26) as having the same care among members (τὸ αὐτὸ…μεριμνῶσιν τὰ μέλη, 12:25), that is, a morality of mutual (ἀλλήλων) care, as opposed to the idionisitc ideology evident among many in Corinth. i. Organic vs. Apolitical Part-Whole and Idionistic Ideology In previous chapters, I have shown that Greco-Roman part-whole ethical arguments can be divided into organic and apolitical part-wholes. Τὸ συμφέρον as an ethical category is an organic part-whole perspective in which τὸ συμφέρον is the common value as the one (ἕν) true advantage for which individual members strive in their relation to the community.102 By contrast, τὸ ἴδιον characterizes the apolitical/libertine aspect of the part-whole in which private interest is not necessarily connected to the common good. Its emphasis often conflicts with the communal advantage. By apolitical part-whole I therefore mean an ethical stance of “not discerning the [social] body” (μὴ διακρίνων τὸ σῶμα, 11:29) as a whole (to use Paul’s own expression) in an individual’s action or a social group’s policy in the community.103 Further, the emphasis on τὸ ἴδιον is ideologically and socially powerful, especially for the upper stratum of the social pyramid, who often believe the lower strata exist for their advantage.104 Paul’s part-whole argument in 1 Corinthians reflects the ethical tension between the self-serving and self-renouncing part-whole dynamic among Christ-followers at Corinth. In 1 Corinthians, Paul bases his directives on the distinctive organic part-whole, that is, the Corinthian community as the body of Christ.105 He shows this ethical perspective from the letter’s first issue (sexual immorality, ch. 5). In his condemnation of the man involved in πορνεία, Paul abruptly “scolds the community as a whole,” before condemning the offender, as if the whole community was complicit in the act (5:2).106 He gives a lengthy rebuke to the community based upon his organic part-whole perspective and their failure to take their part in the moral responsibility to “mourn” together (before he condemns the offender) this one man’s wrongdoing. Paul later fully develops this connective outlook in the letter: “If one member suffers, all suffer together with it; if one member is honored, all rejoice together with it” (12:26). Paul clearly bases his ethical framework on the organic part-whole 102 See Isocrates, De pace, 28; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 7.54.1. 103 It seems that Paul’s expression “not discerning the body” (μὴ διακρίνων τὸ σῶμα, 11:29) is his own alternative expression for the Corinthians’ apolitical part-whole attitude of not considering the whole in their behaviors. 104 Again, remember, for example, a Thrasymachian ideology in Plato’s Republic, Thraymachus, who defines justice as what serves the advantage of the stronger (τὸ δίκαιον ἐστι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον), contends that shepherds (“rulers”) do not work for the good of their sheep, but for their own benefit. See Plato, Resp. 438, 338, 343b–344, 367. 105 As opposed to an idionistic apolitical ideology of not considering other members among the Corinthians. 106 Hays, First Corinthians, 82 (italics his).

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that “the community has moral responsibility for the conduct of its members and that the conduct of the individual members…affects the life of the whole community.”107 Otherwise, his censure of the community for one person’s behavior is not just. In his summary argument (6:12-20) of the first two issues (πορνεία and lawsuits) Paul explicitly brings out the Corinthians’ idionistic ideology based on the self-serving part-whole, which is the real cause of the major problems of the Corinthian community. Paul begins with a maxim that “all things are permissible for me” (πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν, emphasis added),108 which characterizes the Corinthian believers’ apolitical part-whole perspective that any category (πάντα) of τὸ ἴδιον (μοι) is “permissible” (ἔξεστιν) apart from the whole and without considering its resulting effect upon the communal body.109 Paul then evaluates their ethical outlook in connection with its resulting koinonistic (communal) effect: “but not all things are beneficial” (ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πάντα συμφέρει). Here, as Sampley notes, “Beneficial means to the advantage of the common good” (cf. 10:24, 33; 12:7).110 The Corinthians’ idionistic behavior (and their apolitical outlook) may not be wrong on its own, but for Paul it is problematic in the body and not appropriate in view of the effect upon the whole. For example, a lawsuit (ch. 6) that sought personal justice is not, of itself, ethically wrong. But Paul overrules this private morality (τὸ ἴδιον) in deference to his concern for its effect on the larger community.111 Paul thus pushes the pendulum that has been leaning toward apolitical tendencies to lean instead toward the organic part-whole paradigm. The actions of the individual member are evaluated by their consequences for other members (cf. 8:9-13). So in Paul’s part-whole body perspective, what is permissible and beneficial to a part should be good and beneficial to the whole, and vice versa. But Corinthian conduct and their idionistic claim (πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν, 6:12) contradicts this, as reflected in Paul’s subsequent arguments. Another maxim appears at 6:13: “Food is meant for the stomach and the stomach for food.” This is a popular analogy (among Greco-Roman moral philosophers) used to describe the distorted (libertine) part-whole ethical view (see below). Paul places these words in the mouths of the Corinthians to rebuke their idionistic apolitical outlook (v.12). In fact, the second caricature 107 Hays, First Corinthians, 82. But Hays does not conceive the concept of organic partwhole (and apolitical part-whole) as I do. 108 Most English translations (e.g., NRSV, NIV) put 6:12 (and 10:23) in quotation marks as if Paul cites a Corinthian maxim, and most interpreters agree. R. Ramsaran designates this saying as a “maxim” that expresses the Corinthians’ ethical stance. For rhetorical functions of maxims in Paul’s argument, see his Liberating Words and “Paul and Maxims,” in Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook (ed. J. Paul Sampley; Harrisburg/London/New York: Trinity Press International, 2003), 429–56. 109 For further discussion, see Ch. 3 above under “Organic Part-Whole” and “Apolitical Part-Whole.” 110 Sampley, NISB, 2045 (italics his). Also see Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 36. 111 Cf. Hays, First Corinthians, 90.

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(v.13) is basically a reiteration of the first. Here, the “stomach” as a member of the body corresponds to the individual “I” (ἐγώ) as a part of the social whole in the previous statement in verse 12. Yet this time Paul puts the second clearly within the context of the body analogy, thus explicitly revealing the problem of the Corinthians’ individualistic and self-serving ethic. Within the metaphor of the body, it is self-evident that food is not just for the stomach but for the whole body. Therefore, these two maxims highlight emphatically the self-focused ethical outlook Paul attempts to redress.112 This background113 reveals that the Corinthian part-whole perspective is distorted because the stomach is deemed simply part of the body. Paul’s corrective assigns food, not for the stomach alone, but “for the [whole] body,” explicitly replacing “stomach” with “body.” Here (eating) “food” sarcastically represent the Corinthians’ idionistic behavior driven by what benefits me (“part,” here stomach) regardless of whether it hurts other members of the community. Here Paul’s argument is a synecdoche114 through which he represents his larger argument against the Corinthians’ idionistic outlook.115 Against such tendencies among the Corinthians, Paul asserts a forceful argument that “your bodies are members of Christ” (6:15). He continues to argue that the individual body, now as a member of the body of Christ, is not intended, for example, for sexual immorality since it has been “sanctified” in baptism (6:11) and thus belongs to the Lord.116 Therefore, Paul’s modification of the Corinthians’ idionistic outlook puts it this way: “The body is meant…for the Lord and the Lord for the body” (v.13b).117 Paul’s modification is a two-way 112 Paul’s maxim in v.13 exactly matches the ridiculous argument made by the rebels in the fable of Menenius Agrippa studied extensively in Ch. 3. In Agrippa’s story, some members (the hands, mouth, and teeth) of the body revolted against the belly because they thought that food is simply meant for the stomach, and they quit their jobs assigned to each member. As a result, the whole body was “reduced to the utmost weakness,” and the revolting members came to know that food was meant for the whole body, not just for the stomach. See Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.86.1-5; Livy, His. 2.32.9-12. 113 Paul may have known/heard of the parable which had been widespread in the Hellenistic world since the 5th century b.c.e. NT scholars and commentators often refer to this parable in relation to Paul’s use of the metaphor of the body, but no scholar specifies the corresponding part-whole analogy, as I do, between the ridiculous idea in Agrippa’s story and the apolitical view of the Corinthians. On the belly as a topos in ancient Greco-Roman philosophy, see Karl Olav Sandnes, Belly and Body in Pauline Epistles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 35–93; for his discussion of 6:12-20, see 191–9. 114 Synecdoche (συνεκδοχή) is “a figure of speech in which a part represents the whole.” See s.v. “Synecdoche,” in David E. Aune, The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christian Literature and Rhetoric (Louisville/London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 453–4. 115 Paul’s argument here, for example, foreshadows his discussion of the problem related to eating meat offered to idols (chs. 8-11:1), an issue that stems from the apolitical part-whole context in which some believers do not consider the effect that their behavior of seeking τὸ ἴδιον has brought. 116 Here we also see a connective analogy between theology (indicative) and ethics (imperative) in Paul’s argument. Cf. Hays, 1 Corinthians, 96. 117 Besides Paul’s implication in context, my identification of ὁ κύριος with the Corinthian

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street in the organic part-whole; the benefit a part gives to the whole benefits the part as well. Such an idea is often expressed both by active and passive verb forms in Greco-Roman part-whole arguments.118 In Paul’s qualification here no verb form, active or passive, appears, but his reasoning that A is for B and B is for A clearly indicates that the benefit flows both directions, not simply toward the upper strata of the social pyramid. By using τὸ σῶμα Paul retains this connective idea that individual members are (and should be) symbiotically “attached” to the communal body of the Lord as “members of Christ” (τὰ μέλη τοῦ Χριστοῦ, v.15).119 In short, by presenting the community as the body of Christ, Paul lays a strong foundation for the organic part-whole on which he builds the force of his assertion of τὸ συμφέρον against τὸ ἴδιον, the latter of which has created multiple conflicts and factions at Corinth. Paul’s argument, however, appears to be in tension with the Corinthians’ individualistic part-whole stance by which they justify sexual sin, according to 6:18. My part-whole connective paradigm of τὸ συμφέρον supports Hays (and others), who has argued that in 6:18b Paul cites a Corinthian slogan. We can reconstruct verse 18 as a dialogical conversation between Paul and his interlocutors (the Corinthians):120 Paul: Shun fornication! (v.18a). [Corinthians]: [objecting because they think] Every sin that a person commits is outside the body (ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματός) (v.18b). Paul: But the fornicator sins against his own body (τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα) (v.18c).

Many have tried to understand this “notorious crux” in light of (a sort of preGnostic) body-soul dualism. According to this view, the σοφοί at Corinth socio-ecclesial body can be justified from my observation that Paul by ὁ κύριος, in this context, has the communal body of Christ in mind as he shifts the term for the Corinthian communal meal (κοινὸν δεῖπνον) into κυριακὸν δεῖπνον as opposed to ἴδιον δεῖπνον (11:20) in his discussion of the problems around the Lord’s Supper (see below). 118 For example, see Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.86.5; Dio Chrysostom, Or. 39.6. Also see my discussion above in Ch. 3. 119 This connective reasoning is pervasive in Paul’s argument. For example, in dealing with the problems related to eating meat offered to idols, he contends that one’s hurting a weak believer is a sin against members of his or her “family” and “sin against Christ.” As the context implies, by “against Christ,” it seems that Paul has the communal body of Christ in mind. Similarly, Paul’s logic which insists that the individual member should be in solidarity with the ecclesial body of Christ is clear here in his statement: “The body is meant…for the Lord and the Lord for the body.” Also, in his admonition “boast in the Lord” (1:31), it seems Paul has in mind boasting that benefits the communal body as opposed to boasting out of selfish interest, which hurts the whole community. The latter case is indicated in 5:6 where Paul explicitly states, “Your boasting [that damages the whole] is not a good thing.” 120 See Stanley K. Stowers, “A ‘Debate’ over Freedom: 1 Corinthians 6:12-20,” in Christian Teaching: Studies in Honor of LeMoine G. Lewis (ed. E. Ferguson; Abilene: Abilene Christian University Press, 1981), 68–9; Hays, 1 Corinthians, 105; cf. J. Murphy-O’Connor, “Corinthian Slogans in 1 Cor. 6:12-20,” CBQ 40: 391–6.

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claimed that the body has no connection with sin because “what is merely physical, such as sexual activity, is morally irrelevant because it does not touch and cannot harm the inner citadel of the soul.”121 This interpretation is misleading. We should remember that the main concern in the immediate context for Paul is the purity of the community. Moreover, the real issue is the ethical conflict between Paul’s organic part-whole and the Corinthians’ apolitical stance of emphasizing τὸ ἴδιον and detaching their individual actions, as if the “I” does not belong to the body (ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματός).122 Paul reflects this in his summary argument (6:12-20) of the issues of sexual immorality and lawsuits, and verse 18 appears to be the crux of his part-whole argument for the rest of the letter, which shows a tension with the Corinthians’ apolitical part-whole. The Corinthian maxim (v.18b) features the idionistic outlook of not connecting (i.e., ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματός) one’s behavior to the whole, which Paul decisively opposes.123 In doing so, Paul affirms the organic part-whole, and on the basis of the symbiotic idea of oneness in the body that he already developed,124 Paul rejects the view that an individual’s sin or behavior does not affect the community (verse 18c). The issue here lies in how we understand σῶμα (“body”) in this verse. It seems that Paul has a double meaning in mind: the individual body and the corporate ecclesial body, both being connected – one as a member of the other. By τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα Paul likely means the corporate Corinthian body of Christ in which the individual exists as a member (v.15).125 Therefore, the person who sins actually “sins against his own body” (εἰς τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα ἁμαρτάνει), that is, against himself and against the community.126 Paul’s organic idea between the individual body and the corporate communal body is emphasized in his metaphorical image of both entities being “a temple of the Holy Spirit,” as it appears in the immediate context. In 3:16-17, Paul describes the Corinthian congregation as God’s temple, and here in chapter 6 it is the individual body that is a temple. The image that one Holy Spirit indwells 121 I cite Garland (1 Corinthians, 236) who, while not adopting this view, provides a good summary of the view that bodily behaviors are of no significance. 122 In this “apolitical” part-whole, as I defined it, the advantage of an individual’s action is not necessarily measured against its effect on the whole. The agent does not have a concern for the whole in his or her choice of action. The biggest problem at Corinth lies in this sort of apolitical stance. 123 Garcilazo (53) argues that the Corinthians were influenced by Stoic dualism of body and spirit in which the higher status members “think the sinful deeds committed against the physical body do not affect one’s spirituality.” 124 In vv.16-17, Paul emphasizes connective oneness (ἕν): “whoever is united to a prostitute becomes one body [ἕν σῶμα] with her” and “anyone united to the Lord becomes one spirit [ἓν πνεῦμά] with him.” Also, “your bodies are members of Christ” (v.15). 125 Cf. Victor P. Furnish, The Theology of the First Letter to the Corinthians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 59. Furnish believes that Paul here refers to the individual “‘body’ which, since baptism, belongs to the Lord, has been consecrated for the service of God, and is destined for resurrection.” 126 Cf. Nijay K. Gupta, “Which ‘Body’ Is a Temple (1 Corinthians 6:19)? Paul beyond the Individual/Communal Divide,” CBQ 72 (2010): 518–36.

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both bodies binds the individual members to the church as a corporate body of Christ.127 In short, Paul’s ethical perspective is connective, which disallows idionistic private morality. In a previous chapter, I discussed that the body served as the best representative form of the part-whole paradigm for τὸ συμφέρον in GrecoRoman ethical discourse. Further, I indicated that moral philosophers often used the image of the body to oppose the individualistic (τὸ ἴδιον) apolitical ideology of seeking personal benefit without discerning its effect on the whole body. Similarly, and with distinctive emphasis on the community as “body of Christ,” Paul develops his part-whole body paradigm to oppose the selfserving apolitical outlook that had become a seed-bed of conflict and factions at Corinth. My argument that Paul opposes the Corinthians’ idionistic ideology128 becomes clear in his body narrative in chapter 12. He discloses their misguided outlook in a series of diatribal dialogues (12:14-26; here vv.15-16), for example: The foot: Paul:

“Because I am not a hand, I do not belong to the body” (v.15a). “It would not cease to be a part of the body” (v.15b).129

The ear: Paul:

“Because I am not an eye, I do not belong to the body” (v.16a). “It would not cease to be a part of the body” (v.16b).

These verses, I suggest, reveal the ethical stance of self-interest among the Corinthians as persons who detach themselves from seeking the benefit of the whole.130 The first two halves of these verses (v.15a, v.16a) show Paul satirizing the Corinthians who fail to behave in a way that benefits the whole. He lampoons their idionistic outlook because, as noted in previous chapters, in the correct model of the Greco-Roman socio-political and partwhole philosophy, such appropriation is unthinkable. Aristotle, for example, argued that a hand detached from the body is no longer a hand.131 If a part detaches itself from the whole, it does not cease to belong. Thus, some of the Corinthians’ view of the body is flawed. In the second halves of both verses (v.15b, v.16b), Paul corrects the Corinthians’ apolitical ideology of seeming detachment. His implied argument therefore would be: “Even if you are acting and hurting others as if you do not belong to the body, that would not cause 127 Also Paul’s slave metaphor which immediately follows, further enhances this point: “you are not your own” (19b), meaning your body is connected to the church of God who bought you “with a price” (v.20a). 128 An ideology of detaching oneself from the whole as if the agent does not belong to the community. 129 My translation. Like most translations (e.g., NRSV, NIV), I take this exact wording of two second halves of vv.15 and 16 as a statement. But NA27 punctuates it as a question. 130 Sampley contends (Walking between the Times, 50–1) that these verses address persons who have low self-esteem in the community, which caused problems at Corinth. 131 Aristotle, Metaph. 1035b 20-25.

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you to cease to be a part of the body. In fact, you are hurting your (communal) body of which you are a member!” Paul’s ethical outlook for the body of believers is connective; he admits individuation in community with the whole. In verses 21-26, Paul employs another dialogical formulation against this sort of ethical stance among the Corinthians. This time Paul satirizes the behavior of superior parts that would detach weaker members and demean their function within the whole: “The eye cannot say to the hand, ‘I have no need of you’” (v.21a). “Nor again the head to the feet, ‘I have no need of you’” (v.21b).

Here Paul addresses other behaviors that reflect the ways in which the socalled superior members disenfranchise less powerful members in the church and their contribution to the whole and thus implicitly detach weaker members from the whole. In his qualification, Paul counters by saying to the powerful people (“the eye” and “the head”) that the works of the “weaker” members (“the hand” and “the feet”) are “indispensable” (ἀναγκαῖά) in the body. The weaker parts only seem so (τὰ δοκοῦντα μέλη… ἀσθενέστερα) in God’s arrangement of the body. Moreover, Paul asserts that less powerful members rather deserve “greater honor” (τιμὴν περισσοτέραν) and “greater respect” (εὐσχημοσύνην) than the more powerful and honorable members (12:2224). As such, Paul corrects the misguided segmenting and individualistic ranking, as devised by certain members among the Corinthians, particularly the powerful. In his symbiotic view of the body, God has blended together (συνεκέρασεν, v.24) both the weak and the strong, not for the “one-way traffic” wherein the former serves the latter, but for the “two-way traffic” in which all members enjoy the same interrelational benefits together (τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων μεριμνῶσιν τὰ μέλη). Paul’s use of the syn-prefix in verse 24, and two more times in verse 26 (συμπάσχειν, “to suffer together”; συγχαίρειν, “to rejoice together”; cf. 13:6),132 along with his use of the word for reciprocity (ἀλλήλων, 12:25), further emphasizes this “two-way” image and the symbiotic “same care for one another.” Furthermore, Paul’s connective perspective of the body image rejects the ideological part-whole hierarchy. For him, the body both in the physical and socio-metaphorical senses, “is only properly a body when it is a[n organic] whole” in which one (allegedly strong) member cannot and should not enslave another (weaker) one.133 Paul does not undermine Greco-Roman hierarchical 132 Paul weaves his pronouncement of organic part-whole in 12:26 with the parallel structures of two conditional clauses and two apodoses.



καὶ εἴτε πάσχει ἓν μέλος, συμπάσχει πάντα τὰ μέλη εἴτε δοξάζεται [ἓν] μέλος, συγχαίρει πάντα τὰ μέλη

If Paul has this parallel structure in mind, the ἓν before μέλος in the second clause should be authentic as the majority of manuscripts read except for some of the Alexandrian MSS. 133 Best, 102.

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ideology of the socio-political body.134 In fact, Paul’s view of the body supports the socio-political hierarchy (12:27-30),135 and he takes it for granted even in a theo-cosmic sense that God has instituted a hierarchy in the church. Paul even numbers and accepts the hierarchical roles in the body of Christ.136 But Paul demurs from an ideology that seeks, often at the expense of the weak and lower strata, benefits for the upper strata of the social pyramid. In 1 Corinthians, Paul uses his voluntary enslavement to all (πᾶσιν ἐμαυτὸν ἐδούλωσα) to exemplify his conduct against this kind of upward selfseeking ethical perspective exercised in the misguided apolitical part-whole hierarchy. The image of enslaving oneself demonstrates Paul’s morality of τὸ συμφέρον, namely, seeking the benefit of “the many” (οἱ πολλοί). It is particularly intended for those who emphasized τὸ ἴδιον in the social pyramid that disguised between the upper and the lower strata, between the “strong” and the “weak,” and between the rich and the poor. As already indicated, in the Greco-Roman socio-political hierarchy the socially strong often appropriated the idea of advantage for themselves by overriding the good of the socially weak. Paul’s argument also reflects the fact that members of higher status among the Corinthian believers have abused their freedom in the church (cf. notice Paul’s sarcastic expression: “you have become kings!” 4:8; cf. 1:2629, 8:9-13). Interestingly, Paul’s expression that he became a slave to all to save “the many” (10:33; cf. 9:19-23) echoes “not many” (οὐ πολλοί) of the Corinthians in 1:26-29, who occupied the upper strata of the social pyramid in contrast to οἱ πολλοί (“the many”), a term that is often used to refer to people who take up the lower strata. This also indicates that Paul addresses these “not many” or the higher status members and urges them to adopt his exemplary behavior in concern for others because they are also “slaves” of the same master (cf. 6:20; 7:21-24). In short, in 1 Corinthians, Paul’s organic ethical outlook of τὸ συμφέρον, as we shall see further, is in tension with an apolitical idionistic ideology of not connecting one’s behavior to the whole. The Corinthian believers have failed to discern their place in the part-whole organic relationship as “one body” in Christ (cf. μὴ διακρίνων τὸ σῶμα, 11:29), characterized by “no dissension,” working together “for the common good,” and having “the same care” among members. This symbiotic value of τὸ συμφέρον consistently undergirds the pattern in Paul’s argument throughout 1 Corinthians. In his discussion of eating food 134 Contra Martin, Corinthian Body, 248, who insists that Paul tries to undermine the Greco-Roman hierarchical ideology. 135 Also, Paul’s “father-children” metaphor in his relations with the Corinthian believers in 4:14-21 echoes “the common assumption that parent-children relations were hierarchical” in antiquity (cf. Aristotle, Pol. 1252a 8–1256a 19; Philo, Dec. 165–6). See Trevor J. Burke, “Paul’s Role as ‘Father’ to His Corinthian ‘Children’ in Socio-Historical Context (1 Corinthians 4:1221),” in Paul and The Corinthians: Studies on a Community in Conflict. Essays in Honour of Margaret Thrall (eds. Trevor J. Burke and J. Keith Elliott; Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2003), 100–1. 136 Meeks, First Urban Christians, 90; Horrell, Solidarity and Difference, 124.

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sacrificed to idols in 8:1–11:1, for example, Paul maintains that the neglect of considering the weak in eating imposes “a stumbling block” for them and thus is a “sin against members of your family” and “sin against [the body of] Christ” (8:9-12). He clearly makes a part-whole connective between one’s behavior and its communal effect. Thus, Paul finishes his summary argument (10:23-11:1) with a clear implication that the problem (related to eating) comes from the idionistic conduct of self-pleasing/honoring and self-seeking while disregarding the common good of the community (10:23-24, 31-33). In this study, however, I do not intend to discuss all of Paul’s topics and arguments in 1 Corinthians to demonstrate my thesis. Instead, I will discuss chapters 1-4, in which Paul sets out the underlying issue behind the factions and conflicts at Corinth, which will serve as a springboard to my larger argument of τὸ συμφέρον in tension with τὸ ἴδιον in the subsequent chapters. Then, as a test case, I will choose one incident (Paul’s argument about the Lord’s Supper) for a detailed study in order to verify my thesis.

C. Divisions in the Body: Problems of Τὸ Ἴδιον As already argued, by his use of τὸ συμφέρον, Paul employs common rhetorical devices and ethical categories familiar (and thus powerful) to his Greco-Roman readers/hearers. Within this frame of thought, Paul makes his assertion: the Corinthian community of believers should be one family in God’s house (θεοῦ οἰκοδομή) that stands on the one foundation he has laid. Believers constitute the unified “body of Christ” in which they are “all made to drink of one Spirit” (12:13). Even so, factions and conflicts exist within this corporate body, which proves problematic in light of the gospel’s “advantage” (σωτηρία) for the many. Paul argues that these divisions come from the Corinthians’ failure to adopt and exercise the norm of τὸ συμφέρον in its proper ethical context, that is, within the socio-ecclesial body at Corinth. Instead, they emphasize τὸ ἴδιον within the communal context of the body of Christ and idionize (privatize) what should be communal. This has become the fundamental source of the conflicts in the community. Paul shows this tension between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ συμφέρον in the first four chapters of the letter.

1. Tension between Τὸ Ἴδιον and Τὸ Συμφέρον; Chapters 1-4 Interpreters agree that chapters 1-4 serve as an introductory address in which Paul establishes the context for his subsequent arguments against the conflicts and divisions at Corinth. Here Paul “provide[s] a window onto the problem of fractiousness that pervades the letter.”137 Paul describes the ethical tendencies among the Corinthian believers by means of rhetorical bifurcation delineating their conduct in a series of paired opposites, characterized by either τὸ 137 Sampley, NISB, 2039; cf. Liftin, 147–59.

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συμφέρον or τὸ ἴδιον. With their factions in mind, Paul speaks of two wisdoms – the wisdom of the world vs. wisdom of God (1:20-25; 2:6-16) – and of two spirits – the spirit of the world vs. the Spirit from God (2:10-14). He exposes the respective groupings by contrasting “those [who are] perishing” (ἀπολλυμένοι) and “those being saved” (σῳζομένοι) (1:18); “the unspiritual” (ψυχικοί) and “the spiritual” (πνευματικοί) (2:13-15); “infants” (νηπίοι, 3:1) and “the mature” (τέλειοι, 2:6); “we [who] have the mind of Christ” (2:16) and “you [who] are still of the flesh” (3:3); and the “weak” and the “strong” (4:10), to name a few. In the last chapter of his opening address, Paul makes at least three more contrasts: between those seeking false glory (falsa gloria to use Cicero’s expression) and those who become “fools” and “a spectacle to the world” (4:8-13); between father and children (vv.14-20); and between applying a father’s discipline to his Corinthian “children” “with a stick” and “with love” (v.21). Paul highlights the problem of τὸ ἴδιον among the Corinthians by contrasting it with seeking the communal good. His multiple contrasts in the opening chapters reveal the tendency among the Corinthians to emphasize τὸ ἴδιον at the expense of τὸ συμφέρον. These pairings do not require that there are only two factions at Corinth. By setting two portraits against each other, the way it should be within the community (τοὺς ἔσω) and the way it is outside the community (τοὺς ἔξω), Paul discloses an idionistic ethical tendency among the Corinthians in order to persuade everyone within the community to live according to the proper way (i.e., τὸ συμφέρον) that will benefit all (both those within and outside). For example, when speaking of the two wisdoms, Paul regards the foolishness (μωρία) of the cross as the true wisdom and power of God.138 He describes the message of the cross in terms of τὸ συμφέρον because the wisdom of God revealed in the “crucified Christ” benefits (σώζειν, “to save”) those who believe (τοὺς πιστεύοντας). This message bears the non-divisive quality of τὸ συμφέρον that heals and conjoins “those who are called, both Jews and Greeks” (1:24). As in the Greco-Roman part-whole paradigm of τὸ συμφέρον, Paul also uses σωτηρία (salvation) terminology.139 Here he foreshadows his development of the concept by describing the benefits and advantage for the many through the “salvation” that is God’s μωρία (cf. 9:19-23 and 10:31-33). Further, Paul relates God’s wisdom to what is exercised among the mature (τέλειοι), the spiritual (πνευματικοί), and those who “have the mind of Christ” (2:6-16). He then identifies the mature (τέλειοι, 2:6) with those who are spiritual (πνευματικοί, 2:13, 15). Paul’s argument in this context and throughout the document makes it clear that the truly spiritual ones seek the good of others.140 138 Hans-Christian Kammler, Kreuz und Weisheit: Eine exegetische Untersuchung zu 1 Kor 1,10-3,4 (WUNT 159; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 54–122. 139 And ἀπώλεια (destruction) terminology as the opposite value of σωτηρία, as in 1:18. See Ch. 6 below for further discussion. 140 As Sampley states, “The spiritual persons are the ones who take care of the weaker ones and restore them.” See his “Faith and Its Moral Life,” 228. This is the same case with “the

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But the σοφοί at Corinth simply are not so (cf. 6:5), because they do not consider the common good of the community. Conversely, in his concluding remark (2:16), Paul regards as wise and spiritual only those who have assumed “the mind of the crucified Christ” who died for the good of others.141 Unity among the Corinthian believers demands that they share the “same mind” (1:10), that is, the “mind of Christ” that seeks the good of others. Those who are “mature,” “spiritual,” and truly “wise,” for Paul, represent persons who seek the good of others and apply the communal benefit of “Christ crucified” for the many (cf. 8:1-11:1, 11:17-34).142 Furthermore, Paul makes a significant contrast (in these opening chapters) between the self-seeking Greco-Roman honor codes (human wisdom, power, and noble birth) and a mode of self-lowering for the good of others (1:26-29; 4:8-13; 9:19-23). By this contrast, Paul also intends to disclose the underlying issue of τὸ ἴδιον behind the conflicts at Corinth. According to Cicero’s discussion of the Greco-Roman honor codes (Ch. 4 above), boasting of personal honor, glory, and status were common idionistic behaviors, and people who sought these values often departed from the context of the community and sacrificed the greater good of the whole in exchange for personal glory. Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians, as discussed below, also reflects that those who “boast” of their wisdom, power, and wealth at Corinth were not free from this line of idionistic ideology (cf. 5:6). It seems that “boasting” (καυχήσηται, 1:29, 31; 4:6; 5:2, 6) became a divisive force in the community at Corinth because of its idionistic character, as Aristotle had considered φιλοτιμία as a common source of civic division (στάσις).143 Paul agues that, though “not many” (οὐ πολλοί) of the Corinthian believers can claim these socio-cultural values, they certainly ground their boasting on those honor codes (1:29-31; cf. 4:8-13) by “human standards” (κατὰ σάρκα, 1:26), which became a source of conflicts in the community.144 The method God uses to reverse human standards is the foolishness (μωρία) of the cross (i.e., “shame” in contrast to “honor”), which Paul has already presented as the true wisdom and power of God that brings benefit to humanity. In sum, as for the “spiritual,” “mature,” and “wise” persons, Paul also identifies “honorable” persons (ἔνδοξοι, 4:10) with those mature” (τελείοι) who have discarded the childish behavior of seeking private interest (13:11; cf. “infants,” 3:1). 141 Furnish, Theology, 45 (italics his). 142 See my discussion below on Paul’s presentation of the “crucified Christ” as a powerful model for the other-regarding morality of τὸ συμφέρον. 143 Aristotle, Pol. 1302b 10-15: “It is clear also what is the power of honor [τιμή] and how it can cause party faction [στάσεως]; for men form factions [στασιάζουσιν] both when they are themselves dishonoured [ἀτιμαζόμενοι] and when they see others honoured [τιμωμένους].” Cited by Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 91 n.151. 144 Paul defines those honor codes of wisdom, power, and wealth as things highly elevated by the Corinthians’ “human standards” (κατὰ σάρκα; cf. 3:3). His expression of κατὰ σάρκα characterizes the category of τὸ ἴδιον as he explicitly defines their idionistic divisive behaviors as being the “flesh” (σαρκικοί) and “behaving according to human inclinations” (κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖτε, 3:3; also see the discussion below).

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who seek the good of others, as God’s wisdom (as seen in the crucified Christ) brings non-divisive benefits to “both Jews and Greeks” (1:18-25).145 By contrast, Paul categorizes worldly wisdom as τὸ ἴδιον. This becomes clear in his description of the people who boast of worldly wisdom but manifest “jealousy and quarreling” (ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις, 3:3; cf. 1:10, 11:18-19) in the community. These divisive qualities come from the emphasis on τὸ ἴδιον among members and citizens. Paul further signals their tendency toward a life of τὸ ἴδιον when he mentions that these people are of “the flesh” (σαρκικοί) and behave “according to human inclinations” (κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖτε, 3:3). Unlike spiritual and mature persons, those who perpetuate “jealousy” and “strife” are unspiritual (ψυχικοί) “people of the flesh” (σαρκικοί, v.3) and “infants in Christ” (νηπίοι ἐν Χριστῷ, v.1).146 They are similar to those who emphasize the basic “ego” instinct of the flesh (ἐν σαρκί), to use Epictetus’ expression.147 In the Greco-Roman moral philosophical tradition, what is immature or childish often characterizes an idionistic way of seeking private benefit. Epictetus, for example, argues, “You are no longer a lad [μειράκιον], but already a full-grown adult [ἀνὴρ ἤδη τέλειος]…. Make up your mind, therefore…to live as a mature person [τέλειον].”148 In a similar vein, Paul’s description of the Corinthians as νηπίοι (babes, 3:1) and τέκνα (children) and himself as their “father” (4:14-17) characterizes both their stance of τὸ ἴδιον and Paul’s corrective (“be imitators of me,” v.16) to the life of τὸ συμφέρον, respectively. His argument in the context makes this point clear, and later he explicitly exhorts the members who embody τὸ ἴδιον to set aside childish ways (τὰ τοῦ νηπίου, “things of the child,” 13:11) of seeking “your own advantage” and to seek “that of the other” (10:24, 33). In fact, by the child-adult analogy, Paul makes a contrast between a self-regarding “child ethic” (cf. νήπιος, 3:1; 13:11) of τὸ ἴδιον among the Corinthians and an other-regarding “adult ethic” (cf. τέλειος and ἀνήρ, 2:6; 13:10-11; 14:20) of τὸ συμφέρον that he presents as a corrective. The former became the major source for the conflicts at Corinth, and the father of the community develops and exemplifies (cf. 9:19-23; 10:31-11:1; 13:1-3, 11; 14:18-19) the latter to reorient his children’s ethical frame of mind.

145 At the same time, Paul’s identification of these categories with the people who exemplify τὸ συμφέρον becomes a subtle rebuke of those who think of themselves as the “spiritual” and “wise” while looking down at other members at the church. For him, they are rather people of τὸ ἴδιον (see below). 146 Paul states, “I could not speak to you as spiritual people, but rather as people of the flesh, as infants in Christ” (3:1). 147 A similar expression for the basic “ego” instinct in human beings is found in the Greco-Roman moral traditions. Epictetus (Diss, 2.22.15-23) maintains that living creatures incline (ῥέπειν τὸ ζῷον) to the side of emphasizing “I” (ἐγώ) and “mine” (ἐμόν) in contrast to the common good, and that these “ego” instincts are the ruling power in the flesh (ἐν σαρκί). 148 See Epictetus, Ench. 51 (emphasis added).

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a. Adult Ethic vs. Child Ethic Traditionally understood, Paul establishes his apostolic authority by means of a father-child analogy.149 This understanding is partially true.150 But I argue that, beyond this, in the concluding section of the opening chapters of 1 Corinthians, Paul – through the father/child analogy – compares and contrasts the Corinthians’ idionistic, self-serving childish behaviors and a life of τὸ συμφέρον that he, as their father, exemplifies. Paul says that he received the latter mode from Christ (11:1). Paul’s father-child analogy at the end of his opening chapters is another indication of his rhetorical bifurcation of the Corinthian believers into a series of paired opposites that he makes to disclose an idionistic ethical tendency among them. By employing this analogy, Paul expresses the agenda he wants to accomplish, that is, to redirect their ethical mode from τὸ ἴδιον (“child ethic”) to τὸ συμφέρον (“adult ethic”). For example, Paul develops the contrast between child ethic and adult ethic in his encomium on ἀγάπη. This contrast becomes clear as he presents “the greatest” gift of ἀγάπη as adult ethic (τέλειος/ἀνήρ, 13:10-11). The essential character of ἀγάπη is that of τὸ συμφέρον (cf. v.5). With the Corinthians’ idionistic conduct in mind, Paul describes love as “not jealous” (οὐ ζηλοῖ, v.4) against their child-like behavior of “jealousy and quarreling” (ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις, 3:3); as “not boastful” (οὐ περπερεύεται, 13:4) against those who are boastful (cf. 5:6; 1:31); as “not arrogant” (οὐ φυσιοῦται, 13:4) against “arrogant people” (4:6, 18, 19; 5:2; 8:1); and as “not rejoic[ing] in wrongdoing” (οὐ χαίρει ἐπὶ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ, 13:6) against their life associated (συναναμίγνυσθαι) with the man of πορνεία and ἀδικία within the community (e.g., chs. 5-6). These descriptions of what love is not are (as already noted) childish qualities of τὸ ἴδιον, and thus they characterize the Corinthians’ individualistic mode of life. Paul’s development of this child-ἴδιον motif in contrast with the adult-συμφέρον idea becomes further evident in his argument that follows in the same chapter. Toward the end of his discourse on ἀγάπη, Paul states: “When I was a child, I spoke like a child [ὡς νήπιος], I thought like a child, I reasoned like a child; when I became an adult [ἀνήρ; cf. “father”], I put an end to childish ways [of seeking my own benefit]” (13:11, emphasis added; cf. v.5; 10:33). Paul contrasts “things of the child” (τὰ τοῦ νηπίου; i.e., childish speaking, thought, and reasoning, 13:11) that characterize τὸ ἴδιον among the Corinthian believers with the father/“adult ethic” (ἀγάπη) that seeks the good of others, as exemplified in the previous arguments (i.e., 8:1-11:1; cf. “I [your ‘father’] do not seek my own advantage, but that of the many,” 10:33).

149 For example, in her study of the imitation of Paul, Elizabeth Castelli argues that the notion of imitation (i.e., 4:16) “functions in Paul’s letters as a strategy of power” and establishes his own authority. As such, she understands Paul’s rhetoric of imitation of him (“father”) as a “discourse of power.” See her Imitating Paul: A Discourse of Power (Louisville: Westminster/ John Knox, 1991), 15, 98–117. 150 Paul writes, “Indeed, in Christ Jesus I became your father through the gospel” (v.15).

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In chapter 14 (which continues the theme of ἀγάπη)151 Paul addresses how ἀγάπη functions for “edifying” the church within the context of the spiritual gifts of prophecy and tongues-speaking. He speaks of the gift of prophecy that benefits the community (οἰκοδομεῖν) as a whole and a gift of tongues-speaking that benefits (οἰκοδομεῖν) the agent alone (14:3; cf. 8:1). Then Paul asserts his fatherly admonition: “Do not be children [παιδία] in your thinking…but in thinking be adults [τέλειοι]” (14:20, emphasis added). This corresponds exactly to his argument of putting an end to childish behaviors (τὰ τοῦ νηπίου) in chapter 13 as well as to his earlier statement: “strive to excel…for building up the church” (πρὸς τὴν οἰκοδομὴν τῆς ἐκκλησίας ζητεῖτε, 14:12b; cf. πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, 12:7). The contrast between child and father/adult clearly supports my overall thesis that Paul wrestles with the ethical tension between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ συμφέρον, that is, between the Corinthians’ childish behaviors (e.g., in lawsuits, eating, exercising freedom and spiritual gifts, etc.)152 that fail to consider the good of the community and modeling his fatherly example of Christ’s self-giving love (4:16; 11:1).153 For Paul, a genuine mark of one’s maturity (τὸ τέλειον, 13:10; 14:20; cf. κατάρτισις, 2 Cor 13:9) corresponds to the ability to consider and bring the connective benefit (τὸ συμφέρον) to the 151 As Sampley notes, “Love guides the use of the gifts so that the common good is sought” (italics mine). See J. Paul Sampley, “I and II Corinthians,” in The Books of the Bible II: The Apocrypha and the New Testament (ed. B. W. Anderson; New York: Scribner’s, 1989), 258. 152 In all of these issues, the basic pattern of self-regarding “child ethic” in tension with other-regarding “adult ethic” appears, though the explicit child-adult analogy does not occur in the immediate context of Paul’s argument of these issues. For example, in his dealing with the problem of lawsuits (ch. 6), as discussed above, Paul implicitly yet clearly indicates that the Corinthians’ behavior is childish in that they failed to solve the problem within the community. And the result of the litigation hurt the whole community (“a defeat for you [community]” as a whole, v.7). Paul does not use the term “childish” here but he explicitly uses its alternative expression “not wise” (v.5). This echoes his opening chapters, in which he clearly equates the mature with the wise and the spiritual persons of τὸ συμφέρον (see my discussion on issues presented in Paul’s opening chapters above). Furthermore, Paul’s repetition of 6:12 at 10:23 redefines what he meant in 6:12-20 (his summary argument of lawsuit and πορνεία). At 10:23 Paul begins another summary argument of the issues related to eating meat offered to idols and sums it up as the problem of τὸ ἴδιον (i.e., “child ethic”): “Do not seek your own advantage, but that of the other” (10:24; cf. v.33). Thus, Paul’s repetition of the maxim (6:12; 10:23) that characterizes the Corinthians’ behavior in both summary arguments clearly implies that the problem of lawsuits is also childish behavior of τὸ ἴδιον in that the agent in seeking his own legal “justice” (benefit) hurt others of the community. This pattern of τὸ ἴδιον (“child ethic”) in tension with τὸ συμφέρον (“adult ethic”) is consistent with other issues of 1 Corinthians as demonstrated further below. 153 Scholars have noticed Paul’s father-child metaphor in his letters. For example, Reidar Aasgaard, “My Beloved Brothers and Sisters!” Christian Siblingship in Paul (JSNTsup 265, Early Christianity in Context 2; London/New York: T&T Clark International/Continuum, 2004; Peter Balla, The Child-Parent Relationship in the New Testament and Its Environment (WUNT 135; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003); Halvor Moxnes, ed., Constructing Early Christian Families: Family as Social Reality and Metaphor (London: Routledge, 1997); Carolyn Osiek and David Balch, Families in the New Testament World (Family, Religion, and Culture; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997). These scholars, however, have rarely developed the rhetorical function of Paul’s father-child discourse in 1 Corinthians in terms of the other-and self-regarding morality of τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ ἴδιον as I do.

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community as a whole in his or her conduct, as opposed to the childish behavior of seeking what is partial (i.e., idionistic) (τὸ ἐκ μέρους = τὸ ἴδιον, 13:10).154 By the child-adult contrast Paul intends to reorient the Corinthians’ life-style, which had been leaning toward what is partial (τὸ ἐκ μέρους), to the otherregarding wholistic life-style characterized by ἀγάπη.155 Paul has in mind the kind of maturity that moves from a “child ethic” (τὸ ἴδιον) to an “adult ethic” (τὸ συμφέρον) of the full-grown adult (τὸ τέλειον). This movement becomes clearer in his view of the eschaton (“when the complete comes,” vv.9-13) when what is partial (τὸ ἐκ μέρους) “grows” to completion.156 In chapters 1-4, Paul renders a final forceful contrast between two methods of a father’s discipline: a “rod” and “love” (ἀγάπη, 4:21). These instruments of discipline further indicate a contrast between the selfish life-style of the child (ethic) (= τὸ ἴδιον) that has to be corrected by a rod and the mature life of love (cf. τέλειος, 13:10; 14:20) that “builds” (οἰκοδομεῖν) the community (cf. 8:1; 14:3, 5, 12) (= τὸ συμφέρον). Paul’s presentation of these two instruments of discipline as a conclusion of his opening chapters is designed not only to sting the children’s conscience because of the selfish behaviors that created the conflicts at Corinth, but also to serve as a father’s powerful invitation to the life of ἀγάπη (or τὸ συμφέρον) as he exemplifies in the rest of 1 Corinthians. By incorporating Paul’s contrast of disciplines between “rod” and “love” into Epictetus’ ethical child-adult analogy (cited above), we can restate Paul’s rhetoric: “You should no longer be a child who needs a rod for discipline, but already a full-grown adult who should grasp the life-style of a mature person (βιοῦν ὡς τέλειον) characterized by love.” Moreover, later in the letter, Paul extensively develops the metaphor of a “rod of love” or “ἀγάπη ethic” (e.g., 8:1-3, 13; 9:15-23; 10:31-11:1; 13:17; 14:1-6, 12; 16:14) to heal the community broken mainly because of the 154 My identification of τὸ ἐκ μέρους (“the partial thing” or “the part”) with the childish behavior of τὸ ἴδιον seems to be clear in Paul’s contrast here (13:10) between τὸ τέλειον and τὸ ἐκ μέρους (as he demonstrates his own movement from “child” to “adult,” an “ethical” movement that the Corinthian believers need to emulate). By τὸ ἐκ μέρους, Paul in the following verse (13:11) clearly implies “childish” behaviors (τὰ τοῦ νηπίου) that the Corinthians have to cease (καταργεῖν). By τέλειος, which he has already used to characterize the mature person of τὸ συμφέρον in 2:6 in contrast with the νήπιοι (children) of τὸ ἴδιον, as already mentioned above, Paul here also has in mind a state of perfection or mature person who can consider the good of others as opposed to idionstic childish conduct of seeking the benefit of the part (τὸ ἐκ μέρους). This becomes further clear in 14:20 where Paul uses the term τέλειος again to describe a mature person (“adult”) who chooses to exercise the gift (of prophecy) that benefits (οἰκοδομεῖν) the community (ἐκκλησία) as a whole in contrast to a “child” (παιδίον) who prefers to the gift (of tongues-speaking) that merely benefits the individual person (ἑαυτοῦ, that is, a “part;” μέρος, 13:10). Thus it becomes clear in context that Paul puts τὸ τέλειον into the category of τὸ συμφέρον whereas νήπιος or παιδίον fits into that of τὸ ἴδιον, that is, the person who seeks things of the baby (τὰ τοῦ νηπίου; τὸ ἐκ μέρους). 155 Paul’s description of “love” (ἀγάπη) is wholistic in that it “builds” and “benefits” the whole (cf. 8:1) in contrast to “knowledge” (γνῶσις) “in part” (13:9), which “puffs up.” 156 From the perspective of the eschatological completion, Paul confesses that he himself still needs progress (cf. Phil 1:25; 3:12-21) toward the future completion: “Now [ἄρτι] I know only in part [ἐκ μέρους]; then [τότε] I will be fully known” (13:12).

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childish emphasis on τὸ ἴδιον.157 By metaphorical “rod of love,” I mean ἀγάπη functioning as means of rebuke (a “rod”) as in 2 Cor 5:14.158 For example, in Paul’s description of love as “not boasting” (1 Cor 13:4, in contrast to the Corinthians’ “boasting,” as mentioned above) he levels a stinging rebuke forcefully and yet indirectly. Paul’s (“father’s”) exemplary conduct noted in his choice not to eat meat rather than become a stumbling block to weak brothers (8:13) likewise serves as a rod of discipline to his “children,” indirectly imploring them to adopt the same other-regarding pattern of ἀγάπη (v.11). In sum, by mentioning the father’s instrument of discipline “with love” in the last verse (4:21) of his introductory address, I suggest, Paul signals/foreshadows his task of presenting the other-regarding pattern of ἀγάπη (alternative expression of τὸ συμφέρον)159 as his new “household ethic” (οἰκονομία) for the community of believers in Corinth. This corresponds to the father’s role for his household in Greco-Roman moral traditions. b. Father, the Corinthian Household, and Household Ethics In previous chapters, I discussed that the “household,” understood as the most basic unit of the larger Greco-Roman civic part-wholes, served as the “primary school of morality” in antiquity. A variety of part-whole ethics (οἰκονομίαι) were developed within the household, for which the father’s role was significant (see below), and the household served as the matrix of various socio-political theories of the Greco-Roman world such as aristocracy, republic, democracy, and kingship.160 I also argued that the common good (τὸ συμφέρον) of the whole became the prime criterion to determine whether the exercise of any ethical theory is or is not a correct form, and that the household (community or state) was undivided under this common value. Against this background, Paul’s father-child discourse and his emphasis on τὸ συμφέρον are revealing and fully understandable in his effort to heal the divided family. It is true that “Paul uses paternal imagery to call for unity” within the factions among his children.161 But Paul, I argue, has a more important agenda than the mere establishment of power as paterfamilias.162 What scholars have failed to notice is that by father-child discourse Paul in 1 Corinthians establishes the household ethic (οἰκονομία) of τὸ συμφέρον, through which he (as the father) hopes to reunite divisions into a single household.163 Paul’s emphasis on 157 See below for further discussion on ἀγάπη ethic. 158 In 2 Cor 5:14 (“For the love of Christ urges us on”), Paul explicitly develops “love” as a metaphorical image of a “rod” that impels to control (συνέρχειν) one’s action. 159 See the section below (“Ἀγάπη and Τὸ Συμφέρον”) for a full discussion of relation between these terms. 160 For example, see Aristotle, Pol. 1253b-1255b. 161 Burke, “Paul’s Role as ‘Father,’” 107. 162 Thus, against Trevor Burke (95–113, 102), who argues that Paul’s self-designation as their “father” is to establish his “unequal power and authority” over the Corinthians. Likewise, Wanamaker (“Ideology,” 115–37) understands Paul’s argument in chs. 1–4 as his rhetoric of power (“ideology”) that weakens the role of others. 163 It is likely that by “divisions” Paul also has in mind the rivalry issues among the

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ἀδελφός (brother) along with his image of God’s “family” and “house” for a split community, is a telling indication that Paul is attempting to reestablish his “household” and its proper ethic of τὸ συμφέρον (ἀγάπη) among members.164 For example, Paul’s contrast between the father and the “guardians” (παιδαγωγοί) in their relation to children (4:15) characterizes his role with regard to the household ethic. The latter (commonly household slaves) simply oversee and keep the children out of trouble but have no moral obligation to be a model for them, whereas the former should be a model for his children in the Greco-Roman educational tradition.165 Isocrates, for instance, encourages Demonicus to “imitate and emulate” (μιμητὴν δὲ καὶ ζηλωτὴν) the virtue of his father Hipponicus.166 According to Aelius Aristides, as mentioned in a previous chapter, among the behaviors a father was to model for his children is a father’s voluntary self-sacrifice to seek the good of his family members (cf. 9:15-23).167 But the guardians are not required to do so. Paul highlights this difference with the fatherly admonition, “be imitators of me” (4:16; cf. 11:1), which immediately follows the guardian/father contrast (4:15). Paul’s contrast between the relationship of the paidagōgos-child and that of the father-child is intended not simply to assert his power as opposed to other leaders but to define his relationship to the Corinthians as the paterfamilias by which he properly establishes the father’s household ethics of seeking the good of the family members (τὸ συμφέρον).168 It is no surprise that Paul defines this household ethic as “my [father’s] ways” (τὰς ὁδούς μου) that should be adopted by his children in Corinth (4:17).169 “For this reason” (διὰ τοῦτο) he sent Timothy whom Paul designates leaders of different house churches at Corinth. See Stephen C. Barton, “Paul’s Sense of Place: An Anthropological Approach to Community Formation in Corinth,” NTS 32 (1986): 238–39; L. Michael White, Building God’s House in the Roman World: Architectural Adaptation among Pagans, Jews and Christians (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1990), 105; Burke, “Paul’s Role as ‘Father,’” 106–7. 164 According to Moulton and Geden’s Concordance to the Greek New Testament (ed. I. Howard Marshall; London/New York: T & T Clark, 2002), ἀδελφός terminologies (both singular and plural) appear 39 times in 1 Corinthians out of the 112 uses in seven undisputed Pauline letters. Thus, over one-third of the term’s occurrences are found in 1 Corinthians. This phenomenon further supports my argument that Paul is trying to reorganize a split family into a unified household for which he presents τὸ συμφέρον as the principal ethic. See also Garland, 41 and n.1. 165 On the role of παιδαγωγοί in Greco-Roman education, see Norman H. Young, “Paidagogos: The Social Setting of a Pauline Metaphor,” NovT 29 (1989): 150–76; Michael J. Smith, “The Role of the Paidagogue in Galatians,” BSac 163 (2006): 197–214. 166 Isocrates, Dem. 4.11. 167 Aristides, Or. 24.32-33. 168 A fine discussion on pater familias in the Greco-Roman world is found in L. Michael White, “Paul and Pater Familias,” in Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook (ed. J. Paul Sampley; Harrisburg/London/New York: Trinity Press International, 2003), 457–87. Also Burke, “Paul’s Role as ‘Father,’” 95–113. 169 Paul explicitly states that Timothy was supposed to remind (ἀναμιμνῄσκειν) the Corinthians of their father’s way of life (vv.16-17).

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as “my child” (μου τέκνον) in the same sense (“in the Lord,” v.17) as the Corinthian believers became his “children…through the gospel” (v.15). But Paul presents Timothy as a model child who knows and imitates (μιμητής, v.16) his father’s “ways” (ὁδοί).170 Paul implicitly demonstrates his “ways” throughout the letter,171 and he explicitly mentions his “way” (ὁδός) from 12:31 on: “I [your father] will show you my way that cannot be comparable” (καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν ὁδὸν ὑμῖν δείκνυμι, my translation). Paul then continues to demonstrate the “way” as the mature (τέλειος) or other-seeking mode of life that resists and replaces the childish mode of self-seeking (13:5, 10-11; 14:20), as discussed above. In short, Paul has sent his delegate to continue to show and establish (“remind,” ἀναμιμνῄσκειν) his “ways,” that is, the household ethics of τὸ συμφέρον in the “family of God” at Corinth, not simply to “represent the apostle’s power and authority to the Corinthians” during his absence.172 The problem of divisions at Corinth lies not in the absence of the apostolic power or of the fatherly authority but in the failure among his “children” to exercise τὸ συμφέρον in God’s “house” (θεοῦ οἰκοδομή), that is, a failure to take mutual care of one another (τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων μεριμνῶσιν τὰ μέλη, 12:25).173 Rather, they emphasized τὸ ἴδιον. To sum up what we have discussed thus far, by the multiple two-sided contrasts in his opening chapters (1-4), not only does Paul “provide a window” into the problems that he expects to address in the rest of the letter, but more importantly, he discloses the underlying issue behind the dissensions at Corinth: the problem of emphasizing τὸ ἴδιον among the Corinthians. In the opening chapters Paul covertly and yet clearly indicates that divisive problems and conflicts among Corinthian believers arose from their emphasis on τὸ ἴδιον in their notions of the “church” or God’s “household” (as “part-whole” space as I defined above) where each member’s individualistic tendency must be reoriented to other-regarding morality of τὸ συμφέρον. By employing familiar categories of Greco-Roman part-whole discourse, Paul reminds the Corinthian 170 It seems that Paul’s designation of Timothy as his child (rhetorically) alludes to his invitation that his other children at Corinth, leaders of the community in particular, also become like his model child who knows (and imitates) the father’s ethics. 171 For example, in the preceding argument Paul has alluded to his ways of “working together” with Apollos for the common (ἕν) purpose in “God’s field,” as discussed above, in contrast to the Corinthians’ factional ways of being “puffed up in favor of one against another” (4:6) among leaders of the community. Probably, as scholars have suggested, there have been internal struggles among different household churches (Paul refers to several households such as Crispus, Gaius, and Stephanas, 1:14-15, 16:15; cf. “Chloe’s people” in 1:11) and/or within “the whole church” (ἡ ἐκκλησία ὅλη, 14:23) in which they all meet together. M. White maintains that there may have been at least six house churches at Corinth at the time of Paul’s engaging with the Corinthians. See White, Building God’s House, 105. Also see Burke, “Paul's Role as ‘Father,’” 106–11. 172 Contra Burke, “Paul’s Role as ‘Father,’” 111. 173 Earlier in ch. 3 and before his father-child contrast (4:14-21), Paul’s sarcastic description on the maturity of the Corinthian believers as “infants” who “were not ready for solid food” (3:1-2) reflects this kind of failure to grow to be “mature” (= “spiritual;” see my discussion above) persons who can take care for one another.

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believers of the fact that they have problems of τὸ ἴδιον, and his language and concepts should resonate powerfully among them.

2. The Lord’s Supper and the Problem of Τὸ Ἴδιον The problems surrounding the Lord’s Supper serve as striking evidence that divisions and conflicts within the Corinthian congregation arose from unresolved tension that set the concept of τὸ ἴδιον against Paul’s ideal of τὸ συμφέρον. I choose the scenario of the Lord’s Supper as a key example for two reasons. First, Paul chooses technical terms such as σχίσμα and ἔρις (1:10, 11), which otherwise commonly describe civic divisions in Greco-Roman sociopolitical discourse, but in this case lend clarity to his discussion of the Lord’s Supper and the Corinthian problem. That is, when the Corinthian Christians gather as a church, ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ, to share in the Lord’s Supper, divisions (σχίσματα) and factions (αἱρέσεις) arise among them (11:18, 19). Second, Paul draws an explicit contrast between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ κοινόν (= τὸ συμφέρον) in his discussion of the problems surrounding abuses at the Lord’s Supper. This carefully chosen and nuanced vocabulary is decisive evidence that the concept of τὸ ἴδιον asserted itself among the Corinthians and sabotaged their unity as a body for reasons beyond social status. The sociological analysis of Gerd Theissen and others suggests that the problems behind the Lord’s Supper at Corinth arose primarily because of the social stratification between the congregation’s wealthy members and the poorer members.174 Indeed, Paul criticizes the divisions caused by the aforementioned social stratification in his rebuke of the conduct of the wealthy members who went ahead and enjoyed their own food (τὸ ἴδιον δεῖπνον) while “those who have nothing” (τοὺς μὴ ἔχοντας) were shamed (11:22). Theissen’s sociological analysis has been supported by many scholars, notably Jerome Murphy-O’Connor who reaches similar conclusion based upon archaeological research. Murphy-O’Connor attempts to account for the Corinthian divisions (σχίσματα) at the Lord’s Supper in light of the architectural structure of the typical Roman villa.175 The triclinium (dining room) is separate from the atrium (courtyard). When the Corinthians met together to eat at a house-church setting, the limited space in the triclinium did not accommodate late arrivers who, along with members of the lower social

174 Particularly based on v.22, Theissen maintains that the conflict at the Lord’s Supper at Corinth is a conflict mainly between the rich and the poor (μὴ ἔχοντας) members. See Gerd Theissen, The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 145–74; Meeks, First Urban Christians, 67–70; Peter Lampe, “Das korinthische Herrenmahl im praxis und paulinischer Theologia Crucis (1 Kor 11, 17-34),” ZNW 82 (1991): 183–213; Furnish, Theology, 79; Horrell, Social Ethos, 124; Ben Witherington III, “‘Making a Meal of It’: The Lord’s Supper in Its First-Century Social Setting,” in The Lord’s Supper: Believers Church Perspectives (ed. Dale R. Stoffer; Scottdale, PA.: Herald Press, 1997), 81–113. 175 J. Murphy-O’Connor, St. Paul’s Corinth: Texts and Archaeology (3rd rev. and expanded; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical, 2002), 178–85.

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strata, were thus consigned to the common peristyle courtyard.176 The physical structure of the Roman villa, according to this view, might have exacerbated the Corinthian σχίσματα between the haves and have-nots, and the gathering for the Lord’s Supper was no exception.177 The members of the higher social sphere usually occupied the triclinium and thus had access to more and better food, while members of the lower sphere languished in the atrium with less. While this sociological interpretation, combined with archaeological evidence, aids understanding of the barriers in Corinth, it does not fully illuminate the nature of the divisions underlying the Corinthians’ problems. Social distinctions alone do not explain why such divisions dominate the gatherings of Corinthian believers who claim to represent the gospel. Paul’s stern rebuke, urging that the early-comers must wait, indicates issues underlying social propriety. Social factors contribute to the divisions between wealthy and poor,178 but, for Paul, they are not the root cause. The way Paul describes the Lord’s Supper suggests that the unresolved tension of τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ συμφέρον has caused the general breakdown, or σχίσματα, between the social groups and has deepened the gap between those of differing social standing.179 I discern this underlying cause of tension at the Lord’s Supper for four reasons: The first is Paul’s contrast between τὸ ἴδιον δεῖπνον and τὸ κυριακὸν (κοινὸν) δεῖπνον, language which introduces ethics and theology into Paul’s rhetoric. The second is Paul’s clear differentiation between οἶκος and ἐκκλησία in function and ethics, together with the Corinthians’ confusion about this distinction as they exercise ethics in each space. The third reason is Paul’s description of believers’ connective relationship to Christ and to one another as σῶμα, a part-whole collective that generates an ethic of caring for one another. Finally, Paul understands the ritual meal as remembering and proclaiming Christ’s death for all, and he thus promotes an inclusive community-oriented ethic. The four reasons stated above arise from 1 Cor 11:17-34, where the Lord’s Supper incident is enfolded in a chiastic A B A’ structure. The rhetoric of ἐκκλησία- οἰκία appears in both surrounding sections – A (vv.17-22) and A’ (vv.27-34). In section A, Paul opens with criticism and analysis of divisions at the Lord’s Supper with two rhetorical questions that employ ἐκκλησία and οἰκία. Section B (vv.23-26), the heart of the inclusio, is Paul’s recounting of 176 Osiek and Balch, Families, 200–3. 177 On the problems with Murphy-O’Connor's suggestion, see David G. Horrell, “Domestic Space and Christian Meetings at Corinth: Imagining New Contexts and the Buildings East of the Theatre,” NTS 50 (2004): 349–69. 178 Horrell (Social Ethos, 124), for example, claims: “The disagreements and problems at Corinth are all primarily caused by ‘social’ factors…a number of the ‘problems’ which Paul confronts in 1 Corinthians owe a good deal of their origin to sociological factors and to tensions between different social groups.” 179 Cf. Pliny, Ep. 2.6; Martial, Epigrams 3.60. For further discussion, see Theissen, Social Setting, 145–74.

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the story of the crucified Lord (as model ethic) in order to heal the Corinthians’ misconduct at the Supper. In A’ he closes with practical instructions for a worthy manner (i.e., “proper ethic”) at the meal by contrasting differing forms of conduct (“wait” or “eat”) and their proper locations (ἐκκλησία and οἰκία, respectively). With this structure in mind, we return to the four abovementioned reasons for understanding the Corinthians as having the problem of τὸ ἴδιον in tension with τὸ συμφέρον, a problem which manifests in the Lord’s Supper and goes beyond the tension inherent to social status. a. Tension between Τὸ Ἴδιον Δεῖπνον and Τὸ Κυριακὸν Δεῖπνον Many scholars assume that the Corinthian believers celebrated the Lord’s Supper in a way similar to the Greco-Roman “potluck dinner” (ἔρανος). According to this ἔρανος custom, each participant brought his or her own food (τὸ ἴδιον) in a basket, and the amount and quality of the food differed according to each participant’s socio-economic status.180 Despite these differences, once gathered, the table was intended to be “common stock” (τὸ κοινόν) and shared by all participants. But some members did not share their delicacies and chose instead to enjoy their own dinner. As a result, even nonreligious social gatherings that were intended to be communal ignited tension between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ κοινόν. Xenophon, for example, employs Socrates as arbiter to settle the tension that existed at the Greco-Roman ἔρανος. Whenever some of the company at a dinner party brought more meat and fish than others, Socrates would tell the waiter either to put the small contribution into the common stock [εἰς τὸ κοινόν] or to portion it out equally among the diners. So those who brought a lot felt obliged not only to take their share of the pool, but to pool their own supplies [τὸ ἑαυτῶν] also into the common stock [εἰς τὸ κοινόν]. And since they thus got no more than those who brought little with them, they gave up spending much on meat and fish.181

Who brought much and who brought little is not explicitly stated. The answer likely depends on the occasion. A less-wealthy attendee, for example, could bring a large amount of food in order to gain status; a more-wealthy attendee could of course bring a large amount in order to maintain status. In Xenophon’s 180 On the Greco-Roman ἔρανος custom, see Peter Lampe, “The Eucharist: Identifying with Christ on the Cross,” Int 48 (1994): 36–49; Panayotis Coutsoumpos, Paul and the Lord’s Supper: A Socio-Historical Investigation (SBL 84; New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 3–7, 39–79. 181 Χenophon, Mem. 3.14.1: Ὁπότε  δὲ  τῶν  συνιόντων ἐπὶ  δεῖπνον  οἱ  μὲν  μικρὸν ὄψον, οἱ  δὲ  πολὺ  φέροιεν,  ἐκέλευεν  ὁ  Σωκράτης τὸν  παῖδα τὸ  μικρὸν  ἢ  εἰς τὸ  κοινὸν τιθέναι  ἢ  διανέμειν  ἑκάστῳ  τὸ μέρος.  οἱ  οὖν  τὸ  πολὺ  φέροντες  ᾐσχύνοντο  τό  τε μὴ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθεμένου καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀντιτιθέναι τὸ ἑαυτῶν· ἐτίθεσαν οὖν καὶ τὸ ἑαυτῶν εἰς τὸ κοινόν. καὶ ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν πλέον εἶχον τῶν μικρὸν φερομένων, ἐπαύοντο πολλοῦ ὀψωνοῦντες (trans. modified from Marchant in LCL). Lampe (“Eucharist,” 39) also cites Xenophon’s description in line with the Corinthians’ “Eucharistic” dinner, but he does not see the tension between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ συμφέρον/κοινόν as I do.

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account, it seems the wealthy brought the large portions. In the final clause – “they gave up spending much on meat and fish” – the present participle ὀψωνοῦντες (spending) suggests a translation such as, “they gave up their custom of spending much.” Furthermore, the quotation specifies meat and fish, while contributors could surely bring other foods as well (fruit, vegetables, bread); Xenophon’s word choice implies more costly foods. It is clear that a dinner party was intended to be a communal space where the ethic of τὸ κοινόν governed the conduct of each participant. Yet some participants persisted in the self-serving exercise of τὸ ἴδιον. Socrates, according to Xenophon, called those who chose to conduct themselves according to τὸ ἴδιον in situations deemed communal (τὸ κοινόν) “dainty eaters” (ὀψοφάγοι).182 In the New Testament era, Pliny the Younger (61–114 C.E.) objects to the practice of serving varying amounts and qualities of food according to social status.183 Eating one’s dainties (τὸ ἴδιον) at the communal table is not simply enjoying personal food; as Plutarch emphasizes, it is a behavior of taking another’s portion (ἀφαίρεσις  ἀλλοτρίου), thereby bringing a negative, disconnective effect upon what should be communal (τὸ κοινόν). At about the same time, Plutarch (c.46–127 c.e.), in Table Talk, elaborates on similar problems. He describes how τὸ ἴδιον in tension with τὸ κοινόν/συμφέρον fractured Greco-Roman dinners (δεῖπνα) and drinking parties (συμφόσια). He argues that, in the communal meal, when a person privatizes (τὸ ἴδιον ἔστιν) what is common to all, such behavior destroys the common fellowship (ἀπόλλυται τὸ κοινόν): “This is true where there is not an equitable distribution; for not the possession of one’s own, but the taking of another’s and greed for what is common to all began injustice and strife.”184 From these examples two significant points stand out: 1) the exercise of τὸ ἴδιον at the communal gathering resulted in social schism, and 2) the Greco-Roman dinner party was understood as communal space (τὸ κοινόν) where all participants, regardless of social standing, were subject to this communal ethic. It has been argued that at the Greco-Roman ἔρανος it was customary for some wealthy participants to come early and start eating their own food and/ or better quality of food and drink from the “common stock” before other members arrived. These later arrivals would then eat leftover food or perhaps even scraps.185 Coutsoumpos believes such was also the pattern behind the Corinthian celebration of the Lord’s Supper in which some members continued to behave as in the Greek drinking parties (συμφόσια) or in the potluck dinners

182 Xenophon, Mem. 3.14.2. LCL translates ὀψοφάγοι as “greedy”; LSJ offers “dainties,” “gourmand.” 183 Pliny, Ep. 2.6. 184 Plutarch, Mor. 644a-d, c (italics mine): ὅπου  μὲν  οὖν μὴ  ἴσον ἔστιν·  οὐ  γὰρ οἰκείου κτῆσις ἀλλ’ ἀφαίρεσις ἀλλοτρίου καὶ πλεονεξία περὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἀδικίας ἦρξε καὶ διαφορᾶς. 185 Lampe, “Eucharist,” 38–9; W. Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther (1 Kor 11, 17–14,40). Evangelisch-katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament 7/3 (Zurich: Benziger/ Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1999), 24–6.

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(ἐράνοι).186 If this scholarly reconstruction for the Lord’s Supper (and for the Greco-Roman communal dinners) is correct, the customary behavior was linked to a hierarchical ideology of social position/dominion because it deviated from the communal ethics of τὸ κοινόν and τὸ δίκαιον, as Plutarch clearly states. In previous chapters, I have shown that the powerful, those who occupied the upper strata of the social pyramid, often misappropriated τὸ ἴδιον at the expense of other ethical categories, and in this case they justified their conduct at the communal meal as if it was customary. As the above three examples indicate, however, the Greco-Roman dinner party, at least from the time of Socrates (as in Xenophon’s description) to the early second century C.E. (Pliny and Plutarch), was ideally understood as a communal context that must generate the connective ethic of τὸ συμφέρον (κοινόν). Thus, a failure to exercise the communal ethic in its proper place creates a tension in the community (cf. ἀπόλλυται τὸ κοινόν), and the emphasis on social differences is fundamentally a problem of τὸ ἴδιον. Against this background, the divisions at the Corinthians’ communal meal arose from the already-established tensions between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ συμφέρον. Paul analyzes the conflicts at the table as a matter of τὸ ἴδιον δεῖπνον (private dinner) among the Corinthian believers in tension with τὸ κυριακὸν δεῖπνον (vv.20-21). His contrast between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ κυριακόν clearly implies that by τὸ κυριακὸν δεῖπνον Paul has in mind their communal meal (τὸ κοινόν δεῖπνον) that is to be shared by all. Paul criticizes that they were not eating the Lord’s Supper (οὐκ ἔστιν κυριακὸν δεῖπνον φαγεῖν, v.20) because some members insisted on their own supper (τὸ ἴδιον δεῖπνον), which widened social polarization between the rich and the poor (v.21). On religious and ethical grounds, Paul distinguishes their communal meal as the Lord’s Supper (τὸ κυριακὸν δεῖπνον) from other Greco-Roman communal meals (δεῖπνα) or drinking parties (συμφόσια). Just as he signifies the Corinthian ἐκκλησία as the body of Christ, which differentiates it from other socio-political ἐκκλησίαι of the Greco-Roman world, Paul designates their communal meal as κυριακὸν δεῖπνον (Lord’s Supper) not κοινὸν δεῖπνον, distinguishing it from other secular communal meals as well as from what Paul designates as “table of demons” (cf. 10:20-21). For Paul, their table is the Lord’s (κυριακός) because it is the communal ritual that rehearses the story of the crucified Lord (vv.23-26) and defines the believers’ connective relationship to one another and to their Lord (cf. v.29; “body of Christ,” 12:27; 6:15). In addition, Paul has ethical reasons for distinguishing the Corinthian believers’ communal meal as κυριακὸν δεῖπνον from other Greco-Roman communal meals (κοινά δεῖπνα). Although the Greco-Roman κοινὸν δεῖπνον was understood as part-whole communal space where τὸ συμφέρον must be the prime guide for the conduct of participants, the exercise of τὸ ἴδιον often arose in that context. It seems that this kind of self-regarding behavior (τὸ ἴδιον) was adopted at the Corinthian ritual meal by members of higher status 186 Coutsoumpos, Paul and the Lord’s Supper, 49–55.

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(cf. 11:21-22). This meant, for Paul, that there was no difference between believers’ sacred meals and other Greco-Roman communal meals.187 In these circumstances, Paul’s use of τὸ κυριακὸν δεῖπνον reinforces believers’ strict exercise of τὸ συμφέρον and mutual care at the table in contrast to GrecoRoman dinners where such other-regarding sensibilities failed. By clarifying this distinction, Paul intends “to uproot the Corinthians’ meal from the poisonous soil of Greco-Roman conventions and replant it in the nourishing soil of Christ’s loving sacrifice for others.”188 He hopes the believers’ ritual meal will be distinctive (and even unique) in its meaning, purpose, and ethics. Thus, Paul uses κυριακός as a corrective to the Corinthians’ misappropriation of τὸ συμφέρον and the exercise of τὸ ἴδιον. b. Difference between Οἶκος and Ἐκκλησία in Function and Ethics My thesis that the Corinthian believers had the problem of exercising τὸ ἴδιον at the Lord’s Supper is further indicated in Paul’s explicit contrast between οἶκος and ἐκκλησία. His οἶκος-ἐκκλησία analogy/distinction that appears both in sections A and A’ discloses the Corinthians’ confusion in exercising the proper ethic in each context. In section A (vv.17-22), after analyzing divisions at the Corinthians’ ritual meal as a tension between ἴδιον δεῖπνον (private dinner) and κυριακὸν δεῖπνον (communal meal) (vv.20-21), Paul immediately brings out his rhetoric of οἰκία and ἐκκλησία. Employing little restraint, he asks: “What! Do you not have your homes to eat and drink in [in your private manner]? Or do you show contempt for the church of God and humiliate those who have nothing?” (v.22, emphasis added). It seems here that Paul makes a distinction between οἶκος and ἐκκλησία in function and ethics. In the first question, Paul refers to conduct in a private house in which behavior of τὸ ἴδιον is permissible; because the οἶκος, when functioning only as a home, is the private context in which τὸ ἴδιον can be exercised without regard to its effect on others.189 In the second question, however, after the same physical space has been appropriated as the ἐκκλησία τοῦ θεοῦ, where believers meet together to eat, the ethic changes. The house now functions as the public part-whole domain where τὸ συμφέρον must be sought. Logically, Paul’s contrast between τὸ ἴδιον δεῖπνον and τὸ κυριακὸν δεῖπνον therefore corresponds to his use of οἶκος and ἐκκλησία in his two rhetorical questions that immediately follow, and in turn to the ethical norms of τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ συμφέρον, respectively.

187 Paul’s argument, as noted above, implies that certain members practiced such an idionized banquet manner and exercised social dominion over lower status members at the Corinthian communal meal (v.21), thereby disdaining the ethical norm of τὸ συμφέρον. 188 Garland, 534–5. 189 This may sound contradictory to my previous argument of the οἶκος also as a communal space of τὸ συμφέρον as Aristotle conceived accordingly. Of course, οἶκος itself as a part-whole constitution is a communal space, a smaller whole, to use Hierocles’ circle metaphor. But here, I mean that οἶκος functions as a “part” in relation to the community (church) as a whole.

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Paul repeats five times the expression (in slightly different forms), “when you come together as a church” (vv.18, 20, 21, 33, and 34; emphasis added), all of which emphasize the Lord’s Supper gathering as communal space governed by τὸ συμφέρον. Nevertheless, some members of higher means continue to individualize (τὸ ἴδιον) what should be public and thus fail to maintain the ethical priority of the whole over the individual parts. Against this problem of τὸ ἴδιον, Paul gives two practical instructions in section A’ (vv.27-34) by employing the same οἶκος and ἐκκλησία rhetoric: “eat at home” (ἐν οἴκῳ ἐσθιέτω) when hungry; and “wait for one another” (ἀλλήλους ἐκδέχεσθε) when the congregation assembles to eat (i.e., ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ) (vv.3334a). Notice that here Paul assigns two different actions: one for οἶκος and the other for ἐκκλησία. Here again Paul clearly makes a distinction between οἶκος and ἐκκλησία in function and ethics. Otherwise, Paul’s command to “eat at home” does not make sense. For example, for a wealthier member who could provide his or her house for the communal meal of the Lord’s Supper (τὸ κυριακὸν δεῖπνον), both private and communal meals take place in the same space (cf. ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό). In addition, Paul’s two different injunctions for οἶκος and ἐκκλησία in section A’ correspond to his earlier two rhetorical questions (in section A) where he already has signaled the Corinthians’ failure to make a distinction between οἶκος and ἐκκλησία in function/purpose and ethics. In short, by “either-or” instructions (“wait” or “eat”), Paul clearly aligns (respectively) the ἐκκλησία context and τὸ συμφέρον; and οἶκος context and τὸ ἴδιον. Failure to align with this dynamic caused divisions at the Lord’s Supper: “one goes hungry and another becomes drunk” (v.21b). To prevent this kind of behavior, Plutarch notes (similarly Socrates) that “the laws [should] hold in check by limiting and moderating private rights…for sharing one another in regard to what is common to all.”190 Paul’s instructions corroborate this line of argument by which he urges the Corinthians not to choose to exercise their personal rights (“wait”) at the church. Therefore, Paul’s admonition (“wait for one another”) refers to the underlying problem of τὸ ἴδιον behind social factors at the Lord’s Supper in Corinth. His advice should be understood that participants must wait to share together properly what should be communal (ἀλλήλους) beyond social distinctions whether they sit in the triclinium or in the atrium. Paul defines their gathering as a part-whole context wherein individual members must choose not to exercise personal rights (e.g., “wait”) and not take the otherwise permissible initiative to eat (προλαμβάνει…φαγεῖν, v.21) without considering others or late-comers. Only by seeking τὸ συμφέρον can they overcome the issue of social stratification at the Supper. Paul’s emphasis on τὸ συμφέρον does not entirely outlaw exercise of τὸ ἴδιον. The place and time for such individualistic prerogatives, he says, is at home (ἐν οἴκῳ) when in private (v.34a). But when believers gather together to eat (συνερχόμενοι εἰς τὸ φαγεῖν, v.33) they have to reverse their priority in 190 Plutarch, Mor. 644a-d (trans. modified from Clement in LCL).

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deference to “one another” (ἀλλήλους). Paul has drawn a clear line between the sphere of τὸ ἴδιον in which the wealthy may enjoy what is private (cf. “eat at home”) and the communal space of τὸ συμφέρον that requires the exercise of the former not to be chosen, lines similar to those drawn by Socrates and Plutarch as they attempted to define τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ κοινόν (συμφέρον) as noted above.191 Therefore, Paul’s use of ἴδιος and κυριακός does not “refer to questions of ownership” of their food on the table.192 Rather, each term defines an ethical context, and Paul’s κυριακός enforces the other-regarding morality of τὸ συμφέρον as the common value within the body of believers. At the table each member (whether he/she has brought food or not) is subject to the other, in keeping with the ethics of τὸ συμφέρον.193 c. Σῶμα and Proper Ethic Further, Paul’s corroboration of the proper ethic of requiring “worthy manner” with the term σῶμα (body) at his closing of this particular argument (section A’; vv.27-29) is another implication of the problem of τὸ ἴδιον in tension with τὸ συμφέρον. He describes believers’ relationship to one another and to their Lord at their meal as σῶμα whose symbiotic image, as discussed above, he frequently employs in 1 Corinthians to clarify the meaning of the proper partwhole dynamic. In previous chapters, I have demonstrated that in the GrecoRoman socio-political and moral-philosophical tradition the body (σῶμα) is the clearest picture of the part-whole organic idea and is the proper context that generates the ethic of τὸ συμφέρον. This is the same case for Paul, as discussed earlier in this chapter. His case for σῶμα as the part-whole context of τὸ συμφέρον is explicitly made by his body rhetoric; the participants at the Supper must “examine” (δοκιμάζειν) themselves and discern the body (διακρίνων τὸ σῶμα) before they eat and drink (vv.28-29). Curiously, the “body” (σῶμα) here possesses no particular specification; this has puzzled scholars and interpreters as to its meaning and significance, even affecting the tradition of ancient manuscripts.194 Various proposals have been 191 Stephen Barton argues that the Corinthian “conflict occurs between Paul and the Corinthians over where the line is to be drawn between church and household.” See his “Paul’s Sense of Place,” 225 (italics his). Barton does not express the line between church and household in terms of τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ ἴδιον. In the house church setting the material space both for the ἐκκλησία and οἰκία was practically identical, but ethically their difference is enormous. Cf. Økland, 131–67, 132. 192 Contra Theissen (Social Setting, 148), who maintains that “ἴδιος and κυριακός refer to questions of ownership…Thus the ἴδιον δεῖπνον is most likely the meal which individual Christians bring with them. If some Christians have no ἴδιον δεῖπνον, that suggests that not all contributed to the Lord’s Supper but that the wealthier Christians provided for all ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων.” 193 Perhaps the richer members could have provided more provisions for poor members who might have brought nothing or little food (cf. 11:22). See Weiss, Korintherbrief, 293; Theissen, Social Setting, 148. 194 Some ancient MSS read “Lord’s body” (σῶμα τοῦ κυρίου). See Bruce M. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament, 2nd ed. (New York: American Bible Society, 1994), 496.

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suggested that Paul’s use of σῶμα refers to Christ’s body given in death, the community as the body, or even the individual’s body.195 I assert, however, that Paul’s use of σῶμα is intended to signify the individual’s connective relation to the ecclesial body of Christ, thereby laying out the part-whole context that generates its proper ethic. This is not the first occasion in which he employs a multivalent use of the term σῶμα. As discussed, his argument against the Corinthians’ apolitical stance of acting as if the individual is “detached” from the body of the community (6:12-20, esp. ἐκτὸς τοῦ σώματός in v.18),196 Paul here too has a double meaning in mind: the individual body and the corporate communal body of Christ, are connected – one as a part of the other. In chapter 12, following his argument on the Lord’s Supper, Paul expresses this connective body politic of caring for one another, as I discussed above, which explains what the body means in the Lord’s Supper. By using the term σῶμα without being specific, Paul imbues the symbiotic context of the individual body in connection with the communal body of Christ, which, in turn, demands a selfless and other-regarding morality of τὸ συμφέρον. Just as Greco-Roman dinner parties were described as a context for the ethic of τὸ συμφέρον, Paul’s description of the Lord’s Supper as couched in the image of the “body” suggests that Paul understands and defines the Corinthians’ ritual meal as a communal event that requires the associated (body) ethics (“worthy manner,” 11:27), as opposed to their idionistic conduct.197 Therefore, Paul’s judgment of the Corinthians’ participation in the Supper “in an unworthy manner” does not mean the individual’s attitude toward the bread and wine but rather means their failure to “examine” (δοκιμάζειν) their part-whole body relationship (cf. v.29) as governed by the morality of τὸ συμφέρον.198 d. Crucified Christ and Other-Regarding Morality In the chiastic structure, the author’s pivotal point/aim is placed in the center, in this case B (vv.23-26),199 where Paul develops the story of the crucified Christ as his alternative and powerful way to express the principle of seeking the good of others. Here Paul recounts “the words of institution” as spoken by the Lord himself (vv.23-25). He then adds a further interpretation of the Corinthians’ ritual meal as an act of “proclaim[ing] the Lord’s death [for 195 See Barrett, 273–5; Fee, First Epistle, 562–4; A. C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans/Carlisle: Paternoster, 2000), 891–4; Martin, Corinthian Body, 194–7; Garland, 551–3. 196 See the discussion above under “Apolitical vs. Organic Part-Whole.” 197 Thus, the phrase “discerning the body,” I assert, means believers’ appreciation of their christoethical relation to their Lord and to one another in their part-whole (ecclesial) body. 198 It seems that by “not discerning the body” (11:29), Paul means the Corinthians’ failure (μή) to grasp their part-whole relationship and the proper ethical norm to be exercised in that sacred space. Cf. Horrell, Solidarity and Difference, 109. 199 “[T]he ultimate meaning of a chiastically structured passage is expressed not at the end, in what we understand to be the ‘conclusion.’ The real meaning or essential message of the text is to be found rather at its center.” John Breck, “Chiasmus as a Key to Biblical Interpretation,” SVTQ 43 (1999): 255 (italics his).

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all]” (v.26; cf. 15:3). Not only does Paul’s action render a sacred aspect to the members who gather around the table, but also (by reciting the words of institution) reinforces the community’s shared connection with Christ’s death and their anticipation of his return (ἄχρι οὗ ἔλθῃ). He thereby graphically imbues the gathering of all the believers with a theological sense of common context that subsumes all time – remembering the past, celebrating the present, and anticipating the future of God’s final victory (cf. ch. 15). It seems that Paul has ethical implications in mind as he inserts the institution narrative (section B; vv.23-26) between sections A and A’, namely, to correct the Corinthians’ misconduct at the communal meal. The Lord’s Supper, for him, is the occasion at which believers remember (ἀνάμνησις, 11:24 ; cf. μιμητής, v.1) what Christ did on behalf of others. Paul highlights the story of the crucified Christ to exemplify Jesus’ self-giving in contrast to the selfseeking attitude the Corinthians bring when they gather for the Supper. For Paul, believers are to imitate Christ’s self-giving, represented in the Supper itself in its ritual of celebrating the body and blood given by the crucified Lord.200 Paul makes it clear when he recounts as part of the institution narrative the formula, “This [τοῦτο] is my body that is for you.” Here the τοῦτο, as Bruce Winter argues, does not refer to bread (ἄρτος) at the Supper201 but imbues in the act the “pattern of Christ’s self-giving death for others” as the paradigm for the Corinthian believers.202 Thus Paul’s intention is clear: The story of the crucified Lord serves as the model ethic, which in his argument functions as a corrective to idionistic behaviors among the Corinthians at the Lord’s Supper. For Paul, the Lord’s Supper is believers’ communal (body) gathering where Christ-like other-regarding principles must operate. In summary, the occasion of the Lord’s Supper provides one key example that the problem of divisions (σχίσματα) and factions (αἱρέσεις) among the Corinthian believers arose from their exercise of τὸ ἴδιον in the part-whole communal space of τὸ συμφέρον.203 Paul meets this underlying tendency to emphasize τὸ ἴδιον over τὸ συμφέρον with a sharp rebuke in his reorientation of their ethical stance so “that there may be no dissension [σχίσμα] within 200 See Garland, 545, 548. 201 The latter is masculine, whereas the former is a neuter demonstrative pronoun that probably indicates Jesus’ action of benefiting others. According to Bruce Winter, this usage of the neuter demonstrative pronoun is not unusual in Paul’s letters. He points out sixteen instances of the pronoun as representing an action. See his After Paul Left Corinth: The Influence of Secular Ethics and Social Change (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 153–4. Also see Garland, 547. 202 See Horrell, Solidarity and Difference, 108 (italics mine). Cf. Lampe, “Das korinthische Herrenmahl,” 208–13; Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Proclaiming the Lord’s Death: 1 Corinthians 11:17-34 and the Forms of Paul’s Theological Argument,” in Pauline Theology, vol. 2: 1 and 2 Corinthians (ed. D. M. Hay; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 115. 203 In his recent study of the problem around the Lord’s Supper at Corinth, Adewuja has reached a similar conclusion that “the main problem that Paul addresses in the passage is that of individualistic tendencies” among the Corinthians. See J. Ayodeji Adewuja, “Revisiting 1 Corinthians 11.17-34: Paul’s Discussion of the Lord’s Supper and African Meals,” JSNT 30.1 (2007): 95–112, 95.

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the body, but the members may have the same care for one another [τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων]” (12:25). Paul’s argument has greater impact by juxtaposing τὸ κυριακόν and τὸ ἴδιον. Paul’s vision of the body can be achieved only when its members strive “for the common good” (πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον) and meld their τὸ ἴδιον into the organic whole for the greater good.

D. The Cross and Ἀγάπη: A Remedy for the Problems of Τὸ Ἴδιον

In addition to employing the term τὸ συμφέρον/συμφέρειν to advance his argument against the Corinthians’ self-serving behavior, Paul also employs the related terms σταυρός (cross) and ἀγάπη (love) as alternative linguistic expressions for the means by which the Corinthian believers are defined as the “body of Christ.” For Paul, God has shown love for humanity (“for us”) in the cross. In what follows I discuss how Paul develops and applies the image of the crucified Christ and ἀγάπη as a remedy for τὸ ἴδιον and its associated problems.

1. The Story of “Christ Crucified” and Τὸ Συμφέρον Paul grounds his concept of communal ethics (τὸ συμφέρον) in the singular story of “Jesus Christ and him crucified” (2:2; cf. 1:23). No Greco-Roman discourse embodies the story of a sole individual the way that Paul appropriates Christ crucified in his argument. Christ’s death, for Paul, is a death for others and “for our sins” (15:3), the christoethical symbol of a communal model that seeks the “good of others” (cf. 10:24). For Paul, “believers have…[this] common story” of their Lord.204 Through baptism they all enter into a new corporate body. By the Holy Spirit they confess that “Jesus is Lord” (12:3). Thus, the story of Christ, through which all believers define themselves and their conduct, imbues the community with a new way of life (κοινωνία, 1:9) that transcends previous socio-ethnic distinctions. “The common life in Christ shared by all believers”205 is meant to be the paradigm through which the Corinthians live out the story of their Lord. Paul’s gospel story206 of God in Christ undergirds the part-whole argument for τὸ συμφέρον as he develops and mounts his response to the Corinthian situation.207 For this reason, the image of the cross pervades 1 Corinthians. 204 Sampley, “Faith and Its Moral Life,” 224–5. 205 Sampley, “Faith and Its Moral Life,” 223. 206 On Paul’s gospel as a story “from creation to the eschaton,” see Margaret M. Mitchell, “Paul’s Letters to Corinth: The Interpretive Intertwining of Literary and Historical Reconstruction,” in Urban Religion in Roman Corinth: Interdisciplinary Approaches (eds. Daniel N. Schowalter and Steven J. Friesen; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 307–38; id., “Rhetorical Shorthand in Pauline Argumentation: The Functions of ‘The Gospel’ in the Corinthian Correspondence,” in Gospel in Paul: Studies on Corinthians, Galatians, and Romans for Richard N. Longenecker (eds. L. A. Jervis and P. Richardson; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), 63–88. 207 The cross plays an important role in Paul’s ethical reasoning. See Hays, Moral Vision,

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Immediately after his opening address about divisions in the church (1:10-17), Paul continues with a lengthy discourse about the cross in 1:18-3:4.208 Here he affirms “Christ crucified” as the single driving force behind his proclamation. In the remainder of 1 Corinthians (chs. 5-15), the story of Christ crucified and risen implicitly and explicitly directs Paul’s ethical argument of seeking the good of others, as becomes clear in a sweeping overview of his use of the cross throughout the letter. Concerning the purity of the whole, for example, Paul reminds the Corinthians that they live in the wake of the festival of their “paschal lamb, Christ, [who] has been sacrificed”; indeed, the Corinthians themselves are the unleavened bread (5:7-8).209 Similarly, in chapters 6 and 7, Paul exhorts them to give glory to God because they “were bought with a price” (6:20; cf. 7:23), referring to Christ’s death. In 1 Corinthians 8:1 through 11:1 Paul uses the example of Christ’s death as his basis for arguing that individuals must consider the concerns and sensibilities of others (e.g., 8:11)210 and appropriate these considerations in their moral choices and behavior. For example, Paul refers to the deferential treatment of a “weaker brother” as being motivated by the brother’s status as one “for whom Christ died,” thus fleshing out the ethical choice by an individual as it would relate to others. Paul asserts his authority to exhort the believers in this way because he himself demonstrates the model, sacrificing his personal advantage for the good of others (esp., 9:19-23; 10:3233), thus similarly reflecting the model of Christ’s death for the benefit of the many. It is no wonder then that he closes the argument for self-sacrifice (8:13; and chapter 9) with the exhortation to practice imitatio Christi: “just as I try to please everyone in everything I do, not seeking my own advantage, but that of the many, so that they may be saved. Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ” (10:33-11:1; emphasis added). Paul lives what he teaches, upholding the personal imitation of Christ and the model of death for others (in view in 8:11) as the pattern Christ-followers in Corinth should adopt in their individualcommunity relationships.211 Paul desires that the Corinthians, like himself, “put aside of one’s own interests for the sake of others (10.24, 33) as a working out of the love revealed in the cross.”212

197; H. H. Drake Williams, III. “Living as Christ Crucified: The Cross as a Foundation for Christian Ethics in 1 Corinthians,” EvQ 75:2 (2003): 117–31. Raymond Pickett contends that the death of Jesus is “the linchpin of his theology.” See his The Cross in Corinth: The Social Significance of the Death of Jesus (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 9. For a review of scholarship on Paul’s theology of the cross, see 9–24. 208 Hans-Christian Kammler, Kreuz und Weisheit: Eine exegetische Untersuchung zu 1 Kor 1,10–3,4 (WUNT 159; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 50–244. 209 Thus, they should keep their house (God’s church) clean and pure. H. Williams maintains that the idea of Christ’s self-sacrifice is present in Paul’s exhortation of driving out the immoral person from the community. Williams, “Living as Christ Crucified,” 127. 210 Williams, “Living as Christ Crucified,” 128–9. 211 Dustin W. Ellington, “Imitating Paul’s Relationship to the Gospel: 1 Corinthians 8.1– 11.1,” JSNT 33 (2011): 303–15. 212 Furnish, Theology, 74–5.

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Similarly, in chapter 11, Paul establishes the death of Christ as the central impetus for showing gracious deference for the poor at the Lord’s Supper. As Beverly Gaventa argues, Christ’s “death, in Paul’s view, stands diametrically opposed to the claims of social status that were at work in the Corinthian community.”213 Paul further heralds the image of Christ’s self-sacrificial model in his description of love as not seeking its own in his famous encomium on love (ch. 13), for Christ “did not seek his own advantage…but gave himself for others.”214 This trajectory culminates in chapter 15, where Paul declares that Christ died “for us” and elevates this model as the ultimate expression and image of other-regarding behavior. Thus, the gospel story is a ubiquitous aspect of his part-whole argument in 1 Corinthians.215 In sum, when confronting the divisiveness at Corinth, the narrative of “Christ crucified” is the bedrock upon which Paul develops his ethic of τὸ συμφέρον. The cross is his distinctive and genuine model for the otherregarding morality of τὸ συμφέρον. The Corinthians’ ethical problems have arisen from their failure to live according to the “story” (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον) on which they stand (ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἑστήκατε) and through which they are being saved (δι᾽ οὗ καὶ σῴζεσθε) (15:1-2). Paul summons the Corinthians “to live out the story of Christ crucified in their community.”216 His discourse on the cross in confronting the problem of τὸ ἴδιον serves as an antidote to factions and a counterweight to Greco-Roman honor codes. a. The Cross as Antidote to Factionalism For Paul, the cross promotes and even requires unity.217 The primary function of τὸ συμφέρον in Greco-Roman socio-political discourse was to bring divided parts into unity. In Paul’s argument, the cross embodies this unifying role of τὸ συμφέρον. The benefit it brings to the “many” people (οἱ πολλοί) is nondivisive (“Christ died for all”; cf. 15:3; 2 Cor 5:14). Christ’s sacrificial death on the cross is for “all those who [are] in every place” (1 Cor 1:2), not limited or defined by socio-political, ethnic, and religious distinctions. Peter Lampe expresses it well: “The cross [is] the place where God meets humanity”218 where previously division existed. It conjoins disparate members to a unified whole, because it brings advantage (“salvation”) to all those who believe (1:18-25). Its message calls all who claim (ἐπικαλεῖν) the name of the crucified Lord (1:2; cf. 12:3b) into the unified oneness of “us who are being saved” 213 Beverly R. Gaventa, “‘You Proclaim the Lord’s Death’: 1 Corinthians 11:26 and Paul’s Understanding of Worship,” RevExp 80 (1983): 384. 214 Furnish, Theology, 100. 215 According to Mitchell’s analysis of 1 Corinthians as a unified deliberative letter urging concord, 1:18–15:57 is classified as argument for “proofs” of seeking and maintaining concord in the community. See Paul and the Rhetoric, 184–291. 216 Michael J. Gorman, Apostle of the Crucified Lord: A Theological Introduction to Paul and His Letters (Grand Rapids/Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2004), 236 (italics mine). 217 Pickett, Cross in Corinth, 37–84. Cf. Mitchell presents love (ἀγάπη) as the antidote to factionalism. Also see my discussion below on ἀγάπη and τὸ συμφέρον. 218 Peter Lampe, “Theological Wisdom and the ‘Word about the Cross’: The Rhetorical Scheme in 1 Corinthians 1–4,” Int 44 (1990): 119–20 (italics his).

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(1:18). Therefore, it is understandable that Paul incorporates the image of the cross, as noted above, into all his arguments confronting the factionalism at Corinth. In view of the story of “Christ crucified,” therefore, the Corinthians’ self-serving behaviors fail to live out the selfless morality of τὸ συμφέρον that Christ himself exemplified on the cross.219 For Paul, to live out the story of the crucified Christ is the way to achieve ὁμόνοια (concord) among the Christfollowers at Corinth.220 b. The Cross, the Corinthian Honor Code, and Τὸ Συμφέρον I have indicated that Paul sets the Corinthians’ self-raising honor codes in sharp contrast with God’s reversal of their worldly norms.221 Paul’s development of the story of the crucified Christ (his gospel) as his distinctive model for τὸ συμφέρον confronts the Corinthians’ idionistic exercise of their honor codes. Many scholars have noted the honor and shame issue in 1 Corinthians, but they have paid little attention to the Corinthians’ honor code in relation to τὸ συμφέρον.222 In his massive study of the social history of Roman Corinth, Harry Stansbury argues that the social conflicts and divisions at Corinth “revolve around the pivotal values of honor and shame.”223 He concludes that “it was this system of cultural values that Paul recognized as his greatest opponent, not a specific authority, social class, or competing religious ideology.”224 Similarly, Terence Mournet maintains that “honor and shame played a vital role in an individual’s understanding of self and in his or her relationship to the greater community.” Paul is fighting against “the vertical levels of personal relationships” (shaped by the values of honor and shame) that are harmful to the community.225 Paul demonstrates that the Corinthians’ problems were, 219 Pickett concludes: “The death of Christ symbolizes the other-regarding behavior which he [Paul] himself exemplified and the Corinthians should imitate. In the Corinthian correspondence the death of Christ is first and foremost a symbol of Christian community in the sense that it represents the self-giving love which for Paul is essential to true community.” Pickett, Cross in Corinth, 214. 220 Unity is not the end goal of Paul’s argument of τὸ συμφέρον in 1 Corinthians. See Ch. 6 for a full discussion. It is the channel through which the gospel’s advantage (σωτηρία) runs effectively to many “so that they may be saved” (cf. 9:19-23; 10:31-33), and the reverse of unity is “an obstacle in the way of the gospel” (9:12). 221 God altered their values and “chose,” insists Paul, “what is foolish in the world to shame the wise” (1:27). Paul continues to argue that God does the same thing with the two other values of power and noble birth “so that no one might boast in the presence of God” (v.29, emphasis added). 222 For a general introductory study on Paul’s use of honor-shame discourse, see Robert Jewett, “Paul, Shame, and Honor,” in Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook (ed. J. Paul Sampley; Harrisburg/London/New York: Trinity Press International, 2003), 551–74. 223 Harry A. Stansbury, “Corinthian Honor, Corinthian Conflict: A Social History of Early Roman Corinth and Its Pauline Community” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Irvine, 1990), 2. For “Honor and Shame as Pivotal Values,” see 27–39, 47–50. 224 Stansbury, 415. For further discussion on “Honor, Shame, and Conflict in Corinth’s Pauline Community,” see 414–97. 225 Terence C. Mournet, “Honor and Shame in First Corinthians: Paul’s Conflict with the

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to a large extent, connected and interwoven with the predominant GrecoRoman value system of pursuing honor (φιλοτιμία).226 Reading 1 Corinthians as a part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον sheds a new light on the function(s) of Paul’s honor-shame discourse in addressing the problem of divisions at Corinth. Φιλοτιμία, love of and desire for honor and glory, was a leading value in Greco-Roman antiquity.227 Aristotle equated “the great-souled man” (ὁ μεγαλοψῦχος) with the person “who has the right disposition in relation to honors [τιμάς] and disgraces [ἀτιμίας],” and the former “is the object with which the great-souled are concerned.”228 Cicero contended that a “man of honor” always aspires for gloria which is “the noblest” among other rewards in life.229 This value system in Greco-Roman society often created a socioethical polarization between honor and shame; one’s achievement of honor brought shame to others. For example, Aristotle admitted that “the high-born and those who are powerful or wealthy are esteemed worthy of honor, because they are superior to their fellows.”230 But the problem with this value system was that those who thought themselves superior to others often “despised” (καταφρονεῖν) members of the community and exercised their “strength against the weak” (εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι).231 To obviate this sort of social schism Aristotle proposed that any effort to achieve honor and glory should be based on “virtue” (ἐπ’ ἀρετῇ): “Therefore the truly great-souled man must be a good man” who does not override the good of others in the personal competition for honor.232 Similarly, Cicero raised his voice against the Hellenistic value system that caused the same social polarization. For him, the human desire for honor and glory provoked the ethical dilemma of dismissing social justice and the rights and benefits of the whole community.233 Seeking personal honor and glory became a euphemism for the pursuit of personal benefits (tὰ ἴδιa) at the expense of the common good (τὸ συμφέρον) Pivotal Values of Mediterranean Society” in Who Killed Goliath?: Reading the Bible with Heart and Mind (eds. Robert F. Shedinger and Deborah J. Spink; Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press, 2001), 84–5. Also see David A. deSilva, “‘Let the One Who Claims Honor Establish That Claim in the Lord’: Honor Discourse in the Corinthian Correspondence,” BTB 28.2 (1998): 61–74. 226 Likewise, Mark Finney suggests that φιλοτιμία “was the root cause of many problematic issues within the community.” See Mark T. Finney, “Honor, Rhetoric and Factionalism in the Ancient World: 1 Corinthians 1–4 in Its Social Contest,” BTB 40 (2010): 27–36. 227 See my discussion under “A Value System in Greco-Roman Antiquity” in Ch. 4. 228 For Aristotle, “a person is thought to be a great-souled if he claims much and deserves much,” and “it is honor [= ‘the greatest of external goods’] above all else which great men claim and deserve.” For such discussion, see Eth. nic. 4.3.1-34. 229 Cicero, Mil. 35.97; Tusc. 3.2.3; Arch. 11.26-29. 230 “And that which is superior in something good is always held in higher honor,” continues Aristotle. See Eth. nic. 4.3.19: οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἤ πλουτοῦντες. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ’ ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. 231 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 4.3.21-27. 232 See Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.5.5 and 4.3.14: τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. 233 See my discussion on this matter in Ch. 4.

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in the individual-community relationship.234 Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians addresses the same idionistic problem at Corinth. No doubt the Hellenistic value system that emphasized superiority and pursuing honor was alive and well in Corinth during the period of Paul’s engagement there.235 The Corinthian elitism that emphasized education and rhetoric reflects this value system (cf. 2:1-5; 8:1-6),236 as did the Corinthians’ “boasting.”237 The boasting of some Corinthian believers about such grandiose values such as wisdom, power, and breeding, created tensions among them (1:26-31; 3:21; 4:7; 5:6; 9:15-16; 13:3; 15:31). According to Paul’s stinging description of Corinthian pseudo-glory (4:8-13), they elevated themselves in order to “be rich,” and to be “held in honor” (ἔνδοξοι). In contrast, Paul places himself (and other apostles) on the opposite side of the ethical spectrum, that is, on the side of social shame (ἄτιμοι, v.10).238 By this social polarization between honor and shame, Paul voices the rhetorical motif of God’s reversal (1:26-29) of the current social values. He presents his own example of dishonor to challenge the idionistic self-serving exercise of honor codes in which social elites callously disregard others and humiliate weaker members.239 To heal the social schism that pivoted on the honor-shame system among the Corinthian believers,240 Paul provides his distinctive honor code in service to his connective rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον. For him, true honor should be a connective good as he states: “if one member [ἓν μέλος] is honored [δοξάζεται], all [πάντα τὰ μέλη] rejoice together with it” (12:26).241 The Corinthians’ honor code, however, is idionistic, self-referring, and disconnected. Paul’s implied definition of true honor echoes Cicero’s. For Cicero, true glory (vera gloria) 234 Cf. Long, “Cicero’s Politics in De Officiis,” 216–19. 235 On φιλοτιμία (love of honor) as the Greco-Roman value system, see Sullivan, 382–92; Leeman, 177–90. Also see my discussion above in Ch. 4. 236 Robert S. Dutch, The Educated Elite in 1 Corinthians: Education and Community Conflict in Graeco-Roman Context (JSNTSup 271; London/New York: T.&T. Clark International 2005). Dutch argues that there was a group of “educated elite” at Corinth and they created tensions at the church. Also see David W. J. Gill, “In Search of the Social Élite in the Corinthian Church,” TynBul 44.2 (1993): 323–37; cf. Pogoloff, 99–127. 237 deSilva, 64. 238 Paul then admonishes the Corinthians to imitate him in v.16. Stansbury, 478–9. 4:8-13 is understood as one of Paul’s hardship (peristasis) catalogues. See John T. Fitzgerald, Crack in an Earthen Vessel: An Examination of the Catalogues of Hardships in the Corinthian Correspondence (SBLDS 99; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988); 117–48; David E. Fredrickson, “Paul, hardships, and Suffering,” in Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook (ed. J. Paul Sampley; Harrisburg/London/New York: Trinity Press International, 2003), 172–94. 239 For example, Paul, probably against the “superior” members who dishonored the “weak” or socially lower status members in the community, explicitly brings out the theme of God’s reversal of honor-shame in his body analogy (12:23-24). Here Paul uses the terms of “honor” (ἔνδοξος) and “shame” (ἄτιμος). 240 On “boasting” (καυχᾶσθαι) as a divisive force in the community, see Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 91–5. 241 This connective emphasis supports my earlier argument that Paul bases his ethical outlook on the organic part-whole as opposed the Corinthians’ apolitical stance.

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embodies three qualities. First, it should be approved both by the individual who achieved honor and by the multitude (multitudinis testimonio). Second, the individual’s pursuit of honor and glory should be in perfect harmony with moral goodness (honestum/τὸ καλόν; cf. οὐ καλόν, 1 Cor 5:6). Third, personal achievement of honor should bring benefits to the whole (utilitas/τὸ συμφέρον). For Cicero, personal honor and glory were not detached from the connective good of the whole.242 Paul, likewise, adopts this approach to vera gloria and rejects the Corinthian honor code that disregarded these qualities. The Greco-Roman legal system provides an example of the pervasiveness of honor and shame. The system was used as a means of gaining personal honor, status, and reputation on the one hand and of incurring shame on the other.243 In chapter 6, Paul appraises the Corinthians’ behavior as “not advantageous” (οὐ συμφέρει, 6:12; cf. οὐ καλόν [not honorable], 5:6) because they have neglected the communal context of being a family of believers (6:5-6), which brought total “defeat” (ἥττημα) that dishonors the community (v.7). Further, against their competing for honor with respect to spiritual gifts,244 Paul presents his distinctive honor code of ἀγάπη as the “greatest” of other gifts, which “never ends” (13:8-13)245 and edifies (οἰκοδομεῖν) the whole (8:1; see below). For Paul, the pursuit of personal honor and glory undermines giftedness. Further, Paul elucidates the downward movement of social shame to show how it benefits many others (9:19-23) and is the path to true honor and glory (cf. vv.24-27).246 He inverts the dominant Greco-Roman code of self-aggrandizement that emphasized wisdom, power, and wealth. Paul presents the crucified Christ as “the Lord of glory” (ὁ κύριος τῆς δόξης, 2:8) as the model of this new honor code.247 This exalted position (cf. Phil 2:9-11) imitates the shameful death on the cross, through which Christ sought the good of others (1 Cor 15:3; cf. Phil 2:4). Christ gained the glory of resurrection (ἐγείρεται ἐν δόξῃ) by reducing (lit. “sowing”) himself to a place of dishonor (σπείρεται ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ, 15:43). The subsequent glory of resurrection validated Christ as the first fruit that anticipates the future resurrection of “those who belong to” him (vv.20-23). In this manner, the theme of shame and honor forms an inclusio in 1 Corinthians.248 Within this frame he offers the foolishness (μωρία) of the cross as “an antidote to human self-glorification” that became a source of problems at Corinth.249 242 Cicero, Off. 3.28.101; Phil. 1.12.29-30; Off. 2.9.31. 243 Mournet, 82. 244 As deSilva (63) writes, “Paul’s discussion of spiritual gifts also suggests that competition for honor has led members to prefer the more exotic signs of divine giftedness – speaking in tongues.” 245 Cicero contrasts unending immortal glory with the “shadowy phantom of glory.” 246 Cf. Stansbury, 414–97, esp. 472. 247 Stephen Barton argues that Paul presents the crucified Christ and the image of cross as a reversal of shame and honor in the Greco-Roman world. See his “Paul and the Cross: A Sociological Approach,” Theology 85 (1982): 13–19. 248 After setting the issue of divisions (1:10-17), Paul begins with Christ’s shameful death in 1:18 on and ends with his resurrection and final victory in ch. 15. 249 Garland, 61; Stansbury, 475.

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Furthermore, the honor and glory that Paul commends to the Corinthians is eschatological and eternal in contrast to honors that are present and transient. Some Corinthians thought that they had already obtained glory (cf. 4:8-10), but for Paul that which they esteemed is “not yet” fully achieved and “perishable” (cf. 7:31; 9:25; 13:10). Their rejection of the future glory of resurrection (ch. 15) reflects their sense of an already-realized eschatology that emphasizes the present form of glory. The real substance for one’s glory, however, is future: each person will receive his or her commendation from God (4:5b; cf. 3:8).250 Paul also describes love as an eschatological reality (13.8-13).251 Moreover, Paul’s discussion of the Corinthians’ glory that “passes away” (cf. 2 Cor 3:74:18) echoes Cicero’s imperfect form of glory.252 Personal honor and glory in which the agent fails to bring good to the whole is simply “a copy of the true” glory (imitatricem; cf. falsa gloria).253 Against this background, the Corinthians simply attained to “a shadowy phantom of glory” (adumbratam imaginem gloriae), to use Cicero’s expression.254 For Paul, the cruciform life of seeking the benefit of others is the way to true honor and glory. Lastly, the honor code that Paul proposes in 1 Corinthians is theocentric. For Paul, what is advantageous to the whole brings glory to God. This becomes clear particularly in two passages (6:12-20 and 10:23-33) whose overall structures are strikingly similar: First, both sections are summary arguments (on sexual immorality and lawsuits, and on food offered to idols, respectively). Second, both begin with the maxim that characterizes the Corinthians’ idionistic ethical stance (“All things are permissible for me”) and then continue with a part-whole argument. Third, both passages end with a theocentric honor code of giving glory to God. Furthermore, in both sections Paul affirms that what honors the whole honors God. In 6:12-20 Paul identifies a “connective” (individual-communal) relationship in the “body of Christ” in which the Corinthians should strive to glorify God by doing what is beneficial (συμφέρειν, v.12) to the community. In 10:23-11:1, Paul explicitly combines this theo-centered honor code with his part-whole communal ethic of τὸ συμφέρον in verses 32-33. Here his central exhortation, “do whatever is advantageous to the community” is used synonymously with “do everything for the glory of God” (πάντα εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ 250 4:5a: “Therefore do not pronounce judgment [their achievement of glory and incurring shame on others] before the time, before the Lord comes, who will bring to light the things now hidden in darkness and will disclose the purposes of the heart”; cf. 15:58: “Therefore, my beloved, be steadfast, immovable, always excelling in the work of the Lord, because you know that in the Lord your labor is not in vain.” 251 Paul says that love is the “greatest” of other virtues because it is eternal and wholistic (τέλειον) in upbuilding the whole as opposed to other gifts that are partial/incomplete (ἐκ μέρους) (13:8-13) and “passing.” Thus I consider Paul’s exhortation “Pursue love” (14:1) as a maxim for believers’ way to eschatological honor and glory. 252 According to Cicero, a self-approved gloria, based on seeking personal interests apart from the advantage of the whole, is like an imperfect statue (adumbrata imago). 253 Cicero, Tusc. 3.2.4. 254 Cicero, Tusc. 3.2.3.

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ποιεῖτε, v.31). In view of this reasoning, an individual’s exercise of God-given spiritual gifts for the common good (πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, 12:6-7) is the means by which God is honored. Therefore, what is advantageous to the community, for Paul, is to bring glory to God because the community is God’s field (θεοῦ γεώργιον), God’s building (θεοῦ οἰκοδομή),255 God’s temple (ναὸς θεοῦ), and God’s family in which God’s Spirit dwells (3:9, 16-17). Thus, the συμφέρον that Paul develops is God-honoring and not simply human-centered (cf. κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, 3:3). In sum, Paul exhorts the Corinthian believers to discard their idionistic ways and social values and instead rally around the theocentric honor code and cruciform life that seeks the benefit of others, which endures forever.

2. Ἀγάπη and Τὸ Συμφέρον Paul’s other distinctive expression of τὸ συμφέρον is ἀγάπη (love). This love works among the Corinthian believers by bringing about advantage (συμφέρον) and edification (οἰκοδομή) in the community. In his argument against the problems of τὸ ἴδιον and factionalism, these three concepts overlap because their overall qualities are selfless, non-divisive, and constructive. For example, Paul’s maxim “Love builds up” (ἀγάπη οἰκοδομεῖ) in 8:1 weds ἀγάπη and οἰκοδομή, as affirmed in subsequent chapters.256 In chapter 14, for instance, another maxim, “Pursue love” (v.1), is indicated as upbuilding behavior (οἰκοδομή) in the community. As to the relationship between συμφέρον and οἰκοδομή, Paul places their verbal forms in a parallel structure in his correction of the idionistic ethical stance (“all things are permissible”) among the Corinthians (10:23; cf. 6:12): Πάντα ἔξεστιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πάντα συμφέρεὶ (“…but not all things are beneficial”) Πάντα ἔξεστιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πάντα οἰκοδομεῖ (“…but not all things build up”)

In this parallel structure, the term συμφέρειν has semantic overlap with word οἰκοδομεῖν, which in turn echoes the maxim of ἀγάπη (“love builds up”). Thus, in Paul’s estimation, seeking what is advantageous (συμφέρον, 10:24, 33) corresponds to what ἀγάπη accomplishes, which is edification (οἰκοδομή) of the community. Paul presents ἀγάπη as antidote to the problems of τὸ ἴδιον because its essential character is selfless (13:5). His rejection of τὸ ἴδιον becomes clear in his discourse on love in chapter 13. At first, he describes love by emphasizing what love is not. In verses 4-6, the negative particle οὐ (not) occurs eight times,257 which rhetorically intensifies his argument of ἀγάπη as antidote to

255 Notice Paul’s emphasis on θεός by its initial position. 256 Sampley, 1 Corinthians, 950. 257 Also in vv.1-3, Paul is presented as a hypothetical negative example to be rejected. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 273; Sampley, 1 Corinthians, 952.

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the Corinthians’ idionistic mode of life (e.g., love as “not jealous”).258 Paul’s rejection of τὸ ἴδιον reaches its pinnacle with his description of ἀγάπη as “not seeking its own benefit” (οὐ ζητεῖ τὰ ἑαυτῆς, v.5). This corresponds precisely to the other-regarding morality of τὸ συμφέρον that Paul insists upon and exemplifies in the letter: “I do not seek my own benefit, but the benefit of the many” (κἀγὼ…μὴ ζητῶν τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ σύμφορον ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, 10:33; also v.24).259 As Willis argues, the “course of seeking the other’s good rather than one’s own…is simply the course of love.”260 Ἀγάπη, for Paul, limits self and builds up the community, which is his distinctive alternative expression of τὸ συμφέρον. Therefore, a policy or a course of action, if it does not build up, is not advantageous (οὐ συμφέρει) in Paul’s reasoning. Put in different, Pauline terms, the ultimate test of τὸ συμφέρον “is whether it shows love to others, whether it edifies others” (cf. chs. 8 and 14).261 Paul demonstrates this dynamic in his argument of the believers’ proper use of their “new freedom” (ἐλευθερία), found in Christ, and of their knowledge (γνῶσις), for both of which he presents ἀγάπη as a guide.262 a. Ἀγάπη and Ἐλευθερία Paul, as noted earlier, does not negate the individual’s freedom (ἐλευθερία) and right (ἐξουσία) that his or her faith permits (cf. 8:4-6). In chapter 9, he demonstrates how to exercise his (believers’) “new freedom” in Christ in balance with the good of the community. He shows how many more rights he, as an apostle, has than others (vv.1-14), but he stresses that “I have made no use of any of these rights” (v.15; cf. v.12b). Likewise, in chapter 14, Paul says that he can “speak in tongues more than all of you” (v.18), but he urges wisdom and restraint regarding exercising that gift in the church (v.19). By implication, Paul means, believers do not give up their rights263; rather, the exercise of their new freedom in Christ and of what their faith permits (cf. 8:1-6) is a matter of considering others (δι’ ὅν, v. 11; δι’ ἐκεῖνον, 10:28; τοῦ ἑτέρου, v.29). For the sake of advantage (συμφέρειν, 6:12) and edification (οἰκοδομεῖν, 10:23), which are qualities of love, believers should not be enslaved (οὐκ ἐξουσιάζειν, 6:12) by their personal freedom. For Paul, ἀγάπη keeps the “balance” between τὸ συμφέρον and freedom.

258 Cf. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 165–71. 259 In the Greek text, the word σύμφορον occurs only once, but the repetition of the Greek article τό indicates the ellipsis of the term σύμφορον in the second part. 260 Willis (Idol Meat, 228) states, “This course of seeking the other’s good rather than one’s own, which Paul both exemplifies and teaches, is simply the course of love, for ἡ ἀγάπη… οὐ ζητεῖ τὰ ἑαυτῆς” (13:5). 261 Sampley, Walking between the Times, 60. 262 See Wolfgang Schrage, Die konkreten Einzelgebote in der paulinischen Päranes (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, Gerd Mohn, 1961), 257. 263 For a fuller discussion, see Sampley, 1 Corinthians, 903–12; cf. Willis, “Apostolic Apologia,” 33–48.

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Furthermore, ἀγάπη sets limits to the exercise of individual rights and “impels” (cf. συνέχειν, 2 Cor 5:14) believers toward seeking the good of others (1 Cor 8:9-13). As Sampley well expresses, “Love, that is, the acting in careful consideration for the well-being of others, functions as the governor that sets some limits to what might otherwise be runaway individualism.”264 Therefore, Paul’s choice of not exercising his rights (cf. ch. 9) is a matter of love seeking the advantage of others and building up the community.265 This matter of love is elaborated in chapter 13 where Paul’s conduct of not seeking his own advantage (10:33) is explicitly expressed as “love” that resists the idionistic expression of self (ἑαυτῆς, 13:5).266 Conversely, love seeks the benefit of others.267 In sum, Paul’s argument of τὸ συμφέρον and/or of individual rights/ freedom is unthinkable until believers grasp the value of ἀγάπη in their partwhole relationship.268 “God’s love for people becomes the force that enables them” to pursue the ethics of τὸ συμφέρον (cf. 2 Cor 5:14).269 This correlation of τὸ συμφέρον and ἀγάπη in reaction to the idionistic problems at Corinth also appears in Paul’s dealing with the exercise of knowledge (γνῶσις). b. Ἀγάπη and Γνῶσις Paul shows that a certain form of the Corinthians’ γνῶσις (knowledge) became a source of conflicts and divisions in the community.270 Paul rejects “the way they allowed it [γνῶσις] to function in the community.”271 Some Corinthians had defended their idionistic life-style on the base of their theological γνῶσις and did not consider how their actions might affect the community negatively. For Paul, the exercise of one’s γνῶσις must have an edifying symbiotic effect upon the community, a belief similar to an idea that Cicero developed. According to Cicero, gaining/having knowledge is a way of service to the community and the mental activity of pursuing knowledge should be for the public benefit.272 Accordingly, people of prudence (φρόνησις)273 apply what they know to bring advantages to the community (ad hominum utilitatem), not 264 Sampley, Walking between the Times, 62. 265 On the importance of “love” in chs. 8-10, see Willis, Idol Meat, 291–6; Schrage, Die konkreten Einzelgebote, 252–7. 266 Holladay sees 1 Cor 13 as Paul’s “apostolic paradigm” in which love “has been introduced as the primal impulse of Paul’s own apostolic behavior.” See Carl R. Holladay, “1 Corinthians 13 as Apostolic Paradigm” in Greeks, Romans and Christians (eds. D. L. Balch, et al.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1990), 98. 267 Willis, Idol Meat, 294–5. 268 For further discussion on this matter, see the section below “Τὸ Συμφέρον, Tὸ Δίκαιον (Καλόν), Ἔξεστιν, and Ἐλευθερία.” 269 Sampley, 1 Corinthians, 955. 270 Γνῶσις occurs in 1:5; 8:1, 7, 10, 11; 12:8; 13:2, 8; 14:4. 271 P. D. Gardner, The Gifts of God and the Authentication of a Christian: An Exegetical Study of 1 Corinthians 8–11:1 (Lanham/New York/London: University Press of America, 1994), 31. 272 See the discussion above in Ch. 4. 273 Cicero (Off. 1.43.153) refers to this Greek word for prudentia.

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just for personal benefit or honor.274 In violation of this connective function of γνῶσις, the people of knowledge in Corinth idionized their γνῶσις, claiming status and honor apart from its connective effect on the whole. In point of fact, Paul has a high view of the Corinthian γνῶσις. In his carefully structured thanksgiving, Paul first speaks positively of the Corinthian “knowledge of every kind,” praising them for the way God has “enriched” the Corinthians with γνῶσις (1:5). He adds as well that they “are not lacking in any spiritual gifts” (v.7). He later affirms their commitment to monotheism (8:4-6). For Paul, γνῶσις, as other gifts, “is one of several gifts of God for his church, designed to benefit the community (cf. 12:4, 28-31; 14:1).”275 By presenting the γνῶσις as a gift from God, Paul retains the notion of its connective good276 (πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον; 12:7) as he explicitly defines it. This understanding then forbids the idionistic exercise of the divine gift of γνῶσις. Some of the Corinthians, however, did exercise γνῶσις for personal benefit and to claim greater status even if their behavior damaged others in the community (cf. 8:7-13).277 Corinthians’ idionistic life-style, based on certain aspects of γνῶσις, created problems concerning food offered to idols (8:1-11:1). They justified their behavior on the basis of their theological knowledge that “no idol in the world really exists” and “there is no God but one” (8:4). Paul reminds them that not everyone (οὐκ ἐν πᾶσιν) of the community has this knowledge (v.7) and that the practice of their liberty (ἐξουσία) can somehow become a stumbling block (πρόσκομμα) to other Corinthians whom Paul calls “the weak” (v.9). At issue with the Corinthian γνῶσις is the consistent problem of τὸ ἴδιον among them as Paul explicitly points out in his summary of the argument related to eating, γνῶσις, and personal ἐξουσία (10:23-11:1).278 In settling the idionistic problem related to γνῶσις, Paul contrasts γνῶσις and ἀγάπη (love): “Knowledge puffs up, but love builds up” (8:1). We have discussed that the Corinthians grounded their idionistic behavior on a freedom principle (6:12; 10:23), which in turn rested on their γνῶσις (8:1, 11).279 As Gardner comments, “Being ‘puffed up’ involves a flaunting of something for one’s own benefit” in contrast to love, which benefits (“builds up,” οἰκοδομεῖ) others.280 Paul stresses that all knowledge without the constructive (οἰκοδομεῖν)

274 Cicero, Off. 1.43.153-1.44.156; cf. 1.6.18-19. 275 Gardner, 25. 276 By connective good, I mean the common value or the “true” advantage in the organic part-whole perspective in which the individual person grasps his or her personal good in solidarity with the communal good. 277 The exercise of their ἐξουσία on the base of γνῶσις displays their social status. Cf. Gardner, 68. 278 In addition to two maxims on τὸ συμφέρον in this summary (10:24, 33), Paul’s repetition of their idionistic apolitical ethical view (v. 23; cf. 6:12) supports my argument that the problem of γνῶσις among Corinthians lies in a consistent pattern of τὸ ἴδιον. 279 Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 14. 280 Gardner, 31.

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quality of love (ἀγάπη μή)281 is “nothing” (οὐδέν, 13:2). Conversely, the one who loves has reached full knowledge of God (8:2-6).282 Yet Paul’s personal experience affirms the possibility “knowing only in part” (ἐκ μέρους) in the absence of completion (τὸ τέλειον; 13:9-12).283 As long as the Corinthian Christians continue to idionize what is given (e.g., γνῶσις) for the common good (πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, 12:7), what they know is fragmentary and immature (cf. “infants in Christ,” 3:1). “Paul is an enemy not of knowledge per se but of knowledge” being exercised without ἀγάπη.284 Paul’s contrast of the Corinthians’ mode of life as based upon their freedom and γνῶσις with ἀγάπη supports my overall thesis that conflicts at Corinth arose from their emphasis on τὸ ἴδιον. For him, γνῶσις in its function and exercise must have connectivity to the benefit of the whole. Spiritual gifts belong to the public domain, “given for the common good” (δίδοται…πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, 12:7), and so does γνῶσις as a spiritual gift (v.8). To enforce this line of argument, Paul utilizes a powerful image of ἀγάπη – a father’s household ethic (οἰκονομία) for his selfish children as discussed above. It is an alternative expression for seeking the good of others against the ideological exercise of individual rights and of γνῶσις, particularly by socially prominent members (“strong”) as he explicitly states: “So by your knowledge those weak believers for whom Christ died are destroyed” (8:11, emphasis added).285 By presenting the “adult ethic” of ἀγάπη as an antidote to the idionistic childish behavior, Paul argues that Christ-followers at Corinth should adopt the form of love that Christ has exemplified on the cross, that is, “a love that sets aside self-interest in order to work for the benefit of others.”286 Therefore, it is no accident that Paul closes his christoethical discourse of τὸ συμφέρον with an exhortation that “all things be done in love” (πάντα ὑμῶν ἐν ἀγάπῃ γινέσθω, 16.14). This is not only a summary of his connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον in the entire letter,287 but is also his own version of the maxim that corresponds to the popular Greco-Roman part-whole 281 Paul uses this phrase three times in 13:1-3: ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω. 282 In vv.2-3, Paul states: εἴ τις δοκεῖ ἐγνωκέναι τι, οὔπω ἔγνω καθὼς δεῖ γνῶναι· εἰ δέ τις ἀγαπᾷ τὸν θεόν, οὗτος ἔγνωσται ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ (“Anyone who claims to know something does not yet have the necessary knowledge; but anyone who loves God [and his people] is known by him”; emphasis added). Also see Rom 13:8-10: “…for the one who loves another has fulfilled the law… ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’ Love does no wrong to a neighbor; therefore, love is fulfilling of the law.” Cf. J. C. Hurd, Jr., The Origins of 1 Corinthians (New York: Seabury, 1965), 78; Fee, First Epistle, 367–8. 283 As discussed above, this is an image of a full-grown adult and of eschatological completion in contrast to the immature stage of the Corinthians. See my discussion on the “fatherchild” analogy above. See also Reidar Aasgaard, “Paul as a Child: Children and Childhood in the Letters of the Apostle,” JBL 126 (2007): 144–6. 284 Garland, 368. 285 In general, scholars agree that Paul cites opinions of the “strong”: “We all have knowledge” (8.1b); “there is no idol in the world and there is no God but one” (v.4b). Horrell, Solidarity and Difference, 171. 286 Furnish, Theology, 100. 287 Mitchell (Paul and the Rhetoric, 94 n.170) considers this verse “a restatement of the argument of the entire letter.” Also see Furnish, “Theology in 1 Corinthians,” 88.

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argument: “Seek the advantage of the whole!”288 Paul’s entire argument of τὸ συμφέρον in 1 Corinthians is a “love-builds-up” discourse.

E. Further Application of Τὸ Συμφέρον and Related Issues in 1 Corinthians In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss how Paul further develops his idea of  τὸ συμφέρον  to cope with other issues he addresses. Our study of Paul’s argument of τὸ συμφέρον is not complete until we finally discuss how he relates his idea of τὸ συμφέρον to the other ethical categories of δίκαιον, καλόν, and ἔξεστιν, an issue that commonly appears in Greco-Roman moral discussion. I will also devote this part to the discussion of how Paul applies the ethics of τὸ συμφέρον to other manifestations of the problem of τὸ ἴδιον in 1 Corinthians.

1. Τὸ Συμφέρον, Tὸ Δίκαιον (Καλόν), Ἔξεστιν, and Ἐλευθερία In previous chapters, I have demonstrated that any body politic or individual action that embraces either τὸ συμφέρον or τὸ δίκαιον/καλόν at the expense of the other is not acceptable in the mainstream Greco-Roman moral tradition. I also have shown that the clash between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ κοινόν in the community arises from the context of apolitical part-whole policy that chooses one ethical norm against the other (ἀντιπάλων πρὸς ἀλλήλας). In this context, the powerful appropriate an ideological aspect of τὸ συμφέρον for their own advantage without giving proper attention to other ethical implications.289 In resolving these issues, moral philosophers rejected “either-or” arguments that pit τὸ συμφέρον against τὸ δίκαιον/καλόν. Instead they provided “both-and” arguments that embrace these ethical norms together. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, for example, insists that in a conflicting situation290 “I am doing what is just, advantageous, and honorable [at the same time].”291 His juxtaposition of τὸ συμφέρον with τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ καλόν holds in check the appropriation of one category at the expense of the other one. The conflicts at Corinth reflect this sort of ethical conflation between τὸ συμφέρον and other categories. Though no immediate juxtaposition of τὸ 288 Notice Paul’s alternative expressions which are interchangeable with the maxim, “Let all things be done in love.” πάντα δὲ ποιῶ διὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον πάντα εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ ποιεῖτε πάντα πρὸς οἰκοδομὴν γινέσθω πάντα ὑμῶν ἐν ἀγάπῃ γινέσθω πάντα…πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον

(“Do all things for the gospel,” 9:23) (“Do all things for the glory of God,” 10:31) (“Let all things be done for building up,” 14:26) (“Let all things be done in love,” 16:14) (“All things…for the common good,” 12:6-7)

289 See Ch. 3 above for such discussion. 290 See Ch. 3 under “Related Issues: Τὸ Συμφέρον and Other Ethical Categories” for the discussion of juxtaposition as an ethical formula. 291 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 8.34.3 (emphasis added): ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα ἀμαυτὸν τά τε δίκαια ἡγοῦμαι πράττειν καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ καλὰ.

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συμφέρον either with τὸ δίκαιον or with τὸ καλόν occurs in 1 Corinthians, the coordination of these ethical ideas does appear in Paul’s argument. For example, in 6:12, Paul caricatures the Corinthians’ self-serving ethics, suggesting that there has been ethical tension between τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ συμφέρον at Corinth.292 Paul points out that the Corinthians choose the category of τὸ δίκαιον to do what is “permissible” (ἔξεστιν) for the individual person while failing to embrace τὸ συμφέρον (v.12; cf. 10:23), which highlights the “either-or” ethical position among the Corinthians. For Paul, the pursuit of individual claims to justice in lawsuits must be incorporated into the common good of the community (6:16), and individual justice likewise does not depart from the symbiotic aspect of τὸ συμφέρον (vv.7-8; cf. v.12b).293 In this qualification, Paul juxtaposes the two ethical categories (what is permissible for the individual and also beneficial to the community) as a “both-and” arrangement. For him, any form of τὸ δίκαιον should not be in violation of τὸ συμφέρον. Paul rejects the ideological exercise of personal right and power (ἐξουσιάζειν) without considering the koinonistic category of τὸ συμφέρον, that is, the common good. For Paul, what is “permissible to me” (μοι ἔξεστιν) must be considered in the light of its resulting advantage or disadvantage to the greater community. For this purpose, he attempts to place conflicting issues within the larger ethical framework of the organic part-whole where members are not forced to choose “one against the other” (ἀντιπάλων πρὸς ἀλλήλας), between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ συμφέρον, or between τὸ δίκαιον/καλόν and τὸ συμφέρον. For him, what is permissible to “me” (μοι = τὸ ἴδιον; cf. individual “justice”) and what is advantageous to the whole should be in “delicate balance,” not in conflict.294 Paul consistently resists idionistic ideology among the Corinthian believers.295 The Corinthians’ exercise of their freedom (ἐλευθερία) and right (ἐξουσία) also reflects the similar ethical tradition of the “either-or” argument of taking a certain course of action (e.g., what is permissible [ἔξεστιν]) at the expense of the other (e.g., what is not advantageous [οὐ συμφέρει]; 6:12). Some of the Corinthian believers chose to do whatever is permissible on the basis of their particular knowledge (γνῶσις) and yet, in so doing, hurt others in the community (cf. 8:1292 As Mitchell (Paul and the Rhetoric, 39) states, “An appeal to the just (τὸ δίκαιον) lies behind Paul’s outrage in 1 Cor 6:1-11.” Paul begins at 6:12 his summary argument of the two immediate issues of πορνεία and litigation, particularly in the latter case individual person(s) sought personal justice while hurting others of the community. As I argued above, 6:12a (“All things are permissible for me.”) is Paul’s caricature that characterizes the idionistic apolitical ethical stance among the Corinthians believers and is a decisive statement of their private morality that seeks individual justice without considering its connective (negative) impact upon the whole. 293 Cf. Glarence E. Glad, Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy (NovTSup 81. Leiden/New York/Cologne: Brill, 1995), 247–8. 294 Sampley (“Faith and Its Moral Life,” 238) notes a sort of organic part-whole as he states, “To live the proper life before God…was to monitor a delicate balance regarding self and others at every point in one’s life.” 295 For this reason Paul immediately develops his distinctive part-whole idea that “your bodies are members of Christ” (6:15) and “you are not of your own” (6:19) after highlighting the ethical tension (see the discussion above “Organic vs. Apolitical Part-Whole”).

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11:1). Of course, in Paul’s reasoning, believers do not give up their rights but are expected not to exercise them in a way that may cause any harm to other members for whom Christ died. While the Corinthians regarded restrictions on their actions as a denial of freedom, for Paul, the other-regarding morality of τὸ συμφέρον equates a kind of freedom expressed by choosing not to exercise their freedom. He intensively exemplifies this understanding of new freedom in Christ in chapter 9 (cf. 8:13) as discussed above. Here Dio Chrysostom’s discussion of freedom is helpful. In his discourse “on slavery and freedom” (περὶ δουλείας καὶ ἐλευθερίας), Dio argues that humans “desire above all things to be free and say that freedom is the greatest of blessings, while slavery is the most shameful and wretched of states”; yet the majority of them have no clear knowledge (ἄγνοια) about freedom and slavery. He defines “freedom as the knowledge of what is allowable and what is forbidden, and slavery as ignorance of what is allowed and what is not.”296 For Dio, knowledge entails both what is permissible and what is not. Against this background the Corinthians’ γνῶσις leads to abuse of freedom because the Corinthian liberty (ἐξουσία) to do what is permissible to “me” (μοι ἔξεστιν) becomes a stumbling block to the weak members, which is the equivalent of doing “what is forbidden,” to use Dio’s expression, because it harms members of the community (8:9). In other words, the ethical dilemma the Corinthians face is their failure to balance between “what is permissible” and “what is not” (οὐκ ἐξὸν; ἔξεστι μή)297 in their exercise of freedom. For Paul, the exercise of freedom should take note of what is “permissible” and “forbidden” in differing contexts, based on what is advantageous (συμφέρειν) to the community. He argues that hurting (ἀπόλλυται) other members by doing “what is permissible” actually departs from the ethical category of advantage (οὐ συμφέρει, 6:12, 10:23). Thus Paul’s argument sounds like Dio’s statement: “it is not permissible [οὐκ ἔξεστι] to do mean and unseemly and unprofitable things [ἀσύμφορα],” Dio continues, but “things that are just [δίκαια] and [καί] profitable [συμφέροντα] and good [ἀγαθά] we must say that it is both proper and permissible [ἔξεστιν] to do.”298 But Paul differs from Dio in that this choice is exerted because of one’s “love” of the brother or sister (as argued above) for whom Christ died and for the salvation of others (cf. 8:13; 9:19-23; 10:31-33). There is a striking similarity in the “both-and” arguments between Dio’s statement and Paul’s clarification of the Corinthian idionistic ethical stance: Dio:

τὰ…ἀσύμφορα οὐκ ἔξεστι πράττειν. (“It is not permissible to do unprofitable things”).

296 Dio Chrisostom, Or. 14.18: τὴν  ἐλευθερίαν  χρὴ  λέγειν ἐπιστήμην  τῶν ἐφειμένων καὶ τῶν κεκωλυμένων, τὴν δὲ δουλείαν ἄγνοιαν ὧν τε ἔξεστι καὶ ὧν μή. 297 As Dio Chrisostom expresses, Or. 14.17-8. 298 Dio Chrisostom, Or. 14.16 (emphasis added): τὰ  μὲν  φαῦλα  καὶ  ἄτοπα  καὶ ἀσύμφορα  οὐκ  ἔξεστι  πράττειν,  τὰ  δὲ  δίκαια  καὶ συμφέροντα  καὶ  ἀγαθὰ  χρὴ  φάναι  ὅτι προσήκει τε καὶ ἔξεστιν.

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1 Cor 6:12:

πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πάντα συμφέρει. (“All things are permissible for me, but not all things are beneficial”).

Dio’s double negatives can be positively restated as: “what is beneficial is permissible,” which is identical to Paul’s argument. Thus both writers provide a clear implication that the category of what is just/right (τὸ δίκαιον/καλόν) should operate in conjunction with τὸ συμφέρον. Dio explicitly juxtaposes the categories of τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ συμφέρον, and τὸ ἀγαθόν (καλόν) in the statement cited above. As argued earlier, Dio’s rhetoric lies in the ethical tradition of “both-and” arguments that do not separate τὸ συμφέρον from τὸ δίκαιον or τὸ καλόν/ἀγαθόν, against “either-or” arguments that choose one at the expense of the other(s). Paul makes a similar ethical argument and corrects the idionistic “either-or” ideology particularly among the socially powerful who do not consider the benefit to the community in their seeking personal honor, freedom, and status. Many NT scholars have attempted to understand the Corinthian claim of freedom in light of the Greco-Roman sage tradition (Stoicism in particular). That is, only the wise are free to do anything they wish.299 This connection is mistaken because, according to Paul’s qualification of the Corinthians’ ethical views, the wise have failed to embrace τὸ συμφέρον in their exercise of freedom. According to Greco-Roman part-whole argument, the wise are not detached from the whole. They are also “parts” of the whole and are subject to the connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον.300 Moreover, what scholars have not noticed is that the freedom in the sage tradition should not conflict with other ethical categories.301 But it does at Corinth, as noted. In the same oration on slavery and freedom, Dio also relates the theme of what is permissible (ἔξεστιν) to the sage’s freedom. He states, “the wise are permitted to do [οἱ φρόνιμοι… πράττειν, ἔξεστιν] anything whatsoever they wish, while the foolish attempt to do what they wish although it is not permissible [οἱ δὲ ἄφρονες…οὐκ ἐξὸν].”302 Therefore, the sage’s freedom to do anything does not mean to do what is not permissible for them. For the sage, the exercise of one’s freedom must necessarily benefit others because, as Arius Didymus notes, “the wise man 299 On the basis of such ancient authors as: Seneca, Philo, Prob. 59; Epictetus, Diss. 2.1.23; Diogenes Lartius, Vita. phil. 7.121-23; Dio Chrysostom, Or. 14.16. See Stowers, “A ‘Debate’ over Freedom,” 59–71; S. Vollenweider, Freiheit als neue Schöpfung. Eine Untersuchung zur Eleutheria bei Paulus und in seiner Umwelt (FRLANT 147; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989); Malherbe, “Determinism and Free Will in Paul,” 231–55; Terence Paige, “Stoicism, Ελευθερια and Community at Corinth,” in Worship, Theology and Ministry in the Early Church: Essays in Honor of Ralph P. Martin (eds. Michael J. Wilkins and Terence Paige; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992), 180–93; Lincoln E. Galloway, Freedom in the Gospel: Paul’s Exemplum in 1 Cor 9 in Conversation with the Discourses of Epictetus and Philo (Leuven: Peeter, 2004). 300 As discussed in Ch. 2 above, Greco-Roman philosophers believed that every human being (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) is an undetached part of the whole (μέρος πόλεως), and is accordingly subject to the part-whole law (“ethic”) of nature. 301 For example, see Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.117-23. 302 Dio Chrisostom, Or. 14.17.

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does everything in accord with all the virtues.”303 What is allowable for a person, as argued above, entails both what is just/good (τὸ δίκαιον/καλόν) and what is beneficial (τὸ συμφέρον). Personal freedom should not override any of these categories. Against this background, the Corinthians’ exercise of freedom departs from the sage tradition – at least as it is reflected in Arius Didymus, Dio, and Diogenes Laertius. The alleged wise persons, according to Paul, fail to govern their lives according to τὸ συμφέρον and thus do what is not permissible. Therefore, those who claim to be wise at Corinth are actually the opposite. They are far from the sage tradition of the Greco-Roman world because they are doing what is not permissible (cf. 6:5-6, 12). In the sage tradition, “freedom” defined as the “power of independent action” (εἶναι γὰρ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐξουσίαν αὐτοπραγίας) does not depart from τὸ συμφέρον and does not hurt others in the community.304 Therefore, the Corinthian conflicts do not arise from the Greco-Roman sage tradition, but rather from a fundamental failure to balance properly τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δίκαιον/καλόν in their choice of action and policy in the community.305 To conclude, Paul’s argument of τὸ συμφέρον does not conflict with the ethical categories of τὸ δίκαιον (justice) and/or τὸ καλόν (moral goodness). In his part-whole social dynamic, the exercise of one ethical category is not allowed to override the other category.306 Multiple categories are to be realized in delicate balance. Failure to keep this balance has created dissension and conflict at Corinth. To restore the equilibrium in the individual-community relationship Paul develops the organic part-whole (“the body of Christ”) to allow for individuation (τὸ ἴδιον), but in solidarity with the whole. For Paul, what is permissible (ἔξεστιν) to a person (“part”) should “agree” (cf. τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν and ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νοῒ, 1:10) with what is beneficial (συμφέρειν) to the “whole.”

303 Arius Didymus, Epitome of Stoic Ethics (Pomeroy), 5b8: πάντα ποιεῖν τὸν σοφὸν πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς. 304 See Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.122-23. Diogenes continues: “Furthermore, the wise are infallible, not being liable to error. They are also without offense; for they do not hurt to others or to themselves.” 305 Again, my analysis of 1 Corinthians in light of the part-whole ethic of τὸ συμφέρον points to the problem of a common scholarly assumption that the Stoic sage tradition had influenced the Corinthians’ style of “freedom” and their idionistic mode of life in the community. For example, see Paige, “Stoicism, Ελευθερια and Community,” 180–93. But, as shown above, the sage tradition of the Greco-Roman world does not allow the individual person to do what is not permissible. Rather, the Corinthian problems arose from their failure to exercise the correct form of τὸ συμφέρον in their communal relationships, which always embraces what is καλόν, δίκαιον, and ἔξεστιν. 306 Again, this is another indication that Paul is at home with the Greco-Roman moral tradition, that is, in this case, bears “either-or” vs. “both-and” arguments in exercising ethical categories that I have discussed in Ch. 3.

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2. Τὸ Συμφέρον and Ἀδιάφορα Τὸ συμφέρον becomes the guide in matters of indifference (ἀδιάφορα). It helps to discern matters that count and determines a preferred choice of action between two possibilities. In the Greco-Roman moral tradition, particularly in Stoic philosophy, certain fundamental realities do not inherently possess moral standing as either good or bad. These include life, death, wealth, poverty, pleasure, pain, strength, or weakness, among others.307 Scholars have detected a similar and distinctive category in the Pauline ἀδιάφορα, or indifferent matters, which neutralize their significance in one’s life. They include: “neither Jew nor Gentile,” “neither slave nor free,” “neither male nor female,” “neither life nor death,” “neither eating nor being hungry,” and so on.308 These ἀδιάφορα, insists Paul, remain neutral with respect to believers’ moral standing; yet in certain cases Paul chooses to be hungry or chooses life. What is the criterion for doing so? For Paul, what is the criterion for preferring certain things (προηγμένα) while the other things are rejected (ἀποπροηγμένα) in a given situation?309 The answer is τὸ συμφέρον. This determines a preferred choice among ἀδιάφορα.310 Paul uses the philosophical topos of ἀδιάφορα to “free the believer for genuine involvement in life with others and guard against mistaken placement of values.”311 For example, Paul views life and death as indifferent matters. In his letter to the Philippians he expresses in the context of his imprisonment his inability to decide between life and death: “I do not know which I prefer” (τἰ αἱρήσομαι οὐ γνωρίζω, Phil 1:22). He hopes that, in any instance, “Christ will be exalted in my body, whether by life or by death” (v.20). Paul then weighs the two choices and elevates death as “far better” (πολλῷ μᾶλλον κρεῖσσον, v.23) for himself, while life is “more necessary for you” (ἀναγκαιότερον δι’ ὑμᾶς, v.24). He therefore chooses to remain in life because that option is more advantageous to the community (δι’ ὑμᾶς; cf. τἀ ἑαυτῶν [“the things of others”], 2:4). The implied criterion for him is the matter of “true” advantage for the community as opposed to his own personal interest (τὸ ἴδιον), not the matter of death or life per se. Paul exemplifies his teaching of seeking the good of others (τἀ ἑαυτῶν), which is “far better.” Τὸ συμφέρον is the true advantage of the whole and, as such, determines what matters and indicates the course of action in ἀδιάφορα that the agent should follow.312 307 For example, see Cicero, Fin. 3.15.50-3.16.54; Arius Didymus, Epitome of Stoic Ethics (Pomeroy), 5a; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.101-107. 308 On indifferent matters (ἀδιάφορα) in Pauline and Greco-Roman philosophical traditions, see Sampley, Walking Between the Times, 77–83; Will Deming, “Paul and Indifferent Things,” in Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook (ed. J. Paul Sampley; Harrisburg/ London/New York: Trinity Press International, 2003), 384–403. 309 For Stoics, of things indifferent, “some are taken by preference (προηγμένα), and “others are rejected” (ἀποπροηγμένα). See Cicero, Fin. 3.15.51-3.16.52; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.102-105. 310 Cicero, Fin. 3.69. 311 Sampley, Walking Between the Times, 82. 312 Scholars have studied Paul’s use and categories of ἀδιάφορα but they have not paid a full attention to functions of τὸ συμφέρον in Paul’s ἀδιάφορα. Their study is not complete until we

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Paul indicates that the Corinthians’ problems of τὸ ἴδιον were related, to a certain degree, to their failure to discern between things that do not matter (ἀδιάφορα) and things that do (διαφέροντα). In his discussion of eating food offered to idols, for example, Paul points out that Corinthians have failed to make a proper choice in their actions in the community (1 Cor 8:1–11:1). On the one hand, Paul concedes that food is an ἀδιάφορον: “We are no worse off if we do not eat, and no better off if we do” (8:8b; cf. Rom 14). Food is not the measure of one’s spirituality (8:8a). However, because some of the Corinthians choose to eat meat offered to idols, thus becoming “a stumbling block to the weak,” the issue creates an ethical tension. The apostle considers this behavior “sin[ning] against members of your family” and “against Christ” (v.12). To solve the problem, Paul says he will not exercise his freedom to eat. His choice is driven by the connective idea of τὸ συμφέρον: “If food is a cause of their [weak believers’] falling, I will never eat meat, so that I may not cause one of them to fall” (v.13). In the choice between eating and not eating, Paul “prefers” not to give offense to anyone and instead to seek the good of others (8:9; 10:32-33). When invited to an unbeliever’s house, Corinthian believers may “eat whatever is set before you” (10:27). But they should follow Paul’s lead and “not eat” meat sacrificed to idols only if someone there says this has been offered to idols. He advises thus, not because the meat itself or eating it is morally wrong in itself, but because exercising that freedom can carry a negative impact on others (cf. 10:27).313 This instance affirms that τὸ συμφέρον is the criterion in ἀδιάφορα (10:24). Moreover, Paul’s ethical choice of “not eating” such food serves as a paradigm for exemplary behavior that seeks the common advantage, reflecting the attitude he exhorts the Corinthians to demonstrate. He elaborates this synecdoche (“not eating meat,” 8:13) in subsequent chapters, highlighting the benefit of the gospel for the many (9:19-23; 10:33). Paul then sums up his own behavior as imitatio Christi, which, he asserts, must apply to all of the Corinthians’ ethical and moral choices: “whatever you do, [just as I show my exemplary behavior],314 do everything for the glory of God” (10:31-11:1). His ethic of τὸ συμφέρον, that is, imitating Christ’s act of self-giving for others (ἀγάπη), as argued above, is closely tied to his theocentric honor code of “do[ing] everything for the glory of God.” Seyoon Kim maintains that in this way Paul articulates “Jesus’ double commandment of love” (cf. Mark 12:30 pars): love of neighbor (ἀγάπη οἰκοδομει, 1 Cor 8:1) and love of God (ἀγαπᾷ τὸν θεόν, v.3).315 The former see Paul’s use of ἀδιάφορα in light of his other-regarding communal ethics of τὸ συμφέρον. See the references above on Paul’s use of ἀδιάφορα. 313 Cf. Horrell, Solidarity and Difference, 178. 314 Paul explicitly constructs maxims around τὸ συμφέρον two times: “Do not seek your own advantage, but that of the other” (v.24); “…not seeking my own advantage, but that of many” (v.33). Anytime Paul puts something into maxim form it is basic for him. See Ramsaran, Liberating Words, 5–73. 315 See Seyoon Kim, “Imitatio Christi (1 Corinthians 11:1): How Paul Imitates Jesus

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corresponds to “Giv[ing] no offense to [anyone]” and “not seeking my own advantage, but that of many” (μὴ ζητῶν τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ σύμφορον [= ἀγάπη in 13:5] ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, 10:32-33). The latter corresponds to “do[ing] everything for the glory of God” (πάντα εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ ποιεῖτε, 10:31), which, as indicated, is used synonymously in 1 Corinthians with maxims such as πάντα ὑμῶν ἐν ἀγάπῃ γινέσθω (“Let all things be done in love,” 16:14) and πάντα…πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον (“All things…for the common good,” 12:6-7; cf. 10:33). Paul’s explicit combination of the God-honor code (δόξα θεοῦ, v.31) with “lovebuilds-up” ethics of τὸ συμφέρον (vv.32-33; cf. 8:1 and ch. 13) is telling. It forcefully articulates the mandate for Christ-followers to make proper choices of action (e.g., “not eating”) out of love for neighbors and seeking what is advantageous to the community. This, he asserts, is the seminal expression of loving God (ἀγαπᾷ τὸν θεόν) and giving honor to him (δόξαν θεοῦ ποιεῖτε) with the consummate result of building the community as God’s church (ἐκκλησία τοῦ θεοῦ, 10:32; 1:2).316 In sum, for Paul, what matters (διαφέρειν) in issues of ἀδιάφορα as well as in everything they do is the intentional and deferential exercise of τὸ συμφέρον/ἀγάπη.

3. Τὸ Συμφέρον and Giving Priority Therefore, τὸ συμφέρον is a matter of priority in Paul’s part-whole body politic. It guides individuals to the preferred choice between two moral actions or two conflicting duties. In the Greco-Roman moral-philosophical tradition, of the two courses of action, giving priority to the one over the other does not necessarily mean that the rejected course of action is ethically wrong. In other words, giving priority to τὸ συμφέρον over τὸ ἴδιον does not mean that a particular action of τὸ ἴδιον is necessarily wrong. Yet τὸ συμφέρον in partwhole context takes precedence because it occupies a greater good (and more advantage) to the whole. For example, Aristotle discusses which of two things is “the greater good and the more expedient” (περὶ τοῦ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ καἰ τοῦ μᾶλλον συμφέροντος).317 For him, “things that produce a greater good are greater.”318 Likewise, as we have studied Cicero’s order of giving precedence in choosing between two moral actions or between conflicting duties, when a person or a community faces a choice between the two ethically neutral actions, the one that brings greater connective benefit to the community is to be preferred to the other.319 What plays an essential role in necessitating one ethical choice over another is its resulting advantage in the larger context of the whole. Christ in Dealing with Idol Food (1 Corinthians 8-10),” Bulletin for Biblical Research 13.2 (2003): 193–226. 316 Elsewhere in the letter, Paul, as noted above, characterizes the community as God’s field (θεοῦ γεώργιον), God’s temple (ναὸς θεοῦ), God’s building (θεοῦ οἰκοδομή), and God’s family in which God’s Spirit dwells (3:9, 16-17). 317 See Aristotle, Rhet. 1.7.1-41. 318 Aristotle, Rhet. 1.7.7. 319 Cicero, Off. 1.43.152-1.45.161; see Ch. 4 above.

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In dealing with the conflict caused by the matter of believers’ preference between prophecy and speaking in tongues, Paul, for instance, shows this same ethical perspective. He gives priority to that which brings the greater good to the church. He believes that both gifts are from God. He even states, “I would like all of you to speak in tongues” (14:5), and asserts that he speaks in tongues more than the Corinthians (v.18). Nevertheless, Paul restrains speaking in tongues in corporate situations because it does not always edify the community. He judges that “One who prophecies is greater than one who speaks in tongues” (v.5, emphasis added). His criterion for this judgment of prophecy as the greater gift arises from “what brings or causes the greater good: Which of the two can benefit the Corinthians most.”320 Paul maintains that “the person who speaks in a tongue edifies the individual person [ἑαυτὸν οἰκοδομεῖ] but the person who prophecies edifies the church [ἐκκλησίαν οἰκοδομεῖ]” as a whole (v.4).321 Clearly Paul makes a choice between the pursuit of τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ συμφέρον, when the two are in tension. His argument also indicates that the unresolved tension between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ συμφέρον is the underlying source of the Corinthian conflicts. As some scholars have assumed, the glossolalia that some Corinthians claim as expressing higher status is a behavior that seeks private benefit and honor (cf. ζητῶν τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ σύμφορον, 10:33).322 Paul exhorts the Corinthians to strive for a “greater” gift (12:31) and even the “greatest” (ἀγάπη, 13:13) that “builds up” (οἰκοδομεῖν) the community, and this alone becomes the criterion for his ethical guidance. Moreover, τὸ συμφέρον has priority over social conventions and even over scriptural authority in a situation where one has to make a course of action in concern for others. In chapter 9, Paul refers to multiple social norms and cites scriptural authorities to establish and buttress his rights. But he “follows a course [of τὸ συμφέρον] opposed to” these norms, including what “is written in the law of Moses” (9:9) and what “the Lord commanded” (v.14).323 Τὸ συμφέρον, or the concern for the whole, determines the priority and overrides any authority that might be used (potentially) in an idionistic way.324 Paul’s subordination of social, scriptural, and theological principles in favor of the choice of τὸ συμφέρον does not mean that these norms are ethically (and biblically) wrong. Rather, his decision lies in the context-related praxes of 320 Thus Karl Olav Sandnes correctly observes Paul’s ethical perspective of giving priority to what is advantageous to the whole, see “Prophecy – A Sign for Believers (1 Cor 14, 2025),” Bib 77 (1996): 4. For his brief discussion on “the Rhetorical Topos of Common Advantage,” see pp.3–6. 321 Thus Paul’s argument is exactly a part-whole discourse of τὸ συμφέρον against the individualistic ideology. 322 Scholars believe that some Corinthians emphasized speaking in tongues as a sign of their elevated status claims. Sampley, NISB, 2053–4. 323 Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1989), 166; also see Horrell, Solidarity and Difference, 221. 324 Cf. certain members (“strong”) ate the meat offered to idols on the basis of their theological knowledge (8:4-6) in an idionistic way in that their exercise of the knowledge hurt “weak” members of the community.

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part-whole, which demand the “honorableness” of the whole in Greco-Roman moral tradition, as demonstrated in a previous chapter. The part-whole context demands that one override norms and categories of τὸ ἴδιον and take up those of τὸ συμφέρον for others.325 Paul presents this other-regarding morality of τὸ συμφέρον as an imitation of Christ’s self-giving for others (cf. 11:1), which he himself exemplifies (ch. 9; 10:33; cf. v.24) for his friends at Corinth.326 For him, the pattern of Christ’s self-giving for the sake of others in part-whole context must take priority over other authorities.327 Furthermore, when necessary, τὸ συμφέρον demands personal sacrifice. This ethical pattern based on Christ’s self-sacrifice for others is consistent in 1 Corinthians. For example, the idea of Christ’s self-sacrifice is present in Paul’s harsh advice that Christ-believers drive out the immoral person from the community (ch. 5). This directive is a community’s sacrifice. If the sexual offender is a patron for a house church at Corinth, then Paul’s directive demands a sacrifice in the community.328 In the Greco-Roman body politic, as noted, the part could be disconnected for the protection of the whole.329 In a similar vein, the individual member could voluntarily sacrifice the exercise of personal prerogatives for the priority of the whole (i.e., Paul’s own in ch. 9). In solving the problem of lawsuits among Corinthian believers, Paul applies this ethical principle of self-sacrifice as he directs that they take the course of being “wronged” rather than do wrong to others in litigation. He says to take the course of being “defrauded” rather than to defraud others (6:7-8).330 Paul’s emphasis on self-sacrifice for the good of the whole corresponds to Socrates’ exhortation, according to Plato, when he said: “If it were necessarily either to do wrong or to suffer it, I should choose to suffer rather than do it.”331

325 Horrell states, “It is not a matter of whether one has the freedom, or the right…but of whether it is for the common good (συμφέρει; cf. 12.7: πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον), whether it builds up the community (οἰκοδομεῖ).” See Solidarity and Difference, 176–7, also 231. 326 For “Other-regard and Christ as moral paradigm,” see Horrell, Solidarity and Difference, 204–45. 327 Likewise, Horrell (citing Hays, Echoes, 225, n.36) states, “Paul allows the imitatio Christi paradigm to override all particular ethical rules and prescriptions, even when the rule is a direct command of the Lord Jesus.” See Solidarity and Difference, 221. 328 Chow, 130–41; Williams, “Living as Christ Crucified,” 127. 329 Cicero, Off. 3.6.32; Seneca, Prov. 3.1-2; Epictetus, Diss. 2.5.24. Also see my discussion on this issue in Ch. 3 above. 330 Many scholars (e.g., Hays, First Corinthians, 92) think that legal disputes among believers, as Paul’s description of the situation of being “defrauded” suggests (vv.7-8), arose over economic issues. Recent study on the Roman court system has shown that there was bias, inequality, and distorting judgment in favor of high status. On the Roman court system and economic issues between the wealthy and powerful and people of lower status and lesser means, see Alan C. Mitchell, “Rich and Poor in the Courts of Corinth,” NTS 39 (1993): 562–86; cf. Hays, First Corinthians, 93–4. Scholars also believe that those who were pursuing litigation against their fellow believers were among the wealthy and powerful members because people of lesser means are suppressed by expensive court fees. 331 Plato, Gorg. 469c; cited by Hays, First Corinthians, 95.

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Paul’s emphasis on τὸ συμφέρον meets his central goal in 1 Corinthians. As Aristotle says, “of two things that which is nearer the end proposed is preferable.”332 In 1 Corinthians, Paul’s principal concern is to heal factionalism and seek ὁμόνοια (concord) among the Corinthian believers (cf. 1:10) for the effective application of τὸ συμφέρον to the many.333 As I have demonstrated, in Greco-Roman part-whole discussions, τὸ συμφέρον plays the connective role of binding the fragmented parts into a unified whole because the resulting advantage embraces all, not just the interest of an individual or elite group. Again, for example, to heal the factionalism caused by the Corinthians’ idionistic preference for speaking in tongues over prophecy, Paul chooses prophecy to tongues because the former builds up (οἰκοδομεῖν) the church (14:4).334 Thus, the exercise of prophecy more closely corresponds to the proposed purpose of seeking ὁμόνοια in (and τὸ συμφέρον for) the community. Paul’s other directives in 1 Corinthians meet this purpose as well and are consistent with the ethical pattern of edifying the church.

F. Conclusion As my analysis of 1 Corinthians has shown above, Paul employs what I call a Greco-Roman part-whole connective ethics of τὸ συμφέρον to address the problems of τὸ ἴδιον that were the underlying issues behind factionalism and conflicts among the Corinthian believers. In Paul’s estimation, the entire church at Corinth should be the “body of Christ” (σῶμα Χριστοῦ) and the Corinthian believers are to be connective “parts” (μέλη) of “the whole” of a unified community. By “one Spirit” they all (πάντες) became “one body” (ἕν σῶμα) (12:13). Within this corporate Corinthian body, however, there existed divisions and conflicts (1:11; 11:18, 19; cf. 12:25) caused by their adherence to τὸ ἴδιον. Accordingly, concord (ὁμόνοια) is a prominent theme in the letter.335 Paul opens his letter with a call to unity (1:10-17) and ends with the exhortation to stand firm on the foundation (θεμέλιος) of unity in Christ that he laid down (16:13, cf. 3:10-11).336 In between, Paul packs his rhetoric with ethical features of τὸ συμφέρον in his effort to overcome the problems of τὸ ἴδιον, such as: oneness (image of the unified “part-whole”), organic body rhetoric, the image of the crucified Christ, and “love-builds-up” discourses. 332 Rhet. 1.7.35: δυοῖν τὸ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ τέλους. 333 Paul considers factionalism as an “obstacle” for sharing the resulting advantage (that comes from ὁμόνοια) with “many.” For further discussion on this, see Ch. 6 below. 334 Again, remember the function of Paul’s οἰκοδομή metaphor as unity as noted above. 335 Welborn, “On the Discord in Corinth,” 89–90. According to recent rhetorical studies of 1 Corinthians, the document resembles Greco-Roman “deliberative” speeches of seeking ὁμόνοια within the community for which the speaker appeals to the common value or advantage (τὸ συμφέρον). See Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 65–291. 336 Θεμέλιος does not occur at 16:13, but Paul’s argument echoes the foundation of the gospel (3:5-15) on which the Corinthians need to “stand firm.” On Paul’s building metaphor for the purpose of creating concord, see Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 99–111.

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Then, in due order, the Corinthians become God’s one household of caring for one another, asserts Paul (15:58; 16:13-14). For the Greco-Roman moral philosophers and Paul, τὸ συμφέρον builds up the part-whole (community) and mends its brokenness. By employing familiar categories of part-whole arguments and τὸ συμφέρον that would resonate with his audience, Paul reminds the Corinthian believers of where and what their problem was, and how they now overcome it. Paul, however, does not give a moral-philosophical lecture about how to solve the tension between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ συμφέρον. He further qualifies his idea of τὸ συμφέρον that he employs to overcome the idionistic ideology and private morality among the Corinthian believers. To this end, he places his argument within the distinctive part-whole category of the community as the “body of Christ” and presents the story of “Christ crucified” “for us” as the best model of the other-regarding morality of τὸ συμφέρον. This, for Paul, is the story that is to be lived out by Christ-followers. He also demonstrates how the people of the community of the common story exercise their rights and new freedom found in Christ. In sum, what really edifies (οἰκοδομεῖν) and benefits (συμφέρειν) the community in exercising their rights, for Paul, is “love” (ἀγάπη) that “pushes believers out toward others for whom Christ died.”337 It thus draws a wider inclusive part-whole circle (“part-whole theology”) than the part-whole paradigm of the Greco-Roman tradition. This leads to a final summary discussion of Paul’s unique development and application of τὸ συμφέρον as the “advantage” of the gospel for the many in the next chapter.

337 Sampley, “Faith and Its Moral Life,” 236; also see his Walking between the Times, 60–2.

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Chapter 6

Conclusion: ΤῸ ΣΥΜΦΈΡΟΝ for the Advantage of the Gospel to the Many A. What Is Unity For? In addressing the divisions and conflicts among the Corinthian believers, Paul employs the ethical category of τὸ συμφέρον (and the part-whole argument), which carried its force because of its familiarity to his readers. His rhetoric not only discloses the nature of the Corinthians’ underlying issues, but also directs the proper course of action to remedy the problem. With this conclusion, one final important question remains from our discussion thus far: what is the end purpose of Paul’s use of this part-whole rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον? According to recent rhetorical analysis of the letter by Margaret Mitchell, which has been followed by many scholars and commentators, Paul’s primary concern in writing 1 Corinthians was to restore unity or concord (ὁμόνοια) among Christ-followers at Corinth.1 I agree with Mitchell’s view that throughout 1 Corinthians Paul is attempting “to persuade the Corinthians to end their factionalism.”2 Even so, I argue that this is not the ultimate purpose behind the letter. Neither Mitchell’s analysis of the letter as a deliberative argument urging concord amidst a divided community,3 nor the similar approach of seeing the letter as a type of Hellenistic ὁμόνοια speech, adequately addresses why Paul expressed such impassioned concern about the unity of the church body. In other words, for Paul, unity itself was not the end. His writing poses the larger question: what is unity for? Why do the Corinthian believers need concord? What is the nature of this unity that so animates Paul? The unity Paul seeks is not simply the socio-political and catholic unity of believers. He champions a more important agenda that far surpasses the socio-political dimension which, in order to accomplish, he must first appeal for ὁμόνοια (1:10) (see below). Paul, I argue, has a salvific or soteriological 1 Mitchell’s Paul and the Rhetoric; Martin, Corinthian Body, 38–68; Witherington, Paul’s Narrative, 94; Hays, First Corinthians, 9. Cf. Welborn, “On the Discord,” 83–113. 2 Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 75. 3 Deliberative rhetoric, according to Mitchell (Paul and the Rhetoric, 23–64), is characterized by four things: 1) focus on future; 2) appeal to τὸ συμφέρον (what is advantageous); 3) proof by example; 4) appropriate subjects of factionalism and concord. The most distinctive among these features is the appeal to the common good of the community. See Aristotle, Rhet. 1.3.5, 1.6.1; Cicero, Inv. 2.56.168–9.

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purpose to bring the advantage of the gospel to the many (οἱ πολλοί) specifically by adopting the ethic of τὸ συμφέρον. This alone, he is convinced, ultimately will heal the divisions at Corinth (and beyond).4 My analysis of 1 Corinthians as part-whole (ὁμόνοια) rhetoric that seeks advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) carries this salvific thrust.5 As the conclusion to this research, it is necessary to highlight Paul’s distinctive application of τὸ συμφέρον to the salvific advantage (σωτηρία) of the gospel. Paul’s salvific purpose with his argument of τὸ συμφέρον becomes clear in his correlation of ὁμόνοια with σωτηρία, resulting in greater advantage for all, such as it is commonly understood in Greco-Roman part-whole speeches.

B. Ὁμόνοια and Σωτηρία The primary purpose of Greco-Roman ὁμόνοια speeches is not simply for seeking concord, but more for attaining the “salvation of the whole” (σωτηρία τοῦ ὅλου). As I indicated in earlier chapters, Greco-Roman philosophers and politicians often used σώζειν/σωτηρία terminology to express the common good, safety, and welfare of the unified community and/or state as a whole.6 For them, the respective parts accomplish one (ἕν) common goal by working together (συνεργοῦμεν) and/or by sacrificing private benefit when necessary, as discussed above. This is the “salvation of the community” (σωτηρία τοῦ κοινοῦ/ τῆς πόλεως/τῆς κοινωνίας/τοῦ ὅλου). In comforting those who are in sorrow because of loved ones lost in war, Pericles, for example, praises the personal sacrifices (tὰ ἴδιa) as being necessary for the salvation of greater good, the welfare of the country (τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς σωτηρίας).7 Isocrates contends that it is a shame for a person whose duty is bound to the common good to meditate upon his personal reputation more than the public salvation.8 Aristotle and Cicero maintain that public polity and laws exist for the salvation of the state 4 Remember my discussion in the previous chapter that Paul, after setting out the divisive issues (1:11-17) among the Corinthian believers, brings out the lengthy discourse of the cross (ὁ λόγος τοῦ σταυροῦ) from verse 18 onward as a unifying force in the argument of factionalism. For Paul, the gospel or the message of the cross is the “power of God” that conjoins even the division of humanity (between “Jews and Greeks”) into a unified whole as one family of God (see below for further discussion). 5 Thus, the (extended) title of this study in mind would be “Paul’s Use of the PartWhole Connective Rhetoric of Τὸ Συμφέρον for the Advantage of the Gospel to the Many in 1 Corinthians.” 6 For example, Plato, Leg. 10.903b; id., Resp. 346a; Aristotle, Pol. 1276b 20-30; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.85.5; Epictetus, Diss. 2.22.17-18; Stobaeus 3.39.35 (in Hense, 732 and Ramelli, 68-71); also see below. Cf. Cicero, Inv. 1.38-9; Seneca, Clem. 1.11.413.1. 7 Thucydides, His. 2.61.2-4. 8 Isocrates, De pace 39: εἰ φανείην μᾶλλον φροντίζων τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ δόξης ἤ τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας; cf. 51: σφουδάζοντες δὲ περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν οὐκ ἥττον ἤ περὶ τὴν σωτηρίαν ὅλης τῆς πόλεως (“We are concerned about our polity no less than about the safety of the whole state”).

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(σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως or salutem rei publicae ).9 Similarly, Philo argues that, just as physicians seek what best serves the health of the whole body (τὰ ὑγιεινά), so too rulers (ἄρχοντες) and juries (δικασταί) must consider what is beneficial (συμφέροντος) for the salvation and safety of the community (φροντίζοντες τῆς τῶν κοινῶν σωτηρίας καὶ ἀσφαλείας).10 Ὁμόνοια and σωτηρία (for common advantage) are inextricably interrelated: the former serves as the means of the latter. In Book 12 of his Leges, Plato highlights this point. In addressing the correlation between unity and σωτηρία, he argues that mind (νοῦς), combined with the finest senses and being united into one (γενόμενός τε εἰς ἕν), may most justly be called the salvation (σωτηρία) of the individual. Plato then extends the analogy of unity to compare σωτηρία to a ship as symbol for the state. He brings into symbiotic unity the mind of the pilot and the senses of the sailors. On a ship, Plato continues, when the pilot and the sailors find unity in their senses in keeping with the judgment and expertise of the pilot (τῷ κυβερνητικῷ νῷ), they “secure salvation both for themselves and for all that belongs to the ship.”11 Plato clearly emphasizes the relationship between unity and σωτηρία, demonstrating how the latter confers advantage to the former. Likewise, Aristotle, as noted, argues that τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον unites (συνάγειν) individuals into a community of part-whole (κοινωνία),12 and that this advantage saves the state (συμφέρει δὲ τὸ σῶζον τὴν πολιτείαν).13 Following a popular nautical metaphor for the city,14 Dio Chrysostom emphasizes the concord (ὁμόνοια) between the skipper and his crew in order to achieve a certain σωτηρία for arriving safely at port. According to Dio, this σωτηρία is their “one” goal (μία αὕτη ἐστί σωτηρία), resulting in the advantage that saves (σώζειν) all on board.15 These examples indicate that the end purpose of people’s relationship one to another is not ὁμόνοια, but σωτηρία (cf. “those being saved,” 1 Cor 1:18-21). Current rhetorical studies of 1 Corinthians have neglected this inextricable correlation between ὁμόνοια and σωτηρία in Paul’s argument of τὸ συμφέρον.

9 Aristotle, Rhet. 1.4.12; Cicero, Inv. 1.38.68-9. 10 Philo, Jos. 61–3. 11 Plato, Leg. 12.961e: ἆρ’…ἐν νηῒ κυβερνήτης ἅμα καὶ ναῦται τὰς αἰσθήσεις τῷ κυβερνητικῷ νῷ συγκερασάμενοι σώζουσιν αὑτούς τε καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆν ναῦν. Cf. Leg. 4.707a-c. 12 Aristotle, Pol. 1278b 22-3. 13 Aristotle, Rhet. 1.8.2. 14 As already indicated, in Greco-Roman literature, the ship often “represents the corporate life of men united in a political body.” See Hilgert, Ship and Related Symbols, 24. 15 For such discussion see Dio Chrysostom, Or. 38.14 and 39.6: ναῦς ἥτις ἄν μετὰ ὁμονοίας πλέη τοῦ κυβερνήτου καὶ τῶν ναυτῶν, αὐτή τε σῴζεται καὶ σῴζει τοὺς ἐμπλέοντας (“A ship that sails the sea with concord with the pilot and his crew is saved [saves itself] and thus saves those on board”; my translation); cf. Aristotle, Pol. 1276b 25-7: ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστι (“the security of the community is the common goal”).

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C. Paul’s Argument of Τὸ Συμφέρον for the Advantage of the Gospel to the Many It is no surprise that the correlation between ὁμόνοια and σωτηρία (as the ultimate expression of συμφέρον) appears in Paul’s use of the similar genre of the part-whole argument. The theme of salvation (σωτηρία) and verbal forms of the term occur frequently in 1 Corinthians (1:18, 21; 3:15; 5:5; 7:16; 9:22; 10:33; 15:2). What makes Paul distinctive, however, is his development of the idea of the advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) that the gospel brings (σώζειν) to all. Further, Paul’s concept of σώζειν/σωτηρία goes well beyond the GrecoRoman socio-political understanding of peace and communal well-being in ὁμόνοια. He also has in mind believers’ sacred experience of sanctification and redemption through divine intervention (1:30; 6:11, 19-20). Ultimately Paul’s idea of σωτηρία refers to an eschatological reality that will be fully realized “on the day of the revealing of our Lord Jesus Christ” (1:7-8; 3:13-15, 5:5; cf.13:8-13; 15:12-58).16 Paul’s link between unity (ὁμόνοια) among the Corinthian believers and this salvific understanding of the “advantage” (σωτηρία = τὸ συμφέρον)17 of his gospel must dispel any divisive boundaries that have arisen between the respective parts (see below). For Paul, divisions are problematic because they impede the path of the gospel. He argues that any divisive behavior is “an obstacle” (ἐγκοπή) that obstructs “the way of the gospel” (9:12).18 If the “strong,” for instance, place a stumbling block (πρόσκομμα) before the “weak” (ch. 8), Paul says, an obstacle (ἐγκοπή) impedes the gospel and hinders its effectiveness and advantage to as “many” people (οἱ πολλοί) as possible (cf. 9:12-23; 10:31-33). In short, Paul’s rhetoric of seeking concord is his attempt to correct idionistic conduct of the Corinthian believers (as I discussed above) that might lead them into “destruction” (ἀπώλεια/ἀπόλλυμι, cf. 1:18-19; 8:11; 10:9-10; 15:18),19 overthrowing the advantages of τὸ συμφέρον in light of the gospel. For Paul, schisms (σχίσματα) in the church are “against Christ” because they obstruct the gospel’s benefit (σωτηρία) for the people for whom Christ died. Paul’s identifying τὸ συμφέρον with salvation of the many (σωτηρία of οἱ πολλοί) is presented explicitly in at least two passages: chapter 9, verses 19-23 in particular, and 10:31-33.

16 “The day” refers to “the time when Christ returns, when God’s purposes are brought to culmination.” Sampley, NISB, 829. 17 See Ch. 1 above for the semantic relation of these terms in part-whole argument. 18 A “stumbling” (πρόσκομμα) or “obstacle” (ἐγκοπή) is a recurrent theme throughout the Corinthian letters (1 Cor 8:9, 10:32; cf. 2 Cor 6:3) in connection with division and its effect on the path of the gospel. 19 This term, often associated with the emphasis on τὸ ἴδιον, is also commonly used to express the opposite of σωτηρία in the Greco-Roman argument of τὸ συμφέρον, as noted in earlier chapters. For example, see Hierocles, On Duties in Stobaeus 3.39.35, as noted above; cf. Phil 1:28; also see further below.

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In 9:19-23, Paul explains why he imposed upon himself the belittling status of becoming “a slave to all” people (πᾶσιν ἐμαυτὸν ἐδούλωσα), clearly indicating that in so doing he deferred to the advantage of “salvation” for the many. He had established the extent of the rights he could claim as an apostle (vv.1-18), but chose not to exercise them: “For though I am free with respect to all, I have made myself a slave to all (i.e., ‘Jews,’ ‘those outside the law,’ ‘the weak’)…I have become all things to all people” (vv.19-23). He makes it clear that he enslaves himself in order to promote God’s work of saving many. In this passage Paul uses seven purpose clauses to emphasize this point: ἵνα κερδήσω (“in order to win”; 5 times in vv.19-22a); ἵνα σώσω (“in order to save,” v.22b); and ἵνα συγκοινωνὸς γένωμαι (“in order to share,” v.23). Paul then makes an irrefutable statement regarding his deference to all (his chameleonlike behavior) by saying, “I do it all for the sake of the gospel” (v.23a).20 He becomes a slave, on the one hand, and adapts himself to all situations on the other hand, in order to render fullest benefit of τὸ εὐαγγέλιον (v.23) to all. Thus his behavior is gospel-driven and results in συμφέρον for all people. Here, as some scholars have noticed, Paul purposely conforms himself to the pattern of his Lord (11:1) whom he presents (as argued in Chapter 5) as a perfect model of one who seeks the common advantage (cf. Gal 3:13; 4:4-5; Phil 2:68; 2 Cor 5:21; 9:9; Rom 15:1-3).21 Paul hopes his Christ-like behavior22 will likewise be adopted by the Corinthian believers in their conduct, which in turn will be a vehicle for sharing the σωτηρία of the gospel in the community and beyond. Paul’s seeking τὸ συμφέρον is synonymous with “doing things for the sake of the gospel,”23 that is, “shar[ing] in its blessings” (i.e., σωτηρία of the gospel [τοῦ εὐαγγέλιου], 9:23). Paul’s connection of συμφέρον with σωτηρία is more clearly made in 10:3133. In this passage, still using the same slavery motif, Paul suggests practical ways of seeking τὸ συμφέρον: “Give no offense to Jews or to Greeks or to the church of God, just as I try to please everyone in everything I do, not seeking my own advantage, but that of the many” (vv.32-33a). The clause that immediately follows explicates the reason for his exhortation to seek τὸ συμφέρον: “that they may be saved (ἵνα σωθῶσιν, v.33b). For Paul, what is ultimately advantageous (τὸ συμφέρον) is the salvation (σωτηρία) of the

20 Paul’s seven purpose clauses put stress not “on what he does, but why.” Michael Barram, Mission and Moral Reflection in Paul (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 49 (italics his). 21 M. D. Hooker, “A Partner in the Gospel: Paul’s Understanding of Ministry,” in Theology and Ethics in Paul and His Interpreters: Essays in Honor of Victor Paul Furnish (eds. E. H. Lovering Jr. and J. L. Sumney; Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 91–2; Hays, Moral Vision, 31–6; Garland, 436; cf. Horrell, “Theological Principle,” 91. 22 Margaret Mitchell argues that in 9:19-23 Paul was imitating “divine condescension,” after the pattern of Christ. See her “Pauline Accommodation and ‘Condescension’ (συγκατάβασις): 1 Cor 9:19-23 and the History of Influence,” in Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide (ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen; London/Leiden: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 196–214, 298– 309. 23 See Chapter 5 above on this matter.

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many.24 As H. Conzelmann points out, “The content of what is ‘advantageous’ is defined by the ἵνα-clause: salvation.”25 In sum, seeking the “advantage of the many” means pursuing their salvation.26 For Paul, the benefits of the Christian gospel render the true advantage to the Corinthians and beyond, to all the churches and through the churches to all people. In previous chapters, I asserted that the “true” advantage should be a beginning point – common denominator (κοινόν) – that benefits both an individual (or single group)27 as well as the whole. Thus, it plays the connective role of bringing into unity separate parts that had been split. The common advantage (τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον), as Dionysius of Halicarnassus maintains, saves both parts (ἀμφότερα…σώζεσθαι τὰ μέρη) of the state.28 For Paul, the gospel meets this criterion exactly; it is the true advantage that benefits both Jews and Gentiles, and conjoins previously divided groups into a unified people of the “called ones” (κλητοί, 1:18-30). The gospel, for Paul, is the true common advantage because it can please all (πάντας ἀρέσκειν, 10:33)29 while saving those who believe (σῶσαι τοὺς πιστεύοντας, 1:21), regardless of social, ethnic, religious, and gender distinctions (cf. 1:23-24, 27-29; 8:4-5; 12:13). Therefore, Paul’s rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον defines the one true advantage for salvation of the many (οἱ πολλοί) as σωτηρία, the common good that God brings to humanity through Christ’s death and resurrection.30 Σωτηρία serves

24 Similarly, Willis (Idol Meat, 256) states, “What is profitable (τὀ σύμφορον) to Paul is the salvation of others.” Cf. Fee, First Epistle, 478. 25 Conzelmann, 179. For fuller exegetical studies on these passages (9:19-23 and 10:3133) from the perspective of the gospel and mission, see P. T. O’Brien, Gospel and Mission in the Writings of Paul: An Exegetical and Theological Analysis (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1995), 83–107; Barram, 42–77. 26 The “advantage” (σύμφορον) “which Paul seeks for all persons is none other than their salvation (ἵνα σωθῶσιν).” See Robert L. Plummer, “Imitation of Paul and the Church’s Missionary Role in 1 Corinthians,” JETS 44.2 (2001): 222–3. Mitchell argues that “10:23-11:1 is an especially significant point in the overall argument of 1 Corinthians,” where “Paul redefines τὸ συμφέρον… from personal to communal advantage.” See Paul and the Rhetoric, 142–3, 36, 233. But she does not address Paul’s salvific idea of advantage in relation to σωτηρία of “the many” (οἱ πολλοί) as the ultimate advantage that he is seeking. 27 Isocrates, Jas. 3. Here “both” does not mean just two groups in division; rather it indicates a rhetorical bifurcation into two categories: for example, between “insiders” and “outsiders,” “strong” and “weak,” “rich” and “poor,” “senate” and “multitude,” or “king” and “citizens.” Cf. Martin, Corinthian Body, 58. 28 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 6.85.1. “Both” in this case refers to senate and plebeians. Dionysius continues to state that it is the common value “that draws us together, and it will never permit us to be sundered from each other” (αὕτη [τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον] μέντοι πρώτη καὶ μόνη συνάγει τε ἡμᾶς εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ οὐκ ἐάσει ποτὲ δίχ’ἀλλήλων γενέσθαι). 29 As discussed in an earlier chapter, an advantage to be classified as κοινὸν συμφέρον should please both sides. For example, Isocrates, Ep. 6.3, 14. Thus Paul’s presentation of the gospel as the true common advantage that “pleases all” meets this standard. 30 Cf. Sandnes, “Prophecy,” 6.

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the “advantage of the many” (τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, 10:33) or “of the other” (τὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου, v.24) that Paul and the Corinthians seek together, ideally “with the same mind” (ὁμόνοια).31 For Paul, the soteriological benefit that comes from Christ’s death is universal in scope. The expression “Jews and Greeks” (1:24) is his ethnic equivalent that expresses “the totality of humankind”32 and “the universal scope of the saving” power of God revealed in the cross.33 This forces (cf. ἀνάκη; 9:16) Paul to move beyond Jewish particularism to the cosmological universal part-whole paradigm that embraces all humanity including Jews Greeks, slaves and free, male, and female (cf. 12:13; Gal 3:28). All benefit from the common σωτηρία that God brings.34 In 9:19-23 Paul clearly demonstrates this movement from the respective parts to the whole in order to win (κερδαίνειν/ σώζειν) “Jews” (“those under the law”), Gentiles (“those outside the law”), and “the weak.” Furthermore, Paul’s understanding of humanity in light of the Adam/Christ typology (15:22, 45-50) is also a clear indication of the scope of the universal advantage (σωτηρία) God brings through Christ’s death and resurrection (i.e., τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, vv.1-4).35 For Paul, the community of believers is a sort of universal society, called to belong to the last Adam, just as all humanity belongs to the first Adam. Therefore, Paul’s part-whole paradigm is more inclusive than other social and political part-whole categories of the Greco-Roman world.36 Membership in Paul’s ἐκκλησίαι is inclusive and not limited by social status, birth, gender, and ethnicity (cf. 1:26-30).37 His understanding of the universal scope of the 31 As the NRSV’s reading implies, it seems that the two prepositional phrases governed by a perfect passive periphrastic construction (ἦτε κατηρτισμένοι) in his thesis statement (1:10) reflects the correlated double aim of Paul’s rhetoric: ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νοῒ (“in the same mind” = ὁμόνοια) and ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ γνώμῃ (“in the same purpose,” that is, for σωτηρία). Cf. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric, 76. 32 Willis, Idol Meat, 255. 33 Stephen C. Barton, “Christian Community in the Light of 1 Corinthians,” Studies in Christian Ethics 10 (1997): 3. 34 Thus, Paul conceives a “part-whole theology” from his understanding of the cross and its benefits to all nations (“the whole”; cf. the whole of creation in Rom 8), not just to a particular ethnic or social group (cf. 1:26-29; 9:19-23). 35 Contra Adams who argues: In this letter, Paul operates with a strongly particularist understanding of salvation. There is little, if any, hint that salvation is universal in scope (that Christ’s death was for the benefit of ‘all’) let alone that all in the end may be saved. See Adams, Constructing the World, 114. But Paul’s use of the argument of τὸ συμφέρον as the common value for all, and his presentation of the advantage of the gospel to “the many” (οἱ πολλοί), as I argue, indicate that Paul’s application of the benefit of Christ’s death is universal. 36 The Greek ἐκκλησία in a πόλις excludes slaves, females, persons who lost their political rights due to dishonorable behaviors (ἀτιμοι), resident aliens (μετοικοι), and strangers or foreigners (ξενοι). Mogens Herman Hansen, The Athenian Assembly: In the Age of Demosthenes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 7. Hansen cites Demosthenes, Or. 9.3: “foreigners and slaves are excluded from (debating in) the ekklesia.” See also Blumenfeld, 113 n.74. 37 Perhaps, as Blumenfeld thinks (113 n.74), the person of sexual immorality (πορνεία)

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benefit (σωτηρία) requires him to overcome ethnic issues and permits him to cross socio-ethnic boundaries between respective parts and promote the inclusive universal whole as one family of God. For Paul, “the message of the cross” (ὁ λόγος τοῦ σταυροῦ) is “the power of God” (δύναμις θεοῦ) that brings salvation – irrespective of ethnic distinctions – to anyone who believes (1:18; cf. Rom 1:16).38 Paul presents the advantage (σωτηρία) of the gospel as the unitive element for the common good and the ethical norm against which the Corinthians’ idionistic behavior is disparagingly measured. In the Greco-Roman partwhole argument of seeking the common advantage, it is important for the speaker not only to present the common good that benefits many but also to show himself to be the common advantage-seeker, which makes his counsel more powerful and persuasive to the audience.39 Similarly, in Paul’s use of τὸ συμφέρον, he presents himself as the advantage-seeker (cf. 7:35: “I say this for your own benefit” [τὸ ὑμῶν σύμφορον]; 10:33), though this claim might seem problematic or untrustworthy to the Corinthians. He rejects the Corinthians’ favor by not receiving their monetary support, which was standard practice according to contemporary cultural, religious, and social conventions (9:312). Paul’s economic independence from the community in Corinth (by means of his manual work and receiving support from “other churches”40) might have hurt the community (cf. 2 Cor 11) and even created enmity, as Peter Marshall has argued.41 Moreover, his refusal to accept economic support from the Corinthians might have been seen as idionistic – seeking his own advantage –which could have weakened his argument defending τὸ συμφέρον to overcome the Corinthians’ idionistic conduct. But Paul explicitly interprets his own behavior not as “seeking my own advantage, but that of the many” (μὴ ζητῶν τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ σύμφορον ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, 10:33). This indicates that the nature of τὸ συμφέρον in Paul’s conduct departs from what the Corinthians may have expected. If Paul’s concern seeks the advantage for “the many,” then his behavior, even if it seems questionable or offensive, exemplifies the common value that benefits both sides. He benefits because he is able to fulfill his obligation (9:16) to preach the gospel without hindrance, which in turn enables salvation to come to the Corinthians (and beyond) to their ultimate advantage. Paul seeks to establish the fundamental common denominator that not only frees him from the charge of being idionistic but also serves as the proper principle for guiding church members. who has to be driven out from the community in ch. 5 would be the parallel category of ἀτιμία among those who had no political rights in the Greek πόλις. 38 Notice Paul’s ethnic expression “Jews” and “Greeks” in these two passages for the totality of humanity and effectiveness of the gospel upon them. 39 This is important for the speaker in the deliberative argument. For example, see Demosthenes, Ep. 1.10; Dio Chrisostom, Or. 38.1. 40 Including “brothers from Macedonia.” 41 Peter Marshall, Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul’s Relation with the Corinthians (Tübingen: Mohr, 1987).

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In fact, Paul demonstrates that his behavior of not receiving monetary support from Corinth is an example of his refusal to exercise what would otherwise be his right (ἐξουσία; ch. 9). It is the same attitude he exhorts the Corinthians to adopt for the progress of the gospel. Against the possible charge that he seeks his own advantage, Paul exemplifies the selfless demeanor by choosing not to exercise even what his Lord and Moses authorized, when confronted with a situation that seemed “an obstacle” (9:13) to conveying the salvific advantage of the gospel to the many.42 Paul follows the rule of priority of the greater good as the issue that drives his course of action. In previous chapters I have discussed that the argument of “advantage” often faces multiple options wherein the agent must choose an action in terms of “advantage.” Furthermore, the course of action not chosen by the agent (e.g., Paul’s not receiving monetary support) would not necessarily suggest that the action would be ethically wrong or biblically unsound.43 For Paul, a course of action, chosen or not chosen, that serves the advantage of the gospel to the many is to be preferred.44 Thus, Paul presents his seemingly “untrustworthy” actions, to the contrary, as those that bring the benefit of the gospel to the many. Already in 1:9 Paul states that God called all believers “for sharing of his Son” (ἐκλήθητε εἰς κοινωνίαν τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ). In 9:19-23, as noted, Paul explicitly indicates that he “shares together” (συγκοινωνὸς) with others the gospel and its blessings for their salvation.45 Not only does the advantage (σωτηρία) of the gospel for the many serve as the criterion against which Paul measures his own conduct, but also as the criterion against which the conduct of the Corinthians is likewise measured. It becomes the lodestar for proper behavior within the community. Paul encourages believers not to break up existing marriages with unbelieving spouses if possible (7:12-16), to allow for the possibility that the unbelieving spouse may be won by the believing one (v.16).46 He allows believers to dine with unbelievers in an effort “to please everyone in everything” and so to seek their salvation (πάντα πᾶσιν ἀρέσκω…ἵνα σωθῶσιν, 10:33; cf. chs. 8-10). When 42 For a discussion of Paul’s counsel for the exercise of one’s freedom “for the sake of the salvific well-being of the other,” see Anto Popović, “Freedom and Right of the Apostle: Gratis Proclamation of the Gospel as an Example of the Correct Use of Freedom and Right according to 1 Cor 9:1-18,” Antonianum 78 (2003): 415–45. 43 Remember that Paul himself establishes the reasonableness of receiving support from the Corinthians in view of their (and his) socio-cultural and religious conventions (9:3-14). But he takes the opposite course of not receiving favor from the Corinthians. This issue, for Paul, is a matter of priority to the “advantage” of the gospel. In a sense, for him, receiving or not receiving money is an ἀδιάφορον, either of which can be taken in light of what the chosen course of action brings greater good or more advantageous to the community. 44 Blumenfeld (Political Paul, 209) states, “In 1 Cor 9.12, Paul resists the Corinthians’ offer to repay for his upkeep since this would go against the larger good of the euangelion, here understood as the ultimate sumpheron.” 45 Similarly, Ellington (304) states, “When Paul calls the Corinthians to imitate him as he imitates Christ, he means that he wants them to become συγκοινωνοί of the gospel.” 46 Paul states, “Wife, for all you know, you might save [σώσεις] your husband. Husband, for all you know, you might be save [σώσεις] your wife” (7:16).

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it comes to spiritual gifts, he states that prophecy is greater than speaking in tongues (ch. 14) because the former edifies the body and is especially effective in bringing salvation to “outsiders or unbelievers” (vv.15-25). In all of these issues, “what brings salvation to the outsider should guide the Corinthians” in their conduct.47 Therefore, Paul’s ethical argument of τὸ συμφέρον is not simply an issue for the “insiders” (τοὺς ἔσω) within the church. His rhetoric clearly indicates he has “outsiders” (τοὺς ἔξω) in mind, as well, and a concern for their salvation. In the previous chapter, I discussed that Paul makes every effort to protect the whole (e.g., chs. 5–6) by driving out a wicked member if he is harmful to the whole body. But Paul does not establish iron fences around the sacred boundary of “God’s church in Corinth.”48 For him, σωτηρία is not a static condition of peace and security enjoyed only by the “insiders” within the iron fence. Its scope is dynamic enough to push believers out toward “outsiders”49 and his “part-whole theology” is inclusive enough to bring them into God’s assembly (ἐκκλησία).50 In his inclusive part-whole theology “a certain blurring of the boundaries” is allowed to take place between the “insiders” and “outsiders.”51 Σωτηρία is the criterion for doing so; Paul allows this blurring in both directions in order to win people to the gospel.52 This ethical counsel corresponds exactly to his own socio-ethnic boundary-crossing behavior (9:19-23) and models the modus operandi for the exercise of τὸ συμφέρον as it should be adopted by the Corinthians. Yet it seems Paul has uncertainties whether he and the Corinthians can achieve the aforementioned micro- (i.e., σωτηρία of the “insiders” [τοὺς ἔσω]) and macro- (i.e., σωτηρία of the “outsiders” [τοὺς ἔξω]) vision of his gospel ministry as long as factionalism remains in the community (cf. 15:58). It depends on the success of his distinctive ethics of τὸ συμφέρον among them, namely, on their exercise of the story of the crucified Christ for others and on their choosing a mature (τέλειος) way of ἀγάπη, in their part-whole relationships, as the eschaton or the end time moves toward them. In an effort to understand Paul’s “burden” and concern for his ministry among the Corinthians, let me reflect on the church in which I am currently ministering. While pursuing my doctoral program at Boston University, I started a Korean(-American) church in Manchester, NH, about nine years ago. The church sometimes faces internal problems that divide its members into two groups (though not always visible), 47 Sandnes, “Prophecy,” 7; also see Meeks, First Urban Christian, 105–6; Glad, 254; Plummer, “Imitation of Paul,” 232–4. 48 Furnish, Theology, 53. 49 As noted above, believers are allowed to accept unbelievers’ invitation to meals (10:25-30) 50 Paul also knows that outsiders can enter the Christian assembly (14:23-25). 51 Furnish, Theology, 53. 52 Similarly, Barram (143) conceives “the salvific function of appropriate Christian behavior” (but not in connection with the idea of advantage as I do) as he states: “Paul links moral behavior closely to the salvation of others, both Christian and non-Christian. The Corinthians are to make all behavioral decisions with the salvation of others in view.”

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centering around two core families. When the tension gets severe – of course, I have tried to ease it – I often feel that a shipwreck will occur and that the result of my labor will be empty. It seems Paul’s rhetoric similarly reflects this psychological and spiritual burden when he feels that the “foundation” (3:10) he laid at Corinth is at risk because of factiousness among the Corinthian believers. In other words, Paul’s concern about the Corinthians’ ὁμόνοια (1:10) in the church is impassioned because of what is at stake: either they gain the advantage of their σωτηρία, or his and their labor has been in vain. This concern is hinted at by his frequent use of κενός/κενόω (“empty”) terminology (1:17; 9:15; 15:10, 14 twice, 58). The first (1:17) and last (15:58) instances form an inclusio which rhetorically emphasizes emptiness. In the first instance, Paul is opening his letter with expression of concern about divisions in the church (1:10-17). For him, believers’ divisiveness can result in emptying the cross of Christ (ἵνα…κενωθῇ ὁ σταυρὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ, v.17; cf. 18-22; 9:12). Paul then closes the letter body with similar rhetoric, urging the Corinthians to “be steadfast, immovable, always excelling in the work [ἔργον] of the Lord, because you know that in the Lord your labor [κόπος] is not in vain [κενός]” (15:58). This closing exhortation is packed with a fourfold, richly-nuanced ὁμόνοια-σωτηρία motif: First, it explicitly recalls Paul’s earlier fear of emptying God’s saving work in Christ because of divisions in the church (1:17). Second, Paul’s use of the singular for the Lord’s “work” (ἔργον) and for the Corinthians’ “labor” (κόπος) signifies “the believers’ collective effort”53 for “the common purpose” (ἕν, 3:8), namely, the σωτηρία of the whole. Third, Paul’s use of κενός/κενόω with negative particles (in both 1:17 and 15:58) echoes ch. 13, where ἀγάπη “endures” and “never ends,” as opposed to non-advantageous activity such as labor that goes empty-handed and a libertine life-style (e.g., “Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die,” 15:32b).54 Thus Paul pushes the Corinthians to do the work of love that endures forever (e.g., edifying [οἰκοδομεῖν] and saving [σώζειν] others; cf. 8:1, 11; 14:1, 12). Fourth, Paul’s advice to “be steadfast,” as Sampley notes, bears nautical imagery that all sailors should “stay the course” in order that they may reach port safely (cf. “not in vain”).55 Unlike 1:17(24) in which the concord-salvation analogy, along with κενός motif, explicitly appears, the σωτηρία/σώζειν terminology does not occur in 15:58. But one cannot deny that 15:58 is Paul’s conclusion (cf. ὥστε, “therefore”) as well as 53 Sampley, 1 Corinthians, 991. 54 Cf. Rollin A. Ramsaran, “Resisting Imperial Domination and Influence: Paul’s Apocalyptic Rhetoric in 1 Corinthians,” in Paul and the Roman Imperial Order (ed. Richard A. Horsley; Harrisburg/London/New York: Trinity Press International, 2004), 99–101. 55 Sampley, 1 Corinthians, 991. In fact, the nautical metaphor is most frequently used for the ὁμόνοια-σωτηρία analogy, one serving as the means of the other, among Greco-Roman moral philosophers, as I discussed here and in previous chapters. Certainly, it seems Paul has such an imagery of shipwreck in mind, as he is concerned about the Corinthians’ voyage toward eschatological reality (13:12-13; ch. 15) being destroyed (cf. ἀπόλλυμι, 1:18; 8:9-12). It is also worthwhile to notice that Paul uses “a nautical term denoting the act of piloting a ship” (κυβέρνησις) in 12:28. See Hilgert, Ship and Related Symbols, 128–9.

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his direction of how the Corinthian believers can ensure their eschatological victory and salvific glory, as anticipated through ch. 15. For Paul, the way his laboring on behalf of the gospel’s advantage to the many is not in vain (9:15), as well as the way the Corinthians’ labor is not in vain (15:58), depends on whether they steadfastly “stand on the gospel” (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον…ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἑστήκατε) “through which they are being saved” (δι᾽ οὗ καὶ σῴζεσθε, 15:1-2). Paul’s part-whole rhetoric of seeking ὁμόνοια-συμφέρον in 1 Corinthians must be understood in this light, namely, of seeking their σωτηρία and beyond.

D. Further Study 1. Ethics and Soteriology

From the discussion thus far we can conclude that Paul’s argument of τὸ συμφέρον is a soterio-communal ethic that seeks the σωτηρία of the many and which should guide the Corinthian believers in their part-whole relationships. This conclusion raises an issue for further study on the relationship between ethics and soteriology in the moral vision of other Pauline letters. This is because in Paul’s ethics, as outlined in 1 Corinthians, his communal ethic of τὸ συμφέρον is inextricably bound to soteriology. It seems that Paul’s other letters are likewise replete with the soteriological image of the crucified Christ in connection with an ethical thrust of giving self for others (e.g., Gal 2:1920; 5:24; 6:2, 14; Phil 2:5-11; 2 Cor 4:7-15; 5:21; 9:9; 12:9-10; Rom 6:1-14; 14:15; 15:1-7).56 In all of these passages, Paul correlates ethics and soteriology in his christoethical vision for a given society or local church. One example suffices. In Philippians 2:5-11, Paul presents the salvation story of Christ as a model by which Christ-followers at Philippi must shape their lives for the progress of the gospel to the many. As in 1 Corinthians, he frequently employs the rhetorical device of self-exemplification. While in prison, Paul ponders two alternatives, death or life (1:18-26). He knows that death is “far better” (μᾶλλον κρεῖσσον) to him, but instead chooses life, which he knows renders greater advantage for the community.57 He sacrifices personal advantage for the interests of the community (v.24). Paul explicitly states that his reason for doing so is “for the advancement of the gospel” among them (εἰς προκοπὴν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, vv.12 and 24). Like his Lord (2:6-8), Paul voluntarily and sacrificially gives up what is “far better” to him for the benefit of the Philippians. By this unlikely, selfless, and provocative example, Paul seeks to reorient the Philippians’ vision of life from one that is self-seeking to another that is self-giving for the gospel’s progress (i.e., “advantage” [σωτηρία], cf. 1:19, 28; 2:12; 3:20): “Let each of you look not to your interests, but to the interests of others” (2:4).58 He then presents Christ as the model for this other56 57 58

Cf. Hays, Moral Vision, 26. That is the criterion in ἀδιάφορα as discussed above. Μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστος σκοποῦντες ἀλλὰ [καὶ] τὰ ἑτέρων ἕκαστοι. It seems, as his

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regarding soteriological ethic (vv.6-11), as immediately stated in the next verse: “work out your own salvation” (τὴν ἑαυτῶν σωτηρίαν κατεργάζεσθε). This is a clear indication that Paul relates ethics to soteriology in Philippians.59 For him, the story of Christ is “not a mere objective to fact to be believed [for individualistic salvation]…but a way of [communal] life to be accepted” (see below).60 My conclusion that Paul’s argument of τὸ συμφέρον in 1 Corinthians is a communo-soteriological ethic may serve as a further stimulus to investigate his theology in other letters from this ethico-soteriological perspective.

2. Pauline Σωτηρία: Individualistic or Communal We have also observed that in Greco-Roman socio-political discussions σωτηρία is often identified as communal good. This, as already noted, is exemplified in such expressions as σωτηρία τοῦ ὅλου, σωτηρία τοῦ  κοινοῦ, σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως, σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας, all of which in essence mean the “salvation of the whole.” For example, if a ship is lost in a storm the individual sailor cannot be saved lest he secure the safety of the entire ship. His own safety resides in securing the vessel, along with the efforts of the crew, in concert, for the greater σωτηρία τοῦ ὅλου.61 The nautical metaphor serves as an apt example of the notion as it appears in Paul’s letters and as examined in this work. In a similar vein, Paul depicts the “advantage” of the gospel as residing in the communal good shared by the many for their [own] salvation (τὸ [σύμφορον] τῶν πολλῶν, ἵνα σωθῶσιν, 10:33). To this end he asserts that the individual, when necessary, may be called upon not to exercise his or her own rights for the greater benefit of the community (cf. Rom 9:3; 1 Cor 9:19-23). For Paul, the concept of τὸ συμφέρον signifies the salvation (σωτηρία) of “the many” (οἱ πολλοί), (which is the ultimate advantage that he is seeking), in turn begging the question: What then is the Pauline understanding of σωτηρία? Is it individualistic or communal? Are they symbiotic? If so, how? What is argument in the context implies, Paul equates this sort of ethical mode with the “life in a manner worthy of the gospel of Christ” (1:27), that is, seeking the advantage of the gospel to many. 59 There has been much scholarly debate over the function of the Christ-hymn (2:6-11), which can be classified into two mainline interpretations: exemplary (ethical) and soteriological. But my reading suggests that it is not sound to polarize between soteriological interpretation and ethical interpretation because Paul uses the soteriological drama of Christ in the hymn as exemplary of seeking the good of others. See E. Käsemann, “A Critical Analysis of Philippians 2:5-11,” in God and Christ: Existence and Providence (ed. Robert W. Funk; New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 45–88; Ralph P. Martin and Brian J. Dodd, eds., Where Christology Began: Essays on Philippians 2 (Louisville: Westminster, 1998). 60 Morna D. Hooker, “Interchange and Suffering,” in Suffering and Martyrdom in the New Testament (eds. William Horbury and Brian McNeil; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 83. 61 Or, remember Hierocles’ finger-hand analogy (Stobaeus 3.39.35 in Hense, 732): A finger’s survival requires the preservation of the whole hand (i.e., σωτηρία τοῦ ὅλου); conversely, “the destruction of the hand involves the destruction of the finger as part of the hand.”

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the connection between them? Is individual salvation possible apart from the “salvation of the whole/community” (σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως) (and vice versa)? Does Paul’s emphasis on “the salvation of the many” (as in 1 Cor 10:33) mean simply an accumulation of a large number of believing “individuals” who possess no connection one to another (in other words, a non-communal coexistence)? Or does “salvation of the many,” for Paul, assume an organic, communal/connective sense of σωτηρία? As I close this examination I believe that to gain a definitive understanding of Paul’s concept of σωτηρία (and answers to these associated questions), further investigation is necessary not only in his other letters, but also in the context of the Greco-Roman socio-political tradition and its depiction of σωτηρία in a communal sense. All of this, in turn, will offer a larger purview of this present study of  Paul’s salvific understanding of advantage  as communal good (σωτηρία of “the many”) as addressed in 1 Corinthians. 

E. Conclusion In closing, the end purpose (τέλος) of Paul’s argument of τὸ συμφέρον is not just to secure concord (ὁμόνοια) among the believing community at Corinth. Neither is his rhetoric of τὸ συμφέρον simply following a deliberative or a ὁμόνοια speech. Nor is he simply presenting an accommodation to promote the ethical improvement of the Corinthian believers in keeping with or even superior to Greco-Roman moral philosophy. Paul’s argument of τὸ συμφέρον goes beyond the ethical sphere, elevating it to include the salvific intentions that bring the advantage of the gospel to the many.62 The ethics of τὸ συμφέρον, the ultimate purpose of which is expressed as σωτηρία, matches perfectly Paul’s soteriological ethic in light of Christ’s death and resurrection. He utilizes τὸ συμφέρον to develop his christoethical vision for the part-whole life in the church, that is, to seek the good of others in imitation to Christ’s self-giving for salvation of the many. Interestingly, while the universal scope of the gospel’s advantage (σωτηρία) does away with socio-ethnic distinctions and conjoins them into a new partwhole “fellowship” (κοινωνία) of humanity in Christ, at the same time it brings about an eschatological division into two categories based on the individual’s response to the message of the cross: “those being saved” (οἱ σῳζομένοι) and “those perishing” (οἱ ἀπολλυμένοι) (1:18-24). Paul’s bifurcation of humanity into the σῳζομένοι and the ἀπολλυμένοι is another clear indication that Paul’s concern with his use of τὸ συμφέρον goes beyond the ethical dimension. This division corresponds to the tension between τὸ ἴδιον and τὸ συμφέρον. We have noticed that the word ἀπόλλυμι/ἀπώλεια (to destroy/destruction) is often used to describe the opposite of σώζειν/σωτηρία, the latter expressing the 62 Similarly, Robert Plummer contends that Paul’s ethical counsel, particularly in his theme of “imitation,” is “salvation-oriented.” See his “Imitation of Paul,” 219–35.

Conclusion: ΤῸ ΣΥΜΦΈΡΟΝ for the Advantage of the Gospel

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advantage of seeking ὁμόνοια by and for the common good. In contrast, the former indicates the negative result in the community of over-emphasizing τὸ ἴδιον.63 Paul advises the Corinthians not to destroy (ἀπόλλυμι; due to their τὸ ἴδιον) “weak believers for whom Christ died” so that they may be free from sinning “against Christ” (8:9-12). As such, Paul’s other-regarding morality of τὸ συμφέρον is christoethical and salvific. In conclusion, Paul culminates the idea of the “advantage” (σωτηρία) that his gospel brings, in his use of the familiar category of τὸ συμφέρον that he employs to overcome the idionistic problems among the Corinthian believers. By this advantage he wants to benefit them all, and he wishes his friends at Corinth to be motivated to seek such συμφέρον in their relationships both within (τοὺς ἔσω) and outside the church (τοὺς ἔξω).64

63 For example, see Dio Chrysostom, Or. 38.14; Stobaeus 3.39.35. 64 Notice again that Paul describes this job of bringing the gospel (εὐαγγελίζειν) to many as an “obligation” (ἀνάγκη) (laid on him) to be accomplished (9:16).

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Index of Ancient Sources Old Testament Isa. 3:3 144

New Testament Mark 12:30 201 Rom. 1:16 214 6:1-14 218 9–11 33 9:3 219 13:8-10 194 14 201 14:15 218 15:1-3 211 15:1-7 218 1 Cor. 1:1 145, 147, 149 1:1-9 145 1:2 141–2, 145–7, 151, 184, 202 1:5 192, 193 1:7 137, 193 1:7-8 210 1:9 34, 142, 145– 7, 153, 215 1:10 25, 141, 144, 146, 164–5, 172, 199, 205, 213, 217 1:10-7 183, 188, 205, 217 1:11 172, 205 1:11-7 25, 208 1:12 149–50 1:13 141 1:14-5 171

1:17 1:17-24 1:18

147, 149, 217 217 163, 185, 210, 214, 217 1:18-9 210 1:18-21 209 1:18-22 217 1:18-24 220 1:18-25 25, 165, 184 1:18-30 212 1:18-31 33 1:18-2:5 25 1:18-3:4 183 1:18-15:57 25, 184 1:20-25 163 1:21 210, 212 1:22-24 33, 146 1:23 182 1:23-24 212 1:24 26, 33, 145–6, 163, 213 1:26 146, 164 1:26-29 147, 161, 164, 187, 213 1:26-30 138, 213 1:26-31 147, 187 1:27 185 1:27-29 212 1:29 164, 185 1:29-31 164 1:30 210 1:31 157, 164, 166 2:1-5 187 2:2 182 2:6 163, 165, 168 2:6-16 163 2:8 188 2:10-14 163 2:13-15 163 2:16 163–4 3 143–4, 171 3:1 163–5, 194 3:1-2 171 3:3 141, 163–5,

190 3:5 143, 147, 150 3:5-9 150 3:5-15 205 3:5–4:7 151 3:6 149, 151 3:8 142, 144, 150–51, 189, 217 3:8-9 143 3:9 150, 190, 202 3:9-17 143 3:10 144, 217 3:10-11 205 3:10-15 149 3:11 144 3:13-15 210 3:15 210 3:16 143 3:16-17 152, 158, 190, 202 3:21 151, 187 3:21-23 32 4:5 189 4:6 150–51, 164, 166, 171 4:7 187 4:8 161 4:8-10 189 4:8-13 163–4, 187 4:10 151, 164, 187 4:14-17 165 4:14-20 163 4:14-21 161 4:15 166, 170–71 4:16 166–7, 170–71 4:16-17 170 4:17 170–71 4:18-19 166 4:21 163, 168 5 143, 151–2, 154, 204, 214, 216 5:1 152

244 5:2 5:5 5:6

152, 154, 164 152, 210 26, 139, 157, 164, 166, 187–8 5:7-8 183 5:8 152 5:13 152 6 143, 152, 154, 158, 167, 183, 188, 216 6:1-6 196 6:1-11 196 6:5 164, 167 6:5-6 188, 199 6:6 153 6:7 153, 167, 188 6:7-8 196, 204 6:8 153 6:11 143, 156, 210 6:12 1, 138–9, 151– 2, 155, 167, 188–91, 193, 196, 197–9 6:12-20 152, 155, 158, 167, 180, 189 6:13 155–6 6:15 5, 143, 156–8, 176, 196 6:16-17 158 6:18 1, 157–8, 180 6:19 5, 143, 159, 196 6:19-20 210 6:20 143, 159, 161, 183 7 183 7:7 147 7:8 26 7:9 26, 136 7:12-16 215 7:16 210, 215 7:17 147 7:17-24 33 7:17-34 147 7:21-24 161 7:23 183 7:26 26 7:31 189 7:35 31, 138–9, 214 8 7, 33, 210 8:1 27, 139, 166– 8, 188, 190,

Index of Ancient Sources 192–4, 201–2, 217 8:1-3 168 8:1-6 191 8:1-13 30 8:1–11:1 156, 162, 164, 166, 193, 196, 201 8:2-6 194 8:3 201 8:4 193–4 8:4-5 212 8:4-6 191, 193, 203 8:7 192–3 8:7-13 147, 193 8:8 201 8:9 193, 197, 201, 210 8:9-12 162, 217, 221 8:9-13 155, 161, 192 8:10 192 8:11 153, 169, 183, 191–4, 210, 217 8:12 153, 201 8:13 168–9, 183, 197, 201 9 6, 33, 143, 147–8, 151, 183, 191–2, 197, 203–4, 210, 215 9:1-2 148–9 9:1-14 148, 191 9:1-18 211 9:3-12 214 9:3-14 215 9:4-14 148 9:9 203 9:12 149, 185, 191, 210, 215, 217 9:12-23 210 9:13 215 9:14 203 9:15 149, 187, 191, 217 9:15-18 148 9:15-23 149, 168, 170 9:16 147, 213, 214, 221 9:18 26 9:19-22 147–8, 211 9:19-23 7, 32–3, 219,

142, 147–8, 161, 163–5, 183, 185, 188, 197, 201, 210– 13, 215–16, 219 9:22 139, 210–11 9:23 33, 195, 211 9:24-27 188 9:25 189 10:9-10 210 10:16-17 142 10:17 141 10:23 27, 138–9, 151, 155, 167, 190–91, 193, 196–7 10:23-24 162 10:23-33 189 10:23–11:1 30, 88, 162, 189, 193, 212 10:24 1, 138, 155, 165, 167, 182–3, 190–91, 193, 201, 204, 213 10:27 201 10:28 191 10:29 191 10:31 190, 195, 202 10:31-33 32, 185, 197, 210–12 10:31–11:1 165, 168, 201 10:32 33, 202, 210 10:32-33 183, 189, 201–2, 211 10:33 6–7, 34, 138–9, 155, 161, 165– 7, 183, 190–93, 201–4, 210–15, 219–20 10:33–11:1 183 11 143, 184 11:1 6, 166–7, 170, 181, 211 11:3 32 11:17 6, 26, 136 11:17-34 164, 173 11:17-22 173, 177 11:18 178 11:18-19 141, 165, 172, 205

Index of Ancient Sources 11:18-34 147 11:20 157, 178 11:20-21 176–7 11:21 176–8 11:21-22 177 11:22 5, 172, 177, 179 11:23-25 180 11:23-26 173, 176, 181 11:24 181 11:26 181 11:27 180 11:27-29 179 11:27-34 173, 178 11:28-29 179 11:29 141, 154, 161, 180 11:33 178 11:33-34 178 11:34 178 12 140, 142–3, 150, 159, 180 12:3 182, 184 12:4 142, 193 12:4-7 151 12:4-11 142 12:4-13 153 12:5 142 12:6 142 12:6-7 190, 195, 202 12:7 138–9, 141–2, 147, 151, 155, 167, 193–4, 204 12:8 142, 192, 194 12:9 143 12:11 142–3, 147 12:12-13 141 12:13 7, 33, 142, 162, 205, 212–13, 12:13-14 142 12:14-26 147, 159 12:18 140, 147 12:15 1, 159 12:16 159 12:17 153 12:21 160 12:21-26 160 12:22-24 160 12:23-24 187 12:24 140, 147, 160 12:24-25 141

12:25

140–41, 151, 153–4, 160, 171, 182, 205 12:26 24, 153–4, 160, 187 12:27 151, 176 12:27-30 161 12:28 140, 217 12:28-31 193 12:31 136, 171, 203 13 142, 167, 184, 190, 192, 202, 217 13:1-3 165, 190, 194 13:1-7 168 13:2 192, 194 13:2-3 194 13:3 26, 139, 166, 187 13:4 166, 169 13:4-6 190 13:5 27, 138, 139, 166, 171, 190– 92, 202 13:5-7 139 13:6 160, 166 13:8 192 13:8-13 188–9, 210 13:9 168 13:9-12 194 13:9-13 168 13:10 167–8, 189 13:10-11 165–6, 171 13:11 164–6, 168 13:12 168 13:12-13 217 13:13 136, 203 14 142, 151, 167, 216 14:1 139, 189–91, 193, 217 14:1-6 168 14:3 167–8 14:3-5 27 14:4 192, 203, 205 14:5 136, 168, 203 14:6 26, 139 14:12 139, 151, 167–8, 217 14:15-25 216 14:18 191, 203 14:18-19 165 14:19 191

­245 14:20

165, 167–8, 171 14:23 171 14:23-25 216 14:26 27, 147, 151, 195 14:33 32 15 25, 181, 184, 188–9, 217–18 15:1-2 184, 218 15:1-4 213 15:2 210 15:3 181–2, 184, 188 15:8-11 33 15:10 217 15:14 217 15:12-58 210 15:18 210 15:20-23 188 15:22 213 15:31 187 15:32 26, 217 15:43 188 15:45-50 213 15:58 189, 206, 216–18 16:1-4 118 16:13 205 16:13-14 206 16:14 139, 168, 194–5, 202 16:15 171 2 Cor 3:7–4:18 189 4:7-15 218 5:14 169, 184, 192 5:21 211, 218 6:3 210 8:10 139 9:9 211, 218 11 6, 214 12:1 139 12:9-10 218 13:9 167 Gal. 1:11-7 33 2:19-20 218 3:13 211 3:28 142, 213 4:4-5 212

Index of Ancient Sources

246 5:24 218 6:2 218 6:14 218 Phil. 1:12 218 1:18-26 218 1:19 218 1:22 200 1:24 218 1:25 168 1:27 219 1:28 210, 218 2:4 188, 200, 218 2:5-11 218 2:6-8 211, 218 2:6-11 219 2:9-11 188 2:12 218 3:12-21 168 3:20 218

Apostolic Father 1 Clem. 48.6 17

Aelius Aristides Or. 23.7 17 24.32–3 21, 48, 170

Aristotle Cael. 268b 6 278b 10

13, 46, 50 13

Cat. 12.14b 4 62 Eth. nic. 1.2.4 144 1.3.1–4 15 1.5.4–6 125 1.5.5 129, 186 1.7.6 14, 51 1.7.10–15 147 1.7.17–23 15

2.1.7 15 2.6 102 2.2.3 15 2.2.3–5 15 2.3.5 96 2.3.7 97, 104 4.3.1–34 186 4.3.14 186 4.3.17–4.5.4 125 4.3.18 125 4.3.19 186 4.3.21–7 186 4.4.3 131 4.4.4 131 4.6.6 96, 104, 106 5.1.13 96 5.7.5 22 8.1.1 104 8.1.5 104 8.3.2 103 8.4.2 103 8.5.4 103 8.9.4 9, 21, 94, 96, 102 8.9.4–6 14, 21, 51, 64 8.9.13–14 96 8.10 49 8.10.2 8, 66, 93 8.10.1–6 49 8.10.4–6 21 9.6 91 9.6.1 90–91 9.6.2 92 9.6.4 8, 92 Hist. an. 486a 10–13 38 Metaph. 1035a–1036a 25 62 1035b 20–22 159 1069a 19 50 Phys. 252b 26 46 252b 25–7 81 Pol. 1252a 8–1256a 19 161 1252a 24–35 51, 84 1252a 26–34 21, 47 1252a 26–1255b 40 47 1252b 28–35 47

1253a 1–29 14 1253a 2–3 14, 51 1253a 2–8 51 1253a 8 14, 51 1253a 15 96 1253a 18–25 48 1253a 19–29 14 1253 a 19–35 62 1253a 20–21 75 1253a 20–22 62 1253a 27 62 1253b–1255b 49, 169 1253b–1255b 21 1255a 1–3 16 1255b 4–15 21, 51, 84 1255b 10 18, 137 1255b 10–13 16 1260b 8–20 16 1260b 12–6 14, 48–9, 51 1274b 35–42 14, 51 1276b 20–27 72, 76 1276b 20–30 208 1276b 20–32 66 1276b 25–7 209 1276b 25–30 71 1276b 28–9 72 1276b 29 12, 76 1278b 20 51 1278b 20–24 8, 16, 96 1278b 20–1284a 3 11 1278b 22–3 76, 209 1278b 24 18 1278b 31–1280a 6 49 1279a 4–8 66 1279a 17–1279b 10 66, 93 1279a 18–21 94 1279b 7–10 93, 138 1282b 15–23 105 1282b 16–17 9, 21 1282b 16–18 102 1282b 16–19 11, 24, 96 1283b 40–44 96 1283b 41–4 94 1293b 25 93 1302b 10–15 164 1302b 35–1303a 2 14 1324a 5–23 98 1326a 20–22 14, 51 1328a 22–4 14, 51 1337a 23–31 16 1337a 25–32 17 1337a 27–32 48 1337 a 28–31 10, 40

Index of Ancient Sources Rhet. 1.1.7 22 1.2.3 40, 88 1.3.1–3 26, 88 1.3.5 8, 17, 40, 88, 207 1.3.6 11 1.3.5–6 11 1.4.12 209 1.5.1–18 98 1.6 96 1.6.1 8, 9, 20, 26, 88, 102, 106, 207 1.6.16 21, 102 1.6.19–20 11, 45, 64 1.6.30 106 1.7.1–41 136, 202 1.7.7 202 1.7.35 205 1.8.2 8, 12, 71, 92, 209 2.12.3–16 102 2.13.9 23, 102, 121 2.14.2 102 Top. 135a 13

116

Arius Didymus 148.5 48–9 5a 200 5b4 74 5b8 199 6a 53 11c 102

Cicero Amic. 14.51 104 Arch. 6.14 126 11.26 125 11.26–9 186 11.28 133 11.29 125

Att. 8.11 133 9.2 66 13.2 66 14.6.2 66 16.11.4 114 De or. 2.82.334–35

106

Div. 2.34 82 Fin. 2.24.78 104 2.24.78–2.26.85 104 2.26.82 103 2.26.84 102 3.15.50–16.54 200 3.15.51–16.52 200 3.16 55 3.19.62 55 3.18.62–20.8 55 3.19.63–4 58, 78 3.19.64 10, 17, 50, 62 3.20.68 49 3.62–8 54 3.64–5 55 3.69 200 5.12.35 77 Fam. 10.12.5 132 Flac. 98 95 Inv. 1.5.7 26 1.38.68 94 1.38.68–9 71, 95, 209 1.38.69 95 1.38–9 208 1.40.73 95 2.38.112 132 2.39.114 132 2.48.141 106 2.51.156 11, 17, 26, 40, 88, 104–5 2.52.158 106 2.53.159–54.165 114 2.55.166 106, 128

­247 2.56.168–69 11, 26, 40, 88, 207 2.56.169–58.175 119 2.57.172 119 Leg. 1.15 54 1.43 54 Marcel. 8.26 131 Mil. 35.97

126, 186

Nat. d. 2.18–40 53, 64 2.19 82 2.30 82 2.37 52–3 2.115 82 Off. 1.3.9 113 1.5.15 114 1.6.18–19 13, 114 1.7.20 96, 115 1.7.20–1.18.60 115 1.7.22 116 1.8.25–6 134 1.8.26 130–32 1.8.26–7 131 1.10.31 115, 122 1.12 54 1.14.43 134 1.16.50–2 116 1.17.54 47–8 1.18.61–1.26.92 115 1.19.62 115, 125, 130 1.19.62–5(84) 115 1.19.65 130 1.20.68 127 1.24.83 63, 115 1.24.83–4 134 1.25.85 9, 110 1.25.85 17, 89, 132 1.25.86 92 1.27.93 116 1.27.93–1.42.151 116 1.27.94 116 1.28.100 116 1.33.121 127

248 1.35.126 64, 138 1.35.126–7 76, 116 1.35.129 116 1.43.152–1.45.161 116, 202 1.43.153 114, 192 1.43.153–1.44.156 193 1.43.155 116 1.44.156 114–15 2.1.1 117–18 2.3.9 98, 117–18 2.3.9–10 117 2.3.9–11 24, 105 2.7.23 134 2.7.23–8.28 66 2.8.27–9 134 2.9.31 118, 129, 188 2.9.31–2.11.38 128–9 2.9.31–2.14.51 117 2.9.31–2.14.85 117 2.11.38 129 2.12.43 129 2.13.43 130 2.13.45 131, 132 2.15.52–2.18.64 118 2.15.54 118 2.15.55 118 2.17.58 118 2.18.63 119 2.19.65 119 2.19.65–2.24.85 118 2.21.72 119 2.24.85 132, 133 2.24.87 118 2.25.88 136 3.2.7 114 3.2.7–12 113 3.3.11 11, 96 3.3.11–12 120 3.4.17 121 3.4.19 66, 121 3.5.21–6.31 121 3.5.21–6.32 24 3.5.21–3 53 3.5.21–4 120 3.5.22 77–8, 120 3.5.22–3 70, 109 3.5.23 78, 120 3.5.25 121 3.6.32 66, 75, 107, 204 3.6.26 120 3.6.27 119–20

Index of Ancient Sources 3.6.28–31 121 3.6.31 121 3.8.35 120–21 3.8.36 66 3.10.40 120 3.10.40–3.33.120 121 3.10.42 122 3.10.43 104 3.10.43–6 122 3.10.46 104, 122 3.11.47 122 3.11.47–9 122 3.12.51 123 3.12.52 78, 82, 86, 123 3.13.56–7 123, 137 3.16.65–6 123 3.16.65–17.72 124 3.15.64 121, 124 3.17.72 119 3.19.75–7 66 3.19.75–8 121 3.19.76 121 3.20.81 121, 124 3.20.82–21.83 66, 131 3.20.82–21.85 134 3.21.82 132 3.21.83 113, 117, 122, 124 3.21.82–3 131 3.22.87 112, 131 3.25.96 22, 96 3.28.101 124, 131, 188 3.37.115 125

Quint. fratr. 3.6.4 126

Ora. 2.82.334–5 22 3.5.20 46

Ep. 1.5 8, 88 1.10 214

Part. 25.89–90 22 25.90 112, 125

Or. 7.46 39, 104–5 9.3 142, 213 16.1–10 105 16.10 102, 105 20.112 105

Phil. 1.12.29 125, 132, 134 1.12.29–30 128–9, 130– 31, 188 1.14.33 130 5.18.49–50 132 Rep. 1.4.7 126 1.32.49 91, 138

[Rhet Her.] 3.2.3 26, 106 Second Philippic 85–7 66 110 66 116 66 Sest. 16.38 133 32.70 134 60.128 126 65.136 126 66.138f 133 66.139 131–2 68.143 127 68.143–69.144 126 Tusc. 1.2.4 125 1.38.91 130 1.45.109 130 3.2.3 125, 130, 132, 186, 189 3.2.3–4 129 3.2.4 129, 189 5.37.108 50

Demosthenes

Dio Chrysostom Or. 14.6–7 8, 135 14.10 47 14.16 197, 198

Index of Ancient Sources 14.16–18 102 14.17 198 14.17–18 197 14.18 197 27.6 11, 64 34 24 34.16 17, 90, 138 34.16–22 8, 10–11, 90 34.19 90 34.21–3 77 38.1 89 38.9 89 38.10–14 90 38.13 90 38.14 65, 72, 85, 209, 221 39.6 65, 72, 85, 157, 209

Dionysius of Halicarnassus Ant. rom. 2.24.1–27.5 49 2.24.2 48 2.62.1–5 92 2.66.4 63 5.5.2 101 5.5.3 101 5.3.3–5.4.3 100 5.5.4 101 5.6.1–2 101 5.10.2 90 6.83.2–4 78 6.85.1 71, 92, 212 6.85.5 208 6.86.1 24, 71, 77, 81, 86, 90, 138 6.86.1–5 10, 69, 78, 86, 109, 156 6.86.3–4 77 6.86.4 79 6.86.5 80, 84, 157 7.39.2 92 7.53.1 92 7.54.1 90, 92, 135, 154 8.34.3 195 8.85.1 92 11.9.1 87

Diogenes Laertius Vit. phil. 6.63 50 7.42 40 7.84–5 54 7.85–6 55 7.87 52 7.87–8 13, 50, 53 7.87–9 96 7.101–7 200 7.102–5 200 7.108 53 7.117–23 198 7.121 48 7.121–3 198 7.122–3 199 7.139 46 7.142–3 46 9.69 103 10.8 103 10.120 103 10.128 103 10.148 103 10.150 96 10.151 97 10.152 97, 103 10.153 97

Dio Cassius Roman History 41.17.3 132

Epictetus Diss. 1.7.2 51 1.9.1 50 1.12.16 37, 65, 71 1.12.26 59–60, 64 1.14.1–5 37, 82 1.14.6–10 59, 64 1.14.10 59 1.18.2 11 1.19.11–15 65 1.19.12–15 11, 46 1.19.13 8, 56, 64, 71, 82 1.22.1 9, 11, 96, 116 1.22.14 18, 66, 89, 138

­249 1.22.5–6 89 1.26.1 52–3 1.27.14 11 1.28.5 19 1.28.5–6 51 1.29.44 145 2.1.23 198 2.5.10–14 76 2.5.13 60 2.5.13–26 59 2.5.24 67, 75, 107, 204 2.5.24–6 59, 64 2.5.24–8 78 2.5.25–6 59, 81 2.5.27 50 2.8.11 59, 64 2.9.3–4 59, 64, 76 2.10.2–5 78 2.10.3 9, 13, 17, 50, 54 2.10.5 4, 64, 65 2.10.1–6 59, 60 2.10.4–5 59 2.11.15 8 2.14.13 65 2.15.10 59 2.21.1–2 8, 59 2.22.15 54 2.22.15–18 10, 83, 86 2.22.15–23 165 2.22.15–26 11 2.22.16–18 108 2.22.17–18 71, 208 2.22.18 108 2.22.27 30 2.23.38 48 2.24.21–4 89 2.26.2 30 2.5.25 14 3.2.2 51 3.2.4 15 3.5 144 3.7.33 9, 19, 51, 53, 60 3.21.5 48 3.22.3–5 50 3.22.3–8 76 3.22.43 19 3.24.10 50 3.24.10–11 59 3.24.11 50 3.24.64 65 4.4.16 51

250 4.7.6 17, 30, 37, 64 4.7.6–9 59, 64, 76 4.7.7 59, 138 4.7.7–8 60 Ench. 17 76 30 15, 19, 51 31.4 99, 108 51 165

Hierocles On Duties (in Stobaeus, Ecl.) 1.34–9 54 1.51–7 54 2.1–9 54 3.39.35 17, 58, 63, 71, 75, 86, 137, 210, 219 3.39.34–6 11, 62 4.22.21–4 48 4.671.7–673.11 57 9.3–10 54, 58 11.14–8 54, 58

Index of Ancient Sources 6.3 91, 212 6.14 8, 11, 91, 212 9.19 91 Jas. 3 212 Nic. 15.5 97 17 94, 96, 105 Or. 15.8 149 Panath. 133 93 138 79 Paneg. 18

8, 17

Josephus B.J. 1.218 89, 90, 138 4.320 63

Homer

Livy

Il. vi.208 126 xi.784 126

His. 2.32.9 81 2.32.9–12 70, 72, 109, 156 2.32.10–11 77

Isocrates Archid. 34 17 De pace 10 28

8, 17 8, 9, 99, 108, 154 39 208 Dem. 4.11 170 Ep. 3.1 91

Manilius Astronomica 2.60–6 82

Marcus Aurelius Med. 2.1

53, 61, 70, 72–3, 78 2.3 13, 37, 67, 73 2.9 60 2.12 65

2.17 52 4.2 50 4.3 50 4.4 17, 50, 60 4.25 66 4.29 60 5.3 86 5.8 65 5.16 11, 71, 73 5.22 61 5.24 50, 60 5.26 60 5.35 11 6.14 72 6.42 73 6.42–3 73, 151 6.42–5 72 6.44 11, 17, 45, 60–61 6.45 61, 82 7.5 61 7.9 60 7.13 51, 60, 70–72, 78 9.3 65 9.23 61–2, 64, 89, 138 9.40 72 10.6 11, 50–51, 54, 60, 61–2 10.6–7 10, 61, 72 10.20 67 10.33 61 11.8 60 11.21 63, 71 73 12.20 17, 61, 71, 73 12.23 8, 73

Martial Epigrams 3.60 173

Maximus of Tyre Or. 15.4–5

70, 72–3

Index of Ancient Sources

[Ocellus Lucanus] Univ. nat. 45 47–8 45–50 53 48 47–8 50 48 51 49

Philo Abr. 74

10.903b–d 10, 138 10.903c 17, 19, 65 10.903c–d 11 10.903d 19, 86 12.961e 209 Gorg. 469c 204 508a 3 50 Laches 197b 130

21, 79

Agr. 45–8 84 48 17 Dec. 165–6 161 Jos. 38–9 49 61–3 209 143 11 Prob. 59 198

Plato Crat. 416e–419a 96 417a–c 11 419a 11, 64 Leg. 4.707a–c 209 4.714c 107 4.715b 9, 18, 89, 93, 97, 110, 138 8.829 a 18 9.821a 91 9.875a 11, 18, 82, 89, 138 9.875a–b 91, 136 9.875b 19, 63 10.903a–c 64, 76 10.903b 64, 71, 208

Menex. 246c 130 247b 125 Phaed. 80a

20, 79

­251 30b–34b 50 30b–34c 46 32b–33a 13 30c 50 31a 50 33a–c 50 34b 13, 50 55d 50 60c 46 92c 50

Pliny Ep. 2.6 173, 175

Plutarch

Phileb. 29d–e 46

Arat. 24.5

Resp. 336d 11 338 107, 154 342d–e 65 342e 11, 17, 110 343b 84 343b–344 154 343c 11 344 107 344c 11 346a 208 347a–e 107 347d 66, 93 347e 93 352d 20 367 107, 154 420b 110 420c–d 73 427d 114 438 107, 154 462c–d 24, 86 462c–464b 82 462c–e 18, 81 464b 81 465d–6c 110

Cic. 2.2–4.7 126 6.4 127

Tim. 30b–c 13

Mor. 644a–d

109, 136

175, 190

Stoic. rep. 1035c 52 1038b 54, 56 Thes. 24.1–5 92 Adul. amic. 55d 104

Polybius His. 21.32c

24, 98, 105

Quintilian Inst. 2.21.23 26 3.3–4 26

252 3.4.12–5 40, 88 3.8.22–42 8 3.8.34 40, 88 3.8.34–5 26

Seneca Clem. 1.3.2 56, 64 1.3.5 21, 79 1.3.5–1.5.3 24, 78, 80 1.4.3 63 1.5.1 80 1.11.4–13.1 66, 94, 208 2.6.3 64 Const. 1.1 79 Ep. 9.8 104 48.2 81 48.2–3 104 65.16 83 65.19 81 66.10 81, 83 79.13 130 92.30 13, 17 95.51–2 10, 59, 81 95.51–3 78 95.53 73 102. 12 130 102.17 130 113.9 13, 17, 50, 81 121.5–15 55 121.14 55 Ira 1.1.1–2 74 1.5.1–2 74

Index of Ancient Sources 1.6.5–7.1 74 1.9.1 74 1.11.5 75 1.19.2 74 2.31.6–8 78 2.31.7 10, 16, 58–9, 78, 120 2.31.7–8 70, 109 3.2.2–3 74 Otio 3.5 85 4.1 46 Prov. 1.1 3.1–2

81, 83 67, 75, 107, 204

Tranq. 3.1 85

Sextus Empiricus Math. 7.133 53 9.78–92 52

Stobaeus See Hierocles

SVF 1.111–14 13 2.473 82 2.528 21, 50 2.550 64

2.633–37 46 3.4 13

Thucydides His. 1.31–43 22 1.42.2 22 2.44.4 125 2.60.2–4 10, 62 2.61.2–4 71, 75, 208 2.61.4 12, 17, 62 3.40.4 100 3.44.1–4 100 3.49.1 23, 98, 100 5.89 107 5.90 9, 11, 23, 97, 108 5.91 107 5.92–3 107 5.98 11, 108 5.105.3 23, 104 5.105–6 11

Virgil Georg. 1.351–53 82

Xenophon Mem. 2.3.18 72 2.3.18–19 70, 78, 109 2.3.19 87 3.9.4 99, 108 3.14.1 174 3.14.2 175

­

Index of Modern Authors Aasgaard, R. 167, 194 Adams, E. 46–7, 149–50, 213 Adewuja, J. A. 181 Alberti, A. 97 Annas, J. 20, 36, 48–9, 52, 55, 76 Arnold, E. V. 52 Asmis, E. 73 Atkins, E. M. 28, 110, 115, 132 Aune, D. E. 156 Balch, D. 167, 173 Balla, P. 167 Baltzly, D. C. 38 Barnes, J. 13, 15, 38, 46 Barr, J. 27 Barram, M. 211–12, 216 Barrett, C. K. 148, 150, 180 Bartchy, S. S. 145 Barton, S. C. 17, 179, 213 Baur, F. C. 149 Bees, R. 54–5 Best, E. 70, 140, 160 Blumenfeld, B. 143–4 Blundell, M. W. 36, 54–6 Boyarin, D. 33 Braxton, B. R. 33 Breck, J. 180 Bringmann, K. 126, 132, 134 Brink, C. O. 55 Burke, T. J. 138, 161, 169–71 Castelli, E. 166 Chester, S. J. 145 Chow, J. K. 141, 204 Chuska, J. 48 Cole, A. T., Jr. 98 Colish, M. L. 30

Collins, A. Y. 152 Collins, R. F. 10 Conzelmann, H. 30, 32, 212 Coutsoumpos, P. 174–6 Davis, J. A. 150 de Boer, M. C. 35 Deming, W. 47, 150, 200 deSilva, D. A. 186–8 Dodd, B. J. 219 Doniger, W. 27 Douglas, M. 140 Dover, K. J. 39 Downing, F. G. 150 Dunn, J. D. G. 25, 140–41 Dupont, D. J. 30, 135 Durkheim, E. 26, 71, 140 Dutch, R. S. 187 Dyck, A. R. 38, 70, 111, 113, 117, 119, 124, 128, 130, 132–3 Ellington, D. W. 183, 215 Engberg-Pedersen, T. 34–7, 41, 54–5, 135, 181 Farrar, C. 63, 103 Fee, G. D. 9, 146–8, 180, 194, 212 Finley, J. H. 22, 38–9, 99, 101 Finney, M. T. 186 Fitzgerald, J. T. 35, 187 Forschner, M. 36 Fowl, S. 25 Fredrickson, D. 187 Furnish, V. P. 35, 145–6, 158, 164, 172, 183–4, 194, 216 Galloway, L. E. 198

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Garcilazo, A. 135, 158 Gardner, P. D. 192–3 Gaventa, B. R. 184 Geernaert, D. 145 Glad, C. E. 27, 137, 196 Görgemanns, H. 36, 54, 56 Gorman, M. J. 184 Gosling, J. C. B. 103 Goulder, M. 149 Grosheide, F. W. 149 Gupta, N. K. 158

Lanci, J. R. 144 Lapidge, M. 13, 52, 82 Lee, M. V. 8, 10, 78, 88 Leeman, A. D. 125–6, 128 Litfin, D. 150 Lodge, R. C. 39, 73, 84–5 Long, A. A. 12, 28, 38, 50, 52–4, 58, 64–5, 74, 82, 110–11, 113, 118, 126–30, 133, 187 Longenecker, B. W. 25 Lütgert, W. 150

Hahm, D. 13, 37, 46, 50, 64, 82 Hall, D. 139, 148 Halliwell, S. 40 Hansen, M. H. 213 Harris, W. V. 131 Havelock, E. A. 46, 135 Hays, R. B. 10, 25, 146, 153–7, 182, 203–4, 207, 211, 218 Hilgert, E. 65, 209, 217 Holladay, C. R. 192 Hooker, M. D. 211, 219 Horrell, D. G. 5, 35, 142, 148–50, 161, 172–3, 180–81, 194, 201, 203–4, 211 Horsley, R. A. 150 Hurd, J. C., Jr. 194

McCabe, M. M. 50 Mack, B. L. 126 Malherbe, A. J. 11, 28, 30, 34, 48– 9, 70, 72, 93, 110, 150, 198 Marrou, H. I. 125 Marshall, P. 214 Martin, D. B. 4, 20–21, 31–2, 48, 80, 137–8, 141, 150, 161, 180, 207, 212 Martin, R. P. 219 Martyn, J. L. 34–5 May, J. M. 126 Meador, P., Jr. 112 Meeks, W. A. 14–15, 49, 161, 172, 216 Meggitt, J. J. 5 Meier, C. 4 Metzger, B. M. 179 Miller, F. D. 40, 62, 93 Miller, W. 28, 111 Mitchell, A. C. 204 Mitchell, M. M. 3, 8, 10–11, 17–18, 20, 25–7, 30, 32–3, 45, 88, 91, 135, 138, 140–41, 143–4, 148–50, 155, 164, 182, 184, 187, 190–91, 194, 196, 204– 5, 207, 211–13 Moreau, J. 50 Morris, L. 146 Mournet, T. C. 185, 188 Moxnes, H. 167 Murphy-O’Connor, J. 30, 157, 172–3

Inwood, B. 36, 55 Jaeger, W. W. 14–16, 87, 88, 144 Jewett, R. 185 Kahn, C. H. 46 Kammler, H. 163, 183 Käsemann, E. 219 Kee, H. C. 35 Kennedy, G. A. 26, 40, 88 Kim, S. 201 Kitzberger, I. 27, 139 Kraut, R. 40, 62 Kries, D. 112–13 Lampe, P. 172, 174–5, 181, 184

Index of Modern Authors Neyrey, J. H. 140 Nicgroski, W. 28, 98, 111, 114 Obbink, D. 45 O’Brien, P. T. 212 Økland, J. 5, 179 Osiek, C. 167, 173 Paige, T. 198–9 Patton, K. C. 27 Pearson, L. 22, 24, 38–9, 100–101, 105, 107 Pembroke, S. G. 36, 54 Petersen, N. R. 25 Pickett, R. 183–5 Plummer, R. L. 212, 216, 220 Plumpe, J. C. 128 Pogoloff, S. M. 150, 187 Popović, A. 215 Powell, J. G. F. 28, 110–11 Raaflaub, K. A. 47 Ramelli, I. 11, 36–7, 48, 50, 55, 58 Ramsaran, R. A. 148, 155, 201, 217 Ray, B. C. 27 Remer, G. 112 Rowe, C. 93 Sambursky, S. 37, 53, 82 Sampley, J. P. 14, 26, 139, 145–6, 148, 150, 152–3, 155, 159, 162–3, 167, 182, 190–92, 196, 200, 203, 206, 210, 217 Sandnes, K. O. 156, 203, 212, 216 Schmithals, W. 150 Schofield, M. 15, 21, 48, 52, 54, 87 Schrage, W. 175, 191–2 Sedley, D. 50, 54, 57–8 Sevenster, J. N. 30 Sheppard, A. R. R. 88 Silva, M. 27 Smith, M. J. 170 Stanley, C. D. 33 Stansbury, H. A. 185, 187–8

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Stanton, G. R. 50 Steadman, J. M. 127 Stowers, S. K. 20, 30–31, 35, 40, 127, 198 Striker, G. 36, 52, 54, 108, 110 Sullivan, F. A. 126–9 Taylor, C. C. 103 Theissen, G. 5, 172–3, 179 Thiselton, A. C. 10, 180 Thompson, J. B. 4, 138 Tieleman, T. 37 Todd, R. B. 52 Turney-High, H. H. 13 Vander Waerdt, P. A. 45 Vollenweider, S. 30, 198 Walsh, P. G. 111, 113, 115, 118–19 Walter, M. 70, 140 Walters, J. C. 148 Wanamaker, C. A. 138, 144, 169 Watson, D. F. 26, 88 Weiss, J. 3, 30–31, 45, 135, 150, 179 Weiss, K. 10–11, 27, 102–3 Welborn, L. L. 3, 5, 88, 205, 207 White, L. M. 170–71 White, N. P. 15, 47, 52, 64, 85, 100, 170 Wilckens, U. 150 Williams, H. D., III 144, 183, 204 Willis, W. L. 148–9, 191–2, 212–13 Winter, B. W. 87, 181 Wire, A. 150 Witherington, B., III 25, 172, 207 Wood, N. 125 Wörner, M. H. 40 Wright, M. R. 36, 47, 54 Wright, N. T. 25 Yatromanolaki, J. 9 Young, N. H. 170