The Chinese Communist Party in Action: Consolidating Party Rule [1 ed.] 0367198967, 9780367198961

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The Chinese Communist Party in Action

Much is written about China and the role of the Chinese Communist Party, but without exploring in detail the nature of the party and how it operates. This book provides an in-­depth assessment of the current state of the Chinese Communist Party. It outlines the huge size of the party – 88 million members with 4.3 million organizations at the grassroots level. It sets out how the party has developed over time, how the party is organized and how its ideology is formed and transmitted. It discusses how the party acts in the different areas of China’s economy, society and government, at local, regional and national levels. It explores the party’s role in the formation of policy, including foreign policy, and assesses the impact of different factions and of the current anti-­corruption campaign. Overall, the book demonstrates how embedded the Communist Party is in all aspects of Chinese economy, society and politics, and how its position continues to be consolidated. Zheng Yongnian is Professor and Director of the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. Lance L.P. Gore is a Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore.

China Policy Series Series Editor: Zheng Yongnian

East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore

52 Governing Environmental Conflicts in China Yanwei Li 53 Post-­Western Sociology From China to Europe Edited by Laurence Roulleau-­Berger and Li Peilin 54 China’s Pension Reforms Political Institutions, Skill Formation and Pension Policy in China Ke Meng 55 China’s New Silk Road An Emerging World Order Edited by Carmen Amado Mendes 56 The Politics of Expertise in China Xufeng Zhu 57 Gender Dynamics, Feminist Activism and Social Transformation in China Edited by Guogang Wu, Yuan Feng, Helen Lansdowne 58 The Struggle for Democracy in China, Taiwan and Hong Kong Sharp Power and its Discontents Andreas Fulda 59 The Chinese Communist Party in Action Consolidating Party Rule Edited by Zheng Yongnian and Lance L.P. Gore For more information about this series, please visit www.routledge.com/China-­ Policy-Series/book-­series/SECPS

The Chinese Communist Party in Action Consolidating Party Rule

Edited by Zheng Yongnian and Lance L.P. Gore

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 selection and editorial matter, Zheng Yongnian and Lance L.P. Gore; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Zheng Yongnian and Lance L.P. Gore to be identified as the authors of the editorial matter, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-­in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-0-367-19896-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-24395-0 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents



List of figures List of tables Notes on contributors



Introduction

vii viii ix 1

Z h eng Y ongnian and L ance L . P .   G ore

Part I

Overview

11

  1 The Chinese Communist Party: an interpretation

13

Z h eng Y ongnian

  2 Turning the CCP into an Elite Party

33

K j eld E rik B r ø dsgaard

Part II

Organizational and ideological integration

49

  3 Managing human resources to sustain the one-­party rule

51

L ance L . P .   G ore

  4 Party chiefs, formal and informal rules and institutions

81

Wang Zhengxu and Dragan Pavlićević

  5 Party spirit: producing communist belief in contemporary China F rank N .   P ieke

99

vi   Contents Part III

Elite politics in the reform era

119

  6 What is a faction?

121

Josep h F ewsmit h

  7 Politics of anti-­corruption campaign

137

C h en  G ang

Part IV

The party in the state, society and economy

159

  8 The party/army state in great transformation

161

Y ou Ji

  9 The party in the legislature and the judiciary

181

W ang Jiangyu

10 The party in grassroots governance

199

Z h ao  L itao

11 China’s central state corporatism: the party and the governance of centrally controlled businesses

220

L i  C h en

Part V

The party and foreign policy

241

12 International Department and China’s foreign policy

243

L ye L iang  F ook

13 The Chinese Communist Party and restructuring national security policymaking

268

Hu W eixing



Index

284

Figures

  1.1 Hegemonization: domination and legitimation   3.1 The party central organs   3.2 Occupational composition of 2015 new recruits   7.1 Number of officials under procuratorial investigations for corruption (2008–2014)   7.2 The CCP discipline inspection apparatus before 2013   7.3 The CCP discipline inspection apparatus after 2013 12.1 China’s foreign policy decision-­making structure 12.2 Structure of the International Department (ID) of the Chinese Communist Party 

15 53 63 142 152 153 246 250

Tables

  1.1   3.1   3.2   3.3

Institutions of legitimation and domination Internal organs of the COD COD directors in the reform era (1978–now) Organization chart of the organization department of Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee   3.4 COD’s recruitment plans for first, second and third five-­year plan periods   3.5 Main index of the national talents development plan (2010–2020)   3.6 CCP membership growth (1921–2014) and associated major events   3.7 COD: key points of evaluation of local state leadership team (2009)   3.8 COD: key points for evaluation of local leading cadres   7.1 China’s ranking in the corruption perceptions index by Transparency International (2005–2014)   7.2 List of incumbent officials (at vice-­ministerial level or above) under investigation between November 2012 and December 2014   7.3 Division of work among the 12 departments of discipline inspection in the CCDI    7.4 Places of inspection covered by the two batches of anti-­corruption inspection teams, 2013   7.5 Names of 30 PLA officers under investigation (as announced on 16 January and 2 March 2015) 10.1 Selected indicators of Shanghai grassroots governance 11.1 Different patterns of state–big business relations between the catch-­up phase and mature phase of growth 11.2 China’s central state-­owned enterprises and financial institutions in the Fortune Global 500, 2015 11.3 Cases of top personnel rotation at the level of chairman, president and party secretary among central state-­owned enterprises, 2004–2011 12.1 Past and existing directors of the International Department (ID)

16 53 54 55 62 64 70 76 77 138 144 148 149 151 206 223 228 235 248

Contributors

Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard is Professor and Director of the Asia Research Centre, Copenhagen Business School. He is a member of the editorial board of a number of scholarly journals and the founding Editor of The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies. He has published 20 books, including Bringing the Party Back In: How China Is Governed (2004) (with Zheng Yongnian); The Chinese Communist Party in Reform (2006 and 2009) (with Zheng Yongnian); Hainan – State, Society and Business in a Chinese Province (2009; paperback edition 2013); and Globalization and Public Sector Reform in China (2014), with a forthcoming volume entitled Chinese Politics as Fragmented Authoritarianism (2015). His current research covers state, Party and public administration in China; the nomenklatura system and cadre management; the structure and impact of Chinese business groups; and the rise of Chinese supermanagers. Chen Gang is a Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. Since he joined the EAI in 2007, he has been tracing China’s politics and environmental policies and publishing extensively on these issues. Dr Chen is the single author of China’s Climate Policy (London: Routledge, 2012), Politics of China’s Environmental Protection: Problems and Progress (Singapore: World Scientific, 2009) and The Kyoto Protocol and International Cooperation against Climate Change (in Chinese) (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2008). His research papers have appeared in internationally refereed journals such as Asia Pacific Business Review, The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, The International Spectator, The Polar Journal, China: An International Journal, The Chinese Journal of International Politics and The Journal of East Asian Affairs. Joseph Fewsmith is Professor of International Relations and Political Science at Boston University’s Pardee School for Global Studies. He is the author or editor of seven books, including The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in China, China since Tiananmen (2nd edition, 2008) and China Today, China Tomorrow (2010). His articles have appeared in such leading journals as The China Quarterly, Asian Survey, The Journal of Contemporary China, Problems of Communism and Current History. Until recently, he had for 11 years

x   Contributors been one of the seven regular contributors to China Leadership Monitor, a quarterly webzine that reviews contemporary events in the People’s Republic of China. He is an Associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Studies at Harvard University and of the Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer Range Future at Boston University. Lance L.P. Gore is a Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. His research interests span a wide range of topics on China and East Asia. He has done research and published on Chinese environmental politics (the “Green GDP” experiment), the reforms in China’s steel industry, the energy sector, patterns of entrepreneurship in Mainland China, the economic bureaucracies of China, cadre performance evaluation, local state economic behaviour, the impact of China’s socioeconomic changes on the Chinese Communist Party, industrial relations, elite politics and the People’s Liberation Army. For many years he taught courses on Politics and Societies in Southeast Asia, the International Relations of the Asia-­Pacific, Contemporary Chinese Politics, Chinese Foreign Policy and International Political Economy at Bowdoin College and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University in the US. He is the single author of three monographs: The Chinese Communist Party and China’s Capitalist Revolution: the Political Impact of Market (Routledge); Market Communism: the Institutional Foundations of China’s Post-­Mao Hyper-­Growth (Oxford); and Chinese Politics Illustrated: the Cultural, Social and Historical Contexts (World Scientific). He has also published widely in international journals such as The New Political Economy, The China Journal, East Asia: An International Quarterly, Problems of Post-­ Communism and Chinese Journal of Comparative Law, and contributed numerous book chapters. Hu Weixing is Professor of Political Science, Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong. He was educated at Peking University with a Bachelor of Law in 1983, and then went to the United States for postgraduate studies. He received an MA in International Relations at the School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, and a PhD in Political Science at the University of Maryland, College Park. Professor Hu has a distinguished teaching and research career in both the United States and Hong Kong. He was a John M. Olin Fellow at Harvard University 1991–1992, an IGCC Fellow at University of California–San Diego in 1992–1993 and a CNAPS Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC in 2007–2008. He has held academic appointments at the University of California–San Diego, Monterey Institute of International Studies, University of Detroit, University of Georgia, and University of Hong Kong, where he has taught since 1997. He has published widely in academic journals on international security, East Asian international relations, Asian regionalism, China’s foreign policy and cross-­Strait relations issues.

Contributors   xi Li Chen is an Assistant Professor at the Centre for China Studies and Faculty of Social Science, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. He received his PhD and MPhil in Development Studies from Jesus College, University of Cambridge as well a dual bachelor’s degree in International Relations and Economics from Peking University. He was a Management Associate at Sun Hung Kai Properties Group and Research Associate at Fung Global Institute. His recent book China’s Centralized Industrial Order: Industrial Reform and the Rise of Centrally Controlled Big Business has been published by Routledge. Lye Liang Fook is Assistant Director and Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. His research interests cover China’s central–local relations, political legitimacy, print media, China– ASEAN relations and China–Singapore relations. He was part of a team that completed a study on the Suzhou Industrial Park, a flagship project between China and Singapore. He has also conducted research into the Sino-­ Singaporean Tianjin Eco-­city project, the latest flagship project between China and Singapore. He attended the Hanban program for distinguished scholars in China studies in 2009. He has been published by Routledge, Eastern Universities Press, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Publishing, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Publishing and World Scientific Press, and his publications have appeared in International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Journal of Chinese Political Science, and China: An International Journal. Besides academia, he manages the Singapore Secretariat of the Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT) and the Network of ASEAN–China Think Tanks (NACT), two Track II bodies that aim to foster ASEAN plus Three cooperation and ASEAN plus One cooperation respectively. Dragan Pavlićević holds a PhD from the University of Nottingham’s School of Contemporary Chinese Studies. Dragan’s research focuses on China’s domestic politics and foreign relations. He is currently affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, conducting research projects on China’s multilateral diplomacy and the New Silk Road strategy with focus on Europe. Frank N. Pieke studied cultural anthropology and Chinese studies at the University of Amsterdam and the University of California, Berkeley, where he received his PhD in 1992. After lectureships in Leiden and Oxford, he was appointed chair professor in modern China studies at Leiden University in 2010. Pieke is coordinator of the Leiden University research profile area Asian Modernities and Traditions and director of the University’s Modern East Asia Research Centre. Pieke’s work on contemporary Chinese society and politics focuses on the changing role of the Chinese Communist Party. His most recent book is The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China (Cambridge University Press, 2009). Pieke’s other specialization is Chinese international migration. In 2004, he published Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe with Stanford University Press. Pieke’s current research revolves around foreign immigrant groups in China.

xii   Contributors Wang Jiangyu (SJD & LLM, University of Pennsylvania; MJur, Oxford; MPhil in Laws, Peking University; LLB, China University of Political Science and Law) is the Deputy Director of the Centre for Asian Legal Studies (CALS) and a tenured Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law of the National University of Singapore. He is also the co-­Chief-Editor (with Andrew Harding) of the Asian Journal of Comparative Law and Deputy Chief Editor of the Chinese Journal of Comparative Law. He was on secondment as an Associate Professor and Director for the MPhil/PhD programme at the Faculty of Law of The Chinese University of Hong Kong from August 2006 to July 2009. His teaching and research interests include international economic law, Chinese corporate and securities law, law and development and the Chinese legal system. He practiced law in the Legal Department of the Bank of China and in Chinese and Amer­ican law firms. He served as a member of the Chinese delegation at the annual conference of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law in 1999. He is a member of the Chinese Bar Association and the New York Bar Association. He is also a Director on the Executive Board of the WTO Institute of the China Law Society, a Senior Fellow at the Law and Development Institute (LDI) and a fellow of the Asian Institute of International Financial Law (Hong Kong). He has also been invited expert/speaker for the WTO, International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO) and United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). He recently received the 2007 Young Researcher Award of The Chinese University of Hong Kong in recognition of his accomplishment in research from 2007 to 2008. Dr Wang has published extensively in Chinese and international journals and newspapers on a variety of law and politics related topics. He is a regular contributor to leading newspapers and magazines in Singapore, Hong Kong and mainland China. He has served as an external reviewer for dozens of international journals and publishers and research funds. Wang Zhengxu is Shanghai City’s 1000-Talent Distinguished Professor and Oriental Scholar Distinguished Professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, China. He obtained his Ph.D. in political Science from the University of Michigan, and subsequently obtained academic experiences in the National University of Singapore and the UK’s University of Nottingham, having served as Associate Professor at its School of Contemporary Chinese Studies and Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of its China Policy Institute. He researches on national party and state institutions and politics in China, especially the politics among top political elites, citizen values and political behaviors in China and East Asia, and institutional changes and political reforms in China, among other topics. His publications have appeared in Governance, International Review of Sociology, Political Research Quarterly, Japanese Journal of Political Science, Contemporary Politics, Asian Journal of Public Opinion Research, The China Quarterly, The China Journal, Journal of Contemporary China and others.

Contributors   xiii You Ji is a Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He obtained a BA degree from the Peking University and a PhD from the Australian National University. He is author of four books, including China’s Military Transformation, The Armed Forces of China and China’s Enterprise Reform, as well as numerous articles. You Ji is on the editorial board of eight academic journals including The China Journal, Issue and Studies and Journal of Contemporary China. Zhao Litao is a Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He obtained his PhD degree in sociology from Stanford University. His research interests include social stratification and mobility, sociology of education, organizational analysis and China’s social policy. His research has appeared in China Quarterly, Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, International Journal of Educational Development, Social Sciences in China, Built Environment, China: An International Journal, East Asian Policy and Frontiers of Education in China. He has authored, co-­ authored, edited and co-­edited six books, including China’s Social Development and Policy, published by Routledge in 2013. Zheng Yongnian is Professor and Director of East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He is Editor of Series on Contemporary China (World Scientific Publishing) and Editor of the China Policy Series (Routledge). He is also the Editor of China: An International Journal and the co-­Editor of East Asian Policy. He has studied both China’s transformation and its external relations. His papers have appeared in journals such as Comparative Political Studies, Political Science Quarterly, Third World Quarterly and China Quarterly. He is the author of numerous books, including The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor, Technological Empowerment, De Facto Federalism in China, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China and Globalization and State Transformation in China, and co-­ editor of dozens of books on China’s domestic development and international relations including the latest volumes China Entering the Xi Era (forthcoming) and China and International Relations: The Chinese View and the Contribution of Wang Gungwu (2010). Besides his research work, Professor Zheng has also been an academic activist. He served as a consultant to the United Nations Development Programme on China’s rural development and democracy. In addition, he has been a columnist for Xinbao (Hong Kong) and Zaobao (Singapore) for many years, writing numerous commentaries on China’s domestic and international affairs. Professor Zheng received his BA and MA degrees from Beijing University, and his PhD at Princeton University. He was a recipient of the Social Science Research Council-­MacArthur Foundation Fellowship (1995–97) and John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Fellowship (2003–04). He was Professor and founding Research Director of the China Policy Institute, the University of Nottingham, United Kingdom (2005–08).

Introduction Zheng Yongnian and Lance L.P. Gore

With 88 million members and 4.3 million organizations at the grassroots level spanning the entire polity, society and economy, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has emerged as the most successful Leninist party in history despite “Leninist extinction” as postulated by Ken Jowitt in Eastern Europe two and a half decades ago. It has not only held on to power amidst market-­oriented reforms and rapid socioeconomic transformation but also grown stronger over time. It has held the country together and presided over the greatest economic expansion in human history, lifting 800 million people out of poverty and making China a superpower. But our knowledge about the daily operation of the CCP – how it organizes itself and exercises power – is awfully inadequate. Consider this: in addition to the 3,225 party committees helming the county, municipal, prefectural, provincial and central governments, there are 86,440 “party groups” embedded in the departments and agencies of governments at various levels and locales, making key policy and personnel decisions for government bureaucracies. The essence of the party-­state in China is the party and the Chinese government we assume we know actually does not exist. It is the party that is running the country, and it does so in greater detail and with more extensive hands-­on involvement than most governments in the world. The government is but the doorplate outside the party’s office. Consider this: the CCP’s organizations exist in 53 per cent of private and 91 per cent of state-­owned enterprises. Close to 100 per cent of colleges, universities and research institutions, 99.99 per cent of Chinese villages, 99.53 per cent of urban communities and 41.9 per cent of “social organizations” have embedded party cells. Under Chinese president Xi Jinping, the CCP has recently made the move to plant its party groups in all non-­governmental organizations (NGOs), non-­profit organizations (NPOs), trade unions, business associations, religious bodies and other societal organizations considered in the West in the domain of civil society. The Chinese military is not a national institution, but a part of the CCP and pledges loyalty first and foremost to the party; its officer corps constitute extensive party organizations embedded in the military that are in charge of its daily operation. The CCP’s Organization Department is dubbed as “the world’s largest human resources department” by the Financial Times, with a total workforce well in

2   Zheng Yongnian and Lance L.P. Gore excess of 100,000. It is not only in charge of the appointment, promotion, training and performance assessment of the seven million strong cadre corps of the party-­state, but also responsible for human resources development of business administration, civil service, science and technology, higher education, medicine, art and literature and so on. It is the human resources department of not only the party, but also the entire nation. Yet, despite its omnipresence and pivotal role in running the country, the CCP has been largely absent from most China studies on different topics. The academic literature and popular discussions have treated the CCP too often as a political symbol of a type of regime destined for the dustbin of history in the Western political discourse. Therefore, the enduring passion in the field of CCP studies evolves around the question of whether and when it is going to collapse. The discussions of the CCP’s probable fate tend to fall into a normative discourse informed by Western social scientific traditions, evolving around familiar topics such as democratization, liberalization, civil society, political decay, politics of protests, political dissent, repression, human rights violation and so on. Few books deal directly with the CCP itself as an administrative apparatus. We therefore end up missing a central piece when we put together the China puzzle. This is understandable because the CCP remains a behind-­the-scenes player which is mysterious even to many Chinese scholars, let alone the broader audience in the English speaking world. It is a tightly organized and strongly disciplined Leninist party which has kept much of its internal affairs confidential. The sparsity of research in this area is comprehensible, but nevertheless unacceptable if we are to gain better, more systematic and realistic understanding of China, and to lift China studies to the next level. This volume is an attempt to make up for the deficit. It examines the transformation of the CCP in the rapidly changing national and global context. The purpose is to get a glimpse of the evolutionary dynamics of the CCP so that we can make a more informed assessment of its prospects and political change in China. Guided by better knowledge, the book also takes a step back to look at the overall role of the CCP in China and re-­conceptualizes it as a unique category of political party in the making.

The state of the field of CCP studies By and large the research on the CCP has been a by-­product or a side-­line inquiry of research on other topics of China studies, such as elite politics, economic development, social and political change, environmental policymaking, community development, population control, migration, income distribution, policymaking, media and mass communication and so on. These studies are valuable but if we throw the CCP into the equation of their analyses, not only may we gain better insight but also some of their conclusions may be altered. Take governance for example. The “CCP-­infested” Chinese governance structure is unique; by all indications China is developing a radically different model of governance that cannot be conveniently fitted into any existing models.

Introduction   3 Employing conventional terminology and conceptual schema tends to hinder more than highlight. The same can be said about the development of civil society, conflict resolution and income distribution in China. Most research on the CCP so far is subordinate to two overarching topics in the China field, the pending collapse or the resilience of the communist regime, and the democratization of China. Both deal with the larger historical trend and broader political process. The CCP is dealt with to the extent to which it is ­relevant to addressing these topics, and typically indirectly and at too high a level of abstraction to be regarded as the study of the CCP per se. Take one volume edited by Andrew Walder, The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China and Hungary, for example.1 As the title suggests, it delineates the impact of the changes in resources distribution on the CCP. Similar research includes Lance Gore’s volume and Bruce Dickson’s two books that analyze the complicated ties between the CCP and China’s ­burgeoning private sector.2 Dickson’s latest book takes stock of the CCP’s adaptations to changes in the environment.3 This is also the subject of David Shambaugh’s research.4 The volume edited by Martin Dimitrov and another by Andre Laliberte and Marc Lanteigne also look at the CCP’s survival strategy.5 Research that explores the prospect of democratization in China includes Dickson’s Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties.6 Research that does not specifically cover the CCP includes Andrew Nathan’s Chinese Democracy,7 and Minxin Pei’s China’s Trapped Transition and Wu Guoguang’s latest volume, China’s Party Congress: Power, Legitimacy, and Institutional Manipulation.8 In general, with a few exceptions such as Wu Guoguang’s, these pieces of research focus on broader issues of transformation and do not go into detailed analysis of the CCP’s internal structure and processes. Research directly dealing with the CCP is few and far between. Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg’s classic Policy Making in China is an in-­depth analysis of the decision-­making process under fragmented authoritarianism but the emphasis is more on the state bureaucracy than on party organizations.9 Richard McGregor’s book The Party is an account of the encounter of mainly foreign business people with party organizations while doing business in China, highlighting the importance of understanding the role of the CCP in understanding China; the perspective and the insight are refreshing but the treatment is neither systematic nor in depth.10 Frank Pieke’s book The Good Communist only deals with one aspect of the CCP.11 Zheng Yongnian’s The Chinese Communist Party as Organization Emperor took a long-­term cultural and historical perspective of the CCP and its role in the Chinese political system, highlighting the uniqueness of the CCP as a political party vis-­à-vis the conventional parties.12 None of these studies provides a thorough and detailed analysis of the CCP per se. Individually they deal with one aspect or a few aspects of the CCP and collectively they do not provide a systematic and coherent treatment of the CCP.

4   Zheng Yongnian and Lance L.P. Gore The two edited volumes by Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Zheng Yongnian are intentional efforts to redirect research focus to the CCP itself.13 However, they were published more than a decade ago and much has changed since.

How the CCP has been perceived As indicated in the aforementioned brief survey of the literature on the CCP, this literature can be divided into two theses, namely, those who believe that the CCP is coming to demise, and those who believe that the CCP is adapting itself for survival. Not surprisingly, a given scholar can hold opposite views at different times, depending on the evidence he/she has gathered. The first group of scholars holds the pessimistic view that the CCP is on the decline, doomed to obsolescence or even collapse. So far, there have been three waves to the rise of this argument. The first wave took place after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern European communism. Roderick MacFarquhar claimed that it was only a matter of time before China would go the same way as these regimes.14 Also writing in the 1990s, Ding Xueliang argued that the 1989 Tiananmen crisis was the result of a legitimacy crisis precipitated by the CCP trying to liberalize the economy while preventing political reforms. There was an intra-­elite conflict between the CCP’s ruling elite and the “counter-­elite” made up of “politically aware members of the intellectual and professional classes.” Ding demonstrated how the counter-­elites were able to shake the CCP rule by mounting oppositional activities from within existing state institutions rather than from without.15 The second wave followed the late Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992. More radical reforms and greater openness triggered by Deng’s tour did not lead scholars to change such a deeply rooted mindset. In 1994, Avery Goldstein stated that, “[a]lthough scholars continue to disagree about the probable life-­span of the current regime, now is usually about when, not whether, fundamental political change will occur and what it will look like.”16 Andrew Walder examines the unintended political consequences when the CCP chose the path of reform and concessions as a response to declining economic performance. A result of such a reform, Walder argues, is that a “quiet revolution from within” (minus the role of the citizenry) is unleashed that eventually weakens the centralized party-­state structure. By “quiet revolution from within” Walder refers to changes in the relationship of higher to lower levels of government, in the relations between superior and subordinate within the CCP and government, and in the interests and orientations of officials within the party-­state apparatus, especially in the lower reaches.17 Yet Walder is cautious when suggesting that while these changes do transform (and indeed undermine) the institutions upon which the communist regime is founded, they do not lead ineluctably to any specific political outcome.

Introduction   5 The current third wave has lasted almost one decade. When coming to the new century after China had sustained three decades of reform, surprisingly, more scholars tend to believe in the coming collapse of the communist rule. The issue of the sustainability of the CCP was raised in a debate on Reframing China Policy organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Washington-­based think tank in 2006.18 In the debate, two leading China experts in the United States, MacFarquhar and Andrew Nathan, presented rebuttals of each other’s position, with MacFarquhar arguing that the CCP will not be able to sustain itself and Nathan taking the opposite view.19 According to MacFarquhar, The [Chinese] political system is fragile.… Despite truly impressive progress in its economy, the PRC’s polity is in systemic crisis. VIP visitors to Beijing are exposed to an impressive panoply of power, but this is a fragile regime … The problems I shall analyze [in the debate] are likely to result in a breakdown in the communist regime in years rather than decades.20 Some other scholars seem to share MacFarquhar’s pessimistic view. For example, Susan Shirk argues that China may be an emerging superpower, but it is a fragile one. And it is China’s internal fragility, not its economic or military strength, that presents the greatest danger … Chinese leaders are haunted by fears that their days are numbered.21 Along this line of thinking, Minxin Pei argues that China is facing a crisis of governance.22 According to Pei, the power and strength of the CCP has declined drastically, as evidenced in three areas: (1) the shrinkage of its organizational penetration; (2) the erosion of its authority; and (3) the breakdown of its internal discipline. Pei lists rising tension between the party-­state and society and mass disenchantment with the CCP as one of the most important manifestations of what he has called “decentralized predation” or “predatory autocracy.”23 Similarly, David Shambaugh argues that one is likely to see a “slow, methodical and continued decay” of the CCP’s capacity and legitimacy to rule.24 Although Shambaugh observes that the CCP has been very active in instituting reforms within itself and within China as a result of the wide-­ranging assessments drawn from the 1989 Tiananmen incident and the subsequent collapse of the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, he believes that the fall of the CCP is inevitable.25 For Shambaugh, the logic is simple. The CCP will fall because it cannot meet social demands. Political parties, including communist ones, are likened to plants that need to adapt to changing environments in order to survive and develop. The CCP is apparently not such an organism. Shambaugh notes, Leninist systems are not well equipped to respond to the changing demands and needs of society – precisely because they are intrinsically top-­down

6   Zheng Yongnian and Lance L.P. Gore “mobilization” regimes rather than possess the feedback mechanisms to hear and respond to aggregated social needs and demands.26 In his latest article, Shambaugh strongly argued that the endgame of communist rule in China has begun since Xi Jinping’s ruthless measures are bringing the country closer to a breaking point. According to Shambaugh, there are five telling indications pointing to the regime’s vulnerability and the party’s systemic weaknesses. First, “China’s economic elites have one foot out the door, and they are ready to flee en masse if the system really begins to crumble.” Second, Xi “has greatly intensified the political repression that has blanketed China since 2009.” Third, “even many regime loyalists are just going through the motions.” Fourth, “the corruption that riddles the party-­state and the military also pervades Chinese society as a whole.” Finally, “China’s economy is stuck in a series of systemic traps from which there is no easy exit.” Based on these observations, Shambaugh concludes, “we cannot predict when Chinese communism will collapse, but it is hard not to conclude that we are witnessing its final phase.”27 Scholarly works like these, plus frequent journalistic descriptions,28 often lead people to believe in the coming collapse of the CCP. Despite all suspicions about its fate, the CCP continues to matter in Chinese politics. Today, by any measure, the CCP is the largest political party in the world. While facing pressing domestic challenges, the CCP is as strong, if not more so, than at any time since it seized power in 1949. Then, the question is why the CCP has been able to survive and develop. The second group of scholars argues that the CCP is capable of changing and adapting to the times to not only ensure its survival but also retain its grip on power. Scholars point to the CCP’s capability of adapting itself to changing environments. An article in The Economist, aptly titled “The Party Goes On,”29 describes how the CCP has managed to adapt itself and is now “vastly more able to govern.” Rather than perceiving these adaptations as a “proto-­democratization of a Leninist state,” the article argues that the CCP is primarily motivated by the desire to remain in power.30 Similarly, Andre Laliberte and Marc Lanteigne have opined that the challenges posed by the modernization process have “forced the CCP to seek not only new forms of accommodation, but also adaptation to political realities.” They go on to provide case studies of the challenges which the party has been able to successfully manage at the turn of the century.31 Along this line of thinking, scholars have focused on the CCP’s capability to adapt itself to new socioeconomic environments. Early on, Bruce Dickson argued that the CCP was in a phase of what Samuel Huntington called “adaption.” Dickson also believes that unlike the Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan, the CCP would not follow the path of democratization.32 In his more recent work, however, Dickson contends that the initiative of the CCP to recruit private-­sector entrepreneurs is consistent with the evolution of other East Asian ruling parties. This initiative is an effort to “adapt” itself in order to save itself. Dickson believes that this initiative is a pragmatic, adaptive measure. The CCP’s strategy of “co-­optation” is working.

Introduction   7 Nevertheless, Dickson continues to doubt whether the CCP is able to accommodate genuine civil society and the organized aggregation of social interests since Leninist parties are by nature intolerant and incapable of ceding such power to autonomous social groups.33 In her study on China’s private entrepreneurs, Kellee Tsai also shares this view and contends that private entrepreneurs and the emergent middle class are not demanding regime change. Her study explores a variety of “adaptive informal institutions” that have permitted the CCP to rebuild and sustain its rule.34 There are some key features to this growing body of literature. First, while the CCP is analyzed, it is placed into the broader context of China’s socioeconomic transformation. The analyses thus enable us to see what challenges the CCP has faced (the first group of scholars) and how the CCP has responded and adapted to changing environments for survival and further development (the second group of scholars). Most analysts, however, regard the CCP as a reactive rather than an active and pro-­active actor, adapting itself to changing environments. Such a perspective tends to underestimate the role of the CCP in bringing changing environments under its control. Second, the cultural nature and institutional embeddedness of the CCP have been largely ignored. Scholars have placed the CCP in the context of the development of political parties in the West, not in the context of Chinese political culture. In other words, the CCP has been misperceived as a political party such as one can observe in the West, not as a transformed system of the traditional emperorship. As Zheng Yongnian argues in his chapter, the CCP and its development have been deeply embedded in the Chinese political culture. Without looking at its cultural roots, one can hardly understand its modern transformation. Third, the CCP’s efforts to accommodate democratic elements have been underestimated. Scholars simply assume that the CCP, as a Leninist party, is by its nature incompatible with democracy and so cannot make sense of how the CCP has utilized democratic elements to achieve a greater degree of institutional transformation. Indeed, the CCP’s capability to accommodate democratic elements is also embedded in the nature of the Chinese culture.

The organization of the book This volume attempts to provide a systematic and almost encyclopedic treatment of the contemporary CCP. It is an in-­depth examination of the inner workings of the CCP; it examines the operation of party organizations in the economy, government, society and military, and in foreign affairs to shed valuable light on policy and decision making in China and how the country is being run. It studies the changing patterns of internal/elite politics, the anti-­corruption movement, institution building, ideological reformulation, intra-­party legislation, human resources management and interaction between party members, party organizations and the rapidly changing socioeconomic environment. The purpose is to get a glimpse of the evolutionary dynamics of the CCP so that more informed assessment of its prospects and political change in China can be made. Guided

8   Zheng Yongnian and Lance L.P. Gore by better knowledge, the book also takes a step back to look at the overall role of the CCP in China and re-­conceptualizes it as a unique category of political party in the making. The chapters can be divided into five parts addressing five areas of the CCP’s being and operation. Part I consists of two chapters that deal with general conceptual and theoretical issues to characterize the CCP as a political party. In Chapter 1, Zheng Yongnian conceptualizes the CCP, re-­interprets its role in Chinese polity and society from a cultural and historical perspective, and re-­ integrates it with the Chinese political traditions. Chapter 2, by Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, surveys the transformation that the CCP has undergone in the reform era. In particular it proposes that the CCP has evolved from a mass party to an elite party and examines in considerable detail the rules governing the life and career of party elites, their award system and the patterns of mobility. Part II deals with the organization and integration of the CCP. It consists of three chapters. Chapter 3, by Lance Gore, examines cadre management and human resources development vital to the survival and rule of the CCP. The focus is on the Central Organization Department of the CCP and its subsidiaries in lower-­level party committees. In Chapter 4, Wang Zhengxu and Dragan Pavlićević turn their analytic focus on a class of very important actors in the Chinese political system – the party chiefs, mainly of local party committees and party groups in large organizations. They examine their role in the political system, the institutional setting and decision rules to illustrate how the CCP exercises power and runs the country on a daily basis. Frank Pieke provides an account in Chapter 5 of the party’s recent efforts to rekindle the ideological faith of party members in order to regain cohesion in the party. The two chapters in Part III examine the evolving elite politics in the reform era. In Chapter 6, Joseph Fewsmith delves into the various models of Chinese elite politics in an effort to define the political game played by cadres of the CCP. He dispels the common perception that institutionalization has to a great extent transformed elite politics, especially at succession, and suggests more productive ways to study elite politics in China. In Chapter 7, Chen Gang brings out the more contemporary issues in Xi Jinping’s anti-­corruption campaign. His analysis highlights the political dynamics of this round of elite politics. Part IV examines the CCP’s relationship with the state, society and economy. It consists of four chapters. In Chapter 8, You Ji elucidates the CCP’s role in the Chinese military to shed light on the civilian–military relationship in Chinese politics. Chapter 9, by Wang Jiangyu, assesses the promises and limitations of the rule of law in China as a result of the structural constraint imposed by party organizations in the legislative and judiciary systems. Chapter 10, by Zhao Litao, examines the CCP’s role in social management and the development of the community governance structure, and Chapter 11, by Li Chen, analyzes the role of party organizations in corporate governance, focusing on state-­owned corporations directly under the central government. He proposes a model of “central state corporatism” that echoes Jean Oi’s “local state corporatism.”

Introduction   9 Part V consists of two chapters that examine the party’s role in foreign and security policymaking. In Chapter 12, Lye Liang Fook analyzes the structure and role of the CCP’s shadow ministry of foreign affairs – the International Department – and how it affects Chinese foreign policymaking. In Chapter 13, Hu Weixin examines the making of national security policy under Xi Jinping. In particular, he assesses the operation of the newly created National Security Commission of the Chinese Communist Party headed by Xi, as well as Xi’s innovations in the so-­called “comprehensive security concept” in the extension of the CCP’s reach both domestically and abroad.

Notes   1 Andrew Walder, ed., The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China and Hungary (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).   2 Lance Gore, The Chinese Communist Party and China’s Capitalist Revolution: The Political Impact of Market (New York: Routledge, 2011); Bruce Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs and Prospects for Political Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Bruce Dickson, Wealth into Power: The Communist Party’s Embrace of China’s Private Sector (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).   3 Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party’s Strategy for Survival (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).   4 David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).   5 Martin K. Dimitrov, Why Communism Did Not Collapse: Understanding Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Asia and Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Andre Laliberte and Marc Lanteigne, The Chinese Party-­State in the 21st Century: Adaptation and the Reinvention of Legitimacy (London: Routledge, 2008).   6 Bruce Dickson, Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997).   7 Andrew Nathan, Chinese Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1985).   8 Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Wu Guoguang, China’s Party Congress: Power, Legitimacy, and Institutional Manipulation (New York: Cambridge University Press 2015).   9 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). 10 Richard McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers (New York: HarperCollins, 2010). 11 Frank Pieke, The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 12 Zheng Yongnian, The Chinese Communist Party as Organization Emperor: Culture, Reproduction and Transformation (London: Routledge, 2010). 13 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Zheng Yongnian, eds., Bringing the Party Back In: How China Is Governed (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004) and The Chinese Communist Party in Reform (New York: Routledge, 2006). 14 Roderick MacFarquhar, “The Anatomy of Collapse,” New York Review of Books, 26 September 1991: 5–9. 15 Ding X.L., The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis, 1977–1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 1–6. 16 Avery Goldstein, “Trends in the Study of Political Elites and Institutions in the PRC,” The China Quarterly 139 (September 1994): 727.

10   Zheng Yongnian and Lance L.P. Gore 17 Walder, Waning of the Communist State, p. 4. 18 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Reframing China Policy: The Carnegie Debates,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 5 October 2006. See www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=916&&prog =zch (accessed 19 February 2007). 19 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Reframing China Policy.” 20 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Reframing China Policy.” 21 Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower: How China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 6–7. 22 See Minxin Pei, “China’s Governance Crisis,” China Review (Autumn–Winter 2002): 7–10; and Pei, China’s Trapped Transition. 23 Pei, China’s Trapped Transition. 24 David Shambaugh, “The Chinese Leadership: Cracks in the Façade?” in Is China Unstable? Assessing the Factors, ed. Shambaugh (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 36. 25 David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), pp. 2–3. 26 David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), p. 7. 27 David Shambaugh, “The Coming Chinese Crackup,” The Wall Street Journal, 6 March 2015. 28 For example, Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001). 29 The word “Party” as used by The Economist carries two meaning. First, it refers to the CCP as the party that has proved its numerous detractors wrong by continuing to survive. Second, it refers to the celebratory mood (as in a party) that is still continuing. 30 “The Party Goes On,” The Economist, 28 May 2009, www.economist.com/world/ asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13741467 (accessed 24 July 2009). 31 Laliberte and Lanteigne, Chinese Party-­State in the 21st Century, p. 3. 32 Dickson, Democratization in China and Taiwan; and Dickson, Wealth into Power. 33 Dickson, “Populist Authoritarianism: China’s Domestic Political Scene,” paper presented at the Third Amer­ican-­European Dialogue on China, Washington, 23 May 2005. 34 Kellee Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

Part I

Overview

1 The Chinese Communist Party An interpretation Zheng Yongnian

This chapter attempts to provide a cultural-­institutional interpretation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and demonstrate how the CCP, conditioned by the Chinese culture, has been actively undertaking efforts to consolidate itself in the form of modern emperorship, namely, the one-­party system, by institutionalizing its relations with other political and social actors. During this process, the CCP has accommodated democratic elements to respond to the changing socio-­ economic and political demands of the Chinese population, albeit not to the point of transforming itself into a political party like those in the West, or embracing a western type of democracy. The CCP’s openness or inclusiveness has enabled it to accommodate democratic elements. “Democratic accommodation,” however, is not “democracy.” Democracy, as is commonly understood in the West, has certain distinctive features such as having free and competitive elections on a periodic basis, a multi-­ party system, checks and balances, and respect for civil liberties including freedom of political expression, freedom of speech and freedom of the press. By contrast, “democratic accommodation,” as it is used in this chapter, refers to the process of introducing democratic elements or features to an existing political system which is widely regarded as non-­democratic. In this case, the CCP may introduce certain democratic elements but this should not be readily construed as the CCP committing itself to the ideals of democracy per se. Rather, by accommodating democratic elements, the CCP could continue to dominate over other political and social actors. The chapter is divided into several sections. In the first two sections, I will define the CCP as an open political process and identify the institutions and means that the CCP uses to operate this process. In the next three sections, I will explain why the CCP can be interpreted from a cultural perspective before I explore how the CCP has transformed itself from traditional emperorship to a modern organization. In the following sections, I discuss how the CCP in the contemporary era has developed into an organization characterized by what I call “internal pluralism” which has enabled it to integrate Chinese traditional meritocracy and modern elements of democracy.

14   Zheng Yongnian

The CCP as an open political process In the West, scholars simply refer to China’s political system as the one-­party system. They believe that the fall of this system is inevitable simply because checks and balances do not exist in this system. The issue is to explain how the CCP has sustained itself and survived in drastically changing environments. To understand the sustainability of the CCP, we have to make sense of what the CCP is and how it organizes itself and its relations with other actors. The nature of the CCP affects its longevity. Elsewhere, I have discussed why the CCP is a transformed modern emperorship. It is highly organized emperorship which exercises domination over the state and society.1 In other words, the CCP is an entirely different breed of political party from those in the West, wielding power in a similar way to that of Chinese emperors in the past. I interpret China’s one-­party system as a “hegemonic regime,” in Robert Dahl’s term.2 A hegemony is a system in which one man or one organization rules the country. To understand the political process of China’s one-­party system is to understand the process of what I call “hegemonization.” Hegemonization is the key feature of the CCP and its relations with other political and social actors. It involves two dimensions, namely, domination and legitimation. More concretely, the term “hegemonization” connotes three basic tendencies. First, the CCP wants to maintain its domination over other political and social actors. Second, it maintains its domination by accommodating other political and social actors and soliciting their loyalty. Third, hegemonization is therefore an effective tool of legitimation. In this context, I argue that changing relations between the CCP and other political and social actors is a dual process of domination and legitimation. This dual process indicates that the CCP embraces an open and inclusive political system. Arguing for hegemonization as an effective mode of legitimation places its emphasis on the interaction between the CCP and other political and social actors. By doing so, I attempt to highlight the following points. First, the interaction between the CCP and other political and social actors is not a zero-­sum game. Although hegemonization implies the CCP’s domination of other political and social actors, other actors are not completely powerless as for the situation to be otherwise would deny the CCP of its legitimacy. Second, these actors are active in this process, just as the CCP is. Politics is relational, so is power. Legitimation means that the CCP solicits loyalty from other political and social actors through non-­coercive means, with their voluntary acceptance. The two processes of domination and legitimation are struggles between the CCP and other political and social actors. Third, hegemonization is thus a dynamic process of mutual transformation between the CCP and other political and social actors. To acquire legitimacy through hegemonization does not mean that the CCP can simply impose its will on other actors, or that these actors accept CCP domination without resistance or negotiations with the CCP. It is an interactive process between the two actors, and their continuous interactions lead to mutual transformation. Figure 1.1 elaborates the dual process of domination and legitimation, a process established by the CCP to maintain a hegemonic political order.

Chinese Communist Party: interpretation   15 Counter-hegemony

Hegemony

A•

A1

A2

A3

…… A n …… ……Bn……

B3

B2

B1

B•

Legitimation

Domination

Figure 1.1  Hegemonization: domination and legitimation. Source: created by the author. See Zheng Yongnian, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, Reproduction and Transformation (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 134.

The left column in Figure 1.1 represents the dual process of domination and legitimation of the CCP over other political and social actors. “A” represents the CCP, and A1, A2, A3 … represent other political and social actors such as the state (including the government, the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultant Conference), mass organizations (e.g., the Chinese Communist Youth League, the All China Federation of Trade Unions and the Women’s Federation) and other social organizations (e.g., chambers of commerce and various forms of non-­governmental organization). By accommodating other political and social actors within the boundary of the hegemony, the CCP solicits loyalty from them and their acceptance makes these actors a part of the political process. Moreover, the CCP is a part of society, the sphere in which it organizes consent and hegemony. According to Antonio Gramsci, if one organization is to become hegemonic, it has to combine the interests of other organizations and social forces with its own interests so as to create a national and popular collective will.3 Similarly, the CCP cannot achieve national leadership, and become a hegemonic organization, if it confines itself only to its own organizational interests or the interests of other political and social actors upon which it has built its hegemonic position. Instead, to sustain and reproduce its hegemonic position across different historical periods, the CCP has to transcend other interests by taking into account the aims and interests of other political and social forces, linking these with its own interests to become their “universal” representative. By doing so, the CCP realizes a dual process of domination and legitimation in its relations with social forces. Society, however, is also the sphere where the subordinate social forces could organize their opposition, struggle for power and construct an alternative ­hegemony – a counter-­hegemony. The right column of Figure 1.1 points to a possible counter-­hegemony. When the CCP is challenged or perceives that it is

16   Zheng Yongnian ­challenged by different actors within a possible counter-­hegemony (e.g., B, B1, B2, B3 …), it tends to use coercive measures against these actors. It is at this juncture that the CCP departs from the practice of all political organizations in the liberal-­democratic model where political pluralism is the norm. In the case of the CCP, it does not allow a counter-­hegemony to develop. Achieving that goal through coercive measures is not always effective and may indeed be counterproductive due to changing socio-­economic environments. Therefore, while not surrendering the option to use coercive measures at any point in time, the CCP actively engages and transforms social forces by accommodating them. The CCP is increasingly embracing an open and inclusive political process and is characterized by what I call “internal pluralism,” a process which will be discussed in the later section. In this same process, the CCP realizes self-­transformation. To understand the nature of this openness, institutions and means that the CCP has employed to deal with other players have to be identified, in addition to coercion.

CCP as an open process: its institutions and means Those who have predicted the inevitable fall of the CCP tend to have overwhelmingly emphasized the role of coercion as the means which the CCP employs in its interaction with other political and social actors. If this is the case, confrontation between the CCP and other actors becomes inevitable; so does the fall of the CCP. However, if hegemonization is a dual process of legitimation and domination, as defined in this chapter, it is not difficult to find other non-­coercive means or institutions that the CCP employs in interacting with other actors. At least, two other means or institutions, namely, bargaining and reciprocity, could be identified. Coercion, bargaining and reciprocity have formed a coherent body of institutions that governs the CCP’s relations with other political and social players. Table 1.1 outlines the main characteristics of these three institutions and how they affect the CCP’s relations with other players. Table 1.1  Institutions of legitimation and domination Institutions

Justification

Coercion

Necessity of Party control and Personnel unified leadership coordination appointment and centralization and campaign, and so on. Mutually Self-interest Negotiations advantageous Mutually Justification to Self-adjustment, acceptable other, obligation deliberation

Bargaining Reciprocity

Motives

Process

Goal Forced local compliance Conflict resolution Voluntary cooperation

Source: created by author. See Zheng Yongnian, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, Reproduction and Transformation (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 134.

Chinese Communist Party: interpretation   17 Broadly speaking, these three institutions can be defined as follows: •

•

•

Coercion can be defined as a process in which the CCP employs coercive means such as the nomenklatura system, massive campaigns and direct control to solicit compliance from other players. If the CCP perceives the possibility of the formation of a counter-­hegemony or a direct threat to the regime, it will appeal to the most coercive means, namely, crackdown, to eliminate the possibility. Coercion is unilateral, aiming at guaranteeing the CCP’s control over other players, and thus maintaining its survival and domination. Bargaining is a process in which the two actors (the CCP and other players) resolve conflicts between them through various forms of bargaining. It is bilateral and both sides utilize their resources to promote their mutual interests or to maximize their respective interests. Bargaining has been widely employed by both the CCP and other players, both governmental and non-­ governmental organizations. Reciprocity refers to a process in which the two actors (the CCP and other players) achieve voluntary cooperation between them through self-­ adjustment and deliberation. Reciprocity is based on obligation, with each side behaving in a mutually acceptable way or with each side’s behaviour justifiable to the other side.

By taking bargaining and reciprocity into consideration, not only the functioning of the CCP but also its sustainability in the contemporary era can be explained. My own reflections on traditional Chinese politics and observations on contemporary politics lead me to believe that there are three related concepts which best sum up Chinese politics under the CCP, namely, political openness, meritocratic competition and public participation. Political openness is the most important prerequisite for meritocratic competition and public participation. In contemporary China, “openness” is commonly used to refer to the country’s openness toward other countries, that is, in the concept of “reform and opening up.” In the political area, however, openness refers to the openness of a political process to different social groups. It can also refer to meritocratic competition and public participation. Competition is conditional and constrained. It is not free competition among members of society, but a competition among chosen talent based on their expertise in managing internal and external affairs. Talent from different social groups must first be shortlisted before they compete for government positions. This indeed was China’s long tradition of meritocracy. Since the CCP is the core of China’s political system, its openness also determines the openness of the entire political system. Examining the openness of China’s political system is hence to explore how the CCP has gradually opened its political process to society by recruiting its elite from different social groups.4 Apparently, openness is the precondition of competition. Without opening the political process to the whole society, it is difficult to have talent enter the

18   Zheng Yongnian political process, and thus impossible to talk about competition. The closedness of the political process means that it is not open to society and there is monopolization by existing power holders. Competition is not Western-­style election. It is selection-­based election, or meritocracy-­based democracy. Any political competition is conditioned and constrained, be it economic or cultural. While political competition in the West is constrained by economic factors such as campaign financing, political competition in China is conditioned by a different set of constraints which are largely political and cultural. Economic factors so far have not entered the domain of political competition. Public participation refers to different social groups’ participation in the political process. This is what China calls “people’s democracy” or “social democracy.” Again, competition is the precondition of participation. No competition, no participation. Public participation can be embodied in the process of not only selecting and electing talent but also policymaking and implementation. Having defined the CCP as an open and inclusive political process and identified the institutions it employs in dealing with other players, the next question is why the CCP has become an open process as defined here. Much has to do with China’s cultural tradition. One has to examine how cultural factors have come to condition the CCP before the transformation of CCP can be understood.

A cultural-­institutional interpretation In linking the CCP with China’s cultural tradition, the assumption is that the CCP, as a modern political phenomenon, is embedded in the Chinese cultural tradition. The term “embeddedness” in social sciences refers to the dependence of a phenomenon – be it a sphere of activity such as the economy or the market, a set of relationships, an organization or an individual – on its environment, which may be defined alternatively in institutional, social, cognitive or cultural terms. The term was created by economic historian Karl Polanyi. According to Polanyi, in non-­capitalist, pre-­industrial economies, there are no pure economic institutions to which formal economic models can be applied. In these cases economic activities such as “provisioning” are “embedded” in non-­ economic kinship, or in religious and political institutions. Livelihoods are not based on market exchange but on redistribution and reciprocity. Reciprocity is defined as the mutual exchange of goods or services as part of long-­term relationships. Redistribution implies the existence of a strong political centre such as kinship-­based leadership, which receives and then redistributes subsistence goods according to culturally specific principles. Economic decision-­making in such places is not so much based on individual choice, but on social relationships, cultural values, moral concerns, politics, religion or the fear of uncertainties. Production in most peasant and tribal societies is for the producers, also called “production for use” or subsistence production, as opposed to “production for exchange” which has profit maximization as its chief aim. In contrast, in market societies, economic activities have been rationalized, and economic action is “disembedded” from society and follows its own distinctive logic, captured in economic modelling.

Chinese Communist Party: interpretation   19 The difference in types of economy is explained by the “embeddedness” of economic activities in other social institutions. Rather than being a separate and distinct sphere, the economy is embedded in both economic and non-­economic institutions. Exchange takes place within and is regulated by society rather than being located in a social vacuum. For example, religion and government can be just as important to economics as economic institutions themselves. Socio-­ cultural obligations, norms and values play a significant role in people’s livelihood strategies. Consequently, any analysis of economics as an analytically distinct entity isolated from its socio-­cultural and political context is flawed from the outset. An analysis of economics will therefore have to focus on the study of the various social institutions on which people’s livelihoods are based. The market is only one amongst many institutions that determine the nature of economic transactions. Polanyi’s central argument is that institutions are the primary organizers of economic processes. The substantive economy is an “instituted process of interaction between man and his environment, which results in a continuous supply of want satisfying material means.”5 I argue that the concept of embeddedness can be applied to an analysis of the links between the CCP and the Chinese cultural tradition. Culture matters in Chinese politics. The CCP was a radical and revolutionary party during its struggle for power and in its engagement of a total transformation of Chinese society in the Maoist era. Since the late Deng Xiaoping when the CCP began to transform itself from a revolutionary party to a normal ruling party, it has become an increasingly conservative party. The CCP has brought back many cultural traditions in enhancing its legitimacy. For the CCP, culture is a tool box for it to not only govern society but also restructure the party itself. For the Chinese society, despite radical changes in modern times, many cultural elements continue to be acceptable to the majority of the population. For example, elements of openness, meritocratic competition and limited participation were embedded in traditional Chinese politics. They are also present in China’s political practice today. History shows that the rise and fall of China’s politics were closely related to its degree of openness. When politics is open, there will be competition; society will then have opportunities to participate, which in turn boosts good governance. By contrast, when politics is closed, there is no competition, with society becoming irrelevant to politics and leading to the decline of politics.

Openness in Chinese traditional emperorship A key feature of traditional Chinese politics or the way imperial power operated was openness and inclusiveness. China’s traditional state, namely, emperorship, had lasted for centuries before it was defeated by modern forms of the state originated from the West. Internal dynamics had helped the system persist through such a long historical period without major revolutionary changes. It was after China was repeatedly defeated by Western powers in modern times that the emperor was held responsible for China’s weaknesses. However, simple denial

20   Zheng Yongnian of the emperorship will not help deepen one’s understanding of traditional Chinese politics. Compared to Western feudalism before the advent of modern nation states, Chinese emperorship had a considerably higher degree of openness. Although imperial power per se was exclusive, the power of the government was open. In the words of modern times, the “property rights” of the country belong to the emperor, while the right of administration is open to the whole of society. Imperial power (huang quan) exclusively belonged to the emperor and his family. Even so, as Chinese historian Qian Mu correctly pointed out, except for the throne per se, none of the other positions had the legitimacy of hereditary succession.6 This is drastically different from the system of hereditary succession of political families in the European countries and elsewhere. In China, the power of the government was rather open to all social stratums. Such openness was highly institutionalized, mainly through the imperial examination system.7 Theoretically, imperial power was ubiquitous; in practice, however, it had only limited reach. The scope of politics was limited, and the reach of imperial power was confined. The emperor usually “reigned but did not rule,” whereas the government (ministerial power) was vested with the administrative power. Indeed, traditional China had developed a very sophisticated civil service system that was later discovered and employed by the Europeans. The openness of administrative power directly led to the openness of society. In the concepts of modern social sciences, traditional China only had concepts of stratum and class rather than those of clan, caste, race, ethnicity and colours which often prevailed in other societies. Class and stratum are open, that is, someone can change the stratum and class that he/she belongs to through his/her own efforts. By contrast, clan, caste, race, ethnicity and colours are permanent and cannot be changed through any individual efforts. Accordingly, Confucianism emphasized “providing education for all people without discrimination” (you jiao wu lei), meaning that people can change themselves through education and everyone in society can be educated. For Confucianism, human nature is not fixed and education is the foundation for changing human nature. The difference among human beings is between those who are educated (e.g., civilized) and those who are uneducated (e.g., uncivilized). Apparently, the biggest limitation, or even the enemy, of the openness of traditional China was imperial power. Imperial power demonstrated exclusiveness, monopoly and hereditariness; it was incompatible with openness and inclusiveness. Consequently, the only resolution to change was revolution which refers to a dynastic change in the Chinese tradition. Just like other societies, the closeness of imperial power in China directly led to its eventual decline and demise. In modern times, while imperial power in other societies was marginalized and became merely a political symbol, the Chinese imperial power was replaced by modern organized power, namely, the power of the political party.

Chinese Communist Party: interpretation   21

Modern transformation Though in existence for the last few centuries, traditional Chinese emperorship could not even withstand a single blow by the Western modern states in modern times. In the half century after the fall of the Qing dynasty, China experienced a single most significant transformation from traditional imperial power to modern organizational power, namely, the power of the political party (hereafter, party power). This transformation has some of the most significant cultural implications in modern Chinese history.8 Hence, it would be effective to examine China’s political party system from a cultural perspective rather than simply viewing China’s political parties in a Western sense, in spite of the common use of the term of “political party.” Why is the CCP the only ruling party in China? Simple as it seems, this question is very difficult to answer. In academic circles, the CCP is often perceived in the same way as its counterparts in other countries. However, though it has a form that is similar to that of other political parties, especially the Leninist ones, the CCP is very different from its Western counterparts in its cultural implications. In multi-­party systems, regardless of Western democracies or developing countries, a political party is perceived as representing only the partial interests of society, or “factions.”9 The original meaning of “party” refers to one part of the population, not the entire population. In multi-­party systems, the survival and development of political parties depend on their openness. If a political party aims to hold political power, it has to gain the approval of the majority. Moreover, if different political forces within a party are in dissension, its members can found new parties separately. This can be called “external pluralism.” There is always an “exit.” Moreover, people are free to choose among the different political parties. If they do not like party A, they can turn to party B or party C or something else. Such political processes generate dynamics for political parties, forcing them to be open so as to accommodate different interests. In contemporary China, even with the existence of a number of so-­called “democratic parties” and political organizations, the CCP remains the only ruling party. Other parties and political organizations are not allowed to compete for power; they can only participate in politics through the political process set by the ruling party. The domination of the CCP is self-­evident; it has not changed since the People’s Republic was founded in 1949 and is unlikely to change in the near future. This is because of not only the CCP’s own survival and development that require it to be dominant, but also, even more importantly, the profound historical and cultural roots that it possesses. China’s long history did not engender the concept of the modern political party. What is relatively close to the concept of a modern political party in Chinese culture is “clique” (pengdang). While “clique” always existed, it did not have any cultural legitimacy. Indeed, in every dynasty, there were frequent campaigns to crack down on “cliques.” Although the modern concept of political party in China came from the West, it has gradually changed its nature after its introduction. The multi-­party competition

22   Zheng Yongnian lacks sufficient cultural basis in China as the country does not have a tradition of multi-­party politics. The Chinese culture prefers a unitary authority10 which was traditionally the emperor and is now an organization, namely, the party. While people in traditional China expected a good emperor, the people today expect a good party leadership, be it individual or collective. An important research question is the Chinese people’s shift in allegiance from the emperor to the political party. The party and its leaders are now identified by many in society in the same way the emperor was recognized in the past. China’s deep traditional culture implies that its political party can hardly become a Western one. Nevertheless, the organizational format of China’s political party also distinguishes it from traditional emperorship. While traditional emperorship was a closed system and was “ruled as in a family” (jia tianxia), the political party could be an open political process to all social groups and social interests. Simply put, though traditional emperorship and the modern party share some similarities in their structure, the latter has an open characteristic that the former lacks. By its nature, traditional emperorship cannot be democratized because its carrier is individual and family, whereas the carrier of the modern party is organization.

The CCP and internal pluralism Since the reform and opening up, the transformation of the CCP has increasingly demonstrated the characteristics of openness. This differentiates the CCP from other communist parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries before they collapsed. As socio-­economic transformation deepens, the pluralisation of economic and social interests has become a fact in China. The Eastern European communism had chosen the Western path, allowing different interests to found different political parties. Somehow, such a choice was inevitable as it was in accordance with the Western culture and accepted by these countries. For the CCP, as the only ruling party, it has chosen a different way, namely, opening the political process to all social and interest groups, an open party system under one-­party rule. Any political system that is not open will definitely become exclusive and closed. Only with openness can politics be inclusive. In the West, political openness materializes through external pluralism, i.e., multi-­party politics, in which every kind of interest can find representation in a party. In China, since there is no multi-­party politics, political openness is realized through what I call “internal pluralism,” referring to the openness of the party. When different interests emerge in society, the ruling party opens itself to them, accommodating them into the regime and representing their interests through different mechanisms. In the post-­Mao era, the CCP had been making efforts to transform itself from a Maoist revolutionary party to a ruling party. In the course of a revolution, a political party has to depend on the support of certain classes and stratums. In the case of the CCP, it was in alliance with the working class and peasantry. As a ruling party, however, it needs to rely on all classes and stratums in order to attain the most extensive social base.

Chinese Communist Party: interpretation   23 The transformation of the CCP has been rapid. Since no opposition party is allowed, for any social groups, entering the political process of the CCP is a rational way and the most efficient way to express their interests. To a large extent, the “Three Represents” proposed by the CCP in the early 2000s typically reflects its realistic perception that the CCP has to represent different social interests.11 Behind the “Three Represents” is the rise of various social and economic interests. To represent different social interests requires the CCP to be open to including different social interests into one political process. The change of the nature of party members is an indicator. In the Maoist era, workers, peasants and the People’s Liberty Army (PLA) constituted the majority of CCP membership; since the reform and opening up, intellectuals, professionals and the newly risen social stratum have made up an increasing proportion in the party.12 If the West practises “external pluralism,” the Chinese party system tends to be characterized by “internal pluralism.” Different interests are “internalized” to the existing system to compete for their interests which are coordinated by the party within. As the social base of the CCP enlarges, the demand for intra-­party democracy has increased. This is why the CCP has been emphasizing the importance of intra-­party democracy and searching for manifold inner-­party democracy in recent decades. At the Seventeenth National Party Congress in 2002, the CCP leadership laid out a map for the process of China’s democratization, namely, intra-­party democracy leading social democracy or “people’s democracy.”13 The effectiveness of such internal pluralist openness is no less than that of any other system. In recent years, with the rise of the Jasmine Revolution in the Middle East and North Africa, the Chinese regime has been equated with regimes in the Arabic world. While these regimes in general are categorized as authoritarianism in the West, they are quite different in terms of their internal structures. Internal pluralism differentiates China from the authoritarian regimes in the Arabic world and elsewhere. The Arabic world basically has no external or internal pluralism; most regimes are closed, with one family (monarchy) or a few families chronically monopolizing political power and dominating the country. Even in democratic countries, such as Britain, USA and Japan, political power is more often than not monopolized by a small number of political families. The number of people entering politics from the lower social levels is much larger in China than in democratic countries. The rule of the CCP is not based on a political family. It is a mass party with highly diversified interests.14

Party meritocracy and its inclusiveness The openness of the party system is not just to accommodate pluralistic interests. More importantly, as the central feature of Chinese politics, it aims to solve the two most important political problems, namely, first, to peacefully handle power succession and, second, to bring the best and the brightest into the government. Such a system has been called meritocracy. These two problems are in reality

24   Zheng Yongnian also central to politics in the West. One can refer to Joseph Schumpeter’s elitist analysis of democracy in the West. In his great work Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Schumpeter advocated a procedural definition of democracy.15 Focusing on re-­defining democracy in the West, Schumpeter brought back two most important factors into political life, namely, political leadership and the alternation of political elites. Schumpeter criticized the implications of “the eighteenth-­century philosophy of democracy,” which defined democracy as an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will.” According to Schumpeter, this definition has an assumption that there is a known “common good” that we all agree on. The only area of contention is how to quickly move toward this ideal. However, for Schumpeter, this assumption is problematic for several reasons. First, there is no common good that can be brought to light through rational argument. Even those with good intentions can disagree on what is best for society. Second, even if there is a consensus on a common good (ends), the disagreement is on the means. For example, “ ‘[h]ealth’ might be desired by all, yet people would still disagree on vaccination and vasectomy.”16 Third, those using this definition tended to come from a utilitarian perspective, such that the common good is that which is best for each individual. However, this view does not allow people to express their will about the common good, but rather makes an assumption about what form that “will” should “naturally” take. The utilitarian assumption of democracy requires each citizen to be independently rational, able to sort good facts from misleading impressions, and promptly and accurately form opinions. Moreover, each citizen’s value set would be fully formed, not a mere collection of “vague impulses.” In such a society, one person’s opinion would be just as good as another’s. For Schumpeter, it is certainly not a fact in reality. He argued that government by the people is not necessarily better at being government for the people than other forms of governance can be.17 Dissatisfied with the utilitarian assumption of democracy, Schumpeter proposed a procedural theory of democracy which reverses the roles of politicians and people. In the utilitarian theory, each citizen has a rational opinion about every issue and votes for a representative to carry out his/her opinion. Thus, selecting a representative is “secondary.” The procedural theory reverses these roles: “The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”18 Schumpeter was cited here for two reasons. The first is that he provided a realistic view of democracy. His theory has several strengths. First, it established a clearer criterion for distinguishing democratic governments, namely, competition through election. Second, it accounted for the importance of leaders and leadership, unlike classical democratic theory which almost deems leaders superfluous. Third, it assigned a more realistic role to citizens: instead of the moral

Chinese Communist Party: interpretation   25 and rational assumptions of citizens, citizens now choose from a candidate’s bundle of policies. Fourth, there is a continuum between perfectly free competition and non-­competition, just as there is a continuum between perfectly free markets and perfect command markets. Fifth, the new theory clarifies the relationship between democracy and freedom; democracy does not require or guarantee freedom, other than that “everyone is free to compete for political leadership by presenting himself to the electorate.”19 Finally, the public does not control the government; it simply elects or evicts it. The second reason is that Schumpeter’s theory helps highlight the Chinese system of selecting leaders. First, Schumpeter brought political leaders back into politics. In his theory, democracy is not rule by the people, but rather rule by politicians who compete freely for the people’s vote. Central to politics are leaders, not the people. Similarly, central to Chinese politics, be it traditional or modern, are political leaders. Second, for Schumpeter, while the purpose of democracy is to put good politicians in power, those able to win votes are not necessarily talented administrators, leaders, judges, diplomats and others. In contrast, to bring the best and the brightest into the government is the purpose of the Chinese system of meritocracy. By referring to Schumpeter, one can find a base for comparing democracy in the West and meritocracy in China. To a large extent, the nature of Western democracy is to realize alternation of political elites through periodic elections. Before the coming of democracy, violence often played an important role in the process of power succession. This was also the case in traditional China for thousands of years. While traditional Chinese meritocracy opened the government to the public, it could not solve the problem of power succession. As discussed earlier, emperorship was based on the emperor and his family. Revolution helps to solve the problem of power succession. Indeed, the aim of a “revolution” was “to change the dynasty.” In the contemporary era, it is not difficult to observe that China has restored and indeed enhanced its meritocracy.20 While China has refused to follow the path of Western democracy, the CCP has developed a very efficient system of power succession. Ironically, this new system was designed to achieve what democracy in the West has achieved, namely, peaceful alternation of political elites. To a great degree, this should be attributed to the late Deng Xiaoping after he returned to power in the late 1970s. Deng was successful in establishing several institutions. First, a system of political exit was established. Political exit is important for elite politics, particularly power succession. Before new leaders can be appointed, old leaders have to leave. No exit, no entry. For most times in traditional China, the institutionalized rule was that only after the old emperor passed away could his successor formally succeed him as the new emperor. The death of the old emperor could be caused by different factors. There were cases in which the old emperor was forced to give up the throne. When it comes to a change of dynasty by various violent means, the incumbent emperor was simply overthrown. For decades after 1949, China virtually did not have a system of political exit. Top leaders were able to hold on to their positions until they died. Mao Zedong

26   Zheng Yongnian died in the position of the chairman of the CCP. While Deng Xiaoping did not have any formal position in his late years, he was able to exercise great influence through informal channels. The exit problem had troubled both the top leadership and the country since it often had to be solved by a bitter power struggle. To deal with the problem, formal regulations and informal rules have been developed. The most important institution is the age limit. The retirement system for aged cadres was formally established in the early 1980s. Candidates for ministers, provincial party secretaries and governors have to be below 65 years of age, and those for deputy ministers, deputy provincial party secretaries and deputy governors below 60 years of age. The main problem lies in retiring top senior leaders, namely, those in the Political Bureau and especially in the Standing Committee. Although Deng did not specify the retirement age for these positions, he was able to retire aged senior political leaders. During Deng’s tenure, the average age of Political Bureau members was reduced from 71 in 1982 to 62.1 in 1992.21 Since the era of Jiang Zemin, the age factor has become increasingly important in handling power succession.22 After the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992, unwritten rules were developed in retiring top leaders. In 1992, a consensus was reached that no one in the Political Bureau except for Jiang Zemin could be older than 70.23 Needless to say, this also applies to candidates for the premier and vice premier positions (or equivalent level in the party sector). At the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002, all leaders in the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee who were above 70 retired. Li Ruihuan, the chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) then, retired when he was 68. Jiang Zemin has remained an exception even though he no longer holds a position in the Political Bureau. At the Seventeenth Party Congress in 2007, Zeng Qinghong, who was regarded as being in the core of leadership, retired when he was 68. Since then, China has practised what is called the “qishang baxia” system: those who are 67 will stay in power, and those who are 68 will have to step down. This system has so far survived the rule of Xi Jinping. Since Xi came to power in 2012, drastic changes have been introduced into elite politics, but this system remains intact.24 In 2017 at the Nineteenth Party Congress, Wang Qishan, a powerful figure in the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and also a close ally of Xi, retired due to his age limit. Wang was appointed as the vice state president, a position which does not apply the age limit. Meanwhile, since Jiang, most senior leaders have been able to exit from politics peacefully and gracefully. During the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997, Qiao Shi retired gracefully from all power positions. Regardless of whether Qiao retired voluntarily or was pushed out, his retirement was widely regarded as a major step for the CCP to resolve its endemic problem of retiring senior leaders. At the same congress, General Liu Huaqing also gracefully exited from the Standing Committee. Since then, this exit system has functioned well. While changes happened under Xi Jinping in the case of Zhou Yongkang, Zhou was investigated and eventually put into jail only after he retired from the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau in 2012.

Chinese Communist Party: interpretation   27 Second, the CCP established the fixed-­term appointment system or the term limit. In general, leaders including the general secretary of the CCP, the president of state, premier and other important positions are allowed to serve at most two terms in office, i.e., ten years. This system is not hugely different from many Western presidential systems. However, the system is not fully institutionalized. According to China’s Constitution, state leaders such as the state president, vice state president and the premier can only serve two terms, but there is no similar regulation in the Constitution of the CCP. In other words, the rules of the state and the party are not unified. Therefore, the Constitution was revised at the National People’s Congress in 2018, and the two-­term limit was removed for the positions of state president and vice state president. The move was interpreted as Xi’s attempt to abolish the system. Whether Xi will do so remains unclear, but this move per se has demonstrated that the level of institutionalization remains very low. A third system is “intra-­party democracy” or intra-­party collective leadership engendered by internal pluralism. While the one-­party system does not have strong external constraints, there are substantial checks and balances in the highest leadership of the CCP. The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP, the highest and most powerful decision-­making body, is often regarded as the symbol of a highly centralized political system or authoritarianism. However, its members have almost equal power, with each having his/her decision-­making area and having the most important say in that area. Indeed, during the era of Hu Jintao, the power at the top was too diffused, leading to the formation of what is called “political oligarchies” as in the cases of Zhou Yongkang, Lin Jihua and Xu Caihou. As will be discussed later, such a situation was changed after Xi came to power. All these new institutions have greatly impacted the alternation of political elites and power succession. First, all these institutions are effective institutional constraints on personal dictatorship. Put simply, though China does not have a Western form of democracy, it has found an alternative way to prevent personal dictatorship. By contrast, in the developing world, personal dictatorship is commonplace in both the monarchical countries and countries with a modern party system. When a person or a family has dominated a country for several decades, the system is prone to malpractices and abuses, which are intolerable to society. Second, the institutions facilitate the alternation of the political elite. The speed of elite alternation at all levels is not comparable to any other system, including democracy. The Chinese system allows politics to refresh itself at an extremely fast pace and can thus effectively reflect generational changes and changes of interests. Compared to many other political systems, the Chinese political system facilitates the rapid and massive renewal of public officials. With the rigid enforcement of an age limit, there are thousands of officials leaving their positions every year, with the same number of officials assuming these positions. Although such rapid mobility has its own disadvantages, it undeniably reflects changes of times.

28   Zheng Yongnian Third, and more importantly, the new system has enabled the CCP to deal with factional politics and to choose the successor in a peaceful way. To a great degree, central to all political systems is power succession. This has troubled China for thousands of years. It continued to trouble Chinese politics after the People’s Republic was established. Mao behaved like a traditional emperor and was certainly able to preside over all institutions to choose his successor. He chose Liu Shaoqi initially and subsequently Lin Biao as his successor. He failed in both cases, but he was still able to choose Hua Guofeng before his death. The way Mao chose his successor was no different from that of the emperor in the pre-­modern era. In the era of Deng Xiaoping, the situation changed slightly. Deng and his generation of leaders realized the danger of Mao’s way of conducting power succession, and, indeed, many of them including Deng himself were the victims of Mao’s personal dictatorial power. Therefore, Deng put much emphasis on collective leadership. After the 1989 pro-­democracy movement, Deng, together with other elders, appointed Jiang Zemin as the general secretary of the CCP. At the party’s Fourteenth Congress in 1992, they also appointed Hu Jintao as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau to succeed Jiang Zemin. Greater institutionalization took place when coming to the post-­Deng era. The fact that Hu Jintao was appointed by Deng means that Jiang was deprived of his right to appoint his own successor when he retired from all formal positions. Factional politics came to play an important role when Jiang wanted to ensure the continuity of his legacy and policy. In 2002, when Jiang was retired from the position of the general secretary, Hu succeeded him. In terms of formal procedure, this meant a successful power succession, indeed the first smooth power succession in the history of the CCP. However, though Hu ranked the highest in the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, he lacked factional support. There was virtually no one in the Standing Committee whom he could count on for support. In contrast, Jiang could count on six supporters among the nine members of the Standing Committee, including Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Wu Guanzheng and Li Changchun even though he relinquished his senior party post. Indeed, the expansion of the membership of the Standing Committee from the previously seven to nine was to strengthen Jiang’s faction. When Hu took over the power from Jiang in 2002, the new leadership was defined as “the central leadership as Comrade Hu Jintao as the general party secretary.” While Deng defended Jiang as the core of leadership, Jiang did not do so for Hu. That means that Hu had to work harder than Jiang to consolidate his power and make himself a real core of the leadership. As Jiang, Hu consolidated his power by building his power base – the Chinese Communist Youth League. Despite the power consolidation, Hu was not powerful enough to choose his successor. His personal power was even weaker than Jiang’s in planning and arranging the future leadership and he had to appeal to other means when handling power succession. The Seventeenth Party Congress in 2007 was regarded as vital for power succession since the line-­up of the future leadership had to be

Chinese Communist Party: interpretation   29 made. This party congress brought Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang as successors to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, respectively, into the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau by a process of internal voting. According to the Xinhua News Agency, over 400 people, including members and alternate members of the CCP Central Committee and leading officials of relevant departments, participated in picking proposed members of the Political Bureau from a list of almost 200 candidates. Hu Jintao presided over the voting and set, on behalf of the CCP Central Committee, the conditions for the new Political Bureau members, with emphasis on political firmness, capacity and image among the party members and ordinary people. The candidates had to be 63 or younger and at least a minister.25 This is what China now called “democratic recommendation of the new party leadership.” While the “democratic process of electing the new party leadership” at the party congress is still opaque to outsiders, it is certainly true, as the report stated, that for the first time the participants of the Central Committee’s plenary session could select the candidates of the Political Bureau members. The report thus regarded this event as a milestone in the history of the party’s efforts to develop internal democracy. Since no single leader can now dictate power succession, new institutions and methods, including ones with democratic elements, have to be instituted. Again, as in other areas, the level of institutionalization of power succession is still low. Since Xi came to power, he has introduced many changes and thus tremendous uncertainties into power succession. How Xi will handle the power succession after him remains to be closely watched. The collective leadership and the intra-­party democracy are very conducive to prompt policy changes. Theoretically, the obstacle to policy change in multi-­ party systems should be less than that in one-­party states, for policies can change with the alternation of ruling parties. When a new party comes to power, it can discontinue policies initiated by the former ruling party. However, in reality this is often not the case. In many democratic countries in the West or the developing world, opposition parties no longer serve their constructive roles; instead, they oppose merely for the sake of opposing and political parties veto each other. Under such circumstances, substantial policy changes often become very difficult. In China, this is not the case. If Western democracies are more about an alternation of political power, the Chinese system is more about policy alternation. Although Chinese society often complains that the ruling party are too slow in making policy changes, they are implemented on a more rapid basis than under other political systems. In democratic countries, political elites can pass the responsibility of making policy changes to each other; in China, the ruling party has the inescapable responsibility. From the 1980s to this century, China has achieved several significant policy changes. It is difficult to understand the huge changes in China in these decades without taking into account the ruling party’s immense ability to respond to situations with appropriate policy changes. Besides strengthening the dominant position of the CCP, intra-­party democracy has another important task, namely, to maintain the openness of the whole social system. As Amer­ican economist Mancur Olson verifies, even in Western multi-­party democracies, the behaviour of individuals and firms in stable

30   Zheng Yongnian s­ ocieties often leads to the formation of dense networks of collusive, cartelistic and lobbying organizations that make economies less efficient and dynamic and polities less governable. The longer society goes without an upheaval, the more powerful such organizations become. Olson is rather pessimistic as he believes that such interest groups cannot be eliminated except through measures such as revolution, war and large-­scale conflicts.26 However, China’s experience of reform and opening up has shown that maintaining the openness of the system could become an effective way of overcoming vested interests. To overcome vested interests requires an open political party. This can be exemplified by the two campaigns since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. The first campaign, namely, the large scale of anti-­corruption campaign, is taking place at the top. While the campaign has shown how widespread and serious corruption is within the ruling party, it also indicates that the party is very capable of initiating such a campaign to crack down on corruption. The main targets of this campaign are political oligarchies which are perceived to have posed a political threat to the party. By cracking down on the political oligarchies, the ruling party attempts to maintain the openness of the whole system. The second campaign is the mass-­innovation campaign in which the central government creates an environment conducive to the growth of a new generation of entrepreneurs by providing a new set of economic policies. In recent years, after China came to an age of “middle growth,” its economy has been lacking new dynamics. The government has had difficulties in overcoming strong resistance from vested interests, be it the state sector or the private sector. What the government has done is to liberalize/decentralize its economic policy and thus provide new spaces for new interests to grow.

Conclusion Understanding Chinese politics continues to be a difficult enterprise for the scholarly community. It requires one to not only have extensive knowledge of the Chinese political tradition that has existed for thousands of years, but also consider the entire transformation process that takes it from a traditional political tradition to its present modern form. In the post-­Deng era, though there has been little discussion of China’s political reform, many political practices are already indicative of a general trajectory discussed in this chapter, namely, establishing the party in an open manner and building an open political party system. Such a direction is in line with not only the openness of traditional Chinese culture but also the open spirit of modern politics. The future and trajectory of China’s politics from the perspective of openness thus deserve greater further research and deeper analysis. To some extent, all the changes discussed in this chapter are reflective of the CCP’s official guidelines of “building the party in an open manner.” In this context, interpreting the CCP’s intra-­party democracy becomes meaningful. Intra-­party democracy is to strengthen the dominant position of the ruling party. As discussed earlier, the traditional imperial power failed due to its lack of

Chinese Communist Party: interpretation   31 o­ penness. In contrast, with intra-­party democracy, the party remains open. As an organization, the ruling party definitely has its own interests. Without interests, there are no responsibilities. However, as the only ruling party, the CCP should not become the vested interests and the existing interests should not monopolize the political process; otherwise, it would follow the path of traditional emperorship. As the only ruling party, the CCP needs to be an open political system and the political process has to be open for survival and development. The CCP is determined to stay relevant to the needs of a more complex and diversified society. To do so, the CCP has engaged great institutionalization which accommodates democratic elements. While it is unlikely that the CCP will become a political party like those in the West, all these changes show that the CCP is not averse to democratic elements or democratization. In developing “democracy with Chinese characteristics” and in line with its ideological bearings, it is reasonable to conclude that the CCP is prepared to accept or experiment with whatever works. However, what is adopted, the form it will take, and the pace of these changes are likely to be gradual and need not necessarily proceed in a linear direction. The CCP, as the ruling party, ultimately wants to ensure that it remains in power through such democratic adaptations. It is determined to chart its own political path. Therefore, the nature of the political system that eventually emerges is likely to be different from Western-­style democracy.

Notes   1 Zheng Yongnian, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, Reproduction and Transformation (London: Routledge, 2010).   2 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971).   3 Roger Simon, Gramsci’s Political Thought: An Introduction (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1991), pp. 48–52.   4 Democracy can be defined in different ways. Here, following Schumpeter, democracy is defined as competition among elites for political power. According to Schumpeter, “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1975), p. 269.   5 Karl Polanyi, “The Economy as Instituted Process,” in Economic Anthropology, ed. E. LeClair and H. Schneider (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 126.   6 Qian Mu, Zhongguo lidai zhengzhi deshi [The success and failure of politics in Chinese history] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2001).   7 Ho Ping-­Ti, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962); Wolfgang Franke, The Reform and Abolition of the Imperial Chinese Examination System (Cambridge, MA: Harvard East Asian Monograph, 1960); Benjamin A. Elman, “Political, Social, and Cultural Reproduction via Civil Service Examinations in Late Imperial China,” The Journal of Asian Studies 50, no. 1 (February 1991): 7–28.   8 See my examination of the process of this transformation in Zheng, Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor.   9 For example, see G. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

32   Zheng Yongnian 10 Yuri Pines, The Everlasting Empire: The Political Culture of Ancient China and Its Imperial Legacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012). 11 Zheng Yongnian, “Technocratic Leadership, Private Entrepreneurship and Party Transformation,” in Will China Become Democratic? Elite, Class and Regime Transition (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004), pp. 253–81. 12 Zheng, Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor, Chapter 6; Lance L.P. Gore, The Chinese Communist Party and China’s Capitalist Revolution: The Political Impact of Market (New York: Routledge, 2011). 13 Zheng Yongnian, “Hu Jintao’s Road Map to China’s Future,” Briefing Series, Issue 28, China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, 2007. 14 Of course, the rise of political families in recent years is also observable. More princelings are now entering Chinese politics. However, it is questionable whether political families will dominate the CCP in the future. 15 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976). 16 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 252. 17 Schumpeter, pp. 255–56. 18 Schumpeter, p. 269. 19 Schumpeter, p. 272. 20 For example, Daniel A. Bell, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015). 21 Bell, The China Model, p. 21. 22 Zheng Shiping, “The Age Factor in Chinese Politics,” in Damage Control: The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era, ed. Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003), pp. 173–89; Zheng Yongnian, “The Politics of Power Succession,” in Reform, Legitimacy and Dilemmas: China’s Politics and Society, ed. Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (London: World Scientific; Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2000), pp. 23–50. 23 Richard Baum, “Jiang Takes Command: the Fifteenth National Party Congress and Beyond,” in China under Jiang Zemin, ed. Tien Hung-­mao and Chu Yun-­han (Boulder, CO: Rienner Publishers, 2000), p. 24. 24 Zheng Yongnian and Weng Cuifen, “The Development of China’s Formal Political Structures,” in China In the Era of Xi Jinping: Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges, ed. Robert S. Ross and Jo Inge Bekkerold (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), pp. 32–65. 25 Liu Siyang, Sun Chengbin and Liu Gang, “Weile dang he guojia xingwang fada changzhi jiuan – dang de xin yijie zhongyang lingdao jigou chansheng jishi” [For the prosperity and stability of the party and state: on the spot record of the birth the new party leadership], Xinhua News Agency, 23 October 2007. 26 Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982).

2 Turning the CCP into an Elite Party Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard

“If you want to understand China, you have to study the Chinese Communist Party.” Liu Yunshan Copenhagen, June 2014

This is easier said than done. Studying the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is in fact a complicated task. Statistics on the number of CCP members and composition of CCP membership over time are difficult to come by and many Party documents detailing the administrative rules regulating the Party and its role ­vis-­à-vis state organs and social organizations are written in a kind of formal language that requires considerable language capabilities, even of native-­ speaking well-­educated Chinese. It is also difficult to apply a comparative theoretical perspective and most scholars in fact seem to believe that the CCP must be understood on its own terms. In sum, in studying the CCP, scholars confront both empirical and theoretical problems and difficulties. This chapter attempts to address both sets of problems.* First, it provides some data on the composition of the CCP today and when it came to power in the 1949–50 period. Second, the chapter introduces elite theory in order to grasp the significance of the CCP’s development from a mass party to an elite party headed by a group of highly educated cadres. Third, the chapter argues that the CCP is at the heart of a ranking-­stratified system which entails significant benefits and privileges for the elite. Fourth, the paper discusses whether the CCP has a future or whether the system is likely to break down. Finally, some concluding remarks will be offered.

Survey of the field The study of the CCP forms a special part of contemporary China research.1 Interest in the topic has varied according to the ruling paradigms in the field. It is also a topic where it can be difficult to conduct objective, value-­free research independent of one’s own political orientation. Most studies of the CCP are descriptive. They see the Party as an undifferentiated whole governed by a

34   Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard uniform set of rules and regulations. However, in practice different regulations apply to ordinary rank-­and-file members and to Party members in leading positions. Party members who work in administrative positions are also subject to an elaborate set of civil service regulations, as they are both civil servants and Party cadres. In fact, there is a considerable degree of ambiguity and there are seemingly contradictory concepts and practices in the way the Party handles its role in Chinese society. To Western scholars who would like to see things in black and white and who assume a clear link between policy formulation and implementation, this can be confusing. However, to Chinese leaders, the ambiguity is deliberate, as it leaves space for the Party to maneuver. Early works on the Party carefully went through CCP leaders’ (especially Mao’s) exposition of their own ideology because they believed, as Lewis put it, that “Chinese Communism can best be understood as a belief system on its own terms.”2 Their approach was not founded on the belief that the CCP leadership doctrine and philosophy were superior; rather they believed that in order to explain the behavior and practices of the CCP membership, it was necessary to understand the ideological and theoretical self-­perception of the Party and its leaders. This involved coming to grips with key concepts in the Party’s ideological discourse such as contradictions, class struggle, mass line and the dialectical process of knowledge. The exercise was primarily based on close reading of key texts written by Chairman Mao.3 More recent works by Shambaugh and Lieberthal also take the Chinese ideological discourse seriously in contextualizing the Party’s organizational behavior.4 Zheng Yongnian also tries to explain the CCP as it is, arguing that the CCP is a Chinese cultural product and an entirely different breed from the political parties we can observe in the West.5 He also applies theoretical insight from new institutionalism and a set of literature which he calls new Marxism.6 The interpretation of new Marxism developed by Zheng is based on the political thought of Antonio Gramsci and the theoretical insight of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. This is a promising way of combining the Chinese field of research with theoretical reflections. Early edited volumes by Robert Scalapino and A. Doak Barnett investigated the background, career pattern and composition of the CCP elite at national and provincial levels.7 However, subsequent research on CCP leaders failed to follow up on the insight provided by these scholars and neglected to draw on the theoretical insight provided by the general social science literature on elite politics.8 This lacuna in extant research needs to be remedied. In the following I will argue that China in the post-­Mao era has moved from revolutionary authoritarianism to resilient authoritarianism, while during the same period the Party has changed from a mass party to an elite party headed by a professional bureaucracy of Party cadres, many of whom double as state cadres. To paraphrase Wilfredo Pareto: The “lions” of the revolutionary movement have turned into bureaucratic “foxes.”9

China’s Communist Party: mass to elite   35

The evolving elite party When Lewis and Schurmann wrote their classic works in the early 1960s the CCP was still a mass party. Most Party members were workers and peasants and the general educational level was low. Over the years the Party has changed its composition and now appears as an elite party. A few statistics illustrate this transformation. In 1950 there were 5.8 million members of the CCP, compared to 87.8 million at the end of 2014.10 In 1950, 63.8 percent of Party members were illiterate, 30.4 percent had a primary school education, 4.1 percent had a high school education and only 0.6 percent could register a higher education.11 This has changed dramatically over the years. By the end of 1998 there were only 3 percent illiterate Party members left. The percentage of Party members with a primary school background stood at 21.8 percent, while the share of high school graduates had increased to 45.4 percent and graduates of higher education to 18.3 percent.12 By the end of 2014, 27.8 million Party members, or 43.0 percent of the total membership, could register an educational degree at college level and above.13 In 1950, 55.6 percent of all Party members were peasants, 2.8 percent were workers, 11.7 percent were staff workers in state and Party organizations and bureaus, and only 0.9 percent were students. In 1998 the share of peasants had dropped to 32.7 percent, whereas the share of workers had increased to 11.6 percent, so that the combined share of workers and peasants had decreased by 14 percentage points. A new category of cadres defined as “management and specialist technical personnel in public and collective enterprises as well as cadres in administrative organs at all levels” accounted for 30.0 percent, whereas retired personnel and students accounted for 14.8 percent and 0.4 percent, respectively.14 At the end of 2014 workers accounted for 7.3 million or 8 percent, peasants for 25.9 million or 29.5 percent, technical specialist personnel for 12.5 million or 14.2 percent, students for 2.5 million or 2 percent and retired people for 16.2 million or 18.6 percent of Party membership. Staff in Party and state organs amounted to 7.4 million or 8.4 percent. The 2014 figures also included a category called “management personnel in state enterprises and shiye danwei as well as in non-­state enterprises.” They numbered 9 million or 10.2 percent of Party membership. A group called “other employed” numbered 7.1 million or 8 percent of total Party membership. Statistics have become much more fine-­grained over the years as Chinese society has developed.15 To be sure, changes in categories make it difficult to compare Party composition over time, but it is clear that workers and peasants now only account for one-­third of total Party membership compared to almost two-­thirds when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established and the Party came to power. Instead, new strata and groups such as technical and management personnel have evolved. Most of these are considered cadres, and so are staff in Party and state organs.

36   Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard

The Chinese political elite In order to understand how China is governed and by whom, which is ultimately the reason why we are interested in studying the CCP, it is important to realize that China is not governed by the Party’s rank-­and-file membership. Ordinary Party members are not directly involved in ruling China. The country is ruled by millions of people in responsible positions. These are called cadres or ganbu in Chinese. Not all of them are Party members. In fact less than 50 percent of the 41-million strong cadre corps hold a Party membership card. However, once cadres move up the career ladder, they are increasingly likely to become Party members. The important career step is to become a leading cadre, who is defined as a person occupying a government or state position at the rank of county level or above. There are around 508,025 leading cadres, 96 percent of whom are Party members.16 This is the Party elite governing China. It is the pool of officials from which the Party selects the country’s leaders. It is the quality and competencies of this group which will determine whether the Party will stay in power. In 1950 after the establishment of the PRC there were 193,800 cadres in China. A total of 47.8 percent had primary school education or below, 44.3 percent had a middle school education and 6.9 percent could register for higher education. In 1998 the percentage of cadres with only a primary school education or below had shrunk to 11.9 percent, while middle school graduates had increased to 48.3 percent and graduates from institutions of higher learning had increased to 46.5 percent. Clearly the educational quality of the cadre corps had increased significantly. This is even more the case when we look at the educational level of leading cadres. Thus by 1998, 80.5 percent of the 508,025 leading cadres had received a college education.17 For cadres at the departmental level the figure was 88.7 percent. In short, over the years the educational background and qualifications of Chinese leading cadres have dramatically improved. They are much better educated than the rank-­and-file Party membership they are expected to lead. Originally cadres formed the political elite in China. However, in connection with the regularization of the cadre corps that took place in the 1950s, cadre status came to be delineated on the basis of job category and denoted “management and specialist technical personnel in public and collective enterprises as well as cadres in administrative organs at all levels.”18 Thus cadres were no longer perceived to be the vanguard of the revolutionary class as defined by Lenin in his important organizational manual What Is to Be Done?.19 In Lenin’s definition cadres formed the nucleus of the Leninist Party and would “devote to the revolution not their free evenings, but their whole life.”20 With the regularization of the cadre corps, cadres were no longer necessarily Party members. The Party could accept this as long as leading cadres were members of the Party and controlled by Party regulations. This chapter argues that this stratum of leading cadres forms a power elite in Anthony Giddens’ definition of the term.21 Xi Jinping terms the power elite as “the key minority” (guanjian xiaoshu). In connection with the ninety-­fourth anniversary of the CCP on 1 July 2015, he met

China’s Communist Party: mass to elite   37 with 102 “outstanding county-­level Party secretaries” from around China who had been selected from among 2,800 of their peers to receive commendation in Beijing. Xi himself noted that the “key minority” had turned into a hot phrase (re ci) and synonymous with “leading cadres.”22 Xi’s meeting with model county Party secretaries has drawn attention to the leaders of perhaps the most important administrative division in China. The county is the seat of administrative power in China’s vast countryside. County Party secretaries are extremely powerful in the local setting and they form a pool of candidates for future leaders at provincial and national levels in China.

Wages and benefits The elitist nature is reinforced by the ranking system which not only indicates an official’s formal authority, but also determines the official’s salary and a long list of benefits and privileges. Currently there are 27 ranks. From rank 15 and above positions are ranked at county level and above (leading cadres). Within each rank there are grades; for county-­level officials there are as many as 14 grades. Salaries are a combination of position salary and ranking salary as well as a year-­end one-­off bonus, usually equal to one month’s salary. There will also be local allowances depending on the nature of work and the locality.23 Ranking determines access to housing, cars, travel and office space. A cadre at county or division level is entitled to a three-­room apartment, whereas a section head would only be allocated a two-­bedroom apartment. In Beijing leading cadres at vice-­ministerial level and above are allocated an apartment measuring at least 220 square meters. Such privileges could mean fringe benefits worth hundreds of thousands of yuan in big cities like Beijing and Shanghai. In addition, higher-­level cadres are given a car with a driver at their disposal. Again this is regulated according to rank. Ministerial-­level officials are entitled to drive a car with a 3.0 liter engine worth RMB450,000, a vice minister can have a car with a similar engine size, but at a price of only RMB350,000, and an official at the director general level has access to a 2.0 liter car worth RMB250,000.24 When traveling by air a minister/vice minister is entitled to fly first class and a director general may fly business class. Members of the Standing Committee of the CCP fly in special planes and not by commercial airlines. Office space for Chinese cadres is also detailed in administrative regulations. A minister (buji zhengzhi) or an official at the equivalent level is entitled to an office of size 54 square meters, while a vice minister can have an office of size 42 square meters, a director general 24 square meters and a division head 12 square meters. At the provincial level, governors and vice governors are entitled to similar office space to that of ministers and vice ministers, while a provincial director general (tingzhang) has access to 30 square meters. At the county level, the county head can claim a 30 square meter office. This is more than that for a director general at the central level and 2.5 times that of a division head at the central level, who is ranked at the same level. His deputies are entitled to offices the same size as that of a director general in Beijing, namely, 24 square meters.

38   Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard There is no explanation for this in current regulations. However, the difference could perhaps be explained in the availability of office space at the central and local levels, and the fact that counties play a key role in China’s administrative system. According to regulations a ministerial-­level official is also entitled to a private bathroom adjacent to his office. Chinese officials are also entitled to free medical care and access to special hospitals. Cadres at deputy director general level and above have access to the well-­equipped senior cadre wards (gaogan bingfang) when receiving in-­patient treatment. Members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo have their own personal doctors who also accompany them on travel abroad. Executives in state-­owned companies are also part of the elite. Many of them have previously worked in government departments and organizations before being transferred to executive positions in industrial enterprises.25 In a similar way, many business executives are transferred to high-­level positions at vice-­ ministerial level and above after having served a stint in a major state-­owned enterprise (SOE). In this way the business elite is integrated into the country’s governing elite. They enjoy the same privileges in terms of housing, cars and travel. On top of this they enjoy high salaries which can amount to several hundred times the normal pay of industrial workers.26 However, recently the Politburo decided that the high incomes of the leaders of the central SOEs would be adjusted to “appropriate and reasonable levels,” with a ceiling of RMB600,000.27 As some of these business leaders had up to RMB12 million in annual salary, this amounted to a drastic pay cut. By taking this decision the Party underlined that business executives in the SOE sector are subject to Party control and regulation.

Elite access Anthony Giddens distinguishes between open and closed elites with high or low integration. As the Chinese power elite has a relatively open pattern of recruitment and a high level of integration it is a “solidary elite” in Gidden’s definition of the concept.28 Moreover, as the power of the Chinese elite seems to be concentrated and as the issue-­strength of its power must be characterized as broad, it is an elite which holds autocratic power. One might add that as new social groups and strata such as private entrepreneurs make it to the elite, it will increasingly turn into an oligarchic mode of power holding (limited issue-­ strength). However private entrepreneurs would need to take up positions in the state and Party administrative apparatus in order to make it to the political elite. Formulated in another way: membership of the political elite requires administrative ranking. Even though access to the elite in principle is open, it is restricted in the sense that the number of leading positions at the county level and above is limited. According to available statistics there are only 508,025 positions at county level and above. There are 39,100 positions at director general level (ju/si/ting level) and 2,562 at ministerial level (bu/sheng level). According to some reports, for

China’s Communist Party: mass to elite   39 the millions of officials below county level, only 4.4 percent of them have a chance to move upwards to a county-­level position and only 1 percent to director general level.29 In order to allay the dissatisfaction caused by the lack of opportunities for promotion to leading positions for ordinary section members, it has been decided to give them the benefits that belong to the next higher position; section members who have not been promoted for 12 years can acquire the benefits belonging to section heads and section heads can acquire the benefits belonging to a position at the vice-­county level.30 The Party controls the appointment and selection of leading cadres through the nomenklatura system. The nomenklatura list is defined as “a list containing those leading officials directly appointed by the Party as well as those officials about whom recommendation for appointment, release or transfer may be made by other bodies, but which requires the Party’s approval.”31 The nomenklatura system is managed by the CCP’s Organizational Department which handles the file of leading cadres and the recommendation of candidates for leadership appointments. As the objective of the Organizational Department is to manage all leadership positions, even non-­Party candidates for positions in state organs at ministerial and vice-­ministerial level will be managed by the Party’s internal nomenklatura system. In relation to the appointment of business executives in the central enterprises, the Party is assisted by the State-­owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). However, the ultimate responsibility for managing these executives rests with the Party. It is only in relation to the appointment of ju/si/ting-­level business leaders that SASAC plays a determining role.

New regulations Recently new regulations for leadership selection and appointment were published. They show that the current leadership has no intention of abolishing the current practice of controlling and monitoring leadership appointments. On the contrary there is a clear trend toward greater centralization of personnel management. The regulations state in the preamble that they also apply to the small minority of leading cadres that are not Party members, thereby underlining the Party’s authority in managing all state leadership positions from county level and above.32 So even if an official is not a Party member, once appointed as a leading cadre, the cadre’s career will be monitored and managed by the Party. Another important instrument of control on behalf of the Party is the presence of Party groups in all state organizations. According to the Central Organization Department, 99.6 percent of China’s 237,000 state organs (jiguan) have established a Party organization. In major government working departments (gongzuo bumen) the Party organization is established as a Party committee, and in most offices and bureaus the Party organization will be a Party group (dangzu). Of China’s 546,000 public service units (shiye danwei) 92.7 percent have also established a Party group. In the 213,000 public ownership enterprises, 91 percent have established a Party organization, whereas only 53.1 percent of the

40   Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard 2.9 million non-­public enterprises have done so. In the 439,000 social associations, only 41.9 percent have registered a Party cell. Recently regulations were published which clearly mandated the establishment of a Party group for all central and local administrative organs, mass organizations, economic organizations and cultural organizations.33 In June 2015 a Politburo meeting decided to accelerate the process of setting up Party groups in cultural and social organizations.34 This is another indication of sustained centralization efforts by the Party. The CCP with its 87 million members is by far the world’s largest party. In terms of size it is larger than most countries in the world. For several years the CCP has grown by about 2.5 million members a year. However, in early 2013 top leaders declared that its membership should be controlled in order to improve its vigor and vitality. At a meeting of the Politburo chaired by Xi Jinping it was signaled that quality, not quantity, would be preferred in the recruitment of Party members. A statement issued by the meeting said that “the overall number of Party members should be controlled, and the membership structure and quality should be optimized” and efforts should be made to “absorb advanced and outstanding personnel.”35 Unqualified members would be purged from Party ranks.36 The ongoing anti-­corruption campaign is an attempt to ensure that Party members observe Party regulations and do not engage in corruption behavior and waste public funds. The basic problem is that the Party is above the state and the judiciary and in control of the media. Therefore there is no external institution that is authorized to supervise the Party. According to Party leaders the solution to this dilemma is not to introduce a system of checks and balances, but rather it is to “strictly govern the Party” (congyan zhi dang) by the Party itself. In order to explicate what this means in practice a wide range of Party documents have been released on how to correctly behave in official functions. The starting point was the Politburo’s Eight Directives (baxiang guiding) against red tape and extravagance.37 Following this document a flurry of notices (tongzhi), regulations (tiaoli), opinions (yijian) and rules (guiding) have been published concerning what officials can and should do in relation to traveling, banquets, accommodation and reimbursement of expenses, among other things.38 Party members are even reminded that they are responsible for proper family affairs and according to new regulations on demotion and promotion, Party cadres are not eligible for promotion if their wives are living permanently abroad.39 In October 2015 revised regulations were published concerning the various forms of sanctions and disciplinary punishment that will apply if cadres are not observing rules and regulations and are not behaving morally and in an ideologically correct manner.40 The publication of all these documents shows that the anti-­ corruption campaign is about not only taking down corrupt officials, but also reinvigorating and improving the quality and morality of the cadre corps. At the heart of the renewed focus on quality is an attempt to avoid the same pitfalls that brought about the demise of the Soviet Union. According to Xi Jinping an important reason for the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Soviet Communist Party was not only that their ideals and convictions wavered but also that the Soviet Communist Party had become too

China’s Communist Party: mass to elite   41 unwieldy and the quality of its members too low. In November 2013 Chinese Party cadres were made to watch documentaries on the collapse of communist rule in the Soviet Union. The video, “In Memory of the Collapse of the Communist Party of China,” blamed Gorbachev’s moves to introduce Western-­style democratic reform and to relax the Soviet Communist Party’s monopolized control of ideology. Boris Yeltsin’s privatization of Soviet state-­owned enterprises was also mentioned as a major reason for the dismantling of the Soviet Union.41 Given these considerations and the fear of a reprise of the Soviet collapse, this time in China, Chinese leaders are convinced that it is necessary to focus on the quality of Party members. It is acceptable, perhaps even desirable, if this would mean a slowdown in admitting new Party members. However, too drastic a slowdown would have a destabilizing effect, as there are almost 22 million applications to join the Chinese Communist Party in a year.42 Only admitting 2.1 million out of 21 million application is tantamount to an admission rate of 10 percent. Given the fact that Party membership is the precondition for career advancement this may be too low a rate for applicants.

What is the future of the CCP? In international China scholarship there are various views on the future of the CCP.43 They can be divided into three schools: the “Evolution to Democracy” School, the “Fragile/Collapse” School and the “Resilient Authoritarianism” School. The “Evolution to Democracy” School argues that it is only a matter of time before China evolves into a democracy and does away with the Chinese Communist Party in a linear and evolutionary process of political change. There is disagreement on the pace and time frame of the process, but agreement on the end result.44 In contrast the “Resilient Authoritarianism” School argues that the Chinese political system is stable and that the CCP has maintained its dominance and is not about to wither away in the near future.45 On the contrary, as a consequence of the measures and policies of revitalization and rejuvenation the Party has consolidated its grip over China. The Party and its organization have proven able to adapt to new circumstances created by modernization, economic reform and the emergence of new social groups. Contrary to the “Resilient Authoritarianism” School, scholars belonging to the “Collapse” School argue that the current political system in China is fragile and unsustainable.46 The Party has lost its legitimacy and will be swept away by internal and external political pressures. Some see the situation in China as a kind of pressure cooker and that the collapse of the CCP will be violent and chaotic due to built-­up tensions. Related to the “Collapse” School is a “Fragile” School which sees the Chinese political system as brittle and on the verge of a breakdown.47 During the last decade the “Resilient Authoritarianism” School has dominated. Among the three schools, it is still the view that would conform best to

42   Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard the perception Chinese Party leaders and prominent scholars have of the CCP and its role in their own country. However, among Western scholars there has been some questioning in recent years. Andrew Nathan, who originally coined the concept, has argued that forces for change and pressure are building up to an extent that China has reached a tipping point.48 However, there is no telling when and how change will come. Most recently, David Shambaugh in a much-­debated article in the Wall Street Journal has argued that the “endgame of Chinese Communist rule has now begun.”49 He considers five indications of regime vulnerability and the CCP’s systemic weaknesses: (i) China’s economic elite are beginning to leave the country; (ii) political repression has intensified under Xi; (iii) regime loyalists are increasingly feigning compliance with the regime; (iv)  Xi’s anti-­corruption cannot eliminate the problem of corruption which is stubbornly rooted in the Party system; and (v) China’s economy is stuck in a series of systemic traps, and the reform package unveiled at the Third Plenum in November 2012 challenges powerful entrenched interest groups – such as state-­ owned enterprises and local Party cadres – that are blocking its implementation. According to David Shambaugh, some political reforms were introduced in China from 2000 to 2008. They included the strengthening of local Party ­committees and experimentation with multi-­candidate voting for local Party secretaries. The Party introduced the “three represents” and recruited more businesspeople and intellectuals. Party consultations were expanded and Politburo meetings became more transparent. Party leaders introduced feedback mechanisms within the Party and implemented more meritocratic criteria for evaluation and promotion. They also strengthened mid-­career training for state and Party cadres and enforced retirement requirements. In Shambaugh’s opinion the Xi regime has rolled back all these reforms, except the cadre training program. By arresting the reform process the regime has succumbed to the fear of repeating “the Soviet nightmare.” Shambaugh concludes that “[w]e cannot predict when Chinese Communism will collapse, but it is hard not to conclude that we are witnessing its final phase.” As indicated in this chapter, I disagree with the conclusion of Shambaugh’s article. Major political reform may still be on the backburner, but the Party is constantly undergoing incremental change and reform. However, this will not loosen the Party’s control of Chinese society. The goal is to create a more efficient Party headed by increasingly well-­educated and competent cadres and leaders, and not to weaken Party organization and ideology.

Ranking-­stratified system Following Gil Eyal, Iván Szelény and Eleanor Townsley, I define capitalism as a class-­stratified system in which economic capital is dominant, and communism as a system “in which social capital – institutionalized and political capital – is the major source of power and privilege and forms a rank-­stratified society.”50 In the Chinese case the social and political force creating and maintaining society based on rank order is the CCP headed by its leading cadres. These cadres are

China’s Communist Party: mass to elite   43 the main beneficiaries of such a system and they have an objective interest in closing ranks to prevent the system from disintegrating. The strategic sectors of the economy are an integrated part of the rank-­ stratified political system in China. The CEOs, board chairmen and Party secretaries of the largest state-­owned companies are managed by the Central Organization Department and thereby ranked at vice-­ministerial level and some even at ministerial level. This is still the case, even though Party documents have declared that administrative ranking for state-­owned companies will be abolished. Since they are part of the central nomenklatura and thereby core members of the political elite they are rotated to take up government positions such as vice minister/minister or vice governor/governor.51 The opposite process is also often the case. Even though social/political capital dominates, forms of capitalism have emerged in China. The private economy has expanded and now accounts for almost two-­thirds of the Chinese economy.52 A great many private entrepreneurs have built enormous fortunes. According to one report released by China Minsheng Bank and the Hurun Institute, the number of mainland Chinese who hold assets worth at least 500 million yuan now exceeds 17,000.53 Some 300 of them have assets worth at least ten billion yuan, and about 5,100 have assets worth one to two billion yuan. Most of the entrepreneurs are in real estate and manufacturing industries and many own companies that are listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai. The total assets of the super-­rich in 2015 have soared to 31 trillion yuan, equal to ten times the GDP of Norway and 20 times that of the Philippines. Thus we see the contours of a new elite emerging based on private wealth and property.54 This new elite represent important new social strata which the CCP is trying to co-­opt by admitting them to the Party. The door to Party membership was opened by former Party leader Jiang Zemin who in 2001 put forward the concept of “three represents” in order to ideologically justify private entrepreneurs joining the CCP.55 Many of the entrepreneurs are sons and daughters of high-­ ranking Party officials. They are highly visible as delegates to the annual meetings of the national and local provincial people’s congresses and (especially) ditto meetings of the Political Consultative Conference. This attempt to bring new social strata into the elite implies a relatively open pattern of elite recruitment in the Chinese case. Classical elite theorists emphasized that only by being able and willing to absorb new elements and layers would a given power elite be able to prevent regime change and thereby its own demise.56 By way of the “three represents” the Party signaled its openness to the inclusion of private entrepreneurs. However, none of them are members of the elite Central Committee or have formal state and Party positions which qualify them to become members of the political elite. In spite of the emergence of private economic capital, China remains a Party-­managed rank-­stratified society.

44   Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard

Conclusion After two decades of scholarly neglect, the CCP has again become an important part of contemporary China research. However, research is hampered by the difficulty of obtaining reliable statistical material on the composition of CCP membership over time. There are also difficulties in locating reliable data on the cadre corps which stretches beyond 1998 and to the present time. The field also suffers from the fact that scholars have tended to study the CCP and the political system on its own terms and have only rarely applied theories and concepts from the general social science field. Finally, for a while during the 1990s, it was the dominant view in the West that the CCP was a thing of the past. Primarily due to the Tiananmen debacle in 1989 it had lost legitimacy and would wither away, it was argued. However, the CCP is still around today. In fact, we are faced with a CCP that has undergone a process of revitalization and rejuvenation while evolving from a mass party to an elite party headed by a corps of highly educated cadres. Currently the focus of Party building is on quality rather than quantity. Party leadership has realized that perhaps too many entered the CCP in the past without having the correct qualifications and ideological and moral background. This is believed to be one of the factors leading to widespread corruption. The Party has maintained a ranking system which is still the stratifying principle defining who belongs to the elite. However in connection with the ongoing anti-­corruption campaign, some of the privileges and benefits have been curtailed, though this has been compensated by a pay rise of 62 percent for top officials and 110 percent for lower ranking cadres.57 To understand China and Chinese politics, it is imperative to study the CCP and its mechanisms for controlling Chinese society. Such a project involves detailing the inner workings of the CCP by carefully studying the many Party documents that are being published. In this way the Party will be understood on its own terms. However, it is also necessary to apply social science concepts and theories so as to translate CCP practices and self-­perceptions into a more ­universal and comparative framework.

Notes   * Substantial parts of this paper also appear in Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “China’s Communist Party: From Mass to Elite Party” China Report, vol. 54 (no. 4, 2018), pp. 385–402.   1 For a survey of the literature on the CCP, see Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “The Chinese Communist Party since 1949,” in Oxford Bibliographies in Chinese Studies, ed. Tim Wright (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). See also Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, ed., Critical Readings on the Chinese Communist Party, 3 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2017).   2 John Lewis, Leadership in Communist China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 37.   3 The works by John Lewis, Leadership in Communist China, and Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), are good examples of this approach.   4 David Shambaugh’s China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008) provides a detailed overview of the

China’s Communist Party: mass to elite   45 Chinese discourse on the causes and implications of the breakdown of the Soviet bloc. In Governing China (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004), Kenneth Lieberthal has a chapter on the basic concepts and principles of Mao Zedong Thought.   5 Zheng Yongnian, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor (London: Routledge, 2010).   6 Zheng, Chinese Communist Party, p. 18.   7 Robert A., Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People’s Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972); A. Doak Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969).   8 It should be noted that Cheng Li in a number of studies published important background material contributing to prosopographical studies of the Chinese Party elite. See for example Cheng Li, “A Biographic and Factional Analysis of the Post-­2012 Politburo,” China Leadership Monitor 41 (Spring 2013); and Cheng Li, “China’s Top Future Leaders to Watch: Biographical Sketches of Possible Members of the Post-­2012 Politburo (Part 1–4),” China Leadership Monitor 37–39 (Spring, Summer, Fall, 2012).   9 The distinction between “lions” and “foxes” in elite terms can found in Paragraph 2178 in Wilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, vol. 4, General Forms of Society (London: Jonathan Cape, 1935). 10 Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu xinxi guanli zhongxin [Information Centre of the Central Organization Department of the CCP], Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei tongji ziliao huibian, 1921–2000 [Compilation of internal statistical material on the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–2000] (Beijing: Dangjian duwu chubanshe, 2002), p.  2; and Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu [Central Organization Department of the CCP], “2014 nian Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei tongji gongbao” [Year 2014 internal statistical communique of the Chinese Communist Party], http://news. xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-06/29/c_1115760045.htm (accessed 27 July 2015). 11 Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu xinxi guanli zhongxin, Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei tongji ziliao huibian, 1921–2000, pp. 51–52. 12 Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu xinxi guanli zhongxin, pp. 52–53. 13 Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu, “2014 nian Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei tongji gongbao.” 14 Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu xinxi guanli zhongxin, Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei tongji ziliao huibian, 1921–2000, pp. 99–105. 15 Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu, “2014 nian Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei tongji gongbao.” 16 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “Management of Party Cadres in China,” in Brødsgaard and Zheng, Bringing the Party Back In: How China is Governed (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004), pp. 57–91. 17 See Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu, Zhonggong dangshi yanjiushi, and Zhongyang dang’an guan [Central Organization Department of the CCP, Research Office of the CCP Party History, and Bureau of Central Archives], Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao, 1921–1997, fujuan 1 [Material on the organisational history of China’s Communist Party, 1921–1997, Appendix, Volume 1] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2000), pp. 1350, 1359. 18 Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu xinxi guanli zhongxin, Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei tongji ziliao huibian, 1921–2000, p. 100. 19 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “Cadre and Personnel Management in the CCP,” China: An International Journal 10, no. 2 (August 2012): 69–83. 20 Lenin, What Is to Be Done?: Burning Questions of Our Movement (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1973, originally published 1902), p. 225. 21 See Anthony Giddens, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies (New York: Harper & Row, 1975). 22 See “Xi Jinping dao Shanghai daibiaotuan shenyi zhuazhu lingdao ganbu zhege guanjian xiaoshu” [Xi Jinping to Shanghai delegation submit to grasp the key minority],

46   Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard Jiefang ribao, 6 March 2015, www.chinanews.com/gn/2015/03-06/7106771.shtml (accessed 25 July 2015). 23 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Chen Gang, “Public Sector Reform in China: Who Is Losing Out?” in Globalization and Public Sector Reform in China, ed. Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 77–99, at p. 86. 24 “Zhongguo guojia jiguan gongwu yong che bianzhi he peian biaozhun de guiding” [Standard allocation rules for official use of cars in Chinese state organs], 28 April 2009, www.ggj.gov.cn/zcgls/zcfggw/200904/t20090428_267015.htm (accessed 24 July 2015). 25 See Brødsgaard, “Cadre and Personnel Management in the CCP.” 26 See Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard “Gaige shiqi guoqi gaoguan de shehui yu zhengzhi liudong: Zhongguo chaoji jingli ren de jueqi” [Social and political mobility of SOE executives in the reform era: the rise of China’s supermanagers], in Gaige: Kunjing yu chulu [Reform: predicament and future], ed. Zheng Yongnian (Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 2015), pp. 111–125. 27 See “Yangqi gaoguan xinchou tiaozheng caoan: xiaojian 70% nian xin bu neng chao 60 wan” [Draft for regulating the salary of executives of central enterprises: reducing by 70%, yearly salary cannot exceed 600,000 yuan], http://china.cnr.cn/xww/201408/ t20140827_516310751.shtml (accessed 12 January 2016). 28 See Giddens, Class Structure of the Advanced Societies. 29 See “Gongwuyuan zhiji jinsheng tiaojian chulu dajia cheng gongzi jiang puzhang san cheng,” Hebei xinwen wang, 3 February 2015, http://finance.people.com.cn/n/ 2015/0203/c66323-26497646.html (accessed 24 July 2015). 30 “Gongwuyuan zhiji jinsheng tiaojian chulu dajia cheng gongzi jiang puzhang san cheng.” 31 See Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in Control?,” The China Quarterly 211 (September 2012): 624–648, at p. 633. 32 See “Dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo tiaoli” [Working regulations concerning the selection and appointment of leading cadres], People’s Daily, 16 July 2014, http://renshi.people.com.cn/n/2014/0116/c139617-24132478.html (accessed 24 July 2015). 33 See “Zhongguo gongchandang dangzu gongzuo tiaoli (shixing)” [The Chinese Communist Party’s working regulations on party groups (trial use)], Xinhua, 16 June 2015, www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-06/16/content_2880383.htm (accessed 24 July 2015). 34 New York Times, 3 June 2015. 35 “Pledge to Purge ‘Unqualified’ Members of the Chinese Communist Party,” South China Morning Post, 29 January 2013, www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1138219/ pledge-­purge-unqualified-­members-chinas-­communist-party (accessed 25 July 2015). 36 In late July 2015, for the first time, the CCP issued regulations on the promotion and demotion of officials, stipulating concrete measures for dealing with incompetent and corrupt cadres. See “Tuijin lingdao ganbu neng shang neng xia ruogan guiding (shixing)” [Some regulations for the promotion and demotion of leading cadres (trial)], 29 July 2015, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/0728/c64387-27375493.html (accessed 8 August 2015). 37 “Zhongyang zhengzhiju guanyu gaijin gongzuo zuofeng, miqie guanxi qunzhong de baxiang guiding” [Eight directives of the Politburo concerning improving work style, and maintaining close relations with the masses], Shiba da yilai feng lian zheng jianshe he fan fubai fagui zhi huibian [Collection of Documents on the Legal System in Relation to Building Party Work and Clean Government and Anti-­corruption after the Eighteenth Party Congress] (Beijing: Zhongguo fangzhen chubanshe, 2014). 38 See “Zhongyang zhengzhiju guanyu gaijin gongzuo zuofeng, miqie guanxi qunzhong de baxiang guiding” for 24 of these documents covering the period December 2012 to March 2014. 39 See “Tuijin lingdao ganbu nenshang nengxia ruogan guiding (shixin)” [Trial regulations for promoting and demoting leading cadres], 28 July 2015, http://cpc.people. com.cn/n/2015/0728/c64387-27375493.html (accessed 12 January 2016).

China’s Communist Party: mass to elite   47 40 “Zhongguo gongchandang jilu chufen tiaoli de tongzhi” [Notice on the regulations concerning CCP disciplinary punishment], 25 October 2015, http://news.xinhuanet. com/politics/2015-10/21/c_1116897567.htm (accessed 12 January 2016). 41 See “Paranoia from Soviet Union Collapse Haunts China’s Communist Party, 22 Years On,” South China Morning Post, 19 November 2013, www.scmp.com/news/ china/article/1359350/paranoia-­soviet-union-­collapse-haunts-­chinas-communist-­ party-22-years?page=all (accessed 25 July 2015). 42 Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu, “2014 nian Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei tongji gongbao” (see note 10). 43 The discussion on the future of the CCP draws on Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “The Chinese Communist Party and the Evolving Political Order,” in Charting China’s Future: Domestic and International Challenges, ed. David Shambaugh (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 13–21. 44 See, for example, Bruce Gilley, China’s Democratic Future: How It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Cheng Li, China’s Leaders: The New Generation (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Merle Goldman, “The Phrase ‘Democracy and China’ Is Not a Contradiction,” in China and Democracy: A Contradiction in Terms?, ed. Mark Mohr (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2006). 45 Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Resilient Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (January 2003):  6–17; Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation; Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Zheng Yongnian, Bringing the Party Back In: How China Is Governed (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004); and Bruce Dickson, Red Capitalists in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 46 Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001); Roderick MacFarquhar, “The Anatomy of Collapse,” New York Review of Books, 26 September 1991, pp.  5–9: Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). 47 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 48 Andrew Nathan, “Foreseeing the Unforeseeable,” Journal of Democracy 24, no. 1 (January 2013): 20–26. 49 David Shambaugh, “The Coming Chinese Crackup,” The Wall Street Journal, 6  March 2015, www.wsj.com/articles/the-­coming-chinese-­crack-up-­1425659198 (accessed 8 August 2015). 50 Gil Eyal, Iván Szelény and Eleanor Townsley, “Making Capitalism without Capitalists” in Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective, ed. David B. Grusky (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014), pp. 1104–1110, at p. 1106. 51 Brødsgaard, “Cadre and Personnel Management in the CCP.” 52 There is considerable disagreement concerning the size of the private sector, but this is the estimate of Nicholas Lardy who includes the foreign sector in his estimate. See Nicholas Lardy, Markets Over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2014). 53 See China Daily, 6 April 2015, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2015-04/06/ content_20009445.htm (accessed 26 July 2015). 54 See also Andrew G. Walder, “Elite Opportunity in Transitions from State Socialism,” in Grusky, Social Stratification, pp. 1110–1115. 55 Bruce Dickson, Wealth and Power: The Communist Party’s Embrace of China’s Private Sector (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 56 See Pareto, The Mind and Society, vol. 3, Sentiment in Thinking (London: Jonathan Cape, 1935) and Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: MacGraw-­Hill, 1939). 57 “Neidi gongwuyan gongzi tiaozheng fangan chutai ‘zengzhang 6 cheng’ xi wujie,” Beijing bao, 20 January 2015.

Part II

Organizational and ideological integration

3 Managing human resources to sustain the one-­party rule Lance L.P. Gore

The study of the post-­Cold-War Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been inevitably framed by the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. The obsession of the field has been the survivability of the CCP. The “pending collapse” of the CCP regime has been a perennial topic of heated debates. The most dramatic statement of this thesis is Gordon Chang’s book (2001 and 2012) The Coming Collapse of China.1 The most recent death knell is sounded by David Shambaugh, who believes the system will crack under the weight of societal demands on the one hand and the neo-­orthodoxy of Xi Jinping on the other.2 If Shambaugh’s proclamation has been affected by value judgement, MacFarquhar is more analytic; he points out that several of the historical factors that contributed to the CCP’s stability no longer exist – charismatic leaders, the ideological glue, the integrity of party organizations and so on.3 The failure of the CCP to collapse 25 years on prompted a growing literature seeking to explain the “authoritarian resilience.” Acknowledging significant organizational atrophy, Shambaugh also observes the CCP’s conscious learning of the Soviet Union lessons and extensive effort at adaptation.4 Nathan traces the authoritarian resilience to the institutionalization of political life after Mao. He points to the wide range of incremental reforms such as local elections, institutionalization of elite succession, legal and mass media reforms, and others that enhance the level of the regime’s acceptability to the people.5 Walder highlights the continued strength of the core communist institutions – the basic structure of the party-­state is stable.6 Richard McGregor, Zheng Yongnian and many others see the CCP’s staying power through the elaborate personnel control exercised by the Party and its organizational ubiquity and prowess.7 Heilman and Perry argue that the CCP’s accomplishment so far is rooted in the creative adaptation of key elements of China’s revolutionary heritage.8 These scholars all agree that the CCP has to some extent successfully adapted itself to new challenges. This chapter zeroes in on the CCP’s control and management of human resources to evaluate its staying power. The underlying assumption is that the sustainability of the CCP’s one-­party rule depends to a large extent on how successfully it can control, tame and utilize vital human resources for the modernization project from which it derives its legitimacy. Here, human resources are more broadly defined as including a meritocratic political elite and skills in both

52   Lance L.P. Gore public and business administration. Monopoly over these resources also means depriving potential opposition of leadership talent. In the absence of effective challengers, internal cohesion would perpetuate one-­party rule. Both functions – monopoly of human resources and maintenance of internal cohesion, are performed by one vital but hitherto mysterious organ of the CCP – the Central Organization Department (COD) and its subsidiaries attached to the local party committees. Together they constitute what is called the “organization system” (zuzhi xitong) in the CCP’s intra-­party discourse. In this chapter the generic term “organization department” (OD) is used to denote this system but the COD will be the primary case.

The anatomy of a mysterious organ The COD has always been regarded as one of the most mysterious organs of the Party. Their staff seldom make public appearances. They maintain a poker face expression when interviewing cadres. They frequently engage in conversations with provincial-­ministerial-level cadres and sit in their meetings; however they never make any comments and leave as soon as the meeting is over. Their presence is everywhere but they act like “invisible men.” Inside the COD, discipline is strict. The notebooks used by staff come with serial numbers; they are centrally stored after every use and must be handed in when a staff member leaves the COD. No exchanges or contacts are allowed between the different bureaus and offices. Information about destinations of business trips and the people to be interviewed and so on are kept confidential even among colleagues. They must also always maintain a low profile.9 Together with the Propaganda Department, the COD is one of the original components of the CCP, having existed since its founding in July 1921. Figure 3.1 is the organization chart of the CCP’s Central Committee (CC); The COD is one of the eight departments under the Central Secretariat, which handles the day-­to-day affairs of the Party. The COD plays a central role in the careers of the cadres, who often deem the COD to be at the same level as the much higher-­ ranked Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC). The COD is reputed to be the one which dons the “hat” on cadres (making appointments) while the CDIC is the one which removes it. The COD’s role in the political system is summarized by cadres as “controlling organizations, cadres and talents” (guan zuzhi, guan ganbu, guan rencai). Table 3.1 lists the subdivisions of the COD that indicate its functions and jurisdictions. These functions can be classified into two parts: human resources management and party building (including recruitment of new members and organization building). Internal bureaus with zuzhi (organization) in their name work in the area of party building and those with ganbu (cadre) in their name work in human resources management. The COD compiles detailed, confidential reports on potential party leaders and manages, together with the organization departments of local party committees, the appointments and assignments of millions to various positions in the government, business firms, non-­profits and other types of organizations.

Politburo Standing Committee Politburo

People’s Daily Editorial Board

Rural Affairs Department

Central Military Affairs Committee

Central Policy Research Office

Organization Department

United Front Department

Publicity Department

Central Liaison Department

The CCP Central General Office

Secretariat

Central Commission for Discipline Inspection

The CCP Central Committee

The Chinese Communist Party National Congress

Figure 3.1  The party central organs. Source: compiled by the author. Note Dotted lines with arrow head indicate formal election while solid arrow lines indicate control.

Table 3.1  Internal organs of the COD General Office Party-Building Research Office Organization Bureau Cadre Supervision Bureau Cadre Education Bureau Cadre Allocation Bureau (First Bureau)/Civil Servant Management Office Bureau for Party-State and Foreign Affairs Cadres (Second Bureau) Bureau for Economic, Science and Technology and Education Cadres (Third Bureau) Bureau for Cadres in the Party Centre and Central Government Organs (Fourth Bureau) Enterprise Cadres Bureau (Fifth Bureau) Bureau of Retired Senior Cadres Bureau of Talent Work Personnel Bureau Bureau of Office Affairs Management Party Committee of Internal Organs Party-Building Reading Materials Press Guest House Source: adapted from People’s Daily website.

54   Lance L.P. Gore The director of the COD doubles as the deputy director of the CCP’s Central Party-­Building Leading Small Group and is a member of the Central Secretariat. Foreign observers such as McGregor regard it as the third pillar of CCP power, together with the military and the propaganda machine.10 The COD director, like the Central General Office director, is usually a member of the Politburo groomed for further promotion. Similarly, a local OD director is usually a junior member in the local party standing committee. By occupying such a key position he or she is considered to have a bright future because of having earned the trust of senior leaders and the consequent ability to access confidential background information on all important personnel and to know the intrigues of elite politics. Many of the most important leaders in CCP history, such as Chen Duxiu, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, Hu Yaobang, Peng Zhen and Chen Yun, once served as COD director in their earlier career. Table 3.2 lists COD directors in the reform era; of the 12 directors, nine were Politburo members, including six who later moved up to become Standing Committee members and one who became the general secretary of the Party. The CCP’s organization system (zuzhi xitong) is a sprawling establishment with the COD at the pinnacle. Party committees of the provinces, municipalities, counties, townships, urban districts, state-­owned enterprises (SOEs), institutions of higher education, military units, research institutes and others have their own organization departments which not only serve their party committees but also receive guidance and instructions from the COD. Together they constitute a giant organization system. At the end of 1985 it had a total workforce of 96,615, of which 509 worked for the COD, 2,741 for provincial-­level organization departments (94 per province on average), 17,087 at the prefecture-­municipal level, 37,928 at the county level and 38,350 at the township level.11 By now the total should be well over 100,000. The reach of the organization system extends to every corner of society where there are party members. Table 3.2  COD directors in the reform era (1978–now) Name

Serving period

Membership in the Politburo

Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦

Dec. 1977–Dec. 1978

Song Renqiong 宋任穷 Chen Yeping 陈野苹 Qiao Shi 乔石 Wei Jianxing 尉健行 Song Ping 宋平 Lu Feng 吕枫 Zhang Quanjing 张全景 Zeng Qinghong 曾庆红 He Guoqiang 贺国强 Li Yuanchao 李源潮 Zhao Leji 赵乐际 Chen Xi 陈希

Dec. 1978–Feb. 1983 Feb. 1983–Apr. 1984 Apr. 1984–Jul. 1985 Jul. 1985–May 1987 May 1987–Dec. 1989 Dec. 1989–Oct. 1994 Oct. 1994–Mar. 1999 Mar. 1999–Oct. 2002 Oct. 2002–Oct. 2007 Oct. 2007–Nov. 2012 Nov. 2012–Oct. 2017 Oct. 2017–Now

Yes; Standing Committee and General Secretary Yes No Yes; Standing Committee Yes; Standing Committee Yes; Standing Committee No No Yes; Standing Committee Yes; Standing Committee Yes Yes Yes

Managing human resources in one-party rule   55 The functions and internal structure of all organization departments are similar to that of the COD. There are local variations in the organizational setup in accordance with local conditions and the preference of local party chiefs but the general functions are the same. Table 3.3 describes the internal structure of the organization department of the CCP’s Jiangsu Provincial Committee, which Table 3.3 Organization chart of the organization department of Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee Bureau

Portfolio

General Office

Coordinating the activities of different bureaus, logistic support, information and data management, confidential communication Policy Research Office Policy research and recommendation, regulation drafting and coordination, reform planning, document drafting Cadre Bureau 1 Comprehensive cadre management Cadre Bureau 2 In charge of cadres in the provincial party and state organs Cadre Bureau 3 In charge of cadres in municipal party and state organs Cadre Bureau 4 In charge of state-owned enterprise cadres Cadre Bureau 5 In charge of cadres in high education and research institutions Bureau of Cadre Education In charge of training programs Bureau of Cadre Supervision Enforcing organization disciplines Human Resources Bureau Responsible for various human resource development programs Organization Bureau 1 Study and guide overall organization development of the party Organization Bureau 2 Study and guide grassroots organizational development Organization Bureau 3 Party member recruitment and management Propaganda and Information Internal communication with the COD and provincial Management Bureau party committee; mass media relations, run publications and websites Provincial Leadership Talent Assessment policy and planning, question bank, Assessment Centre organize tests and panel experts, establish qualification criteria, provide test services, etc. Provincial High-Level Run political and professional training programs for Management Talents Training organization/personnel cadres of government, Centre enterprises and higher education institutions; compile training texts. Bureau of Senior Cadres Take care of the needs of retired cadres in the organization system of the province Distant Education Centre Guide and coordinate distant education/training programs of party members in the province; produce content programs for online and TV classes; technical assistance. Departmental Party Committee Manage party members and conduct party building in the department Source: Jiangsu OD website at: www.jszzb.gov.cn/sm2111111158.asp.

56   Lance L.P. Gore shows a more elaborate structure at the operational level. By the end of 2017 the CCP had 89.56 million members and over 4.57 million party organizations at the grassroots level. The COD and with its local affiliates are together tasked with their deployment, management, training and indoctrination.

Controlling the nation’s human resources: the COD in action The Financial Times describes the COD as “the world’s largest human resources department”: To glean a sense of the dimensions of the organisation department’s job, conjure up a parallel body in Washington. The imaginary department would oversee the appointments of US state governors and their deputies; the mayors of big cities; heads of federal regulatory agencies; the chief executives of General Electric, ExxonMobil, Walmart and 50-odd of the remaining largest companies; justices on the Supreme Court; the editors of The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post, the bosses of the television networks and cable stations, the presidents of Yale and Harvard and other big universities and the heads of think-­tanks such as the Brookings Institution and the Heritage Foundation. All equivalent positions in China are filled by people appointed by the party through the organisation department. With a few largely symbolic exceptions, the people who fill these jobs are also party members.12 However, unlike a conventional human resources department, the COD not only matches talents with positions but also ensures the loyalty of these people and the integrity of the cadre corps. It runs extensive programs on cadre grooming and training, as well as the recruitment of talents. It dispenses positions as rewards for loyalty and service, with current political needs as well as technical necessity taken into consideration. It is first and foremost a political tool. Nomenklatura One of the fundamental and long-­enduring policies of the CCP is dangguangabu – the Party controls cadres. “Cadres” here refers to all important party and state officials regardless of whether they are CCP members. The COD plays this role by running what is known in the Soviet Union as the nomenklatura. It consists of two lists – a list of positions and list of candidates who formed the Communist ruling class through their eligibility to fill prized jobs in any sectors the state controls. The CCP has greatly broadened the Soviet system and enriched its content. It has expanded its personnel control way beyond the Party and the government and into the economy, society and various such unlikely places as religious organizations, NGOs and charities. In simple terms, the Party wants to control everything. Hence the list of positions controlled by the COD covers all

Managing human resources in one-party rule   57 important institutions in the government, economy and society from the provincial-­ministerial level up. Peking University and Sinopec, for example, are both ranked at the vice-­ministerial level and so their top administrators/executives fall under the jurisdiction of the COD. It is the duty of the COD to maintain a pool of candidates for each of the positions on the list, and whenever a vacancy arises it will have a list of potential candidates to recommend to the Politburo or relevant senior leaders of the Party. Promotions are tied to length of service, education level and mandatory classes at a party school every five years. The COD conducts background screening, guides the process of pre-­appointment evaluation and, upon the approval of the relevant party authorities, formally announces the appointments. The vetting process takes place behind closed doors and appointments are announced without any explanation about why they have been made. When the department suspends candidates from promotion, it does so in secret as well. In the Mao era the COD controlled cadres all the way to the prefecture level right below the province. In sync with the decentralization reforms in the 1980s promoted by Deng Xiaoping, the COD yielded the control of prefecture-­level cadres to the provinces. Altogether the COD currently manages 5,000 or so cadres at the provincial-­ministerial level and above, including the premier, vice premiers, state councillors, provincial governors, presidents of major universities, and the Chinese Academy of the Social Sciences, among others.13 They are called zhongguan ganbu (centrally managed cadres). In 1990 and 1998, the COD twice amended “The List of Positions under the Jurisdiction of the Party Centre.” These positions are classified into nine categories, namely, positions in the central bureaucracies of the Party, Central Commission on Disciplinary Inspection, central government bureaucracies, social organizations at the national level,14 national financial institutions, centrally administered institutions of higher learning, the national media, top-­tier party-­state positions in the provinces and provincial-­level municipalities, and executive positions in the central SOEs. Cadres in different categories are managed by different bureaus in the COD (Table 3.1); they are also trained and groomed differently. An equally important part of the COD’s work is building leadership teams (peibanzi). The COD must make sure that individuals in the leadership team of a local government, a ministry, an SOE or a university, and so on are compatible and can work together effectively. For example, it would avoid putting two persons with strong personality or the same seniority in the same team. It is the COD’s job to see that the cadre corps is always in good shape in terms of age structure, education level, right mix of expertise and work experiences, and so on. However, the COD, or the organization system at large, does not operate on a market basis as far as cadres are concerned. It does not conduct hiring and firing like an ordinary human resources department. There is a membership assumption in party human resources management as the COD envisions itself as the “home of cadres, party members, and intellectuals.”15 It is deeply rooted in the

58   Lance L.P. Gore CCP’s revolutionary history that joining the Party carries considerable risk to one’s life. In exchange for loyalty and sacrifice the Party is expected to take care of the cadres and their families for life. This assumption is built into the life tenure of the cadres of the revolutionary generation and underlies the institution of danwei (work unit). Well into the reform era the customary term for finding a regular job in the state sector is still “joining the revolution” (canjia geming). After joining the elite club as a party member, especially after rising to a certain level as a cadre, one would enjoy a certain degree of “indulgence” from the OD in negotiating the terms of appointment. Rectification campaigns are often used to shake up and purify the spirit of the cadre corps in the place of strict laws and discipline. For example, Xi Jinping urged cadres participating in his “massline education and practice” campaign to “look into the mirror, tidy up the wardrobe, take a bath and seek some remedy.” This membership assumption reduces the leverage of the organization department over cadres. Cadre grooming and training In this area the primary role of the OD is two-­fold: to ensure the continuity of the ruling Party across successive generations and to continuously build up the cadre corps of the CCP and the Chinese state so that it is appropriate for the current mission of the Party. This role is inherited from the revolutionary era when the Party was primarily a military organization. Both Stalin and Mao emphasized that (building up) the right cadre corps is the decisive factor in a revolution.16 In the Mao era a driving concern, for Mao, was to maintain the ideological purity of the Party for his “continuous revolution”; by the time Deng returned to power in the late 1970s, rejuvenation of the cadre corps had become an overwhelming concern because the revolutionary generation of cadres, who enjoyed de facto life tenure in office, were frail and well into the ageing process. Their training, experiences and background knowledge were ill fitted to the reform and modernization mission of the post-­Mao regime – in fact they had in many ways become the obstacle. Deng engineered a massive retirement program in the mid-­1980s. Between 1982 and 1988, 3.4 million old cadres were retired and 640,000 younger cadres were promoted to the county level or above.17 Deng subsequently introduced age and term limits, education and other pre-­requisites for cadres at the various levels and in various sectors and positions. The reform has created the basic institutional framework for cadre management, which is continuously refined and adapted by the COD today. The issue of grooming a new generation of “revolutionary successors” was first raised by Mao in 1964. What prompted him was the remark of US secretary of state John Foster Dulles in 1958 on the “peaceful evolution” of Red China into a bourgeois democracy. Mao proposed second- and third-­tier cadre reserves to groom young cadres and himself retreated to the second line to make room for younger leaders such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. The COD conducted a survey of the conditions of the cadre corps and made policy recommendations in 1965.18 Mao eventually resorted to the Cultural Revolution to rejuvenate the

Managing human resources in one-party rule   59 cadre corps by the violent overthrowing of the old guards and replacing them with the rebels. Coming back to power after Mao passed away, Deng proposed at a party work conference on 25 December 1980 new standards for building the cadre corps, namely, “revolutionary, young, educated and professional” (geminghua, nianqinghua, zhishihua, zhuangyehua).19 The COD established the Young Cadres Bureau in 1982 to select and groom the “third-­tier cadre corps” (disantidui). By 1985 there were over 100,000 nationwide on the list of reserve cadres, of whom 1,054 were directly selected by the COD, 18,000 or so by provincial-­ level organization departments and the rest by prefecture-­level organization departments.20 Unlike cadres already on the nomenclature list, reserve cadres are not aware that they are on the list. The CCP has paid special attention to selection of cadres for grooming from college graduates. The COD runs two programs in this area. One is the “selected and transferred students” (xuandiao sheng) program and the other the “college graduate village cadres” (daxuesheng cunguan) program. The first program picks the best and brightest college graduates to be assigned to work in the base-­level governments for a few years to gain work experience, understand society and acquire the basics of government operation; after successfully passing the test, they will be formally assigned to positions in the Party or the government as cadres. The second program is designed to remedy the massive exodus of young people from rural areas, which has deprived the countryside of human resources and left rural party organizations in ruins. College graduate village cadres will be granted extra points when they take the civil service exams and have the opportunity to be promoted to township and county-­level governments after serving a few years. The COD also has extensive on-­the-job training programs for existing cadres, which fall into two categories: job rotation (ganbu jiaoliu) and apprenticeship (guazhi). The COD systematically rotates cadres to take on different portfolios, between geographic locations, between central bureaucracies and local governments, and between SOEs and local governments or the ministries in Beijing.21 Between 1992 and 1998 approximately 218,000 leading cadres took part in job rotation nationwide.22 At the top level the COD stress-­ tests promising officials by rotating them through jobs in diverse parts of the country and in different administrative units, before hauling them back to Beijing into the big league if they pass. Hu Jintao’s resume started from a technician of a construction company and a bureau-­level cadre in Gansu province to the Central Committee of the Youth League in Beijing, and then to become the party secretary of Guizhou and Tibet before he was moved back to Beijing into the top echelon of political power. He spent ten years (1992–2002) in apprenticeship, being groomed for the top job as the CCP’s general secretary. Before Xi Jinping emerged as the top leader he had served in various positions in four provinces, from county level to provincial party secretary, for three decades before he secured the top job. Xi’s own cadre policy emphasizes both central and local experiences as well as trial at the grassroots level.

60   Lance L.P. Gore Apprenticeship takes various forms as well. It started as a way to allow young cadres of central bureaucracies in Beijing, especially those recruited directly from college as graduates, to gain hands-­on administrative experience in the local government and to understand society. Leading cadres from less developed provinces are often assigned as assistants to executive chiefs of cities and counties in the coastal regions to learn how to develop the economy. Experienced chief executives of the coastal provinces and municipalities are often reassigned by the COD to head the cities and provinces in the western interior. The COD is also responsible for cadre exchange programs between eastern provinces and Xinjiang, Tibet and other least developed provinces. Sometimes Chinese mayors are sent to cities in developed Western countries to serve as the mayors’ assistants for a period of time to learn the best practice in public administration and policymaking. Sometimes the COD engineers batch reassignments to facilitate certain policy programs of the Party, or in the case of an emergency. For example, in the early 2000s the COD twice dispatched a total of 433 cadres from central bureaucracies as part of Beijing’s drive to develop the western regions and to rejuvenate the northeast rust belt; it also assigned 79 young cadres to key national projects. In 2007 the COD dispatched 229 cadres from central bureaucracies, institutions of higher education and central SOEs to the western regions and the old revolutionary base areas.23 While gaining different skills and experiences from the apprentice assignments, the central cadres also bring their skills, resources and connections they have accumulated in Beijing to aid local development. However, recently some of these apprentice cadres have begun to settle locally and formally take up important local positions. These cadres are called “air-­lifted cadres” and are often resented by local cadres because they block the career advancement of the latter.24 The COD periodically arranges cadres at the county level or above to study at the Central Party School, at the three other cadres schools, or for other short courses. It is also in charge of dispatching thousands of cadres abroad each year to attend executive training programs at Harvard, Cambridge, Singapore and other places. To the COD, competent future leaders must have a global perspective, which can be gained by living abroad for a period of time. The COD plays a key role in modernizing the cadre corps and enhancing the governing capacity of the ruling party. The CCP has embarked on a simultaneous marketization, centralization and globalization drive that has integrated cadre training into the larger market for higher education and training.25 Human resources development and management Embracing the market since the late 1970s has brought about not only a long boom but also a socioeconomic transformation. This requires adjustments on the part of the Party to hold onto power. While easing control over aspects of the economy and society, it has worked toward expanding its control of the nation’s vital human resources. The objective is, in the CCP’s terminology, “to unite the best and the brightest around the Party.” The CCP classifies “talents” (rencai) into six categories: party-­state leadership, business management, professionals

Managing human resources in one-party rule   61 and technical experts, people with special skills, rural entrepreneurs (nongcun shiyong rencai) and social workers.26 At an organization conference in December 2002 the CCP formally expanded its “the Party controls cadres” principle by adding the “the Party controls talent” principle to extend control over these strategic resources. The COD is tasked with consolidating the Party’s rule by extending control over the most important human resources in the country, wherever they are.27 At the institution level the CCP created the Central Talent Work Coordination Small Group with its supporting office provided by the Talent Work Bureau of the COD; a deputy director of the COD serves as the minister of human resources and social security, and another as chief of the Bureau of Civil Service in the State Council. Local organization departments often double as the personnel or human resources departments of local governments or enterprises. To control the large and rapidly increasing number of non-­Party-member professionals and experts, the COD created the Bureau of Talent Work (rencai gongzuoju). The CCP Central Committee has established a Leading Small Group on Talent Work and on 27 September 2012 the Party issued a directive requiring all party committees at the county level and above to establish a leading small group on talent work to be headed by either the director of the local OD or the leading cadre of the local party committee or the government.28 A recent development in local cadre appointment is the OD director doubling as the director of the United Front Department.29 The CCP has always handled human resources strategically. In particular, party recruitment has always been politically driven to serve the current mission of the Party. The CCP was founded by a group of prominent intellectuals under the sponsorship of the Comintern. To justify its ideological proclamation as a proletarian party, its initial recruitment effort concentrated on urban industrial workers. When the Party was driven from cities by the Kuomintang (KMT) into remote rural areas and forced into armed struggle, the recruitment emphasis shifted to the peasantry and soldiers. In the Yanan era in the late 1930s and early 1940s, with the establishment of the second CCP–KMT collaboration in 1937, the CCP intentionally pitted itself against the KMT for intellectuals and educated youths, believing those who “grab the intellectuals also grab national power,” and made concerted efforts to woo “enlightened” gentry and individuals in the upper classes.30 At the end of the Long March, the CCP was reduced to around 30,000 members, of whom more than 20,000 were in the military and the Yanan base area. To overcome its plight the CCP launched what it called “the great project” (weida gongcheng) of party building by opening its door to all classes. Under the then director Chen Yun the COD made tremendous efforts in party recruiting, ushering in the most liberal and inclusive phase of the Party history. By the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945, membership had reached a new height of 1.21 million (Appendix I, Table 3.6).31 With the armistice of the Korean War, the CCP embarked on massive economic rebuilding and modernization. The urgent need for well-­educated people forced the CCP once again to shift its recruitment emphasis to the “intellectuals.” Table 3.4 shows the recruitment plans drawn by the longest-­serving COD

62   Lance L.P. Gore Table 3.4  COD’s recruitment plans for first, second and third five-year plan periods Party members

1957

1962

1967

Workers (%) Peasants (%) Military (%) Intellectuals (%) Total party members

12.6 59.2   7.4 20.7 13.5 million

18.4 52.6   5.3 23.7 19 million

21.1 46.1   3.5 29.3 26 million

Source: adapted from Han Jingcao (chief compiler), Selected Works of An Ziwen on Organization (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1988), pp. 110–111.

Director An Ziwen, with a clear intention to reduce the intake from the peasantry while increasing that of the intellectuals. The recruitment of intellectuals started with a higher proportion than that for urban industrial workers and ended with an even higher proportion. The COD plan was interrupted by Mao’s “continuous revolution” that also continued the class bias against intellectuals, who suffered massive persecution during the Anti-­rightist Movement in 1958 and again in the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) when recruitment reverted to the previous emphasis on the Party’s class base and young rebels. One of the first things Deng Xiaoping did upon his comeback in the late 1970s was to remove the Maoist straightjacket of branding intellectuals as “bourgeois.” He re-­affirmed Premier Zhou Enlai’s proclamation in 1956 that intellectuals were “part of the working class” working for socialism32 and subsequently effectively elevated them to “the most important part” when he declared that “science and technologies are the primary forces of production.” Figures cited in a COD report to the Central Committee in January 1985 indicated that only 4 per cent of the 40 million party members then were college educated; 12.8 per cent were high-­school educated; 42.2 per cent only had elementary education and 10.1 per cent of party members were illiterate.33 Since then the CCP has massively increased its recruitment among the highly educated populace, with a special emphasis on college students. By the end of 2014, 43 per cent of party members were college educated.34 College students have consistently emerged as the largest recruiting block among all social categories in the past decade, accounting for nearly 40 per cent of the annual intake of 2.75 million (Figure 3.2). The CCP has adopted an elitist approach to party recruitment that strategically targets vital human resources. By the time college students graduate, most of the best and brightest among them will have been herded into the Party through a long process which started from the elementary school – good students win prizes and these prizes in turn attract party recruiters. The organization cadres of the Party are constantly scouting for talented and accomplished individuals and trying to herd them into the Party. If these individuals are reluctant to join, the recruiters will lure them into one of the eight other parties in the CCP’s united front, or offer them positions in the people’s congresses and the people’s political consultative conferences. The CCP has paid special attention

Managing human resources in one-party rule   63 Workers, 13.6, 6.92% Peasants, fishermen and herdsmen, 34.8, 17.70%

Other, 22.7, 11.55% Students, 71.8, 36.52%

Professionals, 24.8, 12.61% Managers, 18.2, 9.26%

Cadres, 10.7, 5.44%

Figure 3.2  Occupational composition of 2015 new recruits (thousands and percentage). Source: “Intra-party Statistics Communique 2013,” Xinhua News Agency, 30 June 2014.

to spotting bright kids early on and grooming them to become reserve cadres of the Party in a process dubbed as “sponsored mobility.”35 As a result, party membership becomes a reliable indicator of quality – not necessarily ideological or political quality, but quality in terms of knowledge, skills and leadership capability. The 1999 move by then general secretary Jiang Zemin to open the Party to capitalists and his subsequent reconceptualization of the Party with his “three represents” have further consolidated the COD as the human resources department of the CCP. The result is that the best if not the bulk of the nation’s human resources are controlled by the CCP. The Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Party Congress formally established the policy of extending the Party’s human resources work to the entire world.36 “Talent work” was first incorporated into the Tenth Five-­Year Plan in 2001. In the “Outline Plan for Building Up the National Talent Corps, 2002–2005” the CCP proposed establishing a “strong nation by talents” (rencai qiangguo) strategy. On 6 June 2010 the “Outline Plan for Medium- to Long-­Term Talent Development, 2010–2020” was released, which included 12 major programs for human resources development, covering entrepreneurship, business management, teaching, culture, healthcare, engineering, human resources in assistance of interior and western development and to rural areas, and so on, and a program to attract talented and skilled people from abroad. It set the target to expand the national talent pool from 114 million to 180 million to account for 16 per cent of the total labour force (Table 3.5). In 2008 the COD’s Talent Work Bureau initiated the “1,000-Person Program” to attract top-­notch scientists, engineers and other professionals from abroad to

64   Lance L.P. Gore Table 3.5  Main index of the national talents development plan (2010–2020) Statistic

2008

2015

Total talent pool (1,000) 113,850 156,250 R&D persons/annum/10,000 workers 24.8 33 Hi-tech/high-skill workers in total skilled labour (%) 24.4 27 College educated in total working age population (%) 9.2 15 Human resources investment as share of GDP (%) 10.75 13 Talent contribution to GDP growth (%)* 18.9 32

2020 180,250 43 28 20 15 35

Source: http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2010/6/233034-1.shtm. Note * Annual average by time period. That is, the value for 2008 is the average between 1978 and 2008; that for 2015 is the annual average between 2008 and 2015; that 2020 is between 2008 and 2020.

key projects, national laboratories, central SOEs, financial institutions, technological development zones and institutions of higher education, among others. The central government promised to provide half a million yuan subsidy each to cover moving expenses and a one to three million yuan start-­up fund for research; the local governments and the hiring units were expected to match it. Within four years the program recruited 2,263 such talents.37 In September 2012 the COD launched the “10,000-Person Program,” targeted at domestic talents. In ten years it plans to select 10,000 talented people for special support. These people are divided into three tiers; the top tier consists of 100 or so “talents” whose work is worthy of a Nobel Prize; the second tier has an 8,000 quota for leading scientists, engineers and other urgently needed talents; and the third tier allocates 2,000 positions for younger (under the age of 35) and promising people. Approximately one million yuan financial support is provided for each selected person for his or her research and development.38 Both programs are coordinated by the Central Talent Work Coordination Small Group, with the COD as the lead agency and the participation of the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Sciences and Technology, Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department. Policies and programs are also introduced to attract high-­level professionals from foreign countries to work, teach and conduct research on a short-­term basis. State-­owned corporations, financial institutions and others have conducted competitive hiring which is open to the world for specialized positions. For example, in 2008, together with the State-­Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, the COD jointly advertised 16 top executive positions in central SOEs that drew 2,745 applicants from around the world.39 However, the OD is much more than a conventional personnel/human resources department. It is responsible for almost the entire set of positions needed for a functioning society; it is engaged in human capital development on the basis of the entire population and is systematically creating an “in-­group” of party loyalists as the cadre corps to staff the most important positions in the country. Unlike the conventional human resources department, the COD does

Managing human resources in one-party rule   65 not engage in routine hiring and firing; it cannot unload its “cargo” to the market and, instead, has to mould the cadres to the liking of the Party and regulate their behaviour. Its first duty is political. Policy tool and behavioural regulator Increasingly the organization system has moved to the centre of policy implementation by virtue of its role in cadre performance assessment, which has become a major chore in cadres’ lives. Current position holders such as governor or mayor are rated according to a lengthy list of numerical indicators that look as if they were drawn up by management consultants. Economic growth, investment, quality of air and water in the localities, and public order all theoretically count in the performance metric. Appendices II and III (Tables 3.7 and 3.8) give the COD’s master plans for the assessment of local leadership teams and leading cadres respectively. They provide the broad parameters for local party committees and their organization departments to come up with detailed assessment criteria as well as methods that are tuned to local conditions. For new top leaders, their personnel preferences and their policies can be implemented through this performance evaluation system that covers the entire party-­state establishment. Quantitative assignments of quotas and tasks are divided and allocated to be fulfilled by lower-­level cadres, governments and other units; the latter’s performance is evaluated in accordance with their task fulfilment. The lower-­level government in turn does the same to the still lower-­level cadres, governments and work units, all the way to the villages. For example, to implement the policies and preferences of the new top leader Xi Jinping, the COD revised “The Act on the Selection of Promotion of the Leading Cadres of the Party and the Government” soon after Xi took over. The new regulation downplays intra-­party democracy in cadre selections because, according to Xi, polling favours the mediocre and encourages vote buying, factionalism and other “corrupt” behaviours that block the way of bold, talented cadres.40 A year later the COD issued the “Circular on Improving the Performance Evaluation of Local Leadership Teams and Leading Cadres” to reiterate Xi’s idea that performance evaluations should focus away from economic growth figures to broader concerns such as environmental protection and local government debts. The COD also drew up the “Outline Plan for Building Up the Leadership Teams of the Party and the State of the Country, 2014–2018” to consolidate Xi’s power and implement his vision of state building. The bulk of the COD’s daily work is background checks, and cadre inspection and evaluation, especially before new appointments. The main method is old-­fashioned interviews with not only the candidates but also their colleagues, supervisors and subordinates. Both one-­on-one and group interviews are used. Interviews can be lengthy in time, extensive in topics and elaborate in methodology. For example, to select a leader for Beijing in 1985, a team from the COD interviewed a deputy director of the industrial department of Beijing Municipal Party Committee. The venue was a room in the hotel in which the COD team

66   Lance L.P. Gore stayed. It was a free-­wheeling monologue by the candidate, about his life, his thinking, his childhood, the influence of his father, and so on. No one asked questions but everything was kept on record.41 Every word and every facial expression was closely observed. Sometimes the candidates are asked to write something, such as a list of books they have read, a self-­evaluation, a short bio, and so forth. As part of the anti-­corruption campaign of the Xi regime, the COD finally began to conduct systematic verification of the self-­reporting by leading cadres of their family members and assets. All cadres undergoing promotion assessment are verified and others are by random sampling. In 2014 the COD randomly checked 1,550 cadres at the provincial-­ministerial level and above (including reserve cadres); local organization departments on their part verified the self-­reporting of 60,170 cadres, emphasizing those being considered for promotions, those on the reserve cadre list and those who were reported for corruption.42 All these put constraints on cadres to watch their behaviour. “A chat with the organization department” is an important event in any cadre’s life and the COD inspection teams are always received by the top leaders of the localities they are dispatched to.

Structural weaknesses Although the OD of the CCP can be appropriately considered the human resources department of the entire nation, as a party organ its first and foremost role is to sustain the one-­party rule. These two roles are often in conflict. As a result the OD suffers from two structural weaknesses – lack of autonomy within the Party and lack of accountability to the population. The former compromises its role as the vehicle of meritocracy and the latter undermines the legitimacy of the CCP. Autonomy The organization department has often been mistaken as the organ that makes personnel decisions. However, the real decision power is in the hands of the party committee that it serves and is part of. Institutionally, personnel control is exercised by the party standing committee or, in rare cases by the party committee as a whole. At the top level, the COD is a department under the Secretariat of the CC; it renders service to the CC’s decision-­making body – the Politburo and its standing committee. The COD is officially defined as “the assistant and adviser to the Central Committee” on personnel issues.43 The same goes for the organization departments of party committees at lower levels. The OD by virtue of its control of information, background screening and the right to make recommendations exerts considerable influence on personnel decisions; nevertheless, it is subservient to the standing committee. Real personnel power is in the hands of the party secretary who appoints the OD director. Personnel issues are at the heart of Chinese elite politics and the organization department is inevitably caught in the middle. The professionalization of personnel

Managing human resources in one-party rule   67 selection based on meritocratic criteria is constantly being undermined by the innate tendency of fixing appointments based on patronage or parochial relations among party chiefs at all levels. The patronage dispensed through the department, in the form of the most powerful party and government positions in the country, has turned the OD into a theatre for the system’s toughest internal political battles. Politburo members, factional groupings, the centre, the provinces and individuals aligned to different ministries and industries all struggle to place their people into positions of influence in state institutions. Top leaders usually ensure that trusted persons head the OD as a way to consolidate their support base. For example, Zeng Qinghong and Li Yuanchao, COD directors for Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao respectively, utilized the COD to build the Shanghai Gang (or Jiang faction) and the Youth League clique. Officials presiding over local fiefdoms have often swept aside the rules and ignored the recommendations of the OD; they often establish markets in which positions can be bought and sold for personal gain. Even COD recommendations have been overruled and its investigative reports ignored by more powerful figures. That is part of the reason corrupt officials can make their way up the party-­state hierarchy and the political system is infested with corruption despite the OD’s effort. For instance, Liu Tienan, former chief of the National Energy Bureau and deputy director of the NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission), who was sentenced to life in prison for serious corruption on 10 December 2014, was elevated to a vice-­ministerial position based on a glowing recommendation written by a senior leader in 2006. The recommendation letter described him as “young and capable, enthusiastic and creative.” Though a January 2008 report by the COD on Liu concluded that his lifestyle, character and professional background made him “unsuitable for a provincial-­ ministerial level position,” he was promoted nonetheless.44 The COD has found it increasingly difficult to do background checks on candidates. The sensitivity of personnel issues and the complex relations among local cadres have made it difficult for people to be truthful when interrogated. As a result, problems and wrongdoings remain unexposed and corrupt officials are promoted often. The organization departments can be swayed even before the inspection.45 It is reported that former Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Xu Caihou, the second highest ranking People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officer implicated for corruption so far, rigged the intra-­party democratic process to disqualify his opponent General Liu Yuan, son of former PRC president Liu Shaoqi, who received zero points in an internal “democratic assessment.”46 Since taking over the reins, Xi Jinping has indicated his inclination to allow some flexibility on the age rule, downplayed intra-­party democratic procedures and emphasized the “gate-­keeper” role of party chiefs in personnel decision making. This will increase the discretionary power and manoeuvre room for party bosses in personnel decision making; such recentralization of power may encourage corruption. Xi wants to deter corruption by instituting a system of retrospective accountability of personnel decisions which is unproven; one can easily envision ways in which such a system is rendered ineffective.47

68   Lance L.P. Gore Accountability As the CCP controls so many national resources and is responsible for so many areas of the people’s lives, the cadres it chooses to lead the state and manage public affairs are naturally held accountable by the people. The COD, responsible for staffing public offices, plays a key role in the legitimation of the ruling Party. However, it is beset with twin accountability problems, one for ideological reasons and one of organizational origin. As a self-­appointed vanguard party which is supposedly more “advanced” than the population and which knows better where history is heading than ordinary people,48 the CCP’s ruling position could not by definition be determined by popular election – the advanced cannot possibly be produced by the backward. Even if the CCP won a popular vote it would cease to be a vanguard party. Popular election would entail the Party being reconstituted on entirely different organizing principles. The CCP is an organization fundamentally dependent on ideological indoctrination and organizational discipline to retain cohesion and effectiveness. That is why the CCP agonizes over even the most rudimentary democracy such as the village elections; democracy is contradictory to the top-­down political and organizational logic of the vanguard party. Marketization has severely eroded the ideological faith of party members and turned the Party into many organized interests. As a good communist, Xi Jinping is by instinct suspicious of democracy. To salvage the Leninist party he has opted for the Maoist “ideological party building” of the Yanan era in the 1940s.49 He attempted to shore up both internal cohesion and popular support by regaining the Party’s ideological unity, by restoring its ethos of “serving the people whole heartedly,” and by resurrecting the Maoist massline. In a market-­based society this returning to Maoism is doomed from the beginning. Its failure means that the CCP will continue to be bedevilled by problems of popular accountability that undermine its legitimacy and that the masses continue to be at the mercy of a good emperor. Like all hierarchically organized authoritarian organizations, the CCP lacks the basic institutional mechanisms to ensure the internal accountability of its leading cadres to the party members. The institutional design of the OD is one of meritocracy as well as virtuocracy (i.e., the traditional Chinese ideal of “rule by virtue”), but the design is frequently neutralized by too much unsupervised power concentration in the hands of the party chiefs throughout the organizational hierarchy. As we have seen the OD is subservient to the corresponding party committees, which are in turn dominated by the party secretary. The Hu–Wen leadership flirted with “intra-­party democracy” by introducing a set of rules and procedures in cadre selection and promotion that allows broader party members to have a voice in personnel decisions. It began with a bang, hailed by many as “democratization with Chinese characteristics” (i.e., intra-­party democracy to lead the way for full democratization), but ended with a whimper. When Xi took over, he changed direction by revoking the ill-­defined and poorly institutionalized “massline” of Mao.

Managing human resources in one-party rule   69

Conclusion The organization department of the Chinese Communist Party is essential to its grip on power. With the dissolution of the ideological glue of a vanguard party, personnel control has become the primary mechanism of holding the Party together. The organization department also plays a critical role in sustaining the one-­party rule by supplying it with a steady stream of cadres. It helps to maintain the integrity of China’s governing system, upgrading the quality of the cadre corps and the ruling capability of the Party. It is, moreover, a policy tool that operates on a comprehensive and elaborate system of performance evaluation; it also helps to regulate cadre behaviour by controlling the information flow in personnel decision making and by its role in cadre inspection, talent scouting and the maintenance of a reserve cadre pool. By controlling the nation’s vital human resources the CCP effectively deprives potential oppositions of leadership talent; by planting party organizations deep in every corner of society, it helps to prevent organized opposition from emerging. It is versatile and innovative, and its activities are wide-­ranging. Personnel issues are at the heart of Chinese elite politics and the organization department is inevitably caught in the middle. It is a unified system by design but its various parts are subject to power centres at the local level. When the director is a junior member of the leadership team and his or her career prospects are shaped to a great extent by the party boss, the OD lacks autonomy. How to serve its principals while reserving its professional integrity has always been a challenge. When the OD is frequently pushed aside and its work ignored, the system lacks accountability – both internally and externally. The lack of autonomy undermines meritocracy and the lack of accountability undermines legitimacy. Given its centrality in the political system, the organization department is, unsurprisingly, a key node of the networks of corruption. Nevertheless it provides a key institutional mechanism for integration of such a vast and increasingly diverse party, and on balance undergirds more than undermines the resilience of the CCP.

70   Lance L.P. Gore

Appendices Appendix I Table 3.6  CCP membership growth (1921–2014) and associated major events50 Year

Members

Time of data collection and significant events of the year

2015

88,758,000

2014

87,793,000

2013

86,686,000

2012

85,127,000

2011

82,602,000

2010

80,269,000

2009

77,995,000

2008

75,931,000

2007

74,315,000

2006

72,391,000

2005

70,800,000

2004

69,603,000

Fifth Plenum focused on party building, passing regulations and intra-party supervision and norms of intra-party political life. Intentional slowdown of the growth rate of party membership; massive anti-corruption campaign; the National Security Committee established and headed by Xi Jinping; and Fourth Plenum passed resolution on establishing the rule of law. The year-long “massline education and practice campaign” launched in April; the Central Leading Small Group on Comprehensively Deepening Reforms established and headed by Xi Jinping; and Third Plenum passed a comprehensive package of reforms. Eighteenth Party Congress (PC), Xi Jinping ascending to power; Bo Xilai purged; and CCP General Office issued “Opinions on Further Strengthening Talent Work.” Politburo meeting and a workshop held at the Central Party School on the innovations in social management; and the CCP commemorated its ninetieth anniversary. Shanghai World Expo; and national Party conference to summarize the campaign to study the “scientific development outlook.” Fourth Plenum of Seventeenth PC decision to strengthen party building; and military parade commemorated the sixtieth anniversary of the PRC. The great earthquake of Sichuan and numerous new model Party members in the rescue and reconstruction process promoted. Seventeenth PC; Xi Jinping replaced Li Keqiang as the heir to Hu Jintao through an intra-party polling in the Central Committee. December: “Building a harmonious society” and “common wealth” became dominant policy themes. Massive change of guard at all four levels of the party-state; “open Party affairs” concept proposed and COD had its first public face – the spokesperson. December: Jiang Zemin relinquished his last position as chairman of the Central Military Committee to Hu Jintao; and the “advanced nature of the Party” campaign began. December: New Party initiative on building a “harmonious society” and “scientific view of development”; Fourth Plenum of the Sixteenth PC passed resolution on strengthening the CCP’s ability to rule; and of the total party membership, 11.5% were workers, 27.5% cadres, 32.1% peasants.

Managing human resources in one-party rule   71 Year

Members

Time of data collection and significant events of the year

2003

68,232,000

2002

66,941,000

2001

65,749,000

2000

64,517,000

1999

63,221,000

1998

61,877,000

1997

60,417,000

1996 1995

57,000,000 55,000,000

1994

55,407,000

1993

53,000,000

1992

52,793,000

1991

51,517,000

1990

50,321,000

1989

–

1988

47,755,000

198751

47,755,000

198552

44,258,000

December: Hu–Wen new leadership took over; and SARS crisis. Sixteenth PC, Hu–Wen team took over as the fourth generation CCP leadership. Jiang Zemin’s speech commemorating the CCP’s eightieth anniversary which officially opened the Party’s door to private entrepreneurs; the Sixth Plenum of Fifteenth PC passed “Resolution on Strengthening and Improving the Party’s Work Style.” December: Workers totalled 7,335,000 (11.36%); administrative and technical specialist staff in state-owned units 12, 291,000 (19.5%); peasants 20,936,000 (32.45%); 2.55% party members illiterate. February: Jiang proposed “three represents” on inspection tour of Guangdong. National conference on “building socialist spiritual civilization”; and Asian financial crisis. November: Fifteenth PC; and Deng Xiaoping passed away on 19 February. June: Major SOE reforms. June: CCP “Act on Protection of the Rights of Party Members”; and Chen Xitong, party secretary of Beijing and member of Politburo, purged. The Fourth Plenum resolution on “Several Major Issues of Party Building” and problems of rural party organizations dealt with. Zhu Rongji named economic tsar to deal with financial problems. October: Fourteenth PC; Deng’s southern tour speeches; and “socialist market economy” adopted as target model of reform. Deng’s inspection tour of Shanghai and Shanghai Liberation Daily published Huang Puping article on reform. Sixth Plenum passed “Resolution on Strengthening the Ties between the Party and the Masses” and Central Committee circular on strengthening the work on intellectuals. Tiananmen pro-democracy movement; and CCP issued a circular banning private business owners from joining the Party. July: State Council passed resolution on reforming science and technology system and COD introduced “democratic assessment of party members system.” October: Thirteenth PC; Hu Yaobang removed as general secretary in the wake of student protests; “Four cardinal priniciples” emphasized; anti-“bourgeois liberalization”; and Thirteenth PC proposed “primary stage of socialism.” September: COD “recruit in large-scale intellectuals”; and “third-tier cadre reserve” system instituted. continued

72   Lance L.P. Gore Table 3.6  Continued Year

Members

Time of data collection and significant events of the year

1983

40,000,000

1982

39,650,000

1981

39,657,000

1980

38,000,000

1978

36,981,000

1977

35,000,000

1976

35,078,000

1975

33,378,910

1973

28,000,000

1971

25,000,000

1969

22,000,000

196653 1965

21,500,000 18,710,000

196454 1962

18,011,000 17,500,000

1961

17,380,000

1960 1959

– 13,500,000

1958

12,450,000

October: “Document No. 1” endorsed rural contract responsibility system; and the Second Plenum of Twelfth PC passed a resolution on party rectification. September: Twelfth PC; intellectuals listed side by side with workers and peasants as the Party’s class base for the first time; and recruitment targeting intellectuals (COD, “Report on Strengthening Recruitment among Young and MiddleAged Intellectuals”). The Sixth Plenum of Eleventh PC passed “Resolution on Several Historical Key Issues since the Founding of the Republic.” Fifth Plenum of Eleventh PC rehabitated Liu Shaoqi and passed “Resolution on Several Standards on Intraparty Behaviour”; Central Secretariat restored; Deng’s landmark speech on reforming the political system; Hu Yaobang– Zhao Ziyang team formed; trial of the Gang of Four; and “eating in separate kitchens” fiscal reform introduced. Workers in party rose to 18.73%; peasants dropped to 46.9%; 11.9% illiterate; 46.96% elementary school level; white collar workers and professionals (cadres, students, technical specialists, sales and service) 25.8%. August: Eleventh PC. In May Deng proposed “to respect knowledge and talents.” 1966–1976 yearly net increase of party membership numbered at 1.6 million. Deng Xiaoping returned to Beijing as vice-chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC) and chief of staff of the PLA. August: Tenth PC; and the new Party Constitution endorsed formally Lin Biao as Mao’s heir. National work conference on education proposed “two basic judgements” re-iterating the bourgeois nature of intellectuals. April: Ninth PC; Lin Biao designated as the heir to Mao; and Liu Shaoqi expelled from the party. “Cultural Revolution” broke out. National party work conference held in September; decision to establish a party small group in each production team of the rural communes and resume recruitment from rural areas where the “four cleaning” campaign was carried out well. 1961–1964 only 60,000 new recruits. Guangzhou conference wooed intellectuals with “replacing hat with a crown” (脱帽加冕). December: COD began emphasizing quality of the recruited rather than quantity. “The party controls cadres” principle established. July: Peng Dehuai purged at the Lushan Conference and radical trend continued. December: COD proposed another massive expansion of recruitment in rural areas; quota targets were assigned to be achieved by the end of 1961; and 6.42 million recruited in three years (An Ziwen).

Managing human resources in one-party rule   73 Year

Members

Time of data collection and significant events of the year

1957

11,592,000

195655

10,734,384

1955

  9,393,000

1954

  6,500,000

1953

  6,369,000

1951

  5,800,000

1950 1949

  5,000,000   4,488,080

1947

  2,700,000

1945

  1,211,126

1940

800,000

Anti-rightist movement turned against intellectuals; Third Plenum of Eighth PC assertion that intellectuals were “basically bourgeois.” Workers constituted 1.1 million (8.8%), peasants 654,800 (52.37%), soldiers 134.1 million (10.72%) and clerks (职员) 313,100 (25.04%). September: Eighth PC. December: Second national organization conference decided to suspend recruitment in 1957; and the “March to conquer science” conference emphasizing the importance of intellectuals. Record year of recruits of nearly three million (mostly peasants); CC issued circular urging criticism of “bourgeois idealism” in cultural and academic spheres. Hu Feng criticized and was purged. December: COD’s first national conference on rural party organizations, which concluded that rural party members were not adequate for the then tasks of socialist restructuring and rural collectivization, which led to massive expansion of membership during the 1954–1956 period. CC passed “Resolution on Strengthening Cadre Management”; party committees from CC on controlling cadres two tiers down; economic management organs established inside the Party paralleling government bureaucracies, for example, department of industries and transportation, finance and trade, and so on. First national organization conference; and Liu Shaoqi spoke of slowing down recruitment and emphasizing class background of workers and peasants. Work style rectification to improve quality. December: Party membership consisted of 2.5% workers (112,000), 59% peasant stock (267,600), 24% soldiers (mostly peasants), 11.1% clerks (498,000) and 69% illiterate; and three million joined during the liberation war (1945–1949). December: CCP divided its leadership team into two, namely, the frontline committee (led by Mao) and the work committee (led by Liu Shaoqi). The latter approved a land reform program and decided to conduct general party rectification in conjunction with land reform. April: Seventh PC declared that “workers, labourers, farmhands, poor peasants, the urban poor, revolutionary soldiers, middle peasants and clerks, intellectuals, self-employed and other components of society could join the party.” Zhou Enlai visited Moscow; he caused an uproar when he told the people at the Comintern about Mao’s idea of building a proletarian party out of peasants by ideological education. continued

74   Lance L.P. Gore Table 3.6  Continued Year

Members

Time of data collection and significant events of the year

1939

–

1938

–

January: Mao drafted the Party document, “Admitting Intellectuals on a Large Scale,” criticizing the reluctance of some in admitting intellectuals. October: Mao proposed, in his preface to the journal, “The Communists,” what he dubbed as “the Great Project” of transforming the party into a “nationwide, broad-based mass party that is consolidated ideologically, politically and organizationally.” March: CC called a special meeting on party recruitment. It passed a resolution on recruiting new members and criticized the “close-doorism.” Organization departments were created across party organizations for that purpose. January: War against Japan broke out; second KMT–CCP cooperation formed following the peaceful resolution of the Xian Incident; the Red Army was incorporated into the Nationalist military as the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies; and the CCP became a legitimate party openly operating nationwide. The three main groups of the Red Army met in northern Shaanxi on 22 October. The Communist Youth League restructured and turned into a “mass organization.” Xian Incident took place. After the Long March, Mao returned to the power centre at the Zunyi Conference in January; the Wayaobao Conference in December marked a turning point in party recruiting; it also proposed to make the party a melting pot of not only workers and peasants but also the Chinese nation. Before the Long March figure. On 10 October, the Red Army broke through the encirclement of the Nationalist troupes and started the Long March. March: “Resolution on Developing Party Organizations” claimed 2,000 worker members and total membership “above 120,000.” Comintern and party leaders were afraid of the CCP becoming a “party of petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry.” September: Enlarged Third Plenum of Sixth PC. Only 5.5% of party members were workers; and Central Circular No. 73 issued quotas to recruit workers. June: Second Plenum of Sixth PC; only 7% party members were workers; peasant members included landlords and well-to-do peasants; and Mao drafted “On Rectification of the Incorrect Thoughts within the Party” (Gutian Conference Resolution) and began “building a proletarian party ideologically”, de-emphasizing class background in recruitment. Chen Duxiu, father of the CCP, was expelled from the party.

1937

40,000

1936

25,000

1935

40,000

1934

300,000

1931

–

1930

122,318

1929

  69,000

Managing human resources in one-party rule   75 Year

Members

Time of data collection and significant events of the year

1928

40,000

1927

10,000

1927

57,967

1926

11,000

1925

3,000

1925

994

June: Sixth PC (held in Moscow); of the party membership, 76% were peasant party members and 10% workers (mostly unemployed and from small factories). However, 21 of the 36 Central Committee members were workers, including General Secretary Xiang Zhongfa. November: After the massacre and persecution since 12 April when Chiang Kai-shek turned against it in Shanghai, the Special Bureau was established to protect the CC in Shanghai. April: Fifth PC; 50.8% of party members were workers, 18.7% peasants, 19.1% intellectuals, 3.1% from the military, 0.5% small and middle merchants, and 7.8% others. Women members totalled 6,000, or near 10%. The party congress’ “Resolution on Organization Charter” claimed a “true mass party.” KMT–CCP split from 12 April. Before the Northern Expedition that started in July, the January figure was 4,000 (over 70% workers); in May there were only 650 peasant members (5%); six months thereafter, peasant members rose to 2,180 (11.75%), mainly because at the third enlarged meeting of the Central Executive Committee it was decided to reduce barriers to peasants. General Secretary Chen also proposed an expansion of membership to more than 40,000 before the Fifth PC the following year and assigned quotas to the provinces. The CCP recruited from peasants so that “party becomes the core of all peasant movements,” which were surging at the time. There were 1,992 women members in November. October figure. 1,080 of the 3,000 were in Shanghai. In January, 50% Party members were workers. January: Fourth PC and second enlarged Central Executive meeting urged party expansion, especially among industrial workers. In May, the first enlarged Central Executive Committee decided on large-scale recruitment of workers who would enjoy a three-month candidacy period instead of six months for non-workers. June: Third PC decided to allow CCP members to join KMT as individuals. 164 out of the 427 party members were workers (38%). June: Second PC passed “Resolution on Party Organization Charter,” urging the building of a “mass party” (群众党) instead of an intellectuals’ club. Recruitment of workers emphasized. First PC took place on 23 July with the declaration of the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party; all 13 delegates were intellectuals representing 57 party members who were also intellectuals except for one. In November the Central Bureau instructed that the five regional party divisions (Shanghai, Beijing, Changsha, Guangzhou and Wuhan) must expand their members to at least 30 each before July 1922.

1924

–

1923

427

1922

195

1921

57

Level of economic development Comprehensive efficiency of development 经济发展综合效益 Urban and rural resident income 城乡居民收入 Regional development gaps 地区经济发展差异 Cost of development 发展代价

Basic education 基础教育 Urban employment 城镇就业 Medical care and public health 医疗卫生 Urban and rural cultural life quality 城乡文化生活 Public safety 社会安全

Energy conservation, emission reduction and environmental protection Ecology, farmland and other resources conservation Population and family planning 人口与计划生育 R&D and innovation 科技投入与创新

Rise in income level and housing improvement Increase in employment and social security 扩大就业最低生活保障 Convenience in medical service, schooling and commune Cultural facilities and cultural and sports activities

Public security and sense of physical security Mediation in social conflicts; letters and visits work Citizens’ moral education and civic virtue 公民道德教育，文明社会风尚 Safeguard of democratic rights and building grassroots democracy

Rule of the law and open party (government) affairs Quality of public service and work style Effective party grassroots organizations and role-model of party members Fighting corruption and clean, self-disciplined leaders 反腐倡廉，领导干部廉洁自律

Economic development

Social development

Sustainable development

People’s livelihood

Social harmony

Governance

Table 3.7  COD: key points of evaluation of local state leadership team (2009)

Appendix II

Integrity 廉

Achievements 绩

Diligence 勤

Ability 能

Party loyalty

Moral character 德

Clean and self-disciplined

Dealing with complicated issues Consolidating basic work

Duty fulfilment

Work style

Attitude

Law abiding

Organizing skill

Leadership approach

Moral quality

Being principled

Theoretic mastery

Content

Item

Following clean government regulations (fulfilling economic responsibilities); discipline spouse, children and staff; accept supervision; and adopt simple lifestyle 遵守廉政规定（履行经济责 任），对配偶、子女和身边工作人员的要求和约束，接受监督，生活作风

Duty fulfilment and team management or policy implementation 分管工作完成情况，抓班子带 队伍（抓落实促发展）情况 Resolving complex and hot-button issues that concern the masses 解决复杂矛盾和群众关心的热 点难点问题 Emphasis on long-term and base-level work (or department management), and on institution building 注重长远，重视基层工作（重视部门管理），加强制度建设情况

Devotion to the cause, sense of responsibility and conscientiousness 事业心、责任感，敬业精神 Down to earth; pragmatic; and maintains close relations with the masses 深入实际，讲求实效，联系群众

[correct] view on development and political achievement; and [good] at macro policymaking (e.g., innovativeness) 发展观、政绩观、宏观决策（创新意识） [good at] organization, mobilization, coordination of various parties (division of labour and cooperation); emergency response; and maintaining social stability 组织动员，协调各方（分工协作），处置突发事件，维护社会稳定 Rule of the law consciousness; and following the law (administration according to the law) 法治意识，依法办事（依法行政）水平

Ideological faith; carrying out the Party line and policy; implementing democratic centralism; and [abiding by the Party’s] political discipline 理想信念，贯彻党的路线方针政策，执行民主集中制，政治纪律 Adept in learning; thinking strategically; overall steering capability; and skillful at policymaking 善于学习，战略思维，把握大局，政策水平 Courageous to take charge and skillful at management; accept criticism and exercise self-criticism 敢抓善管，开展批评与自我批评 Good work ethics, public morality, family value and personal integrity 职业道德，社会公德，家庭美德，个人品德

Key points for assessment

Table 3.8  COD: key points for evaluation of local leading cadres

Appendix III

78   Lance L.P. Gore

Notes   1 Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001 and 2012).   2 David Shambaugh. “The Coming Chinese Crackup,” The Wall Street Journal, 6  March 2015, www.wsj.com/articles/the-­coming-chinese-­crack-up-­1425659198 (accessed 16 April 2015).   3 “Is Communist Party Rule Sustainable in China?,” a debate hosted at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on 26 March 2008, http://carnegieendowment. org/2006/10/05/is-­communist-party-­rule-sustainable-­in-china/1oi2 (accessed 6 August 2013); see also Susan Shirk. China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford University Press, 2007); Chang, Coming Collapse of China (2001); Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Harvard University Press, 2006).   4 David Shambaugh, The Chinese Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).   5 Andrew J. Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (2003): pp. 6–17.   6 Andrew G. Walder, “The Party Elite and China’s Trajectory of Change,” China: An International Journal 2, no. 2 (2004): 189–209.   7 Zheng Yongnian, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, Reproduction and Transformation (London: Routledge, 2010); Richard MacGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Ruler (New York: HarperCollins, 2010).   8 Heilmann and Perry, eds., Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011).   9 “Decode Cadre Selection by the Central Organization Department: Sometimes over 100 People Interviewed When Determining the Candidate for a Ministerial Level Position,” People’s Daily website, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0904/c100125606329.html (accessed 14 February 2015). 10 Richard McGregor, “The Party Organiser,” The Financial Times, 30 September 2009, www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ae18c830-adf8-11de-87e7-00144feabdc0. html#axzz3gftrCCXu (accessed 13 February 2014). 11 Cai Rupeng, “Decoding COD: How the Largest Human Resources Department of the World Operates,” China News Week, no. 675, 4 September 2014. 12 McGregor, “Party Organiser.” 13 Author’s interviews with COD officials in July 2011. 14 Namely, the All-­China Federation of Trade Unions, Chinese Communist Youth League and National Women’s Association. 15 For example, prior to the 2015 Lunar New Year, the COD allocated RMB59.1 million to subsidize poor party members. See Xinhuanet, 26 January 2015, http://news. xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-01/06/c_118852429.htm (accessed 14 February 2015). 16 Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 2 (Beijing: People’s Press, 1991), p. 526. 17 Gao Guangjing, “An Account of Building the ‘Third-­Tier Cadre Corps’ in the 1980s,” Dangdewenxian [Party literature], no. 6 (2014), http://znzg.xynu.edu.cn/Html/?23742. html. 18 The COD report is http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66676/4493766.html (accessed 23 July 2015). 19 The Research Office of the Central Organization Department, “Review and Reflection of the Building Up of the Cadre System of the Chinese Communist Party,” Qiushi 15 (2001): 25–28. 20 Yang Min, “Before and After the Establishment of the 3rd-Tier Cadre List,” China News Week, 15 September 2009, http://news.inewsweek.cn/detail-­861.html (accessed 9 February 2015).

Managing human resources in one-party rule   79 21 For a description of the basic program see COD (2006), “Stipulations of the Exchange of the Leading Cadres of the Party and the State,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/ politics/2006-08/06/content_4926453.htm (accessed 24 July 2015). 22 Sebastian Heilmann, “The Chinese Nomenclature in Transition,” China Analysis, no. 1 (June) (Trier University, Germany: Centre for East Asia and Pacific Studies, 2000). 23 Such COD dispatches are regularly reported in the Chinese media. 24 “A Follow Up on the First Batch of Exchange Central Cadres Posted to the Localities,” Zhongguo jingji shibao [China Economic Times], 28 July 2013. 25 Frank N. Pieke (2009), “Marketization, Centralization and Globalization of Cadre Training in Contemporary China,” The China Quarterly 200 (December 2009): 953–971. 26 www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-09/26/content_2233780.htm, accessed 12 July 2015. 27 See “The Party Controls Talents – the New Responsibility of the Organization System,” Zuzhirenshibao [Organization and personnel], no. 1184, 29 December 2003. 28 See note 26. 29 This department is responsible for shoring up support for the CCP among the non-­ communist-party social elite including the intellectuals, business entrepreneurs, overseas Chinese, religious organizations and others. See “OD Directors as also Directors of the United Front Department in Many Localities,” Southern Metropolis, 13 July 2015. 30 Li Ying, “The Historical Contribution of the COD During the Yan’an Era and the Implications for Today,” Heilongjiang shizhi [Heilongjiang history], no. 16 (2014). 31 Li, “The Historical Contribution of the COD.” The appendix provides a detailed account of CCP membership from its inception in 1921. 32 “Zhou’s Report on the National Conference on Intellectuals,” January 1956, http://news. xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-12/30/content_2397308.htm (accessed 12 May 2014). 33 The COD, “Report on Massively Recruit from among Outstanding Intellectuals,” 26 February 1985. Dangdewenxian [Party literature], no. 4 (2013). 34 Xinhua News Net, 29 June 2015. 35 Li Bobai and Andrew G. Walder, “Career Advancement as Party Patronage: Sponsored Mobility into the Chinese Administrative Elite, 1949–1996,” Amer­ican Journal of Sociology 106, no. 5 (2001): 1371–1408. 36 See “The CCP Central Committee’s Decision on Several Major Issues in the Comprehensively Deepening Reforms” passed by the Third Plenum on 12 November 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164235.htm, access 21 May 2014. 37 The official website of the program is at www.1000plan.org/qrjh/section/2?m=rcrd. 38 The website of the program is at http://rencai.people.com.cn/GB/362597/370672/. 39 “COD Director Li Yuanchao to 17 Top Executives of Central SOEs,” The People’s Daily, 27 February 2009. 40 Xi has reiterated this point in many occasions, including his speech at the National Conference on Organization Work held on 28 June 2013. Shu Yan, an official from the First Cadre Bureau of the COD wrote an article summarizing Xi’s views on cadre work: “COD Inspector Explains Comrade Xi Jinping’s Cadre Views for You,” http:// cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/0203/c64094-26497440.html (accessed 25 July 2015). 41 Cai Rupeng, “Decoding COD.” 42 Xihua News Agency, 5 December 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/201412/05/c_1113539842.htm (accessed 4 April 2015). 43 Cai Rupeng, “Decoding COD.” 44 “Liu Tienan in Possession of Large Collection of Porn DVD; COD Deemed Him Unsuitable for Ministerial Position,” China News Week, 7 June 2013, http://politics. inewsweek.cn/20130607/detail-­44699-all.html (accessed 14 February 2015). 45 Author’s China interviews in March 2013. 46 “Xu Caihou Manipulate Public Opinion to Hurt Opponent; Liu Yuan Got Zero Point in Democratic Assessment,” Duoweinews, 18 January 2015, http://china.dwnews. com/news/2015-01-18/59630463.html (accessed 14 February 2015).

80   Lance L.P. Gore 47 Lance L.P. Gore, “Revamping the CCP in 2014,” EAI Background Brief, no. 989, January 2015; see also “COD: No Diminishing Age Limits According to Rank,” Xinhuanet, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-12/25/c_1113780591.htm (accessed 14 February 2015). 48 This is called xianjingxing in the Party’s ideological jargon. During the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao administration, the Party conducted lengthy ideological education campaigns among party members “to maintain the advanced nature of the Party,” urging them to play an exemplary role for the population in resisting the corrupt and corrosive effects of the market economy. 49 In Marxism the class base of a revolutionary party is the industrial workers, whereas the CCP membership was made up overwhelmingly of poor peasants at the time. To paper over this discrepancy, Mao advanced the idea of “ideological party-­building,” claiming that the CCP was a proletarian vanguard party as long as its members were ideologically unified in Marxism–Leninism. This emphasis on ideological conformity was later carried to the extreme by Mao’s “Little Red Book” during the Cultural Revolution. 50 Sources: The annual intra-­party statistics communiques of the COD since 2000 released to Xinhua News Agency around the CCP’s anniversary on 1 July; “Statistics of Party Organizations, Party Membership and Cadre Corps,” Dangjian [Party building], July 2001; Li Lieman, “Retrospect and Reflections on the 80 Years of Party Membership Development,” Dangjian Yanjiu [Research on party building], no. 4 (2001): 27–29; Tang Zhengmang and Tang Jinpei, “Exploring the Causes of the Rapid Expansion of Party Membership between the 4th and 5th Party Congresses,” Shanghai dangshi yu dangjian [Shanghai party history and party building], no. 8 (2004):  37–39; Wu Zhenhua, “Making Sense of the Three Historical Expansions of the Composition of Party Membership,” Gazzet of Liaocheng University, Jinan, Shandong, no. 6 (2002): 12–15; Wei Zhiyang, “Analysis and Reflections on the Structure of the Party Membership,” Dangzheng ganbu xuekan, no. 6 (2001), pp.  22–22 and pp.  26–27; Stanley Rosen, “The Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Society: Popular Attitudes Toward Party Membership and the Party’s Image,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 24 (July 1990):  51–92; Research Team of Beijing Center for Studies of Deng Xiaoping Theory, “The Historical Record of the Social Composition of the CCP’s Membership,” Zhongguo teshe shehuizhuyi yanjiu [Studies of socialism with Chinese characteristics], no. 1 (2002): 46–50; Sun Yingshuai, “The Number, Structural Change and Developmental Trends of the Membership of the Chinese Communist Party,” Journal of Beijing College of Public Administration, no. 5 (2009); Lu Jianrong, “The Three Changes in the Membership Composition in the Party’s History,” Journal of Organization and Personnel, no. 2055, 24 June 2002. 51 The Stanley Rosen figure is 46,000,000. 52 Stanley Rosen figure is 42,000,000. 53 The figure cited by Stanley Rosen is 18,000,000. 54 Data from a report to Chairman Mao and the Central Committee by the Central Organization Department, 21 August 1965. 55 The Deng Center figure for 1956 is 12,504,000.

4 Party chiefs, formal and informal rules and institutions Wang Zhengxu and Dragan Pavlićević1

According to David Waldner,2 political regimes are constituted by “formal and informal rules and institutions that both reflect and shape the distribution and organization of political power and that constrain to various degrees the actions of power-­holders.” In this chapter, we aim to explain how power is exercised within the Party by identifying the formal and informal rules as well as institutions relating to a group of political actors that occupy the key positions within the party-­state: the party chiefs at sub-­national levels, often known as the “first hand” (yibashou). We first analyse the key responsibilities of the party chief. Sitting at the top of the local power pyramid, the party chief is charged with a range of responsibilities and assumes different roles in order to fulfil his mandate (we assume the majority of them are male). In the next parts of the chapter, we describe the institutional network within which the local party chief operates, particularly those institutional resources that serve as the main venues or platforms for a party chief to exercise his authority. A description of the overall leading party institutions at the local level in a geographical sense is followed by a description of other institutions/party groups and party committees that extend the outreach of the party into non-­party institutions such as governmental, state-­owned, corporate and public sector organizations. We subsequently turn our attention toward the formal and informal rules that structure the “playing field” available to a party chief for exercising his authority and executive power. We illustrate how these institutional and normative factors interplay as party chiefs work to fulfill the mandate of “first hand” (yibashou) with a case study focusing on the formal rules requiring scientific decision making. In the concluding section, we summarize our findings and discuss their implications for our understanding of the broader reform tendencies of the party-­state.

Setting the context: the party-­state in reform and party chiefs An understanding of several trends concerning the state of China’s party-­state today is essential for understanding the broader context within which party

82   Wang Zhengxu and Dragan Pavlićević chiefs act. First, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as China’s ruling party, is committed to strengthening the Party’s role and its leadership over the government. During the 1980s, separating the Party and government served to develop the state bureaucracy and facilitate rational and professional (zhuanyehua) rather than ideologically driven governance. Into the second decade of this century, however, the trend is toward unifying Party and government (yi dang tong zheng) and for stronger party leadership in governance.3 The case of party groups (dangzu) is illustrative. In 1992, the Fourteenth Party Congress restored the provisions from the Twelfth Congress’s Party Constitution (dangzhang) on the establishment of the party group in the central and local state organs, economic organizations and cultural organizations. It was clearly stipulated that the party group guides discussions and decisions on major issues “in central and local state organs, economic organizations and cultural organizations.”4 This turn was emblematic of the upcoming tide of measures concerned with strengthening the Party’s leadership and capacity that continued through subsequent administrations. In the Xi Jinping era since the Eighteenth Congress, party building and strengthening the Party’s leadership has become ever more prominent. Xi Jinping’s token slogan that summarizes the national project into “Four Comprehensives,” for example, gives clear emphasis to building the Party, and his various other governing initiatives have enhanced party institutions.5 Second, along with efforts to enhance the CCP’s dominant position within the system, institutionalization and professionalization of the party-­state corps have intensified as well. Over the recent years, a process of establishing and standardizing rules, both formal and informal, has settled in. New rules were formally introduced through numerous new laws and party guidelines; these and existing ones were adhered to more consistently than before – for example, leadership successions, collective leadership, performance target setting and review through the Cadre Responsibility System (CRS) are just a few areas where such change can be observed.6 According to an interview with an expert, the Party now has more than 500 internal regulations to govern party members’ and officials’ behavior in internal party affairs and in performing governance tasks.7 In mid-­2016, a new regulation on party officials’ duty of care was promulgated with a high profile8 and the Party had scheduled that year’s Central Plenum, due in autumn 2016, to produce a new version of the Party’s “Regulation on Internal Supervision.”9 Going hand in hand with such institutionalization, competency started to feature prominently as the Party’s key organizing principle. Although loyalty to the center’s policies is required, the ability of party-­state employees to perform in practical terms, now measured, at least in principle, systematically and objectively through CRS, has been gradually established as a key criterion of human resource management within the party-­state. Taken together, these changes mark an attempt to improve the governing capacity of the party-­state to address the challenges brought about by the on-­going reforms and development.10 Third, these prevalent trends develop against the rich diversity of governance practices across the party-­state apparatus. Horizontally, the variations in governance arrangements and mechanisms between different parts of China parallel the

Party chiefs, formal and informal rules   83 uneven economic development across the country. Vertically, there is also much variance between different administrative levels in governance arrangements and expectations. Work content and the daily routine of, for example, township-­level and province-­level party chiefs are quite different, as these depend on the institutional and normative context within which they operate.11 While party guidelines relating to the major points concerning intra-­party organization and affairs are usually designed to apply to all administrative levels between province and county, in practice the power-­sharing structure and way of exercising power might be substantially different at different administrative levels. These broad trends bear clear implications for our understanding of party chiefs and their role within the political system. First, the party chief is a key political figure within the local state, superior to leading figures in government and other non-­party organizations at the corresponding level, and responsible for what government and non-­party institutions within his jurisdiction do. Second, he must take note of, submit to and promote the center’s efforts toward institutionalization and professionalization of the party-­state corps and governing mechanisms. Third, in practice the space for divergence from the center’s agenda by devising non-­standard and non-­prescribed local solutions still exists and is significant. Within this structural context, we understand the party chief as a rational actor who seeks to fulfill his mandate within a complex institutional network, facilitated and constrained by a set of formal and informal rules.

Local party chiefs: political and managerial roles Given the centrality of party chiefs to decision making within party or government organizations at any administrative level, there is a surprising lack of studies focusing on the local yibashou in the party-­state. This chapter provides an initial and broad analytical framework for understanding the role of party chiefs within the governance system. We base our analysis on an inclusive approach – discussing party chiefs in all organizational contexts within the party­state. Such an approach might prevent us from producing more specific insights through focused research on one specific geographic location or administrative unit, but we wish to avoid generalizing from an analysis tied to one location or one administrative unit. In order to overcome the challenge, we support and cross-­check our analysis with data collected through interviews with insiders and practitioners in different roles and functions within the party-­state’s governing apparatus, as well as researchers with long-­standing interest in the issue. We also draw on existing scholarly literature and other sources of information to enrich our analysis. “Local state” in this chapter refers to not only the local state in the territorial sense, namely, the party-­state at a county, city or provincial level, but also a governmental agency, such as a state ministry or a bureau of a provincial government. It also refers to the organizations that “belong” to the broader party-­state, such as public institutions, state-­owned enterprises, governmental non-­governmental

84   Wang Zhengxu and Dragan Pavlićević organizations (GONGOs) and others. In other words, the term “local” here is not restricted to the territorial or geographical sense, but to the “localness” of the part or component of the political system in an organizational sense. Subsequently, party chiefs here refer to leading party cadres both within a certain geographical area and within, for example, a certain government unit or GONGO. For the rest of the chapter, when it is necessary, we will refer to the two types of local state as either a territorial local state or a systemic local state. This will allow us to discuss the party chiefs of a geographic unit and those of a party group of a non-­party organization (such as a ministry, a hospital, or an SOE) with a unified language. As the party committee stands at the center of the territorial local state’s political banzi12 and party group of a non-­party organization, the party chief is mostly responsible for the smooth running and effective functioning of the local party-­ state he oversees. Within that context, any party chief acquires a double institutional role. He is both the highest personified authority within the local party-­state and the chief agent of the Party one level above in the system. From an organizational behavior point of view, as the person with the highest power and the ultimate political responsibility, the party chief can play a range of roles such as: 1

2

3

4

5

Gate keeper: On a daily basis, a large number of issues will reach the party chief ’s desk, requiring an action by the local party-­state. The party chief will decide whether these issues get attention, at which level of the authority and within what time-­frame. Agenda-­setter: The party chief has the power to decide or significantly influence the working agenda and priorities of the various decision-­making bodies of the local state. For example, what issues will be discussed in the next party standing committee meeting or party group meeting, and in what order of importance, will be within the party chief ’s responsibilities and power scope. Manufacturer and enforcer of consensus: While the party chief is endowed with the highest power in the local state, he needs to ensure that the decisions he takes are acceptable to and supported by his colleagues. Formally, decision making should follow a certain prescribed process, often including structured deliberation of the issue at decision-­making venues, such as the party standing committee or a leadership small group meeting. The party chief ’s role is to build consensus at such meetings in order to pursue a certain course of action. Referee/arbitrator: The party chief must play the role of arbitrator when debates among his colleagues fail to achieve a clear consensus to provide solutions for issues he or his superiors deem necessary or mature enough to be addressed. Decision maker: When the collective leadership fails to arrive at a clear consensus and the party chief is disposed toward a certain position, or is facing a situation in which a decision must be taken, he may need to make the decision despite the lack of majority support or a collective preference. He may

Party chiefs, formal and informal rules   85 also elect to postpone a decision, or reframe the issue, or transfer the issue to another decision-­making venue. In this regard he is also exercising his agenda-­setting role. In playing these roles, the party chief mainly aims to achieve two objectives. The first is to ensure that the local state delivers the required governance results, which can include many separate objectives relating to economic development, social management and others. The all-­out effort of some local party chiefs to attract foreign capital or state funding, for example, reflects the key importance of local economic development pursued by the party chiefs, especially prior to the 2010s. More recently, the prevention of mass incidents and the need for a sound environmental government also feature among the key objectives and targets of local party chiefs. His second objective is to ensure a smooth functioning of the local party-­state, the unity and harmony of his banzi, namely, that of the party committee/party group and relevant non-­party bodies and organizations.13 This, at the very basic level, forms a prerequisite for the local party-­state to pursue its governance and development agenda. Meanwhile, any frictions or infighting among members in the banzi will also reflect badly on the party chief as they will cause him to lose credibility as a capable leader and prevent him from effectively steering the ship, damaging his career prospects in the process. Besides the harmonious and effective working relationships of his banzi, the professional ethics or integrity of banzi members also falls within the chief ’s responsibility. Grave incompetency or corruption on the part of his banzi members, for example, will implicate the party chief and cost him political capital. These two groups of objectives or responsibilities of the party chief parallel the two areas of duties against which local leaders are held accountable in the recently promulgated regulation on duties of care. In this new regulation, party officials with “leading supervisory roles” (i.e., holding leadership roles) are held responsible for their negligence or poor work performance in pursuing “party building” (dangde shiye) and “the Party’s enterprise” (dangde jianshe). Needless to say, to achieve these objectives requires a huge amount of political skill and very careful utilization of the resources at the party chief ’s disposal. It can involve a lot of negotiation, persuasion, manipulation and even coercion. To the higher-­level authority to which he is responsible, to the various teams working under him, and to colleagues he has to work together with, the party chief must be a faithful and competent implementer, an effective but flexible manager and coordinator, an astute decision maker and political leader, and a skillful politician, among others, all at the same time.

The institutional structure Performing his various roles entails maneuvering within a complex institutional structure formed by both formal and informal agencies or offices, platforms, rules and processes. Among many things, this structure enables the party chief to request and gather information, receive and provide consultations and advice,

86   Wang Zhengxu and Dragan Pavlićević adopt decisions, direct orders and disseminate information, examine outcomes, and constantly provide or adjust governance and political responses. The same structure, of course, also constrains his ability to act, necessitating his invocation of various skills and tactics in order to achieve his desired outcomes. Below we describe the main institutional structure for party chiefs in a territorial local state and a systemic local state. We envision the institutional structure as formed by a fixed or “material” and a normative, rule-­formed part. The fixed or material features comprise the formal or informal party and state bodies or processes, such as the various departments, offices, bureaus, other agencies and various meetings or congresses. The normative, rule-­formed features, on the other hand, comprise the formal and informal rules, guidelines, regulations and norms that political actors have to comply with or take into account when contemplating and taking their actions. We will first describe the fixed institutional features of a territorial local state, followed by those of a systemic local state, before we describe the normative, rule-­formed component of the institutional structure within which a party chief functions. The party committee-­centered local governance structure The formal structure of the territorial local state consists of four sets of institutions or bodies. These include the party system, the government, the local people’s congress (LPC) and the people’s political consultative conference (CPPCC). They are often called the four sets of banzi of the local state.14 Of the four, the local party’s banzi, most approximately represented by “The committee” (dangwei), as, for example, in shengwei (provincial party committee) or xianwei (county party committee), stands as the core part of the party’s institutional machinery that controls the political power of the geographical locality in question and provides leadership to the local state’s other banzis. On paper, the power structure of the party’s institutions at the local state level should proceed along the following lines and in decreasing order: party congress, party committee, party committee standing committee, party secretary. In reality, however, the power chain appears to proceed in exactly the opposite direction.15 The party chief, holding the post of the party secretary of the local party committee, sits on the pinnacle of this structure. Usually a party chief holds a number of other important positions within the local power structure: for example, head of the corresponding LPC’s standing committee or party group, head or a member of a number of working committees (danggongwei), head of various small leading groups (lingdao xiaozu), and head of semi-­formal or informal bodies such as the party secretary working meeting (shuji bangonghui) or party standing committee briefing meetings (changwei pengtouhui). The main institutional resources for a party chief to exercise the leading role within the local sub-­system are briefly introduced in the following paragraphs. The party committees at all levels, according to CCP’s local party committee regulations,16 represent the core leadership in the region. Being a top decision-­ making body locally, a party committee is tasked with implementing the Party’s

Party chiefs, formal and informal rules   87 line, principles and policies, and state laws and regulations, and with the implementing of overall leadership of the political, economic, cultural and social development of the region and other areas of work. A party committee is also in charge of setting up and supervising party groups (see below) for the same-­level local state organs, people’s organizations, economic organizations, cultural organizations and other non-­party organizations.17 The party secretary heads the party committee and takes the place of the head of the local party committee’s standing committee. The standing committee is an executive organ of the party committee, meeting one to two times a month to steer and supervise local governance. A local party secretary is usually also the head of the standing committee of the local people’s congress’s and/or the LPC’s party group. This in practice puts party secretaries in a position to lead and steer the legislative work at the corresponding level. According to recent media reports and our interviewees, however, at least at the provincial level, increasing numbers of province-­level units have moved away from this practice in an apparent attempt to reinstate and revitalize the legislative and supervisory function of the local people’s congress.18 A local party chief would also usually be a head or a member of several party working committees (PWC). Spanning several administrative sections horizontally and vertically, PWCs are established by the upper-­level party committee in order to strengthen the leadership of the party at the central and local levels and also strengthen the coordination between party and state organs at the same administrative level or system (xitong). The party chief may also head a number of local-­level leading small groups (LSGs). LSGs were established inside the CCP’s Central Committee (CC) in 1958 in order to institutionalize and coordinate decision making and implementation regarding important areas, policies and issues that involve various stakeholders and agents across the party-­ state apparatus. Playing a more prominent role at the national level over the last decade, LSGs can serve as an effective tool for a local party chief to exercise leadership over priority issues and areas, and are an increasingly commonly used mechanism at the local level. The party secretary working meeting (shuji bangonghui) and its “successor” party standing committee briefing meeting (changwei pengtouhui or pengtouhui) are consultative mechanisms originally meant to support policymaking in between party committee standing committee meetings. Although relevant guidelines stipulate that neither is a decision-­making body which can decide on major issues, in practice these mechanisms often serve as key venues for decision making. Our interviewees report the atmosphere to be less formal and more open than the party committee and party committee standing committee’s meetings and are therefore more conducive for thorough deliberation and informed decision making. However, these mechanisms are restricted to the party chief, a limited number of his closest colleagues, and other powerful local figures, such as second-­in-command and director of a party organization unit.

88   Wang Zhengxu and Dragan Pavlićević The party group structure in the local state When we examine a formal organization, instead of a territorial area, within the party-­state, party groups (dangzu) supplement the overall leadership of the Party in micro-­managing policy implementation, serving as the Party’s agent and enforcer of the “party line.” Situated within government organs and other important social and economic actors such as public service institutions, SOEs, GONGOs and others,19 party groups assert the Party’s presence in the very fabric of the broader political–administrative–public apparatus and advance the party agenda within the government and non-­party institutions. It is reported that there are currently more than 86,000 party groups nationwide, spanning four administrative levels from the central to the county.20 In large organizations, dangzus are essentially replicated through the organization by dangzu branches (zhibu) in the subordinate units. Therefore a university or a hospital system, for example, would have one dangzu, but many dangzu zhibu in subordinate schools and colleges. The chief of a party group hence becomes the person with the highest political authority and highest level of political responsibility in the local state where the party group is situated. While the party group functions as the highest political authority within the unit, its main roles concern the unit’s executive and professional functions. A unit often houses its own party affair system, normally called the agency or unit party committee (jiguan dangwei).21 Government and public service organizations and an increasing number of corporate and social enterprises, including GONGOs and non-­governmental organizations (NGOs), house such agency unit party committees. When the unit in question controls a number of affiliated organizations or lower-­level agencies, it will house a bumen dangwei or department party committee that will provide the leadership role in party affairs for the whole system controlled by the agency. For example, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) controls a number of lower-­level PBOC branches; therefore, a PBOC department party committee serves as the party organization that provides leadership for the whole PBOC establishment. For each individual body within that system, such as the PBOC headquarters (zonghang), or its Shanghai branch, it is still the party group that is the political center. While the party committee of an agency/unit can sometimes substitute as the dangzu,22 more often they supplement the former in a mold of “grassroots” organization, primarily engaging in recruitment, education and mobilization of party members, as well as in assisting and supporting the work of the dangzu at the corresponding level, as required. Simply put, the party group is tasked with providing leadership and control of the agency’s political authority, while the unit party committee, including any of the department party committees, is tasked with managing party building, membership work, recruitment and other party affairs within the unit. While in the 1980s the explicit effort to “separate the Party from the government” might have led to increased competence and professionalism in the state agencies, in recent years confusion has begun to set in as to how the Party should retain its leadership role as the state bureaucracy expands and develops.

Party chiefs, formal and informal rules   89 Within some government and public sector organizations, the dangzu party chief is the organization’s top executive; however, the most common situation appears to be one in which the dangzu party chief and the top executive of the same organization unit are two persons, with the latter wielding significantly more influence and decision-­making power.23 Furthermore, our interviews reveal that the status of the dangzu and dangwei, especially in non-­government units, is often very poor, with them playing second fiddle to the administrative leadership and occasionally even “stopping at a mere form.”24 The new party guideline, issued in May 2015, is to comprehensively regulate and standardize the work of party groups and is clearly aimed at clarifying the rules and enhancing the Party in these various bodies. The importance of the party groups in the current Party’s outlook is illustrated by the Central Party School’s Communist Party History Research Department director Xie Chuntao: Historical experience, both positive and negative, proves that when due attention is given to building of the party group and its role, the party’s affairs will advance smoothly; if party groups are ignored and the role of the party group weakened, the party’s undertakings will encounter difficulties and even setbacks.25 In accord with such a view, the recent “Regulations on Work of Party Groups” prescribe ways party groups could play such a substantial role. Article 7 envisions that the position of party secretary of a party group should be assumed by the head of the unit, be it a top official in government organs and agencies or the chairman of the board, where applicable, or the general manager in the state-­owned enterprises. In a case in which the head of the unit is not a party member or cannot serve due to “other circumstances,” the position should be assumed by another person. The document further puts forward a requirement that the positions of other members of the party group should be assumed by the members of the “core leadership” of the unit and the head of the discipline inspection group.26 Subsequently, a party group, to invoke a useful analogy, works like a standing party committee for a state organ or public unit of which it is a part, participating in and approving all major decisions of the organization in question and communicating and consulting with party organizations from above and below.27 Specifically, these regulations stipulate that the party group consults and decides on all important issues of the host organization, including: issues that need coordination with higher-­level party organizations and subordinate units of the party group, organs and units directly under the Party; matters relating to the internal structure, responsibilities, staffing, and so on; major decisions, staff appointments and removal, arrangements for major projects, and arrangements concerning large sums of money; ideological work, ideological and political work, and important issues of spiritual civilization building; clean government and anti-­corruption issues; and other important work. In all cases, it is to guide the work of the same-­level party committee (dangwei) and answer to the party committee one level up, to which group members owe their appointments.

90   Wang Zhengxu and Dragan Pavlićević These stipulations clearly prescribe a central place for the party chief in any party-­state organization in which the party group controls leadership power. By way of the requirement to establish a party group in each non-­party unit the new regulations aim to ensure party penetration, leadership and subsequently control of all segments not only of the state but also of society. By “recruiting” the top executive of the unit for the role of the dangzu party secretary and other leading staff of the unit into dangzu leadership banzi, the Party will also strengthen its political control of various types of elites (in governmental, non-­governmental, corporate and public service arenas). Formal and informal rules There are a number of relevant laws and party regulations pertaining to party chiefs and their role, most important of which are the “Regulations on Local Party Committees of Chinese Communist Party” (promulgated 1996) and the “Regulation on Work of Party Groups” (promulgated in 2015).28 In practice, the key leaders’ speeches are elevated to the level of guidelines as well and serve as an important source for understanding the Party’s overall direction, priorities, demands and expectations placed on cadres and party-­state employees. How relevant and effective are these rules for the operation and outcomes of the decision-­making process within the Party, and, by extension, the institutions in which the Party has a presence and exercises a leadership role, through party organs such as dangzu and dangwei? Our investigation suggests that the impact of such official rules is at best partial. In later sections we will introduce and address the often-­cited reasons why official rules may not gel well with the party chiefs, and, more generally, leading cadres, especially on an everyday basis and at the operational level.29 In response, a set of informal rules, ranging from the most general to the very elaborate, has been developed to supplement or overcome the formal rules, provide a work-­around, or, alternatively, aid the party chief in adhering to their spirit or letter. As such, the interplay of formal and informal rules provides a significantly different context within which party chiefs’ authority is executed.

Navigating the institutional structure in governance This section provides an initial assessment of how official and informal rules influence party chiefs’ work. Or, more precisely, we aim to show how a local party chief exercises agency within the context made up of material and normative institutions, the latter including both formal and informal rules. We focus on the “scientific decision making” (kexue juece), that is regarded as a cornerstone of the party-­state’s internal politics, particularly aspects concerning the “collective and democratic” style of leadership. The references to scientific decision making are scattered across many laws, regulations and leaders’ speeches. Although the term is most often associated with Hu Jintao who made the concept part of his legacy, the central tenets of

Party chiefs, formal and informal rules   91 scientific decision making, such as the rational, informed and collective approach to policymaking and implementation, have been part of the Party’s reformist discourse since the 1980s and well into Xi Jinping’s mandate as the top leader. Below we first describe the formal stipulations regarding scientific decision making before proceeding to show how local party chiefs navigate through these rules while aiming to achieve their governance objectives. According to relevant regulations, the work of local party committees is carried out mainly through the party committee meetings, generally held once a month (or any time in case of emergency), and presided over by the secretary of the party committee (i.e. the party chief ). The regulations on local party committees of the Chinese Communist Party require party standing committees to seek the opinion of lower party organizations, LPC, CPPCC and people’s organizations, and solicit the assistance of experts and scholars to conduct research and obtain analysis. Decision making on important issues within the party committees at local levels should be done through deliberation and discussion, followed by a vote. The minority of different opinions should be carefully considered. If there is a debate over a major issue, with opposing sides having almost the same vote count, then unless it is an urgent issue or case, the decision should be postponed. Such a situation requires “further research and exchange of opinions, followed by another vote; in special circumstances, the issue may also be reported to the superior organization for decision.” Members of local party committees at all levels are required to keep close links with the masses and engage in in-­depth grassroots-­level research, spending no less than two months (provincial-­level PSC members) or three months (county-­level PSC members) at the grassroots in a year.30 The relevant regulations pertaining to a party group require collective leadership and decision making based on “investigation and study, scientific and democratic decision-­making, listening to the opinions from all sides, risk assessment and legal compliance review.” These guidelines also require annual assessment (kaohe) of party group leaders and refer to other documents such as the “Regulations on Selection and Appointment of Leading Cadres”31 that provide further, detailed technical guidance on the appointment of the cadres.32 The relevant document for grassroots party committees fully reflects the above requirements about collective leadership and scientific decision making in both letter and style.33 Filling the gaps: supplementing the formal rules How do party chiefs respond to such formal rules when attempting to make decisions on local governance? As one of our interviewees put it, these guidelines are “too idealist and perfect” (tai lixianghua he wanmeihua) and too general, covering some aspects of decision making, delegation of responsibility, relations between different parts of party-­state apparatus, and other vital points in policymaking and implementation processes. Key leadership speeches are equally, if not more, lacking in aspects missed by the laws and regulations, and often

92   Wang Zhengxu and Dragan Pavlićević cannot effectively “plug holes” with regards to guidance of the everyday work of cadres. In order to fill the gap left by such unspecific official guidelines, the party chief and the whole leadership banzi rely on the division of responsibilities (fengong fuzezhi). Any issues that fall within the jurisdiction of a deputy party secretary, for example, might be signed off or decided by him directly, unless he judges that it warrants the attention of the party chief. The party chief will decide on things that fall within his jurisdiction, or those referred to him by his deputies. In general, the most important ones will be put on the agenda of the next Party Standing Committee (PSC) meeting. Such practice is referred to as “comment and instructions” (pishi) system where, first, an official will comment on the document that was submitted to him. He will give his instructions regarding what should be done for the case. Then the case is channeled to the relevant implementation department. A relevant office (bangongting) is in charge of collecting and registering all the cases, sorting them to different leaders for their comments, and forwarding them around as instructed to the relevant department for further fine-­tuning, decision making or implementation. Of course, some pishi entail a case being referred to another leader or (more powerful or more relevant) department official for consideration, while in other instances an issue will be put to the next PSC or party group meeting. As such, while they are norms that are informally developed and accepted,34 fengong fuzezhi and pishi support and facilitate formal requirements for a collective and systematic approach to governance. Adopting a formalist approach: same rules, different games Formal rules, however, can also be perceived by leaders as putting too much strain on the party chief, as they can “complicate” the decision-­making process and weaken the authority of the “yibashou.” Our interviews suggest that such perceptions are especially widely present in relation to the relevant guidelines and normative expectations set by the official discourse on scientific decision making. Party chiefs may perceive these requirements to be obstacles for many reasons. For example, a party chief may be concerned that following these guidelines would make him appear weak and unable to independently make decisions. Such perceptions would undermine a party chief ’s ability to lead and get things done. Another common perception is that collective and democratic decision making may hurt a party chief ’s performance appraisal results. Party chiefs are, like other cadres, subject to rigorous and detailed performance assessment through the Cadre Responsibility System that impacts their income, reputation and career prospects. Therefore, many party chiefs fear that an open decision-­making process may produce outcomes that could prevent them from achieving their performance targets when support for policies and measures that run counter to those preferred by them or agreed with their superiors is mobilized. In response, the party chief may opt for a formalist approach (xingshi zhuyi) and make decision making democratic in form, but authoritarian/dictatorial in

Party chiefs, formal and informal rules   93 nature. Within party committee standing committee meetings, this may take the form of the shuji using the introductory speech or “study sessions” in the run-­up to decision making to “tone” the discussion and provide hints to other members of the preferred outcome of deliberation and voting. Otherwise, a party chief may secure the majority through persuasion and negotiation in closed meetings, such as changwei pengtouhui, while leaving the decision to be formally made through collective deliberation during the meeting. Playing conflicting rules against each other Sometimes, there is an outright conflict between existing rules. To illustrate, while the Party insists on adherence to relevant rules and guidelines, the reform discourse stresses the need to improve the governing capacity and efficiency of the state, and to pursue reform or innovations whenever appropriate. In reality, the ability of the state to carry out policies is often understood to be the key and above everything else. For instance, the Cadre Responsibility System is a tool to prioritize implementation over other aspects of governance. Therefore, cadres are under pressure to show they can deliver in terms of implementation. As a consequence, the process is only of secondary importance to the outcome. Officials stress that they follow the requirements to ensure smooth implementation and desired outcomes, and play down the fact that a set of other rules, such as those requiring collective and more open decision-­making processes, have been neglected while pursuing the former objective. Establishing informal mechanisms to overcome the formal rules Informal rules can often directly counter formal ones. For example, shuji bangonghui (party secretary’s working meetings) had been essentially relegated to the dustbin in 2007, as consultation between a few leading officials had been perceived as an obstacle to scientific decision making.35 Such a move was meant to lessen the discretionary power of party chiefs by eliminating a platform where decisions were made outside of formal institutions and procedures, while revitalizing the function of formal decision-­making bodies, such as the LPC and party committees. To circumvent this move, party chiefs now rely on the changwei pengtouhui (party standing committee briefing meeting) to promote and discuss issues in a less formal setting with a limited number of key actors. Just like shuji bangonghui before, changwei pengtouhui consists mainly of the party secretary, two deputy party secretaries, general secretary (mishuzhang) and the leader of the corresponding level’s organization department or unit. Attempts to regulate pengtouhui have been reported, with requirements to keep minutes of meetings and to include more people to prevent concentration of power at the very top of the local party-­state and especially in the hands of the party chief.36 Nonetheless, this semi-­formal arrangement remains widespread and oft-­used, clearly in sharp opposition to the Party’s efforts to formalize, standardize and make more inclusive decision making at local level.

94   Wang Zhengxu and Dragan Pavlićević Changwei pengtouhui tends to meet more often than the party committee or its standing committee, and as such it is reported to be the real center of power within a local state. While party chiefs may still decide to place most, if not all, of the important issues on the agenda of the standing committee meeting, pengtouhui can be used to build the consensus, set the agenda, or decide on the most important issues in advance or within a small circle of people. To illustrate, party chiefs appear adamant in keeping personnel/political appointment outside of the formally stipulated procedures. Party chiefs always try to keep the cadre and personnel work within their discretion or a small decision-­making circle, seeing personnel/cadre management as the cornerstone of their authority and power. As such, the requirement to decide personnel issues through a formally stipulated procedure led to a “meeting-­phobia” (shanghui kongjuzheng),37 leading party chiefs to rely on the pengtouhui mechanism to decide on personnel issues instead. Prevalence of informal rules Additionally, written guidelines and leaders’ speeches often do not relate well to the particular circumstances and local characteristics (dangdi qingkuang). A lot of work on daily issues is therefore guided by informal and implicit perceptions and rules – as in some situations applying official documents, statute or leader speeches simply cannot be effective. In the words of an interviewee, the party chief must proceed from reality, creatively implement the party rules and national law, and in many cases, even break the existing rules to achieve the stated objectives; the policy measures can often only be adopted on the basis of partial compliance or non-­compliance with legislations or even entail use of illegal means.38 The selected examples mentioned earlier represent only a portion of various informal rules and resulting practices that were used to supplement, balance or provide a path around the formal requirements. Taken together, the informal rules provide a significantly different normative context within which party chiefs’ authority is executed. The variance in governance strategies, tactics and methods can differ so significantly that, as argued by Li Kejun, the most important feature of the party chiefs’ work is “execution without fixed rules” (xingwudingze).39 Within this context, though there is increased accent put on the formal rules and procedures as a part of a broader shift toward a collective, well-­informed, rational and, in sum, competent governance, the ability of the party chief to dominate the decision making remains strong. Institutional set-­ups, including features such as coordinative, cross-­sectoral bodies such as LSGs and PWCs, and informal institutional features such as changwei pengtouhui combine to enable party chiefs to navigate through the “scientific decision-­making” process. In essence, selectively adhering to formal institutions and rules and creatively

Party chiefs, formal and informal rules   95 mixing them with informal practices and solutions enables the party chiefs to protect and (re)produce their authority while aiming to deliver performance results. It is such a basket of skills that enables the party chief to play his daily role as a local agent of the higher authority, a political leader for the local state and a manager and executive for local governance.

Conclusion Our analysis points to the very special place the party chief occupies at the center of the local state’s institutional structure and the authority and power vested in him. To fulfill his role and ensure effective operation of the local state, the party chief must rely on various skills to perform his many and sometimes conflicting roles, toward accomplishing the objectives of guarding and reproducing his own authority and delivering governance results. The overall reform trend over the recent years since Xi Jinping came to power further strengthens the importance of party chiefs and, more broadly, the Party within the wider party-­state apparatus. The extension of party into governmental, non-­governmental, public sector and corporate units ensures that the Party has appropriate channels to micro-­ manage, that is, to conduct supervision and steer key non-­party sectors to implement party policies and lines. The efforts to further formalize and strengthen the party group system represent an attempt to exercise full control of the affairs of government, public service and other important socioeconomic actors, while streamlining the party-­government affairs (dangzheng guanxi) and therefore making the policy decision making and implementation more effective and efficient. By focusing on the requirement put forward by a set of relevant laws and guidelines to ensure “scientific” – rational, informed and collective – decision making, we find that the proverbial waters through which the party chief needs to navigate as he pursues his and the Party’s agenda are often only vaguely charted by formal rules. Relevant legislation and party documents and speeches are often unspecific, contradictory, or even perceived as obstructive to the party chief ’s performing of his work and achieving the desired results. Party chiefs not only seek to exploit gray areas but also actively create new mechanisms and procedures when necessary to protect their authority and space for action. Subsequently, informal rules and practices emerge to supplement, overcome, or provide a work-­around to the formal rules, and an ever-­evolving interplay of formal and informal rules provides the playing field for the party secretary, effectively shaping the political ecology and decision-­making practices of the local state in China. Our analysis suggests that the current momentum of organizational reforms carries a two-­pronged agenda: (i) further formalizing and standardizing rules, structures and processes within the party-­state in order to improve governance capacity, an aspect that corresponds to state-­building, institutionalization, bureaucratization and rationalization; and (ii) extending the Party’s reach, improving its capacity to steer, monitor and comprehensively dominate state and

96   Wang Zhengxu and Dragan Pavlićević societal governance, and exercising leadership over a vast public sector apparatus, including extra-­party and extra-­state forces and organizations. This aspect is consequential for the state–society relationship, and should be perceived and further examined within the premises of the theories of authoritarianism and the development of one-­party regimes. Whether pursuing such two-­pronged reform can lead to the fulfillment of both sets of objectives, especially when the formal requirements run into informal mechanisms employed to keep cadres ahead of the curve, remains to be seen. In the short to medium term, the aims, modalities and scope of the CCP’s reforms may prompt us to ask fundamental questions in political science.40 If it continues to reform and develop its governance, party building and political discourses, other theories within the political science, such as, for example, the theories of political parties, might need revisiting and updating.

Notes   1 We would like to thank the East Asian Institute of the National University of Singapore for organizing and inviting us to the conference “Chinese Communist Party in Action” from 13 to 14 August 2015 and providing the funding for traveling to present the paper in Singapore for one of the co-­authors. We would also like to thank Professor Zheng Yongnian and Dr. Lance Gore for offering their comments regarding the objectives and design of this research, and participants of the conference for their helpful comments on an early draft of this chapter. For expert interviews, we would like to thank Professors Chen Guoquan, Dr. Shi Chunyu, Dr. Zhang Changdong, Professor He Gaochao and Professor Yang Xuedong. We would also like to thank eight anonymous interviewees who are practitioners in China’s various state and party organizations.   2 David Waldner, “Policy History: Regimes,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Oxford: Elsevier, 2001).   3 Zhang Changdong, “Dangzheng guanxi xianzhuang fenxi” [The analysis of current state of party–state relations], Zhanlue yu guanli [Strategy and management] (March/ April 2013).   4 Zhang Changdong, “Dangzheng guanxi xianzhuang fenxi.”   5 For the Party in China’s governance since the 1990s, see, for example, Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Zheng Yongnian, eds., The Chinese Communist Party in Reform (New York: Routledge, 2006); Zheng Yongnian, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, Reproduction, and Transformation (London: Taylor & Francis, 2009); David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). For Xi Jinping’s governance approaches involving the enhanced role of party institutions, see Wang Zhengxu and Zeng Jinghan, “Xi Jinping: The Game Changer of Chinese Elite Politics?,” Contemporary Politics 22, no. 4 (2016): 469–486. Xi’s “Four Comprehensives” refer to comprehensively developing China into a moderately prosperous society, comprehensively deepening reform, comprehensively governing the nation with rule of law, and comprehensively governing the Party strictly.   6 Zheng, Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor; Brødsgaard and Zheng, Chinese Communist Party in Reform.   7 An interview published by Xinhua on 17 July 2016 on the promulgation of the Party’s new accountability regulation (wenze tiaoli).   8 Xinhua News Agency, 17 July 2016.   9 Xinhua, 26 July 2016.

Party chiefs, formal and informal rules   97 10 Wang Zhengxu and Dragan Pavlićević, “A Transitional Meritocracy? Institutions and Practices of Personnel Management in China’s State-­Building Efforts,” in Globalization and Public Sector Reforms in China, ed. Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard (London: Routledge, 2014). 11 Zhang Changdong, “Dangzheng guanxi xianzhuang fenxi.” 12 Here, banzi is defined as the leadership team at each local state unit – a province or a city. This normally refers to the party committee and its standing committee, which collectively oversees the local state. 13 In a territorial scenario, this would primarily refer to the four branches or the local state in the case of a regional party committee, while in an organizational scenario it would primarily refer to the administrative and management bodies and cadres of the institutions housing a party group (e.g., management board in SOE, director and leading staff in a hospital, or the dean and key academic staff of a university). 14 The “Local People’s Congress and Local Government Organic Law” provides the legal framework for such an arrangement. 15 Sun Wei, “Xianji dangwei juece jizhi fenxi yu gaijin celue yanjiu” [The analysis of county level party committee decision-­making mechanism and the strategy for improvement], Qiu Shi [Seeking Truth], no. 6 (2010): 19–24. 16 Regulations on Local Party Committees of Chinese Communist Party, 1996. 17 Regulations on Local Party Committees of Chinese Communist Party, 1996. 18 “ ‘Yibashou’ renda juese zhibian” [The changing role of first hand at People’s Congress], Wangyi xinwen [Wangyi News], date unknown, http://news.163.com/special/ yibashou/ (accessed 9 June 2015); interviews with leading cadres, August 2015. 19 In recent years, there has been a trend for setting up party groups and party committees within the organizations that do not belong to the broad party-­state system, such as NGOs and private enterprises. See Zhao Litao’s contribution to this volume (Chapter 10). 20 “Jiedu zhongguo gongchandang dangzu gongzuo tiaoli (shixing)” [Interpretation of regulations on work of party groups], Xinhua, 16 June 2015. 21 Regulations on Work of Chinese Communist Party and State Organs’ Grassroots Organizations. 22 Department party committees (bumen dangwei) are designed to be “core leadership” of the department in question, essentially playing the role otherwise played by dangzu. In units that do not have dangzu but do have dangwei, dangwei formally take on the role of the dangzu. In these cases terminology (dangzu versus dangwei) is inconsequential as in these contexts both play a leadership role as a party’s extension into an organization or unit. 23 An interview with a city-level leading cadre, August 2015. 24 An interview with a city-­level leading cadre, August 2015. 25 “Jiedu zhongguo gongchandang dangzu gongzuo tiali (shixing).” 26 Regulations on Work of Party Groups, 2015. 27 A party group should consist of between three and nine people, depending on the size of the host organization. 28 For a detailed overview of various types of laws and regulations, please see Wang Jiangyou’s chapter in this book (Chapter 9). 29 Interviews with leading cadres, August to September 2015. 30 Regulations on Local Party Committees of Chinese Communist Party, Article 33, 1996. 31 Regulations on Selection and Appointment of Leading Cadres, 2002. 32 Regulations on Work of Party Groups, 2015. 33 Regulations on Work of Chinese Communist Party and State Organs’ Grassroots Organizations, 1998. 34 Although present in some laws and regulations, the division of responsibility is required only as a principle, without guidance on how to operationalize it. See, for

98   Wang Zhengxu and Dragan Pavlićević example, Regulations on Local Party Committees of Chinese Communist Party, Article 2, 1996. 35 Sun Wei, “Xianji dangwei juece jizhi fenxi yu gaijin celue yanjiu.” 36 Interviews with leading cadres and experts, August to September 2015. 37 An interview with a county-­level leading cadre, August 2015. 38 An interview with a county-­level party chief, August 2015. 39 “Li Kejun: Xianshi gongzuo de zuidatedian shi xingwudingze” [Li Kejun: The main is execution without fixed rules], Gongshiwang (ConsensusNet), 1 July 2013. 40 An example can be seen in Bo Rothstein, “The Chinese Paradox of High Growth and Low Quality of Government: The Cadre Organization Meets Max Weber,” Governance 28, no. 4 (2015): 533–548.

5 Party spirit Producing communist belief in contemporary China1 Frank N. Pieke

The indoctrination in communist belief in China has staged a comeback. Research in the early 2000s on communist cadre training and party schools in China found that ideological indoctrination was a less important aspect of cadre training than the transfer of professional skills, knowledge and expertise. Ideological training was present, but mainly as “theory” (lilun 理论): studying recent policy developments and the canon of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from Marx to Mao to Hu.2 It has often been observed that the CCP is confronted with a growing gap that separates rhetoric about socialism and party rule on the one hand, and individualism and materialism caused by capitalism and opening up to the outside world on the other. As a consequence, Chinese citizens are increasingly drawn to religion (especially Buddhism and Christianity) to fill a spiritual hole left in their lives. In addition, both individual Chinese and the Chinese state turn to Confucianism as a traditionally Chinese source of rules, order and legitimacy.3 Many of these observations are correct, albeit too often in excessively negative terms, suggesting that the legitimacy of the party faces a full-­fledged moral crisis undermining the foundation of its rule.4 Among other things, such observations tend to focus too much on the CCP’s ideological innovations and pronouncements, which are often dismissed as convoluted and stretching the credulity of all but the staunchest believers. Although it seems unwise to belittle the political relevance of ideological innovation, particularly for the party’s own members and cadres, the legitimacy of the party is actually much more than just ideas and how these are instilled by techniques of more conventional propaganda and cadre training, such as study sessions, reading, lectures or research. This chapter will show that to fill the ideological vacuum, the party has developed strategies that draw on an understanding of dedication and belief that are both more specifically religious and market-­oriented at the same time. The party currently confronts problems similar to those faced by Mao Zedong in the 1960s when he concluded that the party had been taken over by people who “walked the capitalist road” (zouzi 走资). Mao complained that communist beliefs were being learned from books instead of from labor and revolutionary practice. Cadres abused their power and party discipline had to be enforced instead of being followed. Mao’s solution was to strengthen the personality cult

100   Frank N. Pieke around himself and to launch the Cultural Revolution that turned the country into chaos and took the party to the brink. Barring exceptional events such as the massive rescue operation after the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008, real struggle and violence are now no longer an option to strengthen the commitment of party members and cadres. Instead, synthetic revolutionary experiences have been created to take their place. Indoctrination and conformity are deployed to bring the party apparatus to heel as part of Xi Jinping’s political purge and anti-­corruption drive. The most visible aspect of this revolves around the stern Leninist concept of “party discipline” (dangji 党纪) that lays down the rules of what party members and party cadres should and should not do. However, indoctrination, commitment and conformity also have a less heavy-­handed side that is summarized by another Leninist concept, namely, “party spirit” (dangxing 党性), which encompasses unique and unconditional dedication to the party and its mission.5 More than under the previous leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the current leadership under Xi Jinping professes that the party possesses this special spirit. In a 2014 People’s Daily editorial that is widely referred to, Xi Jinping was quoted as saying: The problem of work style [i.e. corruption and power abuse] is fundamentally a problem of Party spirit. To grasp the building of work style we have to go back to basics. The main point is prominent and firm ideals and beliefs, dedication to fundamental purpose, and strengthening moral cultivation.6 The emphasis on party spirit is part of a more general and long-­term trend of selectively reinventing aspects of the party’s revolutionary heritage. The party seeks not just a popular mandate based on its governing performance, but also a retooling of old-­fashioned Leninist and Maoist ideas and practices to foster an unchallengeable dedication to the party, its mission and its rule. Under Stalin and Mao, the veneration for the party included not only submission and dedication, but also the worship of its leaders and words, deeds and objects (Mao’s Little Red Book, for instance) associated with them. In contemporary China, however, party spirit and party discipline are explicitly about the party as a whole and not about the individuals who currently lead it. Despite the increasing concentration of power in his hands and the fawning in the official press over his leadership, Xi Jinping is certainly no Mao Zedong. The special sacred quality of the party is, as mentioned earlier, sometimes referred to as the concept of party spirit (dangxing), but is more commonly associated with the concept of jingshen (精神), which I translate here as party “essence” or “efficacy.” Dangxing is largely passive, sacred and almost transcendental. It should be studied, emulated, cultivated or restored. Jingshen, however, is presented as an active force that affects people, institutions, words and deeds. In doing so, jingshen straddles the line dividing the sacred and the profane. As we shall see in this chapter, jingshen can even be turned into a

Party spirit: producing communist belief   101 c­ ommodity that can be produced, supplied and consumed. The new emphasis on party spirit is thus anything but a return to a dark totalitarian past. It is yet another aspect of a neo-­socialist fusion of Leninist politics and capitalist business practices that has become the bedrock of CCP rule.7 In the sections that follow, I will discuss the neo-­socialist paradox of fostering belief through commodification of party essence in the context of party cadre education and so-­called “red tourism.” As sociologist Erik Cohen has demonstrated, religion, civil religion, tourism and education are often intertwined. In our post-­modern world, pilgrimage, religious education, religious tourism and educational tourism increasingly come together to not only entertain and teach, but also construct and instill common values and beliefs, and shape identities and emotional connections to larger communities.8 Although the word “heritage” (yichan 遗产) itself does not occur in this context, in contemporary China the party has enlisted commercial strategies of the tourism and cultural heritage industry to market party spirit, serving the reproduction of the commitment to the party not only by the general population but also among its own cadre corps. Heritage, including revolutionary heritage, is a selection from what remains of the past to create meaningful tokens of belonging in the present. Producing heritage is an act that simultaneously involves remembering, forgetting, preserving and fabricating. Heritage production turns history and culture into commodities that can be consumed as part of tourism, education, training or leisure and the authenticity of which is validated by a certain authority.9 Parallels between red tourism and religious pilgrimage are not difficult to find either. The words and material remains that serve as tokens of the party’s revolutionary deeds are much like the objects, remains and miracles associated with, for instance, Catholic saints in the context of pilgrimage.10 Moreover, these objects are more than mere tokens. They are thought to possess a spiritual magical power that mediates between the sacred religious and the profane worldly domains. In Mercia Eliade’s evocative interpretation, pilgrimage centers constitute sacred places set off from the profane space around them because of the permanent nature of the manifestation of the sacred that first occurred there. This power has an efficacy that pilgrims and tourists hope will heal, enlighten, destroy, or have any other magical impact on the ordinary world.11 Like pilgrimage centers, red tourism sites serve as nodes where the sacred power of the party becomes accessible. More generally, pilgrimage and tourism (red or others) are similar in that they entail specific events that, through the act of traveling, the absence of work and the distance from ordinary life, create a special period of time and experience set off from the normal and mundane. Like rites of passage that facilitate a temporary leave from the ordinary in order to achieve a change in social status of the participants, so do pilgrimage and tourism create a non-­ordinary state of being where special things can happen, a sacred period of time set apart from profane ordinary life. Pilgrimage and tourism alter their participants, reinvigorating their belief, recharging their energies, renewing their sense of purpose, or even enabling a change to another kind of life. Most importantly, a rite, pilgrimage, or tourist trip matters most

102   Frank N. Pieke a­ fterwards upon return from a temporary sacred state back to ordinary life and the people in it. It matters less what has actually happened while away (which might actually have been quite mundane, contrived or disappointing). What is important is the fact that one has been away, returning with tokens of exposure to something special: a bodily alteration (a tattoo, hairdo, or even just a suntan), an item of clothing, a souvenir or other object, a photograph or video, a social media posting or just stories to tell.12 Drawing on the anthropology and sociology of religion, pilgrimage and tourism as outlined earlier, this chapter traces the CCP’s use of the productive tension between the sacred and the profane in engineering a belief in the party to shore up its rule, starting with the development of red tourism from 2005. It will then move on to the more recent emphasis on party spirit education to foster belief among party members and party cadres. The chapter will also show that red tourism and party spirit education are not simply rolled out across China by central diktat, but are deeply political and connected with competition and conflict within the apparatus of the party-­state.

Party spirit and red tourism Sites and objects associated with the history of the CCP’s revolutionary struggle and especially with the words and actions of major leaders of the party have been preserved for a long time, in some cases as far back as in the 1950s. Tourism at these sites has been encouraged for almost as long. From the early 1990s, as part of the patriotic education campaign that followed the suppression of the 1989 protests in Tian’anmen and elsewhere, selected CCP history sites were included among the “patriotic education model bases” (aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu mofan jidi 爱国主义教育模范基地) designated to strengthen loyalty and respect for the nation and the communist revolution.13 However, the systematic and centrally coordinated effort to list, restore and build sites of CCP revolutionary history as “red tourism” (hongse lüyou 红色旅游) bases started only in 2004. In that year, a national meeting on red tourism development planning was held with a keynote speech by then CCP Propaganda Chief Li Changchun. Subsequently, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council jointly issued a red tourism development planning document for 2004 to 2010.14 Red tourism deploys significant places and objects associated with events during the revolution as bearers of revolutionary history, revolutionary events and revolutionary spirit for tourists to recall, study and observe. Since his accession to power in 2012, Xi Jinping too has fully committed himself to the idea of red tourism. According to an article in the authoritative Guangming Daily (Guangming Ribao 光明日报) on the general secretary’s expositions on the topic, Xi had said that “as far as we Communists are concerned, China’s revolutionary history is the best nutrient.” The article explicitly connects the exposure to revolutionary spirit at red tourism sites to “socialist core values” and the “dream of the great rejuvenation of China,” key indices of the Xi Jinping era for the party’s refurbished ideology, mission and right to rule.

Party spirit: producing communist belief   103 In a further discussion of the effects and functions of red tourism, the Guang­ ming Daily article goes on to quote Xi that developing the study and teaching function of red tourism will solve the problem of patriotism and belief … In the course of the touristic process, guests will come to understand the history of the glorious struggle of the Chinese revolution, strengthening patriotic sentiments and confirming ideological belief.15 Red tourism exposes the tourist to the revolutionary spirit of the deeds of legendary leaders embodied in sacred sites and objects. Such exposure is intended to bring forth not reasoned conviction, but feelings and beliefs. Commitment to the party has become an engineered leap of faith that speaks directly to the soul; red tourism has become a form of pilgrimage in all but name. According to the planning document for 2004 to 2010 that was mentioned earlier,16 red tourism has become a policy priority area for the central party and government. Further five-­year development plans have been issued for the periods 2011–15 and 2016–20. At the central level, red tourism has its own “coordinating small group” (xietiao xiaozu 协调小组) that currently meets annually. The group is chaired by the deputy head of the powerful National Development and Reform Commission with representatives from another 15 or so central ministries, bureaus, offices and companies in attendance as well.17 A book of poems at red tourism sites published in 2013 lists no fewer than 123 such sites. Together, these sites present a narrative of the revolution consisting of 12 phases from “the birth of the party” to “the final victory.”18 It is quite easy to dismiss the ideas, language and techniques of red tourism as mere propaganda, or even to ridicule the artificiality and contrived nature of many red tourism sites as was done by Chinese netizens with the opening of a brand new Communist Party theme park in Wuhan in October 2015.19 Yet like other forms of heritage tourism, red tourism and patriotic education have become an industry. According to official figures, in 2007 red tourism sites drew a total of 230 million visitors, who mainly travel in groups organized by work units or schools. By 2008 an estimated RMB1.86 billion had been allocated to 181 red tourism related projects; in addition, RMB59.8 million private funding had been invested. These investments are clearly paying off. In 2013, the number of visitors to red tourism sites had gone up to 786 million. Red tourism in that year generated an income of almost RMB2 billion, directly employing 1.22 million people and indirectly employing another 460,000.20 Moreover, because many of the events of the revolution took place in remote areas, red tourism is often developed in conjunction with ecological tourism and presented as a way to reduce poverty and enable ecologically friendly development in marginal regions.21 In official documents, red tourism is presented as firmly rooted in the present and confidently looking forward to a bright and enduring future for China and the party. It showcases the party’s commitment to the market economy, economic growth, revolutionary mission, innovation and a fair and

104   Frank N. Pieke sustainable development all at once; a perfect example of how the party would like to be seen.

Party spirit and cadre education Cadre education and training serve two quite different objectives: ideological conformity and professional competence. Cadre education and training take place both in dedicated institutions, such as party schools, that exist at all levels and in all major organizations of the administration, and through collaborations, exchanges or commercial contracts with a range of local, national or international providers. Education and training include management and leadership skills, in addition to more general or vocational subjects, such as economics, international relations, military affairs, law, accounting, history, philosophy, world religions or English. Considerable time has also been devoted to the analysis and discussion of case studies, current events, assignments and research. However, many cadres continue to find policy and to a lesser extent ideology still relevant. Their jobs and promotions continue to depend at least in part on their ability to suss out “correct” from “incorrect” ideas and approaches. Although formal qualifications, performance and competence are increasingly prominent, the Chinese bureaucracy continues to be politicized along ultimately Leninist principles of centralism, discipline and orthodoxy.22 Although reading and study of communist theory in the early 2000s were a part of the curriculum, the party and its leaders were not presented as objects of reverence, devotion or faith. This, however, has changed. The current 2013–17 plan for cadre education and training emphasizes much more than previous plans the importance of cultivating party spirit and the vital role that studying the revolutionary history of the CCP and its leaders should play in forging the dedication of cadres to the party: The party’s spirit, direction and discipline and party national history education must vigorously be strengthened. Party members and cadres must take the party constitution as a fundamental standard for strengthening party spirit. Party discipline, especially political discipline, and cadres’ adherence to the Party’s basic theory, line, programme and experience have always been vital for the party centre under Xi Jinping in order to resolutely safeguard its authority and to ensure that the central government decrees remain unimpeded … Party and national history should become a mandatory part of cadre education. This will help cadres to understand the development of the party and the country and will give them a profound understanding of the experiential lessons the party has drawn.23 Emphasizing party discipline and fighting corruption are part of Xi Jinping’s efforts to gain control of the party apparatus, and as such are relatively straightforward. However, cadres are also told that in order to learn how to be a good cadre and a good communist they should not simply follow orders. They are not

Party spirit: producing communist belief   105 the ordinary masses or soldiers after all, but leaders, the embodiment of the party suffused with the party’s special nature or spirit. This “party-­mindedness” is a fundamental principle formulated by Lenin more than a century ago that guards against divisions within the party and ensures that all work together for the common goal. Party spirit makes cadres into autonomous and disciplined agents to be trusted as “comrades” rather than personal friends, clients or lackeys. In part, party spirit can be learned from the study of the written work of communist leaders. Mostly, however, it must be gained from the study of and exposure to what the party and its leaders have done in the course of the CCP’s long and tortuous history, a method that could be called second-­hand revolutionary practice. An important pedagogy to achieve this is what the CCP calls on-­site learning (xianchang jiaoyu 现场教育) that under the current cadre education plan features increasingly prominently in cadre training and education. Places for such on-­site learning are specifically designated locations developed to accommodate visits by groups of cadre-­trainees.24 In the development of “bases for cadre education about the party’s spirit” (ganbu dangxing jiaoyu jidi 干部党性教育基地), the central authorities took the lead in 2003 when they decided to establish and fully fund three completely new, high-­profile cadre academies (ganbu xueyuan 干部学院, officially translated as “executive leadership academies”) that opened in 2005. They are located in Shanghai, the place where the party was founded. More importantly, it is the pinnacle of China’s modernity and international opening up and the location of the sacrosanct revolutionary sites of Jinggangshan (井冈山), the first base area and the “cradle” of the party, and Yan’an, the base area from where Mao launched the party’s conquest of China. Together, these three sites offer a carefully constructed, material representation of the party’s auto-­narrative of its own birth, growth and maturation on which the academies offer an “experiential education” (tiyanshi jiaoyu 体验式教育).25 Administratively, the cadre academies fall directly under the party’s Central Organization Department. The department coordinates with the Central Party School and the National School of Administration to ensure that trainees at these schools also receive a stint of ten days or so at one of the academies in order to charge their revolutionary batteries.26 Training at the new academies is also available to lower cadres, whose training is the responsibility of organization departments at the provincial or even lower level.27 In addition to the three cadre academies, since 2010–11 the Central Organization Department has recognized (but not funded) nine more bases for party spirit education, making for a total of 13 such centrally recognized sites. The most important are Xibaipo (西柏坡) in Hebei and Hongyan village (红岩村) in Chongqing, about the latter of which I will have more to say in the later sections.28 In addition, over 60 further sites have been established by provincial or other lower authorities to cater for the needs of their own party spirit cadre education plans. None of these sites have received central recognition, let alone funding.29

106   Frank N. Pieke

Hongyan and the commodification of party spirit (nature?) (essence?) The effort to build up party spirit education bases sounds impressive until one realizes that virtually all party spirit cadre education bases are established sites on China’s red tourism trail. Only the three central cadre academies have been purpose-­built. The recent surge in cadre party spirit education uses the existing infrastructure of red tourism, adding to it further investment and elaboration at selected sites for a more discerning clientele of cadres. During a brief fieldtrip to one such site, Hongyan (Red Rock) village in Chongqing in July 2015, the party secretary of the village flatly stated that cadre education at Hongyan “uses a tourist site as a teaching site” (yong lüyou zhi dian wei jiaoyu zhi dian 用旅游之 点为教育之点). Educational visits to Hongyan usually last half a day of “on-­ the-spot observation” (xianchang guancha 现场观察), but Hongyan also offers programs of a full day or more, depending on the requirements of the organization that has commissioned the training. Visits to Hongyan are a mandatory part of the training for Chongqing cadres, of whom Hongyan receives between 10,000 and 20,000 annually. There are also visits by between 1,000 and 2,000 cadres mostly from party schools with which Hongyan has a reciprocal relationship.30 Hongyan village was the location of the CCP’s Southern Bureau (Nanfang Ju 南方局) during the Japanese occupation when the Nationalist (Kuomintang) government had moved to Chongqing (1937–46). Headed by Zhou Enlai, the Southern Bureau had to operate very carefully, navigating between cooperative relations with the Nationalists as part of the united front against the Japanese and the reality of increasing animosity and sometimes even open armed conflict elsewhere in China between the two parties. Further thrown into the mix were foreign embassies and emissaries in Chongqing who were often deeply suspicious of the communists and the nationalists alike, the existence of an underground Communist Party network in nationalist territory, and relations with patriotic non-­communist forces and individuals sympathetic to the communists. Official party history as narrated in Hongyan emphasizes the unique nature of “the contributions of the Hongyan spirit to the system of the party’s revolutionary spirit” (Hongyan jingshen dui Zhongguo geming jingshen tixi de gong­ xian 红岩精神对中国革命精神体系的贡献). Unlike other key revolutionary sites such as Yan’an, Jinggangshan, Zunyi and Xibaipo where the party’s spirit was forged in communist base areas or in the armed forces, the leaders of the Southern Bureau operated openly in territory ruled by the Kuomintang. They had to make endless compromises and deal with all sorts of non-­communist forces. Yet in the flowery language of CCP historiography, they “emerged from the mud unstained, having joined bad elements but not shared their evil practices” (chu yuni bu ran, tongliu bu hewu 出淤泥不染，同流不合污). In terms of its contemporary relevance, the unique experience in Hongyan is the origin of the CCP’s later cooperation with the eight patriotic democratic parties and non-­ party elements, China’s peaceful and pragmatic foreign policy (exemplified by

Party spirit: producing communist belief   107 Zhou Enlai) and cooperation between the CCP on the Mainland and the Kuomintang on Taiwan to unify the fatherland.31 Hongyan village is one of China’s prime red tourism sites. Back in 1958, the original building of the Southern Bureau was turned into a museum called the Hongyan Revolutionary Remembrance Hall (Hongyan Geming Jinianguan 红岩 革命纪念馆). In 2002, the hall was renovated and redecorated again. In 2013 a new exhibition hall was added, including a spacious lecture theater for about 150 people befitting the purposes of cadre education.32 The Revolutionary Remembrance Hall’s displays in the new building include photographs, manuscripts and calligraphy, newspaper clippings, historical footage, paintings, portraits of historical figures and even the old printing press of the Liberation Daily (Jiefang Ribao 解放日报), the CCP’s main newspaper at the time. Some of the materials in the museum are originals (such as bound copies of the Liberation Daily saved from a scrap paper dealer in the 1960s), but most are reproductions or pieces specifically commissioned for the exhibition. The exhibition strongly foregrounds the legendary leaders of the CCP – especially Zhou Enlai – and what they have said and written; the other items mainly serve to contextualize these. This is quite different from the original building of the Southern Bureau that has been very carefully reconstructed to reproduce the original look and feel of the rooms, furniture, decorations and even an old telegraph machine. Here the emphasis is on the leaders (including Mao himself for a period in 1945 during the failed negotiations with Chiang Kai-­shek after the Japanese surrender) as individual human beings who lived and worked there in times of great adversity. Even newer than the exhibition hall is the China Democratic Parties History Exhibition Museum (Zhongguo Minzhu Dangpai Lishi Chenlieguan 中国民主 党派历史陈列馆). The democratic parties are part of the united front that the CCP put together after the World War II in its fight against the Kuomintang. The united front and the democratic parties have continued to exist after liberation in 1949 as part of the consultative structures that were added to the CCP one-­party rule. After the start of reforms in 1978, this multi-­party edifice has again been given greater importance, including the appointment of a modest number of cadres from democratic parties in the administration. As the Kuomintang’s wartime capital, Chongqing claims to be the place of origin of the united front, celebrating the history and role of the democratic parties as an essential part of the CCP’s auto-­historical narrative. The Democratic Parties Museum is located about a ten-­minute drive from Hongyan village at the site of several former foreign embassies during the Japanese occupation. The museum is managed by Hongyan in cooperation with the CCP’s United Front Department in Chongqing. As is the rule with public buildings dedicated to united front work, this museum is even larger and more luxurious than the Hongyan Revolutionary Remembrance Hall itself, but is otherwise similar in nature: the museum primarily conveys a specific political message. The displays are arranged separately for each of the eight democratic parties with additional displays for the Association of Industry and Commerce (Gong­ shanglian 工商联) and non-­party political figures. The primary focus is on

108   Frank N. Pieke i­ndividual historical personages and events mainly narrated through historical photos and texts, the latter including newspapers, speeches and writings. A further and very important revolutionary history site is the Gele Mountain Museum (Gele Shan Bowuguan 歌乐山博物馆), officially known as the Exhibition Hall of the Soul of Hongyan (Hongyan Hun Chenlieguan 红岩魂陈列馆). It was built in 1963 in dedication to the memory of communist revolutionaries victimized by the nationalists. The hall was built not in Hongyan village itself, but at the site of the Sino-­Amer­ican Cooperative Organization (SACO), an organization established in 1942 for sharing intelligence between the Amer­ican and Nationalist Chinese governments. The museum also includes the Gele Mountain Martyrs Monument (Gele Shan Lieshi Lingyuan 歌乐山烈士陵园) and two KMT prisons, White Villa (Baigong Guan 白公馆) and Refuse Pit (Zhazi Dong 渣滓洞). At these former prisons, tourists can watch theme-­parklike shows featuring torture scenes of communist prisoners. In 2008, the exhibition at the museum was upgraded and moved to a new, modern building.33 The Hongyan Remembrance Hall and the Gele Mountain Museum are not only separate sites, but also separate organizations. They have been pioneers of red tourism commercialization under the dynamic leadership of Li Hua, who until 2011 was director of both. According to a report posted by Li on a website dedicated to red tourism, for more than ten years before the start of the official red tourism strategy in 2004, he had organized exhibitions, lecture tours, performances and meetings across the whole country.34 His objective was to turn the “Hongyan soul” (Hongyan hun 红岩魂) into what he calls “the largest revolutionary brand of the country.” Li himself got as far as being a delegate at the 2002 National Party Congress.35 Since April 2004, the two organizations have been formally working together in the Chongqing Hongyan Alliance Culture Development and Management Center (Chongqing Hongyan Lianxian Wenhua Fazhan Guanli Zhongxin 重庆 红岩联线文化发展管理中心). The center was established together with several other smaller revolutionary education bases and cultural scenic spots in Chongqing, presumably to take full advantage of the new national red tourism strategy mentioned earlier that would be announced later in the same year. According to Li, the objective was “to join forces to package and market the Hongyan brand.” Subsequently, the center spun off its money-­making activities into a separate commercial entity called the Chongqing Hongyan Culture Business Group (Chongqing Hongyan Wenhua Chanye Jituan 重庆红岩文化产业集团). In order to attract more business, the two organizations in 2007 built and opened the Hongyan Revolutionary History Museum (Hongyan Geming Lishi Bowu­ guan 红岩革命历史博物馆). Although, per national policy, entry to the museums was made free of charge in 2008, red tourism remains as good business. The museums get paid for guided tours, courses and events that they organize for visiting groups of cadres or tourists, and sell souvenirs, produce performances and release DVDs of theater, dance and music. With red tourism already being so profitable, the commercial impact of cadre party spirit education can only be modest at best. According to a

Party spirit: producing communist belief   109 China Daily article, red tourism visitor numbers in Chongqing have been growing fast, from three million in 2008 to 6.5 million in 2010; by contrast, the number of cadre visitors in 2014 was reported to be in the order of 10,000 to 20,000. Cadre education lends greater credibility to more serious red tourism sites like Hongyan, while profiting from the existing infrastructure of red tourism. Red tourism and cadre party spirit education thus benefit from each other. Both are based on the same premise, namely, that the party’s history and unique character can be transformed into transferable commodities to be consumed for different purposes and by different client bases.36

The politics of party spirit Party spirit in red tourism and cadre education is not just a commercial commodity, but also a political commodity. Commercial and political considerations often chime very well with each other, but sometimes they do not. Local authorities, organizations and individuals develop revolutionary history sites as much to suit their political objectives as to make money. The development and significance of sites is also subject to the shifts and changes of CCP politics. Hongyan happens to be located in Chongqing, a municipality that was recently the focus of the most important confrontation among CCP leaders since the Tian’anmen demonstrations in 1989. This presents us with an opportunity, albeit small and partial, to see the politics of the commodification of party spirit and essence in action. In 2011, Li was stripped of his posts as director of the Hongyan museums, possibly due to suspicions that he was abusing his power, in actions such as the excessive price of 500,000 yuan he paid in 2009 to purchase some offprints of photos from the war period.37 However, the timing of his fall in 2011 makes it very likely that Li, and with him Hongyan, had become caught up in what became a very high-­profile national power struggle. In 2008, Li’s project to turn the Hongyan soul into China’s largest revolutionary commodity received a huge boost when Bo Xilai, a high-­profile figure in Beijing at the time, was sent to Chongqing after losing to Xi Jinping at the Seventeenth Party Congress in 2007 in his bid to become frontrunner for the election of the party’s new general party secretary at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 2012. Down but not out, Bo decided to use his position as Chongqing party secretary to develop a new strategy of economic and social development that quickly became known as the “Chongqing model.” Bo hoped that success in Chongqing would enable him to bid for supreme power against Xi Jinping at the next party congress in 2012. Bo had a very considerable following within the party, while his ideas and achievements met with sympathy and support from several prominent public intellectuals in Beijing, making his maverick campaign a genuine threat to his competitors at the center. Although the exact details of the events will probably never become public, in November 2011 Neil Heywood, a British business associate of Bo, and his wife Gu Kailai were found murdered in his Chongqing hotel room. A few months later, Chongqing’s head of public

110   Frank N. Pieke security Wang Lijun (王立军) suddenly fled to nearby Chengdu trying to get asylum at the Amer­ican consulate in that city, reportedly because he possessed information about the Heywood murder implicating Bo and Gu. After 24 hours, Wang surrendered to the central authorities. These events triggered Bo’s fall in March 2012 and his eventual sentencing to a long prison term. Less than a year later at the Eighteenth Party Congress in November 2012, Xi Jinping was duly elected general party secretary. Bo Xilai’s Chongqing model promoted new solutions for the unfairness created by China’s rapid development and the estrangement between the party and the people. Of particular note was his fight against organized crime in the city. Tapping into the widespread totalitarian nostalgia, Bo promoted a “red culture” that explicitly borrowed from Maoist practices, for instance the requirement for cadres to live, work and eat with the peasants, or the collective singing of nostalgic red songs.38 The emphasis on China’s red revolutionary past chimed very well with Li Hua’s promotion of the Hongyan soul. Li quickly became even more prominent than he already had been, with Bo Xilai going as far as saying that “Chongqing needs ten Li Huas!”39 Hongyan and Li Hua quickly gained further national prominence. In June 2011 China’s premier English-­language newspaper the China Daily ran an article on Hongyan’s successes. In the article the Group’s director (unnamed but presumably Li Hua) confidently stated that “[t]he sector is ready to be expanded and we have engaged consultants to help restructure the Hongyan Culture Business Group to be qualified to be listed [on the stock market] in three years.” The article goes on to quote a policy researcher at the China Tourism Academy in Beijing saying that “the market will take over the role of the government in future in driving the development of red tourism, as is already happening in Chongqing.”40 After Bo Xilai’s fall, Li Hua disappeared from view; however, as a local Chongqing cadre without specific factional ties to Bo he seems to have escaped a full-­fledged purge. Hongyan’s national prominence has also suffered. For a national revolutionary history site, it is essential that top central party leaders pay regular visits to affirm its importance and legitimize its spirit. For Chongqing it is therefore deeply worrying that Xi Jinping has yet to visit Hongyan after becoming CCP general party secretary in 2012. Xi’s most recent visit to Chongqing in October 2015 was all about the city’s strategic role in China’s economic expansion and the One Belt, One Road (“Silk Road”) project to improve China’s infrastructural connections with the rest of Asia, Africa and Europe, and he bypassed Hongyan. Xi also pointedly omits Hongyan when he mentions the country’s most important revolutionary sites. Clearly, Hongyan is still tainted by the brush of Bo Xilai and will have to be content, for the time being at least, with a lower national profile and mainly regional significance. Certain sites symbolize specific ideological positions, but how they navigate the ever shifting waters of Chinese politics is a treacherous and dangerous game in which ideology is only one of the relevant factors. The ups and downs of Hongyan as a revolutionary history site seem to have had very little to do with the actual message that it is supposed to convey about the CCP’s nature and

Party spirit: producing communist belief   111 mission. Emphasizing that true communists can live and work among capitalists, foreigners and nationalists, and that Hongyan is the source of the People’s Republic of China’s foreign relations, united front and the effort to join Taiwan and the Mainland, rubs against the revolutionary spirit of places like Xibaipo, Jinggangshan and Yan’an that emphasize self-­reliance and military struggle. At the center in Beijing, China’s role and suffering during World War II have become a major plank of Xi Jinping’s strategy for a more prominent role of China in the East Asian region and globally. Although the efforts of the CCP during the wartime period continue to be highlighted, more room is given to the contributions of the Kuomintang.41 Chongqing has been quick to avail itself of the opportunities this provides to showcase the city as a site of national historical importance unconnected to Bo Xilai’s red culture, with which it had become associated, and directly relevant to the political priorities of the current leadership in Beijing. In the longer term the CCP is likely again to tap into the messages that Hongyan conveys as part of China’s wartime effort and suffering. Provided that the city and its leadership can fully purge the ghost of Bo Xilai, the spirit of Hongyan is certain to play a prominent role once again.

The magic of instilling Communist belief We started this chapter with the concept of party spirit (dangxing), an undifferentiated and almost abstract quality without concrete form or specific characteristics entailing the cadres’ absolute dedication to the party and its ideology. In our discussion of Hongyan and other revolutionary heritage sites we have seen how this quality has been transformed. In the course of its revolutionary history, the party and its leaders were charged (possessed?) with the party’s spirit, enabling them to face unimaginable hardship, make tremendous sacrifices and, above all, take sagacious decisions that ordinary men and women would not have been capable of. Exposure to the record and remnants of the revolution turns this general spirit into a concrete and transferable quality that is referred to as jingshen (精神) that we translate here as “essence” or “efficacy.” Dangxing and jingshen have very different implications. Dangxing is a transcendental quality that is inherent in the party without having a specific origin or source. Dangxing makes the party and its mission sacred and above ordinary human experience and affairs. Jingshen is a spiritual force and commodity that can be deployed in the commercial and political arenas. It can be transferred to ordinary humans, thus turning them into communist believers, and to ideas, policies, choices and actions, rendering them sacred and beyond doubt. A quote from Xi Jinping serves to illustrate the power of jingshen: Every visit to Jinggangshan, Yan’an, Xibaipo or another sacred revolutionary place is a spiritual and ideological baptism. Every time I go there I receive vivid education in the party’s nature [dangde xingzhi 党的性质] and mission, again confirming the awareness and feelings for the people that we public servants [gongpu 公仆] have.42

112   Frank N. Pieke The party’s essence thus becomes an efficacious force that transforms those who are exposed to it. This transformative force can in turn be turned into a discrete and transferable commodity. Despite the appearance of a return to old-­fashioned communist practices, the business and politics of party spirit reveal all the trappings of modern-­day neo-­socialist governance: a capitalist market that is not merely tolerated by a communist party but is actively deployed to shore up and develop its Leninist political system, coupled with the freedom of political entrepreneurs and local centers within an ostensibly unified one-­party system. Under neo-­socialism, markets have been created for a vast range of commodities, resources and services previously provided and controlled by the state. These include not only social security, housing, education or health care. The party has even turned support for and belief in itself into a transferable commodity. Just like pilgrimages and tourism the world over, the temporary sacredness of red tourism and cadre education amplifies the already sacred nature of the revolutionary sites that have been visited. The sacred time of tourism and on-­ the-spot experiential education enables the release of the productive power of party jingshen, a world apart from the diffuse and sterile party dangxing that may be gleaned from the party’s revolutionary record and that one can learn about at home, in school or elsewhere during one’s ordinary life. Indeed, jin­ gshen can be thought of as the party’s sacred essence as it resides in concrete historical words, deeds, or objects, and has the power to change or transform ordinary people and events. Exposure at a particular site charges tourists or students with its essence. The use of jingshen thus has much in common with magic, namely, activities to compel supernatural forces to behave in a certain way in order to achieve specific and desired effects.43 As a magical power, ­jingshen manifests the party’s sacredness in the ordinary world in order to ­reinvigorate belief in the party and its mission.

Conclusion: the emerging religious basis of Communist rule Party spirit in contemporary China is no red herring. It is serious politics and serious business at the core of the Communist Party that tell us much about the direction in which the party and its political system are evolving. Marxism, socialism and communism have often been compared to religion. They require conversion and unquestioned belief in dogma, and provide a full eschatology that gives sense and purpose to what has to be done here and now. However, viewing these ideologies as such is predicated on a Western understanding of religion modeled on Christianity. Cross-­culturally, religion is not about conversion and dogma. Religion is about the privileging of certain aspects of one’s environment, life and experience as sacred, that is, as special and set apart from the normal, profane domains of life. This distinction exists in any society quite independently from what it is that is believed in and what exactly it is that is considered sacred. The evidence presented here shows that the CCP has also learned this lesson about the nature of religion, belief and magic. As a consequence, it is already well underway in shaping its evolution from an infallible

Party spirit: producing communist belief   113 bearer of ideological dogma to a sacred object of worship and source of magical power. Put differently, just when the party’s ideology is losing its appeal as a quasi-­religious dogma, the party and its rule begin to mimic a religious institution.44 We started this chapter with the observation that the decline of the CCP’s ideology has compelled many people in China to turn to Christianity, Buddhism or Confucianism as a source of meaning and direction in life. It now transpires that the CCP itself has turned to religion too, but not in search of alternative systems of thought, ethics or belief in an attempt to fill an ideological void. In part, it draws on the party’s own past when Mao was turned into an object of quasi-­religious worship. However, Xi Jinping’s use of some the techniques of the Maoist personality cult is only a small (albeit highly visible) and relatively recent aspect of this approach. As we have seen, red tourism and party spirit education are replete with religious language and methods. The old concept of party spirit has been revamped and the party has started to use the repertoire of heritage, tourism and pilgrimage to create a magical power that charges the party and its rule with a sacred nature. However, religious thought has no place here. Instead, religious and magical practices serve as an additional source of neo-­socialist governmental techniques. This, I submit, is no coincidence. It is part of a deliberate attempt to turn the party itself rather than its ideology and mission into a sacred entity and object of religious awe. This is, in fact, not all that dissimilar to the “civil religion” in the United States that has borrowed and adapted Christian religious practices for the purposes of a strictly secular worship of the Amer­ican nation.45 If successful, China’s emerging “communist religion” might in the long term excuse the party from even having an ideology or ultimate mission. It will no longer have to be believed. It will simply be believed in.

Notes   1 I would like to thank Bill Callahan, Vincent Chang, Alka Shah and Danie Stockman for their comments and suggestions.   2 Frank N. Pieke, The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).   3 For an overview of the rise of religion in contemporary China, see Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), Chapter 12.   4 The view that the CCP is facing a moral crisis is shared by many observers both in China and abroad. The best known recent intervention in this regard is probably US China scholar David Shambaugh’s; see David Shambaugh, “The Coming Chinese Crackup,” The Wall Street Journal, 6 March 2015, www.wsj.com/articles/the-­comingchinese-­crack-up-­1425659198 (accessed 27 March 2015).   5 This Leninist reading of party spirit was popularized through the book How to Be a Good Communist, Liu Shaoqi’s guide for party members that was first published in 1946. On this and the use of language of party spirit during the Wenchuan earthquake clean-­up, see Christian Sorace, “Party Spirit Made Flesh: The Production of Legitimacy in the Aftermath of the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake,” The China Journal 76 (2016): 1–22.

114   Frank N. Pieke   6 “To Grasp Work Style Party Spirit Must First Be Strengthened,” People’s Daily, 20 March 2014.   7 On the concept of neo-­socialism, see Frank N. Pieke, Knowing China: A Twenty-­First Century Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).   8 Erik H. Cohen, “Religious Tourism as an Educational Experience,” in Tourism, Reli­ gion and Spiritual Journeys, ed. Dallen J. Timothy and Daniel H. Olsen (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 78–93.   9 On the politics and administration of heritage protection in China, see Robert J. Shepherd and Larry Yu, eds., Heritage Management, Tourism, and Governance in China: Managing the Past to Serve the Present (New York: Springer, 2013). For an early critique of the heritage industry, see Robert Hewison, The Heritage Industry: Britain in a Climate of Decline (London: Methuen, 1987). 10 The literature on religious pilgrimage is plentiful. See for instance Ruth Barnes and Crispin Branfoot, Pilgrimage: The Sacred Journey (Oxford: Ashmolean Museum, 2006), and Ruth Harris, Lourdes: Body and Spirit in the Secular Age (London: Penguin, 1999). 11 Mircea Eliade, “Sacred Places: Temple, Palace, ‘Centre of the World,’ ” in Patterns in Comparative Religion (London: Sheed and Ward, 1958), pp. 367–85. 12 On tourism, pilgrimage and rituals as sacred states, see Nelson H.H. Graburn, “Tourism: The Sacred Journey,” in Hosts and Guests: The Anthropology of Tourism, ed. Valene L. Smith (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977), pp. 17–31. See also Victor Turner and Esther Turner, Image and Pilgrimage in Chris­ tian Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978). For an overview of the literature published since, see Ellen Badone and Sharon R. Roseman, “Approaches to the Anthropology of Pilgrimage and Tourism,” In Intersecting Journeys: The Anthro­ pology of Pilgrimage and Tourism, ed. Sharon R. Roseman and Ellen Badone (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), pp. 1–23. 13 In 2005, a new batch of 66 new patriotic education model bases was announced, with a further batch of 87 sites added in 2009: see “National Patriotic Education Model Bases,” http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/151935/157318/ (accessed 23 July 2015). On the patriotic education campaign, see Zhao Suisheng, “A State-­Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-­Tiananmen China,” Communist and Post-­ Communist Studies 31, no. 3 (1998): 287–302, and William A. Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), Chapter 2. 14 On national red tourism development, see Li Yiping, Hu Zhi Yi and Zhang Chao Zhi, “Red Tourism: Sustaining Communist Identity in a Rapidly Changing China,” Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change 8, no. 1–2 (2010): 101–19; Yoko Takayama, “Red Tourism in China,” in India, Russia, China: Comparative Studies on Eurasian Culture and Society, ed. Mochizuki Tetsuo and Maeda Shiho (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2012), pp. 113–30. 15 “Kaipi hongse lüyou fazhan xin jingjiede kexue zhinan” [Scientific guide to open up the development new realm of red tourism], Guangming Ribao, 28 November 2014, p. 7. 16 “2004–2010 nian quanguo hongse lüyou fazhan guihua gangyao” [Outline of the red tourism development plan for the years 2004 to 2010], cited in Xu Renli, Zhongguo hongse lüyou yanjiu [Research on China’s red tourism] (Beijing: Zhongguo Jinrong Chubanshe, 2010), p. 2. 17 See “Quanguo hongse lüyou gongzuo xietiao xiaozu dishisan ci huiyi zai Jing zhaokai” [National coordinating small group for red tourism work convenes its thirteenth meeting in Beijing], 3 February 2015, www.cnta.gov.cn/jgjj/jgsz/sszwz/qghsly gzxtxz/gzdt/201507/t20150720_742379.shtml (accessed 21 January 2016). 18 Yu Xuecai, “Zhongguo hongse mingsheng lüyou shihua” [Poems from China’s red tourism scenic spots] (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 2013). 19 Tom Phillips, “Communist Party Theme Park Sparks Ridicule among Chinese Internet Users,” Guardian, 1 October 2015.

Party spirit: producing communist belief   115 20 The 2007 and 2008 figures are from Li, Hu and Zhang, “Red Tourism: Sustaining Communist Identity,” p. 106. The 2013 figures are from a report on the 2014 meeting of the red tourism coordination small group, “Quanguo hongse lüyou gongzuo xietiao xiaozu dishi’er ci huiyi zai Jing zhaokai” [National coordinating small group for red tourism work convenes its twelfth meeting in Beijing], 20 February 2014, www.cnta. gov.cn/jgjj/jgsz/sszwz/qghslygzxtxz/gzdt/201507/t20150720_742378.shtml (accessed 22 January 2016). 21 See Wang Hui, Zhongguo hongse lüyou shengtaihua zhuanxing shengji yanjiu [Research on the ecological transformation and upgrading of red tourism in China] (Xiangtan: Xiangtan Daxue Chubanshe, 2014); Xu Renli, Zhongguo hongse lüyou yanjiu [Research on China’s red tourism] (Beijing: Zhongguo Jinrong Chubanshe, 2010), Chapter 9; “Kaipi hongse lüyou fazhan xin jingjiede kexue zhinan,” p. 7. 22 For more information on party schools and cadre training, see Pieke, The Good Com­ munist; and Charlotte P. Lee, Training the Party: Party Adaptation and Elite Training in Reform-­Era China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 23 For the 2013–17 plan, see “2013–2017 National Cadre Education and Training Plan,” Renmin wang, 29 September 2013; the plan was available at http://politics.people. com.cn/n/2013/0929/c100123069508.html as of 20 July 2015, but has since been taken offline. For an earlier plan, see “2006–2010 National Cadre Education and Training Plan,” Renmin Ribao, 15 January 2007, http://cpc.people.com.cn/ GB/64107/64109/5281995.html (accessed 21 July 2015). 24 On-­site learning does not occur in the 2013–17 national plan itself, but is mentioned in local documents. One such document that was freely available on the web is the CCP Jinan City Committee Document no. 7, 2014, Opinion of the CCP Jinan City Committee on the Implementation of the 2013–2017 National Cadre Training Plan 中 共济南市委文件 [2014] 7 号，中共济南市委关于贯彻落实 《2013–2017 年全国 干部教育培训规划》的实施意见, 5 May 2014, www.jnsw.gov.cn/icms_responsepic.aspx?fjid=11271, p. 10 (accessed 18 July 2015). 25 Interview, Beijing, 27 April 2007. See also David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), pp. 148–49. 26 See “Training Classes at the Three Cadre Academies Innovate the Model of Training for Party and State Leading Cadres” 三所干部学院培训班创新党政领导干部培训 模式, 4 August 2005, www.politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/60906/61581/4269456. html (accessed 20 January 2016); also interviews, Beijing, 28 April 2007. 27 Field notes, Beijing, 17 December 2006. 28 For a US scholar’s visit to Xibaipo, see Kenneth Pomeranz, “Musings on a Museum: A Trip to Xibaipo,” The China Beat, 22 July 2010, www.thechinabeat.org/?p=2384 (accessed 22 July 2015). On the recent recognition of the Guizhou red education base, see “Central Party School Lists the Guizhou Education Base” 中央党校贵州教学基 地挂牌, Xuexi Shibao, 26 May 2014, www.celaj.gov.cn/a/xinwenzhuanqu/ganjiaodongtai/2014/0528/7428.html (accessed 22 July 2015). 29 Field notes, Chongqing, 3 July 2015. 30 Field notes, Chongqing, 1 and 2 July 2015. 31 The narrative summarized in the paragraph is from a paper written by Chongqing’s former head of propaganda, Zhou Yong, “Contributions of Hongyan’s Essence to China’s Revolutionary Essence and Its Contemporary Value” 红岩精神对中国革命 精神的贡献及时代价值, 2015. Similar narratives could be found in the teaching materials used in Hongyan for the education of visiting cadres; see Chongqing Cadre Education and Training Teaching Materials Committee 重庆市干部教育培训教材编 审委员会, A Reader on Hongyan Essence 红岩精神读本 (Chongqing: Chongqing Press, 2004); Chongqing Museum of Revolutionary History 重庆红岩革命历史博物 馆, A Reader of Educational Stories on the Spirit of Hongyan and the Mass Line 红岩 精神与群众路线教育故事读本 (Chongqing：Chongqing Press, 2014); Chongqing

116   Frank N. Pieke Museum of Revolutionary History 重庆红岩革命历史博物馆, The Hongyan Spirit and the Party’s Mass Line: Teaching Materials for Practical Training in Mass Line Education 红岩精神与党的群众路线 – 群众路线教育实践活动培训教材 (Chongqing: Chongqing Press, 2014). 32 Field notes, 2 July 2015. 33 On Gele Mountain, White Villa and Refuse Pit, see Li, Hu and Zhang, “Red Tourism: Sustaining Communist Identity.” Further information was obtained from Zhou Yong, personal communication, 24 July 2015. On the new hall completed in 2008, see “The Completely New Face of the Hongyan Soul Exhibition Hall (with Photos)” 重庆红岩 魂新陈列总馆全新亮相(组图), Xinhuawang, 9 July 2008, www.crt.com.cn/ news2007/News/jryw/2008/79/0879142638195I62FJE0K57KD1D0EB.html (accessed 24 July 2015). 34 Li Hua, writing in Zhonghong wang (www.crt.com.cn/). 35 Li Hua, “ ‘Hongyan’ xia hai” [“Hongyan” goes into business], Zhonghong wang, 10 December 2004, www.crt.com.cn/news2007/News/lihua/20065/30/00008659.html (accessed 30 September 2015). For the transcript posted by Li Hua of a TV interview with himself when attending the 2002 Party Congress, see “Zhuanfang Hongyan Jinianguan guanzhang Li Hua” [An exclusive interview with Li Hua, the director of the Hongyan Remembrance Hall], Zhonghong wang, 4 December 2004, www.crt.com.cn/ news2007/News/lihua/20065/30/00008652.html (accessed 30 September 2015). 36 Fieldnotes, Chongqing, 2 July 2015. 37 On the purchase of photos, see “Chongqing zhongjin goumai kangzhan lao zhaopian fuyin shiyongquan yin zhengyi” [Chongqing’s high-­price purchase of the use rights of offprints of old pictures from the wartime period incites dispute], Zhongguo Xinwen wang, 13 April 2009, http://media.people.com.cn/GB/40606/9117970.html (accessed 22 October 2015). 38 On “totalitarian nostalgia,” see Geremie R. Barmé, In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 320. For a partisan account of the Chongqing model by a prominent public intellectual in Beijing, see Cui Zhiyuan, “Partial Intimations of the Coming Whole: The Chongqing Experiment in Light of the Theories of Henry George, James Meade, and Antonio Gramsci,” Modern China 36, no. 6 (2011): 646–60. 39 Since his fall, Bo Xilai’s time in Chongqing has been cleansed from the Chinese internet and there is hardly any trace left of his endorsement of Hongyan and Li Hua. The description here is therefore largely based on a personal communication from a resident of Chongqing at the time and an online article in the US magazine The Atlan­ tic. For the latter, see Xujun Eberlein, “Another Kind of Amer­ican History in Chongqing, 5: Revision,” The Atlantic, 4 February 2011, www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2011/02/another-­kind-of-­Amer­ican-history-­in-chongqing-­5-revision/70787/ (accessed 23 January 2016). 40 “Tourism Flourishing as More Delve into the Past,” China Daily, 26 June 2011. 41 The effort to document and research Chongqing’s wartime history was also started under Bo Xilai in May 2008. It included a total investment of 150 million yuan in the restoration of a total of 108 historic sites, including Kuomintang buildings and the museums at Hongyan village discussed in this chapter. For details, see Zhou Yong, Vincent K.L. Chang and Gong Xiaohui, “Recalling the War in China: The Dahoufang Project in Chongqing and the Restoration of a Legacy,” Frontiers of History in China 9, no. 4 (2014): 611–27; and field notes, 1 July 2015. 42 “Kaipi hongse lüyou fazhan xin jingjiede kexue zhinan,” p. 7. 43 The classic anthropological studies on magic as part of ordinary life are E.E. Evans-­ Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic among the Azande (1937; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976) and Bronislaw Malinowski, Coral Gardens and Their Magic: A Study of the Methods of Tilling the Soil and of Agricultural Rites in the Trobriand Islands (London: Allen & Unwin, 1935).

Party spirit: producing communist belief   117 44 This view of religion as about the dichotomy between the sacred and the profane has of course long ago been formulated by Émile Durkheim, one of the founding fathers of modern sociology and anthropology; see Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912; New York: Free Press, 1965). 45 Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” Daedalus 96, no. 1 (1967): 1–21.

Part III

Elite politics in the reform era

6 What is a faction? Joseph Fewsmith

“Faction” is one of those words that seem inescapable in the discussion of Chinese politics in general and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in particular; however, what exactly faction means and what it explains seems as elusive today as it ever has.1 As Alice Miller recently pointed out, there is a proliferation of terms in Chinese to invoke the concept of faction – pai (派) or bangpai (帮派), “cliques” (jituan 集团), small groups (tuanhuo 团伙), “circles” (quanzi 圈子), and so forth, none of which are any more exact than their English counterparts.2 The English literature on China uses terms such as informal politics, relationship (guanxi 关系) and network, all of which seem related to faction but are not necessarily the same thing. Moreover, such basic features of factions – whether they are static or fluid, policy-­oriented or personal, ideological or not – are often left unclear. Scholars frequently do not distinguish their use of the term from that of others, simply invoking the term faction as if it is somehow clear what it means. In short, it is a term that is widely used but it often contributes to confusion as much as to clarity. Definitional confusion has not stopped the field from plunging ahead, sometimes in quite confounding ways. For instance, in the 1990s there was common reference to Jiang Zemin’s “Shanghai Gang,” and more recently Li Cheng has repeatedly analyzed Chinese politics in terms of the “princelings” and the “Communist Youth League faction.”3 Now political scientists are once more raising the use of the terms “faction” or network, albeit with much greater methodological sophistication than was used in earlier discussions of factions. While the methodology has improved, many of the old issues have been forgotten, and one is left trying to identify factions or proving their existence without tackling the issue that drives one to look at factions in the first place – what does their existence, if they exist, tell us about the Chinese political system? And just as important, has the nature of factionalism, or its place in the Chinese political system, changed over the years? The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature on factions and raise some questions about how the concept can be usefully employed. The first major article on factions was Andrew J. Nathan’s seminal, “A Factional Model for CCP Politics.”4 Nathan elegantly set out a simple, but well specified, model of factionalism. It has become one of the most cited articles in

122   Joseph Fewsmith our field. For Nathan, factions are personalistic; they are formed between two people, one higher in status than the other, and they are non-­ideological relations of convenience. Although Nathan delineated 15 features of factions, the core elements were that factions are hierarchical, dyadic and exchange-­based relations. Factions can be extended downward in “complex factions,” but because they are based on the relations between different individuals at different levels in the system, control between the top and bottom is attenuated; lower levels can often be peeled off by competing personalistic ties, often sweetened by material benefits. The personal ties that are central to the creation of factions inevitably raise control fragmentation issues, particularly in a country of the size and complexity of China. Given the reality that no one faction could dominate the polity, the political space is filled by other competing factions, creating a factional system. The legitimacy of other factions is recognized, at least implicitly, within the factional system, by the fact that factions do not try to destroy each other; indeed, Nathan asserts that there is a “code of civility” that limits contestation. The object of struggle among factions is to keep one from becoming too powerful and overwhelming the others, a task made easier by the control fragmentation issues just mentioned. The code of civility is a natural outcome of this limited struggle. Indeed, a factional system acts much like the balance of power in the description of international relation specialists – the object of conflict is to restore the balance, not to destroy the system. So the factional system, much like the international balance of power, is homeostatic. In response, Tang Tsou wrote his “Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal Groups in CCP Politics.”5 Tsou believes that Nathan’s article is indeed a good description of factionalism but that the model does not apply to Chinese politics as he knows it. Tsou is not against the concept of faction but is cautious about calling all relations factional. He prefers the concept of “informal small group” because he sees groupings in China as more changeable than the term faction allows; people can shift from one informal small group to another depending on interests and issues. More importantly, he believes that in thinking about factions (or informal small groups), we should start with structures. In his article, Nathan referred to factions as sometimes growing on the “trellis” of organizational structures; Tsou agrees and suggests that the relationship between structures and small groups be placed at the center of analysis. Doing so would force the analyst to take policy considerations seriously; political disagreements are not all about personal interest and factional advantage but also about policy. The point over which Tsou most disagrees with Nathan is the so-­called “culture of civility.” As Tsou put it, “The basic assumption of CCP politics has been that a group or coalition can and does decisively defeat a major rival group or coalition, and eliminate it.” In Tsou’s understanding, there is nothing homeostatic about CCP politics. The whole history of the CCP, as Tsou said, “contradicts the characteristics of immobilisme.” It follows from this point that Nathan and Tsou differ in whether Chinese politics could be described as a factional system or whether factions (or informal small groups) exist in a system better described as something else, such as a Leninist system. One might also ask

What is a faction?   123 whether the totality of political space is taken up by factions, as Nathan’s conception implies, or whether there is room for significant political actors to exist outside of factional networks, as Tsou’s approach implies. In this regard, it is worth noting, as Tsou does in a later article, that the arrest of the Gang of Four was largely engineered by Ye Jianying, one of the military leaders least engaged in factional activity. Similarly, one might note that in his memoirs, Zhao Ziyang spoke of the importance of countering certain ideological trends before they gain momentum, a conception that implies that at any given point in time there are a significant number of people who are potentially mobilizable by different sides in a political struggle. This description suggests that different political actors will, at various times, try to set off a political trend in the hope that others will bandwagon, thereby joining the winning side.6 Tsou’s and Nathan’s differing views of factions and elite politics were rooted in different readings of modern Chinese history. Nathan was clearly taking off from his book on Peking Politics, 1918–1923, which described the factional system of warlords in Republican China.7 Indeed, each warlord was the central figure in a factional network that contended for power but never to the extent of threatening the factional system as a whole. Curiously, Nathan recognized in his article that the Guomindang arose outside the arena of factionalism that dominated north China following Yuan Shikai’s death and challenged that system by becoming a more tightly organized, professional and ideological party and more military than were the warlords. They did not play by the same rules.8 If this was true of the Guomindang, it was much truer of the CCP, though Nathan’s quick survey of CCP history led him to conclude that it was a history of factionalism. Historical writings on CCP history have not been kind to this interpretation. It turns out that the most famous faction, the “28 Bolsheviks,” was neither composed of 28 people nor a faction. In reality, leaders of the “returned student faction” often vied among themselves for power – Wang Ming distancing himself from Bo Gu after 1934 and even warming up to Mao Zedong, at least for a while. And at the Zunyi Conference, Mao was able to ally with Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang, two of the leaders of the returned student “faction,” to bring himself back into the leadership at the expense of Bo Gu. Later Mao allied with Liu Shaoqi, separating himself from Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang. Such shifting relations suggest a situation more fluid than the hierarchical relations of a factional system.9 More fluid does not mean more civil. Indeed, this is a period in which CCP politics (and Chinese politics in general) was becoming distinctly harsher. The “Emergency meeting” of 7 August 1927, adopted a resolution accusing Chen Duxiu, one of the founders of the party, of “rightist opportunism”; losers now were not only bypassed but accused of errors of “line” and treated harshly. The Futian Incident of 1930–31 brought a new level of violence to intra-­party struggle. The Yanan Rectification Campaign was an extremely severe way to bring about ideological conformity. What is missing from this picture of shifting coalitions is not only the personalistic and hierarchical relations that characterize factions but also the notion of

124   Joseph Fewsmith legitimacy, a claim to power that separated both the KMT and the CCP from the warlords and their factional politics. The Guomindang claimed legitimacy on the basis of the Three Principles of the People and the CCP claimed legitimacy on the basis of Marxism–Leninism. In the early history of the CCP, this legitimacy was conferred by the Comintern on a person, implying that Marxism–Leninism could not be adopted willy-­nilly by anyone but could only be claimed by those approved by the Comintern; the money supplied by the Comintern was important too, but those who went off on their own, like Luo Zhanglong, without Comintern recognition were doomed to failure.10 It was the Comintern that ultimately signed off on the party line, so despite the Zunyi Conference’s importance in elevating Mao to a military role, the conference did not condemn the line adopted by the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in 1931 (the plenum at which Wang Ming entered the Politburo), so Mao was hardly an undisputed leader of the party. It was not until 1938, when the Comintern verbally recognized Mao’s leadership and the convening of the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee that one could say that Mao had emerged as leader of the CCP. The Zhengfeng (rectification) Movement of 1942–44, sort of an ideological Gleischaltung that made the party subordinate to Mao Zedong Thought, installed hierarchy and discipline; personal relations and even factions may have been part of this new party arrangement but these were hardly the patron–client relations of warlord-­era China. As Gao Hua points out, this evolution of events suggests that “legitimacy” must be understood as having different components. After the Zunyi Conference, Mao had acquired military leadership but not political leadership. With the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in late 1938, Mao gained political leadership. With the Zhengfeng Movement, Mao acquired ideological leadership – the ability to interpret what Marxism–Leninism meant in the Chinese context. Only when these three elements were combined could one say Mao had consolidated his leadership over the CCP.11 The history of leadership disputes within the CCP and Mao’s eventual triumph corroborates Tsou’s understanding that the object of struggle in the CCP, and more broadly in modern Chinese history, has indeed been the elimination of other factions and therefore the destruction of any sort of factional system. This totalistic impulse is closely related to another insight Tsou had about Chinese politics, namely, that the game of politics revolved around “win all, lose all.”12 That did not mean that all politics was about total victory or total defeat all the time; there could be breaks in the action. However, as Tsou noted, compromise in the Chinese political context was not an acceptance of the legitimacy of opposition but rather a pause in preparation for a final showdown that all sides intuited was coming sooner or later.13 Tsou never made clear whether he believed this feature of Chinese politics was rooted in political culture or political structure; probably both. Many observers might well accept that China under Mao was not a factional system in Nathan’s sense but then argue that it had evolved into one in the post-­ Mao era; indeed, Dittmer argues that factionalism burst out in the 1980s.14

What is a faction?   125 However if we argue that there were distinct factions in the 1980s, it is by no means clear that they were the same sort of faction as had existed before or would come later, or that factions in the 1980s all resembled each other. More importantly, it is hardly clear that a factional system had developed or that the game of “win all, lose all” had disappeared. First of all, Deng clearly dominated the system. Despite Dittmer’s claim that Deng “shared power” with Chen Yun and others, at least at the beginning,15 Deng dominated the system in part because he controlled the military, and it is by looking at the military leadership that one sees most clearly the factional elements in the 1980s system. The Central Military Commission in the 1980s was dominated by people from Deng’s old Second Field Army, and when ranks were restored in 1988, 11 of 18 generals were from the Second Field Army, a percentage hardly in accord with their contribution during the Civil War. Moreover, Deng selected Hu Yaobang as general secretary and Zhao Ziyang as premier. In selecting Hu Yaobang, Deng was picking someone he had known for many years, who had made many contributions to bringing about the reform era (overturning many cases when he was head of the Organization Department and leading the ideological charge when he was at the Central Party School), and who brought with him an extensive network of people from the Communist Youth League (CYL), which he had run in the 1960s. Indeed, Hu’s network made the Deng–Hu relationship resemble the complex factionalism of Nathan’s description, but the CYL group was of no help to Hu when Deng decided to drop Hu from the leadership. Deng was not acting in a factional way, since jettisoning Hu and his supporters would weaken Deng if we were to interpret this situation from a strictly factional point of view. Deng could drop Hu without significant damage to himself because he really did dominate the system; he remained, as he put it at one point, the “core” of the second generation of leadership, and that did not change with the purging of Hu (though one might argue that Hu’s demise exacerbated factionalism, leading to the leadership fights of 1989 and later). Zhao’s position was even more precarious than that of Hu. Zhao had, as Roderick MacFarquhar put it, a “constituency of just one.”16 Zhao had been a successful provincial leader, but had never served in the central party prior to being appointed premier of the State Council. His relationship with Deng was not particularly close and he served at the discretion of the “paramount leader.” Deng gave considerable scope for Chen Yun and the State Planning Commission to manage much of the economy and for Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun to dominate the ideological apparatus. Probably the most important position in the economic realm, other than the premier, was the head of the State Planning Commission, and Zhao Ziyang had no power to appoint the head. That position was decided by Chen Yun, with the approval of Deng. There was good reason for Deng to give such latitude to Chen Yun. Chen was, after all, the policymaker with the most economic experience; he had run the economy during the First Five-­Year Plan (1953–57), righted the economy in the wake of the disastrous Great Leap Forward and once again addressed the economic problems as China came out of the Cultural Revolution. There was also the fact that Chen Yun had

126   Joseph Fewsmith a seniority in the party that exceeded even Deng’s and that prestige could not be ignored.17 Indeed, the combination of Deng (and Zhao) pushing for economic reform and Chen and the economic bureaucracy reining in some of the imbalances created by reform made for a good combination for a number of years and kept together the coalition that had come together to guide China in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. Ultimately the tensions between reform and the old planning apparatus would prove too much, suggesting indeed that the compromises reached during the early 1980s were not a recognition of pluralistic tendencies in the party but rather hiatuses on the way to a contest to win all, something that broke out under the pressures of succession politics, increasingly tense ideological differences, and mass protest. This “contest” might be seen as taking place in two phases, first during the Tiananmen demonstrations, which eliminated Zhao Ziyang but did not result in a conservative successor, and Deng’s “Southern Tour” in 1992 and the Fourteenth Party Congress later the same year, in which Deng’s line of “reform and opening” was resoundingly reasserted. Like the economic system, the propaganda system was under the control of conservative leaders who had long experience in propaganda work. Hu Qiaomu, Mao Zedong’s former secretary, oversaw propaganda at the Politburo level, and Deng Liqun, Liu Shaoqi’s former secretary, was head of the Propaganda Department for most of the 1980s. Like the economic sector, the propaganda system had a long-­standing mandate to uphold Marxism–Leninism and prevent “bourgeois liberalism,” which made people in this sector naturally skeptical of reforms that would unmoor the system from the ideological and organizational bases of the Leninist system. Deng Liqun worked hard to forge an alliance with Chen Yun and the economic sector, particularly through a series of speeches he gave in 1980 on Chen Yun’s economic thought.18 The propaganda apparatus was perhaps the most obviously factional part of the system in the 1980s, promoting people who were loyal personally and ideologically, and collecting “black material” on people perceived to be “liberal” (and using it against them in campaigns like those against spiritual pollution in 1983 and bourgeois liberalization in 1987). When Deng Liqun was finally dismissed from his position in the Policy Research Bureau, he carefully placed his people in places where they could still be effective.19 Although the Propaganda Department was increasingly at odds with the more reform-­minded wing of the party,20 particularly Hu Yaobang and then Zhao Ziyang, exacerbating tensions within the party and contributing to the political upheavals of 1987 and 1989, it did not challenge Deng’s authority, at least until after Tiananmen, and it is clear that, to a great extent, Deng shared the conservatives’ concerns with liberal trends in the party and society. After 1989, the differences between “conservatives” and “liberals” widened to the extent that Deng felt his agenda was threatened, which is why he embarked on his 1992 Southern Tour. Once again, divergent views – factionalism, or at least different informal small groups – had given way to dominance as Deng reasserted his leadership and Jiang Zemin moved decisively to support Deng (and maintain his own position).

What is a faction?   127 As the examples of the economic and propaganda systems suggest, these factions were rooted in bureaucratic structures – the “trellises” of Nathan’s conception – suggesting a sort of bureaucratic cum factional struggle. However, both the economic and the propaganda systems had an organizational culture – ideology – that suggests they were not pure factions as defined by Nathan. Rather than being based simply on an “exchange relationship,” a utilitarian calculus of mutual benefit, they were based on an organization steeped in a particular approach to policy issues and overseen by powerful leaders who had pioneered these policy approaches. This raises one of the issues that has often been obscured in the literature. In Nathan’s original conception, factions are based solely on personal interest, not policy or ideology, but many have written about factions that are perceived to be “liberal” or “conservative.” Rather than trying to define factions as being based in part on policy views or sometimes based on policy views, it is probably better to try to define different sorts of factions. Some factions seem organized around ideology (the Gang of Four seems to approach this type), others around organizations and their interests (such as the economic and propaganda systems just discussed), still others around individuals (such as the warlords). The relevance of factions seems to vary from period to period, with factions being least relevant in the 1950s and early 1960s when Mao dominated the system, most relevant during the Cultural Revolution (which spurred much of the writing on factions), and significant as expressions of a rapidly changing system in the 1980s. However, in no period can we say that China was dominated by a factional system as opposed to a political system (Leninist) in which factions existed.

Recent developments In recent years, the concept of factions has developed in two main ways. First, particularly with the availability of greater biographical information and the creation of larger databases, there have been better efforts to track political relations among China’s elite. Li Cheng has tracked the background of many leaders, particularly those who have come up through the CYL and those who are “princelings” (children of former top leaders of the CCP). He argued for many years that these two groupings created a scenario in which there was “one party and two factions.” He believed that the formation of these two factions would lead to a normalization of Chinese politics, a sort of “bipartisanship” that would accelerate the development of “intra-­party democracy” and perhaps, eventually, democratization.21 Similarly Victor Shih has devoted a great deal of effort to define more precisely what he means by a faction and to measure the impact of factions on aspects of Chinese politics. Rather than adopting the traditional methods of Sinology, observing politics closely and drawing conclusions (not always correctly) about the relations between leaders, Shih opts to consider members of a political hierarchy who have common characteristics – birth place, school ties and work

128   Joseph Fewsmith units – to be in the same faction.22 Such a methodology cannot get at the fine-­ grained dynamics of elite politics but has surprisingly robust results. Using it, Shih is able to relate the distribution of bank loans and “nauseating” displays of loyalty23 to factional ties while demonstrating quite convincingly that factional ties have much greater explanatory power than meritocratic performance in explaining who gets into the Central Committee.24 The other direction in which the study of informal politics has gone in recent years has been to apply social network theory, an approach that has been enhanced both by the availability of greater biographical information and by better software.25 Franziska Keller suggests that we “conceive of informal politics as competing coalition formation along the ties of an underlying network.”26 Keller assumes that elites have a wide network but can choose to activate a subset of that network to form an alliance (“faction”) to compete with other alliances. This network approach, she argues, “accounts both for the permanence and fluidity of factions.” This seems to give her network analysis the sort of flexibility that seems to converge with Tsou’s “small informal groups,” albeit using very different methodology. In a separate paper, Keller argues that clients with two patrons are significantly more likely than clients with one patron to be promoted. This is an interesting observation, one seemingly at odds with most of the literature on factions, which assumes a single patron–client relationship is important both for the patron and the client.27 It would seem that a client’s relationship with more than one patron would lead to distrust in one or both of these relationships, but this might depend on the relationship between the two patrons. One might assume that a client who developed relationships with two patrons who had a competitive relationship would not fare well, while one with a connection to two patrons who had a good working relationship or their own patron–client relationship (say with Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong) might do very well. The effect on the patron–client relationship of clients having ties with multiple patrons who have different relations among themselves (cooperative or competitive) has not yet been tested. Another finding that seems to challenge traditional understandings of factions is that someone with greater “closeness centrality” – that is someone who is able to link two or more networks rather than being central to one network – has a greater chance of being promoted than others without such characteristics.28 The use of social network analysis for the study of Chinese elites is just beginning and will no doubt provide new insights in the years to come. At the moment, while its insights are intriguing, there are some anomalies that are jarring. For instance, Keller notes that Zhao Ziyang “starts out as a relatively betweenness central figure, [but] he is not among the top 20 when he actually becomes Party Secretary in 1987.” It should be noted that this is after Zhao has been premier for seven years. She goes on to note that “Hu Yaobang is also not among the most betweenness central figures, but neither is paramount leader Deng Xiaoping.”29 She attributes this finding either to the “unstable” characteristics of the 1980s or, more likely, to her data not capturing relationships dating

What is a faction?   129 back to the Civil War. Perhaps even more likely is that the type of relationships that prevailed in the 1980s (and before) was quite different from those that have come to the fore with the passing of the revolutionary generation.

Institutionalization and factions Another direction in which research has developed in recent years has been to explore the institutionalization of the Chinese political system. Perhaps ironically it was Andrew Nathan who put forth this view most systematically. In a widely cited article on “authoritarian resilience,” Nathan argued that succession politics was increasingly norm bound, promotions were increasingly based on merit, institutions were increasing in functional specialization, and the party had created “input institutions” that increased political participation and popular appeal.30 Although Nathan does not fully explain how and why such a system emerged, he does suggest that factions had settled into a pattern of mutual balance that had allowed norms to emerge that no group had an interest in challenging. As a result, China had made a “transition from totalitarianism to a classic authoritarian regime …”31 In the wake of Nathan’s article, a large number of scholars have talked about the Chinese political system as institutionalized. The belief that the leadership selection process has been institutionalized stems from the regularity of party processes and the “smooth” transition from one leader to another. Indeed, party congresses have been held every five years, regardless of tensions within the party, since 1977, a period of 38 years, whereas party congresses prior to that were held very irregularly. Although the first years of the reform period witnessed the same difficulties with leadership succession as the Maoist era (both Mao and Deng jettisoned two putative successors, though Deng’s purges were less disruptive), power transitions have been smoother in the years since: Jiang Zemin was able to consolidate power as Deng passed from the scene; Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang as general secretary in 2002; and Xi Jinping succeeded Hu in 2012. However this picture of smooth succession obscures much of the politics that was conducted behind the scenes. Jiang was not really able to escape from Deng’s shadow until Deng’s mental capacity declined and Jiang arrested Deng confidant Chen Xitong. Jiang was also aided by the timely passing of such elders as Hu Qiaomu, Li Xiannian and Chen Yun. Such moves and circumstances were central to Jiang securing his own power, as were his efforts to promote confidants from his “Shanghai Gang.” In other words, it was necessary to secure independence from his predecessor and to build a network of reliable confidants in order to secure power. When the time came for Jiang to retire, he expanded the size of the Politburo Standing Committee and filled it with his own followers. The lateness of this decision, on the eve of the party congress, reveals the strong-­arm nature of this action. When Hu Jintao tried to do to Jiang what Jiang had done to Deng by charging Chen Liangyu with corruption, Jiang moved to bolster his own position by ensuring that the investigatory systems of the party were all in the hands of his

130   Joseph Fewsmith own followers. Thus, Zhou Yongkang took over the Politics and Law Commission, He Guoqiang took over the Central Disciple Inspection Commission (CDIC) and Meng Jianzhu took over the Public Security Bureau. It is thus not surprising that the second term of Hu Jintao’s leadership was surprisingly quiet. So the efforts of Xi Jinping to free himself from the constraints imposed by either or both of his predecessors that we have seen over the past three years (2013–15) fit with the pattern of the past, even if they are stronger, and belie the notion that leadership succession is institutionalized. The same can be said for lower levels. There has been much focus in recent years on the cadre evaluation system and its impact both on the selection of cadres and on their behavior. Many of China’s local cadres are indeed capable, but that does not mean they are promoted through an objective, institutionalized system. The evaluations of local cadres, at least sometimes, do not even go to the local organization department, and they are, in any case, extraneous to the evaluations of the organization department. Local organization departments know the characteristics of local cadres quite well – they have been observing and interacting with them for years; the problem is that the local organization department is subordinate to the local party secretary and the local party secretary promotes people for particular, and often personal, reasons. The local party secretary chooses people he (or occasionally she) thinks can advance his or her agenda; that is why informal politics remains such an important part of the local promotion process. Informal politics frequently includes corruption, which can be defined as the opposite of institutionalization. Despite this tendency, institutionalization still prevails. At least until the present, Chinese leaders have felt compelled to step down from their formal positions after serving two terms, presumably because the political cost of violating this norm would be too great. Although promotions of cadres may be made for personalistic reasons, that does not mean that those promoted are not capable. No doubt there are pressures for institutionalization, but elite politics is the level most difficult to institutionalize, and it appears that it has yet to happen.

What do factions do? Although better databases and the development of new methodologies are leading to new insights into Chinese politics, there is a tendency to forget old questions, particularly the traditional focus on understanding regime dynamics. For Nathan, factions are the primary actors in the political system and they struggle to advance their interests, but only up to a point. For Tsou, the notion of informal small groups suggests both, that some “opinion groups” would form around the “trellises” of organizations but “factions” are also not fixed. At the same time, however, Tsou believes that once a struggle for power has been triggered, the game is one of “win all or lose all.” For Tsou, regardless of the degree of institutionalization, it is insufficient to constrain political contestation within a stable set of rules. Dittmer argues that Chinese politics are dominated by informal politics but sees no intrinsic reason why that could not lead to

What is a faction?   131 c­ ompromise and stability. After all, in the political history of the PRC there had been periods of stability and conflict; why privilege one over the other?32 In the work of Shih, Keller and others there seems to be an implicit assumption that China is a stable authoritarian regime and, in that sense, their work seems to converge to some degree with Nathan’s later emphasis on authoritarian resilience and institutionalization. However, Shih and Keller are clear that factions and/or networks still play an important role, so their task is to understand what factions do. In their view, factions provide material benefits for followers and open channels of mobility for an emerging “power elite.” Although Keller’s work explains why some people rise in the system, it begs the question of whether domination is the goal, as Tsou would assume, or whether compromise and system maintenance is the goal, or at least the outcome, as the early Nathan would suggest. One might also ask questions about the relationship between factions and institutionalization. Although they are opposite forms of organization – to the extent that power is distributed by rule, informal relations matter less – one might argue that a stable factional system might, over time, lead to a more institutionalized system, or, conversely, that factionalism might erode political stability by encouraging corruption. In short, it would be useful to relate the recent research on factions to old questions about the political dynamics of China. One might start by asking more systematically why factions are formed (if one assumes they are formed) and what factions do (beyond providing material benefits for followers). As suggested earlier, if the purpose of factions is to secure power, then what is the relationship between factions and legitimacy? Mao used his position and followers to build his legitimacy, but factions in and of themselves are corrosive of regime legitimacy. Presumably this is why Xi Jinping has denounced factions and gone after them in his campaign against corruption. So is the role of faction increasing over time, eroding legitimacy, as Pei Minxin suggests,33 or are they simply part of a relatively stable authoritarian system, as Shih suggests. If factions are formed to protect the power and wealth of political leaders, then it is remarkable how often they fail to do this. This proposition is, of course, difficult to prove because a strong faction that protects a political leader might go unnoticed because it went unchallenged, but whatever factional strength Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang had, it was insufficient to protect them when the top leader decided to topple them. This history suggests that the power of the paramount leader transcends factions, a view that comports more with Tsou’s view of the Chinese political system than Nathan’s. The only successful factional defense of power that comes to mind is when Jiang Zemin apparently successfully fended off Hu Jintao’s effort to undermine Jiang’s power when he (Hu) charged Chen Liangyu with corruption. Moreover, if one purpose of factions is to pass power on to a successor generation in the hope of preserving policy continuity and perhaps family wealth, this has never worked out the way one might have expected. Mao’s policies were overturned by Deng, and Jiang, as suggested earlier, turned on some of the

132   Joseph Fewsmith f­ ollowers of Deng. Hu Jintao apparently tried to do the same thing to Jiang and Xi Jinping has worked hard to curtail the influence of Jiang and other elders. Whatever else factions do, they do not preserve the power and influence of leadership generations. One might also ask about the relationship between factions and policy. Nathan’s original conception of factions suggested that they were policy neutral – factions only served the power interests of factional leaders. However, as we have noted, Chen Yun and others certainly used their influence in the economic system to pursue policy goals, just as Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun used their power in the propaganda apparatus to pursue their policy agenda. Such an approach reopens the relationship between factions (or networks) and the “trellises” they grow on in ways that would benefit the study of Chinese politics. It would also bring together the literature on “fragmented authoritarianism” with those on factions and elite politics. The field could benefit by thinking of factions as being of different sorts, some ideological, some personal, and some organizational and policy oriented. Finally, the field could benefit from thinking about how factions have varied across time. How has their role in the Chinese political system changed over time? As Dittmer has discussed, the strength of a factional leader in the Maoist period depended largely on the depth and breadth of a person’s service in the party. Long-­term veterans, particularly those who had taken part in the Long March, formed a privileged elite, and, indeed, the importance of the Long March in elite selection did not end until the passing of Deng Xiaoping in 1997. Such veterans earned respect by virtue of their early participation in the party, by their accomplishments in the course of the revolution, the range of their activities and the accumulation of relationships throughout the party. Deng’s military background, propaganda experience, participation in foreign affairs and long administrative experience made him a natural choice for leadership following the deaths of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and the arrest of the Gang of Four. By comparison, the young and relatively inexperienced Hua Guofeng did not stand a chance. If we assume that Deng’s long experience and wide contacts in the party provided support for him to become China’s “paramount leader,” no one since Deng can claim the same sort of breadth and depth of following. Indeed, the nature and importance of factionalism underwent an important change when Jiang Zemin became general secretary. Jiang had never (as far as we know) been considered for the top leadership position prior to Tiananmen. Although Keller’s data suggests that his “betweenness centrality” was high, his ability to host leaders like Li Xiannian and Chen Yun when they visited Shanghai in the winter was certainly an important factor in his ultimate selection. In any event, he was moved quickly into position under extraordinary circumstances and many expected that he would not last long. Jiang survived because he not only kept a low profile in his early years, but also cultivated relations with the elders, moved decisively to support Deng’s line in 1992, and was the beneficiary of the fortuitous order in which the “eight immortals” passed from the scene – with Deng

What is a faction?   133 being the last. However, if being respectful of his elders, bending skillfully with the wind, and a degree of luck were important to Jiang’s survival, so too was his careful cultivation and promotion of the “Shanghai Gang.” Indeed, it was with the emergence of this Jiang faction that observers of China began once again to focus on factions. Jiang’s faction, and I think we can consider this more of a pure faction than the widespread support that Deng had, was not the result of the breadth and depth of his contacts within the party but was very much a top-­down creation. Jiang drew heavily (though not exclusively) on people he had worked with in Shanghai because the careers of his post-­revolutionary generation were far narrower, and far more bureaucratic and stove-­piped, than those of their predecessors. Jiang’s power might be more accurately considered based on faction than that of Deng, who had much broader, if not uncontested, support. Moreover, lacking the wide informal power that Deng possessed by virtue of his long revolutionary career, Jiang had to expand and pack the Politburo Standing Committee in order to retain influence after his retirement at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002 and his subsequent retirement as chair of the Central Military Commission two years later. It is hard to imagine a retired Jiang rallying support within the party by embarking on some sort of southern tour as Deng was able to do in 1992; Jiang could only influence policy and particularly personnel through his loyalists in the Politburo Standing Committee. The careful balance of promotions from the “princelings” and the CYL that Cheng Li has traced reflected the continuing strength of Jiang and the inability of his successor, Hu Jintao, to escape Jiang’s influence. If we can say that Mao built his power through a combination of building support in the army, promoting people loyal to him, securing Comintern support (or at least acceptance), becoming the interpreter of Marxism–Leninism for China, and out-­maneuvering rivals through a combination of temporary alliances and well-­executed attacks on other leaders, and that Deng Xiaoping similarly built his support over a long period of time as a military leader, as an administrator and as a party leader, post-­revolutionary leadership will be distinctly different. Jiang’s career, as noted earlier, was far more stove-­piped than his predecessors and Hu Jintao’s career even more circumscribed. For them, factions had to be built from the top down; they were means to exercise power, not to thrust oneself into power. For Xi Jinping, much the same is true, though we can assume that he had through his princeling background gained a much wider network of support in the party when he assumed power than either Jiang or Hu had. Nevertheless, Xi has moved much more aggressively than his predecessors to remove potential rivals and consolidate power. The other trend that has become apparent in recent years is the growing importance of local factions. Mao tried to keep the party bureaucracy under control through political campaigns, but local cadres have become much more secure in their positions in the reform era and engaged in collusive behavior to limit the ability of higher-­ups to inspect their work and potentially sanction their behavior. More importantly, collusive behavior has led to widespread corruption

134   Joseph Fewsmith (at least before Xi Jinping’s campaign against corruption). It is apparently quite common for office seekers to present gifts to superiors, and for those superiors to use such gifts to bribe those above them to secure their own promotions. As Chinese media investigations into political networks in Shanxi have shown, local networks grew up around local resources (primarily coal) and extended from the local level up through the provincial party standing committee.34 In this sense, local factionalism has undermined party discipline, the mainstay of CCP rule. The campaign against corruption is intended in part to strengthen central control over the localities and break up the dense local networks that make local party organizations less than responsive to Beijing’s wishes.

Conclusion This review of the literature suggests that the concept of faction and related notions of guanxi, informal politics and networks can be useful if used carefully and with attention to the political context. Since all political systems have informal politics, the question is how is China different? Is the political system bigger than factions or do factions define the system? How have factions evolved over the years? It seems that the best approach is to try to define the political game being played. Is it a game to win all? Or merely a game to strive for greater benefits? Most of the field now seems to define China as an authoritarian political system; this seems appropriate given the increasing institutionalization of at least some “rules of the game.” However, the role that Jiang Zemin appears to have played vis-­à-vis Hu Jintao suggests that one leader does not give way easily to another leader. The challenge that Bo Xilai presented – and the way that it was dealt with – similarly suggests that the game to win all is still alive and well. It is also important to keep in mind how few are the cases we are looking at. Since 1949, China has had only five leaders, six if one includes Hua Guofeng. In the same period of time, the United States has had 12 presidents. Moreover, assuming that Deng Xiaoping designated not only Jiang Zemin but also Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping is the first leader of China since 1949 not designated by either Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping. So it seems natural that Xi will play by different rules from either of his immediate predecessors. We should accordingly be open to seeing Xi acting outside the bounds of his predecessors. This sensitivity to political context suggests that we need to see factions in relationship to other elements of the system. If faction influences promotion, as many people contend, then we need to keep in mind that the cadre system itself is a product of Leninist organization, not factionalism. The tension between factionalism and Leninism, particularly in the post-­Deng context, is an obvious feature of contemporary politics in need of exploration. The China field does not seem to be able to get away from the concept of faction; however, more attention to what we mean by faction, the different sorts of faction that exist, or could exist, how faction relates to legitimacy, the role that faction plays in the political system, and how that role has changed over time would enhance the usefulness of the term.

What is a faction?   135

Notes   1 I would like to express my appreciation to Jean Oi for encouraging me to write this chapter. I am however solely responsible for the results.   2 Alice Miller, “The Trouble with Factions,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 46 (Winter 2015), www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm46am.pdf.   3 Li Cheng, “One Party, Two Factions: Chinese Bipartisanship in the Making?,” http:// carnegieendowment.org/files/Li_Cheng%20Revised.pdf.   4 Andrew J. Nathan, “A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics,” The China Quarterly, no. 53 (January–March 1973): 34–66.   5 “Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal Groups in CCP Politics,” The China Quarterly, no. 65 (March 1976): 98–117.   6 Zhao Ziyang, Gaige licheng [Milestones in reform] (Hong Kong: New Century Media, 2009), pp. 210–212. See also Joseph Fewsmith, “What Zhao Ziyang Tells Us about Elite Politics in the 1980s,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 33 (Fall 2009), www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM30JF.pdf.   7 Andrew J. Nathan, Peking Politics, 1918–1923: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).   8 Andrew J. Nathan, “A Factional Model for CCP Politics,” p. 50, fn. 47.   9 Thomas Kampen, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the Evolution of the Chinese Communist Leadership (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2000) and Gao Hua, Hong taiyang shi zenyang shengqide [How was the red flag raised?] (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2000), pp. 99–136. 10 Luo Zhanglong was one of the early leaders of the CCP. At the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in 1931, he disagreed strongly with Wang Ming and called his own separate meeting of the “Central Committee.” He was soon expelled from the CCP. 11 Gao Hua, Hong taiyang shi zenyang shengqide, pp. 99–136. 12 Tang Tsou, “Chinese Politics at the Top: Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance-­of-Power Politics or a Game to Win All?,” The China Journal 34 (1995), pp. 95–156. 13 Tang Tsou, “The Tiananmen Tragedy,” in Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective, ed. Brantly Womack (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 319. 14 Lowell Dittmer, “The Changing Shape of Elite Power Politics,” The China Journal 45 (January 2001): 57; and Lowell Dittmer and Wu Yu-­shan, “The Modernization of Factionalism in Chinese Politics,” World Politics 47, no. 4 (July 1995), p. 467. 15 Lowell Dittmer, “The Changing Shape of Elite Politics,” p. 60. 16 Roderick MacFarquhar, “Foreword,” in Zhao Ziyang, Prisoner of the State, tr. Bao Pu, Renee Chang and Adi Ignatius (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), p. xix. 17 The literature on informal politics and factions does not discuss “prestige,” yet it is an important element in any political system. Chen Yun had a great deal of respect among many party leaders for his personal integrity, managerial capability and long history in the party. Such prestige cannot be reduced to “faction.” 18 Richard Baum, Burying Mao (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 160. 19 Deng Liqun, Shi’erge qunqiu, unpublished, p. 715. 20 My natural inclination to use an expression like the “more reform-­minded wing of the party” reflects my skepticism that reformers can be grouped into one or more factions. 21 Li, “One Party, Two Factions.” 22 Victor Shih, “Factions Matter: Personal Networks and the Distribution of Bank Loans in China,” Journal of Contemporary China 13, no. 38 (February 2004): 7. 23 Victor Chung-­Hon Shih, “ ‘Nauseating Displays of Loyalty’: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China,” The Journal of Politics 70, no. 4 (October 2008): 1177–1192.

136   Joseph Fewsmith 24 Victor Shih, Christopher Adolph and Mingxing Liu, “Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China,” Amer­ican Political Science Review 106, no. 1 (February 2012): 166–187. 25 Jerome Tan Sibayan, “A Network Analysis of China’s Central Committee: A Dynamical Theory of Policy Networks” (Ph.D. dissertation, Kansas State University, 2013); and Leo S. Gregory, “A Social Network Analysis of the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo” (MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013). 26 Franziska Keller, “Moving Beyond Factions: Using Social Network Analysis to Uncover Patronage Networks among Chinese Elites,” available at Researchgate.net. 27 Franziska Barbara Keller, “Networks of Power: Using Social Network Analysis to Understand Who Will Rule and Who Is Really in Charge in the Chinese Communist Party,” draft, July 2015. 28 Franziska Barbara Keller, “Networks of Power: A Social Network Analysis of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee, 1982–2012,” paper presented at Amer­ican Political Science Association meeting, August 2014. Emphasis added. 29 Keller, “Networks of Power,” p. 41. 30 Andrew J. Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (January 2003): 6–17. 31 Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience,” pp. 9 and 16. 32 Lowell Dittmer, “Chinese Informal Politics,” The China Journal 34 (July 1995): 8. 33 Minxin Pei, “The Twilight of Communist Party Rule in China,” The Amer­ican Interest, 12 November 2015, www.the-­Amer­ican-interest.com/2015/11/12/the-­ twilight-of-­communist-party-­rule-in-­china. 34 Joseph Fewsmith, “China’s Political Ecology and the Fight against Corruption,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 46 (Winter 2015).

7 Politics of anti-­corruption campaign Chen Gang

China has always had an image problem on the issue of official corruption. Since the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989, corruption is generally believed to have worsened.1 According to the global Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) compiled by Transparency International, China ranked at number 100 in terms of cleanness out of 175 countries in 2014, the same as Algeria and Suriname.2 The ratio of China’s CPI position to the total number of countries surveyed by Transparency International had risen from 40 percent in 2008 to 57 percent in 2014 (Table 7.1), indicating a deteriorating corruption situation in China during that period. Earlier records revealed that mostly low- and mid-­level corrupt officials had been exposed and punished, but high-­level and high-­stakes cases (da’an yao’an) are on the rise these days. Although China has been consistently performing better than some other emerging economies like India and Russia, Ash3 argues that “while the Indian system is a daily soap opera of small crises, the big crisis of China’s self-­contradictory system of Leninist capitalism is yet to come.” Some have deemed China’s corruption as being systematized and embedded in the system of state capitalism.4 While scholars have been paying intense attention to various aspects of corruption in China in the past two decades, cryptic anti-­corruption institutions in this non-­democratic governance are often understudied largely due to the opaque intra-­regime disciplinary inspection process associated with extra-­legal detentions as well as the sub-­rosa nature5 of corruption activities. Scholarly efforts have been made by Manion,6 Quah,7 and Wedeman8 to provide detailed assessment of the effectiveness of China’s anti-­corruption agencies and campaigns, but even these cutting-­edge research works have not been able to capture the recent dynamics of Xi Jinping’s anti-­corruption campaign after the Eighteenth Party Congress in 2012, and its institutional implications for the current condition and future of the Party-­state. Since international scholars with pessimistic views about the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) governance often cite widespread corruption and entrenchment of predatory officials as major evidence of the CCP’s atrophy (gradual decline),9 the study of Xi’s unprecedented anti-­corruption movement helps to provide clues to the question as to whether the CCP is capable of managing the intractable corruption problem through significant re-­institutionalization effort, or in Andrew

70 163 42.9

China’s rank 78 No. of countries surveyed 159 Ratio of China’s position to the total number (%)** 49.1

72 179 40.2

2007 72 180 40

2008 79 180 43.9

2009 78 178 43.8

2010

75 183 41

2011

80 174 46

2012

80 177 45

2013

100 175 57

2014

Notes * The annual CPI, first released in 1995, is the best known of Transparency International’s tools. The CPI ranks countries by their perceived levels of corruption as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. ** The higher the ratio of a country’s rank position to the total number of countries surveyed, the more corrupt the country is. From the calculation of ratio, it is evident that China’s anti-corruption performances might have improved with the ratio dipping from 49.1% in 2005 to 40% in 2008, but could have worsened between 2008 and 2014 when the ratio rose to 57%.

Source: Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index: Results,” various years, at www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results (accessed 1 May 2015).

2006

2005

Year

Table 7.1  China’s ranking in the corruption perceptions index* by Transparency International (2005–2014)

Politics of anti-corruption campaign   139 ­ athan’s words, whether the CCP is enjoying an “authoritarian resilience” N when dealing with this issue. The study of institutionalization in authoritarian regimes, which takes seriously previously neglected institutional pillars of non-­democratic governance, has been revived to explain adaptive initiatives undertaken by resilient authoritarian rulers in coping with chronic governance challenges.11 Current scholarship has touched upon many aspects of the CCP’s re-­institutionalization endeavor for adaptation and co-­optation purposes, which include the professionalization of the civil service,12 rebuilding of Party cells,13 the experiment of “intra-­party democracy”14 and regular career cadre training in Party schools,15 but Xi Jinping’s overhaul of anti-­corruption institutions, as well as the effectiveness in maintaining the CCP’s “authoritarian resilience”16 in the face of bureaucratic fragmentation and citizen activism, is a field yet to be explored. In the shadow of the Arab Spring that had toppled a string of entrenched dictatorships in North Africa, the CCP’s central authority has been facing unprecedented challenges from societal forces and vested interests within the regime in the anti-­corruption campaign, with its credibility and legitimacy overtly damaged by frequent graft and sex scandals in the age of social media. By focusing on institutional flaws in the CCP bureaucracy that have catalyzed high-­stakes corruption and by comparing Xi Jinping’s and Hu Jintao’s anti-­corruption drives in an analysis of the evolution of the CCP’s anti-­corruption effort in the reform era, this chapter discusses the different institutional imperatives or fundamental challenges that the top leadership needs to address in an entirely new political and socioeconomic context featuring social media and civic activism. It also examines the extent to which the re-­institutionalization in Xi’s anti-­corruption movement has been effective in addressing these challenges. 10

Socioeconomic causes of corruption Corruption is not a new phenomenon in the 70 years of history of the People’s Republic of China, and this is often explained from the perspective of a lack of independent judiciary system and media supervision. After over 30 years of gradual economic reform, the Party-­state’s partially marketized economy has become a hotbed of more high-­stakes and high-­level corruption cases. Despite three decades of economic liberalization, the state has not withdrawn from the economy, which is still securely in the control of state sectors and strongly ­intervened in by government policies. China’s rapid marketization process after 1992 has opened up more opportunities for rent-­seeking activities. Large state-­ owned enterprises, public service organizations and local governments have become prone to corruption. In the 1980s, local governments were granted a certain degree of fiscal autonomy including independent budget expenditure planning and sharing of budget revenues as proposed by the central government. The administrative decentralization in the 1980s and 1990s had changed fiscal central–local relations, vesting more power over funds and resources in local governments and inevitably creating

140   Chen Gang more chances for local officials to act corruptly. The 1994 tax-­sharing system reform17 recentralized Beijing’s economic management power by increasing its role in fiscal redistribution among provinces, while giving local governments the jurisdiction to collect business tax, urban land use tax, property tax, land value-­ added tax and other taxes related to local development as local revenues.18 The 1994 new tax system had therefore incentivized local governments to put greater emphasis on developing urban construction and real estate, whereby land was acquired from farmers at low cost and sold at high prices, and the profits shared with developers.19 As gross domestic product (GDP) is still the most important evaluation criterion for the promotion of local officials, developing real estate and infrastructure in the process of urbanization is one of the most effective ways for local governments to boost the local economy. Local land transactions and credit markets have become hotbeds of corruption in China. Officials make the rules and arbitrate the land game. The government maintains tight control over most investment projects through the issuance of long-­term bank credit and grants of land use rights.20 Local officials are granted the authority to regulate the access to market, investment funds, foreign investment and trade, etc., and to redistribute fiscal benefits and burdens. Given these powers to interfere in business, local officials have a good deal of room for rent-­seeking activities. In addition to local officials’ monopolistic and discretionary powers over budgets, resources and investment decisions, local Party officials also exercise authority over the judicial system through the political-­legal committees (zhengfawei) and the selection of personnel through the nomenklatura system.21 Judicial corruption cases and “selling of official posts” scandals have been exposed from time to time. Sectors such as energy, financial services, transportation, telecommunications, tobacco, iron and steel, and non-­ferrous metal, where state-­ owned enterprises (SOEs) are either monopolists or dominant players, are breeding grounds for bribery, embezzlement, squandering and other rent-­seeking activities. The government-­granted monopoly or oligopoly has helped key SOEs reap soaring after-­tax profits, which remain mostly in the coffers of the SOEs instead of being allocated to the public purse in the form of dividends. With monopolistic power and vast assets, large SOEs act like “independent kingdoms,” the leaders of which are usually nominated by CCP organization departments and are of higher administrative rank than (or the same rank as) local judicial and Party disciplinary officials. The heads of many centrally controlled SOEs are vice-­ministerial- or provincial-­level officials and a few are at the ministerial level such as presidents in Sinopec Corp, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). Only the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission, with approval from the Politburo, is empowered to investigate and detain leaders of giant SOEs. Currently there are no effective means to supervise government management of state-­owned assets, and no report on state-­owned assets is required during the annual parliamentary session of the National People’s Congress for deliberation and discussion. A motley collection of organizations at various levels, including

Politics of anti-corruption campaign   141 the CCP’s disciplinary inspection departments, the judiciary, the procuratorate, the auditing offices, and banking/securities/insurance supervision departments from the administration, are participating in the crackdown on graft. Such internal pluralism has forestalled the functions of a professional anti-­corruption organ over the jurisdiction it is responsible for, thus causing low efficiency and poor coordination in many cases. Almost all of the top political leaders have family members who have substantial stakes in the corporate world.22 For instance, the family of former premier Li Peng controls the country’s power sector. The family of former Chinese president Jiang Zemin has moved into telecommunications, while the offspring of former premier Zhu Rongji are prominent players in banking. Wen Yunsong, son of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, is the CEO of Beijing-­based Unihub Global Networks, a telecoms services provider for telecommunications facilities and networks for banks, stock agencies and insurance companies. The runaway corruption was spurred by the RMB4 trillion (US$586 million) government-­directed stimulus package aimed at funding massive infrastructure projects and subsidizing industries during the global financial crisis. While the Keynesian mega stimulus has revitalized China’s economy and salvaged numerous jobs in the aftermath of the crisis, it fostered state cronyism and corruption as projects of all types were allocated from the top down, from the state to provinces, to cities and ultimately to companies. Since 2009, investment by state-­controlled companies has skyrocketed, driven by hundreds of billions of dollars of government spending and state bank lending to combat the global economic downturn. The Chinese government had invested RMB2 trillion in high-­speed railway construction alone since 2008, a sum which proved too attractive to former minister of railways Liu Zhijun and many of his colleagues who were subsequently indicted for one of the largest chain corruption cases in the history of the People’s Republic of China. Global leading luxury brands such as Richemont (the owner of Cartier), Swatch Group (the owner of Omega), LVMH (the owner of Louis Vuitton), and PPR (the owner of Gucci and Bottega Veneta) have benefitted handsomely from the stimulus package and corrupt economy in China, witnessing a 20 percent to 30 percent sales growth year on year in Greater China from 2009 to 2012.23 Discretionary spending by Chinese high rollers, including many corrupt officials, has since 2009 powered Macau’s gambling sector, the only place in China where casino gambling is legal, to a record US$38 billion in 2012, a 13.5 percent jump in revenue. Macau’s casino revenues, two-­thirds of which were contributed by affluent Chinese, soared 58 percent and 42 percent respectively in 2010 and 2011.24 Despite the proliferation of corrupt activities, the number of officials under procuratorial investigations each year had not grown correspondingly before Xi took power in 2012 (Figure 7.1). Official statistics have shown that from 2008 to 2012, a total of 13,173 cadres at or above division and county levels (xianchuji) were investigated by procuratorial departments, of whom 950 were bureau-­level officials, and 30 were ministerial-­level or above officials.25

142   Chen Gang 4500 4000

Officials at division level and above Officials at bureau level and above Officials at ministry level and above

4040

3500 3000

2687

2723

2670

2500

2703

2569

2524

2000 1500 1000 589

500

204

181

0

2008

2009

198

188 8

4

2010

2011

204

179 7

6

5

2012

17

2013

38

2014

Figure 7.1 Number of officials under procuratorial investigations for corruption (2008–2014). Source: Supreme People’s Procuratorate of China.

Besides the stimulus package, a number of other factors have catalyzed corruption in China. These include the one-­party authoritarian system that lacks an independent judiciary system and opposition parties, and imposes media censorship; a relatively low level of economic and social development; a vast area and large population governed by multilayer regimes; and numerous policy loopholes and ambiguities as a result of fast institutional changes during the reform and open-­door phase. Globalization and urbanization also make it more difficult to detect commercial corruption in all covert forms. The fact that corruption operates sub rosa has made monitoring of corruption rates difficult. Not only is there a possibility of false reporting, official data also only measure the rate of malfeasances that are exposed, not the actual rate of malfeasances. The revealed cases may shed light on changes in the real corruption rate, or may be a result of intensified anti-­corruption efforts. To some, it probably seems obvious that corruption has intensified because of larger payoffs in revealed cases. This is attributable to the huge economic scale of China today, with rapid appreciation of state assets such as land, SOE equities and franchise rights in the hands of the government sectors. Almost all of the crimes involving ministerial- or provincial-­level and above officials are high-­stakes corruption cases running into tens of millions of yuan; people will not take such risks if it is not worth their while. Indeed, many officials have come up with ever more imaginative ways to gain wealth, such as

Politics of anti-corruption campaign   143 setting up private foundations or offshore accounts to accept bribes, encouraging entrepreneurs and companies to bankroll their children’s education overseas, and obtaining pre-­IPO (initial public offering) stocks.26 In the 1980s or 1990s, most cases only identified one or a couple of officials as corrupt; corruption cases today often involve dozens of corrupt officials in different departments or localities.

Xi’s anti-­corruption campaign: a game changer Chinese leaders have a tendency to embark on anti-­corruption campaigns in their first year of office to consolidate power and court the public. Xi Jinping’s anti-­ corruption campaign is no exception; the scale and intensity of the crackdown is, however, exceptional compared with the similar political house-­cleaning executed by his two predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, in the reform era. The investigation and detention of Zhou Yongkang, the retired CCP security czar, and a large number of his family members, relatives and protégés has denied members of the Politburo Standing Committee immunity from corruption charges. Such immunity had been an informal rule in Chinese elite politics in the past two decades. Xi has struck a populist tone by vowing to fight both “tigers” and “flies,” or powerful leaders and lowly bureaucrats, respectively, in his campaign against runaway official corruption and extravagance. Besides Zhou, Vice Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Su Rong is the highest-­ranking “tiger” nabbed to date, and Xu Caihou, a retired vice-­chairman of the Central Military Commission and a former Politburo member, was expelled from the Party for alleged corruption. Zhou himself is notorious not only for monetary corruption, but also for his political overambitiousness. His downfall is the second chapter of the “Bo Xilai drama,” in which charismatic Bo, supported by Zhou, was sacked due to his wife’s murder scandal in the run-­up to the Eighteenth Party Congress in 2012. Behind-­the-scene jockeying for power and horse-­trading had been extremely intense before the fifth-­generation leadership power transition; Xi Jinping finally managed to establish his supreme authority through controlling both the Party and the military command. Xi’s crackdown on Zhou, a protégé of retired Party patriarchs Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong, has been politically risky. Jiang was general secretary of the CCP between 1989 and 2002 and has managed to retain his political influence until now through putting many of his surrogates in key positions before he left office. Zeng, who has close ties with Jiang, was reportedly playing a vital role in establishing Xi’s heir-­apparent status in 2007. All these point to the tremendous difficulty in handling Zhou’s case. An unprecedented number of officials at and above vice-­ministerial level have been investigated or detained on corruption charges since Xi came to power. Between November 2012 and December 2014, 53 incumbent senior officials were investigated by CCP’s disciplinary inspection departments (Table 7.2). In comparison, the average number of officials at vice-­ministerial level and above

Deputy Party secretary of Sichuan province Chief of the CCP Central Compilation and Translation Bureau Vice-chairman of Hubei Provincial People’s Congress Deputy director of National Development and Reform Commission Vice-governor of Anhui province Vice-governor of Sichuan province Minister of United Front of Inner Mongolia Vice-chairman of People’s Political Consultative Conference of Guangxi Director of State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) Party secretary of Zunyi city, Guizhou Mayor of Nanjing city, Jiangsu Vice-chairman of People’s Political Consultative Conference of Hubei Deputy Governor of Hubei province Vice-chairman of the Jiangxi Provincial People’s Congress Deputy director of the Committee for Economic Affairs of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Conference of Sichuan Vice-chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Conference of Hunan Vice-minister of Public Security Vice-governor of Hainan province Vice-chairman of the Shanxi Provincial People’s Congress Vice-chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Conference of Shaanxi province Vice-governor of Yunnan province Vice-governor of Jiangxi province Vice-chairman of Chinese Association for Science and Technology Chairman of China Resources Holdings Party secretary of Xining city, Qinghai province Vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)

Li Chuncheng (李春城) Yi Junqing (衣俊卿) Wu Yongwen (吴永文) Liu Tienan (刘铁男) Ni Fake (倪发科) Guo Yongxiang (郭永祥) Wang Suyi (王素毅) Li Daqiu (李达球) Jiang Jiemin (蒋洁敏) Liao Shaohua (廖少华) Ji Jianye （季建业） Chen Baihuai (陈柏槐) Guo Youming (郭有明) Chen Anzhong（陈安众） Yang Gang (杨刚)

Li Chongxi (李崇禧) Tong Mingqian (童名谦) Li Dongsheng (李东生) Ji Wenlin (冀文林) Jin Daoming（金道铭） Zhu Zuoli (祝作利) Shen Peiping (沈培平) Yao Mugen (姚木根) Shen Weichen(申维辰) Song Lin (宋林) Mao Xiaobing (毛小兵) Su Rong (苏荣)

Position

Name

December 2013 December 2013 December 2013 February 2014 February 2014 February 2014 March 2014 March 2014 April 2014 April 2014 April 2014 June 2014

December 2012 January 2013 January 2013 May 2013 June 2013 June 2013 June 2013 July 2013 September 2013 October 2013 October 2013 November 2013 November 2013 December 2013 December 2013

Time of dismissal or investigation

Table 7.2  List of incumbent officials (at vice-ministerial level or above) under investigation between November 2012 and December 2014

Source: compiled by the author.

Sun Zhaoxue (孙兆学) Pan Yiyang (潘逸阳) Qin Yuhai (秦玉海) Zhao Shaolin (赵少麟) He Jiacheng (何家成) Chen Tiexin (陈铁新) Liang Bin (梁滨) Sui Fengfu (隋凤富) Zhu Mingguo (朱明国) Ling Jihua (令计划) Han Xue Jian (韩学键)

Bai Yun (白云) Ren Runhou (任润厚) Bai Enpei (白恩培)

Han Xiancong (韩先聪) Nie Chunyu (聂春玉) Chen Chuanping (陈川平)

Du Shanxue (杜善学) Ling Zhengce (令政策) Wan Qing Liang (万庆良) Xu Caihou (徐才厚) Tan Li (谭力) Zhang Tianxin (张田欣) Wu Changshun (武长顺) Chen Tiexin (陈铁新) Zhou Yongkang (周永康)

Vice-governor of Shanxi province Vice-chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Conference of Shanxi province Party secretary of Guangzhou city, Guangdong province CMC vice-chairman, Politburo member (retired) Vice-governor of Hainan province Party secretary of Kunming city, Yunnan province Vice-chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Conference of Tianjin municipality Vice-chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Conference of Liaoning province Politburo Standing Committee member, secretary of the CCP Political and Legislative Affairs Committee (retired) Vice-chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Conference of Anhui province Secretary-general of Shanxi Provincial Party Committee Party secretary of Taiyuan city, Shanxi province, CCP Central Committee alternate member Director of Shanxi Provincial United Front Department Vice-governor of Shanxi province Deputy director of the Environment and Resource Protection Committee of the National People’s Congress, former Party secretary of Yunnan province President of Aluminum Corp of China Vice-governor of Inner Mongolia Vice-chairman of Henan Provincial People’s Congress Secretary-general of Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee Executive vice-president of the Chinese Academy of Governance Vice-chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Conference of Liaoning province Director of the Organization Department of the Hebei Provincial Party Committee Vice-chairman of Heilongjiang Provincial People’s Congress Chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Conference of Guangdong province Chief of the Party’s United Front Work Department Member of the Heilongjiang Provincial Party Committee September 2014 September 2014 September 2014 October 2014 October 2014 October 2014 November 2014 November 2014 November 2014 December 2014 December 2014

August 2014 August 2014 August 2014

July 2014 August 2014 August 2014

June 2014 June 2014 June 2014 June 2014 July 2014 July 2014 July 2014 July 2014 July 2014

146   Chen Gang that were being investigated in Hu Jintao’s second term (2008–12) only reached six per annum.27 Before Zhou oversaw CCP’s security and legal affairs, he had held key positions in the petroleum industry, Ministry of Land and Resources, and southwestern Sichuan province. Analysing the background of corrupt officials in Table 7.1, it is found that many of them had work experience in places previously under Zhou’s care. “Tigers,” such as Guo Yongxiang, Ji Wenlin (Table 7.1) and Li Hualin, former vice-­general manager of the state-­owned CNPC, were former secretaries to Zhou before they were promoted to key positions in the Ministry of Land and Resources or in Sichuan province. Party secretary of PetroChina International Shen Dingcheng, another former secretary to Zhou, is also being probed for graft. Sichuan province, one of Zhou’s major power bases, and coal-­rich Shanxi province, have contributed the greatest number of disgraced senior officials among all the provinces (Table 7.1). Sichuan governor hopeful Li Chuncheng, semi-­retired Guo Yongxiang, and Li Chongxi, who had held sinecure positions, were closely connected to Zhou and his family businesses in Sichuan, most of which were run by Zhou Bin, Zhou’s elder son. A number of influential business tycoons in Sichuan province, including Liu Han, ex-­head of mining conglomerate Sichuan Hanlong Group, and his brother Liu Wei, were charged for mafia-­style crimes in connection with bribery of corrupt officials. Liu Han, previously a delegate of Sichuan’s political advisory body, was ranked one hundred and forty-­eighth on Forbes’ list of the richest Chinese businesspeople in 2012. The probes into Zhou’s protégés are not confined to the Sichuan province, however. Ding Xuefeng, former mayor of Luliang city, Shanxi province, was removed from office in February 2014. Zhou Bin, Zhou’s son, reportedly contributed to a fund to help Ding run for the mayor’s office in January 2012. Ding later distributed the cash raised among his allies.28 Other “tigers” linked to Zhou’s clique include Jiang Jiemin, former general manager of China National Petroleum Corporation, Wu Yongwen, former vicechairman of Hubei Provincial People’s Congress, and Li Dongsheng, former vice-­minister of public security. Under the auspices of his father, Zhou Bin, a graduate of the Southwest Petroleum University in Sichuan province, has made his fortune from transactions involving oilfields, equipment, power projects and property development at home and abroad. Together with some of his surrogates, Zhou Bin is now under formal detention. During Zhou’s five-­year tenure (2007–12) in the Politburo Standing Committee overseeing China’s police, security forces and judiciary, the country’s budget for internal security and stability maintenance (weiwen) had soared in the face of growing social tensions and citizen activism, exceeding military spending for the first time in 2010. Unprecedented spending on domestic security and order maintenance had induced rampant corruption and malfeasance in the legal and security departments. Li Dongsheng, vice-­minister of public security, and Liang Ke, director of Beijing Municipal Bureau of State Security, were among the high-­flyers in the system that have been taken into custody by anti-­corruption

Politics of anti-corruption campaign   147 watchdogs. Meng Jianzhu has replaced Zhou Yongkang as the secretary of the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee of the CCP Central Committee since 2012. Meng however remains a Politburo member instead of being promoted to the more powerful Standing Committee. Police, state security, armed civil militia, courts and jails are now under the command of the newly established National Security Commission headed by Xi Jinping himself.

Differences between Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao Anti-­corruption campaigns are reflective of intensifying political struggles within the CCP. In the first few years of their tenure, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao had launched house-­cleaning operations against senior corrupt officials like ex-­ Beijing party secretary Chen Xitong and ex-­Shanghai party secretary Chen Liangyu to consolidate their power. Previous anti-­corruption drives usually subsided when a new balance of power had been struck and the central leadership needed to rely on local officials to implement policies. Xi, however, has been the game changer in the CCP’s anti-­corruption record as his populist move against elite corruption is ongoing and extensive, and implemented in tandem with a crackdown on official extravagance and overspending on banquets, gifts and overseas trips. To safeguard the CCP’s image and legitimacy, Jiang and Hu restricted their crackdown to only principal political opponents and their key allies. Xi has proved to be bolder and more determined to stamp out runaway corruption and extravagance. As already mentioned, during Hu Jintao’s second term, despite the proliferation of corrupt activities, the number of officials under procuratorial investigations each year had not grown correspondingly (refer back to Figure 7.1).29 The yearly average number of officials from the division and county levels, the bureau level, and ministerial level and above being investigated were 2,635, 190 and six, respectively. Xi’s crackdown focused more on “tigers” (ministerial officials) than on “flies” (division- or bureau-­level), as shown in Figure 7.1. Between January and November 2013, China’s procuratorate departments investigated a total of 2,703 officials at division level (chu ji) and above, and 204 officials at bureau level and above,30 only slightly higher than the yearly average during Hu’s tenure. In contrast, a total of 17 ministerial officials were investigated throughout 2013, much higher than the average number of six cases per year in Hu’s second term (Figure 7.1). The relatively stable number of low-­level officials under probe does not mean that Xi is more lenient toward the “flies” than the “tigers.” An important aspect of his people-­pleasing campaign to clean up the CCP is the observance of a thrifty lifestyle and punishment for official extravagance. In most cases, such malpractices do not result in criminal charges but only in disciplinary punishment. The CCP disciplinary inspection authority punished almost 20,000 officials throughout 2013 for decadence and breaching stringent rules. More than 5,000 officials were found to have breached rules connected to the use of official cars, while 903 were guilty of organizing overly elaborate celebratory events.31

148   Chen Gang Xi relies heavily on Wang Qishan, a banking veteran who now heads the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) to fight corruption. Nicknamed the “fire fighting chief,” Wang is well-­known for his boldness and efficiency in managing crises like the SARS epidemic in 2003 and a massive bankruptcy restructuring in 1998. A son-­in-law of a late vice-­premier, Wang’s family background and financial expertise give him special advantages in the fight against elite corruption. The CCP’s anti-­corruption apparatus is a hierarchical system of discipline inspection commissions (DICs) that run parallel to Party committees at every administrative level from the center down to counties.32 DICs are Party watchdogs that help guard against power abuse of high-­ranking Party members and ensure the implementation of the Party line, policies and resolutions. At the top level, the CCDI had 27 departments with a staff strength of approximately 1,000 by the end of 2014.33 These departments include the General Office, Office of Inspection Tour, Party Committee, and departments of organization, publicity, research, laws and regulations, supervision of Party and government ethics, complaints, case supervision and management, case review, internal supervision, international cooperation (Office for National Bureau of Corruption Prevention), logistics and retired cadres, and 12 departments of discipline inspection charged with anti-­corruption missions in various regions and Party/administrative systems (Table 7.3). Table 7.3 Division of work among the 12 departments of discipline inspection in the CCDI Serial number of discipline inspection department

Anti-corruption focus

1st department

Organizations directly under the CCP Central Committee, and those in political, legal and publicity fields Organizations under the State Council Organizations under the State Council Financial institutions State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and companies directly under the control of SASAC Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei and Shanxi Shanghai, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian and Jiangxi Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, liaison offices in Hong Kong and Macau Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan and Tibet Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan and Hubei

2nd department 3rd department 4th department 5th department 6th department 7th department 8th department 9th department 10th department 11th department 12th department

Source: the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection [CCDI], A Brief Introduction to CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (Beijing: CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection [CCDI], 2014).

Politics of anti-corruption campaign   149 The CCDI has in recent years paid more attention to tip-­offs from ordinary Party members and the public. It opened its website portal for the first time to the public in September 2013. Informants can send their tip-­offs to the departments of complaints under the CCDI via correspondence, posting on the CCDI website, making a visit to special reception venues set up by discipline inspection organs, or calling the hotline. The discipline inspection departments that handle the reports are required to send the outcomes of investigations to the whistle-­blowers. Inspired by ancient China’s imperial envoys (qinchai dachen) sent by emperors to oversee local officials, Xi and Wang have dispatched ten inspection teams (xunshizu) led by ministerial-­level officials holding sinecure positions to corruption-­prone provinces, state corporations and public service organizations. The inspection teams are stationed in these places for two months to uncover local graft and their contact information is publicized to seek public tip-­offs. Xi and Wang sent the first batch of inspection teams to various localities in May 2013. Five months later, the second batch of inspection teams, headed by different officials, were sent to another ten places for graft investigation (Table 7.4). The teams provide feedback to the inspection bodies and alert the CCP CCDI to signs of possible corruption. The inspection teams have already identified places where rampant corruption occurs, such as Shanxi province, Hunan province, Guizhou province, Jiangxi province, China Grain Reserves Corporation, Renmin University and the Three Gorges Corporation. One of the highest-­profile corruption cases discovered by inspection teams was an electoral fraud scandal in Hunan province involving more than 500 municipal lawmakers who had to step down and 56 representatives of the Hunan People’s Congress who were Table 7.4 Places of inspection covered by the two batches of anti-corruption inspection teams, 2013 Serial number of inspection team

Place of inspection (first batch, May–July)

Place of inspection (second batch, October–December)

No. 1

China Grain Reserves Corporation Hubei province Ministry of Water Resources Inner Mongolia Chongqing city Guizhou province China Publishing Group Corporation Jiangxi province The Export–Import Bank of China Renmin University of China

Ministry of Commerce

No. 2 No. 3 No. 4 No. 5 No. 6 No. 7 No. 8 No. 9 No. 10

Source: Xinhua News Agency.

Xinhua News Agency Ministry of Land and Resources Jilin province Yunnan province Shanxi province Anhui province Guangdong province Three Gorges Corporation Hunan province

150   Chen Gang d­ ismissed for being elected through bribery. An initial investigation revealed that 110 million yuan (US$18.1 million) were offered as bribes to lawmakers and staff in the province’s second city of Hengyang. Tong Mingqian, former vice-­chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Conference of Hunan province, was sacked and probed for graft thereafter. The armed forces, a relatively independent “kingdom” that often evades supervision from the judiciary and even the Party’s disciplinary departments, has also not been spared. Unlike the punishment meted out to civil servants and CCP officials, the investigations and sentences of army officers are seldom announced to the public. However, in the first two months of 2015, Beijing surprisingly announced investigations of 30 senior military officials on serious corruption charges (Table 7.5). These officials were from the major military regions under the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as well as the respective logistics departments, second artillery corps and military universities of these regions. Many of those implicated have ties with the scandal-­ridden Xu Caihou or Guo Boxiong.

Reforming anti-­corruption institutions China’s pervasive corruption is closely related to institutional flaws within the CCP bureaucracy. The top leadership has realized that to win a full-­scale war on corruption, the Party has to rely more on institutional improvements rather than on high-­handed campaigns to make the regime more accountable, transparent and responsive. China’s special judicial system, dominated by the ruling Party, keeps all anti-­corruption investigations under wraps and facilitates manipulation. Instead of the procuratorate or the police, the CCP’s discipline inspection committees at various levels are usually the organs that start the investigations and detain suspects with Party membership. These discipline inspection sub-­branches, established at provincial, municipal, county and even township levels, are often under the dual leadership of local Party bosses and the discipline inspection committees at a higher level (see Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3). In most cases, instead of the higher disciplinary inspection apparatus, the local Party committees or local governments – which approve cadre promotions, determine manpower planning and even allocate resources such as cars, office buildings and employee housing – provide reports about their annual budgetary fund and expenditure to local disciplinary inspectors. In addition, organizations at various levels, including the CCP’s disciplinary inspection departments, the judiciary, the procuratorate, the auditing offices, and the banking/securities/ insurance supervision departments of the administration, are also participating in the crackdown on graft. Such internal pluralism has forestalled the functions of a professional anti-­corruption organ over the jurisdiction that it is responsible for, thus causing low efficiency and poor coordination in many cases. The disciplinary inspectors at local levels therefore encounter difficulties overseeing malfeasance at the peer level. Only the CDIC, with the approval of the Politburo, is empowered to investigate and detain provincial and ministerial

Politics of anti-corruption campaign   151 Table 7.5 Names of 30 PLA officers under investigation (as announced on 16 January and 2 March 2015) Name

Military position before investigation

Liu Zheng Yu Daqing Fan Changmi Wang Minggui Fang Wenping Wei Jin Ye Wanyong

Deputy head of the PLA General Logistics Department Deputy political commissar of the Second Artillery Force Deputy political commissar of the Lanzhou Military Area Command Political commissar of the Air Force Command School Head of the Military Command in Shanxi Deputy political commissar of the Tibet Military Command Political commissar of the Sichuan Provincial Military Command in Chengdu Deputy commander of the Chengdu Military Area Command Deputy chief of staff at the Jinan Military Area Command Deputy chief of staff at the PLA General Logistics Department Deputy president of the PLA Nanjing Political College Deputy political commissar and chief of discipline inspection at PLA Information Engineering University Head of the Political Affairs Department at the PLA Nanjing Political College Deputy commander at the Heilongjiang Provincial Military Command Deputy head at PLA unit 96301 Vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission Director of the joint logistics department of the Chengdu Military Area Command Director of the joint logistics department of the Shenyang Military Area Command Director of the political department of the Shanxi Provincial Military Command Deputy director of the political department of the PLA National Defence University Commander of the Hubei Provincial Military Command Director of the research instruction department of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences Deputy political commissar of the PLA Second Artillery Force Deputy director of the management and support department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters Deputy chief of staff of the North China Sea Fleet of the PLA Navy Deputy director of the joint logistics department of the PLA Guangzhou Military Area Command Deputy director of the political department of the air force under the PLA Beijing Military Area Command Director of the logistics department of the air force under the PLA Guangzhou Military Area Command Deputy political commissar of the Zhejiang Provincial Military Command Deputy commander of the Hubei Provincial Military Command

Yang Jinshan Zhang Qibin Fu Linguo Dai Weimin Gao Xiaoyan Ma Xiangdong Zhang Daixin Chen Qiang Xu Caihou Zhu Heping Wang Aiguo Huang Xianjun Duan Tianjie Yuan Shijun Huang Xing Zhang Dongshui Liu Hongjie Cheng Jie Chen Jianfeng Chen Hongyan Wang Sheng Guo Zhenggang Lan Weijie

Source: Xinhua News Agency.

152   Chen Gang

CCP Central Committee, Politburo

CCP Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC)

Provincial Party Committee

Provincial Discipline Inspection Committee

Municipal Party Committee

Municipal Discipline Inspection Committee

County Party Committee

County Discipline Inspection Committee

Township Party Committee

Township Discipline Inspection Committee

Figure 7.2  The CCP discipline inspection apparatus before 2013. Source: prepared by the author. Note → Denotes leadership relationship.

officials or leaders of giant SOEs. Besides, local Party officials have authority over the judicial system through the local political-­legal committees (zhengfawei) and the nomenklatura system. Judicial corruption cases and “selling of official posts” scandals have been exposed from time to time. To enhance the authority of disciplinary inspection committees at various levels, the top leadership has decided to put them under the direct control of the upper-­level disciplinary inspection committees, thus weakening the leadership relationship between the Party committees and disciplinary inspection committees at each respective level (Figure 7.3). Similar reforms are also applied to judicial systems that include the courts and procuratorates at various levels to strengthen their independence and authority vis-­à-vis local Party bosses.

Politics of anti-corruption campaign   153

CCP Central Committee, Politburo (headed by Xi)

CCP CDIC (headed by Wang Qishan)

Provincial Party Committee

Provincial Discipline Inspection Committee

Municipal Party Committee

Municipal Discipline Inspection Committee

County Party Committee

County Discipline Inspection Committee

Township Party Committee

Township Discipline Inspection Committee

Figure 7.3  The CCP discipline inspection apparatus after 2013. Source: prepared by the author. Notes → Denotes strong leadership relationship. → (Dotted) denotes weakened leadership relationship.

On 11 February 2014, Premier Li Keqiang said the government would open its budget and all its accounts further to the public and urged top cadres to strengthen constraints on their relatives and staff.34 China’s Budget Law which took effect from 1995 does not specifically require governments at various levels to release exact budgetary figures for officials’ extravagance on vehicles, banquets and overseas trips at the expense of public funds, or the “three public expenses” (sangong xiaofei). Soaring fiscal revenues in the past decade have, however, started to make headlines and have pushed the central government to pass a regulation on information disclosure of the three expenses since 2008. In response to the demand to open the government’s account book to public

154   Chen Gang scrutiny, China’s State Council released a circular in November 2011 to request all governments above the county level to include the expenditure on cars, receptions and trips in their annual budget. The regulation required government departments to use medium- or low-­end cars with reasonable maintenance costs for official purposes, set up guidelines for official receptions and limit the number of overseas trips by officials. To further curb red tape and extravagance, Xi Jinping announced the “Eight Directives” (baxiang guiding) in December 2012,35 which required officials to cut back on official meetings and trips as well as media expenses, traffic control and police escorts associated with them. In December 2013, the CCP General Office and State Council General Office jointly issued the “Six Injunctions” (liuxiang jinling),36 banning almost all forms of gifts, banquets, receptions and tours at government expense in the celebration of the Chinese New Year. However, China has yet to meet best practice in budget transparency, which grants ordinary citizens and civil society organizations access to information on public fund allocation and spending.37 Without political opposition and adequate media supervision, non-­transparent budgets at both the central and local levels create opportunities for graft and misappropriation. Experts have urged the government to increase transparency in the budgeting processes to ensure governance accountability and public accountability. In recent years, public discontent with the official corruption and malfeasance has festered as social media has brought to light sex scandals and the extravagant lifestyle of cadres. The Xi leadership appears determined to ride on the anti-­ corruption sentiments that are pervasive online to better oversee its gigantic officialdom. State media like Xinhua and People’s Daily have emphasized the role of public and social media in monitoring corruption.

Xi’s anti-­corruption crusade: more evidence of CCP’s “authoritarian resilience”? Xi’s unprecedented anti-­corruption campaign will affect China’s political and economic trajectory profoundly in the next few years. Politically, Xi’s at first nascent power has been firmly consolidated, after key members in the rival Zhou Yongkang camp were purged under corruption charges, and Xi’s popularity among the public has surged because of his unremitting crackdown on corrupt “tigers” and official overspending. Economically, on the other hand, China’s galloping economic growth will be decelerated by such harsh anti-­graft and austerity measures. Local officials’ appetites for promoting GDP and fiscal revenues, which have been incentivized by the 1994 tax-­sharing system reform and rent-­seeking activities that have happened thereafter as a result of the CCP’s acquiescence, are now being dampened by Xi’s anti-­corruption movement. While the anti-­corruption campaign may slow down overall GDP growth, however, it will bring a positive impact by rectifying the asymmetry between strong government consumption and weak household consumption. Suppliers of luxurious products and services targeted at

Politics of anti-corruption campaign   155 well-­heeled officials have been hit hard by Xi’s austerity measures, while companies and restaurants at the other end of the spectrum are thriving in the new context. The price of China’s state liquor Maotai, a symbol of the country’s banquet culture, has plunged over the last two years, while the businesses of some high-­end restaurants like the Beijing-­based Xiangeqing group, have also shrunk remarkably. President Xi’s pit stop at the lowly Qingfeng restaurant in December 2013 for a steamed bun lunch, which was widely reported in the media, was possibly meant as a model for other officials to follow. Corruption poses a serious threat to the image and legitimacy of the new leadership under Xi, who regards preventing the escalation of large-­scale corruption as imperative in order to win public support. Nevertheless, eradicating corruption is an impossible mission in the current political, economic and social context, and Chinese leaders fully understand the limit of anti-­corruption efforts. High-­profile corruption cases that involve Zhou Yongkang and Bo Xilai may be interpreted as the outgrowth of power struggles within the CCP, with competing factions using the “war on corruption” as a tool to eliminate or weaken rivals and their corporate supporters. The new leadership is expected to taper the scale of the anti-­corruption movement upon consolidating its power and establishing full authority. China’s special judicial system dominated by the ruling Party keeps all anti-­corruption investigations under wraps, thus facilitating manipulation. In what is considered to be under the purview of the procuratorate or the police, the Party’s disciplinary inspection apparatus instead initiates investigation and detention of suspects with Party membership. Although Western observers often criticize China’s anti-­corruption efforts as ineffective and superficial, the CCP’s long-­time adherence to high-­handed actions using multifaceted strategies does prevent corruption from being a fatal threat to the Party’s rule or the country’s economic growth. Punishing big-­timers severely is also an efficient way of redistributing wealth in the context of exacerbating social inequalities. In the long run, to win in a full-­scale war on corruption, China has to gradually institutionalize an independent judiciary system with enhanced supervisory role of the media and the public. Simply catching the “tigers” is not enough to make the regime more accountable, transparent and responsive. Selective enforcement in a politicized process would only lead to more corruption and undermine the effectiveness of Xi’s anti-­corruption campaign.

Notes   1 Timothy Garton Ash, “How Can Such Poverty, Corruption and Inequality Endure in the World’s Largest, Most Diverse Democracy? Come on, India!,” Guardian Weekly, February 8, 2013, p. 48; Jon S.T. Quah, “Minimizing Corruption in China: Is This an Impossible Dream?,” Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, no. 4, article 1 (2013), http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mscas/vol. 2013/iss4/1 (accessed 1 May 2015); Chen Gang, “China’s Recent Clampdown on High-­Stakes Corruption,” East Asian Institute Background Brief No. 490, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, 2009; Yang Dali, “Has Corruption Peaked in China?,” East Asian

156   Chen Gang Institute Background Brief No. 214, 2004; and Hilton Root, “Corruption in China: Has It Become Systemic?,” Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (August 1996): 741–751.   2 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2014: Results,” 2014, www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results (accessed 1 May 2015).   3 Ash, “How Can Such Poverty, Corruption and Inequality Endure?”   4 Root, “Corruption in China”; “Systemic Corruption: Something Rotten in the State of China,” The Economist, 14 February 2002, www.economist.com/node/988457 (accessed 1 May 2015); Jonathan Fenby, Tiger Head, Snake Tails: China Today, How It Got There and Why It Has to Change (London: Simon & Schuster, 2012), pp. 7–8.   5 Andrew Wedeman, “The Intensification of Corruption in China,” The China Quarterly 180 (December 2004), p. 899.   6 Melanie Manion, Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).   7 Quah, “Minimizing Corruption in China.”   8 Andrew Wedeman, Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).   9 David Shambaugh, “International Perspectives on the Communist Party of China,” China: An International Journal 10, no. 2 (August 2012): 11–12. 10 Andrew Nathan, “China’s Resilient Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (2003): 6–17. 11 Andreas Schedler, “The New Institutionalism in the Study of Authoritarian Regimes,” Paper for Amer­ican Political Science Association 2009 Annual Meeting, 2009. 12 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “Institutional Reform and the Bianzhi System in China,” The China Quarterly, no. 170 (2002): 361–386. 13 Frank Pieke, The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 14 Li Cheng, “Intra-­Party Democracy in China: Should We Take It Seriously?,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 30 (2009); and Zheng Yongnian, “Where Does the Chinese Communist Party Go from Here?: Challenges and Opportunities,” China: An International Journal 10, no. 2 (August 2012): 84–101. 15 David Shambaugh, “Training China’s Political Elite: The Party School System,” The China Quarterly 197 (2008): 827–844. 16 Nathan, “China’s Resilient Authoritarianism”; Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds., Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); Shambaugh, “International Perspectives on the Communist Party of China,” pp.  8–22; Wang Zhengxu and Tan Ern Ser, “The Conundrum of Authoritarian Resiliency: Hybrid and Nondemocratic Regimes in East Asia,” Taiwan Journal of Democracy 9, no. 1 (July 2013): 199–219, esp. 199. 17 The 1994 tax reform divided taxes into three categories: national tax, local tax and joint tax revenues shared between the central and local provincial governments. 18 Su Ming and Zhao Quanhou, “China’s Fiscal Decentralization Reform,” www.econ. hit-­u.ac.jp/~kokyo/APPPsympo04/China.pdf (accessed on 12 August 2014). 19 Wang Bai-­ling and Li Hui, “Reforms on China’s Fiscal System and Its Impact on Local Government Behavior,” Chinese Business Review 6, no. 2 (2007): 39. 20 Pei Minxin, “The Dark Side of China’s Rise,” Foreign Policy (March/April 2006). 21 Fred C. Bergsten, Charles Freeman, Nicholas R. Lardy and J. Mitchell Derek, China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008), p. 99. 22 “China’s Corporate World Ruled By Princes,” The Straits Times, 25 July 2009, p. A28. 23 “China’s Austerity Starves a Gifting Economy,” Forbes News, 27 March 2013, www.forbes.com/sites/junhli/2013/03/27/chinas-­austerity-starves-­a-gifting-­economy/ (accessed 1 January 2014).

Politics of anti-corruption campaign   157 24 “Macau Casino Revenue in 2012 Rose to $38 Billion,” Associated Press, 2 January 2013; and “Macau Gaming Revenues Up 58 pct to Record $23.5 bln in 2010,” Reuters, 3 January 2011. 25 “Working Report of Supreme People’s Procuratorate of China in 2013,” The People’s Daily, 22 March 2013, p. 2. 26 “Being Charged with Corruption Has Many Means in China,” International Herald Tribune, 4 September 2009, p. 16. 27 “Working Report of Supreme People’s Procuratorate of China in 2013,” p. 2. 28 “Shanxi Official with Ties to Ex-­Security Tsar Zhou Yongkang’s Son Dismissed,” South China Morning Post, 25 February 2014. 29 “Working Report of Supreme People’s Procuratorate of China in 2013,” p. 2. 30 “More Than 200 Bureau-­Level Officials Were Investigated in China in 2013,” Ifeng. com, 28 January 2014, http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/fanfu/content-­3/ detail_2014_01/28/33429034_0.shtml (accessed 1 March 2014). 31 “Chinese Government Punishes 20,000 ‘Extravagant’ Officials,’ ” Reuters, 2 December 2013. 32 Gong Ting, “The Party Discipline Inspection in China: Its Evolving Trajectory and Embedded Dilemmas,” Crime Law and Social Change 49, no. 2 (2008). 33 The CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), A Brief Introduction to CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (Beijing: CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection [CCDI], 2014), p. 5. 34 “China Pledges Zero-­Tolerance Stance towards Corruption,” Today, 25 February 2014, p. 21. 35 The “Eight Directives” (baxiang guiding) were passed in December 2012 at a CCP Politburo meeting, which was chaired by Xi Jinping himself. These directives include: (i) Inspection tours as a mere formality should be strictly prohibited. Officials should work and listen to the public and officials at the grassroots, and people’s practical problems must be tackled. There should be no welcome banner, no red carpet, no floral arrangement or grand receptions for officials’ visits. (ii) Meetings and major events should be strictly regulated, and efficiency improved. Politburo members are not allowed to attend ribbon-­cutting or cornerstone-­laying ceremonies, or celebrations and seminars, unless approved by the CCP Central Committee. Official meetings should be short and specific to the point, with no empty and rigmarole talks. (iii) Issuance of official documents should be reduced. (iv) Overseas official visits should only be arranged when needed as part of foreign affairs with fewer accompanying members; on most of the occasions, receptions by overseas Chinese, institutions and students at the airport could be done away with. (v) Traffic control or police escort should be minimized if leaders travel by cars in order not to inconvenience the public. (vi) Media reporting on official events should not be allowed unless they are really newsworthy. The regulation also bans non-­newsworthy reports on senior officials’ work and activities, unless such reports have an impact on work needs, news value and social effects. (vii) Leaders should not publish any works by themselves or issue any congratulatory letters unless an arrangement with the central leadership has been made. Official documents without substantial contents and realistic importance should be withheld. Publications regarding senior officials’ work and activities should also be restricted. (viii) Leaders must practice thrift and strictly follow relevant regulations on accommodation and cars. 36 The “Six Injunctions,” issued by the CCP General Office and State Council General Office in December 2013, include: (i) Officials are prohibited from using public funds to pay for visits, gifts, receptions and banquets during the New Year celebrations. (ii) Officials are prohibited from giving complimentary local products to their superiors. (iii) Officials are banned from accepting gifts, cash, gift vouchers or prepaid cards. (iv) Officials are not allowed to take part in high-­end recreational activities or to use official receptions to host families or friends during the holidays. Officials are

158   Chen Gang banned from using public vehicles for private matters. (v) All receptions should strictly follow the guidelines of the central and provincial governments. (vi) All officials are banned from organizing or participating in gambling activities. 37 International standards of budget transparency have been proposed by international organizations as benchmarks for government performance. See, for example, the International Monetary Fund’s Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency (2007), which lists a number of guidelines for open budget processes that should contain clear procedures for budget execution, monitoring and reporting, follow an established timetable, and be guided by well-­defined macroeconomic and fiscal policy objectives, www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/051507c.pdf (accessed 1 July 2012).

Part IV

The party in the state, society and economy

8 The party/army state in great transformation You Ji

China is undergoing a comprehensive transformation, with military transformation as a key component engineered by post-­Deng Xiaoping PLA reforms. Generally speaking, the core of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) transformation is determined by its changing relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These changes have accelerated since Xi Jinping became the commander­in-chief in November 2012. Xi’s control over the PLA has been conducted through two parallel pursuits. First, he categorically raised the banner of “politics in command of the construction of national defense” and “ideological correctness as the precondition to ensure the Party leadership,” the central theme of the Second Gutian Conference on Political Affairs Work in November 2014. Politics is now synonymous with Party leadership that entails tough and detailed control mechanisms in the institution of the Central Military Commission (CMC) chair system.1 Second, PLA compliance to the CCP has been sharpened by the improvement of PLA combat readiness to fight and win the next war – the quintessence of PLA professionalization that also serves to tighten civilian control of the military. The Party’s dual emphasis on politics and war-­fighting capabilities reflects its strategic vision and mission defined for the PLA: a revolutionary and professional armed force. Although revolutionary and professional are self-­ contradictory terminology-­wise, the CCP and the PLA seem to have reconciled the two through enhanced indoctrination and professionalization. The unprecedented PLA reforms that Xi announced in November 2015 have served to consolidate CCP–PLA relations premised on these two pursuits that will sustain Xi’s entire reign to 2022, if he does not follow Russian president Vladimir Putin’s example to extend his terms in office. To both Xi and top professional soldiers, the essence of “politics in command of all PLA affairs” is how to concentrate all top powers in the Party’s CMC and especially in the hands of its chair.2 The manner in which Xi orchestrates Party politics to bring the PLA under the Party’s wing resembles the way in which Mao Zedong used his political acumen to solicit PLA support in launching the Cultural Revolution.3 This shows that the fundamental features of CCP–PLA relations have remained largely intact. Further, the nature of the PLA interaction with the Chinese state and society is determined by its ties with the CCP. For a long time, observers depicted the People’s Republic of China

162   You Ji (PRC) as a Party-­state. In fact the depiction is not accurate as long as the CCP and PLA maintain a symbiotic relationship that is rooted in their wartime bonding. Since 1949, the PLA has twice rescued the Party: during the Cultural Revolution and on 4 June 1989. The CCP–PLA symbiosis, an analytical framework that the research community has used to analyze CCP–PLA relations,4 induces a more realistic depiction of the PRC’s civil–military relations, namely the Chinese Party-­army-state, that highlights the Army’s importance in guaranteeing the Party’s monopoly of power.5 The concept of symbiosis captures the essence of the PRC political process under Chairman Mao, whereby based on an overlapping civilian/military personnel arrangement at the apex of power, the generals had a decisive say on key state policies and national security affairs.6 Today as CCP–PLA relations gradually move beyond their wartime symbiotic origin, should the “PLA” be dropped from the term? The answer largely hinges on the PLA’s role in the civilian decision-­making process and on the depth of its penetration into social life. Undoubtedly the PLA continues to enjoy huge privileges. Yet its role in Chinese political/civil affairs has become basically regulated under civilian primacy. Its activities are increasingly oriented toward national security and defense matters.7 This is most vividly reflected in the central theme of the ongoing PLA reforms: preparation for war. The PLA’s new command chains, war zone establishment and war preparation all service this purpose. The overhaul of the PLA’s administrative system saw the abolition of China’s military region system, which traditionally served as carrier of the PLA’s internal functions.8 The question is not about whether the PLA intervenes in CCP politics, because it does, but rather it is about how much its intervention has shifted from the Maoist (symbiotic) pattern of routine intrusion. Since Deng Xiaoping’s departure, the PLA has been much less involved in civilian factional strife and state administration. Yet as long as the PLA is politically tasked by the Party, the way for its generals to intervene in civilian politics is always open, albeit mostly at the invitation of the civilian commander-­in-chief,9 as evidenced most recently by Bo Xilai’s purge. It is widely believed that Hu Jintao finally made his move on Bo in March 2012 only after he received pledged support from Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, his two CMC deputies.10 Under Xi the PLA’s influence on both Party politics and foreign policymaking is on the rise. One of the features of Xi’s political leadership is his proactive use of the PLA as his primary power base, although there has not been any practical need for Xi to solicit PLA support in CCP elite politics due to his firm control over major policy and personnel issues. This chapter attempts to reconstruct the changing patterns of CCP–PLA interaction since Deng and especially under Xi.

In search of a new analytical model of CCP–PLA relations The concept of symbiosis testifies to the dual role of the military in authoritarian states: protecting the Party-­state in domestic politics and safeguarding national interests against external threats. This echoes the PLA’s self-­depiction of a

Party–military relations in transformation   163 revolutionary and professional army. The domestic role (revolutionary) has long been the political permit for CCP leaders to involve the PLA in Party leadership matters and for PLA leaders to regard intervention in domestic politics as its rightful duty. The Cultural Revolution fully exposed how a symbiotic civil–­ military relationship allowed an all-­powerful leader to use a politicized military to fulfill his factional purposes and how the PLA became politicized once it entered the Party’s factional strife.11 The external role facilitates PLA professionalism, corporate identity and operational autonomy. Such a tendency deepens with the PLA going for informatization as a high-­tech army. The uneasy combination of the two roles has long been portrayed as the conflict of the “red” and “expert.”12 The contradiction inherent in this opposing direction of development will determine the PLA’s long-­term change from inside out and eventual Chinese political change.

Challenges in conceptualizing CCP–PLA relations So, both theoretically and functionally the PLA’s inherent “external-­andinternal” dichotomy dictates different organizational objectives and institutional interests for the PLA to reconcile. Similar cases of symbiotic civil–military relations in other transforming societies, such as Taiwan and South Korea in the 1970/80s, the USSR in 1991, Indonesia in 1998 and Egypt in 2011, have shown that symbiosis is neither a given nor unshakeable.13 The course of divorce starts when the military embraces professionalism, de-­emphasizes ideology and protects its own interests in keeping with general social and technocratic change that deconstructs the authoritarian system.14 Even though the level of symbiosis in the cases mentioned above is not comparable with the CCP–PLA bond, the logic of military professionalization generates similar catalysts in casting new patterns of CCP–PLA interactions, leading ultimately to new civil–military relations in China. More fundamental than this revolution/professionalism dichotomy is PLA identity in the tripartite relations with the Party-­state and society. The PLA calls itself a Party’s army and a people’s army, a servant serving two masters. China’s time-­honored cultural and social tradition is anchored in a popular anti-­state sentiment, reinforced by structural state/society tension embedded in official corruption and mistreatment of ordinary people. So far the CCP has effectively prevented large-­scale cadre/people confrontation through launching the anti-­ corruption campaign, alleviating state penetration into social life and improving standards of living for the majority of the population. The PLA has thus been spared from making a hard choice between its two masters. Nevertheless, state/ society strife seems to be unavoidable, as shown by the mounting numbers of social protests,15 which have become increasingly politicized and organized. It is not unimaginable that a state/society crisis on the scale of 1989 may repeat itself if the current tempo of Party decay and cadre abuse of power is not prohibited. Changes in PLA–societal ties will also deeply affect the PLA’s future and CCP–PLA relations. As Chinese society becomes increasingly middle-­class,16

164   You Ji the internal PLA personnel structure is being middle-­classized as a result. Now the bulk of PLA officer corps and a large proportion of soldiers are urbanites. For the first time in its history, the PLA is no longer a peasantry army nor a proletarian force. Over time a mismatch may emerge between the PLA’s political narrative that follows the Party line and the personal goals of personnel drafted for conscription, thereby exerting a profound impact on military–societal relations. The PLA’s identity confusion will then generate unpredictable consequences at a critical juncture of state transformation. This has been a major test for both the CCP and the PLA.

Conditional subjective control The aforementioned conceptual context means that the CCP’s traditional control methods toward the PLA will no longer work effectively. For instance, Deng Xiaoping’s departure made the type of personalized control difficult to sustain. The technocratic CCP leaders had to seek new models of civilian control. This chapter advances an analytical framework of conditional subjective control, which situates between two Western concepts of subjective control and objective control, to conceptualize the post-­Deng CCP–PLA interactions.17 Both Huntington’s models, of subjective control and objective control, are about civilian supremacy over the military; but they are constituted with different typologies and different means of delivery by the top leader. The former is based on thought indoctrination and strongman-­type domination. Leading politicians vie with each other to invoke PLA participation in internal elite strife as their supporters. The model normally refers to civil–military ties in authoritarian states where the level of military professionalism is low but that of social tension is high.18 The latter reinforces civilian supremacy over the military through promoting its professional values and institutional autonomy that entails a tendency to depoliticize soldiers and dampen generals’ non-­military ambitions. It prescribes the military as a tool of the state and not of partisan politics, a defining feature of democratic societies. The military in the objective-­control model is encouraged to be preoccupied more with the art of troop command than ideological indoctrination.19 The qualifier conditional is important in applying the concept of subjective control to the analysis of CCP–PLA ties, as it defines the purview and applicability of the concept. First of all, CCP control of the gun in post-­Deng China has moved toward a level of objective control to curtail the excessive political zeal of the top brass, as the strongman type of control is no long valid. The transition happens in the civil–military system where a level of PLA politicization and indoctrination is necessary to ensure the Party’s hold on power. As long as the PLA is politically committed to supporting the CCP, its interventionist impulse is inherent, albeit confined within certain limits. Second, as the PLA was deeply involved in the creation of the PRC, it still sees itself as a key and rightful player in China’s overall governance. Third, high PLA professionalism is mitigated by the country’s domestic tension, which forces its involvement in state–society strife. Fourth, China’s worsening security environment uplifts the

Party–military relations in transformation   165 PLA role in CCP national security policymaking, which is a prescribed area of PLA responsibility.20 These factors set visible limitations to the concept of objective control being applied in CCP–PLA interactions, as subjective control is still a viable way for the Party to control the gun. On the other hand, CCP leaders also vigorously guard against PLA generals’ intervention in unwanted political activities, indicating their constant vigilance against an overt use of subjective control. The PLA has been behind all major political events in the history of the PRC, although seldom at its own initiative. Chairman Mao realized unbalanced civil–military power when he warned his civilian colleagues that “the party can create an army but the army can also create a party.”21 The PLA rarely attempts a coup vis-­à-vis dominant Party leaders – probably only once in 1976. Yet the PLA is routinely involved in internal CCP factional strife or policy debates that change China’s political course. In 1978 it was behind Deng’s launch of post-­Mao reform. In 1992 it sided with Deng to force the first-­line leadership to adopt Deng’s way of reforms, each time with no authorization from the civilian commander-­in-chief. The military’s monopoly of means of coercion can be a constant source of insecurity to relatively weak post-­Deng civilian leaders who have designed countermeasures to pre-­empt the top brass in mounting a challenge. Party leaders have adopted hedging strategies in this regard, such as regular transfer of PLA generals to different posts; appointing the local Party secretary to be first Party secretary of the garrison troops; and controlling the CMC membership selection. The relative imbalance of power in favor of the gun further tilts with the departure of paramount civilian leaders like Deng. In the last two decades, with the traditional subjective-­control methods of strongman control and divide-­and-rule largely renounced and with deepening professionalization, the PLA has maintained a fair level of unity that gradually breeds a corporate identity and spirit based on structural organizational integrity as a cohesive force. This can be a double-­edged sword for civilians in transforming societies. A united military is an aid useful to the ruling party when both share strategic interests but it could be a liability if they diverge over major issues. To the CCP an exclusive PLA corporate identity can be potentially hazardous if, for instance, it is under a powerful and politically ambitious general. The civilian commander-­in-chief thus faces double jeopardy: he wants the PLA to be politically conscious in fulfilling its internal functions vis-­à-vis his challengers in the Politburo and against organized societal opposition; but he does not want the PLA to be too political, so as to intervene overzealously in the non-­military decision-­making process, and neither does he want to see the PLA as an entity that takes sides in the Party’s own factional strife. Therefore, post-­Deng Party leaders have tried to shape CCP–PLA relations with the right balance: the PLA’s intervention in civilian decision-­making over domestic issues should be curbed, while loyally adhering to the shared interests of the CCP–PLA common-­fate community. This is possible only when generals accept civilian supremacy in accordance with their cultural adherence (yield to civilian supremacy) and professional values (safeguard national interests). In

166   You Ji meeting this huge challenge, what post-­Deng leaders have done is similar to what most civilian leaders in the world have done: to stimulate soldiers’ innate obsession with high-­tech “toys” more than with elusive political ambition. Xi’s call to the PLA to accelerate war preparation serves this purpose well. Professionalism is pursued to prevent interventionist behavior.22 Meanwhile, the Party continues with traditional symbiotic elements of “absolute control” to ensure PLA compliance. A model of conditional subjective control, or conversely, conditional objective control, could be used to capture some visible signs of change in post-­ Deng CCP–PLA ties. A strong but externally focused PLA would help alleviate the generals’ intrusive behavior rooted in the legacy of symbiosis. As such its corporate identity that distinguishes military professionals from political activists can be positive for the Party’s control of the gun. One attribute of the objective-­control model of the West is a clear division between civilian and military elites that makes elite conflict among them an inter-­institutional conflict.23 The end of the overlapping CCP/PLA personnel structure had paved the way for a similar evolution, reinforced by political taboos that unauthorized personal contacts between civilians and generals entail great political risks to their career advancement. There has been no discernible civil–military factional construction since the Yang brothers (Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing) were removed from the CMC in 2002. Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou may have forged a cluster of followers inside the PLA. Their primary interests were, however, money and promotion, not political ambitions. The CMC has not revealed any evidence that their faction-­forging activities involved any senior civilian leaders to challenge Hu’s leadership. Guo was handed a verdict that sentenced him only for his crime involving embezzlement of large sums of money and sale of official posts.24 Necessary political and professional conditions exist for conditional subjective control to be practiced. First, functional civil–military dichotomy is highlighted in their separate policy processes. Second, as with soldiers in past dynasties, soldier acceptance of civilian supremacy is both habitual and cultural.25 Third, soldiers do not aspire to rule the country directly, especially since they benefit from the CCP rule. Fourth, the PLA has long been a professional force, even though it was, and to some extent is still, associated with non-­ military affairs. Professionalism creates the foundation and incentives for the military to place occupational expertise above political pursuits. In the Eighteenth CCP’s Third Plenum, Xi identified professionalizing of the PLA officer corps as a key item of deepening PLA reforms. Another item is elimination of PLA commercial activities.26 Faced with acute external threats the CCP and the PLA are mandated to work hand in hand. These prerequisites for applying conditional subjective control in CCP–PLA relations are both foundational and structural. The word “conditional” is also critical to defining the CCP’s continued use of subjective-­control measures to hedge against potential PLA disobedience. The civilian commander-­in-chief commands the gun through his institutional authority

Party–military relations in transformation   167 as Party leader. In theory, he has to follow a pre-­set two-­term tenure of ten years as state president and the Party boss, making it difficult for him to perpetuate effective control of the armed forces in the Maoist style. PLA generals’ days in uniform are also numbered and shortened, institutionally preventing structured and enduring faction formation around a few top PLA leaders.27 This conditional subjective-­control model reflects the fact that subjective control is against the post-­Deng CCP efforts in power institutionalization, and overt subjective control may nurture the ambition of the officer corps to challenge civilian supremacy. Thus, enmeshing generals in professional pursuits can be an effective tool to divert them away from excessive political pursuits. Conditional subjective control is also about striking a subtle balance between two contradictory demands for generals: to be political enough but not overtly political, as mentioned earlier. The PLA is still depicted as an armed institution undertaking political missions (its internal function). Then, subjective control is still an indispensable mechanism for CCP rule of China. This is why the Party continues to indoctrinate conscripts and maintains the procedural control over PLA appointments.28 Recently it has stepped up its efforts to repudiate Western conspiracy to depoliticize the PLA. Yet the civilians’ exercise of subjective control has been balanced by their prudence in involving soldiers in non-­military business and by their effort to engage them in raising warfare skills much more intensively than ever before. Thus, subjective control is made conditional without a symbiotic base, more in terms of the inducement of better career opportunities and coalition building short of faction formation.29

Politburo–CMC divide: the cause of weakened party oversight The CCP’s control of the PLA has never been absolute, thanks to inherent loopholes in the Party’s organizational grip over the PLA. This can be traced to the Maoist formula of civil–military interaction: the Politburo is responsible for political/state affairs and the CMC for PLA affairs. This organizational and functional divide creates institutional fault lines in the civilian control of the gun, as it confuses political responsivities of one to the other. The resulting PLA autonomy, however, serves to erode the foundation of the CCP–PLA symbiotic relationship, coupled with the phasing out of the overlapping personnel arrangement at the apex of power – the legacy of the wartime civil–military bond. In the CCP’s hierarchical chain, the CMC is under the Politburo. In actuality the CMC largely operates outside the reach of the Politburo. For instance, the Party’s Central Organizational Department has little say in PLA cadre management.30 The PLA’s legal and discipline system operates autonomously from that of the Party. This is one of the reasons for senior PLA leaders like the Yang brothers being able to snub Jiang in the early 1990s. Guo and Xu’s abuse of power for such a long period of time without being caught also demonstrates the institutional flaws in the Politburo–CMC divide. As the ultimate boss of the PLA’s judiciary and discipline system, Guo and Xu were immune from the PLA’s

168   You Ji system of internal checks and balances. The Party’s discipline and inspection authority could not reach them due to divergent opinions between the Politburo and the CMC about the institutional mission of the Central Commission on Discipline Inspection. They also had no fear of the Party’s system of external checks and balances. The Politburo–CMC differential works if the commander-­in-chief is overwhelmingly authoritative over his soldiers, as such authority generates immense awe in them and is also a deterrent to them. However, the Party leadership over the PLA is considered purely rhetorical if the Party leader is weak in both institutional power and personality. That the CCP/PLA definition of Party leadership over the PLA is political and ideological divests the Politburo of most of its organizational teeth vis-­à-vis the PLA. Such an evolution is facilitated by the following factors. First, civilian oversight is compromised by the tradition of the CMC chair having entrusted routine PLA management to top PLA soldiers, e.g., Chairman Mao vis-­à-vis Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao and Ye Jianying, and Deng vis-­à-vis Yang Shangkun. They only cared about “strategic issues” concerning the PLA’s overall direction and spent most of their time on Party affairs. And they only hand-­picked leaders for positions they deemed to be most important, such as leaders of headquarters and military regions. They relied on executive CMC vice chairs for recommendations for other senior positions.31 The PLA has become used to such a tradition and it has become a “norm,” making it difficult for Deng’s successors to change.32 A breach of the tradition would cause backlashes from senior officers against the civilian leadership. Second, the Politburo’s personal grip on the PLA is seen as a huge organizational loophole – the CMC is a Party organ but is entirely composed of professional soldiers and, except for the Party leader, no other Politburo members are authorized to monitor PLA affairs, and their knowledge and personal ties with PLA leadership are minimal. In the working procedures, no civilian leaders attend the CMC regular weekly conferences where major decisions are made. Additionally the CMC has retained the Maoist tradition of selective submission of important documents to the Politburo to “prevent leak of top military secrets.”33 As a result, even Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) members do not always know what goes on in the CMC. This tradition has been carried on to the Xi era. One notices that no PSC members were present at any of the important meetings that announced key PLA reforms. There is nary a mention of any words from the PSC or Politburo in official reportage of these occasions, begging questions of whether the decisions made were the Politburo’s or the CMC’s alone, although the PSC has to rubber-­stamp them as a Party procedure. Such an organizational void is being reinforced by a time-­honored cultural and psychological taboo on unauthorized civilian–military personal contacts, which has been codified in strict discipline on both sides. Unauthorized visits to PLA barracks by Politburo members risk being dubbed as an “un-­organizational behavior.” For instance, Bo Xilai’s visit to the Fourteenth Group Army that was created by his father was one of the reasons why Hu issued his nine-­word instruction: to be politically sensitive, to observe disciplines and to place Party’s

Party–military relations in transformation   169 overall interests above one’s own.34 Ironically, Xi’s constant visits to the Thirty-­ First Group Army were later praised as his contribution to PLA transformation. Third, there is a fine line between the Party’s overall leadership and the PLA’s autonomy in daily affairs. The PLA may allow the CMC to make highly strategic decisions that have a profound impact on overall civilian leadership in domestic affairs and international pursuits. Decisions of high strategic significance made by the CMC may be linked to matters of war or peace, like the decision to launch missile exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 1996, and Beijing’s strategic foreign policy posture, such as the PLA’s push to establish the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone that seriously eroded the foundation of Sino-­US relations. Under Xi, the PLA’s excessive role in managing national security issues has been further strengthened, not otherwise.35

Institutional hollowing out of commissar control Clearly the institutional fault lines of the Politburo–CMC divide reflect fragmented authoritarianism, an analytical model raised by Lieberthal and Oksenberg in 1988 that describes China’s disintegrated governance process from the center to the localities and has analytical relevance in explaining the CCP–PLA relations.36 The loopholes in CCP control of the gun are functionally inherent and visible in the PLA’s political commissar system which is an instrument of Party control over the military in all communist societies. In China, the system is one of the three internal PLA mechanisms to sustain CCP control of the PLA (the other two being the Party committee system and the political affairs system) which in Jiang’s words are the benchmarks differentiating the PLA from all other armed forces in the world.37 Interestingly, the idea of commissars did not originate from the Soviet model but is rooted in a same logic of “jianjun” (supervisors) in China’s feudal emperor–general relations, by which the ruler dispatched civilian supervisors to the front to watch generals from behind. The fall of the Ming dynasty was largely due to the mistrust between the emperors and their military subordinates. Eunuch supervisors on the front line had seriously disrupted the command chain and caused battlefield failures.38 However, the abolition of this supervisor mechanism helped Yuan Shikai usurp power in 1911, an act that ended the Qing dynasty, as the imperial court lost the front-­line oversight on him and his New Army. Striking a right balance between effective Party surveillance imposed from the outside and maintenance of military combat efficiency has been a tough test for all civilians, including CCP leaders.39 Assigning external controllers in the military, in order to curb the power of generals that posed a threat to the regime, has been a unique feature of Chinese civil–military relations. When ethical persuasion lost effectiveness, there was not much that civilians could do with the soldiers. This was especially true when each dynastic cycle approached the end of its life. Chiang Kai-­shek also employed a similar method in his personalized control of the military. After he was defeated by Chairman Mao, he blamed the collapse of the political affairs system in the Kuomintang military as one of the causes of his failure in the Mainland.

170   You Ji The commissar system bore a resemblance to the design of the jianjun system. Its very existence reflects the Party leaders’ intrinsic suspicion of soldiers in the PLA’s formative years as the latter largely originated from the warlord and nationalist armies. However, the unique commissar system has generated misconceptions about the commissars’ political and functional status, which has changed over the course of PLA’s long history. Commissars are typically regarded as CCP representatives who merely carry out Party organizational control over the army. As evident in the relations of the early days, the Party inserted Party representatives in the upper echelons of commands as watchdog vis-­à-vis the commanders.40 Chairman Mao was called Party Representative Mao in 1927. But the contingent of commissars in the tactical units was composed of professional soldiers promoted from within the army. As the PLA expanded rapidly, they gradually occupied senior posts, crowding out the external appointees. When the Civil War ended in 1949, the PLA had only a handful of external Party jianjun. During the Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao again appointed civilian commissars to the PLA but this caused constant conflict inside the army. They clashed not only with commanders but also with commissars from within the military, who were then criticized as commanders’ allies.41 Today there are no externally appointed commissars in the PLA combat forces. Therefore, the dichotomy between commissars and commanders has been functionally and institutionally exaggerated along the lines that commissars are regarded as external to the PLA. The professionalization of the PLA has changed the origin, occupational concerns, career path and individual behavior of commissars who cannot be simply defined as Party jianjun in the PLA. All commissars and commanders engage in different types of work for a common objective of PLA transformation, including the political work of stabilizing the rank and file. Functionally, political affairs work is at the service of military affairs, as stipulated by the PLA Regulations of Political Affairs Work. This has a profound impact on the way in which the Party exercises control of the gun and creates doubt whether the CCP can confidently rely on the commissar system to survive a major state–society confrontation. This, in a similar vein, focuses the discussion on the effectiveness of Party control of the PLA and the changing CCP–PLA ties in the post-­symbiosis era. Professional military training and cooperation with commanders in the management of PLA affairs are factors that have shaped the value judgment of commissars. There is a vast difference in mentality between a civilian commissar and a commissar trained as a professional soldier. The former, as Party jianjun, monitored PLA activities on behalf of the Party. His concern was less directed toward issues of combat readiness than that of a commissar trained as a soldier. The priority of a uniformed commissar is contrary to that of a civilian commissar. The abolition of the commissar responsibility system in 1937 had a specific purpose, that is, that the political work should focus on tactical strategizing to score battlefield victories. The function of Party control was therefore relegated to secondary importance. This remains valid today, as winning the next war is

Party–military relations in transformation   171 the ultimate goal of political affairs work, as particularly emphasized by Xi Jinping after he assumed the position of commander-­in-chief.42 A commissar is surely entrusted to carry out Party programs and protect Party interests. So is any combat commander. However, there is a gap between the form and the reality. It is an undeniable fact that most commissars join the PLA as a soldier, are trained as an officer and are only later assigned to take on the political affairs job. Increasingly, many commissars are combat officers transferred from combat posts. In each round of the PLA force reduction, the PLA authorities at all levels deliberately retain as many military officers as possible in order to maintain combat readiness. A convenient method to do so is to move them to political affairs posts. As a result, the ratio of military staff to political affairs staff is decisively in the former’s favor. For instance, in a group army in Jinan military region, over half of political affairs staff at the regiment level and below were originally military officers.43 Combat officers, logically, are more concerned about combat readiness than ideological indoctrination. They are strongly conscious of PLA corporate interests, i.e., defense spending, the nexus between foreign policy and defense policy, and PLA hardware/software modernization. Even in commissar posts it is reasonable to assume that commissars’ value affiliation toward the PLA may come before that of CCP ideological indoctrination. There were loyalty tests for them in the history of PLA–CCP interaction – the February 1967 protest of top officers against the Cultural Revolution and the dissenting voices of PLA elders in 1989 – that offer some insights into the mentality of top PLA and CCP officials at critical moments when Party policies were at odds with PLA interests. Most soldiers, including commissars, view Party leadership as a relatively detached concept but their allegiance to their immediate military superior as something that is concrete and inherent in their responsibility.44 Party lines, policies and programs do not bear direct relevance to the daily management of specific PLA units. A commissar, being a soldier himself, is part of the professional team of military administration. His own interests are more aligned with the well-­being of the PLA as a whole. This dichotomy is well known to CCP leaders who see “an inherent danger of the PLA getting rid of Party control.”45 At the core of the question is whether rising PLA autonomy hollows out the Party slogan of “absolute control over the gun,” if the three systems of Party control in the PLA are under practical management of professional soldiers. Institutionally, absolute control is basically a value orientation and cannot be effectively executed without an externally imposed party representative system. As mentioned earlier, the Politburo–CMC divide creates an organizational gap between “absolute control” and PLA autonomy, when the control mission is tasked to uniformed commissars. In bridging this gap, the professional officer corps has willingly accepted the norm of civilian control while emphasizing the importance of effective military autonomy. The ability to strike such a subtle balance will place a heavy responsibility on commissars who are the primary agent of Party control and will greatly impact on the changing CCP–PLA relations.

172   You Ji In addition, it has been a PLA tradition that commanders dominate commissars in PLA history and in the present state of affairs. The primary principle of any military is an effective command of the troops that requires high concentration of power in one center. There is no exception for the PLA either, as indicated by the CMC’s one-­man rule system. At the levels of war zones, group army and below, the duumvirate system is in place. However, due to the practical needs of commanding troops, a de facto one-­man rule is actually exercised in the hand of commanders over military affairs that significantly outweighs political affairs. As one PLA officer observed, “The military affairs system is the carrier of the political affairs subsystem. Separated from the former, the latter would lose the reason of its existence and its object of service. So unless the political affairs system is closely integrated with the combat system, it has no direction, energy and future.”46 The CMC has been predominantly made up of military officers since its inception. Out of ten professional soldiers in the current CMC only one is a commissar. Even the vice chair in charge of political affairs, former Air Force Commander Xu Qiliang, used to be a combat officer. Interestingly, the present make-­up of the CMC is identical to that in 1955 – only one commissar out of the group of ten PLA marshals. The department-­chief responsibility system is implemented one level below the CMC’s 15 functional departments. The General Staff Department does not even have a commissar post that is equivalent to the chief of general staff position. In terms of importance, the General Staff Department is the top PLA executive body, the brain and the nervous system of the PLA daily command. The uniformed commissar is an integral part of the PLA’s professional officer corps. When a major event occurs in the Party–army relationship, a potential identity problem may arise among commissars who are the Party’s first line of defense to ensure soldier compliance. This may result in their divided loyalty or sequential loyalty between the Party they are supposed to represent and the armed forces they serve as a professional insider. And they would be under pressure from other combat officers who hold sway over the decision making in the PLA command chains. This evolutionary situation is of great political significance in the analysis of CCP–PLA relations. For in the long term and during times without domestic and international crisis, economic growth, effective governance and forceful campaigns against corruption are pivotal to the well-­being of the CCP rather than suppressing dissenting views through the gun. In a crisis, the Party would immediately mobilize the Party network in the PLA to persuade commanders to follow the Party line. Commissars bear the brunt, from within and without. They face a dilemma – on the one hand, ensuring Party control over the gun, and on the other, they, like combat officers, have to struggle in making sense of the right thing to do. The question of whether they regard themselves as an insider or outsider would have a key bearing on their professional and political positions. As an insider their institutional loyalty may outweigh their partisan consciousness. And their corporate identity and professional judgment may likely prevail over their Party affiliation. Yet if they regard themselves more in

Party–military relations in transformation   173 the line of a Party representative in the PLA, their values, behavior and practical choices may be very different.

Xi Jinping and the changing CCP–PLA relations When Xi became commander-­in-chief in 2012, he faced a situation of, arguably, the weakest civilian control of the PLA since the Deng era, thanks to Hu Jintao’s “hands-­off ” approach of commanding the gun.47 Two years into office, Xi has overcome the legacies of his predecessor’s “reign-­without-direct-­rule” approach in PLA management that gave rise to serious corruption among the rank and file and disunity among the top brass. Xi has effectively handled these problems with a distinctive political leadership marked by tightened organizational and personalized control, proving that personality and leadership style matter enormously. Xi assertively ended Hu’s technocratic approach in running state and military affairs.48

The game changer in CCP/PLA interaction Xi may not be the solution to these systemic challenges to the Party and the PLA but his assertive way of tackling them seems to have eased the tempo of the decay of civil–military officialdom. His early power consolidation has been the result of both his maneuvering among CCP/PLA elites and his Maoist charismatic and populist pursuits in society where he is gaining popularity. Anti-­ corruption is a key component of both methods. Xi’s overwhelming authority over the top brass would be his most positive asset. During the entire consolidation process the PLA has been firmly behind him.49 For instance, CMC member Zhao Keshi alluded to Xi’s words as the “soul” (hun 魂) of and the “key link” (gang 纲) in PLA day-­to-day operations – a tone of praise that is reminiscent of the Mao era.50 As a politician, Xi has set his new game rules vis-­à-vis PLA generals, demonstrating that personal power matters as much as institutions. Such is a different route of power consolidation and employment as compared with Hu whose PLA leadership primarily rested on his institutional authority.51 The single most significant game changer in CCP–PLA relations under Xi is his hands-­on approach vis-­à-vis professional soldiers. Xi has sought a balanced command of the gun. “Balanced” is defined as the commander-­in-chief allowing the top brass adequate autonomy in running military administration and operations, while his control is hands-­on. Indeed Xi’s closer contacts with PLA soldiers and more direct personal involvement in PLA management are unprecedented in the history of the PRC. Enhancing the one-­man rule of the CMC chair is always a political act, and Mao and Deng always emphasized the one-­man rule when they perceived an internal challenge to their rule. Clearly Xi’s reiteration of one-­man rule principle is more political rather than out of military/managerial concern, so as to accord enormous personal power to the CMC chair, which can in turn be extended to his control of Party agenda and faction activities, especially when there is major elite disagreement on CCP

174   You Ji political line, personnel arrangement (i.e., choice of successor) and strategic policies. One specific move to personalize Xi’s exclusive power is to let him take charge of the PLA operational command, which is the ultimate personal authority that any leader can lay claim to. This is tantamount to the US president making himself both the commander-­in-chief and chair of the joint chiefs of staff, a unique arrangement. The cases of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou were well chosen to “kill the chicken to scare the monkey,” the first time in PLA history that two of its top No. 2 PLA leaders were tried for crimes. So far 51 corps-­level cadres have been indicted for various discipline breaches and corruption charges. Although this constitutes a small percentage of the total number in the CMC nomenclature list (over 30,000 since 1990), the way these generals were exposed and punished was unprecedented. The anti-­corruption campaign has affected PLA soldiers more than civilian cadres due to the latter’s much larger gray income. Xi’s first year in the office saw confiscation of 1,296 apartments from senior officers who violated the PLA residence regulation.52 Given the stakes involved for these officers and their families, the anti-­corruption campaign at this level could have hit a backlash against Xi if he did not enjoy firm backing from the CMC. Given that the PLA is Xi’s primary power base, Xi’s axe on his own men has demonstrated his resolve in tightening control on the PLA. Indeed he cannot afford to be “hands-­off.” Thus the post-­Deng CCP–PLA relations have been reset with Xi’s deep personal involvement in commanding the gun.

Xi–PLA alliance Xi has reversed the post-­Deng Party leaders’ tendency to enlarge CMC autonomy as part of an institutionalized Politburo/CMC division of labor in running China. Under Hu, the CMC adhered to the Party’s strategic guidance as a formality while substantially maximizing its autonomy in administration and operations. Worse still, Hu’s overt dependence on Guo and Xu blurred the line between the CMC chair’s one-­man command system and the authority delegated to his deputies in the management of PLA daily operations. Xi has now put in place two crucial determinants to ensure smooth civil–military interactions – the intensity of civilian control in the hands of a civilian commander-­in-chief and the degree of PLA autonomy that adequately acknowledges civilian control of command-­in-chief as primacy. For instance, he instructed PLA discipline and inspection cadres to report more vigorously to the Party’s Discipline and Inspection Commission, although the PLA still autonomously handles its internal discipline and corruption cases.53 Xi has redressed the imbalance with renewed emphasis on the CMC chair’s ultimate authority.54 Xi’s closer contacts with PLA soldiers and direct personal involvement in PLA management highlight a new pattern of CCP–PLA interaction, as further illustrated by the following points: •

Xi habitually reads reports by war zone-­level commands. He personally assigns specific topics about key Party issues for PLA units to discuss.55

Party–military relations in transformation   175 •

•

•

Xi regularly visits PLA units, probably second only to Kim Jong-­un in terms of frequency of his visits. By now he has inspected all war zone commands and service headquarters. For instance, he personally issued a CMC order to the PLA Air Force to take control of the PLA’s space operational command.56 In contrast to Hu, who appointed senior officers mostly on CMC recommendations, Xi personally interviews and nominates appointees.57 He reviews the credentials of candidates screened by the CMC in a more detailed manner. Xi also frequents grass-­roots posts, has meals with soldiers in their dining halls, and gets into tanks, aircraft and warships. He is increasingly seen as the soldiers’ commander-­in-chief.58

Inclination to solicit PLA support Xi’s command of the gun has proven that striking a balance between the ultimate CCP control and the PLA’s corporate autonomy depends chiefly on the CMC chair and the amount of power he exercises. Enhancing personal power is a convenient way to bolster his PLA control and a shortcut for achieving this has been to build a solid factional backup in the Party and the military at the beginning of his reign. Hu’s weak leadership was largely due to his lack of factional support in the Party and the CMC, leading to softened Party control over the PLA, with profound consequences which Xi has reversed successfully. Hu’s governance principle, centered on passivity (buzheteng), magnified the flaws of the “give-­ and-take” and “reign-­without-direct rule” formulas; his approach had increased generals’ bargaining chips vis-­à-vis the civilians. An asymmetric interdependent relationship emerged that enshrined Party leadership in name but favored generals in substance. Despite the generally positive interactions between Hu and the CMC, one implicit reason for the PLA’s “give” tactic may be Hu’s inadequate personal authority and mild personality that allowed the CMC to “take more.” In fact, a defining feature of Xi’s political leadership is his inclination towards putting the PLA in a position that helps him build policy consensus at the top. It is reflected in his inclination to form factions as an organizational guarantee of support for his political agenda. A Xi Jinping–Yu Zhengsheng–Wang Qishan core emerged in the Eighteenth PSC, supported by three Jiang-­Zeng Qinghong appointees from the Seventeenth Politburo. Likewise, as mentioned earlier, his structured network took shape at an earlier date in the CMC formation with Zhao Keshi (logistics) and Zhang Youxia (armament) at the forefront. Other CMC members have been forthcoming to his call. Fan Changlong owed Xi for his position as the top military officer, because without Xi’s consent it was impossible for Fan to be brought back from the retirement plan.59 Therefore, Fan has been exceedingly faithful in carrying out Xi’s orders. Political affairs chief Zhang Yang’s entry into the CMC has followed a similar path. Ma Xiaotian, the air force chief, maintains close ties with Xi via both family connections and

176   You Ji friendship with Xi’s confidants like Liu Yazhou, president of the National Defense University. Forming cohesive teams of followers in both the PSC and the CMC characterizes Xi’s political style of managing state and military affairs during the sensitive period of crises and opportunities. Soliciting PLA support is essential for all top leaders to exercise power, especially in times of factional strife or policy disagreement in the Politburo. However it can also be a poison, demonstrated by Chairman Mao’s involvement of the PLA in the Cultural Revolution. Xi’s PLA leadership may potentially politicize it with negative consequences. Clearly Xi’s willingness to involve the PLA in state affairs is a defining feature of his political leadership. The question is whether he is able to establish an equilibrium between soliciting PLA support for his endeavors in CCP’s internal politics and preventing its overt intervention. Grave domestic and international challenges present Xi with the need for political employment of military power.60 So far there is no evidence of Xi’s open invitation of PLA intervention in areas other than national security. This is largely due to the fact that Xi’s enormous personal power has prevented any opposition from emerging. Yet Xi’s inclination to use his primary power base politically as well as the PLA’s readiness to answer Xi’s call can generate great uncertainties in the longer term.

Conclusion CCP–PLA relations are complicated and thus a sensitive topic in the study of the CCP. Visible changes in the CCP–PLA relationship are reflected in their respective internal transformation in terms of organizational objectives, personnel structures, functional imperatives and policymaking mechanisms. For instance, Jiang Zemin’s concept of turning the CCP from a revolutionary Party to a ruling party is quite similar to that of a catch-­all party. The PLA’s professionalization and externally oriented focus being the top organizational goals aligns with the Party’s transformation. However, if the Party continues to see itself as a class-­ based proletarian party, its long-­term organizational destiny will clash with that of the middle-­classized PLA, which embraces broader national interests rather than class interests. Furthermore, the PLA will face a profound challenge serving two masters – the Party-­state, on the one hand and the people, on the other – if the state–society tension deepens and becomes structural – and such is a natural phenomenon in every Chinese dynasty. Soldiers will then be forced to make a hard choice during critical moments of social change. Therefore the evolution of this CCP–PLA relationship has a decisive impact on China’s overall transformation. The loopholes in the Party control mechanisms over the PLA have caused the CCP slogan, “absolute control,” to lose its qualification of being absolute. This chapter analyzes two institutional fault lines in the civilian supremacy vis-­à-vis the PLA: the Politburo–CMC divide and the internalized commissar system. The former has been a tradition within the CCP and PLA, and is even considered a norm rooted in the Maoist formula that “the Politburo is responsible to political/

Party–military relations in transformation   177 state affairs and the CMC military affairs.” This caused a serious rift between Party leaders and PLA generals in maintaining the integrated, Party-­dominated decision-­making, personnel appointment and national security processes. Consequently this has also given rise to the “give-­and-take” and “reign-­withoutdirect-­rule” forms of interaction between the Party leader and professional soldiers in the CMC that have weakened Party control over the military. Under such circumstances, in the positive sense, generals pursue efforts to maximize PLA corporate interests and organizational autonomy, a necessary condition for the PLA to be professionalized and to shift its focus to countering against external military threats. However, in the negative sense, some senior officers abuse their power extensively by taking advantage of the Politburo–CMC divide. The corruption cases of Guo and Xu attest to the failure of the commissar system which supposedly serves as a system of internal checks and balances on behalf of the Party. This then raises a question of confused identities of commissars: are they professional soldiers or Party representatives inside the armed forces? A tentative answer points to the latter but this may generate divided loyalty or sequential loyalty with profound long-­term impacts on CCP–PLA relations. Xi’s assertive leadership is intended to address the imbalanced Party control over the PLA and is also an integral part of his political leadership.61 His “hands­on” approach enables him to cultivate personalized power and assume the CMC chair’s ultimate authority. It will be interesting to watch how Xi will rectify the long-­standing Politburo–CMC divide. The Maoist formula in fact provides the commander-­in-chief immense individual and institutional advantages in CCP/ PLA elite politics. Xi may have tightened his personal grip on the PLA but not necessarily the Party’s organizational oversight if the Politburo–CMC divide is not properly addressed. The latest round of PLA reforms has simply widened the divide rather than narrowing it. Xi’s command of the gun, in turn, poses an even bigger question: does the PLA prefer a strong civilian commander-­in-chief to oversee top soldiers’ routine PLA management or a weak one to guarantee PLA autonomy and corporate interest? For the first time in many years, the PLA has been freed from the Maoist strongman control that undermined its key interests in the past, such as Deng’s forceful reduction of the defense budget in the 1980s. It is logical that the PLA does not seek to have another Mao or Deng presiding over it again. On the other hand, the problems caused by Hu’s weak leadership seemed to underline the PLA’s support for a hands-­on leader to ensure the integrity and unity of its military force. The PLA’s unprecedented support for Xi has indicated its preference for subtle balance between the expectations of a firm leader like Xi and its continual search for corporate identity and autonomy.

Notes   1 “Jiang zhengzhi shi diyi yaoqiu” [Politics is the primary leverage for PLA reform], The PLA Daily, Editorial, 14 January 2016, p. 1.   2 Deputy Commander-­in-Chief Fan Changlong made a speech at the PLA panel of the 2016 National People’s Congress session stating that “firmly safeguarding and implementing

178   You Ji the CMC chair one-­man responsibility system is the crux and primary mission of the PLA reforms. It is the concrete criteria to measure PLA’s loyalty to the Party and embodiment of the PLA’s iron discipline.” See The PLA Daily, 8 March 2016, p. 1.   3 Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).   4 Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-­Military Relations in Communist Political Systems,” Amer­ican Political Science Review 76, no. 4 (1982); and David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).   5 Han Weifeng, Kang Yongsheng and Kong Lingjuan, Shizhanhua de junshi gaige [PLA reforms for enhancing combat force capabilities] (Beijing: The PLA Publishing House, 2015), p. 40.   6 Li Nan, ed., Chinese Civil-­Military Relations: The Transformation of the People’s Liberation Army (London: Routledge, 2006).   7 Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip Saunders, Civil-­Military Relations in China: Assessing the PLA’s Role in Elite Politics, China Strategic Perspectives No. 2 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2010).   8 On these reforms, see Li Cheng, “Promoting ‘Young Guards’: The Recent High Turnover in the PLA Leadership,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 49 (2016).   9 Ellis Joffe, “Party-­Army Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect,” The China Quarterly, no. 146 (June 1996), pp. 299–314. 10 Interview with a PLA researcher in Beijing in July 2012. 11 Yu Bin, “The Fourth-­Generation Leaders of the New Military Elites,” in Swimming in a New Sea: Civil-­Military Issues in Today’s China, ed. David Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), p. 76. 12 Frederick Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms (Boulder, CO: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 266. 13 Monte Bullard, The Soldier and Citizen: the Role of the Military in Taiwan’s Development (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997); Norman Graham, “The Role of the Military in the Political and Economic Development of the Republic of Korea,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 26, no. 1 (1991): 114–131. 14 Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Coercion and Governance: the Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). 15 Tong Yanqi and Lei Shaohua, Social Protest in Contemporary China, 2003–2010: Transitional Pains and Regime Legitimacy (London: Routledge, 2013). 16 David Goodman, ed., Class in Contemporary China (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014). 17 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-­ Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985). 18 Orlando Peres, Civil-­Military Relations in Post-­conflict Societies (London: Routledge, 2015). 19 Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 83. 20 You Ji, “The PLA and Diplomacy: Unrevealing Myths about the Military Role in Foreign Policy-­Making,” The Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 86 (2014): 178–196. 21 Gao Minzheng, Chinese Politico-­Military Theory: The Communists’ Thought on Civil-­Military Relations (Beijing: Current Affairs Publishing House, 2011), p. 201. 22 Building a professional officer corps is one of the major items in this round of PLA reform. 23 Perlmutter and LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform.” 24 “Guo Boxiong Tried,” The PLA Daily, 25 July 2016, p. 1. 25 Ray Huang, 1587, a Year of No Significance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981). 26 “Xi Jinping’s Speech to the PLA Reform Conference,” The PLA Daily, 27 November 2015, p. 1.

Party–military relations in transformation   179 27 A convincing fact is that after Xu’s indictment in June 2014, his influence in the PLA evaporated immediately, despite his decade-­long control of PLA personnel affairs. 28 “How Many Generals Did Jiang and Hu Promote during Their Term in Office?,” The People’s Daily Net, 19 November 2012. 29 Xi’s leadership style and power consolidation seem to point to a different pattern of power game, which highlights the mechanism of personalized control based on privileges of the CMC chair. This chapter, however, will not discuss Xi’s command of the gun. 30 Mu Song, “Mao Zedong and the Creation of the PLA General Cadre Department,” The PLA Daily, 14 September 2009. 31 Cadre Department of the General Political Affairs Department, The PLA Institutions of Cadre Management (Beijing: The PLA Academy of Military Science Press, 1988). 32 “How Many Generals Did Jiang and Hu Promote during Their Term in Office?” 33 “How Huang Yongsheng and Jiang Qing Clashed in the Cultural Revolution,” Yanhuang chunqiu, no. 5 (2015). 34 “Do Away With the Anti-­organizational Tendency,” The PLA Daily, 22 March 2012. 35 You Ji, “China’s National Security Council: Evolution, Rationality and Operations,” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 96 (2016). 36 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Process (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). 37 The Party History Research and Teaching Group of the PLA National Defense University, The Guidance for Enhancing the PLA’s Political and Ideological Work in the New Era (Beijing: The National Defense University, 2000), p. 60. 38 Fan Wenlan, Zhongguo tongshi [The Chinese History], vol. 3 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1973), p. 289. 39 This was typical during Song and Ming dynasties when the emperor sent trusted civilians, often eunuchs, to the army located far away from the capital. They enjoyed the same rank as the commanders and secretly reported their activities to the court. See, for instance, Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance. 40 The Party History Research and Teaching Group of the PLA National Defense University, The Political Affairs Work of the PLA (Beijing: The PLA National Defense University Press, 2003), p. 306. 41 Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, The PLA in the Cultural Revolution (Beijing: Zhongguo dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1989). 42 In December 2012 Xi made his first inspection trip to Guangdong as national leader. During the four-­day visit he spent almost two days touring PLA barracks in Guangzhou military region. At every stop, he called on soldiers to prepare for and win the next war. Winning the next war has subsequently become his linkage to command the gun. See The PLA Daily, 14 December 2012. 43 Research Office of the Jinan Military Region Political Affairs Department, “Some Thoughts on Raising Cultural and Technological Quality of Political-­Affairs Staff,” The Journal of PLA National Defense University, no. 1 (2000): 60. 44 This has been the Chinese military culture and tradition in the last 3,000 years, and is still very much stressed in the PLA, which may work against the Party leadership. 45 The PLA Academy of Military Science, The Autobiography of Marshal Ye Jianying (Beijing: The PLA Academy of Military Science Press, 1995), p. 670. 46 Major General Qian Haihao, The Study of Military Organization and Structure (Beijing: The PLA Academy of Military Science Press, 2001), pp. 192–193. 47 You Ji, China’s Military Transformation: Politics and War Preparation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015). 48 On this technocratic leadership, see Zang Xiaowei, “The 14th Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy,” Asian Survey 33, no. 8 (1993); also, John Wong and Zheng Yongnian, Leadership Succession: Problems and Prospects (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2002).

180   You Ji 49 All senior PLA officers vie with each other to express personal loyalty and support for Xi and his policies. The PLA Daily published their pledges in full pages, a rare phenomenon in the post-­Deng China. 50 “Zhao Keshi’s Speech to the PLA Audit Conference,” The PLA Daily, 4 April 2013, p. 1. 51 Wang Zhenxu and Anastas Vangeli, “The Rules and Norms of Leadership Succession in China: from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping and Beyond,” The China Journal 76 (July 2016): 24–40. 52 The Daily Military Report, CCTV-­Military Channel, 19 October 2013, http://military. cntv.cn/2013/10/19/VIDE1382196480871677.shtml (accessed October 2016). 53 For instance, Xi requests the senior PLA discipline and inspection cadres to attend all key meetings of the Party’s Discipline and Inspection Commission to learn how to improve their work; see www.ccdi.gov.cn/ (accessed October 2016). 54 The one-­man rule mechanism of the CMC chair has given the civilian commander-­inchief more detailed institutional powers in allowing the chair to have a final say in strategic decisions, in routine operational command, and in personnel nomination and approval, and in closer monitoring of senior officers by placing the PLA’s legal and discipline organs directly under the CMC chair. See a CCP central document that has unprecedentedly enhanced the CMC chair authority, The People’s Daily, 31 January 2015. 55 “PLA Party Construction since the 18th Congress,” The PLA Daily, 5 November 2013. 56 Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo, New Horizon, Yunnan TV, 17 April 2014. 57 “How Many Generals Did Jiang and Hu Promote during Their Term in Office?” 58 China National Defense Newspapers, 22 July 2013, p. 1. 59 A source from the PLA revealed that the CMC inspection team on Fan Changlong was dispatched to Jinan in July 2012, which was obviously a prompt decision, as the Congress was originally scheduled in October; based on an interview in Beijing, July 2012. According to one of Fan’s former colleagues in the Forty-­Sixth Division, Fan was initially not nominated as an Eighteenth Congress delegate, an indicator of his retirement, since the military region commander and commissar were confirmed members; based on an interview with a former colleague of Fan Changlong in Beijing, April 2016. 60 The upsurge in PLA commentary on China’s domestic and international policies not only reveals the rising anxiety of PLA officers over the transitional challenges the country faces but also their self-­perceived duty to CCP policy process. Liu Yazhou, for instance, leads scholars in the National Defense University to subtly intervene in the civilian debate on how to effect political changes in China. See, for instance, Gong Fangbin, “New Political Outlook: Breaking Point for Innovation,” People’s Tribune, no. 29, 2012. 61 Xi has placed emphasis on the one-­man rule mechanism for the CMC chair, substantiating it with more detailed institutional powers (see note 54).

9 The party in the legislature and the judiciary Wang Jiangyu

The rule of law under the party-­state in China Any discussion about the political system in the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter the PRC, or China) should start with the tenet that the country is ruled by a Party-­state, although this term is not welcomed and is even prohibited from being used in the PRC to describe the Chinese political system. Yet in substance the Chinese state is nothing less than a proper Party-­state. Two basic understandings should be derived from this in the Chinese context. First, it is truly a political system “in which a single party enjoys a monopoly of power through the exclusion of all other parties (by political or constitutional means).”1 Second, to go even further, the Chinese Communist Party (hereinafter the CCP, or the Party) cannot be separated from the Chinese state. It is the Chinese state. As Kenneth Lieberthal has succinctly observed in his landmark work, Governing China: From Revolution through Reform, The Chinese Communist Party retains the power to decide all major political, social and economic policy issues and to appoint the leaders to all public sector bodies (including government offices, public institutions and SOEs). The CCP employs four basic methods to achieve continuing control over the other bureaucracies: nomenklatura appointments and interlocking directorates, leadership small groups, party “core groups,” and “party life.”2 The contemporary CCP leadership is increasingly interested in strengthening and tightening the Party’s grip on state power. Hu Jintao, China’s then state president and the CCP’s general secretary, stated in 2007 that “we must upload the Party’s role as the core of leadership in directing the overall situation and coordinating the efforts of all quarters.”3 This might implicitly suggest that the CCP should stay as a coordinator rather than a direct controller of specific matters. President Xi Jinping, the current general secretary of the CCP, has, however, emphasized that “the Party leads everything in China, be it matters relating to the Party itself, the government, the military, the civilians, or education, or matters concerning any directions including the East, West, South, North or Central.”4 Significantly, Xi’s unprecedented remark was made at a meeting in which the leaders of all state organs,

182   Wang Jiangyu including the National People’s Congress, State Council, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate were called to report to the CCP Central led by Xi himself. Specifically, the CCP plays the leadership role in law-­related work and legal institutions in the following ways. First, the Party dominates the decision-­making process and remains the final decision-­maker for all major issues. Second, the Party controls personnel appointments in all legal institutions. Third, all CCP members must abide by the Party line. This means, in legal institutions, an individual Party member, be he a judge, prosecutor or administrator, must submit himself to CCP disciplines and faithfully implement the orders of the Party. For matters concerning which there are no explicated Party orders or rules, they must be dealt with in a manner consistent with the objectives and general principles of the CCP to ensure the Party’s unequivocal leadership position in Chinese society. However, a minor difference between the legislature and the judiciary with respect to the role of the CCP is that the Party involves itself slightly less in individual cases decided by the courts. The chapter proceeds as follows. The next two sections describes the organization and operation of the legislature and the judiciary as provided in formal laws of the Chinese state. The third and fourth sections examine the role of the Party in the legislature and judiciary, respectively. The fifth section assesses the role of the Party from the perspective of legitimacy management. The last section offers concluding remarks.

Legislature, lawmaking and the party Legislature and lawmaking process in China China’s state Constitution designates the National People’s Congress (NPC) as “the highest organ of state power,” vesting it with the power to represent the sovereignty, namely the Chinese people. The NPC functions through its annual conference of all the deputies and the meetings of its permanent body called the NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC), which comprises NPC representatives who are elected to be the members of the NPCSC.5 The NPC functions, first of all, as China’s national legislature. However, it does more than that. The NPC is legally the power source of all other state organs, including the State Council (which is China’s central government), the Central Military Commission, the Supreme People’s Court and the People’s Procuratorate. These state organs report to the NPC in accordance with the Constitution. As the state legislature, the NPC, often through the NPCSC, exercises the state power to amend the Constitution, make basic laws and interpret laws.6 Local People’s Congresses are authorized by the Constitution to made difangxing fagui, or local regulations, which, however, should never contradict the Constitution, national laws or administrative regulations.7 The NPC’s Law Committee handles the draft laws before they are presented to the NPC or NPCSC for formal deliberation and adoption. In addition, the

The party in the legislature and judiciary   183 NPCSC has the assistance of the Legislative Affairs Commission (LAC) in drafting law or evaluating legal drafts. Unlike the Law Committee, the LAC is not a legislative body. Rather, it is the NPCSC’s staff office consisting of legal scholars and experts specializing in legislative work. The legislative process at the NPC is designed to make it easy for the Party to control. The process consists of four stages: proposing, deliberating, voting and promulgating. The first stage determines who is qualified to introduce a bill to the NPC for deliberation in its current session. The Presidium of the NPC may propose a bill to the NPC, which the NPC is obliged to consider as of right. The NPCSC, State Council, Central Military Commission, Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate can also propose bills to the NPC, but it is up to the NPC Presidium to decide whether the proposals shall be put on the legislative agenda of the current NPC session.8 Delegates of the NPC may also introduce legislative bills, provided that they either act through a delegation or at least 30 delegates act jointly. Such proposals also have to be examined by the Presidium, who may decide to put the bills on the NPC’s current agenda. For such bills, the Presidium may also decide to refer them to a relevant special committee for further examination before it considers whether to put the bills on the NPC agenda.9 When the NPC is not in session, the NPCSC takes over the legislative power, and the NPCSC’s Chairmen’s Council, comprising the chairman, vice chairmen and secretary-­general, assumes a similar role to that of the NPC Presidium. Other state organs, or ten or more members of the Standing Committee acting jointly, may introduce a bill to the Standing Committee, but it is up to the Chairmen’s Council to decide whether to put the bill on the agenda of the upcoming session of the NPCSC.10 Starting from the second stage, the NPC or NPCSC deliberates and votes on the bill. For a bill proposed to be adopted by the NPC in its annual session, a relevant special committee examines it first, and then distributes the draft bill together with the committee’s opinion to all the NPC delegates. The whole NPC will then vote on the bill after listening to the Law Committee’s review and recommendations during the annual session.11 That is, the whole NPC will review the draft bill only once. In contrast, a bill introduced to the NPCSC has to be reviewed and deliberated three times.12 Laws enacted by the NPC or the NPCSC are promulgated by way of a presidential order.13 Party control of the legislature’s personnel and decision-­making The CCP controls the state legislature and lawmaking in China through two means. First, it fully controls the legislative body. Second, it controls each procedure in the legislative process with substantive Party input to ensure that the enacted laws always conform to the Party’s policies and preferences. The control of the legislature by the CCP is asserted at three levels. First, Party members dominate the NPC. CCP members always constitute a majority or even super majority in the NPC.14 Needless to say, this majority forms the

184   Wang Jiangyu foundation for Party control of the NPC. As a Leninist political party, the CCP practices the organizational principle of “democratic centralism,” which requires each and every one of its members to abide by the Party’s organizational and political line in the following way: Individual Party members are subordinate to the Party organization, the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower Party organizations are subordinate to the higher Party organizations, and all the constituent organizations and individual members of the Party are subordinate to the National Congress and the Central Committee of the Party.15 In particular, Party members are bound by duties such as studying, understanding and taking the lead to implement the “Party’s line, principles, policies and resolutions,” putting “the interest of the Party and the people above everything,” abiding by the Party’s discipline, upholding the Party’s solidarity and unity, maintaining close ties with the masses to ensure that the Party’s policies are implemented, and collecting public views and feedback to inform the Party.16 Specifically, Party members among the NPC delegates have no other choice but to closely follow the Party’s political line and instructions. The late Professor Zhang Youyu, a leading official scholar and one of the drafting hands of the 1982 PRC Constitution, stated and explained the rationale from the perspective of the CCP: Delegates who are Party members must, of course, abide by the Party’s disciplines, and must not speak or vote in violation of the line, policies, resolutions and instructions of the Party. You are an NPC delegate, needless to say, but you are first of all a CCP member. You cannot assume that being a delegate would exempt you from Party disciplines. Of course, the Party would not be giving orders to all delegates. But, if you are a Party member, whether you are an NPC delegate or a government staff, you have to behave in accordance with the Party’s line and policies. This requirement is not different from the practice of capitalist countries. [In capitalist countries,] members of the parliament who belong to a political party must also not act in violation of the line and policies of their party, and must discuss important questions within their party first. It is simply not true that such members can disobey their party. We, CCP members, especially should bear this in mind. Furthermore, since the line and policies of our Party overlap with our national interest, it is generally impossible for our Party to oppose a resolution to be adopted by the NPC. However, if it ever happens that somebody in the NPC would propose something which is wrong and so opposed by the Party, members of the Party of course must also oppose it, and may not sing a different tune from the Party.17 In fact, before every meeting of the NPC annual conferences, the Party members among the NPC delegates are convened to meet for the “organizational

The party in the legislature and judiciary   185 life,” in which the members are informed of the “spirit of the Party Center” and requested to understand the intention of the Party with respect to the proposed legislative bill.18 The second level of control is exercised through the appointing of NPC officials by the Party. As noted earlier, one of the fundamental principles in the governance of the Chinese Party-­state is dangguan ganbu (the principle of Party control of cadres), through which the CCP dominates the appointment of officials in all government organs and public institutions. The legislature is no exception. As a matter of fact, the appointment of senior NPC officials including the chairman, vice chairmen, secretary-­general, NPCSC members, chairperson and vice chairperson of all the special committees is directly controlled at the highest level of the Party, by the Central Committee of the CCP.19 Other senior positions are appointed through the “normal process,” namely according to the regular channels of the system of dangguan ganbu. Members of the NPC Presidium are also decided at the top level of the CCP. The third level of control lies in the direct leadership of the Party in legislative activities. This is done through the so-­called dangzu, or the Party leading group, established in central or local state organs, social organizations, economic organizations or other non-­CCP organizations.20 The group, consisting of members appointed by the Party organization of the higher level, “plays the role of core leadership” in the organization where it is placed.21 The leading group is hence the actual decision-­making body in that organization, and reports directly to the Party’s highest organization in the administrative region. For example, the Party leading group of a provincial People’s Congress reports to the Party Committee of that province. Accordingly, the Party leading group of the NPC reports directly to and is under the leadership of the CCP Central Committee. This sophisticated design, intertwining the Party and the legislative organs, effectively puts the People’s Congresses under the leadership of the CCP at relevant levels, a phenomenon that one cannot directly observe from any state laws. CCP’s procedural and substantive control in the legislative process A CCP document titled Guanyu jiaqiang dui guojia lifa gongzuo lingdao de ruogan yijian [Several opinions on strengthening Party leadership in state legislative work], adopted by the CCP Central Committee in 1991, sets forth the following four circumstances in which the CCP Central would step in in the legislative process:22 1

2

Legislative bills concerning constitutional amendments, important political issues, or very important economic or administrative issues, must be reviewed and approved by both the Politburo and the Central Committee, before they are presented to the NPC. The NPCSC, when it begins to draft a law concerning political issues, must submit the rationale and guiding principles of the proposed draft law to the CCP Central for review and approval.

186   Wang Jiangyu 3 4

Draft laws concerning political issues or important economic or administrative issues must be submitted by the Leading Party Group at the NPCSC to the CCP Politburo or its Standing Committee for review and approval. The Party Central exercises “unified leadership” over the law drafting process. All the bills drafted by the NPC or NPCSC and, when necessary, bills drafted by other organizations, must be submitted by the NPCSC Party leading group to the CCP Central for review and approval.

In practice, the Party exercises direct control over China’s legislative work in each and every stage of the legislative process. It starts with legislative planning (lifa guihua). The NPC and local People’s Congresses make plans for legislating at the beginning of each five-­year session of the congress as well as at the beginning of each year.23 Those plans must, first of all, embrace the legislative needs of the Party according to its policy priorities. Further, the plans must be submitted to the relevant Party committee for approval before they take effect.24 In the second stage, the Party plays a leading role in suggesting legislation. It may be in the form of making a legislative proposal and asking the legislature to draft laws. Occasionally, the Party may introduce draft laws to the People’s Congress, mainly when they concern constitutional amendment. Needless to say, any legislative proposals from the CCP will be given the highest priority at the NPC. Once a legislative bill is presented to the legislature, the next stage is to consider, examine and vote to pass the bill. As noted previously, the legislative system of the NPC was carefully designed to give the NPC Presidium and the NPCSC Chairmen’s Council a pivotal status. These two bodies not only have the constitutional power to introduce bills to the NPC or NPCSC (which must then review and vote on the bill), but also have the discretionary power to decide whether bills introduced by other public bodies or the NPC delegates/NPCSC members should be put on the legislative agenda of the NPC or NPCSC. In essence, anyone who controls the Presidium and the Chairmen’s Council would be in a position to control the legislative process in China’s parliament. In this sense, the CCP’s tight control of these two bodies in the legislature is copper-­ bottomed to ensure that the Party can screen out bills which it does not like and put into the legislative agenda bills it prefers. Furthermore, with well-­disciplined Party members constituting always the majority in the NPC, the adoption by the NPC of any CCP-­preferred bill is guaranteed. As remarked by Qin Qianhong, “Thus far, there has never been a case that the NPC or NPCSC rejected a bill that is endorsed by the CCP Central, nor a case that a bill is passed into law by the NPC or NPCSC without the CCP Central’s approval.”25

The structure of the court system Courts in China are organized at four levels, largely in line with the central–local administrative system. At the top is the Supreme People’s Court (SPC), which is a central state organ. The SPC is the country’s highest court and the final court of appeal, although it has also been given first instance jurisdiction, which it

The party in the legislature and judiciary   187 exercised only once in its history.26 The SPC is also the leader of China’s judicial system and, in this capacity, it supervises the trial activities of all lower courts.27 The SPC, however, is also a lawmaker.28 It is authorized to issue judicial interpretations, which normally appear in the form of SPC-­made statutes binding at least upon all courts and judges in China when they adjudicate cases. Below the SPC are provincial higher courts. Each province (sheng), municipality directly governed by the central government (zhixiashi) and autonomous region (zizhiqu) has a Higher People’s Court, which is the highest judicial authority in its region. Many Intermediate People’s Courts are established in bigger cities or districts in the provincial regions. At the lowest level are Basic Courts, which are established in counties, small cities or districts. In addition, there are numerous special courts such as maritime courts, military courts and forest courts. A court is composed of a president, several vice presidents, the judges and the clerks. The president of a court is elected by the People’s Congress of the same administrative level, while the vice presidents, division heads and judges are appointed by the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of the same administrative level.29 In addition, every court in China has an Adjudication Committee, which functions like a senate to “summarize trial experiences and discuss major or difficult cases and other trial related matters.”30 Members of the Adjudication Committee, who are normally the court’s senior judges or officers, are to be officially appointed by the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress at the same level of the court. Several attributes of the Chinese judiciary, embodied in the relevant laws including the PRC Constitution, Civil Procedure Law, Criminal Procedure Law, Courts Law and Judges Law, are worth mentioning. The first is the very ambiguous and ambivalent “independence” requirement, in which the courts are both authorized and required to “exercise trial power independently according to law, and are not subject to interference by any administrative organs, social organizations or individuals.”31 The second is the “system of judgement of the second instance as final,” according which the judgement of the second instance court becomes immediately final.32 As for the third attribute, most cases are tried by collegiate panels comprising normally three judges. The summary procedure with a single judge is used only for very simple cases.33 The fourth attribute is the limited “public trial” system. In theory, the court should follow the principles of trial openness and make the trials accessible to the public.34 Closed-­door trials are permitted for exceptional cases concerning state secrets, individual privacy and minors.35 However, in practice, the courts enjoy great discretionary power in defining those “exceptional cases,” especially those concerning state secrets.

Party control of judiciary through the party political-­legal committees Any inquiry into the CCP’s interference with the judiciary should start with the functions of the Party’s Political-­Legal Committee (zhengfa weiyuanhui, or

188   Wang Jiangyu PPLC). Despite the word “political” in its name, it is practically the CCP’s umbrella organization to oversee – or “organize and direct” – all legal institutions, including the courts, the procuratorates and the police force, and their law enforcement activities, at all administrative levels of the Chinese Party-­state.36 The main functions of the Central PPLC, which is directly under the Party’s Central Committee, involve: (i) unifying the thoughts and actions of all legal institutions in accordance with the Party’s official line and policies; (ii) planning China’s legal work and implementing the Party’s policies on legal work; (iii) coordinating the work of the legal institutions regarding the maintenance of social stability; (iv) coordinating the legal institutions to ensure that they cooperate as well as check against each other; (v) supervising the handling of major and important cases and coordinating the legal institutions handling controversial cases; (vi) participating in the personnel appointments of the legal institutions; and (vii) participating in the Party’s disciplinary action against corrupt officers or wrongdoing.37 The PPLCs at lower levels have similar powers in their respective jurisdictions.38 The prescribed functions and actual practice of the PPLCs (which will be examined later) suggest several features of the Chinese legal system. First, the submission of the legal system, including all legal institutions and their activities, to the leadership of the CCP is the tenet of the political system in the Chinese Party-­state. The role of the legal system is to support the Party leadership, not the other way around.39 Second, it is a governing technique of the Party-­state to set up an arm to supervise the legal system to ensure the Party’s desired outcomes are achieved. Third, it is, however, not clear what the desired outcomes of the Party are in terms of building a legal system. The operation of the PPLCs has sent out mixed messages. On the one hand, the coordination – which effectively means leadership – role of the PPLC in the legal system places it in a position to delete, at any time, the limited checks and balances allowed in the legal apparatus. The membership of the Central PPLC, which comprises, among others, a CCP Politburo member as the chairman, the minister of public security (the police force), the president of the SPC, the president of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), the minister of justice, and the legal chiefs from the armed police force and the People’s Liberation Army, is very revealing of the “harmonization” function of the committee, which, in bringing the legal institutions together, melds their different opinions when necessary. On the other hand, the Central PPLC has undoubtedly been the driving hand behind China’s judicial reform which is, at least in part, moving toward greater professionalism and trial independence. The control of the judiciary, through the PPLCs and other Party-­dominated means, is further examined below. Of course, it is safe to say that the logic of Party control of the judiciary is not fundamentally different from that of the legislature. That is, the Party controls the appointment of senior officials and judges in courts, requires all Party members in the court to abide by the Party line and interferes in individual cases when necessary. Generally, as sympathetically observed by Randy Peerenboom,

The party in the legislature and judiciary   189 [i]n a single-­party socialist state, the Party will inevitably exercise some degree of influence over the courts. However, that does not mean that courts are simply Party organs, or that the Party controls every action of the courts or determines the outcome of all or even most cases. In practice, the Party influences the courts in various ways and through various channels. The Party primarily exerts influence in the areas of ideology, policy and personnel matters, though it sometimes is involved directly in deciding the outcome of particular cases. The Party influences the courts externally through the Party Committees (dang weiyuanhui), the Political-­Legal Committee (zhengfa weiyuanhui), and the Organization Department, and internally through the Party Group, Party Institutional Organ, Party cells, Political Department (zhengzhi bu), and perhaps in some cases the adjudicative committee within the courts.40 Significantly, the PPLCs play a key role in the Party’s control of the courts. Ling Li points out that the CCP, through the PPLCs, has established at all administrative levels, “control over judicial affairs in two approaches: (1) the ‘macro’ approach, by instructing courts on certain judicial policies; and (2) the ‘micro’ approach, by instructing courts on the judicial outcome of specific cases.”41 The “macro” approach is conducted through judicial policies promulgated by the Party, which include decisions, resolutions and opinions of the Party’s Central Committee and the Central PPLC, as well as the judicial interpretations, opinions, decisions or notices issued by the SPC to inform or order lower courts to comply with and implement the Party’s policy priorities in judicial activities. In 2013, the CCP, led by its General Secretary Xi Jinping, adopted a decision to launch a major round of judicial reform.42 Following the Party’s call, the SPC issued, among others, the Fourth Five-­Year Outline for Judicial Reform (2014–2018) in 201443 and a white paper in 2016 to report the progress of the reform.44 Through macromanagement by the PPLC, the Party-­state ensures its policy objectives are achieved. For example, in the late 1990s, the Chinese government launched a campaign against foreign exchange frauds. For this, the Party convened joint meetings of the SPC, SPP and Ministry of Public Security to align their policies and efforts, resulting in a Party decision that the legal and law enforcement institutions undertook to use their respective jurisdictional powers to tackle the frauds together. “Once issued, the decision was circulated to courts, procuratorates, and public security bureaus nationwide for implementation.”45 For example, the SPC issued a judicial policy to strengthen and accelerate the trial of cases relating to these so-­called fraudulent activities and punish the wrongdoers.46 However, what is deemed most controversial about the role of the PPLC is actually its involvement in individual cases, namely its micromanagement of judicial decision-­making in individual court cases when it deems necessary. Although the Party’s direct interference in individual cases is not a daily routine, institutionally the Party has the power to interfere with the decision-­making in

190   Wang Jiangyu certain categories of cases that are believed important to the Party’s rule. This is done through two procedures: case coordination and case supervision.47 In case coordination, the various political-­legal institutions, including the court, the procuratorate and the police department, may be convened by the PPLC to work together so as to remove the “gridlock” that is likely to prevent a case from being concluded promptly or unfavorably to the Party’s policy objectives. Once the coordination meeting reaches a decision, the PPLC will issue an “opinion” which is binding upon all the aforesaid political-­legal institutions. Then, whatever the law is, the court will have to shape the outcome of the case toward complying with the PPLC opinion.48 The mechanism of case supervision is done through the case inspection system, in which the PPLC surveys cases decided by the court “to investigate and solve complaints about non-­compliance with Party policies and State laws” in those cases.49 A case that is politically sensitive, concerns social stability or state security, or involves unlawful conduct of CCP’s political-­ legal officials may draw the PPLC’s attention.50 The Party will impose sanctions, such as public denouncement or dismissal, against the court which rendered a judgement considered to be either politically or legal wrong and/or the responsible individuals.51

Party control and judicial independence It is relatively obvious that the judiciary is firmly controlled by the CCP in China. Does Party control necessarily entail there being no judicial independence, and accordingly, no impartiality and fairness in the Chinese courts’ handling of cases? The answers to this question depend on, first of all, the definition of judicial independence. Judicial independence can be generally defined as “the ability of courts and judges to perform their duties free of influence or control by other actors.”52 However, it is also a contested concept because of several related subconcepts. It may require substantive or decisional independence, which means the judges have personal independence guaranteed institutionally and physically to decide cases independently in accordance with law. It may also require de jure independence, which refers to explicit provisions on a country’s legal system to grant independence to courts. It may entail internal independence, which enables judges to adjudicate disputes without interference from their colleagues, or external independence, which includes “both the decisional independence of judges in deciding cases without interference from external sources and the collective independence of the judiciary.”53 Conventional wisdom, which measures the Chinese judiciary against a global standard of judicial independence, holds, quite rightly to a great extent, that the lack of judicial independence, caused by the Party’s unfettered interference, is the biggest problem in Chinese people’s access to justice. The Congressional-­ Executive Commission on China (CECC), a congressional body created by the US Congress in 2000 “with the legislative mandate to monitor human rights and

The party in the legislature and judiciary   191 the development of the rule of law in China,”54 so describes the situation of the absence of judicial independence in China in its first annual report: [T]he lack of an independent judiciary is a fundamental problem that China must address before it can meet international human rights standards. The Communist Party exerts significant control over the court system. Party political-­legal committees often select judges – decisions that are then simply rubber-­stamped by the relevant provincial or local people’s congresses, which have the formal power to appoint judges. Most senior judges and members of the courts’ adjudication committees are Party members. The adjudication committees supervise the work of the court and have the ultimate power to decide any case before the court. Moreover, judges often confer with the relevant political-­legal committee in politically sensitive or difficult cases.55 Randy Peerenboom has, however, argued that the belief of the (complete) lack judicial independence in China is based on some “common myths and unfounded assumptions.”56 On the Party’s influence on the judiciary, Peerenboom remarks that [t]he Party’s role in the legal system and its impact on judicial independence is generally overstated and assumed – without a close examination of the party’s actual role and its consequences – to be pernicious. In a single-­party, socialist state, the party will exercise some degree of influence over the courts. However, that does not mean that courts are simply party organs or that the party controls every action of the courts or determine the outcome of all or even most cases.57 Fu Yulin and Randy Peerenboom proposed a new analytical framework for understanding and promoting judicial independence in China.58 They categorized cases adjudicated by Chinese courts as pure political cases, politically sensitive cases, and routine criminal, civil and administrative cases. The suggestion was that different types of cases would receive different degrees of interference from the Party and the government. Pure political cases are cases that involve defendants who directly challenge the ruling regime or even intend to overthrow the ruling status of the CCP. The Party plays a decisive role in the outcome of such cases, usually resulting in restrictions of rights and criminal punishment of prisoners of conscience. Politically sensitive cases include “social-­economic cases such as land taking and compensation, some entitlement claims (pension, unemployment, medical care, education) and some environmental and labor disputes.”59 For these cases, the courts are susceptible to external pressure from the Party and the government and would respond by limiting the private parties’ rights or their access to judicial resources. In general, the courts would follow the guidelines and policies set by the PPLCs or other Party organs, and consult the relevant Party organs or government agencies when necessary, to avoid

192   Wang Jiangyu ­disturbance to social-­political or social-­economic stability as defined by the Party. However, for routine criminal, civil and administrative cases, there is limited or no systematic interference from the Party-­state.60 Peerenboom has contended that the Party’s “main interest in the outcome of most cases, whether commercial, criminal or administrative, is that the result be perceived as fair by the parties and the people.”61 It is acknowledged that the aforesaid new analytic framework may suggest that China’s judicial system may not always lack fairness, but it cannot necessarily establish that China has a considerable degree of judicial independence. After all, all the facts are there: the courts operate under the Party apparatus, and generally have no choice but to faithfully execute specific Party orders and implement Party policies, in addition to submitting themselves to the coordinating power of the PPLCs. Chinese courts and judges still depend on local governments for appointment, promotion, funding and material provisions including salaries. To the extent that the judiciary can render impartial decisions in routine civil, criminal and administrative cases, it is because the Party desires such “fair” outcomes from the courts to enhance its own legitimacy, not because the judiciary can decide cases independently. In this regard, the ongoing judicial reform initiated by the Xi Jinping administration in 2013 may strengthen the judiciary’s professionalism and reduce interference from local Party organs and governments, but will not eliminate the interference of the Party-­state, unless it can be clearly seen that the CCP, at its top level, realizes that empowering the judiciary and granting judges genuine independence can enhance the Party-­ state’s legitimacy and earn it greater public trust.62

The raison d’être of the party’s control of the legislature and judiciary Our discussions so far demonstrate that China’s legislature and judiciary are securely placed under the leadership of the CCP. Messages sent out by the Party are, however, often mixed, confusing and even self-­contradictory. The Party does, through issuing legal policies, through personnel appointments and disciplinary actions, and through material provisions and a range of other means, shape the behavior of the legal institutions to ensure they act within the bounds of the Party line. On the other hand, numerous reform measures have been taken by the Party-­state to drive the lawmaking and judicial institutions toward greater professionalism and even a stronger degree of institutional autonomy. A fundamental question is what is the raison d’être, or rationale behind the relationship between the Party and the legislature and the judiciary? The answers to this question truly depend on one’s perspective. There are, first of all, two conflicting views, both idealist in nature. One view, often held by Party scholars in China, unconditionally defends the dominance of the Party over legal institutions in China. It asserts that the Party’s leadership role is the natural result of “historical development” in China and is the best model of judicial governance that suits China’s needs.63 The dominant Western view embraced by many

The party in the legislature and judiciary   193 l­iberally minded scholars in China, however, maintains that Chinese courts lack the rule of law and judicial independence and this is the result of the CCP’s unconstrained interference in legal and judicial affairs. According to this view, China can realize judicial fairness and impartiality only when the CCP’s control of the judiciary is terminated or substantially reduced.64 There is probably a third approach to looking at the role of the Party that aims to understand the reasons, motivations and effects of the CCP’s control of the legislature and judiciary in China. It argues that the Party’s control of the legal institutions is part of its overall effort to manage its own legitimacy in ruling China. Political legitimacy of a ruling regime is defined to include “both citizens’ trust in public officials and their conviction that governmental institutions are fair, responsive, and valuable.”65 Put simply, political legitimacy has two aspects: control of power and popular acceptance. Legitimacy must however be continuously managed by the ruler to adapt to new situations and circumstances. In a nutshell, legitimacy management requires the ruler to achieve the following objectives, which, although often in conflict with each other, need to be deployed concurrently and balanced carefully: (i) concentration of and preservation of power; (ii) promotion and maintenance of the ruler’s ideology; (iii) coordination of interest groups politics; (iv) control of bureaucratic politics (departmentalism) and official rent-­seeking (corruption); (v) pursuit of good policy to rationalize governance, including institutional building; and (vi) creation of an interference to establish legitimacy in the international society.66 Legitimacy management explains why the CCP exercises strict control over the legal institutions, including the legislature and judiciary, as well as offering ways to understand the CCP’s occasional campaigns to create space for limited autonomy in the legal institutions, ending officials’ interference in judicial decisions which do not officially come from the Party, fighting corruption, and increasing professionalism in the legislature and judiciary.67 In the end, all legitimacy management efforts are aimed at strengthening the CCP’s monopoly of political power in China. It is almost impossible to distinguish between CCP policy and governmental policy in contemporary China.68 The current Party-­state system allows the CCP to control all of the political and administrative appointments, convert its policies into state laws, and coordinate all state and Party organs as well as individual officials and Party members to implement the laws. In fact, Party policies are also officially treated as laws, which have to be implemented not only by Party members but also by state officials. The word “state” in China undoubtedly means dang he zhengfu, i.e., “the Party and the government.” The Party’s tight grip on state power has obviously caused many problems. From the Party’s perspective, controlling the legislative power is a natural result of its ruling status and is not inconsistent with international best practices. After all, it is a universal phenomenon that the political party which constitutes the

194   Wang Jiangyu majority in parliament controls the legislative agenda, although the CCP always chooses not to allow free discussion about how it has become the majority party in the People’s Congresses. But the Party surely understands the problems in the judiciary, many of which were intentionally or unintentionally created by the Party-­state itself. Party interference has led to judicial corruption, opaque trial process, and delayed court proceedings and wrongful prosecutions of innocent citizens, a phenomenon that is not uncommon. Probably the biggest problem apparent in Party interference in the judiciary is the conflict of objectives. While fair judicial decisions require independence and impartiality of the adjudicator as well as strict compliance with the black-­letter law, the Party’s policy priorities often force the courts to take into consideration political ideology, social and economic stability, and even bureaucratic politics.

Concluding remarks: legal reform and the future of China’s legislature and judiciary The design and operation of the political system in China have created two facts on the ground. First, China is a Party-­state in which the CCP’s leadership role cannot be separated from the state and the government. In other words, the Party is the state in contemporary China, and it controls the state legislature and judiciary in this capacity. Second, the Party-­state system is here to stay. Despite the outcry for political reform and political liberalization, the Party’s grip on state power has actually been solidified rather than loosened. The CCP seems to be aware of the legitimacy problems caused by its control of the legislature and the judiciary. In recent years, measures have been taken, in the name of legal reform and Party building (dangjian), to improve transparency in the legal system, professionalism in lawmaking and judicial decision-­making, as well as to limit public participation in the legislative and judicial processes. Nevertheless, all of the reforms have been conducted in tandem with strengthened CCP dominance in all public institutions. We will have to wait and see whether this model will lead to good governance under a one-­party rule, as expected by the CCP and its supporters, or to political decay and even political chaos, as expected by the Party-­state’s liberal critics. For the legislature and the lawmaking system, recent reforms, embodied in the newly amended Legislation Law,69 aim to put the People’s Congresses, especially the NPC, at the center of lawmaking activities by limiting the legislative power of the ministries, the SPC and the SPP. The reform has also expanded, albeit to a very limited extent, the scope of public participation in law making by encouraging lawmakers to listen to voices from the grass roots, civil society institutions and experts.70 There are no signs that the CCP would allow the legislatures to become independent lawmaking bodies. However, arguably, the CCP should still be able to control the legislature as the majority party, even if it gives up the complex web of controlling mechanisms in the name of Party leadership within the legislature. For the judiciary, this round of judicial reform seems to be more promising in terms of moving toward a larger degree of judicial independence. The 2013 CCP

The party in the legislature and judiciary   195 Reform Program states that the Party will lead the reform to “guarantee independent and fair exercise of judicial and procuratorial powers according to law.”71 In particular, several dozens of reform measures have been proposed. According to the Party-­state’s new plan, trial independence will be strengthened by holding court hearings to be at the center of the adjudication process. (In contrast, it was not uncommon in China’s recent past that the outcome of a case was determined even before holding the ostentatious court hearing.) Judges will therefore be empowered to decide on the case more independently. Meanwhile, a “quota” system is being established in courts to allow only qualified persons to be judges, and judges will be bestowed statuses distinct from ordinary government officials. Significantly, the management of personnel and funding of local courts will be centralized at the provincial level, thus depriving governments at lower levels of influence over the courts.72 However, as to what extent of “independence” can be achieved, the reform plan only aims to strengthen the courts’ independence from local governments and any unauthorized individuals in the Party-­state system, not from the CCP. Instead, it has emphasized that both the judicial system and judicial reform are under Party leadership.73 In the foreseeable future, the most optimistic yet realistic expectation of the Chinese judiciary’s role is not that it becomes an independent body from the CCP, but that it can deliver impartial decisions in routine cases.74 In other words, the Chinese courts will be under the leadership of the CCP for a long time to come, but hopefully it can gradually achieve fairness without independence, and accountability (directly to the Party and indirectly to the public) even without democracy.

Notes   1 Andrew Heywood, Politics (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 241.   2 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. 234.   3 See Hu Jintao, “Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects – Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China”, 15 October 2007, Part VI, www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-10/31/   4 “Xi Jinping Chairs the Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CCP,” Xinhua newswire, 7 January 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/201601/07/c_1117705534.htm (accessed 28 August 2016).   5 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China], Articles 57 and 61 (hereinafter the PRC Constitution).   6 PRC Constitution, Articles 62 and 67. “Laws,” or falü, in this specific context, are defined as those statutes adopted by the NPC or its Standing Committee.   7 PRC Constitution, Article 100. Administrative regulations, or xingzheng fagui, are rules made by the State Council and a formal source of law in China.   8 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifafa [Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China] (2015 revised edition), Article 14 (hereinafter the PRC Legislation Law).   9 PRC Legislation Law, Article 15. 10 PRC Legislation Law, Articles 26 and 27. 11 PRC Legislation Law, Articles 19 and 20.

196   Wang Jiangyu 12 PRC Legislation Law, Article 29. 13 PRC Legislation Law, Articles 25 and 44. 14 Statistics have shown that the percentage of Party members was 54.49 percent in the First NPC, 57.75 percent in the Second NPC, 54.83 percent in the Third NPC, 76.8 percent in the Fourth NPC, 72.78 percent in the Fifth NPC, 62.5 percent in the Sixth NPC, 66.9 percent in the Seventh NPC, 68.4 percent in the Eighth NPC, and 71.5 percent in the Ninth NPC. See Qin Qianhong, “Zhizhengdang lingdao lifa de fangshi he tujing” [Methods and ways for the ruling Party to exercise leadership in lawmaking], Zhongguo falü pinglun [China Law Review], general issue no. 3 (September 2014), pp. 217–224, especially p. 222. 15 Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangcheng [Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party], 2012 revised edition, Article 3 (hereinafter the CCP Constitution). 16 CCP Constitution § 3 (1997). 17 Zhang Youyu, “Lun renmin daibiao dahui daibiao de renwu, zhiquan he huodong fangshi wenti” [On the tasks, powers and forms of behavior of the delegates of the National People’s Congress], Faxue yanjiu [Chinese Journal of Law], no. 2 (1985): 4. 18 Qin, “Zhizhengdang lingdao lifa de fangshi he tujing,” p. 222. 19 Qin, p. 222. 20 CCP Constitution, Article 46. 21 CCP Constitution, Article 46 22 See Qin, “Zhizhengdang lingdao lifa de fangshi he tujing,” p. 220. 23 For example, the Twelfth NPC, which is the current Chinese parliament, included in its legislative plan 68 items for adoption, revision or consideration. See “Legislative Plan of the Twelfth National People’s Congress,” www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/ syxw/2013-10/31/content_1812101.htm (accessed 21 August 2016). 24 Qin, “Zhizhengdang lingdao lifa de fangshi he tujing,” p. 218. 25 Qin, “Zhizhengdang lingdao lifa de fangshi he tujing,” p. 222. 26 It was the SPC’s trial of the Gang of Four in 1980–1981. 27 The Organic Law of People’s Courts (2006 revised edition), Article 29 (hereinafter the Court Law). 28 Court Law, Article 32. 29 Court Law, Article 34. 30 Court Law, Article 10. 31 PRC Constitution, Article 126. 32 State Council Information Office, China’s Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of Law (Beijing: The Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, February 2008), www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_ 7041733.htm (accessed 30 July 2008) (hereinafter the White Paper on Rule of Law). 33 State Council Information Office, White Paper on Rule of Law. 34 PRC Constitution, Article 125. 35 State Council Information Office, White Paper on Rule of Law. 36 See, e.g., “Zhongyang zhengfa weiyuanhui de zhuyao zhineng” [Main functions of the Central Political-­Legal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party], www.china. com.cn/cpc/2011-04/15/content_22369240.htm (accessed 21 August 2016). 37 “Zhongyang zhengfa weiyuanhui de zhuyao zhineng.”  38 Li Ling, “The Chinese Communist Party and People’s Courts: Judicial Independence in China,” Amer­ican Journal of Comparative Law 64, no. 1 (2016): 37–74, p. 57. 39 See Pitman B. Potter, China’s Legal System (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), pp. 35–36. 40 Randall Peerenboom, China’s Long March toward Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 302. 41 Li, “The Chinese Communist Party and People’s Courts,” p. 59. 42 See Zhongong zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding [Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on some

The party in the legislature and judiciary   197 major issues concerning comprehensively deepening the reform], adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Commission of the Chinese Communist Party on 12 November 2013 (hereinafter the “2013 CCP Reform Program”). 43 Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu quanmian shenhua renmin fayuan gaige de yijian – renmin fayuan disige wunian gaige gangyao (2014–2018) [Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on comprehensively deepening judicial reform – The Fourth Five-­ Year Outline of Judicial Reform], promulgated on 4 February 2015 by the SPC (hereinafter the Fourth Judicial Reform Outline). 44 Zhongguo fayuan de sifa gaige [Judicial reform of Chinese Courts], promulgated by the SPC on 29 February 2016. An introduction of the White Paper is available at the official website of the Chinese judiciary, www.court.gov.cn/zixun-­xiangqing-16695. html (hereinafter “Summary of the Judicial Reform White Paper”) (accessed 21 August 2016). 45 Li, “The Chinese Communist Party and People’s Courts,” p. 62. 46 Li, pp. 60–61. 47 Li, p. 67. 48 Li, p. 68. 49 Li, p. 68. 50 Li, pp. 68–69. 51 Li, p. 69. 52 David S. Law, “Judicial Independence,” in The International Encyclopaedia of Political Science, ed. Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-­Schlosser and Leonardo Morlino, vol. 5, (California: SAGE Publications, 2011), pp. 1369–1372. See also Peerenboom, China’s Long March toward Rule of Law, p. 298. 53 Peerenboom, China’s Long March toward Rule of Law, p. 299. 54 For details about the Congressional-­Executive Commission on China (CECC), see “About,” www.cecc.gov/about (accessed 21 August 2016). 55 Congressional-­Executive Commission on China [CECC], Annual Report 2002, p. 27, www.cecc.gov.CECC (accessed 21 August 2016). 56 Randall Peerenboom, “Judicial Independence in China: Common Myths and Unfounded Assumptions,” in Judicial Independence in China: Lessons from Global Rule of Law Promotion, ed. Randall Peerenboom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 69–94, especially pp. 69–70. 57 Peerenboom, “Judicial Independence in China,” pp. 78–79. 58 See Fu Yulin and Randall Peerenboom, “A New Analytic Framework for Understanding and Promoting Judicial Independence in China,” in Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion, ed. Randall Peerenboom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 95–133. 59 Yulin and Peerenboom, “A New Analytic Framework,” p. 96. 60 Yulin and Peerenboom, pp. 102–107. 61 Peerenboom, “Judicial Independence in China,” p. 80. 62 See Tom Ginsburg “Judicial Independence in East Asia: Lessons for China,” in Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion, ed. Randall Peerenboom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 258 (which states, “it is certainly possible to speak of independence even in an authoritarian political system like contemporary China”). 63 See Hu Yunteng, “Jianchi dang de lingdao he duli shenpan de guanxi” [The relationship between the Party’s leadership role and trial independence in China], Zhongguo falü pinglun [China Law Review], no. 1 (March 2014): 25–29. 64 See Congressional-­Executive Commission on China [CECC], “Judicial Independence in the PRC,” www.cecc.gov/judicial-­independence-in-­the-prc (accessed 28 August 2016). See also Zhang Qianfan, “The People’s Court in Transition: The Prospects of the Chinese Judicial Reform,” Journal of Contemporary China 12, no. 34 (2003): 69–101.

198   Wang Jiangyu 65 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 132. 66 Wang Jiangyu, “The Political Logic of Corporate Governance in China’s State-­ Owned Enterprises,” Cornell International Law Journal 47, no. 3 (2014): 638. 67 See, e.g., “China’s Top Court Urges Judicial Independence, End to Interference,” Reuters news, 29 October 2013, www.reuters.com/article/us-­china-courts-­idUSBRE 99S0HB20131029 (accessed 20 August 2016). 68 Zhu Suli, “The Party and the Courts,” in Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion, ed. Randall Peerenboom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 55. 69 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lifa fa [Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China], adopted by the National People’s Congress on 15 March 2000, and revised on 15 March 2015. 70 Jiang Mingan, “Gaijin he wanshan lifa tizhi, lifa fa chengxian qida liangdian” [The seven highlights of the new Legislation Law in improving China’s lawmaking system], The People’s Daily website, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2015/0520/ c207270-27030565.html (accessed 21 August 2016). 71 2013 CCP Reform Program, supra note 41. 72 Fourth Judicial Reform Outline, supra note 42. 73 Fourth Judicial Reform Outline, supra note 42; see also 2013 CCP Reform Program, supra note 41. 74 Benjamin Liebman, “China’s Courts: Restricted Reform,” Columbia Journal of Asian Law 21, no. 1 (2007): 43.

10 The party in grassroots governance Zhao Litao

The profound economic and social transformations in urban China have created tremendous challenges for grassroots governance. A large body of literature has documented the challenges, which include issues in community services, management and organizations, and has analyzed the evolution of approaches and mechanisms in dealing with those challenges. Studies that locate the driving force either in the state or in the civil society miss out on a basic fact that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) plays a central role in steering and coordinating the efforts in community building and grassroots governance. Bringing the Party back in is necessary for a better understanding of how China is changing.1 Notably, the advance of the Party into the grassroots has been a major theme in the study of community building and grassroots governance.2 Bringing the Party back in has given rise to new analytical frameworks such as the model of “big Party, small state, and great society.”3 This chapter is in line with the “Party’s advance” thesis. Using Shanghai as a case study, it describes the ways (conventional or new) and means (direct or indirect) that the CCP uses to advance at the grass roots. In the process, the Party does not stand in contrast to the “small state” and the “great society.” Instead, it attempts to improve grassroots governance by strengthening the “infrastructural power.”4 Party building is a key part of this effort. The expansion of the state at the grass roots – in terms of manpower and financial resources – is also seen as important for the “infrastructural power,” and so is the “great society” as long as it is under Party leadership. The Party also views the technology that coordinates fragmented authority as part of the “infrastructural power.” In other words, Shanghai represents a model of “big Party, big state and diversified society,” in which the Party uses its own advance, together with state apparatus, social organizations and technology to strengthen the infrastructural power in grassroots governance. This chapter also discusses the challenges for this model.

Challenges for grassroots governance Past studies have documented enormous challenges for the existing system of grassroots governance. The challenges stem from changes within the state sector as well as transformations outside the state sector.

200   Zhao Litao Two changes within the state sector have profound implications for grassroots governance. The first one is the reform of state-­owned enterprises (SOEs) since the mid-­1990s, which led to massive layoffs and reduced welfare. As many SOEs were closed, privatized or restructured, the responsibility of taking care of retirees and laid-­off workers shifted from SOEs to community organizations set up by the government. This shift was by no means trivial. It involved difficult yet important changes to the system of grassroots governance, from one that features danwei as the main pillar and street offices and resident committees playing a supplementary role to one that relies more on street offices and resident committees.5 In rust-­belt regions where SOEs built in the Mao era were concentrated, the need for a new model of grassroots governance was urgent. The emergence of the Shenyang model, which amalgamated two to three residents’ committees to form a “community,” and promoted “autonomy” and self-­help within the community to share limited administrative and financial resources, was thus understandable. As noted by Takahara and Benewick, “particularly in the poorer areas where the government cannot invest much in the provision of services, autonomy has been promoted as an economical means for social management.”6 Another change is the decentralization within the Party-­government hierarchy, which has drastically increased the functional importance of street offices and resident committees. Instead of empowering grassroots organizations in charge of community building and management, such top-­down decentralization of tasks and responsibilities becomes a burden for them. A case study by Heberer and Gӧbel lists the main duties for a resident committee in Chongqing, including mediation; providing information regarding legislation and education for compliance therewith; hukou administration (registration authority); administration of temporary residents; guaranteeing public security (in cooperation with the police); ensuring public stability; complying with and maintaining hygiene and environmental standards (also in private homes); enforcing birth control and family planning; enforcing compulsory education; organizing cultural and sporting events; disturbing contraceptives; punishing birth control violations; increasing services for residents; ensuring workplace health and safety protection in companies within the grounds of the shequ; stipulating economic tasks and the developmental direction of the shequ; implementing tasks and goals passed down from the street office; procuring work for demobilized soldiers; providing aid and care for the elderly, orphans, disabled persons, and victims of natural disasters; combating poverty; arranging burials, and issuing marriage and death certificates.”7 Due to SOE reforms and the decentralization of administrative tasks, the challenge for grassroots governance takes many forms. One is the lack of capacity on the part of kuai to perform tasks assigned by tiao. In the context of China, the term tiao refers to the vertical line of authority; the term kuai refers to the territorial government. At the grassroots level, vertical departments (tiao) pass down

Party in grassroots governance   201 a growing list of tasks to street offices and resident committees (kuai), without delegating authority and resources for kuai to function properly. Similarly, the lack of coordination between tiao and kuai results in a situation where kuai know the problem but do not have the authority to handle it, while tiao have the authority but do not see the problem.8 Another challenge is the lack of coordination between danwei within the community and the street office or the resident committee in charge of community affairs. By design, the street office and the resident committee is supposed to manage urbanites who do not belong to any danwei. With the shift from danwei to the street office and resident committee as the main pillar of grassroots governance, the street office and resident committee still lack the means to gain the support of danwei in managing community affairs. In the case of a conflict of interest involving residents and danwei, the street office or the resident committee as the representative of residents is likely to find itself powerless vis-­à-vis the danwei which often has a higher administrative rank. Apart from changes and challenges from within, broader changes in the economy and society have also presented challenges to grassroots governance.9 One such change is the expansion of the non-­state sector, which has resulted in the separation of work and residence and the end of “organized dependence” on the workplace for access to consumer items and a broad range of services.10 Coupled with urban renewal, this has led to changed patterns of residence and social relations. The sense of community among residents is considerably weaker in newly built “communities.” As trust and social capital in the form of guanxi (network ties) are important for effective grassroots governance,11 the challenge of mobilizing community participation and volunteerism is tremendous in such communities. The second change is large-­scale migration, including both rural–urban migration and urban–urban migration. Nationwide, the migrant population totaled 245 million in 2013. Migrants from the countryside reached 166 million. The separation of registered residence and actual residence has been common. In 2012, about 52.6 percent of the Chinese population lived in urban areas, yet only 35.3 percent had a local urban hukou, suggesting that one in every three urban residents today is an “outsider” without a local hukou.12 The proportion of migrants in Shanghai is even higher. Out of 24 million permanent residents, migrants made up nearly ten million in 2013. Five districts (out of a total of 16) in the outer areas of Shanghai already have more migrants than local hukou population.13 Communities with a high concentration of migrants have been found to be difficult for achieving grassroots governance. As Chinese sociologist Li Peilin observes, [a]ccelerated social mobility has put a lot of pressure on managing the migrant population. Migrants face various barriers in hukou, employment, housing, children’s education and social security. Their integration into urban life is difficult. They tend to live [at] the intersection of urban and

202   Zhao Litao rural areas or [in] city’s underground buildings. The system of urban management, which caters to urban residents with local hukou, is weak in such areas. Social problems such as theft, robbery, gang activities, drug problems, and so on are rather salient in places with a high concentration of migrants.14 The third change is the emergence of organized interest among homeowners and the tension between them and developers and/or property management companies. The street office and resident committee in some communities are asked to mediate disputes between the homeowners’ committee and the developer or property management company. Moreover, scholars attribute the low levels of community participation and volunteerism in urban communities to the lack of stakeholdership. As Takahara and Benewick point out, compared to village autonomy, it is more difficult to secure the participation of residents in the various activities of the urban community. This is partly because a number of urban residents generally do not feel they have a stake in community construction. Compared to the villages that own a substantial amount of assets, such as land and village enterprises, urban communities are penniless. The work of urban communities is targeted mainly at the weak and unfortunate members of society … there is not much incentive for [residents] to participate in community activities.15 The same factor helps to explain the challenge of securing compliance and mobilizing support at the grassroots level. To varying extents, fragmented authority and excessive decentralization of administrative tasks, as well as broader economic and social changes, have presented challenges for grassroots governance. Specifically, the challenges can be categorized into the following issues: (i) lack of authority on the part of the street office and resident committee vis-­à-vis line authorities and danwei within the community; (ii) lack of administrative, personnel and financial resources at the grassroots level; (iii) too many administrative tasks performed at the grassroots level; (iv) lack of motivated, competent staff to take up low-­paid and low-­ prestige posts involving grassroots governance; and (v) low levels of compliance, community participation and volunteerism among community members due to the weak sense of stakeholdership. As urban communities differ in size, history, cohesiveness and resource endowment, different communities have different worries about the challenge of grassroots governance. Communities in rust-­belt industrial cities have different priorities and difficulties in grassroots governance from middle-­class communities in fast-­growing cities, which in turn are different from migrant communities in peri-­urban areas. In this sense, grassroots governance is an evolving and contextual concept in China, depending on the type and extent of challenge facing the community.

Party in grassroots governance   203

The role of party in grassroots governance Given the variety of challenges for grassroots governance, there have been different views and practices, all in the name of “reform” or “innovation.” Broadly speaking, there are two categories of views and practices. The first one favors the liberal approach, emphasizing the need to decentralize, marketize, and diversify the provision of social services, and enlarge the room for non-­state actors, including non-­governmental organizations (NGOs), volunteers and commercial organizations, to participate in the co-­governance of the community.16 The idea of involving non-­state stakeholders in shared governance of community affairs has been accepted by the top leadership from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, as reflected in their speeches or Party/government documents on social management or social governance. In practice, two types of city, to some extent, have embraced the liberal approach, but under drastically different circumstances. Cities of the first type promote “autonomy” in community building as an economical means for social management and service delivery. The best-­known example is Shenyang, which has gone further to limit the intrusion of government into the community. From the very beginning, Shenyang, the capital city of Liaoning in the rust-­belt northeastern China, amalgamated two to three resident committees into a community and excluded the street office from the community. In June 2000, Shenyang “disallowed the establishment at the community level of any organizations directly under the vertical departmental systems.” Meanwhile, “communities were prohibited from establishing organizations that bore the same name as any upper-­ level organization.”17 If cities of the first type are forced to embrace the liberal approach out of severe financial constraints, the second type of city chooses to embrace the liberal approach for higher efficiency and better results. Some cities in Guangdong have sought to “flatten” the structure of governance by removing street offices and establishing a system of “two layers of government, three layers of management” consisting of city–district–community. Guangdong has also taken the lead in removing some of the restrictions on NGO registration and operation.18 While the liberal approach to grassroots governance can be found in scholarly discussions as well as some local practices, the second approach, which emphasizes the role of the CCP in grassroots governance, has become a prevailing one nationwide. The argument is that the mounting challenges facing grassroots governance do not make the CCP less important. On the contrary, they make the Party even more important. The solution lies in the strengthening of Party organizations rather than any other forms of organization. The key issue, from the perspective of the second approach, is which organization has the capacity to hold the grassroots society together. For theorists in favor of the second approach, the answer is simple: no other force except the CCP can hold the society together. As Chinese sociologist Zheng Hangsheng argued,

204   Zhao Litao in the study of China’s community building, if you fail to see that it is party building that drives community building, it is grassroots party organizations that act as the main force to integrate the world of strangers and create links between them, then you cannot understand the past, present and future of China’s community building, as well as its greatest feature. In China, no other social force can play this integrative role at the grassroots level.19 Seen in this light, the more plural, diverse and heterogeneous the community is, the more important the Party work becomes. Among all the forces and organizations, the CCP is the only one that can deeply penetrate into the grassroots society, which “should provide it with sweeping monitoring and organizational capacities.”20 While the government hierarchy formally extends until the street level, the Party hierarchy extends further down. A case study of a community with 466 Party members in Shenyang shows that under the leadership of the street Party committee, this community-­level Party committee is comprised of four Party branches, which in turn are divided into 16 Party groups. At the lowest level, there are 55 Party responsibility sections.21 Through Party organizations and members, the CCP has an extensive reach at the grassroots level. The CCP’s role in mobilizing volunteers is particularly salient in areas where self-­organized, voluntary grassroots initiative is lacking. The level of voluntary activity is very low in China’s population. As a result, “the Party-­state tries to make up for this by mobilizing two groups of people: state-­dependent income support recipients … and Party members.”22 In many places, the emergence of associations within the neighborhood communities is the result of a top-­down process, rather than a civil-­society building process. While some of these associations are not as active as desirable, it becomes clear that without the initiative and mobilization of the CCP, the level of volunteerism could be even lower. As discussed earlier, there are a number of challenges facing grassroots governance. Some of them require the synergy of different stakeholders. Nonetheless, the CCP seems better positioned than other forces and organizations in leading and coordinating the efforts to tackle them. For instance, many neighborhood communities lack motivated, competent staff for community work, as working for the resident committee is cumbersome and difficult, and comes with low pay and low prestige. In some cases, some cadres are transferred to such neighborhood communities solely for the purpose of Party-­related community work.23 To address the problem of low levels of community participation and volunteerism, the CCP has tried to mobilize Party members as “role models” for the larger community. Even for the perennial problem of fragmented authority, the Party is likely to offer some remedy by bringing tiao, kuai and danwei together, as will be discussed next. In short, while the liberal approach to grassroots governance has gained popularity, the Party-­centered approach argues for the strengthening of Party building rather than a shift away from the Party. The Party-­centered approach has become a prevailing one, through the promotion of the Central Organization Department.

Party in grassroots governance   205 To a large extent, this explains the nature and the driving force of many local initiatives in “innovating” social governance.

Shanghai as a case study The concept of grassroots governance is an evolving one in China. In China’s administrative system, a city has two layers of government: the municipal government and the lower district governments. In large cities, the district is often too large to become the interface between government and residents. Every district is therefore divided into a number of streets (jiedao), which in turn are divided geographically into a number of neighborhoods. Streets and neighborhoods form the grass roots, with street offices and neighborhood committees undertaking certain administrative functions. In 1996, Shanghai set up a new governance system known as “two layers of government, three layers of management,” which formally recognized street offices as the third layer of management, below the municipal government and the district government. Urban expansion and renewal have significantly changed the landscape and the population as well as the organization of grassroots society (see Table 10.1 for the number of streets and neighborhoods in Shanghai). Unlike many other cities that define a community as a neighborhood or an amalgamation of several neighborhoods (as in the case of Shenyang), from the 1990s, Shanghai has defined a community as the confine of the street or jiedao. Behind this definition is the view that the street, with more administrative, manpower and financial resources than the neighborhood, is the more proper level to take on the task of community building and management. “Social governance” as an official term appeared in the CCP’s Eighteenth Party Congress in 2012. At the grassroots level, social governance encompasses Party building, community building and community management. Community building started in the early 1990s, with the support of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Shanghai is one of the most well-­known models of community building in China. Towards the end of the 1990s, Party building began to command attention and became a new focus of innovating grassroots governance. The Central Organization Department played a major role in moving Party building to the fore of grassroots governance. Community management also became part of grassroots governance in the 1990s. It took on new forms in the 2000s, such as “grid management” (wanggehua guanli) and “grand coordination” (da liandong). In Shanghai, the system of grid management was established in 2005, and “big coordinated action” has been implemented since 2009.24 It is important to note that the demographics and organizations of communities vary widely across Shanghai. Residential communities formed through relocation from inner city districts to the outskirts are very different from those that have existed for decades; communities in prosperous business districts contrast sharply from those in peri-­urban areas; and communities in development zones are quite distinct from the rest. Such a diversity of communities is recognized as a challenge. In response, Shanghai has been searching for effective

46 3,020 133 3,282

81,100

–

13,340,000 12,833,500

1990 153 2,771 99 3,408

194,141 63,700

16,086,000 13,216,300

2000 108 1,871 103 3,437

322,393 81,500

17,784,200 13,602,600

2005

109 1,739 99 3,671

566,607 232,400

23,026,600 14,123,200

2010

Source: Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau, Shanghai Statistical Yearbook, various years (Shanghai: China Statistics Press, various years).

Offense cases against public order handled by public security organs Civil disputes mediated by people’s mediation

Population    Permanent residents    Hukou residents

Administrative division    Towns      – Village Committees    Street Offices      – Neighborhood Committees

Table 10.1  Selected indicators of Shanghai grassroots governance

108 1,610 98 4,024

798,825 299,500

24,151,500 14,323,400

2013

Party in grassroots governance   207 grassroots governance through “innovations” in Party building, community building and social management. Party building Due to the growing differentiation and diversity of the grassroots society, established and conventional ways of Party building for danwei organizations are no longer adequate. Since the late 1990s, Shanghai has been exploring new ways of Party building. Over the years, Shanghai has established new approaches and mechanisms for Party building in the grass roots. “Area-­based grand Party building” (quyuxing da dangjian) has emerged as the new approach and strategy. It was formally endorsed in Shanghai in 2005. This new approach is a recognition that wide diversity exists both between and within communities. There is a need to move from danwei-­based Party building to area-­based Party building, which would encompass different types of organizations and various groups of populations. “Area-­based grand Party building” aims for comprehensive coverage of various organizations and better coordination of Party organizations formed along different lines. At the community level, Party building operates under the “1 + 3” leadership structure. The Community (Street) Party Work Committee is the leading organization of Party building within the community.25 Under it are Party organizations responsible for Party building in three different types of constituents or three “different lines,” namely administrative Party group (for government organs within the community), comprehensive Party committee (for other organizations within the community, including “new economic and social organizations”), and residential-­area Party committee (for residents). To ensure the leadership and coordination role of the Community (Street) Party Work Committee in community Party building, “three lines” have their representatives in the Community (Street) Party Work Committee. By establishing different lines of Party organizations, it is hoped that danwei organizations within the community will have better communication with residents in the community, and play a larger role in community building. Meanwhile, residential-­area Party organizations, which are often short of activists and have difficulty recruiting Party members, are helped by the requirement that retired Party members should transfer their membership back and re-­register with the residential-­area Party organization, and that resident Party members, who are working elsewhere and register their Party membership elsewhere, should report to the residential-­area Party organization. “Area-­based Party building” takes the form of grid-­style Party building in some districts. In Jiading district, the entire district has been divided into 316 responsibility grids, to comprehensively cover every unit within the district, including private enterprises and social organizations.26 In an effort to achieve comprehensive coverage, establishing Party branches in specialized markets, shopping streets, office buildings and residential blocks has emerged as the new focus of Party building.

208   Zhao Litao There are developed flexible forms of Party organization. Joint Party branches are encouraged for private enterprises or social organizations with fewer than three Party members. Mobile Party branches are set up for migrant workers. In enterprises where there are trade unions, they are likely to become the agent of Party work before the Party branch is set up. In enterprises without trade unions or a Party branch, the Party committee in charge of the area is likely to dispatch political instructors (zhengzhi zhidaoyuan) to conduct Party work. One particular challenge is to establish Party branches in private enterprises and social organizations. As widely observed, these organizations do not welcome the intrusion of Party organizations. For instance, Fewsmith highlights that “entrepreneurs are concerned that Party activities will expend time and resources and will affect normal enterprise operations.”27 The support for Party building is particularly lacking in foreign-­invested firms. A study done in Shanghai finds that managers in foreign-­invested companies believe that “party organizations belong to politics. Enterprises as economic organizations do not need party organizations.”28 In practice, grassroots Party committees have used different means to establish Party branches in private enterprises and social organizations. One way, as practiced in some districts in Shanghai, is to attach some “strings” when these organizations register or conduct their annual inspection with the district Bureau of Industry and Commerce or Administration Bureau of NGOs. One factor for consideration is whether they agree to establish a Party branch and allow the Party branch to operate. There are less blunt ways of Party building. One way is to invite retired senior cadres to serve as enterprise party secretaries.… Enterprises reach out to retired cadres in the hopes that they will use their personal networks to help solve problems for the enterprise, all the while in the hopes of displaying political correctness.29 Alternatively, Party organizations leverage their political and organizational strengths to make them useful to their host organizations. As a study conducted in Jiading district of Shanghai suggests, Party organizations can contribute “soft management” to balance private enterprises’ “hard management,” playing a constructive role in building corporate culture and improving labor relations.30 Organizing events and activities that benefit host organizations is another strategy that Party branches often use to make their presence more acceptable to the host organizations. A study based on interviews conducted in Shanghai Pudong Development Zone has found that Party branches use various ways to forge symbiotic relations with their host organization.31 In one case, the Party branch in a company encouraged Party members to become model workers by displaying their work performance monthly on the public bulletin boards. As a result, Party members substantially improved their work performance. In the end, the management’s attitude changed from a display of antipathy to a show of support. In other cases, Party branches in a number of companies organized public events and charity activities, involving Party members as activists and volunteers.

Party in grassroots governance   209 Such activities improved the public image and increased public awareness of the host companies. In yet another case, the Party branch in a company was able to recruit over half of the middle-­level managers into the Party. Through them, the Party branch established a medical fund for the needy staff, with the financial support of the top management of the company. In some companies where the Party branch had been less successful in co-­opting managers, seminars were organized to help staff members develop their professional knowledge and skills, which were appealing to both the staff and the management. In the case of Party building in office buildings (louyu dangjian), a Party branch organized activities that brought together Party members working in different companies, which increased “social capital” in the office building. In short, Party branches have been quite adaptive. Depending on the situation, they have used different ways to make Party building effective and sustainable, including improving Party members’ work performance, enhancing host organizations’ public image, increasing employee welfare, and promoting social capital in otherwise atomized settings. Considerable progress has been made in extending the coverage in the past decade. According to the Central Organization Department, in 2008, out of 2,385,000 private enterprises in total, 380,000 (or 15.9 percent) had established a Party organization; meanwhile 12,000 private non-­enterprise units had established a Party organization, accounting for 14.8 percent of 81,000 private non-­ enterprise units in total.32 In 2014, the proportion of private enterprises with a Party organization had increased to 53.1 percent (1,579,000 out of 2,973,000), while the proportion for private non-­enterprise units had increased to 41.9 percent (184,000 out of 439,000).33 The fact that nearly half of private enterprises and nearly 60 percent of private non-­enterprise units do not have a Party branch suggests that Party building in the new economic and social organization is no easy task. Challenges abound in the case of grassroots Party building. The level of support from private enterprises and social organizations varies widely. The level of enthusiasm among workers and staff members is generally low, making Party membership recruitment very difficult in private enterprises and social organizations. Many employees do not see the benefit of joining the Party; and many others have low trust toward the Party. Limited funding is another constraint, often forcing Party branches to tap into the operating funds for enterprise trade unions or enterprise departments, or rely on self-­raised funds from Party members. High mobility is also a challenge. Membership turnover rate is higher in the private sector than in the state sector. This is the case not only for ordinary Party members, but also for Party secretaries working in private enterprises.34 Community building Community building in the 1990s focused on providing various forms of community services, including social welfare services for the designated needy within the community; convenience services for all residents; social security

210   Zhao Litao management services for the retirees, the unemployed and laid-­off workers from state enterprises; and bilateral services catering to enterprises, institutions and local residents.35 In some cities, building “autonomous” neighborhood organizations and widening public participation in community affairs also received much attention. Advancing into the 2000s, community building has become more institutionalized and standardized, meanwhile the concept of shared governance is gradually being accepted. Grassroots Party organizations continue to play a leadership role in community building. Party building is seen as the driving force for community building.36 Shanghai’s efforts to institutionalize and standardize community building are reflected in the establishment of Community Committees and the establishment of community service centers. Since 2006, Shanghai has been promoting the Community Committee (shequ weiyuanhui) as the platform for community participation and communication. Every Community Committee has 30 to 40 members, who are elected by the delegate assembly. In reality, members include community (street) Party and government leaders, members of the People’s Congress and the Political Consultative Conference who live in the community, representatives from danwei organizations within the community and representatives of community residents. The Community Committee as the standing body of the delegate assembly also presides over the delegate assembly. The director of the Community Committee is either the secretary of the Street Party Work Committee or the head of the street office (who is often the deputy secretary of the Street Party Work Committee). This arrangement is to ensure the leadership position of the Party in the Community Committee. At the street level, government has established the community affairs reception service center, the community health service center, and the community cultural activity center. In addition, Shanghai has been promoting the community convenience service center. These centers form the mechanism of “grand services” (da fuwu) provided or coordinated by the government. Apart from the Party-­led Community Committee and the government-­funded community centers, Shanghai has paid increasing attention to the role of social organizations in community building. On the one hand, community building is thought to provide room for the development of social organizations, particularly grassroots interest groups and associations, and private non-­enterprise units providing old-­age care, childcare and other community services. The traditional way of having grassroots government and neighborhood committees providing community services has changed. Social organizations, together with danwei organizations (within the community), commercial service providers and community residents, play large roles in the provision and delivery of community services. On the other hand, it is recognized that many such organizations are still at their embryonic stages of development. They need support and guidance in capacity building.37 On such beliefs, a major part of community building in Shanghai in the recent decade has been to nurture social organizations and support them to participate in community building.

Party in grassroots governance   211 In Shanghai, the Street Party Work Committees and street offices support and assist social organizations in a number of ways. First, they set up civil organizations service centers (minjian zuzhi fuwu zhongxin) at the community (street) level. The first center appeared in Changshou Road Community (Street) in August 2002. The center itself is a private non-­enterprise unit, one of the three types of government-­recognized social organizations. As a social organization, it registers with the district Administration of Social Organizations, operating under the supervision of the street office. The decision-­making body of the center is the council formed by representatives of member organizations. The center has been hailed as a new model of managing social organizations. It facilitates the registration of member organizations, which otherwise cannot meet the requirements of registration. It also serves to coordinate the activities of member organizations, “advise them regarding existing regulations, and assist and assess their readiness to prepare competitive bids for local public service provision.”38 Meanwhile, the Party and government hold a firm grip on the center: the government provides venue and operating funds to the center, and the Party makes key appointments, including the director of the center and the chairperson of the council. The fact that the director of the center is concurrently the secretary of the Party branch established in the center shows the fusion of Party building and community building. Such a corporatist way of nurturing, assisting and coordinating social organizations has been adopted in other places, and even scaled up to form “hub-­style” district-­ level organizations.39 Second, the government nurtures and assists social organizations through the mechanism of government procurement of services. The top-­down, “one-­sizefits-­all” approach has been much less effective in meeting the growing demands of diversified, professional and high-­quality social services.40 Apart from street offices and neighborhood committees, the preferred and more efficient and effective approach to service delivery is to convene a wide range of service providers to participate. Based on this belief, danwei organizations within the community, social organizations, commercial service providers and community residents are given a role to play in meeting community needs. Government procurement of services has emerged as a favored mechanism to provide professional and high-­quality services to community residents on the one hand, and to nurture social organizations on the other, which are still at an early stage of development.41 In short, the idea of co-­participation in service delivery has been accepted and practiced. Nevertheless, the Party has been active in steering the co-­participation process through both direct and indirect means, including establishing Party branches in social organizations, creating umbrella organizations and using them to steer member organizations, and using government procurement to nurture and co-­opt social organizations. The penetration of the Party in the grassroots society is evident in community building.

212   Zhao Litao Grid management and “grand coordination” Community management – one of three major components of grassroots governance – has evolved in major ways since the 1990s. The first major change is the adoption of urban grid management in 2005. Since 2009, another major change has occurred, with “grand coordination” (da liandong) emerging as a model for urban comprehensive management. The model of grid management was first developed by Dongcheng district of Beijing in 2004. In July 2005, the Ministry of Construction decided to apply this model to cities nationwide. Shanghai quickly followed suit by trying the city-­ level platform of urban grid management in October 2005, together with the district-­level platform in Luwan district and Changning district. Since 2008, the “1+17” grid management system covering urban Shanghai has been established, encompassing one city-­level platform and 17 district-­level platforms.42 In October 2013, Shanghai further standardized and regularized the operation of the grid management system. At the city level, the Digital City Management Joint Meeting is responsible for the comprehensive coordination of and the major decisions regarding citywide grid management, while Shanghai Urban–Rural Construction and Transport Commission is the administrative department (xingzheng zhuguan bumen). Shanghai Digital Urban Management Center, which is under the Urban–Rural Construction and Transport Commission, is responsible for the operation of the city-­level grid management system. Other stakeholders include relevant administrative departments (such as urban management enforcement, transportation and harbor administration, planning and land resources administration, housing administration, road administration, water administration, public security, civil defense, safe production supervision administration, food and drug administration, health administration, and so on), and relevant public service units. At the district level, the district government takes responsibility for overseeing grid management within the district, and establishing the grid management agency and platform. The grid management system further extends down to the street level, which can then set up a grid management subplatform. The fourth level is the neighborhood. The operation of Shanghai’s grid management system can be described as “one team,” “one web of grids,” “two types of objects/targets” and “three functions.” Each district is required to set up a grid inspection team to conduct daily inspections, transmit inspection information and conduct on-­the-spot checks. Each grid has a comparable size of 10,000 square meters with clear boundaries delineated. A number of grids can be combined into a larger responsibility grid to be inspected by grid management officers. By the end of 2012, Shanghai had 1,809 such responsibility grids in its urban districts, forming a web of grids. The grid management system and the inspection teams focus on two types of objects/targets: physical facilities (bujian) and events (shijian). To date, inspection teams have identified 88 types of physical facilities (such as manholes, fire hydrants, power poles, telephone booths, guardrails, bus stops, traffic lights, road

Party in grassroots governance   213 signs, street trees, trash/recycle bins and so on) that are under their charge and 32 types of events that disrupt public order, affect city appearance and/or violate relevant regulations. In addition to the existing administrative function, the grid management system takes on three new functions: spot/discover problems through inspections, and upload audio, photograph or video information to the district grid management platform; distribute the “problems” to the handling administrative departments or public service units; and evaluate the performance of the handling administrative departments and public service units via the grid management agency. The grid management system has been a key part of the “infrastructural power” in Shanghai’s grassroots governance. From 2009 onwards, some districts began to link the grid management system with other social management and emergency response systems through the mechanism of “grand coordination.” The “grand coordination” model can be seen as an attempt to deal with the problems of fragmented authority and governance structure. The departmentalization and fragmentation of authority, manpower and information has resulted in low efficiency and underperformance of grassroots governance. A study43 has found out that in 2009, a district in Shanghai had 194 employment service organizations which hired 18,470 “social assistants” (shehui xieguan yuan) to assist in different line authorities in social management, such as the Bureau of Greening and City Appearance, the Office of Comprehensive Management, the Bureau of Public Security, the Bureau of Civil Affairs, the Bureau of Housing Security and Management, the Office of Population Management, and so on. But this is no small number in total. However, individual departments still feel overburdened and understaffed. The “grand coordination” model aims to integrate the grid management system with the comprehensive management system and the emergency response system. In practice, various urban management and social management personnel are integrated into two types of grid inspection and patrol team, one for residential communities and the other for business streets. The “grand coordination” platform is also linked to the service hotlines for residents. By June 2010, a district-­level grand coordination center in Shanghai had integrated the public security 110 command center, the urban grid management center, public service hotlines, the District Mayor’s letter box, the Party affairs letter box, and the emergency response office. By late August 2010, the district comprehensive management and emergency response coordination platform had been put into operation. Every street, neighborhood and relevant government agencies has access points. The street grids of this district consist of 75 patrol areas and 189 responsibility grids, while the community grids consist of 350 neighborhood work stations, 166 village and enterprise work stations, and 1,209 responsibility grids. The two types of grids involve a workforce of over 30,000. By the end of 2013, the district platform had received 31,943 reports of public safety hazards, and 132,790 mass appeals and complaints. Over 98 percent of cases were investigated and closed. In addition, community and street patrol and

214   Zhao Litao inspection forces reported 703,053 cases, over 99 percent of which were closed.44 To a large extent, the model of grid management and “grand coordination” represents new efforts to improve grassroots governance. Grid management is seen as a model of “technology + institution,” while “grand coordination” is a model of “technology + institution + coordination.”45 The grid management model features a city-­level information center and a subcity network that extends down to the responsibility grids, accentuating the “technology” component, as well as the establishment of grid management agencies at different levels and the formalization of procedures and standards of grid management, which highlights the “institution” component. The “grand coordination” model builds on the grid management system and integrates other regular and emergency management systems, which add “coordination” into the function. Research has shown that improving grassroots governance through the grid management and “grand coordination” mechanisms is still challenging. In the case of grid management, coordination is still lacking between grid management and law enforcement, and between grid management and emergency response management. The grid management system – which lacks mechanisms to collect information from the public and other sources, and from beyond the radar of the system – depends heavily on grid information collectors. While the intended objective is to ameliorate the problem of fragmented authority, the grid management center at the city or district level, due to relatively low administrative rank, lacks authority over other government agencies.46 The “grand coordination” model works better in terms of integrating grid management with law enforcement and response management, and in terms of opening up channels for the public to report problems. However, unlike the grid management model, which is a city initiative and is formalized as part of government regulation, the “grand coordination” model is a district initiative, with a great many uncertainties and irregularities. District- and street-­level coordination centers have ambiguous legal status. Most of them are temporary organizations without a clear position or officially budgeted posts. Even if some of them have acquired the status of a public service unit (shiye bianzhi danwei), they often lack authority when there is a need to coordinate administrative agencies (xingzheng guanli bumen) in emergency response, and supervise them in closing cases under their charge.47 To a lesser extent, the problem of fragmented authority remains. Without profound reshuffling of the authority structure, there is a limit as to how far the technological approach can improve grassroots governance. What role does the Party play in driving the models of grid management and “grand coordination”? For “grand coordination,” the district Commission of Politics and Legal Affairs (zhengfa wei) and Commission of Comprehensive Management of Public Security (zongzhi wei) are the main driving force. As the key players in maintaining social stability, they benefit most from “grand coordination” as it helps build bridges between “information islands” controlled by different line authorities. To some extent, the “grand coordination” project also

Party in grassroots governance   215 empowers kuai vis-­à-vis tiao, as the newly established street-­level “grand coordination” center is the agent of the project. The district zhengfa wei and zongzhi wei have gained the support of kuai (at the street level) to build the momentum for the “grand coordination” project.48 In comparison, grid management has been driven by a top-­down process, with the Commission of Urban–Rural Construction and Management as the host of the grid management information center. Grid management and “grand coordination” represent a technological approach to tackle the problem of fragmented authority, in the hope that technological changes can lead to institutional changes.49 Advanced technology is part of the Party’s strategy to improve the “infrastructural power” for grassroots governance.

Shanghai’s new initiatives In January 2015, Shanghai Party Committee and municipal government jointly issued “Opinions on Further Innovating Social Governance and Strengthening Grassroots Building.” There are several highlights in the new initiatives announced in January 2015. First, there is a change in the financing mechanism. Previously, part of the operational expenditures came from the refund of a portion of tax levied on businesses brought in by street offices. The new initiative stipulates clearly that operational expenditures at the street level will be entirely borne by the district government, thereby removing the business promotion function from the street level. This will allow Party and government organs at the street level to focus more on their core functions, including strengthening Party building, coordinating community development, organizing public services, implementing comprehensive management, supervising professional management, mobilizing social participation, guiding grassroots self-­governance and safeguarding community safety. Second, there will be streamlining and also regularization of street-­level offices. Previously, there were 11 to 15 divisions and offices at the street level linking with tiao or line authorities. Under the new guidelines, the street-­level offices will be restructured into a standard “6 + 2” model. There will be six offices in every street: the Party and government office, the community Party building office, the community management office, the community services office, the community security office and the community self-­governance office. Two additional offices can be set up, depending on the actual need of the street. The former Community (Street) Party Work Committee will be renamed Street Party Work Committee. As a dispatched organ of the District Party Committee, it will continue to play a leadership role in the street-­level social governance. The street office as a dispatched organ of the district government will perform designated government services and management functions. The “6 + 2” offices operate under the Street Party Work Committee and the street office. Third, the new initiatives seek to empower the street in terms of the tiao/kuai relationship. The Street Party Work Committee will have the power of personnel evaluation of the heads of dispatched organs from district line authorities. Any

216   Zhao Litao of such appointment will have to be agreed upon by the Street Party Work Committee. Street-­level offices are also empowered to participate in street planning, carry out comprehensive management, and make suggestions on important decisions and projects that may affect residents in the street. A permission system will also be set up to regulate the delegation of responsibilities/functions from the municipal or district government.

Discussion and conclusion The emergence of different communities, new organizations and diversified ways of service delivery has created challenges for grassroots governance. Since the 1990s, the CCP and the government at various levels have been searching for a more effective system to provide community services, maintain social stability and fortify Party leadership. Shanghai and some other cities found the solution in a model that integrates Party building with community building and community management. The prevailing approach is to use Party building as the driving force for community building. The Party’s ubiquitous presence in private enterprises, social organizations, residential blocks and office buildings is evident in Shanghai. The Party utilizes penetration tactics to hold grassroots society together, making it governable. In the process, it leverages its political and organizational strengths to extend its influence and reach, and also its coordination competency to bolster its leadership. Meanwhile, it has used indirect means with mastery to control, co-­opt or coordinate new economic and social organizations. Hence, the Party takes a pragmatic approach in the innovation of grassroots governance. Co-­ participation and shared governance are acceptable concepts insofar that they are placed under Party leadership. The Party also appears to embrace the technological approach to urban management as a practical means to improve governance. To what extent has the Party-­centered approach worked effectively in today’s China? There is evidence that it works in some streets and districts. However, in virtually all of the discussions about urban grassroots governance in China, challenges and problems remain and are no fewer than achievements made. At the aggregate level, statistics have shown that Shanghai (Table 10.1) or rather China, on the whole, is still at the stage whereby the Party’s efforts to make the society more harmonious and stable now face an uphill battle. There are many reasons for the mixed results of the Party-­centered approach. For one, fragmented authority remains a big problem. The Party has the power to move cadres around to prevent political or policy gridlock, but this is not a long-­term solution to the departmentalization of power, resources and information. For another, Party building, community building and community management require enormous investments and inputs. Even in Shanghai with a more developed economy, social workers, community workers and “social management assistants” are lowly paid. The difficulty of attracting committed and competent personnel to Party and government posts at the grass roots is widely

Party in grassroots governance   217 acknowledged. Party work in private enterprises and social organizations is also often constrained by a lack of funding. As a coping strategy, in some circumstances, local leaders have to use personal connections to fill the unattractive posts by appointing their own associates; in other circumstances, local Party organizations resort to vanguardism to mobilize Party members in voluntary community services. In most cases, a large number of “social management assistants” work in jobs that are low-­paying and low-­morale. Many of them have become the target of public complaints and protests. As informal guanxi becomes important for making appointments and co-­ opting social organizations, the effectiveness of Party building is inevitably compromised. Party cadres, who are less well-­connected, are likely to have fewer resources to expend on projects, and similarly, the less well-­connected social organizations tend to avoid Party cadres, eventually affecting the efficacy and comprehensiveness of the Party’s campaign. To the ruling CCP, despite the challenges and problems, there is no viable alternative to the current approach of using Party building to drive community building and community management. The belief that the Party is the only force that can hold the society together remains firm and strong among Party leaders in China.

Notes   1 Zheng Yongnian, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, Reproduction and Transformation (London: Routledge, 2010).   2 Thomas Heberer and Christian Göbel, The Politics of Community Building in Urban China (London: Routledge, 2011); Akio Takahara and Robert Benewick, “Party Work in the Urban Communities,” in The Chinese Communist Party in Reform, ed. Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Zheng Yongnian (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 157–172; and Patricia M. Thornton, “The Advance of the Party: Transformation or Takeover of Urban Grassroots Society?” The China Quarterly, no. 213 (2013): 1–18.   3 Thornton, “The Advance of the Party.”   4 Heberer and Göbel, The Politics of Community Building in Urban China.   5 He Haibin, “Woguo chengshi jiceng shehui guanli tizhi de bianqian: cong danwei zhi, jie-­ju zhi dao shequ zhi” [The changing social management system in urban China: From the work unit system, the street office-­residents’ committee system to the community system], Guanli shijie [Management World], no. 6 (2003).   6 Takahara and Benewick, “Party Work in the Urban Communities,” p. 169.   7 Heberer and Göbel, The Politics of Community Building in Urban China.   8 He Haibin, “Chengshi shequ tizhi gaige de licheng yu kunjing fenxi – yi Shanghai weili” [Analysis of China’s urban community management system reform: A case study of Shanghai], Huadong ligong daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban) [Journal of East China University of Science and Technology (Social Sciences)], no. 3 (2012): 110–116.   9 Lance L.P. Gore, The Chinese Communist Party and China’s Capitalist Revolution: The Political Impact of Market (London: Routledge, 2010). 10 Andrew Walder, Communist Neo-­traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). 11 Heberer and Göbel, The Politics of Community Building in Urban China. 12 Zhao Litao, “Xi Jinping-­Li Keqiang’s Hukou Reform: New Guidelines and Implications,” EAI Background Brief no. 942, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, 2014.

218   Zhao Litao 13 Shanghai Statistical Yearbook, 2014, www.stats-­sh.gov.cn/data/toTjnj.xhtml?y=2014 (accessed 22 July 2015). 14 Li Peilin, “Woguo jiaqiang he chuangxin shehui guanli de ruogan wenti” [Several issues regarding strengthening and innovating social management in China], Twenty-­ Second Seminar to the Standing Committee of Eleventh National People’s Congress on 30 June 2011, www.pbgchina.cn/newsinfo.asp?newsid=25298 (accessed 20 November 2012). 15 Takahara and Benewick, “Party Work in the Urban Communities,” p. 168. 16 For a detailed discussion on scholarly advocacy of this approach, see H. Christoph Steinhardt and Zhao Litao, “From ‘Stability Overrides Everything’ to ‘Social Governance’: The Evolving Approach to Social Order in China,” in China Entering the Xi Jinping Era, ed. Zheng Yongnian and Lance L.P. Gore (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 193–215. 17 Takahara and Benewick, “Party Work in the Urban Communities,” p. 165. 18 Steinhardt and Zhao, “From ‘Stability Overrides Everything’ to ‘Social Governance.’ ” 19 Zheng Hangsheng, “Pojie zai moshengren shijie zhong jianshe hexie shequ de nanti” [Tackling the difficult issue of building harmonious communities in a world of strangers], Xuexi yu shijian [Study and Practice], no. 7 (2008). 20 Heberer and Göbel, The Politics of Community Building in Urban China, p. 40. 21 Heberer and Göbel. 22 Heberer and Göbel, p. 82. 23 Heberer and Göbel. 24 Chen Haisong and Ying Min, “Chengshi zonghe guanli de shijian: ‘wanggehua’ yu ‘da liandong’ ” [Practice of comprehensive urban management: Grid and big linkage], Shanghai chengshi guanli [Shanghai Urban Management], no. 4 (2014): 64–69. 25 From January 2015 onward, it was renamed the Street Party Work Committee. 26 Research Team of Central Party School Journals, “Xin shiqi jiaqiang ‘liangxin’ zuzhi dangjian gongzuo de diaocha yu sikao” [A survey and rethinking on strengthening Party building in new economic and social organizations in the new era], Lilun qianyan [Theory Front], no. 18 (2007): 43–46. 27 Joseph Fewsmith, The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2013), p. 136. 28 Tang Rui, “ ‘Liangxin’ zuzhi dangjian ‘liyi gongsheng’ moshi fenxi” [An analysis of the “Interest Symbiosis” model of Party building in new economic and social organizations], Lilun yu gaige [Theory and Reform], no. 6 (2011): 47–50, esp. p. 48. 29 Fewsmith, The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in China, p. 138. 30 Research Team of Central Party School Journals, “Xin shiqi jiaqiang ‘liangxin’ zuzhi dangjian gongzuo de diaocha yu sikao.” 31 Tang, “ ‘Liangxin’ zuzhi dangjian ‘liyi gongsheng’ moshi fenxi.” 32 Central Organization Department, “2008 nian Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei tongji gongbao” [The CCP 2008 communique on internal statistics], 2009, www. china.com.cn/policy/txt/2009-07/02/content_18052692_2.htm (accessed 28 July 2015). 33 Central Organization Department, “2014 nian Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei tongji gongbao” [The CCP 2014 communique on internal statistics], 2015, http://edu. people.com.cn/n/2015/0629/c1053-27226435.html (accessed 28 July 2015). 34 Tang, “ ‘Liangxin’ zuzhi dangjian ‘liyi gongsheng’ moshi fenxi.” 35 Linda Wong and Bernard Poon, “From Serving Neighbors to Recontrolling Urban Society,” China Information 19, no. 3 (2005): 413–442. 36 Zheng, “Pojie zai moshengren shijie zhong jianshe hexie shequ de nanti.” 37 Lin Ligong, “Shilun chengshi shequ (jiedao) xin shehui zuzhi de dangjian gongzuo: yi Shanghai Changshou Lu shequ (jiedao) weili” [Party-­building in new social organizations in urban communities (streets): The case of Shanghai Changshou Road

Party in grassroots governance   219 ­ ommunity (Street)], Zhongyang shehui zhuyi xueyuan xuebao [Journal of the Central C Institute of Socialism] 164, no. 2 (2010): 99–103. 38 Thornton, “The Advance of the Party,” p. 10. 39 Thornton. 40 Jessica C. Teets, “Let Many Civil Societies Bloom: The Rise of Consultative Authoritarianism in China,” The China Quarterly, no. 213 (2013): 19–38. 41 Lin, “Shilun chengshi shequ (jiedao) xin shehui zuzhi de dangjian gongzuo.” 42 Chen and Ying, “Chengshi zonghe guanli de shijian: ‘wanggehua’ yu ‘da liandong.’ ” 43 Chen Huirong and Zhang Yu, “Jiceng shehui xietong zhili de jishu yu zhidu: yi Shanghai shi A qu chengshi zonghe zhili ‘da liandong’ wei li” [How collaborative technologies change collaborative institutions: The case of grand coordination in Suburban A district of Shanghai City], Gonggong xingzheng pinglun [Journal of Public Administration], no. 1 (2015): 100–116. 44 Chen and Zhang, “Jiceng shehui xietong zhili de jishu yu zhidu,” pp. 106–107. 45 Chen and Ying, “Chengshi zonghe guanli de shijian: ‘wanggehua’ yu ‘da liandong’ ”; Chen and Zhang, “Jiceng shehui xietong zhili de jishu yu zhidu.” 46 Chen and Ying, “Chengshi zonghe guanli de shijian: ‘wanggehua’ yu ‘da liandong’ .” 47 Chen and Ying. 48 Chen and Zhang, “Jiceng shehui xietong zhili de jishu yu zhidu.” 49 Chen and Zhang.

11 China’s central state corporatism The party and the governance of centrally controlled businesses Li Chen1

China’s economic reform in the recent decades has led to the rise of a group of giant business groups and financial institutions under the central Party-­state’s control. Strategic industries such as oil, power generation, telecommunication, aerospace, aviation, nuclear and banking dominate the group and occupy the “commanding heights” of the Chinese economy. However, literature on the institutional evolution of China’s central state-­owned enterprises and the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in shaping and governing these enterprises is lacking and the subject area is under-­researched. This chapter examines how the relations between the Party and central state-­owned enterprises (yangqi) have evolved as the economic governance system in China shifts away from bureaucratic administration to more complex forms of ownership, regulation and control. By studying the case of China and the CCP in the historical context of “late development,” the analysis provides a stylized characterization of the different patterns of state–big business relations during the catch-­up phase and mature phase of industrial development. There is evidence that China is now at a transitional stage between the two phases. Reviews of policy debates on Party–­ enterprise relations in transition economies indicate that the governance system of China’s yangqi sector can be characterized as a distinctive model of “central state corporatism,” under which the central state-­owned enterprise sector as a whole resembles a giant diversified business group, with the Party center resembling the headquarters holding the ultimate authority, the Party-­appointed technocrats acting as corporate managerial elites, and each “yangqi” like a business division of this overall structure. Specifically, this chapter analyzes the Party’s roles in organizational entrepreneurship and leadership talent management in China’s central state corporatism.

State and big business: the perspective of “late development” The rise of modern big business, particularly large oligopolistic industrial firms and financial institutions since the late nineteenth century, has posed complex challenges for public policy. On the one hand, modern large firms are essential to a nation’s technological and economic development.2 On the other hand, big

Party in corporate governance   221 business can be a potential threat to public interests and can stifle the dynamism of a society. The analytical framework of “late development” provides a useful lens to interpret the different patterns of state–business relations in the process of industrialization. Alexander Gerschenkron generalized that “the more backward a country’s economy, the greater was the part played by special institutional factors … [and] the more pronounced was the coerciveness and comprehensiveness of those factors,” and “the more pronounced was the stress in its industrialization on the bigness of both plant and enterprise.”3 While the “late development” thesis was initially derived from the experiences of Britain, Germany and Russia in the nineteenth century, it has been extended and modified in the subsequent literature to analyze industrial development in the twentieth century.4 The central idea is that in the face of domestic backwardness and international competition, the late industrializers need to develop nationally specific new institutional instruments and establish unconventional models of industrial organizations to mobilize resources, absorb technologies and catch up with the advanced countries. Utilizing state actions to build large enterprises with strong organizational capability is seen as essential to this process. As Western Europe and the United States advanced early in modern industrial development, their leading large firms were often first movers in their respective industries. The market power and political influence of major companies such as Standard Oil, the US Steel Corporation, General Electric and DuPont had become apparent by the early twentieth century and aroused wide-­ranging controversies. For backward developing countries, the barriers of entry are overwhelming for their indigenous firms to catch up and directly compete with incumbent big business from developed countries. As two leading “late industrializers” in the post-­War period, Japan and the South Korean government actively promoted the growth of private big business during their phase of catching up. They adopted a broad range of industrial policy instruments such as trade protection, subsidies, preferential financial access and government-­backed mergers and acquisitions. In particular, to protect indigenous firms, both Japan and South Korea restricted the activities of foreign multinational corporations. There were active policy coordination and tight elite networks weaving together the economic bureaucracy (such as Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry), industrial associations and private big businesses. The close, “growth-­ oriented” interaction between the state and big business (the pre-­War zaibatsu and post-­War kereitsu in Japan, as well as chaebols in South Korea) was a key feature that defined the East Asian model of developmental state.5 While the government tried to maintain orderly oligopolistic competition among their favored “national champions,” the role of “restrictive” competition policies was largely negligible between the 1950s and 1980s. Only as Japan and South Korea concluded their catch-­up phase of growth and embraced economic liberalization has the focus of state actions in governing big business gradually moved away from industrial policy to competition policy.6 The command economy systems installed by the communist parties reflected an extreme version of an industrial policy of building large enterprises through

222   Li Chen state actions under the condition of backwardness. In the Leninist economic ideology, the growth of big business represents a stage of capitalist development superior to a system based upon proprietary small enterprises. As early as 1918, Lenin emphasized that “we must to a considerable extent, take a lesson in socialism from the trust managers, we must take a lesson in socialism from capitalism’s big organizers.”7 During the period of Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP) in the 1920s, the Soviet communist party made huge efforts to emulate the organizational structure of capitalist big business in the United States and Germany. It amalgamated all major industrial plants into a number of profit-­ making “trusts” similar to Standard Oil and US Steel. Later, under Stalin, these “trusts” were reorganized as specialized organs under various industrial ministries, and hence fully absorbed into the party-­state’s administrative hierarchy.8 It is in this context that the institutional setup of the Soviet command economy was often likened to a single gigantic firm: the control over the industrial sector was monopolized by the state machine and different central industrial ministries acted as the divisions of this huge conglomerate.9 The relentless drive to promote large enterprises caused extreme economic distortion and inefficiency in the USSR, but it also underpinned the technical progress and industrial catch-­up of Soviet heavy industry and the defense industry.10 In sum, there are different historical patterns of state–big business relations. For the early developers, most of their leading big business originated from small private entrepreneurial firms, which over time grew bigger by technological innovation, market expansion, mergers and acquisitions, and improvement of managerial organizations. There were episodes during which the government in the early-­industrialized countries intervened to promote “national champions,” but in general they were exceptions rather than the norm. For the late developers pursuing a catch-­up strategy, however, the state has typically played an active role in nurturing large enterprises, either by directly creating and managing state­owned enterprises (SOEs) or by supporting selected domestic private businesses to compete with incumbent dominant firms from advanced countries. Drawing on the experience of Japan and South Korea, once the catch-­up phase of growth is concluded, the pattern of state–big business relations needs to undertake a transition to facilitate the change of growth model and enter into a new stage of industrial development. Table 11.1 provides a simple dichotomy to characterize the different patterns of state–big business relations between the catch-­up phase and mature phase of industrial development. During the low-­to-middle income phase of development, the growth engine is mainly based on absorbing existing advanced technologies from industrialized countries. To overcome growth barriers, especially in terms of deficiencies in human and organizational capital, the late developers pursuing a catch-­up strategy typically have to create nationally specific institutions to mobilize resources and coordinate entrepreneurial activities. As Alexander Gerschenkron suggests, the more backward the economy is, the more coercive the measures might be. The focal role of the state is coercive entrepreneurship, which is directly involved in building up and directing business organizations.

Distributional bias

Repressed in favor of policy-backed big business Biased towards producers

Biased towards consumers

Limited Strong Limited Competition policy; Regulations on corporate governance Increasingly liberalized

Strong Limited Close Promotional/protective industrial policy

Financial system

From middle-income to high-income Developing frontier innovation capabilities Establish rules, standards and institutions compatible with the norm of global markets State as market-ensuring regulator

From low-income to middle-income Mainly absorbing existing technologies Utilize nationally specific institutions to mobilize resource and organize growth State as coercive entrepreneur

Stage of economic development Technology Institutional response to overcome growth barriers The focal role of the state in economic governance The discretionary power of bureaucracy Oversight by the legislature and courts Bureaucracy–big business linkages Policy approach in governing big business

Mature phase of growth

Catch-up phase of growth

Characteristics

Table 11.1  Different patterns of state–big business relations between the catch-up phase and mature phase of growth

224   Li Chen The discretionary power of bureaucracy tends to be strong, while the oversight by the legislature and courts is weak. The elite networks and policy linkages between the state and big business are close, and the overall orientation of state actions is biased toward promotional industrial policy and the interests of policy­backed big producers. To facilitate the state’s industrial policy and resource mobilization, the domestic financial system would typically be repressed during the catch-­up phase of growth. As the late developers complete their catch-­up phase and move to the more mature, middle-­to-high income phase of development, the growth engine has to increasingly shift to indigenous innovation capabilities. This imposes new requirements on a country’s human and organizational capital as well as the underlying policy framework and governance structure. To facilitate the transition, the state needs to focus more on establishing rules, standards and institutions more compatible with the norms of global markets. As the basic national business system and capacities are already in place, the focal role of the state should no longer be direct entrepreneurship, but supporting and regulating the functioning of markets and private entrepreneurship. Under the new model, the bureaucracy’s discretionary power will be constrained by stronger oversights from the legislature and courts. The linkages between the state and big businesses will become more regulated. The overall orientation of state actions will shift to competition policy and the protection of consumers’ interests. The repressed domestic financial system will be increasingly liberalized as well to broaden society’s financial access.

The party and large state enterprise reform During the reform of former communist command economies in the 1980s and 1990s, how to restructure their large state-­owned enterprise sector was at the center of the policy debates.11 The dominant approach was aimed at dismantling party authority and promoting rapid privatization. It was argued that the achievement of reforms could not be maintained unless privatization occurred quickly and on a vast scale.12 On the contrary, critics of this “transition orthodoxy” suggested that the existing old institutions of command economies, including the communist party bureaucracy itself, might adapt and be rejuvenated to fit new models of governance.13 It was argued that an alternative approach of enterprise reform could be to imitate the statist industrial policies used by Japan and South Korea during their catch-­up phase of growth, so the enterprise system built up under the command economy could be upgraded instead of demolished.14 While the earlier literature focuses more on the possible institutional transplantation and policy lessons from the Anglo-­Amer­ican or Japanese–South Korean corporate systems to former communist economies, the recent literature increasingly emphasizes the indigenous and often unconventional hybrid enterprise development in the transition economies.15 The late 1980s and early 1990s formed a turning point in the evolution of the Party–enterprise relations in China. During the middle to late 1980s, a series of

Party in corporate governance   225 bold reforms were conducted under Zhao Ziyang’s leadership to separate the Party from the functioning of both government and enterprises. In particular, Zhao Ziyang intended to break up the control of the enterprise Party committee over professional enterprise management.16 However, after the crisis of 1989, Zhao’s reforms were soon abolished as the Party moved decisively to reaffirm its authority over reforms. From the post-­1989 Party leadership’s point of view, it seemed “the Party control of leadership selection had decayed and the decentralization of personnel decisions had gone too far” due to the reforms promoted by Zhao.17 From Zhao’s perspective, however, his reforms were necessary, but failed due to the resistance of vested interests. As he later commented: the ruling party must respect the separation of Party and state. The Party’s leadership should be essentially political and not interfere in so many other domains … Separation of Party and state powers and the factory managers’ responsibility system did in fact touch upon the issue of the distribution of power, so those who already had power were unwilling to give it up.18 Instead of dismantling the Party’s control over major state enterprises, the period since the early 1990s has seen China’s persistent “national champion” industrial policy to nurture selected large state enterprises under the Party’s control. Such efforts had been initiated during the post-­1989 retrenchment. It later developed into the “grasping the large, letting go of the small” (zhuada fangxiao) strategy in the mid-­1990s, which aimed at building China’s indigenous “large corporations, large business groups.” Under the Jiang Zemin–Zhu Rongji administration (1998–2003), the Party strengthened its efforts to consolidate the core of China’s existing industrial ministries and financial system into a number of giant central state-­controlled enterprise groups and financial institutions. Later under the Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao administration (2003–2013), a new agency, SASAC (the State-­owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission) was set up under the State Council to coordinate enterprise restructuring and promote the competitiveness of China’s state-­controlled big businesses.19 During this period, the Party has increasingly laid stress on exploring new ways to integrate the Party’s control with modern corporate governance structures in a market-­based environment.20 As Kjeld Brødsgaard points out, the Party–business relations are increasingly important in the decision-­making process and policy outcomes in China’s political economy, but there are unfortunately only a handful of studies on Party–business relations in China.21

The party and China’s central state corporatism The reform of China’s state-­owned enterprise sector has been shaped by the Party-­state’s multilayer governance structure. According to Qian Yingyi and Xu Chenggang, in contrast to the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries that were dominated by a centrally planned “branch” industrial ministries system, China’s economic governance has been dominated by a regionally decentralized

226   Li Chen structure since the late 1950s. Borrowing the terms “U-­form” and “M-­form” from Oliver Williamson’s studies on capitalist firms, they argue that the former command economies in Eastern Europe and the USSR were each organized as a gigantic “U-­form” (or the so-­called “branch”/tiaotiao-­based structure) in which SOEs were subordinated to a number of functionally specialized central industrial ministries, while the Chinese economy is primarily organized as a gigantic M-­form (or the so-­called “block”/kuaikuai-­based structure) on a regional basis, which comprises multilayer local authorities (provinces, prefectures, counties, townships and villages) governing relatively self-­contained regional enterprise systems.22 There is now a vast literature on the impact of governmental decentralization in China’s economic reform and the relations between local governments and local enterprise systems. In particular, Jean Oi’s studies have identified a distinctive hybrid pattern of local Party–state–enterprise relations in China, characterized as “local state corporatism,” under which local Party–government authorities (at the county, township and village levels) treated the enterprises within their jurisdiction as components of a larger corporate whole. With the local Communist Party secretary at the top, local officials were incentivized to promote regional development under such quasi-­corporate organizational structures.23 However, there has been relatively limited research undertaken with respect to the relations between China’s central Party-­state and the large enterprises under its control. China has maintained a large central state-­owned enterprise sector since the late 1950s when all large-­scale industrial production and finance in mainland China were consolidated into a handful of vertical administrative bureaucracies under the Party’s control. Following several rounds of decentralization between the 1950s and 1980s, SOEs directly administrated by China’s central Party-­state had been much fewer in number than those governed locally, but their influence in China’s domestic industrial system was disproportionately larger because of their size, technology capability, bureaucratic rank and their dominant status in the critical sectors. Thanks to decades of experimental reforms and industrial policy efforts, the Party has transformed the central state-­owned enterprise sector by selectively imitating governance forms, corporate structures and practices from advanced industrial countries and combining them with the existing institutional elements of the Party-­state bureaucracy. In particular, since the early 1990s, it has been a stated goal of the Party to nurture and consolidate selected large state enterprise units into a number of modern large corporations and business groups as China’s “national team” to catch up and compete with global leading multinational corporations. By 2003, the core productive assets of the old central industrial ministries had been consolidated into a batch of giant enterprise groups supervised by SASAC. Parallel restructuring in the financial sector also brought about the rise of a number of central state-­controlled financial institutions such as the “Big Four” publicly listed commercial banks (ICBC, CCB, BOC and ABC, detailed below).24 In 2014, there were a total of 112 yangqi under SASAC’s supervision. They had combined assets of over RMB53 trillion and a combined revenue of over

Party in corporate governance   227 RMB25 trillion, dominating the sectors perceived as the lifeblood of China. The Big Four banks had a combined asset of over RMB68 trillion, accounting for around 40 percent of China’s total financial assets, and had a combined net profit of around RMB860 billion in 2014.25 In 2015, 94 large firms from the mainland China were ranked among the Fortune Global 500, of which 58 are central state-­ owned enterprises and financial institutions, such as Sinopec, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Sinochem in petroleum and petrochemicals; the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Bank of China (BOC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), China Construction Bank (CCB) and Bank of Communications (BoCom) in banking; China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom in telecommunications; First Automobile Works (FAW) and Dongfeng in automobile; Baosteel, Ansteel and Wisco in steel; and State Grid, China Southern Power Grid (CSG), Huaneng, Guodian, Huadian, Datang and China Power Investment (CPI) in electricity. As shown in Table 11.2, the 58 largest central state-­owned enterprises and financial institutions in China have a combined revenue of around US$4.5 trillion and a combined assets of over US$22 trillion. Their total employees exceed 14 million. From the Stalinist economic bureaucracy to modern big businesses, this aspect of China’s enterprise reform amounts to no less than a profound institutional transformation. However, alongside the corporate restructuring and growth, the Party has firmly maintained its authority over the central state-­owned enterprise sector. To conceptualize the interweaving of the Party-­state power and new forms of corporate development, the governance system of China’s yangqi sector is characterized here as a distinctive model of “central state corporatism,” under which the yangqi sector as a whole resembles a giant diversified pyramidal business group, with the Party center resembling the corporate headquarters holding the ultimate authority, the Party-­appointed technocrats acting as corporate managerial elites, and each yangqi like a business division of this overall structure. Specifically, this section analyzes the Party’s roles of organizational entrepreneurship and leadership talent management in China’s central state corporatism. The party as organizational entrepreneur In his groundbreaking study, Zheng Yongnian has conceptualized the CCP as “organizational emperor,” a new organizational transfiguration of emperorship that exercises domination over the state and society.26 To analyze the Party’s role in China’s central state corporatism, the Party can also be seen as an “organizational entrepreneur,” which takes on the entrepreneurial functions of creating new organizations, bearing risks and allocating resources. Backed by its coercive power, the Party’s organizational entrepreneurship involves not only actions that shape individual enterprises, but also actions that generate new policies and institutions with system-­wide impact on the targeted enterprise sector. This aspect of the Party’s role was evident under the command economy. Emulating

Table 11.2 China’s central state-owned enterprises and financial institutions in the Fortune Global 500, 2015 Name of enterprise/ institution

Ranking

Revenue (US$ million)

Profit (US$ million)

Assets (US$ million)

Number of employees

Sinopec CNPC State Grid ICBC CCB ABC CSCEC BOC China Mobile CRECG CNOOC CRCC CDB China Life Sinochem FAW Dongfeng Motor CSG China Resources China Post Group China North AVIC China Telecom CCCC PICC CITIC Group BoCom Shenhua China Minmetals Baosteel Huaneng China Unicom CMB Chalco PowerChina ChemChina CNBM COFCO Sinopharm Sinomach CNAF MCC Guodian XXCIG Huadian CEC CSIC CNMC CEEC China Datang CPI China Everbright Genertec COSCO CASC Ansteel China Poly Wisco Total

2 4 7 18 29 36 37 45 55 71 72 79 87 94 105 107 109 113 115 143 144 159 160 165 174 186 190 196 198 218 224 227 235 240 253 265 270 272 276 288 321 326 343 344 345 366 371 390 391 392 403 420 426 432 437 451 457 500

446,811 428,620 339,426 163,174 139,932 130,047 129,887 120,946 107,529 99,537 99,262 96,395 89,908 87,249 80,635 80,194 78,978 76,662 74,887 65,693 65,615 62,287 62,147 60,119 57,047 55,325 54,464 52,731 52,383 48,323 47,401 46,834 45,613 45,445 43,009 41,813 40,644 40,524 40,105 39,722 36,178 35,807 34,627 34,497 34,487 33,084 32,732 30,456 30,322 30,206 29,584 28,155 27,670 27,483 27,190 26,212 26,046 23,720 4,485,779

5,177 16,359 9,796 44,763 36,976 29,126 2,079 27,525 10,451 959 8,592 1,154 15,921 1,687 562 4,248 1,600 1,703 2,450 4,641 727 760 2,037 1,467 2,127 4,715 10,687 4,376 –374 952 423 646 9,074 –1,758 1,071 –185 477 123 439 –288 94 280 488 439 1,080 228 1,087 –12 389 11 234 1,475 475 541 1,431 –1,297 1,020 54 271,282

359,182 634,811 466,298 3,322,042 2,698,924 2,574,815 148,914 2,458,314 246,748 110,473 180,427 101,562 1,662,855 442,745 57,278 52,983 54,201 99,446 150,652 1,048,008 52,570 128,887 112,881 106,696 126,083 762,879 1,010,364 149,685 59,010 86,187 149,606 88,189 762,706 78,408 66,599 43,854 65,591 70,888 32,107 40,801 6,242 54,602 126,877 18,943 117,112 37,768 66,526 19,363 36,753 116,112 109,669 476,719 21,393 57,875 53,018 51,133 88,798 34,447 22,358,019

897,488 1,636,532 921,964 462,282 372,321 505,627 247,672 308,128 274,347 276,697 114,573 297,035 8,723 151,719 54,742 135,599 197,192 306,572 451,503 903,357 250,138 535,942 454,292 113,189 120,842 179,288 95,659 212,233 110,261 136,616 142,260 228,613 75,109 147,564 201,066 99,247 176,854 120,674 94,743 120,771 11,181 149,987 128,299 67,897 110,300 125,771 177,106 46,716 174,755 100,082 127,611 54,000 40,450 75,675 158,067 218,900 61,726 103,594 14,071,551

Source: Fortune Global 500, 2015, at http://fortune.com/global500/ (accessed 27 October 2015).

Party in corporate governance   229 the USSR, the CCP was directly involved in creating large enterprises and served as the ultimate “big organizer” of China’s industrial development with the tools of public ownership and central planning. The origins of many giant state-­controlled business firms in China now, such as CNPC, Sinopec, FAW, Anshan Steel, Wuhan Steel and Harbin Electric, can be traced back to the CCP’s military-­campaign-style mobilization of creating large enterprises during the 1950s and 1960s. As China’s economic reforms have deepened since the late 1970s, the Party’s role as “organizational entrepreneur” has involved increasingly more complex forms of actions and processes, with extensive policy experimentation and institution building under the Party’s top-­down hierarchical guidance. The Party has been the ultimate “big organizer” and entrepreneur in the development of China’s central state-­owned enterprise sector. The policy approach of restructuring the Stalinist central industrial ministries into large business firms under the Party’s control had emerged as early as the 1960s, when Liu Shaoqi proposed that the Party should establish a number of giant national “corporate trusts” (tuolasi) as China’s counterparts of Western monopolistic big businesses. The Party briefly experimented with “tuolasi” reforms in the mid-­1960s, carving out a number of corporate trusts in a range of sectors (such as tobacco, salt, coal, automobile, textile machinery and aluminum) from the existing central industrial ministries. The Party controlled the top personnel of these tuolasi and they had to follow the state’s central plans, but their headquarters had significant managerial autonomy to manage their subordinate enterprises. This approach was expanded in the 1980s by the experiment to establish a batch of large “zonggongsi” as industry-­wide, national administrative corporations, such as China Automobile Industrial Corporation (CAIC), CNOOC, Sinopec and CNPC.27 Since the early 1990s, promoting large state-­controlled big businesses has become a major policy goal. It started with the trial reform of “building large business groups” in 1991, which established around 55 large business groups nationwide (later expanded to 120) to undertake the reform experiments. Some of these large business groups were designated as “nationwide, cross-­regional business groups concerning the lifeblood of national economy” and given preferential planning status similar to provincial-­level governments. Later it developed into a full-­fledged strategy of “grasping the large,” under which the Party aimed at nurturing a number of modern “large corporations and large business groups” that are not only able to dominate the commanding heights of China’s domestic economy, but also able to compete internationally. As an illustration, it is useful to quote Wu Bangguo, then Politburo member and vice premier of the State Council, at some length: In our world today, economic competition between nations is in fact between each nation’s large enterprises and business groups. A nation’s economic might is concentrated and manifested in the economic power and international competitiveness of its large enterprises and business groups … our nation’s position in the international economic order will be to a large

230   Li Chen extent determined by the position of our nation’s large enterprises and groups … We must therefore unite and rise together, develop economies of scale and scope and nurture a ‘national team’ capable of entering the world’s top 500.”28 In the 1990s, the Party coordinated a series of challenging reforms to establish the institutional infrastructure of a “modern enterprise system” to corporatize traditional SOEs. By incremental changes and learning from international standards, China gradually reorganized and consolidated the core assets of existing industrial ministries into a number of giant modern corporations with diversified ownership, many of which listed their minority shares on stock markets. In particular, between 1998 and 2003, the Party center carved out most of the SOEs managed by administrative hierarchies under the State Council, central Party organs, as well as the army and legal system. The core parts of these enterprises were reorganized into a batch of business groups under the central Party-­state’s control, while the rest were handed over to local authorities. This massive round of “decoupling reforms” proceeded on two fronts: financial enterprises and non-­ financial enterprises. The reforms on each front were led by a top-­level CCP central special task commission, with the Central Finance Work Commission (CFWC) in charge of decoupling financial enterprises and the Central Large Enterprise Work Commission (later reorganized as the Central Enterprise Work Commission, CEWC) in charge of decoupling non-­financial enterprises.29 As the first batch of the decoupling reform, 530 large non-­financial firms with a total of 3,151 subsidiary enterprises were decoupled from 50 central government organs in 1998. These large firms accounted for around 10.8 percent of the total assets and around 43.2 percent of the total profits of China’s non-­financial SOEs. They were eventually consolidated into only 159 business groups. Among them, 96 were deemed “crucial” and remained under the central Party-­state’s control, while the other 63 were handed over to local authorities. The central state-­owned business groups carved out during the 1998 decoupling reform included, for example, Shenhua Group from the National Development and Planning Commission; China Ocean Shipping Group (COSCO) and China Shipping Group from the Ministry of Transportation; Anshan Steel, Baosteel and Panzhihua Steel from the State Bureau of Metallurgy Industry; Sinochem, China Minmetals Corporation and China General Technology Group from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations; China Electronics Corporation from the Ministry of Information Industry; China National Coal Import and Export Industrial Group (the predecessor of China National Coal Group) from the State Bureau of Coal Industry; China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) from the Ministry of Construction; Poly Group and Xin-­xing Pipes Group from the People’s Liberation Army.30 A few strategic sectors, including defense-­related industries, telecommunication, electricity, airlines and railways, were treated separately during the decoupling reforms. It is challenging for the Party to reach consensus and strike a balance between breaking up the “administrative monopolies” and enhancing

Party in corporate governance   231 market competition in these sectors on the one hand, and nurturing large business groups with critical mass to compete in the domestic and international markets on the other hand. Eventually, a few large business groups were created in each of these sectors under the Party’s control, with the boundaries of firms artificially drawn by policy decisions. For example, in defense-­related industries, including nuclear, aerospace, aviation, weaponry and shipbuilding industries, their central industrial ministries had all been transformed into industry-­wide zonggongsi by 1993. Each of the five zonggongsi (China Nuclear Industrial Corporation, China Aerospace Industrial Corporation, China Aviation Industrial Corporation, China Weaponry Industrial Corporation and China Shipbuilding Industrial Corporation) was split up and restructured into two large business groups under the central Party-­state’s control in 1999. The resulting ten business groups absorbed China’s core assets in these sectors accumulated under the old industrial ministries. They were supposed to compete and cooperate with each other to promote the development of their respective sectors. Similarly, the core enterprises under the State Bureau of Civil Aviation Administration were consolidated into five large business groups, including three large airlines and two aviation service providers; the core enterprises of the Ministry of Electricity Industry were consolidated into seven large business groups, including two grid operators and five power generators. Together with those firms carved out earlier from their ministries, such as Sinopec, CNPC, FAW and Dongfeng, these giant central SOEs had absorbed the backbone of China’s previous industrial ministries system. In 2003, SASAC took over those non-­financial central SOEs previously managed by CEWC. With authority bestowed on it to own and supervise those yangqi on behalf of the central Party-­state, SASAC has actively shaped their strategies and structures. According to SASAC’s guidelines in 2006, non-­ financial yangqi should operate in three categories of sectors: key industries concerning national security and the lifeline of national economy; basic and pillar industries; and other targeted industries. In particular, seven sectors including defense, oil and gas and petrochemicals, telecommunications, power generation and distribution, coal, aviation and shipping are defined as the “key industries concerning national security and the lifeline of national economy.” Focusing on strengthening the yangqi’s core businesses and nurturing the “national team” as a whole, SASAC has promoted a series of mergers and consolidation programs among yangqi. For instance, in 2008, SASAC consolidated China’s aviation industry by merging AVIC I and AVIC II in 2008, which reversed the split-­up of AVIC (China Aviation Industry Corporation) in 1999. It also restructured China’s telecommunication industry by merging China Railway Signal and Communication Corporation into China Mobile, merging China Network Communication into China United Telecommunications, and merging China Satellite Communications into China Telecom.31 By the end of 2014, the original 196 yangqi groups had been consolidated into 112. Transforming central industrial ministries into modern big business has been a major reform project controlled and implemented by the Party. There are

232   Li Chen certain functional similarities between the old central industrial ministries and the headquarters of yangqi in terms of coordinating large-­scale multi-­plant production, distribution, finance and technological development. Instead of dismantling the pre-­existing governance forms, resources and authority relations, the CCP has sought to combine the institutional legacies of Party-­bureaucratic control with new forms of modern corporate governance, which involves a continual process of organizational change and institution building. As Sebastian Heilmann points out, the CCP has a distinctive policy style of “experimentation under hierarchy,” which combines hierarchical control with decentralized reform experiments.32 From the “corporate trust” experiments in the 1960s and “zonggongsi” experiments in the 1980s to the trial implementation of various “grasping the large” reforms in the 1990s and 2000s, the Party explored and expanded its reforms by following the cycle of setting up pilot experimental points, testing the results, gathering feedback and selectively expanding “from point to face.” It established the overall reform goal and policy framework, and then encouraged officials to try out new ways of organizing the large state enterprise sector. It managed the major challenges of abolishing industrial ministries, laying off redundant workers and enhancing market opening up by China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), where top-­down reform coordination was indispensable. Combining hierarchical control with bottom-­up policy experimentation, the Party can be seen as a meta-­organizational entrepreneur that set up goals, managed risks and restructured assets in China’s central state corporatism.33 The party as leadership talent manager Leadership talent management is defined here as the functions and strategies to recruit, develop, train, promote, discipline and move leadership personnel through the organization.34 The Party has served as the ultimate leadership talent manager in China’s central state-­owned enterprise sector. It involves not only the Party’s traditional personnel command-­and-control tools, but also more diversified functions of leadership talent training, selection, rotation and discipline. While the abolition of central industrial ministries and the decoupling reforms had separated yangqi from China’s formal state bureaucracy in de jure terms by the end of 1990s, the decoupled yangqi have been led by the same network of senior cadres which originates from the old central industrial ministries system and remains under the Party’s management. Based on the nomenklatura system, personnel control is traditionally one of the most important mechanisms by which the Party exercises its authority. The communist party’s nomenklatura system comprises a set of rules which establish the lists of leading personnel positions across different institutional spheres, such as government, industry, finance and education, over which various levels of Party committees exercise their power of cadre personnel control. The most important personnel appointments are directly managed by the Party’s top authority and the Central Organization Department (COD), while the control

Party in corporate governance   233 over positions deemed less important is delegated to lower levels of Party units. The roles of the COD and the nomenklatura control were built into China’s large state enterprise sector as early as the 1950s. Between 1998 and 2003, the COD’s authority over the large enterprises sector was partly taken over by CFWC and CLEWC/CEWC, which assumed the majority of the Party’s top cadre management mandates in large SOEs.35 Later the division of authority in personnel control between the COD, CEWC and CFWC was replaced by the coordination between the COD, SASAC and the Party units of the so-­called “One Bank and Three Commissions” (yi hang san hui), namely the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC); the latter three commissions regulate the banking, securities and insurance sectors, respectively. Among the firms under SASAC’s supervision, the COD directly oversees the core leadership positions (including the board chairman, Party secretary and president/CEO) of 53 top yangqi designated as backbone enterprises concerning national security and the lifeline of the national economy. The Party Committee of SASAC only assists the COD in managing these positions. The direct personnel management authority over deputy top leadership positions (such as deputy general manager or group vice president) of those 53 yangqi and other yangqi top leadership teams is handed over to SASAC.36 The COD also maintained control over the leadership positions of major financial institutions such as the five largest commercial banks, three policy banks, three sovereign investment entities (China Investment Corporation, Central Huijin and China Jianyin) and four major assets management companies (Huarong, Xinda, Great Wall and Orient). Since 2003, the Party has increasingly stressed improving the system of leadership talent training, succession and rotation in the large state enterprise sector. Between 2008 and 2011, the Central Party School and various cadre training academies together trained over 20,000 state enterprise executives. The Party even set up a specialized cadre training school, China Business Executives Academy at Dalian (CBEAD), for in-­house education and training for the top leaders and selected senior managers of central SOEs. The COD has also partnered with various elite institutions overseas, such as General Electric, the University of Cambridge and Copenhagen Business School, to provide tailored training programs for yangqi top leaders. As a general rule, the Party requires top leaders of yangqi (chairman, general manager or CEO, Party secretary and Party disciplinary secretary) to retire at the age of 60; those who are managed directly by the COD may have an extension and retire by 63; only in very rare situations can the retirement age of top leaders of yangqi top leaders be further extended to 65. The rationale behind this rule is for the Party to develop and maintain a relatively young leadership portfolio for yangqi, with a robust talent pool for stable succession. Since 2003, the COD has in general strictly adhered to these rules. For example, Zhou Mingchen retired from China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO) in 2004; Liu Jie retired from Anshan Iron and Steel in 2007; Wang Jianzhou retired

234   Li Chen from China Mobile in 2012, all exactly at the age of 63. By 2010, among 128 top leaders of yangqi (including financial institutions) who are the “No. 1” leader of their respective enterprises, 112 are between the age of 40 and 59, accounting for around 88 percent of the total.37 Since 2003, there have also been frequent top personnel rotations both among yangqi, and between yangqi and other Party–government posts. For example, the COD reshuffled the top leaders of the “Big Four” telecom groups (China Mobile, China Telecom, China United Telecom and China Netcom) in 2004 by transferring Wang Jianzhou from China United Telecom to China Mobile as president and Party secretary; Chang Xiaobing from China Telecom to China United Telecom as the latter’s chairman and Party secretary; and Wang Xiaochu from China Mobile to China Telecom as the latter’s chairman and Party secretary. Similarly, the COD rotated the top leaders of the seven electricity yangqi (Huaneng, Datang, Huadian, Guodian, CPI, State Grid and CSG) between 2007 and 2010 (Table 11.3). There are also regular rotations among central state-­ owned financial institutions, such as Zhang Jianguo from Bank of Communication to CCB, Zhao Lin from CCB to ICBC, and Jiang Chaoliang from China Development Bank (CDB) to ABC. Moreover, there are many “revolving door” appointments between yangqi and other Party–government leadership posts, such as the promotion of Li Yizhong from Sinopec to SASAC and Shang Bing from China Telecom to MIIT; the transfer of Sun Qin from the State Energy Bureau to China National Nuclear Group, and Xi Guohua from MIIT to China Mobile; the appointment of Zhang Qingwei from COMAC to be the deputy Party secretary of Hubei province; and the promotion of Guo Shuqing from CCB to be the chairman of CSRC and later the governor of Shandong province. The specific reasons and processes behind such appointment decisions are complex and need further research, but the “revolving door” mechanisms seem to serve both as a channel to nurture cadres in terms of enhancing their experience, networks and capabilities, and as a way to restrain the entrenchment of their personal power. As China’s recent anti-­corruption campaigns have shown, the Party’s existing arrangements of monitoring and disciplining top business leaders are still far from satisfactory. Corruption is rampant in many yangqi and often involves complex patron–client networks. The Party’s disciplinary force has become increasingly active in monitoring central SOEs and financial institutions. Major cases of corruption have been investigated and prosecuted, such as those of Liu Jinbao (former vice chairman, Bank of China) in 2004, Zhang Enzhao (former chairman, CCB) in 2005, Chen Tonghai (former chairman, Sinopec) in 2008, Zhang Chunjiang (former vice chairman, China Mobile) in 2009 and Kang Rixin (former CEO, China National Nuclear Group) in 2010. The Party initiated a major anti-­corruption campaign after the leadership succession in 2012. By October 2015, the Party’s disciplinary force had brought down over two dozen board-­level top yangqi leaders from a wide range of sectors including telecommunications, energy, airline, automobile, shipping and insurance, such as Sun Zhaoxue (former president, Chalco), Song Lin (former chairman, China Resources), Xu Jianyi (former chairman, FAW), Jiang Jiemin (former head of

Telecom Telecom Telecom Telecom Telecom Defense-related Defense-related Defense-related Defense-related Defense-related Defense-related Defense-related Oil and gas Oil and gas Electricity Electricity Electricity Electricity Electricity Electricity Electricity Electricity Airline Airline Shipping Shipping Shipping Shipping

Wang Jianzhou Chang Xiaobin Wang Xiaochu Shang Bin Zhang Chunjiang Xu Dazhe Hu Wenming Fan Youshan Xiong Qunli Hu Wenming Yin Jiaxu Rui Xiaowu Fu Chengyu Wang Yilin Wang Binghua Lu Qizhou Cai Peixi Li Qingkui Qiao Baoping Zhong Jun Chen Jinxing Chen Fei Li Wenxin Liu Shaoyong Ma Zehua Li Jianhong Ma Zehua Xu Lirong

Chairman, Party secretary, China United Telecom Vice president, China Telecom Vice president, China Mobile President, China United Telecom President, Party secretary, China Netcom Vice president, CASC Vice president, AVIC Vice president, China North Chairman, Party secretary, CEC Party secretary, vice president, China North Vice president, CSGC Vice president, CASC Chairman, Party secretary, CNOOC Vice president, CNPC President, Party secretary, CPI Vice president, State Grid President, Party secretary, Huadian Party secretary, vice president, Guodian Party disciplinary secretary, CPI Vice president, Datang Vice president, State Grid Vice president, Guodian Party secretary, vice president, China Eastern Air Chairman, China Southern Air Vice president, COSCO Vice president, COSCO Party secretary, vice president, China Shipping Vice president, COSCO

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Source: compilation from SASAC and company announcements.

Sector

Name President, Party secretary, China Mobile Chairman, Party secretary, China United Telecom President, Party secretary, China Telecom Party secretary, vice president, China Telecom Party secretary, vice president, China Mobile President, Party secretary, CASIC Party secretary, vice president, China North Party secretary, vice president, CETC President, deputy Party secretary, CETC Party secretary, vice president, CSSC Party secretary, vice president, China North Chairman, Party secretary, CETC Chairman, Party secretary, Sinopec Chairman, CNOOC Chairman, Party secretary, SNPTC President, Party secretary, CPI President, deputy Party secretary, Huaneng Party secretary, vice president, Huadian Party secretary, vice president, Guodian President, CSG President, Datang President, China Three Gorge Party secretary, vice president, China Southern Air President, China Eastern Air Party secretary, China Shipping President, China Merchants President, deputy Party secretary, COSCO President, China Shipping

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2004 2004 2004 2008 2008 2007 2008 2008 2011 2010 2010 2011 2011 2011 2007 2007 2008 2008 2008 2010 2010 2010 2006 2008 2006 2010 2011 2011

Year

Table 11.3  Cases of top personnel rotation at the level of chairman, president and party secretary among central state-owned enterprises, 2004–2011

236   Li Chen SASAC and former chairman, CNPC), Liao Yongyuan (former president, CNPC) and Wang Tianpu (former president, Sinopec). The Party has convened regular inspection teams to investigate yangqi, and the ongoing anti-­graft campaigns are expected to uncover more corruption cases. The Party’s role of leadership talent management is a crucial feature of China’s central state corporatism. It shapes the incentives, mobility and distribution of power in the system. The core leadership personnel of yangqi are deeply involved in the Party’s political processes. Many of them have been elected into the Party’s Central Committee and Central Disciplinary Committee.38 As Lin Nan has pointed out, the top business leaders under the Party’s control have “synchronized incentives and mobility”: they are motivated by both political achievement and business achievement, and can be moved back and forth across political hierarchy and state­controlled business hierarchy.39 While the Party has made considerable progress in institutionalizing a talent management system to govern yangqi, the present system has been revealed to be vulnerable to complex webs of vested interests that breed corroding elements of corruption and managerial abuses. It has proven difficult for the system to effectively monitor and discipline those politically connected business leaders. The networks of interconnected graft tend to reinforce themselves and cannot be unraveled until they are exposed through mishaps, whistleblowing and complaints that lead to the Party’s full investigations.

Conclusion This chapter analyzes the Party’s role in the governance of China’s central SOEs. Based on the analytical framework of “late development,” it points out that the Chinese political economy is at the transitional stage between the catch­up phase and mature phase of growth. It is a crucial dimension of China’s system reform to restructure the Party–state–enterprise relations to match with China’s emerging new growth model. The governance structure of China’s yangqi sector is characterized here as a distinctive model of “central state corporatism,” with the Party center resembling the corporate headquarters holding the ultimate authority, the Party-­appointed technocrats acting as corporate managerial elites, and each “yangqi” like a business division of this overall pyramidal structure. The Party’s roles of organizational entrepreneurship and leadership talent management are examined in detail as the key features of this system. Following the implementation of enterprise reforms spanning over half a century, the CCP had managed to transform the core assets and enterprises governed by the Stalinist technocratic bureaucracy into a batch of giant central state-­ controlled business firms. During the recent decade, these firms have achieved robust growth and built up sizes comparable with global leading corporations. Throughout this process, the Party has simultaneously promoted organizational changes and maintained its centralized control. However, as the Chinese economy is moving toward a more mature phase of development, the pattern of Party–business relations should undertake a new transition as well. There are growing discontents with yangqi which are regarded as vested interest groups

Party in corporate governance   237 that hinder China from completing its marketization reforms.40 As revealed by recent anti-­graft campaigns, the widespread corruption involving yangqi is further undermining the legitimacy of China’s central state corporatism. How to adapt to the new policy environment and establish a more effective governance framework for China’s state-­controlled corporate system remains a major challenge for the Party in the coming decade.

Notes   1 The author would like to thank Peter Nolan, Andrew Sheng, Kjeld Brødsgaard, Zheng Yongnian, John Wong, Lance Gore, You Ji, Jean Oi and Andrew Walder for their comments and suggestions on this research.   2 Alfred D. Chandler, Franco Amatori and Takashi Hikino, eds., Big Business and the Wealth of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).   3 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1962), p. 354.   4 Alice Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Shin Jang-­Sup, The Economics of the Latecomers: Catching-­Up, Technology Transfer and Institutions in Germany, Japan and South Korea (London: Routledge, 1996); Shin Jang-­Sup and Chang Ha-­Joon, Restructuring Korea Inc. (London: Routledge, 2003).   5 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy 1925–1975 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982); Alice Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).   6 Tony Freyer, Antitrust and Global Capitalism, 1930–2004 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).   7 Vladimir Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” 23–28 March 1918, Lenin Collected Works, 2nd English edition, vol. 42 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), pp. 68.2–84, www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/mar/23b.htm (accessed 15 May 2011).   8 Alec Nove, The Soviet Economic System (London: Allen & Unwin, 1977); Mark Harrison and Andrei Markevich, “Hierarchies and Markets: the Defense Industry under Stalin,” in Guns and Rubles: The Defense Industry in the Stalinist State, ed. Mark Harrison (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 50–77.   9 Wu Jinglian, Understanding and Interpreting Chinese Economic Reform (Singapore: Thomson, 2005). 10 Andrei Yu. Yudanov, “USSR: Large Enterprises in the USSR – the Functional Disorder,” in Big Business and the Wealth of Nations, ed. Alfred D. Chandler, Franco Amatori and Takashi Hikino (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 11 Li Chen, “Holding China Inc. Together: the CCP and the Rise of China’s Yangqi,” unpublished working paper, 2015. 12 Anders Aslund, Gorbachev’s Struggle for Economic Reform (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 12; David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs, “Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1 (1990): 75–147, esp. pp. 87–88; Oliver Blanchard, Rudiger Dornbusch, Paul Krugman, Richard Layard and Lawrence Summers, Reform in Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 65. 13 Peter Murrell, “What Is Shock Therapy? What Did It Do in Poland and Russia?” Post-­Soviet Affairs 9, no. 2 (1993): 111–140, esp. pp. 123–124. 14 Peter Nolan, China’s Rise, Russia’s Fall: Politics, Economics and Planning in the Transition from Stalinism (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995); Peter Nolan and Wang

238   Li Chen Xiaoqiang, “Beyond Privatization: Institutional Innovation and Growth in China’s Large State-­Owned Enterprises,” World Development 27, no. 1 (1999): 169–200. 15 David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, Post-­Socialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Jean Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Peter Nolan, China and the Global Economy: National Champions, Industrial Policy and the Big Business Revolution (London: Palgrave, 2001); Andrew Walder, “From Control to Ownership: China’s Managerial Revolution,” Management and Organization Review 7, no. 1 (2011): 19–38; Andrew Walder, Andrew Isaacson and Liu Qinglian, “After State Socialism: The Political Origins of Transitional Recessions,” Amer­ican Sociological Review 80, no. 2 (2015): 444–468. 16 Zhao Ziyang, “Guanyu dang zheng fenkai” [On separating Party from government], 1987, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-02/05/content_2550447.htm (accessed 28 January 2010). 17 John Burns, “Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: the 1990 Nomenklatura,” The China Quarterly, no. 138 (1994): 458–491, esp. p. 458. 18 Zhao Ziyang, Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), pp. 259–264. 19 Li Chen, China’s Centralized Industrial Order: Industrial Reform and the Rise of Centrally Controlled Big Business (London: Routledge, 2015); Li, “Holding China Inc. Together.” 20 Li Yuanchao, “Ba dangde zhengzhi youshi zhuanhua wei qiye kexue fazhan youshi” [Turning the Party’s political advantage into the enterprises’ advantage of scientific development], 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-09/03/content_11988760. htm (accessed 17 November 2011). 21 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “Politics and Business Group Formation in China: the Party in Control?” The China Quarterly, no. 211 (2012): 624–648. 22 Qian Yingyi and Xu Chenggang, “Why China’s Economic Reforms Differ: The M-­Form Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the Non-­State Sector,” Economics of Transition 1, no. 2 (1993):  135–170; Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York: Free Press, 1975); Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985); Xu Chenggang, “The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development,” Journal of Economic Literature 49, no. 4 (2011): 1076–1151. 23 Jean Oi, “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China,” World Politics 45, no. 1 (1992): 99–126; Jean Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 24 Li, China’s Centralized Industrial Order; Li, “Holding China Inc. Together.” 25 State-­Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), Zhongguo guoyou zichan jiandu guanli nianjian [China state-­owned assets supervision and administration yearbook] (Beijing: China Economy Publisher, 2014); People’s Bank of China (PBOC), Zhongguo jinrong wending baogao 2015 [China financial stability report 2015] (Beijing: China Financial Publishing House, 2015). 26 Zheng Yongnian, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, Reproduction and Transformation (London: Routledge, 2010). 27 Li, China’s Centralized Industrial Order; Li, “Holding China Inc. Together.” 28 Institute of Industrial Economics of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (IIECASS), Zhongguo gongye fazhan baogao [China industrial development report] (Beijing: Economy and Management Publisher, 1998), p. 124. 29 Li, China’s Centralized Industrial Order; Li, “Holding China Inc. Together.” 30 Li, China’s Centralized Industrial Order; Li, “Holding China Inc. Together.” 31 SASAC, Zhongguo guoyou zichan jiandu guanli nianjian [China state-­owned assets supervision and administration yearbook] (Beijing: China Economy Publisher, 2010); Li, China’s Centralized Industrial Order.

Party in corporate governance   239 32 Sebastian Heilmann, “Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise,” Studies in Comparative International Development 43, no. 1 (2008): 1–26; Sebastian Heilmann, “From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China’s Distinctive Policy Process,” The China Journal 59 (2008): 1–30. 33 Li, “Holding China Inc. Together.” 34 Ed Michaels, Helen Handfield-­Jones and Beth Axelrod, The War for Talent (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press, 2001). 35 Zhang Zhijian, Dangdai Zhongguo de renshi guanli [The personnel management of contemporary China] (Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 1994); Hon S. Chan, “Cadre Personnel Management in China: the Nomenklatura System, 1990–1998,” The China Quarterly, no. 179 (2004): 703–734; Li, China’s Centralized Industrial Order. 36 SASAC, Zhongguo guoyou zichan jiandu guanli nianjian [China state-­owned assets supervision and administration yearbook] (Beijing: China Economy Publisher, 2004). 37 Li Cheng, China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012 (Part 4: Top Leaders of Major State-­Owned Enterprises), 2011, www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/02/ china-­leadership-li (accessed 18 March 2012). 38 Brødsgaard, “Politics and Business Group Formation in China”; Li, China’s Centralized Industrial Order. 39 Lin Nan, “Capitalism in China: a Centrally Managed Capitalism (CMC) and Its Future,” Management and Organization Review 7, no. 1 (2011): 63–96. 40 World Bank, China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious and Creative High-­ Income Society (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012).

Part V

The party and foreign policy

12 International Department and China’s foreign policy Lye Liang Fook

Foreign policymaking structure In many countries, the foreign ministry is the foremost actor that formulates, articulates and implements foreign policy. In contrast, in China, the Foreign Ministry is but one of many actors and is perceived to confine its role to that of an implementer of state-­to-state relations. The Chinese Foreign Ministry often has to contend with other institutional players such as the Politburo Standing Committee, the Central Military Commission, the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Commerce, the Taiwan Affairs Office, the Office for Hong Kong and Macau Affairs, the Office for Overseas Chinese Affairs, the State Council Information Office, Xinhua News Agency and the International Department (ID) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The ID is one of the most important but least understood institutions in China’s foreign affairs system. The fact that the ID’s work outside of China is less widely known could be due to the nature of its work. It essentially focuses on building CCP ties with political parties in other countries. While such activities may be important from China’s perspective, they are less important to many other countries around the world where state-­to-state relations are conducted through the foreign ministry. Another reason is that the ID intentionally keeps a lower profile compared to the Foreign Ministry in executing its work. It often stresses the importance of resolving issues or delivering results away from the media glare. It further prides itself on the non-­official nature of its work (compared to the Foreign Ministry), which it believes can help to facilitate frank discussion and deliver tangible results. Doak Barnett has noted that the ID has long been a major department under the CCP Central Committee with primary responsibility for developing relations with other communist parties. However, there was no mention of the ID in the Chinese press until recently when some of its activities began to appear in the Chinese press.1 Barnett further opined that while the CCP has reduced its support of overseas communist parties engaged in revolutionary struggles since the 1970s, the ID has continued to play a “very significant role” in advancing its policy toward other communist countries and in developing ties with both communist and non-­communist parties in many countries.2

244   Lye Liang Fook Echoing this view, Lu Ning has observed that since the late 1970s, the ID has begun to broaden its contacts to include non-­communist political parties in foreign countries. However, its impact on foreign policies in the non-­communist world is weak. Lu Ning arrives at a different conclusion from Barnett by arguing that overall, the influence of the ID on foreign policy has been on the decline.3 The predominant reason is that it is more susceptible to changes in the external environment than any other foreign affairs institutions. Its tentative revival in the late 1970s and 1980s when Beijing began to mend its fences with the Soviet Union and the East European nations, where communist parties dominated, however, soon fell victim to the demise of the former Soviet Union in 1989–1991. With the Khmer Rouge fading into oblivion and North Korea and Cuba struggling to survive, Lu is sceptical whether the ID will ever regain its influence in the foreign policymaking process.4 While acknowledging that the ID has experienced its low points especially after the Sino-­Soviet split (in the 1960s) and again after the collapse of the former Soviet bloc, David Shambaugh noted that the ID “has reinvented itself in the post-­Cold War era and now operates globally as never before.” In fact, given the ID’s exchanges with so many democratic parties abroad, Shambaugh surmised that it might even become a conduit to fashion the transformation of the CCP from a “Leninist Party into some new kind of proto-­democratic hybrid.” He is of the view that the diplomacy of the ID “may be quiet, but it is effective.”5 This chapter does not intend to delve into this debate on whether the ID has gained, retained or even lost its influence over the years. Rather, it will try to highlight how the ID has evolved in general and in particular since the collapse of the Soviet bloc. This will contribute to a better understanding of the role that the ID plays in China’s foreign policy. It is worth noting that the CCP’s ties with communist/socialist parties in other countries predate the formal establishment of the ID in 1951. In fact, two representatives of the Communist International who provided assistance for the founding of the CCP attended the First National Congress of the CCP held in Shanghai in 1921.6 From the 1920s until 1943, the CCP maintained close ties with the Communist International.7 During this period, more than ten representatives of the Communist International were sent to the CCP successively, and CCP delegations were sent to the Communist International as well.8 The next section provides an overview of the key institutions in China’s foreign policy decision-­making structure and how the ID fits into this structure. More importantly, this will shed light on the organizational structure and key personnel of the ID. The third section examines how the role of the ID has evolved over the years in three areas: (i) its relations with other parties in other countries; (ii) its proactiveness in learning from the experiences of other countries and, more importantly, in sharing China’s experience in not only Party-­ related matters but also non-­Party-related fields with its counterparts from other countries; and (iii) in helping the CCP retain a strong role in handling its relations with Vietnam and North Korea.

International Department and foreign policy   245

Key players in China’s foreign policy decision-­making structure Within the hierarchical structure of the CCP, the seven-­member Politburo Standing Committee, the highest decision-­making body, makes all major policy decisions including foreign policy. The highest foreign policy coordination body is the CCP’s Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (CFALSG). The Central State Security Leading Small Group shares the same office as the CFALSG, and comprises the same group of personnel as the CFALSG. In Chinese parlance, they are the same outfit with different names (一个机构两块牌子 yige jigou liangkuai paizi). The CFALSG is an informal body usually headed by the state president (i.e., President Xi Jinping) and vice president (i.e., Li Yuanchao) as director and deputy director, respectively. Its members would invariably include the vice premier or state councilor in charge of foreign affairs, foreign affairs minister, defense minister, commerce minister, public security minister, state security minister, head of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, head of the State Council Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, head of the State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, head of the State Council Information Office, head of the ID, head of the Propaganda Department, and other senior leaders from related departments of the People’s Liberation Army.9 As can be gleaned from the above and seen in Figure 12.1, the key actors in the foreign policy decision-­making structure fall largely under three types of systems (xitong): the State Council system (guowuyuan xitong), the Party system (dang xitong) and the military system (jundui xitong). Although not an institutionalized body, the CFALSG plays an important role in coordinating foreign policy decision-­making across different systems as well as across different ministries. The CFALSG is assisted by the CFALSG Office, which is usually headed by the vice premier or state councilor responsible for foreign affairs. The members of the office include senior foreign ministry and military officials. On a daily basis, each of the three xitong involves institutions that play a role in foreign policy decision-­making (Figure 12.1). Under the military system, the top and foremost institution is the Central Military Commission (CMC). In the past, decisions were taken by the military without much apparent consultation with the foreign ministry. These include decisions over the spy plane incident in 2001 and the anti-­satellite missile test in 2007. Under the Party system, the principal institution is the ID, which is often regarded as the “foreign ministry” of the CCP and is ranked higher than the actual Foreign Ministry in the Chinese political establishment.10 Under the State Council system, the Foreign Ministry oversees the day-­to-day operations of China’s foreign affairs. However, the Foreign Ministry is largely considered the implementer of policies made elsewhere given its low ranking in China’s power hierarchy.11 Other indirect institutions in China’s foreign policy decision-­making structure include the Foreign Affairs Committees in the National People’s Congress (NPC or China’s parliament) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

State Council

Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council

Ministry of Public Security

National Development and Reform Commission

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Coordinating Group for Foreign Affairs Emergency

CFALSG Office

...

The State Council Information Office

Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress

Note ... Indicates omitted organizations

Source: Zhang Ji, “China’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making Structure” [Zhongguo waijiao juece jigou], Dongfang Daily, 18 March 2013, www.dfdaily.com/html/51/2013/3/18/963053.shtml (last accessed 27 July 2015).

Figure 12.1  China’s foreign policy decision-making structure.

...

...

Headquarters of the General Staff

Central Military Commission of the CCP

Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council

Ministry of State Security

Ministry of Defense

Ministry of Commerce

Inter-ministry Joint Conference for the Protection of Overseas Chinese Citizens and Agencies

Central State Security Leading Small Group

Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council

...

Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee

International Department of the CPC Central Committee

Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee

Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (CFALSG)

Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee; Politburo of the CCP Central Committee

International Department and foreign policy   247 From the organizational perspective, these two committees are considered marginal players in foreign policy. Nevertheless, at times, individuals that head the Foreign Affairs Committees can help to raise the profile of these bodies and be an effective public face for China. For instance, Madam Fu Ying, who heads the Foreign Affairs Committee in the NPC and is also a seasoned diplomat, is known for her charm and adroitness in conveying China’s position on various issues.12 On several occasions, China’s foreign policy actors have cited the need to take sentiments into account such as national pride or nationalism in the formulation of foreign policy. This situation usually arises over China’s disputed territorial claims with other countries. When Japan nationalized the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2012, there was a massive outpouring of anti-­Japanese sentiments that caused relations to nosedive and has continued to affect ties. More recently, in asserting China’s irrevocable claims over the South China Sea, Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly said that if China were to change its position on the South China Sea, it would bring shame on its ancestors. Wang added that China would not be able to face its children and grandchildren if the “gradual and incremental invasion of China’s sovereignty and encroachment on China’s interests was allowed to continue.”13 China’s foreign policy decision-­making structure thus comprises a multitude of institutions and actors of which the Foreign Ministry is merely one. One of the foremost institutions that the foreign ministry has to contend with is the ID. Table 12.1 lists the tenure of ID directors since 1951. David Shambaugh has observed that the first five directors on the list were political “heavyweights” (excluding Kang Sheng), while the last five were of substantially lower profile and rank in the CCP hierarchy (at the time of their service).14 To a large extent, this is true as the first five (Wang Jiaxiang, Liu Ningyi, Geng Biao, Ji Pengfei and Qiao Shi) were either veterans of the Long March, had served or led the Red Army or were seasoned labor activists. In addition, either during their appointment or after they relinquished their posts as director of the ID, a few of them held or went on to assume higher positions in the power hierarchy. For instance, Geng Biao, who was director of the ID from 1971 to 1979, became vice premier of the State Council (in 1978), secretary general of the CCP Central Military Commission (in 1979) and defense minister (in 1983). Ji Pengfei, who was director of ID from 1979 to 1982, became vice premier and secretary general of the State Council (in 1980). Qiao Shi, who was director of ID from 1982 to 1983, became vice premier (in 1986), member of the Politburo Standing Committee (from 1987 to 1997); secretary of the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (from 1987 to 1992); and chairman of the National People’s Congress (1993–1998). The latter five directors of the ID (Qian Liren, Zhu Liang, Li Shuzheng, Dai Bingguo and Wang Jiarui) were from a different generation from the first five directors; they were known to thrive on the leadership styles of technocrats and managers but were no less capable. Most of them had extensive international exposure before becoming the director of the ID. In particular, Qian Liren had served in the international affairs department of the Communist Youth League;

1951–March 1966

June 1966–April 1968 January 1971–January 1979 January 1979–April 1982 April 1982–July 1983 July 1983–December 1985

December 1985–March 1993 March 1993–August 1997 August 1997–March 2003 March 2003–2015

Wang Jiaxiang (王稼祥)

Liu Ningyi (刘宁一) as acting director

Geng Biao (耿　飚)

Ji Pengfei (姬鹏飞)

Qiao Shi (乔　石)

Qian Liren (钱李仁)

Zhu Liang (朱　良)

Li Shuzheng (李淑铮) Female

Dai Bingguo (戴秉国)

Wang Jiarui (王家瑞)

Vice chairman, Central Military Commission; director general of the General Political Department of Red Army; CCP representative to the Communist International; first Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union; vice foreign minister Communist labor organizer; vice chairman then chairman of the AllChina Federation of Trade Unions; deputy director of the ID Leading posts in the Red Army; Chinese ambassador to Sweden, Pakistan, Myanmar and Albania Joined the Red Army; first Chinese ambassador to East Germany; vice minister then minister of foreign affairs; right-hand man to Premier Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping in foreign affairs Head of Communist Youth League in Hangzhou; worked in state-owned iron and steel enterprises; deputy director of ID Served in international affairs department of Communist Youth League; head of external affairs office of the State Council; member of standing council of Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries; the first Chinese ambassador to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Representative to the World Federation of Democratic Youth; vice minister of international department of Communist Youth League; deputy director of ID Deputy director of international department of communist youth league; member of the Standing Committee of the Ninth Congress of Communist Youth League; deputy director of ID Chinese ambassador to Hungary; vice minister of foreign affairs; deputy director of ID Stints in Jilin and Shandong provinces, and at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation; mayor and vice Party secretary of Qingdao; deputy director of ID

Positions held prior to appointment

Note David Shambaugh included Kang Sheng (康生) as de facto director of ID from April 1968 to January 1971 in his listing of the directors of the ID. See Shambaugh, “China’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy,’ ” p. 39. However, Kang Sheng is not mentioned on the ID website.

Source: International Department (ID) website, at www.idcpc.org.cn/gywb/bld/ (accessed 28 July 2015).

Tenure

Directors

Table 12.1  Past and existing directors of the International Department (ID)

International Department and foreign policy   249 was head of the external affairs office of the State Council; was a member of the standing council of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries; and was China’s first ambassador to UNESCO. The only exception is Wang Jiarui who does not appear to have had much dealing in external affairs before joining the ID. In fact, Wang had spent a considerable amount of time in various posts in Jilin and Shandong provinces and only a few years at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation where he might have had some external relations exposure. In addition, four of them, Zhu Liang, Li Shuzheng, Dai Bingguo and Wang Jiarui, were deputy directors of the ID before they took over the post of director. In terms of structure, the ID is composed of eight functional offices and eight bureaus (Figure 12.2). The structure indicates that the ID is akin to a “mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” with dedicated departments handling the CCP’s external relations. At the top is the General Office that coordinates and manages political and administrative affairs within the ID. It also facilitates the decision-­making of the ID leadership and the execution of these decisions; assists in information summarization and submission on the financial affairs of the ID and its international work, as well as managing and auditing state-­owned assets; and coordinates the administering of the international activities of other organs directly under the CCP Central Committee and Party committees at the levels of province, autonomous region and municipality.15 The Research Office carries out research work on the global situation, major international issues and the state of political parties around the world. It also coordinates research efforts within the ID and conducts academic exchanges and cooperation with outside institutions. The Party Foreign Affairs Coordination Bureau coordinates and manages the international work of organs directly under the CCP Central Committee and Party committees at the province, autonomous region and municipality levels. It also oversees the participation of civil society organizations in international non-­ governmental organization activities. The Publicity Bureau conducts studies on the dissemination of CCP theories and practice to the outside world and is responsible for the overall planning of the dissemination of news about the CCP’s external work and related press releases, oversight of the public diplomacy work assigned by the CCP Central Committee as well as coordination of publicity for projects carried out externally. The Protocol Bureau is in charge of the protocol and reception arrangements for visiting foreign delegations at the invitation of the CCP or the ID, and also takes charge of organizing of trips for outgoing Party delegations as well as other activities involving foreign affairs. The Personnel Bureau is responsible for personnel recruitment, assignment, assessment, appointment and removal, training, wages and welfare as well as rotation and management of personnel posted abroad and travel clearance of staff members who travel abroad for short visits.

Bureau II (Asia II Bureau) – Northeast Asia and Indochina

Bureau I (Asia I Bureau) – South Asia and Southeast Asia

Bureau III (West Asia and North Africa Bureau)

Publicity Bureau

Bureau IV (Africa Bureau) – SubSaharan Africa

Protocol Bureau

Bureau V (Latin America Bureau) – Latin America and the Caribbean

Personnel Bureau

Bureau VI (Eastern Europe and Central Asia Bureau) – Eastern Europe, the Baltics and Commonwealth of Independent States

Party Committee

Bureau VII (America and Nordic Bureau) – North America, Oceania, the Nordic region, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Malta and other countries

Information Center

Bureau VIII (West Europe Bureau)

Source: chart drawn up by author based on information obtained from the International Department website, www.idcpc.org.cn/gywb/jgsz/ (accessed 27 July 2015).

Figure 12.2 Structure of the International Department (ID) of the Chinese Communist Party.

Party Foreign Affairs Coordination Bureau

Research Office

General Office

Vice-Directors

Director

International Department and foreign policy   251 The Party Committee oversees the thinking, organization, political culture and discipline inspection work of the ID. It is also responsible for work related to leading organizations of the workers, youth and women. The Information Center collects and analyzes information on international issues and political parties around the world to facilitate the ID international exchanges and research work. It also compiles background materials for cross-­ regional research; builds and maintains the ID website on the internet; and provides technical support for the smooth operation of the online information system and office automation. In terms of geographical coverage, the eight ID bureaus cover virtually the entire world including the major regions, i.e., Asia (Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and West Asia, which includes the Middle East), Africa (countries to the north of the Sahara Desert as well as sub-­Saharan Africa), Europe (both Eastern and Western Europe), the Americas (North America, Latin America and the Caribbean states) and Oceania (Australia, New Zealand and Pacific island states). More specifically, two bureaus, i.e., Bureau I and Bureau II, are dedicated to Asian affairs (see Figure 12.2). Bureau I is responsible for South and Southeast Asian affairs while Bureau II covers the affairs of Northeast Asia and Indochina. Bureau III covers part of Asia, in particular West Asia, which includes the Middle East. It also oversees North African affairs. There are two bureaus with responsibility for African affairs – Bureau III, as mentioned above, that covers North African affairs; and Bureau IV that oversees the sub-­Saharan countries, i.e., the African countries to the south of the Sahara Desert. There are also two bureaus with responsibility for the Americas. Bureau V covers Latin America and the Caribbean countries while Bureau VII focuses on North America. In addition, Bureau VII oversees the Oceanic (that includes Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific island countries) and Scandinavian countries plus the English-­speaking countries in Europe such as the United Kingdom, Ireland and Malta. Furthermore, there are two bureaus that oversee European affairs. Bureau VIII focuses on Western European affairs while Bureau VI covers Eastern European affairs. In addition, Bureau VI is responsible for the countries straddling the Baltic Sea and the Commonwealth of Independent States, i.e., the former Soviet Union. The staff working in the bureaus are posted to stations at selected Chinese embassies abroad. According to Shambaugh, approximately 30 Chinese embassies abroad – in Washington, Ottawa, London, Paris, Brussels, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Berlin, Rome and in several other countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America – have ID personnel. The ID personnel working abroad usually do not openly identify themselves as staff working for the ID but simply as foreign ministry personnel. This is understandable as part of their duties involves participating in normal embassy functions and reporting. However, it is also assumed (although hard evidence is lacking) that these ID

252   Lye Liang Fook personnel work closely with the Ministry of State Security personnel abroad to gather intelligence and recruit potential agents.16

Evolution of the ID Expanding orientation and improving public engagement One of the distinctive features that characterizes the evolution of the ID is its orientation arising from changes in its external environment. The first major adjustment occurred in the 1970s following China’s ruptured relations with the Soviet Union and its decision to embark on the open-­door and reform policy. After 1978, apart from its ties with communist and workers’ parties, the CCP began to reach out to friendly political parties in developing countries, including ruling parties, coalition parties and even opposition parties. The CCP also started to re-­establish ties with communist parties which it had earlier broken off, such as its renewal of ties with the Communist League of Yugoslavia in 1978. In the 1980s, the CCP began to build ties with socialist parties, social democratic parties and labor parties in other countries. It also gradually reached out to parties in developed countries including Japan, Australia, New Zealand, France and Italy.17 The second major adjustment that the ID made occurred after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, a development that was of far greater significance to China. This is because the collapse of the Soviet bloc raised fundamental questions about the survivability of communist regimes around the world including the CCP. The “end of history” with the one-­sided victory of capitalism and liberal democracy appeared to be incontrovertible.18 This led to much internal “soul searching” within the CCP on deriving lessons from the downfall of the Soviet bloc and how it can avoid the latter’s mistakes or pitfalls in the future. Arising from its internal “soul searching” within the CCP, the ID, as a key institution of the Party, began to reinvent itself. A new feature of the ID’s reinvention attempts is the publicity efforts put into the work of the CCP in promoting party-­to-party ties with its external counterparts. From 1993 on, the ID started to publish an annual entitled Yearbook on the External Work of the Chinese Communist Party [Zhongguo gongchandang duiwai gongzuo gaikuang] that provides an overview of the external work carried out by the ID for the CCP. The ID also made a conscious effort to improve its engagement with the local and overseas media to better publicize its work. In 2006, Cai Wu (director of the State Council Information Office who was a former deputy director of the ID) formally released the names of the spokespersons and the telephone numbers of their media departments of seven CCP departments including the ID at a press conference.19 Going a step further, in June 2010, Wang Chen (director of the International Communication Office of the CCP Central Committee) introduced the spokespersons from 11 departments of the CCP including the ID in an unprecedented group debut in front of the local and overseas media in Beijing.20 This

International Department and foreign policy   253 group debut was intended to convey the CCP’s and ID’s commitment to disclose relevant information on Party affairs. Although this marked the first time that the ID spokesperson was unveiled in a group, the appointment of a spokesperson by the ID was not unprecedented. Apparently, in the 1980s, the ID had already established a dedicated media department and appointed a spokesperson. It went on to hold its first media briefing in November 1984. However, evidently, the frequency of these media briefings picked up only after 2000.21 A message dated 23 December 2003 from Wang Jiarui (director of the ID) explains that the English-­language ID website is targeted at the general public both at home and abroad. By providing an account of the CCP’s international activities and relevant information in a timely manner, Wang hoped that the website could serve as a window for the public to gain an insight into China’s Party diplomacy.22 As Wang was appointed director of the ID in March 2003, the ID launched the English-­language website at the end of the same year.23 The ID also reports the growing number of political parties and countries that the CCP has established ties with over the years. In 1956, 56 delegations from the communist parties and workers’ parties of other countries attended the Eighth CCP Congress in Beijing.24 In 1992, the CCP had established links with over 280 political parties in more than 120 countries. Interestingly, out of the 280, only one-­quarter were communist parties, while the remaining three-­ quarters were non-­communist parties.25 By 2008, 16 years later, the CCP had established ties with more than 500 political parties in more than 160 countries.26 The CCP has extended its reach from 56 countries in 1956, 120 countries in 1992 to 160 countries in 2011. The number of political parties that the CCP has links with also increased from 280 in 1992 to 500 in 2008. The ID has also stepped up efforts to build ties with political parties of various stripes in other countries. In 1991, Song Ping (a Politburo Standing Committee member) and Li Ximing (a Politburo member) led separate delegations to visit Pakistan and India, respectively, at the invitation of the political parties in these two countries. This marked the first time that CCP leaders had led delegations to visit these two countries.27 In 1994, the CCP hosted a visit by a 32-member strong Barisan National delegation, marking the first time it established links with the ruling party coalition in Malaysia.28 In 1999, the CCP established preliminary contacts with the German Green Party,29 France’s Union for French Democracy,30 the British Conservative Party31 and a United States Democratic Party think tank.32 With regard to its ties with the United States in particular, the ID continued to take the initiative to reach out to political parties there. For instance, in 2001, the ID sent a condolence message to the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) on the demise of its former chairman Gus Hall.33 The CCP even went on to hold theoretical discussions with the CPUSA in 2006.34 A breakthrough of sorts occurred in 2009 when Li Yuanchao (a Politburo member and member of the Party secretariat) visited the United States at the invitation of the US government.35 It was the first time a CCP leader had visited the United States in a Party capacity.

254   Lye Liang Fook Furthermore, the ID has actively participated in international party-­related events. For example, in 2004, it hosted the Third International Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP) on the theme of “Exchange, Cooperation and Development.”36 It was apparently the first time that the CCP had organized such a large-­scale conference of political parties. More than 350 delegates from 81 political parties and organizations of 35 countries were present. The event was accorded great importance by the CCP. Its opening ceremony was attended by Zeng Qinghong (a Politburo Standing Committee member, vice president of China, and honorary chairman of the organizing committee of the conference); Liu Yunshan (Politburo member and chairman of the organizing committee of the conference); He Guoqiang (Politburo member and member of the Party secretariat); He Yong (member of the Party secretariat); Tang Jiaxuan (state councilor), Liu Yandong (vice chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference); and Wang Jiarui (director of the ID, vice chairman and secretary general of the organizing committee of the conference). Chinese President Hu Jintao also hosted the delegates to a banquet dinner.37 The ICAPP provides a good multilateral platform for the CCP to extend its reach to other political parties around the world. It was inaugurated in the Philippines in 2000 for the purpose of promoting exchanges and cooperation between political parties of different ideologies in Asia. The ICAPP discusses areas of common concern and solutions to address these concerns. It has held special conferences that focus on issues highlighted by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. China had hosted three out of the first seven such conferences, i.e., on poverty alleviation in Kunming in July 2010; on development and people’s access in Nanning in September 2011; and on promoting green development and building a beautiful Asia together in Xi’an in May 2013. The ICAPP has further sought to strengthen ties with political parties and groupings in Latin America and the Caribbean as well as in Africa. Such an outward orientation to reach out to political parties and groupings in other regions of the world dovetails with the CCP’s objective of building ties with as many external political parties as possible. Apart from the ICAPP, the ID has leveraged other regional and international platforms such as the Socialist International (a worldwide organization of social democratic, socialist and labor parties), Christian Democrat International (a grouping of parties largely from Europe and Latin America dedicated to the promotion of Christian democracy), European People’s Party (a grouping of European center-­ right parties) and other party groups in the European Parliament as well as the Permanent Conference of Political Parties in Latin America and the Caribbean.38 Sharing and adapting experiences, and promoting practical cooperation Another distinguishing feature of the ID is its concerted effort to learn from the experiences (both positive and negative) of other political parties or governments. It also makes an effort to showcase China’s progress under the leadership

International Department and foreign policy   255 of the CCP. From a party that underwent deep internal “soul searching” in the early 1990s to its relative success in weathering the 1997 financial crisis and in achieving stellar performance to become a key pillar of growth and market confidence following the 2008 financial crisis, the CCP’s own formula for leading China’s development has also become of interest to other political parties and countries. There is a palpable sense of growing confidence on the CCP’s part to want to share its own experience with the outside world. There are a number of ways that the ID has leveraged to learn from other countries and share its experiences with them. One way is through bilateral exchanges of visits. In the case of overseas trips, the CCP accepts an invitation from either the host country’s ruling political party or the government. For instance, in September 1992, at the invitation of Singapore’s Monetary Authority of Singapore, Wu Bangguo (Party secretary of Shanghai and an alternate member of the Central Committee) led a delegation to Singapore.39 The delegation included Jiang Guanghua (deputy director of the ID and deputy delegation leader) and other local Chinese leaders from Guangdong, Shenzhen and Shanghai Pudong Development Zone.40 The visit was a milestone of sorts as 1992 was the year Deng Xiaoping reaffirmed China’s open-­door and reform policy in his Southern Tour. In that tour, Deng singled out Singapore as a reference for China’s development. Deng’s comments sparked “Singapore fever” as more than 400 Chinese delegations visited Singapore in 1992 alone. Wu Bangguo’s visit took place in that context and had a strong economic emphasis. Apart from their visit to the headquarters of Singapore’s ruling party, the People’s Action Party (PAP), the Chinese delegation also visited the Economic Development Board, Trade Development Board, Urban Redevelopment Authority and the Singapore Stock Exchange. Wu Bangguo’s visit was less about the CCP developing party-­to-party ties with the PAP than about economic links, as the invitation for his visit came from the Monetary Authority of Singapore and not from the PAP. Also, the visit showed the CCP’s keenness to learn about Singapore’s development experience and how this could be relevant to China. Over time, there were two notable changes in the nature and emphasis of such contacts. The first change was that the initial party-­to-government ties opened the way for party-­to-party ties between the two countries. For example, in 2005, Hu Jiayan (deputy Party secretary of Xinjiang autonomous region) led a Chinese delegation to Singapore. In contrast to previous visits, this visit had strong party-­to-party overtones. First, the invitation for Hu’s visit was issued by the PAP. Second, Hu’s delegation met with Lau Ping Sum (executive director of the PAP headquarters) and Tan Guan Seng (political secretary to the Prime Minister’s Office). The delegation also toured the PAP weekly Meet-­the-People session, visited the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports, the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau and the Central Provident Fund Board.41 Over the years, the areas of interest of visiting CCP delegations to Singapore have also moved beyond economic development experience and economic issues to topics like governance, the relationship

256   Lye Liang Fook between the ruling party and the electorate, leadership selection, anti-­corruption, housing, community building and social harmony. In the words of former executive director of PAP headquarters Lau Ping Sum, the Chinese “no longer want to know the formula for economic development, but how we manage to win successive general elections and deal with the challenges we face now.”42 One other notable change is the shift of the learning experience from a largely one-­sided affair to a two-­way street. In particular, the PAP finds that it can also benefit from the CCP experience. In 2010, Khaw Boon Wan (PAP’s first organizing secretary and minister of health) and Lee Yi Shyan (PAP’s head of external relations and minister of state for manpower and trade and industry) led a 46-strong PAP delegation on a six-­day visit to Jiangsu. The PAP delegation learned about Jiangsu’s political party system, witnessed a village election (in Donghua village of Hutang township) and visited the Chinese version of Singapore’s community centers. A member of parliament in the Singapore delegation recalled that when Mr. Khaw told the Chinese side that the PAP was visiting China to learn from them, “smiles lit up the faces of Chinese officials.”43 Another way for the CCP to learn from other countries or share its experiences with them is to hold bilateral dialogues/seminars on specific topics of common interest. For instance, in the case of Vietnam, one of the few remaining countries led by a communist party, the CCP has held bilateral party-­to-party theory seminars with its Vietnamese counterpart since 2003. These seminars enable the ruling parties in the two countries not only to explore possible theoretical innovations but also to derive relevant lessons and experiences in various areas. The topics covered in seminars through the years include the theory and practice of the socialist market economy (first seminar, 2003); world socialism and the workers’ movement (second seminar, 2004); the scientific concept of development and building a harmonious socialist society (third, 2007); agriculture, rural areas and farmers (fourth, 2008); addressing the global financial crisis (fifth, 2009); culture development (sixth, 2010); governing experiences (seventh, 2011); economic growth models (eighth, 2012); building a pure and strong party (ninth, 2013); and building a socialist country under rule of law (tenth, 2014). Notwithstanding the two-­way learning process, these seminars appeared to be the CCP’s sharing of its rich development experience accumulated over more than three decades of reforms. The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) only formally embarked on economic reforms in 1986, eight years later than the CCP’s launch of reforms in China. On the basis of such theory seminars, the CCP set up its first theory seminar with the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), the ruling party in Laos, in 2010. Similar to its seminars with the CPV, the seminars that the CCP held with the LPRP also covered areas of mutual interests such as theory and practice in the socialist modernization drive (first seminar, 2010); improving party conduct and building a clean government (second seminar, 2013); and building a socialist country under rule of law (third seminar, 2014). Beyond the communist fraternity, the CCP has also established bilateral dialogues with parties in non-­communist countries including the United States. In

International Department and foreign policy   257 his article on the ID in 2007, Shambaugh observed that the ID “has been frustrated in establishing formal ties with the two US political parties” although links have been set up with the International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute, two institutes affiliated to the Republican and Democratic National Committees.44 Today, the ID has succeeded in establishing direct access to the Republican Party and Democratic Party through a regular and institutionalized platform known as the “High-­Level Political Party Leaders’ Dialogue.” The breakthrough occurred in March 2010 when Madeleine Albright (former US secretary of state and former US ambassador to the United Nations) and Richard Williamson (former US assistant secretary of state and former US ambassador to the United Nations) led an 18-member delegation of Democratic and Republican representatives to Beijing for the inaugural High-­Level Political Party Leaders’ Dialogue.45 Within the same year in November 2010, Wang Jiarui (director of the ID) led a 22-strong return delegation to the United States for the second dialogue, marking the first-­ever visit by a delegation of CCP officials.46 In the ID’s judgment, the fact that two such dialogues occurred within the same year was an indication of strong commitment by the two countries to strengthen exchange and cooperation and also of the great significance that both countries have placed on political party dialogue. To date, eight such high-­level political party leaders’ dialogues have been held. Over the years, the topics covered have been wide-­ranging, from the domestic political landscape and challenges, governance philosophy, the economy, China–US relations, to issues of regional and international affairs. At the eighth dialogue held in Beijing in May 2015, for instance, both sides focused on the themes of rule of law and anti-­corruption measures in China and the United States as well as the political landscape in China and the United States.47 In an effort to expand the representation of the dialogue participants beyond party representatives, the eighth dialogue included representatives from US and Chinese corporations who spoke at an inaugural US–China Entrepreneurs Round Table. The round-­table session discussed trade, investment and other economic issues in bilateral relationship and various corporate perspectives on doing business in each other’s country.48 China regards the high-­level political party leaders’ dialogue (or for that matter other forms of bilateral party channel) as a platform that promotes a more discreet channel of communication away from the media/public glare. It also regards the dialogue as offering non-­official forms of exchange that can facilitate candid discussions. Where differences exist between the two countries, Wang Jiarui (director of the ID) had recalled some advice given to him from Henry Kissinger (former US secretary of state and national security adviser), who had suggested that the two countries find solutions to differences in private rather than present the contents of all conversations publicly to the media.49 While not fully endorsing the discreet and non-­official benefits of the high-­ level political party leaders’ dialogue, the United States appears to have come round to the idea that there is value in having party-­to-party ties with China. Ronald Kirk, leader of the Democratic Party delegation to the Eighth Dialogue

258   Lye Liang Fook in May 2015, reportedly said that the “party-­to-party meetings is not meant to try to prove the correctness of the Amer­ican or the Chinese models, but rather for the two sides to understand the strengths of their respective system.”50 In addition, at the Eighth Dialogue, the Amer­ican side raised the level of its representation. For the first time, it sent current office-­bearers from both major US political parties.51 It was also the first-­ever dialogue visit to China involving former cabinet-­level officials from the incumbent Obama administration and its predecessor administration of George W. Bush.52 Yet another avenue for the CCP to learn from other countries or share its experiences with them is to participate in multilateral political party forums. At these forums (like the bilateral party platforms), the parties discuss topics related not only to political parties, but also to their respective countries’ development challenges, strategies and plans, as well as issues of regional and international concern. A case in point is the China–Europe High-­Level Political Parties Forum which convened in Beijing in May 2010 and was regarded as the first multilateral strategic dialogue between the CCP and 40 political parties and groupings from Europe. Issues discussed at this forum were in response to regional and international concerns including the global financial crisis, global governance, climate change and environmental protection.53 Moving beyond dialogues and discussions, the ID has sought to promote practical and mutually beneficial cooperation with other political parties and countries. For instance, in August 2010, the ID, in collaboration with China’s Ministry of Agriculture, convened the first China–Africa Agriculture Forum in Beijing under the framework of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).54 The forum not only discussed food security, food safety and sustainable agriculture, but also explored areas for further cooperation in the food sector between China and Africa. The forum showed how China can be of further assistance to Africa’s ongoing efforts to ensure sufficient food supply over the longer term. Separately, in July 2012, the ID and Tianjin municipal government co-­hosted the Third Forum for Cooperation of Small and Medium-­sized Enterprises (SMEs) of China and West Asia and North Africa (WANA) Countries in Tianjin. The forum explored the avenues through which SMEs in the ­relevant countries can share experiences and strengthen collaboration for mutual benefits.55 The ID has even conducted seminars/training courses for representatives from developing countries. In March 2014, a group of 14 cadre trainees from party and governmental institutions in Senegal were hosted by the Beijing Party Institute and Shanghai Party Institute in Beijing and Shanghai, respectively, for ten days.56 They were not only briefed on the CCP’s structure, organs, orientation and approaches but were also given an overview of the economic and social developments in Beijing and Shanghai. Site visits were also arranged for them in these two locations. Such seminars/training courses afford another means for China to share its development experience, including successes and challenges, with foreign representatives through a direct and first-­hand approach.

International Department and foreign policy   259 Retaining a strong role in relations with traditional “allies” In spite of its major reorientation toward non-­communist/socialist countries around the world, the CCP appears to have managed to retain a strong role in its ties with its traditional ruling counterparts in Cuba, Laos, Vietnam and North Korea. This section illustrates the CCP relations with its counterparts in Vietnam and North Korea, highlighting the importance of party-­to-party relations. Toward Vietnam Even though the number of party-­to-party interactions between China and Vietnam is one of the highest compared to China’s interactions with other countries, it does not necessarily imply that relations between China and Vietnam are trouble-­free. In fact, ties between the two countries hit their lowest point when China deployed Oil Rig 981 off the Paracel Islands (which are also claimed by Vietnam) in May 2014. China reportedly deployed as many as 80 vessels, including seven naval ships, accompanied by air support to safeguard Oil Rig 981. It was further reported that some eight Vietnamese ships were rammed, hit or sprayed with high-­pressure hoses by Chinese vessels.57 Such action sparked off anti-­China protests in several cities in Vietnam with protestors looting, burning and damaging factories and businesses believed to be owned by ethnic Chinese. At the government-­to-government level, strong words were exchanged. In a telephone conversation between China’s state councilor Yang Jiechi and Vietnam’s deputy prime minister Pham Binh Minh, the latter reportedly demanded that China withdraw the oil rig and vessels before holding talks to resolve the issue.58 In a separate telephone conversation with Vietnam’s foreign minister Pham Binh Minh (who is also deputy prime minister), China’s foreign minister Wang Yi expressed China’s strong condemnation of the violence against foreign-­invested companies in Vietnam. He further called on Vietnam to take “resolute and effective measures” to stop all violence and ensure the safety of Chinese citizens and properties of Chinese companies in Vietnam.59 Tensions eased somewhat when China withdrew Oil Rig 981 on the basis that it had completed operations to search for oil and gas off the Paracel Islands. However, the breakthrough on the political front only came through party-­toparty channels. More specifically, Le Hong Anh (a Politburo member and standing secretary of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of Vietnam) visited Beijing in August 2014 as a special envoy of Vietnam’s general secretary or party chief Nguyen Phu Trong. The first person he met soon after his arrival was Wang Jiarui (the director of the ID).60 This indicated that the ID was the key institution on the Chinese side that helped to broker Anh’s visit. More significantly, Le Hong Anh met with Chinese Party secretary Xi Jinping. During the talk, Xi told Anh that China and Vietnam are neighbors that “cannot be moved away and it is in the common interests of both sides to be friendly to each other.” Xi hoped that Vietnam would make joint efforts with

260   Lye Liang Fook China to put “bilateral relationship back on the right track of development.” Xi added that China would continue to adhere to a friendly, cooperative, future-­ oriented policy toward Vietnam to strengthen the relationship between the two parties and the two countries.61 This party-­to-party level encounter marked a turning point in China–Vietnam relations. By sending his special envoy, Nguyen Phu Trong, the most senior party decision-­maker in Vietnam, was conveying the message that Vietnam was ready to move forward from the oil rig incident. By meeting the special envoy, President Xi Jinping, Trong’s counterpart in the CCP, was reciprocating the olive-­branch gesture from Vietnam. Thereafter, bilateral ties improved. In December 2014, Yu Zhengsheng (Politburo Standing Committee member and chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) visited Vietnam (at the behest of President Xi Jinping) to improve “mutual trust, build consensus and boost progress of China–Vietnam relations.”62 Yu, the fourth-­ ranked member in China’s Political Bureau, met the top three leaders of Vietnam (i.e. the general secretary, president and prime minister) and witnessed the launch of the Confucius Institute at Hanoi University.63 Toward North Korea The CCP and Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) also enjoy strong party-­to-party ties. In 2010, China–North Korea relations reached an all-­time high with Kim Jong-­il (general secretary of the WPK) visiting China twice. Zhou Yongkang (Politburo Standing Committee member and secretary of the political and legal affairs committee) also visited North Korea in the same year. In 2011, Kim Jong-­il paid his final visit to China a few months before his death in December of that year. In the same year, Li Yuanchao (Politburo member; member of the Party secretariat; and director of the Central Organization Department) and Li Keqiang (Politburo Standing Committee member and vice premier) visited North Korea. In all, Kim Jong-­il visited China a total of seven times from 2000 (when he embarked on his first overseas visit to China since he rose to power in 1994) up to the end of 2011.64 But between 2010 and the end of 2011, Kim Jong-­il stepped up the tempo by visiting China three times. The frequent high-­level party-­to-party exchanges between China and North Korea appear to have been discontinued after Kim Jong-­un and Xi Jinping took over the helm of power in December 2011 and November 2012, respectively (as head of their respective ruling parties). Since November 2012, Xi Jinping has not visited North Korea. Furthermore, Xi broke with the tradition by putting Seoul ahead of Pyongyang in his visit to the Korean Peninsula in July 2014. Likewise, Kim Jong-­un has also not visited China since coming into power.65 The paucity of high-­level party-­to-party exchanges between China and North Korea is an indication that ties between the two countries have soured in recent years. Observers have highlighted other indicators to show that relations have soured. For instance, Kim Jong-­un’s message to President Xi on the sixty-­fifth

International Department and foreign policy   261 anniversary of the founding of the PRC on 1 October 2014 did not include the usual language about advancing the “friendship” developed under previous generations of leaders, as emphasized in his messages in 2012–2013. It was also reported that China did not send any officials to Pyongyang on 6 October 2014 to mark the sixty-­fifth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.66 It was further reported that while attending Moscow’s Victory Parade in May 2015, Kim Yong-­nam (North Korea’s ceremonial head of state) merely “met and exchanged greetings” (i.e., no substantive talks ensued) with President Xi while he held talks with Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev and Cuban president Raul Castro.67 Various factors have been offered to explain the strained party-­to-party ties between China and North Korea. It has been suggested that China has been upset with North Korea over its provocations such as its missile launches and nuclear ambitions. In December 2012, North Korea put the country’s first satellite into orbit, probably using ballistic missile technology that contravenes the United Nations resolutions. In February 2013, just before Xi Jinping was appointed president, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test, but the first under Kim Jong-­un.68 In 2014, North Korea fired more than 100 projectiles, at least ten of which were believed to have used ballistic missile technology, again in violation of the United Nations resolutions.69 It has further been suggested that the purge and execution of Jang Song-­taek (Kim Jong-­un’s uncle and second-­highest ranking official in North Korea) in December 2013 has further dampened China– North Korea relations as Jang had been the chief interlocutor between the two countries. On its part, North Korea has also attempted to diversify its relations beyond Beijing to other countries such as Russia, Japan, Africa and the Middle East.70 The more important question that needs to be asked is whether the apparent “downgrade” in party-­to-party relations matters. There are indications that it does matter. It appears that the lack of high-­level exchange is intended as an unequivocal message from China that North Korea needs to rein in its nuclear ambitions and not engage in provocations that put China in a tight spot vis-­à-vis its relations with other major powers and its obligations as a responsible stakeholder of the international community. China also plays an indispensable role in propping up the North Korean regime. According to one estimate, Beijing provides some “80 percent of North Korea’s consumer goods, 45 percent of its food, and 90 percent of its energy imports.” In addition, China–North Korea trade accounts for “nearly 90 percent of North Korea’s global trade, while official Chinese investment accounts for almost 95 percent of foreign direct investment in the North.”71 On North Korea’s part, it is worth noting that Kim Jong-­un has yet to embark on his first overseas visit since he became supreme leader in December 2011. Earlier media reports had indicated that he would attend the Asian–African Conference (or Bandung Conference) and Moscow’s Victory Parade in April 2015 and May 2015, respectively. The fact that this did not come to pass suggests that Kim Jong-­un is weighing carefully the country that he should visit on his maiden

262   Lye Liang Fook trip abroad. It is likely that China would be high, if not the first country, on his list. On China’s part, it appears to have held out a possible reconciliation with North Korea. On the sidelines of the National People’s Congress in March 2015, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi told reporters that a bilateral summit between the two countries could be held at “a mutually convenient time.”72 An invitation was also extended to Kim Jong-­un to attend the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II celebrations in Beijing in September 2015 (although Kim eventually did not go). North Korea has also sent positive signals to China. On the occasion of the sixty-­second anniversary of the armistice that ended the Korean War in July 2015, Kim Jong-­un paid tribute to Chinese soldiers who fought for the North during the Korean War. He also sent a wreath to the Chinese People’s Volunteers Martyrs’ Cemetery in Hoechang county, South Phyongan province. He skipped both gestures in 2014. It therefore seems that the lack of high-­level party-­to-party contacts has worked in some way in China’s favor. China has registered the point that North Korea will need to be more accountable in the conduct of its foreign relations or at least not cause unnecessary embarrassment to China. North Korea’s efforts to diversify its external relations are unlikely to have any significant impact on China’s role as the main supporting pillar of the North Korean regime. North Korea, given its lack of friends and heavy dependence on China, will eventually have to find some form of rapprochement with China. When this happens, party-­ to-party ties will be a key channel.

Conclusion The ID is constantly adapting itself to play a relevant role in promoting the CCP’s relations with other political parties and countries. Since the 1990s, it has helped the CCP to expand its orientation to establish ties with political parties of various stripes in many countries. It has also paid greater attention to better publicizing the work that it is doing on the external front for the CCP. At the same time, the ID has assisted the CCP to step up efforts to either learn from the experiences of other political parties/countries or to share its experience with other political parties/countries. It has developed a number of avenues to do this including through bilateral exchange visits, study trips or holding of political party seminars or dialogues. Such seminars or dialogues promote more focused and in-­depth discussion on topics of mutual interest. They further offer useful platforms for the CCP and its foreign counterparts to meet regularly not only to discuss issues but to build personal relationships among party leaders and officials. In addition, the ID has leveraged multilateral platforms to extend its reach. Often, such platforms go beyond mere exchange of experiences or views to pursue practical areas of cooperation. The ID has enabled the CCP to retain a strong role in its ties with its traditional party counterparts in Vietnam and North Korea. In the case of Vietnam, the CCP through the ID played a key role in mending ties between China and

International Department and foreign policy   263 Vietnam after the fallout following the 2014 oil rig incident. In the case of North Korea, the CCP has deliberately stalled high-­level party-­to-party ties with the WPK. This is intended as an unequivocal message to North Korea to “behave” itself. North Korea is likely to lose more if the suspension of high-­level party-­toparty ties with China is prolonged. There are signs that the CCP and KWP could achieve some form of rapprochement at certain point in the future. The ID looks set to continue to play an important role in the CCP’s external relations as long as political parties continue to be the main platform for political mobilization. More importantly, as long as the CCP is able to deliver the goods within China, the ID is most likely to have its plate full in reaching out and maintaining the CCP’s ties with other external political parties/countries.

Notes   1 A. Doak Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1985), p. 46.   2 Barnett, Making of Foreign Policy in China, p. 48.   3 Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-­Policy Decisionmaking in China, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 127–128.   4 Lu Ning, “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 59–60.   5 David Shambaugh, “China’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy’: The International Department of the Chinese Communist Party,” China: An International Journal 5, no. 1 (March 2007): 54.   6 The two representatives from the Communist International were G. Maring from the Netherlands and V.V. Nicolsky from Russia.   7 China became a member of the Communist International in 1922. The Communist International was dissolved by Joseph Stalin in 1943.   8 Cai Wu, “A Review of and Reflections on the 80 Years of Foreign Contacts of the Communist Party of China (CCP),” International Department of the CCP website, 1 July 2001, www.idcpc.org.cn/english/resources/AI/201406/t20140626_31576.html (accessed 23 July 2015).   9 Zhang Ji, “China’s Foreign Policy Decision-­Making Structure” [Zhongguo waijiao juece jigou], Dongfang Daily, 18 March 2013, www.dfdaily.com/html/51/2013/3/18/963053. shtml (accessed 27 July 2015). 10 Lance L.P. Gore and Weng Cuifen, “China’s New Foreign Policy Team,” EAI Background Brief no. 806, 5 April 2013. 11 For a more detailed study of China’s foreign policy decision-­making structure and process, refer to David Bachman, “Structure and Process in the Making of Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), pp.  34–54; and Zhao Quansheng, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-­Macro Linkage Approach (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 12 “Answering Four Questions about China’s Rise” (by Madam Fu Ying), The Huffington Post, 17 October 2014, www.huffingtonpost.com/fu-­ying/china-­rise-questions_b_6004658. html (accessed 28 July 2015). 13 Wang Yi stressed that China’s claims in the South China Sea have not expanded and neither will they shrink, and that China was actually the biggest victim as other countries had taken action to stake their claims way before China did. See “China Says

264   Lye Liang Fook Relinquishing Claims to Territory in the South China Sea Would Shame Ancestors,” Shanghaiist, 28 June 2015, http://shanghaiist.com/2015/06/28/relinquishing_claims would_shame_ancestors.php (accessed 28 July 2015). 14 Shambaugh, “China’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy,’ ” p. 39. 15 For more details on the functional offices and bureaus, see the International Department website, www.idcpc.org.cn/gywb/jgsz/ (accessed 30 July 2015). 16 Shambaugh, “China’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy,’ ” p. 45. 17 Zhongguo gongchandang duiwai gongzuo gaikuang 1992–1993 [Yearbook on the external work of the Chinese Communist Party 1992–1993] (Beijing: Contemporary World Publishers [Dangdai shijie chubanshe], 1993), p. 3. 18 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 19 “Cabinet Spokesman Cai Wu Meets the Press,” China Daily, 29 December 2006. The seven departments are the International Department, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Organization Department, the United Front Work Department, the Taiwan Work Office, the Party Literature Research Center and the Party History Research Center. 20 Apart from the International Department, the ten other departments were the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Organization Department, United Front Work Department, Taiwan Work Office, Party Literature Research Center, Party History Research Office, Central Archives Department, Party School, International Communication Office and Publicity Department. See “Spokespersons of CCP Departments Make Group Debut,” International Department website, 30 June 2010, www.idcpc.cn/ english/events/100630.htm (accessed 31 July 2015). 21 “Li Jun: Zhonglianbu zai shang shiji 80 niandai jiu shelile xinwen fayen ren” [Li Jun: The International Department has since the 1980s appointed its press spokesperson], People’s Daily, 30 June 2010, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/164113/12018786.html (accessed 31 July 2015). 22 “Welcome Message from Minister,” International Department website, 23 December 2003, www.idcpc.org.cn/english/Profile/message/index.html (accessed 7 August 2015). 23 This is confirmed by other CCP sources. See “CCP Disciplinary Body’s Website Shows Transparency Efforts,” News of the Communist Party of China, 5 September 2013, http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206974/8390798.html (accessed 11 August 2015). 24 Zhongguo gongchandang duiwai gongzuo gaikuang 1992–1993, p. 1. 25 Zhongguo gongchandang duiwai gongzuo gaikuang 1992–1993, p. 255. 26 Zhongguo gongchandang duiwai gongzuo gaikuang 2009 [Yearbook on the external work of the Chinese Communist Party 2009] (Beijing: Contemporary World Publishers, 2010), p. 1. 27 Zhongguo gongchandang duiwai gongzuo gaikuang 1992–1993, p. 5. 28 Zhongguo gongchandang duiwai gongzuo gaikuang 1995 [Yearbook on the external work of the Chinese Communist Party 1995] (Beijing: Contemporary World Publishers, 1995), pp. 152–154. 29 In 1998, the German Green Party entered into a coalition for the first time with the Social Democratic Party led by Gerhard Schroder. 30 In 1998, Francoise Bayrou took over the presidency of the Union for French Democracy (UDF ) and continued to lobby for the various component parties in the UDF to merge in favor of a new, single center-­right party. The resultant new UDF was established in 1999, although the leading constituent parties retained their de facto identities. 31 The British Conservative Party was the major opposition party at that time. The party in power was the British Labour Party led by Tony Blair. 32 The name of this Democratic Party think tank is not mentioned. See Zhongguo gongchandang duiwai gongzuo gaikuang 2000 [Yearbook on the external work of the

International Department and foreign policy   265 Chinese Communist Party 2000] (Beijing: Contemporary World Publishers, 2001), p. 19. 33 Zhongguo gongchandang duiwai gongzuo gaikuang 2001 [Yearbook on the external work of the Chinese Communist Party 2001] (Beijing: Contemporary World Publishers, 2002), p. 430. 34 Zhongguo gongchandang duiwai gongzuo gaikuang 2007 [Yearbook on the external work of the Chinese Communist Party 2007] (Beijing: Contemporary World Publishers, 2008), p. 9. 35 Li Yuanchao was accompanied by Liu Jieyi (deputy director of the ID) and Wang Xiaochu (vice minister of the Ministry of Resources and Social Security). See Zhongguo gongchandang duiwai gongzuo gaikuang 2010 [Yearbook on the external work of the Chinese Communist Party 2010] (Beijing: Contemporary World Publishers, 2011), pp. 270–271. 36 The ICAAP was launched in Manila in September 2000 to promote exchanges and cooperation among political parties of various ideologies from different Asian countries. It comprises political parties from Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, the Middle East and Oceania. To date, more than 370 political parties in 53 countries in the region are eligible to participate in ICAPP’s activities. See ICAPP website, www.theicapp.org/ (accessed 31 July 2015). 37 Zhongguo gongchandang duiwai gongzuo gaikuang 2005 [Yearbook on the external work of the Chinese Communist Party 2005] (Beijing: Contemporary World Publishers, 2007), pp. 493–495. 38 “CCP’s International Exchanges in the New Era by Chen Fengxiang,” International Department website, 9 October 2007, www.idcpc.org.cn/english/resources/AI/201406/ t20140627_31604.html (accessed 31 July 2015). See also Zhongguo gongchandang duiwai gongzuo gaikuang 2007, pp. 358–359. 39 This was not the first CCP institution to visit Singapore. In July 1992, a Chinese delegation led by Xu Weicheng (deputy director of the Propaganda Department) came to Singapore and visited relevant departments responsible for social order and discipline including the police; agencies in charge of censorship of videos, films, books and magazines; newspaper offices, radio and TV stations; and the People’s Association and National Trade Union Congress. 40 Zhongguo gongchandang duiwai gongzuo gaikuang 1992–1993, pp. 326–327. 41 Zhongguo gongchandang duiwai gongzuo gaikuang 2006 [Yearbook on the external work of the Chinese Communist Party 2006] (Beijing: Contemporary World Publishers, 2007), p. 80. 42 “A Man for All Seasons,” PAP News and Commentaries, 2 July 2013, www.pap.org. sg/news-­and-commentaries/commentaries/man-­all-seasons (accessed 3 August 2015). 43 “From Big Chill to Warm Ties,” The Straits Times, 18 December 2010. 44 Shambaugh, “China’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy,’ ” p. 47. 45 The ID point of contact in the United States for organizing the High-­Level Political Party Leaders’ Dialogue is the EastWest Institute, a non-­partisan think tank based in New York. 46 “Historic Visit from China to U.S.,”, EastWest Institute, 16 December 2010, www.ewi. info/sites/default/files/ideas-­files/P2P2_Event%20Report.pdf (accessed 3 August 2015). 47 The Chinese side elaborated on the rule of law and the state of its anti-­corruption campaign. The Amer­ican side elaborated on the upcoming 2016 presidential election and state of Amer­ican politics. See “Di bajie Zhong Mei zhengdang gaoceng duihua juxing” [The Eighth China–US High-­Level Political Party Dialogue is held], CCTV, 6 May 2015, http://m.news.cntv.cn/2015/05/06/ARTI1430898023295761.shtml (accessed 3 August 2015). 48 “8th U.S.-China High-­Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue,” EastWest Institute, 8 May 2015, www.ewi.info/sites/default/files/ideas-­files/8th%20U.S.-China%20High-Level%20 Political%20Leaders%20Dialogue%20Event%20Report.pdf (accessed 3 August 2015).

266   Lye Liang Fook 49 “Discreet Communication to Bolster U.S.-China Relations,” EastWest Institute, 17 December 2010, www.ewi.info/sites/default/files/ideas-­files/P2P2_Event%20Report. pdf (accessed 3 August 2015). 50 “China, US Hold High-­Level Party Dialogue,” CriEnglish, 7 May 2015, http:// english.cri.cn/12394/2015/05/07/3745s877604.htm (accessed 4 August 2015). 51 They were Raymond Buckley (vice chair, Democratic National Committee and chair, New Hampshire Democratic Party) and Anthony W. Parker (treasurer, Republican National Committee). See “8th U.S.-China High-­Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue,” EastWest Institute. 52 They were Ronald Kirk (senior counsel, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP and former US trade representative) who led the Democratic Party representatives, and James Nicholson (senior counsel, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck LLP; former chairman, Republican National Committee; and former secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs) who led the Republican Party representatives. See “8th U.S.-China High-­ Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue,” EastWest Institute, 8 May 2015. 53 “China to Display a Self-­Confident, Open and New International Image,” CCP News, 26 May 2010, http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66102/7000945.html (accessed 4 August 2015); and Zhongguo gongchandang duiwai gongzuo gaikuang 2011 [Yearbook on the external work of the Chinese Communist Party, 2011] (Beijing: Contemporary World Publishers, 2012), pp. 9–10. 54 Over 130 representatives from 18 African countries took part in the forum, among whom were five senior leaders of African political parties and 11 agricultural ministers. On the Chinese side, there were about 100 Party and government representatives from the central and lower levels. See “The Success of China–Africa Agricultural Forum: A New Height of China–Africa Inter-­party Relations,” International Department website, 12 August 2010, www.idcpc.gov.cn/english/special%20reports/agr_ forum/100812–3.htm (accessed 4 August 2015). 55 “SMEs Cooperation Forum Opens in Tianjin,” China Daily, 4 July 2012, http:// europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-07/04/content_15549327.htm (accessed 31 August 2015). 56 “A Successful Cadre Seminar of Senegalese Ruling Coalition by Focusing on Three Key Areas,” Shanghai Party Institute of CCP and Shanghai Administration Institute website, 9 March 2014, www.sdx.sh.cn/html/home/news/73781.html (accessed 31 August 2015). 57 “Chinese Ships Ram Vietnamese Vessels in Latest Oil Rig Row: Officials,” Thanh Nien News, 7 May 2014, www.thanhniennews.com/politics/chinese-­ships-ram-­ vietnamese-vessels-­in-latest-­oil-rig-­row-officials-­26069.html (accessed 4 August 2015). 58 “Vietnam Demands China Remove Oil Rig from Vietnamese Waters,” Tuoi Tre News, 7 May 2014, http://tuoitrenews.vn/politics/19498/vietnam-­demands-china-­ removes-oil-­rig-from-­vietnamese-waters (accessed 4 August 2015). 59 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference,” China’s Foreign Ministry website, 16 May 2014, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/ s2510_665401/t1156893.shtml (accessed 4 August 2015). 60 “Vietnam Wants to Restore, Boost Relationship with China: Party Envoy,” Thanh Nien News, 27 August 2014, www.thanhniennews.com/politics/vietnam-­wants-to-­ restore-boost-­relationship-with-­china-party-­envoy-30420.html (accessed 4 August 2015). 61 “Xi Eyes Mended China-­Vietnam Ties,” Xinhuanet, 27 August 2015, http://news. xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/27/c_133590950.htm (accessed 4 August 2015). 62 “Senior Chinese leader Yu Zhengsheng Calls for ‘Correct Path’ in Relations with Vietnam,” South China Morning Post, 26 December 2014, www.scmp.com/news/ china/article/1668632/senior-­chinese-leader-­yu-zhengsheng-­calls-correct-­path-relations-­ vietnam (accessed 4 August 2015).

International Department and foreign policy   267 63 Wang Jiarui, the director of the ID, was part of Yu Zhongzheng’s delegation to Vietnam. See “China’s Top Political Adviser Wraps Up Visit to Vietnam,” Xinhuanet, 27 December 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-12/ 27/c_133882479.htm (accessed 31 August 2015). 64 “Kim Jong Il’s Seven Visits to China,” China.org.cn, 21 December 2011, www.china. org.cn/world/2011-12/21/content_24211950.htm (accessed 4 August 2015). 65 This is despite the fact that Kim Jong-­un reportedly accompanied his father when the latter made a trip to China in August 2010. See “North Korea Leader Kim Jong-­il Visits China,” Telegraph, 26 August 2010. 66 Scott Snyder and Byun See-­won, “China–Korea Relations: Beijing Ties Uneven with Seoul, Stalled with Pyongyang,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14 January 2015, http://csis.org/files/publication/1403qchina_korea.pdf (accessed 4 August 2015). 67 “Top North Korea Official, President Xi Jinping Exchange Only Small Talk at Moscow Victory Parade,” South China Morning Post, 11 May 2015. 68 The previous two nuclear tests were conducted in 2006 and 2009. 69 Michael Pilger and Caitlin Campbell, “Diminishing China–North Korea Exchanges: An Assessment,” U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 23 March 2015, p.  4, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Research %20Report_Diminishing%20China-North%20Korea%20Exchanges%20-%20An%20 Assessment.pdf (accessed 5 August 2015). 70 “N. Korea’s Ceremonial Head of State in Beijing Ahead of African Trips,” Yonhap News, 21 October 2014, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2014/10/21/72/0 401000000AEN201410210044 00315F.html (accessed 5 August 2015). 71 Pilger and Campbell, “Diminishing China-­North Korea Exchanges,” pp. 4–5. 72 “Chinese FM Hints at Summit with North Korea,” Chosun Media, 9 March 2015, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/03/09/2015030901823.html (accessed 5 August 2015).

13 The Chinese Communist Party and restructuring national security policymaking Hu Weixing

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the ruling political party of China. One of the keys to its rule of the Chinese state is its grip on military power and control of national security decision-­making. The practice and tradition stemmed from Mao Zedong’s famous argument of “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” (枪杆子里面出政权 qiangganzi limian chu zhengquan). It was the CCP’s practice then, it still is now and it will be in the future. In order to maintain its rule, the CCP understands perfectly well that it must monopolize the Chinese military and decision-­making power over national security affairs. This is in fact vital for its rule of the Chinese state. The Chinese military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has long been under CCP control, ever since it was founded in 1927. The PLA has played a sweeping role for the CCP regime and the Chinese state. The PLA’s role can be seen in civil wars, domestic power politics and national defense against external threat, as well as in maintaining domestic social stability. Yet, as China rises up to global great power status in the twenty-­first century, the nature and magnitude of national security challenges to the Chinese states have substantially changed. The CCP can no longer solely rely on the PLA and the traditional security state to maintain regime security and domestic social stability. It must modernize the Chinese national security system to deal with emerging national security challenges, from inside and outside. While continuing to hold a tight grip on the Chinese military, the CCP must expand and revamp the current Chinese national security system and enhance the system’s capability to cope with rising national security challenges as China rises to become a great power in the world. It is no secret that the current Chinese national security system is not quite adequate for dealing with the emerging national security challenges China is facing. The system suffers from problems of inefficiency, and a lack of coordination and information sharing, and accountability of decision-­makers. That is why the CCP decided to establish a National Security Commission (NSC, guojia anquan weiyuanhui 国家安全委员会) at the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Party Congress in November 2013. President Xi Jinping justified the setting up of the Chinese NSC for two reasons – the security challenges China is facing and the institutional deficiency in the current system. China’s national security

CCP and restructuring national security   269 and social stability, Xi argues, is challenged by the pressure from both international and domestic sources and the present Chinese security system is not rigorous enough to meet the demands of ensuring national security. That is why China needs to establish a “strong platform to coordinate security work” and “to strengthen unified leadership of national security at the central level.”1 Following the Third Plenum decision, Xi Jinping became the chairman of this newly established commission, which was inaugurated on 15 April 2014 and officially named as the Central National Security Commission (CNSC, Zhongyang guojia anquan weiyuanhui 中央国家安全委员会), under the CCP leadership, not yet a state agency.2 Establishing the CNSC was a major institutional breakthrough for China’s national security policymaking and for decision-­making in China. A Chinese NSC has been under consideration since the late 1990s. The discussion about an NSC could be traced back to the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. In the aftermath of the crisis and following President Jiang Zeming’s visit to the United States in 1997, China showed increasing interest in the idea of forming a central coordinating body for national security affairs, following the US National Security Council model. The Chinese leadership also ordered in-­depth studies on it but the idea did not eventually materialize until November 2013, after Xi Jinping took the top leadership role. Why did Xi finally institutionalize the NSC? Many analysts argue that the timing and way of establishing the NSC is to be attributed to Xi Jinping’s leadership style and his ambition to use it to tighten his power grip.3 But this is more than simply his leadership style and ambition, and we have to look at the “demand side” of the story. As Chinese interests and influence have expanded rapidly all over the world, China’s foreign and security policymaking is not quite up to the test in terms of policy coordination, crisis management and decision-­making efficiency. There are many rising challenges that the Chinese military alone cannot deal with and that calls for new thinking and institutional changes to address the mounting challenges. This chapter examines the institutional logic and rationales behind the CCP’s decision to establish the CNSC and how this new agency will likely fare and function in the current Chinese political system. It is argued here that the establishment of the CNSC is largely to be attributed to the top-­down overall architectural reforms (dingceng sheji 顶层设计) initiated by the CCP. China’s national security decision-­making has problems in coordination and crisis management. To surmount the problems accumulated over the years and to meet emerging security challenges, Xi is taking an issue-­driven and problem-­solving approach to overhaul the system and modernize the Chinese foreign and security policymaking process. Overall architectural changes kicked off recently and will take years to complete. The reforms will take place in three domains: ideational changes, organizational changes and statutory changes. In terms of ideational changes, Xi is trying to reconceptualize “national security” with new concepts of “overall diplomacy” (da waijiao 大外交) and “overall security” (da anquan 大安全). He is calling for an overall approach toward national security affairs (zhongti guojia anquanguan 总体国家安全观). In terms of reorganizing the

270   Hu Weixing state foreign and security apparatus, the establishment of the CNSC is just the first step and an institutional vehicle toward a more modernized system of policymaking, decision-­making and crisis management. The Third Plenum started a new round of comprehensively deepening reforms. The CNSC will serve as a lever as well as a platform for reorganizing China’s cumbersome national security command system and institutions. In the end all institutional reforms will have to be institutionalized and translated into substantive statutory changes to the Chinese political system.

Changing challenges and China’s new national security strategy Chinese national security under Xi Jinping’s leadership is facing more severe challenges, internal and external, than were present in the Hu Jintao years. Since taking over the top leadership role, President Xi has reconceptualized and reconfigured China’s national security strategy to meet the challenges, based on the newly formulated concepts of “big diplomacy” (da waijiao 大外交) and “big security” (da anquan 大安全). China’s international security environment is becoming grim, with increasing tension and possibilities of conflict. During Hu’s tenure (2002–2012), the international environment for China was relatively favorable. Following the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001, the George W. Bush administration reversed its hard-­edged policy treating China as a “strategic competitor,” and the US “war on terror” helped to forge a more constructive Sino-­Amer­ican relationship. The 2008 global financial crisis further consolidated China’s position in the global economy. Now Xi finds himself facing a much more complicated foreign policy challenge. Economic ties with neighbors have not eliminated rising tension over the contested maritime and territorial boundaries in the East and South China Seas. Obama’s pivot to Asia further complicated China’s regional environment, and there is even evidence of “hard balancing” of East Asian countries against China. Many of China’s neighbors appear to be hedging or balancing, and fewer still bandwagoning with China. Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping began to deviate from the constraint of tao guang yang hui (remaining low profile and biding time) and take a much more proactive approach to China’s foreign relations.4 Under tao guang yang hui, Beijing tried not to confront neighboring countries on territorial disputes and to place more emphasis on the reassurance of China’s peaceful rise. But this pacifying approach seems not to be working and not attainable for Xi Jinping today. China has turned to a hard-­line stance on maritime and territorial disputes, with the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea, and with Japan in the East China Sea. From day one in office, Xi has made it clear that China wants to maintain good neighborly relations but it cannot be at the expense of China’s national interests. Xi is not shy of drawing the red line for neighbors when it concerns China’s national interests. Xi’s great power dream requires strong maritime capabilities that enable the Chinese navy to go beyond the First Island

CCP and restructuring national security   271 Chain (from Okinawa to Taiwan and to the Philippines) and even the Second Island Chain (from the Ogasawara Island chain and Guam to Indonesia).5 In response to Washington’s “pivot to Asia,” Xi Jinping has redirected China’s foreign relations westward. Using economic statecraft, Beijing is actively cultivating economic relations of mutual benefit with countries in Eurasia and Southeast Asia. By promoting the development of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (yidai yilu 一带一路), China has injected a strong impetus to its relations with these countries. The Silk Road projects are designed to boost economic ties and infrastructural interconnections between China and Eurasian and Southeast Asian countries, and serve as an overarching architecture for China’s external cooperation endeavor in the new era.6 To finance these projects, Beijing is actively promoting a number of new international financial infrastructures, such as the BRICS Development Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund. Xi Jinping’s new thinking on foreign relations reflects a changing self-­ identification of China in world affairs. The buzzword for Xi’s new thinking is “big power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.” Chinese leaders used to call China the “largest developing country” and now the self-­identification is changed to a “developing big power.” Given China’s rapid rise, the current Chinese leadership thinks China must develop a distinctive diplomatic approach befitting its role as a big power in world affairs. China’s diplomacy must show salient Chinese features, Chinese style and Chinese confidence.7 The “big power diplomacy” has two meanings: one meaning is how to deal with other big powers such as the United States and Russia, and the other meaning concerns China’s self-­ identification as a big power in world affairs (daguo dingwei 大国定位). For Xi Jinping, the second meaning is more important for his notion of Chinese foreign relations. China has already become a big power – the second-­largest economy in the world and a country with global influence and capabilities – and it should not shy away from the reality that it is a big power. To him, China should have a big power’s way of thinking (xintai 心态), sense of responsibility (dandang 担当) and manner (qidu 气度).8 All these challenges Xi Jinping has brought to Chinese foreign policy require Beijing to build up its “diplomatic capability” (waijiao nengli jianshe 外交能力 建设). As one Chinese foreign policy scholar argues, the diplomatic capability is not just material power or “hardware,” but rather, it is about institutional power and “software.” China needs to build up its ideational power in understanding the changing world, its strategic planning capacity for long-­term policy, and its institutional coordinating capability to manage big power diplomacy.9 Compared with other big powers, China is getting stronger in “hardware,” but not quite in “software.” There are over 30 countries in the world that have some sort of national security committees and China is the only big country without a centralized national security management system. That is why many Chinese scholars and think tanks have argued that an NSC is like a “standardized device” for a big power (daguo biaopei 大国标配).10 A rising China could have more advanced

272   Hu Weixing weapons, but the “software” would be missing. It would never become a true great power if it could not modernize its institutional structure in foreign and security policymaking.11 At the CNSC’s first meeting on 15 April 2014, Xi Jinping articulated his concept of “big security” and China’s new overall approach to national security. Although few details about organization and operation were revealed, he was quoted as arguing that “[we] should take an overall approach to national security, strengthen the confidence of the Chinese people in the path, theories and system of socialism with distinctive Chinese features, and ensure China’s durable peace and stability.”12 The “big security” concept covers an array of 11 security areas, ranging from political security, homeland security, military security, economic security, cultural security and social security to technology security, information security, ecological security, resources security and nuclear security. This definition is more inclusive and comprehensive than ever. Traditional national security is defined as the capability to maintain a country’s survival, territorial integrity and development interests through means of national power, especially through military might. In the post-­Cold War era, the concept of national security has expanded in terms of “security of what,” “security for whom,” and “how to achieve security.”13 Achieving security through military might, economic power and diplomacy is no longer attainable after the Cold War. Security challenges today encompass a broad range of threats and most of them come from non-­ military sources and non-­state actors. Among the 11 security areas identified by Xi Jinping, only military security is considered traditional security and the rest belong to non-­traditional security or the “soft security threat.” Non-­traditional security threats have risen to prominence for China in the last two decades. As Shen Dingli argues, China is, on the one hand, rising to the stature of a great power, but it is, on the other hand, ever more vulnerable than before, facing a far more complicated security environment. China’s economy, finance, science and technology, and resource dependence are greatly exposed to the world and hence have become increasingly vulnerable to external threats.14 China is no longer safe from the terrorist threat, both internal and external. The terrorist threat in the Chinese homeland has become more prominent in recent years. As a PLA scholar argues, the issue of whether to set up an NSC has been debated for over one decade and, in the end, it has not been traditional security threats, but rather non-­traditional security threats that have tipped the balance. If its situation merely calls for dealing with traditional security, China does not need to establish a new NSC and the existing system should suffice.15 Non-­traditional security threats, especially “soft security threats,” have greater significance in China’s national security thinking. “Soft security threats” refer to perils that pose threats to Chinese culture, cyberspace, ideology and regime security and have become more pronounced in recent years. The 11 security areas are however interconnected and cannot be dealt with separately. The most salient one for the Chinese leadership is probably political security and

CCP and restructuring national security   273 the threat to regime security from within. A report on China’s national security situation argues that despite continued growth of Chinese national power, “hard security threats” are not diminishing and there are more “soft security threats” to social and political stability in China.16 As Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell argue, despite China’s impressive growth in economic and military power, it remains a vulnerable nation surrounded by powerful rivals and potential foes. Domestic troubles in Tibet and Xinjiang are linked with forces beyond China’s borders. The CCP regime is especially vulnerable in soft power and ideology.17 Political security is a coded word for regime security and ideological security. Beijing always feels the pressure of the “color revolution” from inside and outside. As the recent “umbrella revolution” in Hong Kong indicates, despite the fact that Hong Kong returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, the territory’s capitalist system and high degree of autonomy have allowed room for external threats to penetrate into the Mainland as well as Hong Kong. The soft threat from Western values and ideologies could interfere in China’s domestic affairs and undermine social stability in the Mainland.18 The overall approach to national security with Chinese characteristics conflates domestic security challenges with foreign sources of threats. The “big security” concept gives the CNSC a comprehensive authority in deciding overall security related issues in China. With this big mandate, the CNSC is expected to design and build a more seamlessly integrated security system to address all China’s national security challenges.

Reconstructing China’s national security policymaking The present Chinese foreign and security policymaking suffers from inefficiency, and a lack both of coordination and information sharing, and of accountability amongst decision-­makers. These deficiencies are largely caused by the inherent contradiction in the Chinese political system. In a nutshell, the system is built on centralized authoritarianism on the one hand, and, on the other, it operates in the form of “division of labor” and allows some degree of pluralization. Nevertheless, how to strike a balance between centralization and pluralization is always a challenge for authoritarian regimes. Chinese national security policymaking is not quite a bureaucracy-­driven process. During the Mao era, all major foreign policy and national security decisions were “one-­man’s call” by the paramount leader. After the Cultural Revolution and entering the “reforms and opening up” era, Chinese foreign policymaking was no longer dominated by the paramount leader, but rather, a collective decision-­making process, professionalism and some degree of pluralism were brought into the system.19 The decision-­making began to show some features of what Harry Harding labels as the “consultative authoritarian” model that brings in information and opinions from key sectors of the population while the ultimate power of decision remains in the hands of the Party.20 But looking into the Chinese institutional structure and structural distribution of resources and authority, the “fragmented authoritarianism model” developed by Kenneth

274   Hu Weixing Lieberthal better describes the internal dynamics and the source of institutional deficiencies.21 The fragmented authoritarianism model looks into the structural allocation of authority and the behavior of officials related to policymaking process. Although the final decision authority is vested in the top leadership, the reform process has caused the authority below the top to become fragmented and disjointed. Further complications culminate in the emergence of several power centers at the top of the system coordinating and bargaining the decision-­making process and these power centers have their command channels and interest constituents within the system. This is what Zhao Quansheng labels “horizontal authoritarianism.”22 Decision-­making power on major foreign policy and national security issues today is still centralized at the top of the Party–state system, and the multi-­ member Politburo and its Standing Committee has the ultimate decision power over all major issues of internal and external affairs in the power structure. Decisions are made based on collective rather than individual will and wisdom, according to the so-­called democratic centralism principle (minzhu jizhongzhi yuanze 民主集中制原则). There is a division of labor among the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) members. They are each in charge of their respective specified work areas and represent those government organizations in their work areas when making collective decision. Although their work areas of responsibility are divided, they are supposed to collaborate and coordinate with each other. Strategically important issues must be thoroughly deliberated and decisions should be made on the basis of consensus. Yet consensus-­making at the top often suffers coordination and fragmentation problems in practice. Coordination requires communication, information sharing and consultation among different players, stakeholders and their representatives in the PBSC. According to Hu Angang, under the current PBSC system, there is communication and consultation between individual PBSC members, and this facilitates coordination between different government organizations, resulting in effective inter-­organization and intra-­organization information sharing.23 In regular meetings between the Politburo and the PBSC members, members express their views on specific issues on behalf of the organizations they oversee. When a collective decision is made, all members have to comply and act accordingly. In practice, however, the decision-­making authority at the top is delegated and divided into a number of so-­called central leading groups (CLG, zhongyang lingdao xiaozu 中央领导小组), and the “rule by central leading groups” (xiaozu zhiguo 小组治国) has become a unique feature of the present CCP’s decision-­ making protocol. The rule by CLGs causes the “horizontal authoritarianism” and fragmentation problem as well as the accountability problem within the system. The central leading groups are formed according to tasks and areas of function. They usually serve as the overall coordinator of certain sectors of government functions over their respective policy spheres. Some of them are standing ones defined by the nature of work areas (changshexing lingdao xiaozu 常设性 领导小组) and some are ad hoc ones for certain tasks (linshixing lingdao xiaozu

CCP and restructuring national security   275 临时性领导小组). Central leading groups are expected to perform a wide variety of tasks to lessen the workload of the PBSC. They are often trouble-­ shooter’s, problem-­solvers and arbitrators over issues of cross-­functional and bureaucratic lines. They are decision-­making bodies as their members sit in PBSC or are led by PBSC members. In terms of the command chain, they are directly subordinated and accountable to the Politburo and PBSC. The rule by CLGs distributes responsibilities and delegates authority among PBSC and Politburo members. From the CLG membership, it is evident that the power structure and distribution of authority lies within the current CCP collective leadership at the top. Since foreign and security affairs span several cross-­functional areas, the decision-­making authority has become fragmented, horizontally and vertically. That is why Xi Jinping wants to reform and rationalize this institutional architecture.25 Foreign policy and national security policy decision-­making requires a centralized decision authority, that is, an ultimate decision-­maker with indisputable power and authority to make the call and one which can arbitrate over different bureaucratic interests. The current Chinese system does not have such a paramount leader over foreign policy. The final decision-­making authority is in PBSC but power and work load is delegated to different CLGs. No single CLG has the overall authority on foreign policy and national security issues. As security issues are increasingly characterized as crossing work areas and crossing bureaucratic responsibility lines, power of decision is actually diffused into different CLGs. Among these groups, their decisions need to be made on a broadly based consensus among different players and stakeholders, not confined to the responsibility of one single CLG. Yet broadly based consensus building is time-­consuming and requires information sharing and thorough deliberation, which sometimes prompts turf wars. CLGs are created to increase coordination, information sharing and decision efficiency. But they do not have adequate institutional capacity to coordinate and share information. The jurisdiction over foreign policy and security affairs falls into different CLGs and none of them could function as the central decision-­making body, nor could they provide coordination on a daily basis to monitor and analyze ongoing foreign and national security issues; and this is not to say that they have the professional capacity to do policy research and planning for a longer-­term strategy. To make things worse, the present collective leadership at the top could lead to politics of oligarchy. Each and every PBSC member has one area of responsibility and he or she becomes the “supreme leader” on their turf by having vertical control of the sector in the system (as Zhou Yongkang did in the law and politics area). As a result, division of labor under the collective leadership means no one is accountable for collective decisions. As Zheng Yongnian observes, in the “collective presidency” designed by Deng Xiaoping it turns out that there is no president or there are several presidents in decision-­ making. PBSC members enjoy decision-­making power in their work areas, but if something goes wrong, nobody is held accountable for the decision made under the collective leadership system.26 24

276   Hu Weixing The centralized decision- and policymaking on foreign and national security affairs is exercised through CLGs at the top of the system, and among them the Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs (CLGFA, zhongyang waishi gongzuo lingdao xiaozu 中央外事工作领导小组) is the most important player that exercises general oversight and final power of decision over foreign affairs. The CLGFA was created in 1958, suspended during the Cultural Revolution, and resumed in 1981. It is usually headed by the Party general secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman, and he is assisted by a state councilor in charge of foreign affairs, who is also the director of the Central Office for Foreign Affairs (COFA, zhongyang waishi bangongshi 中央外事办公室). During the 1988 institutional restructuring, the State Council created a Foreign Affairs Office (guowuyuan waishi bangongshi 国务院外事办公室), but it was abolished in May 1998 and converted into the COFA, an office subordinate to the CCP Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs. The CLGFA is within the Party system but it has one office and two bands (yitao banzi liangkuai paizi 一 套班子 两块牌子). The COFA has the supra-­ministerial rank and plays a leading role in policy coordination and consultation within the whole Party–state system. Since 1998, the COFA has become more institutionalized, less dependent on “informal politics” and assisted by a small staff strength.27 The CLGFA is not a fully institutionalized agency with its current small staff strength. It does not have a regular meeting schedule or a fixed list of regular participants. Its meetings are called as needed and the participants are sometimes determined according to the issues at hand. As discussed earlier, policy coordination occurs among Politburo and PBSC members as they sit in the CLGFA meeting as “principals.” Although this “informal politics” mechanism is improved by the assistance of the COFA staff, the office is small in size and short of manpower and may lack expertise in coordinating decision and implementation at the working level of various bureaucracies. Hence, the policy coordination is limited only to some very critical issues that require leaders’ attention. More routine foreign affairs issues are left to the autonomy of the bureaucracy. National security and foreign affairs issues have become increasingly intertwined and prominent in recent years. Security affairs usually fall into the responsibility of the CMC and the Chinese military. But the changing nature of national security affairs, especially the emerging non-­traditional security issues, requires a centralized body like the CLGFA to manage cross-­boundary coordination and enable more prompt decision-­making, especially during a crisis. This explains why the idea of creating an NSC that follows the US model emerged and stirred new debate on the decision-­making mechanism after each crisis, such as the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995–1996, the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the EP-­3 incident in 2001. The CCP leadership established a Central Leading Group for National Security Affairs (CLGNSA, zhongyang guojia anquan lingdao xiaozu 中央国家安全领导小组) in September 2000. It comprises key government and Party agency players in national security affairs. Since then, the leading group has coexisted with the

CCP and restructuring national security   277 CLGFA and these literally became the same organization with two different titles (yige jigou liangkuai paizi 一个机构 两块牌子). Although it is the same organization, there may be a distribution of labor on national security and foreign policy between two different bureaus.28 However, as China has increasingly become involved in global affairs, more international affairs issues and crises have arisen that need to be managed and handled in a timely fashion, on the one hand. On the other hand, the Chinese political system and policymaking process has become more pluralistic. That has all increased the complexity and breadth of decision- and policymaking and calls for better coordination, crisis management capacity, and long-­term planning and research capability within the bureaucracy and policy agencies. A rising big power’s growing foreign and security portfolios require better functionality of the CLGFA and its staff. But the current CLGFA and COFA have become less and less competent to handle the rising demand for more integrated foreign and security decision- and policymaking at the top level. What is the option then – to continue enlarging the CLGFA/COFA or to build a brand new NSC with more comprehensive mandate and better institutional capacity? The answer for Xi Jinping is pretty obvious. The main reason why the NSC did not materialize until 2013 is the debate over what kind of NSC it should be and how it would fit into the current power structure. Of course, the debate impinges on a more fundamental issue of who should have the ultimate power on foreign and security policy and the role of the Politburo (PB) in the overall decision-­making process. By design and power structure, the CCP Politburo/PBSC is at the center of decision-­making over all Party and state affairs. When making important decisions, the PB and PBSC can consider policy recommendations from various state establishments and bureaucracies. When the PB/PBSC or CLGFA meets, it can invite members from the CMC, relevant bureaucracies and designated experts to the meeting. The Party general secretary can play a decisive role in the PB/PBSC and CLG meetings. Therefore the general secretary, with his statutory power as the president of the People’s Republic of China and CMC chairman enjoys ultimate decision power on foreign and security issues. He is able to shape policy debate, build consensus and make choices on all important issues related to foreign and security policy. The question arises – with the CNSC, would the system work better?

What role will the CNSC play in China’s national security policymaking? In theory, China’s foreign and national security decision- and policymaking is divided and exercised among the three statutory players – the State Council, the National People’s Congress and the Central Military Commission (dangzhengjun 党政军). But in reality, it would be misleading to view the CCP just as one of institutional players in the system, holding an equal status with other institutions such as the government, the military and the judiciary. In the end, it is the CCP – its Politburo and PBSC – that plays the central role in leading the policymaking

278   Hu Weixing processes. Hence, the CNSC will remain as a CCP commission, not a state establishment, at least for some years to come before it is converted to a state establishment. In his address at the CNSC first meeting, Xi Jinping required the commission to play the role of centralizing decision-­making, rationalizing planning and cross-­board coordination processes, leveraging the advantage of being small but efficient, and focusing on key links of China’s national security decision-­making (jizhong tongyi, kexue mouhua, tongfen jiehe, xietiao xingdong, jinggan gaoxiao, jujiao zhongdian, zhuagang daimu 集中统一、科学谋划、统分结合、协调行 动、精干高效、聚焦重点、抓纲带目). Xi is right about the problem of Chinese foreign and security policymaking which lies in the overall institutional architecture and requires a cross-­board overhaul, not just some patch-­up works to the system. Without overall institutional restructuring, it is difficult to expect China’s diplomatic institutional capacity to improve. The CNSC is still a “work in process” institution. There are still many unknowns and uncertainties about how it will function. As the outside world tries to make sense of the CNSC, there are two questions that need to be asked about its future role. One concerns its organizational status in the system and the other is about its mission and operational mode. Organizational Status. Little is known about the CNSC’s exact composition and internal structure so far. From the little information released, we know it is or will be an extremely high-­ranked organization within the CCP system, but not yet a state agency. On 24 January 2014, the CCP Political Bureau appointed Xi Jinping as the CNSC chairman, and Li Keqiang, premier of the State Council, and Zhang Dejiang, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, as its deputy heads. An organization headed by the top three leaders of the country says a lot about its weight in the system. The CNSC has two-­tier membership – state leaders such as vice premiers, state councilors and vice chairmen of the CMC whose work portfolios are related to foreign and national security affairs are standing members, while ministerial-­rank officials who have foreign and security work portfolios hold ordinary membership in the commission. By this institutional structure, one can deduce that the PB and its standing members constitute the inner circle of the commission. They can meet more frequently and decide quickly in response to any crisis situation. Another indicator for its organizational status is the rank of the CNSC General Office and who directs that office. It was reported that the current director of the CCP General Office (zhonggong zhongyang bangongting 中共中央 办公厅) Li Zhanshu (栗战书) is the CNSC General Office director. He is a member of the CCP Politburo and the general manager for Xi Jinping and the Party apparatus. The CNSC deputy General Office director is Xi Jinping’s long-­ time protégé Cai Qi (蔡奇). Cai has long served in Zhejiang and Fujian provinces and had at one time worked together with Xi, when the latter worked in these provinces. Cai Qi was deputy governor of Zhejiang province until he was transferred to Beijing recently to assist Xi Jinping and Li Zhanshu in setting up and managing the CNSC office.

CCP and restructuring national security   279 The CNSC’s organizational status can also be viewed from the perspective of the Chinese political system. Based on a Xinhua report about its formation in January 2014, it is neither a state agency (guojia jigou 国家机构) nor a bureaucracy (zhengfu bumen 政府部门) within the State Council. If it were a state agency or a state bureaucracy, it would be described as “founded or instituted” (sheli 设立), not simply “established” (jianli 建立) in the public announcement. It directly answers to the CCP Politburo and its Standing Committee. It is within the Party system responsible for decision-­making, deliberation and coordination over national security works, but it has not yet become a state agency like the CMC. What is its relationship with the current CLGFA/CLGNSA? Another related question is whether it has substantive decision-­making power or is just a nominal platform for coordinated policy discussion and policy planning. The answers to these questions are yet to be known. It depends on its future growth – whether it can become an expanded version of CLGFA/CLGNSA and eventually replace it with substantive decision-­making power. It is speculated that if it grows too powerful – not like an advisory body such as the US NSC, which it should become, but rather like another CMC – it would become the fifth national establishment or power center after the CCP Central Committee, the State Council, the National People’s Congress, and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). CNSC Mission and Operation. The commission is tasked with improving national security procedures and strategies, making overall plans and coordinating major issues and major work concerning national security, building the legal system regarding state security, conducting research, resolving major national security issues, setting principles and policies, as well as implementing these strategies. Xi argued during the Third Plenum that “establishing a national security commission to strengthen the unified leadership of state security work is an urgent need.”29 As such, the following are the speculations about the CNSC’s future mission and functions. First, the CNSC will organize and conduct research on major national security issues and formulate a national security strategy for the country. China does not have an official national security strategy. While Beijing has been more forthcoming in publishing China’s National Defense White Paper in recent years, the content covers just the military and defense strategy, which constitutes only a part of the national security strategy. China faces increasingly complicated national security challenges and needs an integrated national security strategy based on the notion of “big security” articulated by Xi Jinping. Thus, the CNSC’s first and foremost mission is to organize research capabilities within government agencies and think tanks across the nation to carry out strategic research, formulate long-­term national security strategy and conduct security strategy planning. Second, it will not simply be a national security consultation body (guojia anquan zixun jiguan 国家安全咨询机关), but rather, it is likely to become a national security decision-­making and command structure (guojia anquan

280   Hu Weixing lingdao jiguan 国家安全领导机关) in the Chinese political system. When fully developed, it will command and coordinate Chinese national security affairs.30 In order to lead, it needs to play the central coordinating role in decision-­making and in policy implementation over different state agencies and bureaucracies. The deficiency of the current system leads to chaos and lack of coordination in handling security problems. There are misuse and misallocation of resources, confusing policy boundaries, competition for resources, bureaucratic politics and organizational rivalry in the system. Many analysts believe that if the policy coordination were to be raised to the very top level through a unified platform like the CNSC, it would help to break the constraints of vertical and horizontal controls (tiaokuai fenge 条块分割).31 Third, the CNSC will strengthen China’s crisis management capability and enable swifter responses to emergency situations. Given the current institutional structure, there are various emergency management mechanisms at different levels. China has improved crisis management as evident in the Libyan evacuation operation. Yet an efficient and centralized national security crisis management agency is still missing. The CCP Politburo secretariat and the State Council General Emergency Office have played such a function but they lack the professional expertise and staff to carry out tasks with efficiency.32 Without a US-­style presidential system assisted by its NSC, the Chinese system needs to build up institutional capacity at the very top level to handle foreign and national security crises. Fourth, it is tasked with solving other major issues in national security in addition to strategic planning and formulating national security strategy. Xi Jinping highlighted at the first CNSC meeting that it shall “study and solve major issues in national security works” (yanjiu jiejue guojiaanquan gongzuo zhong de zhongda wenti 研究解决国家安全工作中的重大问题). These major issues could include some “bottleneck” institutional structural issues, introducing laws in the realms of military, politics, foreign policy, economics, culture, technology, information, environment and intelligence, among others. Institutional reforms articulated at the Third Plenum require the current leadership to sort out institutional structural issues concerning governance and national security management. It would be an important task for the CNSC to study and introduce laws for instituting more permanent national security agencies in the Chinese political system.

Conclusions The current Chinese foreign and national security policymaking under the CCP leadership seems to work in a well-­coordinated pattern among different agencies at the bureaucratic level and major decisions are made at the top leadership level. The reality is however much more complicated and the picture is much murkier. The policymaking process is actually not very efficient, the coordination and information sharing is not smooth, and accountability of decision-­makers is poor. These institutional deficiencies are caused by the diffusion of decision

CCP and restructuring national security   281 power within the CCP collective leadership, the “rule by central leading groups” and hybrid vertical controls. Thus the biggest challenge for Xi Jinping’s reform is how to break the constraints caused by hybrid vertical and horizontal controls and to form a central platform with substantive decision power. Xi Jinping’s aspirations in foreign policy and national security have prompted this round of institutional reforms. He is taking an issue-­driven and problem-­ solving approach to overhaul the system and modernize the Chinese foreign and security policymaking process. The establishment of the CNSC is expected to serve as a lever as well as a platform for reorganizing China’s national security command system and institutions. But it will be years before one can tell whether Xi Jinping is able to achieve his ambitious goals.

Notes   1 Xi Jinping, “Explanatory Notes for the ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform,’ ” The State Council Information Office, www.china.org.cn/ china/third_plenary_session/2014-01/16/content_31210122.htm (accessed 20 December 2014).   2 “Nat’l Security Matter of Prime Importance: President Xi,” Xinhua News, 15 April 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/15/c_133264574.htm (accessed 19 December 2014).   3 Elizabeth Economy, “China’s Imperial President: Xi Jinping Tightens His Grip,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2014):  80–91; Kathleen McLaughlin, “Chinese Power Play: Xi Jinping Creates a National Security Council,” Christian Science Monitor, no. 13 (November 2013), www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-­Pacific/2013/1113/Chinese-­powerplay-­Xi-Jinping-­creates-a-­national-security-­council (accessed 19 December 2014).   4 Some Chinese scholars term this approach as fen fa you wei (奋发有为). The term literally means “to strive for achievement.” In contrast to Deng Xiaoping’s tao guang yang hui, this term emphasizes a more proactive posture in foreign policy and taking the initiative to shape the external environment. For more discussion, see Shi Yinghong, “China’s New Leadership: Balancing Tensions in Foreign Policy,” China– US Focus, 19 March 2014, www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-­policy/chinas-­newleadership-­balancing-tensions-­in-foreign-­policy/ (accessed 18 June 2014).   5 Christopher K. Johnson et al., Decoding China’s Emerging “Great Power” Strategy in Asia (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014), http:// csis.org/files/publication/140603_Johnson_DecodingChinasEmerging_WEB.pdf (accessed 18 December 2014).   6 For more discussion, see John Wong and Lye Liang Fook, “Reviving the Ancient Silk Road: China’s New Diplomatic Initiative,” East Asian Policy 6, no. 3 (2014): 5–15.   7 “Zhongguo waijiao bixu juyou zhiji de tese yilun guanche luoshi zhongyang waishi gongzhuo huiyi jingshen” [Chinese diplomacy must have its own features – An analysis of how to implement the spirit of the Central Conference on Foreign Affairs Work], People’s Daily, 1 December 2014, http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2014/1201/ c1003-26121550.html (accessed 18 January 2015).   8 “Zai shijie daqiju zhong goujian Zhongguo tese daguo waijiao” [Constructing big power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in a changing world], 1 December 2014, http:// news.xinhuanet.com/2014-12/01/c_1113462477.htm (accessed 17 January 2015). Also see Shi Ting and David Tweed, “Xi Outlines ‘Big Country Diplomacy’ Chinese Foreign Policy,” Bloomberg, 1 December 2014, www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-01/xi-­ says-china-­will-keep-­pushing-to-­alter-asia-­security-landscape.html (accessed 11 January

282   Hu Weixing 2015); Jiang Tao, “Zhongguo kaiqi daguo waijiao xinchangtai” [China starts a new normal for big power diplomacy], China News Service, 16 December 2014, www.­ chinanews.com/gn/2014/12-16/6881205.shtml (accessed 18 January 2015).   9 Zhu Liqun, “Waijiao huanjing bianhua yu Zhongguo waijiao nengli jianshe” [Changes in diplomatic environment and China’s diplomatic capability building], Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies], no. 2 (2013): 102–114. 10 Chen Xiaochen, “Guoanwei: daguo ‘biaopei’ lifa xianxing” [NSC: a standard for big power; first step in legalization], Diyi caijing ribao [First Financial and Economic Daily], 18 November 2013, www.yicai.com/news/2013/11/3118757.html (accessed 12 January 2014). 11 Zhang Ji, “Bijiao shiye xia de guojia anquan weiyuanhui” [National security councils in comparative perspectives], Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], no. 3 (2014):  22–29; and Li Yincai, “Guojia anquan weiyuanhui de guoji bijiao: diwei zhineng yu yunzuo” [National security councils in international comparison: Status, functions, and operation], Dangdai shijie yu shehui zhuyi [Contemporary World and Socialism], no. 6 (2014): 25–30. 12 Xi’s speech at the first meeting of CNSC, 5 April 2014. 13 David A. Baldwin, “Security Studies and the End of the Cold War,” World Politics, no. 48 (1995): 117–141; Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Michael J. Mazarr and Suzanne C. Nielsen, Amer­ican National Security (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). 14 Shen Dingli, “Framing China’s National Security,” China–U.S. Focus, 23 April 2014, www.chinausfocus.com/peace-­security/framing-­chinas-national-­security/ (accessed 29 April 2014). 15 Gong Fangbin, “Guojia anquan weiyuanhui shelihou de anquan guanli” [Security management after the establishment of the NSC], Xuexi shibao [Study Times], 13 January 2014, p. 6. 16 Guojia anquan lanpishu: Zhongguo guojia anquan yanjiu baogao 2014 [National security blue book – A study report on China’s national security 2014], ed. Center for International Strategy and Security Studies, College of International Relations (Beijing: Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, May 2014). 17 Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), pp. 318–326. 18 Liu Jianfei, “An Evaluation of China’s Overall National Security Environment,” Beijing, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) analysis, 11 November 2014, www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-11/14/content_7369467.htm (accessed 8 January 2015). 19 A. Doak Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), p. 16. 20 Harry Harding, China’s Second Revolution: Reform after Mao (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 200. 21 Kenneth Lieberthal, “Introduction: The ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’ Model and Its Limitations,” in Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-­Mao China, ed. Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 6–8. 22 Zhao Quansheng, “Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy: From Vertical to Horizontal Authoritarianism,” The ANNALS of the Amer­ican Academy of Political and Social Science 519, no. 1 (1992): 158–175. 23 Hu Angang, “Collective Leadership, China’s Way,” Beijing Review, no. 37 (2013): 28–29. 24 David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy,” The China Journal 57 (2007):  25–58; and Alice Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 26 (2008), www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM26AM.pdf (accessed 3 February 2015).

CCP and restructuring national security   283 25 Chen Xiangyang, “Zhongguo sheli ‘guoanhui’ de sange xuyao” [Why China needs NSC? Three requirements], Zhongguo guofang bao [Daily of China National Defense], 19 November 2013, p. 1. While it is recognized that reforming the current system is imperative, more ad hoc CLGs are still being formed to deal with emerging matters such as the “One Belt, One Road” initiative and Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei integration (Jing–Jin–Ji yitihua 京津冀一体化). 26 Zheng Yongnian, “Xi Jinping de zhengzhi luxiantu” [Xi Jinping’s political roadmap], 16 October 2014, http://news.ifeng.com/exclusive/lecture/special/zhengyongnian01/ (accessed 18 December 2014). 27 The COFA has three departments: the secretariat and administration (mishu xingzhengsi 秘书行政司), foreign affairs administration (waishi guanlisi 外事管理 司) and policy research (zhengce yanjiusi 政策研究司). Liu Huaqiu (刘华秋) was the first office director when it was converted from the State Council Foreign Affairs Office (guowuyuan waiban 国务院外办) to the Central Foreign Affairs Office (zhongyang waiban 中央外办). Dai Bingguo (戴秉国) and Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪) later held the post, both having the rank of state councilor for this ministerial rank unit. Yet this office plays the central organizational role in managing Chinese foreign policy and coordinating the work of various foreign affairs-­related ministries, provinces and bureaucracies in China, and its status is well above the ministerial rank. 28 Sun Yun, “Chinese National Security Decision-­Making: Processes and Challenges,” CNAPS Working Paper, May 2013 (Washington, DC: the Brookings Institution, 2013), www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/05/chinese%20national% 20security%20decisionmaking%20sun/chinese%20national%20security%20decisionmaking%20sun%20paper.pdf (accessed 18 January 2015). 29 Xi Jinping, “Explanatory Notes for the ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform.’ ” 30 Li Wenliang, “How Should We Define the Status of the Chinese National Security Commission?” [如何定位中国国家安全委员会], Study Times [学习时报], January 27, 2014, p. 7. 31 You Zhibin, “Make Good Use of the CNCS’s Role as a Strategic Platform,” [发挥好 国家安全委员会的战略平台功能], Study Times [学习时报], January 27, 2014, p. 6. 32 You Zhibin (游志斌), “Emergency Management after the Establishment of the CNC,” [国家安全委员会设立后的应急管理], Study Times [学习时报], December 16, 2013, p. 6.

Index

“1,000-Person Programme” 63 accountability 66, 67, 68–69, 154, 195, 268, 273, 274, 280 adaptation 3, 6, 31, 51, 139 aggregation 7 anti-corruption 7–8, 30, 40, 42, 44, 66, 70, 89, 100, 137–139, 141–143, 146–150, 154–156, 163, 173–174, 234, 256–257 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 271 authoritarian resilience 51, 129, 131, 139, 154 authoritarianism 3, 23, 27, 34, 41, 96, 132, 169, 273–274 bangonghui 86–87, 93 banzi 84–86, 90, 92 bargaining 16–17, 175, 274 big business 220–224, 227, 229, 231 Bo Xilai 70, 109–111, 134, 143, 155, 162, 168 BRICS Development Bank 271 business group 220, 225–227, 229–231 cadre management 8, 55, 58, 73, 94, 167, 233 Cadre Responsibility System 82, 92, 93 catch-up 220–224, 226 CCP-PLA relations 161–163, 165, 166, 169, 171, 172, 173–174, 176, 177 Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) 53, 148–149, 247 Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) 52, 130, 150, 152, 153 Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group 243, 245–246; see also Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs

Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs 276 Central General Office 53, 54 Central Leading Group for National Security Affairs 276 central leading groups 274–276, 281; ruled by 281 Central Military Commission (CMC) 67, 72, 125, 133, 143, 145, 151, 161–162, 165, 166, 167–169, 171–177, 182, 183, 243, 245–248, 276, 277, 278–279 Central Office for Foreign Affairs 276 Central Organization Department (COD) 8, 39, 43, 52–77, 105, 204, 205, 209, 232–234, 260 Central Party School 60, 70, 89, 105, 125, 233 central state corporatism 8, 220, 225, 227, 232, 236, 237 centrally controlled businesses 220 clique 21, 67, 121, 146 coercion 16–17, 85, 165 Cold War 51, 244, 272 Comintern 61, 73, 74, 124, 133 commanding heights 220, 229 Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) 253 community building 199–200, 203–205, 207, 209–211, 216–217, 256 community management 205, 212, 215–217 corporate restructuring 227 corruption 6, 30, 40, 42, 44, 66–67, 69, 76, 85, 100, 104, 129, 130, 131, 133–134, 137–143, 146–150, 152, 154–156, 163, 172–174, 177, 193–194, 234, 236–237; see also anti-corruption Corruption Perceptions Index 137–138 county party committee 86, 152, 153

Index   285 Courts Law 187 Cultural Revolution 58, 62, 72, 100, 125–127, 161–163, 170–171, 176, 273, 276 culture of civility 122 Dai Bingguo 247–249 dangzu 39, 82, 88–90, 185 danwei 35, 39, 58, 200–202, 204, 207, 210–211, 214 decoupling reform 230, 232 democracy 3, 7, 13, 18, 23–25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 41, 58, 68, 71, 76, 195, 252–254 Deng Xiaoping 4, 19, 25, 26, 28, 54, 57, 58, 62, 71, 72, 128, 131, 132, 133, 134, 161, 162, 164, 248, 255, 275 disciplinary inspection 137, 141, 143, 147, 150, 152, 155 economic governance 220, 223, 225 education 2, 20, 35–36, 53–55, 57–58, 60, 62, 64, 70, 72, 73, 76, 88, 101–109, 111–113, 143, 181, 191, 200–201, 232, 233, 248 embeddedness 7, 18–19 emperorship 7, 13–14, 19–22, 25, 31, 227 enterprise reform 224, 227, 236 faction 21, 28, 67, 121–134, 155, 166–167, 173, 175 first hand, the 81; see also yibashou “flies” 143, 147 foreign policy decision-making structure 244–247 formal rules 81, 90, 91–95 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 258 fragmented authoritarianism 3, 132, 169, 273–274 Fu Ying 247 future of the CCP 41 Geng Biao 247–248 governance 2, 5, 8, 19, 24, 76, 82–83, 85–87, 90–96, 112, 137, 139, 145, 154, 164, 169, 172, 175, 185, 192–193, 194, 119–207, 212–216, 220, 223–227, 232, 236–237, 255, 257–258, 280 grand coordination 205, 212–215 grassroots governance 199–207, 212–216 grid management 205, 212–215 hegemonization 14–16 heritage 51, 56, 100–101, 103, 111, 113

human resources 1, 2, 7, 8, 51–52, 56, 57, 59, 60–64, 66, 69 inclusiveness 13, 19, 20, 23 industrial ministries 222, 225–226, 229–232 industrial policy 221, 223, 224–226 informal rules 26, 81, 83, 86, 90, 93–95 informal small group 122, 126, 130 institutionalization 8, 27–29, 31, 51, 82, 83, 95, 129–131, 134, 137, 139, 167 intellectuals 23, 42, 57, 61–62, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 109 International Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP) 254 International Department (ID) 9, 243–255, 257–259, 262–263 intra-party democracy 23, 27, 29, 30–31, 65, 68, 127, 139 Ji Pengfei 247–248 Judges Law 187 judicial independence 190–194 judiciary 8, 40, 139, 141–142, 146, 150, 156, 167, 181–182, 187–188, 190–195, 277 Kang Sheng 247–248 Kim Jong-un 175, 260–262 late development 220–221, 236 leadership talent 52, 55, 69, 220, 227, 232–233, 236 legislative bill 183, 185–186 legislature 181–183, 185–186, 188, 192–194, 223, 224 legitimacy 3, 4, 5, 14, 19, 20, 21, 41, 44, 51, 66, 68, 69, 99, 122, 124, 131, 134, 139, 147, 155, 182, 192–194, 237 legitimation 14–15, 16, 68 Li Shuzheng 247–249 Liu Ningyi 247–248 local party committee 8, 42, 52, 61, 65, 86–87, 90–91, 150 magic 111–112; see also magical power magical power 101, 112–113 Mao Zedong 25, 54, 99, 100, 123, 124, 126, 132, 134, 161, 268 meritocracy 13, 17, 18, 23, 25, 66, 68, 69 M-form 226 military transformation 161 modern enterprise system 230 monarchy 23

286   Index multinational corporation 221, 226 National People’s Congress (NPC) 15, 27, 140, 145, 182–186, 194, 245–247, 262, 277–279 National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) 182–183, 185–186 national security affairs 162, 268–269, 276, 278, 280 National Security Commission 9, 147, 268–269, 271–272, 276–277, 279, 280 national team 226, 230–231 network analysis 128 Nguyen Phu Trong 259–260 nomenclature 59, 174 nomenklatura 17, 39, 43, 56, 140, 152, 181, 232–233 Oil Rig 981 259 openness 4, 13, 16, 17, 19–23, 29–31, 43, 187 organizational entrepreneurship 220, 227, 236 Paracel Islands 259 party building 44, 52, 53, 54, 55, 61, 68, 70, 71, 82, 85, 88, 96, 194, 199, 204, 205, 207–211, 215–217 Party–business relations 225, 236 party chief 8, 55, 67, 68, 81, 83–87, 89–95, 259 party committee 1, 8, 39, 53–55, 61, 65, 66, 68, 73, 81, 84, 85, 86–89, 91, 93, 94, 145, 148, 152, 153, 169, 185, 186, 189, 204, 207, 208, 215, 225, 232, 233, 249–251 party constitution 72, 82, 104 party group 1, 8, 39, 40, 81, 82, 84–92, 95, 189, 204, 207, 254; see also dangzu; party leading group party leading group 185, 186 party political-legal committee 187, 191 party secretary 28, 59, 66, 68, 71, 86, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 95, 106, 109, 110, 128, 130, 144, 145, 146, 147, 165, 226, 233, 234, 235, 248, 255, 259 party-to-party ties/relations 252, 255, 257, 259–263 pengtouhui 86–87, 93–94 People’s Action Party (PAP) 255–256 PLA reforms 161, 162, 166, 168, 177 pluralism 13, 16, 21, 22–23, 27, 141, 150, 273 policymaking 2, 9, 18, 60, 77, 87, 91, 162,

165, 176, 243–244, 268–270, 272–274, 276–278, 280–281 Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) 53, 91, 92, 129, 133, 143, 146, 168, 175, 176, 243, 245, 246, 247, 253, 254, 260, 274 political economy 225, 236 political elites 24–25, 27, 29 politics 2, 6–8, 14, 17–28, 30, 34, 44, 54, 66, 69, 90, 101, 109–110, 112, 121–124, 126–130, 132, 134, 137, 143, 161–164, 176–177, 193–194, 208, 214, 268, 275–276, 280 provincial party committee 55, 86, 145, 152, 153 Qian Liren 247–248 Qiao Shi 26, 54, 247–248 ranking-stratified system 33, 42 reciprocity 16–18 red tourism 101–103, 106–110, 112–113 redistribution 18, 140 religion 18–19, 99, 101–102, 104, 112–113 rent-seeking 139–140, 154, 193 repression 2, 6, 42 resident committee 200–204 SCO Development Bank 271 Silk Road Fund 271 small leading group 86 social governance 203, 205, 215 standing committee 26–29, 37–38, 53, 54, 66, 84, 86, 87, 91–94, 129, 133, 134, 143, 145, 146, 147, 168, 182, 183, 186, 187, 243, 245, 246, 247, 248, 253, 254, 260, 274, 278, 279 state enterprise 35, 210, 224–226, 232–233 state-big business relations 220, 222, 223 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 39, 64, 144, 148, 225, 226, 231, 233, 234, 236 stratum 20, 22, 23, 36 succession 8, 20, 23, 25–29, 51, 82, 126, 129, 130, 233, 234 Supreme People’s Court (SPC) 182–183, 186–189, 194 sustainability 5, 14, 17, 51 symbol 2, 20, 27, 155 tao guang yang hui 270 “Three Represents” 23, 42, 43, 63, 71 “tigers” 143, 146–147, 154, 156

Index   287 totalistic 124 transformation 1–3, 7–8, 14–16, 18–19, 21–23, 30, 35, 60, 161, 164, 169–170, 176, 199, 227, 244 transition economies 220, 224

Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) 260, 263 working committee 86–87

U-form 226 United Nations Millennium Development Goals 254 utilitarian 24, 127

Xi Jinping 1, 6, 8, 9, 26, 29, 30, 36, 40, 51, 58, 59, 65, 67, 68, 70, 82, 91, 95, 100, 102, 104, 109, 110, 111, 113, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 137, 139, 143, 147, 154, 161, 171, 173, 175, 181, 189, 192, 203, 245, 259, 260, 261, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 275, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281

village election 68, 256 vulnerability 6, 42

yangqi 220, 226–227, 231–234, 236–237 yibashou 81, 83, 92

Wang Jiarui 247–249, 253–254, 257, 259 Wang Jiaxiang 123, 247–248 Wang Yi 235, 247, 259, 262

Zhou Yongkang 26–27, 130, 143, 145, 147, 154–155, 260, 275 Zhu Liang 247–249