The Changing Soul of Europe: Religions and Migrations in Northern and Southern Europe (AHRC/ESRC Religion and Society Series) [1 ed.] 9781472434692, 9781472434708, 9781472434715, 1472434692

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The Changing Soul of Europe

Ashgate AHRC/ESRC Religion and Society Series Series Editors: Linda Woodhead, University of Lancaster, UK Rebecca Catto, University of Coventry, UK This book series emanates from the largest research programme on religion in Europe today – the AHRC/ESRC Religion and Society Programme which has invested in over seventy-five research projects. Thirty-two separate disciplines are represented looking at religion across the world, many with a contemporary and some with an historical focus. This international, multi-disciplinary and interdisciplinary book series will include monographs, paperback textbooks and edited research collections drawn from this leading research programme. Other titles in the series: Religions as Brands Edited by Jean-Claude Usunier and Jörg Stolz Everyday Lived Islam in Europe Edited by Nathal M. Dessing, Nadia Jeldtoft, Jørgen S. Nielsen and Linda Woodhead Media Portrayals of Religion and the Secular Sacred Representation and Change Kim Knott, Elizabeth Poole and Teemu Taira Understanding Muslim Chaplaincy Sophie Gilliat-Ray, Mansur Ali and Stephen Pattison Varieties of Religious Establishment Edited by Winnifred Fallers Sullivan and Lori G. Beaman Ageing, Ritual and Social Change Comparing the Secular and Religious in Eastern and Western Europe Edited by Peter Coleman, Daniela Koleva and Joanna Bornat

The Changing Soul of Europe Religions and Migrations in Northern and Southern Europe

Edited by

Helena Vilaça

University of Porto, Portugal

Enzo Pace

University of Padova, Italy

Inger Furseth

University of Oslo, Norway

Per Pettersson Karlstad University and Uppsala University, Sweden

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The Changing Soul of Europe This book paves the way for a more enlarged discussion on religion and migration phenomena in countries of Northern and Southern Europe. From a comparative perspective, these are regions with very different religious traditions and different historical State–Church relations. Although official religion persisted longer in Nordic Protestant countries than in South Mediterranean countries, levels of secularization are higher. In the last decades, both Northern and Southern Europe have received strong flows of newcomers. From this perspective, the book presents through various theoretical lenses and empirical researches the impact mobility and consequent religious transnationalism have on multiple aspects of culture and social life in societies where the religious landscapes are increasingly diverse. The chapters demonstrate that we are dealing with complex scenarios: different contexts of reception, different countries of origin, various ethnicities and religious traditions (Catholics, Orthodox and Evangelical Christians, Muslims, Buddhists). Having become plural spaces, our societies tend to be far more concerned with the issue of social integration rather than with that of social identities reconstruction in society as a whole, often ignoring that today religion manifests itself as a plurality of religions. In short, what are the implications of newcomers for the religious life of Europe and for the redesign of its soul? The relevance of The Changing Soul of Europe extends far beyond its stated geographic limits. Vilaça et al. have drawn together a superb collection of essays that together map and explain shifts in the “soul of Europe” and which is sure to illuminate similar shifts in other religious landscapes, including Canada, the United States and Australia. Rich in theoretical and empirical insights, this volume is an essential contribution to scholarship on migration, religion and diversity and “religion in motion”. The radically new terrain on which we find ourselves in relation to religion requires the creative thinking and genuinely innovative approaches offered in this volume. Lori G. Beaman, University of Ottawa, Canada

First published 2014 by Ashgate Publishing Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 2014 Helena Vilaça, Enzo Pace, Inger Furseth and Per Pettersson. helena Vilaça, enzo pace, inger furseth and per pettersson have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and patents act, 1988, to be identified as the editors of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows:

The changing soul of Europe : religions and migrations in northern and southern Europe / edited by Helena Vilaça, Enzo Pace, Inger Furseth, Per Pettersson. pages cm. -- (Ashgate AHRC/ESRC religion and society series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4724-3469-2 (hardcover : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-1-4724-3470-8 (ebook) - ISBN 978-1-4724-3471-5 (epub) 1. Europe--Religion--21st century. 2. Emigration and immigration--Religious aspects. I. Vilaça, Helena, 1961- editor of compilation. BL695.C425 2014 200.94--dc23 2014000535

iSBn 978-1-472-43469-2 (hbk)

Printed in the United Kingdom by Henry Ling Limited, at the Dorset Press, Dorchester, DT1 1HD

Contents

List of Figures and Tables   Notes on Contributors  

ix xi

Introduction  

1

PART I: Theoretical Remarks 1

Religion in Motion: Migration, Religion and Social Theory   Enzo Pace

2

New Economy, Migration and Social Change: The Impact on Religion   José Madureira Pinto

25

Immigrant Religions and the Context of Reception in Advanced Industrial Societies   Tuomas Martikainen

47

3

9

PART II: Religion and Migration in Europe: Case Studies 4 Migration and Ethno-Religious Identity in Contemporary Greece: The Role of the Orthodox Church   Elisabeth A. Diamantopoulou

69

5 How the Portuguese Catholic Church is dealing with Newcomers: The Particular Case of Eastern European Immigrants   Helena Vilaça

89

6

Beyond Parishes: Challenges of Catholic-Christian Second Generations   Roberta Ricucci

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viii

7 Ethnic and Religious Diversities in Portugal: The Case of Brazilian Evangelical Immigrants   Donizete Rodrigues 8 9 10

Accommodation and Tension: African Christian Communities and their Swedish Hosts   Anne Kubai

149

Young Muslim Women’s Public Self-Representations: A New Generation of Italians Seeking Legitimacy   Annalisa Frisina

173

Values and Religion in Transition: A Case Study of a Swedish Multicultural Public School   Per Pettersson

193

11 Hijab Street Fashion and Style in Oslo   Inger Furseth 12

133

Religiousity and Ethnicity: Vietnamese Immigrant Religion in Denmark   Jørn Borup

Conclusion   Index  

209

231

251 257

List of Figures and Tables

List of Figures 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4

Bologna   La Scuderia   La Preghiera   La Zonarelli  

182 183 184 185

List of Tables 6.1 6.2

Relation with religion of those just arrived in Italy by ethnic group   Relation with religion by ethnic group: answers collected during the interviews  

124 124

12.1 Religious engagement in relation to religion (in percentage)    240 12.2 Religious engagement in relation to basic socialization (in percentage)   243 12.3 Basic socialization and ethnic orientation in relation to religion (in percentage)   243

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Notes on Contributors

Jørn Borup is an associate professor within the study of religion at Institute of Culture and Society at Aarhus University, Denmark. His main areas of interest are Asian religion, religious diversity, diaspora religion and transnational religion/spirituality. He has done research on contemporary Zen Buddhism in Japan, Buddhism in Hawaii and Vietnamese diaspora religion in Denmark. His publications include Japanese Rinzai Zen Buddhism: Myoshinji, a Living Religion (Brill, 2008), Religion, Migration and Integration (Museum Tusculanum, 2011). He is presently researching comparative spirituality and “circular transformations” of religion in East and West. Elisabeth A. Diamantopoulou is a sociologist of religion and jurist. She holds a Marie Curie Postdoc Research Fellowship at the Chair for Law and Religions, at the Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL), Belgium. She received her PhD (December 2010) in Religious Studies/Sociology of Religion from the École Pratique des Hautes Études, Sorbonne, Paris. Her PhD dissertation compared the representations of body and sexuality in the Greek Orthodox tradition and in Roman Catholicism. She has presented papers at various international conferences in Europe, the United States and Israel. She is a member of the International Society for the Sociology of Religion (ISSR), the Association for the Sociology of Religion (ASR), the Law and Religion Scholars Network (LARSN – Cardiff University), the French Association for Contemporary Religious History (AFHRC) and the GSRL-EPHE/CNRS research laboratory in Paris. Annalisa Frisina is Researcher in Sociology and Lecturer in Qualitative Social Research Methods at the University of Padova. Currently she works on religious diversity and religious pluralism from a generational perspective and on visual research methods. Her last publications include: “The Making of Religious Pluralism in Italy: Discussing Religious Education from a New Generational Perspective”, Social Compass, 58(2), pp. 271–284 (2011);“Multiculturalism”, in M. Juergensmeyer and W.C. Roof (eds) Encyclopedia of Global Religion, vol. 2, London: Sage, 2012, pp. 836–840; “Ricerca visuale e trasformazioni

Notes on Contributors

xiii

socio-culturali” (Visual Research and Socio-cultural Change) (UTET Università, Torino, 2013 Inger Furseth is Professor/Research Associate at KIFO Centre for Church Research in Oslo and at the Center for Religion and Civic Culture at the University of Southern California. She is the director of the NOREL Research Program (The Role of Religion in the Public Sphere: A Comparative Study of the Five Nordic Countries), and some of her publications include A Comparative Study of Social and Religious Movements in Norway, 1780s–1905 (2001), From Quest for Truth to Being Oneself (2006) and An Introduction to the Sociology of Religion (2006, with Pål Repstad). Her research centres on public religion, religious diversity, gender issues, social and religious movements, and social theory. Anne Kubai is an associate professor of World Christianity and Interreligious Studies. She is a researcher in genocide studies at the Hugo Valentin-centrum and a researcher in religion and international migration at the Faculty of Theology, Uppsala University. She has published articles and books on interreligious dialogue, religion and community relations, religion and international migration, gender-based violence, role of religion in reconciliation and social reconstruction of post-conflict societies. Currently she is working on the role of religion in migration and trafficking of women from Africa to Europe, and identity and belonging among African Christian communities in Sweden. Tuomas Martikainen is a researcher in the Post-Secular Culture and a Changing Religious Landscape in Finland Project at Åbo Akademi University Centre of Excellence in Research in Turku, Finland. His areas of interest include religion, migration and consumer society. Martikainen is currently studying how recent changes in welfare state structures and policies change state–religion/minority relations. His publications include Immigrant Religions in Local Society (Åbo Akademi University Press, 2004) and Religion, Migration, Settlement: Reflections on Post-1990 Immigration to Finland (Brill, 2013). Enzo Pace is Professor of Sociology of Religion at the University of Padova, Visiting Professor at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales and PastPresident of the International Society for the Sociology of Religion. Recent publications: Al Islam fi Uruba (Islam in Europe) (Abu Dhabi: Kadima, 2010); Religião em movimento (edited with H. Vilaça, Porto: Estratégias Criativas, 2010);

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Religion as Communication (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011); Il carisma, la fede, la chiesa. Introduzione alla sociologia del cristianesimo (Roma: Carocci, 2012); Le religioni nell’Italia che cambia (editor, Roma: Carocci, 2013). Per Pettersson is Professor of Sociology of Religion at Service Research Center – CTF, at Karlstad University (Sweden). He is also Guest Professor at Uppsala Religion and Society Research Centre – CRS, at Uppsala University (Sweden), and director of CRS’s 10-year long research programme, “The Impact of Religion Challenges for Society, Law and Democracy, 2008–2018”. He is mainly involved in international comparative research. Recent publications include: State and Religion in Sweden: Ambiguity between Disestablishment and Religious Control (2011); “Majority Churches as Agents of European Welfare: A Sociological Approach”, in A. Bäckström, G. Davie and N. Edgardh (eds), Welfare and Religion in 21st Century Europe, 2011). José Madureira Pinto. PhD, Sociology (1981). Full Professor (Retired) at the Social Sciences Department of the Faculty of Economics in the University of Porto (Portugal) and Researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Faculty of Arts in the same university. President of Portuguese Sociological Association between 1990 and 1994. Director of Cadernos de Ciências Sociais. Main research domains: sociology of education and cultural practices, sociology of classes and social re-composition, analysis of the social foundations of economy, methodology and didactics of the social sciences. He has published and edited several books and dozens of articles and book chapters on the precedent issues, some of them based on the results of prolonged field research. Roberta Ricucci is Assistant Professor at the University of Turin where she teaches Sociology of Inter-ethnic relations and Sociology of Islam. She is also Senior Researcher at FIERI (www.fieri.it) and a member of the international networks IMISCOE and ISSR. She has been visiting researcher at the universities of Princeton (United States), Monash and Western Australia (Australia). She has carried out an intense programme of studies and researches organized at both national and international levels investigating, especially among Muslims, their identity-building process and religiousness. Her main findings have been already published in books and international journals (for example, the Contemporary Journal of Religion and Intercultural Education).

Notes on Contributors

xv

Donizete Rodrigues, PhD in Social Anthropology (Coimbra University), is Associate Professor of Anthropology (with Aggregation in Sociology) at the University of Beira Interior and Center for Research in Anthropology (Lisbon, Portugal). Since 2011, he is Associate Researcher at the Center for the Study of Latin American Pentecostalism – State University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil/ University of Southern California, United States. He has been a visiting fellow in several universities: Columbia (United States), Salamanca (Spain), Bristol and All Souls College/Oxford University (England), and many universities in France, Sweden, India, Romania, Canada, Italy, Latvia and Brazil. He published four entries in the Encyclopedia of New Religious Movements (Routledge), and articles, chapters and many books in anthropology and sociology of religion. Helena Vilaça is Assistant Professor at the University of Porto. She is member of the Council of SISR/ISSR. Her scientific work has been significantly dominated by religion (for example, religion and politics, ethnic and religious pluralism, new patterns of religiosity). These research lines have driven many national and international projects and networks. She has published several works on her main research areas, such as the books Da Torre de Babel às terras prometidas (From the Babel Tower to the Promised Lands: Religious Pluralism in Portugal) (2006) and Religião em Movimento (Religion in Motion: Migrants and Religious Diversity in Portugal and Italy) (2012, edited with Enzo Pace).

Introduction

In September 2010 an international conference was held in Porto on Local Diversity and Global Challenges: Religions and Migrations in Southern Europe. The goal of the conference was to gather scholars from Southern Europe, especially from Portugal and Italy in order to discuss the growing diversity which paved the way for Southern European countries to gradually turn into global societies. Traditionally Roman Catholic, Southern Europe is today watching the proliferation of other religious groups, among them, Islamic, Eastern Christian, and neo-Pentecostal groups from Africa, Asia (China, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Vietnam) and Latin America (Brazil, Colombia, Peru). Within the framework of this conference the book Religion in Motion: Migrants and Religious Diversity in Portugal and Italy was issued (Vilaça and Pace, 2010). That experience is at the root of this volume. In spite of the existence of a huge number of books concerning the religious changes occurring in Europe by the flow of people coming from all over the world, transplanting their culture and religion in the European societies, there are very few efforts to compare the impact of migration from a socio-religious point of view between Northern and Southern Europe. From a comparative perspective, these are regions with very different religious traditions and different historical state/religion relations. Although state religion persisted longer in Nordic Protestant countries than in South Mediterranean countries, levels of secularization are higher. On the contrary, in South Mediterranean countries, like the Catholic Italy and the Catholic Portugal or even in the Orthodox Greece, religion has resisted secularization more. The particular nature of European forms of religion derives from a history of state–church relationships, out of which Grace Davie (2000) developed the notion of “Vicarious religion”, a state church or a historical major church as a public utility available to the population as a whole and based on a territorial and local community criteria (Berger et al., 2008). This applies not only to the state churches or majority churches but also, in a different way, to the long-term established and institutionalized Christian minorities in a country, which became routinized and not competing. This is the case, for example,

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The Changing Soul of Europe

of the Protestant and classical Evangelicals in Mediterranean countries and Roman Catholics in Nordic societies. Christianity had a decisive presence in the structuring of time and space in Europe and church buildings and respective bells have been one of the main traits of the physical landscapes. In spite of the debates held in many countries, the Christian liturgical calendar is still related to holy days and festivities. In short, for centuries, the soul of Europe has been dominated by Christianity. That soul is changing. Since the second half of the twentieth century, Western societies have become culturally, religiously and ethnically more diverse. This is a by-product of the massive waves of migration observed after the Second World War. The first wave of immigration occurred mainly in Central Europe (Belgium, France and Germany), in Britain and to some extent in Northern Europe. The second wave of immigration, historically coincident with the fall of the Eastern bloc, also affected both the Nordic countries and the countries of Mediterranean Europe (Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal). Southern Europe in particular consisted of, until very recently, societies of emigration rather than immigration. And despite the Southern European countries undergoing a dramatic economic and financial crisis, with substantial consequences in the resurgence of emigration, increased diversity will remain as a result of the effects of globalization. In fact, religion still has a territorial basis but its contours indicate, however, a de-territorialization. This book shows how religious identities today have to be placed in the recurrent discussion of the local versus the global, which means constructing and imagining religion as a separate category of communication that manifests itself as a plurality of religions (Beyer, 1998; Pace, 2011). The globalization of society, although structurally favouring the privatization of religion, also contributes to its de-privatization and a renewed influence (Casanova, 1994, 2009; Beyer, 1990) in society. In this new global trend, immigrants – most of the time synonymous with religious minorities – intend to bring their religious identity to the centre of society or even exceed its boundaries (Eisenstadt, 2000). They seek recognition in the public sphere and therefore refuse the connotation with symbols of collective identity related to the traditional correspondence between the nation state and a dominant religious culture. It may be considered a kind of defensive attitude in relation to what Habermas (1991) calls “colonization of the life world”. Contributors to this book are social scientists of religion who examine migration, religious diversity and diaspora-related issues in different countries and social contexts, thus the book takes the form of a comparative account. It also sheds light on research methods and theoretical challenges arising from

Introduction

3

religion and migration studies, with a peculiarity: the chapters in the book deal with both theoretical issues and the outcomes of empirical researches. Usually the research literature either analyses the presence of Muslims or Christian migrants. Here both groups are included as well as Buddhists. The volume consists of two sections. The first one (chapters 1–3) aims at examining the general topic of religion and migration to highlight the state of art of current theories and methodologies; the second part (chapters 4–12) is based on empirical studies carried out in different Northern and Southern European contexts, according to qualitative and quantitative strategies. In the first chapter, Enzo Pace reflects on religion and migration from the point of view of social theory approach, focusing on the concept of social change. He examines the unexpected effects of migration (religion in motion) on society structures and of social change in contemporary society through the bifocal lenses of religion and migration. As Pace states, via religion people experiment the multiple modernities (Eisenstadt), the various levels to combine economic development, entrepreneurial culture, and the adaptation of various forms of capitalism with a set of religious symbols which not only seem to resist social change, but also to support the process of transformation. Considering Enzo Pace’s text as the starting point, Madureira Pinto discusses, in Chapter 2, the new migration patterns induced both by economic globalization and the radical changes that have reshaped the international political map. Special attention is given to the determinants and modalities of the whole cycle of emigration/ immigration, in which economy and employment systems play a crucial role. The author also takes into account the complex of symbolic affinities, convergences and antagonisms in which religion and belief systems may play a relevant role. Tuomas Martikainen, still within an essentially theoretical reflection, focuses on the role of the welfare state in the settlement process of immigrant religions. The context of reception is seen as a key element of immigrant integration which affects the different ways in which immigrant religions find their place in society. The author gives particular attention to the changes in the North European welfare states since the 1980s due to globalization and neoliberalization, illustrating the joint impact of both classical welfare state policies and the more novel modified practices based on new public management on immigrant religions’ settlement. The second part of the book starts with two chapters about the role of the major churches of Southern Europe in the management of migration processes, on the one hand, and of the complex relationship they have with the state in times of socio-cultural challenges and economic crisis, on the other. Chapter 4, by

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Elisabeth Diamantopoulou, deals with the role of the Greek Orthodox Church in the management of migration in contemporary Greece, in the light of the recent political developments, societal transformation processes, and their link to the current economic crisis, something that cannot be dissociated from the specificity of Church–State relations in Greece. Chapter 5, by Helena Vilaça, focuses on how the Roman Catholic Church has risen up to the challenge of managing migration in specific religious contexts and in the political arena, in particular, and, in Portuguese society, in general. No longer crucial for social cohesion, this mainstream church has developed the ability to (re)create different mechanisms in order to accommodate Eastern migrants at both group and individual levels. Roberta Ricucci presents a study of the religious affiliation of the second generation of Catholics from Peru, Philippines and Romania in Italy and examines their identity. Ricucci’s chapter provides a picture of religious transformation and reproduction in the young generations living in Italy and coming from Catholic countries where the secularization process is less developed than in Western societies. The chapters of Donizete Rodrigues and Anne Kubai are both mainly about evangelical communities of immigrants. Rodrigues provides a general overview of the ethnic and religious minorities in Portugal, focusing on the Brazilian immigrants and particularly on the neo-Pentecostal Universal Church of the Kingdom of God and its proselytizing work not only among Brazilians but also other ethnic minorities, like Roma and the general Portuguese population. Kubai, in her chapter, addresses the challenges of the “European immigration paradox” and studies the importance of religion in the life of second and third generations of Africans born in Europe, exploring how the African Christian communities in Sweden use religion to find a social-political space. Three chapters about Muslim minorities – one in Southern Europe and two in Northern Europe – are then introduced. Annalisa Frisina writes about her research on first generation Italian-born Muslim women, focusing on the different types of public self-representation related to their struggle for legitimacy as citizens. She argues that these new female subjectivities are seeking legitimacy, speaking to “interconnected publics”. Per Pettersson presents the results from a Swedish case study in a public school in Gävle with a high degree of immigrant pupils and discusses the conflict of values between the minority group and the major culture. Most of these value conflicts and tensions are handled by negotiations and compromises in a way which can provide good policy examples for other localities and local contexts. Inger Furseth presents

Introduction

5

the results of research work in Oslo, Norway, carried out to find out how women used their style and interpreted Muslim female dress in combination with gender negotiation. The findings show that the women in this study use signals to present themselves in public and assess their Muslim sisters, which pertain to religion, morality, culture and generation. The last empirical chapter, written by Jørn Borup, sheds light on the results of research in Denmark about religion and ethnicity-related issues of two religious traditions (Buddhism and Christianity) among immigrants from Vietnam. He proceeds with a comparative approach to two types of religiosity, arguing that type of religion, religious engagement, socialization and ethnicity are closely related. Taken as a whole, these chapters demonstrate that we are dealing with complex scenarios: different contexts of reception, different countries of origin, various ethnicities and religious traditions. Having become plural spaces, our societies tend to underestimate the effects of diversity. They are far more concerned with the issue of social integration than with that of social identities reconstruction in society as a whole, often ignoring that today religion manifests itself as a plurality of religions. As mentioned above, in recent decades, both Northern and Southern Europe have received strong flows of newcomers. From this perspective, the book aims at presenting through various theoretical lenses and empirical researches the impact mobility and consequent religious transnationalism have on multiple aspects of culture and social life in societies where the religious landscapes are increasingly diverse. In short, what are the implications of newcomers for the religious life of Europe and for the redesign of its soul? References Berger, P., Davie, G. and Fokkas, E. (2008) Religious America, Secular Europe. Farnham: Ashgate. Beyer, P. (1990) Privatization and the Public Influence of Religion in Global Society. In M. Featherstone (ed.) Global Culture: Rationalism, Globalization and Modernity (Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 7). London: Sage, pp. 373–395. Beyer, P. (1998) The City and Beyond as Dialogue: Negotiating Religious Authenticity in Global Society. Social Compass, 45(1): 67–79.

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Casanova, J. (1994) Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Casanova, J. (2009) The Religious Situation in Europe. In H. Joas and W. Klaus (eds) Secularization and the World Religions. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, pp. 207–227. Davie, G. (2000) Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eisenstadt, S. (2000) The Resurgence of Religious Movements in Processes of Globalisation – Beyond End of History or Clash of Civilisations. [Online] MOST: Journal on Multicultural Societies, 2(1): 1–14. Available from: www.unesco. org/most/vl2n1eis.htm [accessed: 29 June 2002]. Habermas, J. (1991) The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I. Cambridge: Polity Press-Basil Blackwell. Pace, E. (2011) Religion as Communication: God’s Talk. Farnham: Ashgate. Vilaça, H. and Pace, E. (eds) (2010) Religião em Movimento: imigrantes e diversidade religiosa em Portugal e Itália. Porto: Estratégias Criativas.

PART I Theoretical Remarks

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Chapter 1

Religion in Motion: Migration, Religion and Social Theory Enzo Pace

Introduction The chapter deals with the relation between religion and migration in contemporary society. I intend to analyse this relation showing its implication for the social theory. In that sense my first assumption is a sort of Husserlian epoché concerning the conventional approach of the sociology of religion I used to adopt as a scholar of this discipline when analysing the impact of migration on the religious landscape. Scholars of sociology of religion tend to focus on the various types of religious transnationalism in a global world (since the seminal studies by Roland Robertson (1992) and by Peter Beyer (1994) and more recently by Peter Beyer and Lori Beaman (2007)); the concept of multiple modernity referred to the differences between secularized and religious societies (see; Berger et al., 1999; Dobbelaere, 2002; Hervieu-Léger, 2003; Davie et al., 2008); the discussion about the notion of boundaries particularly taking into consideration the movement of people around the world, and the consequences on the socioreligious structures of the contemporary society (Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2000; Smith, 2000; Corten and Marshall-Fratani, 2001; Wu, 2001; Spickard, 2007); the process of de-culturalization and de-territorialization of religion (Roy, 2004). My attempt is indeed to move from the analytical aspects of the relation between religion and migration towards a broader conceptualization according to social system theory. Societies can be studied as systems that interact with environments more complex than the precarious and unstable equilibrium where each system tends to reach. A society, like a system, must learn to transfer this external complexity in internal differentiation. Social systems are large organizations that are experts in complexity. The more the social environment in which these organizations operate is differentiated, the greater must be the degree of political expertise of the system in order to learn to reduce the

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complexity of the external environment, accepting the principle of a progressive articulation in many sub-systems, as many are necessary to avoid the entropy of the system itself (Luhmann, 1987, 2012). The point of view of the theory of social systems seems to me particularly useful to analyse what happens in a society when its environment changes, becoming in many ways not easily attributable to the apparatus of social cohesion and social control (political, ideological, economic and cultural) that could apply to a society relatively more stable and homogeneous. Take, for example, the fiscal crisis of the modern welfare state, which has already been analysed with far-sightedness in 1984 by Claus Offe (Offe, 1984a, 1984b) and again more recently by James O’Connor (2009). This crisis has to do with religion as well as the processes of social change produced by mass migration, which started from 1961 onwards in Europe. According to Offe the most crucial contradiction of the welfare state arises because the budget of the State has a tendency to grow much quicker than its resource base. It draws resources from the economy, absorbing a greater part of the gross national product (GNP), contributing to reduce the proportion of the GNP destined to the private sector that, vocationally, works according to the profit-making investment and the accumulation capital. Offe writes: “The contradiction process can be seen as analogous to that of physiological addiction: the addict requires even larger drug doses at the same time as the potential withdrawal phenomena, that would follow a reduction of these doses, become more and more crucial” (1984a: 58). The welfare state crisis implies at least two important consequences on the religious field, as has been well pointed out by Bäckström et al.’s research on religion and welfare in Europe (2010). If the State reduces the weight of welfare because of the fiscal crisis that is gripping the country, this creates a new paradox. We are in fact coping with the new role of churches and religions; it becomes more and more important precisely in an area of social life that the welfare state replaced the traditional power of the churches. But, on the other hand, the churches are forced to go back to being the medical institution of capitalism, as the German sociologist and political scientist, Carl Schmitt (1925) liked to say (not suspected for his proximity to the Catholic Church). The reduction of welfare therefore contributes to differentiate the sustainable welfare state from the sphere of religious welfare, where the ethics of brotherhood reappears, whereas Max Weber (1988) had forecasted its decline in the spheres of the modern society (in the politics as well as in the economics, art, Eros and so on). The anxiety of Europeans who view that the State was committed to resize the welfare system (from pensions to the health system, from the subsidies of unemployment up

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to the support for people affected by severe disabling illness or disability) is not diminishing, whilst seeing the renewed social activism of the churches and other non-Christian organizations, and indeed it increases. That the small number of Europeans who procure material aid from the religious organizations are mostly immigrants, is evidence of at least some relevant stereotypes: that immigrants have not only taken away jobs from natives, but have encouraged the reduction of the benefits of welfare that were also distributed to newcomers. The State, partially receding from the welfare model, is coping with various social and political movements which protest against the policies of hospitality and social integration of the immigrants, who are considered not only as foreigners, but foreign and incompatible with the Christian culture, that is seen as the common root of European identity. To sum up we are coping with a crisis that involves a major restructuring of the modern state. This crisis reflects a profound social change in European societies: from the demographic point of view as well as from the cultural and religious perspective. Therefore the question of religious identity and belonging seem to me crucial in understanding both the relation between welfare and immigration and welfare and religion. The welfare state (crisis), identity and religion form the sides of a triangle which hopefully will not become the Bermuda Triangle of the European Union. In other words I am trying to speak about religion and migration not from a peculiar sociology of religion’s point of view, but with a social theory-oriented approach, because I would like mostly to focus on the concept of social change. Therefore the proposal is to read the social change in contemporary society through the bifocal lenses of religion and migration. The angle of refraction is precisely the notion of social change, a multi-dimensional notion indeed because it concerns at least four relevant aspects among others. Illustrating these four aspects I would like to use a metaphor: the four Knights of the Apocalypse. The metaphor works as a sociological game: on the one hand I am trying to detach the observation of the contemporary phenomena of social change from an incumbent sociology of religion’s approach, and on the other I would like not to disguise myself completely. However the theoretical reflection on the dimension of social change is interested in showing the social function of religion in a globalized world. Last but not least, the word Apocalypse is used in this context not as synonymous with the end of history or the world, but according to the more appropriate etymological meaning: revelation. Religion and migration actually reveal the intensity and complexity of the social change we are facing.

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The White Knight The White Knight symbolizes the tension between Pure and Impure, and clearly evokes the well-known Mary Douglas (1966) thesis in her seminal book Purity and Danger. If the contemporary world is interconnected as it has never been before, it means the inadequacy of the traditional centre–periphery scheme. The world becomes a small village that can be considered global. Economical and technological trends push people to move around the world taking with them their cultural, linguistic, juridical and religious differences as individual and collective stores. The impact on the social stratification and articulation within the labour market is crucial. We are facing a reconfiguration of the classes and division of labour according to at least two unexpected elements. First, the labour market indeed tends to distribute jobs according the ethnic differentiation, that is, the women coming from Eastern Europe are mostly recruited as care workers of the elderly people (Vianello, 2009; Vilaça and Pace, 2010) or the maritime workers are coming more and more from East Asia. The ethnicization of the labour market reproduces sometimes religious cleavages. Second, the clash of classes sometimes reflects the ethno-religious cleavages in a striking juxtaposition which are not easy to analyse according to the classical approach of social theory concerning social stratification and mobility. Take for instance what is happening with the question of conversion in some states of India: the case study on conversions in the Indian subcontinent is an interesting benchmark for analysing the conversion phenomenon as a battle taking place along the symbolic boundaries of various systems of belief, in a society that has historically been pluralistic from the religious standpoint (Pace, 2009). This battle follows a precise narrative scheme: conversion is seen by one system of belief as a perversion; the social action to obtain a reversion of those who convert becomes a communication and action strategy (a socio-religious action strategy) implemented by one system against another. The action is imagined as the re-conquest of a lost soul and celebrated with rites of purification. To defend its boundaries, each system tends to describe its competitors as the expression of falsity, impurity, the reign of darkness, as opposed to its own, the one and only true and pure faith, the resplendent reign of light. The system sees itself as a reign to be preserved actually in the land, in a territory where the cohabitation with others classified as impure (or non-indigenous) is dominated by two hegemonies: one based on the primacy of one class over the other (those who are considered as pure could act as citizen pleno iure), the second ruled by the

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social segregation that condemns those who want to survive as human beings, to accept non-skilled work or dirty jobs, in the grey and black market. The Red Knight The figure of the Red Knight refers to religion in war and the resurgence of religious nationalism and ethno-religious movements. It covers also the recurrent conflicts arising all over the world in host societies, because of the huge number of migrants; it occurs not only at the macro-level but also at a micro one, in everyday life. Social change is dramatically perceived by people when they start to experience unfamiliar sensations; the real clash of civilizations actually begins when the diversity (religious, cultural and so on) strikes our senses in everyday life (sight, hearing, touch, smell, taste), when the colour of the skin, the way a woman dresses, the smell of food, the physical contact, the sound of a religious song – all seem to us as strange, offensive, disturbing, untouchable and so on. The conflicts, affecting many societies involved in the global movement of people, represent indeed another side of the coin of the modern ethnic conflicts. We have to cope with many war scenarios all over the world where not only the contenders claim land, independence or the control of some economic resources (petrol, gold, opium, human trafficking and so on), but also sometimes in doing that invoking the name of God (or Dharma), to stress the impossibility of continuing to share a land with people who belong to another belief system. Those who learned yesterday to live together in the same land start to fight each other tomorrow, building up barriers of religious differences (Buddhist versus Hindu – as in Sri Lanka – or Catholic versus Orthodox – during the recent Balkan wars – or Ashkenazi versus Sephardic – as in Israel, where the original religious division overlaps, and sometimes hides, social, economic, political and cultural conflicts) (Vrcan, 1994; Seneviratne, 1999; Guolo, 1997; Pace, 2004; Roumani, 2009). The Black Knight The Black Knight concerns the question of social justice and the impact of the religious differences on the juridical order. I would like to start by quoting the title of a recent book by Peggy Levitt, God Needs No Passport (Levitt, 2001, 2007). The world is now more and more “a transnational field in which religion operates

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alongside other social institutions and forces” (Adogame and Spickard, 2010). In the global landscape, religion could act either on the backstage or on the stage playing both the function of voice and exit (Hirschman, 1970). Hirschman, striking at the foundational assumptions of liberalism (and of neo-globalliberalism), argued that social groups (at macro, meso, micro levels) have two chances when the members (or part of them) are convinced that the organization to whom they belong is not yet able to guarantee the quality of life, social benefit or satisfaction of the basic needs. First possibility: they can exit (withdraw from relationship, including the dramatic decision to move from the motherland, if the macro-group means a nation-state). Second chance: they can voice, making an effort to confront the social deprivation, improving the relationship through communication of complaint, imagining “another world is possible”, inventing a new set of shared values, and a new repertoire of social action for change. In both cases there is a lack of loyalty, a deficit of social trust. We could interpret the migrants who decided to move to another country as indicators of the exit, as a result of the increasing discontent of people about the quality of life in a society that is not yet able to provide for them; it is a silent protest that has an impact on the economics (both of the sending society and hosting one), without any relevant effect on politics. Vice versa the voice means protest, social mobilization, political conflicts and actions. Hirschman’s theory indeed says: the greater the availability of exit, the less likely the voice will be used. To what extent is it useful to apply Hirschman’s theory to the relation between religion and migration? It seems to me that the scheme exit/voice/ loyalty works quite well if we take into account and under the control of the empirical methodology at least two socio-religious dynamics that occur when we pay attention on the multiple phenomena that the relation between religion and migration involves. First of all, I would like to point out the role that religion plays in transnational migration before actual migration, according to an acute analysis by Obadare and Adebanwi (2010). The thesis of these two scholars actually is: “the transnational migration is imagined and treated as a spiritual phenomenon … religion and religious symbols and rituals are banalized against the backdrop of the disorderly retreat of the State from ordinary people’s lives” (p. 32). The case study is precisely that of Nigeria where the very high wave of emigration to various countries around the world (including Europe) interplays with the upsurge of Pentecostal Christianity on the African continent. Religion from many aspects works as a spin-off of the “appetite for elsewhere” (Ojo, 2006; Kalu, 2008) that affects a large number of highly skilled younger Nigerians. Roughly speaking,

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the will to emigrate is an exit, but because in many cases those who emigrate share a common religious experience (belonging to Pentecostal or Charismatic churches), therefore, they experience the power to communicate with each other the moral and political complaint against the social disorder and the collapse of the State. In other words religion works partially as voice too. It is a voice among others of an implicit protest that is not able to mobilize people politically against the establishment. It is an old story – someone could remark – coming from the Marxian approach to religion. The difference between, in particular, the Engels and Gramsci thesis on religion as an instrument for protest by the marginalized social class and the definition of religion as the opium of the people proposed by Marx, could allow us to reconsider the relation between structure (economic and political) and superstructure (religion, moral and so on), but in any case the Marxian approach does not explain the relative autonomy of religion in a complex society. If we assume religion as communication, its relative autonomy is based on a peculiar power of communication (Pace, 2011) that enables people to imagine another world, to sustain the sacrifices of migration by the moral and spiritual persuasion that the host society is a land to be converted, a gift of God to reverse mission. Part of the controversy around this formula, religious symbols provide support for people to cope with the initial difficulties of integrating themselves in a different society (the host one) (Levitt, 2007; Maduro, 2009), having to resort to faith when adjusting their lives in a new social environment, where more frequently they have to learn not only to cohabit with white people from the North, but also with other migrants coming from the South. Look at what is happening in small countries like Dubai or Abu Dhabi. Over the past 10 years a huge number of people arrived from the South (Africa, Asia and Arabic countries). According to official figures about two million workers came (non-skilled, skilled and highly skilled): each ethnic group has been segregated into separate districts for lodging, while at work they sometimes share the same places, discovering their mutual differences: languages (Urdu, Punjabi, Filipino, Arabic, Hindi and so on), religions (Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Christian and so on), customs and cultures. If in the public sphere their differences are not treated and recognized by the State, at the micro-level, in face-to-face relationships, people are learning practically how to live together despite the visible differences. A second relevant aspect in the analysis I am suggesting, is that the religion of migrants in a de-embedded society (that is, Muslim migrants in a Catholic society or Pentecostal Chinese or Ghanaian in a society shaped historically by Protestantism or women from the Orthodox background in a Catholic country

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and so on) could work both as a useful system of social relation to create an asylum for those migrants who are in search of economic stability and social reputation, and as an attempt to resist the process of assimilation or worse of silent segregation in the host society. In both cases we are coping with new social conflicts. In urban areas in the inner cities the visible religions of migrants sometimes provoke social alarm or confrontation between local political parties, that represent different and opposite ideologies as regards the question of the social cohesion related to the presence of the immigrants and those of the second and third generations. Scholars who have studied these conflicts have stressed the juxtaposition of the socio-economic tensions with symbolic resources. To cope with the former, social actors tend to mobilize the latter. People who live in a district perceive the presence of the newcomers as the beginning of disorder; the more the religion of the alien is visible, the greater the social attention paid to the socio-cultural diversity of the migrants and their children and descendants. Social theory in this case is obliged perhaps to take into serious consideration the ethnological notion of territory, applied in socio-biology. Instead of interpreting the riots in the Paris banlieues either as a social protest of marginalized people or a revolt of the second generation of French-Muslims, perhaps the ethnological techniques of recording in a matrix of interactive contact and antagonistic episodes in the everyday life of people who cohabit in the same space (condominium, urban area, transnational villages and so on) helps social science to investigate the specific function played by religion (a broad label that covers a variety of human and social behaviours in everyday life, feeding and dressing, sexual control on the girls by parents, different ways and places to pray and so on) when the social interaction has been biased by the relation of dominance. A group of local people consider themselves the exclusive owners of the space and the migrants – the alien – as temporary guests who have to adapt themselves to the host environment. We know that actually this process of adaptation is not unilateral, but in many cases mutual: mixed marriage, frequency of interaction in public spaces (market, job, school and worship places) help people – from one generation to another – to overcome the perception of incompatibility because of diversity or to reduce the social complexity of the diversity in a suitable way. But when religion appears in the antagonistic episodes in urban areas (there is a long list of conflicts around projects to build mosques from Sweden to Germany, from Switzerland to Italy) the ethnological techniques reveal that religion is not the subject of the conflict, but the social construction of the invaders as enemy which by religion seems to mark the territory that belongs to the autochthonous, in spite of the fact

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that sometimes the migrants lived in the area for a number of years, and their religious identity had not been taken into consideration until the project of the mosque had been finalized: I know you are Muslim, but if you want to pray in a visible space, it would disturb my perception of the space in which I’m living. The Green Knight This metaphor alludes to the dialectic between monopoly, pluralization, deterritorialization that migration provokes in religious fields. Everywhere we look (including those societies that have been shaped by a process of pluralization of cultures, linguistic practices, political ideologies and religious diversity) there is a religious innovation, a creative mixing of old and new religious symbols and practices. An ethnic church, transplanted abroad, following a group of migrants coming from the same village or city, is part of a transnational religious network, under the sacred canopy of that church, yet nothing entirely persists as good as it was in the origin country. In various areas of the world religion is not synonymous with stability; on the contrary it is one of the most important factors of the social change. In short the areas in which – like in an open-air laboratory – social science could falsify many theoretical assumptions (that is, the secularization paradigm; the dichotomy between tradition and modernity; the elective affinity between Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism; the derivative dimension of the religious belief from socio-economic structure or from some anthropological invariants of the human being and so on) continue until now to bias the sociologists and the sociologists of religion (Beckford, 2003; Furseth and Rapstad, 2006). However the list includes: 1. societies where the religious scene is no longer monolithic or even a context dominated by the recurrent competition between two major forces (Catholicism and Protestantism: but in this second case, which one?); 2. societies in which the regulation by the State of the religious market is diminishing and the political establishment second the process of a relative religious pluralization; 3. societies where the so-called traditional religions (but this label is disputable among the scholars (Bediako, 1992)) not only show an unpredictable vitality facing the hegemonic system of belief that over the

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past five centuries tried to dominate and eradicate the previous symbolic cosmogonies and ritual practices, but also perform a function of shaping a multiple socio-cultural identity of individuals, groups, and, of course, particularly churches, cults and revivalist religious movements; 4. societies that have experienced religious pluralism; this pluralism has been managed by politicians as a resource for democracy when they led the independence process and the creation of a postcolonial nationstate; in that case religion has become a source of liberation for those social groups from the native religion to another one, that individuals freely choose, provoking sometimes violent conflicts between opposite religious groups; these conflicts represent a fear for the democratic fabric, because the vanguard group claims to represent the authenticity of a religious message against those who are for the former, the perverts to be redeemed. Religious fanaticism is a modern phenomenon that is a real fear for democracy, as has been stressed by Amos Oz (2010) in his lectures on this topic; 5. societies that have learned to reduce the impact of religious diversity by establishing various regimes of separation or functional differentiation, including sometimes rules of compromise or/and cooperation between State and Church, politics and religion; these societies are obliged to question the tenets of the laicité; this happens in particular where the religious diversity, as a result of the increasing number of migrants, coming from all over the world, claim the public recognition of their diversities, the religious one in particular. Facing this new type of pluralism the secular State pattern seems stunned in coping with a lacerating dilemma: to be strictly secular without any recognition in the public sphere of those differences classified as incompatible with the rules of a democratic, modern State or to accept, at least partially, to integrate these differences at a juridical and social level, moving from the monolithic to a pluralist jurisprudence (Schachar, 2001; Menski, 2006). In all these cases we have to come back to Durkheim’s sociology of law, and rediscuss the idea of the social cohesion guaranteed by a uniform jurisdiction. I refer, in particular, to the process of pluralization that is happening in Latin America, and also in Sub-Saharan Africa and some Asian countries (South Korea or Singapore) or to a new Chinese laboratory, where old and new and modern forms of religious belief emerge, making the socio-religious landscape more and more plural (see Yang, 1999, 2010). Other similar and equally important

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processes are respectively the Africanization of the Afro-Brazilian religions (Candomblé and Umbanda), the indigenization of Christianity in Africa or in Asia, and the resurgence of the Maya ancient cults in Guatemala. Finally I would like to cite the case of contemporary India. In this country we see a politicoreligious confrontation between the fundamentalist Hindu movement and Christian, Buddhist and Muslim groups. The Muslim faith attracts many dalit (untouchables), who tend to use their new faith as an instrument for liberating themselves from the social and cultural segregation imposed by the system of castes. All the cases briefly mentioned concern the resurgent conflict between secular state and religious movements that are dreaming of the restoration of the Law of God or the Dharma as the ultimate foundation of the State. This conflict, although less acute, is also present in European societies, around the issues of abortion, euthanasia and same-sex marriage. The “question’s faith” thrives on plurality, tension and conflict, and interplays the “migrants’ question”. Conclusion The contemporary phenomenon of religion at war represents an extreme, violent, dramatic representation of the emerging idea that it is impossible to live together, under the same roof, if we are different. In this case, war is the continuation with weapons of the will of the silent majority in affluent society to expel the inassimilable foreigners or, if this is not politically correct, to adopt numerous strategies to segregate people in new ghettoes where the religious cacophony – as studied by Smith (2000) in the case of the Newham area in East London – becomes the basso continuo of daily life, a sort of civic indifference to the differences, which sometimes hides latent conflicts relating to the economic and social gap between people who even belong to different religious denominations and confessions. The relationship between religion and migration helps us to understand the present tension between at least two (past and present) nation-building models, that is, a nationalism based on citizenship, and one on ethnicity. Under the sacred canopy of religion, the aliens’ religion in this case, we can see both these models in action, the torsion sometimes occurring in a society that tends to represent the idea of nation as a door open to newcomers wishing to become loyal citizens; other societies, shaped by the Romantic idea of the ethnic origin of the nation (as in Germany, among others), are suddenly realizing instead that migration has changed their socio-cultural

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and socio-religious fabric, and the collective identity is threatened by the new invaders, the new barbaroi. The contemporary apocalyptic rhetoric in the political arena, amplified by the media and supported by prominent political scientists (Huntington, 1998, 2005), evokes three hazards that have to be coped with. According to this rhetoric, religious diversity becomes more and more an issue on the political agenda all over the world. The so-called multicultural policies have been criticized (more recently, for instance, by Angela Merkel) and sometimes abandoned, although in some cases they have produced significant changes in the legal system (that is, on citizenship for foreigners) or good practices at the local level. Cultural, linguistic, religious and other forms of diversity have been represented as a sign of the disorder and degeneration of societies that seem too weak and compliant, oblivious to their cultural origins and roots. Without memory and identity, the recognition of religious diversity leads society to a progressive decline, and a final collapse. Consider, for instance, the rhetoric concerning the demographic gap between Christian and Muslim people. Because Muslims tend to have more children than Christians, the latter will succumb to the former. In this case, the figure of the enemy takes the shape of the younger generations, and it is taken for granted that they will be animated by an aggressive attitude to Christians in the near future. Similarly, the religious American right-wing calls for the restoration of the primacy of the Bible in the public and political domain, while the hindutva religious and political movements in India dream of a Hindu state and ardently support the construction of the Zero Line (an electronic frontier along the 4,000 kilometers of its borders with Bangladesh) officially to put a stop to illegal immigration from such a predominantly Muslim country as Bangladesh. The intensity of the apocalyptic rhetoric of contemporary politicians resembles that of the representatives of certain religious institutions. It might be interesting to compare the speeches made by various political and religious leaders: a trivial war becomes a final battle between Good and Evil, not a violent confrontation between armies or soldiers, but a sacred ordeal after which truth will triumph over its enemies: it is in this sense that religion tends to infuse politics with a soul. Europe indeed seems in search of its new soul, between the apocalyptic rhetoric of many new political actors (neo-populist, Islamophobic and, by and large, interpreters of the diffused fear for the loss of the collective identity) and the risk of ethnicization of the cultural and religious differences, reified in the territorial enclaves in the cities.

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References Adogame, A. and Spickard, J. (eds) (2010) Religion Crossing Boundaries, Leiden and Boston, Brill. Bäckström, A., Davie, G., Edgardh, N. and Petterson, P. (eds) (2010) Welfare and Religion in 21st Century Europe, Farnham, Ashgate. Beckford, J. (2003) Social Theory and Religion, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Bediako, K. (1992) Theology and Identity, Carlisle, Regnum Books. Berger, P., Sacks J., Martin, D. and Weiming, T. (1999) The Desecularization of the World, Grand Rapids, Eedermans. Beyer, P. (1994) Religion and Globalization, London, Sage. Beyer, P. and Beaman, L. (eds) (2007) Religion, Globalization and Culture, Leiden and Boston, Brill. Corten, A. and Marshall-Fratani, R. (eds) (2001) Between Babel and Pentecost, London, Hurst. Davie, G., Berger, P. and Fokkas, E. (2008) Religious America, Secular Europe, Aldershot, Ashgate. Dobbelaere, K. (2002) Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels, Brussels, PIE-Peter Lang. Douglas, M. (1966) Purity and Danger, London, Routledge. Ebaugh, H.R. and Chafetz, J.S. (eds) (2000) Religion and the New Immigrants, Walnut Creek, Altamira Press. Furseth, I. and Rapstad, P. (2006) An Introduction to Sociology of Religion, Aldershot, Ashgate. Guolo, R. (1997) Terra e redenzione, Milan, Guerini e Associati. Hervieu-Léger, D. (2003) Catholicisme, la fin d’un monde, Paris, Bayard. Hirschman, A.O. (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. Huntington, S. (1998) The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & Schuster. Huntington, S. (2005) Who are we? The Challenge to American’s National Identity, New York: Simon & Schuster. Kalu, O. (2008) African Pentecostalism, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Levitt, P. (2001) The Transnational Villagers, Berkeley, University of California Press. Levitt, P. (2007) God Needs No Passport, New York, New Press.

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Maduro, O. (2009) Religión y exclusión/marginación: Pentecostalismo globalizado entre los hispanos en Newark, Nueva Jersey, Cultura y Religion, 1, pp. 37–54. Menski, W. (2006) Comparative Law in a Global Context, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Obadare, E. and Adebanwi, W. (2010) The Visa God: Would-be Migrants and the Instrumentalization of Religion, in A. Adogame and J. Spickard (eds), Religion Crossing Boundaries, Leiden and Boston, Brill, pp. 31–48. O’Connor, J. (2009) The Fiscal Crisis of the State, New Brunswick, Transaction. Offe, C. (1984a) Contradictions of the Welfare State, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. Offe, C. (1984b) Ungovernability: On the Renaissance of Conservative Theories of Crisis, in J. Habermas (ed.), Observation on the Spiritual Situation of the Age, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, pp. 67–88. Ojo, M. (2006) The End-Time Army: Charismatic Movements in Modern Nigeria, Trenton, Africa World Press. Oz, A. (2010) How to Cure a Fanatic, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Luhmann, N. (1987) Soziale Systeme, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp Verlag (tr. Social Systems, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1996). Luhmann, N. (2012) Introduction to Systems Theory, Cambridge, Politybooks. Pace, E. (2004) Perché le religioni scendono in guerra, Roma-Bari, Laterza. Pace, E. (2009) Convert, Revert, Pervert, in G. Giordan (ed.), Conversion in a Age of Pluralism, Leiden and Boston, Brill, pp. 184–212. Pace, E. (2011) Religion as Communication, Farnham, Ashgate. Robertson, R. (1992) Globalization, Social Theory and Global Culture, London, Sage. Roumani, M. (2009) The Jews of Lybia, Eastbourne, Sussex Academic Press. Roy, O. (2004) Globalized Islam, New York, Columbia University Press. Schachar, A. (2001) Multicultural Jurisdictions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Schmitt, C. (1925) Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form, Munich, Theatiner Verlag (English version: Praeger, 1986). Seneviratne, H.L. (1999) The Work of Kings, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Smith, G. (2000) Global Systems and Religious Diversity in the Inner-City, International Journal of Multicultural Studies, 2, pp. 16–39. Spickard, P.R. (2007) Almost All Alien, New York, Routledge. Vianello, F.A. (2009) Migrando sole, Milan, Angeli.

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Vilaça, H. and Pace, E. (eds.) (2010) Religião em Movimento, Porto, Estratégias Criativas. Vrcan, S. (1994) Una guerra di religione nell’Europa contemporanea, Religioni e società, 18, pp. 16–26. Weber, M. (1988) Die Wirtschaftethik der Weltreligionen. Theorie der Stufen und Richtungen religiöser Weltablehnung, in Gesammelt Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Tübingen, Mohr (original version, 1920). Wu, F. (2001) Yellow: Race in America Beyond Black and White, New York, Basic Books. Yang, F. (1999) Chinese Christian of America, University Park, Pennsylvania State University. Yang, F. (2010) Oligopoly Dynamics: Consequences of Religious Regulations, Social Compass, 57, pp. 194–205.

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Chapter 2

New Economy, Migration and Social Change: The Impact on Religion José Madureira Pinto

Introduction The relations between religion and immigration reveal great heterogeneity, even when we just compare their manifestations in national spaces commonly taken as relatively homogeneous in terms of a large set of other social features. We can certainly admit that such diversity is, to some extent, the inevitable corollary of the contingent nature of all mobility flows and of the crossing of cultures they always imply. However, there are reasons to think that the new patterns of migration induced in the last decades by the uneven and deregulated globalization of economies may have introduced additional complexity and variability to the phenomena here in question. Following such a perspective, the first part of this chapter will focus on some features of the emigration/immigration cycle due to the intensified internationalization of economy and finance. Of course, special attention will be given to the restructuring of labour markets and the employment relations involved in that same cycle. But there is an additional and crucial objective attached to those pages: to demonstrate that, underlying the “decisions” to migrate and to establish in a host(ile) society, always stands a multitude of practicalsymbolic affinities, tacit convergences and antagonisms in which religion and belief systems may play a relevant role – a fact that, after all, some economic conceptions are surprisingly prone to admitting in their analytical models. The second part intends to be an extended commentary on Enzo Pace’s perspective about the relations between religion, migrations and social change.1 1   See Chapter 1, this volume. Preliminary versions of Enzo Pace’s text and of the commentary mentioned above were presented at the Conference Local Diversity and Global Changes: Religions and Migrations in Southern Europe, held at the University of Porto on 30 September and 1 October 2010.

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It begins with a reference to the author’s general sociological perspective on religious phenomena and proceeds with a critical assessment of the metaphor of the “Knights of the Apocalypse”, a rhetoric device elected by Pace to capture the complex social relations mentioned above. It is hopeful that, supported by the considerations made in the first part of the chapter on the symbolic dimensions of migration flows and immigrant condition in an era of intense deregulation of economy and labour markets, the commentary here proposed will serve to highlight how relevant the author’s theoretical insights and empirical suggestions can be to the analysis of “religion in motion”. Transformations of the Labour Market and the Changing Social Construction of Immigrant Condition Neo-Classical and Segmentation Theories on Employment and Migration A comprehensive sociological analysis of populations’ geographical mobility in contemporary societies cannot ignore the economic dimensions of the phenomenon. The global and long-term changes in the productive structures and in the configuration of economic and financial markets, as well as the main trends of the urbanization process itself are of course some of the crucial analytical vectors to take in account (see, among others, Wallerstein, 1974; Sassen, 1997; Castles and Miller, 1998). But the fact of considering that kind of general determinants must not prevent us from drawing particular attention to the dimensions of migratory movements specifically related to the transformation of labour markets and employment systems in local, national and transnational contexts. It happens that the theoretical approaches on the subject are far from being consensual. In the influential paradigm of neo-classical economics, migratory phenomena are essentially seen as the result of an adjustment process between supply and demand of labour force belonging to different geographical spaces. According to this perspective, the regions or countries with labour reserves, reduced capital and low salaries will tend to act as poles of demographic repulsion; similarly, regions or countries with increased capital, relative scarcity of labour and higher salaries are supposed to attract alien populations. Conversely, it is admitted that the “natural” development of these population movements contribute ultimately to mitigating the different starting salaries – something which, after all, does not differ much from pricing mechanisms taking place in other competitive contexts.

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Knowing the importance accorded in neo-classical microeconomic studies to “rational choices” of individuals, it will not be surprising that the general trends empirically observed in this domain will be thought of as the aggregate result of decisions of allegedly skilled evaluators (individuals or families) based on the current and expected costs and benefits associated to the act of emigrating.2 Labour market segmentation theories bring to the analysis of the phenomenon a very different analytical perspective. By refusing to take the employment systems of recipient countries or regions as homogeneous social spaces, now the aim is to highlight a set of economic, cultural and political mechanisms which tends to reproduce and consolidate a hierarchy of employment subsystems (roughly dualistic, in the well-known view of Piore (1975)) provided with different and relatively independent logics of functioning. In this framework, three aspects deserve special attention: first, the existence of a set of objective affinities and congruence between the cultural backgrounds of populations readily available for work, on one side, and the technical-organizational specificities of economic and employment segments (“primary” and “secondary” segments, in the dualistic hypothesis), on the other side; second, the nature of “mobility chains” attached to each of such segments, which basically delimit the horizon of possible professional trajectories within the reach of the different categories of the labour force; and, third, the specificity of employer strategies aiming to strengthen, through recruitment processes adapted to the objective and subjective division of the universe of workers, their margin for manoeuvre in dealing with the downturns of economy. By a conjugation of factors referred to those three domains, the probability of the immigrant population concentrating in the more precarious segments of employment systems will, in principle, be high. Once educational qualifications of their members are normally low (and/or reluctantly recognized in the countries of destination), it becomes “natural” that they predominantly access the lowskilled, underpaid and unstable jobs; furthermore, when combined with other assumed traits of subaltern status, the levels of representation and integration of immigrants in union movements and other instances of civic participation are often very low, a fact which will tend to decrease in a significant way their chances of career progression; finally, with the fragmentation of the legal status of employment and the increasing adoption of corporate management practices based on thinning out labour and outsourcing, it is understandable that migrant populations, less protected and less demanding than other categories of the 2   For a summarized approach of these conceptions, see, among many others, Rea and Tripier (2008: III).

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national labour force, become over-represented in the contingent mobilized to give shape to the flexibilization objectives of the new economy. The effect of conceptual demarcation that theories on labour market segmentation promote in relation to the already mentioned interpretations of emigration of the push and pull type is, as already suggested, largely based on the idea that the assignment of individuals (in particular, immigrants) to available workplaces is determined by tacit adjustment arrangements in which the cultural and practical-symbolic dimensions play a significant role. The “mobility chains” to which Piore refers are not, in fact, analysable in a realistic way, unless they are conceived as a space of intersection of generators and organizers of meaning previously embedded, according to specific socialization arrangements, in agents’ individuality. It is no coincidence, in fact, that the author, having emphasized the strong correlation between professional requirements linked to the lower strata of deregulated employment systems and the cultural universes (sub-cultures) of the “working class” and “low class”, makes a point of linking the consolidation of the latter, in particular in the universe of immigration, to the realms of the lifestyles, the structuring of identities and the construction of socioprofessional projects. It is indeed in this dense space of interrelations and implicit accommodations that the individual horizons of potential employees adapt to the realism of the probable and, ultimately, to the imperatives of necessity. Although possibly experienced as mild elective affinities, when we speak about the coming together of supply and demand in the undervalued labour market segments, we are in fact speaking mostly about objective compulsiveness. Social Networks and Mobilization of Labour Force The “régulation” theory (Théorie de la Régulation) (Boyer, 1979, 1989, 1995) gave an important contribution to deepen and review the analysis of the labour market segmentation originally proposed by M. Piore. It started to underline the overly simplistic nature of a conception that considers the mobilization, use and reproduction of labour force as the strict and univocal result of a combination of institutions such as labour law, the education system, family models, etc. The reproduction of a segmented labour market, notes Robert Boyer, must not be isolated from the global logics of economic reproduction. The new forms of mobilization and management of labour force as well as the corresponding segmentations of the employment system should be seen as a manifestation of the key contradiction between capital and work and, more specifically, as the crisis of the accumulation model which sustained the growth cycle of the previous

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period. Whether by the outsourcing of productive processes (manifested in the dissemination of subcontracting), by fragmenting labour ties in “atypical” forms of employment or even by systematically looking for ways to reduce labour costs, the fact is that the “post-Fordist” strategies for flexible production and deregulation of labour market reflect and consolidate a new stage of power relations in the economic field. Instead of speaking about segmentation, and a fortiori about dualism, we should maybe stress in this respect the complex and diverse patterns of interdependence between types of firms, production processes and organizational models that, in a specific socio-institutional environment, do contribute to reproducing the diversification of employment relations. The concept of labour mobilization networks proposed by J.-P. Gaudemar seeks to develop some of the ideas mentioned above. The author begins by pointing out that “employer recruitment policies and the behaviour of employees or job-seekers converge in the labour market according to the place they occupy in the corresponding social networks” (Gaudemar, 1987: 110), and argues that such a convergence – obviously limited at each moment by the pace of job creation – is always mediated by the habitus systems involved. Acting in the various reserves of labour force as practical maps of job supply and of the limits of plausible mobility projects, those habitus do promote in fact the tacit adjustments between job supply and demand that the concept of mobilization networks wishes to specify. Following this analytical framework, many empirical studies on international migratory movements have demonstrated that the circles of informal relations entertained in the places of origin and/or destination by family members, friends and neighbours do have in fact a strong influence on the emergence and development of migratory phenomena. Dissemination of information on employment dynamics, emigration policies, organization of rudimentary economic and logistic support, cross-inculcation of dispositions that tend to naturalize/ euphemize the risks of mobility are some examples of the social processes here in cause (Monteiro and Queirós, 2009, 2010; Pinto and Queirós, 2008). With the increased internationalization of the economy and the corresponding extension of labour deregulation processes, the influence of these informal networks of labour recruitment will tend to grow. As they contribute to reconcile precarious labour with precarious stays in the countries of destination (an essential feature of the so-called just-in-time model of mass migrations), those networks become a central mechanism of worldwide economic domination. Therefore they will be tolerated and even openly supported by those who think that “immigration without immigrants” is, in a certain sense, the “ideal” formula of transnational adjustments between supply and demand of labour (Rea and Tripier, 2008: 39).

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State Regulation of Migration and Labour Relations Although basing themselves on theoretical positions which globally differ from those that support the interpretative proposals mentioned above, the renowned Mark Granovetter and Charles Tilly also adhere to the idea that the functioning of labour markets has to do with informal “supply networks”, with the “recruitment networks” through which individuals seek opportunities to put their labour force and skills into use, and with “the junctions between them” (Granovetter and Tilly, 1988: 193). According to the authors, family networks as well as friendship or ethnic ties are an effective component of the production and reproduction of places, hierarchies and forms of accessing the employment system, namely in the case of flexible modalities of subcontracting. However, notwithstanding the importance they concede to these less formal components of recruitment and job seeking, Granovetter and Tilly make a point of emphasizing the importance of unions, governments and other institutional entities to the shaping of labour relations. Hence, at the moment of establishing a general framework for the analysis of the formation of labour markets, they clearly emphasize the specific role played by the State and other formal institutions in the regulation of this same process. Even those conflicts on the legal-administrative process of naming and classifying workplaces and occupational status do not escape political intervention. In fact, being merely symbolic in appearance, they deal and interfere in an effective way with class status and power and with the reproduction and legitimization of social inequalities – in other words, they become a State question. Understandably, a significant component of public policies on migration is focused on the regulation of labour problems (access and legalization of employment, security conditions in workplaces, etc.). But State intervention goes far beyond these limits, by interfering in the border control of foreign citizens, in the definition of coercive restrictions on matters of permanence and residence of immigrants, in the extension of citizenship rights and social protection to non-nationals, etc. A set of bilateral or multilateral agreements between national states, turned more and more urgent as the international migratory networks intensifies and becomes more complex, do confirm the influence of politics and state policies on the life of migrant populations. A critical inventory, brief as it may be, of how everyday ideological discourse, scholarly controversies or policies have dealt with the differential statuses and social trajectories within the reach of minorities of the so-called host societies – hesitantly naming them “adaptation”/“insertion”/“integration” (by

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reference to the world of work), “assimilation”/“integration” (by reference to an alleged national cultural context), “insertion”/“integration” (by reference to the institutional system of the host country) – will nonetheless show to what extent the fundaments and real outlines of the social problem of migrations are complex and hard to decipher. Whilst this has not prevented – quite the contrary, it may have stimulated – the production of laws and State intervention in this matter, it seems likewise true that it continues to show a significant discrepancy between the explicit goals of national policies on migration, and the actual ability to put them into practice. Many are the factors that have contributed to this: the scarcity of domestic labour force available to fill jobs in devaluated sectors of the secondary segment of the labour market; the effectiveness of established networks to mobilize non-legal immigrant labour; a never fully controllable movement of family reunification (due in part to the growing influence that social movements defending immigrants’ rights have been gaining in many host countries); the renewal of repulsion demographic factors in currently disadvantaged areas of the global economic system, etc. A particularly instructive example of the contradictions induced by the gap between stated political goals and the conditions for their implementation will undoubtedly be the one resulting from the conjunction of restrictive migration policies with highly deregulated labour markets. In fact, it has often allowed the (informal) logic of traditional labour mobilization networks to be captured by the organized (and therefore, to some extent, “formal”) networks engaged in the recruitment and illegal trafficking of migrants (Peixoto, 2002: 495). Class Structures and the Social Condition of Immigrants Having drawn attention to some symbolic-cultural dimensions of the “mobility chains” involving migrant groups and to the ubiquity (by action or omission) of the State in shaping the logics of the (apparently “free”) labour market, there are some other questions concerning the nature and dynamics of the immigrant condition that, from the point of view of a comprehensive sociological analysis, we need to face. One of them refers to the specific weight that must be assigned to “ethnic factors” in the set of variables that explain inequalities and exclusion processes generated and reproduced in the social space of immigration countries. Does ethnic belonging interfere in an autonomous way with production and reproduction of inequalities and discrimination in the host societies, or, instead, should that fact be subsumed in the more general system of social (and

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specifically classist) determinants typical of a specific stage of social space. In this latter perspective, ethnic filiations will, at best, be part of the subset of secondary or auxiliary independent variables (along with age, sex, etc.) in the interpretative models in question. This debate should not ignore the fact that immigrants do not lose in the social space of host countries a set of social features built and embedded in the societies of origin. Although, for a large set of cultural and political reasons, the word “immigrant” is almost exclusively used to name those foreign individuals who belong and tend to remain in subordinate social positions in terms of the access to economic and educational resources, this is not the only destination reserved to migrants in reception countries: class privileges acquired in home societies do count for the definition of social trajectories and integration processes in host societies. Another aspect deserving consideration is that the relationship of immigrant populations with host spaces always contains a re-socialization component, that meaning a permanent reconfiguration of “cultural identity” of ethnic minorities. To insist in considering ethnic-cultural affiliation as an absolute and irrevocable principle of social differentiation hardly seems a sustainable suggestion. Anyhow, the fact remains that, in some social fields and interaction contexts, that affiliation does really act as a factor of discrimination, (self-)exclusion and inequality, whether it be through the well-known circular stigmatization processes expressed dramatically in the various forms of overt racism, or by means of symbolic and practical operations of naturalization/denigration of some features associated with the “culture of origin” of immigrant groups (thus perpetuated as inassimilable foreigners or threatening outsiders), or even by cumulative disadvantages in accessing jobs and lodging. The considerations on the subtle line between “cultural” dimensions and “social” dimensions of the immigrant condition made by a Portuguese sociologist with extensive experience in empirical research in this domain nevertheless suggest that the problem should not be addressed in a simplistic way. Reporting on the results of applying a “model of analysis of the ethnicity phenomena based on the idea of contrasts or social and cultural continuities among migrant populations and recipient populations”, F.L. Machado argues that the cultural dimensions implied (sociability, language, religion) “should, at least, be put on the same level of dimensions such as inequalities of class, place of residence or socio-demographical composition”. If we want to think of the social space of classes as a network of relations involving a wide range of primary and secondary features, “it is possible to see … contrasts and continuities between immigrant

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populations and recipient populations, but also proximities and distances between different sectors of the same migrant populations, which precisely makes some of these sectors more continuous and other more contrasting vis-àvis the host society” (Machado, 2007: 252). Migrations, Social Change and Religion: Some Challenges to Sociological Analysis Religion in Contemporary Societies: A General Sociological Framework As announced in the Introduction, the moment has come to examine Enzo Pace’s particular view on the dialectics between migration, social change and religion. And we start by highlighting a summary formulation of the author’s sociological conception on religious phenomena. “Religion”, he says, “is a system of belief capable of organizing the lifeworlds of entire social groups”. In this context, he adds, “organizing” comprises: firstly, “giving meaning to social and individual action, by persuading human activity to adhere to norms” (and he specifies that these norms include dietary to ritual practices which discipline mind and body, but also ethical and sociopolitical rules); secondly, “creating places where social ties and representation are facilitated”; thirdly, “establishing a principle of authority” (expressed as an “institution” or “in the form of a consolidated tradition, a line of belief which is considered authoritative and transmitted from generation to generation spontaneously and with no significant breaks”). This principle “may alternatively be placed at the service of a given political power … or set itself up as a centre for criticism of a power structure … considered illegitimate by a social group or movement” (Pace, 2005: 113). In order to clarify and point up the heuristic potential of this definition, Enzo Pace tells us that when a religion functions as a “belief system”, “it may become not only an individual or collective strategy for ‘solving souls’, but also a medium of communication capable of reducing the complexity of the social environment … thus providing a unified vision of reality, notwithstanding existing social differences” (Pace, 2005: 114). In other words, he explains, religion organizes, makes sense of the visible world in relation to the ultimate significance of the invisible sphere of salvation. But this specific process of symbolic embeddedness will be particularly effective when religion succeeds in linking up with “fundamental nodes” of the social construction of individual

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identities in the network of social relations. Family, the education system, the places devoted to worship, sacred art and liturgy are some of the social nodes to be considered. It will not be abusive to say that such a conception draws not only on Durkheim’s view on the social function of collective symbols in the construction of social order, but also on those sociological approaches, clearly inspired by the phenomenological tradition, that take the implicit meaning underlying the most discrete forms of daily interaction as really “constitutive” of society.3 In fact, Pace’s definition suggests that, like other symbolic forms embedded in the realm of social practices, religion participates, through a set of “representations” and “forms of classification” involving relations with the sacred, in specific processes of social integration, and that this social integration transcends the simple production of semiotic consensus. Thus, in societies marked by social differences and class inequalities, religious beliefs are likely to be part of strategies of reproducing/legitimizing the status quo, although it is not excluded that, in certain circumstances, they may act as a political instrument to contest the ruling power and social order. However, according to Enzo Pace, the sociological analysis of how religious beliefs become “constitutive” of social practices requires a spotlight on the place that religion occupies in the regulated spaces of circulation/inculcation of meaning, which he terms “nodes of socialization” – family, school, worship places. It may seem obvious, but nevertheless this is a key point: in the absence of agents predisposed, through adequate and reiterated socialization processes, to act according to the principles of social and symbolic ordering legitimized by religion, none of their symbolic-social (and political) functions would ever be effectively, and durably, embedded in society. It happens that – and now we are giving a first and decisive step to conceptually link religion and immigration – all these fundamental nodes of socialization are affected, although in different ways and with different intensities, when groups of people “are forced to emigrate and re-establish themselves in a social environment which is … alien to the belief system ‘of birth’ or origin”. The existential fracture here in question, common to any migration movement, is particularly dramatic and pervasive whenever the demographic transition corresponds to a sudden shift from social contexts in which predominate communitarian forms of socialization, solidarity and identification into contexts where, on the contrary, the systems of practical dispositions, beliefs and 3   For a summarized and critical approach of these and other sociological conceptions on religion, see Bourdieu (1971).

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aspirations required by a “normal” functioning of labour markets, citizenship affiliations and societal order are shaped by individualism, competition, market rules and monetary incentives. For the so-called “first generation” of this specific group of immigrants, that rupture tends to lead, in an initial phase, to a kind of intimate anomy, isolation and, eventually, sporadic rebellion, frequently experienced with a sense of betrayal towards the community origins and cultural heritage, and, in later periods of the migration cycle, to the isolation within the family group, the reinforcement of family solidarities, the preservation of original values and rituals and the control on the matrimonial choices (Sayad, 1999). But the modes of reproduction of the defensive model of social insertion we have just considered are not indifferent to many other factors inscribed in host societies, such as the specific segmentation and dynamics of economy and labour markets, the characteristics of the housing market and housing policies, the legislation on immigrant rights, the maturation and real equity of welfare state practices, and so on. Besides, it is generally agreed that the transition from the first to the “second generation” of immigrants modifies, in a significant way, the objective and subjective conditions of their integration. Now, the main change has essentially to do, for the best and for the worst, with the relationship established by immigrant families with school and schooling culture, a “fundamental node” in the process of identity construction of young people in contemporary societies. For the worst, when the experience of relative exclusion and institutional relegation in school leads, through unsolved identity crisis, towards deviant counterculture, violence or even some inconsequent riots; for the best, when the access to academic culture and the dominant patterns of sociability in the reference peer group is accomplished without significant ruptures with norms, practices and projects of the family group. The community/society model of migrant transitions, undoubtedly pertinent to analyse the social condition of immigrants involved in postcolonial demographic movements and to broadly portray, in ideal-type terms, the pervasive legitimating deficit of the immigrant condition, is far from exhausting the panoply of situations to consider in the analysis of immigrant practices. The intensification and diversification of migration movements from Eastern to Central and Southern European countries – in fact a very impressive example of recent deep changes in workforce migrations induced both by very precise political factors and by the increasing deregulation of the economy and the labour markets mentioned in the first part of the chapter – can be taken as a good example of the empirical diversity we have in mind.

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Thinking specifically on the ways how religious dispositions, belief systems and instituted practices react to the social fracture caused by emigration, Enzo Pace sustains that those reactions, although very heterogeneous, follow four great models (Pace, 2005: 115–118). The first one, called the diaspora model, corresponds to those cases where the norm or principle of authority on which the religious system is based is reinterpreted and adapted in practical terms to preserve the group’s specificity visà-vis the host society and simultaneously gain some independence with respect to the society of origin. Contributing to the re-embedment of the community, this symbolic strategy can also contribute to maintaining a dense relationship with homologous immigrant communities spread in the world, as well as with the native country itself. Whenever the immigrant group is able to transform, through a religious belief system, its cohesive potential into a kind of collective conscience put into a state of mobilization towards a targeted transformation of the social order, we can talk, according to Enzo Pace, of the politicization of the belief model. The third model to be considered is the compromise model. Here, the immigrant group, especially in the transition from the first to the second generation, invests in integration in the social and economic environment, by complying with its rules and life patterns, notwithstanding a parallel effort to resist, especially through the fundamental node of family relations, hierarchies and rituals, the loss of religious identity and collective memory. The fourth and last model is the individualization of belief. We are not far from the process of secularization which marks the so-called religious modernity, in which the individual management of values and practices related to the sacred tends to substitute the doctrinal, ritual and moral conformity to the norms and authoritative lines of the religious belief system. Based on what has been said before, we can conclude that the social processes evoked by these four models do not evolve in concrete social situations without individual and collective tensions, contradictions and conflicts. They obviously differ according to the overall specificities of the social spaces in question, but three great types are considered by Enzo Pace: (1) the conflict between generations concerning the processes of transmission of collective memory, and the reproduction mechanisms of the authority principle; (2) the conflict between groups of “believers” competing for the legitimate definition of belief; and (3) the conflict between immigrant religious groups and the political institutions and agents in the host society. Let us bring forward some remarks on these proposals.

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Firstly, it must be observed that they do privilege as their relevance domain the so-called “settlement immigration”, which in the literature normally opposes “labour immigration”. While the latter, corresponding to demographical movements that we presume are mostly determined by causes, motivations and economic logics, find their “natural” destination in labour and employment relations, “settlement immigration”, by involving populations that are displaced more for reasons of family regrouping than to actually find jobs, refers to the entire population of non-nationals seeking an effective integration in the host societies in a set of social spaces that go far beyond the circumstances of work. The history of countries that are traditionally recipients of foreign labour reveals that most of the migrations motivated directly by obtaining a job tended to be followed, in a relative short term, by a migratory flow mostly determined by reasons of family regrouping. The fact is that, as the regimes of economic accumulation and of social protection which supported for decades the integration of immigrants in the host societies have gradually been shaken, so too have drastically diminished the opportunities of stabilizing migrant employments and, a fortiori, the incentives to family regrouping. With the expansion of ephemeral forms of circulation of migrant labour induced by the new globalized and deregulated economy and turned possible by the progress of means of transport (temporary emigration, wide range commuting migrations, etc.) and the dissemination of mobile communication tools which permit immigrants to connect with their families and communities of origin in an unprecedentedly efficient manner, some of the assumptions on social patterns of integration of migrant populations have to be revised. Particularly, it seems reasonable to admit that with the deregulation of economy and employment systems and the corresponding undermining of the fundaments of settlement migrations the integration processes will tend to increasingly disconnect from the logic of socialization and religious conformation on which they were customarily based. Social Change and Social Functions of Religion in a Globalized World Having reconstituted some key elements of the theoretical framework on which Enzo Pace’s main arguments and highlights of the relation between religion and migration movements are based, let us now make an effort to look cautiously at the rhetoric topoi (featuring the four “Knights of the Apocalypse”) he makes use of in his contribution to this volume.

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The White Knight symbolizes the tension between “Pure” and “Impure”, which, under the conditions of extended interconnectivity in the contemporary world, is likely to occur in many, and sometimes unexpected, regions. In a global context in which firms power and highly deregulated financial markets tend to confirm or recreate, in very unpredictable terms, drastic economic inequalities – hence, generalized poverty, starvation and despair in many world regions – the extensive emergence of immigrant contingents in the public and semi-public spaces of many societies, including those having an established tradition of workforce exporting, has become a very impressive fact. This meant, in many circumstances and for many people, a sudden and unpredictable contact (and pressure to cope) with alien modal values, lifestyles and daily routines, and particularly with unfamiliar patterns of religious practice. As we said before, the employment systems, whether formal or informal, tend to objectively adjust their logics of segmentation and selective recruitment to this ethnic and national diversity – and as a corollary there can be an overdetermination of labour inequalities, social differentiations and conflicts by ethnic (including religious) cleavages. Yet, the persistence of the otherness condition of immigrant groups (always meaning some sort of stigmatization on the part of “pure” nationals) – and we must bear in mind the already mentioned fact that this process is not indifferent to class determinants – stems from a set of symbolic mechanisms which largely transcend the labour market frontiers, as they inscribe themselves in the most current and apparently anodyne interactions, in formal contacts with State institutions or in explicit ideological conflicts on the legitimacy of immigration itself. Even if we admit that, in all these contexts, religion is not necessarily the proximal causal factor of segregation and stigmatization of the immigrant groups, it is difficult not to admit that it should be at least a condition or distal cause of stigma. As part of what Erving Goffman calls the tribal modality of stigma, religion will in fact contribute, through a process of symbolical devaluing and discrediting involving not only individuals and families belonging to the group of original outsiders but also (by alleged contamination) their descendants, to the transmutation of cultural differences into naturalized negative properties. At this point, it is worthwhile to evoke Norbert Elias and John Scotson’s monographic study on the Winston Parva community, since it presents an unusual but rather heuristic way of looking at the tension between “Pure” and “Impure” (Elias and Scotson, 1965). The text analyses a working-class community which strictly divides itself, at the level of self-identification processes, between the group of “the established”, in fact the most ancient inhabitants, who see

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themselves as the pure (that is simultaneously genuine and virtuous) members of the community, and the “outsiders”, seen by the former as the source of all evil, which includes literal dirtiness, insecurity, conflict propensity, and so on. Belonging to the community seems to afford the more ancient members, through a collective shared legacy of memories, affective ties and aversions, a subjective right of preference and a charismatic certificate of purity, allegedly threatened by the proximity of foreigners. The objective working-class origin and status of the latter is in some sense denied, to give rise to a naturalized set of infused negative properties which, in fact, are built on no more than some ethological (the outsider condition) and chronological (the newcomer condition) evidences – a sort of racism without race in which exclusion is reinforced by the refusal to establish routine relationships with the foreigners. It is realistic to admit that some stigmas and conflicts between immigrant groups or between native and foreign inhabitants apparently based on religious beliefs and practices are, in fact, primarily induced by the chronological rhythm of entrance into the communities in question. The fear of the established insiders to be stigmatized by contagion, hence socially disqualified and harmed in their mobility aspirations, can be hastened and exacerbated when the outsiders are publicly signalled by their religious affiliation. The Red Knight, the second allegoric figure considered by Enzo Pace, alludes to the connexion between religion and war, an occurrence which decidedly contributed, many decades ago, to Robert Merton’s revision of some of his functionalist sociological convictions. Religion, he said, can be either functional or dysfunctional vis-à-vis the social system as a whole or any of its relevant parts. It can be an integrative social trait or, on the contrary, a factor of conflict, violent disruption and anomy. The pertinence of considering religion in war (religion in a state of war) is of course undisputable. As Enzo Pace says, nowadays, “we have to cope with many war scenarios all over the world where the contenders not only claim land, independence or control over economic resources … but also sometimes in doing that invoke the name of God (or Dharma) to stress the impossibility of continuing to share a land with people who belong to another system of belief ”. However, it seems that, under the excess of these conflicts (in fact, a perverse radicalization of the “politicization of the belief model” mentioned earlier), lies the emerging idea that “it’s impossible living together, under the same roof, if we are different” – as if the Red Knight could not enter the scene before the White Knight leaves his mark of incorporated prejudice towards the differentthen-impure Other. That mark stands, in fact, as a sort of antechamber, namely

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in affluent host societies, to the silent will or the explicit claim of expelling foreigners who are allegedly shown to be inassimilable – even or above all in light of their religious beliefs and practices. From the perspective of identity construction, a process which always includes a certain tension between an identification vector (basically assimilated to a set of dispositions, social representations and values which privileges integration into the in-group) and a counter-identification vector (which, on the other hand, marks and stresses symbolically the differentiation towards out-groups), the conflictive potential of religion must be taken as a dramatic deregulation of the equilibrium between the two vectors in favour of the latter. These are moments where belief systems, together with the religious routines and instituted rituals, act not so much as an impulse to build and deepen affinities with the Same, but essentially as an apparatus prone to inventing defamatory stereotypes and marking frontiers against the Other. Peaceful coexistence gives place, through religious affiliation, to open conflict and violence in the social space. In Enzo Pace’s view, the Black Knight symbolizes the issue of social justice and the impact of religious differences on judicial order, and to develop his arguments on this matter he invokes a very heterodox economist, Albert Hirschman. Hirschman is the author of a well-known interpretation on the way social actors react to disorder and lack of perspectives in the social organizations they belong to (Hirschman, 1970). Basing his insight on a conceptual triangle whose vertexes are loyalty, exit and voice, he sustains, referring to migratory movements, that emigration is a good example of a way of refusing status quo through exit. It means, in principle, the weakening of voice, hence, of the perspectives of change within the community through ideological confrontation and negotiation. The potential politicization of discontent is delayed or deleted by physical withdrawal of their most active members. In other words, flight becomes an alternative to fight. But Hirschman himself takes some precautions when he uses this analytical tool. For example, it can happen that the exit option consolidates voice in the long run: in fact, once initiated, the massive abandonment of a territory acts as an effective threat to the established social order and may become a stimulus to contest the dominant power forces in an organized and sustained way. The relation between the emergence of democracy in the 1970s and the intense Portuguese, Greek and Spanish emigration of the 1960s is one of the illustrations used by Hirschman in this proposal (Hirschman, 1986: 76). But, notes Enzo Pace, religion can also be, in societies marked by deprivation and discontent, the voice that gives meaning and reinforces the centrifugal forces of exit and emigration – thus acting as a functional equivalent to political

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mobilization and, by these means, contradicting the Marxist conception of religion as the “opium” of the people. In host societies, religion frequently becomes a worldview and medium of communication which contributes to attenuate the suffering caused by the sense of dis-embedment of expatriated people (a mix of “déracinement” and “double absence”, in Sayad’s terms). From all we have said, the religious commitment here in question can be accompanied by a process of ethnic isolation – through family, peer groups and other discreet socialization nodes – in a segmented residential space; but there are reasons to think that, in spite of the potential tendency of macrolevel political decisions or micro-level incorporated prejudice to reinforce that centripetal movement towards family and neighbourhood, the ethnic and religious legitimacy deficit can be defeated, in the public, semi-public and private spaces of civic commitment, in work and day-to-day life. Several examples of this emancipatory movement can be depicted: the civic struggles for commitment to universal human rights (including freedom of cult) and the extension of social protection measures to immigrant communities; the role of non-governmental organizations in the prevention of specific vulnerabilities and exclusion problems faced by ethnic (including religious) minorities; the attention given by education policies to the enlargement of school attendance and the academic success of immigrant descendants; the defence of immigrant workers causes by trade unions; and so on. But other informal forces acting against prejudice and exclusion can emerge in multicultural societies. Take as an example those very sui generis processes of expanding improbable integrative ties across ethnic and social frontiers which are love attraction and sexual reproduction. The fact that those same processes eventually follow the well-known logics of necessity made virtue does not delete its effectiveness and social relevance – through them, it seems, the White Knight is explicitly invited to leave the stage. But things are not always that simple. In fact, empirical evidence demonstrates that, when economic crisis and the rise of unemployment threatens native social segments, the presence of immigrants in established residential communities tends to be experienced, even in affluent host countries, in terms that radicalize the stigmatization process analyzed by Norbert Elias. For those segments of native popular classes which, as a consequence of decades of labour and social precarization, were relegated to the most deprived residential areas, the arrival of newcomers, or the nearness of the established different, tend to be perceived as the main cause of disorder, insecurity and collective suffering. Being eventually associated with a large web of stigmatized alien practices, religion can then become a relevant ingredient of the processes of symbolic differentiation and

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defamation here in cause. But, as Enzo Pace suggests, it is perhaps more realistic and sociologically adequate to approach the agonistic episodes in this kind of urban contexts by making an effort to discover, under the evoked cultural and religious veil, the more general symbolic construction of the invaders as enemies and, ultimately, the disruptive consequences of unemployment and social precarization. Thinking on the context of advanced industrial societies, this conflictive relation between Red, White and Black Knights is not indifferent to the diversity of welfare state models which have been historically institutionalized in these same societies. In spite of a certain degree of convergence of important dimensions of the institutional activities of national states, several studies demonstrate how national options are still relevant in defining social policies (Esping-Anderson, 1990; Ferrera et al., 2000). In fact, they clearly go on interfering in the way the State, the family, the community and the market combine in providing welfare, in the design of redistributive policies, in the configuration of social stratification and class inequalities. But the diversity of welfare regimes and their recent restructuring processes also affect the immigrant condition, since they interfere not only in the (re)definition of the insider/outsider cleavage concerning the access to welfare benefits, but also in the role of religious organizations which, in many countries, participate in the provisioning of welfare services to the immigrant communities. Finally, let us face the Green Knight of Apocalypse. Here, the issues at stake refer to the dialectic between monopoly, pluralization and deterritorialization in religious fields which are induced by the social dynamics of migration. There are no symbolic and, particularly, no religious systems absolutely immune to change. Notwithstanding the fact that their doctrinal, liturgical and semiotic consistence is the object of a systematic depurating and legitimating work led by a body of entitled specialists in the name of an institutional principle of authority, the religion systems are always open to certain degrees of compromise, hybridization, transformation, for the simple fact of being embedded in, and confronted by, believers’ social practices. Being closely dependent on the contingencies of social and institutional order, and particularly of State policies and regulatory power of host countries, it should not surprise that the metabolism of religious affiliation, expressiveness and commitment can be in migrant communities unexpectedly varied and intense. The increase and diversification of international migrations, with all the changes they impose on the system of religious interests forming the effective demand of salvation goods in national contexts, cannot but modify the ways

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of exercising religious power. In certain contexts, pluralism will triumph over traditional religious monopolies or duopolies, but, in others, it is religious extremism that re-emerges after a well succeeded process of democratization; occasionally, the established control of the State over the religious competition gives place to soft ways of regulating religious pluralism; here and there, traditional popular religious rituals recover, eventually under new forms and with a new kind of protagonists, their ancient integrative roles. At this new stage of transnational demographic movements, the secular State frequently faces a dilemma: to be strictly secular, in the name of the universality principles of modern democracy, or to integrate in its juridical architecture the de facto acceptance of diversity, pluralism and a certain margin of conflict in religious issues. But the concrete ways through which the “invisible sphere of salvation” enters the allegedly secular political agendas will vary in accordance with the characteristics of the migrant flows in cause. In principle, ephemeral work migrations functionally adapted to the flexibility exigencies of labour markets, will be considered, from the point of view of political powers, much less problematic than those that insidiously impose themselves as settled (although precariously inserted) communities of immigrant families. Final Remarks Having considered, since the beginning of this text, that the increasing internationalization of economies and employment systems has thoroughly changed the migratory patterns in recent decades, we briefly examined in the first part of the chapter some theoretical guidelines adopted by economic studies to analyse the functioning of labour markets and the determinants of emigration/ immigration cycle. Such an inventory inclined us to consider the mobilization of the immigrant reserve army as part of a broader process of reproducing labour market segmentation and other social inequalities. The roles played in such a process not only by informal networks and cultural affinities between migrants and non-migrants, but also by public policies and other regulatory devices, were presented as a clear demonstration that the well-known push and pull model, resiliently assumed by neo-classical economics, is far from being realistic. Religion and belief systems take part in the symbolic interchange which precedes the “decisions” to migrate and steers the social trajectories of migrant groups in host societies. This explains how, according to Enzo Pace, religion and migration can reveal so expressively the complexity of social change in a

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globalized world. Having recovered the general guidelines of the author’s well-known approach to religion phenomena, we propose in the second part of the chapter some commentaries on the metaphor he uses to decipher some fundamental axes of changing functions of religion in contemporary societies: the four Knights of the Apocalypse. Several topics were analysed: the dialectics pure/impure underlying cultural contacts with immigrants; the tendency to exacerbate religious differences and tensions in a disruptive or anomic way; the impact of social crisis on the status of immigrant communities and newcomers in host societies; the transformation of national institutional religious systems due to the increase and diversification of international migrations and cultural globalization. Driven by the rhetoric impulse of the Four Knights of the Apocalypse, our analysis of the relationship between religion and migration led us to discuss, among many other topics, the pertinence and heuristic power of two notions – exit and voice – used by Albert Hirschman to interpret action orientations of individual members of organizations and other social collectives. Well then, the point I am inclined to highlight at this closing moment is that religious injunction also acts very frequently – by means of a vast set of implicit processes of incorporation of dominant values, representations and dispositions – as a social vector of “manufacturing consent” (to use Michael Burawoy’s well-known expression). In most circumstances, religion is, in fact, above all, an instrument to produce conformity of souls and bodies to the status quo. And this means that the third, and frequently forgotten, vertex of Hirschman’s triangle – loyalty – must not be forgotten when we decide to sociologically analyse the symbolical and political power of belief systems, even when, at is nowadays the case, we are before an increased interconnectivity of national societies. References Bourdieu, P. (1971) Genèse et Structure du Champ Religieux. Revue Française de Sociologie, 12–3: 295–334. Boyer, R. (1979) La Crise Actuelle, une Mise en Perspective Historique. Critique de l’Économie Politique, 7/8: 5–113. Boyer, R. (1989) Les Transformations du Rapport Salarial dans la Crise. Une Interprétation des Aspects Sociaux et Économiques. Critique de l’Économie Politique, 15/16: 185–228.

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Boyer, R. (1995) Aux Origines de la Théorie de la Régulation. In R. Boyer and Y. Saillard (eds), Théorie de la Régulation – l’État des Savoirs. Paris: Éditions La Découverte, pp. 21–30. Castles, S. and Miller, M. (1998) The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Elias, N. and Scotson, J. (1965) The Established and the Outsiders. London: Frank Cass & Co. Esping-Anderson, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity. Ferrara, M., Hemerijck, A. and Rhodes, M. (2000) The Future of Social Europe: Recasting Work and Welfare in the New Economy. Oeiras: Celta Editora. Gaudemar, J.-P. (1987) Mobilization Networks and Strategies in the Labour Market. In R. Tarling (Ed.). Flexibility in Labour Market. London: Academic Press. pp. 105–126. Granovetter, M. and Tilly, C. (1988) Inequality and Labour Processes. In N.J. Smelser (ed.), Handbook of Sociology. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, pp. 175–221. Hirschman, A.O. (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hirschman, A.O. (1986) Vers une Économie Politique Élargie. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit. Machado, F.L. (2007) Pierre Bourdieu e a Sociologia das Migrações: uma Relação Inexistente? In J.M. Pinto and V.B. Pereira (eds), Pierre Bourdieu. A Teoria da Prática e a Construção da Sociologia em Portugal. Porto: Edições Afrontamento, pp. 247–262. Monteiro, B. and Queirós, J. (2009) Entre Cá e Lá. Notas de uma Pesquisa sobre a Emigração para Espanha de Operários Portugueses da Construção Civil. Configurações, 5/6: 143–173. Monteiro, B. and Queirós, J. (2010) Pela Estrada Fora. Apontamentos sobre a Génese Social da Migração Pendular de Trabalhadores da Construção Civil Portugueses para Espanha. In J.M. Pinto and J. Queirós (eds), Ir e Voltar. Sociologia de uma Colectividade Local do Noroeste Português (1977–2007). Porto: Afrontamento, pp. 261–271. Pace, E. (2005) Religion and Migration. In W. Bosswick and C. Husband (eds), Comparative European Research in Migration, Diversity and Identities. Bilbao: University of Deusto, pp. 113–123.

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Peixoto, J. (2002) Strong Market, Weak State: The Case of Recent Foreign Immigration in Portugal. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 28(3): 483–497. Pinto, J.M. and Queirós, J. (2008) Estruturas Produtivas, Escolarização e Desenvolvimento no Vale do Sousa. Análise da Reprodução da Condição Social Periférica numa Região Metropolitana Portuguesa. Cadernos de Ciências Sociais, 25/26: 309–355. Piore, M. (1975) Notes for a Theory of Labor Market Segmentation. In R.C. Edwards, M. Reich and D.M. Gordon (eds), Labor Market Segmentation. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp. 125–149. Rea, A. and Tripier, M. (2008) Sociologie de l’Immigration. Paris: Éditions La Découverte. Sassen, S. (1997) Global Cities. New York: Princeton University Press. Sayad, A. (1999) La Double Absence. Des Illusions de l’Émigré aux Souffrances de l’Immigré. Paris: Seuil. Wallerstein, I. (1974) The Modern World System. New York: Academic Press.

Chapter 3

Immigrant Religions and the Context of Reception in Advanced Industrial Societies Tuomas Martikainen

Introduction Sociology of religion is increasingly inspired by political science in its analysis of contemporary religion. This includes a growing interest in the role of the State, which has become a popular focus in the sociological study of religion over the last decade.1 The background of this interest is related to a broader change in global political economy that has been pushing nation-states to adapt to globalization, be it due to global trade, international migrations, terrorism or any other reason. States’ efforts to deal with globalization have led to changes in several aspects of societal life and state regulation since the 1980s. In this respect, the development in the sociology of religion is by no means unique; it rather reflects a wider change in sociology, also named a “political turn” (Thörn, 2010: 73–80). While there remains ambiguity of how important these changes for advanced industrial societies ultimately are, it is nevertheless clear that states have in part reinvented their role, and that this has led to both intended and unintended consequences in many areas of organization of society and state regulation (Pierson, 2006: 205–212). Regarding religion, it appears that the changes in political economy have led to both intended and, maybe more importantly, unintended consequences (Martikainen, 2012). The study of immigrant religions has grown jointly with an increasing awareness of a new globalized local context, where international migration is changing population structures in advanced industrial societies. In current studies of religion and immigration, at least two main streams can be identified. On the one hand, there are the studies of particular communities in a local, regional or national setting. The most well-known of these are the US-based   For example: Byrnes and Katzenstein (2006); Bramadat and Koenig (2009); Turner (2011).

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“new immigrant religion” studies in several gateway cities,2 but similar studies have also been conducted in many other countries.3 The studies often represent communities of several religious traditions, including Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Islamic, Jewish, Sikh, etc. groups, and discuss the role of these religious organizations on immigrant incorporation into a new social context. In the religion and locality studies, there seems to be less focus on regulatory power as such, but the communities are rather seen as emancipatory vehicles for the groups in question as well as negotiation partners with other local institutions. On the other hand, there are a vast number of studies focusing especially on Muslims in Europe, approaching the communities from a variety of perspectives. Typically these studies presuppose regulatory power on the national level, including policies of integration, anti-discrimination, security, Church–State relations, and so forth. In this context, vibrant immigrant religiosity is presented almost as an anomaly that leads to all kinds of social problems to which states need to respond. The studies point out the State’s role in shaping these developments and emphasize the different national legislative but also broader political, social and cultural contexts.4 Related to these debates on immigrant religions are efforts to bring the different strands of scholarship together, whereby certain characteristics of the State are seen to explain the differences on the more “positive” role of immigrant religion in adaptation to the US context and the more “negative” outcome for Muslims in Europe.5 Out of scholarship appears to be emerging a consensus that the historical setup of modern nation-state structures, including Church relations and national identity, are key features in explaining the outcome of the settlement process of new minorities. Promoted by sociologists6 and political scientists,7 the studies in brief argue that the historically existing place and thereby resources available for newcomer religions broadly sets the stage for their future development. Hence, there is a process of path dependence, where historical decisions and societal structures restrain and guide available choices for action.8 This chapter looks at the settlement of immigrant religions into a new local and national context, where the advanced industrial societies are the context of reception. The chapter discusses these changes in a Western context, where the     4   5   6   7   8   2 3

For an overview of US research, see: Cadge and Ecklund (2007). For an overview of European research, see: Stausberg (2009). For an overview from a political science perspective, see: Maussen (2007) For example, Casanova (2007); Foner and Alba (2008). For example, Casanova (2006). For example, Fetzer and Soper (2005). For a critical evaluation of these debates, see: Laurence (2012: 18–20).

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case of Finland is used an example. The chapter is structured as follows. First, it discusses the notion of “the context of reception” as used in ethnic and migration studies. Second, it focuses on five relevant areas regarding the incorporation of immigrant religions. These are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

State policies on immigrant inclusion; the type of welfare state; Church–State relations; the local context; and the role of immigrants and their religious tradition.

Third, it applies the theoretical discussion to the case of immigrant religions in Finland. The chapter supports and argues for a manifold approach to immigrant religions’ incorporation, and recognizes the specific role of the welfare state regime and associated policies. It, however, points out the changes that are transforming the very model simultaneously as it is gaining popularity as a scholarly tool to understand the complex realities of immigrant religious incorporation. The Context of Reception Early migration theory focused on the “push-pull” factors that caused the migrations in the first place and on the individual’s characteristics in immigrant incorporation (Samers, 2010: 53–55). Even though this methodological individualism remains strong in some branches of migration studies, especially in economics, the role of the immigrant communities on immigrant incorporation was also noted early on. The communities were seen through the lenses of “ethnicity” or “race”. This trait brought in a notion of collectivism, whereby the characteristics of the group were seen to facilitate the incorporation process. Much influenced by the Chicago school of urban sociology, also the role of the local context was highlighted (Albrow et al., 1996: 22–24). However, classical assimilation theories expected that migrants would eventually be indistinguishable from the mainstream and the role of the community was of temporary nature. Later, the role of the broader receiving context was brought into focus, and often attributed to the nation-state, including its social structures, policies and cultural practices (Kivisto, 2002: 28–34). Even though later migration theory has brought in many more aspects to understand the

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phenomenon and has abandoned a unilinear notion of assimilation,9 we shall in the following focus on the role of the receiving context, wherein theories of immigrant incorporation are of more relevance. The American scholars Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut are often credited with bringing the context of reception to centre stage in contemporary migration research: “For immigrants, the most relevant contexts of reception are defined by the policies of the receiving government, the conditions of the host labor market, and the characteristics of their own ethnic communities” (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006: 92–93). The notion has been widened since then to include, among others, the role of ethnic relations in host society, social capital and local political mobilization ( Jaworsky et al., 2012). Moreover, advances in the study of globalization and transnationalism have since the 1990s increasingly critiqued the methodological nationalism embedded in much of migration studies.10 Hence, there is widespread agreement that the process of immigrant integration consists of multiple relevant aspects, also including various spatial levels. As part of the impact of globalization and transnationalism studies on immigration research the role of the local context has highlighted a crucial axis of immigrant settlement. The relationship between the local and global has gained new interest, whereby discussions of glocalization (Robertson, 1995), transnational urbanism (Smith, 2001), etc. have aimed to highlight the complex relationships between various spatial aspects of social life. The key input of these perspectives is the claim that the local is deeply, and in many complex ways, integrated into the global, and cannot be understood by itself or in national context only. Thereby any understanding of the local is by necessity related to developments taking place in many other (also transnational) spaces. What this means in practice is more open and difficult to define. It is rather locating and deconstructing the web of relations of any particular case, and finding the appropriate scale of analysis for that particular context (Glick-Schiller and Çağlar, 2009). Advanced Industrial Societies, Immigrants and Religious Settlement For the purpose of this chapter, I will look at four aspects regarding the context of reception for immigrant religions and as a fifth one to point out the role of immigrants and their religions, as these are all in some respects mutually dependent. First, policies of immigrant inclusion are central as they define   For general presentations of migration theories, see: Samers (2010: 52–120).   Glick-Schiller et al. (1992); Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002).

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rights and opportunities available for immigrants, also affecting how their cultural or religious differences are viewed by the public. Second, the nature of the welfare state provides the general context into which immigrants settle in advanced industrial societies, and that affects what services and tasks for which the immigrants’ own communities may be needed. Third, as we are focusing on religion, the role of national Church–State relations is significant, as it is related to the type of recognition and resources that may be gained by the community. Fourth, the role of the local context is central, because that is both where public policies are implemented and where the immigrants actually live. Fifth, the religion and its adherents in question are salient to note, because different religions organize differently, and the immigrants are always a selected group of people that may play a role in religious settlement. State Policies of Immigrant Inclusion State policies on immigration, incorporation and cultural recognition play an important role for newcomers. They define the legal status of immigrants, how they are (or are not) supported in different areas of life and how their possible cultural or religious difference is treated or recognized. Moreover, they reflect the nation’s self-understanding that relates to the degree of symbolic difference or unity that newcomers can have or are expected to have. The traditional settler societies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States are often presented as more tolerant of cultural differences, or at least more open in their attitude. The contrary image is portrayed of France as the prime example of republican identity that supposedly asks newcomers to leave their old identities behind (Kivisto, 2002). Somewhere in the middle are located many European nation-states. In reality the sets of rights are manifold and diverge between countries and change over time as for instance reported by the MIPEX studies.11 Policies on cultural recognition and multiculturalism have been analysed and categorized in many different ways. A common feature is to distinguish between historical and newcomer minorities, where the former have more extensive cultural rights than the latter (Kymlicka, 1995: 10–11). Another main line of division lies in the degree of individualism and collectivism, that is to what extent the State treats people as individuals or as members of particular (recognized) groups. French republicanism is again seen as an extreme version of individualistic citizenship, whereas communitarianism is often noted to be stronger, for example, in Great Britain. A third typical variant is the historical   Huddleston et al. (2011).

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German case of exclusion of citizenship, and hence of full participation on one’s own terms in society, for those of non-German heritage (Kivisto, 2002). All these are at least of symbolic importance and, at times, real opportunities or barriers for newcomers’ social and political inclusion in the host society. Through political rights states are able to control and guide newcomers’ settlement. They may also recognize collective identity claims and treat them favourably or dismiss them. Despite recent political talk of the “death of multiculturalism”,12 regularly mediatized hostilities against immigrant religions or legal restrictions on certain religious symbols, it is apparent that today’s legally recognized migrants enjoy generally wide and even extensive religious and cultural rights and freedom (Levitt, 2001: 26). The political and public debates, when removed from their national context, can give the misleading impression of outright suppression of newcomers’ cultural practices. Rather, more often the case is based on very particular issues with limited relevance for the immigrant population as a whole. Nevertheless, policies on immigrant inclusion may influence the way particular claims for collectivism are treated and how they are seen by the public. This feature is noted, for instance, in Martin Baumann’s phase-model of immigrant religious settlement that looks at the development of a religious community over generations in a welcoming or unwelcoming societal context (Baumann, 2002, 2004). Welfare State Regimes All advanced industrial societies have some kind of welfare state that aims to protect its members from the hazards of life. Elements of the modern welfare state were already introduced in many countries in the nineteenth century, but they came to bloom first in the aftermath of the Second World War (Pierson, 2006). A well-known formulation of different welfare state regimes was created by Gøsta Esping-Andersen in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. EspingAndersen analyzed how the production of welfare has been distributed between the State, the market, and the family. From his analysis emerged three different welfare regimes that were typical for modern, developed capitalist nations: the liberal, corporatist–statist, and social democratic welfare regimes. The regimes are different from each other in the way they affect decommodification, that is, the individual’s reliance on the market for welfare, and how different regimes influence social stratification. The regimes have also had consequences 12   Several key politicians in Europe have over the last years stated that multiculturalism has failed and there is a need for stronger integration into host societies.

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for religious organizations’ position in society, as (majority) churches have historically had an important role in the provision of welfare in many societies (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 26–27). The liberal welfare regime is focused on providing social assistance only to those in most need, and, hence, the role of civil society, including religious organizations, is to fill in welfare gaps. Charity and the provision of services play a significant role for many religious organizations, which also have high degrees of autonomy as many of their central activities lie outside the interests of the State. Examples of the liberal regime are the United States, Canada and Australia. The corporatist–statist welfare regime is characterized by strong links between State, corporations and the (Catholic) Church. The regime is conservative in the sense that the redistributive role of the State is low, and the continuation of existing class and status structures is embedded in public policy. In these countries churches often have various kinds of agreements with the State, or concordats as in the case of the Catholic Church. Many central and southern European states are of the corporatist–statist regime, for example, Germany, France, Italy and Spain. The social democratic welfare regime is characterized by universal rights. The role of religious organizations in welfare provision was not particularly prominent in the post-war welfare state, even though the dominant (Lutheran) churches often had an intimate relationship with the State. Other religions remained on the periphery. The social democratic welfare regime is typical of the Nordic countries, including Finland, which is discussed later in this chapter (Grassman, 2010). For the immigrant religious organizations, the setup of the welfare state is more central than often noted. According to Helen Rose Ebaugh and Janet Saltzman Chafetz, typical features of local immigrant religious communities in the United States include activities of worship, religious education of the second generation, events and activities directed at the reproduction of ethnicity and linguistic community, (social) services and assistance for members and representation of the community to outside actors (Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2000). That description suits well the liberal welfare regime, where part of the services are provided by charities and other civil society organizations, including religions. However, in both the corporatist–statist and social democratic welfare regimes many educational and social services are offered by taxpayers’ resources through State or corporatist institutions, thereby lessening the need to create such services, unless they were performed by religious (or “faith-based”) organizations in the first place. It also implies that the immigrants are in many more areas of life in touch with public authorities, and that the role of the religious organization

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is more directly associated with worship and reproduction of community as well as some kind of role in representation of the community’s needs. It further implies that public authorities need to take into consideration the tensions that may arise from religious or cultural differences within the corporatist–statist and social democratic welfare regimes. Church–State Relations Church–State relations vary extensively in advanced industrial societies.13 Key aspects in Church–State relations include whether one or more churches are treated favorably and to what extent minority religions can have specific religious rights. Whereas individual religious freedom in all advanced industrial societies is more or less granted, the treatment of religious collectives is more varied. The favourable treatment of the majority religion or religions takes many forms regarding, for example, their legal status, financing by taxation or State budget and political importance. Even though the particular Church–State relations are quite different in many welfare states, they also bear some resemblance to the welfare regime. This is especially so in the distribution of the delivery of welfare services. For example, in many of the corporatist nations, the historical majority churches do still play a major role in service production and delivery (Bader, 2007: 55–61). In some countries recognized religious organizations may apply or gain funding from the State. Such support can be crucial for newcomer religions, as it allows them an extra source of income in times when many immigrant communities otherwise lack resources. This may have further consequences for the groups in question, as it affects their autonomy and puts pressure on cooperation, if the group has specific demands on how it would like to be treated. For instance, in some countries religious education is conducted in schools, but the particular type of instruction may not be welcomed by the community. Furthermore, the more extensive is the reach of Church–State co-operation, the more there are eventual issues to solve (Bader, 2007: 55–61). It also puts pressure on the immigrant religious organization to deal with bureaucratic demands, when the community activists’ skills for that are only developing, hence again increasing the risk for conflict. Church–State relations and regulations on minority religions are often based on the norm and expectation that a religious collective is more or less like a Christian church, as most of the advanced industrial nations are majority   For a general overview, see: Madeley (2009); for Europe, see: Robbers (2005).

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Christian. This can include demands for a defined doctrine, membership and congregational structure much akin to Christianity, which may initially be an alien framing for the religious group in question. The Local Context The context of reception in sociological studies on immigrant religion is often framed as a national community. A well-known formulation is that promoted by R. Stephen Warner (1998), who argues that in the US context immigrant religions become like Protestant congregations (also called de facto congregationalism). That is so because of the structural necessity of the immigrant community to function in a new context, whereby the new context influences and directs the way that the newcomers can best reach their goals. This observation is shared by other researchers also outside of the United States.14 Debating the congregational approach, Wendy Cadge (2008) both challenges Warner’s argument and explicates its rationale more clearly by relating it to studies of new institutionalism. In new institutionalism, organizational change is taking place through coercive isomorphism (for example, legal norms), mimetic isomorphism (for example, copying models from the surroundings) and normative pressures (for example, peer pressure).15 While Cadge questions linear change and argues for more varied outcomes, including the observation that the change in organizational forms and adaptations may take generations, she, nevertheless, confirms the usefulness of the approach. Similar analyses and insights can be found in many studies of immigrant religions in the United States and Europe, whereby several identified changes among immigrant religions are seen as caused by the new context. While the de facto congregationalism is not the only approach on immigrant religions, it has become a powerful explanation on immigrant structural adaptation in a new society, reaching beyond its US base. While it is inherently tied up with methodological nationalism and limited by its expectations of path dependency, it nevertheless is able to explicate the apparent transformations among immigrant communities towards new organizational forms and rationalities. However, it also leaves open the question to what extent other local or transnational forces are shaping these dynamics.

14   For example, on immigrant religions in Finland: Martikainen (2004: 210–212); Muslim organization in Sweden: Svanberg and Westerlund (1999: 30). 15   Cadge (2008: 352). See also: DiMaggio and Powell (1983).

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Much of the debate over immigrant incorporation is based on national level regulation and policy making. Without denying its importance, it is useful to remember that political power is also located in the local level, in city councils, municipalities, etc. There are also historical, national differences as to what is the relative power distribution between the State, regions and localities. In this vein Patrick Ireland acknowledges the role of the nation-states in providing overarching ideologies and regulations to immigration and integration policies, but stresses the role of the local government in the actual application of these policies. He claims that local level decision-making can at times be even more important than national, and that there is much variance in its actual application between cities in the same country. Moreover, Ireland notes the impact of neoliberal restructuring of local level administration that has created novel types of partnerships, projects and alliances. Much of this is based on EU policy transfer, hence introducing the role of interstate polities. These developments can be understood also as undermining the historical path-dependent formations of minority rule, as they import new rationales of co-operation, agendas and ways to work (Ireland, 2004). Beside the bureaucratically defined city or municipality, the lived city of its people reaches far out. The locality of an immigrant community is not bound to its physical environment, but rather stretches to distant places via personal, family and organizational ties. The milieu in which individuals and organization operate is used for gaining resources, bringing in new ideas and moving people (Eade, 1996). For example, Peggy Levitt (2001: 54–69) discusses the importance of social remittances that have created mutual webs of interaction that tie diaspora or transnational communities over physically distant but socially close environments, creating social change in several places. The researchers’ task is not easy, as Michael Peter Smith addresses: “As increasing numbers of formerly locality-based social networks, cultural formations, grassroots movements, and business activities extend across national boundaries, becoming bi-national if not multinational in spatial scale, urban research needs to be literally ‘re-placed’ from the local to the translocal and transnational scales” (Smith, 2001: 175–176). The Immigrant Religion and its Adherents The previous sections highlighted the roles of the legal context, relevant areas of policy and state structure on newcomer religious groups. However, it is more than obvious that the “newcomers” and their traditions also play a role in adaptation.

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First, religious groups have their own understandings of the need, role and type of collectivity that they aim to create. For example, most active Christians and Muslims would prefer a regular, collective Sunday worship or Friday prayer meeting. Thus, the normative expectation is that people would gather on a regular, weekly basis, and in order to achieve that one usually needs religiously skilled persons to conduct the services, a locale for meeting and an association to run these activities. However, not all religions emphasize the need for collective regular meetings in the same way. For example, for many Buddhists and Hindus religious activity can be closely associated with as well as conducted at home, where one may have a small altar or shrine. Visiting religious meeting places or temples is not as central, or, at least, not necessarily with the same frequency as in some other religions. While it has not been systematically studied, it appears that generally speaking religions of the latter type institutionalize in diaspora to a lesser extent, and the process takes longer. Second, immigrants are always a selected group of people. The selection may be connected to age, gender, education or other aspect, but the key issue is that among them are certain types of people over- or under-represented. As religion, or that of being a religious specialist, is seldom the main reason for migration, it implies that the majority of activists in any immigrant religion are usually laypeople. Thus, there is an inbuilt need for transnational association with religious specialists and resources, whilst the lack of religious specialists provides more room for innovation and the creation of new forms of religious authority. As many of the efforts to build a new religious community are based on voluntary work, it becomes clear that the role of important key-individuals and activists cannot be underestimated. All in all, there is much more randomness taking place than in planned, centrally-led efforts to create new local institutions or to missionize, even though such is also taking place among immigrant populations. Third, as pointed out by Helen Rose Ebaugh and Janet Saltzman Chafetz, it is of crucial importance whether the newcomers belong to the religious majority or form a (new) religious minority. If they share the religion with the majority, a more or less ready religious infrastructure awaits them. Or, at least, this infrastructure can with minor adjustments be made suitable for them: for example, by introducing religious services in the language of the migrants. In the case of ending up in a minority position, the newcomers may be required to start all activities from scratch. Also, psychologically there can be more difficulties in adjusting to a new religious environment, especially when it comes to raising one’s children (Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2000). A further note should be made on the state of art in the study of immigrant religions. As much of the

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research on immigrant religions has focused on those groups that are new to the host society, it has led to ignoring those belonging to majority churches or to another already existing minority religion. The situation is very obvious in European research that is disproportionally directed at Muslims, who despite their great numbers, do not constitute the majority of immigrants in most, if not all, European societies.16 It remains currently open as to what extent this neglect affects the general interpretation of research results on religion and immigrant incorporation. The Case of Finland In order to discuss advanced industrial societies as a context of reception, I will draw from my own studies on immigrant religions in Finland.17 Finland is a North European state with a high GDP, and it ranks among the highest on many international, cross-country comparisons on economy, education, development and general well-being. It is one of the Nordic welfare states together with Denmark, Norway and Sweden. In terms of international migration, it used to be a country of emigration with the two largest migration waves to the United States and Canada at the turn of the twentieth century and mass-migration to Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s. Since the end of the Cold War, Finland has become a country of net immigration. While it is still among the smallest “immigrant nations” in Europe, the share of the first and second generation immigrants of the population will most likely reach 10 per cent during the 2010s (Martikainen et al., 2012). Now, let us turn to discuss Finland as a context of reception. First, more comprehensive immigration and integration policies have developed in tandem with the growth of the immigrant population since the early 1990s. These were initially directed at refugees via the UNHCR refugee resettlement programmes and ethnic return migrants from the former Soviet Union especially. Social rights of the immigrants are tied to the right to stay and permanent residence in the country, and once gained, are rather extensive. In practice, most of the integration measures are directed at improving the immigrants’ labour market skills. From early on, Finland adopted a multicultural integration policy that recognizes and, to a small extent, supports the cultural, linguistic and religious diversity of immigrants via municipalities and ministries. This includes also the   Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2012: 53–55).   For example, Martikainen (2004, 2007, 2009, 2012).

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establishment of a governmental board on ethnic relations, including immigrant religious organizations as members. Policy transfer started to have an important European dimension after 1995, when Finland joined the European Union (Saukkonen, 2010). Religious issues related to immigrants, especially Muslims, have been occasionally debated in public, but they have not so far gained a major place. This might gradually change due to the growth of the political antiimmigration and anti-Muslim movement since 2008, when the issue was for the first time nationally hotly debated in association with municipal elections (Martikainen, 2009). Second, the Finnish welfare state is fairly comprehensive, and includes free (or low cost) health care, social services and education. The voluntary sector, the civil society, is also in many ways tied to the State through webs of financial support, tax exemptions, co-operation networks, etc. As a matter of fact, the State’s relationships with many civil society organizations have grown stronger, ever since the introduction of new public management and associated policies since the 1990s. This somewhat paradoxical result of new public management, that is generally associated with deregulation, marketization, outsourcing and privatization, is related to new forms of control, including auditing, contracts, evaluations and networks (Pyykkönen, 2007). Nevertheless, the welfare state is included in people’s lives from the cradle to the grave, and the more points of contact there are with citizens and the State, the more there are possible areas of conflict. For example, it is currently a contested issue whether boys can have non-medical (for example, religious) circumcision under the public health care (Sakaranaho et al., 2004). However, as the welfare functions are mainly conducted by the State, it means that immigrant religions do not generally deliver such services. However, even this has started to change due to the availability of new forms of funding and an increasing commonality of outsourcing various services to civil society associations, also some immigrant religious groups have taken advantage of these opportunities. Third, Finnish Church–State relations provide a special status for the two “national churches”: the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Finnish Orthodox Church. This includes the collection of “membership fees” through state taxation, as well as other privileges, but also responsibilities. For example, the Lutheran Church takes care of most graveyards in the country. All other religions may organize under the Freedom of Religion Act, and once successfully conducted, they may apply for the right to conduct legally approved marriages, for instance (Heikkilä et al., 2005). The registration process demands predefined information from the applicant much based on the Protestant

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Christian understanding of religion. Whereas all that supports path dependent explanations, the perspective dismisses certain rising areas of new modes of governance. As implicated earlier, governmental practices have been affected by new public management principles of networks and markets. The changes in the ethnic but also religious landscape of Finland have led to government sponsored efforts to reach these communities in novel ways. Besides supporting immigrant associations in general, these have been tied to official representative, negotiation bodies. On religion, this includes the Islamic Council of Finland that was created on the initiative of the Ombudsman for Minorities. Also other new religious networks have emerged that include a variety of different religions (Martikainen, 2007). Fourth, studies on immigrant religions have not been conducted systematically in different cities in Finland, but based on existing data it seems fair to conclude that localities have responded quite differently to new challenges. For example, policies on religious education of minority religions are the most comprehensive in a few cities, but there are also differences between them. Also the inclusion of immigrant religions into local representative councils is by no means systematic (Martikainen, 2004).18 Hence, it supports Patrick Ireland’s observation that local agency and divergence is indeed a salient feature of immigrant inclusion. Fifth, as the great majority (up to two out of three) of all immigrants in Finland are of Christian background, it seems somewhat paradoxical that they gain very few mentions in policy and public debates over immigrant religions in the country. However, empirical studies show that both Christians and Muslims are among the most active in becoming religiously active in the new context; the former mainly in established and free churches and the latter mainly in new mosque communities. Other groups have also organized, but to a lesser degree (Martikainen, 2011). Transnational relations have emerged in order to find resources for establishing new religions in Finland, and in cases of established and free churches both national and international networks have been used to find assistance for the newcomers. However, much of the efforts have, especially in the early phases, been in the hands of single enthusiasts or key-individuals (Martikainen, 2004). To summarize, the context of reception for immigrant religions depends on several external and internal features of Finnish society and the community itself. While it is premature to state any definite outcome of the new migration inflow on religious landscape, it is nevertheless clear that the context of reception matters. Immigrants who have gained access to Finland have been recognized by   See also, Pessi et al. (2009).

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the State as having a legitimate reason to be religiously different; their concerns have been noted and taken into account in several areas of the welfare state; they have been able to gain state recognition as religious communities, and even at times financial support for them; in varying ways have or have not been adjusted to local governance structures; and, finally, much depending on their own interests and abilities, they have made use of available opportunities and resources. Conclusion This chapter has discussed the role of the receiving context for the process of immigrant religious settlement, organization and incorporation, including the role of the immigrants themselves. The chapter has not aimed to be a comprehensive account of the manifold processes taking place but rather a combination of different perspectives on it. It agrees with the general thrust of much current scholarship on the importance of the host society as a key influence for processes among immigrant populations, but also points to the active role of the immigrant religion in question. This interplay could be seen as a central aspect of immigrant incorporation, as it enables to discuss interaction of agency, structure and tradition in a particular context. The case of Finland exemplified on a general level aspects of immigrant incorporation in advanced industrial societies. Perhaps the largest question is how the State’s relationship to religions as actors in civil society in general is developing. Religions, including those of immigrant origin, are increasingly seen as partners by the State. Whereas this can be understood as an extension of new public management of religion, it remains unclear how it will affect Church–State relations. The uncertainty remains because governance mechanisms of new public management are rather different to those of the historical Church–State relations, and they emphasize the role of the markets as well as networks. Studying immigrant religions has made more explicit the special characteristics of the receiving context, as it tries to figure out ways to incorporate newcomers. A promising avenue for further research would be systemic studies comparing the institutionalization processes of immigrant religions more broadly than among Islamic organizations that have dominated the academic debate during recent years. For example, one major area that hitherto remains more or less unaddressed is how the majority churches in different European societies have responded to fellow Christians that constitute the bulk of international migrants in Europe.

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Acknowledgements I would like to thank Peter Kivisto and Jim Spickard, as well as Östen Wahlbeck and other members in his “Transnational and Local” Research Project for their comments, and Benjamin Zeller for linguistic review. The flaws remain mine, though. The chapter has been written in association with Transnational and Local: The Social Integration of Immigrant Communities Project, funded by the Academy of Finland (project number 131720). References Albrow, M., Eade, J., Dürrschmidt, J. and Washbourne, N. (1996) “The Impacts of Globalization on Sociological Concepts”, in J. Eade (ed.) Living the Global City: Globalization as a Local Process. London: Routledge, pp. 20–36. Bader, V. (2007) Secularism or Democracy? Associational Governance of Religious Diversity. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press. Baumann, M. (2002) “Migrant Settlement, Religion and Phases of Diaspora”. Migration: A European Journal of International Migration and Ethnic Relations, 33/34/35, pp. 93–117. Baumann, M. (2004) “Becoming a Colour of the Rainbow: The Social Integration of Indian Hindus in Trinidad, Analysed along a Phase Model of Diaspora”, in K. Jacobsen and P. Kumar (eds) South Asians in the Diaspora: Histories and Religious Traditions. Leiden: Brill, pp. 77–96. Bramadat, P. and Koenig, M. (eds) (2009) International Migration and the Governance of Religious Diversity. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Byrnes, T. and Katzenstein, P. (eds) (2006) Religion in an Expanding Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cadge, W. (2008) “De Facto Congregationalism and the Religious Organizations of Post-1965 Immigrants to the United States: A Revised Approach”. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 76/2, pp. 344–374. Cadge, W. and Ecklund, E. (2007) “Immigration and Religion”. Annual Review of Sociology, 33, pp. 359–379. Casanova, J. (2006) “Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration”, in T. Byrnes and P. Katzenstein (eds) Religion in an Expanding Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 65–92.

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Casanova, J. (2007) “Immigrants and the New Religious Pluralism: A European Union/United States Comparison”, in T. Banchoff (ed.) Democracy and the New Religious Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 59–83. DiMaggio, P. and Powell, W. (1983) “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields”. American Sociological Review, 48/2, pp. 147–160. Eade, J. (ed.) (1996) Living the Global City: Globalization as a Local Process. London: Routledge. Ebaugh, H. and Chafetz, J. (eds) (2000) Religion and the New Immigrants: Continuities and Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations. Walnut Creek: Altamira. Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Fetzer, J. and Soper, C. (2005) Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres. Foner, N. and Alba, R. (2008) “Immigrant Religion in the U.S. and Western Europe: Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?”. International Migration Review, 42/2, pp. 360–392. Glick-Schiller, N. and Çağlar, A. (2009) “Towards a Comparative Theory of Locality in Migration Studies: Migrant Incorporation and City Scale”. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35/2, pp. 177–202. Glick-Schiller, N., Basch, L. and Blanc-Szanton, C. (1992) Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered. New York: New York Academy of Sciences. Grassman, E. (2010) “Welfare in Western Europe: Existing Regimes and Patterns of Change”, in A. Bäckström and G. Davie with N. Edgardh and P. Pettersson (eds) Welfare and Religion in 21st Century Europe: Volume 1. Configuring the Connections. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 25–37. Heikkilä, M., Knuutila, J. and Scheinin, M. (2005) “State and Church in Finland”, in G. Robbers (ed.) State and Church in the European Union. Second Edition. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 519–536. Huddleston, T. and Niessen, J. with Chaoimh, E. and White, E. (2011) Migrant Integration Policy Index III. Brussels: Migration Policy Group and British Council. Ireland, P. (2004) Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

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Jaworsky, B., Levitt, P., Cadge, W., Hejtmanek, J. and Curran, S. (2012) “New Perspectives on Immigrant Contexts of Reception: The Cultural Armature of Cities”. Nordic Journal of Migration Studies, 2/1, pp. 78–88. Kivisto, P. (2002) Multiculturalism in a Global Society. Oxford: Blackwell. Kymlicka, W. (1995) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Laurence, J. (2012) The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Levitt, P. (2001) The Transnational Villagers. Berkeley: University of California Press. Madeley, J. (2009) “Religion and the State”, in J. Haynes (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics. London: Routledge, pp. 174–191. Martikainen, T. (2004) Immigrant Religions in Local Society: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives in the City of Turku. Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press. Martikainen, T. (2007) “The Governance of Islam in Finland”. Temenos, 43/2, pp. 243–265. Martikainen, T. (2009) “Finland”, in G. Larsson (ed.) Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries. London: Routledge, pp. 76–89. Martikainen, T. (2011) “Maahanmuuttajien uskonnollisen taustan tilastollinen arvioiminen Suomessa”. Teologinen Aikakauskirja, 116/3, pp. 232–246. Martikainen, T. (2012) “The Global Political Economy, Welfare State Reforms, and the Governance of Religion”, in P. Nynäs, M. Lassander and T. Utriainen (eds) The Post-Secular Society. London: Transaction Publishers, pp. 71–93. Martikainen, T., Valtonen, K. and Wahlbeck, Ö. (2012) “The Social Integration of Immigrants in Finland”, in J. Frideres and J. Biles (eds) International Perspectives: Integration and Inclusion. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, pp. 127–146. Maussen, M. (2007) The Governance of Islam in Western Europe: A State of the Art. Amsterdam: IMISCOE. Pessi, A., Angell, O. and Pettersson, P. (2009) “Nordic Majority Churches as Agents in the Welfare State: Critical Voices and/or Complementary Providers?”. Temenos, 45/2, pp. 207–234. Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2012) Faith on the Move: The Religious Affiliations of International Migrants. Washington, DC: Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. Pierson, C. (2006) Beyond the Welfare State? The New Political Economy of Welfare. Third Edition. Cambridge: Polity.

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Portes, A. and Rumbaut, R. (2006) Immigrant America: A Portrait. Third Edition. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pyykkönen, M. (2007) “Integrating Governmentality: Administrative Expectations for Immigrant Associations in Finland”. Alternatives, 32, pp. 197–224. Robbers, G. (ed.) (2005) State and Church in the European Union. Second Edition. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Robertson, R. (1995) “Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity–Heterogeneity”, in M. Featherstone, S. Lash and R. Robertson (eds) Global Modernities. London: Sage, pp. 25–44. Sakaranaho T., Alitolppa-Niitamo, A., Martikainen, T. and Tiilikainen, M. (2004) “Religion in Migration: Studies on Muslims in Finland”, in V. Puuronen, A. Häkkinen, A. Pylkkänen, T. Sandlund and R. Toivanen (eds) New Challenges for the Welfare Society. Joensuu: University of Joensuu, pp. 124–139. Samers, M. (2010) Migration. London: Routledge. Saukkonen, P. (2010) Kotouttaminen ja kulttuuripolitiikka: Tutkimus maahanmuutosta ja monikulttuurisuudesta suomalaisella taiteen ja kulttuurin kentällä. Helsinki: Cupore. Smith, M. (2001) Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization. Oxford: Blackwell. Stausberg, M. (2009) “Exploring the Meso-levels of Religious Mappings: European Religion in Regional, Urban, and Local Contexts”. Religion: An International Journal, 39/2, pp. 103–108. Svanberg, I. and Westerlund, D. (1999) “Från invadrarreligion till blågul islam? 50 år av organisered muslimsk närvaro”, in I. Svanberg and D. Westerlund (eds) Blågul islam? Muslimer i Sverige. Nora: Nya Doxa, pp. 9–29. Thörn, H. (2010) “A ‘Political Turn’ in Sociology?”. Acta Sociologica, 53/1, pp. 73–80. Turner, B. (2011) Religion and Modern Society: Citizenship, Secularisation and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Warner, R. (1998) “Immigration and Religious Communities in the United States”, in R. Warner and J. Wittner (eds) Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and New Immigration. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 3–34. Wimmer, A. and Glick-Schiller, N. (2002) “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation–state Building, Migration and the Social Sciences”. Global Networks, 2/4, pp. 301–334.

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PART II Religion and Migration in Europe: Case Studies

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Chapter 4

Migration and Ethno-Religious Identity in Contemporary Greece: The Role of the Orthodox Church Elisabeth A. Diamantopoulou

Introduction Greek society has undergone significant transformations in the last two decades in the pace of globalization and multiculturalism, the latter mainly as a result of the subsequent waves of immigration into the country, and especially Muslim immigrants. Within this context, it is evident that the issue of immigration, not only in Greece, but in most European and Western countries, is closely linked to the issue of religious minorities, and raises further questions regarding the effective implementation of human rights, and more specifically of religious freedom. The specificities of Greece’s historical legacy, and Church–State relations, clearly differentiate this country in several accounts from other European and Western countries. The significance of the Church’s hegemonic position and politicization in Greece can only be understood against the background of the complex relationship between Church and nation, Orthodoxy and modern Greek identity, which constitute a characteristic feature of Greece’s historical, socio-religious, and politico-religious heritage. In fact, the Orthodox religion remains deeply nationalistic in orientation and intertwined with the nineteenth-century interpretation of Greek national identity whereby Orthodoxy and Greece are viewed as inseparable (Fokas, 2008; Manitakis, 2000; Pollis, 1992; Roudometof, 2005, 2011). The nationalization of the Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG) is the result of a long historical process dating back to the Greek Revolution of 1821 against the Ottomans, and the subsequent creation of an independent Greek State in 1830. The Church settlement of 1833, by which ties with the Ecumenical Patriarchate were severed, and the Church was declared autocephalous and subject to a considerable degree of government

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control, constituted a significant breach with tradition (Clogg, 1992: 50).1 Relations with the Patriarchate were not formally restored until 1850, when Constantinople recognized the 1833 settlement.2 The aforementioned breach with tradition took place within the broader context of emergence of nationstates in Europe that marked the nineteenth century, and more specifically, the context of nationalization of Orthodoxy – first initiated in Russia by Czar Peter the Great (1682–1725) – which was basically a modern phenomenon (Makrides, 2009: 73).3 The appearance of nation-states in South- Eastern Europe during the nineteenth century, starting with the creation of the Greek nation-state, constituted a significant breach with the overall historical trajectory of the Orthodox Church in this region; namely, it was this breach that transformed the Church into a national church (Kitromilides, 2001). This “irreversible process of nationalization” culminated with the eventual total conversion of the Church of Greece to the secular values of Greek nationalism and its transformation into an official arm of the civil state, to the point that the OCG spearheaded all nationalist initiatives in the latter part of the nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century. This development represented a major departure from Orthodox tradition and became ideologically possible only after a profound change in the values and priorities of the Church had taken place. This change hinged precisely on the new system of values elaborated by Greek nationalism, which through a series of theoretical compromises managed to redefine the   See also Karalis (2007: 156–185).   Politically, the issue of ecclesiastical independence turned into a confrontation between the proponents of a nationalized state church reproducing Protestant models, and the zealots of the ecumenicity of a supranational Orthodox ecclesiastical community. The major spokesman of the opponents of autocephaly, Constantine Oikonomos, condemned it as an adulteration of the authentic traditions of the Church, through the adoption of Western models (Frazee, C. 1969, The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece 1821–1852, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 146–154, 164–165, 168–170; quoted in Kitromilides, 1989). Although, eventually, in 1850, at the initiative of the Greek state, the Patriarchate issued a tome granting administrative autocephaly to the Church of Greece, the nationalization of the Church was an irreversible process (Kitromilides, 1989: 166). 3   See also the remarks of Kalaitzidis (2010: 373): “The Orthodox peoples’ shared history … was gradually altered in the 18th century and especially the 19th century through the influence of the European Enlightenment and the rise of nationalism that this engendered. This national splintering and the definitive divorce of the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans was made final with … the separation of the respective national churches from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and the state-supported declarations of their autocephaly, which converted them into departments of the state and organs for the spread of the national ideology”. 1 2

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whole tradition of Eastern Orthodoxy by drawing the nation and the Church together as integral parts of the same symbolic universe (Kitromilides, 1989: 166; our emphasis). The Issue of Religious Freedom as a Marker of the Church/Nation Relationship: The Greek Specificity4 It is against this complex background of historical contingencies that forged the religion–national identity link in Greece (Fokas, 2008), and the ensuing legal framework of Church–State relations, as it is set out in the 1975 Constitution, that the Greek specificity in the domains of management of religious pluralism and religious minorities can be understood. In fact, Article 3 of the Greek Constitution stipulates that the “dominant” or “prevailing” religion of the Greek population is Eastern Orthodoxy under the authority of the autocephalous Church, which is united spiritually with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In theory, a State-established religion does not necessarily imply denial, or restrictions of freedom to other religions; however, the Greek model of treatment of religious minorities is somewhat unusual compared with that in other European countries, insofar as Orthodoxy continues to enjoy special privileges in areas of public life. Greek Orthodoxy in fact is the only truly free religion in Greece – other faiths are simply tolerated (Molokotos-Liederman, 2007). Although the Constitution (Art. 13, Par. 2) guarantees freedom of religious conscience5 and in principle grants freedom of religion to all “known” religions, religious rights are limited. In fact, freedom of religious conscience does not necessarily translate into freedom of practice (Pollis, 1992), while the somewhat vague differentiation between “known” and other (not known) religions, and between “legal person in public law” and “legal person in private law” creates conditions that preserve a preferential status for the OCG, with serious implications for other faiths6   See Diamantopoulou (2012: 3–4).   For a detailed analysis, from a constitutional point of view, regarding freedom of religious conscience and “prevailing religion” in the Greek law order, see Sp. Troianos, “Freedom of Religious Conscience and Prevailing Religion”, available from: www. myriobiblos.gr/texts/greek/troianos_eleftheria.html (accessed: 15 March 2012, in Greek). 6   The Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG) has the status of a public law entity; this status is also granted to Judaism and Islam, belonging to the category of “known religions”. However, other religious groups, while recognized as “known religions” (Roman Catholic Church, Old Calendarists, Protestant Churches – primarily Evangelical, and some Pentecostal churches), have the status of private law entity. The significance of this differentiation lies 4 5

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(Molokotos-Liederman, 2007; Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2009). According to the constitutional law expert Nikos Alivizatos, the privileges of the OCG in the Greek state order derive from two different sources in Greek law: the legal status of the OCG as a public law entity, and the prevailing religion clause in the Greek Constitution. In fact, as Karagiannis states, “the problem of secularism in Greece is often described as a problem of both incomplete differentiation between the political and religious spheres, and curtailment of religious freedom” (2009: 145–146). Another important aspect regarding the effective implementation of religious freedom in Greece lies in the issue of proselytism. The Greek constitutional prohibition against proselytism (Art. 13, Par. 2) constitutes a significant hindrance for religious minorities to effectively practice their beliefs, since it denies freedom to teach and at times to worship. According to Pollis, this prohibition against proselytism by religious minorities “is the most sweeping restriction on the exercise of religious freedom”, and it blatantly violates the European Convention of Human Rights, which stipulates that the teaching of one’s religious beliefs and the right to change religion are fundamental human rights7 (Pollis, 1992: 183). It thus becomes clear, that all issues – directly or indirectly – related to religious freedom are of special importance regarding immigrant communities in contemporary Greece, and especially Muslim immigrants, which are estimated to account for 470,000, and constitute the second most important religious minority in the country, following the Old Calendarists (500,000–800,000).8 Even though Islam enjoys a status as the religion of the autochthonous Muslim minority of Western Thrace (in North-Eastern Greece), and constitutes a recognized (that is, “known” according to the Greek Constitution) religious in the fact that there are important privileges deriving from the legal status as a public law entity, such as tax exemption, remuneration by the State, and execution of administrative acts (Molokotos-Liederman, 2007; Pollis, 1992: 181–182; Karagiannis, 2009: 146–147). 7   In guaranteeing religious freedom the Convention states that “everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change one’s religion or belief and freedom … to manifest one’s religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance” (ECHR, Art. 9). 8   For a detailed analysis of the demography of religious minorities in Greece, see Molokotos-Liederman (2007: 142–143); the author states that “information specific to the religious demography of Greece that is broken down according to religious minority groups is scarce and can be based only on estimations”, because “since 1951 the Greek National Statistical Service has not included questions based on religious criteria in its national census and surveys”. According to the author, “this is partly due to an existing sensitivity in Greece over minority issues”.

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minority under public law –along with the Jewish one – these distinctions in themselves have restricted religious freedoms in the country, and have led to a series of discriminatory legal and administrative practices that relate to the rights of religious groups (Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2009: 961). Given the fact that there is no formal mechanism or process for a religious group to become recognized as a “known” religion in Greece, and this can usually be achieved through approval of a permit to operate a place of worship (Molokotos-Liederman, 2007: 158), serious problems arise with special regard to Muslim immigrants that do not belong to the so-called historic Muslim minority in Western Thrace, which has an official status in Greece, by virtue of the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty. All these restrictions on religious freedom are symptomatic not only of Greece’s insularity, but also of the rigidity of the boundaries that define Greek ethnic identity (Pollis, 1992: 185). In his historical sociology of nations and nationalism, as far as Greece is concerned, Anthony Smith explains that “the Byzantine heritage was reinterpreted and annexed to an overarching conception of the millennial Greek nation, so that, like the golden age of classical Athens, that of imperial Byzantium and its Orthodox faith became products of the creative genius of a retrojected conception of the Greek nation” (Smith, 2008: 164).9 Against this background of national identity formation and dominant nationalism discourses, difference in Greece is understood at two inextricably tied levels: ethnicity/nationality and religion. These two aspects emanate from the very definition of Greekness that successfully combined the particularism of the nation with the universalism of Greek Orthodoxy. Greek understanding of difference is mobilized and enacted with regard to both native minorities and immigrant groups. It is the historical experience of nation formation and difficult relations with neighbouring countries and their co-ethnic minorities within Greece that have shaped the Greek notion of ethnic and religious difference. However, these historically shaped notions are today also projected towards the immigrant populations and relevant immigration legislation (Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2009: 960).

  Across similar lines, the sociologist Makrides, raising the question of the alleged “national” role of the Orthodox Church of Greece, is particularly critical of the fact that “Church and related discourses today draw no distinction between ethnie and nation, between pre-national/pre-modern ethnic and modern national identities. The Church addresses the past by looking at the modern period and using national criteria and arguments – as a result of its nationalization in the frame of the Modern Greek state” (Makrides, 2009: 76). 9

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Immigration as a Challenge to the Dominant Greek Ethno-religious Understanding of Identity and the Role of the Orthodox Church in the Twenty First Century Over the last two decades, various geopolitical and socio-economic factors have transformed Greece from a country of emigration into a host country to thousands of immigrants: immigration replaced emigration as the dominant trend (Molokotos-Liederman, 2007; Kasimis, 2012). Since 1989–1990, Greece has in fact become host to a large number of immigrants mainly from the Balkans (Albania and Bulgaria), Central and Eastern Europe (Romania, the Ukraine and Russia) and, increasingly, Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and China). It is estimated that more than 1 million immigrants have arrived in Greece over the course of two decades (www.statistics.gr; www.migrationinformation.org). The ineffective legal and institutional framework for the regularization and integration of immigrants has contributed, among other factors, to create a fragile environment for the management of immigration. In fact, repeated regularization programmes and the remaining large numbers of unauthorized immigrants in Greece confirm the failure of policy. Greece stands out as unique in Southern Europe in the extent of its illegal immigration. It is also unique in the proportion of immigrants to population, and especially in the ratio of non-EU to native population. The latter can perhaps be attributed mainly to geography; however, the extent of illegality, it has been argued, is the direct result of its governmental policy (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002). More than 20 years after the increase of immigration flows to the country, Greece has not managed to design satisfactory and operational policies for both the regularization of unauthorized immigrants already in the country and legal ways of entry for skilled immigrants the country needs to attract (Kasimis, 2012). As a result, the weaknesses and inadequacies of Greek immigration policies, and the deficiency of the Greek state to adequately handle the situation, hinder seriously the social integration of immigrants, and thus create a potentially explosive social context that is susceptible to conflicts and upheavals. As the contemporary theologian Kalaitzidis (2009) points out, “the basic challenge to which the multicultural Greek society under formation is called to respond, consists in adequately accommodating the relations between the autochthonous and the immigrant population, in such a way to avoid conflicts and to get to know each other, leading thus to a mutual understanding, and to a creative interaction between the respective civilizations” (p. 111). The theologian underlines the decisive role that the Orthodox Church of Greece is

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called to play in this respect, through its theology and worship, its pastoral and philanthropic work, by creating thus the adequate conditions for the acceptance and recognition of plurality and difference, as basic features of the social being. Kalaitzidis belongs to the younger generation of theologians and scholars – informally designated as the “generation of the ‘90s–‘00s” , which has been quite critical towards the approaches of the older generation – the so-called “generation of the ‘60s”,10 concerning the identification of the Church with the nation, and of Orthodoxy with the modern Greek identity. It is precisely this ethno-religious understanding of Orthodoxy and Greekness that has been mostly contested in the writings of the younger generation, not only of theologians, but also more generally of scholars and religious thinkers in contemporary Greece.11 Another theologian, Petrou (2007), considers that the “institutional” Church12 should enter into dialogue with the modern world, adapt itself to modernity, and accept the openness and multiculturalism of the modern Greek society. This implies the imperative necessity for the Church to free itself from the concept of nation and ethnocentric ideology, and recall the principle of ecumenicity of Christianity (Christian oikoumene), thus, realizing that she ought to care indistinctively for all human beings, independently from national and specific cultural identities (Petrou, 2007: 349). Across similar lines, the sociologist Makrides, raising the question of the alleged national role of the Orthodox Church of Greece, is particularly critical of the fact that: Church and related discourses today draw no distinction between ethnie and nation, between pre-national/pre-modern ethnic and modern national identities.  The theology of the ‘60s, called the “generation of the ‘60s”, is a theological movement which made its appearance in the 1960s – as its name indicates – and developed in opposition to Catholic and in particular Protestant theology, in an attempt to propose an alternative model to the privatized and individualized religious practice in Western Europe. The most prominent feature of the theology of the ‘60s is “the progressive shift from a purely theological discourse to a culturalistic, ethnocentric and hellenocentric discourse … ” (Kalaitzidis, 2008: 34). 11   This brief analysis regarding the criticism of the younger generation of Greek Orthodox theologians, is part of my paper on “The ‘National Role’ of the Greek Orthodox Church: The Intra-Theological Debate in Contemporary Greek Thought”, presented at the international conference on Orthodox Christianity and the Integration of Europe, 15–17 September 2011, Catholic University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium. 12   The term “institutional church” is used here in the meaning of institutional structuring, functioning and overall organizational pattern, in order to make a clear distinction with the ecclesiological and theological meaning of the term “Church”, in the sense of “ecclesia” (Petrou, 2007: 337). 10

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The church addresses the past by looking at the modern period and using national criteria and arguments – as a result of its nationalization in the frame of the modern Greek state. (Makrides, 2009: 76)

This quest for openness, and readjustment of the ecclesiastical discourse and overall attitude of the Church to the contemporary reality of multicultural civil societies is a common characteristic in the writings of contemporary theologians and religious thinkers. It is particularly interesting to note that theologians from within the ecclesiastical milieu also address this kind of criticism. Representative examples in this respect are Fr. Thermos, Fr. Pinakoulas, the Orthodox priest Kamperidis, and the Archimandrite Papathomas. Papathomas (2006), a theologian and canonist, expresses his strong disapproval of the fact that the ecclesiology of the Church on one hand, and the canonical settlement of ecclesiological issues on the other hand, are still strongly defined by the idea of national state, or, otherwise put, by state nationalism and/or ethnophyletism.13 Fr. Pinakoulas (2007), addressing the issue of Church–State relations, and the relationship between Church and Hellenism in contemporary Greece, strongly criticizes the gradual “transformation of the Church into a state department”, the fact that “the institution of the Church became an instrument of state bureaucracy and politics” (Pinakoulas, 2007: 328).14 He argues that modernity has proved in the most painful way for the Church, and especially through the example of Church–State relations, that the identification between the Church and a specific historical period is simply unrealistic. Deeply aware of the necessity for the Church to readjust her ecumenical message in the cultural context of every historical period, Fr. Pinakoulas calls the Church to seek and (re)discover her role and mission, within the particular cultural and political context of modernity (2007: 335). According to Fr. Thermos (2005), there ought to be a transition of the overall problematic from the concept of nation to the one of civil society; this transition would engender a totally different ecclesiastical attitude and way of thinking, and especially with regard to the products of modernity. Thermos argues that the civil society, contrary to the nation, bears less ideological tension; its main concern consists in being in constant dialogue with, and in a self-critical search for its very own contradictions, in the absence of which it cannot exist. The theologian is quite critical of the contemporary Church discourse, which, in his view, is still constantly referring to the nation, its structural elements, its specificity, and the historical contribution of the Church   About the issue of ethnophyletism, see also his Course of Canon Law (1995: 223–224).   See also Pinakoulas (2001).

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to the preservation of all the above, while, on the contrary, the secular discourse is rather judgemental of, and puts aside these elements in the name of society. He further argues that: The Church is concerned about, and is fighting for the recognition of the parameter nation (…) On the contrary, the modernist attitude, without explicitly denying the existence of the nation as an entity, prefers to discuss in terms of civil society, and calls the Church to comply with the demands of the former -neutrality, democracy, tolerance, openness of mind, etc. (Thermos, 2005: 130–131)

Within this context, it thus becomes clear that the phenomenon of immigration in contemporary Greece poses an important challenge to the dominant ethnoreligious understanding of identity, and the new role that the Orthodox Church of Greece is called to play with regard to the accommodation of the emerging needs of the de facto multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious Greek society. It remains a fact, as Kalaitzidis (2009) points out, that the catechism of the OCG is still inadequate, and does not sufficiently respond to the challenges of the open multicultural society of the twenty-first century. There are important deficiencies with regard to the catechism of foreigners and immigrants and, as a result, most of them remain confined in a conventional religiosity of the traditional type, instead of being in real communion with the ecclesia. Very few immigrants participate actively in the ecclesiastical life of the local parishes (Kalaitzidis, 2009: 99). Along similar lines, Triandafyllidou (2009) points out, that it is actually quite surprising that the Greek Church did not even seek to attract the substantial number of co-ethnic and other migrants from Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Russia who are Christian Orthodox. The explanation may lie in the close connection between Greek ethnicity and the Christian Orthodox religion which prevents the Greek Church from having an Ecumenical vocation and addressing issues that contest the ethnic homogeneity of its flock (Triandafyllidou, 2009: 166–167). The Ministerial Outreach of the Church of Greece: A Slow Process of Reinventing the Christian Orthodox Theological “Ethos of Hospitality (philoxenia)” to Accommodate Migration in Twenty First Century Greece? The specificity of Church–State relations and the complex nexus of religion/ identity in Greece, as described above, constitute a socio-historical factor that

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cannot be disregarded, when it comes to understanding the difficulties in implementing efficient migration policies up to the present -day. Yet, at the same time, the active involvement of the Church of Greece as an institutional actor aside the state, in migration-related policies – especially since the 2000s – is quite emblematic of the efforts made by the OCG, to readjust its discourse and overall attitude, by gradually adapting itself to the new circumstances of the multicultural society. The present-day ministerial outreach of the Church of Greece can be apprehended, insofar as it is deeply rooted in the Orthodox tradition of the socalled “ethos of hospitality (philoxenia)”. The Orthodox theological foundations of the hospitality of foreigners are rooted in the Bible, and the Greek Orthodox patristic tradition. As the contemporary Greek Orthodox theologian Stavrou (2010) points out, “the condition of being a foreigner is constitutive of the ecclesial identity; thus, every migrant incarnates the condition of Christians in this world. The theological foundations of Christian hospitality are evident: the latter is indicative of Christ’s active hospitality, as well as the hospitality given to Christ, which is incarnated in the condition of the migrant” (Stavrou, 2010: 381). In their writings, the Greek Fathers address numerous exhortations to the Christians, to welcome the foreigners, in all kind of circumstances. Saint Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 329–390) calls all Christians to practice hospitality towards foreigners, in order to safeguard the very essence of their baptism.15 This attitude of hospitality towards foreigners does not consist merely in voluntaristic morals; it is rather the extension of the sacramental and ecclesial life (Stavrou, 2010: 386). The Greek Father, St John Chrysostom (c. 347–407), makes a similar exhortation to practice hospitality: “It is us, who are foreigners [to our Father in the divine sky], if we do not offer our hospitality to foreigners”.16 In a recent official document of the Holy Synod, entitled “The Orthodox Church of Greece Responding to the Issue of Migration”, providing information on the history and work of the ministerial services in this field, the Church explicitly reminds that the latter are “rooted in the Orthodox faith, as well as in the long-standing Greek and Orthodox tradition of the ‘magnificent ethos of hospitality’”.17 This excerpt is quite indicative of the Church’s willingness to be an active actor in the accommodation of migration, by re-adjusting the   Gregory of Nazianzus, Disc. 40, 31 (Sources Chrétiennes 358, Éd. C. Moreschini, Paris, 1990: 268); quoted in M. Stavrou (2010: 386). 16   John Chrysostom, Hom. on the Acts of the Apostles, 45, 4 (PG 60, 319); quoted in Stavrou (2010: 386). 17   Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, The Orthodox Church of Greece Responding to the Issue of Migration, 9. 15

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centuries- long theological tradition of “philoxenia” to the present-day migratory and multicultural reality. Yet, at the same time, the identification between the Greek national and Orthodox identity is still explicitly formulated (Greek and Orthodox tradition of the “magnificent ethos of hospitality”). If the issue of identification of Orthodoxy with “Greeknesss” is still very much present, nevertheless, it is argued that the Church’s present-day ministerial outreach constitutes an effort to go beyond this religion/identity nexus, by remobilizing the theological resources of the Orthodox tradition regarding the respect, acceptance and service (in the theological sense of diakonia) towards the foreigner’s “otherness” (διακονία του ξένου). This re-mobilization, or re-invention, of the Orthodox “ethos of hospitality”, is translated in a series of initiatives and activities led by the OCG during the last decades. The brief outline provided below, of the OCG’s involvement in the field of migration during the period from 1978 up to the present day, highlights precisely this slow, albeit progressive process of transition from an institutionally focused attitude of the religious actor to more pastoral oriented policies, at the local level of parishes, in the field of migration. The Contribution of the Orthodox Church of Greece to the Social Integration of Migrants: Past and Present The Orthodox Church of Greece has played a very active role in the field of migration in Greece, by creating special services, aiming at the efficient management of migration-related issues, as well as the overall pastoral support of migrants and refugees. The Integration Centre for Returning Migrants, Immigrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees (KSPM-ERP), and the Special Synodic Committee for Migrants, Refugees, and Returning Migrants (SCMRM) constitute the two main institutions affiliated at the Orthodox Church of Greece, which are in charge of migration-related issues. The Holy Synod of the Church of Greece founded the KSPM in 1978 after the proposal of the Inter-Church Aid and Foreign Relations Committee. It started functioning as a common project of WCC (“Diakonisches Werk der EKD” and “Dienste in Übersee”, 1974–1990), and later on (1990) became a service of the Holy Synod, depending directly from the Office of the InterChurch Aid and Foreign Relations Committee. The role of the KSPM was then confined to offering support services to the numerous Greek returning migrants from Germany, to help them confront the problems arising with regard to their readjustment and social integration

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to the Greek society. However, the gradual transformations of the migration phenomenon, led to the expansion and readjustment of the services offered by the Centre, to accommodate the emerging needs arising out of new forms of migration. In the 1990s, when Greece turned into a country of reception of immigration, the KSPM extended its scope to include immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees. In 1994, after the closing down of the “WCC Refugee Service in Greece”, and following an agreement between the WCC and the Church of Greece, the continuation of the WCC-Greece work with asylum seekers and refugees was assigned to the KSPM. A new service has been established under the name “Ecumenical Refugee Programme” (ERP). The KSPM-ERP are dedicated to: • Provide quality social, psychological and legal support services for returnees, immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees, helping them to meet their needs and integrate into Greek society. • Assist the Church and the parishes to engage in the Ministry of receiving and welcoming the foreigners. • Build and promote cross-cultural and mutual understanding, affirmation and respect of the “otherness”. • Provide current information on migration issues to service providers, communities, parishes and the general public. • Advocate for justice, dignity, and the human rights for the foreigners.18 Gradually, in the context of the implementation of various European programmes, the KSPM-ERP developed a series of more individualized counselling and support services, such as: 1. functioning of guest houses for refugees, and immigrant women in danger; 2. Greek language courses; 3. psychosocial support; 4. information services regarding the recognition of migrants’ diplomas; 5. organization of educational seminars and programmes; 6. legal consulting services for immigrants regarding the legalization of their status; 7. legal support for refugees claiming political asylum; and 18   Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, The Orthodox Church of Greece Responding to the Issue of Migration, 9. op. cit.

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8. legal representation services in cases concerning the violation of immigrants’ working rights, and, more generally, aiming at the guaranty and defence of immigrants’ fundamental human rights. The KSPM’s main responsibility consists in elaborating and enhancing policies aiming at: 1. recognizing immigrants’ basic rights, such as the right to work, to education, to housing, and to medical-pharmaceutical state insurance; 2. realizing and promoting actions for the immigrants’ support (development of skills, educative and acculturation programmes) in order to facilitate their access to the labour market, and to provide them with a satisfactory standard of living; and 3. ensuring that the conditions are fulfilled for the immigrants’ effective participation in the society at an equal basis with the autochthones. The Centre also submits proposals to the State regarding migration-related policies. For the elaboration of such proposals, the Centre draws on its experience from the daily management of immigrants’ and refugees’ claims, its collaboration with various immigrant communities and associations, as well as its participation at a regular basis in the work of the Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME), of which it is a founding member. A second important stage of “institutionalization” of the Church’s activities and policies regarding migration, took place in November 2006, with the foundation of the Special Synodic Committee for Migrants, Refugees, and Returning Migrants,19 at the initiative of the Archbishop of Athens and all of Greece, Mgr. Christodoulos, and following the approval of the Holy Synod of the OCG. The role of this Committee, which is composed of university professors and jurists specialized in migration issues, consists primarily in studying and programming pastoral oriented policies aiming at the efficient social integration of migrants. It also has a counselling role towards the Holy Synod of the OCG, and is further in charge of commenting draft laws, and legal texts in the domains of immigration. Article 2 of the statutory regulation (Regulation n°172/2006 – Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church of Greece) stipulates in fact that: The objectives of the Special Synodic Committee are: to follow up the incoming migratory flows; to conduct research and studies regarding the social, cultural,   Republic of Greece (2006a, 2006b).

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and religious consequences of migration; to address, in the light of the Holy Scriptures and the Holy Tradition, the pastoral problems that arise from the co-existence of autochthonous and foreigners, people of the same religion, heterodox, and people of different religion; to elaborate more efficient methods and policies and take the necessary measures that will contribute to: the peaceful and creative integration of foreigners at both levels of the Holy Bishopric and the parishes, the eradication of prejudices and negative stereotypes, the prevention of social conflicts, and the containment of the observed tendencies towards the development of phyletism and nationalism.

Since its creation, and more particularly in the period 2006–2009, the SCMRM has taken several initiatives, and has supported and organized a series of activities in the domains of migration.20 Among the most significant of these actions, we could mention, for instance, the realization of a pilot project of encounters between Christian Orthodox and Muslim immigrants that took place (2007) in three parishes21 affiliated to the Archbishopric of Athens, in areas that are marked by an important concentration of Muslim immigrants, and the operation of several informal mosques. The main objectives of this pilot project were: 1. to inform the Orthodox priests about the Muslims that live in the respective areas of these parishes, and to promote the contacts between the former, the muftis, and the Muslim immigrants; 2. to inform the parishioners about the discriminations against the Muslim immigrants in these areas, and to enhance the efforts for the social integration of the latter; and   Another initiative that is worth mentioning is the support of the Special Synodic Committee to the organization of the meeting of the executive committee of the Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME), that took place at the Inter-Orthodox Centre of the Orthodox Church Of Greece, in Athens (8–9 March 2007). On this occasion, the Archbishop of Athens and all of Greece, Mgr. Christodoulos, had a meeting with the CCME’s executive committee, in order to discuss about the problems that are related to the phenomenon of migration in Greece and in Europe. For a detailed presentation of the actions of the Special Synodic Committee, see Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, Special Synodic Committee for Migrants, Refugees, and Returning Migrants, Presentation of the Actions Scheme of the Special Synodic Committee for Migrants, Refugees and Returning Migrants (November 2006–November 2009 (in Greek). 21   The parish of Saint-Nicolaos at Acharnon Street (28 November 2007), the parish of Saint-Georgios in the neighbourhood of Acadimia Platonos (4 December 2007), and the parish of Saint-Marina in Thission (19 December 2007). 20

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3. to collect data regarding the various problems encountered in the coexistence between Orthodox and Muslim immigrants in these areas, and to reflect on ways of resolution of these problems.22 The same year (18 December 2007), the Special Synodic Committee organized a meeting at the bishopric of the area of Peristeri in Athens, upon the theme “Adopting a Pastoral Attitude towards Muslim Migrants (Pilot-project Searching for Places of Co-existence)”.23 The aim of this meeting was to gather all Orthodox priests from the bishoprics in the area of Attica, to inform them about the results of a field-research conducted in 2007 by the Integration Centre for Returning Migrants, Immigrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees (KSPMERP) regarding Muslim migrants in Athens. This qualitative research was part of a broader programme of actions undertaken by the Centre in 2007, under the general topic “Searching for Places of Co-existence”. It concerned the inventory and cartography of all informal Muslim places of worship (mosques) operating in the area of the municipality of Athens, as well as the issue of discriminations against Muslim migrants. In the report issued on the results of the research, the sociologist and director of the centre, Antonis Papantoniou (2009), pointed out that Muslim migrants feel disappointed by the State and the political parties, and they turn to the Church for hope and support. Most Muslim migrants think that it is indispensable for them to be in contact with the Church; they consider that the latter has the power and the ability to provide help and contribute to the resolution of the problems of the Muslim community (Papantoniou, 2009: 358). More recently, in November 2008, the KSPM issued a detailed report regarding the situation of immigrants in the “sensitive” area of Saint-Pandeleimon Acharnon in Athens. Approximately 500 homeless illegal Afghan immigrants have practically settled in the yard of the Church of Saint-Pandeleimon, and there have occurred frequently serious conflicts opposing the residents of this neighbourhood to these immigrants.24 The report, in its conclusions, stresses the urgent need for a direct intervention on behalf of the State, in order to put an end to this conflicting and degrading situation, and find a way to prevent in the future similar dramatic events, by enhancing a positive attitude towards difference. In this regard, the report underlines that “the role of the Church, and   HOLY SYNOD OF THE CHURCH OF GREECE, Special Synodic Committee for Migrants, Refugees, and Returning Migrants, Presentation of the Actions Scheme of the Special Synodic Committee for Migrants, Refugees and Returning Migrants (November 2006-November 2009 (in Greek). 23   See Anthis (2007). 24   Kathimerini, “Nights of anger in Agios Pandeleimonas”, 31 May 2009. 22

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more particularly of the local parish, is of a significant importance, provided that the State supports the Church in these efforts”.25 Conclusions The issue of migration in contemporary Greece, viewed in the light of the Church–State relations, and the strong link between religion and identity, highlights the contradictions and cleavages inherent in the ongoing identity transformation process of the Greek society as a whole. Migration constitutes in fact a big challenge both to the Greek dominant ethno-religious understanding of identity, and the role of the OCG in the twenty-first century. Next to the State, the OCG, both as an institution, and as a cultural, spiritual and political factor, constitutes an essential parameter in Greece’s socio-political system. As such, the OCG can play a decisive role upon state immigration policies and, to some extent, could even compensate for the State’s deficiencies in the management of migration-related issues. The contribution of the OCG to the social integration of migrants has undoubtedly been of great importance so far; even more so, given the weaknesses and repeated failures of state policies in this regard. The critical question that has been raised is whether the OCG should confine itself in its institutional role, or, rather re-invent its ecclesial role, as the incarnation of the body of Christ, re-uniting its flock as equal members of that body, independently of their race, ethnicity and religion. Over the last decade, the OCG has shown hopeful signs of openness, and has made serious efforts to address the manifold challenges and problems raised by the reality of the multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious Greek society of the twentyfirst century. The pastoral oriented policies undertaken in recent years with special regard to Muslim migrants’ communities attest of these efforts. Further, they are indicative of a slow, albeit progressive, process of transition from an institutionally focused attitude of the religious actor to more pastoral oriented policies, at the local level of parishes, in the field of migration. The slow process of re-invention of the Christian Orthodox theological “ethos of hospitality (philoxenia)” is a hopeful sign that the OCG is indeed moving towards a rediscovery of its universal ecclesial and pastoral vocation.   Integration Centre for Returning Migrants, Immigrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees (KSPM-ERP), ORTHODOX CHURCH OF GREECE, Report on the presence and situation of immigrants in the area of Saint-Pandeleimon Acharnon (Athens), A. Papantoniou, Archim. Pr. Petridis, and E. Papa (dir.), E. Dourida, and P. Masouridou, Athens, November 2008: 12 (in Greek). 25

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Molokotos-Liederman, L. (2007) “Looking at Religion and Greek Identity from the Outside: The Identity Cards Conflict through the Eyes of Greek Minorities”, Religion, State & Society, 35 (2): 139–161. Papantoniou, A. (2009) “Muslim Migrants in Athens”, Ecclesia (Εκκλησία), 86 (1–11): 348–359 (in Greek). Papathomas, G. (1995) Course of Canon Law: An Introduction to the Sources of the Canonical Tradition of the Church, Mnimonio-Aide-Mémoire. Paris: Publications of the Institute of Orthodox Theology “Saint-Serge”. Papathomas, G. (2006) Kanonika Amorfa: Essays of Canonical Economy. Katerini: Epektasi (in Greek). Petrou, I. (2007) “The Orthodox Church in Greece: From Ethnocentrism to the Reality of the Open Society”, in P. Kalaitzidis and N. Ntontos (eds), Orthodoxy and Modernity. Metropolis Dimitriados and Academy of Theological Studies, Athens: Indiktos Publishers, pp. 337–355 (in Greek). Pinakoulas, A. (2001) “Church and Hellenism in Contemporary Greece”, Synaxi, 79: 36–50 (in Greek). Pinakoulas, A. (2007) “Church and State in Greece”, in P. Kalaitzidis and N. Ntontos (eds), Orthodoxy and Modernity. Metropolis Dimitriados and Academy of Theological Studies, Athens: Indiktos, pp. 323–337 (in Greek). Pollis, Ad. (1992) “Greek National Identity: Religious Minorities, Rights, and European Norms”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 10: 171–195. Republic of Greece (2006a) Official Gazette, FEK A 255/23.11.2006, Regulation n°172/2006. Republic of Greece (2006b) Official Gazette, FEK A 268/19.12.2006, Regulation n°172/2006. Roudometof, V. (2005) “Orthodoxy As Public Religion in Post-1989 Greece”, in V. Roudometof, A. Agadjanian and J. Pankhurst (eds), Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age: Tradition Faces the Twenty-first Century. Walnut Creek : Altamira Press, pp. 84–108. Roudometof, V. (2011) “Eastern Orthodox Christianity and the Uses of the Past in Contemporary Greece”, Religions 2: 95–113. Smith, D.A. (2008) The Cultural Foundations of Nation: Hierarchy, Covenant and Republic. UK: Blackwell. Stavrou, M. (2010) “Les Pères de l’Église face au défi des migrants”, Contacts, Revue Française de l’Orthodoxie, 376–395. Thermos, V. (2005) “The Body of Christ Between Nation and Society”, in V. Thermos, My Own Foreigners (Οι δικοί μου οι ξένοι). Athens: En Plo, pp. 129–155 (in Greek).

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Triandafyllidou, A. (2009) “Greek Immigration Policy at the Turn of the 21st Century: Lack of Political Will or Purposeful Mismanagement?”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 11: 159–177. Triandafyllidou, A. and Gropas, R. (2009) “Constructing Difference: The Mosque Debates in Greece”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35 (6): 957–975.

Chapter 5

How the Portuguese Catholic Church is dealing with Newcomers: The Particular Case of Eastern European Immigrants Helena Vilaça

Introduction According to Lloyd Wong, the existence of millions of immigrants in Europe together with the European Union’s decision to allow the mobility of its citizens has contributed to redefining citizenship and national identity in a European context (Wong, 2002: 175). The author argues that the concept of a post-national model contradicts the State-nation citizenship model: “European citizenship has at least the potential of being a new institution that disconnects citizenship from nationality and territory and includes transnational nationalities” (Wong, 2002: 176). Modern-day diasporas have gradually been subject to a process of reconfiguration, and are now regarded as multiple transnational communities, as communities of “taste” (Giddens, 1994: 188) in which the dominant characteristic is the global construction of locations (Robertson, 1992), that is, the construction of local identity has references to the whole. Despite these substantial transformations, the communities of immigrants still lack resources and opportunities, and this is exacerbated when that status has religious and ethnic profiles. Cases of marginalization or subordination of minority groups, including immigrants, continue to be detected in contemporary democratic societies. Nevertheless, these social issues are one of the most relevant topics of current political and academic debates, and will have to be tailored within the broader framework of pluralism, integration, solidarity and social cohesion. The fact that they are also on today’s agenda shows that immigration is seen as a central challenge. The Catholic Church in Portugal has made significant progress in migrations through its diocesan secretariats and other organizations. This makes us consider

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that by deploying the Catholic Church’s resources, the religious and social networks among the immigrants also contribute to the reconfiguration of the religious field itself. This chapter is the result of a project based on the religious communities of immigrants from Eastern Europe (Vilaça, 2008), and the chapter focuses particularly on the existing interactions between these groups and the Catholic Church, aiming to assess how it affects the integration of these immigrants in the Portuguese society. To that extent, I will be discussing the concepts of solidarity, network and social capital, and religion and ethnicity. After surveying and mapping the religious communities of Eastern European immigrants scattered throughout the country, the research strategy involved a previous contact with the national representatives of each patriarchate and the Greek-Catholic dioceses. Once clarified on the nature and goals of the work, the priests themselves offered to open all doors and help in whatever was necessary. The obstacles found were primarily for personal reasons of some potential interviewees: some associate the priesthood with a profession; some have major limitations in mastering the Portuguese language; others due to agenda clashes, and for reasons of geographical distance. These constraints reflect, above all, the organizational weakness of the religious institutions under study. I was able to explore the networks within the religious communities, and the types of interactions and links established with the outside world by directly observing worship and other events involving the communities, along with exploratory interviews with priests, association leaders, Catholic secretariats responsible for migration, and other privileged informants. The research sought likewise to cover the networks in which religious communities and their members are involved. Accordingly, I identified the main institutional actors involved in the interactions of communities to be the Roman Catholic Church, through its diocesan secretariats for migrations, and the associations of Eastern immigrants. Secondly, for the purpose of further study, I chose a Catholic secretariat and an association of immigrants whose dynamic activity and interaction could empirically illustrate the problem. The choice coincided with a geographical zone, the Porto area, which also made it feasible to be regularly observed. Solidarity, Social Capital and Networks In a critical stance to structural-functionalism, Lockwood (1964) sought to overcome the debate based on the dichotomies structure/action, creating tools

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for a theory that would encompass the micro and macro levels of analysis. By distinguishing social integration and systemic integration, the author draws attention to the lack of analysis on the (social) integration, confined to individuals and actors. The relationships between the different institutions of a society or social system, or to put it differently, among its various sub-systems, are essential to a broader understanding of the phenomenon, not least because both types of integration are inevitably interrelated. Even if they are not essential to social cohesion, as they were in the past, the so-called historical churches have shown the ability to (re)create various kinds of mechanisms with a view to their systemic integration, thus contributing to the social integration of individuals at various levels: civic, economic, emotional, cultural, linguistic and, certainly, religious. All these dimensions become particularly relevant and cross-cutting in the case of immigrant communities. The word solidarity is probably the most common and most positively regarded in democratic societies, spanning political discourses and programmes, academic works, the media, civil society organizations, religious groups and people’s everyday life. Even the Catholic Church has incorporated the word solidarity in its doctrine and put it to use. The Church seeks new means of inculcating moral, religion and ideology either through political action or social intervention – increasingly sectoral organization. Even if at the moment many groups and movements have achieved remarkable autonomy in relation to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the values are still there: responsibility, compassion and charity, in the meantime become known as (Christian) solidarity. These groups or organizations that the Church creates to respond to the secularization (Beckford, 1998; Dobbelaere, 1988; Riis, 1998) process are crucial for converting the word charity into solidarity. In addition to this concept, we need to take into account the concept of social capital, given the similarities between the two. Pierre Bourdieu, whom we can consider a pioneer in the clarification of this concept, wrote in 1980: “Social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu, 1980: 2). Reflecting on the different approaches to social capital, and on the operationalization of the concept, Alejandro Portes (2000: 134) explains that its “originality and heuristic power” is first of all, that, on the one hand, social capital focuses on the positive consequences of sociability and, on the other hand, because it frames these positive consequences into a wider debate,

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emphasizing that the non-economic forms of capital may be strong sources of power and influence. It is not my purpose here to discuss the different approaches to this concept, but it is generally agreed that its components are trust, norms of reciprocity and the involvement in social networks (Billiet, 1998; Putnam, 2007; Halman, 2003). In short, working in associations and groups promotes trust, reciprocity and social networks – all of which are interdependent – and it is precisely this interdependence that produces and reproduces social capital. As Loek Halman (2003: 262) summarizes, “the fact that people invest in each other and can mobilize each other’s resources” is inherent to the notion of social capital. Although Halman is referring to social capital at the individual level, the same process can take place at group level, that is, institutions that invest in each other mutually engaging the resources. This is what has been taking place in Portugal with Eastern Christian churches and the diocesan secretariats for migration of the Catholic Church. The Eastern Religious Communities: Orthodox Patriarchates and Catholic Byzantine Rite Churches Owing to the reshaping of the culture of origin, the religious communities of immigrants may generate a sense of closure and strengthen the right to difference or, conversely, promote networks that contribute to different types of integration (political, labour, cultural, linguistic), hypothetically varied according to the confession, school achievement and country of origin. The sense of community is normally one of the attributes of religious minorities. The community – especially if it has a physical space to meet – has the virtue of strengthening the group’s position within the religious field (Bourdieu, 1984) and to project it to society. The community of believers is a resource that enhances public visibility of the religious minority in the society in which it operates, and especially the reproduction of its identity. When that religious identity is combined with ethnicity, its particular features are doubled (Fenton, 2004) and even if these religious communities are residual from a statistical standpoint, they represent a dimension of reality that cannot be overlooked (Vilaça, 2006). Democratic societies have been transforming in more plural spaces but, precisely because of that they tend to underestimate the effects of diversity even after social sciences, as Robert Putnam (2007) argues, have shown over decades that it is easier to trust and cooperate with others when social distance is smaller.

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The awareness of proximity, of common experiences, generates empathy and support. In other words, these factors produce and recreate or reshape identities. However, social identities are inevitably inseparable from social distances, which, in turn, encourage and consolidate identities (Putnam, 2007: 159). This research focuses on the case of Orthodox and Catholic Byzantine rite communities which have specifics that distinguish them from other minority groups in Portugal. It is associated to a phenomenon of recent immigration, yet the length of time adaptive process of immigration requires, as Putnam upholds, “the reconstruction of social identities, not merely of the immigrants themselves … but also of the newly more diverse society as a whole” (Putnam, 2007: 160). Although these first generation immigrants are an ethnic and religious minority, their proximity to the Roman Catholic history and doctrine – particularly with respect to the Byzantine rite Catholics – and the multifaceted support provided by this institution seems to be indicative of a new structure of relationships within the religious field and of new mechanisms of solidarity. In Portugal there are churches that belong to the Patriarchates of Constantinople and Moscow, and the churches of Romania and Bulgaria, which, because they are ruled by patriarchs, will also be called patriarchates. The same procedure will be adopted with regard to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine – the Kiev Patriarchate. Despite the existence of a community linked to the Kiev Patriarchate, the Ukrainians attend mainly the churches of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. This is a phenomenon of transnationalization that reinforces religious ethnicity and traditionalism (Beyer and Beaman, 2007; Kennedy and Roudometof, 2002), which are decisive for the contemporary religious resurgence. The Byzantine rite Catholics that in Portugal correspond almost entirely to the Greek-Catholic Church of Ukraine are a new group in the Portuguese religious world, the result of the said transnationalization. Most of them are Ukrainian immigrants and form an ethnic minority, but from a religious standpoint they can only be typified in part as a minority. They are Catholics under the jurisdiction of Rome and are integrated in the Portuguese dioceses. The difference lies in the celebration rite. These, too, are first generation immigrants and it can be wondered if, over time, this expression of Christianity will ultimately be one of the components of the Portuguese Roman Catholic Church. Overall, the Orthodox Christians have 17 places of worship in the country. The Patriarchate of Constantinople is the most represented one, with seven communities, and is spread more widely in the country, from Viana do Castelo (to the North) to Portimão (Algarve). Although the bishop of this patriarchate

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lives and celebrates mass in Porto, Lisbon has most of the communities. Besides being the Church with the most communities and the most diverse in terms of ethnicity, it is also the most consolidated institution. While the churches under the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople are the product of a combination of endogenous factors – there are two small communities with Portuguese converts,1 since the early 1980s – with exogenous factors (the immigrants, especially the Ukrainians, called for the presence of priests), the other churches emerged from the religious needs of each immigrant community. The Romanian Orthodox Church (attended by Romanians and Moldovans) and the Russian Orthodox Church are the second most represented churches with four communities in the metropolitan areas of the country. These are economic and cultural hubs, more secularized areas and therefore more permeable and receptive to diversity (Vilaça, 2006), either in religious or ethnic terms. In relation to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian churches of the Patriarchate of Kiev, they can be regarded as two isolated cases less able to expand. In the Bulgarian case it is due to the small size of the immigrant community. The Ukrainian Church linked to Kiev is rather small as almost all Orthodox Ukrainians attend, as I have already said, the communities of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Also worthy of reference is the fact that the Orthodox celebrations take place in Roman Catholic chapels or in spaces assigned to them. The same happens with the Byzantine rite Catholics. Two important factors regarding this group: the number of communities (16) is almost the same as all the Orthodox churches, and they are more dispersed, especially to the interior areas, and therefore differ from the assumptions that religious minorities are generally located in metropolitan areas and along the coast. Celebrations With the exception of the Bulgarian Patriarchate, there are three communities of the Patriarchate of Constantinople (Aveiro, Lisbon and Porto), two communities of the Patriarchate of Moscow (Lisbon and Porto), the Church of the Patriarchate of Kiev (Braga), the Romanian Church of Lisbon and a Byzantine rite Catholic Church, also in Lisbon. I attended not only liturgies and regular evening prayers but also special events in the liturgical calendar – Christmas and Easter – and educational activities promoted by the communities 1   One of these communities, located in Lisbon, started its mission with Greek immigrants, some decades before.

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The history of the Greek-Catholics in Portugal coincided temporarily with the Orthodox history. Like the priests, most people attending the religious services are Ukrainian. In terms of rites and sociability, the differences are few in relation to the Orthodox churches. Although many communities are called Greek-Catholic, the main reason has to do with the fact that the priests running these services are also Greek-Catholic. Strictly speaking, these churches are attended by Catholics and Orthodox. Above all, these are “Eastern religious communities” in which the ethnic and linguistic factor overlaps the doctrinal differences. This in no way invalidates the fact that the cooperation with the Roman Catholic Church is even greater, in the sense that there is already a certain institutional integration. People seek community and participate in liturgy primarily for reasons of ethnic identity. Rituals in the celebration are a key aspect of Eastern Christianity. The ritual precedes the belief: it is a way of communicating with transcendence and with each other (Voyé, 1995). It updates the memory and, by reproducing it, projects it into the future. Many began to attend church, at least in a more regular way, after they emigrated.2 In that sense, what is at stake here is not the belief, let alone a set of doctrinal precepts, but a mix of practices involving all participants affectively and emotionally. Therefore, more than one priest emphasized the need for catechism for the mass attendants. To address the problem of poor theology-doctrinal training, the Bishop of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, for example, gives classes of catechism to adults and children, after the liturgy. Sociability, Diversities and Ethnicities The end of a religious service is, in essence, a moment of fellowship. The extremely familiar atmosphere that characterizes it is strengthened by the tea and snack or even social events, such as picnics. The respondents themselves state: “the Church promotes a place for gatherings and sociability”. When I first visited the Romanian Church of Lisbon, after the liturgy, I was able to participate in a picnic in a city park. This was a very rich experience in terms of observation and analysis. After lunch, a couple celebrated their silver anniversary dressed in typical folk costumes of their region in Romania. However, conviviality also hides dynamics – some discreet, others hidden to the observer – related to other functions performed by the community and its members. This is a place for sharing emotions, for discussions and seeking solutions for all sorts of problems: legalization, employment contracts, funerals,   As proved by the survey done for this research.

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accommodation, food, counselling. As another respondent said, “it is a kind of underground economy; [people] help each other in network”. The problems of some of these individuals were enhanced by the crisis in the labour market in Portugal. In all interviews, the common denominator was the factor that the number of attendants in the liturgies had dropped because many immigrants travelled to Spain to work in civil construction and agriculture. Some keep their families in Portugal and only come back for the weekend or twice a month.3 The many functions of the Church, however, are not found in a closed circuit. Rather, there are levels of interactions with other institutions, thus multiplying their social capital and promoting forms of integration: for their members and for themselves. In this respect, the versatility, in some cases I studied, deserves to be pointed out. For example, the religious work among the Orthodox in Aveiro (central area of the country) started in a room, which served as a place of worship on Sundays and during the week is used as a Portuguese language school for adults, under an agreement with Ministry of Education. That space still exists but it now supports a Project for the Integration of Foreigners under a protocol signed with the Industrial Association of Aveiro District. More specifically, it provides vocational training courses lasting two to three months, and subsequent dissemination to potential employers. This is a case of double social integration of immigrants: in Church and in the labour world. But a systemic integration is also implicit here, since a bridge is established between the two institutions, the religious community and an economic association. This way, both the individuals and the Church expand their networks of interaction and multiply their social capital. However, the search for the Church is, first and foremost, the result of another search: the need for identity based on ethnicity. Even so, some communities, like the aforementioned, have an interesting cultural diversity since they are made up of Ukrainians, Moldovans, Romanians and Russians.4 Moreover, states the president of the community of Aveiro, “the Church unites and cancels out the political differences of the countries of origin”. The Ukrainian priests working with this Church of the Patriarchate of Constantinople have different institutional affiliations in their countries of origin. One of them is from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that belongs to the Patriarchate of Moscow,   According to the Romanian priest, although the legislation is more limiting, integration is easier in Spain (for buying a house, a car). There are places in that country with a high number of Romanians, totalling about 40 per cent. 4   I was also surprised by the presence of Africans (also immigrants) in the liturgy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Lisbon and in the Church of Aveiro (Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople); this seems to be the result of evangelistic work done by Eastern immigrants among their work colleagues. 3

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another priest belongs to the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and another one to the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine. This accords with what the priest of the Romanian community says: “all emigrations are economic, they are not political”. It is interesting to note how the diaspora, as a rule, relativizes differences. As I was told at the Secretariat for Catholic Migration in Porto, “they are, above all, Orthodox. They do not wish to attend two masses, it is logical that they choose on the basis of private reasons”. The excerpts that follow are from an interview given with the Consul of Ukraine, himself a member of the Church of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in Porto, which illustrates well what I have sought to highlight: Then … there is the need to preserve the identity of the Ukrainians, this is also the role of the church … [The church] has to preserve what one is in Ukraine. If the family has a problem of immigration, they have to know the culture of the country where we are [in a situation of ] permanent immigration. But this is not enough … When they are abroad, the Ukrainians are more friendly and closer to one another, and when they are in Ukraine they are in conflict … This is not a problem, not a problem at all, for example, some speak Russian, others speak Ukrainian and they understand each other perfectly. They even help Bishop Hilarion because they talk about the Eastern regions that are closer to Russia … because there are more and more Ukrainians in Portugal, here [in church] they have the opportunity to exchange their life experiences in Portugal, I would say that they take the opportunity to preserve and communicate the tradition to their children.

From the Bridges to the Networks The Roman Catholic Church: Diocesan Secretariats for Migrations All the members of the religious communities I interviewed praise the Roman Catholic Church for the support given from the outset in terms of assigning them spaces and human and logistic aid. If at first I got the impression that this is an attitude of recognition and gratitude, the continuing contacts and observations revealed an intense relationship between the Eastern communities and the Catholic Church, mediated by its Diocesan Secretariats for Migrations. This interaction is particularly intense in Porto.5 Here the secretariat in this 5   Based on the interviews and contacts, I realized that this does not happen in other places in the country.

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diocese has a solid structure, and the person in charge, Maria Eduarda Viterbo – whom I had the opportunity to interview – has a decisive profile in order to promote the multiple interactions observed. The Portuguese Catholic Work on Migration started in the late 1960s and early 1970s, to provide the spiritual support, for example, in terms of chaplains, for the Portuguese emigrants. Ten years ago, all diocesan services had to be structured because of incoming immigration, which then incorporated new areas which are no longer intended for the Portuguese communities abroad as they once were. Since then, the Eastern immigrants represent over 90 per cent of services provided by the diocesan secretariats. As most of them are not Catholic, according to the interviewee, the secretariat takes the initiative to refer the immigrants to their churches. Not all dioceses are able to carry out this work in the same way. This depends on the size, resources, geographical location and commitment and skills of the members. According to the information collected, the work in Viseu is quite organized, and so are Lisbon, Braga and Viana, although the latter is strongly linked to CARITAS. Some dioceses have not yet set up a secretariat, which is of great concern because there are immigrants in their areas. Some secretariats in the Portuguese inland, for example, occasionally organize one or more cultural activities, such as the People’s Festival, an event that aims to unite all associations and groups of immigrants in the area, promoting a gathering where people can express their cultural diversity. This party of the people is, indeed, one of the activities that should be mandatory because it is part of the Vatican’s guidelines. However, not all secretariats meet this guideline. Once a year, during the national Week of Migration, in August, there are offertories supporting the migration work in the country. This includes migrations and pilgrimages to the shrine of Fátima. A percentage of this offering reverts to the national secretariat, and the rest is for the local secretariats, which will manage it throughout the year. When financial resources are depleted, there is always the possibility of resorting to the diocese. Despite these limitations, the Catholic Church has well-developed social services targeted to various areas, including migration. In contrast, because Orthodox and Byzantine rite churches were implemented later and have weaker structures and scarce resources, they are not able to provide the necessary support for the immigrants from the countries they represent. Even some of the social and humanitarian initiatives are carried out with the support of the diocesan secretariats.6 In some cases, the religious leaders act as intermediaries with the 6   During 2010, for instance, the work involved about 30,000 euros which were spent on accommodation, food, transport, medical expenses, funerals, SEF (Office of Foreigners

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Roman Catholic Church, and in others the immigrants themselves use the direct services of the secretariat, as they are aware that their own church cannot meet their needs. According to Eduarda Viterbo, the interviewee from the Diocesan Secretariat of Porto, this is a temporary situation, and she admits that in a few years the Eastern Churches will have a different status and other resources in the Portuguese society. Until then, the secretariat for migration “facilitates”, that is, opens doors, and serves as the “back-office”. Initially, the work done by the Secretariat of Porto was limited to three areas: Portuguese courses, legal support and job offers. However, other areas were then introduced: problems related to passports and accommodation. On this last aspect, the interviewee states: “we needed to find houses for those who could afford a lease” and needed a Portuguese guarantor. So the secretariat had to introduce other services such as support in seeking houses, guarantor services and support for the first rent. When the areas split, the secretariats established bridges: “with SEF [Office of Foreigners and Borders Social Welfare], night shelters, employers, unions, health services, social workers in the hospitals, funeral agencies, consulates, Portuguese embassies and consulates abroad. They consultate us here with a diversity of things, because they are in need, because life is about everything, not only the cultural side of it”. The dynamic activity of the Diocesan Secretariat for Migration of Porto is also visible in the requests it receives, within the Catholic Church itself, to provide training in other dioceses. The discourse of the person responsible for that secretariat is clearly marked by a spirit of mission, as can be seen in the following transcripts. There is one thing that everyone knows, and that is regardless of their situation and status, the door is open and there [in the secretariat] they have a safe place run by people they can absolutely trust, with whom they establish a personal relationship and who is ready to solve their problems … They are our family … Because we are the church, that’s the whole point … why what we do is not the same as the State’s doing. Some things do not go through the Office of Foreigners and Borders (SEF) or the Citizen Shop or even the National Committee in Support of Immigrants (CNAIs): the departments are all official, so there they can renew the work permits, stamp their work contracts … what about the rest? The rest of their lives just passes them by.

and Borders) costs, visa expenses, Portuguese courses and cultural activities. Among the 2,099 supported cases in 2010, only 34 were related to non-Eastern immigrants (African immigrants, Brazilian and Chinese) (Oliveira, 2012: 218–219).

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The emphasis in these excerpts is not that the Church wishes to replace the services provided by the State, rather to emphasize the inability of a bureaucratic and impersonal State, typical of modernity, to solve problems – to paraphrase Habermas – related to the “life world” of individuals, a more private sphere, and in which the solution of problems requires personalized interactions. For this reason, I believe that it will not be at all suitable to hope for any other type of performance for civic and religious groups also working with immigrants and other minorities. Such groups should never be an extension of the State; they may, however, work as agents capable of establishing bridges with the dimensions of social reality that are beyond the range of the State’s action. The issue addressed in this section reminds us of two of the five types of solidarity described by Liliane Voyé (1996): the emancipatory solidarity, which promotes affirmation and integration of populations; and the solidarity of worldview, consistent with the new forms of adaptation of the Catholic Church in late modernity, in the sense that it seeks to promote sectoral spheres of action. The work developed locally with the new communities of immigrants is a rich tool for mutual learning (Putnam, 2007). In the past, as today, the religious institutions play a key role in integrating immigrants and thus in the construction of shared identities that cross ethnic boundaries. Associations of Immigrants: The Case of the Association “Amizade” Like the religious communities, the associations of immigrants are places for gatherings and hospitality. Accordingly, I sought to examine whether the territorial distribution of these institutions follows the pattern of the distribution of churches. There is a tendency for them to be rooted in the more populated areas with a greater number of immigrants, but the parallelism is far from absolute. In fact, there is a marked asymmetry between the implementation of associations in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (AML) and the rest of the country. Of a total of 13 associations, nine are found in AML. Regardless of their dynamic work, the fact is that the associations are less than half of the religious communities. Although associations are a side issue in this study, it has to be taken into consideration since there are interactions between associative and religious structures, which are reflected in terms of networks and social capital. The networks and the social capital under analysis cannot be limited by the churches’ “walls”. My aim was to meet the protagonists who play an important part in the two types of integration (social and systemic) mentioned above. Note

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that to identify the key institutional actors, I took into consideration the field of interactions (negotiation and/or conflict), which refers us to social integration, as the field of “relationships between relationships, and of the consistency and/or inconsistency between social sub-systems” (Pires, 2003: 47), that is, the systemic integration. In both levels, the Roman Catholic Church clearly stood out through its diocesan secretariats for migration and the associations of Eastern immigrants. After listing these institutions, and similar to the procedure adopted with the diocesan secretariats, I chose an association of immigrants whose dynamic activity and interaction could empirically illustrate the problem. Note also that this choice coincided with a geographical zone, the Porto area, which also made it feasible to regularly observe the Association of Immigrants “Amizade” (Friendship). Much of the work of this association is done in cooperation with the Diocesan Secretariat for Migration of Porto. Similarly, the community belonging to the Patriarchate of Constantinople has a close relationship with this association, operating in Rio Tinto, on the periphery of Porto. The Ukrainian leader of this association, Natalia Vaskovska,7 told us that the association began in 2003, but only a year later received its legal status and was recognized by the state body, at the time called High Commission for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue (ACIDI). It is also part of the National Federation of Associations of Immigrants. They work primarily in the area of education, and have two schools for children of immigrants. One of these schools operates in Rio Tinto, in the Parish Council, which assigned two rooms to the association. The other is located in Porto and uses the facilities of a High School of Education, which belongs to the Catholic Church. Russian and Ukrainian are taught at these two schools on Saturdays, for children aged six to 16 who have no knowledge of the language, and another group formed by those who know the language but are keen on practising and improving it. The school has 130 children and is attended mostly by Russians and Ukrainians, followed by Belarusians and Moldovans (who also speak Russian) and two Romanians. Education is free and supported by ACIDI and State Social Welfare. Along with this activity, they also work in the field of culture with a folk group consisting of 30 people, Russians and Ukrainians. They normally perform at the invitation of civic institutions, at the People’s Festival organized by the Diocesan Secretariat for Migration, and at gatherings of immigrant communities. The parties they organize by themselves are always opened to the community. For example, they had a special sponsorship to organize, together with UNICEF, 7   Before immigrating, she was a biology teacher, specializing in microbiology and biotechnology of plants.

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the party on World Children’s Day. On this occasion, invitations were sent to all associations of immigrants of Porto (Chinese, Brazilian, Angolan, etc.) but the turnout was very unsuccessful. In contrast, the party was attended by many Portuguese children. Still in the cultural field, they have a theatre group8 formed by 10 people. The association also hands out food given by the State Social Welfare, humanitarian organizations such as the Food Bank, and the Christmas cheques offered by the City Council of Gondomar. The City Council also lends them a bus for their trips. The association “Amizade” is therefore well known among many institutions and public services. Whenever there is a problem with an immigrant, the association is called to solve it with the police, hospital or in the courts. In many of these circumstances, the association asks for the support of the Diocesan Secretariat for Migrations. The interviewee, Natalia Vaskovska, has a high opinion of the Portuguese people for the generous way in which they welcomed her in the early days of living in Portugal. This experience represents the first steps given in the establishment of informal networks and, as such, of social capital. However, the strong ties with the Orthodox Church (the Patriarchate of Constantinople), on the one hand, and the Diocesan Secretariat for Migration, headed by Maria Eduardo Viterbo, on the other hand, helped the social integration become a systemic integration, since the networks between agents were complemented with networks between institutions. Even the Consulate of Ukraine in Porto has a crucial partnership with this association. In the words of the Consul, the Association “Amizade” is not limited to “grouping citizens from Ukraine”. Its role is essential in solving various kinds of problems, for example, to streamline the travels of immigrants to Ukraine to visit sick relatives or to contact with the relatives of deceased Ukrainians in Portugal. Even so, the interviewee once again stresses the role of religious communities. The Consul has extensive knowledge of this type of associations in the country and says that the essential connections are established with the churches. Those who arrive to the country head to the churches, because “they look for other people of their own nationality”. When they arrive, finding a place of communication is essential and that is inseparable from the “need of tradition” that the religious community can fully provide.

8   In this context, they have translated into Portuguese classical Russian and Ukrainian authors. Worthy of note is the theatre production of Gogol in important public places of Porto like historical cafés and theatres.

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The traits and dynamics of this association suggest that there is a network in which each thread must cross with every other thread – an “alchemy of exchange”, in the words of Pierre Bourdieu (1982) – with the religious community occupying a central place in that web. Finally with regard to the described exchanges based on reciprocity, we can say that “the reward of the donor cannot come directly from the beneficiary, but from the community as a whole” (Portes, 2000: 139). That is, all those who in one way or another contribute (Eastern communities, Catholic Church, associations) to the social integration of immigrants multiply, even if not immediately, their social capital, their recognition in the public sphere, and thus their systemic integration. Conclusion In Portugal, as in other countries of Roman Catholic tradition, the Church has sought to compensate for the weakening of its territorial sphere of action, based on the local parish, by developing new forms of intervention in line with the principles of the social doctrine of the Church and, to that extent, introducing new types of solidarity. I do not mean that the majority Church in the Portuguese society has exclusivity over the social initiatives and institutions in the country, nor in the religious field. This characteristic is common to other religious groups inside and outside Christianity. In fact, in the case of religious minorities, because the sense of community is usually stronger, so is the solidarity among its members. This is precisely what is happening with the Orthodox and the Catholic Byzantine rite communities focused on in this research. As we know, the churches settled in Portugal following the waves of immigration from Eastern Europe. If at first (in the 1990s) the ethnic component gained visibility,9 and became an identity factor, in a second phase the ethnicity was regarded as something that contained a religious identity. This binomial was essential to the formation of communities. Not of communities as a pre-modern stereotype, but in the sense of interpenetration between modernity and tradition, where the residence factor is not the defining parameter of community. On the contrary, 9   Since the 1981 Census, the Orthodox people are known to have been living in Portugal; however, their growth rate was remarkable (580.3 per cent) over two decades. Although the number of Orthodox – about 17,500 – is far from the 95,000 reported by SEF, we should not ignore their statistical evolution and geographical distribution (Vilaça, 2006).

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its spirit is based on the de-spacialization of relationships, on physical mobility and on the dis-coincidence between territory and culture. The community of believers is a resource that enhances the public visibility of religious minorities in society, and especially the reproduction of its identity, promoting the increase of resources of the group within the religious field and its projection into the social field. Moreover, the community is one of the first instances for the acquisition of social capital, as the latter is characterized by trust, norms of reciprocity and the involvement in social networks. And social capital includes social structures or relationships conducive to social activities of cooperation (Billiet, 1998; Halman, 2003; Putnam, 2007), creating a community spirit that goes against individualistic and utilitarian logics. Although representing an ethnic and a religious minority, the first generation of Eastern immigrants, whilst Orthodox and Byzantine rite Catholics, are bearers of a religious identity that draws them closer – as no other minority group does – to the Roman Catholic Church. These historical and doctrinal affinities facilitate joint activities and interactions that suggest a new structure of relationships within the religious field and of new solidarity-producing mechanisms. The fact that religious services take place in chapels graciously lent by the Roman Catholic Church is proof of this proximity. Moreover, the collaboration involves more than the occupation of space, there is often a regular contact with the Roman Catholic priest who is usually present in the celebrations or parties of the Orthodox or Greek-Catholics. The intensity of interactions and the extension of networks was something that became even more evident through the analysis of the role of priests and other members of the communities under study, and their connection to the Diocesan Secretariats for Migrations of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as to associations of immigrants. Both the observations and the interviews were very enlightening on the plurality of roles performed by the churches and of the open communication channels with the outside world (Pace, 2007, 2011). These are levels of interaction that streamline the multiplication of social capital and promote forms of integration: for their community members and for the group itself. In this sense, it is fair to talk of increased variability of the systems (Pires, 2003) that even at the risk of incompatibilities and inconsistencies would nevertheless result, in this case, in an increase of systemic interaction. Besides, as mentioned before, social and systemic integration should be regarded as interconnected, operating in a circle as this represents a crucial cognitive resource of the actors themselves (Perkmann, 1998: 491).

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The religious institutions in the Portuguese society, as in other countries, continue to play a key role in the integration of new immigrants, and are inescapable agents of intercultural dialogue. This is not a process of cultural assimilation, as some authors advocated, a few decades ago, as a common rule of integration. What we see is exchanges based on reciprocity (Portes, 2000; Putnam, 2007). Moreover, today contacts can be maintained with the country of origin, unimaginable in a relatively near past (Furseth and Repstad, 2006: 174). Both the religious communities, such as the Catholic Church, and the associations of immigrants multiply social capital through networks and interactions they promote, contributing to the social integration of immigrants and, at the institutional level, to the systemic integration. References Beckford, J. (1998) Secularization and Social Solidarity: A Social Constructionist View. In: R. Laermans, B. Wilson and J. Billiet (eds), Secularization and Social Integration. Leuven: Leuven University Press, pp. 141–158. Beyer, P. and Beaman, L. (2007) Globalization, Religion and Culture. Leiden: Brill. Billiet, J. (1998) Social Capital, Religious-philosophical Involvement and Social Integration in Belgium: An Empirical Investigation. In: R. Laermans, B. Wilson and J. Billiet (eds), Secularization and Social Integration. Leuven: Leuven University Press, pp. 141–158. Bourdieu, P. (1980) Le capital social: notes provisoires. Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, 31: 2–3. Bourdieu, P. (1984) Quelques propriétés des champs. Questions de Sociologie. Paris: Minuit. Dobbelaere, K. (1988) Chrétienté socio-culturelle et religion civile: essai d’étude comparative. In: R. Cipriani and M.I. Macioti (eds), Omaggio a Ferrarotti. Rome: Siares, pp. 305–325. Fenton, S. (2004) Modernidade, etnicidade e religião. In: D. Rodrigues (ed.), Em nome de Deus: a religião na sociedade contemporânea. Porto: Afrontamento, pp. 51–75. Furseth, I. and Repstad, P. (2006) An Introduction to the Sociology of Religion: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives. Aldershot: Ashgate.

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Giddens, A. (1994) Risk, Trust and Reflexivity. In: U. Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash (eds), Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 184–197. Halman, L. (2003) Capital social na Europa contemporânea. In: J. Vala, M.V. Cabral and A. Ramos (eds), Valores sociais: mudanças e contrastes em Portugal e na Europa. Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, pp. 257–292. Kennedy, P. and Roudometof, V. (2002) Transnationalism in a Global Age. In: P. Kennedy and V. Roudometof (eds), Communities across Borders: New Immigrants and Transnational Cultures. New York: Routledge, pp. 1–26. Lockwood, D. (1964) Social Integration and System Integration. In: G.K. Zollschann and W. Hirsch (eds), Explorations in Social Change. London: Routledge, pp. 244–257. Oliveira, M.J. (2012) Espaços de religiosidade no Porto: o seu papel na integração dos imigrantes brasileiros. Sociologia (Número temático: Imigração, Diversidade e Convivência Cultural): 211–234. Pace, E. (2007) Religion as Communication: The Changing Shape of Catholicism in Europe. In: N. Ammerman (ed.), Everyday Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 37–50. Pace, E. (2011) Religion as Communication: God’s Talk. Farnham: Ashgate. Perkmann, M. (1998) Social Integration and System Integration: Reconsidering the Classical Distinction. Sociology, 32 (3): 491–507. Pires, R.P. (2003) Migrações e integração : teoria e aplicações à sociedade portuguesa. Oeiras: Celta Editora. Portes, A. (2000) Capital social: origens e aplicações na sociologia contemporânea. Sociologia, Problema e Práticas, 33: 133–158. Putnam, R.D. (2007) E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century: The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Leture. Scandinavian Political Studies, 30 (2): 137–174. Riis, O. (1998) Religion Re-Emerging: The Role of Religion in Legitimating Integration and Power in Modern Societies. International Sociology, 13 (2): 249–272. Robertson, R. (1992) Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage. Vilaça, H. (2006) Da torre de Babel à Terra Prometida: pluralismo religioso na sociedade portuguesa. Porto: Edições Afrontamento. Vilaça, H. (2008) Imigração, etnicidade e religião: o papel das comunidades religiosas na integração dos imigrantes de Leste. Lisboa: Observatório

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da Imigração (OI) e Alto Comissariado para a Imigração e Diálogo Intercultural (ACIDI). Voyé, L. (1995) Le rite en questions. Publications des Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis, 69: 105–135. Voyé, L. (1996) D’une reliance incertaine: la reliance religieuse. In: M. Bolle De Bal (ed.), Voyage au coeur des sciences humaines. De la Reliance (Tome II: Reliance et pratiques). Paris: L’Harmattan, pp. 81–98. Wong, L.L. (2002) Home Away from Home? Transnationalism and the Canadian Citizenship Regime. In: P. Kennedy and V. Roudometof (eds), Communities across Borders: New Immigrants and Transnational Cultures. New York: Routledge, pp. 169–181.

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Chapter 6

Beyond Parishes: Challenges of Catholic-Christian Second Generations Roberta Ricucci

Introduction The growing presence of migrants from Christian/Catholic (CC) European countries seems to bring to Europe old ways of practising religion as well as reinforcing religious values in a scenario of secularization or, as Davie said, of “believing without belonging” (1994). The increasing number of first generations of immigrants and their decision to live permanently in the host societies reveals how important religion is among immigrants as well as how strong ethnic chaplaincies and churches are, in contrast with what Rath et al. say (2001). The idea that migrants would interiorize the same secular model that has invested Europe (Berger et al., 2008; Asad, 2003; Modood, 2010) in a kind of religious assimilation has been refused. Religiousness and ethnic churches are both alive among immigrants. Of course, they don’t play a merely religious role, but are also pre-eminent figures in offering welcoming services as well as a kind of welfare system for both first arrivals and illegal immigrants. On the other hand, immigrants feel at home in places of worship where they find priests speaking their home language, who share (or understand) the same ethnic background, and recognize the difficulties emerging from mixing their old way of life and the requests of the new society. If this is true for the first generations, what happens to the second? Generally attention is paid to the children of Muslim migrants, but there are few studies on how young Latin Americans and East Europeans live and define their relationship with religion (Heft, 2006; Lorentzen, 2009): are they following the secularization process like the young native Europeans or not? No systematic analysis has yet been provided on the arrival of migrants with different ways of being “Christian”, having various attitudes towards and relationships with the parishes. What happens to these second generations? Do they continue to

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be religious in the same way as their parents or do they follow the “European secular way”? The question of how faith, ethnicity and acculturation relate to one another is highly pertinent in the Italian context, where Catholicism continues to be the religion of reference for the majority of the population in spite of the secularization process of other European countries (Pérez-Agote, 2012; Garelli, 2013). The core idea of this chapter is to analyse how religion and integration paths interact with and influence one another, both on the societal and on the individual levels in the case of Christian-Catholic second generations in a specific context like Italy, a recent immigration country and a Catholic one. It is organized as follows: I first provide an outline of the theoretical framework in order to situate the research in relation to my aim and goals. Then I’ll introduce the Italian scenario and the findings of my research. It will become clear how discussion about religion and religiousness quickly shifts to the role of ethnic churches and their role as guardians of both origins and integration. Theoretical Framework For quite some time now, the relation between immigration and religion has been central to the interest of scholars. In American literature, Herberg’s assimilation model of Protestants, Catholics and Jews (triple melting pot), has inspired many studies. According to the author (1955), the support to integration provided by religion (and religious institutions) favours the persistence of a strong religious identity at the expense of an ethnic one. Indeed a lot of studies have demonstrated how ethnic congregations favour, through their activities, the perpetuation or strengthening of a marked ethnic identity for the first generation and, in many instances, also for the second. In the course of time, the increase of migrations from non-European countries has further enriched the American debate, drawing attention to religious instances outside the Judeo-Christian tradition. The increase in the number of Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists has re-directed the studies of scholars to the question of whether strong religious traditions (leading to convinced behaviour) favour a better process of integration of immigrants and, above all, of their children in the host society, as evidenced in research on young Asians who profess themselves Catholics (Eck, 2001). The US debate on “immigration and religion” has moved to Europe, where attention was given, initially, to the Muslim presence (Continental Europe) and the Sikh presence (UK). In particular, the

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relation between religion and immigration was tackled, focussing especially on first generations (Hirschmann, 2004; Modood et al., 2006), because of the European delay in considering second generations from the sociological point of view.1 A diachronic analysis of the data on migration flows in Europe underlines how the origin of migrants has moved progressively first towards Latin America and more recently Eastern Europe, with migrations from Poland, Romania, Ukraine and Bulgaria becoming more and more relevant from the late 1990s onwards (Golini, 2008). This process is clearest in recent immigration countries like Spain and Italy (Pastore and Villosio, 2011). Yet, despite the affirmation of increasing religious pluralism, research in Europe has concentrated on the growing Muslim presence (Hunter, 2002; Cesari and Pacini, 2005), with observations on and studies of different viewpoints: beliefs and practices, the hoped-for society (lay versus Islamic), the definition of identity (religious, Italian, cosmopolitan), orientation regarding the upbringing of children and mixed marriages, the demands of various European societies (recognition of festivities, the teaching of religion in schools). Moreover, attention paid to the religious variable was often interlinked with attention to work (are Muslims discriminated against in accessing the job market, compared to other religious affiliations?), school (does the increase in Muslim students give rise to requests for secularization and changes in education?), school timetables and spaces in the city, with specific alimentary requests, place of worship, areas for burial. This is also why the recent episodes of violence in London and Madrid have become strategic in the analyses of this specific group, to understand if these could be the new representatives of fundamentalism in Europe (Meer et al., 2012; Bowe, 2010; Baumann, 2000). At the same time, immigration countries in Europe are now facing a change in their immigrant population: thanks to the migration waves from Central and Eastern Europe, an increasing number of Catholics (and other Christians) are now visible on the migration scene (Casanova, 2009). Consequently, considering the evolution of the migratory process, the almost exclusive focus on the Islamic component allowed little investigation of the increase of the Christian component, following migrations either from Eastern Europe or from South America, or studies of other religious organizations (Vertovec and Wassendorf, 2005; Modood, 2010).

1   This focus of attention was initiated by Beurs’s research in France during the 1980s (Winthol de Wenden, 2004).

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Furthermore, the youth perspective and the religious point of view are also underrepresented in studies on the European side of the Atlantic2 (Forner and Alba, 2008). For these, the “processes of social integration, as well as the definition of cultural identity, in many instances, are filtered through the relation with religious institutions and the educational socializing processes, and through the support they offer” (Ambrosini, 2008). Religious education is given to children by families, especially by mothers: a minority is defined as “convinced and active believers” but the great majority of young people are generally defined as “believers from tradition and training” (Garelli, 2011), where religion plays a strong social role (opportunity to meet with peers and use the mother-tongue). In a way they are religious for social reasons instead of for religious purposes. This applies both to Christians and Muslims. Speaking about children of immigrants, relations with religion need to be framed in two different perspectives. On one hand, there is the acculturation process, that is, how they fit into the receiving society (Portes, 1996; Berry, 1999); on the other hand, how they define their identity as young people with a migratory background in a globalized world (Featherstone, 1995; France, 2007). The way in which immigrants’ cultural identities change over time and under the influence of the larger society, as do the characteristics of the relationship between them, are generally crucial issues in the study of second generations’ integration process. For children of immigrants, joining their parents who emigrated before them, this process is more complex because it overlaps with the larger development task of identity formation, which started in their home countries and then continued in the receiving society. Outcomes of this process mirror the various possible acculturation attitudes. Adolescents and young people can choose among various options: if they don’t solve the cultural identity issues that they face, they may exhibit identity diffusion (Marcia, 1994). Within the family, they acquire the adaptive patterns of behaviour, personal characteristics, values, and social responses expected of them in their heritage culture. This is why even the issues of religiousness, religious belonging and the way of being religious need to fit at the crossroads of various sociological (and psychological) disciplines. Indeed, as Berry et al. (2006) have demonstrated, there is clearly evidence of the importance of religion in how immigrants engage in both their intercultural relations and their integration paths. And, specifically, Christians earn the highest integration score. What is happening in Italy? I shall look at a group of young 2   In the US sociological research, increasing attention has been paid to the relations between Latino second generations and both their religious belonging (and conversion to Evangelicals and Protestants) and religiousness (Rumbaut, 1997; Crane, 2003).

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immigrants who are experiencing intergenerational discrepancies in their families due both to the family reunion process and the fact that they are adolescents. The Research: Context and Aim Around five million migrants were registered at the beginning of 2011 (Istat, 2012) in Italy, which outlines a complex situation, characterized by immigrant flows from more than 191 countries, especially Central and Eastern Europe, Northern Africa, Latin America and South-East Asia. So far, from the religious point of view, the Italian scenario has changed profoundly since the considerable Eastern European migration flows. Romanians, Ukrainians and Poles have modified the religious composition of the migrant population. Even if the media sometimes continue to stress the risk of Islamization, it is incorrect to speak of an “Islamic invasion”, starting from the statistics: according to estimates by Caritas, Christians constitute 49.8 per cent of immigrants, Muslims 32.1 per cent, other religions 6.7 per cent and nonbelievers 11.4 per cent3 (Caritas and Migrantes, 2011). As data show, in the period 1996–2010 the number of minors increased at a much higher rate than immigrant residents as a whole, growing from 125,565 to over 932,675 (Istat, 2012). Two factors influenced this tendency: the arrival of minors from abroad and the number of births of children of foreign-born parents (Billari and Dalla Zuanna, 2008). The presence of immigrant minors in Italy has by now been an established fact of life for at least 15 years, highlighting the stabilizing character of migratory flows towards the country: a rapid evolution which had affected first schools and then the whole society. Foreign minors include second generations in a strict sense as well as those minors who arrived in Italy after the beginning of the compulsory school age and are therefore considered of “1.5” generation. This latter group constitutes the majority even if the rate of the second generation (the children born in Italy from first-generation immigrants) is increasing, but at the moment it is mainly represented by children under 10 years old. Research on the children of immigration in Italy is developing due to their increasing presence (Ricucci, 2010). A first (and obvious) focus has been 3   Apart from estimates of religious belonging, we do not have specific data about either first generations or their children. This chapter does not consider young Muslims but others to whom less attention has been paid, that is to say those who come from Catholic and Orthodox countries and family traditions.

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dedicated to their school integration; nevertheless, studies considering their social integration in a broader sense are emerging alongside some attention to their religiousness (Frisina, 2008). In this scenario, the theme of identity is becoming a crucial issue in the analyses of foreign adolescents in Italy. Adolescents’ identity definition and social integration oscillate between a strongly emotional cultural system within the family context and the array of social symbols and meanings conveyed by the host society. For foreign adolescents, the status of immigrants’ children involves a greater chance of facing difficulties as compared with the full realization of one’s own subjectivity as well as greater likelihood of marginalization. Like everyone else, foreign adolescents are called to assume a role and work out identity, which is not a merely individual process but rather involves family, school and friends. Therefore it is necessary to assess how individual preferences combine with first- and subsequent- generation projects and with the integration policies of the host society. In fact, “how people enact meaning through religion does not happen in a vacuum, but (in part) represents responses to life situations of a particular historical epoch and social climate” (Crane, 2003: 34). In this scenario, in which characteristics of family reunion, acculturation processes and transnational lives emerge in young people’s lifestories, I examine the question of whether young people can be said to maintain their home-country religiousness in the new context of life or they shift to a more secular way. The idea is, on the one hand, that these young people who – formally – didn’t negotiate their religious identities at school or in the broader society due to their Christian/Catholic adherence, can easily maintain a strong religiousness. On the other, they are “children of their time” and they share with their peers (Italians as well as those who belong to other nationalities) the idea of leaving religion and returning just for family reasons or for special events. Three Groups, One Religious Umbrella? Religiosity was hypothesized to lead to greater de-stigmatization among three particular ethnic groups: Filipinos, Peruvians and Romanians, groups that enjoy a favourable reputation among Italians (Allasino et al., 2004). Further, it was expected that their degree of religiousness would change, parallel to their Italian peers, among those interviewees with a high level of integration and vice versa. As if to say that a low level of integration maximizes religious attachments or, at least, churches’ involvement. The above-mentioned three countries of origin – corresponding to the three main Christian/Catholic immigrant groups in Italy – are those I examined: the

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Philippines, Peru and Romania. Filipinos – particularly women – were the first to arrive. Today the community is numerous, with a high incidence of family reunion, adolescents and young people who received the call to Italy after years of being “children left-behind” (Zanfrini and Asis, 2006; Parrenãs, 2003). The Peruvian community, on the other hand, began its immigration flow towards the middle of the 1980s. This was also principally female: as with the Filipinos, South American women left first, to be joined later by their children and possibly their partners (Caselli, 2008; Paerregaard, 2010). The Romanians present different characteristics: their migration exploded in the 2000s with a greater balance between the sexes, even if women were in the majority (Cingolani, 2009; Ricci, 2006). In any case the three groups share some characteristics: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

relative ease of insertion into the labour market; prevalence of care-giving among the women; positive acceptance on the part of Italian society; high rate of children left behind and rejoined years later with their families; positive image of the children in schools.

Using an American concept, Italian media, government and schools as well as the general debate portray Filipinos, Peruvians and Eastern Europeans as the “model minority”, contending that ethnic cultural traits predispose them to be financially and educationally successful (Yu, 2006). Such images foster borders between these and other immigrant groups. Two phenomena upset this peaceful scene: the fact of young Latino gangs; and racism against Romanians when they are all equally considered as being of Roma origin. These two issues, in any case, do not erode the positive perceptions of them among Italians (GMF et al., 2011). Level of Analysis: Ethnography Behind and Beyond the Ethnic Church I explore ethnographically the social and religious experiences of the abovementioned three youth groups with migratory backgrounds behind and beyond their faith communities. Various studies have suggested how an ethnographic research method is useful in understanding ethnic groups and their socioeconomic-cultural interaction with the host societies, including their religious subculture (Warner and Wittner, 1998; Ebaugh and Chavetz, 2000).

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The method used was collecting life-stories as well as participant observation in ethnic churches. Migration paths, family characteristics and values and religious systems are investigated. On the other hand, the characteristics of friendship networks (only fellow-countrymen, only Italians, mixed) and which activities are carried out during free time are useful indicators in order to understand cultural habits as well as the kind of links which young people are forming in Italy and how religion is a reference point. The thesis is that there are many possible patterns in the relationship with religion, with variations that depend on three sets of factors: 1. personal and demographic factors (for example, gender, age, length of residence); 2. factors that are external to individuals and their communities (policies towards diversity in the society); and 3. differences between immigrant groups and society at large (such as differences in values). The children of immigration we are discussing came to Italy to rejoin their parents4 after a period spent in the home country with one parent or entrusted to the care of other relatives. However, they belong to different generations: 66 per cent to the “1.25”, 32 per cent to the “1.5” and the “1.75”; only 2 per cent can properly be called second generation. Most of them attend school or training courses; only 20 per cent can be defined as employed. Speaking about their migratory trajectories, a difference emerges between Peruvians and Filipinos on the one hand and Romanians on the other. All of them have had some contact with their communities’ religious milieux, and all define themselves as being in some sense religious. We do not know much about their relationship with religion. In the following sections we shall begin to explore the subject through qualitative research5 based on the answers to the following questions:   The families of the young people interviewed were structured as follows: 70 per cent parents and children; 30 per cent only mothers with children. Socially the families are lower middle class even when there is high cultural capital: 70 per cent of the interviewees declared that they had at least one parent with a university degree. 5   In the qualitative research “Youth in the Province of Turin: Identity and Integration Paths of the Children of Immigration”, the life-stories of 60 young people were gathered, equally balanced as to gender and drawing on the main immigrant groups: Romanians, Peruvians, Filipinos. The aim of the study was not so much to define differences among individual migratory chains as to investigate migratory paths and family relationships 4

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How do they interact with/develop their religious identity? Are they followers of the “traditional religiosity” of their parents (the first generation) or do they belong to the “secularized millennium generation”? Are they looking for a different (from their Italian peers) relationship with religion, more spiritual, requiring regular meetings, or do they want to get away from this? Are THEY seeking informatics religious tools and means of contact with the church, less visible and “non-inserted” in the integration process among peers? Or, on the contrary, do they choose, strategically, to reinforce the Catholic part of their identity in order to succeed better in the integration process in a Catholic country? The background against which the children of immigration work out their destinies is an urban milieu undergoing profound socio-economic change and having a complex, well-organized relationship whith immigration. Indeed, field research has been carried out in Turin6 where the three communities considered have for some time been developing considerable stabilization processes and where there are ethnic churches at hand to aid positive integration of immigrants, in addition to Italian religious (especially Catholic) associationism which is actively involved with the children of immigration. “1.5” Christian/Catholic Italian Style What relationship do the children of Catholic-Christian migration enjoy with religion? Do they perceive it as a bond with the old country’s traditions or is it a deep reminder of belonging untouched by the migratory process? It is well known that migration affects religious belonging, either weakening or strengthening it: how – among young foreigners inserted into a social context where Catholic-Christian values are not seriously questioned but rather make up an important element of cultural belonging – religious identity and belonging are at risk (Garelli, 2011). For the parents’ generation, religion has been a card to play in the dynamics of insertion in the labour market and acceptance: Filipinos and Peruvians have been welcomed, partly because of their Catholic origins; Romanians, whether developed by the first-hand experience of “left-behind” children or those left by one parent or both in the home country and who then joined their parents in their new abode. Prior to these interviews, preliminary talks were held with privileged witnesses such as teachers, both public and private service operators in the immigration field, and ethnic associationism representatives. 6   The characteristics of the foreign presence and its youth/minors component are studied more in depth in Comitato oltre il razzismo (2006); Ricucci (2010).

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Orthodox or Catholic, have also benefitted from their unproblematical religious belonging, which does not demand alternative (to the churches) places of prayer, special work timetables to fit in with prayer or diets and ad hoc teaching in schools. The reunited children’s generation from these three backgrounds undoubtedly gain from their ethnic-religious identity which does not draw attention to them – as happens with their Muslim peers. This fact, however, does not make them representative examples of religious culture in their home countries, and nor does it immunize them against the effects of the adaptation process implicit in the integration path, including progressive distancing from institutional religion. The Weight of Migration in Religious Biography The children of immigration too are children of their age from the religious point of view and are therefore fully part of two dynamics which the individual–religion relationship is undergoing. The first concerns the continued belonging of the youngest to their parents’ religion, in spite of growing religious pluralism and the advance of the secularization process (Tos, 2000; Hervieu-Léger et al., 1992; Garelli et al., 2003). In a broader sense, the Italian situation reveals particular characteristics compared to other European countries: a higher than average rate of religiosity; faint presence of other denominations; renewed presence of the Church in the public sphere.7 Contrary to the expectations of many observers of modernity, we are not witnessing today a falling off from the religious sphere but a different way of belonging to it and expressing it (Brechon, 2009; Hoge et al., 2001). And it is in this direction that we find the other dynamic, that of the growth of the individualism of faith (Sciolla, 2004). In the field of studies of religiosity, the decline in young people’s attendance at Sunday services is generally considered an indicator of the process of individualization of religious faith; faith is more and more a private fact accompanied by a reduction of participation in parochial life and observance of the Church’s teaching on matters of moral and sexual orientation. This aspect, along with religious institutions’ difficulty in reading and interpreting the needs of orientation and their answers to advanced modernity, makes Berger’s “solitary believer” (1992) topical today, reinforcing what Davie identifies as “believing without belonging”. To these two dynamics can be added – for the “1.5” generation – that of migration: the processes of individualization and personalization of living religion meet a community parenthesis in the initial period after arrival in Italy.   For details see Garelli (2011).

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A few days after I arrived in Italy, my mother took me to the nuns and one of them spoke Spanish. She welcomed me, showed me the recreation centre and told me that they organized activities for young people like me after Sunday Mass. I felt at ease. Before we left we went to the chapel and prayed together. It was the first time I had done that for many years. (20-year-old Peruvian girl) My mother took me to the church on Sunday. The first days I had walked around the city with her, feeling happy and overwhelmed. Although Italian is not difficult, it seemed like another planet. At the Romanian church, on the other hand, it was like going back. From that point on I never missed a Sunday or any activity organized for us young people. (21-year-old Romanian girl) I have to admit that when I arrived I attended more faithfully. For us Filipinos religion is important – it is part of our culture. We grow up with Catholic values and they are what our parents teach us. Since I arrived, however, it has been harder: I have to work many weekends so cannot go to our Mass, Father Benna’s – he says Mass in Tagalog and understands us. For those of us Filipinos who were born there and now are destined to live in Italy, it is important to have him as our priest. He’s Italian and a bit Filipino. He understands us. (22-year-old Filipino boy)

Most of the interviewees say they are Catholic or Orthodox believers: only five Romanians said they believed in a superior being, without going into detail. In describing how they live their lives as believers, all of them, more or less directly, referred to their ethnic churches, which, since their arrival in Italy, have been a point of reference. How this point of reference functions, however, changes in time: if at the beginning it is the “place of worship” par excellence, where one reinforces one’s identity, it later becomes principally a point of reference with regard to the cultural and linguistic environment. Why do I come to this church? Well, it’s not strictly for religious reasons, but cultural. Part of the reason is to keep some contact with the Filipino community because it’s our only source of cultural identity. It’s also important to our parents – this is not the most important factor, but one of the important factors. Another thing is that we think about the next generation. Our kids will have the same exposure if we have contact with the Filipino community. (20-year-old Filipino girl)

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According to another attending member: The first thing that attracts people is fellowship, a sense of closeness. It’s trying to find a group that’s comfortable together. There is a sense of comfort in being with other Filipinos because there’s an understanding in terms of background. (22-year-old Filipino boy) It’s like being part of an extended family. You feel protected, safe. You don’t have to justify who you are, what you do, why you came to Italy. (20-year-old Filipino girl) I feel well when I am in church. I think of my grandmother at home and get a little homesick. She and I often went to church together. Here I can come with my mother only sometimes because she often has to work on Sundays too. But when we come we meet a lot of people we know and chat with them until it closes. It’s like being in Romania and it does us good, especially when outside, round and about, we hear Italians complaining about foreigners, therefore about us. (18-year-old Romanian girl) For us Peruvians, Mass is an important occasion for meeting the community. It is much more than prayer: it is gathering as a family, feeling at home. Our parents feel as though they were back in Peru, not least because they speak Spanish, which is also the language of the Mass, so everything is simpler. The feeling for us young people is of turning back to the world where we grew up but don’t live there any longer. (19-year-old Peruvian boy)

Religion is left in the background: the reunion of compatriots, speaking the same language, the reassuring feeling that they are in a protective cocoon – this is what young people experience. That is not surprising when we consider that they have spent part of their lives elsewhere and at a certain point came to Italy, a context where being a child of immigrants – a foreigner – is not easy (Ricucci, 2012), where the insertion process is interwoven with the identity-building process of their age group. This explains why attendance at ethnic churches is most frequent in the early years in Italy and diminishes thereafter. Integration alone does not suffice to explain this divergence: it is mixed up with how these young people imagine the host society perceives them. For them too – Christian-Catholics in a Catholic country par excellence – there are problems: paradoxically, they too have to deal with prejudice like their Muslim peers.

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Race, an involuntary and ascriptive marker, is considered in the case of Filipinos and Peruvians to be one of the central features of identity, which separates them from Italian society. Among Romanians, their association both with Roma and with criminals risks negatively affecting their integration process: in their case neither the colour of their skin nor their religious belonging makes them stand out. However, one of the most significant ways in which young members of the churches articulate their ethnic identity is through the appropriation of certain elements of “practised culture”, that is, values and standards of their traditional morality. These values, ubiquitously invoked in their discourse about their identity, consist of a set of core traditional values – most significantly filial piety, respect for parents, family-centeredness and a work ethic. My Filipino values include respect for elders, and emphasis on education. Another thing I love about my Filipino culture is its family-orientedness. I adore my parents. And I really like how children take care of their parents. (20-year-old Filipino girl)

Compared to non-churchgoers, church members display a considerably higher degree of attachment to these values and standards of morality, which are appropriated by them as highly relevant criteria of their ethnic identity and as self-defined markers for signalling membership and exclusion. Indeed, the more “religious” a member is, the more embracing he/she tends to be of the traditional values espoused by his/her parents. The non-churchgoers, although they may generally observe these values, are not as strict in their interpretation of or adherence to them. Furthermore, compared with non-attenders, church attenders hold far more strictly to traditional views regarding sexual morality and gender relations, displaying a much more critical stance toward Italian (European) culture and values such as individualism and liberal sexual morality. Between Belief and Belonging: Ethnic Churches’ Control Aside from the cultural functions of the ethnic church, Christianity is above all a system of values and ethics, and it is through the power of this ethical dimension, and the way it inter-relates with the three groups’ value systems, that a powerful sense of group consciousness and protection is forged among the subsequent generation of children. It is clear that the church, in addition to the family, is institutionally an important arena for the transmission and maintenance of traditional values.

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Scholars view the family as the central site of religious transmission. Italy’s changing ethnic and religious demographics, however, may challenge what we know about the role of families in transmitting religious identity and practices. Consistent with previous research, respondents mentioned mothers more often than fathers as being strong influences on their own religiousness. The significance of parental influence, however, includes an assortment of different practices not established in the broader religious and family literature. Findings complicate the role of the ethnic congregation in the migrant communities by emphasizing the overlapping influences of the family both at home and in the religious organization. Differently from existing research on religious transmission, in addition to parents, these respondents see other family members as key agents in their religious socialization (Alba, 2005). The distinctive ways in which non-parental family members were described as influences follows three particular paths, which I conceptualize as “reinforcement, substitution and contrast” roles. They help parents present the “home-country way of life”, confirming that it is possible to follow it in Italy (Reinforcement). They also play parental roles where mothers are involved in full-time or residential-care jobs. In these cases, generally, newly arrived adolescents are at risk without the continuous presence of an adult figure looking after them in their daily activities in a new country (Substitution). Then, when relations between children and parents are difficult, especially in the case of long periods between family reunions, other people can help parents to question the way of life of young generations if they act “badly” according to the traditions (Contrast). It is clear that the three roles overlap. “Children in Italy have too much freedom and consequently are uncontrollable, disobedient and disrespectful” (Filipino mother). Her Filipino practices of parenting, which are based on notions of filial obligations, are no longer effective with her Filipino-Italian children. To solve her parenting problems in Italy, she turns to religion. “We wanted to make sure that the kids were on the right track – so we took them to church” (Filipino youth group director). This mother is not alone in turning to religion to solve the intergenerational tensions that arise in immigrant families, especially in those which have been rejoined after some years. The growing body of scholarship on religion and immigrant adaptation addresses the importance of religion in parenting, particularly in reproducing traditional values and culture for the second generation. Some parents find that religion protects the second generation from the “immoral” influences of Italian culture.

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On this point all the interviewees agree: there is a hiatus between them and their parents. As a young Peruvian said: Our parents don’t understand. We do not have to choose between being Spanishspeaking Peruvians who take part in processions and being Italian. We live in Italy and grow up like our friends. Some attend Mass and others don’t. Some have piercings and others don’t. Some speak Spanish and others Arabic. Our parents need to remember that they brought us here so now we are also a bit Italian and consequently behave like Italians. None of my Italian friends goes to Mass or processions on Sundays, but that does not mean they are not believers. Inside we are believers, Catholics and Peruvian; outside we live Italian style. (21-year-old Peruvian boy)

In order to give an overview and summarize in a diagram (Tables 6.1 and 6.2) the relations with some aspects of religiosity, we can describe the situation of these young people with their “head in a cage” (in relation to traditional family values) and the “body off ” (in interactions with Italian society). Except for Filipino boys and girls, who have the greatest degree of adherence to the model proposed by the family and cultural origins, the rest of the cases seem to be facing a generation seeking the right to be different – at least in part – from their parents; diversity that is being shaped, but that does not seem to take the road of confrontation. The majority of interviewees (equally balanced as to gender and origin) consider some social rules – for example marriage before cohabitation, virginity, marriage “until death do us part” – as traditional practices destined to remain part of their educational background: these values don’t guide their behavioural habits or their decisions. According to recent surveys, their Italian peers feel the same way (Garelli, 2011). Yet despite similarities in behaviour and shared socialization determined by their living and growing within the same generation, the daily-life difference between being Italian and foreign makes itself felt and the children of immigrants find that they have to mediate between the external world and the internal one of family and community which rotate around the church. All of them, however, seek a compromise: nobody burns his/her bridges, either to one side or the other. The girls find that they have to mediate more because they are subject to more rules (places they can go, things they can do): some tell lies, others go along with everything, yet others hold out until they are 18 – but hardly ever does anybody openly defy the rules. For the boys it is relatively easy: most of their mediation efforts consist in handling their parents’ worries and calming them down. It is the tiresome – both for Italians and for foreigners – building of identity, and religion too plays its part.

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Table 6.1

Relation with religion of those just arrived in Italy by ethnic group

Country of Origin

Peru Philippines Romania

Table 6.2

Weekly Attendance at Mass

Participation in Church Activities

Yes

Yes

Romania

Rarely

No

Yes

Rarely

No

Relation with religion by ethnic group: answers collected during the interviews Weekly Attendance at Mass Yes

Philippines

No

F M F M F M

Country of Origin

Peru

Rarely

Respect for Religious Values

Rarely

No

Respect for Religious Values

Participation in Church Activities Yes

Rarely

No

Yes

Rarely

No

F M F M F M

Note: In these tables, I used just the answers of interviewees belonging to the 1.25 and 1.5 generations, in order to compare both religious attitude and religiousness among those who have spent a reasonable period of their religious socialization abroad.

Conclusion: It Sounds Like the Same Old Story If “Muslim youth have assumed a central, if complex, place in the politics and cultures of the global South and North” (Bayat and Herrera, 2010: 5), ChristianCatholics are on the way back, especially in Europe. While in American society sociologists pay growing attention towards this specific youth group, in Europe the “fear of Islam” risks overcoming any another change. Among the novelties

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of the last 10 years there is the increasing number of youths with a Catholic or Christian background and, as a result, the reinforcement – at least on paper – of the mainstream religion in the Italian context, or, in a broader sense, its Christian origin. This chapter shows how rapid are the changes in the religiousness of the children of immigrants with a CC background in a Catholic country. The thesis is that the acculturation process under which these young people define their integration paths is stronger than their religious socialization. Broadly speaking, there is more to the lives of these youth than mere religiosity, conservative cultural ideas, and attachment to their home countries. Despite common elements of identification and cultural specificities, these youth have as much in common with their peers, both Italian and foreign, as they share among themselves. While there exist many lines of demarcation within the category of “children of immigrants” along lines of class, gender, education and cultural divides, to name a few, there are also certain common attributes that make the category of “Christian-Catholic” meaningful. But to understand what’s happening we have to bear in mind that this group stands at the crossroads of three sociological areas of interest: their youth, their assimilation process and their ethnicity. Considering these three facets, their religious belonging as well as their level of religiousness assumes relevance on two planes: in their relations with both the host society and ethnic communities; and in their interaction with peers. As an interviewee says: Religion is a marker. It doesn’t matter if you are Muslim or Catholic. You are what your country of origin says you are. This is our life as immigrants: we cannot choose what we want to do, who we want believe in … I’m a Filipino and when teachers at school speak about me, they immediately class me as a village woman, with a mother involved in domestic services, with a high level of religiousness and strong moral values. It is the same for my Romanian friends. Is it the same for Muslims? They are treated as dangerous, or as at risk, because they belong to a dangerous community. It’s funny: they don’t attend a mosque or any community events.

How have Turin’s young CCs responded to this stereotyped environment? There have been several reactions that I witnessed during my research. Some young people have downplayed their ethnicity and their religion, and have sought to “pass” as non-Filipino/Latino/Romanian. Sometimes is very difficult: skin colour and somatic traits prevent them from hiding their ethnic

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origins. This is the case, of course, for Filipinos and Latinos, whose appearance and accent give them away. However, if Romanians are apparently advantaged in choosing an assimilation strategy, they share with peers the daily struggle with their families and ethnic communities. I attend Mass more because of solidarity with my family rather than personal enthusiasm. They expect my participation, it is like family loyalty. (22-year-oldPeruvian girl) It is important to me because it is important to my parents. (23-year-oldRomanian boy)

Some of them choose the mediation path: they go to church and show loyalty to family values – but without either commitment or conviction. Mass is the only time a lot of Romanians get together. Yes, you can go to a disco, but it is different: in the disco you find only Romanians who want to forget their origins. (23-year-old Romanian boy)

This quotation introduces another aspect: religious belonging is perceived in a social rather than a spiritual sense or in one of deep commitment. It is quite evident that for those young people inserted in the Italian context, with positive relations at school or at work, neither the parents’ religion nor their religiousness is very important. The idea that these young people could revitalize the juvenile composition of Catholics and other Christians is wishful thinking. Children of immigrants, at the stage of the 1.5 generation, do not express the same enthusiasm for religious icons considered vital by the first generation. They respect their parents’ desire to preserve certain traditions, but do not personally speak of them with the same enthusiasm. Nevertheless, while their experience differs from the first generation, it is equally distinct from “Religion Italian Style” as described by Garelli (2011). The second-generation youth in these Christian-Catholic congregations have charted a path that contains elements of collective expression (festivals, language, transnational ties) as well as personal agency (intense religious experience, youth organizations). Their involvement in the ethnic congregation connects them not only to families and their ethnic community here, but also to many peers in their home countries. The situation of those who have not established a positive relationship with Italian society, who have not managed to integrate, is different. They have

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remained anchored only to their family and community, declaring that they assiduously attend their ethnic church and its functions. In these cases, however, attachment to their community of origin seems to be dictated rather by necessity than by choice. Indeed the community, and consequently the ethnic church, are elements of support for those young people with a limited knowledge of Italian, and have not developed a mixed network of friends, but have made contact with compatriots and activities organized within their ethnic circle the main contexts of their identity. As for the first generation, the church becomes a safe port in the storm of Italian society. They are prime candidates for a “downward assimilation” path. Christian-Catholic youth are a large and fast-growing group, and it is important to understand if and how religion can help them in the acculturation process as well as in the transition to adulthood as children of immigrants. The risk of marginalization, drug involvement, the decline in moral values, dropping out and the inability to find a place in Italian society is one of the challenges both to their families and ethnic communities as well as to them. Differences with the parents’ generation are to be expected. Nevertheless, the great importance the ethnic parishes continue to have for these young people shows that they are still “in between”: on the one hand, for the various reasons mentioned above, they continue to follow their ethnic church and, on the other, they look for an autonomous way of belonging and religious adherence. In doing this they are both “children of their age”, as young people who want to express themselves beyond the adult generation, and “children of immigrants”. This marker, as happens for their Muslim peers, intervenes frequently in their daily life. Their religious belonging to Catholic or Christian Orthodox churches can help them only apparently: they feel that they are stigmatized for their saints’ days, for the length of their masses. It is a mirror image of Italians remembering a not-so-distant past, and the experience of their co-nationals abroad, stigmatized because of religiousness and their habit of carrying statues around in processions. References Alba, R. (2005) Bright versus blurred boundaries: second-generation assimilation and exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28 (1): 20–49. Allasino, E., Reyneri, E., Venturini, A. and Zincone, G. (2004) Labour Market Discrimination against Migrant Workers in Italy. Geneve: ILO.

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Ricucci, R. (2012) Figli dell’immigrazione. In M. Naldini, C. Solera and M.P. Torrioni (eds) Corsi di vita e generazioni. Bologna: Il Mulino, pp. 197–219. Rumbaut, R.G. (1997) Assimilation and its discontents: between rhetoric and reality. International Migration Review, 31 (4): 923–960. Sciolla, L. (2004) La sfida dei valori. Bologna: Il Mulino. Tos, N., Mohler, P.P. and Malnar, B. (eds) (2000) Modern Society and Values: A Comparative Analysis Based on the ISSP Project. Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana and ZUMA. Vertovec, S. and Wassendorf, S. (2005) Migration and Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Diversity in Europe: An Overview of Issues and Trends. Oxford: Compass. Warner, R.S. and Wittner, J.G. (eds) (1998) Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and the New Immigration. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Winthol de Wenden, C. (2004) Giovani di seconda generazione: il caso francese. In M. Ambrosini and S. Molina (eds) Seconde generazioni. Un’introduzione al futuro dell’immigrazione in Italia. Torino: Edizioni Fondazione Agnelli, pp. 107–128. Yu, T. (2006) Challenging the politics of the “model minority” stereotype: a case for educational equality. Equity & Excellence in Education, 39 (4): 325–333. Zanfrini, L. and Asis, M.B. (eds) (2006) Orgoglio e pregiudizio. Una ricerca tra Filippine e Italia sulla transizione all’età attiva dei figli di emigrati e dei figli di immigrati. Milano: Franco Angeli.

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Chapter 7

Ethnic and Religious Diversities in Portugal: The Case of Brazilian Evangelical Immigrants 1

Donizete Rodrigues

Introduction Religion, as a social phenomenon, a cultural/social subsystem, is a symbolic expression of social experiences, and it plays a primordial role in the analysis of all human societies. Religion is a decisive element for understanding social life, institutional practices, daily experiences, and the processes of social change (Wilson, 1982). The anthropology of religion, in addition to former studies – of acculturated tribal societies, religious syncretism and messianic movements in societies historically marked by colonialism – has also been studying religious expression in the context of modern countries, particularly in Europe and the United States (Bowie, 2000). The anthropology and sociology of religion have been investigating: 1. the phenomenon of new religious movements; 2. ethnic and religious minorities, in the context of the massive immigration process from peripheral postcolonial countries to these two major economic centres; 3. the important phenomenon of transnational Neo-Pentecostalism, in Africa, Asia, and particularly Latin America, with major impact in Brazil (Freston, 2001; Corten and Fratani, 2001; Clarke, 2006, 2009). The analysis of religious phenomena in the context of globalization corroborates the enormous importance that religion, through the mass migration of people, 1   I am particularly grateful to Bruce Bird, Paul Freston, Sidney Greenfield and Brian Juan O’Neill for helpful comments and suggestions.

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occupies in contemporary society. Therefore, in sociological and anthropological studies, in many parts of the world, there is a wide-ranging and interesting debate about the relationship between religion and immigration (Yang and Ebaugh, 2001). The importance of religion increases when people or groups migrate. The diaspora’s circumstances may strengthen the fellowship bonds amongst them and revitalize religious heritages and traditions (Kivisto, 2007). In the context of migration, it is important to re-establish a sense of belonging, and religion plays an important role in the attempts of the group to maintain a sense of cultural and linguistic identities (Haddad et al., 2003; Pluss, 2009). Contemporary societies are increasingly pluralistic in their cultural manifestations, religion included. In Portugal since the 1980s this has partly arisen from various waves of migration, which created new ethnic and religious diversities (Bastos and Bastos, 1999; Vilaça, 2006). Considering the enormous importance of ethnic and religious changes as a global phenomenon, this chapter discusses, in the context of the relationship between religion and immigration, the new ethnic and religious minorities in Portugal, and particularly the case of Brazilian (evangelical) immigrants. The emphasis is on how the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God is proselytizing and converting Brazilians and other minorities, and also Portuguese Catholics and some Roma. The Historical Ethnic and Religious Minorities Portugal was founded in the twelfth century in the context of Christianity. The south, since the eighth century, had been occupied by Arab Muslims, whose presence the Christian Crusades (1096–1253) displaced from the territory. Thus, Christianity, simultaneously, was strongly associated with the demarcation of the territorial borders and the formation of Portuguese national identity (Mota, 2003). Portugal was a country with a long history of linguistic (Portuguese), ethnic (white) and religious (Catholic) homogeneity, despite the old, but not numerically significant, presence of Jews (Kayserling, 1971), dating back to the fifth century, hence before the formation of the nation-state. And the Roma minority had been in Portugal since the sixteenth century. Ideologically, Portugal tried to constitute its national identity based only on Christian Catholic hegemony. As a consequence, Jews and Roma, the “other” traditional minority groups, were throughout the centuries victims of numerous discriminatory measures. The

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Christian Catholic Portuguese monarchy began to persecute and expel the Jews from the territory in the fifteenth century, and this intensified in the sixteenth century, with the presence of the Inquisition, which ended only in 1821, one year after the Liberal Revolution. However, there was a period, in the late eighteenth century, of more religious tolerance towards Judaism, supported by the policies of the Marquês de Pombal, when a few Jewish families came to Portugal. The Roma, once considered as non-Portuguese citizens, were legally persecuted from 1592 until 1820. Presently, they continue to be legally and socially discriminated. For instance, they have become Portuguese citizens only in the last decade. Occasionally, there are still waves of expulsion from the lands they occupy, demolitions of their houses and camps and other acts of racism against them. For the great majority of Portuguese people, the Roma are seen as troublemakers, criminals and drug dealers (Bastos and Bastos, 1999). Nevertheless, both these old minority groups in Portugal present an enormous capacity to endure. Despite the once massive expulsion of Jews, there is still, for instance, a Jewish community in the town of Belmonte (in the interior of the country, near the Spanish border), who survived secretly practising their religious rituals for centuries (Schwarz, 1993). As for the Roma, and according several sources, they number between 30,000 and 50,000 individuals and, being evangelicals or not, they maintain their distinctive cultural and religious identities (Rodrigues and Santos, 2000; Rodrigues, 2006b, 2006c). Other (small) groups of immigrants came from northern Europe to Portugal in the second half of the nineteenth century. Arriving with them were missionaries of the historical Protestant churches: Methodists, Baptists and Presbyterians. Later some of them founded in Portugal the Anglican EpiscopalLusitanian Church. In early twentieth century, two American religious movements arrived: the Seventh-day Adventist Church (1904) and Jehovah’s Witnesses (1925). Another less visible religious group was Spiritism-Kardecism from France, appearing in the early twentieth century, which established the Portuguese Spiritualist Federation in 1926. The Revolution of 1974 ended a long period of dictatorship in Portugal (since 1933) and established democracy, which also meant religious freedom. According the Constitution (1976, art. 41:1–2), no one can be persecuted or deprived of rights, due to beliefs or religious practices. Therefore, after democratization and greater economic prosperity, caused by Portugal’s admission into the European Union, favourable conditions were created for migration and new immigrants. And the new wave of immigrants brought with them new religious practices.

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Immigration and New Ethnic and Religious Minorities Portugal, historically, was a typical emigrant country. In the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, the main destinations of Portuguese emigration were to Brazil and the United States. Especially in the post-war years, Portuguese emigration to Europe increased dramatically, particularly to France. After 1974, Portugal underwent a major process of social, political, economic and ethnic change. Immediately after the Democratic Revolution (1974) Portuguese colonies gained their independence, marking the end of the Portuguese Colonial Empire. The decolonization process was accompanied by the return of hundreds of thousands of Portuguese citizens (termed retornados) and black African refugees and immigrants, along with some Indian mestizos from Goa. Participation in the European Union brought economic development that has made Portugal more attractive to migrant labour, especially in the construction sector (Machado, 1997). In fact, in the past three decades, Portugal has become a destination for immigrants from: Asia (Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis), Portuguese-speaking African countries (Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, São Tome and Principe),2 Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Russia), and, especially, Brazil. Portugal went through a remarkable process of transformation. The 1990s was the decade of transition; from a country with intense emigration it became a country receiving immigrants. Surely, the process of legalization of illegal immigrants in 1992 would have contributed to these changes. However, it is important to note that, with the economic crisis since 2008, there has been a significant decrease of immigration to Portugal and an increase of Portuguese emigration to other more developed European countries. For example, the Portuguese form the largest immigrant community in Luxembourg. Until the last decade, immigration to Portugal was mainly from countries with historical relationships with Portugal in the context of colonialism, thus implying the arrival of groups of Portuguese-speaking immigrants. However, since 2001, this situation changed substantially, with the massive influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe (Baganha et al., 2004). According to official data, and considering only legal immigrants, in 2011 there were approximately 127,000 Eastern Europeans in Portugal, predominantly from the Ukraine (almost 50 per cent).

2   In 2011, approximately 120,000 immigrants from these countries lived in Portugal with legal resident status (Source: INE-SEF/MAI).

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Therefore, the recent massive immigration to Portugal has caused considerable changes in the demographic, economic and social structures and the presence of the immigrants has brought new cultural, ethnic and religious diversities. Religious Minorities Portugal still is a predominantly Catholic country. However, in the last three decades there has been an enlargement of the Portuguese religious field. In this context, the old and new religious movements with most visibility are: (Neo-) Pentecostal churches, Christian Orthodox, Islamism, Hinduism and AfroBrazilian religions. Buddhism, Judaism, the historical Protestant churches, Spiritism-Kardecism, New Age and other Eastern religions are also present. Hinduism’s presence in Portugal, as a religious minority, dates back to 1961, with the end of Portuguese colonial power in Goa, India. In the following decade, with the end of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, some Hindu Goans emigrated to Portugal, who had formerly lived in Mozambique. In the 1990s, some Hindu Indian immigrants began arriving, coming mainly from the region of the Punjab (Bastos and Bastos, 2001; Sant’Ana, 2009). After 1974, although small in number, new religious movements began arriving: Mormons, Moonies and adherents of Transcendental Meditation. In the mid-1990s, Scientology also arrived (Vilaça, 2006). Although there was already a small community in Lisbon, only after the 1990s did a more significant number of Muslims, mainly Sunnites and Ismaelis, begin to arrive in Portugal. They number approximately 34,000 individuals, the vast majority of them being concentrated in Lisbon. The growth of the Islamic groups is due to post-colonial immigration from Guinea and Mozambique (Tiesler, 2000, 2007). Yet there are also Muslim immigrants from Morocco, Senegal, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Mapril, 2009; Tiesler, 2010). During the past 20 years, the Afro-Brazilian religions (Candomblé and Umbanda) with the first “pais/mães de santo” began arriving in Portugal (Saraiva, 2007). And today there are more than 40 “terreiros”, or places of worship. In the beginning, they followed the Brazilian diaspora, but soon these syncretic religions begin to attract some Catholic Portuguese people in particular. In the specific case of the “terreiro” studied by the author, according to Saraiva (2010: 273), their “clients are almost exclusively Portuguese middleclass individuals, and very few Brazilians frequent them, preferring to join Neopentecostal churches”, probably because Umbanda in particular “coexists

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harmoniously with Catholicism, most of the practitioners were baptized and are regular churchgoers”. Immigrants from Eastern Europe are mostly Christian-orthodox, with a small minority of Catholics of the Byzantine rite. Unlike the Brazilian evangelicals, who maintain a privileged relationship with the Portuguese Catholic Church, there is wider acceptance of this religious minority group from within Portuguese society (Vilaça, 2010). Therefore, as a result of recent large-scale immigration, associated with the freedom of religious expression, there has been a notable increase in the “market of symbolic goods” in Portugal, in the sense advocated by Pierre Bourdieu (1986). The enlargement of the religious market occurred especially in the 1980s, with the arrival of the first Brazilian Neo-Pentecostal churches. This phenomenon was intensified, from the 1990s, with the more massive influx of Brazilian immigrants and new Brazilian evangelical churches, causing rapid and significant changes in the “Portuguese religious supermarket”. Brazilian Immigrants and Evangelical Churches The phenomenon of Neo-Pentecostalism, Catholic and Protestant, emerged in the United States in the 1960s and quickly expanded to Latin America, with particular importance in Brazil. As a consequence, Neo-Pentecostalism is one of the largest global religious movements (Coleman, 2000; Clarke, 2006) and Brazil is the country with the highest concentration of Pentecostal followers in the world. From Neo-Pentecostalism in Brazil there emerged hundreds (or probably thousands) of new evangelical churches (Chesnut, 1997). Since the end of the 1980s, many Brazilian churches, and in particular the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Rodrigues, 2006a), followed the large flux of Brazilian immigration mainly to the United States and Europe.3 It began a rapid and expressive international expansion. As a consequence, today it constitutes an important and global religious phenomenon. The strong expansion of Neo-Pentecostalism from Latin America to the United States and Europe is termed a “reverse mission” (Freston, 2010). Originally arising from European Protestantism and American Pentecostal evangelization, the Protestant and Catholic Pentecostal churches, Brazilians in particular, consider themselves responsible for the important “divine mission” of 3   In the case of Portugal, see Ruuth and Rodrigues (1999); Mafra (2002); Mariz (2009); Gabriel (2009).

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(re-)Christianization of the United States – which has strayed from the moral and true Protestant religious practice (Rodrigues, 2010, 2013) – and Europe, which suffers a strong process of secularization/laicism. According to socio-anthropological research already conducted on the Brazilian religious diaspora, and particularly considering the important Brazilian Neo-Pentecostal movement (Protestant and Catholic), I propose the following categories, that is, there are three main missionary procedures, as follows: 1. An “Intra-ethnic Pentecostal Mission”: Protestant Pentecostal churches that follow the same route of Brazilian immigrants, with the main purpose being to provide religious services and spiritual support to compatriot evangelicals, but also to try to convert other Brazilian Catholics. In the particular case of Portugal, because they speak the same language, the members of these churches – that came directly from Brazil and also the branches founded in the host society – beyond its ‘ethnic boundary’, try to evangelize members of other ethnic minorities, in particular (Portuguese-speaking) black African immigrants, Portuguese Catholics and some Roma. Examples of this procedure are the churches of Brazilian origin, such as the Assemblies of God (with their different branches) and the Pentecostal Church God is Love (Téchio, 2011). 2. An “Extra-ethnic Pentecostal Mission”: Brazilian missionaries and religious leaders (Protestants and Catholics) who work directly with the natives, trying to evangelize them and/or promote religious revival, without engaging exclusively in giving religious support to their compatriots in the diaspora. In this case, geographic location, the locations of the churches and missions, does not necessarily coincide with the communities/enclaves of Brazilians in the host society. Examples of this procedure are: the Brazilian Catholic Charismatic Renewal Movement and, in particular, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, which has adopted this strategy not only in Europe and the United States, but also in other parts of the world, including Asia and Africa.4   We have been doing ethnographic fieldwork on these two Brazilian religious movements – the evangelical Universal Church of the Kingdom of God and the Catholic Charismatic Renewal Movement – in Portugal (Ruuth and Rodrigues, 1999; Rodrigues, 2006a), Italy (Rodrigues and Silva, 2012; Silva and Rodrigues, 2012), Spain (Silva and Rodrigues, 2012, 2013), and Ireland, emphasizing the missionaries’ work, proselytizing practices, and religious revival among Brazilians, other ethnic minorities, and particularly native people. 4

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3. A “Transnational Pentecostal Mission”: Brazilian Protestant Pentecostal churches, already initially installed in non-European countries, which send to Europe mainly Brazilian pastors and religious leaders, but also converted immigrants of other nationalities, with the goal of evangelizing European Catholics. It is the case, for example, of the Pentecostal Missionary Movement of Portuguese Language. Founded in Brazil in 1991, this Neo-Pentecostal Church originally followed the massive flow of Brazilian immigrants to the United States, but later starting to convert Portuguese immigrants in the traditional Portuguese enclaves of Mineola-Garden City (Long Island, New York) and Newark (New Jersey). Afterwards, this new religious movement sent its Portuguese pastors and missionaries to establish the Church in Portugal, with the main purpose of converting Portuguese Catholics (Rodrigues, 2010, 2013). It is important to note that in all these three procedures, even that of evangelizing other ethnic groups in the host society, the churches/missions maintain Brazilian leadership and do not lose their Brazilian character (“Brazilianness”). “Brazucas” Arriving in Portugal Brazilian immigrants come to Portugal by plane and they do not need visas to enter the country. However, after three months they become illegal immigrants. The first flux of Brazilian migration to Portugal was in the mid-1980s and the early 1990s. They were highly educated and qualified people (many of whom were dentists), members of the upper and upper-middle classes. The second wave of Brazilian immigration came after 1995. They were more numerous and mainly from lower-middle and working classes. The large majority is young, male, undocumented, and with a low level of education. They work predominantly in the informal economy: civil construction (men), domestic services, cleaning houses/offices, and restaurants/cafés. After entering Portugal, some of them migrate to other European countries, especially Spain, England, Italy, France, Belgium and Switzerland. However, with the recent Portuguese economic crisis, together with better economic conditions and employment in Brazil, what is occurring today is an interruption of migration to Portugal and even a tendency to return to Brazil. Nevertheless, according to the Portuguese official institution SEF, “Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras”, responsible for border immigration control,

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and considering only those who are legal, there were, in 2011, approximately 116,000 individuals. With the increase of this specific wave of immigrants in the last two decades, the Brazilian minority is today the largest group of migrants in Portugal (Machado, 2006; Malheiros, 2007; Xavier, 2007; Saraiva, 2010). In the specific case of Brazilian immigration, the evangelical churches play an important role in helping immigrants to maintain their ethno-religious identity. Following the main Brazilian migration flows, the pastors and missionaries of the Brazilian Pentecostal churches have travelled to Portugal accompanying their followers and attempting to evangelize for the most part other Brazilian immigrants. Yet, after becoming well installed in Portugal, the Brazilian evangelical churches have a calculated and vigorous strategy of proselytizing, evangelizing, and converting with great success members of other immigrant groups, in particular black Africans, Portuguese Catholics, and some Roma.5 However, in the already super-competitive Portuguese religious context, the Brazilian churches have to compete also with the Igreja Maná, an evangelical Church founded in 1984 by the Portuguese pastor Jorge Tadeu. The target audience of the (Neo-)Pentecostal churches in Portugal is as follows: 1. poor immigrants, in particular Brazilians and black Africans, who are mostly illegal; 2. Roma; and 3. poor native Portuguese people – in this specific case, they are predominantly Catholics, middle-aged women, with a low level of education, unemployed, and retired people. Therefore, the converts belong to the three segments of Portuguese society which suffer the most from social exclusion. One of the first anthropological studies of the Brazilian evangelical presence in Portugal focused on the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, which came to this country in 1989. The ethnographic fieldwork was done between 1995 and 1998 (Ruuth and Rodrigues, 1999; Rodrigues, 2006a). Later, another study of this Church in Portugal was carried out by the anthropologist Clara Mafra (Mafra, 2002). It is pertinent to mention also the anthropological 5   In fact, according to anthropological studies of the “Gypsy Evangelical Church of Philadelphia” in Portugal, the Roma began to be converted to Protestantism in the late 1960s, by a group of the Assembly of God, from France and Spain (Rodrigues and Santos, 2000; Rodrigues, 2006b, 2006c; Blanes, 2008).

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study of the Pentecostal Church God is Love, which arrived in Portugal in 1991 (Téchio, 2011). In addition to the churches that came directly from Brazil (Universal Church and God is Love, but also Assemblies of God and Christian Congregations), there are also more than 20 new Brazilian evangelical churches that have been created in Portugal, in the last decade alone. In the context of this notable presence of Brazilian Pentecostalism in Portugal, one of the most important evangelical churches is the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. The Case of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (UCKG) was founded in 1977, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, under the leadership of Edir Macedo (Rodrigues, 2006a). Like other new religious movements, it is very difficult to get exact data on the number of its members. Yet, according to the official data, the UCKG is present in all continents, in 200 countries, with thousands of temples, and about six million followers. The UCKG is very good at marketing, using printed material (books written by Edir Macedo, the magazine Plenitude and the daily Folha Universal, with a run of a million copies), 24-hour radio broadcasts, and television programmes. The temples (places of worship services) are normally large. They are mostly ex-theatres, as is the case of the Church’s enormous headquarters in Lisbon, the ex-theatre Império. The buildings have not been significantly changed, and the worship service halls are minimally decorated. Situated in central places, and announced in big letters “Jesus Christ is the Lord – Universal Church of the Kingdom of God”, the temples are easily found. “Put an End to Suffering” is the slogan chosen to cover the front wall of the temples. The theological bases of the Universal Church are briefly the following: once heaven and earth were created by the Lord, the divine creation suffered serious contamination due to the fall of the Devil. The angels who followed the Devil were converted into demons. The demons, which do not have their own bodies, need to possess human bodies in order to manifest themselves to the people and perform their evil acts. They are responsible for human suffering and for all evil things in the world. Thus humans are not considered sinners, but victims of the actions of the Devil/demons. These evil forces cause people to lose control, and thus it is necessary to expel the Devil and the demons from them. In the name (or The Universal Church puts emphasis on physical and psychological illnesses and other real problems of daily life. It promises to the people material and spiritual help, and a radical change in their lives: the poor will have money, the sick will

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be healed. Furthermore, through the divine cure, all followers will be freed from evil spirits by means of exorcism. Yet, there is a very important prerequisite condition stressed for the believers to have success in their lives, whether spiritual or material: the God–believer relationship. In the vision of Universal Church this is a contract, expressed by the payment of tithes (10 per cent of all economic goods, money, salaries) and offerings (voluntary donations), two types of contributions necessary to obtain a favourable response from God. Do ut des – a barter in which money and spiritual salvation are the instruments of the exchange. Abundance is understood in three areas: spiritual blessing, physical health and economic well-being. Supported by the “theology of prosperity”, the Universal Church’s discourse is particularly directed towards immigrants, ethnic minorities, poor people, and its promise of economic abundance naturally finds a positive and significant response in Portugal. Edir Macedo, the leader of the Universal Church, believed that in Portugal, being a small country and speaking the same language, it would be relatively easy to create a branch of his Church. Portugal was a strategic country, the gateway to Europe, but also facilitates the expansion of the Church to thePortuguese-speaking African countries. Following the strategy of expansion and internationalization of his religious movement, the original plans of Edir Macedo in Portugal included buying places of worship (ex-theatres), radio stations, renting time on TV channels, and the creation of a political party. However, his work in Portugal has not been easy. The Universal Church faced strong resistance from Portuguese society. The establishment of this congregation caused controversial social, political and religious debate in Portugal, with negative impact on the media. The strong proselytizing, associated with the aggressive practice of collecting money, through tithes and offerings of the faithful, has caused a backlash and stigma, especially by a certain intellectual elite and the Catholic Church. It is pertinent to remember that historically Portugal is a deeply Catholic society. In efforts to escape the strong stigma in Portugal now associated with the name Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, identification of places of worship today appear with a new name – Centro de Ajuda Espiritual (Centre for Spiritual Help). Although its implantation in Portugal has not been easy, the UCKG (with its recent “centres for spiritual help”), has been an enormous success. After 20 years of growth, it remains the largest and most important Brazilian Pentecostal Church settled in Portugal (Swatowiski, 2010). With the exception of not creating a political party (although Edir Macedo has tried this with

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the so-called “Social Christian Party”), the Universal Church has had great success in Portugal, but also in several other European countries, which have a large presence of Brazilian and Portuguese immigrants, and in the Portuguesespeaking African countries. Conclusion The phenomenon of globalization and vigorous transcontinental migratory waves cause significant social, economic, cultural and identity changes. The principal consequence of this migration process is that contemporary societies change faster and become more diverse, regarding ethnic, cultural and religious characteristics. The transcontinental migration process was (and still is) extremely important in the creation, expansion, dispersion and globalization of traditional religions, and particularly new religious movements. And the proliferation of new religious movements is occurring especially within Protestant NeoPentecostalism. Traditionally as a historic Catholic country, contemporary Portuguese society is becoming increasingly pluralistic, in an ethnic, cultural and religious perspective. These cultural, ethnic and religious diversities are due to the democratization process and the strong flow of immigrants. As a result of this massive influx of new ethnic groups, cultures and religions in Portugal there has been a significant increase in the “market of symbolic goods”, with an important presence of Brazilian evangelical churches, and in particular the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. In the era of globalization, in the broad, complex and competitive “world spiritual supermarket”, the Universal Church presents a set of attractive characteristics and strategies for the material and spiritual salvation of its followers. This Brazilian Neo-Pentecostal Church became a very important international religious phenomenon, but, at the same time, one of the most controversial. As discussed in this chapter, there is an enormous growth, proliferation and significant presence of both traditional and new religious movements in Portugal today. Although many studies have been conducted, each new study is an important step towards a better understanding of the heterogeneous Portuguese religious supermarket.

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Chapter 8

Accommodation and Tension: African Christian Communities and their Swedish Hosts Anne Kubai

Introduction This chapter is based on a research project called “Singing the Lord’s Song in a Strange Land: African1 Churches in Sweden between Segregation and Integration”, funded by Sweden’s Central Bank, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond. It is a study of the migrant churches and Christian communities established by African immigrants that are found all over Sweden. At the time that this study started, little was known about African churches in Sweden, therefore, one of the aims is to fill this lacuna and shed some light on the proliferation of African Christian communities and examine the role of these churches in the integration of African immigrants into the Swedish society. In order to do this, using ethnographic methods, we conducted research across a wide variety of religious groups and communities across Sweden. During the fieldwork, 27 churches, groups and fellowships were followed closely between 2008 and 2012. In addition to these, frequent visits were made to other groups and church projects and activities organized by or for African migrant Christians. 1   Language is dynamic and words can be ambiguous, therefore words such as “African churches”, “Swedish churches”, “congregations”, “communities”, “migrants”, “host churches”, are used interchangeably but cautiously. Also, we acknowledge that some pastors and founders of migrant churches in Sweden are uncomfortable with the label “African churches”; they prefer linguistic or international identity tags, such as Swahili-speaking, Tigrinya-speaking or international for their churches. It is necessary to also say that African cultures are diverse and therefore African immigrants in Sweden are not assumed to be a homogeneous group, though they may share some similar cultural values. Here, the label “African churches/ congregations” is used to refer to churches that are established by African immigrants either as branches of churches in African or as new churches in Sweden.

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This chapter will focus on how the emerging African Christian communities in Sweden interrogate the migration situation through their understanding of being accommodated in the Swedish religious space. To illustrate this, we use data obtained in three African churches: Immanuel International Fellowship at Immanuel Church (part of former Mission Covenant Church or Svenska Missionskyrkan) in central Stockholm, Smyrna International Church “connected” with Smyrnakyrkan (Pentecostal Church) in Gothenburg and Grace Connection hosted by Pyngstkyrkan (Pentecosatal Church) in Uppsala. Though a society cannot be completely homogenous ( Jäger and Maier, 2001), there is no doubt that Sweden is waking up to social diversity, it is moving from a largely white homogenous Lutheran population to a society with a large number of migrants and Swedish-born ethnic minorities. Here Mella’s observation is instructive: “religion in the ideological view maintained by the Swedish administration has been conceived to be a property of the isolated individual. Any social significance or social consequence has been generally ignored” (1994). But how long can Sweden maintain the status quo, not only in the face of a growing migrant population which is estimated at 14 per cent (SCB, 2009) of the total population; but also in the midst of changing national and international political and social trends? Only a few weeks after the September 2010 elections the debate between the Skolverket (school authority) and the government on the teaching of religion was picked up by the media, which reported that the government position is that students will learn more about Jesus and that Christianity will have a special place in the teaching of religion. Admittedly, the emerging ethnic profile of the immigrants poses a challenge to the host Swedish population, as it introduces a new sociological dynamic – the immigrants not only bring with them their homeland cultural identities, but also contribute to the phenomenon of ethnic relations in the country. Sociologists Castels and Miller (1998) argue that the outcome of ethnic formation depends on the reaction of the host nation-state and the host society. Openness and acceptance of diversity drive immigrants towards the formation of ethnic communities that become an integral part of a social structure. This chapter examines the relationship between African Christians and their hosts in Sweden. The main assumption here is that religion “continues to be important to people, even when they move to other continents and religious belief continues to guide their daily actions” (Haar, 2011: 17). Research elsewhere has also shown that “through religious affiliations, African immigrants are actively redefining themselves and creating a distinct identity” (Olupona, 2009: 336). Religion serves as resource for interpreting reality for both the individual and

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the society; and shapes social relations and other aspects of human life, such as work and health of immigrants who come from cultures that are not considered to be secular. African Churches in Sweden Most of the African migrant churches in Sweden are established by individual preachers who become founders in their own right; while others are branches of churches back home in Africa, from where “missionaries” and “evangelists” in Sweden draw inspiration. In the case of the larger and more established churches in Africa, the branches in Sweden often have their inaugural ceremonies conducted by pastors or “spiritual leaders” from Africa who visit Sweden for that purpose. In a number of cases some of the Swedish established churches, for instance the Pentecostal Church (Pingstkyrkan), Mission Covenant Church (Svenska Missionskyrkan) and even some individual congregations of the Church of Sweden (Svenskakyrkan) encourage formation of separate African congregations referred usually to as “international”, “English-speaking”, “Swahili-speaking” or “Tigrinya/Amharic-speaking” congregations within their church premises. In some cases, pastors for these congregations are paid by the host church to work alongside and also join the church boards and other administrative organs of the host churches. The African immigrant churches in Sweden can be broadly categorized as: • African Orthodox churches, that is, Ethiopian and Eritrean Orthodox which draw membership from the large number of Ethiopians and Eritrean communities living in Sweden. As I have illustrated elsewhere (Kubai, forthcoming) members observe the orthodox tradition as it is observed in their countries of origin and the priests are brought to Sweden to serve the congregations. But they are also not impervious to political influence from home countries and therefore the question of allegiance to the patriarch has often been a source of internal squabble. • Linguistic or regional churches, which include: French-speaking congregations with membership made up mainly of migrant communities from Francophone Central and West Africa. Amarinya (Amharic) and Tigrinya-speaking churches are formed by immigrants from Ethiopia and Eritrea. Swahili-speaking churches draw their membership from East African immigrant communities.

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• English-speaking interdenominational or international congregations are often made up of different nationalities and they are either established as independent churches in Sweden or as branches of mother churches in Africa. • African Catholic community is served by African priests, who celebrate mass in what is perceived as an African way, regardless of whether it is done in English or French. In addition the community is served by African nuns of the congregation of Daughters of Mary Mother of Mercy,2 based in Stockholm. • African fellowships – interdenominational and/or international. These vary in size and structure and in a certain cases, some of them have evolved into fully fledged churches over time. These churches, missions and fellowships defy easy classifications, and therefore these broad categories cannot be said to fully represent the whole gamut of the peoples and cultures of the African continent that constitute the galaxy of African migrant Christian communities in Sweden. Neither can the statistics of the membership be verified for two reasons: first the churches are registered by the Central Statistics Bureau as associations (föreningar) and not as churches in Sweden due to “legal complications” as church founders and “planters” put it. Kalu (2008: 285) describes these complications thus: In Sweden, for instance, members of African Churches are joined by other immigrants because of restrictive state policies that are not publicly articulated in an environment that pretends to create open spaces understood as conducive free environments where different social and religious groups could operate without hindrance.

The legal challenges are usually circumvented by registration of churches as any other kind of association. Second, is what can be termed as the malleability of the churches and congregation – some of them often break up and develop into new branches or merge and emerge as new entities. Stoffels (2006: 1) also observes that, in The Hague in the Netherlands, the number and names of the immigrant “churches fluctuate constantly: they pop up and then disappear, join and split 2  The congregation was founded in 1961 by the late Bishop Anthony Gogo Nwedo, CSSp. (1912–2000) in Nigeria. On 17 June 1993, Pope John Paul II recognized the congregation as an Institute of Pontifical Right.

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and sometimes they reappear under another name”. The membership of African churches in Sweden is composed of African immigrants, both new arrivals and long-term residents. Also, as would be expected, these churches provide the necessary familiar environment for students and others who may be in transit or short-term visitors in the country. We also recall the importance of transnationality in the accommodation equation, that is, though located in Sweden, African immigrants seek to retain ideological and practical ties with their home countries. Technology has become an asset of power (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001) in this age of rapid communication which makes it possible for ideas to move across the globe in seconds; and for the creation of robust transnational networks, virtual and real. Evidently, “advances in transportation and communication systems have compressed time and space, thereby rendering traditional sociological distinctions between home and host societies empirically unsustainable” (Kusow, 2007: 4). Therefore, as Kusow puts, it African migrant communities are able to create and maintain institutionalized ties to their homelands, host societies and other migrant communities by simultaneously participating in the economic social and political processes of various locations. Hence many African churches in Sweden are “here and there”, either as Swedish branches of the mother churches in Africa, or are independent entities founded and led by African immigrants. “Where Do You Come From?” The accommodation and tension that is found in the churches is an aspect that reflects the nature of the relations between African immigrants and the host society. Both the hosts and the immigrants have to face the differences that separate them. In any given situation, the first point of encounter is when people meet at the individual level for the first time. At this level, both individuals have to deal with the proximity of the “other” and, therefore, some form of communication takes place. Here, we shall take the most asked questions (Where do you come from? Is it not difficult being here?) to illustrate how people try to deal with the proximity of the different “other”. These are questions with which many African immigrants in Sweden have to contend daily. In response, one is often tempted to just say “indeed it is difficult being here”. Why are these questions asked so often, regardless of the place of encounter? Many immigrants will agree that this question is often asked with a mixture of curiosity, genuine interest in knowing how a particular immigrant came to Sweden, but the meaning

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and intention of the questions are considered to be more important, since, as we know, “meaning is always contingent and always constructed in a specific context in relation to other meanings or objects” (Carlbaum, 2011: 79). The first question is asked more often and then the second question is more likely to follow if the conversation continues in the usually predictable direction – that is, an immigrant reacts positively and says where he or she comes from; and shows willingness to reveal a little more about their background by answering subsequent questions that often seem to pry too closely into their life. Flam and Beauzamy provide useful insights for our understanding of the purpose and effect of asking and being asked this question: rejection is also communicated by such a simple question as “where do you come from?” To most immigrants the native asking this question wishes to impose on the immigrant’s own definition of the immigrant’s person solely as a “foreigner”. The immigrant becomes reduced, diminished, boxed in. This native exercise of self-awarded prerogative to name and define things, this sudden assumption of definitional power, to borrow briefly Foucault’s concept, feels like a slap … with this one question one’s past, present, all one’s accomplishments are annihilated, only one’s status as an unwelcome visitor, who does and cannot belong, is brought into relief. It provokes a sense of helplessness, irritation or fury, depending on temperament, and for certain people a deep sense of humiliation (2008: 227). The second question is equally humiliating and usually it follows the first after a short response. Similarly in the spirit of exclusion, the native asks whether it is not difficult being in Sweden, and often whether it is not too cold for the immigrant that is undergoing this interrogation. In this question, apparently the implication is that this is not the place for immigrants; it must be difficult for them because this is not the kind of life they are used to in the countries they come from. These questions arise at the initial points of encounter in public or private spaces. This confirms our assertion that the host society in general is, to a large extent, preoccupied with the themes of identity and belonging, and therefore an immigrant is an immediate embodiment of external threat to the self-preserved sense of “Swedishness”. It does not matter whether the person assumed to be an “immigrant” was born in Sweden or has lived in Sweden all their life. Let us examine two narratives to illustrate the point being made here. The first one is that of Sara, a second generation “Swede” born in Uppsala to parents who are immigrants from Ethiopia. She described her experience of being asked this question often and how she tries to deal with it. In it she has captured many

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aspects of the situation of the second generation of Africans born and raised in Sweden: My parents came to Sweden from Ethiopia late 1970s and I was born in Uppsala. Swedish is my first language though I understand and speak Amarinya. I have also visited Ethiopia many times, but I have no emotional connection with it and deep inside me, I do not consider myself to be Ethiopian. It is my parents who speak of their connection with Ethiopia; they are the ones who are immigrants, not me. But almost daily, someone asks me “where do you come from?” I say “Uppsala”. I can see the disbelief in the eyes of the person as he or she repeats the question, “Jag menar var du verkligen kommer ifrån – I mean where you really come from”. Even if I speak the Swedish language with a native Uppsala accent many people expect me to say that I come from somewhere else because to them, I don’t look like a Swede. About religion … my parents were members of the Orthodox Church in Ethiopia, but some time back they changed from Orthodox; now they are members of a Pentecostal Church in Uppsala. I used to go to Church of Sweden when I was in my teens, but gradually I began to that feel may be it is not necessary to keep going there. It is not easy to say how one feels about these things. However much you try to make people see beyond the appearance, you don’t succeed. At some point you ask yourself – after all does it really matter?

The second case is that of Mutebi in his early thirties, who came to Sweden at age of nine with his parents from Uganda: Yes people will ask you such questions all the time. You look different, that is obvious. You have to be prepared to deal with that. It is difficult for immigrants to be welcome and accepted by the Swedish society. There is a tendency to blame the immigrants for insecurity (terrorism) and also immigration is seen as one of the contributory factors to the current world economic problems. We are different and the differences are only accepted on paper, not in practice. I think majority of Swedes dislike foreigners. I have many negative experiences of living in Sweden in spite of the fact that I came here when I was nine years old and I speak Swedish fluently. Some people say that Swedish language is the problem, but I would not agree with them. Even if I speak Swedish like a Swede, I am not considered to be one and I do not feel like a Swede. I am always conscious of the difference … You might say that is why I go to a predominantly African Church, but I go to Church

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Mutebi’s narrative shows that language is not the main issue – he speaks Swedish with a native accent but he does not find acceptance on account of his language proficiency. These two cases are different yet similar to each other: both are considered to be immigrants; one is a first generation immigrant while the other is not actually an immigrant because she was born and raised in Sweden. According the Swedish Migration Agency records (2009) both are categorized as immigrants and this would be the case even if one of Sara’s parents were a native Swede and the other an Ethiopian, which we can say, is in line with the consideration that “belonging can be imposed by the other, based solely on their interpretation of how one relates to a collective” ( Jones and Krzyżanowskyi, 2008: 47). We see their reaction to the theme of belonging and the different ways in which they deal with it. Needless to say African immigrants from “Black” Africa stand out and will often be noticed. In Sweden, voicing difference based on how a person looks is a taboo, but this is not to say that people do not see or feel that they are different from others. In her social critique, Sjöberg (2010) articulates this problem thus: “in Sweden there is a kind of normality’s embarrassment over what differs. Divergence, be it physical appearance or social behavior, is something embarrassing in the Swedish majority culture”. The point here is the perception of “difference” – native Swedes see the “other” as “different” to themselves. But it should be borne in mind that the process of “othering” is mutual to a certain extent: on the one hand, in the dark and forbidden realm crawl the prejudices which form and transform daily experiences of African immigrants. On the other, in the dark creep stereotypes about the typical “Swede” or “Swedish” in the imaginings of first and second generation immigrants. Pettigrew (1998: 83) identifies two types of prejudice – “blatant and subtle prejudice” – and differentiates the two forms thus: “Blatant prejudice is the traditional form; it is hot, close and direct … Subtle prejudice is the modern form; it is cool, distant and indirect”. He further points out that the distinction in the first form is based on presumed biological differences; while in the second, the distinction is based on “the perceived threat of the minority to traditional values, the exaggeration of cultural differences with the minority, and the absence of positive feeling toward them” (1998: 83). Through these two cases of people who are about the same age, we explore how African immigrants experience and deal with the theme of difference. They illustrate the complexity of the reality on the ground in a context where prejudice

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is subtle, and its existence denied, and indeed its overt manifestation frowned upon by society. They are conscious of the difference but they see it from different perspectives: Sara is aware that, seen through the eyes of others, she “does not look like a Swede” even if she does not consider herself to be an “outsider” or an immigrant, but with a sense of déjà vu, she comes to the conclusion that perhaps it does not really matter and stops going to the church. In spite of the fact that the Swedish Church does not seem to help her come to terms with her sense of belonging, she does not turn to an Ethiopian congregation like her parents. Going to church simply becomes unnecessary for her. Perhaps going to an Ethiopian congregation is not an option since she states clearly that she does not identify herself as an immigrant or as belonging to that community. Reflecting on the relationship between personal identity and collective identity as demonstrated by Sara, we cannot but agree with Jones and Krzyżanowskyi, that “an individual can end up with a sense of belonging that does not necessarily ‘fit’ with his or her collective identity” (2008: 45). Sara’s reaction is comparable to what Creese observed among African immigrants in Vancouver, who “identified the limits of belonging in a context in which acceptance by others remained questioned” (2011: 207). Unlike Sara, Mutebi’s narrative identifies the locus of the difference in his migrant status and accepts it as it is articulated by others. Though he says that he goes to church because it is important for him, he admits that in the predominantly African church, he finds spiritual and social support. Going to a predominantly African church can only accentuate the feeling of difference, but this is his way of dealing with the situation. By framing his experience of exclusion around the difference between the rhetoric of acceptance of immigrants on paper and the reality in practice, he juxtaposes exclusion against Sweden’s self-promotion as a champion of human rights and a haven for migrants in Scandinavia. Therefore he, like many other members of African migrant communities, creates for himself and occupies a social space in an African church, though “religious practices, community and networks of social support that are integrated in the migrants’ country of origin may only be incompletely reconstructed in the country of migration” ( Jarvis et al., 2005: 254). Churches as the Arena for “Inclusion in Exclusion” Churches are some of the spaces where difference and otherness can be reproduced and redefined. It is also the place where power and privilege may

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be exerted by those who are in positions of power or are in the majority. This leads to the point that our analysis of accommodation by other churches should be situated within the wider theme of power relations between African immigrants and the host society. As said above, a number of African congregations are “housed” in church buildings owned by Swedish churches, both the Lutheran and the free churches, mainly the Covenant Mission Church and the Pentecostal (Pingstkyrkan). Not only do some Swedish churches accommodate, but they also encourage formation of separate African congregations or what is dubbed international, English-speaking, French-speaking, Swahili-speaking or Tigrinya and Amarinya-speaking congregations in their church premises. Indeed some Pingstkyrkan leaders indicated that they have developed a policy to work with other churches: African, Spanish, etc. This arrangement often results in the accommodation of several national, linguistic and international congregations in one church building. Perhaps here we can say that the host churches serve as an umbrella for African churches or congregations that come seeking to be accommodated or hosted in the church premises. Uppsala Pingstkyrkan is an example of accommodation par excellence, whereby six churches of different nationalities and languages are currently accommodated. Three of these are African: English-speaking Grace Connections; Ethiopian Amharic-speaking Salem Church; and an Eritrean Tigrinya-speaking congregation; while the others are Spanish, Finnish and Persian congregations. They share the church premises and their pastors are recognized by the host church. Most of the African churches come seeking access to available spaces where they can carry out their own activities. This umbrella accommodation, if we can extend this imagery, usually takes two forms which can be characterized as that of “tenant” congregations paying the host church for access and use of church premises and equipment for worship services and other religious activities; or that of being “co-opted” by the host churches as a part of the larger congregation. In the tenant relationship, there is little interaction between the host and the tenant congregations and they keep their business separate. The umbrella function in the tenant cases is limited to the use of space. In cases where they are co-opted, the umbrella (to continue with the imagery) is extended to cover several aspects, which include salaries for pastors of African congregations who are invited to work alongside their Swedish counterparts; and membership in the church boards and other administrative organs of the host churches. A number of such cases have maintained cordial relations that have been beneficial to both sides. For instance, in two host churches in Stockholm and Gothenburg, the pastors said that their church membership had

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quadrupled after they opened their doors to African congregations. Though in this type of relationship an African congregation is embraced by the host church as a group of fellow Christians with a common destiny in Christ, the process of entry entails negotiations between the two sides. To anchor our illustration of the phenomenon of accommodation, a brief description of Grace Connections and Immanuel International Fellowship is necessary. The International fellowship is part of the larger Immanuel Church, which embraces three fellowships: Swedish, Korean and International. Immanuel Church was part of Mission Swedish Covenant Church, which is now part of the new church union known as Ekumeniska kyrkan,3 launched in May 2012. The International Fellowship was started in 1974 to minister to international immigrants who were coming into the Stockholm area and spoke little or no Swedish. Over the years, it has been served by eight pastors related to a sister church called the Evangelical Covenant Church of America. We note that in its vision statement, Immanuel International aims to be a welcoming church where people from all walks of life, people of all races, nationalities and cultures will find love, acceptance and encouragement in their life journey. It is in this spirit that Immanuel International provides support for a variety of specialized missions including Bukalabi school that was destroyed during the war in the 1980s in Uganda; and Bukalabi agricultural project, which is a “ministry” to help farmers in Uganda to grow in their knowledge of land management, crop production and animal husbandry. However, the American pastor was emphatic that regardless of the fact that an overwhelming majority of members are African, the International fellowship is international and not “African”. On the contrary, the African members that I interviewed made a distinction between the two English church services and clearly identified one of them as more “African” than the other. They went on to express the challenges of being part of the Swedish church, as they put it, and elaborated on what their participation in the various committees entailed – in some cases, their voices were not heard, and usual matters relating to financial control were likely to cause some strain in the relationship between the various groups. Grace Connections is a branch of the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), a large denomination of Nigerian origin established in 1952 by Josiah Akindayomi. By the time of the founder’s death in 1980, there were 3   The union of the Mission Covenant Church (Missionskyrkan), Methodist Church and Baptist Church in May 2012 created a new communion whereby the three churches lost their individual identities and became one church. This new church is known as Ekumeniska kyrkan and it is the second largest after the Church of Sweden or Svenska kyrkan

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39 parishes for which the current General Overseer Enoch Adeboye took over the leadership. In 2002 almost 1,000 of RCCG’s 6,265 branches were outside Nigeria, but according to Ukah (2005) the RCCG is essentially a local church with global outposts. In Sweden parishes have been established in Malmö, Stockholm, Gothenburg, Karlskrona, Uppsala and Borås. Grace Connections in Uppsala started as a house fellowship in Stockholm and later was established as a church in Uppsala by a Kenyan pastor. Grace Connections plays host to African students and visitors who come to Uppsala for reasons of study on private visit, and need an English-speaking Sunday service or something that is familiar to them. Though many of the regular members are from Nigeria or other West African countries, there are a number of East Africans; and the branch was inaugurated by the East African regional coordinator of RCCG. Currently the leading pastor of Grace Connections is a Nigerian woman living in Uppsala. Between 40 and 60 people attend the Sunday services in the afternoon at Pingstkyrkan premises. During the week members attend prayer meetings, a “believers’ training” for new bornagain members, and participate in a programme known as “discipleship training” for members that is conducted periodically by a visiting pastor. In the summer, the church organizes outreach crusades, “barbeque with Jesus” and other fun events for members. Describing the need for “accommodation” that led him to seek contact with Pingstkyrkan in Uppsala, the pastor of Grace Connections said the following: Aha, how we came to worship in Pingstkyrkan … it was an accommodation problem. We used to meet at Rådhussalen but they started doing renovation. Then I came around and spoke to the senior Pastor, who I had met about a year before. So we spoke and he said “Well, you’re welcome to come and join us”. So we looked at their service, they said their service ends at 12.00, you can use the facility after that. I said “fine”. We sat down and discussed our views about everything … we could cooperate, you know, it’s not that they believe in one thing and we believe in something totally different. They also subscribe to the Assemblies of God kind of mission statement and principles.

A more detailed version of what transpired is provided by the leading pastor of Uppsala Pingstkyrkan, which currently accommodates six churches of different nationalities and languages, three of which are African: English-speaking Grace Connections; Ethiopian Amharic-speaking Salem Church; and an Eritrean

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Tigrinya-speaking congregation. He described the process and conditions for the inclusion of Grace Connections in the following excerpt: I can generally say that we have an attitude here, which is that nobody who wants to be in our premises can be there unless he is one with us. So what happens here, I want to say, is close to us and not far from us. When they arrived, this is the kind of discussion we had. They (African Congregation) came, they needed space and contact with Swedish-speaking Pentecostal Church, but then they discovered that it is not only Swedish that is spoken here, but a variety of languages. Therefore, what we agreed is that they are a part of our church formally as well … It is clear that it was a result of our conversations, however it was one single step that they be formally included. So they are included. We have two such groups which have their own legal identity, so to speak, but still included in our church. They are also, as it were, a separate legal entity but they are a part of this larger congregation here. We have church services in a number of languages: Amarinya, Swedish of course, English, Persian, Tigrinya, Finish, and often we have translation to Spanish. There is always translation into English and it is also not unusual in other languages, it depends. Sometimes Swahili when it is Africans, but Spanish is not uncommon.

But what was important for the pastor to know about this particular African church group and its faith? In response to this question, he had the following to say: There were really two tracks that we followed. Partly it was that they define themselves, the type of network to which they belong, because groups pop up … there are others here that could also be called African churches with which we do not have a thing to do and perhaps should not have either. But the discussions we had really revolved around the issue: where do you stand theologically? Where are you located in the theological? And then the next thing was getting to know each other as persons and things like that, but basically it was a theological issue. It was very well defined during those discussions.

During the discussion, he said, they went through the points that are accepted by “the Pentecostal churches or movement” and “it’s all about the most basic: Jesus as the son of God, and so on”. In addition to this he says that nobody who wants to be in their premises can be there unless he is with them. The question of who wields authority in this situation is implicit in the tone of his statement.

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The conditions are spelt out during the discussion with the leader of the incoming Grace Connections. Also, he points out that though African churches are accommodated, they remain separate legal entities, an aspect which makes this form of inclusion characteristically complex both in theory and practice. The statement that there are some African groups with which they have nothing to do, points to the normative position of making choices between groups that seek affiliation. The problem of the underlying notions and assumptions about the identity and perhaps integrity of the African churches is implied in the requirement that they define themselves and the type of networks to which they belong. Evidently theological issues are important, if the African churches are to be included, as the pastor of the Pingstkyrkan put it: “it is not that theology is the hard part for us, but how it is expressed. It is cultural issues”. Further clarification is proffered thus: “when we speak about African congregations and churches, it is possible that when you get into the language around spiritual realities and demons and other things, there it is quite much – it is a cultural issue more than a theological issue”. Hence, from the perspective of the host church, the expression of theology is subsumed in the culture of the African church members. A certain expression of theology is thus being questioned. Nonetheless, it is also said that all churches, associations and companies experience cultural differences which can be rather difficult. But then the condition is that they know about each other, so that they don’t read more into the cultural differences than what is necessary to read into them. The pastor of Pingstkyrkan admits that there are positive aspects of the cooperation or inclusion of African congregations. New members were welcomed into the church, and from very early on they established that they were: a multicultural congregation, but that means multicultural also in the sense that young people can have their music and … our church has said this: All cultures and music styles can be included here. Nobody is allowed a monopoly. So it is not only to come and light a candle and sit devoutly – it could happen that that also is there. And it is not only loud praise on the model of … let’s say an international type of Charismatic congregation, but [we] have … a breadth. And in that breadth this has fitted very well and enriched us. Then it is … what to call it … human relations, very positive. Then this is the situation – that the congregation and the number of people is large enough that there necessarily have to be groupings. And when we talk about integration we should not boast that it so often we spend time and go have dinner together or such things across these boundaries, that is how

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it is. But we meet in services and in the congregational life. But then it naturally becomes like this, that a young African doesn’t go home to a Swedish retired person, there are differences like that. Or vice versa … there are other things as well, it’s not only the ethnic culture.

This statement raises a number of issues: no group is allowed monopoly and the diversity has been found to be suitable and enriching. But there is no indication as to whether or how the different groups relate to each other. Therefore, it is instructive to draw a comparison with the view expressed by the pastor of Immanuel International Fellowship in the following statement: I think too many Swedish churches are functioning programmatically as opposed to seeking the communities of God. Therefore, they have programmes, they have a choir, they have a youth programme, they have scouts, etc. For them, the emphasis is: find your programme. In international churches we put a higher emphasis on: find your relationships, find your sense of belonging, and find friends. I think we are created to grow in community. God did not create individuals, he created family.

These are two different opinions about what the churches do and should do for members. For the international churches, the emphasis is on creating relationships and communities, while the host churches cannot boast of their efforts to create relationships across ethnic and cultural boundaries. Though congregational life may provide the arena where these churches can meet, there are challenges thereof. For instance, the three African groups in Pingstkyrkan were unenthusiastic to participate in the monthly joint church services with their hosts. All manner of challenges were listed, including the usual criticism that the Swedish church services are comparatively dull and less exciting. Here the feeling is mutual – while Swedish churches are seen as materialistic and worldly institutions in need of God’s saving grace, African churches are seen by their Swedish hosts as exotic and loud, alien to the traditionally quiet religious set up of Sweden. Worse still, they are as seen as something for the suffering immigrant “to find place to feel at home”. Some members of the international congregation in Hallunda Church in Stockholm put it rather candidly: “sometimes the Swedish group feels that we take too much space; we take up too much resource”. In the following extract, the pastor at Immanuel International Fellowship gives further insight into the nature of the relationship that we are describing here.

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The Changing Soul of Europe Pastor: Uh … in general, I think that everybody is glad that we are part of the Swedish church. The Swedish group is glad to have the international fellowship as part of the church. I think we struggle to come close in the way we work. We struggle to get to know one another … Anne: Why is that? Pastor: Definitely the premises. But during the week, we share staff meetings, we share … I would say the staff works closely … more closely together than the congregations. Anne: But do you see any challenges with that kind of arrangement? Pastor: Yes, there are many tensions. Anne: For instance? Pastor: We struggle to know how to divide our resources. We struggle to understand that we each need to do certain things. We have a different philosophy of how to accomplish ministry goals sometimes. Anne: What is that philosophy? Pastor: Well I think it relates to what we have said. I think the international fellowship is much more concerned with people building relationships and being committed to come to worship. Anne: Yes Pastor: But they seek to enrich people through their choirs … through their music, through scouts, through other things. We struggle to know what the cohesive centre of the Swedish group is. Yes, we struggle sometimes.

So even if the pastor at Uppsala Pingskyrkan says that the different groups in his church meet in congregational life, the pastor at Immanuel International paints a different picture altogether – it is the staff that work more closely than the different congregations. Admittedly, contestation of pace is an important element among the groups that are under scrutiny here. Space is a commodity that can be appropriated, given or denied. On the one hand, African Christian communities are generally aware of their “marginalized status” but at the same time they urge their members to partake of what God is empowering them to do in this land because they believe that they are here not by default, but by God’s design. They do not just lament about exclusion, they endeavour to create and occupy spiritual and spatial spaces within the host churches and the society at large. Empowerment and affirmation of their presence and mission in Sweden are indeed recurrent themes in the sermons in African churches. On the other, as the Uppsala Pingstkyrkan pastor says, only those who are one with them can get access to the use of the space,

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which indicates that this host church celebrates cultural diversity but within certain delineated cultural frontiers. Thus space is instrumentalized for inclusion and exclusion – not all the African groups are included in this space; while there are other groups that may use the same space. The relationship that has evolved in these circumstances, munificent as it may seem, can often be marred by tension between the host and the hosted church groups. A number of members, leaders and pastors of African churches have described the various ways in which tension manifests itself. For instance, they use the metaphor that “living in somebody else’s house is not like living in your own house”. This metaphor is familiar in many African cultures and it captures the essence of the relationship between the hosted and host groups. If we extend this metaphor in order to understand the nature of the relationship that it is used to describe, then we can say that the one that is “housed” is treated as a guest by the owner of the house and is also expected to behave like a guest. In principle a guest should feel at home, but at the same time, this may be circumscribed by the agreed terms of engagement. Similarly, many African churches that are housed by their hosts, work within certain constraints, for instance some members of the church committees said that sometimes they are left out of the decision-making or they are invited to meetings for “cosmetic purposes” just to be present when certain important decisions are taken. It is “inclusion in exclusion”, as one pastor put it. Also several pastors spoke of their experiences of exclusion, of situations when they felt that they were not accorded due recognition as participants in discussions on important issues concerning all the groups. There is no doubt that refusing to take ideas is a way of exclusion, of ensuring that they play a minimal role in the decision-making process, yet they are part of the leadership in the churches where they are co-opted. They described what they considered to be a veiled form of exclusion and an unspoken need to exercise control regarding the use of resources by the African congregations. They expressed the feeling that they are not treated as equals and there is a deep-seated mistrust for Africans that becomes manifest in subtle ways. But then, as they said, there is nothing they can do about mistrust. Perhaps here we can recall that “widespread ignorance about Africa and its diversity routinely mixed with pejorative assumptions and images of crises and despair” (Creese, 2011: 195) drawn and transmitted by media over the years, contribute in shaping ambivalent attitudes towards African Christianity (implicit in the pastor’s reference to “demons and other things”). We can therefore say that these intersect with power relations, contingency and racism to create the local dynamics that sustain this contestation of space. However, as believers and people who should set an example to their flock, they

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move on, in some cases in an uneasy relationship with their hosts, believing that their faith should vindicate them. “Together or Apart?” The emergence of African Christian communities in Sweden and their contribution to global changes that is shaping the hitherto predominantly Lutheran religious landscape is gradually being acknowledged. As said above some individual congregations in various Swedish churches have reacted to this phenomenon in two ways: they have allowed African church groups and fellowships to use the spaces in their church buildings for worship and other activities; and collaborated with immigrant congregations that are dubbed international. But “the relationship between ‘original inhabitants’ and new immigrants has been a recurring theme in Scandinavian public debate from the mid-eighties, often involving heated exchanges among participants” (Knudsen, 1997: 224). It seems that the churches too, have to deal with the issue – they are waking up to the realization that the hitherto predominantly Lutheran landscape is dotted with African Christian communities. This was the issue when more than 30 scholars, church officials, deacons, clergy and others from the Nordic countries were gathered in Stockholm between 23 and 24 October 2008 for a consultation on church, migration and integration. The purpose of the consultation was to present and discuss different mappings of how migration influences the ecclesial landscape in the Nordic countries. The theme of the consultation was “Together or apart”, from which we get the heading for this section. During this consultation, participants deliberated on whether the Nordic churches, which, with the exception of the Church of Sweden, are still state churches, stand alone or together with the growing immigrant churches. It is worthwhile considering some of the important issues relating to the changing Nordic ecclesial landscape as a result of migration: In the Nordic countries the indigenous mainstream churches have related to Christian migrants in different ways. Migration has been considered an ecclesial opportunity as well as a challenge. In some cases organizational and social integration have taken place. In other cases multicultural congregations have been established. More often than not the mainstream churches have remained culturally homogenous and migrants have established their own churches and communities. This situation forces us to ask whether churches are in fact integrating or segregating factors in society. If most churches are dominated

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by one particular ethnic group (indigenous or migrant), it seems that there is a risk that the churches mostly contribute to segregation. Or are ethnically and culturally homogenous churches a necessary platform for respectful integration in a multicultural society? (Nordic Ecumenical Working Group on Migration Report, 2008: 2)

There is no doubt that these are important issues raised by leaders and representatives of Scandinavian Lutheran churches. Let us briefly examine each of them: first, the challenges are quite clear – the risk of segregation if different churches keep to themselves; and an equal uncertainty about the appropriateness of the homogenous churches as the necessary platform for the integration of immigrants and laboratory for multiculturalism. As said above, there is little interaction between the African congregations and Swedish host even in cases where the former are tenants or co-opted. Therefore segregation, which as we have shown is shaped by many factors, is a reality which has to be dealt with by all the parties involved. The question of whether culturally and ethnically homogeneous churches are the necessary platform for respectful integration in a multicultural society is crucial and deserves attention from both African and Swedish churches. On the one hand, there is a trend in the emergence of African churches that are evidently national, linguistic or ethnic and therefore tending to be overtly homogenous. On the other, Swedish congregations have maintained what can be identified as a traditional sense of homogeneity, both in theory and practice, as our analysis of the relations with immigrant churches has revealed. The report of the Nordic Ecumenical Working Group on Migration further notes that: “In contemporary Scandinavian society impregnated by migration, we are compelled to ask how do we understand the nature of God and what is the basis of understanding our unity as Christians” (2008: 12). And also “as the new churches increase in numbers and membership, they are increasingly becoming a significant part of the ecclesial landscape and the ecumenical processes in the Nordic context” (2008: 6). Much could be made of these statements, but in the given space, suffice it to highlight at least three issues: first, the very fact that this consultation was organized in Sweden is an indication that the Nordic churches are beginning to acknowledge that the religious landscape is inevitably changing due to emergence of new churches including those that clearly identify themselves as African. In view of this change, the participants in the consultation felt that “the changing context of the ecclesial landscapes in the Nordic countries urges the churches to deepen

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their reflection and to strengthen their action in relation to immigrants” (Nordic Ecumenical Working Group Report, 2008: 7). Second, the Scandinavian society is said to be “impregnated” by migration. This is an interesting use of a rather telling imagery, an idea which connotes among other things that the society has something which is situated within it; that it is a process that is going to give birth to something new, which gives a sense of expectancy. To extend the imager a little further, this expectation is also imbued with a sense of anxiety because no one knows for sure the true nature of that which will be “born” when this process is realized. Third, it seems there is a need to reflect on their understanding not only of God, but also of their unity as Christians. It is not clear here what is meant by unity as Christians, but they begin to realize that in a changing ecclesial landscape it is difficult for a group to continue to claim the monopoly of understanding God. Needless to say, the fact that they feel compelled to reflect on their own understanding of God conveys a veiled uneasy feeling, perhaps a feeling of being besieged, which brings us to the next point: why encourage collaboration with African churches and at the same time keep them apart? Are they supported purely with the aim of “infusing life into the diminishing Swedish congregations” as some pastors put it; or with the aim of “keeping the Africans away from the Swedish congregations in the same churches”? Apparently the answer is that African congregations serve either or both functions, depending on the host churches. Perhaps the reason is that although the Swedish churches acknowledge the inevitability of a changing religious landscape, they are not yet ready for immigrant churches in their midst. Hence with hindsight, participants in the consultation called upon the Nordic churches to seek a deeper reflection about their relationship with immigrant churches. This line of argument can be supported by the observation made by several pastors and members of African churches who said that “the native churches in Sweden are not ready for immigrants”. During the fieldwork for this study I had an interesting experience which serves as a useful illustration here: In November 2010, I went to Göteborg to carry out my fieldwork for this study. Before travelling to Göteborg I had met pastor Mubiru from Uganda and learned that he is the leader of the Smyrna International church and he had agreed to be my host during the visit. On Saturday when he picked me up from the train station he took me to the church and gave a guided tour of the premises and explained how the international and the Swedish congregations at Smyrna Church work together in this large Pentecostal church. He explained that on Sundays, they

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hold two services: the Swedish in the morning and the international immediately after, starting at 12.00. I decided to start by attending the Swedish service first. After the service had started and all were settled down, a middle-aged Swedish man came to where I was sitting and whispered to me “hallo, I want to tell that you that there is another service after this, in which I think you would be more comfortable. Here is the name and telephone number of the pastor in charge”. He gave me a slip of paper on which these details were hurriedly scribbled. I thanked him and took the slip of paper. Halfway into the service, another man came to me and whispered that there is “an African church which I think would be very nice for you because there they sing and preach the African way”. He gave me the same contact details as the first one. I thanked him and he went back to his seat.

My initial aim was to do participant observation in order to be able to compare the two services, but it turned out to be an inadvertent experiment with amazing results. This personal experience brought me face-to-face with phenomenon that I was investigating – the ways in which these churches construct the distance between them and therefore keep apart. I was assumed to be an immigrant in need of a church that is amenable to my cultural background as an African immigrant. These two men did not know me and they did not have the faintest idea why I was attending the Swedish church service. They just saw me and obviously became visibly concerned with what they imagined was my situation and approached me with the intention of helping me to find an African church, where, according to them, I would be more comfortable. Their actions lead me to raise several questions: why would these men assume that I would not be comfortable in the Swedish church service? On what did they base their assumptions about the way I might feel or what I would prefer? The second man made an interesting point to which we must be attentive – that the African church would be nice for me because there they sing and preach the African way. This is redolent of the idea of different expressions of theology that we have discussed above. The actions and words of these two men represent the general attitudes that keep the churches apart in spite of the fact that the international is co-opted. Therefore we can conclude that the answer to the crucial question raised above by the Nordic consultation is that these churches are not together, they are apart though they share the premises and the salary of the African pastor is paid by the host. But the phenomenon of being apart is not one-sided, as the adage goes, it takes two to tango. It takes both sides to construct the differences that keep them apart. As intimated above, keeping apart should be understood in the wider context of the relationship between immigrants and native Swedes and the

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whole question on integration. Therefore, we must also acknowledge that it is an assumption that the African immigrant should be integrated and so should their churches. But we must keep in mind that one of the major findings of this study is that there are major challenges for integration both in theory and practice and, nevertheless, integration into Swedish society is not the priority of many African immigrants. The pastor at Immanuel International adds an interesting twist to this in the following statement: I think you have to offer immigrants a place to be separate from the host culture because I think it’s hard to be an immigrant all the time. It’s hard immigrating into the host culture all the time. By having to come into a place where they don’t have to be Swedish and they don’t have to be try to be Swedish then it gives them a break from the stringency of integrating into the Swedish society all through the week. Yah, I think that the international church is probably segregating, but we are only one component of somebody’s life. Most of the people that come to this (particular) International church are working in the Swedish society one way or another, so I would say it gives them strength and encouragement so that the rest of the week they can work on integrating their life into the Swedish society

Here she introduces the idea of the harsh reality of inserting oneself into the Swedish society and points out that the international church is probably segregating, but on the other hand there is need to find solace and refuge, a space where one can feel free from the hassles of being an immigrant, even if temporarily. Conclusion In this chapter we have focused on the mutual perspectives that characterize the relationship between churches founded by African immigrants and the host churches in Sweden. African churches are diverse and represent diverse communities of faith and practice, an array that reflects the cultural vastness of the African continent. Central to our discussion is the observation that the hitherto predominantly Lutheran religious landscape is gradually changing due to the emergence of migrant churches. As a result of this realization, some churches in Sweden have encouraged the leaders of the African churches to collaborate with them and others have sought the use of church premises as tenants. As a result the churches have become the arena for inclusion and exclusion. On the one hand, collaboration is conditional for those that are included – negotiations

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for collaboration reveal the areas of concern for both the hosts and the hosted. The concerns for the hosts include expressions of theology which is subsumed in African cultures. Also it is only those who are perceived to be one with the hosts that are accommodated in the available space. Thus relationships work within defined parameters. On the other, even if it is useful to be accommodated or “housed”, the African churches sometimes struggle to see what holds together the centre of the Swedish churches, which spend huge resources on programs, concerts and music, and pay little attention to relationships and attendance to church services on Sundays. The immigrants also need to create spaces in the churches where they do not have to deal with the challenges of their migration status, where they can be themselves, feel free to sing and express their faith unfettered. As we have observed, even in cases where African churches have been co-opted it is the pastors that work closely with the hosts, while the different congregations have little interaction. We can therefore conclude that, in both types of relationships – the “tenant” and the “co-opted” – the African and the host churches are apart. They trudge on in an uneasy relationship of “inclusion in exclusion”. References Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D. (2001) Networks and Netwars. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. Carlbaum, S. (2011) “Reforming education: gendered constructions of future workers”. In A. Sjölander and J. Payne (eds) Tracking Discourses: Politics, Identity and Social Change. Lund: Nordic Academic Press, pp. 79–112. Castels, S. and Miller, M.J. (1998) The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World. New York: Guilford Press. Creese, G. (2011) The New African Diaspora in Vancouver: Migration, Exclusion and Belonging. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Flam, H. and Beauzamy, B. (2008) “Symbolic violence”. In G. Delanty, R. Wodak and P. Jones (eds) Identity, Belonging and Migration. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, p. 221– 240. Haar, G. ter. (2011) How God become African: African Spirituality and Western Secular Thought. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Jäger, S. and Maier, F. (2001) “Theoretical and methodological aspects of Foucauldian critical discourse dispositive analysis”. In R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds) Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Sage, 34–61.

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Jarvis, E., Kirmayer, L.J, Weinfeld, M. and Larsy, J. (2005) “Religious practice and psychological distress: The importance of gender, ethnicity and migrant status”. Transcultural Psychology, 42 (4): 657–675. Jones, P. and Krzyżanowskyi, M. (2008) “Identity, belonging and migration: beyond constructing ‘others’”. In G. Delanty, R. Wodak and P. Jones (eds) Identity, Belonging and Migration. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 38–53. Kalu, O. (2008) African Pentecostalism: An Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. Knudsen, K. (1997) “Scandnavian neighbous with different character? Attitudes toward immigrants and national identity in Norway and Sweden”. Acta Socological, 40: 223. Kusow, A.M. and Bjork; S.R. (2007). “Introduction: The Somali Diaspora in a Global Context”. In A.M. Kusow and Bjork, S.R. (eds) From Mogadishu to Dixon: The Somali Diaspora in a Global Context. Trenton: Red Sea Press, Inc., 1–13. Mella, O. (1994) Religion in the Life of Refugees and Immigrants CEIFO, Stockholm University Nordic Ecumenical Working Group on Migration. Together or apart? Report from the Nordic Consultation on Migration and Changing Ecclesial Landscapes. December 2008. Nyhetstidningen, 13 October 2010. Olupona, J. (2009) “Emerging communities: the religious life of new African immigrants in the United States”. In I. Okpewho and N. Nzegwu (eds) The New African Diaspora. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 333–346. Pettigrew, T. (1998) “Reactions toward the new minorities of Western Europe”. Annual Review of Sociology, 24: 77–103. Sjöberg, L. (2010) “Response to debate on questions of migration and integration in Sweden”, discussion on SVT 2010. Statistiska centralbyrån, Sweden (SCB) (2009). Stoffels, H. (2008) “A coat of many colours: new immigrant churches in the Netherlands”. In M. Jansen and H. Stoffels (eds) A Moving God: Immigrant Churches in the Netherlands. Zurich: LIT VERLAG GmbH & Co. KG Wien, 13–29. Ukah, A. (2005) “Mobilities, migration and multiplication: the expansion of the religious field of the Redeemed Christian Church of God, Nigeria”. In A. Adogame and C. Weissköppel (eds) Religion in the Context of African Migration. Bayreuth: Bayreuth African Studies Series, No. 75, pp. 317–341.

Chapter 9

Young Muslim Women’s Public Self-Representations: A New Generation of Italians Seeking Legitimacy 1

Annalisa Frisina

Illegitimate Daughters of the Republic? According to Rea and Tripier (2003: 7) a common theme which can be traced in the analysis of immigration in Europe is the legitimacy of the presence of immigrants and their children. It is in particular the loyalties of immigrants’ children towards their “host” countries which raises doubts. The issue of belongings and multiple loyalties are cause for concern especially when linked to issues of security and the fight against international terrorism. Today it is young Muslims, identified on the basis of their parents’ national origin, who arouse most suspicion. They are seen to bear cultural and religious differences which are difficult to reconcile with democratic life (Rouadjia, 2004).2 An example is the editorial by the political scientist G. Sartori in the national broadsheet Corriere della Sera (20 December 2009), where he (re-)affirms “young Muslims’ inability to integrate” (non integrabilità dei giovani islamici), making reference to “third generations” in England and France who are “more fervent and angry than ever” (più infervorate e incattivite che mai). The article takes a stand against the reform of the Italian citizenship law and concludes sustaining that “Islam

  A previous version of this chapter was published in H. Vilaça and E. Pace (eds) (2010) Religião em Movimento. Imigrantes e diversidade religiosa em Portugal e Itàlia, Porto: Estrategias Criativas. 2   Rouadjia (2004, in particular pp. 157–183) harshly criticizes Tribalat whose research on young “beurs” ended up perpetuating and falling victim to her prejudices. In my opinion, the problem regards the (neo-)assimilationist premises which drive the research of Tribalat and other scholars (in Italy too) who have been concerned with the theme “religion and children of immigration”. 1

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is not a domestic religion” and “deluding ourselves that it can be integrated by ‘Italianizing’ it is a hugely naïve risk, a risk not worth taking”. The current situation in Italy is critical for a series of reasons. Besides a law on nationality which is predominantly based on ius sanguinis which makes it difficult even for those who are born and brought up in Italy to become Italian (see Zincone, 2006, on Law 91/1992), there are restrictive laws which criminalize migrants and put them in a precarious situation (the “Bossi-Fini” immigration law and the recent “security decree”/decreto sicurezza), which are even harder in times of economic crisis. Furthermore, as Pace (2005) highlights, in Italy there is a paradoxical model of “Catholic secularism” (laicità cattolica) which is based on a “romantic” view of Catholicism as way of imagining the shared identity of a weak and divided nation (just think of Gramsci’s Questione Meridionale). This model of secularism is the product of a historic compromise between political powers and Catholic hierarchies. The Lateran Treaty granted the Catholic Church, which came to be seen as “guarantor for Italian identity”, a series of privileges (such as the teaching of Catholic religion in state schools). Yet Italian society has undergone a radical change: there are now more than 4 million immigrants, 7.4 per cent of the Italian population (Caritas/Migrantes, 2013), who come from a wide range of countries, and Islam has become Italy’s second religion (655 Muslim prayer centres mapped in 2013 by Rhazzali and Equizi, who say that Muslims in Italy number 1,645,902). The xenophobic Northern League party, which has considerable weight in the recent centre-right government, tries to strengthen this strong link to “Catholic cultural roots” using anti-Islam rhetoric (Guolo, 2003). In short, the best way to construct “Us versus Them” is to reduce Italianness to a reactive identity and represent Islam as the dangerous Other, as the threat to those values which Italians are presumed to share and which are defended by the Catholic Church. In actual fact, Islamophobic discourse exists outside of Italy, circulating on a global level and drawing from a colonialist style, Orientalist imaginary (Said, 1991), which has a strong gender dimension. The “submissive, veiled woman in need of liberation” has served to affirm the moral superiority of an “Us” (European, Western), the only champions of democracy and women’s emancipation. The growing postcolonial literature invites us to see the power relations in these representations, showing how they can be used to legitimize political domination and economic exploitation. Thus, to emerge from the dichotomizing view of the world promoted by both radical Islamists and by a good part of Western media and political powers (Salih, 2008: 103), we need to pay more attention to the growing voices of those women who, on a global level, are trying to legitimize their own claims to equality and full citizenship as projects which are in tune with the

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religious message of Islam. Salih highlights the “endless flow of borrowings and interweaving between cultures and societies which modernity (and colonialism itself, which is a central part of it) has given rise to, albeit in a totally asymmetric power context”. In contrast to the liberal tradition of representing religion as tradition, these young people give rise to modern Islamic subjectivity. With the settlement of migrant families, a new generation of young people who have been educated in the state school system has grown. These people feel Italian even if often they are not necessarily so from a legal point of view, and they identify themselves as Muslims, even if they are so in a different way from their (immigrant) parents (Frisina, 2007). The theoretical approach of everyday multiculturalism (Colombo and Semi, 2007) allows us to observe the daily conflicts and negotiations these young people face in order to feel at home in Italy. In this chapter I will focus on the young women, as I see them as the main actors of social and cultural change. Their self-representations are directed towards different audiences (Salih, 2009): the “secularized” autochthonous non-Muslims and the “religious” immigrant Muslims. What is at play here is legitimization of their own presence. I will start with the well-known examples: Randa Ghazy and Sumaya Abdel Qader, the first “second generation authors”, who bring their religious identity into play and publicly claim multiple belongings, showing that they are capable of multiple loyalties – and also multiple criticisms. I will then analyse how the association Giovani Musulmani d’Italia (GMI) (Young Muslims of Italy) has sought to move from negative visibility, immediately after 9/11, to a publicly asserted positive visibility. I will then present the preliminary results of a research study on “spaces lived in free time” carried out with the GMI through a participatory visual approach, focusing on the case of Bologna. Finally I will focus on the case of Treviso and tell the story of Maryem, founder of the association “Seconda Generazione”. Through the account of her daily battle against the identity politics of the Northern League, it will become clear that the road to legitimize the presence of this new generation of Italian Muslim women is still very long. From Objects to Subjects of Discourse: New Voices in Italian Literature Alongside the many books on Muslim women which often tell tragic and violent stories, a new literature of young Muslim women, daughters of immigration, is emerging. Far from being the passive victims of colonial-style Orientalist

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discourses, they are the voices of new Islamic subjectivities. Every day they resist denigrating representations of themselves through their cultural creativity and denounce the “hypocrisy of the assumed neutrality and equality of individuals in the public sphere, or the artificial nature of the boundary between the public and private spheres, shedding light on the classic opposition of secularism and religiosity” (Salih, 2008: 144). I will take the example of two young women, Randa Ghazy and Sumaya Abdel Qader, who have made themselves heard in the Italian public sphere and express an agility in switching between their multiple belongings in their recently published books. “Perhaps I won’t kill anyone today” (Ghazy, 2007) tells the story of Jasmine, a young Muslim woman of Egyptian origin who “funnily enough is not a terrorist”. Jasmine feels “like a djinn”, good and often angry because she is misunderstood, but also proud of being “different, not inferior” and of resisting Oriana Fallaci’s rhetoric. She rebels against a friend’s choice of accepting a marriage arranged by her parents, as well as against an autochthonous admirer who perpetuates stereotypes on Arabs and Muslims. Her main weapon is irony. Below are two quotes from her story which illustrate her brilliant and humorous account of the desire to “remain faithful” and at the same time her “critical distance” which I repeatedly encounter in my research with young Muslims who have grown up in Italy. The veil is like depilatory wax: do it, whenever you want, ignore what others expect from you. You feel you can do it, when it is not too great a sacrifice. Men would always like us perfectly depilated. Forget it. I’M NOT A FEMINIST, BUT … Muslim men should spend more time on a self-examination instead of spending their time checking what a woman says, what she wears, how she laughs, how many times a month she plucks her eyebrows, maybe things would turn out better. (p. 16, block letters as in the original) Anything a Muslim woman says, beware, beware, she creates a scandal. As if she had a note on her forehead saying: WORK IN PROGRESS, EMANCIPATION PROCESS RUNNING, and as if anyone trying to break with certain traditions were to cause a spreading uneasiness. Reform, ok. But how? Can Jasmine go out with Thomas, for example? … Can angelic Jasmine tell her mother that she was talking to a boy who was trying it on with her? And her father? How long should her skirt be? Below the knee? Slightly above? Can wine vinegar be used to dress food? What about cakes with a low percentage of alcohol? Can we eat them? How about lard in certain kinds of bread? Does that send us straight to hell? Just to list some of the most banal dilemmas. And can we believe that it’s just any

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young “Milanese” girl to raise these issues? Or is she not a true Muslim? Who decides anyway? Is there some kind of licence, a certificate? If there is, please tell me, it’s really important to me, really. (p. 147, block letters as in the original)

As Saint-Blancat (2004: 236) points out, the experiences of young Muslims brought up in Europe reflect the same processes of change regarding religion as we find in their peers, with whom they share the same concerns and aspirations: the same individual search for meaning, distrust of institutionalized forms of religion, questioning of the way authority is reproduced, tendency to establish social ties and interactions on the basis of “elective affinities”. For this new generation of Muslims, “Reterritorializing the Revelation” (Saint-Blancat, 2002) means carrying out “everyday ijtihad” (Frisina, 2007; Maddanu, 2009), loaded with uncertainty. Finding their “own way of being Muslims” means “breaking moulds” as Jasmine/Randa Ghazy says, and thus inevitably “creates widespread unease”. Working within what has been called the “affective turn” in the social sciences, Fadil (2009), has shown us how Belgian women of Maghreb origin, aware of upsetting two different moral orders (the secular one which sees not shaking hands with members of the opposite sex as offensive; and the Islamic religious one which sees eating in front of somebody who is fasting during Ramadan as offensive), carefully adopt “emotion management”, in seeking to respect others sensitivities. However these adjustments are affected by the “unequal ethic weight” attributed to the two behaviours (not shaking hands with a person of the opposite sex and eating in front of somebody fasting for Ramadan) thus revealing the dominant position of the “liberal-secular regime” in Belgium. “I wear the veil and adore Queen” (Porto il velo adoro, adoro i Queen; Abdel Qader, 2008), on the other hand, tells the story of Sulinda, a young Muslim woman of Palestinian/Jordanian origin, who feels part of a new generation of Italians and refuses to be classified on the basis of her immigrant parents’ origins. Sulinda is a practising Muslim, she would like to have the means and places to practice her faith and hand it down to her daughters, but this is not at all simple in Italy today. Two paragraphs from her account are reported below because they are particularly useful in illustrating the feelings of young women who would like to live their faith publicly, “as citizens” (and the beginning words are again “the rage and the pride” of O. Fallaci, but the perspective is “reversed”). I was persecuted by victimism up until high school. Until rage and pride burst inside me and I decided to turn into an attacking position. Stop suffering in

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The Changing Soul of Europe silence! Then there was that new element that made me an easy target: the veil … The change came when the professor of religion asked me one day to join her in the classes to talk about Islam and Arabs. That’s easy, I thought, so I can skip the maths and Italian lessons. The illusion soon disappeared, when I realized I was completely ignorant about Arab history and culture. For many religious questions I had no answers, and where was I supposed to find them? The mosque was just a hole where nobody was prepared to teach the young. My mother told us what she knew. My poor dad was always at work. (pp. 136 and 144–145) (Her daughter Shadia, six years old) has a keen spirit of observation and as soon as she enters the mosque she asks, “Why is it so disgusting here and the church is so beautiful instead?” It’s true. It is impossible not to wonder why, when we are in an industrial shed converted into a mosque, where it is very cold in winter and very hot in summer, humid, dark, with no garden, no grass, nothing attractive. How can I answer her? That the Local Council or Municipal Authorities won’t give us permission to build a real mosque? Or that somebody has instilled people with so much fear that as soon as we think about building an Islamic place of worship or community center, a generalized psychosis and panic spread everywhere so that nobody has the courage to issue any permits? She would not understand and I would risk transmitting to her a sort of rage and hatred against the institutions that they would deserve but that it is neither right nor constructive. I restrict myself to telling her, “We are looking for a new place that will be beautiful”. I hope I won’t have to lie forever. (pp. 120–121)

Whilst these new voices in Italian literature could be seen, in part, as a response to a “market multiculturalism” which makes difference a commodity, Ghazy and Abdel Qader do not appear to be merely adopting “tactics of individual social promotion” which reinforce a dominant culturalist frame (which essentializes cultural and religious differences), nor do they limit themselves to “reversing the stigma”. Their narratives know how to speak to different audiences and raise multiple criticisms: in the text cited above, for example, the author critiques both the educational limits of the generation of immigrant parents and the local authorities who do not effectively guarantee freedom of worship. The voices of these young women also seek legitimacy in new ways of doing journalism,3 as in the case of “Yalla Italia! Il primo mensile delle seconde 3   In the conclusions of his study of Islam in mainstream Italian media, Bruno (2008: 199) affirms that these representations “tell us much more about who represents – and in final analysis ‘imagines’ – alterity rather than on the represented other”. Said’s criticism

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generazioni” – the first magazine for second-generation immigrants) – whose editorial staff is made up of young Muslims who have grown up in Italy, mainly North African women (both from the Maghreb and Mashreq). This is a publishing initiative of a weekly magazine of the non-profit organization (“Vita”), which has published 23 monograph editions since 2007 and has become a blog, www.yallaitalia.it. What brings together the diversity of topics which have been addressed so far4 is the way in which they are presented: a pluralist perspective is offered which values different points of view: Islam is represented through personal and family experiences, showing the changes underway and putting the spotlight on young people and women. As we will see in the next section, these new subjectivities’ search for legitimacy passes as a different type of public visibility, which implies “other codes”, that is a change in the interpretive frames for reading the presence of Muslims in Italy. From Passive Visibility to Visibility as a Choice: The Young Muslims of Italy Association and “Narrated Photos” of Young Women in Bologna Distinguishing between different models of visibility (Brighenti, 2008; Frisina 2013), we can see how the association Giovani Musulmani d’Italia (GMI) (Young Muslims of Italy), founded just after 9/11 (Frisina, 2007), sought to pass from visibility as control (within a predominantly security-based frame, in which being identified as Muslim means becoming a presumed public danger of how media and experts “cover Islam” (1997) that is (dis)inform us about Islam, through stereotypes and prejudices, is brought up again by this scholar and is still relevant. 4   The first topic addressed is “Laughing as Muslims”, a way of trying to challenge stereotypes after the incident of the Danish cartoon of the Prophet Mohammed and show the sense of humour, but also the sensitivity, of young Muslims towards the sacred and profane. The themes addressed so far have been: family relations; holidays in parents’ countries of origin; the impact of 9/11 on their lives; Italian-style Ramadan; television; their dreams and future plans; faith and love; feeling “Italians by half ” due to the difficulty in obtaining citizenship (although they were born and grew up in Italy); facing taboos (such as “homosexuality in the Arab world”); the desire to narrate about oneself in public (avoiding, for example, labels such as “moderate Muslims”); self-criticism amongst Muslims (highlighting the “courageous” women, those who struggle to build a “modern and free Islam”); food, fashion and consumption of “second generations”; plurilingualism; personal and political reflections after the Israeli assault on Gaza; leaders in the Islamic world; lifechanging books; “second generations” in Italy; eroticism and religious faith; Internet; Sartori’s fears and, finally, reflections on the 8 March (and women’s bodies).

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and undergoing the “zealous” checks of security forces) and visibility as a show/ spectacle (within a predominantly culturalist frame where being identified as Muslims means becoming radical Alterity, target of mass media sensationalism) to visibility as recognition, whereby difference is not imposed nor does it bear negative connotations, but it is claimed and is a positive sign. The frame that this youth organization advanced to interpret the public presence of Muslims thus seems to be that of democratic citizenship (Frisina, 2006), which is based on belonging and participation (Delanty, 2000). The GMI’s self-presentation on its website (www.giovanimusulmani.it) is as follows: “The GMI groups together all those young Muslims aged between 14 and 30 who share, as well as the Muslim faith, feeling 100% citizens of this country”; furthermore, a slogan which reveals a religiously motivated public commitment: “We protagonists, with the help of God” (Protagonisti noi, con l’aiuto di Dio). Religious identification does not easily does not easily fit into a secularized discourse concerning citizenship, but it is participation itself that is seen as a moral pledge (Fadil, 2006: 76). As has occurred in other European contexts, the young Muslims’ “politics of visibility” ( Jonker and Amiraux, 2006) responds both to external pressures (the awareness of being “under the spotlight” in a socio-political context which portrays them as dangerous and outsiders) and to internal pressures (the need for greater autonomy from immigrant Islamic associations and from their families), as well as a need to develop a more “autochthonous” and “spiritual” Islam. Entering the public sphere as “Italian citizens of Islamic faith” meant addressing “different interconnected publics” (Salih, 2009), rejecting the dichotomizing “us–them” logic of those who are tied to exclusive loyalties and who see change as betrayal. In autumn 20095 I returned to the field of my PhD research (2001–2004)6 and began a new research study with the GMI using a visual methodology to focus on “spaces lived during free time”. I felt it was important to explore the symbolic dimension of space and understand which “everyday spaces” are important for the young people of the different local branches of the GMI to negotiate, discuss and lay claim to their belonging. Space is important in expressing a   This opportunity arose with the invitation to participate in a national conference “2G Muslims: citizenship rights and duties of young second generation Muslims” (Musulmani 2G: diritti e doveri di cittadinanza dei giovani musulmani di seconda generazione) (1–2 December 2009), organized by Italian Centre for Peace in Middle East (CIPMO) in collaboration with International and European Forum of Migration Research (FIERI) of Turin. 6   “Difference as opportunity? Young Italian Muslims and citizenship requests” (La differenza come opportunità? Giovani musulmani italiani e domande di cittadinanza) (2005, with the supervision of Prof. C. Saint-Blancat). 5

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sense of belonging and through experience becomes incorporated, that is full of meanings, memories and emotions. The space/social actor relationship is complex and changes over time and in different situations (Semi, 2007). Every social actor (individual and collective) has a specific way of interpreting, living and “producing” space (Lefebvre, 1970). A method which is often used in research with young people is that of photo elicitation whereby the research subjects take photos of places, objects and people in their daily lives and on which they can comment with a written narrative and/or discuss with the researcher in individual or group interviews (Heath et al., 2009: 120–121). At a national training meeting of GMI which took place in Milan on 24 October 2009 I thus proposed to each representative of the local branches an individual/group collection of “images and narratives” to tell others about significant places in their everyday lives outside of work and school:7 the spaces/ free time available to them. The material gathered (57 photos and corresponding narratives of six local branches8) shows places where they socialize (associations, bars, shopping centres, squares/parks in their neighbourhoods, historic city centres where they go to “fare le vasche” (literally, to do lengths of a swimming pool, but means walk up and down the main streets or squares of a town to meet other young people …). Their accounts reveal not only their awareness of more or less “clashing looks” but also their discoursal/visual positionings as people who do not surrender to being relegated to the role of “outsider”. In this chapter I will focus on the case of a group of young women from Bologna who prepared a selection of their photos and narratives for the conference in Turin.9 I have done so because of their relevance for our reflection on public self-representations of a new generation of young Italian Muslims.

  From the outset I expressed the desire for a flexible pathway so that each group could present their work in different ways/modes (for example, using PowerPoint, or making a video), at different times and leaving open the opportunity to publicly present their work, starting with the conference in Turin (see note 2). 8   In chronological order of signing up for the project, the local branches are: Bologna; Sassuolo (Mo); Roma; Torino/Novara (a single group); Milano and Vicenza. 9   Linda Elian (one of the participants) also made a video of photographs and narratives, www.vimeo.com/22922917 (presented at the conference). 7

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The authors of the following photo narratives are three university students who have grown up in Italy (two are 22 years old, one is 23; two define themselves as “Italo-Moroccan”, one “Italo-Palestinian”).

Figure 9.1

Bologna

Source: Photovoice project “Spazi vissuti nel tempo libero. Un percorso di ricerca partecipata con i GMI”. Reproduced by permission.

Bologna … La Rossa – the Red one!!! It’s a University town, young and dynamic, with the power to enchant in its simplicity. It’s a multifaceted town, there’s everything for everybody. One can see coloured veils everywhere, Muslim girls fashionably dressed by Promod or Zara or Carmaieu and the icing on the cake is HM, where probably there is the first shop assistant working with the veil … Young Muslim from Bologna, even though they know very well the city and are absolutely an integrant part, are aware that there’s still a lot to be discovered.

Let’s start from the image: the space is Piazza Maggiore, the moment captured shows the celebration of the recent graduation of two young students, a young woman and man, crowned with laurel wreaths. Under these people we see the roofs of Bologna in a panoramic view of the historic centre of the city. It is anything but a self-representation of “marginality”; these young women want to be seen in the heart of the city, as they share the fruits of their studies. The narrative which

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accompanies the image is above all a declaration of love for their city, where they meet lots of young “fashionably dressed” women in “coloured veils”. Bologna is inhabited by young Muslims like them who know they are good looking, locally re-appropriating “global brands”.10 They express curiosity about the territory they live in and want to explore it in order to continue to feel an “integral part” of it.

Figure 9.2

La Scuderia

Source: Photovoice project “Spazi vissuti nel tempo libero. Un percorso di ricerca partecipata con i GMI”. Reproduced by permission.

The University Coffe shop la Scuderia, by some (who did not have the chance to know it and realise the importance as a gathering centre) has been addressed as a “haram” place (forbidden). Instead, those like us, who hang out at it, consider it as a friendly and harmless place where one “feels home away from home”. People become curious, looking at us on the table talking easy in italian even in a bolognese accent. “How is that? How many foreigners can write and use a Pc? And what a Pc! They are so concentrated, they may be plotting a terroristic attack by Internet”. While the pc shows the unmistakable facebook screen where we happily spend our time, like all the youth today.   For an analysis of consumption and identity of the new generations see Caneva (2008).

10

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The image depicts two young women in front of a PC in a youth space. The narrative highlights the plurality of meanings this space has, and reveals the different audiences these self-representations are speaking to. On one hand those Muslims who see cafés and other places where young people meet as “haram”, illicit, impure. On the other hand those autochthonous people who see the young veiled women as “foreigners” and “potential terrorists”. For both the message is clear: they, and the spaces they inhabit, are not evil. They feel at home, they are “like their Italian peers”, “like all young people today”.

Figure 9.3

La Preghiera

Source: Photovoice project “Spazi vissuti nel tempo libero. Un percorso di ricerca partecipata con i GMI”. Reproduced by permission.

“Stand up and pray when you hear the call, wherever you are” says our beloved Prophet (saws). The prayer is an integral part of every Muslim with Faith in his heart and who cannot live without it during the day. For the Muslim youth of Bologna every place suddenly becomes a direct entrance point to feeling closer to God. It does not matter what you are doing or who you are with. A changing room of a shop, an empty school room, a free corridor, a garden … Every place becomes ours for a moment … The prayer from “time” becomes “space”, even though there are no mosques unlike other European countries and there’s no Muezzin calling the Adhan.

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Whilst the other photos depict the city and ordinary meeting places for these young women, here we have an evocation of the transformative power of these women’s faith. At the moment of prayer (one of the five pillars of Islam), places become “other” than what they are normally used for. In the narrative the self-representation of young women who feel strongly about valuing their difference emerges. The “we” that is constructed here is not the young, generational one of the other photos, but the transnational “we” of the “umma”, the “imagined community” of Muslims. Even if there are no mosques and the call to prayer is not heard, their faith does not disappear. Let’s think again of the different significant audiences for these young women. To those Muslims who are afraid that their daughters who have grown up in Italy are getting “lost”, they declare they still have a common memory; to those autochthonous citizens who see daughters of immigrants as “destined to assimilation”, they are saying that “difference” is still meaningful and of value to them.

Figure 9.4

La Zonarelli

Source: Photovoice project “Spazi vissuti nel tempo libero. Un percorso di ricerca partecipata con i GMI”. Reproduced by permission.

Intercultural Centre Zonarelli, a place of different types of meetings: organized, disorganized, of fun, teaching, discussion and sharing. A place where you are not in the spotlight like an alien because you are

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The Changing Soul of Europe wearing the veil or speak half Arabic and half Italian or you have a chocolate or cappuccino complexion … It’s the favourite place of our association, “Giovani Musulmani d’Italia”. A place open to everybody and for everybody. Even though somebody with not such an “open” mind has entered our Guinness book of records of funny memories because, addressing a Muslim girl, they calmly asked her “Why are you dressed as a foreigner?”. I was amazed, speechless. Why are you trying to understand how to recognize a foreigner by her dress … in this day and age!!! And whatismore, at an INTERCULTURAL meeting!?

This image shows a meeting of young men and women, with and without veils, in a coloured and youthful space. The narrative introduces the different uses made of this intercultural centre “Zonarelli”. As GMI, the young women feel at home in a place which institutionally legitimizes difference (www.zonagidue.it), even Islamic difference (commenting orally on this photo, one of the young women explained to me that here they have lockers where they keep their prayer mats). But as Simmel (1908) teaches us, space is produced by the relations between people and even in an “intercultural” space, the ambivalence and conflictuality of all human interactions come into play. However these types of interactions – with people who have not understood “in this day and age” and above all in certain places (such as intercultural centres), that differences are the norm and appearances are misleading – are recounted with a sense of humour. Zonarelli offers a place of recognition, but this new Italian generation’s “search for legitimacy” is played though continuous negotiation (and humour helps, as Sclavi (2003) highlights). While the local relevance of belonging is clear for GMI of other local branches (as for their autochthonous peers), Bologna seems to be particularly wellloved also because of its historic ability to apply policies of recognition in which cultural pluralism is publicly recognized as a value and spaces (like Zonarelli) are set up where differences find legitimacy. Of course, a “real” mosque has not yet been built here and the centre-left have not always been in power, but as Caponio’s study (2006) has shown, through the weight of local administrative functionaries and third sector organizations who have been working in the territory for a long time, the “multicultural policies” promoted by the centre-left have been continued even when centre-right was governing. As we will see in the following, concluding section, in other local contexts the search for public legitimacy seems to be much more contrasted and problematic for young Muslims.

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The Case of Treviso and Meryem’s Story: The Road is Still Long Meryem11 is a young Muslim girl in Treviso, a stronghold of the Northern League and of the Mayor Gentilini, whose xenophobia is well known even internationally. In December 2007, on Aid Al Kabyr day, she protested about the police bursting in during prayers held in a hall in the province of Treviso and she promised to become committed to supporting the “dignity of the Muslim community”. It was not the first time we had been offended … it won’t be the last either. But, looking at the policemen who yet again stormed in to check on us during the prayer and walked over the carpets, I said that’s enough, it is not possible for an old man (Gentilini) to keep all these people under his heel. So I decided to react, to change the way the people of Treviso see us and show the old man that we do not have to feel like guests, we have rights.

Meryem managed to put her ideas into practice in April 2008 when, after yet another concession for a place for Muslims to gather and pray was rejected, she rallied other young Muslims like herself and for three months they organized a protest every Friday for half an hour (from 12:00 to 12:30). With the elections coming up, it was clear that things would get worse … the racism and fascism of the local politicians increasingly vexing the Muslims. After trying to work together with the Islamic associations, I realized they wanted to subordinate the young people, so we continued on our own. “Good luck”, they said. I remember the discouragement and the perseverance. I read the Civil Code and had a revelation: public spaces! Spaces for all citizens, and for us too! Providing there’s no disturbance, of course. Then I looked for a car park near the stadium, that is huge and always empty. I called other young people and we put on blue t-shirts and carried Italian flags … We prayed together. There were 20, 30, even 50 or 60 of us, boys and girls. It depended on the weather! Every time, the police came to check on us and little by little we made friends … In the end, they seemed embarrassed about the job they had to do … One policeman, in particular, who spends his holidays in Morocco, told us, I have to obey orders but you are right.

11   The text and information reported here are based on an interview conducted in Padova on 20 March 2009.

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In July 2008, Meryem received a letter containing death threats and her photo cut from local newspapers, surrounded with crosses. The letter said that she had to die, together with her family and the left-wing politicians in favour of the opening of mosques in Italy. At first, she did not want to report the incident for fear of not being believed, but then her parents convinced her to go to the police. She chose not to inform the media because she does not trust them. She did not surrender, however, and in the summer, while most young people were on holiday, she found offices for the association, called “Second Generation”, of which she became president. The owner of the premises comes from Treviso but had lived for a long time in Libya, where he had got to know and respect Muslims. He was immediately threatened with jail by Gentilini. In front of the association’s offices – where Meryem and her friends put Italian flags – one morning blasphemous words (offending Allah and comparing the Prophet Mohammed to Satan) appeared. The provocations do not stop there, and one evening a car arrived in the blind alley outside the association’s office, from which a man spat and shouted, “immigrants, go home”. Meryem’s parents were there and decided to call the police, but while her father tried to keep the car from leaving, her mother was hit by the car door. Next day, they found out that the man was a Northern League city councillor and the media told an opposite version of the story, in which the aggressor became the victim. Meryem decided to approach an honest journalist, but doubted that there could be any real pluralism in Italy (“they are more interested in their sales than in telling the true story”), so she chose Al Jazeera, which she considers objective and also capable of attracting the solidarity of other Muslims around the world. She took some amateur videos to explain the situation in Treviso and sent them off. An Al Jazeera troupe soon arrived in her home town and together they prepared a report on Muslims in Italy. A short documentary called “Italy’s other religion” was broadcast on the programme “People and power” on 14 February 2009.12 Among the leading characters, it showed Meryem as an example of young Italian Muslims fighting for their civil rights. After an intense year in the public eye, Meryem now wants to concentrate on her university studies (she is in her second year of international economics) and she earns a living working as a shop assistant in a big store in Treviso. She says that this should not be a personal struggle, but collective and with a longterm perspective. 12   See http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/peopleandpower/2009/02/ 2009214114451424970.html (accessed on 4 May 2014).

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The basic problem is that when people in Treviso say “the Muslims must comply with our rules”, they are not thinking about the Constitution … or paying taxes! They are repeating what the politicians say on television and end up thinking that their rules mean … Christianity! Yes, though never directly, but when they tell us “you have to adapt” and refuse us permission to open a mosque, what are they ultimately saying? That we must become Christians? I have met good Christians, a Catholic priest who lent his parish to the Muslim so that they could pray, and he does not think that way … The ones in power are pushing … and influencing our lives.

The priest mentioned by Meryem stopped lending his parish after the local media reported the fact in sensationalist tones (“the church became a mosque”) and the Church authorities put a stop to it. Meryem is disappointed because she thought that Italy, being in Europe, was democratic and instead she now realizes there is no genuine pluralism. She resigned from the association and passed the presidency on to another, younger woman, of Moroccan origin like herself who has grown up in Italy. Without Meryem’s courage and tenacity the association today seems lifeless. Public outings are rare, and the order of the day seems to be “go back to invisibility and silence”, at least until the situation improves. The current political climate, with the Northern League emerging stronger than ever in the last regional elections (2010), leads us to believe that the road for these young people to feel their public presence as legitimate is a very long one. The re-appropriation of public space, starting from group prayer for young Muslims in blue T-shirts and Italian flags already seems to be a distant memory. That space has returned to its original function, a car park, which is often empty. References Abdel Qader, S. (2008) Porto il velo, adoro i Queen. Nuove italiane crescono, Milano: Sonzogno editore. Brighenti, A. (2008) Visuale, visibile, etnografico, Etnografia e ricerca sociale, 1: 91–114. Bruno, M. (2008) L’islam immaginato. Rappresentazioni e stereotipi nei media italiani, Milano: Guerini Scientifica. Caneva, E. (2008) Giovani di origine straniera e strategie identitarie: il ruolo delle pratiche di consumo nella costruzione di sé, Mondi Migranti, 3: 63–80.

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Caponio, T. (2006) Città italiane e immigrazione. Discorso pubblico e politiche a Milano, Bologna, Napoli, Bologna: Il Mulino. Caritas/Migrantes (2013) Dossier Statistico sull’immigrazione. XXIII Rapporto, Roma: Idos. Colombo, E. and Semi, G. (eds) (2007) Multiculturalismo quotidiano. Le pratiche della differenza, Milano: Franco Angeli. Delanty, G. (2000) Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics, Buckingham: Open University Press. Fadil, N. (2006) “We should be walking Qurans”: the making of an Islamic political subject, in G. Jonker and V. Amiraux (eds), Politics of Visibility: Young Muslims in European Public Spaces, Bielefeld: Transcript-Verlag, pp. 53–78. Fadil, N. (2009) Managing affects and sensibilities: the case of not-handshaking and not-fasting, Social Anthropology, 7(4): 439–454. Frisina, A. (2006) The invention of citizenship among young Muslims in Italy, in G. Jonker and V. Amiraux (eds), Politics of Visibility: Young Muslims in European Public Spaces, Bielefeld: Transcript-Verlag, pp. 79–101. Frisina, A. (2007) Giovani Musulmani d’Italia, Roma: Carocci. Frisina, A. (2013), Ricerca Visuale e trasformazioni socio-culturali, Torino:UTET Università. Ghazy, R. (2007) Oggi forse non ammazzo nessuno. Storie minime di una giovane musulmana stranamente non terrorista, Milano: Fabbri. Guolo, R. (2003) Xenofobi e xenofili. Gli italiani e l’islam, Roma-Bari: Laterza. Heath S., Brooks R., Cleaver, E. and Ireland, E. (2009) Researching Young People’s Lives, London: Sage. Jonker, G. and Amiraux, V. (eds) (2006) Politics of Visibility: Young Muslims in European Public Spaces, Bielefeld: Transcript-Verlag. Lefebvre, H. (1970) Il diritto alla città, Padova: Marsilio. Maddanu, S. (2009) L’islamità dei giovani musulmani e l’“ijtihad” moderno: nuove pratiche per una nuova religiosità europea, Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia, 4: 655–680. Pace, E. (2005) L’insigne faiblesse de la laïcité italienne, in J.P. Willaime and S. Mathieu (eds), Des Maîtres et des Dieux. Écoles et Religions en Europe, Paris: Belin, pp. 59–70. Rea, A. and Tripier, M. (2003) Sociologie de l’immigration, Paris: La Découverte. Rhazzali, K. and Equizi, M. (2013) I Musulmani e i loro luoghi di culto, in E. Pace (ed.) Le religioni nell’Italia che cambia. Mappe e bussole, Roma: Carocci, 47–72.

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Rouadjia, A. (2004) Les enfants illegitime de la République. Les beurs et les figures emblématiques de l’ingérence humanitaire, Paris: Maisonneuve e Larose. Said, E. (1991) Orientalismo, Torino: Bollati Boringhieri. Said, E. (1997) Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, London: Vintage. Saint-Blancat, C. (2002) Islam in diaspora: between reterritorialization and extraterritoriality, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 26(1): 138–151. Saint-Blancat, C. (2004) La transmission de l’islam auprès des nouvelles générations de la diaspora, Social Compass, 51(2): 235–247. Salih, R. (2008) Musulmane rivelate. Donne, islam, modernità, Roma: Carocci. Salih, R. (2009) Muslim women, fragmented secularism and the construction of interconnected “publics” in Italy, Social Anthropology, 7(4): 409–423. Sclavi, M. (2003) Arte di ascoltare e mondi possibili, Milano: Mondadori Bruno. Semi, G. (2007) Lo spazio del multiculturalismo quotidiano, in E. Colombo and G. Semi (eds), Multiculturalismo quotidiano. Le pratiche della differenza, Milano: Franco Angeli, pp. 59–76. Simmel, G. (1908) Soziologie, Leipzig: Dunker & Humbolt. Simmel, G. (1989) Sociologia, Milano: Edizioni di Comunità. Zincone, G. (2006) Familismo legale. Come (non) diventare italiani, Roma: Laterza.

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Chapter 10

Values and Religion in Transition: A Case Study of a Swedish Multicultural Public School Per Pettersson

Introduction Welfare and Values in Europe (WaVE) was a research project funded by the European Commission 6th Framework Package in response to a call for research on “values and religions in Europe”. Specifically, the call invited studies aiming “to better understand the significance and impact of values and religions in societies across Europe and their roles in relation to changes in society and to the emergence of European identities”. The Commission asked for an exploration of the following: how religion is sometimes used as a factor in social mobilization, solidarity or discrimination; the processes leading to tolerance or intolerance and xenophobia; and the challenges that religious, ethnic and cultural diversity may pose to legal, educational and political systems in European countries. The research is to impart insight on ways to ensure peaceful coexistence of different value systems through comparison of the differing ways European countries address these issues with various policies and practices and their relative degrees of success in this. (EU FP6 call, 2005)

The WaVE project was a response to this call for research identifying three major and interconnected dimensions of social change in Europe – change related to religion, minorities and gender – and examined these dimensions through the prism of welfare. In so doing, WaVE grounded its approach to the intangible concept of “values” in the ways in which values are expressed and developed in practice in the provision of basic welfare needs. Welfare needs and provision are

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loaded with values linked to ethnicity, culture and religion and thus comprise fundamental areas at which coexistence between different cultures, values and religions can be effectively examined. The central concepts and objectives of the WaVE project may be expressed as follows: first, WaVE is a study of values in Europe, as observable through the prism of welfare. It aims to learn about the values of various groups, as discernible in the domain of welfare (that is, in the expression of, and provision of, “basic” individual and group needs). Second, the project focuses on values leading to cohesion or conflict within society. WaVE aims to gain insight into the value systems which lead to conflict and/or cohesion between and within groups, with a special focus on minority/majority relations. And third, it examines the extent to which these values are related to religion, minorities or gender: is there a religious dimension to the examples of conflict or cooperation? Are there examples of conflict or cooperation between majority and minority groups? Is there a gender dimension in these? The study entailed in-depth qualitative research in medium-sized towns of 12 European countries: Sweden, Norway, Finland, Latvia, England, Germany,1 France, Poland, Croatia, Italy, Romania and Greece. In each of the selected towns, majority–minority relations were focused in the context of welfare provision. The project aimed to shed light on elements of cooperation and social cohesion where they exist between various groups, but also on the potential for tension and conflict. The Swedish case study was made in the town Gävle. The Swedish Religious Landscape Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland have historically formed a Protestant Nordic Region. Since the time of the Reformation, the Lutheran national church has been dominant in Sweden, counting the vast majority of the population as members. Today (2011) Sweden has a total population of 9.4 million of whom 69 per cent belong to the same church, the Church of Sweden. Five per cent are members of different minority Christian Protestant denominations, 2 per cent belong to the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches and 2 per cent of the population belongs to other religions, primarily Islam. This means that in total 78 per cent of the population belongs to an

1   Two case studies have been conducted in Germany: one a town with a Catholic majority and the other in a town with a Protestant majority.

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organized religion (Church of Sweden statistics 2011; Nämnden för statligt stöd till trossamfund, SST, statistik 2009).2 Alongside other European countries, Sweden has passed through a process of secularization through which both the state and the individual have liberated themselves from the former power of the church. Sweden is often referred to as one of the most secularized countries in the world as regards regular participation in worship and belief in traditional church teaching (Zuckerman, 2008). However, the Swedish religious situation is complex, most clearly highlighted by the prevailing formal relationship between the vast majority of Swedish people and the Church of Sweden, and the relatively high level of participation in religious life rites in the context of the majority church. Statistics from 2011 show that 53 per cent of all children born are baptized in the Church of Sweden, 32 per cent of all 15-year-olds participate in its confirmation education programme, 36 per cent of all marriages take place in the Church of Sweden and 81 per cent of all dead are buried within the Church of Sweden setting (Church of Sweden statistics, 2011). This complexity of high levels of secularization in some respects and at the same time high levels of religious affiliation in others is similar to the situation in the other Nordic countries and is sometimes called a Nordic Paradox (Bäckström et al., 2004). The legal regulation of the Swedish religious landscape underwent a major change on 1 January 2000 when new legislation altered the relationship between the Church of Sweden and the state and created a more equal position for all faith communities. The aim was to make the state religiously neutral and secular and that it should treat all faith communities equally. The change is usually described as a divorce between church and state. This is correct on the one hand since the new act proclaimed church and state to be separate bodies (SFS 1998:1591). On the other hand, the act accords the Church of Sweden a continuing special status which makes it more accurate to speak of the current situation as an agreement between partners in an ongoing marriage regarding their respective roles (Ekstrand, 2002). Today, in 2012, more than 10 years after the separation between church and state, the Church of Sweden still retains a dominant role on the Swedish religious scene. However, in the suburbs of major cities the presence of religion is quite different from the general national situation. Here the presence of other religions as well as other Christian denominations and New Age practices is a fact and it becomes clear that Sweden is part of a global world of religions 2   The percentage figures refer to people that are members or users of religion in organized form according to reports from the respective religious organization.

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and cultures. In these areas the Swedish tradition of keeping religion within the private sphere has broken down over the past 30 years and religion has become part of the public sphere through visible attributes and practices (Andersson and Sander, 2005). The relatively homogeneous Swedish society with its privatized religiosity is today challenged by the immigration of members of (for Sweden) minority religious groups, especially Muslims, demanding the right to develop their own specificity, for example by managing their own schools (Berglund and Larsson, 2007). Twenty years ago there were just a few private primary schools in Sweden. Today they are continuously growing in number, many of them with a religious profile. Many observers currently talk about a return of religion to the public scene and Swedish society at large (for example, Sigurdson, 2009). It is not possible, however, to give a generalized description of the development since the effects of migration and globalization are very different from one locality to another. It is also a matter of interpretation of the new ways in which people relate to religious institutions and express their religiosity. So the image one gets of religion in Sweden today depends on the researcher’s choice of geographical area as well as the choice of perspective. When studying values related to religion in the case study of the WaVEproject it became obvious that Christian values and practices are implicit in Swedish daily practice to a larger extent than ethnic Swedish people imagine. The situation within the school system illustrates well the ambiguity of the supposed separation between religion/church and state and the actual reality. On the one hand the school is secular and religiously neutral, but on the other hand there are often in praxis special links to the local Church of Sweden parish. In many localities, there is an organized cooperation between church and school in the context of the major Christian festivals, Christmas and Easter. Most schools do something special in connection with the first Sunday in Advent and St Lucia’s day. End-of-school-year ceremonies are often performed in a church building or in the school with a priest present. These traditions have however recently been questioned in the public debate. The National Agency for Education has also during the last years repeatedly stated that end-of-school-year ceremonies should follow the same restrictions as any other teaching or activity in school. The pupils should not be under the influence of a particular religious view within the school context (Skolverket, 2012). This increasing awareness of being neutral relates to the societal change due to migration and globalization. The Swedish religious landscape is presently in different ways in flux and undergoing change, a change that will have consequences also for the future development of the schools.

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The Case Study in Gävle The Swedish case study was been carried out in Gävle, a residential town with 92,000 inhabitants, in the County of Gävleborg in the middle of Sweden.3 Nine per cent of the population are born in another country, compared with 13 per cent in Sweden as a whole. In the 1980s the amount of immigrants in Gävle started to increase with the arrival of refugees mainly from Iran and Latin America. During the 1990s they were followed by groups coming mainly from the Balkan countries. In the last few years the arriving immigrants have predominantly come from Iraq and Burma (6,M).4 Today people born in at least 153 different countries are represented in Gävle. Fifteen nationalities are represented with more than 150 individuals. The number of immigrants is increasing by approximately 200 persons per year (3,F). According to the local authority’s statistics the major national groups representing the Catholic Church and the three other world religions apart from Christianity in Gävle are: Chile among the Catholics, Iraq among the Muslims, Thailand among the Buddhists, and India among the Hindus. Methods, Sources and Timeframe The choice of methods and sources was motivated by the special character of the Swedish comprehensive welfare system. Advantage was taken of the possibilities given by the extensive organization and transparency of the Swedish public authorities’ administration, providing open access to extensive statistical resources. Initially a mapping was made of the minority situation at large in Gävle, their general access to welfare services, special activities for minority groups and their own associations. Informants in key positions with an overview of the situation at large in Gävle were used as sources of information, like public authority officials, journalists and representatives of religious communities. In line with the common guidelines in the WaVE project special attention was given to the presence of the ethnic Roma minority group and the religious minorities of Muslims and Pentecostals.   The Swedish case study was carried out by Per Pettersson and Ninna Edgardh.   When interviews are cited in the text, they are coded with an individual number for each interview followed by an indication of the interviewee’s sex (F=female, M=male). When there are two respondents in the same interview, they are distinguished with a number following the indication of their sex, for example (22,F,2). When the same part of the text refers to two different interviews, the references to the two interviews are separated by a semicolon, for example: (3,F; 6,M). 3 4

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Mapping the situation at large in Gävle had two purposes: 1. to get an overview of the general situation in Gävle; 2. to find one or two welfare contexts for in-depth study. In order to get close to concrete encounters between majority and minority groups to analyse values in practice, two local welfare arenas were selected: 1. a public school in an area of Gävle with a high degree of immigrants; and 2. the recently established Family Centre run by the local authority in cooperation with the Church of Sweden. The data used consist of written documents from local authorities and organizations, information on the Internet, newspapers, individual interviews and some observations. Thirty-seven individuals have been interviewed, 16 women and 21 men. Fifteen of the interviewees are people born in countries other than Sweden. The data was collected in the period from May 2006 to September 2007. This chapter is focused on the study of the school where interviews were conducted with nine individuals: 1. two male headmasters; 2. four teachers: a male mother tongue language teacher, a female mother tongue teacher, a female teacher in mathematics, natural sciences and language, and a female Swedish teacher; 3. a female school nurse. In addition to these seven adults we also had a short interview with two immigrant male pupils of about 12–14 years of age. Five of the interviewees at the school are immigrants: four Muslims and one Catholic. Findings at the School The selected school has 290 pupils and consists of three parts: two pre-schools with children 5–6 years old and one school with children 7–15 years old in school years 1–9. About 80 per cent of the children have a language other than Swedish as their mother tongue, which means that pupils with Swedish as their mother tongue are a minority and some school classes consist of only immigrant children. The largest groups of pupils are Kurdish, followed by Arabic speakers

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and Somalis, followed by different small groups of Thai, Burmese, Vietnamese, Africans and others (16,M). This diversity of languages can in itself become segregating and create barriers among the different groups. The school has a double strategy in handling language diversity. First, in order to support the development of mother tongue languages the school has a number of mother tongue teachers who regularly gather each language group of pupils for language training and support linked to the minority culture. Second, the school has set up rules that during the school lessons pupils have to speak Swedish and are not allowed to speak any other language. But in the breaks during the school day they are free to speak other languages. The teachers have however noticed that most pupils prefer to use Swedish as a common language also during the breaks. The school has a reputation of having succeeded well in handling the specific needs of immigrant pupils and managing value conflicts (5,F; 7,M; 20,M). Thus, the study was focused on the knowledge and experiences of the school, asking: in what areas do value conflicts arise in the school context? How does the school handle and solve these conflicts over values? What are the practical solutions? Are there any conflicts over values that the school has not been able to solve? The mother-tongue teachers were regarded as especially important since they also represent minority groups themselves. This was also confirmed in the interviews when they talked about their role and how they sometimes in practice were acting internally within the school as a kind of advocate for minority group rights. In their role helping and supporting the pupils to do their homework in different subjects in the school, they also showed to have a broad function of acting as cultural interpreters and mediators between the minority culture and the Swedish cultural context, One of the Swedish teachers stated: “We get a lot of help from our mother tongue teachers who work here, as bridges to the homes” (32,F). She mentioned especially their role in communicating the Swedish policy of gender equality saying, “when thinking about gender equality, in between boys and girls, an area in which we work a lot. It is a difficult area because the boys are often taught at home that they shall have the power, while the girls shall assist at home and do the cleaning” (32,F). She continued, “as teachers we are supposed to transfer certain values to the pupils, but they have other values brought with them from home which are their truths. We touch upon this all the time” (32,F). One of the mother tongue teachers confirmed this, saying that “I have a sort of responsibility also for the pupils’ development. The first part concerns teaching the children in their mother tongue language … and the other part is to help the children with different subjects in school. To be

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a support”. He further explained that he even acts as a religious interpreter from the minority culture perspective, and even as a religious teacher: I use to say to my pupils who are Muslims – most of them are Muslims, but some are Christians – this is what the Christians believe, but we believe like this, and like this, and like this. I think that is my responsibility to explain. Otherwise it will be problems at home … Thus, it is important that the pupils become aware of the differences between this culture and what our own culture says. We shall not lose our own culture, compensating it with other people’s culture. But we shall understand each other’s culture. (25,M)

According to the two interviewed headmasters the cultural mix at the school is generally working out smoothly and without any problematic conflicts. But they also stress that there are great cultural differences based on the different views, values and religion, which are clearly visible in the school’s daily life and have to be managed. One of the headmasters stresses that the issues and questions raised by children from non-Swedish cultures are often very different from the questions normally raised by Swedish children, in the way that religion plays a much more significant role among the immigrant children. “It can be religious questions, for example concerning Ramadan. The issues are very sensitive, for example in biology when discussing naked human beings that are posed. The children bring it up” (16,M). The headmaster mentioned that last week he had to handle a situation with a pupil who got very upset by another pupil’s view of God. The background was that a teacher during a lecture had used a metaphor consisting of a telephone call with God, without thinking that this would be problematic. A Muslim pupil reacted strongly against this way of describing God. But another pupil who is Christian defended the teacher by saying that the teacher was speaking specifically about the Christian God, not about the Muslim God. The Christian pupil argued that the Muslim pupil should not comment on this since the teacher was not referring to the Muslim God. According to the headmaster this way of talking about religion, a subject that is so sensitive and emotionally charged, is totally different from equivalent situations among Swedish pupils. The significance of religion at the school due to its multicultural situation is further stressed in interviews with the mother tongue teachers. They mention several areas in which values linked to religious belonging makes a difference in practical issues at the school. But they also stress that even if a majority of the pupils and their parents come from other cultures, where religion plays a more

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significant role in society than in Sweden, their religious involvement varies a lot. Only a minority within each minority group practise their religion in a strict way. According to the interviewees the majority of immigrants are more or less liberal and for about half of them religion plays no significant role (27,F; 33,M). Our interviewees mention a number of areas and situations in which value differences have been highlighted. Some value differences in between minority groups and the majority system have been easy to manage, while other differences have caused conflicts and called for negotiations. In many cases values linked to religion have caused discussion in a way that reveals tensions in between the cultures of different minority groups and the existing school curriculum, which is shaped by the Swedish majority culture. This majority culture is regarded by most Swedes as very secularized, but obviously many immigrants regard it as Christian and influenced by values that are different from the values that are integrated in their own religion. One Muslim representative said: “The culture in school has been to support the country’s religion, even if people in Sweden say that they are secularized and that there is freedom of religion. But I think that school books are imprinted by the old idea of people being Christian, even if this is not acknowledged” (25,M). Relationships between the Sexes A major area where there are differences in the views between Muslim pupils and the Swedish school system with its majority Christian background is the issue of relationships between the sexes. An important difference for many immigrants when arriving in Sweden is the Swedish practice of mixed school classes with boys and girls within the same classroom. Parents and pupils from a Muslim background are used to schools with classes separated by sex. However, the general practice of mixed classes has not been raised as a problematic issue at the school. But in the context of swim training there was a conflict in the spring of 2006 related to the Muslim tradition of division of the sexes. A few Muslim parents did not want their daughters to participate in swim training because it took place in a mixed group with both boys and girls. In Sweden swim training is part of the general obligatory school curriculum for all children. Upon the request of parents the headmaster decided to make an exception and permit the children to be exempted. When this decision was published in the local media it was criticized as an exception that was prohibited by the national school curriculum. Several articles in the local newspapers had headings such as: “The rules of the Imam direct the X-school”, “The word of the

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Imam is a fact at the X-school” and “Is it up to him to rule?” (Gävle Dagblad, 11 May 2006; Arbetarbladet, 12 May 2006; Gävle Dagblad, 12 May 2006). After a few weeks the headmaster withdrew the agreement to exempt the Muslim girls from swim training. In a new agreement that was accepted by their parents, the school arranged for the girls to have separate swim training. Another practical issue where special arrangements have been requested concerns showers in the context of sports activities. According to Muslim tradition, as expressed by parents and pupils, it is not allowed for an individual to show himself or herself naked to anyone else, not even to other individuals of the same sex. This has been solved by permitting Muslim pupils to shower with their underwear on, or to shower and change clothes individually when this is possible. Apart from sports and swim training, the most often mentioned school subject in which divergent values appear is biology. Immigrant Muslim and some Christian pupils and their parents have reacted negatively when drawings or artificial models have been used showing naked human beings as part of the teaching on the human body or teaching on sexuality. Sometimes these reactions have been so strong that the teacher has decided to use pictures of the human body without any genitals (16,M). This is a practice which has been accepted by the school, but is in conflict with the general Swedish majority values promoting an open attitude to sexuality as a natural part of human life. Not giving proper biological teaching on the human body can also be regarded as being in conflict with the school curriculum according to which teaching on sexuality is compulsory. Religious Festivals and Food The school has in different ways tried to adapt the intentions of the Swedish standard school curriculum to different cultural norms and the needs of minority groups. The previously mentioned cases of swim training and teaching in biology are two examples. Two other areas are religious festivals/holy days and school luncheons. The school has created an internal integrated calendar of the school year including all the festivals and holy days of the religions represented at the school. This is seen as a way to educate both the pupils and the teachers about the traditions present at the school and to pay equal respect to different religions. In practice this means that all the different Christian and Muslim holidays are noted in the school in an informative way, although not celebrated collectively. Thus, the school makes a general notice of the meaning of Ramadan,

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as well as of Christmas, for pupils of all religions. The school also allows pupils of different religions to be absent from school during their respective holy days, even if the school in its general planning follows the Swedish national calendar, which is rooted in the Christian tradition. In all public Swedish schools for children between 6 and 18 years of age, free school luncheons are served to all pupils. Thereby religious traditions and restrictions concerning food automatically become an issue in the Swedish school context. The wish for vegetarian food has existed for many years in the schools. But along with the increasing immigration of Muslims, the need for special meat and dishes without pork has increased and become an issue on the agenda. Thus the school presently also serves food according to the needs of Muslims, which is labelled “religious food”. Visits and Arrangements in Church Buildings The study at the school confirmed its image as being a good benchmark concerning the development of strategies and policy handling minority–majority value relationships. There was only one area in which the school was struggling. It concerns the common gatherings which take place within the framework of the Swedish culture and tradition, and implicitly or explicitly are linked to its Christian framework. The most frequently mentioned example of this kind of struggle is the celebration of the end of the school year (26,M; 33,M). In all Swedish schools the end of school year in the beginning of June is celebrated with a common gathering for the whole school with the singing of songs, a speech by the headmaster and often also by a Church of Sweden priest. This celebration often takes place in a local church building. The basic aim of having large gatherings at important occasions is that all pupils within the school should be present, manifest community and have a common experience. This makes it difficult to arrange separate alternative solutions for certain individuals or groups, without losing the whole idea of having a common gathering. Most Muslims have accepted the use of a church building and the presence of a priest but a few Muslim parents have reacted negatively. After some discussion on the increasingly multicultural situation, the end-of-school-year celebration was for the first time, in June 2006, arranged outdoors in the city park and not in the church. At the time of the interviews it was still an open question how this issue would be handled in June 2007. The headmasters said that before the

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decision, the pupils would be invited to state their opinion by voting for the different alternatives (32,F; 33,M). Another example of conflict is the celebration of the Santa Lucia day on 13 December when Christian songs are sung by choirs in almost all Swedish public contexts, such as in schools, hospitals, workplaces, public open spaces, etc. Most Swedes do not see this as a specifically Christian celebration, but more as a cultural tradition. But some of the Muslim pupils and teachers do not want to take part because they identify the Lucia celebration as a religious tradition in which they do not want to participate (25,M). They are then allowed to abstain from taking part. Even study visits in churches as part of the studies in Swedish history and culture have appeared problematic for some of the Muslim pupils, arguing that they cannot even enter a Christian church building. One of the teachers said: “The classes 4–6 planned to make a study trip to Uppsala to visit Uppsala Cathedral and look inside to see all things. It is like a cultural treasure, a museum. But the immediate reaction was that we can’t enter a church, we are Muslims” (32,F). The interviewed teachers and headmasters stress that they have to negotiate with the pupils, and sometimes also with parents, in order to find practical solutions when such conflicts of values are raised (16,M; 32,F; 33,M). They stress that they always try to find practical solutions through discussion and negotiation. Awareness of Needs, Negotiations and Practical Solutions The study at the school in Gävle shows that issues concerning certain needs of minority groups have become a major issue on the agenda along with the increasing arrival of Muslims in Gävle over the last 10 years. Almost all areas where conflicts of values have appeared in the school have been related to differences between the Swedish majority culture with its Christian roots and other cultures in which Islamic cultural values are strongly integrated. The major change in the schools’ awareness of the significance of religious and cultural value differences took place a few years ago when the children of a conservative imam were pupils at the school. The imam, along with a few other Muslim parents, asked for negotiation meetings with the headmaster concerning the special religiously related needs of Muslim pupils. The result of these meetings was a special agreement named “Advice and guidelines for the Muslim pupils at X-school, 2005” (Råd och riktlinjer för X-skolans muslimska elever, 2005). In

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this document seven areas of specific Muslim needs were described: the fasting period Ramadan, school vacations during religious festivals, food, showers/ swimming/sports, school camps/study tours, Christian and traditional festivals at the school, Muslim prayer times. The guidelines of this document were used only for a short time since it was withdrawn in 2006 when the possibility to be exempted from swim training was criticized in the media. Headmasters, as well as the interviewed minority representatives, stated however that the principles of the guidelines are so integrated in the school today, that a formal document is not needed. They saw the meetings with the imam and the agreement in a formal document as important steps in making all people at the school aware of the need for negotiations and compromises between the practices of minority groups and the general practices of the school. The headmasters stress that they see these issues as practical issues that have to and can be solved. They are related to values, but they concern practices and have to be handled as practical issues (16,M; 25,M; 33,M). Swedish Religious Normality in Change The study of value encounters at the school in Gävle demonstrates the typical character of Swedish cultural normality as seemingly non-religious, although it relies on a predominantly Christian heritage. In Swedish daily life religion is regarded as something that belongs to the private sphere and should not be exposed in public settings. Public arenas and public authorities’ activities should be secular and religiously neutral. This is taken for granted and by most people also regarded as being the reality. But the Christian implicit values are revealed when encountering cultures with different values. The normally hidden face of the Swedish majority religion especially comes to the surface at certain occasions. In these occasions, like the celebration of the end of the school year or the celebration of the day of Saint Lucia, the religious expressions are taken for granted by most Swedes and seen as most natural in public settings. At these occasions the religious Christian character is obvious for external observers from other cultures, but still hidden for most Swedes. Thus, there is one type of Swedish religious normality under “normal” conditions and a different religious normality under certain “abnormal” conditions, like end-of-schoolyear celebration and the Saint Lucia celebration. This shift of “normality” takes place without reflection for most Swedish people, but it is not surprising that

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people coming from other cultural and religious settings observe and react to these two divergent ways of handling religion in the public sphere. The study in Gävle gives a concrete example of the ongoing negotiations on values and thereby changed practices in Swedish public arenas. This type of negotiations and changes is driven by increasing religious diversity and take place in everyday life at the local level, thereby forming future Swedish society as well as European society at large. References Andersson, D. and Sander, Å. (eds) (2005) Det mångreligiösa Sverige. Ett landskap i förändring (Multireligious Sweden: A Landscape in Change). Lund: Studentlitteratur. Arbetarbladet, 12 May 2006. Bäckström, A., Edgardh, B. and Pettersson, P. (2004) Religious Change in Northern Europe: The Case of Sweden. Stockholm: Verbum. Berglund, J. and Larsson, G. (eds) (2007) Religiösa friskolor i Sverige (Religious Private Schools in Sweden). Lund: Studentlitteratur. Church of Sweden statistics (2011) Kyrkan i siffror 2011 (The Church in Numbers 2011). Uppsala: Svenska kyrkan. Available from: www. svenskakyrkan.se/default.aspx?id=645562 [accessed: 30 August 2011]. Ekstrand, T. (2002) Folkkyrkans gränser. En teologisk analys av övergången från statskyrka till fri folkkyrka (Limits of the Folk Church: A Theological Analysis of the Transition from State Church to Free Folk Church). Stockholm: Verbum. EU FP6 call (2005) EU 6th Framework Programme Priority 7: “Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge Based Society”, research Area: 7 “New forms of citizenship and cultural identities”, topic 7.2.1: Values and religions in Europe. Activity Code: FP6 CITIZENS-2004–5. Date of preparation: 22/04/2005 16:57. Brussels: European Commission. Gävle Dagblad, 11 May 2006. Gävle Dagblad, 12 May 2006. Nämnden för statligt stöd till trossamfund, SST. Utbetalda statsbidrag under 2009 (Swedish Commission for Government Support to Faith Communities, SST. Distributed Subsidies during 2009). Stockholm: Nämnden för statligt stöd till trossamfund. Available from: www.sst.a.se/bidrag/utbetaldastatsbidr ag2009.4.8c40fa126730d3c5b800026659. html [accessed: 30 August 2011].

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Råd och riktlinjer för X-skolans muslimska elever (2005) (Advice and Guidelines for the Muslim Pupils at X-skolan). Gävle: X-skolan (with regard to the pupils’ and teachers’ integrity the school’s name is kept secret). SFS 1998:1591 Lag om Svenska kyrkan (The Church of Sweden Act). Stockholm: Sveriges riksdag. Sigurdson, O. (2009) Det postsekulära tillståndet: religion, modernitet, politik (The Post-secular Condition: Religion, Modernity Politics). Göteborg: Glänta produktion. Skolverket (2012) Skol- och förskoleverksamhet i kyrkan eller annan religiös lokal. Juridiska anvisningar, granskade februari 2012 (School and Pre-school Actvities in Church Buildings or Other Religious Premises. Legal Advice, examined February 2012). Stockholm: Skolverket. Available from: www. skolverket.se/polopoly_fs/1.162944!Menu/article/attachment/Skolan%20 och%20kyrkan%20120302.pdf [accessed: 15 March 2012]. Zuckerman, P. (2008) Society without God. New York: New York University Press.

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Chapter 11

Hijab Street Fashion and Style in Oslo

1

Inger Furseth

Introduction The past decades have witnessed a growing popularity among young Muslim women born and raised in the West to cover, which has led to debates. On the one hand, many opponents claim that women cover because they are forced or pressured by their families and religious leaders. Some feminists also claim that the hijab represents oppression of women (see Hoodfar, 1993). On the other hand, several proponents argue that it represents more complex issues related to identity, and in some cases, political statements (Shakeri, 2000). The debate tends to centre on why some Muslim women choose to cover. It is however important to stress that many Muslim women do not cover. Many are not practising and several practising disagree with the idea that covering is mandatory in Islam (Furseth, 2011; Moors, 2009, Read and Bartkowski, 2000). American and European research show that the reasons Muslim women give for covering vary and are complex. This chapter attempts to further this research by studying the sartorial practices of covered Muslim women in Oslo. The starting point is the variation in street fashion and style among hijabi women here. The question is what this style means for those who use it and what it symbolizes. I want to explore different street fashions and see to which degree the women use their style to draw boundaries between Muslim and non-Muslims, and between different groups of Muslim women. It will also explore the relationship between boundary work and gender identity negotiations. In the following, I will first provide an outline of previous research and the theoretical perspectives employed here. I will, then, look at Muslim dress and fashion, before I turn to data and analysis.

1   Originally published in Norwegian in Journal of Sociology (Sosiologisk Tidsskrift) No. 1 2004. www.idunn.no.

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Previous Research Several empirical studies from the United States show that Muslim women have complex motives for covering and that they vary locally. While several covered women in Los Angeles use the hijab to assert and maintain their Islamic identity in a non-Muslim context (GhaneaBassiri, 1997: 108–116), Muslim women in Austin, Texas report that they also cover because it provides them with a protection that enables them to go to college and work alongside men (Read and Bartkowski, 2000). Young hijabi Muslims in Chicago reveal that religious obligation is important, in addition to peer pressure, insulation from parental control, and the desire to make a fashion statement (Williams and Vashi, 2007). Arab girls from Detroit say that the hijab is as much a fashion statement as a religious statement (David and Ayouby, 2002: 140). European studies also show that women have different motivations for covering. A study from Oslo points out that some women relate the hijab to religious piety, as well as individual rights to practice religion and not be discriminated in the workplace ( Jacobsen, 2011: 195–197). A study from London shows that fashion and faith interact among Muslim women who use the hijab to symbolize a modern, global, Muslim identity (Tarlo, 2007, 2009). Muslim women in the Netherlands also link religion and fashion, and highlight their individual freedom to cover (Moors, 2009). These studies suggest that the meanings Muslim women attach to the headscarf vary. Some studies focus on the use of the hijab to draw symbolic boundaries between different groups. Bartkowski and Read (2003) found that practising Muslim women in Texas drew religious boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims, but that they drew few boundaries between Muslim women with and without hijab. Another study from Los Angeles, which compared Muslim covered and uncovered women, found, however, that the hijab was used as a symbol to draw boundaries between the two groups and was related to inclusion and exclusion in the Muslim community. At the same time, the hijab was a contested symbol (Furseth, 2011). This chapter will attempt to extend these findings by focusing only on women who cover. By using symbolic boundary theory, I want to analyse the strategies hijabi women use to make distinctions between Muslims and non-Muslims, and between different groups of Muslim women.

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Symbolic Boundaries and Gender Negotiations Symbolic boundary theory is a form of status group theory. There is a long tradition for studying social and symbolic boundaries in the social sciences (Lamont and Molnar, 2002). In studies of ethnic variations, concepts of “boundaries” have been important. Social anthropologist Fredrik Barth (1969) claims that ethnic groups are not predefined collectivities who share a given culture, but they are formed by creating and sustaining boundaries towards other ethnic groups. His relational approach has been influential in research on ethnic identity formation. Studies of social and collective identity also emphasize the effects of different boundaries on individual and collective strategies of mobility. Social psychologists Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner (1986) claim, for example, that when a social group experiences threats to its social identity, individuals in the group will tend to stress the group’s positive features by outlining the negative features of outsiders (Tajfel and Turner, 1986: 16–17). While Barth is more concerned with the context of boundaries, Tajfel and Turner understand social categorization to be universal processes. Barth, Tajfel and Turner see boundary work as a result of threats to the position of the group. For them, the interests and emotions of the individuals constitute the basis for boundary work, rather than the collective processes whereby a group defines and redefines another group (Lamont and Molnar, 2002: 175). They are more concerned with the interpersonal processes around boundary work, in contrast to the cultural sociological approach used here, which looks at the content and the interpretive dimensions. This chapter uses Michéle Lamont’s symbolic boundary theory (1992). Lamont draws upon Pierre Bourdieu’s idea that shared cultural style reproduces social class (Lamont, 1992: 181). In Distinction (1986) Bourdieu discusses how symbolic classifications reproduce social class privileges. Dominating groups use categories of taste and cultural practices to legitimate their superior status. Their power is demonstrated in their domination over categories of perception. Those who are dominated tend to diminish themselves and their own perceptions. Through their habitus, or cultural dispositions, individuals define social class boundaries. One of the weaknesses in Bourdieu’s work is that he primarily looks at boundaries related to cultural capital and social positioning. In Lamont’s study of French and American upper classes, she finds several forms of boundaries, such as socio-economic, cultural and moral (Lamont, 1992: 181). Bourdieu also assumes that different cultural practices are ranged in a hierarchy, while Lamont finds that some symbolic boundaries are stronger than others, and that they vary

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with time and place. Cultural boundaries have, for example, greater significance for the reproduction of social class in France than in the United States. Bourdieu assumes that individuals emphasize moral values in order to improve their social position, while Lamont finds that high moral status is often valued in and of itself (1992: 184). Lamont’s analysis of different forms of boundaries makes her work relevant for a study of Muslim sartorial practices, since the hijab is associated with a specific religious tradition. It is important to analyse these practices based on an understanding that takes religion seriously and does not reduce it to an expression of social positioning. Lamont and Molnar (2002) define symbolic boundaries as “conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space. They are tools by which individuals and groups struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality” (2002: 168). Symbolic boundaries are conceptual maps that people draw between themselves and others, but they are not entirely individual. People use the general cultural repertoires that are available to them in their context and symbolic boundaries exist at the intersubjective level. When they are widely agreed upon, they can become social boundaries, which exist as groupings of individuals and form patterns of social exclusion, social class or racial segregation. When people engage in boundary work, they use general definitions of value traits that appear to have a rule-like status (Lamont, 1992: 27). Power is an important aspect of symbolic boundary work. The Muslim headscarf is a social practice which is given religious and cultural meaning because there are religious elites who claim that covering is a sign of religious piety (Read and Bartkowski, 2000: 397; Roald, 2001). According to Bourdieu’s theory, the hijab is reduced to an expression of the domination of religious elites, and covered women are victims of “symbolic violence” (Furseth, 2009). Lamont (1992: 177–179) criticizes Bourdieu’s idea that cultural differences automatically have to do with dominance and hierarchy, and claims that not all forms of boundary work are useful in producing hierarchies. She finds, for example, that those who draw strong moral boundaries in France relate perceptions of sovereignty with lack of morality and humanity (1992: 177, 179, 184). It is an empirical question if symbolic boundaries produce hierarchies, exclusion and inequality. Only in situations where boundaries are not contested will they shape the interactions significantly. Even if different Muslim institutions are important for boundary work on the basis of norms for how Muslim women should dress, the hijab is a contested symbol which is interpreted in different ways by Muslims (Furseth, 2011; Christiansen, 2009; Williams and Vashi, 2007;

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Ajrouch, 2004; Read and Bartkowski, 2000). Using symbolic boundary theory is therefore useful in a study of the cultural and religious categories covered Muslim women use when they describe themselves and other women with hijab. Gender structures social life according to accepted notions of femininity and masculinity. Once women participate actively in religious institutions, present themselves in the media as Muslim women or actively engage with the public by posting blogs, they must negotiate their gender identities in light of religious doctrines regarding proper gender relations (Read and Bartkowski, 2000; Brasher, 1998). All the world religions have patriarchal doctrines and traditions, but interpretations of gender based on religious doctrines vary and are shaped by social context. Studies of younger Muslims, born and raised in the West, show that even if they must relate to the patriarchal features of religion, they find various avenues for obtaining change ( Jacobsen, 2011; Williams and Vashi, 2007; Ajrouch, 2004). The women in this study do not relate to religious discourse only, but they must negotiate other dominating discourses on what it means to be a young woman in a Norwegian context, where beauty, a slim and fit body, a fashionable style, a good education and job, and good prospects to get married and have a family give status ( Jacobsen, 2011; Mühleisen and Røthing, 2009; Frønes, 2011). Throughout this chapter, I will attempt to connect how Muslim women’s dress and interpretations of different forms of style frame their different strategies for gender negotiations. Muslim Dress and Fashion It is common within different world religions that women and men wear headgear and other covering garments. The concern here is Muslim dress for women and, in particular, the hijab. The word “hijab” has several meanings (Roald, 2001: 260–263). In the Qur’an, it was used for a blanket hung by men to separate the wives of the Prophet and Medina’s men. In the Qur’an, the ideal of decency applies to women and men, but in the texts Fiqh and Hadith, which came later, there are ideas that women should cover the entire body, except the face, hands, and feet. Later, the word “hijab” was used about women’s headscarf. The expression “Muslim dress” implies more than the headscarf. There are regional variations in traditions and language. Burqa is a full covering, often used by women in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Chador is a long robe, open in front, common in Pakistan and Iran, whereas jilbab is a long robe used in the Middle East, similar to abaya, used by women in North Africa and the Middle East. Niqab is a face veil used in the Persian Gulf and the West (Furseth, 2011).

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Muslim dress for women in the West refers often to hijab, which covers the hair, the neck and the ears, but leaves the face open, combined with other garments, like abaya or typical Western clothing, such as jeans and tunic. Muslim fashion emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. While American and European style of dress was adopted by the urban middle-class in the Middle East during the first half of the twentieth century, the Islamic revival movement in the 1970s represented a shift, and a growing number of Muslim women began to cover (Haddad and Lummis, 1987). The style was often dark, simple and austere, and was meant to represent piety (Mahmood, 2005), political statements, or a desire to do away with fashion. In the 1980s and 1990s, more fashionable styles emerged, which led to a greater variety of Muslim dress styles and colour, especially among younger, middle-class women (Moors, 2009). In the 1990s, the rise of Islamic fashion took place in Turkey, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Iran and Malaysia. The global market for Muslim fashion has resulted in a commercial fashion industry with fashion shows, magazines and catalogues. Numerous web stores are selling Islamic fashion, where Muslims in Europe and America are two of their target groups (Moors, 2009; Jones, 2007; Lewis, 2009; Sandikci and Ger, 2007; Navaro-Yashin, 2002). In Europe and the United States, Islamic fashion came around the turn of the millennium. In the 1990s, migrants and their descendants tended to be defined, and defined themselves, with respect to ethnic or national background as Arab, Pakistani, Persian, Turkish and Moroccan. Muslim dress tended to reflect the ethnic and cultural background of the woman wearing it. After 9/11, they began to be defined, and often defined themselves, based on their religious identity. Islamic fashion in Europe and the United States emerged in this context. The difference between traditional Muslim dress style and fashion is not clear-cut, but the new style is more global in character and not necessarily connected to specific ethnicities. It is inspired by traditional Muslim style, as abaya and hijab, but they are produced and used in new ways, often inspired by international fashion trends (Lewis, 2009). The Muslim fashion seen on the streets of Oslo, London and Los Angeles is inspired by fashion trends in Cairo, Dubai or Kuala Lumpur. It is communicated via Muslim fashion shows, magazines, blogs, YouTube tutorial videos, Facebook groups, and in online shopping catalogues. Studies suggest it is popular among urban, well-educated, young Muslim women (Moors, 2009; Tarlo, 2009, Jones, 2007; Moors and Tarlo, 2007). Young Muslim women in Norway and elsewhere have also begun to create their own fashion, drawing on international as well as local styles and trends. One example is The Fashion House of Badr, which was founded by two sisters,

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Susan and Nafeesah Badrkhan, trained in costume design and fashion design. In 2008, they launched their own line of haute couture head-coverings geared to Muslim women in Scandinavia. Their designer hijabs were shown at several fashion shows and exhibited at Oslo City Museum (Oslo Bymuseum), often with newspaper coverage (Aftenposten, 2008; Dagsavisen, 2009). Another example is the online store Niya, formed by two sisters with a flair for fashion who design and sell their own clothes (www.niya.no). Young Muslim women who are anxious to keep a “cutting-edge” style are turning to an ever-expanding number of blogs on this topic. In 2008 came a Norwegian blog with the name The Hijablog (http://thehijablog.com). Imaan Ali from Oslo is not the only Muslim woman who blogs about style in Norway. Other blogs address fashion in addition to other issues, as for example The Life of Muslima (http://lifeofmuslima.blogspot.com) and Mrs.Xhaferi (http:// missxhaferi.blogg.no). Issues of Muslim clothing are also discussed on a number of Norwegian websites, as for example Islam.no, which is the major website on Islam in Norway, and Desi.no, a website for minorities in Scandinavia with a background from the Indian subcontinent (www.desi.no). These examples demonstrate how Muslim fashion is a phenomenon in Norway, and here I want to take a closer look at the style of younger Muslim women in Oslo. Research Questions and Data As noted, the new trend in Muslim fashion is that younger women are mixing techniques from all over the Muslim world with styles that complement their Western clothing (Lewis, 2009; Moors, 2009). Is this also the case for younger Muslim women in Oslo? Since Muslim fashion, as it is presented in fashion magazines, catalogues and YouTube, shows pictures of women with some form of hijab, this study is limited to what I here call “hijab street fashion”, that is, the style of hijabi women. Muslim women without hijabs or non-Muslim women can also be inspired by Muslim fashion trends, such as a tunic or dress over tight jeans. What characterizes the style of younger women with hijabs in Oslo? When these women talk about the hijab, which meanings do they attach to their practices and styles? How do the women use their style and their interpretations of Muslim female dress to draw symbolic boundaries? And how are the different boundaries related? Finally, the chapter will explore the relationship between boundary work and gender negotiations.

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This chapter is based on an analysis of various sources of data: first, in 2011–12, interviews were conducted with 10 younger Muslim women from Oslo. They were contacted in stores, at the campus of University of Oslo, and during a meeting in a mosque in Oslo. The women were between 19 and 38 years old, with an average of 25. They were relatively well-educated: one was a PhD student, three had an MA, two a BA, two were BA students, and one was a high school student. With the exception of two, the women were born and raised in Oslo with one or two immigrant parents or grandparents. This sample represents a relatively resourceful group of younger, covered Muslim women, and does not in any way represent all Muslim women in Oslo. In addition, I talked to a group of six covered women after a mosque meeting, and most of them do not participate in the interviews. Detailed notes were taken after the meeting, and they are used here. The original data exist in Norwegian, and all the quotations are translated by the author. In addition, I asked the women who were interviewed and the women at the meeting if they would pose for illustrative photos, but they declined. Second, I also analysed The Hijablog. Imaan Ali was not the first to blog on Muslim fashion, but she was perhaps the first in Scandinavia. The Hijablog got a lot of attention in the media, first in the Guardian and the Star (UK), then in The Toronto Star (Canada), and later in Norwegian daily newspapers (Dagbladet, Aftenposten, Nettavisen), radio (NRK, Radio Norge, Østlandssendingen), TV (Waschera, “I kveld”, “Studio 5”), and popular women’s magazines (HENNE (2008) and Det Nye (2009)). Here, I have analysed what Ali said on her blog and in the media interviews, as they appeared from around 2009. The Hijablog has been updated lately and I have been in touch with Ali via email. She studies abroad and thinks that Muslim fashion has improved since she started blogging. I asked the interviewees if they had seen The Hijablog, which none had. Since it is a relatively long time since the media featured the blog, the younger women have missed it. Even if the blog has little influence on the interviewees, I chose to include it, since Ali was the first to blog and discuss Muslim fashion in Norwegian media. Even if the sample is small, the data are suitable to study boundary work and negotiations of gender identities among different groups of covered Muslim women. The findings are tentative, and more research is needed in this area. Drawing Various Forms of Symbolic Boundaries The following analysis explores the style of the women in the sample. The analysis will be structured according to four different types of symbolic

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boundaries found in the material. Symbolic boundaries are analytical categories that are used to detect central themes. They are not mutually exclusive and the women engage in several forms of boundary work. In the analysis, I will include narratives of women whose style depicts particular Islamic aesthetic styles. The names of the women are fictional and the descriptions of the dress styles are used to better understand the symbolic boundaries they draw. The meanings the women attach to their style are emphasized. The chapter also explores the different ways in which the different types of boundaries are related to each other and to negotiations of what it means to be a Muslim woman. Religious Boundaries All the women I interviewed emphasize that they wear the hijab for religious reasons. When I ask them to tell me how they began to cover, their narratives centre on religious turning points and motives. Similar “hijab stories” in connection with a return to Islam are also found in another study of Muslims in Oslo ( Jacobsen, 2011: 306). Zahra’s narrative is an illustrative example. Her parents came from Pakistan years ago and she was born and raised in Oslo. Today, she is a married woman with an MA, who works full-time in the health and social services. During the interview, Zahra wears a silk turquoise tunic over pants and a grey sweater. Her thin, grey hijab with small turquoise flowers matches the colours of her outfit. The scarf is tightly wrapped over a headband, pinned down, and hangs loosely in front. She wears light eye make-up. Zahra prefers to have one hijab to every top, which means that she has about 150 scarves at home, or only 80, if she excludes the Pakistani dupattas. She tries to follow fashion to a certain degree, so the colour of the hijab is affected by the current trends. The only colour she dislikes is black, because many people associate black hijabs with a form of Islam she dislikes. Zahra ties her hijab in different ways, depending upon the occasion. When she is off work, she lets the outer scarf hang a little looser. When she dresses up, she pulls the scarf back, wears earrings and puts on more make-up. When Zahra was in her teens, she developed an interest in her family’s Muslim tradition. As her parents were unable to answer her many questions, she lost interest in Islam, and began to study other religions. 9/11 became a turning point, because many non-Muslim friends began to question her about Islam. By studying a Norwegian translation of the Qur’an and learning through friends

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what Islam represented, she became more practising. She also asked people about the hijab: I asked everywhere about the hijab. I wrote teachers and asked them. I could not begin with the hijab unless it came from my heart. At first, I did not dare. I was afraid people would look down at me. All of a sudden, I made up my mind. I got a lot of opposition from my family. They were worried what society and family would say. My mother worried that no one would want to marry me.

The reason she began wearing is that she was convinced that the idea of covering came from her religion. The other women also emphasize religious motivations. A well-educated convert says: “This is something I should do. Religion is the reason … Hijab is one of many things you do”. A Pakistani woman in her late thirties says that “it says so in the Qur’an”, and a young Norwegian-born woman with parents from the same country says that “if God has said that women should cover, I should cover … It is a duty for me”. While several women talk about obedience and duty, Zahra emphasizes inner convictions. When I ask her if she began to cover in order to be obedient to the prescriptions in Islam, she responds: “No, because of love of God”. For her, covering is not related to obedience to an external source of authority, or a duty to act in spite of her own desires, but it is related to the subjective self and its relationship to the deity. Even if covering is based on perceptions of what the religious prescriptions to Muslim women are, these prescriptions must be understood as something that evolves from the self, or “from the heart”, as she says. Here, she draws on a common discourse among Muslim and nonMuslim youth, where the subjectivity of each individual constitutes the basis for reflections on meaning and morality ( Jacobsen, 2011: 309–311; Furseth, 2006; Frønes and Brusdal, 2000). Some women combine obedience to Islamic prescriptions and inner emotions. The significance of the inner self may explain why the women who were interviewed did not talk about women who do not use the hijab, whether these are Muslim or non-Muslim. This finding may be related to the interview situation, since I am not Muslim, but it may also be related to the significance of subjectivity for the women. When starting to cover is related to the inner self, there is room for other women to have different convictions and emotions. The women use dress style to present themselves in public as Muslim women. In this way, they draw boundaries between themselves and a non-Muslim majority. This form of boundary work is contested by parts of this majority

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in different ways. Several women tell stories of different forms of attacks and discrimination they have experienced because they donned the hijab. A woman in her early twenties of Iraqi background tells me that a middle-aged, ethnic Norwegian man spat at her on the street. A Pakistani woman in her late thirties reveals that a man threw food at her when she walked down the street, holding the hands of her child. One woman, who wears abaya and a niqab, reveals that a middle-aged, ethnic Norwegian man cornered her outside a store and tried to pull off her clothes. The women also tell stories of verbal attacks. Yet another woman was fired from her job because of her hijab and only got it back after contacting a lawyer. Similar incidents are reported in another study ( Jacobsen, 2011: 197). These women also explained to me why they did not want to pose for illustrative pictures for this article: “I don’t want to identify myself in the media and risk being targeted for something negative”, one said, and the others nodded. In light of these narratives, the religious boundary drawn versus the nonMuslim majority is strong, which means that donning the hijab in Oslo requires and represents more than the expression of an aesthetic Muslim self. The strength of the religious boundary may explain why the young women often meet opposition against donning the hijab from parents, who are either worried about what “society and the family will say”, or that the daughter’s chances to get married will be limited, as Zahra remembers. This finding is supported by another study (Williams and Vashi, 2007). Since this sample is a specific category of hijabi women, namely relatively well-educated women, the opposition from family may be related to the family’s status and social aspirations on behalf of their daughters. It is reasonable to assume that the women in this sample have largely been raised in families who value education in order to secure the daughter’s place in the middle class. In such a situation, the hijab is seen as a hindrance, because it may stigmatize the daughter as a religious minority and make it difficult for her to obtain social mobility. The opposition may also be related to fear for the daughter’s safety, as one woman says. Her parents were afraid that she might be attacked on the street if she donned the hijab, which as we have seen is a reasonable fear. If the sample had consisted of women with fewer resources, it is reasonable to believe that the narratives would have included issues of parental and social pressure to don the hijab. Some women reveal that there is peer pressure to cover, and that this comes from girlfriends. One student in her early twenties tells that her school friends began to cover in seventh grade and that “I wanted to be a part of it”. Another woman in her late twenties with a BA and full-time job in the health and social services says that she knows of “several women who wear the hijab to be

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part of the group of girlfriends”. This often happens at schools where the majority of female students are covered. The significance of girlfriends in donning the hijab is also found in other studies (Furseth, 2011; Williams and Vashi, 2007). The women in this study draw religious boundaries on the basis of convictions and devoutness. By wearing the scarf they demonstrate that they have knowledge of Islam and what they understand to be religious prescriptions for Muslim women, and that they are observant Muslims. Their religiosity is based on reading the sacred texts and has evolved within the inner self. It is, therefore, connected to their identities in fundamental ways. The covered women find themselves in a context where different and contradicting norms of what they should do come from friends, family and the non-Muslim majority. The choice to don the hijab can to some degree be viewed in light of the importance of girlfriends for younger women. Moral Boundaries The narrative of Fadime, a woman in her early twenties whose parents migrated from Iraq, illustrates how some women draw moral boundaries based on women’s looks. Fadime is a petite student, who wants to become a Qur’an teacher. During the interview, she is dressed in a long, slim black abaya. She tells me that she dislikes wide abayas, like many Somali women wear, and that she has to shop online to get this type. Fadime wears a white headband with a grey scarf wrapped tightly around her face, with an additional soft pink scarf wrapped around her neck. Fadime wears no makeup and she prefers her hijabs to be in solid colours, like black, brown, grey and dark blue. She shops for her scarves at the mainline store Cubus, because they are so large that they will “almost cover the entire body”. No bling and no loud colours. In her narrative, Fadime emphasizes moral boundaries by drawing attention to the kind of life she used to live before she began to cover: I began with the hijab one and a half year ago. I was raised in a liberal atmosphere, where my parents thought I should learn by my own mistakes. My mother is not very religious. I used to party and drink like other teenagers. I didn’t think I could enjoy myself with a hijab. About two years ago I started to get more Muslim girlfriends and I noticed how happy they were. A hijabi girlfriend stayed overnight and asked me: “What are you waiting for?” I thought about her question all night. When she put on her hijab the next morning, I just put one on, and since then, I have covered.

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Fadime’s style reflects her view that “the hijab should hide your beauty and make you invisible for men”. She feels that neutral colours and lack of make-up fulfil this function. If she is going to a party and has put on make-up, she will cover by using a niqab, because “I don’t want to show my beauty to anyone else than the one I will marry”. By covering her beauty from the gaze of men, men reciprocate by giving her status and respect: “Wearing the hijab gives me more respect from men. Boys who previously would whistle when I walked by, now lower their gaze when they see me. This makes me feel much better”. Fadime draws moral boundaries within the Muslim group by expressing her dislike for the following style of Muslim dress: I get upset when I see hijabs with short tops, tights, and the behind showing. It is your responsibility to carry the hijab in your heart. Hijab is not to cover your hair, but to cover your body and your beauty. I don’t like Spanish hijabs, showing the neck. Some girls tie the scarf behind the neck and use earrings. I don’t.

Other women share Fadime’s view on Muslim dress. A Norwegian-born student in her early twenties of Middle Eastern background says: “Why spend time making myself beautiful for others? It’s a growing pressure to be beautiful. I want to emphasize what I have in my heart, not the outer shell”. The well-educated convert mentioned above claims that she covers for morals reasons: “[Wearing the hijab] is related to the view of sexuality in Islam. Sexuality belongs to the private … The most important aspect [of the hijab] has to do with sexuality, to hide my body, to manage sexuality”. Her style and use of color support her view. She wears long tunics over wide pants and a long-sleeved top. Her hijab is tightly wrapped, so that part of her chin is covered, and she wears no make-up. The long scarves cover most of the upper body. Although she prefers bright colors and likes the scarves to match her outfits, she stays away from red, since red is “a sexual color”. “You don’t have to be ugly, but modest, in order to avoid sexual beauty. You can be modest without being sexual”, she concludes. For her, the hijab and the Muslim dress desexualize women, which is something she desires. In an interview by a local Norwegian radio station, Østlandssendingen, in August 2008, Ali agrees that modesty is important: “I just think you must dress modestly” (Østlandssendingen, 2008). However, she disagrees that Islamic dress desexualizes women: “There is nothing wrong with being beautiful, but you must not be beautiful in the wrong way. You must not necessarily be attractive in a sexy way. Tight, see-through clothing, for example, is not acceptable hijab”.

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The women in this study draw moral boundaries on the basis of women’s looks. The reason that modesty is important is implicitly related to male sexuality. By keeping their beauty “private”, sexuality is managed and kept within the framework of marriage. When women argue that the hijab is a protection against the male gaze, the responsibility for taming male sexuality is placed upon themselves. This seems to be a responsibility many women interviewed here accept. The moral boundaries are largely related to religious boundaries. During the interviews, the moral boundaries appear when the women attempt to explain and justify the religious prescriptions, as Ali does in a radio interview: I use the hijab first and foremost for religious reasons … The most important difference is if you wear it for Islam or not … The hijab is not just a headscarf. There is lots of symbolism in that headscarf … It does not say specifically in the Qur’an that one should cover the head … I don’t think personally that you must cover your head in Islam. I just think you must dress modestly. (Østlandssendingen, 2008)

Here, Ali emphasizes the religious reasons for the hijab. By saying that “The hijab is not just a headscarf. There is lots of symbolism in that headscarf ”, she points to the transformation that takes place when a material object, a scarf, is imbedded in religious meaning. At the same time, she stresses the underlying moral meaning of the headscarf. For her, the hijab is not a sign of obedience to Islamic prescriptions, but it is to dress modestly that is required in Islam. Even if the moral boundaries are related to the religious boundaries, the moral boundaries seem more porous than the religious ones. The women largely disagree on where the moral boundaries should be drawn and what is acceptable hijab. They use dress style to draw different moral boundaries among themselves. Some think that the clothing should not be too snug, and others think that this is acceptable. Some claim that you should not let your earlobes show and wear earrings, and others think this is OK. Some prefer that the Muslim dress desexualizes women, and others argue that this is to go too far. You can be attractive, just not “in a sexy way”. The women largely agree that the cover is related to morality, but they disagree where to draw the moral boundaries, and the moral boundaries are subject to contestation, debate and negotiations. Cultural Boundaries The women in this study also draw cultural boundaries, primarily on the basis of ethnicity. A traditional way of dressing for women and men of Pakistani

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descent is to wear colorful shalwar kameez, characterized by a long tunic over wide pants. The women complete their shalwar kameez by wearing a dupatta (a long scarf loosely thrown over the head and shoulders). Most of the younger women who were interviewed dislike these traditional styles, and opt for a more contemporary global style. The only exceptions are during holidays or celebrations, where traditional clothing is more common. Hajra is in her late twenties and tells me that her grandparents migrated from Pakistan. She is single, has a BA, and works full-time in the health and social services. She is career-oriented and studies part time. Hajra became a practising Muslim when she was a student and started to cover about a year ago. As her father is “non-religious”, he was so angry with her that he refused to speak to her for almost a week. Hajra is dressed in light summer slacks, a white long-sleeved top, and a white and turquoise tunic. Her headscarf is made of thin cotton in turquoise and pink pastels with silver threads, which matches her outfit. The scarf is wrapped tightly around her face and pinned on top of her head. She likes the hijab to be a little high in the back. Hajra learns to tie her scarf from the Internet, from countries she visits, and from Pearl Daisy, a British Muslim fashion online store. When she attends a wedding, she wears more shiny fabrics, like silk. And when she works out in the gym, she wears a sports hijab, a knitted cotton tube that covers her hair and neck. For Hajra, it is important to follow fashion trends and dress nicely. She insists that her clothing should follow Islamic prescriptions as she understands them, and cover the arms, and the tunic should be somewhat long. Hajra rejects long abayas and black clothing. These outfits should be used in Muslim countries, where they represent the acceptable dress code, so she wears them when she visits these countries. For her, it is important that her dress style fits into the society in which she lives: Wearing abayas and black clothing in a Western country only scares people away and makes them oppose you. This is not the intention. You must dress nicely to attract people, not to scare them … By following fashion, people around you see that you watch your style and dress nicely.

Hajra draws boundaries against more ethnic and cultural styles of dressing in a Norwegian context, because it defines the Muslim woman as “the other” in public. By following fashion, she demonstrates visibly that she is a Muslim woman from Oslo. Other women agree with Hajra. Fadime points out that there is a difference between the ways she covers and the ways in which women

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with shalmar kameezes cover: “Dupatta is culture, and not hijab”, she says. The “ethnic” scarves that reveal hair symbolize “culture”, whereas the tightly wrapped hijabs that show no hair symbolize a true and authentic Islam. Perhaps the most important boundary Ali draws in The Hijablog is cultural. This boundary is drawn on the basis of ethnicity, taste and ideals of beauty: “Some Muslims say that I should not use the hijab as a fashion statement, but this is related to culture and does not have anything to do with religion” (Dagbladet, 2008). Ali presents herself in the media as a young, modern Norwegian Muslim woman. She ties her hijab according to the global “Spanish style”, where the scarf is tied at the back of the neck, while the neck is covered by wrapping the scarf in front. The colours are bright and fun, and she claims that this style is rooted in early Islam: “There are no restrictions on color … At the time of the Prophet, as today, women used colorful dress” (Det Nye, 2009). When black is used, the style is sophisticated, and the purpose is to get “a more professional look”, she says, implying that this outfit is for the professional middle-class woman. The women who were interviewed, and Ali, draw cultural boundaries by distinguishing culture from religion. Cultural boundaries are, then, related to religious boundaries. Young Norwegian Muslims have searched for a more authentic form of Islam, free from the norms and practices of the parental generation, often based on an essentialist understanding of culture and religion ( Jacobsen, 2005, 2011: 366). The discourse on authentic Islam takes place in the United States and Europe, and is related to the emergence of a distinct form of American Islam and Euro-Islam, where many want to create new identities as American Muslims (Williams and Vashi, 2007; Peek, 2005), European Muslims (AlSayyad and Castells, 2002), and Norwegian Muslims ( Jacobsen, 2005: 162). The cultural boundary work in which the women in this study engage must be viewed in light of this development. Their style is meant to symbolize an authentic form of Islam not connected to any specific cultural tradition. Generational Boundaries The women also draw generational boundaries, as they compare their own hijab style to headscarves used by older women. This symbolic boundary is closely related to the cultural boundary. Nadia is an illustrative example. She is born and raised in Oslo and her parents are from Pakistan. Nadia is a pharmacy student in her late teens. She began to cover after she had gone on umrah (pilgrimage to Mecca that can be undertaken at any time of the year) about four years ago. As

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many Nordic women, Nadia wears black a lot. She says that all of her hijabs are black, because it looks good on her. She wears a black scarf with small stripes of silver, which she has pulled back so that her earlobes and silver earrings show. A white scarf is wrapped around her neck. Nadia wears a little mascara. She has tight jeans covered by a white tunic. For Nadia, Muslim dress means that women should cover. She dislikes hijabs where the neck shows, but the clothing can be either tight or loose. When I ask her what type of hijab she dislikes, she describes what she labels “auntie type of hijab”. This style is made by triangle scarves that are tied under the chin, often worn by Afghani and Turkish women. She also describes other headscarves she dislikes: The loosely wrapped scarves or dupattas are typical for older women. If a wear a loose scarf like that, my friends say I look like an old woman. Younger women wrap the scarves in their own way, where the hair doesn’t show. It’s a more global style.

Other women also draw generational boundaries based on style. For example, Zahra shares Nadia’s dislike for hijabs tied underneath the chin, and so do some of the other interviewees. Fadime says that older women tend to wear wide dresses or shalwar kameez and they seldom wear the Middle Eastern abayas. If and when they do, their abayas are wide and not slim. Generational boundaries based on ideals of beauty are recurrent themes on The Hijablog and in the interviews Ali gives to the press. She contrasts the “auntie-like, boring hijabs” in Oslo in 2006 with the “totally different” hijabs she observed in Egypt, worn by “younger women” (Nettavisen, 2009). Under the heading “Hijab street fashion & personal style”, Ali shows pictures of hijab styles from all over the world. The outfits are termed “funky”, “cute”, “rocking” or an “explosion of colors”. The emphasis on “colors” and “fun” reveals a playful approach to Muslim dress, where the individual Muslim woman can draw on different styles and be creative. Her engagement in boundary work is also demonstrated in the categories “Funnies” and “Hijab not”. Here, the outfits are termed “scary”, “not fashionable”, “weird”, “ugly”, “not hot”, “a big crime” and “strange”. She concludes that “hijab has become fashion for modern, young women, both in the West and the rest of the world. It is about matching faith and identity, while also being modest and play with dress and colors” (Det Nye, 2009). Ali presents Islam as a religion where there is space for the subjective self to be creative and experimental when it comes to the feminine body.

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The resourceful women who participated in this study demonstrate that they are different from their mothers in several respects. They are better educated and plan to be or already are full-time professional women. They draw cultural and generational boundaries by comparing “aunt-like, boring hijabs” and their style, characterized by tightly wrapped scarves and more snug-fitting clothing, whether these are tunics, abayas or jeans. They fuse different styles, combining the hijab with contemporary fashion and transforming traditional Muslim style from different parts of the world. Conclusion This chapter has attempted to detect different criteria that a small sample of young, well-educated covered women in Oslo use to define and discriminate between Muslims and non-Muslims, and various groups of Muslim women. In order to identify these criteria, this chapter analyses different forms of symbolic boundaries or various types of lines the women draw when they categorize other hijabi women. Here, dress and fashion signal the keys to evaluative distinctions. The analysis of the interviews and the blogger Imaan Ali reveal that they actively engage in boundary work where they use Muslim dress to negotiate between different perceptions of what it means to be a Muslim woman. By drawing selectively on fashion styles found in various parts of the world and in Norway, they use dress to craft identities. Some women attempt to modernize more ethnic styles of Muslim dress, while others use Western style clothing, which they combine with various styles of hijab. These women draw different forms of symbolic boundaries. First, they draw religious boundaries, where they seem to have a certain level of agreement with what they understand to be Islamic prescriptions for women. By adhering to the Muslim dress code, they demonstrate to the non-Muslim public as well as to fellow Muslims that they understand these prescriptions and accept them. The women also draw moral boundaries on the basis of moral character. The moral boundaries are closely related to the religious ones. The analysis also shows that the women draw cultural boundaries against traditional, ethnic styles of dress. The cultural boundaries are related to religious boundaries, as they are connected to the discourse on authenticity and Islam. Finally, the women draw generational boundaries. They dislike “auntie hijabs” and admire the “global hijab- and tunic style”, which is a definite form of boundary work. The cultural and generational boundaries are closely related. The symbols used to draw boundaries between

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ethnicity and generations versus a more global, Muslim identity, are visible and subtle, but still open for individual expressions. In the data used here, the religious boundaries are strong and inform the other symbolic boundaries, in particular the moral and cultural boundaries. The women agree that the hijab primarily symbolizes religious belonging. This shows that studies of symbolic boundaries should include religious boundaries, in addition to moral, cultural and socio-economic ones, which Lamont (1992, 2000) fails to do. Religious boundaries may be important in and of themselves and inform other boundaries. It is to be noted, however, that the strength of the religious boundaries in this study might be related to the sample, since all the women who were interviewed wore hijab. If the sample had included un-covered Muslim women, the disagreements would have been far greater and the religious boundaries more contested. In this sample, the moral, cultural and generational boundaries are more porous than the religious boundaries. The women disagree where the moral boundaries should be drawn and what is “acceptable hijab”. The cultural and generational boundaries are connected to discourses on culture and religion, but they also demonstrate that the hijab is connected to other societal factors, such as the global fashion industry. The cultural and generational boundaries are open and experimental, and subject to contestations, debates, taste and emotions. Bourdieu’s (1986) idea that individuals emphasize moral values to improve their social position is only partly useful in a study of the hijab. On the one hand, it is reasonable to assume that the hijab gives the women more status and improves their positions in some Muslim milieus, in particular among the hijabi girlfriends. On the other hand, the costs of drawing boundaries versus the non-Muslim majority are relatively high, which seems to explain the parental opposition. Hijab is in many ways a “hyper visible” symbol (Lewis, 2009: 81). Either a woman wears a hijab or she does not. By engaging in this form of social practice, she demonstrates her religious identity to everyone she meets. She is easily stigmatized as “the religious other”, which can give her less status outside some Muslim milieus. The narratives show that these women are situated in a context where Islamic fashion trends are communicated through the Internet, in fashion magazines, stores, through their friends, and on the streets of Oslo. Here, I have only analysed the subjective boundaries the women draw. I have not discussed the role religious institutions, such as mosques and Muslim associations, have in communicating norms for how Muslim women should dress. What is communicated about women’s dress, and who within this institutional context do so, the imams or

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the leaders for the women’s groups, or both? There is a need for more research in this area. The women in this study are exposed to peer pressure from girlfriends to cover, and pressure from parents and parts of the non-Muslim majority to reject the same garment. As these women engage in boundary work, and use dress to negotiate what it means to be a Muslim woman in Oslo, they navigate the social milieus by stressing their own agency and the importance of the inner, subjective self that chooses to cover. By drawing on contemporary Norwegian youth culture, these women bring together their religious orientations with their sense of style that is typical for their generation. References Aftenposten (2008) Sisters design head-coverings, Norwegian-style. Available from: www.aftenposten.no/english/local/article2567441.ece [accessed 23 August 2010]. Ajrouch, K.J. (2004) Gender, race, and symbolic boundaries: contested spaces of identity among Arab American adolescents. Sociological Perspectives 47(4): 371–391. AlSayyad, N. and Castells, M. (2002) Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam. Lanham: Lexington. Barth, F. (1969) Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Bartkowski, J.P. and Read, J.G. (2003) Veiled submission: gender, power, and identity among Evangelical and Muslim women in the United States. Qualitative Sociology 26(1): 71–92. Bourdieu, P. (1986) Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. R. Nice. London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Brasher, B.E. (1998) Godly Women. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Christiansen, C.C. (2009) Islamic fashion, media debates and styles of interaction – sartorial strategies on the Copenhagen scene. Paper for AHRC Diasporas, Migration and Identities Programme/CRONEM Conference, 11–12 June, Guildford, UK. Dagbladet (2008) Norske kvinner har mye å lære. Available from: www.kjendis. no/2008/08/05/542696.html [accessed 23 August 2010]. Dagsavisen (2009) Hodepineplagg på utstilling. Available from: www.dagsavisen.no/kultur/article398819.ece [accessed 23 August 2010].

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David, G. and Ayouby, K.K. (2002) Being Arab and becoming Americanized: forms of mediated assimilation in metropolitan Detroit. In Y.Y Haddad and J.I. Smith (eds), Muslim Minorities in the West. Walnut Creek: AltaMira, pp. 125–142. Det Nye (2009) Jenter i hijab: Fanger & fashionistas. Available from: www.klikk. no/mote/detnye/article467570.ece [accessed 17 January 2013]. Frønes, I. (2011) Moderne barndom. Oslo: Cappelen. Frønes, I. and Brusdal, R. (2000) På sporet av den nye tid. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. Furseth, I. (2006) From Quest for Truth to Being Oneself: Religious Change in Life Stories. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. Furseth, I. (2009) Religion in the works of Habermas, Bourdieu and Foucault. In P. Clarke (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 98–115. Furseth, I. (2011) The hijab: boundary work and identity negotiations among immigrant Muslim women in the Los Angeles area. Review of Religious Research 52(4): 365–385. GhaneaBassiri, K. (1997) Competing Visions of Islam in the United States. Westport: Greenwood. Haddad, Y.Y. and Lummis, A.T. (1987) Islamic Values in the United States. New York: Oxford University Press. Henne (2008) Hipp med hijab. November/December. The Hijablog (2009) Available from: http://thehijablog.wordpress.com [accessed 23 August 2010]. Hoodfar, H. (1993) The veil in their minds and on our heads: the persistence of colonial images of Muslim women. Resources for Feminist Research 22(3/4): 5–18. Jacobsen, C.M. (2005) The quest for authenticity: Islamization amongst Muslim youth in Norway. In J. Cesari and S. McLoughlin (eds), European Muslims and the Secular State. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 155–168. Jacobsen, C.M. (2011) Islamic Traditions and Muslim Youth in Norway. Leiden: Brill. Jones, C. (2007) Fashion and faith in urban Indonesia. Fashion Theory 11(2/3): 211–232. Lamont, M. (1992) Money, Morals, and Manners. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lamont, M. (2000) The Dignity of Working Men. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

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Lamont, M. and Molnar, V. (2002) The study of boundaries in the social sciences. Annual Review of Sociology 28: 167–195. Lewis, R. (2009) Veils and sales: Muslims and the spaces of post-colonial fashion retail. In R. Phillips (ed.), Muslim Spaces of Hope. London: Zed Books, pp. 69–84. Mahmood, S. (2005) Politics of Piety. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Moors, A. (2009) Islamic fashion in Europe: religious conviction, aesthetic style, and creative consumption. Encounters 1(1): 175–201. Moors, A. and Tarlo, E. (2007) Introduction. Fashion Theory 11(2/3): 133–142. Mühleisen, W. and Røthing, Å. (eds) (2009) Norske seksualiteter. Oslo: Cappelen. Navaro-Yashin, Y. (2002) The market for identities: buying and selling secularity and Islam. In Y. Navaro-Yashin (ed.), Faces of the State. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 78–113. Nettavisen (2009) Karita er for fokusert på å være sex. Available from: www.nettavisen.no/innenriks/article2545017.ece [accessed 23 August 2010]. Østlandssendingen (2008) Er ikke galt å være vakker. Available from: www.nrk.no.nyheter/distrikt/ostlandssendingen/1.6166439 [accessed 23 August 2010]. Peek, L. (2005) Becoming Muslim: the development of a religious identity. Sociology of Religion 66(3): 215–242. Read, J.G. and Bartkowski, J.P. (2000) To veil or not to veil? A case study of identity negotiation among Muslim women in Austin, Texas. Gender & Society 14(3): 395–417. Roald, A.S. (2001) Women in Islam. London: Routledge. Sandikci, Ö. and Ger, G. (2007) Constructing and representing the Islamic consumer in Turkey. Fashion Theory 11(2/3): 189–210. Shakeri, E. (2000) Muslim Women in Canada: their role and status as revealed in the hijab controversy. In Y.Y. Haddad and J.L. Esposito (eds), Muslims on the Americanization Path? New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 129–144. Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1986) The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worschel and W. Austin (eds), Psychology of Intergroup Relation. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, pp. 7–24. Tarlo, E. (2007) Islamic cosmopolitanism: the sartorial biographies of three Muslim women in London. Fashion Theory 11(2/3): 143–172. Tarlo, E. (2009) Visible Muslim: Bodies of Faith. Oxford: Berg. Williams, R.H. and Vashi, G. (2007) Hijab and American Muslim women: creating the space for autonomous selves. Sociology of Religion 68(3): 269–287.

Chapter 12

Religiousity and Ethnicity: Vietnamese Immigrant Religion in Denmark Jørn Borup

Introduction The close relation between religion and migration is by no means a new phenomenon. Since the dawn of the discipline of history of religions, it has been at its very core to understand the changing religious worlds, where migration of people, ideas and practices quintessentially manifest religion as a human and cultural product in and across time and space. Focusing on migration as movement from one geographical area to another is thus one important approach to go beyond essentialist ideas of mono-cultural and mono-religious identities. However, historical parallels cannot explain away the fact that the relation between religion and migration has become even more important in the frames of modernity and globalization. The boom of recent years’ migration research (Vertovec, 2007: 962) is thus not coincidental, and it is natural that most research on religion has been conducted in the fields of sociology and anthropology of religion, relating also to other concepts such as diaspora, transnationalism, pluralism and acculturation (Cohen, 1997; McLoughlin, 2005; Kumar, 2006; Carnes and Yang, 2004; Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2004; Alba et al., 2008; Vertovec, 2004; Bauböck and Faist, 2010). The dynamics of religion and migrating cultures is encapsulated by focusing on the metaphor of routes rather than roots (Clifford, 1997). That religion has become a significant topic in recent years’ migration research indicates not only that the approach has absorbed and gone beyond univocal secularization theories but also, as has been suggested within the field of Asian American studies, that former Marxist, post-colonialist and feminist theories’ apparent bias against religion (Min, 2002: 6) no longer have

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undisputed authority. Also recent years’ focus on immigration has helped to counterbalance the tendency within social studies to explain religion and religious differentiation solely in terms of social contexts by acknowledging also the significance of culture and ethnicity. Ethnicity is naturally not a given frame of reference, but as Fredrik Barth suggested (Barth, 1969), best understood as a subjectively chosen and thus negotiated affiliation to an ethnic group demarcated from other groups. Ethnicity is an important part of migrant identity in acculturation processes, and a Danish think-tank survey concluded that ethnicity was the single most important factor in explaining differences of values and norms between the Danish ethnic majority and the ethnic minorities (Think Tank for Immigration and Integration, 2007). Empirical investigations in contemporary pluralist contexts in general have challenged former assimilation models, where ethnicity (but in an American context not religion) was seen as a relic to be overcome. Ethnicity is often the most important signifier to distinguish types of religion in the West, where “foreign religion” is practised by different segments, as has often been documented by empirical research on the so-called “two Buddhisms” (Numrich, 2003). On the other hand, while the relation between religion and ethnicity religion has different emphasis among different groups (Hammond and Warner, 1993; Yang and Ebaugh, 2001; Min, 2005, 2010; Hirschman, 2003; Foner and Alba, 2008), it is often the case that religion is the most important element in demarcating ethnicity (Casanova, 1994; Christiano et al., 2008: 153), and the relations between religion and migration is generally an important topic also for future research (Cadge and Ecklund, 2007). Two important concepts in understanding lived religion (as opposed to or supplementing theological religiosity) and migrant religion are “culture religiosity” and “ethnic religiosity”. The former can be used to describe when “religion affords a sense of personal identity and continuity with the past even after participation in ritual and belief has lapsed” (Demerath, 2000: 127). In this way, culture religiosity is the (often unconscious) acquisition of traditional religion in a relatively homogeneous and mono-religious society. Ethnic religiosity, however, can be used to describe when religion is seen as distinct from other ethnic groups and their religions and cultures in a multicultural and multireligious society. While the two concepts often overlap, it thus seems to make more sense to place culture religiosity on a vertical axis going back in time within the same religious tradition and ethnic religion on a horizontal axis, relative to other (ethnic group) religions. In diaspora, religion as an ethnic identity marker can be used to (re-)create and (re-)invent the social and narrative space of which

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it was a natural part in the country of origin as culture religiosity. In the West, where religion often has a separate function and constitutes a more specific domain, ethnicity can thus play a more or less significant role, depending on both the political and cultural environment of the host country and the acculturation strategies of the migrants. It is thus an interesting question to ask to what extent ethnicity matters to the different religions. While it is natural in Europe to focus primarily on Near Eastern migrants and the religion of Islam simply because these are the quantitatively dominant “others”, political agendas among grant giving authorities and ideological stances among scholars should not be ignored. In Europe, “immigrant religion is viewed as a problematic area” (Foner and Alba, 2008) whereas in the United States, “religion has often been overlooked because it is not seen as a problematic area for immigrants” (Foner and Alba, 2008: 360). Combining the often ascribed honour of Asian immigrants being “well-adapted” (Caplan et al. 1991; Bankston and Zhou, 1996; Kibria, 2002), and thus not problematic enough to get attention and research grants, with a general tendency of seeing religion as a problem, it is no surprise that the study of Asian immigrant religion in the United States has been generally underprivileged (Min, 2002: 5) and, in Europe, very sparse. One particular group that has generally been well represented in many Western countries is the Vietnamese, and research on refugees from Vietnam and their migration history has had some scattered, scholarly attention, as have the topics of culture and religion.1 The Vietnamese are interesting in a migration context, not least because they share the same ethnic2 and geographical origin and simultaneously are represented by (at least) two distinct religions. The object of this chapter, based on a broader research project on the Vietnamese in Denmark (Borup, 2011; Borup and Ahlin, 2011),3 is to compare the religiosity and the role of ethnicity of Christians and Buddhists. While acknowledging the general importance of ethnicity and religion of the Vietnamese in Denmark, it is argued 1   Adam (1995) on Vietnamese in Australia; Baumann (2000) (Germany); Borup (2005, 2011) (Denmark); Dorais (2005, 2007) (Canada); Rutledge (1992), Zhou and Bankston (1994) and Caplan et al. (1991) (United States), Rönnqvist (2009) (Sweden) and Valtonen (1994) (Finland). 2   The majority of the Vietnamese immigrants are viet kinh (“Vietnamese people”), who also in their homeland identify themselves as ethnically distinct from both the Montagnards (“mountain people”) and those with an ethnic Chinese origin (hoa). The latter two groups in Denmark are too few to be treated statistically separately, and are thus not part of the survey responses in this project. 3   The research project was funded by the Danish Research Council and included participant observation, interviews with 27 people and a survey with 236 usable answers to the questionnaire consisting of 36 questions (Borup, 2011: 165ff.).

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that ethnic identification and religiosity varies distinctively between the two religious groups and that there is a close relation between ethnic orientation, socialization and religious engagement. Boat People and Immigrants The photo of 3,000 Vietnamese refugees cramped together on the large Danish ship Clara Mærsk appeared in the news and spread as a good story from afar. It has since been part of Vietnamese self-understanding and a living stereotype of the “boat people”. When the last helicopter had escaped from the American embassy on 30 April 1975, a new regime in a united country was about to write history after “the fall of Saigon”. One of the consequences of this history was the persecution of American-friendly citizens, religious leaders and people obstructing the new Communist era. In the following years, from 1975 until the mid-1980s, half a million Vietnamese escaped in different waves to the West and to other Asian countries. Some intended to take refuge in a temporary diaspora, but reality forced especially the subsequent generation to identify as “Overseas Vietnamese” (viet kieu) living permanently abroad. Most of them wished to go directly to the United States, but quite a few ended up in Europe, especially because of the international agreements on quotas. Denmark received 4,000 Vietnamese refugees during this period, primarily from 1980 onwards. In 2011, the number of people of Vietnamese origin totals almost 14,000, corresponding to 3 per cent of the immigrants from non-Western countries. Half of them came here as refugees, the rest are descendants or came through the family reunification programme; 71 per cent of them have Danish citizenship. There are an equal number of men and women, but a large majority (83 per cent) are below the age of 50. Four Buddhist monks and four Catholic priests serve the 3,000 Buddhist and 3,000 Catholic members of the religious communities and an even greater number of individuals (up to 8,000 Buddhist and 5,000 Catholic “users”) at festivals and rites of passages in the six Buddhist temples and the eight Catholic churches that have Vietnamese masses.4

4   While religious demography in itself is a challenging endeavour, the counting of members and users of Asian religions is notoriously difficult. The above-mentioned figures are based on a comparison between Vietnamese and other Western estimates and will be further described in Borup (forthcoming).

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Ethnic Identification One of the stories told at sea and on arrival in the new homelands was that, in order to become truly Western, you had to convert to Christianity. Some did while others found other assimilation strategies by using the indigenous saying that “in a ball you must be round, in a tube you must be long”, which is the Vietnamese equivalent of the phrase “when in Rome, do as the Romans”, meant to express the need to adapt to circumstances. Despite being a minority among the minorities, the Vietnamese as a distinct ethnic group have through combined efforts been able to create, in Danish society (and most Western societies), a general positive image as “model immigrants” (Borup, 2011: 9–10). The Vietnamese are known to make no problems, they are educationally successful, they are well integrated into the labour market, they generally have trust in the society, they are hardly ever represented in crime statistics, they never claim religious or cultural privileges, and although being from the other side of the globe, they generally share Danish values. In other words, there seems to be a consensus, also in Denmark, that they are the perfect “silent other”. That the majority of refugees wish to remain (86 per cent) and be buried (80 per cent) in Denmark can be taken as an indication that they have taken root in Danish soil. Being a challenge to traditional values, the increasing identification of the younger generation as individuals from a value system honouring individualism can be seen as yet another sign of successful acculturation. Successful economic integration, however, does not necessarily parallel ethnic identification, or what could be termed “cultural integration” (Martikainen, 2005). Among Vietnamese in Denmark, there is a clear ethnic orientation towards Vietnameseness. No less than 60 per cent of the respondents in this survey felt mostly Vietnamese. For the majority, identity is thus associated with their country of origin. Such cultural belonging is even further accentuated by a general tendency to marry someone from within the same ethnic group, to find acquaintances and housing among other Vietnamese and to speak the Vietnamese language. Among the Vietnamese, even activities such as membership of social and cultural networks, as a method for potentially “bridge building social capital” (Putnam, 2007), are predominantly focusing on Vietnamese culture (Borup, 2011: 67–68). Ethnicity is thus generally an important factor of identification and orientation among the Vietnamese. Controlling for other variables, the tendency is less significant. Education and age play a role, and the well educated and young tend to be more oriented towards

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either Danish or hybrid cultural belonging.5 The most significant variable, however, is socialization. While a third of those who are born in and/or have lived the first 12 years of their lives in Denmark experience more affiliation with Denmark, the same is applicable for less than a tenth of those who are born and raised in Vietnam. If born and raised in Denmark, affiliation and identification with Danish culture is thus significantly higher. Ethnicity and socialization therefore seem to be important factors for individual and cultural orientation. The question is now how these are related to religion. Religion and Ethnicity Religious Diversity in Vietnam Like most of East Asia, Vietnam has for centuries been a multi-religious country. Especially the imports from China of Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism and their syncretic cooperation as the “three traditions” (tam giao) have been localized as indigenous Vietnamese religion and culture.6 Ancestor worship is practised by most Vietnamese, manifesting a symbolic relation between physical and cultural roots, which many, as expressed by one person, consider as the “real Vietnamese religion”. That such metaphysical symbols of tradition and origin can also be transferred to other diaspora contexts underlines their significance. As in other East Asian countries, ancestor worship has been integrated and institutionalized by Buddhism. Buddhism was a Chinese import from the second century, and especially the Mahayana Buddhist groups in both monastic and lay oriented versions were integrated into Vietnamese society to such an extent that Mahayana Buddhism has today achieved the status of being the typical “default religion”: “Almost all Vietnamese feel they are Buddhist, if they are not something else” (Matthews, 1992: 66). 5   Education was not a variable investigated in this survey, but in the representative survey on ethnic minorities in Denmark by the Think Tank for Immigration and Integration (2007). Age and generation conflicts in this project were expressed especially in interviews. While parents are worried that their children get “too Danish”, the young generation is worried about having to live up to the standards and expectations of adjusting to Vietnamese values, such as the ideals of being a good daughter, wife and mother. 6   It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss whether and how Confucianism is a religion or not. As a free-floating phenomenon, it has had tremendous influence in Vietnam and Asia, being used for political legitimation and critique of everything from social breakdown to the threat from the West (Taylor, 2002: 430).

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Christianity, almost exclusively identical to Catholicism, has a shorter history in Vietnam. Although it has to some extent also been “Confucianized” (Taylor, 2007: 47) and nationalized, it is still considered as a foreign religion, related to seventeenth-century French missionaries and Western colonialism. Despite its attempts to identify acculturation strategies and foster Catholic “inculturation” in a local context, Catholicism has never achieved Buddhism’s role of expressing “Vietnameseness”. That the ratio of Christian Vietnamese immigrants in the Western countries is generally higher than that of Christian Vietnamese in Vietnam also indicates the segmented migrant population and the historical context behind the escape from the homeland. Christians were mainly situated in South Vietnam, where the majority escaped from, and they were the main target of the Communist regime due to both their foreignness and their strong insistence on religion. Ethnic Religiosity in Denmark The ethnic element in the religious life of the Danish people of Vietnamese descent is clearly marked in several contexts and configurations. Though both Buddhism and Christianity claim to be world religions with a global appeal, they share the characteristic of ethnicity. They have their own services in Vietnamese, and almost all attendants for rituals and religious arrangements are Vietnamese, as is the mono-ethnic group of members. Even if they share their religion with other ethnic groups, there is a definite ethnic division into “parallel congregations”. Numrich (1996) termed this concept after observing a general tendency among Buddhist groups in the United States to remain ethnically (and religiously) divided. The “two Buddhisms” also exist in Denmark (Borup, 2008), and although having and actively working with the theologically sanctioned ideal of acculturation, the Danish Catholics experience a similar division. Vietnamese culture is symbolically expressed especially in the Buddhist temples, where yellow and red are not only the colours of the pre-Communist flags, but also the dominant colours of the buildings and the typical Chinese-Vietnamese Buddhist interior. The temple in Aarhus is a splendid example of a building displaying such exotic and Oriental authenticity that several ethnic Danes have passed the temple asking themselves whether this was an amusement park or an Asian restaurant. Catholics celebrate cultural festivals organized by the Vietnamese Catholic Culture Association, just like the Buddhists are organized in the Vietnamese Buddhist Culture Association. However, Catholics also join the celebration of the Vietnamese New Year (tet) at the Buddhist temples, which confirms the generally accepted assumption that the Buddhist temples

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and Buddhist religion typically express Vietnamese culture in a way that Christianity does not. That the Christian church is a religious building and the Buddhist temple is (also) a cultural institution correspond with the responses to the question asked about motives for going to church/temple. Almost a third of the Buddhists and less than a fourth of the Christians marked “important as Vietnamese”, while half of the Christians and only a fourth of the Buddhists marked “experience something sacred”. Differences between the two religions are consciously acknowledged among the Vietnamese themselves. “The relations between Catholics and Buddhists are a tabooed topic”, said one informant, jokingly telling that, at certain festive occasions, stereotypes and suppressed taboos could sometimes be voiced, followed by conflicts. Institutionally and in practice, the two religions are kept distinct, also with regard to cultural and social arrangements. There also seems to be an interpersonal distinction based on religiosity. While there is a general trust in other people and especially people belonging to one’s own religion, Buddhists do not trust the Christians, and Christians do not trust the Buddhists.7 A Christian stereotype about the Buddhists is that they are too relaxed about their religion, while Buddhists consider the Christians to be too strict and even fundamentalist about their religiosity. The latter is experienced not least in interreligious marriages, where it is very often demanded that the Buddhists convert to Christianity.8 Religious Identification, Belief and Engagement While there is interaction but also a general sense of distinctiveness of the two religions and their adherents, it need not follow that this differentiation is reflected also in religiosity. Measuring religiosity across different religions is naturally a task demanding some caution, especially when one of the religions is the one upon which most definitions of “religion” is based, namely Christianity. It should therefore be no surprise that also the Vietnamese diaspora version of Catholicism is more typically “religious” than the Vietnamese diaspora version of Buddhism. On the other hand, both religions are world religions with much   88 per cent of Buddhists trust other Buddhists, and 92 per cent of Christians trust other Christians, one-third of the Buddhists had little trust and one-quarter do not trust at all in Christians, and one-sixth of the Christians had little trust and one-sixth no trust at all in the Buddhists. 8   There are no statistics about conversion, but conversations with the Vietnamese make it plausible to suggest that eight out of 10 Buddhists marrying a Christian convert to Christianity. 7

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theology and lived religion in common, and comparison across boundaries is sometimes necessary in order not to end up in isolated particularism. For one thing, if presumed differences in religiosity thus turn out not to be significant, it could indicate that ethnicity or other variables are more important than religion in immigrant perspectives. For another, if expected differences are actually found, it would at least suggest that religion and religious affiliation are also relevant in a diaspora context. It should here be noted that the survey responses and most interviews in this project stem from religious settings. They are therefore not generally representative of Vietnamese, but are from a focused group having (some kind of ) affiliation with the religious institutions, and thus expected to actually be (somewhat) religious. If we first look at how the Vietnamese respond to the whole question of religiosity, significant differences appear. Apart from religious affiliation (as either Buddhist, Christian, atheist or other), half of the Christians compared to only one-fifth of the Buddhists identified as “religious”. In interviews, several Buddhists explained that Buddhism to them was rather a spiritual path or a way of life than a religion. “It does not matter if you are religious or not, as long as you are a decent person” was one such comment, typically expressing Buddhist ideals. Differences in religious identification and practice are generally significant, which is clearly expressed in the responses to the questionnaire, also beyond conceptual and definitional boundaries. Thus, while all Christians marked their religious affiliation as “Catholic”, there was less agreement among Buddhist answers (with the expected “Mahayana” being one of the possible choices). Fifteen per cent marked “don’t know”, and two-thirds did not even answer the question. More Buddhists than Christians found it legitimate to affiliate with more than one religion, and twice as many Buddhists (44 per cent) agreed to the statement “One can be religious without going to church/temple”. Christians are more “moral” than Buddhists, especially when responding to questions of private morality, including homosexuality, abortion and divorce. Christians pray more often than Buddhists; more Christians than Buddhists: 1. believe their central figure (God/Buddha) to be directly involved in their daily life; 2. have had a religious conversion; 3. have become more religious during the last three years; 4. have been brought up with religion; 5. attribute greater importance to ritual celebrations; and 6. think religion ought to have a greater role in society.

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Nine out of ten Christians and three out of four Buddhists think it important to bring up children religiously, and while two-thirds of the Christians believe or strongly believe, this is the case for only one-third of the Buddhists, of whom 22 per cent actually claim to be non-believers. Sixty-four per cent of the Christians attach great importance to belief in everyday life, while the figure for the Buddhists is 39 per cent, and one-quarter of the Buddhists find it not very important or not important at all. While three out of four Christians attend church every week, this only applies to one out of four Buddhists, and as opposed to the Buddhists, only one person from the Christian response group claimed to only attend church once or a few times a year. If combining church/temple attendance with time spent on religious activities in general, an index shows a significant difference between the two groups. Eighty-eight per cent of the Christians thus have a high or relatively high degree of religious practice, while the same figure for the Buddhists is only 51 per cent. Combining religious practice with religious belief (based on whether one believes in life after death and the continued existence of ancestors) and attitude (based on questions about importance of religion, belief and religious upbringing), also a more general index of religious engagement shows significant differences. Christians are significantly more religiously engaged than the Buddhists, more than half of whom have a low level of engagement. Table 12.1

Religious engagement in relation to religion (in percentage)

Religious Engagement

Religion

Total

Buddhist (n = 106)

Christian (n = 70)

High

30

40

34

Medium Low

18 52

44 16

29 37

100

100

100

Total

According to another representative survey, the differences are even more significant. Based on the above index, 65 per cent of the Christians and only 8 per cent of the Buddhists can be said to have a high level of religious engagement.9

9   These figures are based on the raw data of the general survey from the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs’ Think Tank, the results of which were published in Think Tank for Immigration and Integration (2007).

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These differences are confirmed in other countries10 and point to the fact that the Vietnamese diaspora religion is very diverse according to type of religion and religious affiliation. It would be plausible to argue that this is caused by the theological and organizational differences between the religions. Especially the Catholic version of Christianity has a high degree of “dogmatic authority” (Smith, 1970: 75), being typical of “maximal religion” (Lincoln, 2003: 59) with its stronger organizations demanding exclusive commitment of its therefore more engaged members (Stark, 1997; Hirschman, 2003: 26). Buddhism, on the other hand, and especially in its Mahayana lay version, is in many ways much “softer” as typical “minimalist religion” (Lincoln, 2003: 59), where too little insistence on exclusiveness in a diaspora perspective can turn out to be a “Buddhist handicap” (Tamney, 2008). The Vietnamese Catholics can thus be described as being very religious and the Buddhists not very religious. Or, the differences can be explained as reflecting typological distinctions between, on the one hand, a typical Western, monotheistic, exclusivist church and doctrine oriented religion and, on the other hand, a less typical and less temple and doctrine oriented religion, typically of Asian, pluralist and inclusivist origin. In this sense, Buddhists are more typically “culture religious” in the sense that they are closely related to, but not personally engaged in, believe in or institutionally belong to the religion of the homeland.11 Religion, Religiosity and Socialization Does this then mean that Buddhists in Denmark are also more typically “ethnic religious”, in the sense that they consider ethnicity to be an important aspect of the religion, as distinct from other ethnic groups and their religions? In other words, are Buddhists more ethnically oriented than Christians? According to this survey, this does not seem to be the case. More Christians (77 per cent) than Buddhists (55 per cent) feel primarily as Vietnamese, while a third of 10   Pfeifer (2001) and Beyer (2010) on the Vietnamese in Canada, Hughes (2010) on the Thai Buddhists, Kwon (2003) on the same differences amongst Koreans in the United States. 11   Parallel examples also suggest Buddhism’s “culture religiosity”. In Canada, “very few of our participants from Buddhist backgrounds were in any sense ‘involved’ in Buddhism” (Beyer, 2010: 20), but “the Buddhist sub-sample shows a rather high correlation between religious orientation and ethno-cultural origin” (Beyer, 2010: 23), having “what one might call a ‘secularised lay’ orientation to their religion” (Beyer, 2010: 25). The “weak” religiosity of Buddhists was also shown in a survey from Thailand, where only 32 per cent of the Buddhists, compared to 80 per cent of the Muslims and 60 per cent of the Christians, “said religion had a strong influence on how they lived” (Hughes, 2010: 140).

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the Buddhists and only 14 per cent of the Christians feel both Danish and Vietnamese. The picture is the same if we broaden the concept of ethnicity to include the ethnicity of parents, friends and ideal partners. While one out of five Buddhists are oriented towards Danish ethnicity, this only applies to one out of 10 Christians. The same tendency of a difference between adherents of the two religions seems to appear when we look at other variables: more Christians than Buddhists: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

more often speak Vietnamese; have Vietnamese in their social circle; think their children should marry other Vietnamese; are in associations with clear ethnic or religious relations; have less trust in other people; and wish to bring up their children in Vietnamese tradition.

These significant differences could be explained from the differences between “strict” and “soft” religions and the different emphasis placed on religion and ethnicity as more (Christian) or less (Buddhist) bounded categories and identification fields. It could also point to organizational strategies necessitated by the different amounts of cultural capital of the two religions and the fact that Christianity in a Vietnamese context is less “authentic Vietnamese”. In this way, the multicultural Catholic churches strategically have to engage more consciously in producing a close relation between religion, culture and ethnicity by “Vietnamizing” Christianity, just like the Buddhists, if they actually want to transgress their monoethnic religion and to face the task of “Westernizing” Buddhism.12 However, other variables also seem to be relevant for ethnic identity. If we look at the relation between religious engagement (without including differences of religion) and ethnic orientation, a strong correlation appears. Nearly all (97 per cent) of those with a strong religious engagement also have a pronounced ethnic Vietnamese orientation (based on the previously defined index), while more than half of those with low religious engagement orient themselves towards Danish ethnicity. It thus seems that ethnic orientation is related differently, not only according to religion type but also to the degree of religious engagement. Being more religiously engaged is closely related to having an ethnic Vietnamese   This interesting parallel of the two religions’ challenges is inspired by Yang and Ebaugh writing about Chinese immigrants in the United States: “Chinese Christians face the task of ‘Sinicizing’ Christianity to convert fellow Chinese, while Chinese Buddhists face the task of ‘Americanizing’ Buddhism to become accepted as part of mainstream America” (2001: 376). 12

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orientation, and being less religiously engaged is closely related to having an ethnic Danish orientation. It is logical to relate those with a weak religiosity to a secular society and those with a strong religiosity to the spiritual homeland, even in a diaspora context, where religion itself to many is a strong symbol of ethnic origin. The logic seems to be further underlined by including another variable, namely socialization. The strong correlation between ethnic identification and socialization also applies to socialization and religiosity: those born and raised in Vietnam will most likely have a higher religious engagement than those born and raised in Denmark. Table 12.2 Religious engagement in relation to basic socialization (in percentage) Socialization Religious Engagement High Medium Low Total

Danish (n = 60) 20 28 52 100

Vietnamese (n = 58) 41 28 31 100

Total

(n = 118) 31 28 42 101

Thus, the differences between Buddhists and Catholics in relation to ethnic orientation loose significance when socialization as a variable is taken into consideration. Almost all of those who grew up in Vietnam (93 per cent of Buddhists and 96 per cent of Catholics) also have a Vietnamese ethnic orientation. Table 12.3 Basic socialization and ethnic orientation in relation to religion (in percentage) Socialization Danish

Ethnic orientation

Vietnamese

Ethnic orienation

Danish Vietnamese Danish Vietnamese

Buddhist 36 64 7 93

Religion Christian 27 73 4 96

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Religious affiliation for the Vietnamese Christians and Buddhists in a Danish diaspora context matters differently in terms of both religiosity and ethnicity. But if including the variables religious engagement and socialization, we can also conclude that religiosity seems to become less important the more the individual is oriented towards Danish identity, while religion is more important for those having a Vietnamese orientation. Conclusion In a global world where identity is more fluid and hybrid than ever before, ethnicity could be expected to play a less significant role. But just as the secularization paradigm that has been dominant for many years had to be redefined after being confronted with an empirical reality which did not seem to (wholly) adjust to prescribed theories, there are indications that ethnic identification insists on being taken seriously also in a global world. The case of Vietnamese immigrants in Denmark has underlined this in several aspects. The majority of the immigrants identify themselves as Vietnamese and, in a broader sense, orient themselves towards Vietnamese ethnicity and culture. Whether religion has been “ethnified” or ethnicity has been “sacralized”, there is still a strong correlation between religion and ethnicity. This is interestingly manifested in different ways. The Christian Vietnamese are to a much larger extent oriented towards Vietnamese culture and orientation than the Buddhist Vietnamese. This might be related to the fact that they are also much more religiously engaged, whether measured by belief, moral, practice or attitude. The degree of religious engagement actually turned out to have a direct relation also to ethnic identification. Those with a high degree of religious engagement are also those with a strong orientation towards their ethnic origin, while those who are more acculturated towards Danish orientation are more likely to be less religious. This seems to be underlined by the fact that the variable of socialization is important, even to such an extent that it relativizes the significant differences between being a Buddhist and being a Christian. Those born or raised in Vietnam are much more religious and have a higher degree of Vietnamese ethnic orientation than those born or raised in Denmark. Thus, even though there is a clear difference of religious type and degree between Buddhists and Christians, there is a strong argument that also culture of origin and ethnic identity is closely related to the degree of religious engagement in a diaspora context. The importance of the cultural context of the host country in this sense is also confirmed, being the other part of the whole migration complex. Though

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former assimilation models in contemporary pluralistic countries no longer have the same explanatory value, this case with the Vietnamese at least seems to acknowledge its plausability: religiosity and ethnicity fade when their carriers are acculturated into a Western, secular society. One variable not directly discussed here is age. The responses to the questionnaire showed a slight tendency for younger people to be less religious than older people. They also identify less with their ethnic origin than their parents’ generation. This was expanded upon in the interviews especially by youngsters, who expressed reflections of hybrid, hyphenated or individual (and thus less ethnically defined) identity. As is also characteristic of young people from other ethnic groups, it is important for them to negotiate identity in a country and culture different from that of their parents. Religion is for some a major element of such a personal identification and acculturation process. This is the case among some young Muslims who use “canonical religion” (as opposed to the typical “culture religion” of their parents) as part of an identification project in a secular world. The Vietnamese immigrants and their descendants belong to religions that do not experience the same barriers in Western countries as Islam often does. Christianity is a “Western religion”, and Buddhism a “popular religion”, and no symbolic identity marker against the surrounding world has led the Vietnamese (or in general, Asian immigrants) to use religion in identification battles. While this can be a positive acculturation strategy, in which religion can actually serve, also in a secular society, as a symbolic capital, it might, viewed in a longer perspective, especially for the “soft Buddhists”, mean that religion and ethnicity lose further authority and significance for the generations after the first immigrants. The Vietnamese have not yet been in Denmark long enough for a broader spectrum of generation differences to manifest. In this way, their strong sense of ethnic identity and the strong relation between ethnicity and religiosity might be of only contemporary significance. The role of socialization already now suggests that the importance of these factors changes when migrating to other contexts. It will be the challenge of future research to show whether the differences continue in generational changes. Also investigations of and comparisons with other ethnic groups would be fruitful for understanding the broader perspectives of immigrant and diaspora religions and would force us to reflect on the future relations of religion, culture and ethnicity in a global world.

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Kwon, O. (2003) Buddhist and Protestant Korean Immigrants: Religious Beliefs and Socioeconomic Aspects of Life. LFB Scholarly Publishing. Lincoln, B. (2003) Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Martikainen, T. (2005) “Religion, Immigrants and Integration”, AMID Working Paper Series, 43, pp. 1–14. Matthews, B. (1992) “The Place of Religion in Vietnam Today”, BuddhistChristian Studies, 12, pp. 65–74. Matthews, B. (ed.) (2006) Buddhism in Canada. London and New York: Routledge. McLoughlin, S. (2005) “Migration, Diaspora and Transnationalism: Transformations of Religion and Culture in a Globalizing Age”, in J. Hinnels (ed.), The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 526–549. Min, P.G. (2002) “Introduction”, in P.G. Min and J.H. Kim (eds), Religions in Asian America. Lanham: AltaMira Press, pp. 1–14. Min, P.G. (2005) “Religion and the Maintenance of Ethnicity among Immigrants: A Comparison of Indian Hindus and Korean Protestants”, in Karen Isaksen Leonard, Manuel A. Vasquez (ed.), Immigrant Faiths: Transforming Religious Life in America. Lanham: AltaMira Press, pp. 99–122. Min, P.G. (2010) Preserving Ethnicity through Religion in America: Korean Protestants and Indian Hindus across Generations. New York and London: New York University Press. Numrich, P.D. (1996) Old Wisdom in the New World: Americanization in Two Immigrant Theravada Buddhist Temples. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. Numrich, P.D. (2003) “Two Buddhisms Further Considered”, Contemporary Buddhism, 4(1), pp. 55–78. Pfeifer, M.E. (2001) “‘Community’, Adaption and the Vietnamese in Toronto”, Vietnamologica, 5, pp. 147–225. Putnam, R.D. (2007) “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century − The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture”, Scandinavian Political Studies, 30(2), 137–174. Rönnqvist, S. (2009) “Strategies from Below: Vietnamese Refugees, Education, Secondary Moves and Ethnic Networks”, in P. Bevelander, M. Hagström and S. Rönnqvist (eds), Resettled and Included? The Employment Integration of Resettled Refugees in Sweden. Malmö: Malmö University, pp. 129–157.

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Conclusion

Having in mind the classical example of the history of European Jews, Georg Simmel wrote the well-known essay “The Stranger”. As he explains, the stranger is neither the “outsider” who has no specific relation to a group nor the “wanderer” who comes today and leaves tomorrow. Considered as a unique sociological category, the stranger settles in a spatial group but “his position in the group is determined, essentially, by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning, that he imports qualities into it, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself ” (Simmel, 1950: 402). It is not difficult to identify similarities between Simmel’s stranger and the immigrant in contemporary societies, particularly in the West. The immigrant is, in fact, fixed within a society – Simmel talks about a particular spatial group – and he holds features of nearness and remoteness as in any human relationship. But with the immigrant, as with the stranger, distance means that the immigrant, who is close by, is far, and at same time he who also is far, is actually near (Simmel, 1950). Moreover, the immigrant accumulates all those dimensions of otherness: the racial, the ethnic, the religious, and the low social class. During the last decades, the intensification and deregulation of economic relations has induced a significant reconfiguration of national and transnational employment systems. Consequently, some important changes have taken place, not only in the patterns of migratory fluxes but also in the social modes and government policies which accommodate and regulate the presence and participation (for example through religious practices) of foreign workers and their families in the context of host societies. These facts justify the attention given in this volume to the characteristics of the new economy and the segmentation and precariousness of labour markets, on the one side, and to the changing role of the State (and Church–State relations) concerning immigrants’ inclusion and the protection of social rights of the most vulnerable, on the other side. Both Pinto (Chapter 2) and Martikainen (Chapter 3) deal in an explicit and extended way with the implication of economic and political issues on social conditions and religious practices of

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immigrant communities; these same problems still being present, although in more discreet terms, in several other contributions to the book. The decline of European investment in the integration of social policies, together with the predominance of policy guidelines eroding the welfare states, makes it difficult for future European countries to find symbolic and political capital to strengthen their capacity to reform national policies (Silva, 2010). This has special consequences for the host of numerous newcomers. The relation between religion, migration and the welfare state in Europe represents an important outlook for understanding the policies towards migrants.1 Generally speaking, they swing between hope and fear: hoping that migrants are willing to be integrated into society, self-reducing any claims to have their differences recognized publicly or fearing the collapse of the welfare system opening the door to those who are perceived as foreigners. In other words, either the State tries to exclude immigrants from access to citizenship, and consequently limiting access to welfare, or decides to include them as newcomer-citizens, and automatically readapting the supply-side of welfare to the peculiar cultural and religious features of them (individuals as well as communities). According to some scholars (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002; Andersen, 1990; Wenzel and Boss, 1997), there is a significant correlation between the philosophy of functioning of each welfare system and the typology of the social profiles of immigrants (asylum seekers, illegal and legal workers, low and high skilled workers, refugees …). A universal redistributive welfare state (that tends to cover all social needs for all) seems to attract lowest skilled and poor people who depend on welfare. Meanwhile, a selective not redistributive welfare tends to exclude legal immigrants, segregated from access to full citizenship (pre-condition for access to welfare) and attract paradoxically more illegal immigrants – if illegal, they are indeed automatically excluded from the social services provided by the welfare system as a rule. In this sense there is a sort of elective affinity between the functioning of the welfare and the immigration policies. If all this is plausible in abstract terms – according to the economists of welfare state – in practice the relationship between migration policies of European states, welfare systems and the real situation of immigrants of different origins and with different cultural and religious background is much more complex. This is especially true when in different European Union member states the Islam-factor (with the formation of political parties openly hostile to this religion and Muslim communities) has shaped some forms of exclusion from citizenship for immigrants 1   About the focus on the relation between religion, migration and welfare see also Bäckström et al. (2011).

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as such (and their children born in the territory of a nation) or have encouraged selective forms of inclusion/exclusion based on ethnicity (favouring access to welfare of one group rather than another). This is something Frisina clearly shows in Chapter 9, referring, as an example, to the anti-Islam discourse of the Italian Northern League Party anchored in the defence of the “Catholic cultural roots”. When the subject deals with migrations, Islam is what dominates the minds of most Europeans today, that is reinforced by the rhetoric of politicians and, even the academic research on European immigration which focuses disproportionately on Muslim immigrants. This often leads to forgotten evidence: in many countries the majority of immigrants have a Christian religious background. In addition, as sustained by Martikainen in Chapter 3, newcomers’ identification (or not) with the majority religion makes all the difference. For example, the second generation of Filipino immigrants in Italy studied by Ricucci (Chapter 6) does not face the same problem as the Muslim immigrants analysed by Frisina. In the first case the big question is whether the young Catholic Filipinos will reproduce the religious commitment of their parents as an expression of ethnic identity or, on the contrary, they will become more secularized, moving closer to the standards of most young Italians. In the second case, the young Muslim women deal with a situation of conflict and negotiation as they feel Italian but also see themselves as Muslims, which is a factor of much higher social discrimination. In the context of reception, the question of the identification (or lack of it) of the religious background of immigrants to the dominant religion, Christianity in all its forms – Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant – directs us to another point: the relation between Church and State. Northern Europe had national churches until very recently but also strong welfare states compared with Southern Europe. In the latter European region, the weakness of the state on social policies has been compensated by society and the Catholic Church in Portugal, Spain and Italy or the Orthodox Church in Greece – still a State church – play a crucial role in the social field, inclusively dealing with the newcomers, giving them support at different levels, as it is shown by Diamantopoulou and Vilaça in chapters 4 and 5. Although representing an ethnic and a religious minority, the first generation of Orthodox Eastern immigrants in Portugal (see Vilaça, Chapter 5) have a religious identity that draws them closer to the Roman Catholic Church. There are strong links between both and the Catholic Church helps this migrant community by offering them places to worship. But in general the Catholic Church is developing a working relationship with all migrants independently of their religion and efficiently manages migration-related issues and offers

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different kinds of material support. The Orthodox Church of Greece (see Diamantopoulou, Chapter 4) also plays a very active role in the field of migration, by creating special services as well as the overall pastoral support of migrants and refugees (from the Balkans, Central and Eastern Europe, Asia). It is of interest to note that the Orthodox Church is a state established religion and proselytizing is prohibited in Greece, which puts that Church in a privileged position and, paradoxically, allows it to assume a prominent place in terms of dealing directly with other (competing) religious communities related to newcomers. Also established churches in Sweden – for example the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Sweden and the Pentecostals – have connections with migrant religious communities (Kubai, Chapter 8), by encouraging the leaders of African churches (for instance Ethiopian and Eritrean Orthodox churches, evangelical interdenominational congregations, African fellowships) either to collaborate with them or allowing them to use the church building for worship. As a result the churches have become stages of inclusion and exclusion. This research shows that even if immigrants enter within Christianity, the fact that they recreate communities based on their original culture or belong to a different denomination than the historically established churches in the country of reception, can be a factor of hostility or discrimination. As Rodrigues highlights in Chapter 7, the expansion of Neo-Pentecostalism from Latin America (Brazil in particular) to Europe can also be taken as a threat since these movements and churches are, as a rule, very competitive in the religious field. The Protestant and Catholic Charismatic/Pentecostal movements from the South consider themselves responsible for the mission of (re-) Christianization of Europe, which they regard as suffering from secularization/ laicism. This phenomenon of “reverse mission” is one of the most important challenges to European Christianity as Pentecostal churches represent the fastest growing religious group in the world, and act according to market rules, something which is uncomfortable to historical churches as well as secular elites. An inevitable pluralization of society is in progress and Europe is becoming more and more a landscape of co-existence of competing beliefs and values. One of the goals of this volume is to demonstrate that immigrants are key agents of religious and cultural transformation as a consequence – as Pace argues in Chapter 1 – of a broader social change. What is particularly rich in this regard is the religious diversity within the immigrant groups themselves. That is evident in the study carried out by Borup (Chapter 12) about Vietnamese immigrants. The majority of these newcomers reveal a strong identification with their ethnicity and culture. However it differs according to religious belonging: “Christian

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Vietnamese are to a much larger extent oriented towards Vietnamese culture and orientation than the Buddhist Vietnamese”. Also religious commitment is higher among Christians than among Buddhists, and especially if they were born or raised in Vietnam. Contemporary diasporas are increasingly subject to a process of reconfiguration, becoming understood as multiple transnational communities. One of the aspects of this reconfiguration is that it requires a redefinition of borders within the groups themselves. The analysis of the Islamic fashion trends in Oslo, analysed by Furseth in Chapter 11, reveals that Muslim women are actively engaged in a boundary work where they use Muslim dress to negotiate between different perceptions of what it means to be a Muslim woman. They do it either by modernizing ethnic styles of Muslim dress or combining Western style clothing with various styles of hijab. As the author demonstrates, these women draw different types of symbolic boundaries: religious and moral boundaries, cultural boundaries and generational boundaries. This leads us to the apocalyptical Green Knight, referred to by Pace (Chapter 1). This metaphor is related to the dialectic between monopoly, pluralization, de-territorialization that migration provokes in the religious field. The research related to Muslim women’s fashion in Norway is a good illustration about the way pluralization provokes religious innovation, “a creative mixing of old and new religious symbols and practices”. Through different lenses both theoretical and empirical, all the chapters in this volume prompt a fundamental challenge to European societies: the presence of religion in the public sphere. The notion of faith as a private matter is something deeply held in European culture and public and political rhetoric. The growing presence of diverse religious communities is questioning this assumption, as they compel the state, the law, and education and health systems – not to say society as a whole – to rethink and re-open old debates about the presence of religion in public life. This de-privatization of religion begins with all the evidence offered in countries like Sweden. Compared with Southern Europe where public religion is more tolerated – the exception being France – in the Nordic countries, activities in public spaces should be secular and religiously neutral. But the Christian heritage “comes to the surface” if one takes in account traditional festivals, which are mostly Christian, and situations provoked by encounters with other cultures. The case study led by Pettersson (see Chapter 10) in a school in Gävle is a good illustration of that. The school has pupils from a variety of religious and ethnic backgrounds (Catholics from Chile, Muslims from Iraq, Buddhists from

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Thailand, and Hindus from India) and this is driving significant changes in the sense that religious diversity leads to new practices based on negotiation and compromise. More than that, this case may be considered as a kind of laboratory since what is occurring in everyday life at the local level, can be understood as what will (in the very near future) take place in European society at large. When religious differentiation arises in conjunction with ethnicity, the immigrant’s identity is reinforced. The territory where the believers meet enhances the group’s position within the religious field, making it more visible in society. This is a key strategy for the group’s recognition in the public sphere. Quoting Hirschman (1970), Pace (Chapter 1) states that, in the global landscape, religion can act either as exit or voice. Emigration is an exit but those who migrate share, most of the time, a common religious experience, in the long run their religion may become a voice, in the sense it can stimulate the contest of the dominant forces in the context of reception. Thus religion can be used as a power of communication that “enables people to imagine another world”. Migrants are building, indeed, another Europe: a Europe with a soul of hues and contrasts. References Bäckström, A., Davie, G., Edgardh, N. and Pettersson, P. (2011) Welfare and Religion in 21st Century in Europe, vol. I –II. Farnham: Ashgate. Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2002) Immigration and the Welfare State: A European Challenge to American Mythology. MMO Working Paper 4. Athens: University Research Institute of Urban Environment and Human Resources Panteion University. Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hirschman, A.O. (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Silva, P.A. (2010) Por um novo contrato inter-geracional: a construção de um Estado Providência para o século XXI. In D. Cordeiro (ed.), Socialismo no Século XXI. Lisboa: Esfera do Caos, pp. 51–60. Simmel, G. [1908](1950) The Stranger. In K. Wolff (trans.), The Sociology of Georg Simmel. New York: Free Press, pp. 402–408 (first edition Excursus über Fremden in Soziologie, Frankfurt a.M., 1908). Wenzel, U. and Bos, M. (1997) Immigration and the Modern Welfare State: The Case of USA and Germany. New Community 23(4): 537–548.

Index Bold page numbers indicate figures, italic indicate tables.

associations of immigrants 100–103 Association Amizade 101–103

Abdel Qader, Sumaya 177–178 Adebanwi, W. 14 adolescents and young people acculturation 124–125 family and religion 122–123, 124 identity as crucial issue for 114 identity diffusion 112 immigrant, presence of in Italy 113 religion as less important for 125–127 research on in Italy 113–114 reunion of compatriots in churches 119–120 traditional values, adherence to 121 African Christian churches in Sweden categorization of 151–152 changes in religious landscape due to 166–168 compared to Swedish churches 163–164 differences separating people 153–157 diversity in Sweden, increase in 150 formation of 151 Grace Connections 159–161 Immanuel International Fellowship 159 inclusion in exclusion 157–166 malleability of 152–153 othering in Sweden 153–157 as refuge from being an immigrant 170 sharing of accommodation 157–166 tension with host churches 165–166 together or apart? 166–170 transnationality of 153 age and religiosity 245 anti-Islam rhetoric 174

Barth, Fredrik 211, 232 Bartkowski, J.P. 210 Baumann, Martin 52 Beauzamy, B. 154 Belgian women of Mahgreb origin 177 Berry, J.W. 112 biology, teaching of in school 202 Black Knight 13–17, 40–42 blogs on Muslim fashion 215, 216, 224, 225 boundaries, symbolic 211–213, 215–226 Bourdieu, Pierre 91, 211–212 Boyer, R. 28 Brazilian evangelical churches mission of 138–140 in Portugal 141–144 Universal Church of the Kingdom of God 142–144 Bruno, M. 178n3 Buddhism 237–238 Bulgarian immigrants see Eastern European immigrants Cadge, Wendy 55 Carlbaum, S. 154 Castels, S. 150 Catholic Church Vietnamese immigrants in Denmark 237–238; see also Portuguese Catholic Church celebrations and rites 94–95 Chafetz, Janet Saltzman 53, 57 children of immigrants acculturation 124–125 family and religion 122–123, 124

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identity as crucial issue for 114 identity diffusion 112 presence of in Italy 113 religion as less important for 125–127 research on in Italy 113–114 reunion of compatriots in churches 119–120 traditional values, adherence to 121 underrepresentation in studies 112 Church–State relations 54–55 Finland 59–60 Greece and the Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG) 71–73, 72n7 Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME) 82n20 citizenship and immigration, changes due to 89 class and migration 31–32 collectivism, individualism and 51–52 community/society model of migrant transitions 34–35 compromise model 36 conflicts and religion 13, 39–40 congregationalism 55 corporatist-statist welfare regimes 53 covering by Muslim women see hijab street fashion in Oslo Creese, G. 157 Denmark, Vietnamese population in age and religiosity 245 Buddhism and Catholicism of 237–238 diversity of religion in Vietnam 236–237 ethnic identification of 235–236 ethnic religiosity 237–238 history of 234 as model immigrants 235 religion and ethnicity 244–245 diaspora model 36 difference, perception of in Sweden 153–157 Distinction (Bourdieu) 211–212 Douglas, Mary 12

Eastern European immigrants associations of immigrants 100–103 Catholic Church support for 97–100 Catholic communities in Portugal 92–97 celebrations and rites 94–95 community, sense of 92–93 identity based on ethnicity 96–97, 103–104 Italy 113, 114–115 networks, social 92, 95–96, 104 Portugal 138 sociability after services 95–97 social capital 91–92, 95–96 solidarity 91, 100 Ebaugh, Helen Rose 53, 57 economic crisis and stigmatization 41–42 economics, neo-classical 26–27 Ecumenical Refugee Programme (ERP) (Greece) 80 Elias, Norbert 38–39 emotion management 177 Esping-Andersen, Gøsta 52 ethnicity ethnic religiosity 232–233, 237–238, 241–244, 243 identity based on 96–97, 103–104 and migrant identity 232 and migration 31–32 and religion 244–245 and religiosity 238–244, 240, 243 Vietnamese immigrants in Denmark 235–238, 238–244, 240, 243 ethnicization of the labour market 12 exclusion, forces acting against 41 exit, loyalty and voice as options for when unhappy 14, 40–41 Fadil, N. 177 family and religion 122–123, 124 family networks of labour recruitment 28–30 fashion, Muslim see hijab street fashion in Oslo festivals and holy days 202–203

Index Filipinos, attitudes towards in Italy 114–115 Finland 58–60 Flam, H. 154 food in schools 203 friendship networks of labour recruitment 28–30 Gaudemar, J.-P. 29 Gävle, Sweden biology and sexuality, teaching of in school 202 common gatherings 203–204 festivals and holy days 202–203 gender equality at school 199 guidelines developed at the school 204–205 immigrant population 197 implicit Christian values revealed 205–206 languages at school 198–199 meals, schools 203 methods and sources for research 197–198 questions asked by schoolchildren 200–201 relationships between the sexes 201–202 sports activities 201–202 swim training 201–202 value conflicts at school 199–202 visits to church buildings 203–204 gender equality at Swedish school 199 negotiations 213 Ghazy, Randa 176–177, 178 Giovani Musulmani d’Italia (GMI) (Young Muslims of Italy) 179–80 globalization, state efforts with 47 government regulation of migration 30–31 Grace Connections 159–161 Granovetter, Mark 30 Greece Church–State relations 71–73 contemporary theology 74–76

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difference, understanding of 73 freedom of religion 71–73 identity, understanding of 74–77 Muslim population 72–73 proselytism, prohibition of 72 recognition of religions 73 religious demography of 72–73, 72n8; see also Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG) Green Knight 17–19, 42–43 groups, social, options for when unhappy 14, 40–41 Herberg, W. 110 hijab street fashion in Oslo attacks due to wearing hijab 219 blogs on fashion 215, 216, 224, 225 covering, debate over 209 cultural boundaries 222–224 gender negotiations 213 generational boundaries 224–226 Hijablog, The 216, 224, 225 interview participants 216 meanings of term ‘hijab’ 213 and modesty 220–222 moral boundaries 220–222 motivation for covering 210, 215–226 Muslim dress and fashion 213–215 parental opposition to wearing hijab 219 peer pressure to wear hijab 219–220 power and symbolic boundaries 212–213 religious boundaries 217–220, 222 research questions 215 symbolic boundaries 211–213, 215–226 Hijablog, The 216, 224, 225 Hirschman, A.O. 14, 40 holy days 202–203 identity based on ethnicity 96–97, 103–104 conflictive potential of religion 40

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as crucial issue for second generations 114 diffusion, in young people 112 and ethnicity 232 Greece, understanding of in 74–77 national, and immigration, changes due to 89 race and 121 Immanuel International Fellowship 159 India caste and religious changes 19 conversions in 12 individualism and collectivism 51–52 individualization of faith 36, 118 informal networks of labour recruitment 28–30 institutional regulation of migration 30–31 institutionalism, new 55 Integration Centre for Returning Migrants, Immigrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees (KSPM-ERP) 79–81, 83–84 integration of immigrants affiliation to majority or minority religion 57–58, 60 characteristics of different religions 57 Church–State relations 54–55 role of immigrants in 56–58 and state policies 51–52 Ireland, Patrick 56 Islam anti-Islam rhetoric 174 studies focusing on 48; see also Gävle, Sweden; hijab street fashion in Oslo; self-representation of Muslim women Italy acculturation of young people 124–125 Eastern European immigrants 113 family and religion 122–123, 124 Filipinos, Peruvians and Romanians, attitudes towards 114–115 Giovani Musulmani d’Italia (GMI) (Young Muslims of Italy) 179–180

identity as crucial issue for second generations 114 literature by Muslim women 175–179 minors, immigrant, presence of 113 Muslim population 174 photo elicitation project 181–186, 182, 183, 184, 185 race and identity 121 religion as less important for young people 125–127 research on children of immigrants 113–114 restrictive laws for immigrants 174 reunion of compatriots in churches 119–120 secularism, Catholic 174 Treviso and Meryem’s story 187–189 Jewish people in Portugal 134–135 Jones, P. 157 journalism by Muslim women 178–179 justice and religion 13–17, 40–42 Kalaitzidis, P. 70n3, 74–75, 77 Kalu, O. 152 Knights of the Apocalypse metaphor Black Knight 13–17, 40–42 Green Knight 17–19, 42–43 Red Knight 13, 39–40 and social change 11 White Knight 12–13, 38–39 Krzyżanowskyi, M. 157 Kusow, A.M. 153 labour immigration 37 labour market ethnicization of the 12 neo-classical economics 26–27 push and pull model 26–27 segmentation theories of 27–28 and social networks 28–30 transformations of 26–33 Lamont, Michéle 211–12 laypeople, activists as 57 Levitt, Peggy 56

Index liberal welfare regimes 53 liturgical celebrations and rites 94–95 local government 56 Lockwood, D. 90–91 loyalty, exit and voice as options for when unhappy 14, 40–41 loyalty towards host countries 173–174 Macedo, Edir 142, 143 Machado, F.L. 32 Makrides, V.N. 73, 75–76 meals, schools 203 Mella, O. 150 Merton, Robert 39 migration and class 31–32 and ethnic factors 31–32 hazards invoked in political rhetoric 20 neo-classical economics 26–27 and religion, scholarly interest in 110–112 and religion and the welfare state 252–256 religion’s role before actual migration 14–15 social networks 28–30 state regulation of 30–31 territory, ethnological notion of 16–17 welfare state, crisis of 10–11 Miller, M.J. 150 minors, immigrant, presence of in Italy 113 mobility chains 28 Molnar, V. 212 Molokotos-Leiderman, L. 72n8 Muslim population in Europe, research into 111 Greece 72–73 Italy 174 loyalty towards host countries 173–174 and the Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG) 83 Portugal 137–138; see also Gävle, Sweden; hijab street fashion in Oslo; self-representation of Muslim women

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neo-classical economics 26–27 Neo-Pentecostalism mission of 138–140 in Portugal 141–144 Universal Church of the Kingdom of God 142–144 networks, social 95–96, 104 and migration 28–30 multinational 56 and social capital 92 Nigeria 14–15 Numrich, P.D. 237 Obadare, E. 14 Offe, Claude 10 Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG) Church–State relations 71–73, 72n7 Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME) 82n20 contemporary theology 74–76 decisive role, possibility of 84 Ecumenical Refugee Programme (ERP) 80 ethnie and nation, no distinction made by 73n9 failures in immigration management 74–77 freedom of religion 71–73, 72n7 Integration Centre for Returning Migrants, Immigrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees (KSPM-ERP) 79–81, 83–84 integration of immigrants, contribution towards 79–84 ministerial outreach from 77–79 and Muslim migrants 83 nationalization of 69–71, 70n2 pastoral policies, move towards 84 Special Synodic Committee for Migrants, Refugees and Returning Migrants (SCMRM) 79, 81–83, 82n20 in the twenty first century 74–77; see also Greece othering in Sweden 153–157

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Pace, Enzo 33, 174 Papathomas, Archimandrite 76 parenting and religion 122–123 Peruvians, attitudes towards in Italy 114–115 Petrou, I. 75 Pettigrew, T. 156 photo elicitation project 181–186, 182, 183, 184, 185 Pinakoulas, Fr. 76 Piore, M. 27 politicization of the belief model 36 Pollis, Ad. 72 Portes, Alejandro 50, 91–92 Portugal Afro-Brazilian religions 137–138 Brazilian immigrants to 140–141 Brazilian Neo-Pentecostal churches 141 Eastern European immigrants 138 Eastern European religious communities 92–97 associations of immigrants 100–103 celebrations and rites 94–95 community, sense of 92–93 sociability after services 95–97 emigration from 136 immigration to 136 increase in religious minorities 137–138 Jewish people in 134–135 minority groups in over history 134–135 Muslim population 137–138 Roma people in 134–135 Universal Church of the Kingdom of God 142–144 Portuguese Catholic Church Eastern European religious communities 92–97 identity based on ethnicity 96–97, 103–104 networks, social 92, 95–96, 104 social capital 91–92, 95–96, 104 solidarity 91, 100

support for immigrants 97–100 power and symbolic boundaries 212–213 prejudice forces acting against 41 in Sweden 156–157 proselytism, prohibition of in Greece 72 public policies on migration 30–31 pure and impure 12–13, 38–39 Purity and Danger (Douglas) 12 push and pull model 26–27 Putnam, Robert 92, 93 race and identity 121 Rea, A. 173 Read, J.G. 210 reception of immigrants activists as laypeople 57 affiliation to majority or minority religion 57–58, 60 characteristics of different religions 57 Church–State relations 54–55, 253 context of 49–50 Finland 58–60 local context 55–56 role of immigrants in 56–58 and state policies 51–52 welfare state regimes 52–54 Red Knight 13, 39–40 Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG) 159–150 regulation of migration, state 30–31 régulation theory 28 relationships between the sexes 201–201 religion changes in worldwide 17–18, 42–43 characteristics of different 57 and ethnicity 244–245 family and 122–123, 124 hazards invoked in political rhetoric 20 immigrant, study of 47–48 and immigration, scholarly interest in 110–112 individualization of faith 118 Islam, studies focusing on 48 and justice 13–17

Index and local context, changes due to 55–56 and locality studies 47–48 loyalty, exit and voice 40–41 and migration and the welfare state 252–256 in migration before actual migration 14–15 reaction to emigration, models of 36–37 relative autonomy of in complex society 15 as resisting secularization 109 segregation and stigmatization 38–39 and state efforts with globalization 47 and war 13, 39–40 welfare state, crisis of 10–11 religiosity age and 245 culture/ethnic 232–233 and socialization 241–244, 243 Vietnamese immigrants in Denmark 237–238, 238–244, 240, 243 remittances, social 56 rituals and celebrations 94–95 Roma people in Portugal 134–135 Roman Catholic Church; Vietnamese immigrants in Denmark 237–238; see also Portuguese Catholic Church Romanians, attitudes towards in Italy 114–115 Rouadjia, A. 173, 173n2 Rumbaut, Rubén 50 Saint-Blancat, C. 177 Salih, R. 174–175 Sartori, G. 173 schools in Sweden see Gävle, Sweden Scotson, John 38–39 second-generation immigrants acculturation 124–125 family and religion 122–123, 124 identity as crucial issue for 114 Italy 113 religion as less important for 125–127

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reunion of compatriots in churches 119–120 traditional values, adherence to 121; see also self-representation of Muslim women secularism, Catholic 174 secularization religion as resisting 109 Sweden 195 segmentation theories of the labour market 27–28 segregation and religion 38–39 self-representation of Muslim women Italian literature 175–179 journalism 178–179 photo elicitation project 181–186, 182, 183, 184, 185 Treviso and Meryem’s story 187–189 visibility, passive or as choice 179–180 Young Muslims of Italy 179–180 settlement immigration 37 sexuality, teaching of in school 202 Simmel, G. 186, 251 Sjöberg, L. 156 Smith, Anthony 73 Smith, Michael Peter 56 sociability after services 95–97 social capital 91–92, 95–96, 104 social change Black Knight 13–17, 40–42 ethnicization of the labour market 12 four Knights of the Apocalypse metaphor 11, 37 Green Knight 17–19, 42–43 justice and religion 13–17, 40–42 pure and impure 12–13, 38–39 Red Knight 13, 39–40 religion, changes in worldwide 17–18, 42–43 and religion and migration 11 territory, ethnological notion of 16–17 war and religion 13, 39–40 White Knight 12–13, 38–9 social democratic welfare regimes 53

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social networks and migration 28–30 multinational 56 and social capital 92 social system theory 9–10 socialization and religiosity 241–244, 243 sociological conception of religious phenomena 33–37 solidarity 91, 100 Special Synodic Committee for Migrants, Refugees and Returning Migrants (SCMRM) 79, 81–83, 82n20 sports activities 201–202 states characteristics of 48 Church–State relations 54–55, 59–60 efforts to deal with globalization 47 Finnish policies 58–59 policies and integration of immigrants 51–52 regulation of migration 30–31 Stavrou, M. 78 stigmatization and economic crisis 41–42 and religion 38–39 Stoffels, H. 152–153 “Stranger, The” (Simmel) 251 street fashion see hijab street fashion in Oslo Sweden African Christian churches in categorization of 151–152 changes in religious landscape due to 166–168 compared to Swedish churches 163–164 differences separating people 153–157 diversity in Sweden, increase in 150 formation of 151 Grace Connections 159–161 Immanuel International Fellowship 159 inclusion in exclusion 157–166 malleability of 152–153

othering in Sweden 153–157 as refuge from being an immigrant 170 sharing of accommodation 157–166 tension with host churches 165–166 together or apart? 166–170 transnationality of 153 Church–State separation 195 Gävle biology and sexuality, teaching of in school 202 common gatherings 203–204 festivals and holy days 202–203 gender equality at school 199 guidelines developed at the school 204–205 immigrant population 197 implicit Christian values revealed 205–206 languages at school 198–199 meals, schools 203 methods and sources for research 197–198 questions asked by schoolchildren 200–201 relationships between the sexes 201–202 sports activities 201–202 swim training 201–202 value conflicts at school 199–202 visits to church buildings 203–204 immigrant religions, growth of 196 religious affiliation, levels of 195 religious landscape of 194–196 schools, religious practice in 196 secularization 195 values in daily practice 196 swim training 201–202 symbolic boundaries 211–213, 215–226 Taifel, Henri 211 territory, ethnological notion of 16–17 Thermos, Fr. 76–77

Index Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, The (Esping-Andersen) 52 Tilly, Charles 30 Triandafyllidou, A. 77 Tripier, M. 173 triple melting pot 110 Turner, John C. 211 Ukrainian immigrants see Eastern European immigrants Universal Church of the Kingdom of God 142–144 values and religion biology and sexuality, teaching of in school 202 common gatherings 203–204 conflicts at school 199–202 festivals and holy days 202–203 gender equality at school 199 guidelines developed at the school 204–205 immigrant population 197 implicit Christian values revealed in Sweden 205–206 languages at school 198–199 meals, schools 203 methods and sources for research 197–198 questions asked by schoolchildren 200–201 relationships between the sexes 201–202 sports activities 201–202 Swedish daily practice 196 swim training 201–202 visits to church buildings 203–204 Vaskovska, Natalia 101, 102 Vietnamese immigrants in Denmark age and religiosity 245 Buddhism and Catholicism of 237–238 diversity of religion in Vietnam 236–237 ethnicity and religion 236–238 history of 234

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as model immigrants 235 population in Denmark 234 religion and ethnicity 244–245 religiosity 238–244, 240, 243 visibility passive or as choice 179–180 photo elicitation project 181–186, 182, 183, 184, 185 voice, exit and loyalty as options for when unhappy 14, 40–41 war and religion 13, 39–40 Warner, R. Stephen 55 Weber, Max 10 Welfare and Values in Europe project 193–194 welfare state crisis of 10–11 diversity of regimes 42 Finland 59 regimes 52–4 and religion and migration 252–256 White Knight 12–13, 38–39 Winston Parva community 38–39 women, Muslim see hijab street fashion in Oslo; self-representation of Muslim women Wong, Lloyd 89 ‘Yalla Italia! Il primo Mensile delle seconde generazioni’ 178–179, 179n4 Young Muslims of Italy 179–80 young people acculturation 124–125 family and religion 122–123, 124 identity as crucial issue for 114 identity diffusion 112 immigrant, presence of in Italy 113 religion as less important for 125–127 research on in Italy 113–114 reunion of compatriots in churches 119–120 traditional values, adherence to 121 underrepresentation in studies 112