The Cold War and the Origins of Foreign Relations of People's Republic of China [1 ed.] 9789004369078, 9789004369061

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The Cold War and the Origins of Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China

Brill’s Humanities in China Library Edited by Zhang Longxi (City University of Hong Kong) Axel Schneider (Göttingen University)

VOLUME 13

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/​bhcl

The Cold War and the Origins of Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China By

Niu Jun

Translated by

Zhong Yijing

LEIDEN | BOSTON

This book is a result of the translation license agreement between Social Sciences Academic Press and Koninklijke Brill NV. This book is translated into English from the original《冷战与新中国外交的缘起​ 1949–1955》(Lengzhan yu xin Zhongguo waijiao de yuanqi 1949–​1955) by 牛军（Niu Jun）with financial support from the Chinese Funds for Humanities and Social Sciences. The Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data is available online at http://​catalog.loc.gov LC record available at http://​lccn.loc.gov/2018023149​

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill.” See and download: brill.com/​brill-​typeface. ISSN 1874-​8023 ISBN 978-90-04-36906-1 (hardback) ​I SBN 978-90-04-36907-8 (e-book) Copyright 2018 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-​free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Series Editors’ Foreword vii Preface ix Translation and Acronyms xxi 1

Alliance and Confrontation 1 Section 1: As the Iron Curtain Descends 2 Section 2: The Origin of Alliance 26 Section 3: The Road to Confrontation 50

2

World Liberation and National Security 76 Section 1: Revolution and National Defense 78 Section 2: The Assistance to Vietnam to Resist France 92 Section 3: From Yalu River to the 38th Line 124

3

Road to “Co-​existence in the Cold War” 180 Section 1: Ceasefire in Korea 182 Section 2: Ceasefire in Indochina 216 Section 3: “Fight and Talk” at the Taiwan Strait 259

4 Making New Diplomacy 291 Section 1: “Get some Atomic Bombs” 292 Section 2: Rebuild “the Middle Zone” 308 Closing Remarks 336 Bibliography 339 Index 348

Series Editors’ Foreword The rise of China as an economic and political power is unquestionably one of the most striking phenomena of global significance as we enter the first decade of the twenty-​first century. Ever since the end of the “Cultural Revolution” and the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, tremendous changes have transformed China from an isolated and relatively weak country into a rapidly developing and dynamic society. The scale and speed of such transformations have taken the world—​even the Chinese themselves—​by surprise; China today is drastically different from, and in a remarkably better condition than, China thirty years ago despite the many economic, social, and political difficulties and problems that yet remain to be dealt with. China scholars in Europe and North America are called upon to provide information and explanation of the rise of China, a country with history and tradition reaching back to antiquity and yet showing amazing strength and cultural virility in the world today. Interest in China is not limited to the traditional field of Sinology or China studies, nor is it confined to the academic world of universities, for more and more people outside of academia are curious about China, about its history and culture, as well as the changes taking place in the contemporary world. The Western news media brings images from China to every household; Sinologists or China scholars publish numerous articles and books to satisfy the general need for understanding: China is receiving a high-​level of attention in the West today whether we turn to the scholarly community or look at popular imagination. In understanding China, however, very little is available in the West that allows the average reader to have a glance at how China and its culture and history are understood by the Chinese themselves. This seems a rather strange omission, but in much of the twentieth century, the neglect of native Chinese scholarship was justified on the grounds of a perception of political control in China, where scholarship, particularly in the humanities and social sciences, was dominated by party ideology and strictly followed a prescribed party line. Such politically controlled scholarship was thought to be more propaganda than real scholarship, and consequently Western scholars rarely referred to contemporary Chinese scholarship in their works. In the last thirty years, however, Chinese scholarship and public opinion, like everything else in China, have undergone such tremendous changes that the old stereotype of a politically controlled scholarship no longer holds. New and important archaeological findings in China have changed our knowledge of ancient texts and our understanding of Chinese history in significant ways, and detailed studies of such new materials are available in native Chinese

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scholarship. Since the 1980s, many Chinese scholars have critically reflected on the nature of scholarship and questioned the old dogma of political and ideological orthodoxy, while many important books have been published that present a new outlook on Chinese history and culture. The time has come for Western scholars and other interested readers to engage academic perspectives originating in China, and making important academic works from China available in English is an important step in this engagement. Translation of influential academic works from China will greatly contribute to our better understanding of China from different perspectives and in different ways, beyond the dichotomies of the inside and the outside, a native Chinese view and a Western observer’s vantage point. Brill’s Humanities in China Library is an established book series that has been commissioned by Brill in response to that need. The series aims to introduce important and representative works of native Chinese scholarship in English translation, in which each volume is carefully selected and expertly translated for the benefit of Western scholars as well as general readers who have an interest in China and its culture but may not read the Chinese language in the original. It is our hope that this series of representative books in translation will be useful to both specialists and general readers for understanding China from a different point of view, and that it will be an important step towards a fruitful dialogue and an exchange of ideas between Chinese and Western scholars. Zhang Longxi Axel Schneider July 29, 2008

Preface September 22, 1947 is a special day in the international history of the Cold War. On this day, the world turned its attention to Europe where the us-​ Soviet confrontation to divide the world into two competing camps reached a turning point. On this day, sixteen European countries including the United Kingdom and France attended the European Economic Conference and signed the final report of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation in Paris. The report emphasized that us aid would be critical to Europe’s postwar reconstruction and close relations should be built with the United States.1 Previously, Soviet foreign minister V.  M. Molotov had warned the United Kingdom and France during their three-​state foreign ministerial meeting in Paris that they should not accept the Marshall Plan proposed a short while ago by the United States, or it would “divide Europe into two blocs.”2 His warning was futile. The Soviet Union was apparently also ready to split Europe from the other side. On the same day, communist delegates from the Soviet Union, Eastern European states, France, Italy, and other states held a conference in a small bathhouse in Szklarska Poręba of Silesia, Poland that witnessed the establishment of the Information Bureau of Communist and Workers’ Parties of nine European states. The conference adopted the Declaration on International Situation, which proclaimed that “two camps” had appeared in the world: one “imperialist, anti-​democratic camp,” and one “anti-​imperialist, democratic camp.” And to bring a bright future of the world, the latter camp should dare to stand up and fight.3 Hence, Europe was divided into two. “Two camps” emerged, and the world was also divided into two in politics. Such development of postwar world politics was named by renowned British writer George Orwell as “the Cold War,” which was widely taken at the time as a term that most accurately grasped the key features of a new age. 1 Editorial committee, ed., Zhan hou shijie lishi chang bian (1947) 战后世界历史长编 [A long chronicle of world history after World War II (1947)] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1977), 3:144. 2 Wang Shengzu 王绳祖, ed., Guoji guanxi shi (1945–​1949) 国际关系史 [The history of international relations (1945–​1949)] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1963), 7:133–​134. 3 Gongchan dang qingbao ju huiyi wenjian 共产党情报局会议文件 [Documents of Communist Information Bureau Meetings] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1954), 4–​8.

x Preface On September 14, one week before “two camps” was declared, a town named Ye Tao near Wu’an city in Hebei Province in China distributed People’s Daily, which was still an organ for the Central Bureau of the Jin Ji Lu Yu Border Area of the Communist Party of China (cpc) (中共晋冀鲁豫边区中 央局). That day, the newspaper published an editorial entitled “the Great Counter Offensive of the People’s Liberation Army.” The editorial declared that the cpc military’s “great counter offensive has begun,” and they would “plant flags of liberation all over China.”4 For sure, nobody at that time would realize how much significance the event as described by the People’s Daily editorial would ever come to bear. From such Chinese land lying in East Asia as massive as Europe, a new state would emerge in two years. In light of its size and extent, it resembled a region as large as Europe that achieved the great unity after years of war fights and disintegration. On the other hand, the cpc’s seizure of power also made Chinese foreign policy experience a revolutionary change, which in a rare way in world history destroyed China’s past foreign relations system and threw huge shocks and lasting impact on world politics. This book accounts for history from the birth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949 to 1955. In the course of Chinese history, this is a transition period from the cpc’s final victory of its revolutionary movement to nation-​building, at the same time of which it also witnessed the birth of PRC’s foreign policy. From a global context, it matched the period when the United States and the Soviet Union gradually loosened from the early, extremely intense, and almost rigid confrontation and thus encouraged temporary accommodations in limited parts of East Asia. It seemed a mere coincidence that the outbreak of the Cold War and the colossal change in Chinese politics matched perfectly in time as stated above, but from a long-​term perspective of global history, such chanced encounter effectively showed that us-​Soviet confrontation would spill over from Europe to East Asia, that China would inevitably find its fate entangled with the international Cold War, and that China’s future foreign relations were bound to take place and develop in interaction with the Cold War. On October 10, 1947, the cpc Central Committee issued “Declaration of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army” and “People’s Liberation Army slogan,” which openly declared its strategic goal of seizing national power.5 Thereafter, 4 Renmin Ribao 人民日报 [People’s Daily] (Jin ji lu yu bianqu), September 14, 1947. 5 “Zhongguo renmin jiefang jun kouhao 中国人民解放军口号 [Slogan of PLA],” October 10, 1947, in “Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji  中共中央文件选集 [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee],” ed., State Archives (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1992), 16:551.

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related states would have to consider how to deal with a new state that had risen from violent social revolutions and its foreign policies. While historians have dived into us and Soviet historical archives and tried their best to tell logical stories one after another, it could be quite certain that today after years, all those us and Soviet policies toward China as had been told by historians in logical ways should be posed against such historical backdrop as the follows: the United States and the Soviet Union were staging severe confrontation in Europe and, coupled with the inertia of their past dealings with China, both of their leaders were unexcited and underprepared when corresponding to radically changing Chinese politics; their policies lacked careful articulation at best; the differences between them arose more from their respective history of China policies and relations with Kuomintang and cpc which eventually became differently timed policy adjustments of their countries. Such backdrop, once made clear, was closely related to subsequent development of East Asian international politics, in that during the interaction between New China’s foreign policy and the global Cold War system (and vice versa), there was frequent uncertainty and negative impact caused by subjective factors of decision-​makers, such as lack of experience, lack of attention, lack of knowledge preparation, and even blindness. To decision makers involved in it, there were indeed many unexperienced attempts and explorations in their perceptions. Turning back to cpc leaders, they were pressed into similar haste when dealing with foreign affairs, for they did not foresee the fast arrival of the victory of civil war and heavy responsibility of nation-​building, not to mention the associated foreign affairs issues which were in fact the most unfamiliar to them. Their various considerations and policies when dealing with the international Cold War system carried careful calculations to reach articulated goals, but against all kinds of complex, rapid, and sometimes violent domestic and foreign shocks, they were indeed also exploring, testing, and watching. On a deeper level, the so-​called “New China’s foreign policy” meant foreign policy during the overlap period of revolution and nation-​building. With an external world of the Cold War, it had to respond to sometimes severe external environment caused by the global strategic game between the United States and the Soviet Union. Internally, it faced all fundamental appeals of the transition period from revolution to nation-​building. These internal fundamental appeals also determined how Chinese would react to the external environment. If we define the transition period from the perspective of revolution to nation-​building, the PRC was at a special stage of building a modern

xii Preface nation-​state since the Xinhai Revolution of 1911. In resemblance to new nation-​states in the twentieth century, especially new nation-​states in Asia after the Second World War (wwii), China at this stage had some basic issues to solve that comprise of the following aspects. First, ensure sovereignty and territorial integrity, which as the most fundamental condition to national survival and development, should not be violated or harmed, or the threat they faced should not reach such degree that citizens residing in the state would widely feel insecure. Second, develop the economy and achieve social progress, which was also a basic condition of national survival in today’s world and which carried special historic importance to China. Third, achieve and protect national unity, which was undoubtedly an important driving force and goal of New China’s foreign policy. Fourth, construct core values of a society and form national identity, including recognition, acceptance, and even admiration of the public toward the new nation’s characteristics and basic image, as well as loyalty toward the nation and trust and confidence toward the nation’s basic institutions. After the wwii, all ruling parties of new states were faced with legitimacy challenges, partly because these ruling parties had obtained early support as they met public appeals toward national liberation and independent sovereignty during the revolutionary period; once such historic mission was achieved, however, whether they could provide a basic sense of security and necessary sense of pride, as well as meet increasing demand for national economic development and social progress for its citizens, became challenges for their legitimacy. The same story goes in China. Whether a ruling party could win legitimacy of power was related to solving those basic issues and responding to people’s basic appeals; any ideas and policies including foreign policies raised and implemented by the ruling party had to be able to solve or benefit solving those issues, which would then carry lasting, guiding impact. From such point of view, the moment the cpc seized national power and began nation-​building, it faced the historic problem of transitioning from a revolutionary party to a ruling party. And such problem turned out particularly hard to solve because the cpc was a revolutionary elite organization founded upon Lenin’s ideas of revolutionary organization and it shouldered the important task of completing political, social, and economic revolutions in a backward country. As it dealt with all the aforementioned challenges, it ran into the crucial mission of transforming itself. The depth of cpc leaders’ understanding of achieving such mission also directly linked to their understanding of China’s foreign relations. Objectively speaking, regardless of whether the Cold War existed China would be building a modern nation-​state and China’s foreign relations would

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have to comply with those basic appeals; the Cold War international system only led people to make unique choices. Taking a step further, this dictates that to research the relationship between the Cold War and New China’s foreign policy, two different aspects need to be addressed. One is the formation and development of New China’s confrontational relations with the United States; another is the formation and development of relations with the Soviet Union and other allies. In the realm defined by “foreign policy,” the latter relations had richer and more complicated content. History itself determines the content, structure, and process of historical analysis. To disregard or overlook, or even to try to cover up the historic content, complexity, and immense impact of New China’s relations with its allies would certainly disallow oneself from presenting a full picture of some key features of New China’s foreign policy. As the early stage of the Cold War coincided with cpc’s transition from revolution to nation-​building, the complex intertwining of domestic and foreign issues made it critical for cpc policy makers to understand foreign policies. Research of foreign policy at home and abroad have provided many case studies that proved that, in the field of foreign policy, due to factors such as insufficient preparation of specialized knowledge, lack of experience as well as insufficient information and limited timing, leaders often relied more on prior ideas and experience of domestic politics and made policies using their own perceptual framework. During the late revolution and early nation-​building period, when cpc leaders made foreign policies they often lacked special knowledge preparation and relevant information and faced rather short decision time, despite the fact that they paid great attention to foreign policy issues as, for example, that Mao Zedong (or Mao Tse-​tung in older writings) and Zhou Enlai (or Chou En-​lai in older writings) almost always conducted foreign policy themselves. Their world views, major experiences, and political acumen played a key role in foreign policy making. If one key word must be sought to summarize cpc leaders’ world views and major political experiences, it would be “revolution.” The generation of cpc leaders who determined the form and evolution of New China’s foreign policy almost all joined politics around the time of the First World War (WWI). In China, the period was called “the age of revolution.” China’s foreign relations since 1840 caused huge shocks, pains, and damages to China’s politics, economy, society, and culture. Continued political crises provoked a tide of revolts in the grassroots and reform activities in the upper circle, which merged into a trend of “revolution the must” in the early twentieth century and social atmosphere was intense and fierce just as dry wood that would burn at sparks of fire. As the famous poet Wen Yiduo wrote:

xiv Preface The twentieth century is a century of revolt. The appeal of “freedom” has given us a sharp weapon against authorities, and thus revolution and blood has become the feature of modern civilization.6 The epoch produced large crowds of revolutionaries who had a revolutionary mind and revolutionary passion, who increasingly believed in and pursued radical reforms, and who bore the hope that revolution would completely change the world and China. In those days, these communists almost all went through an intellectual journey in their political life:  from national salvage to revolution, from learning from the West to admiring the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, and finally placing faith in Leninism. Revolution was their final choice for national salvage as well as the core segment that linked their enterprise to faith in Leninism. Such collective memory of history, from the Opium War to the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, led these communists to increasingly believe that only through radical political and social revolution could they fully terminate China’s shameful position in the international community and even completely destroy the international system. They widely believed through experience of China’s modern social reforms and revolutions that China’s national liberation movement had to go together with China’s radical political and social revolutions; China’s future revolutionary movement would surely bear the double mission of political reform and national liberation, the goals of which would include creating whole new foreign relations and further striving to create a new type of international order in which China held a very important and respected position. Mao Zedong was their example and representative. In China’s twentieth-​ century political spectrum from reform to revolution, he did not at first take the side of radical reform, but subsequent political experience and intellectual development made “revolution” the core content of Mao’s ideology. When first taking the political stage, Mao believed that the world’s fundamentals were movement and change, and human history was an endless cycle of order and mess, success and demise, where “mess” and “demise” meant recreation of new history: “In all centuries, all nations engage in various revolutions, often washing off the old and brandishing with the new, which are major changes of life and death, success and demise.”7 On the other hand, world politics were full of

6 Wen Yiduo 闻一多, “Nüshen shidai zhi jingshen 女神时代之精神 [The spirit of goddess’ age],” in Wen Yiduo shi wen xuanji 闻一多诗文选集 [Selected poems and essays of Wen Yiduo] (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1955), 160. 7 Ibid., 201.

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upheavals and crises. “Lack of freedom, lack of equality, and great wars would persist as the heaven and the earth and never exhaust.”8 Mao particularly hated the dark and messy age surrounding China at the time, and hated any power that threw the Chinese nationality into oppression and shame. In his understanding, after WWI, “countries were bad to the extreme, humans were painful to the extreme, and the society was dark to the extreme.”9 During this period, Mao was also subject to complex influences of different social thoughts, but an outstanding and consistent feature of his thoughts was the compassion and admiration for almost any grassroots revolution happening in other countries and societies, and he believed that only through united grassroots movement would the unreasonable world order be destroyed. After WWI, disappointment and anger toward the major powers, as well as admiration for the Russian Bolshevik victory and grassroots revolutions around the world reinforced Mao Zedong’s inclination toward radical revolution from both directions. He believed that the world had been divided into two. One side was major powers shamelessly seeking selfish gains and deceiving and blackmailing each other at the Paris Peace Conference, which was lifeless and bloody; the other side was grassroots mass revolutions represented by Russian Bolshevism forming a world trend that was too strong to be stopped.10 As an idealistic, romantic and outspoken young intellectual, Mao was deeply influenced by radical thinkers in China. He believed that the world was entering “a new era of world revolutions,” in which the Chinese national liberation and social revolutionary movement was part of the worldwide revolutionary movement, and “transforming China” was closely associated with “transforming the world.” He believed that Chinese went for social revolution in China because it was easier for them to participate in revolution where they grew up, and the significance of it was to contribute to the world by standing on “the 8 9

10

Mao Zedong 毛泽东, “Lunli xue yuanli” pizhu 批注 [Comments on “Principles of Ethics”] (Liaoning: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1989), 184. Mao Zedong, “Minzhong de da lianhe 民众的大联合 [The great assembly of the masses],” July 21 & 26, August 4, 1919, in Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao (dang de chuangli shiqi) 中共党史教学参考资料（党的创立时期） [Teaching guide material for history of the cpc (the founding years of the party)], ed. the Library of Department of cpc History at Renmin University in China (Beijing:  Library of Department of cpc History at Renmin University of China, 1979), 124. Mao Zedong, “Minzhong de da lianhe (I),” July 14, 1919; “Minzhong de da lianhe (III),” August 4, 1919; “Zhadan bao ju 炸弹爆举 [Explosion of bombs],” July 14, 1919; “Buxu shiye zhuanzhi 不许实业专制 [Preventing autocracy of industries],” July 14, 1919, in Xiang jiang pinglun 湘江评论 [Xiang Jiang Review], July 14, July 21, August 4, 1919.

xvi Preface soil of ‘China.’ ”11 China’s revolutionary movement must eventually “join hands with liberated nations around the world.”12 As Mao dived into practices of social revolution, his thoughts became increasingly revolutionized and he eventually became a follower of Leninism. What made him turn to revolution was his experience in the summer of 1919 joining and organizing the campaign to expel militant Zhang Jingyao and the subsequent Hunan Autonomy Movement. The latter was his first time to participate in “nation-​ building,” namely to create an “autonomous” Hunan Republic through reform, but it failed. Mao Zedong reached a conclusion from the failed experience: China’s only solution was to adopt the most radical means of revolution. Mao Zedong began to actively comment and research on Russian Bolsheviks’ successful October seizure of power, and he developed an admiration for it. As he saw it, “Lenin used a million party members, built the unprecedented success of grassroots revolution, wiped out anti-​revolution party,” and by relying on the reliable party organization, “rose with a call, gave orders across the land, and without admiring the government, the labor and rural class occupying eighty or ninety percent of national population responded to the call. The Russian revolution owed its success to all these points.” He said that if China had such “full revolution,” he would go for it.13 He commented on Cai Hesen as such: “I see Russian revolution as a convenient modification when all means were exhausted and led to nowhere. It was not abandoning some better means and going only for such means of terror.”14 Mao said that since then he began to study Marxism and soon turned a communist. To be more exact, Mao in fact became a Chinese revolutionary who embraced Leninism, and accepting Lenin’s theories was to him more of catalyzing a new thought. “Imperialism is war,” “imperialism is the eve of proletarian revolution.” 11

Mao Zedong, “Zhi Zhou Shi Zhao 致周世钊 [To Zhou Shizhao],” March 14, 1920, in Mao Zedong zaoqi wengao 毛泽东早期文稿 [Mao Zedong’s early writings], eds. cpc Central Committee Literature Research Center and the Hunan Province Party Committee (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 2008), 474. 12 Mao Zedong, “Hunan jianshe de genben wenti—​ Hunan gonghe guo 湖南建设的根本问题—​湖南共和国 [The fundamental issue of developing Hunan: the Republic of Hunan],” in Mao Zedong zaoqi wengao [Mao Zedong’s early writings], 505. 13 Mao Zedong, “Da po meiyou jichu de da zhongguo jianshe xuduo de zhongguo cong Hu Nan zuo qi 打破没有基础的大中国建设许多的中国从湖南做起 [Start from Hunan to break apart the baseless whole China and build many Chinas],” September 5, 1920, in Mao Zedong zaoqi wengao [Mao Zedong’s early writings], 507–​508. 14 Mao Zedong, “Zhi Cai He Sen deng 致蔡和森等 [To Cai Hesen and others],” December 1, 1920, in Mao Zedong shu xin xuanji 毛泽东书信选集 [Selected letters of Mao Zedong], ed. cpc Central Committee Literature Research Center (Beijing:  Renmin chubanshe, 1983), 6.

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Lenin’s discourse was so close to the world vision in Mao Zedong’s mind and so compatible with Mao Zedong’s sense of crisis, that it provided a theorized explanation for the messy and dark world politics that he had sensed, and led his inclinations and scattered thoughts to gradually form a quite solid idea system. He could quickly accept and use the new discourse to describe the nature of world politics, in that after the WWI the general trend of world politics was still intense conflicts and confrontation, and the confronting parties were respectively “the oppressed class” represented by the Communist International and the “anti-​ revolution forces” represented by the League of Nations. In the bipolar world, the two forces were waging “the final fight.”15 In the structure of world politics dominated by the bipolar fight, the oppressed class and nations had no other choice but engaging in radical revolutions and adopting the “alignment with Russia” policy. In China, “whoever engages with imperialism would be considered as no friend by the people, no matter when.”16 If previously Mao had diverse and changing views of the world, now it settled on the only perspective: revolution. It needs to be pointed out that Mao’s understanding reflected the collective sense of the cpc. Such understanding of world politics logically led to more policy of world revolution than foreign policy. But it indeed provided the starting point and foundation of cpc leaders’ theoretical understanding of world politics. From the Great Revolution movement in the early 1920s to the showdown between Kuomintang and cpc after the wwii, the Chinese political arena presented stormy organized mass movement and large-​scale violent revolutions. Such fierce and spectacular phenomenon harbored revolutionary ideology, revolutionary passion and revolutionary social psychology. By this time, Mao had become a creator, leader, representative and admirer of such state. In his well-​ known philosophical writings, he raised revolution to the height of fundamental law of social movement, namely: In class society, revolution and revolutionary war are inevitable; otherwise a society could not accomplish its developmental leap or overthrow the violent ruling class and let the people obtain political power.17 15

16

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Mao Zedong, “Zhongguo shehui ge jieji de fenxi 中国社会各阶级的分析 [The analysis of classes in the Chinese society],” December 1, 1925, in Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong xuan ji 毛泽东选集 [Selected works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), 1:4. Mao Zedong, “Zhongguo guomin dang zhi fan feng zhanzheng xuanchuan dagang 中国 国民党之反奉战争宣传大纲 [The outline of propaganda against Manchurian warlord launched by Chinese Kuomintang Party],” Zhengzhi Zhoubao December 1, 1925. Mao Zedong, “Maodun lun 矛盾论 [On dichotomy],” August 1937, in Mao, Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], 1:334.

xviii Preface In all political fights, revolution was the fiercest and indispensable means of action, as it was “rebellion, with violent action of one class overthrowing another class.”18 Mao firmly believed that only revolution could create a new China, sweep off the shame cloaking China over a century, and further create a new international order of “world harmony.” Mao’s admiration for revolution was fundamentally associated with his understanding and identification of the character of Chinese nation. While he believed that the Chinese nation faced unprecedented crisis, he increasingly believed that the Chinese nation was capable and would eventually attain a new life through radical revolt.19 When he could quietly think through and express his historical views in Yan’an, Mao raised those obscure, crude and unsettled views to a theoretical level. In his discussion, the Chinese nation was a nation “with glorious revolutionary tradition,” including the people fighting against oppression of the ruling class and people of all nationalities “fighting against oppression of foreign nations, all lifting such oppression through means of revolt.”20 The highly positive comment on the Chinese nation’s past class revolutions and national revolutions became an important component of the revolutionary nationalism constructed by Mao. Although Mao’s theory about revolution increasingly matured and his tactical thinking gradually perfected, his longing and praise for revolution and the mental state of revolution were consistent and always palpable. He had a classic statement of the Marxism fundamentals as he understood it: “Marxism has thousands of theories, but one sentence could summarize them all: ‘Revolt is right.’ ” “According to this maxim, we rise to revolt, to fight, to build socialism.”21 That Mao used such language to explain the essence of Marxism was only partly because he was trying to use popular language to mobilize people to join revolution; the logic behind his language indeed quite accurately reflected Mao’s unique understanding of Marxism, namely that the fundamental feature

18

19 20

21

Mao Zedong, “Hunan nongmin yundong kaocha baogao 湖南农民运动考察报告 [Investigation report of the peasant movement in Hu Nan],” March 1927, in Mao, Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], 1:17. Mao Zedong, “Minzhong de da lianhe (III) [The great assembly of the people],” Xiang jiang pinglun, August 4, 1979. Mao Zedong, “Zhongguo geming he zhongguo gongchan dang 中国革命和中国共产党 [The Chinese revolution and Chinese Communist Party],” December 1939, in Mao, Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], 2:623. Mao Zedong, “Zai Yan’an gejie qingzhu si da lin liushi shouchen dahui shang de jianghua [Remarks at the celebration assembly of Stalin’s sixtieth birthday in Yan’an],” in Renmin ri bao [People’s Daily], December 20, 1939.

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of the theory was to advocate revolt against existing order and participation in complete revolution, as people would win the whole world while the cost would be no more than “lose chains on the neck.” In the final stage of winning the revolution, cpc leaders had shown their attention and support for revolutionary movements outside China’s borders. It was partly derived from the inner impetus of China’s revolutionary movement, which was the hope that China’s revolutionary victory would have huge impact on the whole world, or at least China’s neighboring regions. Since China’s revolution was part of world revolution, the victory of Chinese revolution should and must provoke major changes in the structure of international politics. Such impulsion and hope became a strong force that encouraged them to take major actions abroad. Description and analysis of any major foreign policy issue of this period should carefully consider such historical issue, that Mao and his generation had built long-​term admiration for revolution in the Chinese society, which heavily influenced New China’s foreign policy and it persisted over time. In summary, the interaction between the Cold War, revolution to nation-​ building, and revolutionary ideology provides the starting point, major keys and basic framework for describing and analyzing the historical process of the Cold War and the origins of New China’s foreign policy. In such interactive historical process, New China’s foreign policy took roots and evolved and gradually constructed a series of visions, vocabularies, and diplomatic behaviors, as well as some important features that had lasting impact. This book will follow time sequence and the above stated framework to unfold the picture of Chinese foreign policy from 1949 to 1955. The book consists of an introduction, four chapters with eleven sections, and a conclusion. The introduction mainly introduces the book’s analytical framework, proposing the basic elements and keys for understanding and analyzing the relationship between the Cold War and Chinese foreign policy during this period. Chapter 1 analyzes the process and historical reasons of cpc’s choice to ally with the Soviet Union and to confront the United States around the time of founding of the nation as well as its impact on New China’s foreign policy. Chapter 2 describes major decision-​making on the “Aid Vietnam to Resist France” policy and participation in the Korean War after founding of the nation, and analyzes the historic background of China’s military actions in Indochina and on the Korean Peninsula and its impact on the over spill of the Cold War to East Asia. Chapter 3 describes the three major diplomatic moves in China’s neighborhood between 1953 and 1955, including the Korean armistice, restoration of peace in Indochina, and settlement of the first Taiwan Straight crisis and opening of ambassadorial meetings between China and the United States. It analyzes the internal connections among the three events and illustrates the

xx Preface essence and features of China’s neighborhood policies. Chapter 4 discusses key adjustment of China’s foreign policy in July 1954, including China’s decision to develop nuclear weapons and its active diplomatic engagement all over Asia, which led China’s foreign policy to enter a new phase. Many events in these chapters are well remembered by Chinese and richly discussed by international and domestic academia, thus no detailed introduction here. The contribution of this book is to place those separately studied important events in a historical framework that has an inner mechanism of connection and operation and that reveals the external and internal conditions that have caused these continuous events. Of course, to do so requires verification of those related historical events in as much detail as possible, and by diving into new archives and new historical facts, it supplements or modifies some conclusions from past research. My sincere thanks to the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Institute for European, Russia and Eurasian Studies of George Washington University, and the Cold War International History Research Center of East China Normal University. Their enormous support and help have offered me an opportunity to visit these institutions, gather materials and participate in intellectual exchanges. My special thanks to the selfless help of Professor Shen Zhihua, Chair of the Cold War International History Research Center of East China Normal University, who have provided me with numerous and priceless archives. My thanks to Editor Xu Siyan of the Chinese Social Sciences Publisher for her enormous help in publishing the book, and to Dr. Chen Changwei for his important help during the completion stage of the book. My thanks to Zhong Yijing, Niu Yue, He Rui, Li Danyang, Xiao Zhensu, Liao Yuanxin, Lin Wenxin and Qinyi for their help in translating the book into English. Last but not least, thanks to my family and all friends and students who have provided various kinds of help, and I return their favor with this book. Niu Jun

Translation and Acronyms The First World War (WWI) The Second World War (wwii) 中共     Communist Party of China (cpc)

国民党    (Kuomintang) 中共中央    cpc Central Committee 苏共     Communist Party of the Soviet Union (cpsu) 南共     Communist Party of Yugoslavia (cpy) 越共     Communist Party of Vietnam (cpv) 意共     PCI 政协                 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 欧洲九国共产党和工人党情报局 the Information Bureau of Communist and

Workers’ Parties of nine European states (Cominform)

共产国际    Communist International (Comintern) 东北局   Northeast Bureau 第四野战军 the Fourth Field Army 总前委     General Frontier Committee 八路军      No.8 Army 朝鲜人民军      Korean People’s Army 华东军区    East China Military Area Command 总参     the General Staff 总参谋长    Chief of Staff 军管会   Military Administrative Commission 中央军委    Central Military Commission 越南劳动党 Vietnamese Workers Party 政委     political commissar

Chapter 1

Alliance and Confrontation On November 14, 1948, immediately after the cpc military occupied Shenyang, cpc leaders declared: “With one more year or so, we should be able to fully knock down the reactionary Kuomintang government.”1 Since then they started the practices and consideration of the future new regime’s foreign policy. It is therefore important to summarize their early ideas about world politics, including their views about the center of world politics, the characteristics of the us-​Soviet Cold War, the relationship between the Chinese revolution and the us-​Soviet Cold War, and the idea that in the Cold War structure cpc’s foreign policy was dominated by policies toward the United States and the Soviet Union. The PRC’s foreign relations had “natural connections” with the cpc revolution as in essence they were meant to achieve revolutionary goals from the beginning. Many things would certainly prevail in the foreign policy making of Chinese leaders and thus roughly determine the direction of evolution of Sino-​u s and Sino-​Soviet relations, including the revolutionary mindset, fundamental theories about revolutionary movement, the unique processes and patterns of large-​scale mass mobilization and fierce struggles in the final phase of revolution, and Chinese leaders’ understanding of political and social solutions as deeply revealed by these processes and patterns. In practice, the cpc Central Committee had connected with the outside world before the founding of New China. Certainly, it was mainly relations with the Soviet Union and the Communist International, with high-​level secret exchanges with the Soviet Union already taking place before the founding of New China. But on top of those, the cpc had on-​and-​off relations with some foreign nations and revolutionary organizations, and during the anti-​ Japanese war had exchanges with American and British establishments in China. Particularly, around the end of the Second World War, cpc leaders had dealt with an American ambassador and an American presidential envoy in sequence, Patrick J. Hurley and George C. Marshall, and had held secret talks with American ambassador John L. Stuart before the founding of New China. 1 “Zhonggong zhongyang fuze ren ping zhongguo junshi xingshi 中共中央负责人评中国军 事形势 [Comments on China’s military situation by leaders of the cpc Central Committee],” November 14, 1947, in Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao (Jiefang zhanzheng shiqi) [Teaching guide material for history of the cpc (the civil war period)], 2:311.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | DOI:10.1163/​9 789004369078_​0 02

2 Chapter 1 Although these interactions were far from rich, they left strong traces in the cpc leaders’ mind, and influenced the structure and staff organization of Chinese establishments abroad. With such complicated starting point in history, it is necessary to discuss why New China’s relations with the United States and the Soviet Union headed into two extremes, and indeed, the Sino-​Soviet alliance and Sino-​u s confrontation were the accumulated result of a chain of historical events. While doing so would not necessarily prove that without the following series of concrete and even coincidental events, New China’s foreign policy would look otherwise, it could still be reasonably imagined that the arrangement of New China’s foreign relations might possibly avoid such intensity and extremity.

Section 1: As the Iron Curtain Descends

On March 5, 1946, several separate events took place in Chongqing and Yan’an of China, Fulton and Washington of the United States, and Moscow of the Soviet Union. These events proved to be not only significant but closely interrelated. Simply put, postwar interactions and turns of relationships among the four parties—​the United States, the Soviet Union, the Kuomintang, and the CCP—​evolved from these events on this particular day. On this day, in Fulton, us, accompanied by American President Harry Truman, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill gave a speech titled “the Sinews of Peace” at Westminster College. The speech was broadcasted on radioall over the us and Great Britain. Churchill claimed in his speech that the postwar world was facing “two giant marauders:”  “war” and “tyranny.” He said: “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent,” and without immediate action taken, “catastrophe may overwhelm us all.”2 The Cold War was unveiled from then. On this day, in Washington, DC, the us State Department sent a telegram to George F. Kennan, chargé d’affaires of the American Embassy in Moscow, to make him clarify with the Soviet leaders that the Americans hope China and the Soviet Union not to resume their talks over economic issues in Northeast China until after the takeover of the region by the Kuomintang government.3 2 Cited from Editorial Committee, ed., Zhan hou shijie lishi chang bian 1946 nian [A Long chronicle of world history after wwii 1946] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1976), 1 (2):44–​50. 3 “The Secretary of State to the Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan),” Washington, March 5, 1946, 8 p.m., FRUS, 1946, Vol. 10, the Far East: China, 1114.

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On this day, in Chongqing, China’s substitute capital, the Kuomintang government issued an open notice to the Soviet government rejecting Soviet economic claims in Northeast China. The Kuomintang government finally determined not to solve economic disputes with the Soviet Union through negotiations. On this day, in Moscow, the Soviet Union formally concluded its talks with Iran with no agreement on withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran. The United States sent a note to the Soviet Foreign Ministry the next day, stating that the United States “could not remain indifferent” to the Soviet actions that violated the Tehran agreement and the United Nations Charter.4 The us battleship USS Missouri soon received an order to depart for Istanbul along with a task fleet. On this day, in Yan’an, China, us special envoy George Marshall got on a plane with Zhou Enlai to inspect ceasefire in Wuhan. Mao Zedong and others came to the airport and exchanged a few handshakes with him in farewell. Marshall commented to the Chinese Communist leaders that “our meeting will be significant in history.” Mao Zedong replied with “sincere appreciation” for his “help to Chinese people to strive for peace, democracy, solidarity and unity.”5 Shortly after Marshall took off, Liu Shaoqi drafted a directive to the Northeast Bureau stating that conflicts between Kuomintang and the cpc in Northeast China “will continue for a while,” and not until an agreement was reached between the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union would “conciliation becomes possible” between Kuomintang and cpc.6 For sure, the Chinese Communist leaders were yet to learn about the events taking place elsewhere in the world on the day of March 5. Nor were they aware that the soon-​to-​be famous Kennan had sent an 8,000-​word “Long Telegram” to Washington two weeks earlier urging the us government to contain the Soviet Union. A new form of world politics, the Cold War, was brewing mature and closing in and would soon affect the situation in China. At the same time, the cpc was competing for control over North China and 4 Cited from Li Chunfang 李春放. Yilang weiji yu lengzhan de qiyuan (1941–​ 1947) 伊朗危机与冷战的起源 [The Iran crisis and the origins of the Cold War (1941–​1947)] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2001), 277. 5 Pang Xianzhi 逄先知, ed. Mao Zedong nianpu 1893–​1949 毛泽东年谱 [Chronicle of Mao Zedong 1893–​1949] (Beijing:  Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, renmin chubanshe, 1993), 3:58. 6 CCCPC Party History Research Center 中央党史研究室, ed. Liu shaoqi nianpu 1898–​1969 刘少奇年谱 [Chronicle of Liu Shaoqi 1898–​1969] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996), 2:24–​25.

4 Chapter 1 Northeast China, and it developed into confrontation and cooperation with the United States and the Soviet Union respectively, which bore strategic significance. In retrospect, from the end of 1945 to March 5, 1946, the Kuomintang and cpc seemed to possess an opportunity of reaching another agreement to avoid civil war, because on the one hand, us and Soviet policies towards China still had room for negotiation, and on the other hand, both Kuomintang and cpc found it desirable to pursue a political solution since the bottomline was that neither side held a sure winning hand if the war broke immediately. Of course, any opportunity depends on special conditions in specific time and space. To discuss the issue from the Cold War-​China perspective, the core was to explore the relationship between the outbreak of the Chinese civil war and the outbreak of the us-​Soviet Cold War, and how the cpc Central Committee perceived and took advantage of the rise of the Cold War and the changes in us and Soviet policies. These are crucial to the understanding of Chinese foreign policies before and after the founding of New China, as many events taking place together over this period made Mao and other cpc leaders sway in their perceptions of world politics. After the Chongqing talks and the signing of the “October 10 agreement,” despite fierce fights between Kuomintang and cpc in North China the cpc remained convinced that the ensuing six months would be a transition towards peace, and “peace, democracy, solidarity and unity” would eventually come into reality.7 The reason was that they continued to firmly believe at this point that “the current core problem of the world is the us-​Soviet rivalry, which is reflected in China as Chiang Kai-​shek -​c pc rivalry”; us-​Soviet reconciliation would be the main trend of postwar world politics, and Kuomintang and cpc must also seek reconciliation.8 On December 15, 1945, Truman issued a statement on America’s China policy which called for peace talks between Kuomintang and cpc, and he named the well-​respected Marshall as his special envoy to China for mediation. cpc leaders quickly decided to resume talks with Kuomintang and saw substantial 7 “Zhongyang guanyu guodu shiqi de xingshi he renwu de zhishi 中央关于过渡时期的形势 和任务的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee on the situation and tasks of the interim period],” October 20, 1945, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuan ji [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee], 15:371–​372. 8 “Zhongyang guanyu dui mei jiang douzheng celüe de zhishi 中央关于对美蒋斗争策略的 指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee on strategy of fighting against the United States and Chiang Kai-​shek],” November 28, 1945, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuan ji [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee], 15:455–​456.

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progress possible.9 The cpc Central Committee called a special meeting on us policy towards China, the participants of which agreed that all signs suggested American support for Chiang Kai-​shek was severely constrained. On December 19, the cpc Central Committee issued what was named “neutralizing America” policy in party instructions. The policy stated: America has decided against direct engagement in the Chinese civil war or aid to Chiang Kai-​shek to reunite China by force; instead it has decided to assist China’s peaceful reunification. All these changes in us policies are in the interest of Chinese people’s present struggle for democracy and peace. As a result, all troops should seek conciliatory relations with the American military, be friendly to American troops and personnel stationed in China, be hospitable to American personnel in cpc-​controlled areas, and offer help to American journalists in cpc-​controlled areas to conduct free interviews and coverage which would help them obtain a friendly impression.10 The next day, Wang Ruofei, cpc delegate in Chongqing, was instructed to visit the American embassy in China and express support on behalf of the cpc Central Committee for Truman’s statement and its welcome for Marshall’s mediation in China.11 Four days later when the new round of Kuomintang-​c pc talks opened, Zhou Enlai and other cpc negotiators pursued quite positive cooperation with Marshall, and Marshall indeed pushed the talks into unprecedented progress. His measures in early mediation, as well as Chiang Kai-​shek’s major, unforeseen concession, were key factors in reaching two agreements:  immediate ceasefire between Kuomintang and cpc, and the hosting of a political consultative conference. On February 25, Kuomintang and cpc further reached agreement on “the Plan of Military Reorganization and Realignment of cpc Troops into the Republic of China’s Military.” Such progress seemed to confirm 9

10

11

“Jun wei guanyu baowei zhangjiakou, chengde de bushu 军委关于保卫张家口、 承德的部署 [The Central Military Commission’s military deployment on defense of Zhangjiakou and Chengde],” December 29, 1945, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuan ji [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee], 15:494–​495, 526. “Zhongyang guanyu meiguo dui hua zhengce biandong he wo dang duice de zhishi 中 央关于美国对华政策变动和我党对策的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee on us policy changes toward China and our party’s response strategy],” in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuan ji [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee], 15:494–​495. “Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton, Commanding Officer of the Yenan Observer Group, to Lieutenant General Albert C.  Wedemeyer,” Yenan, December 20, 1945, FRUS, 1945 Vol. 7, the Far East: China, 794.

6 Chapter 1 the previous judgment of the cpc Central Committee, and cpc leaders thought of Marshall as playing a fair hand, for not only was the political consultative conference acceptable, but also the plan on military reorganization had quite some value.12 Some cpc leaders had quite optimistic views believing that “a new phase of peace and democracy has begun.”13 Inside the cpc, some good feelings were also developed about Marshall’s mediation and some cpc leaders even sincerely believed that with Marshall’s help China would enter “a new phase of peace and democracy.”14 But Mao apparently held less faith in Americans. As he saw it, Marshall’s true intention requires further test, especially to what extent the United States would be willing and able to control Chiang Kai-​shek. cpc’s relations with the Soviet Union at this stage were a little more complicated. When cpc troops entered Northeast China in the early postwar period, they at one point received secret support and encouragement from the Soviet troops in Northeast China. But cooperation between the two sides was far from stable, because the Soviets were more attentive to the Kuomintang government as they had special concern of preventing American troops in North China from entering Northeast China, and thus the Soviets were not ready to offer support to cpc troops in the Northeast. The cpc Central Committee must have somewhat understood the Soviet policy. During the Kuomintang-​c pc talks in early 1946, cpc leaders often played with the idea of having the Soviet Union at the table, referring to it frankly in inner circles as “the so-​called policy of 12

13

14

Zhou Enlai, “Zhonggong yuan zai gongzheng de jichu shang tong meiguo he guomindang jixu hezuo 中共愿在公正的基础上同美国和国民党继续合作 [cpc is willing to continue cooperation with the United States and Kuomintang on the basis of justice],” January 31, 1946, in CCCPC Party History Research Center and Nanjing Municipal Party Committee 中央党史研究室、南京市党委, eds. Zhou Enlai yijiu si liu nian tanpan wen xuan 周恩来一九四六年谈判文选 [Selected documents of Zhou Enlai in negotiation in 1946] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996), 92–​94; Xin hua ribao 新华日 报 [Xinhua Daily], Chongqing, February 13, 1946; “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu yu guomindang tanpan jundui zhengbian de fangzhen de zhishi 中共中央关于与国民 党谈判军队整编的方针的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee on the strategy of negotiation with Kuomintang on army reorganization],” February 8, 1946. Liu Shaoqi, “Shiju wenti de baogao 时局问题的报告 [Report on the current situation],” January 31, 1946, in Zhonggong dangshi cankao ziliao ( jiefang zhanzheng shiqi) [Teaching guide material on history of cpc (the civil war period)], 1:120. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu muqian xingshi yu renwu de zhishi [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee on the current situation and tasks],” February 2, 1946, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuan ji [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee], 15:62–​67.

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playing one barbarian state against the other”; they also conceived inviting the Soviet Union to the talks on Northeast China as “Marshall of the Northeast.”15 But as they became concerned that the Soviet Union might demand the cpc to “make further concessions to the Kuomintang,” they no longer invited the Soviet Union to participate.16 As Kuomintang-​c pc talks made major breakthroughs, the relationship between the Kuomintang government and the Soviet Union embarked on a violent swing, which was most directly caused by America’s direct interference in the Sino-​Soviet talks on economic issues in Northeast China. As the Kuomintang-​c pc talks went smoothly, Marshall believed it was time to encourage the Kuomintang government not to concede to the Soviet Union, and he advised Truman to take more actions and force the Soviet military out of Northeast China.17 On February 9, the United States sent separate notes to the Kuomintang government and the Soviet government, opposing that the existing talks only involved China and the Soviet Union in disposing Japanese assets in Northeast China.18 Shortly afterward, the United States and the United Kingdom made the Yalta secret agreement public, and public opinions in both countries began condemning the new excessive claims raised by the Soviet Union in Northeast China, as well as the scheme of the Soviet military not to withdraw from Northeast China just as in Iran.

15

16

17 18

“Zhongyang guanyu tiyi yingguo sulian canjia guo gong tanpan wenti de zhishi 中央 关于提议英国苏联参加国共谈判问题的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee on proposal of inviting the United Kingdom and the Soviet United to join the Kuomintang-​c pc negotiation],” CCCPC Archives Bureau, January 3, 1946. “Zhongyang guanyu dongbei tingzhan tanpan qingkuang zhi dongbei ju dian 中央关 于东北停战谈判情况致东北局电 [Telegram from the cpc Central Committee to the Northeast Bureau on cease-​fire talks in Northeast China],” February 12, 1946, in CCCPC United Front Work Department and CCCPC Archives Bureau 中央统战工作部、中 央档案馆, eds. Zhonggong zhongyang jiefang zhanzheng shiqi tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuan bian 中共中央解放战争时期统一战线文件选编 [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee on united front during the civil war period] (Beijing:  Dang’an chubanshe, 1988), 77–​78. “General Marshall to President Truman,” Chungking, 9 February 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol.9, the Far East: China, 427–​429. “Hongjun cong manzhou ban zou ‘zhanli pin’ 红军从满洲搬走‘战利品’ [the Soviet Red Army takes ‘trophy’ from Manchuria],” in Zhong mei guanxi ziliao huibian 中美关系资 料汇编 [Collected documents of Sino-​u s relations], ed., Shijie zhishi chubanshe 世界知 识出版社 (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1957), 1:617; “The Secretary of State to the Charge in the Soviet Union [Kennan],” Washington, March 5, 1946, 8 p.m., FRUS, 1946, Vol.10, the Far East: China, 1114.

8 Chapter 1 Chiang Kai-​shek was both attentive and sensitive enough to the change in us policy. He immediately instructed the Northeast Administration to “only limit, and not expand” economic cooperation with the Soviet Union.19 The Kuomintang delegates thus rejected many proposals by the Soviet Union. On March 16, the second plenary meeting of the Sixth Kuomintang Congress passed a specific act demanding “effective negotiation” to prompt “an immediate withdrawal” of the Soviet military in Northeast China.20 The once thin atmosphere of assuage between China and the Soviet Union soon dissipated. Sino-​Soviet economic talks led to nowhere, and almost at the same time tensions between Kuomintang and the cpc suddenly rose in Northeast China. Mao also remained attentive and sensitive to the changes in international environment. On March 15, the cpc Politburo held a meeting on the situation of Northeast China upon Soviet withdrawal from Shenyang, which marked a complete shift of policies of the cpc Central Committee. Mao stated during the meeting that no more concession should be made to Chiang Kai-​shek. He criticized the false illusions within the party about Chiang Kai-​shek and expressed his discontent towards the Soviet Union for always requesting the cpc Central Committee to concede. Most notably, he made a series of unique statements about the rapidly changing world environment. He believed that 19

20

“Jiang weiyuan zhang zhi zhang jia ao zhuren weiyuan zhishi dui su tanpan dongbei jingji hezuo wenti fang’an dian, minguo san shi wu nian yi yue er shi yi ri 蒋委员长致 张嘉璈主任委员指示对苏谈判东北经济合作问题方案电，民国三十五年一月 二十一日 [Telegram from Generalissimo Chiang to Chairman Zhang Jia’ao: instruction on the negotiation plan with the Soviet Union on economic cooperation in Northeast China, January 21, thirty-​fifth year of Republic of China]”; “Jiang zhuxi zhi zhang jia’ao zhuren weiyuan gao yi dui su jingji hezuo bu yi tai kuan han, minguo san shi wu nian yi yue er shi liu ri 蒋主席致张嘉璈主任委员告以对苏经济合作不宜太宽函，民国 三十五年一月二十六日 [Letter from President Chiang to Chairman Zhang Jia’ao: economic cooperation with the Soviet Union should not be too wide, January 26, thirty-​fifth year of Republic of China],” in Qing Xiaoyi 秦孝仪, ed., Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chu bian: zhan hou zhongguo 中华民国重要史料初编-​战后中国 [A initial collection of crucial documents of Republic of China: China after wwii] (Taipei: Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang dang shi weiyuan hui, 1981), 7(1): 417–​418, 420–​421. “Dui sulian ti chu kangyi, yanzhong jiaoshe xianqi chetui qi dongbei zhujun 对苏联提 出抗议，严重交涉限期撤退其东北驻军 [Protest to the Soviet Union for severely interfering with the withdraw of its troops in Northeast China within deadline]”; “Duiyu waijiao baogao zhi jueyi an 对于外交报告之决议案 [Resolution on the report of foreign affairs],” March 16, 1946, in Rong Mengyuan 荣孟源, ed., Zhongguo guomindang lici daibiao dahui ji zhongyang quan hui ziliao 中国国民党历次代表大会及中央全会 资料 [Documents of all People’s Congress and central plenary sessions of Kuomintang] (Shanghai: Guangming ri bao chubanshe, 1985), 1049.

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world politics were determined by three important factors:  First, the defeat of Germany, Italy, and Japan paved way for revolutionary activities; Second, “residual forces” of Germany, Italy, and Japan, together with “Fascist-​friendly forces” in the United States and the United Kingdom, were the “main opponents today” who would continue to fight against the Soviet Union and the revolutions “and plan on bringing the Third World War”; Third, within the United States and the United Kingdom there were fractures, because like the ordinary people, the bourgeoisie also had a “Soviet-​and communist-​friendly” element. Therefore, as Mao pointed out, the cpc should pursue a course of uniting the people as well as the center and the left of the bourgeoisie while fighting “the anti-​revolutionaries of the bourgeoisie.” He criticized that after signing the political consultative agreement, some in the cpc leadership forgot about the anti-​revolutionary side of Chiang Kai-​shek, which he said was “very dangerous.”21 Participants of the meeting agreed that at least in Northeast China, the fight against Kuomintang should be strengthened. The meeting adopted “cpc Central Committee’s Instructions about the Current Situation and Actions, which stated that once the Soviet military withdraws from Shenyang, “conflicts between Kuomintang and cpc in Northeast China will ensue.” The cpc troops should make war preparations in Northeast China and at the same time continue to “pay attention to winning support of Americans,” because the Kuomintang government is “instigating us-​Soviet conflicts.”22 The same day, Mao sent a telegram to Zhou Enlai in Chongqing, arguing that the Soviets in Chongqing were being too weak and “don’t fully listen to them.”23 When almost all politicians believed the Soviet Union was too tough, Mao saw them as not only weak, but “too” weak. This specific reaction he made towards the Soviet Union during the initial phase of the Cold War was diametrically opposed to others. The most direct consequence of deteriorating us-​Soviet relations was the immediate escalation of conflicts between Kuomintang and cpc in Northeast China, and it spiraled out of control. The impact on the policies of the cpc Central Committee was almost decisive. According to the plan of cpc leaders, after the anti-​Japanese war the cpc must obtain “favorable status” or even 21 22

23

Pang, ed., Mao zedong nian pu (1893–​1949) [Chronicle of Mao Zedong (1893–​1949)], 3:61. “Zhongyang guanyu muqian jushi ji duice de zhishi [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee on the current situation and cpc’s strategy],” March 15, 1946, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuan ji [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee], 16:92–​95. Pang, ed., Mao zedong nian pu (1893–​1949) [Chronicle of Mao Zedong (1893–​1949)], 3:60.

10 Chapter 1 “autonomy status” in North China and Northeast China.24 However, whatever status the cpc obtained in the Northeast would have to be conditioned upon a us-​Soviet accommodation.25 They worried that even if they could defeat Kuomintang troops in the Northeast, the us military “would still likely enter Northeast China.”26 Warnings from the Soviet side about how a civil war in the Northeast would “tempt the us military to enter Northeast China” undoubtedly worsened their worries.27 They believed, “the Soviet Union would not assist us in fighting the civil war in the Northeast, but could assist us to obtain concession from Chiang”;28 on the other hand, as long as the United States believed that the cpc had no intention of exclusively occupying Northeast China, it would not oppose a peaceful resolution in Northeast China.29 24

25

26 27

28

29

“Zhongyang guanyu guodu shiqi de xingshi he renwu de zhishi [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee on the situation and tasks for the interim period],” Octorber 20, 1945; “Zhongyang guanyu quanli kongzhi dongbei ju zhi jiangjun denglu zhuolu gei dongbei ju de zhishi 中央关于全力控制东北拒止蒋军登陆着陆给东北局的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to Northeast Bureau on controlling Northeast China with full strength and stopping Chiang’s army from landing],” October 28,1945, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuan ji [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee], 15:388–​389. “Zhongyang guanyu dongbei gongzuo fangzhen yu renwu gei dongbei ju de zhishi 中 央关于东北工作方针与任务给东北局的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to Northeast Bureau on the strategy and tasks of Northeast China],” December 7, 1945, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuan ji [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee], 15:465–​466. Ibid. “Peng zhen guanyu youren jinggao dongbei jue buneng da 彭真关于友人警告东北绝 不能打 [Peng Zhen on a friend’s warning that combat must not be launched in Northeast China],” January 26, 1946, Peng Zhen zhuan Editorial Committee, ed., Peng Zhen nian pu 1902–​1997 彭真年谱 [Chronicle of Pengzhen 1902–​1997] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2002), 1:362. “Zhongyang guanyu caiqu heping fangfa li qiu jiejue dongbei gei chongqing daibiao tuan de zhishi中央关于采取和平方法力求解决东北给重庆代表团的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to delegation in Chongqing on settling Northeast China through peaceful means],” January 26, 1946, in Zhonggong zhongyang jiefang zhanzheng shiqi tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuan bian [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee on united front during the civil war period], 52–​53. “Zhongyang guanyu muqian dongbei gongzuo de fangzhen wenti gei dongbei ju de zhishi [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to Northeast Bureau on the current strategy of work on Northeast China],” January 26, 1946; “Zhongyang guanyu caiqu heping fangfa li qiu jiejue dongbei gei chongqing daibiao tuan de zhishi [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to delegation in Chongqing on settling Northeast China through peaceful means],” January 26, 1946, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuan ji [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee], 16:57–​58, 53.

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One thing to be emphasized was that the cpc already had a strategic interest to protect in Northeast China, for the cpc military and political personnel had reached three hundred thousand in the Northeast, and “without a bunch of medium and small cities under control as base areas, such large military could not survive.” But the problem was that the Kuomintang military had convened five high-​capacity forces in the south of Northeast China. Facing the superior forces of the Kuomintang, Mao came closer to the view that only military defeat of Kuomintang would force the Kuomintang government to recognize cpc’s presence in the Northeast, or otherwise even there the cpc enjoyed no status.30 Therefore, although cpc leaders viewed us-​Soviet accommodation as critical, in reality the cpc military had to stage a military counter offensive as long as the Kuomintang government held on to the policy of full occupation of Northeast China. Having theretofore stopped aid to the cpc, and unwilling to take part in the talks solving Northeast China, the Soviet Union had only one means remaining to influence the cpc, which was to claim the possibility of direct us intervention. But the long-​term viability of such cause was highly questionable. By then the cpc Central Committee had realized that further concession would not only hurt the strategic interest already obtained, but even “cause disputes within the party.” The cpc troops in Northeast China had long held tough stances. They not only solidly opposed concessions to the Kuomintang military, but also felt repugnant toward Soviet demands of their withdrawal from their stations, to the extent that they would spare no cost fighting against the Soviet military, “even at the cost of deaths of all troops.”31 As cpc leaders told the negotiating delegation in Chongqing, the views of the Northeast Bureau were “very far from” that of Yan’an and the Chongqing delegation and that “they were very ambitious.” Meanwhile, the cpc Central Committee increasingly leaned toward the view that “taking a rather hard line is beneficial.”32 In addition, the presence of the Soviet military in the Northeast also made the United States and Chiang “both concerned.”33 30 31 32 33

Ibid. Peng Zhen zhuan Editorial Committee, ed., Peng Zhen nian pu 1902–​1997 [Chronicle of Pengzhen 1902–​1997], 1:362. Ibid, 1:386. “Zhonggongguanyu muqian dongbei wenti de tanpan fangzhen gei dongbei ju he zhonggong fu yu tanpan daibiao tuan de zhishi 中央关于目前东北问题的谈判方针给东 北局和中共赴渝谈判代表团的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to Northeast Bureau and cpc delegation to Chongqing talks on the current negotiation strategy of the Northeast China issue],” March 13, 1946, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuan ji [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee], 16:89–​91.

12 Chapter 1 In the early half of March, the Soviet military began an immediate withdrawal from Northeast China. Due to tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Sino-​Soviet background and the stalled talks, the Soviet military decided to support the cpc to control northern Manchuria. They suggested that cpc troops could “stage a big fight” at Changchun Road and assisted cpc troops in occupying Changchun, Harbin, and Qiqihar.34 The cpc Central Committee immediately seized the opportunity. On March 24, the cpc Central Committee instructed the Northeast Bureau to control north Manchuria: “Put in full efforts, at all cost, to control Changchun and Harbin as well as all of China Eastern Railway, and fight Chiang military to occupy those spots.”35 In light of the Soviet Union’s past caprices, the cpc Central Committee warned the Northeast Bureau to make sure to communicate clearly, since “in the future when the Soviet Union sought to solve economic cooperation issues (with the Kuomintang government), it might again show wooing gestures toward Chiang.”36 34

35

36

“Zhongyang guanyu kongzhi changchun ha’erbin ji zhongdong lu baowei bei man gei dongbei ju de zhishi 中央关于控制长春，哈尔滨及中东路保卫北满给东北的指 示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to Northeast Bureau on controlling Changchun, Harbin, and China Eastern Railway and protecting North Manchuria],” March 24, 1946, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuan ji [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee], 16:100–​101; “Ke ba wo bu zhan shenyang bu duan dianyuan zuowei tong guomindang tanpan ziben 可把我不占沈阳不断电源作为同国民党谈 判资本 [We can use no occupation of Shenyang and no cutoff of electricity as the chips of negotiation with the Kuomintang],” March 18, 1946; “Su xiang su fang jiaoshe lizheng wo jieguan chang, ha, qi 速向苏方交涉力争我接管长，哈，齐 [Immediately talk to the Soviet Union to try to let us take over Chanchun, Harbin, and Qiqihar],” March 26, 1946; “Peng zhen guanyu su jun chetui riqi zhi li, huang dian 彭真关于苏军撤退日期 致李，黄电 [Telegram from Peng Zhen to Li and Huang on the date of Soviet troops withdrawal],” April 3, 1946, in Peng Zhen nian pu 1902–​1997 [Chronicle of Pengzhen 1902–​1997], 1:396, 402. “Zhongyang guanyu kongzhi changchun ha’erbin ji zhongdong lu baowei bei man gei dongbei ju de zhishi [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to Northeast Bureau on controlling Changchun, Harbin, and China Eastern Railway and protecting North Manchuria],” March 24, 1946; “Zhongyang guanyu dongbei tingzhan qian jianjue baowei zhanlue yaodi gei lin biao, peng zhen deng de zhishi 中央关于东北停战前坚决保卫 战略要地给林彪、彭真等的指示 [The cpc Central Committee’s instruction to Lin Biao and Peng Zhen on resolutely defending strategic points before ceasefire in Northeast China],” March 25, 1946, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuan ji [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee], 16:100–​103. “Zhongyang guanyu dongbei wenti de zhishi [Instructon from the cpc Central Committee on the Northeast China issue],” March 5, 1946, in Peng Zhen nian pu (1902–​1997) [Chronicle of Pengzhen (1902–​1997)], 1:382–​383.

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On April 18, three days after the Soviet withdrawal of troops from Changchun, the cpc troops seized the city. Shortly after, they occupied Harbin and Qiqihar. The Kuomintang government also felt confident about controlling north Manchuria. On April 1, Chiang Kai-​shek made a speech claiming that the Northeast “must retain sovereignty,” and nobody should hijack the government under the pretext of diplomatic difficulty.37 The Kuomintang military then launched attacks on the defending cpc troops in Si Ping. Ferocious fighting in Si Ping lasted a month until the cpc troops pulled out of Si Ping and Kuomintang military marched north to capture Changchun and control all areas south of the entire Songhua River. The military clash between Kuomintang and cpc in Northeast China set off the fuse and soon exploded into a full-​scale civil war. To cpc leaders, their largest gain from dealing with us-​Soviet relations in Northeast China would be no other than the conclusion that the United States was impossible to conduct direct military intervention. More significantly, cpc leaders also realized they could make full use of the disputes between the United States and the Soviet Union in practice. During the initial stage of Marshall’s mediation in China, cpc leaders believed they could take advantage of the us-​Soviet disputes to influence Marshall, for while they showed acceptance for us mediation, they also raised that Soviet participation in the mediation would “bring more benefits and less setbacks.” In a telegram they sent to Zhou Enlai in the midst of the Chongqing talks, they directly referred to China’s traditional “playing barbarians against each other” policy, namely, “China had long depended on several countries restraining each other to maintain its independence, as was the so-​called policy of playing barbarian states against another, for if China had been controlled by one strong state, it would have long been dead,” and thus “it would be better if the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union could participate.”38 Such change in the perception of cpc leaders was worth noting, for

37

38

The Institute of History of Chinese Academy of Sciences 中国科学院历史研究所, ed. Zhongguo xiandai zhengzhishi ziliao hui bian 中国现代政治史资料汇编 [Collected documents of modern political history in China] (Beijing:  The Institute of History of Chinese Academy of Sciences, unknown), 4 (2). “Zhongyang guanyu tingzhan, shou xiang, huifu jiaotong deng wenti gei chongqing daibiao tuan de zhishi [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to delegation in Chongqing on ceasefire, accepting surrender, and restoring transportation],” January 2, 1946; “Zhongyang guanyu yingguo sulian canjia guo gong tanpan wenti de zhishi [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee on the participation of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in the Kuomintang-​c pc talks],” January 3,1946, CCCPC Archives Bureau.

14 Chapter 1 once the conditions were met, such tactical thinking on deep historical roots would certainly be consciously and continuously put to practice. During the early postwar period, disputes between cpc and the United States over the Northeast China issue became the key factor leading both sides to confrontation. To Mao, the outbreak of civil war proved his consistent suspicion and caution toward the Americans correct. cpc leaders once believed that even if Northeast China broke into conflicts, Marshall himself would be unwilling to support the Kuomintang government to pursue an all-​out civil war, and therefore the cpc still needed “to assuage the situation through him,” and to “improve relations with Americans,” and “do our best to win Americans.”39 But Marshall’s actions finally led cpc leaders to realize that he not only lacked control over the Kuomintang government but was approaching Chiang Kai-​ shek’s position, and thus it was necessary to “reevaluate” America’s intent and role.40 Following the outbreak of a full-​scale civil war, the cpc resumed full reprimand of the United States as an “imperialist” state. cpc’s position of peace or war on the Northeast China issue was apparently influenced by the Soviet Union. While the cpc attempted cooperation with the Soviet Union, the caprices of the Soviets strengthened worries of the cpc leadership. When the cpc leaders decided to completely sever with Kuomintang, they in effect also made the determination not to be bound by Soviet diplomatic strategies. The interesting part of history was that because the cpc’s decision to go its own way coincided with the outbreak of the Cold War, the Soviet Union also decided at the same conjuncture to not

39

40

CCCPC Party History Research Center 中央党史研究室, ed. Zhou Enlai nian pu (1898–​ 1949) 周恩来年谱 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1898–​1949)] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998), 665, 668; “Zhongyang guanyu dongbei jushi ji zuozhan wenti gei Lin Biao, Peng Zhen tongzhi de zhishi 中央关于东北局势及作战问题给林彪、彭真同 志的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to comrades Lin Biao and Peng Zhen on situation in Northeast China and combat issues],” May 15, 1945; “Zhongyang guanyu shiju ji duice de zhishi 中央关于时局及对策的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee on current political situation and corresponding strategy],” May 15, 1945; “Zhongyang guanyu fabiao jinian ‘qi qi’ xuanyan hou dui meiguoji guomindang douzheng wenti de zhishi 中央关于发表纪念”七七“宣言后对美国及国民党斗争 问题的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee on fight against the United States and Kuomintang after publishing the declaration in memory of ‘July 7’],” July 6, 1946, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuan ji [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee], 16:161–​163, 230–​231. cpc Central Committee Party History Research Center, ed., Zhou Enlai nian pu (1898–​ 1949) [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1898–​1949)], 674.

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control the cpc Central Committee anymore, but rather went even further to support the cpc later. After the outbreak of the civil war, Kuomintang and cpc finally broke completely, relations among the four parties including the United States, the Soviet Union, Kuomintang and cpc were depicted more clearly, and the future of the East Asian chess game rested upon the result of the civil war between Kuomintang and cpc. First, the United States and the Soviet Union closed a historical chapter on their relations with China. With cpc’s continued success, American and Soviet influences on China went in reverse directions: American influence gradually faded to the point of complete elimination in China; and Soviet political influence grew to an alliance relationship with New China. Such result was somewhat related to the simultaneous changes in American and Soviet policies toward East Asia. In the spring of 1948, the Soviet Union decided to engage more actively in East Asian affairs, especially by providing aid to the cpc. On the contrary, the us government was brewing an “exit” from the East Asian continent, pivoting its strategic focus to Japan. Nevertheless, the more direct cause was the separate relations of the United States and the Soviet Union with the winner cpc, which, simply put, featured the Soviet Union as the cpc’s supporter and the United States as the opponent or obstructer to the Chinese revolution. The choice of the cpc Central Committee was the final determinant, and a key factor that dictated their choice was that a major change occurred in the view of cpc leaders about how the us-​Soviet rivalry would affect China’s political situation. Although the outbreak of the civil war was related to the escalating confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, cpc leaders realized that such correlation was not tight after all; instead, the capabilities and will of the United States and the Soviet Union in getting engaged in Chinese affairs were limited. In April 1946, Mao Zedong penned down some new views toward the world environment, the very short document of which was only circulated among some leaders of the cpc Central Committee. There was a pessimistic view within the cpc then that the conflicts between Kuomintang and cpc in Northeast China would trigger an all-​out civil war, thus us military intervention. It was only one month after Churchill’s Fulton speech and views about new eruption of conflicts among major powers abounded, which undoubtedly deepened worries and even fears within the cpc. Speaking to such circumstances, Mao Zedong introduced his tentative judgment. He reasoned that us-​Soviet relations would feature accommodation in general, but two other points should weigh more: first, accommodation among major powers “could only be the result of resolute and effective fight by all democratic forces in

16 Chapter 1 the world” against the United States; second, Soviet accommodation with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France “does not request” people of all other countries to “follow suite and pursue domestic accommodation.” In other words, the cpc Central Committee needed not make concessions to the Kuomintang government in response to Soviet foreign policies.41 This signaled an important change in cpc leaders’ view toward the relationship between the Cold War and China’s revolutionary activities. Shortly after the outbreak of the full civil war, Mao Zedong began using the vivid phrase “middle zone” to characterize his understanding of world politics. On August 6, Mao Zedong first raised the concept “middle zone” during his meeting with American journalist Anna Louise Strong. As Mao Zedong saw it, the main contention of postwar world politics was not us-​Soviet rivalry. In his picture of world politics and geopolitical strategies, “between the United States and the Soviet Union lies a vastly expansive zone,” namely the “middle zone.” “Here lie many capitalist countries as well as colonies and semi-​colony countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa.” The primary goal of the United States was to “force these countries to submit,” instead of to “attack the Soviet Union.” According to his articulation, the “middle zone” was significant in both geopolitics and international politics, namely that it was located between the United States and the Soviet Union with “vastly expansive” areas, while it also had vast numbers of countries and populations. As Mao held it, the erupting Cold War in March was a smoke screen released by the United States, the real intent of which was not to attack the Soviet Union, but to solve America’s domestic and international difficulties as well as to expand its “power of aggression” to make all countries “become subordinates to America.” Therefore, the main focus of contention of postwar world politics was not “us-​Soviet rivalry,” but rather American expansion and countries and peoples of the “middle zone” fighting against such American expansion.42 On November 21, Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai met at Zaoyuan, Yan’an. The meeting as recorded by Lu Dingyi showed that they planned to make the viewpoints of the meeting public. Mao again articulated the “middle zone” theme in his remarks. As he commented, the world today was split 41

42

Mao Zedong, “Guanyu muqian guoji xingshi de jidian guji 关于目前国际形势的几点 估计 [Some estimates on the current international situation],” April 1946, in Mao, Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing:  Renmin chubanshe, 2001), 4:1184–​1185. “He meiguojizhe an na lu yi si si te lang de tanhua 和美国记者安娜．路易斯．斯特 朗的谈话 [Conversation with American correspondent Anna Louise Strong],” August 6, 1946, in Mao, Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], 4:1193–​1194.

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into three areas: the United States, the Soviet Union, and “between the United States and the Soviet Union.” The main contention among the “three areas” was “the standoff between American reactionaries and people in the world, which is also reflected in China,” and China’s revolutionary activities formed a part of the main contention (owing not to the Soviet Union) and were thus “closely associated with the world.” He further predicted that in the future, us relations with other capitalist countries would “rise to become the main contention of the world,” just as before the outbreak of the wwii. In a word, us-​Soviet contention was not the center of world politics.43 Having reached consensus in the small group, Mao directed Lu Dingyi to write a specific article to rally the party behind the understanding. Lu Dingyi soon finished the first draft, and after two reviews by Mao and acceptance from Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, it was published on Liberation Daily on January 4, 1947. The article very clearly pointed out, “the main contention of the world today is the contention between American people and American reactionaries, between the United Kingdom and the United States, and between China and the United States,” whereas views such as “us-​Soviet contention was primary” in world politics were “arbitrary propaganda of domestic and foreign reactionaries.”44 Mao raised the “middle zone” idea primarily to accommodate cpc’s need of strategic transition, for once the cpc Central Committee chose to fight Kuomintang it had to answer how such choice related to world politics. Viewing from this standpoint, Mao’s description of world politics was in fact very practical. His analysis of world politics was far from accurate or complete, but it met the basic need of cpc’s strategic transition as Mao grasped the substantive issue that China’s revolution was able to pursue its own course without always having to refer to us-​Soviet relations. In fact, the United States and the Soviet Union indeed had no power, nor will, to get entangled in the Kuomintang-​c pc civil war. The core of the “middle zone” idea was that national liberation and revolutionary activities across countries and regions, with larger impact than us-​Soviet relations, were the major forces deciding the future of the world, 43

44

Mao Zedong, “Yao shengli jiu yao gao hao tongyi zhanxian 要胜利就要搞好统一战 线 [To win we need to build the united front well],” in CCCPC Party History Research Center中央党史研究室, ed. Mao Zedong wen ji 毛泽东文集 [Collected works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1996), 4:197. Lu Dingyi 陆定一, “Duiyu zhan hou guoji xingshi zhong jige jiben wenti de jieshi 对于 战后国际形势中几个基本问题的解释 [Explaination on some basic issues regarding international situation after the wwii],” January 2, 1947, in Jiefang ri bao [Liberation Daily], January 4, 1947.

18 Chapter 1 and Chinese revolution was part of them and occupied an important role. As Lu Dingyi’s article claimed, the “world-​scale united front” in the making was massive in scale, including “a billion people forming a colossal mass,” which “marked a new page in world history,” and most importantly, Chinese revolution was “an important part” of it.45 The new recognition would logically lead cpc leaders to redefine China’s position in the world, but it was not yet materialized at the time. The “middle zone” idea only lasted one year after its introduction. When the Communist Information Bureaus meeting of nine European countries took place in September 1947, the concept disappeared from Mao’s vocabulary. During that meeting, Soviet Communist delegate Andrei Zhdanov made a report entitled “On International Situation” and based on it the meeting adopted “Declaration on the International Situation.” It claimed that the world had formed two camps led by the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively, which were staging a life-​and-​death fight, and the main mission of communist parties from all countries was to unite behind the Soviet Union and fight against American “slavery and invasion.”46 On October 5, Pravda of the Soviet Union broke the news of establishment of the European Workers’ Party and Communist Party Information Bureau (Cominform). The Soviet Union declared on the occasion that it would assume a leadership and organizing role in the world’s anti-​u s fight. The huge impact on the cpc Central Committee was plain. Mao quickly declared his acceptance of the Soviet view, claiming that the world had split into two confronting camps and that the Soviet Union was the undisputable leader of the revolutionary camp. Mao rather pragmatically referred to the Declaration of the Cominform by stating that the United States had “established a plan of enslaving the world,” but “advantage was on our side, not the enemy’s side”; the cpc “should eradicate any weak ideas within itself. Any view that overestimates the enemy’s power and underestimates the people’s power is false.”47 A simple comparison of Mao’s “middle zone” idea and Cominform’s statement would easily reveal the outstanding differences. In Mao’s “middle zone,” Chinese revolution was situated in the center of world politics, though not the only center. Cominform’s Declaration averred, however, that the center of world politics still fell between the United States and the Soviet Union, and 45 46 47

Ibid. Gongchandang qingbao ju huiyi wenjian ji [Collected documents of meetings of the Cominform] (Beijing: Renmin Press, 1984), 5. “Muqian xingshi he women de renwu 目前形势和我们的任务 [The current situation and our tasks],” in Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], 4:1259–​1260.

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from a geopolitical point of view, Europe remained the center. It even made no mention of the cpc-​led revolution, for in the minds of Soviet leaders it remained doubtable whether cpc would count as a communist party. In fact, the immediate acceptance by Mao and the cpc Central Committee of the Soviet and Cominform Declaration was rather selective and pragmatic, for the Cominform Declaration was encouraging rebellion and revolution instead of what the Soviet Union had favored as accommodation and concession. The change in Soviet policy was critical to the immediate support from the cpc Central Committee for the Cominform Declaration. Judging from the two-​decade political life of cpc leaders from establishment of the party to the national civil war, only from the wwii to a very short period of time afterward did they once sincerely believe that accommodation and cooperation among major powers would rise to become the main trend of international politics and influence domestic political struggles toward assuage. But with the outbreak of the Cold War and the civil war, they eventually concluded that assuage and stability would be quite limited and short-​lived, if not illusory. Contentions and conflicts between major powers were fundamental and only continuous and various crises in international politics were definite. It can be said that the idea of “assuage” disappeared from the minds of Mao’s generation thereafter. To them, how to maneuver contentions when facing perennial disputes between major powers and make deals with them became the spirit of foreign policy. Gushes of revolutionary nationalism provided a basic context for cpc’s strategic thinking. It was indeed the live fountain of New China’s diplomatic thoughts, and its impact was enduring. After the wwii, nationalism boomed once again in China and the cpc-​led revolution would stand no chance of success if it were not able to reflect the demands of nationalism. In effect, the Chinese revolution itself harbored radical nationalism, for cpc leaders were extremely repugnant toward any foreign obstruction or interference of the Chinese revolution and would stand up to fight vigorously, although they were meticulous about avoiding us intervention and dealing with the Soviet Union. In practice, nationalism indeed proved to be one of the most effective devices in cpc’s political mobilization, boosting upbeat morale and passion for sacrifice and fearless nerves in the revolutionary crowds. During this period, the most outstanding feature of cpc’s revolutionary nationalism was that it challenged and clashed against the postwar East Asian international order until it eventually staged a fundamental revolution and overthrow. Such feature revealed itself in the immediate period after the anti-​ Japanese war, and resurfaced as the first theory attempt embodied by the “middle zone” idea. Along with cpc’s strategic transition, revolutionary nationalism

20 Chapter 1 reached a new peak in the fall of 1947 when the key vocabulary of symbolic expression and political mobilization and communication became “fearlessness,” its exact meaning being no fear toward us intervention. “Fearlessness” first appeared in a political mobilization speech made by Mao in Yan’an before Japan declared surrender. He told cpc cadres present at the meeting: “We are ‘bound by no law.’ Do not fear American support for Chiang Kai-​shek. Imperialists are merely good at scare tactics and many people in colonies are so easily scared off,” but “there are some in China who do not fear the tactics.”48 After the outbreak of an all-​out civil war, Mao used animated language to describe the United States as a “paper tiger” while the cpc must not “be scared by a gust of wind.”49 Mao since then began to gradually and consciously erase the “us fear” psychology within the cpc, and anti-​us theme became an important part of cpc Central Committee’s political mobilization. The anti-​us theme and eradication of “us fear” psyche continued into the Ideological Reform Campaign on Intellectuals which began not long after the founding of New China, and its subsequent impact grew even greater. In December 1947, the cpc Central Committee held an expanded meeting at Yangjiagou, Mizhi County, which discussed domestic and international situations as well as cpc’s strategic planning since the cpc military transitioned into strategic offense. A  key part of the meeting’s resolution was, as stated earlier, to announce agreement to the Cominform Declaration about the two-​ camp split of the world. But discussion during the meeting revealed that party leaders did have different views. For example, some cadres at the meeting held that the possibility of another outburst of major international conflicts still existed, “people of the world were not powerful enough to stop war,” and so on. Mao criticized some cadres quite sharply that when the United States was mentioned they “would turn pale as if tiger was mentioned.” He claimed that fear

48

49

Mao Zedong, “Kangri zhanzheng shengli hou de shiju he women de fangzhen 抗日战争 胜利后的时局和我们的方针 [The political situation and our strategy after the victory of the Anti-​Japanese War],” August 3, 1945, in Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], 4:12, 17–​18. “He meiguojizhe an na lu yi si si te lang de tanhua [Conversation with American correspondent Anna Louise Strong],”August 6, 1946; Mao Zedong, “Zai xiao he zhonggong zhongyang kuodahuiyi shang de jianghua 在小河中共中央扩大会议上的讲话 [Remarks at the cpc Central Committee expanded meeting at Xiao He],” July 21, 1947, in CCCPC Party Literature Research Office and PLA Academy of Military Sciences 中央文献 研究室、中国人民解放军军事科学院, eds. Mao Zedong junshi wen ji 毛泽东军事文 集 [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), 4:268.

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against America was a mental leftover of history: “China has fought against imperialism for many years and suffered defeat, and so some mental fear is there.” He specifically pointed out that the Soviets also feared America, for they “like American cans, like American cigarettes, and look down upon the great reality, which are all caused by the sufferings of war and lack of mental liberation, and thus there is fear of the paper tiger.” Notably, Mao Zedong showed his admiration for the Yugoslav Communist Party led by Tito when he commented that, in the postwar era, only Tito had no illusion about the United States and continued to adhere to military fight, and thus “remained solid.” With this point he hinted that Zhidanov, Molotov and others were somewhat being weak toward the United States. The praise of Yugoslav communists and the insinuation of Soviet communists could have cast shadows over cpc’s relations with the Soviet Union, but at this point Mao paid more emphasis to the mental liberation of cpc cadres and commanders. He believed that if the cpc wanted to seize national power, it must liberate its mind, beginning with fearlessness toward American military intervention.50 Mao Zedong’s “fearlessness” idea was also grounded in a unique analysis of the international environment. According to his concluding report at the meeting, three basic issues of the international environment bore significance to the cpc: first, another world war would not happen, and the United States and the Soviet Union would reach compromise sooner or later; second, compromise between the United States and the Soviet Union would be limited, not accommodating all issues; third, Soviet compromise toward the United States did not require other countries and parties to “follow suit and pursue domestic compromise,” but rather should “pursue different fights according to different circumstances.”51 Speaking in the context of the outbreak of the Cold War, Mao made these deliberate remarks to offer a convincible argument for cpc’s domestic and foreign policies as well as ample room for maneuver. On January 15, 1948, Mao Zedong again poured out his views of the previous meeting at the expanded meeting of the Northwest Field Army Front Committee

50

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“Mao zhuxi zai yijiu si qi nian shi’er yue zhongyang huiyi shang de tanhua 毛主席在 一九四七年十二月中央会议上的谈话 [Chairman Mao’s remarks at the cpc Central Committee meeting in December 1947],” “Chen yi chuan da mao zhuxi shi’er yue zhongyang huiyi tanhua 陈毅传达毛主席十二月中央会议谈话 [Chen Yi’s conveyance of Chairman Mao’s remarks at the cpc Central Committee meeting in December],” kept in Library of the cpc Party History Department, Renmin University of China, No: 6512/​2.5. Mao Zedong, “Zai yang jia gou zhonggong zhongyang kuodahuiyi shang de jianghua (II) 在杨家沟中共中央扩大会议上的讲话 [Remarks at the cpc Central Committee expanded meeting at Yang Jiagou (II)],” December 28, 1947, in Mao Zedong wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong], 4:333.

22 Chapter 1 (西北野战军前委). He remarked that the Chinese civil war broke out earlier than expected due to America’s “active support” of Chiang Kai-​shek, but: We do not fear Americans, we make little of them, and any imperialism is by no means frightening. We must make little of the enemy, and will make little of them. But right now not many can make little of the enemy; rather they are so afraid of dark piles, so afraid of Hu Zongnan, so afraid of the United States and the four families. Don’t be scared.52 Mao Zedong’s remarks showed unprecedented emphasis on “mental liberation.” Soon after the meeting, cpc leaders began large scales of political mobilization, including eradicating the “us fear” psyche within the cpc.53 The effect of the political mobilization was astonishing. Comparing Zhu De’s talks with military officers in December 1947 and May 1948 respectively, it can be observed that immense changes had taken place in the minds of cpc military commanders. In December 1947, Zhu De attended the cadres meeting of Shanxi-​Chaha’er-​ Hebei Field Army. In his remarks he gave emphasis to the rosy situation: “Now that the Soviet Union has stood up, people of other countries have also stood up,” the cpc was no longer fighting alone. Quite a few questions raised by cadres at the meeting touched upon the United States, such as, “Will the us send troops to aid Chiang Kai-​shek?” Would anti-​u s movements “trigger the Third World War?” And so on. According to minutes of the meeting, Zhu De gave answers in his typical simple and concise style, that “the us is not likely to

52

53

Mao Zedong, “Zai qian wei kuodahuiyi shang de jianghua 在前委扩大会议上的讲 话 [Remarks at the Frontier Committee’s expanded meeting],” January 15, 1948, in Pang, ed., Mao Zedong nian pu (1893–​1949) [Chronicle of Mao Zedong (1893–​1949)], 2:267–​268. “Zhu zong siling zai jin cha ji yezhan jun ganbu huiyi shang de jianghua 朱总司令在 晋察冀野战军干部会议上的讲话 [Commander-​in-​chief Zhu’s remarks at a cadres meeting of Jin-​Cha-​Ji Field Army],” December 1947; “Zhou Enlai tongzhi zai xibei gao gan kuodahuiyi shang guanyu quanguo zhanzheng xingshi de baogao 周恩来同志在 西北高干扩大会议上关于全国战争形势的报告 [Comrade Zhou Enlai’s report on the war status across the nation at a Northwest China senior cadres expanded meeting],” January 11, 1948; Deng Xiaoping, “Zai yezhan jun zhishu gu zhang ying ji shang ganbu huiyi shang de baogao 在野战军直属股长营级上干部会议上的报告 [Report at the Field Army cadres meeting for directly affiliated chiefs above battalion level],” June 21, 1947, in Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao ( jiefang zhanzheng shiqi) [Teaching guide material for history of cpc (the civil war period)], 1:390.

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send troops,” the Third World War “won’t” happen.54 On May 14, 1948, Zhu De attended the cadres meeting of the East China Field Army. This time the question from the floor went: “The Four Families have escaped to America. Will we be able to chase after them for public trial?” According to the minutes, Zhu De’s answer went: “Unable to chase after them,” but “possible to chase after them if American people stage their revolution.”55 It is meaningful to compare the questions from field commanders at both meetings. Questions from the first meeting showed that attendees were worried about direct us military intervention. Question from the second meeting showed, however, that such worry was not only absent but replaced by self-​ confidence of achieving final victory, to the extent that “chasing after” Chiang Kai-​shek in America and bringing him to justice was even thought of. While such question surely revealed certain ignorance of the questioner, more importantly it revealed the fundamental change that had took place in the minds of commanders and soldiers. In other words, the cpc Central Committee had achieved its aim of political mobilization, which was to erase “the rightward view of fearing the us and daring not put up an anti-​us fight.”56 The result of the stated political mobilization also cut deep into the later foreign policy making of cpc leaders. It can be clearly felt in the vocabulary of cpc Central Committee’s foreign affairs-​related documents since 1948. For example, they requested delegates at diplomatic occasions to “oppose foreign intervention,” guard against other side’s “aggressiveness,” “debunk in the face,” “reject sternly,” and so on.57 Since mid-​November of 1948, the 54

55

56

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“Zhu zong siling zai jin cha ji yezhan jun ganbu huiyi shang de jianghua [Commander-​ in-​chief Zhu’s remarks at a cadres meeting of Jin-​Cha-​Ji Field Army],” December 1947, CCCPC Archives Bureau. “Zhu zong siling zai hua dong yezhan jun ganbu hui shang de si ci jianghua 朱总司令 在华东野战军干部会上的四次讲话 [Commander-​in-​chief Zhu’s four speeches at the East China Field Army cadres meeting],” May 14,1948, CCCPC Archives Bureau. “Zhongyang guanyu dui meiguo waijiao douzhengcelüe de zhishi 中央关于对美国外 交斗争策略的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee on strategy of diplomatic fight against the United States],” in Zhou Enlai nian pu 1898–​1949 [Chronical of Zhou Enlai 1898–​1949], 767. “Zhongyang guanyu zai ouzhou huodong fangzhen gei zhongyang gong wei zhuan dongbei ju, liu ning yi tongzhi 中央关于在欧洲活动方针给中央工委转东北局、刘宁一同志 [Letter from the cpc Central Committee to the Central Working Committee to forward to Northeast Bureau and Comrade Liu Ningyi on strategy of actions in Europe],” March 19, 1948; “Zhongyang guanyu yu ying shangtan maoyi wenti gei fang fang tongzhi de zhishi 中央关于 与英商谈贸易问题给方方同志的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to Comrade Fang Fang on trade negotiation with the United Kingdom],” September 25, 1948, in Zhou Enlai nian pu 1898–​1949 [Chronical of Zhou Enlai 1898–​1949], 767, 789.

24 Chapter 1 policies of the cpc Central Committee evidently toughened, which were directly related to the Northeast Field Army’s exchanges with American, British, and French consulates after their occupation of Shenyang and the impact. As can be seen from the incident and other ensuing foreign affairs incidents, a type of interaction had been formed between the cpc Central Committee and local leaders and military commanders, where the already formed and continually rising Kuomintang spirit was indeed affecting, or rather leading, the cpc Central Committee’s foreign policy. For sure, the mental state within the party and the military was in accordance with the cpc Central Committee’s line of thought and thus the trend was pushed even further. From January 6 to 8, 1949, the cpc Politburo held a meeting at Xibaipo. During the meeting, cpc leaders discussed diplomacy for the first time and drafted special instructions on Foreign Service. Mao remarked, the mental “fear” was yet to be solved, “people tend to feel afraid of things invisible, and thus Kuomintang used such invisible things to scare people.” For countries like the United States, the United Kingdom and France, the cpc aimed to “defeat them, not recognize them.”58 Zhou Enlai’s remarks also paid strong emphasis to mental liberation, where he said that Chinese “had been suppressed for a hundred years, but now have stood up, so have some dignity. Fight against fear toward the United States and envy toward the West. Boost our own morale.” Also, countries like the United States “have no choice but to come to us, so we need not hurry.” In a word, “the whole mindset needs a change.”59 After the meeting the cpc Central Committee formally issued the instructions, denying delegates stationed in China from “many imperialist countries” as “formal diplomatic personnel,” which would then enable to “take the upper hand in diplomacy, bound by no shameful diplomacy of the past.”60 During the second plenary meeting of the Seventh Congress in March, Mao Zedong made articulations about foreign policies: it is unnecessary now, “nor for quite a while following the national victory, to hurry to pursue” recognition of the new government from countries like the United States, for “as long as they keep 58 59 60

Hu Qiaomu 胡乔木. Hu Qiaomu huiyi Mao Zedong 胡乔木回忆毛泽东 [Hu Qiaomu’s Recollection of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2003), 537, 546–​547. Zhou Enlai nian pu 1898–​1949 [Chronical of Zhou Enlai 1898–​1949], 805–​806. “Zhongyang guanyu waijiao gongzuo de zhishi 中央关于外交工作的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee on diplomacy],” January 19, 1949, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuan ji [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee], ed., CCCPC Archives Bureau, 18:44.

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their hostile attitude for another day,” we would not offer them “legitimate status in China.” He believed that only directing diplomacy upon such logic would show that Chinese had “stood up.”61 The second plenary meeting of the Seventh Congress was a symbol that marked the two main aspirations of cpc Central Committee’s future foreign policies. First, through revolution and war, destroy the postwar international order in East Asia built by major powers, and construct future foreign relations based on a new identity of China’s status in the world. Second, through revolutionary diplomatic moves, destroy the diplomatic system and basic structure of foreign relations built by past governments in China. Of particular importance was, according to statements of cpc leaders, that they continued to follow the theory and logic of the party-​building period and defined “diplomacy” of the new government as relations with the United States and other Western countries; whereas, relations with the Soviet Union and countries of that camp was defined as another type of “foreign affairs,” or at least primarily as foreign relations dominated by party relations in the international communist movement. The above analysis revealed the inherent logic of thinking of cpc leaders about the international system and foreign policy, as well as the profound impact of the strategic transition during the final stage of the revolution. For sure, they were still observing and exploring at this time, and especially given the lack of experience, they were quite cautious when taking foreign affairs actions despite their consistently harsh locution.62 In particular, the impact of many unpredicted incidents could not be denied, which at least reinforced what Mao later termed the “leaning to one side” choice, and strongly affected their decision to ally with the Soviet Union and the intensity of their confrontation with the United States.

61

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Mao Zedong, “Zai zhongguo gongchan dang di qi jie zhongyang weiyuan hui di er ci quanti huiyi shang de baogao 在中国共产党第七届中央委员会第二次全体会议上 的报告 [Report at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh cpc Central Committee],” March 5, 1949, in Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], 4:1434–​1435. “Zhongyang guanyu dui faguo lingshi yaoqiu yu wo jianli waijiao guanxi wenti gei huabei ju de zhishi 中央关于对法国领事要求与我建立外交关系问题给华北局的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to North China Bureau on the French Counsel’s request to establish diplomatic relations with us],” July 28,1948; “Zhongyang guanyu yu ying shangtan maoyi wenti gei fang fang tongzhi de zhishi 中央关于与英 商谈贸易问题给方方同志的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to Comrade Fang Fang on trade negotiation with the United Kingdom],” CCCPC Archives Bureau.

26 Chapter 1

Section 2: The Origin of Alliance

On June 30, 1949, Mao published “On People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” claiming that “to achieve victory and consolidate victory, we must lean to one side.”63 The phrase “lean to one side” thus became the encapsulation of the period’s foreign policy. Graphic and concise, it truthfully reveals the either-​or nature of choices available to cpc leaders in the early phase of the Cold War which eventually led to the situation of alliance with the Soviet Union and severe confrontation with the United States. Mao published the article at such critical moment when the cpc delegation led by Liu Shaoqi had embarked on a secret visit to Moscow, and thus it could also be made that Mao was expressing the will and determination of Chinese leaders to take the side of the Soviet Union and join the Cold War. That said, it is worthwhile to conduct a detailed study of the long origin before then and the series of events happening during this period. The majority of studies on the Cold War history extend the starting point to post-​WWI American and Soviet foreign policies and their relations. If we adopt a similar long historical perspective to study the relationship between the cpc-​ led revolutionary movement and the Cold War, we would find that they were “naturally related.” The cpc was the most radical force in the nationalist liberation movement in China, and since its birth it regarded Soviet communist leaders as supervisor and leader and the Soviet Union as the spiritual homeland. In practice, the cpc Central Committee received long-​term intellectual and policy guidance from Moscow, and their whole contact with the international community was standing as a branch of the Comintern in the line of the international communist movement led by the Soviet Union. The ideology and discourse system of Leninism and Stalinism played a key role in maintaining the cpc relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (cpsu) and they further shaped the world views of cpc leaders. Of course, this is only a macro generalization, for it became a very complicated and severe issue to cpc leaders to properly understand and conduct relations with the Soviet Union, the learning process of which, even as alliance was formed with the Soviet Union on February 14, 1950, was far from finished and remained intricate. During the wwii, cpc’s relations with the Soviet Union turned increasingly aloof in general. Comparatively speaking, the cpc Central Committee was keener in maintaining relations of both sides but the initiative was not in the

63

Mao Zedong, “Lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng 论人民民主专政 [On people’s democratic dictatorship],” June 30, 1949, in Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], 4:1472–​1473.

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hands of Mao. In the early postwar period, bilateral relations made positive progress in Northeast China, but Mao had consistently bore aversion to the Yalta system pursued by the Soviet Union and the United States and he must have resented the numerous Soviet demands for the cpc to coordinate with the Soviet Union and concede to Kuomintang. While it is not quite clear how the cpc discussed and analyzed its relations with the Soviet Union at that time, what is known is that Mao proposed to Stalin to visit Moscow in 1948 and began active preparation, whereas Stalin somehow showed welcome with reluctance.64 In the telegram dated April 26, 1948, Mao told Stalin that he planned to travel abroad for one to three months, including paying a visit to the “people’s front” in Eastern European countries.65 On July 4, Mao further provided a detailed itinerary of his visit to the Soviet Union. But ten days later, on July 13, Stalin replied that all cpsu leaders would be attending the autumn harvest and suggested Mao to postpone his visit to the Soviet Union. According to the Soviet doctor Orlov Terebin who was accompanying cpc leaders, Mao listened to the translated telegram and said, “Alright, alright,” and gave an oral reply to the telegram agreeing to the postponement of the visit.66 Four days later, Orlov Terebin sent a telegram to Stalin stating that based on his observation of over six years, while “it is very difficult to read his [Mao’s] true mind,” he might have suspected that Stalin rejected him.67 In fact, Mao’s plan to visit the Soviet Union never materialized during the civil war; it seemed more of a posture to show that the cpc keenly hoped to strengthen relations with the Soviet Union. The sudden rise of dispute between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia presented an important opportunity for the cpc Central Committee to show its attitude to Stalin. After March 1948, Soviet relations with Yugoslavia deteriorated abruptly, and Stalin soon decided to launch a purge against the Communist

64

There are several different descriptions on Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union. For Chinese records, refer to Shi Zhe 师哲, Zai lishijuren shen bian 在历史巨人身边 [Standing beside historical giants] (Beijing:  Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1991), 366; Nie Rongzhen 聂荣臻, Nie Rongzhen huiyi lu 聂荣臻回忆录 [Memoir of Nie Rongzhen] (Beijing:  Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1984), 2:675. For Soviet records, refer to “Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin],” 15 June, 1947; “Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin],” 16 December, 1947; “Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin],” 20 April, 1948, see in CWIHP, Issue 16, Fall 2007∕Winter 2008, 113. 65 “Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao [via Terebin],” 20 April, 1948, CWIHP, Issue 16, Fall 2007∕Winter 2008, 116. 66 “Cable, Terebin to Stalin,” 14 July, 1948, CWIHP, Issue 16, Fall 2007∕Winter 2008, 118. 67 “Cable, Terebin to Stalin (via Kuznetsove),” 14 July, 1948, CWIHP, Issue 16, Fall 2007∕Winter 2008, 119.

28 Chapter 1 Party of Yugoslavia (cpy) within the Cominform. On June 19, Cominform held a meeting which reprimanded the cpy for having “wrong hostility” toward the cpsu, demanded that all communist parties break clean from the cpy, and called for overthrow of Tito.68 This was the first serious split of the Soviet Camp. The Soviet-​Yugoslav dispute had complicated origins, the essence of which as happening in the lower belt region of Europe was hard to perceive to the cpc Central Committee that was fighting on the far eastern end of the Eurasia continent. Nevertheless, the cpc Central Committee quickly made their attitude clear. On July 10, the cpc Central Committee passed a resolution condemning the cpy for having “fallen into the quagmire of capitalist democracy and capitalist party.”69 Whatever reasons led the cpc Central Committee to support the Soviet purge of the cpy, the result was that a major change took place inside the cpc, in that after experiencing the twists and turns of anti-​Japanese war and the initial postwar period, the cpc Central Committee’s understanding of world politics was unified into the two-​camp intellectual framework. On November 7, People’s Daily published a long article “On Internationalism and Nationalism” under the name of Liu Shaoqi, which made three statements that later proved vital: first, the world has been split into two camps led respectively by the United States and the Soviet Union, and all countries join either the us Camp or the Soviet Camp; second, when the two camps “engage in such intense fight,” “it is impossible” to remain neutral; third, to coalesce with the Soviet Union or the United States is “the distinction between patriotism and treason,” “the distinction between revolution and anti-​revolution,” and “the distinction between heading for progress and heading for retreat.”70 The cpc Central Committee’s opposition to the cpy finally led to the rallying of party consensus on policy toward the Soviet Union, as well as the formation of a systematic, “either-​or” discourse. In review of history, the repudiation of the cpy also led cpc leaders back to their early thinking of international politics. There was yet another complication to the cause of cpc Central Committee’s repudiation of the cpy. For example, the cpc Central Committee’s resolution 68 69

70

Zhang Shengfa 张盛发, Si da lin yu lengzhan 斯大林与冷战 [Stalin and the Cold War] (Beijing: shehui kexue chubanshe, 2000), 296–​297. “Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuan huiguanyu nan si la fu gongchandang wenti de jueyi 中国共产党中央委员会关于南斯拉夫共产党问题的决议 [Reso­ lution by the cpc Central Committee on the Communist Party of Yugoslavia],” July 10, 1948. Liu Shaoqi, “Lun guoji zhuyi yu minzu zhuyi 论国际主义与民族主义 [On internationalism and nationalism],” November 1, 1948, “Renmin ri bao [People’s Daily],” November 7, 1948.

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accounted for the reality and cautioned the party against “Tito-​like or Zhang Guotao-​like inclinations.”71 Not all regional leaders responded the same though. For example, leaders of the East China region said the focus of anti-​cpy was to maintain solidarity and to relate to “the fight against lack of discipline and anarchy” among military cadres.72 The Northeast Bureau paid strong emphasis to cleaning “residues of any blind anti-​Soviet ideas and emotions,” and “guard[ing] against any instigators harming Sino-​Soviet friendship.”73 At this moment the Soviet policy toward China also quietly went through changes. On February 10, 1948, Stalin received the cpy delegation in Moscow. When cpy delegates questioned about certain Soviet policies toward Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe, Stalin explained that the Soviet Union “had also done some stupid things” in the past, for example, that the cpsu Central Committee had made the wrong judgment about postwar situation in China where it turned out that the cpc Central Committee “was right, and we were wrong.”74 This was the first time Stain admitted to delegates of other communist parties that postwar Soviet policy toward China was wrong and that it would soon be adjusted. At this time, the Soviet policy was turning to more active support of Asian revolutions and Stalin was seeking figures that could lead revolutions in East Asia.75 Soon afterward, the cpsu Central Committee decided to send a group of railroad experts to Northeast China upon request of the cpc Northeast Bureau,

71

72 73

74

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“Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuan huiguanyu nan si la fu gongchandang wenti de jueyi [Resolution by the cpc Central Committee on the Communist Party of Yugoslavia],” July 10, 1948; “Zhongyang junwei gei ge yezhan bingtuan de zhishi 中央军 委给各野战兵团的指示 [Instructions from the Central Military Commission to all field armies],” August 14, 1948; Pang, ed., Mao zedong nian pu (1893–​1949) [Chronicle of Mao Zedong (1893–​1949)], 2:334–​335. “Zhongyang junwei gei ge yezhan bingtuan de zhishi [Instructions from the Central Military Commission to all field armies],” August 14, 1948. “Zhongyang pi zhuan dongbei ju guanyu xuexi nan gong wenti de zhishi 中央批转东 北局关于学习南共问题决议的指示 [Instrucion from The cpc Central Committee: Approve and dispatch the resolution of Northeast Bureau on leaning issue of Communist Party of Yugoslavia],” August 4, 1948. Milovan Djilas 米洛凡·杰拉. Tong sidalin de tanhua 同斯大林的谈话 [Conversations with Stalin], translated by Zhao Xun and Lin Ying 赵洵、林英 (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1983), 143, 146. Vojtech Mastny 沃捷特尼·马斯特尼. Sidalin shiqi de lengzhan yu sulian de anquan guan 斯大林时期的冷战与苏联的安全观 [The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years], translated by Guo Mao’an 郭懋安 (Guilin:  Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshes, 2002), 57.

30 Chapter 1 thereby beginning the history of the Soviet Union sending a massive number of experts to China. In May, Stalin told I. V. Kovalev, head of the Soviet group delegated to aid railroad construction in Northeast China, that the Soviet Union would reserve no effort in assisting the cpc, for if “both countries could travel the same journey, victory of world socialism would be guaranteed.”76 This was an important signal. Whereas previously it was a regional action for the Soviet Union to maintain cooperation with the cpc-​controlled Northeast China, thereafter aid to the cpc carried a long-​term strategic consideration. As soon as Kovalev reached Northeast China, he told Lin Biao in meeting that Stalin paid great attention to the Northeast Bureau’s request about repairing the railroad and instructed him to “offer as much help as possible.” When Mao learned about the subject of the meeting, he expressed joy in his telegram reply to the Northeast Bureau on July 3, commenting that the Soviet Union “has a positive attitude, which is great and comforting, and you should actively work with them to repair the railroad and develop industries.”77 During this period, the cpc strengthened relations with the Soviet Union in Northeast China; in particular, trade relations between Northeast China and the Soviet Union developed rapidly, thus creating an advantage for the cpc to control the whole Northeast China region. Such trade relations between the cpc-​controlled Northeast China region and the Soviet Union began in the fall of 1946, “the initiative proposed” by the Northeast Bureau. At that time, the cpc-​ controlled Northeast China region was facing quite severe material shortage, and the cpc Northeast Bureau believed that the only solution was to have trade with the Soviet Union, or it would still be difficult and in fact unhelpful even if trade was pursued with North Korea. In November of the same year, Liu Yalou after numerous efforts finally made his trip to Moscow and discussed directly with the Soviet authorities about developing economic and trade cooperation in Northeast China, to which the Soviet side agreed. On December 21, both sides held the first trade talks in Harbin and reached an initial agreement on barter trade, and it soon ensued. That year the Soviet Union was having food crisis, and so the Soviet side agreed that the Northeast Bureau use food and meat to exchange for various materials from the Soviet side. Trade volume between both sides reached 93 million rubos in 1947; it climbed significantly to 151  million rubos in 1948; it 76

77

N.B. Kovalyov N.B.科瓦廖夫. “Sidalin he Mao Zedong de duihua 斯大林和毛泽东的对 话 [Conversation between Mao Zedong and Stalin],” Guowai sheke xinxi 国外社科信息 [Foreign Social Sciences Information] 21 (1992): 29. “Mao zedong gei dongbei ju dianbao 毛泽东给东北局电报 [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Northeast Bureau],” July 3, 1948, CCCPC Archives Bureau.

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continued to rise in 1949 to reach 205 million rubos. The Northeast Bureau believed that bilateral trade was of great value to economic recovery and development of the cpc-​controlled Northeast China region.78 Another important assistance provided by the Soviet Union to the cpc was to permit the cpc to pursue defense industry and economic activities in Dalian. In the spring of 1947, as bilateral trade gradually grew, cpc regional authorities and the Soviet military signed agreements to create four successive joint venture companies, including the Far East Electricity Co. (owning several electricity generating plants and over thirty large and medium-​sized metal machinery plants), Sino-​Soviet joint venture oil company, Sino-​Soviet joint venture salt company, and Sino-​Soviet joint venture ship building company (Dalian Ship Building Co.). Both the suggestion and draft agreements of creating joint venture companies were proposed by the Soviet troops stationed in Dalian, and cpc representatives almost immediately signed the agreements during negotiation. In all the four joint venture companies, the Chinese side held 51% of shares, the Soviet side 49% shares. Corporate profits were shared in proportion, and products were mostly sold to the Soviet Union.79 These companies were transferred to the Chinese side after Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union, which not only provided an early model for later Sino-​Soviet joint 78

79

Meng Xianzhang 孟宪章, ed. Zhongsu maoyi shi ziliao 中苏贸易史资料 [Materials on the history of Sino-​Soviet trade] (Beijing: Zhongguo duiwai jingji maoyi chubanshe, 1991), 531–​536; Wang Shoudao 王首道, “Dongbei jiefang qu renmin zhengquan de jianliji caizheng jingji gongzuo 东北解放区人民政权的建立及财政经济工作 [establishment of people’s regime in liberated areas of Northeast China and its financial and economic tasks]”; CCCPC Committee on the Collection of Information on Party History, PLA Liao-​ Shen Campaign Memorial’s Founding Committee, and Editorial and Review Committee on Liao-​Shen Campaign 中共中央党史资料征集委员会、中国人民解放军辽沈 战役纪念馆建馆委员会,《辽沈战役》编审小组, eds. Liao-​shen juezhan 辽沈决 战 [The showdown in Liao-​Shen] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1988), 2:367–​369; Shen Zhihua 沈志华, Sulian zhuanjia zai zhongguo 苏联专家在中国 [Soviet experts in China] (Beijing:  Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 2003), 32. Chen Hui gave slightly higher number in his paper, see Chen Hui 陈晖. “Ma xie er shi hua yu sulian dui hua zhengce 马 歇尔使华与苏联对华政策 [Marshall’s visit to China and Soviet policy toward China],” Lishi yanjiu 历史研究 [Historical Research] 6 (2008):  154. Since Sino-​Soviet trade in Northeast China took the form of bartering goods and services, and there was no detailed explanation of how those statistics came out, so these statistics only serve as references. cpc Jilin Party Committee’s Party History Research Center and Jilin Foundation of Anti-​ Japanese United Army in Northeast China 中共吉林省委党史研究室、吉林省东 北抗日联军基金会, eds. Han guang dang shi gongzuo wen ji 韩光党史工作文集 [Collected works of Han Guang on party history] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997), 339–​340.

32 Chapter 1 venture companies but also led the cpc to agree to later joint ventures with the Soviet Union with few scruples.80 In Dalian were also located cpc’s largest arsenals in Northeast China, which produced a large quantity of ammunition for artilleries. The daily grow of trade and economic cooperation between the cpc and the Soviet Union became another major factor in strengthening strategic relations between both sides in Northeast China. Undoubtedly, cpc leaders were supportive of the Northeast Bureau’s policy to actively cooperate with the Soviet Union, but this did not guarantee insulation from the impact of their already boosting revolutionary nationalism on the cooperation between Northeast China and the Soviet Union. In fact, in all aspects of economy and politics, the cpc was cautious and reserved about cooperation with the Soviet Union. In early December of 1948, the Northeast Bureau sent the cpc Central Committee a report that reflected the political difficulties created by some Soviet policies for the cpc, some of which were the same faced by the Kuomintang government during its talks with the Soviet Union, such as how to define “the property border of China Changchun Rail” to prevent deliberative Soviet occupation, and demanding the Soviet Union to “return part” of the machinery equipment dismantled from Northeast China.81 In early 1949, as some democracy advocates arrived in Northeast China, the cpc Central Committee instructed the Northeast Bureau to get prepared and consult with the Soviet side on how to answer their questions about the Soviet military’s dismantlement of the machinery equipment, as well as find solutions to convert “their attention.”82 In fact, the questions and inclinations of the Northeast Bureau were echoed inside the cpc in addition to the democracy advocates. In the Dalian area where relations with the Soviet Union were closest and the cpc held key military and economic interests, severe disputes also occurred in 80

81

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Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu zhong suliang guo zai xinjiang shelijinshu he shiyou gufen gongsi de wenti gei Mao Zedong de dianbao 关于中苏两国在新疆设立金属和石油股份 公司的问题给毛泽东的电报 [Telegram to Mao Zedong from Liu Shaoqi on the issue of establishing metal and oil joint stock companies by China and the Soviet Union in Xinjiang],” January 2, 1950, in CCCPC Party Literature Research Office and CCCPC Archives Bureau 中央文献研究室、中央档案馆, eds. Jianguo yi lai liu shaoqi wen gao 建国以来刘少奇文稿 [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2005), 1:275–​276. “Dongbei ju zhi zhongyang dui su jingji guanxi de jige wenti 东北局致中央对苏经济关 系的几个问题 [Telegram from Northeast Bureau to the cpc Central Committee: some issues regarding Sino-​Soviet economic relations],” December 2, 1948. “Dui xun wen sulian ban chai wo dongbei jiqi wenti dafu 对讯问苏联搬拆我东北机器 问题答复 [response to the inquiry of the Soviet Union for removing our machines from Northeast China],” February 7, 1949.

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cpc’s local party committee about dealing with the Soviet troops. For example, some cadres criticized the creation of Sino-​Soviet joint ventures as “practicing treason”; enacting the “Soviet-​oriented” policy in the Lvshun-​Dalian area as set by the Northeast Bureau was “joining the vicious with the Soviet troops”; and so on.83 The severity of such disputes forced the cpc Dalian local committee to hold two separate meetings in October 1947 and June 1948 to criticize so-​ called “narrow nationalism.” At the “October meeting” in 1947, leaders of the Lvshun-​Dalian local committee at the time proposed that “all policies should follow Soviet foreign policies,” which however was unaccepted by participants. During the “June meeting” in 1948, new leaders who were assigned to the Lvshun-​Dalian area by the Northeast Bureau attempted to answer concerns by using so-​called “patriotism-​internationalism” dichotomy and proposed that “Soviet-​orientation” was in fact “self-​orientation,” which was a somehow farfetched argument. At the same time, the Lvshun-​Dalian local committee also presented to leaders of the stationed Soviet troops “Some Opinions on the Working Relationship between All-​Union Communist Party and Chinese Communist Party Comrades in Completing the Joint Mission of Consolidating the Soviet Navy Base,” criticizing the Soviet posture of “chauvinism” and “occupier,” and demanding the Soviet military authority to adjust their attitude.84 In late May 1948, as the Soviet Union began to provide direct aid to cpc military in Northeast China, the cpc Central Committee instructed the Northeast Bureau to follow mandatory “advance approval and post reporting” and maintain capability of “self-​reliance” in dealing with the Soviet Union. On April 25, Marinin, the new Soviet acting general counselor in Harbin, met with Gao Gang and formally notified the Northeast Bureau that the Soviet Union would dispatch a railroad expert group and provide all necessary equipment to repair the rail. He also mentioned that the cpc should aim for creating a government of all liberated areas so that it would facilitate Soviet aid.85 On May 26, the Northeast

83

84 85

Han guan dang shi gongzuo wen ji [Collected works of Han Guang on party history], 351; Wu Xiuquan 伍修权. Wo de licheng (1908–​1949) 我的历程 [My experiences (1908–​ 1949)] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1984), 189. Han guang dang shi gongzuo wen ji [Collected works of Han Guang on party history], 367–​368, 380, 426. “Gao gang dian gao mao zhuxi, liu shaoqi guanyu su zonglingshi tan sulian zhengfu bang women xiu tielu he chenglijiefang qu zhengfu wenti 高岗电告毛主席、刘少奇关于 苏总领事谈苏联政府帮我们修铁路和成立解放区政府问题 [Telegram from Gao Gang to Chairman Mao and Liu Shaoqi on the statement of the Soviet Consulate General that the Soviet government will help us to build railways and establish the government of liberated area],” April 25, 1948.

34 Chapter 1 Bureau reported to the cpc Central Committee that the Soviet side agreed to provide rail repairing equipment through a loan that had been requested by the Northeast Bureau to the Soviet side two months earlier. As Gao Gang had never reported on such loan request from the Northeast Bureau to the Soviet Union, the cpc Central Committee on the one hand agreed in its telegram reply to such borrowing of the Northeast Bureau, while on the other pointed out specifically that all foreign-​related matters in the future should “ask for approval of the cpc Central Committee in advance,” and submit for the cpc Central Committee’s “checking” afterward, otherwise it would be “unapproved.” It demanded the Northeast Bureau to resubmit all its past commercial agreements to the cpc Central Committee, at the same time offering a clear explanation as to why it “acted in a manner of no advance counseling and no post reporting in such important diplomatic activities.”86 Apparently, while the cpc Central Committee was actively promoting relations with the Soviet Union, it was trying to control the pace and scope of relations with the Soviet Union and especially to prevent the local authorities a free hand in foreign exchanges. In February 1948, the Soviet side proposed to build port terminals and lighthouses on the Chinese side of the Heilongjiang River. Upon receiving the Soviet proposal, Li Fuchun asked the Soviet side to clarify ownership of these facilities and whether the cpc could use them. As he remarked, such affairs “would relate to the issue of sovereignty from the standpoint of the Chinese people.” The Soviet side then replied that such issues would have to await instructions from Moscow and the issue went silent. Later, on March 4, 1949, the Soviet side once again proposed to build lighthouses on parallel locations near the bilateral borders of the Heilongjiang River and claimed Soviet ownership, which failed to obtain consent from the Northeast Bureau.87 On May 13, Soviet delegates told the cpc Northeast Bureau that G.N. Voitinskii, the Soviet Foreign Minister, hoped to allow Soviet planes and ships to patrol the Heilongjiang River and Songhuajiang River. After receiving the briefing, the cpc Central Committee replied to the Northeast Bureau that Soviet planes and 86

87

“Su fang daying bang wo tielu qicai wu kuan shu nian hou huan de qingshi ji mao zhuxi zhishi 苏方答应帮我铁路器材物款数年后还的请示及毛主席指示 [Request for instruc­tion on the Soviet promise of our repaying the loan of railway equipment and fees in a few years and Chairman Mao’s instruction],” May 26 & 28, 1948, CCCPC Archives Bureau. “Li, Gao, Chen guanyu su zai heilongjiang wo an xiu matou, dengta wenti wanglai dian 李、高、陈关于苏在黑龙江我岸修码头、灯塔问题往来电 [Telegram exchanges among Li, Gao, and Chen on Soviet contruction of docks and lighthouses on our side of the Heilongjiang river],” March 4, March 7, 1949, CCCPC Archives Bureau.

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ships could only patrol the Heilongjiang River, whereas the Songhua River was China’s inland river and could only be patrolled by Chinese ships equipped with cannons and Soviet experts could be hired only to participate in the patrol.88 Since April 1948, the Soviet side mentioned several times to heads of the Northeast Bureau that they hoped the cpc could establish a “government of the liberated zone,” and “establish a national government,” and so on. They said this would make Soviet aid “more convenient.” On June 24, Lin Biao sent a report to the cpc Central Committee after his meeting with Kovalev and others, which analyzed that such Soviet proposal had certainly come from senior leadership in Moscow.89 The cpc leaders maintained great caution toward the issue and told Lin Biao not to offer a reply until two months after.90 On August 22, the Northeast Bureau issued “Proposal to Northeast China People’s Congress on the Governing Plan of the Northeast China People’s Government.” Only until August 27, 1949 when Liu Shaoqi had concluded his secret visit to Moscow and about one month ahead of the founding of New China was the Northeast China People’s Government finally established. In August 1948, the Soviet head of the China Changchun Rail proposed that a coal mine east of Hailar and its exploitation rights be governed by the China Changchun Rail in order to facilitate its development. The Northeast Bureau, however, insisted upon “no transfer into the jurisdiction of the China Changchun Rail” and no expansion of rights as stipulated by the Sino-​Soviet treaty, but rather “make a separate local cooperation agreement” to deal with issues as such. The cpc Central Committee approved the Northeast Bureau’s action as “appropriate.”91 Such solution later became the norm of the Northeast Bureau’s dealings on issues of a similar nature and extended to cooperation with the Soviet Union on other mines. These examples in Northeast China

88

89 90 91

“Su yaoqiu pai lunchuan xun cha heilongjiang hangxian ji manzhouli chezhan jiancha wenti 苏要求派轮船巡查黑龙江航线及满洲里车站检查问题 [The Soviet side asked to send ships to inspect navigation of the Heilongjiang river, as well as inspection of the Manchuria railway stations],” May 14 & 20, 1949, CCCPC Archives Bureau. “Lin yu ke lei deng tanhua 林与柯雷等谈话 [Conversation between Lin and Crain],” June 30, 1948, CCCPC Archives Bureau. “Mao Zedong gei dongbei ju dianbao [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Northeast Bureau],” July 3, 1948, CCCPC Archives Bureau. “Dongbei ju, zhongyang guanyu yu su gongtong kaifa meikuang wenti de wanglai dian 东北局、中央关于与苏共同开发煤矿问题的往来电 [Telegram exchanges between Northeast Bureau and the cpc Central Committee on Sino-​Soviet joint development of coal mines],” August 10 & 17, 1948, CCCPC Archives Bureau.

36 Chapter 1 showed that as the cpc gained more control of state power and dealt with foreign affairs, the nationalist brand that was stamped on them by China’s modern history became increasingly clear. Between September 8 and 13, the cpc Central Committee held a Politburo expanded meeting at Xibaipo and discussed for the first time in history about major issues such as establishing a central government. Mao remarked at the meeting that the three basic judgments about the international environment during the meeting of December 1947 proved correct and the cpc now “enjoyed quite high reputation internationally,” and he expressed quite strong confidence for future relations with the Soviet Union. He said, “Once we declare establishment of the central government,” the Soviet Union “is bound to work with us,” and “is bound to help us, primarily helping us to develop the economy.”92 After the meeting, Mao sent several telegrams to Stalin that further expressed his wish to visit Moscow soon and discuss with him face to face about the cpc’s mission of founding the nation.93 After the cpc controlled all of Northeast China, Stalin surely felt it a necessity to get a fuller picture inside the cpc and its various policies. In particular, as Mao made several requests to visit Moscow, the cpsu Central Committee certainly had to make a substantial decision. On January 14, the cpsu Politburo held a meeting on Mao’s potential visit to the Soviet Union. Still unwilling to receive Mao in Moscow, Stalin decided at the meeting to send A. I. Mikoyan, then member of the cpsu Politburo, to travel to cpc Central Committee’s then headquarter Xibaipo, Hebei to meet with cpc leaders in order to learn directly and comprehensively about the cpc Central Committee’s various policies.94 As the cpsu Central Committee made the decision above, Stalin and Mao discorded on the issue of Kuomintang-​c pc peace talks. On January 10, Stalin forwarded to Mao the Kuomintang government’s request for the Soviet Union to mediate the Kuomintang-​c pc civil war, as well as the Soviet Union’s draft reply to the Kuomintang government which said that the Soviet Union had

92

93

94

Mao Zedong, “Zai zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhi ju huiyi shang de baogao he jielun 在中共中央政治局会议上的报告和结论 [Report and conclusion at the cpc Central Committee Politburo meeting],” September 1948, in Mao Zedong wen ji 毛泽东文集 [Collected works of Mao Zedong], ed. cpc Central Committee Party History Research Center (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1996), 5:132, 143–​144. “Cable, Mao to Stalin,” 28 September, 1948; “Cable, Terebin to Stalin,” 17 October, 1948; “Cable, Mao to Stalin,” 21 October, 1948; “Cable, Mao to Stalin,” 30 December, 1948; CWIHP, issue 16, 122–​123. Andrei Ledovsky, “Mikoyan’s Secret Mission to China in January and February 1949,” Far East Affairs, 1995, No.2, 77.

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long insisted upon ceasefire in China, “but before agreeing to such mediation” it wanted to know the cpc’s position. Stalin also attached a reply letter drafted on behalf of the cpc, which emphasized that the cpc also wanted peace talks but opposed us participation in the mediation.95 On the thirteenth, Mao replied with opposition as he considered the Soviet reply inappropriate: it would invite the United States and others to think that they could also take part in the mediation; would give the Kuomintang government a handle to accuse the cpc as the “aggressor”; and would arouse confusion within the revolutionary forces. Mao asked the Soviet Union to express unequivocally its non-​participation in mediating Kuomintang-​c pc peace talks.96 On the day Mao’s telegram went out, Orlov telegraphed Stalin that Mao reacted strongly to the suggestion of peace talks as he “made many critical comments.”97 Stalin must have realized the severity of the problem. Before Mao’s telegram reached Moscow, Stalin sent a second telegram to Mao explaining that his suggestion in the earlier telegram was meant to earn the cpc a political advantage instead of asking the cpc to accept the Kuomintang government’s suggestion for peace talks.98 After receiving Mao’s telegram reply, he immediately made yet another telegram to Mao and further explained in detail that his intent was merely to help the cpc to gain the political initiative. He also expressed that whether the cpc accepted it would not affect bilateral relations.99 On the same day, Mao replied to Stalin’s telegram on the eleventh that he fully agreed with his opinion and the cpc Central Committee would hold talks with the Kuomintang government.100 On the fifteenth, Stalin made a telegram to Mao to share his final take, that the misunderstanding between both sides “has been solved.”101 By this point, the Kuomintang government was about to fall apart and was hoping to execute a new strategy, that the Kuomintang and cpc would “split the country by half” and “divide and rule by the river.” Stalin’s general proposal at this point to achieve “ceasefire” and “build peace” would thus probably benefit the Kuomintang government. Of course, there could be many reasons behind Stalin’s action, for example, that Stalin lived in the far-​off forest of the 95 96 97 98 99 100 101

“Stalin to Mao,” 10 January, 1949, CWIHP, 1995/​1996, Issue 6–​7, 27. “Mao to Stalin,” 13 January, 1949, CWIHP, 1995/​1996, Issue 6–​7, 27–​28. “Cable, Terebin to Stalin (via Kuznetsov),” 13 January, 1949, CWIHP, Issue 16, 129. “Stalin to Mao zedong,” 11 January, 1949, CWIHP, 1995/​1996, Issue 6–​7, 27. “Stalin to Mao,” 14 January, 1949, CWIHP, 1995/​1996, Issue 6–​7, 28–​29. “Mao to Stalin,” 14 January, 1949, CWIHP, 1995/​1996, Issue 6–​7, 29. “Stalin to Mao,” 15 January, 1949, CWIHP, 1995/​1996, Issue 6–​7, 29.

38 Chapter 1 Kremlin and thus could not yet understand the rapid changes and complexities of Chinese politics; or that when Stalin drafted the telegram to the cpc Central Committee he indeed forgot about how the Soviet Union had pressured the cpc during the Chongqing talks and its consequences. But the most probable cause was Stalin excessive concern about potential us intervention. Regardless of whether Stalin understood the complexities of Chinese politics, cpc leaders certainly knew the consequence of making general mentions of Kuomintang-​c pc peace talks at this point. And given the several Soviet engagements in postwar Kuomintang-​c pc conflicts, they were bound to believe that Stalin would again ask the cpc Central Committee to make concessions, which would only likely lead to “divide and rule by the river.” Hence, Mao was very sensitive and told Stalin directly that the cpc had obtained overwhelming advantage and therefore did not need such circuitous tactics as the Kuomintang-​c pc peace talks. According to Orlov’s report, on January 13, Mao rejected Stalin’s proposal about Kuomintang-​c pc peace talks and mentioned at the same time that if he could not depart by the end of January, he would not be able to visit Moscow.102 Four days later, Mao made a telegram to Stalin that he had received the latter’s telegrams on the fourteenth and fifteenth and had decided to drop his Moscow visit; he hoped that the Soviet Union would send a “comrade of the Politburo to China.”103 Thus was booked the first high-​level direct meeting between the cpc Central Committee and the cpsu Central Committee. On January 30, Mikoyan arrived in Xibaipo. During the first meeting, Mikoyan explained to Mao that the reason Stalin sent him to Xibaipo instead of inviting Mao to Moscow was to allow Mao to direct the war better. Mao replied humbly that “he [Mao] is a student of Stalin”; “Stalin is not only the teacher of the Soviet people, but also the teacher of the Chinese people,” and “we are far behind Russia.” In the next three days, Mao and other cpc leaders had long meetings with Mikoyan. Each day, Mikoyan reported the content of the talks to Stalin and forwarded Stalin’s reply to cpc leaders. The three-​day talks between Mikoyan and cpc leaders mainly addressed three aspects. The first was cpc Central Committee’s judgment about situation in China as well as the cpc’s strategies and various policies, over which both sides had little dispute. The second was party relations between China and the Soviet Union, on which cpc leaders were concerned mostly about party relations and building direct contacts and about being excluded from the international communist

1 02 “Cable, Terebin to Stalin (via Kuznetsov),” 13 January 1949, CWIHP, Issue 16, 129. 103 “Cable, Mao to Filippov (Stalin),” 17 January 1949, CWIHP, Issue 16, 129.

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movement led by the Soviet Union, since words went that Stalin and the cpsu had strong suspicion about the cpc. Mao told Mikoyan about the dispute over Wang Ming to dispel Stalin’s suspicion. Mao mentioned in the talks that Sino-​Soviet party relations should be “direct,” and that future Soviet embassy to China should have “advisor on party affairs.” Zhou Enlai added: “We sincerely hope that the Soviet Union would be closer to the cpc, so that we can often exchange opinions.”104 Mikoyan stated that they had no intent in getting involved in cpc’s domestic party disputes, and as Asia had a different situation from Europe, cpc needed not join the European Cominform but rather create a Cominform in Asia led by the cpc. The third and likely most consequence was future bilateral relations between China and the Soviet Union, especially the Sino-​Soviet treaty signed between the Soviet Union and the Kuomintang government. cpc leaders were mainly concerned about two issues: the status of Mongolia, and how to settle Soviet interests and rights in Northeast China. They first raised the issue of independence of Mongolia as was addressed in the Sino-​Soviet treaty. On February 4, Mao proposed to Mikoyan that, on the ground of common understanding of Lenin’s theory of the right of national self-​determination, the Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia should be “united” and returned to the embrace of China after founding of New China. Mikoyan immediately replied that it was unacceptable. After the meeting he reported to Stalin, and the next day he forwarded Stalin’s reply to Mao that the independent status of Outer Mongolia could not be altered. Mao replied that they “would give careful consideration.”105 On Soviet interests and rights in Northeast China, Mao saw disputes between both sides over ownership of assets associated with China Changchun Rail and Stalin attempted to address the various issues without abandoning the treaty. As with Lvshun (or Port Arthur) and Dalian, Mikoyan told Mao that the treaty on Lvshun “was an unequal treaty” and the Soviet military was ready to pull out once the cpc founded New China. With China Eastern Railway, Mikoyan said the Soviet side admitted that it did not “fully represent the principle of equality” and negotiation could be held in the future. Mao told Mikoyan that the cpc had yet planned to immediately abandon all content of the treaty but would do so in the future. Both sides also discussed a few other issues in bilateral relations, including Soviet aid to China and the Xinjiang issue. The result of the meeting between cpc 104 “Mi gao yang yu mao zedong de huitan jilu 米高扬与毛泽东的会谈记录 [Meeting minutes between Mao Zedong and Mikoyan],” February 4, 1949, accessed at Shanghai: Library of Center for Cold War International History Studies, East China Normal University, Call Number: N.16472. 105 “Mi gao yang yu mao zedong de huitan beiwang lu,” February 4 & 6, 1949, N.16472, 16474.

40 Chapter 1 leaders and Mikoyan showed that both sides had reached a general agreement on cpc’s domestic and foreign policies. It was accidentally mentioned during the meeting that China could sign an alliance treaty with the Soviet Union but no discussion followed. Specifically, during the discussion with Mikoyan on the 1945 Sino-​Soviet Treaty, Mao mentioned in passing that once the cpc “grows stronger” the Soviet Union could leave Northeast China, and then both sides could sign “a Soviet-​China mutual assistance treaty similar to the Soviet-​Polish treaty.”106 It was the first time that cpc leaders mentioned the signing of an alliance treaty with the Soviet Union and they apparently had not given it deep thought. The talk between Mikoyan and cpc leaders had a positive impact on cpc’s relations with the Soviet Union. Mikoyan’s visit and the subsequent development of cpc’s relations with the Soviet Union prompted the cpc Central Committee to make the final decision. During the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh cpc Central Committee in early March, Mao passionately proclaimed that the cpsu and cpc were in “close brotherhood,” that “we should stand on the same front with the Soviet Union, as allies,” and that Soviet aid was indispensable to a new nation’s survival and growth. His formal report at the Congress pronounced that New China would “lean to one side” after its founding.107 This marks the final establishment of cpc Central Committee’s policy to ally with the Soviet Union. What deserves attention is Mao’s logic of reasoning. Shortly after the cpc troops marched over the Yangtze River, the cpc Central Committee decided to send a delegation headed by Liu Shaoqi on a secret visit to Moscow. On June 30, as Liu Shaoqi was on his way to Moscow, Mao published “On People’s Democratic Dictatorship.” He imitated Lenin’s combat-​style language and pronounced in a debate manner that New China would firmly “lean to one side” of the Soviet Camp.108 Most research on Chinese foreign policy focused on the term “lean to one side,” but they neglected that the flowing logic of the essay reflected Mao’s thinking and summary of Lenin’s revolutionary experience and “lean to one side” was based on the comparison between Chinese revolution and Russian revolution. In the essay, Mao emphasized that once the cpc seized power it could certainly follow the Soviet pattern to found a nation because the cpc was in a much better condition than 106 107

Ibid. Hu, Hu Qiaomu huiyi Mao Zedong [Hu Qiaomu’s Recollection of Mao Zedong], 547–​ 548; Mao Zedong, “Zai zhongguo gongchandang di qi jie zhongyang weiyuan hui di er ci quanti huiyi shang de baogao [Report at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh cpc Central Committee],” March 5, 1949, 1434–​1435. 108 Mao, “Lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng [On people’s democratic dictatorship],” June 30, 1949.

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Lenin at his time. “We have international aid, especially Soviet aid, whereas the Soviet Union during the October Revolution did not have another Soviet Union to assist it.”109 If Lenin could complete the socialist revolution under such unfavorable condition, the cpc with the Soviet ally should therefore have more confidence and better chance to succeed. One of Lenin’s works that Mao paid utmost emphasis on was On the Naïve ‘Leftist’ Symptom of the Communist Movement, and he frequently mentioned and instructed cpc cadres to carefully study the pamphlet. As Mao found from the book, the rise of Chinese revolution closely resembled the cpsu experience in that they both “experienced hardships and eventually found Marxism,” the difference being that Marxism was delivered to China by “one cannon shot” from the Soviet Union; his lead of the Chinese revolution also closely resembled Lenin’s lead of the Russian revolution as both revolutions took place in backward countries, only that “China was even more backward.”110 This point revealed that cpc leaders chose to forge alliance with the Soviet Union with strong self-​drive as they saw that alliance with the Soviet Union was the main external condition to accomplish its revolutionary ideal. Indeed, the logic behind Mao’s “lean to one side” determined that he would not lead China onto the road of so-​called “New Democracy.” In his mind, New China would not only take the socialist road but would travel better and faster than the Soviet Union. There was also a pragmatic purpose behind Mao’s pronouncement of “lean to one side” before Liu Shaoqi’s departure for the Soviet Union. In early July, he told Deng Xiaoping, Secretary of Frontier Committee of the Cross-​River Campaign, that the previous secret exchanges with the us Ambassador Stuart “were all exploratory in nature until the UK and the us showed their hand of blockade”; now to break the us economic blockade, in addition to military actions there was the pronouncement of “lean to one side in foreign policy, and the earlier we put it to action, the more we would benefit from it.” Deng Xiaoping told comrades in the East China Bureau: “Chairman Mao said that this was to proactively lean in avoidance of being forced to lean in the future.”111 109 “Mao Zedong zai qi jie er zhong quan hui de baogao jilu 毛泽东在七届二中全会的报 告记录 [Record of report by Mao Zedong at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh cpc Central Committee],” March 5, 1949. 110 Mao, “Lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng [On people’s democratic dictatorship],” June 30, 1949. 111 Deng Xiaoping, “Da po diguo zhuyi fengsuo zhi dao 打破帝国主义封锁之道 [The path to break imperialist blockade],” July 19, 1949, in Deng Xiaoping 邓小平, Deng Xiaoping wen xuan 邓小平文选 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1994), 1:134.

42 Chapter 1 Liu Shaoqi’s secret visit to Moscow was a major event in cpc’s relations with the Soviet Union before founding of New China as this visit in fact laid the foundation of Sino-​Soviet alliance. As soon as the cpc delegation led by Liu reached Moscow and had the first meeting with Stalin, they found difficulties in bilateral communication, for Stalin and cpsu leaders could not understand the statement by the cpc delegation on various issues and policies. This at least showed that they certainly did not devote much attention to Chinese matters, although they issued quite a few instructions to which the cpc Central Committee often gave serious treatment. Thus, the cpc delegation decided to draft a report to Stalin and the cpsu Central Committee so that the other side could have some preparation ahead of discussion. The cpc delegation stated in the report that it hoped to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the following issues:  (1) The Soviet Union would understand and agree to the establishment of the new government and some of its major policies and strategies; (2) The cpc would maintain the same position with the Soviet Union in the area of international situation and foreign policy; (3) Once the New China was founded, the Soviet Union and Eastern European nations would offer immediate recognition; (4) Soviet help would be needed in settling Xinjiang and Taiwan; (5) The Soviet Union would provide economic and technical aid and send advisors; (6)  Discuss and settle the 1945 treaty signed between the Soviet Union and the Kuomintang government; (7) Establish principles of party relations, on which the cpc Central Committee “is prepared to obey and firmly implement decisions of the cpsu Central Committee,” and it hoped that both sides could send “appropriate political representatives.” Finally, the report went that Mao hoped to pay an open visit to Moscow, the timing and means of which would be subject to Stalin’s consideration.112 On July 11, Stalin had a meeting with Liu Shaoqi, after which they watched four movies and Stalin made introductions about them. At the meeting, few but Stalin spoke. According to Liu Shaoqi’s report to the cpc Central Committee, Stalin showed general approval to all issues related to China’s domestic policies and also gave positive response to cpc’s request for economic, technical and military aid. Stalin remarked that both parties should strengthen relations but he did not agree to the exchange of political representatives. As to when 112 Liu Shaoqi, “Daibiao zhonggong zhongyang gei lian gong (bu) zhongyang sidalin de baogao 代表中共中央给联共（布）中央斯大林的报告 [A report on behalf of the cpc Central Committee to Stalin],” July 4, 1949, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao 建国以来刘少奇文稿 [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:1–​17.

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Mao could visit the Soviet Union, Stalin said that after he founded New China he would be welcome to visit Moscow at any time. Regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations, Stalin said that as soon as the new Chinese government declared its establishment the Soviet Union would offer diplomatic recognition. On the treaty between the Soviet Union and the Kuomintang government, Stalin repeated Mikoyan’s views stated at Xibaipo that all would be dealt with during Mao’s visit to Moscow.113 On the twenty-​seventh, Stalin invited Liu to his dacha in Kuntsevo for dinner. During dinner, Stalin specifically praised that cpc leaders were “Marxists in China,” “the Soviets and Europeans should learn from you.” “The center of revolution … has now shifted to China and East Asia.” “Responsibilities [of the cpc] now grow bigger. You should play your duty in revolutions across East Asian countries” and “should establish close contacts with Southeast Asian countries.” He also excused himself for urging Mao to go to the Chongqing talks, explaining that he faced pressure from the United States and others at the time but in fact he did nothing.114 The secret visit of Liu Shaoqi established the principles that, first, Sino-​ Soviet party relations would be the core of Sino-​Soviet relations after the founding of New China, and relations between cpsu and cpc would follow the principle of lead and being led; second, the trip allowed the cpc to complete the basic preparation of alliance with the Soviet Union. The residual issue was how to address the legacy Sino-​Soviet treaty and whether to sign a new treaty, which was indeed the difficult issue in bilateral relations. cpc leaders must have carried mixed feelings when dealing with the Sino-​ Soviet treaty in 1945, and when they decided to ally with the Soviet Union they ran into an embarrassing situation. If they did not demand the Soviet Union to abandon its invaded rights they would surely be questioned at home and their patriotic image would be severely compromised, although they might not lose control of the situation because of it. On the other hand, they truly felt

113 Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu zhonggong zhongyang daibiao tuan yu lian gong (bu) zhongyang sidalin huitan qingkuang gei zhongyang de dianbao 关于中共中央代表团与联共（布） 中央斯大林会谈情况给中央的电报 [Telegram from Liu Shaoqi to the cpc Central Committee on meeting between the cpc Central Committee delegation and Stalin],” in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:30–​37. 114 Liu Shaoqi, “Tong sidalin tanpan tuifan guomindang wenti 同斯大林谈判推翻国民党 问题 [Negotiation with Stalin on overthrowing the Kuomintang regime],” July 27, 1949, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:40–​41.

44 Chapter 1 uncertain about the attitude of Soviet leaders on this issue. Postwar behaviors of the Soviet Union gave them reasons to doubt whether Stalin would in fact live up to the “proletarian internationalism” as had always been spelled out by the Soviets. From the high-​level exchanges of Mikoyan’s secret visit to Xibaipo and Liu Shaoqi’s secret visit to Moscow, cpc leaders must have glimpsed a clue of Stalin’s attitude toward the Sino-​Soviet treaty. Before the cpc troops marched across the River, cpc leaders were telling non-​ party members that “of the foreign treaties, some will be abandoned, some need to be modified, and some can be kept.”115 Such terms as “need to be modified” or “can be kept” were aiming at the Sino-​Soviet treaty. Before Liu Shaoqi’s secret visit to Moscow, cpc Central Committee must have discussed about signing a new treaty. Liu mentioned to Stalin the wish of signing a new alliance treaty but he also gave the Soviet Union some room for choice. He suggested three options for consideration: first, to keep the 1945 treaty and offer recognition to the new regime; second, to abandon the 1945 treaty and make a new treaty; third, both governments would exchange statements that recommended to maintain the 1945 treaty for the time being and prepare to sign a new treaty at an appropriate time.116 It can be made that the cpc Central Committee through Liu expressed clearly to the Soviet Union that alliance with the Soviet Union had to take place in a new treaty. But Liu did not get a firm reply from Stalin. Liu’s secret visit to the Soviet Union was the cpc Central Committee’s first step toward alliance with the Soviet Union, and it established that the abandonment of the 1945 Sino-​Soviet treaty would be a key factor in whether both sides could successfully build an alliance. On December 16, Mao arrived in Moscow and met with Stalin. He walked into the Kremlin with resolution. His goal was to abandon the 1945 treaty and sign a new alliance treaty with the Soviet Union. Mao stated at the opening of the meeting: “China needs three to five years of peaceful respite to recover its prewar economic level and stabilize the nation.” What he expressed was essentially the main intent of seeking alliance with the Soviet Union, which was to obtain security protection, political support, and economic aid through alliance with the Soviet Union, and signing a new Sino-​Soviet treaty would help to achieve these goals. He told Stalin that after Liu returned to China the

115 Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu heping tanpan de baogao 关于和平谈判的报告 [Report on the peace talks],” April 17, 1949, in Zhou Enlai 周恩来. Zhou Enlai xuan ji 周恩来选集 [Selected works of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1981), 1:321. 116 Liu Shaoqi, “Daibiao zhonggong zhongyang gei sidalin de baogao [A report on behalf of the cpc Central Committee to Stalin],” July 4, 1949, 15.

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cpc Central Committee discussed the issue of signing a treaty with the Soviet Union. Obviously, cpc leaders placed conclusion of a new treaty on top of the agenda of this Sino-​Soviet talk. Stalin must have also given careful thoughts to it. He immediately replied that the Soviet side believed it was not time to modify the 1945 treaty in order to avoid offering an incentive to the United States to modify the Yalta secret agreement, otherwise it would affect agreements related to the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin Islands and leave the Soviet Union at a disadvantage. He proposed instead to leave the treaty unaltered in form, but in practice the Soviet troops could withdraw from Lvshun and “some changes could be made” to the disputed part related to China Changchun Railway. As in the past, Stalin was mainly concerned about Lvshun and Soviet military establishment, and “leave the treaty unaltered” meant no changes to Lvshun. As with the main parts of the treaty and other related agreements, Stalin had no plan to discuss with Mao. Mao replied that the cpc Central Committee had not “considered the positions of the us and the UK in Yalta agreement,” and he believed “it was unnecessary to modify the treaty now or withdraw the troops from Lvshun in a hurry.” But “one idea is popular among the public opinion” in China that since the Kuomintang government had collapsed the 1945 treaty was useless. Confronted with Mao’s perseverance, Stalin made some concession and proposed that the 1945 treaty could be modified and with major changes but it had to wait until two years later. Mao certainly was reluctant because with the 1945 treaty in place the new regime could not build alliance with the Soviet Union, or otherwise it would harm the legitimacy of the cpc rule. And if alliance could not be built between China and the Soviet Union, Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union would have much less significance. Hence, when Stalin said that Zhou Enlai needed not come to Moscow, Mao insisted that some agreements should be signed and Zhou Enlai needed to come.117 After the meeting, Mao made a telegram to the cpc Central Committee, which said that issues related to the treaty required further negotiation. The cpc Politburo held a meeting on the twenty-​first and felt unsure about the result of the negotiation, and after the meeting they sent a telegram that suggested that whether Zhou Enlai should go to Moscow would have to wait for 117 “Minutes of meeting between Mao Zedong and Stalin,” December 16, 1949, accessed at Shanghai:  Library of Center for Cold War International History Studies, East China Normal University, Call Number:  NO.00255; Pei, ed., Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo waijiao shi (1949–​1956) [Diplomatic history of People’s Repubic of China 1949–​1956], 17–​18; “Si da lin yu mao zedong huitan jilu [Record of meeting between Stalin and Mao Zedong],” December 16, 1949, Dang shi yanjiu ziliao 5 (1998).

46 Chapter 1 further results from Mao’s meetings in Moscow.118 Mao replied the next day that he would make the final strategy during meetings with Stalin on either the twenty-​third or the twenty-​fourth.119 On the same day, Mao offered two options of the talks to Stalin through Kovalev: first, Zhou Enlai would come to Moscow to negotiate and settle the 1945 Sino-​Soviet treaty; or second, both sides would hold extensive discussion on the issues without having to reach an agreement.120 On the twenty-​fourth, Mao met with Stalin again. The latter apparently became more negative, for he not only made no reply to Mao’s proposal as stated above but he no longer talked on issues related to the 1945 Sino-​Soviet treaty. From Mao’s point of view, Stalin clearly had no intention of solving the 1945 Sino-​Soviet treaty issue or even any interest in signing any agreements. It was considered a display of chauvinistic arrogance, and Mao became upset for quite some time before he lost resistance and finally showed his discontent to the Soviet side.121 The main reason for Stalin’s negative attitude was that the cpsu changed its view toward cpc Central Committee’s domestic and foreign policies. On the twenty-​second when Kovalev had a meeting with Mao, he soon sent a report to Stalin about China’s situation that had negative comments on all of cpc’s policies, for it stated that the cpc Central Committee was problematic in implementing almost all recommendations that Stalin gave since January; also, “the central government was unable to establish central control of the whole country,” its foreign policies had “illusions” about UK and us “recognition,” it even “intentionally kept silent” on building diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia, and so on.122 Kovalev’s report easily caught attention of the cpsu leadership as there had been concerns about the cpc Central Committee for some time inside the cpsu, but Kovalev’s intention of taking such action was certainly suspicious. Since he had exchanges with cpc leaders for a long time during his stay in 118 Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu Zhou Enlai qu mosike de shiji deng wenti gei mao zedong de dianbao 关于周恩来去莫斯科的时机等问题给毛泽东的电报 [Telegram to Mao Zedong regarding the timing of Zhou Enlai’s visit to Moscow and other issues],” December 21, 1949, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:218. 119 Pei, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao shi (1949–​1956) [Diplomatic history of People’s Repubic of China 1949–​1956], 18. 120 N. B. Kovalyov, “Conversation between Mao Zedong and Stalin,” 32. 121 Shi, Zai lishijuren shen bian [Standing beside historical giants], 438. 122 “Report from Kovalyov to Stalin,” December 24, 1949, accessed at Shanghai: Library of Center for Cold War International History Studies, East China Normal University, Call Number: NO. 13860 (20745).

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China, why did he suddenly submit a report that almost totally deviated from his previous perceptions? Perhaps he read Stalin’s mind and tried to cater to his suspicion? Regardless of the reasons, Stalin was certainly affected by Kovalev. He later handed over Kovalev’s secret report to Mao and criticized Kovalev for “inappropriately digging into politics.” On January 2, 1950, the Soviet side showed a significant change in attitude. That day, Molotov and others were instructed to go to Mao’s residence and discuss with Mao about the content of the next meeting and the cpc Central Committee’s positions. Mao immediately gave three options for the Soviet side to choose from: first, abandon the 1945 treaty and sign a new treaty; second, make a brief public announcement through the press of both countries that both sides had reached consensus on major issues; third, publish a joint statement on key points of bilateral relations. Molotov immediately replied that the first option was best and Zhou Enlai should be invited to Moscow for negotiation.123 Mao felt much better. He immediately telegraphed the cpc Central Committee and asked Zhou to make all preparations and immediately depart for Moscow. And before his trip Zhou should explain clearly at home that the negotiation was to sign “a new Sino-​Soviet friendship alliance treaty.” Mao’s judgment at the time was that the new treaty “would create some changes on the Lvshun-​Dalian issue,” whereas the “basic spirit” would still be opposition to foreign aggression and “recognizing independence of outer Mongolia.” To establish Sino-​Soviet alliance under such conditions would help the new regime “occupy a more favorable position,” including forcing the United States and others to offer unconditional diplomatic recognition and “without dare moves.” In a word, while it was imperfect, it was beneficial for enhancing the new regime’s international position.124 Mao was prepared to face different voices at home that would be provoked by some content of the new treaty. He used all occasions to continue to persuade the Soviet side that it had to reflect “completely new relations” between both countries, for as he told the Soviets, “some Chinese have long opposed the 123 “Mao Zedong guanyu Zhou Enlai qu sulian canjia tanpan wenti gei zhonggong zhongyang de dianbao 毛泽东关于周恩来去苏联参加谈判问题给中共中央的电报 [Telegram from Mao Zedong to the cpc Central Committee on Zhou Enlai’s trip to the Soviet Union for negotiation],” January 2, 1950, in CCCPC Party Literature Research Office 中央文献研 究室, ed. Jianguo yi lai zhongyao wenxian xuan bian 建国以来重要文献选编 [Selected key documents since founding of People’s Republic of China] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), 1:95–​96. 124 Ibid, 1:97.

48 Chapter 1 existing Sino-​Soviet treaty.”125 According to Liu Shaoqi’s telegram to Mao, democratic parties had no objection to signing a new treaty, but on concrete issues they were not short of different opinions.126 After returning home, Mao continued to emphasize that the Sino-​Soviet treaty was “a patriotic treaty,” and that it met with China’s needs of economic development and national security.127 In March, the signing of the Sino-​Soviet agreements on the Oil Corporation and Nonferrous Metal Corporation provoked unrest at home, which indirectly proved the necessity of Mao’s aforementioned statements. As seen from documents drafted by Liu Shaoqi, upon publicity the two agreements received questioning and strong criticisms from some youth students.128 On January 20, Zhou Enlai reached Moscow. On the twenty-​second, Mao, Zhou, and Stalin held a meeting to decide on the content and principles of next phase talks. Stalin readily remarked that the upcoming talks would first solve the issue of the 1945 treaty. He said, “Go Shit!” with the Yalta agreement. Mao proposed that the new treaty should consist of three aspects: the confirmation of bilateral friendship, economic cooperation, and security alliance. Stalin expressed full agreement. They also discussed concrete principles related to China Changchun Railway, Lvshun, and Dalian, as well as working principles of loans, military aid, and economic cooperation.129 The meeting between

125 “Mao Zedong yu wei xin si ji tanhua jiyao 毛泽东与维辛斯基谈话纪要 [Minutes of conversation between Mao Zedong and Vyshinsky],” January 6, 1950, in Dang shi yanjiu ziliao 5 (1998), 10. 126 Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu dangpai xieshang huiyi deng qingkuang gei Mao Zedong de dianbao 关于党派协商会议等情况给毛泽东的电报 [Telegram to Mao Zedong on Political Consultative Conference and others],” January 8, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:240. 127 Mao Zedong, “Dijie zhong su tiaoyue he xieding de zhongda yiyi 缔结中苏条约和协定 的重大意义 [The crucial significance of concluding Sino-​Soviet treaty and agreement],” April 11, 1950, in CCCPC Party History Research Center and PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 中央党史研究室、中国外交部, eds. Mao Zedong waijiao wen xuan 毛泽东外 交文选 [Selected works of Mao Zedong on foreign affairs] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe and zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1994), 131–​132. 128 Liu Shaoqi, “Zhongyang guanyu xiang qunzhong jieshi zhong su he ban gufen gongsi wenti de dianbao 中央关于向群众解释中苏合办股份公司问题的电报 [Telegram from the cpc Central Committee on explaining Sino-​Soviet joint stock company to the people],” March 30, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:501–​502. 129 “Minutes of conversation between Mao Zedong and Stalin,” January 22, 1950, accessed at Shanghai:  Library of Center for Cold War International History Studies, East China Normal University, Call Number: NO.00260.

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Stalin and cpc leaders was no doubt a success; but after the twenty-​third as the talks entered discussion on specific treaty clauses, negotiators of both sides, Zhou and Voitinskii, sometimes engaged in sharp “bargaining” on key issues including China Eastern Railway, Lvshun, and Dalian. In addition, by provision of military aid Stalin also insisted on reaching a Supplement Agreement that would restrict other countries from entering Northeast China and Xinjiang.130 On February 14, 1950, both sides signed the “Sino-​Soviet Alliance and Friendship Treaty.” It signaled the birth of Sino-​Soviet alliance. On the negotiation itself, the final agreements were certainly not completely satisfactory to both sides but were the result of a series of coordination and compromise, which was no different to negotiations between many other countries. At that particular point in history, however, an alliance carried more complex meanings to Chinese leaders. First, the signing of the Sino-​Soviet alliance treaty meant that New China declared its clear stance on the Soviet side in the Cold War. It was a long journey before the cpc joined alliance with the Soviet Union. Even the emergence of the idea was somewhat a coincidence. At the time cpc leaders apparently paid more emphasis to revolutionary relations between both parties and, in their understanding, China’s primary duty in the alliance was to assist revolutions in Asia, which soon directly led China to entangle itself in military conflicts in Indochina and on the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, to cpc leaders the Sino-​Soviet alliance was a controversial course. The decision of cpc leaders to ally with the Soviet Union came at the period of transition from large-​scale violent revolution to nation-​building, whereas the main motivation of seeking such alliance was to achieve the goals and ideals of revolution. But no matter how strong the revolutionary impetus was or what huge impact it would have, “nation-​building” would unleash its power in foreign policy-​making from the outset as it had rather different and even incompatible appeals from the revolutionary movement. During the pursuit of alliance with the Soviet Union, cpc leaders showed a position that increasingly reflected national interest (though far from sufficient), and 130 The details of the negotiation can be founded in:  Shen Zhihua, ed., Zhong su guanxi shi gang:  1917–​1991 nian zhong su ruogan wenti zai tantao 中苏关系史纲:1917–​ 1991年中苏关系若干问题再探讨 [Historic outline of Sino-​Soviet relations: renewed discussion on some issues in Sino-​Soviet relations during 1917–​1991] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2011), 117–​122; Pei, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao shi (1949–​1956) [Diplomatic History of PRC (1949–​1956)], 21–​25; “Yu Mao Zedong de tanhua jilu 与毛泽东的谈话记录 [Record of conversation with Mao Zedong],” March 31, 1956, Guowai zhonggong dang shi yanjiu 2 (1995), 21–​22.

50 Chapter 1 they had to respond to domestic (and their own) nationalist appeals, otherwise legitimacy of the cpc revolution would be severely affected. Mao set out seeking alliance with the Soviet Union in order to achieve revolutionary goals, but in the process he bargained with Stalin for “nation-​building” and had complaints about Stalin. Alliance with the Soviet Union was therefore only the beginning of the historical fate of Sino-​Soviet relations.

Section 3: The Road to Confrontation

When cpc leaders were seeking alliance with the Soviet Union, they also embarked on a road to confrontation with the United States. These two choices came at the same time and seemed not contradictory to each other. During the spring and summer of 1948, as cpc military successively conquered some large and medium-​sized cities in North China, cpc leaders finally came to directly deal with relations with the official agencies of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and so on, and policy towards the United States occupied the agenda since then. Besides the continued use of anti-​imperialism slogan for political mobilization, the leaders had to consider more complicated issues such as preventing us military intervention and tackling the us diplomatic recognition problem. In terms of preventing us military intervention, the cpc Central Committee was sharp in words as usual but meticulous and prudent in action. In particular, cpc leaders stringently required that all actions involving conflicts or disputes with us troops be taken only after requesting for instructions. In the cpc Central Committee’s instruction to East China Bureau on the matter of negotiation over five detained us military personnel, on March 24, 1948, the cpc Central Committee elaborated on how to behave “on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint,” and stated in particular that “in any diplomatic negotiation, by central government or local government, diplomatic representatives must not announce breakdown of negotiations without instructions,” and that “from now on, any diplomatic documents must be approved by the cpc Central Committee before its issuance.”131 In comparison, the issue of diplomatic “recognition” was much more complicated. At the beginning, cpc leaders were willing to establish official relations with countries such as the United States at the local government level. In late July 1948, North China Bureau reported to the cpc Central Committee that 131 “Zhongyang guanyu dui meiguo waijiao douzheng celüe de zhishi 中央关于对美国外 交斗争策略的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee on strategy of diplomatic fight against the United States],” March 24, 1948.

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a French Consul expressed the willingness to establish “diplomatic relations” with the cpc authority. cpc leaders instructed North China Bureau to “accept unofficially,” deeming it probable that France was encouraged by the United States to sound out cpc’s intention, and therefore, North China Bureau needed to convey that “the Liberated Area of North China is willing to establish diplomatic relations with other countries.”132 Such reaction of cpc leaders hardly conveyed thoughtfulness, for they lacked both knowledge and experience in this field and thus acted with much caution. For example, the aforementioned principles were instructed to only apply to North China, with the requirement “not to rush into any specific agreement.”133 The principles instructed by the cpc Central Committee that applied to North China soon expanded to Northeastern China with some positive modification. Soon after cpc troops took over Shenyang on November 2, the cpc Central Committee were confronted with the issue of dealing with the us Consulate in Shenyang, and so for the first time the cpc Central Committee clearly put forward the goal of obliging the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and others to acknowledge the legitimacy of cpc local governments. On October 29, the cpc Central Committee telegraphed and ordered Northeast China Bureau on the matter of Consulates and foreign residents of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and other countries, requiring it to set up agencies specialized in dealing with foreign affairs, to observe instructions of the cpc Central Committee, to request instructions from the cpc Central Committee before taking any actions, and “not to make any careless decisions.” So far, the cpc Central Committee did not intend to sever diplomatic relations with the United States, but to “pressure” the United States to “have no other choice but acknowledge” the “status and power” of cpc local governments.134 132 “Zhongyang guanyu dui faguo lingshi yaoqiu yu wo jianli waijiao guanxi wenti gei huabei ju de zhishi 中央关于对法国领事要求与我建立外交关系问题给华北局的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to North China Bureau on the request of the French Consulate General to establish diplomatic relations with us],” July 28, 1948. 133 Ibid; “Zhongyang guanyu yu ying shangtan maoyi wenti gei Fang Fang tongzhi de zhishi 中央关于对法国领事要求与我建立外交关系问题给华北局的指示  [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to comrade Fangfang on the trade negotiation with the United Kingdom],” September 25, 1948, in Zhou Enlai nian pu 1898–​1949 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai 1898–​1949], 789. 134 “Zhongyang guanyu dui ying, mei, fa deng guo lingshiguan ji qiaomin de taidu he fangzhen ying an cou yu dian chuli gei dongbei ju de zhishi 中央关于对英、美、法等国领 事馆及侨民的态度和方针应按丑虞电处理给东北局的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to Northeast Bureau on settling British, us, and French consulates and foreign residents by the principle of “Chou Yu” telegram],” October 29, 1948.

52 Chapter 1 On November 1, the Northeast Bureau forwarded a report to the cpc Central Committee, asking for instruction on how to deal with foreign affairs issues when taking over Shenyang. The report asked for instructions on such matters as whether to shut down foreign banks, and whether to send troops to guard Consulates of foreign countries. The Northeast Bureau didn’t know how to handle the situation where business organizations of both the Soviet Union and western countries co-​existed in Shenyang, and also, the Shenyang Military Administrative Committee was concerned with potential diplomatic disputes resulting from possible attacks of foreign consulates by Kuomintang secret agents.135 On the same day, Zhou Enlai drafted a long telegram to the Northeast Bureau, reminding them to pay special attention to the peculiar circumstances of Shenyang. To exercise caution, the Northeast Bureau should not disrupt normal business of foreign banks at the moment, and should provide armed protection for foreign consulates and not inspect their personnel or rooms inside. To quote from Zhou’s telegram, “We are extremely unfamiliar with many diplomatic issues and international traditions,” and the Northeast Bureau should consult with Soviet experts; however, the Soviet opinions could only be “considered as suggestions,” and “any matter related to policies should be reported to and ask for instructions from the cpc Central Committee.” Zhou also asked the Northeast Bureau to send message to each and every consulate “not to set up radio station,” and if they had radio, they should hand the radio over to the cpc Shenyang Government. Zhou believed that consulates of the United States, United Kingdom, and other countries had secret radios, but the Northeast Bureau “must not enter and search foreign consulates until” those secret radios had been investigated and confirmed in secret and the cpc Central Committee had given its permission.136 On November 5, Zhu Qiwen, Mayor of Shenyang, received Consuls of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and other countries and paid a return visit to these Consulates without asking for permission. Zhu’s acts were not completely against the cpc Central Committee’s policies on foreign affairs, because 135 “Dongbei ju guanyu chuli waiguo yinhang, lingshiguan de qingshi 东北局关于处理外 国银行、领事馆的请示 [Request for instruction from Northeast Bureau on settling foreign banks and consulates],” November 1, 1948, in Zhou Enlai nian pu 1898–​1949 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai 1898–​1949], 794. 136 “Zhongyang guanyu chuli waiguo yinhang ji lingshiguan wenti gei dongbei ju de zhishi 中央关于处理外国银行及领事馆问题给东北局的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to Northeast Bureau on settling foreign banks and consulates],” November 1, 1948, in Zhou Enlai nian pu 1898–​1949 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai 1898–​1949], 794.

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without such action, it was hard to follow some of the cpc Central Committee’s instructions on October 29, such as conveying relevant regulations of the Northeast Bureau to foreign consulates and pressuring them to acknowledge the legitimacy of the cpc Shenyang government. Soon afterward, the Northeast Bureau sharply criticized Zhu and reported to the cpc Central Committee. But what concerned the cpc Central Committee was that Zhu, as the mayor of Shenyang, contacted official representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France without permission. Apparently, the cpc had not coordinated its central and local branches well, and local authorities did not meet requirements of cpc leaders in recognizing the sensitivity and significance of diplomatic disciplines. On November 10, based on report of the Northeast Bureau, the cpc Central Committee came up with the idea of using military control to limit personnel activities of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, hoping that after a long while of stalemate they would be driven to withdraw from Shenyang, for as the Northeast Bureau reported, Consulates of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France didn’t acknowledge legitimacy of the cpc Shenyang Authority. The cpc Central Committee instructed the Northeast Bureau to take strong countermeasures while maintaining prudence and asking for permission before taking any actions.137 By now, cpc leaders bore the thought of driving Consulates of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France out of Shenyang, but they were very cautious about choosing what specific means to use. On the fifteenth, the Shenyang Military Administrative Commission notified Consulates of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to hand over their radio stations within thirty-​six hours. The Northeast China Bureau took such measure for two main reasons. First, it was to execute earlier instructions from the cpc Central Committee. The other reason was the dramatic change of military situation and the response of the Soviet Union to this issue. As Liao-​ Shen Campaign was about to end, Mao Zedong had begun to discuss with Lin Biao and others about having the Fourth Field Army secretly move to North China Area to join the upcoming Peking-​Tianjin Campaign. In mid-​November, the cpc Central Committee decided to end rehabilitation of the main body of the Northeast Field Army ahead of schedule and ordered them to secretly

137

Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 39; Yang Kuisong 杨奎松, Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo jianguo shi yanjiu 中华人 民共和国建国史研究 [A Study of the history of establishment of People’s Republic of China] (Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 2009), 55; Zhou Enlai nian pu 1898–​1949 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai 1898–​1949], 796.

54 Chapter 1 move to North China Area as soon as possible. The cpc Central Committee and Headquarter of the Fourth Field Army both believed that confidentiality was the key to success of this strategic move. Mao personally kept an eye on the radio stations of foreign Consulates, and he even instructed armies stationed around Shenyang to “better set out later because enemy would be noticed of our moves through their radio station in Shenyang.”138 At times when military success mattered the most, diplomacy was only side dish to fit military operations; and when diplomacy didn’t meet the objectives of military operations, diplomacy had to step aside. This was a very significant setting that determined the change of cpc policies and the subsequent fate of the us Consulate. Faced with the complex situation, the cpc chose the most effective means to protect confidentiality. The day after Shenyang Military Administrative Commission sent out the notices, Marinin, the General Consul of the Soviet Union in Harbin, proposed to Gao Gang that they should confiscate radio stations in Consulates of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. He said that “this is important to the Soviet Union,” implying that this proposal came from the Soviet leadership. Gao told Marinin then that notices were already send out to foreign Consulates to hand over their radios, and the Northeast China Bureau planned to “drive away” the us Consulate, through the exact means of confiscation of radio station.139 He then telegraphed the cpc Central Committee and asked it to consider his proposal during the meeting of “driving away” the us Consulate. The cpc leaders replied soon that they agreed on Gao’s objective of “driving Consulates of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France away,” and they required Gao to inform Marinin that the cpc would “definitely coordinate with the Soviet Union on its foreign policies.” At the end of the telegram, cpc leaders also told Gao to keep some caution, and “diplomatic strategies and tactics will be notified in another telegram.”140 The policy of “driving away” the us Consulate was seemingly thus decided; nevertheless, cpc leaders somehow felt that they should consider its impact from a bigger picture.

138 Mao Zedong, “Xian yi si ge zongdui ye xing xiao su mimi ru guan 先以四个纵队夜行晓 宿秘密入关 [Send four battalions first to travel at night and rest in the day to enter the gate in secrecy],” November 20, 1948, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 5:253. 139 “You fang yaoqiu moshou mei ying fa zai shen diantai 友方要求没收美英法在沈电台 [Ally requires us to confiscate us, UK, and French transmitter receivers in Shenyang],” November 16, 1948, CCCPC Archives Bureau. 140 “Tongyi ji zou Shenyang mei ying fa lingshiguan de fangzhen 同意挤走沈阳美英法领 事馆的方针 [Consent to the strategy of driving out us, UK, and French consulates in Shenyang],” November 17, 1948, CCCPC Archives Bureau.

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Although the cpc Central Committee agreed with the “driving away” policy, they could not tolerate the Shenyang Military Administrative Commission for their action without advance request for instructions. On November 17, after thirty-​six hours passed since the notice went out, the Shenyang Military Administrative Commission reported to the cpc Central Committee that the us Consulate replied that us nationals in China didn’t have any transceivers, but neither did they mention anything about radio station in the Consulate nor hand over any radio station. The Shenyang Military Administrative Commission asked the cpc Central Committee for approval on their entry into the us Consulate by force to confiscate its radio station.141 The cpc Central Committee in reply castigated the Shenyang Military Administrative Commission for sending out notices without asking for instruction on the fifteenth, and then not executing the notice after the us Consulate refused to hand over radio station for thirty-​six hours but asking the cpc Central Committee instead for instructions on such situation. All of these were “huge mistakes.” The telegram ordered the Shenyang Military Administrative Commission to send a warning to the us Consulate that if the Consulate continued to refuse to hand over their radio station in the next couple of hours, the Shenyang Military Administrative Commission would enter the Consulate to search for and confiscate the radio station. Also, the Consulate staff should be notified that due to their contempt toward the Shenyang Military Administrative Commission’s order, they would be prohibited from “free contact with the outside world.” The cpc Central Committee believed that “by putting out some restrictions on the old us Consulate, they would know the difficulty and retreat,” thus accomplishing the goal of driving the us Consulate away.142 After receiving the telegram from the cpc Central Committee, Wu Xiuquan, deputy director of the Shenyang Military Administrative Commission received the us Consul Angus I. Ward and demanded the us side to hand over the radio station, but was rejected by the latter. The Northeast China Bureau immediately asked the cpc Central Committee for instructions on whether they could enter the Consulate to confiscate the radio station by force. On the eighteenth, Mao wrote his opinions on the telegram, from which we could read more calmness from his mind. He wrote, “It seems quite appropriate that the us Consulate is still 141 “Qing ji shi duiwai ling diantai chuli banfa 请即示对外领电台处理方法 [Request for immediate instruction on settlement of transmitter-​receivers in foreign consulates],” November 17, 1948, CCCPC Archives Bureau. 142 “Guanyu shenyang jiu lingshiguan jiao chu diantai wenti 关于沈阳旧领事馆交出电台 问题 [On old consulates in Shenyang handing over transmitter-​receivers],” November 18, 1948, CCCPC Archives Bureau.

56 Chapter 1 entitled to its ownership of the radio station, but we will temporarily keep it and return it when both countries build diplomatic ties in the future.”143 Apparently, cpc leaders did not plan to raise the level of confrontation at this stage. The next day, Zhou Enlai drafted a reply telegram that was mild in tone and carefully thought in content. It instructed the Shenyang Military Administrative Commission to state clearly upon entering the us Consulate and taking over the radio, that it would not recognize the us Consulate as a legitimate diplomatic institution but rather foreign residents, and it would protect their safety and “unofficial diplomatic exchanges”; if the us Consulate acted in violation of orders and regulations, the Shenyang Military Administrative Commission was authorized to limit their personal freedom to the extent of “deport from China.” In particular, the telegram required the Shenyang Military Administrative Commission to state that the radio taken over would be kept, not confiscated, by the cpc, and it “would be returned when diplomatic relations are built between both sides or when personnel of the legacy us Consulate are to return to the us from Shenyang.” The telegram further required the Shenyang Military Administrative Commission to take extreme caution and not give any handle to the United States.144 This is the earliest documented record so far where the cpc Central Committee implied the possibility of future diplomatic relations with the United States and such possibility could be expressed to an official us institution. The Northeast Bureau did not receive Zhou’s telegram until six p.m. on the following day. Five hours earlier, the Shenyang Military Administrative Commission had already entered the Consulate where they not only took over the radio and related devices, but also imposed blockade of the us Consulate, restricted freedom of action of the Consulate personnel, and cut off electricity and telephone connection. All such measures except taking over the radio were suggested by the Soviet Union, for as the Northeast Bureau reported to the cpc Central Committee, the Soviets told them that these were what Kuomintang did to the Soviet institutions stationed in Shenyang. The Northeast Bureau also reported that while “the us Consulate personnel were generally rather 143 “Lin luo chen guanyu dao mei lingshiguan qiang qu diantai xiang zhongyang de qingshi 林罗陈关于到美领事馆强取电台向中央的请示 [Request for instruction from Lin, Luo, and Chen to the cpc Central Committee on taking transmitter-​receivers from us Consulate by force],” November 18, 1948, CCCPC Archives Bureau. 144 “Zhongyang guanyu shenyang jiu meiguo lingshiguan ju jiao diantai chuli banfa gei lin biao deng tongzhi de zhishi 中央关于沈阳旧美领事馆拒交电台处理办法给林彪等 同志的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to Lin Biao and other comrades on tackling with the refusal of the old us consulate in Shenyang to hand over the transmitter-​receivers],” November 19, 1948, CCCPC Archives Bureau.

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obedient” during the radio takeover, “there seemed reasons to deport them from China.”145 The Northeast Bureau was apparently more intent to “drive away” the us Consulate as soon as possible, for diplomatic issues were such big trouble to those local leaders that they would rather pick the simple and easy solution, which was to get rid of Americans in their jurisdiction. The measures taken by the Shenyang Military Administrative Commission were beyond its authorization obtained from the cpc Central Committee. When informed about the Shenyang Military Administrative Commission’s blockade of the us Consulate, Mao first instructed that Consulates of the United Kingdom and France should receive more moderate treatment than the us Consulate, and then Mao censured the Northeast Bureau for ignoring the authority of the cpc Central Committee. “It is way too dangerous that Shenyang’s diplomatic moves were taken without requesting prior instruction, such as cutting off electricity and telephone connection.”146 The cpc Central Committee’s repeated criticism of the Northeast Bureau for violation of diplomatic disciplines demonstrated that actions of the Shenyang Military Administrative Commission indeed deviated from policies of the cpc Central Committee, and not just in aspect of following diplomatic disciplines. On November 23, the cpc Central Committee telegraphed leaders of the Northeast Bureau and elaborated its us policy. They reiterated that any diplomatic action should request for prior instruction, and criticized that the Northeast Bureau’s cutoff of the us Consulate’s electricity and telephone connection was “in utter breach of the cpc Central Committee regulation that all diplomatic actions be taken with prior instruction.” The Northeast region should “consult the big picture, not take any rash moves,” and any action “must request for instruction from the cpc Central Committee, otherwise it would be quite dangerous.” More significantly, they elaborated the possibility of developing official relations with the United States in the future, thus any actions taken in Shenyang should consult the overall diplomatic picture. They put forward principles as such: first, give the United States some different treatment from the United Kingdom and France; second, the Northeast China region is unique to some extent and the policy of “driving away” the us Consulate as applied 145 “Dongbei ju chang wei guanyu jieshou jiu meiguo lingshiguan diantai qingkuang de baogao 东北局常委关于接收旧美国领事馆电台情况的报告 [Report from the North­ east Buraeu Standing Committee on taking over transmitter-​receivers of old us consulate],” November 20, 1948, CCCPC Archives Bureau. 146 “Dui ying fa taidu ying jiao dui mei shaowei hehuan xie 对英法态度应较对美稍微和 缓些 [Attitude toward the United Kingdom and France should be slightly more conciliatory than toward the United States],” November 21, 1948, CCCPC Archives Bureau.

58 Chapter 1 in the Northeast China region may not be practical in other areas of China; third, that we do not acknowledge diplomatic relations between Kuomintang Government and other countries like the United States “doesn’t mean we will never develop diplomatic relations with these imperialist countries.”147 Earlier, the cpc Central Committee told the Northeast Bureau in the November 17 telegram that “overall diplomatic strategy and tactics” will be informed in another telegram. After five days of consideration and dealing with various incidents during this period, the cpc leaders finally elaborated their vision. They had apparently given it careful consideration, and their vision was much more complicated than the publicized anti-​u s cant, for they had at least considered keeping some room for maneuver for the future. Shortly thereafter, the Northeast Bureau reported seizure of a spy and uncovering of a spy group, and the busted spies admitted their relations with the us Consulate in Shenyang. The Northeast Bureau thus judged that the us Consulate might possess a secret radio. The Northeast Bureau urged to investigate the connections between the spy group and the Americans, and was apparently inclined to driving away the us Consulate as soon as possible. The cpc leaders soon replied with “comfort” seeing the resolute action of the Northeast Bureau, and said they had been aware of the spy radio and were concerned that it might threaten military operation of the Fourth Field Army moving into the North China region. They also pointed out, however, that before connections between the us Consulate and the spy organization were confirmed and the secret radio in the us Consulate was confirmed, they do not approve total prohibition of engagement between us Consulate personnel or search of Angus I. Ward’s personal residence. Meanwhile, the Northeast Bureau insisted that investigation of the espionage case requires prohibiting engagement between Consulate personnel. In late December, the cpc Central Committee further instructed the Northeast Bureau that they should loosen restrictions on the us Consulate personnel starting from the Christmas Day if no progress was made over the espionage case.148 Subsequent events showed that how to resolve the issue of the us Consulate was in fact put aside at that time.

147 “Zhongyang guanyu ji zou mei ying fa lingshiguan wenti gei dongbei ju dian [Telegram from the cpc Central Committee to Northeast Bureau on driving out us, UK, and French consulates],” November 23, 1948, in Zhou Enlai nian pu 1898–​1949 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai 1898–​1949], 799–​800. 148 “Zhongyang guanyu dui shenyang zhi mei ying fa jiu lingshiguan renyuan de duice gei dongbei ju de zhishi 中央关于对沈阳之美英法旧领事馆人员的对策给东北局的 指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to Northeast Bureau on the strategy of treating staff of the old us, UK, and French foreign consulates in Shenyang],” December 25, 1948, CCCPC Archives Bureau.

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The process of handling the us Consulate case in Shenyang suggested that the cpc policies were both obscure and unstable. Lacking proper diplomatic knowledge and experience, cpc leaders were no doubt cautious, sometimes even nervous. On the other hand, policies among the cpc Central Committee, the Northeast Bureau and Shenyang Military Administrative Commission were far from being coordinated and smooth, to the extent that sometimes cpc leaders could hardly maintain its control over actions of the local bureaus in Northeast China. cpc leaders had been trying to avoid aggravation of relations with the United States, at the same time hoping that actions in Shenyang would not automatically extend to other regions. During the later stage of resolving the us Consulate case in Shenyang, some subsequent events unrelated to the issue also had an impact on the cpc Central Committee’s decision-​making. In early December, the cpc Central Committee received a secret report from Hong Kong. As the report ran, an American journalist named Lei Hewen told cpc representative in Hong Kong that now the core of us policies toward China is “to build an effective opposition party” in the new Chinese government. The United States was willing to recognize the future new Chinese government under the conditions that there is an opposition party acceptable to the United States in the government, and that the United States maintains its right to station troops in Shanghai and Qingdao. Mao reacted strongly to it. He concluded that the United States schemed to create an opposition fraction within the cpc, and thus we must stay vigilant to break the “political conspiracy” of the United States. Mao asked his comrades to pass the report around.149 On December 30, in his New Year address entitled “Carrying the Revolution Through to the End,” Mao described the United States as a lethal threat to the cpc, which is “organizing an opposition fraction within the revolutionary camp” in order to prevent the cpc from infringing upon us interest and to give the reactionaries an opportunity to rest and “strike back on a morning to strangle the revolution.”150 At a Politburo meeting in early January 1949, cpc leaders were mainly under the framework of how to achieve the final victory of war when thinking and

149 Mao Zedong, “Dui (lei he wen tanhua zhaiyao) de piyu 对（雷和文谈话摘要）的批 语 [Comments on summary of Lei Hewen’s remarks],” December 4, 1948, in Mao Zedong nian pu 1893–​1949 [Chronicle of Mao Zedong 1893–​1949], 2:410–​411. 150 Mao Zedong, “Jiang geming jinxing dao di 将革命进行到底 [Carry the revolution through to the end],” December 31, 1948, in Mao, Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], 4:1375.

60 Chapter 1 discussing about the issue of mutual “recognition” with the United States. They believed that Lei Hewen’s remarks was a signal released by the us government as the United States might even use recognition of the new government “to obtain legal status” so that it could implement “destruction from inside,” the conspiracy of which we must “destroy with resolution.”151 On the other hand, the complex situation met in Shenyang had made cpc leaders realize that diplomacy with the United States is not pressing but still troublesome, and the cheapest option is to put it aside for a while. Thus, during the meeting, cpc leaders decided “no urge to press for” recognition from the United States, both because “we are to defeat it, not to recognize it” and because we still lack diplomatic experience, and thus “no urge to settle it.” Mao even suggested that “it is better with no recognition.” Shortly after this meeting, Mikoyan, member of the Soviet Politburo, visited Xibaipo and brought the cpc relations with the Soviet Union closer, which no doubt strengthened cpc leaders’ inclination toward “no recognition.” During the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh cpc National Congress in March, Mao proposed the policy of no urge to obtain “diplomatic recognition” from the United States, and planned “no urge to settle it” for a long period of time.152 In the document published after the meeting, the cpc Central Committee reiterated “absolute no recognition” of foreign relations of the Kuomintang government, and required tighter control over official representatives of the United States, including “surveillance with military personnel and restriction of personal freedom.”153 However, some events that took place around the time of cpc’s takeover of Nanjing showed that Mao’s “no recognition” was not that absolute. On April 17, Zhou Enlai briefed democratic personages who were about to attend the new Political Consultative Conference, that although issues of principle in diplomacy were “unnegotiable,” it “still demands caution and to exercise reason, prudence and advantage to our side to solve issues.” He disclosed that “the United States is not refusing to build relations with China and John

151 “Muqian xingshi he dang zai 1949 nian de renwu 目前形势和党在1949年的任务 [The current situation and the party’s tasks in 1949],” January 8, 1949, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuan ji [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee], 18:17–​18. 152 Mao Zedong, “Zai zhongguo gongchandang di qi jie zhongyang weiyuan hui di er ci quanti huiyi shang de baogao [Report at the the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh cpc Central Committee],” March 5, 1945, in Mao, Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], 4:1435. 153 “Zhongyang guanyu waijiao gongzuo de zhishi [Instrution from the cpc Central Committee on diplomacy],” in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuan ji [Selected documents of the cpc Central Committee], 18:45.

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Stuart has been networking with us everywhere.” The cpc position is to pursue negotiation, “not severing diplomatic relations, nor rushing into establishing diplomatic relations.”154 And by this time, the cpc Central Committee had decided to send Huang Hua, a graduate from Peking University, to engage with John Stuart in Nanjing. Their words and deeds showed that “no recognition” had incorporated a new meaning of “no severance.” Meanwhile, the us embassy in China did not move to Guangzhou with the Kuomintang government, and John Stuart upon approval by the us State Department also proposed and looked for channels to get in touch with the cpc.155 While such action on the us side was remarkable, it was not sufficient to explain why cpc policies toward the us changed so fast as described above. There must be some other more important reasons. It was the increase of mutual trust between Mao Zedong and Stalin, which resulted in that the Soviet Union did not plan to hinder (it was even hoping for) the easing of the cpc Central Committee’s relations with the us. On April 13, Kovalev telegraphed Stalin and reported his conversations with Mao and other cpc Leaders. As Mao introduced the policy of “no recognition,” for financial reasons the cpc had to maintain some factual relations with capitalist countries, but not build legitimate “relations,” which he referred to as “half free-​hand diplomacy.” Also, four days earlier he was notified by a telegram from Hong Kong that an American trade company, introduced by the former us Vice President Wallace, wanted to discuss trade with the cpc, and other news went that the United States wants to give loans to China through Citibank. In a word, Mao talked much about financial problems and difficulties and measures the cpc Central Committee was taking. Apparently they needed to know the attitude of the Soviet Union, and thus Mao told Kovalev that the cpc Central Committee “had not offered a reply yet.”156 On April 19, Stalin replied to Mao that the cpc “should not refuse to establish official relations with capitalist countries including the United States.” The reasons he gave mainly included the benefit to achieving national unity, as well as that the

154 Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu heping tanpan wenti de baogao [Report on the peace talks],” April 17, 1949, Zhou, Zhou Enlai xuan ji [Selected works of Zhou Enlai], 1:321–​322. 155 Shi yinhong 时殷弘, Didui yu chongtu de youlai​Meiguo dui xin zhongguo de zhengce yu zhong mei guanxi de youlai (1949–​ 1950) 敌对与冲突的由来—​ 美国对新中国的政策与中美关系由来 [The origin of hostility and conflicts: us policy toward New China and the origin of Sino-​u s relations (1949–​1950)] (Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe, 1995), 66–​67. 156 “Bable, Kovalev to Filippov (Stalin),” 13 April 1949, Cold War International History Project Bulletin (after here CWIHP), Issue 16, 159–​160.

62 Chapter 1 Soviet Union couldn’t provide loans for the time being, so that the cpc should not reject loans and trade from countries such as the United States.157 Stalin’s statement of position certainly granted more options to the cpc Central Committee. Concerns of and precautions against us military intervention also drove the cpc Central Committee to get in touch with the United States. On April 20 and 21, cpc troops engaged in a fierce firefight with several British naval ships around Sanjiangying area in the Yangtze River, which immediately brought tension to the international situation in East Asia, and troops of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and others stationed in East Asia entered emergency state of alert. On April 21, the cpc Central Committee received a report of foreign naval ships patrolling the Yangtze River, and instructed the frontier headquarter of the Crossing River Campaign that any foreign naval ship that enters the battlefield and gets in our way should be fired at, regardless of its nationality.158 Stalin immediately reminded Mao that the most dangerous scenario was that us troops could land on ports in the North China region and attack cpc troops from behind.159 Hence, how to prevent the incident of Yangtze River firefight from escalating into potential us military intervention became a crucial concern to the cpc Central Committee. After the cpc troops took over Nanjing, some incidents took place that involved foreign countries and aggravated cpc leaders’ concern. On April 25, a group of soldiers from the Thirty-​fifth Army Corps of cpc that captured Nanjing broke into John Stuart’s residence, which caused uproar and pressure from world opinion intensified the tension. Upon receiving the news, the cpc Central Committee reproved the General Frontier Committee in telegram on the twenty-​seventh for not educating its soldiers timely on diplomatic policies, as “the incident must immediately raise attention, or it could create a huge mess.”160 Shortly thereafter, the cpc Central Committee received news from foreign press that cpc troops in Nanjing issued a general order to prohibit 1 57 “Bable, Kovalev to Filippov (Stalin),” 17 April 1949, CWIHP, Issue 16, 160–​161. 158 “Fan fang’ai wo du jiang zuozhan de bing jian jun ke hong ji 凡妨碍我渡江作战的兵 舰均可轰击 [Any military ships that hamper us from crossing the river to fight can be bombarded],” April 21, 1949, in Pang, ed., Mao Zedong nian pu 1893–​1949 [Chronicle of Mao Zedong 1893–​1949], 3:485. 159 N. T. Fedorenko 费德林, et al., Mao Zedong yu si da lin, he lu xiao fu jiaowang lu 毛泽东 与斯大林、赫鲁晓夫交往录 [Mao Zedong’s exchanges with Stalin and Khrushchev], translated by Peng Zhuowu 彭卓吾 (Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 2004), 167–​169. 160 “Su cha gao san shi wu jun paibing jinru si tu lei deng zhuzhai jingguo 速查告三十五 军派兵进入司徒雷登住宅经过 [Immediately check and report on the No.35 Army’s entry into Leighton Stuart’s residence],” April 27, 1949, in Pang, ed., Mao Zedong nian pu 1893–​1949 [Chronicle of Mao Zedong 1893–​1976], 3:489.

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foreign journalists from sending out telegrams of news reports. The cpc Central Committee immediately ordered the General Frontier Committee to cancel the order, and admonished that “Nanjing is the gathering place of ambassadors and ministers from all countries and the central spotlight of domestic and international society, and such outrageous action is extraordinarily dangerous.”161 Later on, the cpc Central Committee repeated its stance on the Thirty-​fifth Army’s foreign dealing incident that such incident “is extremely dangerous with its potential impact.”162 The choice of words such as “could create a huge mess,” “extraordinarily dangerous,” and “extremely dangerous” revealed that cpc leaders put great emphasis on foreign affairs and were highly discontent about what happened in Nanjing. As the cpc Central Committee viewed it, if not controlled in time but allowed to prevail, such emotional actions could result in foreign military intervention, which was exactly what the cpc Central Committee was trying with all effort to avoid. In fact, local officers and soldiers were not fully convinced of the cpc Central Committee’s criticism, for they could understand the overthrow of imperialism and fight for it resolutely, but they were very much confused by the “flexibility” as instructed by the cpc Central Committee, and in their words, they “just cannot be flexible” no matter what. As the General Frontier Committee reported to the cpc Central Committee, such feedbacks of the officers and soldiers were “real and reasonable,” and very concrete instructions should be made to guarantee implementation. Such situation inside the military also put pressure on the cpc Central Committee, and they subsequently issued a series of rules, so shockingly concrete to the extent that, for example, except assigned personnel, “anyone else should have no contact with resident aliens or talk with resident aliens”; under any circumstances any troops “have no right to use weapon upon resident aliens or open fire,” and so on.163

161 “Waijiao shijian bulun da xiao jun xu jing zhongyang tongyi fang neng banli 外交事件不 论大小均须经中央同意方能办理 [All diplomatic events no matter how big or small must be approved by the cpc Central Committee first before making settlement],” April 29, 1949, in Pang, ed., Mao Zedong nian pu 1893–​1949 [Chronicle of Mao Zedong 1893–​ 1949], 3:489, 492–​493. 162 “Dui san shi wu jun shanzi chuli waijiao shijian deng zhongda wenti de chuli yijian 对 三十五军擅自处理外交事件等重大问题的处理意见 [Settlement on No.35 Army’s crucial issues including separate dealings with diplomatic incidents],” May 3, 1949, in Pang, ed., Mao Zedong nian pu 1893–​1949 [Chronicle of Mao Zedong 1893–​1949], 3:495. 163 CCCPC Party History Research Center中央党史研究室, ed. Deng Xiaoping nian pu 1904–​1974 邓小平年谱 [Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping 1904–​1974] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2009), 822–​823.

64 Chapter 1 That the cpc Central Committee strictly controlled its troops was also meant to cooperate with the subsequent secret engagement with the United States. On April 28, Mao telegraphed Deng Xiaoping and other officers in the General Frontier Committee that the United States had “requested through third party to establish diplomatic relations with us,” and if the United States could break off its diplomatic ties with the Kuomintang government, the cpc would consider establishing diplomatic relations with the United States.164 On April 30, under the pseudonym of “Li Tao,” Mao Zedong issued a statement on the Sino-​U K firefight in the Yangtze River that the new government is willing to consider establishing diplomatic relations with foreign governments, under the condition that foreign governments must sever their diplomatic relations with the Kuomintang government and withdraw their troops from China.165 At the same time, Zhou Enlai told Huang Hua who was leaving for Nanjing that he could get in touch with John Stuart, to “see if he has any requirements and hopes.”166 Thus was drawn the cpc’s clandestine exchange with John Stuart in Nanjing. On May 7, Philip Fugh, John Stuart’s secretary, visited Huang Hua’s office and conveyed the wish of Stuart to talk with the cpc directly. He said that the reason why Stuart didn’t move to Guangzhou with the Kuomintang government was because he wanted to build contact with the cpc, and such act of Stuart was approved by Acheson. This revealed that it was exactly “the period the United States change its China policies,” and Stuart was the best choice to catalyze this transition.167 As this message reached Beijing, however cpc leaders interpret it the message must have far exceeded the negative imagination of Americans in their mind. Three days later, Mao wrote a seven-​point instruction to Huang Hua, and explicitly increased freedom of contact with Stuart. He instructed Huang Hua

164 Mao Zedong, “Ruguo mei ying duanjue tong guomindang de guanxi, ke kaolü he tamen jianli waijiao guanxi 如果美英断绝同国民党的关系，可考虑和它们建立外交关 系 [If the United States and United Kingdom break off relations with Kuomintang, we could consider establishing diplomatic relations with them],” April 28, 1949, in Mao Zedong waijiao wen xuan [Selected works of Mao Zedong on foreign affairs], 83; Pang, ed., Mao Zedong nian pu 1893–​1949 [Chronicle of Mao Zedong 1893–​1949], 3:490. 165 Mao Zedong, “Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zongbu fayan renwei yingguo junjian bao xing fabiao de shengming 中国人民解放军总部发言人为英国军舰暴行发表的声 明 [Statement by PLA Headquarter spokesperson on the atrocities of British warship],” in Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], 4:1461. 166 Huang, Qin li yu jianwen [First-​hand experience], 79. 167 Ibid, 80.

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that he can meet with Stuart upon his invitation, in order to “investigate intentions of the us government.” On issues of Stuart’s desire to continue his role as the us ambassador and of amending Sino-​u s Treaty of Commerce, “do not express attitude of rejection.” Mao’s instructions were extremely detailed as if he was in Huang’s position and doing Huang’s work, such as how Huang should switch his attitudes and postures under different situations, and so on. He suggested if Stuart was nice and friendly, Huang also “should adopt an appropriate friendly gesture,” namely an “earnest and gentle gesture.”168 At eight p.m. on May 13, Huang Hua visited Stuart’s residence privately and met with the latter for two hours. The core issues of this conversation were the future of the us troops stationed in China and the issue of “recognition.” According to Chinese records, Stuart stated that the State Department authorized stay of the us Embassy in Nanjing, and he personally hoped to help establish “diplomatic relations between China and the us based on equality and mutual benefit,” and “hoped the coalition government to unite democratic personages to participate.” When asked about his opinions on the “Li Tao statement,” Stuart expressed that the us government cannot sever its diplomatic ties with the Kuomintang government at the moment because the cpc had not founded its own government yet, and only after the new government had been founded and the request raised can the United States “offer recognition.” Philip Fugh then asked about when the new Political Consultative Conference would be held and when the new government would be founded, and said that once the new government was founded, Stuart would go back to the United States and be assigned to China again, thus the “recognition” issue would “automatically be solved.” Regarding the withdrawal of us troops in China, Stuart spoke outright that withdrawal of troops “is no longer a problem.” As with the cpc Central Committee’s primary concern of the possibility of us troops landing in the North China region, Stuart said that us troops in Qingdao would be pulled off as soon as the cpc troops arrive in Qingdao. At that time, the cpc Central Committee was eager to know the status of us troops in Shanghai.169 Stuart said that there were hundreds of us marines stationed in Shanghai for the purpose of protecting 168 Mao Zedong, “Huang Hua tong si tu lei deng tanhua ying zhuyi de jige wenti 黄华同 司徒雷登谈话应注意的几个问题 [Several points Huang Hua should pay attention to when talking to Leighton Stuart],” in Mao Zedong waijiao wen xuan [Selected works of Mao Zedong on Foreign Affairs], 87–​88. 169 Mao Zedong, “Yao zuo hao jieshou shanghai de zhunbei gongzuo 要做好接收上海的 准备工作 [Be prepared to take over Shanghai],” in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 5:560.

66 Chapter 1 us citizens, and “they would leave on the arrival” of the cpc troops; the us naval ships south of Chongming Island would also leave as soon as they finished the evacuation of us citizens. Stuart also said that personally he didn’t mind soldiers of the Thirty-​fifth Army breaking into his residence. In Nanjing Municipal Party Committee’s report to the cpc Central Committee, the conversation with Stuart was summarized as such:  us troops in Qingdao and Shanghai would “withdraw before” the cpc troops arrived; unofficial diplomatic ties and acknowledgment of us Consulates were requested; Stuart would not stay long in Nanjing and he didn’t mind the break-​in of his residence incident; and “the coalition government should include stooge of us imperialism,” and so on. Stuart’s gesture was “idiomatic friendliness.”170 The result of Huang Hua’s meeting with Stuart increased trust of cpc leaders toward Stuart, although they still sounded sharp and adversary in wording. Such trust can be read from the cpc Central Committee’s military decision-​ making. Before this meeting, the cpc Central Committee had ordered the General Frontier Committee that when capturing major cities such as Woosung and Jiaxing, they should “restrain themselves from engaging in any conflicts with foreign warships.”171 After the meeting, the cpc Central Committee was convinced that the United States had no intention to militarily intervene, and thus loosened the restriction on firefight against foreign naval ships, namely to prohibit any foreign naval ships from entering the Huangpu River. On May 20, Mao ordered the General Frontier Committee in telegram that “any ships that dare to enter and move freely can be fired upon; any ships that open fire to us should be returned with fire, until they are sunken, damaged, or expelled from our order.”172 The next day, the General Frontier Committee gave order to the cpc troops in Woosung Bar to treat the Huangpu River with “artillery barrage, and if anyone opens fire we should certainly fight back.” It is notable that the General Frontier Committee explained in its order that the reason for carrying out an artillery barrage was that most foreign naval ships were faked by the Kuomintang naval ships, for Stuart “had personally guaranteed 170 “Huang hua fang si tu jie tan yaodian [Main points of Huang Hua’s talk with Leighton Stuart],” May 17, 1949. 171 Mao Zedong, “Zhanling wu song jia xing deng di ying zhuyi de wenti 占领吴淞嘉兴等地 应注意的问题 [Issues to pay attention to when occupying Wu Song and Jiaxing],” Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 5:575. 172 Mao Zedong, “Dui waiguo junjian lunchuan jinru Huangpu jiang de chuli banfa 对外 国军舰轮船进入黄浦江的处理办法 [Solutions to foreign fleets and ships entering Huangpu River],” May 20, 1949, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 5:589.

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that there are already no us troops in Woosung Bar.”173 On May 23, the cpc Central Committee instructed the Third Field Army to “immediately prepare to move into Fujian Province ahead of schedule,” and with capture of cities such as Shanghai, Ningbo, Fuzhou and Qingdao, “the possibility of us military interference would be minimal.”174 For sure, Mao would not completely put away his worry at this time by the mere explanation of Stuart. On the twenty-​ eighth, the cpc Central Committee issued another warning to all Field Armies of “some signals of combined intervention by imperialist countries.”175 The East China Bureau and the General Frontier Committee, however, expressed a somewhat different opinion in their report of the next day, as they believed “the greatest difficulty from now would probably be economic pressure forced by imperialist countries,” but of course, it was “absolutely necessary” that the cpc Central Committee made “the preparation of vigilant arrangement.”176 On May 23, Mao briefed Kovalev about the meeting between Huang Hua and Stuart, the main points including that the United States did not support the Kuomintang government, the us troops would withdraw from China, the United States would like the cpc to form a coalition government, and so on. Mao mentioned Stuart’s statements, that the United States had stopped supporting the Kuomintang government, with one example being the stay of the us Embassy in Nanjing; us troops would withdraw from cities upon the arrival of cpc troops, and currently the us troops were stationing in Qingdao and Shanghai because properties of many Americans needed protection. And he also hoped for a more representative coalition government, and so on. Next, Mao said that Stuart was “lying” and inconsistent with MacArthur’s actions. 173 “Zong qian wei guanyu dui di jianying shixing paohuo fengsuo zhi su zhang junwei dian 总前委关于对敌舰应施行炮火封锁致粟张、军委电 [Telegram from the General Frontier Committee to Su, Zhang, and Central Military Commission on military blockade against enemy warship],” May 21, 1949. 174 Mao Zedong, “Dui ge yezhan jun de jinjun bushu 对各野战军的进军部署 [Military deployment for all Field Armies],” May 23, 1949, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 5:591. 175 Mao Zedong, “Yu chou diguo zhuyi wuzhuang ganshe de duice he bushu 预筹帝国主 义武装干涉的对策和部署 [Advance planning on measures and deployment against imperialist armed intervention],” May 28, 1949, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 5:600. 176 “Hua dong ju zong qian wei guanyu ru chuan min ji gong qingdao deng bushu xiang zhongyang junwei baogao 华东局总前委关于入川闽及攻青岛等部署向中央军委 报告 [Report from the General Frontier Committee of East China Bureau to the Central Military Commission on military deployments of entering Sichuan and Fujian and attacking Qingdao],” May 29, 1949.

68 Chapter 1 And “we would be very glad” if all embassies of imperialist countries pull out of China.177 While Mao’s such statement was more meant as a political gesture, the Soviet Union didn’t have any negative comment on the cpc Central Committee’s contact with Stuart. After the us troops withdrew from Qingdao, exchanges between Huang Hua and Stuart came to focus on the future possibility of diplomatic relations between both sides. On June 3, the cpc Central Committee gave instructions to the Nanjing Military Administrative Commission on Stuart’s return to the us, that Huang Hua could meet with Stuart and tell him that he was allowed to have an inspection visit to Shanghai, and in the meantime state that the us should not raise the issue of Japanese peace treaty with the Kuomintang government. Mao instructed Huang Hua in particular that he could disclose to Stuart in private that the new Political Consultative Conference would probably open after the cpc troops took over Guangzhou.178 This last point of instruction had strong implications as just four days ago Mao added one paragraph to an editorial of Xinhua News Agency entitled “Wish for the Liberation of Shanghai,” which ran: If these foreign governments are willing to learn a lesson from the incident in China, then they should start to change their wrong policy of interfering in China’s domestic politics and adopt a policy to build friendly relations with Chinese people.179 At this point, the incident of the us Consulate in Shenyang which had been put aside for a while saw a sign of easement, as the Consulate was allowed to communicate with us official institutions in Nanjing and Beijing through coded messages, and shortly afterward Angus Ward and other Consulate personnel were allowed to leave Shenyang.180 On June 6, Huang Hua and Stuart held a second meeting that covered a wide range of issues. With Stuart’s proposal of a visit to Shanghai and Philip Fugh’s to the United States, Huang Hua replied that the cpc Central Committee could arrange both. As with the issue of Treaty of Peace with Japan raised by Huang 177 “Bable, Kovalev to Filippov Stalin, Report on May 22 cpc CC Poliburo Discussion,” 23 May 1949, CWIHP, Issue 16, 165. 178 “Ke yunxu si tu ji fu jing bo fu mei 可允许司徒及傅泾波赴美 [Stuart and Philip Hugh are allowed to travel to the us],” in Pang, ed., Mao Zedong nian pu 1893–​1949 [Chronicle of Mao Zedong 1893–​1949], 3:514. 179 Pang, ed., Mao Zedong nian pu 1893–​1949 [Chronicle of Mao Zedong 1893–​1949], 3:511. 180 Shi, Didui yu chongtu de youlai [The origin of hostility and conflicts], 90–​91.

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Hua, Stuart responded that the United States had no intention to change decision of the Cairo Conference and would return Taiwan “back to China” once the Treaty of Peace was signed with Japan. As with Huang Hua’s request that the us government sever its ties with the Kuomintang government, Stuart said that the stay of the us Embassy in Nanjing had already made its political stand clear, and no matter where the Kuomintang government moves its capital in the future, he “can guarantee that us representatives would not follow along”; since the Chinese political situation is still unclear, the United States “now takes a passive stance” on the sideline. As with us aid, it was a decision made last year and not much aid was left. As usual, Huang Hua sharply criticized the United States for aiding the Kuomintang government, and Stuart stated the obstacles of establishing diplomatic relations, namely that Americans “were afraid of Communism” and that the United States “hopes to absorb all democratic and enlightened persons to join” the government. Huang again refuted those obstacles, and thus the conversation “ended.”181 Viewing the issues discussed in the meeting, both the U.S government and the cpc Central Committee were not urged to establish diplomatic relations, although as a former missionary Stuart personally was probably more eager than Washington. On May 13, Stuart presented a six-​point proposal to the State Department on the status of us Embassy and Consulates in China, which included that as long as the Kuomintang government “was not in complete demise,” exchanges between the United States and the cpc would be limited to “consulting and protest for welfare and property of us citizens.”182 At the same time, Acheson put forward three conditions for the United States to recognize new government: first, the government must be in effective control of the country’s territory and administrative institution; second, the government is capable and willing to perform its international obligation; third, the government is widely accepted by its people.183 Consequently, both sides stuck to their own words in subsequent meetings. While Huang Hua said, “the United States should move first to build ties with the People’s Democratic government,” Stuart claimed that the United States “had to take the passive position.”184 Such argument of “who should take the first step” later lasted several decades. 181 “Huang Hua yu si tu tanhua neirong [The content of conversation between Huang Hua and Leighton Stuart],” June 7, 1949. 182 Rea and Brewer, eds., the Forgotten Ambassador, 323. 183 “The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers,” Washington, May 6, 1949, 5 p. m.; “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Stuart),” Washington, May 13, 1949, FRUS, 1949, 17, 22–​23. 184 Rea and Brewer, eds., the Forgotten Ambassador, 322, 325, 328.

70 Chapter 1 Nonetheless, the cpc Central Committee didn’t make the decision to sever contact, but instead was pushing for more communication between both sides. On June 8th, Philip Fugh met with Huang Hua and mentioned that Stuart hoped to visit Beijing before returning home. He also elaborated his opinion on internal affairs of the us Government and explained that “it was necessary for Stuart to know opinions of higher level officials of the cpc Central Committee so that he could make a convincing presentation back in the United States.” Huang Hua replied then that since the United States had not committed to sever its ties with the Kuomintang government, “it would not be easy” for Stuart to visit Beijing.185 The next day, the Nanjing Municipal Party Committee telegraphed the content of the meeting to the cpc Central Committee. After receiving the telegram from the Nanjing Municipal Party Committee, the cpc Central Committee saw it more convenient to contact Stuart through unofficial channels, and therefore it asked Lu Zhiwei, president of Peking University, to invite Stuart to Peking University for a visit.186 On June 12, Lu Zhiwei drafted a letter to Stuart, the content and wording of which were noteworthy. In the letter, Lu said he met with Zhou Enlai on the morning of the eleventh and Mao also knew his upcoming visit to Beijing. Lu wrote “I predict the government will allow you to come.”187 But before Lu Zhiwei’s letter went out, Zhou Enlai instructed the Nanjing Municipal Party Committee that if Stuart and Philip Fugh raised the request to visit Beijing again, it could approve him “paying a visit to Peking University” before his return to the us, and whether he could meet with Zhou Enlai “will be decided” after his arrival.188 On June 15, Mao made a speech on the preparatory meeting of the new Political Consultative Conference. After the usual condemnation of imperialist interference and conspiracy, Mao stated that “any foreign government” accepting stands of the “Li Tao statement” could “hold talks on the establishment of diplomatic relations.”189 Lu Zhiwei’s letter went out on June 16, the timing of which could hardly be interpreted as coincidence. 185

CCCPC Party Literature Research Office and CCCPC Archives Bureau 中央文献研究 室、中央档案馆, eds. Jianguo yi lai zhou enlai wen gao 建国以来周恩来文稿 [Works of Zhou Enlai since the founding of People’s Republic of China] (Beijing:  Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2008), 1:21; Huang, Qin li yu jianwen [First-​hand experience], 83. 186 Huang, Qin li yu jianwen [First-​hand experience], 83. 187 Zhu, Si tu lei deng yu zhongguo zheng ju [Leighton Stuart and Chinese politics], 262–​263. 188 Jianguo yi lai Zhou Enlai wen gao [Works of Zhou Enlai since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:21. 189 Mao Zedong, “Zai xin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi choubei hui shang de jianghua 在新政治 协商会议筹备会上的讲话 [Remarks at the preparatory meeting for the new Political Consultative Conference],” in Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], 4:1466.

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On June 18, Philip Fugh visited Huang Hua again, and his statement of the us position on the “recognition” issue attracted attention of the Nanjing Municipal Party Committee. Fugh said that Stuart “recently received an order from the Department of State, which approved his communication with the Communist Party of China” and expected him to return to Beijing in two months in private capacity, and would “reappoint him as ambassador to China” once the two countries establish diplomatic relations. The Nanjing Municipal Party Committee reported to the cpc Central Committee on the day and asked that, since Philip did not mention the request again to visit Beijing before leaving for the United States, should they “give a hint” to let him raise the request to visit Beijing.190 On June 21, the cpc Central Committee replied to the Nanjing Municipal Party Committee: Stuart might request again to visit Beijing before his return to the United States, and Lu Zhiwei also sent him a letter implying that if he would like to visit, “it probably will be approved.” If he didn’t mention again, “we don’t need to say anything, just wait and see.” It was significant that Mao added the following sentence: “About ten days before his return to the us, you can suggest that it will be granted if he wants to visit Beijing, and it is possible for him to meet with the authority.”191 The telegram was an important signal of change in the cpc Central Committee’s policy, but the change soon fleeted. On the same day, the Nanjing Municipal Party Committee made another report to the cpc Central Committee that analyzed how to deal with Stuart’s request to visit Beijing. The report revealed that at least the Nanjing Municipal Party Committee had a quite positive estimate of the us policies and was apparently inclined to invite Stuart to visit Beijing, and they made a rather in-​depth analysis. The Nanjing Municipal Party Committee believed that the most possible reason behind Stuart’s request to visit Beijing was that the United States worried that once it recognized the legitimacy of the cpc government, the cpc “will not accept him as the ambassador to China.” Since they hadn’t received the cpc Central Committee’s reply sent out the same day and they didn’t know if Mao approved Stuart’s visit to Peking University, they 190

Jianguo yi lai Zhou Enlai wen gao [Works of Zhou Enlai since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:21–​22. 191 Zhou Enlai, “Zhongyang guanyu si tu lei deng yu lai beiping shi gei nanjing shi wei de dianbao he piyu 中央关于司徒雷登欲来北平事给南京市委的电报和批语 [Telegram and comment from The cpc Central Committee to Party Committee of Nanjing on Leighton Stuart’s hope to visit Peking],” June 21, 1949, in Jianguo yi lai Zhou Enlai wen gao [Works of Zhou Enlai since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:19.

72 Chapter 1 asked further in the report if they should “explore Stuart’s concrete tasks of his visit to Beijing.”192 The letter drafted by Lu Zhiwei on the twelfth went out on the sixteenth, and not until the twenty-​sixth was it delivered to Stuart. As Stuart wrote in his diary that day, he learnt from his conversation with Zhou Yukang that if he visited Beijing, Mao would treat him as “old friend,” and the letter from Lu Zhiwei that arrived today “also mentioned my visit to Beijing.”193 It seemed that these messages through intermediaries did not fully convince Stuart to reach a clear conclusion, and he personally was indeed confused. During this interval, Stuart also asked Chen Mingshu to carry a message to cpc leaders about his hope to meet. To try out the cpc Central Committee’s attitude on his visit to Beijing again, he also invited Huang Hua to his birthday party. The cpc Central Committee instructed Huang Hua to decline the invitation, though, only because they decided to wait for another while. At this time, confrontation between the cpc and the United States grew remarkably. As the us troops withdrew from Qingdao and the cpc Central Committee was relieved from military pressure of the United States, in mid-​June it announced that the us Consulate in Shenyang was involved in the espionage case. As a counter act against the strong condemnation from the us Embassy, the Consulates, and us press of the cpc’s violation of international law, the cpc announced that personnel of the us Consulate involved in the espionage case would be put on trial. On the twenty-​second, the cpc Central Committee instructed the Northeast Bureau not to let any personnel of the us Consulate in Shenyang to leave Shenyang.194 On the next day, the cpc Central Committee telegraphed the Municipal Party Committees in Shanghai, Nanjing, and other cities that “the imperialists are using both bribery and coercion to obtain legitimate status (in order to undermine us from inside),” and so on.195 The cpc Central Committee’s dealing with the Shenyang espionage case was in fact to signal a strong warning to the United

192 “Si tu dui Huang Hua yaoqing chuli qingshi [Request for instruction on response to Stuart’s invitation to Huang Hua],” June 21, 1949, CCCPC Archives Bureau. 193 John Leighton Stuart 司徒雷登, Si tu lei deng riji: meiguo tiaoting guo gong zhengzhi qijian qianhou 司徒雷登日记—​美国调停国共争持期间前后 [Leighton Stuart’s Diary: us mediation in Kuomintang-​c pc conflicts], translated by Chen Lisong 陈礼颂 (Hong Kong: xianggang wenshi chubanshe, 1982), 75. 194 “Buyao rang mei ling guan renhe ren li shen 不要让美领馆任何人离沈 [Don’t let any personnel from the us consulate leave Shenyang],” June 22, 1949, CCCPC Archives Bureau. 195 “Dui zi shi ying hao de chuli fangzhen 对紫石英号的处理方针 [The strategy to deal with Zi Shi Ying incident],” June 23, 1949, in Pang, ed., Mao Zedong nian pu 1893–​1949 [Chronicle of Mao Zedong], 3:520–​521.

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States that even if the United States no longer planned to take military intervention, it must not plot to “undermine us from inside.” It can be speculated that this move was also meant to put more pressure on Stuart. On June 27, Philip Fugh took with him Lu Zhiwei’s letter to Stuart to meet with Huang Hua, said that Stuart was surprised to receive the letter and wanted to learn about the cpc’s intention. Huang Hua explained that he had already reported to Beijing but no instruction was given yet. If Stuart still had the request, he could ask on his behalf. Fugh then made perhaps the worst diplomatic gesture, as he said that originally Stuart was hoping to visit Beijing but given the tight schedule now, the cpc should “quickly make a decision” if it agrees. On the twenty-​eighth, Huang Hua met with Stuart after asking for instructions from Zhou Enlai. He strictly followed Zhou’s instruction and repeated every word of the telegram reply to tell Beijing’s decision to Stuart: “Agree to permit Stuart’s visit to Beijing, and his desire to meet with the authority is also possible.” Stuart was elated then and immediately said that despite many difficulties he still decides to report to Acheson and asks for his decision.196 But what happened next totally reversed the direction. The attitude of cpc leaders changed dramatically in the following two days. On June 28, Huang Hua reported details of his meeting on the twenty-​seventh and the twenty-​eighth to the cpc Central Committee. As Zhou Enlai immediately replied after reading the report, he believed the Lu Zhiwei’s letter which Philip Fugh carried on the twenty-​seventh was not real. Zhou said that “our comrade once sent over a copy” of the letter that Lu Zhiwei sent to Stuart, the content of which differed from what Fugh presented, and as Zhou didn’t meet with Lu on June 14 and 15, “nor ever discuss the issue of Stuart with Lu,” he suspected that either Lu “showed me a fake letter” or Philip Fugh “intentionally added some words to raise Stuart’s status.” Zhou told Huang Hua that he must maintain the principles stated in the former telegram, making it clear that the cpc “permit Stuart’s visit to Beijing,” not invite or welcome him; Stuart’s hope “to meet with the authority is also possible,” but it was a request he raised, “absolutely not an invitation by us,” which “must be made crystal clear.” The telegram went at the end: “We certainly don’t have any illusion for changing the policies of the us imperialism.”197 196 “Si tu tanhua jingguo 司徒谈话经过 [Conversation with Leighton Stuart],” June 28, 1949, CCCPC Archives Bureau. 197 Zhou Enlai, “Zhongyang guanyu si tu lei deng yu lai bei ping shi gei nanjing shi wei de dianbao he piyu [Telegram and comment from the cpc Central Committee to Party Committee of Nanjing on Leighton Stuart’s hope to visit Peking],” June 30, 1949, in Jianguo yi lai Zhou Enlai wen gao [Works of Zhou Enlai since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:20.

74 Chapter 1 Till today it is still unclear what the most direct reason was behind the dramatic change of the cpc policy in two days. With the content of Lu Zhiwei’s letter, one possibility was that when Philip Fugh conveyed his message he mixed up Lu’s letter with Zhou Yukang’s talk to Stuart and thus caused some confusion. During the exchanges between Stuart and Huang Hua, one possibility should not be excluded that Philip Fugh might have exaggerated the willingness of both sides on mutual recognition. On such confusion, Zhou Enlai even asked his secretary Yang Chao to retrieve the bilingual copies of Lu Zhiwei’s letter to Stuart to find out who “was plotting the conspiracy.”198 But more significantly, the behaviors of cpc leaders manifested that they had basically killed the idea of developing diplomatic relations with the United States and no longer planned to continue the secret talks in Nanjing. On June 30, the same day that Zhou Enlai sent out the aforementioned telegram, Mao published his article “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” as well as sent out a briefing inside the Party that the trial of the Shenyang espionage case proved that “the us Consulate did participate in espionage activities in the past.”199 In the meantime Liu Shaoqi had embarked on the trip to Moscow. As Mao told Deng Xiaoping two weeks later, exchanges with Stuart in Nanjing were aimed to pressure the United States to “submit,” “but based on the experience of over a month, it’s not easy to force imperialism to submit,” and therefore, we must put “lean to one side” to action to break the us blockade.200 On the side of the United States, Philip Fugh once suggested acting before reporting, namely that Stuart visit Beijing first before reporting to the Department of State. Stuart dared not do so and still sent a positively worded telegram to Acheson asking for instructions on June 30, hoping to be approved to travel north. It turned out that his visit to Beijing was rejected, and Acheson telegraphed the next day asking Stuart to hurry back to Washington by July 25, with no stopover allowed, and “under no circumstances is a trip to Beijing allowed.”201 If the us Department of State’s rejection of Stuart’s visit to Beijing, the cpc Central Committee’s telegram on June 30, as well as Mao’s published article on 198 Ibid, 21. 199 “Mei shiguan ceng congshi jiandie gongzuo 美使馆曾从事间谍工作 [us ambassy engaged in espionage],” June 30, 1949, CCCPC Archives Bureau. 200 Deng Xiaoping, “Da po diguo zhuyi fengsuo zhi dao [Path to break blockade by imperialism],” July 19, 1949, in Deng, Deng Xiaoping Wen Xuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping], 1:134. 201 States Department, ed., Foreign Relations of United States 8 (1949), 377, 766–​769.

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the same day “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship” symbolized the end of exchanges between the cpc and the United States, then the “White Paper on United States Relations with China” published by the us government on August 5 and the ensuing criticism movement against the “White Paper” initiated and participated by Mao marked the beginning of an all-​out confrontation between China and the United States. At the time, Mao wrote five successive articles in person that were filled with rage accumulated over the years. Five articles were not enough, and Mao further asked Hu Qiaomu to write the “Sixth Commentary” and Chen Boda to write “the Seventh Commentary.” The initial result of the Sino-​u s confrontation was that us official personnel were all pulled out of China by April 30, 1950. Two months later the outbreak of the Korean War brought New China and the United States to fight on the battlefield, and the various American forces and influences in China were soon removed completely from China. The confrontation pattern between New China and the United States was finally set and lasted thereafter for twenty years, and it became the most severe matter determining the development of the Cold War in East Asia.

Chapter 2

World Liberation and National Security Soon after birth, the People’s Republic of China took two major military actions on the adjacent Korean Peninsula and Indochina Peninsula:  “Assistance to Vietnam to Resist France” from March 1950 to July 1954, and “War to Resist us Aggression and Assist Korea” from October 1950 to July 1953. Both military actions took place in the initial phase of alliance with the Soviet Union and confrontation with the United States, and in fact Chinese leaders did not view them as mere regional conflicts at the beginning. Their decision was based on conception and projection of the Cold War and China’s strategic position in the Cold War, which bore a rich combination of Chinese leaders’ understanding of the nature of world politics under the shadow of the Cold War, their perception of the global strategic situation over this period, their hope for the Chinese revolution unleashing larger impact beyond China’s borders, and so on. On the other hand, whatever the perspectives are to account for the decision-​making and implementation process of the Indochina War and the Korean War in the initial years of New China, it is highly necessary to observe the changing Chinese views of geopolitical security. The reason being, historical figures cannot possibly isolate their views from the historical structure they live in, which comprises some basic elements and their interaction in specific time and space, as well as thoughts and summaries based on specific experience and intellectual resources. Since ancient times, Chinese used the term “tian xia” (world, or literally meaning “under the heaven”) to define the world they saw, and standing at the center to view the world, the ancient dynasties thus found that “the king is protected by the barbarian areas (tian zi shou zai si yi).” In modern history, the expansion of Western powers into Asia caused fundamental changes in China’s geopolitical security environment or, in the words of people at the time, “encircled by powerful neighbors, watched by tigers and eagles.” Such description partly reflected a Chinese sense of insecurity and led them to redefine the geopolitical security environment surrounding them. In 1881, Zhou Derun, scholar of the Imperial Academy, submitted a report to Emperor Guangxu that indeed gave a typical summary of the leaps in Chinese perception of their changing surrounding environment. He wrote: I, your vassal, have heard that the king is protected by the barbarian areas, which is indeed a farsighted strategy. Since the ancient times

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | DOI:10.1163/​9 789004369078_​0 03

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when foreign powers invade, minimal effort is put into fighting but many early efforts are put in preparation. If the border is guarded but not the barbarian areas, then the invaders cannot be defeated; if the heartland is guarded but not the border, then even less possibility is there to defeat the invaders. Our dynasty has vast land, and various remote areas have become our feudal lands. Use Ryukyu to guard the Southeast, use Koryo to guard the Northeast, use Mongolia to guard the Northwest, use Vietnam to guard the Southwest. Isn’t it what we call the mountains and rivers are full of stones and live and demise with the nation?1 As Western powers expanded into China, which was “a sea change unseen in thousands of years,” China’s strategic perception of the neighboring countries changed from feudal affiliates to security protection between China and Western powers. Such was how Chinese reacted to the fundamental changes in China’s modern geopolitical and geo-​security environment, and thus it became the basic content and pursuit of China’s security strategy and a basic task of diplomacy. Frankly speaking, the strategic thinking of cpc leaders indeed carried a concern of geopolitics and national security that was related to the aforementioned historical change, and it also guided or regulated China’s policies toward different Asian regions including major military actions. For sure, such concern of cpc leaders was primarily tied to their situation in the revolutionary age and was first reflected through their war experience accumulated during the revolutionary age. During that period, almost all bases that functioned as the cpc’s living space was encircled for long by hostile military forces, and except for the large-​scale civil war period, what they often faced were local military conflicts of various severity and scale with the Kuomintang forces. As their national security perspective developed with a fundamental logic that closely related to the revolutionary theory and practice, many issues such as the association and fundamental difference between revolutionary goals and national security, and which should be seen as a strategic priority in practice, only won gradual clarification during a series of vital decision-​making processes. And clear answers to those were unlikely to be reached by the initial phase of strategic decision-​making in the initial years of New China.

1 Cited from Tsiang Tingfu 蒋廷黻, Zhongguojindai shi 中国近代史 [Modern history of China] (Beijing: Tuanjie chubanshe, 2006), 87.

78 Chapter 2

Section 1: Revolution and National Defense

In July 1936, after great difficulties, American journalist Edgar Snow finally arrived at Bao’an of Shaanxi, the seat of the cpc Central Committee, and stayed there for four months. According to Snow, Mao paid great attention to his visit and would “often put aside piles of reports and telegrams and cancel some meetings” to have a long talk with him.2 The interview records later published by Snow were highly valuable as they documented some of Mao’s thoughts rarely known by the world. Among them ran this paragraph: Mao once talked about his own journey to revolution, and there was one pamphlet that had significant impact on his enlightenment during his youth. Mao then recited the opening sentence of that pamphlet: “Alas, China is about to crumble!” He still clearly remembered that this pamphlet “talked about how Japan occupied Korea and Taiwan, and talked about how places like Vietnam and Burma lost sovereignty.” He said: “Reading it made me feel depressed about the future of this country, and I began to realize that the rise and fall of this country is the duty of everyone.”3 Judging by the current understanding of nation-​state, apart from Taiwan, the states mentioned by Mao were in fact not much related to the rise and fall of China. His recollection only proves that, in his mind, China was more like a dynastic “tian xia (world),” instead of a modern nation-​state with clear borders. Mao believed that ever since converting to a “communist,” he had insisted upon using class theory to interpret the nature of states and nationalist ideas in formal theoretic analysis, thus the kind of conversation he had with Snow was unique in that he had fully presented a revolutionary patriot figure to an American journalist. He spoke freely about the vast land of China which he had borne in his mind and never forgotten since the day of his youth, and he revealed his concern for “tian xia” and his great ambition of striving for its complete emancipation. This is significant for understanding Mao’s world views. There had been a notion of “the East” in the early political discourse of the Communist International. “The East” was both a geographical term as well as a political one. Geographically, it included Asia, mainly the current East Asia and

2 Edgar Snow 埃德加·斯诺, “Fu shi zhi lü 复始之旅 [Journey to the Beginning],” in Si nuo wen ji 斯诺文集 [Collected works of Snow], translated by Song Jiu 宋久, Ke Nan 柯楠, and Ke Xiong 克雄 (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1984), 1:192. 3 Edgar Snow 埃德加·斯诺, Xi xing man ji 西行漫记 [Red Star over China], translated by Dong Leshan 董乐山 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1979), 111–​112.

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South Asia which together were addressed by the cpc leaders as “East Asia.” Politically, it meant that these areas were almost all colonies or semi-​colonies of the Western powers.4 China was part of “the East.” The discourse on “the East” generated a special identity among the cpc leaders, which was that while the cpc was a part of the international communist movement and the world proletarian revolution, it was, more specifically, a part of the East Asian (which later expanded to African and Latin American) national liberation movement. From the perspective of international politics, “the East” formed in their mind an identity only second to the international communist movement, a special regional identity, as they believed that anti-​colonialism and anti-​imperialism as well as seeking national liberation was the principal aspect of the principal contention in East Asia regional politics. The cpc’s Second National Congress described the following scenario in its Declaration: For many years, nations of East Asia have been oppressed under the iron heels of countries like the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and Japan, and imperialist invasions of East Asian nations have grown severer since the end of the last World War. The United States has gripped islands of the Philippines, putting up a fake face of benevolence while continuing its economic invasion without any relaxation. The United Kingdom has taken India by its throat, cracked down on the Indian independence movement with both force and gentleness in order to sustain one million Indian labor dying in the hands of British capitalists every year. The farmers of Annam are enslaved by the oppression of French imperialism and labored like cattle to produce grains only to be exploited by French merchants. No matter how many thousands of farmers starve to death in Annam, there will be thousands of loads of grain exported to French merchants. Japan’s exploitation of the Korean people is even more brutal, and the dumping of Japanese products has put twenty million Korean farmers on starvation to death. The development of imperialist invasion of China over the years manifests best the nature of world capitalism and imperialism. China with its vast and fertile land, abundance of products and hundreds of millions of cheap labor has provoked the appetite of all capitalist powers. They vie

4 Research Center on Chinese Revolution of Department of cpc History of Renmin University of China 中国人民大学中共党史系中国革命问题教研室, ed., Gongchan guoji yu zhongguo geming jiaoxue cankao ziliao 共产国际有关中国革命教学参考资料 [Teaching reference materials of Comintern and Chinese revolution] (Beijing:  Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1985), 1:23–​24.

80 Chapter 2 with each other to get the best privileges and thus put China in its current special position in the world.5 Such description is significant because its notion of “the East” largely coincides with “tian xia” in the minds of many Chinese including Mao. Consequently, the cpc leaders paid greater attention to the development of the East Asian region and had stronger sense of identity and obligation toward the revolution movements and fate of their neighboring countries. Common historic, geographic features, and modern sufferings made the cpc leaders virtually view East Asia as a “revolutionary community.” China was a part of this community, and with a more “special” position, for its people had suffered and been oppressed the most, and thus it had the fiercest resistance and revolution and it naturally became the most significant example. For sure, the massive scale of China was also important, or the primary reason for its significance. Mainly due to their position in the civil war, for the subsequent long period of time cpc leaders no longer mentioned this notion of “the East” or the countries of this region. During the period of Anti-​Japanese War, cpc leaders paid relatively heavy attention to the international situation, but they mainly focused on big powers like the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, as well as the battlefields in Europe and the Pacific Ocean. They only occasionally mentioned the peoples of India and Korea. It is certain that ascending to the “Four Powers” of the world during the late Anti-​Japanese War period would stimulate a great power identity among cpc leaders just as among many other Chinese. This was one of the reasons that led Chinese leaders to pay more attention to the world’s power politics. Nonetheless, it does not mean that the conjecture of the East Asian community had evaporated from the minds of cpc leaders. As situation in China changed radically, it would spill out spontaneously from time to time. On August 10 and 11, 1945, after the Soviet Red Army declared war and entered Northeast China, the cpc Central Committee under the name of Zhu De, the Commander-​in-​Chief, issued seven consecutive orders of accepting surrender and marching forward. Among them, the sixth order commanded that commanders of the Korean Volunteer Army in North China, such as Wu Heng, should immediately direct their troops and join the Eighth Army to “march into North China, eliminate Puppet State enemies, and organize Korean People’s Army in North China in order to achieve the mission of liberating 5 “Zhongguo gongchandang di er ci quanguo daibiao dahui xuanyan 中国共产党第二次全 国代表大会宣言 [Declaration of the second cpc National Congress],” May (July) 1922, CCCPC Archives Bureau.

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Korea.”6 Such apparently unfeasible order virtually revealed a natural concern from the bottom of the heart. On August 29 and 30, Liberation Daily published consecutive articles to congratulate the liberation of Korea, which ran, “We the Chinese nation sincerely welcomes the emergence of a new neighbor and will continue to work with her.”7 As China’s revolution movement approached national victory, cpc leaders increasingly showed their regional concern. In December 1947, just as the cpc Central Committee decided to seize national power, Mao told attendees of the cpc Central Committee expanded meeting to be prepared to support the resistance against France led by Ho Chi Minh. He said that Bao Dai of Vietnam had gone over to France, and Ho Chi Minh had lost his main base as well as munitions and he’s fighting a guerilla war in the villages. Only the cpc can “support them when we take Guangdong and Guangxi provinces.”8 In January 1949, when addressing foreign policy issue at a cpc Central Committee meeting, Zhou Enlai reminded his attending colleagues that in addition to paying attention to the two camps led by the Soviet Union and the United States, they should also be aware of an ongoing “independence movement of colonies” in Southeast Asia.9 The change in Soviet foreign policy was a key factor in bringing cpc leaders to seriously consider the issue of East Asian revolution in the summer of 1949. As the us-​Soviet Cold War reached its peak in Europe, Stalin amidst endless crises in Central and Eastern Europe decided to more actively promote and support revolutions in Asia. Since the summer of 1947, the cpsu Central Committee began to pay attention to promoting revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia. At first, agencies of the party were mostly concerned with the Communist Party of Indonesia as well as the Communist Party of Vietnam, and those party leaders hoped to support the Communist Party of Indonesia to become the flagbearer of revolutions in that region.10 They even had the 6

7 8

9 10

Zhu De 朱德, “Yan’an zongbu mingling di liu hao 延安总部命令第六号 [No.6 order from the headquater in Yan’an],” August 11, 1945, in Jiefang ri bao [Liberation Daily], August 12, 1945. Liao Jinwen 廖今文, “San shi wu nian de jiasuo da sui le 三十五年的枷锁打碎了 [Shackles of thirty-​five years have been broken],” Liberation Daily, August 29, 30, 1945. “Mao zhuxi zai yijiu si qi nian shi er yue zhongyang huiyi shang de tanhua 毛主席在 一九四七年十二月中央会议上的谈话 [Chairman Mao’s remarks at the cpc Central Committee meeting in December 1947],” CCCPC Archives Bureau. “Zhongyang zhengzhi ju 1949 nian 1 yue huiyi jilu 中央政治局1949年1月会议记录 [Minutes of Central Politburo meeting in January 1949],” CCCPC Archives Bureau. Larisa Efimofa, “Did the Soviet Union instruct Southeast Asian communists to revolt? New Russian evidence on the Calcutta Youth Conference of February 1948,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 40(3), October 2009, 449–​469.

82 Chapter 2 idea of letting the Indian Communist Party be the leader of Asia.11 But Stalin finally decided that the Chinese Communist Party should be the center of East Asian revolutions, because the Indian and Indonesian communist parties not only lacked domestic influence, but also lacked strong revolutionary passion and regional leadership. In contrast, the cpc had staged strategic counterattack and was well positioned to seize national power. More importantly, cpc leaders had increasingly expressed the willingness to follow Stalin’s lead. Stalin had strong suspicions and he had long suspected that Mao may become the Tito of Asia. It later turned out that his suspicion was not entirely baseless, for Mao eventually would not stay content to submit to others, although the reasons for Mao to turn against the Soviet Union were somehow different from Tito. Nevertheless, Stalin decided to unite the cpc into the Soviet camp and this decision was carried out in the spring of 1948. He believed that if the cpc could side with the Soviet Union, “victory should be guaranteed.”12 In early 1949, during his visit to Xibaipo, Mikoyan very explicitly conveyed Stalin’s above intentions to the cpc Central Committee. Mikoyan was generous with his words when he emphasized the significance of China’s revolution in Asia. He said that there was no need for cpc leaders like Mao to be modest, for “the Chinese revolution is a significant historic event”; “The cpc’s experience has historical values as it has enriched the science of Marxism”; and “summary of the Chinese experience has important theoretical values for Asia’s national revolutions.” Mikoyan asked Mao in a typical Bolshevik argument: “Can you really deny this? Of course not.” He then asked whether it was possible of “a coordinated action among Asia’s national communist parties” and Mao’s answer was that he had not thought it through. On behalf of the cpsu Central Committee, Mikoyan advised cpc leaders that they “should not join the Communist Information Bureau but should establish a Bureau of East Asian National Communist Parties and preside over it.” Naturally, Mao showed agreement and said would “establish it as soon as possible.” He said, “We have closer connections with communist parties in Indochina and Korea but less with the others communist parties.” They further discussed concrete steps and Mao said he hoped to take further discussion on this after the cpc troops had

11

12

Vojtech Mastny 沃捷特尼·马斯特, Sidalin shiqi de lengzhan yu sulian de anquan guan 斯大林时期的冷战与苏联的安全观 [The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years], trans. Guo Mao’an 郭懋安 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshes, 2002), 57. N.B. Kovalyov N.B.科瓦廖夫, “Sidalin he Mao Zedong de duihua 斯大林和毛泽东的对 话 [Conversation between Mao Zedong and Stalin],” Guowai sheke xinxi 国外社科信息 [Foreign Social Sciences Information] 21 (1992): 29.

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taken over South China and stabilized the situation.13 Later, Mao did discuss establishing a Bureau of East Asian National Communist Parties with Stalin. It was through such talks with Mikoyan that cpc leaders formed a new identity that, from now on, they believed they had the historic obligation to act as the center of East Asian revolutions. This understanding later had very significant and long-​lasting impact on China’s East Asian foreign policies. During the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh cpc Central Committee in March, cpc leaders at least discussed about the position of cpc among East Asian revolutionary movements. Mao was quite cautious at this point and it was consistent with his principal consideration at this time, which was that he had just warned the whole party to make sure to “continue a modest, cautious and neither arrogant nor impetuous manner.”14 On March 13, Mao made it clear in his summary report at the meeting that the Chinese revolution was “the third greatest victory” in the twentieth century alongside the Russian October Revolution and the winning of wwii. But he disagreed with Wang Ming’s suggestion to define “Mao Thought” as “the concrete example of implementation and development of Marxist-​Leninism in colonies and semi-​ colonies.” He listed the following reasons: First, this definition put it as if “Stalin is only in charge of the industrialized places while colonies and semi-​colonies are in our charge”; Second, should there be countries that do not follow China’s lead “and just go to Moscow to buy products, what should we do then?”; Third, “Don’t think too broad. Just focus on solving our own issues. Should there be experience that is applicable to other countries, others will apply it naturally.” He also believed that “don’t list Mao alongside with Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin” yet, for the cpc was not up to par with theoretical levels.15 Mao was still modest at this time, but the reasons he listed did not deny the top position of the Chinese revolution among colonies and semi-​colonies. During Liu Shaoqi’s secret visit to Moscow, Stalin mentioned personally his wish to have the cpc as the center of East Asian revolutions. He clearly

13

14

15

“Mi gao yang yu mao zedong de huitan beiwang lu [Memorandum of conversation between Mao Zedong and Mikoyan],” February 3, 1949, accessed at Shanghai: Library of Center for Cold War International History Studies, East China Normal University, Call Number: NO.16471. Mao Zedong, “Zai zhongguo gongchandang di qi jie zhongyang weiyuan hui di er ci quanti huiyi shang de baogao [Report at the the second Plenary Session of the Seventh cpc Central Committee],” March 5, 1945, CCCPC Archives Bureau. Mao Zedong, “Zai zhonggong qi jie er zhong quan hui shang de zongjie 在中共七届二 中全会上的总结 [Conclusion at the second Plenary Session of the Seventh cpc Central Committee],” in Mao Zedong wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong], 5:260–​261.

84 Chapter 2 emphasized the position of East Asia and China in world politics and described to Liu Shaoqi a historical process of how the center of world revolution was gradually moving from the West to the East, namely, that since the deaths of Marx and Engels, such center of revolution had moved from Europe “eastward” to Russia, and “now it has moved to China and East Asia.” He said the cpc enjoyed “very high status” and thus “has heavier responsibilities.” During the meeting, Gao Gang brought up that the cpc was hoping to join the European Communist Information Bureau. Stalin said that China’s situation had two important differences from Eastern European countries: first, “China is a country long being oppressed by imperialism”; and second, China’s capitalist class is different from that of Eastern Europe. He suggested establishing a “League of East Asian National Communist Parties” because “East Asian countries have many similar circumstances with China,” namely, China’s revolutionary experience had common significance in East Asia, and the Soviet Union could also join this League of East Asian Communist Parties.16 Such comment from Stalin greatly strengthened cpc leaders’ sense of identity and responsibility with East Asian revolutions, and they appeared to be willing to accept such mission, although they planned not to take major actions before obtaining and consolidating national power. By this time, at least the cpc delegation in Moscow had begun to think from an East Asian revolution perspective. Liu Shaoqi specifically wrote a report to Stalin on the tactics of East Asian revolutions, which suggested that “such revolutions has or will sooner or later take the principal form of armed guerrilla war” and should “remain quite” in cities. He put it frankly that this judgement was “based on China’s experience.”17 Not long after founding of New China, cpc leaders publicly stated that they were willing to take the responsibility of the leader of East Asian revolution. Only forty-​five days after the establishment of New China, the Trade Union Congress of Asia and Australia was held in Beijing and it adopted many resolutions, the most important of which was the decision to establish an Asia and Australia Liaison Bureau of the World Federation of Trade Union. Liu Shaoqi was chairman of the meeting’s presidium and he delivered the opening remarks. He boldly announced that China’s revolutionary experience and course had universality among colonies and semi-​colonies, that China’s 16 17

“Si da lin tanhua 斯大林谈话 [Remarks of Stalin],” July 27, 1949, CCCPC Archives Bureau. Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu dongya minzu geming yundong celüe wenti gei si da lin de baogao 关于东亚民族革命运动策略问题给斯大林的报告 [Report to Stalin on strategy for national revolutionary movements in East Asia],” in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:51.

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revolutionary course was “Mao’s course,” and that “it is the course that people of many colonies and semi-​colonies should take when seeking their national independence and people’s democracy.”18 Furthermore, the Chinese revolution was also significant to the revolutions in capitalist countries, said Liu, for that achieving victory meant that the Chinese working class “should also take the heavy responsibility of supporting the working class and laboring people of all capitalist countries and especially those colonies and semi-​colonies in Asia and Australia,” which was an “honorable responsibility” that they could not and should not refuse.19 Liu’s speech clearly revealed their regional identity, understanding of their role and sense of responsibility of supporting regional revolutions. In fact, the first choice they met was military involvement in East Asia’s Indochina Peninsula and Korean Peninsula. Since its birth, New China showed its attention and support to revolutions abroad, especially those in the East Asian neighboring countries. Such attention and support can be simply termed “expansionist force,” which partly arose from an inner impetus of the Chinese revolution, which was a desire to have the victory of Chinese revolution unleash great impact on the world or at least China’s neighboring regions. Leaders of the New China believed that since the Chinese revolution was part of the world revolution, the victory of Chinese revolution should and must cause major shift in the international political structure. In particular, as the Chinese revolution achieved such an astonishing victory in the heart of the vast East Asian land, its experience must have universal values, not to mention that even Stalin, the leader of international communist movement, had claimed that the center of world revolution had moved to China.20 18

19

20

Liu Shaoqi, “Zai yazhou ao zhou gonghui huiyi shang de kaimu ci 在亚洲澳洲工会会 议上的开幕词 [Opening speech at the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australian Countries],” November 16, 1949, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:160–​161. Liu Shaoqi, “Zai beijing ge jie qingzhu yazhou ao zhou gonghui huiyichenggong dahui shang de jianghua 在北京各界庆祝亚洲澳洲工会会议成功大会上的讲话 [Remarks at the celebration meeting by all aspects of society in Beijing for success of Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australian Countries],” in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:176–​177. For representative arguments in this field, see Zhou Enlai, “Minzu jiefang yundong de diwei hezuoyong 民族解放运动的地位和作用 [The role and functions of national liberation movements],” April 9, 1951, in Zhou Enlai waijiao wen xuan [Selected works of Zhou Enlai on foreign affairs], 34–​37; Liu Shaoqi, “Zai yazhou aozhou gonghui huiyi shang de kaimu ci [Opening speech at the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australian Countries],” in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:130–​135.

86 Chapter 2 It is necessary to further examine the content of the talks between Mao and Stalin in Moscow and what consensuses they reached on East Asia policies, for Mao apparently discussed issues of Indochina revolution and the Korean Peninsula with Stalin. On March 4, 1950, Mao, Zhou Enlai and others returned to Beijing from Moscow. Ten days later, Liu Shaoqi drafted an internal party instruction for the cpc Central Committee on supporting East Asian revolutions. Such connection of timing cannot be a mere coincidence. The internal party instruction ran that after achieving victory of the Chinese revolution: All possible means should be taken to support the communist parties and people of the oppressed nations in Asia to fight for their liberation. It is an irrefutable international obligation of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people, and it is one of the most important ways to consolidate the victory of Chinese revolution internationally. The cpc should provide “brotherly support” for all communist parties and revolutionary organizations, “thoroughly explain China’s revolutionary experience to them,” and never show any “aloofness or arrogance.”21 This is a landmark event of how the Sino-​Soviet alliance heavily influenced China’s East Asia policy. It showed that cpc leaders finally decided to take the heavy responsibility of being the center of East Asian revolutions. It is undeniable that “expansionist force” existed in China’s foreign policy and was impactful. But it needs to be pointed out that at least at one point in time, such “expansionist force” did not have an overwhelming impact because there was also an inherent “introversion” in New China’s foreign policy. In fact, on a deeper level there was a kind of continuity between New China’s foreign policy and the past Chinese foreign policy, and it was mainly featured by such “introversion,” that China’s foreign policy was often made according to its domestic political agenda and often heavily influenced by domestic politics. It reflected the long-​time heritage of Chinese history, and since the beginning of modern diplomacy in the mid-​nineteenth century it existed and continued into the twentieth century. Such “introversion” had a natural connection with the massive scale of the Chinese territory, and as the territory under cpc control increasingly expanded during the late civil war period, its influence increasingly surfaced. But on the other hand, the formation of the Sino-​Soviet alliance and changes in the neighboring situation also strengthened their attention and support to revolutions beyond the border.

21

Liu shaoqi nian pu 1898–​1969 [Chronicle of Liu Shaoqi 1898–​1969], 2:245.

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As stated above, after receiving Stalin’s message from Mikoyan of China being the “East” revolution, Mao made a cautious formal response at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh cpc Central Committee. Aside from the listed reasons, he did not directly address his principal concerns, which were to achieve the final victory of the Chinese revolution and to prevent the us military intervention. In subsequent telegram communication with Stalin, Mao explicitly expressed the strategic priority in his mind. After the cpc troops crossed the Yangtze River, Mao told Stalin through Kovalev that he did not think it an appropriate time to establish the “East Communist Party Information Bureau.” Stalin agreed and said the priority for cpc was to prevent us intervention. He also told Mao that when the cpc troops reached the southern borders, “a revolutionary trend” would be formed in Indochina, Burma, India, and even in the Philippines and Indonesia. For sure, this could cause countries like the United States to intervene so that they could control South China. To prevent such consequences, Stalin suggested the cpc troops to refrain from rushing to areas bordering Indochina, Burma, and India and prepare for opposing military intervention in North China.22 cpc leaders, however, disagreed with Stalin’s such deployment, for they were determined to march onwards to reach the entire nation and this naturally included all China’s border areas, in order to “protect the independence and integrity of China’s territorial sovereignty.”23 Mao replied to Stalin that cpc troops would reach all parts of the country but they “have no plan to go beyond the borders,” and after swiftly crashing the Kuomintang government and adequately deploying troops there, there would be “not much” possibility for the United States to intervene.24 During this period, the cpc Central Committee indeed made deployment to prevent military intervention from the United States. What is worth analyzing is that, since this time, Mao began to use the notion of “permanent national defense” to exchange views on China’s national security with Stalin.25 With the establishment of the new country, considerations

22

23

24

25

“Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong delivered by Kovaleov,” May 26, 1949, accessed at Library of Center for Cold War International History Studies, East China Normal University, Shanghai, Call Number: NO.16522. Mao Zedong, “Xiang quanguo jinjun de mingling 向全国进军的命令 [March on the whole country],” April 21, 1949, in Mao, Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], 4:1451. “Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin delivered by Kovaleov,” June 12, 1949, accessed at Library of Center for Cold War International History Studies, East China Normal University, Shanghai, Call Number: NO.16525. Ibid.

88 Chapter 2 and actions of cpc leaders to obtain national power and prevent us intervention thereof during the last stage of the civil war swiftly changed to become the national defense strategy. And after the cpc leaders became leaders of the country, almost without any break they began to use the notion of “national defense” to redefine the nature of us military intervention and think about military strategy. Since these issues lay in the same historical process, right from the beginning of the PRC the cpc leaders had viewed us intervention as the principal security threat to the new country and made prevention of us military invasion the priority issue of national security strategy and national defense policy. In Mao’s mind, the first military deployment for national defense was aimed at us invasion. He proposed the strategic deployment for national defense only one month after the establishment of PRC, which went: “National defense should focus on the three areas centered on Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.” He was most worried about North China which had only three army corps and six divisions, for “in case of an emergency, the troops are far from sufficient,” and therefore he required that six army corps of around two hundred thousands of soldiers to “be prepared to reinforce North China on the call” from different directions.26 In fact, Mao continued to apply his judgement that the United States might land in North China and attack from behind once the cpc troops crossed the Yangtze River, and thus his worries about insufficient troops in North China. Liu Shaoqi told Stalin in Moscow that the cpc considered it “still possible for imperialist powers to send a hundred to two hundred thousands of troops to occupy three or four Chinese ports or conduct some military attacks to create chaos.”27 The history of international conflicts has repeatedly proven a logic that perceptions of imminent security threat often leads to military conflicts. It is worth further examination that to what extent the perceptions during the late civil war period affected Chinese leaders’ military decision-​making during the early PRC period. There were other reasons for Mao to worry about us threats on China staged from North China. He told Stalin in June that if there were no foreign invasion,

26

27

Mao Zedong, “Guanyu bingli bushu de jidian yijian 关于兵力部署的几点意见 [A couple of views on military deployment],” in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:35–​36. Liu Shaoqi, “Daibiao zhonggong zhongyang gei lian gong (bu) zhongyang si da lin de baogao 代表中共中央给联共（布）中央斯大林的报告 [Report on behalf of the cpc Central Committee to Stalin],” July 4, 1949.

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the cpc would move on to the “stage of peaceful development” after the end of the civil war.28 The opening words Mao said when he first met Stalin was: The most important issue is to ensure peace. China needs three to five years of peaceful respite to recover its prewar economic level and stabilize the nation. To solve China’s most urgent issues depends on the prospect of peace. Stalin told Mao to rest assured, “Actually no one will fight with China.”29 Mao was purposeful when he said those. On October 21, Mao sent a telegram to Stalin asking him to try to persuade Kim Il-​sung into giving up the idea of uniting the Korean Peninsula by force. Stalin replied with agreement to Mao’s suggestion, and would “follow this idea and advise our Korean friends.”30 The discovery of this episode explained why Mao expressed the worry of “in case of an emergency” on October 31, proposed to massively shift military deployment for “priority of national defense,” and pay heavy attention to North China. New China’s East Asia policy was about to be significantly affected by the evolving situation in the Korean Peninsula. For Chinese leaders, the Korean Peninsula was the most difficult to control in East Asia. It was a battlefield of the United States and the Soviet Union, and after the war there was no room for China’s voice. Besides, both the south and north sides of Korea had strong will of reunification by force, especially the north as its will and passion for a reunification war grew daily as it was greatly stimulated by the victorious Chinese revolution. How to handle this situation was a conundrum facing the Chinese leaders after the establishment of PRC. Their solution conspicuously reflected the inner contradiction of China’s East Asian policy during this period. As stated above, Chinese leaders had sufficient reasons to oppose Kim Il-​ sung’s plan of reunification by force policy and explicitly had expressed their position. However, their influence on Kim Il-​sung was limited and they had 28 29 30

“Mao zedong tongguo ke wa liao fu gei si da lin de baogao [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin delivered by Kovaleov],” June 12, 1949. “Minutes of Conversation between Mao Zedong and Stalin,” December 16, 1949. “Ge luo mi ke guanyu xiang mao zedong zhuan jiao si da lin de dafu zhi ke wa liao fu dian 葛罗米柯关于向毛泽东转交史达林的答复致科瓦廖夫电 [Telegram from Gromyko to Kovalyov on passing Stalin’s response to Mao Zedong],” Novemebr 5, 1949, in Shen Zhihua 沈志华, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng: e guo dang’an guan de jiemi wenjian 朝鲜战争：俄国档案馆的解密文件 [The Korean War:  declassified documents from Russian Archives] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2003), 276.

90 Chapter 2 to go through Moscow to persuade North Korea. During the secret visit to Moscow, Liu Shaoqi asked for Stalin’s help to solve the dispute between China and North Korea over the transmission of power from the Xiaofengman Dam on Yalu River to China, hoping that North Korea could transmit more power to North China. He explained China’s awkward situation, which was that it “failed the attempt to negotiate with North Korea on its own.”31 Kim Il-​sung had said frankly in the face of Chinese representatives:  “Instructions from Comrade Stalin are law to him.”32 On the other hand, since Chinese leaders had decided to act the role of the center of East Asian revolutions, they thus lost reasonable argument against Kim Il-​sung’s reunification by force. And if, in particular, Kim Il-​sung waged the war without asking for China’s support, it would be very difficult for Mao not to agree, let alone that Mao probably was not that determined that Kim had no chance of winning. On January 11, 1945, when Mao was in Moscow, the cpc Central Military Commission decided to let the troops of Korean nationality in the Fourth Field Army to return to Korea and enter North Korea in April as Kim Il-​sung planned.33 The Fourth Field Army was following the order of military-​ wide disarmament and thus proposed to the cpc Central Committee to send those troops of Korean nationality that had lost fighting capacity back to North Korea. The Soviet Union wanted to know North Korea’s attitude to returning these troops and, to avoid suspicion of the Soviet Union, Kim Il-​sung “asked how to reply to China” to the Soviet Ambassador.34 The timing of such decision by the cpc Central Military Commission was indeed sensitive, although their motive was simple and they were not aware of 31

32

33

34

“Report from Kovalyov to Stalin,” July 6, 1949, accessed at Library of Center for Cold War International History Studies, East China Normal University, Shanghai, Call Number: No.16528. “Shi te ke fu guanyu jin ri cheng ti chuxiang nanfang fadong jingong wenti zhi wei xin si ji 什特科夫关于金日成提出向南方发动进攻问题致维辛斯基 [Telegram from Shtkov to Vyshinsky on Kim Il-​sung’s plan to attack the south],” January 19, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:305. Liu Shaoqi, “Jun wei tongyi di si ye zhan jun zhong chaoxian guanbing hui chaoxian de baogao 军委同意第四野战军中朝鲜官兵回朝鲜的报告 [Report on Military Com­ mis­sion’s approval of sending Korean soldiers of the Fourth Field Army back to Korea],” January 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:319–​321. “Shi te ke fu guanyu chaoxian tongyi jieshou zhongguo renmin jiefang jun zhong chaoxian zu ren dian 什特科夫关于朝鲜同意接收中国人民解放军中朝鲜族人电 [Telegram from Shtkov on North Korea’s consent to receive Koreans from the Chinese PLA],” January 11, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:281.

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the disputes between the Soviet Union and North Korea. On January 17, Kim Il-​sung at a lunch party complained in front of the Soviet Ambassador Shtykov about Stalin not supporting his plan of reunification by force. He claimed that if Stalin refused to meet him in Moscow, he would go to Beijing to discuss with Mao on issues of attacking the south and establishing the East Communist Party Information Bureau.35 Kim Il-​sung wanted to juggle between the two big powers and sway the Soviet policies. Upon receiving the telegram, Stalin instructed Shtykov to tell Kim Il-​sung that Moscow was ready to receive him soon and would provide necessary support to North Korea after learning about the situation.36 This telegram on January 30 became a turning point of the Soviet Union’s policy. Soon after, Kim Il-​sung visited Moscow and Stalin gave the green light to North Korea waging its war. There are two issues here that require further investigation. First, when Stalin changed his policy on the Korean Peninsula, Mao was in Moscow. Was he aware of this? Second, why did Stalin change his policy? It was not likely that Mao was informed because at the time Stalin felt he needed to learn about Kim Il-​sung’s plan and North Korea’s real situation first. Then there were two other possibilities. One was that Stalin could have thought that the Sino-​Soviet alliance left the Soviet Union no reason to refuse Kim Il-​sung, so as not to repeat the mistake of “no revolution” in China. The other was that he worried that Kim might turn to embrace China out of dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union. It was true that Kim Il-​sung had started planning his trip to Beijing, and the Soviet Union was generally aware of the Sino-​North Korean exchanges.37 For whatever reasons, the decision of Stalin and Kim Il-​sung was grave for China because it would drag China into a war. Based on China’s strategic interests, Mao should have firmly rejected Kim Il-​sung’s plan and he did have such opportunity. The Soviet Union as an ally to China also had a duty to ask for China’s consent before making a decision that would potentially drag China into war. Stalin did perform his duty as he told Kim Il-​sung that he must obtain 35 36

37

Ibid, 305. “Si da lin guanyu tongyi huiwu jin ri cheng taolun tongyi wenti zhi shi te ke fu dian 斯 大林关于同意会晤金日成讨论统一问题致什特科夫电 [Telegram from Stalin to Shtkov to agree to meet with Kim Il-​sung and discuss the unification issue],” January 30, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:336. “Yi ge na ji ye fu guanyu mao zedong hui jianli zhou yuan de qingkuang zhi wei xin si ji dian 伊格纳季耶夫关于毛泽东会见李周渊的情况致维辛斯基电 [Telegram from Ignatieff to Vyshinsky on the meeting between Mao Zedong and Li Zhouyuan],” April 10, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:336.

92 Chapter 2 consent from China before waging the war.38 It would be stretching the point to interpret Stalin’s action as dragging China down, for should he not have done so, he would have faced many more reproaches such as being accused of acting “behind the back” of China or even “betraying China,” and so forth. On May 13, Kim Il-​sung came to Beijing to meet with Chinese leaders including Mao. He briefed them on his exchanges with Stalin and said that he hoped Chinese leaders would support his cause just as the Soviet Union, and that he did not need China to provide any concrete support. Zhou Enlai then met with officials of the Soviet Embassy on the same day, to verify Kim Il-​ sung’s statement. Stalin replied the next day that he did agree to Kim Il-​sung’s plan of reunification by force, but everything should be reconsidered should the Chinese leaders disagree.39 Judging by the wording of this telegram, Stalin and Mao had reached a consensus earlier that North Korea should not rush to reunite Korea by force, or there would be no need for Stalin to raise the case of Mao disagreeing. But Mao did not firmly reject Kim Il-​sung’s plan at the time, and thus missed the only chance of stopping this war. Reviewing the development of Chinese leaders’ East Asian policy, two events had made it difficult for Mao to reject Kim Il-​sung’s plan, which were the Sino-​ Soviet alliance and the March 14 instruction, let alone that by this time China had started arranging support for Ho Chi Minh’s war against France. It is fair to conclude that China’s involvement in the military conflicts of the two peninsulas had become inevitable since March 1950.

Section 2: The Assistance to Vietnam to Resist France

The “Assistance to Vietnam to Resist France” is the first story to be told about the origins of New China’s East Asian policies. The decision led New China to take the first step of providing military assistance to revolutionary movements

38

39

“Si da lin guanyu tongyi chaoxian tongzhi jianyi zhi mao zedong dian 斯大林关于同 意朝鲜同志建议致毛泽东电 [Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong on consent with North Korean comrade’s advice],” May 14, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:384. “Shi te ke fu guanyu jin ri cheng fang hua jihua zhi wei xin si ji dian 什特科夫关于金 日成访华计划致维辛斯基电 [Telegram from Shtkov to Vyshinsky on Kim Il-​sung’s planned visit to China],” Kim Il-​sung, May 12, 1950; “Shi te ke fu guanyu jin ri cheng yu mao zedong huitan qingkuang de dianbao 什特科夫关于金日成与毛泽东会谈情况 的电报 [Telegram from Shtkov on the meeting between Mao Zedong and Kim Il-​sung],” in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:381, 383.

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in neighboring countries, which had a decisive impact over New China’s East Asian policies. A long-​term examination of China’s Indochina policy after the year of 1949 essentially reflected a strategic geopolitical consideration with strong historical roots. The “Assistance to Vietnam to Resist France” policy took shape in the early years of PRC and lasted until 1954; through the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962, China made significant diplomatic efforts to maintain peace in the region; since the mid-​1960s, China provided massive aid to Vietnam to fight its decade-​long war against the United States; since the mid-​1970s the deterioration of Sino-​Vietnamese relations evolved into China’s punitive military strike against Vietnam in 1979 and subsequent border conflicts of a smaller scale that lasted for a long time. From the geopolitical security perspective, China’s interventions in Indochina had a very consistent purpose of preventing any super power from controlling this region, which also included preventing the rise of a regional military power from controlling the entire region. China spent forty years of efforts during the entire Cold War including providing military aid and taking military actions, and it expelled first France, next the United States, and finally the Soviet Union, one after another out of the Indochina region, and during the process it also destroyed the Vietnamese dream of establishing its own Indo-​Chinese Federation or becoming the leader of a regional military alliance. In essence, Chinese leaders regarded this region as China’s buffer zone and would never tolerate others to encroach on its bedside. One meaningful question commands attention here: since this policy was conceived during the final stage of the Chinese revolution and launched amidst violent confrontations of the Cold War, what impact did such historic context have on this policy? What were the branded features? The Chinese policy “Assistance to Vietnam to Resist France” was finalized around March 1950 after Mao returned to Beijing from Moscow. The previously quoted document drafted by Liu Shaoqi on March 14 served as a guide for New China’s East Asian policies as well as the guiding principles of the decision of “assistance to Vietnam to resist France.” Undoubtedly, after the cpc troops fought across the Yangtze River, cpc leaders considered more of the situation in Indochina from the perspective of avoiding Western military intervention and they made great efforts to prevent Western powers from taking the region as a base to intervene in China. Chinese leaders believed that although the United States, the United Kingdom, and France would strengthen their military presence in Indochina, it was unlikely for them to launch military intervention from there, while the cpc troops were enough to deal with that possibility.40 40

“Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin delivered by Kovaleov,” June 12, 1949, CCCPC Archives Bureau.

94 Chapter 2 It is important to analyze the above considerations of the cpc leaders during the late civil war period, because as later development showed, when they were making national defense policy after the founding of PRC they still considered Indochina as a region that might breed security threats. In particular, with the progress of national development, the concern of geopolitical security increasingly gained weight in China’s Indochina policy. On the other hand, cpc leaders also paid great attention to the anti-​French movement led by Ho Chi Minh and formally established radio contact with the Communist Party of Vietnam (cpv) in the spring of 1947. Mao stated shortly afterward that he had conceived of supporting Ho Chi Minh in the future. The basic reason behind Chinese leaders’ inclination to support the cpv as early as in the transition period of the civil war was because they believed that there were natural links between the Chinese revolution and the Vietnamese one led by Ho Chi Minh. The relations between both sides originated from the Communist International under which they had early cooperation with each other. At that time, they shared the core identity that the cpc and cpv were East Asian comrades in the international communist movement under the leadership of the Soviet Union and the Communist International. Later, such relationship was accurately described as “comrades and brothers” and as a result, Ho Chi Minh turned to the cpc for help before the founding of New China in 1949 without any show of hesitation, and cpc leaders felt a natural obligation to help Ho Chi Minh and the cpv. Of course, Stalin’s consent and encouragement and the formation of Sino-​ Soviet  alliance substantially stimulated the passion and courage of cpc leaders to support the cpv, and the Soviet Union’s attitude dispelled scruples of cpc leaders. At the beginning, the cpc Central Committee only roughly categorized Vietnam as an East Asian country where “the main form of revolutionary campaign was or will be armed guerrilla warfare.”41 Although there were some specific contacts between cpc local organizations in Guangxi and the cpv, at large the communication between cpc Central Committee and cpv had been intermittent and limited before the cpc troops marched toward the Southwest. Right before the establishment of the PRC, People’s Daily had an increasing amount of coverage toward Viet Minh’s fight against France, which included the reprinting of Pravda’s article and news that Viet Minh annihilated the French. Among these, Pravda’s article detailed Vietnam’s 41

Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu dongya minzu geming yundong celüe wenti gei si da lin de baogao [Report to Stalin on strategy for national revolutionary movements in East Asia],” August 14, 1949, 50, CCCPC Archives Bureau.

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strategic location:  lying in the “center” area of the “Pacific Alliance” put together by the United States, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam led by Viet Minh controlled “over 90% of the territory with a population of twenty millions” and Viet Minh led “deep democratic reform and gained power from it.”42 This comment was apparently overstated and could have no positive impact on the cpc. In October 1949, the cpv Central Committee sent Li Ban and Nguyễn Đức Thụy secretly to China and requested for military assistance and restoration of direct contacts between leaders of both parties. At this point, the cpc Central Committee was hoping that the cpv could assist to prevent the Kuomintang troops in Guangxi and Yunnan from fleeing into Vietnam and taking it as shelter. The cpv’s assistance was important because the cpc Central Committee strictly prohibited cpc troops from fighting beyond national borders. In the meantime, the cpc Central Committee was also considering how to provide military aid to the cpv.43 The relationship made substantial progress during Mao’s visit to Moscow. Sino-​Vietnam relations embraced a rapid change in December. Chinese leaders made two important decisions in that month: to provide military aid to Vietnam and establish diplomatic relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the “regime in the jungle.” The direct reason for Chinese leaders to pay attention to Vietnam was due to the changing situation in Southwest China. According to Mao’s conception in the late civil war, if Bai Chongxi’s troops refused to surrender, the cpc troops would encircle and annihilate them; if they retreated to Indochina, the cpc would chase them and destroy them as well as any other “reactionaries” there that dared to resist.44 Stalin, however, replied and tried to discourage the cpc troops from entering Indochina in

42

43

44

“Yingyong dikang fa di qinlue, yuenan gongheguo yiqiang gu 英勇抵抗法帝侵略 越南 共和国益强固 [With heroic resistance against French imperialist invasion, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is increasingly strong],” People Daily, September 10, 1949. Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu jieji he xie jiao tao ru yuenan jingnei guomindang jun can bu wenti de dianbao 关于截击和解交逃入越南境内国民党军残部问题的电报 [Telegram on intercepting and handing over residual troops of Kuomintang that have escaped into Vietnamese borders],” December 1949, February and March, 1950; “Junwei wei zhunbei jinjun Yunnan gei lin biao deng de dianbao 军委为准备进军云南给林彪等的电报 [Telegram from the Central Military Commission to Lin Biao and others on preparing to march into Yunnan],” December 8, 1949, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:197–​199, 201. “Cable, Kovaleov to Stalin, Report on the 22 May cpc CC Politburo Discussion,” 23 May, 1949, CWIHP, Issue 16, 164.

96 Chapter 2 order to avoid intervention from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, and he even suggested that Mao should not rush to send troops to the border areas in Southern China.45 Soon after Mao’s departure for Moscow, the Battle of Guangxi came to an end and Kuomintang forces led by Li Mi began to transit toward the Yunnan border areas. The move of Li Mi’s troops alerted Chinese leaders with a special concern that once the troops entered Vietnam they would threaten the cpv from behind, thus Chinese leaders repeatedly ordered their troops to promptly intercept Li Mi’s troops.46 At this moment, the French colonial authority began to strengthen military deployment on the border areas between Vietnam and China to prevent the Chinese war from spilling over to Vietnam. Such action raised a red flag to Chinese leaders as they worried that the French colonial authority might provide asylum for the Kuomintang troops. On November 30, 1949, Zhou Enlai issued a statement in the name of the Chinese Foreign Minister, which warned the French colonial authority not to “harbor Kuomintang armed rebels.”47 It can be made that both the retreat of Kuomintang troops into Vietnam and the growing military deployment at the border areas by the French colonial government led Chinese leaders to the judgement that it was necessary to intervene in Vietnam. On December 24, when Liu Shaoqi reported the political and military situation in Yunnan to Mao in Moscow, he mentioned that the cpv delegates had raised two requests. First, they hoped that China could provide a huge amount of military aid including military equipment and supplies for three divisions, provide financial assistance worth ten million us dollars, as well as send military cadres to Vietnam to assist with command operations. Such request for China to send military cadres was the origin that prompted China to send the Military Advisory Group to Vietnam later. Second, they asked China to offer diplomatic recognition to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam led by Ho Chi Minh. On military assistance, Liu Shaoqi told Mao that leaders in Beijing found it acceptable to provide aid, “but it cannot be too much”; some supplies could be provided through trade, “but it cannot be ten million us dollars”; military 45 46

47

“Cable, Stalin to Mao (via Kovaleov),” 26 May, 1949, CWIHP, Issue 16, 166. Liu Shaoqi, “Jun wei mingling lin biao bu ying ji guomindang jun de dianbao 军委命 令林彪部迎击国民党军的电报 [Telegram from the Military Comission on ordering Lin Biao’s troops to attack Kuomintang troops],” December 26, 1949, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:233. People’s Daily, November 30, 1949.

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cadres could be sent, but only after Luo Guibo took a trip there with a radio. In a word, they would not meet cpv’s request immediately and fully. On diplomatic recognition, the Politburo held a meeting to weigh pros and cons. Liu Shaoqi told Mao that they held that before the French recognition of China, “it is ok to establish diplomatic relations with Ho Chi Minh, with more pros than cons.” The language such as “it is okay” certainly did not convey a very positive attitude and they saw “cons” there, only that by comparison there were more “pros.” As to what the “cons” were, Liu Shaoqi made no mention and asked Mao to decide.48 As a matter of fact, it was not so easy to weigh pros and cons of whether to establish diplomatic relations first with France or the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Sat in Moscow, the center of world revolution, Mao replied to the telegram the same day. In addition to emphasizing that it was “extremely important” to stop Kuomintang troops from entering Vietnam, he showed great enthusiasm about providing aid to the cpv. He asked Liu Shaoqi to forward to the cpv that it should “send a politically responsible delegation” to visit China openly and Beijing would “extend a public welcome”; aid to Vietnam should increase gradually so that the cpv “can make good use of these supplies”; it was highly necessary for Luo Guibo to go to Vietnam with a radio, but “educate” him that he “must take a friendly and cooperative attitude, encourage more, and do not criticize.” In the telegram Mao also mentioned for the first time that the military cadres sent to Vietnam could only act as “advisors.”49 Apparently, leaders in Beijing took more caution than Mao as they did not want to quickly promise more aid before figuring out the real status of the cpv. Upon receiving Mao’s instructions, Liu Shaoqi immediately telegraphed the cpv Central Committee to quickly dispatch “a politically responsible delegation to Beijing,” but different from Mao’s view, he made it clear that the cpv delegation “should visit China secretly, not publicly.”50 The next day, he

48

49 50

Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu yunnan junqing he yuanzhu yuenan wenti gei mao zedong de dianbao 关于云南军情和援助越南问题给毛泽东的电报 [Telegram to Mao Zedong on the military situation in Yunnan and aid to Vietnam],” in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:226–​227. Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:228. Liu Shaoqi, “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiedai yindu zhina gongchandang zhongyang daibiao tuan wenti de dianbao 中共中央关于接待印度支那共产党中央代表团问 题的电报 [Telegram from the cpc Central Committee on receiving the delegation of Indochina cpc Central Committee],” December 24, 1949, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:229.

98 Chapter 2 sent another telegram to the cpv Central Committee with even more cautious wording, that the cpc was “very willing” to provide “some aid” to the cpv and would like to send a representative with five or six companions and a radio to visit the cpv-​controlled area.51 By this time, Lin Biao dispatched the Fourth Field Army’s 151st Division to march toward Tinh Bien, Lao Cai, and China began to significantly strengthen the management of trade and personnel exchanges over the Sino-​Vietnamese border. In a telegram on the New Year’s Day in 1950, Liu Shaoqi told Lin Biao and others that cpv troops could pass through or temporarily shelter in Chinese territory if prompted by war needs but they should receive “unofficial” approval and they should be told not to enter China “if not highly necessary”; if they did cross the border under necessary conditions they “need to act secretly during the night”; when they needed bullets and food, we could “temporarily give them a moderate amount.” Mao soon expressed disagreement with such caution from Moscow. Hence, five days later Liu told Lin Biao again that Mao believed we “must provide Viet Minh personnel and Vietnamese people as much convenience and help as possible” and “should do our best to help” with ammunitions and food needed by Vietnam, and that Mao asked comrades at home to treat the cpv “as our own comrades,” and so on.52 On January 2, Liu had told Lin Biao to “keep it secret before the cpc Central Committee openly declared” the visit of cpv delegates to Beijing. After receiving Mao’s directions, Liu sent another telegram to Lin Biao and instructed the latter to treat the cpv delegation “with warm hospitality and send them to Beijing using the quickest means.”53 But Liu still believed, however, that 51

52

53

Liu Shaoqi, “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu ni pai daibiao fu yuenan wenti gei yindu zhina gongchandang zhongyang de dianbao 中共中央关于拟派代表赴越南问题给 印度支那共产党中央的电报 [Telegram from the cpc Central Committee to Indochina Communist Party Central Committee on sending delegates to Vietnam],” December 25, 1949, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:231. Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu yunxu yuenan jundui biyao shi dao woguo jingnei duobi deng wenti de dianbao 关于允许越南军队必要时到我国境内躲避等问题的电报 [Telegram on allowing Vietnamese troops to enter our border to hide when necessary],” January 1, 5, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:710–​711. Liu Shaoqi, “Zhongyang wei husong yuenan daibiao tuan lai beijing shi gei lin biao deng de dianbao 中央为护送越南代表团来北京事给林彪等的电报 [Telegram from the cpc Central Committee to Lin Biao and others on escorting the Vietnamese delegation to Beijing],” January 2, 6, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:231.

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both sides lacked communication and the delegates sent by the cpv could not clearly explain what aid they really needed, and thus China should not meet all of their requests.54 Therefore, the cpv delegates still could not openly visit Beijing. At this point Liu did not know, though, that the important figure of the cpv he was about to receive in Beijing was the cpv leader Ho Chi Minh. Ho Chi Minh’s visit to Beijing was an important turning point for Chinese leaders to decide on “Assistance to Vietnam to Resist France.” Ho Chi Minh knew that Beijing was the only place he could find solutions to cpv’s urgent military needs. On January 15 when Ho Chi Minh was about to depart for Beijing, the cpv Central Committee announced that “the Socialist Republic of Vietnam decided to establish formal diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Zhou Enlai replied three days later and announced the establishment of diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and Ho Chi Minh’s Republic.55 Establishing relations with Ho Chi Minh’s government was the critical first step for China to embark on “Assistance to Vietnam to Resist France,” which carried important mental support for the cpv. People’s Newspaper, the organ of the cpv Central Committee, called the day of January 18 “the memorial day for diplomatic victory” and a “day for the whole country to celebrate.”56 When Ho Chi Minh embarked on the journey from his jungle, though, he did not even know that Mao was still in Moscow negotiating the Sino-​Soviet alliance treaty with Stalin. Nor did he know that the Chinese delegate Luo Guibo was already on his way to Vietnamese jungles with his secretaries and the radio. The same went for the Chinese side. On January 25, Ho Chi Minh arrived in Wuhan. Only until then did Liu Shaoqi learn from the telegram sent by leaders of South China Bureau that the “responsible” cpv delegate preparing to visit China was Ho Chi Minh himself. Liu Shaoqi immediately realized its significance, for by any means it had become an event between two countries and he did not know how to receive

54

55

56

Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu yuanzhu yuenan junhuo wuzi wenti de dianbao 关于援助越南军 火物资问题的电报 [Telegram on assisting Vietnam with armament and material supplies],” January 11, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:315. Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu zhongguo yu yuenan jianjiao de dianbao 关于中国与越南建交 的电报 [Telegram on the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Vietnam],” January 18, 1950, in People’s Daily, January 19. Guo Ming 郭明, Luo Fang Ming 罗方明, and Li Baiyin 李白茵, eds. Xiandai zhong yue guanxi ziliao xuan bian 现代中越关系资料选编 [Selected documents of modern Sino-​ Vietnam relations] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1986), 1:10.

100 Chapter 2 one and also the first head of state that came to visit New China, although probably Ho Chi Minh himself never realized it. He immediately instructed the South China Bureau not to make it public, but instead only extend a secret welcome inside the party, offer warm hospitality, and then “escort to Beijing by Zhou Mi.” The next day, Liu sent a telegram to Mao and told him that the visitor from Vietnam was Ho Chi Minh himself, that he had instructed Wuhan to receive him secretly, and asked if Beijing should welcome him publicly. Mao replied with great enthusiasm. He asked Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Dong Biwu, Nie Rongzhen, and others to welcome Ho Chi Minh at the train station and to “agree as many as possible” to aid items requested by Vietnam, and he also hoped that Ho Chi Minh could wait for Zhou Enlai and himself to return to Beijing to have what we call today a “summit.” He probably was not aware either that Beijing was about to receive a head of state, not just a “comrade and brother,” and that a public reception required a big ceremony. But things were still quickly changing. On the twenty-​eighth, Liu Shaoqi forwarded to Mao a telegram from Ho Chi Minh, in which the latter proposed to Mao, Stalin, and Zhou that he planned to secretly visit Moscow so as to achieve both Sino-​ Vietnam “summit” and Soviet-​Vietnam “summit.” As a revolutionist, Ho Chi Minh did not care much about rules. On January 30, Ho Chi Minh arrived in Beijing. Liu Shaoqi only sent Yang Shangkun to the station to welcome him in order to still keep it secret. In the evening, Liu held a banquet to welcome him and had a warm meeting with him. Ho Chi Minh was full of imagination about his desired aid as he even requested for airplanes during the meeting. Liu replied that except airplanes most of his requests could be met and claimed that the specifics needed to be discussed with Mao and others before being decided. Liu also mentioned that China was not in a rush to establish diplomatic relations with France and assistance to the cpv would not likely affect French recognition of China.57 But reality went the opposite. The diplomatic relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was an important reason for France not to follow suit of the United Kingdom and establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. Liu was deeply impressed by Ho Chi Minh. In his telegram to Mao after the meeting, he said that while Ho Chi Minh was “in his sixties” and looked thin, he “still maintained good health,” especially that he managed to walk seventeen days on bare foot to get into China. Ho Chi Minh said that since he had been away from his battlefield for a month, he wanted to cancel the trip to Moscow

57

Zhai Qiang, “Transplanting the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advisers and the First Vietnam War, 1950–​1954,” The Journal of Military History 57 (1993), 4:692.

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as it would seem to take months to travel back and forth, and it would also be “impossible” to wait for a month in Beijing to meet with Mao. Mao immediately replied with passionate invitation to Ho Chi Minh to visit Moscow. He said that immediately after receiving Ho’s request to visit Moscow he called Stalin, and Stalin expressed welcome but preferred it to be a public visit after the Soviet Union announced recognition of Vietnam. Only when Mao raised Ho’s wish for an unannounced visit did Stalin give his approval. In other words, it was under Mao’s persuasion that Stalin agreed to immediately receive Ho. Now if Ho wanted to cancel the distant trip, he would discuss with Stalin again. Liu Shaoqi had another discussion with Ho Chi Minh after receiving the telegram, and the latter thus was determined to go to Moscow and set the departure date as February 3. They soon discussed with the Soviet chargé d’affaires to China on whether to reach Moscow by train or plane. At the same time, Mao and Zhou sent a congratulations telegram from Moscow saying that the “Soviet Union had publicly recognized Vietnam,” and that China had helped to convey Vietnam’s request for all members of the Soviet Camp to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam, all of whom “are likely to offer recognition.” Thus, China brought North Vietnam along into the Soviet Camp. To facilitate Ho’s trip, Mao continued to make efforts in Moscow. On February 3, he telegraphed Liu Shaoqi that Stalin had decided to send a plane to pick up Ho to Moscow. In the meantime, however, Liu Shaoqi received a notice from Voitinskii through the Soviet chargé d’affaires that the plane had been cancelled and that Ho could only travel first to Manchuria by train and then the Soviet Union would send a train to pick him up from there. Ho decided to immediately depart the very night and requested the Soviet side to arrange a plane to Chita or Irkutsk for pickup. Liu Shaoqi suggested Mao to contact Voitinskii directly in Moscow.58 Ho arrived in Moscow on February 6, the timing of which tells that the Soviet side eventually sent a plane.

58

Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu Hu Zhiming fangwen zhongguo he sulian de dianbao 关于胡志 明访问中国和苏联的电报 [Telegram on Ho Chi Minh’s visit to China and the Soviet Union],” January to February, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:421–​426; “Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai wei wenhou Ho Chi Minh gei Liu Shaoqi de dianbao 毛泽东、周恩来为问候胡 志明给刘少奇的电报 [Telegram from Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to Liu Shaoqi on greetings to Ho Chi Minh],” February 1, 1950, in CCCPC Party Literature Research Office 中央文献研究室 and CCCPC Archives Bureau 中央档案馆, eds., Jianguo yi lai mao zedong wen gao 建国以来毛泽东文稿 [Works of Mao Zedong since the founding of People’s Republic of China] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1987), 1:254.

102 Chapter 2 During his stay in Moscow, Ho had an opportunity to be received by Stalin, the disclosed content of which suggested that Stalin’s invitation to Ho was mainly a symbolic gesture to show Stalin’s recognition and support of the cpv. Prior to Ho’s arrival, Stalin told Mao that China could be mainly responsible for assisting the cpv whereas the Soviet Union could assist on the side by providing some supplies.59 Stalin also shared the same thought with Ho during their discussion. For sure, Ho yearned for a more intimate relationship with the Soviet Union. On February 16, Stalin arranged a banquet for the Chinese delegation which Ho also attended. He took the opportunity and proposed to Stalin that the cpv could also sign a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union, but the latter did not offer a reply.60 Shortly after Mao’s return to Beijing, he received a telegram from Luo Guibo from the frontier in Vietnam, which proposed to stage a campaign at Cao Bang and Lao Cai to connect transportation at the border of China and Vietnam. Luo Guibo further suggested of providing the cpv with weapons and equipment sufficient for fifteen thousand people as well as sending to Vietnam a group of commanders from the battalion level to army level as military advisors. Chinese leaders held an immediate meeting upon this telegram and discussed aid to Vietnam.61 This meeting basically set the policy of “assistance to Vietnam to resist France,” which was to assist the cpv to defeat the French colonial rule through providing military aid and sending military advisors. From April to September, to implement the Border Campaign, China quickly supplied to the cpv 15,700 firearms of all varieties, over 500 various artilleries and rockets, large quantities of ammunitions, food, medicine, communication equipment, and so on, in addition to a large number of Vietnamese soldiers

59

60

61

Dou Jinbo 窦金波, “Canjia fu yue junshi guwen tuan jixing 参加赴越军事顾问团纪 行 [Recollection of the trip of the military advisory group],” in Editorial Committee of Zhongguo junshi guwen tuan yuan yue kang fa shi lu《中国军事顾问团援越抗法实 录》编委会, ed. Zhongguo junshi guwen tuan yuan yue kang fa shi lu (dangshi rende huiyi) 中国军事顾问团援越抗法实录（当事人的回忆）[Records of Chinese military advisory group in assisting Vietnam to resist France (Recollections of witnesses)] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2002), 191. Wu Xiuquan 伍修权, Zai waijiao bu ba nian de jingli 1950.1–​1958.10 在外交部八 年的经历 [Eight Years in Ministry of Foreign Affairs:  Jaunary 1950 to October  1958] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1983), 13. Zhang Guanghua 张广华, “Zhongguo yuan yue kang fa zhongda juece mi lu 中国援越抗 法重大决策秘录 [Secret record of China’s crucial decision-​making in assisting Vietnam to resist France],” in Zhongguo junshi guwen tuan yuan yue kang fa shi lu [Records of Chinese military advisory group in assisting Vietnam to resist France], 28.

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entering the Chinese border areas to receive military training as well as weapons and equipment.62 Meanwhile, the Central Military Commission decided after meeting to appoint Wei Guoqing as head of the Military Advisory Group and issued an order on April 17 to all field armies to select commanders to the Military Advisory Group. The delegation was formed in mid-​May with an assembly of legion commanders and staff totaling 281 people.63 On June 27, two days after the outbreak of the Korean War, Mao, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and others received all commanders above colonel level of the Military Advisory Group at Zhongnanhai. A  summary of their elaborations on the “assistance to Vietnam to resist France” policy at the meeting and an analysis of the previous decision-​making process would show that the policy featured “active assistance but not taking control.” As previously stated, Mao had shown great enthusiasm towards assisting the cpv from the start, for this was after all the first time that New China put the “proletarian internationalism” into practice. Other Chinese leaders also had similar thoughts as their speeches and actions conveyed a self-​claimed noble sense of sacredness and mission; Mao in particular paid special attention to the moral perfection of providing aid. During the meeting with members of the Advisors Group, Mao clearly stated his understanding of international obligation, which was that communist parties that had obtained national power “must help others, and such is called internationalism.” He urged members of the Advisors Group to show a noble spirit since life would be tough in Vietnam and “there would be the risk of sacrifice,” while “do not worry” over when to return. Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De also stressed that assisting Vietnam “carried world significance” and was “a crucial international mission.”64 Moreover, Mao lectured the military advisors about how to behave, including “don’t look down on them,” “carry an honest and cautious attitude,” “don’t show pride and self-​content as victors,” and even that the Advisors Group should reflect on what they did inappropriately on a daily, at most a weekly basis. 62

63 64

Editorial Committee on History of Chinese Military Advisory Group 中国军事顾问团 历史编写组, ed., Zhongguo junshi guwen tuan yuan yue kang fa douzheng shishi 中国 军事顾问团援越抗法斗争史实 [Historical facts of Chinese military advisory group in assisting Vietnam to resist France] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1990), 44. Ibid, 3. Ibid, 6–​7; Yu Huachen 于化辰, “Yuan yue kang fa douzheng zhong de wei guoqing tongzhi 援越抗法斗争中的韦国清同志 [Comrade Wei Guoqing during the assisting Vietnam to resist France],” in yuan yue kang fa shi lu [Record of assisting Vietnam to resist France], 38.

104 Chapter 2 Mao’s ideal was to establish a perfect image of internationalism. He even brought up that “China once maltreated Vietnam” since the Han Dynasty such as “Mayuan’s Conquest of Cochin” (“马援征交趾”), thus the Military Advisory Group should apologize to the cpv for such historic matters, and so on. In a word, the power of role model was infinite and as long as the Chinese advisors did their job perfect, the cpv would naturally and happily listen to us. As with the cpc Central Committee’s disputes with the cpv Central Committee on land reform and other areas, he instructed the Advisors Group to only focus on helping the cpv with building an army and fighting the war while “speak little” on other matters and wait for the cpv itself to gradually improve their understanding. Liu Shaoqi also made similar statement during the meeting.65 Later, Mao also added a paragraph to Wang Jiaxiang’s draft of Code of Conduct for the Military Advisory Group: “Love every grass and tree of the Vietnamese people and respect Vietnam’s national independence and Vietnamese people’s culture and norms.”66 It was very similar to his addition to Peng Dehuai’s report at the joint meeting of Chinese People’s Volunteer Army and Korean People’s Army, which was to “educate commanders and combatants to love and protect every mountain, water, grass, and tree, and do not take a single needle and thread from the Korean people.”67 Chinese leaders viewed internationalism as a moral reflect of individuals, for the cpc had once experienced dear lessons. Luo Guibo remembered that once Mao “quite emotionally” talked about the Comintern military advisor Otto Braun who was stationed in the “Central Soviet Area.” In Mao’s mind, Otto Braun was terrible not only because he caused major loss to the cpc enterprise, but also he conducted himself poorly, “running everything in his own hands, arrogant and pushy, always interfering, and imposing his will on others, just like a cocky imperial envoy.” Mao certainly could never accept his own soldiers to become a second Braun. He thus warned Luo

65 66

67

Ibid. Luo Guibo 罗贵波, “Wuchan jieji guoji zhuyi de guanghui dianfan 无产阶级国际主义 的光辉典范 [Shining model of proletarian internationalism],” in yuan yue kang fa shi lu [Record of assisting Vietnam to resist France], 14. Mao Zedong, “Zhiyuan jun yao aihu chaoxian de yi shan yi shui yi cao yi mu 志愿军要爱 护朝鲜的一山一水一草一木 [The Volunteer Army should love every mountain, river, grass, and tree of North Korea],” January 19, 1951, in CCCPC Party Literature Research Office and PLA Academy of Military Sciences 中央文献研究室、中国人民解放军 军事科学院, eds. Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao 建国以来毛泽东军事文 稿 [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2010), 1:449.

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Guibo and company to be extra cautious and not proud and self-​content, or China’s assistance to Vietnam would be counterproductive. In order to prevent members of the Military Advisory Group from conducting immoral behaviors, Mao commanded that Luo and company must “request for instructions” if they encountered major issues.68 Apparently, from the start Chinese leaders paid great attention to shaping what they considered a new type of inter-​party relations, in which China should play a role with high moral standards. Their understanding of high moral standards came partly from the moral principles in traditional Chinese culture and partly from the experience and feelings during the interaction with the Soviet Union. In other words, they believed that the unreasonable and uncomfortable behaviors felt by China as the Soviet Union handled inter-​party relations were out of conformity with the proletariat internationalist morality, and therefore should be avoided by the cpc Central Committee. Chinese leaders also straightforwardly expressed their concerns over China’s geopolitical security. They believed that helping the cpv was “beneficial to our own security” and was “an act that kills two birds with one stone.”69 As previously stated, during the final stage of the civil war Chinese leaders had long considered Indochina as a potential entry point of foreign intervention, and judging by the situation of the Sino-​Vietnamese border area at the time, Chinese leaders had reasons to be concerned about the French military presence in Indochina. To prevent any spillover of the Chinese civil war into Vietnam, France reinforced its military deployment and military reconnaissance at the Sino-​Vietnamese border area. Their main purpose, however, was not to support the Kuomintang government but rather was out of worries that the cpc would probably support the cpv after seizure of national power.70 With the rapid expansion of the Cold War into East Asia, France increasingly turned to the United States for support, whereas the United States also became increasingly determined to make Indochina a new battlefield to execute its containment strategy. 68 69 70

Luo, “Wuchan jieji guoji zhuyi de guanghui dianfan [Shining model of proletarian internationalism],” 12–​13. Dou, “Canjia fu yue junshi guwen tuan ji xing [Recollection of the trip of the military advisory group],” in yuan yue kang fa shi lu [Record of assisting Vietnam to resist France], 190. Huges Traeger, “China’s role in the Indochina war: a French perspective,” in Yang Baojun 杨保筠, Yu Xiangdong 于向东, eds., Biandong shijie zhong de dian bian fu zhanyi yu ri nei wa huiyi 变动世界中的奠边府战役与日内瓦会议 [The Dien Bien Phu Campaign and the Geneva conference in a changing world] (Hong Kong: Xianggang shehui kexue chubanshe, 2005), 118.

106 Chapter 2 There was indeed a clear interaction between the two Camps during the expansion of the Cold War into Indochina. On February 1, 1950, one day after the Soviet Union offered recognition to the Ho Chi Minh government and the day Mao convinced Stalin to invite Ho to the Soviet Union, a working group of the us Department of State submitted a report on Indochina. The report argued that the Soviet Union and China were working together to “overthrow” anti-​communist governments in Southeast Asia and the region was “in danger of slipping into Communist rule.” The French troops were “resisting the southward expansion of communism from Red China” and were in need of help. The choice that the United States faced was “either to support the French in Indochina or watch the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.”71 On February 7, the Truman Administration announced its recognition of the Bao Dai government backed by France. On May 1, President Truman signed an aid program of ten million dollars to the Bao Dai government. At the same time, the Truman Administration also announced to provide aid to France. After the outbreak of the Korean War, in addition to announcing full intervention the Truman Administration also approved military aid to Indochina and reinforcement of us military power in the Philippines.72 Soon, Truman announced to provide military aid of fifteen million dollars to France and two days later, us transport aircrafts airdropped supplies to the French troops in Vietnam. In one year, us aid to the French colonial authority reached 150  million dollars. On August 12, the Chinese Military Advisory Group arrived in Quang Uyen, Cao Bang of Vietnam. One month later, the United States also sent a military advisory group to Vietnam upon French request to help France train Vietnamese troops and provide strategic consulting.73 China’s participation in the Korean War also greatly influenced us strategic thinking over Indochina. Before this, the United States had considered the core of the Indochina issue to be containment of expanding Soviet influence; after China’s participation in the Korean War, the United States concluded that China was a direct threat to the United States in Asia and the us Southeast Asian strategy should focus on containing China.74 Such change in strategic thinking led the Truman Administration to provide increasing aid to France. 71 72 73 74

Gareth Porter, Vietnam:  A History in Documents (New  York:  New American Library, 1979), 86–​87. Harry S. Truman 哈里.杜鲁门., Du lu men huiyi lu 杜鲁门回忆录 [Memoir of Harry S. Truman], translated by Lishi 李石 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1974), 2:400. George C. Herring, “America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950–​1975,” American Historical Review 84(4): 20. Russell D. Buhite, Soviet-​American Relations in Asia, 1945–​1954 (University of Oklahoma Press, 1981), 205–​206.

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Undoubtedly, the us full intervention in East Asia aggravated Chinese leaders’ concern about security in Indochina. On June 27, the same day when the Truman Administration announced its increasing aid to the French-​controlled Indochina, both Mao and Liu Shaoqi mentioned that the us aid to France in Indochina was the same with its interference in Korea, in that they “want to create encirclement around us and when opportunity rises they will turn on us directly.” “With lips gone, teeth are exposed to coldness.”75 Since then, Mao’s attention turned increasingly toward geopolitical security. In November, as Luo Guibo returned to Beijing from Vietnam to report on his work, Mao elaborated on Sino-​Vietnamese relationship that carried strategic significance, which was that both sides had a common enemy as France. He said that once the cpv expelled the French colonists out of Vietnam, “China’s southern border would get rid of threats from the French colonists.”76 By this time, China had joined the Korean War and discussions over whether to join the Korean War would have greatly increased their attention to geopolitical security. The concern over geopolitical security was also a major reason for Chinese leaders to decide on “assistance but not taking control.” While Chinese leaders and especially Mao had great enthusiasm for assisting the cpv to resist the French, they decided from the beginning to adopt a limited assistance policy, namely “not taking control.” The primary thing was to insist that Chinese army should never directly participate in the war in Indochina. Chinese leaders had consistently kept the principle and even when Chinese military advisors proposed to send Chinese troops into Vietnam to assist the fight, they firmly rejected. On July 11, 1952, in a telegram to the Central Military Commission, Luo Guibo mentioned that in order to successfully pursue the Northwest campaign, the cpv wanted Chinese troops in Yunnan to join the battle. Ten days later, the Central Military Commission replied with an explicit rejection that it was “an early established important principle” not to send troops into Vietnam to fight.77 The first reason for the Chinese leadership to insist on no direct participation in the war was to avoid military intervention from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. This principle was decided when Mao replied to Stalin after the Crossing River Campaign in 1949. At that time, Stalin suggested cpc troops to restrain from marching to border areas after taking hold of major 75 76 77

Dou, “Canjia fu yue junshi guwen tuan ji xing [Recollection of the trip of the military advisory group],” 187, 190. Luo, “Wuchan jieji guoji zhuyi de guanghui dianfan [Shining model of proletarian internationalism],” 8. Yuan yue kang fa douzheng shishi [Historical facts of assisting Vietnam to resist France], 58.

108 Chapter 2 cities in Southwest China. Mao instead insisted on taking control of the entire territory and China could avoid foreign intervention by not fighting over the border.78 In the meantime, Chinese leaders also disallowed cpv troops to enter Chinese territories to fight. On January 23, 1950, the cpv Central Committee offered to send troops into China to assist with interception of the remnants of the Kuomintang forces, and their reason was that the French army had blocked the Sino-​Vietnamese border and thus the Vietnamese troops could not take action on Vietnamese soil. On the twenty-​sixth, Liu Shaoqi replied to the cpv Central Committee and kindly declined their offer. He said that Kuomintang forces had been destroyed, thus “there is no need for the Vietnamese troops to come to the Chinese territory.”79 It was during his visit in Moscow that Mao proposed the idea of sending military advisors to Vietnam and such was a result of learning from the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union provided aid to the cpc during the Chinese civil war which included sending technical advisors to Northeast China, it tried hard to avoid offering any excuse to the United States to claim that the Soviet Union was interfering in the Chinese civil war. During his visit in Moscow, Mao proposed to Stalin at their first meeting that they hoped that the Soviet Union could secretly send troops to join the PLA in its fight on Taiwan. Stalin said, “Means of aid must be thoroughly considered and the main issue here is to not provide any excuse for the United States to intervene,” and he consequently suggested that the Soviet Union send “advisors and instructors.”80 This was a direct reason that Mao thought of sending military advisors upon Ho Chi Minh’s request for aid, for same as the Soviet Union, China faced a similar situation in Indochina to not “provide any excuse for the United States to intervene.” In fact, Chinese leaders also took a cautious approach about sending military advisors to Vietnam as they asked the military advisors to remain secret. As Mao instructed the departing military advisors, “All actions must be kept secret, no boasting, not even to family and friends,” and the Advisors

78 79

80

“Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong delivered by Kovaleov,” May 26, 1949; “Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin delivered by Kovaleov,” June 12, 1949. Liu Shaoqi, “Zhonggong zhongyang wei gao guomindang jun canbu yi jiben bei xiaomie gei yindu zhina gongchandang zhongyang de dianbao 中共中央为告国民党军 残部已基本被消灭给印度支那共产党中央的电报 [Telegram from the cpc Central Committee to Indochina Communist Party Central Committee regarding residual troops of Kuomintang having been largely destroyed],” January 23, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:401–​402. “Minutes of conversation between Stalin and Mao Zedong,” December 16, 1949.

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Group should adopt code names in Vietnam and personnel should frequently dress in civilian clothes or Vietnamese military uniforms. In all, they should not leave any “opportunity of finding excuses” for the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the like.81 In the early years of PRC, Mao’s strategic focus had been on North China and he certainly did not want Chinese troops to be trapped in the Southwest due to excessive support of the cpv. The subsequent outbreak of the Korean War confirmed Mao’s concern of security threats coming from the North. As Chinese troops joined the war in Korea, Mao was further apart from sending troops into Indochina. Notably, that Mao would rather send troops into the Korean Peninsula than to Indochina was at least partly associated with Stalin’s attitude on Indochina. Stalin had told Mao in Moscow when Ho Chi Minh was secretly in Beijing that he hoped China would support Ho while the Soviet Union would remain completely behind the scene.82 This passive attitude of the Soviet Union in fact limited China’s policy options. As Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River in massive number, Chinese leaders continued to insist on no troops in Indochina. They even refused to conduct small-​scale supportive operations near the Sino-​Vietnamese border area and disallowed Vietnamese troops to send French captives into Guangxi.83 This surely was difficult for the cpv to understand and had a potentially negative impact on Sino-​Vietnamese relations, in particular because Ho passionately compared Vietnam’s resistance against France with battles in North Korea and he even once proposed to send a Vietnamese delegation to North Korea, for the victory in North Korea was “also a victory for our people.”84 The cpv leadership may have hoped that China would decisively send troops to Indochina after finishing the Korean War. Mao had clearly noticed this problem. He had 81 82 83

84

Dou, “Canjia fu yue junshi guwen tuan ji xing [Recollection of the trip of the military advisory group],” 195. Zhang, “Zhongguo yuan yue kang fa zhongda juece mi lu [Secret record of China’s crucial decision-​making in assisting Vietnam to resist France],” 23. Mao Zedong, “Zai zhengduo zhan zhongdaliang jian di you shengliliang shi hen you li de 在争夺战中大量歼敌有生力量是很有利的 [It is beneficial to wipe out the enemy’s effective forces massively in fierce battles],” September 21, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:215. Ho Chi Minh, “Yi jiu wu san nian qingzhu ba yue geming jie he guoqing jie de haozhao shu 一九五三年庆祝八月革命节和国庆节的号召书 [A letter to call upon celebration of the Revolution Day and National Day in August 1953],” in Ho Chi Minh 胡志明, Hu Zhiming xuan ji 胡志明选集 [Selected works of Ho Chi Minh] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1962), 254.

110 Chapter 2 to explain the situation in North Korea to not only the cpv, but also and first to Chinese delegates in Vietnam, that assisting Vietnam was “equally significant” with assisting North Korea, and the decision of sending troops into Korea but not Vietnam was all based on the local “actual circumstances.” As for what such “actual circumstances” were in Vietnam that even required secrecy of military aid, Mao made no mention.85 In retrospect, Chinese leaders’ insistence on the principle of no troops to Indochina was undoubtedly necessary for maintaining China’s security environment. For the United States also had no intention to intervene directly in Indochina especially since Chinese troops joined the Korean War, but the United States had a condition that if Chinese troops joined battles directly in Vietnam, the United States would at least send the Navy and Airforce to participate in the war and might even attack Chinese territories from sea and air.86 In addition, China’s “not taking control” policy also comprised the meaning that it could not satisfy all aid requests from the cpv without limit. The cpv tended to raise insatiable aid requests since the beginning. Upon the first visit in Beijing, Li Ban and his aide submitted a list of aid requests that totaled ten million dollars, which was so stunning that Liu Shaoqi even questioned the necessity of their requests and insisted on sending people to Vietnam to understand the actual situation before decision-​making. When Ho first visited Beijing, he also made novel aid requests including airplanes. Soon after returning to Vietnam from Beijing, he further requested China for support of personnel, various kinds of supplies and equipment, and three thousand tons of food.87 While Mao was indeed more generous during his stay in Moscow, he also somehow changed his position after returning to Beijing. When aid began to be transported to Vietnam in April, the troops in direct charge in Yunnan reported to the cpc Central Committee that the cpv “requested for too much that is over our supply capacity” and even refused to provide food to Vietnam. Liu Shaoqi instructed Chen Geng, head of the Military Advisory Group, that they should follow the principles of cpv’s actual need and China’s supply capacity when providing aid and should explain clearly to 85 86 87

Luo, “Wuchan jieji guoji zhuyi de guanghui dianfan [Shining model of proletarian internationalism],” 5–​6. Herring, “America’s Longest War,” American Historical Review 84: 22. The telegram from Ho Chi Minh to the cpc Central Committee can be found in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 2:44.

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the Vietnamese side, but do not completely cut off food support.88 The cpc Central Committee also advised Luo Guibo in telegram that he needed not satisfy all requests: “Those impossible to achieve, we cannot provide.”89 In fact, Chinese leaders were trying to limit cpv’s appetite for aid during the entire resistance war against France. Such behaviors of Chinese leaders were partly related to their experience in the Chinese revolution, and especially directly related to their experience of Soviet aid during the revolutionary period. When they received members of the Advisory Group on June 27, they pointed out in particular that the cpv should learn to be “self-​reliant.” Mao put it very clearly, “It is impossible to satisfy all their need.” Zhu De also believed that “it’s not the only solution” for the cpv to rely on Chinese support and we should help the cpv to “insist on the principle of self-​reliance.”90 Luo Guibo also said frankly to Mao in person that Vietnam’s “aid plan was too big and requests were too much.” Mao in fact accepted Luo’s judgment as he instructed to “help them with patience,” which was to gently persuade Vietnam into not making too many requests and China would only provide “those that are actually needed by Vietnam and that we actually have.”91 Later, as China ran into problems of assisting Vietnam, it turned out highly necessary that the Chinese leadership insisted on this principle. On March 18, 1951, Ho Chi Minh made a telegram to the cpc Central Committee and requested for aid of 1,500 tons of rice, 150 vehicles, 100 thousand sets of summer clothing, and so on. The cpc Central Committee immediately decided to first provide 500 tons of rice.92 On May 15, Ho telegraphed the cpc Central Committee again and said that Vietnam “has entered the break 88

89 90 91 92

Liu Shaoqi, “Zhongyang guanyu bangzhu yuenan budui lai Yunnan zhengxun he zhuangbei de dianbao 中央关于帮助越南部队来云南整训和装备的电报 [Telegram from the cpc Central Committee on helping Vienamese troops to train in Yunnan and obtain armament],” May 23, 1950; “Guanyu zhiyuan yuenan liangshi ji jiejue yuan yue wuzi yunshu wenti de dianbao 关于支援越南粮食及解决援越物资运输问题的电报 [Telegram on assisting Vietnam with food and solving the transportation issue of aid supplies to Vietnam],” June 17, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 2:186–​187. Liu shaoqi nian pu [Chronicle of Liu Shaoqi], 2:186, 249. Yuan yue kang fa douzheng shishi [Historical facts of assisting Vietnam to resist France], 6. Luo, “Wuchan jieji guoji zhuyi de guanghui dianfan [Shining model of proletarian internationalism],” 8. Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu yuanzhu yuenan liangshi wenti de piyu he dianbao 关于援助越 南粮食问题的批语和电报 [Comments and Telegram on aiding Vietnam with food],” April 30, 1951, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:157–​158.

112 Chapter 2 between harvests and food will definitely run out without rice support.” He requested for immediate provision of 1,500 to 2,000 tons of rice. Liu Shaoqi instructed the next day, “If possible, better transport such batch of food to them.” But the fact was the cpv had no capacity to receive and transport such food and management was quite chaotic. On June 21, the cpc Central Committee replied to the cpv Central Committee based on local reports that the 500 tons of rice that had been transported in March to Hekou Town near Lao Cai, Vietnam, “have not been received and transported by you so far,” and therefore China could not provide any more.93 Similar situations happened in military aid. At the beginning of 1951, Chinese leaders felt that the cpv “would make random lists of aid requests, sometimes in very large quantities,” and some requests were almost “completely unreasonable.” They instructed the Chinese Military Advisory Group to “examine responsibly every time” over cpv’s aid requests, the unreasonable and impossible requests of which “should always be deleted or reduced,” and they should also request the Vietnamese side to take care of weapons and ammunitions.94 In a telegram on May 2 to the Chinese Military Advisory Group, Liu Shaoqi specifically mentioned the management of military equipment provided to Vietnam. He said that according to a report from Nanning, only 65 out of the 250 vehicles provided were collected by Vietnam; supplies transported to Vietnam were “badly kept,” as “many ammunitions were left unattended” by the road side and became rusted and out of use, and as many as over 300 tons of scrapped ammunitions were transported back. Luo Guibo must forward this situation to Ho Chi Minh and the Military Advisory Group must examine any military aid project proposed by Vietnam.95 With the development of the Korean War and the consequent financial difficulties faced by China, China’s aid to Vietnam was inevitably affected and the Chinese government gradually strengthened its management and control over aid supplies to Vietnam, which included gradually coping with the chaotic transfer of aid supplies to Vietnam. On April 7, 1951, the South China Bureau reported 93 94

95

Ibid, 3:362–​363. Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu yuanzhu yuenan wuqi zhuangbei wenti de piyu he dianbao 关于 援助越南武器装备问题的批语和电报 [Comments and Telegram on aiding Vietnam with arms and equipment],” January 31, 1951, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:64–​65. Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu gaishan yuan yue wuzi guanli deng wenti de dianbao 关于改善 援越物资管理等问题的电报 [Telegram on improving management of aid supplies to Vietnam and other issues],” May 2, 1951, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:290–​291.

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to the cpc Central Committee that the cpv Central Committee’s liaison officer in Hainan had borrowed a large sum of loans from the Hainan District Party Committee. Liu Shaoqi instructed in his reply telegram that all loans to Vietnam must have an advance budget and be approved by the cpc Central Committee before making the transfer. The Hainan District Party Committee “must not willfully lend to them,” and “it was wrong” to have lent without approval before.96 On August 10 and 13, Luo Guibo reported financial problems of the cpv and situation of Sino-​Vietnam trade to the cpc Central Committee. He said that Sino-​Vietnamese trade was very unbalanced, and Vietnam would often make a new request without paying off old debts whereas their actual need was not that much. He concluded: “It is impossible for Sino-​Vietnam trade to become normal trade relations now.” The cpc Central Committee in its reply disagreed with Luo’s view on Sino-​Vietnam trade relations as “impossible to become normal.” It instructed Luo to tell the cpv Central Committee that Sino-​Vietnam trade “can only follow the common trade rule of exchanges at equal values and must not be confused with financial aid”; Vietnam should make efforts to produce goods for export to pay off China’s export supplies.97 On the other hand, the cpc Central Committee also helped the cpv Central Committee to establish financial institutions to support its wartime economy. Since early 1951, Luo Guibo and other Chinese representatives made great efforts to help the cpv Central Committee solve financial problems, by mainly learning from the financial system of the revolutionary bases and their focus on production and trade during the Chinese revolution. Chinese leaders instructed Luo to inform Ho that the cpv Central Committee “could use self-​ reliance to basically solve” wartime financial difficulties; most importantly, the cpv Central Committee must understand that self-​reliance was “a significant fundamental strategy,” and “all problems that can be solved by Vietnam adopting self-​reliance” should be solved that way.98 96

97

98

Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu yuenan laodong dang zhu Hainan dao banshi chu jingfei wenti de baogao 关于越南劳动党驻海南岛办事处经费问题的报告 [Report on the expenses of the Vietnam Socialist Party’s office on Hainan Island],” April 10, 1951, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:271. Liu Shaoqi, “Zhongyang guanyu zhong yue maoyi deng wenti gei luo guibo de zhishi [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee to Luo Guibo on Sino-​Vietnam trade and other issues],” August 16, 1951, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:674–​675. Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu yuenan kefu zhanshi caizheng jingji kunnan de dianbao 关于越南 克服战时财政经济困难的电报 [Telegram on Vietnam fighting over wartime fiscal and economic difficulties],” April 20, 1951, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:275–​277.

114 Chapter 2 Luo Guibo and his team did an efficient job as they helped the cpv Central Committee to establish a quite complete financial system which proved effective. On April 14, Luo reported to the cpc Central Committee that after actions such as regulating taxation, controlling currency issuance, and tightening financial management, there were “real possibilities” for Vietnam to achieve financial balance that year.99 On May 31, Ho sent a telegram to the cpc Central Committee saying that they could not overcome “the difficulty of running behind their expenses.” Three weeks later, Liu Shaoqi replied to him very clearly in telegram that the Vietnamese people were diligent and Vietnam’s resources were abundant, and with the right leadership of the cpv, “your budgetary income can be exceeded and some of your expenses can be saved.” In sum, Vietnam’s financial difficulties could be “further overcome.”100 Chinese leaders deeply hoped that the cpv Central Committee could learn self-​reliance from China’s revolutionary experience, and China was no longer willing to respond to everything that Vietnam asked for. Chinese leaders had a basic judgement of the length of the Vietnamese resistance against France. They believed it would be a long-​term fight for the cpv to expel the French, and therefore from the beginning they informed the military advisers to prepare “for a long-​term and hard fight.” According to Liu Shaoqi’s estimate, the Military Advisory Group should be prepared for at least three years.101 This estimation was significant as it virtually provided a rough baseline of how long Chinese leaders were willing to assist Vietnam against France. As it turned out, it took about four years to reach ceasefire in Indochina. Such timeline mentioned by Chinese leaders directly related to some specific problems they faced, which were that some selected officers were not willing to go to Vietnam as military advisers, and later some officers who were in Vietnam were not willing to work long-​term there. Liu Shaoqi was the first to address the Advisory Group on June 27 as Mao was delayed by other errands. Liu opened by addressing the unwillingness of some members to go to Vietnam, to which he talked about the crucial significance of assisting Vietnam to internationalism and protection of national security, and he further encouraged the military 99

Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:277–​276. 100 Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu yuenan keyi jin yibu kefu caizheng kunnan wenti gei hu zhi ming de dianbao关于越南可以进一步克服财政困难问题给胡志明的电报 [Telegram to Ho Chi Minh on Vietnam’s capability to further fight over fiscal difficulty],” June 25, 1951, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:502–​503. 1 01 Yuan yue kang fa douzheng shishi [Historical facts of assisting Vietnam to resist France], 7.

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advisors to bring out their courage and spirit of fearless sacrifice. Mao addressed the very practical aspects of the issue. He said that where the advisors were heading would be harsh, and so their needs such as watches, leather shoes, and pens would “all be satisfied.” Also, “their stipends will see some increase.”102 Subsequent development showed that having the Military Advisory Group work long-​term in Vietnam indeed caused some internal problems. Some officers were somewhat depressed due to the harsh conditions and brutal war and they asked to return home ahead of time. When Mao listened to Luo Guibo’s report on such problems, he thought of the Canadian Bethune and he deeply hoped that those officers could all hold on in Vietnam like an “internationalist soldier,” although he knew it was not easy.103 This issue was also probably one of the most important factors in affecting China’s decision-​making, especially during the summer of 1953 when the Korean War ended and the military advisors had been fighting in Vietnam for exactly three years as the Chinese leaders originally estimated. In those four years, the most classic was China’s effort in promoting its revolutionary experience in Vietnam. It was beyond doubt that both the Chinese leadership and members of the Military Advisory Group believed that China’s revolutionary experience was widely applicable to national liberation movements in East Asia, and the cpv should seriously learn and apply those experience. However, they did not want to repeat the Soviet mistake of imposing their will on others, but believed instead that behaviors of a role model had stronger appeals, and with the active and unselfish assistance and the moral virtues demonstrated by the Military Advisory Group, the cpv would eventually learn from the Chinese role model. All Chinese leaders reminded officers heading for Vietnam as such: don’t display “arrogance as a victor,” don’t “impose will on others,” and “don’t put on air of a big power.”104 After arriving in Vietnam, Luo Guibo quite strictly practiced the morality principle as emphasized by Mao and others. He seldom engaged himself in political affairs of the cpv Central Committee, and especially on issues relating to the internal affairs of the cpv he spoke and acted cautiously, for he considered it an issue of high moral principle. On June 2, 1951, he reported to the cpc Central Committee that he was often invited to meetings of the cpv Central Committee Politburo and was asked for opinions. The principles he stuck to included: participate in as 102 Dou, “Canjia fu yue junshi guwen tuan jixing [Recollection of the trip of the military advisory group],” 186, 197. 103 Luo, “Wuchan jieji guoji zhuyi de guanghui dianfan [Shining model of proletarian internationalism],” 14. 104 Yuan yue kang fa douzheng shishi [Historical facts of assisting Vietnam to resist France], 6.

116 Chapter 2 few meetings as possible; only offer an opinion when he is familiar with the situation, the opinion is mature, and it could be accepted by the other side; crucial issues will be first reported to the cpc Central Committee and ask for instructions, and no participation or offering of opinions on cpv’s internal personnel and historical affairs. He won praise from Chinese leaders for following these principles, though certainly he could be somewhat more active.105 In November 1951, Ho mentioned to Mao in person to invite Luo Guibo to meetings of the cpv Central Committee Politburo. Mao accepted it on the spot, but once Ho left he asked Luo Guibo to speak and act with caution. Since then, Luo Guibo always asked the cpc Central Committee for instructions before offering any advice to the cpv Central Committee and only took actions after he got clear instructions. Chinese leaders not only wanted Vietnamese to eventually follow the path opened by the Chinese revolution, but also wanted their sincere admiration, for only this would be the highest state and best result of “proletarian internationalism.” It was exactly such issues that the Soviets failed to achieve and made the cpc leaders develop huge dissatisfaction against them. After implementation began on the aid policies, the cpv’s attitude toward China’s revolutionary experience attracted apparent attention. Luo Guibo soon realized after his first arrival in Vietnam, as he reported to the cpc Central Committee, that the cpv seemingly did not think much of China’s revolutionary experience. On May 8, Liu Shaoqi replied to Luo by telegram and reminded him, “Don’t ever pay too much attention to such shortcomings of the Vietnamese comrades. And more so, don’t criticize their shortcomings as such.” According to Luo’s observation, the “shortcomings” in his mind included that the Vietnamese “are afraid of revealing their shortcomings and faults, pay little attention to China’s revolutionary experience, rely more on foreign aid, easily ask for help, and so on.” Liu Shaoqi asked Luo to “sincerely, honestly, and warmly” offer advice in every aspect and introduce “the Chinese experience,” and some effect would be seen in time.106 About twenty days later, on June 2,

105 Liu Shaoqi, “Zhongyang guanyu luo guibo canjia yuenan laodong dang huiyi ji tigong yijian shi ying caiqu taidu de zhishi 中央关于罗贵波参加越南劳动党会议及提供意 见时应采取态度的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee on Luo Guibo’s attitude to adopt when attending meetings of the Vietnam Socialist Party and offering opinions],” June 25, 1951, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:504–​505. 106 Liu Shaoqi, “Zhongyang dui luo guibo zai yuenan gongzuo de youguan wenti de zhishi 中央对罗贵波在越南工作的有关问题的指示 [Instruction from the cpc Central Committee on Luo Guibo’s work in Vietnam],” May 8, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 2:146–​147.

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Luo telegraphed to Liu Shaoqi that after multiple observations he had proven that he was “biased and should be corrected,” that the cpv Central Committee “in general welcomes and accepts” China’s revolutionary experience, and their consensus was that much of China’s revolutionary experience “generally fits and can be applied to Vietnam.” Moreover, the cpv Central Committee further realized that “they now have a vision of solution for problems that could not be solved in the past, and they now have a compass whereas the direction could not be found in the past.”107 It is still unclear why cpv leaders had such huge change, or put it another way, how Luo in so short time found such a different cpv Central Committee. Liu Shaoqi soon replied to Luo and praised him: “On your point about Vietnamese comrades’ emphasis and learning of China’s revolutionary experience, it is very good that you corrected the previous wrong view.” He encouraged Luo and others to “make some more efforts in introducing China’s revolutionary experience,” but “must not be too impatient or opinionated.”108 Winning is everything to a war. It was after the Border Campaign that the cpv Central Committee fundamentally changed its attitude toward the Chinese revolutionary experience, and because of the military victory the cpv Central Committee began to trust the Chinese Military Advisory Group. Before waging the Border Campaign, the Vietnamese military had planned to attack and occupy Cao Bang. Chen Geng suggested after his arrival in Vietnam to attack Dong Khe first, and with permission from the cpc Central Committee he began to persuade the commander of the Vietnamese military. His main argument of persuasion was indeed the cpc experience of “concentrating a superior force to destroy the enemy forces.” After the Campaign, Ho telegraphed to the cpc Central Committee that the victory of the Border Campaign “is a revolutionary, internationalist victory following Mao’s path.”109 In late October, the Vietnamese military convened a review meeting of the Border Campaign convened by all of the main leaders of the cpv. Chen Geng at the meeting “profoundly illustrated Mao’s thought 107

Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 211. 108 Liu Shaoqi, “Zhongyang guanyu yuan yue gongzuo de youguan wenti gei luo guibo de dianbao 中央关于援越工作的有关问题给罗贵波的电报 [Telegram from the cpc Central Committee to Luo Guibo on issues related to aid to Vietnam],” June 7, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 2:210. 1 09 Luo, “Wuchan jieji guoji zhuyi de guanghui dianfan [Shining model of proletarian internationalism],” 7.

118 Chapter 2 of people’s war and people’s army,” and he also introduced “China’s revolutionary war experience.” Ho paid great emphasis on China’s assistance in his speech and he stated that the victory of the Border Campaign was “a victory of proletarian internationalism.” The recognition of the Long March was most encouraging to Chinese leaders. He said the Border Campaign was “a victory of the combination of Mao’s Military Thought and Chairman Ho’s Thought,” especially that the Vietnamese military realized that Mao’s military thought was “fully applicable to Vietnam’s anti-​French war.”110 Since then, the cpv Central Committee kept promoting that with the cpsu and cpc’s experience compared, they “need to pay special attention to learning the Chinese experience” because the latter “most fits our nation’s situation and level.”111 Shortly thereafter, Luo Guibo returned to China again to report on his work. After listening carefully to his report, Mao confirmed his belief that it would serve China better to fulfill internationalist obligations with humility, and he soon felt increasingly better about himself. As Luo recalled, Mao commented on the spot that China’s aid should be “unselfish, voluntary, and without any political strings.” This could be the original version of China’s subsequent statement on the moral principles of foreign aid. Luo was also deeply moved and thought that Mao’s “such internationalism is indeed rare in the world.”112 In all, it was on a higher level than the Soviet Union. The experience in Vietnam also affected how Mao dealt with the relationship with Kim Il-​sung in North Korea. At this time the Volunteer Army just ended their first battle, and difficulties arose in terms of coordination of operational command between the Chinese and North Korean forces, mainly because North Korea did not accept military instructions of the Volunteer Army’s Command. On November 12, Mao said in a telegram to Peng Dehuai: the Volunteer Army’s opinions to North Korea were all appropriate, but the way of statement should take a “euphemistic and moderate manner.” He believed that “debate and disagreement” would persist between the Chinese and North Korean militaries,

110

Yuan yue kang fa douzheng shishi [Historical facts of assisting Vietnam to resist France], 24–​25. 111 “Waijiao shenglijinian ri 外交胜利纪念日 [The memorial day of diplomatic victory],” Renmin bao [People’s Newspaper of Vietnam], January 12, 1953, in Guo, Luo, and Li, eds., Xiandai zhong yue guanxi ziliao xuan bian [Selected documents of modern Sino-​Vietnam relations], 1:11. 1 12 Luo, “Wuchan jieji guoji zhuyi de guanghui dianfan [Shining model of proletarian internationalism],” 7.

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and only through military victory in which China’s views were “repeatedly proven to be correct” would North Korea be “agreed and convinced.”113 Mao believed that Kim Il-​sung and company would eventually admit after military victory that Mao’s Military Thought and China’s revolutionary experience were also applicable to the Korean Peninsula. The cpv Central Committee’s action further strengthened Mao’s confidence. In February 1951, the cpv held its Second National People’s Congress and one agenda item was to confirm the guidance position of the Chinese revolutionary experience and Mao Zedong Thought. As the Party Constitution adopted by the Congress stipulated: The Vietnamese Workers Party takes the combination of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin’s doctrines and Mao Zedong Thought together with Vietnam’s revolutionary practice as the Party’s intellectual basis and guidance of all actions.114 During the Congress, the cpv Central Committee’s People’s Newspapers continuously published articles to explain the importance of learning from the Chinese revolutionary experience. One classic example of promoting Chinese revolutionary experience in Vietnam was the adoption of something similar to the “New Military Reform Movement” adopted by the cpc military after the outbreak of the national civil war. In the winter of 1952, Ho visited Moscow again and consulted Stalin on what he called some profound issues in the Vietnamese revolution, one of which was the launch of land reform. In January 1953, the cpv Central Committee’s Fourth Plenary Session passed a resolution to prepare for the implementation of land reform. In early March, Ho returned to Vietnam from China in car with Wei Guoqing. During the journey, Ho implied to the latter that cpv’s adoption of land reform was the idea of Stalin “himself” who hoped that the cpc would provide more help. According to description, Wei Guoqing immediately thought of China’s revolutionary experience and told Ho that land reform would greatly affect seizure of national power. Given that the subsequent land 113 Mao Zedong, “Yu Chaoxian tongzhi shangtan ying zhuyi fangshi 与朝鲜同志商谈应注 意方式 [Pay attention to manners when talking to Korean comrades],” in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:348. 114 Huang Wenhuan 黄文欢, Canghai yi su: Huang wen huan ge min huiyi lu 沧海一粟： 黄文欢革命回忆录 [A drop in the ocean:  Huang Wenhuan’s revolution memoir] (Beijing: Beijing waiguo yu chubanshe, 1988), 277–​278.

120 Chapter 2 reform in Vietnam could cause anxiety in the Vietnamese military, he said that the Vietnamese military “should also engage in education and reform,” namely to adopt the new military reform.115 Under guidance of the Military Advisory Group, the Vietnamese military followed suit of the military reform movement in the cpc military and launched political education in the military, including mobilizing soldiers to accuse of exploitation and oppression with their own experience, so as to arouse “class hatred” that could raise morale. Some Vietnamese forces also watched the Chinese movie White-​Haired Girl, during which as described “more than ten people cried their heart out on the spot,” and “one soldier ran to the screen to shoot ‘Huang Shiren.’ ”116 Reaction of the Vietnamese forces as described was almost identical with that of the Chinese forces in the earlier years, and thus it was excellent effect. This record was a live example to prove directly to Chinese leaders that Chinese revolutionary experience was down to every detail and indeed applicable to all “oriental” revolutionary movements. From the Border Campaign in 1950 to the Dien Bien Phu Campaign in 1954, the Chinese Advisory Group helped the Vietnamese military to nail a series of military victories. During the “Assistance to Vietnam to Resist France,” China provided military aid to the cpv on a massive scale, including over 155,000 various guns, over 57,850,000 bullets, 3,692 artilleries, over 1,080,000 bomb shells, over 840,000 grenades, 1,231 vehicles, over 1,400,000 uniforms, over 14,000 tons of crops and non-​staple food, over 26,000 tons of fuels, and many other kinds of supplies. By the conclusion of war, the cpv military had reached a formal military of 284,000 people and grew into a formalized military of multiple arms of services. Nevertheless, there were still issues in the cooperation between both sides, such as China’s incapacity and unwillingness to satisfy all of cpv’s desired aid programs and quantity, the attitude of Chinese military advisors toward the Vietnamese military in daily work, mistrust among the Vietnamese military toward the Chinese military advisors, and so forth. Relatively speaking, disagreement between both sides on Vietnamese military strategy had the deepest impact. The Chinese Military Advisory Group was influential over the Vietnamese military strategy and held decisive influence over both strategic planning and concrete campaign planning process, and the Chinese Military Advisory Group was directly commanded by the cpc Central Committee. It could be said thus that major strategic ideas of the Chinese Military Advisory Group all reflected

115 Yu, “Yuan yue kang fa douzheng zhong de wei guoqing tongzhi [Comrade Wei Guoqing during the assisting Vietnam to resist France],” 66–​67. 116 Yuan yue kang fa douzheng shishi [Historical facts of assisting Vietnam to resist France], 84.

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the cpc Central Committee’s views. This situation was due to both the richer war experience of the Chinese Military Advisory Group and the Vietnamese military’s dependence on China for arms and equipment. Without Chinese assistance, the Vietnamese military had little chance of initiating large-​scale campaigns. In the summer of 1951, as the thirty-​eighth parallel became consolidated as the frontier demarcation of both sides on the Korean battlefield, the cpc Central Committee had an increasingly clearer strategy in Indochina, the main idea of which was to concentrate the main power of the Vietnamese military to capture strategic spots in North Vietnam and Upper Laos and establish a series of strategic bases that rest upon China. After three Plain Campaigns, on Febrary 16, 1952, Luo Guibo who just returned to North Vietnam from Beijing proposed that a Northwest Campaign could be launched later that year and then extended into Laos. This proposal got approval from the cpc Central Committee because they believed “it is important to help Laos to achieve liberation.”117 On March 18, the Vietnamese military’s Military Committee met to discuss the Northwest Campaign proposal. The majority of the Vietnamese military cadres disagreed with the Chinese Military Advisory Group’s proposal to organize the Northwest Campaign in September. Their reasons varied, while some reflected deep suspicions toward China’s strategic intention, which was later proven to be almost unalterable. According to Wei Guoqing’s report to Mao, some of the Vietnamese military’s senior officers even believed that the purpose of the Chinese Military Advisory Group’s proposal to launch the Northwest Campaign was to consolidate China’s border areas, “because it is to China’s interest.”118 It is worth examination whether China truly bore such intention in its strategic planning. According to Mao’s original strategic idea, the Chinese Military Advisory Group should have first helped the Vietnamese military to consolidate areas back-​to-​back to China and establish solid bases. Such strategic plan was gradually implemented in the Chinese Military Advisory Group’s war planning. In early December 1950, Chinese leaders had formed the strategic idea of first taking full control of North Vietnam and next attacking Central Vietnam and South Vietnam.119 This strategic choice was first based on China’s revolutionary 117 Ibid, 56. 118 Yu, “Yuan yue kang fa douzheng zhong de wei guoqing tongzhi [Comrade Wei Guoqing during the assisting Vietnam to resist France],” 75. 119 Mao Zedong, “Qingqiu sulian bangzhu jiejue qiche he qiyou wenti 请求苏联帮助解决 汽车和汽油问题 [Request to the Soviet Union for providing motor vehicles and gas],” December 8, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:403.

122 Chapter 2 experience, especially that the cpc gained control over Northeast China that was back to back with the Soviet Union, which thus helped the cpc obtain a secure strategic base and a convenient channel to receive massive aid from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it was also related to the Chinese Military Advisory Group’s views toward Vietnam’s strategic environment. They believed that South Vietnam was too far from the center of command and was blocked by the French military, which made it difficult for transportation and communication and “left few methods of doing military work.” Therefore, South Vietnam should pursue bushwhacking wars to “assist the battlefields of North Vietnam” whereas the strategic focus should be placed on North Vietnam.120 Anyone familiar with China’s traditional strategic thinking might even be able to predict that Chinese leaders would unconsciously choose that strategy. The Border Campaign in September 1950 forced the French troops to abandon most of the strongholds along the Sino-​Vietnam border area, and the Vietnamese military captured five major towns, controlled as long as 750 kilometers of areas adjacent to China’s border, and thus linked China and North Vietnam’s bases together. China believed that it was also “beneficial to the ongoing campaign of eradicating enemies and spies in China’s Guangxi and Yunnan, and beneficial to strengthening national defense of China’s southern border.”121 The subsequent Northwest Campaign, Upper Laos Campaign, and Dien Bien Phu Campaign were almost all related to taking full control of North Vietnam’s border area with China. On the other hand, China was indeed facing continuous deterioration of its strategic environment. After the Chinese military joined the Korean War, the United States began to build military encirclement against China in Southeast Asia. In October 1950, the United States first signed “Military Assistance Agreement” with Thailand. On December 23, the United States signed a formal military assistance agreement with France and the Bao Dai government. In August 1951, the United States signed a “Mutual Defense Treaty” with the Philippines. In September, it signed a “new us-​ Australia Security Pact” with Australia and New Zealand. The Chinese leaders’

120 Liu Shaoqi, “Zhongyang guanyu zanshi bu pai zhongguo guwen dao yuenan nanbu youji qu de dianbao 中央关于暂时不派中国顾问到越南南部游击区的电报 [Telegram from the cpc Central Committee on temporarily not sending Chinese advisors to the guerilla war zone in South Vietnam],” March 12, 1951, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:155–​156. 121 Wang Yanquan 王砚泉, “Yuenan bianjie zhanyi qianhou de chen geng tongzhi 越南边界 战役前后的陈赓同志 [Comrade Chen Geng before and after the Border Campaign in Vietnam],” in Yuan yue kang fa shi lu [Record of assisting Vietnam to resist France], 129.

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consideration of the Indochina war could not be unaffected by such military deployment of the United States. In late September 1952, Ho Chi Minh paid a secret visit to Beijing and finally confirmed the Northwest Campaign plan upon direct coordination with Chinese leaders. On October 18, the cpv Central Committee Politburo held a meeting in which Wei Guoqing and Luo Guibo participated. It decided to implement the principles finalized by Ho and the cpc Central Committee and launch the Northwest Campaign as scheduled.122 The Chinese Military Advisory Group soon participated in the Laos campaign, and thereafter the “Assistance to Vietnam to Resist France” virtually went beyond Vietnam. The cpc Central Committee pointed out that the purpose of launching the Upper Laos Campaign was to consolidate the fruit of the Northwest Campaign, thereby linking the cpv’s Northwest base with Northern Laos. For China, this also built a barrier in the border between China and Vietnam as well as China and Laos. The revealed suspicion of cpv leaders was not eliminated by the huge success of the Northwest Campaign and the following Upper Laos Campaign, although the new situation there was highly beneficial to them as well. Without the solid ground of these campaigns, Dien Bien Phu Campaign would not be a success. In the summer of 1953, the Chinese Military Advisory Group began to plan winter warfare and the subsequent Dien Bien Phu Campaign. At this time, debates again arose among the Vietnamese military cadres, which in Wei Guoqing’s words to Mao, was “relapse,” as they suspected again the motivation of the Chinese Military Advisory Group’s operational plan. Chinese leaders insisted on following the Chinese strategic plan no matter what, to completely control Vietnam’s Northwest region and Upper Laos. By this time they had known the French military’s “Navarre Plan,” the main content of which was to eventually eliminate the main forces of the Vietnamese military through sustained combat. The Plan started in July as the French military swept areas in the North and then the Central and South. On November 20, the French airborne forces captured Dien Bien Phu, a key town in the Northwest. Chinese leaders believed that if the Navarre Plan with us support succeeded, it would be detrimental not only to the cpv but also to the security environment in China’s Southwest region, and therefore it was necessary to fight back and never allow the French military to gain a foothold in Vietnam’s Northwest region. On November 24, 1953, during a meeting of the cpv Military Commission’s meeting for senior officials, Wei

122

Yuan yue kang fa douzheng shishi [Historical facts of assisting Vietnam to resist France], 60.

124 Chapter 2 Guoqing made a comprehensive statement about the significance of launching the Winter Offensive. He said that it was in accordance to the reality to continue taking North Vietnam as the strategic direction, and such strategic choice was also identical with China’s revolutionary experience.123 The Vietnamese military again accepted the operational plan by the Chinese military advisers. Due to the French adjustments of their military deployment, the Winter Offensive of the Vietnamese military later became the well-​known Dien Bien Phu Campaign. While this campaign occurred with military reasons, it eventually paved way for the diplomatic negotiation in the upcoming Geneva Conference. By May 1954, China had assisted the cpv military to secure a series of important military victories, including the Border Campaign, the Midstream Campaign, the Northeast Campaign, Ninh Binh Campaign, the Northwest Campaign, and Dien Bien Phu Campaign. By the time Zhou Enlai put forward and carried through the ceasefire plan based on demarcation between the North and the South in Vietnam, the series of military plans proposed and implemented by the Chinese Military Advisory Group had created such clear strategic situation that the cpv had gained a strategic base with considerable area of land and population, and China had gained a security buffer zone in its Southwest region.

Section 3: From Yalu River to the 38th Line

Stalin sent a telegram to Kim Il-​sung from Kremlin on January 30, 1950. He told Kim that uniting Korea with force “must be organized without excessive risks.” Stalin said he “is always ready to receive” Kim in person, and all North Korea had to pay for Stalin’s decision was merely an annual supply of “25,000 tons of lead” to the Soviet Union.124 A long-​term ardent supporter of Kim fulfilling his dream, the Soviet Ambassador to North Korea, T. F. Shtykov immediately met Kim on the day he received Stalin’s telegram. After the meeting, he stated in his telegram to Stalin that “Kim Il-​sung listened to my conveyance of the message with much satisfaction.” Probably too unexpected of the news, 123 Wang, “Yuenan bianjie zhanyi qianhou de chen geng tongzhi [Comrade Chen Geng before and after the Border Campaign in Vietnam],” 81–​83. 124 “Shi da lin guanyu tongyi huiwu jin ri cheng taolun tongyi wenti zhi shi te ke fu dian 史达林关于同意会晤金日成讨论统一问题致什特科夫电 [Telegram from Stalin to Shtkov on consent to meet with Kim Il-​sung to discuss the unification issue],” January 30, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:309.

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Kim, “in order to listen more accurately,” asked again whether he could really “go to meet Comrade Stalin.” Shtykov answered in the affirmative.125 Mao was in Moscow at the time, and he spent substantial time with Stalin on the Soviet recognition of Ho Chi Minh’s Socialist Republic of Vietnam, on China’s critical role in assisting the cpv’s resistance war against France, and so forth. It is likely that on the same day Stalin telegraphed Kim, Mao made a phone call to Stalin to discuss whether Ho could openly visit Moscow.126 But probably unbeknownst to him, Stalin at the time was considering full support for North Korea to unite Korea by force, the decision of which had the serious consequence of dragging China into a war against the United States. In fact, as early as May 1949, Mao clearly told Kim Il, the delegate of Kim Il-​sung who was on a secret visit to China, that North Korea should give up the idea of initiating an attack. According to Soviet statement, Mao clearly expressed that the cpc would help its North Korean comrades but only when the latter faced attack from the South would China live up to its promise.127 During Mao’s stay in Moscow, he did have discussion with Stalin on North Korea’s immediate desire to launch military attacks, the time of discussion of which should be between January 19 and 30. But they came to no conclusion and decided to leave the issue for later.128 The problem was that the result of the meeting effectively drew China into the issue, so when Stalin later decided to support North Korea’s military plans, he needed to use Kim to transmit the news that he had changed his decision. On April 10, Stalin secretly met with Kim Il-​sung in Moscow, and the pair agreed on North Korea’s military action. As was mentioned before, following Stalin’s instruction, Kim secretly visited Beijing on May 13, informing Mao of the decision of the Moscow meeting. On the same day, Zhou Enlai urgently met with the Soviet Ambassador to China N.  V. Roschin to confirm whether Stalin himself consented to Kim’s plan. 125 “Shi te ke fu guanyu jin ri cheng zhunbei fang su shiyi zhi si da lin dian 什特科夫关于金 日成准备访苏事宜致斯大林电 [Telegram from Shtkov to Stalin on Kim Il-​sung’s prepared visit to the Soviet Union],” January 31, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:310. 126 Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:425. 127 “Ke wa liao fu guanyu mao zedong yu jin yi huitan de qingkuang zhi si da lin dian 科瓦 廖夫关于毛泽东与金一会谈的情况致斯大林电 [Telegram from Kovaleov to Stalin on the meeting between Mao Zedong and Kim Il],” May 18, 1949, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:189–​190. 128 Iu. M. Galenovich, 尤.米.加列诺维奇, Liang da lingxiu si da lin yu mao zedong 两大领袖 斯大林与毛泽东 [Two Leaders: Stalin and Mao Zedong], trans. Bu yanxiu 部彦秀 and Zhang Ruixuan 张瑞璇 (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1999), 429.

126 Chapter 2 Roschin wrote in his telegram to Moscow that “Chinese comrades request a speedy returning call.”129 The next day, Stalin told Mao through the embassy that he had approved Kim’s plan “as the international situation has changed,” but if Mao disagreed, “re-​discussion should be had to solve the issue.”130 Mao had the opportunity to oppose Kim’s risky action, but he did not. The direct reason was that Kim and Stalin both had full confidence in victory, and in particular, Kim expressed that Chinese assistance was not required.131 These left Mao with nearly no cause for objection. Viewing its post-​combat situation, the Korean Peninsula had been a venue for competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and the situation there was a product of conflict and compromise between the two powers. The Kuomintang government did not have any involvement, and the cpc’s involvement was not deep. North Korea had assisted the cpc’s Northeast troops with supplies, and the cpc troops had used the border area of North Korea as safety retreat for the wounded and supplies. After the cpc troops moved past the Yangtze River, Kim proposed to Mao and Stalin separately that an organization such as East Asian Communist Parties Intelligence Bureau should be established. He visited Moscow in early March of 1949, and two months later he expressed to cpc leaders his active support of establishing the Bureau so as to tie China closer to North Korea.132 In addition, with an East Asian communist organization in place, North Korea would have one more avenue to influence the decision-​making of big powers, 129 “Luo shen guanyu jin ri cheng yu mao zedong huitan qingkuang de dianbao 罗申关于 金日成与毛泽东会谈情况的电报 [Telegram from Roshchin on meeting between Kim Il-​sung and Mao Zedong],” May 13, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:383. 130 “Shi da lin guanyu tongyi chaoxian tongzhi jianyi zhi mao zedong dian 史达林关于同 意朝鲜同志建议致毛泽东电 [Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong on consent with Korean comrade’s advice],” April 14, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:384. 131 “Shi te ke fu guanyu jin ri cheng fang hua jihua zhi wei xin si ji dian 什特科夫关于金日成访 华计划致维辛斯基电 [Telegram from Shtkov to Vyshinsky on Kim Il-​sung’s planned visit to China],” May 12, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:381–​382. 132 “Ke wa liao fu guanyu mao zedong yu jin yi huitan de qingkuang zhi si da lin dian 科瓦 廖夫关于毛泽东与金一会谈的情况致斯大林电 [Telegram from Kovaleov to Stalin on the meeting between Mao Zedong and Kim Il],” May 18, 1949, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:189–​190; “Shi da lin yu jin ri cheng, piao xian yong de huitan jilu 史达林与金日成、朴宪永的会谈记录 [Conversaton between Stalin, Kim Il-​sung and Park Hyon-​yong],” April 10, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:334.

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where the moral principle of proletarian internationalism would dominate and North Korea’s wave of the national liberation banner would have more of a blockbuster effect. Kim’s proposal was rejected by both Mao and Stalin, though for hugely different reasons later. Mao did not want to do it himself, while Stalin did not want Mao to do it. Chinese leaders were mainly focused on domestic issues at the time, and the Chinese military was preoccupied with advancing into Tibet and occupying Taiwan, as well as eradicating bandits. Even to compare the Korean Peninsula with the Indochina Peninsula, Chinese leaders apparently paid more attention to the latter. In retrospect, allowing and supporting Kim to launch attacks was a very serious strategic mistake for Stalin. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States not only joined the war promptly, but also started its military intervention in all of East Asia. In a meeting on June 25, Truman approved the Seventh Fleet to enter the Taiwan Strait. The next day, he further approved the increase of military assistance to the French military and the Bao Dai government, and reinforced us military power in the Philippines.133 In consequence, the United States completely reversed its strategy of reducing presence in East Asia, and the strategic situation in the region was substantially altered. China would face military pressure from three strategic directions, including Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Taiwan Strait. The military deployment of the Truman Administration was based upon one fundamental assessment, which was that the Soviet would never join the war directly, and Kim Il-​sung’s risky move “provided a valuable opportunity” for the United States to take actions.134 Their assessment was proved correct. Stalin supported North Korea’s attack, but did not plan to pay too much for Kim’s failure. From the moment the Truman Administration clamorously declared its participation in the war, Stalin must be concerned about his serious strategic mistake, and he looked to China. At the very least, China shared one thousand and three hundred kilometers of borderline with North Korea, and the Northeast China region was the base for China’s heavy industry. China indeed had a much bigger strategic stake in the Korean Peninsula than the Soviet Union. In fact, Northeast China was dragged into the war from the very start and became North Korea’s de facto strategic back. It was used in early July by the Soviet Union as a major conduit and transport hub of delivering supplies 133

Zi Zhongyun 资中筠, ed., Zhan hou meiguo waijiao shi:  cong du lu men dao li gen 战后美国外交史—​从杜鲁门到里根 [us diplomatic history after World War II: From Truman to Reagan] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1993), 206–​207. 1 34 “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs [Clubb],” Washington, August 14, 1950, FRUS, 1950, VOL.II, the United Nations, 263.

128 Chapter 2 to North Korea.135 It was thus difficult to insulate the security of Northeast China from the quandary of North Korea. Also, the Yellow Sea was invaluable to the security of North China. It was thus a vivid and proper metaphor that the Korean Peninsula to North China was like lips to the teeth and windows to the hall—​should the lips be removed, the teeth would feel the cold, and should the windows be broken, the hall would be endangered. Record shows that Zhou Enlai and the Soviet Ambassador to China Roschin had a meeting on July 2, the third day after the us intervention, which is the earliest record of discussion between the Soviet Union and China on the Korean situation after us intervention. In the meeting, Zhou expressed frustration over Kim’s risky military action. After analyzing the situation with the United States in the matrix, he said that China would send a Volunteer Army to fight in North Korea if the Americans crossed the 38th line.136 Such concern of Chinese leaders turned out reasonable, and Chinese leader had deep concerns over the future of North Korea. On July 5, after Stalin received the report of this meeting, he ordered Roschin to pass on the message that China’s military preparation was “correct,” and the Soviet troops “will do its best to provide air cover for the troops.”137 Stalin also personally prompted Chinese leaders to send delegates to North Korea “as soon as possible,” so that “it is easier to communicate and quickly solve problems.”138 Apparently, he was already uneasy by this point. But it would be an overstatement to say that based on these communications, the Soviet Union was the primary cause of China’s decision to deploy forces in North Korea. 135 Zhou Enlai, “Zhongyang guanyu bangzhu chaoxian yunshu wuzi shi gei gao gang de dianbao 中央关于帮助朝鲜运输物资事给高岗的电报 [Telegram from the cpc Central Committee to Gao Gang on helping North Korea to transport supplies],” July 9, 1950; “Zhongyang guanyu xiang sulian linshi kaifang hangkong ji tielu shi gei gao gang de dianbao 中央关于向苏联临时开放航空及铁路事给高岗的电报 [Telegram from the cpc Central Committee to Gao Gang on temporarily opening air navigation and railway to the Soviet Union],” July 11, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Zhou Enlai wen gao [Works of Zhou Enlai since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:17, 31–​32. 136 Shen, ed., Zhong su guanxi shi gang [Historic outline of Sino-​Soviet relations], 128. 137 “Shi da lin guanyu zhongguo zai zhong chao bianjing jijie budui wenti zhi luo shen dian 史达林关于中国在中朝边境集结部队问题致罗申电  [Telegram from Stalin to Rosh­ chin on Chinese armies gathering on the Sino-​North Korean border],” July 5, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:431. 138 “Shi da lin guanyu zhongguo jinkuai xiang chaoxianpai chu daibiao wenti zhi luo shen dian 史达林关于中国尽快向朝鲜派出代表问题致罗申电 [Telegram from Stalin to Roshchin: China should send representatives to North Korea as soon as possible],” July 8, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:437.

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From the start of the Chinese civil war until around establishment of PRC, Chinese leaders saw the United States as a principal enemy in its revolution and a main threat to national security. This was also a reason why they decided to ally with the Soviet Union. But they did not consider the us military threat imminent, and thought the Americans were unlikely to conduct direct military intervention even if the PLA attacked Taiwan in massive scale.139 The us full military intervention in East Asia caused the Chinese leaders to radically change their assessment of the regional security situation. The Chinese leaders’ sense of insecurity grew gradually as North Korea lost control of the battlefield. When the North Korean troops still prevailed on the battlefield, the Chinese official media mainly assailed the United States for the us military blockade of the Taiwan Strait. But internally, Chinese leaders had a stern assessment of the situation, for as they saw it, what the us use of force in North Korea and its military fortification in the Taiwan Strait and Southeast Asia showed was that the Korean War was only an excuse for the United States to have bigger military expansion in East Asia.140 Zhou Enlai remarked on August 26 that the United States “is trying to hammer a wedge in North Korea,” “and next it will certainly crack down upon Vietnam and other former colonial countries. Therefore, the Korean War is at least the focus of fight in the East.”141 Concerns over such domino effect increased after the us troops crossed the 38th line, and such concerns were the background to China’s decision to send troops to North Korea. Later when explaining the reason of China’s dispatch of troops, Mao always emphasized that it was required by the international situation, especially the situation in “the entire East.”142 Importantly, China’s Military Advisory Group was entering Vietnam at the same time, and there 139 He Di, “The Last Campaign to Unify China: The CCP’s Unmaterialized Plan to Liberate Taiwan, 1949–​1950,” Chinese Historians, Spring 1992, 5 (1): 13. 140 “Zhou Enlai waizhang chize meiguo wuzhuang qinlüe Taiwan de shengming 周恩来外 长斥责美国武装侵略台湾的声明 [Foreign minister Zhou Enlai’s statement on condemning us armed invasion of Taiwan],” June 28, 1950, in Zhong mei guanxi ziliao hui bian [Collected documents of Sino-​u s relations], 2:91–​92. 141 Zhou Enlai, “Chongfen zhunbei, chu shou ji sheng 充分准备，出手即胜 [Prepare fully and make an instant win],” August 26, 1950, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:43–​44. 142 Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:106–​ 108; “Mao Zedong guanyu zhongguo renmin zhiyuan jun yingdang he bixu ru chao can zhan gei Zhou Enlai de dianbao 毛泽东关于中国人民志愿军应当和必须入朝参战 给周恩来的电报 [Telegram fron Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai: Chinese People’s Volunteer Army should and must enter Korea to join the war],” October 13, 1950, Dang de wenxian 党的文献 [Party Literature] 5 (2000).

130 Chapter 2 was a remarkable interaction between the two military actions in the Korean Peninsula and Indochina. On July 7, the Central Military Commission decided to form a Northeast Border Protection Army and Su Yu, who was the commander for attacks on Taiwan at the time, was appointed its commander and political commissar.143 At a Politburo meeting on August 4, Mao again mentioned the “domino” effect of us intervention in the Korean War. He said, “if the imperialist America wins, it will be exultant and it will threaten us, so we must help North Korea.”144 On August 26, Zhou Enlai explicitly stated at a military meeting that attacks on Taiwan must be postponed, and the PLA should prepare for assisting North Korea and fighting the us military.145 Immediately thereafter, China began amassing troops in Northeast China in large scale, and decided to deploy another eight armies to the region on top of the four armies already there. It also started to build up air defense capacities in the region.146 The Ninth Corps which was preparing for attacks on Taiwan and the Nineteenth Corps which was being demobilized at the time were deployed to Jinpu Road and Longhai Road to assemble. According to the Central Military Commission’s plan, the main forces in Northeast China should be prepared to fight in September.147 Apparently, Chinese leaders had a much sterner view towards the deteriorating battlefield situation. It is likely that the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang and Soviet military advisors in the North Korean troops did not report the real situation of the war to Stalin,

143

Jianguo yi lai Zhou Enlai wen gao [Works of Zhou Enlai since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:34–​35. 144 Bo Yibo 薄一波, Ruogan zhongda jüece yu shijian de huigu 若干重大决策与事件的回 顾 [Reflection on major decision-​making and events] (Beijing:  Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), 1:43. 145 Zhou Enlai, “Chongfen zhunbei, chu shou ji sheng [Prepare fully and make an instant win],” August 26, 1950, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:43–​44; Lei Yingfu 雷英夫, “Kang mei yuan chao zhanzheng jige zhongda jüece de huiyi (xu yi) 抗美援朝战争几个重大决策的回忆（续一）[Recollections of some critical policy makings of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea (supplement one)],” Dang de wenxian 1 (1994), 24–​25. 1 46 Mao Zedong, “Xu jizhong shi er ge jun yi bian jidong 须集中十二个军以便机动 [We have to gather twelve armies to stay mobile],” in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:97. 147 Mao Zedong, “Dongbei bianfang jun wubi zai jiu yue san shi ri yiqian wancheng yiqie zuozhan zhunbei 东北边防军务必在九月三十日以前完成一切作战准备 [The North­ east Border Defense Force must finish combat preparation by September 30],” August 18, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:184.

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or they failed to observe the critical changes of the situation. On August 28, Stalin asked the Soviet Ambassador to North Korea to pass on a letter to Kim Il-​ sung. The letter congratulated Kim for “the glorious victory in the great liberation war” under his leadership, and believed the UN troops “will soon be driven out of North Korea,” and so on. Kim replied the letter three days later saying he was greatly touched at heart, expressed “thanks to the beloved teacher,” and stated his resolve to achieve “total victory” against us intervention.148 Three days before Stalin sent out the congratulation letter, on August 25, Zhou Enlai said at the forty-​seventh work meeting of the State Council that for the Korean War, “the probability of it being prolonged has increased,” and North Korea will “fight a long-​term war.”149 On August 31, the day Kim boasted “total victory” to Stalin, leaders of the PLA Thirteenth Corps including Deng Hua, Hong Xuezhi, and Xie Fang submitted a joint strategic analysis report on China fighting in North Korea. Because they belonged to the Fourth Field Army, the report was submitted to Lin Biao. After review, Lin Biao handed over the report to Mao. The report asserted explicitly that North Korea had lost its opportunity to win, “the war has become long-​term,” and North Korea’s “advantage on the ground is already not big.” The report opined that it was unavoidable for China to join the fight, but the problem was “if we don’t have the necessary air force joining the battle, it will be very difficult to quickly and completely wipe out the enemies.”150 Later development proved that assessment in the report was accurate and farsighted, and it very much reflected the pragmatic style in China’s military decision-​making. Subsequently, Lin Biao was extremely cautious on sending his troops, which was certainly highly related to the thoughts of his military officers. On September 1, Gao Gang from Northeast China also submitted to Mao a report that comprehensively evaluated situation of the Korean War and Northeast China’s security. He thought that if North Korea did not change its battle strategy, it would very likely “suffer losses,” and if China joined the fight, it not only needed sufficient logistic support, but also needed to consider 1 48 Cited from Galenovich, Two Leaders: Stalin and Mao Zedong, 436. 149 Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai 1949–​1976], 1:69. 150 “Guanyu bianfang jun zuozhan zhunbei qingkuang wenti gei lin biao de baogao 关于 边防军作战准备情况问题给林彪的报告 [Report to Lin Biao on combat preparation of the Northeast Border Defense Force],” August 31, 1950, in Editorial Committee of Zhiyuan jun di yi ren canmou zhang xie fang jiangjun 《志愿军第一人参谋长解方将 军》编委会, ed. Zhiyuan jun di yi ren canmou zhang xie fang jiangjun (1908–​1984) 志愿 军第一人参谋长解方将军 [the first chief of staff of People’s Volunteer Army: General Xie Fang (1908–​1984)] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1997), 94–​95.

132 Chapter 2 the possibility that Northeast China was bombarded extensively. He recommended stepping up air defense preparation and moving major factories and equipments in southern Manchuria to the hinterland to avoid being “blown up.”151 At the time, Mao did not think China would join the fight immediately. He thought that although North Korea was already incapable of achieving unification by force, it could still mobilize millions to fight, and “thus staying in the war for a substantial period is expected.”152 At this stage, he was still personally commanding the Border Campaign in Vietnam and fortifying military defense of the Southeast coast, and thus he was not even active about sending military observers to North Korea. On September 15, us troops landed in Inchon, which caused a sudden turn in the combat situation, and very soon North Korea showed signs of defeat. On September 18, Ni Zhiliang, Chinese Ambassador to North Korea, reported to home the sudden change of the Korean battlefield. Chinese leaders immediately replied and asked Ni to tell Kim Il-​sung that he must give up the illusion of fast victory, be prepared to “rely on himself and fight in the long term,” and critically, “work hard to maintain control of the north of the 38th line.”153 It showed that Chinese leaders did not want to see participation in the war becoming their inescapable choice. They were now expediting war preparation in Northeast China in order to enhance the region’s defense capabilities. However, problems found during the strengthening of Northeast defense became a significant factor of Chinese leaders’ decision to send troops to North Korea. The first problem was air defense in Northeast China. After reviewing the Air Command’s plan of building military airports in the Northeast, Zhou Enlai immediately saw that the large number of proposed airports had substantially exceeded the country’s financial capacity, though these airports might be necessary militarily. He wrote in his report to Mao that “the most difficult issue

151

Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:200. 152 Mao Zedong, “Dui Dongbei bianfang jun zhunbei gongzuo deng wenti de piyu he fu xin 对东北边防军准备工作等问题报告的批语和复信 [Comment and reply to the report on preparation of the Northeast Border Defense Force],” in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:198, 201. 1 53 Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu Chaoxian renmin jun zuozhan fangzhen de dianbao 关于朝鲜人 民军作战方针的电报 [Telegram on the combat strategy of Korean People’s Army],” in Jianguo yi lai Zhou Enlai wen gao [Works of Zhou Enlai since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:311.

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is to approve the budget,” and “Andong Airport alone will cost one hundred million jin of wheat flour and rice, and following this pattern we will waste resources and suffer losses to an unknown degree in the future.” Mao expressed his agreement with Zhou’s opinion.154 The second problem was relocating the Northeast factories. After Gao Gang proposed relocating factories in southern Manchuria, Mao immediately thought the proposal “very problematic, and it would be better to focus on active air defense while keeping the majority in place and relocating the select few.”155 The subsequently drafted guiding principles for the relocation proved that it was an impossible mission, not to mention that the principles assumed a precondition of “ready-​planned, well-​prepared relocation without much impact on production.” It was easy to see that the relocation was hard to execute.156 Even more troublesome was the fact that China had to store North Korea’s supplies in the Northeast, whereas the latter would also transfer equipments to the region. North Korea had apparently deemed the Northeast as its strategic back.157 As a result, war preparation in the Northeast was trapped in a vicious circle. Chinese leaders were unwilling to relocate factories and equipment on a large scale and hoped to solve the problem by active air defense. But the airports required by air defense would incur huge cost that was fiscally difficult to bear. Apparently, from a purely fiscal perspective, the serious difficulties and those predictable and unpredictable costs brought by passive defense were not cheaper than opening a new battlefield in North Korea. It was not unreasonable to solve the Northeast’s security predicament by joining the fight in North Korea. Shortly after China joined the fight, on October 24, Zhou Enlai 154 Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu kong si xiujian jichang jingfei wenti gei Mao Zedong de baogao 关 于空司修建机场经费问题给毛泽东的报告 [Report to Mao Zedong on fund for air command’s airport construction],” in Jianguo yi lai Zhou Enlai wen gao [Works of Zhou Enlai since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:342–​343. 155 Mao Zedong, “Dui Dongbei bianfang jun zhunbei gongzuo deng wenti de piyu he fu xin [Comment and reply to the report on preparation of the Northeast Border Defense Force],” in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:199. 156 Jianguo yi lai Zhou Enlai wen gao [Works of Zhou Enlai since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:294–​295. 157 Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu tongyi Chaoxian zai zhongguo sheli cangku deng shi gei ni zhi liang deng de dianbao 关于同意朝鲜在中国设立仓库等事给倪志亮等的电报 [Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Ni Zhiliang and others on consent to North Korea to build warehouses in China etc.],” September 29, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Zhou Enlai wen gao [Works of Zhou Enlai since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:345.

134 Chapter 2 explained at a larger-​scale meeting the difficulties faced by decision-​makers and the circumstances that left them with no choice but to send troops.158 Different to Mao’s prediction, the North Korean troops were unable to “persist very long,” and they collapsed soon after the us troops landed in Inchon. On September 27, members of the cpsu Central Committee Politburo held a meeting, the discussion and decision of which looked preposterous. The meeting discussed the military situation in North Korea and approved Stalin’s telegram instruction to the Soviet advisors in North Korea. In the telegram, after scolding the mistake of the Soviet advisors, Stalin seriously discussed the use of tanks, artillery, barricades, and so on, and the necessity of occupying “important hubs” such as bridges, mountain passes, and ports in order for the “main forces to pass,” and in all a new defensive line should be formed.159 Sending out instruction on such tactical level only showed Stalin’s severely muddled thinking of the military questions and his lack of solutions. Another decision of the meeting was to instruct the Soviet representative to the UN to try to get in touch with the United States and discuss possibilities of solving the Korean issue peacefully. It was preposterous to propose peaceful solution to the Korean problem at this time, because such diplomatic posture virtually told the strategic opponent that the Soviet Union was ready to give up on Kim and it expected a coerced agreement at best. Pyongyang was also in panic. On September 30, Kim Il-​sung met with Shtykov and told the latter that the North Korean troops “are lacking in discipline and are not following orders,” and all in all they could not be withdrawn. He asked the Soviet Ambassador what North Korea should do and whether the us troops would “cross the 38th line.” If the us troops would not cross the 38th line, North Korea “hopes to unify the country by its own force”; if the opposite was true, then North Korea “cannot possibly resist the enemy effectively.”160 158 Zhou Enlai, “Kang mei yuan chao, baowei heping 抗美援朝，保卫和平 [Resist US aggression and aid Korea, and protect peace],” October 24, 1950, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1997), 4:77. 159 “Lian gong (bu) zhongyang zhengzhiju guanyu niuzhuan chaoxian jushi zhishi de jueyi 联共（布）中央政治局关于扭转朝鲜局势指示的决议 [Resolution of the cpsu Politburo on reversing situation in Korea],” September 27, 1950; “Lian gong (bu) zhongyang zhengzhiju guanyu tongyi yu mei fang jiechu de jueyi 联共（布）中央政治局关 于同意与美方接触的决议 [Resolution of the cpsu Politburo on consent to engage with the United States],” September 27, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 2:555–​556. 160 “Shi te ke fu guanyu yu jin ri cheng de huitan qingkuang zhi ge luo mi ke dian 什特科 夫关于与金日成的会谈情况致葛罗米柯电 [Telegram from Shtkov to Gromykom on the meeting with Kim Il-​sung],” September 30, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 2:561–​562.

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Kim’s incoherent and illogical statement showed that he was indeed in panic. Kim also asked Shtykov to pass on a letter to Stalin, in which he pleaded “dear Comrade Stalin” to help him at the brink of collapse, and stated that North Korea “is in dire need of direct military assistance from the Soviet Union.” He asked emotionally that if “dear Joseph Vissarionovich” was unwilling to directly send Soviet troops, please then help North Korea to request for China and other countries to organize a Volunteer Army to fight in Korea.161 Stalin indeed was unwilling to send Soviet troops, and the cpsu Politburo also decided on the thirtieth that the Soviet Union would not fight with us troops even if North Korea was wiped out before its eyes. The next day, upon Kim’s request and also in order to shift the pressure he was facing, Stalin sent a telegram and letter to Beijing that requested China to send troops to assist North Korea. In the telegram, Stalin first stated that North Korea failed to execute the correct instruction long given by the Soviet Union and as a result they now had no troops to resist the enemies. He asked whether China could dispatch “as few as five or six divisions” and provide cover for North Korea to “organize reserve forces north of the 38th line.” He said he was not planning to discuss with Kim about “this matter” of China sending troops, which likely meant to give Chinese leaders room for maneuver.162 Late that night, Kim Il-​sung personally met Ni Zhiliang, Chinese Ambassador to Pyongyang, and expressed his request of China sending troops to assist once us troops crossed the 38th line. Kim and Park Hyon-​yong also drafted a joint letter to Mao that requested Chinese military assistance.163 At the time, the South Korean troops had already crossed the 38th line. Chinese leaders finally had to face the question of whether to send troops to fight against the United States directly in Korea, and their final decision shaped the East Asian Cold War structure that lasted for nearly thirty years, the main feature of which was fierce confrontations and crises between China and the United States.

161 “Shi te ke fu guanyu zhuan cheng jin ri cheng gei shi da lin de qiuyuan xin zhi ge luo mi ke dian 什特科夫关于转呈金日成给史达林的求援信致葛罗米柯电 [Telegram from Shtkov to Gromyko on passing Kim Il-​sung’s request for aid letter to Stalin],” September 30, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 2:563–​565. 162 “Shi da lin guanyu jianyi zhongguo pai budui yuanzhu chaoxian wenti zhi luo shen dian 史达林关于建议中国派部队援助朝鲜问题致罗申电 [Telegram from Stalin to Roshchin on suggesting China to send troops to assist North Korea],” October 1, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 2:571. 163 Pang Xianzhi 逄先知 and Jin Chongji 金冲及, eds., Mao Zedong zhuan 1949–​1976 毛泽 东传 [Biography of Mao Zedong 1949–​1976] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2003), 1:113.

136 Chapter 2 Mao drafted a report to Stalin after receiving requests from Moscow and Pyongyang, but it is not clear whether it was ever sent out. In the report, Mao reviewed North Korea’s reckless military actions in disregard of China’s warnings, and Kim Il-​sung’s continued disregard of China’s warning that us troops might land from Inchon, which resulted in the severe consequence of leaving North Korea in a badly defeat now. It can be seen that Chinese leaders were disgruntled with the entire decision-​making of North Korea, and they in fact indirectly criticized Stalin for allowing “tail wags dog” to happen.164 Nevertheless, Mao urgently notified Gao Gang to come and meet in Beijing, and ordered the Northeast Border Protection Army to finish war preparation and “be ready at any time to fight new enemies according to the original plan.”165 He also sent Kim a telegram for “strategic reassurance,” telling the latter that the future was still hopeful and now it was important to “avoid fear and vacillation.”166 It can be ascertained that Mao had no hesitation in sending the troops, which was related to his already formed perception of us threat; related to his long-​term war experience; related to his sense of internationalist obligation already constructed during the decision-​making of “Assistance to Vietnam to Resist France”; and also related to the military preparation he had arranged. Importantly, it was also related to Mao’s distinct personality. After all, every Chinese leader might face the same circumstances, but only he alone could immediately give such clear and fierce response. Mao drafted a telegram to Stalin before calling a Secretariat meeting, in which he expressed his resolution to lead his troops across the Yalu River. Speaking from the high stance of “the East” beyond China’s strategic security interest, he told Stalin that Beijing decided to dispatch Chinese troops to Korea to fight against the us troops, because otherwise the United States would be more “rampant and detrimental to the entire East” once it occupied the entire Korea. Instead of merely helping North Korea to hold the 38th line as Stalin suggested, the objective of Chinese troops joining the war was “to eliminate

1 64 Pang and Jin, eds., Mao Zedong zhuan 1949–​1976 [Biography of Mao Zedong], 1:113. 165 Mao Zedong, “Dongbei bianfang jun suishi daiming chudong 东北边防军随时待命出 动 [Northeast Border Defense Force should stand ready to battle at any time],” October 2, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:225. 166 Mao Zedong, “Wufa bei che de Chaoxian renmin jun ying zai yuandi jianchi da youji 无法北撤的朝鲜人民军应在原地坚持打游击 [the Korean People’s Army which can’t withdraw to north should insist on guerrilla warfare in place],” October 2, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:229.

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and evict the invading troops of the United States and other countries in Korea.” Mao thought that once China joined the war, it must “prepare for a declaration of war from the United States against China, and prepare for at least the us bombing of multiple Chinese major cities and industrial bases and naval attack of coastal areas.” Mao believed that all would hinge on “whether Chinese troops can eliminate us troops in Korea,” and once the war in Korea was won, the situation would become “favorable.” Certainly, he also realized that the worst scenario would be “a deadlock between the two troops, and the United States would also openly declare war against China.”167 In effect, this telegram was a fairly complete strategic plan, which clearly set forth the best result Mao was trying to achieve and the worst scenario he was trying to avoid. Mao’s telegram was never sent out, because in the subsequent Central Secretariat meeting, barely anyone supported his choice. Mao told the participants the situation was extremely urgent, but it had no effect. The meeting decided to substitute Peng Dehuai for Lin Biao as the commander of the Volunteer Army, and to hold a Politburo expanded meeting on the fourth to discuss the issue of sending troops. The next day, Mao explained to the Soviet ambassador the dissenting views among the decision makers, which mainly concentrated on the concern that “direct conflict between the United States and China” would ruin China’s plan to peacefully build the country and cause domestic discontent from all sides.168 This reflected the biggest concern of both Mao and the other participants. The state of the decision makers also reflected that although Chinese leaders had been making military preparations for some time, they never planned to be forced into war as such. The North Korean troops had not even built a tolerable defense line. Starting from September 15, China took several diplomatic actions directed at the United States. Viewing their characteristics, these actions can generally be seen as a type of international crisis management. Chinese leaders through multiple channels expressed China’s security concerns and strategic interest to the United States, and in an effort to avoid direct military confrontation, they clearly communicated China’s bottom line to the United States, which was that 167 Mao Zedong, “Guanyu pai zhiyuan jun ru chao can zhan wenti 关于派志愿军入朝参战 问题 [On dispatch of Chinese People’s Volunteer Army into Korea to join war],” October 2, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:226. 168 “Luo shen guanyu mao zedong dui chu bing de taidu wenti zhi shi da lin dian 罗申关 于毛泽东对出兵的态度问题致史达林电 [Telegram from Roshchin to Stalin on Mao Zedong’s attitude toward sending troops],” October 7, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 2:588–​590.

138 Chapter 2 us ground forces should not cross the 38th line in their combat operations in Korea. These diplomatic actions generally created the basic model of international crisis management as later used by China. On September 21, when Zhou Enlai met with K.  M. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to China, he had said that China bore no responsibility for the UN Several days later, Nie Rongzhen again clearly indicated to Panikkar that China was prepared to counter us invasion.169 In retrospect, these warnings were not so explicit, which was due to the circumstances then and the hesitation of Chinese decision makers. On September 30, Zhou Enlai issued an explicit warning during his National Day speech in Beijing: Chinese people will absolutely not tolerate foreign invasion, and they will not allow imperialists to recklessly invade our neighbors and ignore such acts.170 The content of the speech was certainly discussed and approved by the highest level, and it reflected the spike in sense of war crisis of Chinese leaders. Their message further showed that China would not only protect its own land, but also would resolutely counter us military actions, because the us crossing the 38th line and entering North Korea was viewed as “invading China’s neighbors.” After the Central Secretariat meeting on October 2, Chinese leaders made a last effort of managing the crisis. Zhou Enlai visited the Indian Embassy in China on the early morning of the third and clearly stated China’s bottom line: us troops are attempting to cross the 38th line and expanding the war, and should they do so, we cannot sit and watch and we will intervene. Zhou’s statement clearly indicated that crossing the 38th line was an untouchable red line, and it was the bottom line for China on whether to send

169

Zhang Baijia 章百家, “Kang mei yuan chao yu yuan yue kang mei:  zhongguo ruhe yingdui Chaoxian zhanzheng he yuenan zhanzheng “抗美援朝”与“援越抗美”—​ 中国如何应对朝鲜战争和越南战争 [“Resist us aggression and aid Korea” and “assisting Vietnam to resist us:” How China responded to the Korean war and the Vietnam war],” in Zhang Tuosheng 张沱生 and Shi Wen 史文, eds., Zhong mei anquan weiji guanli anli fenxi 中美安全危机管理案例分析 [Case studies on Managing Sino-​u s security crises] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2007), 117. 170 Zhou Enlai, “Wei gonggu he fazhan renmin de shengli er douzheng 为巩固和发展人民 的胜利而奋斗 [Striving to strengthen and develop victory of the people],” September 30, 1950, in Zhou Enlai xuan ji [Selected works of Zhou Enlai], 2:37.

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troops.171 Judging from the time of the statement, it was the consensus of the Chinese decision makers. The diplomatic efforts by Chinese leaders were to no avail, but they probably never had a high hope. The Indian side promptly passed on Zhou’s statement to the us government through the British Foreign Ministry. Upon receiving the report, the us State Department immediately informed Truman and military leaders. The department officials in charge of the State Department East Asian and China affairs both thought that Zhou’s warnings should be treated seriously and must not be viewed simply as bluffing. They suggested taking some measures to reduce the risk of Chinese intervention.172 But the us leaders were entrenched in their belief that Chinese leaders did not have the resolution or will to send troops to fight in Korea, and instead they viewed the warnings of Chinese leaders as “bluffing” or “intimidation.” Truman even thought that Panikkar was “a guy who usually sympathizes with the communists,” and he may have exaggerated China’s response, so it was not worth serious treatment and Zhou’s statement may be “merely intimidation towards the UN”173 Heavily influenced by the historical legacy, this judgment turned out to bring disastrous consequences to us troops. On the day Zhou’s statement was received, the State Department instructed Henderson, its Ambassador to Indian, to try to request the Indian side to inform the Chinese government that the United States saw China’s warning “lacking in legal and moral basis.” In addition, he could also request the Indian side to arrange a direct contact with officials of the Chinese embassy in India, so that the message could be sent across that the United States had no intention to conflict with China, the UN troops would not threaten China’s security, and the us government was ready to compensate China for its verified losses caused by the “accidental bombing” by us fighter planes.174 China rejected

171 Zhou Enlai, “Mei jun ru yue guo san ba xian, women yao guan 美军如越过三八线，我 们要管 [If the us troops cross the 38, line, we will take charge],” in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:67–​68. 172 “Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs [Merchant] to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs [Rusk],” Washington, October 3, 1950, 10:30 a.m.; “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs [Clubb] to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs [Merchant],” Washington, October 4, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.VII, Korea: 848–​849, 864–​866. 173 Truman, The memoir of Harry S. Truman, 2:431–​432. 174 “The Ambassador in the Soviet Union [Kirk] to the Secretary of State,” Moscow, October 3, 1950, 6 p.m.; “The Ambassador in India [Henderson] to the Secretary of State,” New Delhi, October 5, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. VII, Korea, 851, 876.

140 Chapter 2 the us suggestions because the United States made no clear or meaningful statement on China’s security concerns, but the United States did not take any further diplomatic measures. Thus, the last opportunity to avoid war between China and the United States vanished. In the following days, the cpc Politburo held successive meetings to discuss the issue of sending troops, and Mao, with the strong support of Peng Dehuai, eventually convinced his colleagues. On October 5, Stalin telegraphed Mao, expressing that the Soviet Union would fulfill its treaty obligations. He said the United States was not prepared to initiate a large-​scale war, and should the United States expand the war into China, the Soviet Union would fight alongside China. He thought that China’s sending troops would force the United States into compromise and “unwillingly give up on Taiwan.” On the contrary, if China did not send troops, “even Taiwan won’t be obtained.”175 But this telegram did not reach Mao until the next day. Roughly by the time Stalin sent the telegram, the Chinese Politburo had made the final decision to send troops to Korea, which was largely facilitated by Peng Dehuai’s passionate remarks.176 By October 6, Mao had free time to reply to the telegram request for instruction that was sent two days earlier by the Chinese Military Advisory Group in Vietnam and could directly command the Border Campaign that started in Vietnam’s northern border area. Since then, Mao began to simultaneously direct the wars on the two peninsulas beyond China’s border, which was probably considered by him to be one of the most splendid periods in his military career, and which had an influence on his mental state and way of thinking that could not be underestimated. Logically speaking, he would be driven to devote more actively into directing anti-​u s wars and winning the biggest victory possible. The Chinese leaders’ analysis of the situation after the us military intervention was a critical factor that led to their decision of sending troops to resist the United States and assist North Korea. The us military deployment made them think that us military intervention was beyond the Korean Peninsula from the 175 “Shi da lin guanyu zhongguo chubing wenti zhi jin ri cheng de xin 史达林关于中国出兵 问题致金日成的信 [Telegram from Stalin to Kim Il-​sung on China’s dispatch of troops],” October 8, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 2:591–​592. 176 Xu Yan 徐焰, “Chu bing ru chao can zhan jüece queding de quzhe guocheng 出兵入朝 参战决策确定的曲折过程 [the circuitous decision-​making process of sending troops to North Korea to join the war],” in Dang shi yanjiu ziliao 4 (1991), 11; Shen Zhihua, “Zhongguo chu bing Chaoxian de jüece guocheng 中国出兵朝鲜的决策过程 [the decision-​making process of China’s dispatch of troops to North Korea],” in Dang shi yanjiu ziliao [Materials of party history studies], 1 (1996), 9.

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start, which revealed the us intention of full expansion and invasion in East Asia against China, and without resolute counterattack, China’s basic security and East Asia’s stability could not be maintained. But the specific decision-​ making process showed that there were at least two other factors that caused China’s dispatch of force to become irreversible. The first was that due to the blockade of the Taiwan Strait by us troops, which forced China to abandon the attacks on Taiwan under preparation, the strategic reserves originally deployed for the attacks could thus be quickly turned to the Northeast. The second was the us troops crossing the 38th line, which prompted Chinese leaders to finally make the decision of joining the war. On October 7, the UN passed a resolution that authorized the UN troops to unify Korea by force, and the us troops began to swarm across the 38th line. On October 8, Mao signed the “Order to Organize the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army” and informed Kim Il-​sung that Chinese troops would cross the Yalu River to join the war.177 On October 9, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed MacArthur that in the face of possible intervention from China, he was authorized to fight on as long as victory was guaranteed, but make sure to obtain pre-​approval before expanding the war into China.178 On the twenty-​ fourth, MacArthur ordered to cancel the limitation imposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that only South Korean troops could be dispatched to North Korea’s northern border area with China, and the us troops may now advance to the riverside of the Yalu River.179 However, what he didn’t expect was that only the second day after secretly entering North Korea, the Chinese troops launched their first campaign. China and the United States finally met on the battleground. Chinese leaders faced tremendous external hardships and troubles during the decision-​making process of sending troops, and among them the most complicated issue was not crisis management between China and the United States, but rather the relations with their Soviet ally. Policy coordination with

177 Mao Zedong, “Jueding paiqian zhiyuan jun ru chao zuozhan 决定派遣志愿军入朝作 战 [Decision to send People’s Volunteer Army into Korea to join the combat],” October 2, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:237. 178 “The Charge in Korea [Drumright] to the Secretary of State,” Seoul, May 5, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol.VII: Korea, 68–​70. 179 John W. Spanier 约翰.斯帕尼尔., Du lu men yu mai ke a se de chongtu he chaoxian zhanzheng 杜鲁门与麦克阿瑟的冲突和朝鲜战争 [The Truman-​MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War], trans. Qian Zongqi 钱宗起 and Wu Guofu 邬国孚 (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1985), 132.

142 Chapter 2 the Soviet Union went throughout their decision-​making process, for unlike the United States, China was neither a leader in the Soviet Camp nor a country powerful enough militarily and economically to disregard the attitude of its allies and fight with the United States alone. It followed that Chinese allies had had far more influence on China’s decision-​making than what us allies had on the United States. This increased China’s decision-​making difficulty tremendously, and sometimes it even took a toll on China. But the strategic benefit gained through such effort was also apparent, as the United States had to face two major powers, China and the Soviet Union, which were working closely together on the Korean battlefield. Policy coordination between Chinese leaders and the Soviet Union mainly focused on two issues, which were, whether China should send troops, and what obligations the Soviet Union should assume after China’s dispatch of troops. On the first issue, the Soviet Union of course proposed that China send troops, and Stalin used various opportunities to influence Chinese leaders. In light of the relative standing of the two countries, there is no doubt that the Soviet influence could not be underestimated. On the second issue, after deciding to send troops, Chinese leaders apparently thought that it was still necessary to prompt the Soviet Union to adopt a more active and clear position and to fulfill its promises. As was stated before, in his October 2 telegram, Mao already told Stalin about China’s strategic objectives in joining the war, which in his conception included expelling us troops out of the Korean Peninsula. It is necessary to emphasize here that since Mao had read about Xie Fang’s report as mentioned earlier, he was very clear that to defeat the United States completely and avoid the perpetuation of war, air cover and support was a must-​have condition. It is fair to say this telegram already expressed the strong intention to coordinate with the Soviet Union on strategic guiding principles and planning. On October 6, the second day after the Politburo decided to send troops, Mao told Roschin that he thought Chinese troops were poorly equipped, so “it is improper to move in a hurry,” and it was necessary to send Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao to Moscow immediately so that Stalin could clearly know and understand “all plans” of China.180 As Chinese leaders made the decision to join the war, they urgently needed to confirm that as China sent its troops, what responsibilities the Soviet Union would assume, such as providing military assistance as requested by China, and should the Soviet Union fail to meet all of China’s requests, with what responsibilities assumed by the Soviet Union could China still join the war. 180 “Shi da lin guanyu zhongguo chubing wenti zhi jin ri cheng de xin [Telegram from Stalin to Kim Il-​sung on China’s dispatch of troops],” October 8, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 2:591–​592.

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From the very start, Mao held that China and the Soviet Union must have coordination, and the Soviet Union had the necessity and obligation to assist China.181 However, what Stalin promised in his October 5 telegram was to assume ally’s obligation when the us troops attacked China, but what China needed was the Soviet Union providing enough assistance when the United States did not attack China but Chinese troops already joined the war. China needed a variety of assistance, which mainly comprised three aspects: providing sufficient military equipment and various supplies to the troops on the battleground; providing loans to China for military supply purchases in order to alleviate China’s fiscal burden and avoid excessive impact on Chinese economy that may cause domestic discontent; and most importantly, providing air force support, including air cover for Chinese troops that entered Korea, air protection for major targets inside China, and increased support and training to Chinese Airforce to empower it to join the fight as soon as possible. On October 8, the same day the Central Military Commission issued the “Order to Organize the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army,” Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao left Beijing for Moscow to discuss with Stalin whether China would join the war, and if it did, how the Soviet Union would provide assistance. Three days later, on October 11, Zhou and Lin found Stalin recuperating in Crimea on the shore of the Black Sea. The latter said during the meeting that if the United States occupies North Korea, it would pose a long-​term and serious threat to China and would jeopardize the economic development of the Northeast. Zhou told Stalin that once the Soviet mobilized its air force to provide air cover, China could start sending troops, and in addition, it needed many weapons and ammunition. Stalin replied that the Soviet Union could satisfy China’s needs for weapons and ammunition fully, but it would take two or two and half months for the air force to provide air cover for the Chinese troops, because the Soviet Airforce needed time for preparation and an immediate dispatch was impossible. He also considered the possibility of China not joining the war, and even proposed that if North Korea was occupied, China’s Northeast could become the asylum for the Kim Il-​sung’s government-​in-​exile.182 Earlier, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, Stalin promised to Chinese leaders that once China sent its troops to Korea, the Soviet Union would provide 181 Mao Zedong, “Guanyu pai Zhiyuan jun ru chao can zhan wenti [Dispatch of Chinese People’s Volunteer Army into Korea to join the war],” October 2, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 107; Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1898–​1949)], 1:85. 182 Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1898–​1949)], 1:85.

144 Chapter 2 air cover for Chinese troops.183 But when China finally decided to send troops, Stalin withdrew substantially from its position on whether to provide air cover. Immediately after the meeting, Zhou Enlai telegraphed Mao about Stalin’s position, which caused a huge shock among China’s decision makers. As Chinese troops would have no air cover from the Soviet Airforce while fighting in Korea, Chinese leaders had to consider whether to insist on sending troops. If they insisted, how should they and could they fight the war? Mao immediately asked Peng Dehuai, who was already in Northeast China, to get back to Beijing and re-​discuss those basic strategic questions. On the thirteenth, the cpc Politburo met and decided to send troop immediately. Mao stated in his telegram after the meeting to Zhou that the Politburo’s consensus after discussion was that joining the war “is extremely beneficial to China, North Korea, the East and the World,” and the contrary “is detrimental to all parties.” He asked Zhou to continue negotiation with Stalin and prompt the Soviet Union to make commitment in several aspects as follows. First, weapons provided by the Soviet Union “could only take the form of lend-​lease,” so that the Volunteer Army could fight a long-​term war abroad without worries, and unity could be ensured at home. Second, if the Soviet Union was able to mobilize its air force to cover the Volunteer Army in Korea in two to two and half months, China then would be willing to “bear some losses.” Third, the Soviet Airforce should protect Beijing, Tianjin, Shenyang, Shanghai, Nanjing, Qingdao, and other cities, so that China would “not be afraid of any airstrikes.” At the end of the telegram, Mao told Zhou that he must express the unmovable resolution of joining the war, “we think we should and must join the war. It is extremely beneficial to join the war and extremely detrimental not to,” only that we were not fully certain at present about the three points above.184 That night, Mao met with Roschin and told him the Politburo’s decision, and at the same time he emphasized that the Soviet Airforce should join the war “no later than in two months in any event.”185

183 “Telegram from Stalin to Roshchin: Chinese armies gathering on the Sino-​North Korean border,” July 5, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:431. 184 Mao Zedong, “Women renwei yingdang can zhan bixu can zhan 我们认为应当参战必 须参战 [We believe we should join the war and must join the war],” October 13, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:252–​253. 185 “Luo shen guanyu mao zedong jueding chubing deng wenti zhi shi da lin dian 罗申关 于毛泽东决定出兵等问题致史达林电 [Telegram from Roshchin to Stalin on Mao Zedong’s decision to send troops and other issues],” October 13, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 2:597.

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On October 14, pursuant to Mao’s instruction, Zhou Enlai drafted and delivered a letter to Stalin, which mainly informed about the cpc Politburo’s decision and proposed eight assistance items, including various weapons and equipments, supplies and machinery, and especially, a repeated request for Soviet Airforce to fight in Korea and protect the major Chinese cities close to coast.186 On the thirteenth, Stalin already informed Kim Il-​sung to immediately begin evacuating personnel and prepare for withdrawing troops to the border areas with China and the Soviet Union, as he judged it possible that China would not join the war. On the fourteenth, after receiving a letter from Zhou and a telegram from Roschin, Stalin immediately lightened up. He made two successive telegrams to Kim to tell him that the Chinese troops would join the war and he personally “feels happy.”187 On the same day, Mao sent another two telegrams to Zhou at three p.m. and nine p.m., which told him about the Volunteer Army’s military plan and also asked him to confirm with Stalin that whether the Soviet Airforce could fight in Korea and protect major cities in China within two months, and whether it could provide military assistance in the form of lend-​lease.188 Zhou informed Mao the same night that Stalin had told him through Molotov that the Soviet Union could only dispatch air force for stationed defense inside China, but in two months the air force could not reach and fight in Korea.189 On October 18, Zhou returned to Beijing, and based upon Zhou’s report on the Soviet Union, Chinese leaders once again discussed the issue of sending troops and made the final decision. The next day, the Volunteer Army crossed the Yalu River and, without participation of the Soviet Airforce, it began the war against the United States outside China’s borders, which was also the biggest regional war between major powers after the wwii.

186 Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu su kongjun ru chao zuozhan deng wenti gei si da lin de xin 关于苏 空军入朝作战等问题给斯大林的信 [Letter to Stalin regarding dispatch of Soviet Air Force into Korea for combat and other issues],” October 14, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Zhou Enlai wen gao [Works of Zhou Enlai since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:404–​405. 187 “Shi da lin guanyu zhongguo jueding chubing chaoxianzhi jin ri cheng dian [Telegram from Stalin to Kim Il-​sung on China’s decision to send troops to assist Korea],” October 14, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 2:600–​601. 188 Mao Zedong, “Chaoxian qing kaung he dui wo jun ru chao can zhan de yijian [The situation in Korea and opinions of dispatch of our army in to Korea],” October 14, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:256–​257. 189 Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronical of Zhou Enlai], 1:87.

146 Chapter 2 From Zhou’s visit to Moscow and his negotiation with the Soviet Union, China obtained the following commitments from the Soviet Union: (1) once us troops attacked China on its soil, the Soviet Union would join the war to protect China according to the “Sino-​Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance,” which basically solved the concern of Chinese leaders over the incurrence of a full-​scale war with the United States; (2) the Soviet Union would provide China with all needed weapons, equipments, and various military supplies in the form of lend-​lease, which satisfied Chinese troops’ combat needs, greatly alleviated China’s fiscal hardship, and was beneficial to China’s fighting a long-​term war and avoiding possible domestic discontent; (3) the Soviet Union would provide air protection for major cities and strategic strongholds in China, which greatly relieved China’s pressure at home. The only thing the Soviet Union was unable to provide was its Airforce in Korea for air cover and combat support. Under such circumstances, in order to remedy the lack of air cover, Chinese leaders decided to substantially lower the aim of war and make pragmatic strategic planning. In form, since the consideration of joining the war, the combat aims proposed by Chinese leaders at least changed frequently, and sometimes were even obscure. This shows that Mao’s military strategic principle that formed during long-​term wars took a decisive effect, which, to use an animated description by the Chinese military, was “the straw sandal has no shape but it takes shape as it goes.” Since making the military preparations, Chinese leaders had both offensive and defensive considerations, including when Kim Il-​sung was in need, help them get “victory” of the war. As for the meaning of “victory,” it changed with the developing situation in the mind of Chinese leaders. As the Korean People’s Army fell into trouble, Zhou Enlai estimated in late August that the Korean War would become long-​term, the North Korean army would voluntarily retreat, and Chinese troops would assume the task of “finally wiping out all us troops.”190 Apparently, Chinese leaders were then focused on helping North Korea to win the unification war, and this idea probably continued to influence Mao’s thinking after Stalin and Kim Il-​sung requested China to send troops, thus he immediately thought of destroying and expelling the UN troops in Korea upon Chinese participation in the war. Apparently, the proposed combat aim in Mao’s October 2 telegram to Stalin was not produced by careful collective discussion of Chinese leaders, but more likely was a product influenced by judgment on previous combat situation. Mao did not have the time 190 Zhou Enlai, “Chongfen zhunbei, chu shou ji sheng [Prepare fully and make an instant win],” August 26, 1950, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:44–​45.

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to seriously go through the circumstances that newly surfaced, nor did he have detailed understanding of the condition of North Korean troops. Upon deeper discussions and the changing circumstances, Chinese leaders tended to adjust their combat aims downward substantially. On October 4, Zhou Enlai drafted a telegram to Ni Zhiliang, which required the military observers group that had been dispatched to North Korea to “avoid going to the south of the 38th line,” but instead to divide into two teams to conduct battlefield investigation. In revising the telegram, Mao emphasized that for the two teams, “one team should investigate nearby Pyongyang as well as Pyongyang-​Andong line and Pyongyang-​Ji’an line, and the other team should investigate Pyongyang-​Wonsan line, Wonsan-​Chongjin line, and the mountain area north of it. If possible, investigation should be brief but in-​depth investigation shall be avoided.”191 The confirmed locations of the battlefield investigation reflected that instead of pursuing bigger targets, Chinese leaders had limited the battle zone generally to the above areas, and they did not even plan to defend the 38th line. After knowing that Stalin would not commit to air cover, Mao further clarified that the battle targets must be commensurate with Chinese army’s combat conditions. On October 12, after receiving Zhou Enlai’s telegram about his October 11 meeting with Stalin, Mao proposed sending troops to “build bases in the vast mountain areas north of Wonsan-​Pyongyang line,” and in six months they “may attack us troops.”192 On October 14, after repeated exchanges of ideas with Peng Dehuai, Mao further clarified the war strategy of Chinese troops in the early phase: Set up two to three lines of defense in the area north of Pyongyang-​ Wonsan railroad and south of Tokchon-​Nyongwon highway. If the enemy launches attack, then separate and destroy them in there. If the us troops launch attacks in two forces from Pyongyang and Wonsan, then fight the 191 Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu zhongguo wuguan canguan zu zai chao diaocha renwu gei ni zhi liang de dianbao 关于中国武官参观组在朝调查任务给倪志亮的电报 [Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Ni Zhiliang on Chinese military attaché observation group’s investigation tasks in Korea],” October 14, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Zhou Enlai wen gao [Works of Zhou Enlai since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:385; Mao Zedong, “Guanyu wo fu chao wuguan canguan zu de renwu 关于我赴朝武官参观组的任务 [On the tasks of our military attaché observation group visiting in Korea],” October 4, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:230. 192 “Mao Zedong guanyu zhongguo renmin zhiyuan jun yingdang he bixu ru chao can zhan gei Zhou Enlai de dianbao 毛泽东关于中国人民志愿军应当和必须入朝参战给周 恩来的电报 [Telegram fron Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai: Chinese People’s Volunteer Army should and must join the Korean war],” October 13, 1950, Dang de wenxian 5 (2000), 6–​8.

148 Chapter 2 lone and weaker force. The current resolve is to fight the puppet army, while certain lone us troops may also be fought. If time allows, further fortify the defense works. If in six months, the enemy defends Pyongyang and Wonsan without coming out, then our troops will not go out attacking Pyongyang and Wonsan. After our troops are trained and equipped in full and have overwhelming advantage against the enemy both on the ground and in the air, we will then attack Pyongyang, Wonsan, and the like. In other words, we will only talk about offensives after six months. This in fact was an improved version of Lin Biao’s “sending without fighting” principle previously raised, namely, to send troops to North Korea but avoid, at least for a period, fighting directly against the us troops, and also to choose battlefields that were further away from the border of China and North Korea. To say the least, it was difficult to predict whether Chinese troops could have the kind of military advantage as Mao conceived. It was acceptable to Chinese leaders even if Chinese troops just held their line of defense for the long-​term due to certain limitations. In Mao’s words, it was to “push the line of national defense from the Yalu River to Tokchon-​Nyongwon and more southern lines, and this is highly achievable and beneficial.”193 The strategic aim was to prevent us troops from approaching the border areas of China and also to ensure that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) survived in Korea. Chinese leaders’ decision on the combat aim had important significance, as it reflected the degree of affinity that Sino-​Soviet alliance could have in dealing with major international crisis, as well as the extent of limitation of their cooperation in a regional war. Based on judgment on these two issues, Chinese leaders put forward the combat aim as stated above. This shows that Chinese leaders had a fairly clear understanding of China’s strategic interests in North Korea, which was to prevent troops of a hostile major power from approaching China’s border area excessively, and to keep the North Korean regime alive on the Korean Peninsula. Mao used the concept of “national defense line” for the first time in this decision, and it is fair to say that in his mind, the strategic interests had included national security. 193 “Mao Zedong guanyu Chaoxian qingkuang ji wo jun zhunbei chu bing Chaoxian qingkuang gei Zhou Enlai de dianbao 毛泽东关于朝鲜情况及我军准备出兵朝鲜情况 给周恩来的电报 [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai regarding the situation of Korea and People’s Volunteer Army’s preparation for the Korean war],” October 14, 1950; “Mao Zedong guanyu zhiyuan jun ru chao zuozhan de fangzhen he bushu gei Zhou Enlai de dianbao 毛泽东关于志愿军人朝作战的方针和部署给周恩来的电报 [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai regarding deployment and strategy of People’s Volunteer Army’s Korean war operations],” October 14, 1950, in Dang de wenxian 5 (2000), 7–​8.

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A statement made by then Foreign Minister Chen Yi during Snow’s visit to China at the end of 1964 proves the point above. Chen told Snow while talking about the Vietnam War that China would not have joined the war if us troops had not advanced to the Yalu River; “When MacArthur occupied Pyongyang, we said that if Americans don’t advance to the north any further and Kim Il-​sung has a place to stay, then we will not intervene,” “but Americans were resolved to fight to the Yalu River, and we have no choice but to intervene.”194 As for where the line was drawn eventually, it was mainly dependent on the battlefield situation, as well as Chinese leaders’ feeling in that situation and their judgment of us intention. In an effort to avoid being in a state of war with the United States, China named its troops “the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army” and chose to secretly join the war. On October 19, the day the Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River, Mao required that “in these couple of months, only do, but not speak,” and the combat aim on the battlefield was to “stay firm, catch opportunities to have mobile battles, and support North Korean people’s continued fight”195 in certain northern areas of North Korea. Even after their first military campaign, Chinese leaders still insisted on acting secretly, including prohibiting publication of military news in the name of Chinese troops.196 During the same period, Chinese leaders were also making preparations to deal with a full-​scale war with the United States, including vast evacuation of cities and populations. Even temporary relocation of the capital to Xi’an was considered.197 On November 8, Chinese leaders finally decided to announce the participation of 194 “Chen yi fu zongli huijian meiguo zuojia si nuo tanhua jilu 陈毅副总理会见美国作家 斯诺谈话记录 [Minutes of conversation between vice premier Chen Yi and American writer Snow],” December 11, 1964, “Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives [Hereinafter as ‘PRCFMA’],” 106-​01265-​05. 195 “Mao Zedong guanyu zhiyuan jun chudong muqian zhi zuo bushuo de dianbao 毛泽东 关于志愿军出动目前只做不说的电报 [Telegram from Mao Zedong: the dispatch of the People’s Volunteer Army is to proceed in absolute secrecy at present],” October 19, 1950, Dang de wenxian 5 (2000), 11. 196 Mao Zedong, “Dui chuban zhiyuan jun baozhi qingshi baogao de piyu 对出版志愿军报纸 请示报告的批语 [Comments on the report for instruction on publishing Volunteer Army’s newspaper],” November 6, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:341. 197 Zhou Enlai, “Dui yang shangkun guanyu zhongyang ge ji jiguan shusan wenti baogao de piyu 对杨尚昆关于中央各级机关疏散问题报告的批语 [Comment on Yang Shangkun’s report on the evacuation of all levels of government bureaus of the cpc Central Committee],” November 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Zhou Enlai wen gao [Works of Zhou Enlai since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:477, 480.

150 Chapter 2 Chinese troops in the war in North Korea, and their reason was “the enemy has announced the participation in war by the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army,” so publicity “will not have other effects in the international community.”198 Chinese leaders still kept the combat aim flexible and obscure then, a typical summary of which was that through seeking military victory, “make the United States retreat before difficulties.”199 For a period after the Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River, the situation of the Sino-​us competition on the battlefield was decisive, which decided the development of Sino-​Soviet and Sino-​us relations. In view of the early military actions by the Volunteer Army after they entered North Korea, Mao apparently tended to enhance the combat aim, and such enhancement was gradual but indeed fast. The primary and direct reason was the quick deterioration of situation on the Korean battlefield, which caused the inability of Chinese troops to conduct defensive operations as originally planned. The Volunteer Army’s initial conception of the war was, as described above, “stay firm in North Korea’s northern areas that are not lost to the United States, and catch opportunities to have mobile battles.”200 Pursuant to this conception, Peng Dehuai and others adopted the principle of active defense and strove for “controlling a large area in North Korea’s north.”201 The specific plan was to control the line of Kusong, Taechon, Tokchon, Nyongwon, and Oro-​ri and perform active defensive operations there. The problem was when Chinese troops entered North Korea, they could not possibly reach the planned area to execute the defensive 198 Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu gongkai zhiyuan jun ru chao zuozhan wenti gei chai jun wu de dianbao 关于公开志愿军入朝作战问题给柴军武的电报 [Telegram to Chai Junwu on publicizing the Volunteer Army’s entry into Korea to fight],” November 8, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Zhou Enlai wen gao [Works of Zhou Enlai since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:473. 199 Zhou Enlai, “Kang mei yuan chao, baowei heping [Resist us aggression and aid Korea, and protect peace],” October 24, 1950; “Dui Chaoxian wenti de guji yu women de sixiang zhunbei [Estimate on Korean situation and our mental preparation],” November 13, 1950, “Kang mei yuan chao jushi de fazhan qiantu 抗美援朝局势的发展前途 [The future situation of resisting us aggression and assist Korea],” January 25, 1950; “Kang mei yuan chao yundong zhong cunzai de sixiang wenti 抗美援朝运动中存在的思 想问题 [Ideological problems emerging from the resisting us aggression and assisting North Korea campaign],” November 25, 1950, all cited from Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:75, 92, 107, 114. 200 Mao Zedong, “Zhiyuan jun canzhan muqian zhi zuo bu shuo 志愿军参战目前只做不说 [Only do but not speak about the Volunteer Army’s participation in war],” October 19, 1950, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:126. 201 Junshi kexue yuan junshi lishi yanjiu bu 军事科学院军事历史研究部, Kang mei yuan chao zhanzheng shi 抗美援朝战争史 [A history of the War to Resist us Aggression and Assist North Korea] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2000), 3.

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plan. After occupying Pyongyang, the UN troops advanced to the north rapidly, the strategic intention of which was to quickly occupy key strategic locations in North Korea’s northern border and lock down the border area, in order to eradicate the opportunity of China and the Soviet Union to prevent us military occupation of all Korea. By October 20, the second day the Volunteer Army entered North Korea, three South Korean forward divisions on the west line had already reached the line of Sunchon, Sinchang-​ri, Songchon, and Pa-​uep, which was 90 to 130 kilometers from the Volunteer Army’s planned defensive line. Further still, South Korea’s forward units on the east line had arrived in Chinese troops’ planned defensive area. Four divisions and one regiment of the Volunteer Army entered North Korea at the time, but their distance to the planned defensive area was about twice as long as that of the Korean troops. On October 21, UN troops staged a large-​scale offensive to the north from the whole line of Pyongyang to Wonsan, which forced Chinese troops to change their original plan, and Chinese leaders instead adopted an aggressive plan. This was related to their experience in domestic wars, especially with Mao, for in the late stage of the Chinese civil war he had shown his admiration and understanding toward the Mongol Empire’s creations of mobile warfare and outflanking tactics, which had become embedded in his brain as a mode of thinking. Mao told Peng Dehuai and other Volunteer Army leaders in his October 21 telegram that us and Korean troops did not expect China’s participation in the war, and that was why they dared to advance north in two forces. For Chinese troops, now it was about “fighting for opportunities,” not “having a period of time to arrange defense and then considering offense” as originally planned. Mao instructed Peng Dehuai and others to promptly finalize battle plans and initiate attacks to wipe out the three divisions of Korean troops on the west line, so as to achieve the aim of “changing the combat situation in Korea.”202 He did not explain in detail the meaning of “changing the combat situation in Korea” at this time, but undoubtedly, he intentionally abandoned his plan of setting up a defensive line to defend in position that had been made shortly before the troops were sent to Korea.203 Peng Dehuai and others also noticed the change in combat situation and believed that it was already impossible to execute the battle plan as previously made. But on how to deal with the current situation and what military plan to 202 Mao Zedong, “Zhiyuan jun da hao chuguo di yi zhang 志愿军打好出国第一仗 [The Volunteer Army should make a good first battle abroad],” October 21, 1950, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:128. 203 Mao Zedong, “Zhengqu zhanji xunsu wancheng zhanyi bushu 争取战机迅速完成战役部 署 [Seize war opportunity and quickly complete deployment for the campaign],” October 21, 1950, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:130.

152 Chapter 2 adopt, they had views that distanced from Mao’s. Peng believed it was possible for the Volunteer Army to immediately use mobility battle to wipe out some Korean troops, so that the UN troops would dare not advance recklessly and it would buy time for defensive deployment.204 On October 22, he told Mao in a telegram that the basic plan in the next half year was to hold some areas in the north, “buy time and prepare conditions for a counter offensive.” As without control of the air, “cities on the east and west coasts and even Shinuiju” could not be defended, so they should be abandoned to “reduce unworthy self-​consumption.” At present: Three armies shall be gathered to wipe out two or three divisions of the puppet army, so that the hold on the mountain areas north of the Wonsan-​Pyongyang line can be expanded and strengthened, and guerrilla warfare can then be developed in South Korea.205 Mao apparently considered Peng’s plan too conservative, and in his subsequent reply telegram he proposed to fundamentally change the Volunteer Army’s war plan. He held that early aggression might lead to three pairs of uncertainties: first, if major victories were secured, the UN troops would stop the offensive and might even retreat in some areas; on the contrary, if aggression bore no big fruit and the UN troops were reinforced quickly, the situation would be unfavorable to China. Second, if the us Airforce caused big losses to Chinese troops, Chinese troops would be in a difficult position; on the contrary, if no serious damages were made, Chinese troops, through mobility combat, would be able to wipe out UN troops in large numbers, or force the United States to have peace talks, or occupy all major cities one by one. Third, if the United States substantially increased its troops and the Chinese troops were not too successful with mobility combat, disadvantages and difficulties would ensue; the opposite would be beneficial to Chinese troops. Mao was determined to fundamentally change the defensive war plan, as he proposed to “strive for perfect victory for this campaign,” and “on solid and reliable bases, seek all possible victories.”206 Mao’s newly proposed war plan had two clear features, the first being much more progressive and aggressive than before, and the second being that it still 204 Kang mei yuan chao zhanzheng shi [A history of the War to Resist the United States and Assist Korea], 2:13. 205 Ibid, 2:14. 206 Mao Zedong, “Zai wendang kekao de jichu shang zhengqu yiqie kekao de shengli 在稳 当可靠的基础上争取一切可靠的胜利 [Strive for all reliable success on a steady and reliable basis],” October 23, 1950, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:140–​141.

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remained quite vague. Its upper limit included wiping out large numbers of us troops through mobility combat and creating conditions to force them out of Korea; its lower limit was fighting a long-​term war and seeking peace talks under extraordinary difficulties. Mao believed that the best outcome should be pursued, while he was also prudent at the time with reasonable estimation of possible hardships. The first campaign launched by the Chinese troops basically reflected Mao’s new plan, but it didn’t achieve the result of wiping out large numbers of UN and Korean troops. Peng Dehuai’s comment was to the point, that the campaign was meaningful for reassuring North Korean people and enabling the Chinese troops to stay, but it wasn’t enough to reverse the battlefield situation.207 In fact, by the time the campaign was over, the Forty-​second Army was still defending against attacks of the UN troops. Impossible to ascertain the future evolvement of the battlefield, Peng and others, based on the situation and hardship they faced, proposed the strategy of “consolidating victory, overcoming current difficulties, and preparing for fighting again,” as well as to use mountains to shield and rest troops and build fortifications at strategic points in the inner line so as to wait for the UN troops to advance their offensive before striking back. Mao’s view of the battlefield was also influenced by the result of the first campaign. On the one hand, because of the victory, Mao would rather continue using the Chinese troops’ well-​accomplished mobility combat to wipe out effective UN forces quickly and in big numbers; on the other hand, he thought that as the first campaign did not achieve the ideal result, the next aim should be to fundamentally reverse the situation on the Korean battlefield, namely, to turn Chinese troops from “defensive situation to offensive situation” through one or two battles.208 Based on this conception, in early November Mao proposed to strategically focus on the direction of Tokchon and the frontline shall be “placed in front of Wonsan and Pyongyang, and use the north and the west of Tokchon, Kujang, and Yongbyon as strategic back, which will be good for the long-​term war.”209 Shortly thereafter, he proposed “to have one or two military 207

Kang mei yuan chao zhanzheng shi [A history of the War to Resist the United States and Assist Korea], 2:76. 208 Mao Zedong, “Chaoxian zhanju shi keyi gaibian de 朝鲜战局是可以改变的 [The military situation in Korea can be changed],” November 13, 1950, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:201. 2 09 Mao Zedong, “Zhengqu zai yuan shan shun shan tielu xian yi bei chuangzao zhanchang 争取在元山顺川铁路线以北创造战场 [Try to create battleground north of the Wonsan-​Sunchon railway],” November 5, 1950, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:194.

154 Chapter 2 campaigns both on the west line and the east line within one month between this month to early December,” and “push the frontline forward to the railway area between Pyongyang and Wonsan.” This way, according to Mao, the Volunteer Army would “win fundamentally.”210 By then, Mao basically determined that the United States would not possibly attack China on its soil, including from air and sea. On November 14, Mao revised a telegram entitled “A Review of Responses of All Parties on the Korean War” as follows: “In summary, the imperialist countries continue to show their panic toward our Volunteer Army’s entry into Korea and they have no solution at all.”211 Shortly thereafter, he said again in his telegram to Peng Dehuai that “the United States, the United Kingdom, and France have no solution at all on us.”212 Three days later, changing course from his previous prudence, Mao required that news reports of the North Korean battlefield “should not mention solely the People’s Army without mentioning the Volunteer Army,” newspapers “should write editorials that encourage the Volunteer Army,” and news reports should not “misplace titles that help the Americans to frighten Chinese.”213 Mao’s spirit then again reached as high as in the period before the founding of PRC. Mao’s statement about “win fundamentally” was not intended to boost morale of his solders for the moment, and it basically can be understood as the Volunteer Army should seek the upper hand on the battlefield, and specifically should occupy the area from Wonsan to Pyongyang. If the aim could be 210 Mao Zedong, “Tongyi zhiyuan jun xia yibu de zuozhan fangzhen he bushu 同意志愿军 下一步的作战方针和部署 [Consent to the combat strategy and deployment of next step for the Volunteer Army],” November 9, 1950, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:198. 211 Mao Zedong, “Dui ‘zonghe gefang dui chaoxian zhanzheng fanying’ dianbao gao de xiugai 对《综合各方对朝鲜战争反映》电报稿的修改 [Revision of the draft telegram ‘summary of reactions of all sides to the Korean War’],” November 14, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:350. 212 Mao Zedong, “Zhiyao duo da jige shengzhang zhengge guoji jushi jiu hui gaiguan 只要 多打几个胜仗整个国际局势就会改观 [With a few more victories the whole international outlook will improve],” November 18, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:358. 213 Mao Zedong, “Guanyu chaoxian zhanchang xinwen baogao de zhishi 关于朝鲜战场新 闻报道的指示 [Instruction on news coverage on the Korean battlefield],” November 17, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:352.

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achieved, the strategic situation would indeed be favorable to both offensive and defensive and upper hand would be gained on the battlefield. This was also the strategic plan that had been set right before the Chinese troops joined the war, the mere difference being that it now had to be realized through heavy strikes against the UN troops by mobility combat. In this sense, although the second campaign was an aggressive operation, the aim to achieve was similar to the plan that had been set immediately before the troops were sent. At the end of the second campaign, the UN troops withdrew to the south of the 38th line, and the Chinese troops took Pyongyang and basically achieved their plan, but they immediately faced the question of whether to cross the 38th line. As described before, crossing the 38th line was not a necessary aim of the Volunteer Army when they first entered Korea. In view of China’s security interest, the strategic intent of joining the war, and the combat aim in the early stage, it can also be said that crossing the 38th line was not a target that must be reached, and the Chinese leaders might well have thought this way. Thus, the debate about when to launch the third campaign and whether to cross the 38th line surfaced and caused disagreements among allies. In early December, the time when only a preliminary victory was won in the second campaign and the Chinese troops were preparing to attack Pyongyang, Mao proposed crossing the 38th line and occupying Pyongyang. On December 3, Mao met with Kim Il-​sung to discuss the battlefield situation, strategic plans, and coordination between Chinese and North Korean troops. In the discussion, Mao, just like the way he treated his Vietnam comrade Ho Chi Minh, told Kim to form the thinking of self-​reliance. He said “the war may be quickly concluded, or may drag on”; while China “is prepared to fight for at least another year, North Korea should plan for the long term and should mainly stick to self-​reliance and seek outside assistance as a supplement.”214 Comparing Mao’s judgment then and around the time of sending troops, the most impressive thing was exactly that he was much more optimistic, believing that it was possible to conclude the war quickly. Based on this judgment, Mao proposed that the original plan should be changed to, on the one hand, taking Seoul after occupying Pyongyang, and on the other hand, further destroying the effective forces of the UN with the first priority being “completely wiping out” South Korean troops. Regarding calls for settlement from the international community, Mao set out the clear ceasefire conditions that .

214 Mao Zedong, “Zhanzheng ying cong zui huai fangmian zhuoxiang 战争应从最坏方面 着想 [Think from the worst scenario of the war],” December 3, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:388.

156 Chapter 2 the United States acknowledge its withdrawal from Korea and first retreat to the south of the 38th line. He told Kim Il-​sung: the us troops “must acknowledge their withdrawal from North Korea, and they must first retreat to the south of the 38th line before ceasefire talks can be had,” and: If the United States acknowledges the withdrawal, the UN may agree to support the whole Korea to elect its own government with Chinese and Soviet participation and under the supervision of the UN It can be said that after China joined the war, it was the first time Mao proposed using military victories to seek political means to the settlement of the Korean problem. He didn’t forget to remind Kim based on Chinese revolutionary experience that American “promises and agreements are not reliable, so the worst scenario must be thought about.”215 Mao’s December 3 statement showed that his view on the battlefield had two material changes. First, the aim of quickly concluding the war was emphasized; second, the UN troops’ retreat to the south of the 38th line was proposed as a necessary condition for ceasefire, and of course the aim was to make us troops retreat from the Korean Peninsula. Mao’s statement to Kim Il-​sung was telegraphed to Peng Dehuai and other Volunteer Army leaders on the frontline the next day. The problem here was that before Mao discussed and agreed with his colleagues about such big change in the strategic aim, he already directly mentioned it to Kim and also notified the frontline military leaders. This changed Chinese leaders’ decision-​making procedures by placing negotiation between allies higher than domestic decision-​making procedures, thus the weight of promises to ally was increased in the decision-​making process. Mao’s new conception became his starting point in considering the third campaign. Two issues were involved in deciding whether to launch a third campaign. The first was when to launch it. After receiving Mao’s telegram, Peng Dehuai and others carefully studied the battlefield situation. Their observation was that it was difficult to conclude the war quickly, because there was no absolute advantage in the numbers as the UN troops deployed as many as two hundred thousand troops on the frontline while China and North Korea had three hundred thousand in total, and also the Chinese troops were exhausted after two consecutive campaigns. The more concerning issue was that the supply line was stretched twice long and transportation capacity was clearly deficient, leaving two hundred thousand troops on the west line with only three hundred vehicles for transportation. After discussion, they recommended to 215

Ibid.

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Beijing that it would be better to hold the new campaign until the spring or February to March of 1951, and it would be difficult for the troops to handle the tough offensive operations without relatively long period of rest and necessary supplies.216 Du Ping, Volunteer Army’s chief of political division, later recalled that they were taken off guard by Mao’s reply. The latter, on the contrary, required them to launch the third campaign sooner in early January, and his reason was that suspending attack and resting for long would incur speculation in Western countries and would also provoke comments in the Soviet Camp. In short, international situation was Mao’s main focus then. However, this decision brought a hard time for Peng Dehuai and others. They thought that Mao considered from the perspective of international political fight in making the decision, and military action must follow the need of international political fight. But “how should political fight also attend to the reality of military fight?”217 The second issue was whether to cross the 38th line. As unconvincing as the early launch of the third campaign, Peng and others thought that fighting after a hasty crossing of the 38th line would face substantial difficulties, including overly exhausted soldiers and extremely scarce supply caused by the lengthened supply line, and so forth. On December 8, Peng ordered the troops to advance towards the 38th line. He telegraphed Mao at the same time that crossing the 38th line would be decided later upon consideration of the developments on the battlefield. He thought if the UN troops could be defeated in large numbers, “we then can march to cross the 38th line, and find opportunities to take Seoul,” but if defeating enemies in large number was not achieved, even if “crossing the 38th line or taking Seoul is possible, we may not do it,” but rather we should “stop fighting dozens of li north of the 38th line and let the enemy take the 38th line.” He also proposed to dispatch the Korean People’s Army to go deep into the south to fight.218 Peng apparently was not in favor of hurriedly crossing the 38th line to fight. Mao again disagreed with Peng and his associates, requiring him to resolutely fight across the 38th line in any event. He gave two reasons. The first was 216 217

218

Du Ping 杜平, Zai zhiyuan jun zongbu 在志愿军总部 [At the headquarter of People’s Volunteer Army] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1991), 141. Du, Zai zhiyuan jun zongbu [At the headquarter of People’s Volunteer Army], 142；Hong Xuezhi 洪学志, Kang mei yuan chao huiyi 抗美援朝回忆 [Memory of the War to Resist the United States and Assist Korea] (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 1990), 98–​99. Kang mei yuan chao zhanzheng shi [A history of the War to Resist the United States and Assist Korea], 2:163; Du, Zai zhiyuan jun zongbu [At the headquarter of People’s Volunteer Army], 147.

158 Chapter 2 based on his analysis of us policies. He thought mediation from the international community showed that Americans were using diplomacy to demand the Chinese troops to stop north of the 38th line, and if China limited its fighting to north of the 38th line at this point, it would effectively announce China’s acceptance of the us demand, which was an extremely huge disadvantage politically.219 The second reason was consideration of future battles. As Mao decided to force the United States to commit to withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula, it was necessary for the Chinese troops to eliminate “the old impression of the existence of the 38th line,” so as to avoid being bound by it.220 Mao’s optimism and confidence also came from the intelligence he received, which showed that Washington, DC was dispatching a special envoy to Tokyo to comprehend the difficulties of us troops and order MacArthur to prepare withdrawal from South Korea, and the latter had already started arranging the withdrawal. Mao estimated that the authenticity of the intelligence would be verified when Chinese troops advanced to the vicinity of Seoul. He also told Peng not to disclose this information to the troops, so as to avoid underestimating the enemy.221 In total, there was a prospect very worth trying. In view of the reality of us decision-​making at the time, the intelligence received by Mao was fairly reasonable, be it based upon facts or analysis. After the Chinese troops launched the second campaign, all fronts of us troops were forced to retreat to the south of the 38th line. MacArthur then asked the Truman Administration to authorize him to expand the war into Chinese territory and substantially increase troops in North Korea.222 His suggestion was not accepted by the Truman Administration, as almost all members of the National Security Council thought that us military action in Korea had to be placed in the framework of global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, 219 Mao Zedong, “Wo zhiyuan jun bixu yue guo san ba xian zuozhan 我志愿军必须越过三八 线作战 [Our Volunteer Army must march over the 38th Line to fight],” December 13, 1950, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:239. 220 Mao Zedong, “Guanyu chaoxian zhanchang xingshi he zuozhan bushu 关于朝鲜战场 形势和作战部署 [On the situation of the Korean battlefield and military deployment],” December 13, 1950, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:245–​246. 221 Mao Zedong, “Guanyu mei jun si zhunbei cong chaoxian chetui qingbao de tongbao 关于 美军似准备从朝鲜撤退情报的通报 [Briefing on the intelligence that us troops might plan to pull out of Korea],” December 11, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:405–​406. 222 Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East (Washington: us Government Printing Office, 1951), 5:3495.

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maintenance of solidarity among allies, and pursuit of UN support, and no action that might expand the war should be taken, namely, that the United States should not expand the war into Chinese territory and it should only strive for better results under existing situations.223 At the same time, the Truman Administration began to explore the means and possibility of political solution to the Korean predicament. Various discussions surfaced in the United States during the period, including the option of withdrawing from the Korean Peninsula. The Joint Chiefs of Staff once notified MacArthur that when facing powerful offense from the Chinese troops, he was authorized to order withdrawal of the troops to Japan, if he thought a withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula could avoid more serious losses.224 Apparently, the us troops had the intention and plan to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula, though this did not become the final decision. The problem was that although the us troops were facing serious decision-​ making challenge, Chinese troops were also in a very difficult situation by this time and they had no capacity to cause severe losses and casualties to us troops as was conceived by Mao. For this reason, the frontline commander Peng Dehuai was hesitant after receiving Mao’s telegram. Other military leaders also had complex considerations for the result of the campaign. Deputy commander Deng Hua stated in his letter to Peng that “the third campaign could fight to produce three possibilities:  first is settlement request from a compelled enemy, second is involuntary withdrawal from Korea, and third is building one (Daegu, Busan) or two (Seoul, Inchon) strongholds,” and “from today’s situation, the third is most probable,” that is, wiping out UN troops in large numbers was unlikely, so long-​term war should still be prepared.225 In Beijing, Zhou Enlai also urged Mao to consider “the combination of strategic intention and the campaign,” and whether to “put off attacks on Seoul until March,” or otherwise it would be difficult to fully prepare the reinforcement troops, air force, artillery divisions, and transportation, and so forth.226 After several days of deliberations, Peng Dehuai decided to coordinate Mao’s political consideration, military expectation, and actual difficulties of 223 “The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East [MacArthur],” Washington, 29 November 1950, FRUS, 1950, VII, Korea: 1253–​1254. 224 “The Charge in Korea [Drumright] to the Secretary of State,” Seoul, April 28, 1950, FRUS, 1950, VII, Korea: 55–​56. 225 Kang mei yuan chao zhanzheng shi [A history of the War to Resist the United States and Assist Korea], 2:165. 226 Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu jingong hancheng shijian wenti gei mao zedong de xin 关于进攻 汉城时间问题给毛泽东的信 [Letter from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong regarding the schedule for attacking Seoul],” December 9, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai zhou enlai wen gao [Works of Zhou Enlai since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:615.

160 Chapter 2 the troops with a conservative campaign plan. In arranging battles across the 38th line, Peng told Mao that “the Korean War is still very much long-​term and difficult,” and it should be seen that the Chinese troops had serious losses of personnel and logistics and supply was extremely tight, and from both military and political perspectives, Americans would not withdraw from Korea immediately.227 As for the planned third campaign, Peng told Mao that defeat was impossible, but a not big win was probable. In order to accommodate the actual difficulties faced by the Chinese troops in executing Mao’s direction to cross the 38th line, he proposed “the steady advance policy,” that is “attack only the puppet army, narrow down the targets, capture what is possible, and retreat at proper times,” and that whether to control areas across the 38th line would be determined according to the situation, that is, if required militarily, troops would still return back to the north of the 38th line.228 Peng’s plan was designed to coordinate political needs and military difficulties, which was approved by Mao. Mao expressed his support that the Volunteer Army “advances steadily,” agreed to “withdraw the troops if not doing well and come out again from proper locations after rest,” and “retreat several dozens of kilometers to take rest” after the campaign.229 Mao accepted Peng’s campaign plan because of his domestic war experience, and he was not in favor of long-​range pursuit fight or fight against fortified enemy, but rather would operate in the southern and northern areas of the 38th line, wiping out large numbers of active us forces through mobility combat. Long-​range operations by Chinese troops was not only risky, but also would only drive UN troops to the several cities and strategic locations to the south even if a temporary win was obtained, which was exactly the painful lesson of North Korea in the early stage of the war. Mao was not even in support of dispatching North Korean troops to fight in the deep south as he thought that luring the main UN force to stay between the 38th line and the 37th line was helpful for Chinese troops to wipe them out.230

227

Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:246; Du, Zai zhiyuan jun zongbu [At the headquarter of People’s Volunteer Army], 152. 228 Du, Zai zhiyuan jun zongbu [At the headquarter of People’s Volunteer Army], 152. 229 Mao Zedong, “Guanyu chaoxian zhanchang xingshi he zuozhan bushu [On the situation of the Korean battlefield and military deployment],” December 21, 1950, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:245–​246, 249–​250. 2 30 Mao Zedong, “Di san ci zhanyi jieshu hou quan jun zhuli jun ying houche xiuzheng 第 三次战役结束后全军主力均应后撤休整 [After the Third Campaign the main forces of the Army should all retreat to the back for recuperation],” December 26, 1950, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:249.

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Mao’s acceptance of Peng’s campaign plan enabled the Chinese troops to advance across the 38th line and occupy Seoul, and at the same time avoided militarily impossible missions. The campaign did not wipe out UN troops in large numbers, but China indeed obtained a strong political position and substantially preserved its military capacity to deal with later counterattacks by the us forces. “War is continuation of politics.” For the Chinese troops, advancing across the 38th line was military expediency, and they considered politics far more than military needs. While deciding to cross the 38th line, Chinese leaders were also prepared to give up areas south of the 38th line and retreat to the defense lines in the north. The question is what political considerations caused Chinese leaders to decide crossing the 38th line when there was not much military advantage. One of the major considerations of Mao was China’s international political reputation, primarily the reputation in the Soviet Camp, but also in East Asia and the neighboring regions. Soon after the second campaign was launched, voice for settlement surfaced in the United States and its allies as the UN troops was again hit hard. At the same time, some Asian countries started their effort to reach ceasefire in Korea through the UN, the most prominent one being that thirteen Asian countries called for China not to cross the 38th line.231 They then drafted a “Peace Accord for Korea” and planned to propose it in the UN.232 UN representatives of several countries also made private inquiries to China regarding the possibility of a ceasefire. Due to these events, Chinese leaders immediately faced the pressure of whether to accept settlement. Soon after the Chinese troops joined the war, Chinese leaders stated multiple times internally that the United States might be compelled to solve the Korean issue through negotiation after the wrestling on battleground.233 They tended to think at the time that peace talks were the most practical and acceptable solution. As stated before, Mao in his early December meeting with Kim Il-​sung in Beijing already discussed the issue of us peace talks. They thought the bottom condition for such talks was us troops retreating to the south of the 38th line, and the best time would be after their occupation of Seoul and 231 Zhong mei guanxi ziliao hui bian [Collected documents of Sino-​u s relation], 2(1):321. 232 FRUS, Vol.XII, 1950, Korea, 1488–​1489. 233 Zhou Enlai, “Kang mei yuan chao, baowei heping [Resist us aggression and aid Korea, and protect peace],” October 24, 1950; “Dui Chaoxian wenti de guji yu women de sixiang zhunbei [Estimate on the Korean situation and our mental preparation],” November 13, 1950, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 5:76, 92.

162 Chapter 2 wiping out large numbers of South Korean troops.234 Such judgment was fundamentally based upon the favorable situation on the battlefield, but it also involved two other considerations. First, Chinese leaders held that if China stopped at the 38th line when it was on the offensive with clear advantage, the international community might think that China in effect accepted foreign mediation. By this time, the United States did not step forward to propose a ceasefire, but to the contrary, the Truman Administration openly conducted war mobilization in large scale, increased military budget substantially, and declared that the United States entered a state of war. Chinese leaders decided to join the war because they concluded that the intention of the United States was to occupy the Korean Peninsula by force, and without verifying that the Truman Administration had completely abandoned its policy to unify Korea by force, they would easily think that any ceasefire proposal no matter suggested by whom would be a trick by the Americans (or used by the Americans) to buy time and recuperate their troops. And indeed they analyzed the issue as such.235 They would also easily conclude that imprudent acceptance of mediation or halt of offense would seriously damage China’s political reputation, and to say the very least, it would place China in a not so powerful position in the potential political settlement in the future. Therefore, mediation proposals by some countries at the time were both untimely and inconsiderate, for such proposals were not sufficient to build mutual trust with Chinese leaders but instead prompted Mao to revolve in advancing the Chinese troops across the 38th line. Second, Chinese leaders found a strong identity in its membership in the Soviet Camp, as was proven in many cases. It follows that they were both very sensitive and concerned about reactions from the Soviet Camp. Maintaining and improving prestige in the Soviet Camp was the first priority compared to consideration of other international issues. On December 1, Stalin sent a telegram to Mao and congratulated the latter for Chinese troop’s military victory and encouraged them to keep working hard towards further offensives.236 234 “Zhonggong zhongyang zhi Peng Dehuai bing Gao Gang dian 中共中央致彭德怀并 高岗电 [Telegram from the cpc Central Committee to Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang],” December 4, 1950, in Kang mei yuan chao zhanzheng shi [A history of the War to Resist the United States and Assist Korea], 2:162; Du, Zai zhiyuan jun zongbu [At the headquarter of People’s Volunteer Army], 140. 235 Zhong mei guanxi ziliao hui bian [Collected documents of Sino-​u s relation], 2(1): 355–​358. 236 “Shi da lin guanyu jianyi zhongguo pai budui yuanzhu chaoxian wenti zhi luoshen [Telegram from Stalin to Roshchin on suggestion to China to send troops to aid North Korea],” October 1, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chao xian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:571.

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Stalin enjoyed feeling such sense of leadership in his Kremlin office, but the problem was that it was hard for Chinese leaders not to view it as a signal sent from the Soviet Union. At the time, the Soviet representative in China and Kim Il-​sung frequently exerted pressures on Peng Dehuai, requesting that the Chinese troops not stop the offensive but continue to advance across the 38th line until the unification of Korea. While Stalin on the one hand expressed that North Korea should respect Peng’s decision and criticized the Soviet representative for his attitude, on the other hand, he announced to Mao at the same time that the Soviet Union would supply additional two thousand vehicles to the Volunteer Army.237 At this point the Chinese troops were facing a serious lack of logistical supplies, and one of the reasons for Peng’s prudence was transportation difficulties for the extended battleground. With such background, Mao certainly could imagine that Stalin through this action intended to encourage the Chinese troops to continue the offensive. At the same time, the Soviet Camp was preparing for an important Cominform conference. On October 28, a Politburo meeting of the cpsu Central Committee passed “the Decision to Hold a Meeting of Cominform Secretariat,” the main content of which was to increase the functions of Cominform and establish a Secretariat of Cominform. From November 22 to 24, the meeting of Cominform Secretariat was held in Bucharest. The important decision of the meeting was to establish an international organization with a permanent body just like the Comintern in order to guide and assist communist parties around the world, unlike the European Cominform that only covered Europe. The Soviet representative M. A. Suslov stated explicitly in the meeting: We should also pay attention to the interests of those communist parties in Europe, the Americas, and Asia that have not joined the Intelligence Bureau, and should propose the task of assisting those parties that request for advice from the Intelligence Bureau.238 In addition to expanding the reach of the international communist organization to the whole world, the meeting also conceived that the organization should have a Secretary General, just like the Comintern with its leader Georgi 237 Mao Zedong, “Da yige sheng zhang hou xiuzheng zhunbei chunji gongshi 打一个胜仗 后休整准备春季攻势 [Recuperate after fighting a victory and prepare for spring offensive],” December 29, 1950, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:252. 238 Cited from Zhang, Si da lin yu lengzhan [Stalin and the Cold War], 441.

164 Chapter 2 Dimitrov. Stalin’s original favorite candidate was Palmiro Togliatti, leader of the Communist Party of Italy (PCI), but the PCI and Togliatti himself rejected the offer. The latter claimed poor health conditions and his inability to assume the duty. In fact, he was unwilling to become the second Dimitrov. Abortive efforts on candidacy caused postponement of the Cominform conference which was originally scheduled on December 23. On January 4, 1951, Togliatti wrote to Stalin personally and completely broke the latter’s hope that he might assume the post. The cpsu continued to remain hopeful until February 12, when the PCI Central Committee again completely rejected the cpsu’s suggestion that Togliatti work for the Cominform Secretariat, and the planned conference of the Cominform was finally aborted.239 Right at the time Mao decided to launch the third campaign and cross the 38th line, the cpsu and the Cominform were preparing and discussing the plenary meeting. Mao’s attention to the impression of allies, as well as his consideration of the position of the cpc Central Committee in the proposed plenary meeting and in the international communist organization, could not but influence his thinking on the military issues in Korea. He hoped that the Chinese troops could achieve the most heartening victory possible at this time, especially fighting across the 38th line, which would substantially enhance China’s prestige in the Soviet Camp. There was another reason that made Chinese leaders feel encouraged at this time, namely that because of Chinese troops’ participation in the war and winning three consecutive campaigns, China’s prestige in the Asian national liberation movements substantially increased. Chinese leaders took China’s rising status in the Asian revolutionary movements and national liberation movements seriously, and they were gradually forming a kind of awareness as the leader of Asian revolutions, which led to their willingness to undertake more internationalism and further strengthen relationship with the cpsu. On the other hand, this sense, together with the proposed Cominform’s plenary meeting, prompted Chinese leaders to substantially raise their expectation of achieving a higher position in future international communist party organizations. On December 31, 1950, the day the third campaign was launched, Mao and Liu Shaoqi hosted the Soviet Ambassador to China Roschin to a meal. During the meal, Mao told the ambassador that “representatives of all Asian communist parties except the Indian communist party have gathered in Beijing,” and China should “give them advice and provide them assistance in all aspects.” He again proposed stronger cooperation between the cpc and cpsu in Asia and discussed the need for the Soviet Union to establish a liaison agency in Beijing

239

Ibid, 432–​453.

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for this purpose. On January 3, Liu Shaoqi told Roschin that “all communist parties in Asian countries have a permanent representative at the cpc Central Committee,” and they all came voluntarily. After analyzing the Asian parties one by one, he recommended the cpsu Central Committee to have a representative office in Beijing with five staff members who ideally were Asian issue experts, but at least should be “relatively familiar with” Asian revolutionary movements.240 At the same time, the cpc Central Committee also decided to establish a foreign liaison department with Wang Jiaxiang, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, to come back to act as its head. Liu Shaoqi stated in Wang’s appointment letter that the responsibility of the agency was to connect with communist parties of various countries, and “the specific task and most important task is to connect with the brother parties in the East and assist them,” and many domestic organizations would cooperate with the Central Liaison Department in its effort.241 As these important events of the international communist movement occurred nearly at the same time and Mao and others personally participated in them, it is hard to imagine that these events had no influence over Chinese leaders’ thought on the Korean battlefield. It is worth mentioning here that the Chinese military advisors were then directing the cpv troops to secure successive military victories, and the cpv Central Committee expressed admiration for China’s revolutionary experience. Despite great discontent towards the cpv’s ill management of the military equipment supplied by China, Chinese leaders still promptly agreed with the cpv’s request and equipped another six infantry regiments and one artillery regiment for the Vietnamese military in the first half of 1951, and further expended three billion RMB (equal to three hundred thousand of new currency in 1955)  to build a Vietnamese printing factory in Guangzhou for the cpv.242 By this time Chinese assistance to 240 “You jin gei si da lin de baogao 尤金给斯大林的报告 [Report from Yudin to Stalin],” January 20, 1951, Shanghai: Library of Center for Cold War International History Studies, East China Normal University, Shanghai, Call Number: NO.20001. 241 Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu chengli zhonggong Zhongyang duiwai lianluo bu wenti 关于成立 中共中央对外联络部问题 [On the issue of establishing International Department of cpc],” January 16, 1951, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi Since the Founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:25. 242 Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu yuanzhu yuenan wuqi zhuangbei wenti de piyu he dianbao 关于 援助越南武器装备问题的批语和电报 [Comment and telegram on assisting arms and equipment to Vietnam],” February 10, 1951; Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu zai Guangzhou she yue wen yinshua chang wenti de piyu he dianbao 关于在广州设越文印刷厂问题 的批语和电报 [Comment and telegram on establishing a Vietnamese printing shop in Guangzhou],” February 2, 26, 1951; in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:66, 68–​69.

166 Chapter 2 Vietnam in its anti-​French effort was expanded to the entire Indochina including Laos and Cambodia.243 The international political situation, especially the important events in the international communist movement, occupied an important place in Mao’s thinking, and this led him to repeatedly encourage Peng Dehuai and other military leaders to advance bravely as it would result in “quite good impact.” On the contrary, if the Chinese troops did not cross the 38th line, Mao thought it would necessarily “incur many speculations from capitalist countries, and some people from countries on the democratic front will also think little of the Chinese troops and have many comments.”244 Mao paid great attention to political prestige and this was one of the motivations behind his various decisions. In major decision-​ making, the influence of any external element is usually determined by two factors. One is the objective weight the external element supposedly should have in decision-​making; the other is whether decision-​makers attach importance to such element and the degree they do so, the latter of which also usually decides the actual influence of the external element. For example, if Chinese leaders did not attach so much importance to the Soviet political comments on their words and actions in the early years of PRC, then certain comments from the Soviet Union and the Soviet Camp would have much different influence. Although the Soviet influence was an important cause for Chinese leaders’ decision to cross the 38th line, Stalin at least did not publicly intervene in China’s military strategy and campaign decision-​making until before the launch of the second campaign. Stalin’s initial conception of the number and tasks of the Chinese troops was relatively simple, which was to merely assist North Korea to hold the 38th line and to try to solve the Korean issue through negotiation. In his own words, it was about China sending troops to “have a serious competition” with the Americans and the latter “will have to accept the conditions to settlement on the Korean issue.”245 In the period between China

243

Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:168. 244 Mao Zedong, “Wo zhiyuan jun bixu yue guo san ba xian zuozhan [Our Volunteer Army must march over the 38th Line to fight],” December 13, 1950; “Guanyu chaoxian zhanchang xingshi he zuozhan bushu [On the situation of the Korean battlefield and military deployment],” December 21, 1950; “Da yige sheng zhang hou xiuzheng zhunbei chunji gongshi [Recuperate after fighting a victory and prepare for spring offensive],” December 29, 1950, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:252–​254. 2 45 “Shi da lin guanyu zhongguo chubing wenti zhi jin ri cheng de xin [Telegram from Stalin to Kim Il-​sung on China’s dispatch of troops to North Korea],” October 8, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:591–​592.

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joining the war and the start of the second campaign, Stalin did not propose any idea or demand that went beyond negotiation by the 38th line. In other words, Stalin didn’t think China’s participation in the war would result in a total ouster of the United States from Korea at the time. After thirteen countries proposed a ceasefire plan in early December, the Soviet Union clearly expressed its hope for China not to accept the ceasefire. On December 4, Wang Jiaxiang, Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, returned to China to assume his new official duty. He took advantage of his farewell trip to learn from A. A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, about the Soviet position on the Korean ceasefire. On whether to negotiate ceasefire with the United States, Gromyko stated that the United States had not offered “proposals of resolving the Korean situation peacefully.” When Wang Jiaxiang asked whether the Chinese troops should cross the 38th line, Gromyko said the Chinese troops should “strike the iron while it is hot.”246 In view of Gromyko’s response, it is very likely that the Soviet leaders had not made a clear decision on whether Chinese troops should cross the 38th line, but they apparently did not want the Chinese troops to stop at the secured victories. Three days after the conversation between Wang and Gromyko, the Soviet Union began to clearly express that the Chinese troops should cross the 38th line and occupy Seoul. On December 7, Zhou Enlai told Roschin that in order to avoid a disadvantaged position on ceasefire China was ready to propose five conditions of ceasefire to the relevant countries. Zhou expressed his hope to learn the Soviet attitude towards this.247 Gromyko received Roschin’s report on the same day and he promptly instructed the latter to tell Zhou that China should propose its ceasefire conditions after occupying Seoul.248 At the same time, the cpsu Politburo criticized the Soviet Ambassador to the UN Voitinskii as he should not have raised suggestion of Korean ceasefire in international forums such as the UN. Instead, he

246 “Ge luo mi key u wang jiaxiang huitan de beiwang lu 葛罗米柯与王稼祥会谈的备忘 录 [Memorandum of Conversation between Gromyko and Wang Jiaxiang],” December 5, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:635–​636. 247 “Luo shen guanyu zhongguo zhengfu tingzhi zai chaoxian junshi xingdong de tiaojian de dianbao罗申关于中国政府停止在朝鲜军事行动的条件的电报 [Telegram from Roshchin on Chinese government’s conditions on ceasefire in korea],” December 7, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chao xian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:639–​640. 248 “Ge luo mi ke guanyu sulian tongyi zhongguo zhengfu tingzhi chaoxian junshi xingdong de tiaojian zhi luo shen dian 葛罗米柯关于苏联同意中国政府停止朝鲜军事行动 的条件致罗申电 [Telegram from Gromyko to Roshchin on Soviet Union’s agreement with Chinese government’s conditions on ceasefire in korea],” December 7, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chao xian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:641–​642.

168 Chapter 2 should have proposed “immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.” The cpsu Politburo thought the United States suggested ceasefire now only to win time to save its defeat.249 Apparently, the Soviet view then was identical to Mao’s, as they also thought the Chinese troops should cross the 38th line and occupy Seoul and propose ceasefire conditions only after gaining such favorable position. Time-​wise, the Soviet decision was made after the December 3 meeting between Mao and Kim Il-​sung, and thus it is possible that the Soviet leaders expressed their views after they learnt about Mao’s statement on relevant military plans. However, while the Soviet decision encouraged China, it also put pressure on China. After learning the Soviet position, Zhou immediately notified the Chinese representative attending the UN conference that on the ceasefire issue, there should be no rush to disclose China’s conditions but instead should use delay tactic.250 During the decision-​making process of crossing the 38th line, China and the Soviet Union in fact influenced and pushed each other. Initially, the military victories of Chinese troops made Chinese leaders lean towards enhancing the combat aim; then the Soviet leaders encouraged Chinese leaders to cross the 38th line and accordingly opposed initiating ceasefire negotiation before the 38th line was crossed; then Mao learnt about the actual difficulties faced by the frontline troops but had to consider the Soviet decision and reaction; the final result was Peng Dehuai, through making a prudent battle plan, coordinated the tension between political needs and military difficulties. Such decision-​ making process was hardly a positive circle. The third campaign was generally successful. On December 31, 1950, Chinese troops initiated attacks on a broad front of two hundred kilometers in bitter coldness and rapidly broke the UN troops’ defense on the 38th line. Leaders of the Volunteer Army apparently did not expect such smooth progress in the campaign. On January 3, us military commander Ridgway ordered a full-​scale retreat for the UN troops, and Chinese troops occupied Seoul the next day and thereby held a very favorable position. On the other hand, the campaign did not achieve all intended aims as it failed to wipe out large 249 “Lian gong (bu) zhongyang zhengzhi ju guanyu tingzhan wenti zhishi de jueyi 联共（布） 中央政治局关于停战问题指示的决议 [Resolution of the cpsu Politburo on Instruction for ceasefire],” December 7, 1950, in Shen, ed., Chao xian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 2:643. 250 Zhou Enlai, “Dui tanpan ying qu ta ji wo bu ji 对谈判应取他急我不急 [The negotiation should adopt a strategy of putting the other side in haste but not us],” December 8, 1950, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:125.

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numbers of UN forces through mobility combat. Right at this moment, the UN “three-​person group on Korean ceasefire” proposed five recommendations for an immediate ceasefire. The recommendations were similar to Zhou Enlai’s ceasefire conditions proposed in late December, and for whatever reason, the United States expressed it was acceptable.251 This situation invited discussion between China and its allies on the Korean battlefield situation and future strategic objectives. The first issue for discussion was whether to accept the recommendation of immediate ceasefire proposed by the “three-​person group on Korean ceasefire.” The situation after the third campaign was not beyond expectation of the military leaders, but the real problem was that a sentiment of fast victory, which was already shown during planning of the campaign, quickly fermented under the encouragement of Chinese troops crossing the 38th line. In mid-​December, Chinese leaders set the five conditions for Korean ceasefire, one of which was “withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.” On December 22, in response to the UN ceasefire resolution, Zhou Enlai made an announcement that the basis of negotiation was “withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.”252 Clearly, Chinese leaders were inclined towards enhancing the combat aim by then. When the third campaign ended in January 1950, there was widespread public opinion at home that demanded: “Those us invasion troops that do not want to withdraw from Korea, drive them into the sea!”253 China’s allies were also constantly putting pressures on China. First of all, Kim Il-​sung, not learning his lesson from his early defeat in the war, was not shy about his ambition to quickly unite Korea. He told Peng Dehuai face to face that he did not agree with Chinese troops taking a two-​month rest after occupying Seoul, and Peng should immediately dispatch three armies to advance further south. The Soviet Ambassador to North Korea V. H. Razuvaev, also 251 “Wu jie lian da zheng wei hui ‘chaoxian tinghuo san ren xiaozu’ tichu de ‘wu bu fang’an’ 五届联大政委会“朝鲜停火三人小组”提出的“五步方案” [The ‘five-​step plan’ proposed by ‘the three-​person group on Korean ceasefire’ at the fifth UN General Assembly Political Committee meeting],” January 11, 1951, in Zhong mei guanxi ziliao hui bian [Collected documents of Sino-​u s relation], 2(1):367–​368. 252 Cited from Qi Dexue 齐德学,  Juren de jiaoliang; kang mei yuan chao gaoceng jüece he zhidao 巨人的较量—​抗美援朝高层决策和指导 [Wrestling of giants: high-​level decision-​ making and guidance on the War to Resist us aggression and aid Korea] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1999), 141. 253 Xu Yan 徐焰, Di yi ci jiaoliang:  kang mei yuan chao zhanzheng de lishi huigu yu fansi 第一次较量—​抗美援朝战争的历史回顾与反思 [The first wrestling: Recollection and reflection of history of the War to Resist us aggression and aid Korea] (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 1990), 67.

170 Chapter 2 being Kim Il-​sung’s military advisor at the time, also voiced discontent over the plan to rest the troops as he thought it would leave breathing room for the us troops, and instead the Chinese troops should exploit the victory.254 On January 11, six days before Zhou Enlai’s planned announcement on the ceasefire conditions, the Soviet representative spoke at the UN General Assembly opposing the ceasefire recommendations by the “three-​person group on Korean ceasefire.”255 The Soviet representative continued his position from before the third campaign, but in fact he substantially restricted Chinese leaders’ room for choice, because on the issue of when and how to propose ceasefire conditions, the Soviet attitude was almost decisive. Without Soviet support and coordination in the UN, China was incapable of dealing with peace talks, not to mention that Chinese troops still relied on Soviet military assistance. This perhaps can help to understand why Chinese leaders held they must consider the acceptability of the ceasefire conditions to “various parties.” As the complex moves of the allies showed, a big-​scale regional war such as the Korean War, combined with China’s position among its allies, decided that China needed to establish an effective mechanism for strategy and policy coordination among its allies in order to ensure accuracy and efficiency in communication, decision-​making, and execution. But it was by no means easy. Peng Dehuai was firmly against continuing the offensive, as he estimated the difficulties of Chinese troops to be very severe. He completely disagreed with North Korea’s view that the us troops would soon quit Korea, and held that Chinese troops had no power to launch new attacks very soon. On January 15, he even telegraphed Zhou Enlai, stating that he did not support immediate rejection of the ceasefire plan proposed by the UN “three-​person group on Korean ceasefire.” He recommended that a ceasefire of limited duration should be proposed.256 254 Editorial committee of Peng Dehuai zhuanji, Peng Dehuai quan zhuan 彭德怀全传 [Full Biography of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing:  Zhongguo da baike quanshu chubanshe, 2009), 3:932–​935. 255 “Sulian daibiao ma li ke zai wu jie lian da zheng wei hui shang guanyu 1951 nian 1 yue 11 ri ‘chaoxian tinghuo sanren xiaozu’ de baogao de fayan 苏联代表马立克在五届联大 政委会上关于1951年1月11日‘朝鲜停火三人小组’的报告的发言 [Remarks of the Soviet representative Malik on the January 11, 1951 report by the ‘three-​person group on Korean ceasefire’ at the fifth UN General Assembly Political Committee meeting],” in Zhong mei guanxi ziliao hui bian [Collected documents of Sino-​u s relation], 2(1): 369–​370. 256 Wang Yan 王焰, ed., Peng Dehuai nian pu 彭德怀年谱 [Chronicle of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1998), 467.

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At this time, all hinged on Mao’s personal view. On January 14, Mao explained his estimation of the battlefield situation in a telegram to Peng Dehuai, thinking that there were two possibilities in the future. The first was that United States would “make slight resistance and then quit South Korea”; the second was it would resist in Daegu and Busan until they could not hold on “and would only then quit South Korea.” In sum, us troops would quit Korea sooner or later. He therefore proposed that the battlefield aim in the spring was “liberating the whole Korea.” Critically, he also informed Stalin of this major strategic change.257 With such view in mind, Mao was unwilling to accept ceasefire so as to avoid restricting future battlefield options and reducing deterrence to the United States. Importantly, his judgment was gradually implemented in Chinese troops’ military planning and preparation, and this was the most main cause that led Chinese leaders to reject the recommendations of the “three-​ person group on Korean ceasefire.” The end result was that China lost a very good opportunity to gain diplomatic advantage and divide the enemy group. However, Mao continued to firmly support Peng Dehuai’s plan to suspend the offensive and rest the troops. His war experience in the long past made him believe that to achieve the aim of expelling us troops, it would be more helpful to wipe out large numbers of us troops through mobility combat in the southern and northern vicinity of the 38th line, rather than having long-​range pursuit operation and fighting fortified enemies.258 Thus, Mao on the one hand insisted his unrealistic strategic aim and rejected recommendations of obtaining ceasefire as soon as possible, while on the other hand he supported Peng Dehuai’s military planning and was not in a hurry to launch a new large-​ scale offense. On January 15, Mao personally telegraphed Stalin, explaining in detail the Chinese troops’ military plans and the immense difficulties they were facing. He warned Stalin that without full preparation, “the mistake of North Korean troops in June to September 1950 will be committed again.”259

257 Qi, Juren de jiaoliang [Wrestling of giants], 152–​153. 258 Mao Zedong, “Di san ci zhanyi jieshu hou quan jun zhuli jun ying houche xiuzheng [After the Third Campaign the main forces of the Army should all retreat to the back for recuperation],” December 26, 1950; “Da yige sheng zhang hou xiuzheng zhunbei chunji gongshi [Recuperate after fighting a victory and prepare for spring offensive],” December 29, 1950, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:249–​253. 259 “Mao Zedong guanyu xia yi bu zuozhan jihua zhi shi da lin dian 毛泽东关于下一步 作战计划致史达林电 [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin on the combat plan for the next phase],” January 15, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:663–​664.

172 Chapter 2 One day earlier, Mao just made a request to Stalin for military loans, and the next day he followed with such clear opposition of immediate attack, which showed his strong determination in supporting Peng Dehuai. On the other hand, Mao was also accommodating Kim Il-​sung’s request. When North Korea strongly demanded an immediate new attack, he instructed Peng Dehuai that North Korea troops could continue advancing to the south by themselves and they could take their own command, and Chinese troops were only responsible for defending Inchon, Seoul, and areas north of the 38th line and could take a rest there.260 When China was still conducting internal coordination with its allies, us troops promptly launched their powerful counterattack, and this caused Chinese decision-​makers to begin internal discussion of ceasefire again. There was also a view among military leaders on the Korean battlefield to “wipe out all enemies and liberate the whole Korea in one concerted effort.”261 But different to Mao, they didn’t think the aim could be achieved through one or two campaigns in the future, and Chinese troops were in serious lack of personnel, ammunition, and food. Soon after us troops launched attack, Peng Dehuai again suggested to Beijing that a limited-​duration ceasefire should be proposed in some way and the Volunteer Army can retreat fifteen to thirty kilometers voluntarily.262 Mao rejected Peng’s suggestion. On January 28, he stated in a telegram to Peng that the suggestion of limited-​duration ceasefire is “inopportune,” because that was exactly what us troops needed. On top of that, he elevated ceasefire conditions again, and required Chinese troops to launch a fourth campaign as soon as possible to wipe out twenty thousand to thirty thousand enemies, occupy the line of Daejeon and Andong south of the 37th line, and thereby ensure a firm hold of Seoul and Inchon, by which time it would bring China and North Korea a favorable position in the negotiation, but a ceasefire now would be unfavorable and so “we must not allow it.”263 Stalin also added fuel to the flames by claiming to Mao in his telegram that “from an international view,” 260 261 262

Wang, Peng Dehuai nian pu [Chronicle of Peng Dehuai], 466. Du, Zai zhiyuan jun zongbu [At the headquarter of the Volunteer Army], 186. Wang, Peng Dehuai nian pu [Chronicle of Peng Dehuai], 469; Kang mei yuan chao zhanzheng shi [A history of the War to Resist the United States and Assist Korea], 2:224. 2 63 Mao Zedong, “Zhiyuan jun bixu liji zhunbei faqi di si ci zhanyi 志愿军必须立即准备发 起第四次战役 [The People’s Volunteer Army must prepare to immediately launch the forth campaign],” January 28, 1951, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:454–​455.

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Seoul and Inchon should not be given up and it was “completely appropriate” to continue the heavy blow on the enemies.264 Peng Dehuai had no choice but to execute the order, but he strongly asserted that the guiding strategy to “stop the enemy from making advances, steadily open up the situation, … still make a long-​term plan” must be implemented, and he also reminded Mao that if the offensive did not go well, the troops might still retreat. Mao again approved Peng’s campaign plan.265 The major reason behind Mao’s rejection of the three-​person group’s ceasefire recommendations was that he explicitly set forth the combat aim of “liberating the whole Korea” after the third campaign.266 His disapproval of continued attack and pursuit operation not only showed his acceptance of Peng Dehuai’s advice, but it also reflected his own consideration of the military plan. Mao possessed abundant war experience, trusted Peng’s capability to command, and had the harsh lesson of North Korean troops’ past defeat, and all these made him strive as best as he could to harmonize the increasingly proven unrealistic strategic aim with the reality on the battlefield. His conception was to wipe out large numbers of fighting forces in the UN troops through mobility combat in the southern and northern vicinity of the 38th line, thereby achieving the aim of forcing them out of the Korean Peninsula without long-​ range pursuit operations and fighting against fortified enemies. Therefore, after the third campaign, he hoped that Chinese troops could have a relatively long period of time for sufficient rest so that they were able to launch a more powerful attack on the existing areas.267 Such conception was seemingly reasonable tactically but was unrealistic strategically, and it disabled Mao to fully comprehend the difficulties as stated by Peng. In mid-​February, the first stage of the fourth campaign ended, and Chinese troops switched to mobile defensive fight on all lines. On February 17, Peng Dehuai and other military leaders issued an instruction to all military party commissions and reported it to the Central Military Commission, acknowledging that “regarding the power comparison between the enemies and us, 264 265 266 267

Wang, Peng Dehuai nian pu [Chronicle of Peng Dehuai], 469. Ibid, 471–​473. Qi, Juren de jiaoliang [Wrestling of giants], 152–​153. Mao Zedong, “Di san ci zhanyi jieshu hou quan jun zhuli jun ying houche xiuzheng [After the Third Campaign the main forces of the Army should all retreat to the back for recuperation],” December 26, 1950; “Da yige sheng zhang hou xiuzheng zhunbei chunji gongshi [Recuperate after fighting a victory and prepare for spring offensive],” December 29, 1950, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:249–​253.

174 Chapter 2 the enemies still temporarily have some advantages.”268 For this reason, Peng found it already necessary to return to Beijing in person and reach consensus with Mao and others on the strategy. The Central Military Commission by then also noticed the unfavorable elements in the changing combat situation and difficulties faced by the Chinese troops, and it was considering whether the troops should retreat to the north of the 38th line.269 On February 8, the Central Military Commission drafted a telegram to Peng, the content of which showed that Mao also began to realize that if the strategic aim of removing all us troops from the Korean Peninsula remained unchanged, it would be difficult for the Korean War to end in the short term.270 On February 21, Peng Dehuai arrived in Beijing. He immediately discussed issues related to the Korean War with Mao in the day, and this meeting had a decisive effect in adjusting the strategic plan for the war. In the following days, Peng Dehuai held intensely scheduled meetings with other military leaders in Beijing and participated in an expanded meeting of the Military Commission, during which he presented, discussed, and arranged the various important matters related to the military operations in Korea. Peng’s activities had a major influence on the Volunteer Army’s change of strategic plan, for after listening to Peng’s presentation, Chinese leaders began to abandon the idea of “fast victory” and propose the policy of “preparing for a long-​term war while striving for a short-​term one.” Mao was also changing his own take as he suggested that in Korea, “if fast victory is possible, get a fast victory, but if not, get a slow victory and don’t rush for fruit.”271 On March 1, Chinese leaders informed Stalin of their decision through telegram. This telegram amply reflected the decision on combat situation and combat aim that was made by Chinese decision-​makers after discussion. As Peng Dehuai had different views from Kim Il-​sung and his Soviet advisor on the strategy issue, it was necessary to make Stalin understand China’s strategic adjustment fully. The telegram explained that based upon the experience and lessons from fighting us troops, now: 268

Kang mei yuan chao zhanzheng shi [A history of the War to Resist the United States and Assist Korea], 2:255. 269 Zhou Enlai, “Dui di fanji de bushu yu shi jiu bingtuan de kaijin 对敌反击的部署与十九 兵团的开进 [Deployment on counter-​attack on the enemy and the marching forward of the 19th Legion],” February 11, 1951, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:154–​155. 2 70 Kang mei yuan chao zhanzheng shi [A history of the War to Resist the United States and Assist Korea], 2:246–​247. 2 71 Peng Dehuai quan zhuan [Full Biography of Peng Dehuai], 3:952–​955.

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It is necessary to prepare for a long-​term war, using a few years to consume several hundred thousand Americans and thus make the United States retreat in the face of difficulties, and only then can the Korean issue be solved. In light of the changing circumstances on the battlefield now, the UN troops “have the possibility of reentering the southern and northern vicinities of the 38th line,” and will “re-​occupy Seoul and re-​cross the 38th line, and turbulence is unavoidable and preparation must be made.” The telegram finally stated that Peng Dehuai had informed Kim Il-​sung about China’s strategic plan.272 Stalin replied expressing consent with Chinese leaders’ decision, and indicated that the Soviet Union would continue its military assistance and could increase the assistance according to the need of Chinese troops.273 On March 15, Zhou Enlai informed Kim Il-​sung of China’s decision and Stalin’s reply through telegram. He mentioned in the telegram that “the Korean War has the possibility of going long-​term,” the us troops would still “advance to the southern and northern vicinities of the 38th line,” and Stalin replied in telegram to “agree with Chairman Mao’s plan regarding future military operations in Korea,” and so on.274 Until then, China finally completed another round of policy coordination with its allies. The strategic principle then proposed by the Chinese decision-​makers was still transitional, and it did not mean that Mao’s views were fundamentally changed. Expressions like “preparing for a long-​term war while striving for a short-​term one” were used by Mao after the second campaign.275 Chinese decision-​makers still set the combat aim as expelling the us troops from the Korean Peninsula, and it served the starting point for the so-​called “preparing for a long-​term war.” 272 Zhou Enlai, “Bixu zhunbei changqi zuozhan 必须准备长期作战 [Must prepare for long-​ term combat],” March 1, 1951, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:162–​165. 273 “Shi da lin guanyu fangyu zuozhan deng wenti zhi mao ze dong dian 史达林关于防御作 战等问题致毛泽东电 [Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong regarding defensive combat in Korea],” March 5, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 2:784. 274 Zhou Enlai, “Qiangxiu zugou de jichang shi kongjun zaori canzhan de zhongxin keti 抢修 足够的机场是空军早日参战的中心课题 [Quickly repair enough airports is the center project of the Airforce’s early participation in war],” March 15, 1951, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:171. 275 Mao Zedong, “Di san ci zhanyi jieshu hou quan jun zhuli jun ying houche xiuzheng [After the Third Campaign the main forces of the Army should all retreat to the back for recuperation],” December 26, 1950, in Mao Zedong junshi wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong on military affairs], 6:249–​250.

176 Chapter 2 Additionally, Chinese leaders did not discuss about peace talks at this time, because the us troops still had advantages on the battlefield and were launching large-​scale offensives then, and so they didn’t think Americans would be interested in ceasefire negotiation, and also they believed that proposing ceasefire without military advantage would leave them in a disadvantaged position. On April 22, Chinese and North Korean troops launched the fifth campaign. This campaign was a large-​scale offensive operation for the purposes of destroying large numbers of UN troops encountered between the 38th and 37th line, breaking the UN troops’ landing operations plan, and “getting back the upper-​hand.”276 At the end of the campaign, the two sides formed a relatively stable frontline in the 38th line area, and the war came to a stalemate. The fourth and fifth campaigns clearly showed that the military weak points of Chinese troops were irresolvable in short term, such as lack of air cover, insufficient troop mobility, extremely difficult logistics, and so on, not to mention the need to constantly prepare for defending us Airforce attacks on Chinese soil. On the other hand, with us troops swiftly changing their tactics, it was no longer possible for Chinese troops to wipe out us fighting forces in mobility combat as in the first and second campaign. In late May, soon after the fifth campaign ended, Peng Dehuai sent Deng Hua and a few important frontline army-​level commanders back to Beijing, in order to help the decision-​makers there to better understand the difficult circumstances faced by Chinese troops on the Korean battlefield. At the time, not only Chinese troops were facing severe battlefield difficulties that demanded prompt and resolute change of military strategy, but also the military assistance promised by the Soviet Union did not arrive at the frontline on time. It was not that Stalin and other cpsu leaders were unwilling to provide substantial help, but that the Soviet military capability was indeed unable to immediately meet the huge demand by Chinese troops on the Korean battlefield. Exactly at this moment, substantial change occurred in the us policy as decision-​makers of the Truman Administration believed that the time for ceasefire negotiation matured. On May 31, us representative Kennan met with Jacob Malik, the Soviet Ambassador to the UN, expressing the Truman Administration’s hope to hold talks on Korean ceasefire as soon as possible.277 That the United States conveyed the message of ceasefire talks through the Soviet Union possessed value at least on a technical level. For long, Chinese decision-​ makers had strong suspicion toward comments on ceasefire 276 277

Kang mei yuan chao zhanzheng shi [A history of the War to Resist the United States and Assist Korea], 2:306. Zi, ed., Zhan hou meiguo waijiao shi [us diplomatic history after World War II], 1:225.

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negotiations from the United States and other parties, and a message conveyed through the Soviet Union made it easier for Chinese decision-​makers to ascertain that the Americans were serious this time. This was critical to Chinese leaders making the determination at that point to negotiate on ceasefire. The Soviet Union promptly notified China of the content of the meeting between Kennan and Malik, and this directly led Chinese decision-​makers to have a serious internal discussion about whether to cease fire and negotiate and whether to change their military strategy. On June 3, Kim Il-​sung arrived in Beijing to discuss the Korean military situation and the ceasefire talks with Mao. The duo agreed to temporarily suspend launching large-​scale offensives, negotiate with the United States, and seek the 38th line as the demarcation line for ceasefire, and they also exchanged preliminary opinions on the potential concrete issues in the demarcation, on which Kim Il-​sung in fact expressed that specific adjustments could be made to the demarcation line according to actual circumstances.278 This discussion was also critical to Chinese leaders’ decision to cease fire and negotiate, for right after the discussion, Chinese leaders held a meeting to discuss the decision on ceasefire. The majority of attendees at the meeting considered it acceptable to “fight and talk, and try to solve the issue through negotiation” around the 38th line “while negotiate and try to solve the problem by negotiation.”279 On June 10, Kim Il-​sung and Gao Gang went to Moscow to discuss ceasefire talks and the military situation directly with Stalin. On June 13, Stalin notified Mao of the content of his discussion with Kim Il-​sung and Gao Gang. He said that the Soviet Union agreed with holding the ceasefire talks because “ceasefire now is a good thing.” He also expressed again that assistance would not be affected, and he would first provide China with military equipment for sixty divisions and would continue sending military advisors. He also reminded Mao to stay on alert as the Americans would probably launch an attack before the ceasefire.280 On the same day, Mao telegraphed Kim Il-​sung and Gao Gang, 278 Mao Zedong, “Liu qi liang yue bu jinxing da de fangong zhanyi 六七两月不进行大的 反攻战役 [Won’t launch major counteroffensive campaigns in June and July],” June 11, 1951, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:502; Zhou Enlai, “Chaoxian tingzhan tanpan de ruogan wenti 朝鲜停战谈判的若干问题 [several issues on the Korean War ceasefire talks],” November 14, 1951, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:250. 279 Nie, Nie Rongzhen huiyi lu [Memoir of Nie Rongzhen], 2:741–​742. 280 “Si da lin guanyu tingzhan he kongjun shiyong wenti zhi mao zedong dian 斯大林关 于停战和空军使用问题致毛泽东电 [Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong regarding ceasefire and deployment of air force],” June 13, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:806.

178 Chapter 2 asking them to propose to Stalin that the Soviet Union should go forward to “explore ceasefire issues” with the Truman Administration. In addition, China’s main position in the negotiation would be to set the 38th line as the demarcation line, and issues like China’s seat in the UN and Taiwan could be excluded from the ceasefire negotiation.281 By this time, ceasefire negotiation finally became the policy of Chinese leaders. After reaching internal consensus and finishing coordination with the allies, Chinese leaders finally formulated the strategic plan to “fully prepare for prolonged war and seek peace talks, with the purpose of ending the war.” Between June 25 to 27, Chinese troops in Korea held a “senior cadres” meeting to discuss implementation of the “prolonged operation, active defense” operations plan, and how to coordinate with the ceasefire talks. At the meeting, Deputy Commander Deng Hua made a report entitled “On the Prolonged Operations on the Korean Battlefield,” during which he said that “it is impossible to conclude the Korean War quickly,” and thus the whole army “should have a long-​ term plan and execute the strategy of waging solid fights,” which specifically meant “fighting till the 38th line.” The meeting also circulated the news of proposed ceasefire talks, and Deng Hua said “if the ceasefire talks fail, we will continue to fight resolutely.”282 This meeting marked that China finally completed its strategic transition in Korea. On the day Chinese troops held the senior cadres meeting, Malik gave a speech at the UN, stating that the Korean War could be solved through negotiation, and “the first step is that the warring parties shall negotiate a ceasefire and cessation of hostility, and the parties shall withdraw the troops from the 38th line.”283 After confirming that Malik’s speech represented the position of the Soviet government, the us government decided to initiate direct contact with the battlefield commanders of the Chinese and North Korean troops. 281 “Mao zedong guanyu tingzhan tanpan wenti zhi gao gang, jin ri cheng dian 毛泽东关于 停战谈判问题致高岗、金日成电 [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Gao Gang and Kim Il-​sung regarding Korean war ceasefire talks],” June 13, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 1:383. 282 Deng Hua 邓华, “Lun Chaoxian zhanchang zhi chijiu zhan 论朝鲜战场之持久战 [On the protracted war in Korea],” late June, 1951, in Deng Hua 邓华. Lun kang mei yuan chao zhanzheng de zuozhan zhidao 论抗美援朝战争的作战指导 [On operational guide of the War to Resist the United States and assist Korea] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1989), 25–​34. 283 “Sulian daibiao ma li ke guanyu heping jiejue chaoxian wenti de yanshuo 苏联代表马立 克关于和平解决朝鲜问题的演说 [Speech by Soviet representative Malik on peaceful resolution of Korea],” June 23, 1951, in Zhong mei guanxi ziliao hui bian [Collected documents of Sino-​u s relation], 2(1):511.

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The us Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered Ridgway to immediately issue a public announcement inviting China and North Korea to ceasefire talks. On June 30, following the order, Ridgway issued a broadcast announcement in the warring areas. The next day, Peng Dehuai and Kim Il-​sung jointly replied to Ridgway, agreeing with holding the ceasefire talks. Beginning from this moment, the Korean War entered a stage of “pause and fight, fight and pause” around the 38th line, which lasted as long as two years. For New China, the Korean War was indeed unexpected. It occurred during the period when New China was founded and the Cold War was having severe confrontation, and it caused a large-​scale expansion of the Cold War in East Asia. Because of direct participation in the war, China suddenly stood at the frontier of the East Asian Cold War, and hostility and military confrontation between China and the United States were pegged and lasted for long. On the contrary, alliance between China and the Soviet Union was hugely consolidated, and China completely leaned towards the Soviet Camp. Like in Indochina, the determination of Chinese leaders to go to the Korean Peninsula and fight against the us troops carried many spirits, including the impulse of assisting revolutionary movements in East Asian countries, the shared identity with the Soviet Camp and its ensuing sense of internationalist obligations, as well as the sentiment of doing justice and helping the weak. These factors made Chinese leaders feel the nobility and sanctity of joining the war. On the other hand, the motives of the Chinese leaders unquestionably included a geopolitical concern that was rooted in historical tradition, and it both gave them resolution and limited their actions. In any event, Chinese participation in the war after all substantially changed the fundamental structure in Northeast Asia that had resulted from us and Soviet military occupation, and China at least partially recovered its traditional influence there.

Chapter 3

Road to “Co-​existence in the Cold War” The years between 1953 and 1955 are indeed extraordinary in the East Asian history of the Cold War. As relations between the East and West military blocs shifted from sharp confrontation in the early Cold War to reconciliation, the situation in East Asia also assuaged and eventually became a region where the East and West engaged in interaction and vacillation of confrontation and reconciliation. History has repeatedly proven that wars between major nations have the strongest impact and shaping power over the strategic thinking and strategic planning of the warring parties. The Korean War offers no exception, for it served as the most extreme form of confrontation between China and the United States and greatly shaped both sides in their security thinking and security strategy in East Asia. Before the end of the Korean War, the United States actively sought to sign military pacts and build military alliances with a few Asian countries. By the end of 1954, the United States built in consecution the us-​Japan alliance, the Baghdad Treaty Organization, the Southeast Asian Nations Treaty Organization, the us-​Taiwan military alliance, and so on, and thus formed a military alliance system that is historically called “the Crescent Encirclement” in China’s east, south and west, the purpose of which was to contain and encircle China on the East Asian continent. If one extends such front of containment built by the United States in Asia westward to connect with the Balkan Treaty Organization, the European Union, and so on, which were all built in the same period, one would clearly find the “border” of the Cold War between the East and West built by the United States. In this light, New China’s foreign affairs were associated with the international Cold War more closely and directly due to such battlefront opened by the United States. But East Asia was China’s main stage of geopolitics, and the us action would certainly provoke China’s resolute counterattack. China also took intense military and diplomatic actions to confront the us military alliance system against China. Most of China’s actions then concentrated on neighboring areas mainly to build a buffer zone between the border area and the us military alliance system, which was named the “peaceful and neutral region” by Chinese leaders. China and the United States engaged in repeated competitions in China’s neighboring areas for containment and anti-​containment, especially in Indochina and the Taiwan Strait where military conflicts and big-​power diplomatic negotiations alternated and created a lot of uncertainty and rapid changes.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | DOI:10.1163/​9 789004369078_004

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The geopolitical fight in East Asia between China and the United States did not come to rest until a series of development took place including the Korean War ceasefire in July 1953, the signing of ceasefire in Indochina at the Geneva Conference in July 1954, and the Sino-​u s ambassadorial meeting in Geneva in August 1955. The result was emergence of a buffer zone between the us military presence and China’s border areas, which ran from the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula, through the Taiwan Strait, to the 17th parallelin Indochina, and its outer extent was eventually China’s geopolitically secure borderline, as well as the borderline of Sino-​u s military security confrontation. Although the situation later turned stormy again, the geo-​security structure created during this period remained fundamentally unchanged until the emergence of Sino-​ Soviet confrontation and Sino-​u s rapprochement. On the geopolitical stage of East Asia, China and the United States were the main actors of the game, and the aforementioned unusual historical process once again showed the important significance of interaction between the founding of PRC and the international Cold War. On the surface, China’s anti-​containment strategy was a reaction to us containment, and while it was certainly related to the Cold War system and competition over ideology and political institutions, its motivation was far from this simple. A longer historical perspective reveals that military actions shared some common features in the early years of PRC: on the Korean Peninsula, China broke the us policy of uniting Korea by force through the Korean War, thus a long-​term continuous confrontation was formed between the north and south; on the South Asian Peninsula, China reduced India’s regional ambition through military fight and helped to create a balance of power between India and Pakistan; on the Indochina Peninsula, China drove off France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in succession through successive military actions including the Assistance to Vietnam to Resist France, Self-​Defense War against Vietnam, and long-​term Assistance to Cambodia to Resist Vietnam and terminated Vietnam’s dream to control Indochina. As a matter of fact, after seizure of national power Chinese leaders gradually formed and showed in diplomatic actions a kind of strategic thinking with clearer and stronger geo-​security consideration, and its principles grew clearer daily: that no military forces of a major enemy should be allowed to approach China’s border areas excessively; and that balance of power should be created in neighboring areas against regional powers. These two principles guided and regulated China’s actions including military actions in different Asian regions. Furthermore, the behaviors and strategic goals chosen by China reflected not only a basic instinct of protecting national security, but also a deep historical past. During the early years of PRC, eight Chinese characters were popular

182 Chapter 3 among Chinese leaders:  “Without a peaceful neighborhood, the limbs feel dumb (zhoubian bu ning, sizhi bu ling 周边不宁，四肢不灵).” While it is still unclear such animated characterization of China’s security environment was made by which leader at what time and on what occasion, it indeed very accurately captured the primary issue or primary trouble that faced China’s security strategy and foreign policy during this period. Since China lies at the center of the East Asian continent, a country with “all sides and directions,” it would be the worst strategy to “fight on all sides” and the most reasonable choice to “pacify neighbors on four sides.” As revolutionary movement gradually receded and nation-​building increasingly became the primary task, “pacify neighbors on four sides” must rise to become the main idea that drove national security strategy. Hence, it would enrich understanding of the pattern of the East Asian Cold War to take a deeper interpretation of the inner drive and behavioral patterns behind China’s fight against the us containment strategy. There were several alternations of military conflicts and diplomatic negotiations in China’s neighborhood: from the death of Stalin in March 1953 to the Korean War ceasefire in July, from the escalation of Indochina War in spring 1954 to reaching agreement on peace restoration in Indochina in July, and from the sudden intensification of the Taiwan Strait to the Sino-​u s ambassadorial meeting in the fall of 1955. Through these three cycles of fierce military conflicts to reconciliation the East Asian geopolitical structure was finally created in the early Cold War. During this process, geopolitical strategy grew outstanding each day in major decision-​making in the early years of PRC. “Talk and fight, and fight and talk,” Chinese leaders relied upon such experience gained in the first few years of the East Asian Cold War and promoted development of events in the neighborhood, with the purpose of creating a stable security barrier for China. In retrospect, it can be said that the beginning of ceasefire talks on the Korean War in the summer of 1951 marked the initial formulation of China’s security picture, and it eventually shaped a secure environment for China for more than a decade, namely through reliance on the Soviet Union in the north and northwest, and a buffer zone created in the southeast coastal area as well as on the Korean Peninsula and Indochina, where China embarked on indirect confrontation against the United States and both countries began “coexistence in the Cold War” thereafter.

Section 1: Ceasefire in Korea

From the decision of sending troops to North Korea in October 1950 till the end of the fifth military campaign launched by the People’s Volunteer Army

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in May 1951, China’s military wrestle with the United States on the Korean Peninsula basically entered a stable state. Although the ensuing ceasefire talks lasted two years, during which both sides repeatedly exchanged long-​term offensives and defensives of various scope, neither could break the military balance that had taken shape near the 38th line. This featured the equilibrium of military confrontation reached by China and the United States on the Korean Peninsula, while at a deeper level, it reflected that under the constraint of multiple complex factors, the West Camp and East Camp finally reached some kind of equilibrium in their underlying strategic competition in East Asia. On July 27, 1953, the belligerent parties in the Korean War concluded ceasefire, a result that derived from realities of power, for sure, but the perceptions held by leaders on both sides of their strategic circumstances and their game play with each other also provided a pivotal force that determined the result of the war. Back in early 1951, as the frontline gradually moved toward the northern and southern vicinities of the 38th line, the Korean War began to show a trend toward a limited war. As no national soil was dragged into war and the security threat on Northeast China was generally lifted, Chinese leaders redirected their main focus to domestic affairs, and the cpc Central Committee decided to start making the first Five-​Year Plan. On July 5, Liu Shaoqi gave a report in Zhongnanhai entitled “the Future Historic Mission of the Communist Party of China,” which proclaimed to “solve the Korean issue this year,” and “except for necessary national defense, all work and other constructions will support economic development.”1 By the fall of 1952, Chinese leaders held that the three-​year transition period following founding of PRC was basically over, and starting from the year of 1953 the nation would turn to large-​scale economic development. Overall foreign policy adjustment was in order. Whether China could begin large-​scale economic development partly hinged upon whether there would be an external security environment inductive to economic development, the primary problem of which was the Korean War. The war with the United States on the one hand severely threatened national security, as China had to always watch out for us expansion of the war to the coastal areas; on the other hand, it severely consumed China’s human capital, material resources, and financial capital. The cpc Central Committee had planned to greatly reduce military expenditure in 1950, but the Korean

1 Liu Shaoqi, “Zhongguo gongchandang jinhou de lishi renwu [Chinese Communist Party’s historical mission in the future],” July 1951, in Jianguo yi lai liu shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 3:538–​539.

184 Chapter 3 War paralyzed the goal. According to the numbers revealed by Zhou Enlai to Stalin in September 1952, military expenditure comprised 44% of national budget in 1950, which was 14 percentage points higher than the original plan; it comprised 52% in 1951. In Addition, according to Zhou’s report at the 109th political affairs meeting, over 50% of financial expenditure in 1951 was spent on military affairs and the Korean War’s cost comprised over 30% of the total expenditure.2 Only until the year of 1952 did military expenditure drop to comprise 27.9%, but still it reached as high as 6.6 billion rubos, compared to the planned military purchases for the first Five-​Year Plan of 4.5 billion rubos.3 Such heavy burden could not but catch serious attention from Chinese leaders when they made major decisions. In comparison, however, the more serious issue was that China’s neighboring security environment was still deteriorating. The United States began building a military system to contain China since the Korean War, which no doubt formed a direct threat to China’s security. On the other hand, since its founding, New China engaged directly and indirectly in two limited wars abroad and continuously promoted publicity on supporting Asian revolutionary movements, both of which increased worries, concerns, and even fears of neighboring countries toward China. It was thus a true fact that some countries rather preferred to lean to the United States for protection. To Chinese leaders, consequently, taking measures to stop military conflicts in the neighborhood and pacifying the neighbors through diplomatic means became the most urgent task of improving national security environment. In view of history, the Korean ceasefire talks was the first practice of Chinese leaders to end the war with the United States through diplomatic negotiation, and again through the Korean ceasefire talks, Chinese leaders gained rich experience and created a model of ending big-​power conflicts in adjacent areas. In June 1951 when Chinese leaders agreed to begin the ceasefire talks, their thoughts and decisions were constrained in all aspects, where factors such as military reality, us policy, and China’s relations with its allies became the keys to understand Chinese policies during the ceasefire talks. As mentioned before, the Chinese leaders’ decision to negotiate a ceasefire with the United States was primarily based on their perception and acknowledgement of the military reality on the ground, but two other important factors also affected their decisions: first, the development and changes of corresponding us policy; and

2 Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai 1949–​1976], 1:255. 3 “Si da lin yu zhou enlai jianghua jilu [Minutes of conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai],” September 3, 1952, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1210.

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second, how China coordinated relations with its allies. China’s involvement in the Korean War was directly associated with the Soviet Union and at the same time conducted to save the North Korean ally. Managing relations with the Soviet Union and North Korea, therefore, became the primary concern on the diplomatic front from the very beginning of China’s participation in the war, and it continued as much during the ceasefire talks. The ceasefire talks were a process of “talk and fight, talk along with fight,” which involved many decisions that were fundamentally different from that of entering the war, and China’s relations with its allies thus grew more complicated. As the decision of Chinese leaders to hold ceasefire talks with the us troops was pressed by a consideration of military reality at the time, the decision was yet solid at the beginning, and as a matter of fact, the People’s Volunteer Army was preparing to launch the sixth military campaign when the talks began. But the People’s Volunteer Army needed time then to make strategic adjustments and arrangements, plus the Soviet military aid could not arrive in time according to China’s wish due to constrained capacity, and so forth. On August 8, Peng Dehuai sent a telegram to Mao and reported that the People’s Volunteer Army planned to stage the sixth military campaign on September 10. Three days later, Zhou Enlai and others discussed and recommended to Mao to postpone the campaign: “We believe it is in our interest to strengthen preparation and postpone the campaign in order to stage a big fight.” Their reason was that staging the offensive short of ready preparation and air cover would not guarantee a victory.4 On the seventeenth, the People’s Volunteer Army Headquarter made another telegram to Beijing asking about the battling plan for the sixth military campaign. On the nineteenth, the Central Military Commission replied a telegram to Peng to halt execution of the sixth military campaign and aim instead at “strengthening preparation without launching it.” The Military Commission cited lack of necessary military preparation and that Stalin had agreed to the Chinese Airforce’s postponed participation in the Korean War, under which conditions victory could not be guaranteed for an offensive. Moreover, military moves “should coordinate with negotiation demands.”5 Roughly since then, China’s policies were generally settled. 4 Zhou Enlai, “Jia jin zhunbei, tui chi da da 加紧准备，推迟大打 [Accelerate preparation and postpone major campaign],” August 11, 1951, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:211–​213. 5 Zhou Enlai, “Muqian de zuozhan fangzhen yu di liu ci zhanyi de bei er bu zhan 目前的 作战方针与第六次战役的备而不战 [The current combat strategy and the preparation without fighting for the Sixth Campaign],” August 19, 1951, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:217–​219.

186 Chapter 3 Near the end of the fifth military campaign, Chinese leaders, with their experience and lessons learnt in fighting against us troops, began to take the effort to adjust the military strategy on the Korean Peninsula. During this period, Mao called a cpc Central Committee meeting with an unknown number of audience to discuss “what to do next” with the Korean War. Most of the participants agreed to end the war near the 38th line, talk along with fight, and solve the Korean issue through negotiation. They gave two reasons:  first, by occupying areas north of the 38th line, the political objective of going to war was achieved; and second, ending the war along the 38th line would be quite acceptable to “all parties.”6 Such opinions conveyed two conditions that would render a ceasefire acceptable to Chinese leaders: first, that China achieved its strategic aim, or in other words, it defended its defined basic interest, namely “defending North Korea is defending our borders”;7 second, the result should be acceptable to “all parties,” which certainly comprised the us opponent, but also China’s allies of the Soviet Union and North Korea. This in fact built the framework whereby Chinese leaders had to make their choices. Once they confirmed that they had accomplished their overall strategic objective, the key determinants of decision-​making became the opponent and the allies. Put it another way, they could not easily end the war for the simple reason of China achieving its strategic objective. In a word, whether it was the decision to go to war or the decision finally to negotiate a ceasefire, relations with allies consistently dominated China’s decision-​making as the most fundamental factor. Chinese leaders’ recognition of China’s strategic interest and assessment of balance of power often had to go through coordination with allies before they became policies for implementation. It was also at this meeting that Chinese leaders practically set the objective of pursuing ceasefire along the 38th line. The complexity of relations among allies manifested itself in the discussion between Chinese leaders and Stalin before the start of the ceasefire talks. Mao even proclaimed that China did not want to participate in the ceasefire talks as a major player. On June 29, Kim Il-​sung made a telegram to Chinese leaders to ask about the proper response if the us side offered to negotiate. Only one day earlier, Mao had received through Roschin the meeting minutes between Gromyko and Alan G. Kirk, the us ambassador to the Soviet Union, which mentioned some specific arrangements of the talks. Mao immediately sent a telegram to Stalin on that day, stating that “if the negotiation should 6 Nie, Nie Rongzhen huiyi lu [Memoir of Nie Rongzhen], 2:741–​742. 7 Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu Chaoxian tingzhan tanpan wenti 关于朝鲜停战谈判问题 [On Korean war ceasefire talks],” August 22, 1951, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:225.

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come into reality,” it was very much necessary to have Stalin “closely guide the talks,” which he said was necessary “to avoid playing into the enemy’s hands.”8 The next day, Matthew Ridgway, commander of the UN forces, issued an open statement at the battleground of holding ceasefire talks with China and North Korea. On receiving the information, Mao immediately made a telegram to Stalin, in which he gave a brief account of the response measures he planned to take and suggested then, that Stalin “directly communicate with Comrade Kim Il-​sung, supervise the meeting closely, and just inform us your decisions.”9 In the meantime, Mao forwarded Peng Dehuai and Kim Il-​sung this telegram to Stalin, which was mostly meant to tell Kim Il-​sung that the negotiation would be “mainly represented” by North Korea and under direct guidance from Stalin, and Kim Il-​sung was advised to often communicate with Stalin and “report directly to him if there is any issue.” Mao hoped that Kim Il-​sung would “consider and prepare” the content and means of the negotiation, whereas China would send its Deputy Foreign Minister Li Kenong over to “offer inside help.”10 Stalin must have considered it a serious matter and on the same day he replied a telegram to Mao rejecting his proposal. As he stated in the telegram, leading the ceasefire talks by Moscow “is unnecessary and meaningless. You, Comrade Mao, can lead the negotiation.” He said that the role of the Soviet Union would be at most to “advance some suggestions on certain issues” and it “cannot maintain direct contact with Kim Il-​sung,” but instead, Mao “should keep in touch with him.”11 From the decision-​making perspective, such exchange between Mao and Stalin was extremely critical, because it in fact constructed a practical decision-​making mechanism and procedure between 8

9

10

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Mao Zedong, “Guanyu chaoxian tingzhan tanpan deng wenti 关于朝鲜停战谈判等问 题 [On Korean war ceasefire talks and other issues],” June 29, 1951, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:511–​512. Mao Zedong, “Guanyu Chaoxian tingzhan tanpan shijian didian deng shiyi 关于朝鲜停 战谈判时间地点等事宜 [On the schedule and location of Korean war ceasefire talks],” June 30, 1951, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:513. Mao Zedong, “Tingzhan tanpan daibiao yi Chaoxian renmin jun wei zhu 停战谈判代 表以朝鲜人民军为主 [The composition of ceasefire talks representatives should be mostly Korean people’s army],” June 30, 1951, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:515. “Shi da lin guanyu tingzhan tanpan wenti zhi mao zedong dian [Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong regarding Korean war ceasefire talks],” June 30, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 2:839.

188 Chapter 3 China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea. Stalin in his reply confirmed the leadership position of Chinese leaders in the ceasefire talks. On the opening day of the ceasefire talks, North Korean delegate, General Nam Il raised a proposal that included three agenda items. The first was that the belligerent parties issue a simultaneous order to end all hostile military actions; the second was to designate the 38th line as the military demarcation line, and militaries on both sides should retreat ten kilometers from the north and south, respectively; and the third was to “withdraw all foreign troops as soon as possible.” Chinese delegate Deng Hua followed with supporting remarks.12 Because the Chinese delegation played a dominant role on the Chinese and North Korean side, such proposal mainly reflected China’s claims. On June 13, Mao informed Kim Il-​sung and others who were in Moscow about China’s principle on the ceasefire talks, namely to end the war along the 38th line.13 The us side immediately announced opposition to the third item in the Chinese and North Korean proposal that demanded all foreign states to withdraw their troops from the Korean Peninsula as soon as possible. They reasoned that without an explicit guarantee, the withdrawal of UN forces from the Korean Peninsula would give rise to new conflicts. Although the United States had conflicts or disputes with its allies on many strategic issues, such refusal to withdraw troops received unanimous support from its allies. George Kennan once made it clear in his first meeting with Jacob Malik that the United States would not immediately pull out of the Korean Peninsula. Jacob Malik didn’t voice a strong opposition, only stating in the meeting on June 5 that the United States needed to negotiate directly with China and North Korea to solve the issue.14 12

13

14

“Chao zhong daibiao tuan shouxi daibiao nan ri jiangjun zai kai cheng tingzhan tanpan shouci huiyi shang guanyu tingzhan tanpan san xiang jianyi de fayan 朝中代表 团首席代表南日将军在开城停战谈判首次会议上关于停战谈判三项建议的发 言 [Remarks from General Nam Il, Chief Representative of the North Korean-​Chinese delegation, on three recommendations of the ceasefire talks at the first meeting of the Kaesong ceasefire talks],” July 10, 1951; “Chao zhong daibiao tuan deng hua jiangjun zai kai cheng tingzhan tanpan shouci huiyi shang zhichi nan ri jiangjun de fayan 朝中代 表团邓华将军在开城停战谈判首次会议上支持南日将军的发言 [Remarks from General Deng Hua of North Korean-​Chinese delegation on supporting General Nam Il at the first meeting of the Kaesong ceasefire talks],” July 10, 1951, in People’s Daily, July 11, 1951. “Mao zedong guanyu tingzhan tanpan wenti zhi gao gang, jin ri cheng dian [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Gao Gang and Kim Il-​sung on ceasefire talks],” June 13, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 2:808. Zi, ed., Zhan hou meiguo waijiao shi [us diplomatic history after World War II], 1:225–​226.

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The debate over whether to include withdrawal of foreign troops in the negotiation agenda continued for as long as sixteen days. In light of the military reality then, China and North Korea lacked the military capabilities to drive the us troops out of the Korean Peninsula, and the battle at the negotiation table simply reflected the battlefield reality. On July 17, Chinese leaders directed the negotiation delegation to “insist on withdrawal of all foreign troops from North Korea.” Chinese delegates replied to Mao that “it is not advisable to overly insist on” the withdrawal issue on the agenda, and suggested instead to reach ceasefire along the 38th line first before “negotiating withdrawal of troops as the next step.”15 On the twenty-​third, Mao agreed with the delegation’s opinion as he replied, “this round of ceasefire talks should keep focusing on ending the war and retreating behind the 38th line as the first step to reach peaceful resolution of the Korean issue,” whereas the issue of withdrawing foreign troops from North Korea could be a subject of future negotiation.16 After discussion, the Chinese and North Korean delegation advanced a compromise proposal on July 25 that comprised five points. The proposal deleted the language “withdrawal of foreign troops from North Korea,” whereas the fifth point was to “make recommendations to every government on a series of issues that are relevant to both sides.” Nam Il explained in his speech during the talks that the wording “a series of issues” included the issue of withdrawal of foreign troops. The us side accepted this obscure expression. On July 26, both sides reached a five-​point agreement on the negotiation agenda.17 The compromise by the Chinese and North Korean side revealed to a certain extent the changing perceptions of Chinese leaders. The second phase of the talks took place from July 27 to November 27, during which both sides focused on the issue of military demarcation line. Early in the talks, the Chinese and North Korean delegation proposed to adopt the 38th line as the military demarcation line to achieve ceasefire, a condition that underlined China’s strategic goal of limiting the scope of the war.

15

16

17

Zhou Enlai, “Bixu jianchi yiqie waiguo jundui che li Chaoxian 必须坚持一切外国军队 撤离朝鲜 [Must insist on withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea],” July 17, 1951, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:200–​203. Zhou Enlai, “Che jun wenti keyi bu lie ru Chaoxian tingzhan tanpan yicheng 撤军问题 可以不列入朝鲜停战谈判议程 [The issue of troop withdrawal can be excluded from the agenda of the Korean ceasefire talks],” July 23, 1951, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:204–​205. “Pei tu huo fu guanyu chaoxian tingzhan tanpan de qingkuang baogao 佩图霍夫关于 朝鲜停战谈判的情况报告 [Report from Petukhov on situation of the Korean ceasefire talks],” September 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:995.

190 Chapter 3 Throughout the decision-​making process of China’s participation in the Korean War, “limited war” remained a core concept that provided strategic direction. It carried China’s strategic motive of resolving the Korean issue, and it was closely associated with the 38th line since its creation. The concept of “limited war” was first raised by Zhou Enlai during his meeting with Panikkar, Indian Ambassador to China, on October 3. Zhou mentioned “localizing the Korean incident,” in that all belligerent parties on the Korean Peninsula should immediately cease fire and foreign troops should be withdrawn. What he raised as the absolute condition of China’s noninterference was that the us troops should not exceed the 38th line.18 Later, when analyzing combat aim and ceasefire for several times, Chinese leaders invariably paid special attention to the 38th line, which showed that the line at least carried important symbolic meaning in the minds of Chinese leaders. As stated before, during the discussion of whether to accept the ceasefire talks, Chinese leaders judged that it was acceptable to all parties to “fight and talk, and resolve the issue through negotiation” near the 38th line. On June 13, Mao informed Stalin about China’s position on ceasefire, which was that the point of negotiation was to achieve ceasefire at the 38th line, while such issues as China’s seat in the UN and Taiwan could be left untouched in the ceasefire negotiation. Stalin replied, “It’s optimal to cease fire now.”19 Achieving ceasefire along the 38th line was, it could be argued, a general consensus between China, the Soviet Union, as well as North Korea, which formed a major basis for cooperation for the three allies. The United States announced opposition early on to setting the 38th line as the military demarcation line, which was indeed an established policy of the us government. The us military believed that the 38th line crossed areas that were, due to geographical reasons, unsuitable for the us troops to establish an effective military defense line. The us representative demanded in the talks that the Chinese and North Korean troops must retreat 38 to 68 kilometers from their various locations, giving in an area of about 12,000 square kilometers. The United States demanded such huge strategic interest, but only with a weak justification that because the UN forces enjoyed an allegedly overwhelming “advantage in naval and air power,” which after the ceasefire would not be able to move in waters and skies north of the 18

19

Zhou Enlai, “Mei jun ru yue guo san ba xian, women yao guan 美军如越过三八线，我 们要管 [If the us army crosses the 38th line, we will take measures],” October 3, 1950, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:67–​68. “Si da lin guanyu tingzhan he kongjun shiyong wenti zhi mao zedong dian [Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong regarding ceasefire and deployment of air force],” June 13, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 2:806.

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military demarcation line, the Chinese and North Korean troops should therefore compromise on land as a “compensation for the sea and air” of the UN forces.20 The negotiation immediately came to an impasse. us military leaders believed that they faced the necessity, and were equipped with sufficient capabilities, to take military actions and prove the effectiveness of its “advantage in naval and air power.” But the Summer Offensive they launched soon failed. On August 10, Li Kenong updated Mao about progress of the talks. He mentioned in his report that Charles Turner Joy, the us delegate, had made remarks during his speech that the United States could adjust their previous proposal on the military demarcation line, as “discussion on the issue of military demarcation line should be based on actual military circumstances.” The next day, Mao raised a new idea in his telegram to Li Kenong. He directed the Chinese and North Korean delegation to continue uncovering “the opponent’s plot” and “falsified propaganda” while in the meantime put forward more practical proposals. As he mentioned, the 38th line could be “set as the basis for military demarcation line between both sides,” with a demilitarized zone established accordingly, and militaries on both sides could accommodate actual terrains in their retreat, “not necessarily all retreating ten kilometers.”21 On August 12, members of the People’s Volunteer Army delegation, including Li Kenong, Deng Hua, Xie Fang, and Qiao Guanhua, received Mao’s telegram as mentioned above after a new round of talks. They replied to Mao after discussion that based on the latest situation of negotiation, “a clear decision must be made on the 38th line issue.” As Li Kenong and others noted, the us attitude in the negotiation showed that their “wrong views (A/​N:  opinions)” towards China’s policies were “deepening,” the “wrong views” being their conclusion that China would eventually make concessions due to its eagerness to end the war, which led the United States to make war threats as well as prepare for halting the talks. The aim of the United States was to cease fire along the current battle front in place and it was willing to make some adjustments accordingly. As they reported in the telegram, taking all aspects into consideration, “it is impossible” to force the United States to accept the 38th line as the military demarcation line, and thus it was necessary to make a decision as to “whether to fight for the 38th line and prepare for termination of the talks, or to avoid break of the talks and pursue military ceasefire.”

20 21

Zi, ed., Zhan hou meiguo waijiao shi [us diplomatic history after World War II], 2:228. Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:216.

192 Chapter 3 They believed that the latter policy was more in their interest, namely to “better consider ending military actions in areas along the current battle fronts instead of continuing to fight for the 38th line, so that termination of the talks could be avoided.”22 On August 13, Zhou Enlai replied to Li Kenong and others on behalf of Mao, directing them to carefully study the us position in the negotiation and at the same time inform Kim Il-​sung for his consideration. Zhou pointed out that the real proposal of the United States was to “achieve ceasefire in place and make minor adjustments.” Observing the reality on the ground, if the demarcation line was drawn to reflect the terrains and military circumstances, where the eastern part of Imjin River was drawn inside the north of the 38th line and the western part of Imjin River was drawn inside the south of the 38th line, with the size of both areas being “roughly identical” on the north and south, the United States “might be able to readily accept.” He instructed the delegation to carefully study the us position and keep Kim Il-​sung informed of the above consideration. During the talks, the delegation needed to take actions to “encourage the enemy to give up or modify its original proposal,” and based on their altered position, put forward Beijing’s proposal as mentioned in the telegram on the eleventh. Zhou further directed Li Kenong and others to “combine the 38th line with the current battle fronts, and even combine the military demarcation line with baffle zones” during the talks, so as to “set the scene for advancing the planned compromise proposal.” It would then make the United States “approach our proposal” and allow us to gain an upper hand in the media.23 The telegrams sent by Chinese leaders on August 11 and 13 showed that they prepared to make practical adjustments on the military demarcation line. It was an important change in Chinese policy, revealing that Chinese leaders became more eager to reach ceasefire at this time. On the seventeenth, Mao made a telegram to Kim Il-​sung and informed him about the new policy on the military demarcation line. Zhou also explained the rationale of the adjustment at a later meeting with officials of various domestic departments, during which he said the current battle front of both sides “was a tipped 38th line,” with the us troops intruding north of the 38th line on the east and the Chinese and North Korean troops infiltrating south of the 38th line on the west, both sides occupying areas of relatively the same size. China’s principle was to “pursue

22 23

Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:215–​216. Zhou Enlai, “Junshi fenjie xian yu muqian tanpan celüe 军事分界线与目前谈判策略 [Military demarcation line and current strategy for negotiation],” August 13, 1951, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:214–​215.

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ceasefire based on fair and reasonable negotiation.”24 Later in a telegram to Stalin, Chinese leaders explained at length about the adjustment of the military demarcation line. They told Stalin that Kim Il-​sung “already had this intent” back in early June during his meeting in Beijing, and this time China “only raised it after having obtained his consent.”25 On August 15, the talks showed traces of progress. The United States first submitted a map with detailed labels to illustrate its claimed military demarcation line and demilitarized zone. The next day, the United States raised a new suggestion of setting up a working group consisting of relatively junior representatives from both sides, with an aim of exchanging opinions on specific issues related to the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone. On the sixteenth, Li Kenong reported to Mao in telegram that the Chinese and North Korean delegation planned to agree with the us suggestion of establishing a working group to further articulate the “possibility of making adjustments” of the demilitarized zone.26 They acted so that day. On August 20, the Chinese and North Korean delegation raised a proposal during the talks, which was modeled after the August 11 telegram from Mao. But the United States rejected the proposal, stating that they could not relinquish their occupied areas north of the 38th line, and reiterating simultaneously their claimed compensation for “sea and air advantage.” As the United States held an unrealistic judgment about the position of the Chinese and North Korean delegation and took an aggressive attitude, the Chinese and Korean delegation decided to make no further concession thereafter. On the night of August 22, us warplanes shelled the neutral zone at Kaesong and strafed the residence area of the Chinese and North Korean delegation, thus lending justification to the Chinese and North Korean delegation for suspending the talks. Before the incident, on August 19, the UN forces launched the Summer Offensive, trying to occupy some areas demanded by the United States during the talks. The Chinese side considered it unacceptable to

24

25

26

Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu chaoxian tingzhan tanpan wenti 关于朝鲜停战谈判问题 [On the Korean ceasefire talks],” August 22, 1951, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:224–​225. Zhou Enlai, “Chaoxian tingzhan tanpan de ruogan wenti 朝鲜停战谈判的若干问题 [Several issues on the Korean ceasefire talks],” November 14, 1951, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:250. “Mao Zedong guanyu zhuanfa tingzhan tanpan di 25 hao jianbao zhi shi da lin dian 毛泽 东关于转发停战谈判第25号简报致史达林电 [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin on forwarding the No.25 brief report of ceasefire talks],” August 16, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:964–​965.

194 Chapter 3 continue the talks under us military pressure, since any reasonable discussion then would be taken as a sign of weakness and encourage the United States to more readily resort to force when the talks made no progress. This was the primary reason behind Chinese leaders’ decision to suspend the talks, which also echoed their usual strategic thinking. During suspension of the talks, Chinese leaders on the one hand instructed the People’s Volunteer Army to tenaciously strike back on the Summer Offensive of the UN forces, while on the other hand they were analyzing and judging the real intent of the United States. Mao himself still believed that the United States was able to “find alternative solutions during protraction and seek compromise on the issue of the military demarcation line.”27 Mao once shared his judgment with Stalin and asked him to forward a suggestion to Kim Il-​sung to propose the idea at the talks of having a neutral country invited as an inspector. Stalin did not agree with Mao’s judgment about the us intent, for he believed that “the Americans are more willing to continue holding off the talks,” and once Kim Il-​sung raised such proposal of having a neutral country as inspector, it would make the United States think of China and North Korea as more eager to end the war, which would “bring no benefit” to China and North Korea.28 Stalin’s attitude was related to the dubious reports he had received from the Soviet Embassy in North Korea. According to the statements and analyses of those reports, at this point China and North Korea had open disputes between them, which dwelled on China’s eagerness to end the war soon while North Korean leaders were more concerned about unfavorable ceasefire conditions forced upon them thereof. V. Petukhov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, drafted a report to Kremlin that explained and analyzed in detail the Soviet Embassy’s views towards the prospect of the ceasefire talks. The report held that China and North Korea should not make any concession

27

28

“Mao Zedong guanyu diren zai zhongli qu jinxing pohuai wenti zhi shi da lin dian 毛泽东关于敌人在中立区进行破坏问题致史达林电 [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin regarding enemy’s sabotage in demilitarized zone],” August 27, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:985. “Shi da lin guanyu tongyi zhong chao fangmian tanpan lichang zhi mao zedong dian 史达林关于同意中朝方面谈判立场致毛泽东电 [Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong regarding agreement with China and North Korea’s negotiation position],” August 29, 1951; “Mao Zedong guanyu jieshou shi da lin de jianyi zhi shi da lin dian 毛泽东关于 接受史达林的建议致史达林电 [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin on acceptance of Stalin’s advice],” August 30, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:986–​987.

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on the military demarcation line issue, and stated that the two parties did not reach a consensus on the administration of the demilitarized zone. The report concluded in acrimonious language that the United States had the upper hand in the war, whereas some moves by the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea were seen by the United States as “signs of weakness and being compelled to make compromise.” At this point, North Korea was concerned that they “will be forced to accept ceasefire conditions that will hurt the reputation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” Meanwhile, China “refuses to stage offensive battles” and “attempts to end the war and get rid of the North Korean burden as soon as possible.” The report also used terms that could well portray the narrow-​mindedness of the Russian mentality, as it described the allegedly advantaged situation the Soviet Union had achieved in North Korea and claimed that North Korean leaders were “apparently cold” to China while their expectations towards the Soviet Union were “growing firmer and broader.”29 The Soviet Representative to the Far East Commission in Washington also submitted a report to Stalin on the ceasefire talks which analyzed the strategic intent of the Truman Administration. Its conclusion was that the United States chose “the tactic to postpone the ceasefire talks for unlimited time,” and the Truman Administration did not plan to achieve ceasefire based on the 38th line or to withdraw its armed forces from the Korean Peninsula.30 On September 10, the Soviet Embassy in North Korea gave a special briefing to Kremlin on the disputes between China and North Korea. Because of the peculiar relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea, especially the intimate relations between Kim Il-​sung and the Soviet Ambassador V. H. Razuvaev, the report drafted by Razuvaev offered a good reference for studying Soviet-​North Korean relations and Soviet views at that time. The report held that North Korean leaders generally believed they could not achieve national unification and “have to agree to the worst conditions and return to pre-​ war status,” the result of which Kim Il-​sung partially blamed on China. They believed that China “is inclined to making concessions to the Americans as long as ceasefire can be achieved,” without paying sufficient attention to North Korea’s position. Kim Il-​sung even complained that Li Kenong disputed with 29

30

“Pei tu huo fu guanyu chaoxian tingzhan tanpan de qingkuang baogao 佩图霍夫关于朝 鲜停战谈判的情况报告 [Petukhov’s report on the situation of Korean ceasefire talks],” September 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1003. “Yuan dong weiyuan hui sulian daibiao chu guanyu chaoxian tingzhan tanpan de baogao 远东委员会苏联代表处关于朝鲜停战谈判的报告 [Report from Soviet representative office in the Far East Committee regarding the Korean ceasefire talks],” October 3, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1046–​1055.

196 Chapter 3 him “on a series of issues” but “shows enormous tolerance and compromise” to the Americans. Such exchanges often provoked “apparent fury” from Kim Il-​ sung. He also complained that after the third campaign the People’s Volunteer Army did not exploit their victory to kick the Americans out of the Korean Peninsula, only being mindful instead of ceasefire at the 38th line. According to Razuvaev, North Korea therefore “further confirmed the strategy of leaning to the Soviet Union.” What’s particularly worth noting, Razuvaev believed Kim Il-​sung also bore the expectation that the Soviet Union and China would not eventually abandon North Korea.31 This was probably the primary reason that Kim Il-​sung was in fact unwilling to cooperate with China’s negotiating position. One could reasonably predict Stalin’s decision following the logic stream of the aforementioned reports. He instructed on the one hand that China and North Korea maintain their solid position and abandon illusions; on the other hand, he turned down Mao’s request of sending eighty-​three Soviet military advisors, but decided instead to send only five advisors, citing lack of necessity to dispatch that many military advisors.32 Apparently, China not only had to fight hard against the United States, but also had to coordinate as hard with its own allies in order to achieve its strategic aim. With respect to designating the 38th line as the military demarcation line to cease fire, the policies made by the Truman Administration during this period proved that Mao had a more accurate judgment. Following the Summer Offensive launched by the UN forces on August 19, the Truman Administration also faced profound choices as to whether the war would expand and what if the Summer Offensive failed to achieve its aim. According to analysis of the State Department, two possibilities existed: one, that both sides would continue the impasse without reaching an agreement; and the other, that the Chinese and North Korean troops would stage new offensives. In answering to the first scenario, the State Department offered a solution of strengthening us military presence in North Korea, maintaining the current front, and 31

32

“La zu wa ye fu guanyu tingzhan tanpan zhong chuxian de zhengzhi qingxu ji zhong chao guanxi de dianbao 拉祖瓦耶夫关于停战谈判中出现的政治情绪及中朝关系的电 报 [Telegram from Razuvaev regarding emerging political emotions during the ceasefire talks and Sino-​North Korean relations],” September 10, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1022–​1026. “Shi da lin guanyu paiqian junshi guwen wenti zhi mao zedong dian 史达林关于派遣 军事顾问问题致毛泽东电 [Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong on dispatch of military advisers],” September 12, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1039.

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imposing economic blockade on China. Under the second scenario, the State Department suggested counseling allies in advance before expanding the scale of military actions, which included removal of restrictions on air operations and approval of attacking bridges and power stations on the Yalu River. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed after deliberations that it was imperative to expand military actions, but the principle of advanced discussion with allies was unacceptable and would cause inaction, since few of the allies supported the United States to escalate military actions in North Korea except the South Korean regime.33 As the Summer Offensive ended in late September short of achieving its aim, the State Department held a joint meeting with the military. The attendees believed that the UN forces already gained an upper hand in the power realities for the time being and should immediately seek renewal of the ceasefire talks. The State Department forwarded the decision to Matthew Ridgway after the meeting, pointing out that the primary reason for suspending the ceasefire talks was that both sides had fundamental disputes over the military demarcation line. At this point it was necessary to consider the us position and the importance of obtaining popular support at home and abroad, whereas the goal of the United States was to achieve ceasefire.34 Following the instructions of the us government, Matthew Ridgway put forward a compromise solution to reopen the talks, suggesting that Chinese and North Korean delegates should propose possible locations for the talks. The suggestion was accepted by the Chinese and North Korean side, which led to a turnaround of the talks. At this point, the us government increased internal discussions on the military demarcation line. On September 26, Matthew Ridgway noted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with reference to the situation on the battleground, that the objective of the UN forces’ offensive was to control Line Kansas north of the eastern 38th line and build defendable positions along the terrains. In order to achieve the objective, the UN forces could retreat south in certain areas in exchange for corresponding adjustments on the Chinese and North Korean side. Washington accepted Ridgway’s suggestion and immediately made a proposal, that the current actual contact line between both sides should be taken as the center line and 33

34

“Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State—​Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting,” Washington, 29 August 1951; “Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense [Marshall],” Washington, 29 August 1951, FRUS, 1951, Vol. VII, Korea and China, 859–​864, 880–​881. Attachment: “Draft Message for General Ridgway, Prepared in the Department of State,” FRUS, Vol. VII, Korea and China, 945–​946.

198 Chapter 3 a four-​kilometer wide neutral zone should be established, followed by minor adjustments.35 The basic content of the proposal already approximated Mao’s idea on August 11. Moreover, the progress proved Mao’s basic judgment that as long as the Chinese and North Korean troops could hold on and strike back us attacks, they had opportunities in the ceasefire talks. After settling on the general policy of reopening the talks, the United States reached out again to the Soviet Union. On October 5, Kurk met with Andrey Vyshinsky and gave a two-​point oral statement on behalf of the us government. The first point was that the us government attached great importance to the ceasefire talks, and the second was that it hoped to improve us-​Soviet relations. Kurk’s statement was simply meant to decorate the meeting as if it was not solely directed at the ceasefire talks, which might hurt the us position in the talks. He even refused to hand over the original text of the two-​point statement to Vyshinsky. As a result, while both sides confirmed the other side’s attitude towards the ceasefire talks, they habitually engaged in an endless, heated debate over political principles.36 On October 15, Vyshinsky called a meeting with Hugh Cumming, Chargé d’ Affaires of the us embassy. He read out the oral reply from the Soviet government to the latter, which went that the military demarcation line should be solved through negotiation, not on the battlefield, and the Soviet Union was willing to make “all practical efforts” to bring the talks to a fruitful end.37 Up to this point, the Autumn Offensive by the UN forces had ended, taking tolls of severe injuries and deaths whereas the battle front moved only two kilometers north on average, thus it became inevitable for the United States to return to the negotiation table. Hence, as soon as the Soviet Union gave a positive response and the Chinese and North Korean side agreed to change the location of the talks to Panmunjom, the United States immediately agreed to reopen the talks on October 25. Before resuming the talks, Chinese leaders betrayed their hope to achieve ceasefire as soon as possible. Mao said in a telegram to Li Kenong on the eighteenth, “we

35 36

37

“The Commander in Chief, Far East [Ridgway] to the Joint Chief of Staff, Tokyo,” 26 September 1951, FRUS, Vol. VII, Korea and China, 952–​955, 955–​962. “Wei xin si ji yu ke ke guanyu chaoxian tingzhan wenti de huitan beiwang lu 维辛斯基 与柯克关于朝鲜停战问题的会谈备忘录 [Memorandum of Conversation between Vyshinsky and Kirk regarding Korean ceasefire],” October 5, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1058–​1061. “The Charge in the Soviet Union [Cumming] to the Secretary of State, Moscow,” October 15, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VII, Korea and China, 1041–​1042; “Memorandum of Conversation between Vyshinsky and American Charge d’affaires Cumming,” October 15, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1063.

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should stick to the goal of encouraging an immediate reopening of the talks,” and he held that the change of the talks’ location to Panmunjom and arrangements on the neutral zone “will hardly benefit the enemy from their point of view.”38 Obviously he did not want to be entangled in trivial matters that would stall an immediate reopening of the talks. On October 22 and 23, Li Kenong continually reported to Beijing on issues of principle that could arise in the resumed talks, all of which Mao forwarded to Stalin. The main subject of those telegrams was to modify proposals of the military demarcation line with the goal of seeking ceasefire, or put another way, to prepare for further concessions.39 On October 25, the day of reopening the ceasefire talks, Mao instructed Li Kenong and others that during the resumed talks, they could “put forward the suggestion that both sides abandon discussions on the old proposal and instead offer new proposals on the demarcation for discussion by both sides.” Once the United States agreed to it, they could raise the new proposal suggested by Li Kenong in the telegram on the twenty-​third. He believed that with efforts, it was “possible to achieve the goal of drawing the demarcation line in the current battle front areas with minor modifications.”40 In other words, they should no longer insist on the original claim of setting the 38th line as the military demarcation line to cease fire. Mao had shared his thought with Kim Il-​sung one day earlier and received a telegram of consent from the latter on the twenty-​fifth. On the thirty-​first, Mao forwarded Kim Il-​sung’s consent to Stalin.41

38

39

40

41

“Mao Zedong guanyu tingzhan tanpan celüe wenti zhi shi da lin dian 毛泽东关于停战 谈判策略问题致史达林电 [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin regarding strategy for ceasefire talks],” October 18, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1065. “Mao Zedong guanyu zhuanfa dui tanpan celüe de qingshi zhi shi da lin dian 毛泽东 关于转发对谈判策略的请示致史达林电 [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin on request to dispatch strategy for ceasefire talks],” October 25, 1951; “Mao Zedong guanyu zhuanfa dui xiugai fenjie xian jianyi di er fang’an de qingshi zhi shi da lin dian 毛泽 东关于转发对修改分界线建议第二方案的请示致史达林电 [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin on request to dispatch the second solution in the recommendations on military demarcation line],” October 25, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1073–​1074, 1075–​1076. “Mao Zedong guanyu fu hui hou tanpan celüe wenti zhi shi da lin dian [Telgram from Mao Zedong to Stalin regarding negotiation strategy after resuming the talks],” October 25, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1077. “Mao Zedong guanyu jin ri cheng tongyi zhong fang suo ti tanpan fang’an zhi shi da lin dian [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin on Kim Il-​sung’s consent with China’s proposal of negotiation plan],” October 31, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1083.

200 Chapter 3 After the talks reopened, important changes also took place in us policies. The us delegation no longer insisted on “sea and air compensation,” but instead, based on a general consensus of setting the current contact line between both sides as the military demarcation line, they demanded to exchange two intruding sections in Kumsong and Ganseong areas occupied by the UN forces in return for China and North Korea’s consent to include Kaesong in the neutral zone. The us demand grew partly out of military concerns, and partly out of pressure from South Korea. The Chinese and North Korean delegation rejected the demand. On November 12, the us Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff held a joint meeting to discuss the military situation in detail. They eventually decided to forego the demand on Kaesong, only insisting on setting the current actual contact line as the temporary military demarcation line, but in the meantime they announced a thirty-​day window for declaring ceasefire in order to press China and North Korea so that adjustments of the actual contact line would be completed through negotiation during this period.42 Five days later, the us delegation advanced the proposal to China and North Korea based on instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Chinese leaders apparently noticed the changes in us policies and believed that the possibility of achieving an agreement was increasing. On November 14, two days after Washington decided to make significant compromise, Mao signed a telegram to Stalin. The telegram explained at length the basic assessment of Chinese leaders towards the ceasefire talks and actions China would take to achieve an immediate ceasefire. As the telegram ran, the United States “is increasingly likely to accept conditions to ceasefire,” and the debate by both sides on the military demarcation line “won’t last long.” The Chinese side sought no immediate resolution to issues such as setting the 38th line as the demarcation line and withdrawal of foreign troops from the Korean Peninsula, because at this point the goal was to seek ceasefire, and ceasefire along the current battle line also carried advantages to China and North Korea. As Chinese leaders told Stalin, “we propose ceasefire in place, setting the current contact line between both sides as the military demarcation line,” which was also agreed upon by Kim Il-​sung who had stated this opinion during his visit in Beijing in June and also given consent to the current proposal. They further analyzed other issues that were brought up in the talks and believed that those issues were 42

“Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State—​Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting,” Washington, November 12, 1951, FRUS, vol. VII, Korea and China, 1123–​1124.

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not difficult to solve, such as ceasefire inspection, prisoners of war (pow), and holding meetings of relevant countries to solve the Korean political issue. On this ground they set the “aim to achieve an agreement of the talks within the year.” At the end of the telegram they presented major arrangements in China’s domestic realm, with a special mention that because of participation in the Korean War, fiscal budget of the Chinese government increased 60% from the year before, and 32% of total national budget was spent on war.43 It was practically impossible for Chinese leaders to make an empty point on the impact of the Korean War on China’s fiscal situation amid the ceasefire discussion. On November 20, Mao even remarked in a telegram to the PLA Airforce, “A ceasefire before Christmas is extremely likely.”44 When Mao’s telegram reached Moscow, Stalin held off his reply for a long time. Due to the profoundness of the issue, Mao instructed Zhou Enlai to press Stalin for his immediate show of attitude through the Soviet Ambassador Roschin, making Stalin aware that the Chinese and North Korean delegation had postponed meeting with the us delegation twice to wait for his reply.45 On the nineteenth, the day he received Roschin’s telegram, Stalin immediately replied to Mao that he agreed with Chinese leaders’ judgment on the situation and measures adopted, but he also suggested China and North Korea “don’t show haste and anxiety of ending the talks soon.”46 In the meantime, the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko sent a telegram to the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang, scolding the Soviet ambassador Razuvaev for acting on his own to allow North Korea to publish its appeal letter to the UN on the military demarcation line issue, and particularly, that he did not check to make sure if such act of North Korea had been coordinated with

43 44

45

46

Zhou Enlai, “Chaoxian tingzhan tanpan de ruogan wenti [Several issues of the Korean ceasefire talks],” November 14, 1951. Mao Zedong, “Kongjun bixu xunsu zuzhi xin budui can zhan [The Airforce must quickly organize new troops to join the war],” November 20, 1951, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:562. “Luo shen guanyu mao zedongyaoqiu shi da lin jinkuai dafu dui tanpan de qingshi de dianbao [Telegram from Roshchin on Mao Zedong’s request for Stalin’s immediate instruction on the negotiation],” November 19, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1107. “Shi da lin guanyu chaoxian tingzhan tanpan wenti zhi mao zedong dian [Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong on the Korean ceasefire talks],” November 19, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1108.

202 Chapter 3 China.47 According to a subsequent explanation made by Razuvaev, the appeal letter by North Korea focused on the issue of pow, only demanding at the end that “militaries retreat from the battle line, establish a two-​kilometer demilitarized zone, all foreign troops withdraw from North Korea, the criminals who provoked the war be held accountable,” and so on.48 Such content was not quite surprising literally, but the sections addressing ceasefire conditions short of advance notice could indeed cause a mess among allies. The Soviet action showed that in the decision-​making mechanism of the ceasefire talks, China so far had held the dominant position and relations between Chinese and Soviet senior officials had been quite smooth, but China and North Korea on the other hand had rubs in their relations, or at least the Soviet side believed so. Gromyko was therefore particularly sensitive to events that had bearings to China-​North Korea relations. On November 27, the Chinese and North Korean delegation and the us delegation finally reached agreement on the military demarcation line issue. China and North Korea was quite optimistic at this point about the prospect of ceasefire, for Kim Il-​sung sent a confidential telegram to Stalin on the same day, noting that Mao told him if “ceasefire is achieved within the year,” Chinese troops “should return to China for adaptation,” and in time some Soviet weapons would be transferred to the North Korean troops.49 The content of the telegram evidenced that there was an element of optimism in Mao’s assessment about the situation, which differed remarkably from assessments by some Soviet departments. According to a report by the Soviet representative to the Far East, the United States was unlikely to compromise on any of such issues as pow, ceasefire inspection, and the Korean political issue. Stalin wavered in his views, for he usually complied with Mao’s suggestions on specific negotiation issues, but he also issued some warnings on the extreme lack of sincerity of the United States on an immediate ceasefire. As later development showed, the United States indeed did not give up after the military demarcation line was settled. 47

48

49

“Ge luo mi ke guanyu chaoxian huyu tingzhan wenti zhi la zu wa ye fu dian [Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev on North Korea’s call for ceasefire],” November 20, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1109–​1110. “La zu wa ye fu guanyu zhuanfa piao xianyong de shengming zhi ge luo mi ke dian [Telegram from Razuvaev to Gromyko on forwarding Park Hen-​yuong’s statement],” November 21, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1083. “La zu wa ye fu zhuan cheng jin ri cheng guanyu yuanzhu wenti zhi shi da lin de dianbao [Telegram from Razuvaev to Stalin on forwarding Kim Il-​sung’s request for aid],” November 27, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1130.

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In early December, both sides began to negotiate such issues as ceasefire inspection, postwar restrictions on military facilities within North Korean borders, and exchange of pow, the latter of which began negotiation on December 11. As early as October 27, the second day after the resumed talks, Truman clearly stated that he disagreed with exchanging all pows with the Chinese and North Korean side, except if it could barter for important concessions otherwise impossible from the latter.50 Neither did the us troops plan to repatriate all pows, for they believed the Chinese and North Korean pows controlled by the UN forces far outnumbered that of the other side, whom, if fully repatriated, might strengthen Chinese and North Korean military power once they rejoined the battling troops. Moreover, some of these North Korean and Chinese pows surrendered under the impact of psychological war and announced their unwillingness to be repatriated, and thus their full repatriation without distinction would impair the effectiveness of the us psychological war. The us intelligence community and political institutions certainly believed that they could make use of repatriated pows subject to potential persecution to propagate against communism, and therefore protecting pows had “profound value” for fighting ideological battles around the world.51 By May 1952, both sides had solved issues of ceasefire inspection and postwar restrictions on military facilities, leaving the issue of exchanging pows as the major obstacle of ceasefire. The us policy on pow took Mao by surprise. He had long held that the pow issue was not hard to solve, an expectation associated with the judgment that the United States did not want a protracted war, especially provided that the military demarcation line issue was solved on the basis of actual contact line between both sides. He once said affirmatively in a telegram to Stalin, “We oppose the principle of one-​on-​one exchange but support the principle of full exchange. The issue shouldn’t be difficult to agree on.”52 Long after that, Chinese leaders still believed that the POW issue was not a major barrier to ceasefire. With issues of ceasefire inspection and restrictions on military

50 51

52

“Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State,” Washington, October 29, 1951, FRUS, vol. VII, Korea and China, 1073. “Memorandum of Conversation, by Frank P. Lockhart of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs,” Washington, July 3, 1951; “Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense [Marshall],” Washington, August 8, 1951, FRUS, vol. VII, Korea and China, 614–​ 618, 792–​794. Zhou Enlai, “Chaoxian tingzhan tanpan de ruogan wenti [Several issues of the Korean ceasefire talks],” November 14, 1951.

204 Chapter 3 facilities making progress, they expected a possible agreement in “at most May or June.”53 Indeed, there were constant swings in us policies. The us side once claimed in April that it could repatriate 116,000 out of all 132,000 Chinese and North Korean pows, which would have met the general expectation of the Chinese and North Korean side, but shortly afterwards they themselves dropped the proposal. During this period the UN forces scaled up military actions and the us Airforce expanded their battling areas, shelling in June Supung power station on the southern bank of Yalu River and power facilities at Chosin and other places, attempting to press for a compromised peace through shelling and obtain political and psychological advantages in the meantime. Faced with the only pow issue left unsolved in the ceasefire talks and the enormous military pressure and political challenges imposed by the United States, Chinese leaders once again had to choose between compromise and continued war. Chinese leaders were confronted with two outstanding issues then. One was domestic economic situation. As could be seen from Mao’s exchanges with Stalin, Chinese leaders bore expectation for an early ceasefire partly due to the heavy fiscal burden inflicted upon China by the war. In 1952, the domestic front developed fast and Chinese leaders proposed in the fall that the nation would embark on large-​scale economic development. But the Korean War had and was continuing to consume a massive amount of resources and fiscal budget, its severity as addressed earlier, which could not have failed to draw serious attention from Chinese leaders as they made major decisions. When they decided on whether to compromise on the pow issue to end the war, they apparently gave serious consideration to the fiscal burden. In August 1952, Zhou Enlai organized the drafting of “China’s Economic Situation and Five-​Year Development Tasks.” Under his supervision, the working group conducted careful research and made a basic judgment that “if the Korean War continues as it is, we still need to and possibly start the five-​year development.”54 The conclusion lent support to the decision of Chinese leaders to continue the war instead of making compromise under us military pressure. On the condition of not affecting domestic political agenda, Mao declared China’s resolve to fight on: “Whatever number of years the us imperialism wants to fight, we are prepared to fight, to the day when

53

54

Zhou Enlai, “Dui di muqian dongxiang de guji [Estimate on enemy’s current movements],” February 14, 1952, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:267. Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–​1976)], 1:255.

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imperialism wants to call an end.”55 In all, the principle was to never give in to the us military pressure of escalated intensity and scale of war, while at the same time to strengthen active diplomatic efforts to seek more Soviet aid. Another outstanding issue was that the North Korean ally became anxious to put an early end to the war. North Korea found it increasingly difficult to stand the escalating military strikes from the United States, particularly the bombings from the us Airforce, which dealt a heavy blow to the North Korean morale. Early in 1952, North Korean Foreign Minister Park Hen-​yong told Peng Dehuai, “People across North Korea want peace and they don’t want to continue war.” And of course he also mentioned that if China and the Soviet Union wanted to continue fighting, North Korea would overcome all difficulties.56 Soviet reports showed there was indeed a lack of morale in the North Korean military, as well as lack of military capabilities, facilities, trainings, and so on.57 Moreover, us air strikes left North Korean cities and rural areas in wreckage, a horrifying scene as the Soviet side described. For example, one report mentioned Soviet representatives witnessed that a village that was once filled with farmers laboring in the fields turned into “a heap of ruins full of shell craters” two days after us air strikes, and the village was gone.58 In order to encourage Kim Il-​sung to persevere, the Soviet Union and China promised separately to increase all kinds of aid to North Korea, including food, transportation equipment, artillery, and so forth, whereas the Soviet Union also strengthened trainings of the North Korean military.59 North Korean leaders expressed hearty 55

56

57

58

59

Mao Zedong, “Kang mei yuan chao zhanzheng bixu jixu jia qiang [The war to resist the United States and assist Korea must further escalate],” Feburary 7, 1953, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 2:121. “Mao Zedong guanyu tingzhan he yuanzhu chaoxian liangshi deng wenti zhi si da lin dian [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin regarding ceasefire and food aid to North Korea],” February 8, 1952, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1153. “Sulian zhu chao shiguan 1951 nian de zhengzhi baogao zhaiyao (1951 nian 1 yue) [Abstracts of political reports in 1951 of the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang],” in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1139. “Ke tuo fu guanyu chaoxian zhanzheng xingshi gei ma li ning de baogao [Report from Kotov to Malinin regarding the situation of The Korean War],” October 30, 1952, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1242. “Lian gong (bu) zhongyang zhengzhi ju guanyu yuanzhu chaoxian liangshi de jueyi [Resolution of the cpsu Politburo food aid to North Korea],” April 14, 1952; “Sulian buzhang huiyi guanyu 1952 nian yu chaoxian maoyi de jueyi [Resolution of Soviet Ministerial Meeting on trade with North Korea in 1952],” June 13, 1952; “La zu wa ye fu guanyu renmin jun xunlian qingkuang gei shi jie mian ke de baogao [Report from

206 Chapter 3 thanks to the Soviet and Chinese aid, but did not change their hope to end the war early. After June, us military campaigns escalated. Between July 11 and the midnight on the twelth, the us Airforce launched a large-​scale shelling of Pyongyang, resulting in injuries and deaths of over 6,000 residents. On the thirteenth, the us side immediately proposed to repatriate 83,000 Chinese and North Korean pows during the talks, which consisted of over 76,000 North Korean pows, and over 6,400 pows of the People’s Volunteer Army.60 Li Kenong made a telegram to Mao, Peng Dehuai, and Kim Il-​sung about proper response to the proposal. The numbers came close to what China and North Korea proposed internally, namely repatriating 90,000 people, but the total number of Chinese and North Korean pows under UN forces’ control was 138,000, including 111,000 North Koreans and over 20,000 from People’s Volunteer Army. The us repatriation proposal, proportioned as such after a large-​scale bombing of Pyongyang, was apparently aimed to play China and North Korea against each other. On the fourteenth, Kim Il-​sung sent Mao another telegram expressing hope to end the war soon. On the fifteenth, Mao rejected the suggestions made by Li Kenong and Kim Il-​sung. He signed a reply telegram to Kim Il-​sung, which said that after two days of deliberations, the Chinese side reached a consensus that “it does us no good to accept the enemy’s luring but empty proposal absent of real compromise, especially after the enemy has landed massive bombs.” The disservice, he mentioned, would not only “encourage the idea of driving more wedges between us” and nibble further, but would erode “our reputation.” Mao attached great importance to reputation, which indeed constituted part of the immeasurable strategic interest, and he would never want to accept the aforementioned proposal under us military pressure. With the perception of alliance in mind, at times Mao viewed China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union as one. As he told Kim Il-​sung, through the war, they had achieved “protection of North Korea and Northeast China,” North Korea had “stood gloriously at the forefront of protecting the world’s peace camp,” and both countries’ security and political positions had strengthened. But accepting the us proposal would

60

Razuvaev to Shtemenko regarding training of the People’s Army],” July 1, 1952; “Mao Zedong guanyu tingzhan he yuanzhu chaoxian liangshi deng wenti zhi si da lin dian [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin on ceasefire and food aid to North Korea],” Feburary 8, 1952, all in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3: 1152–​1153, 1171–​ 1172, 1173–​1177. Kang mei yuan chao zhanzheng shi [A history of the War to Resist the United States and assist Korea], 3:252.

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“prove that one step wrong leads to a whole game lost.” China would make its best efforts, and if insufficient, would request for the Soviet Union to “offer help.”61 Meanwhile, he also sent a telegram to Stalin proclaiming that China would not accept the “provocative” proposal made by the us side, nor could it “kneel to the enemy’s pressure” at this moment.62 Kim Il-​sung sent a telegram to Mao after being informed of China’s decision. On the one hand he expressed agreement with the latter’s decision on the fifteenth, while on the other he strongly demanded that the Chinese and North Korean troops alter what was called the passive defense military strategy. His suggestions included that the People’s Volunteer Army Airforce should extend its battling area from the Yalu River all the way north to the Pyongyang area, at the same time sending fighter planes of abundant fighting capacity to infiltrate the enemy’s rear and shell the us military airports and facilities, and the Volunteer Army should also launch limited ground offensives to step up pressure on the us troops.63 In a word, China could reject the us proposal but in return, it had to launch active military offensives to relieve North Korea’s burden and all kinds of losses. On the seventeenth, Razuvaev made a telegram to A. M. Vasilevskii and Vyshinsky, in which he forwarded the telegram Kim Il-​sung drafted to Stalin on the sixteenth. In the telegram, Kim Il-​sung expressed extreme pessimism towards the prospect of ceasefire talks and complained that the Chinese and North Korean troops remained in passive defense since the start of the ceasefire talks, resulting in enormous losses in North Korea’s human and physical capital but inflicting little wounds on the us troops. He also mentioned that North Korea agreed with the Chinese position of rejecting the us ceasefire conditions, but found it necessary to take measures to protect North Korea’s major facilities and launch active military campaigns. The telegram listed four recommendations, which included strengthening air defense capabilities, launching land attacks on the enemy’s principal regions in order to lessen the us Airforce’s pressure on the Chinese and North Korean rear, and to “pursue with strong resolve to sign the ceasefire as soon as possible, achieve ceasefire, and

61

62

63

Zhou Enlai, “Buneng jieshou diren de qianfan zhanfu fang’an 不能接受敌人的遣返战 俘方案 [Cannot accept the enemy’s proposal on repatriating POW s],” July 15, 1952, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:289–​290. “Mao Zedong guanyu bu jieshou mei fang jianyi wenti zhi si da lin dian [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin reagarding rejection of us suggestion],” July 18, 1952, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1187. Ibid, 3:1187–​1189.

208 Chapter 3 exchange all pows according to the Geneva Convention.” And of course, there was a request for more military aid to the Soviet Union.64 Mao also forwarded Kim Il-​sung’s previous telegram and his response telegram to Stalin. Stalin replied with support for Mao’s decision, “your position on the ceasefire talks is absolutely right.”65 But this round of communication was not sufficient to fully solve the problem. Not until August when Zhou Enlai paid a visit to Moscow did Chinese and North Korean decision-​makers have an opportunity to get together with Stalin and make key decisions. Zhou Enlai’s visit to Moscow was aimed to secure Soviet aid for China’s prepared first Five-​year Plan, and also of course to win continued military and fiscal aid from the Soviet Union for China’s defense modernization and People’s Volunteer Army. On August 20, Zhou Enlai met with Stalin in Kremlin where they specifically discussed the Korean ceasefire talks. Zhou explained China’s policies on the pow issue and its disputes with North Korea, as well as mentioning that North Korea “somehow wavers” with “unsteady mood.” In response to Stalin’s questions, Zhou mainly answered two of them. One was that the People’s Volunteer Army could hold its ground, but could only launch limited local attacks instead of large-​scale offensives. The second was that China believed that the us proposal on exchanging pows on July 13 was a conspiracy aimed to poison China-​North Korea relations, which China could never accept. He said China was prepared “to fight for even another year,” in which case he hoped that Stalin would provide necessary aid to North Korea. Stalin commented that he firmly supported Mao’s decision, because the Korean War “has hurt the American power” while North Korea “loses nothing,” and now “perseverance and patience are needed.” Stalin promised to provide military aid to North Korea, proclaiming that “we would protect North Korea at all costs.” He voiced disagreement with Kim Il-​sung’s suggestion of the People’s Volunteer Army Airforce reaching the enemy’s rear to fight, but rather, the Chinese and North Korean military “should not launch any offensive,” whether tactic or strategic. Stalin commented that the talks should continue if the United States “made some compromise.” Zhou told him that China was prepared:  “If the Americans make some concession, whether substantial or not, their demand 64

65

“La zu wa ye fu zhuan cheng jin ri cheng dui tingzhan tanpan kanfa zhi hua xi lie fu si ji dian [Telegram from Razuvaev to Vasilevsky on forwarding Kim Il-​sung’s views on the ceasefire talks],” July 17, 1952, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1184–​1185. “Shi da lin guanyu tongyi zhong fang tingzhan tanpan lichang zhi mao zedong dian [Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong on agreement with China’s position on the ceasefire talks],” July 17, 1952, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1186.

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can be catered to.” China had prepared three due solutions for discussion, the worst of which had the bottom line that the pows not repatriated would be handed over to neutral countries. The idea later became the eventual solution to the pow issue. Finally, Zhou forwarded Mao’s suggestion that Kim Il-​sung and Peng Dehuai be invited to Moscow and discuss with Stalin in person. Stalin said he was “willing to receive them.”66 After the meeting, leaders of the three countries quickly made the itinerary of Kim Il-​sung and Peng Dehuai’s secret visit to the Soviet Union. On September 4, a meeting was held between Stalin, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, Kim Il-​sung, and Park Hen-​yong, all accompanied by their senior advisors. Stalin hosted the meeting and he fully executed the agreement he had reached with Zhou in their earlier meeting. He first confirmed with Kim Il-​ sung about the North Korean military’s morale and was told they “have great mood.” Then Stalin made a generous promise of aid to North Korea, including airplanes and equipment of one to three fighter plane divisions, as well as materials and equipment of ten anti-​aircraft gun regiments, and in order to provide such aid in time the Soviet Union was prepared to reduce one to two Soviet Airforce divisions. As with all other equipment and materials requested by Kim Il-​sung, Stalin gave almost the same reply, “give us the list.” In order to boost Kim Il-​sung’s confidence, Stalin catered to almost all his demands. Once these were completed, he moved to ask Kim Il-​sung about his disputes with China, on which the latter answered that he had agreed with China’s suggestions but was “more willing to conclude the ceasefire agreement as soon as possible.” Stalin replied that he supported China’s firm stand of repatriating all pows, and planned to make a proposal of proportionate repatriation, namely that if the United States retained 20% of Chinese and North Korean pows, China and North Korea would also retain 20% of their pows. Kim Il-​sung disclosed that among the pows from the south captured by North Korea, about 27,000 were regimented into the North Korean troops and thus were not calculated. It was a major reason why North Korea was willing to accept the us proposal on July 13. Before the end of the meeting, Stalin announced it would aid China and North Korea each with an air force division.67 Thus, the three allies solved their disputes and coordinated their policies. 66

67

“Shi da lin yu zhou enlai de huitan jilu [Minutes of conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai],” August 20, 1952, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1195–​1204. “Shi da lin yu jin ri cheng, peng de huai de tanhua jilu [Minutes of conversation among Stalin, Kim Il-​sung, and Peng Dehuai],” September 4, 1952, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1214–​1221.

210 Chapter 3 Since the opening of the ceasefire talks, Stalin consistently supported all the decisions made by Chinese leaders and offered to provide military aid to China, and when China and North Korea had disputes he often showed support for China’s position and helped Chinese leaders to convince North Korea. A major reason behind Stalin’s closer relations with China, as well as his willingness to support hardline policies in the ceasefire talks, was that the United States unilaterally promoted and controlled the peace-​making process with Japan. The unilateral peace-​making pursued by the United States accompanied the strengthened Soviet-​China military alliance, both processes of which clearly associated and interacted with each other. On September 4, 1951, the Japanese Peace Conference was held in San Francisco. Forty-​eight of the fifty-​one countries in attendance signed the Japanese peace treaty, while the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czech Slovakia refused to sign. In particular, five hours after the peace treaty was signed, the us and Japanese delegates signed the planned “security defense treaty.” The event signaled the final formation of confrontation between blocs in East Asia, starred by the Soviet-​China alliance and the us-​Japan alliance. The situation made the Soviet Union more inclined to choosing confrontational policies in East Asia. Stalin not only showed more active attention and support for China’s defense modernization plan, but he also raised an idea of establishing a regional organization in Asia headed by China in order to elevate China’s political position in Asia.68 In late March of 1952, China and the Soviet Union began to discuss extension of the length of Soviet troops stationed in Lvshun, which was an important step taken by China and the Soviet Union in face of the us-​ Japan security defense treaty.69 On September 15 during Zhou Enlai’s visit to Moscow, both countries exchanged agreements on extending the Soviet troops stationed in Lvshun. After Zhou’s visit to Moscow, China and the Soviet Union published “the Sino-​Soviet Joint Communiqué on the Negotiation between People’s Republic of China Delegation and the Soviet Union Government,” in which they announced the extension of the Soviet military use of the Lvshun

68 69

“Shi da lin yu zhou enlai de huitan jilu [Minutes of conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai],” September 19, 1952, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1228. “Mao Zedong guanyu zhongguo guofang he jingji jianshe deng wenti zhi shi da lin dian [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin regarding China’s national defense and economic development],” March 28, 1952; “Shi da lin guanyu su jun che chu Lüshun deng wenti zhi mao zedong dian [Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong regarding withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lüshun and other issues],” April 2, 1952, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1160–​1164.

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marine base.70 The Sino-​Soviet military alliance thus was consolidated, which naturally was reflected in the policy coordination process of the ceasefire talks. Policy coordination on the ceasefire talks between China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea took place against intensified confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in East Asia, which had a significant impact on China’s adherence to confrontational policies against the United States. Chinese leaders’ resolve won whole-​hearted support from the Soviet Union as well as promise from Kim Il-​sung. On October 8, the ceasefire talks were adjourned indefinitely due to lack of common ground on both sides, verging on the brink of collapse. During this period the United States continued to increase intensity of the war, but China and North Korea maintained their unanimous and unshakable positions during the talks at Panmunjom. Faced with the stalemate, the us president-​elect Dwight Eisenhower found himself mired at first. He tried to force China and North Korea into compromise by using a series of military and political means, such as tightening economic blockade and embargo on China, and scrapping the “neutralization” policy of the Taiwan Strait to encourage the Kuomintang military to launch attacks on the mainland, and so on. He even suggested to the National Security Council the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons in Kaesong.71 But to no avail and the United States could not extract a tiny concession from China. In December, the International Red Cross requested the belligerent parties to exchange injured pows first. With a consideration of winning international popular support, Washington instructed Mark Clark, who replaced Matthew Ridgway as commander of the UN forces, to propose to China and North Korea to discuss the request by the Red Cross. On February 22, Clark sent a letter to the Chinese and North Korean delegation, stating that both sides could exchange injured pows first during the war and discuss the suggestion by the Red Cross.72 The Chinese side, however, did not offer an immediate reply but left the talks in a continued deadlock.

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“Guanyu zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu daibiao tuan yu sulian zhengfu de tanpan de zhong su gongbao 关于中华人民共和国政府代表团与苏联政府的谈判的中苏 公报 [Sino-​Soviet communique on the negotiation between PRC government delegation and the Soviet government],” September 15, 1952, in CCCPC Party Literature Research Office 中央文献研究室, ed. Jian guo yi lai zhongyao wenjian xuan bian 建国以来重 要文件选编 [Selected collection of critical documents since the founding of People’s Republic of China] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1992), 3:340–​341. Zi, ed., Zhan hou meiguo waijiao shi [us diplomatic history after World War II], 1:232. “The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command [Ridgway] to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Munsan 1952,” April 4, FRUS, 1952–​1954, vol. XV, Korea, 136–​138.

212 Chapter 3 On March 5, Stalin suddenly died of disease. The event had paramount influence on Soviet foreign policies in the early stage of the Cold War, shortly after which the Soviet East Asia policies shifted significantly and the new Soviet leaders decided to end the Korean War as soon as possible.73 In particular, they showed irrevocable resolve in executing this new decision. On March 8, Zhou Enlai led a delegation to Moscow to attend Stalin’s memorial service. During the trip, Zhou held a meeting with Soviet leaders on the Korean ceasefire talks, in which the Soviet leaders flatly told Zhou of their decision to end the Korean War soon, and Zhou replied that he would report to Beijing about the new change in Soviet policy. The Soviet Union also sent a special envoy to Pyongyang to inform Kim Il-​sung that the Soviet Union had decided to end the war early.74 Kim Il-​sung’s response could be readily expected. He told the Soviet delegate that he “absolutely agrees with the Soviet recommendation on the North Korean issue,” and hoped that it “would materialize as soon as possible.” He said that with “tremendous” losses North Korea suffered every day, it would be “quite unwise” to indulge in discussions of the number of pows. The Soviet recommendation thus “is the most wise and correct,” and North Korea would actively prepare for resuming the talks.75 On March 19, the new Soviet leaders decided to send letters to Mao and Kim Il-​sung respectively to explain the latest Soviet resolution on the repatriation of pows, while simultaneously they sent similar instructions to the Soviet delegation in the UN. Their letters began with the clear wording “instructions to all sides,” which could be interpreted as the irreversibility of resolution adopted by the new Soviet leaders. In the documents it sent, the Soviet Union not only provided quite concrete steps for China and North Korea to take to resume the ceasefire talks, but also clearly expressed that the aim of resuming the talks was to achieve ceasefire.76 As could be seen, the Soviet Union not only made 73

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Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press & Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 98–​99. “Sulian waijiao bu guanyu chaoxian zhanzheng de beijing baogao 苏联外交部关于朝 鲜战争的背景报告 [Soviet Foreign Ministry’s background report on The Korean War],” August 9, 1966, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1349. “Ku ci nie zuo fu he fei de lin guanyu tingzhan wenti chao fang lichang zhi mo luo tuo fu dian 库茨涅佐夫和费德林关于停战问题朝方立场致莫洛托夫电 [Telegram from Kuznetsov and Federline to Molotov regarding North Korea’s position on ceasefire],” March 29, 1953, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1305. “Sulian buzhang huiyi guanyu zhanfu qianfan wenti gei ge fang fa chu zhishi de jueyi 苏联部长会议关于战俘遣返问题给各方发出指示的决议 [Resolution of the Soviet Ministerial Meeting on sending instructions to all sides regarding repatriation of prisoners of war],” March 19, 1953, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1295–​1300.

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the decision to end the war, but also planned not to further counsel its allies. Two days later, the Soviet leaders held another meeting with Zhou to discuss the issue of the ceasefire talks. The ally’s policy and attitude apparently affected Chinese leaders. On March 22, after receiving two consecutive telegrams from Zhou, Mao replied to Moscow that Bejing was ready to respond to Clark’s proposal on February 22. He said the Soviet proposal coincided with the worst scenario solution that Zhou had proposed to Stalin during his visit to the Soviet Union last August. However, what was the purpose behind agreeing to resume the talks? How far should and could it go? Was resuming the talks only intended to solve the issue of repatriating injured pows, or pursuing larger objectives? These had to be decided after Zhou’s trip back to Beijing.77 On March 26, Zhou Enlai returned to Beijing. He immediately reported to Mao about the change in Soviet policy, and Chinese leaders soon began planning concrete steps of resuming the talks. Mao himself believed that the Soviet proposal did not go beyond the bottom line that Zhou had mentioned to Stalin, and the key was to see how far the Americans were willing to go. On March 28, China and North Korea issued a statement of willingness to resume the talks, followed by the Soviet Union announcing its support.78 On the thirteenth, Zhou issued a statement with a new recommendation on the repatriation of pow, that “both sides should guarantee that once ceasefire is reached, they would immediately repatriate all pows under control who wish to be repatriated, while handing over the rest of pows to neutral countries so as to ensure fair resolution of their repatriation.”79 The American leaders were also exhausted by now. The soldier-​turned president-​elect Eisenhower used to be Commander of Allied Forces on the European battleground in the Second World War. Before assuming the post,

77 Mao Zedong, “Tongyi suo ti zhanfu jiaohuan fangzhen 同意所提战俘交换方针 [Agreement with the proposed strategy of exchanging POW s],” March 22, 1953, in Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:131. 78 “Jin ri cheng yuanshuai, peng de huai jiangjun zhi lianhe guo zong siling ke la ke han 金日成元帅、彭德怀将军致联合国军总司令克拉克函 [Letter from Marshal Kim Il-​sung and General Peng Dehuai to Mark Clark, general commander of the UN Command],” March 28, 1953, People’s Daily, March 29, 1953. 79 “Zhou Enlai waizhang guanyu Chaoxian tingzhan tanpan wenti de shengming 周恩来 外长关于朝鲜停战谈判问题的声明 [Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai’s statement on the Korean ceasefire talks],” March 30, 1953, in Zhong mei guanxi ziliao hui bian [Collected documents of Sino-​u s relation], 2(1): 1113.

214 Chapter 3 he took a trip to North Korea and observed the military situation himself, concluding that the us troops “could not remain at a static battle front and continue to bear injuries and death tolls that have no significant bearing.”80 Besides, the United States also faced huge pressure from its allies. Clearly, ending the war soon also became the choice not to shy away from for us leaders. Hence, although they were still quite suspicious of the intent behind China and North Korea’s sudden change of policy, they nonetheless decided to resume the talks to fully understand the Chinese and North Korean position. On April 26, the talks finally resumed. On May 7, China and North Korea again raised an eight-​point new proposal. On May 28, shortly after receiving the new proposal by China and North Korea, Charles Bohlen, the us Ambassador to the Soviet Union, met with Molotov and briefed the latter about a new six-​point proposal raised by the United States two days earlier during the talks. He explained that the emphasis of the new proposal was that the United States agreed to hand over those pows unwilling to be repatriated to a political committee, which would be organized and operated based on India’s proposal to the UN.81 On June 3, Molotov met Bohlen for three minutes, telling the latter that he “can satisfactorily conclude” that the ceasefire talks would successfully end, and then Molotov continued as usual to state that whether a deal could be truly reached relied not on the Soviet Union. Bohlen grasped the tacit message and did not raise further questions, only expressing his hope that the talks would come to a successful end.82 Three days later, Eisenhower sent a letter in person to Rhee Syngman of South Korea, telling him to forego the “dream” of unifying North Korea by force, for the United States would not extend the war.83 On June 8, China and North Korea reached an agreement on exchanging pows with the United States, which completed the full agenda of the ceasefire talks. On July 27, the belligerent parties signed the ceasefire, finally putting an end to the Korean War that had lasted three years. Before signing the

80 81

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Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of Army, the President-​Elect, 1950–​1952 (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1983), 31. “Mo luo tuo fu guanyu jiejian meiguo dashi bo lun de beiwang lu 莫洛托夫关于接见 美国大使波伦的备忘录 [Memorandum of conversation between Molotov and us ambassador Pollan],” May 28, 1953, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1310–​1313. Ibid, 2:1314. “Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense [Wilson], Washington, May 19,1953”; “Memorandum of Discussion at the 145th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday,” May 20, 1953, FRUS, 1952–​1954, Vol. XV, Korea, 1059–​1069.

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ceasefire, the Soviet leaders made the remarks to China that they fully agreed with China’s positions and measures and believed that their negotiation tactics “have achieved a complete success.”84 After signing the ceasefire, the cpsu Central Committee sent a congratulations letter to the cpc Central Committee. On the twenty-​ninth, Mao met with V.  V. Kuznetsov, Soviet Ambassador to China, and articulated the military situation of North Korea, the strategic position of the People’s Volunteer Army, and the general gains and losses of the ceasefire. He believed that from a military point of view, the People’s Volunteer Army had the capacity to reach Hangang area after another year of fight, but it would also result in an over-​stretched battle front, leaving the flanks of the People’s Volunteer Army under serious threat. Then he told Kuznetsov that China had many other things to discuss with the new Soviet leaders.85 Mao’s judgment of the military situation was consistent with that of Peng Dehuai. In all, ceasefire was achieved in North Korea, but many issues caused by the war were far from over. The end of the Korean War paved way for Chinese leaders. Although Mao and Peng Dehuai had reservations about the timing of the ceasefire due to the power realities then, Chinese leaders in general found the result of the Korean War acceptable, believing that “the current situation is hugely to our country’s advantage.”86 On September 12, 1953, Mao gave a speech at the 24th meeting of the Central Government Committee, proclaiming the significance of the end of the Korean War. He remarked that they had “won a great victory” in the Korean War, which was “very significant” as it has “postponed a new war of imperialists conquering China, and postponed the Third World War.”87 Such assessment by Mao was thought-​provoking. Nevertheless, Chinese leaders soon shifted their focus to Indochina where exchange of fire continued each day, and China assisted Vietnam to resist France and thus faced huge risks of 84

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“Mo luo tuo fu guanyu dafu ke la ke han deng zhi ku zi nie zuo fu dian 莫洛托夫关于答 复克拉克函等致库茨涅佐夫电 [Telegram from Molotovto to Kuznetsov on the reply letter to Mark Clark and others],” July 5, 1953, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1316. “Ku zi nie zuo fu guanyu mao zedong tan tingzhan wenti gei waijiao bu de dianbao 库茨涅佐夫关于毛泽东谈停战问题给外交部的电报 [Telegram from Kuznetsov to Foreign Ministry on Mao Zedong’s remarks on ceasefire],” July 29, 1953, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1323. Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:304. Mao Zedong, “Kang mei yuan chao zhanzheng de shengli he yiyi 抗美援朝的胜利和意 义 [The victory and significance of the War to Resist the United States and assist Korea],” September 12, 1953, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 2:173–​176.

216 Chapter 3 another war against the us Camp. Mao knew well the strategic principle of “less will last, more will lose.” After the confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, China obtained a strategic prestige of immeasurable value; on the other hand, the geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula were more or less stabilized, with the us troops confined to the south of the 38th line and a vast buffer zone lying between China’s northeast border areas and the us troops. All these changes led to Mao’s determination not to fight the United States again, or put another way, not to offer the United States another chance to harm China’s strategic prestige.

Section 2: Ceasefire in Indochina

On September 28, 1953, about two months after the Korean ceasefire agreement was signed, the Soviet Union delivered a note to the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, calling for a meeting of foreign ministers of the five states including the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China to resolve the Korean issue and other international issues that caused international tensions such as the conflict in Southeast Asia.88 The Soviet Union also sent an invitation to China and the latter soon expressed their welcome to such a meeting. On October 8, Zhou Enlai made an announcement in the name of the Chinese foreign minister that the Five Powers “share a particularly important responsibility to resolve issues that are critical to peace and international security,” and that the Chinese government was willing to send a delegation to attend the proposed five powers meeting.89 As early as in September 1950, the Soviet Union created the concept of “five powers” (or “the Big Five”) when it called for the five countries of the Soviet 88

89

“Sulian zhengfu zhi fa, ying, mei san guo zhengfu jianyi zhaokai zhong, su, fa, ying, mei wu guo waizhang huiyi de zhaohui 苏联政府致法、英、美三国政府建议召开 中、苏、法、英、美五国外长会议的照会 [Diplomatic note from the Soviet Union to the governments of France, UK and us on suggestion of holding a five-​state foreign ministerial meeting of China, Soviet Union, France, UK, and us],” September 28, 1953, in Zhong mei guanxi ziliao hui bian [Collected documents of Sino-​u s relation], 2:1385–​1386. “Zhou Enlai guanyu zantong zhaokai wu da guo waizhang huiyi de shengming 周恩来 关于赞同召开五大国外长会议的声明 [Zhou Enlai’s statement on consent of holding a five-​state foreign ministerial meeting],” October 8, 1953, in PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 中国外交部, ed. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao dang’an xuan bian: 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi 中华人民共和国外交档案选编（第一集）1954 年日内瓦会议 [Selected documents of People’s Republic of China’s diplomatic archives (1): Geneva conference in 1954] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2006), 3.

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Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China to draw up a treaty on strengthening international peace. By doing so, it aimed to elevate China’s political position in Asia as well as around the world at a time when the PRC was excluded from the United Nations. In response, People’s Daily published an editorial on February 28, 1951, expressing its acceptance of the concept and international regime. While the editorial on one hand continued to emphasize the “equality” idea in foreign affairs, on the other hand it also recognized that the five powers indeed had special roles and “play very important roles” in world politics, and that only upon their cooperation with each other, “world peace would be secured.”90 A week later, People’s Daily published another editorial and argued that cooperation among the five powers was “extremely important to the future of world peace.”91 On November 1, 1951, the First National Committee of the CPPCC even passed a resolution to support the Soviet Union’s proposal of a Five Powers meeting.92 Such response of China to the proposal should not be considered simply as propaganda or support for the Soviet Union. Rather, they were also a herald of Chinese leaders’ willingness to participate in the so-​called “great-​power politics.” The reason being, the heavy emphasis and favorable comments on the importance of great powers in international politics did not match the previous ideology of revolutionary diplomacy. As the logic ran, first, those comments recognized that great-​power politics was decisive, or at least very important. Next, they recognized that China had a different “identity” from other Asian countries and many other countries in the world in that China was a big power, the only big power in Asia, thus it had more important international status and responsibility. For sure, embracing the concept of “five powers” would affect Chinese leaders’ way of thinking because it showed 90

91 92

“Wei zhengqu shijie heping er douzheng dao di—​yonghu shijie heping lishi hui de weida jueyi 为争取世界和平而斗争到底—​拥护世界和平理事会的伟大决议 [Fight to the end to strive for world peace—​embrace the great resolution of the World Peace Council],” in People’s Daily, February 28, 1951. “Zhengqu zaori dijie heping gongyue 争取早日缔结和平公约 [Strive to conclude the Peace Accord soon],” in People’s Daily, March 4, 1951. “Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi di yi jie quanguo weiyuan hui guanyu zhichi wu da guo dijie heping gongyue de yaoqiu de jueyi 中国人民政治协商会议第一届全 国委员会关于支持五大国缔结和平公约的要求的决议 [Resolution of the CCPCC’s First National Committee on support of the demand of the five powers to conclude Peace Accord],” November 1, 1951, in Shijie zhishi chubanshe 世界知识出版社, ed. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi wenjian ji (1951–​1953) 中华人民共和国对外关系文 件集 (1951–​1953) [A collection of foreign relations documents of the People’s Republic of China] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1958), 2:50–​51.

218 Chapter 3 that Chinese leaders accepted the identity of “power” as a different category from other countries and such power and non-​power were defined in terms of comprehensive national power which was the basic standard of international politics tradition. Of course, more importantly was that it showed they were willing to take the responsibility of a “power.” Apparently, Chinese leaders shared a strong self-​identity in China as a big power, and they were willing to take certain international responsibilities to construct this identity, especially resolving those affairs that mattered to China’s key interest. However, such “power” identity had to be essentially constructed in interactions within the international system—​it could not merely rely on publicity or support from the Soviet bloc but instead must be widely recognized by emerging countries in Asia and other powers. The Geneva Conference held in April 1954 provided an important stage for Chinese leaders. The convening of the conference was directly related to the perception in the international community of the fact that China was indispensable in defusing regional tensions in Asia, and the outcome of the conference was partly subject to Chinese leaders’ understanding of the responsibilities of being a power and their willingness to take them. Facts later proved that the power identity was indeed affecting their thoughts on how to resolve the Indochina issue and went even beyond that. To be specific, China’s positive response to the Soviet proposal of holding a five powers meeting was not only a necessary reaction to keep accordance with the Soviet Union as an ally, but also a product of the specific circumstances when the Korean ceasefire talks began in July 1951. At the time, the United States and its followers took advantage of China’s absence from the United Nations and attempted to isolate China by resolving the Korean issue within the UN framework. Some neutral nations also tried to settle the Korean issue within the United Nations, but at the same time they were also seeking ways to help China resume its seat in the United Nations. Chinese leaders had no illusions about returning to the United Nations and they were not interested in having a try. When they decided to have ceasefire talks with the United States in June 1951, Chinese leaders believed that there was little necessity for China to immediately return to the United Nations and thus it was not necessary to link the issue to the ceasefire talks.93 At this time, the Truman Administration followed a strategy that the talks would only 93

“Mao Zedong guanyu tingzhan tanpan wenti zhi gao gang, jin ri cheng dian 毛泽东关于 停战谈判问题致高岗、金日成电 [Telgram from Mao Zedong to Gao Gang and Kim Il-​sung on the ceasefire talks],” June 13, 1951, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 2:313–​314.

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concentrate on reaching ceasefire and would not cover issues such as withdrawal of foreign troops from the Korean Peninsula and post-​war political arrangement. Chinese leaders accepted the negotiation agenda then, but later when they were about to sign the ceasefire agreement, they had to consider how to resolve the political issue in postwar Korea. The Chinese leadership reiterated for many times after the talks began that China would never accept any resolution to the Korean issue without its participation, including any political resolution that might be passed by the United Nations. China also made contact with the United States through third party on convening a meeting to resolve the political issue. In his telegram to Stalin November 14, 1951, Mao proposed to convene a meeting attended by “the Soviet Union, China, the United States, and the United Kingdom” to settle the Korean political issue.94 In August 1952, Zhou discussed with Stalin in Moscow about the Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s proposal of convening a meeting of the Big Five (the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom, and France) to settle the Korean political issue. They both agreed that regardless of Nehru’s intention, China and the Soviet Union “should support this proposal.”95 This was the first time for China and the Soviet Union to reach consensus face to face on convening a conference of the Big Five. After the death of Stalin, while Soviet leaders actively pushed for the Korean ceasefire talks, it did not neglect resolving the postwar political issue, which apparently provided an important common ground and foundation for China and the Soviet Union to act in concert in the ceasefire talks. In its negotiation plan delivered to China and North Korea, the new Soviet leadership argued that resuming the ceasefire talks should help resume China’s legitimate seat in the United Nations.96 By doing so, they showed that the Soviet Union would not neglect China’s long-​term interest when peace was restored in Korea. As Molotov pointed out in a public statement, signing the Korean ceasefire

94

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“Mao Zedong guanyu chaoxian tingzhan tanpan he zhongguo guonei qingkuang deng wenti zhi shi da lin dian 毛泽东关于朝鲜停战谈判和中国国内情况等问题致史达 林电 [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin on the Korean ceasefire talks and China’s domestic situation],” in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1103. “Shi da lin yu zhou enlai de huitan jilu 史达林与周恩来的会谈记录 [Minutes of conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai],” September 19, 1952, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1129. “Sulian buzhang huiyi guanyu zhanfu qianfan wenti gei ge fang fa chu zhishi de jueyi [Resolution of Soviet Ministerial Meeting on sending instructions to all sides regarding repatriation of POW],” March 19, 1953, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1298.

220 Chapter 3 agreement should help in China’s return to the United Nations, or otherwise “the possibility that international security and overall peace would be strengthened in the right way will be lost.”97 Based on the consensus above, Mao sent an urgent telegram to the new leadership in Moscow just two days after the Korean ceasefire agreement was signed, informing them that China had many relevant matters to discuss with them and in ten days would send them a proposal with many measures and plans.98 It was no wonder that Mao was anxious and worried, for after all, everything was still a blank check before the beginning of the five powers meeting. China had made concessions for the Korean ceasefire and that needed to see returns, and just as the iron principle in any politics ran, any short-​term costs paid need to be compensated in time. It is certain that the Soviet Union again proposed the convening of the Big Five meeting on September 28, 1953 to deliver its promise to China. On the twenty-​ninth, Gromyko spent fifteen minutes informing Zhang Wentian, the Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, that in response to the note by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to convene a meeting of four-​state foreign ministers, the Soviet Union replied yesterday that it was necessary to convene another five-​state meeting that included China. The meeting would “discuss possible ways to defuse international tensions,” including solving the problems in Asia, whereas the meeting of the four-​state foreign ministers only needed to cover the German issue.99 By dividing the topics into Asian and European, the Soviet Union aimed to compel the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, or rather to cajole the United Kingdom and France, to accept its proposal of convening a meeting of five-​state foreign ministers. The reason was that it would be impossible to settle any hot issues in East Asia without China’s participation; at the same time, for the United Kingdom and

97

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“Mo luo tuo fu guanyu chaoxian wenti de shengming gei sulian buzhang huiyi zhuxi tuan de cheng wen [Document from Molotov to Dais of Soviet Ministerial Meeting on statement on the Korean issue],” March 31, 1953, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1307–​1309. “Ku zi nie zuo fu guanyu mao zedong tan tingzhan wenti gei waijiao bu de dianbao [Telegram from Kuznetsov to Foreign Ministry on Mao Zedong’s remarks on ceasefire],” July 29, 1953, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1323. “Ge luo mi ke guanyu zhaokai si guo waizhang huiyi yu zhang wentian de tanhua beiwang lu 葛罗米柯关于召开四国外长会议与张闻天的谈话备忘录 [Memoran­ dum of conver­sa­tion between Gromyko and Zhang Wentian on holding a four-​state foreign ministerial meeting],” September 29, 1953, in Shen, ed., Chaoxian zhanzheng [The Korean War], 3:1336.

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France, the worse thing was that not accepting the Soviet proposal might even lead to a deadlock over European issues. From January 25 to February 18, 1954, foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union met in Berlin and discussed issues including convening a meeting of foreign ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and China, Germany and European security, and the Austrian State Treaty. As a result, they agreed to have a conference in Geneva on April 26 with delegates of relevant countries and their armed forces, which would discuss the political issue in Korea and peace restoration in Indochina.100 Except for this agreement, the meeting did not reach agreement on other aspects. Because on the one hand, the Soviet Union and the other three participating countries were willing to ease tensions; one the other hand, they all believed that the place where they could afford a cost was the southern tip of the East Asian continent, not the heartland of Europe. While it seemed somewhat funny that the four-​state foreign ministerial meeting resulted in that they wanted to make a compromise in East Asia, it was a real opportunity for China. Because China was an indispensable regional power in East Asian politics and conflicts here could not be settled without China’s participation and cooperation—​it was a reality and basic feature in East Asian politics at the time. There was little dispute in the Berlin foreign ministerial meeting that China was already a newly risen regional power. The problem was, however, that the United States was reluctant to be forced to have talks with China. John F. Dulles, us Secretary of State, made many efforts to prevent the expansion of China’s “international reputation and prestige.” In the draft resolution proposed by the United States, the Soviet-​proposed five-​state meeting was degraded into a meeting of many “relevant countries” to jointly discuss the political issue in Korea, whereas whether to hold “another meeting” on the Indochina issue should be later and further considered. In particular, the draft resolution specifically included a cumbersome sentence as follows: It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-​mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded.101 100 “Su, mei, ying, fa si guo waizhang huiyi gong bao 苏、美、英、法四国外长会议公报 [Communique of the four-​ state foreign ministerial meeting of Soviet Union, us, UK, and France],” February 18, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 24–​25. 101 “Sulian zhu hua dashi you jin tigong de Guanyu si guo waizhang bo lin huiyi qingkuang de cailiao 苏联驻华大使尤金提供的关于四国外长柏林会议情况的材料 [Materials

222 Chapter 3 Despite this, Dulles finally had to agree to the convening of the Geneva Conference and the United States never absented from its “observer” seat during the Geneva Conference. The fundamental reason was that the rapid development of the Indochina war against France and the Korean ceasefire granted China with irreplaceable regional influence. Chinese leaders recognized and were very glad to see the huge rise of China’s position in East Asia, for making use of the Geneva Conference to establish China’s prestige as a great power was exactly one of the goals they pursued strongly from the beginning, and this in turn silently influenced and to some extent restrained their words and actions. In their “Geneva words,” “great power” was no longer a negative vocabulary as was used in some earlier comments. Instead, the logic of classic realism such as that a state’s power determines its position and responsibilities became the mainstream of China’s description of the “Big Five Conference.” From the fall of 1953 to January 1954, major documents and statements of the Chinese government emphasized that the goal of having such Big Five conference was to enable China to participate in the settlement of the Korean issue and to raise China’s international position. The Indochina issue did not rise to the scene until the Berlin Conference began. Primarily, the Soviet Union insisted on having a five-​state foreign ministerial meeting including China to settle Asian issues, and it did not oppose that the meeting undertake the “mediation responsibility” to restore peace in Indochina.102 However, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France were ambiguous on the matter. The United States proposed to first hold a multilateral meeting on Korea and then decide on whether to hold a meeting on Indochina upon development. France placed it a precondition of inviting China to the foreign ministerial meeting as that China should give up support for the Vietnam. The United Kingdom kept ambiguous as always, proposing a conference of “relevant countries” to discuss “specific issues.” The result was, as the communique of the Berlin foreign ministerial meeting stated, that the proposed Geneva Conference would first and primarily discuss the Korean issue, while it would “also discuss restoration of peace in Indochina” with participants including the Big Five and “other related countries.”103 In other words, provided by Soviet ambassador Yudin regarding the Berlin conference of four-​state foreign ministers],” Feburary 27, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 7. 102 Ibid, 6–​7. 103 “Su, mei, ying, fa si guo waizhang huiyi gong bao [Communique of the four-​state foreign ministerial meeting of Soviet Union, us, UK, and France],” February 18, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 24–​25.

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the “five-​state foreign ministerial meeting” had turned into a “meeting of related countries.” Not until February 27, one day before the Berlin Conference ended, did the Soviet Union notify China of the progress in Berlin and it sought for China’s acceptance of the Soviet proposal. The Chinese leadership gave a positive reply.104 Apparently, the Soviet Union added the Indochina issue to the Geneva Conference in order to prompt a conference of the Big Five and promote China’s position in international affairs. It turned out, however, that the Geneva Conference spent most of its time on the Indochina issue and it became a major achievement of the Conference that all parties reached an agreement on restoring peace in Indochina. Such result was due to the situation in East Asia after the Korean ceasefire, for not only did conflicts in Indochina stand out against the Korean ceasefire, it also became a place where many historical processes converged. History often scores a lucky hit as such, for there are many possibilities that only men with extraordinary imagination could seize and they have great room to create. Primarily, the Indochina War was at a historic turning point. The war strictly speaking was a war to either maintain or oppose colonial rule, while from the military perspective it could also be defined as a typical regional conflict. The problem was that it was entering the realm of the Cold War, especially that the us policy was highly likely to turn Indochina into another battleground of the Cold War. Since the war broke out almost at the same time with the Cold War, and with France already an important member of the us bloc and Ho Chi Minh’s republic joined the Soviet bloc, they received support and aid respectively from the two opposing blocs thereafter. But the war as such could not yet be regarded as part of the Cold War. France wanted to destroy the cpv to maintain its colonial rule, whereas the cpv wanted to defeat the French primarily to achieve national independence and unity; their appeals were basically limited to the level of pursuing national independence. At first, the Truman Administration was not sure whether the anti-​French movement led by Ho Chi Minh had any direct relations with the Soviet Union. With the cpc’s victory, however, worries and antagonism gradually arose within the Truman Administration toward the cpv’s anti-​French campaign, 104 Liu Shaoqi, “Dui sulian zhengfu guanyu ri nei wa zhengzhi huiyi beiwang lu de piyu 对苏 联政府关于日内瓦政治会议备忘录的批语 [Comments on the memorandum from the Soviet government regarding the Geneva political conference],” in Jianguo yi lai liu shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 6:153–​154.

224 Chapter 3 and the outbreak of the Korean War finally and decisively provoked the desire of the Truman Administration to intervene. They decided to fully intervene in the Korean War and at the same time announced military aid to the French forces in Indochina. In the “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia” enacted in February 1952, the Truman Administration considered it strategically important to support France in fighting against the cpv. The United States should, it argued, provide financial, military and economic aid to France in order to help France “defeat or significantly weaken power of the Vietminh.”105 On June 25, the us National Security Council’s 124/​2 paper further developed the “domino theory,” arguing that the whole Southeast Asia was facing the danger of expansion by China and it was necessary for the United States to scale up its aid to France.106 It did scale up the aid as the Korean War ended: in 1953 it amounted to $568.2 million, 33 percent of French expenses in the war that year; as planned, these numbers would respectively increase to $1.313 billion and 61 percent in 1954. The Eisenhower Administration based the us Indochina policies more explicitly on the domino theory and attempted to bring Indochina into the military alliance system that the United States was establishing. They kept warning the American public and us allies that once Indochina was taken, countries in Southeast Asia would succumb to communism one after another, and the us global strategy would go bankrupt.107 With such backdrop, Edmund A. Gullion of the us State Department’s Policy Planning Committee submitted a memorandum, arguing that ceasefire in Indochina was not a good option for the United States and once the cpv controlled Vietnam, the “subversion” of all of Southeast Asia would follow thereafter;

105 “Guojia anquan weiyuan hui yanjiu baogao: meiguo zhendui gongchandang zai dongnan ya qinlue suo caiqu de xingdong mubiao yu fangzhen 国家安全委员会研究报告：美 国针对共产党在东南亚侵略所采取的行动目标与方针 [National Security Council study report:  us goals and strategy toward CPC invasion in Southeast Asia],” February 13, 1952, in Tao Wenzhao 陶文钊 and Niu Jun 牛军, eds., Meiguo dui hua zhengce wenjian ji 美国对华政策文件集 [A collection of documents of us policy toward China] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2004), 2(2): 739–​747. 106 Ibid, 2(2): 749–​754. 107 “Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, address to the Overseas Press Club in New York,” 29 March 1954; “President Dwight Eisenhower to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill,” 4 April 1954, in Michael Hunt ed., A Vietnam War Reader:  American and Vietnamese Perspectives (Penguin, 2010), 26–​27; Zi, ed., Zhan hou meiguo waijiao shi [us diplomatic history after World War II], 1:281.

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thus if necessary, the United States should consider military intervention.108 Three days later, Dulles held a special meeting on us position in the upcoming Geneva Conference. He described this conference as “a holding action” in order to provide time for the French to have a favorable military build-​up and continue the war.109 Before the opening of the Geneva Conference, the us Department of State established two special task forces to direct and coordinate on all matters related to the Geneva Conference. They proposed three principles upon request of Dulles:  first, the result of the Geneva Conference must not lead to Indochina being “placed under control of the Communist Party,” and the United States must not concede to China on this point; second, the Geneva Conference could not feature “a meeting of the Big Five,” but instead should invite representatives from other Indochina countries to participate in discussions; third, rally support from allies for the us policy.110 Then, us leaders followed to actively persuade the United Kingdom, France, and some Asian countries, asking France in particular not to make any concessions in the negotiation that the United States was unwilling to accept. Obviously, containing China was the top priority of us policy in Indochina. Ho Chi Minh’s fight against France also reached a crossroad. The Vietnamese leaders were determined to end the French colonial rule, and their ultimate goals were to achieve national independence as well as establish a large Indochina federation with Vietnam as its core. By this time, the Vietnamese troops had controlled large areas in North Vietnam as well as several places in Central and South Vietnam. Many in the cpv Central Committee were confident that they already possessed the military capabilities to completely expel the French colonials. On the other hand, however, they were also facing apparently higher risks as the United States could intervene militarily at a large scale at any time, which would prolong the war.

108 “Memorandum by Edmund A.  Gullion of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of That Staff [Bowie], Washington,” February 24, 1954, FRUS, 1952–​1954, the Geneva Conference, Vol.16, 417–​424. 109 “Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat [Kitchen] to the Acting Secretary of State, Washington,” March 1, 1954, FRUS, 1952–​1954, the Geneva Conference, Vol.16, 427. 110 “Memorandum by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom [Aldrich] to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [Eden], London,” April 6, 1954; “Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, Washington,” April 7, 1954; “Memorandum by Charles P. Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff, Washington,” April 9, 1954, FRUS, the Geneva Conference, 1952–​1954, Vol.16, 496–​497, 503–​507, 507–​510.

226 Chapter 3 In the spring of 1952, senior leaders in China and Vietnam were already exchanging opinions in secret on the Indochina peace talks.111 In the fall of 1953, China and Vietnam again exchanged views on the peace talks. On November 23, Mao sent a telegram to Ho, suggesting that the French was facing increasing domestic pressure to end the war through peace talks, thus it was “necessary and opportune” for Vietnam to officially express its willingness to negotiate peace, which would not only “hold the flag of peace in our hands,” but also “seize and expand the dispute between France and the United States.” Recalling China’s experience, Mao reminded Ho that peace talks and military fight were mutually reinforcing: “Fight along with talk, talk a while and fight a while, and do not lean toward one at the expense of the other.”112 Three days later, Ho released a telegram interview with a Swedish journalist, announcing that if France was willing to negotiate peace and resolve the Vietnam issue through peaceful means, Vietnam “would accept this motion at any time,” on the condition that “France sincerely respects the true independence of Vietnam.”113 In such way Ho expressed his willingness to talk, but his statement was overly cautious to the extent of somewhat vague. After all, it was rather unexpected to Ho and other Vietnamese leaders that peaceful resolution of Indochina was added to the agenda of the Geneva Conference. They hoped to learn about the background from China and from the Soviet Union through China. On February 26, 1954, the cpsu Central Committee sent a telegram to cpc Central Committee via P. F. Yudin, requesting the Chinese side to inform Ho about discussions at the Berlin Conference on the Indochina issue. The “other interested countries” mentioned in the conference communiqué, it explained, would include the Socialist Democratic Republic of Vietnam and “the three puppet governments of Vietnam’s Bao Dai, Cambodia, and Laos.” The telegram said it believed that the cpc Central Committee would agree to the

111 Liu Shaoqi, “Zhongyang guanyu yuenan jinhou gongzuo tichu yixie jianyi wenti gei luo guibo de dianbao 中央关于越南今后工作提出一些建议问题给罗贵波的电报 [Tele­ gram from the CPC Central Committee to Luo Guibo on a few sugesstions to future work on Vietnam],” in Jianguo yi lai liu shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 4:125. 112 “Mao Zedong zhi hu zhi ming dian [Telegram from Mao Zedong to Ho Chi Minh],” November 23, 1953, in Pang, ed., Mao Zedong zhuan 1949–​1976 [Biography of Mao Zedong], 1:552–​553. 113 Ho Chi Minh, “Da yige jizhe wen 答一个记者问 [Response to a correspondent’s questions],” in Hu Zhiming xuan ji 胡志明选集 [Selected Works of Ho Chi Minh] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1962), 263.

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Soviet opinion, and it was hoping to learn about the opinions of “Vietnamese friends.”114 On March 6, Zhang Wentian met with Molotov and told the latter that Ho hoped to visit Moscow. Molotov replied that he had to ask for instructions before any decision was made, but it would be fine if Chinese, North Korean, and Vietnamese representatives came to visit the Soviet Union in mid-​April.115 It seemed that the Soviet Union was yet ready to receive Ho, or at least it had not thought about listening directly and closely to Vietnam’s views. Moscow did not want to be involved in Indochina conflicts or take any actions that would show a close relationship with Vietnam. At this point, what it wanted was taking advantage of the dispute between France and other countries such as the United Kingdom and Germany to impede the proposed establishment of a European Defense Community, as well as to help the French Communist Party to prevent an embarrassing situation in legislative elections. China faced choices, too: either it could continue to support Vietnam and risks us military intervention that could lead to another Korean War; or, it could choose to negotiate ceasefire soon. The latter would not only avoid us military intervention but also stabilize the southwest border areas, as well as pacify a large batch of Asian neighbors as was later proven. It could be seen from the timing and content of the Soviet briefing to China of the discussions at the Berlin Conference, that the Soviets had not discussed carefully and fully with Chinese leaders on how to solve the Indochina issue, and the latter had insufficient time to consider whether such issue should be included on the agenda of the Geneva Conference and to exchange full views with the Soviet Union. But this is what diplomacy is, especially in special times, for more often there is hardly enough time for whoever is involved to get fully prepared, and many circumstances arose in such hurries. On February 27, one day after receiving the communique of the Berlin Conference through Yudin, Chinese leaders began to work out the guidelines of attending the Geneva Conference. They raised two questions to the Soviet

114 “Telegram, Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee (CPUS CC) to CPC (Chinese Communist Party) Central Committee, via Soviet Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Comrade (Pavel F) Yudin,” 26 February 1954, CWIHP, 2008, Issue 16, 12. 115 “Zhu sulian dashi zhang wentian guanyu sulian waizhang mo luo tuo fu huiwuqingkuang zhi waijiao bu bing bao zhou enlai ji zhongyang dian 驻苏联大使张闻天关于与苏联 外长莫洛托夫会晤情况致外交部并报周恩来及中央电 [Telegram from PRC ambassador in Moscow Zhang Wentian to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhou Enlai, and the CPC Central Committee on the meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov],” March 6, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 12.

228 Chapter 3 Union. The first was whether the Geneva Conference would be attended by foreign ministers of the Big Five throughout the duration of the conference. They obviously cared about whether the conference would reach a de facto level of big powers. The second question was whether the conference agenda could change. On March 2, Yudin forwarded the reply of Soviet leaders: the first stage of the Conference would definitely be a meeting of the Big Five’s foreign ministers, while the rest of the conference would “appear” not but would still be of ministerial level. Regarding the conference agenda, the Soviet side said, “better not make much suggestion,” but procedure-​wise one could “expect” that the Korean issue be discussed first. Finally, it hoped that China could announce its acceptance of the invitation in two or three days.116 The Soviet leaders’ reply was hardly very explicit, and China had to make great efforts to achieve its own goals. Two days later, on March 4, the Chinese government announced its acceptance of the invitation to attend the Geneva Conference. On March 2, the Secretariat of the cpc Central Committee approved the “Preliminary Opinions about the Assessment of and Preparation for the Geneva Conference,” which was prepared under Zhou’s leadership. The document regarded the upcoming Geneva Conference as a victory of the Soviet Union and considered China’s participation upon invitation as an important step in easing international tensions. The United States opposed such a conference, but the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had disagreements, “in particular” on the Indochina issue. The “Opinions” did not set a high expectation of what agreements could be reached in Geneva; it only proposed in general terms that China should “pursue active participation in the Conference” in order to undermine the United States of its “blockade, embargo, and expanding armaments and war preparations policies in order to promote the relaxation of international tensions.” Specifically, China should “try its best effort to reach some agreements, even temporary or individual agreements, so as to open the path to resolving international disputes through negotiations by the big powers.” The “Opinions” offered no different suggestions on the Korean issue, but its recommendations on the Indochina issue were all new. First of all, it proposed that China should try its best to make sure that the Geneva Conference would not “end without any result.” Even if no agreement could be reached,

116 “Sulian zhu hua dashi you jin jiao lai guanyu yaoqing zhongguo canjia ri nei wa huiyi de cailiao 苏联驻华大使尤金交来关于邀请中国参加日内瓦会议的材料 [Materials from Soviet ambassador Yudin on inviting China to join the Geneva conference],” February 2, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 9–​11.

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it should create a situation of “talk along with fight” in order to create conditions for final resolution. On the concrete conditions to restoring peace, the “Opinions” suggested that ceasefire in place was not as good as “a demarcation line between the east and west and a division of regions between the south and north,” and even proposed the 16th parallel as the demarcation line for ceasefire. Obviously, the Chinese side had believed since the beginning that making a south-​north division of governance in Vietnam was “favorable,” and such resolution required long-​term fight to achieve.117 Four days later, Zhang Wentian held a detailed discussion with Motolov in Moscow on issues of concern to Chinese leaders. The issues included whether foreign ministers of all five powers would attend the conference, plans to resolve the Korean and Indochina issues, and which countries and delegates should be invited, and so forth. Regarding the Indochina issue, Zhang told Molotov that the “ceasefire in place” as proposed by India and others was hardly acceptable. Molotov asked:  on what conditions would ceasefire be achieved? Zhang replied that there was a proposal of ceasefire along the 16th parallel, which was favorable to Ho Chi Minh. As to Laos and Cambodia, Zhang said that delegates of anti-​government forces in both countries should also be invited, or otherwise it would be “unbalanced.” Molotov replied that more consideration was needed, but since China and North Korea could settle the Korean issue well, China and Vietnam should also be able to settle the Vietnam issue well. In short, the Soviet Union did not plan to raise concrete recommendations, and China should represent the Soviet bloc and play the main role. Finally, Molotov agreed that delegations of China, Vietnam, and North Korea visit Moscow during April 10 to 20.118 The discussion was significant in that the Soviet Union supported China to take control of the negotiation on the Indochina issue. In mid-​March, Zhou telegraphed Ho that whatever the results of the Geneva Conference, it should “actively participate,” and he hoped the cpv to immediately organize a delegation and prepare a plan for discussion. He did not directly tell Ho that China was in favor of a division of governance between the south and north, but he explicitly pointed out:

117 “Preliminary Opinion on the Assessment of and Preparation for the Geneva Conference,” March 2, 1954, CWIHP, Issue 16, 12–​13. 118 “From the Journal of (Soviet Foreign Minister Vjacheslav M.):  Secret Memorantum of Conversation between Molotov and PRC Ambassador (to the Soviet Union) Zhang Wentian,” March 6, 1954, CWIHP, Issue, 16, 86–​87.

230 Chapter 3 If ceasefire is destined, it is better to have a relatively fixed line that could maintain a relatively intact region. In fact the line for ceasefire today could become the demarcation line in the future. As to where to draw this line, it would depend on the military situation in Vietnam, with the principle that “on the one hand, it should be favorable to Vietnam; on the other, it should be acceptable to the enemy.” “It seems that the 16th parallel North could be considered as one of the options.”119 Not long before sending this telegram, Zhou also asked the Chinese Military Advisory Group in Vietnam: “In order to have an upper hand in diplomacy, can we organize and win a few nice battles in Vietnam, just as before the ceasefire in North Korea.” And try to stage an offensive in Dien Bien Phu early.120 During March 12 to 15, the cpv troops launched its first offensive on the guarding French troops in Dien Bien Phu, and the cpv Central Committee also began to discuss negotiation plans. On March 23, the “Task Force on Vietnam” of the Chinese delegation came up with a negotiation plan entitled “Preliminary Opinions on Peaceful Resolution of the Indochina Issue,” which clearly set China’s goal as restoring peace in Indochina through negotiation. The “Opinions” had two sections including policy analysis and policy recommendations. The policy analysis section discussed in detail various issues related to ceasefire in Indochina, as well as standpoints of the directly opposing parties of France and Vietnam. Regarding which participants should be invited to the negotiation, the Task Force on Vietnam argued that first it should substantially enhance China’s international status: “It would be best, through Soviet effort, to have the Big Five to negotiate a solution. Thus, from the start of the conference, it creates a situation of the Big Five negotiating a solution.” Next, it proposed that in addition to the Big Five, all participants from Indochina should be “3 vs. 3,” namely that the Socialist Democratic Republic of Vietnam and anti-​government forces in Laos and Cambodia versus the South Vietnam regime and the royal governments of Laos and Cambodia. If this could not be achieved, “1 vs. 3” would also be acceptable, which meant that delegates from anti-​government forces in Laos and Cambodia would be incorporated into the Vietnamese delegation, making “3” into the “1,” whereas the opposing side would be the three states. Such plan was already accepted by the Soviet Union, and particularly the cpv was also willing to represent the three parties at the negotiating table. As for

119 120

Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:358. Ibid.

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the agenda of the Geneva Conference, although the Soviet Union had informed that the consensus of the Berlin Conference was Korea first and Indochina second, the Task Force on Vietnam held that China should propose both issues to be “discussed in parallel,” namely that once the Korea agenda began, discussion also would open for the Indochina issue, so that under the situation of the Korean issue ending especially in discord (which was highly likely), negotiation on Indochina being put off could be prevented. Later development proved such measure highly necessary. In addition to these procedural matters, the “Opinions” also had a section that was the most important and most articulate about China’s intention of negotiation, entitled “Comprehensive Proposal on Peaceful Resolution of the Indochina Issue.” As the Task Force on Vietnam argued, the core of the Indochina negotiation includes two parts: “military ceasefire” and “political resolution.” France could have two choices. One was proposing a package solution of both ceasefire and the political issue; the other was proposing to negotiate only over ceasefire but without political resolution. And France was more likely to propose the former. The Vietnamese side, however, might prefer unconditional ceasefire in place, namely “ceasefire first and negotiation second.” The Task Force on Vietnam recommended that the Chinese side should propose a “comprehensive plan” that covers both military ceasefire and political resolution, and that should “make sense” in content. By doing so, the proposal would reach agreement with the French proposal and at the same time settle the differences with Vietnam, which “would be good for us.” On military ceasefire, the Task Force on Vietnam articulated in substantial detail the possible proposals of France and Vietnam. France had four options for its proposal: 1) establish an uninhabited zone in the Red River Delta, the Vietnamese troops withdraw from Laos and Cambodia, demarcate central Vietnam for both sides to station troops, and the cpv withdraw from or disarm in southern Vietnam; 2) the Vietnamese troops withdraw from Laos and Cambodia, and both sides make ceasefire in place; 3) the Vietnamese troops withdraw from Cambodia, make ceasefire in place in Laos, the Vietnamese troops withdraw from southern and central Vietnam, and make ceasefire in place in northern Vietnam; 4) all areas have ceasefire in place. The first option would be the highest price France could ask for, while the last one could be exploratory. Vietnam’s proposal was to restore the situation to what it was before December 19, 1946, so that the cpv would take control of large intact areas in northern and central Vietnam together with the most important economic resources. But the biggest problem was that the proposal was unrealistic and

232 Chapter 3 impossible for France to accept, thus “there seems no need to propose it.” The Task Force on Vietnam also speculated “ceasefire along the 16th line.” The upside was the cpv could control all areas north of the 16th line with more than ten million in population. The down side was it had to give up southern Vietnam, Cambodia, and small areas of land in Laos. “In particular, this would create a partition of the Indochina Peninsula in appearance, which probably could not be tolerated by common people.” Thus, it would not be appropriate for China to “be the first to propose” this option. Instead, the Task Force on Vietnam recommended “ceasefire in place and make adjustments,” drawing one or a few military demarcation lines through negotiation. The adjustments could be exchanging large trunks of land, focusing on controlling the Red River Delta; or it could be “small adjustments,” namely swapping minor areas or making specific adjustments in place. While the war against France began in the south and Vietnam was thus reluctant to withdraw from its bases in South Vietnam, it “would be against our interest if we make no adjustments at all.” On the part of political resolution, the Task Force on Vietnam believed it was necessary to tightly hold “the banners of peace, independence, democracy, and unification,” to satisfy the cpv’s dream of establishing an Indochina Federation, and thus it proposed: “The three countries after unification should form an Indochina Federation.” Moreover, in order to “lull” France, it could be raised that the Indochina Federation join the French Union, but “it would not be appropriate for our side to propose it first.” To sum up, the Task Force on Vietnam proposed “preliminary opinions” that included: the “3 vs 1” proposal on the participants of the three Indochina countries, pursue “creating a situation of the Big Five negotiating from the start,” seek to negotiate over Korea and Indochina in parallel, and so on. On ceasefire, first propose “ceasefire in place and make adjustments,” and “create a situation of talk along with fight that develops in our favor.” The most ideal plan was division of governance along the North 16th line, but “there is no possibility at present and it would not be appropriate for our side to propose.” The recommendations on political resolution were not much different from the above analyses.121 On the twenty-​fourth, the Task Force on Vietnam drafted another document entitled “Comprehensive Proposal on Peaceful Resolution of the Indochina

121 “Heping jiejue yindu zhina wenti de chubu yijian 和平解决印度支那问题的初步意见 [Preliminary opinions about peace settlement of Indochina],” March 23, 1954, PRCFMA 206-​00057-​03, 67–​92.

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Issue,” which added “ceasefire in place” in its content.122 After discussion with the Vietnamese side, it was finalized as “Proposal on Restoring Peace in Indochina,” which further elaborated on the content of “make adjustments.”123 However, the Task Force on Vietnam carefully compared the proposal of “ceasefire in place and make adjustments” with the proposal of demarcation between the east and west and division of governance between the south and north. It believed that while the first proposal had its benefits, it required conditions of political settlement to go together, namely, if it could be secured that “an election be held in Vietnam’s favor,” then ceasefire in place could be accepted. But if the ceasefire was merely a strategy used by France to buy more time for the next offensive, then ceasefire with division of governance between the south and north should be pursued. In addition, ceasefire in Laos and Cambodia needed further discussion based on concrete circumstances, and therefore, “the fight must be fierce and long-​lasting.”124 These two documents, “Preliminary Opinions on the Assessment of and Preparation for the Geneva Conference” passed by the cpc Politburo on March 2, and the “Preliminary Opinions on Peaceful Resolution of the Indochina Issue” prepared by the Chinese delegation on March 23, were two important documents as they reflected the basic ideas and characteristics of Chinese leaders on solving the Indochina issue. As can be seen from the communication between China and the Soviet Union, Chinese leaders did not learn fully about discussions at the Berlin Conference and based their decision on their own judgment of the situation, which was that there was severe divergence among the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as the United Kingdom and France were reluctant to be further swamped in Southeast Asia whereas the United States was still attempting to intervene militarily. Moreover, these two documents clearly showed that Chinese leaders were quite confident that their major opponent in the upcoming negotiation would be France, not the United States, and France’s difficult situation in Vietnam made it possible for reaching agreement. 122 “Guanyu heping jiejue yindu zhina wenti de quanmian fang’an 关于和平解决印度支那 问题的全面方案 [A complete proposal for peace settlement of Indochina],” March 24, 1954, PRCFMA 206-​00057-​04, 57–​58. 123 “Guanyu huifu yindu zhina heping wenti de fang’an 关于恢复印度支那和平问题的方 案 [A proposal for the restoration of peace in Indochina],” March 24, 1954, PRCFMA 206-​ 00057-​04, 101–​103. 124 For the ceasefire issue, see, “Guanyu yu faguo tanpan wenti de chubu yijian 关于与法 国谈判问题的初步意见 [Preliminary opinions about negotiation with France],” March 1954, PRCFMA 206-​00057-​07, 116–​118.

234 Chapter 3 However, China had to consider more than the opponents. The relationship between China and her allies was different from that when solving the Korean issue and the biggest difficulty for China was indeed coordinating policies with Vietnam. In general, China had more leverage over its Vietnam ally than North Korea, which of course was related to the Soviet policies at this time. The new leaders in Kremlin was shifting its focus of foreign policy to European affairs, thus it would rather hand over all the dominating power over Korea and Indochina to China and it only offer assistance on the side. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was also ready to exploit the Indochina issue to bargain with France over security issue in Europe. For the Vietnamese side, the goal was clear: to achieve national unification through all means, or at least a clear prospect for unification on the horizon, as well as a commitment of the international community to establishing the Indochina Federation, in order to help realize the ambition of uniting the whole region. And their regional ambition was in fact beyond that of North Korea. With regard to the general military situation formed in Vietnam, the Vietnamese troops had indeed gained the upper hand of the battlefield, but Chinese leaders did not think that this equated with military advantage, for the French troops still outnumbered them and there was the possibility of direct intervention by the United States. On March 29, Chen Jiakang of the Task Force on Vietnam submitted to Zhou a comparative analysis of the specifics of the Chinese and Vietnamese proposals. The report’s summary of the cpv views was derived from meetings of the cpv Central Committee Politburo on March 5, 13, and 21, as well as personal views stated on March 25 by Vo Nguyen Giap, the commander-​in-​chief of the Vietnamese military, as well as the personal views of Nguyen Chi Thanh, another senior leader in the Vietnamese military. The report first pointed out that there were differences in the goals of negotiation between China and Vietnam. To be specific, the cpv Central Committee put forward during a meeting on March 12 that the guiding principle in the negotiation was “to realize independence, unification, and peace of Vietnam, and so, all foreign troops must withdraw from Indochina.” In contrast, China’s “Preliminary Opinions” on the twenty-​third set the goal merely as “peaceful resolution of Indochina” and raised a “comprehensive proposal” of both military and political issues. Combining this with the “Preliminary Opinions” on March 2, one would conclude that the main goal of China was to achieve ceasefire under terms acceptable to both Vietnam and France. Apparently, the goals of China and Vietnam were far apart. On the question of whether to pursue “ceasefire first and negotiation second” or “negotiation first and ceasefire second,” the cpv Politburo held the view

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during its meeting that the order should be “ceasefire, withdrawal, and election.” Vo Nguyen Giap held personally that “it would be in our favor to negotiate first and then ceasefire later,” because the Vietnamese troops were gaining an upper hand in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign and immediate ceasefire now would benefit the French troops. The Chinese side was “inclined to negotiation first and ceasefire second,” and considered it important to “first raise” a “comprehensive proposal” that would solve both military and political issues. On the ceasefire proposal, the cpv Politburo had unsettled views. The Politburo meeting on March 23 decided to adopt the principle of “ceasefire in place and make appropriate adjustments” under the condition that France should agree to hold a national election in Vietnam. Such proposal was in accordance with China’s draft on the twenty-​fourth. But Vo Nguyen Giap and other military generals disagreed with the cpv Politburo’s proposal. Vo argued that “ceasefire in place is extremely unfavorable,” whereas the Political Department of the Vietnamese Military believed that the proposal of division between the south and north “might be the most favorable to us,” and where to draw the demarcation line would depend on the circumstances, which would be both beneficial and “practical.” The Task Force on Vietnam had analyzed the pros and cons of such proposal in its March 23 “Preliminary Opinions,” concluding that it had both pros and cons and it would not be appropriate for the Chinese side to raise first. In terms of Laos and Cambodia, the cpv Politburo emphasized the “coordinated and close relations among the three countries” and suggested in general that Laos and Cambodia should “be settled together” with Vietnam. At the same time, it allowed for the possibility that Laos and Cambodia might be settled in different ways and suggested to “gain whatever is possible.” Vo argued that it was “desirable to have a division between the south and north” in Laos, which echoed the Chinese proposal. On the prospect of the talks, Vo argued in his March 25 remarks that it would be better to take the “second option,” which was “negotiation first and ceasefire second,” otherwise there would be a period of “talk along with fight, fight a while and talk a while.”125 Thus, Vo in fact could accept “demarcation 125 “Heping jiejue yindu zhina wenti fang’an duizhao biao 和平解决印度支那问题方案对 照表 [A comparison table of proposals for peace settlement of Indochina],” March 29, 1954 (the date of Chen Jiakang 陈家康’s delivery to Zhou Enlai), “Zhongguo canjia ri nei wa huiyi daibiao tuan yuenan zu zai hui qian zhunbei de guanyu heping jiejue yindu zhina wenti de fang’an duizhao biao 中国参加日内瓦会议代表团越南组在会前准备的关 于和平解决印度支那问题的方案对照表 [A comparison table of proposals for peace settlement of Indochina, prepared by Taskforce on Vietnam of the Chinese delegation to the Geneva Conference ahead of the conference],” PRCFMA 206-​0057-​05, 85–​100.

236 Chapter 3 between the east and west and division of governance between the south and north.” Since Vo held the position of the highest command in the Vietnamese Military, his opinions could by and large reflect that of the Vietnamese Military. It is worth mentioning, though, that since the Chinese Military Advisory Group mostly worked in the command of the Vietnamese Military and Vo worked closely with them, it was no wonder that his views on ceasefire were closer to the Chinese views. By the end of March, the Chinese delegation drafted another document entitled the “Draft Recommendations on Peaceful Resolution of the Indochina Issue,” which comprised both military and political aspects. The “Draft” prioritized “the restoration of peace in Indochina” as the number one goal, and at the same time stated that the legitimate goals of “independence, freedom, democracy, and unification” that the three Indochina countries were pursuing should be reflected. This statement demonstrated that China attempted to reconcile the different concerns with Vietnam. On ceasefire, the most important change was that the “Draft” incorporated both proposals of “ceasefire in place and make adjustments” and “demarcation between the east and west and division of governance between the south and north.” On the political issues, the “Draft” did not mention the establishment of Indochinese Federation, but gave concrete terms to the establishment of a united government and the host of election. In addition, the “Draft” also offered very strict procedures and timeline for the withdrawal of foreign troops.126 Undoubtedly, this document was drafted after synthesizing the positions of China and Vietnam as well as anticipating the possible extent of France’s acceptance. Having finished the draft, the Chinese delegation further considered the issue of withdrawing all foreign troops. On April 8, the Task Force on Vietnam provided two “drafts” of the proposal on troop withdrawal. This came after Zhou’s visit to Moscow and so both documents reflected coordination with the Soviet Union. One “draft” contained two points, which resembled Article 3, Item 5 of the “Draft Recommendations on Peaceful Resolution of the Indochina Issue” proposed at the end of March. While Item 5 proposed that 126 “Guanyu heping jiejue yindu zhina wenti de jianyi cao’an 关于和平解决印度支那问题 的建议草案 [A draft proposal for peace settlement of Indochina],” March 30 or 31, 1954 (date uncertain), “Zhongguo canjia ri nei wa huiyi daibiao tuan yuenan zu zai hui qian zhunbei de guanyu heping jiejue yindu zhina wenti de jianyi cao’an 中国参加日内瓦 会议代表团越南组会前准备的关于和平解决印度支那问题的建议草案 [A draft proposal for peace settlement of Indochina, prepared by Taskforce on Vietnam of the Chinese delegation to the Geneva Conference ahead of the conference],” PRCFMA 206-​ 0057-​05, 134–​138.

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foreign troops withdraw from “Indochina,” this “draft” stated further that foreign troops should withdraw from “Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.”127 The other “draft” included three points, the third of which explicitly proposed that if agreement was reached on the proposal of troop withdrawal, “the Cambodian and Lao troops in Vietnam, the Vietnamese and Lao troops in Cambodia, and the Vietnamese and Cambodian troops in Laos” should all withdraw back to their own countries.128 This indicated that before the start of the conference the Chinese side had considered and was ready to accept a proposal that asked the Vietnamese Military to withdraw from Laos and Cambodia, but this was a key issue on which the cpv would not make any concession for a long time later in the negotiation. In summary, according to the series of produced guiding documents, China and Vietnam had substantial differences over both the leading strategies and concrete proposals, and there were also different voices inside Vietnam. China must persuade her ally to stay coordinated in order to achieve her own goals, a task that was obviously not easy to fulfill. In late March, Vietnamese leaders including Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong visited Beijing. On March 29, Mao and Zhou explained to them the basic policies of China and in particular shared experiences in the Korean ceasefire talks.129 On the thirty-​first, the cpc Politburo held an expanded meeting and approved Zhou’s report on the preparation for the Geneva Conference. The next day, Zhou, Ho and Pham took the drafted proposal and headed for Moscow. The Soviet leaders showed much agreement to the China-​Vietnam proposal, but revealed at the same time that they believed the prospect was pale for the negotiation, and Khrushchev reminded them to be prepared if no agreement was reached. Still, Zhou informed them

127 “Guanyu chetui yindu zhina yiqie waiguo jundui de fang’an (chu gao) 关于撤退印度支 那一切外国军队问题的方案（初稿） [Proposal for withdrawing all foreign troops from Indochina (first draft)],” April 8, 1954, “Zhongguo canjia ri nei wa huiyi daibiao tuan yuenan zu zai hui qian zhunbei de guanyu chetui yindu zhina jingnei waiguo jundui de fang’an 中国参加日内瓦会议代表团越南组会前准备的关于撤退印度支那境内 外国军队的方案 [A draft proposal for withdrawing foreign troops from Indochina, prepared by Taskforce on Vietnam of the Chinese delegation to the Geneva Conference ahead of the conference],” PRCFMA: 206-​0058-​02, 34–​35. 128 Ibid, 33. 129 Li Haiwen 李海文, “Zhou Enlai zai ri nei wa huiyi qijian wei huifu yindu zhina heping jinxing de nuli 周恩来在日内瓦会议期间为恢复印度支那和平进行的努力 [Efforts of Zhou Enlai on restoration of peace in Indochina during the Geneva conference],” Dang de wenxian 1 (1997), 58.

238 Chapter 3 according to the cpc Central Committee’s policies that they should try for the best to fight for further fruit and the Soviet Union should keep in touch with China.130 This trip by and large completed the process of policy coordination among China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam, and China’s policies won the Soviet endorsement. Zhou returned to Beijing on April 12. Three days later, the cpc Politburo held another expanded meeting discussing the five documents prepared by the Chinese delegation. On the nineteenth, Zhou had the documents revised according to the meeting’s suggestions and sent them to Mao for review. That night, he had the last discussion with Mao, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping, and Zhou obtained full authorization. In the first half of April, while the Chinese delegation was consuming great energy preparing for the Geneva Conference, the Vietnamese Military launched another offensive against the guarding French troops in Dien Bien Phu, which immediately intensified the situation and apparently increased the us intention for military intervention. On one hand, news reports spouted that the Eisenhower Administration was going to send troops; on the other, us leaders repeatedly threatened to take action to prevent the fall of the first domino. They continually frightened the American public that Chinese troops had taken part in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign and “shot down French fighters flying in the air” with machine guns.131 Having announced the sending of another twelve B-​26 bombers in February, the us military received the order to deploy two aircraft carriers in waters near Indochina. At the same time, Dulles went to Europe for persuasion in person and encouraged the French to hold on. Caution and concern of us military intervention had significant impact on China’s policies. On April 19, Zhou met with Raghavan, Indian Ambassador to China, and condemned the us attempt to “invade Asia” and intention to “create bigger conspiracy.”132 On the same day, Zhou instructed Lu Dingyi who was in charge of publicity to add the following sentence to the People’s Daily 130 131

Shi, Zai lishijuren shen bian [Standing beside historical giants], 540. Coral Bell, Guoji shiwu gailan 1954 nian 国际事务概览 1954 年 [Survey of Inter­ national Affairs], trans. Yun Ting 云汀 et  al. (Shanghai:  Shanghai yiwen chubanshe, 1984), 40. 132 “Zhou enlai huijian yindu zhu hua dashi lai jia wen guanyu yazhou xingshi he ri nei wa huiyi de tanhua 周恩来会见印度驻华大使赖嘉文关于亚洲形势和日内瓦会议的 谈话 [Zhou Enlai’s conversation with Indian ambassador Raghavan on the situation in Asia and the Geneva Conference],” April 19,1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 16–​17.

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editorial that would be published in two days: “We will never ignore any armed invasion by others.”133 At the same time, Chinese leaders also kept an eye on how South Asian and Southeast Asian countries viewed the Indochina issue. During the period, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continually analyzed the situation in Asia before the Geneva Conference and paid special attention to the Colombo Conference to be attended by five heads of states. Chinese leaders learned from the foreign policy specialists that Asian countries were vacillating, that countries including India and Burma did not want to form military alliance with the United States but they all preferred ceasefire in Indochina. The Colombo Conference countries raised a proposal that in general resembled a temporary division of governance between the south and north, which said that it is acceptable to have the northern Vietnam including Hanoi under Vietnam’s control and the French troops withdraw, and so on.134 After the Geneva Conference began, Chinese leaders paid increasing attention to the Colombo Conference and it also affected some of their decisions, for after all they had a greater ambition in Asia. The Geneva Conference opened on April 26. The Conference first discussed the Korean issue, which lasted until June 15. The Chinese side had been coordinating policies with North Korean leaders since early March. Chinese leaders did not think there was any possibility to reach a new agreement, nor was North Korea interested in “free election.” In fact, the reason that China and North Korea could reach the temporary ceasefire agreement with the UN Command was because the East and West blocs had reached balance of power on the Korean Peninsula, as the United States would not make any more concession and certainly war would not break out again.135 In fact, at the Geneva Conference, the discussion on Korea led to no agreement on a single word, which threw huge negative pressure on the negotiation on Indochina.

133 134

135

Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:360. “Guanyu yazhou wu guo zongli huiyi wenti (zonghe 1 yue zhi 4 yue 25 ri yindu, miandian, yinni, ba ji si tan xun 关于亚洲五国总理会议问题（综合1月至4月25日印度、缅甸、 印尼、巴基斯坦讯） [On the premier’s conference of five Asian nations (collection of telegrams from India, Burma, Indonesia, and Pakistan between January and April 25)],” April 30, 1954; “Yi zhou dianbao di 83 qi (guanyu yazhou wu guo zongli huiyi wenti) 一周电报第83期（关于亚洲五国总理会议问题）[Collection of weekly telegrams No.83 (on the premier’s conference of five Asian nations)],” April 30, 1954, PRCFMA 102-​00212-​06, 25–​28. Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:355.

240 Chapter 3 Negotiation on Indochina opened on May 8, by which time the complicated situation on the battlefield of Indochina provided opportunities for progress of the talks. In early May, the Vietnamese Military launched a general offensive in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, which made all parties watch for the outcome and the talks on Indochina had been put off for several times. On May 7, the Dien Bien Phu Campaign completely ended, leaving the French troops with severe casualties and its commander captured. The talks began the next day, and since then France and Vietnam put forward their proposals and next came continuous debate over twenty days without any progress. The main contentions of all parties could be summarized in two categories. The first category was how to reach ceasefire in Laos and Cambodia, which included two issues. First, as France, the United Kingdom, and some other countries held, peace restoration in Laos and Cambodia should be separated from ceasefire in Vietnam. As the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault insisted, the situation of Laos and Cambodia was different from that of Vietnam as there were no local anti-​ government forces fighting on the ground but only cpv troops, thus it cannot be a package solution with the three countries together. Second, the core to peace restoration in Laos and Cambodia was withdrawal of the cpv troops, not ceasefire of two battling parties within the two countries. The Vietnamese delegation insisted, however, that Laos and Cambodia should be treated as a component of the whole Indochina issue and ceasefire should be achieved in all three countries simultaneously. The thinking and position of the cpv delegation was deeply affected by Vietnam’s history, as while Vietnam actively supported the resistance war in Laos and Cambodia, it also attempted to establish an Indochina Federation dominated by Vietnam after the war. The historic factor combined with an estimate of the military situation made the Vietnamese delegation reluctant to make concessions on Laos and Cambodia, and it would rather incorporate delegates of anti-​ government forces in Laos and Cambodia into its own delegation. The Soviet Union supported such action from the beginning, and China also thought it acceptable.136 But it turned out, however, that the Vietnamese delegation’s acceptance of the “3 vs. 1” proposal was a fundamental mistake for their goal, because it in effect admitted the independent representation power of the 136 “Zhou enlai guanyu di yi ci quanti huiyi qingkuang zhi mao zedong, liu shaoqi bing zhongyang dianbao 周恩来关于第一次全体会情况致毛泽东、刘少奇并中央电报 [Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi as well as the CPC Central Committee on the first plenary session],” May 9, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 120–​121.

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governments of Laos and Cambodia whereas the anti-​government forces were represented by Vietnam. The insistence of the Vietnamese delegation was also related to the military situation. After the victorious Dien Bien Phu Campaign, the Vietnamese delegation believed that it should try to achieve the proposal of ceasefire in place, make minor adjustments and wait for a general election, which would pave the way for unification once and for all. But the problem was that if the principle of “ceasefire in place and make adjustments” was followed, it would be almost impossible to have a ceasefire in Laos. The military situation there was so complicated that it was difficult to draw the occupation zones of the battling parties. Moreover, among the three Indochina countries the Lao government was particularly close to France, whereas the latter had stated that it was impossible to accept the cpv’s proposal. For a while, the Chinese delegation believed it “shall never accept” recommendations that settle Laos and Cambodia separately from Vietnam.137 However, its starting point of the negotiation was different from that of the Vietnamese delegation from the outset, while its judgment on the military situation after the Dien Bien Phu Campaign was also different from the cpv Central Committee. The Chinese delegation was more willing to adopt the proposal of ceasefire and division between the south and north, and in association, to take corresponding steps according to local circumstances in Laos and Cambodia.138 In addition, the Chinese delegation also changed its view on the royal governments of Laos and Cambodia as they began to realize that the royal governments of Laos and Cambodia enjoyed legitimacy within their borders. During the meeting, delegates of the royal governments of Laos and Cambodia expressed their opposition to the Vietnamese Military fighting on their soil and they sternly requested the Vietnamese Military to withdraw, to the extent that if they could not achieve this goal in Geneva, they would appeal to the United Nations. Obviously, Vietnam’s ambition of establishing an Indochina Federation was utterly impossible to come true. Under such circumstances, the Chinese delegation had to first break the stalemate over Laos and Cambodia. On May 27, after discussion with the 137 “Zhou enlai guanyu di er ci xianzhi xing huiyi qingkuang zhi mao zedong liu shaoqi bing bao zhongyang 周恩来关于第二次限制性会议情况致毛泽东、刘少奇并报中央 [Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CPC Central Committee on the second restricted session],” in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 132. 138 Qu Xing 曲星, Zhongguo waijiao 50nian 中国外交 50 年 [Fifty years in Chinese diplomacy] (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2000), 116.

242 Chapter 3 Vietnamese and Soviet delegations, Zhou raised a six-​point proposal, which centered on achieving overall ceasefire in the three Indochina countries simultaneously. The proposal suggested the talks to first focus on establishing military build-​up zones, then according to the concrete circumstances in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as well as the principle of division and adjustments, adopt different means to settle separately.139 Zhou’s proposal provided the possibility of treating Laos and Cambodia differently and thus moved the talks a little bit forward. The next day, Molotov met with Eden and they came up with a three-​ point recommendation, which included that commanders of the two warring parties should meet in Geneva while both parties should also get in touch on the battlefield; the talks should discuss the issue of military build-​up zones after ceasefire and submit report to the Conference as soon as possible.140 On May 29, all parties of the Conference reached agreement, which called for ceasefire in all three countries, announced to solve the ceasefire issue in Vietnam first, and asked commanders of the two warring parties to discuss their military deployment after the ceasefire.141 At this point, the Chinese delegation ran into an unexpected problem, which was that Pham Van Dong consistently disagreed that commanders of the two warring parties meet in Geneva, because the cpv Central Committee instructed the Vietnamese delegation twice through telegram that military representatives of both sides could only meet on the battlefield. Zhou immediately telegraphed the cpc Central Committee that day, asking Beijing to tell the cpv Central Committee that the Chinese, Soviet, and Vietnamese delegations shared the view:  “It was both impossible and harmful to refuse delegates of both commands to meet in Geneva.” He specifically mentioned that the Soviet Union “was very concerned about this.” Liu Shaoqi immediately forwarded the telegram to Ho Chi Minh after he received it, telling the latter that Beijing agreed with Zhou and the cpv Central Committee should “immediately decide and telegram its reply,” and China had already prepared

139 “Zhou Enlai zai di si ci xianzhi xing huiyi shang de ji xi fayan 周恩来在第四次限制性 会议上的即席发言 [Zhou Enlai’s impromptu remarks at the fourth restricted session],” May 27, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 136–​139. 140 Jianguo yi lai liu shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 6:259. 141 “Zhou Enlai guanyu di ba ci xianzhi xing huiyi qingkuang zhi mao zedong, liu shaoqi bing bao zhongyang de dianbao 周恩来关于第八次限制性会议情况致毛泽东、刘少奇 并报中央的电报 [Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CPC Central Committee on the eighth restricted session],” May 30, 1954, in Geneva conference in 1954, 139–​140; Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:370.

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a plane to carry Vietnamese military representatives to Geneva.142 While there was no doubt about the cpc Central Committee’s view, this incident revealed that the decision-​making structure formed among China and its allies could cause inability to take actions whereas negotiation sometimes could not afford hesitation. China had to obtain decision power in Geneva if it was to move the negotiation forward in the direction it desired. As the Conference focused on Laos and Cambodia, France insisted on clearly spelling out the withdrawal of foreign troops, namely the Vietnamese troops. The royal governments of Laos and Cambodia sided with the French position and insisted on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. The Vietnamese side continued to deny presence of Vietnamese forces in Laos and Cambodia, whereas China and the Soviet Union offered support as planned. The Conference thus reached a deadlock. Debate over Laos and Cambodia became further heated during the open meetings on June 8, 9, and 10. Not only delegates of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France emphasized on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, foreign ministers of Laos and Cambodia also demanded in strong terms that the Vietnamese troops must leave their country. A series of incidents during this period finally made the Chinese delegation decide to make substantial concessions on Laos and Cambodia, namely that Vietnam must withdraw its troops. On the afternoon of May 30, Zhou met with Molotov who just returned from Moscow. The latter told Zhou that he had already suggested to Eden that the issue required more discussion, and so all parties can have “foreign ministers return home early” and leave their lower-​rank delegates to continue the talks. Eden had agreed and had already informed the press. Zhou replied then that it might take another two weeks to finish the job.143 In effect, Molotov conveyed that the Soviet Union had given up hope for the talks and had no plan to be tangled on the Indochina issue for long for the sake of satisfying the cpv’s demands. In particular, Molotov acted

142 Liu Shaoqi, “Zhongyang guanyu yuenan, faguo junshi daibiao ying zai ri nei wa huiwu shi de dianbao 中央关于越南、法国军事代表应在日内瓦会晤事的电报 [Telgram from the CPC Central Committee: military representatives of Vietnam and France should meet in Geneva],” May 30, 1954, in Jiang guo yi lai liu shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 6:257–​258. 143 “Zhou Enlai guanyu di ba ci xianzhi xing huiyi qingkuang zhi mao zedong, liu shaoqi bing bao zhongyang de dianbao 周恩来关于第八次限制性会议情况致毛泽东、刘少奇 并报中央的电报 [Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CPC Central Committee on the eighth restricted session],” June 1, 1954, in Geneva conference in 1954, 143.

244 Chapter 3 on his own and made agreements with the British even before consulting with China and Vietnam. It undoubtedly raised a red flag to Zhou. In the meantime, French delegates frequently contacted the Chinese side and explained their bottom line on Laos and Cambodia and the potential consequences if the talks broke. On May 27, Paul Boncour and Jacques Guillermaz of the French delegation met with Chinese delegate Wang Bingnan, telling the latter that the issue of Laos and Cambodia might be submitted to the United Nations, by which time China would have no say on the issue. Also, since “China’s interest is to prevent us intervention and the establishment of an anti-​communist treaty in Southeast Asia,” China should persuade the cpv to withdraw its troops, otherwise in several months the cpv would be facing not France but the United States.144 Three days later, both sides met again, and Wang told the French delegates as instructed, “Don’t complicate or internationalize the war.” “It is not in France’s interest to hand over the war to others.” Such logic of statement obviously did not hit home, as the French delegates claimed that in “times of danger” the intervention of the United States would be “real.”145 On June 1, when Zhou met with Bidault, the latter reiterated “if the ongoing debate continues,” us intervention might be inevitable. Zhou told him that China’s biggest concern was “us intervention and its threat to China’s security,” while Pham Van Dong was not asking to “obtain anything at the conference table that could not be gained on the battlefield.”146 It was obvious that Bidault did not make good use of his first meeting with the Chinese chief representative to further explore solutions to Laos and Cambodia. This was probably because he was distracted by the serious crisis that the Joseph Laniel Administration was facing at home. On June 12, the Laniel Administration failed to survive the parliamentary confidence vote

144 “Wang bingnan yu bao luo—​peng gu ji ji le ma zi de tanhua jiyao 王炳南与保罗-​ 彭古及吉勒马兹的谈话纪要 [Minutes of conversation among Wang Bingnan, Paul-​ Boncour, and Guillermaz],” May 27, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 261–​263. 145 “Wang Bingnan yu bao luo—​peng gu tanhua jiyao 王炳南与保罗-​彭古谈话纪要 [Minutes of conversation between Wang Bingnanand Paul-​Boncour],” May 30, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 264–​267 146 “Zhou Enlai guanyu yu ai deng, pi du er jiechu qingkuang bao zhongyang 周恩来关 于与艾登、皮杜尔接触情况报中央 [Telegram from Zhou Enlai to the CPC Central Committee regarding contact with Eden and Bidault],” June 2, 1954; “Zhou Enlai yu pi du er huitan jilu 周恩来与皮杜尔会谈记录 [Minutes of conversation between Zhou Enlai and Bidault],” June 1, 1954, both in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 239, 268–​271.

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and thus announced resignation. The next day, the French President accepted Laniel’s resignation and as a result Bidault had to return to France. Eden also said he was ready to return home. On the fourteenth, delegates from sixteen countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France convened a meeting and decided to end the discussion on Korea on the fifteenth. The Soviet Union also believed apparently that the Geneva Conference would produce no result. The Chinese delegation finally faced the choices of whether to abandon its own goals for the insistence of the Vietnamese delegation. On June 13, delegates of China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam had a meeting. They all held that the French had basically accepted the idea of drawing a demarcation line in Vietnam between the south and north, but the United States was trying to sabotage the talks by creating public opinion while the United Kingdom was planning to end the talks. Thus, China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam had to make concrete concessions on Laos and Cambodia in order to save the talks. Zhou then suggested taking two actions in the next secret meeting. First, the Vietnamese delegation should put forward a statement that the three Indochina countries “respect each other’s independence, unification, and domestic institutions,” and then China would raise a suggestion to “moderately satisfy the opponents’ demands” in terms of prohibiting the introduction of new forces and weapons into Laos and Cambodia from abroad.147 China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam had the inclination to move toward compromise. Compared to his counterparts, Zhou was more reluctant to see the conference end without any result, which would not meet China’s policies or reflect Zhou’s talents for negotiation. But the situation continued to get worse. The secret meeting on the afternoon of the fourteenth did not see any important progress although China and Vietnam expressed their openness to making some concessions. Eden said in his remarks that the divergence was simply too big and he suggested to actually suspend the meeting, allow all foreign ministers to return home, and wait for the outcomes of discussion between military delegates. It seemed that all efforts to save the conference were exhausted by this time, amidst which, however, something positive was in fermentation. On the morning of June 15, Harold Caccia of the British delegation met with Zhang Wentian. While he described to Zhang the bottom line of the United 147 “Zhou Enlai guanyu zhong, su, yue san fang cuoshang qingkuang zhi mao zedong, liu shaoqi bing zhongyang dian 周恩来关于中、苏、越三方磋商情况致毛泽东、刘 少奇并中央电 [Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CPC Central Committee on the caucus among China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam],” June 14, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 133–​137.

246 Chapter 3 Kingdom, he deliberately revealed the urgency of timing. He emphasized to Zhang that the bottom line of the United Kingdom was that the Vietnamese troops must pull out of Laos and Cambodia, on which the British delegation “would never yield.” Regarding China’s concern about the prospective us intervention in Laos and Cambodia, Caccia stated that if agreement could be reached on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, there would not be “any country that would take advantage of such agreement to establish bases in Laos or Cambodia.” Finally, he claimed that if such agreement could not be reached in Geneva, the issue would be submitted to other international occasions for discussion in which China could not participate, but the United Kingdom hoped to see China’s participation because any international conference would be meaningless without China’s participation. At this point the Chinese delegation was thinking of changing tactics but had not discussed with the Soviet Union or Vietnam. Zhang replied to Caccia that tomorrow China would come up with its own recommendations, and Caccia’s words today would be “taken into account.” Finally, they made an appointment for Zhou and Eden to meet before the conference starts on the sixteenth.148 That night, Zhou held a special meeting with Molotov and Pham Van Dong. Zhou told Pham clearly that only by making Vietnam the focus and making concessions on Laos and Cambodia could they find ways to reach agreement. The concession he meant was to agree to withdraw the Vietnamese troops after the war, and then to try to exchange for compensation on demarcation and ceasefire in Vietnam.149 Since the Soviet Union had no special interest from the beginning, and Molotov had been well prepared for no agreement to be reached, he immediately expressed his support for Zhou’s suggestion. Pham found no option but to agree by this time. On the morning of the sixteenth, Zhou met with Eden, since Zhou wanted to fully learn about the other side’s bottom line before the meeting in the afternoon and to obtain commitment of the other side to live the promise. Zhou elaborated in full details to Eden about China’s policies, that the key of Laos and Cambodia was they should become “normal Southeast Asian countries,” and that China particularly opposed the United States to establish military bases there since it “is not good for Vietnam and it threatens the security of China,” thus China “cannot leave it unattended.” Zhou suggested dividing the issue into two parts: first, to recognize the existence of anti-​government forces 148 “Zhang wentian yu ka xi ya tanhua jilu 张闻天与卡西亚谈话记录 [Minutes of conversation between Zhang Wentian and Kaseya],” June 15, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 240–​241. 149 Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:383–​384.

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in Laos and Cambodia and thus a ceasefire needed; next, to withdraw all foreign troops, including any Vietnamese volunteer troops which used to fight there. The domestic issues of Laos and Cambodia should “be solved politically” through means of democracy, whereas Vietnam “is willing to respect the independence, sovereignty, and unification of Laos and Cambodia.” Eden immediately responded, “There’s hope now, much hope now.” The United Kingdom would not want to see Laos and Cambodia to “become the military base of any country, whether Vietnam or the United States,” and “the United States does not want to establish military bases there either.” Therefore, the agreement must include “Laos and Cambodia should not be used as bases.” He suggested that Zhou talk directly to the French and the United Kingdom was willing to arrange the meeting, since the French also wanted to see Laos and Cambodia become neutral countries.150 The meeting was critical to all parties reaching agreement on Laos and Cambodia, and Zhou completed all the coordination work of changing China’s policies on Laos and Cambodia. That afternoon, Zhou spoke on the fourteenth session and proposed the above recommendations on reaching ceasefire in Laos and Cambodia, and he specifically stated that after ceasefire, “No foreign country should establish military base in any of the three Indochina countries.”151 This recommendation later became a principle that had lasting impact on China’s policies. On June 17, Zhou held a meeting with Bidault and described his talks with Eden the day earlier. He further elaborated on the concrete recommendations of his proposal on Laos and Cambodia, which included ceasefire in place in Cambodia, and “recognizing the means of military build-​up zones as solution” in Laos which were close to the borders of Vietnam and China. On the other hand, to satisfy the legitimate demands of Laos and Cambodia, the “legitimate demands” of Vietnam should be satisfied as well.152 Bidault replied immediately that the conference cannot end without result. 150 “Ri nei wa huiyi qijian zhou enlai waizhang 6 yue 16 ri fang yingguo waijiao dachen ai deng de tanhua jilu 日内瓦会议期间周恩来外长6月16日访英国外交大臣艾登的 谈话记录 [Minutes of conversation between Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai and British Foreign Secretary Eden on June 16 during the Geneva conference],” June 16, 1954, PRCFMA 206-​00005-​05(1). 151 “Zhou Enlai zai di shi si ci xianzhi xing huiyi shang de fayan 周恩来在第十四次限制性 会议上的发言 [Zhou Enlai’s remarks at the fourteenth restricted session],” June 6, 1954, in Geneva conference in 1954, 170–​172. 152 “Zhou Enlai guanyu yu pi du er tanhua qingkuang zhi mao zedong, liu shaoqi bing bao zhongyang de dianbao 周恩来关于与皮杜尔谈话情况致毛泽东、刘少奇并报中 央的电报 [Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CPC Central

248 Chapter 3 The next day, Bidault sent Jacques Roux and others to meet with Wang Bingnan and confirm China’s standpoints on two specific issues. First, in the sentence “delegates of commands of the warring parties” in the agreement, who were the warring parties referred to? Was it Vietnam against Laos and Cambodia? Second, would it be feasible to settle Cambodia first? Because the French side was yet sure about whether the royal government of Laos would agree to Zhou’s concrete recommendations. Wang Bingnan said that he would reply to Roux by twelve-​thirty, and after asking for instructions, he told Roux on time that the warring parties referred to France and Vietnam; the French delegation could negotiate directly with Vietnam over Laos and Cambodia, which China “would like to facilitate”; as to whether Cambodia could be settled first, Wang said “when it comes to solving issues on the ground, naturally there is an order of precedence.”153 That day, China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam convened a meeting, and Zhou said in the meeting to make Vietnam the focus and make some concessions on Laos and Cambodia. Specifically, demand ceasefire in place in Cambodia and solve the political issue; whereas “a division between south and north” in Laos.154 At 3:30 p.m. on June 19, Wang Bingnan had a final discussion with Roux on the detailed terms of the agreement, in which there were mainly two disputes. One was that the French proposed to create two separate agreements on Laos and Cambodia. The second was that since the French had signed an official agreement with Laos and therefore had military technical personnel present in Laos, the French argued to find concrete solutions but better not state clearly in the agreement of “withdrawal of military personnel.” After asking for instructions, Wang replied to Roux at a quarter past four as promised that China agrees to make two separate agreements as long as they were identical in content. Regarding the language of “withdrawal of military personnel,” China believed that it did not hinder the presence of French technical personnel and France could find flexible solutions. Roux asked for further accommodation and Wang agreed to ask for instructions another time before reply.155 By Committee on conversation with Bidault],” June 18, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 181. 153 “Wang bingnan yu lu en ji le ma zi liang ci tanhua jilu 王炳南与鲁恩吉勒马兹两次谈 话记录 [Minutes of two conversations between Wang Bingnan and Rouen Guillermaz],” June 18, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 282–​285. 1 54 Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:385–​386. 155 “Wang bingnan yu lu en ji le ma zi liang ci tanhua jilu [Minutes of two conversations between Wang Bingnan and Rouen Guillermaz],” June 19, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 286–​288.

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this time, Molotov and Eden had already reached consensus on the language of the agreement during their meeting. During the last meeting of the day, all parties finally reached the “Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos and Cambodia.” It made the Geneva Conference alive again, which fulfilled the expectation of Chinese leaders. Reaching agreement on Laos and Cambodia was a turning point for Indochina to head toward peace. It was also an important turning point for China’s policies. By successfully settling the issue of Laos and Cambodia, Zhou earned the leading position within the delegations of China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam and could therefore more effectively coordinate their policies to meet China’s strategic expectations. Moreover, upon its success the Chinese delegation also changed their stereotypical impressions of the United Kingdom and France and could make deals with British and French leaders, which sometimes could even lead to better results in China’s favor. Most important of all, Zhou confirmed in general that the United States would not intervene militarily in Indochina, nor, as he was repeatedly told by the British and French foreign ministers, did the United States have plans to establish military bases in Laos and Cambodia. It was unlikely that the attitudes of the United Kingdom and France had no influence on Zhou, and he increasingly believed that they hoped to reach an agreement. In particular, the successful settlement of Laos and Cambodia made him believe that by making reasonable compromises rather than fighting in unnegotiable manners, China could gain much better results than expected. This was also an important reason that he later more insistently persuaded the cpv Central Committee to make concessions. The second key argument about Indochina was how to draw the military demarcation lines. From the beginning, discussions focused on whether to agree on it and how to set the military build-​up zones. The Chinese delegation had conceived two proposals: “ceasefire in place and make adjustments,” and “demarcation and ceasefire between the south and north.” The former was associated with political resolution after ceasefire, namely whether a national election could be held soon. The latter was less associated with political resolution, and the domestically decided principle was to move the demarcation line to the south as far as possible, and that it could not be raised by China first. Early on it did not receive full discussion since the debate focused on Laos and Cambodia. Once the initial agreements on Laos and Cambodia were reached, however, the demarcation and ceasefire issue immediately became outstanding and occupied the focus of the negotiation. As mentioned before, Zhou met with Bidault on June 17 and conveyed important information to the latter on the demarcation issue. He repeated the recommendation to Pham Van Dong two days earlier of making concessions

250 Chapter 3 on Laos and Cambodia to exchange for compensations on demarcation in Vietnam, and he stressed to Bidault, “To satisfy reasonable demands of Laos and Cambodia, the reasonable demands of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam must be met.”156 That day, Zhou also emphasized to Eden during their meeting:  “There will not be unreasonable demands on Laos and Cambodia as long as the reasonable demands of Vietnam are met.”157 In other words, Zhou had linked the concrete plan of ceasefire in Laos and Cambodia with the demarcation and ceasefire plan in Vietnam. This was a profound transformation, because while it facilitated the settlement Laos and Cambodia, it also led the Chinese delegation to focus more on military issues and in effect formed a principle of prioritizing military issues over political issues. On June 19, in his telegram to the cpc Central Committee, Zhou explained the idea of prioritizing Vietnam and making concessions on Laos and Cambodia. He argued that by raising an appropriate and detailed proposal in military negotiation, it was possible to quickly settle the issue with France and achieve ceasefire, which was good for both the East and West. He said that all “critical issues” should be clearly explained to our allies, but since it was “not easy to reach consensus” through telegram, it was necessary for him to pay a visit to Nanning and directly meet with the cpv leaders, to “inform them about the situation and explain the strategy of focusing on demarcation.”158 Here, Zhou had revealed the idea of greatly shifting the policy, and viewing from the meetings of the Chinese delegations with other parties, the critical issues Zhou spoke of were the demarcation of military build-​up zones. The next day, he said in another telegram to Beijing that the center of discussion in the next phase would be military issues, “so we need to quickly decide on a demarcation plan.” He had obtained consent from Molotov and Pham Van Dong that after a visit to India, he would arrive in Nanning to meet with the cpv Central Committee and the Chinese Military

156 “Zhou Enlai guanyu yu pi du er tanhua qingkuang zhi mao zedong, liu shaoqi bing bao zhongyang de dianbao [Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and the CPC Central Committee on conversation with Bidault],” June 18, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 281. 157 “Zhou enlai guanyu yu ai deng tanhua qingkuang zhi mao zedong, liu shaoqi bing bao zhongyang de dianbao [Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CPC Central Committee on conversation with Eden],” June 18, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 242. 158 Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976, 1:386; Li, “Zhou Enlai zai ri nei wa huiyi qijian wei huifu yindu zhina heping jinxing de nuli [Efforts for the restoration of peace in Indochina made by Zhou Enlai during the Geneva conference],” Dang de wenxian (1997), 59.

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Advisory Group, to whom he would brief on the talks and the demarcation issue and would try to seek consensus, “so as to make progress at the Geneva talks.”159 The cpc Central Committee replied on that day, which approved of Zhou’s trip to Nanning to meet with leaders of the cpv Central Committee and the Chinese Advisory Group, as well as told him that a plane would be arranged to carry him from New Delhi to Guangzhou and then another plane would be sent by the Military Advisory Group and wait for him in Guangzhou.160 In the meantime, the cpc Central Committee also telegraphed leaders of the Chinese Advisory Group in Vietnam, forwarded the main points of Zhou’s telegram, and instructed Wei Guoqing and others to ask Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, Vo Nguyen Giap, and leaders of the Chinese Advisory Group to reach Nanning on June 28th and wait to meet with Zhou.161 Apparently, leaders in Beijing fully agreed with Zhou’s judgment and supported his decision. On June 21, Zhou made a speech inside the Chinese delegation, especially pointing out that the Indochina talks were very different from the Korean ceasefire talks, “It’s a completely new situation.” He said that the Indochina issue “matters a lot to us” and “has an impact on Europe.” He believed that the following three weeks would be crucial in determining whether the conference could reach any agreement. While the agreements on Laos and Cambodia had been reached, which had paved the way to peace, more efforts were still needed.162 Before this speech, he had telegraphed the cpc Central Committee and suggested sending Chinese advisors to participate in the talks in Indochina between French and Vietnamese military delegates. The cpc Central Committee soon agreed and believed that generals of higher ranks

159 “Zhou enlai guanyu zan li ri nei wa de gongzuo anpai shi zhi deng xiaoping zhuan mao zedong, liu shaoqi bing zhongyang de dianbao 周恩来关于暂离日内瓦的工作安排 事致邓小平转毛泽东、刘少奇并中央的电报 [Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Deng Xiaoping to forward to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CPC Central Committee on work arrangement in Geneva during his temporary leave],” June 20, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 174–​175. 160 “Telegram, CPC Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, Concerning the Meeting at Naning,” 20 June 1954, CWIHP, Issue 16, 48. 161 “Telegram, CPC Central Committee to Wei Guoqing, Qiao Zaioguang and Convey to the Vietnam Works Party Central Committee，Regarding the Meeting between the Premier and Comrade Ding,” 20 June 1954, CWIHP, Issue 16, 48–​49. 162 “Zhou enlai zai ri nei wa dui daibiao tuan jianghua jiyao 周恩来在日内瓦对代表团 讲话纪要 [Minutes of Zhou Enlai’s speech to Chinese delegation in Geneva],” June 21, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 453–​454.

252 Chapter 3 such as Xie Fang should be sent to go to Vietnam.163 Xie Fang had participated in the whole process of the Korean ceasefire talks and had rich experience in negotiation. An optimistic estimation of the prospective talks motivated Zhou to take more active steps. During the adjournment of the foreign ministerial meeting, Zhou mediated between delegates of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, facilitated a meeting between Pham Van Dong and delegates of the Lao and Cambodian governments, and even arranged them to watch the Chinese movie Butterfly Lovers, which made Pham feel great. A key meeting among all was Zhou’s meeting with Pierre Mendès-​France, who was member of the left-​wing Socialist Party in France and who just became the new Premier and foreign minister. Since a major policy adjustment was in embryo, the meeting with the new French leader would help Chinese leaders to determine their mind. On June 23, Zhou went to the French Embassy in Bern, Switzerland to meet with Pierre Mendès-​France. In the meeting, they not only reached consensus on several key issues, but also established a beneficial and trustworthy personal relationship. Zhou told Mendès-​France that China’s bottom line was that the three Indochina countries cannot become us military bases or join the us military bloc, China hopes to see Laos and Cambodia become neutral countries, and the Vietnamese Military withdraws from the two countries. Regarding Vietnam, since Pham Van Dong had suggested the idea of division between the south and north in the multi-​lateral meeting on May 25, on such ground Zhou suggested that first, demarcate two large military build-​up zones in the south and north, and then hold a free election in a while after ceasefire. Mendès-​France said he completely agreed on the two-​step plan of ceasefire first and politics second. Currently on the demarcation issue, French experts had “noticed” the suggestion of military build-​up from the Vietnamese side on May 25, and believed currently that the demarcation line drawn by the Vietnamese side was “too south.”164 Having reached consensus with Mendès-​France was crucial. Zhou was therefore more confident that a final agreement would be reached, and the rest was to persuade his allies. However, if we compare Zhou’s plan here with Vietnam’s original plan, it was easy to see the differences between both sides. Vietnam wanted to achieve the goal of national independence and unification, 163

Jian guo yi lai liu shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 6:270–​271. 164 “Zhou enlai yu meng dai si—​fu lang si huitan jilu 周恩来与孟戴斯-​弗朗斯会谈记录 [Minutes of conversation between Zhou Enlai and Mendes-​France],” June 23, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 292–​297.

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and thus no plan should lead to long-​term division within the country and they closely linked the military solution to political solution. Pham Van Dong had thus sternly insisted on their position. On June 26, Zhang Wentian made a report at the Chinese Embassy in Moscow and explained the strategy of the Chinese delegation on the south-​north division and ceasefire. He said that “many capitalist newspapers” spread that China stood for south-​north divided governance, but in fact the demarcation of build-​up zones “was only meant to facilitate ceasefire,” and after ceasefire China “proposes an immediate national election.”165 Whether Regardless of whether such statement was convincing or not, his remarks indicated that China was facing pressure with its policy adjustment. Zhou left Geneva on June 24, where Li Kenong acted the temporary chief representative of the Chinese delegation. On the twenty-​sixth, the delegates of China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam held a meeting on the military negotiation plan. Pham Van Dong mainly outlined a demarcation plan in Vietnam and Laos. He said that demarcation in Vietnam could have three options: the upper option was drawing the line along the 13th or 14th line, the middle option was drawing along the 15th line, and the bottom line the 16th line. And political, military and economic conditions should all be taken into consideration. As for Laos, Pham asked for both Upper and Central Laos whereas concessions could be made on Lower Laos. The Soviet delegate K. V. Novikov said he had no clear idea about the demarcation lines, only that the bottom line of Laos was to get the areas adjacent to the Chinese and Vietnamese borders in Upper Laos, thus in comparison, what Pham asked for expanded much larger. The three parties finally decided to learn more about the situations and wait for the decision of the meeting in Nanning between Chinese and Vietnamese leaders.166 On the twenty-​nineth, China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam continued their discussion on new development of the military talks of all parties. The Soviet delegate Vasily V. Kuznestrov said that, as he was told by French delegate Jean Chauvel, Pham’s demand during the talks of drawing the demarcation line along the 13th or 14th line was too harsh, which the French could not accept. Pham, however, avoided addressing the military demarcation issue. As 165 “Zhang wentian guanyu ri nei wa huiyi de baogao jiyao 张闻天关于日内瓦会议的报告 纪要 [Summary of Zhang Wentian’s report on the Geneva Conference],” June 26, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 460. 166 “Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao, Liu Shaoqi, and the CPC Central Committee, and Convey to Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian and (PRC Vice foreign minister) Wang Jiaxiang, Concerning the Content of a Meeting between the Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese Delegations,” 26 June 1954, CWIHP, Issue 16, 57.

254 Chapter 3 Li Kenong reported to the cpc Central Committee after the meeting, demarcation was the key at present, but it was difficult to find a solution since it was not good to make too much compromise while making too little compromise could not reach agreement. So hope the Nanning meeting could make a decision soon and inform the Vietnamese delegation.167 One could read the worries between the lines in Li’s report about the harsh Vietnamese demand, and he could only hope for the coordination between Zhou and senior leaders of the cpv. During this period, Li Kenong and others also had frequent contact with the French and learnt quite clearly about the French position.168 Those reports were all forwarded to Nanning so that Zhou could have accurate knowledge about group meetings in Geneva when he was meeting with the cpv Central Committee. After leaving Geneva, Zhou first visited India and Burma in sequence before finally arriving in Liuzhou, Guangxi on July 3, where he had long meetings with Ho Chi Minh and other cpv Central Committee leaders. During the meetings, leaders of both sides exchanged views in detail about the ongoing negotiation, the international environment and Chinese and Vietnamese policies. Then upon Ho’s suggestion, Zhou made a long report to members of the cpv Central Committee. The cpv Central Committee policies were based on assessment of the military situation and assessment of France’s intention of negotiation. In the military aspect, neither Vo Nguyen Giap nor Ho thought it possible that their troops obtain a complete victory quickly, rather it would take at least another two or three years, or even longer. Zhou pointed out that in such long period of two to three years, no one could ensure that the United States would not intervene militarily. As to France’s intention of negotiation, Vo Nguyen Giap argued that the French wanted to use the ceasefire to regroup its forces and seek a favorable military situation. It was very different from the impression Zhou had obtained in Geneva. Then Vo Nguyen Giap and Wei

167 “Telegram, Li Kenong to Mao, Liu Shaoqi, and the CPC Central Committee, Briefing on the Meeting by the Chinese, Soviet and Vietnamese Delegation,” 29 June 1954, CWIHP, Issue 16, 59–​60. 168 “Li kenong guanyu chuxi faguo daibiao tuan yanhui qingkuang zhi mao zedong, liu shaoqi bing zhongyang de dianbao 李克农关于出席法国代表团宴会情况致毛泽东、刘少 奇并中央的电报 [Telegram from Li Kenong to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CPC Central Committee on attendance of dinner party held by the French delegation],” July 4, 1954; “Zhang wentian, li kenong yan qing faguo daibiao tuan tanhua jiyao 张闻天、李 克农宴请法国代表团谈话纪要 [Minutes of conversations by Zhang Wentian and Li Kenong at the dinner hosted for the French delegation],” July 8, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 398–​399, 300–​302.

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Guoqing both reported on the military situation before Zhou made a long speech, which could be summarized in two points: why an agreement should be sought in Geneva and how to reach an agreement. As to why to reach agreement, Zhou’s remarks reflected the vision and thinking of Chinese leaders. He first quoted Mao’s view that the Indochina issue had been highly internationalized, to an extent even higher than the Korean War, and if no agreement could be made, it would affect both Southeast Asia and Europe that were home to over one billion people. In a word, the cpv Central Committee needed to consider the Indochina issue from a bigger perspective and base their decision and actions on the overall situation of conflicts between the East and the West. Such statement of Mao revealed that Mao preferred to see the Indochina issue from a global and Asian perspective, but it was very difficult to ask the cpv to view the issue in this light. Next, Zhou pointed out that Vietnam could not achieve national unification by force in the short term, and if the United States intervened, it could not be realized in the long term either. In particular, according to the Korean War experience, the us would intervene very quickly once it decided to, for example, only three days on the Korean Peninsula. Zhou’s final argument was that reaching an agreement was beneficial since it could secure an area of land in peaceful means, and then seek a national election, divide the Western Camp and unite Southeast Asian countries. As to how to reach an agreement, Zhou argued that the core of the problem was demarcation, and the line could be drawn along the 16th line, or even further north along Route 9; Laos and Cambodia realize neutralization, which would be crucial in preventing us intervention as well as keeping them away from military alliances with the United States. Zhou further suggested that Vietnam should take the initiative to talk to the French in order to facilitate an agreement.169 In his concluding remarks, Ho expressed his agreement with Zhou and also reminded his colleagues to change their mind, for the cpv Central Committee originally planned to “fight till the end” but now it changed to “demarcation and division.” The cpv Central Committee accepted Zhou’s analysis after discussion. The meeting decided to adopt the strategy of seeking ceasefire in Indochina soon and draw the demarcation line along the 16 line, and some further appropriate concessions could be made. The meeting passed the resolution on “the Plan and Negotiation of the Geneva Conference.” 169 Li, “Zhou Enlai zai ri nei wa huiyi qijian wei huifu yindu zhina heping jinxing de nuli [Efforts for the restoration of peace in Indochina made by Zhou Enlai during the Geneva conference],” 59–​60; Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:394–​395.

256 Chapter 3 On July 5, the cpv Central Committee telegraphed the resolution of the meeting to the delegation in Geneva. At 7 p.m. that day, V. V. Vaskov, acting chargé de affairs of the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, met with Mao. He forwarded Moscow’s instructions to Mao that China and Vietnam should take advantage of the political shift in France and resolve the Indochina issue, and Molotov himself would reach Geneva in two days and would meet with Mendès-​France before formal meetings restarted. Mao expressed agreement with the Soviet suggestion and gave Vaskov a copy of Zhou’s telegram on the meeting in Liuzhou. He further expressed his optimism about the international situation and said that Zhou would visit Moscow around the tenth, and so on.170 During this period, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France also had discussions on Indochina. From June 24 to 28, Churchill and Eden visited Washington and had discussions with us leaders on issues including the Indochina talks. They agreed to submit a “seven-​point guidelines” to the French on how to settle the Indochina issue. The guidelines included guarantee of the complete independence of Laos and Cambodia, the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, and agreement to demarcation and division between the south and north in Vietnam.171 Such “division of governance” had long been opposed by the United States, for they believed that it would accept the de facto communist invasion of Indochina. The result of the us-​U K meeting showed that us leaders in fact decided to make a compromise. On June 29, leaders of the United States and United Kingdom issued a six-​point joint declaration. Mao paid great attention to this document as he said that part of the joint declaration showed that the United States “indeed wanted to join hands with us.”172 After Zhou returned from Liuzhou, the cpc Central Committee Politburo held an expanded meeting on July 7 to listen to Zhou’s report on the Geneva talks and meeting with the cpc Central Committee. The attendees all agreed with Zhou’s analysis of the situation and recommendations of solving the Indochina issue, that ceasefire in Indochina was the focus of Asia at present, and the Chinese delegation should strive for an agreement. During the meeting, 170 From the Journal of (Soviet Charge’d affaires in Beiing) V. V. Vaskov, 27 August 1954: Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation with Comrade Mao on 5 July 1954, CWIHP, Issue 16, 88. 171 “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, Washington,” June 28, 1954, FRUS, 1952–​1954, the Geneva Conference, Vol.16, 1257. 172 Mao Zedong, “Tong yiqie yuanyi heping de guojia tuanjie hezuo 同一切愿意和平的国 家团结合作 [Unite and cooperate with all countries who seek peace],” July 7, 1954, in Mao Zedong wen ji [Collected Works of Mao Zedong], 6:333.

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Mao remarked that an agreement can be reached if the delegation shall “take quicker steps” on concrete measures.173 Hence, China’s policy on Indochina finally completed a major adjustment. The new policy was to “resolve the issue proactively, actively, quickly and straightforwardly, and under conditions of no harm to basic interest, make individual concessions in order to reach an agreement.”174 To facilitate the talks, Mao instructed the Guangxi Provincial Party Committee to control the scale of Vietnamese military actions, for as he believed: As the Geneva Conference is making progress and may reach a ceasefire agreement in July, it seems appropriate for the Vietnam People’s Army to neither scale up nor scale down its military actions but to maintain the current level … When to unleash a major offensive should totally be decided by the situation of the Geneva Conference.175 On July 10, Zhou stopped in Moscow during his journey back to Geneva and exchanged views with the Soviet leaders on the negotiation strategy. Zhou’s ideas and suggestions apparently won Soviet support as he wrote in his telegram to the cpc Central Committee that day: In light of all parties, an agreement is generally in reach if we have the 16th line as the demarcation line, allow the French to temporarily use the Port of Tourane, and allow Laos to use Route 9 as entry and exit.176 On July 12, Zhou returned to Geneva and met with Pham Van Dong that day, trying to persuade him to accept the resolution of the China-​Vietnam meeting 173 “Mao Zedong guanyu zhongguo daibiao tuan canjia huiyi fangzhen, zhengce de jianghua (jie lu) 毛泽东关于中国代表团参加会议方针、政策的讲话（节录）[Mao Ze­dong’s remarks on the strategy and policy of Chinese delegation’s attendance of the conference (excerpts)],” July 7, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in  1954], 185; Jin Chongji and CCCPC Party History Research Center 金冲及、中央党史研究室, ed. Zhou Enlai zhuan (1949–​1976) 周恩来传 [A biography of Zhou Enlai (1949–​1976)] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998), 1:189. 174 Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:397. 175 Mao Zedong, “Guanyu yuenan renmin jun de zuozhan guimo de dianbao 关于越南人民 军的作战规模的电报 [Telegram regarding scale of combat of the Vietnamese People’s Army],” June 20, 1954, in Jian guo yi lai mao zedong wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 4:509. 176 Cited from Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:397.

258 Chapter 3 and the agreement of the party central committees of China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. He told Pham to resolve the issue “proactively, actively and quickly” and can in the talks “accept measures that are slightly different from the original plan.”177 Earlier, Molotov had met with Mendès-​France who complained about Pham’s harsh and changing demands, as the Vietnamese proposal of the 13 or 14 line was unacceptable whereas the 18th line as France proposed was based on history and geography. Molotov told him that Pham’s views would change in the next day’s meeting, and since the essence of the French plan was to keep the possession of Route 9, it could be discussed in another special session.178 Obviously, the Soviet Union had exerted pressure on Pham and it proved effective. Zhou also had several meetings with French and British delegates and persuaded them to seriously consider making realistic concessions in order to reach a final agreement. On July 14, Mendès-​France met with Zhou to discuss military demarcation lines. Zhou told him that if France made a concession, Pham would offer bigger returns. By this time Zhou had realized that it was possible for France to retreat from the position of the 18th line. In the following meeting between Pham and Mendès-​France, Pham revealed the Vietnamese bottom line of retreating to the North 16th line. Mendès-​France then mentioned Route 9, Toulon, and Hue, the three places that France hoped to control. Zhou inferred in his telegram to the cpc Central Committee that day: “In fact the French want to reach an agreement with a line between the 18th line and 16th line.”179 On the sixteenth and seventeenth, Zhou, Molotov, and Pham held a series of meetings to discuss on the final agreement. During the meetings, Zhou strongly stated China’s policies that in order to prevent us intervention and prevent Indochina from being included in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, it is a must to reach an agreement and it is necessary to make concessions on

177 “Zhou Enlai yu fan wen tong tanhua (zhai lu) 周恩来与范文同谈话（摘录）[Zhou Enlai’s conversation with Pham Van dong (excerpts)],” July 12, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 190. 178 “From Journal of Molotov: Secret Memorandum of Conversation at Dinner in Honor of Mendes-​France, French Prime Monister and Foreign Minister,” 10 July 1954, CWIHP, Issue 16, 88–​90. 179 “Zhou enlai guanyu yu su, yue deng hui wai jiechu qingkuang zhi mao zedong, liu shaoqi bing zhongyang dian 周恩来关于与苏、越等方会外接触情况致毛泽东、刘少奇 并中央电 [Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CPC Central Committee concerning contact with the Soviet Union and Vitenam outside meetings],” July 14, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 233–​234.

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the issue of Route 9. Pham argued, however, that if a concession was made on the demarcation line, it was necessary to clearly set a schedule for the national election in Vietnam, which reflected the concern of the cpv toward long-​term division of the country. The three parties finally reached consensus: the military demarcation line should be drawn to the north of Route 9; the negotiation should set a schedule for the Vietnam general election; no foreign military bases should be established in Indochina; and Indochina countries cannot join any military pacts.180 In the negotiation that followed, France and Vietnam finally reached compromise and agreed to ceasefire along the 17th line. On July 21, after seventy-​ five days of discussions, all parties at the last plenary session finally reached an agreement on restoring peace in Indochina and three ceasefire agreements and issued a final declaration. us delegates refused to sign the final declaration but stated that the United States would not obstruct the peace process under these agreements. Another war in China’s neighborhood came to an end, and between China and the us containment frontier emerged another “middle zone” then named “peaceful and neutral region.” The efforts of Zhou and the Chinese delegation demonstrated clearly that Chinese leaders had gained rich experience from the Korean War and had firmly applied them in the negotiation on Indochina. They also learned enough lessons from the Korean War that when they were determined to oppose us deployment of military forces close to China’s borders, they made sure that China would not be dragged by allies into war with the United States again.

Section 3: “Fight and Talk” at the Taiwan Strait

On July 23, 1954, Zhou left Geneva and passed Berlin, Warsaw, and Moscow before returning home. He made a statement before the trip that restoration of peace in Indochina “assuaged the tensions and paved way for further settlement of other major international issues through negotiation.”181 He did not 180 “From Journal of Molotov:  Secret Memorandum of Conversation with Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong,” 16 July 1954; “From Journal of Molotov:  Secret Memorandum of Conversation with Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong,” 17 July 1954, CWIHP, Issue 16, 95–​96, 97–​98. 181 “Zhou enlai likai ri nei wa shi fabiao de shengming 周恩来离开日内瓦时发表的声明 [A statement made by Zhou Enlai before his departure from Geneva],” July 23, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 484.

260 Chapter 3 anticipate at this point that another hotspot in East Asia, the Taiwan Strait, was involved in radically heated tensions. On July 26, a us Navy airplane struck down two PLA fighter planes above the sea of Hainan Island. That day, Zhou Enlai made remarks at a public gathering in Warsaw and again affirmed that the Geneva Conference “further reduced international tensions,” but he made no mention of the fierce conflict in the Taiwan Strait.182 The next day, the cpc Politburo held a meeting in heated atmosphere to discuss the Sino-​u s military conflict in the Taiwan Strait and possible development in the future. A telegram was immediately sent to Zhou after the meeting (hereafter named “the July 27 instructions”) to brief on the decision of the Politburo meeting, which instructed Zhou to explain to Soviet leaders about China’s new policy toward the Taiwan Strait once he reached Moscow. The “July 27 instructions” went in strong wording that Mao and other leaders in Beijing believed that although the Geneva Conference had reached agreement on Indochina peace, the United States would continue to create tensions in East Asia and the United States and the Taiwan authority might build military alliance. Therefore, China still faced war with the Kuomintang regime and bore the task of liberating Taiwan. The telegram especially mentioned: After the end of the Korean War, we did not in time (about half a year late) raise the task to our nation’s people, did not in time adopt necessary measures and conduct effective work in military, diplomatic and publicity aspects according to the task, which was inappropriate. If now we still do not pursue the task, or conduct any work, we will make a serious political mistake.183 The sentence “we did not in time (about half a year late)” meant that the Taiwan issue should have been raised at the beginning of the talks on Indochina. Zhou arrived in Moscow on the afternoon of the twenty-​eighth, and the next morning he met with G. M. Malenkov and Khrushchev among others and forwarded the decision of the cpc Politburo. He told them that the United 182 “Zhou enlai zai hua sha qunzhong dahui shang de jianghua (zhai lu) 周恩来在华沙群众 大会上的讲话（摘录） [Zhou Enlai’s remarks at a mass rally in Warsaw (excerpts)],” July 27, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 485. 183 “1954 nian 7 yue 27 ri zhonggong zhongyang zhi zhou enlai dian 1954 年7月27日中 共中央致周恩来电 [Telegram from the CPC Central Committee to Zhou Enlai on July 27,  1954],” in Pang and Jin, eds., Mao Zedong zhuan 1949–​1976 [Biography of Mao Zedong], 1:585.

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States was instigating new conflicts in East Asia and this time directly against China, including its support to Chiang Kai-​shek to take military actions against the mainland, robbery of merchant ships to encroach on the coastal areas of the mainland, direct dispatch of two aircraft carriers to China’s offshore areas, strike of two PLA fighter planes recently, and most importantly, a plan to sign the “us-​Taiwan collective defense treaty.” To fight against us instigations, the cpc Central Committee would propose “liberating Taiwan” to prevent the United States and Taiwan from signing the treaty. He would issue a statement after returning to China that the Chiang Kai-​shek group was attacking the mainland’s coast with us assistance and the PLA Navy and Airforce would strengthen counter attacks; in addition, China would also seize the disputes between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, and defeat the us plan of piecing together the Southeast Treaty Organization. Malenkov showed agreement to the judgment and decision of the cpc Central Committee as well as understanding that the Taiwan issue was the primary concern of China. The Soviet Union was willing to provide Tu-​4 long-​distance bombers. Zhou also shared the new development of China’s relations with Indonesia, that Indonesia had invited him to visit Jakarta and planned to sign with China a “non-​aggression treaty.” Malenkov showed support for China to develop relations with Indonesia, that if China could reach agreement with Indonesia, the Soviet Union would help to increase as much publicity as possible. Finally, Malenkov accepted Zhou’s invitation and would send a delegation led by a senior leader to attend China’s five-​year ceremony of founding of the nation.184 It later led to Khrushchev leading a delegation to visit China. The “July 27 instructions” and Zhou’s meeting with the Soviet leaders showed that after the end of the Geneva Conference, Chinese leaders soon believed that Indochina ceasefire would not be enough and they prepared to take more active diplomatic and military actions. More specifically, they wanted to take advantage of the heating tensions in the Taiwan Strait and through political mobilization of declared liberation of Taiwan and strengthened military actions, seek to defeat the us plan of signing a military treaty with the Taiwan authority. After listening to Zhou’s report on the Geneva Conference on July 7, Mao raised that in addition to reducing tensions in East Asia, they also needed to try to “destroy” the us plan to sign a military treaty with Taiwan, by taking both measures of publicity and diplomacy such as pounding on us policies

184 “Reception of G. M. Malenkov by CDE. Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Administrative Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs,” 19 July 1954, CWIHP, Issue 16, 102–​103.

262 Chapter 3 and engaging diplomatically with the United States, to “compel the United States not to sign treaty with Taiwan.” At the time he believed that there were discrepancies inside the United States, and some people including President Eisenhower “disagreed with fighting now” and “wanted to take our hands,” and therefore “things could be done about countries like the United States.”185 Mao’s idea at this point of improving Sino-​u s relations and seeking to negotiate with the United States was primarily influenced by the exchanges between Chinese and American delegates at the Geneva Conference, while on the other hand as mentioned before, was related to the us-​U K joint declaration issued on June 29. During the Geneva Conference, not only the Soviet Union wanted China to take the opportunity to improve relations with the United States, the United Kingdom was also actively mediating between China and the United States. On May 19, Humphrey Trevelyan, the British negotiation representative to China and member of the British delegation to the Geneva Conference, appointed to meet with Chinese delegate Huan Xiang and asked a so-​called “personal” question, which was that whether he could mediate China and the United States and settle the repatriation of civilians to both sides. The latter said it required instructions before reply.186 Trevelyan’s move at least obtained us consent. Before this, on the twenty-​second, the us delegate to the Geneva Conference Smith himself expressed to Molotov the hope to discuss with China on how to repatriate civilians to both countries, and that the policy of the us government not to have exchanges with China was not appropriate. The Chinese delegation soon learned about this conversation from Molotov. On the twenty-​seventh, Huan Xiang replied to Trevelyan that the Chinese delegation “does not reject negotiation,” and that China and the United States could negotiate directly in Geneva.187 On June 3, Zhou reported dynamics of all sides to Beijing and his views toward the Sino-​u s negotiation, namely that there were still discrepancies inside the us government and it needed some more time for observation; if the 185 Mao Zedong, “Tong yiqie yuanyi heping de guojia tuanjie hezuo [Unite and cooperate with all countries who seek peace],” July 7, 1954, in Mao Zedong wen ji [Collected Works of Mao Zedong], 6:333–​334. 186 “Huan xiang yu du wei lian guanyu zhong mei liang guo qiaomin huiguo wenti de tanhua jilu (jie lu) 宦乡与杜维廉关于中美两国侨民回国问题的谈话记录（节录） [Minutes of conversation between Huan Xiang and Humphrey Trevelyan regarding foreign residents in China and the United States returning home (excerpts)],” May 19, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 379–​380. 187 Ibid, 381–​382.

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United States decided to negotiate, China would get in touch with the United States and set a location for negotiation as planned.188 Obviously, by this time Zhou had not considered about linking the negotiation on how to return overseas civilians to the settlement of the Taiwan issue. Three days later, the cpc Central Committee replied and agreed to Zhou’s plan.189 Through active match-​making of the United Kingdom, Chinese and American delegates held direct meetings on overseas civilians and studying abroad. From June 5 to 21, Chinese and American delegates four meetings in total and exchanged concrete views on both sides returning overseas civilians. With a quite pragmatic atmosphere, both sides promised to discuss again after the meetings. On July 19, Smith made an explicit statement at the official meeting of all parties that the United States was not a participant of the Indochina War and would not sign on the Geneva agreement, but it had no plan to destroy the agreement reached by this Conference. Compared with the last meeting on the Korean issue at which the United States opposed any agreement of even a single word, the change in us policy was obvious. Smith also chatted with Zhou during the adjournment that he hoped that China and the United States “can become better acquainted with each other,” and expressed appreciation for Zhou on behalf of the us head representative who returned home for medical treatment.190 Zhou’s every contact with the United States was reported to Mao word by word, and thus it was not difficult to get an impression that some issues could be solved through negotiation with the United States. With such background, Mao suggested the idea of using all means including diplomatic engagement with the United States to “compel the United States to not sign a treaty with Taiwan.” 188 “Zhou enlai guanyu meiguo yaoqiu shifang zai hua fanzui qiaoming shi zhi mao Zedong, liu shaoqi bing zhongyang de dianbao 周恩来关于美国要求释放在华犯罪侨民事致 毛泽东、刘少奇并中央的电报 [Telegram from Zhou Enlai to MaoZedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CPC Central Committee on us request for releasing criminal foreign residents in China],” June 3, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 383. 189 “Zhonggong zhongyang dui zhou enlai 6 yue 3 ri guanyu mei qiao wenti de fu dian 中共中 央对周恩来6月3日关于美侨问题电的复电 [Reply from the CPC Central Committee to Zhou Enlai regarding the issue of us expatriates on June 3],” June 6, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 384. 190 “Zhou enlai guanyu di er shi san ci xianzhi xing huiyi qingkuang zhi mao zedong, liu shaoqi bing bao zhongyang de dianbao 周恩来关于第二十三次限制性会议情况致 毛泽东、刘少奇并报中央的电报 [Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CPC Central Committee on the twenty-​third restricted session],” July 19, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 196–​197.

264 Chapter 3 Mao used such animated language of “talk and fight, fight and talk” to summarize the experience of Chinese leaders settling the situation on the Korean Peninsula, which had direct impact on their strategic thinking and was used to interpret the relations between the whole East Asian region and the United States. With regard to the Taiwan Strait, simply put, that in order to make the Americans sit at the negotiation table, there needed to be sufficient military pressure and the process could not be finished in one round. Especially in mid-​ July as the situation in Indochina just assuaged, tensions in the Taiwan Strait suddenly rose and led Chinese leaders to reach the conclusion that it was no more than another round of “fight and talk,” and only through military confrontation would the United States be forced to negotiate. From the military deployment of the PLA seizure of the southeast coastal islands, Chinese leaders intended to link military actions with actions to oppose the us alignment with Taiwan. In other words, the military actions planned and gradually unveiled during this period originally had no direct close relations with foreign policies. Regardless of whether there was the us discussion with the Taiwan authority on signing a military treaty, tensions in the Taiwan Strait would always grow and the southeast coastal campaign would always happen. Mao was simply inducing the situation to maximize gains from military actions. It is therefore very important to systematically trace the process of the southeast coastal fight in 1954 in order to understand foreign policy-​making. The southeast coastal military actions began in the spring of 1954, which included the “reaching forward of force” of the Navy and Airforce in coastal Zhejiang, fishing protection campaign in the spring freshet period, the Airforce campaign in competing for control of the air in coastal Zhejiang, the Navy and Airforce campaign to protect navigation, bombardment of large and small Jinmen in coastal Fujian, and seizure of Dachen Islands in coastal Zhejiang by the joint campaign of Army, Navy and Airforce. The military actions of this period roughly lasted till April 23, 1955. That day, Zhou issued a statement at the Bandung Conference that the Chinese government was willing to negotiate with the us government to discuss “assuage of tensions in the Taiwan region.”191 Thus roughly ended the military actions on the southeast coast. 191 “Zhou enlai guanyu huanhe yuandong jinzhang jushi wenti de shengming 周恩来关于缓 和远东紧张局势问题的声明 [Zhou Enlai’s statement regarding easing tensions in the Far East],” April 23, 1955, in PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 中国外交部, ed. Zhongguo daibiao tuan chuxi 1955 nian ya fei huiyi 中国代表团出席1955年亚非会议 [Chinese delegation’s attendance in the Asian-​African Conference in 1955] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2007), 75.

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Since us intervention in the Korean War, Chinese leaders had averred that the United States planned to threaten China from the three strategic directions of the Korean Peninsula, Indochina, and Taiwan Strait. But compared with the Korean Peninsula and Indochina, the military conflict in the Taiwan Strait was largely different as it originated from the Kuomintang-​c pc civil war and was an extension of such civil war in essence, only that it was internationalized in the Cold War system. In the spring of 1949, after the PLA achieved victory of the Cross River campaign, the cpc Central Committee demanded leaders of the Third Field Army in June to attack and occupy Taiwan, as it mattered to the security of Shanghai and all port cities along the coast.192 With the subsequent gradual liberation of the mainland, attack and occupation of Taiwan gradually became one of the PLA’s focuses of war. Especially after the founding of New China, attack and occupation of Taiwan was set as a strategic task to be finished early. The plan of the cpc Central Committee at this time was to try to stage an offensive on Taiwan between 1950 and 1951 and complete national unity.193 Chinese leaders had paid great attention to us policies from the outset. At the time they believed that direct us military intervention was unlikely, but such judgment was fundamentally changed with the us blockade of the Taiwan Strait after the outbreak of the Korean War, and it finally made them decide to postpone the planned offensive on Taiwan. In December 1950, when considering the Korean armistice talks, Chinese leaders had suggested to solve the Korean issue in a basket with the Taiwan issue and restoration of PRC’s legitimate seat in the UN.194 In June 1951, they accepted the plan of only negotiating on the Korean armistice without addressing other issues, and the Taiwan issue was eventually not listed on the negotiation agenda. For a while in the subsequent period, the Taiwan issue did not occupy an outstanding place on the agenda of Chinese leaders, but their strategic perception

192

Pang, ed., Mao Zedong nian pu 1893–​1949 [Chronicle of Mao Zedong], 3:519; Editorial Committee of Su Yu zhuan 《粟裕传》编委会, Su Yu zhuan 粟裕传 [A biography of Su Yu] (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 2007), 849. 193 Jianguo yi lai zhongyao wenxian xuan bian [Selected critical documents since founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:73; He Di 何迪, “ ‘The Last Campaign to Unify China’: The CCP’s Unmaterialized Plan to Liberate Taiwan, 1949–​1950,” Chinese Historians 5 (1), Spring 1992. 194 “Zhou Enlai waizhang guanyu 12 yue 14 ri wu jie lian da jueyi de shengming 周恩来外 长关于12月14日五届联大决议的声明 [Statement of Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai on the resolution of the Fifth UN General Assembly on December 14],” December 22, 1950, in Zhong mei guanxi ziliao hui bian [Collected documents of Sino-​u s relation], 2(1): 358.

266 Chapter 3 of the Taiwan issue was greatly changed due to the Korean War. Because of us military intervention, they began to see the Taiwan issue as one of the three strategic directions in which the United States could threaten China. Since then, the Taiwan issue was not only a matter of sovereign and national unity of China, but also a matter of China’s national security. As the Korean Peninsula and Indochina pacified, tensions in the Taiwan Strait must rise to become the most outstanding threat. The original plan of the southeast coastal campaign had no direct bearings with the us-​Taiwan signing of collective defense treaty as its main and basic content had originated from the spring of 1952. From the halt on the offensive campaign on Taiwan after the outbreak of the Korean War to before the armistice in July 1953, PLA’s southeast campaign had very limited scale and number of actions, and were defensive in nature, including cleansing of pirates supported by the Kuomintang military, air defense campaign in coastal cities, breaking of naval blockade of the Kuomintang military, seizure of some small islands very close to the mainland coast, and so on. In May 1951, the Central Military Commission recommended to postpone the seizure of Quemoy Island near coastal Fujian for future consideration after the Korean War obtained decisive victory.195 Between the spring and summer of 1952, the East China Military Area Command began to plan on seizing a few major islands in coastal Zhejiang and the war plan of occupying the Dachen Islands was made, and war instructions were issued to the Military Region in mid-​June. Peng Dehuai believed then that as China and the United States were fighting in North Korea, “when attacking on Dachen Island, the us Navy and Airforce could also participate in the war,” and therefore actions should wait until the end of war in North Korea. On July 27, Mao approved Peng’s opinion and instructed that the campaign to seize islands near coastal Zhejiang should not be implemented before the end of war in North Korea, and “it also requires cautious consideration as to when and how to conduct such campaign after the end of the Korean War.”196 195 Mao Zedong, “Tongyi zai chaoxian zhanzheng jieshu qian tuichi jiefang jin en 同意在 朝鲜战争结束前推迟解放金门 [Consent to postponing liberation of Quemoy before the end of The Korean War],” May 10, 1951, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:483. 196 Mao Zedong, “Chaoxian zhanzheng jieshu qian buyao jinxing dui da chen dao de zuozhan 朝鲜战争结束前不要进行对大陈岛的作战 [Don’t launch attacks on Dachen Island before the end of The Korean War],” July 27, 1952, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 2:45.

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After the Korean armistice in July 1953, the PLA remarkably reinforced military deployment along the southeast coast, and first engaged in the competition for air power along coastal Zhejiang. The guiding principle of this period was largely different from the military actions of seizure of islands occupied by Chiang and prepared attack on Taiwan as the nation was newly built. Around the time of founding of New China, the PLA’s seizure of islands occupied by Chiang and attack to occupy Taiwan were all targeted at the purpose of complete destruction of the Kuomintang regime and completion of national unity. But around the year of 1953, the awareness of protecting national security gradually strengthened in the strategic thinking of the PLA, and the military plan of settling Taiwan added more content of protecting national security and with growing weight. The primary reflection was the PLA’s making of national defense policies and military modernization plan. In the spring of 1952, the Chinese government began to make the first Five-​ year Plan, and Zhou Enlai asked the General Staff to propose a five-​year military development plan. the General Staff confirmed in the process of making the plan that the United States “forms the main threat to New China’s security” from the three directions of the Korean Peninsula, the southeast coast, and Indochina, based on which it proposed a Five-​Year Military Development Plan that included national defense policy and military development plan and that began implementation after obtaining approval of the cpc Central Committee in July.197 The Plan included setting defense focuses at the Shandong Peninsula and East Liaoning Peninsula in the north, and Hainan Island in the south, and building perennially stable constructions, and so on. With such national defense arrangement, the expansion of southeast coast’s strategic defense depth became an important driver of various military actions. The PLA’s making of military plan was also affected by situation of the Taiwan Strait. The us declaration of blockade of the Taiwan Strait after the outbreak of the Korean War not only led to the halted PLA plan of attacking to occupy Taiwan. The Kuomintang military was still falling apart after October 1949 and even was prepared to give up on defending Dachen Islands and islands such as Quemoy Island.198 The Korean War gave Chiang Kai-​shek 197 198

Zhang Zhen 张震, Zhang Zhen huiyi lu 张震回忆录 [Memoir of Zhang Zhen] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2003), 449–​450. Hu Lian 胡琏, Jin men yijiu 金门忆旧 [Memory of Quemoy Island] (Taipei: Liming chubanshe, 1976), 112, cited from Huang Wenjuan 黄文娟, “20 shiji 50 niandai tai hai weiji qijian meiguo yu liang’an hudong moshi zhi yanjiu 20世纪50年代台海危机期间美国 与两岸互动模式之研究 [A study on the interaction model between the United States and mainland and Taiwan during the Taiwan Strait crisis in the 1950s]” (PhD thesis), May 2006, 62.

268 Chapter 3 an opportunity for respite and revival, and the Kuomintang military began attacks of harassment in the year of 1952 that made Chinese leaders pay attention to the security situation there. On December 28, Mao instructed leaders along the southeast coast to be prepared to strike back offensives of the Kuomintang military.199 Around the Korean armistice in the summer of 1953, with us assistance and support, the Kuomintang military used the occupied islands in the southeast coast as a front centered by Zhejiang Dachen Islands and as a base to increase naval and air attacks and invasions of annoyance on the mainland’s coastal regions. Of the largest scale was between July 16 and 17, when the Kuomintang military gathered twelve thousand people and occupied Dongshan Island in Fujian. The action of the Kuomintang military was offensive and formed serious threat to the southeast coastal regions, including threat to fishers’ life and property security, production security, seaborne transportation security, and security of some coastal cities, and so on. The rapid increase of tensions in the Taiwan Strait around the Korean armistice had direct relations with policies of the Eisenhower Administration. After entering office, Eisenhower instigated and supported the Kuomintang military to strengthen military attacks on the mainland’s coast in order to open a new front to impose military pressure on China. On February 2, 1953, Eisenhower said in the State of the Union that because of China’s participation in the Korean War, the us Seventh Fleet would no longer stop the Kuomintang military from attacking the mainland.200 Such policy was vividly named as “unleashing Chiang outside the cage.” With such background, Chinese leaders defined such military actions of the Taiwan authority as a reflection of us aggressive policies of opposing and threatening China, and as new instigations of the United States due to refusal of the defeat in Korea.201 Another serious matter was that the United States began to discuss with the Taiwan authority about signing a military alliance treaty. Although both sides had disputes over whether to defend the exterior islands, the Taiwan authority believed that signing the treaty was only a matter of time as the forces inside the 199 Mao Zedong, “Jia qiang fangbei, fensui guomindang jun dui Fujian yanhai de jingong 加强防备，粉碎国民党军对福建沿海的进攻 [Strengthen security protection and smash attacks from Kuomintang on coastal Fujian],” December 28, 1952, in Mao Zedong wen ji [Collected Works of Mao Zedong], 6:250–​251. 200 “Zongtong zhi guohui zi wen 总统致国会咨文 [Letter from the President to Congress],” February 2, 1953, in Tao and Niu, eds., Meiguo dui hua zhengce wenjian ji [A collection of documents of us policy toward China], 2(1): 134–​135. 201 Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:405.

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United States in support of signing treaty with Taiwan were indeed very powerful. The discussion of signing treaty between the United States and Taiwan began exactly in the spring and summer of 1953, which was in step with us active establishment of military alliance in Asia against China. Chinese leaders were very sensitive to such us move, and at the time beside Taiwan, Dachen Islands in coastal Zhejiang and Quemoy Island and Mazu in coastal Fujian were unoccupied. If the United States included these coastal islands in the treaty with Taiwan, the us troops would directly reach the coast and form an extremely serious threat to China’s coast. In fact, that us fleet’s occasional visit to Dachen Islands occupied by the Kuomintang military already caused pressure on the PLA troops stationed in coastal Zhejiang. On October 11, Mao specifically instructed on a report submitted by the Military Commission’s Liaison Office to confirm whether the United States and Taiwan indeed “have an agreement on Quemoy Island and the Dachen and Xiaochen Islands.”202 During this period, China continually reprimanded that the us establishment of military alliance in Asia was schemed to invade China and increased tensions in Asia, and the military treaty prepared between the United States and Taiwan was a us conspiracy to occupy Taiwan for the long-​term and threaten China.203 In a word, after the end of the Korean War, the meaning of settling Taiwan evolved from completion of national unity in the early period of New China to both completion of unity and protection of national security, which provided the main background for all policy changes. Since then, Chinese leaders associated the settlement of Taiwan with confronting the us containment strategy in East Asia, and opposition to the us-​Taiwan treaty became part of the opposition to the us establishment of military alliance system in neighboring regions. Taking a step further, as the factor of national security was continually strengthened by tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the diplomatic plans and military actions surrounding settlement of Taiwan became extraordinarily 202 Mao Zedong, “Mei jiang qianding junshi xietiao liangjie xieding zhide zhuyi 美蒋签订军 事协调谅解协定值得注意 [The us-​Chiang signing of a military coordination understanding agreement should receive attention],” October 11, 1953, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 2:178. 203 “Meiguo jiajin jinxing dishi zhongguo de qinlue bushu wang tu jixu nuyi yazhou renmin he jiashen guoji jinzhang 美国加紧进行敌视中国的侵略部署妄图继续奴役亚洲 人民和加深国际紧张 [The United States strengthens invasion deployment hostile to China and hopes in illusion to continue to enslave the Asian people and deepen international tension],” March 26, 1954; “Meiguo tongzhi jituan dishi yazhou renmin 美国统治 集团敌视亚洲人民 [The us ruling bloc stages hostility against Asian people],” May 14, 1954, People’s Daily.

270 Chapter 3 complex and there was a close interaction between military security, politics, and diplomacy. The primary target of the cpc Central Committee’s opposition to the us-​Taiwan treaty was to prevent coastal islands in Zhejiang and Fujian from being included in the us-​Taiwan military treaty, which was the primary starting point of military and diplomatic actions and diplomacy supported military actions to seize the coastal islands. The PLA’s southeast coastal campaign lasted about a year and focused on seizure of the coastal islands. The largest battle was seizure of Dachen Islands, the key of which was occupation of Yijiangshan Island on January 18, 1955. There was a special background that the war plan of PLA’s seizure of coastal islands was formed exactly when Chinese leaders proclaimed, “we must liberate Taiwan” and “destroy” the us-​Taiwan plan of signing treaty. The East China Military Area Command began to consider and plan on seizure of southeast coastal islands in the spring and summer of 1952. Till the spring of 1953, as tensions rose in the southeast coastal region, the East China Military Area Command again began to make military plans on seizure of the southeast coastal islands occupied by Chiang. Since then till the early half of July in 1954, with repeated discussions, the war plan of “from small to big, from north to south, attack islands one by one” was eventually formed.204 First, gradually seize the Chiang-​occupied islands along Zhejiang and Fujian coasts, instead of attacking Dachen Islands as well as Quemoy Island and Mazu Island at the same time. Next, between the Zhejiang coastal islands and Fujian coastal islands, first seize Dachen Islands of the Zhejiang coast, and then seize Quemoy Island and Mazu Island of the Fujian coast, which was “from north to south.” Third, whether it was seizure of Dachen Islands or islands such as Quemoy Island, all start from seizure of small islands to big islands, and attack the islands one by one. Hence, the battle to seizure southeast coastal islands occupied by Chiang in fact took a “two-​step” approach. While the strategy was being considered and decided, local military actions had begun. Since the spring of 1954, the Airforce executed “extension forward of forces” along the Zhejiang coast and competed for air power with the Kuomintang Airforce; the Navy proactively went forward in the sea of Zhejiang and conducted the spring flood fishing protection campaign and had many battles with the Kuomintang Navy, and both the Navy and Airforce 204

Zheng Wenhan 郑文翰, Mishu ri ji li de peng laozong 秘书日记里的彭老总 [Marshall Peng in secretary’s diaries] (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1998), 32; Lin Xiaoguang 林晓光, “Zhongguo gongchandang dui tai zhengce de lishi yanjin 中国共产党对台 政策的历史演进 [Evolution of Chinese Communist Party’s policy toward Taiwan],” Dangshi yanjiu ziliao 党史研究资料 [Party History Research Information] 3 (1997), 3.

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gained remarkable fruits. Under such military context, on July 11, the Military Commission generally agreed to the battle plan of the Zhejiang coastal islands and Mao himself approved it that day.205 Two days later, on July 13, Chinese leaders held a meeting to discuss protection of navigation of foreign merchant ships that headed toward ports of China’s mainland. The meeting was called upon by the Foreign Ministry and foreign shipping companies which asked the Navy and Airforce to protect navigation of foreign merchant ships. It happened at times that Kuomintang Navy and Airforce attacked and kidnapped foreign merchant ships, the most serious of which was on June 23 when the Kuomintang Navy kidnapped the Soviet merchant ship Tuapse toward Port Kaohsiung. It severely harmed security of navigation as well as severely harmed China’s international prestige. The Soviet advisor thus raised the request of offering protection of navigation for foreign merchant ships, which greatly increased pressure on the Navy to protect navigation. The meeting on the thirteenth demanded the General Staff war department to make a battle plan for protecting navigation and defending territorial waters and airspace, and after the meeting publicity on military actions against Taiwan remarkably increased and the media obviously increased condemnation on the United States. On July 16, People’s Daily published a representative article on the PLA’s protection of navigation. The article claimed to “fight till the end for the final unification of Taiwan and destruction of us pirate behaviors.”206 Since this time, Mao and the cpc Central Committee began to add more complex political content to the southeast coastal military actions, for based on judgment of future situation in Asia after the Geneva Conference and the increasing tensions in the southeast coast, they attempted to use the already planned military actions of seizure of exterior islands to emphasize on the potential severe consequences of conflicts in the Taiwan Strait. The United States was also taking more diplomatic and military actions on the Taiwan Strait. The United States continually increased military exchanges with Taiwan, the us Navy and Airforce increased military activities along the southeast coast, the aircraft carriers of the us Seventh Fleet entered eastern seas of Hainan Island. In addition, political figures on both the us side and Taiwan openly declared the preparation to conclude military treaty. Karl Rankin, the us Ambassador to Taiwan, returned to Washington to report on his

205 206

Zhang, Zhang Zhen huiyi lu [Memoir of Zhang Zhen], 1:494; Wang, ed., Peng Dehuai nian pu [Chronicle of Peng Dehuai], 571. People’s Daily, July 16, 1954.

272 Chapter 3 work. On July 20, Gu Weijun, Taiwan Ambassador to the United States, returned to Taipei, and before the journey he held meetings with political figures including the us President Eisenhower. Rankin and Gu Weijun made open remarks separately in Washington and Taipei that the United States and Taiwan would conclude an alliance treaty, and public opinion in Taiwan widely held that the us-​Taiwan signing of treaty was only a matter of time. The United States also strengthened diplomatic moves at the UN of opposing discussions on restoring the seat of Chinese delegate. In the meantime, us allies also joined the ranks of perpetuating the separation of the two parties across the Taiwan Strait. On July 14, the British Prime Minister Churchill made remarks at the Parliament to “hand over Taiwan to the UN trusteeship.” Such change in international opinions attracted serious attention from Chinese leaders.207 The prevention of the international opinion of “two Chinas” from becoming unalterable became a very important reason that Chinese leaders proclaimed the slogan “we must liberate Taiwan” at this time. The above-​mentioned actions of the United States and its allies combined with attacks by the Kuomintang Navy and Airforce further pushed Chinese leaders to decide to take firmer military actions in the Taiwan Strait. On July 22, as the Geneva Conference just reached the Indochina ceasefire agreement, the cpc Central Committee Military Commission held a special meeting. At the meeting, Peng Dehuai forwarded Mao’s instructions on settling Taiwan and asked that concrete plan of settling Taiwan militarily be made. He said that Mao at the Politburo meeting criticized that after the Korean War the issue of settling Taiwan was not raised in time.208 On the twenty-​third, People’s Daily issued a commentary entitled “we must liberate Taiwan,” which reprimanded the United States and the Taiwan authority for the secrete plan of military alliance, as well as criticized Churchill’s remarks on July 14 about putting Taiwan under UN trusteeship.209 On the twenty-​fourth, Mao instructed on the battle plan submitted by the Navy that leaders of the East China, Zhejiang, and Fujian Military Regions should reach

207 “Yingguo shouxiang qiu ji er zai xia yuan guanyu Taiwan wenti de fayan 英国首相丘吉 尔在下院关于台湾问题的发言 [Remarks of UK Prime Minister Churchill on Taiwan at the House of Commons],” July 14, 1954, in Zhong mei guanxi ziliao hui bian [Collected documents of Sino-​u s relations], 2(2):1914; Yin Qiming 尹启明, Cheng Yaguang 程 亚光, Di yi ren guofang buzhang 第一任国防部长 [The first Secretary of Defense] (Guangzhou: Guangdong jiaoyu chubanshe, 1997), 197. 208 Zhang, Zhang Zhen huiyi lu [Memoir of Zhang Zhen], 1:498. 209 People’s Daily, July 23, 1954.

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Beijing to discuss the campaigns in coastal Zhejiang.210 He felt the need to more fully understand and coordinate military actions along the southeast coast. On July 26, as Chinese leaders were actively planning the southeast coastal campaigns, two PLA fighter planes were struck down by us military plane. It pushed Mao to finally decide to battle against the United States again. The aforementioned “July 27 instructions” were produced under this background, which asked Zhou to coordinate actions as usual with the Soviet Union during the formation of major policies and seek military assistance and diplomatic support. The General Staff war department followed the decision of the meeting on July 22 and soon made a draft battle plan “the Military Plan and Implementing Steps of Active Fight against the Chiang Military Gangs in Taiwan,” which was not entitled with “liberating Taiwan,” somehow indicating that they did not plan to immediately start the campaign of occupying Taiwan. On July 30 and 31, the Central Military Commission held two consecutive days of meetings to discuss the military plan submitted by the General Staff. Peng Dehuai first stated that it was necessary to raise the issue of settling Taiwan in time, but his later explanation of the guiding principle and military plan had no major changes from the aforementioned plan on July 11. On August 8, Mao approved the plan. The next day, the Politburo held a meeting that discussed and passed the plan.211 The importance of the plan was that based on a judgment that the military conflict against Taiwan would be long-​term, it took a “two-​step” approach to settle Taiwan, namely first seize the exterior islands along the southeast coast and obtain air power, and then under ready conditions occupy Taiwan. On August 11, Zhou made a report on the work of diplomacy at the thirty-​third meeting of the government committee, which mainly analyzed the assuaged situation after the Geneva Conference, but he also specifically emphasized that “we must liberate Taiwan.”212 People’s Daily later issued the 210 Mao Zedong, “Dui gongji da chen gang di jian fang’an de piyu 对攻击大陈港敌舰方案 的批语 [Comment on the plan to attack enemy fleets in Dachen Harbor],” July 24, 1954, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 2:222. 211 Wang, Peng Dehuai nian pu [Chronicle of Peng Dehuai], 574; Zhang, Zhang Zhen huiyi lu [Memoir of Zhang Zhen], 1:494, 499. 212 “Zhou Enlai zongli jian waijiao buzhang zai zhongyang renmin zhengfu weiyuan hui di san shi san ci huiyi shang de waijiao baogao 周恩来总理兼外交部长在中央人民政 府委员会第三十三次会议上的外交报告 [Report on foreign affairs from Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai at the 33rd session of the Central People’s Government committee],” in People’s Daily, August 14, 1954.

274 Chapter 3 “Joint Declaration of All Democratic Parties and All People’s Organizations of the People’s Republic of China on Liberation of Taiwan.”213 However, Mao’s remarks at the meeting showed that the mentioning of “liberating Taiwan” was more for the purpose of political mobilization. He said that to mention the issue now “is to emphasize it,” as “it won’t be a short time to liberate Taiwan” and it required the Navy and Airforce to “grow strong and thus could complete unification of Taiwan,” and so in a word “it’s a hard job.”214 In fact, Chinese leaders had decided to largely adjust foreign policies and it would be impossible to take actions in the Taiwan Strait that contradicted with the big picture of foreign relations.215 On August 31, the Central Military Commission officially issued the aforementioned plan. On September 3, the front troops stationed in Fujian bombarded Quemoy Island and thus drew open the battle of seizing coastal islands. On the twenty-​ninth, the Soviet party and political delegation led by the General Secretary of the cpsu Central Committee Khrushchev arrived in Beijing as expected and attended the five-​year celebration ceremony of the nation and paid a state visit. The meeting between leaders of both countries addressed many aspects, and Khrushchev promised to further provide China with large quantities of aid, but they did not specifically discuss the increasing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Nevertheless, in the Sino-​Soviet joint declaration issued at the end of Khrushchev’s visit to China, both sides reprimanded the United States for “continued invasion and occupation of the Chinese territory Taiwan.”216 Three days later, Vyshinsky moved to discuss the us “behavior of invasion” in Taiwan at the UN General Assembly and passed a draft resolution that reprimanded the United States.217 The Eisenhower Administration was 213 People’s Daily, August 23, 1954. 214 Mao Zedong, “Hai kong jun qiangda qilai le jiu nenggou shoufu Taiwan 海空军强大 起来了就能够收复台湾 [With a strong Navy and Airforce we will be able to recover Taiwan],” August 11, 1954, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 2:227–​228. 215 The topic of adjustment of foreign policy will be discussed in Chapter 4. 216 “Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo he su wei ai shehui zhuyi gonghe guo lianmeng zhengfu lianhe xuanyan 中华人民共和国和苏维埃社会主义共和国联盟政府联合宣言 [Joint declaration of the allied governments of PRC and Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union],” October 12, 1954, in Zhong mei guanxi ziliao hui bian [Collected documents of Sino-​u s relations], 2(2): 2009. 217 “Sulian daibiao wei xin si ji yaoqiu lian da taolun meiguo qinlue zhonghua renmin gonghe guo wenti zhi jiu jie lian da zhuxi de beiwang lu he ti’an 苏联代表维辛斯基 要求联大讨论美国侵略中华人民共和国问题致九届联大主席的备忘录和提案 [Memorandum and proposal from Soviet representative Vyshinsky to the Chairman of

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busy preparing the so-​called “first Taiwan Strait crisis management,” and the timing of Khrushchev’s visit to China was to the us side more like support and endorsement of China’s military actions. The Sino-​Soviet display of close cooperation in large scale formed powerful restraint on the United States. The reality showed that the us-​Taiwan secret talks on signing a treaty indeed increased the difficulties to PLA’s seizure of coastal islands. Such situation led Mao and the cpc Central Committee to add more political significance to the planned military actions, namely to closely associate the military actions with political mobilization on liberating Taiwan, and diplomatically with prevention of us-​Taiwan conclusion of alliance treaty. Some historians held in the past that China’s publicity and military actions taken at the time were meant to prevent us-​Taiwan conclusion of a collective defense treaty, and thus by reasoning, China’s military actions along the southeast coast not only failed to achieve the purpose, but rather facilitated the conclusion of us-​Taiwan treaty.218 Generally speaking, China’s strengthened military actions along the southeast coast provided the atmosphere for those inside the United States that advocated for signing treaty to dominate public opinion and provided them with more reasons to push for talks on us-​Taiwan treaty, and the us-​Taiwan signing of the “Collective Defense Treaty” in early December was indeed at the PLA’s peak of war preparation for the campaign of seizing Yijiangshan Island. But it was overly simplified to conclude that China’s policies achieved the contrary result. First, it was hard to accept that Chinese leaders including Mao truly believed that by issuing declaration in newspapers and taking limited military actions along the coast would sufficiently stop the United States and Taiwan from signing the treaty. As mentioned before, military actions including the military plan to occupy Dachen Islands went through long-​term preparation, got confirmed before the slogan “we must liberate Taiwan” was raised, and the content of the plan never changed. On July 23, Mao modified and approved to issue

218

the Ninth UN General Assembly on request to the UN General Assembly to discuss us invasion of PRC],” October 15, 1954, in People’s Daily, October 18, 1954. Zhang Baijia 章百家 and Jia Qingguo 贾庆国, “Duikang zhong de fangxiang pan, huanchong qi he ceshi yi: cong zhongguo de jiaodu kan zhong mei dashi ji huitan 对抗中的方 向盘、缓冲器和测试仪：从中国的角度看中美大使级会谈 [The steering wheel, bumper, and tester in confrontation:  viewing the Sino-​u s ambassadorial talks from Chinese perspective],” in Jiang Changbin 姜长斌 and Robert Ross, eds., Cong duizhi zou xiang huanhe: lengzhan shiqi zhong mei guanxi zai tantao 从对峙走向缓和: 冷战时期 中美关系再探讨 [From hostility to détente: A reexamination of Sino-​u s relations during the Cold War] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2000), 175.

276 Chapter 3 the instructions on providing protection for navigation of foreign merchant ships, in which he was still very cautious about military actions. For example, it required that “no attacks should be made on any foreign airplanes or military fleet,” and foreign navy and air force “will not engage in robbery behaviors in peaceful times, and so no attacks should be made unless under self-​defense conditions.”219 On August 21, Mao further instructed:  “Make sure there is no us fleet or us airplane before launching attacks on the upper and lower Dachen Island, otherwise no attacks be made.”220 Chinese leaders had no plan or intention of fighting against the United States in the Taiwan Strait, and they would not remain unknown that such limited military actions were impossible to create enough military pressure to stop the us-​Taiwan signing of treaty. Apparently, it required some more in-​depth analysis. The first key was how Chinese leaders understood the scope of application of the us-​Taiwan treaty. From the outset, Mao paid great attention to whether the extent of the us-​ Taiwan treaty included exterior islands of Zhejiang and Fujian. Zhou even estimated during the meeting with Soviet leaders that the United States and Taiwan might use the military treaty to expand the naval blockade of China’s mainland to “coastal Guangdong and Tokyo Bay area.”221 If such circumstances happened, it would not only cause long-​term separation of Taiwan but also cause more severe security threat to China and might even obstruct the set plan of seizing the exterior islands. Chinese leaders had reasons to worry. In early June, the us Navy fleet once approached Dachen Island to display force. On August 19, four fleet of the us Navy reached Dachen Island and the us commander even landed on the island to inspect. At this time, the us-​Taiwan talks on signing the treaty was in acceleration and Chinese leaders and military generals were more concerned that the treaty’s areas of application would include the exterior islands. To them, the logical choice would be that if the us-​Taiwan treaty was unavoidable, it

219 Mao Zedong, “Dui junwei guanyu baowei linghai zhuquan ji huhang zhuyi shixiang zhishi gao de xiugai 对军委关于保卫领海主权及护航注意事项指示稿的修改 [Revision on the draft instruction from the Central Military Commission on protecting sovereignty in territorial waters and precausions on protection of navigation],” July 23, 1954, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 2:220–​221. 220 Mao Zedong, “Guanyu gongji shang xia dachen dao shiji wenti de piyu 关于攻击上下大 陈岛时机问题的批语 [Comment on the timing of attacking upper and lower Dachen Island],” August 21, 1954, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 2:229. 221 Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:405.

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should be limited in its areas and only through military actions could that be achieved. On November 11, Su Yu, the Chief of Staff, commanded related troops of the East China Military Area Command to actively fight in the war to compel the us-​ Taiwan treaty out of the exterior islands.222 On November 30, the General Staff issued a war order to occupy the exterior islands in Zhejiang as soon as possible in order to prevent the us-​Taiwan treaty from covering them.223 The signing of the us-​Taiwan “Collective Defense Treaty” did not make leaders of the East China Military Area Command shrink back, and in January 1955, they submitted the “Battle Plan on Attacking Yijiangshan Island” as planned. During discussion on approving the battle plan, the Chinese decision-​makers did not change the strategy due to the us-​Taiwan treaty. Rather, on the contrary, the us-​Taiwan treaty reinforced their determination to occupy Yijiangshan Island.224 From the military standpoint, seizure of the southeast exterior islands was undoubtedly the most solid guarantee of preventing the us-​Taiwan treaty from covering them. The “strike through” of the us-​Taiwan treaty plan said by Chinese leaders was primarily to prevent them from including the exterior islands. On January 18, 1955, the PLA rapidly occupied Yijiangshan Island as planned and the southeast coastal battle reached a peak. The next day, some ships of the us Seventh Fleet reached the open waters of Dachen Islands and Sino-​u s military confrontation severely sharpened. The PLA battling troops were ordered to temporarily halt military actions in order to learn whether the us military would intervene directly. Soon thereafter, the United States sent an important message to China through the Soviet government that the Kuomintang troops stationed in Dachen Islands would automatically withdraw and they hoped that the PLA would not launch attacks during their withdrawal.225 Between February 8 and 12, the Kuomintang troops under us assistance all pulled out of Dachen Islands in order, and the Kuomintang troops on other exterior islands of coastal Zhejiang also followed to withdraw. In the second half of February, battles in this region generally ended. Chinese leaders reached part or the lowest extent of their planned goal, including recovering exterior islands 222 223

224 225

Xu Yan 徐焰, Jin men zhi zhan 金门之战 [The battle of Quemoy] (Beijing:  Zhongguo guangbo dianshi chubanshe, 1992), 180. Jiang Ying 江英, “50 niandai mao zedong waijiao sixiang shu lun 50 年代毛泽东外交思 想述论 [Account and discussion on Mao Zedong’s diplomatic thoughts in the 1950s],” in Jiang and Ross, eds., Cong duizhi zou xiang huanhe [From hostility to détente], 587. Zhang, Zhang Zhen huiyi lu [Memoir of Zhang Zhen], 1:495. Yang Guoyu 杨国宇, et al., eds., Dangdai zhongguo haijun 当代中国海军 [Contemporary Chinese Navy] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan chubanshe, 1987), 222.

278 Chapter 3 in Zhejiang, the us-​Taiwan treaty not addressing whether to include Quemoy Island, Mazu Island, and so on. It turned out that the military actions of seizing the exterior islands along the southeast coast in 1954–​55 also mainly aimed at the military threat that was considered urgent, and the motivation of choosing this time to battle first came from lifting the security threat that faced the southeast coast. The us military during this period made many deployments of Navy and Airforce power in related waters and airspace and conducted military exercises to stage military coercion. China assailed the United States in publicity, but in military actions maintained huge patience and caution. In almost every major military action, Mao and the cpc Central Military Commission made all kinds of specific and strict rules to avoid military conflict with the us military. For example, when planning on occupation of Dachen Islands, it was repeatedly emphasized militarily that fight with the us Navy and Airforce must be avoided. On June 1, the East China Military Area Command stipulated that the battling troops must not proactively launch attacks on the us Navy and Airforce; at the military meetings on July 30 and 31, Peng Dehuai specifically emphasized that the battle plan should be implemented only under the condition of no participation of the us Navy and Airforce. Later as he listened to war preparation reports, he reiterated that fight with the us Navy and Airforce must be avoided.226 In mid-​December, to increase military coercion the us Navy and Airforce conducted a large-​scale military exercise near the seas of Dachen Islands. Mao thus asked Peng Dehuai and Su Yu, “Since the us military was conducting a large military exercise in the seas east of Zhejiang, please consider if it’s appropriate to attack Yijiangshan now.”227 In February 1955, the Kuomintang troops gradually withdrew from all islands in coastal Zhejiang. Mao specifically instructed Peng Dehuai that during the withdrawal of the Kuomintang troops, regardless of whether there was participation of us fleets, launch no attacks, “let the enemy withdraw safely, don’t covet such petty advantages.”228 The Airforce thus made explicit and strict rules to avoid 226 Wang, Peng Dehuai nian pu [Chronicle of Peng Dehuai], 574, 576. 227 Mao Zedong, “Guanyu gongji yi jiang shan dao shiji de piyu 关于攻击一江山岛时机的 批语 [Comment on the timing of attacking Yijiangshan Island],” December 11, 1954, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 4:627. 228 Mao Zedong, “Jiang jun cong dachen dao chetui shi wo jun bu xiang gangkou yidai sheji 蒋军从大陈岛撤退时我军不向港口一带射击 [When Chiang’s troops retreat from Dachen Island our troops don’t shoot at the harbor area],” February 2, 1955, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 2:256.

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striking us fighter planes by mistake. The reality was as such, that if there was conflict with the us military due to policy mistakes, the battles along the southeast coast certainly could not achieve its planned purpose. There was a deeper reason of avoiding military conflict with the us Navy and Airforce. Before the us-​Taiwan treaty was signed in December, in addition to the battle considerations, the avoidance of fight with the us Navy and Airforce also had the intention of learning about to what extent the us assisted defense of exterior islands could reach. On July 11, the Central Military Commission said in an instruction to the East China Military Area Command that the choice of first occupying Yijiangshan Island was also meant to “investigate possible actions by the us military.”229 After the us-​Taiwan “Collective Defense Treaty” was signed, its areas of coverage and whether it contained an intention of attacking the mainland became a strategic question to be faced and understood in the battle along the southeast coast. One of the crucial issues left over by the military actions of the 1954 and 1955 was the uncertainty of whether the us-​Taiwan treaty included Quemoy Island and Mazu Island of coastal Fujian, which was not solved until 1958. The battles of 1954 and 1955 were conducted between the end of the Geneva Conference and the opening of the Bandung Conference, during which period Chinese leaders were indeed considering the possibility of holding diplomatic negotiation with the United States and military actions increasingly had the feature of coordinating with diplomatic policies, and the word “diplomacy” began to appear in some battling orders. After the Kuomintang troops rapidly withdrew from Dachen Islands and other exterior islands of Zhejiang, the focus of Chinese policies gradually shifted from military toward diplomacy. The us message through the Soviet Union that the Kuomintang troops would withdraw from the exterior islands of Zhejiang must have been unexpected to Chinese leaders. Thereafter, forcing the Kuomintang troops to withdraw from the exterior islands of Fujian became an important option of the PLA’s battles. On March 9, the cpc Central Military Commission approved the plan of occupying Mazu Island. Mao stated when approving the plan that if “the enemy withdraws from Mazu and any other islands, we should all let them go and don’t launch any attacks or obstruction.”230 229

Wang, Peng Dehuai nian pu [Chronicle of Peng Dehuai], 571; Zhang, Zhang Zhen huiyi lu [Memoir of Zhang Zhen], 1:494. 230 Mao Zedong, “Guanyu mazu deng daoyu diren chezou shi wo jun buyao gongji de piyu 关于马祖等岛屿敌人撤走时我军不要攻击的批语 [Comment that our troops should not attack the enemy when they retreat from Mazu and other islands],” March 14, 1955, in Jiang guo yi lai mao zedong wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong since the founding

280 Chapter 3 Financial pressure was also an important factor that affected Chinese leaders. As mentioned before, the general context of their decision to achieve ceasefire in the Korean Peninsula and Indochina was that China was about to begin the first Five-​Year Plan, and the large-​scale economic development required large compression of military expenditure. After occupying the exterior islands of Zhejiang, while forcing the Kuomintang troops through military pressure to withdraw from Quemoy Island and Mazu Island themselves was the best option from the military perspective, it also reflected on a deeper level the concern of Chinese leaders about the financial issue of battles as Chinese leaders including Mao himself were quite sensitive to the cost of war. In fact, the planning of the battles along the southeast coast was largely affected by war expenses from the beginning.231 In October 1953, the plan made by the General Staff was to first occupy Quemoy Island. Mao rejected the plan in the second half of December. Apart from the different opinion of the East China Military Area Command toward the plan, there was a very important reason that Mao himself considered the expenses too high. On December 21, Peng Dehuai instructed on the plan: “Attacking Quemoy Island would cost huge, and after discussion with comrade Chen Yi, it is temporarily called off and will be prepared again after exploration.” The report was forwarded to Mao the next day, who immediately instructed: “I agree with the opinion. It requires a cost of nearly five trillion, which is unaffordable; at least such large expenses should not be made in the year of 1954.”232 The same as the decision-​making on the Korean ceasefire, the presence of financial pressure drove Chinese leaders to search for means other than military and increased the need for diplomatic means. The military actions along the southeast coast were originally related to major diplomatic consideration, and changes in international situation and in the Taiwan Strait after occupation of Yijiangshan Island led military actions to gradually become means of supporting diplomacy. It was reflected in that Chinese leaders began to intentionally take advantage of tensions in the Taiwan Strait to push the United States to agree to solve the Taiwan issue through negotiation or other issues in bilateral relations. of People’s Republic of China], 5:51; Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:478–​479. 231 Yang et al., eds., Dangdai zhongguo haijun [Contemporary Chinese Navy], 71. 2 32 Mao Zedong, “Tongyi muqian bu da Jinmen 同意目前不打金门 [Consent with no attacks on Quemoy Island now],” December 22, 1953, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 2:194.

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As mentioned before, direct contact and negotiation between China and the United States on non-​military security issues began during the Geneva Conference. Zhou Enlai once admitted that before going to Geneva, he did not even know how to get along with Americans and he had to consider whether to look “more formidable or easygoing” when facing Dulles in the meeting.233 Under joint facilitation of Molotov and Eden, the Chinese delegation began direct contact with us delegates and finally held meetings. The influence of Molotov was special as he once helped the us delegate Smith to forward to Zhou the willingness of direct contact. And when Molotov forwarded the message, he told China that there were disagreements within the us delegation and Smith believed “it is unrealistic for the United States to adopt adversary polities toward China.” Molotov said Smith’s views required attention.234 He told China in such way that contact with us delegates was not impossible and might even bring benefits. After the end of the Geneva Conference, talks between China and the United States did not continue. When Chinese leaders had the intent to negotiate with Americans, very importantly the Soviet Union again offered active diplomatic support after the Taiwan Strait crisis. At the time, the Soviet leaders suggested seeking to discuss tension in the Taiwan Strait at the summit of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France to be held in early 1955, in order to help China to seek an opportunity to settle Taiwan diplomatically. Of course, the facilitation by Soviet leaders on Sino-​u s direct talks was also because they needed China to coordinate with Soviet policies, and the continued tensions between China and the United States would not facilitate detent with the West that was promoted by Khrushchev. Whenever Chinese leaders took new actions against the United States, especially military actions, the Soviet Union had to endorse China out of the alliance duty, which sometimes interfered with Soviet relations with the United Kingdom and France in Europe and certainly would affect us-​Soviet relations. In December 1954, the CPSUCC sent the document prepared for the four-​ state summit to China for Chinese opinions. On January 1, 1955, the Chinese Foreign Ministry drafted the “Draft Reply to the CPSUCC on the Four-​State Summit,” which first agreed to the inclusion of tensions in East Asia on the summit agenda; it also agreed with the CPSUCC recommendation on Taiwan, 233 “Zhou enlai zai ri nei wa dui daibiao tuan jianghua jiyao [Minutes of Zhou Enlai’s speech to Chinese delegation in Geneva],” June 21, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 454. 234 Wang Bingnan 王炳南, Zhong mei huitan jiu nian huigu 中美会谈九年回顾 [Review of the nine years of Sino-​u s talks] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1985), 19.

282 Chapter 3 namely “to put major focus on facilitating Sino-​u s direct talks because such means of negotiation was more likely to achieve,” and the early contact between China and the United States could choose a third-​party, such as Moscow, London, or New Delhi; other means such as holding a “Big Five conference” or “Asian countries conference” were not as likely as the Sino-​ us direct talks; China also agreed with the CPSUCC’s opinion and would forward the message through India that the American pilots would be released recently.235 After confirming China’s willingness to settle the issue through diplomacy, especially its willingness to directly negotiate with the United States, the Soviets began to seize all opportunities to facilitate Sino-​u s talks. On February 4, at the most tense moment of the Taiwan Strait, Molotov suggested the immediate hosting of a ten-​state meeting that included China, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, India, Burma, Pakistan, and Ceylon to discuss tensions in East Asia.236 Soon afterward, the Soviet side again suggested hosting of a Big Five meeting to discuss reduction of tensions in East Asia. On March 19, the Soviet leader N. A. Bulganin met with Liu Xiao, Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and said that of the Soviet foreign policies, “the most crucial issues are: the Germany issue in the West, and the Taiwan issue in the East,” the Soviet policies “are always active and aggressive,” and “policies in the Far East are always aggressive.”237 In addition to the Soviet Union, first the United Kingdom and then India and a few Asian countries also successively joined the ranks of mediation. China through the United Kingdom and India made it clear that it planned to directly negotiate with the United States. On January 5, Trevelyan, the British chargé d’affaires to China, met with Zhou and persuaded China to stop military actions on the exterior islands. Zhou told him that the responsibility was not

235 “Guanyu si guo huiyi dafu su gong zhongyang gao 关于四国会议答覆苏共中央 稿 [Reply letter to the cpsu Central Committee regarding the four-​state conference],” January 1, 1955, PRCFMA 111-​00065-​02. 236 “Sulian waizhang mo luo tuo fu zhuzhang zhaokai shi guo huiyi taolun Taiwan wenti de shengming 苏联外长莫洛托夫主张召开十国会议讨论台湾问题的声明 [State­ ment from Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov on calling to hold a ten-​state meeting to discuss the Taiwan issue],” February 4, 1955, in Zhong mei guanxi ziliao hui bian [Collected documents of Sino-​u s relations], 2(2): 2203. 237 “Bu er jia ning yu liu xiao de huitan jilu 布尔加宁与刘晓的会谈记录 [Minutes of conversation between Bulganin and Liu Xiao],” March 19, 1955, Shanghai:  Library of Center for Cold War International History Studies, East China Normal University, Call Number: NO.16665 (23023).

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on the side of China, that China and the United States could still hold negotiation, and that China “will offer its hand, without exception to the United States.”238 On February 5, Zhou met with Hugo, Swedish Ambassador to China, and the latter forwarded an oral message from UN Secretary General Dag Harmmarskjold on reducing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Zhou told him that China did not refuse negotiation with the United States, and the United States should accept “the recommendation of direct negotiation” with China.239 Since February 26, Raghvan, Indian Ambassador to China, met several times with Zhou and forwarded Nehru’s will to mediate Sino-​u s relations and tried to learn about Chinese policies. Zhou asked that the United States “must stand out and talk,” for China could hold bilateral talks with the United States at multilateral international conference, “the most direct, most simple way is to have talks between China and the United States.”240 On February 28, Trevelyan, British chargé d’affaires to China, met with Zhou and forwarded Prime Minister Eden’s oral message that he hoped to meet with Zhou in Hong Kong or some bordering area, and that if China could declare no use of force to occupy Taiwan, “the basis can be found to peacefully liberate the coastal islands.” On March 1, the Soviet Ambassador handed to Zhou in person a telegram from the Soviet government, which said “in Moscow everyone agreed with the opinion of our Chinese friend about meeting with Eden.” That day, Zhou immediately replied to Eden and invited him to Beijing to discuss how to reduce tensions in Taiwan.241 During the Asian-​African conference held soon afterward, Zhou openly expressed many times the willingness to directly negotiate with Americans. Chinese leaders believed that due to us obstruction, it was almost impossible to restore the PRC’s legitimate seat in the UN, and Mao himself even considered it unnecessary to spend too much time and energy on it. Under the context of tensions in the Taiwan Strait, it was of greater strategic significance

238 Zhou Enlai, “Jianjue fandui zhizao ‘liang ge zhongguo’ de yinmou 坚决反对制造“两个中 国”的阴谋 [Firm opposition to the conspiracy of creating ‘two Chinas’],” January 5, 1955, in Zhou Enlai waijiao wen xuan [Selected works of Zhou Enlai on foreign affairs], 100. 239 Zhou Enlai, “Fandui lianhe guo ganshe zhongguo neizheng 反对联合国干涉中国内政 [Opposition to UN interference in China’s internal affairs],” February 5, 1955, in Zhou Enlai waijiao wen xuan [Selected works of Zhou Enlai on foreign affairs], 107. 240 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic History Research Office 中国外交部外交史 研究室, ed. Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashi ji (1949–​1975) 周恩来外交活动大事记 [Memorabilia of Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic activities (1949–​1975)] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1993), 100, 102. 241 Ibid., 102–​103.

284 Chapter 3 to negotiate with the United States on settling the Taiwan issue.242 On April 30, Zhou submitted to the cpc Central Committee a “Report on Discussing the Taiwan Issue at Various Places Abroad,” which suggested that “the United States needs to negotiate with China,” and key was to insist on separating the two aspects of domestic politics and international aspect associated with the Taiwan issue; the Sino-​u s talks should focus on the United States stopping interference on the Taiwan issue, but not on ceasefire. This was the fundamental difference of the Taiwan issue with the ceasefire talks on the Korean Peninsula and Indochina.243 The main views of the report obtained consent of the cpc Central Committee. On April 23, Zhou issued an open statement at the eight-​state foreign ministerial meeting of the Bandung Conference, “the Chinese government is willing to sit down to negotiate with the us government and discuss reduction of tensions in the Far East, especially reduction of tensions in the Taiwan region.”244 On May 12, Zhou told Melon, Indian delegate to the UN, that he had expressed the willingness to negotiate with Chiang Kai-​shek in Taiwan at the eight-​state foreign ministerial meeting, and he planned to openly declare the position at a proper time.245 The next day, Zhou declared at the fifteenth meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, that China was willing to negotiate with the Taiwan authority to settle the Taiwan issue, “willing, under possible conditions, to seek peaceful means to liberate Taiwan.”246 On the thirtieth, China declared the release of four captured American pilots. 242 “You jin yu mao zedong de huitan beiwang lu 尤金与毛泽东的会谈备忘录 [Memorandum of conversation between Mao Zedong and Yudin],” January 8, 1955, accessed at Shanghai: Library of Center for Cold War International History Studies, East China Normal University, Call Number: NO. 09844. 243 Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:474–​475. 244 “Zhou enlai guanyu huanhe yuandong jinzhang jushi wenti de shengming [Zhou Enlai’s statement on easing tensions in the Far East],” April 23, 1955, in Zhongguo daibiao tuan chuxi 1955 nian ya fei huiyi [Chinese delegation’s attendance at the Asian-​African Conference in 1955], 75. 245 Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashi ji [Memorabilia of Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic activities 1949–​1975], 111. 246 “Zhou Enlai zongli zai quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuan hui di shi wu ci huiyi kuoda huiyi shang guanyu ya fei huiyi de baogao (youguan Taiwan bufen) 周恩 来总理在全国人民代表大会常务委员会第十五次会议扩大会议上关于亚非会 议的报告（有关台湾部分）[Report on the Asian-​African Conference from Premier Zhou Enlai at the 15th session expanded meeting of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (related to Taiwan)],” May 13, 1955, in Zhong mei guanxi ziliao hui bian [Collected documents of Sino-​u s relations], 2(2): 2265.

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Chinese leaders sought to negotiate with the United States based on their new understanding of the strategic situation of neighboring regions, namely that many countries in Asia did not want tensions in the region to continue, and especially after the Asian-​African conference, Chinese leaders had more direct and accurate understanding of views of Asian countries.247 They believed by taking to show willingness to negotiate with the United States, it was easier to obtain good feelings and support of relevant countries, and of course first the Soviet  ally would provide more active support. On May 26, Mao told Yudin during the meeting that India was actively mediating Sino-​u s talks, and in addition to India, countries including the United Kingdom, Burma, Indonesia, and Pakistan were also mediating. As long as China took a soft position, there were many conditions to take advantage of.248 China’s diplomatic efforts were effective. As it turned out, if the United States continued a gesture of non-​compromise, it would lead to self-​isolation while China would continually obtain compassion, good feelings and even praise. Such situation was under formation, not to mention that the United States indeed had to solve the release of captured us military personnel with China. After repeated discussion, the Eisenhower Administration decided to hold talks with China on limited ranks. On July 11, Dulles asked the British government to forward to China the recommendation to hold Sino-​u s ambassadorial meetings.249 On July 13, Con O’Neill, the British chargé d’affaires, met with Zhou and forwarded the recommendation from the us government on holding Sino-​u s ambassadorial meetings. He said he had received instructions from Foreign Minister Harold Macmillan that asked him to forward the oral message to Premier Zhou from the us government. The instructions he got was “oral forward,” but he was willing to leave a paper draft for Zhou. Then he read the full text of the us government letter, and then mentioned a supplement of three-​point recommendations, which included full confidentiality for the content of the recommendations: one, recommend the holding of ambassadorial meetings without indication of us “recognition” of the People’s Republic of 247 “You jin yu mao zedong de huitan beiwang lu 尤金与毛泽东的会谈备忘录 [Memorandum of conversation between Mao Zedong and Yudin],” January 8, 1955, accessed at Shanghai: Library of Center for Cold War International History Studies, East China Normal University, Call Number: NO. 09844. 248 “Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong and Yudin,” May 25, 1955, accessed at Shanghai: Library of Center for Cold War International History Studies, East China Normal University, Call Number: NO. 09844. 249 Zi, ed., Zhan hou meiguo waijiao shi [us diplomatic history after World War II], 1:299.

286 Chapter 3 China; and two, that the British government believed the us recommendation as “highly useful,” and “hope the Chinese government can accept the recommendation.” Finally, he hoped that Zhou could notice what was said on the us letter, that this recommendation “will also benefit further discussion and settlement of some other practical issues that are currently in dispute between both parties.” Zhou stated that China had long been willing to continue contact with the United States and he would reply after studying the us recommendation.250 On July 15, China replied to the United States through the United Kingdom that it agreed to the recommendation of the us government on holding ambassadorial meetings, and suggested that the first meeting should be held on July 21.251 The time chosen by China was to support the Soviet move at the four-​state summit to discuss the Taiwan issue. July 18 was a very crucial day. That day, the four-​state summit opened in Geneva. In Beijing, the Foreign Ministry finished the draft “Plan on the Meetings in Geneva between Chinese and us Ambassadorial Representatives,” which analyzed in detail the reasons and purpose of us request for talks, and suggested to “increase pressure on the United States, try to solve some issues through the meeting, and prepare for a higher-​level talks between China and the United States on reducing and erasing tensions in the Taiwan region.” Of course, the Sino-​u s meeting should also “benefit the discussion on the Taiwan issue at the four-​state summit and the mediation work by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and India to improve Sino-​u s relations.” The Foreign Ministry also predicted that the United States might postpone the Sino-​u s talks till after the four-​state summit, but the talks not opening on the twenty-​ first would also benefit the Soviet request to discuss the Taiwan issue at the four-​state summit.252 That day, People’s Daily published a front-​page editorial entitled “Welcome to the Four-​State Summit,” which claimed that “the four-​ state summit must discuss situation in the Far East,” which “bears special significance” to China.253

250 “Zhou enlai jiejian yingguo daiban ao er ni tanhua jiyao 周恩来接见英国代办奥尔尼 谈话纪要 [Minutes of Zhou Enlai’s conversation with British Charge d’affaires Olney],” July 13, 1955, PRCFMA 207-​00011-​11. 251 “Guanyu zhong mei shuangfang dashi ji daibiao zai ri nei wa di yi ci huitan de fang’an 关 于中美双方大使级代表在日内瓦第一次会谈的方案 [Proposal for the first session of the Sino-​u s ambassadorial talks in Geneva],” July 18, 1955, PRCFMA 111-​00014-​01. 252 Ibid. 253 “Huanying si da guo huiyi 欢迎四大国会议 [Welcome to the four-​state meeting],” in People’s Daily, July 18, 1955.

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At quarter past four on that afternoon, the British chargé d’affaires to China O’Neill forwarded to Zhou a draft “News Communique” provided by Dulles for both parties to publish. It read very awkward, which reflected that the us government indeed pondered over the words, and the main content was that China and the United States agreed to hold ambassadorial meeting on August 1 to solve the issue of repatriate civilians between both sides, which “will also benefit further discussion and settlement of some other practical issues that are currently in dispute between both parties.” The British apparently took pains to choose the timing to forward the us recommendation. Zhou immediately made long remarks, such as criticizing the United States for using “Peking” to call China, and that the United Kingdom should not forward in such way. On issuing the communique on July 20, a point of special us concern, he said that the time was for sure impossible to catch. As with the date of August 1 as suggested by the United States to open the ambassadorial meeting, Zhou did not give a definitive and positive answer nor suggest another timeline.254 The us suggestion was apparently to postpone the meeting till after the four-​state summit, while Chinese leaders needed to wait for the result of Soviet diplomatic efforts at the four-​state summit. At twelve that night, la. A. Lomakin, the Soviet chargé d’affaires to China, handed Zhou in person “the Position of the Soviet Delegation at the Geneva Summit.” On the evening of the seventeenth, Zhou decided to hand over the plan on the Sino-​u s meeting prepared by China to the Soviets the next day, and thus the Soviet Union used the quickest means to forward their strategy to be taken at the four-​state summit.255 The document fully explained the eight issues that the Soviet Union planned to introduce and seek settlement at the summit, in which the Asian and East Asian issue was placed the eighth, and the Taiwan issue was placed under the second part of the eighth issue, with its content being that the Soviet Union would “propose the Taiwan issue as the most important issue,” and would support Zhou’s statement on April 23 on holding Sino-​u s direct talks.256 Apparently, the Soviet Union did not put the 254 “Zhou enlai jiejian yingguo daiban ou nian ru tanhua jiyao 周恩来接见英国代办欧念 儒谈话纪要 [Minutes of Zhou Enlai’s conversation with British Charge d’affaires Con O’Neill],” July 18, 1955, PRCFMA 110-​00141-​07. 255 “Zhou enlai zongli guanyu zhong mei huitan de juti zhishi 周恩来总理关于中美会谈 的具体指示 [Detailed instruction from Premier Zhou Enlai regarding Sino-​u s talks],” July 18, 1955, PRCFMA 111-​00009-​03. 256 “Sulian daibiao tuan zai ri nei wa huiyi shang de lichang 苏联代表团在日内瓦会议上 的立场 [the position of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva Conference],” July 18, 1955, PRCFMA 206-​00061-​07(1).

288 Chapter 3 Taiwan issue at an important place, and in fact the Soviet Union eventually failed to include the East Asian issue on the agenda of the four-​state summit. At the beginning of the summit, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France first proposed to focus on discussing the German issue. Bulganin proposed instead to discuss disarmament, ban on nuclear weapons, establishment of European collective security system, and East Asia. After discussion, leaders of the four states agreed that the summit would discuss Germany, European security, arms reduction, and increasing contacts between the East and West, but East Asia was excluded. The Soviet leader only suggested in unofficial meetings that the Taiwan issue should be solved, but it was immediately rejected by us and UK leaders.257 On the twenty-​first, Dulles told Bulganin in attendance that he hoped the Sino-​u s meeting to first discuss the repatriation of civilians, while discussion on other issues would not be excluded but don’t expect them to progress fast.258 As the four-​state summit was impossible to discuss East Asia, on July 23, China forwarded to the United States through the United Kingdom that it agreed to open the ambassadorial meeting on August 1. Two days later, China and the United States published the news communique on the two countries holding ambassadorial meeting soon. On the twenty-​sixth, in view of the situation after the end of the four-​state summit, the Foreign Ministry drafted a supplementary instruction on the Sino-​u s ambassadorial meeting that at this time it was impossible to coordinate with Soviet diplomatic efforts at the four-​ state summit, and “the concrete steps to coordinate with the four-​state summit are thus automatically unnecessary” in the original plan, but other planned strategy did not change. The Sino-​u s ambassadorial meeting must not be limited to the discussion on repatriating civilians, and the goal was still to seek to solve some issues through negotiation, and to “prepare for higher-​level negotiation on reducing and erasing tensions in Taiwan” between China and the United States.259 On July 30, the Foreign Ministry issued “Instructions on the Geneva Meeting between Chinese and us Ambassadorial Representatives” to some diplomatic corps stationed abroad, which made detailed analysis on us policies, 257 Dwight D. Eisenhower 德怀特 D.艾森豪威尔. Bai gong suiyue 白宫岁月 [White House Years 1953–​1957], trans. Jing Hai 静海 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1978), 573. 258 “Memorandum of Conversations, Geneva,” July 21, 1955, FRUS, 1955–​1957, Vol.2, 670–​671. 259 “Guanyu zhong mei dashi ji daibiao zai ri nei wa huitan de buchong zhishi 关于中美大 使级代表在日内瓦会谈的补充指示 [Supplemental instructions for Sino-​u s ambassadorial talks in Geneva],” July 26, 1955, PRCFMA 111-​00009-​04.

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the prospect of the talks, and Chinese policies. The “Instructions” held, “It is a result of pressure from all parties that the us government suggested to hold the Sino-​u s ambassadorial meeting in Geneva,” and now not only people from all circles in the United States, “even Dulles and Eisenhower who are in office dare not to openly oppose the request,” and thus this time the United States “does not close door to higher-​level Sino-​u s negotiation” with the purpose of “reducing tensions between China and the United States under the situation of the created ‘two Chinas,’ and improving its increasingly isolated and reactionary position on the Taiwan issue.” Very importantly, the “Instructions” held, “If the ambassadorial meeting goes smooth, and pressure from all sides continues to increase, especially that our national defense power along the cost continues to grow, the possibility of holding a higher-​level Sino-​u s meeting and even peacefully restoring the coastal islands would increase, the prospect of which we should pursue.” And therefore: The basic strategy of the meeting is: from the start of the meeting, proactively declare that we have released eleven us military personnel who violated the law (with measures already told), deprive the United States of excuses, increase pressure on the United States, seek to solve some concrete issues through this meeting, to prepare for a higher-​level Sino-​ us negotiation, and make the United States more isolated an reactionary on the Taiwan issue.260 Two days later, the Sino-​u s ambassadorial meeting finally drew open, and thus began a long journey of fifteen years of negotiation. Seizure of the southeast exterior islands and the opening of the Sino-​u s ambassadorial meeting was the final battle of China against the United States in the neighboring regions, and the result was it eventually drew the battle front between China and the United States in the East Asian Cold War. Through the establishment of us-​Taiwan “Collective Defense Treaty,” the United States finally completed its construction of military system in East Asia to contain China. China through seizure of the exterior islands in Zhejiang erased an existing military threat and drove military bases that were usable by the us military to two hundred nautical miles away, which increased the defense in depth of the southeast coast and expanded the buffer zone of the southeast coast. Of course, Quemoy Island and Mazu Island of coastal Fujian was not

260 “Guanyu zhong mei dashi ji daibiao zai ri nei wa huitan de zhishi [Instruction for Sino-​u s ambassadorial talks in Geneva],” July 30, 1955, PRCFMA 111-​00009-​01.

290 Chapter 3 fundamentally settled in this battle, and the Sino-​u s ambassadorial meeting continued intermittently. The two factors eventually led to the second Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958. By April 1955, the military confrontation between China and the United States was generally fixed along the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula, the 17th parallel in Indochina, and the “middle line” in the Taiwan Strait along the southeast coast, and continued for a long time thereafter. On the other hand, China’s seizure of the southeast exterior islands and the subsequent diplomatic actions failed to compel the United States into negotiation with China on settling the Taiwan issue. Nevertheless, China and the United States began negotiation on non-​military security issues and especially established the communication mechanism of the ambassadorial meetings, thus East Asia after five years of conflicts and tensions emerged in temporary peace and stability. On August 7, People’s Daily published editorial “Continued Efforts to End the Cold War,” which commented on the Sino-​u s ambassadorial meeting that as long as both China and the United States “adopt a conciliatory and sincere negotiation attitude,” the meeting would find ways to solve issues of both countries.261 The article was indeed just in time, for China and the United States exactly transitioned from the end of hot wars to the Cold War worthy of the name. Mao later called such state “coexistence in the Cold War.”262 261 “Wei jieshu lengzhan er jixu nuli 为结束冷战而继续努力 [Continue to strive to end the Cold War],” in People’s Daily, August 7, 1955. 262 Mao Zedong, “Tongmeng ge ma li tan guoji xingshi 同蒙哥马利谈国际形势 [Conversation with Montgomery on international situation],” May 27, 1960, in Mao Zedong waijiao wen xuan [Selected works of Mao Zedong on foreign affairs], 422.

Chapter 4

Making New Diplomacy April 1955 is a special period in New China’s diplomatic history. Two important events took place in sequence during the period that brought crucial impact on China’s global position both during and after the Cold War. On April 17, Zhou led a highly capable Chinese delegation to Bandung, Indonesia to participate in the Asian-​African Conference on the eighteenth to the twenty-​second. The conference, historically named “Bandung Conference,” welcomed leaders from thirty Asian and African countries who gathered together and discussed a wide range of topics. The conference symbolized the rise of Asian-​African movement that had an important impact on world history. Because of its participation in the conference, China was accepted as a special member of the Asian-​African movement and thus was entitled to a new identity, which, in addition to the identity of a socialist country shared by other countries of the Soviet bloc, allowed China to enter the international stage and join the game as a newly rising Asian-​African nation. On April 27, the Chinese government delegation signed with the Soviet government in Moscow “the Agreement on Using Atomic Energy for the Need of Developing National Economy.” According to the agreement, the Soviet Union would provide assistance to China’s nuclear physics research and nuclear experiment, including helping China to design and build experiment-​level nuclear reactors and cyclotrons.1 Such agreement opened a new field for Sino-​ Soviet cooperation, added new content to the Sino-​Soviet alliance, and in particular accelerated China’s transformation into a nuclear power. Because of its possession of nuclear power during the Cold War, China rose from a regional power to an influential nation in the world as the only newly rising state with nuclear weapons, although the fact of which did not materialize until ten years later. The two events above reflected the development of New China’s diplomacy during this special period and the consequent huge impetus. On the one hand, as domestic situation developed quickly, national economy quickly recovered, and the first Five-​Year Plan began to be executed, China urgently needed a stable and peaceful external environment, primarily a stable and peaceful

1 Li Jue 李觉, Dangdai zhongguo de he gongye 当代中国的核工业 [The nuclear industry in contemporary China] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1987), 20.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | DOI:10.1163/​9 789004369078_005

292 Chapter 4 neighboring environment; on the other hand, the series of military and diplomatic moves in East Asia during the early years of PRC had secured a position of regional power for China, and greatly enhanced its position in the Soviet bloc in particular. This not only strengthened the pride and self-​confidence of Chinese leaders, but also eagerness in them to more quickly overcome the strategic weakness in communication with the outside world and promote development of China’s foreign relations in wider fields. To achieve the above goals, Chinese leaders again searched for vocabularies in the familiar revolutionary discourse to describe the new diplomatic strategy, which became “international united front on peace.” Thus, China’s diplomacy gained a new starting point and embarked on a crucial transformation. China’s foreign relations quickly developed in two directions thereafter: further enrich and strengthen the Sino-​Soviet alliance, and open new development space in the Asian-​African regions. The two directions went in parallel then, which laid new foundation for Chinese diplomacy. Most profoundly, during the process of making new diplomacy, China completed the construction of national identity.

Section 1: “Get some Atomic Bombs”

The Politburo expanded meeting held on January 15, 1955 by the cpc Central Committee Secretariat in Zhongnanhai is usually taken by historians as the key decision-​making moment of China’s development of nuclear weapons. That meeting lasted more than three hours before finally producing the decision to immediately develop the nuclear industry. If taken as the starting point of China’s development of nuclear weapons, it is necessary to explore the background and causes that led to it. This is because, on the one hand, it is necessary to understand the historic root of such major decisions that were made by Chinese leaders; on the other hand, Chinese leaders formed their unique strategic thinking on nuclear during this time. China’s development of nuclear weapons is different from that of both the United States and the Soviet Union, given one basic and simple fact that China’s decision-​making happened against the backdrop of the early Cold War years when the United States and the Soviet Union began nuclear confrontation. On July 16, 1945, at the Alamogordo testing base in New Mexico, us, the first atomic bomb had a successful test explosion in the world. The next day, the us Secretary of War Henry Stimson flew to Potsdam and reported in person to Truman about the details of the nuclear test explosion, who was attending the summit of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. As Truman later recalled, he was “very excited” after hearing Stimson’s

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description of the explosion scene of the atomic bomb and stated “this is the greatest achievement in history.”2 The birth of atomic bomb indeed had huge and profound impact, but Truman naming it as “the greatest achievement” was mainly because us leaders were still worried about the prospect of war against Japan. While they totally believed that they would defeat Japan for sure, they were worried about the potential huge casualties inflicted upon the us troops. To encourage the Soviet troops to take part in the war against Japan soon, Truman followed the set strategy of Roosevelt and bargained hard with Stalin. It can therefore be imagined how excited he must be when hearing of the news of the successful nuclear test, because thus the us troops would reduce losses and he no longer needed to make more concessions to Stalin to secure Soviet participation in the war soon. On July 24, after careful calculation, Truman “accidentally” mentioned to Stalin in a meeting that the United States possessed a “new weapon” of immense power. He hoped that it would make Stalin learn of the sudden increase of advantage of the us troops, while at the same time not to make the sensitive Soviet leader feel that the United States was imposing pressure. Stalin’s reaction was unexpected, as he only said flatly that he was glad and encouraged Truman to “make good use of it to fight Japan.”3 Faced with Stalin’s aloofness, Truman at one time suspected if the latter really understood what atomic bomb was, but it turned out that soon after the end of the meeting, Stalin issued an order that the Soviet Union must accelerate development of atomic bombs. The success of the us nuclear test marked that world history entered a new era because of a new weapon enabled by advancement in science and technology, and because of the emergence of this new weapon at the final and special moment of the wwii, it opened the process of nuclear armament race and control against the special backdrop of the United States and Soviet Union transitioning from cooperation toward confrontation. The world was never in so much danger, and powers including the United States and Soviet Union never tried so hard to avoid war between them. Thus, they could only conduct the Cold War. In remote caves in Yan’an, Mao soon made his own response to the us possession of atomic bombs, and his early views had crucial impact on China’s future nuclear strategy. On August 6, two B-​29 bombers of the us Airforce flew over Hiroshima, Japan, and dropped the first atomic bomb, which was the first time that humans used atomic bombs in real war. The atomic bomb 2 William Daniel Leahy 威廉.李海., Wo zai xianchang 我在现场 [I Was There], trans. Ma Dengge 马登阁, et al. (Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 1988), 462. 3 Truman, The memoirs of Harry S. Truman, 1:353.

294 Chapter 4 with explosion volume equal to 20,000 tons of TNT decimated a city of over 300,000 residents in a blink of moment, leaving 13,000 people dead and 90% buildings destroyed. The world was shocked as the news went out. The Liberation Daily, the cpc Central Committee organ in Yan’an, soon reported the news of Hiroshima being destroyed by atomic bombs. The report cited description by foreign coverage that the us new weapon of immense power was “a revolution in war technologies,” and then briefly described the severe consequences caused by the explosion of the atomic bomb: smoke and fire in the city “reached as high as forty thousand feet,” “only thick smoke was seen, nothing else”; a few rivers in the city were also invisible, “only fire spread fast like lightning,” and “all living creatures in Hiroshima were burn to death.” In particular, after dropping the bomb the Allied forces urged Japan to quickly surrender, “otherwise Japan will be destroyed by atomic bombs.”4 On the ninth, the us Airforce dropped a second atomic bomb in Nagasaki, Japan. The next day, Liberation Daily reported that “atomic bomb further bombed Nagasaki,” together with a short essay entitled “estimate of the power of an atomic bomb,” which said 60% urban buildings were destroyed in Hiroshima with casualties over 100,000.5 Generally speaking, such coverage by Liberation Daily on the explosion of atomic bombs was less than other Chinese and foreign media. It was related to a regulation of the cpc Central Committee. As mentioned before, after the Soviet Union declared the termination of Soviet-​Japan Neutrality Treaty, the cpc Central Committee asked the publicity department to emphasize in coverage the role of the Soviet Red Army in the campaigns of Allied Troops. Thereafter, Liberation Daily had significantly reduced coverage on the huge technological advantage of the us military in the Pacific War and of the us Navy and Airforce. Despite this, Mao was still unhappy when he read about those reports on the us military using atomic bombs and considered them exaggeration. He immediately had a meeting with those in charge of publicity including Hu Qiaomu and told them that they “should not exaggerate the effect of atomic bombs.”6 This was the first time that Mao showed his basic view toward nuclear weapons as not to exaggerate the effect of nuclear weapons. As the Soviet troops declared war against Japan that day, cpc leaders immediately shifted their attention to issues such as counter offensives against Japan and accepting surrender, at the important moment of which Mao openly stated his views on atomic bombs. On August 13, he said at the cadres meeting 4 Liberation Daily, August 9, 1945. 5 Liberation Daily, August 10, 1945. 6 Pang, ed., Mao Zedong nian pu 1893–​1949 [Chronicle of Mao Zedong], 2:617.

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in Yan’an, “atomic bombs can’t make Japan surrender,” and he criticized that inside the party, “some comrades also believe that atomic bombs are gorgeous” and they were subject to “capitalist influences.” He said sharply that the idea of “weapon decides” “should be frequently cleaned away just like dust being cleaned.”7 Thereafter, cpc media greatly shifted the inclination of their reports. On August 12, Liberation Daily reprinted news from the British Daily Herald, which demanded publicity of the secret of atomic bombs and fight against the “danger of military monopoly.”8 On September 6, Liberation Daily reprinted another article from a Soviet magazine, the main point of view of which was that the atomic bomb was not omnipotent and it “cannot solve political issues in the world.”9 It can be seen thus that the cpc Central Committee formed a generally negative comment on nuclear weapons since the beginning and inclined toward limiting the political impact of us possession of atomic bombs. In Mao’s military thoughts, it was both a philosophical issue about military and a strategic issue about Chinese revolution of whether the human factor or the weapon factor would decide the result of war. His emphasis on no exaggeration of the role of nuclear weapons since the beginning was an extension of his strategic thoughts and reasoning. He believed that what decided the result of war was primarily the nature of war, and next the people who stood on the side of justice, not pieces of objects: “Weapon is an important factor of war, but not a decisive factor.”10 On the other hand, Mao at this time could not have clearly understood the changes brought by atomic bombs on world politics, but he knew deeply the significance to Chinese revolution to oppose the so-​called “weapon decides” idea. From its birth to the outbreak of the full civil war, the cpc-​led military had been surviving and fighting under disadvantaged conditions of armament, and to admit the decisive role of armament in war would be to admit that the cpc was destined to fail. The same goes for commenting on the role of nuclear weapons, not to mention that the one

7

8 9

10

Mao Zedong, “Kangri zhanzheng shengli hou de shiju he women de fangzhen 抗日战争 胜利后的时局和我们的方针 [The current situation after the victory of the war against Japan and our strategy],” August 13, 1945, in Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], 4:1133–​1134. Liberation Daily, August 12, 1945. “Yuanzi dan bu neng jiejue shijie zhengzhi wenti 原子弹不能解决世界政治问题 [Atomic bomb cannot solve the world’s political problems],” Liberation Daily, September 6, 1945. Mao Zedong, “Lun chijiu zhan [On protracted war],” May 1938, in Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], 2:469.

296 Chapter 4 possessing atomic bombs was the United States instead of the Soviet Union and that the cpc Central Committee policies were shifting toward confrontation against the United States. Later development soon proved that it was prescient and highly necessary that Mao controlled publicity on the power of atomic bombs, and his basic statement on nuclear weapons had strategic significance for the progress of Chinese revolution. The outbreak of the full civil war was also the beginning of the cpc Central Committee to start confrontation against the United States, and major decision-​making inside the cpc was accompanied by thoughts and discussions on whether the United States would intervene in the Chinese civil war, and whether it would use nuclear weapons in China. It was at this moment that Mao used extremely vivid language to comment on nuclear weapons, which he never changed thereafter. He directly resembled the atomic bomb to a “paper tiger” just like the United States: The atomic bomb is a paper tiger used by the American reactionaries to frighten people. It looks frightening, but in fact it is not frightening. Of course, the atomic bomb is a weapon of large-​scale massacres, but what decides the victory or defeat of war is the people, not one or two pieces of new weapons.11 Mao’s statement on nuclear weapons was mainly based on his existing perception of the relations between weapons and war as well as of the realistic need of Chinese revolution, while in the meantime, the statements of him and other cpc leaders generally reflected that they noticed the non-​usability of nuclear weapons and their limited destructive effect in underdeveloped countries and regions.12 On August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union declared the first successful test explosion of atomic bomb and became the second nuclear state in the world. The cpc Central Committee’s response to the Soviet possession of nuclear weapons was apparently quite positive as the “lean to one side” principle was also applicable to nuclear weapons. On September 5, People’s Daily issued a commentary in commemoration of defeating Japan, “The Soviet Union played 11

12

Mao Zedong, “He meiguo jizhe an na lu yi si si te lang de tanhua [Conversation with the American correspondent Anna Louise Strong],” August 6, 1946, in Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], 4:1194–​1195. Zhou Enlai, “Quanguo da fangong, da dao jiang jieshi 全国大反攻，打倒蒋介石 [Launch the massive counter-​attack across the country, and defeat Chiang Kai-​shek],” September 28, 1947, in Zhou Enlai xuan ji [Selected works of Zhou Enlai], 2:272–​282.

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a decisive role in defeating Japanese imperialism.”13 On September 26, People’s Daily published a statement by the Soviet press Tass that the Soviet Union had long possessed nuclear weapons and the United States needed not panic.14 On October 10, People’s Daily stated in a report of comments from a few countries that the Soviet possession of nuclear weapons would help to break the nuclear monopoly by the United States and the United States could no longer ignore the Soviet “peace recommendations.”15 These selected reports generally constructed such logic, that who possessed nuclear weapons was more important that the power of nuclear weapons, that possession of nuclear weapons was the best way to break nuclear monopoly, and that the Soviet possession of nuclear weapons was beneficial to the break of us monopoly and thus would form restriction on the United States. Regardless of whether it was a fight on ideology or political system, the view of possessing nuclear weapons to break nuclear monopoly was in logic equal to admitting that to avoid using nuclear weapons, it would be better to have more than two countries possessing nuclear weapons than only one country possessing nuclear weapons. The trip to Moscow not long after the founding of PRC inspired Mao to produce atomic bombs as Stalin’s words provoked his interest in developing nuclear weapons. Stalin was deeply encouraged by the Soviet successful test explosion of atomic bomb and he also hoped that it could encourage other countries in the Soviet Camp, and in particular, he needed to use the success to consolidate the confidence of Chinese leaders to join the Soviet Camp. During Mao’s visit to Moscow, Stalin accompanied him in person to watch movies that recorded the Soviet explosion experiment of atomic bomb. Mao was deeply impressed as it was the first time for him to directly see the huge power of explosion of atomic bomb. He told his bodyguard Ye Zilong after returning home that he felt his “horizons have opened,” and revealed the thought that China “can also get some.”16 The “get some” in Mao’s words cannot be simply

13

14 15 16

“Ji kui riben diguo zhuyi sulian qi le jueding zuoyong 击溃日本帝国主义苏联起了决 定作用 [The Soviet Union played a decisive role in defeating Japanese imperialism],” People’s Daily, September 5, 1949. People’s Daily, September 26, 1949. People’s Daily, October 10, 1949. Shen Zhihua, “Yuanzhu yu xianzhi: Sulian dui zhongguo yan zhi he wuqi de fangzhen (1949–​1960) 援助与限制：苏联对中国研制核武器的方针 [Aid and restriction: Soviet policy toward Chinese development of nuclear weapons (1949–​1960)],” in Shen Zhihua 沈志华 and Stiffler, Douglas 李滨, eds. Cuiruo de lianmeng:  lengzhan yu zhong su guanxi 脆弱的联盟：冷战与中苏关系 [Fragile alliance: The Cold War and Sino-​Soviet relations] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2010), 208–​209.

298 Chapter 4 understood as oral language, for it reflected another basic understanding of Mao toward nuclear weapons, that nuclear weapons were needed, but not too many, and hence he spoke of it as “get some.” The first clause of the Sino-​Soviet Friendship and Alliance Treaty dictated that when one party to the treaty was invaded by a third party “and is consequently in the state of war, the other party to the treaty should try its best to offer military and other assistance.”17 As the Soviet Union already possessed nuclear weapons, the treaty essentially stipulated that the Soviet Union should provide nuclear umbrella to China. But the subsequent Korean War must have discounted the actual power of this clause in the minds of Chinese leaders. Because when the Chinese military marched generously into North Korea to participate in the war, Stalin disobeyed his early promise and was reluctant to provide air coverage quickly for the Chinese troops fighting in North Korea, which was meant for the sole purpose of avoiding military conflict with the United States. The Soviet action left hard lessons on Chinese leaders, who had long taken “self-​reliance” as the fundamental principle of survival and development. Their political experience determined that they would never depend major strategic interest on the Soviet nuclear umbrella. From the general context of security strategy, the decision of Chinese leaders to develop atomic bombs was close associated with us nuclear threats. China faced us nuclear threat for the first time during the Korean War. As the Chinese troops waged two successive campaigns that dealt heavy blows on the UN troops, Truman announced nuclear threat to China for the first time at the press conference on November 30, 1950. He claimed that the us government was strengthening military power to confront the severe situation after China’s participation in the war, and “has been actively considering” the use of atomic bombs.18 After Eisenhower entered the White House, he also claimed once that the us military would use tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula in order to compel China to end the war in us terms.19 The second time China faced us nuclear threat was during the Taiwan Strait crisis between 1954 and 1955. To prevent the PLA from taking military actions along the southeast coast, the Eisenhower Administration made large-​scale deployment 17 “Zhong su tongmeng youhao tiaoyue 中苏同盟友好条约 [Sino-​ Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance],” February 14, 1950, in Niu Jun 牛军, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi shi gailun 中华人民共和国对外关系史概论 [An introduction to the history of foreign relations of the People’s Republic of China] (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2010), 99. 18 Truman, The memoirs of Harry S. Truman, 2:472–​473. 19 Zi, ed., Zhan hou meiguo waijiao shi [us diplomatic history after World War II], 1:232.

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of the Navy and Airforce at the Taiwan Strait, at the same time discussing how to protect Taiwan including whether to use nuclear weapons, and so forth. The year of 1954 enjoyed the name of “Year of Bomb” in the Cold War history, during which discussions echoed on nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy inside the United States, and corresponding public opinions had their way. On January 12, Dulles made a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in New  York City and announced that the Eisenhower Administration would implement a new strategy of “massive retaliation.” He said that no matter where war occurred, the United States would “depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing.” Richard Nixon, the us Vice President at the time, was more straight-​forward in his following speech as he claimed that the United States should depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, with mobility, “strike major bases of invasion at times and places of our own choosing.”20 The new strategy of the Eisenhower Administration provoked a new round of nuclear arms race. The Taiwan Strait crisis, taking place in such heated atmosphere, naturally became an important reason for the hawks in the United States to advocate for hardline policies, and their noise certainly would deepen China’s worries. On January 7 and 8, 1955, People’s Daily issued consecutive commentaries that reprimanded the United States for strengthening military deployment along China’s southeast coast and issuing war threats to China. These commentaries criticized that “the American generals recently have increasingly fell in love with waving the atomic weapons,” and they “shouted to use atomic weapons in the East and West” to frighten China, but “it is a waste of effort,” because “the us monopoly on the patent of atomic weapons is long obsolete.”21 The statements on breaking nuclear monopoly in the commentaries carried the logic that China was possible to develop nuclear weapons. In fact, six days later, on January 15, Chinse leaders made the first crucial decision of developing nuclear weapons.22 It was not long after the end of the Korean War that Chinese leaders seriously began to consider development of nuclear weapons. When making the first Five-​Year Plan in 1952, development of nuclear weapons was not included mainly because of the ongoing Korean War and financial difficulties. 20 21

22

Cited from Bell, Survey of International Affairs 1954, 131, 133. Jiang Nan 江南, “Zhongguo renmin shi xia bu dao de jiang 中国人民是吓不倒的江 [Chinese people are a river that cannot be frightened],” “Renmin dui zhanzheng wanhuo zhe shi buhui rongqing de 人民对战争玩火者是不会容情的 [People will not tolerate those who play with fire of war],” in People’s Daily, January 7–​8, 1955. Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:440–​441.

300 Chapter 4 On September 8, 1953, Peng Dehuai proposed to Mao to modify the Five-​Year Military Development Plan made in July 1952, which received approval from Mao.23 Peng’s proposal of modifying the Five-​Year Military Planning mainly reflected his experience commanding the Korean War and his thoughts of China’s national defense modernization, and in addition, his motivation also included the great ambition of Mao who wanted to build the Chinese military “into the second best modernized military in the world.”24 The Number One military was certainly the Soviet Red Army, and to become the second best military in the world it logically should also possess nuclear weapons. In November, to prepare for the speech at a military-​wide senior cadres meeting, Peng Dehuai arranged to meet with Gao Gang who was in charge of making the national economic plan. Peng Dehuai mentioned the prospect of development on nuclear weapons and asked if ten years would be enough to catch up with the United States in nuclear weapons.25 Gao Gang did not give an answer, just as he did not give an answer after hearing Qian Sanqiang talk about developing atomic energy. Between December 7 and January 26 the following year, the Central Military Commission held a military-​wide senior leaders meeting to make the military development planning. But no discussion was made on development of nuclear weapons at this important military meeting, One historical detail was probably the root of Mao associating nuclear weapons with China’s position in the world. As early as September 23, 1949, Vyshinsky mentioned during his speech at the UN General Assembly, “It cannot be further postponed to adopt the unconditional ban on atomic weapons and implement full and strict international control measures.” In particular, he said that the “Big Five” of the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China had “major responsibilities” to solve such issue of world peace.26 While the delegate of Kuomintang government was then occupying China’s seat in the Security Council, it did not prevent Vyshinsky’s confirmation of China’s position in the “Big Five” to be soon transferred to New China. By this time the People’s Republic of China was yet to be established, but People’s Daily

23

24 25 26

Wang Yazhi, Shen Zhihua, and Li Danhui 王亚志、沈志华、李丹慧, eds. Peng Dehuai junshi canmou de huiyi: 1950 niandai zhong su junshi guanxi jianzheng 彭德怀军事参 谋的回忆：1950 年代中苏军事关系见证 [Recollections of Peng Dehuai’s military staff: Witness of Sino-​Soviet military relations in the 1950s] (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2009), 81. Peng Dehuai quan zhuan [Full biography of Peng Dehuai], 3:1043. Ibid, 3:1087. People’s Daily, September 27, 1949.

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nevertheless published Vyshinsky’s speech, which showed that Mao and other leaders believed that New China should naturally be included in the Big Five. Mao’s identification with China’s world power position was subject to difficulties after the founding of PRC. Especially in the early 1954, the discussion among the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France on whether to invite China to the Geneva Conference and the forms of the Conference severely affected the thinking of Chinese leaders. The us government first opposed international meetings that had Chinese foreign minister in attendance, and then to abase China’s position, changed the Big Five foreign ministerial meeting proposed by the Soviet Union into a meeting “attended by foreign ministers of all countries,” and claimed at the same time that us participation in such meeting did not mean to admit the legitimacy of the PRC government. The Geneva Conference finally failed to become “the Meeting of the Big Five.” Later when Mao stated why China should develop and how to better develop nuclear weapons, he stated his views on the political values of nuclear weapons. In his mind, nuclear weapon was related to a country’s prestige and world position, not merely and even not primarily for the purpose of protecting the basic security of a country. He said that the United States and other countries looked down on China because China “has no atomic bombs, only grenades.” Therefore, China “not only needs more airplanes and cannons, but also atomic bombs. In today’s world, we have to have such thing without being bullied by others.”27 During this period, faced with the us “large-​scale revenge” strategy and changes in European security situation after the signing of the Paris Agreement in October, the Soviet Union decided to strengthen nuclear armament to balance against the large-​scale revenge strategy of the Eisenhower Administration. The Soviet military proposed a “rocket nuclear strategy” centered on developing nuclear weapons and missile carrier tools, and in the meantime to confront the development of military security cooperation between the United States and Western European countries, decided to strengthen military integration with Allied states. This played a key role in leading Chinese leaders to make the final decision. In September 1954, Peng Dehuai led a senior military delegation to visit the Soviet Union. Before the trip, Peng Dehuai especially arranged to meet with Qian Sanqiang and learnt from him about the science and technological knowledge and production issues related to development on atomic

27

Mao Zedong, “Lun shi da guanxi 论十大关系 [On the ten key relationships],” April 25, 1956, in Mao Zedong wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong], 7:27.

302 Chapter 4 bombs. Members of the delegation included many famous generals including Liu Bocheng, Su Yu, Liu Yalou, Xu Guangda, Chen Geng and so on, and they were invited to especially travel to Torsk to watch the military exercise on nuclear explosion named “Snowstorm.” At the nuclear testing bases in the Soviet Union, these generals for the first time watched the rise of mushroom cloud, as well as the huge destructive power of the shocking waves caused by the nuclear explosion. After the exercise, Bulganin gave a key that ignited the atomic bomb to Peng Dehuai as a gift. In China’s national defense and security decision-​making system, these generals were all ranked on key positions and their desire for advanced weapons could be expected, and after such visual shocks they would certainly be inclined to develop nuclear weapons. It turned out as such. On September 30, Peng Dehuai told Li Fuchun when preparing for the plan of meeting with Khrushchev who was soon to arrive for a visit, development of atomic bombs must be included in the meeting plan, and even if a few other items were reduced, development of atomic bombs should be included.28 Every Chinese leader knew that the best way to development on atomic bombs was by obtaining Soviet help, which was their consensus. Between September 29 and October 12, 1954, Khrushchev led the Soviet delegation to visit China and attend the five-​year celebration ceremony for the new nation. On October 3, at the meeting with Khrushchev, Mao directly mentioned “we are interested in atomic energy, and nuclear weapons,” “we also want to develop the industry,” and hope the Soviet Union could provide help. Mao in fact raised two requests, which respectively reflected the different focuses of China’s nuclear physicists and military leaders. The focus of the former was to develop the science of atomic energy and the nuclear industry, while the latter wanted to develop nuclear weapons. Khrushchev indeed was prepared to enhance Sino-​Soviet relations on this visit and he was determined to change almost all things that Chinese leaders thought were not conforming to internationalist principles. He also believed indeed that some of Stalin’s actions had harmed China’s interest and should be corrected.29 In addition, he also decided to increase large-​scale aid to China so that China could advance more quickly toward an industrialized country. He believed that through sincere effort and devotion, the Sino-​Soviet alliance would be strengthened, the 28 29

Liang Dongyuan 梁东元, Yuanzi dan diaocha 原子弹调查 [Investigation of atomic bomb] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2005), 30–​31. Iu. M. Galenovich  尤.米.加列诺维奇., Liang ge yibashou: he lu xiao fu he mao Zedong 两个一把手：赫鲁晓夫和毛泽东 [Two leaders: Khrushchev and Mao Zedong], trans. Fei Zhou 飞舟, Meng Xiuyun 孟秀云, Li Fanghua李芳华, Lu Jingli 卢敬利等 et  al. (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1999), 15–​18.

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Soviet Union’s international position would be further raised, and the Soviet bloc would become more united. This not only accorded with the proletarian internationalism, but also would greatly benefit the Soviet Union in dealing with the growing tensions in Europe, and more importantly would consolidate Khrushchev’s political position at home. Despite all this, Khrushchev was not fully prepared when he heard of Mao’s sudden request of help with developing nuclear weapons. Probably out of basic instinct, he immediately showed disagreement to China developing nuclear weapons as he said that it would be sufficient for China to enjoy the Soviet nuclear umbrella and there was no need to spend so much money as the development cost of an atomic bomb was very high, “It can’t be eaten, nor used,” and storage after production would also be very costly. He suggested that Mao put national economy and people’s living at the first place while what the Soviet Union could do was to help to first build a “small-​scale atomic reactor,” and China could first start on research and training of technical personnel, and so on. Khrushchev in fact stated that the Soviet Union could help China to first start on research on nuclear energy, and in response Mao said that he would consider Khrushchev’s advice.30 On October 23, Mao stated his views on atomic bombs during his meeting with the Indian Premier Nehru who was visiting in Beijing. He said that the atomic bomb as a new weapon did not fundamentally change war, “except for the increase of casualties, there was no fundamental difference.” He told Nehru that China “was beginning to conduct research,” and “it can’t be done in a while.”31 This was the first time that Chinese leaders revealed to foreign leaders outside the Soviet Union that they had decided to develop nuclear weapons. On November 29, the Soviet Union held a conference with seven Eastern European countries and prepared to establish the Warsaw Pact. Zhang Wentian, Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, attended the conference and he issued a statement supporting any decisions of the conference. The tension of a new round of us-​Soviet nuclear arms race and the Soviet Camp’s military integration process made Chinese leaders believe that they would obtain indispensable help from the Soviet Union. In fact, since Khrushchev returned home from Beijing, China and the Soviet Union had begun to hold discussions on technical cooperation over atomic energy technologies and in first half of

30 31

Shi, Zai lishijuren shen bian [Standing beside historical giants], 572–​573. Mao Zedong, “Tong yindu zongli ni he lu de si ci tanhua 同印度总理尼赫鲁的四次谈 话 [Four conversations with Indian Premier Nehru],” October 23, 1954, in Mao Zedong wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong], 6:367.

304 Chapter 4 January reached an initial agreement on the Soviet Union providing important aid to China including nuclear reactors. Based on the promise of Soviet aid, on January 15, 1955, the cpc Central Committee Secretariat held the important meeting in Zhongnanhai as was mentioned at the opening of this section. The meeting was chaired by Mao himself, while major leaders including Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De all participated in the meeting. They listened to reports of a few scientists and their judgement on the prospect of China developing atomic energy. The meeting lasted more than three hours, and Chines leaders finally made the decision and China marched toward a nuclear country hence force.32 Mao said at the meeting of fifteen people that “by a serious undertaking, it surely can be done,” and he believed that China had enough talents and resources that under Soviet help, “any miracle can be created.”33 Three days after the expanded meeting of the cpc Central Committee Secretariat, People’s Daily published a statement of a Soviet ministerial meeting. The statement declared that the Soviet Union would assist China, Poland, Czech Slovakia, Romania, and Eastern Germany to develop plans of peaceful use of atomic energy. The Soviet assistance would include design, equipment provision, and construction of an experimental atomic reactor of five thousand mega-​watts of heat energy, atomic particle accelerators, provision of sufficient numbers of atomic reactors and fission materials for use of scientific research, as well as that scientists and engineers of these countries could visit the Soviet Union to learn about related scientific research and experimental atomic reactors, and so on.34 On the twentieth, China and the Soviet Union signed the protocol of Soviet assistance to China on exploration and development of uranium mines. Undoubtedly, Sino-​Soviet cooperation and Soviet assistance was the key factor of Chinese leaders making the decision at the moment, while the fact that Soviet leaders decided to provide the aforementioned assistance to China at this moment had direct relations with the signing of the Paris Agreement between the United States and Western European countries to strengthen 32 33 34

Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:440–​441. Li, Dangdai zhongguo de he gongye [The nuclear industry in contemporary China], 20. “Sulian buzhang huiyi fabiao shengming zai cujin yuanzi neng heping yongtu de yanjiu fangmian jiyu woguo he qita guojia yi kexue, jishu he gongye bangzhu 苏联部长会议 发表声明在促进原子能和平用途的研究方面给予我国和其他国家以科学、技 术和工业帮助 [The Soviet ministerial meeting issues announcement on providing our country and other countries with help in science, technology, and industry in the field of research in peaceful use of atomic energy],” in People’s Daily, January 18, 1955.

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military cooperation, including strengthening nuclear armament in Europe. The Soviet Union was preparing to organize the Warsaw Treaty Organization, a military pact against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization under preparation, and Soviet leaders clearly knew the significance of Chinese consent and support. However, regardless of the Soviet complicated calculation of strategic interests, even mainly of its own, China after all had obtained the indispensable Soviet aid for developing nuclear weapons. On the thirty-​first, Zhou Enlai made a report on developing nuclear energy and Soviet aid at the Fourth Meeting of the State Council Plenary Session, and the meeting adopted the decision and issued for publication.35 The decision on development of atomic energy soon led to and promoted the decision-​making process for developing nuclear weapons. On February 18, when reporting to Mao about the military work for the Year 1955, Peng Dehuai proposed to gradually develop nuclear weapons.36 Development of nuclear weapons was hence put on the agenda. Since about this time, “atomic bombs” became concept of high frequency in the language of Chinese leaders and their nuclear strategic thinking began to emerge. That Chinese leaders decided soon after nation-​building to develop nuclear weapons certainly had close relations with the Cold War, as both confrontation against the United States and alliance with the Soviet Union were the important factors that led Chinese leaders to decide to quickly join the ranks of nuclear states. But in the decision-​making process of developing nuclear weapons, Chinese leaders indeed formed a unique, nuclear strategic thinking that was different from the United States and the Soviet Union, and that was unique not only because of China’s relatively backward modernization levels. Primarily, Chinese leaders still insisted that nuclear weapons as a new type of weapon could indeed cause mass destruction, but could never therefore become the key factor deciding the result of war. They certainly did not intentionally abase the role of nuclear weapons in war out of China’s difficult economy, low levels of science and technology, and weak industrial base. As Mao saw it, weapons of war from the cold weapons to hot weapons, and to nuclear weapons, “had not much difference except for the number of casualties,” and “with changes in weapons, it would only lead to nowhere other than more casualties.”37 Such perception was the basis of Mao’s nuclear deterrence 35 36 37

Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs], 4:363. Peng Dehuai quan zhuan [Full biography of Peng Dehuai], 3:1081. Mao Zedong, “Tong yindu zongli ni he lu de si ci tanhua [Four conversations with Indian Premier Nehru],” October 23, 1954, in Mao Zedong wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong], 6:367.

306 Chapter 4 thought and the important reason that he despised on nuclear threats from any side (first the United States, later the Soviet Union). For sure, the sharp confrontation between China and the United States made Mao particularly abominated the nuclear threat from the United States, and any indication in this aspect, whether minimal, would have to be hit back. The most typical was his conversation with Carl-​Johan Sundstrom, the Finn Ambassador to China. On January 28, 1955, Sundstrom presented his credentials to Mao and described how powerful the us hydrogen bomb was and dropping a few would be enough to destroy China. Mao hit back in his special cutting language: “The utmost power of the atomic bomb would be no more than hit the earth through, and if it could hit the earth through, hitting in from China and then popping up on the other side of the earth, that side would exact by the United States. The Second World War had total casualties of less than a hundred million people, and if war comes again, even if China on its own had casualties to the total casualties of the Second World War, we still have more than five hundred millions of people. The United States wants to frighten us with terror, but they can’t frighten us.”38 Since China not only possessed no nuclear weapons but its other armament was rather backward compared with that of the United States, it was thus necessary for Chinese leaders to continue to show “no fear” on nuclear deterrence, or otherwise, logically speaking, China would have to continually to make compromises, which Mao could never accept. As with the role of nuclear weapon in future wars, Chinese leaders made the basic judgement that it could not be used, or in other words, the possibility of using it was small. In this aspect, Zhou Enlai’s explanation was representative. He resembled nuclear weapons to biochemical weapons, and deduced from the ban on biochemical weapons that nuclear weapons would eventually be banned. He said, in the First World War there was poison gas, and since all parties of war possessed the weapon, “If you use and I use, the war cannot go on,” and so “international treaty was made to ban the use of poison gas,” to the extent that even in the Second World War “Hitler did not dare to use poison gas.” Viewing such trend of development, Zhou Enlai believed that “it is possible now to ban the use of atomic weapons.” The logic of statement of Chinese leaders goes that the non-​usage of nuclear weapons was certainly due to the severe disasters to humans caused by mass destruction that even the user could not survive. Mao said to Nehru in their meeting, nuclear weapons “since cannot be controlled, the issue is therefore 38

Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu heping liyong yuanzi neng wenti 关于和平利用原子能问题 [On peaceful uses of atomic energy],” January 31, 1955, in Zhou Enlai junshi wen xuan [Selected works of Zhou Enlai on military affairs, Vol. V], 4:358.

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solved,” “destruction of the early would not be allowed by humans.” However, they also held that a clear guarantee of ban on using nuclear weapons was to break the nuclear monopoly of one country (and later became breaking that of the United States and the Soviet Union). This was an important reason Chinese leaders gave when they agreed with the Soviet possession of nuclear weapons, and also an important reason as they believed that China needed to develop nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. In Zhou Enlai’s words, “oppose the use of atomic weapons on the one hand, while on the other we need to take hold of atomic energy.”39 Every time when Mao mentioned developing the type of weapons as nuclear weapons, he would normally say to “get some,” exactly because that he believed that it was low possibility that nuclear weapons be used, and a country needed not to possess large quantities of nuclear weapons, as long as “get some” could achieve the purpose of breaking the nuclear monopoly. Compared with eliminating the security threat caused by nuclear weapons, strengthening national power and enhancing international position had a larger influence on China’s decision to develop nuclear weapons. Since this period, the big country, powerful country defined in China’s strategic thinking meant to possess nuclear weapons. For possessing nuclear weapons is not necessarily a big country, a powerful country, but without nuclear weapons it must not be a big country, a powerful country. In China’s decision-​making process, two groups had been actively pushing Mao to make the decision. One group was a few nuclear physicists who were following the major trend of science and technology development and strongly suggested that China should develop the nuclear industry and allow China’s science and technology reach the world’s frontiers soon, and their voices as such had been present since the Republic of China era. The other group was military leaders such as Peng Dehuai, as aforementioned, they proposed to develop nuclear weapons from the perspective of building the world’s top armed forces. The two groups both used positive statements to promote the decision-​making process, the essence of which was to enhance national power and enhance China’s position in the world. On the other hand, the major events continuously emerging such as the Korean War, us intervention in the fight in southeast coast, Soviet development of nuclear armament and military strategy, and so on, continually provided negative stimulus on Chinese leaders and provoked their attention and emphasis on nuclear weapons. When Mao decided to develop nuclear

39

Ibid, 4:359.

308 Chapter 4 weapons, he did not change his view that nuclear weapon was no more than a new type of weapon, but he admitted that possession of nuclear weapons mattered to China’s international position. He said that atomic bomb “was said to be such a big thing, without which others would say your words don’t count. Well, let’s get some then.”40 Such perception of Chinese leaders on nuclear weapons determined that China’s nuclear strategy had the main goal of breaking nuclear monopoly and enhancing China’s international position, and based on such goal was the development plan of nuclear weapons made. As soon thereafter China decided on the military strategy of “active defense,” the border of China’s military security cooperation with the Soviet Union was gradually drawn clear, and the scope and limit of China’s nuclear cooperation with the Soviet Union was also drawn clear. The Sino-​Soviet cooperation on developing nuclear weapons became a cohesive this period that powerfully strengthened Sino-​Soviet  alliance. With the goal of breaking us nuclear monopoly and enhancing national power, China with Soviet assistance quickly marched toward a nuclear state, which had profound impact on the Cold War in East Asia and the international situation in East Asia, and till the end of the Cold War, China was the only country with nuclear weapons in East Asia. Speaking further, because of it China won the position of a powerful country that exceeded the East Asian region. At the end of the 1960s, a concept of “large triangle” emerged in China’s strategic thinking and diplomatic discourse, which was originated from here.

Section 2: Rebuild “the Middle Zone”

From the adjournment of the Geneva Conference on June 20 to the end of meeting with VCP leaders in Liu Zhou on July 5, Zhou Enlai engaged in such intense and busy diplomatic activities that were so stunning even by today’s standard. He met with Conference delegates from Laos and Cambodia, reached initial agreement on Indochina ceasefire with the new French Premier and Foreign Minister Mendès-​France, visited India and Burma, had a meeting with the VCPCC in Liuzhou to set the negotiation strategy for the next phase, and so on. Due to the importance of the Geneva Conference, historians have somehow overlooked Zhou Enlai’s lightning visit to India and Burma from June 25 to 29. 40

Mao Zedong, “Gao yidian yuanzi dan qing dan zhouji daodan 搞一点原子弹氢弹洲际 导弹 [Get some atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, and intercontinental missiles],” June 21, 1958, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong junshi wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 2:387.

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The two visits were significant primarily because of a very simple fact:  this was the first time after founding of the nation that Chinese Premier visited an Asian country not belonging to the Soviet Camp—​before then they only visited Moscow. This reason alone would tell that this diplomatic action was extraordinary. Zhou Enlai said a while later that his visit to India and Burma and the issuance of joint communique had all been decided and planned by Mao and others in Beijing.41 The development of history was also sufficient in proving that the purpose and impact of this visit had far exceeded the settlement of Indochina, and Zhou’s diplomatic efforts had paved way for Chinese diplomacy to enter a whole new world. In fact, Zhou’s visit to India and Burma was not an itinerary prearranged before participation in the Geneva Conference, for his visit to India was due to Nehru’s repeated invitations while visit to Burma was simply added to the journey. Chinese leaders by that time even hadn’t thought about going abroad to visit non-​Soviet Camp Asian countries. Compared to relations with countries of the Soviet Camp, the policy toward this type of countries was at first not active, but at this point it was growing active. The situation certainly reflected the complications in Sino-​Indian relations, particularly as India’s policies to China were once entangled with China’s Tibetan issue. On the other hand, China’s policies to India also reflected the deep impact of “Two Camps” theory and the “clean up the house before hosting guests” policy inside China. On May 23, Melon, Indian representative to the UN, met with Zhou Enlai in Geneva. He mentioned at the start of the meeting that Nehru invited Zhou to visit New Delhi during his trip back home, and Zhou gave no response. The next day, Zhou telegraphed the content of the meeting to Beijing and his focus was apparently fully on Indochina, while Nehru’s invitation was listed as the fourth item in the long report, with only two sentences informing Beijing, and without any comment or further suggestions.42 On June 13, Melon again offered invitation to Zhou. He said then that if Zhou could “stop by India for a short stay, even one day is fine,” which showed great sincerity. But Zhou told 41

42

“Zhou enlai zongli jian waizhang dui waijiao bu quanti ganbu de jianghua [Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai’s speech to all cadres of the Foreign Ministry],” November 3, 1954, PRCFMA 102-​00168-​01. “Zhou enlai guanyu yu yindu zhu lianhe guo daibiao mei nong de tanhua qingkuang zhi mao zedong, liu shaoqi bing bao zhongyang de dianbao 周恩来关于与印度驻联合国 代表梅农的谈话情况致毛泽东、刘少奇并报中央的电报 [Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and the cpc Central Committee on conversation with Krishna Menon, Indian representative to the United Nations],” May 24, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 337.

310 Chapter 4 him “it’s hard to answer right now.” This conversation was still listed in the meeting minutes to Beijing, neither long nor outstanding.43 Zhou was waiting for instructions and he did not offer his own opinions in the report. In Beijing, the CCPCC sent a reply telegraph on the thirteenth and agreed that Zhou pay a visit to India. Only one day earlier, Zhang Hanfu, the deputy Foreign Minister, submitted to the CCPCC a recommendation on whether Zhou should visit India, which was included in a comprehensive report on signing non-​aggression treaty with Southeast Asian countries. From the report, leaders in Beijing thought about Sino-​Indian relations and whether Zhou should visit India from a larger framework and the Department of Foreign Affairs was quite cautious, which was an important reason why they did not immediately reply to Zhou. Soon after the opening of the Geneva Conference, the Department of Foreign Affairs submitted a special study on the conference of premiers of five Asian countries including India, Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan and Sikkim. The study argued that premiers of the five countries were in favor of ceasefire in Indochina, and their ceasefire plan was very close to China’s proposal. In particular, India, Indonesia, and Burma all opposed the us plan of establishing the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, although they had their own purposes and reasons.44 In all, the five countries shared common positions with China on regional security issues of great concern to China, which was the main reason that Chinese leaders made the decision. In the report submitted on the twelfth, Zhang Hanfu did not give a definitive attitude to whether Zhou should accept India’s invitation, but instead raised a difficult choice. On the one hand, China had “complicated border issues” with India and Burma, while “it is possible” for India and Burma to raise the issues, which “cannot be solved in a short time,” and so whether Zhou should accept the invitation indeed had to be carefully considered. On the other hand, rejection to the invitation could lead to postponement of establishing an “Asian collective security accord,” and “it could be a major loss” to miss the window of timing. They proposed thus that if “the strategy to actively obtain support from these countries” is settled, then “it is necessary” to accept Nehru’s invitation, which not only can “show good will” to India, but can also learn Nehru’s attitude toward “Asian collective security,” and “mutual non-​aggression,” as well 43

44

“Zhou enlai yu mei nong tanhua jilu 周恩来与梅农谈话记录 [Minutes of conversation between Zhou Enlai and Krishna Menon],” June 13, 1954, in 1954 nian ri nei wa huiyi [Geneva conference in 1954], 352, 354. “Yi zhou dianbao huibian di 83 qi (guanyu yazhou wu guo zongli huiyi wenti) [Weekly collection of telegrams NO.83 (on the premier’s conference of five Asian countries)],” April 30, 1954, PRCFMA 102-​00212-​06.

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as extend an invitation to Nehru to visit China.45 The inclination and logic of the report was quite clear. Whether Zhou should accept Nehru’s invitation in fact depended upon whether to make sufficient adjustment to past foreign policy and to actively promote development of relations with non-​socialist Asian countries such as India. Soon after reading the report Mao, Liu Shaoqi and others made the decision. Liu Shaoqi instructed Zhou in a telegraph sent on the thirteenth to accept Nehru’s invitation. Seen from later development, this was a quite crucial decision as it led Chinese leaders to officially visit non-​Soviet Camp Asian countries for the first time. According to the principle of “clean up the house before hosting guests,” before this Chinese leaders had not prepared to visit countries outside the Soviet Camp, nor had any plans of inviting leaders from those countries to come for a visit. On the seventeenth, Zhou replied to the CCPCC that he decided to travel to New Delhi during the adjournment of the Conference.46 Later, his itinerary added another one-​day visit to Burma. According to his plan, the visit to India had three goals: to prepare for the conclusion of “Asian Peace Treaty,” oppose the us plan of organizing the Southeast Asian Treaty, and push for Indochina ceasefire.47 In such logical order, the purpose of this trip was mainly to exchange views with Nehru on solving regional security issues in East Asia and try to reach consensus. As the result of the visit showed, Zhou reached the expected purposes, especially as he signed with Nehru and Burmese Premier U Nu respectively a Sino-​Indian and Sino-​Burmese “Joint Declaration of Premiers.” In both joint declarations, Indian and Burmese leaders confirmed that they as China believed that the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” could apply to the relations between Asian countries and other countries in the world.48 The two communiques led Chinese leaders to believe that the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” could be a banner held high by China in Asia and possessing such banner not only benefited China’s pursuit of strategic goals in this region but were also important for subsequent adjustments of Chinese diplomacy.

45 46 47 48

Jiang guo yi lai liu shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 6:268–​269. Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:386. Ibid, 386–​387. “Joint statements from Chinese and Indian Premiers,” June 28, 1954, “Joint statements from Chinese and Burmese Premiers,” June 29, 1954, in Niu, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi shi gai lun [An introduction to the history of foreign relations of the People’s Republic of China], 99–​101.

312 Chapter 4 The visit gave Zhou more optimism and confidence. The diplomatic activities during the Geneva Conference and its adjournment led him to greatly change his views on international affairs, and the visit to India and Burma was the icing on the cake. In particular, he proposed to Nehru that the Sino-​ Indian borders maintain their current status, and the latter said “if there is an opportunity, both sides can discuss and make adjustment.”49 Regardless of how Nehru explained for himself later, Zhou apparently believed that the residual border issues were far from urgent and sharp that disallowed China to greatly improve Sino-​Indian relations, and the reality was indeed as such at the time. He believed that it was necessary and possible to change the schedule of “cleaning the house before hosting guests” made not long before founding of the new nation. On July 5, Zhou ended meeting with the VCPCC. The next day, he swept home from Nanning to Beijing and without any rest, that night he went to Mao’s residence in Zhongnanhai for an important meeting that discussed his diplomatic activities and foreign policies in the future. According to the CCP major decision-​making model, before making major decisions Mao would first choose relevant major leaders to discuss and reach consensus. This time the attendees included Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Chen Yun, and Deng Xiaoping. Undoubtedly, Zhou’s report played a key role in having them finally make the decision to adjust foreign policies. They decided to hold a Politburo expanded meeting the next day to discuss Indochina and the broader foreign policy issues.50 On July 7, the CCPCC Politburo expanded meeting was held to especially discuss China’s foreign policies. At the meeting Zhou reported the progress at the Geneva Conference, his visit to India and Burma during the adjournment, and his meeting with the VCPCC, and so forth. He said with his own observations, “In the past we planned to close the door for another year, but now it seems it can’t be closed,” “there is a trend of one wishing to close but cannot!” It was because China held very high international position, and the Soviet Union also wanted China to get more involved in international affairs.51 Not long after the meeting, Zhou made a clearer statement on the above views in another meeting. He said when mentioning Sino-​Indian relations: “In the past 49 50 51

Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:393. Ibid, 1:395. “Zhou Enlai zai zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhi ju kuoda huiyi shang de baogao jilu 周恩 来在中共中央政治局扩大会议上的报告记录 [Record of Zhou Enlai’s report at the cpc Central Committee Politburo expanded meeting],” July 7, 1954, cited from Jin, ed., Zhou Enlai zhuan 1949–​1976 [Biography of Zhou Enlai 1949–​1976], 189.

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few years, we said to first clean up the house before hosting guests. Now with initial work, the house is generally clean and so some guests can be invited to come.”52 Zhou’s description about the Geneva Conference and the visit to India and Burma elated the attendees. Mao showed recognition to the work of Zhou and the Chinese delegation, and showed deep agreement to Zhou’s suggestions. He said, “The door can no longer be closed, it shouldn’t be closed, and we must go out,” because according to the situation reported by Zhou, “It’s impossible to fully close the door, and there is a situation to our great advantage that requires us to go out.”53 Thus, the period of “cleaning the house before hosting guests” ended. He then stated his thoughts about world politics for the period, and in particular proposed a new set of policies. To state and explain the basis and significance of the great adjustment of foreign policies, in the meeting Mao once again used the “middle zone” he deserted for eight years to summarize his observation and conclusion of world politics. He said the world had seen huge changes, “The overall international situation is that the Americans are isolated. One the one hand, the Soviet Camp is well united, on the other is that other parts of the world are ‘divided and split to pieces,’ ‘it is impossible to remain monolithic.” The key was the us strategy, and Mao said the United States “has the main and biggest purpose as to settle the middle zone, namely those places from Japan to the UK, to settle those countries into cries”; the United States used the anti-​communist banner to “occupy” the territories of its allies, and especially in the East, it occupied many countries such as Japan, the Philippines, Pakistan, Thailand and others. As Mao’s argument showed, his reiteration of “middle zone” was not merely to use the phrase to describe the features of changing international politics, but rather to reevaluate and define the main goals of us strategy and the consequent main conflicts in world politics. Mao’s conclusion was clear, that the strategic goal of the United States was, as he had stated in the summer of 1946, to use the anti-​communist excuse to control the “middle zone.”

52 53

Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:420. “Mao Zedong zai zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhi ju kuoda huiyi shang de fayan jilu 毛泽东在中共中央政治局扩大会议上的发言记录 [Record of Mao Zedong’s remarks at the cpc Central Committee Politburo expanded meeting],” July 7, 1954, cited from Jin, ed., Zhou Enlai zhuan 1949–​1976 [Biography of Zhou Enlai 1949–​1976], 189; Mao Zedong, “Tong yiqie yuanyi heping de guojia tuanjie hezuo [Unite and cooperate with all countries who seek peace],” July 7, 1954, in Mao Zedong wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong], 6:333.

314 Chapter 4 Of course, in addition to using “middle zone” to describe the features of changing international politics, Mao had to provide a more complete argument for the adjustment of foreign policies. Compared with the “middle zone” thought proposed in August 1946, the concept raised this time by Mao was largely different. According to Mao’s description, in the “middle zone” raised in the summer of 1946, the main actors were thousands of revolutionary people and their revolutionary movements, although there were also a few “capitalist countries.” The “middle zone” proposed in the summer of 1954 had a quite different picture, in which the main actors became a large group of various countries and to-​be-​born new countries. Chinese leaders should focus their attention on the governments and representatives of those countries, instead of merely on people of all classes and revolutionary movements. They believed that in a world of major changes, China not only needed to strengthen the Sino-​Soviet alliance, but needed to “go out” to a larger area. The above judgment on world politics was an important basis of Mao’s decision to change China’s foreign policies. He said at a Politburo meeting on July 7, in the new global situation, China “is in a good state,” and China should “go out” to seek room of development exactly in those “middle zone” countries, with the guiding principle of “peaceful coexistence,” and “as long as they can be united on the issue of peace, we build relations with them, to protect our country, and protect socialism.”54 The next day, Mao delivered a speech on foreign policies at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Consultative Conference. He said that in the future diplomacy would develop in full feathers and the guiding principle would be the “united front on international peace.”55 Thus, Chinese leaders finally provided a complete argument for their adjustment on foreign policies. On August 24, 1954, Mao received the Labor Party delegation led by former Prime Minister Clement Attlee in Beijing, during the meeting of which he further explained the “middle zone” issue with clearer views. He described the world political structure as three parts segmented geographically, that North America where the United States was situated sat on “that side” of the Eurasia Continent, the Soviet Union and China “sit on this side,” and the rest all belong to “the middle zone.” “The United States used anti-​communism as a title to write articles,” the real purpose of which was to “occupy the countries lying in the vast middle 54 55

Mao Zedong, “Tong yiqie yuanyi heping de guojia tuanjie hezuo [Unite and cooperate with all countries who seek peace],” July 7, 1954. “Mao Zedong zai yijie quanguo zhengxie di shi wu ci huiyi shang de jianghua yaodian 毛泽东在一届全国政协第十五次会议上的讲话要点 [Summary of Mao Zedong’s remarks at the fifteenth session of the First CPPCC],” July 8, 1954, 562–​563.

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zone, bully them, control their economy, building military bases on their territories, and better weaken those countries.”56 Soon after, Mao also reminded the visiting Nehru that the us anti-​communism “is used as a title, and there is another purpose.”57 Mao’s such argument, same with that of the 1946, clearly displayed his thinking logic, that the structure of world politics was closely associated with the structure of geopolitics, and the latter had very huge impact and even determined the former. Mao’s thinking logic was quite reasonable in explaining the emergence of the Cold War international system and its basic features. All explanations on the post-​w wii international system were based on such basic fact of the rise of two non-​European powers of the United States and the Soviet Union and the fall of Europe. This was the most basic reason for the occurrence of the Cold War, and many maps of geopolitical and international politics originated from such change. In this sense, Mao’s “middle zone” was an international political vocabulary of rich content, as its grasp, summarization and description of the world contained not only unique, but universal content. It was a big and general summarization of Mao’s claim that those countries between the United States and the Soviet Union were located in the “middle”; what’s more significant was that from such perceptual framework corresponding measures gradually evolved and enriched. Again he went to the habitual revolutionary discourse to find words to summarize the new diplomatic strategy, and the concept of “united front on international peace” was thus logically born. While it certainly reflected how much Chinese leaders were used to the revolutionary discourse, its meaning also contained reasonable logic, namely that international politics were the same as domestic politics as it was full of conflicts caused by factors rooted in ideology, national interest, class conflict, and history and culture, and any effective foreign policy would therefore have to be built on the foundation of perception and identification of those conflicts, as well as to provide enough room for maneuver and appropriate guiding principles for seizing those conflicts. Here, history has provided the performing stage for people, the size of which is set, but perception and handling of the size is different and with a distinction of good and bad, which is fundamentally decided by the thinking quality of the person perceiving it. It once 56

57

Mao Zedong, “Guanyu zhongjian didai, heping gong chu yiji zhong ying zhong mei guanxi wenti 关于中间地带、和平共处以及中英中美关系问题 [On the middle zone, peaceful coexistence, Sino-​u s and Sino-​U K relations],” August 24, 1954, in Mao Zedong waijiao wen xuan [Selected works of Mao Zedong on foreign affairs], 159–​160. Mao Zedong, “Tong yindu zongli ni he lu de si ci tanhua [Four conversations with Indian Premier Nehru],” October, 1954, in Mao Zedong wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong], 363.

316 Chapter 4 again proved the existence of the “domestic orientation” feature in Chinese diplomacy and its huge impact. When Chinese leaders wanted to explain a new policy, they so easily applied experience of domestic political conflicts, followed the philosophy and mindset of explaining domestic politics, and used the discourse of domestic political conflicts to think and express. According to the political logic of Chinese leaders, to solve the above issues, first they needed to confirm the main contentions in world politics, and then assess how the various forces were associated with the main contentions before making policies to tackle with the various forces, and only thus could the “united front on international peace” be achieved. The basic vocabularies that Chinese leaders used to define the world’s main contentions were revolution, war, and peace, which mainly came from the Soviet foreign policy theories and which quite firmly supported their perceptual high-​rise in that age. In their mind, the three had different order of precedence and priorities in different times and they formed two dichotomies: one was “revolution and war,” the other “peace and war.” At times surrounding founding of the new nation, the issue of war, or more accurately speaking whether there would be a new world war and whether there would be large-​scale invasion to China, was the primary focus of Mao and others when they thought about world politics and it severely affected their thinking about Chinese diplomacy. At the time they believed that there was a danger of breaking a new world war, which was certainly related to their belief of Leninist theory and Stalin’s argument, but which also reflected a common concern of people after the end of the Second World War as the horror of world war would not so quickly dissipate from people’s minds. The outbreak of the Cold War the Soviet theory of two camps in effect deepened the worries of Chinese leaders. On September 8, 1948, the CCPCC held a Politburo meeting. Mao addressed eight issues in a report that day, the opening of which was whether there would be an outbreak of world war. As he recalled, at the meeting in December 1947, there were different opinions inside the CCPCC with two judgments of “will” and “will not,” and his own opinion was that world war could be prevented. Despite this, four days later, he still pointed out during his conclusion of the meeting, “the danger of war is strong,” although not “immediate in fight.” And so all possible difficulties must be fully predicted, the primary difficulty of which was that “if we predicted it wrong, and because of poor work and lack of power, couldn’t stop the war, the world war broke and broke fast.”58

58

Mao Zedong, “Zai zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhi ju huiyi shang de baogao he jielun [Report and conclusion at the cpc Central Committee Politburo meeting],” September 1948, in Mao Zedong wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong], 5:131–​132, 145.

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While Chinese leaders always judged it unlikely that world war break out soon, it was indeed an undisputable fact that all major decisions since the founding of nation were accompanied by their thinking and worries of world war. During this stage, in their thinking, revolution and war were the main contentions in world politics. Seizing the victory of Chinese revolution and the subsequent Chinese support for world revolution, and especially support for Asian revolutionary movements, were the most major means of preventing war to the extent of eventually destroy imperialism, mostly destroy the American imperialism at the time. In historical development, to protect basic national security, strike back on the American containment policy, and especially stop the United States from establishing a military alliance system in Southeast Asia against China, were the original and important goals when Chinese leaders adjusted the Asian policies. On the one hand, they planned to build an Asian collective security system led by China;59 on the other hand, they supported all regional security organizations or regional political organizations that had conflicts with the United States or that were different from the United States, as long as those organizations were not “put together” by the United States.60 After the conflicts and turmoil in the early founding of nation, and with the settlement of more complicated and richer diplomatic events, when Chinese leaders felt the need to adjust foreign policies to adjust to the reality of world politics, they were also trying to search for argument of more explanatory power to provide theoretical basis for more complicated foreign policies. On June 5, 1953, Zhou made a report on a foreign affairs meeting, which reflected his view that around the founding of new nation the CCPCC needed to adjust and develop an argument of world politics, and under the influence of Soviet change in foreign policy after the death of Stalin, he tried to raise some new ideas. Zhou raised a series of questions, such as “What is the main contention of the world?” What is the specific evidence of us-​Soviet confrontation? And whether has the us-​Soviet conflict “reached a showdown?” Zhou’s answers displayed his consistent style, that making theoretically one main contention into many manifestations and then ranking them to show his priority. He said, “The main contentions currently are shown in four aspects as war and peace, democracy and anti-​democracy, imperialism and colonies, and among imperialist countries.” In his mind, war and peace was in effect the 59 60

Jianguo yi lai liu shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 6:268–​269. Zhou Enlai, “Tui jin zhong ying guanxi, zhengqu heping hezuo 推进中英关系，争取和 平合作 [Promote Sino-​U K relations, strive for peaceful cooperation],” August 12, 1954, in Zhou Enlai waijiao wen xuan [Selected works of Zhou Enlai on foreign affairs], 85.

318 Chapter 4 main contention and thus placed at the first of four contentions. The subsequent center and logic of argument proved this.61 Compared with arguments in the past, Zhou’s views were quite bold and new, for he denied that us-​Soviet confrontation was the center of the world, the foundation of the “Two Camps” theory, and more importantly he placed the future of revolutionary movement at a lesser important place than before but instead peace and war became the primary concern of world politics. Since then till Mao’s speech at the “July 7” Politburo expanded meeting, no further argument on the main contentions of the world were seen from other leaders. It has repeatedly proven by history that because of Chinese leaders’ habitual logic of perception in the past and the obscurity and uncertainty toward the main contentions of the world and so on, changes in foreign policy must be incomplete and unstable. However, Zhou’s statement indeed reflected that Chinese leaders were considering some fundamental issues related to Chinese diplomacy and there was a real need to try to re-​explain the real world and Chinese diplomacy that China faced. After all, the diplomatic activities from the Korean War to the Geneva Conference made Chinese leaders feel and see firsthand that through negotiation the East and West could solve some conflicts. Their thoughts on the possibility of preventing a world war and many new argument provided room for adjustment of foreign policies, and the “united front on international peace” was a product of their thinking. Under the context then, to confirm the identity of enemy or friend through whether to agree with and support peace provided practical standards and immense room of development for the adjustment of Chinese diplomacy. In the development of diplomacy after founding the nation, the ideas explained by Chinese leaders at the meetings between July 6 and 8 represented the opening of a historic change in Chinese diplomacy, which played a transitional role in New China’s diplomatic history. All the previous chapters have provided the origins of New China’s diplomacy, as well as the evolvement of foreign policies at various stages against different environments and situations, which have shown that New China’s diplomacy contains an almost inherent transitional nature. Generally speaking, such transitional nature should have been natural by itself at this historical period, since the transition from revolution to nation-​building itself could not be the common state of history. However, it is still necessary to examine in depth some of the concrete 61

Zhou Enlai, “Jintian guoji shang de zhuyao maodun shi zhanzheng yu heping wenti 今天 国际上的主要矛盾是战争与和平问题 [The main contention in the world today is the issue of war and peace],” June 5, 1953, in Zhou Enlai waijiao wen xuan [Selected works of Zhou Enlai on foreign affairs], 58–​59.

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meanings of the transitional nature in New China’s diplomacy, which entails that during the formation of New China’s diplomacy, the Chinese Communist Party as the principal actor of foreign policy decision-​making went through the transition from a revolutionary party to the ruling party; CCP leaders including Mao and Zhou also had a transition of roles from leaders of revolutionary movements to national leaders. The two transitions were critical, for obviously there were crucial differences between considering China’s relations with the world from the perspective of revolutionary movement and considering the issue from the perspective of the nation, which at least included crucial differences in the main issues to be solved through diplomatic means and the main principles of solving foreign relations. Later history shows that the two transitions lasted a quite long time and did not finish during the period that this book accounts for. New China’s diplomacy was closely associated with foreign relations during China’s revolutionary movement, not only because its guiding principles were formed during the revolution, but also that the Chinese revolutionary victory was achieved through gradual progress. The CCP had long been an opposition party that had areas and large populations under its control and had its own political government and military, and party leaders sometimes considered and settled foreign relations through the perspective of regional government leaders and gained unique experience thereof. Mentioning of this characteristic thus helps to understand the complex meaning entailed by the transitional nature of Chinese diplomacy, for during the revolutionary period, CCP leaders had worked together with the Soviet Union and Communist International delegates as party leaders; negotiated with us special envoys and military personnel and had exchanges with government officials of Western countries as opposing party and base government delegates; had exchanges with Asian revolutionary organizations as leaders of national liberation movement, and so forth. In Asia, the CCP had almost no contact with Asian countries other than North Korea, whether official or unofficial. The CCP’s position of opposition party and the outbreak of civil war made the CCPCC too busy from considering policies toward Asian countries, and it was one of the important reasons that led Chinese leaders to continue to consider relations with Asian countries from the revolutionary perspective in the early years of the new nation. After founding of the new nation, CCP leaders became national leaders, but the change of role doesn’t mean that their views and perspectives of considering relevant issues would immediate follow the change, for such change needs a multi-​level, interactive process of construction. They once continued to observe the world through the lens of revolutionaries and the identification with the Soviet “Two Camps” theory

320 Chapter 4 further severely framed their basic views toward the situation of international politics. Shortly before founding of the new nation, Mao summarized the historic experience of Chinese revolution in “On People’s Democratic Dictatorship.” He said that the “main and basic experience” of the Chinese revolutionary victory was to “form a domestic united front” and “form an international united front.” The “international united front” here meant uniting the Soviet Union and countries in the Soviet Camp, as well as uniting “proletarian classes and peoples of all other countries.”62 Their categorization of countries at the time in fact followed very revolutionary standards. In their views, except for countries in the Soviet Camp, the rest would either be imperialist countries, or countries under control of imperialism or anti-​revolution forces. During his visit in the Soviet Union, Liu Shaoqi made a report to Stalin on the tactics of revolutions in East Asia, in which he believed that in East Asian countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and India, “the city is the center of anti-​revolution forces.”63 There is no need to explain its meaning, but what’s important is that such view was directly copied to diplomacy with other countries after founding of the new nation. After Liu’s visit to the Soviet Union, People’s Daily remarkably increased report on Asian revolutionary movements, for example, that the Vietminh in Vietnam destroyed over 500 French troops at once, the Pilipino guerilla fighters were prepared to attack the capital of Luzon, and so forth.64 On November 8, 1949, the Foreign Ministry held its inaugural ceremony. Zhou Enlai gave a speech at the event, where he said that New China’s diplomatic missions “comprise of two aspects,” one was to “establish brotherly friendship with the Soviet Union and people’s democratic countries”; the other was to “oppose imperialism.” With the presence of class, the state machine was the weapon of class conflicts, and its foreign relations function was to “unite all brother countries, unite oppressed people of all countries,” and oppose countries that were adversary to New China.65 At the Asian and Austrian Union 62 63

64 65

Mao Zedong, “Lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng [On people’s democratic dictatorship],” June 30, 1949, in Mao Zedong xuan ji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], 4:1472. Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu dongya minzu geming yundong celüe wenti gei si da lin de baogao [Report to Stalin on strategy of national revolutionary movements in East Asia],” in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:40. People’s Daily, September 7, 1949; September 12, 1949. Zhou Enlai, “Xin zhongguo de waijiao 新中国的外交 [Diplomacy of New China],” November 8, 1949, in Zhou Enlai waijiao wen xuan [Selected works of Zhou Enlai on foreign affairs], 1–​2.

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Conference held soon later, Liu Shaoqi explicitly defined many newly rising Asian countries as “colony and semi-​colony countries,” and talked freely about the development of revolutions and armed conflicts, and that the Chinese revolutionary victory was both an encouragement and a role model to the “national liberation wars” there, and in particular, that New China should take the “onerous responsibility” of assisting revolutionary movements in those countries.66 Such perception was clearly reflected in the diplomatic actions and words of Chinese leaders. In this aspect, the language used by Chinese leaders on whether to build diplomatic relations with India and Burma in the early years of the new nation was a typical representation of their basic views and attitude toward this type of countries. During this period, Chinese leaders once saw the newly independent India as part of the international reactionary forces. On pages of People’s Daily, the Indian government was defined as “reactionary government,” “cooperator” of imperialism. Chinese leaders openly expressed the belief that “India would never be bridled for long under imperialism and its cooperators,” and would one day “appear in the world as a member of the big family of socialism and people’s democracy.”67 Such negative comment on India was strengthened due to India’s attitude toward Tibet at the time. On November 12, 1949, B. T. Ranative, the Secretary General of Indian Communist Party, sent a congratulations telegraph to Mao on founding of New China. In the telegraph he praised the huge impact of the Chinese revolutionary victory to Asian revolutionary movements, and said at the same time that the Nehru government was

66

67

Liu Shaoqi, “Zai yazhou aozhou gonghui huiyi shang de kaimu ci [Opening remarks at the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australian Countries],” November 16, 1949; Liu Shaoqi, “Zai beijing gejie qingzhu yazhou aozhou gonghui huiyi chenggong dahui shang de jianghua [Remarks at the celebration assembly by all aspects of society in Beijing for the success of the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australian Countries],” Novemer 23, 1949, in Jianguo yi lai Liu Shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:130–​139, 145–​150. “Yindu fandong zhengfu xuexing zhenya renmin 印度反动政府 血腥镇压人民 [The Indian reactionist government bloodily oppresses its people],” March 15, 1949; “Zhong yin renmin tuanjie qilai! Da bai diguo zhuyi yinmou! Yindu gongchandang yu shehui gonghe dang dian he zhongyang renmin zhengfu mao zhuxi fenbie hedian 中印人民 团结起来！打败帝国主义阴谋！印度共产党与社会共和党电贺中央人民政府 毛主席分别贺电 [Unite, Chinese and Indian people! Defeat imperialist conspiracy! Congratulation telegrams to the Central People’s government from Indian Communist Party and Social Republican Party, and Chairman Mao replied separately],” November 20, 1949, in People’s Daily.

322 Chapter 4 implementing policies opposing New China and it could not represent Indian people, that this government “implements orders of the British and American imperialists,” and “wants to build India into a reactionary fortress that opposes China.”68 The telegraph was published in People’s Daily and Mao replied with appreciation, which showed that Chinese leaders accepted such description of India. The causal relations could clearly be told between the description of the Indian government in the congratulations telegraph and Mao’s claim of India as “an affiliate state to imperialism,” and such historical factor could only be erased by historical development. On December 16, 1949, the Burmese government sent a telegraph to the Chinese Foreign Ministry and expressed its recognition of the New China and its willingness to establish diplomatic relations. In the telegraph in reply to Zhou Enlai’s request for instructions, Mao said that the other side needed to “send a delegate in charge to Beijing” to discuss related issues, that “all capitalist countries should follow this,” where negotiation was to guarantee that “initiative is still in our hands.” Mao’s reply telegraph contained both a categorization of Burma’s class, as well as the real purpose of demanding negotiation.69 On the twenty-​first, Zhou Enlai replied in telegraph that confirmed the classification of Burma and agreed with Mao’s opinion, namely to “gain initiative” through the demand of negotiation, and he added “the negotiation can procrastinate some time as appropriate,” namely no hurry to establish relations and there could be some procrastination.70 That day, he replied to the Burmese government asking to hold negotiation on building relations. Soon after, the Indian government expressed the will to establish relations and Chinese leaders basically followed suit. On January 17, 1950, Liu Shaoqi told Mao in telegraph that Nehru had sent a telegraph that day, stating that only by agreeing to both countries having established relations and adopting practical steps “can effective negotiation

68 69

70

Ibid. Mao Zedong, “Guanyu tong miandian jianli waijiao guanxi deng wenti de dianbao 关于同缅甸建立外交关系等问题的电报 [Telegram regarding establishment of diplomatic relations with Burma and other issues],” December 19, 1949, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:193. Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu tong miandian jianjiao deng wenti gei mao zedong de dianbao 关于同缅甸建交等问题给毛泽东的电报 [Telegram to Mao Zedong on establishment of diplomatic relations with Burma and other issues],” December 18, 21, 1949, in Jianguo yi lai zhou enlai wen gao [Works of Zhou Enlai since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:690–​691.

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be made,” namely establish relations first before negotiation.71 Later, Liu Shaoqi certainly sent another telegraph on the matter to Mao and suggested a reply to India and touched upon relations with the UK. At one a.m. on the twentieth, Mao replied to Liu Shaoqi in telegraph that he agreed with the reply to India, but the reply to the UK “should be delayed for a while.” Apparently out of discontent with some in the Foreign Ministry, Mao said they “don’t get the benefit of delaying a while,” because “the initiative is fully in our hands.”72 That day, he sent another telegraph to Liu and particularly explained that the request for negotiation before establishing relations with those countries was for the exact purpose of delaying for some time. He said that negotiation with the UK and India was “to create some trouble and delay the time, to show that we are not in a hurry to build diplomatic relations with these imperialist countries and their affiliate states, but instead to prove that these countries are hurrying to squeeze inside.” He also stated that the benefit of delaying them was “to at the same time delay the time of the us imperialist bloc from squeezing in.”73 Mao’s view of these countries requesting to establish relations with China as the hope to “squeeze in” was a logical extension from “clean up the house before hosting guests.” Here Mao defined India as an affiliate state to imperialism, and the principle of “non-​recognition” also applied to such countries. In some activities hosted by the Chinese government, they intentionally decided not to invite India delegates to participate in order to show the discrimination policy between socialist countries and capitalist countries. Later, on April 1, China officially established relations with India, and the main reason of Chinese leaders quickly making such decision was that the PLA would

71

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Liu Shaoqi, “Guanyu yindu zhengfu pai daibiao lai beijing tanpan liang guo jianjiao deng wenti gei mao zedong de dianbao 关于印度政府派代表来北京谈判两国建交等 问题给毛泽东的电报 [Telegram to Mao Zedong regarding the Indian government’s dispatch of delegates to Beijing to negotiate the establishment of diplomatic relations between both countries and other issues],” January 19, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai liu shaoqi wen gao [Works of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:364. Mao Zedong, “Guanyu tongyi yindu lishi daibiao dao Beijing tanpan jianli waijiao shituan de dianbao 关于同意印度历史代表到北京谈判建立外交使团的电报 [Telegram on consent to receive Indian representatives in Beijing to negotiate on establishment of diplomatic corps],” January 20, 1950, in Jianguo yi lai mao zedong wen gao [Works of Mao Zedong since the founding of People’s Republic of China], 1:249. “Mao Zedong dui ying yin tanpan qi mudi zai tuoyan shiri zhi zhishi 毛泽东对英印谈 判其目的在拖延时日之指示 [Mao Zedong’s instruction: the purpose of British-​Indian negotiation is to buy time],” November 20, 1950, PRCFMA 110-​00022-​05.

324 Chapter 4 soon march into Tibet and India admitted to Tibet being the internal affairs of China. The negotiation process revealed that the identification of countries such as India through ideology indeed affected the thinking and decision-​ making of Chinese leaders. There were many complex factors affecting New China’s relations with newly rising countries in Asia, which not only included the “Two Camps” theory in the Cold War and Sino-​Soviet relations, but also historical heritage issues between China and these countries such as territorial disputes around border areas, overseas Chinese and so on. Of course, there was another most basic historical reason, that these countries were newly independent and Chinese leaders totally lacked experience dealing with those countries. They had not visited those countries nor had any direct contact with leaders there, and such lacking of knowledge and experience made the Cold War ideology more likely to dominate the thinking and policies of Chinese leaders. That India and other newly rising countries showed increasingly strong independent characters in major international affairs gradually changed the view of Chinese leaders toward these countries. Especially on the series of issues that directly mattered to China’s national security and position in the world, such as China’s seat in the UN, the Korean ceasefire, restoration of peace in Indochina, and us establishment of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the newly rising countries in Asia proved with real actions that they maintained strong independence and were inclined toward seeking fuller right of autonomy and impact, and that it would be far from the reality to define their national nature and foreign policies in by such labels as “former colony and semi-​colony country,” “affiliate state to imperialism,” “capitalist country” and so on. More frequent and deeper exchanges with leaders of these countries also changed the view of Chinese leaders. For a long time, Chinese leaders found it confusing as to how to define these Asian countries. They could not easily find words from the existing political vocabulary that adapted to the development of Chinese diplomacy, while the habit of class conflict language also limited their imagination. By the summer of 1954, some new concepts emerged in Chinese diplomacy and Chinese leaders began to use them to address the newly rising countries in Asia (and later including Africa). These concepts basically included three categories, which reflected the perspective and logic of Chinese leaders. The first category used geography and culture as standard, such as “country in the East,” “Asian country,” “Asian-​African country” and so on. The second used the degree of independence of national sovereignty as standard, such as “independent and self-​reliant,” “close to independent and self-​reliant” and so on. The third used relations with the Cold War “two camps” as standard, such as “countries

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in the middle,” “neutral country,” “the Third World bloc” country and so on.74 Obviously, when Chinese leaders decided to change foreign policies, they had been consciously redefining these countries in order to find reasonable basis for the new policy and establish a diplomatic discourse that would assist advantaged and effective relations. The effort to redefine newly rising countries in Asia carried a more profound significance to the change of Chinese diplomacy. The discourse system constructed upon those definitions in effect reflected a new identity of Chinese diplomacy, namely that China possessed an identity that was not only different from capitalist countries such as the United States, but also different from socialist countries such as the Soviet Union. Such identity was first seen in Liu Shaoqi’s conversation on revolutionary movements in the East during his visit in Moscow in the summer of 1949, and since July 1954, it was consciously constructed by Chinese leaders during their exchanges with leaders of Asian countries. On October 19, 1954, Mao met with the visiting Nehru. After consideration he decided to make the identity of “countries in the East” as the theme. During this meeting, Mao stated that newly rising countries in Asia shared three commonalities, including that they had all suffered invasion and oppression of imperialism and colonialism, they had all been looked down on as agricultural countries with backward industries, and geographically they were all in the East, in Asia.75 Probably since this day, “commonality” became a theme of Chinese leaders’ meeting with all visiting Asian and African national leaders. On April 19, 1955, Zhou’s supplementary remarks at the plenary session of Bandung Conference was a classic piece in which he drove the theme set by Mao toward a peak.76 Undoubtedly, when Chinese leaders used the world 74

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Mao Zedong, “Tongyindu zongli ni he lu de si ci tanhua [Four conversations with Indian Premier Nehru],” October 1954; “Tong miandian zongli wu nu de tanhua [Conversation with Burmese Premier U Nu],” December 21, 1952; “Tong yinni zongli sha si te luo a mi zuo yue de tanhua 同印尼总理沙斯特罗阿米佐约的谈话 [Conversation with Indonesian Premier Sastroamijoyo],” May 26, 1955, all in Mao Zedong wen ji [Collected works of Mao Zedong], 6: 367, 374, 411. Zhou Enlai, “Women de waijiao fangzhen he renwu [Our diplomatic strategy and tasks],” April 30, 1952, in Zhou Enlai waijiao wen xuan [Selected works of Zhou Enlai on foreign affairs], 49; “Guanyu ya fei huiyi 关于亚 非会议 [On the Asian-​African Conference],” PRCFMA 207-​00085-​17. Mao Zedong, “Tong yindu zongli ni he lu de si ci tanhua [Four conversations with Indian Premier Nehru],” October, 1954. Zhou Enlai, “Zai ya fei huiyi quanti huiyi shang de buchong fayan 在亚非会议全体会 议上的补充发言 [Supplementary remarks at the plenary session of the Asian-​African Conference],” April 19, 1954, in Zhou Enlai waijiao wen xuan [Selected works of Zhou Enlai on foreign affairs], 120–​125.

326 Chapter 4 “commonality,” it showed that they believed that China was a country of that kind of nature and image, and such nature and image were worthy and active and was the foundation and starting point of China’s diplomatic actions. The subsequent continuous exchanges with Asian and African countries repeatedly strengthened such identity. For a period after the “July 7” meeting, Chinese leaders achieved uncommon success in building a new national identity, which was not only reflected in laying a solid foundation for the development of relations with Asian and African countries and opening a wide avenue, but more importantly, the peak of such identity construction was associated with perspectives of revolutionary history of Chinese leaders and made Chinese hold strong belief in such special identity and with full pride and self-​confidence. While it enforced China’s confrontation against the United States at the time, it later became an important root of Sino-​Soviet dispute, the profound impact of which even reached today. Because of such identity, Chinese leaders had a stronger sense of privilege morally than the Soviet Union deep inside, and they believed that China by inheritance had larger legitimacy than the Soviet Union in Asian and African (and later adding Latin American) national liberation movements. After founding of New China, the first Asian countries to establish relations with China were North Korea and the People’s Republic of Vietnam. Later until the opening of the Asian-​African conference in April 1955, the Asian countries that established relations with China included India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The reasons to this situation were many, which certainly included the aftershock of the Korean War and the impact of the us containment policy, but not to be underestimated were the limitations on Chinese leaders making foreign policies within the “Two Camps” theoretic framework, as well as the negative impact of the special understanding of Chinese leaders toward diplomacy. To change the foreign relations situation required adjustment of foreign policies and change in fundamental understanding of state relations. On April 30, 1952, the Foreign Ministry department held the first meeting for foreign ambassadors stationed in China. Zhou Enlai made a speech at the meeting that stated New China’s diplomatic strategies and future tasks. When explaining China’s foreign policies, Zhou from the beginning said clearly that since the founding of New China, “we have insisted on peaceful foreign policies,” and then summarized the concrete strategies of “executing peaceful policies” in the six aspects that had been implemented in the past, such as “starting all over again,” “lean to one said,” “cleaning up the house before treating guest,” “courtesy requires reciprocity,” “exchanges of possession,” and “uniting the world’s people.” On such basis of statement with a history and logic not so easily

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understood, Zhou modified the statement of Chinese leaders before founding of New China on the international united front and made a rather creative statement. He said that to Chinese diplomacy, except the United States, countries were distinguished according to “the main key as attitude toward war and peace,” not the class nature of countries. Zhou also pointedly raised a question in the remarks: “Is diplomacy relations between states, or relations between peoples?” He said that diplomacy needed to unite people of all countries, but “diplomacy itself has a subject of relations between states.” Diplomacy “has a subject of relations between states.” Such simple conclusion seen today was symbolic at the time as it showed that the fundamental difference between New China’s diplomacy and foreign relations of China’s revolutionary movement was finally clearly understood and explained. But Zhou at the time had to coordinate his explanation with the past understanding toward diplomacy, to explain that “diplomacy runs in the form of relations between states, but the end result is to impact and win support of people.” He said “it is dichotomy,” and “this point needs to be clear.”77 Zhou’s statement marked a beginning of Chinese leaders to think about China’s diplomatic policies from a new level, as his remarks had both a summary of diplomatic experience of the past period and a response to the deteriorating security environment of China. Besides taking the side of the Soviet Camp to confront the United States, China’s foreign relations needed to have new fields of development. The subsequent diplomatic activities had to solve an outstanding issue of not relations with “brother countries” led by “brother parties” of the Soviet Camp, but rather relations with countries in the “middle zone,” which mainly meant Asian countries, and primarily relations with neighboring Asian countries. As what Chinese leaders gained from the exchanges with leaders from India and other countries, Asian countries represented by India were to China “closer, with stronger united front.”78 The Asian countries that newly established relations with China at this period included North Korea and the People’s Republic of Vietnam that belonged to the Soviet Camp, as well as newly rising Asian countries such as India and Burman. As they represented two types of countries of different nature, Chinese leaders gained different experience from the exchanges. What played a decisive role in relations between countries of the Soviet Camp was relations between the ruling communist parties, and the operating principle behind such dominating inter-​party relations was called “proletarian 77 78

Zhou Enlai, “Women de waijiao fangzhen he renwu [Our diplomatic strategy and tasks],” 48–​54. Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:420.

328 Chapter 4 internationalism,” which was consistent with the principle of solving foreign relations of revolutionary movement; but such principle apparently found no universal application in solving relations with other countries and could not be applied to relations with any other type of countries. Moreover, later development sufficiently proved that even among countries of the Soviet Camp, the principle could not sustain. Chinese leaders gradually gained experience from the exchanges with India and other countries and their positions and attitudes on major international affairs, and summarized the basic principles of solving relations with countries of different political systems. On May 23, 1951, the “Agreement between People’s Central Government and Tibetan Regional Government on Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” (“zhongyang renmin zhengfu he Xizang defang zhengfu guanyu heping jiefang Xizang banfa de xieyi”《中央人民政府和西藏地方政 ) was signed. The situation in Tibet gradu府关于和平解放西藏办法的协议》 ally settled, but dispute between China and India on India-​Tibet relations thus stood out. China and India continued to engage on some concrete matters mainly to solve some privileges and common rules that India obtained during the British colonial rule, such as Indian station of troops in some places in Tibet, privileges of Indian diplomatic personnel, and so on. On September 2, 1953, Nehru sent a letter to Zhou and suggested that both sides hold negotiation talks on Sino-​Indian relations in the Tibetan region.79 Three days later, Indian envoy B. K. Nehru handed in a memorandum in person to Yuan Zhongxian, Chinese Ambassador to India, which suggested that both sides “discuss all issues to be solved as soon as possible,” and many exchanges in the past showed that “consideration of scattered issues cannot lead to full settlement.”80 One month later, on October 3, Nedyam Raghvan handed in another memorandum in person to Yuan Zhongxian, suggesting that the Chinese government “take the earliest opportunity” to solve issues between

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“Lai jia wen dashi zhuanda ni he lu zongli zhi zhou enlai zongli guanyu quanpan shangtan zhong yin zai xizang de guanxi wenti de laidian 赖嘉文大使转达尼赫鲁总理致周恩来 总理关于全盘商谈中印在西藏的关系问题的来电 [Telegram from Premier Nehru to Premier Zhou Enlai passed by Ambassador Raghavan regarding an overall discussion of Sino-​Indian relations in Tibet],” September 2, 1953, PRCFMA 105-​00119-​03, 9–​11. “Yin waijiao mishu R.K. ni he lu mian jiao yuan zhong xian dashi guanyu quanpan shangtan zhong yin zai xizang de guanxi wenti de beiwang lu 印外交秘书R.K.尼赫鲁面交袁 仲贤大使关于全盘商谈中印在西藏的关系问题的备忘录 [Memorandum handed by Indian Secretary of Foreign Affairs R.K. Nehru to Ambassador Yuan Zhongxian regarding an overall discussion of Sino-​Indian relations in Tibet],” September 5, 1953, PRCFMA 105-​00119-​03, 11–​13.

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both countries in India-​Tibet relations.81 On the fifteenth, Zhou replied to Nehru and officially expressed the hope to hold talks in Beijing in December. As he said in the letter, the foundation of Sino-​Indian friendly cooperation was “equality, reciprocity, and mutual respect of sovereignty,” and relations of both sides in Tibet should use the three-​point “new foundation to discuss and rebuild,” namely that those Indian privileges built upon unequal treaties between the British Indian colonial government and China should be abandoned, but India’s interest in Tibet could be solved through negotiation.82 On the twenty-​third, Nehru replied with agreement to the suggestion of holding talks, and agreed to Zhou’s suggested “new foundation.”83 At the end of December, Sino-​Indian talks were held in Beijing as planned. On the thirty-​first, Zhou met with the Indian negotiating delegation. He recommended that both sides should follow “the principles of mutual respect of sovereignty, mutual non-​aggression, mutual non-​interference in other’s domestic politics, equality and reciprocity, and peaceful coexistence.”84 With the extreme complexity of Sino-​Indian relations and subsequent curvy development of relations of both countries, it was with strong purpose in mind that Zhou recommended so many principles systematically at the time, which also reflected the typical meaning of Sino-​Indian relations. On April 29, 1954, China and India signed an agreement, in the “preamble” of which included Zhou’s aforementioned recommendation, and the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” were for the first time completely written in diplomatic 81

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“Lai jia wen dashi mian jiao zhang han fu fu buzhang guanyu quanpan shangtan zhong yin zai xizang de guanxi wenti de beiwang lu 赖嘉文大使面交章汉夫副部长关于全 盘商谈中印在西藏的关系问题的备忘录 [Memorandum handed by Ambassador Raghavan to deputy Minister of foreign affairs Zhang Hanfu regarding an overall discussion of Sino-​Indian relations in Tibet],” October 3, 1953, PRCFMA 105-​00119-​03, 18. “Zhou enlai zongli zhi ni he lu zongli guanyu quanpan shangtan zhong yin zai xizang de guanxi wenti de fuhan 周恩来总理致尼赫鲁总理关于全盘商谈中印在西藏的 关系问题的复函 [A response letter from Premier Zhou Enlai to Premier Nehru regarding an overall discussion of Sino-​Indian relations in Tibet],” October 15, 1953, PRCFMA 105-​00119-​03, 19–​21. “Gao bodeng canzan zhuanda ni he lu zongli zhi zhou enlai zongli guanyu quanpan shangtan zhong yin zai xizang de guanxi wenti de fuhan 高勃登参赞转达尼赫鲁总理致周 恩来总理关于全盘商谈中印在西藏的关系问题的复电 [Response from Premier Nehru to Premier Zhou Enlai passed by counsellor Gao Bodeng regarding an overall discussion of Sino-​Indian relations in Tibet],” October 23, 1953, PRCFMA 105-​00119-​03. Zhou Enlai, “Heping gong chu wu xiang yuanze 和平共处五项原则 [Five principles of peaceful coexistence],” December 31, 1954, in Zhou Enlai waijiao wen xuan [Selected works of Zhou Enlai on foreign affairs], 63.

330 Chapter 4 literature.85 It was not coincidence that the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” were first raised in China’s agreement with India, which revealed the logic of Chinese leaders when they perceived relations between countries. It was necessary for Chinese leaders to find solutions that could both work and be widely accepted that China could peacefully coexist with countries of different social institutions at the same time with supporting revolutionary movements. In other words, Chinese leaders had to cut off revolutionary ideology from foreign policies and diplomatic behaviors of a nation in order to prevent the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” from falling into unconvincing, flamboyant empty talk. It required Chinese leaders to have a conscious role awareness of national leaders. In retrospect, such role awareness of Chinese leaders was gradually constructed in the interaction between diplomacy and nation-​building. The most influential event during this period was the Geneva Conference, which was the first multilateral international conference between non-​socialist countries that New China’s leaders attended in the role of national delegates. During the conference, Zhou was engaged with delegates of almost all types of countries in the world, the majority of which considered Zhou as a national leader, not a member of the Standing Committee of the CCPCC Politburo. And when Zhou himself and other members of the Chinese delegation appeared on the international multilateral diplomacy stage as national diplomatic delegates, they also had to use vocabularies such as nation and national interest to think about and explain China’s policies and behaviors, or otherwise they could not even conduct basic communication, not to mention diplomacy. Zhou’s visit to India during the conference was symbolic, for a major point of his meeting with Nehru was to explain to the latter, “revolution cannot be exported.”86 In other words, China could not develop cooperation relations with countries of different systems on the basis of facilitating revolutionary movements. Continuous foreign exchanges often could in return promote adjustment of foreign policies, for during exchanges with the outside world it was necessary for Chinese leaders to continually offer explanation and mobilization domestically. They not only had to explain to foreign delegates that China also hoped to

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“Zhonghua renmin gongheguo, yindu gongheguo guanyu zhongguo Xizang defang he yindu zhijian de tongshang he jiaotong xieding 中华人民共和国、印度共和国关 于中国西藏地方和印度之间的通商和交通协定 [Agreement between PRC and Republic of India on commerce and transportation between Tibet, China and India],” in People’s Daily, April 30, 1954. Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:391.

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peacefully get along with them, but also had to explain to their own cadres why and how to peacefully coexist with those countries. Such job was far from easy. After the decision to invite Nehru to visit China in October, some in the diplomatic system had suspicion toward the decision, for in their views the mission of Chinese diplomacy should be to support revolutions, not to have exchanges with capitalist leaders. After Nehru left China, some still could not understand why he was “warmly welcome.”87 Before taking major diplomatic actions, Zhou often would explain domestically in person the relations of those actions with the new foreign policies. In a meeting one day before Nehru’s arrival in Beijing, Zhou especially explained the reasons of changing policies toward such type of Asian countries as India and inviting Nehru. He said that countries like India “indeed want peace, not war,” and uniting them “not only can postpone war, but can change the direction of war.”88 On November 3, about one week after Nehru left China, Zhou made a speech at an all cadres meeting of the Foreign Ministry and systematically explained the new foreign policies. It could be concluded from Zhou’s logic that he believed that this adjustment of foreign policy had a purpose to change some policies made in the early period after founding of New China. As he addressed foreign policy issues, he said from the start that “when the Foreign Ministry was established I made a speech,” and then directly pointed to the core issue that must be solved to execute the “international united front on peace” policy, namely China’s relations with the revolutionary movements inside Asian countries. He said that class societies would embark on revolutions, that the human society would enter socialism and eventually “enter communism,” and from there he explained the reason of why revolution was a must but revolution could not be exported. He said, “What does revolution rely on? On people, and primarily on the laboring people,” and so “revolution must rely on a country’s own people,” not relying on other countries, and thus “the claim of revolution import should be criticized.” He said that the world’s proletarian class was indeed “one family and should be united,” but the capitalist class “has divided nations,” under the circumstances of which we had to rely on “peaceful competition, not force,” and “believe that our system is superior.” In a word, the policy of peace was China’s “fundamental policy,” and the future of world revolution “was to rely on first, a nation’s own people, and two, peaceful

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“Zhou Enlai zongli jian waizhang dui waijiao bu quanti ganbu de jianghua [Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai’s speech to all cadres of the Foreign Ministry],” November 3, 1954, PRCFMA 102-​00168-​01, 9. Zhou Enlai nian pu 1949–​1976 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai], 1:420.

332 Chapter 4 competition between countries.”89 Thus, Zhou temporarily crossed off the task of supporting world revolutionary movements from the nation’s diplomatic actions. At this point, Mao was also thinking about it and in general agreed with the view that “revolution cannot be exported,” but with a slight difference from Zhou. In his meeting with the Burmese Premier U Nu he explained as such: a country relying on a foreign exported revolution could not achieve success, and thus “revolution cannot be exported,” but it was also undeniable that a country’s revolution was still subject to foreign influence.90 This reflected that the existing logic in his head was in fact very hard to change, and its influence was later proved immense. With the end of the Geneva Conference, New China’s diplomacy entered a new stage of development. Beginning from August, Chinese leaders consecutively received many delegations from around the world in Beijing. They included the Soviet government delegation led by Khrushchev and delegations from a large bunch of Soviet Camp countries, as well as leaders from Asian and European countries and all types of government and party delegations. All these diplomatic activities would be attended by Mao and Zhou themselves. From their exchanges with leaders and political figures from Asian and European countries, it could easily be seen that the “middle zone” concept was beginning to replace “two camps”; vocabularies such as “peace” and “peaceful coexistence” frequently appeared and became the main diplomatic language of Chinese leaders when they explained international political issues and China’s foreign policy. Remarkably, these vocabularies soon were adopted by Chinese leaders to define and describe relations with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Camp countries. The change in New China’s diplomacy peaked at China’s attendance of the Bandung Conference in April 1955. From the spring of 1954 till summer of 1955, staff of the Foreign Ministry did a great many in-​depth studies and analyses on the major events happening in Asia such as the Colombo Conference, the Geneva Conference, the Manila Conference, the Bogor Conference, and the Bandung Conference, as well as the major Asian countries involved. The Foreign Ministry came from the Central Military Commission’s Foreign Affairs Group established at Yan’an times, and the first core diplomats of New China were members of the Group. It was the same for these professional diplomats coming from revolutionary movement that they often observed world politics with their domestic 89

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“Zhou Enlai zongli jian waizhang dui waijiao bu quanti ganbu de jianghua [Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai’s speech to all cadres of the Foreign Ministry],” November 3, 1954, PRCFMA 102-​00168-​01, 5–​6. Mao Zedong, “Tong miandian zongli wu nu de tanhua [Conversation with Burmese Premier U Nu],” December 21, 1952.

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political experience. It was quite easy for them to understand, accept and apply the policy of “international united front,” which to them was no more than applying the domestic political experience of the revolutionary period to international politics. The studies they submitted rather fully displayed how the “international united front” idea was effectively used to analyze the various aspects of domestic and foreign policies of newly rising Asian countries and to help Chinese leaders further see and believe that the us Camp was no longer monolithic, and that China could make great achievements among the Asian and African newly rising countries. People of those countries and all classes all opposed war, wanted peace and opposed the West. In order to maintain the rule, the “ruling class” there had to hold the banner of peace and neutrality and oppose us expansion and establishment of an anti-​China military alliance system in Asia.91 These studies were important basis for Chinese leaders to decide to change foreign policies and believe that there was chance for success, and they were important conditions for China to walk to the center stage of Asia through Asian and African conferences. During the decision-​ making process of participation in the Bandung Conference, Mao as usual played the role of core leader and main driver of policy. He attended to the matter himself and met with every visiting foreign leader to Beijing during this period. In his meetings with Asian national leaders including Nehru and U Nu, Mao directly listened to their explanations of concepts such as “peaceful zone,” neutrality, the Colombo Conference, and Asian-​African Conference, as well as the essence of policies implemented by those leaders and their determination. On December 21, Mao told U Nu that 91

“Yi zhou dianbao hui bian di 83 qi (guanyu yazhou wu guo zongli huiyi wenti) [Weekly collection of telegrams NO.83 (on the premier’s conference of five Asian countries)],” April 30, 1954, PRCFMA 102-​00212-​06; “Guanyu ya fei huiyi wenti [On the Asian-​African Conference],” September 4, 1954, PRCFMA 207-​00085-​19; “Dongnan ya jiti fangwu tiaoyue ji ge guo dui gai tiaoyue de fanying 东南亚集体防务条约及各国对该条约的 反应 [The Southeast Asian Collective Defence Treaty and responses of all countries],” October 1, 1954, PRCFMA 105-​00626-​02; “Guanyu ya fei huiyi wenti [On the Asian-​ African Conference],” December 15, 1954, PRCFMA 207-​00085-​17; “Yi zhou dianbao hui bian di 98 qi (dongnan ya wu guo mao wu huiyi de chengxu ji wu guo dui zhongguo canjia ya fei huiyi de taidu) 一周电报汇编第98期（东南亚五国茂物会议的程序及五 国对中国参加亚非会议的态度） [Weekly collection of telegrams No.98 Procedures of the Bogor Conference of the five Southeast Asian nations and attitudes of the five nations toward China’s participation in the Asian-​African Conference],” December 29, 1954, PRCFMA 102-​00212-​21; “Cong mao wu huiyi kan ya fei huiyi从茂物会议看亚非 会议 [The Asian-​African Conference in light of the Bogor Conference],” January, 1955, PRCFMA 207-​00085-​25.

334 Chapter 4 Chinese leaders were “very interested” in the planned Bandung Conference, “if other countries agree, we would like to attend the conference.” He also stated China’s requirement, that the Taiwan authority could not be invited to participate.92 Mao focused his attention on diplomacy during this period, which greatly facilitated China’s rapid change of foreign policies. Thereafter, China began to actively seek to participate in the Asian-​African Conference and began careful preparation till Zhou finally walked onto the stage of Bandung. By participating in and driving the Bandung Conference toward success, China greatly improved relations with Asian and African countries, and Zhou himself gained unprecedented reputation and influence. Most classic was his “supplementary remarks” made on the afternoon of April 19, which very effectively explained the principle of “seeking common ground while reserving differences.”93 In the subsequent enormous amount of diplomatic activities, he played the principle to the extreme and achieved shining result. The result of the Bandung Conference made Chinese leaders believe that the principle of “seeking common ground and allowing differences” could work, and therefore peaceful coexistence was entirely possible. They had no time to think yet that “seeking common ground and allowing differences” actually had and must have its conditions and limitations. Its effectiveness was partly dependent upon the issue related, and partly upon China’s domestic environment, including the will of Chinese leaders or China’s policies on specific issues at specific times. It can be said that China’s participation in the Bandung Conference was a milestone in Chinese diplomatic history, for it marked that after getting entangled in the Cold War due to alliance with the Soviet Union at the early years of New China, Chinese leaders finally decided to explore the “middle zone” outside the us and Soviet camps. Chinese leaders indeed paid great attention to this “middle zone,” as if they were on Jinggang Mountains (or Ching Kang Mountains) now and finally found the road of armed independent regime by workers and peasants, and encirclement of cities from rural areas. As they saw it, this area had huge potential of influencing world politics and was the new strategic space of China changing the world political map, and China needed 92

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Mao Zedong, “Women yinggai zai hezuo zhong zeng jin liaojie 我们应该在合作中增进 了解 [We should further understanding through cooperation],” December 21, 1954, in Mao Zedong waijiao wen xuan [Selected works of Mao Zedong on foreign affairs], 183. “Zhou Enlai zai ya fei huiyi quanti huiyi shang de buchong fayan [Zhou Enlai’s supplementary remarks at a plenary session of the Asian-​African Conference],” April 19, 1954, in Zhongguo daibiao tuan chuxi 1955 nian ya fei huiyi [Chinese delegation’s attendance at the Asian-​African Conference in 1955], 56.

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and in fact could make great achievements there. It also had special importance in geo-​security, for it was one of the security buffer zones in China’s southeast direction and China needed to snipe at us expansion there. It was also a new stage for China to engage in war-​like competition outside the us and Soviet camps, and China must possess powerful influence here to the extent of even a leadership position. With such unique thinking, Chinese leaders began to promote Chinese diplomacy to dance in this “middle zone” and thus had opened a new diplomatic battlefield in the international Cold War since then, the tip of iceberg of which was already visible at the time. Later historical evolvement proved that China’s diplomatic adjustment opened a unique and impactful progress of reshaping the Cold War and facilitating the globalization of the Cold War, and since then till today, China had never left the center stage of the “middle zone,” which had become a new “foothold” and “starting point” for Chinese diplomacy that lasted longer than the Sino-​Soviet alliance.

Closing Remarks This book accounts for a series of crucial events that took place during 1949–​ 1955. They had various specific reasons for happening and unique ways of ending, and the thoughts and decisions of Chinese leaders also had specific causes and background. Without description and analysis of the actual conditions would leave any historical account meaningless. But as this book approaches the end, it is necessary to point out the broader significance carried in such historical account. As the Preface of this book states, the crucial events of this period took place in a structure of three interrelated and interactive factors. The structure not only provided the basic cues and framework for the crucial events to take place, in which Chinese leaders laid the foundation for Chinese diplomacy and China’s international position in the Cold War through settling a series of historical events, but it also provided some key features for Chinese foreign policy. In particular, it constructed China’s major identities, including socialist country, regional power, and newly rising nationalist country (or “developing country” as commonly called later). The three identities subsequently became the reason and starting point of China’s various foreign policies and foreign actions (some even lasting till today) and also the fountain of pride for many Chinese people. In this light, how to evaluate the impact of Chinese diplomacy on China’s modern nation-​building during the Cold War is still an area that needs further discussion. It further yields lasting, decisive impact on later development of Chinese diplomacy. By accounting for a series of historical events, this book reveals how Chinese diplomacy was constructed amidst the interaction of international system and China’s domestic politics. It has two layers of meanings. First, regardless of the personalities and perceptions of Chinese leaders, they had to respond to the basic appeals of Chinese history when they reckoned and dealt with foreign policy issues, such as the appeal of national security based on geopolitical realities, the appeal of modernization rooted in world trends, and so on. The special environment caused by revolutionary movement and their levels of understanding only advanced or postponed their responses and gave them different forms, such as radical behaviors and vocabularies and the various consequent results and costs thereof. On the other hand, the domestic appeals of China’s modern history were certainly subject to the huge influence of the external world, and the narratives accounted for in this book were only the extension of such feature in the field of diplomacy. Diplomacy during the nation-​founding stage served the purpose

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2018 | DOI:10.1163/9789004369078_006

Closing Remarks

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of national strategy, the formation of which both caused and resulted from the “leaning to one side” choice toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It is impossible for China to make national strategies and foreign policies in isolation from the international system at any historical stage, which fundamentally dictates that diplomacy cannot be used as a barrier to isolate China from the world. To think otherwise would be ridiculous and lead to absurd results even if unconsciously done. The two points above are not too deep to understand. Instead, they are very common reasoning and almost common sense of international relations and diplomacy shown in the field of New China’s diplomacy. True reasoning u ­ sually is not complicated and does not go beyond common sense, thus it is ­sometimes overlooked. Historical account repeatedly proves to us both ­positively and ­negatively that action often does not follow common sense, which therefore helps us to increasingly raise our levels of understanding. It is also necessary to examine how Chinese diplomacy impacts the international Cold War, especially the Cold War in East Asia, in order to better explore and analyze the historical significance of Chinese diplomacy during this period. China’s foreign policies and diplomatic moves during the early nation-​founding era not only deeply influenced China’s domestic agenda, but also dealt a strong blow to the international Cold War system and forcefully shaped the Cold War structure in East Asia in particular. On the one hand, China closely united with the Soviet bloc and firmly stood at the East Asian frontline against the United States; on the other hand, it pursued the goal of quickly becoming a major power and gaining wider strategic development space between the United States and the Soviet Union. As this period drew to a close, China laid new foundation for challenging the Cold War international system and set out to reshape the Cold War. It foretells that China rising from the Cold War would eventually become a massive force to reshape the Cold War. Chinese diplomacy during this period is so rich in content that it is far beyond what a book can carry; the questions posed are so many that they cannot be clearly answered all at once. “Endless learning” is not only a broad generalization, but real and concrete truth in study of a specific historical era. In this sense, I see this book as only a new beginning of research. Niu Jun August 5, 2014

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Index anti-​China military alliance system 333 anti-​government forces in Laos and Cambodia 229, 230–​31, 240–​41, 246–​47 anti-​Japanese war 1, 9–​10, 19, 28, 80 Asia and Australia Liaison Bureau of the World Federation of Trade Union 84 Asian-​African Conference 283, 285, 291, 326, 333–​34 Asian-​African movement 291 Asian Peace Treaty 311 “Assistance to Vietnam to Resist France” policy 92–​124, 105, 107, 136, 181 atomic bombs  see nuclear weapons Attlee, Clement 314 Bolshevik revolution xiv, xv, 82 Bandung Conference 264, 279, 284, 291, 325, 332–​34 Battle of Guangxi 96 Berlin Conference 222–​23, 227, 231, 233 Bidault, Georges 240, 244–​45, 247, 249 Big Five Powers 217–​18, 220–​22, 225, 228–​30, 232, 300–​301 Bogor Conference 332 Bohlen, Charles 214 Border Campaign 102–​3, 117–​18, 120, 122, 124, 132, 140 Braun, Otto 104 Bulganin, N. A. 282 Bureau of East Asian National Communist Parties 82–​83 Burma 78, 87, 239, 254, 282, 285, 308–​13, 320–​22, 326–​27 Caccia, Harold 245–​46 Cambodia 229, 230–​31, 235, 237, 240–​44, 246–​47 ceasefire in Indochina 216–​59 Berlin Conference 222–​23, 227 Big Five Powers’ meeting 217–​18, 220–​22, 225, 228–​30, 232, 300–​301 China–​United States ceasefire talks 218–​19, 246–​47

China–​Vietnam proposal 237–​38 Chinese delegation on Laos and Cambodia 240–​43 communication between China and the Soviet Union 233–​34 comprehensive plan 231–​33 CPV Politburo’s proposal 234–​35 Draft Recommendations on Peaceful Resolution of the Indochina Issue 236–​37 efforts of Zhou 234, 236–​38, 242–​43, 245, 248–​49, 251, 253, 255–​59, 261 four-​state foreign ministerial meeting 220–​21 French proposal on Laos and Cambodia 243–​44, 247–​49 issues of concern to Chinese leaders 229–​30, 233 July 27 instructions 260–​61 main contentions 240 military demarcation issue 245, 249–​55 “1 vs. 3” proposal 230, 240–​41 Preliminary Opinions on Peaceful Resolution of the Indochina Issue 228–​31, 233–​34 proposals of France and Vietnam 231–​32 seven-​point guidelines 256 six-​point joint declaration 256 “3 vs. 3” proposal 230 US Indochina policies 224–​25 US–​U K meeting 256 ceasefire talks in Korea 176–​79, 182–​216, 219 along the 38th line 186, 189–​92, 196–​97 China’s principle 192–​93 Chinese leaders reason for 204–​5 disputes between China and North Korea 194–​96 exchange of intruding sections in Kumsong and Ganseong 200 first phase of 188–​89 five-​point agreement on the negotiation agenda 189

Index Kaesong incident and suspension of the talks 193–​94 lessons learnt 160, 174–​75, 186, 259 Mao–​Stalin talks 186–​88 measures to stop military conflicts 184 military demarcation line 188–​92, 196, 200, 203 Nam Il’s three agenda items 188–​89 North Korea’s eight-​point new proposal 214 repatriation of POWs 203–​4, 206–​10, 212 second phase of (July 27 to November 27) 189–​200 significance to US 198 Soviet Embassy’s views 194–​95 Summer Offensive and 191, 193–​94, 196–​97 United States’ opposition 190–​92 Chauvel, Jean 253 Chen Boda 75 Chen Geng 110, 117, 302 Chen Jiakang 234 Chen Mingshu 72 Chen Yi 149 Chen Yun 238, 312 Chiang Kai-​shek 4–​6, 8, 13, 20, 22–​23, 261, 267–​68, 270 China  age if revolution xiii–​x iv, xvi–​x viii anti-​containment strategy 181–​82 and ceasefire talks in Korea, 192–​93, 204–​5 delegation on Laos and Cambodia, 240–​43 diplomatic move in neighborhood (1953–​1955) 182 dispute between North Korea over the transmission of power 90 domestic orientation diplomacy 315–​16 expansionist force 86 Five-​Year Military Development Plan 300 foreign policy x see also New China’s foreign policy on independent India 321 and India 309–​13, 322–​23, 329 military actions and strategic goals 181–​82

349 military aid to Vietnam War, 96–​98, 102–​3, 108–​9, 111–​12, 120, 165–​66 military expenditure 184, 201 national security 87–​88 and North Korea, disputes between, 194–​96 “not taking control” policy 110 participation in the Korean War 106–​7, 118–​19 policy of peace 331–​32 policy on Indochina xix, 49, 87, 93–​94, 105, 107, 109, 257 see also ceasefire in Indochina political position in Asia 217–​18, 222 publicity and military actions, lessons learnt, 275–​77 rationale and decision-​making process for developing nuclear weapons 305–​8 relations with Indonesia 261 and Soviet  see Sino–​Soviet alliance and United States, 88–​89, 218–​19, 246–​47 see also Sino–​U S relations and Vietnam, 93, 95, 113, 237–​38 China Changchun Railway 35, 39, 45, 48 China’s geopolitical security environment 76, 105, 155, 180, 184, 310, 335 aid to Vietnam 92–​125 change in Soviet foreign policy 81 concern of US military intervention and 238 decision-​making system 302 Indochina policy 93, 110 strategic thinking of CPC leaders 77 Taiwan Strait 266 Yellow Sea, importance of 128 China’s revolutionary experience 15–​19, 81–​85, 117, 119, 121–​22, 165, 295, 321–​22, 327 CPV’s attitude toward 116, 119 national liberation wars 321 Chinese delegation in Geneva 246, 249–​51, 253, 256, 259, 262, 281, 313, 330 Chinese intervention in Korean War 182–​83 assessment of assistance required 143 Chinese decision-​makers and ceasefire plan 172, 174–​77 Chinese leaders’ analysis, 140–​41

350 Index Chinese intervention in Korean War (cont.) commitments from the Soviet Union 144–​46 CPC Politburo’s decision and proposed eight assistance items 144–​45 decision to cross the 38th line 157–​60, 163, 166–​68, 172, 175, 183 decision to deploy forces 128–​29, 134–​36 diplomatic actions directed at United States 137–​40 fifth campaign 176, 186 first campaign 153–​55 fourth campaign 172–​74, 176 Korean ceasefire talks 176–​79, 182–​216 Mao’s military strategy 146–​48, 150–​61 Peace Accord for Korea 161 Peng’s campaign plan 159–​61, 171–​74 policy coordination between Chinese leaders and Soviet Union 141–​42 problems during strengthening of Northeast defense 132–​33 provide cover of 38th line of Yalu River 135–​39, 149, 162 rationale 162, 179, 185 second campaign 155–​57 third campaign 157–​59, 164–​69 Volunteer Army’s initial conception of the war 150 Volunteer Army’s war plan 151–​52 war preparation in Northeast China 132–​33 see also Korean War Chinese Military Advisory Group 103–​5, 110, 112, 114–​15, 117, 120–​21, 123–​24, 129–​30, 140, 250–​51 Wang Jiaxiang’s draft of Code of Conduct for 104 Chinese People’s Volunteer Army 104, 149–​50, 182, 185, 191, 194, 196, 206–​8, 215 Churchill, Winston 2, 256, 272 Clark, Mark 211 Cold War xiii, x–​x i, 1, 76, 299 Colombo Conference 239, 332–​33 Cominform Declaration 18–​20, 163–​64 Communist International xvii

Communist Party Information Bureau (Cominform) 18 Communist Party of China  see CPC (Communist Party of China) Communist Party of Italy (PCI) 164 Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) 94, 234 anti-​French campaign 223–​25 Central Committee 225, 242, 249–​50, 254–​56 Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) 27–​29 CPC (Communist Party of China) x, xii and nation building xiii Northeast Bureau 29 and Soviet Union 6–​7, 26–​50 and United States 13–​14 CPC Central Committee 1, 5–​6, 9, 11–​12, 16, 18–​19, 23, 26, 28, 34, 36–​38, 45, 54, 226–​27, 242, 251–​52, 256–​57, 261, 263, 265, 304, 316, 330 “absolute no recognition” of foreign relations of Kuomintang government 60 confrontation with the United States 50–​75 Declaration of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army x establishment of financial institutions to support wartime economy 113 future foreign policies 25 international system and foreign policy 24–​25 Kuomintang–​C PC peace talks  see Kuomintang–​C PC conciliation meeting at Xibaipo 24, 36, 38, 82 meeting with CPV delegation 98–​99 Mikoyan’s advice to 82 military aid to CPV 95, 97–​98 Military Commission 90–​91, 103, 107, 130, 143, 173–​74, 185, 266, 272–​74, 278–​79, 300, 332 negotiation over five detained us military personnel 50–​51 opposition to the CPY 28 participation in the Korean War 90–​92 People’s Liberation Army slogan x political mobilization 23

351

Index promotion of revolutionary movements 81–​82 relations with the Soviet Union 37–​38, 42 response to Soviet possession of nuclear weapons 296 seven consecutive orders of accepting surrender and marching forward 80–​81 supporting of East Asian revolutions 86 support to overcome Vietnam’s financial difficulties 114 three-​day talks between Mikoyan and 38–​40 understanding of world politics 28 on Vietnam 94 view of East Asia 80 Crossing River Campaign 41, 62, 107, 265 Cumming, Hugh 198 Dachen Islands 270, 275–​76, 279 Dalian Ship Building Co. 31 Declaration on the International Situation ix, 18 Deng Hua 131, 159, 176, 178, 191 Deng Xiaoping 41, 64, 74, 238, 312 Dien Bien Phu Campaign 122–​24, 235, 238, 240–​41 Dimitrov, Georgi 163–​64 Double Tenth Agreement 4 Dulles, John F. 221–​22, 225, 238, 281, 285, 287, 289, 299 Du Ping 157 “East,” notion of 78–​80, 136 East Asia x, 80, 180 Cold War 135 see also Cold War imperialist invasions of 79–​80 revolutionary movements 81–​86, 90 see also specific countries East Asian Communist Parties Intelligence Bureau 126 East China Military Area Command 266, 270 East Communist Party Information Bureau 87 Eden, Anthony 240, 243, 245–​46, 249, 256, 283

Eisenhower, Dwight 211, 213, 224, 238, 274, 289, 298 European Communist Information Bureau 84 European Defense Community 227 Europe ix, xi, 221, 288, 301 “Two Camps” theory ix–​x , 18, 28, 81, 106, 309, 316, 318–​20, 324, 326, 332 see also specific countries European Economic Conference ix European Workers’ Party 18 Far East Electricity Co. 31 five powers  see Big Five Powers foreign policy making 1, 23, 49, 264 see also New China’s foreign policy “Four Powers” 80 France 3, 16, 24, 50–​54, 57, 79, 81, 92–​94, 96–​97, 100, 105–​7, 109, 111, 122, 125, 154, 181, 215–​17, 219–​22, 225, 227, 231, 243, 254 free election 239, 252 Fugh, Philip 64, 68, 70–​71, 73–​74 Gao Gang 33, 55, 84, 131, 133, 177, 300 General Frontier Committee 62–​64, 66–​67 Geneva Conference 218, 221–​23, 225–​26, 228–​30, 238–​39, 242, 245, 249, 256, 260, 262, 270, 272–​73, 281, 301, 308, 310, 312–​13, 330, 332 Germany 9, 221, 227 great-​power politics 217 Gromyko, A. A. 167, 186, 201–​2, 220 Guangxu, Emperor 76 Gullion, Edmund A. 224 Hainan District Party Committee 113 Henderson, Ambassador 139 Ho Chi Minh 81, 94, 99–​100, 111, 118, 125, 155, 223, 225–​27, 237, 242, 251, 254–​55 in Beijing 100, 109, 123 in Moscow 101–​2, 119 Hong Xuezhi 131 Hunan Autonomy Movement xvi Huang Hua 61, 64, 67–​69, 73 Huan Xiang 262 Hu Qiaomu 75, 294 Hurley, Patrick J. 1

352 Index imperialism xvi–​x vii India–​Tibet relations 328–​29 Indochina, ceasefire  see ceasefire in Indochina Indo-​Chinese Federation 93 Information Bureau of Communist and Workers’ Parties ix Japan 9, 15, 293–​94 Japanese Peace Conference, 1951 210 and Kuomintang 68–​69 Soviet–​Japan Neutrality Treaty, 294 Soviet–​Japan War, 294, 296–​97 Joy, Charles Turner 191 Kennan, George F. 2, 176–​77, 188 Khrushchev, Nikita 62, 237, 260–​61, 274–​75, 281, 302–​3, 332 Kim Il-​sung 89–​92, 118–​19, 124, 128, 131, 134–​35, 143, 145–​46, 156, 161, 169–​70, 175, 177, 179, 187, 192–​96, 199–​200, 205–​9, 212 Kirk, Alan G. 186, 198 Korea 76, 159, 189, 219, 239, 255, 264 ceasefire talks  see ceasefire talks in Korea liberation of 80–​81 military demarcation line 188–​92, 196, 200, 203 and Taiwan Straight crisis 265, 267–​68 see also North Korea; South Korea Korean War 75–​76, 266–​68, 298, 307 casualties 206 Central Military Commission’s plan 130 China’s decision to deploy forces in North Korea 128–​29 Chinese leaders’ analysis of 140–​41 Chinese participation in 106–​7, 118–​19 and CPC 126–​27 diplomatic actions directed at United States 137–​40 discussion between Soviet Union and China 128 first campaign 153–​55 issue of US crossing 38th line 135–​39, 141, 155 military advisors assessment 130–​31, 134 North Korea’s military plans 125

participation of the Soviet Airforce 143–​45 second campaign 155–​57 Soviet intervention 127 Stalin’s instruction to Soviet advisors 134–​35 third campaign 157–​59, 164–​69 UN “three-​person group on Korean ceasefire” proposal 169–​71 US military deployment and campaigns 127, 129, 206 see also ceasefire talks in Korea Kovalev, I. V. 30, 46–​47, 61, 67, 87 Kuomintang–​C PC conciliation xi, 2–​25, 265 Chongqing talks 2–​5, 9, 11, 13 CPC Central Committee and 6–​7, 11–​12, 15 disputes over ownership of assets 39 hosting of political consultative conference 5 immediate ceasefire 5 Mao’s views 8–​11, 15–​16 Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai meeting 16–​19 middle zone concept 16–​18 military clashes between Kuomintang and CPC 13, 15 October 10 agreement 4 peace talks 4–​5, 36–​38 Plan of Military Reorganization and Realignment of CPC Troops, agreement of 5–​6 Sino–​Soviet treaty 39–​40, 43–​50 to solve Soviet economic claims in Northeast China 3 Soviet mediation in 4, 6–​7, 11–​12, 14, 36–​38 talk between Mikoyan and CPC leaders 38–​40 Truman’s statement and Marshall’s mediation 4–​7, 14–​15 Kurile Islands 45 Kuznestrov, Vasily V. 215, 253 Laniel, Joseph 244–​45 Laos 229, 230–​31, 235, 237, 240–​44, 246–​47 League of Nations xvii Lei Hewen 59–​60

Index Lenin, Vladimir xii, 40–​41 Leninism xiv, xvi–​x vii, 26, 39, 316 Liao-​Shen Campaign 53 Li Ban 95, 110 Liberation Daily 294–​95 Li Fuchun 34 Li Kenong 187, 191–​93, 198, 206, 253 Li Mi 96 Lin Biao 30, 35, 98, 131, 137, 143 Liu Bocheng 302 Liu Shaoqi 3, 16, 28, 35, 40–​44, 48, 74, 83–​84, 86, 88, 96–​97, 99–​101, 103–​4, 107–​8, 110, 114, 116–​17, 164–​65, 183, 238, 242, 304, 311–​12, 320–​23, 325 Liu Xiao 282 Liu Yalou 30, 302 Liu Zhou 308 Lomakin, A. 287 Lu Dingyi 16–​17, 238 Luo Guibo 97, 102, 107, 111, 113–​18, 121, 123 Lu Zhiwei 70–​74 Lvshun-​Dalian local committee 33 MacArthur, Douglas 67, 141, 149, 158–​59 Macmillan, Harold 285 Malenkov, G. M. 260–​61 Malik, Jacob 176–​78, 188 Manila Conference 332 Mao Zedong xiii, xiv–​x ix, 3, 27, 36, 40, 45, 47–​48, 50, 55, 59, 67–​68, 82, 92, 97, 103, 107, 115, 125, 127, 134, 136, 140, 142–​44, 147, 168, 187, 212–​13, 215–​16, 219, 226, 237–​38, 255, 260, 263–​64, 266, 268, 274–​76, 278, 305–​7, 311, 313, 315, 325, 332–​33 anti–​U S theme 20–​21 argument against Kim Il-​sung’s reunification by force 89–​92 articulations about foreign policies 24–​25 basic issues of international environment 21 ceasefire talks 176–​79 conception of changing situation in Southwest China 95–​96 criticism on Chiang Kai-​shek 8–​9 estimation of Korean battlefield situation 156, 171

353 “fearlessness” idea 20–​22 on independent India 323 journey to revolution 78 Kuomintang–​C PC peace talks 36–​39 “lean to one side” 41 Li Tao statement 64–​65, 70 “middle zone” idea 16–​18, 313–​15, 334–​35 military deployment for national defense 88 military thought of 117–​18 mobile warfare and outflanking tactics 151–​53 notion of “permanent national defense” 87–​88 “On People’s Democratic Dictatorship” 26, 40, 74–​75, 320 “Order to Organize the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army” 141, 143 on Otto Braun 104 policy of “no recognition” 60–​61 reason of China’s intervention in Korean War 129 rejection of three-​person group’s ceasefire recommendations 173 seven-​point instruction to Huang Hua 64–​65 talks with Stalin 43–​46, 87–​89 understanding of nation-​state 78 US threats on China 88–​89 view of internationalism 104 views on atomic bombs 293–​96, 300, 303 visit to Soviet Union 27, 36, 38–​39, 44–​45 “White Paper on United States Relations with China” 75 world politics, important factors 9, 15, 17–​18 Marinin 33, 55 Marshall, George C. 1, 3 Marshall Plan ix Marxism xviii–​x ix, 41, 43, 82 Mazu Island 270, 279 Melon, Indian representative to the UN 284, 309 Mendès-​France, Pierre 252, 258, 308 Midstream Campaign 124 Mikoyan, A. I. 36, 38–​39, 43–​44, 82–​83, 87

354 Index military build-​up zones 242, 247, 249–​50, 252 military demarcation line, Korea 188–​92, 196, 200, 203 Molotov, V. M. ix, 21, 47, 145, 214, 219, 227, 229, 242–​43, 246, 249–​50, 256, 258, 262, 281–​82 Nanjing incident 62–​63 Nanjing Municipal Party Committee 71 nation-​building x, xi, 49–​50, 182, 305, 318, 330, 337 nation-​states xii–​x iii, 78 Navarre Plan 123 Nehru, B. K. 328 Nehru, Jawaharlal 219, 303, 309–​12, 325, 331, 333 New China’s foreign policy xi, xiii, xix, 2, 41, 86, 89, 291–​92 “Assistance to Vietnam to Resist France” policy 92–​124 confrontation with United States 75 diplomacy 315–​20, 324–​35, 337–​38 East Asian policies 93 and Korean War 90–​92 Kuomintang–​C PC conciliation 2–​25 “neutralizing America” policy 5 principle of “seeking common ground and allowing differences” 334 relations with newly rising countries in Asia 324 Sino-​U S and Sino-​Soviet relations 1–​2, 7–​8 Nguyen Chi Thanh 234 Nguyễn Đức Thụy 95 Nie Rongzhen 138 Ninh Binh Campaign 124 Nixon, Richard 299 Ni Zhiliang 132, 135, 147 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 305 North China Bureau 50–​51 North Korea  and China, dispute between 128–​29, 194–​96 eight-​point new proposal 214 military plans 125 and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 130 see also Korea Northeast Border Protection Army 130, 136

Northeast Bureau 35 Northeast Campaign 124 Northeast China Bureau 3, 11–​12, 29–​35, 52–​53, 55–​59, 72 Northwest Campaign 121–​24 Northwest Field Army Front Committee 21 Novikov, K. V. 253 Nu, U 333 nuclear weapons 292–​308 first nuclear test explosion 292–​93 Hiroshima explosion 293–​94 Nagasaki explosion 294 rocket nuclear strategy 301 “Snowstorm” exercise 302 “Year of Bomb” 299 October 10 agreement 4 October Revolution 41, 83 O’Neill, Con 285 Orwell, George ix Panikkar, K. M. 138 Paris Agreement xv, 301, 304 Park Hen-​yong 205, 209 Peking-​Tianjin Campaign 53 Peng Dehuai 104, 118, 137, 140, 144, 147, 150–​52, 156, 159, 163, 166, 169–​74, 176, 179, 185, 187, 205–​6, 209, 215, 266, 272, 278, 300–​302 People’s Liberation Army (PLA)  Airforce 201 in assisting North Korea to fight US 130 attack on Taiwan 108, 129, 267 southeast campaign 264, 266–​67, 270–​71, 273, 275 strike of fighter planes 261 Thirteenth Corps 131 People’s Daily x, 28, 217, 238–​39, 271–​73, 286, 290, 296–​97, 299–​300, 304, 321–​22 People’s Newspaper 99, 119 Petukhov, V. 194 Pham Van Dong 237, 242, 244, 249–​50, 252–​53, 258–​59 Plain Campaigns 121 power identity 80, 218 Pravda 94

Index Qian Sanqiang 300–​301 Qiao Guanhua 191 Quemoy Island 270, 280 Raghavan, Nedyam 238, 283 Ranative, B. T. 321 Razuvaev, V. H. 169, 195–​96, 201–​2 Red Cross 211 Ridgway, Matthew 168, 179, 187, 197, 211 Roschin, N. V. 125–​26, 128, 142, 144–​45, 164, 167, 201 Roux, Jacques 248 Sakhalin Islands 45 Self-​Defense War against Vietnam 181, 276 Shenyang Military Administrative Commission 52, 54–​55, 57, 59 Shtykov, T. F. 124–​25, 134–​35 Sino–​Indian relations 309–​13, 322–​23, 329 five principles of peaceful coexistence 311 Sino–​Soviet alliance 29, 49, 86, 92, 94, 99, 148, 274–​75, 291–​92, 302, 304–​5, 308, 314, 335 agreements on the Oil Corporation and Nonferrous Metal Corporation 48 aid to CPC 30, 33–​34, 39–​41, 108, 111 construction of port terminals and lighthouses 34 in Dalian area 32–​33 economic and trade cooperation 30–​32 economic talks 1, 6–​8 joint ventures 31–​32 June meeting, 1948 33 in Korean War 146, 148 see also Korean War in Lvshun-​Dalian area 33 Mao Zedong, Joseph Stalin and Zhou Enlai meeting 48 military agreements 31, 211 October meeting, 1947 33 patrolling near Heilongjiang River 34–​35 postwar Soviet policy toward China 29 Sino–​Soviet Alliance and Friendship Treaty 49 Stalin–​Liu Shaoqi meeting 42–​43 supply of rail repairing equipment 34

355 Sino–​Soviet treaty 39–​40, 43–​48 Friendship and Alliance Treaty 298 Sino–​U S relations 1, 9–​11, 50–​75, 181, 246, 262, 317 concerns of and precautions against US military intervention 62, 65–​66 confiscation of radio stations of foreign Consulates 52–​56 exchanges between Huang Hua and Stuart 67–​68 imposition of restrictions on US Consulate personnel 56 Korean War  see Korean War military conflict in the Taiwan Strait 260 Nanjing incident 62–​63 policy of “driving away” United States, United Kingdom, and France 55–​58 in Shenyang 51–​52 Shenyang espionage case 58, 72–​74 Stuart’s six-​point proposal on status of US Embassy and Consulates 69 Treaty of Commerce 65 United States stance on Kuomintang government 67 Yangtze River firefight incident 62, 64 Sino–​Vietnamese relations 93, 95, 237–​38 Sino–​Vietnamese trade 113 Smith, Walter Bedell 262–​63, 281 Snow, Edgar 78, 149 South Korea 135, 141, 151, 155, 173, 200 see also Korea Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 258, 310, 324 Southeast Treaty Organization 261 Soviet–​China  see Sino–​Soviet alliance Soviet–​Japan Neutrality Treaty 294 Soviet–​Japan War 294, 296–​97 Soviet–​U S  see US–​Soviet relations; US–​Soviet rivalry Soviet–​Yugoslavia dispute 27–​28 Stalin, Joseph 27, 29–​30, 36–​37, 48–​49, 61–​62, 82–​83, 87, 92, 95, 119, 124, 127, 134–​36, 142–​45, 163, 167, 174, 187, 193–​94, 201, 208–​9, 317 Kuomintang–​C PC peace talks 36–​39 policy on the Korean Peninsula 91 recognition and support of the CPV 100–​101

356 Index Stalin, Joseph (cont.) support of North Korea’s military plans 125 views on atomic bombs 297 Stuart, John L. 60–​62, 65–​69, 72–​74 Sundstrom, Carl-​Johan 306 Suslov, M. A. 163 Su Yu 130, 302 Taiwan Straight crisis 259–​90, 299 China’s publicity and military actions, lessons learnt 275–​77 Chinese leaders, efforts of 260–​66 Five-​Year Military Development Plan 267 four-​state summit 286–​88 Indian mediation 282–​85 Korean armistice and 265, 267–​68 Mao’s concerns 261–​62 opposition to US alignment with Taiwan 260, 263–​64 PLA’s military plan 267, 273 seizure of Quemoy Island 266 Sino–​U S negotiation 261–​63, 281–​90 southeast coastal military actions 264, 266–​67, 270–​71, 273, 280 Soviet mediation 282 “two-​step” approach 270, 273 United Kingdom mediation 282–​83, 285, 287 United States, diplomatic and military actions 271–​72, 278–​79 US–​Taiwan collective defense treaty 261, 266, 272, 275–​77, 279, 289 withdrawal of troops 277–​78 Task Force on Vietnam 231–​34, 236 Terebin, Orlov 27 “tian xia (world)” 78, 80 Tito, Josip Broz 21, 82 Togliatti, Palmiro 164 Trevelyan, Humphrey 262, 282 Truman, Harry 2, 106, 127, 139, 158–​59, 162, 176, 178, 195, 223, 293, 298 Truong Chinh 251 “Two Camps” theory ix–​x , 18, 28, 81, 106, 309, 316, 318–​20, 324, 326, 332

united front on international peace 292, 314, 315–​16, 318, 320, 327, 331, 333 United Kingdom 3, 7, 9, 13, 16–​17, 24, 50–​54, 57, 62, 79–​80, 93, 96, 100, 107, 109, 154, 181, 216–​17, 219–​22, 225, 227 United States xiii Australia Security Pact with Australia and New Zealand 122 China policy 4–​5, 59–​60 Military Assistance Agreement with Thailand 122 Mutual Defense Treaty with Philippines 122 United States, intervention in the Korean War 127, 129 ceasefire negotiation 176–​78 Chinese leaders’ analysis of 140–​41 diplomatic actions directed at 137–​40 domino effect of 130 issue of US crossing 38th line 135–​39, 141, 155 military fortification in Taiwan Strait and Southeast Asia 129 Upper Laos Campaign 122–​23 US–​Soviet relations x–​x i, 1, 9–​11, 13–​15, 65, 262 US–​Soviet rivalry 9–​11, 13, 15–​17 Cold War 4, 81 US–​Taiwan collective defense treaty 261, 266, 272–​73, 275–​77, 279, 289 US–​U K joint declaration 262 Vasilevskii, A. M. 207 Vaskov, V. V. 256 Viet Minh 95, 224 Vietnamese Military 119–​21, 234, 236–​38, 240–​41, 252 Vietnamese resistance movement (Vietnam War) 225, 238 China’s military aid 96–​98, 102–​3, 108–​9, 111–​12, 120, 165–​66 diplomatic relations with Ho Chi Minh 97 intervention of Military Advisory Group 103–​5, 110, 112, 114–​15, 119–​21, 123 move of Li Mi’s troops 96 reasons 94–​96

357

Index retreat of Kuomintang troops into Vietnam 96–​97 US stance in 106, 110 Voitinskii, G. N. 34, 49, 101, 167 Vo Nguyen Giap 234–​36, 251, 254 Vyshinsky, Andrey 198, 207, 274, 300–​301 Wang Bingnan 248 Wang Jiaxiang 165, 167 Wang Ming 83 Wang Ruofei 5 Warsaw Pact 303, 305 Wei Guoqing 103, 119, 121, 123–​24, 251, 254–​55 Wen Yiduo xiii–​x iv World War I xiii, 306 World War II 306 Wuhan ceasefire 3 Wu Heng 80 Wu Xiuquan 55 Xie Fang 131, 142, 191, 252 Xinhai Revolution xii Xu Guangda 302 Yalta secret agreement 7, 45, 48 Yalta system 27 Yang Chao 74

Yang Shangkun 100 Yangtze River firefight incident 62, 64 Ye Zilong 297 Yijiangshan Island 275, 277, 280 Yuan Zhongxian 328 Yudin, P. F. 226–​27 Yugoslav Communist Party 21 Zhang Hanfu 310 Zhang Jingyao xvi Zhang Wentian 220, 227, 245–​46, 253 Zhdanov, Andrei 18 Zhejiang coastal islands 270 Zhou Derun 76 Zhou Enlai 5, 8, 13, 16, 24, 39, 45, 47–​48, 52, 56, 60, 64, 70, 73–​74, 81, 86, 96, 99–​100, 124–​25, 128–​30, 132–​34, 138, 143–​47, 159, 167, 170, 175, 184, 190, 192, 201, 204, 208–​10, 212–​13, 216, 219, 228–​30, 234, 236–​38, 242–​43, 245, 248–​49, 251, 253, 255–​59, 263, 267, 281, 283–​84, 286–​87, 304–​7, 309–​13, 317–​18, 320, 322, 326–​27, 330, 332 Zhou Yukang 72 Zhu De 22–​23, 80, 103, 111, 238, 304, 312 Zhu Qiwen 52–​53