The Chinese Communist Youth League: Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization 9789048542642

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The Chinese Communist Youth League

China: From Revolution to Reform The China: From Revolution to Reform Series was launched by AUP to meet the rising influence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as an economic, military, and political power in the world arena. Forty years after the Chinese Communist Party kicked off the reform, the PRC is now poised to surpass the United States as the world’s greatest economy. A more confident and powerful PRC coupled with increasingly rich primary sources have drawn tremendous interest from scholars around the world. The primary focus of this series will be the PRC in the new era with somewhat dual attention to previous periods such as the Republic of China (1912-1949) and the late Qing (1644-1911), both of which are not only intertwined with and inseparable from the PRC but also crucial to our better understanding of the PRC. This series invites studies from a wide variety of disciplines and topics in politics, law, history, diplomacy, gender, and the like. Researches in earlier periods of 20th century China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong are also welcome. Series Editor Qiang Fang, University of Minnesota Duluth Editorial Board Xiaobing Li, University of Central Oklahoma Chen Linghai, East University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai Aminda Smith, Michigan State University Harold Tanner, University of Northern Texas Xiaoping Cong, University of Houston

The Chinese Communist Youth League Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization

Konstantinos D. Tsimonis

Amsterdam University Press

Cover illustration: ID 77285442 Source: © Esebene | Dreamstime.com Cover design: Coördesign, Leiden Lay-out: Crius Group, Hulshout isbn 978 94 6298 986 3 e-isbn 978 90 4854 264 2 (pdf) doi 10.5117/9789462989863 nur 740 © Konstantinos D. Tsimonis / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2021 All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book.

To Daphne, the source of all happiness



Table of Contents

Acknowledgments

11

1 Introduction Scope and importance of the study The challenge: Reversing the legacy of an uneasy relationship Enter Hu Jintao: ‘Keep the Party Assured and the Youth Satisfied’ Beyond dependency: ‘Youth’ as a junior political subject Researching the League Organization of the book

17 20 24 28 30 33 35

2 ‘Juniority’ and the generational subordination of party youth organizations Circumventing dependency: Cadre agency and responsiveness Youth leagues and generational politics Generational subordination and juniority

47 49 55 61

3 The League on Campus Joining the League Grassroots League committees and cadres League activities on campus The view from below: The League’s evaluation by students Conclusion

81 85 89 94 101 110

4 The League in the workplace Locating ‘youth’ and the League in the Chinese workplace Deregulated labor and League membership ‘Building the League through building the Party’ The League’s activities: Between the Party committee and the management Serving and representing young employees Conclusion

117 119 124 128

5 Training youth cadres Organizational aspirations and realities The Central League School: Training generalist cadres The League School at the grassroots

151 153 157 163

132 138 143

Improving training at the local level Personnel exchange and recognition programs Conclusion

167 173 178

6 In Search of Responsiveness Youth work norms Serving youth in practice Relations with social organizations Conclusion

185 187 196 214 225

Conclusion: From Hu to Xi The League as a dependent and junior organization The League under Xi: Factional considerations or a new mission? Juniority beyond the League

235 237 242 248

Appendix

255

Bibliography

287

Index

317

List of Figures and Tables Figures Figure 3.1 Main motive for young people joining the Youth League (%) Figure 3.2 Is joining the party important to you? (%) Figure 3.3 How should CYL cadres be appointed? (%) Figure 7.1 The CYL under Xi Tables Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3

88 88 102 246

Age limits for Communist Youth League cadres 68 Requirements for League awards 91 Does your league branch follow these procedures? 103 Have you participated in CYL events after entering university?104 Table 3.4 CYL activities that students participate in, prefer, consider useful 105

Improving training at the local level Personnel exchange and recognition programs Conclusion

167 173 178

6 In Search of Responsiveness Youth work norms Serving youth in practice Relations with social organizations Conclusion

185 187 196 214 225

Conclusion: From Hu to Xi The League as a dependent and junior organization The League under Xi: Factional considerations or a new mission? Juniority beyond the League

235 237 242 248

Appendix

255

Bibliography

287

Index

317

List of Figures and Tables Figures Figure 3.1 Main motive for young people joining the Youth League (%) Figure 3.2 Is joining the party important to you? (%) Figure 3.3 How should CYL cadres be appointed? (%) Figure 7.1 The CYL under Xi Tables Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3

88 88 102 246

Age limits for Communist Youth League cadres 68 Requirements for League awards 91 Does your league branch follow these procedures? 103 Have you participated in CYL events after entering university?104 Table 3.4 CYL activities that students participate in, prefer, consider useful 105

Table 3.5 How useful are the following organizations in helping you with study-related issues and student-life-related issues? 106 Table 3.6 If you require the assistance of an organization to deal with a problem, will you turn to the CYL? 107 Table 3.7 CYL representation and responsiveness beyond the campus108 Table 3.8 Problems university students face and the CYL’s 108 effectiveness in addressing them 110 Table 3.9 CYL member’s views and suggestions Table 4.1 Characteristics of work units and companies analysed 119 in this chapter 125 Table 4.2 Annual transfer of members 2003-2007 126 Table 4.3 League membership development 2003-2007  133 Table 4.4 Example of annual plan of activities 134 Table 4.5 Example of annual plan of activities 135 Table 4.6 Frequency of political study meetings 142 Table 4.7 Rights protection 156 Table 5.1 CYL branches and cadres in numbers 2002-12 (in 000s) 159 Table 5.2 The League School in numbers 160 Table 5.3 Educational background of LS/CYUPS instructors 161 Table 5.4 2006 and 2007 Sessions of the Central League School 165 Table 5.5 Advanced Level League School Training Plan Table 5.6 Study subjects of 2004 Minority Youth Cadres Training 172 Class (week long) 176 Table 5.7 All-China Outstanding League Cadres Award Winners Table 5.8 Red Flag League Committee (Grassroots Branches) 177 Award Winners Table 6.1 Content of CYL activities initiated at the national level, 1980-2007187 189 Table 6.2 Beijing City League committee activities, 2010 Table 6.3 When looking for employment, where did you get help from?198 Table 6.4 During the past year, did you join a meeting of a participatory politics institution? (%) 211

Acknowledgments Work for this book began at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) as research for my PhD thesis, and was completed a few blocks away, at King’s College London. Necessary ‘detours’ included a few years in Beijing, long visits to Zhejiang, Shanghai and Shandong, intensive writing periods in Sai Wan Ho (Hong Kong), Peckham and Pimlico (London) and Kifisia (Athens), and unmissable summer breaks in Palio (Kavala). In all these places, I was fortunate to have the academic and personal support of many wonderful people. First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my former PhD supervisor Julia Strauss for her patience and valuable guidance throughout my postgraduate studies at SOAS. I will always be thankful for her passionate teaching in the module ‘State and Society in the Chinese Political Process’, which inspired me to work on China’s domestic politics. The life and career path I chose as a result of taking this module was until then unimaginable for a student coming from a country with no tradition in East Asian or Chinese studies. I’m also deeply grateful to Laleh Khalili, Dafydd Fell, Patricia Thornton and Jennifer Altehenger for their critical comments and constructive suggestions at different stages of my PhD. Thoughout my doctoral studies, the A.G. Leventis Foundation was a generous financial supporter. I was also fortunate to receive a grant to conduct my fieldwork, from the China University Committee in London. In China, I would like to acknowledge many people whose identity has to be protected, especially in the repressive post-2013 social and political environment. These include, among others, academics and researchers at Peking University, at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and at the China Youth and Children Research Centre. I am grateful to my interviewees and to many more occasional discussants, as well as my Chinese friends who supported me through their contacts, comments, hospitality and cooking! Back in the UK, I am particularly indebted to Gerda Wielander who provided critical comments on the first draft, prompting me to rethink and redesign its framing, and rewrite and restructure its content. In the process of writing this book, I have also benefited greatly from discussions with and comments by superb colleagues and good friends: Igor Rogelja, Jerome Doyon and Zaad Mahmood. I consider myself very fortunate in my colleagues at the Lau China Institute at King’s College London, my academic ‘home’ since 2015. Working with Kerry Brown, Charlotte Goodburn, Jan Knoerich, Sun Xin and Ben

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Barratt has been a privilege – they are not only brilliant academics but also wonderful individuals and co-workers I rely upon. I have benefited greatly from their support and scholarly example. I am also deeply grateful to my academic mentor at King’s, Anthony Pereira, for his guidance and constant encouragement. I have presented bits and pieces of my work on the Communist Youth League at different conferences and seminars including the Conference on Youth Mobilisation and Political Change (ZOiS, Berlin 2019), the European Association of Chinese Studies Biannual Conference (Glasgow 2018), the 10th Annual International Asian Dynamics Initiative Conference (Copenhagen 2018), the 10th and 11th Conferences on Asian Studies, Palacky University (Olomouc 2016, 2017), the International Conference on Political participation in Asia (Stockholm 2015), the British Association of Chinese Studies Conference (Newcastle 2014) and the China Postgraduate Network Annual Conference (Lancaster 2013). During these events, the challenging questions and comments by fellow panelists and participants were enormously helpful. Among the people I met at these academic occasions special thanks are due to Olga Dror, Felix Krawatzek and Maria Strasakova. I had the privilege of working with a wonderful team at the Amsterdam University Press. Special thanks go to the ‘China: From Revolution to Reform’ Series Editor, Qiang Fang, and to the Editorial Board, the Senior Commissioning Editor Saskia Gieling, the Desk Editor Jaap Wagenaar, Mike Sanders, and the anonymous reviewers. Outside AUP, Sumati Dwivedi provided invaluable proofreading assistance for which I am grateful. Any remaining errors are, of course, solely of my own making. As I started working on the book well after I finished my PhD, some of its parts have previously appeared in other publications. Specifically, Chapters 3 and 4 are respectively derived from articles published in Modern China Vol. 44, No. 2, March 2018, pp. 170-207 (Tsimonis, 2018), and the Journal of Youth Studies Vol. 20, No. 10, 26 November 2017, pp. 1362-1379 (Tsimonis, 2017), while short portions of these articles have also been included in the Introduction and Chapter 2. My thanks to Sage, and to Taylor & Francis, for their permission to adapt these articles as part of the present book. Life in academia is a constant race against deadlines, publishing goals, and ever-expanding administrative tasks, to say nothing of countless hours reading, writing and teaching – and then thinking about all the above. The rewarding feeling one gets from a good peer review, a student’s expression of gratitude and a pat on the back from a senior colleague make it all worthwhile. But for me, the beam of light at the end of the tunnel of self-doubt, stress and tiredness in which we often find ourselves, is always family. My

Acknowledgments

13

mother and my daughter, my two ‘Lydias’, are indispensable and constant sources, the first of encouragement and the second of unceasing joy. Rita, my ‘first-born’, is a little fearless Lhatese and the primary adversary to my concentration on work. But as with everything good in my life since 2013, so this book would not have been possible without Daphne. Being with her has been the best thing that ever happened to me, and dedicating this book is a tiny token of my endless gratitude and love. Konstantinos D. Tsimonis September 2020

Fieldbo: But what will you do with your League? Stensgard: The League shall remain as it is; it is founded on a pretty broad basis. Its purpose is to counteract noxious influences; and I am just beginning to realize what side the noxious influences come from. Fieldbo: But do you think the “Youth” will see it in the same light? Stensgard: They shall! I have surely a right to expect fellows like that to bow before my superior insight. Fieldbo: But if they won’t? Stensgard: Then they can go their own way. I have done with them. You don’t suppose I am going to let my life slip into a wrong groove, and never reach the goal, for the sake of mere blind, pig-headed consistency! − Henrik Ibsen, The League of Youth [translated by William Archer]

1 Introduction Abstract Chapter 1 introduces the research question and identifies three reasons to focus on the “keep youth satisfied” mandate under Hu Jintao: a) unpacking Xi Jinping’s criticism and decision to downgrade the League; b) understanding the institutional dimension of Party-youth relations; and c) opening avenues for comparison on youth political participation under authoritarianism and democracy. The Chapter continues by outlining the League’s problematic engagement with youth under Mao and during the first period of reform, and Hu Jintao’s decision to break the cycle of youth’s political alienation leading to conflict with the Party, by increasing the League’s responsiveness. It then presents the analytical approach of this study and the concept of ‘Juniority’, and explains the methodology and outline of the book. Keywords: CYL, League, Youth, Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping, Juniority

Xi Jinping’s administration has been eventful and intriguing, as scores of Chinese political and military figures, who were previously considered ‘untouchable’, have lost their titles, offices and freedom (Brown, 2018a; Walder, 2018). Apart from individual officials, however, the body count of Xi’s first five-year term also includes one of the most well-known and respected organizations of the Party, the Communist Youth League (CYL, League). As an alleged bastion of factional support for the Hu-Wen administration, in early 2016 the League was severely criticized by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection for exhibiting an ‘aristocratic’ (guizuhua 贵族 化) and ‘entertainment-oriented’ (yulehua 娱乐化) mentality. Its budget was then halved, many of its central officials were demoted or had their careers stalled, and the CYL central committee lost control of its training institutions and business interests (Lam, 2016; Doyon, 2019a; Shan and Chen, 2020). Xi Jinping justified these measures on the grounds that they reduced the League’s bureaucratic character and increased its capacity at

Tsimonis, Konstantinos D., The Chinese Communist Youth League: Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2021 doi: 10.5117/9789462989863_ch01

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The Chinese Communist Youth League

the grassroots, with the goals of better serving young people, and bolstering their support for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, the Party) and for his own ‘China Dream’ (CYL Reform Plan, 2016; Xi, 2017: 11-19). Xi offered a conservative prescription for achieving these goals, consisting of intensified indoctrination and an effort to re-energize the political functions of local League organizations. But there could not be a starker contrast between his instruction for a uniform and overtly ‘red’ engagement with young people, and the pluralistic landscape of contemporary Chinese society. Four decades of economic and social development have diversified the Chinese youth, generating groups with disparate social realities, and varying demands, views and aspirations. In this new social context, young people view politics with apathy and exhibit instrumentalist attitudes towards joining the Party and participating in its organizational life (Rosen, 2004; Fish, 2015; De Kloet and Fung, 2017). Therefore, it is not clear how more propaganda, formalism, and pressure to adhere to topdown, prescribed political behaviors can solve the problem of the youth’s passivity and cynicism towards, and disassociation from official politics. It is difficult to imagine that intensification of practices like group study of Party documents, flag-raising ceremonies and self-criticism sessions can remedy young people’s alienation from the political life of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As a matter of fact, Xi Jinping’s prescription is quite familiar and somewhat banal. Like many other conservative leaders in China and in the former socialist world, Xi responded to young people’s distance from officially sanctioned channels for political participation, not by inducing their engagement with more meaningful processes, but by bringing the same form of politics closer to their everyday lives (Solnick, 1998; McDougall, 2004; Saunders, 2007; Fürst, 2012; Tsipursky, 2015a, 2015b). Paradoxically, communist regimes have often reacted to youth political apathy by eventually implementing a rebranded yet almost identical version of the type of politics that alienated youth in the first place. Interestingly, though, this was not always the case: under socialism, communist parties experimented with new forms of engagement with young people, aimed at appealing to their needs, their desire for self-expression, as well as their cultural and lifestyle preferences (McDougall, 2004; Saunders, 2007; Sadowska, 2016; Spaskovka, 2017). What is the role of the Communist Youth League in China’s socioeconomic context of reforms, that is characterized by marketization, globalization, and authoritarian resilience? How does the League engage young people and is it effective in cultivating support for the CCP? This is the first booklength study of the Chinese Communist Youth League that explores its role

Introduction

19

and effectiveness vis-à-vis its constituency of young people. But instead of focusing on a period characterized by a ‘back to the roots’ intensification of youth indoctrination and Party-building that is still ongoing, it concentrates on a time when the regime chose a less politicized approach to achieving these goals. Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, soon after taking power, called upon the CYL to increase its responsiveness in order to ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’ (2003 CYL Yearbook: 5). What followed could be characterized as the CYL’s ‘Golden Decade’, a period during which the League had substantial political support at the top, and a mandate for a more meaningful engagement with young people at the grassroots. The League’s emphasis on youth’s ‘satisfaction’ during this period, and its concomitant efforts to adapt its work as a means of fostering support for the communist regime, are areas for study that remain unexplored. This lacuna is symptomatic of a broader scholarly inattention to the League’s functions as a mass organization and its engagement with young people. Thus far, the literature on Chinese youth has not engaged with this important state-society perspective, treating the League essentially as a secondary theme in investigations on youth political attitudes (Rosen, 2009; Clark 2012; Fish, 2015; De Kloet and Fung, 2017). This creates an important gap in our understanding of young people’s experience with official politics in the PRC. The CYL’s membership in the last two decades ranges consistently between 70 and 90 million, encompassing a large part of the young Chinese population (between 14 and 28 years of age). Although preparing young people for CCP membership remains its central task, the League is also the main channel for Chinese youth’s political socialization and normative instruction; in addition, it has expanded its role in the areas of youth welfare and recreation through both nationwide and local activities, as well as specialized institutions. Other mass organizations, notably the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU, the Unions) and the All-China Women’s Federations (ACWF, the Federations), have attracted considerable scholarly attention for their dual role in offering a channel for bottom-up representation and responsiveness, while also cultivating loyalty to the regime and maintaining social stability. Many studies have recorded the difficulties and tensions faced by cadres in carrying out these inherently contradictory tasks, as well as their responses and initiatives in addressing social problems (Hershatter, 2004; Lee, 2007; Angeloff and Lieber, 2012; Pringle, 2011). The League, in comparison, remains an understudied organization, possibly because it is considered too close to the CCP and too preoccupied with Party membership preparation to develop an autonomous role. The present study will

20 

The Chinese Communist Youth League

contribute to filling this gap in the scholarship by investigating the League’s response to the challenge of increasing its capacity to relate and respond to its youth ‘constituency’ while preserving its main characteristics as a mass and Party-dependent organization.

Scope and importance of the study Apart from expanding our understanding of the CYL and the political system of the People’s Republic of China, there are three main reasons to study the League’s attempt to redefine its ‘youth work’ (qingnian gongzuo 青年工作) to ‘serve youth’ ( fuwu qingnian 服务青年) in the Hu-Wen era. To start with the most immediate one, unpacking the regime-youth relationship through its main intermediary organization can shed light on the motives behind the recent attack on the CYL. Although the media quickly attributed the CYL’s fall to factional cleansing,1 it is necessary to pay closer attention to Xi’s own consistent criticism of the League as an essentially self-serving organization that fails to engage the youth (Xi, 2017). A fuller view of Xi Jinping’s indirect dismissal of the CYL’s efforts under Hu and Wen, and of his conservative backpedaling on how the Chinese regime should approach young people, demands a better understanding of what exactly happened during this period. How was this call for responsiveness implemented organizationally and how was it received by young Chinese? Answering this question and analyzing the reasons behind the developments it encompasses, can help determine whether the League’s downgrading under Xi is solely the outcome of factional considerations, or also reveals other concerns. One alternative way to explain these changes could be that they are part of Xi’s efforts to reinvigorate Party life both organizationally and ideologically, which have been translated into more routine Party processes, and an emphasis on morality, discipline and ideological indoctrination across the CCP and government (Brown, 2018b: 128-130). However, the League has received much more attention than any of its sister organizations, including trade unions and women’s federations. Thus, a third possible explanation emerges, namely the regime’s deepening mistrust about what lies under the political apathy of the youth, and a consequent apprehension that the

1 In an almost univocal manner, media reports identified the so-called Tuanpai (the CYL Faction) as the target of Xi’s moves against the League, for instance: Hornby, 3 August 2016; Buckley, 4 August 2016; Feldman, 11 August 2016; Kang and Blanchard, 30 September 2016.

Introduction

21

CYL is incapable of addressing it. Perhaps, ultimately, Xi is more worried about the loyalty of young generations than about his factional opponents. Understanding the implementation of Hu’s call for responsiveness can help explain the motives behind his successor’s decision to overhaul the League. If the implementation was successful and created more support for the regime, the ‘factional’ explanation gains prominence, portraying Xi essentially as having sacrificed a successful experiment for his own efforts at political consolidation. If, however, ‘Keeping the Youth Satisfied’ was an elusive task, poorly carried out by a large and lethargic organization, then there is more merit to the other two explanations, and accordingly more attention is due to the logic of Party reinvigoration, and to the CCP’s concerns over youth loyalty, respectively. In relation to these concerns of the CCP, it is especially worthy of investigation that, if the CYL’s more responsive mode of operation failed to generate youth support for the Party, there is little reason to expect that the intensification of propaganda and compulsory political participation will fare any better. Secondly, examining the CYL’s policies and activities under Hu and the ways these were received by young people, offers an opportunity to understand the nature of the youth-regime relationship in the post-Tiananmen period. Are young Chinese supportive of the political system of their regime or just tolerate it? Can the absence of confrontation and contentious politics since 1989 be attributed, even partially, to the ability of the CYL to co-opt social groups and offer institutional responses to bottom-up demands? Or is it ephemeral, based primarily on a combination of fear, successful performance of the Chinese economy and the manipulation of nationalism that the Party has employed to sustain support more broadly? The post-1989 loyalty to the CCP apparent in Chinese society in general, and in the youth in particular, is usually attributed to the promise of opportunity for material and professional advancement, the careful merging of patriotic duty and obedience to the Party under the same umbrella of nationalism, and the threat of coercion (Zhao, 1998; Wright, 2010; Wang, 2014). But under closer examination of each of these factors, the fragility of this loyalty and its circumstantial basis become glaringly obvious. Citizens below the age of thirty have no memory of poverty and hardship under socialism, and take fast economic growth and material abundance for granted (Wright, 2010: 176). As a result, appealing to economic development to enhance popular acceptance of the CCP may become a less convincing narrative, especially if China experiences an economic downturn, rising unemployment and salary stagnation. Similarly, nationalism is actively cultivated within the educational system (Wang, 2012) and the Young Pioneers (Woronov, 2007),

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The Chinese Communist Youth League

the Party’s organization for children aged 6 to 14 years old, but this too can turn against the Party if it fails to deliver on its nationalistic discourse and promises (Weiss, 2014: 2). Finally, coercion is also an important pillar of authoritarian rule and creates strong disincentives to dissent, but it has to be a last-resort option for the regime rather than a ubiquitous condition, otherwise it risks and furnishes justification for violent resistance, as in the case of many Arab autocracies before the Spring of 2010 (Brownlee, 2015). In response to the high degree of uncertainty attached to these modes of fostering loyalty, the Party increased its reliance on institutional mechanisms at the top and at the base to bolster its own resilience. This move included the improvement of its capacity for responsiveness through meritocratic, differentiated and specialized bureaucracies, and the opening of feedback channels and input institutions (Nathan, 2003). The call for a more responsive League follows exactly this logic. As the reformist regime’s commitment to secure employment has long been abandoned and young Chinese face a very competitive and deregulated job market, the League cannot offer a loyalty-for-career trade-off as in the past (Montaperto, 1977; Healy, 1982; Shirk, 1982), at least not on a mass scale. Further, its effectiveness in spreading nationalist propaganda and in assisting the Party’s monitoring capacity, especially in well-defined spaces such as university campuses, carries the same uncertainties and limitations as the regime’s own efforts. With these obstacles in view, Hu Jintao recognized and articulated the necessity for the League to increase its engagement with young people’s views and demands, to provide channels for feedback and participation and to augment its capacity for responsiveness (Yang, 2009; Li, 2010), according to the CCP’s prescription for authoritarian resilience. Understanding the strengths and limitations of this effort will enable better evaluation of the effectiveness and durability of the means available to the regime to sustain loyalty among young Chinese. The third reason for studying the Communist Youth League in the HuWen decade is its comparative value. Taking a step back from the Chinese context to look at youth political participation more broadly, one cannot but identify patterns and similarities in state-youth relations that cut across different historical and contemporary political contexts. On the one hand, communist regimes in Europe and elsewhere during the Cold War struggled to maintain support among young people and often experimented with new approaches to achieve the same. A growing body of research has recorded these (mostly) abortive attempts, which met with internal opposition from conservative Party elites as well as bureaucratic resistance from within youth organizations (Fürst, 2002; McDougall, 2004; Saunders, 2007;

Introduction

23

Neumann, 2008). These experiments, usually short-lived and half-hearted, sent contradictory messages. Their failure to deliver on their promises intensified young people’s disappointment with politics, fueling protest and, occasionally, rebellion. On the other hand, the rise of youth apathy towards the political life of Western democracies has attracted considerable scholarly attention. This phenomenon has taken the form of low voter turnout in elections, declining participation in parties and their youth organizations (Lamb, 2003; Hooghe, 2004; Fieldhouse et al, 2007; Mycock & Tonge, 2012; Quintelier, 2015), as well as, more recently, increasing support for populist parties and candidates (Mierina & Koroleva, 2015; Seippel & Strandbu, 2017; Westheimer, 2019). The reduced appeal of party youth organizations corresponds to the overall decline of mass parties in Western democracies. However, research has revealed that the membership of youth organizations has declined even faster, thereby accentuating generational imbalances within parties (Hooghe and Stolle, 2005; Mycock and Tonge, 2012). Although the rejection of official channels co-exists with a search for alternative spaces and forms of political expression and action (Coleman, 2007; Loader, 2007; Amadeo, 2010; Hooghen and Boonen, 2015), it is a major concern for democracies how the quality of representative processes will be impacted by rising political apathy among the youth. With this broader picture in mind, a comparative question emerges: If young people in authoritarian and democratic states alike choose to abstain from official politics, can the causes of their apathy be similar or, at least, comparable? This question directs us to concentrate more on young people’s experiences with institutions designated for youth, and less on the heterogeneous political systems that host them. In such institutions, the meaning of ‘youth’ as a socio-political category is shaped through complex power relations that are reflected in formal processes and policies. The study of a large organization such as the CYL will reveal the social, political and generational power relations that determine youth policy in an authoritarian context. Furthermore, concentrating on these dimensions makes it possible to start thinking about youth in politics from a comparative perspective that bridges historical and contemporary political divides, thus allowing for reflection on the broader phenomenon of youth disassociation with politics, and on possible ways to address it. This book’s focus on the Hu-Wen decade further contributes to such a comparative line of inquiry. Hu Jintao’s overall supportive stance towards the CYL, and the relatively liberal social and political conjuncture of his administration in comparison to both Jiang’s and Xi’s, were conducive to a

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The Chinese Communist Youth League

more autonomous and responsive form of youth work. By examining a period when the Party was less intrusive, and was explicitly encouraging the CYL to address youth problems and needs, this research aims to dissect the power relations in play that inform its institutional capacity for responsiveness. Before turning to Hu Jintao’s call to ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’ in 2003, I will first briefly explore the nature of the challenge facing the League at that time. Despite its autonomous origins as a revolutionary organization, the CYL developed a symbiotic relation with the CCP, which led it into open conflict with Chinese youth twice in its history. As such, by the time Hu Jintao came to power, the CYL had an already long record of rather modest results in engaging youth.

The challenge: Reversing the legacy of an uneasy relationship Surprisingly, the League’s dependent and subordinated position to the CCP was not predetermined at the time of its founding. The Socialist Youth League (Shehuizhuyi qingniantuan 社会主义青年团), as the CYL was originally named, was officially established in 1922, but its first local organizations had already emerged autonomously in 1920, fueled by the revolutionary fervor of the May 4 movement (Graziani, 2014: 124). Until the end of the first United Front with the Guomindang in 1927, the League developed rapidly as an organization for the urban-based educated youth and young workers, exceeding the CCP in membership and competing with it in terms of influence (ibid.: 119). In this period, its political and organizational subordination to the Party had not been solidified; on the contrary, it retained significant autonomy and even challenged the CCP for the leadership of the Chinese communist movement (Chen, 2015: 37-73). In the 1930s, however, the League was transformed into the youth branch of the CCP’s agrarian revolutionary army (Graziani, 2014: 146-147). As with youth organizations elsewhere in wartime (Neumann, 2011; Dror, 2018), its functions were subsumed by the Party’s military efforts, first in the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and then in the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949) (Chen, 2015: 115-124). Regime-building and the League’s first fall From 1949 onwards, the New Democratic Youth League (xinminzhuzhuyi qingniantuan 新民主主义青年团), as the League was titled until 1957, concentrated on the regimentation of Chinese youth, and followed the political ups and downs of the CCP in the Maoist era. Sporadic studies offered

Introduction

25

glimpses into the CYL’s organizational development as a transmission belt in the early People’s Republic (Barnett, 1952; Chao, 1954; Pringsheim, 1962). Montaperto (1977) examined the League’s attempt to cultivate communist values and morality in young people, but discovered a sluggish bureaucracy resembling a revolutionary movement in nothing but its symbols and rhetoric. Essentially, the League operated as a component of a conservative establishment that ‘socialized China’s young people to the wrong things’ (ibid.: 258) instead of revolutionary ideals. In secondary education it was preoccupied with political instruction and ritual, socializing students with political models and correct attitudes, with varying effectiveness (Whyte, 1974: 113,118-121). In universities, the League organized cultural, recreational and sports activities but maintained a heavy emphasis on ‘ideological mobilization and political education to increase production’ (Healy, 1982: 110-111). As a result, between 1949 and 1966, the CYL’s bottom-up representational function was ‘nothing more than a myth’ (ibid.: 112). The Cultural Revolution (CR) posed an existential challenge for the League, as radicalized youths sought organizational alternatives by forming militant Red Guard groups (Israel, 1967: 4). The League was too close to the CCP to ‘respond dynamically to changing political conditions’ (Leader, 1974: 707), and consequently was quickly rendered obsolete by Red Guards (Funnell, 1970). In fact, the CYL, controlled by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, attempted to water down the Cultural Revolution by initially implementing a moderate rectification campaign, which made it a target for radicals (Israel, 1967: 9; Leader, 1974: 707). The findings on the dependent and bureaucratic character of the League are consistent with the literature on the CR that emphasizes societal causes to explain its intensity. Lingering social tensions piled up during the first two decades of CCP rule resulting from off icial class categorizations; from ‘frightening’ campaigns that created open accounts to be settled among individuals; and from resentment towards bureaucratic power and privilege (White, 1989: 46-47). Shirk (1982: 67) quotes a secondary-school student who explained his motivation for joining the League: ‘League members were powerful in class because they could struggle against people they wanted to ‘get’ for other reasons… get a job… join the PLA… and get into the Communist Party’. In the 1950s and 1960s, the League became indistinguishable from the CCP as a bastion of privilege in schools and universities. Active members cultivated social capital with teachers and obtained more opportunities for career advancement (ibid.: 68-70). In the microcosm of the classroom, League members were viewed as ‘little specially privileged persons’ (Chou, 1973a: 52), attracting the animosity of

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The Chinese Communist Youth League

their peers, who turned against them at the outset of the CR (Israel, 1967: 15; Funnell, 1970: 127; Leader, 1974: 702). Rosen (1982) in his study on Guangzhou Red Guards points out that members in the most radical groups came from ‘bad’ family backgrounds (classified as bourgeois, professionals, landlords, capitalists, pro-Guomindang, etc.) which disqualified them from enjoying the special privileges and political affiliations of their peers with revolutionary classification (that is, poor, working, cadre) (ibid.: 147). Whereas most studies show that infighting among conservative and radical groups took place along such ascribed class categories (Blecher and White, 1979: 81; Dikotter, 2016: 115-117), others have demonstrated that students joined factions opportunistically during the process of institutional collapse at the start of the Cultural Revolution (Walder, 2009: 9-15). On the whole, however, there is broad agreement that the CYL was seen as part of the same establishment that Red Guards vowed to destroy, which sealed its fate for this period. The League ceased to exist in the radical phase of the Cultural Revolution and only re-emerged with the Party’s effort to re-establish control in the early 1970s, when CYL organizations were restored and membership expanded again (Wang, 1972; Chou, 1975). In this period, young people became disillusioned with the League, its bureaucratic reassertion of authority among Red Guards, and its new emphasis on political re-education and ‘red’ recreational activities (Chou, 1973a; 1973b). This form of youth work continued into the first decade of reforms, leading to a new round of alienation, contention and conflict. The second fall of the League In the years leading to the student protests of the late 1980s, it is possible to identify dynamics similar to those in the 1960s: a far-reaching policy shift (in this case Deng’s reforms) created social conditions that triggered ‘exit’ responses by young people. During the 1980s, opinion surveys among students and young workers revealed a trend of increasing disassociation from the Party both ideologically and organizationally (Liu, 1984; Rosen, 1987), a prevailing skepticism towards socialism, a lack of interest in political instruction, and a declining desire to join the CYL (Liu, 1984: 979, 986, 990). Indeed, educators, Party and League officials reported significant difficulties in recruitment of young students and workers, as well as cynical and satirical attitudes towards CCP membership, even among League cadres (Rosen, 1987: 59, 85, 88). Proposed solutions ranged from conservative recipes, such as intensified indoctrination and stricter criteria for new members, to more

Introduction

27

attention towards young people’s needs and demands. This discussion revealed a sense of crisis among officials and a lack of direction on how to deal with politically dissociated youth (ibid.: 3). Characteristically, in the 12th CYL National Congress held one year before the Tiananmen massacre, Song Defu, then the League’s first secretary, spoke of a ‘divorce’ between the CYL and youth masses (Chiang, 1988: 36). In this time of crisis, the Party’s reflex action was to intensify ideological instruction and propaganda in the League (Liu 1984: 991-993). Gold (1996: 186-189) explains the ambivalence inherent in preaching compliance with lofty collectivist ideals and Lei Feng-style selflessness, in a social environment that revered individualism, consumerism and wealth. Grassroots cadres responded in two ways to this approach. The first was to emphasize their non-political work, such as sports competitions and cultural activities, coupled with a rather perfunctory and limited engagement with their political duties (191). The second response was a mixture of ‘voice’ and ‘exit’. Investigating the backgrounds of leading protesters, Rosen (1992) argues that the ‘real threat’ for the CCP did not come from the CYL cadres who were unconcerned with politics and who mechanically joined rebellious youths, but rather, from ‘more committed student cadres who found officially sanctioned organizations irrelevant and therefore created new ones’ (Rosen, 1992: 188). CYL cadres in fact played a leading role in creating new, informal organizations on campus, using skills and resources they had gained in the League to organize protests (Wasserstrom and Liu, 1995: 383). As the sequence of contentious events unfolded during April-May 1989, Youth League cadres became critical of the government’s intolerant reaction to peaceful student demonstrations and protested accordingly (Liang, Nathan and Link, 2002: 101). Thus, as in the Cultural Revolution, the League in the late 1980s also failed to respond to rapidly changing social conditions, with the result that its local organizations either became paralyzed or were hijacked by members and cadres-turned-protesters. The already limited academic work on the League almost disappears after 1989. Surveys and qualitative studies of Chinese youth (mainly focused on university students and graduates) show that in contrast to the idealism of the first decade of reform – a lost generation in the eyes of the Party (Rosen, 1992: 168) – those born after 1980 are ‘success oriented’ and openly seek the ‘good life’ (Liu, 1996: 171; Rosen, 2004: 159); they have passive political attitudes, and join the League and the Party for career reasons, while they channel their grievances and criticism into online forums (Chan, 2000; Rosen, 2004: 161-170; Clark, 2012: 194-195; De Kloet & Fung, 2017: 32-35, 38). Against this background, a new Chinese leadership with a long career in

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The Chinese Communist Youth League

the League emerged in 2002 and decided to break the vicious cycle of failed routine engagement with young people leading in turn to their alienation from official politics, and eventually crisis.

Enter Hu Jintao: ‘Keep the Party Assured and the Youth Satisfied’ The League’s new mandate for engagement with the Chinese youth emerged in a period of expansion of social policy in China, when the CCP leadership appeared committed to addressing various injustices and welfare needs that emerged after rapid marketization in the 1990s (Brown, 2012; Howell and Duckett, 2018). Hu and Wen’s vision of a harmonious (hexie 和谐) and moderately well-off society (xiaokang shehui 小康社会) created a favorable political context for the CYL’s experimentation with new types of youth work. Hu Jintao introduced his call for a more responsive League on 25 July 2003, just a few months after being appointed president and general secretary of the CCP. Addressing the first session of the 15th National Representative Congress of the Communist Youth League, Hu’s speech followed Party protocol closely (2003 CYL Yearbook: 3-5). He explained, first, the importance of the present conjuncture for China’s development, then outlined the goal of ‘building a well-off society in an all-round way’ (quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui全面建设小康社会) as had recently been decided at the 16th Party Congress, and continued by defining the duties of young Chinese in general and of the CYL in particular. The content of his speech was didactic and paternalistic, again not deviating from his predecessors. Hu expressed ‘three hopes’ (sandian xiwang 三点希望) for the Chinese youth: ‘to be diligent in learning’ (yao qinyu xuexi 要勤于学习 in order to acquire the knowledge and skills necessary for economic development and comprehend the Party’s ideology and goals; ‘to be good at creating’ (yao shanyu chuangzao 要善 于创造) in order to build a well-off society; and ‘to be willing to give’ (yao ganyu fengxian 要甘于奉献) by ‘consciously serving the motherland and selflessly contributing to society’ (zijue fuwu zuguo, wusi fengxian shehui 自 觉服务祖国，无私奉献社会). Hu Jintao’s ‘hopes’ echoed the expectations of the regime from young Chinese at the turn of the 21st century: learn, create, follow the Party line and serve the motherland. Since 1989, when Chinese students and youth from all segments of society clashed with the CCP, the Party meticulously regimented the education system and promoted nationalism in the curriculum, expanded compulsory military training for all new university students, and intensified its efforts in indoctrination to regain youth support (Wang, 2014; Fish, 2015; Genevaz,

Introduction

29

2019). Hu Jintao, like Party leaders before and after him, was a strong advocate of co-opting the youth and keeping them aligned with the social contract as it was first imposed under Deng Xiaoping and then violently reaffirmed in the Tiananmen massacre of 1989: in exchange for political stability, economic development and opportunities for wealth and better living standards. Nevertheless, Hu Jintao’s instructions to League cadres indicated a new awareness that the CCP’s and the CYL’s efforts also had to take into consideration the many socioeconomic pressures and challenges that young Chinese faced. Accordingly, after religiously reiterating the Party’s expectations of loyalty and industriousness from CYL cadres, Hu continued by instructing them ‘to be dedicated to their posts in the League’ (reai tuande gangwei 热爱团的岗位), ‘to serve youth wholeheartedly’ ( jiecheng fuwu qingnian 竭诚服务青年) and ‘to work hard to keep the Party assured and the mass of youth satisfied’ (nüli zuo rang dangfangxin, rang guangda qingnian manyi de ganbu 努力做让党放心、 让广大青年满意的干部). Thus, in addition to indoctrinating and mobilizing young people, preparing them for Party membership and offering aspiring cadres a career avenue, the former Chinese leader ordered the League to engage with the needs and demands of its youth constituency as a means of cultivating political support for the communist regime. One day after Hu’s speech, the 15th National Representative Congress of the CYL passed a resolution (2003 CYL Yearbook: 22-29) to amend the League’s constitution, recognizing its new role in ‘assisting the government in managing youth affairs’ (xiezhu zhengfu guanli qingnian shiwu 协助 政府管理青年事务) (Chen, 2015: 296). The resolution also explained the political rationale behind the League’s new mandate, pointing out that by ‘serving youth wholeheartedly’ the League would improve its ability to ‘attract and unite youth’ (xiyin he ningju qingnian 吸引和凝聚青年). Official documents, work handbooks, articles and speeches by Chinese leaders repeated the CYL’s new commitment to ‘serving youth’ in education and in the workplace, by improving the training of its cadres accordingly, and carrying out youth work campaigns and projects as well as expanding local infrastructure to ‘cover youth’ ( fugai qingnian覆盖青年) and address its needs (CSCCYEC, 2004: 39; Li and Liu, 2007; Li, 2008; Fu and Wang, 2008; Yang, 2009; Fu and Yang, 2010). Hu’s call was codified as the slogan ‘Keep the Party Assured and the Youth Satisfied’ (rang dangfangxin, rang qingnian manyi让党放心，让青 年满意) and informed the CYL’s discourse and self-perception, as well as the expansion of its youth work, over the next decade. Perhaps it is hard to think of a more laconic yet precise articulation of the CYL’s new tasks,

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The Chinese Communist Youth League

despite the many contradictions it entails. Cultivating legitimacy for the Party requires the League’s engagement with the needs and demands of its youth constituency and the augmentation of its capacity for responsiveness. In order to achieve this, the League has to expand its activities beyond its traditional political areas, increase capacity for social work and responsiveness, and moderate its formal and bureaucratic outlook and processes to allow for meaningful participation. At the same time, however, the CYL is dependent on and subordinated to the CCP, and as such its loyalties have always been clear, while the space available for maneuvering has remained limited. This created many contradictions and pressing questions for cadres. How should they engage young people in a meaningful manner without abandoning political indoctrination and mobilization as the League’s key functions? How should League cadres involve young people in consultation, and negotiate on their behalf with the Party and government to promote their views and demands, while keeping them loyal and committed to the regime and its policies? How should they develop specialization in social work, in an organization that is preoccupied with routine political tasks? And, last but not least, how should they convince the Party to create the necessary conditions in terms of resources, incentives and organizational expectations, for this broad mandate to be translated into concrete action? The way cadres have dealt with these contradictions and questions has defined the outcome of the ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’ mandate and the CYL’s effort to engage youth.

Beyond dependency: ‘Youth’ as a junior political subject This book explores the organizational life of the League in the Hu-Wen decade and discovers a series of abortive, superf icial and half-hearted attempts to change its operation in order to increase its appeal and relevance for young Chinese. More importantly, it reveals that the disappointing outcome of Hu’s call for responsiveness cannot be adequately explained on the basis of organizational dependency and the various political controls that the Party has in place. Whereas one could be tempted to conclude that the CYL’s failure to adapt to the social environment of the 2000s was simply the outcome of dependency on the Party, this investigation reveals a more complex set of dynamics in play, that impede organizational change. Dependency on the CCP is often assumed to create an impenetrable web of control that determines every organizational decision of the dependent part. Indeed, the literature on Chinese youth treats the League as little more

Introduction

31

than the arm of a monolithic regime, explicitly or implicitly explaining its interactions with young people on the basis of this dependent relation (Rosen, 2009; Clark, 2012; Fish, 2015; Woronov, 2015; De Kloet and Fung, 2017). This approach, albeit capturing interesting insights on the regime’s effort to regiment youth, is one-dimensional, and lacks nuance and interpretative depth in its analysis of the dynamics that materialize the ‘youth’ as a political subject in the work of the CYL. The literature on China’s mass organizations, in fact, shows the opposite: in their efforts to promote the interests of different social groups, cadres do negotiate the limits between dependency and autonomy (for instance, Croll, 1995; Hershatter, 2004; Kohrmann, 2005; Pringle, 2011). As a result of this negotiation, the state at the local and national levels has expanded its institutions and policies on a wide range of social issues, and has engaged in new forms of collaboration with civil society. In order to give voice to social demands, and respond to them in the socioeconomic context of reforms, cadres must not only circumvent the limitations imposed by organizational dependency on the CCP but, more importantly, offer meaningful solutions to a wide range of problems. Emanating from structural forms of subordination of social categories like women and workers, these problems include resurrected patriarchy, all-pervasive marketization, and deteriorating capital-labor relations (Shang, 1999; Howell, 2000; Zhu and Chan, 2005; Hishida, 2010; Angeloff and Lieber, 2012). These forms of structural subordination are present not only in society but also within the Chinese political system and are evident, for instance, in the low political representation of women, and in labor policies (Jin, 2001; Wang, 2004). Reflecting on the findings of this literature, I evaluate the impact of dependency but also seek to understand the structural forms of subordination of the youth, and how these forms impede responsiveness in the League. ‘Youth’, of course, is a very broad social category, as diverse as the concept of the ‘people’ itself. Therefore, patriarchy, marketization, heteronormativity and other forms of subordination (Ferfolja, 2007; Ward & Schneider, 2009; Sukarieh & Tannock, 2015) are all shaping the social position of different groups of young people. However, the unfavorable position of youth within the generational hierarchies that permeate state and society requires a closer investigation. This book studies a Party youth organization, and also the ways generational subordination in society is institutionalized in government and policy, using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, including: interviews with cadres in national and local CYL committees; surveys and ethnography in universities, workplaces, urban

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The Chinese Communist Youth League

and rural localities; as well as data from official CYL and youth research publications. My main argument is that the CYL failed to materialize the new mandate for responsiveness under Hu Jintao, because its discourse and work methods continued to embody a disempowering notion of youth, which limited its ability to engage young people in a meaningful and responsive way. This notion emanates from the League’s juniority, conceptualized as a form of subordination that is distinct from institutional dependency, since it merges political control and generational authority. Juniority is institutionalized and expressed in the set of norms, organizational practices and incentives that constitute youth as a junior political subject, whose interests and duties are top-down defined through hierarchies that favor the structural position of more senior stakeholders in politics and society, including Party committees, government departments, university authorities, employers, unions, etc. The League, as a junior organization, has no real ability to develop localized strategies for responsiveness and for innovation in youth policy. This incapacity produces widespread apathy and cynicism among young people and League members, and demotivates cadres who see little benefit in sustaining a commitment to youth work. In consequence, juniority prevents the League from following the path of other Chinese mass organizations, which modestly adapted their work methods to partially respond to the demands of their constituencies. Rather than treating it as an abstract concept, my investigation will reveal the ways juniority is institutionalized and normalized in the League, thus undermining the League’s prospects of increasing its own responsiveness. Crucially, the problematic notion of youth as equivalent to junior, is mirrored in the disadvantaged position of Communist Youth League cadres in all places in which they operate. Their agency is conditioned by seniority-based power relations that permeate both grassroots spaces and the vertical structure of government administration. The CCP’s paternalistic approach towards youth is replicated through organizational practices in appointments and promotions, that keep League cadres attached to weak positions within multiple hierarchies: political, administrative, academic or professional. In a system that provides cadres with very little material incentive, and few unconstrained processes for realizing the ‘Keep Youth Satisf ied’ mandate, their juniority ultimately blocks the only channel available for responsiveness in China’s authoritarian setting: the agency of committed and professional individuals, working from within the political system, who take pro-youth initiatives that gradually expand and reorient the tasks and focus of the League. The individuals assigned with the task

Introduction

33

of representing and responding to young people experience the tension between the social mandate and their positional weakness in their everyday work. Ultimately, CYL cadres represent youth as a junior political subject, not as a diverse social reality. In this context, ‘youth affairs’ as a policy area is belittled and lacks a meaning of its own, other than that assigned in a top-down manner. The League’s institutional weakness and inaction are discursively normalized by traditional notions of the youth’s subservience, and of the filial duties incumbent on them. Youth as a social constituency is delineated at will by conservative morality and by the regime’s political phobias and priorities, in a way that prioritizes certain groups of young people and justifies the neglect or exclusion of others. This book will explore the tensions between youth as a junior political subject and the mandate to increase responsiveness to young people in the case of the Chinese Communist Youth League. In the course of this exploration, I hope to demonstrate that the analytical usefulness of the concept of juniority exceeds the Chinese context, and has a comparative value for the study of youth politics and policy more broadly.

Researching the League It is a formidable task, especially for a single researcher, to analyze strategies for increasing responsiveness, as well as the challenges and difficulties this objective presents, which are magnified in an organization as gigantic as the CYL. For this reason, my research design sought to explore the interplay between the endemic characteristics of China’s authoritarian political system and the particular structural factors constituting youth as a sociopolitical category, as it takes place within selected organizational contexts and spaces. My examination of the League gives paradigmatic emphasis to qualitative research within a mixed methods framework, an approach that is deemed particularly suitable when political conditions and red tape hinder the collection of data (Tarrow, 1995: 473; also Creswell et al, 2003; Hesse-Biber, 2010). The qualitative component of the fieldwork was carried out in Beijing and in Zhejiang province, supplemented by targeted visits in Shanghai and Shandong to investigate local CYL initiatives and new patterns of collaboration with social organizations. Data collection concentrated on interviews, assessment of official documents and publications, as well as personal observation. As part of my fieldwork I visited CYL committees from the grassroots level to the League’s headquarters at number 10, Qianmendong Dajie in Beijing. I used the findings of the qualitative part

34 

The Chinese Communist Youth League

to formulate questionnaires for surveys, which aimed at connecting and contrasting the experiences and views of cadres with those held by university students, the League’s largest pool of members. The rationale behind this ‘reconstructive methodology’ in designing surveys was to avoid imposing my questions, by attending as closely as possible ‘to subjects’ own constructions of politics’ (Dryzek and Berejikian quoted in Blecher, 2006: 62) and their own understanding of youth as a sociopolitical category. I chose fieldwork locations in affluent regions of coastal China to avoid areas where financial and material shortages rendered League Committees dysfunctional. As such, my aim was not to identify a representative sample of local areas in terms of economic development and state capacity, but to concentrate on sites where material conditions were supportive to the League’s operation. Whenever lack of financing was reason for inaction, this was because of prioritization of funds in a manner unfavorable to the CYL and youth affairs in general, rather than due to their unavailability. I began my investigation in the Chinese capital because it houses the CYL Central Committee and its affiliated organizations. Fieldwork in the municipality of Beijing focused on two densely populated urban districts (qu 区) with high concentration of universities and businesses, and one rural district. In Zhejiang, I shortlisted fieldwork sites through snowball sampling, and after evaluating access and contacts with local government and League organizations. As in the case of Beijing, the rural areas visited in Zhejiang (township government seats) are within two hours’ drive from the respective cities where fieldwork took place. Consequently, these rural sites have benefited from their proximity to urban centers and are not regarded here as reflecting the conditions of remote and less developed parts of the Chinese countryside. Lastly, during f ieldwork, interviewees identif ied exceptional cases of local-level experimentation with social organizations. As reformist China has a tradition of pioneering local-level initiatives that result in national-level policies (Heilmann, 2018), I visited two such cases in Shanghai and Shandong and investigated their development, and their prospects of informing the CYL’s future direction. The CYL’s official membership range is 14 to 28 years of age, but fieldwork concentrated on university students and young employees, covering the 18-28 range. Access to League members in high schools was neither possible,2 nor 2 League membership in high schools is not uniform and all-encompassing as in university campuses, so fieldwork in schools would require free access to students to identify members and talk to cadres. At the preliminary stage of research, I explored the feasibility of such an endeavor, but in the end, free access to high schools was not possible.

Introduction

35

analytically essential for my inquiry. In order to compensate for this ‘gap’ in my examination of political socialization in the CYL and to understand the rationale of the official age range, I asked interviewees to reflect on their years in the League during high school. I also investigated policies and campaigns targeted at the younger cohort of members (14-17 years old) and even children, to understand how youth is constructed in the CYL’s social work. My examination of grassroots CYL organizations includes five universities and twelve work units, and then committees at township, county, provincial and national levels. The selection of these organizations followed purposive sampling according to the different nature of the various institutions in which the League has presence. In addition, I visited League-affiliated research institutions and social organizations, such as the China Youth and Children Research Centre in Beijing. The particular characteristics of the organizations I visited, and my fieldwork, are explained in detail in the respective chapters. During my visits, I conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with committee secretaries and cadres. I spent as much time as possible observing members’ work and talking to them, and accessed organizational documentation on membership, awards, activities, youth projects and cadre training sessions. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes to 3 hours, and in total I interviewed 60 individuals, whose positions in the League are presented in Appendix 1. In most cases, access to League organizations and cadres would not have been possible without guaranteeing full anonymity of the interviewees’ personal details, work or study unit and location below the provincial level. Accordingly, I present most fieldwork locations in coded form, revealing only the names of provinces and provincial-level cities (Beijing and Shanghai municipalities) and organizations.

Organization of the book My investigation begins in Chapter 2 with developing the analytical framework of this study, and establishing its value for unpacking the institutional dynamics that inform the relationship between communist regimes, youth Leagues and the youth in China and beyond. Since the CYL’s functions remain unexplored from a state-society relations perspective, I first review the efforts of other Chinese mass organizations to respond to their social constituencies, within the context of institutional dependency to the Party. The experiences of the Trade Union and the Women’s Federation demonstrate

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The Chinese Communist Youth League

that, under bottom-up pressure to engage with their corresponding social groups, cadres have attempted to partially increase responsiveness, update Party discourse and introduce policy and legislative improvements at the local and national levels. The second part considers the experiences of youth Leagues in the former socialist world as arenas of generational politics, and explains the value of this body of literature for the study of the Chinese case. These two comparative lines of inquiry lead to the discussion of generational subordination and the concept of juniority, and establish the analytical advantages of this concept for the present examination of the League. The main body of the book follows the logic of capturing the dynamics informing the League’s youth work in key spaces and different levels of administration during the Hu decade, and is organized in two parts. The first (Chapters 3 and 4) concentrates on the League’s operation on campus and at the workplace vis-à-vis its largest pools of membership. The second (Chapters 5 and 6) investigates the CYL’s cadre training and social work. Chapter 3 discusses the findings of fieldwork in five different universities in Beijing and Zhejiang, examining the League’s operation, activities and relations with students. It shows that the League has an unimpressive record of engaging in a responsive manner with its largest constituency, university students, because cadres faced important disincentives and obstacles in creating participatory processes and in providing a platform for advocacy and social work. Overall, the League’s involvement in student affairs was from a junior, subordinate position, and its volunteer activities pursued a Lei Feng-style didactic agenda, while in its interaction with student societies the League assumed a regulatory role as a Party agency. With very little space for autonomous action, political and administrative matters dominated the League’s interaction with students, thereby augmenting the problem of its relevance. The second part discusses the findings of surveys conducted on three campuses, asking students to evaluate the League’s responsiveness. According to the surveys, students remained skeptical of the League’s efforts to appear more inclusive, they demanded more attention to their interests and were cynical about the CYL’s claim to represent them. This chapter reveals that while often regarded as evidence of loyalty to the regime, the impressive numbers of League members reported on campus hide a reality of distancing from its organizational life. In chapter 4, I examine the League’s operation in workplaces by analyzing qualitative data collected from twelve different sites in Beijing and Zhejiang province. The chapter begins by reviewing the official documents and policies that establish the League’s mandate in workplace representation. It then assesses the impact of labor deregulation on the League’s institutional reach

Introduction

37

to the working youth, demonstrating that market socialism has resulted in its significant decline. Regarding the CYL’s role in employee welfare and representation, I find that its context of operation was antithetical to assuming a pro-youth stance. League cadres occupied junior positions in political and workplace hierarchies, resulting in their multifaceted subordination to the senior power holders present: the management, Party committee and Union leadership. This institutionalized juniority of the cadres created strong disincentives for pro-youth employee initiatives, and led to failure in articulating a distinctive youth labor agenda. Accordingly, the CYL’s functions in the workplace have been corporatized, and aim at sustaining labor peace and improving corporate image. In Chapter 5, I examine whether the CYL training programs were adapted to enable cadres to confront the multifaceted challenges of their social mandate. I find that training policies under Hu and Wen were insufficient in developing a specialization in ‘youth affairs’ among League cadres, and relatedly, in cultivating an esprit de corps that promotes social work. At the local level, training in League schools (tuanxiao 团校) remained weakly institutionalized and largely dependent on the local Party committee, replicating the same problems in content, frequency of sessions, and quality of instruction that are also present in local Party schools. At the national level, the Central League School has not managed to establish a distinct youth affairs curriculum. Similarly, other nationwide personnel-development and exchange programs reflected the Party’s developmental priorities, and did not promote social work or improve youth conditions in poor regions. Without promoting normative commitment to youth work and relevant skills, training in the League, thus, has failed to contribute to the ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’ agenda. Under Hu, the CYL increased its social work, created a network of topdown youth organizations, and attempted to open up spaces for consultation with young people. Chapter 6 investigates these efforts. The f irst part examines work norms associated with social work and f inds that the majority of League activities were directed to non-youth related areas as decided by the Party and other government departments. As a result, the League’s own social work, including youth employment programs and building youth infrastructure, were deprioritized and exhibited poor results. The League’s public consultation spaces were overtly ceremonial in nature, providing very limited opportunities for genuine bottom-up representation of youth views. This chapter also examines the League’s relations with youth organizations and groups, showing that instead of developing synergies in social work, the CYL unsuccessfully sought to

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The Chinese Communist Youth League

expand its monitoring capacity, and to interfere with their activities as a corporatist agency of the Party. The book concludes with an appraisal of its main findings and evaluates the League’s efforts in addressing the needs and demands of its constituency. It also connects this study to recent developments under Xi Jinping, suggesting that the drastic reduction of support and mass demotion of League cadres that is part of Xi’s power consolidation, will have a negative impact on the CYL’s capacity for social work and responsiveness. As the League has entered a period of uncertainty, the political reflex of its cadres will likely be to abandon the ‘Keep the Youth Satisfied’ initiatives and concentrate on the traditional tasks of indoctrination, preparation for Party membership, and mobilization, that have in the past alienated the youth. As such, the problems identified in this study are likely to remain relevant and indeed their impact to increase, further deepening the apathy prevalent among League members and the youth in general. Lastly, in conclusion, I will reflect on the value of these findings for the systematic and comparative analysis of youth party organizations across different political contexts.

References 2003 Zhongguo Gongqingtuan Nianjian (2003 CYL Yearbook). Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe (China Youth Publishing), 2004. 2016 Gongqingtuan Zhongyang Gaige Fangan (2016 Central CYL Reform Plan). Communist Youth League Official Website: http://www.gqt.org.cn/notice/201608/ P020160809382774540571.pdf. Accessed 1 October 2018. Amadeo, Jo-Ann, ‘Patterns of Internet use and Political Engagement among Youth’, in Peter Dahlgren, Young Citizens and New media. NY; Oxon: Routledge, 2010, pp. 125-148. Angeloff, Tania, and Marylène Lieber. ‘Equality, Did You Say? Chinese Feminism after 30 Years of Reforms’. China Perspectives, 4, December 2012, pp. 17-24. https:// doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.6014. Barnett, Arthur D., ‘Mass Political Organization in Communist China’. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 277, 1951, pp. 76-88. Blecher, Marc J., ‘What -and How- are Tianjin Workers Thinking?’, in Katsuji, Nakagawe; Tomoyuki, Kojima (Eds.). Restructuring China: Party, State and Society after the Open Door. Tokyo: Tokyo Bunko, 2006. Blecher, Marc J., and Gordon White, Micropolitics in Contemporary China: A Technical Unit during and after the Cultural Revolution. White Plains, N.Y: M. E. Sharpe, 1979.

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2

‘Juniority’ and the generational subordination of party youth organizations Abstract Chapter 2 develops the analytical framework of this book which concentrates on the institutionalization of youth’s subordination as a social category and as a political subject. It discusses the Chinese mass organizations’ efforts to negotiate dependency and respond to social demands since the 1980s, and the youth leagues’ experiences as arenas of generational politics in former socialist regimes. It then develops this study’s systematic approach on the subordination of youth in politics based on the works of Foucault, Bourdieu and Butler, and explains how the concept of ‘juniority’ captures the process of conditioning youth as a ‘junior’ political subject. It further explains the discursive and organizational ways juniority has been institutionalized in the League, rendering its adaptation a highly difficult proposition. Keywords: Juniority; generational subordination; dependency; mass organizations; League cadres

The present book brings the Communist Youth League back into the debate on youth politics in the PRC by exploring the challenges, tensions and contradictions that characterized the CYL’s effort to expand its youth work during the Hu-Wen decade. Although increasing responsiveness within an authoritarian context may sound like a paradox, the League’s attempt is actually far from unique. Mass organizations in China’s Reform era, and communist youth organizations in former socialist countries have also attempted to appeal and respond to society, especially during periods of comparatively ‘liberal’ party leaderships. But it is an inherently contradictory process to become socially responsive while remaining compliant with

Tsimonis, Konstantinos D., The Chinese Communist Youth League: Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2021 doi: 10.5117/9789462989863_ch02

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party orthodoxy. The CCP, like communist parties elsewhere, has assigned interests and duties to various social groups that only partially correspond to actual demands and views articulated within society, while there is only limited space for expression and promotion of these demands. What is more, in the context of economic reform, large social groups such as workers and women also face structural forms of subordination emanating from new capital-labor relations and patriarchy. Finding ways to increase responsiveness in such a restrictive context is a complicated but not impossible task, and depends on the ingenuity and commitment of those involved in organizing and promoting societal interests. In this regard, mass organizations in reformist China have been called upon by state and society to play the role of a regime-friendly social advocate, offering channels for representation and responsiveness to society without questioning their loyalty to the regime (Croll, 1995; Hershatter, 2004; Kohrmann, 2005; Pringle 2011). In doing so, they have faced many difficulties and drawbacks but can also demonstrate a record of successful interventions and initiatives, which shows that social responsiveness can take place also under conditions of dependency to the regime. Similarly, party youth organizations in the former socialist world have struggled to manage the tumultuous relationship between communist regimes and young people, which has gone through phases of superficial conformity, apathy and rebellion. Recent historiography has revealed that this relationship was characterized by a generational-turned-political clash between the youth, and the revolutionary regimes and societies in which they were born (McDougall, 2004; Saunders, 2007; Spaskovska, 2017). Analytically, these two sets of literature draw our attention to the importance of the agency of cadres in mass organizations in negotiating dependency to foster responsiveness, and on the generational aspect of youth’s domination (and resistance) under socialism. This chapter develops the analytical framework of my investigation around the concept of ‘juniority’ and the generational subordination of youth as a social category and as a policy subject. I do so, first, by discussing the experience of mass organizations’ cadres in mitigating the effect of dependency on their work in order to increase social responsiveness. This body of literature has explored cases where, with varying degrees of success, cadres attempted to address social problems, assumed representative roles, built institutions and increased the professionalization of their organizations. The promotion of the interests of labor, women or other social groups has been an effort involving cadre agency that has taken the form of more or less frequent bottom-up initiatives, carefully designed not to antagonize

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the CCP. For the purposes of this discussion, the cases of the All China Women’s Federation and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions offer a blueprint of what responsiveness under authoritarianism ‘looks like’, and in particular, the kind of initiatives, processes and limitations one would reasonably expect to find in the case of the CYL. The second body of research examined, concerns the experience of communist youth organizations as battlegrounds of generational conflict in socialist regimes. This literature analyzes the ways in which communist regimes merged political and generational authority, creating junior political identities that alienated young people. By discussing the experience of communist youth leagues under existing socialism, it is possible to identify the intrinsic characteristics of ‘youth’ as a political subject, and the ways generational subordination served political goals. Their experience also reveals the contradictions and insurmountable difficulties this subordinated youth identity created for cadres who attempted to engage young people in a less politicized and more appealing manner. Based on the findings on cadre agency and on the generational subordination of communist youth organizations respectively, I then develop the concept of juniority and establish its value for analyzing the CYL’s efforts to increase responsiveness.

Circumventing dependency: Cadre agency and responsiveness In theory, mass organizations (MOs) serve as ‘transmission belts’ between the party-state and society, transmitting downwards the center’s policies and instructions for mobilization, and upwards the society’s views and demands (Lenin, 1965: 21-23; Stalin, 1976: 98, 174-186). From a bottom-up perspective, MOs may provide a channel for ‘voice’ in political systems where mechanisms of electoral representation are either non-existent or largely ceremonial. However, the literature on Soviet and communist regimes has concluded that the representation function of MOs was consistently undermined, broadly due to three reasons. Firstly, communist leaders shared the paternalistic belief that since the masses are not always aware of their own best interests, parties need to avoid ‘tailism’, i.e., sacrificing revolutionary consciousness and submitting to mundane and short-term bottom-up demands (Unger, 1974: 20). Secondly, the institutionalized norm of democratic centralism prohibited the representation, within ruling parties, of voices that run against the official line (Waller and Fennema 1988: 18). Dissident voices were treated with suspicion, and frequently subjected to purges or worse. Thirdly, ruling parties sidelined the upward movement of

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the ‘belt’ to carry out socioeconomic transformation without disruptions (Kasza, 1995: 3). Essentially, communist parties employed MOs to incorporate social groups in a structure of control that resembles a mass conscript army, what Kasza (1995: 4) has described as ‘the conscription society’. As in other communist regimes, Chinese mass organizations were created according to top-down ascribed identities, in effect as a way to substitute civil society. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU, the Unions), the Communist Youth League and the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF, the Federation), jointly referred to as gongqingfu (工青 妇), have traditionally been the three major mass organizations responsible for the political participation of workers, youths and women respectively, but there have been many others.1 MOs were designed according to the logic of verticality, an arrangement in which ‘all members of society are incorporated into hierarchically organized institutional systems’, with limited horizontal linkages to achieve ‘social encapsulation’ (White et al, 1996: 19). Saich (2001: 170), referring to the Maoist years, has branded the system of mass organizations as ‘two-edged swords’ intended to mobilize society while preventing the formation of autonomous organizations. In the Reform era, however, the Chinese state withdrew from its socialist commitment to society’s welfare, thus radically altering the position of mass organizations vis-à-vis their assigned social groups. Since 1979, the MOs found themselves at the forefront of state-society relations and under increased pressure from both sides to respond to social problems created by China’s profound and rapid economic transformation. From an institutional perspective, this has been a unique experience. In former socialist countries, as part of democratic transitions, MOs were either disbanded or adapted to the new political and socioeconomic context, broke their dependency on their host parties, diversified their identity, and pluralized the content of their interactions with their members. As China’s road to market socialism with Chinese characteristics has not involved a democratic transition, MOs have had to adapt to the new social environment without severing their dependency on the CCP in terms of deciding on personnel appointments and promotions, setting work priorities and budgets, and carrying out political 1 MOs in China and elsewhere can be further differentiated on the basis of their mass or exclusive/elite character. Examples include the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles (Zhongguo Wenxue Yishujie Lianhehui 中国文学艺术界联合会), the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (Zhonghua Quanguo Gongshangye Lianhehui 中华全国工商业联合会), the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (Zhongguo Renmin Duiwai Youhao Xiehui 中国人民对外友好协会), and the China Disabled Persons’ Federation (Zhongguo Canjiren Lianhehui 中国残疾人联合会).

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functions. This combination of circumstances created a series of contradictions that resulted in a rather limited space for initiative and societal action by the MOs, as the regime retained its monopoly over defining the acceptable interests and characteristics of various social groups for policy purposes. Although the social experiences of, for instance, workers and women were significantly transformed and pluralized in comparison to the Mao era, the MOs were expected to engage with society using the permissible social identities as ascribed by the Party. At the same time, however, both the Party and the rapidly changing social environment prompted the cadres of MOs, at all levels of administration, to partially engage and respond to the new challenges and predicaments faced by their corresponding social groups. The cases of labor unions and state feminism best illustrate how the tension between the CCP’s social imaginary and China’s social reality set the context for the many dilemmas confronting MOs, prompting limited innovation in the form of partial organizational and functional adaptation. Trade unions In relation to labor, the restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the decentralization and devolution of fiscal and welfare responsibility, and the emergence of a highly ‘flexible’ labor market, all had significant implications for Chinese workers (Blecher, 2002; 2004; Weston, 2004; Lee, 2007; Pringle, 2011). In this context some authors investigated whether unions would attempt to break away from Party subservience and side with labor, ‘becoming a central element of an emergent civil society’ (White et al, 1996: 39) and facilitating ‘associational pluralism’ (Ogden, 2000: 291). The literature on labor unions in China has consistently portrayed a rather mixed picture, with different dynamics at play at the center and in localities. Despite being under the CCP’s tight organizational control (Baek, 2000; Feng 2004), the All-China Federation of Trade Unions has a regular consultative role and a modest influence in national policy-making, as evident in the 1992 Trade Union Law (White et al, 1996: 51-53), the 2008 Labor Contract Law (Wang et al, 2009: 489), and various less successful earlier attempts to introduce pro-labor legislation, including the right to strike (Pringle, 2011: 5). The ACFTU has also run re-employment centers for laid-off workers and has promoted awareness of China’s labor law, occasionally collaborating with non-state actors (ibid.: 35; Cheng, Ngok and Zhuang, 2010). Contact with international agencies, such as the International Labor Organization, has exposed the ACFTU to collective bargaining strategies (Howell, 1998: 162). At the local level, Union cadres are caught in what has been described

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as a ‘social nutcracker’ (White et al, 1996: 45) of opposing forces, comprising on the one hand Chinese and foreign capital supported by growth-hungry local governments, and on the other, labor discontent. In this context, the positions and careers of Union cadres depend on maintaining labor peace, which in turn involves at least partially satisfying bottom-up demands. Although this entails many tensions and dilemmas for Union cadres, it provides some space for pro-labor action. Still, Unions engage only selectively with segments of China’s workers and their agenda, widely neglecting migrant workers, who often work in construction and in sectors that employ informal labor (Swider, 2015: 17). In relation to the workforce they cover, the ability of Unions to promote welfare issues, intervene in pay disputes, and facilitate workplace representation varies among different localities, sectors and types of enterprises, and largely depends on the commitment and skills of local Union organizers. (Howell, 1998; Chan, 2000; Zhu and Chan, 2005; Howell, 2006a; Hishida, 2010) Overall, the Unions do not challenge the structural characteristics of China’s socialist market economy and key policies such as SOE restructuring and privatizations. In return for its ‘institutional passivity’ (Pringle, 2011: 38) in these areas, the ACFTU has assumed a seat in national policy-making and has retained its monopoly over labor organization and regular funding. Its position as a bridge between workers and corporations has allowed it some initiative in promoting workers’ interests, as part of its effort to maintain labor peace. However, continued dependency on the CCP means that the Unions act as a control mechanism for the subordination of labor to state and private capital that characterizes China’s economic model. Women’s federations The All China Women’s Federation, China’s state feminist mass organization, has also struggled to redefine its position vis-à-vis women in the context of marketization and dependency on a Party that embodies conservative morality and patriarchal norms, albeit with greater success and autonomy than the ACFTU, both locally and centrally. China’s economic reforms have created more opportunities for career and wealth in Chinese society but have also had dire consequences for gender equality. As the CCP abandoned its commitment to welfare policies and socialist ideals, replacing them with market forces, new expressions of patriarchy emerged in addition to the traditional ones, in both society and the state. These resulted in a wholesale retreat of the position of women in the Chinese family, workplace, society and politics. Some of the most notable examples include: the exploitation of

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women at work and disregard for workplace protections relating to marriage and maternity decisions; the sharp rise in gender crimes, including domestic violence, trafficking, rape, and bride-buying among others; the widened gender inequality in the distribution of wealth and income; various state policies, for instance, encouraging gendered lay-offs, regularizing patriarchal discourses, and the 1-Child policy with its implications for women’s health; and, last but not least, the low participation of women in government. (see Honing and Hershatter, 1988; White et al, 1996; Howell, 2000; Wang, 2004; Wang and Pickowicz, 2002; Hong Fincher, 2014) In response, the All China Women’s Federation attempted to adapt the content and mode of women’s work ( funügongzuo 妇女工作) to address some of these issues, in a process that involved cadre initiative in both Beijing and the localities. The first step in this process was to understand the challenges that women faced in the Reform era, through the launching of surveys, journals and periodicals, and the creation of Women’s Studies institutes and research centers (Croll, 1995: 144-150, Chow et al, 2004: 165167). The creation of this knowledge infrastructure pluralized the debate and policy on women’s rights and welfare by introducing the concepts of patriarchy and gender (Angeloff and Lieber, 2012: 22), which questioned the Engelsian and Maoist orthodoxy on women’s liberation. Further, at the central level, ACWF cadres became involved in the international feminist movement, organizing exchange programs and international events, with the 1995 UN Conference on Women as the most notable example (Howell, 2000: 133; Lee and Regan, 2009: 547; Kaufman, 2012: 593-594). ACWF cadres developed intragovernmental advocacy and institutionbuilding initiatives. They successfully lobbied the government to abandon policy proposals that would be harmful to women’s interests, and to introduce laws and amendments opposing discrimination in employment, education and access to health services (Shang, 1999: 196; Croll, 1995: 130-150; Jin, 2001: 125; Hershatter, 2004: 1037-1038; Du, 2009: 266). The Federation has been active in the promulgation of important legislation protecting women in the family, at the workplace and in society at large,2 and promoting participation in politics and government (Howell, 2002; Wang, 2004; Du, 2009). Further, the creation of the National Working Committee for 2 The most important examples are: Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women (1992); Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Minors (1992); Law of the People’s Republic of China on Maternal and Infant Health Care (1995); and Domestic Violence Law (2016). The ACWF has also introduced amendments and regulations in China’s Criminal, Labor and Education laws, among others.

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Children and Women (NWCCW) enabled the Federation to acquire a formal position in China’s policy-making and legislative processes (Croll, 1995: 136-144; Howell, 2003: 200; Angeloff and Lieber, 2012: 19-20). The Committee drafts and supervises the Programs for the Development of Chinese Women (1995-2001, 2001-2010, 2011-2020), which coordinate the work of government departments in promoting gender equality. Locally, ACWF cadres have engaged in various welfare initiatives, forming horizontal partnerships with non-state women’s organizations and groups, including international NGOs and donors. Related projects include the creation of shelters for victims of domestic violence, hotlines and organizations offering psychological and legal assistance, initiatives to promote participation in local affairs, microfinance schemes, projects for migrant women’s welfare and employment, and trainings and workshops on women’s work for Federation cadres and civil society activists (Croll, 1995; Judd, 2002; Jacka, 2006; Lee and Regan, 2009; Chen, 2011; Gao, 2011). This record of successes co-exists with important limitations emanating from ongoing organizational and ideological dependency on the Party, making the Federation complicit in its patriarchal policies and discourses, which often sacrifice women’s rights in service of government policies (Chow et al, 2004: 174; Chen, 2011: 6). For instance, the ACWF faithfully promoted the 1-Child policy throughout its duration, while nowadays it urges women not to delay marriage and risk becoming ‘leftover’ (Hong Fincher, 2014: 6). In addition, there is significant unevenness, not only in terms of the ACWF’s commitment and outreach to women in China’s dispersed localities, but also in relation to different groups. Migrant and rural women continue to receive limited attention, while lesbians, sex workers, and ‘second wives’ are stigmatized and marginalized by the ACWF (Howell, 2003: 196, Hong Fincher, 2014: 178-182). As such, although the ACWF has become the ‘voice of women’ in the Chinese government (White et al, 1996: 83, 89; Angeloff and Lieber, 2012: 22), at the same time it often replicates the regime’s cacophony of sexist views. Overall, cadres have managed to renegotiate and expand women’s work to the extent that the CCP even described the ACWF as ‘China’s largest NGO’, but without fundamentally altering the context of dependency on the Party, nor the ensuing subordination to some of its patriarchal beliefs (Zhang, 2001: 162; Howell, 2000: 127-128; also see Tsimonis, 2016). In the cases of both labor unions and women’s federations, the double pressure on cadres, from society for welfare attention and from the regime for diffusion of social tensions, has triggered initiative and innovation. This agency, displayed both by leading and ordinary cadres, has acted as a stimulus for partial adaptation, revisiting the discourse and scope of work

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as traditionally defined by the CCP. However, dependency on the CCP is translated not only into organizational but, more importantly, structural forms of subordination. The control of appointments, promotions, activities and budgets, which constitute elements of organizational dependency, are also tools for the subordination of ‘workers’ and ‘women’ as subjects of policy, to capital and patriarchy respectively. As the CCP relies for its own survival on an economic model that exploits labor, and ideologically endorses conservative patriarchal values, the effect of organizational dependency over MOs is not ‘just’ political control over its cadres, but through such control, the subordination of these social groups to the identities ascribed by the regime. Of course, the social reality of labor and gender escapes the top-down assigned identities and assumed policy needs, causing contradictions and dilemmas for cadres on how to engage with the corresponding social groups. Failure and success in such engagement depends on the cadre’s ability to renegotiate the impact on policy-making of these official identities and the structural forms of subordination they recreate. Essentially, although dependency acts as a ceiling to the degree of organizational change and societal impact MOs can create, cadre agency has nevertheless increased responsiveness to these groups, and introduced modest pro-society initiatives. Next, I will discuss the experiences of youth organizations in socialist countries, taking them as a distinctive form of MOs which embody the generational subordination of youth in politics and society. These experiences, as recorded and analyzed in the burgeoning literature on communist youth leagues in the socialist camp during the Cold War, reframe the often contentious relations between socialist regimes and their youth as the result of a generational conflict that turned political.

Youth leagues and generational politics In 1921, the Communist International resolved that communist youth organizations would be subordinated, ideologically and organizationally, to communist parties, thus ending a decade-long discussion on the degree of their autonomy (Young Spartacist, 1974; Cornell, 1982). In the 70 years of communist experimentation that followed, behind the colorful images of youthful devotion to the revolution as depicted in propaganda posters, there existed a reality of an uneasy triadic relationship between parties, their youth organizations, and young people. In fact, under communism, youth leagues became the arena of generational politics. For ruling parties, young people served as a pool of inexpensive labor to be mobilized for

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propaganda, socioeconomic transformation, and regime rejuvenation through cadre recruitment. However, young people questioned both the form and substance of communist ‘youth work’; instead, they developed their own subcultures, became cynical towards politics, and criticized the revolution as they experienced it, often in an open and contentious manner. When league cadres took a pro-youth stance, they invited the ‘wrath’ of communist parties, and when they sided firmly with the party – as they eventually did – young people became widely disaffected with them. The difficulty of bridging the conservatism and formalism of their regimes with young people’s spontaneity and tendency to question authority contributed to a series of clashes. (See discussions by Cornell, 1965; Juricic, 1994; Solnick, 1998; McDougall, 2004) Despite some differences in the regime-youth relationship among socialist countries, there exist strong comparative themes in the ways generational tensions were built, and in the failed attempts of various youth communist organizations to diffuse them. This literature demonstrates that, in addition to dependency on the host party organization, communist youth leagues actualized the generational subordination of youth to the revolution of their parents and grandparents. This was evident in the discourse and content of youth policies that emphasized sacrifice, collectivism, and revolutionary continuity, as well as in the organizational life of youth organizations that socialized members and cadres in the uninspiring realities of bureaucratic authoritarianism. In turn, generational subordination in communist youth leagues contributed to the deterioration of the youth-regime relationship by politicizing the generational gap and therefore preventing cadres from becoming more responsive to young people. Youth and regime-building In the USSR, following the revolutionary phase of the 1920s and the consolidation of the communist regime, the Komsomol was transformed from an organization of youth to ‘merely for youth’ (Neumann, 2013: 216). Before Stalinization, the Party encouraged grassroots and bottom-up activism that empowered Komsomol branches (ibid.: 218) which maintained a considerable degree of decision-making autonomy (Neumann, 2008: 245-246, 250). Under Stalin, however, the USSR ‘infanticized’ the youth by placing them at the receiving end of paternalistic policies, controls and discourses that enforced adult and Party authority (255-260). As a consequence, members and cadres lost the capacity to define the organization’s identity, while working on behalf of the youth became a futile task. Fürst (2012: 47-49) records the many frustrations of grassroots and Central Committee cadres who tried to

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convince Party leaders to improve the difficult working and living conditions of young workers post-WW2. The inherently contradictory role of cadres as agents of the Party and also representatives of youth became increasingly impracticable, leading many into bureaucratic lethargy or into becoming ‘the merciless executives of adult authority’, faithfully carrying out orders from above to advance their careers in the Soviet party-state (ibid.: 315). Not surprisingly, under a façade of loyalty, politically passive attitudes and apathy emerged in Komsomol ranks, as young people learned how to ‘speak Bolshevik without genuinely engaging with their organizations’ (Neumann, 2008: 255-260). Cadres adopted various youth subcultures suppressed by the regime, and even joined underground anti-Stalinist groups (Fürst, 2002; 2012: 310). After Stalin and until the mid-1980s, the prevailing identity of the Komsomol as the Party’s assistant meant that it primarily served goals that had little to do with young people and their needs. Komsomol’s work on youth welfare suffered, as grassroots organizations faced material and personnel shortages and had to prioritize political-bureaucratic duties and economic production tasks (Tsipursky, 2014: 24-25, 29-33). These included preparing young people for military service, assisting WW2 veterans and their relatives, mobilizing the youth for economic production, creating new role models, and promoting socialist recreational activities to cultivate a sense of togetherness among USSR youth (Hornsby, 2017: 429-441). The Komsomol also helped the Party to realize a hierarchical social vision that used many pre-revolutionary and conservative ideas on youth, gender, family and social order, thus merging Party with patriarchal and adult authority (Molyneux, 1990; Mally 1996; Tsipursky, 2015a). For instance, Soviet leaders created a moral panic around youth delinquency, to root out Western subcultures believed to be fueling the youth’s cynicism towards authorities (ibid.: 243, 248; Tsipursky, 2015b: 59-63). Overall, after the revolutionary phase, the Komsomol became an enforcer of Party authority and thus socialized youth with the bureaucratic politics and the conservative mentality of the Soviet regime. As a result, both in Russia and in the other Soviet republics, Komsomol organizations failed both in defusing youth’s grievances with life under communism and in cultivating their support for Moscow. Soviet youth, including Komsomol members and non-members alike, often fell into apoliticism, sought alternative lifestyles and subcultures as hippies, rock and punk fans, created their own spaces for recreation and socialization (Fürst, 2017: 179-182; Kasakow, 2017: 233-236; Toomistu, 2017: 42-43), and occasionally took their frustration with the regime to the streets (Swain, 2013: 10-12; Brüggemann, 2015: 243-245; Gordeeva, 2017: 131).

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Questioning the ‘revolution of our fathers’ Studies on party youth organizations in other countries of the socialist camp, have recorded a similar trajectory of development of the regimeleague-youth relation. Another prominent case in the literature on youth organizations under communism, the East German Free German Youth (FDJ), evolved during the 1950s from a group of grassroots anti-fascist youth organizations to a top-down bureaucracy that quickly lost its dynamism and its appeal for young Germans (McDougall, 2004: 19-25). The FDJ struggled to carry out a very diverse, and often conflicting, set of social and political tasks, consistently sacrificing its youth programs in favor of political functions (ibid.). The liberal ‘interlude’ in youth policy under Ulbricht in 1963-1965 aimed at changing the FDJ’s bureaucratic outlook and unresponsiveness towards young people. But reforms were short-lived, as conservative cadres both within the FDJ and the Party resisted them, leading to their eventual abandonment (171). Only the few FDJ grassroots organizations that defied the regime’s restrictions on Western cultural influences (in music, fashion, etc.) were successful in engaging young people and keeping them involved (131). In the 1980s, there was a significant expansion of membership with a simultaneous decline of the ‘feeling of attachment’ to the FDJ, evident in surveys reporting growing youth apathy and disinterest towards its organizational life and activities (Saunders, 2007: 95). Saunders explains the generational politics at play, as Party officials rejected proposals by FDJ cadres to rejuvenate the organization (ibid.: 97), and instead used the FDJ and Stasi to repress youth subcultures influenced by Western rock and punk, treating them as signs of political decline and decadence (Brauer, 2012: 93; Gerrard, 2015: 154-155). Limited innovation did take place, such as an increase in outdoor activities, but overall FDJ and Party leaders were indifferent, if not outright antagonistic, to the idea of becoming more responsive to young East Germans and endorsing their changing cultural and lifestyle preferences. The conflict embedded in the FDJ’s dual identity as the ‘helper and reserve’ of the party and as the ‘representative of the interests of young people’ was never resolved. Political socialization in the FDJ created members who were superficially involved, yet apathetic to formal politics, and who used the FDJ for their personal and career purposes (Saunders, 2007: 99-102). Not surprisingly, in periods of political crisis FDJ members and non-members alike joined mass, anti-regime protests (Mcdougall 2004; Saunders, 2007). Youth self-expression became a generational battlefield between communist regimes and young people, starting from the realm of culture and

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eventually spilling over into politics. After WW2, the Czechoslovak Youth Union (CSM) mobilized students and young people to take part in construction projects and agriculture, and offered a space for socialization and entertainment (Pospisil, 2012). But in the 1960s, a new generation of young Czechoslovaks, with a rather faint memory of the wartime period and a less ideological association with communism, contested the Party’s cultural hegemony by turning to Western rock and pop influences, ‘beatlemania’, and various subcultures (479-481). Young people, especially from working-class backgrounds, became cynical towards the CSM and the careerist motives of its functionaries, and enthusiastically endorsed symbols and lifestyles outside the official cultural package (Siklova, 1982: 159). Progressive circles in the Czechoslovak regime, and some among the CSM leaders, favored the endorsement of Western influences through the creation of rock bands, festivals, and magazines reporting on Western music and fashion (Pospisil, 2012: 482-488). Eventually, however, Party conservatives imposed a hardline campaign against ‘hooligans’, known as ‘longhairs’ (Vlasatci), who were subjected to arrests, fines and forcible haircuts (ibid.: 493). The Party also appealed to the conservatism of older Czechoslovaks, portraying youth subcultures as a threat to traditional values, and its violent campaign as a defense of traditional morality (499). The regime’s violence and rigidity fueled existing grievances of young people on being denied freedom of speech and association, contact with the West, and policy autonomy from the USSR. All these factors would contribute to the ideological battlefield of the Prague Spring in 1968 (Scwartz, 1968: 980-981). In the few cases, such as Poland and Yugoslavia, where communist youth organizations were more tolerant of youth self-expression, they still failed to generate legitimacy and support for the regime. In Poland, the recreational activities of the Socialist Youth Union (ZMS) were atypically rich for communist youth organizations (Sadowska, 2016: 150-153). Apart from political tasks, the ZMS promoted contact with youth organizations in eastern and western Europe through participation in international conferences, youth camps and tourism programs. Rock bands and festivals were also organized, as the regime tried to co-opt the youth music scene (Junes, 2015: 246). Nevertheless, despite being offered a space for recreation and social life, young Poles were largely passive and indifferent to their ZMS membership and had rather cynical views about its ideology and functions, expressing mainly utilitarian, pragmatic or conformist attitudes (Sadowska, 2016: 150-153). This resulted in an organization with a large nominal membership and very few active members, which failed to cultivate regime legitimacy and support among Polish youth (154-155). During political unrest in 1968

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and 1970 many ZMS members took part in anti-government protests, and eventually joined Solidarity in the early 1980s (152). The Yugoslavian League of Socialist Youth (SSOJ), in the same period, also faced a widespread crisis of legitimacy. Its local organizations were operating ‘as junior branches of the Party’, and Yugoslav youth were very critical towards its cadres, who were considered careerist and self-serving ‘little bureaucrats’ (Spaskovska, 2017: 49). As a response, the SSOJ prompted considerable change within its organization. It sponsored rock, New Wave and punk bands, concerts and festivals, but more importantly, it encouraged free speech and criticism, and held roundtables and public discussions on youth problems and ways to reform the work of the SSOJ. As a result, by the end of the 1980s, public opinion surveys reported an increase in young people’s participation in, and positive attitudes towards the SSOJ, but also a simultaneous decline of support and membership applications to the Party (ibid.: 51-52, 95-96). SSOJ members and leaders became critical towards the regime, aligned themselves with reformists and liberals, and even called for a new version of socialism, different from ‘the socialism of the fathers’ (162). However, as the Party itself failed to reform, it also did not capitalize on the renewed support of Yugoslav youth for its youth organization. The paternalism of communist parties towards youth has been a constant theme that escapes the European experience of socialism. Communist regimes that emerged from anti-colonial struggle created youth organizations in order to mobilize young people for war and nation-building efforts, and to instill revolutionary values in them. To name just a few cases, children and youth in Vietnam participated in campaigns to emulate revolutionary heroes, and read publications on the ‘Obedient Nephews and Nieces of Uncle Ho’ (Dror, 2018: 80-81, 120); their peers in China had to ‘learn from Lei Feng’ (xiang leifeng tongzhi xuexi 向雷锋同志学习) proper political behavior and emulate his unconditional devotion to the revolution (Tian, 2011); in Cuba young people were expected to follow the example of Che Guevara (Blum, 2011) and their counterparts in North Korea to worship Kim Il Sung and his successors (Cha and Anderson, 2011). Dutifulness, sacrifice, reverence for the revolution and its leaders – these were the central messages of the well-orchestrated campaigns implemented by hierarchical organizations for youth under socialism. Ultimately, however, transmitting revolutionary values and fostering support for communist regimes took the form of youth’s subordination to the symbolism, ideals, values and priorities of revolutionary generations. In turn, this defined the way youth leagues operated with, engaged and, eventually, alienated young people.

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Generational subordination and juniority When Hu Jintao instructed League cadres to strive to ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’ in 2003, he echoed the anxieties of many leaders from the socialist world before him, who realized that cultivating support for their regimes required meaningful engagement with young people, and a sincere commitment to responsiveness. Unlike them, however, he presided over a country with a very different social environment and economy, in which marketization, globalization and the ensuing social liberalization of the first two decades of reform, had diversif ied youth experiences, demands, expectations, aspirations and interests. Hu had at his disposal an organization that had in the past demonstrated little political and organizational aptitude for change. League organizations were subordinated to Party committees at all levels of administration for virtually every operational matter, including cadre appointments, budgets and work priorities. But the experience of Chinese MOs in the Reform era, demonstrates that organizational dependency on the CCP has not prevented cadres from developing ‘purposive incentives’ for societal action, i.e. the ‘intangible rewards that derive from the sense of satisfaction of having contributed to the attainment of a worthwhile cause’ (Wilson, 1973: 34). The cadres’ sense of social purpose emanates from their experience of social reality, and from the structural forms of subordination that affect their lives and those of the social groups they are supposed to give voice to. As discussed above, cadre agency is a key factor in translating these purposive incentives into action and institutionalizing them in the work of their organizations. This cadre-driven process takes the form of local projects, new discourses and types of training, as well as intervention in policy-making to offset some of the negative effects of marketization and resurrected patriarchy. Cadre agency also fueled discussions for a gradual distancing of unions and women’s federations from the regime as part of the emergence of a civil society or a variant of societal corporatism (see discussions by White et al, 1996; Unger and Chan, 1995; Ogden, 2000; Lu, 2009; Teets, 2014), but these expectations actually never materialized. What is observed, instead, is a modest and partial form of adaptation where organizational dependency coexists with purposive incentives for proconstituency action. This interplay explains both the successes and failures of MOs in addressing social issues. Women’s federations, for instance, have both a record of positive local and national initiatives on gender, and of monumental failures, such as supporting the family planning obsessions of China’s patriarchal regime (Angeloff and Lieber, 2012; Tsimonis, 2016).

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The cases of Chinese MOs reveal that dependency on the CCP cannot fully account for cadre agency. The financial de-prioritization of non-growthrelated policy areas, the de-politicization of private life, and the intensity and speed with which social issues have emerged after the reforms, are all factors that create stimulus and space for cadre initiative. In addition, the CCP recognized that if its own organizations do not engage with social problems, then some other entities will. For this reason, it prompted MOs and the League to increase responsiveness, notwithstanding its ambivalence and vagueness on how exactly to achieve that. However, this study finds that both when compared to other MOs and in the light of the ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’ mandate, the League has a consistently low capacity to engage youth and initiate pro-constituency action. The reason, I argue here, is that the League’s organizational identity is structured around an understanding of ‘youth’ as a social category and as a subject of policy that incapacitates cadre agency. Manipulating ‘youth’ The feminist critique of the idea of a naturally unified identity and social category of ‘women’ is a useful point of departure in this inquiry into the category/identity ‘youth’. Gender approaches have analyzed the construction of ‘women’ as a social category through power structures in the form of state institutions, the law and language (Butler, 1999: 1-3). Women as ‘subjects regulated by such structures are […] formed, defined and reproduced in accordance with the requirements of these structures’, and molded into a social category with ascribed characteristics that relate to supposedly legitimate and illegitimate demands and rights (ibid.: 2). In what essentially constitutes a process of domination, ‘women’ are simultaneously ‘produced and restrained’ (ibid.: 5) as political subjects. For instance, Barlow (1994, 2004) has demonstrated that despite the many positive laws the Chinese communists introduced from 1949 onwards on women’s liberation, state feminist organizations represented a state-defined (Engelsian) notion of femininity, the so-called ‘funü’, instead of Chinese women. As a result, the All-China Women’s Federation in the 1980s could not provide analytical explanations of the many challenges women were facing, nor prescribe meaningful forms of action against them. The ACWF’s processes, organizational practices and campaigns were calibrated in order to make ‘funü’ present in politics, rather than represent the social reality of women in political processes and give voice to their multifaceted struggle with patriarchy. The feminist criticism of the creation of the social category of ‘women’ as a process of domination is part of a broader scholarly inquiry into the

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ways by which ‘human beings are made subjects’ (Foucault, 1982: 777). For Foucault, a social category is produced through practices that divide the subject ‘inside himself or […] from others’, thus creating categories which objectivize it: ‘the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the good boys’ (ibid.: 778). Baker (2006: 163-165) building on Foucault’s notion of subjectification, urges scholars to explore how these dividing practices exist in political institutions meant to represent, resulting in the production of political subjects rather than in their representation. Following this train of thought, it is possible to move beyond an understanding of youth as an age-defined, descriptive social category, and start thinking about youth as a construct, as a subject that is produced through practices of exclusion and inclusion. Bourdieu (1993 [1978]: 95) notes that when youth is assumed as a unitary social category with common interests attributed to the biological age of its members, this constitutes an ‘obvious manipulation’, ‘an abuse of language’ intended to homogenize a group of people with otherwise very distinctive characteristics. ‘Youth’ covers important differences in class, gender, ethnicity etc., essentially subsuming ‘under the same term social universes that have practically nothing in common’ (ibid.). This manipulation of ‘youth’ precedes modernity. In antiquity, the anxiety of aging generations for the continuation of their social and political institutions after their own biological end, was expressed in mechanisms for civic education, religious or philosophical study and combat training, as well as in oral and written codes of proper and filial conduct for young people. But the emergence of the state in the 16th century as ‘both an individualizing and totalizing form of power’ (Foucault, 1982: 782) brought into play new mechanisms of manipulating ‘youth’ as a social category. The institutions that have traditionally developed around ‘youth’, from systems of education, to scouting, church and sports organizations to name a few, have consistently attempted to mold young people across the board as future loyal members of an existing collective, transmitting to them values, beliefs and attitudes as well as disciplined, hygienic and socially acceptable behaviors that are deemed essential for social reproduction and perpetuation (Côté, 2014: 82-92). This attention to young age that emerged with industrialization and the advent of the modern nation-state (Jones, 2009: 4) developed practices, institutions and spaces for the systematic construction of ‘youth’ as a political subject. Arbitrary age limits for citizenship, ascribed youth social attributes, codes of proper social, individual and sexual conduct, education systems, designated youth organizations and spaces of political participation, are all mechanisms for the ‘manipulation’ (akin to Foucauldian ‘dividing practices’) of ‘youth’ as a

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political subject that is loyal and, ultimately, generationally subordinated to a present or envisioned sociopolitical order. The literature on youth leagues in the socialist world, discussed in the preceding pages, reveals that the contradictions, frustrations and tensions that characterized youth-party relations were part of a broader generational struggle of young people against state and society. The ‘moral panics’ against youth subcultures, especially, exemplified generational domination and resistance, as authoritarian communist states that worried about the perpetuation of socialist morality appealed to the conservatism of older generations in a concerted attack against young people’s self-expression. This generational dimension of young people’s subordination to revolutionary expectations and to prevalent social aesthetics and norms rendered youth organizations the battlegrounds of a generational-political clash. As this chapter has shown, youth cadres often found themselves in disagreement with the conservatism of party leaders, had their proposals for a more responsive and engaging approach to young people repeatedly rejected, and saw their political careers ending in purges. An important element of this inquiry into the CYL, therefore, is the re-framing of youth leagues as organizations that capture the domination and resistance of ‘youth’ to a regime and to the revolutionary vision of older generations. As ‘generational subordination’ can be an abstract and elusive notion, this study introduces the concept of ‘juniority’ to analyze the political manipulation of Chinese ‘youth’ as a dominated subject and the impact of this process on the CYL’s attempt to increase responsiveness. Building on Bourdieu’s (1993 [1978]) understanding of youth as socially constructed and of age divisions as arbitrarily defined in a manner that reflects the ‘struggle between young and old’, juniority refers to the conditioning of youth as a ‘junior’ subject of the political process, def ined by its weak position in relation to older generations and according to the priorities, social values and predispositions of senior power holders in politics and society. Juniority, as a structural form of subordination, aims at subsuming the agency of ‘youth’ through ascribing proper behaviors and acceptable forms of participation in politics. As such, it is a discursive and habitual construct, stemming from a pervasive paternalistic rhetoric that normalizes young people’s subordination to existing power structures. Youth has been described as a loosely defined, ‘border category’ between childhood and adulthood, and so in the process of discursively constructing youth as a junior political subject one can invoke either childlike or adultlike characteristics to justify paternalistic or disciplinarian attitudes (Sukarieh and Tannock, 2015: 24, 25).

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Juniority is also the outcome of youth’s socialization and lived experience in institutional spaces and organizational processes that materialize the rhetoric of subordination. Thus, although youth has been correctly identified as an ‘unfixed and fluid’ social category (Cieslik and Simpson, 2013: 3), youth in these spaces and processes is reconstituted as a politically junior condition. ‘Youth as junior’ is created through, for instance, arbitrary age limits for full citizenship and political rights as well as for participation in parties and party youth organizations, through normative instruction on acceptable ideologies and beliefs (for instance, patriotism, a state religion, or an ideology), and through discourses appealing to young people’s sense of duty for the future continuation of a certain political community, defined as a nation, a republic or a revolution. It is also imperative to point out that the power structures that shape the experiences of youth in a modern society surpass the ‘political’ narrowly defined as a state or a regime, and also include patriarchy, sexism, racism, heteronormativity (Ferfolja, 2007; Ward & Schneider, 2009; Garcia, 2009; Pascoe, 2011), and neoliberalism (Giroux & Penna, 1979; Giroux, 2014; Sukarieh & Tannock, 2015). In addition, the ways in which youth is defined vis-à-vis the social ‘whole’ change across time and space (Jones, 2009: 4). Viewed through this lens, juniority may take various forms among different historical junctures as the result of interactions with other power structures and ensuing dividing practices. This is evident in how the construction of youth as a ‘junior’ subject of the political process creates and normalizes boundaries between supposedly legitimate youth issues (and groups) and those that are not, in a process that justifies social prejudice, welfare inattention and state inaction or suppression. Of course, every hegemonic project creates reaction and as such, juniority inadvertently contributes to setting the agenda of resistance to the relationship it attempts to impose, taking the form, for instance, of youth’s passivity and apathy, of a search for alternative routes and spaces of political expression and organization, or even of outright confrontation. These youth agency-driven processes of resistance often at some stage involve superficial conformity, making them less visible. Indeed, the literature on youth organizations in socialist regimes reviewed above, offers many examples of sudden eruptions of protest in between periods of social peace. The construction of youth as a political subject not only impacts young people but also creates complex and often unintended consequences for youth policy formulation and implementation. As Jones (ibid.) insightfully notes, ‘the constructions of ‘youth’ … say much about the builders as about their subjects’. Indeed, the process of juniorizing youth is reflected in the

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content of youth policy and modes of youth engagement, and it impacts the work and bureaucratic standing of those responsible for designing and implementing it. Under socialism, youth leagues struggled to implement a vision of youth that would fit the utopian communist society that their host parties believed they were building. As such, the work of cadres served the process of constructing youth as a political subject, not engaging with the lived experiences of young people. Accordingly, this book examines the construction of youth as a junior political condition through the League’s ‘youth work’ (qingnian gongzuo 青年工作), which in turn creates many limitations to the agency of its cadres and to the CYL’s capacity to increase responsiveness. This investigation will reveal how juniorizing ‘youth’ costs the League its appeal and its ability to engage young people. Juniority in the League Juniority defines the content of youth work in the League and, by extension, the characteristics of ‘youth’ that merit the state’s attention. This is evident in CYL official rhetoric and publications, which echo paternalistic attitudes towards young people, emphasizing their presumed duties to Party and nation. Youth was already linked to modernization and nationalism since the late Imperial and early Republican periods, when state and society became increasingly preoccupied with young people’s bodies and minds, developing institutions for education, health and physical development through sport (Dikotter, 1995; Brownell, 1995; Morris, 2004). Despite rapid social change in the PRC over the last 70 years, communist leaders from Mao to Xi have, without exception, shared the view of youth as the driving force of China’s revolutionary transformation (Liu, 2011: 6). Accordingly, CYL discourse highlights the role of the League as a ‘school of communism’ (gongchanzhuyide xuexiao 共产主义的学校), as a ‘reserve force’ (houbeijun 后备军) and ‘assistant’ (zhushou 助手) of the CCP, and as an organization whose members need to be morally instructed and politically groomed. Its publications also disseminate conservative views on acceptable social behavior, (patriarchal) obedience to the family and elders, instructions on ‘proper’ (heterosexual) love and family, and widely employ role models from China’s revolutionary but also more recent past. Further, the League refers to itself as the organization of ‘advanced youth’ (xianjin qingnian 先进青 年), a term that a priori justifies its inattention to groups of young people that do not fall into this category. The following chapters will examine the ways in which the League’s construction of ‘youth’ affects the content and impact of its engagement with young people.

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Apart from its discourse and self-perception, the most characteristic example of Chinese youth’s manipulation into a junior category is the League’s age range of membership, which is not based on any common social, psychological or other characteristics of the part of the population it covers. League members are from 14 to 28 years old, an odd grouping of teenagers, higher education students, and young professionals, under a junior political identity. This age range was modelled after the soviet Komsomol, but it also resonates with the traditional Chinese notion of youth (qingnian 青年 translated as ‘green years’) that begins in the early teens and extends to late twenties or, even, mid-thirties (Liu, 2011: 5). This range reveals an underlying understanding of youth as a group of politically junior individuals whose contribution to the revolution needs to be secured through continuous indoctrination, dutifulness and political preparation for CCP membership, which remains the ultimate expression of political maturity. League members do not need to reach the upper age limit set by the Party, as they can become CCP members in their early twenties, thus proving their political loyalty, readiness and reliability for the regime. Crucially, juniority has an important organizational dimension with direct implications for cadre agency. This book will demonstrate that the CYL is not in a position to follow the example of cadre-driven responsiveness that characterizes other MOs in China, because of the operationalization of juniority in organizational practices that affect cadre incentives, conduct and career expectations. Mass organizations have a low bureaucratic status in China’s hierarchical party-state system. However, individual cadres in unions and women’s federations have used their network of contacts, social and political capital, skills and bureaucratic experience to develop more responsive patterns of work. MO cadres can have considerable access to bureaucratic resources and influence, as well as relevant specialized knowledge, which enable cadre initiative to develop further. CYL cadres, on the other hand, occupy junior positions within all hierarchies on campus, workplaces, and local governments. This is the outcome of age restrictions that accompany all grades of CYL cadreship, from the grassroots to the CYL Central Committee, that serve the logic of the League as a training ground for future Party administrators. As Table 2.1 reveals, according to the 1982 regulations on age limits in the League, cadres have a very short time in their positions. For the more senior cadres in provinces or municipalities, reaching 35 or 40 years of age means they are getting ‘too old’ for youth affairs and are thus expected to move on to other work assignments. For cadres from the county level and below, the age limit is even lower.

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Table 2.1 Age limits for Communist Youth League cadres Administrative level and rank National level (团中央) League First Secretary Secretary of the secretariat Other members of the secretariat Central Committee Department Director and Vice Director Bureau Director and Vice Director Provincial League Committee (团省委） Committee Secretary Vice Secretary Municipal League Committee (团地委) Committee Secretary Vice Secretary County League Committee (团县委） Committee Secretary Vice Secretary Commune (Township and village) Committee 公社(乡、镇)团委 Committee Secretary and Vice Secretary Branches in government organs, work units, factories, mines, neighbourhoods (街道), enterprises and public institutions

Age limit No specific limit Up to 45 Half need to be between 35-38 years old Not more than 40 Not more than 35 Not more than 40 Not more than 38, with one or two Committee cadres under 35 Not more than 35 years old Not more than 32 years old Not more than 30 Not more than 28

Around 25 years old The age limits of corresponding administrative level apply

Source: CCPOD, 1982

This organizational practice renders a position in the League the equivalent of an entry-level post (especially for part-time and ordinary cadres), or the preparation for promotion to the Party and government (for full-time and leading cadres). Among the former, grassroots cadres, who are usually in their 20s, are not only junior to CCP committees but also occupy a low position in academic and workplace hierarchies respectively. Attaching League cadreship to early academic/career stages, means that cadres lack the experience and social capital within their place of study or work to support and effectively promote (or protect) pro-youth initiatives. Because of this deficiency, juniority bounds agency: it reduces the likelihood that CYL cadres can circumvent obstacles to press for changes in the long term, given that they can only ever negotiate internally for new youth initiatives from a position of institutional weakness. As for leading cadres, who occupy full-time positions as CYL committee members and are usually in their 30s, their career trajectory leads them to the party-state. Their successful

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advancement thus depends on carrying out work as delegated from senior departments and officials, and on building the necessary social capital with Party committees and influential individuals who can sponsor their future application for a position in the government, the public sector or an SOE. Due to age limits, there is no prospect for a career in youth affairs through the CYL, and the resultant fast turnaround of cadres reduces the incentive for developing youth specialization in the long run, and for initiating pro-youth activities and programs. In contrast to other MOs, both ordinary and leading CYL cadres know that their future careers will take them to non-youth related positions and, therefore, their time in the League is a trial period to prove their skills and potential as future cadres in the Chinese party-state. Essentially, juniority is a ‘self-enforcing institution’ (Weingast, 1998: 178), since it deprives cadres, the potential agents of change and renewal in youth work, of the incentive to instigate it. An important distinction to make here is between a cadre responding to an ad hoc social demand and institutionalizing pro-constituency attitudes in the CYL’s grassroots activities, personnel training and development, and policies. The above organizational practices do not preclude the possibility that cadres will attempt to respond to certain social conditions. However, juniority reduces the likelihood that cadres will have the political capital, skills and incentives necessary to sustain a pro-youth stance in the long run. Cases of individual cadres introducing new activities or alerting the government to certain social problems are not sufficient to generate longterm impact, even in the partial form observed in women’s federations, and secondarily, in trade unions. Sporadic initiatives have taken place; however, responsiveness requires a wider and more systematic socialization of cadres with pro-constituency norms. Exceptions to the negative impact of juniority within the League prove the rule of its overall debilitating effect. These, for instance, include initiatives by academics and researchers in CYL-sponsored youth research institutions who combine long-term commitment to youth affairs with professional knowledge, the two key ingredients for purposeful agency that League cadres lack. In the following pages, more examples of agency in the League will be identified, distinguishing between pro-constituency initiatives that flare up and disappear, and those (very few) that have assumed institutional form. The book will maintain that even in the period under examination, when a more favorable context for pro-youth social action was in place, juniority minimized the possibility that agency within the League would trigger changes with long-term repercussions.

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My investigation will consider the discourse and policies of the CCP but, more importantly, it will concentrate on the League’s organizational life, its engagement with young people, and their responses. Although juniority f inds different expressions in the various spaces where the League maintains organizational presence, there are common themes that cut across horizontal and vertical, spatial and institutional barriers. I will demonstrate, for instance, how the strikingly similar junior status of cadres in universities and public organizations is consistently replicated in the local government, and upwards to the Central CYL secretariat in Beijing, where interviewees reported that they lack the power to instigate autonomous youth policies. This is even more surprising in view of the existing literature on the League, which portrays it as a fast-track promotion channel, as a leadership incubator and an organization where powerful political allegiances are formed and solidif ied (Bo, 2004; Kou and Tsai, 2014; Doyon, 2019a). How can an organization be simultaneously a bastion of power and a showcase of powerlessness? The answer refers to the power structures that underlie the League’s different functions on ‘youth’. The CYL is a reliable ‘school of communism’ and training ground for future cadres, so as a Leninist institution aiming at the rejuvenation of an authoritarian political system it has proved its effectiveness. But the League’s assessment as an organization that ‘Keeps Youth Satisfied’ through the implementation of a social work mandate that involves capacity for representation and responsiveness, is completely different. In this regard, the CYL embodies the generational subordination of youth as reflected in its discourse, policies and internal organizational practices, which profoundly undermine its engagement with young people and its potential for social action. Few cases express the League’s contradictory identity and ambiguous relationship with young people more clearly than its engagement with university students. Often assumed to be synonymous with ‘youth’, the subgroup of students has been consistently valuable for the regime’s modernization efforts since the launch of Deng’s reforms, and for this reason the majority of CYL work and its most active organizations exist in higher education institutions. It is to this important subgroup of youth that the following chapter now turns.

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Lee, Lay Tang, and Regan, Francis. ‘Why Develop and Support Women’s Organizations in Providing Legal Aid in China? Women’s Rights, Women’s Organizations and Legal Aid in China’. Journal of Contemporary China Vol. 18, No. 61, September 2009, pp. 541-565. Lenin, Vladimir I. ‘The Trade Unions, the Present Situation and Trotsky’s Mistakes’. Collected Works of V.I. Lenin. Vol. 32. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965. Liu, Fengshu, Urban Youth in China: Modernity, the Internet and the Self. New York: Routledge, 2011. Lu, Yiyi. Non-Governmental Organizations in China: The Rise of Dependent Autonomy. China Policy Series. London; New York: Routledge, 2009. Mally, Lynn. ‘Performing the New Woman: The Komsomolka as Actress and Image in Soviet Youth Theater’. Journal of Social History Vol. 30, No. 1, 1 September 1996, pp. 79-95. https://doi.org/10.1353/jsh/30.1.79. McDougall, Alan. Youth Politics in East Germany: The Free German Youth Movement, 1946-1968. Oxford Historical Monographs. Oxford: Clarendon, 2004. Molyneux, Maxine. ‘The ‘Women Question’ in the Age of Perestroika’. Agenda, Vol. 7, No. 10, 1991, pp. 89-108. https://doi.org/10.2307/4065459. Morris, Andrew D. Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China. Berkeley, Calif.; London: University of California Press, 2004. Neumann, Matthias. ‘Revolutionizing Mind and Soul? Soviet Youth and Cultural Campaigns during the New Economic Policy (1921-8)’. Social History Vol. 33, No. 3, August 2008, pp. 243-267. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071020802268330. —. The Communist Youth League and the Transformation of the Soviet Union, 19171932. 1st Ed. BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies. Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2011. Ogden, Suzanne. ‘China’s Developing Civil Society: Interest Groups, Trade Unions and Associational Pluralism’, in Malcolm Warner (Ed.) Changing Workplace Relations in the Chinese Economy, Studies on the Chinese Economy. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2000, pp. 263-297. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333978030_14. Pascoe, C. J. ‘Resource and Risk: Youth Sexuality and New Media Use’. Sexuality Research and Social Policy Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2011, pp. 5-17. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s13178-011-0042-5. Pospíšil, Filip. ‘Youth Cultures and the Disciplining of Czechoslovak Youth in the 1960s’. Social History Vol. 37, No. 4, November 2012, pp. 477-500. https://doi.org /10.1080/03071022.2012.729336. Pringle, Tim. Trade Unions in China: The Challenge of Labour Unrest. Routledge Contemporary China Series 65. Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2011. Sadowska, Joanna. ‘The Socialist Youth Union (1957-1976) – Polish Counterpart of Komsomol’. Respectus Philologicus, Vol. 30, No. 35, 25 October 2016. https://doi. org/10.15388/RESPECTUS.2016.30.35.15.

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Saich, Tony. ‘Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China’. China Quarterly, Vol. 161, March 2000, pp. 124-141. Saunders, Anna. Honecker’s Children: Youth and Patriotism in East(ern) Germany, 1979-2002. Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 2007. Schwartz, Morton. ‘Czechoslovakia’s New Political Model: A Design for Renewal’. The Journal of Politics Vol. 30, No. 4, November 1968, pp. 966-984. https://doi. org/10.2307/2128684. Shang, Xiaoyuan. ‘Women and the Public Sphere: Education, NGO Affiliation and Political Participation’, in Jackie West, Minghua Zhao, Xiangqun Chang, and Yuan Cheng, Women of China: Economic and Social Transformation. New York: Macmillan, 1999. Šiklová, Jiřina. ‘Sociology of Youth in Czechoslovakia: A Report from 1968’. Zeitschrift Für Soziologie Vol. 11, No. 2, 1 January 1982. https://doi.org/10.1515/zfsoz-1982-0204. Solnick, Steven Lee. Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions, Russian Research Center Studies 89. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998. Spaskovska, Ljubica. The Last Yugoslav Generation: The Rethinking of Youth Politics and Cultures in Late Socialism. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017. Stalin, Josev V. On the Opposition. Beijing: Beijing Foreign Language Press, 1974. Sukarieh, Mayssoun, and Stuart Tannock. Youth Rising? The Politics of Youth in the Global Economy. Critical Youth Studies. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015. Swain, Amanda Jeanne. ‘From the Big Screen to the Streets of Kaunas’, Cahiers du Monde Russe, Vol. 54, No. 3-4. 2013. http://journals.openedition.org/monderusse/7960. 10.4000/monderusse.7960. Swider, Sarah C. Building China: Informal Work and the New Precariat. Ithaca; London: ILR Press, Cornell University Press, 2015. Teets, Jessica C. Civil Society under Authoritarianism: The China Model. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Tian, Xiaofei. ‘The Making of a Hero: Lei Feng and Some Issues of Historiography’, in William C Kirby, The People’s Republic of China at 60: An International Assessment. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011, pp. 283-295. Toomistu, Terje. ‘The Imaginary Elsewhere of the Hippies in Soviet Estonia’. in Juliane Fürst and Josie McLellan (Eds.), Dropping out of Socialism: The Creation of Alternative Spheres in the Soviet Bloc. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2017, pp. 179-206. Exington Books, 2017. 179-206. Tsimonis, Konstantinos, ‘‘Purpose’ and the Adaptation of Authoritarian Institutions: The Case of China’s State Feminist Organization’. Journal of Chinese Political Science Vol. 21, No. 1, March 2016, pp. 57-74. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-015-9375-x.

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Tsipursky, Gleb. ‘‘Active and Conscious Builders of Communism’: State-Sponsored Tourism for Soviet Adolescents in the Early Cold War, 1945-53’. Journal of Social History Vol. 48, No. 1, 2014, pp. 20-46. —. ‘Coercion and Consumption: The Khrushchev Leadership’s Ruling Style in the Campaign Against ‘Westernized Youth’’, in William Jay Risch (Ed.), Youth and Rock in the Soviet Bloc, Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2015a, pp. 55-80. —. ‘Worker Youth and Everyday Violence in the Post-Stalin Soviet Union’. European History Quarterly Vol.45, No. 2, April 2015b, pp. 236-254. https://doi. org/10.1177/0265691414568282. Unger, Aryeh L., The Totalitarian Party: Party and People in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974. Unger, Jonathan, and Anita Chan. ‘China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model’. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs Vol. 33, January 1995, pp. 29-53. https:// doi.org/10.2307/2950087. Waller, Michael and Fennema, Meindert. Communist Parties in Western Europe: Decline or Adaptation. NY: Basil Blackwell, 1988. Wang, Haiyan; Appelbaum, Richard P; Degiuli, Francesca; Lichtenstein, Nelson. ‘China’s New Labour Contract Law: is China Moving Towards Increased Power for Workers?’, Third World Quarterly. Vol. 30, No. 3, 2009, pp. 485-501. 10.1080/01436590902742271. Wang, Liping, Pickowicz Paul. ‘Village Voices, Urban Activists: Women, Violence, and Gender Inequality in Rural China’, in Link P, Madsen R, Pickowicz (Eds.), Popular China: Unofficial Culture in a Globalizing Society. Rowman & Littlefield Publisher Inc. 2002, pp. 57-87. Wang, Qi. Renegotiating Gender and Power: Women’s Organizations and Networks in Politics – The China Women Mayors’ Association. Working Paper 2 CESEAS, Lund University, 2004. Ward, Jane, and Beth Schneider. ‘The Reaches of Heteronormativity: An Introduction’. Gender & Society Vol. 23, No. 4, August 2009, pp. 433-439. https://doi. org/10.1177/0891243209340903. Weingast, Barry R. ‘Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives’, in Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingermann (Eds.) A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998, pp. 167-190. Weston, Timothy. ‘The Iron Man Weeps: Joblessness and Political Legitimacy in the Chinese Rust Belt’, in Peter Gries and Stanley Rosen (Eds.), State and Society in 21st Century China. NY: Routledge, 2004. White, Gordon, Jude Howell, and Xiaoyuan Shang. In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China. IDS Development Studies Series. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1996. Wilson, James Q. Political Organizations. NY: Basic Books, 1973.

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Young Spartacist. ‘Youth-Party Relations in the Communist Youth International’, No. 21, January-February 1974. Zhang, Naihua. ‘Searcing for Authentic NGOs: The NGO Discourse and Women’s Organizations in China’, in Ping-Chun Hsiung, Maria Jaschok, and Cecilia Nathansen Milwertz (Eds.), Chinese Women Organizing: Cadres, Feminists, Muslims, Queers. Oxford; New York: Berg, 2001. Zhu, Xiaoyang, and Anita Chan. ‘Staff and Workers’ Representative Congress: An Institutionalized Channel for Expression of Employees’ Interests?’ Chinese Sociology & Anthropology Vol. 37, No. 4, August 2005, pp. 6-33. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/21620555.2005.11038349.

3

The League on Campus Abstract This chapter discusses the findings of fieldwork in five different universities in Beijing and Zhejiang, examining the impact of juniority on the League’s operation, activities and relations with students and student societies. Overall, the involvement of League cadres in student affairs was from a junior, subordinate position, and failed to appeal to students. Surveys revealed that despite the ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’ mandate, students remained skeptical of the League’s responsiveness and inclusivity, they demanded more attention to their problems and were cynical about the CYL’s claim to represent them. This chapter also shows that while often regarded as evidence of loyalty to the regime, the impressive numbers of League members on campus hide a reality of increasing disassociation with the CYL’s organizational life. Keywords: university students, student societies, juniority, surveys, CYL

The special relationship between students and the Chinese state is a welldocumented topic and scholars have identified recurring themes that cut across the revolutionary transitions from empire to republic, to Maoist and then reformist state (Wasserstrom, 1991; Lanza, 2010; Cheek 2016; Li and Fang, 2019). These themes include the students’ rapid shifts between iconoclasm and loyalty; the state’s reliance on students and young intellectuals for modernization but also its deep mistrust of their criticism; and, of course, cycles of contentious politics when the expectations of either side are not met. Indeed, the defiant stance of student leader Wu’er Kaixi when he met Premier Li Peng on national television before the Tiananmen massacre, personifies many of the ideals Chen Duxiu urged Chinese youth to possess in his 1915 ‘Call to Youth’: Be independent, not servile Be progressive, not conservative Be aggressive, not retiring

Tsimonis, Konstantinos D., The Chinese Communist Youth League: Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2021 doi: 10.5117/9789462989863_ch03

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Be cosmopolitan, not isolationist Be utilitarian, not formalistic Be scientific, not imaginative

Many times since the late Qing Dynasty, young intellectuals and students have established secret societies and political groups; printed iconoclastic publications and propagandized the necessity of breaking with the past; organized rallies and clashed with authorities. Both the Nationalists and the Communists have sought to trace their ideological and political origins to the May 4 movement, but at the same time as ruling entities have attempted to diffuse the students’ revolutionary spirit into their own state-building efforts, often in violent ways (Lanza, 2010: 204). Throughout modern Chinese history, students have acted both as a lynchpin of Chinese society calling for progress and efficient governance, and as a social group that axiomatically seeks to integrate itself into the establishment in a more favourable manner. May 4, May 30, December 9, the Cultural Revolution, and the Tiananmen protests are all instances in which students challenged state authority, and that accordingly, have been selectively valorized or demonized by the ruling entities occupying fragments of time and space in post-imperial China. These movements, and their prominent position in modern Chinese history, are the most notable examples of the uneasy relationship between students and the Chinese state. Since 1949, the CCP has entrusted the Communist Youth League with the task of managing the complex relationship between political authority and students by providing the main formal channel for their participation in politics. The League has traditionally cultivated the students’ loyalty to the regime and prepared them for Party membership as ‘reds’; has tempered and mobilized them as a ‘mass’; and has channeled their abilities to the state’s developmental strategies as ‘experts’ (Israel, 1967; Leader, 1974; Montaperto, 1977; Healy, 1982). Since Deng’s reforms, maintaining the support of this politically important constituency of young people has been a continuous challenge for the regime. Students are an integral part of economic reforms as the architects, engineers, economists, doctors, researchers, businessmen, officials of the future. Perhaps more importantly, they are the social group from which the new middle class and socioeconomic elite will emerge. Therefore, it is no surprise that the regime’s relations with university students have attracted considerable scholarly attention. Existing research has focused on the nationalistic propaganda, material incentives, and control mechanisms that the Party uses to inculcate attitudes favorable to its rule (Liu, 1996; Rosen, 2004;

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Yan, 2014). This body of scholarly work agrees that some combination of increased career opportunities for graduates and authoritarian practices (indoctrination, control, fear of coercion) have tamed, for the time being, this historically important force in Chinese politics, either by convincing students of the necessity of the current political arrangements or by leading them to political apathy. This is a causal explanation that also reads as a self-evident proposition. Either way, its negation has been silently postponed until the next round of student protests. In this regard, the umbrella and anti-extradition movements in Hong Kong, despite their local characteristics, are a reminder that students’ passivity towards state authority should not be taken for granted. Although it is not possible to predict exactly what will drive students to the streets and when, both Chinese history and the experience of authoritarian regimes elsewhere render it highly unlikely that students will be absent from future contentious politics in the People’s Republic. Overall, students are the main beneficiaries of reform, but they are also the group with the highest expectations and are therefore easily disillusioned. University students expect to receive a good education, to have opportunities for recreation and leisure, and upon graduation, to achieve relatively high standards of living and consumption. Pressure to succeed from family and society is intensive and still echoes previous generations’ understanding of a trade between social expectations and state promises, when a university degree would secure prosperity and social status. These aspirations are maladjusted to a reality of intense competition for the most desired jobs, and a growing graduate unemployment rate that has exploded during the 2000s due to urbanization and the expansion of higher education (Liu, 2006; An, 2006: 1007; Bai, 2006, Fish, 2015). Therefore, the loyalty of students to the regime depends more than ever on the latter’s effective response to the life aspirations created through the reforms. In this context, in order for the League to maintain its relevance to students, it needs to engage with a whole range of social issues it cannot control directly, and deliver the promise of representing the interests of this diversified and sophisticated constituency. Since the reforms, membership and participation in the League have a smaller impact on one’s career, so co-optation in the traditional way of exchanging loyalty for a secure livelihood is not effective. In this context, the upward flow of the ‘transmission belt’, providing channels for participation and representation and offering social assistance, has become more important than ever. In this chapter, I seek to understand how the call for a more responsive League was implemented vis-à-vis its key ‘constituency’ of university

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students. Was the ‘Keep Youth Satisf ied’ mandate translated into new forms of engagement with students and reflected in League activities, participatory processes, routine work and relations with student societies? In order to answer these questions, I explored the League’s routine operation and role in university life as well as League-student interactions, combining the perspectives of both sides. The qualitative data for this chapter were collected from f ive institutions of higher learning: an elite comprehensive university (CU1) and two specialized universities (SU1 and SU2) in Beijing, and a vocational college (ZJ1) and a technical university (ZJ2) in Zhejiang province. By including both urban-based (‘elite’) universities in Beijing and the more isolated and vocational education-focused higher-education institutions in Zhejiang, I intended to contrast the League’s operation in different settings, and the corresponding attitudes of students towards its activities and organizational life. Fieldwork included semi-structured, in-depth interviews with CYL cadres, 1 personal observation during visits to the campuses, and the collection of organizational documentation on activities and work reports. The chapter also discusses the f indings of surveys conducted in the institutions CU1, SU2 and ZJ1.2 My analysis begins with an examination of League membership, cadreship, and activities on campus. It then continues with a discussion of the survey data on student’s views of the League.

1 The interviewees were primarily cadres in university League committees, but the chapter also includes information provided by cadres in local and national-level CYL administrations. The author’s academic and personal contacts facilitated communication with the interviewees, creating a snowball effect. 2 The surveys were conducted between May and June 2010 in Beijing and Zhejiang, with a total of 1,705 self-administered questionnaires (CU1: 662; SU2: 495; ZJ1: 548) completed (out of 1,745 distributed). The survey questions were prepared by the author. In order to identify and correct possible issues with the language, presentation, and structure of the questionnaire, a pilot study was carried out in April 2010 in Beijing among 12 students. A Chinese academic commented on and proofread the questionnaire. Due to the practice of offering automatic League membership and access to its activities to all students, the survey focused on participation in events and attitudes toward the CYL’s presence on campus to determine the degree of student engagement. The author sought permission to carry out the surveys following interviews with League cadres in the three universities. With the exception of Zhejiang City 1, where a local CYL committee cadre asked to read the survey questionnaire, there was no other involvement of authorities nor any attempts at censorship. The surveys took place in student dormitories and classrooms after the end of lectures and during self-study hours. A team of students in each university assisted the author in distributing and collecting the questionnaires.

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Joining the League What is the meaning of being a League member? Official rhetoric echoes traditional paternalistic attitudes toward young people, emphasizing their presumed ‘duties’ to Party and nation. The CYL’s discourse emphasizes its role as a ‘school of communism,’ as a ‘reserve force of the Party,’ and as an organization whose members need to be morally instructed and politically groomed (Fu and Yang, 2001; Yang, 2009). League members are ‘advanced’ yet ‘junior’ individuals who are expected to obtain CCP membership, which represents political maturity. The notion of League membership as a junior political condition informs virtually all aspects of the League’s organizational life, that as I will argue, hinders its ability to develop effective, pro-constituency work on campus and beyond. Socialization with the idea of ‘youth’ as signifying a ‘junior’ political status already begins with the application to join the League. Standard entrance into the CYL starts at the age of 14 and involves the following criteria: 1) achievement in school, 2) correct thinking (expressed mainly through the application essay), and 3) proper behavior toward teachers and fellow students. Initially only a small number of students enters the League, with the number progressively increasing in subsequent years (Interview 29). By the senior third grade, the large majority of students in cities have become members, unless a person is not willing to join or, as a former secondary school teacher and League cadre explained, is ‘really backward’ (tai luohou 太落后) (Interview 29). In the countryside, League membership is more exclusive (Interviews 15 and 16), an indication of the CCP’s preference for urbanites. The very formalistic application process (Yang, 2009: 273) is also indicative of the notion of juniority embedded in the League’s discourse: a ‘school,’ an ‘aide,’ an organization of individuals that need to raise their political consciousness, abilities, and skills. For example, an application essay reads in part: I am an ordinary young person and like every other youth, I have ideals and aspirations, yearning for a better future, but I need to have a guiding light, and the League is a navigation mark on the road ahead, so I eagerly request to join the Communist Youth League. The Chinese Communist Youth League is the mass organization of advanced youth, the school of communism, the CCP’s powerful aide. The League was personally built and nurtured by the great leader Chairman Mao […] [League members] should train themselves to raise their socialist consciousness; become

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educated workers; love the motherland; be true to the people; be knowledgeable, disciplined, and robust; be hardworking, courageous, vibrant. I am determined to challenge myself in all aspects, work practically and hard, actively sought to better myself, to become worthy of the name of Communist Youth League member.3

As highly formalistic processes are often easily ridiculed in practice, students often copy-paste model application essays available in online platforms. An applicant is formally accepted after a background evaluation and the completion of a probation period that can last from six months to one year, during which the applicant is monitored through attendance in CYL sessions, seminars, school events, and volunteer activities (Interviews 7, 17, 25, 29). Joining the League does not affect one’s life in high school nor does it provide any material or other benefits. Interviewees reported that ‘outstanding’ (youxiu 优秀) members can get free or easier access to university departments with Party-oriented subjects, such as Marxism, but the already low demand for these subjects renders this motive of little importance (Interviews 7, 16 and 22). In the period under examination, non-membership was not considered a stigma nor was it accompanied by sanctions. When asked to reflect on their decision to join the League, the interviewees often noted that at this age one perceives the passage from being a Young Pioneer (the CCP’s organization for children) to the League as an honor (rongyu 荣誉). (Interviews 7, 17, 25, 29) Joining the League is ‘something you do at school,’ an indication that you have grown up, a part of school life that is not different to other rites of passage on one’s road to adulthood. It also serves as an introduction to how political authority is structured and exercised in China. Essentially, the League is part of a hierarchy that places the student as junior to the teacher both academically and politically. Teachers are in charge of the CYL and student associations and decide on all important matters related to members and cadres (Hansen, 2015: 95-97). Student cadres are expected to act as a ‘bridge’ between students and school authorities, be role models, and also make upwards reports on students’ conduct and problems. They are selected by teachers not only based on their academic performance but also on their popularity, so that they can influence 3 A list of model application essays can be found at popular online platforms such as Wenwen and Baike. The one cited here was derived from http://wenwen.soso.com/z/q61614403.htm (first accessed 30 October 2011). It is worth noting that a simple Google search reveals that variations of this essay can be found on multiple websites, available for applicants to copy-paste and submit.

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other students’ attitudes towards school authorities (ibid.: 104). Overall, school and League activities can hardly be separated from one another, as teachers are responsible for both (Interviews 7, 17, 25, 29). The merging of multiple types of authority (political, generational, academic) creates a hierarchical environment in which students are expected to behave in a respectful manner, learn to be loyal to the Party, and accept its ‘monopoly on truth’ (Hansen, 2015: 182). In university, the most straightforward co-optation function of the CYL is the automatic membership offered to first-year students following the completion of a short period of military training ( junxun 军训). Military training was selectively introduced in 1985 but expanded after the Tiananmen crackdown as an attempt to instill patriotism (ai guojia 爱国家) and ‘love for the Party’ (ai dang 爱党) in the new generation of students (Rosen, 1993: 317-319; Genevaz, 2019: 458). This training has since been compulsory for all freshmen, League members and non-members alike, and includes basic military drills, marching, and political and military theory lectures, over a period that varied among schools, ranging from one to four weeks.4 Both automatic membership and the military training aim at co-opting the largest number of students possible by indoctrinating them as junior participants in the formal political process, and by opening the road to Party membership. League membership for university students is not accompanied by any particular benefits, and its importance for later employment in the wider public sector is relevant only to the degree that it can be a step toward joining the Communist Party. The interviewees, when asked about the motives for someone to join the League, pointed to career (qiantu 前途, shengya 生涯) and conformity concerns (‘it is a tradition’ shi yige chuantong 是一个传统; ‘there is no practical meaning’ meiyou shijide yiyi 没有实际的意义), while a minority also mentioned patriotism and serving society as reasons. The survey results (Figure 3.1) support the findings of the interviews, demonstrating pragmatic and conformist attitudes (responses 1 and 2) as significantly more common than idealistic reasons (3 and 4). Interestingly, joining for the ‘prestige’ (response 5) associated with League membership, a main motive for high school students, ranks relatively low. In the past, non-membership would be considered a politically deviant choice, minimizing chances for joining the Party and for advancing one’s career, but in the period under 4 During interviews, I noticed that some students did not include the theoretical component (military and Party theory) into the overall time length of junxun. However, there was also variation in its length among different schools.

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Figure 3.1 Main motive for young people joining the Youth League (%) CU1

SU2

ZJ1

Because it is a good foundation for one’s future career

Imitating others

To struggle better for the cause of socialism To have more opportunities to contribute to the betterment of country and society The prestige and honor of being a league member

Missing 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

35

40

Figure 3.2  Is joining the party important to you? (%) CU1

SU2

It is not important because I believe in another ideology or religion

It is, because I believe in communism

It is, because it will benefit my future prospects

Joining or not doesn’t matter, it is just a formality

Missing 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

examination those who do not wish to be involved in formal politics could abstain without any repercussions. Interestingly, upon comparing the students’ motives for joining the CYL to those for Party membership (Figure 3.2),5 it emerges that in both cases only a minority demonstrated ideological reasons whereas the majority of students were either apathetic or had a utilitarian attitude. 5 This question was not included in the Zhejiang survey as I was concerned that a Party-related question could jeopardize access to campus.

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Overall, becoming a League member in reformist China is a formalistic process that reproduces the notion of ‘youth’ as a politically junior identity. It is more accurate to say that Chinese university students decided whether to decline League membership rather than whether to join, and most chose the latter out of conformity-related and utilitarian considerations. In fact, all student cadres interviewed reported that participation in League ceremonies and activities in university was not compulsory, and apart from paying the League fee, membership can be rather nominal.

Grassroots League committees and cadres The League’s organization on campus closely resembles that of a Party committee and follows the academic structure, from class (banji 班级) and grade (nianji 年级) to the university level (CU1 CYL, 2009a; ZJ1 UCYL, n.d.).6 The League committee is organized in different offices/departments, which despite slight variations in their titles between colleges, perform the following major tasks: 1) the Organization Department (zuzhibu 组织部) is in charge of personnel files and issues, i.e., recommending and selecting cadres and leaders and monitoring the Party application process, 2) the Propaganda Department (xuanchuanbu 宣传部) is in charge of the League’s newspaper, online and paper publications, posters, and announcements, 3) the Societies Department (shetuanbu 社团部) administers and monitors student societies, 4) the Volunteers’ Department (zhiyuanzhebu 志愿者部) is essentially in charge of student mobilization, and finally 5) the Activities Department (huodongbu 活动部) or (wenhuatiyubu 文化体育部), which organizes and implements the League committee’s own student-oriented activities. CU1 in Beijing also had a General Department (zonghebu 综合 部) to coordinate League work across the school, and an office for young researchers and graduate students (CU1 CYL, 2009a). The SU1 committee also included a Public Relations Department (wailianbu 外联部) to attract donations for League activities. Large institutions have League subcommittees ( fentuanwei 分团委) at the faculty level, replicating the internal division of labor of committees. 6 The first document is a non-classified text provided by an interviewee in November 2009. Since then it has been published online, but a URL is not included here to avoid compromising the anonymity of the university visited. The second document is also a non-classif ied text provided by an interviewee in May 2010.

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The ‘Laoshi’ At the top of this organizational structure are the League secretary and vice secretaries, also referred to as ‘teachers’ (laoshi 老师). The term laoshi is used by students as an honorific form of addressing academic and administrative personnel, while in the League, it refers to teaching staff (and occasionally administrators) who occupy the leading positions of CYL committees (tuanwei 团委). As with League organizations in workplaces and local governments, the League committee secretary and vice-secretaries are appointed by the Party committee, to which they also report (Interviews 2, 4, 16, 18). The number of full-time League personnel varied greatly among different universities; for example, in CU1 in Beijing there were six full-time cadres, while in ZJ2 there was none. On average, I found one or two full-time cadres – usually the university secretary and vice secretary – per campus. Internally, the central position of the laoshi was explained by their role in administering the CCP membership preparatory process on campus – the League’s core political function. Their double authority as university staff and members of the CCP committee, in conjunction with a lack of objective criteria that characterizes the regulations for cadre evaluation, work assignment and awards,7 created fertile conditions for favoritism. Indeed, interviewees often mentioned the impression (yinxiang 印象) a student made on the laoshi as a more important element in awards distribution and work allocations than measurable criteria like grade point average (GPA).8 The laoshi, a traditionally respected and unified body of authority in the eyes of students (Liu, 2006: 155), could pursue their own personal career goals and agendas in a way that even obstructed the routine function of the League. Perhaps the most illustrative example of this is their ability to manipulate the organization for careerist motives and engage in turf wars. In SU1, after the position of the university League secretary became vacant, two teachers with previously unresolved personal differences and common career targets competed bitterly behind the scenes for the job, as a CYL secretary position is an opportunity to exhibit leadership skills and be considered for future promotion in the Party administration. The Solomonic solution of the university CCP committee was to appoint one teacher as the 7 A document that was made available to me by an SU2 League cadre, explained the requirements for League awards. From a total of twelve different criteria referring to three different awards only one, academic performance, was objectively measured (SU2 CYL). 8 In two instances, award holders explained that the student’s family connections, or sharing a birthplace with a teacher, can be important factors (Interviews 25, 28). Hansen (2015: 101-102) also notes that ‘good connections’ are an important factor in the distribution of cadre posts.

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Table 3.1 Requirements for League awards Requirements for ‘Outstanding League Member’ title (1) Conscientiously study Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and “Three Represents”, having strong socialist beliefs, a firm and clear-cut stand on major issues. (2) Perform duties conscientiously, actively participate in group activities and exhibit outstanding performance in ideological education, quality development, academic and technological innovation, social practice, cultural and other activities on campus. (3) Have a proper learning attitude, clear target, be hardworking, with good performance, be in the top 50% of league members in a class in terms of academic score and moral education achievement. (4) Have good moral character, and actively participate in youth volunteer and other public welfare activities. Strictly abide by state laws and school rules, exhibit solidarity to comrades, care about and love the collective interest. Promote righteousness, courage and self-criticism, daring to fight against negative phenomena. Requirements for ‘Outstanding cadre’ title In addition to the criteria for ‘outstanding members’, ‘outstanding cadres’ must also meet the following requirements: (1) Love the work of the League, cherish one’s working post in the League, have high standards and strict requirements for oneself, and high quality working style. (2) Work in a serious and responsible manner, demonstrate initiative, serve the youth with enthusiasm, have a strong spirit of dedication and courage to sacrifice, be able to work the right way, demonstrate outstanding achievements. (3) Have an upright style, self-discipline, be concerned for comrades, set an example in study, work, life and every other aspect, enjoy a relatively high trust by the public. Requirements for ‘Top Ten member’ title In addition to the criteria for ‘outstanding members’, ‘top ten members’ must also meet the following requirements: (1) Politically active and progressive, with a strong sense of professionalism and social responsibility, honest thinking style, high moral character. (2) Have an excellent academic record, be recipient of first grade scholarship, be among the top three students in one’s year after a comprehensive evaluation of the total academic score. Regarding the graduate students they must have demonstrated outstanding achievements in scientific research. (3) Love the League, participate enthusiastically in every kind of League work, and have outstanding achievements. (4) Be a model and an example for other students, enjoy a high level of trust by the students. (5) During one’s studies, hold consecutively the title of ‘outstanding member’ or ‘outstanding cadre’. Source: SU2 CYL, n.d.

secretary and the other as the vice secretary, however, as they were both appointed by and only answered to the university Party committee, they started acting as leaders of two separate League organizations. Due to their unwillingness to cooperate, a classic turf war started that divided the League,

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the student union, student societies and, occasionally, students into two different camps. The secretary and the vice-secretary boycotted each other’s activities and used favors to gain students’ support, such as simplifying the establishment of societies, approving activities, and promising better grades. Eventually, after two years of infighting, they were both promoted to different posts in the university Party administration (Interviews 18 and 19). The central position of the laoshi also results in increased arbitrariness in CYL procedures. An SU2 cadre complained that due to lack of connections to the university League committee, the applications for activities from his department were either rejected for no clear reason, or were processed with so much delay that deadlines were often missed. To circumvent this problem, he submitted joint applications with departmental League organizations that maintained better relations with the university CYL secretary. Identical applications submitted in two different ways had opposite outcomes, as the joint proposal was eventually accepted within a reasonable period of time (Interview 28). To sum up, CYL leaders were Party committee members in charge of student affairs and acted as CCP cadres rather than youth organizers. They combined political and academic authority on campus and therefore controlled decision-making within the organization. Their tenure was short (approximately three or four years) and served as a stepping-stone for higher posts in the Party and university administration. These leading cadres should be distinguished from ordinary cadres who are routinely recruited among students. Student cadres There were no consistently applied rules and procedures for student cadre recruitment across the different institutions visited. These ranged from closed processes in which students were approached by a laoshi and then were assigned cadre roles, to open calls for interviews and elections among preselected candidates. In all campuses visited, interviewees explained that a student wishing to become a cadre had to be ‘noticed’ by the teacher in charge, and go through a process that involved an interview and a trial period of approximately one year. Student cadres occupy lower positions in the different levels of the League’s structure within the university (up to faculty vice secretary), staffing its various offices and acting as assistants of the committee secretary (Interviews 7, 8, 10,11). Why would a student choose to become a League cadre, especially when the heavy coursework and study load in a Chinese academic institution

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are taken into consideration? Interviewees cited three sets of potential benefits for student cadres, namely: Party membership; the prospect of career advancement; and opportunities for a social life. Concerning the first, one of the main functions of the League is acting as a ‘school for communism,’ translated as preparing its members and cadres for Party membership and acting as a training ground for future Party administrators (Doyon, 2019b). Since Deng’s reforms, the Party has been actively seeking to recruit ‘advanced youth’ and groom talented future CCP cadres, so it encourages students to go through the application process (Interviews 16 and 24). Experience as a student cadre was reported as being an advantage for one’s Party entrance (rudang 入党) review (Interviews 10, 11, 16, 25). Secondly, although serving as a League cadre is just one among various gateways into the party-state, students still consider it potentially helpful in building a political-bureaucratic career. League cadreship experience can add some weight to job applications to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and to the wider public sector, valued as equal to an internship (Interviews 8 and 9). In addition, for the few cadres with proper qualifications and social capital, experience at a grassroots university committee may open opportunities to work full time for the League in local government. Particularly for those pursuing a career in the party-state, various studies have revealed that the CYL can offer a fast-track (at least by Chinese standards) path to promotion, and a gateway to government jobs (Kou and Tsai, 2014; Doyon, 2019b). The League also serves as a space where leadership networks and individual loyalties are formed (Bo, 2004). Chien-wen Kou (2007) has shown that the League road to career advancement was increasingly effective under Hu Jintao, as evidenced by the large numbers of CYL cadres promoted to Party secretary and vice secretary positions in provincial and sub-provincial governments. A study on the benefits of participation in Beijing-backed youth organizations in Macau reached similar conclusions (Tam, 2008). Although it has been argued that ‘going the way up’ through the Party road is losing importance in comparison to the more materially rewarding opportunities in the private sector (Rosen, 2004), the attractiveness of a job through the League-Party path should not be underestimated, especially under conditions of intense competition in the job market. Finally, interviewees explained that a third and more immediate reason for a student to join the League’s team of cadres is social life. The caricature of a cadre in a gray office rubber-stamping documents was not very far from reality, as the majority of League cadres described their work as consisting mainly of administrative duties. Indeed, in all campuses surveyed, the League was considered a more formal and less exciting organization to

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get involved with in comparison to the student union and student societies – another indication of the League’s wider challenge of remaining relevant by updating the content of its work. However, student cadres had opportunities to socialize with colleagues and, occasionally, dabble in creative and entertaining activities. The teamwork involved, even in political tasks, offered pleasant breaks from the solitude of long study hours in the library and was a motive for participation. To conclude, student cadres were chosen mainly through the subjective criteria applied by League secretaries, to be their assistants and administrators. The institutional and normative context in which they operated allowed little space for initiative, and this, as I will examine next, affected the content of League activities on campus, which had little input from students.

League activities on campus The confined geography of the Chinese university, with its closed-in and orderly campus life, creates favorable conditions for the League’s engagement with its members. Nonetheless, the CYL’s student constituency is more diverse than ever in terms of competing interests and pastimes. Chinese students are fashion and trend conscious, follow mainstream as well as various youth subcultures, seek recreation, and organize their own societies. In this context, the League attempted to remain relevant to students through its activities and services. The range of League activities on campus mirrors the challenge of balancing a multifaceted identity as a junior Party bureaucracy and as an organization seeking to engage and be responsive to students. During fieldwork, the activities of university League committees fell under three groups: political, student-oriented, and volunteer. Political work The CYL’s political work included political study, propaganda activities, and supervising student organizations on campus. The first was mainly addressed to CCP membership applicants and took the form of group study of policy documents and talks by Party cadres.9 Their frequency varied among institutions, approximately once a month for a study session and once or twice a semester for a lecture. Participation was usually obligatory for Party 9 Lectures on Falun Gong, ‘terrorism,’ and the ethnic conflict in 2008 had been carried out in all universities visited.

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applicants. Propaganda activities included public singing of patriotic songs and flag-raising ceremonies, which were usually on a voluntary basis,10 as well as the dissemination of political messages through posters, banners, the university League newspaper and the Internet. The CYL’s political tasks also included the supervision of campus organizations, notably the student union (SU) and student societies, essentially acting as the incorporating mechanism of the Party. The League exercised control of the SU and the other various student societies through administrative measures and indoctrination, which sustained its ability to mobilize their resources and members, and allowed it to preserve a facade of ideological uniformity. From the university down to the class level, the student union has been placed under the ‘leadership’ (lingdao 领导) or ‘guidance’ (zhidao 指导) of the CYL, terms that refer to a relationship of dependency (Interviews 6, 17, 19, 25).11 In practice, this was mainly achieved through control of cadre appointments. According to the Opinion on Further Strengthening and Improving the Construction of the Communist Youth League in Colleges and Universities (13-1-2005), League committees had to identify talented students and appoint them as student union cadres in different levels of the host institution’s administration (2005 CYL Yearbook: 558). In universities visited during fieldwork, the League controlled the union by involving it in political activities (as in CU1) and through creating an additional ‘coordinating’ office (called tuanxuelian 团学联 in SU2), or even by completely taking over its daily work (as in the case of ZJ2). The union independently organized recreational activities, and cadres have described their work in that area as creative, active and lively, whereas League work was regarded as formal, political, and monotonous (Interviews 13, 17, 25, 36). Not surprisingly, in the two colleges where comparative data was available, cadres reported that applications for the student union outnumbered those for the League (SU1: 4 to 1 and ZJ1: 7 to 3 respectively). In addition, student union cadre appointments and activities at each level required permission from the secretary of the corresponding League committee, a process that was far from standardized and often depended on the arbitrary decision of one individual. In SU2 a union cadre complained that because of the relatively small size of his department the teacher in charge repeatedly blocked applications for recreational activities (Interview 28). 10 ZJ1 college in Zhejiang organized a flag-raising ceremony once every two weeks and participation was obligatory. 11 Characteristically, the National Student Union is located in the CYL headquarters at Number 10, Qianmen Dongdajie, Beijing.

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Student societies (which numbered 195 in CU1 and 42 in ZJ1) have been part of an expanding associational space that the state wishes to control, and the League has assumed the responsibility for monitoring, regulating, and reporting on their activities. In 2005, the CYL Central Committee and the Department of Education issued the Opinion on Strengthening and Improving the Work of University Student Societies (2005 CYL Yearbook: 547-549), which called on grassroots Party and League organizations to improve their leadership and supervision of student societies. It further stipulated the establishment of Party and League cells, the introduction of political education elements in their activities, and the initiation of regulations for the establishment and management of student societies (ibid.). At the time of fieldwork, the regulatory framework in place resembled the 1998 Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations (Pei, 1998; Ma, 2002; 2005) and was described by students as ‘complex and time-consuming’ ( fuza feishi 复杂费时). Student societies could not engage in any activities that could be perceived as threatening the political order, breaking the law or insulting public morals. A society needed to have a ‘guiding organization’ and a ‘guiding teacher’ and receive official approval of its constitution (CU1 CYL, 2009b). Despite local variations, all League committees had specialized departments (xueshengshetuan bumen 学生社团部门 or shetuangongzuo bumen 社团工作部门) that supervised the establishment, growth, and activities of societies.12 In addition, the League co-opted their organizers by involving them in training sessions and discussion salons organized by the local League School. Every year, student societies recruited new members and had to submit an annual report on membership and activities to the League in order to retain their license to operate (Interviews 20, 25, 41, 44). The student union and student societies indirectly undermined the CYL’s appeal to students in two ways. First, they accentuated the problem of the League’s relevance as they offered an alternative for more diverse and meaningful activities than the CYL’s formalistic organizational life. A cadre commented that student meetings organized by the League were unexciting and students would ‘go in quietly and leave quietly’ (anjingdejinqu, anjingdechuqu 安静地进出, 安静地出去) (Interview 13). Second, their presence reinforced the CYL’s dependence on the CCP, as League organizations assumed supervisory duties on its behalf. Consequently, rather than 12 ZJ1 has the College Societies Work Committee (学院社工委) and ZJ2 has formed a Student Associations Committee that is directly subordinate to the Party committee.

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creating conditions for renewal through competition and interaction with organizations that were closer to student interests and preferences, the CYL’s position vis-à-vis the student union and student societies sustained its work as an agent of the Party. As a result, the CYL’s political work was the least popular among students and cadres alike (see also Liu, 2006: 148). One interviewee explained that ‘in the League we have leadership (lingdaoxing 领导性) activities and those that students like (xuesheng xihuande 学生喜欢的)’ (Interview 43), and another distinguished between political activities characterized as a ‘duty’ (renwu 任务) from those that are ‘fun’ (kuaile 快 乐) (Interview 17). Almost all cadres interviewed complained that political and administrative duties drained their time, leaving no room for other types of activities. The League’s annual political calendar is indeed heavy, as cadres are involved in organizing ceremonies, speeches and parades on May 1, May 4, October 1, etc.13 In addition, they had to participate in routine political meetings and CCP membership preparation sessions, and carry out the miscellaneous chores ordered by the Party committee. If one also considers the heavy academic workload for students, with its four examination periods annually, cadres were left with limited time and energy for nonpolitical work. ‘Serving the students’ Following Hu’s call to ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’, the CYL directed local committees and organizations to get involved in student welfare.14 Cadres mentioned sporadic examples of student work and initiatives in this regard. At SU1, cadres reported f irst-year students’ concerns about a module that was subsequently revised and simplified, as well as problems with hot water in dormitories, and accessibility of the campus (Interviews 9 and 10). In CU1 and SU2 the League participated in the committee responsible for monitoring the catering services offered by the canteen (shitang weiyuanhui 食堂委员会), collecting student feedback and negotiating with management 13 League branches also celebrate June 1 (Children’s Day) and July 1 (founding of the CCP). 14 Psychological support and employment are also areas of special concern, see: CYL Central Committee, Ministry of Education, All China Students Federation, (21-8-2003) Opinion on Further Improving the Work on the Employment of Graduates (2003 CYL Yearbook: 395); Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, CYL Central Committee (12-1-2005) Opinion on Further Strengthening and Improving the Psychological Health of University Students (2005 CYL Yearbook: 544); Central CYL (10-4-2005) Opinion on Further Improve Work on University Student Employment and Entrepreneurship (2005 CYL Yearbook: 559).

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to lower prices and improve quality (Interviews 11, 28).15 In CU1, the League and the student union jointly lobbied university authorities for a building designated for demolition to be turned into an activity center for student societies instead of administration off ices (Interview 20). Similarly, in SU2, League cadres passed along student demands for a new, bigger library building (Interview 28), while in ZJ1 they achieved an extension of the school’s infirmary operating hours. Also in ZJ1, cadres mentioned that the League passed student feedback on to university authorities regarding sports facilities, Internet speed, and the mobile phone signal on campus (Interview 39). In both Beijing and Zhejiang, League cadres were also involved in psychological and study support, assisting weaker students in their coursework and exam preparation (Interviews 8, and 38, 39). These examples demonstrate that the bottom-up impetus for responsiveness existed and cadres were generally sympathetic to student demands. However, their weak position in the political and academic hierarchies on campus, limited the commitment, ability, and time available for these cadres to routinely carry out representative roles. This was equally evident in the League’s nonpolitical work. The League’s student-oriented activities were typically organized into three areas: registry, careers services, sports and recreation. First, the League was in charge of student affairs offices that also offered registry services, including collecting applications for the formation of student societies and activities, issuing student certificates for various purposes,16 and collecting applications for school events. In all universities visited, the same office space was also used as the headquarters of League committees and volunteer associations; in addition, every September, League cadres were actively involved in enrolment and induction. The League is in an advantageous position to provide registry-style services due to its large pool of student cadres that can assist with operations. What is more, the League’s administration of student affairs also serves political purposes. At the time of my fieldwork, the CU1 League Organization Office was about to launch a new service, providing certified records of extracurricular activities for students, such as volunteer work, membership in organizations, and awards received, to be used upon graduation in applications for further study or employment. The cadre in charge commented that the introduction of this 15 This is an area of frequent tension between students and the management of canteens (Interviews 11, 28). 16 For instance, I obtained a student certificate from the CYL office in CU1 that I found useful when contacting other universities.

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service was a response to relevant student demands (Interview 20), but, of course, the self-reporting of extracurricular and extra-League activities involved in certification also expanded the Party committee’s monitoring capacity. A second area of student-oriented activities was employment, the main concern of Chinese graduates. The League has turned much of its attention to this field by administering national initiatives, notably the Go West Program (Xibu Jihua 西部计划),17 microfinance schemes for rural youth and job fairs for graduates, including projects organized by local governments (Wang and Zhao, 2009; Xi and Liu, 2009). On campus, CYL committees were involved in skills-enhancement and job-search strategy seminars (writing a CV and interview preparation), internship programs, and ‘career days.’ As a rule of thumb though, these projects were organized by the university or local governments with the League assisting in administration. Characteristically, in ZJ1, cadres mentioned the Entrepreneurship Park (chuangyeyuan 创业园) – a project run and funded by the university – as an example of the League’s involvement in graduate employment. Essentially, the League’s role in this crucial field for its relations with students, was again auxiliary, with no decision-making autonomy. A third category of student-oriented activities was recreation, which included singing contests, parties, museum visits, sports competitions, cultural festivals, and excursions. Overall, the League carried out more formal (political) events, and the student union focused on entertainment. As a League cadre described it: ‘The student union activities are of a casual (suibian 随便) nature while those organized by the League are more serious, have deeper meaning and are quite formal’ (Interview 8). However, in order to appeal to students, university League committees occasionally ran recreational activities independently or in collaboration with other organizations such as the student union and the women’s federation. At college/university level such activities followed a minimum Party protocol, blending political ceremony – even a ‘light’ version of it – with recreational elements. At ZJ1, for instance, the League organized a pop singing and dancing show for students, but its opening act was a performance based on the revolutionary movie Song of Youth (1959). Overall, League organizations appeared comfortable with their informal division of labor with the student union between formal and ‘fun’ activities. The League’s student-oriented activities were infrequent and, as the second half of this chapter examines, this was a major complaint of students and cadres alike. 17 I will discuss this scheme in Chapter 6 in more detail.

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Volunteering From a Western perspective, ‘volunteerism’ (zhiyuanzhuyi 志愿主义) in China is ambiguous due to the central role of the state (Ma, 2006; Hustinx, Handy, and Cnaan, 2012) and the inclusion of activities not traditionally associated with the term.18 Chapter 6 of this book will examine the League’s nationwide volunteer projects. In the microcosm of the campus, apart from mobilization for large-scale events such as the 2008 Olympics and the 2010 EXPO, volunteerism included charity and blood donation drives, visits to nursing homes and migrant schools, cleaning of public spaces, participation in environmental projects, and AIDS and birth control awareness campaigns.19 I sought to understand whether this type of volunteerism could transform the League’s priorities and functions, by giving it a new sense of purpose, similarly to the collaboration of the ACWF with grassroots organizations on women’s rights (Croll, 1995; Judd, 2002; Jacka, 2006; Lee and Regan, 2009; Chen, 2011; Gao, 2011). On all campuses, volunteer activities were directed by the CCP committee, the university, or the local government, and were on the must-do list of a university League organization, as they were routinely reported in annual reviews. Although the involvement of these ‘senior’ organizations guaranteed that League committees would have to take part in volunteer work, its social impact depended on the industriousness of League cadres as well as their ability to introduce new activities. More often than not, these requirements were not met and grassroots committees organized activities rather perfunctorily and without a clear purpose. In an illustrative case in Beijing, the CU1 League committee cleaned the city’s botanical gardens on an annual basis, even though there was no apparent need for it, since the gardens’ staff cared for the premises daily. Similar cleaning drives took place on campuses throughout the country, to demonstrate the selflessness and devotion of League members rather than actually serving hygienic purposes, as universities have sanitation personnel on site. League activities in universities promoted a Lei Feng-fashion altruism and the notion of ‘serving the people’ in general, rather than a particular social group. This normative element, which the subsequent chapters 18 For instance, the term ‘volunteers’ may also include neighborhood committee patrols and security guards (bao’an 保安). 19 Two interviewees also mentioned that volunteers are involved in the system of online monitoring known as the Fifty Cent Party (wumaodang 五毛党). For more on the Fifty Cent Party, see King, Pan, and Roberts, 2017.

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will argue is a defining characteristic of the League’s understanding of volunteerism, prioritized the educational value for volunteers, but neglected making an actual and meaningful contribution by developing some sort of specialization in social work. As a result, local campus branches did not engage in long-term projects that would require commitment of material and intellectual resources and time. Instead, they were involved in projects with little impact outside the confines of the university, and which mostly took the form of one-off, inconsequential activities and tasks. In relation to this, League committees on different campuses maintained remarkably low levels of communication with each other and with social organizations (Interviews 18, 28, 37, 44). Committees occasionally cooperated with statesponsored organizations, such as the Red Cross Society of China (Zhongguo Hongshizihui 中国红十字会), but even these activities fell under city-wide blood donation drives (Interviews 8, 25, 38). Overall, the CYL on campus engaged with volunteer projects only as the junior partner of Party and university authorities, offering free labor and mobilizing volunteers. In turn, this was not an indication of the local League organizations’ autonomy increasing due to their involvement in volunteer work, but rather of the opposite.

The view from below: The League’s evaluation by students The remaining pages of this chapter analyze students’ views on the CYL’s performance on campus as recorded in surveys conducted in three locations. I begin with the findings on the League’s organizational life and student participation and conclude with an evaluation of the League’s involvement in student welfare and its degree of responsiveness. Organizational life and participation Elections in the League exist only at the grassroots level for the branch (class) secretary, who represents his or her class in the departmental League meeting. The position of the secretary is open annually for election among CYL members but, as discussed earlier, it involves interference from the teacher in charge, which may take the form of candidate preselection or even open support for a nominee. When asked to comment on the best way to select cadres (Figure 3.3), the majority of respondents chose elections as the most preferred process, either without any interference by the laoshi, or involving a post-election ratification. The view that a more ‘wise’ input

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Figure 3.3  How should CYL cadres be appointed? (%) CU1

SU2

ZJ1

League members recommend, the teacher decides

The teacher consults with the students and then decides

Following elections, the teacher in charge approves

Open elections, selection based only on the opinion of the students

Missing 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

is necessary was often recorded during the interviews, and can perhaps be explained as the habitual effect of long-term socialization with the CCP’s discourse and top-down processes. Still, the surveys showed that students did wish to have a say in the selection of the branch secretary and were critical of appointments behind closed doors. Student participation in grassroots elections for League branch secretaries was relatively high (CU1: 48.9 percent; SU2: 71.7 percent; ZJ1: 74.3 percent), possibly because elections take place during lecture hours, when the majority of League members are present. When students were also asked if they would participate in direct League cadre elections (at any level) should they be given this opportunity, the results were similarly high (sum of responses ‘Yes I will’ and ‘Probably I will’: CU1: 61.4 percent; SU2: 76.3 percent; and ZJ1: 84 percent). In an organization where cadre promotion depends on decisions made at higher levels, accountability to the base is weak. Grassroots cadres were rewarded for their good performance not through reelection but through appointment to the departmental or university-level League committees. In theory, cadre accountability is assessed through reports to the members of the branch, and peer evaluation. Provisions for transparency in League affairs and consultation with members were in place; however, students exhibited a wide lack of knowledge of these processes (see Table 3.2). Even when moving from the more metropolitan CU1 institution toward the more isolated ZJ1, which is located in a remote, less urbanized area, with a more parochial school life, there was still a high number of responses indicating lack

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Table 3.2 Does your league branch follow these procedures? CU1 Responses (%)

SU2

ZJ1

Yes

No

DK

Yes

No

DK

Yes

No

DK

37.3 Nomination of candidates from the members League affairs are open/ 35.5 transparent Cadres regularly submit 29.5 reports on their work to the members Members are consulted 35.2 before major decisions

15.0

43.2

49.9

19.8

25.8

56.6

15.1

22.6

13.0

47.1

47.9

15.9

30.9

53.5

10.9

30.7

15.6

50

38.9

19.2

36.9

56.2

10.8

27.6

9.8

50.6

38.9

19.2

36.9

56.2

10.8

27.6

DK = don’t know Notes: 1. CU1 = an elite comprehensive university in Beijing; SU2 = a specialized university in Beijing; ZJ1 = a vocational college in Zhejiang. 2. Percentages may not add up to 100 because of missing values.

of awareness concerning such transparency and consultation processes and criteria. By way of contrast, in the institutions visited in Beijing, the combined ‘No’ and ‘I don’t know’ answers were always in the majority (see Table 3.2). Regarding participation, Table 3.3 showed that in all universities surveyed, around one-third of the students chose to abstain completely from the League’s activities throughout their studies.20 Data on participation frequency identified a core minority group of ‘loyal’ students (2 to 3 out of 10) who took part at least once a month, while for the rest participation frequency ranged from once every three months to two years. It is important to note that the difference between the two Beijing-based institutions and ZJ1 is considerable, as the latter’s remote location and small size enabled its League organization to mobilize students more frequently. The online attitudes of respondents at CU1 and SU2 revealed a similar pattern.21 Students were asked to comment on university League websites. The results exhibited an unexpectedly high proportion of students that had never visited the CYL website (CU1 81.5 percent, and SU2 67.6 percent), with corresponding negative perceptions regarding its content (80.9 percent and 73.7 percent, respectively, finding it not interesting). Further questions on 20 Surveys were held at the end of the academic year, so first-year students had one year to participate in CYL events, and therefore the result is not distorted by bias due to year of study. 21 At the time of fieldwork, the ZJ1 University did not have a separate webpage.

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Table 3.3 Have you participated in CYL events after entering university? Replies (%)

CU1

SU2

ZJ1

No Yes No reply If “yes,” how often? At least once a month Once every 3 months Once every semester Once a year Once every 2 years Other

37.5 61.9 0.6

31.2 66.8 2.0

30.3 67.9 1.8

19.0 15.4 16.3 8.0 2.4 0.8

19.4 17.6 12.6 8.7 2.5 6.8

33.6 10.0 9.3 4.9 0.9 9.2

Note: CU1 = an elite comprehensive university in Beijing; SU2 = a specialized university in Beijing; ZJ1 = a vocational college in Zhejiang.

the frequency of visits revealed that only 4.9 percent of students in the two universities accessed the website at least once a week, and 12.8 percent and 21.8 percent respectively at least once a month. The two websites contained practical information on student affairs (student activities, forms for student society registration, Party membership application, announcements for training, etc.). The survey attempted to identify the extent to which the participation of students in activities corresponded to preferences and perceived usefulness. Table 3.4 compares League activities students participated in to those they preferred and perceived as useful. Political study sessions and moral education classes, which are obligatory for those wishing to pursue Party membership, drained much of the cadres’ time and energy. These political activities were less welcome, and students perceived them as less useful. This was more evident in CU1 (with a 26.1 percent participation rate compared to a mere 4.4 percent preference and 7.9 percent usefulness perception) and SU2; but in ZJ1, also, there was a considerable difference between the activities students participated in and those they preferred or found useful. Lack of correspondence between actual participation and preference or perceived usefulness existed in almost all categories of activities, with the exception of cultural and recreational events, which the CYL usually co-organized with other organizations on campus. As argued also in qualitative terms, the organization’s political priorities diverted time and resources from activities that were more relevant to student interests and needs. Job-hunting training offers an example of a central policy priority that was only partially implemented by the League as a result of its uneven

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Table 3.4 CYL activities that students participate in, prefer, consider useful Participate in

Prefer

Consider useful

Replies (%)

CU1

SU2

ZJ1

CU1

SU2

ZJ1

CU1

SU2

ZJ1

Professional skills Job-hunting skills Sports Political study sessions Culture & recreation Basic moral education

15.7 10.9 20.1 26.1 46.5 14.2

14.3 11.7 28.5 27.4 51.2 18.7

23.2 25.4 34.3 39.1 42.5 34.3

29.5 23.7 35.6 4.4 66.8 3.2

32.9 32.4 38.1 8.7 71.2 9.3

38.5 33.4 42.0 14.1 72.1 20.1

41.8 38.1 19.5 7.9 36.4 5.9

50.7 46.5 20.6 14.8 36.9 13.9

64.6 56.8 20.3 22.8 30.5 37.6

Note: CU1 = an elite comprehensive university in Beijing; SU2 = a specialized university in Beijing; ZJ1 = a vocational college in Zhejiang.

distribution of resources and time. The relatively low participation in jobhunting skills training was not due to a lack of demand; in fact, in terms of preference and perceived usefulness this training rates high. This disparity is explained by the relatively small supply of activities in this area by an organization that has other priorities in its day-to-day work. The League in student welfare and representation Regarding the League’s ability to intervene in, promote, and solve issues related to study and campus life, the proportion of students who answered ‘Very useful’ and ‘Somewhat useful’ was low in the Beijing-based schools. The evaluation of the League was more positive in the Zhejiang vocational school, where the League and the student union operated in effect as one organization. For comparison, respondents were also asked to comment on the ability of the student union and student societies to assist them with the same issues. The union has fewer resources than the League and, unlike the League, does not perform registry services. Furthermore, union cadres described their work as recreational in nature, not as advocating on behalf of students. Nevertheless, in all campuses surveyed, the student union fared better than the League in terms of responsiveness (combined ‘Very useful’ and ‘Somewhat useful’ responses) (see Table 3.5). Similarly to student unions, student societies were evaluated more positively than the League, with the exception of ZJ1 where setting up and running a society is restricted and their number is smaller. In Beijing, student societies did not carry a mandate for representation within the organizational system on campus, but by being less political and more oriented to student recreation and interests, they were also perceived as more

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Table 3.5 How useful are the following organizations in helping you with studyrelated issues and student-life-related issues? Replies (%) CYL

Student union

Student societies

Study-related issues

Very useful Somewhat useful Not very useful Not useful at all Missing Very useful Somewhat useful Not very useful Not useful at all Missing Very useful Somewhat useful Not very useful Not useful at all Missing

Student-life-related issues

CU1

SU2

ZJ1

CU1

SU2

ZJ1

4.5 18.1 49.1 25.7 2.6 4.1 26.6 43.4 23.3 2.7 7.3 34.9 38.1 16.5 3.3

9.1 26.0 47.6 15.1 2.2 13.1 34.0 36.7 14.2 2.0 13.7 38.4 32.8 12.6 2.5

18.1 42.2 28.5 10.2 1.1 18.1 43.1 27.9 9.5 1.5 10.2 35.4 36.1 15.7 2.6

5.1 27.5 41.2 24.0 2.1 4.8 30.5 40.5 21.9 2.3 7.6 31.6 40.6 17.5 2.7

9.0 26.8 44.6 18.4 1.3 12.0 37.5 35.4 13.5 1.6 11.8 34.3 36.4 15.1 2.4

13.1 36.5 35.6 13.3 1.5 14.1 40.9 30.7 12.6 1.8 9.9 29.7 37.6 19.7 3.1

Notes: 1. CU1 = an elite comprehensive university in Beijing; SU2 = a specialized university in Beijing; ZJ1 = a vocational college in Zhejiang. 2.  The percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding.

helpful in dealing with issues related to study and student life. Interestingly, even though the League was in a politically stronger institutional position to serve its constituency, students evaluated the League’s responsiveness as lower than that of organizations with little or no formal mandate and capacity to respond (Table 3.5). Not surprisingly, only a very small percentage of students would turn to the League as their first choice if they required organizational backing and assistance. For the large majority of students in Beijing-based schools, and approximately half of the students at ZJ1, the League’s usefulness was limited to administrative affairs (Table 3.6). Beyond campus The League sends representatives to the People’s Congresses and People’s Political Consultative Conferences, the two formal institutions that have the potential to function as representative bodies at all levels of government. Table 3.7 illustrates the League’s assumed representative capacity vis-à-vis the city and central governments.

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Table 3.6 If you require the assistance of an organization to deal with a problem, will you turn to the CYL? Replies (%)

CU1

SU2

ZJ1

Yes I will; it is my first choice Yes I will, but I will try to find another solution first No, unless it is for an administrative issue Missing

4.2 25.7 68.7 1.4

4.4 32.0 61.7 1.9

6.0 44.2 48.0 1.8

Note: CU1 = an elite comprehensive university in Beijing; SU2 = a specialized university in Beijing; ZJ1 = a vocational college in Zhejiang.

The number of students who strongly believed in the League’s representational capacity was low (4.2 percent, 4.5 percent, and 6 percent, respectively). Negative responses were prevalent regarding the League’s representational role in city government (CU1: 64.1 percent; SU2: 54.2 percent) and the central government (CU1: 58.8 percent; SU2: 47.1 percent), a finding also supported by the interviews. Apart from the various negative personal opinions that were expressed by students and recorded during interviews or personal observation, it is worth noting that not a single interviewee could provide an example of youth policy/legislation proposed by the League that was implemented by city or central government authorities. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that an exceptionally high percentage of students in all universities surveyed agreed with the statement ‘The CYL needs to strengthen its youth work’ (86.1 percent, 91.9 percent, and 89.6 percent, respectively) (see Table 3.7). Next, respondents were asked to evaluate the League’s performance on issues that affect them the most, identifying employment as the most important problem for their constituency (see Table 3.8). Of course, the League cannot solve the problem of unemployment; therefore, the question here concerns its role in assisting through training and skills programs, job fairs, internship placement schemes, and other initiatives that the CYL undertakes. The surveys revealed that only a small minority of students viewed the League as ‘Very effective’ in assisting young people in dealing with the problem of graduate unemployment, the second area of work after politics where the CYL at all levels devotes much of its attention and resources. Even upon adding the ‘Somewhat effective’ responses, the overall percentage remains below 50 percent. Still, this rate is not low, demonstrating that the CYL has not failed to identify the main concern of its key constituency of students, who in turn recognized its efforts. Graduate unemployment has been rising and the Chinese government’s plans, in which the CYL is

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Table 3.7 CYL representation and responsiveness beyond the campus CU1 Replies (%)

1

2

3

SU2 4

5.7 33.8 42.9 15.9 1. The CYL can effectively represent my interests, opinions, & demands vis-à-vis the central government 4.8 29.8 47.9 16.2 2. The CYL can effectively represent my interests, opinions, & demands vis-à-vis the city government 27.3 58.8 10.1 2.4 3. The CYL needs to strengthen its youth work

1

2

3

ZJ1 4

1

2

3

4

16.4 35.0 35.1 12.0

NA NA NA NA

12.3 31.8 40.8 13.4

NA NA NA NA

45 46.9

5.4

1.1

46.0 43.6 8.6

0.7

1 = Strongly agree; 2 = Somewhat agree; 3 = Somewhat disagree; 4 = Strongly disagree Notes: 1. CU1 = an elite comprehensive university in Beijing; SU2 = a specialized university in Beijing; ZJ1 = a vocational college in Zhejiang. 2. Percentages may not add up to 100 because of missing values.

Table 3.8 Problems university students face and the CYL’s effectiveness in addressing them Replies (%)

CU1

SU2

ZJ1

What is the most important problem that university students face today? Finding a job Opportunities for further education Marriage Protection of their rights Other Missing

78.4 9.2 2.4 5.4 3.9 0.6

82.4 9.0 2.7 3.5 1.3 1.3

88.0 6.0 0.4 2.6 2.2 0.9

How effective is the CYL in helping young people deal with the problem of finding a job? Very effective Somewhat effective Not very effective Not at all effective Missing

5.4 39.4 44.4 8.8 0.6

11.3 30.2 44.7 12.3 1.3

10.8 35.4 43.2 9.7 0.9

Notes: 1. CU1 = an elite comprehensive university in Beijing; SU2 = a specialized university in Beijing; ZJ1 = a vocational college in Zhejiang. 2.  The percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding.

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involved, can only respond to it partially. As a student cadre commented, ‘they can’t solve my needs’ (wo xiangyaode dongxi tamen bukeyi jiejue 我 想要的东西他们不可以解决) (Interview 17). As unemployment is a key factor affecting public attitudes toward the government’s effectiveness, it can be assumed that student perceptions of the League’s contribution will be directly affected by the regime’s overall performance in this area. In conclusion, the final part of the survey invited respondents to provide views and suggestions. These responses were grouped in five categories, as displayed in Table 3.9. Although the majority of students chose not to reply to this open-ended question, the comments collected corroborate the overall picture developed from the aforementioned qualitative and quantitative data. The responses showed that students: 1) called for more frequent and impactful activities (‘carry out more meaningful activities,’ ‘organize activities that are useful for the students’); 2) criticized formalism (‘become more humane, do not always judge according to formal standards,’ ‘don’t be so red and single-minded,’ ‘the League should not act hypocritically by doing things on the surface and only in words, but needs to do some practical work’); 3) demanded that League cadres communicate more with students (‘get to know the demands of young people, strengthen communication and understanding, change the pattern and way of work,’ ‘communicate more and reach the students, don’t be so capitalistic’); 4) would like more responsiveness to bottom-up demands (‘listen to the opinions of the students, serve the students,’ ‘represent the interests of members, respond with enthusiasm to demands’); and finally, 5) asked for a more open, fair, transparent, and inclusive style of work (‘League affairs need to be open, fair and transparent,’ ‘I hope that the League can enable more students to understand what this organization is and why it exists,’ ‘For ordinary people the League keeps the door closed […] Let there be more light, being a member does not mean only paying the membership fee’).22 22 The original comments (in Chinese) of these examples in each of the five categories are: 1) ‘多开展一些有意义的活动’ (SU2), ‘多举办些对大学生有用的活动’ (ZJ1), ‘办吸引人的, 有 意义的活动, 少办形式主义的活动’ (CU1); 2) ‘应该更加的人性化,不要总是在形式上做文章’ (ZJ1), ‘不要太红太专’ (CU1), ‘团组织不要做一 些表面上, 口头上的虚伪行动, 作一些切合实 际的工作’ (ZJ1), also, ‘少些形式主义, 多为学生做些实事’ (SU2); 3) ‘了解青年需求, 加强交流, 理解, 转变工作方式和方法’ (CU1), ‘多与学生交流, 深入学生不要太资本主义’ (SU2), also: ‘深 入学生群中, 了解学生的思想主流,把握学生思想,行为动向’ (ZJ1); 4) ‘多听学生意见。为同学 们服务’ (CU1), ‘能够代表团员的利益,积极反映其要求’ (SU2), also: ‘ 加强在服务青年方面的 作用,调动团员积极性’ (ZJ1), ‘ 减少官僚主义’ (CU1); 5) ‘团务公开化,公正化’ (SU2), ‘希望团组织 能让大多数团员知道团组织是什么, 它存在的意义’ (ZJ1), ‘团组织对一般人而言总是关着大 门的 […] 希望其能阳光化一些, 让我们不只成为只在交团费上有意义的一员’  (ZJ1).

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Table 3.9 CYL member’s views and suggestions Replies (number): Increase number and improve content of activities Be more practical, less formalistic Communicate and engage with students more Be more responsive to the base More open, transparent, inclusive style of work

CU1

SU2

ZJ1

24 16 20 33 12

48 31 22 41 26

109 30 51 39 80

To sum up, the surveys recorded student attitudes towards the end of Hu Jintao’s second term and 7 years after his ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’ call. The antithetical dynamics of the ‘youth Party agency’ and the ‘youth organization’ were at play in every aspect of the League’s grassroots work on campus, with the former prevailing. Thus, despite recognizing the CYL’s efforts in the sphere of employment, students remained critical of the processes followed and the degree of responsiveness attained. The result was a feeling of increasing disassociation with formal political life, which students in China share with their peers elsewhere. In the period under examination, this took the form of apathy, expressed as passive participation, or as distancing from political channels and activities.

Conclusion The League’s self-proclaimed commitment to increasing its own responsiveness to students cannot be dismissed as mere ‘Party talk’ (danghua 党话). My examination of the League’s work on campus demonstrates that the regime recognizes some of the widespread and complex challenges students face in the socioeconomic context of reforms (especially with regard to employment) and realizes that cultivating political loyalty depends on responding to at least some of these issues. It also reveals, however, a particular combination of factors that prevented cadres from engaging with students in a more substantive and less formalistic manner. Dependence on the local CCP committee is the most obvious factor ensuring that the CYL’s tasks are largely def ined through the regime’s political priorities. The corresponding Party committee controlled cadre selection and promotion, finances, offices, materials, and funds for specific activities, and this translated into the Party’s considerable ability to direct the form, content, and timing of League work. As a result, CYL organizations were mainly preoccupied with the political and administrative tasks

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assigned by the Party committee and school authorities, deprioritizing student welfare. The League was involved in student affairs from a junior, subordinate position, for instance, assisting school authorities in organizing training activities, such as job interview skills for students. Even its social and volunteer activities pursue a Lei Feng-style didactic agenda, which has little appeal for students. In addition, in its interaction with student societies, the CYL assumed the role of the supervisory and regulating arm of the Party committee, thereby strengthening its identity as a Party agency rather than a youth organization, and limiting the potential for socializing its cadres with new methods of work. With very little space for initiative, the League’s sterile interaction with students augmented the problem of its ‘relevance’, which was also reflected in the surveys. As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature on China’s mass organizations has shown that social pressure often prompts cadres to take pro-constituency action, which in turn leads them to renegotiate dependency and introduce constituency-focused activities and initiatives. However, I did not identify evidence of a similar dynamic on campuses. All university CYL organizations visited exhibited a low capacity to engage with students in a responsive manner, as both leading and ordinary (student) cadres operated in a context of juniority that further reduced their autonomy, and made it an unlikely prospect that bottom-up cadre agency would animate the CYL’s interaction with students. This is because League cadres on campus are embedded in political, academic and generational hierarchies that inhibit their ability to undertake pro-student action. Leading cadres were university employees and Party committee members whose work priorities reflected those of the CCP: Party recruitment and political work, measured in numbers of applicants and frequency of meetings and activities. CYL committee leaders had little incentive to experiment with new work patterns that could divert focus from their political duties, on which they are evaluated by the Party committee. Student cadres, on the other hand, could be agents of renewal, yet they were integrated in a very unfavorable manner in the academic, generational, and political hierarchies present on campus, a situation that limited their initiative and scope for autonomous action. They were placed in a position of institutional weakness to negotiate internally with the committee leaders, who, as university employees, occupied positions of multifaceted authority: political, academic, generational. Their short tenure and the absence of pro-student work norms further accentuated the impact of juniority, which prevented cadres from circumventing the context of dependency. Ultimately, juniority had a clearly limiting effect on how cadres perceived their duties and role vis-à-vis their constituency. This

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is evident in the formalistic way the League communicated with young people, in its cold treatment of student societies, and in its many outdated norms and methods of work. Student views recorded in the surveys corroborated the qualitative findings of this chapter. The League has been trying to expand its involvement in areas relevant to students, but according to the surveys, they remained skeptical of its capacity for responsiveness and demanded more attention to their interests and needs. The surveys recorded apathetic and cynical attitudes about the CYL organizational life and participatory processes, as well as critical views of the League’s claim to represent student interests. Ultimately, the League’s standing as a political organization with a weak ability for pro-constituency action is likely to further substantiate and popularize cynical attitudes among students toward the formal political process. In hindsight, the apprehension of Hu Jintao’s successor about the League’s ability to engage students appears justified. Leaving the walls of university campuses, the League faces an even more challenging context in which to engage with graduates and young professionals who cover roughly the upper half of its age range. The next chapter will turn to the examination of the League’s grassroots committees in public organizations, companies and private enterprises.

References 2003 Zhongguo Gongqingtuan Nianjian (2003 CYL Yearbook). Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe (China Youth Publishing), 2004. 2005 Zhongguo Gongqingtuan Nianjian (2005 CYL Yearbook). Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe (China Youth Publishing), 2006. An, Guoqi. Zhiyuan Xingdong Zai Zhongguo-Zhongguo Qingnian Zhiyuanzhe Xingdong Yanjiu (The Volunteer Movement in China – A Study of the Chinese Youth Volunteer Movement). Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2002. —. ‘Chinese Youth’s Employment’, in Xi Jieying, Sun Yuxiao, Xiao Jingnian (Eds.), Chinese Youth in Transition. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2006. Bai, Limin. ‘Graduate Unemployment: Dilemmas and Challenges in China’s Move to Mass Higher Education’, China Quarterly, Vol. 185, 2006, pp. 128-144. doi:10.1017/ S0305741006000087. Bo, Zhiyue., ‘Hu Jintao and the CCP’s Ideology: A Historical Perspective’, Journal of Chinese Political Science Vol. 9, No. 2, September 2004, pp. 27-45. https://doi. org/10.1007/BF02877001.

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Cheek, Timothy. The Intellectual in Modern Chinese History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Chen, Minglu. Tiger Girls: Women and Enterprises in the People’s Republic of China. Routledge Studies on China in Transition 39. Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2011. Croll, Elisabeth. Changing Identities of Chinese Women: Rhetoric, Experience, and Self- Perception in Twentieth-Century China. Hong Kong; London; Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Hong Kong University Press; Zed Books, 1995. CU1 CYL. CU1 Communist Youth League Committee ‘CU1 ‘CU1 Daxue Tuanwei Renyuan Jigou Jieshao’ (University League Committee Members and Organization)’, 2009a. CU1 CYL. CU1 Communist Youth League Committee ‘CU1 Daxue Xuesheng Shetuan Dengjibiao (CU1 University Student Society Registration Form)’, 2009b. Doyon, Jérôme. ‘The Strength of a Weak Organization: The Communist Youth League as a Path to Power in Post-Mao China’. China Quarterly, 2019b. https:// doi.org/10.1017/S0305741019001516. Fish, Eric. China’s Millennials: The Want Generation. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015. Fu, Zhongdao, and Jiankang Yang. Gongqingtuan Jichu Zhishi 1000wen (League Basic Knowledge 1000 Questions). Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe, 2001. Gao, Xiaoxian. ‘From the Heyang Model to the Shaanxi Model: Action Research on Women’s Participation in Village Governance’, in Harriet Evans and Julia C. Strauss (Eds.) Gender in Flux: Agency and Its Limits in Contemporary China. The China Quarterly Special Issues, New Series, No. 10. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 54-82. Genevaz, Juliette. ‘Defense Education in Chinese Universities: Drilling Elite Youth’. Journal of Contemporary China, 28:117, 2019, pp. 453-467. https://doi.org/10.108 0/10670564.2018.1542224. Hansen, Mette Halskov. Educating the Chinese Individual: Life in a Rural Boarding School. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015. Hustinx, Lesley; Ram A. Cnaan; Feminda Handy. ‘Student Volunteering in China and Canada: Comparative Perspectives’. Canadian Journal of Sociology, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2012 pp. 55-84. 10.29173/cjs10363. Healy, Paul Michael. The Chinese Communist Youth League, 1949-1979. Griff ith Asian Papers, No. 6. Nathan, Qld: School of Modern Asian Studies, Griff ith University, 1982. Hodder, Andy, and Lefteris Kretsos (Eds). Young Workers and Trade Unions: A Global View. Basingstoke Hampshire; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

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Israel, John. ‘The Red Guards in Historical Perspective: Continuity and Change in the Chinese Youth Movement’. The China Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1, April 1967, pp. 1-32. Jacka, Tamara. Rural Women in Urban China: Gender, Migration, and Social Change. Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2006. Judd, Ellen R. The Chinese Women’s Movement between State and Market. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002. Kou, Chien-wen, ‘‘Hu Jintao Shidai Tuan Xi Ganbu de Jueqi: Paixi Kaoliang vs Ganbu Shusong de Zuzhi Renwu’ (CYL Cadres Rising in the Era of Hu Jintao: Factional Networking vs Organization’s Mission)’. Journal of Yuanjing Foundation. Vol. 8, No. 4, 2007, pp. 49-95. Kou, Chien-wen, and Wen-Hsuan Tsai. ‘‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System’. The China Journal, Vol. 71, January 2014, pp. 153-171. Lanza, Fabio. Behind the Gate: Inventing Students in Beijing. NY: Columbia University Press, 2010. Leader, Shelah Gilbert. ‘The Communist Youth League and the Cultural Revolution’, Asian Survey, Vol. 14, No. 8, August 1974, pp. 700-715. Lee, Lay Tang, and Regan, Francis. ‘Why Develop and Support Women’s Organizations in Providing Legal Aid in China? Women’s Rights, Women’s Organizations and Legal Aid in China’. Journal of Contemporary China Vol. 18, No. 61, September 2009, pp. 541-565. Li, Xiaobing, Fang Qiang (Eds.). A Century of Student Movements in China: The Mountain Movers, 1919-2019. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 2019. Liu, Junyuan. ‘Chinese College Students’, in Jieying Xi, Yunxiao Sun, and Jing J. Xiao. Chinese Youth in Transition, The Chinese Economy Series. Aldershot, Hampshire, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006. Liu, Alan P. L. Mass Politics in the People’s Republic: State and Society in Contemporary China. Politics in Asia and the Pacific. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996. Ma, Qiusha. ‘The Governance of NGOs in China since 1978: How Much Autonomy?’ Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2002, pp. 305328. https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764002313001. —. Non-Governmental Organizations in Contemporary China: Paving the Way to Civil Society? Paperback Ed. London: Routledge, 2009. Montaperto, Ronald Nicholas. The Chinese Communist Youth League and the Political Socialization of Chinese Youth. PhD diss., Univ. of Michigan, 1977. Pei, Minxin. ‘Chinese Civic Associations: An Empirical Analysis’. Modern China, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1998, pp. 285-318. https://doi.org/10.1177/009770049802400303. Rosen, Stanley. ‘The Effect of Post-4 June Re-Education Campaigns on Chinese Students’. The China Quarterly Vol. 134, June 1993, pp. 310-334. https://doi. org/10.1017/S0305741000029702.

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—. ‘The State of Youth / Youth and the State’, in Peter H. Gries and Stanley Rosen, State and Society in 21st-Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation. New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004. SU2 CYL. SU2 University Communist Youth League Committee. ‘SU2 Youxiu Tuanganbu Pingxuan Tiaojian’ (League Cadre Awards Criteria), n.d. Tam, Derrick Chi Kuong. ‘Political Leadership in Youth Organizations of Macau’. MA Thesis, Department of Government and Public Administration, Univ. of Macau, 2008. Wang, Liping and Zhao Fei. 2009. ‘Gaige Kaifang 30nian Gongqingtuan Guanli Qingshaonian Shiwude Moshi Yu Jingyan’ (Patterns and Experiences of the Management of Youth Affairs by the CYL during the Thirty Years of Reform and Opening Up). Youth Guide, No. 1, 2009, pp. 17-24. Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. Student protests in twentieth-century China: The view from Shanghai. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991. Xi, Jieying and Liu Junyan. 2009. ‘Dangdai Zhongguo Qingnian Quanyi Zhuangkuang Yanjiu Baogao’ (Research Report on the Rights of Modern Chinese Youth). Beijing Yanjiu Chubanshe, 2009. Yan, Xiaojun. ‘Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control over University Students in Post-Deng China’. The China Quarterly Vol. 218, June 2014, pp. 493-513. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741014000332. Yang, Jiankang, (Ed.) Tuanwei Gongzuo Zhidaoshouce (League Committee Work Instruction Manual). Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe, 2009. ZJ1 UCYL. ZJ1 University League Committee Organizational Structure (ZJ1 Xueyuan Tuanwei Zuzhi Jianshe), n.d.

4

The League in the workplace Abstract Chapter 4 examines the League’s operation in workplaces by analyzing qualitative data collected from twelve different sites in Beijing and Zhejiang. It begins by considering the meaning of ‘youth’ in the Chinese workplace and by examining the League’s mandate in labor representation. Despite its formally recognized role in promoting the interests of youth employees, the context of the League’s operation in the workplace is antithetical to assuming a pro-youth stance. In all places visited, League cadres occupied junior positions in political and workplace hierarchies resulting in their multifaceted subordination to the management, party committee and union leadership. The institutionalized juniority of cadres resulted in the disarticulation of a distinctive youth labor agenda and in the corporatization of League activities. Keywords: Labor, industrial relations, young employees, workplace representation

What is the role of a communist youth organization in the increasingly deregulated and often repressive Chinese workplace? The concept of ‘advanced youth’, a key component of its organizational identity, refers to university students and graduates rather than to any other sub-group of youth. Accordingly, studies on the Chinese youth and the Communist Youth League in both the Maoist and Reform eras have concentrated almost exclusively on students, their political socialization and their attitudes towards the communist regime (Pringsheim, 1964; Montaperto, 1977; Healy, 1982; Liu, 1996; Rosen, 2004; Liu, 2006; Yan, 2014). This focus corresponds to trends in the membership composition of the Communist Youth League, as an increase in the number of university students and a simultaneous decline in workers and peasants has been recorded in the Reform era (An et al., 2008: 65-66), echoing the regime’s emphasis on recruiting young scientists, engineers and intellectuals to drive economic development. Still, in the period I examine,

Tsimonis, Konstantinos D., The Chinese Communist Youth League: Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2021 doi: 10.5117/9789462989863_ch04

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the League had approximately 20% of its members in the public and (quasi-) private sector, and an extensive organizational network, while it made efforts to expand in private companies and Foreign Investment Enterprises (An et al., 2009: 63-65). Researchers in the fields of industrial relations and youth politics alike have overlooked the role of the CYL in these complex relations between political, labor, and social changes. Addressing this gap, the present chapter will explore the League’s functions in the workplace, and evaluate the impact of Hu’s call for responsiveness on workplace representation. Data for this analysis was collected during fieldwork in twelve different public organizations and private companies in Beijing and in Zhejiang province (Table 4.1 presents details on these organizations). I selected companies from the main industries (services, manufacturing, hospitality) of the areas visited, while the ratio between public and private organizations (8: 4) reflects the more extensive presence of the League in the public sector. The educational background of employees (‘advanced’ graduates as opposed to workers) stood out early on as a variable possibly affecting the intensity of the League’s work, that needed to be explored. For this purpose, I included companies and organizations that set different educational requirements for their employees, ranging from elementary/secondary, to vocational and higher education. Fieldwork included semi-structured interviews with cadres, and visits to League-run facilities (offices, recreation areas) and general amenities, such as canteens and dormitories for factory workers (where applicable). In most cases the interviews took place away from the sites visited. Interview questions focused on three themes: a) the challenges young employees face, b) the work of the League committee in addressing them, and c) the difficulties League cadres confront in their work. The examination of the CYL’s challenges on the ground was further enriched by the insights of League functionaries at the local, city/province and national levels, as well as by discussions with young employees and personal observation. In addition, I reviewed printed material such as Party documents on youth work, company guidelines, announcements and annual reports on local League activities and training programs. Lastly, the qualitative findings of this chapter are supported by reports and surveys1 conducted by the China Youth and Children Research Centre. 1 The first report used here, ‘The Blue Book of Chinese Youth Work’ by (An et al., 2009), uses primary data generated by the Communist Youth League on organizational expansion of CYL branches, changes in membership composition, operation of local branches, and finances and policies implemented in urban areas. The second, titled ‘Research Report on the Rights of Modern Chinese Youth’ (Xi and Liu, 2009), is based on a nation-wide survey of 4650 people from 18- and 35 years old, 47% of which are League members and 77.9% have already entered employment.

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The League in the workpl ace

Table 4.1 Characteristics of work units and companies analysed in this chapter Code Description

Ownership Educational background of young employees

Location

HR1

Public

Vocational/higher education

Beijing

Public

Vocational/higher education

Beijing

PH1

Human resources provider for foreign and/or joint venture enterprises Human resources provider for foreign and/or joint venture enterprises Public hospital

Public

Beijing

PH2

Public hospital

Public

BN PM

Newspaper Property management company Water department* Insurance company

Public Private

Vocational/higher education Vocational/higher education Higher education Vocational/higher education Higher education Vocational/higher education Vocational/higher education Elementary/ secondary Elem/secondary / vocational Elementary/ secondary

HR2

WD IC HT F

High-tech engineering company Factory

H

Hotel

CM

Clothes manufacturer – 2 factories

Public Public Private(expublic) Private(expublic) Public Private

Beijing Beijing Beijing Beijing Zhejiang City 1 Zhejiang City 1 Zhejiang City 1 Zhejiang City 1 Other location in Zhejiang

* ‘Water Department’ refers to a subdivision of the Water Authority of the Beijing Municipality.

Before examining the League’s organization and its activities in places of work, it is necessary to address (1) the dynamics at play in work life and how they inform young employees, and (2) the League’s mandate to represent. The chapter will then continue with a consideration of organizational dependency in both political and generational terms, the corporatization of CYL activities, and in conclusion, the League’s involvement in employee welfare and representation.

Locating ‘youth’ and the League in the Chinese workplace What is the meaning of ‘youth’ in a work environment? What are the particular characteristics of young employees that differentiate them from their

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older colleagues, and require special attention and a dedicated channel of representation? The first, and stark, difference between the League as it operates in educational institutions, and in workplaces centers on the very term ‘youth’. In educational institutions, the world of student life, well delineated in space and time, creates an empirical correspondence between a sub-group of young people and the CYL’s officially defined constituency. But when one leaves the school and university campus walls behind and moves to a work environment, this correspondence fades out. Once the context of the subsidized student life is removed, the variation between workplaces, let alone between experiences acquired, life courses, career paths and progress, locality and income, appear to disintegrate the common characteristics of a particular sub-group of young people. Students in different colleges and localities have more experiences in common than, for example, a young nurse in a public hospital does with a young migrant worker, a young employee in a foreign IT firm with a young security guard, a young entrepreneur with a young factory worker. Entry into work life tends to overshadow the social attributes of ‘youth’, as full integration in the labor market has often been used to locate its end as a life stage (Jones 2009, 84-86; Cieslik and Simpson, 2013: 3-5). A first approach to locate ‘youth’ in the workplace is to examine it as part of the ongoing capital-labor antagonism in the context of hegemonic neoliberalism. Globally, the advance of labor market deregulation in the last two decades has had a distinctive generational dimension (Sukarieh and Tannock, 2014; Hodder and Kretsos, 2015). There is an extensive range of issues specific to the employment conditions of young people as a category, and young Chinese employees are not immune to these. The increasing deregulation is associated with: more flexible and less secure employment conditions; low entry-level salaries; higher job insecurity as the young and less experienced are more vulnerable to redundancy schemes; weakening of social security systems; and finally the decline of unionization and collective bargaining agreements (ILO 2011, 3-5). Additionally, there are problems that Chinese employees, in particular, contend with, such as the lack of affordable housing for public servants; the poor implementation of labor law for private sector employees; the exclusion of migrant workers from hukou-based social welfare schemes, as well as poor working and living conditions that lead to mental health problems, depression and suicide (Selden and Wu, 2011; Cheng, Wang, and Smyth, 2013; Pun and Chan, 2013). A second approach is to focus on those elements that differentiate ‘youth’ from the ‘old’ in a working environment. As discussed previously, Bourdieu’s (1993) starting point in understanding youth is the arbitrary nature of

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old-young divisions, as ‘entirely variable and subject to manipulation’ (ibid.: 95). He explains that the construction of ‘youth’ is essentially a power relation, a ‘struggle between the young and the old’, or, put differently, between newcomers and those established (ibid.: 95, 112). This struggle often concerns access to material resources, and is expressed in generational and hierarchical junior-senior divisions. For example, in interviews for this chapter, young doctors and nurses complained about not having the same access to affordable work unit (danwei) housing as their older colleagues; young public employees loathed those in their 40s and 50s for their relatively secure employment contracts; and private sector employees questioned the worthiness of older colleagues and managers for their superior benefits, expressing their wish for more opportunities and faster advancement. In contrast, older employees face the threat of being sidelined by younger and more ambitious newcomers with more up-to-date skills and knowledge. Generational divisions are present even within organized labor, as unions often prioritize the interests of older employees over those of younger ones (Wamba, 2002: 80-81; Simms, 2011: 14-15; Standing, 2011). In China, Chan and Unger (2009: 11-12), in their examination of welfare provisions in a state-owned distillery, note how older employees and retirees were those who benefited the most from new housing and communal spaces for workers, in line with the enterprise’s emphasis on work-year seniority. Similarly, Cheng, Wang, and Smyth (2013) record that young migrant workers are less likely to be unionized than older generations, which limits their institutional voice. The power relation between the old and the young is also evident in the case of the League’s operation in the Chinese workplace. The CCP, like communist parties elsewhere (McDougall, 2004; Neumann, 2011), has institutionalized ‘youth’ as a junior political identity that places its cadres in a position of multifaceted subordination and disempowerment. It is not attempted here to offer an exhaustive list of the challenges and problems that young employees face in China, but to establish that the category ‘youth’ in the workplace indicates a distinctive set of experiences and stresses, shaped on the one hand by the deregulation of employment and the retreat of welfarism, and on the other, by generational divisions and power relations within the labor force that have been accentuated by the dominant developmental paradigm and the country’s political system. These two approaches demonstrate that ‘youth’, as ‘age’ more broadly, in the workplace is contentious and in need of representation. What is the response of the League to this new reality? In general, the CYL Central Committee is primarily concerned with promoting employment

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and productivity, rather than with improving the conditions of work for young Chinese people. Its national-level policies concentrate on organizing job fairs and entrepreneurship competitions, as well as promoting labor market skills and on-the-job training schemes.2 The League’s presence in the workplace is peripheral, in contrast with higher-education institutions, where it has an ex-officio central position in campus grassroots organization, and is in charge of political (Yan, 2014) and volunteer activities (Xu 2012). The representation of workers’ interests is instead vested in the trade unions, which do not have a clear orientation in favor of labor in general (Howell, 2003a; Zhu and Chan, 2005), let alone young workers in particular. Thus, the mounting challenges young employees face, and the limited power of Union cadres, together create the conditions for the youth labor agenda to seek alternative channels for representation. In this context, I hypothesized that a) the League would be under pressure to promote this agenda through advocacy to Union and management and by engaging directly with young employees on welfare issues; and that b) this pressure would lead CYL cadres to become involved in the representation of young employees. Indeed, the League Committee Work Handbook (Yang, 2009: 260) states: The enterprise League branch must be concerned about the healthy growth of young employees, should reach out to them, listen attentively to their voices, understand their wishes […]; and protect and represent their reasonable demands and legitimate rights.

The League’s legitimate role in the representation of young employees in working spaces is recognized at both national and provincial levels. A 2006 joint circular by the CCP Central Committee Organization Department, the CYL Central Committee, and the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission Party Committee, titled ‘Further Strengthen 2 See: 5 April 2004 Opinion on Young Workers’ ‘Skills Revitalization Plan’ (2004 CYL Yearbook: 501-502); 9 April 2004 Opinion on deepening the implementation of the ‘Chinese Youth Entrepreneurship Action’ (2004 CYL Yearbook: 503-505); 8 October 2004 Notice on promoting effectively youth employment and re-employment information reporting activities (2004 CYL Yearbook: 510-511); 16 February 2005 Notice on Issuing the Implementation Plan of the ‘Revitalization Cup’ Youth Skills Competition (2005 CYL Yearbook: 491); 26 September 2005 Notice on Implementing the ‘Successful Entrepreneurship Plan’ among Youth (2005 CYL Yearbook: 505); 18 May 2006 Construction Plan of the National Youth High-Skilled Talent Training Demonstration Platform 2006-2010 (2006 CYL Yearbook: 358); 15-11-2006 Opinion on Strengthening the Work of Youth Entrepreneurs Associations (2006 CYL Yearbook: 366).

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and Improve the Work of the Communist Youth League in State Owned Enterprises’ (2006 CYL Yearbook: 360-364), offers directions on how to build representational capacity at the grassroots: The League Committee Secretary can join the presidium of the workers’ congress, attend the Executive Council, as [his/her] participation involves the vital interests of young employees such as adjustment of wages, evaluation of professional titles etc. The enterprises when formulating and implementing decisions on major reform measures that involve the interests of young employees, should have a representative of the League and young employees, and listen extensively to their views. Young employees must occupy a certain proportion of representatives in the staff and workers’ representative congress of the enterprise.

This circular also addresses issues of organizational capacity that directly affect the vitality of a League grassroots organization. It first stipulates that it is the responsibility of the Party and management to provide the material conditions for the League to conduct its work (2006 CYL Yearbook: 362). For small-medium scale companies, the League can either set up an independent presence or conduct youth work through another department of the company (usually Human Resources) or the Union. The document also identifies a number of full-time cadres that grassroots League organizations must have, depending on the size of the host company (ibid.). It also stresses the importance of cadre training from the Party School and higher education institutions (363). These general provisions are repeated in official documents at the local level. For instance, a set of regulations by the Shenzhen Municipal People’s Government on the implementation of the PRC’s labor law, stipulates that: The trade union should establish a system of joint meetings with the Communist Youth League, Women’s Federation, Disabled Persons’ Federation and other social organizations at the same level in order to investigate and handle important issues affecting the interests of staff and workers (Paragraph 22, Shenzhen Government, 2008a). Organizations such as the Communist Youth League, the Women’s Federation, and the Disabled Federation shall provide legal assistance to workers in need, and if necessary, support and help workers to apply for arbitration and file lawsuits. (Paragraph 59, Shenzhen Government, 2008b)

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Although these regulations are not legally binding, they introduce the League’s mandate as a representative organization for young employees. This is in recognition of the fact that the tasks of organizational expansion and standardization of political work in enterprises rely on simultaneously establishing and operating some channels for feedback and consultation. The League can disseminate its views and policies among young employees, and exert its normative and political influence on them, only if it can offer in return, at the very least, a channel for advocacy. The first obstacle in achieving this is the negative effect of labor-market deregulation on the League’s ability to retain its members.

Deregulated labor and League membership As the preceding chapter discusses, young students join the League in high school or at university, where they are expected to participate in some of its activities. In these spaces, the League has the ability to monitor and promote membership within a population of students that is relatively easy to reach. The CYL on campus relies on existing structures (academic departments) and personnel (teachers) to acquire new members, attract student cadres and carry out its political, recreational and other activities. When students leave the structured environment of these educational institutions, however, transferring their CYL membership requires functioning League organizations at both ends of the process. In the public sector this requirement is often met. However, between 2003 and 2007, due to the low degree of League presence in the private companies in China, approximately two-thirds of League members at the school or university level were actually ‘lost’ during the transition to a workplace organization. Only one in every three League members3 retained their membership (Table 4.2). Young rural immigrants in particular are impossible to trace, since they usually work without contracts, in companies that hardly ever have an active union, not to mention a League branch (Interviews 15 and 22). Party and United Front organizations have a presence at every level of government and in all public organizations/companies. Workplace mobilization (zuzhi qilai 组织起来) through this extensive organizational nexus has sought to ‘align the worker with CCP policy and ideology’ (Bray, 2005: 98), and is perhaps the most important legacy of the Maoist period. In the period under examination, despite a downward trend in the percentage of CYL members in the public sector, due to a boost in student recruitment 3

These figures do not include former members who joined the CCP.

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Table 4.2 Annual transfer of members 2003-2007 Year

Outflow of League members (in 10.000s)

Inflow of League Members (in 10.000s)

Loss of League members in between (in %)

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

601 631 657 755.8 761.8

375 368 374 376 379.8

37.6 41.7 43.1 50.3 50.1

Source: An et al., 2009: 66

by the CCP, the former was increasing in absolute numbers and amounted to a considerable 14.6% of the entire League membership. As a central CYL functionary commented (Interview 14), despite the private sector’s rapid expansion, the only reliable ‘pools’ of League membership were the education system, the army and the public sector (Table 4.3). Political affiliation and type of employment also affected the CYL’s ability to attract members. During fieldwork in Beijing, I came across paralyzed branches in organizations where one would assume the CYL to be active: a state-controlled think tank; the department of cultural affairs of one of the most affluent districts; and even a League-run newspaper. This was partly because most of the young employees in these organizations were already Party members and thus not obliged to participate in the League (Interview 27), creating frustration for cadres who watched CYL membership declining. A branch secretary in the Beijing Water Department (WD), for example, noted that in two years there would be no members left, other than three cadres (Interview 57). Thus, ironically, the task of preparing young employees for the transition to ‘political adulthood’, i.e. joining the Party, limits the pool of members that can support the operation of workplace League committees. The type of employment is another factor affecting the League’s reach. For instance, the hospitals visited in Beijing (PH1, PH2) had active branches and a large number of members due to the annual flow of new graduates from nursing schools. In contrast, young employees in the provincial governmentowned hotel (H) visited in Zhejiang City 1 were temporary laborers and interns, who did not participate in the League because of the short term of their employment, their heavy workload and unstable shift schedule (Interview 48). Even in state-owned enterprises, the deregulation of labor had a negative impact on the League’s ability to engage with young people. Turning to the private sector, a distinction should be made between the three categories of privatized (formerly state) companies, private companies,

0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 28.0 28.8 30.2 29.2 32.4 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 51.1 55.7 52.8 53.8 57.3

3.8 3.7 2.8 2.7 2.7

267.0 265.6 205.6 197.3 202.5

3.3 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.5

231.4 234.8 249.0 260.9 265.6

17.5 16.2 15.8 14.7 14.6

1246.3 1163.8 1140.1 1082.3 1097.8

Source: An et al., 2009: 63-65

’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07

As % of League members

In 10.000s As % of League members

In 10.000s

As % of League members

in 10.000s

Hong Kong/ Taiwan Companies

As % of League members

Foreign Companies

In 10.000s

Collectives

As % of League members

Private Sector

in 10.000s

Public Sector

Table 4.3 League membership development 2003-2007

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and Foreign Investment Enterprises (FIEs). Regarding the first, officially ceasing the operation of a League branch could cause the local government’s discontent (Interviews 21, 24, 47), so privatized companies opted to maintain League branches only on paper. The Factory (F) and the High-Tech company (HT) visited in Zhejiang City are cases in point, as they reported membership figures of their branches annually (70 members and 7 cadres, 10 members and 3 cadres respectively), but held no more than one activity per year and in collaboration with the Union. Secondly, in private companies League membership is even lower since there was no legal obligation to establish a CYL branch, as with unions (Interviews 47, 53). In this regard, the weak presence of the CCP and the Union in the private sector also indicated the limited reach of the League. Further, the elitist self-image of the League as the organization of ‘advanced youth’ and the perceived ‘backwardness’ of rural youth (Interview 22) discouraged expansion in companies employing migrant workers by normalizing the marginalization of their ‘youth’ identity. Cadres at various levels of the League’s administration were unclear about the necessity of engaging ‘less advanced’ groups of youth. As a Union cadre in CM factory commented, ‘for companies with educated employees the League is meaningful, but for uneducated workers it makes no sense’ (Interview 53). Thus, the unresolved ‘elite or mass’ contradiction in the League’s character further undermines its reach in the new spaces created by economic reforms. Those very few private companies that established League branches, did so in order to maintain good relations with local authorities, and to comply with calls to intensify political work and to expand Party and United Front cells. The property management company in Beijing, for instance, established its League (and Women’s Federation) branch in 2008, after a city-wide organizational expansion drive by the CCP ahead of the Olympics. At that time, the government of Chaoyang district asked local, private Chinese companies to create League branches in order to mobilize volunteers (Interviews 22 and 58). Nevertheless, such examples of top-down pressure to set up League cells are rare, and as one interviewee in Zhejiang commented, ‘the reason there is no functioning League organization in our firm is that there is no pressure from the government for it’ (Interview 53). Lastly, FIEs account for a mere 0.8% of total League membership (Table 3), and FIEs from Hong Kong and Taiwan, for an even smaller 0.4%. In theory, young employees can register under the League organization of state-run Human Resources companies that provide personnel to FIEs. However, the League secretaries of two major HR (public) companies in Beijing explained that their League organizations maintained no regular communication and had no capacity to reach out to private-sector employees (Interviews 1, 29).

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To sum up, labor deregulation, political affiliation and type of employment all contributed to the CYL’s varying reach in different organizations and companies. In addition, the League’s organizational presence reflects the CCP’s own.

‘Building the League through building the Party’ The CYL leadership structure in public and private companies closely follows the organizational chart of the host institution, and is organized in branches (zhibu 支部) (requiring at least 3 League members), general branch (zongzhibu 总支部) in large organizations, and League Committees (tuanwei 团委). As with the unions, League branches report primarily to the Party organization at the same level and, secondarily, to the League Committee at the level above, following the ‘Dual Management’ principle (Yang, 2009: 125). The rationale that governs the Party-League relation at the Local level is expressed by the ‘Building the League through building the Party’ principle (dangjian dai tuanjian 党建带团建), which is ‘the fundamental guarantee and effective measure for the [League’s] grassroots construction’ (2003 Yearbook: 243). The aim of this principle is to achieve the following: To have both a good team and especially a good leader. To have a group of League members who play an exemplary leading role. To have activities which match the youth characteristics of League members. To have an effective working system. To have the necessary funds and positioning for activities, that guarantee the normal development of work (Yang, 2009: 79-80).

The importance of Party committees maintaining leadership and guidance over League functionaries is a constant theme in Party and League instruction manuals, work reports and publications. The journal Beijing Branch Life (Beijing Zhibu Shenghuo 北京支部生活), a publication targeting grassroots CCP and United Front cadres, offers a number of characteristic examples. An article titled ‘West District Post Off ice: The Twinning of the Party and League Branch Secretaries is Leading the Development of Youth’ (Yang, 2010: 27), describes the experience of the Post Off ice Party branch secretaries in rectifying the work of League branches:

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After examining the League’s work, the League Committee of the West District Post Office noted that the level of the League branch’s building, is decided in a high degree by the ability of the League branch secretary, and that the latter’s development requires the assistance of the Party organization. The League Committee organized a ‘twinning’ activity for the Party and League branch secretaries, demanding from the former to offer concrete help and directions to the latter’s work, thus assisting the development and progress of the League secretary. […] Chen Wei, the Party Branch Secretary of the Baiwanzhuang Post Office branch, […] after attending the meeting meant for proposing Party membership candidates, realized that their standards and system for proposing candidates was inadequate. He then instructed the League secretary how to follow […] every aspect of the standard procedures for proposing Party membership candidates. […] Kanrui, is the New Old Town Post branch League Secretary. Once she started a meeting on selecting the ‘outstanding League members’ without first counting the members present. After the meeting two League members did not recognize the result saying that: ‘we did not receive the notice about the meeting, and when we arrived the selection process was already completed’. The New Old Town Party branch Secretary, Wang Qiuzhen, heard about this incident, and he criticized Kanrui. When he demanded that the meeting be repeated, Kanrui started snivelling [obviously from embarrassment]. Wang Qiuzhen then said that ‘when League branch secretaries make a mistake must not cajole and flatter but they have to correct it at once, as this benefits their development’. Under the Party secretary’s help a new meeting was convened. […] The League Secretary of the Baiwangzhuang Post Office branch, called Liu Wei, who is a sales team leader. After the Party branch classified her as a talent […] it gave her more tasks because she was clearly hard-working. Chen Wei, the Party branch secretary, said that apart from being in charge of youth work, she will also help the Party branch secretary in inspecting the Party branch work plan […] Through exercise, Liu Wei can adequately consider together the League and Party work. […] Under the support and drive of the Party branch, young League members continuously introduce new services, such as the ‘Happiness coming from a Letter’ service, that received praise from the public.

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Apparently, the twinning of Party with League branch secretaries boosted the League’s work in terms of internal organization, identification of outstanding members, inner democracy, its role as a reserve force for the Party and finally, directing young people in perfecting their working methods. The clearly didactic article and the idealized conditions it portrays typify the Party’s perception of youth as a group of people in need of direction, the League as an organization of junior status, League cadres as immature yet promising individuals, and of the Party itself as a wise, fatherly figure providing guidance. In practice, cadre appointment is the single most important way available to the CCP for exercising control over League organizations in various localities, and for standardizing their process in relation to ideological education and Party membership preparation. As the previous chapter demonstrates in relation to students, the distinction between leading cadres (League committee secretary and vice secretary) and ordinary cadres (including branch secretaries) is important. League Committee secretaries are Party members appointed by the CCP Committee at the same level. In the workplaces I visited the involvement of these individuals with the League was on a part-time basis, as they were full-time employees in their respective companies/organizations (often working in their Human Resources departments), and their average age was between mid 30s and early 40s. The Workers’ Union can also be directly involved in the League’s operation, particularly in companies with high employee turnover such as the factories (F, CM) and the hotel (H) visited in Zhejiang City (Interviews 47, 48, 53). In Beijing, the Union of the Water Department established a Youth Work Committee (qingnian gongzuo weiyuanhui 青年工作委员会) to cover ( fugai 覆盖) young employees regardless of political membership (Interview 57). Overall, the League committee secretary was primarily a Party or Union cadre, and had a more senior position in the workplace hierarchy, thus becoming distanced from ordinary workers, a situation that has also been observed in the case of Union leadership (Baek, 2000: 51). It should be noted, however, that the CYL committee secretaries were still considered junior to the local Union and Party heads. They did not enjoy the ‘deputy position treatment’ ( fuzhidaiyu 副职待遇) of the Union leader, whose status is equal to the deputy secretary of the Party or the deputy director of a factory (ibid.), nor were they expected to raise issues affecting young employees directly to the management (Interviews 2, 35, 57).

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Ordinary cadres were selected4 from among the League’s rank-and-file, and their position was strongly indicative of the generational subordination of youth in workplace hierarchies. Ordinary cadres are closer in terms of age and workplace seniority to young employees, which places them in a better position to act as representatives. But these cadres, who usually occupied entry-level positions, had limited work experience and social capital in their place of employment, which in turn translated into limited leverage to push for change internally. Their political superiors were also their seniors in the company hierarchy, which created a disincentive to assuming a more vocal pro-youth labor position. As a result, League-related work was directed primarily towards these more senior organizations, rather than young employees. In all places visited, League cadres were considered a pool of free labor for the Party, Union and management: they would meet whenever there was ‘work to be done’ (Interviews 4, 23) and were the first to be sent as ‘volunteers’ for activities and campaigns organized by local governments (Interviews 4, 29, 35, 42, 48). As there was no provision for remuneration, stipends, or reduced time schedules for CYL cadres, League duties were considered an additional burden to their full-time work responsibilities, offering no concrete advantage: It is not like the university where there is free time available. League work at the Hospital is a duty, not something that I am happy doing. (Interview 4) Actually, the reason why the League branch in our company exists, is because it has to, there is no concrete meaning or function. (Interview 42)

The method for appointing ordinary cadres reflected company-specific conditions, such as the number of young employees and Party members available to assume roles in the League. In the two hospitals in Beijing, League branches in different departments of the hospital elected their secretary every two years (Interviews 4, 5, 23). The Party and League committees’ involvement included the screening of candidates and affirmation of incumbents. In contrast, in the equally large Insurance Company in Zhejiang City, the rather active League Committee secretary was the only person involved in cadre selection (Interview 35). The two human resources companies in Beijing reported similar practices (Interviews 1, 29). In Beijing, 4 There was no direct involvement of young employees in the selection process of League branch secretaries. Hospitals 1 and 2 had an election process in place but this involved pre-screening of candidates by the Party committee.

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at the Water Department and the Zhejiang-based high-tech engineering company, the Party Committee directly appointed branch secretaries (Interview 57). These top-down selection practices further enforced the weak capacity of League cadres for bottom-up representation. To sum up, ‘Building the League Through Building the Party’ is an organizational principle that maintains a hierarchical and highly dependent pattern of work, which limits the space for pro-youth stances by cadres on the ground. League cadres are subordinated to the hierarchies of the workplace, where the priorities of the Party committee, the Union and the management ultimately define the content and nature of youth work. Thus, the subordinated position of a young cadre who typically occupies an entry-level or junior post in the company, is further reinforced by a political arrangement that favors hierarchy over representation and confers political authority on individuals who have seniority in age and career stage. As a result, League cadres are mainly occupied with tasks assigned by the Party, the Union and the management, which restricts their potential as representatives of young employees. I will now turn to the core of the League’s grassroots activities and examine how these organizational characteristics limit the intensity and scope of League work, as well as any prospects for its innovation and renewal.

The League’s activities: Between the Party committee and the management In higher education, the characteristics of campus life that cut across different educational institutions guaranteed a minimum level of exposure to CYL activities. The same did not apply in workplaces where variation was high. Some examples have already been offered: inactive League branches even at the core of public organizations; and companies with migrant young workers with no League presence. In addition, the working schedule, intensity of work duties, mode of operation (office hours or shifts), and funds available are all factors that defined the frequency and scope of League activities. These particular conditions limited the resources, commitment and time available for cadres and resulted in significant variation in the frequency and content of work. However, despite this variation, a common theme in all organizations visited was that League activities at the workplace mirrored the priorities of the Party committee and management. Table 4.4, for instance, shows the key areas of activity for the Water Department League committee in Beijing. These contain on the one hand, political/propaganda functions, and on the other, the promotion of water conservation practices.

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Table 4.4 Example of annual plan of activities 1) Effectively promote the building of local level League organizations – Push forward the work of “Building the League through building the Party” [spread the principle through propaganda, hold a meeting with this theme, perfect the system of cooperation between the two organizations] – Thoroughly carry out excellent activities [carry out activities in the light of moral and political principles suitable for the education of young people] 2) Make the 90th anniversary of the establishment of the Party a juncture in the strengthening of political ideology education, strengthen further the ideals and beliefs of League members and youth – Thoroughly carry out thematic education activities [Organize Party history study sessions] – Organize “Party history competition” 3) Continue strengthening the building of a corps of “Water conservation and protection volunteers”, make a new contribution to water utilities – Perfect the construction of “Water conservation and protection volunteers” [propagate their volunteer work internally, build a separate website and network system] – Perfect the system of regular meetings of the “Water conservation and protection volunteers” – Thoroughly carry out water saving and protection activities [disseminate water conservation practices through activities in neighborhoods, villages, schools, parks, companies and organizations] 4) Carry out actual youth service work – Build a platform for learning and demonstration Carry out the 3rd “Top Ten Youth of the Beijing Water Department” selection contest (…), demonstrate a youthful elegant demeanor – Build a platform for making friends and entertainment Carry out the “Water Conservation Intelligence” activity, enthusiastically disseminate water conservation knowledge and ideals among young people, strengthen the youth’s water conservation awareness, build a platform of exchange and friendship for young people. Source: Beijing Water Department, 2011

Meanwhile, ‘build a platform for making friends and entertainment’ stands out as the only, brief (and rather vague) reference to an activity targeting young employees. Similarly, in the annual program of activities of the Hospital League branch, it is easy to identify the same pattern of political tasks (assigned by the Party committee and local government) and management tasks (assigned by the hospital administration), which dominates the workload of grassroots League organizations. The space for developing employee-oriented work was very limited in these conditions as League cadres already operated between the ‘pincers’

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Table 4.5 Example of annual plan of activities Month

Activity – Description

March

Government of “Queuing up day”, disseminate information on the Chaoyang district event, send volunteers to instruct the public how to maintain the queue. Study of the concept of scientific development, lecture Hospital Party committee Government of Convenience Service Bags (bianmin fuwudai), placing bags containing information material and newspapers Chaoyang district in communities Hospital League League thematic daily activity: visit to the military museum and Yuyuantan Park, make small donations Committee Blog writing contest Branch “The journey of health”, Public lecture on the treatment Hospital of hypertension administration Hospital “The journey of health”, Public lecture on the first antihypertensive drug treatment administration Poetry readings, ‘Motherland, I am proud of you’ Hospital League Committee

April May

June July August September September

Organizing body

Source: Hospital (H1) Branch program of activities for 2009, Interview 4

of political and management priorities. As discussed next, although the exact balance of political and management tasks differed between the public and private sector as well as among different companies, in all cases it resulted in League cadres not being in a position to develop systematically pro-youth action. Political tasks The frequency and intensity of the League’s core political activities (propaganda, and Party membership preparation) were limited when compared to universities, where the CCP aimed at attracting a large percentage of students to its ranks. In the public sector, the majority of new public servants are university graduates and often already Party members, and the Party committee organized membership preparation sessions with the League’s assistance. In private companies (including formerly public ones), preparation and training for Party membership was primarily a personal pursuit, in cooperation with CCP cadres present (Interview 47), or with the local government (Interview 58). Propaganda and dissemination of CCP policies were carried out through traditional means (posters and leaflets) as well as online (company website and social

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Table 4.6 Frequency of political study meetings Company code

Description

Frequency

HR1

Human resources provider for the foreign-joint venture enterprises Human resources provider for the foreign-joint venture enterprises Public hospital Public Hospital Newspaper Property management company Water department Insurance company High-tech engineering company Factory Hotel Clothes manufacturer – 2 factories

N/A

HR2 PH1 PH2 BN PM WD IC HT F H CM

Once every two months Once a month Once every two months N/A Once a year 3-4 times a year Once every two weeks Twice a year Once a year Once a month No meetings

Source: Information collected through interviews

media). In addition, the frequency of political study sessions varied not only between the public and the private sector but also within public sector organizations (Table 4.6). Under Mao, League propaganda aimed at boosting loyalty and productivity through the use of role models (notably Lei Feng, Zhang Haidi, Wang Jingxi, Jiao Yulu), non-material rewards (honorary titles and awards), and organizing ceremonies and celebrations. Rohlf (2003) in his study of the rural resettlement to Qinghai between 1956 to 1961, analyzes the propaganda of this mass land reclamation project carried out by the League. The images transmitted expressed adventure, the prospect of a life-transforming experience, and great achievement (473-479). An example of this type of propaganda in the Reform era is the establishment of a ceremonial squad of model workers by the China Railway League Committee (under the Ministry of Railways), called the Qinghai-Tibet Railway Construction Pioneer Force (Qingzang tielu jianshe qingnian tujidui 青藏铁路建设青年突击队). This squad was used in the inaugurations of new stations as well as in various official celebrations organized by the Ministry (Huang and Gao, 2003: 106). During interviews, cadres described the use of models and propaganda activities as having an ‘encouraging effect’ (guli zuoyong 鼓励作用), especially among young employees. A Hospital cadre and the secretary of the Insurance Company explained that the CYL committee would also organize appraisal sessions to honor League members with excellent work

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performance (Interview 23, 35). Indeed, there has been a growing awareness among Party officials and company managers of the CYL’s potential in cultivating an enterprise culture of committed and disciplined labor. For example, Lu Hao, the former First secretary of the CYL Central Committee, characteristically noted (2007 CYL Yearbook: 70): […] first, with the precondition of assisting the operation and management of an enterprise, we must identify the link between serving both the enterprise and the youth […]. The enterprise is a typical economic organization, and its profits determine directly its survival and development, as well as the realization of the interests of young employees. Therefore, we must make our priority serving the enterprise’s production and management, lead young employees to work hard, and assist the enterprise to generate profits. Regarding this issue, the League organizations in enterprises had many breakthroughs, such as implementing the ‘Youth Job Experts’, and ‘Mark of Civilization’ campaigns; assisting employees to improve their abilities; cultivating professionalism; carrying out cultural activities; and helping the enterprise to strengthen its cohesion.

Developing a similar narrative, a document titled ‘The Effect of the League in Building a Corporate Culture’, which has been disseminated amongst grassroots League organizations in corporations, outlines their tasks as follows: (1) to build a corporate identity of dedication, ‘to sacrifice and give up some pleasure today for the enterprise’s development’; (2) to raise the young workers’ self-esteem, foster their creativity and sense of belonging; (3) to create a strong learning atmosphere, and: (4) to establish a good corporate image (Zhu, 2009). Likewise, Wal-Mart League branches are described as ‘encouraging members to play an exemplary role in doing a good job that will assist business development’ (Jeffries, 2010: 369). Such embellished descriptions point to the corporatization of League activities in the new economic environment, and provide a fine example of how institutions are renegotiated and made to serve new ends, while their original form is maintained relatively unchanged. Management tasks The majority of activities by CYL organizations at the workplaces visited were not dictated by the Party committee but by the management. League cadres were involved in staff training sessions aimed at improving productivity and skills which mirrored the company’s area of specialization. Some examples

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are offered here from the companies visited: training on water technology by the Water Department (Interview 57); basic Japanese-language classes for workers in the factory (F) due to collaboration with a Japanese firm (Interview 47); basic computer skills for hotel employees (Interview 48); and work-safety and traff ic regulations for the workers in the CM factory (Interview 54). The Insurance Company in Zhejiang City expects its employees to undergo a week-long series of seminars every two years, which includes lectures on ‘the working post’s essential political accomplishments,’ as well as on professional skills and ethics. According to the interviewees, the League’s role in these training sessions was auxiliary, mainly assisting with administrative matters (announcements, preparation of venue, distributing of applications, etc.). It must be noted, though, that the involvement of cadres in such activities was not always clearly connected with their capacity as League functionaries. For example, the position of League committee secretary, both in the Insurance Company and in the Hotel in Zhejiang City 1, was held by the head of the human resources department, which is in any case ex officio responsible for handling such training sessions. In these cases, the capacity of the League Committee secretary in conjunction with his or her role in the company ensured that a small group of League cadres could be called upon to assist whenever necessary. Perhaps the clearest example of corporatization of the League’s work since the reforms is its involvement in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), which builds on the League’s long tradition of volunteerism. In the Mao era, being a volunteer was associated with the revolutionary virtues of selflessness and devotion to socialism. In addition, the official discourse on individual sacrifice for the collective good permeated the normative training of the youth through iconic figures and role models. In the Reform era, nationwide and local volunteering projects are still a major component of the League’s work, its self-perception and public image (Xu 2012, 105-106). In public organizations and companies, the majority of volunteer and CSR work fell under large-scale projects and campaigns initiated by local or national-level authorities. Such examples include mobilizing volunteers for the 2008 Olympics, the 2009 celebrations on the 60th anniversary of the PRC, and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo; supporting China’s biggest charity, Project Hope (Xiwang Gongcheng 希望工程), through regular donations; participating in environmental actions such as nationwide campaigns for mass re-forestation and conservation of rivers, lakes and wetlands, and ‘Queuing Days’ (paidui tuidong ri 排队推动日) (Interviews 4, 32, 42, 58). In

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addition, individual public organizations were involved in volunteer projects according to their specialization. The Beijing Water Department League Committee, for instance, has created a volunteer group to disseminate water conservation practices in urban communities (Interview 57). Other examples included public lectures organized by hospitals on the prevention and treatment of various diseases (Interviews 4, 23) and the dissemination of information on passenger safety by the Railway League Committee (Xu 2007, 105). In return, the League rewarded grassroots organizations that participated in such activities with honorary titles such as the ‘Mark of Civilization’ (wenminghao 文明号). In the private sector, including in FIEs, League-related CSR activities were rare and mainly comprised donations and participation in volunteer projects that promoted a socially responsible corporate image. Amway China, for example, established the Amway Volunteers and the Amway Volunteer Education Aid Program, and cooperated with the China Youth Development Fund (CYL-supported) and the Volunteers Association (CYLestablished) through donations and sponsorships. The private companies visited occasionally participated in volunteer activities organized by local governments, and contributed with donations. Overall, the frame of reference for the League’s volunteer activities in private companies was the management’s willingness to develop a CSR portfolio, with no autonomy or clear role for the League in this regard.

Serving and representing young employees During interviews, there was a common understanding among cadres that the League has to appeal to young employees through new activities and patterns of work. As a League Committee secretary commented: Our main challenge is to make young employees feel that the League organization is their own. The company, the various departments and the Party, all expect from their employees to study and train. If the League does the same, then it will lose touch with young people. (Interview 35)

In the organizations and companies visited, the League’s recreational activities promoted values such as teamwork, loyalty to the company, vitality and creativity; and included sports competitions, dinners and karaoke nights, visits to museums and parks, excursions, horse riding, climbing, and classes in calligraphy and painting. The frequency of these activities depended on

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the enthusiasm of the Committee secretary, the time available to devote to such events, and the financial support of management or the Union. The Union cadre who acted as League secretary of the factory (F) in Zhejiang City explained that management was supportive of sports competitions because they train the workers’ physique and instill discipline (Interview 47). Nevertheless, due to lack of time, very few recreational activities actually took place on the sites visited, with League committees organizing just one to two each year. The League’s role in welfare was also marginal and indirect. Issues of administration and welfare (housing, health, canteen food, etc.) lay within the duties of the Union or the human resources department of the danwei, with no CYL involvement. A Union cadre in charge of League affairs, in the CM2 factory visited, argued very eloquently that the biggest problem in regard to young workers was bridging ‘ideal’ (lixiang 理想) with ‘reality’ (xianshi 现实), which she explained as the younger workers’ ‘desire’ (kewang 渴望) for a better life, higher salaries and improved working conditions. The League’s role, she continued, was to carry out ‘psychological intervention’ (xinliganyu 心理干预), small-scale activities and socializing events, in order to allow workers to ‘psychologically adjust’ with reality (Interview 54). However, even after the first wave of Foxconn suicides, when workers’ mental health attracted considerable media attention, Union and League cadres in the sites visited had received no training in offering relevant support to staff. Another aspect of young employees’ welfare, in which the League is indirectly involved, is finding a spouse. The CYL, like the Komsomol in the former Soviet Union, has been at the forefront of disseminating the official views on love and sex to young people (Gooderham, 1982). The League Committee Work Handbook (Yang, 2009) identifies the provision of moral education on courtship and love, marriage, and family affairs, as a task for grassroots organizations. The Handbook offers detailed descriptions of how each stage from courtship to starting a family should be conducted, echoing Party-defined working-class morality, traditional norms, and Marxist feminism.5 Despite the liberalization of sexuality in the PRC since the 1980s, 5 Courtship should be based on looking for love, cultivating love with purpose […]. The process of courtship must be characterised by noble interest and healthy ways of intercourse […] Marriage should support the unity of rights and duties, it is not to be taken lightly, […] and must oppose ‘bought marriages’ […] extravagant weddings. The moral meaning of family is to implement the true sense of monogamy […] opposing male and female chauvinism, must respect the elders, […] and educate the offspring. (Yang, 2009: 199-200)

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finding a spouse is still a challenge, especially for migrant workers (Li, Li and Feldman, 2019: 2). League organizations occasionally arranged social gatherings and partner-f inding events, and two Committee secretaries boasted about their role in making successful matches (Interviews 35, 48). But the League could not escape from the elitist identity imposed by the Party: cadres explained that dating events were open only to white-collar employees, in order to bring ‘advanced youths’ together to form families, thus revealing eugenic strains of thought (Interviews 23, 24, 48). On the other hand, factory cadres mentioned that the management did not encourage such events, citing time constraints as the main reason. Because labor relations in the PRC are loosely regulated, even the workers’ personal life choices, such as marriage and childbirth, are vulnerable to profit calculations by the employer, especially for female workers.6 Overall, the CYL is peripheral both in important and in seemingly inconsequential aspects of young employees’ welfare. Feedback and workplace representation The League’s low capacity for responsiveness to employees’ needs was also evident in the functioning of feedback mechanisms, which include meetings, surveys and personal contact. The effectiveness of these channels depended entirely on the goodwill and industriousness of cadres, who operated in a context of dependency and juniority that was antithetical to autonomous and purposeful action. Inescapably, the political subordination of League cadres to the Party secretary reinforced their junior position in terms of generational and workplace hierarchies, and diminished their ability to negotiate with the Union and the management. In some rare cases, the League organized discussion meetings and consultation gatherings to collect feedback from employees. For example, in Zhejiang City 1 Factory and in the Insurance Company, the League hosts, once a year, a young employees’ discussion meeting (qingnian zhigong zuotanhui 青年职工座谈会) where various welfare issues are raised and then forwarded to the management (Interviews 35 and 47). However, since 6 See, for example, the following reports from China Labor Bulletin in the period under examination: ‘The ‘Nine Lives’ of a Chinese Woman Migrant Worker: Ms. Zhang Tells Her Story’, 8 March 2006; ‘Violence and Discrimination Against Tibetan Women workers’, 16 Jul 2003; ‘Seeking Re-employment? Please Show Your Divorce Certificate!’, 30 August 2005; ‘Selection of News on Women Workers in China’, March 2004

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there was a widespread lack of provision for participation in democratic management through the CYL, such infrequent ‘instances’ of representation must be treated as exceptions rather than as the norm. It is characteristic that League committee secretaries do not participate as representatives of young employees in Staff and Workers’ Representative Councils (SWRC), a formal representative institution that, despite its weaknesses, has occasionally promoted the participation of workers (Zhu and Chan, 2005). Further, when these secretaries occupy managerial positions, they participate in any form of democratic management processes not in their capacity as League cadres, but as managers (Interviews 35, 47, 57, 58). Unsurprisingly, then, their accountability for cadres under their purview was directed upwards, towards the Party committee and the management, not towards young employees. Similar patterns emerge from consideration of questionnaires distributed online by League organizations, and which interviewees often used as evidence of the League’s inclusiveness and consultative character. It was not clear, however, how these questionnaires were used, what the response rate was, and whether they actually had any impact. Lastly, various interviewees attributed the League’s lack of representation capacity to young people’s preference for dealing with problems personally, by seeking the assistance of friends and family rather than organizational support. From interviews and informal chats, I gathered that in the very few instances that young employees sought the assistance of a League cadre, a good interpersonal relation was more likely to be the underlying factor. Overall, there was very little perception among cadres that their League duties involved a representative function, for which they are accountable to young employees. As exceptions to this broader finding, however, some instances of representation did occur. In a rare case of advocacy in welfare, cadres raised the issue of accommodation shortages for young personnel with hospital authorities (PH2) and with the district League Committee (Interview 23). Also, a factory cadre in Zhejiang raised to management the problem of low entry-level salaries to the Union, resulting in a small readjustment, and secured Union funding to set up a volleyball court for workers (Interview 47). These examples are indicative of the potential importance of cadre initiative but, overall, League grassroots organizations demonstrated very poor capacity for sustaining responsiveness. In a survey administered by the China Youth and Children Research Centre, young employees were asked to identify their preferred course of action for rights protection in the workplace, as well as to evaluate the outcome of these actions (Table 4.7). The League was chosen by a mere

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Table 4.7 Rights protection If your interests and rights were violated, which channels would you use to protect them? (Provide up to 2 choices) Channel

Number of responses

%

Legal action

539

29.8

Help from relatives and friends

339

18.7

Head of the work unit

206

11.4

Workers Union

75

4.1

Communist Youth League

64

3.5

Women’s Federation

41

2.3

Resort to violence

59

3.3

Feel wronged but I cant do anything

425

23.5

Other

63

3.5

Total

1811

100

What was the outcome of your attempt to protect your rights? Outcome

Number of responses

%

Succeeded

1047

29.9

Failed

760

21.7

I did not protect my rights

1690

48.3

Source: Xi and Liu, 2009: 245

3.5% of respondents, ranking only slightly higher than the option ‘resort to violence’ (3.3%). Another finding of the survey was that, overall, employees were distanced from mass organizations in the workplace, and that they demonstrated a relatively high preference for silence and passivity. Similarly, in the 2010 Annual Report on Social Development of Beijing, Party and League organizations ranked after other channels of assistance by employee preference, with 9.1% and 5.1% respectively (2010: 30). These findings show that the League’s claim to represent young employees in the workplace remained highly unsubstantiated. This is consistent with other studies that have identified the League’s weak capacity in acting as a channel for the bottom-up articulation of interests and views of young people in general (Ngai, Cheung, and Li, 2001; Liu, 2006; Yan, 2014). A League functionary in the textile industry made a typical observation: Because of various reasons, the willingness of young people to enter the League is not strong and the number of ‘marginal youths’ that are alienated from the League is increasing; the ‘League consciousness’ of many of the

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members, including some cadres, is weak, their feelings for the League are not deep, and have an indifferent attitude towards League membership. […] For a long time now, the League does a lot to educate and manage young people but nothing to serve them. (Yao, 2003: 11)

League Committee members in a petroleum company and a hospital, respectively, criticized the League’s mode of work: The work of some League organizations in enterprises lacks innovative and scientific planning, some even maintain that ‘Army group’ style of activities from the past, paying attention to quantity over quality, form over practice. (Institutional) Blindness, passivity and sluggishness are serious problems. (Zhou and Xu, 2007: 99) If the League, continues to follow the old style of work, carrying out those singing and reciting competitions, it will not be able to appeal to young people. (Li and Liu, 2007: 58)

These opinions fall in line with views expressed during interviews and informal discussions with League cadres, and especially with their responses to my inquiries about their involvement in workplace representation and in the welfare of young employees. In the places I visited, participation in League events, even recreational ones, was low, and there was a widespread lack of enthusiasm for assuming League posts, which shows the deteriorating capacity of the League to create affective responses without revisiting its traditional mode of operation.

Conclusion The transition to a market economy has created challenges for young people that are nowhere felt as strongly as in the workplace. Workers’ rights are outweighed by the developmental priorities and strategies of a country that has built a large part of its wealth on the competitive ‘advantage’ of cheap and disciplined labor. In this context, the League’s rhetoric exhibits contradictory characteristics: as a ‘school of communism’ it offers normative incentives through flowery expressions of socialist selflessness in an economic context that promotes material ones, and combines communist symbolism with the glorification of market reforms, and of the concomitant labor-capital relations and ethics. As an organization aspiring to reach out

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to young employees, the League emerges as even more paradoxical, since its presence is felt more in public organizations than in the expanding private sector that employs large numbers of young workers, especially in construction and manufacturing. Overall, under Hu, the League’s ability to engage young employees and contribute to their welfare was very weak, rendering the CYL increasingly irrelevant in places of work. In this chapter, I discovered that although official pronouncements and legal documents at the national and provincial levels established the CYL’s mandate to promote the welfare of young employees, League cadres operated in a context that was antithetical to assuming a pro-youth stance. The League depended entirely on the Party or Trade Union for its existence and operation at the grassroots level. As the central state did not fund youth work in local areas, it is unimaginable that the extensive organizational network of the League in the various localities could be maintained and expanded without the CCP offering the organizational backbone. But the ‘Building the League Through Building the Party’ principle epitomizes the League’s organizational dependency on the Party in all types of enterprises, preventing the League from developing its own, autonomous work direction. All grassroots League organizations visited exhibited low to non-existent ability in keeping members involved, training cadres in youth affairs and deciding on activities and internal processes. More importantly, CYL cadres were integrated in the workplace hierarchy in junior positions, which further subordinated them to the senior power holders in generational, institutional and political terms. Due to their young age and junior work posts, League functionaries were unfavorably embedded in these three kinds of hierarchies dominating the workplace and, as a result, had to maintain a docile stance towards the management, the Party committee and the Union. League cadres were Party-appointed, part-time, and received no compensation for their extra duties as cadres, so they perceived their League work as an additional burden, without any concrete benefit. Occasionally, individuals with a higher post at the workplace, acting as CYL committee secretaries, took initiative to promote what they perceived as the interests of young employees, mainly in the form of organizing social and sports activities. As a rule of thumb however, cadres exhibited very limited initiative in advocating in favor of their young colleagues. The only channel available to them was to influence the agenda of the Union and enlist its support on issues directly affecting young employees’ welfare. But in addition to the impact of dependency and juniority, the

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effectiveness of this channel was contingent upon the existence of an active and influential Union, and on the willingness of its cadres to endorse such demands and negotiate with the management. These conditions were not often met. To conclude, the institutionalization of a pro-youth orientation is very unlikely to occur in a context where market, generational and political dynamics integrate and subordinate League functionaries as junior cadres in workplace hierarchies. Under Hu, despite the lofty rhetoric of ‘Keeping Youth Satisfied’ and an explicit, albeit legally weak, mandate to promote the interests of young employees, the Communist Youth League did not manage to position itself as their institutional voice. The realities of working life under China’s socialist market economy did not provide a supportive environment in which the League could sustain the symbolic capital it accumulated as a ‘youth organization’ in the education system, reinforced with ritual, training and habit. On the contrary, the League’s communist character bent under the weight of market and profit-driven labor relations; its collectivist and altruistic rhetoric was cancelled in practice by the individualism and careerism that prevail in a market economy; and its outdated ‘transmission belt’-style mode of work exemplif ied its unimportance to the problems and hardships young employees face in China today. In such a context, the management’s emphasis on labor peace, along with the League’s very low capacity for pro-youth intervention, resulted in the corporatization of League activities. Increasingly, they were aimed at cultivating a pro-capital working culture and a good corporate image, rather than responding to bottom-up demands. As such, the Communist Youth League appeared irrelevant in the Chinese workplace, neither ‘Communist’, nor ‘pro-Youth’, but also without the inclusive and participatory character of a ‘League’. In the microcosms of the campus and the workplace, CYL cadres are juniorized by generational, political, academic and workplace hierarchies that bound their agency. But what about the higher levels of the organization and its activities, projects, campaigns and policies? Perhaps the impact of juniority weakens as one moves up the administrative ladder of the Chinese party-state, to echelons where League cadres have higher bureaucratic status, more scope for taking initiative, and more resources. Having examined the League’s operation vis-à-vis its two key constituencies, university students and young employees, I turn next to the second part of the book, which explores the CYL’s cadre training and social work at the local and national levels.

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Sukarieh, Mayssoun, and Stuart Tannock. Youth Rising? The Politics of Youth in the Global Economy. Critical Youth Studies. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015. Wamba, Nathalis Guy. ‘‘Union? I Don’t Get It’: Young Workers vs. Old Unions’. New Labor Forum, No. 11, 2002, pp. 74-84. Xi Jieying and Liu Junyan. 2009. ‘Dangdai Zhongguo Qingnian Quanyi Zhuangkuang Yanjiu Baogao’ (Research Report on the Rights of Modern Chinese Youth). Beijing Yanjiu Chubanshe, 2009. Xu Hanqiu. ‘Tielu Gongqingtuan Zuzhi Yunyong Liqi Jiaoyu Chuangxin Gongqingtuan Gongzuo Fangfa de Shijian Yu Yanjiu’ (Empirical Research on the CYL Organizations in the Railways’ Department’s Use of Adventure-Based Education to Renovate the CYL’s Work Methods). Guangdong Qingnian Ganbu Xueyuan Xueyuanbao, 2007. Xu Ying. ‘Chinese Communist Youth League, Political Capital and the Legitimising of Volunteering in China’. International Journal of Adolescence and Youth Vol. 17, No. 2-3, June 2012, pp. 95-112. https://doi.org/10.1080/02673843.2012.656195. Yan, Xiaojun. ‘Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control over University Students in Post-Deng China’. The China Quarterly Vol. 218, June 2014, pp. 493-513. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741014000332. Yang, Jiankang, (Ed.) Tuanwei Gongzuo Zhidaoshouce (League Committee Work Instruction Manual). Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe, 2009. Yang, Xiaofeng. ‘‘Xiquyoudianju: Dangtuan Zhishu Jiedui Yinling Qingnian Chengzhang’’ (West District Post Office: The Twinning of the Party and League Branch Secretaries Is Leading the Development of Youth)’’. Beijing Zhibu Shenghuo, No. 10, 2010. Yao, Shunyuan. ‘Xin Shiqi Zuohao Qiye Gongqingtuan Gongzuo Chuongxon de Ji Dian Sikao Ji Dian Sikao (Some Thoughts on the Innovation of New Era Enterprise Communist Youth League Work)’. Fujian Qingfang, No. 7, 2003. Zhou, Shengguo, and Hui Xu. ‘Xin Xingshi Xia Guoyou Qiye Gongqingtuan Gongzuo Cunzai de Wenti Ji Duice (Problems and Solutions of the Communist Youth League’s Work in State Enterprises under the New Situation)’. Daqing Shehui Kexue, No. 2, 2007. Zhu Tianming. ‘Gongqingtuan Zuzhi zai Qiye Wenhua Jianshezhong de Zuoyong’ (The effect of the League in Building a Corporate Culture) Luan An Group Website, 2009. http://www.esmjx.com/Article/zhongjibaogao/dzbg/200607/52991.asp. Accessed 28 May 2017. Zhu, Xiaoyang, and Anita Chan. ‘Staff and Workers’ Representative Congress: An Institutionalized Channel for Expression of Employees’ Interests?’ Chinese Sociology & Anthropology Vol. 37, No. 4, August 2005, pp. 6-33. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/21620555.2005.11038349.

5

Training youth cadres Abstract This Chapter investigates whether the “keep youth satisfied” mandate was translated into new training institutions and programs for CYL cadres, that could develop specialization in youth work. It begins with an examination of the Central League School’s educational programs and continues with its operation at the local level. It then analyzes national programs of cadre development, exchange and recognition. It is argued that cadre training institutions and policies under Hu demonstrated major inconsistencies between discourse and reality as they were insufficient in promoting the League’s new social mandate. Both the League School and the national programs examined, aimed at training future Party administrators, not cadres specializing in youth affairs, while their institutionalization at the local level was anemic and uneven. Keywords: League School, Tuanxiao, cadre training

The Party officially recognized the Communist Youth League’s new role of ‘assisting the government in handling youth affairs’ (xiezhu zhengfu guanli qingnianshiwu 协助政府管理青年事务) in the CYL constitution amendment of 2003; since then, Chinese scholars and League cadres have agreed that this broadened mandate required the combined functions of a Party agency, a government department of youth affairs and a social organization (Li, 2008; Zheng, 2008; Wang and Zhao, 2009; Xi and Liu, 2009; An et al, 2009). According to this view, the League had to expand its youth work capacity by adopting service-oriented operations as a social organization, and similarly increase its role in youth policy formulation and implementation as a government agency. Its new tasks included a large pool of ‘unfunded mandates’ (Tsui and Wang, 2004): administering charity work, setting up youth hotlines and youth centers, organizing job fairs and community recreational activities, offering educational assistance to impoverished children, running youth volunteer programs, and providing

Tsimonis, Konstantinos D., The Chinese Communist Youth League: Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2021 doi: 10.5117/9789462989863_ch05

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channels for consultation and representation on campuses, workplaces and localities.1 These new tasks also required a new set of skills. Recent research has demonstrated the CYL’s value as a career channel in the Party and in the government, ascribing it to the regime’s emphasis on recruiting younger cadres post 1978 (Kou and Tsai, 2014). However, the content and efficiency of CYL cadre training in view of the League’s ambitious social agenda remain largely unexplored. After all, if the League is going to contribute to the resilience of the communist regime through a more specialized and responsive engagement with China’s youth, it needs to train cadres with relevant expertise. The present chapter will address this previously uninvestigated aspect of the League, by answering the following question: Has the Communist Youth League developed training programs that allow its cadres to meet the multifaceted challenges of its new social mandate? This is a new question in the study of the League, but an old one amongst researchers of Chinese mass organizations. Since the early 1980s, All-China Women Federation cadres, both at the national and local levels, have built bridges with academia and women’s organizations in an effort to understand and respond to the challenges faced by Chinese women. They introduced new concepts such as ‘gender’, as well as ways to engage with women, often pushing the limits of Marxist orthodoxy and the CCP’s patriarchy. The resulting socialization of cadres with new methods of work and new discourses has enriched the Federation’s training initiatives and programs, enabling it, at least in part, to engage in a more responsive manner with its constituency (Tsimonis, 2016). Despite considerable unevenness in cadre training among China’s different localities, and the Federation’s persistent conservatism, many scholars have noted that the ACWF’s initiatives in the field of training have increased its cadres’ skills and cultivated a new sense of commitment in them, in turn facilitating the Federation’ expanding involvement in social work (Jin, 2001 and 2005; Ding, 2006; Gao, 2011). The case of the ACWF demonstrates that even in Leninist mass organizations, exposing cadres to new knowledge facilitates novel forms of engagement with their corresponding social groups. 1 Other examples of the CYL’s social work include: in-home visits for elderly citizens; collection and donation of goods and money for areas hit by natural disasters; environmental awareness activities and exhibitions (water conservation, energy conservation, waste reduction); visits/ donations to orphanages; activities and services for migrant children, orphans, economically disadvantaged families; awareness campaigns on juvenile delinquency, drug prevention, AIDS; entrepreneurship forums and funds, employment fairs, business plan competitions; volunteer work festivals; and activities for students on exam stress management.

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This chapter concentrates on national, grassroots and local-level cadre training under Hu Jintao. It begins with the contextualization of cadre training, by placing it in the broader picture of the League’s organizational aspirations regarding its future form of engagement with young people, and by highlighting personnel-related problems as observed on the ground in the sites visited. It will then continue with an investigation of the League School (Tuanxiao 团校) at different levels of administration, and discuss policies on personnel training, exchange and recognition.

Organizational aspirations and realities The call for ‘Keeping the Party at Ease and the Youth Satisfied’ has been translated into organizational initiatives at different levels of the CYL’s administration. Two sets of developments are of particular interest here. The first concerns innovations aimed at promoting the CYL’s involvement in NGO-style activities. Already since 1994, the establishment of the Association of Chinese Young Volunteers (ACYV) (zhongguo qingnian zhiyuanzhe xiehui 中国青年志愿者协会) was allegedly directed towards building capacity for social work. The ACYV is a United Front organization of the CYL which is organizationally indistinguishable from the League, since like the All China Youth Federation (ACYF), it operates as ‘one institution with two names’ (yige jigou liangkuai paizi 一个机构两块牌子). Further, in order to increase capacity for social work, local League committees set up platforms for coordination between League branches in educational institutions, workplaces and local communities, as well as between the CYL and independent youth social organizations. The first example of such coordination is the introduction of ‘District-School Joint Councils’ (quxiao gongjian lianxihui 区校共建联席会), essentially using active League grassroots cells in educational establishments to regenerate League presence and activities in local communities (Interview 24). Another example is the overambitious and largely unsuccessful nationwide policy of establishing ‘Youth Centers’ (Qingnian Zhongxin 青年中心) in urban communities (Zheng 2008) and rural areas. A third example is the creation of platforms of communication and cooperation between youth social organizations (formally registered or not) and the League. Such platforms of cooperation were established by city and provincial-level CYL committees in Shanghai and in Guangdong to promote cooperation with unregistered youth organizations and groups and keep them aligned to the CCP’s youth policies (Interview 50; Youth Daily, 2009: A08; People’s Daily, 2012). Such initiatives, examples of which

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are discussed in more detail in the following chapter, are indicative of the CYL’s aspiration to improve its social work capacity. A second set of developments evolved around the idea of creating a new government department specializing in youth affairs, similar to those in Germany and Australia (Interviews 31, 50). This discussion has been fuelled by the establishment of local youth affairs departments (YADs) since 2005 (qingnianju 青年局) in a small number of district level governments in Shanghai (Shanghai CYL, 2009), and proposals to expand this initiative to other parts of China. As explained by researchers in the field of youth / League affairs in Beijing and Shanghai, the objective was to develop a government bureaucracy with the necessary expertise to deal with the mounting social issues that affect young people and children (Interviews 31, 32, 50). The YADs are financed directly by the local district government, are under the CYL committee leadership, employ active or former CYL functionaries, and their work is supplementary to the League, mainly liaising with the various departments involved in youth work (Education, Hygiene, Security, Sports, etc.) (Interview 50). As a researcher in Beijing explained, the relationship between the YAD and the Shanghai League is neither antagonistic nor one of parallel co-existence, but one of ‘belonging to the same family’ (yijiaren 一家人) (Interview 31). Although the institutionalization of this initiative remained weak and geographically limited, it demonstrates that local governments have realized the need for professional engagement with youth affairs. The above discussions and developments regarding ways to expand the League’s responsiveness by emulating and cooperating with youth social organizations or, alternatively, by following a path to their institutionalization and transformation into government agencies, indicate a common frame of mind among League officials, cadres and researchers: the fulfilment of the League’s mandate depends on becoming responsive to young people’s aspirations and needs. But given its dependency on the Party, can the League accomplish greater responsiveness without readjusting its priorities, operations, and allocation of its resources? This is a rather common question that bureaucratic organizations face when confronted with external pressure to change. Their response is usually that of minimal adjustment, changing ‘as little as they must, rather than as much as they should’ (Kanter et al, 1992: 18). In organization theory, a classical approach to ‘change’ presented by Kanter et al, comprises three components: 1) identity changes in the relationship between the organization and its environment and in the ability of the organization to ‘endure over time as a factor in that environment’; 2) changes in control, which place emphasis on

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the political aspect, and on shifts in the dominant coalition and interests; and 3) coordination changes which refer to the internal configuration of the organization (culture, structure, personnel) (ibid.: 15). In the case of the League, the first dimension would require a decisive shift in its orientation towards young people, while the second would entail the removal or drastic weakening of Party control. Both scenarios would include enhanced decision-making autonomy, the removal of dependency mechanisms, more material and intellectual resources, and the reconceptualization of the League as a youth organization rather than a communist transmission belt, with all the necessary corresponding changes in its operation. As such changes were already highly improbable under Hu and remain even more so under Xi, the question of how much ‘change’ can be achieved within the League highlights the importance of the last component, the CYL’s internal configuration. Organizational realities When contemplating the prospects for ‘change’ in this regard, one needs to acknowledge the inherent limitations. The first is that the expansion of the CYL’s mandate to cover new areas of work does not (and cannot) entail a new organizational culture that sidelines its traditional roles in mobilization, mass indoctrination and training for young Party cadres. As chapter 1 discusses, the Party has been consistent and clear about the fact that social work will be developed in addition to its political functions, not at their expense. This is also the case for cadre training. The second limitation is that such ‘configurational’ changes in training cannot alter the League’s dependency on the Party. Based on the experience of the ACWF’s partial engagement with societal demands while not challenging the core characteristics of its structural relation with the CCP, the changes that can be expected in the League are confined to the qualitative improvement of its personnel, through the enrichment of youth work training. In the ACWF, two types of cadre training coexist in parallel as a result of identical limitations: one politically oriented and centrally directed, and another defined bottom-up, which albeit fragmented, concentrates on social work. A third limitation in bringing about change in the League is the reality of a rather extensive horizontal and vertical organizational network, coupled with a comparatively limited number of full-time cadres. In the decentralized post-Mao environment, CCP organizations face paralyzing limitations in material resources and personnel, a situation best described by Shambaugh (2008: 8) as ‘organizational atrophy’, a notion that is very

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Table 5.1 CYL branches and cadres in numbers 2002-12 (in 000s) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 200 203 212 199 205 176 172 Grassroots committees 基层团委 240 230 234 220 220 224 211 General branches 总支部 Grassroots 2720 2550 2540 2491 2561 2946 2425 branches 基层支部 N/A 183 188 191 191 193 191 Full time cadres 专职团干部 Members 69860 71070 71880 72146 73496 75439 78588 共青团员

N/A

N/A

N/A

212

N/A

N/A

N/A

234

N/A

N/A

N/A

3087

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A 89900

Sources: CYLCC, n.d.; CYLCC, 2005; People’s Daily, 2006; PRC Government, 2008b; PRC Government, 2009; PRC Government, 2013

relevant to the case of the CYL. Official reports portray the CYL as a gigantic organization with millions of branches and hundreds of thousands of cadres. As Table 5.1 shows, under Hu Jintao the CYL had on average around 200,000 committees, 220,000 general branches, 2.5 million grassroots branches and 200,000 full time cadres. Taking into consideration that League committees in higher levels of administration usually employ more full-time personnel, the number of available cadres does not cover the needs of grassroots committees and branches, which usually depend on part-time cadres to function. During my visits to urban and rural-based committees, it became clear that all local organizations were understaffed, existed on paper only, and had no capacity for actual engagement with young people. Both local and national level cadres noted widespread personnel shortages, which meant that the League had to rely on part-time work by local government employees and volunteers. At township level, permanent full-time cadres were reported to be non-existent, and as a consequence League work was carried out by township staff on a part-time basis (Interviews 14, 45, 46, 50, 56). The relatively well-off township level committees visited in Zhejiang depended on three part-time cadres for their operation (Interviews 45, 46). According to officials in Beijing, rural townships in less affluent provinces often exist only on paper despite routinely reporting numbers of members and cadres (Interviews 14, 15, 22, 56).

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County-level League committees also depend heavily on part-timers. In Beijing and Zhejiang City 1, full-time League personnel number only three and four cadres respectively, while district 1 in Beijing, one of the biggest and wealthiest in China, reported less than 5% of its staff as full-time and salaried (Interviews 26, 49, 52). Inevitably, these committees relied on volunteer work for their daily operations, not to mention activities and campaigns. In prefecture (provincial capitals) and provincial-level organizations the number of cadres improved slightly in absolute numbers, but the workload is heavier (Interviews 21, 22, 59). As a rule of thumb, from county level upwards, full-time League functionaries held positions in the local branch of the All China Youth Federation and/or the Volunteers Association, as well as in local government.2 In addition, they had duties in the local Party committee, and would sit in the People’s Congresses and People’s Political Consultative Conferences. Respondents in Zhejiang City 2 and Beijing noted that the 2008 Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai EXPO increased the number of volunteers at the League’s disposal, but this was a short-lived situation characterized by wide mobilization, and had no positive impact on the capacity of the local branches in the long term (Interviews 21, 22, 54). Considering the above limitations, the qualitative augmentation of skills and methods of work through cadre training was a potential solution that would allow the League to improve its responsiveness. ACWF cadres initiated a process of systematic interactions with academic institutions as well as domestic and foreign women’s organizations, which has exposed Federation personnel to non-CCP discourse and social work approaches (Croll, 1995; Chow et al, 2004; Angeloff and Lieber, 2012). This enabled the Federation to develop a more autonomous and socially impactful sphere of work. Can similar changes be observed in CYL cadre training within the constraints present? To answer this question, this chapter will turn first to the League School.

The Central League School: Training generalist cadres The official institution in charge of personnel training in the CYL is the League School (Tuanxiao, LS 团校). Although training for young cadres already existed in the revolutionary period, the League School was officially 2 Typically, the name cards of my interviewees included their posts in both the CYL and the local Volunteer Association / Youth Federation.

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founded in September 1948 and had trained approximately 11,000 cadres by 1966, when it had to cease its operations due to the Cultural Revolution (CYL LS, 1998: 21-22). The League School was revived in 1978 (ibid.: 22), at a time when Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power and the subsequent launch of technocratic modernization created the necessity for forming a new corps of educated and young cadres. The League School’s reinvention mirrored developments in the Party School (Dangxiao 党校) system, which undertook significant initiatives reshaping its curriculum, establishing links with academia, introducing management training, bringing in foreign instructors and allowing specialized institutions to operate under its umbrella (Shambaugh, 2008: 128-160). Since then, the mission of the Party School has been the training of loyal, knowledgeable and competent cadres who can face the complex issues associated with economic development (Brødsgaard and Zheng 2004; Burns, 2004; Shambaugh 2008). Accordingly, the Central League School was reinstated as a distinct training institution for CYL personnel to assist the Party’s efforts in molding the new generation of cadres. In 1985, the League Central Committee and the Ministry of Education established the China Youth University of Political Studies (CYUPS) as an extension of the Tuanxiao and with a specific focus on professional training. The CYUPS operated interchangeably with the League School, with the aim of nurturing future generations of young cadres and instilling the skills necessary to carry out the four modernizations (CYL LS, 1998: 98). From its formal establishment in 1948 until 2013, 92,000 cadres had received training through the Tuanxiao, and an additional 16,000 students graduated from the academic programs of the CYUPS (Table 5.2). The new Central League School had two routes: cadre training through regular short sessions, and the academic route via CYUPS which included 2-year vocational diplomas (zhuanke 专科), Bachelor’s (benke 本科) and Master’s (shuoshi 硕士) degrees, as well as distance learning and night courses. From 1978 to 1990, cadre training was organized around four themes: regular training (renamed ‘rotating training’ after 1986, tuanganbu peixun putongban 团干部培训普通班 ／lunxunban轮训班); courses for ethnic minorities (minzuban 民族班); training for Young Pioneers cadres (shaoganban 少干班); and special short courses (zhuanti duanxunban 专 题短训班). The content of regular courses slightly varied between different sessions, but all included Marxism and Party theory, political economy, youth work theory, Party construction, and youth movement history. More specialized subjects for regular, minority and young pioneer trainings included psychology and philosophy, public speaking, United Front work,

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Table 5.2 The League School in numbers Period

Institution

Number of cadres trained

1948-1966 1978-1985 1986-1997

League School League School League School / China Youth University of Political Studies League School / China Youth University of Political Studies

11113 5442 25439

1998-2013

50000* CYUPS students 1985-2013: 447 postgraduates 12594 BA undergraduates 2939 vocational education 10000 distance learning and night courses

Sources: CYL LS, 1998: 105, 109; CYLCLS, 2013 *This is an approximate figure, based on a total of 92000 cadres reportedly trained between 1948-2013.

minority policy, project management and even artistic direction (CYL LS, 1998: 108-110). Special, tailor-made short courses targeted specific groups of CYL cadres, for instance secretaries in county level committees, and cadres in universities or in major SOEs (ibid.: 112-113). After 1991, the Central Committee of the CYL reorganized training into two groups: a) training series directly planned by the CYL Central Committee (youtuanzhongyang jihua diaoxunde banci xilie 由团中央计划调训的班 次系列), and b) training courses organized by the Central League School (youzhongyangtuanxiao zixing anpai jihua jubande peixun banci xilie 由 中央团校自行安排计划举办的培训班次系列), which focused mainly on specialized and short training. This move, as well as the new subjects that appeared in the curriculum, can be explained in the context of the 1989 political events, and reflected the Party’s anxiety over control and ideological conformity. In addition to the subjects taught earlier, cadres were now asked to study ‘Theory of Youth Ideological and Political Work’ (qingnian sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo lilun 青年思想政治工作理论), ‘Theory of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ (jianshe youzhongguotese shehuizhuyi lilun 建设有中国特色社会主义理论) and ‘Important Practice of the Party in the Current Stage of Socialism’ (dang zaishehuizhuyi xianjieduande zhongyao shijian 党在社会主义现阶段的重要实践) (ibid.: 118-120). In the second half of the 1990s and as the focus of the regime shifted again to economic reforms, the LS partnered with universities in Beijing to introduce specialized management and business studies courses, including: management economics, modern production management, analysis of

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Table 5.3 Educational background of LS/CYUPS instructors Year

Number of instructors

PhD

MA

MA students

BA

2 year degree

Less than 2 year degree

1987 1997

153 137

0 11

26 38

18 8

91 75

14 4

4 1

Source: CYL LS, 1998: 291

accounting statements, corporate finance, economic law, international trade and international finance, corporate strategy, human resource development and management (ibid.: 129-130). The emphasis placed on offering specialized political/managerial knowledge can also be seen in the academic pathways of the CYUPS during this period, leading to 2-year certificates and Bachelor’s degrees,3 as well as in the increase in academically qualified instructors (Table 5.3). In the second term of Jiang Zemin and throughout Hu Jintao’s decade, the Central League School significantly expanded its involvement in cadre training. As Table 5.2 shows, in the period 1998-2013 the League School trained approximately 50,000 cadres. This was achieved partly by the geographical expansion of the Central League School through opening branches in other provinces. In 2006, the CYL Central Committee decided to establish four training bases for League cadres (All-China League Cadre Education and Training Bases Quanguo Tuanganbu Jiaoyu Peixun Jidi 全 国团干部教育培训基地) in Inner Mongolia, Shandong, Chongqing and Liaoning (CYLCC, 23/2006). In Table 5.4 one can see the themes and curriculum used in the 2006 and 2007 sessions of cadre training as organized in the League School’s different training bases. Echoing the ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’ mandate, youth-related topics were included in both sessions, namely social work organization and youth leadership; however, these remained a very small fraction of the curriculum. Once more, the ‘learning outcomes’ in these training sessions aimed at young cadres aspiring to have a career in the Chinese party-state. The composition of teaching staff reflects these goals as the largest pool of instructors were experienced Party and League practitioners. 4 3 For instance, the 1997 academic pathways were in the following subjects: youth ideological education, law, social work and management, national economic management program, journalism (CYL LS, 1998: 172, 182, 189, 197, 201). 4 See List of Outstanding teachers of the National League School (全国团校优秀教师名单) (CYLCC, 24/2004).

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Table 5.4 2006 and 2007 Sessions of the Central League School Year Session theme and location

Curriculum and institutional affiliation of instructors

Youth social work, Central LS Criminal Law, Central LS Chinese legal history, Central LS Cadre eloquence training, Beijing LS CYL work organization & management, Beijing LS CYL cadre qualification certificate training course, Shanghai League School Public speaking, Shanxi LS Database development and use, Shanxi Large state-owned enterprise group CYL LS Microcomputer theory & application, cadre training, Liaoning League School Liaoning LS Thinking and expression, Shanghai LS 2006 Skills training course for young workers in power plants, Liaoning League School Network operating system, Shanghai LS Vocational Journalism, Shandong LS Adventure training, Guangdong League Moral Cultivation, Shandong LS Choreography, Shandong LS School Catering service and management, Shandong LS International youth cadre advanced Youth leadership, Guangdong LS seminar, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Public relations, Chongqing LS Region League School CYL Project management, Guizhou LS Basics of modern logistics, Shaanxi LS Cadre basic job training, Qingdao League School Training course for outstanding grassroots CYL cadres in the central and western regions of China, Shanghai League School

Beijing Private College Youth League Secretary Training Course, Shandong League School

Theory and Practice of Communist Youth League Work in the New Period, Central LS

Training for Grassroots CYL Committee Secretaries, Beijing League School

Introduction to Mao Zedong Thought, Liaoning LS

National young pioneer counselor Shanghai training class, Shanghai 2007 League School CYL cadre training and practice, Hangzhou League School

Positive attitude of cadres and League activities design and innovation, Hebei LS Chinese volunteer service and management, Guangdong LS Theory and practice of League work in ethnic minority areas, Inner Mongolia LS The basics of modern management, Chongqing LS

Sources: CYL CC 2006/20 and 2007/32

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In addition, the Central League School recruited academics from elite universities, and professionals from key bureaucracies with emphasis on public management, law, and Party affairs.5 These scholars and specialists enhanced the training and academic profile of the League School as an institution, but their background affirms the logic of cadre training in the League as an auxiliary process to personnel development in the CCP, in which youth expertise is emphatically marginalized. For instance, the China Youth and Children Research Center (CYCRC), an academic institution with significant research output, supports the League at the national and provincial levels by conducting surveys and sponsoring research programs and publications on youth affairs. However, its involvement in central level cadre training has been token, with CYCRC researchers participating only occasionally as instructors (CYLCC 20/2006 and 32/2007). Overall, in spite of modestly introducing youth work subjects in its curriculum, the Central League School under Hu did not develop into a space where cadres could cultivate skills that were relevant to youth work. As such, the School’s emphasis on political and ‘managerial’ training sustained a knowledge gap on youth affairs that directly affected the position of League cadres in relation to their youth constituency. 5 Department of Training, National Academy of Education Administration (国家教育行政 学院培训部); China University of Political Science and Law (中国政法大学); Chinese Public Administration Society (中国行政管理学会)；China Central Television (中央电视台); School of Economics, Peking University (北京大学经济学院); Graduate School, Central Party School ( 中央党校研究生院)；People’s Liberation Army National Defense University (解放军国防大学) ；China Youth Research Center (中国青少年研究中心); Standing Committee of Beijing Municipal CPPCC (北京市政协常委)；School of Marxism, China University of Political Science and Law ( 中国政法大学马克思主义学院)；Korea-China Youth Friendship Exchange Association (韩中 青少年友好交流协会)；Department of International Politics, School of International Studies, Peking University (北京大学国际关系学院国际政治系); Ministry of Communications (交 通部)；Social Development Research Institute, Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (中国社会科学院社会学研究所社会发展研究室); National Population and Family Planning Commission (国家人口和计划生育委员会); School of Sociology and Population Studies, Renmin University of China (中国人民大学社会与人口学院); Department of Cultural Management, People’s Liberation Army Academy of Art (解放军艺术学院文化管理系)；Art Education Committee, National Education Ministry (国家教育部艺术教育委员会)；Science and Education Department, Central Party School (中央党校科社教研部); School of International Relations, Renmin University of China (中国人民大学国际关系学院)；Marxism-Leninism Research Department, Central Institute of Socialism (中央社会主义学院马列研究部)；School of Labor and Human Resources, Renmin University of China (中国人民大学劳动人事学院) ；Beijing Times Group (北京时代集团); Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council (国务院港澳办交流司)；Party History Research Department, Central Party School (中央党校 党史研究部)；Institute of Education, Tsinghua University (清华大学教育研究所)；National Center for Economic Research,Tsinghua University (清华大学中国经济研究中心)

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The League School at the grassroots Following the adoption of League School reconstruction as a central policy in May 1978 (CYL LS, 1998: 22), its expansion throughout the country faced the difficulty of standardizing the quality of training. Higher education was the obvious place to launch the institutional building of the League School, as it offered not only a reliable pool of recruits and teaching personnel but also direct access to university students, a valuable constituency for the CCP’s new vision of technocratic modernization. The investigation of training at the local level will therefore begin with the League School in academic institutions. It needs to be noted that university LS are rather distinctive cases. Some ‘elite’ universities have developed active Tuanxiao, offering training to aspiring student cadres and even assisting the work of the Central LS. However, variation in the performance and effectiveness of the League School has been high even in these ‘privileged’ spaces of League work. The very existence of University League Schools demonstrates the CCP’s emphasis on recruiting talented students and creating spaces for their socialization with the realities and expectations associated with a career in the party-state. Given the high concentration of qualified instructors and prospective students with strong academic abilities, it is not surprising that I could find cases of very highly institutionalized League Schools. An example of an outstanding Tuanxiao is that of Peking University, established in 1983 (PKU CYLC, 2004). The School was then referred to by students as the ‘Whampoa of Peking University’ (Beida Huangpu 北大黄 埔), named after the famous military academy set up by the Nationalists under Sun Yatsen, an indication of its orientation and mission as an elite Party institution (Interview 30). Not surprisingly, its alumni and cadres moved on to pursue careers as top Party leaders. For example, Premier Li Keqiang, who took office in 2013, was in charge of cadre training at the Peking University League School (Ganbu peixun fuzeren 干部培训负责人). The PKU Tuanxiao has acted both as a model to emulate, and as a constant reminder of the difficulty of replicating its high standards in China’s higher education sector, which is vast and uneven in terms of quality. Indeed, the only commonality of the Tuanxiao in the different campuses visited, was its name. Even universities within the Chinese capital exhibited startling differences in terms of professionalization, frequency of sessions, curriculum and composition of attendees. One of the Comprehensive Universities in Beijing (CU1) that I visited during f ieldwork, offered an exceptional case of a well-organized and forward-looking League School that maintained a Party-oriented core

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while also expanding its curriculum and activities to other areas. The CU1 League School developed three levels of training: basic ( jiceng tuanxiao 基层团校), institutional ( jiguan tuanxiao 机关团校) and high level (gaoji tuanxiao 高级团校), for cadres at different levels in their studies and work posts (CU1 CYLC, 2009c: 2). Sessions were organized every year, taught by a mix of academics and Party/CYL practitioners, and certificates were awarded following examinations, assignments and group presentations. Apart from student CYL cadres, the School admitted Party members, student union cadres, student society secretaries and administrative personnel, thus creating wider opportunities for networking (ibid.). The University League committee secretary acted as the LS head. As can be seen in Table 5.5, the CU1 Tuanxiao curriculum included three types of training: self-education (ziwo jiaoyu 自我教育), practical education (shijian jiaoyu 实践教育) and peer education (tongban jiaoyu 同 伴教育). The self-education curriculum included CCP and Marxist theory, but student cadres have also added readings by classical sociologists such as Max Weber, texts on organization theory, public administration and youth psychology (ibid.). Although the compulsory reading materials of the LS referred exclusively to CCP related subjects, a Tuanxiao cadre explained that students ‘will not simply accept whatever they are being offered’, and unless the content of the books is rich and varied, the LS enrollment and quality of work will decline (Interview 30). Therefore, while Party related subjects constituted the off icial (compulsory) curriculum, the remaining content (electives) was drafted after discussion among the organizing committee members and, quite often, with feedback from previous participants (Interview 30). Practical education included visits to SOEs, villages, hospitals and schools. The participants were expected to investigate, analyze and appraise the conditions under investigation and their reports could, in theory at least, be forwarded to the local People’s Political Consultative Conference. Finally, peer education involved small group learning sessions (approximately eight people per class) and open debates (CU1 CYLC, 2009c). The CU1 League School’s sophistication and professionalism, however, remained quite atypical among the campuses surveyed in both Beijing and Zhejiang. In CU1, the key drivers behind its development were a large group of cadres comprising outstanding students, the continuous financial support of the school, and a tradition of notable former League members with careers in government. In the other four campuses visited, the League School was either absent or indistinguishable from the Party School. This variation among university League schools reflected different levels of commitment

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Table 5.5 Advanced Level League School Training Plan Module category

Module content

Classification Credits

Team building 团队建设

Group meeting 小组见面 Fun games 趣味运动会 Team research 团队调研 Winter vacation individual social practice 个人寒假返乡社会实践 Intercollegiate excellent student exchange 校际学生骨干交流 Various forms of international exchange activities 多种形式的国际交流活动 Visit a government department, business unit, news media etc 参观政府部门、企业单位、新闻媒体等 Team graduation project show 团队毕业设计展示

Compulsory 必修 Elective 选修 Compulsory

2

Compulsory

2

Elective

2

Elective

2

Elective

2

Compulsory

2

Studying recommended books, compulsory readings and write reports 阅读推荐书籍和必读篇目并撰写读书报告 Two seminars on current affairs 两次时事主题研讨会 Submit article to CU 1 Youth Affairs Review 投稿《CU1青年时事评论》 Debate competition 辩论赛 Practice in simulation competition 实务模拟竞赛 Three thematic trainings 三次主题培训

Compulsory

2

Compulsory

2

Elective

2

Elective

2

Social practice 社会实践

Experiential learning 体验学习 Graduation project 毕业设计 Theoretical study 理论学习 Current affairs and policies 时事政策 Practical skills improvement 实务技能提高 Thematic training 主题培训

2 2

Source: CU1 League School Handbook, 2009: 8

and capacity, material shortages and unavailability of instructors, as well as the organizers’ awareness of how local conditions affected youth. In the specialized Universities in Beijing (SU1 and SU2), the Tuanxiao curriculum was essentially an extension of the Party School, offering political lectures and study sessions on government policy documents for League cadres and Party candidates (SU2 CYL, 2010; Interviews 13, 28).

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In the colleges visited in Zhejiang, the ZJ1 League School’s main function was to occasionally organize political lectures for non-League members (Interviews 36, 44). In ZJ2 there was no formal League School and the only reference made by interviewees to Tuanxiao training was in relation to sessions occasionally organized by the city or district level League committees, which were attended by teachers involved in League work (Interview 44). Essentially, both political and youth work training was far from standardized. Professional sessions on youth affairs involving academics or social workers were infrequent even amongst elite academic institutions in Beijing. On the campuses visited in Zhejiang, the only example offered by an interviewee was an annual lecture (dajiangtang 大讲堂) given by a retired Party member with experience in political work in the League (Interview 37). In colleges with a weak League presence such as ZJ2 (which had only recently established a League branch at the time of fieldwork), such lectures did not take place. Unsurprisingly, the teachers in charge of League work in those schools mentioned a lack of training and specialized knowledge as the main drawbacks in League work (Interviews 36, 44). Outside the structured environment of higher education, access to the Tuanxiao as a distinct institution offering youth-related training to full and part time League cadres was significantly minimized. In public organizations, under the ‘dangjian dai tuanjian’ principle, the Party committee was responsible for the training of League cadres. Cadres explained that in public sector entities, such as hospitals, League members were given lectures on Party theory once or twice a year (Interviews 4, 5, 23), in addition to the more standard policy document study for Party members. In the public companies surveyed, the Tuanxiao did not have a distinct presence or impact. The League secretaries interviewed mentioned that occasionally, and depending on the relations of the given company/ organization with the local government Party and League committees, cadres might be invited to attend training sessions or seminars in the Party School, but these were primarily focused on political indoctrination, familiarization with CCP policies and internal organization (Interview 35). As the previous chapter mentions, League cadres would participate in company seminars for improving the work skills of young employees, but they did so in their capacity as company personnel, not as League functionaries (Interviews 35, 48). Overall, the day-to-day operation of League branches in companies and public organizations relied on part-time cadres for whom emulation and habit are the main means available of instruction, rather than participation in a structured training program (Interviews 1, 2, 7, 23, 29, 35, 48).

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League functionaries underlined the importance of renewing CYL cadre training, and directing it towards enabling cadres to engage with young employees in a more meaningful and responsive manner (Xu, 2007; Zhou and Xu, 2007; Li and Liu, 2007). A member of the National Railway League Committee, for instance, reported on the positive effects of ‘adventure-based education’ on cadre training, e.g., cooperative games, outdoor adventure, trust and team-building activities (Xu, 2007: 12-14). He claimed that in the few branches where they were implemented as a means of instruction, adventure-based education methods raised cadre enthusiasm, confidence and ability to take initiatives; improved their communication and cooperation by building a teamwork attitude; and promoted notions of selflessness, and contribution to the common good. But such initiatives, despite the straightforward benefits they have for the renovation of youth work, remain sporadic, and rather peripheral to League training activities and priorities in relation to young employees. Overall, the League School at the workplace can be characterized – at best – as an underdeveloped institution with a prestigious name, given that its activities are infrequent and its curricula are far from standardized. The LS is more sophisticated in some institutions of higher education, but in the vast majority of local organizations surveyed on campus and beyond, it is indistinguishable from the Party School in terms of organization and content. In all cases, though, both part-time and leading cadres exhibited little understanding of the potential the League school harbors as a space for the cultivation of skills relevant to youth work. The absence of bottom-up initiatives for such training demonstrates that the context of subordination in which cadres operated was not conducive to bottom-up renewal of the League’s work methods.

Improving training at the local level Recognizing that local training reflects the local capacity of Party and League committees, the CYL in the Hu-Wen decade introduced policies on local cadre development, as codified in 5-year plans and in programs for cadre exchange and recognition. Of particular interest here is the role of these policies in a) promoting skills and competencies that enhance the ability of cadres to perform their duties according to the League’s expanded mandate, and b) in standardizing League training in different localities. To begin with, the necessity of raising the ‘quality’ (suzhi 素质) and competence (nengli 能力) of cadres is a recurring theme in reports made

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by Party and League officials (2003 CYL Yearbook: 342; 2005 CYL Yearbook: 461; 2006 CYL Yearbook: 327; 2008 CYL Yearbook: 215, 219, 255). From 1999 to 2010, the League initiated the following major training programs to achieve improvement in cadre ‘quality:’ 1) ‘The League Cadres 321 Training Plan’; 2) the cadre training programs of 2002-2005 and 2006-2010; and 3) the ‘National Long-Distance [Education] Class’. The ‘321 Plan’ was arguably a Party-education drive ahead of the 16th National Congress of the CCP and the transfer of power to the 4th generation of leaders under Hu Jintao. It particularized the general directions given by the Party’s ‘1996-2000 National Cadres Education Training Scheme’, setting the ambitious target of training, within three years, all 210,000 full-time League cadres throughout the country (1998-2002 CYL Yearbook, Vol. 2: 948). The 2002-2005 and 2006-2010 training programs had limited concrete targets and provided very few specific directions regarding implementation (1998-2002 CYL Yearbook, Vol. 2: 948-950; 2007 CYL Yearbook: 297-303). Lastly, the ‘Long Distance’ program referred exclusively to the training of cadres in rural areas, instructing League branches on how to utilize long-distance training channels and opportunities (2008 CYL Yearbook: 215). In the documents outlining these programs, it is possible to identify two primary characteristics regarding League cadre development. The first is Party dependency both in ideological and institutional terms, as best exemplified by the periodization of these programs, which coincide with the CCP’s cadre training plans. In terms of content, although the documents, quite unsurprisingly, reflect the ideological trends in the Party at the time of their publication,6 classes on Party ideology, policy and morality consistently remain at the core of training. The 2006-2010 plan, grounded in Hu Jintao’s theory of ‘Scientific Development’, made more provisions than the previous 2002-2005 document for practical and managerial skills and for the involvement of academic educators and resources. However, the prominence of CCP theory and policies in the curriculum remained unchanged, while there were very few and rather vague provisions for the actual conduct of this training in terms of funding, teaching personnel, frequency, and period of study. Regarding institutional dependency, all four documents stress the Party’s leadership, its constant supervision and the hierarchical organization of these programs. In theory, the League school (in the form of the Central CYL-led Chinese Association of Youth Work Colleges Zhongguo Qingnian 6 The two documents reflect the political trends of the time: the first Jiang Zemin’s ‘3 Represents’ and the following, Hu Jintao’s concept of ‘Scientific Development’.

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Gongzuo Yuanxiaoxiehui 中国青年工作院校协会)7 is at the core of the training plans. However, the educators, curriculum and study materials used locally were under the Party’s close supervision. Lastly, the low level of League School institutionalization was explicitly recognized in these documents and, therefore, the Party School was assigned the responsibility of offering LS sessions. Characteristically, the 2008 document on longdistance education programs for rural League cadres, acknowledging the limited capacity of the LS, directed CYL organizations and branches to participate in training programs offered through the Party School (2008 CYL Yearbook: 215-218). Essentially, these policies recognized that in order to be able to operate in some form at the local level, the League School had to rely heavily on the organizational capacity and commitment of local Party committees and the Party School. Dependency, thus, has allowed the LS to maintain its presence in various distant locations, but at the same time severely undermined its ability to develop even a modest degree of autonomy. Perhaps the most straightforward implication was the dominance of political training (lectures on Party theory and policies), even in the most advanced grassroots LS cases. The second characteristic concerns the absence of ‘youth’ as an autonomous policy subject, as League training was essentially considered part of CCP cadre development. The four programs mentioned above, aimed to produce CCP-loyal cadres who could assume posts in different state and Party bureaucracies, but who lacked the training necessary to understand and respond to the psychological, social, legal and developmental aspects of a youth affairs agenda. Apart from ‘vigorously strengthening political education’, training subjects included socialist market economy, modern management and technology, law, accounting and project implementation, while the term ‘youth work’ referred to League administration and awareness of legislation on children and juveniles. Curriculum innovation, in the sense of introducing training on subjects that would improve youth-targeted social work, was not identified as a priority area. The CCP’s aspiration of developing a more professional corps of cadres was also evident in the involvement of academia in the training process stipulated by the above programs. Institutions of higher learning around 7 The Association, established in 1994 under the leadership of the Central Committee of the League and registered under the Ministry of Civil Affairs, is the organization in charge of coordinating the work of League Schools (here branded as Youth Work Colleges) and promoting the education of cadres through seminars, publications and exchange programs. The Association was abolished in 2017 under Xi’s reform of the CYL.

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the country, with Peking University and Tsinghua being the most notable examples, have initiated Master of Public Administration (MPA) programs for Party cadres. CYL functionaries who manage to gain access to these, receive general management education to help them assume positions in the Party and government. Clearly, the directions set by these policy documents fell in the ambit of a more general drive in the Chinese party-state towards younger and better-educated cadres who can exhibit work aptitude and effectiveness and, thus, did not promote a distinctive ‘youth’ agenda. Problems of implementation During fieldwork, interviewees at different levels noted that training remains the most problematic aspect of the League’s work (Interviews 1, 14, 21, 26, 33, 49). Three main factors were identified as responsible for this situation. First, personnel development relied almost entirely on the Party School, consequently mirroring the latter’s own weaknesses in terms of institutionalization and the quality of training offered. The training available for League cadres covered mainly politics and management classes, with no institutional attention to topics that fall under the interdisciplinary category of ‘youth affairs’. The 2002-2005 and 2006-2010 plans discussed above, called for professional educators and for the utilization of modern teaching materials and methods. But with the exception of those few League cadres who had the necessary academic abilities and/or social capital to enter an MPA program like the one described above, training in the League concentrated on the study of Party policies. The vast majority of grassroots organizations visited had no access to an advanced teaching environment, no exposure to a structured curriculum, little awareness of the complexity of the youth agenda and next to no information on international trends in youth work. Second, despite sporadic attempts to raise the quality of the training systems on the ground, there was minimal organizational commitment from the CYL in terms of finances and time allocated to personnel development programs. This hindered their potential and actual impact. The 2002-2005 and 2006-2010 plans did not stipulate any financing from the local or central governments for the training of cadres. Instead, League organizations at all levels were left to cater to their own needs according to the means at their disposal. In addition, the length of training provided by the two plans was rather short, especially at the grassroots level. Central and provincial-level cadres had to undergo at least one week of classes a year, and from the prefectural level and below, where training was most needed, only two days (1998-2002 CYL Yearbook Vol. 2, 2004: 948-950; 2007 CYL Yearbook: 297-303).

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The vice secretary of the Zhejiang City 1 District Committee explained that cadres in her League organization underwent half a day of political thought training every month and a week-long political education session once a year, which included topics such as marriage law and stress management (Interview 49). Again, no classes on specialized youth subjects were mentioned. Under conditions of limited resources, when confronted with pressing demands for cadre training from above, League committees tended to fall back to the familiar ground of carrying out political study sessions, which were inexpensive but also rather unsophisticated. Such political study is indicative of a bureaucracy that concerns itself with the routine reporting of numbers of sessions and participants, paying next to no attention to content and teaching methods, as long as Party theory and the current ideological and policy trends are included. Respondents have characterized these sessions as too abstract, repetitive, intellectually non-stimulating and ultimately of limited usefulness, as they rely on memorization and recitation of passages from Party documents (Interviews 22, 26, 45, 51). Unsurprisingly, committee cadres in both Beijing and Zhejiang remarked that the ‘enthusiasm’ ( jijixing 积极性) of the participants was low (ibid.). Third, grassroots cadre development reflected the poor operational state of CYL branches in less developed areas. The League’s ability to implement its proclaimed training strategies deteriorated when moving from the province to the township levels, from urban to rural settings, and from eastern to western parts of China (Interviews 15, 22). In the rural townships visited, training for cadres was held once a year, and its content was exclusively political study and moral education, supplemented with monthly policy-document readings organized by the local Party committee. Rural functionaries commented that this training was of limited use when dealing with youth affairs (Interviews 45, 46, 56). I need to point out that the townships I visited in Zhejiang province were above the average rural League branches, where cadre training was even more infrequent or nonexistent (Interview 15). Two national-level functionaries explained that due to migration of rural workers, the less developed rural areas were usually left only with the elderly and children, and as a result most of the League organizations existed merely on paper (Interviews 14, 15). Unsurprisingly, initiatives from the center to improve the situation in rural areas focused on establishing channels of communication and disseminating documents of Party theory and policies, rather than on raising the quality of training. For example, the program of long-distance education for rural cadres that, in theory, involved structured learning through hardcopy and online materials, was in practice little more than the inclusion

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Table 5.6 Study subjects of 2004 Minority Youth Cadres Training Class (week long) Training content Spirit of the 16th Party Congress and the “Three Represents” Spirit of the 15th Communist Youth League Congress Marxist theory on minorities Party policy on minorities and theory of socialist market economy Actual condition of economic, cultural and social development in western regions Implementation of the Party’s strategy on the development of western regions New experiences and methods of League work in minority regions Joint study and site visits Source: 2004 CYL Yearbook: 440-441

of League personnel in an existing Party-run program of disseminating political and basic administration content (2008 CYL Yearbook: 215-8). The top-down logic of establishing channels for communication as a means of strengthening political control remained the guiding principle behind cadre development also in minority regions where young people would benefit the most from activities and programs addressing their welfare, educational and recreational needs. However, training for minority cadres aimed at indoctrinating them in Party theory and policies (Interview 15), instead of educating them on how to respond to the social problems that young people were confronted with. As can be seen from Table 5.6, the content of cadre training for minority cadres was also entirely focused on political / managerial topics. Lastly, as dependency ensures that the Party’s priorities dominated the League’s top-down efforts in the field of training, juniority reduced the impetus for bottom-up initiative in renewing its content and focus. Due to the age limits attached to specific positions in the League, cadres remained relatively inexperienced and embedded in disadvantageous positions in political and generational hierarchies in their place of work. Being at the beginning or in the early stages of their career, they were confronted with paths of advancement that would inevitably lead them outside the League and the sphere of youth work. In this context, cadres needed to primarily prove themselves competent at implementing orders from the Party committee, and as loyal and skillful administrators with leadership potential. The absence of any pro-youth incentives, material or ‘purposive’ (Wilson, 1973), further hindered the potential for bottom-up renewal. During fieldwork, committee secretaries and cadres across different spaces explained that they did not know how to engage young people and had little time to do so, let alone to introduce new methods of work

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and training (Interviews 16, 22, 26, 37, 52). Many interviewees were highly critical of the ‘quality’ of their peers, complaining about their self-serving attitude and motivations at work (Interviews 2, 11, 16, 24, 36, 48). But rather than being a matter of ‘low individual quality’, as it was usually presented, this was the outcome of existing structural limitations that incapacitated cadre agency and initiative. The space for cadres’ purposeful action, already limited due to dependency on the Party committee, is further reduced as these potential agents of renewal are conditioned by factors that turn their age into a disadvantage: occupying junior positions in workplace hierarchies; having no prospect of a career in the field of youth affairs; operationalizing ‘youth’ as a politically subordinated identity instead of a diverse social category requiring channels of expression and representation, as well as welfare attention and responsiveness. Although there were spaces in which cadres had informed renewal of training, as in the League School of CU1, these must be treated as exceptions rather than as indicating a trend. This discussion of nationwide programs and grassroots training in the period under investigation, shows that youth work was not defined by actual social needs. Ultimately, the ‘shy’ involvement of institutions such as the CYCRC in training and the absence of interactions with academia indicate that cadres did not acquire professional knowledge on youth affairs.

Personnel exchange and recognition programs The aforementioned nationwide cadre development policies were supplemented by personnel exchanges, which included short and long-term secondments to League organizations in different provinces and localities, as well as nationwide programs for recognizing cadre and branch achievements. Regarding personnel exchanges, the annual ‘Training Plan’ (peixun jihua 培训计划) for cadres from western regions and minorities, and the ‘PhD Service Group’ (boshi fuwutuan 博士服务团), were designed to foster the transfer of knowledge to disadvantaged areas (1998-2002 CYL Yearbook Vol. 2: 1163-1164; 2008 CYL Yearbook: 255). The potential benefits of exchange schemes were twofold: League organizations in the less developed regions could benefit from the introduction of new methods of work; and cadres from eastern provinces could gain awareness of the actual social and economic conditions of youth in the inland provinces, and receive feedback on policy implementation in China’s more remote localities. As a central CYL cadre noted in relation to China’s western regions: ‘we need to learn more about

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them and they more about us’ (Interview 15). In reality, however, these exchange programs were not designed to raise the League’s responsiveness, since their political character and small scale compromised their effectiveness in promoting the League’s expanded mandate. Regarding their character, the only ‘youth’ element in these exchange programs was that they were co-administered by the League and intended for young cadres. Cadre exchange falls under the Party’s wider effort to rejuvenate its personnel with younger and skilled individuals; therefore, participants were not transferred to youth-related posts but to government and Party departments where they were trained in the normal functions of the Chinese bureaucracy. In their new posts, they gained administrative experience rather than specialized, transferable knowledge on social work. Two examples are offered here. First, the ‘PhD Service Group’ was a program jointly implemented every year since 19998 by the CYL Central Committee and the CCP Central Organization Department – a clear indication of its subordination to Party personnel development. It was designed for cadres with postgraduate degrees mainly in science and engineering subjects, and stipulated assignments for a period of one year to local governments in western provinces. In addition to academic credentials, the participants had to be in good health and under 45 years old, have at least two years of work experience, and possess ‘good political qualities’, management and technical skills. Their destination units were economic development-related departments that required such technical competencies (1998-2002 CYL Yearbook Vol.2: 1163-1164). Similarly, the ‘Training Plan’, initiated in 1997, concentrated on cadres from western provinces. The participants were League secretaries from the county level and above, and those from a minority background were prioritized (2008 CYL Yearbook: 255). The CCP’s political objectives, namely the cultivation of political loyalty and of a spirit of engagement in economic development, were quite straightforward and frequently expressed in related documents and speeches. As described by the League Central Committee secretariat in the conclusions of the 2008 session in regard to the goals of the minority cadres exchange program (ibid.): First, we must stress the issue of education, as educating minority youths is an important force in protecting the unity of the country and of the nationalities, promoting social stability and building a harmonious society. 8

On an experimental level in 1999 and formally since 2001.

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Second, we must raise the ability to serve the youth by strengthening the League’s impact on the focal point of minority youth development. Third, we must put forth the effort of cultivating youth talent, be adept at training, serving and consolidating youth talent, and continuously offer talent and intellectual support for the construction and development of minority areas. Fourth, we should strive to improve the overall quality [of cadres] to become a model and example for young people.

Regarding the issue of scale, the first important limitation of these programs was the exclusion from such schemes of township- and village-level cadres. The fact that those at the forefront of youth policy implementation were deprioritized in exchange schemes, in favor of cadres closer to leading positions at the higher levels of administration, is consistent with the aim of nurturing loyal cadres to make them capable of handling political and administrative issues and assuming leading posts. Secondly, the scale and frequency of these exchange programs, as well as visits abroad for familiarization with foreign youth-focused state agencies, were considerably smaller compared with other training practices, and access was restricted to a small number of cadres. Characteristically, between 1999 and 2008, the total number of participants in the ‘PhD Service Group’ scheme reached a 10-year total of a mere 920 individuals (1998-2002 CYL Yearbook Vol.2: 1163-1164). Similarly, the ‘Training Plan’ estimated around 50 cadres per year to be seconded to eastern provinces, and another 50 to attend limited exchange periods to provincial and prefectural-level government and Party units (2008 CYL Yearbook: 255). The large proportion of the funding for these programs burdened the departments involved – a factor that further limited their size. Ultimately, the small scale of exchange programs is another evidence of the very weak autonomy of the League in designing training policies, as well as of its auxiliary role in assisting cadre development in the Party. Recognition and awards Lastly, maintaining a corps of cadres, the large majority of whom receive no form of material compensation, inevitably places high value on recognition as a means of increasing their motivation, commitment and performance, by boosting morale and offering examples for emulation. The CCP is very familiar with the normative instruction of its cadres and members through political and moral indoctrination and the extensive use of awards for model workers, cadres, youths, etc. (Landsberger, 2010; Funari and Mees, 2013).

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Table 5.7  All-China Outstanding League Cadres Award Winners Cadres

2008

2008%

2009 2009%

2010

2010%

Total

%

Total cadres Rural grassroots cadres Education sector cadres County cadres*

189 6

100 3.17

104 9

100 8.66

104 4

100 3.85

397 19

100 4.79

32

16.93

22

21.15

26

25

80

20.15

54

City** cadres Companies*** State organs Army

27 50 13 7

28.57

30

28.85

18

17.31

102

25.69

14.29 26.45 6.88 3.70

4 27 8 4

3.85 25.96 7.69 3.85

17 23 12 4

16.35 22.12 11.54 3.85

48 100 33 15

12.09 25.19 8.31 3.78

* County cadres include county level districts and autonomous counties. ** City cadres include every level of cities. *** In their vast majority state-owned. Source: CYD 2009; 2010; 2011

Accordingly, the League has its own system of awards in place to reward members, cadres and committees. The selection process involves nominations and consultation, at least on paper. Starting at the grassroots level, committees would nominate candidates (often just one) for the award at the level above. This was followed by ‘consultation’, in the form of an open invitation for opinions on the designated candidate, before a final recommendation was put forward. In practice, however, the participation of League members and cadres at the base was minimal, since the Party committee in coordination with the League secretary decides on and promotes the nominee (Interviews 26, 29, 45). In addition to the obvious propaganda purposes it serves, a cadre recognition program can promote the standardization of work among branches operating in different localities, by broadcasting the message that efficiency is rewarded along with loyalty, and by systematically encouraging cadres from China’s poorest regions to perform better through preferential acknowledgement of their efforts. However, the distribution of CYL cadre-specific awards, namely the ‘All-China Outstanding League Cadre’ and the ‘Red Flag League Committee’ replicated inequalities based on occupation and geography, instead of promoting cadres from disadvantaged backgrounds. The figures in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 confirm the internal imbalances that existed in the League’s organizational development, as urban committees in the east and central provinces consistently outperformed those in rural and western parts of the country. Characteristically, during the 3 years under

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Table 5.8 Red Flag League Committee (Grassroots Branches) Award Winners Branches

2008

2008 %

2009

2009 %

2010

2010 %

Total

%

Rural

50

10.64

42

13.63

37

10.33

129

11.35

Education sector Eastern Region* Central Region** Western Region*** PLA

98 157 118 122 30

20.85 33.4 25.1 25.95 6.38

70 128 78 83 12

22.72 41.53 25.32 26.93 3.90

96 145 99 86 15

26.82 40.5 27.65 24.02 4.19

264 430 295 291 57

23.24 37.84 25.96 25.62 5.02

China Railway

9

1.91

2

0.65

3

0.84

14

1.23

Various*^

34

7.23

5

1.62

10

2.79

49

4.31

* Beijing (3-year total: 30, 3-year %: 2.64%), Tianjin (25, 2.2%), Hebei (52, 4.58%), Liaoning (29, 2.55%), Shanghai (29, 2.55%), Jiangsu (64, 5.63%), Zhejiang (48, 4.23%), Fujian (33, 2.9%), Shandong (65, 5.72%), Guangdong (45, 3.96%), Hainan (10, 0.88%) ** Shanxi (29, 2.55%), Jilin (29, 2.55%), Heilongjiang (34, 2.99%), Anhui (37, 3.26%), Jiangxi (25, 2.2%), Henan (61, 5.37%), Hubei (39, 3.43%), Hunan (41, 3.61%) *** Inner Mongolia (22, 1.94%), Guangxi (29, 2.55%), Chongqing (36, 3.17%), Sichuan (44, 3.87%), Guizhou (22, 1.94%), Yunnan (23, 2.02%), Tibet (7, 0.62%), Shaanxi (32, 2.82%), Gansu (26, 2.29%), Qinghai (11, 0.97%), Ningxia (10, 0.88%), Xinjiang (29, 2.55%) *^ SOEs, government departments, banks, airlines Source: CYD 2009; 2010; 2011

examination, provinces such as Shandong, Henan and Jiangsu each won an equal number of ‘Red Flag Awards’ as the combined committees of Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet. In terms of occupation, cadres and branches in schools, state companies, organizations and government are dominating the award winners list, while rural cadres and branches occupy a mere 4.79% and 11.35% respectively. This is a distortion, as the CYL claimed that more than a quarter of its membership came from rural areas. CYL awards for cadres and branches have limited significance for the large majority of members, young people, and the public in general. However, they carry a certain weight as evidence of a given committee’s performance, and indirectly also of their access to training and personnel development opportunities. A close reading of the background of prize winners in the annual May 4 issue of China Youth Daily discloses that the pattern for the entire system of rewards is intended to acknowledge well-established League units and individuals, that have consistently exhibited the ability to win such awards from the grassroots upwards. Branches in less advantaged settings were in effect penalized: less experienced cadres, in organizations facing material constraints and without a comparable rich and long record of achievements, had little chance of recognition. The prominence of the urban public sector, and examples such as the PLA and the China Railway

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League committees that combined have more Red Flag organizations than any individual province, demonstrated that the CYL’s recognition program was not used to encourage cadres from disadvantaged areas to improve their work. Overall, personnel exchange and recognition programs were preoccupied with exposing League cadres to the wider political and organizational practices of the CCP and with offering a structured path for promotion to the most talented individuals. The necessity to increase and standardize the League’s capacity for responsiveness was not reflected in these nation-wide cadre development policies.

Conclusion Turning back to the opening question of whether the Communist Youth League managed to develop training programs that equipped its cadres to meet the multifaceted challenges of its expanded mandate, the above examination of its personnel institutions and policies can be summed up as establishing major inconsistencies between discourse and reality. Overall, the key empirical finding from this examination is that training in the League remained geared towards creating generalist cadres, with the knowledge and skills necessary to pursue a future career in the Party state, rather than in youth affairs. The League School did not manage to develop a specialization in social work for young people, as its programs concentrated almost exclusively on political/managerial training for cadres. What is more, even in wealthy localities like those surveyed here, the School remained weakly institutionalized, depending on the local CCP committee and Party School for its operation. Locally, even as an auxiliary institution to the CCP’s cadre training system, the Tuanxiao was of very limited effectiveness and replicated the same problems in standardization of training (referring to frequency and quality) that authors have pointed out in relation to the Party School. Similarly, the national policies of 2002-2012, aimed at improving training at the local level, were not designed to cultivate a corps of cadres with the necessary knowledge and work orientation towards social problems, while the reward and exchange programs demonstrated anaemic provisions for promoting training opportunities across different localities and for improving the CYL’s work in poor regions. The very low impetus for bottom-up introduction of youth training is evident both in the national training institutions and policies, and in the

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spaces where fieldwork took place. League cadres at all levels operated in a context of Party dependency and juniority, in which they had no motive to pursue either the institutionalization of social work or, in the long run, their own relevant training. With a limited tenure in the League, due to age restrictions, and with a career path based on incentives and training that direct their ambitions and skills outside the sphere of youth affairs, cadres did not see any value in exploring and introducing new methods of training. Even the instances of curriculum innovation I identified in League Schools of elite universities did not aim at having a societal impact, but instead revealed a desire to make training in the CYL more relevant (and engaging) for participants on campus. Due to these limitations, cadres were unprepared for the demanding nature of youth work, which required norms and skills not systematically promoted in the League. Alas, the CYL’s aspiration to respond to young people’s needs and demands would require a very different corps of cadres than those developed through its training schemes. In the next chapter, I will turn to the analysis of the League as youth’s transmission belt by examining its attempts to substantiate the claim of becoming more responsive to societal demands. These include the CYL’s activities and campaigns, and its engagement with social organizations.

References 1998-2002 Zhongguo Gongqingtuan Nianjian (1998-2002 CYL Yearbook). Vol. 2. Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe (China Youth Publishing), 2004. 2003 Zhongguo Gongqingtuan Nianjian (2003 CYL Yearbook). Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe (China Youth Publishing), 2004. 2005 Zhongguo Gongqingtuan Nianjian (2005 CYL Yearbook). Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe (China Youth Publishing), 2006. 2007 Zhongguo Gongqingtuan Nianjian (2007 CYL Yearbook). Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe (China Youth Publishing), 2008. 2008 Zhongguo Gongqingtuan Nianjian (2008 CYL Yearbook). Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe (China Youth Publishing), 2009. An, Guoqi, Ma Xingmin, Li Wuyi, and Deng Xiquan. 2008 Zhongguo Qingnian Gongzuo Lanpi Shu: Dangdai Chengshi Gongqingtuan Gongzuo Yanjiu Baogao (The 2008 Blue Book of Chinese Youth Work: A Research Report on Contemporary Communist Youth League Work in Urban Areas). Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshe, 2009.

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Angeloff, Tania, and Marylène Lieber. ‘Equality, Did You Say? Chinese Feminism after 30 Years of Reforms’. China Perspectives, 4, December 2012, pp. 17-24. https:// doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.6014. Brødsgaard, Kjeld Erik, and Yongnian Zheng. Bringing the Party Back In: How China Is Governed. Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004. Chow, Esther Ngan-Ling, Naihua Zhang, and Jinling Wang. ‘Promising and Contested Fields: Women’s Studies and Sociology of Women/Gender in Contemporary China’. Gender & Society Vol. 18, No. 2, April 2004, pp. 161-188. https://doi. org/10.1177/0891243203261128. Croll, Elisabeth. Changing Identities of Chinese Women: Rhetoric, Experience, and Self- Perception in Twentieth-Century China. Hong Kong; London; Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Hong Kong University Press; Zed Books, 1995. CYD. China Youth Daily. 2008 Niandu Quanguo Youxiu Gongqingtuan Ganbu Mingdan (List of National Outstanding Communist Youth League Cadres in 2008), 4 May 2009. http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2009-05/04/content_2649006. htm. Last accessed 20 November 2019. CYD. China Youth Daily. 2009 Niandu Quanguo Youxiu Gongqingtuan Ganbu Mingdan (List of National Outstanding Communist Youth League Cadres in 2009), 4 May 2010. http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2010-05/04/content_3212666. htm. Last accessed 20 November 2019. CYD. China Youth Daily. 2010 Niandu Quanguo Youxiu Gongqingtuan Ganbu Mingdan (List of National Outstanding Communist Youth League Cadres in 2010), 4 May 2011 http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2011-05/04/nw.D110000zgqnb_20110504_1-08. htm. Last accessed 20 November 2019. CYLCC. Communist Youth League Central Committee. ‘Quanguo Gongqingtuan Zuzhi Jiben Qingkuang Tongji Biao’ (Table of Basic Statistical Information of Nationwide CYL Organizations), n.d. http://www.gqt.org.cn/history/situation/. Accessed 10 October 2018. CYLCC. Communist Youth League Central Committee. ‘Gongqingtuan Zhongyang Guanyu Biaozhang Quanguo Tuanganbu Jiaoyu Peixun Gongzuo Xianjin Geren、Quanguotuanxiao Youxiu Jiaoshi de Jueding (The Communist Youth League Central Committee Commends Outstanding Individuals for their Work on the Education and Training of Cadres Throughout the Country – National League School Decision on Excellent Instructors) – No 24/2004, 10 September 2004. http://www.gqt.org.cn/documents/zqf/200705/t20070508_25550.htm. Accessed 10 October 2018. CYLCC. Communist Youth League Central Committee. ‘Guanyu 2004 Nian Quanguo Fazhan Tuanyuan Gongzuo Qingkuang de Tongbao’ (Notifijication on the Nationwide Situation on the Development of Youth League Members

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in 2004), 5 September 2005. . CYLCC. Communist Youth League Central Committee. ‘Gongqingtuan Zhongyang Guanyu Biaozhang Diyijie Quanguo Tuanxiao Jingping Peixun Xiangmu, Jingping Kechengde Jueding’ (The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League on the Commendation of the First National Quality Training Programs and Courses for Youth League Schools), No. 20/2006, 21 March 2006. http://www.gqt.org.cn/documents/zqf/200611/t20061128_1511. htm. Accessed 10 October 2018. CYLCC. Communist Youth League Central Committee. ‘Guanyu Mingming Neimenggu Zizhiqu Tuanxiao Deng 4 Suo Tuanxiao Wei “Quanguo Tuanganbu Jiaoyu Peixun Jidi” de Jueding (Decision about Designating the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Youth League School and other 4 Youth League Schools as “National Youth League Cadre Education and Training Bases”)’, No. 23/2006, 5 April 2006, http://www.gqt.org.cn/documents/zqf/200611/t20061128_1514.htm. Accessed 10 October 2018. CYLCC. Communist Youth League Central Committee. ‘Gongqingtuan Zhongyang Guanyu Biaozhang 2007 Niandu Quanguo Tuanxiao Jingping Peixun Xiangmu, Jingping Peixun Kecheng de Jueding’ (The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League on the Commendation of National Quality Training Programs and Courses for Youth League Schools in 2007), No. 32/2007, 16 November 2007. http://www.gqt.org.cn/documents/zqf/200711/t20071119_51556. htm. Accessed 10 October 2018. CYL LS. Gongqingtuan Zhongyang Tuanxiao – Zhongguo Qingnian Zhengzhi Xueyuan Zhi (Records of the Central CYL School and the China Youth University of Political Studies). Gaige Chubanshe, 1998. CYLCLS. Communist Youth League Central League School. ‘Xuexiao Lishi’ (History of the School). May 2013 Update. http://www.sxahsh.net/html/.xxgkxxls.html. Accessed 30 March 2019. CU1 CYL. CU1 Communist Youth League Committee ‘CU1 Di 26 Qi Tuanxiao Xueyuan Shouce (Handbook of the 26th Session of the CU1 League School)’ 2009c. Ding, Juang. ‘Fulian Ganbu Dui Fulian Zuzhi de Renzhi yu Pingjia (ACWF Cadre’s knowledge and evaluation of the ACWF organization)’, Zhongguo Nüzi Xueyuan Xuebao, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2006. Funari, Rachel and Mees, Bernard. ‘Socialist Emulation in China: Worker Heroes Yesterday and Today’. Labor History. Vol. 54. No.3, 2013, pp. 240-255. Gao, Xiaoxian. ‘From the Heyang Model to the Shaanxi Model: Action Research on Women’s Participation in Village Governance’, in Harriet Evans and Julia C. Strauss (Eds.) Gender in Flux: Agency and Its Limits in Contemporary China.

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The China Quarterly Special Issues, New Series, No. 10. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 54-82. Jin, Yihong. ‘The All China Women’s Federation: Challenges and Trends’, in PingChun Hsiung, Maria Jaschok, and Cecilia Nathansen Milwertz (Eds.), Chinese Women Organizing: Cadres, Feminists, Muslims, Queers. Oxford; New York: Berg, 2001, pp. 123-140. —. ‘‘Fulian Zuzhi: Tiaozhan Yu Weilai’ (The ACWF Organization: Challenges and Future)’, in Lin Tan and Baihong Liu, Zhongguo Funü Yanjiu Shinian Huigu (Review on the Chinese Women’s Studies in Recent 10 Years). Beijing: Zhonghua Nüzi Xueyuan Xuebao, 2005. Kanter, Rosabeth Moss; Barry A Stein; Todd Jick. The Challenge of Organizational Change: How Companies Experience It and Leaders Guide It. Free Press; Maxwell Macmillan Canada; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992. Kou, Chien-wen, and Wen-Hsuan Tsai. ‘‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System’. The China Journal, Vol. 71, January 2014, pp. 153-171. Landsberger, Stefan R. ‘Learning by What Example? Educational Propaganda in Twenty-first-Century China’. Critical Asian Studies. Vol.33. No. 4, 2010, pp. 541-571. Li, Jieran. ‘Gaoxiao Gongqingtuan Gongzuo Fazhande Youxiao Tujing’ (Approaches to the Development of CYL Work in Colleges and Universities). Journal of Hebei Normal College of Science and Technology Vol. 7, No. 1, 2008, pp. 90-93. Li, Min; Liu Xiqin. ‘Ba Wo Yiyuan Yedian, Chuangxin Gongqingtuan Gongzuo’ (Innovate the Work of the CYL According to the Hospital’s Characteristics), Yiyuan Wenhua, Vol. 11, No. 8, 2007. People’s Daily. ‘Quanguo Gongqingtuanyuan Da 7214.6 Wanming’ (There are 72,146 Thousand Youth League Members Nationwide), 5 May 2006. http:// paper.people. com.cn/rmrb/html/2006-05/05/content_5817308.htm. Accessed 25 April 2019. People’s Daily. ‘Guangdong Gongqingtuan Litui Shuniuxing Zuzhi Jianshe’ (The Guangdong Communist Youth League Implements Hub Organization Construction), 24 December 2012, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2012/1224/ c70731-19988173.html. Accessed 18 April 2018. PKU CYLC. Peking University Communist Youth League Committee. Gongqingtuan Zai Beida [The Communist Youth League in Peking University], Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2004. PRC Government. The Central Government of the People’s Republic of China. ‘Quanguo Gongyou Gongqingtuanyuan 7543.9 Wanming Jiceng Tuanzuzhi 294.6 Wange’ (There are 75,439 Thousand Youth League Members and 2946 Thousand Youth League Organizations), 4 May 2008b. http://www.gov.cn/ jrzg/2008-05/04/content_961315.htm. Accessed 25 April 2019.

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PRC Government. The Central Government of the People’s Republic of China. ‘Jiezhi 2008 Niandi Woguo Gongqingtuanyuan Zongshu Dadao 7858.8 Wanming’ (There are 78,588 Thousand Youth League Members in our Country by the end of 2008), 3 May 2009. http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-05/03/content_1302922.htm. Accessed 25 April 2019. PRC Government. The Central Government of the People’s Republic of China. ‘Zuixin Tongji Shuju: Zhongguo Gongqingtuan Tuanyuan Dadao 8990.6 Wanming’ (Latest data: there are 89,906 Thousand Youth League Members), 3 May 2013. http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-05/03/content_2395487.htm. Accessed 25 April 2019. Shanghai CYL. ‘Tuanshiweishuji Pan Min Zai Shanghai Gongqingtuan Xiezhu Zhengfu Guanli Qingnian Shiwu Zhabeiqu Xianchang Tuijinhuishangde jJianghua (Speech by Pan Min, Secretary of the City Communist Youth League Committee, at the Zhabei District On-Site Promotion Meeting On Assisting the Government in Managing Youth Affairs)’ Shanghai Youth Website, 13 April 2009. http://www.shyouth.net/html/shequqingshaonian/sqqsn_ldjh/2009-04-13/ Detail_30476.htm. Accessed 13 September 2012. Shambaugh, David L. China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. Woodrow Wilson Center Press; University of California Press, 2008. SU2 CYL. SU2 Communist Youth League Committee ‘SU2 Daxue Tuaxiao Tuanke Peixun Jiaoxue Dagang (SU2 University League School ‘League Training’ Syllabus)’, 2010. Tsimonis, Konstantinos. ‘‘Purpose’ and the Adaptation of Authoritarian Institutions: The Case of China’s State Feminist Organization’. Journal of Chinese Political Science Vol. 21, No. 1, March 2016, pp. 57-74. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11366-015-9375-x. Tsui, Kai-yuen, and Youqiang Wang. ‘Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu: Fiscal Decentralization in China’. The China Quarterly Vol. 177, March 2004, pp. 71-90. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741004000050. Wang, Liping and Zhao Fei. 2009. ‘Gaige Kaifang 30nian Gongqingtuan Guanli Qingshaonian Shiwude Moshi Yu Jingyan’ (Patterns and Experiences of the Management of Youth Affairs by the CYL during the Thirty Years of Reform and Opening Up). Youth Guide, No. 1, 2009, pp. 17-24. Wilson, James Q. Political Organizations. NY: Basic Books, 1973. Xi, Jieying and Liu Junyan. 2009. ‘Dangdai Zhongguo Qingnian Quanyi Zhuangkuang Yanjiu Baogao’ (Research Report on the Rights of Modern Chinese Youth). Beijing Yanjiu Chubanshe, 2009. Xu, Hanqiu. ‘Tielu Gongqingtuan Zuzhi Yunyong Liqi Jiaoyu Chuangxin Gongqingtuan Gongzuo Fangfa de Shijian Yu Yanjiu’ (Empirical Research on the CYL Organizations in the Railways’ Department’s Use of Adventure-Based

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Education to Renovate the CYL’s Work Methods). Guangdong Qingnian Ganbu Xueyuan Xueyuanbao, 2007. Youth Daily. Qingnian Canyu Shehui Jianshe Reqing Gaozhang (Young People Enthusiastically Participate in Social Construction), 11 December 2009, p. A08. Zheng, Changzhong. 2008. ‘Guanxi Kongjian Zaizao de Zhengzhi Luoji – Qingnian Zhongxin Jianshe Yu Zhengdang Qingnian Jichu Zhong Zhu’ (The Political Logic of Rebuilding the Spatial Relationship: Establishing Youth Centers and Rebuilding the Basis of Party Youth). Fudai Qingnian Yanjiu (Contemporary Youth Studies) No. 1, 2008, pp. 21-28. Zhou, Shengguo, and Hui Xu. ‘Xin Xingshi Xia Guoyou Qiye Gongqingtuan Gongzuo Cunzai de Wenti Ji Duice (Problems and Solutions of the Communist Youth League’s Work in State Enterprises under the New Situation)’. Daqing Shehui Kexue, No. 2, 2007.

6

In Search of Responsiveness Abstract Under Hu Jintao, the League attempted to increase its social work profile by, for instance, introducing employment schemes for graduates, launching nationwide efforts to build youth centers and organizing mass volunteer campaigns. Chapter 6 investigates these efforts and finds that the majority of the League’s social work activities were actually directed to non-youth related areas by the Party and other ‘senior’ government departments. As a result, the League’s own policies in youth employment, youth infrastructure and public consultation processes, were de-prioritized and exhibited poor results. In addition, the CYL failed to develop social work and synergies with non-state youth organizations because of contradictions with its problematic identity as an organization for ‘advanced youth’ and as a corporatist agency of the Party. Keywords: responsiveness, social work, youth affairs, consultation, social organizations

‘Serving Youth’ (fuwu qingnian 服务青年) is an old slogan in the Communist Youth League, that preceded ‘Keeping Youth Satisfied’. But throughout the Hu-Wen decade, the League actually appeared to be more engaged than ever with youth affairs: from employment schemes for university students to charities for children from China’s poor regions, from nationwide efforts to build youth centers in urban communities to mass volunteer campaigns, the League actually attempted to increase its relevance for its constituency. The expansion of the League’s social mandate at a national level was a conscious and pragmatic response to its organizational decline outside the walls of educational institutions. As cadres I interviewed repeatedly explained, the League attempted to ‘cover youth’ ( fugai qingnian 覆盖青 年) by increasing its activities and engagement with youth affairs in an attempt to improve its ‘attractiveness’ (xiyinli 吸引力) to young people. Put simply, since youth could not be reached through the traditional means

Tsimonis, Konstantinos D., The Chinese Communist Youth League: Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2021 doi: 10.5117/9789462989863_ch06

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of organizational expansion, the League would engage them through nationwide projects and campaigns. Examples from its social work were constantly invoked in CCP and CYL reports and speeches to showcase the League’s responsiveness to young people’s needs, demands and aspirations. However, more careful scrutiny is required to understand their actual social impact, and their effect on the CYL’s mode of operation and its relation with Chinese youth. This chapter will investigate the League’s performance in this regard by appraising its youth work nationally and locally. Social work can revitalize a mass organization’s agenda, promote the professionalism of its members, allow new ideas to challenge established beliefs and outdated work methods, and increase its appeal. In the period under examination, apart from the customary cleaning of public spaces and visits to elderly homes and orphanages, League committees were involved in a very wide range of projects: job fairs for graduates, hotlines for children, charity work, micro-f inance schemes for young peasants, environmental conservation projects, and various cultural and educational activities. Table 6.1 shows a substantial (quantitative) increase in the League’s social work in the period under examination, with the CYL Central Committee (CC) initiating a series of campaigns and activities throughout the country.1 This increase corresponds to an overall expansion of social policies that characterized the Hu-Wen decade (Brown, 2012; Howell and Duckett, 2018). Did this expansion breathe new life into the organization, extending the League’s social reach and augmenting its capacity for responsiveness? The investigation of the CYL’s social work is organized here in three sections. The first section examines the operational norms for youth work, as observed during fieldwork and through interviews with cadres. Has the League in the local and national government escaped the interplay of dependency and juniority that prevented it from becoming committed, professional, and effective in campuses and workplaces, as previously examined? The second section investigates the CYL’s key areas of youth work: promoting youth employment and entrepreneurship, creating youth infrastructure, protecting children’s and adolescents’ rights, and opening up consultation channels. Youth work requires planning and execution of 1 Certain activities have a double character, for example, the promotion of employment and entrepreneurship, which falls under the categories of both social work and economic development (there are 13 such activities in total). Further, although all activities involve a strong propaganda component, I have only recorded here those that are exclusively propaganda-oriented.

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Table 6.1 Content of CYL activities initiated at the national level, 1980-2007 Year

1980-9 1990-9 2000-7 Total

Moral & political education

Institutional Capacity Building

Social Work

4 12 28 44

1 8 8 17

5 13 41 59

Environmental Economic protection development 0 3 5 8

13 10 20 43

Source: Appendix list 2

social work, participation in policy making, and cooperation with local governments and Party committees. Did the League manage to acquire the necessary expertise, autonomy and bureaucratic status to lead social work in these areas? The last section will concentrate on the League’s associational space and on its abilities to cooperate with social organizations and to communicate with informal youth groups. The key question here is whether the League developed synergies and negotiated forms of cooperation with social actors or, instead, pursued their co-optation and control. The cases examined in this chapter were chosen through purposeful sampling aimed at covering the social work initiatives that were identified by interviewees as the most important, in terms of scale and impact. I assessed cases from the CYL’s key flagship projects in the period of interest, including the Project Hope, Go West Project, and the expansion of volunteer activities and youth infrastructure. In addition, the search for cases of best practice led me outside Beijing and Zhejiang, where the majority of fieldwork for this book was carried out. For this reason, the discussion of the CYL’s responsiveness in this Chapter also considers initiatives in Shandong and Shanghai, as proposed by League functionaries and Chinese youth studies researchers during fieldwork. I will begin with an examination of the normative context of youth work in the League.

Youth work norms Social work in the CYL revealed four entrenched norms that were closely associated with the top-down definition of youth as a ‘junior’ political subject: a) generalist scope, b) didactic purpose, c) vertical decision-making process, and d) elitism.

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Generalist scope The f irst norm is the Maoist-era understanding of League work as generalist in nature, which echoes the ‘reserve force’ mentality and Lei Feng’s bold and all-encompassing spirit of ‘serving the people’, as summarized in the phrase: ‘the individual is for the revolution, like a screw in a machine’ (yige ren dezuoyong，duiyu geming shiye laishuo，jiuru yijia jiqishangde yike luosiding ‘一个人的作用，对于革命事业来说，就如 一架机器上的一颗螺丝钉’). Characteristically, Table 6.2 demonstrates that propaganda and political activities dominated the Beijing League Committee’s activities in 2010. These included ceremonies, parades, and themed events according to the PRC’s political calendar (May 1st, May 4th, June 1 st , October 1 st). In terms of social work, the majority of Beijing League’s activities were directed towards non-youth areas, such as environmental conservation projects, natural disaster relief, and general public services. League committees throughout the period under examination were involved in a very diverse scope of events: celebrating role models such as Lei Feng and Zhang Haidi, the astronauts Yang Liwei and Zhang Zhigang; organizing activities in relation to the Beijing Olympics (2008), the Shanghai EXPO and the Guangzhou Asian Games (both in 2010); and taking part in government publicity events, such as opening ceremonies for trade exhibitions and sport competitions, patriotically themed TV shows, etc. An illustration of the CYL’s generalist mode of work in urban areas was its involvement in city transportation. In 2010, the municipal government of Beijing launched the ‘Beijing CYL 3510 Action’ (Beijing Gongqingtuan 3510 Xingdong 北京共青团3510行动), a city-wide campaign promoting the idea of ‘walking for three km, riding a bicycle for five km, and using public transport for distances over ten km’. The CYL raised awareness of this campaign by disseminating promotional materials through its cells and volunteer information stations, and by organizing a televised show (BCYL, 2010). In addition, the Beijing League reported dispatching volunteers to railway and bus stations during the Chinese New Year to offer directions to migrant workers returning home (ibid.). A similar distribution of activities was described both in annual reports and by cadres in the city committees visited in Zhejiang, with the majority of social work directed to issues unrelated to youth. The Zhejiang City League claimed that it performed social work on the pattern of carrying out a volunteer activity ‘once a week at the county level,

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Table 6.2 Beijing City League committee activities, 2010 Type of Activity Propaganda & Politics Propaganda

Political activities

Social work – targeted group General public services and activities – non-youth targeted

Description Ceremonies (national days, awards, celebrations), publicity events and official visits/inspections Meetings of the CYL and its affiliated organisations, study sessions, consultation forums

Elderly people (visits in homes), women, general public (“3510 Action” and transportation directions during CNY), areas hit by natural disasters (collection + donation of water, money), natural disaster reaction Environment Water conservation, energy conservation, waste reduction, environmental protection awareness campaigns, themed pavilions and exhibitions Vulnerable groups of children Visits/donations in orphanages, activities & services for migrant children, orphans, economically disadvantaged families Forums and thematic events on Juvenile delinquency, drug prevenyouth welfare issues tion, AIDS awareness activities Employment – Entrepreneurship Entrepreneurship forums and funds Employment fares, business plan competitions, volunteer festivals Student welfare – Beijing school Winter activities for students staying & university students in during CNY holiday, exam stress handling Other Cultural activities Cultural festivals, events, sports competitions Exchange & cooperation International visits, exchanges, workshops Total

Number

%

142 63

62.99

79

40 11

18.06

8

7

6 5

3

42 24

18.95

18 225

100

Source: BCYL, 2010

every day on the city level’ (ZJ1 CYLC, 2009). These included mobilizing volunteers for the Shanghai EXPO and the Zhejiang Provincial Games, holding a month-long environmental awareness campaign (focused on maintaining a clean city, and popularizing a ‘car-free day’), assisting with

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public security,2 organizing a celebration of folk customs as well as blood donations in cooperation with the Chinese Red Cross, and expanding local Volunteer Association branches (ibid.). Evidently, the CYL’s role in these activities was not to organize youth work, but rather to mobilize volunteer labor for the local Party committee’s various projects. Didactic purpose Secondly, the CYL’s activities also demonstrated a well-entrenched instrumentalist understanding of social work, which regarded it primarily as serving the goal of educating youth on a set of social norms deemed appropriate to the regime’s vision of a ‘harmonious society’. Providing sustainable, long-term solutions on the ground, or equipping cadres with skills for youth work, were not central concerns, to say the least. The education of participants and, through propaganda, of the entire youth audience, in norms that foster social stability (traditional morality, discourse on a harmonious utopia), was seen as a goal in itself rather than a by-product. Social work served normative indoctrination (ruling by example). Among the many personal testimonies collected during fieldwork on the centrality of the didactic nature of social work, the most characteristic were the opinions expressed by cadres on the prospect of establishing a specialized youth bureaucracy, and on the potential impact of detaching social-work functions from the League. The Zhejiang City 2 League vice secretary argued that social work serves ideological education, which is the CYL’s primary area of work. Consequently, he continued, since ideological education is so important, the League would continue engaging in social work even if a youth bureaucracy was to be established (Interview 59). Echoing the same rationale that emphasizes the indoctrination function of social work, a Beijing county secretary expressed his apprehension that without social and volunteer work the League would lose the main means through which ideology and politics are transmitted to young people. Therefore, he concluded, the introduction of a youth affairs agency as a separate bureaucracy would be detrimental (Interview 56). These two cadres 2 The tendency of League leaders to overstate their actual involvement in certain areas of work is exemplified by their rebranding of security guards as volunteers, and subsequent inclusion of their services in internal League reports as evidence of a committee’s performance. In an informal discussion with public security ‘volunteers’ in Beijing during the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the PRC’s founding, they explained that they worked full-time for security companies but were instructed to wear the characteristic yellow t-shirts and red caps of the CYL Volunteers Association.

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reached the same conclusion from different vantage points, both expressing the firm belief that social work is primarily a political instrument. Similarly, the League’s re-introduction of the idea of ‘volunteerism’ with the creation of Volunteer Associations (VAs) throughout the country was its main vehicle for engaging young people, and its most important organizational innovation since the 1990s. The appeal of volunteerism for the Chinese leadership is the function it is assumed to serve in socializing young people with values and ideas supportive to social and political stability. The establishment of the Chinese Young Volunteers Association (Zhongguo Qingnian Zhiyuanzhe Xiehui 中国青年志愿者协会) (CYVA) in 1994, was intended not only to capture a social space where autonomous organization was rising, but also to engage young people in volunteer activities as a means of fighting individualism and bourgeois liberalism, the main Western influences that according to Party leaders led to the student protests of the 1980s (Sarotte, 2012: 170). League publications repeatedly praise the didactic value of volunteerism. A book titled ‘Building and Managing Volunteer Organizations’, by the Beijing Volunteer Federation, explains the value of volunteering as a tool for ‘advocating a new type of ethics and improving social morality’ (changdao xinxing lunlidaode，gaishan shehui daode fengmao 倡导新型伦理道德，改善社会道德风貌): ‘The volunteer spirit of dedication, friendship, mutual help, progress […] has been effective in renewing the traditional Chinese virtue of helping the poor, and in vigorously promoting a new socialist morality. […] The existence and development of voluntary organizations can strengthen the construction of a socialist spiritual civilization and improve social morality through advocating new ethics.’ (BVF, 2006: 12-13)

The League Committee Handbook also directs grassroots organizations to include volunteer activities as part of their educational work. In particular, cadres were expected to: Organize youth to participate in the construction of spiritual civilization, and cultivate a civilized and healthy new era to build a harmonious socialist society. […] Vigorously promote the actions of young volunteers and regard volunteer service as an important carrier for the Communist Youth League to participate in the construction of a harmonious society. (Yang, 2009: 171-172)

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In the eyes of the Party, the necessity of moral and ideological education, and the importance of volunteerism and social work as means for delivering it (Xu, 2012: 98), have been reaffirmed by the urgency among politicians and educators to battle what they perceived as the negative trends of individualism and materialism in those born after 1980 (80 hou后) (Rosen, 2010: 163). Accordingly, volunteer branches were established rapidly, in most cases simply by putting up a new sign in the local CYL committee’s office, thus giving a new sense of purpose to an organization that had widely lost its appeal. However, there is an apparent contradiction in preaching altruism within a socioeconomic system that glorifies consumption and the quick attainment of wealth as marks of personal worth. As earlier chapters have discussed in relation to university students, the contradiction between discourse and reality created apathy among the biggest group of League members. In addition, viewing social work mainly as a means of indoctrination diverts attention away from the actual problem and from the potential beneficiary group or cause, thus hindering the development of professional attitudes and long-term commitment. Consequently, the didactic understanding of social work undermined the organization’s commitment to producing an actual social impact and expanding its activities where they are most needed. Verticality A third norm I observed that informed the League’s operation was ‘verticality’ in decision-making. Local committees operated in a normative context in which work priorities were defined top-down and not by the social conditions present. The majority of cadres described the League’s work intensity as following a wave pattern: peaking when there were directions from above for mobilization, and then drifting to relative inactivity until the next call-to-arms, only routine organizational functions being maintained in the interim period. Characteristically, a cadre in Beijing District 1 with positions in both the League and the Volunteer Federation, described her work as normally ‘relaxed’ (qingsong 轻松), but explained that because of the Beijing Olympics, the 60th anniversary of the PRC and the 90th anniversary of the CCP (2008, 2009, and 2011, respectively) the League had been busy to an unprecedented degree (Interview 21). Cadres in League committees visited at township, district and city levels described a similar situation of constantly being in stand-by mode, waiting for the next order for a volunteer activity (Interviews 24, 33, 45, 46, 56, 59). In grassroots branches this stance could be explained by sheer material limitations and absence of full-time personnel, which

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rendered autonomous activities unattainable. But at county committees and above, where personnel and material resources were more available, this attitude revealed a pervasive organizational culture that sustained an intermittent and non-standardized involvement in social work. Of course, the persistence of this work culture was consistent with the overall low level of professionalism and commitment by cadres, as identified in previous chapters. Consequently, social work in the League took the form of short-lived ‘bursts’ of mobilization,3 during which the reporting of a high number of involved volunteers, and publicity by the local media, sufficed as ‘evidence’ of ‘Keeping Youth Satisfied’. Another important expression of ‘verticality’ was the League’s role of supporting policies decided by more ‘senior’ departments. The League resembled a pool of free labor that different local government departments could access, rather than an organization with a clear mission and the capacity necessary to assess social conditions, design appropriate responses and carry out action plans in a horizontal manner. One could, therefore, observe a duality in the League’s operation. Seen as the gateway to Party politics, the CYL’s importance is established and recognized (Bo, 2004; Kou and Tsai, 2014; Payette, 2016; Doyon, 2019). However, in regard to social work, the League appeared to suffer from an organizational variation of what is known in popular psychology as the ‘Peter Pan’ syndrome, a refusal to grow up and assume the responsibilities of adulthood. This was evident in the assumed ‘filial’ obligation of the League to follow instructions from other government departments, which masked its actual poor capacity for social work. In very characteristic wording, the League secretary of Beijing District 1 argued that: ‘The League can only find its own place by serving others,’ and defended the organization’s inability to demarcate an area of autonomous activity by explaining that the CYL, ‘should not act as a spoilt child saying that this toy is mine and that is not’ (Interview 26). Others also described the relationship in terms of the ‘little brother listening to the older brother’ (Interviews 50, 59), voicing the well-entrenched idea that the League’s work tasks are to be decided by more ‘senior’ departments. In the two townships visited in Zhejiang, cadres explained that they have no autonomous decisionmaking capacity, but simply assist other departments by disseminating 3 Manion (2004), examining anticorruption in China and Hong Kong, has argued that anticorruption in China takes the form of ‘short bursts of intensive enforcement’, which is detrimental to routine enforcement (ibid.:161). This mode of implementation also best describes the League’s involvement in social work.

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information, for example on earthquake and fire protection, and family planning (Interviews 45, 46). The Zhejiang City 2 vice secretary also commented that although there was less intervention by the Party in the daily management of the League, the government and its agencies decided the League’s work priorities at the city level (Interview 59). Back in Beijing, the District 2 CYL secretary pointed out that other than material resources and personnel, the lack of a delineated agenda for youth work hindered engagement with young people, as the League simply supported the departments of health, family planning, education, etc. (Interview 52). Therefore, although the CYL’s overall involvement in social work increased as a consequence of its inclusion in projects and campaigns by other agencies and departments, verticality prevented cadres from ‘looking downwards’ (xiangxia gongzuofangfa buduo 向下工作方法 不多) at the needs, demands and problems of young people. Ultimately, verticality as an expression of the CYL’s juniority, provided an explanation for the League’s poor performance in social work. Elitism The last norm that def ined the League’s engagement with social work is the elitism of its ‘advanced youth’ rhetoric and self-perception. The belief that only ‘advanced’ groups of young people deserve the League’s time and support, was most evident in the disproportionate attention directed towards students and graduates, over blue-collar workers and rural youth. Previous chapters have shown in detail that the ‘advanced vs. not advanced’ dichotomy was internalized by cadres in universities and workplaces alike, and even explicitly reiterated to justify the League’s active presence on campuses and its feeble involvement in the lives of factory workers and rural/migrant youth. Interviewees at higher levels of the League’s administration were considerably more careful in making class-based derogatory comments. Notwithstanding this caution, they frequently expressed concerns regarding the perceived backwardness of rural youth (luohoude sixiang 落后的思想), while not hiding their preference for activities targeting students and graduates, who are less socially vulnerable than rural and urban working youth with no higher education. The interviews revealed that the explicit or implied dichotomy vis-à-vis ‘non-advanced’ youth is not only part of an outdated discourse but also a well-established operational norm. Furthermore, this dichotomy normalizes the League’s moralistic bias against marginalized young people, providing the rationale for

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discrimination against them, and for their selective exclusion from the League’s scope of attention. For example, the heavily moralistic and patriarchal conceptualization of ‘advanced’ youth, prevents the League from expanding its communication with groups that require welfare, health, legal attention and assistance (drug addicts, sex workers, homeless youth), instead making them subject to persecution and discrimination (Liu and Finckenauer, 2010; Kaufman, 2011). During fieldwork, when I inquired about social work in relation to these groups, I repeatedly received negative reactions from cadres on the CYL’s role in establishing relevant channels of communication and offering welfare support. The responses ranged from denial (‘such youths do not exist in our area’) and belittlement (‘they are very few’), to refusal on the grounds that the police and the health department are dealing with these youths (Interviews 43, 45, 49, 52). Of course, this bias reveals the CCP’s stance towards these groups, but the mantra of being ‘an organization for advanced youths’ (xianjin qingniande qunzhong zuzhi 先 进青年的群众组织) that was invoked repeatedly by the cadres, further normalizes the League’s stance. Likewise, in regard to LGBTQ+ groups, even the League-sponsored academic research bodies such as the China Youth and Children Research Center, abstained from addressing the various political, legal, social and health dimensions of discrimination and stigmatization, in a manner similar to the Women’s Federation distancing itself from the lesbian community (Du, 2004: 189-190). Therefore, conservative morality and elitism act as blinders, compromising the League’s ability to approach rights-related issues affecting the young people who could gain the most benefit from the welfare attention of an organization in such proximity to the Party and the government. To sum up, the normative context of the CYL’s social work is highly problematic: its generalist approach means that the League only incidentally addressed youth-related issues in a ‘bits and pieces’ manner; the prevalence of indoctrination de-prioritized the need to produce tangible results on the ground; verticality in decision-making blocked initiative by local committees; and the moralism and elitism embedded in the CYL’s discourse prevented the expansion of social services to vulnerable groups of young people. These norms are not just remnants of the socialist past; they are also by-products of the League’s resilient organizational juniority, which reinforces its subordination to the CCP, and reflects the latter’s understanding of ‘youth’ as a political subject. The next section will demonstrate the impact of these norms on the League’s key areas of social work, negating its claim of serving China’s youth.

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Serving youth in practice This section will examine the efforts of League committees to materialize the ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’ mandate in relation to four key areas that were given particular attention in the period under examination: youth employment and entrepreneurship, youth infrastructure development, children’s and teenagers’ welfare, and consultation channels. The examination of the interplay of juniority and dependency in each of these areas will enable us to assess the level of responsiveness attained by the League. Youth employment and entrepreneurship Youth employment and entrepreneurship are of particular concern for the CCP for reasons relating both to economic development and to social stability. The League has been active in youth employment since the 1950s, when it introduced the ‘rustication movement’ of sending youths to work in the countryside (Rohlf, 2003). This campaign aimed at reclaiming land for agriculture while addressing job shortages in the cities, and it was implemented after the perceived success of a similar program carried out by the Soviet Komsomol (Pan, 2003: 39, 45). In the Reform era, concerns regarding urban unemployment are echoed in wellestablished programs that the League has actively been promoting such as the ‘Go West Project’ (Xibu Jihua 西部计划), a scheme offering work placement in the less affluent regions of China (2003 CYL Yearbook: 343). This project was developed by the Departments of Education, Finance, Human Resources and Social Security and the Communist Youth League under the Western Development Strategy (Xibu Dakaifa 西部大开发) launched in 1999. It is on a voluntary basis, and participants are university graduates placed mainly in schools, hospitals and local agricultural production departments. In the 2002-2012 period, the intake of young graduates for the Go West Project was approximately 90, 000, with an additional 70,000 participating in aff iliated schemes organized by local governments (Go West, 2017). The CYL has also organized local job fairs and created websites for jobseeking graduates, while under the direction of the Labor departments it has set up internship schemes to address the increasing rate of youth unemployment (Yang, 2009: 229-232; Shi, 2018: 199-200). For instance, in Beijing District 2 the League launched a program covering social security and meals (a monthly stipend of 500 RMB) for approximately 100 interns (university students and graduates) placed in local companies (Interview 51).

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Zhejiang City 1 reported that it initiated 1,115 internship positions in 2009 (ZJ1 CYLC, 2009). In addition, local universities offered students the possibility of working in the fields during the summer harvest (Interview 33). The district CYL committees in Beijing assisted the local government in running night schools (yexiao 夜校) for unemployed and untrained youths, teaching basic professional and business skills (Interviews 52, 56). Local League committees may also use their leverage with state and private enterprises to open positions for interns and offer to train graduates in job-hunting skills. It is difficult to assess, using only official reports, the League’s actual degree of involvement in such schemes. It should also be noted that Chinese officials in different government departments and Party organizations tend to inflate their own contributions to economic indicators (Tsai, 2008: 809-810; Wallace, 2016: 12-17; Gao, 2015: 624-627), and even present the work of other organizations as related to their own. Therefore, there is ample room to suspect that reports on the League’s efforts in creating internship and employment positions may have been exaggerated by claiming ownership over local government projects, while in fact the League simply communicates these projects to universities and middle schools by sending leaflets and posters. In any case, the two most helpful indicators in assessing the CYL’s effectiveness in the field of employment are scale, and evaluation by young people themselves based on their experiences. Regarding the first, the reported numbers for nation-wide and local internship and graduate employment projects carried out by the CYL were proportionately of little impact. The annual intake of the ‘Go West Project’ (approximately 16,000 participants) only equaled the number of students graduating from two middle-sized universities in Beijing in one year. What is more, only one in ten participants chose to stay in the western regions (Go West, 2017), which shows the strong preference young people have towards employment in coastal areas (Fish, 2015: 90). In addition, a recent study (Xu, 2018) examined state-led youth civic programs co-organized by the CYL and launched in the period 2003-2006. It revealed that these programs have failed to benefit graduates and local communities alike, since young participants usually end up doing mundane jobs as office aides or receptionists (ibid.: 150). Mismatches between academic majors and jobs, and the lack of clear career paths on offer, are problems that reduce the appeal of these programs for graduates. At a local level, 39,935 students graduated annually from education institutions that were eligible for the comparatively few 1,115 internship positions in Zhejiang City 1, setting aside more than 45,000 graduates of

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Table 6.3 When looking for employment, where did you get help from?

Family Classmates, friends and acquaintances University/College The Employment Department Employment agencies The League Other Total

Number of Answers

Valid Percentage

1,670 913 529 412 179 72 201 3,976

42.0 23.0 13.3 10.4 4.5 1.8 5.1 100.0

Source: Xi and Liu, 2009: 229

junior-secondary schools, around half of whom enter the job market at an early age (ZJ1 CYLC, 2009; Yearbook China, 2009). The 100 internship positions on offer by Beijing District 2 committee were also insignificant in proportion to the local demand; likewise, night schools in Beijing offered just 200-300 places per district, with priority given to Beijing hukou holders (Interview 52). Although employment has been a top priority for the CYL’s youth work, and considerable time and resources in local committees were directed to employment-related projects, young people attributed very little importance to the League as a channel for f inding employment (Table 6.3). Another survey from the period under examination shows that a mere 8% of university graduates and 4% of vocational education degree holders found their f irst job by ‘joining recruitment activities by the government or other university organizations’ (canjia zhengfu huo qita daxuezuzhide zhaopin huodong 参加政 府或其他大学组织的招聘活动), in which League initiatives were also included (Wang, 2011: 139-140). Besides employment, the CYL has also expanded its work in the f ield of youth entrepreneurship. At the central level, the League created two specialized organizations to promote entrepreneurship, the China Youth Entrepreneurs Association (Zhongguo Qingnian Qiyejia Xiehui 中国青 年企业家协会), (CYEA) and the Chinese Association of Young Rural Entrepreneurs (Zhongguo Qingnian Xiangzhen Qiyejia Xiehui 中国青 年乡镇企业家协会) (CYREA). Both associations were created in the late 1980s, and by the Hu-Wen decade they had grown to approximately 60,000 members in all provinces. An employee at the national-level committee of the latter organization explained that these two institutions have branches in provincial capitals and act as forums for socializing

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entrepreneurs, disseminating technical knowledge, and rewarding successful business ventures. Essentially, their main function was to co-opt young and successful entrepreneurs by offering ‘status memberships’, access to formal channels of discussion and consultation such as in local and national People’s Political Consultative Conferences (PPCCs), platforms for networking with other businessmen and cadres, training opportunities, business awards, as well as familiarization trips within China or abroad (Interview 15). The associations also organized competitions for local entrepreneurs, which were, in theory, administered by local League committees. However, the ownership of these programs was diffused: local governments had the f inal say and there were no feedback or follow-up functions by League committees (Interviews 15, 49, 56). The CYREA’s biggest challenges were securing material resources and encouraging rural youth to ‘work hard and open up to new methods and ideas’ (Interview 15). During the interviews, cadres offered examples of the League’s involvement in promoting entrepreneurship projects. In 2010 and after a nationwide call to boost youth entrepreneurship, the Zhejiang City 1 District Committee secured twenty free stall/shop areas for local youth, in a newly-built market. Successful applicants could use these spaces rent-free for a period of up to a year, after which a commercial tenancy agreement would need to be signed. Nevertheless, since there was no stipulation for funding from the local government, the county secretary explained that the future of this initiative was uncertain. The new market eventually attracted many regular tenants and the management wanted to withdraw from this program after its first year (Interview 49). In both Zhejiang City 1 and Beijing, the district governments occasionally organized public lectures by successful entrepreneurs on how to establish a business, while in the Chinese capital, the night schools organized by the Labor department with the administrative assistance of the League included basic courses on accounting skills, law and business planning. These programs were supplemented by opportunities to shadow and learn from successful professionals, and apprenticeships to acquire on-the-job experience. Furthermore, local League committees supported entrepreneurship competitions (chuangye bisai 创业比赛) during which participants present business plans, those with the greatest potential being rewarded with small amounts of money or electricity/water fee waivers for a certain period of time (Interviews 45, 46, 49, 56). The League was also involved in sponsoring applications by new businesses for preferential bank loans with low interest and annual payment

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requirements. 4 Applicants were required to obtain reference letters from the village, township and county level League committees and then apply to one of the participating banks (Interviews 22, 33). The bank was supposed to make its own investigation and, at least in theory, base the decision solely on the viability of a business plan. Again, the actual impact of the League in this process varied widely and cannot be accurately discerned from official reports, which tended to inflate its involvement. Characteristically, the Zhejiang City 1 committee listed as an achievement in its 2009 annual work report a scheme by the local branch of the Agricultural Bank of China, which offered 395 loans of an average of 180,000 RMB to young rural entrepreneurs. However, this was actually a project of the local government. There is also the question of how successful such loans were. The District secretary from Zhejiang City 1 explained that the district committee promoted 76 applications for 2009, 10 of which got approval from the bank, but the rate of success of these business ventures was less than 50% (Interview 49). League committees could sponsor applications, thus introducing political input in the selection process.5 Nevertheless, the League did not own these schemes and its involvement was limited and usually of an administrative nature. Lastly, in the period under examination, the CYL sponsored policy proposals (ti’an 提案) to alleviate youth unemployment in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). These contain very general, non-critical suggestions that do not go into detail about particular measures and actions. For example, proposals No. 0251 of the 4th session of the 10th CPPCC, and No. 1175 of 1st session of the 11th CPPCC, both referred to the problem of youth unemployment, with a special emphasis on graduates and those born after 1980, respectively. The first document raised the general issues of: 1) securing fair competition in the job market; 2) opposing age discrimination; 3) enforcing the social security system in order to cover newcomers; 4) enhancing programs for the employability of graduates, and, lastly; 5) creating a favorable social atmosphere for graduate employment. The second document called for state and private organizations to: 1) ‘open the doors’ to those born after 1980; 2) offer on-the-job training regarding skills and ‘correct thinking’; 3) provide opportunities for personal growth, and; 4) mobilize the entire society and government to carry out the task 4 A Committee secretary explained that the interest and the annual payment requirements are not predetermined. She gave an example of a 200,000 RMB (USD 32,000) loan that may require as little as 8,000 RMB (USD 1,270) of annual repayment for the first years. 5 Such practices in the Chinese party-state create a considerable amount of politically-directed lending through clientelism and patronage, which is a major source of corruption and waste (Pei, 2006; Chen et al, 2013).

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of promoting youth employment. The two proposals summarized the difficulties faced by newcomers to the job market but made rather broad recommendations, that had little practical value (in terms of concrete measures, funding, and timelines) for policy makers. To sum up, for the last two decades, employment has been the single most important concern for young people, while entrepreneurship has been centrally encouraged as a means of boosting job creation and growth. Despite the considerable allocation of time and resources by League committees at different levels, in the period concerned here, the actual impact of their proentrepreneurship and employment efforts was very modest. Even in Beijing and the well-off province of Zhejiang, the scale of the programs remained small, and their ability to create sustainable results very uncertain. In the League’s defense, it could be argued that employment and entrepreneurship were complex areas of economic policy and, therefore, significant impact could not reasonably be expected from a youth organization. Still, the League’s complete lack of autonomy in initiating and running relevant projects is indicative of its well-entrenched subordinated and auxiliary role. This becomes even more apparent in the League’s work in two policy areas that fall more clearly within the scope of ‘youth affairs’, to be examined next. Youth infrastructure The League inherited youth infrastructure in urban areas from the Maoist era, and has struggled to keep it operational. The most characteristic example is the Children’s Palaces (Shaoniangong 少年宫), an institution imported from the Soviet Union that offered extra-curricular and recreational activities including sports, art and music lessons, as well as parties, dances, and film screenings. Although the ideological education element was always present, the palaces offered services to the local (mainly urban) communities, especially during periods of economic and political stability (Swartz, 1989: 125-126). However, the difficulty of sustaining youth infrastructure in a marketized economy forced the Palaces to start offering their activities on commercial terms, introducing fees and memberships (ibid.: 132). In addition, Palaces were consolidated to reduce costs and compete commercially with the private schools and activity centers that have mushroomed since the 1990s. The variety of extra-curricular services on offer were increased to target middle-class urban families and were soon followed by bookshops, cinemas, karaoke, cafes and fitness centers. The Children’s Palaces in Beijing and Zhejiang also occasionally organized recreational events in urban communities

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and schools, in part to advertise their activities and conform with local government requests, but these were not systematic (Interviews 26, 49). As a result of the consolidation and the streamlining of their operations, the reach of the Palaces had been considerably reduced, especially in the central and western provinces (Chen, 2015). A nationwide survey taken at the height of the Hu Jintao era reported that only 12.1% of young respondents confirmed that there was a cultural palace in the county of their residence, while only 4.7% had used it at least once (Xi and Liu, 2009: 243-244). The loss of its recreational infrastructure and the emergence of new youth spaces signaled that the League was gradually slipping into irrelevance. The League aimed to reenergize its local presence by setting up ‘Youth Centers’ (Qingnian Zhongxin 青年中心) in urban communities, targeting mainly children and adolescents. It also participated in ‘5-in-1’ stations (Wuzhanheyi 五站合一) to establish a point of contact with young adults in companies, social organizations, and rural areas. In 2003, the League decided to establish youth centers at the sub-district level ( jiedao 街道) across China’s cities, a move which was preceded by similarly abortive institutional attempts to reach young people in urban communities in the 1990s.6 The goal was to promote grassroots work and reverse the post-1980s trend of the CYL’s ‘marginalization’ (bianyuanhua 边缘化) by offering social services, recreational facilities and activities for local youths (Zheng, 2008: 23). According to official guidelines, youth centers were first to be established by district League committees in 15-20% of urban neighborhoods across China’s provinces. The centers would have one full-time employee and would be located in places accessible to young people (2003 CYL Yearbook: 413-414). Other articles of the program description stipulated that the role of district committees was in ideological leadership and management, and in promoting the centers’ ‘unified image’ (tongyixingxiang 统一形象) and ‘branding’ (pinpaihua 品牌化) (ibid.). According to these guidelines, the range of youth center activities involved five areas: 1. Administration of League affairs: Administer and coordinate the League’s building […] carry out thematic propaganda and education activities; strengthen the management, leadership and coordination of the youth center, youth associations and other youth organizations. 6 These include: 1) the ‘Community Adolescents Service Center’ in 2000, the ‘Twinning of Hundreds of Schools with Hundreds of Neighborhoods Students’ Community Aid Activity’ in 1997, and the ‘Civilized youth Community’ project in 1996 (with various satellite events throughout mid to late 1990s) (Ding and Wang, 2008).

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2. Information service: Utilize the information technology platform by providing information in the center’s webpage related to study, employment, life, and entertainment; develop the youth service card and service manual, in order to enable more young people to acquire convenient and favorable / preferential service. 3. Youth volunteer service: Establish a youth volunteer service station, enlist community youth volunteers, make the registration of volunteers in the community the backbone of work; enthusiastically develop the volunteer service towards the youth and masses of the community. 4. Reading club for adolescents: Implement the plan ‘Book reading for adolescents in the new century’ […]. 5. Management of Adolescents’ affairs: Assist the government in the management of adolescents’ affairs regarding the lives, education, employment, social participation, love and marriage, housing etc. Research the requirements for young people’s development, make suggestions for the formulation of the government’s policy towards adolescents; protect their legal rights and prevent juvenile delinquency. (Ibid.: 415)

Both at the central and provincial CYL levels, implementation of the youth centers initiative took the form of an ‘unfunded mandate’ (Tsui and Wang, 2004). League committees would rely on their own local material resources and facilities as well as the commitment of their cadres. As such, this policy was already condemned to failure from its infancy, because the implementation of such an ambitious plan of organizational expansion overstretched the material, administrative and personnel capacity of district level committees (Interviews 26, 31, 50). In Beijing and Zhejiang City 1, cadres commented that the meagre funding available was spent on very basic infrastructure costs, such as signage, leaving almost nothing for activities and equipment (ibid.). As a result, budget limitations were translated to on-the-ground improvisations, which undermined the League’s profile and operation. Youth centers were nominally established without permanent personnel in communal spaces that were simultaneously used as common rooms for the elderly, people with disabilities and as recreation areas for the residents (Interview 50). In an amusing account of his experience with this undertaking, a cadre described how the people most often to be found inside the youth centers were retirees smoking and playing mahjong, thus making it impossible for children and adolescents to even step inside (Interview 26). In some cases, a ping pong table and an Internet connection were provided, but ultimately the centers were little more than another sign on the wall of a communal room

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already used for other purposes. Indeed, during walks in urban communities in Beijing and Zhejiang city 1, it was very common to find signs for ‘youth center’, ‘residents center’, ‘pensioners center’ all referring to the same space. Zheng (2008: 25), who studied more than 20 youth centers in Shanghai, points out that League committees did not see this new policy as an opportunity for renewal but as another call for the organizational penetration of local communities, thereby replicating the same anachronistic modes of work they were supposed to put aside. The youth centers initiative took the form of an expansion of physical presence, but failed, since district- and city-level committees could not mobilize the necessary material and intellectual resources. During the same period, a similar attempt in the countryside (2003 CYL Yearbook: 391-395) did not even begin to materialize beyond the outskirts of urban centers, reflecting the very low level of League presence and operation in rural China (Interviews 26, 50). The second case, that of 5-in-1 stations, offers a similar example of ineffective institution-building at the grassroots. The League sought to expand its channels of communication to private companies, the most important of the ‘two new organizations’7 (liangxin zuzhi 两新组织) where ‘advanced’ youths are employed. The organizational expansion of these stations was slow and often only nominal, and took the form of simultaneously opening CCP, League, Workers Union and Women’s Federation branches according to the ‘Building the League Through Building the Party’ principle. In 2010, the Beijing City CYL committee announced its participation in the ‘5-in-1 stations’ program that aimed at establishing work stations for the Party, and mass organizations in the city’s commercial buildings (BCYL, 2010). These work stations were introduced within the building management offices and, in theory, would provide the company staff working there with access to League services. However, in the sites visited in Chaoyang district in Beijing (one of the biggest and most central areas in the Chinese capital), these stations were established only on paper, being just a corner table with leaflets of the CCP and mass organizations’ constitution and policies. As explained by a building management employee in charge of one of these stations, their establishment was part of a city-wide drive by the League to mobilize volunteers for the 2008 Olympics, and had since attracted no attention (Interview 58). The CYL’s 5-in-1 nominal expansion into private companies was also replicated in rural areas, with the aim of providing a point of reference for young people interested in the work of the League. In November 2011, Chinese media reported that the Beijing Party committee experimentally 7

The second is social organizations, to be discussed in the third section of this chapter.

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implemented the 5-in-1 pattern of organizational expansion in Weidian village in Huairou district, on the outskirts of the capital. The detailed news release by the Huairou district government offered an informative picture on the ruralization of the ‘5-in-1 stations’ pattern of organizational expansion. According to a report by the Huairou Social Work Committee (Guan Ming, 2011), the main organizing principles and successes of the expansion were: […] ‘One person, many posts’. Weidian is the experimental village of Bohai township for carrying out the policy of ‘Jointly construct Party and masses, jointly operate the 5 stations’. The 6 employees in the station, perform social functions of 10 organizations: Party affairs, Workers Union, Communist Youth League, Social Security Administration, Family Planning, Dispute Mediation, Disabled Persons Federation, Chinese Red Cross etc. […] [The new policy] achieved the following: 1) Economized the space in the office building […], 2) Made easier for the masses to handle their affairs [by bringing all the services to the ground floor, older citizens can access the offices more easily] […], 3) Improved the coordination capacity [of the different offices], 4) standardized the working behavior of employees.

The case of Weidian shows that the Party’s primary concerns in setting up the 5-in-1 stations were streamlining local government services, and providing an access point for citizens to the work of mass organizations. The League’s part in this process was indiscernible from the Party’s. Further, the fact that the roles assigned to local branches far exceeded their personnel provisions and capacity supports the finding discussed earlier: that in this period, the CYL’s strategies for renewing its presence in rural localities were condemned to failure by material limitations. Characteristically, township cadres in Zhejiang were unaware of this initiative, while the secretary of a rural district at the outskirts of Beijing (Interview 56) explained that due to personnel shortages, the functions of these stations would be more effectively implemented online. Overall, the League’s shy attempts to engage in institution-building in new spaces have produced very few tangible results. One must ask whether funds and time would be better targeted towards areas of work where the League can gain reasonable specialization and make a more sustained contribution. With these observations in mind, I turn to the CYL’s involvement in children’s and teenagers’ welfare.

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Children’s and teenagers’ welfare The children’s and teenagers’ agenda has become more complex due to the economic and social pressures of reform, including the marketization of education, recreation, and migration, leading to a rise in exploitation and abuse (Guan, 2006; Naftali, 2016). As a consequence, more specialized state agencies have been set up to deal with protecting the rights of these groups, while ministries under the State Council cover different aspects of the agenda. At the national level, the CYL has been integrated into the policy-making system as a junior partner, with very limited institutional capacity to influence legislative initiative and youth policy. The League participates in the National Working Committee on Children and Women under the State Council (Guowuyuan funü ertong gongzuo weiyuanhui 国务院妇女儿童 工作委员会) established in 1993, and the China National committee for the Wellbeing of Youth (Zhongguo guanxin xiayidai gongzuo weiyuanhui 中国关心下一代工作委员会), established in 1990. In both committees that are entrusted with a significant portion of government work in the field of protecting children’s and teenagers’ rights, the Ministry of Education and the All China Women’s Federation have had a prominent role, while the institutional influence of the CYL was characterized as weak by many interviewees (Interviews 14, 15, 31, 50, 55). In the first, the CYL has been represented through its First Secretary who occupies one position in a 36-member body, while the ACWF’s secretary has held the deputy director position of the committee; in the second, the League was assigned only one out of 21 deputy director ( fuzhuren 副主任) positions, and none among the more senior standing committee members (NCWY, 2012; PRC Government, 2003; PRC Government, 2008). Regarding the League’s ability to influence policy-making at the national level, a Central Committee cadre with roles in both the League and the All China Youth Federation (ACYF) commented that the CYL has no power at all, since despite participating in government consultative bodies, it cannot assume an autonomous position in youth affairs (Interview 14). In addition to the Ministry of Education, the ACWF and the aforementioned State Council committees, other departments including the Ministries of Health, and Human Resources and Social Security, have more important roles than the CYL in drafting and proposing legislation on youth (Interviews 31, 55). Similarly, a national-level cadre from the Association of Young Rural Entrepreneurs explained that the League is represented in the CPPCC through ‘outstanding individuals’ (youxiuderen 优秀的人), but that the

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policy process is dominated by other government departments, with minimal input from the League (Interview 15). In both Beijing and Zhejiang, League representatives in local People’s Congresses participated in drafting local regulations and policy targets to promote the implementation of the law on the protection of minors, China’s most important law on children’s and teenagers’ rights (Interviews 22, 26, 33, 49, 50, 52, 56, 59). In the rural Beijing district, the League co-sponsored a policy proposal on internet addiction (Interview 56). In addition, in the 2009 and 2010 sessions of the local PPCC in the cities visited in Zhejiang, the League submitted proposals on left-behind children, and on psychological assistance to primary and secondary school students. These two almost identical proposals submitted the same year at the provincial PPCC, concentrate on the implementation of existing laws and regulations, and particularize policies initiated at the central level. The participation of the League as a dependent partner in State Council committees focused on children’s and teenagers’ rights was replicated at the lower levels of government (Interviews 26, 45, 46, 56). Essentially, the CYL’s role in policy-making in this area was indirect, mediated through the work of official think-tanks such as the China Youth and Children Research Center (CYCRC) and Youth Research Institutes (Qingnian Yanjiusuo 青年研究所) affiliated with provincial League committees across the country. The CYCRC has produced a large volume of research on teenagers’ psychological health, publishes the ‘Red Book on Youth Law’ annually, and has repeatedly raised the issue of the harshness of punishments for juvenile delinquency, thus impacting the drafting of government policy in both areas (Interviews 31, 32; Guan, 2006: 241). With the assistance of local League organizations, the CYCRC conducted surveys and investigations of children’s and teenagers’ rights protection, juvenile delinquency, and of the social conditions affecting youth. It also proposed leniency for juvenile offenders, triggering a significant change in the official understanding and practice in this respect, which has also been mirrored in legislation8 (Interviews 31, 32). The CYCRC provides the CYL with a channel for its input regarding children-related legislation (Interviews 14, 31, 32, 55), with the Law for the Protection of Minors (1991) providing a characteristic case.9 The League was involved in the preparation of this statute during 8 In reference to the 1991 Juvenile Protection Law and the 1999 Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Law. 9 Adopted at the 21st Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People’s Congress on September 4, 1991, promulgated by Order No.50 of the President of the People’s

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the 1980s, and since then assists with monitoring its implementation by carrying out surveys and disseminating information (Interviews 31 and 55; Cho, 2009: 130). Still, the CYL can only be praised for the CYCRC’s work in children’s and adolescents’ affairs to the extent that it assists with research and maintains a supporting position to its proposals (Interview 31). The League is also involved in social work projects for children and teenagers. The case of the ‘12355 Youth Service Platforms’ (Qingnian Fuwu Pingtai 青年服务平台), one of the most widespread projects carried out by the CYL in the last decade, offers a good example of the challenges faced and compromises made by the League in its effort to expand its social work mandate without autonomous material resources and specialized personnel. The 12355 platforms were initially set up in 2005 as a network of hotlines offering much-needed psychological support to children and teenagers, at a time when stress-related illnesses and suicides were rising as a result of post-reform economic and social pressures on families and the demands of the highly competitive educational system (Naftali, 2016: 86-89). The CYL Central Committee instructed city organizations to introduce these hotlines and within the first year they were established in more than 100 cities, with the number of calls received far exceeding initial projections (2006 CYL Yearbook: 486-487). By 2011, according to official announcements, 251 cities participated, and the annual volume of calls reached 4 million (CYN, 2011). The 12355 project also absorbed the ‘youth’s right protection posts’ (Qingshaonian Weiquan Gang 青少年维权岗), a CYL program initiated in the 1990s that offered legal support to adolescents. Nevertheless, from the beginning of their operation, the 12355 hotlines experienced problems that limited their prospects for a standardized impact. The first issue was the professionalization and standardization of the services offered. Calls to 12355 hotlines were answered by volunteers whose experience on issues of psychological consultation could be as little as a brief induction seminar, while more urgent cases of, for instance, severe depression and imminent suicide attempts were referred to specialized psychologists (if available) and the police (Interview 31, 32). Volunteers usually worked 1-2 days a week. They could be as young as 15 years old, acting as ‘middle school heart-to-heart partners’ (Zhongxueshengde Zhixin Huoban 中学生的知心伙伴), who mainly offered a friendly talk and advice on study problems. Various departments at the local level got involved in the operation of the 12355 hotlines. Despite local variations, the hotlines offered counselling services on study-related stress, mental Republic of China on September 4, 1991 and effective as of 1 January 1992.

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health, domestic violence, sexual harassment, teenage pregnancy and birth control, love and marital issues, and legal consultation. In 2008 in Beijing, the 12355 hotlines were advertised as a psychological support service for Olympic volunteers (Beijing 2008 Website). The result was that, at the local level, the hotline operated as a one-stop help center for children, teenagers and parents alike. As one researcher in the field of adolescent law in Beijing commented, in order for the hotlines to be effective, a wide range of specialist institutions and professionals had to be locally available. For example, an important parameter was the existence of psychology and pedagogy departments in local institutions of higher education, which would provide interns and professional personnel on a voluntary basis. As 12355 units had to rely on local material support and personnel, this meant that the level of services on offer depended on the availability of local resources (Interview 32). Finally, the CYL was involved in other local welfare programs for children and teenagers; however, their impact was once more limited and very uneven, varying with local conditions. The main issue cadres repeatedly raised with social work was their reliance on local authorities for funding. For example, the League committee in Zhejiang City 1 had access to a city government fund that enabled it to provide welfare support for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. However, the city government’s contribution to this fund was very small, approximately 10,000 RMB per year, supplemented by local donations. Under these conditions, in 2009-2010 the Zhejiang City 1 League provided assistance to 600 schoolchildren, who received 600 RMB (95 USD) per annum each, to cover a fragment of primary school expenses (Interview 49). Another local League program would partner a child from a low-income family to an affluent one, with the latter offering money and study support. Again, however, the project remained very small in scale with only twenty families participating (ibid.). Overall, the League’s involvement in children’s and adolescents’ welfare is characterized by its subordination in both decision making and implementation. The CYL made no autonomous contribution in the legislative process, and in social work projects like those mentioned above, it essentially followed directions from more senior departments that controlled the social and welfare agenda on children and teenagers. Only the specialized research institutions affiliated with the CYL, such as the CYCRC, could make a meaningful contribution in youth affairs. This highlights the importance of developing youth expertise, a condition that requires organizational autonomy and trained personnel but also good knowledge of the actual conditions on the ground.

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Opening spaces for consultation The League attempted to expand consultation meetings with young people in order to ‘listen to their voices’ (qingting qingnian xinsheng 倾听青年心声) (Interviews 26, 56). The importance of these meetings for the evaluation of CYL committees was evident by their place among the main achievements cited in annual work reports. For example, in 2010 Beijing announced that 220 ‘face-to-face’ meetings were held throughout the city, during which 700 opinions were raised and 76 recommendations from the League were submitted to relevant departments (Beijing CYL Annual Report, 2010). Zhejiang City 1 in 2009, reported an unspecified number of meetings with 15 recommendations made to ‘relevant organs’ (youguanjiguan 有关机 关) (ZJ1 City League Committee Annual Report, 2009). Did such meetings provide a social space for consultation with young people and bottom-up articulation of their demands? China scholars have examined deliberative institutions in a wide range of contexts, from villages and urban districts to academic and workplace environments, and have pointed out potential benefits these could hold for China’s authoritarian regime: maintaining stability and security by establishing feedback channels; diffusing social tensions; enabling a limited degree of consensus in policy-making; and enhancing collective solidarity. They have also identif ied cadre commitment to genuine consultation, public awareness of these processes, and past experience with responsive outcomes as important variables explaining the success or failure of these initiatives (He, 2006: 190-195; Xu, 2006: 254-256; Dong and Shi, 2006: 226-227; Tsang, 2009). Despite carrying some potential to facilitate responsiveness in local authorities, CCP cadres have instead exhibited an instrumentalist understanding of deliberation, largely using these forums as a mechanism for projecting an image of governing competence. He Baogang (2006: 192) in his extensive research on representative institutions in rural areas, notes the cynicism and drop in participation rates among villagers when local officials prevented deliberation meetings from acquiring decision-making powers. In Chapters 3 and 4, I already discussed that the attitudes of students and young employees towards such processes ranged from caution to apathy, which illustrates cynicism and alienation as the consequences of limited official commitment to meaningful deliberation and participation. According to published surveys in the period under examination, young people in China remained skeptical of official politics, and out of all age groups, were the least likely to participate in them. As the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University reported in its ‘Chinese

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Table 6.4 During the past year, did you join a meeting of a participatory politics institution? (%)

Work unit discussion or consultation meeting (单位座谈会或单位咨询会) Government hearing (政府听证会) Government discussion or consultation meeting (政府座谈会或咨询会)

Party members

League members

Masses

Total

75.8

64.6

63.3

67.8

8.2

9.4

8.8

8.9

14.9

9.4

9.6

11.2

Source: Xi and Liu, 2009: 119

Citizenship Survey Data Report’ study, those between 18-29 years old were the least satisfied with the degree of democracy in the country, and had the lowest voting rates in village and neighborhood committees among all other age groups (Shen, 2009: 282-286). The study reported a mean of 5.4 (1 = worse, 10 = best) for young people’s opinions on the degree of democracy in China, the lowest among all age groups (30-49: 5.5; 50-59: 5.9; 60-70: 6.4). Concerning voting rates in village and neighborhood committees, 57.2% of young people 18-29 years old voted, compared with 77.8% of those between 30-39 years old, 79.6% of those 40-49, 85.8% of those 50-59 and 81.9% of those in the 60-70 years old group. Another survey by the China Youth and Children Research Center, reported that only 26.6% of young people felt ‘very informed’ (hen liaojie 很了解) or ‘informed’ (liaojie 了解) on the government’s public policy decisions (zhengfu gonggong juece 政府公共 决策) (Xi and Liu, 2009: 120). This last study also inquired into youth and League members’ participation in official channels of deliberation like those discussed above (see Table 6.4). These findings show that the danwei remains the main unit of involvement in off icial political life, a fact that, as the previous chapters have discussed, is explained by the compulsory character of participation. In comparison, deliberation institutions that are of a voluntary character and exist outside the conf ines of the danwei, such as neighborhood hearings and consultation meetings, attracted little attention from young people and League members alike. This f inding is consistent with other studies on political values and participation in China. Stanley Rosen (2010) assessed various surveys conducted by off icial bodies during the mid 2000s on the political beliefs and participation of the post-1980s

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generation, concentrating on university students. The surveys reported the students’ disassociation from the discourse and institutions of the Chinese political system (Rosen, 2010: 163-168), an increasing admiration of Western principles and systems of government, as well as individualist and careerist concerns in joining the CCP. He argues that according to these surveys, the student’s admiration for the American model exceeded their support for the Chinese system of government (ibid.: 167). Interestingly, only 0.6% of young people would contact a Party or a League organization to express an opinion (165). A more recent study conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2014, a year after the end of the Hu-Wen era, reported that people between 18 and 45 were the least likely to vote in county and township People’s Congress elections and had the lowest levels of political participation in the PRC (Fang et al, 2015: 63, 273). The post-1980s generation is also the least likely to vote and to run for village or neighborhood committee posts (Fang and Zhou, 2016: 41). Other deliberation meetings organized by the League, beyond those examined in Chapters 3 and 4 on campus and work units, include: 1) sessions during which local officials ‘listen’ (qingting 倾听) to the views of residents; and 2) face-to-face (mian-dui-mian 面对面) discussions between members of people’s congresses (PC) and people’s political consultative councils (PPCC), and representatives of young people (Interview 31, 32). Regarding the first, these meetings were open to all citizens in a specific neighborhood or residential community, and included officials belonging to the local Party committee, government departments and mass organizations. As these meetings were not restricted to young citizens, the participating League cadres acted in the capacity of government representatives (Interviews 22, 26, 33, 59), thereby eroding the ‘youth’ character of consultation. Interviewees in Beijing and Zhejiang commented that during these meetings it was very common for the League to receive demands and complains unrelated to youth issues (Interviews 22, 26, 33, 49, 52, 59). Characteristically, a Beijing District 1 cadre, described how the agenda of a 2009 meeting presided over by the district League secretary was monopolized by complaints against traffic problems caused by the poor coordination of traffic lights. Eventually, the secretary brought the issue to the attention of the Beijing transportation department where he was previously employed (Interview 24). In addition, the effectiveness of deliberation was undermined by officials who staged these sessions in a manner that suppressed genuine discussion. For instance, official ‘investigations’ and public hearings in localities could not be conducted in a manner that would embarrass the local government

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(Interviews 15, 26). Overall, the League’s involvement in such forums of public consultation did not strengthen its own ‘youth’ character. Turning to ‘face-to-face’ sessions, these were actually not participatory but mediated, as they usually took place between local PC and PPCC delegates, and ‘youth representatives’ – a term that referred to League leaders as well as individuals from organizations affiliated with the All-China Youth Federation, the League’s United Front organization. Essentially, during these sessions, local government and Party officials deliberated with League cadres. The CYCRC researchers explained that it was difficult to assess the success of such meetings in regard to the promotion of bottom-up demands (Interviews 31, 32). Their actual usefulness relied on the commitment and sense of responsibility of those acting as representatives. But these ‘youth representatives’ were primarily junior League cadres operating under institutional constraints and personal career motives that enforced or incentivized compliant and non-confrontational behaviors. Typically, cadres who participated regularly in such sessions as ‘youth representatives’ explained that the discussion on youth affairs hardly ever escaped the government’s agenda (Interviews 22, 26, 46, 52). Of course, League cadres could, in theory, assume a pro-youth stand, exposing problems and providing proposals for related action. Notwithstanding this possibility, the interviewees were rather vague about issues raised independently of the government agenda in these meetings and couldn’t provide concrete examples. The hierarchical nature of these consultations and the absence of accountability mechanisms favors the scenario that in fact cadres exhibited passive and compliant attitudes. To sum up, the League’s participation in consultation forums at the local level bore many similarities with corresponding processes on campus and in the workplace. Consultation tended to be either superficial and ceremonial or, at best, confined within a pre-set agenda of permissible discussion. Accordingly, ‘youth’ was either absent or emphatically underrepresented. My examination of the CYL’s social work in the above fields demonstrates the negative impact of juniority on responsiveness, through analysis of how the League operated without autonomous decision-making and resources, thereby impeding cadre focus and commitment, and straining its institutional capacity. The result was that it remained superficially involved in many different areas. At the same time, this investigation reveals that the League’s greatest potential for responsiveness was in the field of children’s and adolescents’ affairs, which just partially covers younger League members (ages 14-17). The reason for this somewhat paradoxical situation of the CYL demonstrating a higher degree of responsiveness towards non-members, is

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that various institutions it has sponsored, such as the CYCRC, have developed relevant specialization, which in turn has enabled them to become important actors in policy-making. This shows that the League’s biggest challenge in social work is a clear sense of mission towards its constituency, and the commitment to developing expertise and autonomous resources. Moving forward, the League is no longer the only organization involved in youth work, as recent years have witnessed an explosion in formal and informal associational life. In the next pages, I discuss the relation of the League with new organizations and evaluate the potential of these interactions to increase the League’s responsiveness to its constituency.

Relations with social organizations In CCP terminology the role of ‘mass’ towards social organizations is described as ‘leading’ (lingdao 领导), ‘guiding’ (zhidao 指导), ‘supervising’ ( jiandu 监督) and ‘managing’ (guanli 管理). Although there are subtle differences among these terms regarding the degree of involvement they indicate the former has in the latter’s operation and work, their common denominator is co-optation, through the (real or aspired) inclusion of social organizations in a structured and controlled system of operation under the League. Schwartz and Lawson (2005: 271) describe co-optation as an effort to ‘ensure resources’ and ‘tap into the concerns’ of potentially important actors in the political process. They explain that co-optation serves the purpose of giving voice to new elements, in order to ‘prevent them from causing disruption’ or to make them ‘less fervid exponents of their original group’s interests’ (ibid.). Therefore, the main function of co-optation is to ‘win over’ actors with the actual or incipient ability to challenge an existing hierarchy, and make them internalize the regime’s views and priorities. But co-optation is often viewed only as a top-down ‘control’ mechanism between stronger and weaker actors, a perspective that blurs the more complex reality of a ‘two-way street’ with influence flowing in both directions (Scott, 1998: 200 quoted in Schwartz and Lawson, 2005: 271): the co-opted part may accept or even actively seek co-optation in order to secure access to resources and gain political influence in policymaking. This can take the form of both formal and informal exchanges, as co-opting and co-opted sides have the potential to influence each other’s ideological and political orientation and positions on certain aspects of policy-making.

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The Chinese regime can oppress and exclude an actor (individual, group) from social life and formal politics, but compulsion is usually preceded by more cautious approaches to co-opt and normalize its behavior. The case of the Falun Gong movement is a characteristic example as authorities initially maintained formal relations and attempted to co-opt its founder, Li Hongzhi, before launching a crackdown against the increasingly restless movement that demanded recognition (Schechter, 2000: 66-68; Ownby, 2010: 88-90). Another example of exclusion is non-Party organized labor, with the suppression of the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation offering the most notable instance (Pringle, 2011: 68-71). The CCP has also negotiated its relations with, accommodated the demands of, and co-opted emerging social forces, including individuals, organized interests, social classes, groups and organizations (Dickson, 2008; Ma, 2009; Wright, 2010). Jiang Zemin in his ‘Three Represents’ officially invited entrepreneurs and business professionals to join the Party, and local committees became actively involved in recruiting them (Dickson, 2008: 86-93; Shambaugh, 2008: 34). In addition, the Party has attempted to expand its network of branches to social organizations and private businesses (the ‘new two kinds of organizations’), and has moved quickly to create associations and platforms for communication with new social forces with the aim of regulating their operation and growth. The active efforts of the All China Women’s Federation to engage and lead autonomous women’s organizations is also an example of the state’s pragmatism in dealing with China’s emerging civil society (Liu, 2001; Howell, 2003b; Du, 2004). The Communist Youth League has followed the CCP’s co-optation drive by integrating youth organizations and groups, using two approaches. The first involves the top-down establishment of organizations to pre-emptively capture new social space, thus echoing the ‘united front’ tactic of setting up cells and branches to mobilize local society. Through this maneuver, the CYL has become involved in well-known voluntary activities and charities. The second involves the co-optation of social organizations formed at the grassroots level, including formally registered organizations and unregistered groups with which the League is attempting to establish channels of communication and monitoring. In the next pages, I will examine the logic and limits of these approaches separately, by discussing two prominent cases of top-down co-optation and two grassroots examples, which were identified through interviews as innovative approaches of the CYL in the Hu-Wen period. This line of inquiry will adopt the understanding of co-optation as a ‘two-way street’ (Scott, 1998: 200) and also examine the space and opportunities that non-state youth groups had to influence the League’s work orientation. The examination of

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the following cases demonstrates the serious limitations of these strategies in redirecting CYL cadres towards new forms of youth work. Setting up top-down organizations Setting up new organizations to establish the League’s presence in a certain field of social activity can have both a direct and an indirect co-optation function. Direct co-optation integrates particular individuals and organizations within the League’s system, controlling their work priorities and mobilizing them to serve the state’s goals. Indirect co-optation is achieved by capturing a social space and hierarchically re-ordering it around a newly established organization, which has the state’s mandate to mobilize social resources on a certain subject area. Examples of new organizations established by the League to perform these functions include the Chinese Young Volunteers Association (CYVA, VA, Volunteers) and the China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF, Foundation). These cases have been selected for examination here because they are associated with the League’s most publicly recognized and acclaimed programs in social work (Xi and Liu, 2009: 224). Starting with volunteerism, the first part of this chapter discussed the normative context of social work in the League. Its generalist scope, didactic nature and top-down decision-making processes affect the quality, impact and, ultimately, growth of CYL volunteering activities. This section will now add another important dimension: volunteering work as a co-optation mechanism. As earlier discussed, the League introduced its first Volunteer organization in Beijing in 1993 and the following year it formally established the Chinese Young Volunteers Association. National and local VAs have maintained a very close relationship with the League, acting, in effect, as the mobilization branch of CYL committees. At the national level, the Secretariat of the CYVA has been under the leadership of the CYL Central Committee Volunteer Work Department (Tuanzhongyang Qingnian Zhiyuanzhe Gongzuobu 团中央青年志愿者工作部), located at number 10 Qianmen Dongdajie (the CYL national headquarters), and its leading cadres include present and former functionaries of the CYL Central Committee and the All China Youth Federation (ACYF), the League’s united front organization. At the various levels of local government, the pattern of the local CYL and VA branches acting as one entity remained unchanged. CYL cadres also had posts in VAs, as evidenced by their double-sided business cards, while League Committees and VAs shared the same finances, infrastructure and chain of command, and organized joint activities (Interviews 22, 24, 26). The CYVA conducts volunteer work in the same fashion and with the same important limitations as examined in reference to the League itself.

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The League’s decision to develop volunteering as a major component of its work and identity has been characterized as a ‘rational choice’ for an organization that had lost its appeal for young people (Xu, 2012: 97). The CYL aimed to rejuvenate and popularize collectivist ideas that were viewed by the Party as supportive to its ideology and legitimacy, and also to create a nationwide governing mechanism for volunteering services at the grassroots (ibid.: 98-101). Essentially, the introduction of the CYVA served the purpose of capturing the developing social sphere of volunteerism with an organization that is supportive of the state’s policies and goals. Even though the CYVA increased the CYL’s appeal to China’s youth (ibid.), its mode of operation as a co-optation mechanism proved problematic in many aspects. First, at the grassroots level, local VAs maintained communication and cooperation almost exclusively with formally registered social organizations (Interviews 21, 24 and 50). The restrictive, corporatist 1998 legal framework allowed one social organization per issue area (for example children’s rights protection) to operate at each administrative level, thus containing their growth locally or driving them underground. From the perspective of this framework, informal volunteer groups were treated with suspicion, which minimized the VAs’ co-opting capacity by inhibiting communication and cooperation with actors without state recognition. In addition, by prioritizing national campaigns initiated in a top-down fashion, the VAs limited their activities within the prescribed definition of volunteering, which prevented them from expanding their work agenda to become more responsive locally. Characteristically, a Beijing League cadre who was also a vice secretary of the Beijing Volunteer Federation explained that the League and the Volunteers did not know what issues to address first and how, thus generating low levels of interest and participation in their volunteer campaigns (Interview 22). Interaction with formal and informal social organizations and groups could reveal which areas require more attention, but the CYVA’s operation as a state agency impedes its own responsiveness, the quality and impact of its work, and, ultimately, the growth of the volunteer sector in general. A United Nations Development Program report on volunteerism in China (2011) pointed out these problems, despite also noting increased societal awareness and participation in volunteer activities: [The] registered voluntary organizations are mainly large-scale, ‘official’ ones. They are homogenous and lack flexibility. […] funding is still limited […] [and] there is a preference to only subsidize important events. There are limited experts and scholars involved in volunteer research […].

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While it is clear that more people in China are willing to participate in voluntary service activities, they lack professional guidance and training. This means that some effects of service activities are not good. Some volunteers can only engage in simple and non-professional services and cannot adjust to the specific needs of service targets; some volunteers can only undertake superf icial activities giving no practical help to people’s life. A prominent example is volunteering activities conducted during main holidays and festivals which are mainly single events with a lack of strategic sustainable planning and development focus. (UNDP, 2011: 32-33)

These critical observations are similar to those raised throughout this book in relation to the CYL’s social work, a large portion of which is carried out under the label of the CY VA. Chapter 3 demonstrated that League volunteering activities on campus were low-impact and generalist in nature. Despite the popularization of volunteering, the CYVA’s work has been detrimental to raising professional attitudes and producing impactful results. According to the UNDP report, state-led volunteerism also undermines the development and expansion of longstanding partnerships with non-state organizations. Indeed, League cadres interviewed in Beijing and Zhejiang mentioned that the main organizations with which they maintained contact and co-operated were either state-organized, such as the Chinese Red Cross, or created by foreign enterprises to promote corporate responsibility activities, such as the Amway Volunteers (Interviews 21, 24, 49, 59). By excluding informal organizations and prioritizing top-down initiated campaigns, the CYVA blocked an important channel for renewal of its work: collaboration with social actors whose mission is to respond to social problems on the ground. In turn, this inhibits the diversification, growth and improvement of the volunteering sector in China. The China Youth Development Foundation is another prominent case because it has positioned itself as a leading charity organization in the country, enlisting the League’s wholesale support. For the purposes of this chapter, it offers an example of a successful ‘two-way street’ co-optation. The CYDF was formally established in 1989 under the Communist Youth League Central Committee and in 1991 initiated Project Hope, a nationwide charity program, which has since become the most popular of its kind in China. Xu Yongguang (徐永光), its founder and first general secretary, was one of the longest-serving members of the League Central Committee (Lu, 2009: 39). Xu was a state official-turned-social entrepreneur, who successfully

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pursued the co-optation of the CYDF by the League, offering board member positions to CYL CC cadres and consulting them about appointments and activities (ibid.: 32-33). He also skillfully maintained the strong support of the Party and the League by sharing face-giving, positive publicity. The co-optation tactics of Xu Yongguang were so thorough that even today League members and cadres believe that Project Hope is a CYL-initiated undertaking. In contrast to the CYVA examined above, at the top-level, the CYDF maintained considerable autonomy from the Party and the League in its decision-making process and finances, which enabled it to carry out its work in a specialized manner and with minimal interference. In addition, by gaining the Party’s support and the endorsement of prominent leaders, notably Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, the CYDF managed to win turf wars with government departments, such as the Ministry of Education, and even with local League committees that wanted to entirely take over the management of its funds. Lu explains that the CYDF and the Ministry of Education were on a collision course from the very beginning, since the Foundation was exposing the poor educational conditions in impoverished areas and the inefficiencies of local education departments (2009: 41-42). Apart from leading political figures, Project Hope has also been endorsed by celebrities, such as NBA superstar Yao Ming, and has built a network of partnerships with local communities, state agencies, Chinese and foreign enterprises, international organizations and various local and international charity foundations.10 Organizationally, the CYDF relied on the League to carry out its charity work at the local level, thereby exposing League cadres to fundraising and related activities, such as organizing publicity events and building partnerships with state and social actors. Lu (2009: 40) describes the economic and political gains for League committees in impoverished areas. Access to Project Hope funds gave committees decision-making power over projects such as building schools, purchasing books and teaching materials, and paying school fees for poor students, all of which raised their standing in local communities and provided them with an invaluable opportunity to present their superiors with concrete evidence of social impact (Sun et al, 1999, quoted in Lu, 2009: 41). In the more affluent areas of Beijing and Zhejiang visited during fieldwork, fundraising for Project Hope had become an important and easily quantifiable measure of a local committee’s 10 Including Motorola, Coca Cola, the Asia Foundation, the World Bank, the UNDP, International Youth Foundation. More information available on the CYDF website http://www.cydf.org.cn/

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performance, and was routinely included in annual reports. In addition, the CYDF has expanded its activities to contribute to Party and League projects in the fields of environmental protection, health awareness and leadership (CYDF, n.d.). Overall, the CYDF is the most successful League-supported foundation and has considerably expanded the League’s social work agenda. The CYL-CYDF partnership mobilized state support and financial resources and has equipped local committees with administrative skills and funds with which to carry out charity work. Also, it has provided the League with a platform to expand its communication and cooperation with social groups and businesses alike. However, proximity to the League also came at a price for the CYDF. First, the Foundation’s close relationship with the regime exposed it to the latter’s informal operation practices. Starting in the mid-1990s and again in the 2000s, accusations of corruption at the local and national levels undermined Project Hope’s credibility. The CCP attempted to suppress information on these scandals in order to avoid embarrassment, which prevented the introduction of greater transparency and fueled negative public perceptions of corruption (Lu, 2009: 111-113). Second, League committees absorbed Project Hope as another bureaucratic function, leaving unchanged the operational norms discussed earlier in this chapter. In fact, it can be argued that Project Hope has not facilitated the League’s reorientation towards social work, but has instead acted as a justif ication for contentment with the inherited low level of responsiveness. National and local government departments routinely carry out donation drives internally (Interviews 14, 22, 26, 31), making the collection of funds a compulsory process. By presenting Project Hope fundraising as coming from government departments and SOEs, committees satisfy social work expectations from within the bureaucracy. A common theme during interviews was that Project Hope constituted the only social work function that League cadres were committed to, precisely because, over the years, it became a bureaucratic task, a ‘duty’ (renwu 任务). Considered as a whole, therefore, despite the CYDF exposing League cadres to a new area of social work, the internal working norms remained unchanged and, eventually, took over. Project Hope tasks have been routinely added to a committee’s workload rather than changing its priorities and its internal allocation of time and resources. Project Hope has become a symbol of state-led charity and therefore it will not be allowed to fail, but the CYL’s involvement has left its internal bureaucratic priorities and processes largely unaffected.

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Co-opting grassroots organizations I now turn to the second category of the League’s co-optation functions towards organizations and groups that are created in a bottom-up fashion, and operate either as formally registered organizations or as informal groups outside the official regulatory framework. The first case is based in a city in Shandong (hereafter coded as Shandong Organization, SO) and operates in the field of migrant workers’ welfare, covering a wide range of issues from labor rights to community-building. The organization emerged from the devotion, skills and passion of its founder, a migrant worker, who initially set up a hotline for free legal support on labor rights. After a few years of the hotline’s successful operation, the organization expanded its operation by opening a community center offering classes and after-school care for children of migrant workers, followed by a recreational and educational center for young workers within the city’s industrial park. At each step, the founder was very careful to include local state agencies in his initiatives in order to avoid controversy and gain their political and financial support (Interview 60). He obtained the League’s patronage by presenting his work as supportive to social stability, and by avoiding any action that could be mistaken as activism. Eventually, his non-confrontational approach, devotion and modesty resulted in city and provincial League officials emphatically supporting his endeavor. The authorities co-opted the Shandong Organization in a number of ways that have also been previously identified by other scholars (Cheng et al, 2010): a) by giving political honors, such as awarding the ‘model worker’ prize to the founder, and the May 4th award to the community center; b) by offering ‘status’ memberships and positions – in this case the founder is also vice president of the city youth federation; c) by organizing visits by high ranking cadres, a notable example being Lu Hao, the CYL CC First Secretary (2008-2013); d) by establishing institutional links through setting up, within the organization, branches of the Party, Workers Union, Youth League and Women’s Federation; e) promoting the founder and the community center in the national and foreign media as an example of China’s civil society; and f) by delegating certain social work projects to the organization and offering material contributions in the form of facilities and equipment. Characteristically, the new education center in the industrial park was registered as a League branch and was partially funded by the city (Interview 60). This enabled the Shandong Organization to attract donations and to benefit from the volunteer work of League committees, but at the same time it involved a sacrifice of its autonomy. More specialized

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activities, such as the SO’s consultations and lectures on legal rights, did not fall within the realm of interaction with the League, since the latter had little or nothing to contribute in terms of specialized knowledge (ibid.). The picture that emerges is one of a distribution of activities: those officially delegated (publicity events and ceremonies, official lectures, mobilization campaigns) and those carried out by the organization itself, which were of a more specialized nature. The official support that the Shandong Organization received from local authorities enabled it to present itself as an advocate for Chinese labor law, fending off suspicions that its activities could disrupt the production process. Through its hotline service and frequent on-site seminars, the SO educated migrant workers on their rights as employees as well as ‘new citizens’ (xinshimin 新市民) of coastal cities. In some cases, Chinese companies even requested its services to educate workers on their lawful rights to prevent them from making demands that transcended the legal obligations of the employer. In addition, foreign enterprises hired the SO to carry out seminars on labor law and health and safety regulations for their Chinese subcontractors in order to avoid violations and protect their public image (ibid.). Furthermore, the SO built a community of migrant workers, promoting their integration into local city life by offering basic welfare and recreational services for migrant children, adolescents and their parents, circulating a small newspaper, and holding social events. In the words of the organization’s founder, the SO’s mission is to promote ‘equality and respect for the citizens’ (migrant workers), and close cooperation with local authorities was a valuable factor in its continuing operation. From the state’s perspective, the SO’s co-optation has provided the city League committee with a channel of communication with migrant youth, and a reliable source of good publicity. The personal charisma, leadership and negotiation skills of its founder have been the cornerstone of the SO’s success. Co-optation by the League has offered official recognition to the SO and allowed it to maintain relative autonomy in operating the hotline, and in many of its community-building activities. The organization did not employ activist tactics and its social work has benefitted local authorities and the CYL, who were confident in entrusting it with community-building projects financed by the local government (Interview 60). According to the founder and social workers in the SO, this ‘trust’ translates, in practical terms, into access to more material resources and volunteers. The authorities did not interfere in its internal affairs, allowing it substantial autonomy in deciding and implementing its social work agenda.

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The case of the Shandong Organization demonstrates how a close relationship with the state is often strategically pursued by social organizations that seek access to resources and official sanctioning of their work in order to gain legitimacy, be more effective and autonomous (Lu, 2009: 52-77). The SO allows examination of the League’s role as a co-opting agency of the Party; however, the CYL’s overall level of engagement with non-state and unregistered organizations was very low. Cadres in Beijing and in the cities visited in Zhejiang could not identify cases of the League’s interaction with civil society outside the formal sphere of mass organizations and state agencies. This is a major weakness that reduces both the League’s social impact and its potential for responsiveness. Another case of co-optation was an attempt to open a channel of communication with organizations and groups that young people form without seeking formal registration. Among many of the cadres interviewed, there was a realization that the framework that regulated the registration and operation of social organizations was counterproductive. The registration regulations often drove social organizations underground, as they failed to secure required sponsorship, or they wished to avoid the painstaking process of registration and the exposure it involved (Ma, 2002, 2009; Hildebrandt, 2011; Spires, 2011). Without registration, state agencies could not closely monitor the growth of social organizations. For instance, in Beijing and in Zhejiang City 1, I came in contact with groups that, despite operating in the politically innocuous area of recreational and outdoor activities, had been avoiding official registration and any contact with authorities in general. Instead, they were either registered as a private business or operated under the unofficial sponsorship of a foreign school (Interviews 3, 34). The CYL committees I visited during fieldwork were in the dark regarding the exact number of youth social organizations and groups operating informally. Their attempts to establish contact were reportedly unsuccessful, as any official interaction would eventually have to follow the regulatory framework of registration and supervision, while the League committees’ human and material resources did not suffice to carry out an investigation of informal organizations on the ground (Interviews 22, 26, 31, 32, 33, 50, 51, 56, 59). In Beijing and Zhejiang, cadres recognized the League’s weak understanding of its social environment and explained that as in the case of young people in general, the only way to establish contact with youth organizations was to give them an incentive to engage with the League through activities and services. The Shanghai League committee made a more organized effort in this direction, attempting to set up a platform of communication and cooperation

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with unregistered youth organizations and groups by creating the Shanghai Youth Community NGO Service Centre (Shanghai Qingnian Jiayuan Minjian Zuzhi Fuwu Zhongxin 上海青年家园民间组织服务中心 ) (Youth Community) (Interviews 31 and 32). The Community was established in 2006, with the initiative of a city League committee member and a university researcher in the field of youth work and CYL-CCP-youth relations (Interview 50). Although its work was primarily web-based, it took advantage of academic resources and facilities to provide opportunities for socialization and training for leaders and members of unregistered groups, on how to establish and operate an organization (ibid.). The fact that the Community was sponsored by the League, rather than being a League branch, allowed it to act in a less overtly political and formal manner. Nevertheless, the Community did still participate in disseminating information on League mobilization drives for volunteers (it organized 6,000 white-collar employees to act as volunteers in the 2010 EXPO), and invited its members to participate in youth festivals organized by, or with the support of, the city CYL committee. In addition, it carried out co-optation functions like those described earlier in reference to registered organizations: awards, publicity events, common projects, and the like. In the first two years of its operation, it had come in contact with approximately 300 organizations (including groups of foreign youths residing in the city), had organized two annual socialization and training gatherings and recommended three organizations for official registration (Interview 50). The contrast between the Community’s online format with the League’s campaign to establish Youth Centers is interesting. As discussed before, the latter was underfunded, unrealistically planned and resulted in a waste of time and resources, while the Community’s emphasis on engaging youth online was a more targeted and eff iciently designed way to approach young people (Interview 50). City and provincial level CYL committees in Guangdong undertook similar efforts in engaging youth groups online (People’s Daily, 2012) but such initiatives remained rather exceptional in the period under discussion. The Community’s limited political character and its founders’ commitment to offering services to social organizations and groups without demanding adherence to the state’s regulatory framework in return, allowed this venture to develop, albeit slowly. The Shanghai initiative was replicated in Guangdong, where the League faced the same problem of lacking the means to engage with unregistered youth groups online (Interview 32, 50). Its success depended on increasing its services, and offering practical and

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relevant assistance to youth groups and organizations, in effect acting less as a League branch and more as a grassroots organization. Considering the cases analyzed here, to what extent can one say the League’s interaction with formal and informal social organizations has fostered the introduction of new ideas and methods of youth work? On the positive side, the League managed to attract funding and to support projects in areas of interest to young people, where it previously had no presence or ability to act. In theory, through interaction with social organizations, cadres could learn new skills and become aware of new social issues and work methods. On the negative side, however, it is evident that the above cases actually involved very few concessions on behalf of the League with respect to its own understanding of its role in relation to young people. The examination of top-down organizations demonstrates that capturing social space resulted in a superficial expansion of the League’s involvement in volunteering and charity, but not in a qualitative enhancement of its capacity for responsive social action. Neither did the League’s engagement with social organizations challenge the operational norms identified in relation to its own social work projects. Initiatives towards youth organizations were sporadic and infrequent, and prioritized the top-down dynamic for mobilization and co-optation over the bottom-up demand for support and assistance. Ultimately, the League was open to synergies with social organizations but only on its own terms. The cases discussed here suggest that the reverse and transformative function of co-optation, in which the co-opted part influences the priorities and methods of work of the co-opting, was circumscribed by the League’s goals as a state agency.

Conclusion In response to inquiries about social work, a cadre in Beijing noted that the League ‘does not know what young people want’ (buzhidao nianqingren xiangshenme 不知道年轻人想什么), while another added that the ‘demand is difficult to satisfy’ (nanmanzu xuqiu 难满足需求) (Interviews 26 and 59). Indeed, any fair assessment of the League’s social work needs to acknowledge that no single organization, even one with the gigantic proportions of the League, could ever be in a position to address the multitudinous and complex problems faced by young people in China. Even in the more conducive environment for social work under Hu and Wen, the League’s many practical and conceptual difficulties in understanding and responding to ‘youth’

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were further exacerbated by the new social challenges emanating from rapid economic and social transformation. Notwithstanding this broad acknowledgment, the above assessment of the actual and potential impact of the League’s youth work demonstrates that, specifically, its capacity for responsiveness was severely compromised by its ‘junior’ position in policy making. The League in many ways acted as the institutional version of Lei Feng, uncritically internalizing the Party’s discourse and faithfully following its orders, even though it implemented them in a less enthusiastic and more perfunctory manner. In addition, there were many contradictions, conflicts and paradoxes between what the Party wanted to achieve in relation to Chinese youth, and the social context in which the League operated. The CCP has long realized the value of responsiveness for authoritarian resilience, and under Hu Jintao the League launched various projects and activities to ‘cover’ different groups of young people. But implementing a social work mandate requires appropriate work norms and priorities, a certain degree of specialization and commitment, and a willingness to engage and collaborate with other social actors. All these were preconditions that League cadres could not meet, even partially. In conclusion, this chapter engaged in an exploration of the League’s responsiveness towards young people in the Hu-Wen decade. The main finding was that its involvement in social work was rather superficial, and did not exhibit any potential for strengthening its autonomy and capacity for purposeful action in the sphere of youth affairs through institutionalizing commitment and developing professional attitudes. On the contrary, the CYL’s youth work enforced both dependency and the League cadres’ junior role in decision-making and policy implementation. The meanings associated with social work distorted its focus, since they emphasized indoctrination of participants over social impact, they internalized the advanced vs nonadvanced dichotomy that excluded many vulnerable groups of young people, and they enforced dependency in decision-making and a generalist scope of activities, thereby channeling their efforts to areas unrelated to youth. In practice, the four key areas of youth work examined here, revealed that the League’s capacity for responsiveness was minimized by the context of juniority in which cadres operated, while marketization and decentralization further compromised the scale, reach and quality of its operations. At the same time, I identified cases where commitment and specialization facilitated purposeful action. The creation of the CYDF and the important research of the CYCRC demonstrated an alternative path of engaging with youth affairs in a more professional manner, by mobilizing intellectual and social resources to address specific problems

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on the ground. However, these remained rather exceptional examples over which the League could not claim full ownership. Lastly, interaction with social organizations did not escape Party canon, leaving the League isolated from the many informal youth groups that have emerged in the last decades. Even in the relatively liberal social environment under Hu and Wen, formalism and corporatist control still prevented the League from more effectively engaging with other social actors. Alas, even alternative approaches such as the Shanghai-based Youth Community, had to adjust to perform mobilization functions. Ultimately, the League’s failure to improve its responsiveness in the decade under examination also revealed what needed to change: loosening Party control, strengthening engagement with young people and developing a sincere commitment to and specialization in youth affairs. China’s next administration under Xi, would choose to widely disregard these lessons and press ahead with a vision of China’s future that used as a source of inspiration the most authoritarian periods of its past.

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Conclusion: From Hu to Xi Abstract The Conclusion appraises the empirical and conceptual findings of this book and evaluates the League’s efforts in addressing the needs and demands of its constituency. It also connects this study to recent political developments, suggesting that the 2016 reform of the League under Xi Jinping reveals the regime’s apprehension about the loyalty of younger generations. Xi’s call for intensification of the CYL’s political work will be translated into emphasis on the traditional tasks of indoctrination, Party membership preparation and mobilization. As such, the problems identif ied in this study will remain relevant, sustaining the League’s juniority and further strengthening apathy among youth. Lastly, the conclusion reflects on the lessons from the examination of the CYL’s abortive adaptation for comparative youth politics. Keywords: League Reform, Xi Jinping, juniority, political apathy

The Chinese Communist Party’s attempt to lead a rapidly changing society without losing its monopoly on power has placed its institutions under enormous pressure to adapt. As the regime keeps the core of its political system closed to the prospect of liberalization, the pressure for change has been more intense on those agencies and organizations that are located at the forefront of state and society relations. Chinese citizens have become more outspoken and demanding, while their loyalty is more conditional than ever, largely depending on the regime’s ability to offer meaningful and effective responses to their current problems and hopes for the future. In the case of mass organizations, the pressure to change their decadeslong mode of operation has been particularly strong. Emerging after many years of inaction during the Cultural Revolution, the MOs were called upon to reactivate their transmission-belt functions with society while maintaining their loyalty and organizational dependency to the Communist Party. However, economic reform, and the ensuing social pluralization and

Tsimonis, Konstantinos D., The Chinese Communist Youth League: Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press 2021 doi: 10.5117/9789462989863_concl

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significant de-politicization of individual life, have eroded the regime’s ability to define the individual-subject. With the advancing obsolescence of the uniform, top-down assigned social categories on which the operation of MOs depended in the Maoist years, the social agenda MOs need to respond to has also expanded in previously unimaginable ways: economic reforms have drastically changed labor relations and created pressures on trade unions to represent workers; the Engelsian state feminist policies failed to respond to the social problems Chinese women have been confronted with since Deng’s reforms; and lastly, indoctrination and Lei Feng-style activities and discourse mean little to young people who are preoccupied with the challenges of education, the uncertainties of employment, the many problems linked to the marketization of welfare, and who identify with many diverse trends in fashion, popular culture and recreation. In the context of an authoritarian polity that has lost its monopoly over designating social interests and demands, the MOs’ performance in mobilizing support for the regime depends on building their organizational capacity to meet two interrelated tasks. First, to act as channels for participation and representation, thus affecting policy and legislation; and, second, to respond to problems that affect their very diverse constituencies, through provision of social services. This is a difficult task given that there has been no consensus or clarity within the regime on how MOs should best respond to these challenges. In fact, the CCP’s discourse on the matter ranges from being ambivalent, as in the case of the slogan ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’, to sending downright contradictory signals, as with the CYL’s continued emphasis on ‘advanced youth’. Thus, Party leaders often stress the representational character of MOs, even their presumed autonomy in the case of the ACWF, but simultaneously emphasize their duties to the CCP. In this ambiguous and contradictory context, the agency of cadres and their ability to navigate the system, identify opportunities in the wider political conjuncture, and accordingly design interventions and policies, are key factors in facilitating responsiveness. Based on the experience of Chinese MOs and communist youth organizations elsewhere, this study concentrated on the institutional and ideational factors that shape the agency of CYL cadres and explain their capacity for responsiveness. I examined a period during which the CYL had a mandate to increase responsiveness, which reflected two key characteristics of the Hu-Wen era: a commitment to expanding welfare policies and collaboration with non-state actors, and a more liberal social environment in comparison to both Jiang Zemin and Xi Jinping. The first factor I considered was dependency to the CCP. Party committees at every level control all the important

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decisions an organization is expected to make: whom to appoint, how to train its personnel, how to find access to and allocate material resources, how to prioritize and develop its functions and work. However, the social implications of economic reform have created many pressures for change, exposing cadres to a social reality that offers a wide range of discourses and opportunities to employ alternative material and intellectual resources. Both the literature on Chinese mass organizations and initiatives within the Communist Youth League demonstrate that the seeds for a modest augmentation of responsiveness are present. CYL cadres realize the need to change their youth work and many interviewees expressed their concern about failing to do so. As in other MOs, despite a context of dependency, the societal impetus for change exists and individual cadres have demonstrated that purposive incentives develop even in an authoritarian context. With these observations in mind I sought to identify the particular factors that explain why these purposive incentives have not been institutionalized, not even partially as in the case of the All China Women’s Federation, where cadres managed to modestly expand its responsiveness. My investigation discovered that the CYL represents a notion of ‘youth’ as a junior social and political condition, rather than young people as a very pluralistic constituency confronted with a wide range of welfare issues. This creates a distinctive type of subordination that merges political with generationally-based authority, which I have referred to as ‘juniority’. Juniority is maintained through the regime’s discourse on youth and organizational practices, including the cadres’ length of tenure, the age at which they assume CYL positions, career paths and incentives, and their hierarchical relations with other government and Party organizations. In addition, by consistently placing cadres in a disadvantageous position within seniority-based hierarchies in their places of study and work, the League’s already modest prospects for responsiveness are reduced further. In the conclusion of this study, I will first review its main findings regarding juniority and the CYL’s abortive attempt to engage youth. I will then reflect on developments since 2012 and suggest that the League’s responsiveness and capacity for social work will likely decline further due to Xi Jinping’s efforts to centralize power.

The League as a dependent and junior organization The league’s core mission is captured by its long-standing self-description as a ‘school of communism’ and as a ‘reserve force’ and ‘assistant’ of the Party. These notions correspond to its key political functions that serve the

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organizational perpetuation of the regime: preparation for Party membership as a means of co-opting ‘advanced’ youth (especially university students and graduates); operating as a training ground for cadres, offering opportunities for early advancement in the Party bureaucracy; and mobilization of volunteer labor for local Party committees and governments. These tasks also provide the rationale for the CCP’s continuous, close involvement in League affairs as evident in: i) cadre appointment practices, ii) content of training, iii) access to material and intellectual resources, and iv) meaning and form of ‘youth work’. First, personnel processes, including the system of appointments and training, aim at introducing young, educated cadres into the party-state bureaucracy. In all spaces visited, leading cadre positions in the CYL were decided by the Party committee. On campus, CYL secretaries above the branch level were Party cadres who in most cases were employed as administrative staff or teachers/instructors. In places of work the League’s organizational presence was uneven and weak, nevertheless in all sites visited the Party and/or the Union designated its cadres. In local government, the Party also controlled League appointments. Ordinary cadres in their vast majority were part-time and/or unpaid, and the salaries of paid committee secretaries depended on their work unit. Second, the Party’s pivotal role in the League’s personnel affairs extends also to the area of training. During interviews, League secretaries repeatedly complained about poor cadre quality especially in relation to social work. Despite the expansion of the League’s training system under Hu Jintao, my investigation of grassroots and national-level League Schools and systems of recognition, rotation and development revealed that the youth component of training was anemic, since the League has remained preoccupied with preparing future Party administrators. As a result, League cadres neither acquired skills similar to social workers, nor developed a long-term commitment to youth affairs as specialized public servants. The career incentives and paths created in the League’s cadre appointment and training system lead inevitably outside the League or the sphere of youth work in general. As such, ‘youth’ as an area of social policy is emphatically sidelined. Third, Party committees also controlled the League’s funding and material resources, as best illustrated by the physical location of CYL offices within local government and Party buildings. Grassroots organizations relied on membership fees, an amount too small to cover even basic expenses. In addition, the effectiveness of this source of funding depends on having a sufficiently large pool of members, an obvious precondition that was not met in most cases outside higher education. In workplaces, the absence of

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compulsory financing of branches, and the usually small number of registered members, rendered the CYL entirely dependent on Party and Union committees or the management for their operation. In local governments, the organizational principle of ‘Building the League through Building the Party’, preserved the League’s vast network of local branches, but at the expense of institutionalizing youth work. As youth projects and campaigns are implemented as unfunded mandates, they remained rather peripheral to the developmental priorities of local governments, resulting in very poor outcomes. This leaves the CYL in the worst possible position: persistence of Leninist control without access to new resources in market and society. Fourth, dependency also preserves the Party’s ability to direct League work locally and nationally. On campus, in addition to celebrations for political anniversaries, League organizations provided administrative support to Party and school authorities, including supervising the student union and societies. Their volunteer work mirrors the Party’s preference for Lei Feng-style activities, aiming at the normative instruction of participants rather than at having a concrete social impact. In workplaces, League organizations mainly assisted with team building, training and CSR activities while their involvement in the welfare of young employees was feeble at best. Despite the ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’ mandate, the League has responded very lethargically to the challenge of engaging youth outside the sphere of education. This is very evident in the limited innovation characterizing youth activities, which further accentuates its irrelevance to young people. Social work was primarily generalist and didactic in nature, implemented in an abrupt rather than continuous and standardized manner, while the time and energy of cadres were exhausted by the demands of nationalistic fanfare, role-model worship, monotonous study sessions, and repeated mobilization for yet another large-scale sports event or national celebration. The few actual social-work activities that were implemented did not achieve any tangible and sustainable results on the ground, nor did they improve the League’s operation. Lastly, I investigated the League’s relations with social organizations to test whether cooperation with civil society introduced new understandings of and approaches towards youth work. The League’s much-acclaimed involvement in Project Hope is a rather unique case, involving a statesponsored organization (the China Youth Development Foundation) with work carried out through the same bureaucratic channels and mobilization methods. In reference to formal and informal social organizations created outside the structure of the state and the League, there were sporadic examples of cooperation, but these remained rather peripheral to a reality

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of cold relations, especially with non-registered groups. As the League does not communicate with the emerging sphere of informal and grassroots youth groups, it insulates itself from the potential benefits of cooperation. The empirical findings of this book portray an organization that has failed to develop responsiveness both in the sense of opening channels for civic engagement and creating capacity for social services. As such, the League compares negatively not only to social organizations in democratic contexts, but also to other mass organizations in China. Chinese Trade Unions and Women’s Federations are dependent on the CCP and operate in a context of capital-labor relations and patriarchy that create very difficult conditions for giving voice and providing solutions to workers and women respectively. Within this restrictive structural and institutional context, the level of responsiveness by mass organizations is inconsistent and modest, as they often deprioritize the interests of their members. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the social pressures created by marketization have triggered various pro-constituency cadre responses: from new institutions and laws protecting labor and women’s rights at the national level, to local interventions promoting grassroots demands and cooperation with society. These cadres have tried to negotiate the restrictive context of dependency on the CCP with varying degrees of success. Unfortunately, despite the ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’ mandate, their counterparts in the CYL have failed to reach even this modest level of responsiveness. CCP Jr. The League is subjected to the same political controls present in other mass organizations. More importantly, its capacity for responsiveness has been further reduced by the politically disempowering notion of ‘youth’ as a ‘junior’ political subject that is embedded in the League’s discourse and work methods. This junior identity is the product of the structural subordination of youth to generational hierarchies in society and politics. Discursive analysis of this identity has shown that the League’s self-description is interspersed with references to notions of servitude to the Party and, indirectly, to assumptions of young people’s political immaturity. In this regard, the League projects itself as the school where Chinese youth can learn the CCP’s version of communism through participation in political ceremonies, study sessions, and volunteer activities. The League’s discourse also creates a further taxonomy between those segments of youth that are ‘advanced’ enough to deserve the League’s attention and those that are not, thus producing justif ications for the

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emphasis on urban students and the neglect of rural and migrant youth, young workers and marginalized groups. The junior political status of its members is exemplified by the official membership age range (14-28 years old), that groups high school students with young professionals. This range is not based on any biological or sociological categorization of age but has a political rationale of constituting ‘youth’ as a politically junior subject. League members are, thus, placed at the bottom not only of the political hierarchy that favors individuals occupying higher positions in the Party, but also in the university, at the workplace and in different localities. What is more, by constituting ‘youth’ as ‘junior’, the League also undermines its own capacity for responsiveness, as it prioritizes indoctrination and mobilization over engaging with young people’s views and demands, and offering channels for meaningful political expression and consultation. Even in the relatively favorable political context for experimentation examined in this book, the League has not been able to contest this disempowering notion of ‘youth’ and introduce changes in its approaches and methods. What I have defined as ‘juniority’, a form of subordination that merges generational and political authority, has an important organizational dimension with a direct impact on the agency of cadres. Despite variation in the organizational capacity of CYL committees in different localities and levels of administration, a recurrent theme in this investigation is the League’s inferior organizational status among other government agencies and departments that in all cases has taken the form of young, less experienced cadres being in disadvantageous positions within seniority-based hierarchies. Age restrictions under the 1982 regulations limit the length of tenure and lower the career stage in which cadres assume posts in the League. For example, CYL grassroots organizations are staffed with younger cadres (students, junior employees) at the entry level of their careers in politics and administration, who are junior not only to Party cadres but also to the majority of their co-workers, teachers or managers. Similarly, in local government, holding a position in the League is in effect either an entry-level position to prove oneself or, in the case of leading cadres, a first assignment of responsibility during which one tends to follow orders and satisfy superiors in the party-state in order to secure future promotion to other bureaucracies and organizations. Apart from being dependent on Party committees, League cadres occupy junior posts in their organizations of study or work (university, workplace, government). As a consequence, they are in a position of considerable institutional weakness and under strong disincentives against pro-constituency action. The certainty of future advancement and employment outside

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the League and youth affairs prompt ordinary cadres to maintain docile attitudes that avoid antagonizing those in position of authority. Interestingly, even full-time and leading cadres in local and national level organizations commented on their lack of power to instigate pro-youth initiatives, naming the CCP, the ministry of Education, the ministry of Labor and Social Security and even the ACWF-led National Working Committee for Children and Women as the key policy actors in youth affairs. In this context of juniority, cadres exhibit little potential to become agents of renewal by breaking away from the elitist (‘advanced/non-advanced youth’ dichotomy), moralistic (in reference to marginalized groups) and patronizing notions of youth that define the League’s work and self-perception. Of course, rare instances of responsiveness take place, with cadres occasionally addressing demands raised by students in universities and working on local issues affecting youth. The interviews also recorded the cadres’ shared belief that the CYL has to improve the social component of its youth work and do more to build capacity for responsiveness. However, juniority prevents the CYL from developing the commitment and specialization necessary to engage systematically with the youth agenda and sustain results. As such, the main impetus for the League’s involvement in new areas of work will continue to come from the Party and the government and, therefore, follow their priorities. The result is that the CYL combines two distinctive organizational identities based on its different functions. On the one hand, it is a powerful promotion mechanism that in the post-Deng period has acted as a channel for the CCP’s personnel ‘rejuvenation’ (Doyon, 2017) and as the platform for the creation of personal networks, political alliances and functions. On the other, however, the League is a weak youth organization that lacks the autonomy and capacity necessary to carry out social work and increase its participatory character. Even the new mandate and the more politically and socially liberal environment during the Hu-Wen administration, did not prompt an improvement in its form of engagement with Chinese youth. As such, seen both from the perspective of the 2002-2012 decade and from what would follow during Xi Jinping’s first term, the call to ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’ was a lost opportunity for the regime.

The League under Xi: Factional considerations or a new mission? Xi Jinping’s first term (2012-2017) was characterized by a comprehensive and extensive effort at consolidating power, implemented through a series

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of measures to re-centralize control over the Party and state. This effort overturned collective leadership norms and processes that were in place for over three decades (Lam, 2015; Brown, 2016; Li, 2016; Minzner, 2018). In the eyes of Xi Jinping and of other Party leaders who feared that the CCP’s rule was eroding under Hu and Wen, the Party’s survival and Xi’s centralization of power became indistinguishable goals. The chosen recipe for survival included ‘back to the roots’ measures of restoring and intensifying indoctrination, normative instruction and Party meetings, routine political study and self-criticism, and imposing a culture of frugality among leading and rank-and-file cadres (Brown, 2018b: 128-130). These measures were accompanied by the longest and most intensive anticorruption ‘struggle’ ( fanfubai douzheng 反腐败斗争) China has experienced since Deng’s reforms (ibid.: 56-63). Xi’s sweeping anticorruption campaign has acted on the one hand as a disciplining mechanism by removing corrupt officials, and on the other as a power-consolidation tool used to purge individual opponents as well as networks, groups and organizations not willing to follow his vision for the Party (ibid.: 64-67). In this uncertain political climate, where previously powerful officials were arrested, disgraced and imprisoned within days, the Communist Youth League found itself on the wrong side of the tide. The League has long been considered a bastion of factionalism. This is partly due to the same reasons that factionalism exists in every authoritarian polity that forbids open and institutionalized competition among political actors, and partly due to the new opportunities created by Deng’s emphasis on recruiting young and more educated cadres. I have discussed how, since the 1980s, the CCP has used the League as a fast-track career mechanism to identify and promote individuals that fit its desired age and educational standards. In this context, during rounds of promotions, CCP leaders helped their protégés in the League in order to increase their influence within the Party, thus creating networks of trust and personal loyalty (Kou, 2007; Kou and Tsai, 2014). In addition, friendships and bonds of work created among cadres during their years in League posts became political assets which enhanced one’s political capital in the party-state. For instance, during fieldwork I came across cases of ‘elevator promotions’, i.e. a promoted cadre ‘pulling up’ other trusted individuals to assist in the new post. The nature and processes of the CYL’s involvement in elite politics and factionalism is beyond the scope of this book, but it is widely acknowledged that the League has provided a platform for the creation of powerful alliances and connections, especially since ‘youth’ became a valuable political currency in the political economy of promotions within the regime. Indeed, a considerable body of research on factionalism has concentrated on the so-called League

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Faction (tuanpai 团派), a group of cadres with previous experience in the CYL, supporting figures such as Hu Yaobang and Hu Jintao who started their careers in the League. Although the nature, cohesion, and inner workings of the tuanpai are only partially known, China scholars agree that it has provided a base of support for the Hu-Wen administration (Bo, 2004; Kou and Tsai, 2014; Payette, 2016; Doyon, 2019b). Seen from that perspective, the League faction became an obvious target for a new leader like Xi, who sought to consolidate his rule and weaken actual and potential opponents. For instance, the purge of individual officials known for their links to the tuanpai (e.g. Ling Jihua), falls under this effort. Other officials simply got sidelined, losing advancement opportunities. For example, Qin Yizhi, the former CYL first secretary, was demoted to a bureaucratically lower-ranked position, while Yang Yue, former head of the CYL secretariat and alternate member of the 18th Central Committee, was not appointed to the 19th Central Committee in 2018 (Shen and Chen, 2020:160-1). Besides factional considerations, however, Xi Jinping also gradually unfolded and implemented his political vision for mass organizations in general and for the League in particular. From the first months of his term, he expressed critical views on different aspects of the League’s operation and re-emphasized its political and Party-dependent character. Speaking to CYL cadres in June 2013, exactly 10 years since his predecessor called upon them to ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’, the new Chinese president criticized the League’s style of work, content and reach. He told cadres that ‘the League needs to closely focus on the overall situation of the Party and the country to find the right entry point for its work’ (gongqingtuan yao jinjin weirao dangheguojia gongzuodaju zhaozhun gongzuo qierudian 共青团要紧紧 围绕党和国家工作大局找准工作切入点), warned them not to behave as ‘youth officials’ (buzuo qingnianguan 不做青年官), instructed them to ‘improve their work abilities’ (bixu tigao gongzuo nengli 必须提高工作能 力) and expand ‘the effective coverage of [their] work’ (gongzuo youxiao fugaimian 工作有效覆盖面) contrasting it with organizational expansion ‘that in reality has no effect and exists in name only’ (bushishuo zuzhi youle，haoxiang fugaile，dan shijishang buqi zuoyong，xingtong xushe 不 是说组织有了，好像覆盖了，但实际上不起作用，形同虚设) (Xi, 2017: 62, 65, 82). Also, speaking at the CCP Central Committee Conference on the Work of Mass Organizations on July 6, 2015, Xi sent a clear message about the regime’s expectations: ‘The soul of mass organizations is primarily their political character. Abandoning it, can easily produce the tendency of separating from the

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CCP’s leadership, can cause MOs vulgarization, turning them into ordinary social organizations, or even leading them to an evil path. Maintaining and strengthening the political character of the work on the CCP’s mass organizations is a matter that requires our greatest attention’.1

Following the conference, the CCP Central Committee issued the ‘Opinion on Strengthening and Improving the Work of the Party’s Mass Organizations’ (9-7-2015), which placed emphasis on their closer political management by the Party. In October 2015, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) dispatched an inspection team to the CYL for a two-months-long investigation. Following that inspection tour, the CCDI produced a report criticizing the CYL for being too ‘bureaucratic, procedurally minded, aristocratic and entertainment-oriented’ ( jiguanhua, xingzhenghua, guizuhua, yulehua 机关化、行政化、贵族化、娱乐化) (Lam, 2016), with weak Party leadership (dangde lingdao ruohua 党的领导弱化) (CCDI, 2016). The CCDI also pointed out that the Party’s grassroots organizations are weak and scattered ( jiceng dangzuzhi ruanruo huansan 基层党组织软弱涣散)，League committees do not strictly implement the cadre selection and appointment system (zhixing ganbu xuanba renyong zhidu guiding buyan 执行干部选拔 任用制度规定不严), and fail to control and communicate with subordinate units (dui zhishu danwei jianguan budaowei，youde danwei yibashou changqi bujiaoliu 对直属单位监管不到位，有的单位一把手长期不交流) (ibid.). This report set the context for the CYL’s restructuring as laid out in the 2016 ‘Central Communist Youth League Reform Plan’. This Plan stipulated a series of principles amounting to the most comprehensive reform the League has undergone since its re-organization in the early 1970s. The overall logic of the reform was to strengthen the League’s grassroots and mid-level capacity, while weakening its upper echelons. The Plan justifies this reorientation on the basis that it brings cadres closer to China’s youth in order to strengthen the Party’s leadership ( jianchi dangde lingdao 坚持 党的领导), enhances its ability to serve and directly connect with young people ( jianchi fuwu qingnian，zhijie lianxi qingnian 坚持服务青年，直接 联系青年), and better ‘guides them to listen to the CCP’ (yindao qingnian tingdanghua 引导青年听党话) (CYL Reform Plan, 2016: 3, 11). The measures taken in the context of the Party’s newfound vision for the League under Xi had a significant impact on its membership, grassroots 1 Original text: ‘政治性是群团组织的灵魂，是第一位的。离开了政治性群团组织就容易 产生脱离党的领导的倾向，就会庸俗化，就会成为一般社会组织，甚至会走向邪路。保持 和增强党的群团工作的政治性这个问题，必须引起我们高度关注’

246 

The Chinese Communist Youth League

Figure 7.1  The CYL under Xi 10000 9000 8000 7000 CC CYL Budget (in 00000s)

6000 5000

Members (in 0000s)

4000

Grassroots Organisaons (in 000s)

3000 2000 1000 0 2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

Sources: CCPN, 2016; CYLCC, 2011a; CYLCC, 2012; CYLCC, 2013; CYN, 2014; CYLCC, 2016a; CYLCC, 2011b; CYLCC, 2016b; CYLCC, 2017; CYLCC, 2018; CYN, 2018; Hainan CYL, 2013; Xinhua, 2014

presence, budget, cadre ranks, affiliated organizations and activities. First, the CYL downsized its membership, from 89,499 million in 2013 to 81,246 million in 2017, and its grassroots organizations from 384,200 in 2013 to 357,900 in 2017 (see Figure 7.1).2 Second, in 2016 the CYL Central Committee announced a substantial reduction of its budget, down by more than 50% in relation to the previous year, from 624 to 306 million RMB. The cut affected personnel and administrative expenses (down by 54.81%), but also the budgets for education and training (down by 61.27%), sports, culture and media (down by 22.41%), signaling a comprehensive downgrading of the Central CYL’s means, projects and capacity (CYL CC, 15-4-2016). Third, the League redistributed its personnel by ‘reducing the top ranks and supplementing the base’ ( jianshang buxia 减上补下) (CYL Reform Plan, 2016: 11). It reduced personnel in the CYL Central Committee and re-assigned more cadres to the local government for longer periods of placement, with special attention given to county-level organizations (ibid.: 5, 7). Top cadres in the central and provincial CYL committees found their careers stalled with many ending in marginal posts of low bureaucratic ranking with reduced prospects for rising to high positions in the Chinese party-state (Shan and Chen, 2020: 159-162). 2 It is not clear to what extent this reduction is the outcome of deregistering non-active branches and updating membership files, rather than closing down problematic organizations and expelling members.

Conclusion: From Hu to Xi

247

Fourth, the CYL Central Committee’s control of the China Youth University of Political Studies (CYUPS), that represented an effort towards the professionalization of the CYL School, was weakened. The CYUPS has since been placed under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Doyon, 2019a: 44) and has stopped accepting undergraduate students and conferring degrees (Lam, 2016; Shan and Chen, 2020: 164-165), which is indicative of its overall reduced role as a higher-education institution. Lastly, at the time of writing there were reports of an ongoing divestiture, and reduced control over volunteering projects. In 2018, the CYL lost its shares in China CYTS Tours Holding Co. and Cachet Pharmaceutical Co. to China Everbright Group (Doyon, 2019a: 44; Shan and Chen, 2020: 163). In addition, the CYL has lost part of its control over local volunteering projects, including those funded by the China Youth Development Fund (ibid.). What can the examination of the CYL under Hu Jintao disclose about Xi Jinping’s motives and rationale for these measures? Do they reveal only factional considerations or also a new vision of how to respond to old fears about the loyalty of young Chinese? The findings of this book on the poorly implemented ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’ mandate justify the latter explanation, which emphasizes Xi Jinping’s apprehension about the ability of the regime to engage young people. The regime’s relations with youth during the 16th and 17th Party Congresses (2002-2012) had been shaped by market and social forces outside the regime’s control, while socialization in the League has strengthened cynical views on formal political processes. As such, although it did constitute a source of factionalism, ‘factional cleansing’ is only one part of the story of the League’s downfall. Xi’s decision to weaken the CYL’s organizational power also follows the logic of enforcing political discipline and implementing a vision of a regime that is simultaneously more ‘red’ and closer to the people. One could argue that the CYL’s ‘reform’ provided a good opportunity for Xi to kill two birds with one stone: on the one hand weaken the institutional basis for actual or potential opponents from the Tuanpai and, on the other, implement his vision for a more disciplined and selfless corps of cadres. Under a political plan that places emphasis on discipline, loyalty, and a renewed promise by the CCP to better serve the Chinese nation, the League cannot continue to operate only as a powerful channel for ambitious cadres. Instead, it has to concentrate on its functions as a ‘school of communism’ for the masses, as the organization where the ‘China Dream’ is mediated and internalized by young generations. Looking into the future, although the above developments are ongoing and more fieldwork-based research is required to accurately assess their impact in the long run, the available information reveals a trend towards a

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The Chinese Communist Youth League

more frugal League with less authority and fewer resources at its disposal, including weaker career opportunities that it can provide to its cadres. Bringing the work of the League closer to young people would be a desirable development, but the combination of reduced capacity and status with a stricter political environment under Xi, will likely result in the CYL’s retrenchment to the familiar and ‘safe’ functions of indoctrination and Party-membership preparation, as it did in the past. In addition, further weakening the political standing and career prospects of CYL cadres in the party-state will enhance the League’s juniority. As such, it is very unlikely that Xi’s reforms will create the conditions necessary for more effective and responsive social work or promote a more pluralistic and participatory engagement with young people. So far, Xi Jinping’s recipe for renewal is inspired from China’s communist past, and shows no potential for promoting the CYL’s professionalization, specialization and commitment to youth affairs. After 70 years of rapid economic and social transformation, the socialization of younger generations with the Chinese political system continues to be mediated through an organization that can do little more than ineffectively indoctrinate its members and mobilize inexpensive labor in periods of stability. In this regard, there is significant continuity in its inability to engage youth. During the Cultural Revolution and the student protests of late 1980s the CYL could not reduce discontent and promote support for the CCP. In fact, its formal and bureaucratic character contributed to young people’s discontentment with the regime. In the period under examination and despite the ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’ mandate, it failed to become more participatory and responsive, and thus fueled apathy and indifference. The reforms introduced under Xi promote an even more sterile and formal engagement of CYL organizations with young people, with emphasis on routine indoctrination and propaganda functions. For this reason, the League will most likely remain a ceremonious and anachronistic organization with weak capacity for pro-constituency action, further substantiating and popularizing cynical and instrumentalist attitudes among young Chinese towards the formal political process of the PRC.

Juniority beyond the League As discussed in Chapter 2, recent work on communist youth organizations has unearthed the complexities of youth politics under socialism, and it is hoped that the present book will contribute to this growing body of

Conclusion: From Hu to Xi

249

literature. Research on youth leagues in the socialist world has identified many dynamics that correspond to my conceptualization of ‘juniority’: the infantilization of the youth agenda; the domination of the Party’s patriarchal, conservative and highly patronizing understanding of youth and its presumed duties; the opposing pressures on cadres created by top-down directions for mobilization and indoctrination versus the bottom-up demands for responsiveness; the institutional incentives and career expectations of cadres that turn them into ‘youth bureaucrats’; the many abortive attempts at the local and national level to offer a more youthful outlook, providing channels for meaningful participation and opportunities for recreation and self-expression; and, lastly, the sudden changes between liberal and repressive youth policies followed by cadre purges and leadership changes. The Soviet Komsomol, the Yugoslav SSOJ, the East German FDJ, to mention only a few examples, all went through cycles of crises in their relations with young people, which were characterized by extensive apathy and even open antagonism and contestation (McDougall, 2004; Saunders, 2007; Fürst, 2012; Spaskovska, 2017). In all cases, communist organizations embodied a notion of ‘youth’ as the vanguard and worthy successor of the revolution, that made little sense to young people in the context of growing up under socialism. This notion was not only the product of Marxist dogma but also reflected prevalent social norms and the morality of revolutionary generations, creating a chasm between the expectations the regime placed on ‘youth’, and the views, anxieties, ambitions, lifestyle preferences, and values of young people themselves. This chasm was constantly widening with generational change, leading to more cynical and apathetic political attitudes amongst the youth and to a prevalent sense of helplessness among cadres. Even leagues that took drastic steps to change the form and content of their engagement with young people, as in the Yugoslav and the Polish cases (Sadowska, 2016; Spaskovska, 2017), eventually failed to emancipate themselves from the junior identity that facilitated the regime’s political and generational domination over young people. Ultimately, communist youth organizations struggled to cultivate support for socialism among younger generations in the long run and proved unable to diffuse tensions during periods of crisis. Of course, there are important differences between the CCP and other communist regimes during and after the Cold War, which need to be taken into account in any comparative inquiry. China’s economic reforms and ensuing rapid social transformation have diversified the social experience of ‘youth’ and created unprecedented challenges for the League’s relevance to the lives of young Chinese. Notwithstanding such specificities of the Chinese

250 

The Chinese Communist Youth League

context, this examination of the discursive and organizational construction of a junior political identity for Chinese youth, can offer comparative insights to the study of youth organizations in the communist world. By providing an analytical approach that escapes the prism of the ‘inevitable’ demise of communist regimes, juniority captures the macro and micro processes (and failings) of young people’s political socialization. It can also explain the incentives, constraints and contradictions that prevented cadres from materializing a more genuine engagement with young people during periods of relatively progressive Party leadership. Hu Jintao’s ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’ call in this regard is far from unique; typically, in times of political openness in socialist countries youth organizations attempted to increase their responsiveness and participatory character. Examining the generationally and politically subordinated notion of ‘youth’ that leagues represented through their rhetoric, operation and activities, can explain such abortive attempts at youth work innovation even under favorable political conditions. In this regard, the nature and practice of youth’s subordination can enhance our understanding of the process of young people’s disassociation from socialist politics, including their many abrupt shifts from apparent conformity to contention and rebellion. Going one step further, the present examination of juniority in the case of the CYL, also informs discussions on youth politics more broadly. The construction of ‘youth’ as a junior political condition exceeds the historical context and experiences of communist regimes. In the last two centuries, modern states and societies have put in place policies, budgets, education systems, youth organizations and extracurricular activities to mold and discipline young people into citizens. These efforts have normalized structures of control in the form of ascribed behaviors, institutionalized expectations and age-based exclusions. As domination and resistance are both products of any structure of control, young people have responded by finding alternative spaces of expression, have antagonized the authority of parents, teachers and politicians, and have repeatedly clashed with the state. Many democracies have been confronted with an increasing trend of young people’s disassociation from formal politics, expressed as political apathy and, more recently, support for populism (Mattson, 2003; Marsh et al, 2007; Cammaerts et al, 2016). But if the rejection of mainstream politics is a common problem under both authoritarianism and democracy one cannot but wonder about possible common causes. Indeed, young people both in China and in the West, for example, express cynical attitudes and often abstain from formal politics, reject youth organizations, unions and political parties and do not participate in local affairs and elections.

Conclusion: From Hu to Xi

251

Reorienting one’s attention to the similarities instead of the differences of ‘youth’ as a political subject in authoritarian and democratic states, offers to open new avenues for comparison and creative reflection. The intention of such a comparative perspective is not to minimize the irreconcilable differences between authoritarianism and democracy, but to closely examine the ways in which modern societies politically alienate their youth, with a view to improving the appeal and participatory character of democratic institutions. Such a line of inquiry is necessary to address the increasing influence of populism and skepticism towards democracy and liberal values. Especially at a time of resurrected populist actors in Europe and the US, who openly admire authoritarian regimes in China and Russia, it is a pressing task to renew young people’s interest and faith in democratic politics. To this end, bridging the analytical divide and comparing youth politics in authoritarian and democratic states, carries the potential of identifying similarities in the way ‘youth’ is discursively and institutionally constituted as a disempowered political subject. This is a necessary step in reimagining ‘youth’ in politics in a way that promotes young people’s meaningful participation and trust in democracy and does not just seek to keep them passively loyal or ephemerally ‘satisfied’.

References 2016 Gongqingtuan Zhongyang Gaige Fangan (2016 Central CYL Reform Plan). Communist Youth League Official Website: http://www.gqt.org.cn/notice/201608/ P020160809382774540571.pdf. Accessed 1 October 2018. Bo, Zhiyue. ‘Hu Jintao and the CCP’s Ideology: A Historical Perspective’, Journal of Chinese Political Science Vol. 9, No. 2, September 2004, pp. 27-45. https://doi. org/10.1007/BF02877001. Brown, Kerry. CEO, China: the Rise of Xi Jinping. London: I. B. Tauris, 2016. —. China’s Dream: The Culture of Chinese Communism and the Secret Sources of its Power. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018b. Cammaerts, Bart, Bruter, Michael, Banaji, Shakuntala, Harrison, Sarah, Anstead, Nick. Youth participation in democratic life: Stories of hope and disillusion. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan: 2016. CCDI. Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Gongqingtuan Zhongyang Youdeganbu Wudu Wujie Dangde Quntuan Gongzuo Huiyi Jingshen (Some cadres in the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League Misread and Misunderstood the Spirit of the Party’s Conference on the Work of Mass Organizations), 4 February 2016. http://m.thepaper.cn/renmin_prom. jsp?contid=1429616&from=renmin Last accessed 24 September 2020.

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CCPN. Chinese Communist Party News. ‘Jiezhi 2015 Niandi Quanguo Gongyou Gongqingtuanyuan Jin 8800 Wan Ming’ (There were Approximately 88,000 Thousand CYL Members by the End of 2015), 4 May 2016. http://cpc.people.com. cn/gqt/n1/2016/0504/c363174-28324633.html. Accessed 25 April 2019. CYLCC. Communist Youth League Central Committee. ‘Gongqingtuan Zhongyang 2011 Nian Bumen Yusuan’ (Central Communist Youth League 2011 Departmental Budgets), 18 May 2011a. http://www.gqt.org.cn/notice/201105/t20110518_480565. htm. Accessed 25 April 2019. CYLCC. Communist Youth League Central Committee. ‘Gongqingtuan Zhongyang 2010 Niandu Juesuan Shuoming’ (Communist Youth League Central Committee 2010 Final Accounts Explanation), 1 September 2011b. http://www.ccyl.org.cn/ notice/201109/t20110901_514917.htm. Accessed 25 April 2019. CYLCC. Communist Youth League Central Committee. ‘Gongqingtuan Zhongyang 2012 Nian Bumen Yusuan’ (Communist Youth League Central Committee 2012 Departmental Budgets), 24 April 2012. http://www.ccyl.org.cn/notice/201204/ t20120424_563527_1.htm. Accessed 25 April 2019. CYLCC. Communist Youth League Central Committee. ‘Gongqingtuan Zhongyang 2013 Nian Yusuan Gongbu (Central Communist Youth League 2013 Budget), 18 April 2013. http://www.gqt.org.cn/notice/201304/t20130418_632547_1.htm. Accessed 25 April 2019. CYLCC. Communist Youth League Central Committee. ‘Gongqingtuan Zhongyang 2015 Nian Bumen Juesuan’ (2015 Central Communist Youth League Central Departmental Final Accounts), 22 July 2016. http://www.gqt.org.cn/notice/201607/ t20160722_760931_1.htm. Accessed 25 April 2019. CYLCC. Communist Youth League Central Committee. ‘Gongqingtuan Zhongyang 2016 Nian Bumen Yusuan (Communist Youth League Central Committee 2016 Departmental Budget)’, 15 April 2016. http://www.ccyl.org.cn/notice/201604/ t20160415_757233.htm. Accessed 10 October 2018. CYLCC. Communist Youth League Central Committee. ‘Gongqingtuan Zhongyang 2017 Nian Yusuan Gongkai’ (Communist Youth League Central Committee 2017 Budget), 7 April 2017. http://www.gqt.org.cn/notice/201704/t20170407_769376_2. htm. Accessed 25 April 2019. CYLCC. Communist Youth League Central Committee. ‘Gongqingtuan Zhongyang 2018 Nian Yusuan Gongkai’ (Communist Youth League Central Committee 2018 Budget), 13 April 2018. http://www.gqt.org.cn/notice/201804/t20180413_777391. htm. Accessed 25 April 2019. CYN. China Youth Net. ‘Jiezhi 2013 Niandi Quanguo Gongyou Gongqingtuanyuan 8949.9 Wanming’ (There are 89,499 Thousand Youth League Members by the end of 2013), 4 May 2014. http://qnzz.youth.cn/gzdt/201405/t20140504_5136946. htm. Accessed 25 April 2019.

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CYN. China Youth Net. ‘Zuixin Shuju Tongji: Quanguo Gongyou Gongqingtuanyuan 8124.6 Wan Ming’ (Latest Data: There are 81,246 Thousand Youth League Members), 31 May 2018. http://qnzz.youth.cn/gzdt/201805/t20180531_11632923.htm. Accessed 25 April 2019. Doyon, Jérôme. ‘Rejuvenating Communism: The Communist Youth League as a Path to Power in Post-Mao China’. PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 2017. —. ‘The Strength of a Weak Organization: The Communist Youth League as a Path to Power in Post-Mao China’. China Quarterly, 2019b. https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0305741019001516. Fürst, Juliane.Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012. Hainan CYL. Hai Nan Communist Youth League. ‘Jiezhi 2012 Niandi Quanguo Gongyou Gongqingtuanyuan 8990.6 Wanming’ (There are 89,906 Thousand Youth League Members by the End of 2012), 6 May 2013. http://www.hngqt.cn/ page.php?xuh=22537. Accessed 25 April 2019. Kou, Chien-wen, ‘‘Hu Jintao Shidai Tuan Xi Ganbu de Jueqi: Paixi Kaoliang vs Ganbu Shusong de Zuzhi Renwu’ (CYL Cadres Rising in the Era of Hu Jintao: Factional Networking vs Organization’s Mission)’. Journal of Yuanjing Foundation. Vol. 8, No. 4, 2007, pp. 49-95. Kou, Chien-wen, and Wen-Hsuan Tsai. ‘‘Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System’. The China Journal, Vol. 71, January 2014, pp. 153-171. Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. ‘The Eclipse of the Communist Youth League and the Rise of the Zhejiang Clique’. China Brief: A Journal of Analysis and Information – The Jamestown Foundation Vol. 16, No. 8, May 2016, pp. 3-6. Li, Cheng. Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership. Washington, District of Columbia: Brookings Institution Press, 2016. Marsh, David, Therese O´Toole, Su Jones. Young People and Politics in the UK Apathy or Alienation? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Mattson, Kevin. Engaging youth: Combating the Apathy of Young Americans Towards Politics. New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2003. McDougall, Alan. Youth Politics in East Germany: The Free German Youth Movement, 1946-1968. Oxford Historical Monographs. Oxford: Clarendon, 2004. Minzner, Carl. End of an Era: How China’s Authoritarian Revival Is Undermining Its Rise. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press, 2018. Payette, Alex. ‘Factional Pull: Measuring the ‘Tuanpai Effect’ on Elite Formation from 1992 to 2012’. International Journal of China Studies Vol. 7, No. 3, 2016, pp. 319-350. Sadowska, Joanna. ‘The Socialist Youth Union (1957-1976) – Polish Counterpart of Komsomol’. Respectus Philologicus, Vol. 30, No. 35, 25 October 2016. https://doi. org/10.15388/RESPECTUS.2016.30.35.15.

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Saunders, Anna. Honecker’s Children: Youth and Patriotism in East(ern) Germany, 1979-2002. Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 2007. Shan, Wei and Chen Juan. ‘Decline and Repositioning of the Communist Youth League in China’ in Zheng Yongnian and Zhao Litao (Eds.) Chineseness and Modernity in a Changing China: Essays in Honour of Professor Wang Gungwu. EAI Series on East Asia. Singapore: World Scientific, 2020. Spaskovska, Ljubica. The Last Yugoslav Generation: The Rethinking of Youth Politics and Cultures in Late Socialism. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017. Xi, Jinping. ‘Guanyu Qingshaonian he Gongqingtuan Gongzuo Lunshu Zhaibian’ (Excerpts from Xi Jinping’s Speeches Regarding Youth and the Communist Youth League) Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2017. Xinhua. Xinhua News Agency. ‘Jiezhi 2014 Niandi Quanguo Gongyou Gongqingtuanyuan 8821.9 wanming’ (There are 88,219 Thousand Youth League Members by the End of 2014), 3 May 2014. http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/201505/03/c_127759455.htm. Accessed 25 April 2019.

Appendix Appendix List 1 – Interviewees #

Position in the CYL

Occupation

Location

Time of interview

1

Committee secretary

Beijing

May 2010

2

Committee secretary

Employee in public company Employee in government

April 2009

3

Not applicable (N/A)

Beijing (interviewed in London) Beijing

4

Branch secretary

Beijing

September 2009

5

Committee secretary

Beijing

September 2009

6 7

Cadre N/A (ex branch secretary in university) College committee cadre College committee cadre College committee cadre College committee vice-secretary League member and student society organizer Student Union cadre League Central Committee & All China Youth Federation department director League Central Committee & China Youth Rural Entrepreneurs Association department vice-director University committee cadre Student Union cadre Branch secretary Department Committee cadre University committee cadre

Beijing Beijing

September 2009 October 2009

Beijing Beijing Beijing Beijing

October 2009 October 2009 October 2009 October 2009

Graduate student

Beijing

October 2009

Student Full-time CYL

Beijing Beijing

October 2009 October 2009

Full-time CYL

Beijing

October 2009

Graduate student Student Student Student

Beijing Beijing Beijing Beijing

November 2009 November 2009 November 2009 November 2009

Full-time CYL and graduate student

Beijing

November 2009

8 9 10 11 12 13 14

15

16 17 18 19 20

Boy scouts group principal Employee in public hospital Employee in public hospital Student Employee in foreign company Student Student Student Student

August 2009

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#

Position in the CYL

Occupation

Location

Time of interview

21

Beijing Youth League Committee & Beijing Young Volunteers Federation cadre Beijing Youth League Committee & Beijing Young Volunteers Federation vice-secretary Branch secretary

Employee in local government

Beijing

January 2010

Employee in public company

Beijing

January 2010

Employee in public hospital Employee in local government

Beijing

January 2010

Beijing

February 2010

Graduate student Employee in local government

Beijing Beijing

February 2010 February 2010

Journalist in Beijing CYL – sponsored newspaper Student

Beijing

March 2010

Beijing

February 2010

Employee in public company Graduate student

Beijing

January 2010

Beijing

March 2010

China Youth and Children Research Centre – Researcher China Youth and Children Research Centre – Researcher Local government employee Local youth recreation club organizer Public Company University admin employee Teacher

Beijing

March 2010

Beijing

March 2010

Zhejiang

April 2010

Zhejiang

April 2010

Zhejiang Zhejiang

May 2010 May 2010

Zhejiang

May 2010

Zhejiang

May 2010

Zhejiang

May 2010

Zhejiang

May 2010

22

23 24

25 26

27

28

29 30

Beijing District 1 Committee & District Volunteers Federation cadre College cadre Beijing District 1 Committee & District Volunteers Federation vice secretary N/A

Student’s Union president and University committee cadre Committee Secretary

31

University League School departmental head N/A

32

N/A

33

City Committee vice-secretary N/A

34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Committee Secretary University committee secretary Departmental committee secretary Departmental committee Teacher secretary Departmental committee Student vice-secretary University committee cadre Student

257

Appendix

#

Position in the CYL

Occupation

Location

Time of interview

41 42

Student Union president Branch secretary

Zhejiang Zhejiang

May 2010 May 2010

43

Zhejiang

May 2010

Zhejiang

May 2010

45

University committee secretary University committee vice-secretary Township Branch secretary

Student Public company employee University admin employee Teacher

Zhejiang

May 2010

46

Township Branch secretary

Zhejiang

May 2010

47

Committee secretary

Zhejiang

May 2010

48

Committee secretary

Zhejiang

May 2010

49 50

District vice-secretary Organizer – Shanghai Qingnian Jiayuan Beijing District 2 committee cadre Beijing District 2 committee Secretary Union cadre in charge of League affairs

Local government employee Local government employee Factory employee and Union cadre Public company employee Full-time CYL Faculty member

Zhejiang Shanghai

May 2010 June 2010

Local government employee Full-time CYL

Beijing

June 2010

Beijing

June 2010

Private company employee and Union cadre Private company employee and Union cadre Central government employee (through national examinations) Local government employee Local government employee Private company employee Full-time CYL

Zhejiang

June 2010

Zhejiang

June 2010

Beijing

June 2010

Beijing

July 2010

Beijing

July 2010

Beijing

July 2010

Zhejiang

May 2010

Organizer of local social organization

Shandong

October 2011

44

51 52 53

54

Union cadre in charge of League affairs

55

CYL Central Committee & All China Youth Federation – department vice-director

56 57

Beijing rural county secretary Branch secretary

58

Branch secretary

59

City Committee vice-secretary City Youth Federation vice-secretary

60

1980

1981 1983

5 Things to Emphasize, 4 Things to Beautify and 3 things to Love

Polite Citizens Month

Learn from Zhang Haidi

全民文明礼貌月活动

学习张海迪活动

1979

1979 also in 80s

1979

Before 1979-today

五讲四美三热爱活动

‘党政工团同心联谊’ 活动

Party-GovernmentUnion–League One Heart Friendship 修造三北防护林活动 Protect the Forest in 3 Northern Areas 争当 新长征突击手活动 Shock Workers Striving for the New Long March 新长征火炬接力活动 New Long March Torch Relay

Learn from Lei Feng 1963-today Youth Educational Activity Before 1979 -today

学习雷锋活动 青春期教育活动

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

Appendix List 2 – Nationwide CYL Activities

Moral & political education Moral & political education (moral behavior and ‘civic consciousness sessions’) Moral & political education (includes study sessions and recreational activities) Environmental protection (reforestation campaign) Economic development (forming work groups for ad hoc projects) Moral & political education (Political study sessions during the 4th National Games torch relay) Moral & political education (‘5’: culture politeness, hygiene, order, morality; ‘4’: soul, language, behavior, environment; ‘3’: motherland, socialism, CCP) Moral & political education (social behavior, civility) Moral & political education

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

CCP Politburo

National Sports Commission; China Sports Federation ACFTU; ACWF; China Federation of Literary and Art Circles; + 9 United front organizations

State Forestry Administration

CCP CC Education Department

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Entire youth

Entire population

Entire youth

League cadres & members League cadres & members League cadres & members

League cadres & members

Entire youth Junior secondary students

Target group

258  The Chinese Communist Youth League

Economic development (encouraging workforce through propaganda activities & competitions, using the idea of starting from something small to create something bigger) Economic development (promote technology and new production methods) Capacity building (issue League membership cards so that members moving from rural to urban areas can participate in destination’s League branch) Economic development (League organizations in the Eastern and more developed areas provide training to cadres from Western provinces) Economic development (send university graduates on a voluntary basis to work in Western provinces) Social work (raise awareness on law) Economic Development (mobilize workforce through propaganda activities & competitions to achieve pre-set production goals)

1983

1984

1984

1985

1985

The 5 Small (small invention, creation, design, innovation, suggestion)

‘2 kinds of households in 1 group’

Implement the League Membership Card System

‘The Great Opening of West Regions’ and ‘East and West Help Each Other’

‘五小’活动

‘一团两户’活动

实行团员证制度

西部大开发与 东四互助活动

招贤引才，振兴西北活动 Mobilize Students to Revitalize the NorthWestern Areas 普法教育活动 Popularize Legal Education 为重点工程献青春活动 Youth Contributes to Key Projects 1985

1985

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

Department of Education; State Nationalities’ Affairs Commission Department of Justice

Young workers in SOEs

State Economic Commission; ACFTU

Young workers and employees in SOEs & state agencies

Entire population

University graduates

Provincial League Committees

Rural League cadres & members

Rural youths

Target group

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Appendix

259

1986

1986

Creating Civilized Working 1986 Conditions for Youth 1986

1986

1987

Aiming at Contribution

Practical Technological training

Hand in Hand Helping People with Disabilities

Young Workers’ ‘2 Increases and 2 Savings’

立志建功活动

创建青年文明岗活动

实用技术培训活动

手拉手助残活动

青工’双增双节’活动

Rural Youth Technological 1985 Training

农村青年科技培训活动

National Young Workers’ Technology Training and Competition

1985

Youths from 100 Cities Reaching CRE Targets

百城市青年CRE达标 行动

全国青工技术练兵比 武活动

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

Responsible/ Leading institutions

National Education Economic Development Examinations Authority (promote the use of personal computers among students) Economic Development (promote use of technology by rural youths) Economic Development (promote technology and new production methods to young workers in industry, transportation, finance and trade organizations) Economic Development (raise production level through propaganda, competition and consultation with workers) Economic Development (promote modernization through work competitions in SOEs) Social work & Economic Development (offer practical training opportunities for rural youths) Social work (awareness and assistance activities during the International Day of People with Disabilities) Economic Development (promote the idea of ‘increase production and profits, while making savings and reducing costs’)

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

Young workers

Young pioneers

Rural youths

Young workers

Young workers

Young workers

Rural youth

Urban students

Target group

260  The Chinese Communist Youth League

1988

1988

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

Junior Military School

Rights Protection

Train Young Leaders

Project Hope

Hand in Hand Helping Each Other

National Young Workers ‘8/5’ Beneficial Project

Cross-Centuries Chinese Young Eagles Action Young Eagle Medal Competition

少年军校

维权活动

‘培养青年星火带头人 活动’

希望工程

‘手拉手’互助活动

全国青工’八五’效益 工程

跨世纪中国少年雏鹰 行动 ‘雏鹰争章’活动 1992

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name Moral and political education (military-themed activities, exhibitions on history and military equipment, political lectures) Social work (raise awareness on law, protection of rights of adolescents) Economic development (spread the use of technology to rural areas by offering small- scale training opportunities) Social work (charity for children from poor areas) Moral & political education (link penfriends between urban and less advantaged children) Moral & political education (increase work efficiency, political loyalty, sense of contribution to society of young workers) Moral & political education (study sessions & activities) Moral & political education (sessions on socialist ethics and moral behavior, report own good deeds and be awarded a medal)

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

State Science and Technology Commission

PLA; Armed Police; Department of Public Security

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Young pioneers

Young pioneers

Young workers

Young pioneers

Entire population

Rural youth

Entire youth

Young pioneers

Target group

Appendix

261

Moral & political education (organize activities with the theme of proper conduct and behavior) Moral & political education (political, patriotic, moral and policy study) Moral & political education (cultivate ideals, morals, self discipline and ideology of youths to use their creativity for economic development) Moral & political education (promote the idea of self-care, self-study, self-discipline, selfprotection, self-improvement)

1992

1993

1993

1993

1994

1994

Young Eagle Summer Small Group Activities

Cross-Centuries Youth Civilization Project

Cross-Centuries Youth Talent Project

The 5 Responsibilities to Oneself

China Youth Volunteers Action

Young Volunteer Long Term ‘1 to 1’ Pairing Service

雏鹰假日小队活动

跨世纪青年文明工程

跨世纪青年人才工程

‘五自’活动

中国青年志愿者行动

青年志愿者’一助一’长 期结对服务

Capacity building (establishment of the Volunteers Association to act as the volunteer work branch of the CYL) Social work & Economic Development (pairing youths from rich and disadvantaged families and profitable with struggling enterprises in rural areas to pass on knowledge, information, operation methods and material help)

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

State Education Commission – Basic Education Division; CCTV-Children’s Department and 13 other departments

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Urban and rural youth

Entire youth

Entire adolescent population

University students and graduates

Entire youth

Young pioneers

Target group

262  The Chinese Communist Youth League

1994-today

1994

1994

Chinese Youth Mark of Civilization

Cultivate Youth Job Skills

Youth Culture Park

中国青年文明号活动

培养青年岗位能手活动

‘青年文化园’活动

大中专学生志愿服务队 ‘3 Things to bring to to the 1995 暑期文化科技卫生’三下 Rural Areas’ Summer Vaca乡’活动 tion Student Volunteer Service Group on Culture, Technology, Healthcare 服务万村行动 Assisting 10.000 Villages 1995 Action

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name Capacity building (each League branch may achieve the Mark of Civilization by reaching certain requirements regarding its operation) Economic development & Moral and political education (organize study sessions on both practical skills & ideology) Moral & political education (promote ideological work and high spiritual civilization through cultural activities in the local level and introduction of reading and singing awards) Social work (volunteer students offer services in rural areas during the summer vacation on culture, technology and hygiene) Economic development – capacity building (call to assist economic activity in the rural areas, especially agricultural production and promote League branch building, organize cultural activities, book donations and study sessions for youth)

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

University Students

Urban committees

CCP Politburo

Entire youth

Young workers in SOEs

League Committees

Target group

Central Propaganda Department; Education Department

State Economic and Trade Commission; Department of Labor and Social Security

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Appendix

263

1996

1996

‘A Civilized Youth Community – Everyone is Happy’

1996 Reaching Adulthood Ceremony (Educational Activity) 1996 Youth volunteer ‘aid the poor’ Work Relay Program

1996

Building a ‘Civilized Youth Community’

‘青年文明社区’创建 活动

‘青年文明社区大家 乐’活动

18岁成人仪式教育活动

振兴千家中小企业行动

Revitalize a Thousand Medium and Small Enterprises Action

1996

Students’ Volunteer Community Aid Work

大中学生志愿者社区援 助工作

青年志愿者扶贫接力 计划

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

Young workers

University students and graduates

Secondary school students

Urban youth

Urban youth

Secondary and university students

State Education Commission; Department of Civil Affairs Departments of: Civil Affairs; Construction State Administration for Industry Departments of: Civil Affairs; Construction; State Administration for Industry

Target group

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Capacity building (events to boost the above program, cultural activities promoting ideology, morality and Party policies) Moral & political education (patriotic ceremonies and volunteer work) Social Work (sending volunteer teachers to schools in rural and poor areas, predecessor to Go West Project) China Youth Entrepreneurs Economic Development Association (mobilize young workers to take part in the revitalization of their enterprises by raising their abilities, working overtime and accepting salary reduction)

Social work (volunteer students offer education, technology and culture services during weekends to communities) Capacity building (organizational expansion in urban communities)

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

264  The Chinese Communist Youth League

1997

1997

Disseminate Science and Technology to Millions of Rural Youths

‘百校百街结对’大学生 ‘Twinning of Hundreds of 社区援助活动 Schools with Hundreds of Neighbourhoods’ Students’ Community Aid Activity

‘百万农村青年科技传 播’活动

1997

1996

Hand in Hand Global Village

手拉手地球村活动

‘千校百万’外来工青年 ‘Thousands of Schools for 培训计划 Millions’ of Youth Migrant Workers Training Program

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Environmental protection (promote recycling through activities for children)

Chinese cultural Committee on Poverty Reduction(中国 文化扶贫委员会) National Environmental Protection Agency Departments of: Public Economic Development (League Committees are instructed Security; Justice; Labor; Construction; State Family to assist in the promotion of work Planning Commission; skills and basic management trainings as well as in disseminating State Administration for information on labor law and work Industry and Commerce; Central Committee for safety in enterprises) Comprehensive Management of social order Central Propaganda Social work Department; (satellite event of the ‘Three Things Brought to the Rural Areas’, Education Department spreading scientific knowledge in rural areas through setting up ‘study stations’-dushuzhan- and training sessions) Capacity building (mobilize university League committees to enter local communities to engage youths in activities)

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

University students

University students

Young workers

Students (primary school, junior secondary)

Target group

Appendix

265

English translation

Year initiated

1998

1998

Youth Rights’ Protection Stations

Youth on the job Quality Improvement

青少年维权岗

‘青年岗位能手兴质 量’活动

‘手拉手捡回一个希望， Retrieve Hope Hand in 1997 用小行动保护大地球’ Hand, Make a Small Action to Protect the Earth

Chinese Name

Economic Development (Promote efficiency, new skills and innovation, as well as high level of services among young employees in the State Council’s 512 Key enterprises)

Environmental protection (educate youths how to conserve water, recycle, use less electricity etc) Social work (disseminate knowledge on children and adolescent’s legal rights, establish information centers and organize activities in local level)

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities) Students

Urban adolescents

Environmental Protection Administration

CC for Comprehensive Management of social order; High People’s Court; Supreme People’s Procuratorate; Departments of Public Security; Justice; Labor and Social Security; State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT); State Administration for Industry; Press and Publication Administration National; Quality and Technical Supervision Administration 中国经济效益纵深行组委会 Chinese Economic Organizing Commission for In depth-profit

Young SOEs workers

Target group

Responsible/ Leading institutions

266  The Chinese Communist Youth League

1998

1998

1998

Young Workers Excellent Standards Competition

Laid-off Young Workers Entrepreneurship Activity

Chinese Youth New Century Reading Plan

Hand in Hand Overcoming 1998 Difficulties and Offering Aid

Gold Bridge Plan

青工创优达标竞赛活动

‘下岗青工创业’活动

中国青少年新世纪读书 计划活动

‘手拉手解困救助’ 活动

‘金桥计划’

1998

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

Laid-off young workers

Young Workers

Target group

Graduates

Entire youth Central Propaganda Department; Departments of Education; Science & Technology; Culture; SARFT; General Administration of Press and Publications; China Science Association; 总政组织部 Students

Labor Department

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Social work (Assist families of laid-off workers by providing material help, holding after school activities, establishing relief funds, promoting money- saving practices) China Association for Economic Development Science and Technology (platform for promoting technological innovation and knowledge, providing skilled personnel to Western areas and fostering international cooperation in the form of scholarships, student exchanges)

Economic Development (Work efficiency competition, awards in every work unit) Social work (provide training and job searc services for laid off young workers) Moral & political education (recommending reading lists, organizing study sessions and book donations)

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

Appendix

267

Environmental protection (program initially focused on the environmental degradation of China’s major rivers, it was then expanded as a platform of volunteer work, charity and raising awareness for various environmental issues)

Economic Development (promote the idea that 60% of young workers acquire new skills in technology, management and services) Economic Development-Social Work (promote technology skills to workers in SOEs under reform and those laid-off) Social work (activities improving local environment, culture, cleaning etc.)

1999

1999

1999

1999

Protect Mother River Action

‘Youth Innovation and Achievement’

Chinese Youth Volunteers Scientific Service Long March

Civilized Youth Street

保护母亲河行动

‘青年创新创效’活动

中国青年志愿者科技服 务万里行活动

‘青年文明一条街’ 活动

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

Ministry of Science and Technology; All China Journalists Association Department of Construction

League cadres & members, volunteers

National Afforestation Committee; NPC Environmental and Resources Protection Committee; Population, Resources and Environment Committee of the CPPCC National Committee; Department of Water Resources; State Environmental Protection Administration; State Forestry Administration; China Youth Development Fund ACFTU

Young workers, unemployed, rural areas, Western regions Urban youth

Young workers

Target group

Responsible/ Leading institutions

268  The Chinese Communist Youth League

English translation

1999 Rural Youth ‘Increase Efficiency and Profit, Growth and Success’ Action 1999

1999

China Youth Academy of Sciences

Establish League Schools for Juniors

Teenagers’ self-protection 1999

中国少年科学院

创建少年团校活动

青少年自护活动

1999

Year initiated

农村青年’增效增收成 长成才’行动

‘乡村青年文化节’活动 Rural Youth Cultural Festival

Chinese Name

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Social work (cultural activities for rural youths during the New year’s celebration) Economic development (mobilize League committees to assist in agricultural production and Party work in rural areas) China Association for Social work Science & Technology; (spread scientific education to Education Department; children) China National Institute for Educational Research; Chinese Academy of Sciences Capacity building (expand the League school institution to prepare primary & junior secondary students for CYL membership) CC for Comprehensive Social work Management of social order (Raise awareness about how to avoid potential danger and harmful situations)

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

Urban adolescents

Young pioneers

Central Level organization

Rural youth

Rural youth

Target group

Appendix

269

2000

2000

Assist Youth Entrepreneurship

Hundreds of Cities and 10 Thousands of Stores Chinese Youth Mark of Civilization Promoting Achievement Summer Young Culture Activities

帮助青年创业计划

‘百城万店青年文明号 促销创效’行动

2000

1999

Youth Card

中国青年卡

暑期青少年文化活动

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Various Banks Capacity building (initially aimed at registering members, youth card is a multipurpose card for youths between 14 to 35 years old that can be used as pay as you go travel card and as a youth pass offering access to services and discounts that vary in different provinces. Major Chinese Banks also offer Youth Cards as debit cards) Labor and Social Security Economic development & Social Department work (promote the idea of entrepreneurship among young people and laid-off youths, offer trainings and information services on starting a new business) Economic development (promote the idea of working efficiently, offering high standard services and fighting counterfeit products to the workers of the service sector) Social work (utilization of locally available facilities such as youth palaces for cultural and educational activities)

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

Urban adolescents

Service sector workers

Graduates, the unemployed

Urban Youths

Target group

270  The Chinese Communist Youth League

Economic development & Social Work (promote the idea of entrepreneurship for boosting development and reducing unemployment) Economic development & Social Work (promote the idea of entrepreneurship, environmental protection, volunteerism and poverty alleviation in Western areas) Environmental Protection (EP program, calling upon local volunteer associations to organize different kinds of EP activities) Social work (spread information on safety at work and legal rights among young migrant workers)

2000

Chinese Youth Western 2000 Regions Entrepreneurship

2000

2000

2000

Young Entrepreneurs Travelling to the Western Areas

China Youth Volunteers Green Action Plan

Working in Safety

Rural ‘Electronic Information Centre’

青年企业家西部行活动

中国青年西部创业行动

中国青年志愿者绿色行 动营计划

‘平安打工’活动

乡村电子信息馆工程

Social work (Activity under ‘Project Hope’ – locally administer a collection of 2300 CD-ROMs and VCDs, including rural education resource materials, educational software, rural science and technology, health care instructions, law, ‘spiritual civilization’ video sessions, business management and marketing-related topics, films, folk opera videos. )

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name Youth from the Western regions

China Youth Entrepreneurs Association

Rural youths Central Propaganda Department; Department of Culture; SARFT; Press and Publication Administration and other six ministries

Volunteers CPPCC Natural Resources Committee; Water Department; China Forestry College Young migrant State Economic & Trade workers Commission; Department of Labor and social security

Youth from the Western regions

Target group

Responsible/ Leading institutions Appendix

271

2000

2001

‘社区青少年服务中心’ Establishment of ‘Com建设活动 munity Teenagers Service Centre’ Activity

‘党在我心中’主题宣传 ‘The Party in our Hearts’ 教育活动 Thematic Propaganda Education 创建’五四红旗团委’ Establish ‘May 4 Red Flag 活动 CYL Committees’ 2001

非公制经济组织团建 工作

2001 Non-public Sector Economic Organisations League Building Work APEC 青年节暨杰出青年 APEC Youth festival, Youth 2001 企业家论坛 Entrepreneurs Forum

Protect Mother River Ecological Monitoring

2000

中华少年小甲A足球活动 ‘A’ Football League for Children

保护母亲河生态监护 活动

2000

Experiential Education

体验教育活动

2001

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

Economic development (forum of young entrepreneurs from the Asia-pacific)

Moral & political education (under the theme of ‘Rule by Virtue’, educate children on moral conduct using models) Social work (cultivate football skills, following Deng Xiaopin’s call to ‘Start football from Childhood’) Capacity building (penetrate urban communities, standardize educational, cultural and recreational services on offer) Moral & political education (80 years since the establishment of the CCP) Capacity building (system of awards for League Committees) Environmental Protection (satellite event of Protect Mother River Action, establish monitoring station for river ecosystems) Capacity building (organizational expansion in private companies)

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

State Environmental Protection Administration

China Football Association; CCTV

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Young entrepreneurs

League Committees

Volunteers and social organizations

League Committees

Students

Urban youth

Young pioneers

Young pioneers

Target group

272  The Chinese Communist Youth League

English translation

2001-5

2001

Chinese Teenagers New Century Reading Plan

Young Rural Migrant Workers Development Plan

2001 ‘Children from all Nationalities Hand in Hand Helping Each Other’

Establish Law Education Schools for Juniors

中国青少年新世纪读书 计划活动

进城务工青年发展计划

各族少年手拉手互助 活动

创建青少年法律学校 活动

2001

2001

Youth Cultural Square

2001

Year initiated

‘青年文化广场’活动

‘志愿者在行动’ 活动 Volunteers in Action

Chinese Name Social work (celebration of the world volunteer year by the UN, call to local organizations to carry out activities in all areas of volunteer work) Social work (introduce cultural festivals for young people in cities and counties) Moral & political education (periodically issue recommended reading lists, hold study sessions) Social Work (provide cultural activities and information of life in the city, work safety, legal rights) Moral & political education (political and history study sessions for minority children emphasizing China’s unity, also a pen-friend program for Han and minority children) Social work (disseminate knowledge and offer study sessions on legal rights of minors, and on juvenile delinquency)

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

Minority adolescents

Young migrant workers

Adolescents

Urban youth

Volunteers

Target group

Adolescents Departments of: Justice; Education; CC for Comprehensive Management of social order

State Ethnic Affairs Commission; China National Committee for the wellbeing of the youth

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Appendix

273

Moral & political education (anti-Falun Gong campaign) Moral & political education (study the Three Represents and Party theory) Moral & political education -Social Work (information on culture, health and safety, moral conduct) Social Work (organizing activities and service stations for the elderly)

2001

2001

2002

2002

‘Community Teenagers Stay Away From Drugs’ Action

‘Youth Civilised Community’ Anti-Cult Action ‘Youth Civilised Community’ Moral Construction

3 Offers, 1 Help

Volunteers Serving the Elderly Golden Sunlight Action

‘社区青少年远离毒 品’行动

‘青年文明社区’反邪 教行动 ‘青年文明社区’道德建 设行动

‘三送一助’ 活动

志愿者为老人服务金 晖行动

2001

Social work (disseminate knowledge on the ethical use of the internet, inspect the internet café environment, instruct adolescents to avoid dangers, establish an agency responsible for inspecting internet cafes in all cities) Social work (anti-drugs campaign, raise awareness among adolescents)

2001

‘Safe Internet Cafes for teenagers’

‘青少年安全放心网 吧’活动

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

China National Committee on Ageing

Adolescents

CC for Comprehensive Management of social order; Office of the Leading Work Group on the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency; Departments of Public Security; Education, Culture, etc CC for Comprehensive Management of social order; Office of the Leading Work Group on the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency; Civil Affairs department; National Narcotics Control Commission Department of Public Security

Volunteers

Migrant youth

Adolescents

Adolescents

Urban adolescents

Target group

Responsible/ Leading institutions

274  The Chinese Communist Youth League

Social work (community volunteer work during summer vacations to spread science, culture and sports, law, hygiene) Social work (establish teams, stations and programs assisting the disabled) Social Work – Economic Development (promote the entrepreneurial spirit to students and the unemployed through activities and local competitions ) Social work (Aids awareness campaign) Social work – Economic Development (Mobilize local League committees to set up online employment platforms to assist job seekers) Moral & political education (politics and traditional morality sessions)

2002

2002 Youth volunteers Helping People with Disabilities China Youth Entrepreneur- 2002 ship Action

2002 2002

Student Volunteers Summer Vacations ‘4 Entries into the Community’

Youth Red Ribbon

Job Express

Rural Youth Moral Practice 2002

大中学生志愿者假期’ 四进社区’活动

百万青年志愿者助残 行动

‘青春红丝带’行动

‘工岗快递’行动

‘农村青年道德实践’ 活动

中国青年创业行动

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

Central Propaganda Department

Students, unemployed

Department of Employment and Social Security

Rural youths

Unemployed urban and rural youths

Entire population

Volunteers

University and secondary school students

Target group

China Disabled Persons Federation

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Appendix

275

Moral & political education (promote political study and traditional morality, social and volunteer service, skills and innovation, development of body and mind) Social work (publicize government crackdown on crime in internet cafes, spread knowledge about potential dangers and juvenile delinquency regulations)

Social Work – Economic Development (sending volunteers from universities in the Eastern and central provinces to work in Western regions)

University Student Quality 2002 Development Plan

2002

2003

Youth Rights Protection Stations in Action

‘Hundreds of Counties and Thousands of Villages Cultural Promotion Project’ Volunteer Action

‘青少年维权岗在行 动’活动

‘百县千乡宣传文化工 程’志愿服务行动

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

大学生素质拓展计划

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name University students

Education department

Adolescents CC for Comprehensive Management of social order; High People’s Court; Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Departments of Public Security; Justice; Labour and Social Security; SARFT; State Administration for Industry; Press and Publication Administration; National Quality and Technical Supervision Administration Students and Central Propaganda graduates Department; 中央文明办；Department of Culture

Target group

Responsible/ Leading institutions

276  The Chinese Communist Youth League

2003

2003

Rainbow Project

‘True Feelings offer Warmth to Thousands’ activity

High School Students 2003 Quality Development Plan

真情爱万家活动

中学生素质拓展计划

Social work – Economic development (annual conferences on youth employment–entrepreneurship) Social work (organizing recreation activities and charities for disadvantaged youths, laid-off workers, those unemployed and young people with disabilities) Moral & political education (improve morality and political thinking, physique and culture)

‘Take the Internet Express, 2003 Enjoy a Cultural Feast’ Youth Internet Cultural Activities Study the ‘3 Represents’ 2003

‘乘网络快车，享文化 大餐／青少年网上文化 行’活动

学习贯彻’三个代表’重 要思想 ‘彩虹工程’

2003

Anti-SARS Effort

抗击’非典’斗争

Secondary school students

Disadvantaged youths

League cadres and members Graduates and unemployed

Adolescents

Entire population

Students and Graduates

Department of Education; Department of Finance; Department of Human Resources and Social Security

Social Work – Economic Development (sending graduates for 1-2 years in Western regions to work in education, health, rural technology, poverty alleviation projects) Social Work (disseminate information) Moral & political education (use the internet to promote political study and ‘appropriate’ books and documents) Moral & political education

2003

University Student Volunteer Service ‘Go West Project’

大学生志愿服务西部 计划

Departments of: Health; Public Security Department of Culture

Target group

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

Appendix

277

Social work – Capacity Building (prevention of physical injuries and dissemination of self-protection methods, boost to expand the rights protection stations) Social work (promote safety in the use of public transportation for students returning alone at home) Social work (Raise awareness on the dangers involving crossing train lines) Social work (Convoy of volunteers travelling to 46 townships in impoverished areas, offering medical services) Social work – Economic Development (satellite event of the China Youth Entrepreneurship Action, highly publicized event on youth entrepreneurship and employment with competitions and job fairs)

2003

2004

Chinese Children’s Safety Action

Children Return at Home Safely

Chinese Adolescents Train 2004 Safety Action

Chinese Youth Volunteers 2004 Medical Services and Poverty Alleviation Long March China Youth Entrepreneur- 2004 ship Week

中国少年儿童平安行动

‘少年儿童平安回家’ 活动

中国少年儿童铁路平 安行动

中国青年志愿者医疗扶 贫万里长征活动

中国青年创业周

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name Adolescents

Adolescents

Adolescents

Departments of Education; Culture; Health

Departments of Education; Public Security

Departments of Education; Public Security; China Railway Department of Health; CCTV

China Young Entrepreneurs Young entrepreAssociation neurs, graduates, students

Volunteers

Target group

Responsible/ Leading institutions

278  The Chinese Communist Youth League

China Youth Entrepreneur- 2004 ship International Plan

2004

2004

Chinese Entrepreneurs Forum

Civilized Internet for Adolescents

中国青年创业国际计划

‘中国民营企业家创业 论坛’活动

青少年网络文明行动

2004

2004

Young Workers Skills Revitalization Plan

青工技能振兴计划

‘民族精神代代传’全队 National Spirit Passes 统一行动日活动 from one Generation to Another

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name Economic development (in order to battle the high-tech skills personnel shortages League committees are ordered to participate in introducing management training, skills contests and evaluation,’talent identification’, and improve the incentive mechanism) Social work – Economic Development (satellite program of the UN Youth Entrepreneurship International Plan, establishing business mentorship programs and youth entrepreneurship schemes) Social work – Economic Development (organize forums on entrepreneurship in colleges and universities) Social work (inspect internet cafes and convince adolescents to avoid harmful situations) Moral & political education

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities) Young workers

Department of Labor and Social Security; Stateowned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission; State Intellectual Property Office; China Association of Science

Adolescents Department of Culture; State Administration for Industry & Commerce; 中央 文明办 Central Propaganda Department; 中央文明办; Education department

Adolescents

Students

All China Federation of Industry and Commerce

China Young Entrepreneurs Young entrepreAssociation neurs and graduates

Target group

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Appendix

279

Year initiated 2004

English translation

‘Our Civilization’ Series of Activities

Chinese Youth Technology 2004 Innovation Incentive Fund

Chinese Name

‘我们的文明’主题系 列活动

中国青少年科技创新奖 励基金

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Target group

Moral & political education (promote Chinese culture, history and patriotism)

Students Central Civilization Office; Central Propaganda Department; Party Literature Research Center; China Federation of Literature; Departments of Culture; Justice; Press and Publication Administration; SARFT; Academy of Social Sciences; China National Committee for the Wellbeing of Youth; Soong Ching Ling Foundation; Association of Chinese National Unity and Progress; 29th Olympic Games Organizing Committee Economic development (encourage Education Department University innovation among students) students

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

280  The Chinese Communist Youth League

Year initiated 2004

2004

2004

2004

English translation

China Youth Green Action

Youth Cultural Action

National Rural Youth Employment Promotion Program

Rural Youths Read Good Books

Chinese Name

中国青年绿色行动

‘青年文化行动’

全国农村青年转移就业 促进计划

‘农村青年读好书’ 活动

Moral and Political education (set up reading rooms, recommended reading lists, joint study sessions and reading competitions for rural youths)

Environmental Protection (satellite event of Protect Mother River Action, raise awareness through activities about the Yangtze and Yellow River ecosystems and about soil erosion. Publicize the Earth Day, Green Day, and Fight against Desertification Day, organize a Protect Mother River Week in schools and local communities) Moral and Political education (promote studying hard, taking part in production and making contributions to the nation) Economic development (promotion of use of new methods and technologies in agriculture, cultivation of transferable skills)

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities) Students

League cadres and members

State Environmental Protection Administration

Departments of Education; Culture; 5 more state agencies

Rural youth State Council Office of Poverty Alleviation; Departments of Agriculture; Education; Science; Labor and Social Security State Press and Publications Rural youth Administration

Target group

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Appendix

281

青少年’为了明天——青 Adolescents ‘For 春自护暑期行动’教育 Tomorrow – Youth 活动 Self-protection Summer Vacation Action’ Educational Activity

2004

CC for Comprehensive Man- Adolescents agement of social order; Office of the Leading Work Group on the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency

University & Secondary School Students University & Secondary School Students

Moral and Political Education (thorough socialist education program for students) Capacity Building (Mobilizing students to assist in the establishment and running of youth centers in rural and urban areas) Social work Moral and Political Education (Organize activities, study sessions and disseminate information material on legal protection and prevention of juvenile delinquency, organize moral and political theory sessions)

University and High School Students Quality Development Sunrise Plan Colleges and High Schools 2004 twinning with Urban and Rural Youth Centres

大中学生素质拓展曙 光计划

大中专院校和城乡青年 中心工作结对活动

Secondary school students

Department of Education Moral and Political Education (participate in 1 patriotic education activity, 1 community volunteer project, do 1 good deed for parents or elders, study 1 new skill, gain 1 self-protection ability)

2004

High School Students ‘4-1’ Social Practice Summer Activity

Target group

中学生暑期’四个一’社 会实践活动

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

282  The Chinese Communist Youth League

2005

Successful Business Plan

2005 ‘Enhance the Awareness of League Members’ Thematic Education Activity Anti-corruption Education 2005 for Youths

成功创业计划

增强共青团员意识主题 教育活动

Moral & political education (study sessions with emphasis on anti-corruption)

2004

‘Caring Supermarket’

爱心超市

青少年廉洁教育活动

Capacity building (predecessor to previous attempts to establish presence in local urban communities) Department of Civil Affairs Social work (collect donations for citizens in need: second hand clothes, food, toys, books, electric appliances, magazines) Department of EmploySocial work – Economic ment and Social Security Development (satellite event of the China Youth Entrepreneurship Action, organise trainings, internships, business plan directions) Moral & political education

2004

Youth Centres

青年中心建设

Adolescents

League cadres & members

Graduates, young entrepreneurs

Entire population

Urban youth

Entire youth

State Council Anti-AIDS Work Committee, Central Propaganda Department; Departmens of Education; Health and 12 more

Social work (Aids awareness campaign, satellite event of the Youth Red Ribbon program)

Target group

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Youth Red Ribbon – Youth 2004 Volunteers Fighting Against AIDS ‘1 to 1’ Educational Activity

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

‘青春红丝带’行 动——青少年防治艾滋 病志愿者’面对面’宣传 教育活动

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

Appendix

283

2005

2005

‘The Same River’ Environmental Protection and Cultural Activity

Rural Youth Centres Double Help Action

‘同一条河’生态 环保 文化活动

农村青年中心双助行 动计划

‘四个一’节约资源 活动

4-1 Resources Conservation Activity

2005

2005

2005

Youth Mark of Civilization Festival

‘青年文明号文化节’ 活动

‘小时候’青少年社会教 ‘When you are a Child’ 育活动 Youth Social Education

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

Environmental protection (disseminate the idea and practice of resource and energy conservation among youths)

Capacity building (satellite event of ‘Youth Mark of Civilization’ to promote this program) Environmental Protection (satellite event of Protect Mother River Action, raise awareness through activities and publicity, raise funds through charity, emphasis on rural areas) Capacity building (replication of the Youth Centers project in rural areas) Moral & political education (Educate children on proper social behavior, using study sessions, organizing lectures by old teachers and elders to share ‘moving’ stories of historical significance with children)

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

Rural youth

Rural youth

League Committees

Target group

Adolescents Central Propaganda Department;中央 文明办；Departments of Education and Culture; General Administration of Press and Publications; SARFT; State General Administration of Sport; ACWF; 11 more agencies Entire youth

State Environmental Protection Administration

Responsible/ Leading institutions

284  The Chinese Communist Youth League

Senior secondary students Adolescents

Central Propaganda Department

Education department

State Council Information Office; Ministry of Information Industry; Departments of Education; Science and Technology; Public Security; Culture; China National Committee for the Wellbeing of Youth and 5 more agencies

Moral & political education

Moral & political education

Social Work (disseminating information on internet safety and safe surfing for adolescents)

2006

2006

2006

中国青少年绿色网络 行动

‘迈入青春门，走好成 人路’系列教育活动

学习《江泽民文选》，贯 彻科学发展观活动

Central Propaganda Department

Moral & political education

2006

Carry out Socialist Education on Honour and Disgrace Study the Selected Works of Jiang Zemin and the Scientific Development View Enter the Doors of Adolescence-Take a Good Road to Adulthood Chinese Adolescents ‘Green’ Internet Action

开展社会主义荣辱观 教育

League cadres & members

League cadres & members

Students

Moral & political education (DXP theory, Three Represents, Marxism, study of policy documents)

2006

‘Me and the Motherland Jointly Forging Ahead’ Thematic Education Practical Activities

Target group

‘我与祖国共奋进’主 题教育实践活动

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

Appendix

285

Youths Build New Villages and a Harmonious Home

2007

2007

Rural youths

Secondary school students

Volunteers

Target group

CYL 1979-2007 major activities (including some initiated before 1979 but still repeated in this period). Sources: Ding, Hong, and Wang Rui (Eds.). Zhongguo Gongchanzhuyiqingniantuan Tuanyuanjiniance (CYL Member Commemoration Book). Beijing: Hongqi Chubanshe, 2008. Fu, Zhongdao, and Jiankang Yang. Gongqingtuan Jichu Zhishi 1000wen (League Basic Knowledge 1000 Questions). Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe, 2001. Li Yuqi, (Ed.) Zhongguo Gongqingtuan Shigao (History of the CYL). Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe, 2010. Yang, Jiankang, (Ed.) Tuanwei Gongzuo Zhidaoshouce (League Committee Work Instruction Manual). Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe, 2009. *All activities involve a strong propaganda component not recorded here as a separate category.

青春建功新农村，共建 和谐家园

中学生热爱生命教育 活动

Social work (promoting volunteering in local communities) Departments of Education; Social work – Moral & political Health education (promote awareness on drugs, AIDS and traditional morality) Economic development (conference on rural economy, encourage rural production, set up a fund)

2006

Community Volunteer Service Harmonious Action Secondary School Students Love Life Education

社区志愿者服务和谐 行动

Responsible/ Leading institutions

Primary Area of Work* (description of content and/or activities)

Year initiated

English translation

Chinese Name

286  The Chinese Communist Youth League

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Xu, Xining. ‘Shehui Zhuanxing Yu Gongqingtuande Gaige Chuangxin (Social Transformation and the CYL’s Revolutionary Creativity)’. Gongqing Shiye, January 2008. Xu, Ying. ‘Chinese Communist Youth League, Political Capital and the Legitimising of Volunteering in China’. International Journal of Adolescence and Youth Vol. 17, No. 2-3, June 2012, pp. 95-112. https://doi.org/10.1080/02673843.2012.656195. —. ‘Beyond the Structural Boundary? Exploring the Challenges and Options for State-Led Youth Civic Service Programmes in China’. China: An International Journal Vol. 16, No. 2, 2018, pp. 133-150. Yan, Xiaojun. ‘Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control over University Students in Post-Deng China’. The China Quarterly Vol. 218, June 2014, pp. 493-513. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741014000332. Yang, Jiankang, (Ed.) Tuanwei Gongzuo Zhidaoshouce (League Committee Work Instruction Manual). Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe, 2009. Yang, Xiaofeng. ‘‘Xiquyoudianju: Dangtuan Zhishu Jiedui Yinling Qingnian Chengzhang’’ (West District Post Office: The Twinning of the Party and League Branch Secretaries Is Leading the Development of Youth)’’. Beijing Zhibu Shenghuo, No. 10, 2010. Yao, Shunyuan. ‘Xin Shiqi Zuohao Qiye Gongqingtuan Gongzuo Chuongxon de Ji Dian Sikao Ji Dian Sikao (Some Thoughts on the Innovation of New Era Enterprise Communist Youth League Work)’. Fujian Qingfang, No. 7, 2003. Yearbook China. Statistical Yearbook Sharing Platform. ‘2009 ZJ1 Tongji Nianjian (2009 Statistical Yearbook of ZJ1)’, 2009 [Link not provided to protect the identity of the city]. Last accessed 15 May 2019. Young Spartacist. ‘Youth-Party Relations in the Communist Youth International’, No. 21, January-February 1974. Zhang, Naihua. ‘Searcing for Authentic NGOs: The NGO Discourse and Women’s Organizations in China’, in Ping-Chun Hsiung, Maria Jaschok, and Cecilia Nathansen Milwertz (Eds.), Chinese Women Organizing: Cadres, Feminists, Muslims, Queers. Oxford; New York: Berg, 2001. Zhao, Suisheng. ‘A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China.’ Communist and Post-Communist Studies Vol. 31, No. 3, 1998, pp. 287-302. Zheng, Changzhong. 2008. ‘Guanxi Kongjian Zaizao de Zhengzhi Luoji – Qingnian Zhongxin Jianshe Yu Zhengdang Qingnian Jichu Zhong Zhu’ (The Political Logic of Rebuilding the Spatial Relationship: Establishing Youth Centers and

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Rebuilding the Basis of Party Youth). Fudai Qingnian Yanjiu （Contemporary Youth Studies）No. 1, 2008, pp. 21-28. Zhou, Shengguo, and Hui Xu. ‘Xin Xingshi Xia Guoyou Qiye Gongqingtuan Gongzuo Cunzai de Wenti Ji Duice (Problems and Solutions of the Communist Youth League’s Work in State Enterprises under the New Situation)’. Daqing Shehui Kexue, No. 2, 2007. Zhu, Tianming. ‘Gongqingtuan Zuzhi zai Qiye Wenhua Jianshezhong de Zuoyong’ (The effect of the League in Building a Corporate Culture) Luan An Group Website, 2009. http://www.esmjx.com/Article/zhongjibaogao/dzbg/200607/52991.asp. Accessed 28 May 2017. Zhu, Xiaoyang, and Anita Chan. ‘Staff and Workers’ Representative Congress: An Institutionalized Channel for Expression of Employees’ Interests?’ Chinese Sociology & Anthropology Vol. 37, No. 4, August 2005, pp. 6-33. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/21620555.2005.11038349. ZJ1 CYLC. Zhejiang City 1 Communist Youth League Committee. ‘Gongqingtuan ZJ1 Shiwei Gongzuo Zongjie (Zhejiang City 1 Communist Youth League Committee 2009 Work Summary)’, n.d. ZJ1 UCYL. ZJ1 University CYL ‘ZJ1 Xueyuan Tuanwei Zuzhi Jianshe’ (University League Committee Organizational Structure), 2009. Zou, Xingping and Li Gengyue. 2008. ‘Gaoxiao Gongqingtuan Gongzuo Ying Shixian Liuge Zhuanbian’ (The Work of the CYL in Colleges and Universities Must Achieve the Six Transformations). Economy History, No. 1, 2008. pp.139-141.

Index 1-Child Policy 53-54 1982 regulations 67-68, 241 ACFTU 19, 50-52 ACYF 153, 206, 216 ACYV 153 ACWF 19, 49-50, 53-54, 100, 152, 155, 157, 206, 236, 242 adaptation 47, 51, 54, 61, 235 ‘advanced youth’ 66, 93, 127, 185, 236 concept of 117 rhetoric 194 advocacy 36, 53, 122-124, 141 agency of cadres 32, 48-49, 54-55, 61-62, 66-69, 145, 173, 236, 241 of the Party/state 36-38, 110-111, 151, 185, 190, 217, 223, 225 of youth 64-65 alienation 17-18, 26-28, 210 All-China Federation of Trade Unions see ACFTU All-China Women’s Federation see ACWF All-China Youth Federation see ACYF apathy 18, 20, 23, 32, 38, 48, 57-58, 65, 235, 248-250 among students 83, 110, 192, 210 army see PLA Association of Chinese Young Volunteers see ACYV authoritarian political system/polity/state/ regime 23, 33, 64, 70, 83, 210, 236, 243 authoritarian resilience 18, 22, 226 authoritarianism 17, 49, 56, 250-251 Beijing 33-36, 53, 70, 81, 84, 89-90, 93, 95, 98, 100, 103-108, 117-119, 125-128, 130-133, 138, 142, 154-166, 171, 177, 187-199, 201-212, 215-219, 223-225 Olympics 100, 127, 137, 157, 188, 192, 204 Beijing Volunteers Federation see BVF BVF 191, 217 cadres agency of see agency appointments of 32, 50, 55, 61, 95, 102, 130, 219, 238 careers/career paths of 52, 57-60, 64, 67-69, 83, 87-88, 90, 93, 98, 132, 152, 160, 163-164, 172-173, 178-179, 213, 237-238, 241-249 student 27, 86, 89, 92-94, 97-98, 111, 124 training of 35-36, 123, 151-179 cadreship 67-68, 84, 93

CCP Committee 37, 89-92, 96-97, 110-111, 117, 122, 131-136, 141, 144, 157, 166, 171-173, 176, 204, 212, 238 membership preparation 19, 29, 38, 82, 87-88, 93, 104, 129-130, 134, 235, 238, 248 Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 17, 245 Central Communist Youth League Reform Plan 18, 245-246 Central League School see League School charity 100, 137, 151, 186, 218-220, 225 Children’s Palaces 201-202 China Dream 18, 247 China Youth and Children Research Centre 35, 118, 141, 162, 173, 207-209, 213-214, 226 China Youth Development Foundation 216, 218-220, 226, 239 China Youth Entrepreneurs Association 198 China Youth University of Political Studies 158-159, 247 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 162, 212, 247 Chinese Association of Young Rural Entrepreneurs 198-199 Chinese Communist Party see CCP civil society 31, 50-51, 54, 61, 215, 221-223, 239 Communist Youth League see CYL conscription society 50 conservatism 56, 59, 64, 152 consumerism 27 co-optation 21, 59, 87, 187, 199, 214-225 Corporate Social Responsibility 137-138, 239 corporatism 38, 61, 185, 217, 227 corporatization 117, 119, 136-137, 145 cultural revolution 25-27, 82, 158, 235, 248 CYL age range 35, 67, 112, 241 and institutional reach 36 and institutional weakness 33, 68, 111, 241 Central Committee 17, 34, 67, 96-97, 121-122, 136, 158-160, 174, 186, 208, 216-218, 246 entry process 85-86 in the public and private sector, collectives and FEIs 124-128 in universities 87 reasons for becoming a League member 25, 27, 87-88 grassroots committees/branches/organizations 57-58, 100, 112, 122-123, 138-139, 141, 156, 170, 177, 191-192, 221, 225, 238, 241, 245-246

318  membership 19, 26, 34-36, 67, 83-89, 117-118, 124-127, 143, 177, 238, 245-248 Czechoslovak Youth Union (CSM) 59 Deng Xiaoping 25, 29, 158, 219 dependency see organizational dependency elitism 127, 140, 187, 194-195, 242 employment 22-23, 37, 51-54, 83, 87, 97-99, 107, 109-110, 118, 120-122, 125, 128, 131, 140, 152, 185-186, 189, 196-201, 203, 236, 241 ethnic minorities 158-159, 161, 171-175 factionalism 17, 20-21, 242-244, 247 feminism 51-53, 62, 139, 236 formalism 18, 56, 82, 85-86, 89, 96, 109-112, 227 Free German Youth (FDJ) 58, 249 gender 52-57, 61-63, 152 generational conflict 49, 55 generational divisions 121 generational power relations 23, 32, 121 Guangdong 153, 161, 177, 224 heteronormativity 31, 65 Hong Kong 83, 127, 193 Hu Jintao 17, 19, 22-24, 28-29, 32, 61, 93, 110, 112, 153, 156, 160, 168, 185, 202, 226, 238, 244, 247, 250 call to ‘Keep Youth Satisfied’ 19, 24, 30, 61, 97, 242-244 Hu-Wen decade 17, 20, 22-23, 30, 47, 167, 185-186, 198, 212, 215, 226, 236, 242, 244 hukou 120, 198 human resources 119, 123, 127, 130, 131, 135-139, 162, 196, 206 individualism 27, 145, 191-192 industrial relations 117-118, 221 Jiang Zemin 160, 215, 219, 236 job fairs 99, 107, 122, 151, 186, 196 job-hunting 104-105, 197 junior identity 89, 240, 249 junior political subject 30-33, 47, 64, 187, 240 juniority 32-33, 36-37, 47-70, 85, 111, 140, 144-145, 172, 179, 186, 194-196, 213, 226, 237, 241-242, 248-250 concept 62-66 in the League 66-70 junxun 87 Komsomol 56-57, 67, 139, 196, 249 labor deregulation 36, 128 peace 37, 52, 128, 145 Labor Law 51, 120, 123, 222 League see CYL

The Chinese Communist Youth League

League School (tuanxiao) 37, 96, 151-179, 238 Lei Feng 27, 36, 60, 100, 111, 135, 188, 226, 236, 239 Li Keqiang 163 loyalty of students 81, 83-84, 110 of young Chinese/younger generation 2122, 235, 247 Mao Zedong 51, 66, 85, 135, 137, 155 Maoist era/period/state/years 21, 50, 81, 117, 124, 188, 201, 236 marketization 18, 28, 31, 52, 61, 206, 226, 236, 240 mass organizations 19, 31-32, 35, 47-55, 67, 111, 142, 152, 204-205, 212, 223, 235, 237, 240, 244-245 May 4 movement 24, 82, 97, 177, 188, 221 migrant youth 194, 222, 241 Ministry of Education 97, 158, 206, 219, 242 moral education 91, 104-105, 139, 171 National Working Committee for Children and Women 53-54, 242 nationalism 21-22, 28, 66, 82, 239 New Democratic Youth League 24 online attitudes 103 forums/platforms 27, 86 initiatives by the League 141, 171, 205, 224 monitoring/propaganda 89, 100, 134 organizational dependency 30-32, 35, 47-56, 61-62, 95, 111, 119, 140, 144, 154-155, 168-173, 179, 186, 196, 226, 235-240 party see CCP Party School 123, 158, 164-170, 178 patriarchy 31, 48, 52-55, 61-62, 65, 152, 240 patriotism 21, 65, 87, 95, 188 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 25, 125, 176-177 political apathy see apathy political socialization 19, 35, 57-59, 65, 85, 102, 117, 163, 247-250 Project Hope 137, 187, 218-220, 239 purposive incentives 61, 237 Reform era 47, 50, 53, 61, 117, 135-137, 196 representation and mass organizations 19, 31, 48-49, 52 of university students 83, 105-110 of young employees/at the workplace 3637, 117-123, 132, 140-143 the CYL as a channel for representation of youth 25, 37, 70, 83, 152, 173, 236 responsiveness capacity for 24, 30, 70, 112, 140, 178, 186, 226, 236, 240-242

319

Index

Shandong Organization 221-223 Shanghai Expo 100, 137, 157, 188-189, 224 Shanghai Youth Community NGO Service Centre 224-225 social organizations (non-state) unregistered/informal 153, 215, 221, 223-224 of youth 185, 202, 215, 223-225 Socialist Youth Union (ZMS) 59-60 SOEs 51, 93, 109, 159, 164, 177, 220 Song Defu 27 Staff and Workers’ Representative Councils 141 State Owned Enterprises see SOEs structural forms of subordination 31, 48, 55, 61 student societies 36, 81, 84, 89, 92, 94-98, 105-106, 111-112 student union 92-99, 105-106, 164 students in high school 34-35, 86-87, 124, 241 in university see university students representation of see representation Tiananmen 21, 27, 29, 81-82, 87, 231 training see cadre training tuanpai 244, 247 unemployment 21, 196, 200 of graduates 83, 107-109 unions 20, 32, 51-52, 54, 67, 69, 122, 127-128, 236, 240, 250 generational divisions within 121 university students 34, 36, 81-111, 163 and participation in League events 103-105 and value for the regime 70, 82, 163 employment programs/schemes by the League for 37, 185 military training for 28; see also junxun volunteerism 100-101, 137, 191-192, 216-218 volunteers at the local level 188-192, 216-217, 221 at the national-level 191, 216-218 at the workplace 122, 133, 137-138 on campus 86, 91, 94, 98-101, 111

women’s federation(s) 20, 35, 53-54, 61-62, 67-69, 99, 123, 127, 195, 204, 206, 215, 221, 237, 240 women’s work 53-54 Xi Jinping 17-20, 38, 235-237, 242-244, 247-248, 251 Xu Yongguang 218-219 young employees/workers 34, 117-145, 166-167, 210, 239 Young Pioneers 21, 158 youth construction as a junior political subject see junior political subject consultation and feedback processes by the League 22, 37, 97-98, 124, 102-103, 124, 140, 152, 164, 173, 186, 199, 210-214 cynicism towards official politics/authorities 18, 26, 32, 36, 56-59, 81, 112, 210, 247-250 employment and entrepreneurship 37, 122, 185-186, 196-201 informal/unregistered organizations of see social organizations politics 33, 47, 118, 235, 248-251 political participation of 18, 21-22, 50, 63, 212 representation of see representation welfare 19, 37, 57, 65, 97, 101, 105, 111, 119, 122, 139-144, 172-173, 189, 195-196, 205, 209, 221-222, 236-239 Youth Affairs Departments 154 Youth Centres 151, 153, 202-204, 224 youth work expansion and renewal in the Hu-Wen decade 29, 47, 69, 151, 198, 216, 224-226, 239, 250 norms/meaning/content of 37, 132, 187-195, 238-239, 242 specialization/training in 155, 158, 162, 166-170, 173, 179 Yugoslavian League of Socialist Youth (SSOJ) 60, 249