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The Categorial Structure ofthe World By REINHARDT GROSSMANN An original inquiry into some impor tant problems of metaphysics from a contemporary perspective, this book is an attempt to give a complete and accurate list of the categories of the world, or, in the author 's words, "an at­ tempt to keep Artistotle's Categories up to date." After three introductory chapters in Part One treating the nature of ontology, the realism­ idealism cont roversy, and the nominalism ­ realism issue, the book examines in Part Two the following seven categories: individuals, proper­ ties, relations, classes, structures, numbers, and facts. Grossmann maintains that "most disputes in ontology revolve around, not whether or not there are, for example, colors, or numbers, or biological facts, but rather what kinds of things these are." He then presents the main alternative categorizations of the entity in question. Num­ bers, for example, have been categorized as mul­ titudes of units, proper ties of properties, classes of properties, or classes of classes. Grossmann argues that they are none of these, but belong to the category of quantifier. Par t Two is also a systematic inventory of the ontological innovations of the last hund red years. New categories that have been added to the traditional list include relations, structures, classes, and facts. The book concludes in Part Three with a discussion of the nature of being. Grossmann maintains that being is not only not a property, but not even a category. It is an entity of an entirely different sort, which he calls '�the substratum of the world, the ultimate subject of all predication." Throughout, The Categorial Structure of the World establishes his­ torical connections between t raditional ap(continued on back flap)

( continued from front flap) proaches to these problems and contemporary solutions, and cites ar guments by Frege, Meinong, Russell, Wittgenstein, Bergmann, Quine, and Sellars, as well as the positions of Avicenna, Scotus, and Leibniz. '�Grossmann's book is an impressive and un­ usually wide-ranging work. It is an important contribution to metaphysics, as well as to the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of mathematics. Anyone working in these fields will have to take it into account. There is no book comparable to Grossmann's with respect to systematic scope and the sheer range of the topics discussed." - P ANAYOT BUTCHVAROV REINHARDT GROSSMAN N, P rofessor of Philosophy at Indiana University, is author of Ontological Reduction) Meinong) and On the Con­ tent and Object of Presentations.

The Categorial Structure of tl1e World

The Categorial Structure of the World REINHARDT GROSSMANN

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS BLOOMINGTON

Copyright

O

1983 by Reinhardt Grossmann

All rights reserved No part of this book may be by any means, electronic or and recording, or by any system, without permission Association of American Permissions constitutes the

reproduced or utilized"in any form mechanical, including photocopyi information storage and retriev in writing from the publisher. 1 University Presses' Resolution only exception to this prohibition.

Manufactured in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Grossmann, Reinhardt, 1931The categorial structure of the world. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Metaphysics. 2. Categories (Philosophy) I. Title. BD111.G74 111 81-48615 ISBN 0-253-31324-4 AACR2 1 2 3 4 5 86 85 84 83

CONTENTS

Preface Part I:

xv Introductory Remarks about Ontology, Realism, and Empiricism

3 Chapter 1: The Task Of Ontology (1) Ontology searches for the categories of the world (2) And in order to discover these categories, we must analyze facts (3) Ontology categorizes all and only those objects which have being (4) But ont ology does not try to decide what particular entities there are (5) Definitions are the bane of ontology 19 Chapter 2: � Defense of Realism (6) C a rtesian rea li s m contains the se eds of idealism (7) One of these seeds is the spurious distinction between primary and secondary qualities (8) The argument from colorless atoms does not call for this distinction (9) Nor does the argu ment from the relativity of sensing (10) For, perception does not consist of sensing plus inference (11) Another seed of idealism is Descartes' "new way of ideas" (12) But knowledge is not confined to the contents of our minds (13) Finally, the argument from hallucination does not prove that we perceive sense-impressions

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(14) But, rather, that we can perceive objects which do not exist 34 Chapter 3: A Defense of Empiricism (15) Platonism is the root of rationalism (16) But there are no unexemplified universals (17) And such things as numbers are just as sensible as colors (18) Rationalism is also fostered by the pernicious dogma of space and time as forms of sensibility (19) But what we perceive are states of affairs and their constituents Part II:

The Categories .Q.f the World

49

51 Chapter 1: Individuals 51 I. Categorized� Particulars (20) The fundamental question is: Are individuals particulars or else bundles of properties? (21) Particulars, contrary to Descartes, are not recognizable as such (22) But this does not mean, contrary to Locke, that particulars are unknowable (23) And it does not mean, contrary to Berkely, that we are not acquainted with particulars (24) Part icu lars, contrary to Leibniz, do not contain their properties 61 II. Categorized 2-.! Bundles of Properties (25) A so-called bundle is a structure consisting of properties in an association relation (26) If this association relation has two places, then there must also exist "combinations" of properties (27) And this raises the important question of what such a "combination" of properties is (28) Furthermore, the bundle vie w implies the principle of the identity of indiscernibles for properties (29) For, relations cannot differentiate between bundles of properties (30) T h e b u n d 1 e v i e w m u s t a 1 s o f a c e t h e epistemological problem of how we can perceive se veral qualita tively indi st ingu ishable individuals (31) This problem l eads S tout to claim that individuals are bundles of instances rather than of universals (32) The bundle vie w has the problem of ho w to accommodate relations

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(33) And it also has the pro bl e m of ho w to accommodate properties of properties (34) But the bundle view does not imply that all predication is analytic 89III. Space and Time (35) Particulars have spatial parts (36) Particulars have temporal parts (37) Particulars are changing continuants (38) Events are either attributes or else structures (39) Minds are temporal structures 102 Chapter 2: Properties 102 I . Categorized� Instances (40) The fundamental question is: Are properties concrete or are they abstract? (41) Properties are not concrete, for they are not located in space or time (42) The argument from diff erent second-level properties does not show that properties are instances (43) Nor does the Kantian dogma of space and time as forms of sensibility prove that properties are instances (44) Most importantly, the instance view must face the sorting problem (45) But the sorting problem cannot be solved in terms of concrete entities alone (46) And it cannot be solved by means of similarity relations (47) P rop ert i es cannot be eliminated through definition by abstraction 117 Categorized� Universals II. (48) The main probl em for the universal view is to explain the nature of exemplification (49) An individual is not identical with its species ( 50) Nor does an individual resemble its species ( 51) Nor is the relation between individual and species the same as that between object and concept (52) There are no common natures (53) Universals depend in various ways on other entities for their existence 133 III. Essential and Accidental Properties (54) Since there are no instances the distinction between essential and accidental properties must not rely on their existence (55) Ra th e r, essential prop erties are tho s e properties of an entity which it has lawfully ( 56) Another, less important, notion of an essential

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Contents

property 1s that of a scientifically important property (57) Necessary properties are simply the same as essential properties 144 IV. Simple and Complex Properties ( 58) The crucial insight is that the principle of property abstraction is false (59) There are no complex properties, only complex facts (60) No scientific discover could prove that there are conjunctive properties ( 61) Since there are no complex properties, there are also no individual essences 155 Chapter 3: Relations 155 I. Reduced 1.Q. Foundations (62) The A ri st ot e l ian tr adition has n o t been hospitable to relations (63) But relations are not mere entia rationis (64) And they cannot be reduced to foundations, firstly, because foundations themselves must be ordered (65) And secondly, because foundations must also be coordinated with each other (66) Thirdl y , e v ery redu ction to f o u n d a t i o n s employs so-called "formal relations" 164 II. Accepted as Irreducible (67) Relations are uniquely characterized by having directions (68) One of Bradley's arguments merely shows that a certain argument for the existence of relations is not sound (69) And his famous regress argument merely proves that relations obtain between entities without being related to them in turn 170 III. The Nexus of Identity (70) Identity is clearly a two-place relation (71) Many identity statements are informative (72) But informative identity statements do not pose Frege's dilemma (73) For, informative identity statements are not instances of the ontological law of self­ identity (74) The issue has been muddled by being blended with the epistemological problem of how we think of individuals (75) We must, at any rate, distinguish between d em on s tra t i v e s, n a m e s , and d e s c ri p t i o n expressions

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(76) And we must also distinguish between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by name only (77) The so-called Leibniz-Russell definition of identity is a mere equivalence 189 IV. The Nexu s of Intentionality (78) A relational account of intentionality faces the problem of nonexistent objects (79) Brentano tries to solve this probl e m b y tampering with the notion of a relation (80) Russell tries to solve the problem at first by proclaiming the being of nonexistent objects (81) Later on, Russell advoca tes the view that belief is a many-place relation (82) Twardowski solves the problem of nonexisting objects by accepting "abnormal" relations (83) The intentional nexus must be distinguished from the representation relation 204 Chapter 4: Classes 204 I. Categorized il Sets (84) Cantor's description of classes as wholes needs to be amplified (85) Russell' s conception of a class as "many" is incoherent (86) Since a class is distinct from its unit class, it cannot be a whole 212 II. Categorized il Wholes (87) Halmos' description of classes as wholes is there£ ore wrong (88) The empty class is a convenient fiction (89) For wholes, there exists no parallel to class inclusion 216 III. Tied to Properties (90) Frege ties classes too closely to properties (91) A s a consequence, he is faced with paradox (92) Russell tries to eliminate classes in favor of properties (93) But, of course, he does not succeed 223 IV. The Lesson of Paradox (94) Type theory is not the correct response to paradox (95) Nor will it do to decree that properties cannot have properties (96) The class-set distinction is not the correct response to paradox (97) Nor can we blame a vicious circle for the creation of paradox (98) The paradoxes are simply nonexistence proofs which shock our intuitions

X

Con tents

238 Chapter 5: Wholes 238 . d � "G esta 1 ten " I. Categorize (99) Mach raised the problem of ho w wholes are experienced (100) Ehrenfels correctly argues that the experience of a whole is not a class of experiences (101) But the fact that wholes are not classes does not imply that they are unanalyzable (102) Nor does it imply that wholes determine the nature of their parts (103) But it is true that wholes have emergent properties 250 II. Categorized as Structures (104) Structu res can be similar to each other in different ways (105) Structures are uniquely characterized by the fact that they may be isomorphic to each other (106) S ince iso morphic str u c t u r e s n e e d n o t be identical, there are no implicit definitions ( 107) And for the same reason, isomorphic structures cannot be reduced to each other . 260 III . Sense Dimensions (108) Synthetic � priori truths are truths about our sense dimensions (109) Such truths are known� priori, since they are known without induction (110) And they are necessary, since we cannot imagine them to be false (111) This kind of necessity must be distingu ished from necessity as lawfulness 269 IV . Descriptions (112) Frege' s fundamental insight is that there are two objects connected with every description expression (113) Russell' s fundamental insight is that sentences with description expressions are not of the subject-predicate form (114) Definite descriptions are abstract structures of a certain kind (115) And so are indefinite descriptions (116) The relation between a description and what it describes is grounded in an identity (117) Since descriptions are structures, they obey the identity condition for structures V . Functions 283 (118) Proper functions are structures which are parts of descriptions (119) Proper functions are not represented by forms

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(120) Proper function s mu st be di stingui shed from the relation s which they contain (121) Propo siti on al functi on s must be di stingui shed from the propertie s which they contain 022) So-c alled " rel a t i on al propertie s" are not propertie s at all, but are structure s (123) S o - c a 1 1 e d " s e c o n d - 1 e v e 1 f u n c t i o n s " a r e structure s which contain qu antifier s (124) The v ari able entity form s a tr an scendent al category Chapter 6: Number s 293 293 I. Categorized� Multitude s (125) Euclid define s number s a s multitude s of unit s 026) Hu s serl' s ver sion of Euclid' s definition fail s, fir stly, becau se the connective and i s not the sum relation (127) And it f ail s, secondly, bec au se the notion of something i s not the notion of the number one 299 II. Categorized� Propertie s (128) Frege argue s correctly th at the number one i s not a property (129) He also argue s correctly that number s cannot be propertie s of individual s (130) Num ber s a r e not rel ati o n al propertie s of propertie s (131) Number s are not contextually defined propertie s of propertie s (132) Nor, finally, are number s str aig htforw ard propertie s of propertie s or of cla s se s 306 III. Categorized� Cla s se s (133) Frege' s f am ou s definition i s an inform ative identity statement (134) Thi s i d en t i t y s t a tement i s f al se bec au se number s h ave attribute s w hich cl a s se s do not have, and conver sely (135) So-called "recur sive definition s" of arithmetic rel ation s are re ally de scription s of the se relation s (136) And, hence, they do not reduce arithmetic relation s to anything el se 312 IV. Categorized a s Quantifiers (137) Number s are definite quantifier s (138) Ru s sell' s argument against the exi stence of the indefinite qu antifier all i s not sound (139) The quantifier nothing i s not nothing (140) The qu antifier some h a s nothing to do with exi stence (141) So-c alled "ordinal number s" are not re ally

xii

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numbers, but classes of well-ordered structures (142) The real numbers cannot be reduced to the natura 1 num hers by "stepwise definition" 324 Chapter 7: Facts 324 I. Categorized� True Propositions (143) Brentano correctly insists that judgments form an irreducible kind of mental act (144) Bolzano correctly maintains that judgments intend propositions rather than things (145) But he is mistaken in thinking that false propositions subsist (146) McTaggart's solution to the problem of false belief is unsatisfactory (147) Ryle's solution to the problem eliminates false belief altogether 048) Bergmann's sol u t ion leads back to t h e subsistence of false propositions 335 II. Categorized� Existing States of Affairs 049) Meinong's objectives are similar to our states of affairs (150) Bolzano is also mistaken in holding that the idea of Socrates rather than Socrates himself is a constituent of propositions (151) Frege, by the w ay, makes the same mistake (152) Finally, Bolzano is mistaken in thinking that truth is a property of propositions (153) Truth is a property of beliefs, assertions, etc. (154) But to say that a belief is true is to say nothing else but that it intends a fact (155) The test for factuality is coherence (156) Factuality is a categorial feature of the world (157) Finally, if false as well as true propositions subsisted, then the real world would not be distinguished from any other 350 III. Atomic and Molecular Facts (158) Wittgenstein's objection to molecular facts rests on a confusion between equivalence and identity 059) Atomic facts cannot make molecular sentences true (160) N e g a t i o n c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d t o a n incompatibility relation (161) N o r c a n i t b e r e d u c e d t o n e g a t i ve exemplification (162) Nor, finally, can it be reduced to negative properties (163) Negation forms a category of its own

Contents

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359 IV . Logical Laws and Analyticity (164) Connectives and quantifiers do not characterize logic (165) Propositional logic formulates under what general conditions states of affairs obtain (166) Predicate logic formulates under what general conditions properties are exe mplified and relations hold (167) Our characterization of logic implies that it is the theory of valid deductions (168) A sentence is analytic if its expanded vers ion is an instance of a law of logic 367 V. The Fundamental Notion of Necessity (169) Necessity is lawfulness 070) T here a re theref ore dif ferent kinds o f necessity and possibility (171) And necessity and possibility can therefore also be explicated in terms of consistency between possible worlds 374 VI. The Identity ..Qf Facts (172) Facts are identical if they have the sa me constituents in the same order (173) Logically equivalent sentences, therefore, need not represent the same fact (174) Sub s t i t u t i v i t y in belief c o n texts is a n important criterion for identity of facts (175) Equivalent sentences, quite obviously, need not be substitutable salva veritate (176) The law of substitutivity of identicals holds without restriction f o r belief a n d modal contexts (177) What breaks down for such contexts is, rather, the pernicious principle of extensionality (178) The law of existential generalization holds without restriction f o r belief a n d modal contexts Part III: Concluding Remarks about the Nature of Existence

385

Chapter 1: The Spurious Doctrine ..Qf Modes ..Qf Being 387 (179) E x i s t e n c e mu s t b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m exemplification (180) E x i s t e n c e m u s t b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m concreteness (181) Existence must be distinguished from being an object of thought

xiv

Contents

Chapter 2: Existence Conceived ..Q.f i!.E.. .2. 393 Property of Properties (182) The word 'exists' is not just an empty sound (183) Existence is not a property of properties (184) For , it makes perfect sen se to at tri but e existence to individual things Chapter 3: Existence Conceived of i!.E.. the 402 Substratum ..Q.f the World (185) Existence is undefinable (186) Existence is not a property, but the ultimate substratum for all attributes (187) Some objects of thought do not exist (188) Nonexistent objects have no properties (189) Nonexistent individuals are not constituents of fact (190) There are two kinds of negative existence facts Bibliography

417

Index of Names

429

PREFACE

This book attempts to give a complete and accurate list of the categories of the world. In other words, it tries to bring Aristotle's Categories up-to-date. My investigation into the categorial structure of the world was guided by two main ideas, one systematic, the other, historical in nature. The systematic idea is that most ontological disputes concern, all appearances to the contrary, not the existence of certain entities, but rather their nature. In each one of the chapters which deal with distinct categories, I have therefore discussed the main alternative categorizations of the kind of entity in ques­ tion. Individual things, for example, have been classified either as particulars (as substances, in the traditional sense) or else as bundles of properties. For properties, too, there are two important views: they are categorized either as particulars (located in space and/or time) or as universals. Numbers, to give a third example, have been conceived of as multitudes of units, or as properties of properties, or as classes of properties or of classes. In regard to these three kinds of entity, I come to the con­ clusions that individuals are particulars rather than bun­ dles, that properties are universals rather than particu­ lars, and that numbers are neither multitudes, nor proper­ ties, nor classes, but belong to an entirely different category of quantifier. The historical idea 1s that until very recently, an Aristotelian ontology of substance and accidence formed the basis of almost all philosophizing. Descartes, for example, is still a member of this tradition. However, in the 17th century there occurred a decisive break with that ontology. The notion of substance was attacked from the left by empir­ icists (Berkeley) and from the right by rationalists (Leibniz) . As a result, a bundle view of individuals was

Pref ace

xvi

widely accepted, and the Aristotelian distinction between essential and accidental properties was abandoned. But the acceptance of an ontology of bundles and properties raised a series of new questions. How do bundles of properties differ from mere classes? What role do relations play in the formation of bundles? What is the ontological status of relations? What kind of complex entity is a fact? And so on. The 19th century sees the final destruction of the Aristotelian ontology. Not just one, but several new cate­ gories appear on the ontological stage: relations, struc­ tures, classes, and facts. In this work, I try to ta ke stock of these ontological innovations of the last hundred years or so. The manuscript for my book was sub sta ntially finis hed several years ago. I mention this fact because it explains why I have not been able to do two things which I would like to do. Firstly, I would like to discuss in greater detail some of the important contributions to ontology which have recently been publis hed. As it was, I could only insert brief references to the works of Arm strong, Butchvaro v, Castaneda, Hochberg, and other philosop hers. Secondly, I would now devote a separate chapter to negation, in.order to emphasize that it is just as much a fundamental category of the world as, say, the category of property. I think that there are precisely eight categories (not counting exis­ tence), namely, individuals, properties, relations, classes, structures, quantifiers, facts, and negation. On second thought, negation really deserves, not just a chapter of its own, but, like existence, a whole separate part; for it is clear that, like existence and unlike the categories, it is not a property. I shall have to write another book called "Negation and Existence"! Once again, I would like to thank my colleagues, prof.es­ sors Paul Eisenberg and Michael Dunn, for their help. They read the manuscript and made many helpful suggestions. R. Grossmann Bloomington, Indiana June, 1982

Part!

Introductory Remarks about Ontologx Realism) and Empiricism

1. The Task of Ontology

(1) Ontology searches for the categories of the world Ontology asks and tries to answer two related questions. What are the categories of the world? And what are the laws that govern these categories? In chemistry, by comparison, we search for chemical elements and the l aw s which they obey; and in physics we try to discover the elementary particles and their laws. But ontology is not a science among sciences. Its scope is larger; its viewpoint, funda­ mentally different. When Anaximander speculated that everything is made up from the four elements--fire, earth, air, and water--he proposed, in effect, a rudimentary theory of chemistry. And so did Anaximenes when he maintained that ev erything con­ sists of various densities of air. Ontology was born when someone realized that any view of this sort implies a dis­ tinction between individual things, on the one hand, and their properties, on the other. Ontology was born when someone realized that there are, not only different kinds of individual thing, but also different kinds of entity. This realization must have led almost immediately to a number of distinctly ontological questions. How, precisely, do indi­ viduals and properties differ? How are they related to each other? Are there perhaps any other kinds of entity? And so on. Plato's theory of forms deals with just these sorts of questions, and we think of it, therefore, as one of the first ontological inquiries. The so-called natural sciences are interested in indi­ vidual things--in the kinds of individuals there are; in their tiniest as well as their most gigantic configurations; in the constituents they have; and in the manner in which 3

4

About Ontology, Re alism, and Empiricism

these constituents are put together. The sciences are con­ cerned, to say it philosophically, with everything there is in space and time, with the physical universe. Ontology, on the other hand, concerns itself with everything there is, irrespective of whether it is concrete or abstract. To argue, as we shall, that there are abstract entities, is to defend the very enterprise of metaphysics. It is, to use Plato' s image, to enter the battle of Gods and Giants; the battle between metaphysicians and those who think science is philosophy enough. The contrast between concrete and ab­ stract entities serves as a paradigm of a categorial dis­ tinction. It illustrates what we mean by a categorial difference. Plato's separation of a world of becoming from a world of being captures the spirit of this metaphysical point of view. But properties are not the only kind of abstract entity, as we shall see. There are numbers and, hence, there is arithmetic. There are sets and, hence, there is set theory. There are several kinds of abstract entity and, hence, several further kinds of inquiry, dist inct both from the natural sciences and from ontology. And this fact raises a number of new questions for ontology. How do these �inds of abstract entity differ from each other? How are they con­ nected with each other? And how are they related to indi­ vidual things? What looks at the beginning of the ontologi­ cal enterprise like the fundamental dichotomy, namely, the distinction between individuals and properties, turns out to be just one of many equally basic distinctions. A particular ontological theory must of course strive to accommodate all of these differences and connections. It must attempt to present us with a complete list of catego­ ries. Everything there is must find a place in the system. , , The theory is un s a t i sf a c t or y if i t i s inc om p 1 e t e, th a t i s if there are entities which are not categorized. It may be argued, for example, that classes have no place within the Aristotelian framework of substance and modification of substance. But it is not enough that everything should find � category in the theory. Everything must be fitted to the proper category. An ontological theory is also faulty if it assigns entities to the wrong categories. For example, a Cartesian would contend that Aristotelians misplace the m ind: A mind is a substance in its own right and not, as Aristotelians claim, a mere modification of a substance. Or it might be argued, to turn to the present, that natural numbers are, not classes of classes, but quantifiers of a certain kind. Nor, finally, must the ontology contain dis­ tinctions that make no differences. Categorial distinctions must not be made capriciously. Categories are not to be

The Task of Ontology

5

multiplied arbitrarily. Aristotelian ontology may be ac­ cused of introducing a spurious distinction by separating so-called essential from accidental properties. Hand in hand with the discovery of categories goes the discovery and form ulation of categorial laws. To discern the former is, in a sense, to find the latter; for these laws specify how the categories differ from each other and resemble each other. There is again a similarity to the natural sciences. In physics, the fundamental laws describe the behavior of elementary particles. In ontology, similar­ ly, the fundamental laws describe the behavior of catego­ ries. For example, individuals are subject to change, while properties are not. Individuals, furthermore, even though they exemplify properties, are never exemplified by any­ thing. Laws of this nature distinguish between different categories; and the second law mentioned also shows how they establish connections between categories. Properties are connected with entities by means of what I shall call "the nexus of exemplification." Classes, on the other hand, are connected with entities by the membership relation. And it may be thought, mistakenly as we shall see, that properties and classes determine each other mutually. Ontology, I said at the beginning, asks what the catego­ ries of the world are. What is a category? It is a kind of entity. What kind of kind? In answer to this question, we can only give examples. It is that sort of kind, as we have seen, that distinguishes between between individuals, on the one hand, and properties on the other. It is that sort of kind, as we have noted, which obeys a certain kind of law, namely, categorial laws. But this reply does not really help much either. We must therefore rest content, as on so many other occasions, with examples rather than definitions. In these most fundamental matters of metaphysics, defini­ tions are impossible. (2) And in order to discover these categories, we must analyze facts Ontology consists in large part of a classification of entities. It seems to resemble botany more than chemistry and physics; for what we classify in chemistry and physics are, not the ordinary perceptual objects around us, but the elements and particles of which these objects consist. And these elements and particles are only discovered through an analysis of ordinary objects. But this first impression of the nature of ontology is incorrect. Ontology, too, re­ quires analysis. But while in chemistry and physics the objects of analysis are individual things like apples,

6

About Ontology, Re alism, and Empiricism

rocks, and cells, the objects of analysis in ontology are facts like the fact that the earth is round, the fact that all whales are mammals, and the fact that 2 plus 3 equals 5. Facts are to ontological analysis what individual things are to chemistry and physics. And the world, conceived of as a complicated fact, is to ontology what the physical universe is to science. However, the purpose of ontological analysis has of ten been misunderstood. It has been held mistakenly that only simple entities, the result of ontological analysis, need to be categorized. And this view is often based on the equally mistaken notion that only simple entities deserve to be called existents. Bergm a n n, f o r e x am ple, s t a tes: "Ontologists do not just catalogue or classify what exists. Rather they search for "simples" of which everything that exists "consists." These simples, and nothing else, they hold to 'exist', or to be the only existents." ("Ineffabil­ ity, Ontology, and Method, " in G. Bergmann, 1 964, p. 57.) There is a sense in which it is true that ontolog y searches for simples. A fact is a complex entity, but the property of being a fact is simple. Similarly, a class is a complex entity, but the property of being a class is simple. Finally, although it sounds paradoxical, a complex entity is complex, but the property of being complex is simple. Inso­ far as ontology looks for categories, it searches for cer­ tain simple properties, namely, categorial properties. But we must note that all entities, complex entities as well as simple ones, have to be categorized. In this respect, ontology differs from chemistry and physics. It differs from them, not because it can get along without analysis, but because it attempts to classify, not only the results of analysis, but the objects of analysis as well. It asks, not what kinds of simple entity there are, but what kinds of entity there are. And this leads us to a misconception of the very nature of ontological analysis. If I am so far right, then we must distinguish in ontology between two quite different prob­ lems. On the one hand, there is the question: What are the constituents of this complex entity? Or, to put it differ­ ently: To what categories do the constituents of t his complex entity belong? On the other hand, there is the entirely different question: To what category does this complex entity itself belong? An answer to the first ques­ tion is not automatically an answer to the second. If one does not see this clearly, then one may well come to the conclusion that the limits of ontological analysis are the limits of ontology itself. Analysis, we must emphasize, is

The Task of Ontology

7

onl y p a rt of ont olog y . It does n ot p ro v ide us , in Butchvarov's words, "with an understanding, with an adequate a c c o u n t , o f the natu re of a co mplex entit y." (P. Butchvarov, 1974, p. 16.) To under 1 ine this most important point, let us consider an example. Assume, for the sake of the example, that the correct analysis of the fact that A is different from� yields the three constituents A, �, and the relation of difference. Every analysis yields, on the linguistic level, just like this one, a list. To this list, there corresponds In our particular case, analysis re ­ in reality a class. sults in the class consi sting of A,�, and the relation of the difference. Next, we ma y ask to what categories the members of this class belong. Let us agree that it consists of two individuals and one relation. Notice that this answer does not tell us that the object of analysis belongs to the category of fact. And notice also that neither the result of analysis, the class, nor the members of this class belong to the categor y of fact. Thus even if we kno w to what categories the constituents of a complex entity belong, we do not automatically kno w to what categor y the complex entity itself belongs. Of course, we have gained some insight into the nature of our object of analysis. We know no w that it consists of individuals and a relation rather than of so me other kinds of entity. But the corresponding class consists of exactly the same kinds of entity. In this clear and obvious sense, analysis does not provide us with an account of the nature of the analyzed object. Analysis alwa ys yields a class of entities. Hence, if the object of analysis itself is not a class, analysis ma y be said-- with the h yperbole so dear to metaphysicians--to "destroy or fa 1 s if y its obj e ct." If one does not re a 1 i z e that this is of the ver y essence of analysis, one ma y make still another mistake. One may search in vain for a consti­ tuent that distinguishes, for example, between the members of the class arrived at through analysis, on the one hand, and the constituents of the analy z ed entity, on the other. Russell, for example, seems to introduce a distinction be­ tween two kinds of relation, relations that actually relate and those that do not, when he claims that in our example "the difference which occurs in the proposition actually relates A and B, whereas the difference after analysis is a notion which has no connection with A and�." (B. Russell, 1964, p . 49.) He seems to think that the relation of dif­ ference as a member of the class is one thing, while this relation as a constituent of the fact is quite another. But there is no difference between the relation as it occurs in

8

About Onto logy, Re ali sm, and Empirici s m

the fact and as it occu r s in the class. (Com par e F . H. Bradley, 1911, p . 74.) The r elat ion which is a const ituent of the fact is the very same entity as the relation which is a member of the class. What d ifference there is between the fact and the class is a matter, not of the r el at ion, but of the d ifference between facts and classes. A fact is cate­ gorially different from a class, even though it may have as const ituents the same ent it ies which the class ha s a s members. So much about the funct ions and l im its of ontolog ical analysis. The world, I said earlier, is the ult imate object of ontolog ical analys is. But th is wor ld must be d ist in­ gu ished fr om the phys ical un iver se. The un iverse is a compl icated spatio-temporal structure. Facts, on the other hand, do n o t f o rm such a structu r e . I t f oll o ws, as Ar mstrong fails to realize, that a world consisting of facts cannot be identical w ith the un ive r se . (D. M . Armstr ong, 197 8 , vol. 1, p p . 126-135.) But if the wor ld is not the same as the un iver se, to what category does it belong? Ther e are a number of plaus ible answers. It may be sa id that the world is the total ity of ent i t ies. Or it may be claimed that it is the tota l ity of facts. (C o m pare L . Wittgenstein, 1961b, p. 7.) I f these answers imply that the wor ld belongs to the categor y of class, then I th ink that they are wrong. But I must admit that I do not know how to argue for my view. I believe that the world is a fact; that it belongs to the category of fact. If this is the correct view, then we can dist ingu ish between two levels of ontolo­ gical analysis. On the first level, the world can be anal­ yzed into its const ituent facts. On th is level, we do not arr ive at new categories, but d iscover the k inds of fact ther e are. We discover, in other words, the subcategories of the category fact. On the second level, we analyze facts which do not consist of further facts into the ir const itu­ ents. It is on this se cond level of ana lys is that we enc ounte r th e tr a d it ion a l c a te g o r ies of ind iv idu al, property, relation, etc. To analyze a natural substance into its chem ical elements is quite obviously not the same thing as to analyze a class into its members. And a ga in, to analy ze an atom into its elementary particles is not the same thing as to ana lyze a geometr ic f igure into its spatial parts. We deal here w ith very d ifferent kinds of whole and, consequently, with very d ifferent k inds of the part-whole r elat ion. (Com par e T.R. G ir ill, 1976, p p . 69-79 . ) Ontolog ical a na lys is, as we un­ derstand it, is a well-defined enterpr ise, clear ly d ist in­ gu ished fr om other k inds of ana lys is. Its obje cts a r e f a cts , and its cha r a cter ist ic p art-whole r elat ion is the

The Task o f On to l o gy

9

rel ation between any entity and any fact of which the entity is a part. I sha l l continue to ca ll this the constituent rel ation . (3) Onto logy cat egorizes a l l and .Q.B.ly those ob j ects which have being Onto l ogy asks what are the cat egories of the wor ld. So far, I have tried to el uc idate the crucial terms ' category' and ' wor ld' . But I could have begun instead by saying that onto l ogy attempts to categorize everything there .i.!, and this alternative introduction wou ld have led us earl ier to a number of questions which we must now consider. There is an o l d and ha l l owed tradition, according to which being comes in many modes. One distinguishes, for examp l e, between the existence of individual things and the mere subsistence of facts. Concrete things are said to exist, whi l e abstract ent ities are he l d to subsist . But even though this view has been maint ained by some of the recent p hi l oso phers I most admire--by Bo l z ano, Frege, and Meinong, among others-- ! do not think that it is correct. I do not believe that there are modes of being. Existence is the on ly kind of being there is. I sha l l later defend this be lief. What is of primary interest to us right now is how the possibil ity of modes of being affects our conception of onto l ogy. It seems to me c l ear that if there are mod es of b eing, then it is the task of onto l ogy to categorize a l l entities, irrespective of their particul ar modes of being. The fie l d of onto l ogy is as wide as the rea l m of being itse l f . But i t i s not any wider: What has no being cannot be categorized. What has no being cannot be the subject of ontology. Meinong, as we al l know, wou ld demur. According to him, there is an enter p rise that dea l s, not on ly with existents and subsistents, but also with objects that have no being whatsoever; with objects like the golden mountain and the round square. And he c l aims that we are mere l y prejudiced if we exclude such objects from categorization. (A. Meinong, 1 90 4 . ) But Meinong's defense of a genera l theory of objects rests on an important assumption which I do not share. He maintains that objects without being may neverthe l ess have pro p erties and stand in re l ations. He ho l ds t hat the go l den mountain is golden, that the round square is both round and square. No w , if it were true that objects without being brist l e with properties, then it wou ld make sense to attempt to classify them, according to these properties. But if Meinong's assumption is mistaken, as I sha l l contend in a l ater cha p ter, then there simp ly can be

10

Abo ut O ntology, Re alism, a nd Empiricism

no such classification; for one can only classify what has properties and stands in relations; what has , in short , attributes. My conviction that ontology cannot be extended beyond the realm of being thus rests on my rejection of the v iew that beingless objects can have attributes. (4)

But ontology does not � .!.Q. decide what part icular entities there are

There may be a fair amount of agreement about these two contentions that ontology covers the whole realm of being and that it does not go beyond it . But my next thesis is bound to be unpopular. It is widely believed that ontology ought to tell us , not only what cat egories of ent it y there are, but also whether or not there are such things as elec­ trons, colors, natural numbers, and union classes. I think that this conception of the task of ontology is mistaken. Moreover , I believe that it is the source of a vast amount of bad philosophy. Whether or not there are electrons is a quest ion for physics to decide; whether or not there are colors is a question which enlightened common sense answers in the affirmative; whether or not there are naturaJ numbers is a topic for arithmetic; and whether or not there are union classes is a problem for set theory. Common sense , the so-called nat ural sciences , arithmetic , geometry, set theory , etc. , t ell us w hat there is. Ont ology is then presented with a long list of entities which, to the best of our knowledge , exist . As philosophers , it is not our task to dispute the discoveries of the physicist and mathemati­ cian. We merely try to establish a certain order among that multit ude of entities before us. We merely try to do in a systematic fashion what is done haphazardly and on the side in most inquiries, nam ely , to categoriz e all the entit � es there are. And we discover similarities and d ifferences , connections and coherences , among categories of which neither common sense nor science ever dreamed. The metaphysician' s prejudice in favor of t his or that particular kind of entity has seldom carried the day in the natural sciences. A physicist can rarely be persuaded , on philosophical grounds , that electrons do or do not exist . But mathematicians have all too often been int imidated b y philosophers. They have gladly conceded t o philosophers such questions as whether or not there are natural numbers. And philosophers have eagerly rushed in where mathematicians feared to tread. The source of this intimidation is episte­ mological: How do you kno w , mathemat icians are taunt ed, that there are numbers? Surely, not by means of perception. Nor, of course, by experimental observation. But if neither

Th e Ta s k o f On to lo gy

11

by perception nor by experiment, then you probabl y do not know it at al l; unless, of course, you are wi l ling to postu­ l ate, in desperation, a specia l facu l ty of eidetic intui­ tion. I think that this epistemol ogica l cha l l enge can be met. We perceive num bers in precise l y the same way as co l ors. But it can on ly be met, as we sha l l see, if we reject a number of dogmas of the P l atonic tradition. We sha l l discuss this matter in chapter 3. At present, I mere ly wish to point out that one reason for this mistaken conception of onto l ogy is that ma thema ticians have been intimidated by the epistemo logical chal lenge and have, as a consequence, avoided questions about the existence of num­ bers. But there is also another reason for this conception. It seems to me that two different questions have often been confused with each other. There is the question, for example, of whether or not there are natural numbers. And there is also the quite different question of what category natura l numbers be l ong to. Assume, in order to have an i l l ustration, that someone conc l udes that numbers are classes, that they belong to the category of class. It may then happen that he expresses his conclusion by saying that there are no such things as numbers, but on ly certain c l ass e s. He the reby giv es the impression of having determined that there are no numbers. But it shou ld be clear that this impression is misl eading. If it real ly were true that there are no numbers, then they could not possib ly be cl asses of a certain sort. A person who serious ly claims that there is no Loch Ness monster cannot, in the same breath, hold that it is a repti le rather than a fish. How then must we interpret the conc l usion concerning numbers? Obvious ly, our hypothetical philosopher ho lds that numbers exist and that they belong to the category of class. But this l atter contention al lows for at least three differ­ ent variations. First l y, it may be maintained that the expression 'natural number' happens to be a mere abbrevia­ tion of some such phrase as 'class of such and such a kind'. Second l y, it may be he ld that the property of being a natural number is identica l with the property of being a c l ass of such and such a kind. These two views are of course equiva l ent to each other. A third possibi l ity is rather different. It may be contended that there are two properties, the property of being a natural number and the property of being a cl ass of such and such a kind, and that these two properties are co-extensive. Now, it may appear obvious that this l ast contention does not amount to a denia l of the existence of natura l numbers. But we must realize that the same ho lds for the first two possibilities.

About O n tology , Re alism, and Empiricis m

12

To argue that the word ' bachelor' is merely short for some such phrase as ' unmarried male of marriageable age' is not to argue that there are no bachelors. Similarly, to argue that the property of being human is identical with the property of being a rational animal is not to argue that there are no human beings. We must, therefore, be on guard against the common mistake of thinking that philosophers are discussing the existence of numbers, or of classes, or of facts, etc. , when in reality they argue about the proper categorization of these kinds of entity. My contention that it is not the task of ontology to decide whether or not there are such things as numbers has some important methodological consequences. For example, we shall not have to bother with views that deny the existence of colors in favor of classes of (colored) individual things, or in favor of mere color words. The issue between realists and nominalists cannot be joined by denying the existence of such things as colors, shapes, pitches, etc. A view that denies their existence is, not a respectable, albeit mistaken, alternative to realism, but merely silly. A philosopher who denies that there are colors need not be taken seriously. (N. Goodman, 1977 .) And w h a t -holds for colors holds just as much for numbers, classes, and facts. The realism-nominalism controversy, for example, concerns, not the existence of colors, shapes, and pitches, but their nature. It centers around questions like: To w ha t category do colors belong? Is the particular shade of olive green which this pen on my desk has a concrete or an abstract entity? If it is concrete, can any other individual have the identical shade of color? And so on. (5)

Definitions are the bane of ontology

P hilosophers who believe that it is their business to decide whether or not there are such entities as numbers, and who, moreover, wish to hold the ridiculous view that there aren ' t any, speak often about a reduction of numbers to other kinds of entity. This reduction is usually thought to be accomplished by definition. Numbers are said to be defined as classes of classes of certain sort. And if one dares to ask whether it is really true that the number 2, for example, is the class of all couples, one meets with shocked surprise that such a question could ever be raised in view of the fact that numbers have simply been defined in this way. Nothing, I believe, has been as harmful to genuine prog­ ress in ontology as the prevalent uncritical use of the term ' definition' . Almost any kind of statement has been called a definition. And if this confusion w ere not bad eno ugh ,

The Ta sk of O nto logy

13

one also thinks of all of these v ar i ous kinds of st ate ment as mere mat t ers of convenience and convention . A defini­ tion , one implicitly or explicitly assumes , is neither true nor f alse ; it need not be argued for ; it need not be est ab­ lished. (There are some laudable excep tions , for example , S. Le s ni e w s ki , 1931 • ) This p e rv as iv e as su mp ti on exp 1 ains the surpri se w he n a definition is c alled into questi on. Finally , there is the exasperating practice of just laying do w n w h at thi ngs are by definiti on. To the question of whether numbers are really classes of classes of a certain sort , we may get the reply that this is precisely what they are , because they have been defined as such. Of course , we w ould w ant to protest th at nu mbers either are cl asses of cl asses or are not cl asses of cl asses , and th at nobody c an turn them into classes of classes if they are not classes of classes , not even with the magic w and of definition. In order to avoid the many pitfalls associated with the use of the term 'definition' , we sh all completely do without it . We sh all menti on it , to be sure , but w e sh all not use it . Inste ad , we sh all di stinguish betw een four kinds of st ate ment: (1) St ate ments to the effect th at a cert ain expression is an abbrevi ation of another e xpression ; (2) statements to the effect that a certain expression, though not an abbreviation for another , represents the s ame entity as another expressi on ; ( 3 ) identity statements ; and (4) e quiv alence st atements . The truth of a statement of kind (1) depends , of course , on the prior adoption, explicitly or implicitly, of an abbrevi ation proposal. Such a proposal by itself is neither true nor false , although it may be more or less convenient. If all definitions were nothing but abbre­ vi ati on propos als , then it w oul d i ndeed be true th at a dispute about their truth-value w ould be pointless . But in this c ase and by the s a me to ken , definitions w ould be of small significance in ontology. In p articular, they could not determi ne , to st a y with our ex a mple , whether or not numbers are classes. I f a given abbre vi ati on propos al is accepted , then a cert ain statement of kind (1) is tru e . If one were to argu e , on these grounds , th at nu mbers are cl asses of classes , one w ould h ave to show that owing to some linguis­ tic conv ention or practice the w ord 'nu mber' h appens to repre sent the s a me property as the expression 'cl ass of classes of a certain sort'. And similar considerations hold for statements of kind ( 2) . Furthermore , if a statement of kind ( 1 ) or ( 2) is true , then a cer t ai n identity st ate ment is also tru e . For e x a mple , if 'number' is j ust a nother expression f or w h at the phr ase 'cl ass of cl asses of a certain kind' represents , then it is true that the property of being a number is ident ical with the property of be ing a

14

About Ontology, Re ali sm, and Ernpiri ci s n

cla s s o f cla s s e s o f a certain k i nd. And it i s al so true that numbers are identical with clas se s of clas ses. Some of the most widely and intensively di scus sed problem s of con­ temporary philosophy arise from the fact that the converse doe s not hold ; that we cannot infer from the truth of an identity s ta t ement the truth of a s tatement of kind ( 1 ) or (2) . We shall join thi s di scu s s ion later in a section on identity. That the conver se doe s not hold i s due to the fact that some identity statement s involve de scriptions. To s ee thi s , let ' G' be a s traightforward a b b reviation for ' green' . If s o, then f is identical with green. And f r om thi s identity, in turn, it follow s that ' G' and ' green ' are word s for the same entity. H owev er, from the fact that Scott i s the author of Waverley, it doe s not follow that ' Scott' is just another expre s sion for the entity repre sent­ ed by ' the author of Waverley'. Thus there are true identi­ ty s tatement s that cannot be ju s tified by reference to lingui s tic practice s . Such s tatement s are often called "informative identity statement s." And it is precisely this kind of identity s tatement that ha s often b een called a definition. Frege' s famou s definition of number s is such an informa­ tive identity s tatement. Adju s ted to our terminology, it read s : The number of F ' s is the cla s s determined by the property of b eing s imilar to I_. (G. Frege, 197 4, pp. 7 980.) We have here a straightforward identity statement to the effect that a certain number, de scribed as the number of things which are I., is identical with a certain clas s, which is described as the clas s determined by a certain relational property. To be more preci se, we ge t such an identity statement, if we instantiate Frege' s general formula. Now, it i s obviou s that thi s statement may b e either true or fal s e, so that it make s perfect sen s e to a sk wha t tru� h­ value it has. Moreover, it is equally obviou s that thi s is not a lingui stic que s tion in the s en s e ju st de s cribed. I t i s a factual que s tion: Doe s the numb er of F ' s , a s Frege contend s , have the property of b eing a cla s s of the kind indicated? Dedekind' s recursive definition of the sum function also consists of informative identity statements. ( R. Dedekind, 1888.) Dedekind proves , in effect, that there i s one and only one s u m function (relation) which fulfill s the fol­ lowing two conditions: (1) The sum of m and 1 i s identical with the succe s sor of m, (2) The s u m of m and the succe s s or of n i s identical with the succe s sor of the sum of m and n.

Th e Task o f On to l o gy

15

Thus he proves that these two identity statements hold. In ( 1) , one and the same number is described in two different ways ; once, as the sum of m and l ; once, as the successor of m. And (1) is , just as is Frege' s definition , a general statement, holding for any natural number m. Furthermore, it makes perfect sense here too to ask whether ( 1) is true or false. And the truth or falsehood of (1) is not a matter of linguistic fact. The same holds for (2) . Together, the two informative identities tell us that any natural number which is the sum of two natural numbers is also the succes­ sor of some natural number. They inform us that any natural number that can be described in terms of the sum relation can be described by means of the recursive successor rela­ tion. But this fact of arithmetic has not the slightest tenden cy to prove that there is no such thing as the sum relation , that the sum relation can be reduced to the suc­ cessor relation. Q uite to the contrary. If there were no sum relation , then it could not possibly be true that the sum of m and 1 is identical with the successor of m, just as the son of J ames could not be the brother of Henry unless t h e r e exist e d t h e son-father rel ation. (Compar e R. Grossmann , 1973, pp. 55-61.) Just as we must distinguish between identity statements which are true by virtue of linguistic facts and those which are true because of other kinds of fact, so must we distin­ guis h, correspondingly , between two kinds of equivalence statement. L et 'X' abbreviate the sentence ' The earth is round'. If so, then P is identical with (the fact that) the earth is round. Furthermore , P is also equivalent to (the fact that) the earth is round , that is , f obtains if and only if it is the case that the earth is round. It is clear that if two states of affairs Q and R are identical , then they are also equivalent. But the converse does not hold. Now , we may say that in our example f is equivalen t to the fact that the earth is round as a matter or consequence of linguistic fact, since we made and ac cepted a certain abbre­ viation proposal. To be more precise, the equivalence fol­ lows from the acceptance of the proposal, the fact tha t if '.Q' and 'R' represent the same thing , then Q is identical with R, and the further fact that if Q and R are identical, then they are equivalent. Next, let us consider two states of affairs , .§. and T, which are equivalent , bu t not identi­ cal , so that they could not possibly be equivalent as a matter of linguistic fact. This equivalence holds, but not as a matter of ho w we use expressions. Y et even factual equivalences of this kind have been called definitions. It is customary , for exampl e , to claim that the connec­ not; and the or and -and can be defined in terms of -tive -

-

16

Abo u t On tology, Re al ism, an d Emp iric ism

fol lo wing e q u i v alen ce i s cited i n s u p p o r t of this contention: All states of affai rs .E and _g_ are such that the state of affairs .E and _g_ obtains if and only if the following state of affairs obtains: ll ll not the case that not-p or not-g obtains. But this equivalence is true, I submit, not as a matter of linguistic convention. There is, as far as I can see, no explicit or implicit agreement among English-speaking people to abbreviate sentences of the one kind by shorter sentences of the other. Rather, it is a matter of logical fact that whenever a state of affairs of the one kind obtains, a state of affairs of the other kind obtains, and conversely. Thus the existence of this true equivalence lends no plausibility whatsoever to the contention that there is no such thing as conjunction, that conjunction can be reduced to disjunction and negation. At this point, still a further mistake often enters the picture. A general equivalence, like the one just men­ tioned, is sometimes confused with identity. One claims that a logical equivalence amounts .!.Q an identity. It has been said, for example, that the state of affairs .f and Q is identical with the state of affairs ll. is not tne case that not-P or not-Q simply because they are logically equivalent. If this were true then it may also be argued that the rela­ tion of conjunction does not exist. B ut nothing could be further from the truth. The equivalence relation is not the same as the identity relation, and an equivalence that holds generally for all states of affairs is precisely this, a general equivalence, and not an identity. The two states of affairs under discussion are equivalent, they are even equivalent as a matter of logic, but they are not identical. But the most pernicious use of the term ' definition' occurs in connection with so-called contextual definitions. In almost every instance, a contextual definition is used to camouflage an ontological thesis as a harmless linguistic convention. A case in point is the Russellian paradox of the property which a property exemplifies if and only if it does not exemplify itself. Starting with the form 'f is not f' , one introduces the sign 'I.' by contextual definition, and one claims that ' f is I.' is mere ly short for ' f is not f' . And then one treats the sign 'I.' without further ado as an expression for a property. But this procedure is quite obviously illegitimate. Nothing can prevent us from abbreviating ' f is not f' in any fashion we choose. In particular, we may write ' f is I.' instead of ' f is not f' . But then we cannot treat, and this is the crux of the mat­ ter, the completely arbitrary sign 'I.' as if it were the n a m e of a prop e r t y. Of co u r s e, t h e l e t t e r ' F ' 1. s

The Task o f Ontolo gy

17

deliber ately introdu ced, rather th an so me arbi tr ary sign devoid of prior meaning, because it customarily represents a property. Wh at h appen s, therefore, is that a cert ain equiv alence is disguised as a contextu al definiti on, in order to make a hig hly i mpl ausible step appe ar to be unproblematic, namely the equiv alence: All f are such that f is I. if and only if f is not f . Here 'I.' is assu med to be t h e n a me of a c e rt ai n p r o p e rty. B u t i t i s j u s t the existence of this property which the ensuing contradiction disproves. (Compare R. Grossmann, 1972. ) Another c ase i n point is the contextu al definiti on of class terms. It is sometimes stipulated that 'e is a member of the class determined by I.' be just another expression for ' e is I_' . If this w ere nothing but a h armless lingui stic convention, then no useful purpose could possibly be served by using such w ords as ' cl ass ' and ' member '. These expres ­ sions should be av oided at any cost; for they give the mi st aken i mpressi on th at one is t alking about cl asses and their members when one is really talking, only by me ans of different shapes or noises, about properties and the things w hich exe mplify them. On the other h and, if one w ants to introduce classes and the membership rel ation, then no mere ling uistic con venti on could possibly tu rn the tri ck. The w ords ' cl ass ' and ' member ' must then be used in their ordi­ n ary me anings. The proponents of contextu al definiti ons w ant to h ave their c ake and e at it, too. But ei ther the p atterns ' cl ass ' and ' member ' are co mpletely arbitr ary and are presumed to have no prior meaning of their own, or else they me an here wh at they ordi n a rily me an. In the first c ase, one merely cre ates confusi on by using the m. In the second case, the proposed definition cannot be a ma tter of stipulation. It turns out to be a disguised equiv alence to the effect th at all entities e and all properties f are such that e is a member of the class determined by f if and only if e i s f. It has not completely escaped the notice of philosophers that straightforw ard factu al identity and equiv alence st ate­ ments h a ve been offered up as definiti ons. So me philoso­ phers h ave therefore distinguished between two kinds of identity and equiv alence statements, those that fulfill the twin conditions of elimin ability and noncreativity, on the one h and, and those th at do not, on the other. (For ex am ­ ple, D. Hilbert and P. B ern ays, 193 4, vol. 1, pp. 292-293, and 3 91 - 3 92 ; P. Suppes, 1957, pp. 152 - 1 6 3. ) And they have proposed to c all only the former definitions. One should perh aps ob ject th at this use of ' defi niti on ' is bound to mislead a great number of people who think of definitions as matters of convention and convenience. But the more impor­ tant point to notice is that even eliminable and noncreative

18

Abo ut O n tolo gy, Re alism, a nd Empi ricism

equivalence s, as I have already pointed out, have no reduc­ tive force in ontology. So far, I have rai sed two objection s a gain st the frequent indi scriminate u se of the term 'definition ' for identity and equivalence statement s . Fi r stly, there i s the fact that some of the se statement s are true, n ot a s a matter of lin­ gui stic st ipu l ation or practi ce, but a s a matter of fact. Thi s critici sm i s in line with Frege' s admonition, "One mu st never pre sent a s a definiti on what re qui re s a proof or an intuiti on to e stab l i sh it s truth. " (G. Fre ge, 196 Ob, p. S.) But if an identity statement i s true a s a matter of fact, then it ha s some reductive force. If, for examp le, Frege ' s definition of number s were correct, then it would be e stab­ li shed that nu mber s are certain c l a s se s and a l so, w e mu st not over look, that the se cla s se s are number s. If the morn­ in g star i s the evenin g sta r, to take an obviou s exa mple, then there exi st s only one such hea venly body, the planet V enu s, and not tw o, a s one may have mi sta ken ly thou ght. However, and thi s i s my second cri tici s m, eli minable and noncreative equiva lence s do not have the reductive power of true identitie s. Not even a logical equivalence prove s that we are dea ling with ju st one rather than two kind s of state of affair s. To confu se ontological matter s further, there are such thin g s a s definiti on s by ab stracti on, real definiti on s, i mp licit definition s, con structiona l definition s, impredica­ tive definiti on s, etc. I shall comment on some of the se Anticipating the notion s at the appropriate place s below. re su l t s of the se co mment s now, I maintain that there a re on ly two way s of show i n g that what i s al l e ged to be an onto l o gical kind reduce s in rea l i ty to another kind. First ly, one may di scover that expre s sion s which apparently repre sent different kind s of entity refer, in truth, to the very sa me kind of entity. In so me of the se ca se s, · one expre s si on w i ll be an abbreviati on of another. Second l y, one may e stabli sh that an informative identity statement i s true. In thi s ca se, a kind of entity de scri bed in one w ay i s identical with a kind of entity de scribed in a different w a y. A ll other so -ca lled definiti on s h ave n o reductive power. So much, then, in defen se of ontology. Sure ly, no u seful pu r p o s e w ou l d b e s e rv e d b y t ry i n g t o e s t a b l i s h i t s po s sibi l i ty in a purely genera l and ab stract fa shi on. Di spute s about the true natu re of onto l o g y, ju st li ke simi lar di sputes about phi l o sophy as a who le, are singu lar ly barren and tediou s. The proof of the pudding, a s the sayin g goe s, i s in the eatin g. Our inve stigation s i n the main part of thi s book mu st speak for onto l o gy more e lo quent ly and convincing ly than any genera l de scription of it can.

2 . A Defense of Realism

(6) Cartesi an re alism contains the seeds .Qf ide alism We know th at something exists because we are acqu ainted with it or with something else from which we can infer its existence . There is no other w ay of knowing that something exists. Hence, whene ver we clai m to kno w th at a cert ain thin g or kind of thin g exists, we must be prep ared to sho w either th at we are ac qu ainted with it, or th at we are ac­ qu ainted with so m ething else fro m which we c an infer its existence. For ex a mple, if we clai m, as we s h all, th at there are numbers, then we must be prep ared to explain how we know that they exist. We shall maintain that the exis­ tence of nu mbers is, not inferred, but a m atter of percep ­ tion. Inference need not be considered in the follo wing inquiries. The c ategories with which we are concerned are so b asic and perv asive th at we should be ac qu ainted with the m if they exist at all. But we must try to shed some light on the notion of ac qu aint ance which is here in play. By acqu aintance, I shall mean experience and perception. An act of p erception is either an act of seeing, or an act of he aring, or an act of s melling, or an act of t astin g, or an act of touching (feeling) . There are thus five kinds of perceptu al act. Wh at we perceive are perceptu al ob jects, that is, such things as chairs, mount ains, clouds, inkmarks, and melodies. By me ans of perception, we know the extern al w orld. B y me ans of experience, on the other h and, we kno w our o wn inner ment al life. We kno w th at t t e r e a re p ains, n ot by perceiving them, but by feeling them. We kno w t h at there are thoughts, hopes, and wishes, because we have them. And w e kno w th at there are sense - i mpressions, bec ause we sense the m. I a m not sure ho w m any diffe rent kinds of 19

20

About Onto lo g y , Re a l ism , a nd Emp ir icism

mental act fall un der the gen u s experience. B ut thi s detail, fort unately, doe s not matter for our p urp o se. What matter s i s only that there are both perception s and experi­ ence s, and that their object s are mutually exclu sive. J u st a s we cannot perceive a pain, but can only experience it, so we cannot experience a chair, but can only perceive it. Thi s evident view, however, i s threatened from two side s. From the left, if you plea se, there i s an attack on percep­ tion and it s object s. Ac q uaintance, one clai m s , can only co mp ri se experience. The re s ult of thi s attack, w hether intended or not, i s al mo st alway s so me for m of ideali s m. B ut perception i s al so attacked from the right, a s it were. Perception, one maintain s, i s not powerful enough to yield knowledge. There mu st be, in addition to experience and perception, so me special rational fac ulty. Thi s line of rea soning lead s to one form or another of rationali s m. It i s a fa scinating hi storical fact that both of the se diamet­ rically oppo sed po sition s have their recent origin s in one and the sa me philo sop hical sy ste m, na mely, in Carte sian philo sophy. De scarte s' view s contain, on the one hand, the seed s for Berkeley' s ideali s m and, on the other, the root s of Hu s serl' s rationali sm. In partic ular, Carte siani s m contain s tw o v i e ws which almo st inevitably lead to ideali sm. Fir stly, there is the di stinction between primary and secondary qualitie s or, more accurately, the di stinction between idea s and sen sation s. Berkeley, a s we know, make s the mo st of thi s Carte sian di stincti on in one of hi s main arg u ment s for ideali s m. Sec on dly , t here i s "t he new w a y o f i d e a s , " t h a t i s , De scarte s' ingenio u s view that idea s rep re sent external object s without re sembling them. In thi s chapter, we shall di scu s s some of the main argument s against reali s m which are a p art of the Carte sian herita ge. Of cour se, we cannot pretend to give here a thoro ugh defen se of reali s m. · B ut since we shall ta ke for granted, in the main part of thi s book, that there are percept ual object s, we shall at lea st indicate what kind of respon se we hold ready to the ideali s­ tic c hallenge. Th u s we have to enter, at lea st for a mo­ ment, into the epi stemological spirit which ha s so forceful­ ly dominated the philo sophical di scu s sion s since De scarte s. (7) One .Qf the se seed s i s the spuriou s di stinction between primary and secondary qualitie s Exten sion, according to De scarte s, is a modification of material s ub stance s and, a s s uch, known t hro ugh idea s.

A De fens e of Rea l ism

21

Color, on the other hand, is not a property of mater ia l sub­ stances, but is merely a sensat ion in the mi nd. Ga l i l eo makes the same po int in these words: "Hence I th ink that tastes, odors, colors, and so on are no more than mere names so far as the object in wh ich we place them is concer ned, and that they res ide only in the consc iousness. Hence if the living creatures were removed, all these qual it ies would be w iped away and ann i h ilated." (The Assayer, fr om The P h i losophy .Q.f the 16th and 17th Centur ies, R.H. Popk in ed., The Free Press, 1966, p. 65.) This divis ion of properties into real properties and mere sensat i ons in the mind, as I said ear l i e r , leads a l most inevi tably to ideal ism. For, if we accept as sound the arguments which allegedly prove that color is a mere sensa­ t i on in the m i nd, then s i m i lar argu ments wi l l p r ove that extens i on is a mere sensat ion. Th is is, of cou r se, one of Berkeley's most forceful po ints: "I shall further add that, after the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sens ible qualities to have no ex istence in matter, or with­ out mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sens i ble q ual i t i es whatsoe ver." (G. Berkeley, Principles, sec. 14.) A perce ptual object, so Berkeley argues, is nothing but a bundle of sens ible qualit ies. The Cartes ian adm i ts that most of these q ual i t i es are sensat ions in the mind. But what holds for color holds for extension as wel l, as any close look at the argument for the subject ive nature of color sho ws. Hence all sens ible q ual it ies are mer e sensations. Therefore, a perceptual object is nothing but a bundle of sensat ions (ideas). Berkeley is q u ite correct when he po ints out that the arguments which presumably prove the mental nature of color can be appl ied to extens ion as well. But wh ile he accepts the thrust of these arguments and, hence, arr ives at his ideal ist i c conclus ion, we must, on the contrar y, inqu ire i nto the soundness of the Cartes ian case for the mental existence of color. Our reason ing goes like this: Not even color i s a mere sensat i on in the mind ; thus even if a per­ ceptual object were noth ing but a bundle of perceptual propert i es, it would not follow that it is a bundle of sensat ions. What then are the arguments that convince the Cartesian that colors are mere sensations? There are, to the best of my knowledge, two such arguments, the argument from color­ less atoms and the argument from the relat ivity of •sens ing. In the rest of this section, we shall cons ider the first of these two arguments.

22

Ab out Onto lo gy , Real ism , an d Emp i ri c is m

(8) The argument fro m colorless atoms does not call for this distinction The argu ment from colorless atoms claims that modern physics, either the atomistic physics of Descartes' time or contemporary particle physics, has shown that colors are not among the properties of atoms or particles. But perceptual objects consist of such atoms or particles. Hence the y cannot be colored either. Therefore, if there are colors at all, they cannot be part of the nonmental physical and perceptual world. But since it is clear that there are colors, the y must be mental, that is, the y must be sensa­ tions in minds. I shall without further ado concede that elementary par­ ticles are not colored. It is nevertheless obvious to me, as it is to most people who are not philosop hers, that perceptual objects are colored. Hence something must be wrong with the step that leads from the claim that particles are not colored to the conclusion that perceptual objects cannot be colored either, since they consist of elementary particles. This step re quires an added premise. It re­ quires the assumption that a so-called "principle . of reduc­ tion" is true. Sellars, for example, puts it this way: "If an object is in � strict sense a system of objects, then every property of the object must consist in the fact that its constituents have such and such qualities and stand in such and such relations or, roughly, every property of a system of objects consists of properties of, and relations between, its constituents." (W. Sellars, 1963, p. 27.) But the principle of reduction is false . A co mplex entity may have properties which its parts do not have. To see this clearly, though, we must distinguish between the principle of reduction and a quite different principl� to the effect that there are no emergent properties. According to this very different conception, "the occurrence of a characteristic W in an object w is emergent relative to a theory T, a part relation Pt, and · a class G of attributes, if that occurrence cannot be deduced by means of T from a characterization of the Pt-parts of w with respect to all the attr ibutes in G. " (C o mp ar e C . G. He mp e l an d P . Oppenheim, 1948, p. 336.) If we apply this criterion , colors of perceptual objects are not emergent properties because their occurrence can be deduced from certain laws of physics. Very roughly, a surface of a perceptual object has a certain color if and only if its atomic structure is in a certain state. To claim that a certain property is emergent or is not emergent is not the same as to claim that it

A De fens e o f Rea l ism

23

exi st s or doe s not exi st. Rather, it i s to say so mething about how its occurrence is or is not lawfully connecte d with the occurrence of other properties. To state that an emergent property F doe s not exi st is somewhat of a contra diction. What makes sense, though, is the clai m that there are no emergent properties. Colors, at any rate, are by our criterion not emergent properties. The principle of re duction, to fill the gap in the argu­ ment from physics, must use a notion of re duction much stronger than mere lawful connection with other properties. This notion can be illustrated by one of Sellars' examples. One might maintain that the sentence ' This is a la dder' is a mere abbre viation of so me su ch sentence as ' Thi s thing consists of such an d such parts, in such an d such relations to each other'. Since the longer sentence does not mention the property of being a la dder, there is no such property at all. There are only parts, their properties, and the rela­ tion s a mong the part s. The principle of re duction, then, comes d o w n to this: All statements purporting to attribute properties to whole s are in reality mere abbreviations of statements about the properties of and relations among the parts of whole s. Or shorter: Wholes do not have proper­ ties, only their parts have. We see now clearly that the principle of reduction is, at best, a highly dubious assumption. (Compare R. Grossmann, 197 Sa.) I think that the argu ment from physics can be viewe d a s an argument again st thi s a ssu mption. If the pri nciple were true, then trees coul d not be green an d billiard balls coul d not be re d. But tree s are green an d billiard balls are red. Hence, the principle is false. But we can al so disprove the principle directly by citing ob­ vi ou s exceptions to it. Consi der, for exa mple, a square whose diagonals have been drawn, so that it consists of four tri angles. Thi s figure has a certa in shape ; it is square. But its four spatial parts are not square, but triangular. The square thus has a property an d moreover, a property which none of its parts has. What holds in this case, holds in most : Wholes co mmon l y possess properties which their parts do n ot have. (Compare J. M c T. E. M c Tagg art, 1921, vo l. 1, p. 142.) Since the principle of reduction is false, and since the argu ment from physics depen d s on it, we do not have to accept the conclusion that perceptual objects have no col­ ors. We can hold, without any hesitation, both that elemen­ tar y parti cles ha ve no colors an d also that perceptual objects do. What we have here demon strate d for co l ors holds, of course, for other perceptual properties. (Compare J. W. Cornman, 197 5.)

24

Ab out On to logy , Re a lism , an d Emp i ri c ism

(9) Nor does the argument from the relativity .Qf sens ing The second argument for the mental existence of so-called secondary qualities is harder to assess. (Versions o f the argument can be f o und in L o cke' s Essay , B o o k I I, Chapter VIII; in Berkeley's Three Dialogues, the first dialogue; and in C . D. Br o ad, 1925, pp . 158- 183 .) It is not to o apparent ho w the argu ment pro ceeds . We shall have to keep an open mind and consider alternative interpretations of it . But first, we have to set up a situation. When I enter my o ffice in the morning, I see my desk a fe w yards in front o f me . The top of the desk is rectangu­ lar. No w, let us assume that I look at the top of the desk, first fro m the door, then fro m only a yard away, and finally fro m directly abo v e . Acco rding to the argument, ( 1 ) I see in succession that the top has a certain trapezoidal shape A, another trapezo idal shape B, and a rectangular shape C . (2) We know that it cannot have these three different shapes at the same time . (3) Thus, at least t wo o f these percep­ tions must be mistaken . (4) But there is abso lutely no consideration that favors one of these perceptions over the other two or , we mus t add , over any other such p e.rc ept ion. (5) Hence, the shapes perceived cannot be properties of perceptual objects, but must be mere sensations in the mind. There is a glaringly obvious gap in this argument between step (4) and the conclusion. What foll o ws fro m the first four steps, if we accept them as they are, is, not that shapes must be sensations, but that we cann ot kno w which shape is the true shape of the top of the desk . And fro m this conclusion no plausible premise leads to the furt her conclusion mentioned in (5) . Berkeley already saw this shortcoming when he co mmented: "Though it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much prove that there is no extension of color in an outward object as that we do not kno w by sense which is the true extension or c o lor of the o bject." (Principles, sec. 15.) But it would still be an embarrassment to realism, if the argument proved that we cannot kno w the perceptual proper­ ties of perceptual objects. If we cannot claim to kno w the shape o f the desk top, then our realism is merely a to oth­ less tiger fully at the mercy o f the stalking hunter o f idealism. Realism, if it is worth defending, must hold, not only that perceptual o bjects have colors and shapes, but also that we kno w, within the bounds of human error, which colors and shapes the y have. We must, therefore, take a closer l o o k at the first four steps o f the argument. In particular, we must inspect steps ( 1 ) and (4) . But before we can do this, we must clear up one very common confusion.

A De fense of Re a lism

25

Some phi lo sop he r s are i n the habit of spea king of co lor sen sations, and thi s give s the impre s sion that a co lor i s a sen sation or sense-impre ssion. The who le argument from the re lativity of sensing i s tai lored to reinforce thi s mistaken impre s sion. But we mu st keep firm ly in mind that a sen sa­ tion or sen se-datum i s an individua l thing, whi le a co lor or a shape i s a p rop e rty. Thu s we mu st c l ear ly di stingui sh betw een a given vi sua l sen sati on, on the one hand, and it s co l or, shape, etc., on the othe r. (How ea si ly a sen sation i s co nfu sed with it s p ropertie s can be seen from G. E. M oore, 1 9 6 2, p. 48, p. 52, p. 54, and p. 67.) A co l or, then, c a n not be a sen sation. In what se n se doe s it sti l l ma ke sen se to say of it that it i s menta l ? Se n sati on s, we sha l l grant, are quite obviou s ly menta l entitie s. The on ly p lau sib le answer seems to be that a co lor may be said to be me nta l if it characte rize s on ly me nta l thing s. If the argument from the re lativity of sen si ng were sound, then it wou ld lead to the conc lu sion that co lors, shape s, etc., are p ropertie s, not of perceptua l ob j ect s, but on ly of sen sa­ tio n s. But ou r version of rea li sm doe s not oppo se thi s view, a s one may think, by ho lding that these propertie s are exc lu sive ly propertie s of perceptua l ob ject s. In my view, co l o rs, shape s, etc., a re p ropertie s both of se nsatio n s a s we l l as of perceptua l object s. For examp le, the pen before me o n my de s k is o live g ree n, and so i s the vi sua l se nse­ imp re ssi on which I have of it. If I put on dark g las se s, then the co lor of my se n se-impre s si o n s changes, say, from o l ive g reen to g rey, but the co lor of the pen remain s the same. Let u s now return to the argument and, first ly, consider step (1). Under norma l veridica l circum stances, it i s sim­ p ly not true that I see succe s sive ly that the desk top i s of trapezoida l shape A, then of trapezoida l shape B, and fina l­ ly of re ctangu l a r shape C. Rathe r, I see from a l l three p oints of view that the top i s rectangu l a r. However, the visua l sen se-impres sion s which I experience succe ssive ly do have diffe re nt shap e s, eve n if I am n ot mi staken a bout the shape of the desk top which I see. Thu s whi le I experience a trapezoida l sense-impression when I stand near the door, I see a recta ngu l a r de sk top. We ca n ea si ly p rove thi s con­ te ntio n. We ask someo ne to d raw the desk top i n per spec­ tive. I f he i s any g ood at thi s so rt of thi ng, he wi l l rep roduce the trapezoida l shape of hi s a nd my sen se­ impre s si o n s w he n we stand nea r the door. And we ca n a lso ask hi m w hat shape the des k top ha s. He wi l l te l l u s what he sees, name ly, that the top is recta ngu la r. And he wi l l see that the top has t his shape, eve n though he may never have seen thi s top exact ly from that point of view before.

26

A bout Ontolo gy, Re alis m, and Empi ricism

But this distinction between the shape perceived and the shape experienced necessitates a reformulation of the argu­ ment. We must start, as before, with a normal observer and a veridical situation. But we must consider the three shapes of the sense-impressions: At the door, I experience a sense-impression with shape A, then one with shape B, and finally, a sense-impression of rectangular shape. Now, we know that the top cannot have all three of these shapes at once. How do we know which one it has? The answer is obvious. We know what shape the desk top has, in distinc­ tion to the shapes of our sense-impressions, by looking at the desk top and seeing what shape it has. I f I am asked what shape the top has, I look at it and see, even when I am near the door, that it is rectangular. I do not inspect my sense-impressions. On the other hand, if I am asked to draw the top in perspective, I consult my visual sense-impression and do not care about the shape of the desk top. While it is true that the shapes of the sense- impressions of the observer vary with his position, he normally sees from all of these different positions the same shape of the desk top, namely, a rectangular shape. (10) For, perception does not consist of sens ing � inference It now becomes clear that step (4) is the crucial step in our new version of the argument. Step (4) rests on a cer­ tain conception of the nature of perception. It is this conception which, without coming to the surface, guides the flow of the argument. The obvious answer which we just gave to the question of how we know the shape of the desk top, e ve n t ho u g h we experience differently shaped sense­ impressions at different places, is only satisfactory if there is such a thing as seeing, in addition to sensing (experiencing). Step (4) relies on a re jection of this assumption. Step (4) rests on the contrary vie w that we know the properties of perceptual objects by inference from the properties of our sense-impressions. Thus the argument from the relativity of sensing presupposes a certain concep­ tion of the nature of perception; a conception, I regret to say, which has been uncritically accepted by many modern philosop hers, namely, the conception that perception is sensing plus inference. Assume, for the sake of the argu ment, that this concep­ tion were correct. An observer would then be faced with the task of inferring, in some fashion or another, the shape of the desk top from the different shapes of his successive sense- impressions. What I called his seeing the shape of

A Defense o f Re al ism

27

the de sk top would con si st in nothing else but an inference of thi s kind. The argument ch allenge s the re ali st to give a re a son why the ob ser ver shoul d prefer one p articul ar inference to all other po s sible one s. Why, for ex a mple, shoul d we infer that the top i s rect angul ar r ather th an of trapezoi dal shape A? We can no longer an swer that we simply see that the top i s rect angular ; for thi s me an s nothing more than that it i s inferre d to be rectangular. Nor can we say that under "normal condition s" the shape of the de sk top i s the same a s the shape of the experienced sen se-impre s sion. For ex a mple, we c annot cl ai m th at the top i s rect ang ul ar bec au se the sen se-impre s sion i s rectangular when the top i s viewe d un der nor m al or st an d ar d con dition s. For then we mu st al so explain wh at we mean by normal or standard condi­ tion s, and thi s cannot be done without either circularity or el se arbitr arine s s. If we s ay th at normal con dition s are tho se in which our perception s are correct, we are caug ht in a circle. I f we s ay th at we c an pick out any set of con di­ tion s and call it normal, then we are arbitrary. Thu s I am willing to concede th at the argument from the relativity of sen sing would prove that we cannot know the true propertie s of perceptu al ob ject s , if it were the c a se that perception i s a matter of inference fro m sen s ation. But it i s not. Wh at coul d be pl ainer th an th at you do not infer the sh ape of the de sk top from the shape of your sen se-impre s sion when you see that it i s rectangular? You may not p ay any atten­ tion at all to the sh ape of you r sen se - i mpre s sion in thi s situ ation. It may take a con sciou s effort on your part, to make out th at it has thi s particular trapezoidal shape. And to spe a k of "uncon sci ou s" inference s an d the like in thi s connection i s nothing but a p altry denial of the plain fact that no amount of analy si s, concentration, and training will ever reveal an inference from sen se-impre s sion s when you see the thing s around you. And yet philo sopher s have per si sted, ag ain st all the obvi ou s f act s, in the mi st a ken view that perception i s nothing but an inference from sens ations. To under st and their fixation on thi s p articular dog ma, we mu st t ake a detour and briefly con sider the epi stemological le s son s of De sc arte s ' new w ay of i de a s. Afterw ar d s, we sh all be in a better po sition to ev alu ate the force of the argument from the relativity of sen sing. (11 ) Another see d Qf i de ali s m i s De sc arte s ' "new w ay .Qf ide a s" According to the Ari stotelian tra dition, external thing s are known directly by me an s of i de a s (concept s, notion s ) , bec au se a n i de a i s i dentic al with an extern al thing � it

28

Ab ou t On tology, Re al ism , and Emp i ric ism

exists in the mind. One and the same essence or nature, as it was sometimes put, can exist materially in the external world and also, but immaterially, in the mind. (Compare Sir Kenelm Digby, 1665.) By knowing the idea, the mind k n o w s ipso facto its object, because the idea is the object as it exists in the mind. I do not think that this view is intel­ ligible. But be that as it may, what we must note is that Cartesianism breaks with this conception of how we know the external world in a most decisive way. By insisting that mind and matter are essentially different, Descartes creates an ontological chasm between ideas and their objects which raises a number of fundamental questions. An idea, and this is the crucial point, cannot be identi­ cal, not even in part, with its object. And this means that it cannot resemble its object. The idea of Jumbo, a certain elephant, is, not only different from Jumbo, but does not even resemble him. This proposition of Cartesian philoso­ phy, I think, is quite correct. But the Cartesians did not know ho w to ans wer two fundamental criticisms which were soon raised by the Aristotelians. As a conse quence, they unwittingly spawned a series of idealistic philosop hies . (Compare R. A. Watson, 1966.) The first criticism is ontological. If ideas do not resemble their objects, then they cannot represent them. If they cannot represent them, then we cannot know them. At best, we can know our own ideas, but we cannot kno w their objects. (This objection was raised, for example, by Simon Foucher, 1675.) What this objection amounts to is a confes­ sion by the Aristotelian that he cannot make sense of repre­ sentation without resemblance, that is, without partial identity. Nor is he alone: M any Cartesians reluctantly admitted that they could not explain within the C artesian philosophy how representation is possible. The solution to this puzzle, I submit, was finally articulated by Brentano and his students. It had to await the clear recognition that relations belong to the ultimate furniture of the world. There is, according to this recent solution, a unique indefinable relation, what I shall call "the inten­ tional nexus," between an idea and what the idea is an idea of. This relation between an idea and its object is neither identity nor resemblance. But even if we equip the Cartesian with this contemporary response to the first criticism, there remains the second, even more formidable, challenge in the form of the following argument. (Compare John Sergeant, 16 97 .) (1) In order to know what a certain idea represents, we must be able to compare it with its object. (2) But in order to compare it

A Defense o f Re a l ism

29

wi th i t s object, we mu s t not only know the objec t, bu t mu s t k now i t i ndepe nde n tly of the idea. ( 3) However, the o nly way i n which we ca n k now a n ob jec t, accordi ng to the Car te sian, i s by way of i t s idea. ( 4) Hence, we cannot know the ob jec t i ndepe nde n tly of i t s idea. ( 5) Therefore, we canno t know wha t a given idea repre sent s. The Car te sian s, I thi nk, ne ver fou nd a n a n swer to thi s argu me n t ei t her. Bu t i t , t oo, ca n be me t , a s I shall briefly i ndica te. ( For de tail s see R. Gro s smann, 1 965, pp. 1 82-197.) ( 12 ) Bu t knowledge i s no t confined to the content s of our mind s The crucial Carte sian a s sump tion tha t su s tai n s the argu­ ment i s the the si s tha t to know some thing i s to experience i t. Accordi ng t o t he Car te sia n Turn, we k now direc tly a nd truly only our own idea s and sen sa tion s. Every thing else, if i t i s k now n a t all, i s k nown merely i ndirec tly. There are a t lea s t two rea son s for thi s mi s taken insi s tence tha t t he paradi g m of k nowi ng i s experie nce. Fir s tly, there i s the implici t identifica tion of the knowing rela tion wi th the o nly rel a t i o n a v a i l able for t h i s p u rp o se w i t hi n a n Ari s to telian framework, namely, the rela tion be tween a men­ tal sub s ta nce and i t s modifica tion s. Secondly, there i s the Only cer tain charac teri s tic Car te sian s tre s s on cer tainty : k nowledge de ser ve s to be called k nowledge. At a ny ra te, while we may admi t tha t we cannot know an ob jec t o ther than by ha vi ng a n idea of i t , we mu s t re jec t the no t i o n tha t t o ha ve a n idea i s to k now i t. Whe n we have a n idea, whe n we experie nce an idea, we k now, no t the idea, bu t i t s ob jec t. I n order to k now a n idea, we mu s t ha ve, no t i t, bu t a n idea of i t. Such i s the na ture of the kind of knowledge which we are di scu s si ng. Therefore pre mi se ( 2 ) of t he argu me n t i s fal se. I n order to co mpare a n idea wi th i t s ob jec t , i t i s not nece s sary to know the objec t other than by mean s of i t s idea ; for thi s i s si mply i mpo s sible. Ra t her, i t i s nece s ­ sary t o k now bo th the ob jec t a nd t he idea. And thi s can be accompli shed ; for we can know the objec t by having an idea of i t , a nd we ca n k now the idea by havi ng a no t her idea of i t. A nd si nce we ca n k now bo th the ob jec t a nd the idea i n thi s manner, we can compare them. And since we can compare them, we can di scover tha t the Carte sian i s correc t when he mai n t ai n s t ha t the idea of the elep ha n t Ju mbo i s qui te differen t from the elephan t i t self. Le t u s now re turn to the argument from the rela tivi ty of sen sing. The crucial hidden a s sump tion wa s tha t percep tion con si s t s of experiencing sen se-i mpre s sio n s plu s i nfere nce.

30

Ab o u t On to logy , Re alism , and Emp i ri cism

We are now in a position to understand the great attraction which this pernicious dogma has in the wake of the Cartesian Turn. Assimilate ideas to sensations, that is, abolish the Cartesian distinction between ideas and sensations, in the spirit of Berkeley' s idealism. But try to cling to a realisitic vie w about the existence of external objects. Then, what you can know directly are your own sense­ impressions, and nothing else. But since you claim that there are external objects, you must explain ho w the y are known. The only plausible explanation in sight seems to be that we know perceptual objects by inference and, hence, indirectly, from our sense-impressions. A Cartesian thus tri es to re c o·nc i 1 e two irr e conc i 1 ab 1 e vie ws , name 1 y , his view about the nature of knowledge and his claim that we know that there is an external world. There is no escape for the Cartesian from the argu ment from the relativity of sensing, as I already pointed out. No inspection of sense-impressions, no matter how thorough and extensive it may be, can tell us what we should infer in regard to the properties of perceptual objects. Only if we can inspect both our sense-impressions and the external perceptual objects, and can establish how their respective properties are lawfully connected, can we make an inference from the former to the latter. But the C artesian denies that we can inspect the properties of perceptual objects independently of any inference from our sense-impressions. There is an obvious parallel between this argument against the inference vie w of perception and the argument just mentioned against Descartes' ne w way of ideas. And it is instructive to realize why the first one is sound, while the second is not. While it is true that one can only infer the properties of perceptual objects from the properties of sense-impressions if one can observe the former in so me sense of observe, other than that of inferring them from the latter, it is not true that one can only know the objects of ideas if one can know them other than by means of ideas. The argu ment from the relativity of sensing, we have seen, proves that we cannot know the properties of percep­ tual objects, if we assume that perception is a matter of experience plus inference. But this assu mption is false. Nor does the traditional argument against knowledge by way of ideas force us to embrace idealis m. It is effective against a Cartesian position, because the Cartesian's para­ digm of knowledge is experience. But this is false, too. We do not �now what we merely experience. To p ut it in terms of ideas, we do not know the ideas which we have, but know the objects of these ideas. The paradigm of knowledge is the experience of an idea of an object.

A De fense o f Re alism

3]

(13) Finally , the argu ment fro m hallu cination doe s not prove that � perceive sen se-impre s sion s To buttre s s our stand against idea 1 i sm, we mu st finally con sider the so-called argument from halluci nation; perhap s, the mo st formidable of the three. Si nce thi s argu ment i s well-known, I shall merely give an outline of it. (See C. D. B road, 192 5; A. J. Ay er, 1956; and R. Gro s s ma nn, 1965. ) The argument ha s two part s. The conclu sion of the fir st part i s that a hallucinatory mental state con si st s, e s sen­ tially, of experience s (sen sing s) of sen se-impre s sion s. In order to have a concrete example, a s sume that someone hallu­ ci nate s a pink spider; that he see s, i n hi s halluci nati on, that a pi nk spider crawl s up the w all in front of hi m. B y a s sumption, a pink spider i s not pre sent i n thi s hallucina­ tory situation. But the hallucinating per son doe s pre suma­ bly experience certain sen se-impre s sion s; for the se sen se­ impre s sion s can be experienced in the ab sence of the rele­ vant perceptual stimulu s. Next, i n the second part, one con sider s a veridical perceptual situation. As sume that someone el se see s that a real spider crawl s up the wall in front of him. How are we to a s say thi s situation? At thi s point in the argument, one appeal s to the principle that phenomenally indi stingui shable situati on s mu st yi eld the same pheno menal ingredi ent s. Since one further claims that the two situation s are phenom­ e nally i ndi stingui shable, one conclude s that a veridical perceptual mental state al so con si st s, e s sentially, of ex­ perience s of sen se-impre s sion s. But thi s mean s, st i 1 1 ac­ cording to the argu ment, that what i s before the mind in the veridical situation i s ju st a s much a sen se-impre s sion (or bundle of sen se-impre s sion s) a s what i s before the mind in the halluci natory situati on, namely, a s the pink spider. Hence, the so-called real spider i s nothi ng but a sen se­ impre s sion. In general, when we think we perceive percep­ tual object s, we are in reality experiencing certain more or le s s coherent familie s of sen se-impre s sion s. The real spi­ der, no le s s than the halluci nated one, i s a (fa mily of) sen s e-impre s si on ( s). The conclu sion of the argument from hallucination i s so ab surd that there can be no do ubt that the argu ment i s un sound. However, the ideali st or phenomenali st who avail s h i m sel f o f the argu ment cannot po s sibly ad mit thi s. He i n si st s that the argu ment i s sound, b ut tri e s to di sgui se the obviou s fal sehood of the concl u si on. Since B erkele y ' s di singenuou s admonition in the Principle s, sec. 51, that we mu st in thi s matter "think with the learned and speak with the v ulgar, " it ha s beco me a standa rd ploy o f the ideali st to claim that hi s conclu sion i s in perfect harmony with what w e all know to be tr ue, na mely, that there are perceptual

32

A bou t O n to lo gy, Re a lism, a nd Empiri ci sm

obj e c t s. B u t w e m u s t n o t be d e c e i v e d . I t 1 s no t t r ue , c o n t r a ry t o w h a t B e r k e l ey t h e r e c l a i m s t h a t " w h a t ev e r w e s e e , f e e l , h e a r , o r any w i s e c on c e iv e or un d e r s t a n d r em a i n s as s e cur e as ev e r , and i s as r ea l as ev e r . " What we see, f or exam p l e , a r e p er c e p t ua l o b j e c t s , and p er c e p t ua l o b j e c t s d o no t "exi s t i n t h e m i nd , " c o n t r a r y t o w h a t B er k e l ey m a i n­ tains in the same cont ext. T h e r e c a n b e n o d o u b t t h a t t h e h a l l u c i n a t i ng p e r s o n i s , n o t m e r e ly e x p e r i en c ing c e r t a i n v i s u a l s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s , b u t a l s o s e e i ng s o m e t h i ng . In add i t ion t o ment a l a c t s o f s e n s i ng , t h e r e o c cur s i n t h i s s i t u a t i on a l s o a n a c t o f s e e i ng . Thi s i s t h e ba s i c m i s t ake o f t h e ar gum en t f r om h a l l u c i na t i on. H a l l u c i na t o ry s i t u a t i o n s c o n t a i n , j u s t l ik e v er i d i c a l one s , m en t a l a c t s o f p e r c e p t i o n , o r r em em b e r i ng , o r d e s i r i ng , e t c . O f c o u r s e , i f one t h i nk s o f p er c e p t i on a s c o n s i s t ing o f s en s i ng and i nf er en c e , th i s m ay e a s i l y b e o v e r l o o k e d . A t a ny r a t e , w e m a i n t a i n t h a t i n b o t h s i t u a ­ t i o n s , t h e h a l l u c i na t or y a s w e l l a s t h e v er i d i c a l o n e , t h e r e o c cur s an a c t of s e e ing in a d d i t i on to a c t s of s e n s ing v i su a l s en s e- im pr e s s i o n s . T h u s w e d o c o m p l y w i th t h e p r i n­ c i p l e tha t p h e nom ena l ly i nd i s t i ng u i s h a b l e m om en t ar y s i t u a­ t i o n s r e c e iv e t h e s a m e ana l y s i s . O f c o u r s e , t.h e r e i s a d if f erence b etw een the two s i tuat ions. B u t t h i s d i f f e r en c e l i e s , no t on the s i d e o f a m om en t a r y ment a l s t a t e , but on t h e s i d e o f r ea l i t y. I n t h e v e r i d i c a l ca s e , th e r e exi s t s a s p i d er ; t h e r e ex i s t s t h e o b j e c t w h i ch i s s e en. In the h a l l u c i na t o ry c a s e , on t h e o t h er h a n d , t h e p i nk s p i d e r d o e s no t ex i s t ; t h e o b j e c t o f p e r c e p t i o n d o e s no t ex i s t . ( 1 4 ) Bu t , r a t h e r , t h a t w e c an p e r c e iv e o b j e c t s w h i c h d o no t ex i s t T h i s c r i t i c i s m o f t h e a r g u m e n t r e v e a l s i t s h i c_i d e n A m e n t a l a c t o f s e e i ng c anno t o c cu r i n t h e h a l l u­ s t r eng t h . c i na t o r y s i t u a t i o n , on e a s s um e s , b e c a u s e t h e r e i s n o t h i ng w h i ch i s s e en. T o pu t i t d i f f e r e n t l y , s i n c e t h e r e i s no p i n k s p i d e r , t h e r e c a n b e n o s e e i n g o f a p i nk s p i d e r . But s i n c e t h e r e ar e a t any r a t e s en s e- im p r e s s i o n s , t h e s o - c a l l e d s e e i ng o f a p i nk s p i d e r m u s t r e d u c e t o t h e h av ing o f c er t a i n s e n s e- i m p r e s s i o n s . Thu s w e m u s t s e t t l e t h e q u e s t i on o f w h e t h e r o r n o t per c e p t u a l a c t s can int end none x i s t en t o b ­ j e c t s. P l a i n e x p e r i e n c e s h o w s t h a t t h ey c an. One c a n s e e a p i n k s p i d e r w h e n t h e r e i s n o p i nk s p i d e r , a n d o n e c a n h e a r v o i c e s w h e n t h e r e i s no b o dy a r o und. O th er k i n d s o f m en t a l One c an i m a g i ne m e rm a i d s and a c t have t h i s sam e f ea t ur e : o n e m ay d e s i r e m o un t a i n s o f g o l d . I n t h e t w o p er c e pt u a l s i t u a t i o n s un d e r c on s i d er a t i o n , o n e a l s o e x p e r i en c e s s en s e­ im p r e s s i o n s . B u t t h e s e s e n s e- im p r e s s i o n s a r e n o t w h a t o n e s e e s ; f or ho w c o u l d t h e y b e s e e n , i f w h a t o n e s e e s -- a s

A De fense o f Re a l i sm

33

anyone admits--does not exist, while the sense-impressions do exist? And there is a second consideration which supposedly shows ·that the hallucinatory situation cannot contain an act of seeing. What is seen in the situation is in some sense "private" and "mind-dependent." Nobody else sees the pink spider which is hallucinated. But this means, according to this line of thought, that what is before the hallucinating mind are private and mind-dependent sense-impressions. And these sense-impressions are sensed rather than seen. How­ ever, this argu ment does not hold either. A real spider is indeed a "public, " "mind-independent " object; and what one senses are in fact "private, " "mind-dependent" sense­ impressions. But it does not follow that an hallucinatory act of seeing must intend sense-impressions. In our case, it intends neither a perceptual obje ct, a real spider, nor any sense-impressions. What it intends is a nonexistent object, a pink spider. In response to the argument from hallucination, we hold fast to the truism that what one sees is, in our example, a pink spider rather than sense-impressions. Of course, the spider does not exist. But this merely means, and this is a second truism, that one can see what is not there. What distinguishes the hallucinatory from the veridical situation is the fact that the grey spider exists in the veridical situation, while the pink spider does not exist in the hallucinatory situation. And this is just another truism. As I mentioned before, we cannot hope within the scope of our ontological inq uiries to give a detailed defense of realism. But it may he l p to see these inq uiries in a dif­ ferent and more appropriate light, if we take a brief look at the most important idealistic arguments and thereby re­ veal, though not defend, our own epistemological assump­ tions. The principle of reduction, I have argued, is false. As a consequence, we are not forced to believe that colors, shapes, and other perceptual properties are "mere sensa­ tions" in the mind. Perception, I have insisted, is not a matter of inference from sensation. There are irreducible, unanalyzable mental acts of seeing, hearing, etc. And since we do not inf er the properties of perceptual objects from the properties of our sense-impressions, the relativity of sensing does not affect our ability to know the true proper­ ties of perceptual objects. Finally, I have emphasized that perceptual acts occur even in hallucinatory and other non­ veridical situations. While the argument from hallucination concludes that in a veridical situation a mind has nothing before it or in it but sense-impressions, we saw that even a hallucinating mind sees something that is not a sense­ impression.

3 . A Defense of Emp iricism

(15) P latonism is the root of rationalism Empiricism means different things to different people. I sha l l mean the view that our knowledge of onto l ogical kinds rests entirely on experience and perception. . In par­ ticu lar, there is no special facu lty of the mind by means of which we are acq u ainted with abstract entities . (M ora l properties, in my vie w, are known to us neither through experience nor through perception, but are intended by emo­ tions . For a simi l ar vie w, see A . Meinong, 1917 .) In defending this form of empiricis m, I shal l go against a tradition that is as o l d as it is pop u l ar. According to this tradition, I sha l l cal l it the P latonic tradition, the mind has two eyes . One eye sees the sensible wor l d, whi l e the other contemplates what is not sensible at all, namely, the rea l m of abstract, unchanging forms. Expressed l e ss poetica l l y, there are two menta l facu l ties--in Kantian terms: intuition and conception-- which acq uaint us with concrete and abstract entities, respective l y. Only if both eyes are wide open do we see the whole of reality. As Kant puts it: Intuitions without concepts are blind, while con­ cepts without intuitions are empty. Much of the perennial aversion to abstract entities is a reaction to this P latonic tradition. Most nominalists and realists agree with each other that if there are abstract entities, then they can on ly be presented to us by means of a special facu l ty, and not by means of perception. But while the nomina list then goes on to argue that since there is no such special facu lty, there are no abstract entities, the realist contends that since there are abstract entities, there must exist a special facu lty by means of which we are acquainted with them. Therefore, empiricists are as a rule

34

A De fense o f Empi ricism

35

nominali st s . But our empirici sm i s of a different stripe. One c an bre a k out of the tr aditi on al di alectic if one re a­ lize s that the fundament al a s sumption shared by mo st nomi­ n ali st s and reali st s i s fal se . Abstract entitie s a s well a s concrete entitie s are pre sented to u s together in perception and experience . It i s true, a s the nomin ali st claims, that there i s no speci al rati on al f acult y a s a window on the ab str act re al m. But it doe s not follow th at there are no ab str act ent itie s . And it i s al so true, a s the re ali st m aint ain s, th at there are ab str act entitie s . But it doe s not follow that there i s a special faculty which acquaint s u s with them. I c annot hope, of cour se , to prove thi s point in the se introductory re mark s . A s w a s the c a se for our defen se of re ali s m in reg ard to the exi stence of perceptu al ob ject s, here too we merely wi sh to outline the kind of defen se which we would mount in det ail, if the b a sic epi ste mologic al b ac kground of our ontologic al in quirie s w a s ch allenged . Ju st a s we concentr ated in our cri tici s m of ide ali s m on a few cruci al argu ment s from the C arte sian tradition, so shall w e n o w , in defen se of e mpirici s m, di scu s s two main the me s from the Platonic tradition . There i s, fir st of all, the doctrine of unexe mplified univer sal s . According to the Platonic tradition, there are univer s al s (propertie s) which are not exe mplified . The se univer s al s are therefore completely sep ar ated from individ­ u al s . Since we are pre sumably acquainted with them, it mu st be through a men t al f acult y th at pre sent s the m to u s in splendid i solation from all individu al thing s. But such a faculty, we may ju st a s well a s sume, pre sent s u s al so with all exemplified univer sal s . All propertie s, therefore, are p re sented to u s, n ot in perception or experience, but through the r ation al f acult y of under st andin g . To put it differently, the a s su mption t h at there are unexe mplified univer s al s open s up a gulf between univer sal s and individ­ u al s which c annot be sp anned by experience or perception . There i s, secondly , the argu ment fro m sp ace and ti me a s forms of sen sibility. According to the Platonic tradition, perception and experience, to u se our terminology, acquaint u s only w ith w h at i s loc alized in sp a ce and ti me . I t fol­ low s i mmedi ately that we c annot intuit ab stract entitie s ; th at they c annot be ob ject s of experience or perception . B ut since there are such ab str act entitie s , it further follow s that we mu st be acqu ainted with them by some special facult y of re a son . The dogma th at sp ace and ti me are the f o r m s of s e n s i b i l i t y le ad s in t h i s w a y d i re c t l y t o rationali sm.

36

Abou t On to lo gy , Re a lism , and Emp i ri cism

I shall argue that both of these roots of rationalism are false. There are no unexemplified un iversals, and space and time are not forms of sensibility. We are acquainted with un iversals as exempl i f i ed, and we are so acq u a i nted w i th them in experience and percept ion. (16) But there are no unexemplified universals To hold that there are unexempl if ied un i versals, as I said, is to open up a gulf between i nd i v i duals and proper­ t ies . As long as propert ies are f i rmly t i ed to ind i v i dual things--and ind i v i du al t h i n gs are se cu re ly b o u n d to properties-- it is not unreasonable to hold that one and the same mental act may acquaint us with both. It is not unrea­ sonable to believe, for example, that we may see an individ­ ual thing which is blue and, hence, see both the ind ividual as well as its color . Indeed, what could be plai ner but that one and the same act of percept i on presents us w ith both an ind i v i dual of some sort as well as one or more of i ts propert ies? It takes a large amount of p h ilosop h i cal prejudice to question this obvious fact. This prejudice is due, at least in part, to the doctrine that some propert ies w ith wh i ch we are acq u a i nted are not t i ed to ind i v idu als . As far as I can see, no really sound line of reason ing leads from th is doctr i ne to the rat i onal ist ic conclus i on that abstract ent it ies are contemplated by the understand i ng rather than presented through the senses. But the doctrine does suggest the rationalist ic conclus ion; it invites it, if you prefer; it confers some plaus i b i l ity to it . We can remove the prejudice if we real ize that there are no unexem­ pl if ied un iversals. I shall adm it at once, though, that I cannot prove that there are no unexempl ified un iversals in the same sense in which I cannot prove that there are no mermaids. I am sure that there are no mermaids because ne ither I nor anyone else has ever seen one; nor have we perce ived any evidence for the ir ex i stence, for example, no skeletons of the proper sort have ever been found . My case aga i nst unexe mpl if i ed properties is of the same cloth. I am convinced that there are no such propert ies because I have ne ver perce i ved or experienced one; and ne ither has anyone else. I have never perceived, for example, the property of be ing a mermaid, and ne ither has anyone else. But it may be objected that at least some people have in fact seen this property on certain occasions, namely, when they were halluc inat ing. In such a s i tuat i on, it may be cla i med, a person sees something wh ich exempl i f i es the

A De fense o f Emp i ri cis m

37

property o f being a me rmai d. But as soon as we put the ob jection this way, as soon do we become aware of its weak­ ness. What the person sees, we reply , looks to hi m like a mer mai d, it see ms to him to have this property, but it is not a me rmai d and it does not have this property. Other­ wise, we w oul d have to belie ve after all that there are mermai ds. Si milarly, the person sees what he ta kes to be the p roperty of being a mermai d , what see ms to him to be this p roperty. But in reality, he sees no such property, j ust as he sees no such enchanting figure. Hallucination, imagination, and mere conception count as acquaintance nei­ ther when we are intereste d in the existence of individuals nor when we inquire int o the existence of p roperties. I n ou r i magination we may be able t o create the most bizarre properties , but this fact does not i mply that there are these properties. But if it is then grant e d that we neither experience nor perceive--always in the veridical sense--unexemplified pro­ perties , what is left of the case for such properties ? Well, it has been argue d that since the existence of all but one indivi dual is irrelevant to the existence of a property, why should the existence of this one instance constitute the existence of the property ? (Compare P. Butchvarov, 1966, p. 186.) B ut surely this is no argu ment. If there were only one mermaid in the whole wide world, then there would exist such a thing as a mer mai d an d such a property as that of being a mermai d. Shoul d we re quire the existence of at least five mermaids before we a dmit that there are mermaids and, hence, the property ? Of course, not. It is clear that j ust because we consi der the p recise nu mber of exi stent mermai ds to be irrelevant, as long as there is at least one, we cannot also consi der the existence of at least one mer­ mai d to be irrelevant. It has also been sai d that the logical possibility of the instantiation of a property entails the existence of this p roperty. (Ibi d., p.188.) But this, too, is surely not a sound claim. I have no doubt that it is logically possible --t hough not biologically possible--for there to be mer­ maids. But j ust as I cannot conclude from this possibility that there are mermaids, so can I not conclude from it that there exists the property of being a mermaid. I consider it to be a mistake to believe that a property must exist simply because it is not contradictory. I think that the most cogent reason for accepting unexem­ plified universals derives from the fact that all candidates turn out to be co mplex. The property of being a mermai d, for exa mple, is u sually thought of as consi sting of such s i mpler p roperties as that of having a fishtail, that of

38

About Onto logy, Re al ism , and Emp iric is m

having a female t orso, e tc. No si mple proper t y is e ver ci ted as an example of an unexempli fied universal. Now, i t may be assumed tha t a complex proper ty exis ts i f and only i f i ts cons ti tuent properties exis t. ( Compare R. Carnap, 1956, pp. 29- 31.) Applied t o our case , this means tha t t he prop­ er ty o f being a mer maid exi s ts because such p roper t ies as tha t of being a fish tail and t ha t of bei ng a fe male t orso exis t. These la t ter proper t ies exis t , i t may be held, because there are individual things which are fish and which are female. We agree, o f course, tha t these two proper ties exis t. Bu t the co mplex proper t y o f being a mermaid i s no t jus t a class w hich consi s ts o f these two proper t ies and, perhaps, so me o t hers. I f i t were such a class, t he n i t s exi s tence would indeed f ollow from t he exi s tence o f t he si mpler proper t ies - - a t leas t , in t he case o f classes o f properties. Bu t the proper ty in question is an en ti ty o f a dif feren t sort. I t consis ts o f those simpler properties and some connec tion be tween them. I t is mos t likely conceived o f as a conjunc t ive proper t y, t ha t is, as consis t ing o f simpler properties which are conjoined by means o f a rela­ tion which rese mbles the fa miliar conjunction be tween s ta tes of a f fairs. For our present purpose, i t does not mu t ter how one precisely views the inner s truc ture o f complex proper­ ties. We shall re turn to this topic la ter, and I shall then argue t ha t t here are n o co mplex p roper t ies a t all. At presen t, we merely hold firm to the insigh t tha t the prop­ er t y o f being a mermaid i s no t a class o f p roper t ies. And jus t as we cannot conclude tha t there mus t exis t a complex en t i ty ( o t her than a class) jus t because cer t ai n si mpler en t i t ies exi s t, so can we n o t conclude tha t t he co mplex property mus t exis t because i ts ingredien ts exis t. Jus t as we canno t conclude t ha t a cer t ain house mu s t exi s t jus t because i ts building ma terials exis t, so can we no t conc lude t ha t t he proper ty o f being a mer maid mus t exi s t because there are such proper t ies as t ha t o f being a f i s h t ail and tha t of being a female torso. I conclude, there fore, tha t the case for the exis tence o f unexe mpli fied universals i s n o t con vincing. And I submi t t ha t i t is a law o f on t ology tha t all proper t ies are exe m­ pli fied ; t ha t t here are no u nexe mpli f ied un iversals. ( I n agreemen t wi th Arms trong, who calls this law the "Principle o f Ins tan tia t i on" in 197 8, vol. 1, p. 1 1 3.) B u t t his law i s only one side o f a coin. There i s als o t he co mp an i on law tha t all en ti ties--not jus t individual things, of course-­ have properties ; tha t there are no en t i ties wi thou t proper­ ties. A proper ty is alw ays tied to so me t hing by t he nexus o f exemplifica tion ; and every ent i ty has at leas t one prop­ er ty t ied t o i t. Proper t ies g o t og e t her w i t h t he t hing s

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which they qualify, and entities go together with properties which characterize them. If this is so, then it stands to reason that when we are acquainted with a property, we are also acquainted with the thing that has it; and that when we are acquainted with something, we are acquainted with some property of it. The Platonic picture of the two eyes is as fundamentally mistaken as it is grandiose. In truth, one and the same eye can see both a property and the thing which has the propert y. In a different sense, there are indeed two eyes, namely, the eye of experience and the eye of perception, and these eyes see different things. But both of these eyes acquaint us with properties as well as indivi­ duals, with abstract entities as well as concrete entities. (17) And such things as numbers are j ust � sensible � colors There can be no doubt, I think, that we see colors. But can we also see such abstract entities as numbers? I shall argue that we can. I hold that we see some numbers in precisely the same way in which we see some colors. I do not me an, ho wever, that we ever see the number two all by itself, separated from everything else. But neither do we ever see the color (shade) olive green all by itself. We see the color, when we see, for example, that a jacket has this color. In general, we see colors whenever we see that things have colors. Similarly, for numbers. We see the nu mber two when we see, for example, that there are two apples on the table. In general, we see numbers whenever we see that things are numbered. To repeat, just as you see the color olive green when you see that your daughter wears an olive green jacket, so you see the number two when you see that she holds two apples in her hands. This vie w appears to me to be, not only correct, but quite manifestly so. What could be plainer than that you have to take a look and see, if you want to know ho w many apples there are on the table; just as you have to take a look and see, if you want to know what colors they have. Of course, you can also touch the apples without looking at them. Numbers can be seen, but they can also be felt. They can be perceived, and they can also be experienced. You may experience, for example, two pains, one in each foot. Can it really be doubted, one may well wonder, that we can perceive numbers? Obviously, it can; for I know of no contemporary philosopher who shares my view on this matter. And this sho ws, charitably interpreted, that the Platonic tradition holds almost everyone in its spell.

40

A bout Ontology , Re al ism, and Emp ir i c ism

A ca se in point is Frege. Hi s example is so ins tructive, becau se he i s a firm reali s t in re g ard to ab s trac t enti tie s in gener al and number s in p ar ticul ar . B u t e ven Fre ge d oe s no t believe, a t le a s t no t a t fir s t, t h a t we c an perceive number s. Wha t convince s him is an argumen t from the lack of sen se-imp re s si on s . I n ou tline, t hi s ar gumen t s t a te s t h a t percep tion i s a m a t t e r of sen s a ti on s ; and while there are color sen s a tion s, t here are no number sen s a tion s, so t h a t number s, unlike colors, cannot be perceived. "When we see a blue su rf ace, " Fre ge s ay s, "we h ave an impre s si on of a uni que sor t , which corre spond s t o the word ' blue ' ; t hi s impre s sion we recognize again when we c a tch sigh t of ano ther blue surf ace ." (G . Fre ge, 197 4, p . 31 .) And t he n he goe s on to ar gue t h a t t here i s no corre spondin g i mp re s si on for t he w ord ' three ' when we look, for in s t ance, a t a tri an gle and see i t s three side s. Fre ge give s two re a son s for thi s con t en ti on, bu t t he y come down t o one and the same thing. Fir s tly, if we a s sume th a t some thing sen sible corre spond s to t he w ord ' three ' , then that same sen sible enti ty mu s t be found al so in three concep t s . Hence, we should find some thing sen sible, wha t ­ ever corre spond s t o the word ' three ' , in some thing non sen s­ i ble, n a mely, concep t s . "The effec t w ould be, " F°re ge re­ mark s, "ju s t like spe aking of a fu sible event, a blue ide a, a sal ty concept, or a s tringy judgmen t ." (Ibid .) Secondly, Frege a sk s how i t i s that we become acqu ain ted wi th the number of fi gure s of the Ari s to telian syllogi sm s . And h e an sw er s t h a t i t c anno t b e b y me an s o f our eye s . For wha t we see is at mo s t cer t ain symbol s for the syllogi s tic fi gure s, no t the fi gure s them selve s . And how c an we see their number, he a sk s rhe t ori c ally, if the fi gure s t h e m­ selve s remain invi sible ? Bo th con sider a ti on s, a s I s aid, m ake t he s a me poin t . No thing sen sible can corre spond to the word ' three ', beca u se even non sen sible enti tie s can be so numbered. Fre ge t ake s for granted tha t i t i s impo s sible for some thing sen sible to be pre sented to the mind toge ther with some thing non sen si­ ble . Bu t why should t hi s be imp o s sible ? Surely, t he an alo gy with a blue ide a doe s no t hold . The no tion of a blue idea, one may gran t, make s li t tle sen se becau se an ide a i s no t the sor t of thi n g t h a t i s colored . Bu t concep t s, like every t hing el se, c a n in f ac t be numbered . Of cour se, wha t come s immedi a tely to mind in defen se of Frege ' s a s sump­ tion i s the Pl a t onic t heme of the two eye s of t he mind . Frege thu s seem s to a s sume, wi thou t further ado, tha t there are two realm s, the sen sible and the nonsen sible, comple tely sep ar a ted from e ach o t he r, and such t h a t we c an only be

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ac quainted throu gh sen sati on with entitie s of the fir st realm. The eye of the sen se s cannot see concept s, and the under standing cannot gra sp sen sation s. Thu s even if there could be an entity compo sed of both sen sation s and concept s, neither eye could see it. Frege thu s settle s the i s sue before u s in hi s favor when he di stin gui she s between sen sible sen sati on s, on the one hand, and non sen sible concept s, on the other. According to our view, by contra st, concept s, if there are such thin g s, are ju st as sen sible as sen se-impre s sion s ; if there are such thing s, then they can be experienced or perceived. Now, Frege implie s on occa sion that concept s are what I call propertie s, so that hi s claim that concept s are non sen sible mean s that propertie s are non sen sible. But color s, surely, are both propertie s and sen sible. How could Frege po s sibly think otherwi se? Recall a point I made in our di scu s sion of the argument from the relativity of sen sing. Philo sopher s, I said, are prone to collap se the di stinction between an individual and it s propertie s when it come s to sen sation s. One spea k s of the sen sation blue rathe r than of � blue sen sation or � sen sation .Qf � blue ob ject. Frege, I su s ­ pect, may ha ve made thi s mi sta ke in the Foundation s .Qf Arithmetic. And thi s mi stake may have been invited by the fact that he think s of the concept blue, not as a color, but a s the property of reflecting li ght of a certain wave len gth. (G. Frege, 197 4, p. 29.) Thi s property, one may plau sibly hold, i s n ot sen sible . The color blue, on the other hand, i s sen sible. But if one now reali ze s that thi s color i s ju st a s much a concept (property) a s any other, then it become s highly dubiou s that all concept s are non sen­ sible. By thinking of the color blue a s a sen sati on, a s an individual thing, Frege manage s to conceal thi s fact from v iew. However, we mu st proceed in our attempt to explicate the n otion of a sen sible entity. A sen sation or a plum i s a sen sible entity, we hold, becau se it i s experienced or perceived. Propertie s of such sen sible individual s can al so be experienced or perceived. Color s, for example, are both experienced a s well a s perceived, and they are therefore sen sible. Are number s sen sible? I su spect that a negative an swer to thi s que stion i s often given becau se of the wrong notion of what it mean s to be sen sible. One notice s, fir st­ ly, that number s are neither individual thing s nor proper­ tie s of such thing s. One rea son s, secondly, that since they are n ot entitie s of the se two kind s, they cannot be sen si ­ ble. But thi s i s to look at the matter up side down. A plum i s a s e n s i ble e n t i ty beca u se it c a n be p e rcei ved ; a sen sation, becau se it can be experienced. In stead of a sking

42

About Ontology , Re al ism , a nd Emp i ric ism

whe t her or no t nu mber s are of the s a me kind s a s plu m s or sens a tion s, we mu s t a sk whe ther or no t they c an be perceived or experien ced. I t may well be, and i t i s indeed the c a se , tha t en ti tie s o ther th an individu al s and propertie s of indi­ vidu al s c an be per ceived or experien ced. We sh all try t o answer thi s fund amen t al que s tion in a moment. (1 8) R a tionali sm i s also fo s tered ..Q.Y the perniciou s dogma of sp a ce and time� forms of sen sibili ty The eye of the sen se s , a c c ording t o t he K an t i an ver sion of the Pl a t oni c theme, con si s t s of a c t s of in tui t i on. I n our view, i t con si st s o f experien ce and per cep tion. If the eye of the sen se s con si s t s of i n tui t i on, t hen only in t u i ­ tions de serve t o be c alled sen sible. Wha t are intui tion s ? I n t ui t i on s are lo c a ted i n sp a ce or t i me. They are, i n our terminology, con c re te en t i t ie s. Sp a ce and t i me , a s K an t pu t s i t , are the for m s of in t ui t i on. Thi s i s the mo s t perni ciou s dog ma of the tradi tion. I t lead s i mmedia tely to the una c cep t able conclu sion that all ab s tra c t enti tie s are non sen sible. Hen ce, if there are su c h en t i tie s , t he y c an only be known by a spe ci al f a cul t y, t he eye of c e a son or under s t anding. Bu t the dog ma of t he sp a t io- t e mpor al lo c aliz a t i on of sensible enti tie s i s fal se. Transla ted into our terminol­ ogy, i t i s no t true th a t what we experien ce or per ceive mu s t be a con cre te t hing. Thi s should be r a t her obviou s. I f any t hing de ser ve s t o b e c alled a sen sible en t i ty, i t i s a cer t ain shade of color. Ac cording to the dogma of lo c aliz a­ t i on, though, i t c anno t be sen sible ; for c olor s, lik e all propertie s, are ab s tra c t enti tie s. The trui sm that color s are sen sible c an only be re conciled with the dog ma of lo c al­ iz a tion if one a s sume s that color s are, no t ab s tra c t enti­ tie s, bu t c on c re t e t hing s. In thi s f a shi on, t he dog m a furni she s a mo s t powerful mo tive for confu sing t he color of a sen s a t ion wi th the sen s a t ion i t s elf. A cer t ain sh ade of blue , when c on c ei ved of a s a sen s a t i on r a t her t h an t he property of a sen s a tion, i s both concre te and sen sible. I t make s li t tle differen c e t o t he di ale c ti c of t hi s si tu a t ion whe t he r we c on sider the c olor of a sen s a t i on or the color of the corre sponding percep tu al obje c t. In sofar a s per cep tion i s a ma t ter of sen sibili ty, i t s obje c t s mu s t be con cre te, a c cording t o Kant ' s view. Wha t we perceive, to pu t i t differently, mu s t be lo c alized in spa ce or time. B u t t hi s me an s t h a t if we per c e ive c olor s , and w ho c an doub t t h a t we do, t he n c olor s mu s t be so lo c alized. I n t hi s m anner, t he dog ma o f lo c aliz a ti on al so le ad s t o t he view t h a t t he proper t ie s of per cep t u al obje c t s are c on c re t e

43

rathe r than abstract , that they are what I shall call instances rather than un iversals . Conversely , it may be argu ed that s i nce we actually see colors as local i z e d in certa in places at certa in t imes , that we see the color blue "over there where the plum is , " the dogma of local i zat ion is conf i rmed by pl a i n observat i on . Thus the do gma helps to interpret the facts , and the facts , in turn , seem to conf irm the do g m a . It is not surp r is i n g , therefore , that th is part icular ph ilosoph ical gamb it has been extremely popular. I shall argue in a later chapter that colors are abstract ent it ies . But what can a ph ilosop he r do who , on the one hand , accepts the dogma of local i zat ion , and , on the other, agrees w ith us that there are abstract ent it ies? In part ic­ ular , what i s he to do , if he holds s i multaneously that space and t i me are the forms of sen s ib il ity and also that the color blue is an abstract ent ity? Well , he can invent insta nces of colors , that is , concrete ent it ies wh ich are in some way connected w ith the un iversal color blue. By means of th is invent ion , he avo ids the untenable v iew that colors are nonsens ible . In sta nces of colors , s ince they are con­ crete , are sens ible ; and we are talk ing about these ent it ies when we talk about the colors wh ich we see. The un iversal colors , on the othe r hand , are nonsens ible ; these ent it ies are som ehow gra sped by the m ind . In add it i on to ord inary intu it ion , there is another k ind called e idet ic intu it ion , and i t i s th is k ind that acqua i nts u s w ith abstract e nt i­ t i es . Th is i s , of cou rse , Husserl ' s way out . (E . Husserl , 197 0b , vol . 2 , pp . 7 7 3- 802 .) Seen from th i s perspect ive , pure phenomenology results from accept ing the dogma of lo­ cal i z at i on wh ile ins i st in g on the ex i stence of abstract ent it ies . Its Ach illes ' heel is the alle ged faculty of e idet i c i ntu it i on . All knowledge truly deserv in g of the name is presumably acqu ired by means of th is spec ial facul­ ty. I t i s rather iron ic that in an a ge so dom inated by emp irical sc ience , one of the few true systems of ph ilosophy turns out to be a mod if icat ion of Plato's rat ional ism. Husserl , after some prodd in g by Frege , became conv inced that numbers are abstract (non mental) ent it ies . And th i s convers ion from an earl ier psycholog ist ic v iew leads even­ tually to h is rat ional ism. Frege , on the other hand , never wavered in h is concept ion of numbers as abstract ent it ies . But h is answer to the quest ion of how we are acqua inted w ith them ta kes a d ifferent for m . Nu mbers , he ma i nta i ns , are p re s ented to us , not throu gh acts of concept i on or e idet ic intu it i on , but throu gh jud g ment s . Th is I sub m it , i s the s i gn if icance of the principle announced at the beg inn in g of the Foundat ions of Arithmet ic, namely , the princ iple "never to a s k for the m ean i n g of a word in i solat i on , but only in

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Abo u t On tolo gy, Re alism, and Empiri ci sm

the context of a p r oposition." (G. Frege, 197 4, p. xxii.) Only if we adhere to this p rinciple, Frege claims later on, can we "avoid a physical vie w of nu mb e r without slipping into a psychological view of it." (Ibid., p . 116.) To fully app reciate Frege 's position ) we must go a little deeper into the Kantian version of the Platonic tradition. But fi r st let us b riefly ta ke stock. Pe r haps the most important motive for rejecting empi ricism in favor of some kind of rationalism is the acceptance of the dogma of local­ ization. If space and ti me a re the ve ry fo r m of sensib il­ ity, then abstract entities cannot be sensible. Hence there must be anothe r faculty, t he eye of the und e r standing, by means of which we are ac quainted with the m. But we think that the dogma of localization is false. What we perceive need not be an individual thing. Colo rs, for exa mple , a r e abstract entities which can be perceived. (19) But what we pe r ce ive a re states of affa i r s and t he i r constituents Kant, as you may recall, distinguishes between p resenta­ tions and judgments, and he divides p resentations . into in­ tuitions and concepts. Intuitions constitute the eye of the s enses ; conceptions, the eye of the unde r standing. The fi r st sees the conc rete and p a rticula r ; the second, the abstract and universal. But what does the eye of judgment s ee ? What a r e the p r ope r objects of this kind of mental act ? Kant answers that a judgment is merely a special kind of p resentation, na mely, an act of p re sentation which ac­ quaints us s o mehow with a co mplex p resentation. (Kant , Logik, 9: 101.) Thus the t rue natu r e of jud g ment is doubly misunderstood. Firstly, Kant does not realize the unique­ ness of mental acts of judging. He does not recognize �hat this kind of mental act cannot be reduced to any other kind. This is a point which B rentano and his students ne ve r ti r e of emphasizing. Secondly, Kant does not see that his judg­ ments have objects of a different so rt from p resentations. Balzano is p robably the first philosopher who fully app reci­ ates the difference between p ropositions (states of affairs, ci r cu mstances) , on the one hand , and all othe r kinds of ent ity, on the othe r. Frege , to co me back to the poi nt , follows i n Bolzano's footsteps. H e holds that the re a re so­ called objective thoughts, which can be grasped by the mind in certain (propositional) acts of thinking, and which can also be recognized to be t rue or false in acts of judging. (G. F r e ge , 1956.) The metaphor of the two eyes still applies to F r e ge's p h il o s op h y. But the s e c ond e y e , t h e eye o f t h e

A De fense o f Emp i ric ism

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under standing, i s quite different fro m what it i s i n the Platonic tradition. There i s the sen sible eye of pre senta­ tio n ; it ac quaint s u s with the "inner world" of ou r mental life. And then there i s the quite different eye of app re­ hen si on. I t pre sent s u s , not with the ab st ract entity by it self, not with a Platonic form or a Kantian concept, but with a propo sition. Ab stract entitie s are pre sented to u s a s con stituent s of such propo sition s. At long la st, we can now fully under stand why Frege can ta ke for granted that a sen sible entity cannot be pre sented together with a nonsen­ sible entity in a single mental act. Frege a s su me s that the re a re only two (main) kind s of m ental act, act s that ac quaint u s w i th sen sible pre sentation s and act s that ac­ quaint u s with non sen sible thought s. B ut what about perception, how doe s it fit int o Frege' s theory ? When you see a tree, according to F rege' s later v i e w, you experience certain sen se-imp re s si on s. But the mere having of the se sensations i s not sufficient in order to see a tree. So mething non sen sible, a s he put s it, mu st be added. He doe s not tell u s what thi s something nonsensi­ ble i s. But he clai m s that it i s very much li ke the app re­ hen sion of a p ropo sition. In fact, the only thing that di stingui she s between the perception of a tree and the apprehension of a propo sition i s, a s he explains it, that in the for me r ca se, but not 1.n the latter, sen se-i mp re s si on s have to be experienced. Thi s i s not the place to di scu s s Frege' s later view in detail. What we a re intere sted in i s the fact that F rege here articulate s a ver sion of another perva sive the me of epi stemology, namely, the notion that perception consi st s of sensing plu s judgment. The similarity of thi s notion to the po st- Carte sian conception of perception a s sen sation plu s inference i s obviou s. Indeed, one may think of the latter a s a mere specification of the former. But the more general conception acquire s new philo sophical force, if we add to it B olzano ' s di scovery of the uni quene s s of object s of judg ­ ment. I f perception con si st s of sen sation plu s judg ment, then it follow s that it is propo sitional. What a perception intend s i s the n alway s a p ropo sition (state of affai r s, circum stance). Thi s i s the fundamental in sight that allow s u s to break the impa s se between empirici sm and rationali sm. But the traditional conception ha s to be modified in two i mportant re spect s. Perceptual act s, I have repeatedly stre s sed, are unanalyzable, indefinable, or however else you may w i sh to put it. Thu s it cannot be the ca se that an act of seeing, for example, consi st s of the experience of sen se­ i mp re s si on s plu s an act of judging. An act of seeing i s ju st a s ba sic and simple a s an act of experiencing or an act

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Abo ut On t o lo gy , Rea lis� , an d Emp i r i c i sm

of judging. What is true, though, is that a perceptua l situation contains, among many other things, certain acts of sensing sense-impressions in addition to an act of seeing. Thus it is more accurate to say that whenever something is perceived, certain sense- impressions are also experienced. An act of sensing is not a part or constituent of an act of seeing, but is causa l ly connected with it. This is the first modification we have to make. The second e l aboration is contained in the first. The mental act which characterizes a perceptua l situation and which is added to the experien ce of sense- impressions is, not a judgment, but a perceiving. A perceptual situation is characterized, not on ly by the occurrence of the experience of sense-impressions, but just as essential ly by the occur­ rence of a menta l act of perceiving. When I see the moon on one occasion and mere l y think of it on another, then I experience certain visua l sense- impressions in the first case, but not in the second. But this is not the on l y significant difference between the two situations. In the first case, there a l so occurs an act of seeing the moon , while in the second case, there occurs an entire l y different kind of mental act, name ly, an act of thinking of the moon. The view that perception consists of sensation plus judg­ ment is therefore, if taken l iteral l y, mistaken . But it does contain an important insight, name ly, the insight that perception is propositiona l . There is indeed a striking similarity between perception and judgment: Both kinds of act are propositional. Their objects are states of affairs rather than things. Consider, then, what happens when you see that this (plum here in front of you) is b l ue. The intention (object) of your act of seeing is the state of affairs this � b l ue. What you see, in one sense of the expression, is the fact that this is blue. I f you halluci­ nate, then there is no such fact, but what you see is st i l l that this is blue. Let me from now on use the term ' state of affairs' in order to ta l k about what we perceive, irre­ spective of whether what we perceive is fact or mere ly fic­ tion. In either case, then, the ha l l ucinatory as we l l as the veridical one, you see the state of affairs that this is blue. But you may a l so be said to see a b l ue object, a p l um, the color b l ue, etc. Whenever you see a positive state of affairs of the sort under study, you see, ipso facto, its constituents. To see a plum, to see an individ­ ual thing of this kind, is to see some such state of affairs as that there is a plum on the table, or that this is a p lum before you, or that this plum is b l ue. Simi l ar l y, to see the color b l ue, to see a property of a certain kind, is to see some such state of affairs as that this p lum is blue, or

A De fense o f Empi ri cism

47

that there i s a blue sweater on the table. In short, you see ind ividual things, because you see states of affairs of whi ch the y are const ituents; and you see propert ies by seeing states of affa irs of which they are const ituents. I do not mean to imply that there are two ways of seeing, a seeing of states of affairs, on the one hand, and a seeing of th i ngs, on the other. Rather, there are two ans wers to the question: What did you see? The first answer is more deta i led, more l i teral, more def in ite: One ment ions the precise state of affairs which was seen. The second answer is more dependent on context, one may say e i ther "a plum, " or else "the color blue." The question of what one can perceive has therefore also two answers. One perce ives states of affairs. But one also perce i ves the ir const ituents. Assume now someth i ng for which I shall argue later, namely, that states of affairs and propert ies of individuals are abstract ent ities. Then i t follows that what one sees, when one sees a state of affa irs, is an abstract ent ity. And if one sees that this plum is blue, one also sees the abstract color blue. Our view clearly contradicts the Kant ian vers ion of the Platonic tradition, according to which the sens ible is the concrete. And this holds, not only for acts of percept ion, but also for exper i ences. Such acts as acts of sens ing, acts of feel ing, etc. , are in my op in ion just as propos i t i onal as perceptions. If so, then we may say with del iberate inac­ curacy that all sens ible acts intend abstract ent it ies 1.n the form of states of affairs. What can we perce i ve? W e can perce ive, in add it i on to certain states of affairs, all the constituents which these states of affa irs have. Thus the question of whether or not we can perce ive such properties as colors and shapes becomes the question of whether or not we can perce ive such states of affairs as that this plum is blue and that the ball over there is round. And the answer to this question is obvious. Nor can there be any doubt that we can perce ive such states of affairs as that there are two plums on the table and that some plums on the table are blue, wh ile others are green. If one den i es this tru ism, one must co me up w i th powerful arguments against it. And these arguments, I have no doubt, w i ll s i mply hark back to our earl ier d i scuss i ons. If my pos it i on i n those previ ous d iscuss ions was sound, then we should be able to turn back such criticism. Now, to perce ive that there are two plums on the table 1.s to perce i ve, i pso facto, the number two; just as it is to perceive the plums or the table. We perce ive, as I claimed at the outset of our inqu iry, (some) numbers in prec isely the same way in which we perce ive (some) colors. Of course,

48

A bout Ontolo gy , Real is m, and Emp i ric ism

numbers are neither individual things nor properties of such things; at l east, not according to the vie w which I sha l l defend. Numbers be l ong to an entire l y different category from individuals and from properties. But they occur, j ust like individuals and properties, as constituents of perceiv­ able states of affairs. To repeat, it is true that the mind has two eyes, as the magnificent metaphor of the P l atonic tradition says. But these two eyes do not see separate ly each its own category of entity; the eye of sense, concrete things, the eye of understanding, abstract entities. Rather, there is experi­ ence and perception. Wha t we experience and perce ive are states of affairs and their constituents. While the one eye looks inward, the other eye sees the outer world. What the eyes see is different, but it is not categorial l y different. Experience acqu aints us with menta l things, their proper­ ties, their numbers, etc.; perception presents us with per­ ceptua l things, their properties, and their numbers. If properties and numbers, upon onto l ogica l ref l ection, turn out to be abstract entities, then we s ha l l no l onger be forced to invent a special facu lty of the mind as our window on the abstract world. And after this pre liminary discus­ sion, we sha l l rej ect al l those arguments against abstract entities which are based on the contention that their exis­ tence wou ld require such a special faculty.

Part II The Categories ofthe World

1 . Individuals

I.

Categor ized as Part iculars

(20) The fundamental q u e st i o n i s: Are i n d i v i du als particulars or else bundles .Qf propert ies? To what category do such i nd i v i dual thi ngs as apples belong? There have been two main answers to this question. According to one view, a view which I shall associate with Descartes ' philosop hy, an apple is a part i cular wh ich has certain properties. According to the second main answer, an answer which I shall lay at Berkeley's doorstep, an apple is a co mplex ent ity cons ist ing of propert ies. Before we can proceed to compare and contrast these two main pos itions, we shall have to s i mpl ify matters i n the follow i ng way. An apple ex ists for some t i me. I shall call it a cont i nuant. During the time of its existence, it undergoes all kinds of changes. Its color changes, its taste changes, and so on. Any attempt to find the correct category for an apple must take th is fact i nto cons iderat ion. But I shall, for the t i me be i ng and for the sake of s i mpl i c i ty, completely ne­ glect the temporal nature of the apple. I shall talk about an apple as it exists at a moment; about a temporal slice of the apple, i f you please . The quest ion before us the n becomes: To what category does an apple at a moment belong? Accord i ng to the Cartes ian v i e w, an apple is a part icu­ lar. I would much rather say that it is an i nd i vidual thi ng. But I shall reser ve thi s term for a ne utral use . Each chapter of this part of my book is headed by a term for what I cons ider to be a bas ic category. But I do not w i sh to pre j udge the ontolog ical i ssues, and so I had to search i n each case for a second term wh i ch is descr i pt i ve of the v i e w whi ch I shall defend. In this chapter the word 51

52

Th e Ca tego ries o f the Wo rl d

'particu 1 ar' wi 1 1 have to do. It is supposed to get some of its meaning from the history of philosophy; some of it, from a contrast with other vie ws . So I must caution the re ader not to read too much into this particular choice of a term. The terms which appear as chapter headings indicate most faithfully, as I have already remarked, what I take to be the basic categories. One traditional term for what I call a particular is 'substance' . But I avoid this expression in order to disas­ sociate the ensuing discussions from historical connections with certain classical views . A particular, then, is an entity that has properties and stands in relations to other entities. When I lump both properties and relations toge­ ther, I shall speak of attributes. A particular has attri­ butes . For example, an apple has a certain shape, and it grows to the left of another apple on the tree. The apple is somehow related to its attributes. This relation, how­ ever, is not a whole-part relation. A particular, and this is essential, does not in any sense of the term consist of its properties. To emphasize this most fundamental point, we shall adopt the slogan that a particular has properties, but does not consist of them. I shall continue to call this relation between a particular and any one of its properties "the nexus .Qf exe mplification ." The nexus of exemplifica­ tion resembles such relations as being to the left of, being later than, and being the wife of, rather than such "part­ whole relations" as that of being a spatial part of, or that of being a member of. Since the nexus of exemplification is not a part-whole relation, a particular is not a complex entity--for short, a complex-consisting of properties. Exemplification, we may briefly add in anticipation of later discussion, holds between any entity of any kind and its properties. This fact does not so much help to charac­ terize particulars as it helps to illuminate the nature of properties. Exemplification can only hold between an entity and a p r op ert y . P r o p e r t i e s are e n t it i e s w h i c h a r e exemplified . The two main views about the nature of individuals, therefore, come down to this . According to the C artesian approach, an individual thing has properties, but does not consist of them; according to the Berkeleyan school of thought, it is a bundle or co mplex of properties. The Cartesian view has fallen on hard times. Many modern and contemporary philosophers follow in Berkeley' s (and Hume's) footsteps. What arguments are responsible for this turn of events? What accounts for the recent decline of the Cartesian substance view? I think that there are two main themes that contributed to the downfall of the C artesian

53

In divi dual s

assay of individuals. There is, firstly, the problem of ho w we know particulars. There is, secondly, the problem of ho w we can make sense of exemplification. I shall discuss these two issues in the following sections. (21) P art i c u 1 a rs , c o n t rary t o Descart e s , recognizable� such

are n o t

The epist emological attack on the notion of part icular (substance) centers around the contention that if there were part iculars, they would be unkn o wable . This content ion appears in three distinct forms. The first of these is invited by Descart es' famous wax example. In the second Meditation, Descartes tries to make a point about the nature of knowledge by considering a piece of wax which has just been taken from a hive. This piece of wax has a certain sweetness, a cert ain odor, a certain shape, et c. As Descartes puts it, "everyt hing which can make a body distinctly kno wn are found in this example." But now he takes the wax into a room and brings it close to a fire. What remained of the taste of honey evaporates; the odor vanishes; its color changes; its size increases; and so on. All of its perceptual properties change. Does the same piece of wax remain after the change? Descartes holds that it does; "no one denies it , no one judges ot herwise ." And t hen he asks : "What is it t hen in this bit o f wax t hat we recognize with so much distinctness? Certainly, it cannot be anyt hing that I o bserved by means of t he senses, since e veryt hing in the field of tast e, smell, sight, t ouch and hearing are changed, and since the same wax nevertheless remains." Descart es concludes that the bit of w ax "w as neither that sweetness of honey, nor that odor of flowers, nor that whiteness, nor that shape, nor that sound, but only a body which a little while ago appeared to my senses under these forms and which now makes itself felt under others." And he concludes further that this body is not known by the senses (by perception) , but by a different faculty, namely, the understanding. I t hink that we can extract fro m Descartes' discussion two important contentions. Firstly, there is the view that a piece o f wax cann o t be a co mplex o f propert ies, but must be a p articular. If it were a co mplex of properties, then there would have to exist two different pieces of wax , the piece t h at tastes o f honey and the piece that doesn't . But we kno w that there exists only one such piece of wax . Sec­ ondly, there is the view that there must be a faculty other t han perception by means o f which we recognize a piece o f wax as the same. I f perception were our only guide, then we

54

Th e Catego r i es o f the Wo rl d

would have to conclude that there are two pieces of wax rather than one. I think that Descartes succeeds in sho w­ ing, not surprisingly, that the bit of wax cannot be a complex of those properties which it has at only one given moment. But a proponent of the bundle vie w, as we sha l l see, it is not necessarily affected by this argument. How­ ever, Descartes is wrong when he claims that there must be a special faculty by means of which we recognize the wax to be the same, independently of its (perceptual) properties and directly, as it were. We can easily show that Descartes is wrong. For if there were such a faculty, then we should be able to decide wheth­ er or not we are dealing with the same bit of wax, even if our observation of it has been interrupted. But this is obviously not the case. Assume that we show to Descartes a piece of wax freshly taken from the hive, and then we show him a piece of wax, a little while later, that is blackened from the fire, but is roughly of the same size as the e ar­ lier one. He will then not be able to tell us whether or not it is the same as the one we showed him earlier. What this experiment proves is, not only that there is no such faculty as the understanding which grasps individuals di­ rectly, but that we cannot recognize individual things other than by means of their properties (attributes) . In every single instance in which we have to decide whether or not an individual thing observed on one occasion is identical with an individual thing observed on a different occasion, we must consider and compare the attributes of the individual things in question. There is no other test for identity. In a case of interrupted observation, individuals cannot be recognized to be the same as such or directly. This important truth furnishes us immediate ly with an argu ment against Cartesian (material) substances. lf a substance is the kind of entity which Descartes claims it to be, namely, something that can be recognized as such, then it follows that there are no substances. More accurately, it follows that individual things cannot be substances. But, of course, we need not claim that particulars are recognizable as such and, indeed, we maintain, to the con­ trary, that it is an essential property of particulars that they are not recognizable directly. But the bundle proponent may also argue differently. He may say that particulars are unkno wable, since the y are admittedly unrecognizable. And then he may question the philosophical astuteness of those who defend the existence of unknowable entities. In response, we suggest that par­ ticulars are knowable, even though they are not directly recognizable. We must not identify these two notions with

Individuals

55

each other. To recogni ze a particular as the sa me is not the same thing as to know it. But are particulars knowable ? This question leads us to the second for m of the attack on particulars which claims that particulars are un knowable entities. (22) But this does not mean , particulars are unknowable

contrary to Locke ,

that

While Descartes invites the first criticism of particu­ lars by his mi staken clai m that they can be recogni zed as such, Locke invites the second by this erroneous description of particulars as unknowable supporters of properties: •�he idea then we ha ve, to which we give the general na me sub­ stance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown, support of these qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, sine .E__g_ substante, without something to support them, we call that support substantia ; which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, standing u n d e r or u p h ol d i n g. " (An E s s a y C o n cern i n g HuE,!an Understanding, B oo k I I, xx 1. 1. 1., sec. 2. See also E. B. Allaire, 1965a.) Why does Locke believe that substances, our particulars, are un knowable? He does not really g ive a clear reason. But we may surmise that he used an argu ment which has strangely survived until the present. It can be found in Kant ' s Criti q ue .Q.f Pure Reason (p. 331 and p. 337) , as well as in Russell ' s An In quiry into M eaning and Truth 0948, p. 97) , and Sellars ' Science , Perception and Reality 0 963, pp. 282-283). A substance, being so mething apart from all of its propert ies, so the argu ment goes, cannot be known, because one can know an entity only by means of its proper­ ties. Put differently, in order to know a substance, one would have to accomplish the impossible feat of knowing what properties a substance has when it is conceived of as having no properties. But it is obvious to me that this argument, if it were sound, would prove that one cann ot know any entity w hatsoever. Take any entity � and distinguish be­ tween E and its properties. It is impossible to describe � without menti oning some of its properties and, hence, to know E independently of all of its propert ies. Leibni z make s -the s a me po int when he re marks : "In d i s t in g u i s hi n g two things in substance, the attributes or predicates, and the common subject of these predicates, it is no wonder that we can conceive nothing particular in this subject. It must be so, indeed, since we have already separated fro m it all the attributes in which we could conceive any detail." (New Essays, I I, xxiii, sec. 2. For si milar criticis ms of the

The C a te go r ie s o f the Wo rld

56

argument see, for example, McTaggart, 1 921, vol. 1, p. 69; and R. M. Chisholm, 1976, p p . 43- 45.) We saw that we cannot kno w p articulars in the sense of recognizing them as such. Can we know p articulars in the sense of knowing their properties? Of course, we can ! We can know that this is an ap p le, that it is round, that it tastes sweet; we can even know that it is a p articular rather than, say, a property or number. (23) And it does not mean, contrary !.Q_ Berkeley, that we are not acquainted with particulars Thirdly, there is Berkeley ' s version of the claim that Berkeley holds that we cannot particulars are unknowable. know p articulars because we are not acq uainted with them. We are only acquainted with sensible properties: Phil.

This point then is agreed between us--tbat sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived J?..y sense. You will further inform me whether we immediately p erceive by sight anything besides l ight and colors and figures; or by bearing, anything but sounds; by the p alate, any­ thing besides tastes; by the smell, besides odors; or by touch, more than tangible qualities . We do not .

Phil.

It seems, therefore, that if you take aw ay all sensible q ualities, there remains nothing sensible?

Hyl.

I grant it .

Phil.

Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many sensible qualities or combina­ tions of qualities. Nothing else. (Three Dialogues Between Hylas and P hilonous, the beginning of the first dialogue.)

Hylas concedes here too much when he agrees immediately that we perceive nothing but sensible qualities (properties) . We see, for example, such things as apples, and mountains , and . rainbows; and we also see, of course, their p rop erties .

Individ uals

57

When we see two indistinguishable white billiard balls, we do not just see the color white and the shape spherical; for we see these two properties also when there is only one billiard ball in front of us. In addition to the color and the shape, we see two individual things in the first case, and one such thing in the second. Berkeley's contention that all we perceive are properties is thus quite obviously false. (Compare D. C. Long, 1968.) But it may be objected that we have misinterpreted Berkele y's contention. Berkeley does not make the absurd claim that we do not see apples. Of course , we do. But apples, in his view, are nothing but properties. Thus it is true both that we see apples and that we see nothing but properties. Our reply is that it cannot possibly be true that we perceive nothing but properties, since we perceive apples and apples are not properties but are individual things. Sensible things, Philonous claims, are nothing but so many sensible qualities or combinations of qualities. But, surely , an apple is not a sensible quality. It is not identical with a certain color, or with a certain shape, or with a certain taste. It is not even identical with the property of being an apple. This leaves us with the possi­ bility that an apple is a combination of sensible proper­ ties, or a collection, as Berkeley says in Principles, of such properties. Now, it is important to notice that such a collection must itself be a property if Berkeley's conten­ tion about what we can perceive is to be retained. The only possibility which we have to consider in the present context therefore is that perceptual objects are complex properties. Are they? Once again, the answer is obvious. An apple could not possibly be a complex property; for while it always makes sense to ask what a giv en property is a property of, it makes no sense to ask what an apple is of. Or, as Cook Wilson puts it, "' attribute ' is necessarily ' attribute .Qi' something, and presupposes that of which it is attribute." (J. C. Wilson, 1 926, vol. 1, p. 154.) Most succinctly, every property is exemplified by something, while an apple is not exemplified by anything. Such is the ontological difference between properties, on the one hand, and individual things like apples, on the other. It may be replied that we must distinguish between two kinds of property, those that are exemplified and those that are not. But this distinction will not do. A property is the kind of entity that is exemplified; anything that is not exemplified cannot be a property. Thus we cannot here be talking about t wo kinds of property, but must be dealing with properties, on the one hand, and with some sort of

58

The Cate go rie s o f the Wo rl d

entity other than property, on the other. As far as I can see, there is only one way of avoiding this concl usion. One could hold, with Bradley and Bosanquet, that such things as apples are really (complex) properties of the on l y true individual, namely, the absolute. And there is the further problem that, whi l e a complex property, though it consists of properties, does not have the properties of which it consists, an apple has these properties. Let us assume, for the sake of the argu ment, that a particular apple is red. Then this apple has this color, but the complex property of which the color is a part does not have this property; it is not red. It follows that the apple cannot be identical with the complex property. An apple, then, is neither identica l with a color, or a shape, etc.; nor is it identical with a complex property consisting of color, shape, etc. Hence Berkeley is mistaken when he claims that we can perceive only properties. Let us summarize the conclusions of our discussion of the epistemological attack on particulars. Particulars, it has often been said, cannot be known. In order to evaluate this claim, we distinguished between three inter p retations of what it means to be known. We ackno wledge, . against Descartes, that particulars cannot be known in the sense of being recognized as such. But we insisted that they can be known in two other way s. One can kno w what the y are; one can know their properties. And one can also kno w them in the sense of perceive (or experience) them. In these two latter respects, particu l ars are not any different from properties. But we must also emphasize that there is an epistemological feature which sharply separates particulars from attributes. Particulars, in distinction to attributes, are not recognizable. (Compare E.B. Allarie, 1963.) (24) Particulars, contrary to Leibniz, do not contain their properties. The modern onto l ogica l attack on particulars re volves around the nature of predication. Berkeley asks, rhetori­ ca l ly , what we cou l d possib l y mean by say ing that a sub­ stance supports its accidents and goes on to claim, in the first edition of the Principles (sec. 16) , that he, for his part, is "not able to discover any sense at all that can be applicab l e to it." Berkeley thus raises ane w the very question which so vexed, as we sha l l see, the ancients, name l y , the question of what kind of relation conne cts an individual with its properties. But this time, Leibniz has an answer:

Individuals

59

We must consider, then, what it means to be tru l y attributed to a certain subj ect. Now it is certain that every true predication has some basis in the nature of things, and when a proposition is not an identity, that is to say, when the predication is not express ly contained in the subj ect, it must be included in it virtual ly. This is what the philo­ sophers cal l in-esse, when they say that the predi­ cate is in the sub j ect. So the subject term must a l ways inc l ude the predicate term in such a way that anyone who understands perfect ly the concept of subject wil l also know that the predicate per­ t ains to it. (Discourse on M e t a p hysics, in P hi l osophica l P apers and Letters, vo l. 1, p p. 47147 4. ) Fina l l y , I have given a decisive reason, which I be lieve has the force of demonstration. It is that a l ways, in every true affirmative proposition, whether necessary or contingent, universal or par­ ticu lar, the notion of the predicate is in some way included in that of the subj ect. Praedicatum inest sub j ecto. Otherwise I do not know what truth 1.s. (Correspondence with Arnauld, ibid. p. 517.) Leibniz speaks here of the predicate as being included 1.n and contained in the subj ect. I take this to mean that he has some kind of part-whole re lation in mind. He seems to be saying that he can make no sense--no ontological sense-­ of the concept of truth, un less he assumes that the rel ation between predicate and sub j ect of a true proposition is a part-whole re lation. This kind of exp lication of predica­ tion, and this is the point of our historica l excursion, imp lies the rej ection of an ontology of particu lars in favor of comp l exes. Leibniz, we must note, ta l ks about subj ect and predicate terms and concepts rather than individua l things and their prop erties, and we cannot simp l y assu me that the subj ect of a singu lar proposition is the individual thing we have talked about. But there is some evidence that Leibniz thought of an individua l as being composed of an individual concept and existence. And this means, roughly, that an individual is composed of properties p lus the fea­ ture of existence. From a structura l point of view, there is the argu ment that one cannot make sense of predication un l ess one con­ ceives of the copula as representing a whole-part re lation between an individua l thing and one of its prop erties. If t his is tr u e , t he n it fo l l o ws, o f c o u rse , t hat the

60

Th e Ca tego r i es of the Wo r l d

individual must be a complex of properties. The proponent of particulars has to claim, in response, that one can make sense of predication even if one assumes that it is not a whole-part relation. And, indeed, this is precisely our contention. The nexus of exemplification, though it is not a whole-part relation, grounds the truth of singular affirm­ ative propositions (sentences) . There is a relation between an individual and the properties it has. Otherwise, I grant, I too would not know what truth is. But I fail to see that this relation must be a whole-part relation. However, in order to come truly to grips with the issue of predication, we must take into account that the tradition distinguishes between essential predication, on the one hand, and accidental predication, on the other. Socrates, for example, is said to be a human being essentially and to have merely accidentally the characteristic of having a snub nose . It is part of the pre-philosop hic intuition, which allegedly leads to this division, that the essential proper­ ties of an individual are most intimately connected with it while the accidental properties are merely externally at­ tached to it. And it is one of the most fundamental prob­ lems of the tradition to explicate this distinctio�. I think that one may look at Leibniz's v i e w as an attempt to explicate predication so as to do justice to the intimacy between subject and essential predicate. What, indeed, could be more intimate than the p artial identity which is implied by a part- whole relation? An essential property, according to this conception, is a part of what it is a prop erty of. However, since Leibniz cannot make sense of any other kind of predication, his vie w leads to the de­ struction of the traditional distinction. All properties, not just essential ones, are parts of the individuals which have them. All predication, not just essential predication, turns out to be analytic, as it has been alleged. · All properties, even accidental ones, turn out to be essential. We s hall return to this topic later when we discuss the short-comings of the bundle v i e w . For now , let us briefly compare the effect of Leibniz' s explication of predication on the traditional distinction with the effect of our own in terms of the nexus of exemplification. While Leibniz's part-whole relation may serve as a para­ digm for essential predication, the nexus of exemplification may serve as a paradigm for accidental predication. Accord­ ing to the tradition, an accident is merely externally connected with its subject. An individual thing, with all of its properties, resembles a pin cushion, as one of my colleagues immersed in mediaeval philosophy is fond of pic­ turing it. The essential properties of the individual are

Ind ividuals

61

p art of the intern al structure of the cu shion, while the acciden t al p ropertie s are pin s, stuck into the cu shi on. Thi s picture doe s ju stice, in a rough and ready way, to our notion of the nexu s of exemplification, except that we hold that all propertie s are like the pin s of our ex ample. Thu s all propertie s, not ju st accidental one s, are merely exter­ n ally rel ated to thei r sub ject. All p redic ation, n ot ju st accidental predication turn s out to be synthetic. All prop­ ertie s, even allegedly e s sential one s, turn out to be acci­ dental. Of cour se, the se pronouncement s mu st be taken with a grain of salt. They are made for the sake of empha si s and do not per spicuou sly reflect our view in detail. But it i s quite liter ally true, at an y r ate, t h at the tr aditi on al di stinction between e s senti al and accident al p ropertie s di s appear s on our view just as readily a s on Leibniz' s. Ou r view t h at individu al thing s are p articul ar s (sub­ st ance s ) h a s f allen int o di srepute du ring the l a st three hundred year s. Two philo sophical theme s, a s we have seen, are in the main re spon sible for thi s turn of event s. There i s, fir stly, a clu ster of argument s which purport s to show that, if there were particular s, we could not know them. I have tried to show that the se argument s are not convincing. There i s, secondly, the idea that the ontological ground of true predication c annot con si st of anything else but a p art­ whole relation. I have propo sed that it may con si st of the nex u s of exemplific ation. Next, we sh all con sider the altern ative view that individu al s are bundle s of propertie s. II.

CATEG ORI ZE D AS BUNDLE S OF PROPERTI E S

(25 ) A so-called bundle i s � structure con si sting of propertie s in an a s sociation relation Berkele y , we rec all, thin k s of perceptu al ob ject s a s bundle s, combin ation s, or collection s of sen sible p r oper­ tie s. But he never tells u s what a bundle, combination, or collection i s. He never expl ain s to w h at c ateg ory a bundle belong s. However, thi s p roblem i s an extremely p re s sing one. For if a bundle of propertie s c annot be a property, a s w e argued e a rlier, then it c annot be true th at all we per­ ceive are (sen sible ) p ropertie s. An apple i s perceived, e ven though it i s, n ot a p ropert y, but a bundle of proper­ tie s. It i s one of the mo st baffling fact s of modern philo sophy that neither Berkeley nor any one of hi s immediate follower s add re s sed him self explicitly and at length to the obvi ou s qu e stion of whether or n ot bundle s form an i rreducible c ateg or y ; a c ateg o r y which merely sub stitute s in the

62

The Cate go r ie s o f the Wo rl d

Berke l eyan tradition f or the category o f substance as it occurs in the Cartesian schoo l. This question is eventual ly taken up by Brentano and his students. Meinong discovers so-ca l l ed objects of higher order. His student Ehren f e l s becomes the father o f Gesta lt psychology. Husser l writes an investigation on the theory of who les and parts. Twardowski precedes him by ana ly zing the constituents o f ideas and their objects. And this Brentano-inspired investigation cu lminates in Lesniewski's mereo logy. But let us leave the historical context and turn to the systematic questions. It is c l ear, to begin with, that a bund l e o f properties cannot be a mere class of properties. The word ' bund le ' (or ' co l lection' , ' comp l ex ' , ' combination ') , as it is used to categorize individua l things, cannot be synonymous with the term 'class' ('set') . Since there exist the four properties round, square, red, and green, there exists a l so the c l ass consisting o f these f our properties. But there exists no bundle, no individual thing, with these four properties as its parts. Obvious ly, the properties which are thought to form an individual are somehow associated with each other. I f and on l y i f round and red are so associated with each other, then there exists a round and red individµ a l . But since the four properties just mentioned are not associated with each other, there exists no corresponding individual. C onsiderations of this kind l ead to the view that bund l es are structures consisting of properties in association. It l eads to the view that individu a l s be l ong to the gener a l category of structure. Structures, as we sha l l see in great detai l l ater, are comp l ex entities just l ike c l asses and f acts. But they dif fer from c lasses in that classes are identical if their members are identical while two structures are identical if and on l y if, not on l y the ir non-re l ationa l parts , are identical, but these parts also stand in the same re l ations to each ot her. Structures, to shed some more pre l iminary l ight on this notion, are the kind of entity which are isomorphic to each other. So-ca l l ed ordered sets are, in our termino l ogy, structures. And so are a l gebraic rings, lattices, etc. But the particu lar kind of structure we are interested in, what I cal l for short "a bundle, " consists o f properties in the association re lation with each other. The question be f ore us is, not whether or not there are structures, but whether or not indiv idu a l things are This, in my opinion, is the most reasonab l e bund l es. interpretation of the question which arises in the wake of Berke l e y ' s contention that "a certain co l or, taste, sme l l , figure, and consistence having been observed to go together,

Ind ivi duals

63

are accounted one distinct thing signified by the name apple." (Principles, sec. 1.) (26)

.li

this association relation has two places , then there must also exist "combinations" of properties

Assume that the apple A has an indefinite number of properties R i , R2 , • • • , Rn · According to the assay of individuals under discussion, it is a fact that the n-place association relation holds b e t w e e n these prope rties: As s(R 1 , R2 , • • • , Rn) . Since the re 1 at ion holds bet ween these properties, there exists an individual thing consist­ ing of these properties in that relation. Let us abbreviate ' the bund 1e cons is t in g o f R 1 , R2 , • • • , Rn in the asso ci a t ion r e 1at ion ' by ' ' • In add it ion , the r e is a second relation, a part-whole relation, which obtains be t we en a pr op er t y , say R1 , and the bun d 1e � they appear before the mind, but they do n ot have the se propertie s si mpliciter . And thi s mean s nothing el se but that we conceive there to be certain ob­ ject s, even though they do n ot e xi st, and that we conceive of them a s having certain propert ie s, even thou gh they do not have the se propertie s. That thi s i s the correct way of looking at the matter become s clear a s soon a s we a sk Meinong what specific prop­ ertie s certain n one xi stent ob ject s are suppo sed to have . Why i s the golden mountain suppo sed to be golden rather than silver, why i s Hamlet suppo sed to be indeci sive rather than deci sive, w hy i s the round s quare suppo sed to be roun d rather than triangular ? Here i s Meinon g ' s an swer: I can make up a de sk in my i magination w hich ha s the mo st out standing feature s and which doe s not

4 10

Abou t t he Na ture o f Exis tence

ex ist any where in the world. I f I do not include in my thought any cost of its product ion, then there is no just ification for attr ibut ing this cost to it, while in a real case nothing would depend on whether or not I had thought of the cost, s i nce it would not be missing anyway. (A. Meinong, 1907, p. 46.) The imag ined desk, it is clear, is supposed to have all and only those properties which Meinong imagines it to have. (And also some properties, we must add, which it must have, if it bas the ones Me i nong imag i nes it to have.) Thus we can and must d i st i ngu ish between the propert ies wh ich the desk is imagined to have and the propert ies which are left out. But this d i st inct ion does not allow us to i nfer that the desk really has the former. We can only i nfer that it is i mag ined !_Q_ have the former. While Me i nong m i stakenly holds that merely imag ined things have propert ies, I insist that merely imag i ned th i ngs are merely imag i ned to have properties. There is another reason, I believe, for Me inong's propos­ ing the thes is. He thinks of i nd i v i dual things as bundles of properties. That a certain individual has the property I., becomes the fact that it contains I. as a part. Exempli­ fication, as I argued earlier, is mistaken for a part-whole relat i on. Th is m i stake i nv i tes another one. It i s very easy to confuse the part-whole relat ion which does the duty of exempl i f i cat ion w i th an ent irely d i fferent part-whole relat ion, namely, the one that obta i ns between a property and the complex property of which it is a part. I t is therefore easy to confuse a co mplex of propert ies w i th a complex property. I f one does confuse these two q u i te d i ff erent relat i ons w i th each other, then one may co me to believe that the golden mountain must be golden because . the complex property of be ing a golden mounta i n cons ists, in part, of the property of be ing golden. One may reason, in other words, that since a golden mounta in would be golden, it is golden. But wh ile we have to agree that a golden mounta in would have to be golden, the golden mounta in is not golden, for there is no such thing. Me inong is not sat isfied with this answer. What happens if there are no golden mountains, he asks, are they then not golden? And if they are not golden, is it then not true, after all, that they have the property of be ing not golden? No, it is not true. A nonexistent golden mountain does not have the property of being not golden. It is of the essence of our v i e w that th is object ne i ther has the property of be ing golden nor has the property of being not golden.

Exi stence as the Substr atum o f the Wo rl d

411

However, Meinong per sist s : But would n ot some one who a s sert s thi s be in a po sition similar to that of the ab solute skeptic? Would he not ha ve attributed to the nonexi stent triangle at lea st this much, namely, that nothing can be attributed to it ? Furthe r m ore, can one really deny that the nonexi stent triangle is trian­ gular? And who could then draw more than an arbi­ trary line in regard to the po s sibility of further ju stified attribution s ? (Ibid., 45.) Meinong thu s ob ject s, fir stly, that we are a s serting some­ thin g about the nonexi stent trian gle when we say that no­ thing can be a s serted about it. But there is no contradic­ tion. To say that nonexi stent object s have no propertie s is not to attribute to them the property of not having proper­ tie s. There is no such property. What we a s sert is simply that nonexi stent ob ject s are such that there is no property which they ha ve. In re gard to M einon g ' s second point, we repeat what we said a moment ago: The nonexi stent triangle i s neither trian gular nor i s it non-triangular. Meinong ' s la st que stion, therefore, doe s not arise. Since the nonex­ istent triangle ha s no propertie s whatsoever, no line can be drawn between the propertie s which it ha s and the propertie s which it doe s not have. To su m up, there are at lea st thre e thing s true of the golden mountain. Fir stly, it i s true that it i s conceived of as being golden. Secondly, it is true that if there were such a thing a s the co mplex property of bein g a golden mountain, t hen it would in part con si st of the property of being golden. And, thirdly, it is true, therefore, that if there were such an entity as the golden mountain, it would be golden. But none of the se three truth s implie s that the golden mountain is golden. (189) Nonexistent individuals are not con stituent s of fact s M einong hold s, not only that the golden mountain i s golden, but also that it i s a part o f man y fact s. But he doe s not conclude, a s the early Ru s sell doe s, that the golden mountain mu st therefore have so me kind of being. Rather, he embrace s the other horn of the dilemma, namely, the con sequence that the part-whole relation in que stion is abnormal and, hence, can hold between a nonexi stent golden mountain and a sub si stent fact. Ru s sell' s theory of de­ scription s, a s we have noted, wa s de signed to offer an e scape from the se two horn s. According to this theory, we

4 12

Ab o u t t h e N a t u re o f E xi s t en c e

need t o e mbrace neither the being of the g olden mounta in, nor the bein g of abnormal relati ons, beca use the g olden mountain is si mply not a part of any fact. In particular, it is n ot a part of the fact that the g olden mountain does not exist. This fact, according to Russell, is of the form : It is not the case t hat t here is precisely one thing w hich is � g� ��a� Therefore, it doe s not conta in the g olden mountain, although it contains the properties of being golden and of being a mountain. Russell's point, in a nutshell, is that the fact that the golden mountain does not e xist is not of the for m A does not e xist, where A is the g olden mountain. Si milarly, the sentence 'Ghosts do n ot e xist ' represents a fact, not of the for m A ' s do not e xist, No e xistents are w here A's are ghosts, but of the form: ghosts. And this fact does not contain ghosts, but only the property of being a ghost. (This property eventually disap­ pears, too, too, under further analysis in favor of several actually exemplified properties.) The question before us is this: Do the facts just men ­ tioned contain the golden mountain and ghosts, respectiv ely, as Meinong maintains, or do they not contain these ob jects, I t h ink t ha t Ru s s e 1 1 i s ri g.h t , an d I a s Ru s s e 1 1 ho 1 d s ? shall defend his view against an objection by Meinong and a similar objection by Findlay. Meinong argues that if on one occasion someone thinks about ghosts and denies their e xi stence, and on another occasi on thinks about s o mething actual, whethe r this be vaguely or precisely determined, and recogni zes that such an ob ject is not a g host , he is in each case thinking two totally different thoug hts. (Ibid. , p. 39.) I think that Meinong 's point against Russell is clear. The sentence 'Ghosts do not e xi st ' can be used to rep resent a fact other than the "Russellian " fact N o e xistent s are ghosts ; and this other fact contains ghos � But Meinong's argument for the existence of this second fact is not clear. Meinong seems to be saying that Russell's fact is such that if one thinks of it, then one thinks of an e xisting t hing, be it vaguely or precisely deter mined, that it is not a ghost. And since this is not what one thinks of when one thinks the fact that ghosts do not exist, he concludes that there must be thi s ot her fact which contains ghost s. But If you M einong 's claim seems to be quite clearly false. think that no e xi stent (no ent ity, no actual indi vidual, etc.) i s a ghost, you do n ot thin k of any p articular

Exis tence as the Subs tr a t wn o f the Worl d

413

exis ten t . You do no t t hi nk, for exa mple, of t he chair before you an d ju dge t ha t i t is no t a g hos t . Nor do you asser t tha t some par ticular chair or ano t her is no t a ghos t . When we ju dge that all men are mor tal, as Frege once pu t it , we do no t t hink of so me obscure tribal chief in so me far­ aw ay coun try . Quan tifica tio n is no t to be u n ders t oo d i n t his fashion . The generality in tro duce d by quantifiers an d proper ties is no t due to some kin d of "in dis tinc t co ncep ­ tion" of par ticular en ti ties . T he sa me ob jec tio n can be raise d, I t hink, agai ns t Fi n dlay 's cri ticis m of Russell 's a nalysis . Assu me t ha t so meone wis hes for t he p hilosop her ' s s t one . If Russell 's analysis were correc t, so Fin dlay claims, then this person would really be wishing t ha t one or the other of the exis t­ ing t hing s in t he u niverse s houl d possess t he proper ty of being a philosop her 's stone . Bu t i t i s perfec tly clear t ha t t he man mig h t wis h not hing of t he kind . He might be perfec tly sa tis­ fie d wi t h all t he ob jec ts in t he universe, an d according to the theory, these are all the ob jec ts wi t h w hic h we are concerne d . Bu t he mig h t wis h, no t t ha t any of the ob jec ts in exis tence should be o t her t han it is, bu t tha t some o t her ob jec t, some ob jec t not comprised among the objec ts of our uni­ verse, bu t whose na ture is never t heless de termina te in various ways, s houl d be co mprise d in t ha t u ni­ verse, t ha t is, s houl d exis t . (J . N . Fin dlay, 1963, p . 53.) Le t us ass u me, in accor dance wi t h our assu mp tion abou t the proposi tional na ture of men tal ac ts, t ha t the intention of a wis h is a s ta te of affairs, so t ha t a wis h is fulfill­ ed, perhaps unknown to the wisher, if that s ta te of affairs ob t ai ns . Accor di ng t o a Russellian, Fi n dlay 's man wis hes t ha t some e n ti ty be a p hilosop her's s t one . Pu t s til te dly, he wishes t ha t t he s ta te of affairs Some en tity is � philo­ sopher's s tone ob taine d . Fin dlay claims t ha t t his cannot be t he s ta t e of affairs wis he d for, since t he man does no t t hink of exis ting t hings, bu t t hinks instea d of nonexis ting t hi ngs of a cer t ain sor t . And Fin dlay see ms to be arguing t ha t t his cannot be the correc t s ta te of affairs because i t amounts to wishing t ha t some exis ten t were o t her t han it is. Bu t t his las t claim is dubious. To wish tha t some entity be t he p hilosop her 's s t one is no t to wis h t ha t so me en t i ty be o t her t ha n i t is. I t is to wis h, ra t her, t ha t a mong t he exis ten ts t here be a p hilosop her's s tone. This wish would be sa t isfie d if i t were a fac t t ha t � e n t i ty � �

4 14

Abo ut t he N a ture o f Exis tence

philosopher ' s stone. For the w i sh to be fulf illed, it is not necessary that it be a fact that some ent i ty has propert ies other than the ones it has. (190) There are two kinds of negative ex istence facts But even if Me i nong's and F indlay' s concept ion of the Russellian state of affairs is mistaken, there remains the content ion that it is not th is state of affa irs wh i ch one wishes for when one wishes that there were a philosopher's stone. Or, to return to our or iginal example, there remains Meinong's claim that the state of affairs The golden moun­ not exist is not the same as the Russellian state tain -does --of affairs It is not the case that prec isely one ent ity is a golden mountain. Is th is claim correct? We saw earlier that the quant ifier the d iffers from the quant ifiers all and some in several important respects. For example, the definite art i cle can gra mmat ically not occur alone, but only in conne ct ion w i th some such word as ' whi ch', so that we cannot say ' The ent ity is I' (or ' The ent ity is not I') , even though we do have express i ons l ike ' All ent it ies are F'. It is essent i al for a de s cr ipt i on expression to single out an entity by describing it, � that someth ing else can be said about i!_. It is not the sole funct ion of the def i n i te art i cle to i nd i cate un i q ueness; that can be done by the nu mer i cal q uant i f i er express i on ' one ' in such phrases as ' One ent ity is I' · The state of affairs represented by ' The I ex ists', therefore, cannot be represented by ' The ent ity is I' , for the latter makes no sense. What, then, is the structure of the state of affairs represented by ' The I ex ists'? Obviously, if we wish to deny that precisely one thing is I, we can do so by say ing ' It is not the case that prec i sely one ent ity is I' · If we want to deny that some entity is F, we can say ' No ent i ty is I' · No w, if on a certain occas i on someone den ies the existence of the golden mounta in, he may well have either one of these two thoughts in mind. He may mean to deny that there is prec isely one ent ity wh i ch is a golden mountain; perhaps, because he believes that there are at least three such mounta i ns; or he may mean to deny the ex i stence of any golden mounta i n. But I bel ieve, and this is the cruc ial po int I w i sh to make, that he may also mean something quite d ifferent. By saying ' The golden mountain does not ex ist' (or by say ing ' The golden mounta i n ex i sts') he may be describ ing somethi ng in order to say of that someth i ng that it does not ex ist (or that it does ex i st) , just as if he were descr i b i ng someth i ng i n order to say of it that it is not a mounta i n, or that it is bald. If th is

Exis te nce as the Subs t r a t um o f the Wo rld

41 5

i s so, then M einong may be vi ndica ted. There exi s t then s ta te s of affair s which do no t fi t the two Ru s sellian po s si­ bili tie s ju s t men ti oned and which are repre sen t ed by sen ­ tence s li ke ' The I. e xi s t s ' and ' The I. doe s no t e xi s t '. However, there i s a problem wi th thi s a t temp t to vindi­ ca te M einong. If we de scribe some thing in term s of the "ordi nary proper ty" I. and then a s ser t of it tha t it doe s or doe s n o t e xi s t, one of tw o thing s i s bound to happen. We are ei ther saying some thing true bu t uninforma tive, or else some t hing fal se and con tradic t ory. Thi s follow s from the fac t tha t if so me thing ha s the proper ty I., then i t exi s t s wi th on t ological nece s si ty. Thu s to say tha t the g olden moun tain doe s no t exi s t turn s ou t to be con tradic tory ra ther t han true. To say tha t i t e xi s t s turn s ou t to be trivially true ra ther than fal se. To say of the birthplace of Mozar t tha t i t doe s not exi st turn s ou t to be con tradic tory ra ther than merely fal se, and to say of i t tha t i t doe s exi s t turn s ou t to be trivially true ra ther than informa tively true. To e scape fro m thi s unde si rable re sul t, we mu s t find a way of de scribing some thing wi thou t implying tha t i t ha s a proper ty. We mu s t pick ou t an object, no t by a t tribu ting to i t the p roper ty I., bu t in so me o ther way. Thi s can ea sily be done. We can alway s de scribe a thing, no t in term s of the propertie s which it ha s, bu t in terms of the propertie s whi ch i t i s suppo sed (t hough t, i magined, e tc.) t o have. Thu s we may wi sh to a s sert tha t the object commonly though t t o be a g olden moun t ain doe s no t exi s t. Here there i s no con tradic ti on. Nor are we u t tering a mere t rui sm ; for whe ther or no t an object which is imagined to have certain propertie s really exi st s may be an open que stion. Further­ more, if someone a s ser t s tha t the person who i s believed to be the au thor of Waverley doe s n o t e xi s t, then he say s some thing tha t i s fal se, bu t no t con tradic tory. And so on. My con ten ti on, then, i s tha t a sen tence li ke ' The I. e xi s t s ' may so me ti me s be u sed t o repre sen t a fac t of the form The ob jec t though t !..Q. be I. exi s t s, and tha t a sen tence like ' The I. doe s n o t e xi s t ' may be u sed t o repre sen t a fac t of the form The ob jec t though t !..Q. be F doe s no t exi s t. Wha t a given per son preci sely mean s by wha t he say s on a given occa sion i s far from clear, even to him, when we apply philo sophi cal s tandard s. I shall therefore no t specula te abou t wha t Meinong may have had in mind when he talked abou t t he s ta t e of affai r s repre sen t ed by ' The g olden moun t ain d oe s n o t e xi s t '. B u t if wha t I have said i s correc t, then we can di stingui sh be tween three differen t sta te s of affairs tha t may be a s socia ted wi th thi s u t terance. Fir s tly, there i s t he fac t : There ll n o such en ti t y (t hing) fil � golden moun tain or No en ti ty i s i! golden moun tain. Secondly, there

416

About the N a ture o f the Wo rld

1. s the ne gation of the Ru s sellian rendition of The golden mountain exi st s, namely, ...!.! i s not the ca se that preci sely one entity i s i!. golden mountain. And, finally, there i s the fact : The o b ject thought !_Q � i!. golden mountain doe s not exi st. It i s clear that the context of the utterance deter­ mine s which state of affair s may be meant. Ordinarily, I should think, the fir st fact w ould be meant. The second come s into play, if more than one thing i s believed to be a golden mountain ; and the third fact, when the object who se exi stence i s denied i s taken from a specific context . What i s true of the golden mountain al so hold s for gho st s. The sentence 'Gho st s do n ot exi st ' may be u sed to mean one of two thin g s. It may be u sed to mean that no entity i s a gho st, or may be u sed to mean so methin g of the following sort : object s believed to be gho st s do not exi st. Thu s there are b a sically two different way s in which we can deny the exi stence of so methi n g. We can either point out that no exi stent i s of the sort in que sti on, or el se we can a s sert that object s believed to be of a certain kind do not exi st, that i s, are not exi stent s. In ei ther ca se, t he object whose exi stence i s denied i s not a con stituent of the fact. I n thi s re gard, a s I mentioned earlier, I side with Ru s sell rathe r than M einon g. But , then, it mu s t al so be pointed out once more that in the end we cannot e scape from Meinong's conclu sion that nonexi stent object s can be con sti­ tuent s of fact s ; for we are forced to adm it that nonexi stent state s of affair s can be con stituent s of co mplex fact s.

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