The Chinese Internet (Routledge Studies in New Media and Cyberculture) [1 ed.] 103232175X, 9781032321752

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The Chinese Internet

This book explores China’s digital discourse and how the Internet influences social and ideological changes to the country’s political economy, within China’s historical context and through a variety of social and political actors. Analysing discourses as diverse as policy papers, addresses from the Xi-Li administration, and speeches from CEOs of the dominant Internet companies in China, as well as those of Chinese Internet Users, this book illuminates the dynamics, complexity, and structural contradictions in China’s current network technology-enabled developmental path through the lens of ideology and discourse. The book proposes a multi-dimensional model to understand Marxist ideologies under capitalism, emphasizing the relevance of alienation, commodity fetishism, and reification in contemporary discussions of ideology and discourse. This insightful study offers fresh insights into Chinese digital discourse and will be of interest to upper-level students and scholars of communication studies, digital media, sociology, political science, and Internet and technology studies. Yuqi Na is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Lingnan University, HK.

Routledge Studies in New Media and Cyberculture

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For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/RoutledgeHandbooks-in-Religion/book-series

The Chinese Internet Political Economy and Digital Discourse

Yuqi Na

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Yuqi Na The right of Yuqi Na to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-32175-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-32602-3 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-31581-0 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003315810 Typeset in Sabon by codeMantra

Dedicated to my parents, Xiaobin Yang and Xianfei Na, for their unconditional love and enduring support

Contents

List of figures and tables Acknowledgements Preface Introduction

xi xiii xv 1

PART I

1 Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism 1.1 A Marxist Theory of Ideology and Subjectivity in Capitalism 16 1.1.1 Where Does Ideology Come from?  18 1.1.2 Few Notes of Ideology  25 1.2 Discourse and Ideology  28 1.3 Digital Discourse and the Political Economy of the Internet 30 1.3.1 Technological Determinism  30 1.3.2 The New Economy  33 1.3.3 The New Politics  36 1.3.4 The New Culture  38

15

2 Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China 2.1 Capitalist Contradictions with Chinese Characteristics 45 2.2 Matrix of Power Relations in China’s ICT Industry  53 2.2.1 The Post-Revolutionary State and the Modern Globalized World  53 2.2.2 The Party-State and Marketization of the Media and the Internet  55 2.2.3 The Social Dimension  56

45

viii Contents 2.3 BAT  59 2.3.1 Baidu  59 2.3.2 Alibaba  60 2.3.3 Tencent  61 PART II

3 Government Digital Discourse 3.1 Building a Cyber Superpower  75 3.2 Information Economy  77 3.2.1 A “New Normal” of the Chinese Economy  77 3.2.2 Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation  79 3.2.3 The Chinese Enterprises  79 3.2.4 Deepening the Reform  81 3.3 Cybersecurity  83 3.4 “A Community of Shared Destiny in the Cyberspace” 88 3.5 Discussion and Conclusion  90

73

4 Digital Discourse and BAT 4.1 Building the Ecosystems  102 4.1.1 BAT as Connectors, Community, Medium, and Infrastructure 103 4.1.2 BAT “Enable” (Fu Neng) the Partners  105 4.1.3 Participating Online and Sharing Data  106 4.1.4 Working at BAT  107 4.1.5 Data Collection  109 4.2 From Competing with the Industry to Upgrading the Economy 111 4.2.1 From Clashes with the “Real Economy” to Help Upgrade Traditional Industries  111 4.2.2 Increasing Domestic Consumption  114 4.2.3 Relationship with the Government  116 4.3 Globalized or Chinese Companies  119 4.3.1 Globalized BAT  119 4.3.2 AI for Global Expansion  121 4.3.3 Chinese Companies  122 4.4 Discussion and Conclusion  125

99

Contents  ix 5 Negotiating Digital Discourse 5.1 The Internet Economy  134 5.1.1 A Decentralized Market with New Opportunities? 135 5.1.2 “There Is Simply No Privacy Online”  136 5.1.3 “Internet Companies Need Advertising to Survive” 138 5.1.4 “We Are Powerful Consumers”  139 5.2 Internet Politics  141 5.2.1 The “Enemy State”  142 5.2.2 “We Need a Stable Country”  144 5.2.3 “We Have a Unique National Condition” (Guoqing) 146 5.2.4 The State or the Companies?  149 5.3 “There Is No Alternative”  151 5.4 Discussions and Conclusion: Hegemonic, Negotiated, and Oppositional Positions among Digital Labourers 154

134

PART III

6 The Digital Ideologies 6.1 Informational Developmentalism  165 6.1.1 From “Post-industrial” Ideology to “Neo-industrialization” 167 6.1.2 The “Non-political” Technology  170 6.2 Technological Nationalism and Globalism  172 6.2.1 Three Narratives in China’s Techno-nationalism 172 6.2.2 Techno-globalism  176 6.3 Digital Individualism  177 6.3.1 Entrepreneurship in the Digital Era  177 6.3.2 Digital Consumerism  181 6.4 The Spirit of Chinese Internet  183

165

7 Conclusion 7.1 The Story of Yinghaiwei  191 7.2 Digital Discourse as a Contested Field  195 7.2.1 Digital Discourse from the Government  196

191

x Contents 7.2.2 Digital Discourse from the BAT  197 7.2.3 Digital Discourse from the Digital Labourers 198 7.3 The Ideological Digital Discourses  200 7.3.1 Legitimating the Global Expansion of China’s Capital and Enterprises  201 7.3.2 Legitimating the Concentration of the Market 202 7.3.3 Constructing a Consumer Identity to Replace Class Politics  202 7.4 Reflections on Ideology  204 Index

209

Figures and tables

Figures 1.1 The relationship between capitalism, appearances, and ideology 2.1 Percentage share of world GDP based on purchasing-powerparity (PPP), by selected countries and regions 2.2 GDP per capita in China and other regions 2.3 GINI index in selected countries 2.4 Power dynamics between different forces in ICT development in China 6.1 Ideologies about the ICT and the Internet in transnational informational capitalist China 7.1 The double-layered and multidimensional model of ideologies under capitalism

17 46 46 47 54 186 206

Tables 1.1 Typology of digital discourses in advanced capitalism 2.1 Contradictions under Chinese capitalism and the corresponding social relations 2.2 Weibo revenue (revenue in $ thousands) 2.3 Baidu revenues (revenue in millions, RMB) 3.1 List of selected government documents 3.2 Time specific words used in Xi’s 4.19  speech 3.3 The government’s digital discourse and the corresponding premises in practical arguments 3.4 Chinese government’s digital discourse on the new economy 3.5 Chinese government’s digital discourse on the new policies 4.1 List of documents collected from BAT 4.2 BAT’s digital discourse on the new economy 4.3 BAT digital discourse on the new politics 5.1 Public digital discourse on the Internet Economy in China 5.2 Public digital discourse on Internet politics in China

31 53 64 64 74 81 90 91 91 100 126 126 156 156

Acknowledgements

Researching and writing a book can be a challenging and often solitary journey. I am deeply grateful to all those who have made this journey more enjoyable, fulfilling, and ultimately possible. First and foremost, I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to my parents, Xiaobin Yang and Xianfei Na, to whom I dedicate this book. Their unwavering love, acceptance, support, respect, and encouragement have been indispensable in making this project a reality. I could not have done it without their faith and confidence in me. This book originated as my doctoral dissertation at CAMRI, University of Westminster, and I am deeply grateful to my PhD supervisor, Christian Fuchs, for his invaluable guidance and unwavering support throughout the research process. His critical thinking, intelligence, diligence, and professional advice have shaped my research and intellectual pursuits. I have been fortunate to have been surrounded by groups of wonderful friends, whose companionship has helped me navigate this journey with a sense of joy and purpose. I would like to thank Duygu Karatas, Tiankai Tang, Xiang Fan, Yang Zhou, Yilin Shan, Matthias Kispert, Arne Sjögren, Yang Zhang, Hang Gao, Yanning Huang, Andong Li, Songyin Liu, Ronggang Chen, and Luna Liu for sharing all the laughter, tears, chips, and drinks. Special thanks to Aliaksandr Herasimenka, whose infectious enthusiasm for research, politics, and life has been a great source of inspiration, and whose intelligence and positive attitude have lifted my spirits on many occasions. I am also deeply grateful to the communities of critical researchers and scholars who have supported me throughout this journey. Many thanks to Ngai Pun, Eran Fisher, Thomas Amller, Marisol Sandoval, Magdalena KaniaLundholm, Jack Linchuan Qiu, Lianrui Jia, Bingqing Xia, Vincent Mosco, and others who have shared their insights, feedback, and encouragement. It has been a privilege to engage in critical discussions and debates with them. The CAMRI community has been an incredible source of inspiration and support during my time there, and I would like to thank scholars and researchers such as Xin Xin, Pieter Verdegem, Maria Michalis, Jacob Johanssen, Musab Iqbal, Doug Specht, Mary Kay Culpepper, Pablo Morales, Vivien Mash, Daya Thussu, Peter Goodwin, Winston Mano, Roza Tsagarousianou,

xiv Acknowledgements Colin Sparks, and many others. Special thanks to Anthony McNicholas, whose support, patience, and encouragement have been vital to my time at CAMRI. Last but not least, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my interviewees and friends, without whom this book would not have been possible. I am grateful for the generous help and insights provided by Lunjing Wu, Jimmy, Yipeng Wu, Weixin Zhang, and others who have shared their experiences and perspectives with me. I am also grateful to the anonymous and courageous interviewees who have contributed their invaluable opinions and insights to our discussions.

Preface

Christian Fuchs Yuqi Na’s book The Chinese Internet: Political Economy and Digital Discourse is an excellent and insightful study of the political economy of the Internet in China. It combines critical theory and empirical social research in order to show what role ideology has played among powerful political and economic groups that have shaped the development of the Internet in China as well as among Internet users. The author also studied how Chinese Internet users have reproduced and challenged Internet ideologies. Methodologically, this study combines theory construction, critical discourse analysis, and focus groups. It analyses official documents, speeches of Internet corporations’ CEOs, as well as data the author collected by conducting focus groups with Chinese Internet users (manufacturing workers, programmers, and white-collar workers). This book gives particular attention to the roles of informational developmentalism, techno-nationalism, consumerism, technological determinism, and digital individualism in the context of the Internet in China. The Internet in China and China’s Political Economy Why is a study about the political economy of China’s Internet important? In 2022, the world’s largest transnational digital and media corporations listed in the top 100 of the Forbes Global 2000 list of the world’s largest transnational corporations were Amazon, Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Verizon Communications, AT&T, Tencent Holdings, China Mobile, Comcast, Alibaba, Meta Platforms, SoftBank, Intel, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, Sony, Taiwan Semiconductor, Deutsche Telekom, Cisco Systems, Walt Disney, and IBM (data source: https://www.forbes.com/lists/global2000, accessed on April 17, 2023). Twenty out of the world’s largest transnational corporations are part of the media and digital industries. Industries and companies organizing mediated communication and digital communication play an important role in the world economy. Of course, also financialization in the form of banks, insurance companies, and real estate as well as classical manufacturing, construction, and oil and energy companies play an important role.

xvi Preface The majority of the world’s large transnational media and digital corporations have their headquarters in the United States. Some have their headquarters in China. “BAT” (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent) is a term that has been established for characterizing large Chinese Internet corporations that have shaped the Internet in China. TikTok has become one of the most popular apps in the world. It has both an international English version and a Chinese version (Douyin, 抖音). The Chinese corporation ByteDance which created the app has become one of the major players in the Internet economy. In 2022, China had more than 1 billion Internet users, and about 70% of its population used the Internet (data source: https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm#asia, accessed on April 17, 2023). It was the country with the largest number of Internet users in the world. In 2022, TikTok was the world’s most downloaded app (https://www.businessofapps.com/data/most-popular-apps/, accessed on April 17, 2023). At the same time, it has also been involved in controversies about critical infrastructures that include communications as infrastructure. Given the significant role of China’s digital industry in the world (digital) economy, we need to better understand how the political economy of this industry works. This book is an outstanding contribution to this task that utilizes the approach of the Political Economy of Communication. Table 0.1 shows the development of the share of agriculture, manufacturing, and services in the Chinese GDP. The data indicates that China’s economy has been undergoing a simultaneous process of post-industrialization and industrialization. As a consequence, construction, manufacturing, the finance sector, and the digital sector have become key aspects of the Chinese economy. Agriculture has at the same time become less important. In 2021, China accounted for 30.3% of the world’s manufacturing value-added and 15.2% of the world’s services value-added (data source: World Bank Data, accessed on April 17, 2023). Since the 1970s, China has become an important economy where commodities as part of an international division of labour are assembled and manufactured. But manufacturing is not the only global aspect of China’s economy. Also, services such as finance and digital technologies are important aspects of China’s role in the global political economy. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is not just a project that constructs physical infrastructures in other countries but also includes a digital component, namely the Digital Silk Road Initiative. China’s political economy has played multiple roles in the global political economy. China in the world of finance has become an important creditor. Table 0.1  The development of the share of economic sectors in the GDP, in per cent Country

Economic sector

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

China

Agriculture Manufacturing Services

35.1 40.4 24.5

29.9 48.2 21.9

26.8 41.2 32.0

14.9 45.7 39.4

 9.9 46.4 43.7

 8.0 38.0 54.0

Source:  UNCTADstat (accessed on April 17, 2023)

Preface  xvii Political Economy and Ideology Critique Political Economy as a field of study is focused on the interaction of politics and the economy. This includes not just the analysis of how regulation and the state interact with the economy but also the interactions of worldviews and ideology with the economy. Yuqi Na’s book gives particular attention to the analysis of the interaction of the economy and ideology in the context of the Chinese Internet. Already for Marx the interaction of ideology and capital was an important aspect of the Critique of Political Economy. In Capital Volume I, Marx starts the analysis with a focus on the commodity. He first focuses on aspects of value and labour and then in Section 1.4 of Chapter 1 stresses the role of ideology when analysing “The Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret” (Marx, 1867, Section I.1.4). The fetishism of the commodity is an ideological aesthetic that makes social relations disappear behind the appearance of commodities, capital, and money. Specific “social relations of production between people appear as relations of things to people, or else certain social relations appear as the natural properties of things in society“ (Marx, 1867, p. 1006). Ideology is a structural feature of commodities that makes the existence of commodities, money, exchange, value, and capital appear natural and thing-like. What disappears behind the aesthetic and omnipresence of commodities and money are the social relations in which humans produce and reproduce society, i.e., the historical, relational, and dialectical character of society. “The social relations and therefore the social position of the agents of production in relation to each other, i.e. the relations of production, are themselves produced: they are also the constantly renewed result of the process” (Marx, 1867, p. 1065). Ideology in general naturalizes, reifies, and essentializes domination. The analysis of the economy and culture, labour and communication, capitalism and society belong together. All too often they are broken apart so that ideology critique is not seen as part of Critical Political Economy and Critical Political Economy is situated as external to ideology critique. Hence, for example, Critical Labour Studies and Critical Discourse Analysis have developed quite separately as two approaches to the critical analysis of society. Yuqi Na’s study is situated in the context of Critical Media and Communication Studies. It avoids the separation of economy and culture by focusing on the analysis of ideology not outside but as a constituent part of political economy. The Political Economy of Communication The Critique of the Political Economy of Communication has developed as an important approach and subfield of Media and Communication Studies. Political Economy of Communication “is the study of the social relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the production, distribution, and consumption of resources, including communication

xviii Preface resources” (Mosco, 2009, p. 2). This definition stresses that the approach’s focus is on (a) the analysis of power relations in the context of media and communication (media power, communication power) and (b) that such power has an economic dimension as it has to do with the production, distribution, and consumption of information. What needs to be stressed is that in a Political Economy study, among the power relations studied, socioeconomic relations, especially class relations, are considered to play a special role. It is assumed that in class societies, all power relations interact with and are influenced and constrained by class relations. Graham Murdock and Peter Golding provided the following definition of the Political Economy of Communication: “The obvious starting point for a political economy of mass communications is the recognition that the mass media are first and foremost industrial and commercial organizations which produce and distribute commodities. […] In addition to producing and distributing commodities, however, the mass media also disseminate ideas about economic and political structures. It is this second and ideological dimension of mass media production which gives it its importance and centrality and which requires an approach in terms of not only economics but also politics” (Murdock & Golding, 1973, pp. 205–207). Murdock and Golding stress that the Political Economy of Communication analyses the economic character of communication systems, which in capitalism means their role in the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities. Murdock and Golding stress that media in capitalism have a double role in fostering (a) commodification and (b) ideologies. In the book Media, Economy, and Society: A Critical Introduction, I present an introduction to the Critique of the Political Economy of Communication (Fuchs, 2024). My understanding is that the Political Economy of Communication and the Media is an approach that uses social theory, empirical social research, and moral philosophy for analysing the roles of communication and communication systems (media, communications) in society, especially the interaction of politics and economy in the context of the media and communication. It studies how the interaction of communication, politics, and economy works and this interaction’s roles in society. It sees the dialectic relationship between the economy and politics as the most important factor shaping communication and society. An important focus is the analysis of the production, distribution, and consumption of information in the context of society. The Political Economy of Communication and the Media often is a critical analysis of how communication and communications work and are organized in capitalist society works and how they impact on and interact with society and the lives of humans in society. This critical analysis is also termed Critique of the Political Economy of Communication and the Media. It gives particular attention to the analysis of the capitalist mode of producing information; communication labour; the production, distribution, and consumption of information and communication(s) as commodities; the space and time of communication; the interaction of politics and the media

Preface  xix economy; ideology critique; communication in the context of class and social struggles; and alternatives to capitalist communication(s) (non-capitalist communication(s)). Yuqi Na’s book is situated in the field of the Critique of the Political Economy of Communication, to which she makes an important contribution. Critique of the Political Economy of Communication analyses the relationship between capitalism and communication (Fuchs, 2020). Given there are capitalist digital corporations in China, including, for example, Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, and ByteDance, the question arises how the political economy of China in general and its digital dimension look like. David Harvey stresses that China’s political economy is neither similar to Western political economy nor completely dissimilar from it. Authors such as Harvey and Huang, therefore, speak of capitalism with Chinese characteristics (Harvey, 2005, Chapter 5; Huang, 2008). In her book Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict, communication scholar Yuezhi Zhao (2008) analyses the Chinese characteristics of the political economy of China’s media system. Building on and extending Critical Political Economy approaches such as the ones of Harvey and Zhao, Yuqi Na analyses ideologies of the Internet with Chinese characteristics. The Chinese Internet: Political Economy and Digital Discourse is a pathbreaking major contribution to the Political Economy of Communication. References Fuchs, C. (2020). Communication and capitalism: A critical theory. University of Westminster Press. https://doi.org/10.16997/book45 Fuchs, C. (2024). Media, economy, and society: A critical introduction. Routledge. Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press. Huang, Y. (2008). Capitalism with Chinese characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marx, K. (1867). Capital Volume I. Penguin. Mosco, V. (2009). The political economy of communication (2nd Edition). Sage. Murdock, G., & Golding, P. (1973). For a political economy of mass communications. Socialist Register, 10, 205–234. Zhao, Y. (2008). Communication in China: Political economy, power, and conflict. Rowman & Littlefield.

Introduction

In the last decade, China has undergone remarkable changes facilitated by digital technologies. The digital economy in China has grown fourfold, and its contribution to the country’s GDP has increased from 21.6% to 39.8% between 2012 and 2021 (Xinhua, 2022). China has now become the largest e-commerce market globally, accounting for nearly 50% of the world’s transactions (International Trade Administration, 2021), which is a significant shift from its less than 1% contribution a decade ago (Kynge, 2017). The Xi-Li administration, which took office in 2013, has emphasized the importance of the Internet-enabled Economic “New Normal” and the need for new socio-political arrangements in the digital era. This new development paradigm centres on high-quality development, with a focus on ICT, Internet-enabled production, domestic consumption, and technology development. This restructuring plan is a continuation of China’s economic transformation initiated after the 2008 world economic crisis (Hong, 2017), and it heavily relies on digital technologies. China’s technology industry tycoons have played a pivotal role in this transformation, encouraged but sometimes restricted by the state. Their services have permeated almost all aspects of life in China, from social media, entertainment, e-commerce, and home delivery to finance services. Although they have faced some challenges from the government since 2020, Internet tycoons still occupy half of the 10 richest Chinese Billionaires list in 2021 (Flannery, 2022). Between 2011 and 2020, China’s GDP increased by slightly more than double, whereas the collective fortunes of the members of China’s 100 richest list during the same period have risen approximately sixfold, mostly from the tech sectors. The exceptional growth of China’s digital economy has been accompanied by a significant increase in data collection and surveillance activities. During the 2015 World Internet Conference, President Xi popularized the terms “Cyber Sovereignty” and “a community of shared future in cyberspace”, which imply more stringent controls over online activities. The Cyber Security Law, implemented in 2016, mandates that all “personal information and important data” collected in China must be stored within the country. An investigation conducted by the New York Times found that phone trackers DOI: 10.4324/9781003315810-1

2  Introduction are used in all provinces and regions of mainland China, and it was estimated that over half of the world’s nearly one billion cameras are situated in China (Qian et al., 2022). Beneath China’s impressive economic figures lies a complex web of challenges and opposition stemming from digital labourers. These labourers, ranging from manufacturing workers to programmers, experience severe exploitation and alienation within China’s digital economy. In 2018, Shenzhen Jasic Technology Company workers staged protests and strikes in response to the dismal work conditions and low pay. They attempted to establish a trade union that would be autonomous from the Chinese government. Marxist and Maoist student groups, leftist scholars, and sympathizers expressed support for these protests. Nonetheless, the government quickly put an end to the protests and detained radical students and activists. In March 2019, a programmer created a webpage on GitHub, a well-known online community for programmers, called 996.ICU. The term 996 refers to the prolonged working hours that Chinese programmers are subjected to: from 9 am to 9 pm, six days a week. The acronym ICU signifies that these programmers may suffer from poor health and end up in intensive care units due to their overtime work schedules. The 996.ICU webpage evolved into a movement aimed at opposing the 996 work system. This campaign triggered significant discussions on Chinese social media platforms, but the CEOs responded with counterarguments. For example, Jack Ma, the founder of Alibaba, claimed that working for 996 systems is a “blessing”. Qiangdong Liu, the CEO of JD, another e-commerce behemoth, supported Ma’s statements, arguing that the country’s economic growth had spawned “slackers” who are not his “brothers”. However, their dismissive remarks only elicited further public backlash.

***

How and why digital technology attains a significant prominence in China’s capitalist development and transformation across economic, political, and social spheres is a subject of inquiry. What is the reason for attracting significant attention from various entities such as the state, the market, the business world, the media, and the general public? How can one comprehend the relationship between digital technology and China’s digital capitalism, characterized by workers who are alienated and exploited in industries that span from electronics manufacturers to high-tech sectors, an increasingly concentrated market with a handful of dominant giants in tech, and strict censorship with occasional loosened control over the online space? Academic works have investigated various aspects of China’s digital capitalism, including its evolution, the impact of technology, and the role of technology. Researchers have explored the complex power dynamics between global capital, the Chinese state, the market, and society in transnational informational capitalism from political-economic perspectives (Meng, 2018; Schiller, 2005; Yang, 2009; Zhao & Schiller, 2001), the economic transformations enabled by digital technologies (Hong, 2017), the emergence and

Introduction  3 development of China-based tech or Internet giants and business ecosystem (Greeven & Wei, 2017; Shen, 2021; Tang, 2019), and labour issues that have arisen during the transformation process(Chan et  al., 2013; Fuchs, 2014; Pun, 2005; Qiu, 2016). Others have focused on the political implications of these changes, such as surveillance (Byler, 2021), Internet control, Internetbased actions, and online participation. Yet these studies have failed to adequately consider the cultural and ideological foundations of these changes, facilitated by digital technologies in China. They have overlooked the ways in which Chinese society conceives, discusses, and imagines digital technology and the reasons behind these perceptions. This book seeks to bridge this gap by examining the discourse surrounding China’s digital landscape. Rather than solely focusing on the establishment of Alibaba’s dominance in the Chinese market or the government’s use of digital surveillance, I aim to investigate how digital technologies are discussed, promoted, and framed through digital discourse, and to reveal the underlying purposes and consequences of this discourse. In this context, digital discourse refers to the contemporary discussion of digital technology, which is viewed as a social practice that both constructs and is constructed by social reality. The discourse on digital technology is not merely a set of neutral representations, but plays a crucial role in shaping the operations and perception of these technologies, and the extent to which they are integrated into society. Through an analysis of various sources such as political speeches, policy papers, media reports, financial reports, and interviews with digital labourers and Internet users in China, I examine the ways in which digital discourse reflects and shapes social structures and contradictions within China’s contemporary capitalist society. Digital discourse is always ideological. As an instance, the assertion that the Internet has the potential to establish a decentralized marketplace, democratize society, and eliminate all social issues without the need for political intervention is an ideological belief. The term “ideology” is a multifaceted construct, and Eagleton identifies six distinct approaches to defining it, each with unique epistemological and ontological commitments. This book does not adopt a neutral stance toward ideology, which is seen as a culture, worldview, or collective expression of political groups. Instead, it interprets ideology from a critical Marxist perspective. Ideology, as used in this book, justifies, maintains, and reproduces current social relationships, particularly the dominance of the ruling group or class. It involves promotion, legitimation, and deceit, whether intentional or not. Chapter 1 delves deeper into this discussion of ideology. In advanced capitalist societies that have undergone a transition from Fordism to post-Fordism (Harvey, 1990), there is widespread use of ideological digital discourse. One such discourse is the optimistic perspective that new technologies offer positive solutions to social issues, commonly referred to as “technological fixes” or the “technological sublime”. Mosco adapted this discourse to the contemporary myths propagated by digital technologies, coining the term “digital sublime”. Mosco observed that cyberspace

4  Introduction has been instrumental in propagating three of the central myths of our time: the end of history, geography, and politics (Mosco, 2005). Fisher argues that the discourse surrounding network technology has been central to legitimizing the transformation of advanced capitalist societies (Fisher, 2010). This discourse emphasizes that network technologies have facilitated decentralization and de-hierarchization in the market, flexible production and working processes, and a participatory culture (Fisher, 2010; Freedman, 2012; Fuchs, 2014; Fuchs & Sandoval, 2013). From a political standpoint, these ideologies assert that the Internet will automatically promote democratization and empowerment in society, thus supporting deregulation and depoliticization (Dean, 2004; Mosco, 2005). China’s digital discourse differs from that of advanced capitalism due to its unique historical and social context. As a peripheral country (Wallerstein, 2004) during the expansion of capitalism and subsequent de-colonization, China’s development has been both influenced by and restricted by the world capitalist system. While China has learned from Western experiences and concepts, its pre-industrialized situation has limited its ability to fully emulate the Western path. Rather than undergoing a complete de-industrialization, China’s digital revolution has been shaped by techno-nationalist, de-politicization, and “neo-industrialization” features, with electronic manufacturing remaining a crucial component. The current historical conjuncture has brought about unique contradictions and power relations between global capital, the state, the market, and society. The transformation to monopolized and imperialist authoritarian capitalism (Fuchs, 2018; Lee, 2017; Pun & Chen, 2022) has relied heavily on digital technologies. China’s digital discourse reflects, shapes, and legitimizes these new power relations and contradictions (Gewirtz, 2019; Hong, 2008; Wu & Yun, 2015; Zhao, 2007), yet no previous research has provided a comprehensive analysis and ideology critique of it. This book is a study of digital discourse in China but also beyond China. It seeks to avoid methodological nationalism by situating China within the context of transnational informational capitalism. The book argues that China’s economic and digital transformations are deeply interconnected with the global capitalist system, and as such, digital discourse in China frequently references the political-economic conditions of advanced capitalist societies, especially in the West. Furthermore, the book analyses the diverse actors involved in the construction and promotion of digital discourse in China, recognizing the existence of internal contradictions and struggles within Chinese society. Finally, the book offers a critical examination of the mechanisms of ideology at play in contemporary China, which in turn provides insights into the role of ideology in capitalist societies more broadly, from a Marxist perspective.

***

In short, this book examines how and why some of the most intriguing digital technology-related political-economic arrangements in contemporary China – for instance, the ICT-led economic transformation, the ever-expanding of

Introduction  5 surveillance from the state and the companies, and the platformization of Chinese society – are discursively proposed, advanced, legitimated, and contested by three key types of stakeholders, the government, the tech companies, and Internet users. It does so by telling three interwoven stories. First, this book analyses China’s dominant digital discourse in the past decade, which has been shaped by significant economic, political, and social changes facilitated by digital technologies. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the global economic crisis of 2008 prompted the Chinese government to transition from an FDI-driven, export-led economy to a consumption-based and innovation-driven one (Hong, 2017). With the combination of high technology and authoritarian state power, China has entered a new stage of monopolized capitalism that differs from the competitive capitalism of the 1990s and early 2000s (Pun & Chen, 2022). Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent (BAT), the early tech giants of China, were founded in the late 1990s and early 2000s, shaping the current digital economy in China in search engine, e-commerce, social media, and mobile gaming. The Great Fire Wall (GFW) was launched in 2002, leading to an increase in domestic Internet usage. By 2011, BAT’s dominant status emerged, following a decade of growth, competition, and expansion into different areas, driven by the mobile Internet. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passed a law in 2012 to establish an online identity management system to protect personal information. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the Cyberspace Administration of China were launched in 2008 and 2014, respectively, contributing to the gradual establishment of the network governance system. Digital discourse is a crucial part of these changes. Beginning around 2010, major companies such as BAT adopted a discourse centred on positioning themselves as the central “infrastructure”, “pipeline”, and “ecosystem” of China’s Internet market and business. This strategy was utilized to reinforce their already dominant position in the market and was frequently featured in CEO speeches at important tech conferences, events, and financial reports. Additionally, after assuming power in 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping delivered several speeches on the topic of cybersecurity and informatization to bolster control over the Internet. In March 2015, Premier Li Keqiang announced the adoption of the “Internet Plus” strategy, which aimed to integrate the Internet and new network technologies into nearly all sectors of the Chinese economy. Examining the digital discourse used over the past decade provides a critical avenue for comprehending the changes brought about by digital technologies in Chinese capitalism. Second, this book offers a comparative analysis of the primary stakeholders involved in shaping digital discourse in China, namely the state, tech corporations, and digital labourers. Through this exploration, the book delves into the contestation and struggle that characterizes China’s contemporary digital capitalism. While both the state and the CEOs of tech companies employ digital discourse to legitimize the transformation of Chinese capitalism

6  Introduction using digital technologies, such discourse is not without tensions. Notably, Jack Ma, the former CEO and founder of Alibaba, has challenged the state’s authority through his outspoken and liberal-leaning speeches, which are examined in this book. These speeches are seen as having contributed to the failure of Ant Group’s IPO, the largest Fintech company owned by Alibaba, and Ma’s subsequent disappearance and low profile since late 2020. The prevailing digital discourse in China is met with varying responses from Internet users and digital labourers. The public discourse or “street talks” about China’s digital development made by non-elite, subaltern groups can easily be under-represented and under-studied. This book presents a study that delves into the attitudes and beliefs of Chinese Internet users and digital labourers regarding the country’s digital capitalism development. Through conducting interviews and focus groups with 43 individuals, including manufacturing workers, programmers, and white-collar Internet users in Shenzhen between 2016 and 2017, the research sheds light on how these users interpret, justify, and express dissatisfaction about their experiences with the Internet in China. While some users align with the government and CEOs’ dominant discourse, expressing techno-nationalism and individualism, others adopt highly critical and opposing views. Some users hold a negotiation stance that simultaneously agrees and disagrees with the dominant discourse. One prevalent digital discourse among Internet users is the belief that “There is no Alternative”, implying a lack of alternative public services or platforms and limited opportunities for political participation to change the current economic and political system under digital capitalism. Despite this, almost all users interviewed exhibit certain practices that challenge state surveillance and commercial platforms. Third, this book elucidates the ideological function of digital discourse in the transformation of Chinese capitalism. It offers insights into comprehending the nature of ideology and the mechanisms by which ideologies operate in the present-day capitalist system. The author identifies three underlying digital ideologies that interconnect to construct the Internet as an ideology that justifies the power and production relationships in modern-day China. These ideologies include informational developmentalism, techno-nationalism, and digital individualism. The state and tech giant CEOs actively frame digital technologies in ways that serve their interests in attaining and maintaining power. For instance, the state commonly employs techno-nationalist rhetoric, such as cyber security and China’s great rejuvenation, to validate its policy of supporting oligopolies in the tech industry and implementing surveillance. CEOs are content to quote the state’s discourse by asserting that they represent Chinese companies and promote China’s industrial upgrading to garner widespread support in the domestic market and sustain their dominant positions. On the other hand, the workers interviewed in this book construct differing ideological discourses as a means of addressing social life contradictions which cannot be resolved in reality, contrasting with the dominant groups’

Introduction  7 promoted ideologies. This divergence illustrates the disparities discussed by Eagleton between “normative” acceptance of dominant ideology and “pragmatic” acceptance. The former refers to the internalization of legitimated power by its targets, while the latter denotes subaltern groups’ endorsement of their rulers’ governance due to a lack of realistic alternatives (Eagleton, 2007, p. 56). This highlights the need for caution when analysing ideologies, such as Chinese nationalism, as the ruling power’s legitimacy may not be successfully internalized. The most successfully internalized ideology is the notion of “There is no Alternative”, drawing attention to the classic Marxist ideology critique that stems from an examination of alienation, commodity fetishism, reification, and identity thinking.

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The structure of this book is straightforward. It is comprised of three parts, with Part I (consisting of Chapters 1 and 2) serving to establish the theoretical, sociological, and empirical foundations, as well as the political-economic and social context, for the research. Chapter 1, in particular, outlines the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of the study of digital discourse and ideologies. The chapter explores the interplay between discourse, technology, and society, conceiving of discourse as an integral part of social practices that simultaneously reflects and shapes social order (Fairclough, 1992, 2015; Jaworski & Coupland, 2006). Additionally, the chapter proposes a framework for analysing digital discourse in the specific context of China, covering key areas such as the market, production, and consumption from economic perspectives, as well as political arrangements at the state, societal, and individual levels. These elements collectively constitute the analytical framework that guides the research presented in this book. In Chapter 2, the digital discourse within China’s capitalist framework and its transformations is explored. Initially, the chapter discusses China’s economic, political, and social dimensions, including land and ownership issues, foreign investment, political reforms, and the decline of socialist welfare, to highlight the characteristics of and contradictions in China’s transformation. Network technologies not only facilitated transformations in production and consumption but also enabled social changes and new power struggles. The chapter subsequently focuses on three areas of the power matrix surrounding China’s ICT industry, including the tensions between global capital and the state, dynamics between the state and the market, and labour struggles in society, to highlight the three facets and forces in the ICT development in China, namely the state, the capital, and the society. This chapter finally introduces brief histories of BAT. Part II (consisting of Chapters 3–5) presents the empirical investigation of digital discourse, encompassing viewpoints from various entities such as the government, corporations, and different categories of digital larbourers. Specifically, Chapter 3 will concentrate on scrutinizing the digital discourses emanating from the Xi-Li administration since 2013. The analysis

8  Introduction will encompass various government Informatization policies, Internet-related policies, Premier Li Keqiang’s yearly Government Work Report, and President Xi’s speech on network technologies and the Internet during the current government’s tenure. This chapter aims to identify the core themes of the current government’s discourse regarding China’s ICT industries. These themes include the ultimate goal of “building a cyber superpower”, promoting an information economy, ensuring cybersecurity, and constructing “a community of shared destiny of Cyberspace”. Chapter 4 conducts a thorough examination of the discourse of the three major China-based global Internet companies, namely Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent (collectively referred to as BAT), which are dominating the Chinese Internet and technology market. The chapter scrutinizes a total of 123 documents, consisting of the speeches delivered by the CEOs of BAT at their respective companies’ largest annual gatherings and the most significant industry events in China. These speeches span a ten-year period from 2008 to 2018, which marks the timeframe when BAT solidified their dominant positions in the Chinese Internet market. By employing a combination of thematic analysis and critical discourse analysis, this chapter exposes how BAT employs discourse to construct their current state of affairs, define themselves, and justify their relationships with other stakeholders, thereby legitimizing their dominant market position, expansion into new industries, and global expansion. Chapter 5 delves into the social construction of digital discourse in China in the context of everyday life. While the book does not aim to provide a comprehensive classification of everyday digital discourse, this chapter focuses on digital labourers (Fuchs, 2014; Qiu, 2016) and Internet users, including manufacturing workers, programmers, and white-collar workers/ consumers, who construct discourses related to the Internet Economy and Internet politics in China. The chapter illustrates the ideological discourse used by digital labourers to legitimize China’s censorship and Internet control and to justify the Internet Economy, employing language such as “trust”, techno-determinist discourses, nationalist arguments of “us vs. them”, “stability”, and “unique national condition”. At the same time, the chapter demonstrates the diversity of workers’ responses to power relations regarding the Internet in China. The discourse of negotiation and opposition highlights the complexity of the social construction of digital discourse, revealing workers’ active attempts to negotiate the development and representation of the Internet, their relationships with the government and companies, and their identities as consumers or citizens. Nevertheless, this chapter also shows that workers’ construction of digital discourse is limited by a broader discourse of “There is no alternative (TINA)”, which asserts that there are no viable alternatives to monopolistic market structures and neoliberal logic, no progressive public service Internet platforms in China, and no effective political participation or solutions. Part III, comprising Chapter 6 and the Conclusion chapter, presents two discussions that offer conclusive analyses from both theoretical and analytical

Introduction  9 perspectives. Chapter 6 approaches the digital discourse with a different lens from the thematic analysis presented in Part II. It employs a theoretical discussion on ideology critique within capitalist societies to interpret and explicate the digital discourse, aiming to comprehend the socio-political meanings and implications of China’s digital discourse in its capitalist transformation. The chapter illustrates how China’s contemporary digital discourse utilizes certain ideologies, such as nationalism, from China’s historical and social context, and imbues them with digital elements to mobilize, invigorate, and “upgrade” these ideologies. These mobilized ideologies serve to construct and legitimize China’s existing network technology-enabled developmental path, institutional arrangements, and power relations. The chapter identifies three interrelated digital ideologies – informational developmentalism, techno-nationalism, and digital individualism, which are anchored by technological determinism as the core. The final chapter of this book has three objectives. First, it aims to provide a summary of the major findings concerning digital discourse. This includes an analysis of how various actors construct, promote, resist, and challenge different forms of digital discourse, the similarities and differences between these actors, and the various types of discourse that arise from within these actors. These similarities and differences demonstrate that digital discourse is a contested field where power struggles occur in the transformation of China’s capitalism through network technologies. Second, it focuses on China’s digital discourse’s ideological elements, as it is used to obscure social conflicts, redirect public attention, and justify power relations. This chapter proposes to reintegrate the critique of digital ideologies into China’s development of capitalism. Lastly, based on the analysis of discourse and ideologies from various social actors, the concluding chapter proposes a multi-layered and multidimensional model to comprehend ideologies in capitalism. This model emphasizes the significance of alienation, commodity fetishism, and reification in present-day discussions of ideology and discourse. By identifying the ideologies, their origins, functions, and limitations, we can develop better strategies for social struggles and transformations. References Byler, D. (2021). Terror capitalism: Uyghur dispossession and masculinity in a Chinese city. Duke University Press. Chan, J., Pun, N., & Selden, M. (2013). The politics of global production: Apple, Foxconn and China’s new working class. New Technology, Work and Employment, 28(2), 100–115. Dean, J. (2004). The networked empire: Communicative capitalism and the hope for politics. In P. A. Passavant & J. Dean (Eds.), Empire’s new cloths (pp. 265–288). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203644003 Eagleton, T. (2007). Ideology: An introduction, new and updated edition. Verso. Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and social change. Polity press. Fairclough, N. (2015). Language and power (3rd Edition). Routledge.

10  Introduction Fisher, E. (2010). Media and new capitalism in the digital age. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230106062 Flannery, R. (2022, November 9). China’s 100 richest 2022. Forbes. https://www. forbes.com/lists/china-billionaires/?sh=71b9e5d52d43 Freedman, D. (2012). Web 2.0 and the death of the blockbuster economy: Des Freedman. In Misunderstanding the Internet (pp. 73–98). Routledge. Fuchs, C. (2014). Digital labour and Karl Marx. Routledge. Fuchs, C. (2018). Authoritarian capitalism, authoritarian movements and authoritarian communication. Media, Culture & Society, 40(5), 779–791. https://doi. org/10.1177/0163443718772147 Fuchs, C., & Sandoval, M. (2013). Critique, social media and the information society. Routledge. Gewirtz, J. (2019). The futurists of Beijing: Alvin Toffler, Zhao Ziyang, and China’s “New technological revolution,” 1979–1991. The Journal of Asian Studies, 78(1), 115–140. Greeven, M. J., & Wei, W. (2017). Business ecosystems in China: Alibaba and competing Baidu, tencent, Xiaomi and LeEco. Routledge. Harvey, D. (1990). The condition of postmodernity (Vol. 14). Blackwell. Hong, Y. (2008). Information society with Chinese characteristics. Javnost-The Public, 15(3), 23–38. Hong, Y. (2017). Networking China: The digital transformation of the Chinese economy. University of Illinois Press. International Trade Administration. (2021, February 3). China – eCommerce. International Trade Administration. https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/ china-ecommerce Jaworski, A., & Coupland, N. (2006). The discourse reader. Routledge. Kynge, J. (2017, October 27). China harnesses big data to buttress the power of the state. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/5f483a34-ba5f-11e7-8c125661783e5589 Lee, C. K. (2017). The specter of global China: Politics, labor, and foreign investment in Africa. The University of Chicago Press. Meng, B. (2018). The politics of Chinese media: Consensus and contestation. Palgrave Macmillan. Mosco, V. (2005). The digital sublime: Myth, power, and cyberspace. MIT Press. Pun, N. (2005). Made in China: Women factory workers in a global workplace. Duke University Press. Pun, N., & Chen, P. (2022). Confronting global infrastructural capitalism: the triple logic of the ‘vanguard’ and its inevitable spatial and class contradictions in China’s high-speed rail program. Cultural Studies. DOI: 10.1080/09502386.2022.2056219 Qian, I., Xiao, M., Mozur, P., & Cardia, A. (2022, June 21). China’s expanding surveillance state: Takeaways from a NYT investigation. The New York Times. https:// www.nytimes.com/2022/06/21/world/asia/china-surveillance-investigation.html Qiu, J. L. (2016). Goodbye iSlave: A manifesto for digital abolition. University of Illinois Press. Schiller, D. (2005). Poles of market growth? Open questions about China, information and the world economy. Global Media and Communication, 1(1), 79–103. Shen, H. (2021). Alibaba: Infrastructuring global China. Routledge. Tang, M. (2019). Tencent: The political economy of China’s surging Internet giant. Routledge.

Introduction  11 Wallerstein, I. M. (2004). World-systems analysis: An introduction. Duke University Press. Wu, J., & Yun, G. (2015). Where will the future of the information society go (Weilai Xinxi Shehui Xiang Heche Qu). People’s Forum, 15, 52–66. Xinhua. (2022, July 4). China’s digital economy more than quadruples in past decade. Xinhua. https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/statistics/202207/04/content_ WS62c2227bc6d02e533532d232.html Yang, G. (2009). The power of the Internet in China: Citizen activism online. Columbia University Press. Zhao, Y. (2007). After mobile phones, what? Re-embedding the social in China’s “Digital revolution.” International Journal of Communication, 1(1), 29. Zhao, Y., & Schiller, D. (2001). Dances with wolves? China’s integration into digital capitalism. Info, 3(2), 137–151.

Part I

1 Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism

The primary inquiry of this book pertains to the justification for studying digital discourse in China, which refers to contemporary conversations regarding network technology in the context of the Chinese variant of capitalism. The book’s scrutiny of digital discourse centres on its ideological elements. Its aim is to investigate the underlying ideologies of digital discourse during China’s transformation from export-oriented FDI-driven competitive capitalism to state-monopolized capitalism. This examination is not intended to endorse “China threat” theories or create international tensions. Rather, the book’s approach focuses on domestic contradictions in a global context and employs classical Marxist ideology theory to scrutinize the construction and development of Internet ideology during China’s transition. The objective is to revive classical ideology critique and capitalism as analytical tools. The present chapter offers a comprehensive theoretical discussion of Western neoliberal capitalism, while the next chapter will delve into the specific historical context of China’s capitalism. The objective of this chapter is to provide a theoretical and conceptual framework for the examination of digital discourse within capitalist societies. Initially, it investigates the interconnection between ideology and capitalism, as well as the operation of ideology in contemporary capitalist societies. This specific understanding of ideology critically examines the fundamental structural conditions of society, aiming to uncover deceptive appearances and encourage transformative action (Adorno, 1976, p.  68). This approach to ideology is based on classical Marxism, which emphasizes the critical analysis of the political economy of capitalism, the contradictions inherent in capitalist systems, and the agency of the working class. In the context of China’s state-led structural transformation since the late 1990s, digital discourse and Internet-related ideologies have played a political role in promoting a partial version of reality, obscuring social contradictions, proposing distorted solutions to these contradictions, gaining consent, legitimizing existing power relations, and most importantly, suppressing revolutionary and alternative perspectives and transformations. This chapter establishes the theoretical and conceptual framework for examining digital discourse in capitalist societies. It begins by exploring the DOI: 10.4324/9781003315810-3

16  Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism relationship between capitalism and ideology, with a critical approach that aims to reveal the deceptive appearances of societal conditions and seek ways to alter them. This approach is based on classical Marxism, which emphasizes the critique of capitalist political economy, contradictions in capitalism, and working-class subjectivity. The chapter then focuses on the role of digital discourses and Internet-related ideologies in shaping political discourse during China’s structural transformation led by the state since the late 1990s. Specifically, it argues that these discourses have played a political role in legitimizing existing power relations, presenting a distorted version of reality, and curbing revolutionary and alternative perspectives and transformations. This chapter develops a framework for studying digital discourse in China by analysing existing academic discussions on the topic, particularly in Western advanced capitalist nations. The framework delineates key areas of inquiry into digital discourse from an economic perspective, including market dynamics, production processes, and consumption patterns, as well as from political arrangements at the state, societal, and individual levels. Furthermore, the chapter examines emerging cultural phenomena associated with digital technologies. These components collectively establish an analytical framework that guides subsequent empirical investigations. 1.1

A Marxist Theory of Ideology and Subjectivity in Capitalism

The central emphasis of this book centres around the classical Marxist viewpoint, with the aim of understanding (a) the essence and genesis of ideology, (b) the mechanisms by which ideologies function, and (c) the primary actors responsible for formulating, disseminating, and construing ideology (specifically, the correlation between ideology and social class). This book presents the Marxist theory of ideology, which is illustrated in Figure 1.1. The theory emphasizes the importance of recognizing social conflicts in understanding ideology (Section 1.1.1). In a capitalist society, economic struggles within the structure create fundamental conflicts. However, ideology does not directly reflect this reality. Rather, deceptive appearances obscure the contradictory reality, which is evident in both the economic structure (via commodity fetishism resulting in reification) and the political superstructure (where ideology is used to gain consent and exert power). The culture industry perpetuates the existing social order by continuously reproducing it. Ideologies correspond to the contradictions inherent in capitalist society. This means that ideology is not mere arbitrary speculation from individuals, rendering it absurd when people refer to their own personal or individual ideologies. Instead, ideology has its roots in reality, constructed through the interactions between objects and subjects. As per the book’s delineation of ideology, it has its foundations in the paradoxical actuality of the societal setup.  Consequently, the interests of the dominant class and those in authoritative positions are inevitably upheld through the medium of ideology (Section 1.1.2). In modern-day politics,

Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism   17

Figure 1.1 The relationship between capitalism, appearances, and ideology

ideology holds immense significance as it obstructs the emergence of a revolutionary shift and the formulation of an intense and analytical workingclass consciousness. In essence, ideology endorses the extant social structure, particularly the predominant power dynamics, and perpetuates the existing system through misrepresentation (reverse manifestation). The fundamental objective of ideology is to promote, legitimize, and mislead, be it done knowingly or inadvertently. It is crucial to acknowledge that ideology is not a static or uniform way of thinking but instead a complex and dynamic concept. Even within the ruling class, there can be competing ideas, and individuals may interpret societal appearances in different ways. Nonetheless, these differences are typically confined within a closed system, and in times when the dominant class’s rule is challenged, these differences tend to disappear. This underscores the primary purpose of ideology, which is to maintain the current social order in the interests of the dominant class. To gain a complete understanding of ideology, it is insufficient to examine solely the ruling class. It is equally necessary to consider subordinated groups and their perceptions of their social circumstances. Consequently, in addition to scrutinizing discourses emanating from the government and other influential entities, this publication will explore the discourses of digital labourers and Internet users and how they either comply with, confront, or negotiate dominant ideologies. By examining these groups’ confrontational behaviours, their comprehension of their place within the system, as well as their alternative perspectives, it is feasible to identify challenges to and alternative outlooks on the dominant ideologies. To encapsulate, ideology is characterized by divergent manifestations that preserve the existing societal structure by obfuscating inconsistencies through

18  Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism distorted remedies and inadequate depictions of actuality. The involvement in ideological cognition or conduct entails concealing true contradictions in support of the dominant class, notwithstanding the existence of ideological convictions in both the governing and subordinate factions. Advancement in the resistance against ideology can be accomplished by comprehending the system and by examining alternative possibilities, leading to practical actions. 1.1.1  Where Does Ideology Come from? 1.1.1.1  Ideology Arises from Economic Contradictions

In capitalist societies, the definition, origin, and function of ideology are significant inquiries that can be explored through two distinct Marxist traditions. The first tradition, as demonstrated by young Marx, Lukács, Adorno, and Horkheimer, considers ideology as emerging from economic structures. On the other hand, the second tradition, represented by Gramsci and Hall, regards ideologies as collections of political concepts in contradiction with each other. Williams (2005) makes a distinction between “epochal questions” addressed by the former and “historical questions” addressed by the latter. These two traditions offer a framework for comprehending the ideologies associated with the Internet and digital technology. Marx posited that ideology is a form of consciousness that emerges from the prevailing conditions of existence within a particular social structure. He viewed consciousness as a byproduct of material activity and social interaction, with individuals’ ideas serving as “direct efflux”, “reflexes”, or “echoes” of reality (K. Marx & Engels, 1845, p. 42). Marx contended that ideology could only arise from actual struggles within social reality that correspond to specific economic and political contradictions. In his analogy of the “camera obscura”, Marx explained how ideology results from a distorted representation of social reality, which inverts our comprehension of the social formation (ibid.). Alienation and fetishism are two concepts that are closely linked to Marx’s discourse on ideology, with alienation denoting the dominance of commodity relations over human relations and fetishism referring to the mystical character that commodities assume, reflecting the social relations among human beings (K. Marx, 1867, p. 165). Drawing on Marx’s examination of economic structure within society, Lukács elaborated on the concept of ideology by scrutinizing the commodity form, while Adorno formulated his perspective on ideology by examining the mechanism of exchange value (Eagleton, 2007, p. 125). Georg Lukács built upon Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism by introducing the concept of reification and linking it to Weber’s notion of rationalization in modern society. Reification, according to Lukács, is the transformation of human relationships into a thing-like form, resulting in an apparent objectivity and autonomy that conceals its underlying social nature

Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism   19 (Lukács, 1972, p. 83). Lukács extended this phenomenon to all areas of social organization, drawing on Weber’s critique of rationalism, and argued that capitalism has created a legal and political structure that corresponds to its own needs (ibid., p. 95). He further expanded the concept of reification to encompass the increasingly fragmented and isolated aspects of social consciousness (Rehmann, 2014, p. 79). This perspective suggests that human life is mechanically divided into isolated parts, divorced from a totality. It is noteworthy to consider the definition of “false” within Lukács’ discussions on “false consciousness”. According to Eagleton, both Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism and Lukács’ concept of reification refer to an objective material structure of capitalism, rather than being solely “a state of mind” (Eagleton, 2007, p. 100). It is within this prevalent phenomenon of reification in a capitalist society that the concept of “false consciousness” arises, where the relation between objects in daily life obscures the underlying relations between individuals. Consequently, this “false consciousness” is perceived by individuals as the authentic and unadulterated representation of reality, despite it not accurately reflecting their societal existence. “False” means not the “true representatives of his [human] societal existence” (Lukács, 1972, p. 93). The term “ideology” refers to the psychological consciousness derived from the domination of commodity structures in daily life, and Lukács develops Marx’s definition of ideology as “false consciousness” to describe a partial, immediate, empirical, and psychological understanding of social reality, which conceals the true dialectical relations between humans and nature. In capitalist societies, ideology is derived from the economic structure and its contradictions, and its primary purpose is to disguise the reality of capitalist exploitation, alienation, and reification. Additionally, ideology serves as distorted solutions to real problems. Commodity fetishism as an ideology has three consequences according to Eagleton. First, it conceals the social character of labour and makes it difficult to comprehend society as a whole, rendering the capitalist order less susceptible to political critique (Eagleton, 2007, p. 85). Second, the domination of social life by inanimate entities leads to the feeling of a capitalist social system as something natural and inevitable. Third, ideology arises from a contradictory reality and distorted appearance of material limitations. The origin of ideology is in the contradictory nature of reality, and as long as these contradictions exist and people cannot solve them in reality, they can only reach distorted solutions in their minds. These solutions usually stem from inverted appearances, as ideology is an imaginary resolution of real contradictions that blinds people to the harsh actuality of their social conditions. Marx emphasizes that the increase in productive forces is the material premise of communism, and until people reach an adequate level of productive forces, they can only liberate themselves based on the existing productive forces and historical conditions (Eagleton, 2007, p. 77; Larrain, 1979, p. 46; K. Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 431).

20  Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism Drawing on the key notion of exchange value, Theodor Adorno developed an alternative strand of ideology analysis that closely aligns with Marx’s examination of the capitalist economy (Eagleton, 2007, p. 125). Adorno posits that the mechanism of abstract value underlies ideology, with abstract value referring to exchange value as distinct from use value. Use value denotes the practical utility of a product, whereas exchange value pertains to the price paid for it in the market. Marx’s Capital explicates the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of commodities, with the former relating to their usefulness and the latter to their exchange value. Exchange value emerges as the quantitative proportion in which different use values exchange. Abstract labour, which is detached from the specific use value of the commodity, generates exchange value. Concrete labour is reduced to a common denominator of human labour in the abstract, with its various forms differentiated only by the duration of labour-time. This process reduces the heterogeneous features of commodities and individual labourers to an abstract sameness. According to Adorno, ideology is founded upon the abstract exchange value which causes the seeming incompatibility of various aspects of objects and human thought to vanish. Adorno regards ideology as a form of “identity thinking”, which “homogenizes the world” (Eagleton, 2007, p. 126). In so doing, ideology impedes the diversities, disparities, and singularities of human thought. Adorno extends this concept of identity thinking, emphasizing its role in replicating the prevailing framework of social actuality. A significant critique of Adorno’s concept of ideology as synonymous with totalitarianism claims that modern capitalist society differs greatly from Nazi society as there is more room for “variousness, plurality, cultural relativity, concrete particularity” (Eagleton, 2007, p. 128). While it may be challenging to argue that modern society is inherently structured this way, it is undeniable that “it cannot be different from what it is” (Rehmann, 2014, pp. 92–93). In other words, we should interpret the uniformity of ideology in a broader sense, recognizing that capitalism tolerates a range of variations and fluctuations only within the confines of its fundamental principles. There is no alternative possibility of developing a socialist social order on a large scale. The idea of socialism is often deemed impossible, dangerous, or incompatible with human nature by “common sense”, which sets limits on revolutionary thinking. According to Adorno and Horkheimer ideology thus “functions as an instrument of control”, perpetuating the current social order and manipulating individuals to conform to it (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002, p. 118). Ideology achieves this by creating a world of appearances that obscures reality and prevents critical insight (Rehmann, 2014, p. 85). This pervasive world of appearances is so powerful that it consolidates the unchanging nature of existing circumstances (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002, p. 119). This understanding is akin to Marx’s notion of ideology as a disguised reality, where appearances, such as the fetishism of commodities or reification, veil the true relationship between individuals and their products, as well as among people themselves.

Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism   21 Adorno and Horkheimer posited that in late capitalist society, the deceptive function of ideology is manifested through what they termed as “the culture industry”. This industry employs positivistic technocratic thinking to immortalize the present situation as unchangeable and thus legitimizes existing social power (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002, p. 95). The culture industry achieves its aim of degrading people to pure objects that willingly submit to the current system, and to the domination of existing power, by reproducing reality and leading people to follow the reproduced social relations. It does so by uncritically duplicating the alienated reality or reified relations, thus exploiting the cult of fact and elevating bad existence into the realm of facts, where existence itself becomes a surrogate of meaning and justice. In the process, people are reduced to a human species without individuality and can thus be interchangeable with one another. The culture industry promotes the promise of a welfare state while using tragic stories to remind those who wish to leave the system of a miserable existence once they are abandoned by the system. It ultimately gives people a choice to be an insider or outsider, with success seemingly available to all who obey the rules and accept the planned opportunities given by the powerful. 1.1.1.2  Ideologies Embedded in Political Conflicts

An additional primary avenue of inquiry, valuable for comprehending ideology within Marxist frameworks, involves examining political conflicts among various classes or within a specific class. When analysing ideology through the lens of such struggles, it is emphasized that economic relationships alone are insufficient in determining a singular, rigid, and unchangeable way of interpreting societal phenomena. Rather, social reality can be represented through diverse ideological discourses (Hall, 1996, p. 38). This perspective underscores the importance of ideology in securing agreement from the subjugated class. The discussion of ideology can be elucidated by considering refinements and distinctions in Gramsci’s work. Gramsci differentiates between two types of ideology: “organic ideologies” which are an indispensable component of a particular structure and “arbitrary elucubrations of particular individuals” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 376). Gramsci argues that both types of ideologies can influence human behaviour, with organic ideologies being historically necessary and possessing a psychological validity that organizes the masses and creates the framework for human action and consciousness. Arbitrary ideologies, on the other hand, only generate individual movements and polemics (Gramsci, 1971, p. 377). These distinctions can provide valuable insights into the study of ideology. Gramsci highlights the concept of “common sense” as a characteristic of people’s empirical consciousness that is chaotic in nature. Common sense, according to him, is a materialistic and realistic element that is also superstitious and uncritical, and an “immediate product of crude sensation” (ibid., p. 420).

22  Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism He refers to it as the spontaneous philosophy of the multitude, which imposes a limit on revolutionary thinking. In contrast to Bukharin’s systematic philosophies, Gramsci asserts that the philosophy of common sense, which is the philosophy of non-philosophers, should be the starting point to understand consciousness (Gramsci, 1971, p. 419). He argues that philosophical and religious systems have no direct influence on the thinking and actions of the majority of people (ibid., pp. 419–420). Instead, common sense operates indirectly and restricts people’s potential for revolutionary thinking. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony goes beyond the traditional understanding of ideology, as it highlights the practical and dynamic process by which a ruling power secures the consent of its subordinates. This process involves not only economic and political means but also language and culture, as reflected in discourse. For instance, the ruling class may use the tax system to win support from the people it needs, or create a wealthy but politically disengaged middle class. On the political level, the parliamentary system may create an illusion of self-government and freedom, while the legal system should appear impartial to all. These are normal strategies used to establish hegemony, which Gramsci sees as the result of appearances that create ideology in the sense of Marx and Lukács. However, Gramsci places more emphasis on the political struggle involved in the use of ideology/hegemony. It is evident that the success of this strategy depends on the ability of ideology to conceal reality and offer a partial representation of it. The arena for people to explain these appearances actively and for the ruling class to strategically gain consent is civil society. Rather than using coercive power, such as that employed by the state through repressive apparatuses such as the army, police, or criminal system, ideology in civil society operates through “hegemonic apparatuses” such as schools, churches, families, and other private institutions. These “hegemonic apparatuses” bind individuals to the ruling power by consent rather than coercion (Eagleton, 2007, p. 114). Civil society serves as a mediation between the state and economic structure, a terrain for class contestation, and a place where hegemony is fought for according to Gramsci. It is the stage for various competing interpretations of appearances and daily practices. Therefore, the social and cultural superstructure is not completely determined by the economic structure, as there would be no contestation or no need for ideology to operate as a discourse. According to Gramsci’s perspective, ideologies are formed through actual class conflicts. Although ideologies and common sense appear random and disorganized, they are not merely the subjective musings of individuals but rather are rooted in historical social reality, both economically and politically. Hegemony refers to the practical tactics employed by a dominant class to gain the approval of subordinate groups. As such, ideology is inherently designed to advance the interests of the dominant social group. Gramsci’s perspective on ideology differs from that of Marx and Lukács, as he adopts a more neutral approach and emphasizes the subjects who hold ideologies. Nevertheless, both perspectives recognize the coexistence of

Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism   23 objective and subjective aspects of ideology. According to Gramsci, ideologies are historically predetermined and actively constructed by individuals. They correspond to a specific historical context and political situation, and are grounded in reality. Furthermore, ideologies are subjective interpretations of daily experiences and practices, produced by subjects. Gramsci’s definition of ideology shares similarities with Lukács’ in terms of being an immediate and empirical expression of lived experience. However, Gramsci deviates from the negative function of ideology posited by Lukács, which obscures the perception of contradictory reality. Hall also departs from the conventional Marxist notion of ideology as negative and repositions class struggle as the central issue in the study of ideology (Larrain, 1996, p. 47). In his view, ideology is a term that refers to the images, concepts, and premises that provide frameworks for representing, interpreting, understanding, and making sense of various aspects of social existence (Hall, 1995, p.  89). According to Hall, ideologies are comprised of key notions, including their operation in the articulation of different elements into a distinctive set or chain of meanings, their emergence through social practice and political struggle, their pre-existence to individuals as part of determinate social formations, and their construction of subject positions of identification and knowledge that enable individuals to articulate ideological truths as if they were their own (ibid., pp. 89–90). Through this rearticulation, Hall highlights that the concept of ideology does not necessarily represent a certain ruling class, but rather refers to ideological discourses that can represent different classes or groups. Hall’s conceptualization of ideologies can be more effectively explained through his examination of Thatcherism. In his analysis, Hall raises the issue of internal conflicts within the dominant classes and the innovative components of ruling ideas, criticizing classical Marxist theory for its inadequacy in explaining the tangible, empirical development of consciousness and practice among working classes in advanced capitalist societies (Hall, 1995, p. 43). Consequently, he employs a Gramscian method to investigate how Thatcherism acquired its dominant power over the ruling and dominated classes. Hall aims to comprehend how Thatcherism managed to gain popular support and create a new framework for political discourse and calculation, thereby achieving ideological effectiveness (ibid., p. 41). Unlike Lukács, who focuses on the economic circumstances that differentiate empirical consciousness from possible class consciousness, Hall examines how this empirical consciousness is shaped, interpreted, and made popular, thereby conferring hegemonic power. As Larrain highlights, through his examination of Thatcherism’s concrete political dilemma, Hall significantly contributes to the understanding of the formation or transformation of political discourses and currents of thought, as well as how social groups seek to articulate their interests with those of others (Larrain, 1996, p. 63). Gramsci and Hall examine the intricate nature of political ideologies across diverse social classes and groups. While Lukács and Adorno assert

24  Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism that capitalism’s economic structure is the origin of ideology, Gramsci and Hall’s conceptualization of ideology differs from this perspective. Nevertheless, their viewpoints are not necessarily contradictory. For instance, Hall delves into the cultural and historical fabrication of gender ideologies, which, despite their complexity, originate from the socio-economic structure (Hall, 1995, p. 90). The examination of racism can also coexist with ideological perspectives on class and economic issues. Similarly, the conservative or nationalist ideology in Thatcherism could arise from people’s distorted economic situation or a partial understanding of reality, as well as from long-standing ideologies that acquire new characteristics in contemporary times. 1.1.1.3  Tensions and Reconciliation: A Summary

In the context of Marxist ideology, two approaches have been identified for understanding it, namely the negative and the neutral approaches. These can be characterized as epochal questions and historical questions respectively, as per the terminology used by Raymond Williams (Williams, 2005, p. 38). The epochal questions refer to the major features of different societal epochs, such as the transition from feudalism to capitalism. These questions require an analysis of the economic conditions and modes of production that underlie such changes and enable us to identify key features of capitalist society such as commodity fetishism and reification. The historical questions, on the other hand, focus on the active and dynamic meanings, values, and ideas that emerge within social practices and political struggles within bourgeois society. Overall, these two approaches offer different lenses through which to understand ideology in the Marxist tradition. According to Williams, there exist three categories of culture: the dominant, alternative, and oppositional. The dominant culture consists of meanings and values that have undergone a “selective tradition”, wherein certain meanings and practices are emphasized, while others are ignored and excluded (Williams, 2005, p.  39). The emergence of alternative and oppositional cultures results from previous social formations and the emergence of new social classes. Williams’ examination of culture and social consciousness may also provide a model for comprehending the source of ideological and non-ideological consciousness. By utilizing Williams’ analytical framework, we can deduce that ideologies stem from a historical selection process, and conquering these ideologies necessitates the development of new classes’ practices and consciousness. Williams’ conceptualization of the interplay between base and superstructure can provide insight into two ideological approaches as demonstrated earlier. Williams posits that the term “determination” in the phrase “social being determines consciousness” refers to the imposition of boundaries and exertion of pressures (Williams, 2005, p. 34). Thus, we can argue that the prevailing ideology stemming from economic conditions constrains the realm in which political ideologies can manifest during various stages of capitalism.

Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism   25 Drawing from the discussions, there are four fundamental categories of the roles of ideology in the classical Marxist contentions. First, ideology is utilized to obscure resolutions and hinder legitimate revolutionary ideas and options. Second, ideology functions as camouflage to veil the actuality of capitalist modes of production in their entirety. It is a biased and incomplete portrayal of reality that could either be deliberately or unintentionally manufactured. Third, ideologies are employed to secure authorization and validate the supremacy of the ruling power. Lastly, ideologies are purported to perpetuate and uphold the present capitalist structure. 1.1.2  Few Notes of Ideology 1.1.2.1  Ideology and the Ruling Class Interests

Initially, it is evident that Marx believed that ideology always served the interests of the ruling class due to its position within the societal system. In his work, The German Ideology, Marx argued that “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force” (Marx & Engels, 1845–1846, p. 67). Marx provided this analysis from a materialistic perspective, suggesting that consciousness is determined by reality and corresponds to a class society where productive forces and social relations are organized under the conditions of the dominant class’s rule. The primary contradiction that ideology conceals is the struggle between different classes throughout history, including free men and slaves, nobility and serfs, and bourgeoisie and proletariat (K. Marx & Engels, 1976, p.  432). In this way, ideology functions as a means of legitimizing and reproducing the existing economic and political system, thereby serving as a tranquilizer. Marx believed that ideology conceals social contradictions and legitimizes the structure of domination in the interests of the dominant class. However, for Marx, this process of disguising is relatively straightforward and involves reversing the true conditions of existence, similar to the camera obscura metaphor. In the 20th century, Marxist thinking would describe this process as compensatory fictions, fantasies, misdirected idealism, or escapism. In his work, Marx offers an explanation for why the ideas of the ruling class hold sway over society. He suggests that the ruling class is able to construct and interpret appearances in a way that serves their own interests. They control the production and distribution of ideas, and this process is not a static event but a dynamic one (K. Marx & Engels, 1845, p. 67). As a new ruling class emerges, they present their interests as those that are shared by all members of society or at least those outside of the ruling class. The development of ideology is an ongoing process, rather than a one-time event. This argument posits that the validity of a particular class is shaped by the historical conditions under which it emerges. However, as new conflicts arise between the ruling class and the non-ruling classes, ideology is employed to

26  Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism obscure these tensions. The more pronounced the conflicts between the ruling class and the advanced productive forces become, the more traditional ideas that express actual private interests descend into the realm of idealistic rhetoric, conscious illusion, and deliberate hypocrisy (K. Marx & Engels, 1845, p. 310). When the ruling class finds itself in a practical collision that threatens its very existence, the internal divisions within its ideas are reconciled, resulting in the ruling ideas becoming synonymous with the ideas of the ruling class (ibid., p. 68). In other words, the ideas of the ruling class are adopted as the dominant ideas to maintain their power and advance their interests. According to Lukács, the concepts of reification and false consciousness are ubiquitous and apply to all individuals, regardless of their social status or class. Lukács defines ideology as the reification of the mind, which involves the perception of the external manifestations of capitalist commodity structure as the actual process of capital. The author places more emphasis on the influence of such ideologies rather than their originators. The primary concern is the way in which these ideologies mask the exploitative economic reality, the “real life-process of capitalism”, including the extraction of surplus value and the genuine connection between individuals and the objects that truly satisfy their needs (Lukács, 1972, p. 93). Therefore, the concept of reified consciousness is a universal phenomenon inherent in the historical process, and it applies to all individuals, regardless of their class position. However, it would be hasty to contend that for Lukács, there is no correlation between ideology and class. Rather, Lukács proposes that the two are indirectly linked. He associates the bourgeois class with the workings of ideology in the sense that it is compelled to defend ideology to maintain their dominance and the stability of the social order. When class conflicts bring to light the concealed social contradictions, the bourgeoisie is forced to rely more consciously on defence mechanisms. Thus, the “false” consciousness is transformed into “a mendacious consciousness” (ibid., p. 65). In essence, for Lukács, reification is intertwined with a social class owing to the existing system; this is an inherent feature due to their position in society; when their power is threatened, they adopt intentional consciousness to preserve their authority. This progression to intentional (deceptive) consciousness leads to the formation of ideology to mask the economic reality of a functional process in the interests of the entire bourgeois class. Therefore, for Lukács, the universal presence of ideology does not clash with its purpose to serve the ruling class’s interests. 1.1.2.2  Ideology and the Working Class

Gramsci’s contribution to the discussion on ideology highlights the disorderly nature of people’s common sense. Through his analysis of hegemony, ideology, and common sense, he identifies two key features of ideology that Marx and Lukács did not emphasize. The first feature of Gramsci’s analysis

Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism   27 relates to the dynamic nature of hegemony, which involves the constant renewal, recreation, defence, and modification of ideologies. Hegemony is not a one-time process, but one that must continuously negotiate with change, resistance, and contradictions arising from capitalism (Williams, 1977, p. 112). Williams proposes a change in concept from “hegemony” to “the hegemonic” to emphasize this ongoing process. The second feature of Gramsci’s analysis is the complexity of ideology. Due to struggles within a system and the differences between organic and arbitrary ideologies, ideologies are a complex area in which various ideas compete and coexist. Gramsci’s use of the plural form of “ideologies” indicates his emphasis on struggles and the complex lived experiences of ordinary people that cannot be entirely subsumed by the dominant ideology. In summary, Gramsci, while remaining a Marxist, develops a less direct, instrumental, and monolithic notion of ideology compared to Marx and Adorno, and Horkheimer. His insights on the dynamic and complex nature of hegemony and ideology offer a valuable contribution to the discussion on ideology. Gramsci characterizes common sense as a haphazard amalgamation of varied conceptions, devoid of any systematic structure (Gramsci, 1971, p.  422). He observes that it comprises conflicting components of different belief systems, as well as ideas that are yet to be formulated. People’s “disjointed and episodic” conception of the world may strangely contain “Stone Age elements and principles of a more advanced science, prejudices from all past phases of history at the local level and intuitions of a future philosophy which will be that of a human race united the world over” (ibid., p. 324). Common sense reflects the complexity and diversity of human thought, rather than a coherent system of thinking. However, this absence of self-awareness and historical consciousness leads to common sense being subordinated and dependent on other forms of knowledge (Hall et  al., 2012). Therefore, a detailed analysis of the chaotic nature of common sense is crucial to better comprehend ideological deviations. 1.1.2.3  Ideological Struggles and Working-Class Subjectivity

Due to pragmatic considerations and grounded in theoretical deliberations regarding the relationship between struggles and subjectivity within ideology, I shall make use of two methods of classifying consciousness in opposition to ideologies. In Stuart Hall’s work, he discusses the encoding-decoding model, which outlines three positions in which media audiences or “receivers” can interpret messages. The first position is the dominant-hegemonic position, whereby the audience decodes the message of media texts fully and straightforwardly, without the need for conscious decoding. The meaning is accepted as “obvious”. The second position is the negotiated position, where the audience accepts the dominant ideology at a general level, but applies their own rules based on their life experiences and self-interests in situational contexts.

28  Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism The third position is the oppositional position, whereby the audience can deconstruct the message and reconstruct the meanings using alternative and contrary frameworks (Hall, 1980). In Christian Fuchs’ proposed framework for categorizing people’s responses to ideology, which draws on the works of Hall and Žižek, there are 16 potential reactions (Fuchs, 2015). Fuchs notes that individuals may be conscious, partially conscious, critically conscious, or unconscious of an ideology, while simultaneously following it, following parts of it, or resisting it. It is possible for someone to be aware of an ideology but still conform to it, as is frequently observed in the Chinese context, where people may agree with nationalist ideologies supporting government control of the Internet for the sake of stability and national security, but still use VPNs in their daily lives. Thus, it is essential to examine the variations in individuals’ ideological and confrontational stances within their praxis. To summarize, the objective of this discussion is to investigate how to detect challenges faced by Internet users from their own perspectives. This investigation will be supported by empirical research that forms the basis of this thesis. In addition to direct opposition to ideologies, there are three other methods to identify non-ideological, confrontational, critical, and oppositional potential within users. These include observing their confrontational behaviour, their perception of their position within the entire system, and alternative imaginations. The concept of ideology has been expanded from its original definition by Marx, and people can now react to ideologies in three ways: oppositional, negotiated, and dominant. People can also hold varying degrees of knowledge or awareness about ideologies (unconscious, conscious, partly conscious, and critically conscious) and respond differently to them (follow, partially follow, not follow, or resist the ideology). 1.2

Discourse and Ideology

The primary arena for ideological struggle is language, as discourse serves as the medium for communication (Fairclough, 1992). The concept of discourse stresses the interdependence between the text and its surrounding contexts, such as the producer and audience. Language, therefore, serves as a battleground and a manifestation of social conflict, power relationships, and common sense. To examine these hidden, opaque, and visible structures of dominance, discrimination, power, and control embedded in language, critical discourse analysis (CDA) is the preferred method. This book adopts CDA as it aligns with the philosophical and methodological foundations of analysing language as a site of power relations, discrimination, and control (Wodak & Meyer, 2015, p. 12). The two key characteristics of CDA that this book utilizes are its interest in analysing hidden structures of power and its focus on language as a site of ideological struggle.

Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism   29 To begin with, CDA adopts a problem-solving approach that stems from critical theory’s tradition, which seeks to promote enlightenment and emancipation. This publication is grounded in the critical dialectical Marxist tradition. In discourse analysis research, theory is not only necessary to formulate research questions that guide data selection, collection, analysis, and interpretation, but it is also rooted in previous interpretations of empirical analyses. Furthermore, this thesis acknowledges that theory plays a critical role in the entire research process. Additionally, the critical tradition of CDA compels it to address power dynamics and ideologies, which are the central focus of this thesis. Second, the examination of discourse by CDA offers insight into the interests of power and ideologies. CDA views discourse as a social practice that can both reflect and shape power relations within society while also being influenced by social structures. Ideology, which is often concealed within everyday language, is an important aspect of CDA as it is revealed through conceptual metaphors and analogies. According to CDA, discourse is a social construct that can have significant impacts on social structure. This understanding of language and its ideological function is relevant to this research as it seeks to uncover ideological expressions through various discourses. Additionally, the Discourse-Historical Approach, as explained by Reisigl and Wodak (2015), highlights that power is not only realized through grammatical forms, but also through an individual’s control of social situations, the genre of a text, and the regulation of access to specific public spheres (Reisigl & Wodak, 2015, p. 26). Therefore, discourse, in its broadest sense, is a type of social practice that is linked to both ideology and power. The present book conceptualizes Chinese digital discourse as the contemporary discourse concerning network technology within the context of China’s capitalism. The advent of network technologies has facilitated political-economic changes within China’s state-led capitalism, concomitant with shifts in ideology, politics, and technology. The phenomenon of digital discourse is thus an integral aspect of a broader social process that intersects with various other social transformations. Through an examination of the diverse manifestations of digital discourse, this book aims to elucidate the social and ideological transformations underway within China’s digital capitalism. In this study, my research is centred on the examination of stakeholders involved in the production and consumption of digital discourses within the Chinese Internet and ICT landscape. The study will concentrate on three primary stakeholders, namely the government, the three oligopolies (Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent) that shape the Chinese Internet, and digital labourers and Internet users. The analysis will be carried out separately in Chapters 3–5, which will provide an empirical evaluation of each stakeholder. Chapter 5 will also demonstrate how digital labourers and Internet users actively engage in negotiations concerning the development and

30  Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism portrayal of the Internet, their interactions with the government and companies, and their roles as consumers or citizens. Finally, the Conclusion Chapter 7 will conduct a comparative analysis of digital discourses among these stakeholders. 1.3

Digital Discourse and the Political Economy of the Internet

The present study aims to make a contribution by initiating preliminary discussions on the emergence of digital discourse and its role in legitimizing the ongoing transformation of China’s capitalist system. The research focuses on the two key functions of ideology, namely, disguising or misrepresenting reality and legitimizing the status quo while perpetuating the prevailing social order. What prevailing digital narratives have gained widespread acceptance as conventional wisdom in modern society? What factors contribute to the popularity of these particular digital narratives over others? How do these narratives shape our perceptions of reality, and what power dynamics or social structures do they legitimize? Several studies have examined the relationship between technology and society from various perspectives (as depicted in Table 1.1) to explore different research questions. Among these, the notion of technological determinism has been a significant focus of scholarly inquiry. Furthermore, researchers have also explored the technological ideologies related to the capitalist economy, particularly in the production, exchange, and consumption processes. One emerging area of research aims to combine discourse and ideological analysis with political economy to investigate Internet-related issues. Additionally, some scholars have examined the political discourse surrounding technology in advanced capitalist societies. However, research on China’s digital discourse is limited and fragmented, with only a few sporadic studies conducted (Gewirtz, 2019; Hong, 2008; Wu & Yun, 2015; Zhao, 2007). Therefore, this study aims to conduct a systematic review of the existing literature to establish a comprehensive understanding of China’s digital discourse and provide a framework for future research in this area. 1.3.1  Technological Determinism

Whenever a new form of media is introduced to society, there tends to be a binary debate that emerges between those who hold optimistic views about the technology and those who hold pessimistic views (Gillespie et al., 2014; Williams, 2004). This pattern of discussion can be seen in historical examples such as the introduction of radio, television, cable TV, and the Internet. Optimistic arguments often suggest that the introduction of these new technologies will automatically result in economic expansion, greater democracy, and increased global understanding. Pessimistic arguments, on the other hand, suggest that the introduction of these technologies will distort or damage “authentic” human relationships, or lead to a society that is “amusing itself

Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism   31 Table 1.1 Typology of digital discourses in advanced capitalism Technological determinism

An essential form of ideological communication that requires comprehension in the context of the correlation between technology and society, comprising aspects of both the New Economy and the New Politics discourses.

The New Economy

Centres on the discourse of technology pertaining to the market, production, and consumption processes within the context of advanced capitalism. Examines the evolving dynamics of power relations among the state, society, and individuals.

The New Politics

The New Culture

Several transformations pertain to the cognitive aspect of individuals in relation to diverse domains such as information, work, and leisure activities.

• The development of technology has its own logic and is isolated from society • New technology, as an independent agency alone or as a secondary force in collaboration with other social agencies, has great influences on societies, no matter if the consequences are considered good or bad • Technological progress equals to human progress • Decentralized and dehierarchized market • Restructuring of the production Process and the workplace • Consumerism, prosumer • Deregulation • Decentralized structure, horizontal organization • Individualism and de-politicization • Entrepreneurship (individualism) • Participatory culture, sharing, and openness • How to understand information: Information or data as new resource • Playbour

to death”. However, both optimistic and pessimistic perspectives are considered techno-deterministic, as they fail to account for the social factors that influence technology and the real social contradictions that give rise to these phenomena. Both perspectives are also reductive and are partly influenced by a media-centric view that does not capture the complex relationship between new technologies and societies (Fenton, 2012, p. 124). The concept of technological determinism encompasses both optimistic and pessimistic views, suggesting that the development of technology is governed by its own internal logic and operates independently from society. As an autonomous agent or in collaboration with other social forces, new technology has significant impacts on society, regardless of whether the consequences are positive or negative (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999a). At its core, technological determinism proposes that the advancement of technology follows a fixed

32  Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism and necessary sequence dictated by a natural law that operates independently of social factors. However, this perspective overlooks the influence of social forces, such as economic, political, cultural, and individual factors, on the development and application of technology. The idea that only the best technologies will endure is also a social construct rather than an inherent property of the technology itself. To gain a more comprehensive understanding of the role of social factors in the development of technology, scholars have proposed alternative approaches, such as the social construction approach (Bijker, 1997; Bijker et al., 1987) and Actor-Network Theory (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1996; Law & Hassard, 1999). These frameworks highlight the importance of considering the complex interplay between technology and society in shaping technological development and its outcomes (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999a). Second, the concept of techno-determinism posits that technologies can act as either a scapegoat or a cure-all for social issues. It suggests that specific economic, social, and cultural transformations can be automatically generated through the use of certain technologies, and maintains that society can only progress along a predetermined sequence. This theory overlooks the intricacies and uncertainties associated with technological development, as well as its co-construction with society (Cohen, 2000; Fuchs, 2011; Kling et al., 2005; Staudenmaier, 1985). More than often, the relationship between technological progress and human progress is viewed as an indicator of social progress (Fisher, 2010, p. 17). This view suggests that technological innovation usually leads to societal improvements (L. Marx, 1987, p. 33). However, this assumption can be dangerous if technology is viewed as an end in itself rather than a means to achieve the ultimate goal of societal and human development. In capitalist systems, technological advancements can be utilized to further the interests of capital accumulation or political domination, rather than promoting a more equitable society (Marx, 1987; Smith, 1986, 1994). Techno-determinism thus refers to an overly simplistic view of the relationship between technology and society that focuses solely on the influence of technology on society (Fuchs, 2011). This deterministic perspective assumes that technology will inevitably lead to certain societal outcomes, without taking into account the complex interplay between technology and social factors such as economic, political, institutional, or cultural aspects. Concerns of the domination of this cause/effect or input/output logic in modern society have been expressed by Western Marxists and are termed as reification by Lukács (1923), as the instrumental reason by Horkheimer and Adorno (1944), or one-dimensionality by Marcuse (1964). This view has been criticized by scholars for neglecting contradictions, antagonistic forces, and the coexistence of risks and potentials in reality (Curran et  al., 2012; MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999b; Mosco, 2005). From a critical dialectic perspective, technodeterminism conceals the complex nature of technological development, including historical “intentions” and the need for “cultural screening” (Smythe, 1994; Williams, 2004). Both techno-optimism and techno-pessimism tend to

Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism   33 oversimplify the complex reality, and techno-determinism facilitates a passive response to technological developments. Furthermore, it discourages people from actively participating in liberating the potential of science and technology and promotes one-dimensional thinking about how technology should be developed and how it could influence society. In doing so, technodeterminism serves the interests of the ruling powers by expecting technology to change society instead of challenging any social relations. 1.3.2  The New Economy

During the 1990s, the commercialization of the Internet brought about high hopes for widespread prosperity and economic growth. Supporters of the New Economy believed that the Internet would serve as a means for everyone to achieve greater productivity and financial success. This perspective emphasized a significant discontinuity between the “Old” and “New” economies. Proponents such as Alvin Toffler, John Naisbitt, Kevin Kelly, and Nicholas Negroponte advocated for a complete shift from traditional practices across various fields. Scholars have studied these ideological discourses under a larger category of “culture” (Fuchs, 2015; Van Dijck, 2013), “spirit” (Fisher, 2010), “myths” (Mosco, 2005), “predictions”, or “prophecies” (Curran, 2012). The alterations in “culture” are intricately related to the context of neoliberalism predominant in developed capitalist countries. Neoliberalism encompasses both a political theory which advocates for minimal government interference in business affairs (McChesney, 2000, p. 6) and a theory of political-economic practices that prioritizes individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). Essentially, neoliberalism consists of a set of institutional arrangements that significantly curtail the government’s role in the market while maximizing the role of free market and profit-making corporations. Additionally, the worldwide diffusion of neoliberal political-economic development has been influenced by parallel ideologies that promote a free market, deregulation, and a laissez-faire economy, shaping government and public practices. Given this context, digital discussions concerning the economy concentrate mainly on three elements: a market structure that is decentralized and non-hierarchical, flexible production and work processes, and consumerism. These discussions aim to shift individuals’ focus away from exploitation and towards liberation, as seen in the deregulation of the market, flexible work arrangements, and the notion of a joyful “prosumer” or “playbour”. All of these discussions serve ideological purposes. First of all, digital discourse in the Western world advocates for the global information market economy (Schiller, 2007). Curran shows the historical development of this ideology and how it has been promoted as a means to generate wealth and prosperity, even during and after economic crises

34  Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism (Curran, 2012, p.  4). The term Web 2.0, popularized by Tim O’Reilly in 2004, is seen by some as a marketing ideology aimed at potential investors (Scholz, 2008). While some authors propose new terms such as attention economy (Doyle, 2013; Vukanovic, 2009) and gift economy (Barbrook, 2005; Barbrook & Cameron, 1996) to describe the potential benefits of the Internet, Fisher (2010) argues that it is used to legitimize the shift from liberal Fordism to neoliberal post-Fordism in advanced capitalist societies. According to Fisher, though the integration of the market into network technology has made it more spontaneous and self-regulating, requiring no external regulations or governing coordination, yet, the market has become more chaotic and unpredictable, requiring individuals and companies to be adaptive and flexible (Fisher, 2010, pp. 45–79). New technologies were claimed to serve the rebels and pioneers who are sceptical of traditional hierarchical industries and the authoritarian state and who believe in the rule of the free market. This view believes that the new capitalist phrase brought by network technologies is “an overcoming of the pitfalls of Fordist society” and “the embodiment of the humanist critique of capitalism” (Fisher, 2010, p. 72). Furthermore, the Internet environment is seen as an open, connected, and decentralized market that encourages innovation and exposes consumers to more choices (Curran, 2012, p. 5; Freedman, 2012). However, the Internet economy that took off in a socio-political background of deregulation and neoliberalism has also facilitated the expansion of multinational companies and digital media companies, leading to a higher rate of integration and concentration, and letting several companies monopolize the market (Mosco, 1996, 2005; Schiller, 2007). The New Economy discourse has failed to create a level playing field between small and large enterprises and take into account the continuing economic advantage of corporate size (Curran, 2012, p.  7). The existence of Internet giants such as Facebook, Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft demonstrates this argument. Partnerships between companies from different positions in the production chain, including traditional media, Internet platforms, search engines, and advertising agencies, have created a “nirvana of interoperability” that allows for frictionless sharing of users’ data between big Internet companies and platforms, benefiting for-profit and non-profit platforms alike (van Dijck, 2013, p. 164). Second, during the 1970s and 1980s, new buzzwords such as “postmodern”, “post-Fordism”, and “post-industrial societies” emerged in advanced capitalist societies (MacDonald, 1991). These terms were related to the structuraltechnological transformation in the production and capitalist accumulation from Fordist to post-Fordist modes of production. The proponents of the New Economy argued that restructuring firms, industries, and the labour market were necessary to respond to tightened international competition and technological changes (Piore & Sabel, 1986). This restructuring involved more multi-skilled workers, a flexible workforce, and a flexible wage system

Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism   35 (Atkinson & Gregory, 1986). The structure of firms became more decentralized and de-hierarchized, and the management style became more flexible (Castells, 1996, p.  164). This flexible management is claimed to have increased profits for companies. However, critical scholars, such as Harvey, argue that the enhanced flexibility and mobility actually allowed stronger labour control at the workplace (Harvey, 1990, pp.  141–172). This control was achieved through “structural” unemployment, the destruction and reconstruction of skills, modest gains in the real wage, and the roll-back of trade union power (ibid., pp. 147, 150). The labour market was divided into a core and periphery, where employees in the core had more secure and permanent jobs, while those in the periphery suffered from lower levels of job security (part-time, fixed-term, or lesser-skilled work). The seemingly “flexible” production and geographical mobility facilitated an “ever more tightly organized” capitalism, which exerted tighter control over workers (ibid., p. 159). While the New Economy promised individual emancipation, it also enabled more implicit exploitation, such as “collective self-discipline” and to perform more functions, in the post-industrial work process (Armstrong et  al., 1984, p.  399; Greenbaum, 1995, p. 100). The formal control in technology companies, thus, is replaced by softer normative control (Fisher, 2010, p. 102). The proponents of the New Economy also argue that this mode of production can democratize production and liberate labour, in addition to providing flexibility. This restructuring of corporations has given rise to new work cultures such as “fun work”, “creative work”, and “happy work”. In developed countries, the transformation of manual work to more informational work has been observed, including immaterial labour, affective labour, cognitive work, prosumer, and playbour (Hardt & Negri, 2001; Kitcher, 1990; Kücklich, 2005; Lazzarato, 1996; Ross, 2009, 2012). The traditional industrial, blue-collar workers have been replaced by knowledge workers or informational workers who are said to have more control over and acquire more freedom during the work process (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996). The “New Economy” theorists such as Tapscott and Williams and companies such as Google celebrate the benefits brought to the companies by involving employees and consumers in decision-making processes (Freedman, 2012, p. 77). However, critical scholars have pointed out that despite the development of forces of production in the digital area, the relations of production have not changed much, and the production process still involves extracting surplus value, leading to exploitation (Fuchs, 2014a; Fuchs & Sandoval, 2013). Various studies have been conducted in different industries to examine exploitative labour issues, such as call-centre (Huws, 2009), the knowledgebased economy (Huws, 2014), manufacturing factories in the Global South (Qiu, 2016), the so-called Gig Economy (Woodcock & Graham, 2019). Labour issues within Internet companies, which claims their employees enjoy more freedom at the workplace, are also repetitively reported (Birkinbine

36  Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism et  al., 2016). Thus, while the New Economy may offer some potential for individual emancipation from alienation, it may also enable implicit exploitation in the post-industrial work process (Fisher, 2010). Third, the emergence of a new mode of production is closely associated with changes in consumption side. Advances in technology have enabled a new wave of consumerism, which can be understood through two broad trends in the contemporary sociology of consumption in Britain, as outlined by Campbell. These trends inform the analysis of two key ideological aspects of consumerism (Campbell, 2005). The first of these is that the emphasis on consumption serves to conceal the fundamental contradictions of capitalist production, particularly in developing countries and the global capitalist system. This aligns with Harvey’s (1990) argument that consumption is an ideological reflection of changes in production, serving to maintain profitability. The second aspect is that the celebration of consumption and consumer power overlooks the ability and willingness of capitalism to shape workers to suit new production processes, such that consumer choices may not reflect political interests but rather favour the global economy’s quest for low-cost labour (Miller, 2005). Consequently, consumption can be better understood as a “lack of choice” (Miller, 2005, p. 16), which is reminiscent of Marx’s concept of alienation whereby producers are estranged from the means of production, their labour power, and their own products. Thus, as consumers, people have a secondary relationship with goods, without direct control over their production or distribution. 1.3.3  The New Politics

The political aspects of digital discussions can be categorized into three levels: institutional/state, societal/group, and individual. The advent of digital technology has led to a new form of politics that endorses and validates deregulation, individualism, and de-politicization. First of all, the principles of a decentralized market, free trade enabled by network technologies, and flexible production in the New Economy have led to a common belief in a deregulation approach to governance. The emergence of neoliberalism, particularly under the Reagan administration in the US and Thatcher in the UK, has significantly undermined the welfare state that emerged after World War II. The state has reduced its involvement in economic activities and focused on providing limited social services. Transnational Corporations exert control over businesses, imports, and exports both domestically and internationally. Neoliberalism advocates for strong private property rights, free markets, free trade, individual entrepreneurship, and minimal government intervention. This shift in ideology has resulted in a transfer of power from the government to the private sector and a trend towards deregulation, which involves the removal or reduction of regulations in various sectors, including industrial and service sectors.

Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism   37 In the discourse surrounding technology and deregulation, it is not only corporations that hold significant influence. Governments also play a crucial role in shaping digital ideologies, as their legitimacy is closely tied to their identification with future technological advancements (Mosco, 2005, p. 43). As power has increasingly shifted from the government to the private sector, the government’s ability to keep pace with technology is crucial for gaining recognition and legitimacy in liberal democratic societies. Therefore, governments take necessary measures to strengthen identification with new technologies, including publishing favourable policies to attract investment in high-tech sectors, incentivizing international technology companies to invest, investing in increasing access to technology, and emphasizing education in technology-related disciplines at various levels of education. Such actions not only endorse the discourse surrounding the “New Economy” but also lend legitimacy to its development. At the societal level, there is a prevalent belief in the discourse on technology and politics that new technologies and the free market will inherently lead to the democratization of societies. This argument is often supported by figures such as Francis Fukuyama who use grand narratives to paint visions of cyberspace and the end of history (Mosco, 2005, p. 59). Fukuyama asserts that the widespread acceptance of the free market, technology, and empirical science will result in the global spread of liberal democracy. In recent times, the Internet and social media have been highlighted in scholarly and popular publications as having an “essential” role in radical social movements. These movements, including the 2009 “Twitter Revolution”, are seen by some, like Castells (2012), as “spontaneous processes of mobilization” that emerged through the use of the Internet and wireless communication networks. Castells emphasizes that digital social networks, based on the Internet and wireless platforms, are crucial tools for mobilizing, organizing, deliberating, coordinating, and decision-making. However, some scholars have argued that placing social media at the centre of social movements overlooks the broader social and political context in which they arise (Fenton, 2012, p. 125). Instead, a more detailed analysis is required to understand the political impact of the Internet on social media (Aday et  al., 2012; Anderson, 2011; Newsom et  al., 2011). For instance, the Arab Spring was not solely caused by social media but had deeper underlying causes and was prefigured by protests over many years. Similarly, when comparing Singapore and Malaysia, despite both being considered authoritarian democracies, a more detailed socio-political context is necessary to understand the role of media in social movements (Curran, 2012). Empirical research has shown that media usage by protesters is complex, with face-to-face communication and traditional media playing significant roles in providing information and communicating (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). The importance of both interpersonal and mediated interactions for activists has also been highlighted, with older online media being more important than Web 2.0 social media (Fuchs, 2014b). Therefore, the role of social media

38  Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism and the Internet in radical social movements should not be overestimated, and careful scrutiny is needed to understand their role within specific sociopolitical contexts. At the individual level, the Internet is viewed as a liberating tool that brings an end to spatial limitations and traditional power structures. This notion of an “end of” series includes the end of space, which refers to the dissolution of nation-states, vertical social structures, and traditional identities, ultimately leading to the end of war and inequality. The Internet is believed to facilitate communication beyond territorial boundaries, replacing the nation-focused space with a global cyberspace that supports horizontal organizations and relationships. As a result, the Internet’s infrastructure eliminates virtual space and traditional power relationships, ushering in new forms of citizens and identities characterized by horizontal communication through digital technologies. Therefore, the end of space signifies a process of freeing individuals from spatial limitations and their associated social and economic constraints (Mosco, 2005, p. 92). However, the death of distance and the end of history arguments are ideologies as they often leads to the conclusion of end of politics, resulting in the belief that these is no need to advocate for equal education or a sustainable environment in the physical world (Wertheim, 2000). This is due to the belief that the Internet can provide everything and that technology can solve all problems. The potential of new technologies to empower people and eliminate boundaries often diverts attention away from concrete politicaleconomic issues and towards a personalized view of public concerns (Borsook, 2001; Fenton, 2012; Sunstein, 2007). However, the excessive focus on individuality in personalized new media is a significant issue. As Dean (2013) argues, drawing from Agamben’s concept of the “whatever being”, this emphasis on personalization encourages passive individuals who lack any sense of desire or need (Dean, 2013). As a result, it risks leading to the abandonment of politics. The notion that democracy can be achieved through online participation in any issue of one’s interest perpetuates an ideology that conceals the real struggles and needs that exist in society. The discourse on “online participation” thus serves to obscure the actual challenges that need to be addressed. 1.3.4  The New Culture

In the contemporary era, there are transformations in individuals’ perceptions of concepts such as information, work, and leisure time. One of the central issues regarding the emerging digital or network technologies is the way in which information is conceptualized (Schiller, 2007). The Information Age posits that media and communication technologies will be the driving force of the economy. It is suggested that information is a valuable resource that has costs and values, and it is utilized to achieve programme goals (Schiller, 2007, p. 3). Recently, the phrase “data is the new oil” has been credited to

Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism   39 Clive Humby, a UK mathematician in 2006. While information is undoubtedly a crucial resource, the problem lies in how the discourse has been appropriated to legitimize the commodification of information and data within the current capitalist mode of production. By solely highlighting information as a resource, the discourse overlooks the social relations and surplus value that capital extracts from it. The critical inquiry is identifying who has the authority to control and use information and data. From a Marxist perspective on capitalism, there exists a need to identify the specific form of the commodity used by capital to accumulate wealth. According to Marx, wealth in capitalist societies is represented as a vast collection of commodities, with individual commodities serving as the basic unit (K. Marx, 1867, p. 125). Smythe contends that under monopoly capitalism, the commodity form of mass-produced communications supported by advertising takes the form of audiences and readerships (Smythe, 1994, p. 3). Thus, in advertising-supported social media, the user is the commodity, and the time spent on social media is considered work time, during which users produce economic value as user-commodities (Fuchs, 2014a, p.  74). This implies that social media users are unpaid workers who generate economic value for social media companies by producing user-commodities. Although social media users are active and creative, their active character is the source of exploitation, as emphasized in critical political economy. The more active users are on advertising-financed corporate social media, the more they are exploited. Social media companies sell not only users’ participation and social networks as commodities but also personal information, which is used to make targeted advertising more effective, thereby increasing capital accumulation (Fuchs, 2014a). Greenbaum identified a new work culture that values entrepreneurship, in which workers are expected to rely on themselves (Greenbaum, 1995, p.  92). Harvey observed that neoliberalism seeks to promote individual entrepreneurial skills and freedoms, which are facilitated by information and network technologies (Harvey, 2005, p.  2). Fisher further noted that workers are increasingly viewed as individuals, rather than members of a class (Fisher, 2010, p.  88). In this worldview, individuals are expected to pursue material advancement, take personal responsibility for their lives, and embrace self-regulation and entrepreneurial self-identities (Howard, 2007). The traditional notion of class in industrial factories has dissolved, and knowledge workers can choose to work for companies or as freelancers, or even start their own businesses (Kelly, 1999, as cited in Fisher, 2010, p. 95). While this new work culture affords greater freedom and mobility, it also comes with decreased connections to corporations, increased responsibility for equipment and training, and lower levels of protection and security (Sandoval, 2016). The growing trend of flexible and entrepreneurial work has led to a blurring of boundaries between work and leisure, as well as between production and consumption. The emergence of new technologies and the Internet has

40  Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism fundamentally transformed how people interact and live together, leading to the creation of new terminologies like “prosumer” and “playbour”. These concepts describe the active participation of consumers and Internet users in the production process, including contributing to open source projects, crowdsourcing, and sharing. While new technologies promise increased creativity, joy, and participation in the production process, they also lead to a deeper involvement in the capitalist logic of production (Fisher, 2010). This integration of audiences, users, and gamers into the production process benefits large companies and Internet platforms (Andrejevic, 2013; Freedman, 2012; Fuchs, 2014a; Ross, 2012; Tiziana, 2013). However, this productive labour is often concealed by discourses of “participation”, “sharing”, “fun”, “open source”, and “joyful”, which serve as ideological constructs that disguise the exploitation of users as productive labour (Fisher, 2010; Van Dijck, 2013). These celebratory discourses of new media and the Internet function as ideologies that conceal the exploitation of users. The so-called Internet economy is actually constructed by “contradictory forces” that “promise dispersion but reward concentration and that fetishize openness but encourage proprietary behaviour” and, ultimately, serve the capitalist pursuit of profit (Freedman, 2012, p. 92). References Aday, S., Farrell, H., Lynch, M., Sides, J., & Freelon, D. (2012). New media and conflict after the Arab Spring. United States Institute of Peace, 80, 1–24. Adorno, T. W. (1976). Sociology and empirical research. In T. W. Adorno, H. Albert, R. Dahrendorf , et al. (Eds.), The positivist dispute in German sociology (pp. 68–86). Heinemann Educational Books Ltd. Anderson, L. (2011). Demystifying the Arab spring: parsing the differences between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Foreign Affairs, 90, 2. Andrejevic, M. (2013). Estranged Free Labor. In T. Scholz (Ed.), Digital Labor: The Internet as playground and factory (pp. 149–164). Routledge. Armstrong, P., Glyn, A., & Harrison, J. (1984). Capitalism since World War II: The making and breakup of the great boom. Fontana. Atkinson, J., & Gregory, D. (1986). A flexible future: Britain’s dual labour force. Marxism Today, 30(4), 12–17. Barbrook, R. (2005). The high-tech gift economy, originally published in 1998. First Monday; Special Issue #3: Internet Banking, e-Money, and Internet Gift Economies, 5 December 2005. Barbrook, R., & Cameron, A. (1996). Californian ideology, originally published in 1995. Science as Culture, 26, 44–72. Bijker, W. E. (1997). Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a theory of sociotechnical change. MIT Press. Bijker, W. E., Hughes, T. P., & Pinch, T. J. (1987). The social construction of technological systems: New directions in the sociology and history of technology. MIT Press. Birkinbine, B. J., Gómez, R., & Wasko, J. (2016). Global media giants. Routledge.

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44  Ideology, Digital Discourse, and Capitalism Tufekci, Z., & Wilson, C. (2012). Social media and the decision to participate in political protest: Observations from Tahrir Square. Journal of Communication, 62(2), 363–379. Van Dijck, J. (2013). The culture of connectivity: A critical history of social media. Oxford University Press. Vukanovic, Z. (2009). Global paradigm shift: Strategic management of new and digital media in new and digital economics. The International Journal on Media Management, 11(2), 81–90. Wertheim, M. (2000). The pearly gates of cyberspace: A history of space from Dante to the Internet. W. W. Norton & Company. Williams, R. (1977). Marxism and literature. Oxford University Press. Williams, R. (2004). Television: Technology and cultural form. Routledge. Williams, R. (2005). Culture and materialism. Verso. Wodak, R., & Meyer, M. (2015). Critial discourse studies: History, agenda, theory and methodology. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of critical discourse studies (3rd Edition, pp. 1–22). Sage. Woodcock, J., & Graham, M. (2019). The gig economy: A critical introduction. Polity Press. Wu, J., & Yun, G. (2015). Where will the future of the information society Go (Weilai Xinxi Shehui Xiang Heche Qu). People’s Forum, 15, 52–66. Zhao, Y. (2007). After mobile phones, what? Re-embedding the social in China’s “Digital revolution.” International Journal of Communication, 1(1), 29.

2 Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China

Being a peripheral country in the world capitalist system (Wallerstein, 2004), China’s progress has been impacted by advanced capitalism and restricted by the world system. China has actively incorporated Western experiences and concepts, including the Information Superhighway and Information Society, while also being limited in copying the Western path due to its preindustrialized state. This book’s perspective on ideology, as discussed in Chapter 1, is rooted in the interdependent relationships between political economic structures, power dynamics, and social contradictions. To provide context for China’s digital discourse, this chapter will explore the distinctive features of China’s state-led capitalism (Section 2.1), followed by an examination of power relations within China’s ICT industries from the vantage points of political economy and political science (Section 2.2). Finally, this chapter will introduce the primary oligopolies responsible for establishing China’s Internet industry, specifically Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent (BAT). 2.1

Capitalist Contradictions with Chinese Characteristics

To comprehend the intersection of technology and society in China, it is essential to establish the distinct characteristics of Chinese capitalism. From an economic standpoint, China has undergone significant marketization and privatization through the economic reforms, which has impacted areas such as land issues, ownership, and socialist welfare. Politically, Chinese leaders have adopted the position of New Authoritarianism, wherein the CCP maintains political authority and monopoly while simultaneously pursuing economic liberalization for the purpose of development. Socially, the decline of socialist welfare in China is evident. Within this context, ICT- and Internetrelated industries in China have developed, showcasing their unique features, which will be explored in the following section. Over the past 40 years, China’s remarkable economic progress has often been referred to as the “rise of China”. This phrase is typically used to describe the country’s swift economic growth. Figure 2.1 depicts China’s share of worldwide GDP based on purchasing power parity (PPP), along with other regions (data source: IMF, GDP based on PPP, April 2023a). Since 2017, DOI: 10.4324/9781003315810-4

46  Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China

Figure 2.1 Percentage share of world GDP based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP), by selected countries and regions Source: IMF (2023a)

Figure 2.2  GDP per capita in China and other regions Source: IMF (2023b)

China has held the top position in PPP, surpassing the US. In addition, China’s GDP (PPP) is significantly larger than the shares of the other top BRICS countries, India (#3) and Russia (#5), as well as Japan (#4) and Germany (#6). This rapid growth is often cited as evidence of China’s robust economy in comparison to both advanced economies and emerging and developing countries. China has also become increasingly integrated into the global economy, participating in activities such as the import and export of goods and foreign direct investment (FDI). However, when examining the GDP per capita statistics, the situation appears distinct. Figure 2.2 illustrates that China and India’s national income per individual is merely a fraction of that of the United States, Japan, Germany, or Hong Kong (data source: IMF, GDP per capita, 2023b). To measure wealth distribution inequality in a country, the GINI index is a commonly

Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China  47

Figure 2.3.  GINI index in selected countries Source: The World Bank (2023)

used metric. The World Bank GINI index values range from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating greater levels of inequality. Figure 2.3 displays the considerable level of inequality in China when compared to other regions in 2019, with Japan being the most recent data available up until 2013 (data source: The World Bank, GINI index, 2023). The extensive involvement of China in the contemporary capitalist world market is indisputable, the result of both internal reforms and external pressures. The transformation of China’s political economy has sparked intense discourse surrounding its fundamental “nature”, with particular attention paid to the question of whether China’s market economy is socialist or capitalist (Amin, 2013; Arrighi, 2007; Harvey, 1990, 2005; C. Lin, 2006, 2013). Certain scholars place emphasis on the socialist elements of China’s development. At the outset of China’s reforms, some authors held a positive view of the country’s market socialism, anticipating that the transition to a market economy would foster private enterprise, encourage entrepreneurship, and promote social justice and equal rights (Nee, 1989; Schweickart, 1998, p.  8; White, 1996). An alternative perspective, which highlights the socialist characteristics of China’s economy, posits that China can be viewed as a fusion of state socialism and private capitalism (Amin, 1990, 2013; Arrighi, 2007; Therborn, 2000), with socialist principles remaining integral to certain areas such as healthcare, education, and welfare (Arrighi, 2007, p. 351), and collective ownership in rural areas and Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) facilitating accumulation without dispossession (Arrighi, 2007, pp. 361–367). These scholars also contend that the commodification of land in China is now complete (Amin, 2013, p. 66).

48  Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China An opposing perspective posits that China’s political economy is fundamentally capitalist in nature. This viewpoint emphasizes the market’s dominant role in China, often referred to as “state capitalism” (Naughton & Tsai, 2015, p.  2). Advocates of this perspective argue that China has effectively shifted from a centrally planned economy to a market-based system, with the market now serving as the primary institution in the country (Naughton, 2017, p.  5; Qian, 2002). Other scholars raise concerns regarding the economic reforms that have been implemented without corresponding political reforms, suggesting that China’s political economy is based on “crony capitalism built on systemic corruption and raw political power” (Huang, 2008, pp. 236, 276; Pei, 2016). The land issue, domestic enterprise ownership (including TVEs and SOEs), and foreign investment are three crucial economic areas when considering the capitalist or socialist “essence” of China’s economy. Land issues in rural areas in China have been a complex and evolving problem. While scholars such as Amin and Arrighi argue that China’s collective land ownership system sets it apart from capitalist countries, others have offered critiques (Amin, 2013; Arrighi, 2007). Harvey suggests that income growth during the early years of the rural land contract policy led to stagnation, and collective social rights were lost (Harvey, 2005, p. 126). Two groups of scholars have made extensive contributions to the critique of this view. One group argues for the privatization of land to give peasants more control, while another argues for strengthening collective ownership to protect peasant rights (ChaseDunn, 2010; Jinqing, 2004; G. J. Wen & Xiong, 2014; T. Wen, 1999, 2021; X. Yang et al., 1992). Despite different views, both sides criticize the inequality, decline of welfare corruption, and abuse of power in land conversion have led to several mass incidents. Besides, the current land ownership in reality brings little benefits to peasants who work on the land nor migrant workers to move out to work in cities (He, 2009; Le, 2010; Zhang, 2011). Urbanization developments have also caused challenges for rural populations, with local governments eager to acquire rural land for profit, resulting in the destruction of peasants’ houses and forced relocation to new buildings (G. C. S. Lin & Yi, 2011; F. Zhou & Wang, 2015). While “access to land” may not guarantee peasants’ ownership and use of the land or protect them from involvement in capitalist production, Zhang and Donaldson have found that capitalist forms of agrarian production are on the rise in rural China (Zhang & Donaldson, 2008, 2010). In sum, the land issue in rural areas of China remains a complicated and an ongoing challenge. Debates on China’s economy include discussions about the ownership of domestic enterprises, which is significant in the classical Marxist viewpoint that the capitalist system is based on the commodification of labour and exploitation of surplus value (Mar, 1867). The significance of TVEs and SOEs in debates on China’s economy lies in their role in the redistribution of profits and capital. Public ownership is based on the idea that local governments or the state can redistribute profits to decrease exploitation in enterprises.

Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China  49 Ideally, workers should own the means of production and control how to run the enterprises, with profits distributed equally. Arrighi suggests that TVEs should be collectively owned, with management authority held by local governments and profits allocated accordingly (Arrighi, 2007, pp.  362–363). Many believe that the innovation of TVEs has contributed to the success of reforms by increasing rural income and competition in the market (Naughton, 2018, p. 271; Roland, 2000, p. 282). TVEs are also claimed to prevent public assets from being appropriated by private capitalists (Stiglitz, 2006). However, the reality is more complex as TVEs are not all collectively owned, with the private sector increasingly dominating (Harvey, 2005, p.  129; Huang, 2008, pp. 75–79; Jefferson & Su, 2006). The power relations within TVEs also make the situation more complex, with employees lacking the right to organize and control the production process. The privatization of previously collectively owned TVEs has resulted in a significant transfer of public assets from the public sector to the private hands of local elites. The ideal type of TVEs described by Arrighi is far from the real situation, with the power dynamic never being democratic or socialist. Similarly, the significance of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in China’s economy has been steadily declining. From 1980 to 2002, the number of employees in SOEs decreased from 67 million to 35.3 million, while private companies saw a significant increase from 0.8 million to 42.7 million employees (Harvey, 2005, p. 128). SOEs have also gone through transformations, including becoming limited liability or shareholding companies and even foreign-owned companies. They can hire “contract workers” with little social protection or insurance. The manufacturing industry, including the electronic components manufacturing sector, has experienced a significant decrease in employment since the 1990s (Hong, 2011, p. 45). In addition, the ownership of SOEs is held by the Party-State, not the people. Before the reforms of the 1980s, public ownership meant collective ownership and ownership by the whole people. However, after the reforms, ownership by the whole people was transformed into state ownership, which includes wholly state-owned companies or companies in which the state has a stake. This change has caused workers to lose control over production and technological innovation (Zhu, 2018). Therefore, the current situation of SOE ownership has lost its original purpose as a socialist means to protect people’s ownership and property rights, especially without proper democratic popular control (Wu, 2005; Zhao, 2007). Foreign-invested enterprises play an important role in China’s economy due to its export-driven development, which has contributed to China’s increasing integration in the global market. FDI inflows into China have increased since the 1980s, with two peaks in the 1990s and early 2000s (UNCTAD), indicating China’s greater integration into the global market. Hong Kong is the leading source of Mainland China’s FDI, followed by other Asian countries (Nolan, 2012). China is also opening up to foreign investment by loosening restrictions on real estate, manufacturing, and certain

50  Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China service sectors (UNCTAD, 2016). China’s outward investment is also increasing, with a focus on mining, construction, and manufacturing industries (Lee, 2018; Nolan, 2012). Chinese state capital has distinct characteristics compared to global private capital and plays a crucial role in China’s global capital expansion with the aim to strengthen China’s political influence all over the world. According to two different sets of data analysed by Huang, both indigenous and foreign private ownership of large Chinese industrial firms have increased (Huang, 2008, p. 15). Both the OECD and Guangdong Statistical Manual provide different estimates of the increase in indigenous and foreign private sector ownership in China. According to the OECD data, the sum of private sector ownership has risen from 28.9% in 1998 to 44.7% in 2001 and 71.2% in 2005. In contrast, the Guangdong Statistical Manual estimates a change in private ownership of 31.8% in 1998, 38.8% in 2001, and 50.8% in 2005. Despite the differences, both sets of data indicate the growing dominance of capitalist private ownership in China. The changes in FDI further demonstrate China’s complicated relationship with the global capitalist system. Some scholars highlight the challenges faced by revolutionary states in both historical and contemporary contexts due to international pressures. Halliday discusses these pressures and the difficulties post-revolutionary countries face in navigating the international capitalist system (Halliday, 1999, pp. 283–287). Additionally, some critical globalization scholars argue that globalization primarily benefits global capital and transnational corporations (Chase-Dunn & Gills, 2005, p. 54). Some argue that China was compelled to enter the world market after the collapse of the USSR, while others criticize internal reform policies for forcing China into the world market and accommodating the demands of global capital and multinational corporations (Hong, 2010; Huang, 2003). China’s political reforms have not matched the pace of its economic transformation, with scholars and politicians characterizing the country’s political development as New Authoritarianism or New Conservatism. One of its defining characteristics is the separation of economic and political reforms. Deng Xiaoping adopted the ideas of New Authoritarianism in 1988 to consolidate political power while pursuing economic liberalization (J. Yang, 2004, p. 546). Proponents of New Authoritarianism, such as Wu Jiaxiang, Zhang Bingjiu, and Xiao Gongqin, believe that authoritarian rule and a strong state are necessary for modernization in developing countries, and that this model differs from traditional authoritarianism in its ultimate goal of democracy (Lu, 2009; J. Yang & He, 1994). Due to the lack of democratic institutions and civil society in developing countries, proponents argue that it is necessary to build a new political authority to drive economic development and liberalization, which will eventually bring democracy. Stability is seen as crucial for economic development, making a strong state essential in China’s current stage of development. The Asian Four Tigers and Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies serve as examples supporting the position of New Authoritarianism.

Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China  51 However, this perspective has been highly criticized since its inception. Critics argue that New Authoritarianism holds an idealized assumption of political power and that the separation of politics and the economy, a precondition for its success, is not a reality in China (J. Yang & He, 1994). Social problems such as corruption arise precisely because of political power, rather than the lack of it. The economic transition in China has actually strengthened and benefited political power holders, and there are clear correlations between economic and political power. Some observers, therefore, perceive China’s political economy as “crony capitalism” or a combination of authoritarianism and neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005; Pei, 2016). Furthermore, New Authoritarianism believes that economic development will lead to a stronger civil society, but civil society needs to be cultivated and struggled for, as experiences from Latin America have shown (Diamond et al., 1989). Moreover, the development path of the Asian Four Tigers, which served as the basis for New Authoritarianism, was conditioned by the Cold War and US support, which is not applicable to China (Zheng, 2004). Additionally, the examples of Taiwan and Hong Kong suggest that several factors need to come together to lead to political reforms, rather than economic development alone (So & May, 1993). After Mao’s death, both the left and liberal factions of China’s political spectrum, including officials and the public, supported reforms and the development of a market economy. For the liberals, the capitalist market was seen as a means to achieve political liberation for the people, while for the left, developing a capitalist market economy was viewed as “unavoidable” if socialism is the ultimate goal for China (Amin, 2013, p. 71). Despite the controversy surrounding this argument, there is a consensus among both the left and the right that a market economy is necessary for China’s economic development. China’s economic reforms have brought significant growth, particularly in poverty reduction (Amin, 2013; C. Lin, 2006). China’s large-scale anti-poverty initiatives have reduced the number of people living below subsistence levels from 250 million in 1977 to 50 million in 2003 (C. Lin, 2006, p. 7). This development represents a stark contrast to the former China of extreme poverty (Amin, 2013, p. 70). Additionally, China’s reform has led to massive urbanization, with around 400 million new urban inhabitants accommodated over two decades (ibid., p. 73). Along with this urbanization, there have been advancements in infrastructure, transport, financial systems, and the diversity of consumer commodities. While China has achieved huge economic successes in developing its economy and decreasing absolute poverty, the economic transformations to the capitalist path and political reforms towards authoritarianism since the late 1970s have led to several negative social consequences, including overcapacity, decline in social welfare, increase in inequality between rural and urban areas as well as regions, increase of corruption, and the reconstitution of class

52  Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China power (Harvey, 2005, pp. 142–151; C. Lin, 2006, pp. 8–10). The increase in inequality is probably the most dramatic. Sun has used the term “Cleavage of the society” to describe the social inequality and unbalanced development in China, while Hu and colleagues have referred to China as “one country, four worlds” due to the huge inequalities between different regions, areas, and social structures (Hu et al., 2001; Sun, 2003). Whyte claims that rural-urban inequality has led to two societies within China (Whyte, 2010). Although economic growth has improved the situation in poorer regions, inequality remains high, as reflected by the GINI index shown in Figure 2.3. The dissolution of SOEs, township, and village enterprises, and the commune system demonstrates the growing dominance of capitalist private ownership in China, leading to intense and massive exploitation of workers and peasants. Li notes that the wage share dropped from 51–52% in the 1980s to 38% in the early 2000s (Li, 2008b, 2008a). Lin contends that the persistence of sweatshops, the collusion of money and power, the dictatorship of capital, and the reign of developmentalism all represent a violation of socialist promises (C. Lin, 2013, p. 87). Meanwhile, Huang, a liberal economist, critiques the rural policies implemented in China during the 1990s, arguing that they led to an increase of 30 million illiterate adults between 2000 and 2005, and a decline in public financing for healthcare (Huang, 2003, pp. 244–251). Manufacturing workers’ suicides at Foxconn factories and the “996, ICU” movement of programmers are some of the examples in recent years. Additionally, economic reforms have led to unequal distribution of symbolic resources, making it more difficult for disadvantaged groups to produce and distribute their own meanings and symbols (Meng, 2018, pp. 12–13). As a result, the decline of many aspects of socialist heritage since the reforms is evident. In summary, China exhibits certain contradictions common to other capitalist economies, including overproduction, underconsumption, and capital overaccumulation. Moreover, the Chinese political economy is characterized by several unique contradictions, as outlined in Table 2.1. The rhetoric of “equal access to land” fails to guarantee peasants’ rights, particularly in light of pervasive corruption at the local and village levels of government, and the ongoing process of urbanization. Additionally, the trend toward privatization of state-owned and TVEs has resulted in significant corruption and the erosion of workers’ rights. FDI not only has become a cornerstone of China’s export-driven development strategy but has also led to increased exploitation of workers and an upstream position in the global manufacturing system. Finally, while the Chinese government continues to play a prominent role in the economy, the lack of democratic reform has contributed to the unequal distribution of wealth, corruption, and the decline of social welfare. In conjunction with the decline of China’s socialist heritage, these contradictions have given rise to increasing inequality, precarious labour, and the decline of social welfare. Furthermore, while ICT development is a critical component of neoliberal development, it is also viewed as a panacea for resolving social

Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China  53 Table 2.1 Contradictions under Chinese capitalism and the corresponding social relations Capitalist contradictions share in common: Overproduction, underconsumption, overaccumulation of capital Ownership issue: “equal access to land” cannot guarantee peasants’ ownership and rights in reality Ownership issue: SOEs and TVEs are not de facto collectively owned since the privatization Capital and ownership issue: FDI has become an important part of China’s export-driven development strategy after the 1990s Political reform: the government is still playing a conspicuous role in the economy Decline of Socialist Heritage

Class struggles and social relations

Social relations between the state, capital, and peasants and migrant workers Social relations between the state, capital, and workers Social relations between the international capital, the state, and workers Social relations between the state, domestic capital, and workers Social security for the working class worsens

problems without altering social relations. Acknowledging China’s adoption of capitalism is thus essential for identifying and analysing the ideological discourses that obscure this reality. 2.2

Matrix of Power Relations in China’s ICT Industry

As noted in Chapter 1, the formation of ideology is closely intertwined with political economy and power dynamics. This section will examine three areas of power dynamics (Zhao, 2007) and a power “matrix” (Meng, 2018, p. 7): tensions between global capital and the state (Section 2.2.1), tensions between the state and the market (Section 2.2.2), and struggles of labour in society (Section 2.2.3) (refer to Figure 2.4). These three areas of tension highlight the three dimensions and forces in ICT and Internet development in China: the state, capital, and society. 2.2.1  The Post-Revolutionary State and the Modern Globalized World

There are two seemingly contradictory but interconnected ways to understand China’s relationship with the world in the ICT and media sectors. On the one hand, there is a dominant ideology of techno-nationalism, reflecting the competitive relations between China and the West. On the other hand, there is a pursuit of a market-based and export-oriented path of development, which has integrated China more closely into the world market. The inherent contradictions in these two paths have led to the development of ideological discourses aimed at reconciling them.

54  Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China

Figure 2.4 Power dynamics between different forces in ICT development in China

The modernization and industrialization of China through integration into the global market system were partly driven by the need to catch up with Western technology, and the techno-deterministic view of technology as a neutral instrument for economic development (Hong, 2011; Zhao, 2007; Zhao & Schiller, 2001). As the ICT industry became the frontrunner in the expansion of transnational informational capitalism (Fuchs, 2010; Schiller, 2005; Zhao & Schiller, 2001), China made informatization its top developmental priority (Hong, 2011, p. 31). ICT industry as “capitalism’s most dynamic industry” and China as “its most expansionary growth zone” are two poles of growth after the financial crisis for the transnational capitalism (Schiller, 2005, p.  80). These “two poles” are increasingly integrated into each other. The ICT manufacturing industry has been crucial in China’s integration into the world economy (Schiller, 2008, p. 112). The stark contrast of investments received between China’s special economic zones, coastal regions, and central, western areas shows how developments of China’s ICTs during reforms have been prioritized to coordinate with the shift of transnational capital to flexible production (Zhao, 2007, pp. 99–100). The market-oriented reform and open-up process further unleashed rampant consumerism in China and turned itself into the workshop of the world (ibid., p. 95). China has pursued a “globally integrated, marketbased, ICT-driven mode of economic development”, especially during the 90s (Hong, 2011, p. 31). Xi Jinping’s Davos speech about embracing globalization while Trump was building barriers might be a surprise to those who maintain a cold-war image of China (Meng, 2018, p. 9). The ICT sector has become one of the main areas for China to integrate into the world capitalist system successfully. The media and Internet industries have opposing views towards the influence of Western media in non-Western media systems. There is resistance against it due to imperialism and the hegemonic nature of the Western media (Zhao, 2012, p. 146). However, there is also an economic imperative to learn from Western media, particularly in the entertainment industry ((Sparks, 2012). Zhao notes that non-Western media analysis cannot solely focus on the relationships between media systems and political settings within the boundaries of the modern Western nation-state. It is essential to consider

Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China  55 power dynamics between central and peripheral media systems globally (Zhao, 2012, p. 146). In China, the first modern newspapers were established by missionary agents in colonized cities and in foreign languages. During the Cold War, China dedicated many resources to prevent broadcasting signals from perceived enemies. Nowadays, there is still strong resistance against the influence of Western media in non-Western countries, driven partly by Third World nationalism. Meanwhile, the media and Internet industries have become increasingly integrated into the world financial system, with major Internet companies in China undergoing financialization (Xia & Fuchs, 2016). Financial institutions play a central role in the ownership of BAT, and foreign investors hold significant ownership stakes in Alibaba (40%) and Tencent (45%) (Jia & Winseck, 2018, p. 54). The rising financialization of the Chinese Internet economy and the participation of transnational finance capital have impacted state-corporate relations (Hong, 2017). 2.2.2  The Party-State and Marketization of the Media and the Internet

The second major power dynamic at play concerns the relationship between authoritarian state power and the capitalist market logic. Internet platforms, social media, and all online content production are subject to strict controls similar to other propaganda machines as they are viewed as one of the key ideological state apparatuses. However, as profit-driven enterprises, Internet companies operate in a relatively more liberal market environment, where they are not as directly subject to political influence. The recent failed IPO plan of Ant Group (Alibaba) in 2020 and the release of anti-monopoly regulations by the government against tech giants in 2021 have highlighted the growing conflict between the state and China’s home-grown Internet companies. To explain the role of media in China, scholars have identified two key functions: as an ideological tool and as a commodity (Ma, 2000; Zhao, 2012). The media system established by the Communist Party of China, which was influenced by the Soviet system, has always been focused on motivating the public and establishing cultural dominance (Zhao, 2012). Under this system, news production and distribution were strictly controlled by the state. After the 1989 reforms in China, the role of media institutions shifted from serving as a revolutionary party mouthpiece to maintaining social stability under an authoritarian state (Meng, 2018, p. 3). In the wake of China’s reform, commercialization has become an integral part of the media system. While news media remains part of the official propaganda apparatus and cannot be privatized, peripheral areas of the media and cultural industries, such as entertainment and advertising, are now open to private and foreign capital. These areas are viewed as profit-generating enterprises rather than official organs, making the “functioning of capitalist logic in allocating communication resources” crucial in China (Meng, 2018, p. 9). Television, which is arguably more important for Chinese people’s everyday

56  Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China lives, is also subject to state control, monopolistic operations, and high commercialization. News agencies in China underwent a similar process of marketization. The market has also fostered media commodities, audience commodities, consumerism, and media conglomerates that restrict content and exploit media workers (Fuchs, 2014; Mosco, 1996; Schiller, 1997, 2007; Smythe, 1994). Similarly, the Chinese government’s control over the Internet can be understood in two ways. First, they view it as part of their state-controlled news media system and use it as a propaganda tool. Second, the government has allowed private capital to enter peripheral areas of the Internet that are less politically sensitive. However, the regulation of new technologies has lagged behind, allowing commercial Internet platforms to dominate the market. These platforms not only function as media but also provide other services like e-commerce, which contributes to economic growth. The government has encouraged their development, as long as they engage in selfcensorship.  The recent growth of Internet businesses, like BAT, has shown that profits are generated by controlling content. As China shifts from competitive capitalism to state-led monopolized capitalism, and with Xi Jinping entering his third term of leadership, the state has tightened its control over both the content production and market side of the Internet. 2.2.3  The Social Dimension

In addition to the role of capitalism and the state, the social dimension is another important aspect to consider in understanding the power dynamics of China’s ICT and Internet. Scholars from political economy and political science have examined this issue from different angles. Political economy scholars have focused on labour issues in ICT-related industries, while political science scholars have mainly explored the potential for the Internet to democratize society. In Chinese society, labour struggles in ICT-related industries have been ongoing due to the global transformation from Fordism to post-Fordism and the transfer of manufacturing industries from advanced capitalist countries to developing economies like China. China’s integration into the global market has only exacerbated these issues, with more manufacturing factories now located in coastal areas. This has led to acute labour struggles in China, which has been dubbed the “world factory” by some scholars (Hong, 2011). Numerous scholars have investigated labour issues in China, with Ching Kwan Lee studying Chinese capitalism’s transformation through the lens of labour and working-class experiences and struggles (Lee, 1998), Ngai Pun and colleagues focusing on labour issues in transnational factories like Foxconn (Chan & Pun, 2010; Chan et al., 2013), and Jack Linchuan Qiu and Christian Fuchs defining digital labour from a global division of labour perspective (Fuchs, 2014; Qiu, 2016). Recently, Lee has also studied the impact of China’s capitalism expansion in Africa on local labour struggles (Lee, 2018).

Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China  57 However, in authoritarian contexts like China, marketization and economic independence can actually weaken political control, enhance editorial autonomy, and provide some limited personal freedom (Ma, 2000; Lee, 2001; Xin, 2008). Scholars have examined the potential of the Internet to empower citizens and promote democratization in China, with three main perspectives. The first view holds a positive attitude towards the Internet’s role in promoting public discourse and personal expression. Scholars like Yong Hu (2008) and Esarey and Xiao (2008, 2011) argue that the Internet has provided a platform for citizens to express their opinions and critiques, challenging the state agenda and political repression. The second view examines the mechanics of China’s censorship, with Gary King and colleagues (2013) showing that government criticisms are allowed while collective expressions are silenced. Finally, some researchers highlight the Internet’s potential to facilitate protests and struggles in China, as shown in Yang’s (2009) study of online activism. Overall, scholars have suggested that the Internet has the potential to promote public discourse, criticisms, and protests in China, though its impact on democratization may be limited. The timing of these publications is significant, as they reveal that during the early years of the Internet, particularly in the first few years of Sina Weibo’s launch (August 2009) and before Xi’s administration (since 2013), China’s Internet observers had a more positive outlook on the potential for the Internet to bring about societal change. This is not surprising, as during this period the government had yet to establish complete control over the Internet, making it a freer space than it is now. Weibo was regarded as a public sphere where government officials’ corrupt activities were exposed, local governments were held accountable, and political criticisms were able to be expressed to some extent. Since 2010, there has been a gradual shift in the control of the Internet in China, which has been further tightened after Xi Jinping assumed leadership in 2013 (Yang, 2015, pp. 3–4). A range of measures have been implemented by various agencies, including “hard” measures such as the establishment of the ministerial-level Cyberspace Administration of China (Wang Xin Ban) in 2014 and the publication of the China Internet Security Law (Wangluo Anquan Fa) in 2016. “Soft management” measures have also been employed, such as requesting Internet companies to commit to regulating online comments (Xinhua Net, 2014) and increasing the online presence of Chinese government agencies and official media. While this democratization approach is crucial and fruitful, some scholars have argued to think beyond this approach (Meng, 2010; Sparks, 2012; Y. Zhou, 2009). While the liberal view tends to link freedom of speech to the free market, this equation is problematic as research by political economists has shown. They suggest that further marketization and commercialization may not benefit a highly divided society like China and may actually oppress disadvantaged groups (Zhao, 2007). Scholars have also found that the free market does not necessarily conflict with the state, and journalists can serve

58  Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China both the party and the market, while avoiding direct confrontation with censorship (Lee et  al., 2006; Sparks, 2012). In some cases, state censorship even protects domestic companies, and party-state power and market rationality can work together (Schiller, 2008, p. 114; Zhao, 2009, p. 175). Therefore, it is not advisable to equate freedom of the market with freedom of speech. Moreover, it has been argued that focusing solely on state control overlooks other more subtle types of control and struggles present in society. For instance, as early as 2000, Ma identified flexible governance by administrative and regulatory technologies that served to “contain strong commercial development within political control” (Ma, 2000, p. 23). This illustrates the irony of marketization in China where media conglomerates and groups are tolerated by the authorities as a means of controlling chaotic free competition and limiting the proliferation of minor papers (Ma, 2000, p. 18). Zhao Yuezhi also highlights that the commercialization of China’s media system has not substantially undermined political instrumentalization (Zhao, 2012, p. 162). Instead, there exist “blunt forms of commercial instrumentalization and the abuse of the party’s journalistic power”, including paid journalism and blackmailing companies through negative reporting (ibid.). This suggests that rather than conflicting political and economic systems, the commercialization of the media system can result in the concerto of political and economic power abuse. Consequently, it is crucial to look beyond state control and examine other subtle forms of control and power struggles in China’s media environment. Recent research offers a more nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics at play in China. Meng highlights the significance of online political discourse in comprehending the nuanced power relations between official rhetoric and civic culture (Meng, 2009, 2011; Meng & Huang, 2017). Repnikova criticizes Western studies of China’s media and the Internet for solely focusing on censorship, coercion, and official propaganda, instead of recognizing the contested nature of the media landscape and the negotiations that take place between the state and critical journalism (Repnikova, 2017, p. 3). Through her fieldwork, Repnikova illustrates how different actors in the media ecosystem in China negotiate and adapt to each other, showcasing the potential for flexible collaboration between critical actors and the authoritarian regime. The edited volume by Yang similarly explores the complex and subtle negotiations that occur online (Yang, 2015). To expand on the existing research on the Chinese Internet, it is necessary to move away from the traditional approach of analysing the resistance and control dichotomy and instead focus on the subtle ways in which the state exerts power, including through propaganda and ideology (Yang, 2015). The historical legitimacy of the authoritarian state in China, rooted in its revolutionary past, means that assuming an oppositional relationship between the regime and the state is inaccurate (Meng, 2010; Zhao, 2009). Thus, there is a need for more contextualized studies on ideology in China (Chapter 3).

Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China  59 2.3 BAT In the late 1990s, BAT emerged in China’s complex power dynamics between the state, global capital, and the domestic market. They became dominant players in the Chinese Internet market in the mid-2010s, as oligopolies, cross-industry conglomerates, and multinational corporations. It’s important to note that the Chinese government’s permission and intervention were necessary for BAT’s business expansion. According to Alexa index data from July 2021, Tmall.com, qq.com, and Baidu.com – owned by Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu respectively – are the top three sites in China (Alexa, n.d.) (data accessed in July 2021). These companies still dominate the instant messaging, online shopping, and search engine market in terms of importance and usage rate, as reported in the CNNIC 47th report of 2021. Although other Chinabased Internet companies like ByteDance, Meituan, and Didi have been successful in the stock market recently, BAT witnessed the fastest growth in China’s Internet and ICT industry during the Chinese state’s more neoliberalleaning competitive capitalism phase before its shift to state-monopolized capitalism. Therefore, BAT’s digital discourses reflect and shape this significant moment in Chinese Internet development history. 2.3.1 Baidu

Baidu, founded by Robin Li in 2000, took five years to be listed on NASDAQ in 2005. Baidu established its position in China’s market by offering search engine and ranking services, and generated revenue through advertising. Baidu also aimed to expand its business into content communities, including MP3 music (November 2002), Tieba (December 2003), Zhidao (June 2005), Baike (April 2006), and other areas such as Baidu Video, Baidu Map, Baidu Hi, social media applications like Baidu Space (launched in 2006 and closed in 2015), and e-commerce like Baidu Youa (launched in 2008 and closed in 2011). After Google discontinued its service in Mainland China in 2010 due to the Great Firewall and government regulations, Baidu became the dominant player in the search engine market in China. In 2011, Baidu surpassed Tencent to become the most valuable Internet company in China on NASDAQ. As Robin Li’s speeches indicate, Baidu always presents itself as an open platform that connects users, developers, advertisers, and services. Based on its financial report, Baidu’s operations are divided into two segments: Baidu Core and iQIYI. Baidu Core primarily offers “online marketing services”, while iQIYI is “an innovative market-leading online entertainment service” (Baidu, Annual Report, Form 20-F, 2020). Baidu Core’s products and services include Mobile Ecosystem, Baidu Cloud, and Apollo Intelligent Driving & Other Growth Initiatives. iQIYI focuses on providing online entertainment content. Baidu utilizes both horizontal and vertical integration strategies to expand its businesses into different areas.

60  Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China In recent years, Baidu has attempted to recover from losing market advantages in the social media era by focusing on developing AI. Robin Li has stated that Baidu began developing and implementing AI in 2010, followed by deep learning in 2012. In 2013, Baidu introduced IDL, which was the first institute to be dedicated to deep learning (Robin Li, 2018 World Internet Conference, AI panel). Since 2014, Robin Li has consistently emphasized the importance of Big Data and AI on various occasions. Baidu launched Baidu Brain in 2016 (ibid.), and in 2017, Baidu officially changed its mission to “awaken everything” (Robin Li, 2017 Baidu Union), marking a significant shift in Baidu’s development strategy. According to Robin Li in 2018, the Baidu Apollo Platform has become the world’s first autonomous vehicle ecosystem (Robin Li, 2018 World Internet Conference). 2.3.2 Alibaba

Alibaba began as an e-commerce business and later expanded into other sectors. The company was established in 1999 and initially focused on the B2B business model, providing web pages for Chinese medium-sized and small businesses to engage in international trade. However, following huge overseas expenses and the bursting of the Internet bubble in 2000, Alibaba was forced to refocus its attention on China. By 2002, Alibaba had established its profit model based on membership fees and value-added services. In 2003, Alibaba Group created Taobao, a shopping website that enables C2C retail, and also launched Alipay the same year. Later, in 2010, Tmall replaced the B2C service developed out of Taobao, and Alibaba also launched YiTao, which focused on search engines in the e-commerce sector. Starting from 2005, Alibaba began to diversify its business beyond its core e-commerce services. It sought to expand into several areas, such as search engine (acquisition of Yahoo China in 2005 but failed in 2006), community website (acquisition of Koubei in 2006), advertising (establishment of Alimama in 2007, later evolved into AliUnion in 2010), enterprise software (Alibaba Software in 2007), AI and Cloud (founding Alibaba Cloud in 2009), and logistic (establishment of Cainiao in 2013). It is worth mentioning that, in 2007, Alibaba started providing loan services to small and medium-sized businesses, marking its entry into financial services. In 2008, Alibaba founded Alibaba Capital Partners and expanded into the cultural and entertainment industry, O2O, and other industries through investments. By 2015, Alibaba had integrated its businesses into seven main categories, which include e-commerce, Ant Finance, Cainiao Logistics, Big Data and Cloud Computing, Advertising Service, International Trade, and Internet Service. Alibaba’s financial report for 2020 states that the company operates in four main segments: (a) “core commerce”, which includes retail and wholesale commerce in China and globally, (b) “cloud computing”, (c) “digital media and entertainment”, and (d) “innovation initiatives and others”, which includes digital maps and operating systems. Additionally, Alibaba participates

Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China  61 in logistics (through Cainiao Network) and local services (through Koubei) sectors, as well as online financial services (through Alipay, an online payment platform) via investee affiliates. Alibaba describes its business as an “ecosystem” that encompasses consumers, merchants, brands, retailers, service providers, alliance partners, and other businesses. Alibaba claims to provide a comprehensive range of products and services to cover various aspects of people’s lives, from shopping to entertainment, both domestically and globally. 2.3.3 Tencent

Tencent was founded in 1998 and initially focused on the instant messaging service OICQ, which was later renamed as QQ. In 2003, Tencent began expanding its business into various areas such as games, Internet portals, social networking services (SNS), e-commerce, etc. Its profit model included charging membership fees on IM services like the QQ show and through its games. According to its financial reports, more than 50% of Tencent’s revenue has come from games since 2014. Between 2003 and 2010, Tencent was known for copying ideas from startups and quickly overtaking them. However, this developmental approach was halted in 2010 after a controversial incident. In November 2010, Tencent announced that it would stop operating QQ software on computers with 360 software installed, which led to a backlash from users who accused Tencent of exerting too much power over their personal computers. This incident also reflected long-standing dissatisfaction with Tencent’s market behaviour. After government intervention, QQ and 360 became compatible again. However, Tencent had to reconsider its business operations, according to Pony Ma. 2010 has become a turning point for Tencent. At the end of 2010, Pony Ma created 8 Guiding Principles for the future of the Internet. In 2011, Tencent announced its “open platform” strategy, which aimed to create a platform that was open and collaborative and would allow Tencent’s partners to share in the profits. According to Pony Ma, a true platform is built around social networks, including networks of accounts, traffic, and payments (Ma, 2011 Tencent Global Partner Conference). Following the launch of the open platform strategy, Pony Ma began to frequently mention the concept of the “Tencent ecosystem”. By expanding into other business areas such as search engines (in partnership with Sougou) and e-commerce (in partnership with JD), partners within this ecosystem could share resources, customers, and data openly and freely (Ma, 2016 Tencent Global Partner Conference). Additionally, Tencent began investing in other companies and venture capital firms. According to their official website, Tencent Investment has invested in over 800 enterprises in more than 20 countries and regions, covering industries such as culture and entertainment, retail, services, education, finance, and high-tech. Tencent has an advantage in controlling two of China’s largest social media platforms: QQ and WeChat. WeChat has become Tencent’s most important

62  Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China mobile application and serves as an entry point to the mobile Internet for millions of users in China. These platforms allow for easy integration with APIs to direct users to other websites, apps, and advertising. In January 2017, Tencent introduced a new feature within WeChat called Mini-Programs, which connect users to a wide range of online and offline services, including retail, e-commerce, lifestyle services, municipal services, and games (Financial Report, 2017, p. 5). The most significant aspect of Mini-Programs is its ability to direct users to retailers, a move that positions Tencent to compete with Alibaba in e-commerce. The introduction of Mini-Programs has expanded Tencent’s reach beyond social media, allowing the company to further diversify into the retail and finance industries. More recently, as Tencent began to delve into AI, its language evolved from focusing on connecting its partners and users to connecting everything, including equipment, using the term “connector”. Additionally, Tencent now aims to establish a “digital eco-community”, marking a shift from its previous positioning as a copycat to an “open platform” to an “ecosystem”. As the company’s business grows, its language shifts to justify its expansion and increasing dominance in the market. 2.3.3.1  BAT’s Ecosystems and Data Collection

Mosco (1996) notes that while there are similarities between oligopolies in traditional industries and those in media and communication industries, the latter is more flexible in expanding their control and exerting power (p. 169). This is due to the fact that technology and Internet companies are able to expand their power by collecting and utilizing more data. This has led to the emergence of a new type of oligopoly known as the “data oligopoly”. In contrast to traditional oligopolies which are pursued mainly through acquisition and mergers, technology and Internet companies such as BAT are constantly competing to “cooperate” with more partners and “share” data with each other through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). These companies use the metaphor of an “ecosystem” to describe their approach, claiming that small businesses can “grow” and develop by themselves without intervention from the oligopoly. This is because their main objective is to obtain a “complete picture” of each customer or user. BAT, as they expand their businesses, prioritize the acquisition of data as one of the most important resources. Jack Ma, founder of Alibaba, has boldly claimed that his company is not a GMV company, but rather a data company (Jack Ma, 2016 Investor’s Day). To obtain more data, BAT promotes the discourse of “ecosystems”, “enabling” partners, and “participation and sharing” among users, similar to their Western peers (Fuchs, 2014; Van Dijck, 2013). The exchange of audience/user online behaviour and online data into advertising income used to be called “monetization of traffic”. Now, “Big Data” and “AI” have become buzzwords in the marketing area, and BAT have their marketing services for advertising customers based on

Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China  63 their control of a large amount of user data and algorithms to harvest them. They all generate large amounts of revenue from advertising or online marketing services. The importance of the exchange value of user data is illustrated by the significant revenue generated by social media platforms through advertising. Tencent, for instance, offers Tencent Social Ads to partners and advertisers, highlighting its ability to target specific user groups and its vast number of users on social networks like QQ and WeChat. Tencent’s revenue is heavily reliant on its social network services, with VAS, online advertising services, FinTech and Business Services, and other online-related services accounting for 55%, 17%, 27%, and 1% of its total revenue respectively in 2020. Similarly, Weibo’s financial report shows that a significant portion (77%–88%) of its revenue is generated through online advertising services (Tencent, Annual Report, 2020, p. 11). QQ and WeChat, while not reported as independent companies, contribute significantly to Tencent’s revenue, with online games and social network services accounting for most of Tencent’s VAS revenue and advertisements displayed on both entertainment and social network platforms, especially Weixin Moments, accounting for most of its online advertising revenue (pp. 199, 6). Because QQ and WeChat are not run as individual companies, their revenue reports are not available separately from Tencent’s. However, we can use Weibo, another major Chinese social media platform, as an example. Weibo’s financial report (Table 2.2) demonstrates the significance of revenue generated by advertising, with a substantial portion (77%–88%) coming from online advertising services provided by Weibo (Weibo Corp, 2017, 2020). Alibaba Group invested in Weibo through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Ali WB, in April 2013. As a result, Alibaba is now the second-largest shareholder of Weibo, holding 29.8% of ordinary shares with 15.7% voting power (Weibo Corp, 2020). Weibo’s financial report emphasizes the importance of Alibaba as its largest customer and strategic partner. Weibo states that if it fails to maintain its collaboration with Alibaba, its growth prospects and results of operations may be adversely affected (Weibo Corp, 2020, p. 12). Alibaba’s marketing platform, Alimama, claims to be a “data-powered marketing technology platform” that utilizes Big Data and AI technologies to provide a complete picture of individual consumers. It emphasizes its ability to gather information on consumer consumption patterns, preferences, geographical locations, and social media activities, enabling more effective harvesting of consumer behaviour. In one of its PR videos, Alimama is portrayed as monitoring every consumer closely, with an eye symbolizing the information gathered from consumers through its own or cooperative platforms. Baidu, like other companies, relies heavily on advertising revenue (as shown in Table 2.3). Baidu has two main services focused on advertising and data: Baidu Union (BU) and Baidu Advertising (Baidu Tuiguang). BU is composed of several third-party websites and applications and is used mainly for displaying online advertising arranged by Baidu and earning

1,486,155 1,689,931 87.94%

1,530,211 1,766,914 86.60%

2019

78,093

107,413 72.70%

72,840

107,074 68.03%

2019

Source: Annual Report (2020, 2017), Form 20-F

Revenues from Online marketing Total revenues Percentage

2020

102,277 80.09%

81,912 84,809 86.25%

73,146

70,549 91.46%

64,525

402,415 477,891 84.21%

2015

66,3812 96.47%

64,037

2015

570,982 655,800 87.07%

2016

2016

996,745 1,150,054 86.67%

2017

2017

1,499,180 1,718,518 87.24%

2018

2018

Table 2.3 Baidu revenues (revenue in millions, RMB)

Source: Weibo Form 20-F

Revenue from advertising Total revenue Percentage of revenue from advertising

2020

Table 2.2 Weibo revenue (revenue in $ thousands)

49,052 98.86%

48,495

2014

264,782 334,172 79.24%

2014

31,944 99.56%

31,802

2013

148,426 188,313 78.82%

2013

22,306 99.73%

22,246

2012

51,049 65,929 77.43%

2012

64  Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China

Capitalism and Digital Revolution in China  65 revenue from it. Baidu Tuiguang is Baidu’s primary advertising service, which provides marketing services to advertisers to display ads on Baidu search result pages and partner websites. Both BU and Baidu Tuiguang claim to be able to conduct precise analyses of user needs and interests using large databases and AI technology, enabling targeted advertising. However, Baidu is expanding its business and attempting to generate revenue from other segments, such as membership services, content distribution, cloud services, and financial services. The proportion of revenue generated directly from online marketing is decreasing from 99.73% to 68.03% (Baidu, 2015, 2020). BAT’s use of AI and big data marketing is based on a similar principle: selling users’ personal data that they collect from their platforms and partners to advertisers for profit. This practice has been criticized as a form of exploitation of users, with scholars arguing that users generate value and use value for the platforms (Andrejevic, 2013; Fuchs, 2014; Smythe, 1994). Furthermore, privacy violations resulting from the use of big data and algorithms in marketing have also been a concern. One example of this is the practice of “price discrimination” based on big data in China, where users are shown different prices based on their characteristics such as their device or usage frequency. Frequent users are often charged higher prices, which decrease to the normal level once cookies are cleared or the device is changed. This highlights the potential for companies to use data to set higher prices for frequent users. References Alexa. (n.d.). Top sites in China. Retrieved November 27, 2018, from http://www. alexa.com/topsites/countries/CN Amin, S. (1990). The future of socialism. Monthly Review, 42(3), 10–30. Amin, S. (2013). The implosion of contemporary capitalism. New York University Press. Andrejevic, M. (2013). Estranged free labor. In T. Scholz (Ed.), Digital labor: The internet as playground and factory (pp. 149–164). Routledge. Arrighi, G. (2007). Ada Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the twenty-first century. Verso. Baidu. (2015). Baidu Form 20-F. Baidu. Baidu. (2020). Baidu Form 20-F. Baidu. Chan, J., & Pun, N. (2010). Suicide as protest for the new generation of Chinese migrant workers: Foxconn, global capital, and the state. The Asia-Pacific Journal, 37(2), 1–50. Chan, J., Pun, N., & Selden, M. (2013). The politics of global production: Apple, Foxconn and China’s new working class. New Technology, Work and Employment, 28(2), 100–115. Chase-Dunn, C. (2010). Adam Smith in Beijing: A world-systems perspective. Historical Materialism, 18(1), 39–51. Chase-Dunn, C., & Gills, B. (2005). Waves of globalization and resistance in the capitalist world system: social movements and critical global studies. Critical Globalization Studies, 45, 54.

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Part II

3 Government Digital Discourse

This chapter focuses on the government as a key actor in producing, promoting, shaping, and partially controlling digital discourses. It examines three categories of government documents. The first category includes documents found on the government’s website that provide a general overview of Internet-related policies. These include laws, administrative ordinances, and departmental regulations from the State Council (27 documents), CAC (Cyberspace Administration of China) (53), MIIT (Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, set up in 2008) (18), SAPPRFT (State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television) (37). Relevant documents were identified using keywords such as “Internet”, “Big Data”, and “New Media”. The second category comprises top-level policies that direct the government’s work, such as the Outline of National IT Development Strategy, 13th Five-Year-Plan, 13th Five-Year-Plan for National Informatization, and Government Work Reports from 2014 to 2019. The third category focuses on speeches made by Xi Jinping, which are repeatedly cited in media and official documents.1 These speeches were delivered at important meetings related to cybersecurity and informatization, and the most important Internet-related conference for the industry. I carefully reviewed all the documents and policy titles and selected 21 for further thematic analysis and critical discourse analysis, as shown in Table  3.1. I focused on documents that address the Internet industry as a whole, rather than specific sectors or groups. I also considered how frequently these documents are referred to by other documents in my selection process. For instance, the Provisions on Ecological Governance of Network Information Content refers to both the Cybersecurity Law and Administrative Measures for Internet Information Services (2011 Revision) in terms of content regulation. This chapter uses Fairclough and Fairclough’s (2012) critical policy analysis approach to examine the practical argumentation in government discourse (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012), see also (Fairclough, 2013). The approach understands the purpose of a policy or official speech to advocate certain policies is to advocate certain action or actions, i.e. to solve the question of what should we do. To endorse this solution, government policies and speeches typically follow DOI: 10.4324/9781003315810-6

74  Government Digital Discourse Table 3.1 List of selected government documents Law, Administrative ordinances, and departmental regulations

Top-level policies that direct the government’s work Xi’s speeches

Total: 21 out of 148

1 Provisions on Ecological Governance of Network Information Content 2 Administrative Measures for Internet Information Services (2011Revision) 3 the Opinions on Promoting the Sound and Orderly Development of the Mobile Internet 4 Cybersecurity Law 5 Guiding Opinions on Actively Promoting the “Internet Plus” Action (Internet Plus Action Plan) 6 Outline of Actions to Promote Big Data Strategy 7 Made in China 2020 8 Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Innovative Development of Cloud Computing and Cultivating New Business Forms of the Information Industry 9 the Outline of National IT Development Strategy (published in 2016), 10 13th Five-Year-Plan, 11 13th Five-Year-Plan for National Informatization, and 12 Government Work Report (GWRs) from 2014 (the first year conducted by Premier Li Keqiang) to 2019 13 Xi’s speech at the first meeting of the new Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization (2014.02.27) 14 Address at the 2nd World Internet Conference (2015.12.16) 15 Speech at the 2016 Work Conference for Cybersecurity and Informatization (2016.04.19)a 16 Speech at the 2018 Work Conference for Cybersecurity and Informatization (2018.04.20)

The speech given by Xi Jinping on April 19th, which focused on the advancement of the Internet in China, holds significant importance for various reasons. It was the first instance where the central government and CPC organized a conference regarding national cybersecurity and informatization. All members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee participated in the conference, along with officials from different Ministries and local governments. The event received extensive coverage by official media, and the complete speech was published and distributed in bookstores throughout the country. The speech has been repeatedly cited and quoted over the years, especially after the US imposed sanctions against China in April 2018. The speech can be viewed as laying out a strategic and comprehensive plan for the development of the Internet and IT in China.

a

a structure of identifying current problems, proposing desirable goals, and suggesting actions to achieve those goals. Underlying values and concerns also play an important role in the development of arguments. Therefore, analysis involves identifying the premises and conclusion of an argument and evaluating the relations between them (I. Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p.  11). Criticism of a claim involves showing how the proposed action may have negative consequences that conflict with the agent’s goals and values. This type of analysis goes beyond mere description of policy and links texts with social contexts, and is

Government Digital Discourse  75 useful not just for evaluating practical arguments in government documents, but also for examining ideological discourses more broadly. The focus of the analysis in this chapter is on the economic, political, and cultural aspects of the government’s digital discourse, as outlined in previous chapters. 3.1

Building a Cyber Superpower2

Firstly, in this section, there will be a presentation of how the current digital era is portrayed in government papers, highlighting it as a part of the digital revolution. Next, there will be an introduction to the government’s ultimate objective of “Creating a Cyber Superpower” and its fundamental principle of “Serving the people”. These three aspects – description of the current state of affairs, ultimate goal, and core value – provide a general understanding of the government’s digital discourse. The majority of government documents commence with an overview of the current situation. In the case of Internet-related policies, these documents frequently emphasize the ongoing digital revolution and the necessity of joining it, with an urgent tone to emphasize the gravity of the matter. Metaphors like “tide” and “wave” are often used to emphasize the irresistible and inevitable changes brought by the integration of the Internet into all aspects of social life. For instance, Xi’s speech states that our country is in the midst of this tide, and its influence will deepen over time3 (Xi, 2014, speech at the first meeting of the new Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization). He uses the expression “We must forge ahead or otherwise will be swept downstream” (Bu jin ze tui). In Chinese, this expression is followed by “like a boat sailing against the current” (Ni shui xing zhou). This is another powerful metaphor to describe the irresistible changes. The Outline of the National Informatization Development Strategy also states that the tide of informatization, characterized by digitization, networking, and smartification, has vigorously arisen4 (General Office of the Communist Party of China and General Office of the State Council, 2016, Outline of the National Informatization Development Strategy). The Internet Plus Action Plan uses the metaphor of “an overwhelming tidal wave” to express the unstoppable future brought by the Internet and one must go with this flow5 (State Council, 2015, Guiding Opinions on Actively Promoting the “Internet Plus” Action). Metaphors are often used to describe changes and to imply an inevitable future (I. Fairclough, 2016). This type of discourse could lead to technodeterminism, where people join the wave without questioning how to develop new technologies, for whom, and for what purpose. It could also downplay ethical and political concerns about privacy issues, and lead to a narrative of “us vs them” and national competition. Thus, it is essential to scrutinize whether such metaphors serve these purposes by analysing other premises such as descriptions of problems, goals, and mean-goal premises. In this “‘tide” of the digital revolution, the goal of building a “Cyber Superpower” in China is proposed by the government, which is part of

76  Government Digital Discourse the larger aim of rejuvenating the Chinese nation. The term “Cyber Superpower” (网络强国, Wǎngluò qiángguó, hereinafter WLQG) has been used since 2014, and it distinguishes a country with extensive Internet presence from a country (网络大国) with advanced technological innovation and development (网络强国). Xi Jinping has identified a few problems in China’s current state of affairs that need to be addressed to achieve the “Cyber Superpower” status (Xi’s speech at the first meeting of the new Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization, 2014). Since then, the term has become a central concept in China’s Internet development and related policies and the government discusses national Internet development, cybersecurity, and informatization policies with this goal in mind. The National Big Data Strategy and National Cyber Development Strategy, which are part of the WLQG strategy, were launched in 2015. The strategy has been repeatedly emphasized by President Xi Jinping, such as at the Work Conference for Cybersecurity and Informatization in 2016 and 2018. It covers a wide range of Internet and digital technology-related policies, including Internet governance, content control, cybersecurity, technology development, international competition, and cooperation. The term has also been mentioned in government reports and policies, such as the 19th Party Congress in 2017. Due to its importance, various official interpretations of the term have been published, providing insight into Xi’s thinking and setting the agenda for discussions on the topic. Different articles by the official party-led stateowned media, including Qiushi,6 Xinhua, People’s Daily, have emphasized the importance of developing cybersecurity, technology innovation, managing cyberspace, and strengthening China’s role in Internet governance. Overall, the term has become an “umbrella term” covering various aspects of China’s Internet and digital technology policies. The government’s emphasis on building a WLQG is accompanied by the goal of serving the people, a key value in traditional socialist discourse. This value is also applied to the Internet, which is expected to provide public services and reduce poverty. Xi Jinping has emphasized that the development of the Internet and informatization should prioritize the people’s needs and put them at the centre (see for example, Xi’s speech at the 1st WIC, 2014; Xi’s 4.19 Speech). In his 2016 speech, he reiterated this value, emphasizing the need to adapt to people’s expectations and requirements, reduce application costs, provide affordable and accessible information services, and ensure that hundreds of millions of people benefit from the development fruits of the Internet. I have previously highlighted the Chinese government’s aim of creating a “Cyber Superpower” (WLQG) in the “wave” of the digital revolution, and its emphasis on the value of serving the people. In the upcoming sections, I will not only provide an overview of the key aspects of the government’s digital discourses but also conduct a critical evaluation of their policies regarding these goals. This evaluation will address several questions. What does it mean to realize WLQG? Will the proposed actions achieve the goal to realize

Government Digital Discourse  77 WLQG? Will the proposed actions be the best means to serve the people? Will there be unintended negative consequences happen in the process? Are these consequences violating Communist Party of China’s (CPC) promises to serve the people or clash with CPC’s political commitments? Are there any other facts that need to be taken into consideration? Through thematic analysis, I have identified three main themes in the government’s digital discourse related to building a National Cyber Power and serving the people: the Information Economy (7.2), Cybersecurity (7.3), and “A Community of Shared Destiny in the Cyber Space” (7.3). Rather than simply describing these themes, I will use Critical Discourse Analysis to investigate their implications and provide a critical evaluation. 3.2

Information Economy

The primary focus of the Chinese government’s digital discourse is on the Information Economy. This is being done to develop the country’s economy under the “New Normal” and to implement a national Big Data strategy. The Chinese government highlights the significance of the Internet and Big Data to improve the country’s economy, but it fails to prioritize the rights of workers in the new economy and ownership of data. Additionally, the government aims to encourage mass entrepreneurship and innovation, and to provide support to key Chinese enterprises. To achieve these economic goals, the government has announced plans to deepen political reform. However, there are concerns about issues such as data privacy, security, and the impact of digital technologies on employment and inequality. 3.2.1  A “New Normal” of the Chinese Economy

The Chinese government has adopted the concept of the “New Normal”, which prioritizes better quality growth with a focus on services, innovation, reduced inequality, and environmental sustainability (Green & Stern, 2015, p.  10). Chinese President Xi Jinping (2014) points out three main characteristics of the “New Normal”: To begin, it has shifted from rapid growth to moderately high growth. Additionally, the economic structure has seen ongoing advancements, with a greater emphasis on the service sector and consumer demand as the primary driving forces. This has also led to a reduction in the gap between urban and rural areas, an increase in the proportion of residents’ income, and a broader range of people benefiting from development achievements. Finally, it has moved from being driven by factors and investment to being driven by innovation.7 The Internet and Big Data are viewed as a key tool to achieve economic development and stimulate growth. President Xi has emphasized the importance of the “Information Economy” and the need for a new driving force for the country’s economic development. The Internet is expected to upgrade the

78  Government Digital Discourse agricultural and manufacturing industries, develop the service industry, and stimulate consumption. The government’s national strategy involves building a Cyber Superpower and implementing the “Internet Plus” Action Plan and the Big Data Strategy, with the goal to promote the converged development of the Internet and the real economy. The government aims to drive technology, talent, and material flows through information flows, optimize resource allocation, improve the productivity of all factors, and promote innovation and economic transformation8 (Xi, 2016, 4.19 Speech). Two years later, President Xi summarized the government’s actions as promoting the deep convergence of the Internet, Big Data, AI, and the real economy to promote digitalized, networked, and AI-enabled manufacturing, agriculture, and service industries (Xi, 2018, 4.20 Speech). Emphasizing the importance of data, Xi proposes that China should construct a modern economic system that is reliant on the development and implementation of Big Data9 (Xinhua, 2017). This was outlined in his speech during the 2nd WIC. This shows a shift in the government’s development strategy, as the focus is no longer solely on attracting investment and increasing exports in the manufacturing industry but on moving China’s industries up to a higher level in the global value chain. As observed by Hong (2008), the Chinese government is aware of the current economic situation in China, instead of promoting “de-industrialization”, the Chinese government used the Internet to “upgrade” the economic structure, to “neo-industrialization”. This “upgrade of economy” discourse emphasizes Internet technologies as new forces of production, as exemplified in Xi’s statement in 201810 (Xi, 2018, 4.20 Speech). The focus is on the construction of a modern economic system and achieving high-quality development, accelerating informatization development, and driving improvements in industrialization, urbanization, and agriculture modernization. The government’s discourse mentions using the Internet to reduce differences between rural and urban areas, alleviate poverty, and provide better governance services, but there is little mention of relations of production or how new technologies might affect alienated working conditions. The only instance where the concept of “relations of production” is mentioned is in the Outline of the National Informatization Development Strategy, which strongly asserts that the Internet and information undertaking represent new productive forces and new development orientations. The document claims that this new technology is profoundly changing people’s ways of production and life, triggering a major change in the relation of production and becoming a guiding force in remoulding a new structure in the development of various aspects of society11 (General Office of the CPC and General Office of the State Council, 2016, Outline of the National Informatization Development Strategy). However, this is the only document in the samples provided where “relations of production” is mentioned, and it is not clear how the Internet and information undertaking would trigger a major change in this regard.

Government Digital Discourse  79 3.2.2  Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation

The New Normal emphasizes the importance of innovation as the new driving force for the Chinese economy. One term closely related to the Internet economy is “Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation” (MEI or Shuang Chuang in Chinese, 双创), which appears frequently in Internet-related documents. The government believes that the Internet can promote innovation and facilitate enterprise, and the “Internet Plus” Action Plan proposes to use the Internet to promote entrepreneurialism and innovation, which shares the similar idea of the Information Superhighway and Industry 4.0. This plan aims to stimulate start-ups and innovation by promoting the collection, openness, and sharing of all categories of factors, and to guide and promote all of society to create a thick atmosphere for mass start-ups and mass innovation12 (State Council, 2015, “Internet Plus” Action Plan). The Xi-Li administration has actively encouraged MEI with the help of the Internet, and the creation of this term is related to the government’s efforts to encourage the vitality of the market and withdraw some of its control.13 MEI is seen as a necessary choice to cultivate and promote new driving forces for socio-economic development, expand employment and enrich people, and stimulate the whole society’s innovation potential and entrepreneur vitality (Opinions to promote innovation and entrepreneurship, 2015). The government argues that MEI is not only beneficial for the prosperity of the nation and for individuals to become wealthy, but also for social equality and justice (Li Keqiang, 2015 GWR). The goal of MEI is to “make more people rich and realize their life value”,14 according to Premier Li, and it is expected to promote the economy and public services, create new jobs, and foster innovation. According to this reasoning, individuals should seize the opportunity to become entrepreneurs by utilizing the Internet and participating in this trend. The government commonly employs topos of usefulness to argue that if the Internet can bring economic advantages to both individuals and the nation, then it is necessary to support entrepreneurship and innovation, as a way to promote Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation (MEI) and the “Internet Plus” initiative. 3.2.3  The Chinese Enterprises

The government emphasizes the importance of enterprises as significant stakeholders in national development, and they are crucial actors to represent the nation’s interests, especially in international competition. In 4.19 speech, Xi especially emphasizes the missions and responsibilities of enterprises. He specifically states that “to foster a sustained and healthy development of the enterprises is not only the objectives of entrepreneurs but also the need for national development”. Moreover, Xi continues “the fate of enterprises is closely bound up with the development of the country” (4.19). Chinese businesses are seen as representing national interests and advanced technologies

80  Government Digital Discourse and are expected to lead China’s global strategy (e.g. the Belts and Roads Initiative (BRI)). This discourse combines nationalism and neoliberalism, and the Chinese government seeks to build a positive relationship with capital and businesses, rather than solely controlling them (Y. Hong, 2017). This equivalence between China and Chinese businesses is shown in the government’s discursive events with discursive strategies, sometimes implicitly. For example, in Xi’s 4.19 speech, when he praises China’s achievements in developing new technologies, he says: [1] China’s notable achievements in the development of the Internet over the past 20 years or more have included a number of technological accomplishments. At present, four of the world’s top 10 Internet companies are Chinese. While attending the Second World Internet Conference last year, I visited the “Light of the Internet” Expo, where more than 250 companies from across the globe showcased more than 1,000 new technologies. It was exciting to see that many of them were ours.15 (Xi, 2016, 4.19 speech, translation from the official magazine Qiushi, italics added) This passage does not directly state that Chinese businesses represent China or its people, but it implies this message. According to Fairclough, the concept of local coherence involves connecting ideas within a specific part of a text to create a cohesive interpretation (Fairclough, 2015, p. 157). This can be achieved through formal linguistic cues or through implicit connections between ideas. In this case, Xi’s speech suggests that the success of Chinese Internet companies reflects well on China as a whole, and that Chinese businesses are expected to represent the country’s interests in global competition. When Xi talks about “core technologies”, he acknowledges China’s past shortcomings in this area but proposes that by overcoming this hurdle, Chinese businesses can help China achieve greater success in the development of the Internet. Topos of threat is also applied to address a threat due to Chinese Internet companies having to rely on the “core elements” under the control of foreign entities. The language used in the speech blurs the lines between China, Chinese businesses, and the government, suggesting equivalence between them. From a qualitative perspective, Xi’s emphasis on enterprises is evident in his 4.19 speech, where the Chinese word for enterprise or business, “Qiye”, appears 54 times. Of those 54, 6 refer to entrepreneurs (Qiyejia), while words related to research appear only 3 times, experts (Zhuanjia) 8 times, scholars (Xuezhe) 6 times, and scientists (Keji Renyuan and Keji Rencai) 4 times (as shown in Table 3.2). The use of the word “Qiye” and “Qiyejia” is present in five out of six sections of Xi’s speech, including a dedicated section on the “mission and responsibility of Internet companies”. The other four sections cover topics such as people’s lives, core technologies, cybersecurity,

Government Digital Discourse  81 Table 3.2 Time specific words used in Xi’s 4.19 speech Specific words used

Number

Total

Enterprise/business (Qiye) Entrepreneurs: Qiyejia Research (including research departments and research institutions) Experts (zhuanjia) Scholars (xuezhe) Researchers/scientists (Keji Renyuan and Keji Rencai)

48 6 3

54

8 6 4

21

and human talent resources. In all five sectors, Xi discusses the crucial role that enterprises should or could play, which highlights their significance over other institutions. The argument put forward is more than just an equivalence between China and its businesses. It suggests that, given the intense and unavoidable competition at the global level, Chinese companies play a crucial role in representing the nation’s interests. Therefore, the government should actively encourage, support and even serve these companies. This aligns with the government’s push for MEI and the streamlining of government functions and administration through the delegation of powers (JianZheng FangQuan), which involves reducing government intervention in the market while maintaining political control. This can be seen, for instance, in the government’s determination to support “key enterprises” (known as Long Tou Qi Ye in Chinese) and enable them to establish research and development bodies, expand into foreign markets, and use global resources to enhance their international development levels (2016, National Informatization Strategy). The government’s 13th Five-Year Plan for National Informatization also aims to cultivate innovative enterprises that can develop core technologies capable of competing globally and ranking among the top 500. Additionally, Chinese companies are expected to participate in international open-source organizations. 3.2.4  Deepening the Reform

During the initial phase of the Xi-Li administration, there was a brief period of increased openness and rhetoric of reforms within the government. The need to deepen reform is highlighted in various Internet-related government documents. There are two primary themes in these documents. The first is promoting an open market in Internet-related industries to encourage entrepreneurship and innovation. To make it easier for businesses to enter the Internet-related market, the government claims to simplify administrative procedures, delegate power to lower levels, and implement a combination of decentralization and control (2017, the Opinions on Promoting the Sound

82  Government Digital Discourse and Orderly Development of the Mobile Internet). The government is transforming its role in the market to support China’s Informatization project. The 13th Five-Year Plan for National Informatization even claims to insist on a “decisive role of the market in allocating resources”: [2]  Insist on comprehensive deep reform, strike a balance between the role of the government and that of the market, insist on the decisive role of the market in allocating resources, and let the government play its functions better. Get rid of defects that harm innovative developments of informatisation in various systems and mechanisms, stimulate the vigour of innovation, strengthen the law-based social management system, release digital dividends, and provide an instant drive for economic and social development.16 (State Council, 2016, 13th Five-year Plan for National Informatisation) The second is using the Internet to serve the free market. The Internet and Big Data are believed to be useful for the government to better serve the market. The government plans to withdraw its power over the market in less politically sensitive areas. This expression – using Big Data and new technologies to better serve the market – exists in all types of Internetrelated government documents, such as the Internet Plus Action Plan, Outline of National IT Development Strategy, Made in China 2025, Opinions on Cloud Computing, Guiding Opinions on IP, and Opinions on Big Data, Several Opinions on Strengthening the Services and Supervision over Market Entities by Means of Big Data Analysis. The development of Big Data could serve this purpose well: to improve the government’s work efficiency and to promote the transformation of its functions. The government’s push to open up the market and limit its own power in the realm of the Internet is consistent with its broader goal of promoting reforms. This shift in language began in 2013 with the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, after the first year of Xi-Li leadership, which emphasized the decisive role of the market in resource allocation (CPC, 2013). The Session passed The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, which aims to create a fair, transparent, and unified market system, promoting competition and the “survival of the fittest”. This expression of “decisive role” is in clear contrast with the previous expression of a “basic” role of the market in resource allocation. The 2014 Government Work Report (GWR) explicitly claims that it is difficult to make decisions through “Microeconomic regulation and control”, thus should facilitate the free make, the “invisible hand” to promote economic growth (Li Keqiang, 2014 GWR). As the market’s role has transformed, so has the government’s role, with the government claiming to retreat from its previous commanding role in the market. The government’s goal is to strike a balance between the market

Government Digital Discourse  83 and government roles, with the market playing the decisive role in allocating resources and the government improving its functions. The government aims to streamline its administration and delegate more power to promote market vigour and fair competition (Jian Zheng Fang Quan “简政放权”): [3]  China has a population of 1.3 billion and a workforce of 900 million. Our people are hardworking and talented, and there is no limit to their ingenuity. When an abundance of market cells spring into life, they will form a mighty driving force for development, ensuring China’s economy remains resilient in spite of the downward pressure on it and continues to be full of life and dynamism. The government should be bold in imposing reform on itself so as to leave ample space for the market and society to play their respective roles and level the playing field for fair competition. Individuals and enterprises must have the mettle to promote their business development and make innovations, and our society needs to nurture a culture of entrepreneurship and innovation. In this way, while creating wealth, people will be able to meet their cultural and intellectual needs and realise their full potential in life.17 (Li Keqiang, 2015 GWR, translation published on ChinaDaily) The government’s reforms seek to create ample space for the market and society to play their respective roles while nurturing a culture of entrepreneurship and innovation. The ultimate goal is to create wealth, meet cultural and intellectual needs, and realize people’s full potential (Li Keqiang, 2015 GWR). The government’s statement about promoting individual and business entrepreneurship through market cells is similar to David Harvey’s definition of neoliberalism, which emphasizes the importance of private property rights, free markets, and free trade for advancing human well-being through individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills (Harvey, 2005, p.  2). Additionally, the government’s policies promote the use of the Internet to alleviate poverty, with a focus on providing infrastructure in rural and poor areas rather than directly providing social security, education, and employment. The government sees the market, facilitated by the Internet, as the solution to social problems and poverty. This is evident in policies such as the Opinions on Promoting the Sound and Orderly Development of the Mobile Internet and the 13th Five-year Plan for National Informatization. 3.3 Cybersecurity The government’s digital communication focuses on cybersecurity as another significant topic. This kind of discussion involves talks about (1) creating essential technological advancements, (2) securing cyber sovereignty, and (3) establishing a secure and safe environment in the online world.

84  Government Digital Discourse The most important discourse about cybersecurity centres around “core technology”. In one of the most important speeches about informatization given by President Xi Jinping (4.19 Speech), he points out: [4]  Core Internet technologies are our greatest weakness, and the fact we rely on others for core technologies is our biggest threat. It matters little how large an Internet company is or how much that company is worth if it relies heavily on foreign countries for core components and its supply chains are controlled by others. It is like building a house on someone else’s foundation. It might be big and impressive, but it could be torn down at any time. If we are to seize the initiative in the development of the Internet, and guarantee our cybersecurity and national security, it is imperative that we overcome the hurdle posed by core technologies, and try to perform an “overtake on the bend” in certain fields and areas.18 (Xi, 2016, Speech at a Symposium on Cybersecurity and IT Application, English translation from CPC’s official magazine Qiushi) This passage presents a typical argument from the Chinese government regarding the importance of “core technologies”. Using a common rhetorical strategy identified by Reisigl and Wodak as topos of threats (2001, p. 77), Xi invokes the idea of threats to justify taking action against them. This strategy often involves creating a sense of conflict between “us” and “them”. Xi argues that China faces dangers and threats from being dependent on other countries for its core technologies and stresses the importance of developing domestic technologies to ensure cybersecurity and national security. He also sets ambitious goals to surpass other countries in certain areas in the future. The passage suggests that China and its ICT sector are equivalent, blurring the lines between the nation and its industries. Xi warns of the risks faced by Chinese Internet companies that rely on foreign countries for their core technologies and calls for specific actions to be taken by the government and the entire nation to address these threats. “Cyber Sovereignty” (Wang Luo Zhu Quan, 网络主权) is another buzzword that is often associated with statements about cybersecurity. During the Second World Internet Conference, Xi Jinping suggests that there is a great deal of conflict and antagonism between nations in the current situation: [5]  No double standards should be allowed in upholding cybersecurity. We cannot just have the security of one or some countries while leaving the rest insecure, still less should one seek the so-called absolute security of itself at the expense of the security of others.19 (Xi, 2015, 2nd WIC, originally in Chinese with official English translation, italics added)

Government Digital Discourse  85 At this Second World Internet Conference, Xi Jinping introduced the phrase “Cyber Sovereignty” to both the nation and the world. In his speech, Xi proposed four principles to improve the global Internet governance system based on his understanding of the current situation, which he sees as marked by conflicts and antagonism between nations. The main argument presented in this excerpt is that a secure, stable, and prosperous cyberspace must be maintained. At a textual analysis level, this excerpt uses the strategy of collectivization identified by Reisigl and Wodak. Xi employs deictic language, such as “some countries”, “the rest”, and “others”, to highlight differences between two groups of nations. One group is portrayed as engaging in hostile behaviour that leaves others insecure, while the other is depicted as a victim. This creates a clear narrative of “us” versus “them”. The predicational strategy of explicit comparisons (ibid., p. 54) is also used, as Xi attributes responsibilities to the first group of countries accused of pursuing cyber hegemony. The strategy of topos of threat is also employed implicitly, with Xi suggesting that implicit antagonisms exist within the current Internet governance system. He implies that seeking one’s own security at the expense of others can leave them insecure. Therefore, every country should work to “respect cyber sovereignty” and “maintain peace and security” (Xi, 2015, 2nd WIC). It is clear from the speech that Xi is implying American hegemony. Xi Jinping’s introduction of the concept of “cyber sovereignty” has garnered significant attention, but the idea of national sovereignty has always been a crucial issue in China’s international relations, particularly with regard to territorial integrity. According to Zhao, the preservation of national sovereignty, reunification of China, and the attainment of national wealth and power have always been significant factors in China’s international relations, especially in relation to issues that trigger historical sensitivities. The pragmatic nationalism observed by Zhao is assertive in matters concerning territorial integrity, which means that the Chinese government is unwavering in protecting and advancing Chinese national interests (S. Zhao, 2000). While Xi’s emphasis on national sovereignty is not new, the current government has added new elements to its discourse on sovereignty. It has been extended from geographical territory to cyberspace, and historical territorial issues, such as those of Hong Kong and Taiwan, have been appropriated to assert influence over the Internet. The discourse has shifted from one of class conflict to a nationalist ideological discourse. During Mao’s era, the discourse of sovereignty was framed as a conflict between capitalist and communist/socialist countries, with an element of class conflict in traditional Maoist-left discourses. However, since the 1980s, this class element has been removed, turning the discourse of “cyber sovereignty” into a nationalist ideological discourse. The emphasis on sovereignty is no longer for the purpose of emancipation and liberation of oppressed people, but rather to divert people’s attention from domestic problems and serve the interests of the ruling class, as Xi does.

86  Government Digital Discourse This shift risks legitimizing the government’s control over the Internet under the guise of protecting national security, potentially diverting attention from domestic issues and serving the interests of the ruling class. The Chinese government’s tight control over the Internet reinforces this risk (King et al., 2013; Yang, 2015). In the 2016 National Informatization Development Strategy, one section entitled “Retaining Cyber Sovereignty and National Security”, which aims to prevent and crack down on online activities intended to “divide the country, provoke rebellion, overthrow the regime, damage integrity, and leak confidential information” (2016 National Informatization Development Strategy, 2016, article 54). “A clean environment in cyberspace” is another often-cited phrase as a justification for Internet governance and a component of cybersecurity measures. Xi argues that a healthy cyberspace is in the best interest of the people, especially the youth, and that it is the responsibility of the government to strengthen governance and promote positive online content (WIC 2015).20 To achieve this, Xi emphasizes the need for a unitary nation: [6]  Attaining the “Two Centenary Goals”21 requires that our entire society works together in one heart and one mind. It requires that people of all ethnic groups focus the thoughts and efforts towards the same goal. A society that lacks common ideals, goals and values, and that finds itself in permanent disorder will never achieve anything. China has a population of more than 1.3 billion people, and neither the people nor the country would benefit if we ended up like that. Forming a consensus is no easy task, and so we all need to work together. To attain our goals, we will need to form concentric circles, both online and offline. What do I mean by concentric circles? I mean rallying all Chinese people under the leadership of the CPC, and motivating all parties to engage in a concerted effort to bring about the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.22 (Xi, 2016, Speech at a Symposium on Cybersecurity and IT Application (4.19 Speech), adapted English translation from the official magazine Qiushi, italics added) In this extract, Xi employs a metaphor and the strategy of collectivization to convey the idea that Chinese society should be unified, with all ethnic groups sharing the same goals and working together towards a common purpose. He uses the imagery of a human body with “one heart and one mind” to emphasize this idea of collectivization and to construct a vision of a unitary country. This argument is based on the belief that having “common ideals, goals, and values” will benefit everyone, and that without this unity, no progress can be made. Xi’s ultimate goal is to direct action towards this purpose, with the action being the formation of “concentric circles” both online and offline under the leadership of the party. The use of the topos of

Government Digital Discourse  87 usefulness and topos of threat further reinforces this idea that a unified national identity is necessary for the well-being of society. However, there is no explicit explanation of what these circles entail, although censorship and content control are implied. Xi’s speech proposes that government officials should utilize the Internet as a means of gauging public opinion and improving communication with the general public. However, he also emphasizes the importance of censorship and controlling content to ensure a clean and positive online environment (Xi, 2016, 4.19 Speech). This concept of building a clean online environment is repeatedly emphasized in official media reports. In a separate instance, Xi specifies which agencies should be involved in creating “concentric circles” and improving online governance. He proposes the formation of a comprehensive management system involving Party Committee leadership, government administration, responsible enterprises, a watchdog society, and self-disciplined netizens (Xi, 2018, 4.20 Speech). The CPC has a long-standing goal of creating a unified national identity, and it has used nationalism as an instrumental tool to achieve this aim. Zhao suggests that instrumental nationalism was first used to replace communism in the 1980s as a means of maintaining social stability (Zhao, 2000, pp. 17–18). Since then, the CPC has continued to use nationalism to foster loyalty and legitimacy. Cyberspace has become an important arena for the government to construct a unified national identity and oppress dissenting views while winning over public opinion. Carlson argues that the production of national identity is critical for the state to maintain its monopoly within China (Carlson, 2009, p. 32). However, the need to control online space is paradoxical because it also leads to increased discontent and more social activism online (for studies about this issue, see G. Yang, 2009 and King et al., 2013). Therefore, the state has to enhance its control over online content, which has given rise to disputes and criticisms. To legitimize its control, the CPC needs to promote a single national goal that is beneficial to all Chinese people and construct a unitary national identity. The government emphasizes the importance of a unified national identity, but at the same time, it downplays or ignores internal conflicts within society. This nationalist discourse of creating a “clean and sound” online space disguises these struggles. As Zhao points out that nationalism is used to remove differences within the country and replace them with a hegemonic order of political values (Zhao, 2000, p.  17). Official documents, such as the 2016 Outline of National IT Development Strategy, address inequalities between rural and urban areas and regional differences. However, the document uses the word “differences” only three times (the first one is about differences between reality and goals, the second one about differences of Internet infrastructures between regions and rural and urban areas, and the third one about differences of education levels between rural and urban areas, regions and schools), and there is no mention of class. The document mainly focuses

88  Government Digital Discourse on improving access and infrastructure, using the Internet to decrease poverty, and encouraging enterprises to help decrease poverty. While there is no mention of workers (only one mention of labour-power as a resource: to facilitate the migration of labour resources among regions) nor class, the word “enterprise” (Qiye) appears 30 times. The absence of class and workerrelated issues in the document contradicts the CPC’s claim of leading a socialist country based on Marxist doctrines. 3.4

“A Community of Shared Destiny in the Cyberspace”

While there are implicit narratives of antagonism between China and other countries regarding core technologies and cyber sovereignty, the Chinese government explicitly promotes global cooperation. The government’s digital language on global collaboration consists of three key components: engagement in the global digital economy through investment and globalization, active construction of “soft power” by conveying the stories of China, and participation in global Internet governance in the name of cybersecurity. In a speech at the 2nd World Internet Conference, Xi Jinping coined the concept of a “community of shared destiny in cyberspace” and called for the construction of a “multilateral, democratic and transparent global Internet governance system” based on mutual support, trust, and benefit, rather than a zero-sum game. This discourse of a “Community of Shared Destiny” reveals China’s increasing integration into the globalization process and its determination to have a more significant influence on the world’s economy, culture, and politics. The government’s economic cooperation in discourses can be categorized into three main layers. The first layer pertains to China’s determination to continue integrating into the global economy by promoting an open-up policy to attract foreign investment and support Chinese capital, IT, and Internet companies to operate businesses in the global market. President Xi’s statement during the 2nd WIC clearly indicates this policy23 (Xi, 2015 2nd WIC, official translation published by CGTN). The second layer of cooperation involves the government’s commitment to support Chinese companies to expand globally and “go out”. The BRI is highlighted in government documents, and the government provides support for information, legal, and taxation services. This strategy represents the national interest, as stated in the 4.19 speech excerpt by President Xi24 (Xi, 2016, 4.19 Speech). The government’s “going out” discourse exhibits more elements of nationalism than the discourse to attract foreign investment. As shown explicitly in Xi’s 4.19 speech – “wherever there is the national interest, there shall be informatisation coverage” (Xi, 2016, 4.19 Speech). The Chinese Internet and information companies are now more integrated into the world economy, and the government’s role is to provide better support for these businesses by offering consulting services, legal advice, and tax agency (State Council,

Government Digital Discourse  89 2015, “Internet Plus” Action Plan). This expansion is accompanied by government discourse on cyberspace governance. Alongside the “going out” of products and services, cultural aspects are also emphasized. On the one hand, in the international arena, Xi Jinping proposed building an online platform for cultural exchange and mutual learning, which will promote the prosperity and development of cyberculture and enrich people’s minds and advance human civilization and progress. He emphasizes that the Internet plays a crucial role in enhancing mutual understanding between people from different cultures, and he proposed the establishment of an online platform for cultural exchange and mutual learning at the 2nd World Internet Conference25 (Xi, 2015, 2nd World Internet Conference, official translation on CGTN). On the other hand, in the Chinese discourse sphere, the government is actively promoting its “soft power” project. The aim is to strengthen its international communication capacity by using the Internet to tell “Chinese stories” (Central Office and the General Office of the State Council, 2016, Outline of the National Informatization Development Strategy; 2017, the Opinions on Promoting the Sound and Orderly Development of the Mobile Internet). Xi Jinping has emphasized the importance of “telling China’s stories and conveying China’s voice” in international communication.26 The government has taken various actions, including enhancing content production and distribution capacity, supporting the development of news websites and media groups, and strengthening discipline and management of online communication to achieve this goal (Thussu, 2019, p. 193). The state is funding “central media” such as Xinhua News Agency, China Central Television, China Radio International, People’s Daily, and China Daily to expand their global reach (Shambaugh, 2013). However, these media outlets are often viewed as propaganda vehicles and lack credibility in gaining global influence (Thussu, 2019, p. 194). China has used different media forms such as television, documentaries, and feature films to promote its culture internationally. From the political aspect, the government is actively promoting the idea of participating in the governance of the global cyberspace. There are several key aspects to this participation. Firstly, the government aims to participate in the establishment of Internet governance rules and technology standards, and to actively participate in organizations responsible for Internet name and number allocation, as well as international Internet technology and management activities. For instance, the 13th Five-Year Plan for National Informatization emphasizes the need to deeply participate in such efforts. Similarly, the “Internet Plus” Action Plan intends to perfect convergence standards systems and advance international and domestic standardization work, with a greater say in international organizations like the ISO, IEC, and ITU. Moreover, the government recognizes the importance of global Internet governance in the realm of cybersecurity. The 13th Five-Year Plan for National Informatization calls for establishing an international cooperation mechanism

90  Government Digital Discourse to combat cybercrime and collaborate to prevent and fight commercial espionage, hacker attacks, and terrorist crime. Ultimately, the goal is to promote a peaceful, secure, open, and cooperative cyberspace and establish a multilateral, democratic, and transparent global Internet governance system, as stated in Xi’s 2015 speech at the 2nd WIC and also reflected in the Cybersecurity Law. 3.5

Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter has outlined various important elements of the Chinese government’s discourse on the Internet and ICT through a critical policy analysis (Table 3.3). The first section (Section 7.1) focused on the government’s ultimate goal of creating a Cyber Superpower (Wang Luo Qiang Guo) and its stated value of serving the people. These claims were made in the context of the global competition in technology. The subsequent sections discussed the government’s short-term goals, descriptions of current circumstances, and proposed means to achieve those goals. Section 7.2 explored the government’s digital discourse on the Information Economy, where it uses topos of usefulness to emphasize the importance of upgrading the national economy, developing digital economy and Big Data, and promoting entrepreneurship and innovation (MEI). Through an analysis of local coherence, there is also an implicit equivalence between China and Chinese enterprises. Section 7.3 examined the government’s digital discourse on cybersecurity, where it Table 3.3 The government’s digital discourse and the corresponding premises in practical arguments

Information Economy

Cybersecurity

Global Cooperation

• “Build a Cyber Superpower” • Realize “China’s great rejuvenation”

Ultimate goal

• “Serve the people” • “Join the Wave” • Build the “New Normal” of the Chinese Economy • Build a vigorous Digital Economy • Encourage MEI • Chinese enterprises represent China in the global competition • Deepening the reform • Develop Core Technologies • Ensure cyber sovereignty • Construct a “Clean Environment in the Cyberspace” • Participate in the Global Digital Economy • Construct a Strong National “Soft Power” • Participate in the Construction of “A Community of Shared Destiny in the Cyberspace”

Key value Circumstances Actions (what to do) and Circumstances

Actions (what to do) and Circumstances Actions (what to do) and Circumstances

Government Digital Discourse  91 employed various linguistic strategies and discursive tactics to emphasize nationalist ideologies. For example, the government used the topos of threats to stress the importance of developing “core technologies” and guaranteeing national security. The government also employed a strategy of collectivization and metaphors to emphasize the unity of the nation and its people. Finally, Section 7.4 discussed the government’s discourse on globalization, which emphasized the importance of international cooperation and mutual benefits. However, this emphasis on national interests confirmed the pragmatic approach of the current leaders’ nationalism. Furthermore, applying the analytical framework, regarding the Internet economy and politics, developed in Chapters 1 and 2, Tables 3.4 and  3.5 illustrate the government’s digital discourse on the New Economy and New Politics. As shown in this chapter, though there are some similar proposed actions or developments along with the Western Internet and digital technologies, the logic behind them is different, and so are the discourses. Table 3.4 Chinese government’s digital discourse on the new economy In this area

The government claims to:

The market

• Open the market and deepen reforms to better serve the economy • Support key Enterprises for National Interests • Make full use of the Innovation-driving role of the Internet to promote MEI for a vigorous economy • Upgrade the agricultural and manufacturing industry and develop the service industry to acquire new economic growth (the “New Normal”) • Open Data as a national strategy • Expanding domestic consumption with the help of the Internet for economic development

Production

Consumption

Table 3.5 Chinese government’s digital discourse on the new policies International

State

Societal Individual

• Develop core technologies to win the international competition • Increase international cooperation to build “A Community of Shared Destiny in the Cyberspace” • Tightening Internet control to acquire cyber sovereignty and to ensure national security • Construct a strong national “soft power” • Deepen reform for economic growth • Supporting key Chinese enterprises (oligopolies) because they represent China • Tighten Internet content control to build “a clean environment in the cyberspace” • Reduce poverty with the help of the Internet • Make the Internet accessible to all

92  Government Digital Discourse The digital discourse from the government developed out of the Chinese context and reacted to China’s political-economic situation. Among these government digital discourses, nationalism is a key ideology. It can be contended that in China, nationalist discussions often emerge in response to concerns about new technology and modernization. This is evidenced by the discourse of “historical humiliations” starting in the 19th century that attributed China’s failure in wars with the imperialist West to China’s technological and scientific backwardness. This perspective is further exemplified by the well-known phrase “Lagging behind leaves one vulnerable to attacks” (Luo Hou Jiu Yao Ai Da), which was initially used by Stalin in 1931 and later propagated by the CPC. One more recent example of this argument is the “Needham Puzzle”, which asks why the industrial revolution did not originate in China. Another example is “He Shang” (River Elegy), which raises the question of why Western modernity did not begin in China. The nationalist discourse regarding technological competition has a techno-deterministic tone, as it overlooks the role of politics in the development and application of technology. This perspective has been criticized by long-standing critical political economists, such as Smythe (1994) and Williams (1974), who argue that the historical “intentions” behind the development and application of technology require constant “cultural screening”. In other words, technology does not develop independently of society, but rather it arises from power struggles and serves specific interests in society. Focusing on the competition with other countries in terms of “core technologies” implies that technology should be developed in the same way as in other countries, which may not necessarily serve the best interests of people. For instance, Smythe (1994) notes that the differences between bicycles and motor vehicles extend beyond their respective technologies and also involve social relations. The rapid growth of the motor industry and widespread adoption of cars have enabled the transformation of public production resources, such as investment and space, from the public sphere (e.g. education) into the realm of individualized consumption. While policymakers must consider international relationships and competition, placing too much emphasis on these factors could divert people’s attention from domestic issues and foster an “us vs. them” mentality. This approach may also aid the CPC in its efforts to establish a stronger authoritarian regime. By emphasizing the need to defend Chinese people against external threats, the government may gain more power. As Zhao (2004) points out, this strategy of presenting itself as a defender of China’s national interests was employed by the government following the Tiananmen incident when the West imposed sanctions on China. It was also utilized during China’s bid to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO) and host the Olympic Games. This nationalist narrative is linked to the historical context of a century of suffering and humiliation inflicted by foreign imperialism. These narratives allow the government to justify building a strong party-state at the expense of its citizens’ freedom.

Government Digital Discourse  93 The neoliberal construction of data as a commodity is another key ideology found in the government’s digital discourse. While the importance of data and Big Data in China’s economic development is highlighted, there is little emphasis on the accountability principle of data – which stakeholders take responsibility for how data is used. This is different from the government’s discourse on cybersecurity and online content control, where the responsibility and accountability of enterprises and agents are emphasized. The way data is linguistically constructed as an independent agent27 that grows by itself is problematic and ideological, as it leaves out important questions about how data is collected and used, who decides what data to collect, and who has the power to determine how data is used and for what purpose. This type of discourse portrays the development and usage of data as a “natural” process, when in reality, the development of technology is full of “human intentions”. Raymond Williams’ seminal study on television in the 1970s emphasizes the crucial role that “intention” plays in technological development. Similarly, Dallas Smythe argues that a two-way TV system could have been technologically developed in the past, but this intention was not realized. Smythe is critical of the commercial TV industry’s tendency to commodify audiences, which he believes hinders the development of a TV system that could be more beneficial for democracy and participation. However, if technology and data are claimed to develop on their own, both an alternative approach to development and possible criticism of the commodification of users are disregarded. According to the evidence, the actual use of data differs from what is claimed. Large companies and governments usually collect and use data for their own purposes. In 2016, Premier Li Keqiang stated that the Chinese government controlled over 80% of information and data resources (Li, 2016), while in 2018 at the China Development Forum, Ginni Rometty, Chairman, President and CEO of IBM, claimed that companies controlled the majority of data, with only 20% on the Internet (Lv, 2018). However, regardless of who controls the data, it is not made available to the public. When the privileged class claims that databases are open to everyone, they typically mean corporate enterprises or their partners. In China, for instance, data from education and healthcare systems are opened for commercial exploitation, disregarding the voices of students and patients. Similarly, data stored in government departments is not being used for the good of the public, as it should be. This process of data privatization, which is in line with neoliberalism, has turned formerly unsellable data into commodities, leading to accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2005, p. 137). The construction of data as an independent agent responsible for other changes in society is problematic, as it facilitates the existing situation where technologies and data cannot be controlled by users and the public. This type of argument leads to techno-deterministic thinking that sees data as an independent determinant and allows the free market to lead the future. The government’s digital discourses on MEI are also ideological, promoting a one-dimensional instrumental understanding of the Internet as well as

94  Government Digital Discourse individualism. First, this line of reasoning limits the significance and potential of the Internet to only economic benefits, which is a narrow and instrumental understanding of its capacity and connectivity. Essentially, it suggests that the Internet is solely useful for individuals to create their personal brand and engage in economic activities. This interpretation fails to recognize the broader political potential of the Internet and its ability to facilitate connections and innovation. Additionally, promoting entrepreneurship and opportunities has further ideological implications, including a fetishization of individual success and opportunity that encourages people to conform to the rules of the competition and the capitalist logic of producing, organizing, and living. As Adorno and Horkheimer argued, this “ideology hides itself in probability calculations” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 116). It discourages people from challenging the current social order and benefits those who follow the rules while punishing or expelling those who challenge the system. Furthermore, despite the emphasis on the potential success of start-ups, the high rate of failures is often overlooked. For example, a report by Mycos in conjunction with the Chinese Academy of Social Science revealed that although the number of undergraduates starting their own businesses increased from 1.6% in 2011 to 3.0% in 2017, only 3% of them succeed (Mycos, 2017). Even in Zhejiang Province, where policies and the environment are more favourable, the success rate is still only 5%. The promotion of the Internet as a solution to social problems also carries a techno-optimistic bias, as it suggests that technology alone can solve issues such as poverty and unemployment. This ignorance can also be seen in the government’s claims of upgrading China’s economy. While it claims to prioritize the benefit of the people in their values and goals, its policies regarding the upgrade of China’s economy through the Internet don’t address how it would benefit workers. Instead, the main concerns are economic growth, industry upgrade, and company interests. Inequality is framed in terms of insufficient infrastructure and differences between regions and rural and urban areas, rather than the relationship between capitalists and workers and farmers, including migrant workers. Similar to the discourse on the Information Society in advanced capitalism, there is an emphasis on new forces of production, but there is a neglect of the ongoing existence of the old exploitative relation of production (Fuchs, 2014; Fuchs & Sandoval, 2013). The government’s professed commitment to serving the people is contradicted by its digital discourses, policies, speeches, proposed actions, and potential outcomes. Its construction of China as a nationalist entity and its equating of Chinese companies with China overlook social conflicts. The endorsement of a neoliberal view of data legitimizes the government and big businesses’ monopoly. The emphasis on individualistic MEI policies and the Internet as a solution to economic problems is biased and incomplete in its portrayal of reality.

Government Digital Discourse  95 Notes 1 For example, People’s Daily’s article titled: Important statements on the Internet made by Xi Jinping. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-12/05/content_5244492. htm.   Website published by CAC on Xi’s important speeches. http://www.cac.gov.cn/ ztzl/xzt/10/zt/index.htm.   Website published by CAC 2. http://www.cac.gov.cn/2018zt/xxgc420hy/index. htm.   Special issues published by CAC. http://www.cac.gov.cn/gzzt/ztzl/More.htm. 2 There are several versions of the translation of Wang Luo Qiang Guo Zhan Lue (“网络强国战略”). The translation “national cyber development strategy” used here comes from the State Council Information Office of PRC. http://www.scio. gov.cn/zhzc/35353/35354/Document/1507446/1507446.htm. This document announces how certain important terms should be translated into foreign languages. ‘the Strategy to build Cyber Superpower’ is another commonly referred to the translation of this term in media (e.g. Wired, the Economist, Foreign Affairs). The rest of this chapter will use ‘Cyber Superpower’ to refer to Wang Luo Qiang Guo (“网络强国”). Quotes in Chapter 3 (original in Chinses) 3 信息化和经济全球化相互促进，互联网已经融入社会生活方方面面，深刻改变 了人们的生产和生活方式。我国正处在这个大潮之中，受到的影响越来越深。 （习近平，2014年2月27日，在中央网络安全和信息化领导小组第一次会议上 的讲话） 4 当今世界，信息技术创新日新月异，以数字化、网络化、智能化为特征的信息 化浪潮蓬勃兴起。（中共中央办公厅，国务院办公厅，2016，国家信息化发展 战略纲要） 5 在全球新一轮科技革命和产业变革中，互联网与各领域的融合发展具有广阔前 景和无限潜力，已成为不可阻挡的时代潮流，正对各国经济社会发展产生着战 略性和全局性的影响。（国务院，2015，关于积极推进“互联网+”行动的指导 意见） 6 The original article in Chinese: http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2017-09/15/c_ 1121647633.htm   Translation: https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/blog/chinasstrategic-thinking-building-power-cyberspace/. 7 http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/1109/c1024-25998809.html 8 我们要加强信息基础设施建设，强化信息资源深度整合，打通经济社会发展的 信息“大动脉”。党的十八届五中全会、“十三五”规划纲要都对实施网络强 国战略、“互联网+”行动计划、大数据战略等作了部署，要切实贯彻落实好， 着力推动互联网和实体经济深度融合发展，以信息流带动技术流、资金流、人 才流、物资流，促进资源配置优化，促进全要素生产率提升，为推动创新发 展、转变经济发展方式、调整经济结构发挥积极作用。（习近平，2016年4月 19日，在网络安全和信息化工作座谈会上的讲话） 9 Available at: http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1209/c64094-29696290.html 10 网信事业代表着新的生产力和新的发展方向，应该在践行新发展理念上先行一 步，围绕建设现代化经济体系、实现高质量发展，加快信息化发展，整体带动 和提升新型工业化、城镇化、农业现代化发展。（习近平，2018年4月20日至 21日，在全国网络安全和信息化工作会议上的讲话） 11 网信事业代表新的生产力、新的发展方向，推动人类认识世界、改造世界的能 力空前提升，正在深刻改变着人们的生产生活方式，带来生产力质的飞跃，引 发生产关系重大变革，成为重塑国际经济、政治、文化、社会、生态、军事发 展新格局的主导力量。（国务院，2015，关于积极推进“互联网+”行动的指导 意见）

96  Government Digital Discourse 12 充分发挥互联网的创新驱动作用，以促进创业创新为重点，推动各类要素资源 聚集、开放和共享，大力发展众创空间、开放式创新等，引导和推动全社会形 成大众创业、万众创新的浓厚氛围，打造经济发展新引擎。（国务院，2015， 关于积极推进“互联网+”行动的指导意见） 13 According to the official website, the first relevant official document about MEI can be traced back to 2012. MEI became a buzzword in China when it was used by Prime Minister Li Keqiang in the 2014 World Economy Forum and written into the 2015 Government Work Report. According to search results on the government’s online archive of official documents published by the State Council, available at http://sousuo.gov.cn/column/30142/2.htm, last accessed on 08 November, 2018; For more explanation of Shuang Chuang, see Premier Li Keqiang’s Meeting with the Press after the 12th National People’s Congress 3rd Session, 2015, available at http://lianghui.people.com.cn/2015npc/n/2015/0315/c39453726695490-2.html 14 Premiere Li Keqiang’s Meeting with the Press after the 12th National People’s Congress 3rd Session, 2015, available at http://lianghui.people.com.cn/2015npc/n/ 2015/0315/c394537-26695490-4.html 15 20多年来，我国互联网发展取得的显著成就中，包括一批技术方面的成就。目 前，在世界互联网企业前10强中，我们占了4席。在第二届世界互联网大会期 间，我去看了“互联网之光”博览会，来自全球的250多家企业展出的1000多 项新技术新成果中，我们也占了不少，这令人高兴。（习近平，2016年4月19 日，在网络安全和信息化工作座谈会上的讲话） 16 “坚持全面深化改革. 正确处理政府和市场关系，坚持发挥市场在资源配置中 的决定性作用，更好发挥政府作用，破除不利于信息化创新发展的体制机制障 碍，激发创新活力，加强法治保障，释放数字红利，为经济社会发展提供持续 动力” （国务院，2016，十三五”国家信息化规划） 17 我国有13亿人口、9亿劳动力资源，人民勤劳而智慧，蕴藏着无穷的创造力，千 千万万个市场细胞活跃起来，必将汇聚成发展的巨大动能，一定能够顶住经济 下行压力，让中国经济始终充满勃勃生机。政府要勇于自我革命，给市场和社 会留足空间，为公平竞争搭好舞台。个人和企业要勇于创业创新，全社会要厚 植创业创新文化，让人们在创造财富的过程中，更好地实现精神追求和自身价 值。（李克强，2015，政府工作报告） 18 互联网核心技术是我们最大的“命门”,核心技术受制于人是我们最大的隐患。一 个互联网企业即便规模再大、市值再高，如果核心元器件严重依赖外国，供应 链的“命门”掌握在别人手里，那就好比在别人的墙基上砌房子，再大再漂亮 也可能经不起风雨，甚至会不堪一击。我们要掌握我国互联网发展主动权，保 障互联网安全、国家安全，就必须突破核心技术这个难题，争取在某些领域、 某些方面实现“弯道超车”。（习近平，2016年4月19日，在网络安全和信息化 工作座谈会上的讲话） 19 维护网络安全不应有双重标准，不能一个国家安全而其他国家不安全，一部分 国家安全而另一部分国家不安全，更不能以牺牲别国安全谋求自身所谓绝对安 全。（习近平，2015，世界互联网大会，官方翻译） 20 For example, as stated in this article on people.cn http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/ n1/2018/0421/c385474-29941405-6.html 21 “Two Centenary Goals”, according to Xinhua, means that “by 2021, to celebrate the CPC’s centenary, the goal is to “build a moderately prosperous society in all respects” and “by 2049, the centenary of the People’s Republic of China, the goal is to “build a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious”. See Xinhua Net: CPC Q&A: What are China’s two centennial goals and why do they matter? Available at http://www.xinhuanet. com/english/2017-10/17/c_136686770.htm, last accessed at 10 July 2023. 22 实现“两个一百年”奋斗目标，需要全社会方方面面同心干，需要全国各族人 民心往一处想、劲往一处使。如果一个社会没有共同理想，没有共同目标，没

Government Digital Discourse  97 有共同价值观，整天乱哄哄的，那就什么事也办不成。我国有13亿多人，如果 弄成那样一个局面，就不符合人民利益，也不符合国家利益。凝聚共识工作不 容易做，大家要共同努力。为了实现我们的目标，网上网下要形成同心圆。什 么是同心圆？就是在党的领导下，动员全国各族人民，调动各方面积极性，共 同为实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦而奋斗。（习近平，2016，4.19讲话） 23 中国互联网蓬勃发展，为各国企业和创业者提供了广阔市场空间。中国开放的 大门永远不会关上，利用外资的政策不会变，对外商投资企业合法权益的保障 不会变，为各国企业在华投资兴业提供更好服务的方向不会变。只要遵守中国 法律，我们热情欢迎各国企业和创业者在华投资兴业。我们愿意同各国加强合 作，通过发展跨境电子商务、建设信息经济示范区等，促进世界范围内投资和 贸易发展，推动全球数字经济发展。（习近平，2015，世界互联网大会） 24 中国开放的大门不能关上，也不会关上。我们要鼓励和支持我国网信企业走出 去，深化互联网国际交流合作，积极参与“一带一路”建设，做到“国家利益 在哪里，信息化就覆盖到哪里”。（习近平，2016，4.19讲话） 25 互联网是传播人类优秀文化、弘扬正能量的重要载体。中国愿通过互联网架设 国际交流桥梁，推动世界优秀文化交流互鉴，推动各国人民情感交流、心灵沟 通。我们愿同各国一道，发挥互联网传播平台优势，让各国人民了解中华优秀 文化，让中国人民了解各国优秀文化，共同推动网络文化繁荣发展，丰富人们 精神世界，促进人类文明进步 （习近平，2015，世界互联网大会） 26 For example, see http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/413700/, accessed on 20 June 2020;   andhttp://keywords.china.org.cn/2018-11/30/content_74227030.htm,accessedon 20 June 2020. 27 See for example, State Council, Outline of Actions to Promote Big Data Strategy 信息技术与经济社会的交汇融合引发了数据迅猛增长，数据已成为国家基础性 战略资源，大数据正日益对全球生产、流通、分配、消费活动以及经济运行机 制、社会生活方式和国家治理能力产生重要影响。（国务院，2015，促进大数 据发展行动纲要）

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4 Digital Discourse and BAT

The Internet giants have power, not only in dominating the market, manipulating the users, but also in shaping discourse and meanings about the Internet and network technology. This is not to say that they hold a monopoly in how technology is understood, but corporations are influential in the formation of public opinions and the distribution of interests (Habermas, 2006; Herman & Chomsky, 2010). Scrutinizing how public figures and the tech companies’ founders discuss and frame these platforms is a key perspective to understand the discursive and ideological construction of the development of the platforms and network technology in China. This chapter will focus on the digital discourse from Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (hereinafter as BAT), three China-based Internet giants. I use the term “China-based” instead of “Chinese Internet companies” to remind these companies’ international financial background and outreach, though they were initially set up in China. Recent financial reports and market reports have shown that several other China-based technology giants have exceeded the market value of Baidu, thus, propose to change the term into HAT (Huawei, Alibaba and Tencent) or ATB (Alibaba, Tencent and ByteDance). Some have proposed to pay attention to emerging tech giants, such as TMD (Toutiao, Meituan, and Didi) instead of BAT (Huang, 2018). While these arguments worth taking note of, this chapter chose BAT for two reasons. First of all, BAT are the “old” giants in the “new” media and technology sectors in China. They witness and participate in the shaping of China’s Internet as it is seen today and in building the “digital infrastructure” in China. Moreover, from a discursive perspective, BAT have been actively shaping the digital discourse in China through influential discursive events. First, there are two most important national events about the Internet in China: The World Internet Conference (hereinafter WIC, launched since 2014) and Big Data Expo (launched since 2015). CEOs of BAT all participated in these two events almost every year. These two events also have an official background. For example, President Xi made speeches every year at WIC since 2015. Second, BAT all organize events every year to publicize their annual goals, newly launched products and services, and their perspectives of the industry’s future developments. These events are what Fairclough termed DOI: 10.4324/9781003315810-7

100  Digital Discourse and BAT as important communicative or discursive events (Fairclough, 2013). These events are key sites for BAT to (re-)shape discourse on themselves, the Internet and network technology in China. The analysis in this chapter mainly comes from more than 123 documents I collected from BAT-related discursive events (see Table 4.1). I have chosen these documents for the following reasons. Since the establishment of Baidu by Robin Li in 2000, according to Li, there have been two most important discursive events where Li and Baidu deliver messages to the whole industry. These events receive lots of attention from the media and the public. The first is Baidu World where Baidu launches new products. The second is Baidu Union in which Robin Li shares his thoughts of the whole industry to the public (Robin Li, 2012 Baidu Union). One cornerstone of Baidu’s development is its launch of “Box Computing” in 2009 that signifies the start of its “open system”. Therefore, I collected data from the stated two discursive events, Baidu World Congress (since 2006-) (collected from 2009) and Baidu Union (since 2006) (collected from 2009). Baidu’s development before 2009 will be studied with complementary materials, such as financial reports or news reports. Jack Ma established Alibaba in 1999, first focusing on B2B, and then founded Taobao in 2003, a shopping website that facilitates C2C retail. As a company started from, and whose core business still is, e-commerce, Alibaba launched Wshang Conference in 2004 to promote its construction of Table 4.1 List of documents collected from BAT Baidu

Alibaba

Tencent

Total:

Baidu World Congress (2009–2018) BU (2009–2017) WIC (2014–2019, including all speeches from Robin Li in several panels) Big Data Expo (2016–2018) AC (2015–2018) Investor’s day (2016–2018 Wshang (2008–2012, including a speech from 10-year anniversary in 2009) WIC (2014–2017, including all speeches from Jack Ma in several panels) Big Data Expo (2015–2018) TFHC

Partner (2011–2018) Cloud + Future (2016–2018) Internet Plus Digital Economy TGDES (2019, Lau) WIC (2014–2018, including all speeches from Pony Ma in several panels) Big Data Expo (2015–2018)

10 9 Total 10 3 4 3 6 7 3 41 (excluding 3 speeches already collected in other categories) 8 3 4 1 7 4 123

Digital Discourse and BAT  101 an “e-commerce ecosystem”. In 2008, the Wshang Conference announced to upgrade it to a global e-commerce conference. In 2009, Alibaba created the “Double Eleven” shopping festival. This chapter has collected Jack Ma’s speech at Wshang Conference from 2008 to 2012 (the annual conference was cancelled since 2013). Since 2015, Alibaba launched Apsara Conference (Yunqi) as the most important event for Alibaba every year. Between 2016 and 2018, Alibaba has Investor’s Day where Jack Ma speaks to investors. This is another important event to understand Alibaba’s discourse. Moreover, Jack Ma has published a compilation of his speeches, The Future Has Come (2017) to promote his ideas. I have also included this book in the materials. Therefore, I have collected data from the discursive events in Alibaba including Apsara Conference (2015–2018), Investor’s Day (2016–2018), WShang Conference (2004-) (collected from 2008) and Ma’s book The Future Has Come (2017). Tencent was established in 1998 by Pony Ma, first focusing on the instant messaging service OICQ, later adapted into QQ. During its fast-developing period between 2003 and 2010, Tencent was notorious as a copycat and market disruptor. It stole ideas from start-ups and soon overpassed them. This type of developmental path was stopped in 2010 due to a vicious competition between Tencent’s QQ and 360 software. By the end of 2010, Pony Ma published 8 Guiding Principles for the future of the Internet. Later in 2011, Tencent announced its “open platform” strategy and promised to build an open and sharing platform that means to share profits with Tencent’s partners. There were three important events for Tencent since 2011. In 2019, Tencent announced to integrate these three conferences into one: Tencent Global Digital Ecosystem Summit (TGDES). Pony Ma did not give speech at this conference. However, considering the importance of the conference, I have collected the speech given by Martin Lau, the current president and the Executive Director of Tencent, in 2019 at this conference. Therefore, I collected speeches/addresses from Tencent in these three events: Tencent Global Partner Conference (2011–2018), Tencent Cloud + Future (2015–2018) (Pony Ma participated in 2016–2018), and Internet Plus Digital Economy (2015–2018), TGDES (2019, speech given by Lau). To sum up, I have collected the following materials for analysing digital discourse from BAT: For analysis, I combined thematic analysis (Bryman, 2012, p. 578) with Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 2015). Two mutually informed deductive and inductive steps were applied in the thematic analysis process. First, on the basis of literature on the political economy of and discourse on social media (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996; Curran et al., 2012; Dean, 2004; Fisher, 2010; Fuchs, 2015; Hoffmann et al., 2018; John, 2013; Mosco, 2005; Raynes-Goldie, 2012; van Dijck, 2013), I developed a preliminary coding scheme, focusing on the criteria such as BAT’s self-definitions (e.g. What is BAT, how do BAT represent themselves), their relations with different stakeholders (partners, users, clients/advertisers, government,

102  Digital Discourse and BAT employers), and how they present the reality through searching for the keywords on the Internet itself, the Internet Economy (e.g. “market”, “production”, “consumption”) and Internet Politics at international, national, societal and individual levels (e.g. “international relations”, “state”, “democratization”, “freedom”, “empowerment”). I then went through the materials, in an inductive approach, to identify the key themes. The final codes have been refined through reading through the documents. Some second-level codes were added. For example, poverty was not included in my first coding sets. However, it was covered in BAT’s narrative of upgrading the national economy. I noticed this coding and started to pay attention to relevant codes and add the keywords to the societal level, such as “rural areas”. This chapter refers to CDA as a method that analyses discourse from “a perspective of opposition” and do so “by formulating critical goals” (van Dijk, 2013; Wodak & Meyer, 2015, p. 3). More specifically, among the diverse methods of CDA (van Dijk, 2013), I will refer to Fairclough’s theory of discourse (Fairclough, 1992, 2015). Fairclough understands discourse as the language in use. It is different from a text, as discourse denotes a process while text refers merely to the final product. The term “discourse” indicates the dialectic understanding of the relationships between language and society that they are mutually shaped and conditioned. From this understanding of discourse, my analysis of digital discourse from BAT will not only focus on the texts of the CEO’s speeches but also the production, distribution, and interpretation process of the texts, as well as the broader social context. For this purpose, this chapter will integrate the critical political-economic analysis of BAT and the broader social context in the analysis of digital discourse from BAT. Through the analysis, I have identified three main themes in BAT’s discourse. The first is to build digital ecosystems, through which BAT construct themselves as Internet facilitators and digital infrastructure, and construct their relationships with their partners, users, and employees carefully. The second theme focuses on the changes of BAT’s digital discourse from replacing the traditional industries to a nationalist discourse that emphasizes upgrading the Chinese economy. The third theme reveals how BAT’s discourse sways from constructing their identities as globalized companies and Chinese ones. At the end of this chapter, I will discuss why BAT’s digital discourse emerges and changes as such from a political-economic perspective and the socio-political context. 4.1

Building the Ecosystems

BAT’s digital discourse centres around the idea that they are synonymous with the essence of the Internet, which they define as being characterized by connection, sharing, and decentralization. As a result, BAT claims itself as having the duty to serve as “connectors” and to develop the necessary “community”, “infrastructure”, “utility”, and “ecosystem” to ensure the smooth

Digital Discourse and BAT  103 functioning of the entire Internet. They assert that their ecosystems have helped small businesses and their partners to expand, and they encourage users to share their data with both BAT and their partners, but they neglect the welfare of their employees. 4.1.1  BAT as Connectors, Community, Medium, and Infrastructure

BAT, Tencent, Alibaba, and Baidu, all compete fiercely to dominate the market and occupy emerging markets, but they all share similar language to describe themselves as the embodiment of the borderless Internet. They argue that building online ecosystems is essential for the functioning of the whole Internet and to showcase the “spirit of the Internet”. Tencent’s metaphors have evolved from “connector” to “forest” and “ecosystem”, and then to “Digital Ecological Community”, reflecting its transformation from a closed system to an open one. Following the intense competition between Tencent’s QQ and 360 software, Pony Ma opted for a strategic shift in Tencent’s approach, moving from a “closed system” to an “open system”. In 2011, Tencent announced its “open platform” strategy, pledging to establish a sharing platform that would enable partners to benefit from the company’s profits (Pony Ma, 2011 TGPC). During the significant 2011 Tencent Global Partner Conference (TGPC) event, Pony Ma famously coined the term “connector” (Lian Jie Qi in Chinese). Subsequently, he consistently referred to Tencent as the “connector” of the Internet (Pony Ma, 2012 TGPC). The term implies that Tencent will “connect their partners to users” (ibid.) and function as an open platform that presents greater opportunities for partners to create new businesses, and for users to share freely. On one end of the “connector” are Tencent’s partners, and on the other end are the vast users (Pony Ma, 2014 TGPC). Starting in 2016, Pony Ma began using nature-related metaphors to describe Tencent, such as comparing it to a “forest” and an “ecosystem”, in order to emphasize the company’s expansion in a natural way. Ma suggested that Tencent was moving away from a centralized “tree-like” system towards a more decentralized “forest” and “ecosystem” (Pony Ma, 2016 TGPC). In 2017, Tencent introduced the terms “digital infrastructure” and “Digital Ecological Community” (Pony Ma, 2017 TGPC), which were prompted by the company’s launch of a “digitalization strategy for traditional industries” as it entered the online retail and e-commerce sectors. From this year on, Tencent began to focus more on consumers and consumption in their annual events. According to Ma, Tencent will act as the “connector” in the “Digital Eco-community” by facilitating connections between all industries and sectors and the “digital world” (Pony Ma, 2018 TGPC). Alibaba, a company that primarily deals in e-commerce, also uses similar terms to Tencent in its rhetoric. Jack Ma, the founder of Alibaba, uses words like “ecosystem”, “infrastructure” (Jack Ma, 2014 WIC, 2016 AC), and “community” (2016, TFHC, p. 186) to describe the company’s operations.

104  Digital Discourse and BAT In 2014, Ma introduced the term “DT” (digital technology) and made a distinction between the DT era and the IT era (information technology) during a lecture at the Tsinghua Graduation Ceremony. He suggested that the shift in thinking from “me” to “others” is the key to this change, which then leads to a shift in technology1 (Jack Ma, 2014, TFHC, p. 113). Ma believes that helping others is one of the hallmarks of the DT era and, as such, Alibaba is focused on assisting small businesses, clients, partners, and users (Jack Ma, 2014 WIC, 2015 TFHC, p. 40). Jack Ma also refers to Alibaba as a “community” that is intended to encourage sharing and participation. This term became more prominent after Alibaba purchased and launched its own social media platforms (Weibo in 2013, DingTalk in 2014) as a means of competing with Tencent’s WeChat and QQ platforms. Ma claims that Alibaba is working towards creating a “widely participatory community” and that the Internet will eventually become a society (Jack Ma, 2016 TFHC, p. 186). Similarly, Baidu, which originated as a search engine service, markets itself as an open platform that connects users and content providers. Robin Li, the company’s founder, has referred to Baidu as a “medium” between these two groups (Robin Li, 2010 BWC). Li also asserts that Baidu is the “best entry” to connect people with services, and promotes the company as an “open platform” (Robin Li, 2015 BWC). Starting in 2014, Baidu began promoting the idea of “connecting people and service“, which refers to its role as a platform for facilitating the gig and sharing economies (Robin Li, 2015 BU). This focus on connectivity has allowed Baidu to expand into the field of AI, which Li has been discussing since 2014 when speaking to Baidu Union. In 2017, Baidu announced a shift in its mission from “connecting information” to “awakening all things” (Robin Li, 2017 BU). While all three founders of BAT use different terms and comparisons to describe their platforms, they all emphasize that their companies are boundaryless and the “infrastructure” and “utility” of the Internet. For instance, Jack Ma believes that Alibaba must be boundaryless to serve as the infrastructure for e-commerce and to promote entrepreneurship by providing resources (Jack Ma, 2014 WIC). He also argues that the Internet has no boundaries and that big companies should take social responsibility to build infrastructures (Jack Ma, 2016 TFHC, p. 32). This is a tactic he employs to refute allegations of market dominance against Alibaba: [1]  People always ask me that is there any boundary for Internet companies? Alibaba seems to be ubiquitous, Tencent seems to be ubiquitous, and so does Facebook. Do you Internet companies have boundaries? My answer is that the Internet has no boundaries, just like electricity has no boundaries. 100 years ago, you wouldn’t say that this industry could use electricity and that one couldn’t, because electricity has no boundaries.2 Similarly, Pony Ma claims that Tencent aims to be the bottom layer for traditional sectors to build their own applications and to create a boundaryless

Digital Discourse and BAT  105 ecosystem-like organization on which “Tencent Functions as a “connector” to build a new type of infrastructure in the new era” (Pony Ma, 2015 TGPC). Robin Li’s focus is on Baidu’s development of AI, and he claims that Baidu is strategically building AI infrastructures, such as Baidu Brain and PaddlePaddle Deep Learning Framework, as its strategic blueprint for infrastructure (Robin Li, 2019 WIC). Overall, all three founders are invested in promoting the idea of being the modern “infrastructure” in the digital era. 4.1.2  BAT “Enable” (Fu Neng) the Partners

The way BAT constructs itself as “infrastructure” is linked to their rhetoric of supporting small businesses, which are considered as BAT’s partners including developers, advertisers and those who offer products and services to Internet users through their platforms. These partners are the focus of BAT’s most significant annual events, such as the TGPC, Baidu Union (BU), and Alibaba’s Wshang and Apsara Conference (AC). These events demonstrate how much importance BAT places on their partnerships. Jack Ma frequently emphasizes that Alibaba’s goal since its inception has been to assist small businesses and start-ups and make it easier for them to conduct business (Jack Ma, 2013 TFHC, p. 55, p. 175; Jack Ma, 2015 TFHC, p. 194). This is due to Alibaba’s focus on e-commerce, and according to Jack Ma, to accomplish this goal, Alibaba must create an ecosystem and become an e-commerce infrastructure provider (Jack Ma, 2014 WIC). Jack Ma refers to Alibaba as a platform that facilitates other businesses and assists them in achieving their goals (Jack Ma, 2014 TFHC, p. 124; Jack Ma, 2015 TFHC, p. 156). Jack Ma states in his 2015 speech at Davos that Alibaba’s mission is to make running businesses easier for small and medium-sized enterprises. Jack Ma also emphasizes the importance of being omnipresent to benefit clients and allow small and medium-sized companies to grow: [2]  Many say that Alibaba is always investing in other companies and buying stocks. It seems like we are everywhere. In fact, this is true… Only when we are everywhere, our clients can benefit, our small and medium-sized company clients can develop.  Therefore, we must be omnipresent.3 (Jack Ma, 2015 TFHC, p. 67) Pony Ma, the founder of Tencent, also emphasizes that the company’s mission is to create opportunities for businesses. He claims that Tencent prioritizes the success of its partners over its own success (Pony Ma, 2011 TGPC), and aims to act as a “connector” between partners and users (Pony Ma, 2012 TGPC). According to him, Tencent’s “social gene” encourages openness and sharing among friends (Pony Ma, 2016 TGPC), which can help build and maintain loyal user groups for small businesses. Tencent uses the phrase “enable people” (Fu Neng) to describe its goal of helping businesses, and has

106  Digital Discourse and BAT expanded this goal to also include enabling brands and retailers through its Mini-programme launch (Pony Ma, 2017 TGPC). By doing so, Tencent is positioning itself as not just a specialist in online games and social networks, but also in retailing. Additionally, Pony Ma believes that Internet companies can help traditional industries to better converge into the digital world (Pony Ma, 2017 WIC). Baidu started as a search engine service provider and positioned itself as an open platform from the outset. Each year, BU Conference is held where Robin Li, the founder of Baidu, shares his thoughts about the industry with other entrepreneurs, and the main goal is to promote BU and attract new companies (Robin Li, 2011 BU). Baidu claims to have supported application and programme developers and content providers through its open platform, which enables them to approach a vast number of users (Robin Li, 2010 BU). In 2010, Robin Li emphasized Baidu’s role as “a medium” between users, developers, and advertisers, and between businesses and individuals, and provided the “most open information on China’s internet” (Robin Li, 2010 BWC). Baidu launched Baidu Cloud in 2012, which provides developers with open access to Baidu’s Cloud storage, calculation, AI, and Big Data, enabling them to provide applications to users (Robin Li, 2012 BWC). As Baidu expanded its business into traditional industries, it broadened its partners from developers, advertisers, and content providers to various types of businesses, stating its goal of assisting businesses. 4.1.3  Participating Online and Sharing Data

The importance of user involvement and data sharing cannot be overstated for Internet companies, and this is reflected in the language used by CEOs when discussing these topics. The word “sharing” is particularly prevalent in these discussions. As the CEO of Tencent, which owns two of China’s biggest social media platforms, QQ and WeChat, Pony Ma frequently employs this type of language: [3]  From 2010 to 2011, I spent an entire year thinking about how to make Tencent an open platform that could facilitate more partners to create their own businesses freely and more users to share freely.4 (Pony Ma, 2014 TGPC, italics added) [4]  …the Tencent Open Platform insists on facilitating a ‘de-centralised’ open and sharing network. This is related to the embedded gene of social networking in Tencent. Our open platform was based on QQ and later WeChat at the beginning, deriving from the structure of social networks. Social networks are naturally net-like and encourage friends to share openly.5 (Pony Ma, 2016 TGPC, italics added)

Digital Discourse and BAT  107 These arguments are commonly used by for-profit social media platforms, such as Facebook (van Dijck, 2013), to encourage users to engage in social connections and share information freely on their platforms. Similarly, in the 2014 WIC, Pony Ma presented two guiding principles for Tencent: connection and openness. The ultimate goal of these principles is to collect a large amount of data that can be made available to the public. However, this discourse emphasizes the benefits of sharing personal information online while overlooking the intricate processes involved in tracking user behaviour, analysing personal data, and selling this information to advertisers and other companies to generate profits. Later on, BAT has taken data collection to a new level. For Alibaba and Tencent, data is utilized to create a “credit system” and provide financial services. Additionally, data is used by BAT to develop AI and train machines. In a speech, Pony Ma claims that a “real open platform” has its own network chains and payment network (Pony Ma, 2011 TGPC). According to Jack Ma, Alibaba is a “data company” and the reason it sells products is to acquire data (Jack Ma, 2016 Investor’s Day). He not only claims that Alibaba is a data-driven company (Jack Ma, 2017 AC) and a manufacturing company of data (Jack Ma, 2017 WIC, Entrepreneur Session). Jack Ma has explicitly explained that a new credit system based on various data types is necessary for the New Finance in the future (Jack Ma, 2017 BDE). As a result, with vast amounts of data, BAT is expanding into new areas, especially finance and AI, and is becoming cross-industry conglomerates. 4.1.4  Working at BAT

BAT companies are focused more on building relationships with their partners and users rather than promoting working ethics for their employees. Their priority is to reduce costs and staff by utilizing new technologies. For instance, Pony Ma uses Tencent Cloud, a Cloud computing service offered by Tencent, as an example. He explains that Tencent acquired a majority stake in Supercell, the largest mobile game company, which only has 180 employees, yet it is valued at over $10 billion in the stock market. Ma argues that this would have been unimaginable in the past, but it was made possible by using Cloud services6 (Pony Ma, 2016 C+F). Jack Ma provides an example of how Alibaba manages to expand its business while reducing the number of employees and saving money. During the 2015 employee conference, he uses rhetorical language to explain why Alibaba is limiting the number of employees: [5]  Having more employees does not necessarily mean a good thing. The more employees we have, the fewer jobs could be created for society. There will be at least 10 million people in the logistic industry, why I only give Cainiao (a logistic network owned by Alibaba) the budget

108  Digital Discourse and BAT of 5,000 employees? Because only if I do so, there could be 10 million job opportunities created for the world. The more employees we have within our company, the fewer opportunities could be created outside the company. We should create jobs for others. This is what our company is going to do. We will not hire any more people in 2015…7 (Jack Ma, 2015 TFHC, pp. 65–66) Jack Ma’s language regarding job opportunities may be unclear and different from the common rhetoric of flexibility in developed capitalist societies (Fisher, 2010). It is uncertain whether “jobs opportunities created for the world” refers to outsourcing work to other companies or utilizing the sharing economy. While Jack Ma portrays limiting employee numbers as a means of saving jobs for society, the actual reason for this policy may be different. Jack Ma offered a different explanation for businessmen one year later: [6]  Alibaba made a budget in 2012 that in 2013 all targets, benefits and income indexes will double. In 2012 Taobao and Tmall were performing more than good. I said we must double though I know that it will realise even I don’t say so. But what is the basis for doubling these indexes? I ask them to do a ‘budget’ on employees. How many people will we need for these sales numbers to be doubled? At that time, Alibaba has already had 20 thousand employees. They made the budget and told me that we need 8700 more people to reach the goal. I said no, I don’t accept it. The second time they tried 7800 people, I still didn’t accept. The last time they said 5000, I still said no. I said I only accept 200 people. If it goes beyond 200 people, all employees, including managers and myself, will receive no bonus for the year. What is the final result? All indexes have doubled with only 300 more employees. This proves that reforms of the company need to be pushed.8 (Jack Ma, 2016 TFHC, p. 138) BAT’s discourse is noticeably lacking in statements about the nature of their work. Unlike Silicon Valley, which often uses rhetoric about fun and democratic work processes (Fisher, 2010; Fuchs, 2013), BAT do not promote how jobs have changed in the information age or in their own companies. There is no sign of work in “post-industrialized society” in this aspect of these Internet giants. They use old language to describe the workplace and focus on saving labour costs. While they occasionally emphasize employee benefits, such as the all permanent staff shareholding plan (2016 WIC), they operate like traditional companies. Tencent, for example, hires many outsourced staff and interns. In March 2021 alone, Tencent opened 8,000 internship positions (Wen, 2021). In my private interview with an employee in one of the core game departments at Tencent, at least 30% of the work is

Digital Discourse and BAT  109 outsourced. These outsourced staff receive lower salaries, worse benefits, and discriminatory treatment at the workplace. Jack Ma actively promotes certain work ethics within Alibaba. According to Jack Ma, working at Alibaba should be challenging because it is essential for young people to grow and understand the company’s commitment to making the world an easy place for business (Jack Ma, 2015 TFHC, p. 69). In one lecture given to Peking University, Jack Ma claims that all employees at Alibaba should internalize the company’s mission, and Jack Ma believes that the company is particularly idealistic and influencing everyone with its sense of mission and values (Jack Ma, 2014 TFHC, p.  86). By idealistic, Jack Ma means that the company’s employees should not expect to become wealthy or acquire material possessions such as cars or homes9 (ibid.). Ma has explained on several occasions why the company does not provide inhouse commute buses or accommodations for new employees (Jack Ma, 2014 TFHC, p. 86, 2016 TFHC, p. 72). He believes that these benefits must be earned by individual efforts, and that if employees value and love their jobs, they will make the effort to get to work on time and find their own transportation. Ma states that the company applauds effort and pays bonuses and higher salaries to those who achieve results, but those who work hard without achieving results should still be content with their efforts10 (Jack Ma, 2016 TFHC, p. 72). This is a typical social Darwinist and individualist view towards employees. Jack Ma’s approach to work may have been effective in the past, but it has come under scrutiny in recent times. In March 2019, a webpage called 996. The intensive care unit (ICU) was created on Github, revealing the harsh working conditions experienced by Chinese developers under the 996 system, where they work from 9 am to 9 pm, six days a week. The name of the webpage refers to the idea that such a schedule could land workers in the ICU of a hospital. There have been previous studies on the work conditions of programmers in China (e.g. Ping & Magasic, 2016). When Jack Ma attempted to defend the 996 system by claiming it was a “blessing for everyone” in 2019, he faced backlash from both employees and the public. This suggests that Ma’s approach to work may no longer be suitable or acceptable to modern employees, who prioritize work-life balance and fair treatment in the workplace. 4.1.5  Data Collection

BAT place significant importance on data in their digital discourse. To legitimize or hide the commodification of data, they utilize two approaches: either denying that big companies are the primary agents in data collection, or solely highlighting the positive aspects of data collection. First, they present data as an entity separate from human activities and processes, as demonstrated by Jack Ma’s speeches. In his 2015 speech at CeBIT, he portrayed romanticized notions of data and new technologies. Although originally

110  Digital Discourse and BAT delivered in English, a Chinese version was later published in a compilation of his speeches titled “The Future Has Come”. [1]  We don’t know what the world would look like in 30 years, and we don’t know what the data will look like, but we are sure the whole world in the next 30 years will be changed. (Ma, 2015) The Chinese translation of the speech contains a significant difference compared to the original English version: [2]  We don’t know what the world would look like in 30 years, and we don’t know what data will grow into (zhang cheng) in 30 years, but we are sure the whole world in the next 30 years will be dramatically changed. (Ma, 2017) There are two possible interpretations of the difference between the Chinese and English versions of the speech. It could be a deliberate attempt to convey slightly different messages to different audiences, or Jack Ma may have realized that the metaphor used in the English version was not appropriate for an international event. Another possibility is that as a native Chinese speaker, the Chinese version in his book more accurately represents his original thoughts than his English speech. Regardless of the reason for the difference, it is noteworthy that the extract personalizes data, portraying it as an animate subject that can grow on its own. However, data is an inanimate agent of an active process and cannot grow on its own. The wording of “growing into” (zhang cheng) could be modified to say that we don’t know how much data can be collected and how it will be collected by companies and governments in the next 30 years. The context of the speech is also important. The event was CeBIT, the largest and most internationally representative computer exposition with a target audience of CXOs, managers, experts, visionaries, and out-of-thebox thinkers. China had just become an official partner country in CeBIT in 2015, after President Xi’s trip to Germany, and the year was designated as the year of “innovation cooperation” between China and Germany. Jack Ma gave an English speech at the opening ceremony as a representative of Chinese IT enterprises, with 2,800 attendees present, indicating the importance of the event in shaping public discussions. The second way for companies to justify their collection of users’ data is by highlighting its benefits and downplaying its drawbacks, as discussed by van Dijck (2013). To present data collection and for-profit Internet platforms in a positive light, language and vocabulary choices play a crucial role. Rewording, for example, is a way of constructing the world according to certain perspectives (Fairclough, 2015, p. 131). Language shapes the reality it aims

Digital Discourse and BAT  111 to comprehend and thus constructs a particular representation of that reality. The word “sharing”, “open”, and “connection” are frequently employed by CEOs when discussing the Internet under the theme of data (H. P. Ma, 2014), TGPC; 2014 WIC (H. P.  Ma, 2016); TGPC). Topos of usefulness is another frequently employed discursive strategy. For example, Robin Li from Baidu, advocates for data collection and development of new tools to collect data for the benefit of people. He emphasizes that the challenge is not to create new hardware, but to identify what data is valuable to people (Li, 2014). This argument utilizes the topos of usefulness, which suggests that if an action is deemed useful, it should be undertaken (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 75). These discourses accentuate the positive side of uploading personal information online and elide the extremely complex processes of the tracking of user online behaviour, analysing personal data and the selling of this information to advertising and other companies to make profits. 4.2

From Competing with the Industry to Upgrading the Economy

BAT has developed by constantly clashing with the so-called “traditional industries”. Their relationship with these industries can be divided into two phases. In the early stages, BAT was accused of taking opportunities away from the “real economy” and luring customers away from traditional industries, leading to intense competition. However, BAT denied these accusations and argued that they were providing a larger market for traditional industries through platforms for selling (Alibaba, Tencent) and advertising (Baidu), while also urging traditional industries to adapt to new trends. Later, after the government launched the “Internet Plus” Action Plan, BAT began proposing cooperation and convergence with traditional industries. They claim that they can offer new technologies and data to help traditional industries upgrade and improve their operations. 4.2.1 From Clashes with the “Real Economy” to Help Upgrade Traditional Industries

During their early stages, BAT each focused on specific areas, with Baidu concentrating on search engines, Tencent on social media and online gaming, and Alibaba on e-commerce. Their goal was to create platforms that connected people and services (see Section 4.1). As these companies grew, they expanded their businesses into various other areas. For example, Baidu extended its core business to include online entertainment (iQiyi) and AI technology (Baidu Brain and PaddlePaddle Deep Learning). Similarly, Alibaba’s ecosystem now includes finance (Ant Financial Service and Alipay), logistics (Cainiao), entertainment (Weibo and Youku) and Cloud computing (Alibaba Cloud), while Tencent leveraged its social media network to launch Mini-programmes, financial services, and AI-enabled services.

112  Digital Discourse and BAT BAT’s public discourse reflects the changes that have taken place in their businesses. This can be seen in their involvement in the debate between traditional industries, also known as the “real economy” in China, and new industries, which are referred to as the “virtue economy”. Alibaba has been at the forefront of this debate since the beginning, with e-commerce being pitted against offline retail. A notable example is the 2012 debate between Jack Ma and Jianlin Wang, CEO of Wanda Group, where they argued about whether e-commerce could replace traditional retail and shops. During the debate, they made a bet that by 2020, if e-commerce exceeded 50% of China’s retail market share, Wang would give Ma 100 million RMB, and vice versa, Ma would lose 100 million to Wang. This bet, known as the “100 million yuan bet between Jack Ma and Wang Jianlin”, became the official declaration of war between traditional business and Internet e-commerce. During the debate, Ma argued that while e-commerce would not completely replace the retail industry, it would essentially take its place (B. Wang, 2013). Jack Ma was also a pioneer in highlighting the significance of flexible production. As early as 2012, he predicted that e-commerce would shift from a B2C (business-to-consumer) model to a C2B (consumer-to-business) model. Ma believed that flexible production would be necessary to solve problems for consumers and achieve real personalized production. He predicted that this shift would gradually take place within 3 to 5 years, and regardless of whether they acted upon it or not, it was an inevitable trend in society11 (Jack Ma, 2012 Wshang). Over time, Jack Ma’s tone became more conciliatory, and he began to emphasize that traditional industries still had opportunities (Jack Ma, 2015 AC). In response to the constant accusations from traditional industries, Jack Ma further argued that they should accept new technologies to facilitate flexible and personalized production. According to Ma, if traditional industries failed to keep up with the new trend, they should reflect on their shortcomings and ask themselves why they couldn’t adapt to change (Jack Ma, 2016 TFHC, p. 76). Later on, Ma took this idea further and promoted the concept that traditional manufacturing companies should learn to use data to offer personalized products to customers, as “enterprises in the future will not only focus on scale and standardisation but also flexibility, agility and personalisation” (Jack Ma, 2015 TFHC, p. 82, italics added).12 After the Chinese government’s official release of the “Internet Plus” project in 2015, there was a nationalist tone in BAT’s discourse. For example, in 2016, Jack Ma claimed that the Internet industry (virtue economy) was part of the service sector (real economy). Ma argued that China’s economy needed to transform from a manufacturing-powered real economy to a servicecentric economy, which was necessary for society. Furthermore, there was no need to oppose the real economy and the virtue economy. In fact, the bank and Internet industries were also parts of the service economy13 (Jack Ma, 2016 TFHC, p. 52).

Digital Discourse and BAT  113 He then shifted his focus to the transformation of traditional companies to digital companies and the importance of using the Internet. He believes that companies that can effectively use the Internet will be the ones that succeed in the future. Additionally, he emphasizes the convergence of the manufacturing and service sectors, stating that there is no longer a clear distinction between the two. He even considers BAT as manufacturing companies, as they produce and process large amounts of data and share it with others. According to Jack Ma, developing the real economy should not only focus on the manufacturing sector but also include the service sector, especially with the emergence of the Internet of Things14 (Jack Ma, 2017 WIF, Entrepreneur Session). Similarly, Robin Li’s views on the role of China’s Internet in relation to traditional industries have changed over time. Initially, he believed that the Internet was replacing traditional industries (Robin Li, 2013 BU), but he later stated that it would be better for traditional companies to adopt the Internet to develop themselves (Robin Li, 2015 BU). Robin Li now argues that for China to transform and upgrade its economy, the Internet and AI are necessary to maintain rapid development. At the 2019 World Internet Conference, he emphasized the importance of AI and other technologies in driving high-quality economic development in China. He explained that China’s market offers significant opportunities for technology companies to develop applications, and that the massive data produced by millions of Internet users has accelerated the development of AI and other technologies15 (Robin Li, 2019 WIC). Pony Ma, the founder of Tencent, claims to have originated the term “Internet Plus”, which gained widespread popularity in 2015 after being used by Premier Li Keqiang (Pony Ma, 2015 BDE). Tencent’s goal of integrating with traditional industries is evident in its 2018 TGPC, where Ma states that the company’s new aim is to establish a presence in Internetenabled consumption and embrace Internet-enabled industrialization (Pony Ma, 2018 TGPC). Ma argues that Tencent promotes the convergence of traditional industries with the Internet to address conflicts between traditional and new industries, and to help government and companies better understand the utility of the Internet (Pony Ma, 2016 TGPC, 2017 WIC, 2017 BDE). Furthermore, Ma encourages traditional industries to upgrade by joining Tencent’s ecosystem and utilizing the company’s platforms and technologies. According to Ma, the Internet can benefit traditional industries by enabling them to reach a large user base and build an ecosystem with hardware, software, and services. In the future, traditional industries will need to converge with Internet companies to realize their full potential16 (Pony MA, 2018 TGPC). During the 2019 TGDES, Martin Lau, the current president and Executive Director of Tencent, emphasized the importance of the Internet and new manufacturing in upgrading China’s economy. According to Lau, the

114  Digital Discourse and BAT Internet will become a crucial component for enhancing productivity and digital transformation across all industries. By effectively connecting personalized demands and large-scale production, many new business models can be created, and productivity can be increased. This is a challenging feat in the industrial age, making the Internet not just an industry, but a core capacity of all industries. In the future, successful enterprises will be those that are digitalized17 (Lau, 2019 TGDES, italic added). In particular, he emphasizes the role of the Internet in transforming China’s economic development. 4.2.2  Increasing Domestic Consumption

Increasing domestic consumption is another significant topic in BAT’s discussions on upgrading and enhancing China’s economy. Jack Ma, in particular, highlights this connection between China’s economy and domestic consumption. In his speech at Alibaba’s 2015 AC, Ma underscores the potential of Internet technologies and platforms in driving domestic demand. He asserts that consumption is crucial to the success of the Chinese economy: [7]  Many people are worried about China’s economic problems, but I personally think that the Chinese economy has never had such a good opportunity… The huge potential of the Chinese economy lies in domestic demand. The three driving forces of the Chinese economy used to be investment, export and domestic demand. Investment and export are the strengths of the government, but the government can hardly force people to spend money to consume. Today we can use new technologies, use the ‘cloud’ to stimulate domestic demand, use the ‘cloud’ to start domestic demand, use cloud computing and the Internet to cultivate domestic demand. I believe, in the coming 20 years, China will enter an era of real domestic demand.18 (Jack Ma, 2015, The Future Has Come, p. 44) Ma notes that it is a challenge for the government to compel people to consume, but new technologies and businesses have the potential to boost domestic consumption. This quote highlights a clear objective of developing technologies that facilitate consumption. The innovators and start-ups should contribute to promoting consumption demand through new technologies. Robin Li’s perspective on domestic consumption is worth noting as it reflects Baidu’s business expansion. Since Baidu established its open platform in 2010 to facilitate connections between businesses and services, Robin Li’s attitude towards domestic consumption has evolved from negative in 2009 to positive in 2010. Previously, in 2009, he adopted a negative tone towards domestic consumption to highlight the potential of Baidu’s business model that utilizes user-generated data. However, in 2010, he acknowledged the

Digital Discourse and BAT  115 importance of domestic consumption in China’s economic development, indicating a shift towards a more positive outlook: [8]  In the first 50 years, people are trying hard to produce the same things on large scales to satisfy needs, and to some point, there is no more consumption need. In the last 50 years, we think about how to release consumption needs from consumers, how to make them buy stuff, so there came the credit card and eventually led to the financial crisis. The new financial services and unlimited leverage produced the victims of over-consumption.19 (Robin L, 2009 BU, italics added) [9]  … The search engine is all about driving sectors that are related to domestic demand. The 300 thousand clients of Baidu are all related to domestic demand. In other words, we make contributions to the economy entirely through increasing domestic demand – and this is the best way for China’s economic growth.20 (Robin Li, 2010 BU) Pony Ma from Tencent believes that the Internet’s communicative functions, such as expressing opinions and communicating with others, are crucial for marketing purposes. He goes as far as to equate the spirit of the Internet with instruments for business. In his open letter to partners in 2014, he highlights the significance of comprehending young consumer groups as they are the driving force behind China’s consumption upgrade: [10]  Consumers interact fast through the Internet to convey their preferences and feedback. This reflects the spirit of the Internet, which is to pursue an extremely good experience of products and extremely good feedback from users. The first-class products created by word-ofmouth marketing and fan culture will make people talk with each other about it. Moreover, making consumers participate in decision making is also very important for the competitive capability of mobile Internet products.21 (Pony Ma, 2014 TGPC, italics added) Pony Ma of Tencent equates the essence of the Internet with business instruments, promoting a consumer culture. This equivalence reflects a neoliberal and instrumentalist view of the Internet that disregards the hacker and geek spirit and the freedom and openness associated with it. Moreover, the use of “participate” in this context eliminates the political connotations of the term and focuses on consumption and economic behaviour. This approach positions users’ power in their identity as consumers, emphasizing

116  Digital Discourse and BAT “participation in decision making in consumption” rather than political participation aimed at changing the direction of Internet development. 4.2.3  Relationship with the Government

BAT’s discourse has evolved to include a more nationalist message, highlighting the benefits of integrating traditional industries with the Internet and AI technology for China’s economic progress. BAT claims that their platforms and the Internet can improve the quality and speed of China’s economic development. This shift in focus coincided with BAT’s expansion into various industries. The nationalist discourse of “upgrading China’s economy” from Baidu and Tencent actively construct their relationship with the government. Robin Li and Pony Ma emphasize the importance of government support and seek to actively collaborate with governments at various levels. Baidu, like other Chinese companies, places great importance on government policies and intentions. Robin Li often refers to the government’s intentions to guide Baidu’s development strategy and persuade partners. For example, he used the government’s shift towards domestic consumption in 2010 to demonstrate the importance of Baidu’s contribution to China’s economy (Robin Li, 2010 BU). He also used the “Internet Plus” project to support Baidu’s expansion into traditional industries. Baidu’s recent development in AI and its application is an explicit example of this governmentBaidu relationship. Robin Li emphasizes the importance of local government support for Baidu to develop its AI applications and associates Baidu’s technology development with China’s technology advancement. Baidu is seen as representing China, with the government expected to support Baidu’s experiments. Robin Li mentions Baidu’s cooperation with local governments in Shanghai, Wuhu, and Gui Yang to carry out AI application experiments, highlighting the Wuhu government’s support in providing an area exclusive to unmanned cars. He claims that China could be the first country to have an AI-powered unmanned-car-only city because of strong government support for Baidu (Robin Li, 2016 BDE). Two years later, Robin Li repeats the argument that the development of AI needs support from different stakeholders, including government, manufacturing factors, research institutions, and so on. He specifically emphasizes the importance of government support in realizing the development of unmanned cars, saying that China is likely to achieve it because of its strong government and world-leading infrastructure construction22 (Robin Li, 2018 BDE). Similarly, Tencent views the government as an important partner and client, and hopes to facilitate cooperation through events like the Cloud + Future Conference (Pony Ma, 2016 C+F). Tencent sees the digitalization of user groups expanding beyond individual customers to businesses and even the government, and wants to be a connector for all three (Pony MA, 2018 BDE). Cooperation with the government is crucial for Tencent, and examples include the “Digital Guangdong” e-commerce project (Pony MA, 2018

Digital Discourse and BAT  117 C+F) and a tourism promotion project in Yunnan Province (Pony MA, 2018 BDE), both of which use WeChat mini-programmes and public accounts. These successful examples are intended to be expanded throughout China. During the 2019 BDE conference, Dowson Tong, who represented Tencent, shared examples of Tencent’s partnership with Guiyang to introduce innovative forms of e-commerce (Dowson Tong, 2019 BDE). Tencent aims to use these successful collaborations to expand its services across the entirety of China, as stated by Pony Ma during the 2018 Cloud + Future Conference and reiterated by Dowson Tong during the 2019 BDE conference. In contrast to Robin Li and Pony Ma, Jack Ma takes a bolder stance on the involvement of the Chinese government in the market and businesses. While it is inevitable for a company headquartered in State-led capitalist China to have some level of interaction with the government, Jack Ma attempts to keep his distance from the government. He expresses gratitude for the support that Alibaba received from the Hangzhou local government, but claims that Alibaba has never received any money from the government. When asked about Alibaba’s relations with the Chinese government at the 2015 Davos, he stated that if the government requested Alibaba to provide services, Alibaba would do so for free to serve the public (Jack Ma, 2015 TFHC, p. 192). This response can be understood as Jack Ma being cautious about defining Alibaba as a company with government backing in front of international investors and the business community. It is also consistent with Jack Ma’s persistent views. Jack Ma adheres to the neoliberal view that the free market is the best way to promote human well-being. He believes that the government is not effective in solving problems or developing the economy and that it should leave the market and entrepreneurs to address these issues. Jack Ma thinks that the government’s interference could harm China’s economy and that businesses should rely more on the market than on the government. As early as 2010, Jack Ma claims that if the government started to publish policies on one specific area, then it won’t work (Jack Ma, 2010 Wshang). On another occasion, he explicitly claims that “running businesses should depend on the market” and “in principle, businesses should comply with the market and the mayor (government), but I choose to rely more on the market since the mayor could be wrong” (Jack Ma, 2015 TFHC, pp. 110–115). Jack Ma advocates for deregulation by highlighting the potential negative consequences of regulation. For instance, he believes that the Internet should not be controlled and that privacy concerns are misplaced or the result of faulty thinking. In support of his argument, Ma tells a story about how experts’ concerns about privacy decades ago did not come to pass. He also warns against enacting regulations similar to the Red Flag Traffic Law, which was enacted in the 19th century in the UK and US to limit the maximum speed of automobiles and require waving a red flag in front of the vehicle as a safety warning. According to Ma, this law was the reason why Britain missed out on the opportunity to develop its auto manufacturing industry

118  Digital Discourse and BAT and was surpassed by Germany. He believes that China should avoid making similar mistakes and refrain from setting regulations that would hinder the development of the Internet. In addition, there is a nationalist tone in Ma’s argument, suggesting that deregulation is necessary to maintain competitiveness in the global market and to enable the development of new technologies by companies. Additionally, Jack Ma advocates for self-regulation of the market, particularly in areas like e-commerce and trade (Jack Ma, 2014 WIC; 2016 Investor’s Day; Jack Ma, 2016 TFHC, p. 140). Jack Ma believes that the Internet and Big Data can help the market do what the government cannot, by predicting and planning the economy (Jack Ma, 2015 WIC; Jack Ma, 2016 TFHC, pp. 182–186; Jack Ma, 2017 BDE). He thinks that the Internet is a powerful tool that can change the global pattern of trade and that governments should retreat from the market and let businessmen make deals: [11]  We must build a real commercial society through the market economy and by entrepreneurs. The Internet today has provided such an opportunity… The Internet will change the whole trend and pattern of global trade… In the next 30 to 50 years, nobody could stop the Internet. The Internet itself is a huge ecosystem, and it could improve by itself.23 (Jack Ma, 2014 WIC) Jack Ma also started the e-WTP (Electronic World Trade Platform) initiative, which aims to incubate transnational e-commerce rules to support small global companies. He hopes to achieve this through a business-led approach, rather than negotiating with governments. As Jack Ma explains this e-WTP: [12]  …We hope to support 80% of the small global companies, so we want to build e-WTP, it’s not e-WTO, WTO is an organisation that governments sit together and negotiate… Taobao’s business covers 30 provinces in China, but we never put the 30 governors in the same room to negotiate. We just do it through the business way, using the market economy.24 (Jack Ma, 2016 Investor’s Day) At first glance, Jack Ma’s call for deregulation may seem daring in light of China’s reputation as an authoritarian state with strict control over the market and information. However, this stance aligns partially with the government’s overall direction in the early 2010s. In particular, guidelines and opinions on the development of the Internet and Big Data are based on significant decisions made during the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in November 2013. At that time, the government proposed to build a fair, open, transparent, and unified

Digital Discourse and BAT  119 market system, reform the market regulation system, and promote competition and “the survival of the fittest” with a “decisive role” for the market in resource allocation (see Chapter 3). This is a significant shift from the previous notion of a “basic” role for the market. Additionally, the government claims to be stepping back from its previous dominant role in the market and focusing on streamlining administration, delegating more powers, improving regulation, and providing better services (JianZheng FangQuan), as outlined in Premier Li’s 2016 Report on the Work of the Government (Li, 2016). While Pony Ma from Tencent and Robin Li from Baidu actively seek support from local governments and adapt nationalist discourse to promote their services, products, and brands at important events, Jack Ma actively promoted more neoliberal ideas on deregulation and market. The relationship between the Chinese government and the market is constantly changing as the state is transforming the economy from competitive to state-led monopolized capitalism. This is evident in the investigations and fines imposed on BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent) and other emerging tech companies for monopolizing the market. In February 2021, the state council published anti-monopoly guidelines on the platform economy, and in April 2021, the state administration of market supervision and administration announced that it had imposed a hefty fine on Alibaba for its monopoly in the online retail platform services market. The fine is RMB 18.228 billion, 4% of its 2019 sales in China (Murdoch & Stanway, 2021). Tencent and Baidu were also investigated and issued fines due to anti-monopoly reasons (Y. Wang, 2021). With the government’s recent efforts to regulate the Internet-related market, including anti-monopoly laws and other regulations, it remains to be seen how BAT’s digital discourse regarding the government and state will evolve in the future, especially following Jack Ma’s retirement from the Alibaba Group board chairmanship in 2019. 4.3

Globalized or Chinese Companies

BAT’s description of their national identity encompasses two distinct discourses. The first discourse emphasizes that BAT is a global entity, which is further supported by their incorporation of advanced technologies such as Big Data and AI. However, despite being a transnational corporation, BAT also underscores their Chinese identity to validate their dominance in the Chinese market, as well as the backing they receive from the government and various industries. 4.3.1  Globalized BAT

This section will illustrate how BAT’s discourse has evolved over time as they progressed into cross-industry transnational corporations. Specifically, their rhetoric regarding globalization has undergone significant changes. Initially,

120  Digital Discourse and BAT they imitated Western platforms, then they began to exploit China’s unique domestic market, and finally they gradually expanded into the global market. At the outset, BAT relied heavily on Western models for inspiration, as noted by Robin Li, who openly stated that “in the past, many Chinese companies just copy what successful foreign companies do” (Robin Li, 2011 BU). Li’s speeches often incorporated statistics and market analysis from American and global Internet industries to convince investors and partners of Baidu’s potential (Robin Li, 2009 BU, 2012 BU). However, over time, Li began to emphasize the distinctions between China and America, highlighting the distinct opportunities presented by China’s vast market (Robin Li, 2011 BU, and 2013 BU). Despite Google’s position as a significant competitor to Baidu, Li suggested that Baidu’s understanding of Chinese users was superior (Robin Li, 2011 BU), and in 2013, he maintained that Baidu’s innovations resulted in superior search results. He illustrated this with examples, demonstrating how using Chinese on Baidu produced better search results than using English on Google when searching for information on people’s networks and relationships (Robin Li, 2013 BWC). Similarly, Pony Ma expressed his desire for Tencent and its partners to “take root in China” (Pony MA, 2013 TGPC) and later attributed the success of China’s Internet companies to their ability to innovate according to domestic consumer needs (Pony Ma, 2015 WIC interview). As China’s Internet economy and technologies have rapidly advanced in recent years, BAT has begun to compete with global companies, which is reflected in their discourse. For instance, in 2015, Robin Li asserted that in some O2O (online-to-offline) areas, China’s Internet leads the world. The following year, during the WIC, he further stated that the global centre of innovation would shift from America to other places, and he hoped that Chinese companies would compete with Silicon Valley to attract global talent and migrants (Robin Li, 2016 WIC, and Entrepreneur Section). Robin Li’s global vision is evident when he mentions Baidu’s new slogan, “make the complex world simpler” (Robin Li, 2017 BWC). He later reiterates that Baidu’s goal in the mid- to long-term is “to become a leading AI platform company in the world, to accelerate AI’s application, to practice Baidu’s mission – using technology to make the complex world simpler” (Robin Li, 2019 WIC). Similarly, Pony Ma remarked that in the past, Chinese companies primarily followed and learned from others, but now they need to become innovators and contributors to new technologies (Pony Ma, 2017 TGPC). He then discussed Tencent’s technological innovations and its AI Lab, emphasizing the competitiveness of Tencent’s AI technologies worldwide. Alibaba, unlike Baidu and Tencent, was an early adopter of globalization as an e-commerce company. Jack Ma, the founder of Alibaba, emphasizes the differences between China and other countries and the importance of the Chinese market. He explains that e-commerce in China differs from that in Japan and America due to China’s inadequate credit, payment, and logistic systems (Jack Ma, 2007 Wshang; Jack Ma, 2011; Wshang Jack Ma, 2014

Digital Discourse and BAT  121 WIC). Nevertheless, Jack Ma stresses that Alibaba is a globalized company, and e-commerce should develop worldwide, not just in Hangzhou and China (Jack Ma, 2007 Wshang). He believes that companies should have an open and sharing spirit and a global vision (Jack Ma, 2008 Wshang, 2009 Alibaba Ten Years). In 2009, when Alibaba celebrated its tenth anniversary, Jack Ma announced his goal of creating an e-commerce platform for ten million small businesses and 100 million jobs worldwide (Jack Ma, 2015 TFHC, p62). He also aimed to provide a consumption platform for one billion people worldwide. Jack Ma expands these goals further to create a platform that provides job opportunities for 100 million people, serves two billion people, and generates profits for ten million businesses. Alibaba’s aim in 20 years is to become the fifth-largest economic entity globally (Jack Ma, 2017 AC). Jack Ma claims that Alibaba is a globalized company, and although it was born in China, it is not a Chinese or American company, as its investors come from all over the world: [13]  “Alibaba was born in China, but Alibaba is not a Chinese company, nor an American company, of course. People ask to which country Alibaba belongs. My answer is that our investors come from all over the world. I tell people, though Alibaba was born in China, yet it is a globalised company”.25 (Jack Ma, 2016 TFHC, p. 72) 4.3.2  AI for Global Expansion

BAT’s recent emphasis on global expansion has been largely centred around the theme of AI, as this technology has opened up new opportunities for the companies to enter the global market. As a result, there has been a shift in language from domestic to global markets in their discourses. Baidu’s AI platform, Apollo, has enabled the company to provide services and technologies to the global auto manufacturing industry, with more than 113 partners and 11,000 developers currently on the platform (Robin Li, 2018 WIC). Robin Li has emphasized that AI has a strong capability for vertical convergence and can be used to “build a community of shared future in cyberspace”26 (Robin Li, 2017 WIC). The “community of shared future in cyberspace” is a clear resonance of Xi Jinping’s speech on cyber security (see Chapter 3). This language also highlights the importance of AI in enabling big tech giants to expand globally and demonstrates how they are attracted to technologies that have significant market potential. Similarly, Martin Lau from Tencent has stated that in the next 20 years, the digital and physical worlds will converge, and the boundaries between commodities and services will blur, creating an important opportunity for Chinese companies to engage with the world and open up the global market27 (Lau, 2019 TGDES). Similarly, Pony Ma has encouraged Chinese companies to expand into the global market. He believes that the digital economy provides new

122  Digital Discourse and BAT opportunities for trans-regional cooperation and urges Chinese companies to collaborate and attract global talents to achieve this. He urges Chinese companies to “coil into a fist” to expand into the global market and attract talented individuals from all over the world. He believes that competition in the digital “community” (gong tong ti, which President Xi Jinping has spoken about) can help create a sustainable ecosystem (Pony Ma, 2017 TGPC). In a later speech, Pony Ma reiterates President Xi’s message, stating that China’s economy offers significant opportunities and room for innovation, not just for Chinese companies, but for global companies as well (Pony Ma, 2018 WIC). Jack Ma, like Baidu and Tencent, recognized the importance of new technologies to achieve Alibaba’s global goals. He is known for creating new terms, and in 2017, when Alibaba redefined itself as an e-commerce infrastructure provider, it restarted Wshang with the theme “Made in the Internet”. Jack Ma used this term on several occasions, explaining its connection to the “community with shared destiny” phrase coined by President Xi. He claimed that the problems faced by humanity are common and the global value chain will be revolutionized, leading to fast deliveries for small parcels and “Made in Internet” instead of “Made in China” or “Made in America”28 (Jack Ma, 2017 WIC). He believes that AI technology will enable this “Made in Internet” vision, and stated that Alibaba is a data-driven and dataprocessing company29 (Jack Ma, 2017 AC). Jack Ma further explained that in the future, all small and medium-sized businesses will be transnational enterprises, and technologies should be inclusive, which is the aim of Damo, Alibaba’s research and innovation centre established in 2017. In summary, the evolution of BAT’s language reflects its journey towards global expansion. Initially, BAT emulated Western platforms before turning its attention to the domestic market and creating its own distinctive features. Now, BAT is actively competing in the global market, with AI emerging as a crucial factor in its expansion strategy. 4.3.3  Chinese Companies

BAT, although operating as transnational corporations, sometimes present themselves as Chinese companies through their discourse. They not only refer to themselves as Chinese companies in their speeches (similar to how Facebook is referred to as an American company despite its global presence), but also position themselves as representatives of China, Chinese entrepreneurship, and technology development in the global market competition. By using this type of nationalist language, BAT aim to justify their dominant market position and their expansion into new areas as a conglomerate. Essentially, their reasoning is that if they are representing China in the global market, they should receive support from the government and industries (as discussed in the previous section).

Digital Discourse and BAT  123 Despite Jack Ma’s distancing from the government (as discussed in Section 4.2), he still uses nationalist rhetoric to associate Alibaba with the future of China. This association legitimizes Alibaba’s dominant position in the market, which contradicts Jack Ma’s claim that Alibaba is a global company. Jack Ma acknowledges Alibaba’s responsibility in the country, stating that it is not a typical business. He explains that if China’s e-commerce industry does well, it is not solely due to Alibaba’s success, but if it fails, Alibaba will be implicated. Jack Ma believes that Alibaba’s success is closely tied to the success of the entire country, as many e-commerce talents were concentrated within Alibaba at the time30 (Jack Ma, 2017 AC). In a similar vein, Baidu also emphasizes its Chinese identity and the role it plays in contributing to China’s economy. This identification serves Baidu’s interests by establishing its dominant position in the market and enabling the expansion of its businesses into various industries. Robin Li, for instance, asserts that Baidu has made significant contributions to the growth of the domestic economy in China (2010 BU speech). Furthermore, in 2013 BWC, he claims that Baidu has played a crucial role in improving and strengthening China’s mobile Internet ecosystem. Similarly, Pony Ma has also expressed his commitment to realizing the “Chinese Dream” on multiple occasions. In the 2017 WIC, he expresses his desire for Tencent to take on greater responsibility and become part of the “Chinese power” and “Chinese Scheme” to contribute more significantly to building and maintaining the “community of shared future in cyberspace”. He goes on to appreciate the Chinese government’s support for the private economy and encourages Chinese companies, including Tencent, to build China’s strength in the Internet and technology in his 2018 WIC speech. The term “we” is specifically employed by BAT when they aim to broaden their business operations into different sectors. To legitimize their expansion into other industries in China, BAT use the discursive strategy of creating an ingroup. As an illustration, Tony Ma asserts that Tencent embodies China’s Internet company, not only in technology but also in Internet culture and the entire cultural industry (Pony Ma, 2018 WIC). At the 2017 WIC conference, where President Xi has been speaking annually since 2015, Pony Ma declares that: [14]  In the past, Chinese companies mainly play the role of followers of new technologies, but today we need to become the drivers and contributors to new technologies. For example, Tencent uses Cloud technology to provide our products and technologies to enterprises in our ecosystem. We will also use the open content platform to promote the development of the creative cultural industry.31 (Pony Ma, 2017 WIC) In this excerpt, it is evident that there are two distinct usages of the pronoun “we”. The first one is an “inclusive” we that encompasses the entire

124  Digital Discourse and BAT country. The second is a more “exclusive” we that pertains specifically to Tencent. By using the inclusive we, an implicit claim of authority is being made – that Tencent has the power to speak for the country’s technological advancement and can identify with the whole nation. This type of discourse is particularly effective in conveying its purpose, as exemplified in 2017 TGPC when Pony Ma emphasizes the need for Chinese companies to collaborate and “unite as one” to attract global markets and talents, ultimately enlarging the digital technology innovation ecosystem32 (Pony Ma, 2017 TGPC). Robin Li highlights how Baidu’s expansion into new areas through AI has contributed to upgrading China’s economy (as discussed in Section 4.3). He also uses the pronoun “we” to emphasize Baidu’s Chinese identity. For instance, when discussing Baidu AI’s involvement in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, he asserts that “the use of AI in the agricultural industry is unavoidable if we want to produce high-quality Chinese food and crops”33 (Robin Li, 2018 BWC). Furthermore, Robin Li emphasizes that Baidu has been investing in AI for more than ten years and aims to collaborate with other entrepreneurs to further China’s AI technology development and advancement in the future. He envisions China becoming a world leader in AI technology, and hopes to witness the emergence of the world’s first city with only driverless cars on the road in China34 (Robin Li, 2016 BDE). Jack Ma utilizes nationalist rhetoric to promote Alibaba’s newly established Damo Lab in 2017. A noteworthy aspect of his discourse is the frequency with which he talks about China’s technology development following the announcement of the Damo Lab. For example, during the 2017 AC, he questions why China cannot develop its own path and declares that Damo must exceed the likes of Intel, Microsoft, and IBM (Jack Ma, 2017 AC). Additionally, during the 2017 BDE, he asserts that China now possesses technology, funding, and a market, so it should redefine the future (Jack Ma, 2017 BDE). He particularly emphasizes the nationalist stance that China should develop its “own core technology”. It is easy to observe the similarity between Alibaba and the Chinese government’s discourse on “core technology”, as well as between President Xi and Jack Ma’s rhetoric. For instance, Jack Ma highlights the significance of chips as core technology and acknowledges the gap between China and developed countries in this area. However, he remains optimistic about the potential for China to catch up in IoT chips35 (Jack Ma, 2018 AC). Besides gaining support from the government, this type of discourse to form one unitary identity has economic purposes for marketing. For example, at the 4th WIC in 2017, Yanhong Robin Li, CEO of Baidu, describes the Chinese market as a unitary, homogeneous collective community defined by one unitary culture, language and law. [1]  The generation of data is still developing very fast, especially for the Internet in China. China has an extraordinary situation: 750 million netizens all use the same language, share the same culture and obey

Digital Discourse and BAT  125 the same laws. It is such a large group of people, massive market and a large data set which are continuously generating new data. It will promote constant innovations in algorithms and bring new capabilities for computing power. (Yanhong Robin (Y. R. Li, 2017), WIC, my translation) Li’s speech, first of all, articulates a very simplified, naïve understanding (or conception) of Chinese society, especially when considering the obvious diversity of language and culture within the territorial boundary of China. This extract applies the fallacy of petition principii (or begging the question). This fallacy means that “what is controversial and in question, and has thus to be proved, is presupposed as the starting point of the argumentation” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 73). The speaker is using China’s unity as a basis for advocating the rapid growth of data and algorithm development in the country. There are two ways to interpret this speech. First, as it was delivered at the World Internet Conference, it could be seen as an intentional effort to attract investment and instil confidence in Baidu, China, and its market. Secondly, the speech espouses a clear nationalist ideology that glosses over or creates a false picture of a homogenous, united society in China. This ideology is further in line with the neoliberal logic of capital and benefits Internet companies. The economic leaders promote a unified China using nationalist rhetoric. The CEOs frequently use the pronoun “we” to signify the inclusion of the entire nation and to associate their companies with the nation’s identity, technological advancements, and business interests. This portrayal of BAT as Chinese companies contradicts their actual status. The variations in BAT’s discourse regarding their “national identity” serve to legitimize their expansion and dominance in the Chinese market. 4.4

Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter has outlined how BAT has discursively portrayed the Internet and China’s Digital Economy, depicted themselves as the digital infrastructure that can enhance the Chinese economy, elaborated on their connections with collaborators, customers, workers, and governments, and described how their identities oscillate between being globalized and Chinese enterprises (Tables 4.2 and 4.3). BAT employs the aforementioned discursive constructions to validate their prevailing status in the market (Section 4.1), their foray into unexplored industries (Section 4.2) and their worldwide growth (Section 4.3). BAT’s digital discourse on “building the ecosystem” and “upgrading the traditional industries” is in line with the expansion of their businesses and services. The “ecosystem” and “infrastructure” discourse appropriate the Internet’s de-centralized and boundaryless features to describe BAT’s own organizational structures. It not only disguises BAT’s past and continuous purchases of small businesses and suppression of competition but

126  Digital Discourse and BAT Table 4.2 BAT’s digital discourse on the new economy What the BAT say about it: Market

Production

Consumption

• The Internet is boundaryless, so should be the BAT • BAT are providing Internet infrastructures, not dominating the market • The Internet is de-centralized, so is the BAT (Tencent shifted from “closed system” to “open system” in 2010) • BAT are facilitating niche markets and helping small businesses (partners) • Deregulation (Jack Ma/Alibaba) vs. collaboration with the government (Baidu and Tencent) • Data is the “new oil” • The Information Age requires companies to rethink production modes (e.g. convergence with the Internet; flexible and personalized production; prosumption) • BAT can help companies save operational costs with AI and digital technologies • BAT are helping agricultural and manufacturing industries to upgrade • Data is an important resource for the Information Age thus should be open to all • Participatory culture is an important spirit of the Internet • BAT are contributing to China’s economic growth by promoting domestic consumption

Table 4.3 BAT digital discourse on the new politics How BAT describe these agencies and construct relations with them: International level State level

• • • •

Societal level

• •

Individual level

• • •

BAT are globalized companies BAT are representing China in global competition and market Keeping distance with the government, deregulation (Alibaba) Getting support from the state and provide services to the government (Baidu and Tencent’s AI development, cooperation with the government) Online participation is restricted to prosumption Little mention of how new technologies could change the workplace for the interests of the workers Justify exploitative and alienated work Users are consumers, not active citizens Little mention of users’ privacy and rights of control over data

also deliberately confuse the Internet as a public space for communication with BAT as private entities for making profits. This type of discourse legitimates the expansion of their business operation and avoids more straightforward terms – “oligopolies” or/and “monopolies”. Finally, even though

Digital Discourse and BAT  127 they are global companies, BAT resorts to nationalist rhetoric to justify their expansion and to obtain backing from the government. In terms of discursive strategies, BAT utilizes rewording as a linguistic strategy to assert that they function as the “infrastructure” and “utility” of the Internet and that they are supporting small and medium-sized enterprises. BAT also accentuate their usefulness (topos of usefulness) for businesses to revamp, for traditional industries to modernize and for the entire Chinese economy to progress. As Mosco points out when discussing the “digital myths”, “myths are selfsustaining but embody, or mutually constitute, political economic interests as well” (Mosco, 2005, p. 142). As private companies thriving in state-led capitalist China, BAT enjoyed some level of freedom in the domestic market and investment in their early development stage. Navigating between the market, global capital and the state, they managed to establish their dominant positions in the Internet area in China (see Section 2.2). The digital discourses constructed by BAT serve economic purposes, with socio-political meanings and the consequences. To naturalize and legitimate BAT’s collection and sale of user data, various linguistic techniques are utilized, including metaphors and emphasizing their usefulness. These tactics also conceal the existence of oligopolies or the domination of a small group of companies, presenting them in a positive light. One such metaphor used by BAT is that of an ecosystem, which creates a favourable impression while also suggesting that the system is self-regulating, with no one in control or responsible if something goes wrong. By using this metaphor, BAT is able to position themselves as simply providing connections and adapting to the system, rather than being accountable for the sale of user data and the profits they generate from it. Additionally, the entrepreneurial ideology of neoliberalism is a crucial aspect of how BAT interacts with partners, users, and workers. Users are encouraged to take on the role of “prosumers” instead of citizens, while workers are expected to voluntarily work overtime in order to meet their goals. Unlike Silicon Valley, which often promotes the idea of enjoyable and democratic workplaces, as described by Fisher (2010) and Fuchs (2013), BAT companies do not focus on changing job structures in the information age or within their own organizations. Instead, they use conventional language to describe the workplace and prioritize minimizing labour costs. Furthermore, nationalism is a most prevalent ideology in the digital discourse of BAT, as they frequently equate themselves as the representatives of Chinese companies, national technological advancement, and national pride. On one hand, they promote the idea of a unified Chinese nation with great potential as a massive market, in order to attract investment and gain support from the state in international competition. This type of nationalist discourse is ideological because it disguises the existence of diverse opinions, identities, and interests among Chinese people, suppressing dissidents and activists and maintaining dominant power. On the other hand, BAT’s global

128  Digital Discourse and BAT investment structure and expansion align with China’s “go abroad strategy” such as the Belt and Road Initiative. By invoking Xi Jinping and the government’s speeches, BAT employs nationalist discourses to gain support from the government in both domestic and international markets. Thus, their digital discourse reflects a blend of nationalism and neoliberalism. As demonstrated in Section 4.2, the relationship between the state and capital cannot be simplified as one of ruler and controlled, nor can it be reduced to oppressive and liberating forces. Both BAT and the Chinese government are striving to build a more positive relationship with occasional implicit conflicts. Jack Ma is a unique case as he advocates for reducing government involvement in the market through deregulation. However, as a result, he has been facing significant limitations in both his business and personal life since 2020. BAT’s nationalist rhetoric is also rooted in a form of techno-determinism, which suggests that technology will inevitably bring about economic growth, prosperity, and progress. They seem to assume (or at least convince people) that as long as people keep up with technological advancements, they will achieve a more equal and free society, rather than actively shaping technology to achieve those goals. Notes 1 “IT是以我为主，方便我管理。DT的思想是以别人为主，强化别人，支持别 人。DT思想是只有别人成功，你才会成功。这是一个巨大的思想转变，由这个 思想转变带来技术的转变。” （马云，2014，未来以来p. 113） 2 最近一直有人问我，互联网公司有边界吗？阿里巴巴似乎无处不在，腾讯似乎 无处不在，facebook也一样，你们这些互联网公司有没有边界？我的回答是， 互联网没有边界，就像电没有边界一样。100多年以前，你不会说这个行业可 以用电，那个行业不能用电，电是没有应用边界的。互联网是一种平台，一种 技术；从某个角度来说，也可以说它是一种思想，一种未来。（马云，2016云 栖，未来已来 p. 32） 3 很多人讲阿里今天投资这投资那，参股这参股那，似乎我们无处不在。事实 上，的确是这样…只有我们无处不在，我们的客户才能受益，我们的中小企业 客户才能得到发展。为此，我们必须做到无处不在！（马云，2015员工大会， 未来已来 p. 67） 4 从2010年到2011年间，我花了一年时间思考如何能将腾讯打造成一个供更多合 作伙伴自由创业、供更多用户自由分享的开放平台。（马化腾，2014 合作伙伴 大会） 5 腾讯自身的开放平台，也一直在坚持促成一个“去中心化”的开放分享网络。 这和腾讯的社交基因有关。我们的开放平台最早是基于QQ及后来的微信，从社 交关系链的架构推演出来。社交网络天然呈网状，鼓励朋友间开放分享。（马 化腾，2016 全球合作伙伴大会） 6 第二，我想谈谈分享经济。大家知道最近这一两年分享经济非常热，它跟云的 发展是息息相关的，它们的发展周期几乎一致。云其实也是一种分享经济，我 们过去看到分享经济中比较成功的，像交通出行、房屋，以及快递等等很多领 域，他们都是把我们社会中的服务能力共享出来、分享出去，这从我的角度定 义就是生产力的云化，就是把每一个企业、每一个个人拥有的生产力能够放到 云端，给需要这个能力的人共享。我们看到这个趋势是非常明显的。另外一个 就是社会分工的精细化，术业有专攻，每个企业都不可能是万能的，我们现在 看到未来的趋势是越来越往生态化走，每个企业都在自己最擅长的一个领域， 可能很薄，但是又非常广的层面上发挥自己的优势，然后进行上下游的合作。

Digital Discourse and BAT  129 最近腾讯发起了一个财团，这个财团并购了一个在芬兰的只有180多人的小公 司，但是它的估值却超过100亿美金，它是一个全球最大的手机游戏公司Supercell，我们这个财团用了86亿美金收购了84%的股份。应该说这是腾讯有史以来 最大的一个并购。但你很难想象，一家企业20多亿美金的收入，接近10亿美金 的利润，它只有180多人。这在传统企业是不可想象的，像我们过去讲，年收入 100多亿人民币的企业，怎么可能才100多人？任何一个部门都不止这个数字。 它恰恰就是使用了云的技术，它的所有的运营、服务全部都使用云端，所以它 的总部和它的开发人员非常精简，这就是一个非常好的社会化分工，以及云的 使用的案例。（马化腾，2016，云+未来） 7 员工不是越多越好，自己的员工越多，为社会创造的就业机会就越少。 • 将来至少有1000万人从事物流行业，为什么只给菜鸟5000人的预算？因为只 有这么做，才有可能在物流行业为世界创造1000万个就业机会。自己的人员 越多，给外面创造的机会就越少。我们应该给别人创造饭碗，这是我们企业 要做的事情。2015年我们不会再增加一名新员工 （马云，2015员工大会， 未来 pp. 65–66） 8 2012年，阿里做过一个预算，2013年所有指标、利润、收入翻一番。2012 年，淘宝、天猫如日中天，我说我们必须翻一番，其实我心里知道，我不说也 会翻一番的，但翻一番的基础是什么？当时，我请大家做一个“人”的预算， 翻一番要招多少员工？那时候，阿里总共已有两万多名员工，做出来的预算说 如果要翻一番，需要再增加8700人。我说不行，不能接受；第二次重新做计划 是7800人，我仍然不能接受；最后一次缩到5000人，我还是说不行，只能200 人！超过200人，所有员工，包括管理层，包括我在内，统统没有奖金，没有年 终奖。最终的结果是什么？所有的指标翻了一番还多，而新招人数只有将近300 人。这说明，改革就是逼出来的。（马云，2016浙商，未来已来 p. 138） 9 我一定不承诺你们会有钱，不承诺你们会当经理，不承诺你们会买到房子和汽 车，但你们的眼泪、委屈、冤枉、倒霉，我们公司一个都不会少，都会给你 们。（马云，2014，未来以来，p. 86） 10 我告诉大家，一旦有了班车，迟到的人就会更多，放下工作到时间就走的人会 更多。我们不是在乎加班，我们在乎的是你是否重视你的工作。如果你重视、 热爱你的工作，那你就会早起。 • 记住，利益一定是靠自己的努力换来的，没有谁的奖金、没有谁的收入是别 人给的，必须凭自己的努力去挣。业绩、市场是打下来的，没有人会平白无 故地给你们。成绩也是靠努力赢来的。我们为努力鼓掌，为结果付报酬。有 结果，We pay（我们付报酬）；如果你很努力，没有结果，我们鼓鼓掌，也 很好。（马云，2016，未来以来，p. 72） 11 我们将会从消费流通领域里面进入到生产制造，然后再进入到第三步生活方式 的改变，我们将从B2C全面挺进C2B，必须进行柔性化定制，真正为消费者解决 问题，真正的个性化制造。这将会在未来三年到五年逐步实现，不管我们做与 不做，这是社会的必然趋势。（马云，2012，网商大会） 12 制造商们也必须个性化，否则他们的生存将非常困难。未来制造商们生产的机 器，不仅要会生产，还要会“说话”，会“思考”。机器不再仅仅由石油和电 力驱动，还要靠数据来支撑。未来的企业将不再仅仅关注于规模，关注于标准 化，它们会更多地关注于灵活性、敏捷性、个性化。（马云，2015汉诺威，未 来已来 p. 82） 13 我觉得中国的产品从数量走向品质、质量，是一个必需的逐步完善的过程。中国 经济从制造业为主的实体经济，走向服务业为主的经济是必然的过程，是社会进 步的需求。现在没必要把实体经济和虚拟经济对立起来，其实银行、互联网产业 也是服务产业的一个组成部分。（马云， 2016南华早报，未来已来 p. 52） 14 更何况未来没有纯制造业，没有纯服务业，未来的制造业一定是服务业，尤其 到了IOT时代，你的纯制造时代已经过去了，未来得服务业一定是制造业。 … • 你说BAT是制造业还是服务业，我们是制造业，我们是制造了大量的数据， 处理信息制造过以后，跟别人去分享。（马云，2017互联网大会，企业家会 场，）

130  Digital Discourse and BAT 15 人工智能等技术成为推动经济高质量发展的重要力量，一方面经济转型升级的 内在要求为人工智能服务的实体经济提供了广阔的空间，另一方面，国内很多 应用场景为科技企业提供宝贵的机会，亿万网民产生的海量数据为机器学习提 供原料，大大加速技术迭代，加速智能经济的高速发展。（李彦宏，互联网大 会2019） 16 对于大量的传统企业来说，要尽快打通从生产制造到消费服务的价值链，要 实现从智慧零售到智能制造、从消费到产业（C2B）的生态协同，就不能仅仅 满足于一个完整的传统产业链，未来更需要与互联网公司进行跨界融合，真 正触达海量用户，并实现硬件、软件与服务三位一体的生态化能力。（马化 腾，2018合作伙伴） 17 我们相信，产业互联网是各行各业全面提升生产力、进行数字化转型升级的 重要载体，将会帮助中国经济从高速度向高质量转型。如果我们能够把个性化 的需求和规模化的生产力进行有效连接的话，我们将会创造出很多新的商业模 式，并且产生更多的生产力。这在工业时代是难以实现的。所以，互联网再不 是一个产业，而是所有产业的核心能力之一。在未来，所有的成功企业，都会 是数字化企业。（Martin Lau，数字生态大会2019） 18 很多人在担心中国的经济问题, 其实我个人觉得，中国经济从来没有遇到过这 么好的机遇… 中国经济巨大的潜力在于内需。以前中国经济的“三驾马车”， 即所谓的投资、出口和内需，投资和出口是政府的强项，但政府很难让老百姓 把钱掏出来进行消费。今天，我们可以用新的技术，用“云”去激发内需， 用“云”去启动内需，用云计算、用互联网去培养内需。我相信未来的20年， 中国会进入真正的内需时代。这是所有创新者、创业者的巨大机会所在。（马 云，2015云栖，未来已来 p. 44） 19 前五十年大家拼命的去生产，大规模生产同样的东西来满足这个需求，到一定 阶段以后人民没有消费领域了，到了后五十年咱们怎么让消费者消费需求的释 放出来，怎么样让他去买东西，于是就产生了信用卡，以及最后直接导致金融 危机，不同的金融创新东西，还有无限制的杠杆使得我们现在变成了这样一种 可以是说过度消费的受害者。（李彦宏，2009百度联盟） 20 …搜索基本上全部是拉动内需行业，百度30多万家客户都是面向内需的，也就 是说我们对经济所做的贡献，对经济的推动全部是内需方面，而这恰恰是中国 经济最良性的增长（李彦宏，2010百度联盟） 21 消费者的喜好、反馈是快速地通过网络来参与互动，同时还代表着互联网精 神，就是追求极致的产品体验，极致的用户口碑。用口碑营销、粉丝文化创造 出一线互联网化的产品，让人们口口相传，并让消费者参与决策，对移动互联 网产品的竞争力也非常重要。(马化腾, 2014腾讯全球合作伙伴大会) 22 无人车确实不是某一个公司单方面的努力，它是方方面面的巨大生态，而它的 这种演进，我觉得中国最有希望，因为我们有一个强势的政府，它在很多很多 基础设施的建设上都是在全世界是超前的。（李彦宏，2018数博会） 23 地球已经真正成为一个村落…原来的贸易方式会因为互联网彻底改变，WTO是 一个伟大的创举，但是这是在上一个世纪，WTO是政府制定的游戏规则，企业 执行，而政府制定的游戏规则，有的时候是非常难让企业执行的，各国之间出 于政治的原因，中国跟日本的谈判，日本跟韩国的谈判，根本坐不在一起，各 国有自己的思考，必定影响市场，我们应该建立一个真正通过市场经济、通过 企业家组建起来的商业社会，而今天互联网给了我们这样的机会。也许由于互 联网的出现、DT的出现，全世界的小企业因为这个技术、因为这个支付、因为 这个跨境的整个物流会联合在一起，就像今天淘宝网站上，青海和浙江、浙江 和海南、海南和广东，整个贸易如果是各省政府坐下来谈判搞一个协议，一定 做不成，一定是商人之间达成一个协议。…互联网将会改变整个全球贸易的走 势和格局，随着电子商务越来越多，这才是巨大的机会所在…所以大家在未来 的三十年到五十年以内，我相信没有人能阻挡互联网的力量，互联网本身巨大 的生态，它是能自己完善的 （马云，2014，互联网大会2014）

Digital Discourse and BAT  131 24 我 们 希 望 支 持 全 球 8 0 % 的 小 公 司 ， 所 以 我 们 倡 议 建 立 E - W T P （ 不 是 EWTO，EWTO是个组织，是政府行为）。淘宝上有30个省，我们从来不 让30个省长坐在一起讨论决策，生态会自己发展。所以我们要做E-WTP，EROAD，用商业的模式改变世界。（马云，2016投资者日） 25 阿里巴巴诞生在中国，但阿里巴巴不是一家中国公司，当然也不是美国的公 司。人家问阿里巴巴是哪个国家的公司，我回答，我们的股东来自世界各地。 我跟大家讲，阿里巴巴虽然诞生在中国，但它是全球化的公司。（马云，2016 百年阿里，未来已来 p. 72） 26 人工智能还有一个和过去互联网不一样的地方，就是它有强大的垂直整合的 特点，或者用我们这次会议的主题来说，就是网络空间的命运共同体。（李彦 宏，2017互联网大会） 27 第三个演化是，从“数字全球化”演化到“全球数字化”。过去二十年，互联网 与科技公司在全球化浪潮中获得了快速发展，推动着数字技术在全球的应用与普 及，培育了多家市值达到千亿，甚至万亿美元的公司。未来二十年，数字世界与 物理世界将深度融合，商品与服务之间的界限会进一步模糊，全球的数字化进程 将全面启动。这时，不单单是互联网与科技企业，各行各业都将驶入数字化增长 的“快车道”。随着全球数字化，数字技术和信息科技将成为连接全球经济的重 要纽带。大量的传统产业和新兴地区，有望通过数字化升级实现跨越式发展。我 相信，这也是中国企业跟全球接轨，并且打开全球市场的一个重要契机，我们在 这里一定要把握好这个机会。（刘炽平，2019全球数字生态大会） 28 新时代我们将面临新的问题，而同时又是新的机遇。人类只有成为“命运共同 体”，共建“命运共同体”，才能一起迎接新的时代和挑战。人类面临一系列 的问题是共同的，全球产业链一定会彻底变革，不是集装箱，而是小件快运， 不是Made In China或者Made In America，而是Made In Internet，不是B2C， 而是C2B。（马云，2017互联网大会，开幕） 29 将来的中小企业都是跨国企业，将来没有中国制造、美国制造，只有 Made IN Internet。达摩院要做的，就是真正要把技术进行普惠。（马云，2017云栖） 30 阿里巴巴已经不是一家普通的商业公司，我们在这个国家、在这个时代担当有 巨大的责任。十年以前我就在阿里巴巴讲：中国电商发展得好，跟阿里巴巴没 有关系；但是中国电商发展得不好，跟阿里巴巴有关系。因为那时候90%的 中国电子商务人才在我们公司，我们做得不对，就意味着这个国家做得不对。 （马云, 2017云栖） 31 过去，中国企业主要扮演的是新技术的跟随者，但是今天我们需要成为新技术 的驱动者和贡献者。例如，腾讯将用云的技术把我们的很多产品和技术开放给 生态企业，我们也将通过内容开放平台促进文化创意产业的发展，未来更多的 科技和文化产品将通过数字丝绸之路走向世界。（马化腾, 2017 互联网大会 2017） 32 同样，数字经济的发展让跨地域的协作创新产生了更多可能。比如今年我多次 谈到的粤港澳大湾区，也需要采用“宽平台”思维来鼓励协作创新，过去大家 之间有竞争，现在更需要握成一个拳头去向全球要市场、要人才，共同把数字 科技的创新生态做大。（马化腾，2017合作伙伴） 33 农业的AI化已经非常显现了，我们要打好中国粮，端好中国碗，AI是不可或缺 的。（李彦宏，2018世界大会） 34 百度在过去十多年一直致力于人工智能技术的投入，我们未来也希望跟在座 很多的同行企业家一起为中国的人工智能技术发展和进步作出我们应该做的事 情，也非常期待中国能够成为全球领先的人工智能技术的国家，也很希望看到 未来第一个完全只允许无人车行驶的城市出现在中国，谢谢。（李彦宏，2016 数博会） 35 芯片是核心技术，而我们和发达国家确实有不少差距，但是在IoT芯片领域，我 们有机会弯道超车。中国拥有全球最大的互联网用户和市场，有机会发展自己 的芯片。很多时候，因为基础不好才有可能更快地发展。（马云，2018云栖）

132  Digital Discourse and BAT References Barbrook, R., & Cameron, A. (1996). The Californian ideology. Science as Culture, 6(1), 44–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/09505439609526455 Bryman, A. (2012). Social research methods (4th Edition). Oxford University Press. Curran, J., Fenton, N., & Freedman, D. (2012). Misunderstanding the Internet. Routledge. Dean, J. (2004). The networked empire: Communicative capitalism and the hope for politics. In P. A. Passavant & J. Dean (Eds.), Empire’s new cloths (pp. 265–288). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203644003 Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and social change. Polity Press. Fairclough, N. (2013). Critical discourse analysis and critical policy studies. Critical Policy Studies, 7(2), 177–197. Fairclough, N. (2015). Language and power (3rd Edition). Routledge. Fisher, E. (2010). Media and new capitalism in the digital age. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230106062 Fuchs, C. (2013). Social media: A critical introduction. Sage. Fuchs, C. (2015). Culture and economy in the age of social media. Routledge. Habermas, J. (2006). Political communication in media society: Does democracy still enjoy an epistemic dimension? The impact of normative theory on empirical research. Communication Theory, 16(4), 411–426. Herman, E. S., & Chomsky, N. (2010). Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media. Random House. Hoffmann, A. L., Proferes, N., & Zimmer, M. (2018). Making the world more open and connected: Mark Zuckerberg and the discursive construction of Facebook and its users. New Media & Society, 20(1), 199–218. Huang, Z. (2018, January 24). China’s next-generation tech giants are TMD: Toutiao, Meituan-Dianping, and Didi Chuxing. Quartz. John, N. A. (2013). Sharing and Web 2.0: The emergence of a keyword. New Media & Society, 15(2), 167–182. Li, R. (2014). Speech at the Baidu Union Summit. Summary available at http://www. rmzxb.com.cn/c/2014-05-29/332400.shtml Li, R. (2017). Speech at the 4th WIC. Official Website: http://www.china.com.cn/ zhibo/content_41954456.htm Ma, P.  (2014). Letter to Tencent’s Partners at Tencent Global Partner Conference (TGPC). Summary available at http://tech.china.com.cn/entrepreneur/20151020/204684.shtml Ma, P.  (2016). Letter to Tencent’s Partners at Tencent Global Partner Conference (TGPC). Official website: http://tech.cnr.cn/techzt/tgpc2016/ Ma, Y. J. (2015). CeBIT 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cgMG0059IGg Ma, Y. J. (2017). The future has come (Weilai Yilai) (Alibaba Group, Ed.). HongQi Publisher. Mosco, V. (2005). The digital sublime: Myth, power, and cyberspace. MIT Press. Murdoch, S., & Stanway, D. (2021, April 10). China fines Alibaba record $2.75 bln for anti-monopoly violations. Reuters. Available at: https://www. reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/china-regulators-fine-alibaba-275bln-anti-monopoly-violations-2021-04-10/ Ping, S. S., & Magasic, M. (2016). Knowledge workers, identities, and communication practices: understanding code farmers in China. TripleC: Communication,

Digital Discourse and BAT  133 Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society, 14(1), 312–332. Raynes-Goldie, K. S. (2012). Privacy in the age of Facebook: Discourse, architecture, consequences.Curtin University. Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (2001). Discourse and discrimination: Rhetorics of racism and antisemitism. Routledge. van Dijck, J. (2013). The culture of connectivity: A critical history of social media. Oxford University Press. van Dijk, T. (2013). CDA is NOT a method of critical discourse analysis. EDISO. Available at: https://www.edisoportal.org/ca/blog/en-voz-alta/cda-is-not-a-method-of-criticaldiscourse-analysis Wang, B. (2013, January 5). E-commerce King Jack Ma: E-commerce will basically replace traditional business. China Times. Available at: http://finance.sina.com.cn/ leadership/crz/20130105/005714186979.shtml Wang, Y. (2021, March 15). Chinese regulators impose antitrust fines on internet giants like Tencent and BaiduThe Wall Street Journal (Chinese). Available at: https:// cn.wsj.com/articles/中国监管部门以违反反垄断法为由对多家互联网巨头处以罚 款-11615535413?reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink Wen, J. (2021, March 25). Tencent officially launches 2021 internship recruitment, opens over 8,000 positions. Beijing Youth Daily. Available at https://new.qq.com/ rain/a/20210325A075KB00 Wodak, R., & Meyer, M. (2015). Critial discourse studies: History, agenda, theory and methodology. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of critical discourse studies (3rd Edition, pp. 1–22). London: Sage.

5 Negotiating Digital Discourse

Gramsci (1971) points out the chaotic configuration of common sense and the importance to relate ideology to people’s everyday experiences. It is important to study not only the leaders and elites but also the ordinary digital labourers and how they understand and express ICT-related ideologies. Therefore, in addition to the dominant speeches of the Chinese leaders and BAT CEOs, this chapter presents findings from focus groups that aim to gain insight into the nuanced positions of Chinese digital labourers. Drawing from previous studies on digital labour (Fuchs, 2014; Qiu, 2016; Qiu et al., 2014), this chapter selects three types of informants – assembly-line workers, programmers, and white-collar Internet users – to explore their roles in the production process, their value in different stages of value creation and profit realization, and their perspectives on ICT industry-related ideologies. To gather information from digital labourers, focus groups were utilized, and the questionnaire used in these groups was centred around three areas: cultural, economic, and political aspects. The goal was to understand the online experiences of three different types of workers in China’s digital capitalism and how they interpret and understand these experiences. This chapter will specifically focus on their digital discourse related to the Internet Economy (Section 9.1) and Internet Politics, which encompasses both content control and market regulation (Section 9.2). Additionally, this chapter will explore a significant ideology among participants – There Is No Alternative (TINA). Lastly, a summary of participants’ digital discourse will be provided using Hall’s (1980) encoding-decoding model, and an attempt will be made to clarify the relationship between digital labourers’ class positions and their opinions about the Internet. 5.1

The Internet Economy

In this section, the digital discourse of three different types of workers regarding the Internet economy will be analysed. This section aims to address the following questions: What are their opinions on the New Economy, particularly MEI; What are their attitudes towards Internet companies; How do they view data collection; and How do they construct their relationship with companies through discourse? DOI: 10.4324/9781003315810-8

Negotiating Digital Discourse  135 5.1.1  A Decentralized Market with New Opportunities?

It is not surprising that, under the neoliberal paradigm of the Internet, as well as the active promotion of MIE (mass innovation and entrepreneurship) by the government and companies (see Chapters 3 and 4), people consider the Internet and ICT provide new opportunities for individuals and economic growth for companies and nations. This section focuses on how participants perceive the Internet as providing new opportunities in the market. This type of argument from workers is consistent with the propagation of the ideology of the “New Economy” or “Digital Economy” from the dominant groups. With the help of the Internet, it is claimed, there are new opportunities and niche markets for individuals to start their businesses. By emphasizing economic benefits brought by the Internet, individuals are encouraged to participate in the wave to start their businesses. This argument also shows a one-dimensional understanding of the Internet as economic instruments. When asked to summarize their impressions about the Internet using three words, a programmer responded “I think that the Internet is all about making money” and claims that the “spirit of the Internet” to make a lot of money.1 The programmer explained that the Internet has disrupted traditional industries and enabled companies to generate significant profits. Those who become successful in this Internet business can be perceived as “legends”. For example, another programmer cites Zhou Hongyi, CEO of the 360 antivirus company, as an example of a legend who employed a smart approach to doing business (programmer group 2, #3). Although Zhou’s questionable practices of pushing advertisements through pop-up windows caused controversy, he was still highly regarded by the programmer for his success in dominating the market. He describes Zhou’s triumph over his competitors in a dramatic and storytelling manner, portraying him as confident and cool. The programmer also emphasizes the importance of having a large user base in making money, and expresses their general identification with a competitive commercial process. Several participants shared their experiences of using the Internet to generate income, such as participating in Weishang (businesses built through WeChat networks), opening stores on Taobao, or engaging in other types of the gig economy related to the Internet. One example is a manufacturing worker group participant who, when asked about their impressions of the Internet, answered that it provides more opportunities to make money.2 The participant’s response is solely based on an economic perspective without any mention of the specific types of employment or opportunities provided by the Internet economy. The coherence between the question and answer implies an assumption of an instrumentalist view of the Internet. However, this optimist view about new opportunities and business models on the Internet is constantly contested by the workers. A programmer, for example, points out that in all industries, the businesses that seize the largest group of users become the tycoons of that industry eventually (programmer

136  Negotiating Digital Discourse group 2, #4).3 Thus, the Internet will not necessarily bring decentralized market. While there are discussions among manufacturing worker groups about the reality of starting businesses through e-commerce and new jobs created by the Internet, such as logistics, some participants are more critical about this argument. For instance, one manufacturing worker from group 2 started a small online shop on Taobao but found it difficult to make money due to the high competition and the need to invest in credibility or profile-building, which requires a lot of effort and resources. [1]  “I didn’t make any money, because [if you open a shop] on Taobao, if you always stay in front of your computer, then there might be some business, but it also requires you to have high credibility or profile … If you are a new shop, it is hardly visited … Millions of people are opening shops on Taobao, I mean, there is little chance that your shop will be paid attention to, it is very hard to make money, you need to invest a lot of money, and to Shuadan [to construct fake visiting and buying numbers]”.4 One participant in the manufacturing worker group shares her friend’s experience with Weishang, a new business phenomenon enabled by WeChat. She explains that her friend invested tens of thousands of Yuan but did not make any money (manufacturing worker group 2, #8). Weishang refers to small businesses run through WeChat networks, where people can advertise to their friends, relatives, and acquaintances. This type of advertising is shown in a relatively private communication tool in China, which is WeChat moments. While other groups complain about the advertising on WeChat moments, participants in the manufacturing worker groups discuss Weishang more as they or their friends have tried starting Weishang businesses before. 5.1.2  “There Is Simply No Privacy Online”

Two ways are commonly employed to legitimize Internet companies’ collection of user data. One of these ways involves a phenomenon where concerns about data security are conflated with the for-profit operations of data collection by these companies. Internet companies collect data from users, incentivize them to provide more personal information, and sell it to advertising companies. This is distinct from the actions of hackers who exploit security loopholes to steal personal data. However, while I asked participants about their views on data collection by commercial online platforms, their concerns mostly revolved around data security, disruptive advertising, and data leaks. This is problematic as it can lead to the legitimization of Internet companies’ data collection practices since, according to those conflate these two, “every user is running naked” on the Internet. The confusion between these two issues is especially prevalent among programmer groups. When asked about their worries regarding personal data

Negotiating Digital Discourse  137 online and their understanding of how online platforms obtain user data, a programmer (group1, #4) suggested that those with a background in Internet security may have fewer concerns. He cited his own experience working in a cybersecurity company and being knowledgeable about cybersecurity techniques that can be used to obtain information from users. He claimed that it is possible to acquire any information from users through these techniques. [2]  Although we keep emphasising users’ privacy, yet actually on the Internet, every user is running naked, it means that through technological means, you can acquire any information.5 This is a typical argument from programmer groups that data breaches and leaks are bound to happen. #4 provided an explanation for why he isn’t concerned about the collection and leaks of personal data, citing two reasons, one of which is the inevitability of data leakage. [3]  If people don’t consider, for example, mobile numbers, QQ numbers, date of birth, etc., information as private, then there won’t be any issues, because it is unrealistic to consider these as private. There are so many ways to leak the information. Several years ago in China, many websites used unreliable security protection, so, if you used, including QQ, if you registered, you filled your information online, if there were leakage incidents a few years ago on these websites, they called it ‘Drag Database’…then this information has already been leaked, your [information] has already been leaked, then [after the leak] you made some extra security protections in other occasions, what is the result? It just means that [your information] will be leaked fewer times, but eventually, it will be leaked anyway.6 He also uses Mark Zuckerberg’s personal data leakage as an example to highlight that hackers will always find opportunities, and complete online security is impossible. As a result, he suggests people should give up their concerns about online privacy because data breaches are inevitable. Extracts 2 and 3 incorrectly equate the issue of personal data collection and privacy violations caused by companies to personal data theft by hackers. When asked about how companies collect and analyse user data, the programmer immediately links it to security issues and argues that data leaks are unavoidable. This type of discourse is ideological because it deflects attention from the problematic practices of commercial companies to hacking issues. The argument implies that personal data collection by commercial platforms is acceptable due to this inevitability, which is a technologically deterministic argument. It is interesting that this argument is pessimistic, yet it is turned around to suggest that personal data collection, analysis, and commodification are legitimate practices. Therefore, this argument helps legitimize the collection of personal data. If data leak is inevitable, the argument continues, big companies have better technologies to protect their personal data, which is why participants

138  Negotiating Digital Discourse choose to give data to BAT. For example, participants prefer to use one or two social media accounts, typically WeChat or Weibo, to sign up for other platforms using the Application Programme Interface (API) because it is convenient and they trust big companies to protect their personal information better.7 API is a collection of procedures that enable applications to connect and exchange data with an open operating system. When users use one social media account to sign in to another application, it is through API, and platforms then share user data and information to show advertising based on the integrated information gathered from different platforms through API. Ironically, concerns about information security enable big companies to commercialize the collection of personal data through API. 5.1.3  “Internet Companies Need Advertising to Survive”

Another way of justifying companies’ data collection practices is by arguing that market rules dictate them. This argument accepts the neoliberal notion that data collection is a necessary foundation for Internet-based businesses to survive, and selling advertising is the only way for these platforms to stay afloat in the market. The main point of this argument is that if an Internet platform or company wants to survive, it must collect data and sell it for advertising purposes. For instance, a participant from the manufacturing workers group described some disruptive and disturbing advertising they had experienced and argued that “these ads might be its [the companies/ platforms] ways of survival” and “ways to make money”. Another participant added that it is “their important way to survive” (see also Section 5.3). Nonetheless, there are opposing viewpoints about companies collecting user data for their own benefit. Programmers are also more knowledgeable about how Internet companies deceive users into uploading or sharing more personal information with them. For instance, a programmer (#6) in programmer group 1 differs from #4, who used the metaphor of users running naked online and equated user privacy with information security. Programmer #6 argues that: [4]  The companies are probably misleading [users] (Moderator: Why?) because, as they [other participants] discussed earlier, to make themselves easier for users to use, many apps can be installed by only one click … If you want to use the new apps, normally you need to register, but if you use WeChat or QQ to authorise the app, you can skip all the steps, so before you log in to a new app, it asks whether you agree to use QQ or WeChat to log in … You think it’s convenient, then you authorise the app, then because it’s authorised, then they can get your information on social media such as WeChat and QQ, and through this way, they can gain some personal private information, but as a normal user, you probably think [it’s fine], but they don’t tell you what the risks behind this authorisation are, they didn’t tell you that actually, they have gained your privacy.8

Negotiating Digital Discourse  139 Furthermore, apart from being aware of companies’ data collection practices, there is also oppositional behaviour towards data collection through a more passive use of social media. Some participants take opposing stances by claiming to use social media platforms less frequently, exhibiting a type of critical consciousness and not following any ideologies in Fuchs’ 16 categories (Fuchs, 2015, p. 87; see also Chapter 1). These participants’ actions demonstrate that the collection of data and violation of user privacy by commercial platforms can damage the Internet’s connective functions. It is worth noting that while all types of participants express criticism towards online advertising and data commodification, white-collar groups and programmers are more capable of engaging in oppositional behaviour, such as using ad-block software or browser extension add-ons, compared to assembly line workers. In white-collar group 1, for instance, all participants indicate that they use some kind of software to block advertising online, such as 360, Tencent PC Manager, or add-ons on Chrome. Similarly, participants in programmer groups demonstrate a general understanding and use of blocking software. In contrast, participants from assembly line worker groups claim that there is no way to block advertising. When asked if they knew of any way to block online ads, one manufacturing worker stated that “there is no way to block [ads]”, while another worker claimed that “it needs professionals/experts [to block online ads]”. These responses are markedly different from those of white-collar and programmer groups, who demonstrate a greater level of knowledge and ability to engage in oppositional behaviour against online advertising and data collection. 5.1.4  “We Are Powerful Consumers”

During the focus groups, it was evident that many participants primarily view themselves as consumers of commercial platforms and Internet companies. When discussing their opinions about the Internet and concerns regarding privacy and security, they approached these issues from a consumer’s standpoint. This aligns with the neoliberal perspective that the market is the best way to promote human well-being (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). It also shows an instrumental understanding of the Internet and ignores its communicative function as a public sphere (Habermas, 1991). For instance, when asked about alternative platforms without advertisements, some participants inquired about the funding model, whether it involved membership or subscription fees. One participant, who previously donated to two community-built CC software, specifically emphasized that she perceives her contribution as payment for the service rather than as a donation: [5]  Moderator: So did you donate for the software because you think it was helpful for you? (#5): It is not like a donation; I think it is worth it spending money to purchase their products

140  Negotiating Digital Discourse (#2): [we are] willing to pay for our use (#5): yes, I think I am really willing to pay for it, and also they didn’t charge a lot, or maybe it’s just me, I think my current situation is that if the product is worth the money. I wouldn’t waste a lot of energy to find a free replacement, to find free software for bypassing the GFW [She donated to the software for this purpose]. If there is a good service, I would like to pay for it.9 This is a response when I asked the groups to share their thoughts on non-commercial platforms such as Wikipedia and whether they believe the Wikipedia model is feasible in China. Participant #5 from white-collar group 2 gave examples of two software programs she supported through donations but emphasized that she perceives her contributions as purchasing a service. This response is noteworthy as it reframes the Moderator’s use of the word “donate” and strongly implies the participant’s identity as a consumer. Through this discourse, the participant positions herself as a consumer even of non-commercial, community-supported software. Given the current dominance of commercial Internet platforms in China, it is not surprising that there is a lack of imagination regarding alternative, non-profit, publicly owned or shared Internet platforms. A significant number of participants perceive their power as Internet users primarily in their role as consumers, rather than as active citizens or netizens with political identities. This reflects a narrow, neoliberal view of the Internet as a tool for economic growth, where benefits are only gained through financial transactions or consumer-oriented marketing tactics such as advertising and promotions, rather than as a political public sphere. This inclination to view themselves as Internet consumers is evident in the trust participants place in large companies or interactive social media platforms operating on a commercial model. Users believe that these companies must protect their data to maintain their position in the market. Participants commonly express trust in big companies such as BAT, which dominate the market, assuming that they are less likely to misuse or leak user data and can provide better protection of information. The prevailing sentiment among participants is that if these companies lose the trust of their customers, they will fail. As one programmer puts it: [6]  I think, from now on, Internet companies and some big companies will pay a lot of attention on issues about Internet security, including individual privacy, because since they have attracted these user groups, then the privacy of these user groups and the security of these individuals’ information have become an important task of the company, as if one day they lose this information, they will lose a majority of users, and for Internet companies, if they don’t have users, then they don’t have a future.10 (programmer group 2, 40.53, #4)

Negotiating Digital Discourse  141 Fairclough’s notion of scripts refers to the accepted representations of subjects and their relationships involved in activities (Fairclough, 2015, p. 169), which are evident in this excerpt. These scripts can only be comprehensible among participants when the following scripts are widely accepted. First, there are two dominant subject identities involved: commercial Internet companies, as providers of products and services, and users as consumers who receive those services, rather than as politically engaged citizens or netizens on not-for-profit or publicly owned platforms. Second, the excerpt claims an explicit power relation where users have the power to negotiate with companies and demand protection of their private information and online data because users are customers who can choose to stay with or leave the service providers. These pre-existing expectations and assumptions allow the textual elements to form a coherent whole, constituting an ideological discourse. These scripts reflect the “positive” dynamic of a free market/neoliberal thought. In contrast, there are minimal discussions on how to involve oneself in political decision-making to restrict companies’ collection and use of personal data. Instead, when discussing laws or regulations on the Internet, it is often regarded as something for the government to solve, rather than for people to participate in. This demonstrates a deeper ideology of “there is no alternative” (as discussed in Section 5.3). The above statement demonstrates the fallacy of petitio principii or begging the question, as argued by Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p. 73). The argument that big companies will protect user data and not misuse it because they will lose users if they do not, assumes that this premise is true without providing any evidence to support it. However, there have been instances of serious data leakage by Chinese Internet platforms, including all BATs and several large platforms (Ye, 2018). This issue is not solely due to hackers or the ability and willingness of Internet companies to safeguard user information but also because these companies encourage users to share more personal information and connect all their platforms through APIs, without fully informing users about how their data is collected, shared, and used. The development and monopolistic tendencies of these platforms rely on the compulsive acquisition of user data and violations of users’ right to know. 5.2

Internet Politics

The upcoming portion of this study will centre around the encounters of individuals with Internet censorship and content regulation in China. The inquiries I asked were aimed at understanding how participants defend the actions of both the government and companies involved in this control. Three noteworthy patterns emerged from their justifications, which include concerns about potential risks and adverse impacts from hostile foreign countries, the possibility of social instability, and the distinctive “national condition” (Guo Qing “国情”) of China.

142  Negotiating Digital Discourse 5.2.1  The “Enemy State”

The primary ideology prevalent in China is nationalism, which involves the creation of an “us vs. them” mentality where other countries, particularly Western nations, are portrayed as adversaries to be confronted. Participants in the focus groups legitimize the Chinese government’s Internet control policies through a narrative that emphasizes the antagonism between China (as the “us”) and other countries, especially the United States (as the “them”). This section highlights two approaches used to construct this narrative. The first approach involves asserting that certain online content, primarily from the West, has a detrimental impact on the worldview of Chinese people. The second approach is to describe perceived threats to China’s national security posed by other countries. According to some participants, censorship is deemed necessary because they believe that the West attempts to corrupt the thinking of Chinese citizens. For instance, one white-collar group participant referred to the term “enemy state” (Di Guo “敌国”) when expressing their views about censorship: [7] First of all, one country’s own politics surely serves the interests of its own country. And enemy states’ (slight laughter), I mean other country’s politics (slight laughter) surely also serves the interests of their own country. First of all, just one simple example, often some foreign anti-China forces influence Chinese people’s thinking on some websites, such as Weibo. Therefore, it [the government] needs [to apply censorship].11 These expressions construct a narrative that portrays other countries as enemies. The participant uses the word “them” to differentiate between China and other countries. Reisigl and Wodak refer to this as a strategy of collectivization, which uses pronouns to emphasize similarities among “us” and differences between “us” and “them” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 48) The extract also employs the topos of threat, as the participant characterizes “enemy states” as “foreign anti-China forces” who aim to “influence” (meaning corrupt) Chinese people’s thinking. Additionally, the extract suggests that the participant views China and the Chinese government as equivalent entities. The participant perceives politics as serving the interests of the “state” rather than the people. Another method of constructing confrontational relations between China and other countries is through the lens of national security. According to this perspective, the government’s Internet control measures are deemed “necessary” to safeguard national security and interests. For instance, a programmer explains why they support the government’s decision to block Facebook and Google in China: [8]  I have different opinions [about whether the Chinese government should allow Facebook to enter China or not]. I think there are some

Negotiating Digital Discourse  143 concerns at the state level to ban Facebook because if people use some means for social communication so widely, there are some very, very important issues about information, for example, some officials, if [they] all chat through Facebook, America can gain our information easily, then it can do something about this information, for example, two Chinese officials talk to each other, and talk about something, then Facebook, it, after all, it is from a foreign country, we cannot have full control, perhaps, maybe, Facebook, for example, it and America, it and its government, conduct some [exchange of information] and its information must not only be stored in Facebook but also in some of its national stuff, right? It perhaps could collect this information, or do something, for example [if] China has some issues with some other countries, it [Facebook/America] could conduct some actions, I think from the national level, it [the Chinese government] should not want it [Facebook] to come in…12 In this passage, the participant asserts that Facebook is a “foreign” company that may cooperate with the American government or is highly likely to do so. There is an equivalence between the American government and American companies, with the participant frequently using the deictics “we” and “our” to distinguish China from other countries, particularly America. This creates a clear distinction between “we” as China and the Chinese state versus “them” as America, American companies (Facebook), and the American government (strategies of collectivization). When asked if she believes that Facebook could represent the interests of the American government, the participant explains that American intelligence agencies could obtain information about China if Chinese people and officials use Facebook. She also contends that Facebook could easily disseminate “some information” (which could be detrimental to the Chinese government) to the American government via Facebook, as demonstrated in the excerpt [8]. The way in which the participant constructs the relationships between America, its intelligence agencies, and American companies like Facebook and Apple is quite simplistic.13 This may be due to a lack of understanding of the complex nature of the relationships between the government and businesses in the US. In contrast, the participant seems to perceive a more direct relationship between the Chinese government and Chinese companies, perhaps due to the Chinese government’s greater control over businesses operating within the country. This perception of state power as primary over business power is common among Chinese Internet users, who tend to internalize a friend/enemy nationalist discourse that portrays other countries as enemies and justifies state control over the Internet as a necessary measure to protect national security and interests. This is exemplified by cases such as Google’s departure from China14 and Apple’s recent agreement to store Chinese user data in a new database within mainland China.

144  Negotiating Digital Discourse On the other hand, there are arguments that oppose the notion of Chinese Internet companies being equivalent to China. Some participants express their desire for banned foreign platforms, like Google and Facebook, to be allowed entry into China to provide unfiltered information for Chinese people. Baidu, a Chinese search engine, is often compared unfavourably to Google, as seen in the example where a white-collar group 2 participant #2 criticizes Baidu-Baike and Baidu as less reliable than Wikipedia and Google (white-collar group 2, #2). Additionally, one programmer criticizes Baidu for charging money for documents that are freely shared by users on the platform, which he believes goes against the spirit of the Internet (programmer group 1, #4). Therefore, according to the non-ideological opinions of the participants, Chinese Internet companies do not represent China and do not necessarily serve the interests of the Chinese people. 5.2.2  “We Need a Stable Country”

This second type of discourse advocates for the necessity of government control over the Internet in China, including measures such as censorship and surveillance. The argument is that stability is more important than other demands from the Chinese people, including freedom, democracy, or the right to dissent. It is said that oppression is necessary to maintain social stability, and that any attempt to fight for democracy or instability caused by such attempts is viewed as a threat rather than a positive force. To begin with, the focus groups revealed a nationalist perspective that argues oppression is necessary to maintain stability in China. This viewpoint is widespread among the participants, who consider stability to be a fundamental priority and believe that Internet control is necessary to achieve it. This perception is so ingrained that it is considered basic common sense and background knowledge. It is ironic that this concept of using social media to pacify people is not limited to China, as it is also present in supposedly free market and capitalist Western societies, where social media is believed to promote consumer and individualist identities. In contrast, there is a lack of discussion on the root causes of discontent that leads to instability, who benefits from oppressing dissidents, who loses their rights and freedoms under strict control, and what the consequences of such control might be. Instead, some participants argue that national stability requires the oppression of certain ethnic minority groups, revealing a racist discourse. For example, one participant argues that ethnic minority groups may make the country more unstable and that information about these groups needs to be censored online (programmer group 1, #2). Although the focus group was meant to discuss government censorship and the closure of websites, this participant spontaneously linked the need for censorship to ethnic issues, illustrating how some people use ethnic issues to legitimize Internet control. Another example of this discourse was found in a focus group of manufacturing workers, where a participant expressed

Negotiating Digital Discourse  145 the belief that certain online posts related to “sensitive” issues should be censored to prevent them from causing instability, as they were considered “extreme”. [9]  If some individuals make extreme [statements], or use some sensitive terms, I mean, if [the statements and terms are] browsed by other people, I mean [they] might cause others’ to have, similar attitudes or similar opinions, so it is normal to have some information deleted, and then now there is a lot of ‘positive energy’ (slight laughter).15 The participant asserts that an unregulated society leads to instability, making it reasonable and necessary for the government to practice censorship. He does not provide any further explanation for the cause of instability, but suggests that prioritizing stability is common sense for the development of the Chinese economy and well-being. The participant uses the term “positive energy” to describe the government’s censorship efforts, which is a term promoted by the government to shape Internet culture. The exact meaning of “positive energy” is not clear, but it appears that a controlled Internet is seen as a source of positivity (for example, see Xi’s 419 speech in Chapter 3). The use of the term “positive energy” indicates the participant’s attitude towards Internet control. Another approach to support the importance of stability in China is to highlight the negative consequences of instability in other countries, particularly those where pro-democracy movements have caused instability. For instance, a programmer uses the example of the Arab Spring to emphasize the need for Internet control. According to the programmer, the local government’s failure to control the Internet led to the loss of discourse power, which resulted in continuous wars and overthrown governments in the Middle East. Therefore, the programmer believes that information, which he refers to as a special type of capital, must be controlled.16 The programmer uses the Arab Spring as a lesson or a warning for those who advocate for a more relaxed control of the Internet in China, as they believe it will lead to instability and war. However, the programmer does not provide any explanation regarding the underlying causes of the Arab Spring or why people rebelled. The programmer concludes that the lack of Internet control will lead to instability and implies that stability should be prioritized over any other concern in China. This argument regarding the importance of stability in China is not a recent development and has existed for a long time, even before it was applied to Internet-related discussions. Scholars have attempted to explore the historical origins and ideological power of this dominant idea. At a broader level, the idea of hierarchical stability as a fundamental function of the state can be traced back to Confucian thought, where Confucius emphasized the importance of ethical behaviour and ritual. In more recent times, the concept of stability in China is linked to the disastrous Cultural Revolution and social upheavals in the 1980s both in China and globally. Yongnian Zheng

146  Negotiating Digital Discourse (2004) examines the formation of “China’s model of reform” for the thirdgeneration leadership under Jiang Zemin, which involves economic reform without political reform. According to Zheng, one of the ways the legitimacy of “China’s model of reform” was established was by emphasizing sociopolitical stability. Initially, in the 1980s, the Chinese Communist Party found it challenging to justify stability as a prerequisite for economic reform. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s changed popular perceptions of stability. Radical political reform was no longer acceptable, and authoritarian rule became more tolerable as long as economic improvement continued (Zheng, 2004, pp. 54–56). Wang Hui also argues that the state used the upheaval of 1989 to establish its legitimacy, and ironically, the request for maintaining stability eventually obscured the crisis of state legitimacy that had gradually arisen due to neoliberal reforms (Wang, 2003, p. 62). Hence, arguments for tighter control to maintain stability in China have a historical context and have always been an ideological discourse. On the other hand, there are counterarguments that challenge the notion of prioritizing stability and emphasize the need to recognize the interests of minority groups that are oppressed. These arguments are more prevalent among manufacturing worker groups who are more likely to fight against censorship and hold oppositional positions towards the dominant ideology. Many participants from these groups have experienced their accounts being banned or deleted, leading them to change accounts or wait for their accounts to become active again. Unlike white-collar workers who tend to hold more negotiated positions (acceptance of dominant ideology at an abstract level but make its own rules at a situational level based on their life experiences and self-interests), manufacturing worker groups have a stronger motivation to resist censorship because their posts relate to their lived experiences of exploitation in factories and human rights movements. Additionally, the government is more likely to allow looser control over the rights movements of single, individual, urban, middle-class issues, compared to collective farmers and worker issues relating to provocative social movements (Yang, 2009, p. 292). This partially explains why white-collar workers and programmers’ posts are more about freedom of expression and rights to information, while manufacturing worker groups’ posts are more directly linked to their experiences of exploitation. 5.2.3  “We Have a Unique National Condition” (Guoqing)

There is a third type of argument used to justify online content control in China, which revolves around the idea of China’s unique “national condition” (Guoqing). Focus group participants argue that Western-style liberal democracy is not suitable for China due to its unique “national condition”. The concept of “national quality” (Guomin Suzhi) is also related to this argument, referring to the overall quality of the Chinese population. Those who make this argument claim that Chinese people are not ready for democracy

Negotiating Digital Discourse  147 due to their low level of “national quality” and that they require a strong authoritarian state to maintain stability. This section will examine the discourse surrounding these two terms: “national condition” (Guoqing) and “national quality” (Guomin Suzhi). To begin with, during a group discussion on online censorship and surveillance, one programmer cited China’s unique “national condition” as a justification for censorship. The programmer stated that China has a complex national condition due to its many ethnic groups and that rumours can easily cause social instability if left unchecked, so censorship is necessary to prevent this.17 Another programmer agreed and added that censorship is currently needed due to China’s stage of development, which is not yet ready for a more open and free society.18 This argument is common among focus groups, where “national condition” is used to refer to various factors such as Chinese traditional culture, political culture, and “national quality” (Guomin Suzhi). Both are typical in their focus on “national condition”, with the first one emphasizing China’s numerous ethnic minority groups as a unique factor, which the second focuses on China’s current stage of development. However, there is no one clear definition of “national condition”, and it is often used as an ambiguous term to justify censorship in China. The second example also shows a specific discourse that concentrates on individuals. This discourse, centred around the concept of “quality” (Suzhi), argues that Chinese individuals are not ready for democracy. One programmer, when asked about their opinion on government censorship, uses this discourse to explain their views.19 According to the programmer, the lack of free speech in China is due to the current level of “national quality” (Suzhi). As the national quality improves (in terms of education and other factors), the state will be able to grant more freedom of speech without harming society: [10]  In fact, perhaps compared to foreign countries, [China] is not free enough in terms of speech, but in fact, this is due to the national quality (Suzhi). If national quality (Suzhi) rises to a certain (higher) level, then there will be more freedom of speech. Freedom is relative, if the national quality is not (high) enough, is low, it (the state) gives you freedom it will actually bring more harm to society, for example, if the whole or average national education level keeps increasing, from the previous primary school average gradually to the current high school and university level, if when the country, or say from our generation, I think gradually, when in the future everyone can go to university, I think when in that way the national quality (Suzhi) increases to a certain level, then the state will give you much greater freedom of speech, including, for example, though our country has voting rights now, we actually don’t have it, meaning there are some delegates, who represent us to vote, that is because it [the state] thinks we can’t make decisions, can’t vote. In the future I think, after our government and nation

148  Negotiating Digital Discourse gradually develop, including our whole level comes up, gradually [the state] will give us more freedom and rights, and this is also for the purpose to maintain social stability. The question of which type of system, a flawless authoritarian one or a flawed democratic one, can better promote and improve people’s “quality” (Suzhi) for democracy is an important one. The concept of national quality (Guomin Suzhi) is often used in China to legitimize its undemocratic situation, and this is a widely accepted argument. Although there are more than 32 translations of Suzhi into English, no single term can fully capture its meaning (Kipnis, 2006, p. 296; see also, Anagnost, 1997; Judd, 2002; Kipnis, 2006; Murphy, 200420). However, several studies have attempted to explain Suzhi’s meaning in China’s socio-political context, and it is often used to legitimize the country’s neoliberal tendencies and growing inequality (e.g. Judd, 2002; Kipnis, 2006; Murphy, 2004). It is also viewed as crucial for the survival of the nation in nationalistic discourses (e.g. Anagnost, 1997, see also a popular book embedded in this argument written by Xie Sizhong, The Quality Crisis of Our Nation), and the Chinese government uses it as a measure of patriotism (Kipnis, 2006, p. 311; Murphy, 2004, p. 16). Regardless of its exact meaning, Suzhi is used to legitimize the current situation in China, and it is a nationalist discourse that supports the authoritarian socio-political arrangements in the country. In extract [10], Suzhi has two key meanings that are related to nationalist ideology. Firstly, it is associated with technocracy and patriarchy in Chinese politics. According to Yan Hairong, the term Guomin Suzhi (the quality of the national population) is “suitably technocratic in a context where technocratic leaders dominate national politics and politics itself is deployed as a technocracy” (Yan, 2003, p. 514). Extract [10] argues that the low level of national quality makes it unsuitable for the population to have greater freedom of speech and rights, which is a highly technocratic argument. It suggests that the government (or those with higher levels of Suzhi) could and should make decisions for the country and population due to the overall low level of national quality. Additionally, extract [10] asserts that the government “will give people more freedom and rights”, reflecting a patriarchal argument. The government is viewed as an active agent, while the people are viewed as passive recipients/objects. This sentence conveys a “relational value”, which denotes a specific relationship between the government and the population. The extract further indicates that Suzhi is an ideology used to legitimize the government’s control and domination, as its vague definition makes it difficult to implement institutional reforms. In extract [10], Suzhi is associated with the notion of technocracy and patriarchy, which suggests that the government should make decisions for the population due to the low level of national quality. The lack of specificity regarding when democratic reform should occur highlights the function of Suzhi as an ideology to prevent

Negotiating Digital Discourse  149 reform. The Chinese people may never be deemed ready for reform due to the ambiguous concept of improving national quality. This can be seen in popular intellectual writings, such as Xie Sizhong’s book on Chinese national quality, which argues that improving people’s Suzhi is more important than institutional reform.21 This argument may serve as an ideology to delay or reject any possible pro-democratic reforms in China. 5.2.4  The State or the Companies?

While the previous three sections examined how participants justify the control of Internet content, this section will delve into their views on the relationship between the Chinese government and Internet companies. The connection between the two is not as straightforward as either complete deregulation or strict regulation in the traditional neoliberal sense. Along with market regulation, there are also concerns about power struggles over content control between various entities, including users, the Chinese government, international corporations, and domestic Internet companies. The interaction between the Chinese government and the market has been a key topic of debate between the neoliberal and leftist factions, particularly the New Left.22 The neoliberal viewpoint advocates for minimal government intervention in market competition, and promoting a free market. Conversely, the left-leaning perspective advocates for government intervention in limiting the market’s neoliberal tendencies and prioritizing the protection of citizens’ rights. Discussions about the government’s role in regulating the market and its relationship with Internet companies have always been a key topic. Among participants, there are two main types of arguments regarding this issue. The first argument is that the government should intervene to protect personal data security. Unlike debates in liberal democracies where there are opposing views on government intervention in Internet platforms, participants in this study generally support some level of government intervention in content regulation. They are concerned about issues such as Internet fraud, gambling, sexual content and personal information leaks, and they expect the government to regulate the Internet in an authoritative way. This discourse aligns with the government and official’s discourse of promoting “positive energy” and a “clean environment in the cyberspace” as shown in this section. The second point of discussion is more significant and intriguing, which is about the expectations that participants have of companies. The case of Google entering the Chinese market in 2006 and the launch of the commercial social media platform Sina Weibo in 2009 sparked a lot of public debate about the potential liberation and empowerment that a free Internet market could bring. However, the termination of Google China’s service in 2010 and the decline of Weibo’s function as a public sphere have highlighted the failure of the neoliberal belief that a free market will automatically lead to freedom of speech and democracy. Although people used to have hope for this, recent developments

150  Negotiating Digital Discourse in China with more intense control over content and looser control over the market have made that hope fade. For instance, one participant expressed disappointment when Apple gave users’ data to the Chinese government: [11]  In China no company can fight the government’s power, for example, Apple said they didn’t want to give away users’ information, but if you don’t give it [to the government], you will die [other participants: Yes], so there is no other way. The big companies also can’t protect personal data, individual privacy.23 (white-collar group 2, 39’48’’) The development of the Internet and the increasing corporate power under the neoliberal system does not necessarily lead to the government loosening its control over online content. Instead, the government and corporations work together to consolidate power and limit public access through online advertising, surveillance, and censorship. Participants in the study are aware that platforms engage in self-censorship to meet government demands, and some even suggest that censorship is also driven by platforms’ concern for their profits24 (programmer group 1). The focus groups reveal that some participants once held the belief that the free market and the Internet would bring democracy to China. However, this myth has been shattered by reality. Participants now understand that companies and the government collaborate to censor and control information. The idea that a free market would bring a free Internet and freedom of speech has lost its appeal. Despite the rapid expansion of companies and their increasing power under neoliberalism, it is unlikely that the Internet will equally empower users in China. Therefore, deregulation could potentially harm users more than it could benefit them. The participants in the study have different opinions regarding regulation and deregulation, as well as the roles of the state and commercial companies in shaping the Internet landscape. Some hope that the power struggle between political and economic elites could create public space for civil society, while others believe that no power can change the state’s censorship and surveillance. However, the prevalent discourse among participants is nationalist, and some hold techno-deterministic views about the relationship between technology and society. These perspectives will be further explored in the following section. Participants in the study express varying views on regulation and deregulation, as well as the balance of power between the government and commercial companies. While some believe that clashes between political and economic elites could create space for civic society, others argue that no power can overcome state censorship and surveillance. The most prevalent views, however, are those centred around nationalist discourse as shown above, and techno-deterministic claims about the relationship between technology and society, which will be further discussed in the next section.

Negotiating Digital Discourse  151 5.3

“There Is No Alternative”

The discussions among the participants reveal a notable theme that “There is no alternative”, which is further elaborated in this section. I identify three types of discourse that fall under this category. The first type involves participants justifying companies’ data collection practices by claiming that there are no other ways for them to stay afloat in the market. It is argued that Internet companies cannot survive without advertising. When asked about non-commercial alternatives to these platforms, participants seem to struggle to come up with concrete examples, indicating a lack of imagination or exposure to such options. As an illustration, when asked if they have used nonprofit platforms without advertising, a programmer responded with a laugh, saying that such platforms don’t exist because companies need advertising to make money. Another programmer was asked to imagine a website like Wikipedia in China, and he suggested that it could be expensive to run. He mentioned some online forums that don’t have advertising, but questioned where they would get their income from. He cited a specific forum as an example that is free to use worldwide but may still require a significant cost to operate. When the Moderator asked if it relied on donations, the programmer agreed, but noted that it could still be expensive.25 When asked about alternative non-commercial platforms without advertising, the manufacturing worker group gave rise to similar one-sided reactions: [12]  (Participant #2): Such a website won’t appear, and even if there will be one, I think, after a while, it will have to charge a fee in some way or other. (#1): There can’t be such websites at the moment, there are none now. (#2): No, there are no such websites. (#7): There will be no such websites that you can watch videos online for free, without advertising, free.26 The notion that Internet companies can only survive by selling user data to advertisers is not true, as there are successful examples of non-profit, userowned platforms such as Wikipedia. However, it’s worth noting that it may be harder for Chinese Internet users to imagine such alternatives, given that the Chinese language version of Wikipedia is inaccessible. Most websites are built on the ability to sell advertising in various ways, and the BAT companies (Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent) claim that any website can work with them by inserting codes and displaying targeted ads to users. This aligns with the neoliberalist ideology that the free market rewards talent and invention that meet consumer demands. Non-commercial enterprises that rely on voluntary donations may not necessarily contradict this ideology, as donors are effectively paying for something they want.

152  Negotiating Digital Discourse The second reason is more direct and simple – there are no non-commercial Internet platforms available in China. When asked about his concerns regarding the protection and usage of personal data on different platforms, a member (#6) of the first group of programmers expressed more trust in larger companies than smaller ones, as he needs to use their platforms for communication. He stated that he believes big companies and brands are trustworthy and if they cannot be trusted, one would lose connections with the outside world in the Internet society.27 His statement highlights the conflict between the participants’ desire for a public-owned platform for communication and the private companies’ use of their personal data for profit. Despite companies’ digital discourse presenting themselves as “public utility”, participants recognize that these companies are exploiting the public’s need for connectivity to make a profit. van Dijck argues that users’ need for connectivity is what initially drew them to these sites but was soon appropriated by platforms as a valuable resource (van Dijck, 2013, p. 4). While participants choose social media for its use value, companies profit from the exchange value of users’ data and connections (Fuchs, 2014). Participants trust big companies out of necessity as there are no other options, and the only other choice is to entirely withdraw from a society that depends on social media. The most significant TINA discourse among participants is that there are no effective ways for political participation or finding political solutions. According to this argument, personal information collection by platforms has already occurred and will continue to occur, and participants must accept this as a fact since they have no power to prevent companies from collecting personal data. One individual from the white-collar group 1 holds the view that the Internet platform tracks their browsing history and suggests relevant items through ads, and he finds it acceptable. He believes that websites already have the option to record their information by default, and there is no way to entirely prevent it. Therefore, he feels compelled to agree to it.28 Similarly, when questioned about their apprehensions regarding Internet companies accessing their location information, a member of the same group expressed their opinion: [13]  #1: You mean that [the platforms] use your information to find out your location? It’s useless to worry about it, because they do whatever they want, you can only accept passively, you know, you can’t do anything, even if you are worried #5: [users are] are at the mercy of [the platforms] #Moderator: is that because they are in charge of algorithms and design of the programmes? #5: Because in China I think it’s useless to fight against these things, also there is only one platform, and if you don’t want to accept their terms, then you don’t use it. The platform will never change for you.29

Negotiating Digital Discourse  153 When asked about whether she was concerned about the collection of personal data and companies’ invasion of privacy, one participant from the other white-collar group expressed her attitude in an extreme metaphorical expression: [14]  It doesn’t mean we don’t care. How to say, it’s like you are getting used to being raped, then after a while, you don’t care anymore, you know, I mean it’s a passive acceptance.30 The given passages suggest that users have limited to no control over the growth of the Internet and its platforms. Therefore, it is argued that taking any action or considering change is futile if users are powerless to influence companies. For instance, a programmer from group 2 contends that he uses QQ and WeChat to log in to various websites and apps via API since information from these social media has already been leaked. The passages imply a prevalent sense of pessimism regarding user control and political involvement. Participants feel that they have no legal means to control how platforms collect and utilize their information for targeted advertising, despite finding it bothersome and sometimes humiliating. There seems to be no direct or effective way for users to participate politically and effect change. However, some participants hold a more negotiated position who acknowledge that their power as consumers is limited when it comes to controlling how platforms collect and use their personal information for targeted advertising. Although they believed they could use their consumer power to push companies to be more cautious about security issues, they could not control how platforms use their data for advertising purposes. The participants expressed concerns about targeted advertising, finding it annoying and sometimes embarrassing. The recent controversy surrounding Baidu CEO Robin Yanhong Li’s statement that Chinese users are willing to sacrifice privacy for convenience is a relevant example of this issue. This statement sparked heated online discussions, with many criticizing Baidu for dominating the market due to the lack of alternatives. The resistance of a consumer identity may stem from a suspicion of its implications and recognition of power imbalances in practice. As an example, a white-collar group participant describes his response to social media platforms as “passive”. He explains that he tries to minimize the amount of personal information shared with platforms like Weibo, including location, by turning off such functions and using them less frequently. He feels that such demands have discouraged him from using these platforms, but acknowledges that it is nearly impossible to avoid them completely due to social needs for ICT and Internet participation. As a precaution, he takes great care to avoid posting any personal information on these platforms or sharing as little as possible. (White-collar group 1).

154  Negotiating Digital Discourse There exist critical concerns and alternative visions that challenge the individualistic outlook of the Internet and promote alternative digital commons. This viewpoint is particularly evident within programmer groups. They advocate for a more open and collaborative Internet that opposes the present state of affairs. The reason behind programmers being more inclined to envision a collective Internet could be due to their involvement in online collective communities, which has always been a fundamental aspect of the Internet’s ethos. As an illustration, a programmer in group 2 suggests that an ideal Internet would resemble communism: [1]  [the spirit of the Internet] is about community, sharing, and Geek spirit, and humanistic care. [Moderator: can you explain Geek spirit and humanistic care?] Geek spirit, I think is about the Internet, how to say, it should be a community built by a group of people who love the potentials of new technology, who like technological innovations, and who like to share. This is for me the most ideal Internet: everyone cares about other’s needs, all contribute, and share with others, I mean, it’s like communism, in accord with people’s needs. It should have this function. (programmer group 2, #5) Another programmer from group 1 contends that profiting from the commercialization of open source codes goes “against the spirit of the Internet”. He suggests that if companies choose to commercialize open source codes or Creative Commons content, they should give back to the community in some way, such as through charitable donations, sharing their codes, knowledge, and techniques (programmer group 1, #4). The introduction of the Creative Commons approach in China has gained momentum over time (Meng, 2009). The participant highlights the tension between commodity and commons production models, as well as the conflict between individual creators, the state, and capital. 5.4

Discussions and Conclusion: Hegemonic, Negotiated, and Oppositional Positions among Digital Labourers

The purpose of the focus group research is to understand how users legitimate, contest or challenge the current social relations and the political economy of the Internet. Critical methodology is different from the conventional interpretivist approach in the way it relates back to the social structure in understanding empirical data. As pointed out by Habermas the dependence of these ideas and interpretations upon the interests of an object of an objective configuration of societal reproduction makes it impossible to remain at the level of subjective meaning-comprehending hermeneutics; an objective meaning-comprehending theory must also

Negotiating Digital Discourse  155 account for that moment of reification which the objectifying procedures exclusively have in mind. (Habermas, 1976, p. 139) A person’s understanding of the external world is inevitably shaped by her/his living experiences, which is shaped by the social structure. A dialectic concept of meaning, according to Adorno, relates to “the societal essence which shapes appearances, appears in them and conceals itself in them” (Adorno, 1976, p. 37). This chapter has examined how workers in China have responded to power relations related to the Internet, using the framework developed in Chapters 1 and 2. This chapter has highlighted the diversity of these responses, the ideological discourses used to justify China’s censorship and control of the Internet as well as the economic logic of data collection and entrepreneurship (Tables 5.1 and 5.2). Workers have constructed their identities as individual consumers and legitimized the dominance of certain conglomerates in the market through the language of “trust”. Nationalist arguments, such as “us vs. them”, “stability”, and “unique national condition”, have also been used to justify Internet control. As explained by Gramsci and Hall (see Chapter 1), ideology can be spontaneous and chaotic. While participants may use hegemonic ideological discourses, such as arguing that censorship and Internet control are necessary in China for reasons such as national security and protecting against negative Western influences, the focus groups indicate that many participants hold negotiated and oppositional positions, in Hall’s term (1980). Participants who hold these types of position may have different levels of understanding of an ideology, ranging from unconscious to conscious or critically conscious, and may only partially agree with and act in line with the ideologies in practice (Fuchs, 2015, p. 87, adapted from Žižek’s works). For instance, one participant in the study legitimized the use of VPNs to “know the truth about history” while also using the term “enemy state”, demonstrating that their acceptance of censorship only works at an abstract level (white-collar group 1, #3). There are also various arguments opposing the neoliberal, nationalist, and individualist ideologies. First, many workers express scepticism against the belief that the Internet will bring new opportunities and decentralized markets. For example, one worker from group 2 started an online shop on Taobao but found it challenging to make money due to intense competition and the need to invest in credibility or profile-building, which requires a significant amount of effort and resources. Another participant in the manufacturing worker group shares her friend’s failed experience as a Weishang. Data collection behaviours and other commercial operations conducted by BAT are criticized by the focus groups for violating the spirit of the Internet. Nationalism is another highly contested topic. Many suggest that Chinese Internet companies do not serve the interests of the Chinese people. Some

156  Negotiating Digital Discourse Table 5.1 Public digital discourse on the Internet Economy in China

Market

Production (focus on data collection) Consumption

How participants understand and justify the Internet Economy

Negotiated/oppositional positions

• The Internet provides new opportunities, especially to start own small businesses • We trust in big companies • No Internet platforms are trustworthy, but if we don’t trust big companies, we will lose connection with the society (TINA) • Data collection is the way for Internet companies to survive • There is no privacy online anyway (TINA)

• The opportunities provided are not as good as promoted

• We are consumers who use the Internet companies’ service, and our power lies in this consumer identity • This consumer power is limited, but there are no ways to change it (TINA)

• Critical about data collection • There are ways to block ads (differences between groups) • [Companies’ name] is charging users for the documents they share for free, this is against the spirit of the Internet

Table 5.2 Public digital discourse on Internet politics in China

International level

State level

Societal level

Individual level

How participants legitimate China’s censorship and Internet control

Negotiated/oppositional positions

• There are threats from other countries in the cyberspace • Online content from other countries (especially from the West) could have negative influences on Chinese people’s worldview • Us (China, Chinese companies, Chinese people) vs. them (Facebook=America) • Stability is central for the Chinese society • Asking for authoritative content regulation regarding fraud, gambling, sexual and rumours online • China has a unique national condition (Guoqing) so not ready for democratization

• Hoped the international commercial Internet companies could confront the Chinese government’s control (bankrupted)

• Chinese people’s “quality” (Suzhi) is not high enough for free expression online

• Hope commercial companies could confront political power (bankrupted) • The Internet failed to provide democratization it has promised • The Internet is not free

Negotiating Digital Discourse  157 workers argue that they do not have an equal say on the Internet because someone else holds the power of speech. This suggests that the interests of the Chinese people are not the same as those in control of the Internet, whether it be the government or big companies. Furthermore, some people disagree with the idea that censorship and an authoritarian regime are necessary to maintain stability in China. They argue that the government could do better in terms of maintaining stability without resorting to censorship.  This perspective implies that the government’s need to control the Internet is not due to the unique “national condition”, but rather an attempt to maintain its own limited power. The most salient ideology is the TINA argument, which suggests that there are no alternatives to public ownership and no way for Internet companies to survive without selling users’ data, is particularly powerful and de-politicizes discussions about the political economy of the Internet. According to Fuchs (2015), there is a type of argument that acknowledges the presence of an ideology but still submits to it under certain circumstances (Fuchs, 2015, p. 87), as opposed to a negotiated position where users actively negotiate with the ideology as elaborated by Hall. Users who hold this type of argument are aware of ideological coercion but accept and submit to it in reality, making it an ideological behaviour. The argument “there is no alternative” functions as an ideology that facilitates neoliberal development in the Chinese Internet, discouraging people from actively building alternative non-commercial platforms and promoting deregulation. This type of thinking has led to individualist solutions to problems of information collection and data leaks, such as using fake information or trusting larger companies, rather than demanding government protection. However, the lack of social protection from the Chinese government leaves users vulnerable to exploitation by Internet companies, who prioritize economic aims over social concerns.31 Deterministic arguments about technology’s development and the powerlessness of participants are ideological because they divert attention from data collection and exploitation by Internet companies and conceal the politics of technology, including the social relations behind certain technological developments. Ultimately, there are unspoken connections between one’s social class status and their perspectives regarding the Internet. In comparison to other groups, manual workers tend to have oppositional viewpoints towards the dominant ideology because they face more structural oppressions in their daily lives. They also demonstrated a stronger determination to combat censorship. Many members of these groups reported having their accounts and posts removed or banned for criticizing the government, prompting them to create new accounts or wait until their accounts were reinstated. The reason for this more confrontational approach among worker groups may be due to the intense exploitation experienced by assembly-line workers in China’s shift towards informational capitalism (Pun, 2005; Qiu, 2016). The content they post online, which is often censored by both the government and platforms,

158  Negotiating Digital Discourse is closely tied to their everyday experiences in factories, labour rights movements, and exposure to exploitation. Therefore, they are unlikely to fully accept the dominant nationalist discourse surrounding the “need” to suppress online dissenting voices promoted by both the state and Internet companies. On the other hand, programmers and white-collar workers might only appear to hold negotiated and dominant positions. The censorship or deletion of posts by white-collar workers and programmers tend to revolve more around the issues of freedom of expression and access to information. This is partly because the government takes a more lenient stance on controlling rights movements that pertain to urban, middle-class, and individual issues compared to social movements that provoke collective farmers and workers (Yang, 2009, p. 292). Yet, their hegemonic positions might appear only on superficial level since they have more economic and technological resources to find ways around structural limitations, such as using VPNs and alternative platforms. They also frequently use Wikipedia as a way to question the government’s ban, potentially due to their higher levels of education and different Internet usage habits and goals. In addition to using the Internet for entertainment and practical information, these groups often search for historical and educational information online, emphasizing the significance of alternative sources of information. However, it’s important to recognize that these three positions and their associations with various Internet workers are not clearly defined and can change depending on situational contexts like international conflicts or domestic crises. Notes 1 我觉得这个互联网就是挣钱（Moderator :挣钱，怎么说？）互联网，我就指 公司方面… 好多高科技的东西，就把很多传统的行业都已经给冲击的特别的厉 害，他就是赚钱赚的挺厉害的…大家知道那个小米对不对，特别厉害的，当时 小米刚出来的时候他就采用了一种饥饿销售…有人分析它是一种互联网思维… 这时候他就一下子赚很多很多钱。就是就是互联网这个东西出来之后知道吧， 就是整个的这个产业，这个生产的经济格局都有好多好多种…好多好多种模式 就是生长出来…（programmer group 2, #3, 01.45.12） 2 也就是说出现赚钱的机会，就是由于互联网的发展，然后就是推动了网络购物， 给很多人提供了一些就业的机会。（manufacturing worker group 2，01.46.14 ） 3 所以每个行业都是刚开始出现的时候就像雨后春笋啊什么都有，然后谁谁抓住 了这最终的主体群体的话，他就会成为这个行业的巨头。(programmer group 2, 29.00，#4) 4 没有赚到钱，因为那个淘宝的话，如果说你经常坐电脑前的话，还可以有点生 意，但是，但是他那个主要就是信誉度…如果说你是个新店的话，很少被光顾 到，因为淘宝的话，做淘宝的话也差不多，几百上亿的人都在做淘宝，就是说 的话，人家来关注你的店的机会是很小，就也是很不好做的，要砸很多钱，因 为他说要刷单… (#5, manufacturing worker group 2, 23’48’’). 5 …虽然我们一直在强调用户隐私，但是实际上在互联网上，每一个用户都是 裸奔的，就是可以通过技术手段获得，你可以获取到的任何信息 (programmer group 1, #4, 18’49’’) 6 比如说大家不把手机号码呀，QQ号码呀，出生年月日啊，这种东西当作隐私的 话，没有这么多事情，因为这种你想当作隐私不现实的，有各种途径已经给它

Negotiating Digital Discourse  159 泄露出去了，就是在国内很早之前，前几年吧，有很多网站，他安全其实做得 很不靠谱的，你使用了，也包括QQ，以前也一样，你注册了，你的信息已经 填过去了，如果这可能这几年前一批已经发生过一次泄露了，他们叫脱库… 这 些信息都已经泄露了，那么你就是泄露了，然后你在另外一个场合，你做了一 些安全加固，那结果是什么？就是保证少泄露一次嘛，但是终归还是要泄露的 (programmer group 1, #4) 7 我首先是看他网站是否有一些最基本的加密… 比如说协议啊，是不是加密的协 议啊，是不是https的，然后，比如说是那种很大的网站，比如说阿里巴巴这种 啊，你人家的技术很牛了，应该在这方面也做的肯定很ok了，就不用去担心这 些，但是如果那种小的网站，你甚至连个备案信息都看不到的这种网站，那就 可能要么填假的，要么就不填啊… (programmer group1，#4，30’37’’) • 我对这个这个东西比较信任，比如QQ微信啊，我就知道他是一个比较大的 公司，腾讯这个公司，他不太可能欺骗你，我觉得可能比较信任一点，但是 像那些不知名的话，我没见过的那种，我绝对不会输入[实名信息]的（manufacturing worker group 1，#4， 58’05’’） • 目前我觉得大公司来说，它对用户的一个信息安全应该是做的相对比较好 的，然后对于小公司它其实是完全不负责任的 … 我觉得如果哪一天阿里巴巴 比如说达到了上万人或者几千万人的一些信息掉了的话，他可能会就因此而 衰败…对于它们来说其实如果是大公司…它肯定会守护住你用户的这个信息 (programmer group 2，45.20) 8 他也可能是一种诱导，（Moderator：怎么说？）就是因为就像他们刚才说的， 因为现在好多应用，可能你用户为了方便吗？就相当于是一键式的… 如果其他 的那些软件或者是一些新的app，你要想登陆的话，正常的方式你是要注册的 嘛，但是你要通过这些微信或者QQ让他们来授权的话，你就省去了很多步骤 嘛，然后他就是你来登陆一个新的app之前，他就问你同不同意用QQ或者微信 来登录… 你觉得很方便，然后就授权了，然后他们因为你授权了，然后他们就 可以得到你这边的，就是QQ微信的这些，这些就是社交信息了，通过这种方 式，然后来达到自己原有的一些，就是个人隐私嘛这些东西，但是你自己，可 能普通用户来说，可能觉得就是，但他并没有告诉你，告诉你授权背后的，是 到底有什么风险，没有告诉你，其实他们是拿到了你自己的隐私的 （programmer group 1，19：07， #6） 9 Moderator :所以就是你觉得这两个[软件]对你可以有帮助，然后你觉得给他们 捐一下款也可以是吗？ (#5)：也不是捐款，我就觉得我他值得我花一笔钱去买他们这个东西， (#2)：是可以付费使用的 (#5)：对，我是觉得我真的可以付费使用，而且收费又不高，就是有可能，反正 我现在是到了那种，就是，嗯，就是我觉得他值那个价的话，我就不会说为了图 免费去花很多精力，去找一个免费的东西去翻墙，如果有一个很好的一个服务， 我愿意付这个钱… (white-collar group 2, 01:02’44’’) 10 (#4)：嗯我觉得网络安全吧，包括个人隐私这一方面，应该是今后互联网以及一 些大公司，或者说互联网大咖，这些公司应该非常注重的，因为它既然拥有了 这些用户群体，而这些用户群体的隐私以及它的个人信息安全就会成为他一个 非常重要的一个部分，如果他哪一天把这些用户信息泄露了，所以他会损失很 大一部分的用户，而对于这种公司来说，如果他没有用户，那他就没有未来… (programmer group 2, 40.53, #4) 11 首先的话，一，本国的那个政治肯定是为本国服务啊。然后，敌国（笑）， 就是说其他国家的政治（笑）也肯定是为他们自己国家去服务。首先的话很简 单，经常吧，一些网站上就是那个像国内的微博上也说有一些就是外国反华势 力，渗透国家中国国民的思想，所以说他那个要[审查]… (white-collar group 1, #3, 01’23’27) 12 我有不同意见，我觉得不让Facebook进来是有国家层面的一些考虑的，因为 一些社交手段哈，人们如果大范围普及使用的话，存在一些特别特别重要的 信息问题，比如说一些官员，如果聊天都使用Facebook的话，美国可以很容 易地获取到我们的信息，然后针对这些信息他进行一些手段。比如说，中国的

160  Negotiating Digital Discourse 两个官员，然后聊天，然后说怎么样怎么样怎么样，然后他Facebook，因为 毕竟是国外的东西，我们是没有办法掌握这个主动权的，是不是，它可能就 会，Facebook比如说它跟美国，他跟它的政府，进行一些信息，它信息肯定不 光在Facebook，还在它国家的一些东西里面存着是不是，他可能就会收集到这 些信息，或进行一些那个说，比如说中国跟哪个国家怎么样怎么样，他可能就 会进行一些行动。我觉得从国家层面的话，他完全就是不太想让他进来。（Programmer group 2, #1, 01：24：02) 13 About the complex relations between Apple, Facebook and American government, see reports for example: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/ feb/22/mark-zuckerberg-sympathetic-apple-fbi-encryption-battle, and https:// www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/17/inside-the-fbis-encryption-battlewith-apple, accessed 18 September 2018. 14 The latest news about Google and China is a confirmation of Google’s plan return to China with a censored Chinese search engine. See reports on this project, for example, from the Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/02/ google-working-on-censored-search-engine-for-china 15 …如果有一些个人比较极端一点，或者说敏感一些词汇，就是如果被其他人浏 览到，就是说也可能会引起别人这种，啊，这种心态或者说这种，想法，所以 正常的屏蔽掉，恩，这种“正能量”（微弱的笑声）很多吧…(manufacturing worker group 2,01.23.48) 16 …你比如说前两年呢，像中东的叙利亚，那个应该叫什么，嗯，中东之春就是 这些事件吗，（Moderator :阿拉伯之春）其实就属于当地的政府吧，丧失了网 络的话语权，就是放任，嗯，这一种特殊形式的资本[he means information as a special type of capital in his previous statements]在肆意发挥它的力量，就导致 现在中东战火连连，各个政府都被推翻，所以我觉得这个资本肯定是要被管的 (programmer group 2，01：10：19) 17 就是这个，我觉得跟国情有关嘛，中国，像刚才2号说的，民族比较多嘛，国情 比较复杂嘛，确实如果说传出什么谣言，你不封的话，任他传播的话，这是一 个很严重的问题，容易导致社会动荡之类的事情，所以说对于传播谣言这种， 我个人觉得，应该封，其他的像你说的那个历史问题，这些东西，这个真的不 好评价( programmer group 1, 01：05：44) 18 我觉得这应该是社会发展的一个阶段。可能就是说，我们国家现在由一个封闭 走向开放的阶段，现在就可能是处在这个中间的一个阶段，所以现在可能各方 面，由于国民素质啊，或者国内啊，或者是周边环境都没有准备，所以说做这 样的一些控制，我觉得也是有道理或者说是符合现在的这些，现在的一些事情 吧。我觉得未来就是说，环境或者是国家或者是人民什么什么都准备好，到一 定阶段了，那是应该是社会的发展或者政治发展到一定阶段的时候，嗯，这方 面东西应该是迎刃而解，到时候会更加开放，我这样想。（Programmer group 1. 01.06.33) 19 …其实国内，恩，可能对于国外是言论还不够自由，但其实也是根据全民的一 个素质，嗯如果全民素质提高到了一个层次，那么言论就会相对自由，自由是 相对的。如果如果全民的一些素质还不够，低下的话，他给你自由，其实是给 社会带来更多的危害。如果整个，比如说国内现在的教育水平不断上升，从以 前的小学到现在慢慢高中大学，如果到国内嗯，或者说从我们这一代吧，我觉 得慢慢的，等以后大家每个人都能够上过大学的话，我觉得整个全民素质提上 来了以后，那国家给你的言论自由也会特别强。包括，现在我们国家虽然有， 啊，自主一个选举权，但我们实际上都没有拿到，啊，会有一些人民代表，代 表了我们选举，那是因为他自认为我们根本就做不了主，选不了，等以后我觉 得啊，我们的政府以及国家慢慢的发展，包括我们整体的一个水平上来以后， 慢慢的会给我们更多的一些自由和权利，这样的话也是为了维护社会的一个稳 定（programmer group 2, 01:42’26’’) 20 For example, Ellen Judd (2002) examines the rural reforms in the early 1980s in China how low Suzhi (quality) was seen as a decisive factor in women’s disadvantages, and how a set of policies and programmes were set to improve women’s

Negotiating Digital Discourse  161 quality to make them more competitive in China’s ‘Socialist market economy’. Another example is from Ann Anagnost (1997) shows how the improvement of national quality of the population, especially that of its children, is linked to the survival of China as a nation. Murphy, Rachel (2004) shows how suzhi is central to legitimize party-state and its policies in rural areas in four aspects. 21 See Xie Sizhong, 2004, The Crisis of China’s National Quality (Zhongguo Guomin Suzhi Weiji), Beijing: China’s Changan Publishing House) 22 See debates between New Left and Neoliberalists, Pan, Li, Lu, Lao, etc. 23 在中国就是这个没有什么企业能对抗公权力的，比如像苹果说我们那个东西就 不交了，你不交那个东西就是死（大家说：对）所以就是没办法，他公司也不 能保证个人安全，个人隐私的（white-collar group2，39.48） 24 有一些，可能也是它平台为了个人利益考虑，比如说豆瓣的话，可能他觉得， 你在我的豆瓣上发了这个帖子，豆瓣关注人比较多，可能政府会不会对我豆瓣 有什么压力啊… (programmer group 1, 01.03.25) 25 应该有还是有的，有一些技术论坛啊，人家确实就没有广告，但是没有广告 的话，他的收入来源怎么办呢？他虽说不盈利，比如[论坛名]，全球都可以使 用，（Moderator : 他是靠捐款什么的？）对啊，可能也是比较花钱吧（programmer group 1, #4, 41.24 ） 26 （2：不会有这种网站出现，就算有的话，我觉得他是，到一定的程度，他都会 变相收费）（1：目前不会有，目前呢还没有这种）（2：对啊，就是没有这种 网站）（7：就是不会有那种一个网站可以看电视啊，然后就是说没广告，他免 费的）(manufacturing worker group 1, 01.04.07) 27 我是觉得...那些大公司，大的品牌还是可以信任的，如果他们都信任不了的话， 你对于这个互联网社会基本上就失去了跟外界交流的那些渠道… (programmer group1, #6, 34.40) 28 他会记录我的浏览记录，然后他就会给我推荐相关的东西，我觉得这个是可以 接受的，因为你也没有办法彻底屏蔽掉网站对你的记录，因为这个已经是一个 默认的你不接受也得接受的事实…（white-collar group 1, #5, 28’40’’） 29 #1: 就是说通过你的信息去探测你地点这件事情吗？你顾虑也没用啊，因为他想 做就做呀，你就是只能被动接受，你知道吗？你顾虑也没用 #5：任人鱼肉 NA:是因为他负责这个算法和一些程序的设计? #5：因为在国内会觉得这些东西你去反抗也没有用，然后就只有这一个平台， 你说你不愿意接受，但那你就不要用，然后平台永远不会为了你改变的（whitecollar group 1, 52’24’’） 30 不是说无所谓，怎么说呢，他就被强奸强奸惯了，后来你也也也无所谓了，你 知道吗？就那种感觉消极接受（white-collar group 2, #5, 58’50’’） 31 The General Data Protection Regulation has been implemented by the EU, but the Chinese government has not yet caught up with similar regulations. A notable case occurred in 2014 when a user sued Baidu for breaching her privacy by using her browsing history and cookies for targeted advertising. She won her case at first instance, but Baidu appealed and the final judgement went against her. The Nanjing Gulou People’s Court stated in their verdict that the original verdict would impede the healthy development of Internet technologies and services, and that personalized services represent a universal need of users. This verdict appears to protect the Internet industry and aligns with the government’s focus on developing Internetrelated industries with an emphasis on economic goals over social concerns.

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Part III

6 The Digital Ideologies

Focusing on the key agencies in shaping the development and meanings of China’s Internet and ICT industries, this book has documented digital discourses from three major players in Chinese digital economy, the ­government, BAT, and Internet users and workers. This chapter will cut across the digital discourses from different agencies and uncover the key ideologies about the Internet and network technologies in China. Building on the discussions of ideology critique and the Chinese context in Part I, this chapter identifies three dominant ideologies that are interconnected: informational developmentalism, techno-nationalism, and digital individualism. These contemporary digital discourses in China construct new assumptions about network technology and its relationship with society, interpreting and justifying changes in Chinese society. Additionally, they revitalize certain existing ideologies in China’s historical and social context by incorporating digital components. By examining ideology through China’s historical context, social structure, and political economy, this chapter raises the question of who benefits from technological development and who holds the power to decide, ultimately addressing the social and power dynamics surrounding the advancement of network technology in China. 6.1

Informational Developmentalism

China’s approach to development since the 1990s has been characterized by a powerful state apparatus, with the central government gradually gaining more control. The government intervenes in the economy through developmental planning, strategic industrialization, state investment in infrastructure, export promotion, and the suppression of labour protests and popular struggles (Huang, 2008; So, 2007). This developmentalism reflects China’s strong determination to overcome its previous backwardness (Lin, 2006, p. 60). As discussed in Chapter 2, technology has always been viewed as an instrument to achieve national development in China. This development is pursued through a combination of neoliberal economic policies and authoritarianism in the political sphere. DOI: 10.4324/9781003315810-10

166  The Digital Ideologies The term neoliberalism is largely undefined and used to denote a large variety of phenomena, though it is more asymmetrically used by scholars who are more critical about the free market (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009; Harvey, 2005; Mirowski & Plehwe, 2015; Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005). The term reflects struggle and collaboration in three worlds: intellectual, bureaucratic, and political (Mudge, 2008). In general, neoliberalism includes a whole range of political and economic institutional arrangements. I will limit its use of the term from a critical perspective and focus on how it influences economy and politics (Chomsky, 1999; Harvey, 2005; Herman & McChesney, 1997). In general, neoliberalism displays a fetishism of the free market: the free market has an overwhelming advantage. It is based on the rationality of the competitive market and self-interest. It is claimed to facilitate the freedom of human agency. Moreover, the state intervention is said to be best restricted to a limit. The “enemy” of neoliberalism is any distortion of the free market caused by state intervention. Theoretically, it has several socio-political arrangements (rules, social processes, and regulations), such as to encourage the dominant role and expansion of free market, the reduction of public benefits in favour of deregulation, privatization, etc. To sum up, as an ideology, neoliberalism promotes a myth of the free market, commodification, privatization, deregulation, i.e. capitalist modes of production and social relations. Harvey has identified a version of neoliberalism that has “Chinese characteristics” (Harvey, 2005). Although there is debate about whether China is a socialist (Amin, 2013; Arrighi, 2007) or authoritarian capitalist country (Harvey, 2005; C. Lin, 2013), the neoliberal trend that emerged after Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening-up policy is a topic of discussion in both academic and public spheres. China’s version of neoliberalism differs from those in more developed capitalist countries, such as the US and UK, as well as postcolonial democratic states like India. The historical context of state autonomy, authority, and governmentality in China has allowed reformers to legitimize retaining a powerful authoritarian state while implementing privatization and marketization through rational devices and calculation (Lin, 2006). The authoritarian state places a higher emphasis on “statism overtaking nationalism in nation-building” and “hijacking socialism in development” (ibid., p. 73). Deng’s slogan, “development is a hard truth”, perfectly summarizes this approach, where economic growth takes precedence over any other social considerations and becomes the top priority of the state. China’s ICT industries are embedded in this broader context of modernization, globalization, and neoliberalism, with a state-oriented and marketdriven strategy (Hong, 2010; Wu & Yun, 2015; Y. Zhao, 2007). China’s ICT and Internet industries are considered key players in economic restructuring, affecting production, circulation, and consumption (Hong, 2017). As transnational informational capitalism gains momentum (Fuchs, 2009; Schiller, 1999), China is becoming an increasingly important player in the global market, with its neoliberal policies allowing for a significant degree of control by domestic and transnational capital (Hong, 2017). According to CNNIC

The Digital Ideologies  167 (41st), for the financial year ended December 2017, there are 102 Chinese Internet-related companies listed on the stock market (CNNIC, 2017). Tencent, Alibaba, and Baidu, account for 73.9% of the total market value of China’s listed Internet companies (CNNIC, 2017). On the other hand, this freedom in the marketplace is dependent on the state remaining untouched politically, as ICT and Internet industries are profit-making sectors and part of state propaganda organs, leading to occasional conflicts between private companies and the state. Moreover, this growth is accompanied by exploitation, with China having the largest exploited working class in the global information age (Fuchs, 2014; Qiu, 2016). This ideology of developmentalism is prevalent in digital discourse, with Internet and network technology being viewed as non-political tools for strengthening and advancing the country’s economic growth. 6.1.1  From “Post-industrial” Ideology to “Neo-industrialization”

In the early days of the Internet’s development, Chinese digital discourse was heavily influenced by ideological discourses from advanced capitalist societies, particularly those related to optimistic and futurist ideologies in the economic sphere. However, China’s digital discourse had its own distinctive features. Following the Opium Wars, which shattered China’s self-reliance in the late Qing Dynasty, Chinese intellectuals and political activists have persistently looked towards the West (including Japan) to learn not only about technologies but also socio-political institutions. The argument between Ti (institutions) and Yong (technology) is a notable example of this. The debate centred around whether China should adopt Western political institutions and constitutions or instead focus on learning technologies from the West, as documented by Li (1994). China’s drive for technological development during Mao’s era was intrinsically linked to its larger goal of modernization, particularly in terms of industrialization. Chinese leaders were eager to catch up with Western technology. However, due to the Cold War context and economic sanctions imposed on China, the country’s connections to the global economy were severely limited, as noted by Hong (2011, p. 33). To address this challenge, China strategically imported foreign technology on an import-substitution basis, as documented by both Hong (2017) and Tian (1998), with the main objective being the development of domestic industries. During China’s economic reforms, its ICT- and FDI-driven export-oriented policy successfully reintegrated the country into the global economy. In line with international trends, China prioritized informatization and industrialization (Dai, 2003; Hong, 2008; Mueller & Tan, 1997; Wu & Yun, 2015; Zhao, 2007). According to Dai, the Chinese government’s Informatization of the National Economy (INE) programme was launched when an international consensus was emerging, which held that information technology

168  The Digital Ideologies could be a revolutionary force for developing countries to leapfrog in terms of technological and economic development, particularly among G7/8, the European Commission, and the UN (Dai, 2003, p. 10). This post-industrial ideology led to numerous developmental policies promoted by international organizations and benefited newly industrialized countries such as the Four Little Tigers in Asia to some extent (Hong, 2008, p. 25). China’s official discourse during this time embraced the idea of “leapfrogging” and “catching up with the West”, as seen in the 16th Party Congress in 2002 which identified IT applications as the logical choice for accelerated industrialization and modernization (Zhao, 2007, p.  98). Wu and Yun (2015) argue that technological nationalism shaped China’s imagination of modernization, which was not only a legacy of Mao’s era but also an appropriation of Western techno-utopianism. The “Toffler Fever” that swept China in the 1980s had a significant influence on Chinese leadership’s policy agenda for modernization. Alvin and Heidi Toffler were invited to China several times to discuss China’s economic construction and future development, and their ideas had a direct impact on policy-making and action planning, including the premier multibilliondollar state industrial R&D programme, the 863 Programme (Gewirtz, 2019, p. 132). Zhao Ziyang, then Premier and General Secretary, met the couple formally at Zhongnanhai, the central headquarter of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the State Council, in September 1988. The Tofflers and other futurists such as Naisbitt promised a dramatically transformed future brought by technology, which attracted China’s elite groups and officials. Their promises suggested that developing countries with backward industrial development could leap ahead of capitalist developed countries in technology development. The Chinese leaders who were struggling to improve productivity and economic development by “feeling the stones” saw technology development as a means to catch up with emerging trends and overcome their backwardness in the industry sector to lead ahead of capitalist countries in the “Third Wave”. In the 1990s, the terms “Surf the Internet” and “Information Highway” became popular buzzwords in China and the Internet began to gain attention as a phenomenon. Information and communication technologies (ICTs) became the “most commercialized and popularized area of high-tech development in China” (Y. Zhao, 2007, p.  98). “Information society” became a popular slogan. Public opinion leaders during this time included elites who received American postgraduate education and returned to China, as well as local scientists and media elites who recognized the potential of information technologies for China’s development (Wu & Yun, 2015). The popularity of these new words and concepts was due to their alignment with China’s pursuit of modernization through a more pragmatic approach, as advocated by Deng Xiaoping. Additionally, the perceived opportunity to catch up with or even surpass Western societies with the help of information technology was consistent with China’s techno-nationalist discourse, creating a new social phenomenon and hype around these new technologies, particularly personal computers.

The Digital Ideologies  169 However, the idea of Western techno-utopianism is also facing challenges in China. According to Hong’s (2008) analysis of articles published in People’s Daily from 1995 to 2003, the official discourse in China does not entirely align with Western utopian discourse on information and postindustrialization. Initially, People’s Daily had an obsession with the “post-” discourse in the 90s, but it later shifted to a more modest tone. Hong suggests that the term “neo-industrialization” used by People’s Daily reflects China’s reality of incomplete urbanization and agriculture industrialization, and China’s low-end position in the global information economy (Hong, 2008, pp. 29–30). Additionally, the concept of neo-industrialization is used to promote market forces and values. Hence, China’s information society combines informatization and industrialization instead of de-industrialization (ibid., p. 37). Gewirtz’s historical study of Zhao Ziyang and his policies on economy and technology confirms Hong’s observations. According to Gewirtz, for Zhao and his peer leaders, science and technology development and innovation should serve China’s economic innovation and development, targeting both promoting the traditional Industrial Revolution and catching up with the new task of the global New Technological Revolution (Gewirtz, 2019, p.  132). This economic innovation should not contradict China’s political system. This neo-industrialization is a part of China’s neoliberal development since the reforms proposed by Harvey (2005). Xi has highlighted the growing importance of the Information Economy in the Chinese economy. He states: “Our country’s economic development has entered a new normal. New normal requires new driving force, and the Internet could play an important role in this aspect” (Xi, 2016, 4.19 Speech). The Internet is expected to drive innovation, productivity, and restructuring of the economy, specifically through upgrading agriculture and manufacturing, developing the service industry, and stimulating consumption. As he further emphasizes “We must strengthen the construction of our information infrastructure, strengthen the deep integration of information resources, and open up information “arteries” for economic and social development” and strive to promote the converged development of the Internet and the real economy, drive technology flows, talent flows and material flows through information flows, stimulate the optimisation of resource allocation, promote the improvement of the productivity of all factors, and play a vigorous role in promoting innovative development, the transformation of economic development methods and the adjustment of economic structures.1 As Green and Stern define it, the New Normal is understood by China’s leadership and policy elite with a focus on better quality growth, reduced inequality and environmental sustainability (Green & Stern, 2015, p.  10). BAT also claims that they could provide new technologies and data to enable traditional industries to upgrade (Chapter 4). Their discourse has shifted

170  The Digital Ideologies from replacing the traditional economy to upgrading and converging with it. However, it is not clear how these goals can be achieved without restructuring production, consumption, and redistribution. This developmentalist discourse is intertwined with nationalist elements, and the new technology is expected to solve social problems without political changes. This approach also differs from Western utopian discourses on digital technology as Transcendence (Fisher, 2010, p. 197). 6.1.2  The “Non-political” Technology

In China’s developmental approach, it is crucial to maintain regime and social stability by implementing economic reforms without significant political changes. In the digital age, the focus on informational developmentalism deliberately separates digital technology from the political sphere, following the trend of depoliticizing technology in China’s recent history. While Mao’s era emphasized technology for “self-determination”, post-Mao reformers viewed technology as a depoliticized “neutral tool”. The global technological competition, including military conflicts, and capitalist consumerism has gradually eroded Mao’s project of finding an alternative technological path for self-determination (Zhao, 2007, p.  94). More recently, technology has been portrayed as the primary instrument for economic development. In other words, there is an increasingly deterministic and instrumentalist view of technology in China. CCP’s depoliticization of technology can be traced back to the 1970s when the cultural revolution was ending. During Mao’s era, technology was used to increase workers’ control over the production process under socialist relations of production (Wang, 2014). However, in 1971–2, Dallas Smythe found that Chinese political economists, philosophers, and political scientists viewed “technique and technology as autonomous and non-political” (Smythe, 1994, cited in (Zhao, 2007, p. 93). This detachment of technology from the political realm had a specific ideological appeal to the post-Mao Chinese ruling elite, who were “victimized by the excesses of Cultural Revolution politics and its rhetoric of class struggle” (Y. Zhao, 2007, p. 98). This detachment was a reflection of the broader consensus in China’s society during the post-Mao era when Mao’s industrialization strategies and policies were seen as a failure, a pursuit of unrealistic radical relations of production and political struggles (Wu & Yun, 2015, p. 3). Depoliticization must be viewed within a wider context. As Deng Xiaoping famously stated, “it doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice”. The initial years following Mao’s era were marked by significant uncertainty for both economic and political reforms. The phrase “crossing the river by feeling for the stones” (Mozhe Shitou Guohe) accurately describes the complex and challenging situations that arose, rather than serving as an excuse to legitimize a fully developed capitalist approach. During the 1980s, leaders of the CCP recognized the severity of the economic

The Digital Ideologies  171 crisis and the urgency to develop the economy not only for growth but also to improve people’s living standards. According to Zhao Ziyang, the third Premier of the People’s Republic of China and one of the most influential figures in the country’s economic reform, China’s “industrial output had grown 8.1 times, GDP had grown 4.2 times, and industrial fixed assets had grown 26 times” from 1952 to 1980, yet “average consumption had only doubled” (Zhao et  al., 2009, p.  112). The primary objective during this period for leaders, elites, and intellectuals was to recover the national economy and improve people’s lives, rather than continue political and ideological debates between capitalist and socialist approaches.2 As Zhao stated in his memoirs, published posthumously, he had “no preconceived model or systematic idea in mind” when he began working on economic reform; he simply “started with only the desire to improve economic efficiency” (Zhao et  al., 2009, p.  113). Zhao also believed that technology was “like economics, a realm distinct from political affairs”, which differed from Mao’s notion of a connection between politics and technology (Gewirtz, 2019, p. 123). Thus, this broader context – placing economic recovery and efficiency ahead of the political debate surrounding the socialist path – is also evident in the attitudes of leadership and elite groups towards technology. China’s economic transformation, particularly during the 1990s when its economy began to flourish, aimed to achieve a globally integrated, marketbased approach to development, with a strong emphasis on the deployment of ICTs and informatization (Hong, 2011, p. 31). This focus on technology became a key priority for post-Mao leadership and their developmental strategies (Y. Zhao, 2007, p. 98; Y. Zhao & Schiller, 2001). Essentially, technologies were viewed as instruments for promoting economic growth and were thought to be politically neutral, detached from any social relations and thus political debates (Gewirtz, 2019). The depoliticization of the Internet and network technology is evident in the digital discourses of Internet workers and users, who believe that there are no alternatives to data collection and commercialized platforms (Chapter 5). Participants in focus groups legitimize data collection by Internet companies as essential for their survival in the market, and argue that advertising is also necessary for their survival. However, this approach excludes direct political action or participation for change, and the development of non-commercial public-owned platforms is not considered. This view is also reflected in the government and BAT’s discourses of “catching the wave” (Chapters 3 and 4). The government and companies emphasize the need to “join the wave” or “catch up with the West” without specifying what kind of technology should be developed or for what purpose. While nationalists may be concerned with which platform to use, the possibility of developing non-commercial, publicly-owned platforms is not considered. However, the belief that technology is politically neutral and detached from social relations is actually an ideology that serves the purpose of promoting the idea of the “end of politics” and a “digital sublime” (Mosco).

172  The Digital Ideologies This depoliticization is not without its dangers, as argued by Smythe, who warns against measuring technological development solely against capitalist techniques. In fact, the pursuit and consumption of capitalist luxury goods by Chinese consumers, such as private automobiles, family-sized washing machines, and one-way TVs, could lead to the education and preparation of Chinese consumers for capitalist social relations and ultimately steer China towards a capitalist path of development (Dallas Walker Smythe, 1994) cited by(Zhao, 2007, p.  94). The belief in technology as neutral is a form of techno-determinism. It views technological development as an independent process, free from intervention by social relations and power dynamics. Although the depoliticization of technology has its roots in China’s historical context, it was also influenced by Western technology discourse. 6.2

Technological Nationalism and Globalism

The term “techno-nationalism” was initially introduced by Robert Reith in 1987 to highlight the need for the United States to safeguard its future technological advancements from being exploited by foreign nations, especially Japan (Reich, 1987). Subsequent research has primarily focused on the technological development strategies of Asian countries, including Japan and China (Keller & Samuels, 2003; S. Kennedy et al., 2008; Samuels, 1996; Suttmeier, 2004). Such studies underscore the central role assigned by techno-nationalists to national innovation and high-tech industries in enhancing national security, military autonomy, international competitiveness, and economic and technological performance. Researchers such as Edgerton (2007), Ostry and Nelson (2000), and Feigenbaum (2019) have identified several common features of techno-nationalism, including its widespread adoption by nations confronting global challenges, the belief that national economic and technological progress is determined by the country’s rates of innovation and high-tech industries, and the emphasis on the relationship between technology and national security, military autonomy, and selfreliance (Edgerton, 2007; Feigenbaum, 2019; C. W. Hughes, 2011; JohnsonFreese & Erickson, 2005; A. B. Kennedy, 2013; Nakayama, 2012; Ostry & Nelson, 2000; Samuels, 1996; Tyroler-Cooper & Peet, 2011). Consequently, nationalism is considered a crucial element of many countries’ economic and industrial policies. 6.2.1  Three Narratives in China’s Techno-nationalism

In China, the process of informatization has been closely tied to modernization and industrialization, as noted by various scholars (Dai, 2003; Hong, 2008; Mueller & Tan, 1997; Wu & Yun, 2015; Yang & Mueller, 2014; Zhao, 2007, 2010). This process has been heavily influenced by nationalist discourses, which revolve around national security, competition with the West, and national progress. Techno-nationalism is perceived as prevalent in

The Digital Ideologies  173 China’s technology policies in areas such as cyber security (Ahmed & Weber, 2018), energy (A. B. Kennedy, 2013), aviation (Tyroler-Cooper & Peet, 2011), ICT industries (Kim et al., 2020; Shim & Shin, 2019, 2015), and technology development in general (S. Kennedy et  al., 2008; Suttmeier, 2004). However, the emergence of techno-globalism has led to tensions between this techno-nationalist discourse and the need to integrate into the global economy. First, military concerns and national security were significant factors in China’s early efforts of industrialization. While Chinese leaders see technology and industrialization as vital to economic development and national progress (Mueller & Tan, 1997, p. 14), Chinese leadership in Mao’s ear was also “compelled to address the most pressing problem of the post-revolutionary regime in the Cold War context to survive militarily in the age of high-tech wars and nuclear deterrence” (Zhao, 2007, p.  95). The military-led developmental path of Chinese techno-nationalism was established under Mao in the early 1950s and saw technology as essential for national security, as well as industrial competitiveness and international status (Feigenbaum, 2003, p. 29). One prominent example is the “two bombs and one satellite” project. This belief was reinforced by China’s experiences in the Korean War and witnessing America’s Gulf War as an “information war” (Y. Zhao, 2007, p. 97). Moreover, as Wang (2014) points out in his historical narrative of “the computer as the nexus of technology and class politics in China 1955–1984”, the pursuit of national independence was the primary motivation in the early development of ICT in China. Therefore, technological development in China is closely connected to the discourse on national security and the nation’s self-determination since an early stage. Post-Mao reformers also embraced military-led techno-nationalism. One representative example is the launch of the 863 Plan, “a massive military and industrial research and development plan initiated in March 1986” (Zhao, 2007, p. 97). This military-led technological development sets the basic tone of China’s techno-nationalism. Second, the nationalist dialogue in China regarding technology is also heavily influenced by the idea of the “century of humiliation”, which attributes China’s past humiliations to its inferiority in science and technology development. This perspective was not unique to the Communist Party of China (CCP), as even prior to the establishment of the CCP, Chinese intellectuals such as Kang Youwei, Sun Yat-sen, and Yan Fu discussed this matter in the late Qing Dynasty, under the themes of enlightenment (QiMeng) and salvation (JiuWang) (Z. Li, 1994). The CCP emerged at a time when China was seeking modernization and salvation. Chinese nationalists have linked China’s national humiliation to its technological, economic, and military backwardness. Zhao argues that pragmatic nationalists in China view Western imperialism’s economic exploitation and cultural infiltration as a significant factor in China’s weakness, and historical humiliation is a result of “political decay, technological backwardness, and economic weakness” (Zhao, 2000, p. 9). The issue of China’s cultural

174  The Digital Ideologies and modern backwardness is also crucial to anti-traditionalist nationalism, as demonstrated in the documentary Heshang (River Elegy). Hughes, in his study of China’s nationalism, examines several popular texts and identifies a “geopolitik” turn, where science and technology, rather than culture, are emphasized in the key nationalist book “Unhappy China” (Hughes, 2011, p.  613). Shen, in his classification of Chinese nationalists, notes that “authentic” nationalists among non-liberal intellectuals believe that science and technology backwardness is one of the main reasons for China’s victimization in recent history (Shen, 2007, p. 30). Third, the theme of technological development as a means of national pride and progress has been central to the Communist Party of China’s (CCP) national development strategies. For example, China’s economic reforms began with the slogan of “four modernizations” which included science and technology, and later projects like “863” aimed to develop high technologies and make China competitive with the West (Dai, 2003, p. 9; Y. Zhao, 2007, p.  97). Informatization is also seen as essential for modernization, leading to projects like the “Golden Projects” in the 1990s and the INE programme (Dai, 2003; Zhao, 2007). More recently, the state has sought greater control over domestic communication infrastructure and technological development through projects like the National Informatization Development Strategy (2006–2020) and discourses on “Internet Sovereignty” and “State Information Security” (Y. Zhao, 2010, pp. 267, 271). This discourse is rooted in a nationalistic ideology of “Us” (China) versus “Them” (foreign actors and agencies), which has been prominent in the Internet era. The theme of the “century of humiliation” is closely intertwined with this discourse on technological development and is still evident in contemporary China under Xi Jinping’s leadership (G. Yang, 2014). ICT and Internet technology have been closely linked to the idea of national progress and the hope for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Officials in China have viewed communication technology as a neutral tool that represents national progress, according to Smythe (1973/1994). While Smythe’s main concern was the shift in the public’s consumption habits from bicycles to cars, the primary reason for prioritizing technology development has remained political, in response to the international historical situation (Y. Zhao, 2007). Industrialization and modernization have become more closely associated with economic prosperity and development since the reforms. Wu and Yun’s analysis of the discourses surrounding technological changes and the “Internet Plus” in China provides a more recent example of how technological nationalism has influenced China’s perception of modernization (Wu & Yun, 2015). The belief that technology is closely tied to national progress is not limited to official discourse in China, but is also prevalent in Chinese society. This is exemplified by the “Needham Puzzle”, a question that has puzzled many Chinese nationalists as to why the Industrial Revolution did not originate in China (J. Y. Lin, 1995; Needham & Wang, 2004). This puzzle has been further developed into a larger question of why modernity did not originate

The Digital Ideologies  175 in China, which was explored in the widely watched 1988 documentary Heshang (River Elegy). The importance of technology development in China was further emphasized by Deng Xiaoping’s 1988 policy statement that “Science and technology are primary productive forces”. From an instrumentalist view, in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, nationalism became a useful tool for the CCP to suppress dissent within the country (S. Zhao, 2000). Despite claiming legitimacy through rapid economic growth, the CCP has not eased its political repression (although this has varied under different leadership). The Internet has become a crucial means for the CCP to control the flow of information and ideas, with techno-nationalism and nationalist discourse serving to gain support for this control from the Chinese public. The CCP justifies repression of domestic dissent as being necessary for “national security”. The Chinese “digital revolution” has an anti-democratic nature, and the development of the Internet has not been designed to promote socialist democracy, as the reform policies have always followed a technocratic developmental path (Y. Zhao, 2007, p. 99). As a result, it is not surprising that the role of the Internet as a profit-making tool is separate from its potential role in promoting political and social liberation. The contemporary techno-nationalism in China is exemplified by the digital discourse of “Cyber Superpower” which emphasizes national security, proficiency in core technology, and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (see also Section 3.1). This term gained prominence in 2014 during the first meeting of the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization led by Xi Jinping. During the meeting, Xi drew a distinction between a country with “Cyber Power” and a country with “Cyber Superpower”, with the latter indicating a more advanced level of cyber capability. Despite China’s significant Internet presence, it had not yet achieved Cyber Superpower status due to various issues such as a lack of innovation, discrepancies between urban and rural areas, low bandwidth per capita, and Internet development bottlenecks, as highlighted in Xi’s speech at the meeting (Xi’s speech at the first meeting of the new Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization, 2014). The term “Cyber Superpower” has been given official interpretations and meanings by the party-led and state-owned media in China. The Communist Party of China’s leading journal on theory, Qiushi, published an article in 2017 titled “Deepening the Implementation of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Strategic Thinking on Building China into a Cyber Superpower, Steadily Advancing Cybersecurity and Informatization Work”. This article, written by the Theoretical Studies Centre Group under the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), outlines six key areas related to Xi’s thinking on Cyber Superpower. These areas include strengthening planning, content control, cybersecurity assurance, the leading role of informatization, China’s international influence, and the Party’s leadership of cybersecurity and informatization work. Other official media outlets such as People’s Daily and Xinhua have also published similar articles on the topic. In 2021, the Institute of Party History and Literature of the CPC Central Committee published a

176  The Digital Ideologies book compiling Xi’s speeches, reports, directives, and instructions from 2013 to 2020 on Cyber Superpower, which includes a total of 285 paragraphs and is divided into ten parts.3 These parts cover topics such as strengthening the Party’s centralized leadership, prioritizing the development of the people, building China into a Cyber Superpower, winning the ideological battle of the Internet, safeguarding national cybersecurity, accelerating the development of essential technologies, using information technology as a leading force for economic growth, and creating a community of shared destiny in cyberspace. These topics emphasize Chinese political leaders’ pursuit of techno-nationalism, as well as techno-globalism. 6.2.2 Techno-globalism

While techno-nationalism has been prevalent in China’s discourse on technology and national progress, it has clashed with “techno-globalism” since China’s integration into the global economic system. Techno-globalism emphasizes the diverse and conflicting interests of different players involved in the development of networked technologies (Y. Zhao, 2010, p. 273). While there is a consensus among domestic actors in support of indigenous innovation of networked technologies, it is not easy to achieve the goal due to the interactions among transnational and domestic forces and domestic actors themselves. The dynamics of China’s telecommunication and information reform have always been complex, reflecting the central-local power relations, competition between different ministries for economic benefits and political power, spontaneous privatization, foreign dependency, and political repression (Mueller & Tan, 1997, pp. 9–12). In official discourse, there are contradictions shown in the People’s Daily, which tries to downplay the danger of losing national autonomy while emphasizing China’s advantage in cheap labour and huge market potential, and occasionally emphasizes the importance of creating self-sufficiency in pillar industries and national capacities of military defence (Hong, 2008, pp. 35–36). As China becomes more integrated into the global economy and the online world, we can expect clashes between techno-nationalism and techno-globalism. One of the primary features of Cyber Superpower is the promotion of a “community of shared destiny in cyberspace” which stresses international cooperation in both Internet governance and economic development. During the 2nd WIC, President Xi Jinping used this phrase to advocate for the establishment of a “multilateral, democratic and transparent global Internet governance system”. He called for cooperation among all levels of institutions and individuals, including governments, international organizations, Internet companies, technology communities, non-government institutions and individual citizens. Xi emphasized that this approach follows the principles of mutual support, mutual trust, and mutual benefit, while rejecting zero-sum game or winner-takesall mentality (Xi, 2015, 2nd WIC). In government and BAT’s digital discourses, China maintains its openness to foreign investment and companies from all

The Digital Ideologies  177 over the world, and Chinese companies, with government support, are ready to compete globally. Additionally, China is actively involved in the global Internet governance system. However, it is unclear how much this techno-globalism will persist in light of the trade war between China and the US, and the sanctions against China imposed during the Trump administration. 6.3

Digital Individualism

The concept of individualization has played a significant role in understanding modernity and late modernity, as described by various scholars (Bauman, 2000, 2001; Beck, 1992; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Giddens, 1991). It refers to a social process where individuals become increasingly free from previous social categories and hierarchies, such as family and kinship, and take on greater responsibility for their own choices in a risk society. Contemporary interpretations of individualization have added new dimensions to classic theories of individuality. The “discursive field” of individualization can be divided into two types of discourse (Howard, 2007). The first is heavily influenced by neoliberalism, which emphasizes individuality over collective institutions or organizations. The second type challenges the neoliberal assumptions by acknowledging the tension between people’s need for individuality and the interdependence of individuals in complex modern social institutions. This book approaches the concept of individualization and individualism by focusing on the critique of the first type of discourse of individualization, based on the theoretical foundation and definition of ideology for domination. The neoliberal view of individuality overlooks social contradictions and the impact of broader social structures on individuals, redirecting people’s attention from collective political participation to self-improvement and materialistic pursuits. As argued by McChesney, neoliberal initiatives are “characterized as free market policies that encourage private enterprise and consumer choice, reward personal responsibility and entrepreneurial initiative” (McChesney, 1999). This is in line with the idea that neoliberal initiatives promote free market policies, private enterprise, consumer choice, and personal responsibility. The chapter examines two aspects of individualism – consumerism and entrepreneurship – in relation to depoliticization in China (Wang, 2008; K. Yang, 2014), which serves the interests of elite groups by diverting attention from democratic political participation and suppressing behaviours that challenge the dominant ruling classes. 6.3.1  Entrepreneurship in the Digital Era

An enthusiastic promotion of entrepreneurship is one facet of individualism. According to Harvey, Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can be best advanced by

178  The Digital Ideologies liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private rights, free markets and free trade. (Harvey, 2005) As Howard puts it, for neoliberalism, “individuals are interpreted as rational and self-interested beings who seek material advancement, while rejecting public or social intervention into their lives” (Howard, 2007). Individuals are encouraged to “become self-critical, to take personal responsibility for their lives, to adapt specific practices of self-regulation and improvement, and to embrace entrepreneurial and materialistic self-identities” (ibid., p. 5). In China, enterprise has become a main feature of Chinese individualism. One characteristic of Chinese individualization is that “disembedment in the Chinese case manifests itself mainly in the domain of emancipatory politics, i.e. the everyday politics of life chances and social status” (Yan, 2009). The “first and foremost” purpose of individual efforts is “about the improvement of living standards and social status” (ibid., p. 288). The Internet is seen as a great tool to facilitate this “self-improvement”. Both government and businesses praise the potential of the Internet to bring new opportunities and wealth to individuals. Marketization and privatization in China have facilitated the imagination of individual entrepreneurs and technocrats, and have replaced collective endeavours to solve social problems by individual’s proposals as consumers (Wu & Yun, 2015). This neoliberal ideology of individual entrepreneurship also finds support among many Chinese. It is instrumentalist for the regime because, as argued by Yan as early as 2002, “the political survival of the Communist regime depends on the state’s capacity to maintain rapid economic growth and to create more employment opportunities for the large population of unemployed young labourers” (Yan, 2002). The government’s emphasis on entrepreneurship is particularly visible in its digital communications on MEI, as discussed in Section 3.2. The government sees the Internet as a tool to support innovation and business growth. Policy documents such as the “Internet Plus” Action Plan and Opinions to Promote Innovation and Entrepreneurship aim to promote start-ups and innovation through the use of the Internet. Premier Li Keqiang emphasized this point in a press conference during the Fifth Session of the 12th National People’s Congress in 2017 (K. Li, 2017): We believe that our initiative of mass entrepreneurship and innovation is a response to the call of this age of economic globalization and ‘Internet Plus’. The government’s further reform of streamlining administration and delegating powers is also designed to boost this public enthusiasm for business start-ups and innovation…Not only SMEs

The Digital Ideologies  179 are doing entrepreneurial and innovation activities. Big companies are actively engaged in this too. They have opened up vast online marketspaces to enable a matching between the innovative capabilities of their employees with the demands of customers in the marketplace. The notion of entrepreneurship through the Internet is also promoted by BAT, who stress their capacity to empower small businesses and individuals (see also Section 4.1). As an instance, Pony Ma asserts: [1]  Many cases show that the connections promoted by the ‘Internet Plus’ is ‘enabling individuals’, enabling the smallest unit of individual partners. When large numbers of individuals are connected, they might possess the capability to surpass the capability of themselves – to not only create their own individual brands, but also even create selforganisations through connections, generating various forms of economic activities. As units that are closest to market and capillary vessels of social economy, individuals can acutely feel the changes of demands from users and adjust and innovate very fast accordingly. (Pony Ma, 2014 TGPC, my translation) Whether the Internet has really provided good job opportunities needs to be proven. It is an ideological argument because it only represents part of the whole scenario, the seemingly rosy part of the picture. This type of argument reflects the ideologies in debates about the “New Economy”. While the use of machines and new technologies are supposed to emancipate human beings from hard labour, yet the reality is different. The updating of technologies (productive forces) does not equate to an “update” of social relations. For example, as early as the 1980s, there are debates about “flexibility” brought by new technologies, during which many celebrated the new “post-industrial” sectors. Because of the development of technology, it is said that competition had been replaced by cooperation. A lot of small businesses were built up, because they were said to be more sensitive to the market with the help of direct communication between producers and consumers. And of course, the upgrade of work, the replacement of hard manual work by white-collar mental work, seemed to be nothing but plausible. However, as Harvey (1990) points out from the other side of the story, these are just strategies for a more “flexible accumulation” leading to a more precarious status for workers: a more flexible employment policy with fewer “core” workers and more “periphery” workers, combined with a more flexible wage system. Moreover, while the “flexible management” in the workplace seemed to give more autonomy (in terms of less direct control from the managers) to workers, it actually led to more direct discipline and “collective self-discipline” (Armstrong et al., 1984, p. 399).

180  The Digital Ideologies Similar things happen in the “digital economy”. Many researchers have shown that the Internet might not be beneficial to all but increase inequality and further appropriate power from users to companies (Fuchs, 2014). Scholz (2008) has pointed out the market ideology and myths of the Web 2.0. While work in general is more informationalized, mental work becomes more informational in advanced countries and manual work more industrialized in developing countries, it is hard to say whether working conditions are getting better. As some critical scholars have pointed out that though forces of production have developed in the digital area, the relations of production have not changed so much (Fuchs, 2014; Fuchs & Sandoval, 2013). The production is still based on the logic of extracting surplus value, thus is exploitative. Moreover, the new types of jobs, such as logistics jobs, are highly exploitative. In fact, some participants who used to join the “digital economy”, such as opening online stores on Taobao or Weshang, expressed that “it is hard to really make money”. Moreover, this one-dimensional understanding of the Internet is problematic. It perceives the Internet solely from its exchange value to make profits instead of its communicative use value for human beings. The Internet is seen as a tool for the companies to make profits, instead of primarily for people to communicate, to spread information, and to promote equality and social inclusion, etc. Furthermore, this argument implies the companies or entrepreneurs as main actors in the developing and application of the Internet. It legitimates the business model of online platforms by emphasizing the investments they make to maintain websites, servers and technologies. However, the contribution of tax-funded university and military projects in the development of technologies is neglected, not to mention the user labour embedded in the development of online platforms. It neglects how the Internet is actually developed out of support and resources from all citizens and thus should be owned and developed by and for the public. In other words, this one-dimensional argument neglects the right of people to own the means of communication for the benefit of a public that sees itself as a public (as in the Greek “polis”, meaning a body or community of citizens). This ideological argument about the Internet should be understood in association with the specific path of development of the Internet in China. First of all, ICT was introduced in China in the context of a developing economy (Zhao, 2007). There were and are constant emphases on the economic benefit that the Internet can bring to China for economic growth. Second, content control and surveillance online are strict in China. Though the Internet first appeared to be emancipating in mobilizing a public and organizing social movements, these tendencies were soon oppressed by the government (Yang, 2009). Therefore, it is not surprising that the main benefit brought by the Internet is claimed as an economic one, not as political nor communicative tools outside of that framework.

The Digital Ideologies  181 Moreover, encouraging inexperienced young people and graduates to start their own businesses can distract them from the bleak reality of unemployment and poor working conditions for peasants and workers in China. The Nongmin Gong phenomenon, where migrant workers are categorized as peasants but work in factories in cities seasonally, has resulted in high unemployment rates in rural and urban areas and a shortage of workers in factories due to harsh working conditions. The MEI suggests that the Internet can provide a temporary solution by enabling individuals to start their own businesses online and factories to adopt more flexible production methods. However, this approach requires the government to guarantee social security systems, including education, healthcare, and housing, which have already been largely reduced in China after privatization in the 1980s and 1990s. This means that responsibilities that were previously the government’s burdens have been shifted to individuals and families. 6.3.2  Digital Consumerism

The second relevant feature about individualism is its association with consumerism. Campbell points out two broad strands in the contemporary sociology of consumption in Britain (Campbell, 2005). His discussion is used to inform my analysis of two fundamental ideological aspects of consumerism. The first one is that the shifting of focus/paradigm to consumption conceals the still fundamental contradictions of production in capitalism, especially in developing countries and the global capitalist system. As illustrated by Harvey in his discussions about the conditions of post-modernity, consumption is rather an ideological reflection of changes in production. It has an ideological function to “keep capitalist production profitable” (Harvey, 1990). The second one is that the celebration of consumption and consumer power neglects the fact of capitalism’s capability and wiliness to forge a particular type of workers suited to new productive processes or work. It disguises the fact that consumer decisions may not reflect their political interests but “not surprisingly favour the global economy’s search for the cheapest possible prices, irrespective of the consequences for labour” (Miller, 2005). Consumption can be rather better defined as “lack of choice” (Miller, 2005, p.  16). This “lack of choice” links back to Marx’s concept of alienation which means the producers are alienated from the means of production, their own labour power and their own products. Therefore, as a consumer, people only have a secondary relationship to goods, instead of a direct control of production or distribution of goods. Neoliberal development of the capitalist market in China and worldwide capitalism in general relies on consumerism as a fundamental process. To maintain and expand economic growth, the government has repeatedly stressed the significance of stimulating domestic demand. As a result, there

182  The Digital Ideologies has been a shift from an export-driven production economy to a consumeroriented or a mixed economy. With the emergence of e-commerce, the Internet has contributed significantly to increased consumption. Furthermore, digital devices have created new markets and generated new desires or dependencies (Qiu, 2016). The focus groups conducted in this research revealed that Internet users and workers tend to identify themselves as consumers rather than citizens or online community members (as discussed in Section 5.1). For instance, one participant from white-collar group 2 remarked, “It is not like a donation; I think it is worth it spending money to purchase their products” (#5). These participants also strongly believe that their power to influence Internet companies, platforms, and even the government is derived from their role as consumers. This discourse aligns with the principles of neoliberal individualization and consumerism, where individuals are viewed as rational and self-interested consumers who make choices based on their needs, without concern for the underlying imperatives behind their consumption. This includes issues such as how choices are made, what resources are required to make them, whether they are real or illusory, how to create better alternative choices, and wider political and moral considerations such as responsibilities. According to Miller (2005), these assumptions about neoliberal and individualized consumers serve an ideological function of deflecting attention away from politics, as the source of their demands and desires is deemed entirely irrelevant to both economics and politics. The identity of Internet users as consumers and their decision-making processes based on consumerism may not align with their political interests, but rather benefit the capital accumulation of Internet companies and enable monopolistic tendencies of large corporations. Participants in the study were willing to sacrifice their privacy for convenience, particularly when dealing with big companies like BAT. Some participants even preferred sharing their information with BAT rather than smaller platforms due to concerns about security (see also Section 5.1). This trust in big companies and the pursuit of convenience promotes the idea of “connection” that is emphasized by Internet monopolies. These monopolies promote the use of API to obtain user information from various platforms and websites, in order to display more targeted and personalized advertisements. This neoliberal individualized construction of user identity as consumers has an ideological function. This construction serves the interests of both economic and political elite groups. First of all, it is beneficial economically for commercial Internet platforms and companies. The limited power given to the users do not really restrict the companies’ business operations and its financial gains through collecting and selling user information. For the state, the Internet has boosted the economy as promoted in the “Internet Plus” policy. Second, shaping a user consumer identity also meets the interests of elite groups politically. For the state, this could prevent or undermine the

The Digital Ideologies  183 possibilities of an emerging public sphere for citizens’ political engagements. For the companies, this avoids the risks of users engaging in political issues on their platforms and thus causes trouble for them from the state. As the state tries to control and manage the “the cultural market in the era of cultural globalization” through “railroading with interests” (Yan, 2002, p. 41), it is not surprising that this type of ideology is shared by the Internet companies. Though this is not to say that this ideology is totally shaped and propagated by the elite groups, yet it does serve their interests but not the public’s interests, as a “public” cannot be made up of individualized consumers as they cannot act as any kind of collective or group, even if “statistically” they may act in similar ways. 6.4

The Spirit of Chinese Internet

The development of China’s Internet and ICT industry has taken place during a period of significant social and economic transformation in the country. Beginning with the market-oriented reform and opening-up period of the 1980s and 1990s, guided by neoliberal principles, and continuing through the combination of neoliberalism and authoritarianism in the late 1990s, the Chinese government has pursued economic liberalization and modernization through the introduction of new technologies, particularly in the manufacturing and export sectors. The government has consolidated central power through the implementation of various policy tools, including tax reform, monetary policy, and budget, to maintain macroeconomic stability and allocate resources to achieve policy objectives. Since the late 1990s Asian financial crisis, especially the 2008 global economic crisis, the Chinese government has gradually shifted from an export and investment-driven growth model to a consumption and servicedriven one, with network technology and the Internet playing a critical role in this transformation. In the traditional manufacturing sector, the ICT industry has allowed China to maintain its export advantage and become the main hope for China to enter the upstream of the international supply chain and achieve industrial upgrading. Unlike the developed capitalist West, China’s Internet and information technology did not evolve in a society transforming from modern to post-modern, or post-industrial one. Instead, from the outset, Chinese society, including its state and enterprises, has envisaged the Internet as a means of achieving modernization and industrial upgrading, and purposefully becoming a leading country in the global industrial economy. Looking at the global economy, China’s impressive progress in the real economy challenges the United States’ international dominance that was established through the post-war financial order. As a result, there has been continued friction between these two major economies, which has expanded the competition internationally beyond economic factors and into the political,

184  The Digital Ideologies cultural, and ideological domains. This has also led to the growth of state-led nationalism, which now feeds more easily into grassroots nationalism. This surge of Chinese nationalism aligns with the trends of populism, racism, and anti-globalization that have emerged in the United States and many European countries. At the same time, China’s economy has undergone rapid growth in the 40 years since its opening up and reform. The increase in the average living standards has been boosting Chinese people’s national pride, which has further driven the rise of nationalism. The Internet has become not only a space for public discussions and the expression of nationalist sentiments but also a core site for international competition, including key technologies, governance, and discursive power. In the domain of consumption, the ongoing transformation of the Chinese economy necessitates a rapid escalation of domestic consumption. To this end, e-commerce, facilitated by the ubiquity of the Internet and infrastructures, has become instrumental in opening up vast untapped markets and enabling more personalized production and consumption patterns. As such, this transformation allows for the identification and exploration of niche markets and the provision of innovative models of personal financial lending. The proliferation of digital gadgets has likewise generated a significant consumption market, leading to the emergence of new forms of addictive behaviours. This developmental model also entails the support of nationalism to endorse Chinese companies’ products and services as integral components of the nation’s overall economic advancement. In the realm of ideology, the Chinese government has progressed from a state of initial disregard or inexperience towards the Internet as a space for public discourse to establishing a complete set of measures that exert control over public discourse. These measures encompass the Great Firewall, departmental regulations and directives, non-official orders, the enactment of the Cybersecurity Law, and the deployment of bots, trolls, and misinformation campaigns to influence online discussions. During this time, China’s Internet users reached 45% in 2013, with middle-class urban residents making up the majority of users who briefly experienced limited political and public issue discussion freedom. Sina Weibo briefly became a phenomenal public space, while BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent) established their dominant position in the business sector. As the Internet and business spaces gradually tightened, the emergence of a dominant discourse on how to conceptualize Internet security, control, and censorship has gradually taken shape, with particular emphasis placed on nationalist themes such as social stability, national security, and national unity, all of which are founded on the government’s formidable and cohesive police power. This form of Internet censorship is designed to inhibit the formation of radical communities or political solidarity at the societal level while simultaneously pushing individuals to seek psychic

The Digital Ideologies  185 compensation caused by individualization from nationalism. Furthermore, it constrains individuals’ identities to a space of Internet consumerism rather than actively engaging in politics as civic individuals. At an individual level, the emergence of the Internet has created new categories of employment, such as digital labourers, platform workers, and online business owners, that in some respects satisfy a desire to resist the alienation inherent in traditional factory work. Younger generations, for instance, have been known to prefer employment in food delivery services to working in factories. However, it should be noted that these new forms of employment do not necessarily reduce exploitation, and the prevailing discourse of both the government and businesses does not generally encourage discussions on the meaning of work. Furthermore, dissenting viewpoints such as those associated with “lying flat”, “leeks”, “996, ICU” are often swiftly condemned and subjected to strict control by the authorities. The Internet has a dual identity as both a profit-making sector and a state propaganda and censorship machine creates inherent contradictions. On the one hand, Internet companies in China seek to secure monopolistic positions and favourable treatment through government support, thereby contributing to nationalism and developmentalism. On the other hand, the very essence of the Internet requires openness and sharing, both in terms of technological innovation that necessitates international cooperation and talent exchange and content development that requires public contribution. However, due to political pressure and commercialization, an increasing number of users view the Internet as an unreliable source of information, although they continue to depend on it for its convenience. Internet companies also shifted to present themselves as providers of infrastructure for connectivity, avoiding involvement in political content. This depoliticized stance grants the government greater access to information and monitoring capabilities. In this context, consumerism and materialism play a significant guiding role. Individuals who were previously disconnected from traditional society during China’s market-oriented reform and opening up are now being re-embedded into the national level through nationalism. The public and businesses actively follow political red lines and do not challenge authority, internalizing a depoliticized ideology. The Internet discourse has developed in this context and provided nourishment for such discourse through its technological features. Technology is viewed as a tool to achieve economic transformation and development in production and consumption fields and as a means of monitoring and controlling individuals. The network space has been transformed into an integral part of government propaganda. This has resulted in the dominance of informational developmentalism, technonationalism, and digital individualization, together with technological determinism in mainstream digital discourse in China (Figure 6.1).

186  The Digital Ideologies

Figure 6.1 Ideologies about the ICT and the Internet in transnational informational capitalist China

Notes 1 我们要加强信息基础设施建设，强化信息资源深度整合，打通经济社会发展的 信息“大动脉”。党的十八届五中全会、“十三五”规划纲要都对实施网络强 国战略、“互联网+”行动计划、大数据战略等作了部署，要切实贯彻落实好， 着力推动互联网和实体经济深度融合发展，以信息流带动技术流、资金流、人 才流、物资流，促进资源配置优化，促进全要素生产率提升，为推动创新发 展、转变经济发展方式、调整经济结构发挥积极作用。（习近平，2016年4月 19日，在网络安全和信息化工作座谈会上的讲话） 2 Although there were exceptions among the leadership, such as Chen Yun, as described in Zhao’s memoirs on pages 101–102. 3 http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0121/c64094-32007869.html

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7 Conclusion

In this book, I have analysed the digital discourse, discourse on network technology and the Internet, which is generated, endorsed, negotiated, and disputed by three primary groups of actors, namely the government, the tech giants, and various digital workers and Internet users. The similarities and differences in different agents’ digital discourse show that it is a contested field (Section 7.2). The issues their digital discourse covers range widely, from upgrading industries to starting online businesses, from cyber security to online privacy, highlighting the pervasive nature of digital technologies and the Internet in today’s world. The ideological digital discourse is used to obscure social conflicts, redirect public attention, and justify power relations (Section 7.3). These discussions advocate for a renewed and multifaceted ideology framework I will show in Section 7.4. Prior to delving into the specifics of the conclusions and reflections, it is pertinent to examine the account of Yinghaiwei, China’s initial privately owned Internet firm, and its key founder, Zhang Shuxin (Section 7.1). This tale provides insight into the wider societal environment during the nascent stages of China’s Internet and informs the current tensions around the Internet and information and communication technologies (ICT) industries. Yinghaiwei’s development can be considered as both a leader and an initiator, as well as a martyr. On the one hand, Yinghaiwei explored and promoted certain rules and foundations of the Chinese Internet; on the other hand, it was constrained by the complex relationships among Chinese Internet companies, the government, and society. 7.1

The Story of Yinghaiwei

In 1996, Yinghaiwei, known as the “first Chinese private enterprise in the Internet industry”, erected a billboard in Zhongguancun, also known as “China’s Silicon Valley”. The billboard displayed a striking slogan: “How far are the Chinese people from the information superhighway? 1,500 meters to the north”. This advertising slogan may be one of the earliest and most popular Internetrelated expressions in China. The ad’s significance lies in its ability to reveal the futuristic and nationalist expectations and aspirations attributed to the Internet by early Chinese Internet practitioners, entrepreneurs, elites, and the state. DOI: 10.4324/9781003315810-11

192  Conclusion It is highly likely not a coincidence that the creator of this impactful slogan, Zhang Shuxin, had worked as a journalist for Chinese Science Daily, the earliest established technology-oriented newspaper in the People’s Republic of China, for three years before venturing into entrepreneurship. Zhang was born in 1963 to parents who were intellectuals and were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution until 1978. She enrolled in University of Science and Technology of China in 1981, four years after the resumption of the national college entrance examination in 1977. After graduating, she initially worked as a journalist for three years at Chinese Science Daily before transitioning to enterprise research at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. During this time, she witnessed the rapid rise of Zhongguancun, as well as the many ebbs and flows of the enterprise tide. In 1992, a large number of intellectuals working in government agencies and research institutes were influenced by the Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” and actively engaged in entrepreneurship in market reforms, known as the “92 Group”. That same year, Zhang Shuxin left the Chinese Academy of Sciences to start her own company, initially focusing on planning services before shifting to the Internet industry. In 1994, she and her husband visited Dell headquarters and Gateway in the United States, where they were exposed to the Internet industry. This coincided with the boom of the Internet in the United States, with Bill Clinton, the presidential candidate at the time, proposing the construction of an information superhighway in 1992, which became a government plan in 1993. In September of that year, President Clinton’s State of the Union address formalized this plan as the “National Information Infrastructure”. Inspired by her trip to the United States, Zhang returned to China in early 1995 and founded Yinghaiwei (Information Highway in transliteration). As an early Internet enterprise, Yinghaiwei made various attempts in business, including providing email services to tech professionals in Zhongguancun, selling computers and modems as well as news aggregation, e-commerce, and even virtual currency. It can be said that Yinghaiwei was a pioneer in the portal website and the core businesses BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent) now focus on. Yinghaiwei’s most prominent projects, however, are ICP (Internet Content Provider) and ISP (Internet Service Provider). As the first private company in China to provide Internet services to ordinary users, Yinghaiwei borrowed the Internet access through Chinese Academy of Sciences and established the country’s first portal website, “Yinghaiwei Space”. Users logged onto Yinghaiwei’s server by dialling a telephone number and connected to the United States through the international gateway of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The network was primarily used for surfing the Internet, and users were required to register and pay an access fee before entering “Yinghaiwei Space”. It is very similar to the early stage of AOL. At that time, Chinese society, including government officials and the public, was not familiar with the Internet, and there was no network open to

Conclusion  193 ordinary households in China. Zhang Shuxin, a former journalist, planner, and an idealist, actively promoted the Internet in China. She opened the country’s first private science and education museum, where people could come to learn about the Internet for free and experience Yinghaiwei’s network. She frequently appeared on television and wrote columns in newspapers to popularize knowledge about the Internet. She provided the “China Popular Information Superhighway” exhibition area to the China Science and Technology Museum free of charge and collaborated with the Beijing Library to provide book searches on the “Yinghaiwei Space” website. During the Atlanta Olympics, she also established a news information channel between Atlanta and Beijing for the media. The core message conveyed was that the information industry presented an important opportunity for the rise of the Chinese nation in the world. Nationalism has played a significant role in the history of Yinghaiwei. In 1997, during the same year that Hong Kong was returned to China and the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held, construction began on the Three Gorges Dam project. Zhang Shuxin believed that this momentous year presented an excellent opportunity to promote the story, characters, and history of Yan’an, a crucial area for Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during revolutionary period, online. She organized nationwide viewings for primary and secondary school students and planned to invest millions of yuan over three years to integrate a vast amount of content with the best available technology, ultimately creating an online version of Yan’an and China under the brand of Yinghaiwei. Unfortunately, the project ultimately failed, resulting in significant financial losses and dealing a massive blow to the team’s morale. Futurism also constitutes a significant element in the discourse of Yinghaiwei and Zhang. At the age of 15, Zhang Shuxin came across the futurist novel “Roaming the Future with Little Pager”, in which the protagonist travels to the future and witnesses flying drop-shaped cars, robotic waiters, weather control systems, solar-powered lights, and off-season vegetables, among other imaginative inventions. The author’s vision of the future thoroughly overturned Zhang Shuxin’s perspective. After establishing Yinghaiwei, Zhang sponsored American futurist Nicholas Negroponte’s first visit to China. Zhang Shuxin had previously read Being Digital, and held Negroponte in high esteem, eagerly hoping to connect with him. As a result, she sponsored Negroponte’s first visit to China and arranged a luxurious lecture hall on a 1000-square-metre floor within Yinghaiwei to host his speech. Zhang’s endorsement of Negroponte can be interpreted as a long-term consequence of the prevalent enthusiasm for Toffler’s futurist ideas in China during the 1980s. This was exemplified by the invitation extended to the Toffler couple by Chinese officials and the party organ to deliberate on the nation’s economic progress subsequent to 1982. Zhao Ziyang, then Premier and General Secretary, met the couple formally at Zhongnanhai, the centre headquarter of CCP and the State Council, in September 1988.

194  Conclusion As the earliest ICP, Yinghaiwei was the first to explore and gain experience in online content regulation. At the time, Yinghaiwei was a community where many individuals freely expressed their opinions. As a former media reporter at state-affiliated media, Zhang was attentive to public discussions and was conscious of the issue of accountability in the event of “inappropriate” speech. She inquired with the relevant authorities about who would be responsible, and was informed that Yinghaiwei would bear the responsibility as the provider of the platform for public opinion. As a result, they “invented” a self-accountability regulation. Subsequently, online forums in China began implementing the “self-accountability for content” system, whereby users must agree to take responsibility for their online comments before registering. In 1996, Yinghaiwei also pioneered the IP registration system, requiring all Internet users to register with the Public Security Bureau. At the time, Internet service providers, such as Yinghaiwei, assumed the responsibility of registration on behalf of their users, ensuring that individuals could be traced through their IP address in the event of any incidents. Due to the lack of network operators providing Internet services to ordinary users in China at that time, Yinghaiwei began to gradually develop towards the direction of an ISP. It was also one of the earliest enterprises to experience and even promote the reform and development of the Chinese telecommunications industry. In January 1996, the Chinese Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (the predecessor of China Telecom) built and opened the national backbone network of ChinaNet for public computer interconnection. In April 1997, the National Informatization Working Conference approved the “National Informatization Ninth Five-Year Plan and 2000 Vision”, which included the development of the Chinese Internet as a national information infrastructure project, with the goal of rapidly expanding its reach. In the early days, Yinghaiwei purchased bandwidth resources from the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and then sold them to users at a higher price to earn a profit. However, at that time, there was no separation between government and enterprise in the Chinese telecommunications industry. China Telecom was both an ISP and an Internet provider, and all other ISPs, including Yinghaiwei, can only purchase bandwidth resources from it and resell to ordinary users. In an environment lacking fair competition, China Telecom’s monopoly position as a state-owned enterprise gave it absolute bargaining power to set fees, making it difficult for other ISPs to make profits. Therefore, Yinghaiwei attempted to challenge the monopoly on network access prices held by China Telecom by independently providing a complete set of network access and charging services to netizens through the establishment of a self-built physical backbone network. In 1997, Yinghaiwei opened network nodes in 8 cities nationwide, and purchased 12 special edition advertisements in local newspapers where they established branch stations. The titles of these advertisements were all “A Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire” (a famous revolutionary quote from Mao Zedong). However, Yinghaiwei’s challenge to the national monopoly was ultimately unsuccessful and led to a

Conclusion  195 loss of nearly 20 million yuan. Nonetheless, it was the joint efforts of several service providers who proposed negotiations and pushed the National Development and Reform Commission to change its policy and ultimately led to a significant reduction in Internet fees by the end of 1997, ushering in the era of universal Internet access. The relationship between Yinghaiwei and capital is also complex. In a summary conducted after being forced to leave Yinghaiwei, Zhang Shuxin believed that the root cause of Yinghaiwei’s major mistake was the injection of large sums of capital by Zhongxingfa in 1996, which planted a “seed of disaster” and led it astray from the ideal Internet economy. Due to continuous losses, conflicts continued to arise between the major shareholders and Zhang Shuxin. In 1998, Zhang Shuxin was forced to resign. Also in 1998, the commercialization of the Chinese Internet truly began, with the establishment of Sohu, the launch of Netease’s portal, the establishment of Tencent, the founding of Alibaba in 1999, and the establishment of Baidu in 2000. Although it ultimately failed, Yinghaiwei’s emergence, development, and decline were highly representative. Zhang Shuxin resigned from the Chinese Academy of Sciences to start her own business during the entrepreneurship wave after Deng Xiaoping’s speech in “South Tour”. Yinghaiwei’s emergence was inspired by Zhang Shuxin’s trip to the United States during the dot-com boom, and its name is a transliteration of “InfoHighWay”. Throughout its development, Yinghaiwei was closely tied to its relationship with the government. As Zhang Shuxin herself said, her understanding of the political system, being adept at navigating the market economy, and ability to navigate both within and outside the system were all important qualities (Shuxin, 2005). Yinghaiwei’s earliest “Yinghaiwei Space” borrowed access through the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and its subsequent self-built network challenged the monopoly position of the state-owned telecommunications bureau in the market reforms, and helped to lower network fees, making the Internet accessible to everyone. As a former media professional, Zhang Shuxin was not only adept at creating and promoting digital discourse, but was also highly sensitive to state’s requirements of content control. As the first company to provide Internet content, Yinghaiwei was the earliest to deal with self-censorship and IP monitoring, and created the “self-responsibility for content” system under the requirements of the regulatory authorities. However, its failure to challenge the telecommunications bureau thus the state power, lack of familiarity with the capital market, and ideological restrictions on content production ultimately led to its decline and Zhang’s departure. 7.2

Digital Discourse as a Contested Field

The book has conducted a discourse analysis on the economic and political dimensions of the transformative potential of network technologies under the framework of China’s capitalist system, as represented by the government, the tech giants BAT and Internet workers and users.

196  Conclusion 7.2.1

Digital Discourse from the Government

The administration led by Xi-Li has prioritized the “New Normal” of an Internet-enabled economy and new socio-political structures in the digital era. This publication examines 21 government documents, including official statements on the growth of ICT and Internet-related industries, high-level strategies, and speeches made by Xi on issues of informatization and cybersecurity. The book also utilizes certain state-owned media documents as official explanations of these materials (refer to Chapter 3). Through a thematic analysis utilizing the framework outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, this book identifies the primary themes in these documents pertaining to the development of China’s informatization. Subsequently, it applies Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to evaluate the primary arguments within these themes. The Xi-Li administration has identified the overarching objective of establishing China as a preeminent Cyber Superpower (Wang Luo Qiang Guo) to facilitate the attainment of China’s great rejuvenation. The central tenet espoused is to prioritize the interests of the people, which reflect the socialist promises. The rapidly evolving technological landscape has created the imperative for the government to embrace the digital revolution and avoid being left behind. The current state of affairs and the desired outcomes have led the government to propose measures that prioritize the information economy, cybersecurity, and global collaboration. Utilizing CDA, Chapter 3 offers a comprehensive analysis of the discursive strategies utilized in official discourse and offers detailed interpretations and clarifications of the said discourse. In China, the official digital communication is deeply intertwined with the country’s modernization efforts. This integration can be attributed to several factors. First, the Xi-Li administration has placed a high priority on the development of Internet and information and communication technologies (ICT) as part of their strategy to transform the economy from one driven by exports and foreign direct investment (FDI) to a new economic model that emphasizes high-quality development. The core of this new model is the ICT and Internet-enabled new production, domestic consumption, and technology development. Second, the central government, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, has adopted a more assertive political stance, as evidenced by the use of the term “cyber sovereignty” in official digital communication. This term conveys a strong message regarding the government’s determination to exercise control over the domestic Internet. Third, while the government has projected a tough image in its domestic policies, it has also sought to deepen global cooperation in various areas, including political participation in international Internet governance, economic expansion of Chinese investments and companies, and cultural diplomacy to enhance China’s “soft power” on the world stage. Notwithstanding the possibility of multiple realities, inconsistencies exist between the language used by governmental authorities and the actual state of affairs. As Fairclough (2000) posits, different discourses contribute to

Conclusion  197 distinct representations of reality. Hence, the government discourse is liable to overlook certain realities. For instance, the Chinese government’s digital capitalism rhetoric does not address modifications in production relations. Moreover, discussions of inequality predominantly focus on rural and western regions rather than class disparities. The public’s involvement in the digital world is confined to the digital economy and opinion expression, without much emphasis on democratization or personal empowerment. Although the government promotes Internet-enabled entrepreneurship, it hardly addresses worker safety and insurance protection. Consequently, the official digital discourse and its omissions offer valuable insight into the Chinese government’s aspirations regarding the nation’s current development and modernization. 7.2.2  Digital Discourse from the BAT

The companies Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent, collectively referred to as BAT, have effectively expanded their operations from being Internet-based entities centred on domestic affairs to multifaceted global conglomerates with a comprehensive coverage of various aspects of Chinese citizens’ lives. This research work has identified the most significant discursive occurrences of BAT, primarily consisting of speeches delivered by the companies’ CEOs. The analysis of these materials employs a combined approach of CDA and thematic analysis. The political economy of BAT shares several common themes, as demonstrated in Chapter 4. They justify their domination in the domestic Internet market, as well as their expansion into new industries and the global market, using various discursive strategies that respond to government discourse. BAT employs discursive strategies to construct positive self-representations and favourable relationships with stakeholders, such as the government, advertisers, and users. First, BAT legitimizes its dominant position in the market by claiming to build an “infrastructure” that helps small businesses in the “boundaryless Internet”. However, they define infrastructure as ubiquitous and boundaryless, rather than public and neutral, and claim to have supported clients in a decentralized Internet-enabled market. These discursive strategies serve to mitigate the negative aspects of oligopolies. Second, BAT claims to support China’s economic upgrade and has expanded their businesses into various sectors, including manufacturing, agriculture, and finance, through the use of nationalist statements that won over traditional industries. Third, there are contradictions in BAT’s discourse as they attempt to position themselves as both global and Chinese companies, which demonstrate their main objective of expanding their businesses into new sectors and global markets. BAT has deliberately appropriated nationalist discourse to legitimize and promote their de facto domination and expansion. The application of CDA proves valuable not only in recognizing the primary themes of British American Tobacco’s (BAT) discourse but also in revealing BAT’s operational strategies and underlying motivations. While

198  Conclusion BAT’s discourse centres on neoliberal perspectives, it does not reflect the full extent of their business expansion, which is often portrayed positively or distortedly. BAT consistently acquires and subdues new technology startups and companies in various fields, while simultaneously expanding their businesses into all aspects of public life. These operations are reframed as “building ecosystems” and “facilitating small businesses”. BAT’s violation of user privacy and data is scarcely acknowledged in their discourse, and their manipulation of public discussions is rarely addressed. This manipulation includes government-ordered censorship, self-censorship driven by economic interests, promotion of non-political and entertainment information over public political discussions, toleration of rumours and misinformation to increase web traffic, and avoidance of accountability as the most powerful communication and media platforms in the digital age. Consequently, these crucial discussions concerning the public’s digital life are absent from BAT’s discourse, and the discourse primarily revolves around neoliberal and nationalist views influenced by economic and political interests. 7.2.3  Digital Discourse from the Digital Labourers

Although governmental and corporate discourses usually receive greater attention, the public discourse, or colloquially known as “street talk”, about China’s digital development that is generated by non-elite, subaltern groups, can be easily overlooked or under-examined. This raises questions about the attitudes and beliefs of other social groups or classes towards China’s path of digital capitalism, as well as their acceptance or rejection of dominant ideologies, official discourses, and narratives. Moreover, it is crucial to explore how these groups interpret, legitimize, and justify their lived experiences regarding the Internet within China’s state-led digital capitalism. Chapter 5 of this study aims to investigate these issues. The research at hand opted to employ focus groups as a means of data collection. While survey-based methods are conventionally employed to investigate public opinion, they can be limited by either yielding overly simplistic responses or incurring excessive resource costs. Additionally, in China’s authoritarian context, the accuracy of survey data pertaining to political matters may be difficult to ascertain. Alternatively, online data mining with digital tools can be utilized but may pose the risk of collecting distorted opinions due to censorship and disparities between online and offline behaviours. Thus, this study chose to employ focus groups to simulate natural settings for authentic “street talks”. The present study concentrates on three categories of Internet workers and users in China’s digital capitalist system. While certain groups, such as radical dissidents and investigative journalists, have gained significant attention, Chapter 5 aims to investigate the perspectives of three subaltern groups that have received less consideration. These groups consist of representative workers who are also users and digital labourers, but are not as powerful as dominant government officials or CEOs, nor do they possess

Conclusion  199 greater communicative or symbolic power. The first group is composed of manufacturing workers, predominantly migrant workers with lower educational backgrounds, who are crucial to China’s digital capitalist development and represent an emerging, yet consistently underrepresented, group of Internet users. The second group consists of programmers, who are the newly emerging knowledge workers and hold crucial positions in the digital capitalist era due to their required skills, innovation potential, and extensive knowledge of the Internet and new technologies. Lastly, the third group comprises white-collar workers, primarily in the service industry in urban areas, who are often the most vocal online, especially in the domains of online entertainment, gaming, and consumption, but exclude the first two categories of workers. In this study, these distinct groups were brought together to gain a diverse understanding of the digital discourse prevalent in Chinese society. Chapter 5 critically examined the discourse of these groups and identified how dominant ideologies are both legitimized and challenged. The discussions centred around the participants’ experiences of the opportunities presented by the Internet, the data collected by companies, and their constructions of identities as consumers, from the perspective of the Internet Economy. Internet workers and users have established their self-identity as distinct consumers and legitimized the dominance of BAT in the marketplace through the concept of “trust”. Furthermore, nationalist contentions, such as the dichotomy of “us versus them”, “stability”, and “unique national conditions”, have been employed to justify Internet censorship and control. Meanwhile, from a political aspect, the participants debated and disputed the current state of affairs, with one dominant ideology being “There is no Alternative” (TINA), which embodies neoliberal, individualistic, and techno-deterministic elements. This type of digital discourse often claims that there are no alternative public services available in China, no effective methods for political participation to solve the current problems regarding Internet platforms, and no alternative ways to fund Internet platforms except through advertising. However, criticisms of the current situation were also expressed by the participants, who were shown to be both critical of dominant ideologies and negatively accepting of the reality. Chapter 5 has highlighted the highly contested and chaotic nature of hegemony in Chinese society. Many workers are doubtful about the Internet’s ability to generate fresh opportunities and decentralized markets. Some of them have attempted to start online businesses but encountered intense competition and the need to invest significant effort and resources in credibility-building. Internet workers and users have also criticized data collection practices and other commercial operations performed by BAT for violating the Internet’s essence. Nationalism is also a contentious subject, with many suggesting that Chinese Internet companies do not represent the best interests of Chinese citizens. In addition, some groups feel that they lack an equal voice on the Internet, as others possess greater speech power. This indicates a divergence between the interests of

200  Conclusion the Chinese people and those who control the Internet, be it the government or large corporations. Some individuals also disagree with the notion that censorship and authoritarianism are essential for China’s stability, proposing that the government could maintain stability more effectively without censorship. Such an outlook suggests that the government’s need to control the Internet is not due to unique national circumstances, but rather an attempt to retain its limited authority. The social class status of an individual can influence their perspectives towards the Internet. Manual workers often hold oppositional viewpoints due to facing structural oppressions in their daily lives and demonstrate a stronger determination to combat censorship. On the other hand, programmers and white-collar workers may appear to hold negotiated and dominant positions, but their censorship or deletion of posts often revolves around freedom of expression and access to information. These positions and their associations with Internet workers are not clearly defined and can change based on situational contexts. For instance, the government may take a more lenient stance on controlling rights movements that pertain to urban, middle-class, and individual issues compared to social movements that provoke collective peasants and workers. Overall, the content posted online by different groups is closely tied to their everyday experiences, and they are unlikely to fully accept the dominant nationalist discourse surrounding the suppression of dissenting voices promoted by both the state and Internet companies. 7.3

The Ideological Digital Discourses

Through an analysis of ideology and digital discourse within China’s historical context, social structure, and political economy, as expounded in Chapter 2, the theoretical concluding of Chapter 6 identifies three prevailing interconnected ideologies: informational developmentalism, techno-nationalism, and digital individualism. These contemporary ideological digital discourses in China formulate novel presumptions concerning network technology and its association with society, construing and validating modifications in Chinese society. Furthermore, they rejuvenate particular existing ideologies in China’s historical and social context by assimilating digital elements. This section aims to demonstrate how these ideological digital discourses reinforce institutional arrangements and social power relations that facilitate China’s capitalist transformation within the information society, using distortion and deception. Ideology, discussed in Chapter 1, is defined as a range of inverted appearances that sustain the prevailing oppressive social system by masking contradictions via incomplete and distorted representations of reality. More specifically, ideological digital discourse serves to justify the global expansion of Chinese capital and enterprises, the concentration of Internet-related markets, and the creation of consumer identities that replace more politically driven class identities.

Conclusion  201 7.3.1 Legitimating the Global Expansion of China’s Capital and Enterprises

China’s engagement with the global capitalist system has increased, facilitated by the government and the digital discourse of BAT, which has promoted and legitimized the expansion of China’s capital and enterprises worldwide. This globalization discourse goes beyond attracting foreign investments and includes a comprehensive strategy of international cooperation in various areas, such as the global digital economy, culture, politics, and Internet governance. The government’s “going out” strategy is justified by nationalist discourse, which connects it to the “national interest”. In this regard, President Xi has expressed that China’s informatization coverage will extend to wherever its national interests are at stake, thereby equating Chinese firms’ transnational business operations with the country’s national interests. These issues are further discussed in Chapter 3. In conjunction with the government’s proactive “going out” policy, Internet corporations are expanding their global reach. In support of their global expansion efforts, BAT has employed a nationalist rhetoric. BAT’s digital discourse has consistently drawn upon nationalist ideologies as they have ventured into new technology areas and expanded their operations to the global market. For instance, BAT asserts that their entry into “traditional industries” will assist in upgrading China’s economic growth and increasing domestic consumption. Additionally, they claim to represent China’s technology development and national interests in global competition and the global market. While they present themselves as international corporations on certain occasions, when entering new sectors, such as when they require government assistance to conduct AI experiments, BAT employs discourse that portrays them as Chinese corporations. In essence, BAT’s portrayal of Chinese national identity serves as a pragmatic strategy to depict their dominant position in the domestic market and conglomerate status in a positive light. Thus, BAT’s underlying rationale is that if they are competing in the global market to represent China, they should receive support from the government and industries. The tension between two competing nationalist discourses, one focused on internal defence and the other on global expansion, can be observed through an analysis of the discourse of worker groups. These groups use three main types of arguments to construct a nationalist identity: “us vs. them”, “unitary nation”, and “unique national condition”. Like the discourse of government officials and CEOs, worker groups use language that emphasizes threat, collectivization, and the use of pronouns such as “us” and “them” to create a sense of national identity and equate China with Chinese companies. However, worker groups use this nationalist discourse to legitimize domestic control of the Internet, rather than to justify Chinese capital’s global expansion. It is unclear to what extent the dominant group’s promotion of a “going out” nationalist discourse will be accepted, as some participants challenge

202  Conclusion the equivalence between China and Chinese companies in the domestic market and do not believe that these companies serve the interests of the Chinese people. The worker group’s digital discourse offers a different perspective on globalism that highlights the need for a nuanced understanding of the relationship between China and its companies. 7.3.2  Legitimating the Concentration of the Market

The Internet industry in China is primarily dominated by a few powerful corporations, resulting in an oligopolistic market structure. Digital rhetoric is utilized to justify this market concentration and to minimize its adverse effects. The BAT group, in particular, is highly active in legitimizing their market dominance, as demonstrated in Chapter 4. They have strategically adopted Internet-related terminology such as “boundaryless”, “connector”, “ecosystem”, and “infrastructure” to portray their image. Additionally, they seek to mitigate the negative impacts of their market power by asserting that they are generating new job opportunities in specialized sectors. In a more implicit manner, the government has legitimized its control over the Internet-related market. Chapter 3 illustrates that the government endorses “key enterprises” (Long Tou Qi Ye) as they are viewed as representing China’s technological advancement, promoting China’s economic transformation, expanding Chinese capital globally, and augmenting China’s soft power. The nationalist rhetoric of “us” is crucial in this regard. The government asserts its backing for “key enterprises” to assume a “leading and driving role” in creating research and development entities, expanding their foreign market reach, efficiently utilizing global resources, and enhancing their international development standards (2016 NIDS). Correspondingly, the 13th Five-Year Plan for National Informatization aims to foster innovative firms that can develop core technologies, compete globally, and rank among the top 500. The legitimization of market concentration by Internet workers and users is mainly achieved through the rhetoric of “trust”. This phenomenon is explored in Chapter 5, where study participants reveal their willingness to sacrifice their privacy to larger corporations in return for convenience and security. This is due to the perceived superiority of big companies’ technologies in safeguarding personal data, compared to smaller firms. Additionally, an overarching ideological discourse among workers is the notion of “There Is No Alternative” (TINA). 7.3.3  Constructing a Consumer Identity to Replace Class Politics

In China’s digital discourse, emphasis is placed on citizens’ identity as consumers, while the role of class politics is minimized. The government does not frequently address the nature of work and workplaces in the digital age,

Conclusion  203 and discussions of equality are limited to differences between rural and urban areas, rather than class inequality. This is particularly problematic given the CCP’s claims to represent workers and peasants. The government’s official documents also inadequately address exploitation and relations of production, with the latter phrase only appearing in the 2014 Government Work Report (GWR) under the Xi-Li administration and not in subsequent official documents. Government discussions of inequality are constrained to poverty in rural and western areas, with poverty reduction efforts focused on developing productive forces rather than altering relations of production. These omissions are unacceptable given the CCP’s professed mission to promote the interests of workers and farmers. Concurrently, corporations opted to overlook a crucial aspect of their discourse, which pertains to the primary distinctions between China’s digital discourse and that of advanced capitalist societies. The analysis of employment within BAT, as presented in Chapter 4, primarily focuses on remuneration, with little attention given to working conditions, alienation, workplace arrangements, or production relationships among BAT employees. Comparable to the government, BAT’s discourse acknowledges poverty in China, proposing to alleviate it through offering Internet services and e-commerce to underprivileged families and rural areas. This e-commerce service has enabled Internet companies to tap into a vast rural market. However, certain participants who previously participated in the “digital economy”, such as opening online stores on Taobao or Weishang, have indicated that “earning a substantial income is difficult”. On the other hand, consumer identities are explicitly formed while class identities are seldom referenced. The promotion of the Internet by both government and corporations is directed towards boosting domestic consumption. Within the government’s economic “New Normal”, there is an emphasis on promoting service industries and consumption as the principal drivers of China’s economy. The government highlights the significance of “information consumption”, with a specific focus on elevating Internet access rates and enhancing Internet speed to tap into vast consumption potential. BAT expressed their welcome towards digital discourse of this nature. As delineated in Chapter 4, Jack Ma emphasized the significance of the Internet in boosting China’s economic growth through promoting domestic consumption in its early stages. Furthermore, BAT has adopted the “participatory” discourse to endorse prosumption and consumption facilitated by the Internet. For instance, Pony Ma asserted that the “essence of the Internet” is “to pursue an extremely good experience of products and extremely good feedback from users” (Pony Ma, 2014 TGPC). The prevalence of consumerism among workers has become dominant. Chapter 5 illustrates through CDA that workers construct their identities as consumers, which supersedes other identities such as politically engaged citizens or netizens. However, this does not imply that the Internet is not

204  Conclusion utilized as a platform for political activism in China. The absence of democratic elements in digital discourse is a characteristic of China’s digital capitalism, which contrasts with the use of the Internet for political participation. Although marginalized groups utilize the Internet for free expression, it is not a central aspect of digital discourse for the government, BAT, or themselves. The government and BAT often disregard discussions on democratization and empowerment, or restrict them through nationalist discourse that confines discussions to “online expression”. According to Xi, the government can “listen to” public opinions online. Focus group participants frequently refer to cyberspace as an “unfree” and “unequal” domain, with no alternative options available. 7.4

Reflections on Ideology

The investigation into the digital discourse of Internet workers and users has yielded valuable insights into comprehending the attributes of ideology and the mechanisms through which they function, particularly in contemporary capitalism. Workers develop their own interpretations that differ from the ideological discourse propagated by the dominant groups to legitimize the prevailing power dynamics. In other words, workers do not necessarily conform to the dominant ideologies; instead, they create various ideological discourses to address societal contradictions that cannot be resolved in reality. There is a disparity between the ideologies of dominant and subaltern groups. For instance, as evidenced in Chapter 5, workers rationalize the current state of market concentration, data collection, and dominant companies in ways that differ from those of governments and CEOs. This underscores the importance of this research in studying ideology and digital discourse by means of focus groups with subaltern groups. This disparity highlights a crucial aspect of ideology whereby the ruling power that is considered legitimate may not necessarily be fully internalized. The dominant groups possess the means of material, distribution, and communication that they employ to obtain or construct consent. Eagleton emphasizes the distinction between “normative” acceptance of dominant ideology and “pragmatic” acceptance. The former denotes the successful internalization of legitimated power by its targets, whereas the latter refers to a situation in which subordinate groups endorse the right of their rulers to govern because they perceive no feasible alternative (Eagleton, 2007, p. 56). It is within this void exists a potential for the rejection of the more uniform and despairing interpretations of ideology. The concept of “structure of feeling” by Williams (1977, p. 125) illustrates that novel forms of consciousness are generated from social experiences in specific social relationships and perceptions. These social experiences are active but not completely expressed. They can be disregarded or suppressed by the dominant groups, and there is a possibility of their integration into the dominant ideologies. Nonetheless,

Conclusion  205 as Eagleton (2007, p. 49) argues, “practical” and “official” forms of consciousness may conflict, and their relation can be variable, ranging from compromise and adjustment to incorporation and outright opposition. This phenomenon is evident in the focus groups I conducted, where workers’ experiences reveal interconnected social struggles attempting to break through the current dominant digital discourse. However, these struggles have not yet been fully articulated or developed into organized ideas or beliefs. In addition, disparities among social groups exist and are contingent upon their respective social realities and lived experiences. These lived experiences serve as confirmation of Gramsci’s concept of “practical consciousness”, which diverges from official consciousness and emerges from individuals’ life circumstances. Such “practical consciousness” allows for alternative interpretations of official political ideologies and consequently provides an avenue for contestation. These group differences also exemplify the contemporary class structure in China. Under a classic Marxist viewpoint, all of these groups of workers are considered part of an exploited class due to their labour selling activities. However, from a Weberian perspective, they belong to different categories within the taxonomy of social stratification. Ultimately, while it is imperative to acknowledge the disordered nature of common sense ideologies, it is equally crucial to emphasize the structured ideology that arises from the capitalist economic structure. The worker groups’ declaration of “There Is No Alternative” (TINA) reflects the existence of a more fundamental ideology that stems from the economic contradictions in the capitalist system. As discussed in Chapter 1, Marx, Lukács, and Adorno’s conceptualization of ideology is founded on a critique of alienation, commodity fetishism, reification, and identity thinking. As Rehmann points out that Marx’s critique of ideology is rooted in the “fatalistic arrangement as the naturalization of social relations based on the fetishism of commodities: movements of ‘things’ as ‘natural forms of social life’” (Rehmann, 2014, p. 93). The first type of TINA serves as a contemporary example of the naturalization characteristic of ideology through commodity fetishism. The commodification of user data, the prioritization of exchange value over use-value of data, and the replacement of communicative actions by for-profit economic behaviours on the Internet have been regarded as the only destiny for society and organizing social relations. This fatalism among groups is considered an “axiom” in public discourse, leading to a pessimistic outlook on changes in social relations in informational capitalism (Fuchs & Sandoval, 2013) or communicative capitalism (Dean, 2004). As illustrated by Chapter 1, the nature of ideology is multifaceted, with tensions stemming from different definitions. On one hand, ideology is commonly perceived as a dynamic and disjointed construct, which emerges from political interests and lived experiences. Findings from my research highlight the diverse interpretations and challenges that focus group participants have regarding the dominant class’s ideologies. On the other hand, there is

206  Conclusion a specific ideology that originates from the fundamental contradiction in capitalist society, namely, alienation. In this context, workers experience alienation from various aspects of their lives, such as the labour process, products of their labour, other workers, and human nature. The TINA group discussion revealed that workers feel they lack control over the Internet and platforms, a crucial communicative tool created by modern capitalism. This ideology of alienation has overtaken other types of ideologies, practical consciousness, and common sense, dominating the workers’ minds. Hence, I posit that the dichotomy between capitalist-derived ideology and ideology rooted in lived experiences is flawed. Gramsci argues that the term “ideology” encompasses both the necessary superstructure of a specific structure and the arbitrary thoughts of individuals. It is imperative to differentiate between historically organic ideologies that are essential to a particular structure and those that are arbitrary, rationalistic, or intentional. Gramsci further asserts that both forms of ideology can influence human behaviour, as historically necessary ideologies possess a “psychological” validity that organizes human masses and creates the foundation on which individuals understand their position and struggles. Conversely, arbitrary ideologies only produce individual “movements, polemics and so on”. Thus, the existing Figure 1.1 from Chapter 1 may require modification (see Figure 7.1).

Dom inant class in (politi terests cal co nflicts )

e.g. techno-utopianism Highly likely to be intemalised by the dominated classes

Com mon ideolo sense g (politi ies econ cal, cultu omic, ral, e tc.)

; ns sm ali dictio sed pit ca ntra urali rom co at s f ntal nd n e a ise Ar am ised d fun emal int all by

Othe r life sit conflicts in cann uations th ot be at solv reality ed in

Pro duc ed Mig by h dom t be in dom in t ina ted emalis ant cla clas s e sed d by t s; or n he ot

Capit

alism

Alien

ation

Figure 7.1  The double-layered and multidimensional model of ideologies under capitalism

Conclusion  207 Reference Dean, J. (2004). The networked empire: Communicative capitalism and the hope for politics. In P. A. Passavant & J. Dean (Eds.), Empire’s new cloths (pp. 265–288). Routledge. Eagleton, T. (2007). Ideology: An introduction, new and updated edition. Verso. Fairclough, N. (2000). New labour, new language? Routledge. Fuchs, C., & Sandoval, M. (2013). Critique, social media and the information society. Routledge. Rehmann, J. (2014). Theories of ideology: The powers of alienation and subjection. Haymarket Books. Shuxin, L. (2005, July 11). Zhang Shuxin: I am a pioneer of the Chinese Internet. University of Science and Technology of China News Network. http://news.ustc. edu.cn/info/1051/35619.htm Williams, R. (1977). Marxism and literature. Oxford University Press.

Index

Note: Bold page numbers refer to tables; italic page numbers refer to figures and page numbers followed by “n” denote endnotes. Administrative Measures for Internet Information Services 73 Adorno, T. 18, 20, 21, 27, 32, 94, 155, 205 Agamben, A. 38 AI see artificial intelligence (AI) Alexa 59 Alibaba 3, 5, 29, 55, 56, 59–61, 151, 184, 195; Alibaba Cloud 60, 111; Alibaba Software 60; Alimama 60, 63; Alipay 60, 111; Ali WB 63; Ant Financial Service 111; Apsara Conference (2015–2018) 101, 105; artificial intelligence 122; business categories 60; as Chinese company 123; as community 103–104; as connector 103; digital discourse 99–128, 197–198; documents 100; domestic consumption, increasing 114; “Double Eleven” shopping festival 101; ecosystem 62–65; as “enable” (Fu Neng) the partners 105; e-WTP (Electronic World Trade Platform) 118; financial report for 2020 60–61; globalization 120–121; informational developmentalism 167; as infrastructure 104–105; Investor’s Day (2016–2018) 101; as medium 104; online and sharing data, participating 107; Taobao 60, 203; traditional industries, upgrading 112–113;

virtue economy 112; working at 107–109; WShang Conference (2004) 101, 105; YiTao 60 alienation 2, 7, 9, 18, 19, 36, 181, 185, 203, 205, 206 Alphabet 34 Amazon 34 Amin, S. 48 Anagnost, A. 161n20 Ant Group 6, 60; IPO plan of 55 anti-poverty initiatives 51 APIs see Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) Apple 34, 143, 150 Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) 62, 138, 141, 153, 182 Arab Spring 37, 145 arbitrary ideologies 21 Arrighi, G. 48, 49 artificial intelligence (AI) 60, 62, 63, 65, 78, 104–107, 111, 113, 116, 119–122, 124, 196, 201 Asian financial crisis 5, 183 Asian Four Tigers 50, 51 ATB (Alibaba, Tencent and ByteDance) 99 attention economy 34 authoritarian capitalism 4 B2C (business-to-consumer) model 112 Baidu 5, 29, 55, 56, 59–60, 151, 161n31, 184, 195; artificial intelligence 121; Baidu Advertising (Baidu Tuiguang) 63, 65; Baidu Apollo Platform 60; Baidu Brain 60, 105, 111; Baidu Cloud 106; Baidu Core

210 Index 59; Baidu Union (BU) 63, 65, 105; Baidu World Congress 100; Box Computing 100; as Chinese company 123, 124– 125; as community 103–104; as connector 103; digital discourse 99–128, 197–198; documents 100; domestic consumption, increasing 114–115; ecosystem 62–65; as “enable” (Fu Neng) the partners 106; globalization 120; informational developmentalism 167; as infrastructure 104–105; iQIYI 59, 111; as medium 104; PaddlePaddle Deep Learning Framework 105, 111; relationship with the government 116, 117, 119; revenues 64; traditional industries, upgrading 113 BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent) 60–65; as connectors, community, medium, and infrastructure 103–105; digital discourse from 197–198; ecosystems and data collection 62–63, 64, 65; globalized 119–121; partners 105–106; working at 107–109; see also separate entries Being Digital 193 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 88, 128 Big Data 60, 62, 63, 65, 73, 76–78, 82, 93, 106 Big Data Expo 99 Bingjiu, Z. 50 bourgeois class 26 BRI see Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Britain see UK British American Tobacco 197 ByteDance 59 C2B (consumer-to-business) model 112 CAC see Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC, Wang Xin Ban) Cainiao 107, 111 Campbell, C. 36 capitalism 15, 36, 45–65; authoritarian 4; communicative 205; crony 48, 51; digital 2, 5, 6, 29, 134, 197, 198, 204; informational 157, 166, 205; Marxist subjectivity in 16–18, 17, 39; monopoly 39; private 47; real life-process

of 26; state 29, 48, 50, 119; transnational 54; transnational informational 2, 4, 54, 166 capitalist: contradictions with Chinese characteristics 45–53, 53; exploitation 19 Castells, M. 37 CDA see critical discourse analysis (CDA) CeBIT 109, 110 censorship 2, 8, 56–58, 87, 141, 142, 144–147, 150, 155, 156, 157, 158, 184, 185, 198–200; government-ordered 198; Internet 141, 184, 199; selfcensorship 150, 195, 198 Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization 75, 175 “century of humiliation” 173, 174 China Central Television 89 China Daily 89 China Internet Security Law (Wangluo Anquan Fa) 57 ChinaNet 194 “China Popular Information Superhighway” exhibition 193 China Radio International 89 “China’s model of reform” 146 China Telecom 194 Chinese Academy of Social Science 94, 192, 195 Chinese enterprises 79–81, 81 Chinese Science Daily 192 civil society 22, 50, 51, 150 class struggle 23, 170 “Cleavage of the society” 52 Clinton, B. 192 CNNIC 166–172 Cold War 55, 167, 173 collective land ownership system 49 collectivization, strategy of 85, 86, 142, 143, 201 commercialization 55–58 commodity fetishism 7, 9, 16, 18, 19, 24, 205 common sense 21–22 communicative capitalism 205 Communist Party of China (CPC) 55, 77, 86, 92, 146, 173–175, 193, 203; depoliticization of technology 170; Institute of Party History and Literature 175–176; on national identity 87 Community of Shared Destiny 88

Index  211 “community of shared destiny in cyberspace” 88–90 “A Community of Shared Destiny in the Cyber Space” 77 consumer identity, construction of 202–204 consumerism 33, 36, 54, 56, 177; capitalist 170; digital 181–183; Internet 185; prevalence of 203 CPC see Communist Party of China (CPC) Creative Commons 154 critical discourse analysis (CDA) 28–29, 77, 101, 102, 196, 197 critical policy analysis 73 crony capitalism 48, 51 Cultural Revolution 145 culture 33; industry 21; New Culture 31, 38–40 Curran, J. 33–34 cyber hegemony 85 “Cyber Power” 175 cybersecurity 76, 83–88, 173 Cybersecurity Law of 2016 1, 73, 90, 184 “cyber sovereignty” (Wang Luo Zhu Quan) 1, 84–86, 88, 196 Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC, Wang Xin Ban) 5, 57, 73, 175 Cyber Superpower (Wang Luo Qiang Guo) 78, 90, 175–176, 196; building 75–77 data oligopoly 62 Dean, J. 38 The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms 82 de-industrialization 4, 78, 169 democracy 30, 37, 38, 50, 93, 144–150, 175 Deng Xiaoping 166, 168, 170, 175; “Southern Tour” 192 Didi 59 digital: capitalism 2, 5, 6, 29, 134, 197, 198, 204; consumerism 181–183; economy 135, 180, 203; individualization 177–183; infrastructure 103; labour 56; myths 127; revolution 45–65; sublime 3, 171 digital discourse 3–9, 29–40; in advanced capitalism, typology of

30–40, 31; BAT 99–128, 197– 198; as contested field 195–200; from the workers 198–200; government 73–94, 196–197; ideological 200–204; negotiating 134–158; New Culture 31, 38– 40; New Economy 31, 33–36; New Politics 31, 36–38 Digital Ecological Community 103 digital ideologies 165–186; informational developmentalism 165–172 digital individualism 6, 9, 165, 200; digital consumerism 181–183; entrepreneurship 177–181 digital technology (DT) 104 Dijck, J. van 110, 152 discourse: digital (see digital discourse); and ideology 28–30, 200–204 Discourse-Historical Approach 29 Donaldson, J. A. 48 Dowson Tong 117 DT see digital technology (DT) Eagleton, T. 3, 7, 19, 205 e-commerce ecosystem 101 economy: contradictions, ideology from 18–21; independence 57 ecosystems 62–65; building 102–111; e-commerce 101 Edgerton, D. E. H. 172 863 Plan 168, 173, 174 encoding-decoding model 27–28 enemy state 142–144 entrepreneurship, in digital era 177–181 equal access to land 52 Esarey, A. 57 e-WTP (Electronic World Trade Platform) 118 exchange value 18, 20, 63, 152, 180, 205 Facebook 34, 122, 142–144 Fairclough, I. 73 Fairclough, N. 73, 80, 99–100, 102, 141, 196–197 false consciousness 19, 26 FDI see foreign direct investment (FDI) Feigenbaum, E. 172 fetishism: commodity 7, 9, 16, 18–20, 24, 205; of free market 166 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China 192 Fisher, E. 34, 39, 127 Fordism 3, 34

212 Index foreign direct investment (FDI) 46, 49, 50, 52, 196 Four Little Tigers 168 Foxconn 52 free market 33, 34, 36, 57, 82, 83, 93, 117, 141, 144, 149–151, 166, 177, 178 Fuchs, C. 28, 56, 127, 139, 157 Fukuyama, F. 37 GDP 1, 45–46, 46, 171 General Data Protection Regulation 161n31 Germany: auto manufacturing industry 118; GDP 46; wealth distribution inequality 46 Gewirtz, J. 169 GFW see Great Fire Wall (GFW) gift economy 34 gig economy 35, 135 GitHub 2, 109 global economic crisis (2008) 1, 5 global expansion of China’s capital and enterprises, legitimating 201–202 globalization 119–125 “go abroad strategy” 128 “Golden Projects” 174 Gongqin, X. 50 Google 35, 120, 142–144, 149 government digital discourse 73–94, 74, 90, 196–197; “community of shared destiny in cyberspace” 88–90; cybersecurity 83–88; Cyber Superpower, building 75–77; information economy 77–73; on New Economy 91; on New Politics 91 Government Work Report 2014 (GWR) 82, 203 Gramsci, A. 18, 21–23, 155, 206; on arbitrary ideologies 21; on common sense 21–22; on hegemony 22; on organic ideologies 21; on practical consciousness 205 Great Fire Wall (GFW) 5 Green, F. 169 Greenbaum, J. M. 39 Guangdong Statistical Manual 50 Guiding Opinions on IP 82 Gulf War 173 GWR see Government Work Report 2014 (GWR)

Habermas, J. 154–155 Hall, S. 18, 155, 157; encodingdecoding model 27–28; on Thatcherism 23, 24 Halliday, F. 50 Harvey, D. 35, 36, 39, 48, 83, 169, 177–179, 181 HAT (Huawei, Alibaba and Tencent) 99 hegemony 22, 26, 199; cyber 85; dynamic nature of 27; hegemonic apparatuses 22 “He Shang” (River Elegy) 92 historical consciousness 27 Hong, Y. 78, 167, 169 Hong Kong 51, 85, 193; wealth distribution inequality 46 Hongyi, Z. 135 Horkheimer, M. 18, 21, 27, 32, 94 Howard, C. 178 Hu, Y. 56 Huang, Y. 52 Humby, C. 39 Huntington’s Political Order 50 IBM 124 ICP (Internet Content Provider) 192, 194 ICT see information and communication technologies (ICT) identical thinking 20 ideological struggles 27–28 ideology 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 204–206, 206; arbitrary 21; discourse and 28–30, 200–204; as disguised reality 20; from economic contradictions 18–21; embedded in political conflicts 21–24; as false consciousness 19; Marxist theory of 16–18, 17; organic 21; and ruling class interests 25–26; tensions and reconciliation of 24–25; and working class 26–27 IEC 89 imperialism 54, 92, 173 India 166; GDP 46 individualism 6, 36, 94, 177, 178; digital 6, 9, 165, 200 industrialization 172–174; deindustrialization 4, 78, 169; Internet-enabled 113; neoindustrialization 4, 78, 167–170; strategic 165

Index  213 Industrial Revolution 169, 174 Industry 4.0 79 inequality 38; rural-urban 52; social 52; wealth distribution 46–47, 47 INE see Informatization of the National Economy (INE) Information Age 38 informational capitalism 157, 166, 205 informational developmentalism 6, 9, 165–172, 185, 200; neoindustrialization 167–170; “nonpolitical” technology 170–172; “post-industrial” ideology 167–170 information and communication technologies (ICT) 1, 4, 7, 8, 29, 45, 52, 54, 59, 135, 153, 166– 168, 171, 173, 174, 180, 183, 191, 196; industry, matrix of power relations in 53–58; postrevolutionary state and modern globalized world 53–55; state dimension of 55–58 information economy: Chinese enterprises 79–81, 81; “Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation” (MEI, Shuang Chuang in Chinese) 79; “New Normal” of 77–78 Information Society 45, 168; in advanced capitalism 94 information superhighway 45, 79, 192 informatization 5, 8, 54, 73, 75, 76, 78, 84, 167, 169, 171, 172, 174, 175, 196, 201 Informatization of the National Economy (INE) 167–168, 174 instrumental nationalism 87 Intel 124 Internet 77–78, 82, 178, 180, 200; censorship 141, 184, 199; Chinese government’s control over 56; commercialization of 33; consumerism 185; control 3, 8, 142, 144, 145, 155, 156; hegemonic, negotiated, and oppositional positions among workers 154–158; spirit of 183–186, 186 Internet Economy 102, 134–141; advertisement 138–139; decentralized market with new opportunities 135–136;

participants as consumers 139– 141; privacy 136–138; public digital discourse on 156 Internet of Things 113 “Internet Plus” Action Plan 5, 7, 75, 78, 79, 82, 89, 111–113, 116, 174, 178, 179, 182 Internet politics 142–150; enemy state 142–144; “national condition” (Guoqing) 146–149, 157; public digital discourse on 156; stable country, need of 144–146; state or companies 149–150 Internet Sovereignty 174 investment-driven growth model 183 ISP (Internet Service Provider) 192, 194 Jack Ma 2, 6, 62, 100, 103–105, 107–110, 112–114, 128, 203; on artificial intelligence 122; on Chinese entrepreneurship 123; The Future Has Come 101, 110; on globalization 120–121; relationship with the government 116–119, 123 Japan 167, 172; GDP 46; wealth distribution inequality 46–47 Jiang Zemin 146 Jianlin Wang 112 Jiaxiang, W. 50 Judd, E. 161n20 Kang, Y. 173 Kelly, K. 33 King, G. 57 language 28, 29 Larrain, J. 23 Latin America, New Authoritarianism 51 Lau, M. 101, 113–114, 121 leapfrogging 168 Lee, C. K. 56 legitimacy 7, 37, 58, 87, 146, 175 Li Keqiang 5, 79, 93, 113, 178–179; 2016 Report on the Work of the Government 119 Li, M. 52 Li, R. 59, 60, 100 Li, Robin Yanhong 106, 111, 113–115, 153; on artificial intelligence 121; on Chinese entrepreneurship 123, 124–125; on globalization

214 Index 120; relationship with the government 116, 117, 119 Lin, C. 52 Liu, Q. 3 Lukács, G. 22, 32, 205; on false consciousness 19, 26; on reification 18–19, 26 Malaysia 37 Mao Zedong 51, 85, 167, 168, 170, 171, 173, 194 Marcuse, H. 32 market: concentration, legitimating 202; economy 33, 47, 51, 118, 161n20, 195; free 33, 34, 36, 57, 82, 83, 93, 117, 141, 144, 149– 151, 166, 177, 178; socialism 47 marketization 56–58 Marx, K. 18, 22, 27, 205; on alienation 18, 36, 181; Capital 20; The German Ideology 25 Marxism 15, 16; Marxist subjectivity, in ideology 16–18, 17; Marxist theory of ideology 16–18, 17 “Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation” (MEI, Shuang Chuang in Chinese) 79, 90, 93– 94, 96n13, 134, 135, 178, 181 McChesney, R. 177 Meituan 59 methodological nationalism 4 Microsoft 34, 124 MIIT see Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) Miller, D. 182 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) 5, 73 Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 194 mobile Internet 5, 62 modern globalized world 53–55 Mosco, V. 3–4, 62, 127 Murphy, R. 161n20 Mycos 94 Naisbitt, J. 33, 168 National Big Data Strategy 76 “national condition” (Guoqing) 146– 149, 157 National Cyber Development Strategy 76 National Development and Reform Commission 195 National Informatization Development Strategy (2006–2020) 174;

entitled “Retaining Cyber Sovereignty and National Security” 86 “National Informatization Ninth FiveYear Plan and 2000 Vision” 194 National Informatization Working Conference (1997) 194 nationalism 7, 9, 80, 91, 92, 127, 128, 142, 155, 166, 185, 193, 199; instrumental 87; methodological 4; pragmatic 85; state-led 184; techno-nationalism 6, 9, 53, 165, 168, 172–176, 184, 185, 200; Third World 55 “national quality” (Guomin Suzhi) 146–148 national security 28, 84, 86, 91, 142, 143, 155, 172, 173, 175, 184 Needham Puzzle 92, 174–175 Negroponte, N. 33 Nelson, R. R. 172 neo-industrialization 4, 78, 167–170 neoliberalism 33, 34, 36, 39, 51, 80, 93, 127, 128, 150, 166, 177–178, 183; definition of 83 Netease 195 New Authoritarianism 45, 50, 51 New Culture 31, 38–40 New Economy 31, 33–37, 135, 179; BAT’s digital discourse on 126; government digital discourse on 91 “New Normal” of Chinese economy 77–78, 203 New Politics 31, 36–38; BAT’s digital discourse on 126; government digital discourse on 91 New Technological Revolution 169 996.ICU 2, 52, 185 “92 Group” 192 Nongmin Gong phenomenon 181 “non-political” technology 170–172 OECD 50 OICQ (QQ) 61, 63, 101, 103, 104, 106, 137, 138, 153 online participation 3, 38 Opinions on Big Data 82 Opinions on Cloud Computing 82 Opinions on Promoting the Sound and Orderly Development of the Mobile Internet 83 Opinions to Promote Innovation and Entrepreneurship 178

Index  215 Opium Wars 167 O’Reilly, T. 34 organic ideologies 21 Ostry, S. 172 Outline of National IT Development Strategy 73, 74, 87 Outline of the National Informatization Development Strategy 75, 78 PaddlePaddle Deep Learning Framework 105 parliamentary system 22 patriarchy 148 People’s Daily 76, 89, 169, 175, 176, 192 playbour 33, 35, 40 political conflicts, ideologies in 21–24 political economy 2, 4, 7, 15, 16, 29, 45, 47, 48, 51–53, 56, 57, 92, 101, 102, 127, 154, 157, 165, 170, 177, 197, 200; of Internet 30–40 Pony Ma 61, 101, 103–107, 113, 115, 203; on artificial intelligence 121–122; on Chinese entrepreneurship 123–124; on digital entrepreneurship 179; 8 Guiding Principles for the future of the Internet 61, 101; relationship with the government 116–119 positive energy 145 “post-industrial” ideology 167–170 post-revolutionary state 53–55 PPP see purchasing power parity (PPP) practical consciousness 205 pragmatic nationalism 85 prejudice 27 price discrimination 65 private capitalism 47 pro-democracy movements 145 prosumers 33, 35, 40, 127 Provisions on Ecological Governance of Network Information Content 73 purchasing power parity (PPP) 45, 46, 46 Qiu, J. L. 56 Qiushi 76, 175 Reisigl, M. 29, 84, 85, 141, 142 Reith, R. 172 relations of production 78

“Roaming the Future with Little Pager” 193 Rometty, G. 93 ruling class interests, ideology and 25–26 SAPPRFT (State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television) 73 scripts 141 self-determination 170, 173 Several Opinions on Strengthening the Services and Supervision over Market Entities by Means of Big Data Analysis 82 Shen, S. 174 Shenzhen Jasic Technology Company 2 Singapore 37 Sizhong, X. 149; The Quality Crisis of Our Nation 148 Smythe, D. W. 39, 92, 93, 174 socialism 20 socialist market economy 161n20 social media 1, 2, 5, 37, 39, 55, 59–63, 101, 104, 106, 107, 111, 138–140, 144, 149, 152, 153 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 5 state capitalism 29, 48, 50, 119 State Information Security 174 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 48, 49, 52, 194 state socialism 47 Stern, N. 169 structural unemployment 35 structure of feeling 204 Sun, L. 52 Sun, Y. 173 Taiwan 51, 85 Taobao 60, 203 technocracy 148 techno-globalism 173, 176–177 technological determinism (technodeterminism) 9, 30–33, 31, 150, 185 technological fixes 3 technological sublime 3 techno-nationalism 6, 9, 53, 165, 168, 172–176, 185, 200 techno-optimism 32 techno-pessimism 32 Tencent 5, 29, 55, 56, 59–65, 151, 184, 195; AI 62; artificial

216 Index intelligence 121–122; as Chinese company 123–124; as community 103–104; as connector 103; digital discourse 99–128, 197–198; “Digital Guangdong” e-commerce project 116; documents 100; domestic consumption, increasing 115–116; ecosystem 61–65; as “enable” (Fu Neng) the partners 105–106; globalization 120; informational developmentalism 167; as infrastructure 104–105; Internet Plus Digital Economy (2015–2018) 101; as medium 104; OICQ (now QQ) 61, 63, 101, 103, 104, 106, 137, 138, 153; online and sharing data, participating 106–107; relationship with the government 116–119; Tencent Cloud 107; Tencent Cloud + Future (2015– 2018) 101, 116; Tencent Global Digital Ecosystem Summit (TGDES) 101; Tencent Global Partner Conference (2011–2018) (TGPC) 101, 103, 105, 106; traditional industries, upgrading 113–114; VAS 63; WeChat 61–63, 104, 106, 117, 138, 153; working at 107–109 Thatcher, M. 36; Thatcherism 23, 24 Theoretical Studies Centre Group 175 “there is no alternative” (TINA) 6–8, 20, 134, 141, 151–154, 157, 199, 202, 205 Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 82, 118 Third Wave 168 Third World nationalism 55 13th Five-Year-Plan for National Informatization 73, 82, 89–90, 202 Three Gorges Dam project 193 Tian, X. 167 Tiananmen Square protests (1989) 92, 175 TINA see “there is no alternative” (TINA) TMD (Toutiao, Meituan, and Didi) 99 Toffler, A. 33, 168 Toffler, H. 168

“Toffler Fever” 168 topos of threat 80, 84, 85, 87, 91, 142 topos of usefulness 79, 86–87, 90, 111, 127 totalitarianism 20 Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) 47–49, 52 transnational informational capitalism 2, 4, 54, 166 Trump administration 177 TVEs see Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) Twitter Revolution (2009) 37 “two bombs and one satellite” project 173 “Two Centenary Goals” 96n21 UK 166; auto manufacturing industry 117–118; sociology of consumption 36; speed of automobiles, limiting 117 “Unhappy China” 174 United States (US) 42, 166, 183, 184; GDP 46; Gulf War 173; “National Information Infrastructure” 192; speed of automobiles, limiting 117; trade war with China 177; wealth distribution inequality 46 virtue economy 112 Wang, H. 146, 173 wealth distribution inequality 46–47, 47 Web 2.0 34, 37 WeChat 61–63, 104, 106, 117, 135, 138, 153 Weibo 57, 62, 111, 138, 149, 153, 203; revenue 64 welfare state 21, 36 “whatever being” concept 38 WIC see World Internet Conference (WIC) Wikipedia 140, 144, 151 Williams, R. 18, 24, 93, 204 Wodak, R. 29, 84, 85, 141, 142 working class: ideology and 26–27; subjectivity 27–28 World Bank GINI index 46–47, 47, 52 World Internet Conference (WIC) 99, 107, 120, 125 World Trade Organization (WTO) 92 Wu, J. 168

Index  217 Xiao, Q. 57 Xi Jinping 1, 5, 54, 56, 57, 74, 75, 76, 122–124, 128, 169, 174–176, 196, 204; “community of shared destiny in cyberspace” 88–80; on cybersecurity 84, 87, 121; “New Normal” of Chinese economy 77–78 Xi-Li administration 1, 79, 82, 196, 203 Xinhua 76, 175 Xinhua News Agency 89 Yahoo China 60 Yan, F. 173

Yan, H. 148 Yang, G. 57, 58 Yinghaiwei 191–195 YiTao 60 Youku 111 Yun, G. 168 Zhang, Q. F. 48 Zhang, S. 191–195 Zhao, S. 85, 92, 173 Zhao, Y. 54–55, 58 Zhao, Z. 168, 169, 171, 193 Zheng, Y. 145–146 Žižek, S. 28 Zuckerberg, M. 137